Addis Ababa University

School of Graduate Studies

College of Social Sciences

Department of Political Science and International Relations

Multiculturalism in Amhara National Regional State, Ethiopia: Practices and Challenges

By: Tadessse Aklog Legesse

November, 2020

Addis Ababa University

Addis Ababa University

School of Graduate Studies

College of Social Sciences

Department of Political Science and International Relations

PhD Dissertation in Political Science

On

Multiculturalism in Amhara National Regional State, Ethiopia: Practices and Challenges

Supervisor

Associate professor Tarekegn Adebo, PhD

By: Tadessse Aklog Legesse

tadkl2015@gmail.com

November, 2020

Addis Ababa University

Addis Ababa University
School of Graduate Studies

This is to certify that the Dissertation prepared by Tadesse Aklog Legesse, entitled

Multiculturalism in Amhara National Regional State, Ethiopia: Practices and Challenges

and submitted in Partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of philosophy in Political Science complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

Approved by Board of Examiners:

Associate Professor Tarekegn Adebo

Supervisor _____Sig_____Date_____

Internal Examiner_____Sig_____Date_____

External Examiner_____Sig_____Date_____

Chair Person _____Sig_____Date_____

Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for any degree in any other University, and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duully acknowledged.

Name: Tadesse Aklog Legesse

Signature: _____

Place: Addis Ababa

Date of Submission: November, 2020

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I thank to God who gives me time, love, and privilege to finish such a long journey. Next to God, my special thanks go to Associate Professor Tarekegn Adebo –My late supervisor -without his guidance and support the completion of this research project would have been possible. Regrettably, Dr Tarekegn passed away without seeing the completion of this project. May his soul rest in peace!

I would like to express my gratitude to the Department of Political Science and International Relations, especially to the Chairman, and the Doctoral Program Coordinator, and the academic staffs for their patience, support and encouragement so that the work could be completed. I particularly would like to thank the ad-hoc committee that the department established to help the completion of the project. I am grateful to the members of the committee, Dr. YacobArsano and Dr. Asnake Kefale who gave me feedback and ideas to improve the manuscript.

I extend my heartfelt thanks to my friend Dr. Belachew Getinet for his unreserved and sustained support that had been crucial for the advancement of my research skill in the area of quantitative research.

I warmly acknowledge the support of my former students in the in-Service training program of the Bahir Dar University during the fieldwork. I am also grateful to my informants in the study areas who shared their experiences generously.

Finally, but most importantly, my heartfelt gratitude goes to my family, especially my beloved wife, Gizework Melkamu, and our beloved daughters, Dagi (Yehuana) Tadesse and Maya Tadesse. It is your generous love that makes my life hopeful and meaningful.

Contents

Acknowledgements v
Abstract xii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1
1.1. Background of the Study 1
1.2. Statement of the Problem 4
1.3. Objective of the Study 6
1.4. Research Questions 6
1.5. Core Argument of the Study 7
1.6. Significance of the Study 7
1.7. The Scope of the Study 8
1.8. Limitation of the Study 9
1.9. Organization of the Study 9
CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAME WORK, THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EMPERICAL REVIEW OF RELATED LITRATURE 11
2.1. Clarification of Concepts 11
2.1.1. Essence of Multiculturalism 11
2.1.2. Majority, Minority and Internal Minority Groups 17
2.1.3. Ethnic Group, 'Nation', 'Nationality' and Nationalism 19
2.2. Contending Normative Perspectives on Multiculturalism 23
2.2.1. The Communitarian-Multiculturalim 24
2.2.2. The Liberal- Multiculturalism 26
2.2.3. Deliberative-Multiculturalism 29
2.2.4. The Leninist-Stalinist Approach to Multiculturalism 30
2.3. Institutional Approaches to Multiculturalism 34
2.3.1. Autonomy 35
2.3.2. Language usage for the Minority groups 45
2.4. Empirical Review of Related Literature 47
2.4.1. An Overview of Multicultural Orientations among Majority and Minority Groups 47
2.4.2. Institutional Accommodation of Diversity in the post-1991 Ethiopia 51
2.5. Conceptual Framework of the Study 67
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 69
1.1. The Study Area 69

1.1. Philosophical Foundations of the Research and the Research Design 74
1.1. Sampling Processes 76
3.4. Sources and Methods of Data Collection 78
3.4.1. . Sources of Data 78
3.4.2. Method of Data Collection 79
3.5. Validity and Reliability 81
3.6. Method of Data Analysis 84
3.7. Research Ethics 86
CHAPTER FOUR: STATE-BUILDING, NATION-BUILDING AND THE NATIONALITY QUESTION IN ETHIOPIA. 88
4.1. State- Building Process in Ethiopia 88
4.2. Nation-Building Process 92
4.2.1. Assimilation 94
4.2.2. Centralism 95
4.3. The Nationality Question' in Ethiopia 98
4.4. The Response of the Military Government to the Nationality Question 101
CHAPTER FIVE: THE HISTORY OF THE AMHARA REGION 104
5.1. Historical of Genesis of the Amhara Region during the Pre-1991 Era. 104
5.1.1. The Amhara Adminstrative Areas during the 1930s 105
5.1.2. The Amhara Region during the Colonial Times, 1935-41 107
5.1.3. Amhara Provinces in the Post Liberation Period 109
5.2. The Transitional Government and Political Developments, 1991-1994 113
5.2.1 The Transitional Charter and Transitional Government 114
5.2.2. The Formation of Amhara Region and the Territorial Surgery. 115
5.2.3. Political Participation and Elections during the Transitional Era 118
5.2.3.1. The 1992 Regional Elections 119
5.2.3.2. The 1994 Election for Constitutional Assembly 120
5.3. Elections Results and Implications in the Post- Transitional Era, 1995-2015 122
5.3.1. The 1995 and 2000 Elections 123
5.3.2. The 2005 Election 123
5.3.3. The Repercussion of the 2005 Election: The Politics of Census 125
5.3.4. The 2010 and the 2015 Election 128
CHAPTER SIX: NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF MULTICULTURALISM 130
6.1. Recognition of Ethnic Diversity 130
6.2. Ideology 136

6.2.1. The Stalinist –Leninist Approach 136
6.2.1.1. The Thesis of National Oppression 137
6.2.1.2. The Essence of Nation and Nationalities 145
6.2.3. Communitarianism 149
6.3. Summary 154
CHAPTER SEVEN: INSTITUTINAL ACCOMODATION AND CHALLENGES. 156
7.1. Representation of the Majority and Minority in Region wide institution 156
7.1.1. Representation in the Regional Council 158
7.1.2. Participation of Groups in Political Party 163
7.1.3. Media 168
7.2. Titular Autonomy 173
7.2.1. The Structure of 'Nationality' Zones: 173
7.2.2. The Structure of *Liyu Wereda:* The Case of *Argoba* Wereda 175
7.3. Challenges on Internal Minorities 179
7.3.1. Decline in the Size of the Internal Minorities 179
7.3.2. Challenges of Segregation at Schools 182
7.3.3. Preferential Treatments in the Bureaucracy 184
7.4. Summary 188
CHAPTER EIGHT: MULTICULTURAL ORIENTATION OF MAJORITY Vs MINORITY 194
8.1. Profile of the Respondents of the Survey 194
8.1.1. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents 194
8.1.2. Socio-Economic Characteristics of Respondents 196
8.2. Groups' Orientation to Multiculturalism 198
8.2.1. Orientations of the Majority Vs the Minority 198
8.2.2. Women and Multicultural Attitudes 201
8.3. Factors for the Prevalence of the Gap in Multicultural Orientation 202
8.3.1. The Cultural Thesis 202
8.3.2. The Normative (Ideological) Factor: The national oppression thesis 203
8.3.3. The Politics of Redistribution 206
8.4. Summary 209
CHAPTER NINE： CONCLUSION 211
APPENDICES 250
Appendix - 1. : Ghizats (Administrative Regions of The Ethiopian Empire in Early 1930S before the Italian invasion. 250
Appendix -2. : Teklay Ghizat/Province and Awraja(sub-province) in 1970s 250

Appendix 3: Autonomous and Administrative Regions of Ethiopia in late 1980s 251
Appendix-4: The List of Ethnic Groups, and Their Self Government Status During the TGE..... 252
Appendix-5: Survey Questionnaires 253
Appendix 6: Focus group Discussion Checklists..... 259
Appendix -7: Checklist for Key Informants. 260
Appendix-8 : Lawshe's Content Validity Index 261

List of Tables

Table 1: Distribution of Ethnic Groups (NNPs) at HoF, 2010-2015 Term 57
Table 2:. Distribution of Multi level Accommodation Across Regional state, Ethiopia 62
Table 3: Distribution of Ethnic Groups in the Region in between 1994 and 2007 by Population 69
Table 4: Distribution of ethnic groups across administrative Zones of Amhra region, 2007 71
Table 5: Distribution of the Councilors by Zone and Sex, 2015-2020 72
Table 6: Distribution of Sample Survey 78
Table 7: The List of Adminstrative provinces among the five geographic locations during the 1930s . 106
Table 8: Lists of Provinces and sub Provinces of the Amhara , 1970s..... 110
Table 9: Selected Administrative Regions Representing Amhara Homelands, 1987. 112
Table 10: Election Result for Constitutional Assembly of Amhara Region, 1994..... 121
Table 11: Election Results and Distribution of Seats of the Regional Council 125
Table 12: Annual population growth rate by region between 1994-2007 126
Table 13: Number of representative in the Regional council 160
Table 14: Representation of Women in the Regional Council by Group Category, (2015 -2020) 162
Table 15: Political Parties and their seats in the Regional Council, 1995-to date (2020) 163
Table 16: Perception of Respondents on the Representativeness of ANDM by Group Category 167
Table 17: Patterns and intended plans of Weekly production of Magazines in Copies from 2014/15-2020/21 Fiscal Years..... 169
Table 18: Weekly Radio Transmission Programsby the Languages of Groups 170
Table 19: Television Broadcast Transmission Programs by the Languages of Groups 171
Table 20: Response of Groups perception on the Freedom of Cultural Expression..... 172
Table 21: Groups' Response Rates of Factors affecting Freedom of Cultural Expression 172
Table 22: Composition of Nationality Council in Three Zones 175
Table 23: Trend of Population Growth within Titular Nationality Zones 1994& 2007 181
Table 24: Training Requirements of Civil Servants in Amhara Region..... 185
Table 25: Per-capita Distribution of man power in Zones, 1992 186
Table 26: percentage Distributions of Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents..... 195
Table 27: Percentage Distributions of Socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents..... 196
Table 28: Result of Group Means..... 199
Table 29: IST test Result..... 201
Table 30: Group Mean Score of Respondents by Sex 201
Table 31: Significance Test Result Among and between Majority and Minority by Sex 202
Table 32: Response on the Perception of Discrimination by Groups in percent 205
Table 33: Perception on the Factors for Discrimination in percent 205

List of Figures

Figure 1 Conceptual Framework of the Study. 68
Figure 2: Map of the Study Area 73
Figure 3: Map of Ethiopia during the Italian Occupation, 1935-41: Italian East Africa 108
Figure 4: Map of Ethiopia in 1974 111
Figure 5: Map of the Adminstrative Regions of Ethiopia in late 1980s 113
Figure 6: Map of Ethiopia in the Post 1991 Ethiopia 117
Figure 7: Bar Charts: percentage distribution of respondents by group category 198
Figure 8: Mean Distribution of Respondents. Source: Computed from the Survey (2016) 199
Figure 9: Group Means by Groups 200
Figure 10: Trends of Capital Budget Allocation per capita, 1994/95-2014/15 207
Figure 11: Trend of per capita Revenue Distribution per capita, 1994/95-2014/15 208

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAPO	All-Amhara People Organization
AGPDP	Agew Peoples Democratic Party
AMA	Amhara Mass Media Agency
ANDM	Amhara National Democratic Movement
ANDO	Argoba Nationality Democratic Organization
ANRS	Amhara National Regional State
APDO	Argoba People Democratic Organization
ARNDM	Argoba Nationality Democratic Movement
BoFED	Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
BoPED	Bureau of Plan and Economic Development
CBCSR	Capacity Building and Civil Service Bureau
CSA	Central Statistics Authority
EBE	Electoral Board of Ethiopia
EDP	Ethiopian Democratic Party
EPDM	Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement
EPRDF	Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
MAS	Multicultural Attitude Scale
PC	Plan Commission
PRO	Public Relation Office
RD	Revolutionary Democracy
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TGR 3	Transitional Government of Region Three

Abstract

After the collapse of the military government by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) dominated Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in May 1991, Ethiopia has entered into a kind of multinational federalization process. Following the enactment of the Federal Democratic Republic Constitution of Ethiopia in 1995, Two City Administrations and Nine regional states, as members of the Federation, were established. The Amhara National Regional state (ANRS) is one of the members of the federation which is multiethnic in its composition. The Regional state adopted ethnic-based decentralization to most of minority ethnic groups from within. That policy scheme could demonstrate an interesting case of multiculturalism from below. Multiculturalism connotes myriad of measures consisting of normative and institutional mechanisms of accommodating diversity. However, the multicultural practices in the region both at region-wide and sub-regional level have not yet been explored by researchers. And hence, this study was intended to examine the narratives, the institutional mechanisms of the accommodation of ethnic diversity, and the orientations of majority and minority groups towards the ideology of multiculturalism in the study area. In this study, it was assumed that the practices of ethnic- based decentralization in the ANRS have been shaped by communitarian cum Stalinist-Leninist version of multiculturalism that dichotomize the difference between the majority and minority groups in a society. In line with this, the researcher argues that the institutionalization of multilevel ethnic federalization process would create inter-group competitions and comparisons which, in turn, may disrupt the fabric of local diversity, crystallizes inter- group attitudinal difference, and induces discriminatory practices in the study area. The data for the study were obtained from a survey of 581 participants *drawn following a multi-stage sampling procedure, focus groups discussions and key informants. Methodologically, this study has been oriented by the pragmatist or realist research foundation whereby both qualitative and quantitative approaches and research strategies were employed. To achieve the objectives of the study, different methods of data analysis were employed. While thematic analysis was employed for qualitative data; An Independent Sample Test (IST) and descriptive statistics were employed as instrument of data analysis for those quantifiable data. The result from the analysis of qualitative data showed that there were normative and different institutional mechanisms of accommodation of ethnic diversity both at region-wide and sub-regional levels of government. The regional Council, the Media and the political party represented important sites of region –wide public spheres which were sensitive to ethnic diversity. Furthermore, titular autonomy and mother tongue education remained the twin policy pillars of accommodation of ethnic diversity at sub-regional level. The result from an independent sample test yielded P- value of 0.004, at 95 % confidence level, which was below 0.05 confirming the hypothesis of the study that there existed significant difference between the majority and minority groups. And hence, it is suggested that inclusive narratives in tandem with measures that reduce the incentive structures and opportunities for segregative practices are more likely to improve such attitudinal gap between the majority and minority groups in the study area.*

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

Despite the ideological claim of 'nation-state' that assumes congruence between a homogenous cultural community with a political community (Gellner, 1983, p.1), there hardly exists a homogenous state in the actual world. In this regard, an empirical research conducted by Nelsson (1985) revealed that out of one hundred sixty four states of the world, none of them were found to be homogeneous (Nelsson, 1985 cited in Rayan, 1990). In a similar fashion Kymilicka and Norman have found that there exist a great deal of minority groups which range from five thousands to eight thousands (5000-8000) within the existing states of the world (2000, p.13).

So, the dictum of nation-state with its underlying assumptions of a homogenous state seems to be more of an ideal, if not a rhetoric, than a reality (Heywood, 2002) as most of the states are diverse and plural in their very nature. While very few states adopt multicultural response to such diversity; many of them have remained "defacto multicultural states", without giving *dejure* recognition to the existing diversity (Bennett, 1998, p.2).

However, the demand for multicultural response to the claims for diversity has attracted policy makers in some countries. Indeed, some of the response of states, though-*context-specific*, include: official recognition of languages , cultural exemption rights, cultural exchange programs, special representation rights and self- government rights (Mahajan, 2002).

In this regard, countries such as Switzerland recognized all of the lanaguges spoken in the country as the official languages (Topperwien, 2008). In India, English, Hindi and Urdu languages have been recognized as the federal level, while more than dozens of other lanaguges have been recognized at sub-national or state level (Bhargava, 2006). In India, an attempt has been made to provide self-government rights to a certain linguistic community at sub-national level as well (ibid.).

In Canada, the French speaking community which is found in the province of Quebec does not only enjoy self-government rights within the larger federation, but also enjoys privilege at the federal level as the country has recognized English and French as the two official languages of the country.

In addtion to the exercise of linguistic bilingual polcy at the federal level, the experiences of the Canadian provinces have been quite diverse. In some provinces like Northwest Territories, about six languages of the *indigenous* communities have been recognized through the provincial language acts (Kymilicka and Norman, 2000, p.275).

Ethiopia has been referred as the mosaic of ethnic groups characterized by linguistic, religious and cultural diversities. The country comprises of eighty and so linguistic communities. As documented by Tadesse and Girma (1994), there are about Eighty Three languages with 200 dialects. With regards to religion, Islam, Christianity (Orthodox, Catholic, Protestantism and other sects) and *traditional religions* exist in the country (Tadesse and Girma, 1994).

After centuries of expansion and contraction, Ethiopia took its present geographic shape due to the successful state building endeavors by Emperor Minelik II during the end of the 19th century (Andargachew, 1993; Clapham, 1988). The King's South ward expansion led to the (re) incorporation of diverse ethnic groups into a single political umbrella.

Despite the status of Amharic language which served as the *lingua franca* of the country as far back to 12^{th} and13^{th} century up to the present; linguistic pluralism had been encouraged during the Era of Emperor Minelik II (Moges, 2010; Sergew, 1972). In this respect, local languages such as *Oromiffa*, *Tigringa*, *Amharic*, and *Geeze* were used in school systems (Moges, 2010).

Furthermore, Ethiopia remained, relatively speaking, decentralized during the Reign of Emperor Minelik (Bahru, 2014). Minelik's legacy of decentralized system of provincial administration and practice of multilingualism did not continue by Emperor Hailessilasie. The new prince went for centralism and assimilation which could be taken as nation- state building endeavor (Asnake, 2009). Such process was heightened in the post-liberation period with the view of reversing the observed disintegrative tendencies of the colonial rule (Gebru, 1991; Bahru, 2014).

Consequently, Amharic language was declared as the official policy of the country (Cohen, 2006). Orthodox- Christianity was established as the state religion of the country through *the 1931 Constitution* and the *revised constitution* of 1955. Amharic was declared as the official language, following the withdrawal of the Italian occupation, of the country (Bahru, 2014; Lapiso, 1991). Such trend was also

accompanied by the policy of centralism ((Bahru, 2014; Clapham, 1988) with the view of reinforcing the nation-state building project.

However, following the radicalization of the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM), the *national question* emerged as testimony for the failure of the nation-state building project of Emperor Hayla-Sellase (Gebru, 1993). In line with Marxist-Leninist tune to national question, the Amhara ethnic group had been perceived as "oppressor nation whose political system, culture and language oppressed … other nations and nationalities" (Merera, 2003, p.97). On top of this, the class contradiction which was beset by the feudal economic relations was a major battle-cry among intellegencia of the time (Clapham, 1988).

The monarchical system was not able to address the popular demands for economic and political reforms. The system was not able to survive such a tide neither. The year 1974, a tumultuous period, rather created a power vacuum that was cleverly hijacked by the military. The military group known as the *Dergue* ruled the country from 1974-1991. Following the overthrow of the monarchical system, the question of nationality had been officially recognized by the military government.

However, the implementation of the promises of accommodation of diversity was long-awaited that could not match to the demands of the rebellious TPLF-led forces. Among other things, the militarist approach, rather than seeking a negotiated solution, to internal conflicts stood as one of the perennial weakness that consumed the military government from power (Merera, 2003; Alem, 2003).

The Peace and democratic conference, that was held from June 1- 5, adopted a transitional Charter. The Charter established the transitional government of Ethiopia (TGE), and set out guidelines for the operation of the interim government that would in turn facilitated the formulation of constitution (Hovde, 1994). Consequently, the principle of self-determination which guaranteed both internal and external secession right to every groups-designated as *nation, nationality and peoples* had been recognized. Correlated with this, *a defacto* federal arrangement, consisting of fourteen Regions, had been established in 1992.

The *dejure* federalization process came with the enactment of the Federal Democratic Republic Constitution of Ethiopia (FDRE) in 1995. Consequently, Two city administration and Nine regional States, as members of the federation, were established. Among these, the Amhara National Regional

State, as one of the members of the federation, is a multiethnic regional state which hosts Amhara, Agew, Oromo, and other smaller ethnic groups. This study was intended to examine the practices and challenges of multiculturalism in the Amahara National Regional State.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Despite the lack of agreement among scholars regarding the theoretical foundations, motives and practices of federalism; the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia constitution have clearly states its commitment to unity and diversity which is presumed to be foundational in the discourse of multiculturalism (FDRE, 1995, Preamble).

In this respect, Assefa (2007), Becken (2013), and Yonatan (2008) have undertaken research on the institutional accommodation of diversity. Asnake (2009) and Feyisaa (2006) have critically made balance sheet on the merit and demerit of federalism in terms of alleviating and regulating conflicts in some of the peripheral regions of Ethiopia including *Gambella*, Ethiopian-Somali and *Beneshangul-Gumuz* regional states.

Berihun (2004) and Vaugan (2006) have also investigated the dynamisms of identity politics in Ethiopia and in Beneshangul Gumuz respectively. Berihun (2004) underlined as to how the historical exigencies had been reinterpreted, used and misused to understand the post- 1990s political realities in the region. Uthman (2006) had also seen the intermediary role of religion and religious institutions in moderating the volatile intergroup relations among the *Berta* and *Gumuz* Ethnic groups in Beneshangul Regional State.

For others, the practice of accommodation of diversity has been fraught by the practices of authoritarian system of government (Abbink**,** 2009; Merere Gudina, 2000; Ottaway, 1995**)**. For Merera (2003) has come up with bold assertion that *competing nationalisms* among *Tigrian*, *Amhara* and *Oromo* elites have been the main stumbling block for the democratization of the country- Ethiopia.

The adoption of ethnic-based federalism, linguistic policy and the attendant "ethnic-zonation" (Feyissa, 2006, p.223) could be taken as the fundamental policy responses to the *fact of diversity* in the country. As some of the scholars suggested, the logic behind the of adoption "ethnic-based federalism" and furtherance of *ethnic-based decentralization*, in some of Regional states, seems to have been driven by the assumption that the creation of homogenous entity would help to ensure peace and stability (Assefa,

2007; Poluha, 1998), in so doing, empower the local community, recognize ethnic identity, enhance democratization, and enhance inter-ethnic harmony (Feyissa, 2006). Such *multilevel federalization* process has appeared to be practiced in Amhara National Regional state and the Southern Regional states.

However, the multicultural practices in the region both at region-wide and sub-regional level have not yet been explored by researchers. Taking up the experience of other multiethnic regional states including Gambella, SNNPR and Beneshangul States, ethnic-territorialization or *ethnic-zonation* has been hailed as innovative ways of accommodating diversity and effective ways of averting conflicts (Assefa, 2007; Feyisas, 2006; Meyer, 2000 in Cornell, 2002; Yonatan,2008).

Conversely, other scholars have also contended that group-specific (titular) accommodation within a multiethnic region will be fatal and conflict prone (Cornell**,** 2002; Basta**,** 2012; Cunningham & Weidmann, 2010). So, ethnic based decentralization cannot be conceived as panacea for every problem.

It appears that the success or the failure of federalism, regardless of its variants, depends upon many factors such as the choice of institutional design, the will of political elites, the available political space for plurality, the nature of the political party, the financial and economic conditions, and other related factors (Anderson & Erk, 2010; Cunningham & Weidmann, 2010; Basta, 2012).

However, most of the research endeavors made on Ethiopia, including, for instance, Assefa (2007), Asnake (2009), Yonatan (2008) , and Becken (2014) have focused on the institutional dimension of accommodation of diversity at Macro level. Apart from this, with the exception of the works of Asnake (2009) who investigated the role of the ethnic federalism as conflict regulation mechanism in regional states of Ethiopian- Somali Region and Beneshanguel Region; the remaining studies have given due attention to the *macro* politics or the *politics from above* which tended to gloss over the political and institutional nuances *from below*.

Above all, the concept of multiculturalism, which could probably be relevant analytical category in this country, which has institutionalized *identity politics* in its constitution for a quarter of century, has been neglected.

This study, thus, attempted to explore the practices and challenges of multiculturalism in Amhara National Regional State through, by and large, comprehensive consideration of the normative,

institutional and dispositional factors of multiculturalism in the *Amhara National Regional State* (ANRS), which is one of the multiethnic regional states in the country. Furthermore, the contextual factors such as nature of the political party, media, and financial resource allocations were also taken into account with the attempt to provide a meaningful picture, if not holistic understanding, of the practices of multiculturalism in the Amhara National Regional State (ANRS).

1.3. Objective of the Study

The general objective of this study was to examine the narratives and institutional mechanisms of the accommodation of ethnic diversity, and the orientations of majority and minority groups towards multiculturalism in the study area-the *Amhara National Regional state*. Specifically, the study was intended to:

1. Explore the narratives shaping the institutional models of accommodation;
2. Examine the institutions and policy frameworks which has been adopted for the accommodation of ethnic diversity;
3. Identify the challenges of accommodation of diversity on internal minorities
4. Explore the extent of gaps in multicultural ideology or orientations among the majority and minority groups; and
5. Identify the factors which are likely to contribute for the gaps in multicultural ideology or orientations among groups;

1.4. Research Questions

In line with the statement of the problem and the stated objective(s), this dissertation research was intended to address the following questions. These included:

1. What was and/or were the prevailing narrative(s) which shaped the institutional approaches to accommodation of ethnic diversity?
2. What were the legal-institutional mechanisms of accommodation of ethnic diversity?
3. What were the challenges of accommodating ethnic minorities in the Region?
4. How significant difference existed between the majority and minority groups on the ideology of multiculturalism?

5. What factor(s) would explain the likely attitudinal gaps between the majority and minority groups on the ideology of multiculturalism?

1.5. Core Argument of the Study

I assumed that the experience of 'multiculturalism' in the regional states of Ethiopia and the practices of *ethnic-zonation* in the Amhara National Regional State(ANRS) have been shaped by the perspective of communitarian- cum- Stalinist-Leninist version of multiculturalism that dichotomized the difference between the majority and minority groups in a society. Such meta narratives have in turn shaped the institutionalization of *titular* autonomy at provincial (*Zonal*) and District (Wereda) levels.

I further contend that such territorial- based ethnic decentralization would enhance the politicization of ethnic groups, which for long have remained to be a social category. As many instituionalist scholars underline, the institutionalization of identity politics will help for the reconstruction of political identity, if not responsible for violent conflict (Brubaker, 1996; Jennne, Lowe & Saidman, 2007; Lieberman & Singh, 2012). In line with this, I argue that the institutionalization of multilevel ethnic federalization process would create inter-group competitions which may lead to the disruption of the fabric of local diversity, crystallizes inter- group attitudinal difference, and induces discriminatory practices in the study Area.

In relation to this, the nexus between the *politics of recognition* and *politics of redistribution*, if existed, would also have immense repercussion in terms of reifying the inter-group differences between the majority and minority groups. Informed by the above two inter-related propositions, I contend that *there existed statistically significant difference of attitudes between the majority and minority groups on the attitudes of multiculturalism*. And the *Null hypothesis* stipulated that *there was no significant difference of multicultural attitudes between the majority and minority groups*.

1.6. Significance of the Study

Ethiopia, since the downfall of the military government, has adopted federal state structure that aims at primarily addressing the demands of ethnic and religious groups. Both the Charter of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE, 1992) and federal constitution (FDRE, 1995) gave explicit provisions for the protection of group and individual rights. More importantly the constitution has explicitly stated that every "Nation, Nationality and People" of Ethiopia (NNPE) have been given bundles of group-

differentiated rights which include mainly self government rights, special representation rights, cultural and religious exemption rights and linguistic rights.

Likewise, the constitution has also given exclusive coverage to the civil and political rights of individuals and women. Indeed, the spirit of the constitution, as it has been stated in the preamble, appears to be ensuring unity within diversity. Undoubtedly, the country has begun the road to multiculturalism which is novel, and yet, such bold measures remained to be the *road –less- traveled* in many states of the world including Africa. It is timely then to examine the experiences of the country with regards to its effort to accommodating diversity and the attendant challenges and prospects towardensuring multicultural democracy and sustainable peace.

In this respect, I believe that the findings of this study will be relevant, first and foremost, for the governmental policy makers and implementers who are working at different levels of the government structure. Among other things, the findings of the study would unravel the challenges of creating harmonious intergroup relations at regional, provincial and district level. In addition, it would not fail to shed-light on the ideology and practices of accommodation of diversity in ANRS. Furthermore, the study pointed out different possibilities as well as approaches of dealing with differences which would be taken as menu of policy option to the concerned bodies.

1.7. The Scope of the Study

Multiculturalism touches a wide range of issues and actors. The *perspectival diversity* among groups and individual counts one stand of multiculturalism (Parekh, 2000, p.4). Among other things, multiple and wide-ranging issues, including immigrants, gender, race, sexual orientations, disability and ethnic diversity have been dealt with under the preview of the subject. This study has focused on ethnic diversity and hence other forms of diversity are beyond its scope. The minority groups covered in this study are those which have already been given territorial autonomy within the Region. Accordingly, the thesis covered *Argoba, AgewAwi, AgewHimira,* and Oromo *minority* groups in the region; while the *Amhara* ethnic group has been labeled as the *majority.*

Consequently, the case of *Kimant* and other minorities such as the *Negedes, which* did not have a territorial autonomy during the phases of data collection, were not considered as the target groups of this study. Given the tumultuous political conditions of the region and the country, the identity politics

associated with Kimant ethnic groups could have been included. But that was just impossible due to the timing as well as complexity of the issue, which in turn, may require a deeper investigation of its own.

1.8. Limitation of the Study

The practices of *Multiculturalism* could have covered the daily practices and relationships of members of groups towards each other in many arena of social life such as marriage, friendship, market places, religious places, recreational centers and work places. Yet, this study has not addressed all these. The study focused rather on the institutional and dispositional (ideological) dimension of multiculturalism at regional and sub-regional levels. And yet, the scope is still wide enough which probably limited the depth of the study. Cognizance of such limitation, effort has been done to improve the quality of the research through the application of multiple methods and techniques of data collection and analysis so that readers could capture the normative and institutional mechanisms of the accommodation of ethnic diversity.

A holistic understanding of the issue, however, requires a deeper investigation of inter-group relations and behaviors such as marriage, friendship, and other forms of social encounters at places like market places, recreational centers, work places and the like. Accordingly, I could not claim that this research was an all-encompassing one that addressed such sensitive issues.

1.9. Organization of the Study

This dissertation work is organized into Nine Chapters. The first chapter is introductory chapter where the backgrounds of the study, the statement of the problem, the research objectives and questions have been briefly discussed. Chapter two presents theoretical and empirical literature relevant to the study and provides the conceptual framework for the study. The theoretical review part, in turn, has three sections which provide conceptual clarifications, contending meta narratives and the institutional approaches of multiculturalism. The empirical literature review part contains two sections. The first section provides a brief overview of multicultural orientations among the majority and the minority groups elsewhere in the world. The Second Section has been devoted to a systematic literature review on the institutional aspect of multiculturalism on Ethiopia. The Fifth section of the Chapter illustrates the conceptual framework of the study. Chapter three provides the description of the study area and set out the methodology of the study. Chapter four provides the political history of state- and nation- building processes which served

as intellectual backdrop to the emergence of the agenda of the *national question* in the country. Chapter five explores the historical genesis of the Amhara region. This chapter basically uncovers the politics behind the formation of the region during the transitional government and the attendant political developments afterwards. To that end, the chapter has been organized into three sections. The first section explores the historical genesis of the Amhara region during the pre-1991 periods. The second section deals with the political developments during the period of the transitional government. This section addresses specifically the formation of the Amhara *Kilil* and the elections for the region and constituent assembly during the transitional government. The third section deals with four national and regional elections in the post- transitional government. In this section, an attempt has been made to reveal how periodic elections were instrumental to consolidating the power of EPRDF and subsequently for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism at the national and regional governments. Furthermore, the 2005 election and its repercussion at the national and regional levels have also been highlighted.

The Findings of the study have been discussed in the remaining three successive chapters. Accordingly, Chapter six presents the normative frameworks which justifies and shaped the institutional design of accommodation of diversities in ANRS. Chapter seven focuses on the institutional aspects of accommodation and the challenges. In this regard, the First Section of this part deals about the representation of groups in those region-wide public spheres. The Second section emphasizes on the modalities, structures and the scopes of autonomy which has been conferred to minority ethnic groups. The Third section has been devoted to the discussion of the challenges of multiculturalism from below by way of taking the condition of internal minorities within the local majorities. Chapters eight is concerned with the findings related to inter- group orientations towards the construct variable of multiculturalism. This Chapter has been presented into three sections. The First section is concerned with brief description of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents of the survey. The Second section emphasizes on the multicultural orientations of majority and minority groups. The Third section of this chapter outlines and discusses the factors which might have contributed for the prevalence of the groups' divergence on the ideology of multiculturalism. The last Chapter (Chapter nine) provides concluding remarks and implications for policy intervention.

CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAME WORK, THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND EMPERICAL REVIEW OF RELATED LITRATURE

Multiculturalism is one of the most contested terms. One of the sources of the controversy emanates from the ideological baggage and the multiple meanings the term connotes**.** The prevalence of contending views among normative political thinkers and scholars as to the question of what multiculturalism 'ought and out not to be' has made the concept more controversial terms. One of the sources of the controversy emanates from the ideological baggage and the multiple meanings the term connotes**.** Likewise, there existed various institutional responses to the quest for diversity among states. In light of this, this chapter discusses about theoretical, empirical literature review and the conceptual framework of the study. The theoretical review part, in turn, has three sections which provide conceptual clarifications, contending meta narratives, and the institutional approaches of multiculturalism. The empirical literature review part contains two sections. The First section provides a brief overview of multicultural orientations among the majority and the minority groups elsewhere in the world. The Second section has been devoted to a systematic literature review on the institutional aspect of multiculturalism on Ethiopia. The Fifth section of the chapter illustrates the conceptual framework of the study**.**

2.1. Clarification of Concepts

2.1.1. Essence of Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism is one of the most contested terms. One of the sources of the controversy emanates from the ideological baggage and the multiple meanings the term connotes (Hannerz, 1999 cited in Horsti, nd)**.** The prevalence of contending views among normative political thinkers and scholars as to the question of what multiculturalism ought and out not to be has made the concept more controversial (Song, 2007). Apart from these perspectives, the term multiculturalism has many dimensions and hence, it can be considered as a multilayered concept (Inglis, 1996). In this respect, one would shortlist at least three overlapping meanings to it. These include, the descriptive meaning, normative meanings and institutional meanings of multiculturalism (Bennett, 1982; Inglis, 1996)**.**

The term "multicultural" or "multicultural society" can be used to signify the existence of diversity which is invariably natural phenomena to every Society or states (Parekh, 2000, p.6). Such notion may not necessarily show the commitment of the state towards such existential facts. Yet, the term

multicultural- can be considered as "descriptive or demographic" meaning of multiculturalism (Inglis, 1996, p.16)[1]. Indeed, multiculturalism can only be thought of within the context of multicultural society. In this case multiculturalism cannot be thought of without the presence of diversity as matter of fact.

However, in the strict sense of the term, multiculturalism goes beyond its descriptive meanings. One of the often mentioned meanings of multiculturalism takes up normative dimension. In this regard, "multiculturalism is concerned with the issue of equality. It asks whether the different communities, living peacefully together, co-existence as equals in the public arena" (Mahajan, 2002, p.11). For Mahajan (2002) multiculturalism refer to the assertion that "all cultural communities must be entitled to equal status in the public domain" (p.15**).** Evidently, the normative meaning of multiculturalism also takes up the beliefs and attitudes of members of a society towards diversity. In light of this, multiculturalism is defined as "ideology that refers to the acceptance of cultural diversity, and also active support for these cultural differences" in a society (Arends-Toth & Vander Vijvuer, 2000, 2003; Berry& Kalvin, 1995,2002 cited in Schalk-Soekar & Vander Vijvuer, 2008, p.2152).

Caleb Rosado elucidates multiculturalism further as ,

> *A system of beliefs and behaviors that recognizes and respects the presence of all diverse groups in an organization or society, acknowledges and values their socio-cultural differences, and encourage and enables their continued contribution within an inclusive cultural context which empowers all within the organization or society (*Rosado, 1996, p.2).

As is evidently clear, multiculturalism is about recognizing, acknowledging or valuing and respecting diversity in society. In relation to this many scholars underline on the relevance of "mutual recognition" (Baubock, 1994 cited in Vasta, 2007, p.26; Tully, 1995, p.7; Parekh, 2000) towards the creating or imagining of an all- inclusive and all -empowering environment in a society. Thus, the normative meaning of multiculturalism would encompass a wide range of groups and personal dispositions which aims at embracing diversity with unity. Some of the manifestations of such ideological orientations involve recognizing diversity, tolerating diversity, valuing diversity, cooperation and empowering the self and showing cultural sympathy to others (Rosado, 1996).

[1] The descriptive meaning of multiculturalism is equivalent to the description of "multiethnic society that contains multiple ethnic groups"(Inglis, 1996,p.9)

In addition to descriptive and normative meanings, multiculturalism takes up the institutional dimension. This aspect of multiculturalism lines up with the historical origin of the concept itself. The term *multiculturalism* has been originally used by Canadian government as official policy response towards the acceptance of the fact that Canada is a bi-cultural society where the French and the English got to live with mutual recognition and respect (Bennett, 1982). Multiculturalism arose as policy response against assimilative policy of the English over the French Canadians (ibid; Kymlicka & Norman, 2000). Consequently, the notion of multiculturalism has been increasingly associated with any sort of policy response to claims of ethno-cultural minority groups (Kymilicka, 2002; Kymilicka &Norman, 2000).

The source of *ethno-cultural group* claims is presumed to be the prevalence of assimilative nation-building process of modern states (Baumeister, 2000; Mahajan, 2002; Kymilicka, 2002)[2]. In this respect, Will Kymilicka explicates the process of nation building as,

> *Process [sic] of promoting a common language, and a sense of common membership in, and equal access to, the social institutions operating in that language. Decision regarding official language, core curriculum in education, and the requirement for acquiring citizenship, all have been made with the intention of diffusing a particular culture throughout society, and of promoting a particular national identity based on participation in that societal culture* (Kymilicka, 2002, p.347).

The term 'Societal culture' is in turn defined as " a territorially concentrated culture, centered on a shared language which is used in a wide range of societal institution, in both public and private life(schools, media, law, economy, government, etc)" (Kymilicka, 2002, p.346). Nation building process involves the imposition of societal culture of dominant group over other groups. In explaining the adverse effect of such nation building project, Mahajan(2002) submits that "when the nation state…. grants official recognition to the language of the[majority] community, other languages and culture existing within the state are inevitably devalued"(p.36).

Seen from the institutional perspective, multiculturalism could mean the institutional accommodation of diversity or group(s)'s claims. Here, accommodation is understood in terms of a continuum that falls

[2] There could visibly appear at least two modalities of assimilation: benign assimilation and forced assimilation (Ryan, 1990) . Ewiegand & Khelkp **(** 2010) use the term "violent" and "non-violent" assimilation to describes the nuances of the two modalities(p.11). Often the benign model is associated with American Model; "forced" assimilation model[2] is associated with the French experience. The French imposed the dominant language of Versailles bourgeoisie class, which itself was demographically a minority (Giravd, 1968 in Nimni, 1995, p.60). According to some sources the then French languages speakers, during the Jacobins movement, consisted of only 3 million populations (3%) out of the total population of 25million in the country (Brunnot, 1958 in Nimni, 1995, p.60). And consequently other languages were prohibited and using one's language was considered as punishable offence (Birsch, 1989, p.44).

between assimilation and secession (Basta, 2012). For Basta (2012) assimilation and secession are described as "destabilizing and morally problematic extremes" (p.2). Indeed, assimilation, secession and or partitioning, forced population transfer-ethnic cleansing and genocide are measures for "elimination of diversity" (McGarry & O'Leary, 1994, p.95). According to McGarry and O'Leary (1994, p.95), Cantonization, federalism and consociation are strategies of accommodating diversity. Accordingly any policy or institutional mechanism which balances the force of unity and diversity in a society can be understood as an institutional way of accommodation.

As Will Kymilicka rightly argues the process of accommodation is claim- based (Kymilicka, 2002, p.349) and hence goes through "democratic deliberation" and procedures..Consequently, the responses to claims are likely to be "through contextual inquiry" (Song, 2007, p.42) instead of straight jacket imposition. Indeed, there would be wide ranges of group claims. It could include cultural exemptions, special assistance, special representation, and self- government (autonomy) which might take the form of cultural autonomy or territorial autonomy and constitutional recognition (Levy, 1997, p.25; Mikesell & Murphey, 1991, p.588)[3].

Some scholars have also adopted developmental approach to minority demands. In light of this, Jenne, Lowe, and Saidman (2007) argue that group claims invariably increases from simple demand of affirmative actions up to secession depending upon the bargaining power of the group. Accordingly, it is argued, claims for affirmative action, cultural autonomy, territorial autonomy (limited autonomy) and, finally, seeking independence or irredentism, represent the ranges of the demand- menu that could be left at the disposal of groups respectively (ibid. p.545).

Similarly, Mikesell & Murphey (1991) have put the demands of the minority groups in sequential and incremental manner. According to them, the first claim that minority groups aspires to fulfill is what is referred to as "recognition" (p.588). Recognition means the act to acknowledging the existence of a group and its attributes. Group may claim symbolic recognition as in terms of acknowledgment of mere

[3]In this regard, Will Kymilicka adopted the following indicators, an effort to measuring the extent of the accommodation of immigrants in among Western states, including; (1) legislation affirming multiculturalism; (2) `the adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum`; (3) media sensitivity of ethnic cultures; (4) exemptions from dress-codes, holidays(closing days) which are meant to represent the culture of the majority;(5) `allowing dual citizenship`; (6) funding and financial support of ethnic group organizations and cultural activities; (7) the funding of mother tongue instruction; and (8) affirmative action (Kymilicka, 2012, p.6). Often such measures are associated with the intention of accommodating the rights and benefits of immigrants (in North America and Western Europe) and aboriginal communalities in U.S.A, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Baumeister, 2000,p.36).

existence of the group, or its language, or customs or religions defining the group in question. Next to recognition is "access" in that claims, a group may claim "access" to opportunities in the form of financial subsidies, economic opportunities such as job so that the minority group becomes equally competent with the majority (Mikesell& Murphey, 1991, p.588). Such demands could be fulfilled in the form of measures including affirmative action policies in public institution, anti-discrimination laws and special financial subsidies. Once the first two demands have been fulfilled, what minorities could demand is "participation" (ibid.). In this phase groups demand to get involved in the political decision making process. Such demand could be entertained when the state responds through institutional mechanisms such as proportional electoral system, fixed ethnic quota systems, guaranteed representation in the form of redrawing the electoral districts so that minorities would be turned to local majority. The next stage in the demand formation of minority group is "separation". Here, separation neither refers to "external self-determination"[4]- independence nor "internal self-determination" (Gilbert, 2002, p.309). Rather, *separation* is synonymous to cultural "exemption" (Levy, 1997, p. 25) in that the customary laws and practices of the minority could flourish without any imposition of modern laws and practices which is often cloaked with culture of the majority group. Such demand could be fulfilled through "cultural autonomy" (Mikesell& Murphey, 1991, p.588). Then, comes "autonomy" as next ladder in the hierarchy of minority demands (ibid.).

As will be discussed below (see section 2.3) of this chapter, the accommodative models could range from non -territorial autonomy (NTA) to territorial autonomy (TA) of different scope or a combination of the two. Corollary to what has been discussed above, the institutional dimension of accommodation may include measures of resource redistribution in tandem with identity claims. Most normative political philosophers fairly distinguish between "politics of recognition" or identity politics and "politics of redistribution" (Fraser, 2001, p.21). What is commonly considered to be 'the politics of redistribution' refers to an egalitarian movement or orientation which "seeks to have more just allocation of resources and goods" in a society from the 'haves to have nots' (Fraser, 2001, p.21). Often the issue of redistribution has been considered as the preoccupation of "class politics" while the politics of

[4] The claim for external self determination is conventionally understood as the right of people to liberate itself from the yoke of colonialism. So it implies independence with full sovereignty. Whereas internal self-determination involves claims for substantial autonomy or self- government within the framework of existing state (see Gilbert, 2002, p.325; Bendikter, 2009, p. 15-16). Some scholars also used internal secession and external secession interchangeably with internal self-determination and external self determination respectively.

recognition is equated with "identity politics" (Fraser, 2001, p.24). Multiculturalism has been linked to the latter.

Conceived this way, the politics of redistribution and politics of recognition seems to be mutually antipodes at conceptual level (Owen & Tully, 2007). Yet, as matter of practices multiculturalism may encompass the politics of redistribution and, hence both can be reinforcing each other. In such state of condition, the "struggle for, or over, recognition always have a redistributive dimension and struggle for, or over, redistribution are always already struggles for , or over, recognition"(Owen & Tully, 2007, p.267)[5].

As discussed above, multiculturalism is a multilayered and complex term which connotes myriad of measures consisting of normative and institutional mechanisms, in response to the demands of groups which are marginalized or felt disadvantaged due to the imposition of official culture-as an identity of a state (Song, 2007; Mahajan, 2002; Kymilcika, 2002)[6]. Accordingly, multiculturalism has increasingly been seen as accommodation of the disadvantaged (minority) groups (see Kymilicka, 2001, 2002, 2006). In this limited sense multiculturalism would imply one sided accommodation. Such one-dimensional application of multiculturalism has faced strong reaction from Bikuh Parekh:

> *Multiculturalism is not about minorities, for that implies that the majority culture is uncritically accepted and used to judge the claims and define the rights of minorities. Multiculturalism is about the proper terms of relationship between different cultural communities* (Parekh, 2000, p.13)**.**

Accordingly, multiculturalism is an issue that concerns both the minority and the majority alike which necessitates "mutual accommodation" (Baubock, 1994, p.114 cited in Vasta, 2007, p. 26) not just one way accommodation. In other words, it means that multiculturalism is about accommodation of group claims with the view of ensuring diversity and unity, or "equality and unity" (Skobla, 2001, p.151). As Daniel Skobla strongly asserts multiculturalism is not about ensuring horizontal equality among groups, but at the same time, it requires preserving or forging out unity (ibid.).

---

[5] Other scholars also contend that multiculturalism may include both "redistribution" and" recognition" (Song, 2007, p.1)

[6] .Will Kymilicka, on the basis of his comparative study of identity politics in the Western and Eastern part of the world, has come up with "liberal" and "illiberal" forms of nation building processes. He describes that nation building in the West is characterized by imposition of thin social culture of the dominant group which does not involve religious beliefs, customs, personal life styles. By contrast, in illiberal nation building process requires "much thicker form of cultural integration involving not only a common language and public institution but also elements of religion, rituals and life styles" (Kymilicka, 2001, p.76.).

As highlighted in the aforementioned discussion, multiculturalism involves the institutional, normative and attitudinal dimensions of accommodation of diversity. Thus, at the heart of multiculturalism is mutual accommodation of the majority and minority groups' claims and concerns. Seen from the individual attitudinal perspective, multiculturalism would mean positive dispositions towards diversity, respect, recognition, readiness to know and appreciate others' languages, folk music, history, and cultures; cherishing unity, readiness for dialogue and mutual understanding, and readiness to preserve commonality among groups. In this study such multicultural dispositions has been used interchangeably with terms like multicultural ideology, multicultural attitude, or multicultural orientation.

2.1.2. Majority, Minority and Internal Minority Groups

The term *minority* and *majority* groups are commonly used conceptual categories among scholars of multiculturalism. These terms serve as a unit of analysis in the discourse as well as research related to multiculturalism. The literal meaning of majority and minority connotes quantitative meanings (Killian, 1996). Accordingly, the minority group(s) implies "self- conscious publics" having lesser number of populations in relation to the majority groups with its predominant size of population (Longers, 1982, p.7). However, the contemporary usage of the terms goes beyond the demographic size or number of groups. There are circumstances where groups with majority population could be categorized as minority. As Killian (1996) told us women can be considered as minority though they are majority.[7]

The distinction between majority and minority, perhaps, lies on its qualitative meanings (Skobla, 2001). In light of this, it has been elucidated that "the difference between majority and minority has to do with power and influence and with state of subordination" (Longers, 1982, p.7). In line with this, the term 'minority group' has been used to refer to the subordinated or disadvantaged groups whose cultures have been marginalized due to `state-nation building project of modern states` (Kymilick, 2001,2002 , 2006).[8] In contrast, the term `majority group` has been used to refer to the privileged groups whose

[7] As John Longers notes that, during the time of Apartheid South Africa, the majority blacks were under the yoke of the white minority in demographic terms. However, the number could not mislead the historic fact that the inferior number had supremacy over the black majority (Longers, 1982).

[8] .Will Kymilicka has identified two types of national minorities which resulted from the nation-building process of the majority. These are "sub-state nations" and "indigenous peoples" (kymilicka, p.39). For him both groups do not have currently state in which they are majority, but which may have had in the past. The difference between them is that while sub-state nations may have an interest to have a state, the indigenous people may not have such desire. The indigenous peoples seek to "preserve their traditional ways of life" and hence their desires could be fulfilled by the provision of limited self rule (ibid.). Kymilicka's scheme of national minorities as sub-national and indigenous might be relevant in the context of some of the European states and American States (as Austarlia, Canada, Newzealnd, U.S.A)(Thornberry, 2002, p.34).

culture has been diffused as the official culture of the state in the public sphere (such as schools, in the media, government offices….etc) (Mahajan, 2002). So, it appears that status of groups, instead of demographic size, in society describes the essence of being majority or minority. Consequently the term "dominant group" (Killian, 1996) can be used interchangeably, if not preferably, with majority, to describe the dominating group in a society.

Seen from the power relation point of view the denotative meanings of minority and majority are subject to change and hence cannot have fixed meanings. Thus, the status of groups is more likely to change with the changes in the power relations in the society. What probably will remain valid is the demographic meaning of majority and minority.

Another important concept, in relation to the practice and theory of multiculturalism from below is the concept of *internal minorities*. Internal minorities refers to "those whose rights might be threatened by the authority vested in minority communities by the theories and practices of mutual accommodation" (Wienstock, 2007, p.243). Sometimes, such a term best refer to "minorities within minorities" (Eisenbergand Spinner-Halev, 2004**,** p.2; Green cited in Baker, 1994, p.101**)**. As diversity may not be bounded to a certain territorial locality, it is natural that different groups can cohabit in a certain territory or locality. Often, the application of territorial principle to accommodation of a specific minority group would turn the group in to local majority. It has been argued that such titular accommodation of local majority could be harsh on the minorities living within such local majority (Birsch, 1989, p.46). Such internal minorities could be women or other ethnic, religious and racial groups which cohabit within certain autonomous areas which are primarily designated for the local majority-other than the internal minorities. Those countries that lack adequate human right protection, there is more likely to exist not only discriminatory practices and exclusion would be common, but the avoidance of "the wrong people" will also be inevitable action (Baubok**,** 2001, p. 42).

Indeed, the internal minorities would face measures ranging from assimilation, discrimination and violence ranging from ethnic deportation (ethnic cleansing) to genocide (Cunninghm & Weidmann, 2010; Adeney, 2007). One specific measure to be taken seriously is the principle: a given "ethnic group should not be allowed to govern their own units unless guarantees for minorities are respected" (Beran, 1984 in Adeney, 2007, p.18). Furthermore, Adeney (2007, p.18) suggests that a strong human rights

---

Thornberry (2002) contends that "the notion of indigenous peoples makes little sense in the context of Africa and Asia, where all are indigenous"(p.34).

regime with strong enforceability as well as central government follow up and support would minimize the burden of the minorities within minorities. Indeed, the enforcement of human rights would help to minimize the burden of cultural conformism by the local majority on women and dissenting individual members of the local majority. Apart from that, some scholars called for a proper mechanism of accommodation of internal minorities, especially of ethno cultural groups, in addition to the protection of individual rights (Green, 1995).

In this study, the usages of the terms take both qualitative and quantitative connotations of the terms. The *Amahara* ethnic group is considered as majority by its sheer size and the dominant status it enjoys. Politically speaking, the region has been designated for the *Amahara* people as its nomenclatures stands for. So, the designation of *Amahara* as majority group tend to fulfills the qualitative and quantitative meaning of majority groups as has been discussed above. The remaining groups, particularly those enjoying local autonomy at *Zonal* and district levels, namely, *Awi*, *Wag Himira*, *Oromos* and *Argoba*, could be locally dominant groups in relation to internal minorities. However, at region-wide level, such autonomous groups can be categorized as minorities in quantitative and qualitative parameters.

2.1.3. Ethnic Group, 'Nation', 'Nationality' and Nationalism

These terms have been readily used among researchers, scholars in the area of social science and humanities and the general public (Brubaker, 2004**).** Despite this, there lacks clear distinction as to the meaning of each term. Coming to our case, for instance, the term nation, nationalities and Peoples have been used to signify the different groups in Ethiopia .Yet, ethnic groups have also been used to signify the same groups. However, as many scholars write these terms - ethnic group and nation- are not synonymous words (Smith, 1986; Anderson, 2006; Heywood, 2002; & Gellner, 1983). Indeed, there lacks consensus on a single term either.

Ethnic Group

For some scholars ethnic group[9] represents group having distinguishable features that can be easily displayed by outsiders or out groups (Connor, in Cassif, 2014). Connor seems to underline on what is

[9] The usage of ethnicity or ethnic group has been associated with the description minority groups which used to be portrayed as traditional and backward. However, since the 1960s, such fixation has been changed to apply to the majority groups. As aptly described: "the majorities and dominant people are no less ethnic than the minorities" (Ericksen, 1994, p.5).

commonly understood as "the objective" elements of ethnic group which are easily discernible to other groups. So, as Cassif (2014) argues an ethnic group can be "other defined" (p.118)[10].

However, Barth (1961) contended that objective characteristics of group such as shared language, custom, culture, common territory may not help to distinguish groups who have shared experiences and cultures in the long life process of interaction with each other. Barth contends that a group defines itself in relation to others and there is often process of "boundary maintenance" among the insider and the outsider (Barth, 1961 cited in Eriksen, 1994, p.44). Barth (1961) explicates:

> *The group's culture as well as forms of organization may change without removing the ethnic boundary. In some cases groups may actually become more similar at the same time that boundary are strengthened…[thus] it would be misleading to argue that ethnic boundary contain cultures. Cultural differences relates to ethnicity if and only if such differences are made relevant in social interaction (cited in Eriksen, 1994, p.45)*

Accordingly, therefore, the identity of an ethnic group cannot be defined as given-in terms of some visible objective elements mainly due to two reasons. The first reason is that ethnicity is self defined with "invisible dividing line" with others (Barth, 1961 cited in Eriksen, 1994, p.49). Secondly, even if some objective criteria would be there, groups may selectively used in a manner that they can maintain their boundary. So, what distinguishes between different groups could be constantly changing depending on the importance it gives to keep their boundary vis-à-vis others[11].

Anthony Smith, in his classic work, *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History* provides what appears to be a comprehensive definition of ethnic group. Accordingly, an ethnic group is defined as "named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myth of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites" (Smith, 2001, p.13). While Connor underlines on what is commonly understood as "the objective" elements of ethnic group, Smith's definition composes both the objective and subjective elements. So, it appears that the objective-subjective parameters are not mutually exclusive, rather objective elements serve as resources for subjective elements in defining the identity of a group. Corollary to this, some scholars adopt developmental approach to understanding ethnicity and nationalism (Smith, 1986; Cohen, 1974).

[10] The primordial schools underlines that ethnic group or nation are defined in terms of some objective criteria which are considered as putatively given and durable (Geertz in Smith, 2009, p.9).

[11] Barth (1969) seems to subscribe to the instrumentalist school that contend that objectively given features of groups can be manipulated and used as a means or tool to achieve some other interests such as political office and or resources in the process of competitive environment such as election.

Accordingly, at earlier stages of such linear development, level, group may not be aware of themselves and, for that matter, they could be defined by other. But as the group collective consciousness increases, they logically define themselves. And it is logical to envision that *self* definition emerges through rigorous interactive process with other groups.

Nation, Nationality and Nationalism

An ethnic group without collective political aspirations remains as mere sociological reality. However, nation is a politicized community which desires to have state (Weber, 1984 cited in Smith, 2001, p.25). Underling on such a desire, nation can also be defined as "imagined political community" (Anderson, 2006, p.6). Nation is much of social artifact than primordial features of culture. Yet, as Anderson (ibid.) argues, cultural roots are often blended with ideology of solidarity, sovereignty in the construction of such a conception. Rooting to the cultural sources, Smith (2001, p.13) defines nation as "named human community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members" .

Smith's definition of nation has strong affinity with the Stalinist understanding of nation. For Joseph Stalin, " nation is a historically constituted , stable communities of people formed on the basis of common language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a common culture" (Stalin,1953, p.306). As evidently seen, Smith seems to have been influenced by Stalinists understanding of nation. The difference, perhaps , is that while Stalin focuses primarily on primordial elements such as common language, territory, shared culture and history, Smith employs both primordial (objective) and subjective elements in defining the term. For Stalin and Lenin nation emerges in historic juncture of transformation of feudal society into capitalist society and hence often labeled as bourgeoisie ideology. On the other hand the term 'nationality' signifies "a historical community with its own language, territory, common culture and rudimentary economic ties" (Karat, 1975, p.6). And thus, nationality or nationalities are those ethnic groupings which are believed to exist in the pre-capitalist society. For Stalin, Marx and Engeles the absence of common market remains an obstacle in the development of common language and culture among nationalities.(Engeles and Marx in Nimini, 1995; Stalin, 1953).

And thus, nation and nationalities are not synonymous, rather nation is portrayed as advanced and "modern", while nationalities are pre-modern, perhaps, "backward" cultural organizations (Engels and

Marx in Nimni, 1995, p.64). In addition, the Stalinist usage of nationality seems to be synonymous with ethnicity or ethnic groups that are particularly termed as minorities within a single state (Nimni, 1995, p.64). Above and beyond the parameter of population size, lower advancements in the economy and development standardized languages, have also been considered as the distinguishing factor of nationalities as compared to nations who are majority, with advanced economic order, and standardized languages (ibid.). Despite such nuances between nation and nationalities, Marxist politicians align their view with the modernist schools in their contention that capitalism creates conducive environment for envisioning nation (ibid.).

Nevertheless, the categorization of nations and nationalities using objective criteria seems to have undermined the significance of nationalism in the creation or envisioning of nation. As most of the main stream scholars suggested, nationalism play critical role for imagining nation. Nationalism is an expression of such desire that serves as key instrument for attaining such political community (Gellner, 1983). In other words, as Ifran Habib argues, "inherent in the concept of the nation is the existence of a popular consciousness of the desirability of that nation as a sovereign state" (Habib, 1975, p.15)[12].

So, it appears that nations are result of nationalisms (Smith, 2001; Anderson, 2006; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1983 cited in Heywood, 2002). In this respect, it is emphatically argued that "it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way round" (Gellner, 1983, P.55). For some scholars, the objective of nationalism has been associated with the creation of state. For Gellner (1981, p.1) nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent. Similarly, Anderson (2006, p.7) underlines that "the gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state".

The claims of nationalists, however, may not be limited to the desire to have a state of their own. For Smith, the objective of nationalism encompasses mainly three ideals, including, "autonomy, unity, and national identity" (2001, p.25). Autonomy could range from independence to internal self rule. While the former (independence) signifies having sovereign states, the latter (internal self rule) encompasses a wide range of schemes including federalism, limited autonomy such as "cultural self-rule, legal autonomy, economic autarchy and political home rule" (Smith, 2001, p.25-6). For Smith, unity implies territorial unification which can be considered as first step to demand further autonomy or independence

[12] The inherent nexus between state and nation seems to have neglected by J. Stalin and his advocates (Habib, 1975).

(p.26). The third ideal of nationalism is attaining what he calls as "national identity" which is expressed in the form of "collective character" defined mainly in terms of "historical and cultural basis" (p.27).

What Kymilicka dubbed as minority nationalism –claims for autonomy or limited self- government, independence or maximum autonomy within federalism, or claims of poly ethnic groups for special representation, linguistic, cultural and religious recognition and protection all falls within the schemes of Anthony Smith's notion of nationalism and nationalistic claims. While this remains the conventional understanding of *nation; Stalinist* concepts of nation and nationalities are considered to be 'given' and not something to be claimed for. As groups fulfill the criteria of one of such category, then they will be recognized and institutionalized as such without due consideration of their demands or claims or nationalism.

In most of the cases in western democratic states, recognitions are demand driven or claim based and hence lacks rigid objective criteria as precondition to be fulfilled[13]. However, the institutionalization of multinational federation in the former socialist state, the modus operandi of accommodation was based on such primordial-objectively defined understanding of the category *of nation and nationalities* (Brubaker, 1996). Such institutionalization seemed to have transformed ethnic communities in to nations- a political community which ultimately led to the disintegration of the federation (Brubaker, 1996; Alemante, 2003).

In this study, regardless of the likely effects of the institutionalization of ethnic federalism, the term *nation, nationalities and peoples* –the official expression of groups, has been used with *ethnic groups* interchangeably.

2.2. Contending Normative Perspectives on Multiculturalism

As we have discussed above, the notion of multiculturalism is about management of diversity or the proper accommodation of diversity and unity. However, there is no consensus as to the ways by which diversity should be best accommodated and or managed in light of the normative values governing human nature and human values such as justice, equality, individual liberty, democracy and others. In

[13] For most of the scholars on nationalism, what derives national sentiment is the ideology than sort of cultural-objective staffs. For instance the fighting creeds of French Revolutions were liberty, equality and solidarity (Hobsbawm, 1983 in Heywood, 2002, p.109). This type of nationalism is referred to as civic nationalism. Connor (1984) argues that this is akin to patriotism .Conversely scholar such as Smith (2001) contends that ethnicity serves as the source of nationalism. Such sort of nationalism is commonly referred to as ethno-nationalism. Eric Hobsbawm rejected Smithian thesis out rightly as " myth created by nationalism itself" (Hobsbawm, 1983, cited in Heywood, 2002, p.109).

relation to this, there is no consensus as to how multiple identities and the respective claims could be accommodating in a manner that is amenable to the modern days of democracy. Among other things, normative orientation or ideologies play significant role in shaping the institutional design of states (Tierney, 2004 cited in Yonatan, 2008, p.95). They serve "an interpretive framework" (Benz& Broschek, 2013, p.6). Such normative constructs can be seen in terms of the narratives regarding the identity of state and the motives behind the reconstruction of a state and society (ibid, p.6-7). Such normative frameworks are often interwoven within the texts of constitutions. Often these are reflected in the preamble, the flags, anthems, public holidays and even the nomenclature of the state (Yonatan, 2008, p.98). In this regard, there are many schools of thoughts and approaches to multiculturalism. It would be practically impossible to exhaust all the controversies surrounding the issues. Yet, one can identify four main contending perspectives surrounding the accommodation of diversity. These include, (1) Communitarianism, (2) liberal multiculturalism, (3) deliberative or dialogic approaches to multiculturalism, and (4) Leninist-Stalinist (the Marxist) approach.

2.2.1. The Communitarian-Multiculturalim

Communitarian school is one version of multiculturalism that gives primary focus on the role of culture and communal values in shaping the interest and role of individuals (Kymilicka, 2002; Mahajan, 2002). It is argued that culture of the community or ethnic group determines not only the identity of individual members, but also their preferences and interests, too (Kymilicka, 2002, p. 220). Consequently, individuals cannot be free to pursue their own way, outside of the dictates and interest of the cultural group. Furthermore, communitarians assert that all communities have rights that members of which are obligated to subscribe to (Kymilicka, in Judith, 1994**,** p.19). Such egalitarian notion of culture and community overlooks the relevance of group-differentiated rights where "some rights are unequally distributed between groups" **(**Kymilicka, 1994, p.19**).** Indeed, as James Tully commented**,** "culture's are conceived as analogous to the more familiar constitutional concept of nations…and multiculturalism is simply seen the recognition of each culture in the same constitutional form" (Tully, 1995, p.8)[14].

[14] Such version of multiculturalism is sometimes referred to as "thick multiculturalism" (Baumeister, 2000, p.58). The term thick is used to show the undue preoccupation corporal culture of groups more than the rights of individuals including those members to such a culture. Thick multiculturalism advocates strongly for the preservation of culture of every ethnic group.

Communitarians seem to be passionate to see a kind of cultural egalitarianism among groups in multiethnic society. Such moralistic orientation to culture or ethnic groups has been derived from a peculiar conception of culture as "separate, bounded and internally uniform"(Tully, 1995, p.10). Such thick description of culture takes up Herderian conception of culture which has been understood as " […] well-integrated, well-bounded, and largely self -generated entities, defined by a set of key attributes, including a shared language, history, and values (Song, 2007, p.18**).** Consequently, communitarian scholars equate culture with primordial conception of ethnic group which is understood in terms of members having a common name that shares exclusively common language, descent , history, identity, custom and territory (Narrol, 1964 cited in Polluha, 1998, p.32; Smith, 2001)

Notwithstanding its adverse effects on the rights of individuals, such notion of culture and identity could be promoted in homogenous society. However, the infusion of such ideology and practices in heterogeneous or multiethnic society would invite danger of balkanization, if not disintegration. In the case of the multiethnic society, such version of multiculturalism would fall into the trap of "essentialism" (Mason, 2007, p. 222). Group or cultural essentialism assumes cultural groups as "billiard- balls" with the notion that each group culture is clearly "demarcated", "separated" and" internally uniform" rather than having an overlapping and blurred boundaries with internal heterogenity (Mason, 2007, pp. 222-7). It is also assumed that each culture is unique and authentic that hybridization could be interpreted as corruption or morally unacceptable[15].

The political expression of such notion of diversity will yield what is termed as "fragmented pluralism" where ethnic groups enjoying "self-determination rights" or maximum autonomy with the view of protecting its own culture from external influence , with little or no concern for the culture of 'others' within the same group which probably becomes local majority (Gerteis and Hertmann, 2005, pp.229-30). As result, the internal minorities would be instigated to demand for the same recognition and such trend of endless claims would likely to continue (Tully, 1995).

What has been contrasted with this is "thin multiculturalism" that endorses multiculturalism under the strict preconditions of liberal-individualism (ibid.).

[15] The billiard ball conception of culture, as some scholars contends, "misrepresents the cultural diversity" of the complex world. It fails to capture the emerging meaning of culture as "overlapping, interactive and internally negotiated"(Tully, 1995, p. 10). Consequently, cultural hybridity seem to be the governing principle, instead of the logic of homogeneity as essentialist would assume, as defining nature of culture or an ethnic group.

Thus, some of the basic limitation of communitarianism can be summed up as follows: firstly, it enhances cultural boundaries and discourages inter-group dialogue and cooperation. Secondly, as result of the crystallization of cultural boundaries, the move towards cultural revivalism and nationalism will get bolstered. Following this cultural nationalism, the condition of internal minorities such as women and dissenting individuals and groups will be precarious. Among other things, women would be the first victim of the move because, in most societies, they have been considered as the "conduit of culture" (Sacher in Kymilicka & Norman, 2000, p.202). Thus, there will be the tendency for the prevalence of "cultural majoritarianism" (Mahajan, 2000, p.49) which is anti-thesis to multiculturalism. Condition of 'assimilation from below' is the likely consequence of such perspective to internal minorities.

Theoretically speaking, communitarian version of multiculturalism appears to be logical and intellectually appealing in diverse society, yet its practical implementation seemed to be a risky political adventurism. It may lead to crystallization of difference, on the basis of the myth of common origin of the past or imagined community of the future. In the process, inter-group relations, dialogues and common values of humanity might easily be relegated by cultural or ethnic entrepreneurs.

2.2.2. The Liberal- Multiculturalism

The proponents of what is often termed as `Liberal-Culturalism`(Kymilicka, 2002, p. 342) or liberal multiculturalism take up the value of culture of groups as important instrument to members of respective culture. Advocates of thin multiculturalism tend to see group membership as a key aspect of individual identity and, consequently, regard the recognition of cultural and social differences as vital if all individuals are to be guaranteed a secure environment in which they can flourish and advance their choice (Kymillicka, 2002). According to this scholar, culture provides alternatives to the individuals and thus, directly or indirectly, is important for the personal freedom of individuals.

Contrary to the widely held view that group rights are incompatible with the liberal emphasis on individual freedom, autonomy and equality, Scholars like Kymillick in Baumeister(2000) and Benhabib (2002), and Mahajan (2002) argue that multiculturalism involves the accommodation of individual rights and *group-differentiated rights*[16]. Both rights are not inherently contradictory as both liberals and communitarians have portrayed them to be. Those scholars who claims to be 'liberal –culturalism', as

[16] The term group differentiated rights or citizenship has been employed to make conceptual distinction from that of the universalist orientation of citizenship where the later has been criticized as *difference blind* (Taylor, 1994; Young, 1997)

Kymilicka (2002, p.339) labeled it, have attempted to make judicial balance between liberals and communitaraians position towards the accommodation of diversity.

According to this model, individual freedom is in important ways tied to group membership, since a person's capacity to make meaning full choice depends on access to` societal culture`. It is through her/his culture, language, and history that an individual become aware of the options available to her and their significance (ibid.; Kymillick in Baumeister, 2000, p. 176). Membership of a societal culture is therefore a precondition of making intelligent judgments about how to lead our lives. Accordingly, the state shall have social responsibility to protect culture, especially those cultures which get marginalized as result of the misguided nation building project through the mechanism of assimilation (Taylor in Kymilicka, 2002; Mahajan, 2002).However, sometimes some cultures may be intrusive to the basic freedoms and interests of individuals (Kymilicka, 2002).

Thus, in a culturally diverse society balance need to be stricken between the claims for group - differentiated rights and the commitment to individual rights. Here, Kymilicka (ibid) supports the view of recognizing or giving autonomy to minority groups under the condition that their culture and customs does not undermine the autonomy of any individual including children, women, and dissenting group within it. The latter are often labeled as "minorities within minorities" (Philips, 2004, p.113) or "internal minorities" (Green, 1995, p.261; Wienstock, 2007, p.243). The term *internal minorities* and *minorities within minorities* are interchangeably used. Both terms refers to "those whose rights might be threatened by the authority vested in minority communities by the theories and practices of mutual accommodation" (Wienstock, 2007, p.243). As diversity may not be bounded to territoriality, it is natural that different groups can cohabit or coexist in a certain territory or locality. Often, the application of territorial principle to accommodation of a specific minority group would turn the group in to local majority. It has been argued that such titular accommodation of local majority could be harsh on the internal minorities (Birsch, 1989, p.46). Those countries that lack adequate human right protection, there is more likely to exist not only discriminatory practices and exclusion would be common, avoidance of "the wrong people" will be inevitable action (Baubok, 2001, p. 42).

Indeed, the internal minorities would face measures ranging from assimilation to violence and genocide. Cognizance of such possibilities, Ayelet Shacher warns the likely possibility of "paradox of

multicultural vulnerability" (Shacher, 2004, p.3) if communitarian based accommodation happens to be practiced in a society. Shacher succinctly elucidates such paradox,

> *When pro-identity group policies aimed at leveling the playfield between minority communities and the wider society [majority] unwittingly allow systematic maltreatment of individuals within the accommodated group-an impact which in certain cases is so severe that it can nullify these individuals citizenship rights (2004, p.2).*

In the same vein of argument, Syla Benhabib raises the dilemma between multiculturalism and women rights and suggests for a judicial balance between women rights and cultural rights (Benhabib, 2002). Anchoring on the liberal value of autonomy, Benhabib (2002, p.20) opines,

> *… An individual must not be automatically assigned to a cultural, religious, or linguistic group by virtue of his or her birth. An individual's group membership must permit the most extensive forms of self-ascription and self-identification possible. There will be many cases when such self-identifications may be contested, but the state should not simply grant the right to define and control membership to the group at the expense of the individual; it is desirable that at some point in their adult lives individuals be asked whether they accept their continuing membership in their communities of origin.*

As part of solution to such problem, some scholars called for the prevalence of "the right to exit" (Spinner-Halev, 2004, p.159). The granting of exit rights *perse* may be necessary, though not sufficient, to groups like women or religious groups. Empowerment measures such as education may play paramount role in making exit right as practicable as possible (ibid.). However, exit right may not address the problems of oppression of other categories of internal minorities including mainly of ethnic and linguistic minorities. Unlike the case of women or any dissenting individuals where the granting cultural exemption rights or exit right could offer a kind of safety for their protection, other kind of internal minorities as ethnic group might require "a collective right to the resources needed for their cultural and linguistic security"(Green, in Kymilicka, 1995, p.262)[17].

Indeed, most liberal scholars demanded what Sara Song emphatically called for "right respecting accommodation" where the interest of multiple identities respected and their voice heard (Song, 2007, p46). Despite this, in the case of contradictions between the corporate rights and individuals, the individual's rights takes primacy. So, the accommodation of the claims of groups would be granted on condition that claimants respect the rights of individuals of their members as well as other internal minorities within them. Such view seemed to have simplified the intrinsic value, as communitarians

[17] Leslie Green, in his classic article-internal minorities and their Rights , writes that "English-Speaking Quebecers have, in addition to their individual rights of freedom of association , of expression, and collective right to the resource needed for their cultural and linguistic security"(Green, in Kymilicka,1995, p.262).

told us, that culture offers to members who ascribed to it. Indeed, culture is represented as a marketable commodity left to the choice of individuals.

As described above, liberal -multiculturalism theoretically seemed to have offered a middle ground between individuals rights-which is the corner stone in liberal thinking and practices, and group rights-the main thrust in the thinking of communitarian philosophy.

2.2.3. Deliberative-Multiculturalism

This school has been known under different designations such as inter-culturalism, "intercultural dialogue" (Parekh, 2000, p.268**) ,** conversational approach(Mookherjee, 2008**) ,** deliberative approach to diversity (Young, 1997; Ayirtman, n.d.), or "interactive approach" (Gerteis & Hartmann, 2005, p.232). Despite such seminal difference, the central assumption is that the interactive or relational aspect of diversity constitutes the essence of multiculturalism which is understood largely as the accommodation of difference and unity. Rooting their ideas about culture and identity formation, many scholars adopt social constructivist perspective to diversity.

According to social constructivism, culture, identity of any social category (ethnic or others), is not naturally-given, rather it changes due to some contingent factors. By the same logic collective identity, including ethnicity can be transformed, and reconstructed (Chandra, n.d.; Philips and Jorgensen, 2002)[18]. Rooting to the constructivist tradition, some scholars argue that multiculturalism- as a common identity of heterogeneous society emerges out of the interaction and *discursive process* of cultural groups(Jorgensen and Philips, 2002; Parekh, 2000). In this line, Parekh underlines,

> *Like any other society, a multicultural society needs a broadly shared culture to sustain it. Since it involves several cultures, the shared culture can only grow out of their interaction and should both respect and nurture their diversity and unite them around a common ways of life (Parekh, 2000, p.219).*

Accordingly, multiculturalism requires *a composite culture* which is to be constructed through intensive process of mutual interaction, understanding and dialogue among groups in a society (ibid.).That is to mean that multiculturalism emerges out of the cultivation of shared understanding between majority and minority groups through "cultural dialogue and exchanges" (Gerteis and Hertmann, 2005, p.231).

[18] Anchoring on the vantage point of constructivism, Chandra opines that flexibility of identity or identity shifts can happen depending on the circumstances.

In general, the assumption behind dialogic or deliberated approach to multiculturalism is that a democratic deliberation among groups be it at the formal governmental bodies or in the private networks, will beef up mutual understanding of one another's view on matters that might have led to misunderstanding and conflict in the absence of open and fair discussion or dialogue. Accordingly, the successful construction of multiculturalism-defined as the forging of unity and diversity, is contingent not only upon the existence of formal rights and opportunities enabling public deliberation, but also requires the prevalence of informal forums , site of deliberation, negotiation, and interaction among groups and the citizenry in general.

Consequently, deliberative approach to multiculturalism may help to transform the conflictive and competitive tendencies to cooperative and consensual orientation over values and perspectives among groups in a society. But again, deliberation alone could not be sufficient condition in the reconstruction of multicultural identity that benefits all-the majority and the minority alike. To that end, it really needs not just formal institutions, mostly top-down, but also the normative commitments of governmental, nongovernmental and the ordinary citizens to. Thus, the normative views need to be complemented with appropriate institutional design.

2.2.4. The Leninist-Stalinist Approach to Multiculturalism

The Leninist –Stalinist perspective centered upon the narratives of *oppressed -nation and oppressor -nation*, dichotomies in the conception of ethnic groups as *nation and nationalities*, and hierarchical-multilevel accommodation.

2.2.4.1. The Thesis of Oppressed and Oppressor Nation

Stalin and Lenin, in the struggle of toppling down the feudal tsarist Russia, transposes the classical Marxist theory of class contradiction into in to identity politics where Ethnic Russians figured out the "oppressor- nation" while the rest groups were identified as the "oppressed nations" (Slezkine, 1994, p.414). In line with such categorization comes two contrasting forms of nationalism, namely "the oppressor nation –nationalism" and "oppressed nation-nationalism" have been envisaged (ibid. p.419). Yuri Slezkine explicates the difference between the two as follows:

> *The first, sometimes glossed as great power chauvinism, was gratuitously malevolent; the second was legitimate, albeit transitory. The first was the result of unfair size advantage; the second was a reaction to discrimination and persecution; Thefirst could only*

> *eliminated as a consequence of proletarian victory and subsequent self –discipline and self purification; the second had to be assuaged through sensitivity and tact* (Slezkine, 1994, p.419).

In so doing, socialism and nationalism were tactically married together as maximum and minimum program respectively to construct the Socialist USSR (Ezergailis, 1971, p.6)[19]. While the promotion of proletariat class and socialism was posited as an end point, the recognition and promotion of national self- determination for groups particularly for the minority groups-*oppressed nations*, to use the Stalinist and Leninist lexicon, was employed as tactical tool, if not a short cut, that are decisive to accelerate the socialist revolution (Conner, 1984; Ezergailis, 1971; Ree, 1994).

In addition to the dichotomy of oppressed nation and oppressor nation, the Stalinist-Leninist coinages of terms like 'nation' and 'nationalities' is worthy for discussion. As discussed in the first chapter (section **2.1),** term nation and ethnic group represent distinct level of understanding to society. Nation can be defined as "imagined political community" (Anderson**,** 2006, p.6). It represents a politicized community which desires to have state (Weber, 1984 cited in Smith, 2001, p.25). Often nation is created through nationalism; whereas an *ethnic group* represents mere sociological realities. In the conventional usage of the terms, what distinguishes nation from that of ethnic group will be the degree of political assertiveness.

However, in Marxist lexicon, the term 'nation' and 'nationalities' connote something different from the conventional meaning of nation and ethnic group. *Nation* is portrayed as advanced and "modern", while *nationalities* are pre-modern, perhaps, "backward" cultural organizations (Engels and Marx in Nimni, 1995, p.64). In addition, nation is portrayed as large while nationalities are smaller in terms of their size. According to the Stalinist-Leninist definition of nation and nationalities, factors such as size, historicity, and economic advancement were some of the distinguishing parameters among nation and nationalities instead of the level of political consciousness of groups.

2.2.4.2. Hierarchical Multilevel Accommodation of Nation and Nationality rights

The Soviet Union was established as "hierarchical federation of ethnically defined territories" (Cornell, 2002, p.71). It was made up of five tired government that accommodates diversity in an embryonic manner. The second tiers of government, obviously next to the centre, were fifteen federating units

[19]Such reformulation by Lenin and Stalin seems to have to have turned Karl Marx's theory of class upside down. Indeed, for Marxist thinkers, socialism and nationalism has been conceived as direct opposites (Ezergailis, 1971, p.3).

known as Union Republic or Soviet Socialist Republics (SSR). All of the SSR were granted to exercise self -determination rights including secession. In addition, they were entitled to enjoy their sovereign rights to having some privileges to have membership to the United Nation and maintain diplomatic relations (Khanna, 1972, p.650). Next the SSR, were the twenty (20) Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) which in turn were constituent parts of the Union Republics. The ASSR did not have the right to secession as well as diplomatic relations, but enjoy maximum autonomy within the union Republics. Accordingly, they were entitled to have their own Constitution, flags and emblems just like any member of federations in normal federations elsewhere[20]. What comes at the fourth level of government in the hierarchy were *Eight* (8) *Autonomous Regions* (AR) or '*Oblast*', and fifth and the last autonomous unit were the ten (10) Autonomous Area (AA) or *Okrug* (Cornel, 2002; Khanna, 1972)[21].

Despite the existence of such autonomous structures, there exited no clear cut division regarding the functional distribution of power common to every federations. Apart from linguistic and cultural autonomy, there hardly existed economic decentralization. Instead, the central government controlled the decision on matters related to economic and social development statewide (see USSR, 1936, art.14). Instead of power division, one would see a sharing of overlapping responsibilities that went upwards. In other words, the union republic implements the decision of the Supreme Soviet (central houses). And by the same logic those autonomous units below the union republic (such as ASSR, AR, AA) implements the decision and policy direction from above in their respective territories (USSR, 1977, art. 77&83)[22].

[20]Despite such selective treatment of diversity, there had been some precondition which were served as signpost to distinguish between the Union Republic and the Autonomous Republic (ASSR). A population of more than one million and an outlet to the outside world were the two criteria to qualify as Union Republic. An outlet to the external world was set to be as criteria on the basis of the assumption that the union republics exercise secession rights without much trouble on the hinterland of USSR. For other autonomous arrangement, population size and relative homogeneity of population was assumed to be the general signpost. In general, as we go down from Union Republics to autonomy areas, population of the constituent unit decreases (Cornel, 2002; Khanna, 1972).

[21]Out of the 108 identified nation and nationalities, about 53 groups were given titular autonomy at different levels within hierarchical entrenched multilevel arrangement (Cornel, 2002; Khanna, 1972).

[22] Article 77 stipulated that union republic shall ensure comprehensive economic and social development on its territory, facilitate exercise of the power of the USSR on its territory, and implement the decision of the highest bodies of state authority and administration of the USSR. Similarly, it was also provided that an autonomous republic shall ensure comprehensive economic and social development on its territories , facilitate exercise of the power of the USSR and the Union Republic on its territory and implement decisions of the highest bodies of the state authorities and administration of the USSR and the Union Republic(USSR, 1977, art.83).

Such power centralism was also reinforced by the communist party and the so called 'democratic centralism'[23] decision making practices. Consequently, the role of the communist party was all pervasive all activities of autonomous units at any level were subject to massive control and command of the party (Khanna, 1972). Khanna opines that "the so called autonomy of the union republics and of other areas based upon nationality was no more than the freedom to implements the policy laid down by the party" (1972, p.660).

Another manifestation of hierarchy was reflected in the number of representation in what is commonly considered as upper house- the 'soviet of nationalities' , which was one of the 'Supreme Soviet of USSR(legislative body) parallel to the lower house - 'the soviet of the union', at the central government level. While representation in the lower house was on the basis of citizenship criteria, representation in the upper house-the soviet of nationalities have been staffed by according to "union and autonomous republics, autonomous regions and national areas on the basis of 25 deputies from each union republic, 11 deputies from each autonomous republic, 5 deputies from each autonomous regions and 1 deputy from each national area" (U.S.S.R, 1936, art. 35). According to this ratio: 25:11:5:1 each autonomous unit, regardless of its population size, having similar status enjoyed equal representation at the center. Yet, one would clearly see uneven representation vertically (as one moves up in the autonomous arrangements or vice versa). While population sizes seems to be considered vertically, the same logic did not apply when it comes to horizontal positioning of each autonomous units.

As a result of such complex arrangement, there emerged anomaly disproportional representation observed at two logics. Firstly, there emerged huge gaps in terms of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.R) and every other non-Russian Union Republics. The R.S.F.R had about 236 seats, while most union republic had only 25 seats, except Georgia which had 52 seats. However, this doesn't mean that the ethnic Russians had greater representation in the *Soviet of Nationalities* as there had been minority overrepresentation within R.S.F.R. The ratio was 25:211 showing the over representation of the non Russians delegated to the upper house, representing the R.S.F.R. Secondly,

[23] In the former USSR, the constitutional interpreting body was constituted out of the elected members consisting of the two legislative houses and it was also be accountable to the supreme soviets (see USSR, 1936, art.48). This could be taken as another manifestation of democratic centralism.

one would also see that the non-Russian ethnic groups with their own union republic in combination had dominated the seats of the upper house (USSR, 1936, Art.35)[24].

2.3. Institutional Approaches to Multiculturalism

Institutionalism is as old as the field of political science. The analysis of constitutions, laws, rules and regulations and the structure of government has been central preoccupation of institutionalism, to understand political processes and outcomes -behaviors (North, 1990 in Reilly, 2000; Peters, 1999). One strand of thought within this school is what is referred to as the *normative institutionalism* which focuses on the role of rules and regulations and structures in shaping political actors' behavior and intentions towards goals or aspirations that are set to be appropriate or right (Peters, 1999, p.19). In so doing, political institutions would set course of actions, intentions and behaviors which are acceptable or unacceptable, or politically correct or incorrect. The second strands of thought is the *rational choice institutionalism* that contend that "behaviors are functions of rules and incentives" (ibid.) and hence cannot be fully neutral in their formulations and operations from interest of human actors. This captured by what is termed as "the logic of interest" to imply that "institutions are seen as structure of incentive within which rational actors follow their preferences" (Schmidt, 2006, p.99). Thus, institutions are system of rules and inducements to behavior in which individuals attempt to maximize their own utilities (Knight, 1992 in Peters, 1999, p.19). In this case it is not always true that institutions shape the behaviors of society, the converse of this could also be valid in that human agents, be it individually or in group, with specific socioeconomic interest could also shape the creation as well as operational process of institutions.

[24] One could be puzzled by the multiplication of autonomous units within the 'Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (R.S.F.R)' where the union republic was supposed to be named after the majority-Russians. It apparently looks that the non Russian autonomous union republics were homogenous. The main justification for the absence of mechanism of accommodation for internal minorities within non Russian union republics could largely be explained in terms of the ideological biases towards the minority against the majority. For the Marxist politicians, self- determination was understood as something the oppressed nation deserves to enjoy and hence was exclusionary for the majority (Cornell, 2002) . In fact the majority were labeled as "chauvinists" or 'the oppressor nation'' that was deserves nothing more than probably oppression (Slezkine, 1994, p.419) . While Lenin was asked about the interest of the majority-Russian, Lenin was reported to have ridiculed it as absurd and claimed that his plan was to accommodate the interest of the minorities only (Cornell, 2002, p.68). Indeed his scheme of 'nationalism of oppressor nation and nationalism of oppressed nations' clearly indicated the failure of the ideology in terms of addressing identity issue in an all encompassing or inclusive manner. At least rhetorically, the dichotomization of groups sounds discriminatory and exclusionary to the majority group.

There exist various the mechanisms of institutional accommodation of diversity. Federalism, autonomy, linguistic policies, consociationalism represented the major approaches of accommodation of diversity. For the sake of brevity, and relevance to the topic of this dissertation research, different model of autonomy and linguistic policies have been dealt with.

2.3.1. Autonomy

Autonomy connotes "degree of control over one's own affairs" (Gilbert, 2002, p.300). So, autonomy is a relative term that indicates the degree in which a particular group or groups exercises self-government at different levels within the existing state structure. In this respect autonomy has been conceived as "method of affording internal self-determination to minorities who form part of [….] the state" (Gilbert, 2002, p.309).Autonomy basically implies 'limited self- rule' (Lapidoth, 1996 cited in Basta,2012, p.9) often granted to minority group "as counterweight to the groups right already enjoyed by the majority population"(Wright, 1999, *abstract*). Here "self-rule" is understood as a community's ability to legislate and implement laws according to the wishes of its representative" (Lapidoth, 1996 in Basta, 2012, p.21). And the term " limited" here refers to scope of the policy areas in which the unit is entitled to act upon which may not necessarily be considered as hindrance or challenges emanating from financial shortcomings or administrative competencies (Basta, 2012, p.22). So, as highlighted by Lapidoth, autonomy requires more than declaratory statements and proclamations, it requires the implementation of the rights given by laws (constitution or proclamations). Like Lapidoth (1996), Thomas Benedikter also underlined that having legislative competence is the minimum requirement of autonomy, in addition to democratic representation (Bendikter, 2009, 12).

Indeed, autonomy as it has been envisaged by scholars cannot be genuine in undemocratic systems. Yet, as a matter of practices, different sort of autonomy have been adopted to accommodate identity groups among states of the world with contrasting track difference on issue of democracy. In this respect different forms of autonomy have been employed as tools of accommodating group claims, specifically the minority groups so that the group(s) can have partial or limited or complete, control over its own affairs. The form of autonomy could take either territorial or Non territorial or mixed- a combination of the two.

2.3.2. Forms of Autonomy: Territorial and Non Territorial Autonomy

2.3.3.1. Non Territorial Cultural Autonomy

More often the logic of modern state is territorial based in which members of nation-states are demarcated by territory. In this regard territorial autonomy works on the logic of territorial limited where groups or individual rights and privileges are defined into some territorial jurisdiction. In contrast to this, Non territorial cultural autonomy implies a type of limited autonomy given to members of a cultural community or nation to exercise cultural, linguistic and religious activities regardless of geographic demarcation/ space (Basta, 2012, p.11). Accordingly, an individual could enjoy such rights regardless of the place of origin or administrative jurisdiction. In other words, the non territorial autonomy works in line with the "personality principle"[25] where a certain minority ethnic or cultural group is given equal rights with the majority wherever they happen to live (Birch, 1989, p.153).

Historically speaking non territorial autonomy (hereafter NTA) was one of the oldest forms of self-government (autonomy). During the medieval period, the "millet system"[26] was entrenched during the time of Ottoman Empire wherein different religious communities were allowed to administer their own affairs in the domain of education, religion and family matters such as marriage, divorce and inheritance (Coakley, 1994, p.300).

The concept of NTA can be traced back to the working of socialist democratic thinkers of Otto Bauer and Karl Renner's. According to Marxist thinking class as an economic category, has been the corners stone of socialist thinking and nation or any cultural units has been conceived negatively. Indeed, nation and nationalism has been considered as an impediment to modernization as envisaged by socialists. The NTA alternative had no longer be accepted by Lenin and Stalin on based on their suspicion that this

[25] There are two principles of language policy that countries adopt. One is based on territorial principle where the country administratively divided in to monolingual areas. Belgium, Finland, Switzerland, Ethiopia and many more countries apply this logic. The other principle is the personality principle where linguistic minority communities are offered the right to use their language anywhere in the country without any jurisdictional limit. Few countries adopt this policies: Canada as bilingual country and South Africa where 11 languages are declared as the official language are good examples (Birch, 1989, p.153).

[26] The Greek orthodox churches, the Armenian catholic churches and the Jewish communities were recognized as millets. Similarly the dominant Muslim community had their own separate "millets" (Coakley, 1994, p.300).

model would create segregation among cultural groups which is likely to overshadow solidarity among classes of different category of peoples (Bowring, 2005)[27].

Amid of this intellectual pessimism, Bauer (1907/1996) contend that "cultural groups were autonomous from classes and would become even more differentiated under socialism [and] socialism would bring stability by decoupling culture from economy" (Bauer, 1996 cited in Arel, 2001, p.66). Bauer then suggest the possibility of "granting non territorial self -determination to the nationalities"[28] (ibid.). Karl Renner (1902), in his seminal article, *State and Nation*, provided a new model that applies separation between the nation (as cultural group) and the state (political organization) both having their own autonomy so that cultural and linguistic diversities would be accommodated regardless of any territorial limit. And he elaborates that the state will be concerned about non-cultural issues, while the "nation" concerns about matters of culture and language. Karl Renner's model is often termed as 'national cultural autonomy'[29] (Nimini, 2005, p.1). Separating state and nation as envisaged by above, has been considered to be as a panacea to the threat of genocide, ethnic cleansing or internal wars which is likely to occur under the nation-state model (Nimini, 2005, p.1)[30].

However, some scholars question the feasibility of NTA as most of the claim of self-determination involves territory, or own 'homeland' (Baubok, 2001)[31]. And thus mere accommodation of culture may not satisfy the ethnic entrepreneurs. Indeed, the ethnic entrepreneur prefers territorial autonomy as it will give them effective control over the total population of the territory that would give them leverage or bargaining power with the centre (Basta, 2012, p.41). Apart from this, NTA would help to ease out problems that may emanate from rival claims over certain territory or enclave, problems arising from

---

[27] . In retrospect, some boldly claim that USSR could not have been disintegrated had it adopted NCA/NTA model suggested by Karl Renner and Otto Bauer (Bowring, 2005, p.170). The move to NTA among the post-communist countries including Russian federation can be considered as a proof to such hypothesis.

[28] Some scholars believe that the original meaning of self-determination regards people only, not territory. What problamitizes the question of self-determination is when the claim includes territory as well. The territorial application of self-determination would risk the minorities sharing the same space. In this regard NTA would avoid such problem.

[29] Autonomous units will be established as public law Corporation on the basis of a nationality register in which individuals declare their affiliation. And nations are represented at the state level in separate national council elected on the basis this register (Baubok, 2001, p.19).

[30] .NTA would also help to normalize or mollify radical demands of exclusivist movements like secession into pluralistic solidarity(Baubok, 2001, p.48)

[31] Horowitz (1997) in his *Self determination, Politics, Philosophy and Law'* contest that the principles of self-determination refers people not territory. Yet he regretted that in the west secessionist claim of territory misplaced the concept of self determination.

demarcating borders among contiguous communities, and question of viability on the basis of the population size. Small group may not be considered as candidate for territorial autonomy due to the suspicion that it would not be viable due to its smallness. Yet, such question may not be as such relevant to provide NTA to the group in question (Baubok, 2001).it is rightly argued that "the boundaries of constituency are unambiguously defined by voluntary declaration of membership, there is no more exclaves and enclaves" (Baubok, 2001, p.44).

According to Rainer Baubok NTA is squarely fit into "divided and dispersed nations" including " exiled nations" (as in the case of Roma and Palestine), "divided nations without state" (as in the case of Kurds which are found in Turkey, Iraq and Iran), "external national minorities" (as the case of Russians, outside Russian Federations, in many newly created states following the implosion of former USSR) , "mixed territories" (regions hosting heterogeneous groups as in the case of South Tyrol in Italy[32]), and "territorially dispersed internal minorities" (Baubok, 2001, p.42).

In most of the post-communist state in Eastern and central European state, non territorial model of accommodation[33] has become the norm. There are two modalities of practicing such approach. One is by establishing self-governing institution that concerns to the governance of education, tourism, language. The second modality is establishing advisory and consultative bodies that will be consulted in matters affecting the minority groups (Smith, 2013)[34]. These are basically cultural autonomy models. In some countries, external minorities have been given the right to form political parties[35].

The other cases where non- territorial autonomy has been employed in where there exists heterogeneous region or province. In this regard, there could be non-territorial autonomy arrangements which aim at ensuring participatory autonomy (power- sharing) and cultural autonomy as well. A good example in this regard is the Atlantic Coast Region in Nicaragua, and also South Tyrol in Italy. In Nicaragua, the Atlantic Coast region is inhabited by Six (6) distinct "ethno-racial groups" which have been

[32] In South Tyrol, both TA and NTA approaches were uniquely employed and hence hybrid form.

[33] Non territorial approach has become preferred approach of the newly born "nationalizing state"-a state that follows the principle of nation-state model where a majority nation is considered as owner of the state. And NTA has been envisaged as none threatening than territorial approach. As legacy of their own experience showed, TA would put a threat of secession. Yet As Will Kymilicka argues NTA help to assuage the claims of external minorities to look outside for their kin state-external homeland(Kymilicka, 2001)

[34] Ukraine, Russia, Hungary, Romania, Latvia, and Estonia provides Advisory and consultative bodies to minorities

[35] In Ukraine, Russians have been given the right to form political parties. In addition, the Russian language has been recognized as the second official language.

accommodated in the political decision making through proportional electoral system (Hooker, 2009, pp.1-6) . In Italy, the South Tyrol has adopted robust accommodative system where three linguistic groups, including Germans, Italians and *Ladin* cultural autonomies in addition to proportional representation in the civil service and political decision making (Baubok, 2001, p.44).

2.3.3.2. Territorial Autonomy

Territorial autonomy is "exercised through institutions which make and enforce rule for all persons inhabiting a delimited part of a state's territory, regardless of the group affiliation (Basta, 2012, p.11). Any sort of territorial autonomy may not be sensitive to the demands of minorities and hence may not serve as mechanism of accommodation of diversity. To be considered as accommodative then, the territorial autonomy need to be linked to the demand of ethnic group. In light of this Ruth Lapidoth defines territorial autonomy as "an arrangement aimed at granting to a group that differs from the majority of the population in the state, but that constitutes the majority in a specific region, a means by which it can express its identity" (Lapidoth, 1996 in Basta, 2012, p.16). Such notion of TA is very much akin to what is sometimes termed as 'titular autonomy' where a specific minority group is entitled to have autonomy or control over certain areas where the group members expected to be concentrated and become majority in such locality or region. In other words titular autonomy could be rightly referred to as "group specific accommodation" (Cunningham& Weidmann, 2010, footnote 7, p.1038). So, in group specific accommodation[36], a certain group will be singled out and guaranteed autonomy.

A typical form of *multilevel titular autonomy* was instituted in the Former USSR and Yugoslavia. In USSR, there were Twenty (20) Autonomous Titular sub units within Fifteen(15) federating units which further contain Eight (8) titular units at provincial level and Ten (10) titular units at district level(Basta, 2012; see also U.S.S.R, 1977). In the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo (for Albanians) and Vojvodin (for ethnic Hungarians) autonomous province were instituted within former "Republic of Serbia" one of the titular republic out six republics.

[36]Crimea (for Ethnic Russians), for instance, in Ukraine before its annexation by Russia had such autonomous status. For more information on autonomy see Bendikter (2009) Solving Ethnic Conflict through self government: A short Guide to Autonomy in Europe and South Asia. .Countries like India, Russia, Ethiopia, Mexico and Bolivia had titular autonomy to minority groups with multilevel arrangements.

Territorial autonomy could also be granted to ethnic groups sharing the same region or province. This is also be referred to as "region-specific accommodation[37]" (Cunningham& Weidmann, 2010, footnote 7, p.1038). In this case the autonomous units are defined by heterogeneity of groups. In region specific accommodation a single group may not be singled out for special treatment as in the case of Titular autonomy. It may address the claims of minorities in different ways. Such autonomy could be better expressed as 'multiethnic regional autonomy'. Below such units, different tools, territorial, or both TA and NTA can be used. Cases in point include Assam region in India and also South Tyrol region in Italy (Philip, 2009; Baubok, 2001).

2.3.4. Contending Views on the Merit and Demerit of Territorial Autonomy

There is an ongoing debate as to the significance of autonomy within the context of multinational federalism. In this regard, there are adherents and critics. The protagonists contend that autonomy allows territorially concentrated groups exercise self- government. In doing so, multinational federalism would empower identity groups of their culture, language and history.

The other justification is the view that territorial autonomy very much helps to avoids or minimizes conflict by way of separating identity groups who are different from each other (Conway &Simeon, 2001; Adeney, 2007). In this regard, Ted Robert Gurr contends that "negotiated autonomy has proved to be an effective antidote for ethno-national wars of secession in Western and Third World states" (Gurr, 2000 in Anderson and Erk, 2010, p.4).

So, granting autonomy to a claimant group, either under the arrangement of federalism or unitary framework has been considered to be the last option to ensuring peace and stability. Some even contend that guaranteeing autonomy to specific homogenous group do have double role. It is argued that, once the autonomy is guaranteed, then there would no longer be a threat to stability or unity for mainly two reasons; first, the elites of the region in question may satisfy with the privileges they won through the negotiation. Second, if conflicts are to happen, it may logically take a horizontal dimension involving

[37] Region specific accommodation may be confusing as there are regional autonomies, that could be homogenous or heterogeneous, whose purpose is to address the socioeconomic need of its constituent population. Here the approach is welfares in orientation than identity. But in the case of multiethnic regions, accommodation tools may be different from that of homogenous regions.

the same group (Adeney, 2007, p.21).[38] Consequently, it is likely that the gravity of the conflict will be limited in scope and space.

However, contrary to this, it is also argued that titular autonomy may exacerbate conflicts for which it is designed to address. The attempt to attain peace or regulate peace through separating group into some titular self- governing entities may also give opportunities for the political elites to fight for seeking more autonomy that may extend to the level of independence (Dion, 1992 in Conway &Simeon, 2001; Ezgi, n.d. ; Lake & Rothchild, n.d; Anderson& Erk, 2010**).** In this respect, territorial autonomy specifically titular autonomy has been criticized due to the following four factors discussed below.

2.3.4.1. Titular Accommodation induces Local Conflicts

Some scholars contend that multilevel titular accommodation, which is understood as "further federalization of multiethnic state along an ethnic lines, "has been conceived as a "cure all prescription" for ethnic conflict (Meyer, 2000 in Cornell, 2002, p.4). Despite this, however, it is strongly argued that group specific accommodation –titular accommodation- within heterogeneous region will be fatal and conflict prone. In this respect, Cunningham & Weidmann(2010) contend that any attempt to grant autonomy to specific group within heterogeneous region will be problematic and may engender intergroup conflicts mainly for three reasons, including:(1) "differential costs and benefits of accommodation"; (2) "competition and zero -sum local politics "; and (3) "discrimination by a local majority"(p.1040).

It is obvious that any accommodative process involves the politics of redistribution. It is logical that resources will be redistributed from others to the aggrieved minority group. From this established premises, it is argued that group specific accommodation benefits only the group while, at the same time, is costly to others (ibid.). For instance institutionalizing bilingual education requires extra cost , other than it was the case in monolingual education , requiring man power training through mother tongue, building schools and other facilities all of which my require redistribution of resources. So,

[38] The assumption of intra ethnic conflict is on the basic view that multiparty democracy from below would create tension among the group and hence any conflict of this nature is limited in scale. Yet such assumption takes prevalence of democracy for granted .yet as a matter of practice, multiparty democracy at the local level might be limited, on none in many cases. The basic shortcoming of such view is the view that local conflicts remains local in nature and so local conflicts are considered to be an instrument of counterchecking centrifugal forces. Such pessimistic understanding of politics could not help to ensure peace and stability in transcending manner.

giving autonomy to specific group within a certain heterogeneous region would have negative repercussion to others in terms of resource distribution.

The other factors hindering accommodation from below is, its far reaching the implication on the competitive nature of local political contexts. Conferring autonomy will have implication on the current status of groups in terms of calculation of interest and domination in the region. Such sensitivity to relative gain will be enhanced under the tempo of multiparty competition. Especially if groups are competitive, giving recognition or autonomy to one, but denying another would create condition of "security dilemma" and hence will generate local conflict (Cunningham & Weidmann, 2010, p.1041). From this it could also be mentioned that giving recognition to a specific group will have a domino-effect. Other groups will demand the same kind of claim, if not more[39]. The third reason that may contribute to intergroup conflict is the danger that local autonomy will likely to create on what is commonly known as "internal minorities". In this regard, it is said,

> *even when concessions are designed not to disadvantage other groups, increasing the power or status of one group relative to another can cause commitment problems within the diverse region. It is difficult for the advantaged group to make a commitment not to actively work to diminish the status of other groups in the future. This is most likely to be a problem when a minority group constitutes a local majority [. ….on the other hand] the demographically majority group will likely to keep its dominance through assimilative policy that would degrade the identity of other group*(Cunningham & Weidmann,2010, p.1041, ellipsis and bracket mine).

So, not only discriminatory practices and exclusion would be common, avoidance of "the wrong people" will be inevitable action (Baubok, 2001, p.42). Less than this assimilation from below remains the common path. Very few democratic countries do have protective regimes to internal minorities.

2.3.4.2. Territorial Autonomy Risks Internal Minorities

The other major criticism against territorial autonomy within the framework of multinational federalism, be it asymmetric or symmetric one, is the view that minorities who live within the federating units will be victimized(Adeney, 2007). More often, there has been tendency of homogenization as part of the nation-building process from below; and such measures would either marginalize or assimilate the minorities within the previously minority-turned majority. Consequently, genocide and forced

[39] The domino effect of politics of recognition in Spain is captured by the phrase "coffee to all" syndrome. Initially, Autonomous community (AC) status was given to the three historically known regions. But the door has been opened up for attaining ACs through negotiation with the center resulted for the establishment of 17 ACs. The historic community then reacted negatively this move. Some political elites representing the historic region bashed this as "coffee to me"

population transfer would be inevitable unless strict minority rights regimes are emplaced (Adeney, 2007). One specific measure to be taken seriously is the principle: "Ethnic group should not be allowed to govern their own units unless guarantees for minorities are respected" (Beran, 1984 in Adeney, 2007, p.18). Furthermore, Adeney (2007, p.18) suggest that a strong human rights regime with strong enforceability as well as central government follow up and support would minimize the burden of the minorities within minorities.

2.3.4.3. Territorial Autonomy Discourages Inter- elite Cooperation

Homogenous units do not provide opportunities for interethnic cooperation among elites and masses. Identity politics will lead to zero-sum game than mere power politics commonly observed in other issues (Horowitz, 1985 in Adeney, 2007, p.20). The politicization of identity will further erode the socio-cultural and economic bonds of society. Consequently, some scholars strongly call for the creation of heterogeneous units that would permanently avoid the problems of minorities within minorities (Lake & Rothchild, n.d. ; Horowitz, 1985).

2.3.4.4. Territorial Autonomy Encourages Secessionist Conflict

Territorial Autonomy may "foster ethnic mobilization, increased secession, and even armed conflict" (Cornell, 2002, p.7). Such assertion is justified along three contending theses. The first of this is the institutionalist argument. In this regard, group of scholars contend that "autonomous structures, including local government, veto power and tax authority lead ethnic groups to make extreme demands for independence" (Jenne, Lowe & Saidman, 2007, p.542). Consequently, institution can induce for the construction of nationhood which might lead to the demand of statehood within or without the existing state framework. It is argued that once a group enjoys titular autonomy, there are favorable conditions that push the group for secession. These conditions are, (1) Border, (2) group identity formations, (3) "state-like institution", (4) leadership, (5) financial resources, (6) mass media, and (7) external support (Basta, 2012**).** An autonomous territory would have sense of border through map, shape and flag that will facilitate future state making processes. Similarly "state –like institution like law making, executive body, media, leadership and police create institutional capacity which are requisite for nation building. All these institutional set up will enhance capacity building of autonomous units for furtherance of secessionism.

The second argument takes up the role of strategic power for the furtherance of ethnic demands. It is argued that the furtherance of group claims depends on the bargaining capacity of the group vis-à-vis the central government (Jenne, Lowe, Saideman & Stephen, 2007). *Internal factors* such as territorial compactness and *history of autonomy*, and *external factors* such as military support and support of external homeland are some of the factor that could augment the bargaining power of the claimant group (ibid. p.541)[40]. Similarly, Valerie Bunce in his empirical investigation of possibility secession in three post-communist states including *Georgia*, *Russia* and *Serbia* from 1989-2003, identified several factors that could encourage secession such as the balance of power between the center and the subunits; the entrenchment of "ethno federalism"; large size with geographically concentrated minority; the availability of arms to the subunits; and the outcome of political struggle at the center (Bunce, 2005, p.8). These principles or variables, which are empirically derived, shows that no single variable explanation would be convincing to talk about the possibility of secession.

Apart from this, minority groups may resort to violence due to communal grievance and the presence of the "political opportunity structures" within certain political regime (Cederman & Wimmer, 2009, p. 319). For instance, within the context of ethnic based federalism, the incentive structures and opportunities provided under the principles of self- rule will encourage some group to claim for some level of autonomy which in turn my initiate other minority group to go for similar moves and hence there will be domino-effects.

Cognizance of the discontents of titular autonomy, some scholars argue that non-territorial autonomy appear to resolve the problem of rival claims, of contiguity and of size (Baubok, 2001, p.44). In addition, non titular and non territorial autonomy may offer better options in terms of addressing the problem of *internal minority*. Furthermore, region specific accommodation is also believed to increase intergroup solidarity and hence would ensure sustainable peace and stability.

However, the paradox lays on the will of elites. Elites of ethnic groups tend to prefer the territorial approach than other alternatives forms of autonomy (Basta, 2012). Karlos Basta identified three justifications as to why elite prefer TA than NTA. The first point is the relative advantage TA provides to political elites for group mobilization by "providing effective policing of group members". TA will

[40] The claim of Basque, Catalonia and Garcia for autonomy were based on the historical claim that they used to enjoy in the second Republic(1931-39) which later (1978) have been reconsidered towards the adoption of multinational federalism. The case of Quebec and many other cases were on the basis of the autonomy they used to exercise in the past.

give opportunities for taking collective action and mass mobilization (Basta, 2012, p.40). Yet in NTA effective group mobilization and action will be hampered due to geographic reasons. Secondly, it is believed that TA will enhance the bargaining power of the elites of the titular group for achieving further objective with the central government. Basta (2012) argues "if minority –inhabited region contain important natural resources or if its location is of strategic importance, TA might enhance the influence of nationalist politicians have in negotiation" (p.41). Thirdly, Land or 'home land[41]' could have symbolic significant to the group and hence TA will help to satisfy such identity need (ibid.)

2.3.2. Language usage for the Minority groups

Language remains to be at the core of identity and conveyor of culture (Fang, 2017, p.1; Carmack, n.d, p.2). Indeed, it is considered to be "one of the most important expressions of identity" (UN Special Reporter on Minority Issues [UNSRMI], 2017, p.5). According to UNSRIM(2017) language rights for those minority groups has been advocated as instruments to the promotion of human 'dignity' or self esteem, 'liberty' (as freedom of expression) , 'equality and non-discrimination'(p.6).

Apart from such obvious reasons, the use of minority language has wide-ranging implications and functions. Among other things, it helps to improving "access to and the quality of education for minority children" (UNSRMI, 2017, p.8). It also helps to induce effective delivery of public service by way of improving the quality and access to social services (ibid, p.9). Failure to do so will not only hinder the communication between the government and the concerned minority group, but also hinders effective service delivery. Furthermore, it is pointed out that minority language usage serve as conflict prevention and or stability. In this respect, it is envisaged that "ethnic tension and conflicts with in a state are more likely to be avoided where language right are in place to address the causes of alienation, marginalization and exclusion" (UNSRMI, 2017, p.9).

Most importantly, usage of minority right protects diversity and human's heritage. It is advocated that "respectfully and actively accommodating linguistic diversity is the hall mark of an inclusive society, and is one of the keys to countering intolerance and racism" (UNSRMI, 2017, P.10). Indeed, the recognition and usage of minority right can be taken as stepping stone to enhancing tolerance, mutual respect and embark upon intercultural dialogue among diverse groups in a society.

[41] Home land is considered to be one of the objective markers of ethnic group (Smith, 2001)

For the effective and better utilization of the above-mentioned functions, scholars underlined on the need for institutional support to minority languages (Fang, 2017). Such institutional support is required in the sphere of public institution, media and education. Institutional support in public institution can take different forms of enactments and enforcements of language right to use in the courts, the political assemblies and public service institutions (Fang, 2017, p.3).

The extension of institutional support to minority language in all forms of media, including print, electronic and broadcast media have symbolic as well as material reward to the minority group (Carmack**,** n.d, p.2). The self-esteem needs of symbolic recognition seem to be straightforward advantages. On top of this, public media in minority language creates job opportunities, in manner exclusively to the minority group, and hence has economic advantage. It is also enables the communities to set their own agenda and helps to sensitize concerned peoples for some public causes (ibid.). Above all, public media in minority languages do have multifaceted advantage as stated below:

> *It gives government a tool to prevent the isolation of minorities in public life, establishes a direct communication and information link between the state and minorities, and provides a particular effective tool for ensuring their inclusion while promoting tolerance, cultural diversity, mutual respect, understanding and cooperation (UNSRMI, 2017, p.32).*

However, the enforcement of tolerance, mutual respect and understanding requires not just a separate media for majority and minority groups. In this respect Husband (2000) strongly argues that "media must provide for the exchange of information and cultural products across the communities of identity…otherwise it would create a Babel of parallels and exclusive public sphere that would have no sympathy with the rights to be understood" (p.209). For Husband (2000, p. 209), media in multiethnic society need to enhance and work for the strengthening 'solidarity' which encompasses the right to be understood, mutual understanding and mutual coexistence. As stated above, the advantage of allowing public media in minority language has not been confined only to the minority groups. It rather benefits the majority and the wider society, too.

Regarding education, bilingual education program in schools has been a key for the maintenance of minority language (Fang, 2017, p.6)[42]. Besides to this, it has commendable effect towards building up tolerant and harmonious society. In this respect, Tingting Fang opines that "those who speak more than

[42] Bilingual education program involves the usage of two languages in school program, one representing the mother tongue and the official language of a country. The instruction of mother tongue could last for six to eight years (UNSRMI, 2017, p.19).

one language and own more than one culture are more sensitive and sympathetic, more likely to build bridges than barricades and boundaries" (Fang, 2017, p.5).

However, caution need to be taken that "language difference must not be used as an excuse to segregate students along ethnic or racial lines in education" (UNSRMI, 2017, p.20). Language education needs to be undertaken with the mission of enhancing intergroup dialogue, cooperation and recognition. In light of this, it is recommended that "minorities must not be prevented from understanding the language and culture of the majority and the majority must also be given similar opportunities in relation to the minority culture and language" (ibid. p.19). In this regard, the proper management of language education would result a bilingual student and society (ibid.).

2.4. Empirical Review of Related Literature

2.4.1. An Overview of Multicultural Orientations among Majority and Minority Groups

Multicultural orientation measures attitudes of individual members of the majority and the minority towards one another. It helps to grasp the attitudes towards "one's own group and others group, identities with both groups, and values of both groups" (Berry, 2011, p.15). In light of this, a group of scholars have conducted a study on "inter-ethnic ideology, intergroup perceptions and cultural orientations" in United States of America (Ryan, Casas and Thompson, 2010). The targets groups were people of Latin origin and non-Latinos. These researchers aim was to examine the extent of level of endorsement of the three ideological categories, namely *multiculturalism*, *assimilation* and *colorblind* (ibid.). According to these researchers, multiculturalism has been constructed to represent the commonly held view that ethnic and cultural diversity need to be recognized and respected.

Whereas color blind ideology has been used to capture the view that diversity such as race, ethnicity are not important as they are presumed to be `superficial`. And the ideology of assimilation has been used to capture the view that "it is best for society if immigrants shed their own cultural practices and adopt those of the mainstream society" (ibid). The team employed questionnaire and included an adapted version of Multicultural ideology scale, as developed by Berry and Kalvin (1995). The researchers found that `Latinos` support for multiculturalism was stronger than those of the whites.

However, it was also found that the perception of the `Latinos` was almost similar with regard to assimilation and color blindness. And they are more stereotyped –as they perceived less within group

variability, had stronger stereotypes (Ryan, Casas, & Thompson, 2010). Similar research has been made in U.S.A by a group of scholars with the view of refuting the assumption that white majority supports colorblind ideology. To this purpose, they investigated the view of the minority and majority towards multiculturalism and color blindness in same work environment. It is found that the choice of each ideology by the respective groups has been contingent upon majority and minority group interaction and engagement (Plaut, Thomas & Goren, 2009).

Maykel Verkuyten, a social psychologist, made a study to examine whether there existed a difference between the majority and minority ethnic groups to the ideology of multiculturalism in the Netherlands (Verkuyten, 2005). The finding confirmed his hypothesis that the minority strongly supported multiculturalism while the majority supported assimilation. In addition, it has been revealed that the minority groups were found to be less interactive, stereotype and inward looking than that of the majority (ibid). Similarly, Other researchers seemed to have confirmed the findings of Maykel Verkuyten (Berry & Kalvin , 1995; McDermott & Samson, 2005, Chung Stevens, Plaut, & Sanchez-Burks, 2008). A converse to these findings is the research by Van de Vijver and Schalk-Soeker (2008), who made an investigation on the view of Dutch majority towards multiculturalism. These researchers found that the majority view towards multiculturalism was found to be slightly positive, if not neutral (ibid).

The Dutch case seemed to be an exception because other studies have repeatedly confirmed the view that the minority groups (immigrants) favor the ideology of multiculturalism than the majority (white). As we have seen in the theoretical part also, some political theories underscore that multiculturalism is about mutual accommodation and hence is a mutual concern (Parekh, 2000; Tully, 1995; Vasta, 2007).

Such *deficit of multiculturalism* attracted the attention of scholars to further investigate the reason behind the problem. In this regard, it is argued one of the fundamental reasons the majority group (whites) have been resistant to ideology multiculturalism has been associated with the belief of the white-majority that the practice and discourse of multiculturalism exclusively applicable only to the minority groups (Stevens, Plaut, & Sanchez-Burks, 2008 cited in Morrison and Chung, n.d.). They argue that multiculturalism has been felt as social boundary between the minority-cultural group and white majority- referred as `default racial category` whose members are assumed to have less sense of a distinct heritage (McDermott & Samson, 2005 cited in Morrison and Chung, p. ibid).

Indeed, the category of whiteness is culturally empty, though it does have significant implications on the collective identities non-white groups in Europe and America. Thus, reconstructing the discourse of multiculturalism in a manner that could embrace all cultures is what these researchers have to say (ibid).

Jannifer A.Richeson and Maurean A. Craig, have investigated how the minority-majority dichotomization helped out to establish solidarity among the minority racial groups in the United States of America. The finding was considered to be a break through as violated the classical Social identity theory that assumes that "a certain cultural group derives self-esteem from group memberships and attempt to enhance their esteem by perceiving their own group against the others" (Craig and Richeson, 2011, p.166). Other groups are often stereotyped negatively, consequently.

However, the dynamism between the majority and minority racial groups would lead to "intra-minority" group solidarity (Craig and Richeson, 2011, p.167). The researchers warn that such alliance across different minority groups could put a threat to the identity of minority individually (Craig and Richeson, 2011, p.169). In addition, a research by Killian (1996) has demonstrated that the affirmative action policy which gave some privileges led to crisis of "victimlogy" –sending misleading view that all minorities are invariably oppressed and exploited (1996, p. 25).

Killian claims that *Victimlogy* also fails to reflect the fact that there may be degree of victimization among the people who make up minority groups (p.25) . This study has also confirmed the "intra-minority group solidarity" thesis of Craig and Richeson (2011, p.167) and its implications for inter-group solidarity among the white races. Such dichotomy has also been reflected in United States of America where the Democratic Party has been accused of buying votes from minorities which has been interpreted as a conspiracy against the whites (Killian, 1996). And the whites respond negatively – playing the card of victimization: "the victims of racial discrimination have dramatically shifted from racial minorities to whites particularly white males" (Killian, 1996, p.26).

Researches in Sydney, Australia, do not appear to support the *white- race* versus *minority dichotomy*. In Sydney, where the largest racial and ethnic diversity exists, the study of James Forrest and Kevin Dunn confirmed mixed result (Forrest and Dunn, 2005). The perception of the minority and the majority was not conclusive in sense that the outcome was partly shaped by mere diversity and partly by geographic and contextual factors (ibid.). In another study which aimed at assessing the attitude of indigenous

groups and non-indigenous immigrants in Australia, it is found that there was no significant difference between the two groups (Dunn, Forest, Kamp, Paradies & Shaw, n.d.) However, like the research findings in U.S, significant variation existed between the indigenous group and the white-Anglo-Celtic people in the country.

Some researches made in U.S, and in Malaysia universities have found that the inter-group relations and integration among students was found to be discouraging (Gurin, Negda, Maxwell & Sorensen, 2009). Gurin and his colleagues have adopted a social constructivist perspective, with emphasis on the dialogical perspectives and recommended that emphasis need to be given to meaningful interaction focusing of the importance of dialogue and critical reflections among students within the campus life (Gurin etal., 2009). They argue that self -engagement (active participation), alliance across racial groups, dialogue, and critical reflections are some of the qualities which need to be fostered within the campus environment (Gurin, Negda , Maxwell & Sorensen, 2009).

Another research team, at Malaysia universities, came up with similar finding, and recommended range of activities including the engagement of students in dialogue to improving intergroup harmony (Ahmed, Azman, Lubis & Mustapha, 2009.). The findings of these teams of researchers seemed to be valid elsewhere. Some studies on Higher Education students in Ethiopia found more or less similar findings and same recommendation. In this respect, a study conducted at Bahir Dar University on the issue of ethnic conflict, revealed that inter-group relations in the campus has been shaped by the outside political environment, particularly ethnic-based political competition (Tilahun Bejitual, 2007). Tilahun (ibid) found that students inter-ethnic relations often gets polarized and crystallized during elections, particularly during national elections.

As discussed above, most of studies in Continental Europe and America have focused on the relation between racial groups, focusing largely on the white-majority versus the immigrants-as minority group, between ethnic and religious groups mostly of the immigrants in cities and towns, covering a wide range of social strata, including students, employees and others. More importantly, the discourse of multiculturalism seems to have been fixed between two categories of society: the white (majority) and the immigrant (minority).

As it has been mentioned above, it is less convincing to take up the two category of population as cultural communities or groups. The white represents the racial group, not ethnic group and nor is the

immigrants as homogenous groups (Killian, 1996). It seems that both concepts are constructed to fit into the context of the society in question; however, the fact that there exist multiple identities in society should not be discounted. In this context, such findings are hardly replicable to any society like Ethiopia and many cases in Eastern Europe.

Furthermore, one could easily discern the dilemma of multiculturalism in Europe. The majority group does not seem to uphold the principles and norm of multiculturalism mainly for the following three reasons. Firstly, the politics of multiculturalism is repugnant to the white majority because they felt that it is an exclusive agenda of the immigrants (Stevens, Plaut, & Sanchez-Burks, 2008 cited in Morrison and Chung, n.d; Parekh, 2000). Society does not take it as its own agenda. As one of the prominent political theorist on multiculturalism pointed out the *minoritization* of multiculturalism is a danger for any society due to its exclusionary tone and practice (Parekh, 2000, p.13). For Parekh (2000) multiculturalism is the concern of all-majority and minority groups. Secondly, the failure to adopt a sort of legal and institutional approach where diversity get the chance of recognition and political expression seemed to have been relegated as an ideological stance. Often multiculturalism is celebrated only at the individual level (Heywood, 2002; Mahajan, 2002). Thirdly, in relation to the second factor, there has been increasingly a tendency to associate multiculturalism with the politics of redistribution which misses the point that multicultural theories underline (Barry, 1991). Multiculturalism is primarily a politics of recognition which includes taking normative value to it and working towards its realization through concrete policy measures (Parekh, 2000). However, it has often been associated with sort of affirmative action for the immigrants so that they can get economic and social services (Mahajan, 2002).

The other limitation of the researches done in North America and West Europe is the focus on a single aspect of multiculturalism. As clearly shown, most of the researchers have focused on the normative (ideological) aspect of multiculturalism. Accordingly, the institutional aspects have not been given due attention. Empirical review on the practice of Ethiopia seems to have filled such a gap. As the following discussion indicates, researches focused on the institutional aspect of multiculturalism. Such preoccupation, however, have neglected the normative aspect of multiculturalism, in turn.

2.4.2. Institutional Accommodation of Diversity in the post-1991 Ethiopia

2.4.2.1. Accommodation of diversity during the Transitional Era (1991-94)

After the collapse of the military government through mainly by the TPLF led rebel forces in May 1991, the Peace and Democratic conference was held from June 1- 5 in the same year. The purpose of the conference was to adopt the Charter for the formation of Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), set out guidelines for the operation of the interim government that would in turn facilitate the formulation of constitution (Hovde, 1994). About thirty one leaders of political movements mainly of the ethnic liberation fronts and smaller ethnic movements had participated in the conference (Keller, 2002, p.29). The transitional charter established a council of representatives (COR) with a legislative organ, the presidential system as executive; and the judicial system. It also provided individual and collective rights (Hovde, 1994, p.129).

The Council of the Representatives (COR) were composed of eighty seven members out of which EPRDF took the largest having Thirty two seats, and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), remained the second largest, with twelve (12) seats (Keller, 2002, p.29). Remaining seats were distributed to representatives of smaller ethnic movements which, according to Akililu, "were hastily assembled and manufactured with the encouragements of the EPRDF" (2006, P.97). A clear testimony to such encouragements to ethnic politics has been vividly seen when some six seats were reserved to five ethnic based movements in absentia. These included the *Agew* People's Democratic Movement (APDM)(1 seat), Yem National movement (1 seat), *Kaffa* People's Democratic Union (2 seats), *Gedeo* People's Democratic organization (1seat), and *Burji* People's Democratic Organization(1seat) (Teguadda, Feb.2011, p.54).

Despite the fact that EPRDF took the lion share both in the executive and the legislative branch of the TGE, there appeared to be a semblance of power-sharing between the EPRDF and the other liberation fronts. Scholars have been divided on the assessment of such institutional changes and promises, some scholars dubbed the process as 'a holding together' sort of federalism (Akililu, 2006, p.87; Keller, 2002, p.24) while others labeled it as 'new authoritarianism' (Merera, 2000, p.183; Ottaway, 1995) which appeared to have democratic in form but not in practice (Hovde, 1994, p.129). For Akililu (2006) and Keller (2002), EPRDF promises to empowerment of ethnic groups and the forging of pacts among the former separatist ethnic based parties was initially seen as holding out type of *de facto* federalism. However, taking note of the political developments including the expulsion of the OLF and the

boycotting of political parties during the first election held in 1992, some argue that the federalization process turned up to "putting together federation"(Keller, 2002, p.24).[43]

The exclusive emphasis given to ethnicity seemed to have prevented the representation of *Amhara* elites who were not sympathetic to the 'ethnicization' of Ethiopian politics (Polluha, 1988, p.31; Meyamir, 2006). Later, as result of such gap, Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement (EPDM) shed out its multiethnic pan -Ethiopian nomenclature into Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM). In addition, the different associations and organized groups including, the pan-Ethiopian multinational organizations such as the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON) and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the *Worker Party of Ethiopia* and Youth associations were not allowed to participate in the peace and democracy conference (Merera, 2000, p.183).

The Charter conferred wide ranges of *self-determination* rights to ethnic groups or *nations* and *nationalities* (Hovde**,** 1994, p.129). For the EPRDF the nationality question stood out, and still is, as the main guiding justification for the preoccupation of collective rights (Zemelak, 2014, p.99). In this respect, the charter explicitly stated that 'each nation and nationalities to govern its own people within its own defined territory with each having the rights to declare its independence' (Hovde, 1994, p.130). In line with such provisions, a proclamation to provide for the establishment of Regional Governments, or, to use Amharic versions, *Killil*, was enacted by proclamation No.7/1992 in which sixty two (62) 'nations or nationalities' were listed out and forty five (45) of them were entitled to exercise self- rule at "the *Wereda* level or above" (Zemelak, 2014; TGE, 1992, Art.3 sub art.2(a))[44]. Accordingly, two

[43] Cognizance of the federal aberration in the former socialist federations, Alfred Stepan developed a new model of federalism ,which is referred to as, " putting together"(Stepan,2001, p.324) as additional model to the existing ones – "coming together" and "holding together" that have been developed by Juan Linz (Linz, 1997 cited in Conway& Simeon,2001, p.339; Stepan,2001,pp.322-324). "Coming together" federations are made through voluntary agreements between and among state or units that had been previously 'sovereign' or loosely connected as in the form of confederation. Such federations, thus, shares their sovereignties for furtherance of common interests, visions and aspiration and enjoys self-government rights short of confederation. Federations closer to such ideal type include, U.S.A. (since 1787), Switzerland (1848), Australia (1901), Canada (1867), Germany (1949), Austria and Brazil (Stepan, 2001, p.324). Similar to coming together federations, the holding together federations are those formed by "consensual parliamentary decisions of the unitary states" with the view of maintaining territorial integrity which could have been at stake under unitary and power centralism (Stepan, 2001, p.324). India[43] (since 1950), Spain (1978) and Belgium[43] (1993) are closer to holding together ideal type. Putting together federations are characterized by non-voluntary and non democratic federation formation"(Stepan, 2001,p.322). Consequently, federal arrangements of such types "did not promote the politics of accommodation but was rather a mirage that gave the illusion of power sharing on an ethnic basis" (Morrilas , n.d., p.12).

[44] Nation and nationality represents "a people living in the same geographical area and having a common language and a common psychological makeup of identity"(TGE,1972, art.7). The meaning of the terms very much sound to the Russian Marxists interpretations. However, the provision of similar-uni linear- meanings for nation and nationality does not take

schemes of self-government were envisioned at the regional level. The first was the *national* approach which was conferred to a specific group to exercise it alone, and the second approach was the *regional* approach thereby the different ethnic groups could exercise self- government jointly as per their consent (TGE, 1992, art. 2 sub. art. 5 & 6).

2.4.2.2. Institutional Accommodation Ethnic Diversity in the Post 1994

The second phase of federalization has begun with the adoption of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution (FDRE). As Akililu (2006) argues the FDRE Constitution has given legal expression and further elaboration to what had been put into practice during the period of TGE. Very much akin to its predecessor, the constitution has exalted ethnic groups as *nation, nationalities and peoples* (NNP), which, at same time, were portrayed as the authors of the same document (FDRE, 1995, see Preamble). Driven largely by the Marxist understanding of *the national question* by the then Student Movements, Ethiopia has been portrayed as the "prison of nations and nationalities" were there existed *one oppressor nation* and *many oppressed nations* (Addis Hiwot ; Balsvik; Kiflu, cited in Merera, 2003, p.97).

Regardless of the elusive meanings of the terms-nation, nationalities and peoples, accommodation of such entities was believed to be an imperative for the survival of the Ethiopian state (Assefa, 2007). To this end, different packages of institutional and normative measures have been put into place. Among other things, the following standout as the main institutional façades of 'accommodation' including: federalism, multilevel titular autonomy, linguistic rights, and special representation rights.

Federalism: Self-Rule and Shared Rule

Federalism is considered to be "a de jure form of territorial decentralization explicitly organized into fixed number of levels of government" (Lake and Rothschild, *n.d.*). Usually there exists two level of government each acting directly on their citizens" (Watts, 1996 in Swenden, 2006, p.10). For Daniel Elazar any territorial a division of state on the basis of "self- rule and shared rule" would qualify to a federation and/or a federal arrangement (Elazar, 1987, p.7). Here Self- rule implies autonomy of the sub

into account the conceptual nuances between the two terms which has been understood by Russian Marxists such as Joseph Stalin.

-national unit and shared rule implies shared purposes and powers at the center that would enable "joint action" (King, 1982 in O'Leary, 2001, p.277) or "common ends" (Elazar, 1987, p.6)[45].

As an aspect of self- rule nine autonomous units (states) as members of the federation have been created. These include the *Tigray*, *Afar*, *Amhara*, *Oromia*, *Somalia*, *Beneshangul/Gumuz*, Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP), *Gambella Peoples*, and *Harari People* (See FDRE, 1995, Art.47 sub.1). The state of *Tigray*, *Afar*, *Oromia* , *Amhara* and *Somali* have been designated for the dominant groups, measured in terms of population size, represented in each names. Other states like *Beneshangul/Gumuz*, SNNPR and *Gambella* have been designated to different ethnic groups cohabiting within such territoriality and hence are not titular regions. The state of *Harari* represented anomaly as the state was designed for the *Harari* ethnic group whose size falls far below the size of the non-titular groups residing there (Assefa, 2007; Beken, 2013**).**

Furthermore, the constitutional division of power and the attendant practices to ensuring for the existence of genuine autonomy of the federating units are central elements in the discussion of self rule (Dorf, 1994 in Morrilas, n.d,p.5; McGarry & Oleary,1993 in Adeney, 2007,p.8). In this regard, research findings revealed that the autonomy of the federating units is heavily circumscribed (Assefa, 2007; Befkadu, 1996, Tadesse, 1996 cited in Tegene, 1998**;** Solomon, 2006**).** One source such limitation emanates from the constitutional provisions itself. As mentioned by Assefa (2007) the powers and functions allotted to the federating units are so meager enough to ensure their autonomy. In this regard, empirical data and research indicated that most of the lucrative revenue sources such as tax, loan and aid are mandated to the federal government (Solomon, 2006, pp.68-9; FDRE, 1995, Art.51 and 52)[46].

Another constraining factor that work against the autonomy or self rule of federating states is pertinent with the practice or implementation of what is rarely referred to as the "framework powers"-

[45] The question of how best federalism accommodates ethnic identity claims lead us to the discussion of "regional federation" and "ethnic federation" (Baubok, 2001, p.10).In regional federation, the borders of federating units (sub-national governments) are associated with regional identities or criteria which would consider historical, economic and geographic parameters. Where as in the case of the latter, the borders of federating units coincide with the identity related criteria peculiarly language and settlement. Often ethnic federation are used interchangeably with multinational federalism and multicultural federalism (see Erk, 2008, p.5; Baubok, 2001, p.10). So, there lacks conceptual clarity on such concepts.

[46] About 21 enumerated powers and functions are provided to the Federal government, while only seven(7) are explicitly stated as belongs to federating units(See Art 51 and 52 respectively).

overlapping powers between the federal and states (Solomon, 2006, p.64)[47]. As Scholars suggests that "the federal government may use framework legislation to regulate federations-wide standards while leaving the state rooms to legislate the details and to deliver the services in a manner adaptable to local situation. The states under this category of power are allowed to fill in the gaps with more detailed laws**"** **(**Assefa, 2007, p.317). In this regard, there are indeed overlap between the federal and federating units on matters of economic, social, cultural, and historical policies as stipulated in the constitution. However, as matter of practice, Assefa contends that the federal government often enacted detailed policies on such issues, which as matter of fact, restricts the policy autonomy of states (2007, p.317)[48].

The dominance of the EPRDF, entrenched with strong fist at all level of governments, and its centralized decision making procedures could have contributed for the diminished role of policy autonomy in the areas of framework power, but also in many issues areas that regional states could have exercised autonomously (Assefa, 2007; Beken, 2014).

As institutional manifestation of shared- rule at the central level, the House of peoples Representative (HoPR) and the House of Federation (HoF) seem to have represented the majority and the minority groups respectively. The HoPR, with maximum seat of 550, "are believed to be representative of Ethiopian people as whole, and not of specific groups" (Assefa, 2007, p.220). On the matter of special representation, only 20 seats are preserved to "minority nationalities and peoples" (FDRE, 1995, art.54 sub.3). Whereas, the HoF is staffed by the representative of groups-NNPs (FDRE, 1995, art 61 sub 1). Hence, as compared to HoPR, the HoF could be considered as home of minorities (Haileyesus, 2012) [49]. (see the following Table)

---

[47] The framework power represents a kind of shared power between the federal and federating units where the federal government sets general standards for the sake of uniformity, while at the same time leaving policy autonomy to federating unit so that the latter can enact detailed policies and programs(Solomon, 2006, pp.64-5; Assefa, 2007, p.317)

[48] . According to FDRE Constitution, the role of the federal government is set to be enacting common standards on different ranges of issues including education. Accordingly, higher education is a federal matter while elementary and high school education fall within the jurisdiction of the state. What is actually happening is "the federal government has issued a very detailed policy directive covering the whole range of education from elementary to university level" (Assefa, 2007, p.318).

[49] . The term minority and majority is used in contextual manner taking into account the constitutional provisions regarding the members of HoF. It is stated that "each Nation, Nationality and People shall be represented in the House of Federation by at least one member. Each Nation or Nationality shall be represented by one additional representative for each one million of its population"(FDRE, 1995, Art.61 sub.2). In such specific context, then, minority could refer to those groups whose population size is found to be less than one million; while those groups having population size of more than one million could be considered as majority. Apart from this contextual meaning, there lacks clarity as to who are minority in the context of Ethiopia especially in the post 1994 period. As per constitution the minority 'Nationalities and Peoples' refers to those ethnic groups that don't have sufficient t number of people to make up a constituency so as to have their own representatives in the house of peoples representative (FDRE,1995, art.54 sub 3). So those groups with population below 100, 000 –which

Table 1: Distribution of Ethnic Groups (NNPs) at HoF, 2010-2015 Term

S. N	Region	No. of Majority	No. Minority	Total	List of Ethnic groups
1	Afar	2	1	2	Argoba and Afar
2	Tigray	5	2	7	Tigrawi, Kunama, and Erob
3	Amhara	20	3*	23	Amhara, Awi, Awi kymera, and Oromo
4	Oromia	26		26	Oromo
5	SNNPR	13	49	62**	
6	BenShangul/Gumuz			5	Berta, Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao, Komo
7	Gambella			4	Agnaw, Mejenger, Opa, Nuer
8	Somali	5		5	Somali
9	Hareri		1	1	Hareri
Total/%/		71 (52%)	64(48%)	135	

Source**:** Modified and adopted from (*FDRE/HoF***,** 2012**).**

* in Amhara Regional state, Argoba and kimant have also gotten seats as of 2006 and 2016 respectively

**49 of them in SNNPR do have less than a million people with only 1 representative at HoF , except , Hadiya(2), Welayita(2), Gurage(2), Gamo(2), Gedo(2) and sidama(3)

As indicated in the table, the minority shares almost half of the seats in the HoF. Unlike the case in the HoPR where the Amhara (137 seat) and the Oromia (with 178) seats and hence two biggest regions have controlled a total of 315 seats , which consisted of 57% of the total seats of the House; in the case of the HoF both groups have a total seat of only 49(36%) out of 135. So, both groups have minority status even in comparison to the seats other groups in SNNPR enjoy. As evidently shown, ethnic groups from the Southern Region have controlled Sixty Two (62) seats that amounts to forty Six percent (46%) out of the total of members of the HoF.

Despite such asymmetry of descriptive representations of minority and majority in both HoF and HoPR, it has been argued that the decision making process does not encourage an all inclusive participation of groups (Beza, 2013). For Beza the simple plurality decision making system is the main stumbling block for the lack of meaningful political participation for the minorities in respective houses (ibid.). As some political scientist suggests, minority groups will have strong bargaining power if they are allowed to

represents an electoral constituency, may be considered as minority nationality and people (Proclamation No 111/1995 cited in Beza, 2013, p.100). However, the revised electoral law seems to have complicated the matter. It states that "minority nationality which require special representation shall be determined on the basis of clear criteria set in advance by the HoF (FDRE/EBE, 2007, art.20 sub.1) If the determination as to the status of the minority is made by the HoF using its own criteria, then the issue will likely go beyond issues of population size.

exercise veto rights in political decisions affecting their own life **(**Lijphart**,** in Kymilicka, 1995). In the context of Ethiopia, the decision making procedure of simple plurality do have constraining effect for the minorities. The presence of special representation for minorities without having an inclusive decision making procedure could only ensures what is commonly referred to as symbolic or **"**descriptive representation" rather than "substantive representation" (Mansbridge in Kymilicak 2000, p.101)[50].

In prevalence of such state of condition allowing the participation of ethnic parties for the minorities groups could enhance political participation (Bieber, 2008). Yet again, the adoption of single district plurality voting system curtails the likely presence of minority based ethnic parties in the HoPR and hence the possibility of forming coalition of minority party government thereof (Beza, 2013; Assefa, 2007).

Furthermore, researchers have also revealed that the absence of in built horizontal power sharing arrangements have hugely curtailed what probably could have existed in the form of shared rule (Beken, 2014**;** Assefa, 2007). The following three factors have been identified under purview of such inadequacies of shared rule.

The first factor is to do with the competencies of the HoF as matters of law making powers. Unlike the case in many countries, the HoF in Ethiopia has not been constitutionally empowered to enact laws by itself or co-legislate laws with the HoPR. As result, it is noted that the HoPR is the only federal house entrusted with enacting laws and hence the parliament is "unicameral" in strict sense of its function (Assefa, ibid, p. 227). The idea is that the empowerment of the HoF with legislative function could enhance the participation of groups and thereby strengthen shared rule, or state wide loyalties, at the center. Short of this, the HoF federation has been mandated to few tasks including, mainly,

[50] Substantive representation requires that representatives work for the promotion of the interests of whom they are supposed to represent. Whereas descriptive representation implies mirror representation where each characteristics of society are supposedly represent in assemblies and councils (Mansbrige, in Kymilicka, 2000). The latter is based on the assumption that a member of certain ascriptive groups as women, black, an X or Y ethnic group need to be represented in the decision making bodies. Yet, in Ethiopia, the process of representation of NNP for the HoF is quite disturbing. As Beken(2014, p. 321) underlines, they have been cherry -picked by the regional politicians from the regional councils and send to the HoF. In this context, talking about substantive representation would sound less relevant.

constitutional interpretation and the determination of the rule of the game for the allocation of grants and subsidies to federating units (Assefa, 2007; Solomon, 2006, Beken, 2014)[51].

The second factor that limits shared rule is the absence of "horizontal power sharing" among the executive, civil service and judiciary (Beken, 2014, p.322). Beken claims that horizontal power sharing arrangement has been enshrined by the FDRE constitution in article 39 sub article 3 which provides that "Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right […]to equitable representation in state and federal governments"(ibid., p.195). For Beken , thus, the failure to have horizontal power-sharing seems to have been considered as operational weakness , rather than problems that appeal to the constitution itself.

The third limitation to institutionalizing of power-sharing has been evidently seen in the political exclusionary nature of the incumbent party. The incumbent party- EPRDF , as coalition of four Ethnic based parties, claims to have representing only the dominant ethnic groups in four of the Regional states, controlled the government. The dominance of the EPRDF at the federal level would mean that other NNPs and Regions would not be duly considered in the federal power-sharing scheme (Beken, 2014, p.322). Corollary to this, it is argued that EPRDF has not culture of accommodating minority based ethnic groups, other than its own (Assefa, 2007, p.242). For Assefa, it has been demonstrated that the incumbent party has so far been unwilling to form coalition government with other ethnic-based, or otherwise, political parties regardless of their ideological affinity (ibid. p.243)[52].

Linguistic Accommodation

Language has been a key instrument for the accommodation of diversity (Fang, 2017; Gagnon & Tully, 2001). In this regard it has been provided that all Ethiopian languages have been officially recognized as equals (FDRE, 1995, art.5 sub 1). Sub article 3 of this section further provided that regions enjoy the ultimate right for the determination of their working language internally. Seen from the vantage point of

[51] It is also argued that the constitutional entrustment of judicial review for the HoF, which is meant to be the political organ, it is argued, intended with "silencing the Ethiopian court"(Braasch et al., 2008, p.282). These researchers have also mentioned that the influence of Marxist ideology, in limiting the role of the courts, have been commonplace in the former socialist states including the Military government in Ethiopia (ibid.).

[52] It is argued that "so many political parties that more or less share the ideology of the ruling party are forced to operate autonomously because they are not encouraged to form a coalition as the ruling party insists on subscribing such parties to its conditions" (Assefa, 2007,p.243).

such constitutional provision, the territorial logic of linguistic accommodation seems to be the intended goal to be achieved. According to this principle the country will be divided into monolingual territories with the view of accommodating the language of territorially concentrated minorities (Birsch, 1989, P.45). Indeed, each language attains the official language status in respective territories or provinces. In this regard, three patterns have, so far observed, as matter of fact (Assefa, 2007). One strands of this is related to the experiences among those regions which were designated to the dominant group or nation. This includes regions like *Oromia, Tigray, Afar* and *Somalia*. The second strand related to the case in multiethnic regions where Amharic has been used as working language. Typical to this include *Beneshangul//Gumuz Region*, *Gambella* and the *SNNPR*. The *Hareri* regional experience remains to be exceptional in that two of the languages-*Hareri* and *Oromiffa* are chosen as the working language in the region (Assefa, 2007, p.225).

Without denying the merit of employing mother tongue for primary education, the way the decision has been made and implemented seems to have been profoundly problematic, at least in reference to the *Amahara* Regions. In this particular region, the implementation of minority languages for primary schools had faced huge resistance. In this respect, a study made in *Awi* nationality zone, have found that the implementation of *Awigne*-the language of the *Awi* nationality was fiercely resisted by parents, students and teachers alike (Dessalew, 2002). The parents felt that the local language will have only limited economic significance. In addition to such challenges, other factors like the un availability of teaching materials, training for the teachers and lack of synergic support from the official in the sector were also included as factors hindering the implementation of the '*Awign*' as medium of instruction in the zone (Dessalew, 2002, p.92).

Next to the official language rights of regions and the attendant practices mentioned above, perhaps the most interesting provision on language rights is provided as follows: "Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to speak, to write and to develop its own language, to express, to develop and to promote its culture; and to preserve its history" (FDRE, 1995, Art.39 sub 3). As language is believed to be a conduit of culture, it plays a critical role in ensuring the empowerment of ethnic groups. As reinforcement to such constitutional provision, the Education and Training Policy of the country has provided that "primary education will be given in nationality languages" (FDRE, 1994). Consequently, about 22 nationalities languages have been used as medium of instruction in school systems (Moges, 2010, p.43).

What has been discussed so far could be considered as linguistic expression of diversity. There need to be a common official language that could serve as symbol of unity (Asefa, 2007, p.225). To that end, Amharic has been declared as the working language of the federal government as stipulated by the FDRE Constitution (FDRE, 1995, art 5 sub 2) , and " the language of country wide communication" as stipulated in the Education and Training policy (FDRE, 1994)[53] .

Multilevel Accommodation of Minorities

In Ethiopia despite the existence of nearly 80 or more ethnic groups, only six of them, including *Tigrawi, Amhara, Afar, Oromo, Harari* (*Adere)* and *Somali* were granted as member of the federation. The remaining ethnic groups were "either put together in multiethnic region or attached as minority ethnic groups to the bigger ethnic regions" (Asnake, 2009, p.84). In some of the regions like Afar , Amhara, SNNPR, *Beneshangul -Gumuz,* and *Gambella*, there are furtherance of a kind of " multi - tiered" or multilevel accommodation below the regional states as in the form of *Nationality Zones* and *special Werdas* (Asnake, 2009, pp.65-6). *Nationality Zones* or *special Weredas* are distinct from that of the ordinary *Zones and Weradas*. While the ordinary units are administrative and functional, the *special Wereda* and *nationality councils* are "self -determining units" whose boundaries are territorially defined for a single ethnic group or groups (Vaughan**,** 2003, p.240).

The multilevel accommodation has been envisaged as provided by Art.39 (3): " every nation, nationality and people in Ethiopia has the right to full measure of self -government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that it inhabits…"(FDRE, 1995). As clearly indicated, a territorial autonomy which intends at achieving "group specific accommodation" has been stipulated by the constitution (Cunningham & Weidmann, 2010, footnote 7, p.1038). Such notion of territorial autonomy is very much akin to what is sometimes termed as *titular autonomy* where a specific minority group is entitled to have autonomy or control over certain areas where the group members expected to be concentrated and become majority in such locality or region.

[53] English has been declared to be the medium of instruction for Secondary and Higher Education and will be given as subject commencing from grade one (FDRE, 1994). Amharic as the language of country wide communication starts at grade three (Moges, 2010, p.38). The introduction of English at earlier ages before the teaching of Amharic, reflects one of the anomalous thing that could only "show the ideological stance of government towards such languages", Moges contends (ibid. p.38).

So, in group specific accommodation, a certain group will be singled out and guaranteed autonomy (see Table-3 for comparison of multilevel accommodation among regional states in the country below).

Table 2. Distribution of Multi level Accommodation Across Regional state, Ethiopia

Region/states	Group(s) Specific Accommodation to groups At zonal level		Region Specific accommodation to groups at Zonal level	Mono ethnic Nationality council At Wereda
	Mono ethnic Nationality council	Multiethnic Nationality Councils at Zonal levels		
Southern NNPR.	1. Dewuro Zone 2. Gedeo zone 3. Hadiya zone 4. Shakacho zone 5. Sidama zone 6. Silte zone 7. Wolaita zone	1. Bench Majie Zone **2.** Gamo-Gofa Zone 3. Guragie Zone 4. Kaffa Zone 5. Kambata-Tambaro Zone	1. Debub Omo Zone 2. Segan Area Peoples	1. Basketo special wereda 2. Aalaba special wereda 3. Konta special wereda 4. Yem special wereda
Amhara Region	8. Agew Awi 9. Agew Himira 10. Oromo Zone			1. Argoba Liyu Wereda 2. Kimant Liyu Wereda*
Afar				1. Gachenie Liyu Wereda
Benshangul				2. Pawe 3. Mao Komo
Gambella	11. Anywaa 12. Nuer 13. Majanger			

Source: Modified and adopted From (Beken, 2013; Yared, 2017, P.23; Zemelak, 2014).

*. Based on the claim for recognition and self -government, the The Amhara Region had a decision that a special Wereda, consisting of 42 kebeles, was to be established. However, conflict continued due you the claim of the Kimant elites to have special Zone which consists of far more than the 42 kebeles.

As indicated above, territorial autonomy has been conferred to single group or groups in some of the regional states in the country. Besides, there are few case where "region-specific accommodation" (ibid.) were evident in the SNNR. The SNNPR has the largest number of such autonomous arrangements both at provincial/ Zonal/ *Nationality* councils and *special Districts* or *Liyu Weredas.* It has got Seven (7) group specific (mono-ethnic) nationality councils, *five (5)* multiethnic councils and two region-specific autonomous units. In those multiethnic zones, about *Forty three* (43) of ethnic groups are lumped together. The composition of groups within each Zones ranges from three to fifteen (Yared, 2017, p.23). In addition, four *special Weredas* were instituted.

As the experience of the SNNPR reveals, there appears to be clear qualitative difference between special *district -Wereda* and *nationality councils*. One contributing factor to such difference is the location in the hierarchy of allocation of authority and budget. The second difference lies on the way the *special provincial* and *special District* councils were composed off. Those provincial Nationality councils are not directly elected but chosen from elected district (*Wereda)* councilors and regional state councilors (Beken, 2013, p.13).

Despite the presence of qualitative difference between nationality zones and *special Werdas*, the constitution of SNNPR has provided similar functions, including determining working language, power of appointment, framework powers, and budget approval (Beken, 2013, pp.9-11).

Regarding the power to the determination of languages, some of mono-ethnic zones such as *Sidama*, *Wolyita*, *Hadiya* and *Gedeo* have adopted the language of their own both as working language and school medium, whereas other adopted Amharic as the working language of their nationality councils. In addition to such linguistic and cultural rights, the nationality Zones or special Weredas are also empowered to exercise appointment powers of their own speakers and deputy speakers of the respective councils, of the chief administrators and the head of the nationality councils. It has also consultative powers over the approval of judges and budget (Beken, 2013, p.11).

Regarding financial role, they do not exercise any right over revenue collection; rather their power is limited to the approval of budget which is allocated to them by the regional state Council/ assembly **(**Beken, 2013, p.10**).** Concerning the policy autonomy, they have got the "power to issue laws that has to be consistent with regional state and federal government" (ibid.p.11). Beken submits that the scheme of power granted by the constitution to *special Zones* and *Weredas* is tantamount to the *framework power*. And thus, the level of policy autonomy of such autonomous units very much dependent upon how broadly or narrowly the regional government would use such framework powers (ibid., p.10).

As it has been revealed in the table3 above, with the exception of few regions as Amhara and SNNPR, the remaining regions were not sensitive to internal minorities which were conceived as, endogenous or exogenous to the Regions. Some scholars use the term 'indigenous' and 'non indigenous' groups to

signify such internal minorities (Becken, 2014, p.301)[54]. While there are few experiences of accommodating indigenous internal minorities, especially in Region three(*Amhara Region*) and in the SNNPR , those so called non indigenous internal minorities are not still entitled with self- government rights (ibid.). According to Vander Beken "non indigenous do not need a specific protection, since they are indigenous to another region where they can enjoy such protection" (ibid.)

From the perspective of Beken's assertion, one would logically argue that *indigenous internal minorities* were entitled to self-government rights. If this was the principle, then one ethnic group would have only one self administrating unit-be it at the level of region (statehood), province-*Zone* or special district level-*Wereda*. A case in point is the *Argoba* ethnic group having two special *Weredas*, one in Afar Regional state, and one in *Amhara* regional state disprove Beken's assertion. The prevalence of *Oromo Nationality council*-self governing unit at Zonal level- in *Amhara* region and of course a regional state for the Oromo would represent countervailing evidence. Indeed, the practices appear to be mixed. Ethnic groups such as *Kunama and Saho* in*Tigray Regional state* are, for instance, *indigenous minorities* who were not having self- government rights (Yonatan, 2008, p.470)[55].

The commonly stated reason for the failure to institutionalize self government unit to the ' non indigenous" ethnic groups has been attributed either to their dispersed settlements or intermeshing pattern of settlement in urban centers (Assefa, 2007; Zemelak, 2014; Beken,2014 and Yonatan, 2008)**[56].** For these scholars, the territorial autonomy would no longer be feasible for the non-indigenous minorities; instead, they suggest alternative reform packages including, the enforcement of bill of rights, adoption of non territorial autonomy model, special representation for such type of internal minorities (Yonatan, 2008; Beken, 2014; Assefa, 2007).

---

[54] According to Vander Beken, indigenous groups are groups that have been living in the region for a long time …and non indigenous are those internal migrants or those moved to the region in the recent past (p.301). However, the usage of the term indigenous seems to be erroneous to be applicable to Ethiopian context. As Alfonso Martinez Report of UN discloses that the term "indigenous" can be more relevant in those immigrant countries such as Australia, New Zealand, North American, and South American countries. Accordingly, it has been argued that the term is not relevant to describe African realities as both peoples, with the exception of white settlers, are indigenous (Thornberry, 2002, p.34).

[55] Often the indigenous groups have been understood as having something pertinent to particular place (nativity), prior habitation to a place and having unique culture or distinctive society (Thornberry, 2002, pp.37-39).

[56] Tesfaye Tafess(2009) in his, *Predicament of Amahara settlers in East Wellega Zone*, revealed how the concentration of *Amhara* community have, among other things, contributed for their displacements by *Oromo* local officials and community due to the suspicion that the *Amharas* could claim for self government right for them. This particular context, perhaps many more to come within or without *Oromi*a Region, demonstrates that settlement dispersion was not the factor behind the failure to grant self government rights to internal minorities.

Apart from this, there have always been claims of identity for recognition, fair resource distribution and even for self government in many of the regional states. Even there are cases of merger and fissures of autonomous entities especially in the SNNPR. In this region, during the TGE period, there were five regional states, numbered from region Seven (7) to Eleven (11), and then they were merged into one regional state –the SNNPR by 1992 (Vaughan, 2003,p.249).

Following the adoption of the FDRE Constitution, the SNNPR get recognized as one of the member of the federation within which about Nine (9) group specific autonomous zones and Eight (8) *special Weredas* were institutionalized. By the turn of 2000, former zone, known under by the name-*North Omo nationality Zone,* was split into three additional zonal and two *special Weredas* (Vaughen, 2006, p188; Zemelak, 2013, p.101). That was also preceded by the split *of Slite ethnic group* from that of Garage zone. Such process increased the number of Zones from Twelve (12) to Thirteen (13). Nearly a decade after, a new zone- *Segen Area Peoples Zone,* was created with the amalgamating of Eight (8) ethnic groups, out of which four of them had *special Wereda* status previously (Yared**,** 2017, p.45). Such amalgamation reduced the number of *special Wereda* from Eight to just Four (4) , while at the same increased the number of zones to Fourteen (14) (SNNPR Council of Nationalities, 2016 cited in Yared, 2017, p.44).[57]

Some scholars opined that such process of expansion and contraction process has been the result of two intermeshing processes. One of the factors is something to do with the strategy of the government and ruling party. The second factor is to do with the role of ethnic entrepreneurs for autonomy. Regarding the first factor, it is argued that the very initiative to institutionalize self government units both at state and below remained to be the decision of the EPRDF and the government at the centre rather than the decisions of regional government (Zemelak, 2014; Vaugan, 2006).

Zemelak strongly asserts,

> *The provisions in the regional constitution dealing with nationality zones and liyu wereda (as in Amhara and SNNPR) purported to have created the ethnic local units for the first time; however, most of the nationality zones or liyu werdas had already been established at the point when the regional constitution were adopted. The regional constitution therefore simply recognized the existing ethnic local government rather than brought them into being* (2013, pp.100-101).

[57] Those special weredas which were later dissolved and relegated into ordinary Weredas, after a decade of self government, included *Amaro special Wereda*, *Burji special Werda*, *Dirash special wereda* and *Konso special wereda* (Yared, 2017, p.44).

Without undermining the role regional governments' play, the role of the central government and the ruling party have hugely shaped the modus operandi of identity politics including the determination of regions from above and those autonomous arrangements from below. Sarah Vaughan captures such story, taking the experience of SNNPR, succinctly,

> *During the second half of the 1990s there was an orchestrated move by the EPRDF in the Southern regions to claw back control over what some have described as the "ethnic free for all" in the political and administrative organization which had prevailed during its first few years. Groups of all sizes, and with varying claims and credibility, had been encouraged by the party to mobilize their population for self- determination. Later, however, the government started to argue that, for reason of budgetary efficiency, it made a sense to consolidate the myriad zones, regions and political parties which had emerged in response to this encouragement (Vaughan, 2006, p.188).*

The clumping together of the five regions, the *WEGAGODA* project and the merger of ethnic political parties into a coalition of parties were mentioned as some the measures taken by the EPRDF and the central government "an attempt to repack the Pandora's Box" in the Southern Region (Vaughan, 2006, p.188).

The *WEGAGODA* represents one of the efforts of the central government to construct a new identity and language through the process of linguistic standardization of the four ethnic groups, residing in *North Omo Zone*, by taking the first letter of *Welayita*, *Gamo*, *Goffa* and *Dewaro* respectively (ibid, p.194). As political expression of such concocted identity, WEGAGODA Peoples' Democratic Organization was formed as well (ibid, p.191). Such project was doomed to failure as the groups thought the process as an imposition of new identity and consequently waged for autonomy territory for their own(Dea, 2006)[58]. At last, the government was forced not only abandon its project but also conceded to establish self governing zones for *Welayita,Dewaro*, and *Gamo-Goffa*, and Two(2) *special Weredas* to *Basketo* and *Konta* ethnic groups (Vaughan,ibid., p.192).

The second strategy to unpack the " Pandora- box" has been through the instrumentality of the *Wereda* level decentralization which was effected since 2000 and the attendant reforms such as block grant to the *Wereda*, the fixation of financial grants to the nationality zones not to exceed more than 5% of the regional block grants sent to them (Zemelak, 2014, p103). Before the onset of the reform, "the

[58] The attempt to concoct artificial language could demonstrate the gap between the rhetoric of empowerment and disempowerment. Such political venture went beyond the post modern adventurism of identity politics. it could rather be labeled as "historic mistakes"(Dea, 2006, p.140).

regional grants to *Weredas* were first transferred to the *nationality zones*, which retained for themselves whatever amount they pleased before transferring the balance to the *Weredas* under their jurisdiction" (Zemelak, 2014, p.103).

Still, another measure to discourage the claim for group specific self government unit was the introduction of new proclamation that demands that claims of such type would be treated only when evidences supporting "the violation of the concerned ethnic group's individual and groups rights" are presented or fulfilled (SNNP Council, 2003 cited in Beken, 2013, p.14)[59].

The second factor in shaping the modus operandi of identity *politics* is related to the behavior of ethnic elites who claims for autonomy for the sake of resources and prestige. In this respect "there is **[**sic**]** was considerable speculations that the diminution of the role and resources of zones in the SPNNRS is intended not least to remove the 'budgetary carrot', which has encouraged educated members of a number of ethnic and language groups to seek a well resourced ethnic zones of their own(Vaughan, 2006 , p.189).

So, the government attempt to limit the claims of self- government for ideological as well as financial reasons was no longer heeded. Especially the financial incentive, whatever the size of the cake is going to be, attached to autonomous units seemed to have reinforced the claim for more! At the surface value, the incentive systems and the elite behavior-entrepreneurship, are seemingly dichotomous, yet at heart of the process identity politics, both operates in tandem with each other, and reflects the contradictory strategies of the government.

2.5. Conceptual Framework of the Study

This study adopts a conceptual framework in explaining the gaps in multicultural orientation (attitudes) of majority and minority using the analogy of concentric circle indicated below. Anchoring on the view of institutionalists, the researcher contends that institutional settings like overlaying state and sub-state structures, rules and regulation shapes the behavior of individuals and groups alike. Besides, the choice of such institutional settings is in turn being impacted by the normative orientations or ideologies of the ruling elites or the framers of institution such as constitution. Consequently, the meta narratives of

[59] The mention of human right violation as precondition for the claim of group recognition could be taken as a new ideological turn on the experience of EPRDF. The prevailing discourse has been that self government, including secession, is unconditional right that every NNP can embark on.

ethnic federalism seems to have influenced the choice of the types of institutional design of accommodation which in turn seems to have hugely influenced the attitude, if not the behavior, of majority and minority groups in the study area.

.



Figure 1 Conceptual Framework of the Study.
Source: Own (2016)

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY

This chapter shades light on the research methodology which clarifies about the ontological and epistemological foundations of the study. The chapter elucidates more about the contours that guide the entire research processes and procedures employed for data collection, sampling procedures and data analysis for the purpose of achieving the intended objectives the study. For that purpose, the chapter has been organized into five sections. The first section describes the study area. The second is concerned with the exploration of the philosophical foundation and the research design. The sampling procedures and processes have been dealt in the third section of the chapter. The fourth and fifth sections deal with the methods of data collection and analysis.

1.1. The Study Area

Amhara National Regional State -often known as 'Amhara Region', is one of the nine regional states of Ethiopia. It is the second largest, next to the Oromia, region. It has a total area of 161, 828 square kilometers. The region shares an international border with the Sudan in the West and four regional states, namely, Tigray, Afar, Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz. According to the 2007 national census, some of the linguistic groups, whose size goes well over three thousand population include: the *Agew Awi*, *Agew Amhara*, *Hamyara*, *Oromo*, *Argoba*, *Tigray*, *Berta*, *Somali*, *Gumuz* and *Anywak* (CSA, 2007). The *Amhara*, the Agew Awi, the Agew Himira, the Oromo, the Argoba, and the Kimant are the major ethnic groups which inhabit in the region. The ethnic composition and there relative size of the population across two censuses era has been indicated below.

Table 3: Distribution of Ethnic Groups in the Region in between 1994 and 2007 by Population

Ethnic groups	1994		2007	
	Population	(%)	Population	(%)
Amhara	12,615,160	91.2	15,752,992	91.5
Argoba	37,626	0.27	70,012	0.40
Agew Awingi	374,132	2.70	595,878	3.46
Agew Kamyr	143,241	1.04	238,653	1.38
Kemant	172,286	1.24	-	-
Oromo	416,883	3.01	451,362	2.62
Others	74,969	0.54	351,732	2.04
Total	13,834,297		17,221,976	

Source: (CSA, 1995, p.101; CSA, August 2010, p.125-126). Percentage calculations are my own (2016).

As indicated in the table, the 2007 census result showed that the total population of the region has been over seventeen million (CSA, 2010). According to the same source, the Amhara population constitutes about 91.5 percent of the whole population, while the other minority groups constitute the rest of the regional population. The people of the region follow all of the major religions that are found in the country. These are Orthodox, Protestants, and Catholics, Islam, traditional religions and others. Among these the Orthodox religion and Islam constitute 82.5 percent and 17.2 percent respectively (CSA, 2007).

During the Transitional era, the region was restructured into seven administrative provinces. Following the adoption of the 1995 constitution, three autonomous nationality zones have been curved out of the existing seven administrative zones. The autonomous nationality zones include Awi, the Wag-Himira and Oromo zones. The Argoba special District-*Liyu Wereda* has been instituted as of the year 2006. Just recently, Kimant special District has been established following the demands of Kimant ethnic group. The following table shows the list of administrative zones and autonomous units in line with ethnic composition each hosts from within.

Table 4: Distribution of ethnic groups across administrative Zones of Amhra region, 2007

Zone	Ethnic groups	Population	Zone	Ethnic Groups	Population
North Gondar	All persons	2929628	East Gojjam	All persons	2153130
	Amhara	2,866,207		Amhara	2150130
	Gumuz	5154			
	Tigray	19580			
	Kimant*				
South Gondar	All persons	2051738	West Gojjam	All persons	2106596
	Amhara	2046385		Amhara	2094319
				Gumuz	1015
				Oromo	5388
				Agew Awi	1181
North Wollo	All persons	1,500,303	WagHimira	All persons	426213
	Amhara	1490923		Agew- Himira	225564
	Tigray	2805		Amhara	193719
South Wollo	All persons	2518862	Awi	All persons	982942
				Agew Awi	587943
	Amhara	2501882		Amhara	377864
	Argoba	1093		Gumuz	6830
	Oromo	3335		Oromo	1256
North Shoa	All persons	1837490	Oromo	All persons	457,278
	Amhara	1759103		Amhara	57330
	Argoba	31,427		Argoba	2896
	Oromo	39228		Oromo	393584
Bahidar Sp.Zone	All persons	221991	Argoba Sp. District	All persons	34,998

Source: CSA (2007).

Those administrative units represented by ethnonyms enjoy not only autonomous administrative status but also do have special representation in the regional council. However, the remaining administrative units lack constitutional autonomy and serve as intermediary institutions between the regional government and the woreda. The following table reveals the number of representatives in the regional council.

Table 5: Distribution of the Councilors by Zone and Sex, 2015-2020

S.N	Name of zone	Number of councilors	Sex	
			Male	Female
1	Awi	17	9	8
2	North Wollo	20	9	11
3	North Shoa	36	18	18
4	Oromo	8	5	3
5	East Gojjam	36	18	18
6	South Gondar	38	17	19
7	West Gojjam	37	17	15
8	South Wollo	49	37	12
9	North Gondar	45	26	19
10	Waghimira	8	4	4
	Sum	294	167	127

Source: ANRS (2016)

As indicated above, 33(11%) of the members of the council represented the three of minority ethnic groups and the remaining 261(89%) are representatives of the majority ethnic group in the region. In terms of gender, 127(47%) of the members of the council were women, the reaminign 167(57%) were men.

At the federal level, the Amhara region has about 138 representatives at the House of People's Representatives (HoPR). Out of these representatives 15 (11%) were representatives of minority ethnic groups while the remaining 123(89%) belong to the majority-Amhara ethnic group. Regarding the upper house, the House of Federation, the region has 23 members during the period from 2005 to 2010. Of the 23 seats at the House of Federation, twenty (20) seats have been left for the Amhara while Awi, Waghimira, Oromo and Argoba has one seat for each (HOF, 2008).



Figure 2: Map of the Study Area

Source: Administrative Zones within Amhara Region (AZAR, 2008)

1.1. Philosophical Foundations of the Research and the Research Design

The three major methodological positions that guide social science researchers are positivism, interpretive and realism (Mathew and Ross, 2010). Positivist epistemological position claims that knowledge of social phenomenon can be captured through empirical or objective ways; while the interpretivists underline on the subjective understanding of the social phenomena through the effective or meaningful interaction of the researcher and the participants of the study (ibid.; McNabb, 2005). The positivist approaches takes up the ontological potions of objectivism and empiricism that assumes that reality or *Truth exists*-'*out- there'* that can be observed and recorded , only through our five senses, independently of the researcher`s and researched beliefs, opinions and views(Creswell, 2009).

On the other hand, the interpretivist research tradition takes up , largely, the constructivist ontological foundation that underscores on the existence of multiple reality that can be captured through the inter-subjective or dialogical process between the researcher and the participants of the study. As Mathew and Ross (2010) point out, it appears that the two approaches are mutually exclusive. Indeed, both the positivist and post-positivist orientations are considered to be dichotomous and contradictory. However, realism conjoins the two approaches. In this respect, Mathew and Ross (2010) aptly contend**:**

> *Realism starts from a position similar to positivism in acknowledging that there is a social reality that is external to the researcher and a belief that it can be researched using approaches similar to those used in the natural sciences. Realism, however, goes further and suggests that the apparent social reality is underpinned by invisible but powerful structures or mechanisms. These mechanisms are not directly observable but their effects are apparent so these can be gathered and used to provide evidence of the underlying structures or mechanisms (p.29).*

The realist research tradition rightly goes with what is often termed as "pragmatist world view" (Cresswell, 2009, p.11). Pragmatism underscores on the need to adopt and forge out different approaches and methodologies, just like the mixed methodology on the basis of the purpose, context and research problem. As Creswell contends "pragmatism is not committed to any one system of philosophy and reality…. [it]opens the door to multiple methods, different world views, and different assumptions, as well as different forms of data collection and analysis" (2009, p.11). Indeed, many scholars agree that the choice of appropriate research methodology is very much dependent up on the nature of the research objective and research questions (Sekaran and Bougie, 2009).

Accordingly, the present study is oriented by the pragmatist or realist research foundations whereby both qualitative and quantitative approaches and research strategies will be used on the basis of the nature of each research questions and conditions.

The choice of the research design has been very much dependent upon the aims and objectives of the study. Accordingly, mixed research design particularly "concurrent mixed design" has been employed (Creswell, 2009, p.14). This design used both quantitative and qualitative data with the intended objective of offering "a comprehensive analysis of the research problem" (ibid.).

In addressing quantitative oriented research questions cross-sectional survey has been employed. This method has been employed with the intended objectives of measuring the attitude of the majority and minority groups towards multiculturalism.

Besides to this, institutionalist and interpretivist approaches have been employed to answer qualitative research questions. Institutionalism has been at the center of political science research methodology. As many scholars agree "institutions structures political actions and outcomes" (Aspinwall, 2000 cited in McNabb, 2005, p.23). Indeed, Aspinwall has succinctly sum up the significances of institutions in shaping political behaviors and dispositions as :

> *The first is their structure. Institutional rules, norms, and procedures regulate behavior and limit choice. The second is via the concept of path dependency. Path dependency refers to the tendency for structure to not be easily altered. It resists change at all levels. In addition, decisions tend to have subsequent, often unintended, unanticipated and undesired, effects. The third influencing factor of institutions is…. appropriateness, which refers to actions that is based up on rules, and is the product of norms and obligations. Moreover, institutions frame the environment in which political struggles takes place. Institutional rules structure the game and do so in ways that are not always anticipated when rules are devised, thus leading to the notion of path dependency (*Aspinwall, 2000 cited in McNabb, 2005, p.23*).*

So, the usage of institutionalism was found to be relevant to look into the examination of the institutional set ups which have been put in place and its likely outcomes in shaping the attitudes and behaviors of groups in the study area in tandem with the focus to institutionalism, text analysis of documentary sources such as constitutional provisions, and subsidiary legal enactments such as rules and regulations, working procedures, party programs and policies have been used in an interpretive manner.

1.1. Sampling Processes

Sampling process refers to the procedure where representative sample is drawn from the target population. Such process begins with defining the study population (Sekaran and Bougie, 2009). As scholars suggest, "the target population must be defined in terms of elements, geographical boundaries, and time" (Bougie and Sekaran, 2009, p.267). Accordingly, the sampling elements or units are ethnic groups in Amhara Region. So, the Amhara Region and the post- 1990s epoch represented the spatial and temporal boundary of the study area.

Regarding the sampling design, purposive sampling and *multistage –cluster sampling* design have been employed. While purposive sampling was employed to collect qualitative; multistage cluster sampling was employed for the sake of undertaking the survey research. In cluster sampling, the total population will be first apportioned in to clusters and a sample will be selected out from each cluster randomly (Bougie & Sekaran, 2009). In multistage cluster samplings the process of apportioning the population will be done in many stages (ibid). In line with the process of multistage sampling techniques, the population of the study was clustered in to two clusters on the criteria of zonal administrative jurisdiction. Accordingly we will have three *ethnic-based nationality provinces (Zones)* or *Titular Zones* and Eight *administrative Zones* or *non-titular Zones*. In the case of the three ethnic-Zones, all of them were selected.

Accordingly, Enjibara (Capital of Agew Awi), and Kemesie (capital of Oromo Zone), and Sekota-Capital of Waghimira Zone have been selected. With respect to non-ethnic Administrative zones, an attempt will be made to balance geographic representation with the level of ethnic diversity. A valid assessment of multiculturalism requires some level of urbanization where there exist interactions among ethnic groups. In the absence of diversity, multiculturalism cannot be studied. In this regard, the Seven *Zonal* administrative areas are classified into two. The first being those characterized by, relatively speaking, homogeneity, and those relatively heterogeneous zones. Here homogenous *Zones* are best characterized by either of the following conditions: 1) the availability of number of ethnic groups less than three; 2) very small population size of minority ethnic groups in urban centers. South Gondar, East Gojjam, and North Wollo falls within this category.

The remaining administrative zones such as North Gondar, West Gojjam, North Shoa, and South Wollo are found to be more heterogeneous zones. Out of the heterogeneous zones, West Gojjam and South

Wollo were selected randomly. Accordingly, towns like Bure and Dessie have been chosen as second phase in sampling process. Bahirdar, being the capital of the region is supposed to be home of diverse groups, was also selected. In total, six (6) towns were selected from both titular and non titular administrative zones. The third stage of the cluster sampling takes up the selection of kebeles within the mentioned towns; and finally, the participants of the study were selected randomly.

Another important stage in the sampling process is sample size. The sample size has been determined by using Glenn Israel Formula which has been used for calculating proportions of population in multistage cluster sampling (Isreal, 1992). As indicated below, such sampling process took two stages. The first stage determines the nominal sample size using the formula: $n_0 = \{t^2 \frac{p\,(q)}{d^2}\}$.

The second stage determines the adjusted sample size for variability. This again has been determined using, $n = \frac{n_0}{\frac{1+(n_0-1)}{N}}$

Accordingly,

$n_0 = \{t^2 \frac{p\,(q)}{d^2}\}$DEF

n_0 = Nominal Sample size

t^2=Linked to 95% confidence interval for cluster sampling

p=expected to prevalence i.e. the proportion of Amhara Population in the region which is equal to 0.88

q=1-*p* is the proportion of minority ethnic groups in the region=0.12

d^2=relative desired precision i.e. 0.05

DEF= design effect (2 used as designed effect)

$$n_0 = \{1.96^2(\frac{088x0.12)}{0.05^2}\}2=690$$

The adjusted sample size in turn will be determined in the following manner:

$$n = \frac{n_0}{\frac{1+(n_0-1)}{N}}$$

Where ,*n*=adjusted sample size; *N*=is the total number of people in 6 zones

$n=\frac{690}{\frac{1+(690-1)}{6,710,116}}=689$

So, the adjusted or corrected sample size was determined to be 689. The distribution of the sample survey is indicated below.

Table 6: Distribution of Sample Survey

S,N	Selected Towns	Sample size*
1	Sekota	34
2	Kosober	38
3	Kemissie	35
4	Dessie	223
5	Bahirdar	318
6	Bure	56
Total		689

Source: My Own (2016).

* The respective size for each town is determined taking the population size the respective towns in proportion to their contribution to the urban populations of the six towns multiplied by adjusted sample size (n=689).

Out of the sampled population 646 (94%) were interviewed. That means that the refusal rate was only 6%. Indeed, such a low refusal rate was maintained due to the follow up mechanisms taken in the field work. However, out of 646 respondents, 581(90%) respondents' responses were found to be valid during the data checking (cleaning) processes.

3.4. Sources and Methods of Data Collection

3.4.1. . Sources of Data

Both primary and secondary data sources were employed in the study. The primary data involves views, opinions, experiences and attitudes of the participants of the study which include political practitioners, experts, ordinary citizens, community leaders and elders, students and teachers across groups. Likewise the sources of secondary data involved both published and unpublished materials relevant to the study. It included documents such as Constitutions, Proclamations, Directives and Rules, Memos, and decision making Procedures. Besides, reports which were available at different archival sites located under different levels of government including mainly regional and federal government offices have also been referred to. In addition, published books and articles and unpublished materials such as academic research outputs including Master thesis and PhD dissertations were also consulted mainly for the purpose of composing the literature review part of the dissertation.

3.4.2. Method of Data Collection

3.4.2.1. Questionnaire

Questionnaire is the commonly used quantitative data collection instrument in social science researches. It is used to gather information about large number of population by way of gathering data from a systematically arranged sampled population which is small in number (McNabb, 2005). Accordingly mixed -closed and open ended- type of questionnaire has been prepared with the intended objective of soliciting data mainly about what people, know, think and feel about multiculturalism and its practices in the study area. The survey questionnaire was purposely steered towards acquiring a wide range of information that addresses the set of research objectives. It was categorized into different modules in such a way to address the following main aspects**:** 1) General information about the respondents characteristics, 2) multicultural attitudes(orientations) of respondents , 3) institutional accommodation of diversity among political parties, the bureaucracy, the media, education, and the regional governments, and 4) the perception of respondents to these institutions mentioned.

While most of the question items were open-ended giving more freedom for the respondents to express their views and opinions on wide ranges of issues mentioned above, closed ended questions were intended to measure the multicultural attitudes of the respondents based on the adopted version of multicultural ideology scale of Barry and Kalvin (1977). Berry and Kelvin and other Canadian researchers have introduced the multicultural ideology or attitude scale on the basis of 10 Likert statements. The concept of" multicultural ideology" has been used to refer that "(i) cultural diversity is good for society (i.e. cultural maintenance is valued); (ii) there should be equitable participation of all groups in society; and (iii) all groups are willing to change their culture in order to accommodate the cultural orientations of others" (Breugelmans, Van de Vijver & Schalk-Soekar, 2008.).The multicultural ideology scale, sometimes referred to as 'Multicultural attitude scale', is widely used to measure the attitude of minority usually immigrants and the white-majority in Western part of Europe. It is a ten items Likert scale.

In this study, an attempt was made to adapt the instrument adaptable to the Ethiopian context. And consequently, a modified version of 'multicultural attitude Scale' or 'multicultural ideology scale' was prepared to measure the perceptions, attitudes and dispositions of individuals from both minority and majority ethnic groups. Such instrument contained 32 items prepared with five point likert scale: *Strongly Agree* (5), *Agree* (4), *Undecided* (3), *Disagree* (2), and *Strongly Disagree* (1). Out of these

Twelve (12) items were written in reverse format while the remaining 19 were written in normal terms. Such procedure would help to boost up the internal consistency of the questionnaire.

The objective of the Likert scale is to measure the extent of subjects' agreement with each item. However, as McNabb aptly describes, the "researcher are typically not concerned with subjects response to any one item on the scale. Rather, an attitude scale is established by summing all ratings of items in the scale (ibid., 2005, p. 161). In this study, the constructed variable-multiculturalism has been defined as a composite variable having multiple indicators. So, attitude scales like likert scale was found to be most relevant tool or instrumentation.

Furthermore, nominal and ordinal type question items, including open ended questions were incorporated within the questionnaire. So the questionnaire was mixed type which combined structured (likert scales and other scales) and open ended items that gave the freedom to the participants to reflect their views and justifications.

After the instruments were checked for their validity and reliability, as discussed in section 3.4.3 below, the survey was conducted into two phases from mid of September to end of November 2014. The first phase included the capital of *Waghimira Zone-Sekota*, Kemissie, and Dessie. The Second phase included Enjibara, Bure and Bahir Dar.

3.4.2.2. Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

FGD is commonly used tool solicit qualitative data with the view of grasping the prevailing debates, views and practices over issues related to the practices of accommodation of diversity in the study Area**.** Members of these groups were identified with the help of the local research assistants. It was attempted to make sure that the discussions were held in a participatory manner. A checklist of open-ended questions was used to guide the discussion over wide ranges of issues including mainly of the condition of ethnic representation among institutions (such as in the government structures and political parties); media and language use (media support to minority languages and language uses in schools); condition of internal minorities; and women representation.

Participants were allowed to freely discuss over the issues focusing on the challenges and prospects for interethnic tolerance, peace, and mutual respect**.** The researcher facilitated the discussion, took notes, and record the discusstion following the permission of the participants.

Focus group discussions (FGDs) were run all of the sampled towns in a manner which could reflect the diversity of the people in each locality. Teachers, public servants, business men represented from all ethnic groups, ages, and gender have been involved in the process. Overall, about 14 FGDs were run in all of the sampled towns consisting of 68 persons. The size of each FGD consisted of persons ranging from 5-6 on the average.

3.4.2.3. Key Informant Interview (KII)

Apart from the focus group discussions, face to face and telephone interview were employed with party leaders, administrators, legal advisors, council members, speakers and members of standing committees of zonal/Woreda councils, and experts, teachers and officials working at media institutions (both public and private), education offices, schools and colleges; culture and tourism offices, Courts and judicial administration, Women and youth offices, Civil service administration, Statistics and population offices, and finance heads and experts. In total about 37 key informants were interviewed and 36 of them were run through technique of face to face interview techniques, while one persons was interviewed using telephone interview due to the difficulties to access to the person physically .

A checklist of was prepared to guide the semi-structured interview with key informants. Such guides helped to elicit data regarding on the practices, challenges and prospects of multiculturalism, focusing on the ideology of the incumbent government and the institutional mechanisms. Audio cassettes were used to record the key informant interviews following their prior consent and permission.

3.4.2.4. Documentary and Secondary Data

The study also garnered secondary data in order to produce empirical evidence to fulfill the set of objectives. The sources of secondary data involved both published and unpublished materials relevant to the study. It included documents such as constitutions, proclamations, directives and rules, memos, decision making procedures, and reports which were available at different archival sites located under different levels of government including mainly regional and federal government offices. In addition, published books and articles and unpublished materials such as academic research outputs including Master thesis and PhD dissertations were also consulted.

3.5. Validity and Reliability

The scientificity of any research project depends upon on the quality of the data collection instruments, the proper administration of the instruments, data entry, analysis, and many other factors (Bougie & Sekaran, 2009).[60] Among other things, the *validity* and *reliability* of the research instruments, especially of the questionnaire, takes the centre stage to producing a piece of research which is credible, sound, and replicable. *Validity* is used to test the quality of the instruments to capture the subject under consideration (Gupta, 2007; Taherdoost, 2016). In other words, validity can be considered as a *litmus test* that tells us "whether we measure the right concept" or not (ibid. p. 157)[61].

With the view of boosting up the validity of the research, content validity test and face validity were used. Content validity tests whether the contents that were included in the instruments encompass the essential items which together measures what the researcher intended to measure (Gilbert& Prion, 2016; Gupta, 2007; McNabb, 2005).

In this respect, Content validity index of Lawshe (1975) was employed to test the validity of the instruments, specifically of the multicultural attitude scale. In this test, a panel of experts across the field of Social Psychology, Educational Psychology, Federal Studies, and Political Science and International Relations, were selected and given to rate each items of the questionnaire as "*essential",* "*relevant"* and "*not essential"* and then content validity ratio (CVR) and content validity index (CVI) were calculated for the test of individual items and the whole entry (Gilbert & Prion, 2016, p.530)[62]. (See Appendix-7**).**

The result showed that the content validity index (CVI) for the entire instrument was turned out to be 0.92 (92%) which is found to be acceptable (Gilbert & Prion, 2016).

Furthermore, face validity of the questionnaire has been checked in qualitative manner by the way of checking the clarity of wordings, language and format. Among these, the English Version of the questionnaire has been translated into Amharic language and given to a language specialist, in the department of Amharic Literature, for language appropriateness, grammar, and wordings.

[60] Umma Sekaran and Roger Bougie noted that research can be qualified as *scientific* if if fulfills the following eight requirements such as, "purposiveness, rigor, testability, replicability, precision and confidence, objectivity, generalizability and parsimony" (Bougie & Sekaran, 2009, p.23).

[61] In qualitative research the term credibility is used as an equivalent term to validity-a commonly used jargon in quantitative research..

[62] According to Gilbert & Prion (2016, p.530), a panel of 5 -10 experts is preferable but "in content area where it is difficult to find experts, the use of three experts is acceptable".

Even then, there could be a possibility that " people in a career path will often share a particular sense of meanings for words and phrases that are not likely to be shared by everyone else" (McNabb, 2005, p.158). This in turn has necessitated for the launching of pilot study in order to make wordings and statements in the instrument were understandable to the local communities in the study areas.

So, qualitative pilot study was made with the view of eliciting local language usages and expressions to issues and things such as name of places, *ethnonyms* and the like. To that end, some of the respondents residing the vicinity of two districts located in *Awi Nationality Zones* and *South Gondar Administrative Zones were consulted.* Feed-backs from such interactive discussions was incorporated. Accordingly, some items which were thought to be redundant like 'ethnic origin' and 'linguistic groups' were corrected.

Among other things, the researcher learned that there should be trained research assistant, with the physical presence and monitoring of the researcher himself. Accordingly, trainings were provided with 1 or 2 individuals-teachers working in respective sampled towns, and the researcher worked hand-in hand with those assistants in the study area.

The other face of the coin which has paramount role in ensuring scientific research is *reliability*. *Reliability* tests support how *consistent* and *stable* are the instruments to measure what was intended to measure (Bougie & Sekaran, 2009). It measures the degree of consistency of the data collection instrument "across time and across the various items" (ibid., p.161). In this regard, a careful attempt was made to ensure the internal consistency of the questionnaire for measuring multicultural attitudes among groups byway of inserting reverse item questions to check whether respondents of the study were consistent or not in filling up the questionnaire. In addition to this, a test of *split-halves reliability* using the formula of Pearson's correlation coefficient has been employed to test the internal stability of the questionnaire. The result of the test turned out to be (r=0.87) which is considered to be *high* reliability.

Similar methods and techniques which aimed at boosting up the credibility and dependability of the instruments have also been employed to addressing qualitative types of research questions. As described above, credibility is an emerging jargon for validity in qualitative research. And dependability is used in qualitative research instead of reliability, nevertheless; there is no basic difference among the two.

For the sake of ensuring credibility of the instrument, different sources of data were consulted and triangulated. The participants of the study have covered up a wide range of persons representing both majority and minority groups, at different capacity, including teachers, experts and politicians. Furthermore the process of data collection was so rigorous that used audio recorders, vignettes, and guidelines for running both interviews and FGDs.

3.6. Method of Data Analysis

Method of data analysis adopted in the study was shaped by the nature of the data and the research objectives. Accordingly, combinations of quantitative and qualitative data analysis techniques were employed in the study. The quantitative data analysis technique began checking up of the data obtained through questionnaire. Intensive editing was also done at office level to ensure the quality of data and minimize data collection errors. In this respect, about 61 questionnaires were found to be invalid out of the 646 returned questionnaires. Consequently, about 581 were found to be valid questionnaires. The next main task was coding the data into a form that could be entered into SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (version 20) software for further analysis. All gathered raw data were then entered into SPSS. The data entry operation was done by the researcher. Following data entry operation, the data was further filtered for data consistency, missing, etc.

After getting the data ready for analysis, a descriptive statistics and hypothesis testing methods were employed to analyze the quantitative data. While descriptive statistics were employed to describe the characteristics of the sampled populations in different parameters; hypothesis testing method was employed to prove or reject whether there was significant difference between majority and minority towards the constructed composite variables of multiculturalism. Majority and minority groups were treated as categorical variables measurable by discreet data (nominal data) while multiculturalism was treated as continuous data measurable through interval data[63].

In light of this, it was hypothesized that *there was statistically significant difference between the majority group and minority group towards the ideology of multiculturalism in the Amhara National*

[63] There are some Statistician that likert scale can only be measured as ordinal data only to rank analysis instead of calculation of mean and variance. However, applied researcher and statisticians have come up with some qualifications between of likert scale and likert-type items . In this regard, it has been contended that individual likert –type item can be considered as discrete variable. But, the measurement of latent variables (abstract concepts like multiculturalism) with its" multiple likert scale questions" can be treated as interval variable (see Bertram, n.d, p.4; Norman, 2010; Chandel, Joshi & Kale, 2015; Boon& Boon,, n.d; Classon & Dormody, n.d). It follows that composite variable like *multicultural attitudes* can be treated as interval variable.

Regional State. Converse to this, the null hypothesis which was to be rejected was that there *was no statistically significant difference between the majority and minority ethnic groups towards the ideology of multiculturalism in the Amhara National Regional state*. To that end, *an independent sample test* (IST) was employed as specific tool of data analysis to test the hypothesis. As underlined by methodologists, such statistical tool can be employed to,

> *See if there are any differences in the means for two groups in the variables of interest. That is a nominal variable that is split into two sub groups is tested to see if there is significant mean difference between the two spilt groups on a dependent variable , which is measured on an interval or ratio scale(Bougie and Sekaran, 2005, pp.345-346).*

Cognizant of this, the respective groups were treated as independent variable with nominal measure while multiculturalism was treated as dependent and interval measures. In light of this, once the mean score of the respective groups were calculated, then an independent sample test was used to check whether the mean difference between the two groups were statistically significant or not at the 95% level of confidence.

In addition, frequency distribution, percentages and ratio were used to show the result of related findings. The results of quantitative analysis were presented with tables, charts and graphs. Some the graphical tools used to display the results included histograms, bar graphs and line-graphs.

On the other hand, the qualitative data which were collected through documentary sources, personal interview (key informant interview) and group interview (focus-group discussion) were analyzed using thematic and content analysis methods. The thematic analysis involves generating general themes out of detailed chunks of data through repeated efforts of coding of units (sub units) into some meaningful pictures which aims at grasping the general story of the issue under investigation. To that end, approaches on matters of normative and institutional aspect of multiculturalism were instrumental in developing such themes deductively. Content analysis was used in the context of text analysis where key concepts or narrative have been extracted and analyzed through a through investigation of documentary sources mainly of the constitutions, regulations, decision making procedures and government reports.

As a brief summary to what we have discussed, one would say that the ethnic based decentralization practices to the minority ethnic groups in Amhara Regional state provides a unique case that opens up an academic interest to investigate the issue of *multiculturalism from below* taking into account the majority and minority groups as *units of analysis*. As studies elsewhere in occidental world demonstrate,

the presence of majority and minority conceptual categories appears to make easy the methodological contours in the subject. Nevertheless, the multidimensional meanings of multiculturalism having both 'subjective' and 'objective' ontological connotation implies neither positivist nor post positivist research tradition alone could be sufficient to shape or guide the research methodology. With the view of filling up such lacunae, pragmatism or the realist research tradition has been adopted to shape the research process right from the setting the research objectives or questions to the choice of the research design and strategies.

And finally, scrupulous mechanism of ensuring the quality of the research such as validity and /or credibility and reliability and/or dependability was also used. Accordingly, Lawshe's content validity index and Pearson's correlation coefficient have been employed as statistical check-ups for validity and reliability respectively. In a similar fashion, qualitative checks-up mechanisms such as face validity and internal consistency checks have also been employed to boost up the validity and reliability of the research instruments respectively.

3.7. Research Ethics

Research ethics refers to the application of moral standards to decisions in conducting research, including reporting and dissemination of the result of the study. In this regard, the researcher commit himself to exhibit and demonstrate relevant and appropriate moral and professional standards and responsibilities which are required to be observed in the entire process of the research, including the data gathering process, interpretation of data , reporting and dissemination of the results of the research.

Truthfulness, thoroughness, objectivity and relevance were the basic guidelines which I strived to realize in the conduct of the study. Furthermore, as the study was concerned with human behaviors, utmost concern was given to my primary data sources while collecting data through interviews, focus group discussions and observations. Such data sources have been informed about the purpose of the study in a language they can understand so as to get their voluntary consent.

To that end, establishing trust, confidentiality and rapport between the researcher and the participants was critical to determining the quality of data. In this regard, strong emphasis was given to ensure the safety and 'create comfort zone' for the participants so that they could provide genuine information. To that end I have used various strategies such as submission of clearance letter both in English and

Amharic language, self-introduction, introducing the title and objective of the research and its likely benefit to the state, local government and communities; establishing close contacts both in person and through phone. Most importantly, my formerly students of have served as a bridging persons between me and the participants of the study. In order to secure their privacy, the researchers committed him to observe the principles of anonymity and confidentiality of the participants of the research throughout the study. Furthermore, multiple methods of data collection and analysis were employed to ensure objectivity and neutrality of the researcher.

Consequently, with the exception few occasions or case, the data collection process had taken place smoothly and successfully. There had been occasions and cases that some respondents refrained from accepting my invitation of the survey questionnaire. These was observed in *Kemesse,Desie* towns and *Sekota* as well. When I asked them to explain the reasons, they have given me political reasons. I was also informed by the research assistances that some respondent had aired out their fear and suspicion that the information will be used against them. These complaints have claimed to be arisen from teachers.

In Kemissie the issue even attracted some politicians to get involved in the matter. While some felt suspicion that the researcher was a 'security agent' of the government. On the contrary, there was also some of the politicians who suspected me as person from opposition parties of the country.
I thought that all this emanated from the different perspective participants have towards the contents of the questionnaire and the issue of multiculturalism in their contexts. Overall, what I realized from such experience was that the research agenda was sensitive and controversial to local peoples and politicians in the study area. It did not surprise me as I have such expectations beforehand.

As a brief summary to what we have discussed, one would say that the ethnic based decentralization practices to the minority ethnic groups in Amhara Regional state provides a unique case that opens up an academic interest to investigate the issue of *multiculturalism from below* taking into account the majority and minority groups as *units of analysis*. As studies elsewhere in occidental world demonstrate, the presence of majority and minority conceptual categories appears to make easy the methodological contours in the subject. Nevertheless, the multidimensional meanings of multiculturalism having both 'subjective' and 'objective' ontological connotation implies neither positivist nor post positivist research tradition alone could be sufficient to shape or guide the research methodology. With the view of filling

up such lacunae, pragmatism or the realist research tradition has been adopted to shape the research process right from the setting the research objectives or questions to the choice of the research design and strategies.

And finally, scrupulous mechanism of ensuring the quality of the research such as validity and /or credibility and reliability and/or dependability was also used. Accordingly, Lawshe's content validity index and Pearson's correlation coefficient have been employed as statistical check-ups for validity and reliability respectively. In a similar fashion, qualitative checks-up mechanisms such as face validity and internal consistency checks have also been employed to boost up the validity and reliability of the research instruments respectively.

CHAPTER FOUR: STATE-BUILDING, NATION-BUILDING AND THE NATIONALITY QUESTION IN ETHIOPIA.

The quest for multiculturalism is usually a response to the policy of state –nation building process of modern state formation. In Ethiopia the *nationality question*, to use the often cited lexicon of the Marxist intellectual tradition, could be seen as expression of the discontents of the modern state formation and nation building process. This Chapter discusses the political history of state- and nation- building processes which served as intellectual backdrop to the emergence of the agenda of the *national question* in the country. Accordingly, the content of the Chapter has been organized into Four Sections. The First and the Second section elucidates about the state building and nation building processes respectively. The Third and Fourth sections discuss about the quest for the *national question, and* the response of the military government respectively.

4.1. State- Building Process in Ethiopia

In the vocabulary of political science and legal studies, state refers to "legal political entity […].that has a sovereign government exercising supreme authority over a relatively fixed population within well-defined territorial boundaries and acknowledging no higher authority outside those boundaries" (Pearson &Rochester, 1992, p.39). In other words, state is a modern concept which is defined by its constitutive elements including government, sovereignty, recognition, defined boundary and population.

Sovereign state primarily ensures supremacy over contending forces or internal dissents on the issue of maintain security or order within its boundary and population (Pearson & Rochester, 1992). Sovereignty also presupposes independence of the state from external control (de Blij, Glassner & Yacher, 1967, p.44).

Recognition connotes acceptance of the international community (other states) which confers, more or less, equal legal personality on the state. Recognition is vital element for the survival and prosperity of state since it allows establishing diplomatic relationships with other states (ibid.).

Another constitutive element of modern state is boundary. "Boundary marks the limit of states jurisdiction and sovereignty" (de Blij, Glassner & Yacher, 1967, p.82). Defining the limits of states often on paper and also map is a characteristic of modern state. The concept of "frontier" seems to be pertinent to describe the gray area or space separating neighboring 'old states'-often medieval empires (ibid). The existence of such separating space-frontier may be "unclaimed, unsurveyed or mere sphere of influence" where expansion could take place by the stronger unit (ibid.).

The concept of state-building captures the process of modern state formation. According to scholars, state building involves 'penetration and integration', which is considered as the first stage in political development of state, 'where elites took the intuitive for the unification of a given territory' (Almound & Powel, 1996 cited in Tilly, 1975, p.80; Rokkan cited in Newton & Ven Deth, 2003, p.13).

To that end, as the experience of Europe shows, state-builders use a blend of instruments including brute force and cooption (Finerest, 1975, p.24). In most of Western Europe, the process took many centuries, which according to some, commenced at around 11th century and completed in 16th century. The famous treaty of Westphalia was a turning point for the formation of sovereign state with defined borders (Pearson & Rochester, 1992, p.37).

In light of this, states like France and Britain, for instance, emerged out of the long process of the 'transformation' of medieval political units. States like Italy and Germany are late comers in this respect. They just emerged during 19th century due to the process of "unification of independent but dispersed political units" (Newton & Ven Deth, 2003, p.12). The bulk of states in the developing countries, including African states are resulted from decolonization process. Ethiopia is an exception in this matter.

In Ethiopia, the project of modern state formation was initiated by Emperor Tewdros II and completed by Menilek II (Andargachew, 1993; Marcus, 1994; Clapham, 1988). Tewdros had a conception of bigger Ethiopia, out of the fragmented units during the infamous historical period called by the *era of Princes* and "imbued with Ethiopian nationalism, Tewodros conducted a series of campaigns and managed to bring most of the northern highlands under his control, thus putting an end to the era of princes" (Andargachew, 1993, p.5). Tewdros's vision of building up a unified and modern state was continued by Yohaness *IV* as well, yet Ethiopia took its present shape by Menilek II (r.18889-1913) (Bahru, 2014; Andargachew, 1993; Clapham, 1988). In this respect, Bahru (2014) writes,

> *Emperor Menilek is rightly credited with the creation of modern Ethiopia, a process that he had began years before he was crowned emperor through successive stages of expansion that lasted from about 1875 to 1898, he had given Ethiopia more or less its present shape (p.188).*

Menilek's relative strength of firearms and skilful of persuasions, it has been argued, had enabled him to expand to the south and southwest incorporating small kingdoms and city states (Andargachew, 1993; Clapham, 1988). True to the state building process in Western Europe, force (coercion) and cooption were employed as tools of expansion. Regions that submitted peacefully were tolerated to have their autonomy over their internal affairs, while force had been used against those regions which were not willing to submit peacefully (Bahru, 2014, p.188)[64].

Emperor Menilek II, not only ensures internal sovereignty of the country, through the efforts of consolidating territory of the country but also guaranteed the independence (external sovereignty) at the historic battle of Adwa. Ethiopia earned international recognition as an immediate consequence of the shining victory of Adwa. Since then European powers frequented Minilek's courts to establish diplomatic consulates. Corollary to this, Ethiopia has fixed its boundaries through a series of treaties with the neighboring colonies which were under the auspices of the colonial masters (Andargachew, 1993). Accordingly, Ethiopia concluded treaty with France concerning the Ethio-Djibouti border in 1897; it also signed treaty with Great Britain concerning the Ethio-Sudan border, Ethio- Kenya border and Ethio-British Somaliland in 1902, 1907 and 1908 respectively. Furthermore, borders concerning

[64] Regions which submitted peacefully and relatively maintained autonomy, manifested mainly through maintenance of hereditary rules and exercising autonomy over the internal affairs were the some dynasties of the Gibe Region, Wellega, and Jimma. Conversely, regions which were forced to submit forcefully included Arsi, Keffa, Harara and Welyta (Bahru, 2014, p.188).

Ethio-Italian Somaliland boundary 1908, Ethio-Eritrea boundary was signed in 1908 and 1908, respectively (Andargachew, 1993, p.5).

As opposed to such State-building perspective on modern state formation, which the researches advances, is a different narrative which is referred to as 'colonial thesis' (Merrera, 2003, p.100). Proponents of this view associated Menilek's policy of expansion to south and southern western part of Ethiopia as part of colonial project of the Shoan Amhara elites.[65] Some even went far to label Ethiopia as black colonial power that participated in the process of scrambling Africa (Pausewang, 1993; Seyoum, 1997; Baxter, 1978; Assefa, 1993 in Merera, 2003). This claim was first advanced by the Somalia irredentist elites, Eritreans and their sympathizers which later was also be used by different ethnonationalist groups in the southern part of the country , especially the Oromo elites such as OLF(Tarekegn,1982)[66].

One of the justifications, often put forward is the idea that Ethiopia benefited as result of the boundary treaties signed with the then neighboring colonial powers (Seyoum, 1997). Of course, in retrospect, signing boundary agreements with the colonial powers could have benefited Ethiopia from the security perspective- perhaps that could be the only option the king had to ensure the survival of the country and defaulting that could have also reversed the gains Ethiopia had at Adwa Victory.

Apart from this, one should not also missed the motive of the colonial powers in getting Ethiopia signed the boundary agreement. The motive of the colonial powers was primarily to limit Ethiopia's territorial space as it stands now. The colonial powers seemed to have frustrated by the narration and conception that the king had of Ethiopia. For the king, his southward expansion was based on the historical claim that the regions were part of Ethiopia (Marcus, 1994). In this respect, it is opined that "from the

[65] Often the category of "Shoan Amhara" is difficult to trace their ethnicity as they have been mixed (Markakis, 1972, p.19). Even some of the most important heroes of Adwa , who involved in the process state building process, included Ras Gobena ,Ras Mekonen, FItawrari Gebeyeh, Fitawrari Habtegiorgis and Dejazmach Balcha all are known to be members of the Oromo ethnic groups(Merera, 2003, p.103).

[66] Tarkegn Adebo(1982), in his seminal article, *Ethnicity and Class: Concepts in the Analysis of the Ethiopian Revolution*, disclosed that scholars such as Edmon,J.Keller, John Markakis, P.T.W Baxter and T. Oberst , as the origin as well as advocates of colonial argument in their attempt to understanding Ethiopian state formation. Some Ethiopian elites seemed to have easily assimilated and succumbed to the colonial thesis during the euphoria of anti-colonial struggle elsewhere in Africa. Merera Gudina (2003) also hinted the influence of western writers on Oromo nationalists when he writes "…there are a number of Oromo and foreign academics who unreservedly share the colonial thesis in characterizing the Oromo question" (Merera, 2003, p.101).

Axumite period, public history in Ethiopia has moved from north to south, and the twentieth century state developed along this well-trodden path" (Marcus, 1994, p. xiii).

Despite this, tracing back to Axumite period could be too far in terms of time referencing, Yet, ample evidence were found during medieval history, ranged from 12^{th} -17^{th} centuries, which showed the contacts and interactions of diverse ethnic groups of the country as result of the 'criss-crossing' of peoples (Levine, 1974, p.44) and cultures due to war for internal supremacy and expansion, migration, trade, religion, political marriages and so on (Daniel Kendie, 2003, p.177).

As result of such *criss-crossing of peoples*, the incorporation of the southern peoples under a sovereign monarch did not mean that those peoples were 'strangers' (Levine, 1974, p.46) in a way as the colonial power had put conglomerations of different groups under the artificially created borders. The advocates of the colonial thesis consider the pre- Menilek Ethiopia as 'mosaic' of ethnic groups which hardly shares commonalities among them (Levine, 1974, p.21). Without underestimating the diversity among them, however, there emerged also a kind of shared culture- or to use Miamer Menasemay's phrase, 'composite identity' resulted over centuries of interactive effects (Miamer, 2006, p.16; Tarkegn, 1996; Daniel, 2003; Levine, 1974).

Indeed, what happened during the 19^{th} century was something akin to unification of Germany or Italy which is qualitatively different logic of state formation from that of the process of colonialism (Tarekegn, 1982). Thus, the colonial thesis seems to have marginalized such historical facts and justifications for the formation of modern state during the 19^{th} century by Emperor Menilek II.

4.2. Nation-Building Process

Nation- building is a strategy that aims at establishing common allegiance of peoples of different socio-cultural background to the state and state-wide institutions. While accommodations call for nation building process which fosters overlapping identities, without denigrating plurality or diversity, conventionally nation-building process takes up the nation-state model which is assimilative in its nature (Assefa, 2007). Accordingly, it " involves welding the population of the state in to single people with a shared sense of belonging that often comes from a common language, religion, education, historical heritages and culture"(Van Deth & Newton, 2003, p.14).

So, regardless of its approach to diversity, nation-building comes next to state-building. The process of nation –building is not similar to state- building (Finerst, 1975). However, this distinct political development seems to have underrated, if not used in misplaced manner, at least in principle. In this respect Merera Gudina seemed to have used nation-building as state building synonymously or in misplaced manner when he argues that the Amhara elites support the nation- building thesis. Accordingly, it has been claimed that "Menilek's achievement amounts to historic *nation-building process*" (Merera, 2003, p.95, italic mine). In the same vein, other scholars associates the failure of accommodation as "*state failure*" (Assefa, 2006, p.55, italic mine). Here again, what could logically be considered as *failure in nation building process has* been interpreted as erroneously as failure *of state building* process.

The researcher advances the position that what Menilek II did falls, at least theoretically**,** under state building process that paved the way for nation-building process for subsequent regimes. Despite the introduction of modernity such as Rail ways, Postal Office and the ministerial system, Menilek II left was "relatively decentralized Ethiopia" (Bahru, 2014, p.188).

Regarding medium of instruction, linguistic pluralism had been encouraged as well. Here, despite the fact that French was the dominantly adopted, English, Italian, Arabic, and local languages such as *Oromigna*, *Tigringa*, *Amharic* and *Geeze* were used in school systems (Moges, 2010, p.31). Amharic , which served as the as the *lingua franca* of the medieval state as far back to 12^{th} and 13^{th} century (Sergew, 1972) , flourished through the modern state-building process which was initiated by Emperor Tewdros and completed, more or less by Emperor Menilek II (Andargachew, 1993; Clapham, 1988), up until the language got formally established as the official language of the country during the reign of Emperor Hayla-Sellase I (Bahirue, 2014; Lapiso, 1990)[67].

[67] There is no consensus as to the origin of Amharic. Some considered as if it originated from Saudi Arabia (Ullendroff, 1973; Lipsky,1967; Levine, 1974). Some considered it as pidgin language (fused stoke) which just emerged during twelve and thirteen century (Baye, 1987[1995] ; Atsme Giorgis in Lapiso, 1983 E.C[1991]). Some also considered it as indigenous language (Marcus, 1994; , Girma, 2009; Fikre,2016.). Fikre Tolessa suggests that the origin of Amharic could be traced three thousand years back (Fikre, 2018, p.151). Harold G.Marcus explains that the" Semitic branches spread to the Middle East , whence, millennia later, it returned in written form to enrich its cousins several times removed"(Marcus, 1994, p.3). Fikre (2016) seemed to have conccurred the view of Marcus. Girma (1999) contend that there probably was one prototype language around the central Ethiopia from which Amharic and Argobinga emerged as sister languages. Girma adds that the linguistic affinity with Cushitic languages resulted from historical contacts rather than the result of piginization process. By doing so, Girma rejects both the migration thesis and the piginization thesis in his work-*The Origin of Amharic*.

So, the official declaration of Amharic as medium of instruction at the expense of local languages came later by Emperor Hayla-Sellase indeed, Emperor Hayla-Sellase I went for centralism and linguistic imposition as policy of 'nation- state building' endeavor. Assimilation and centralism served as the twin policy/tools of the nation -building process in line with the nation-state dictum of political development.

4.2.1. Assimilation

Minelik's legacy of decentralized system of provincial administration (Bahiru, 1991) and practice of multilingualism (Moges, 2010) did not continue by Emperor Hayla-Sellase. The new prince went for centralism and assimilation which could be taken as nation- state building endeavor (Asnake, 2009). In the first five years of his kingship, however, multilingualism had been tolerated and encouraged. Consequently, missionary schools were encouraged to expand education in the country mainly in the Southern Ethiopia (Moges, 2010).

Such development was set to be reversed due to the Italian occupation. Foreign languages in both government and primary (missionary schools) were suspended and those bodies were forced to withdraw from the country and introduced a new trend of using indigenous languages for the purpose of schooling).

Consequently, the country was restructured into five big regions and one Capital city on the basis of ethno-linguistic lines including, Eritrea (merged out of the former Eritrean colony with that of Tigray), Amhara (curved out of the combination of Gojjam, Gondar and Wollo provinces), Somali (formed out of the merger of Ogaden with the former Italian Somaliland), Harar, and Oromo-Sidama regions (Bahru , 2001, p.191). Among these regions, Amahara and Somali regions were monolingual whereby Amharic and *Somaligna* served as the official languages dominated respectively. Whereas the rest four of the regions were bilingual in their orientations. In this respect, Tigrigna and Arabic were used in Eritrea, *Oromifha* and *Kefinoonoo* in Oromo –Sidama region, Harari and Arabic in Harar region, and Amharic and *Oromifha* in the Capital-Addis Ababa (Pankhurst, 1974 in Dessallegen, 2002, p.2; Bahru, 2014, p.191; Moges, 2010, p.31).

Apparently, the recognition of indigenous languages could be considered as a positive signpost towards the politics of recognition. However, the intention as well as the practices of the colonial power was akin

to the conventional ways of 'divide and rule' policy so that peoples of different ethnic groups could not stand in unison against the colonial master (Bahru, 2001; McNab, 1989 in Dessalegn, 2002).

In the post- liberation period, there had been disintegrating tendencies, manifested through revivalism of ethno-regionalism (Gebru, 1991; Bahru, 2014), which seemed to have jeopardized the nation-building project. To reinforce unity, Amharic language was declared as the official language of the country in the post liberation era (Bahru, 2014, Lapiso, 1990 ; Moges, 2010). It was declared that "having a common language not only reinforces unity of ideas among peoples but also is a precondition for the national integrity and prosperity of the country" (Lapiso, 1990, p.125). Such imposition of the official culture seemed to have driven by its instrumentality to ensuring assimilation or national integration rather than for its intrinsic values of protection of the Amhara culture (Cohen, 2002 in Moges, 2010, p.34).

Despite such official declaration, it should have to compete with English which replaced French as medium of instruction in schools for some times to come. Finally, the Ministry of Education declared that Amharic to replace English as medium of instruction in elementary schools in 1963 (Bahru, 2014, p.193; Moges, 2010, p.32).[68] Before such historical juncture, the development of the language was more of "spontaneous' rather than the result of preplanned policy aims (Bahru, 2014, 193; Getachew, 1986, p.472).

4.2.2. Centralism

Centralism remained the central deriving element of the nation-building project. Accordingly tactics of diplomacy and coercion were used against forces that were resistant to the intended policy. The battles of *Segele* in 1916 with Governor of *Wollo* and the battle of A*nchem* (1930) with governor of *Begemdir* ushered the end of provincial autonomy through the use of coercion. With the exception of *Tigray* , and *Wellega*, *Lasta* regions where hereditary rulers remained intact, the then hereditary rulers of the provinces were replaced by newly appointments from the center (Clapham, 1988, p.28 ; Bahru, 2014, p.191). Following the death of the hereditary ruler of Abba Jiffar II, the autonomy of Jimma province

[68] There lacks precision as to the time when Amharic was declared as the official language of the country. In this respect, some scholars disclosed that "Amharic as the dominant language came with its establishment of 1955"(Bahirue, 2014, p.193). While Lapiso (1990) mentioned the 1936E.C(1944) as the time line for the adoption of linguistic policy of the country(p.114)

was put into an end in 1932. Such autonomous units were maintained even after the restoration the sovereignty of the country (Bahru, 2014, p.191).

A systematic erosion of provincial autonomy came up with the restructuring of the provincial administration which was effected by decree number 1 of 1942. The decree established four-tiered local government administration with *Teklay Gizat* (Provinces), *Awraja* (sub-province), *Wereda* (districts) and *Miktil wereda* (sub- districts) (Cohen & Koehn, 1988, p. 19)[69]. The primary roles of maintaining law and order and tax collection were enforced at all levels of the local government system. The Emperor retained ultimate power over the appointment and dismissal governors of provinces and sub-provinces who in turn had same power to do the same over the districts and sub-districts (ibid).

Unlike the cases during the era of Emperor Menilek and his predecessors, the provincial governors were not allowed to have their own military forces and establish any relations with foreign countries. Indeed, the police forces remained under the Ministry of Interior (Cohen &Koehn, 1988, p.24).

The adoption of the 1931 constitution did also contributed much to the Hayla-Sellase's policy of centralization (Bahiru, 1993). On the one hand, the constitution had given legal ground to the king‘s derive to centralization and power monopolization. On the other hand, the representation of the nobilities and local lords in the bicameral legislative houses-Senate and Deputies seemed to have assuaged the grievances these forces would have (ibid) .

Despite such moves towards centralism, there were few exceptions that continued as legacy of the past administration. The first is the trend to maintain ‘ethnonyms’ in the process of provincial and district formations (Daniel, 1994). When one ventured to see the local administration system during 1970s, some of the provinces like Tigre, Gamogofa, Sidamo and the like reflected ethnic names (Mesfin, 1970 cited Cohen & Koehn, 1988, p.21). Similarly, ethnic names of minority groups were largely reflected at the level sub-provinces. For instance, in the then province of *Gojjam*, *Agew Midir Awraja* (sub-province) was constituted (see the list of provinces and sub-provinces of during 1935 and 1970s at appendix 1&2).

[69] The numbers as well as the boundaries of these administrative divisions had continually changed. And the number of provinces which were assumed to be over thirty during the pre-occupation period-1935, gradually got reduced to fourteen provinces during 1970s (Cohen &Koen, 1988).

The other exception is related to the tolerance of the Emperor towards maintaining hereditary rules in few of the provinces such as *Tigre* and *Wellega* and some sub-provinces like *Lasta*. The *Tigre* province was created out of the merger of former provinces of the West *Tigre* and Eastern *Tigre*. Ras Seyoum, who was the governor of western *Tigray*, was reinstated and continued as the governor of Tigre province. Following the death of the governor, his Son-Mengesha Seyoum ruled the province up to the collapse of the monarchical system (Bahru 2014, p.190). The province of Wellega was also governed by the descendants of hereditary rulers (Bahru, 2014, p.191).

The autonomy of *Lasta* and the *Wag* region enjoyed prior to 1974 could be considered as 'a historic anomaly' in the country where centralism remained a *modus operandi* of the administration. While there lacks conclusive evidence as to the modalities of power transfer from the last ruler of *Zagwe dynasty* to the first rulers of the *restored Solomonic dynasties*, there are emerging information's as to the historic deal between the leaders of the two dynasties which inscribed the special privileges and the duties of members of the *Zagwe* dynasty-often came to be known under hereditary system of '*Wagshum*[70]' within the Solomonic dynasty. Accordingly, it is stated that, Nakuteleab, the last ruler of Zagwe dynasty and Yikuno Amlake, the first restorer of the Solomonic dynasty, agreed that,

> *(1) the former would maintain his kingship up to his death, marking the peaceful assumption of power by Yikuno Amlak; (2) the lasta governors would be ruled by the hereditary rulers of Zagwe dynasty; (3) The governors of the Zagwe would reserve immunities and privileges , often ceremonial, before the court of the Emperors of solomonic dynasty. Thirdly, and most importantly, the ruling families of the Zagwe and the Lasta province would remain free of any obligations of paying taxes to the centre* (Bartinisk & Mantel, 1978/2018, p.44); Ayalew, 2015 , pp.166-167).[71]

Arguably, such power sharing arrangements and autonomy continued up to the end of monarchical system in 1974. During the military regime, lasta was named as sub-province yet its rulers were appointed from the centre.

Taking such apparent similarities and trends between the past and the present federal and local government arrangements , Daniel Gamachu contends that the ethnic-based formation of federations and local government of the post 1991 system is not "surprisingly new and innovative" (Daniel, 1994,

[70] According to Ayalew (2015) the term 'Wagshum' represents the title conferred to the rulers of lasta among members of Zagwe dynasty (p..184).

[71] Some scholars traced the agreement between the two dynasties as far back to the time of Minelike I-the son of the king Solomon and the founder of Solomonic dynasty (Fikre, 2016 ., p.150) .

p. 84). Daniel further explains that "the difference between the present and the past political or administrative divisions of Ethiopia does not lie in the basic criteria used but rather in the political aims and motives in creating the divisions and the administrative modalities employed" (1994, p.84). In the post 1990 experience shows that there have been regions such as Gambella, and SNNP which are not defined solely on ethnic terms against those regions whose name bore name of a single ethnic groups as Amhara, Somali, Harari, Tigray and Oromia (Becken, 2014**;** Assefa, 2006). Indeed, the existence of similarities, which seems to be under-investigated yet, shows incremental nuances and continuities between the past and the present. Yet, notable differences in the ideological orientations, motives and approaches have been in order among the past and the present. In the past, according to Gebrehiwot,

> *Assimilation policy was a principal guide…..majority of the Awraja [sub-province] and Wereda [districts] were curved by bringing two or more ethnic groups together. Blending feuding ethnic groups was viewed as an ethnic conflict resolution mechanism at the local level (Gebrehiwot, n.d, p.3, emphasis and translation mine).*

Indeed, assimilation policy was primarily driven by the logic of nation-state building process which had been a trend elsewhere in Europe. Apart from this, the five year colonial presences, though seemingly short-lived, like the case in other colonies, had created atmosphere of hostilities and frustrations among Ethiopians which adds another reason for the king to commit himself for assimilative integration in the post-liberation period.

4.3. The Nationality Question' in Ethiopia

The other basic issues which came at the height of the radicalization of student movements was what is known to be 'the national-question' in the lexicon of Marxist-Leninist approach to the claims of identity. According to Walker Connor, the national question is broadly associated with "the entire network of problems arising from the existence of nations and nationalities" (Connor, 1984, p.xv). In Marxist tradition, the minority groups were presented as 'oppressed- nations' and nationalities while the majority is presented as 'oppressor nation' (Slezkine, 1994, p.414). In Ethiopian context, the Amhara ethnic group had been perceived as "oppressor nation whose political system, culture and language oppressed … other nations and nationalities" (Merera, 2003, p.97). The nationality question, as mobilization agenda came sometimes later than the land question. The class question seemed to have dominated the student movements before the submission of an article entitled as *On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia,* by Walleligne Mekonen by the year 1969. Walleligne strongly criticized the

assimilationst nation building project as "fake" endeavor which was put forward by the ruling class. He interrogates that:

> *What is this fake nationalism? It is not simply Amhara and to certain extent Amhra-Tigre supremacy? Ask anybody what Ethiopian culture is? Ask anybody what Ethiopia language is? Ask anybody what Ethiopian Music is? Ask anybody what the national dress is? It is either Amhara-Tigre. To be genuine Ethiopian one has to speak Amharic, to listen to Amharic music, to accept the Amhara-Tigre Shama in International conferences (Wallelign, 1969, p.2).*

Wallelign concludes that "Ethiopia is not really one nation". Instead "it is made up of a dozen of nationalities" and "nations" (ibid. p.2). Nationalities are defined as group of people "with their own language, ways of dressing, history, social organization and territorial entity", whereas nations are defined as groups of people "with a particular tongue, particular ways of dressing, particular history, particular social and economic organization" (ibid)[72]. This definition squarely fits with the Stalinist understanding of nation and nationalities. Despite such similarities on the normative orientation of the terms, there lacked clarity as to the actual classification of groups as nation and nationalities. In this regard, while Wallelign boldly listed out what he thought as nations, the identification of nation and nationalities, as it had been practiced in the former USSR, came only at the operative level which was subject to political decision of the communist party (Connor, 1984).

There had been allegation that he served as "the mouthpiece of Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)" which wanted the agenda badly for its own secessionist (independence) cause (Bahru, 2014, p.200). Other criticized that the question of nationality came later only as instrument of political mobilization and action against the system (Tarekegn, 1984). Despite this, and perhaps other criticisms, Wallelign's thesis remained to be one of the first ever articulated positions that challenged the nation-state building project of his time.

Following Wallelign, the nationality issues had been one area of consensus among multiethnic political organization and nationality-based ones. In this regard, multiethnic political Organizations such as Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (AESM) accepted self-determination of groups up to secession (Merera, 2003, p.98). ELF and later Eritrean People Liberation Front (ELF) was the harbinger of independence where question was justified under

[72]Walleligne (1969, p.2) listed out the *Oromo*, the *Tigre*, the *Amhara*, the *Gurage*, the *Sidamo*, *Welayita* and *Harari* as "Nations". It is not clear whether other groups falls under nationalities or nations. Unlike such seemingly putative definitions, scholars contend that nations emerges from the process nationalism rather than vice versa (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983, p.55; Hobsabawm, 1983, cited in Hywood, 2002, p.109).

the discourse of self-determination of nations. In addition, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) represented the most powerful ethno-nationalist movement as well.

The agenda of nationality questions advanced by the ESM and subsequent emergence of political organizations, both multiethnic ones and ethno-national ones, testified, among other things, the failure of nation-building project. In this regard, Gebru Tareke aptly said "Ethiopian leaders have been far less successful in nation-building than in state creation and consolidation. State penetration and control of society considerably expanded over the last hundred years but without sufficiently enhancing the identification, participation and loyalties of the citizens to the nation-state" (Gebru , 1991, p.29).

The next logical question would be then why the nation-state building project failed in Ethiopia despite successes in other states elsewhere? In this regard Gebru opines that" the modern Ethiopian state was created in socio -economic environment characterized by low productivity, the absence of accumulation, a resultant failure to promote manufacturing, and continuing dependence on craft production….no transformation of agrarian rule (1991, p.56). For this scholar, then, the failure of the country to extricate itself from feudalism (Merera, 2003) and transform to capitalism had been one of the profound reasons for the failure of the nation state building project. The second would be that the system remained to be "modern autocracy" (Andargachew, 1993, p.7) which failed to have democratic credence as well. The success of nation-state building in France seemed to have been attributed to the concurrence of capitalism and democracy. Thus, in explaining the failure of nation building in Ethiopia, the internal problems might not be sufficient. The role of the external forces seemed to have played its own role, not just in terms of the radicalization and the framing of the problem, but also from the then USSR'S strategic interest point of view.

Following the overthrow of the century old monarchical system, the question of nationality had been officially recognized by the military government, despite the political bickering and conflicts among competing elites over the approaches or methods of addressing the problem (Clapham, 1988). The political schisms were intensified among the two multiethnic political parties-EPRP and AESM (ibid.).

Ethnic based secessionist political forces got momentum as the military government was not ready to have embarked a democratic system. Consequently, Tigrean Liberation Front (TPLF in 1975), Afar Liberation Front (ALF), Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF in 1975) later the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF in 1986) emerged seeking secession and or autonomy (Merera, 2003, p.106).

Some of the opposition movements such as Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) came up with liberal approach to the land question as well as suggest federalism which would grant limited autonomy as response to national question (Andargachew, 1993). During the early times of the military rule, the guerilla movement of OLF was weakened, due to the land reform as well as the dominance of Oromo elites in the All Ethiopian Socialist movement (AESM) which has been known as -'Meison' in Amharic version (Clapham, 1988, p.215**).**[73]

4.4. The Response of the Military Government to the Nationality Question

The monarchical system was not able to address the popular demands of economic and political reform. The system was not able to survive such a tide neither. The year 1974, a tumultuous period, rather created a power vacuum that was cleverly hijacked by the military group which later known as 'the *Dergue'*. As early as 1975, the historic land reform policy was considered as revolutionary as it addressed the problems of tenancy particularly in the southern part of Ethiopia (Merera, 2003, P.82). A year after-1976, came the Program for the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) which introduced to address the nationality question and fill up the ideological gap of the military government. Accordingly, the NDR provides:

> *The right to self- determination of all nationalities will be recognized and fully respected. No nationality will dominate another one since the history, culture, language and religion of each nationality will have equal recognition in accordance with the spirit of socialism. The unity of Ethiopia's nationalities will be based on their common struggle against feudalism, imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism and reactionary forces. This united struggle is based on the desire to construct new life and new society based on equality, brotherhood and mutual respect….given Ethiopia's existing situation, the problem of nationalities can be resolved if each nationality is accorded full right to self government. This means that each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political, economic and social life use its own language and elects its own leaders and administration to head its own organs. The right of self government of nationalities will be implemented in accordance with all democratic procedures and principles* **(**PMAC, April 1976 cited in Merera, 2003, pp.82-3*).*

As revealed, the nationality question was not only recognized but also was promised to be approached through the regional autonomy model under the dictums of socialism. Such promises, however,

[73] Do you to the dominance of Oromo elites within MEISON dominated- the Military government, some scholars go to the extent of leveling the government as Oromo government (Clapham, 1988).

remained largely on paper and long awaited, until the adoption of the constitution-the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1987. The constitution portrayed Ethiopia as a unitary multinational state which guaranteed equality and autonomy to nationalities (PDRE, 1987, preamble). To that end, among other things, five autonomous regions, apart from the twenty four administrative regions, were established. These were Eritrea, Tigray, Asseb, Ogaden, and Dire Dawa (Merrera, 2003, p.83). Furthermore, "Amharic was denied the formal status of national languages, but was designed as the language in which state activities would be conducted" (Clapham, 1988, p.201).

Apart from these, the National literacy campaign in 1979, the establishment of the Nationalities Institute in 1983, and the constitutional commission in 1986 served as institutional ways of accommodation. (Clapham, 1988, p. 200; Alem, 2003, p.11)[74]. Most remarkably, the literacy campaign was conducted through languages of nationalities reaching as much as fifteen which was reportedly reached over ninety percent of Ethiopian population (Alem, 2003, p.11; Moges, 2010, p.36)[75].

Despite such formal and informal policies to address, the nationality question, ethno-nationalist armed forces were intensified both in scale and number. Unfortunately, the response of the regime was more of military approach rather than seeking a negotiated solution (Merera, 2003; Alem, 2003). As result of this internal struggles and the end of cold war, externally combined yielded the collapse of the Military government in 1991[76].

In this chapter, attempt has been made to provide a brief over view of the genesis and history of modern state formation in Ethiopia. In doing so, the concepts of state building and nation building have been delineated for the purpose of the analysis. The quest for multiculturalism more often arises as response to the policy of nation building process of modern state formation. However, in the context of Ethiopia, there lacks clarity as to the politico-historical condition that attributed for the quest for multiculturalism. Regardless of this, the identity claims had been presented under the generic term of *question of*

[74] The National Amharic Language Academy which was established in 1972 was replaced by Ethiopian languages academy (Moges, 2010, p.36).

[75] There had been media coverage for few languages such as Tigrigna and Oromigna. Apart from this, the media coverage for other minorities was on occasional days such as the annual 'Revolutionary Day Celebration' (Clapham, 1988, p.200). Furthermore Folk music and dances were encouraged during the regime (Alem, 2003, p.11).

[76] . There is no consensus as to the continuation of struggle of the ethno-nationalist forces despite the measures the government took in response to the land and nationality questions. For Merrera (2003), the NDR and the PDRE Constitutional provisions were only on paper than reality. Others argues that the regime biased to class questions than the nationality questions (Keller, 1988, p. 203) . In addition, the regimes defiance to the call for popular government and its militaristic approach to the demands of intelligencia of the times could have added the problem.

nationality or the nationality question. The usage of the term *question of nationality* is the Leninist-Stalinist lexicon which was put forward as an agenda in the early 1970s, following the radicalization of the Student Movement. The Military Government responses, in the form of granting special autonomy to limited areas and cultural and linguistic recognitions, were not able to satisfy the demands of the radicalized political movements which ultimately led to the consummation of the regime by the TPLF led rebel forces in 1991. The *nationality question* remained the mainstay of the government ideology in the post-1991 political development in the country.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE HISTORY OF THE AMHARA REGION

An administrative Region for the Amhara had, for the first time, been emerged during the Italian occupation. The Amhara region was one of the sixth regional administrations which were introduced by the Italian administration with the villain purpose of the divide-rule. Such ethnic based administration had been discontinued in the post-liberation periods, but only up to the 1990. The ethnic based administrative regions have been re-introduced since 1991 following the seizure of state power by the TPLF led EPRDF government. Then, emerged Amhara Region under the designation of *Region 3* or *Killil-3* during the period of the transitional government, 1991-1994. As of 1995, following the adoption of the FDRE constitution, the former Region 3 has been re-designated as the *Amhara National Regional state*. Regardless of the difference in nomenclature, the newly curved out administrative region, however, was found to be problematic as the region has claimed to have lost significant portion of its conventional territories to its neighboring regions. This chapter basically uncovers the politics behind the formation of what has been conventionally known by the name- the *Amhara region* during the period of the transitional government, and the attendant political developments afterwards. To that end, the chapter has been organized into three sections. The first section explores the historical genesis of the Amhara region in the pre-1991 periods. The second section deals with the political developments during the period of the transitional government. This section addresses specifically the formation of the Amhara *Killil* and the elections for the regional government and the national constituent assembly during the transitional government. The third section deals with four national and regional elections in the post- transitional government. In this section, an attempt has been made to reveal how periodic elections were instrumental to consolidating the power of EPRDF and subsequently for the emergence of competitive authoritarianism at the national and regional governments. Furthermore, the 2005 election and its repercussion at the national and regional levels have also been highlighted.

5.1. Historical of Genesis of the Amhara Region during the Pre-1991 Era.

The formation of ethnic homeland for a particular ethnic group had been uncommon in the administrative history of the modern Ethiopia. Instead, multiple criteria like productivity of land, location and settlement of ethnic groups had been employed (Daniel Gamachu, 1994, p.83). This,

however, did not preclude the prevalence of administrative provinces and sub- provinces which were named after certain ethnic groups.

In this respect, the existence of Amhara administrative region had been mentioned in the early medieval history of Ethiopia (Bahiru, 1991; Levine, 1974). Donald Levine points that " the earlier description of Amhara from the sixteenth and early seventeenth century refers to as a large region containing several subject provinces all of which speak Amharic" (Levine, 1974, p.72). According to the accounts of Levine, Such region or province was considered to be one of the "nucleus of the Abyssinian kingdom" (ibid., p.73).

The centrality of the Abyssinian kingdom which had been spearheaded by the rulers of the Amhara region, however, declined during the early sixteenth century (ibid.). The emergence of the so called "Era of princes" in the late18th century had furthered eroded the suzerainty of the Amahara rulers in particular and the Abyssinian kingdom in general (Bahiru, 1991, p.12). The Era of Princes symbolized the decline of the center-the king of kings, as the provincial leaders, called Rases, could not obey the dictates of the center located at Gondar.

Consequently, the geographic sphere of influence over which different *Rases* exercised varied depending upon the power they actually had (Daniel Gemechu, 1994). Such internal struggle to dominate the center had continued unabated up until the rein of Emperor Menilek II, who finalized the modern state formation process which had begun by his predecessors.

In the absence of stable and centralized state, any attempt to locate the geographic size and location of a certain province or region would be a futile exercise, at least for the students of political science. In the same token, the attempt to locate the Amhara region needs to be explored in light of the historical administrative genesis of Ethiopia in the modern Era. Furthermore, the brief colonial intrusion of Italy in the 1935 up to 1941 seemed to have served as a background for the formation of the regional states of Ethiopia including the Amhara National Regional state in the post-1991 (Bahiru, 1991).

5.1.1. The Amhara Adminstrative Areas during the 1930s

The administrative regions of Ethiopia took shapes during the Era of Minelike whence different administrative regions or *Gizats* of the country enjoyed a significant level of autonomy as long as they

were willing to pay tribute to the King or to center (Bahiru, 1991). The administrative units had gone through further refinements and changes following the coming of Emperor Hailessilasie who had put huge effort to consolidate and restructure the country to meet his motive of centralism and modernity. Accordingly, there emerged about 32 Ghizats (Administrative Regions) in the country (Daniel Gemechu, 1994, p.93) as indicated in Table 8.

Table 7: The List of Administrative provinces among the five geographic locations during the 1930s

Northern Ethiopia	Central Ethiopia	South Eastern Ethiopia	Southern Ethiopia	South Eastern Ethiopia
1.Western Tigre 2.Eastern Tigre 3.**Northern Amhara** 4.Wag 5.Yeju 6.Angot, Gura, Kelem 7.Wello Teru, Birru and Awsa 8.Northern Beneshangul 9.Gojjam	10.**Central Amhara** and Selale 11.Eastern and Southern Shoa 12.Nono and Gurage	13.Southern Beneshangul 14.Guduru and Leka 15.Western sibu 16.Sayo and Anfilo 17.Wallaga 18.Illubabor 19.Eastern Sibu and Goldya 20.Limmu and Enarya 21.Gera 22. Jimma, Gumma and Janjaro 23.Gurafereda 24. Keffa, Maji and Gimira	25.Bako and Gofa 26.Konso and Gardula 27.Wellamo 28. Kembata 29. Sidama and Borena	30.Arusi 31.Bale 32.Harerge and Ogaden

Source: Daniel Gamachu (1994, p.93)

As listed above, those provinces which were conventionally believed to be Amhara areas were distributed over different geographic locations mainly among the Northeren Ethiopia and central Ethiopia. In addition to those areas in the north, Wollo, Gojam, Angot, Lasta and part of Shoa were believed to be conventional areas of the Amhara speaking people.

5.1.2. The Amhara Region during the Colonial Times, 1935-41

The Italians invasion came with not only to protecting and promoting the national interest of the invading power in East Africa, but also as a vengeance to offset their humiliation at the Battle of Adwa (Bahiru, 1991). Ethiopia, despite its diplomatic successes and the restoration of Eritrea, the internal development were in dismay. Despite the posturing of the king as modernizer, the fact of the matter had been depicted by the development of absolute monarchy in tandem with the entrenchment of feudalism and bureaucratic centralism. Consequently, Ethiopia's resistance was mercilessly smashed out with the modern army of the colonial power (ibid.).

The colonial power soon introduced a new administration which had been unique, but went along with the conventional style of colonial administration. Language and religious criteria were employed for the creation of six colonial administrative regions as 'the Italian East Africa" Africa Oreintale Italiana (Sbacchi, [Tran.] Garedew, 1995, p.75; Daniel Gamachu, 1994, p.98). Amhara region was established constituting of Begemidir, *Wollo*, *Gojjam* and *Northen Shoa* (Bahiru, 1991, p.162). There emerged a four layered hierarchical administration with Province (*Ager Ghizat*) –Sub-province (*Awraja*), District (*Wereda*) and Sub-District (*Mikitil Wereda*) (Sbacchi, [Tran.] Garedew, 1995, p.96).

Figure 3: Map of Ethiopia during the Italian Occupation, 1935-41: Italian East Africa

Source: Wikipedia (2019)

As revealed in Map 3, the Italian East Africa incorporated the former colonies –Eritrea and Italian Somali land with the newly invaded Ethiopia**.** Accordingly, in the north, in addition to Amhara Ghizat, Eritrea and the Tigre provinces was joined into a single administrative unit; on the East, the Ogaden area of Ethiopia was to conjoin with the Somali land. The remaining three regions included the Sidama-Oromo region, the Harari Region, and Addis Ababa (later changed to Shoa (Bahiru, 1991, p.162; Daniel Gamachu, 1994).

Among these Regions, Amhara and Somali Regions were monolingual whereby Amharic and *Somaligna* served as the official languages respectively. Whereas the rest four of the regions were bilingual in their orientations. In this respect, Tigrigna and Arabic were used in Eritrea, *Oromiffa* and *Kefinoonoo* in Oromo –Sidama region, Harari and Arabic in Harar region, and Amharic and *Oromiffa* in

the Capital-Addis Ababa (Pankhurst, 1974 in Dessallegen, 2002, p.2; Bahru, 2014, p.191; Moges, 2010, p.31). Apparently, the recognition of indigenous languages could be considered as a positive signpost towards the politics of recognition.

However, the intention as well as the practices of the colonial power was akin to the conventional ways of 'divide and rule' policy so that peoples of different ethnic groups could not stand in unison against the colonial master (Bahru, 2001; McNab, 1989 in Dessalegn, 2002). Indeed, there had been ruthless attempts of ethnic cleansing and murder of the Amhara ethnic group, who resided 'beyond their own region' with the apprehension that such group would rebel against the colonial masters (Sbacchi, [Trans.] Garedew, 1995). Similarly, Orthodox Christianity was also been suppressed with the view of garnering support from the Muslim population in Ethiopia and beyond (ibid.). The massacre of Debre Libanos remained one of the worst atrocities made by the fascist Italy over the Church and the Christian community (Combell, 2014)[77].

5.1.3. Amhara Provinces in the Post Liberation Period

A systematic erosion of provincial autonomy came up with the restructuring of the provincial administration which was effected by decree number 1 of 1942. The decree established four-tiered local government administration with Provinces (*Teklay Gizat*), Sub-Province (*Awraja*), Districts(*Wereda*) and Sub- Districts(*Miktil wereda*) (Cohen & Koehn, 1980, p. 19). Accordingly, the country was divided in to Twelve provinces (*Teklay Gizats*) including Arsi, Begemidir, GamuGofa, Gojjam, Hararage, Illubabor, Kaffa, Shoa (Shewa), Sidamo, Tigre, Wellega, and Wollo. Then Bale was curved out of Harerege and became the 13th province of the country in 1960 (Cohen and Kohen, 1988).

Accordingly, it is reported that there were about Thirteen (13) Provinces, Eighty Seven (87) Sub-Provinces, Three Hundred Eighty Seven (387) Districts and One Thousand Fifty Six (1056) Sub Districts during the early 1960s (Daniel, 1994, p.99). In the mid 1960s, the number of the provinces were increased, due to the incorporation of Eritrea with the status of an ordinary province in 1962, to the level of Fourteen (14). Consequently, the number of the sub-provinces and districts were increased to Ninety nine (99) and Four Hundred Forty Four (444) respectively (ibid.p.101; Cohen & Koehn, 1980, p.23). In both times, i.e in the early 60s and the mid 60s, the size of the Amhara province appeared to

[77] Persons whose number ranged from 1,801-2,201 were executed at *Debre-Libanos* (Cambell, 2014, p.171).

have constituted same number of sub-provinces. In this regard, what has been considered as Amhara Provinces including *Begemidir*, *Gojjam* and *Wollo* had constituted Seven (7) and Twelev (12) Sub - provinces or *Awrajas,* respectively (ibid.).

Table 8: Lists of Provinces and sub Provinces of the Amhara , 1970s

SN	Lists of Provinces	Area (km2)	Capital of the Province	List of the Sub-Provinces	
1	Begemidir	74200	Gondar	1.Chilga	5. Libo
				2.Gondar	6. Semen
				3.Wogera	7. Gayint
				4.Debere Tabore	
2.	Gojjam	61600	Debre Markos	1.Metekel	5. Mota
				2.Bahirdar	6. Bichena
				3.Agew Midir	7. Damot
				4.Debere Markos	
3	Wello	79400	Dessie	1.Lasta	7. WereImenu
				2.Wag	8. Dessie
				3.Kobo&Raya	9. Ambasel
				4.Wadila Delanta	10. Awsa
				5.Yeju	11. Qallu
				6.Borena & Sayint	12. WereIllu

Source: Extracted from **(**Mesfin, 1970 and CSA 1976 cited in Cohen &Koehn, 1980, pp.20-21).

It is obvious that Shoa Province, though known as home of ethnically inter-mixed population mainly of between the Oromo and the Amhara (Markakis, 1974); it has been also known as a home of Amhara ethnic group. The administrative province of Shoa Province during the time of 1970s seemed to have reflected such hetrogenity. Accordingly, it constituted eleven sub provinces including Selale, Merabete, Menz& Tegulet, Jara, Tegulate & Bulliga, Mengesha, Jibat & Mecha, Chebo & Gurage, Kembata, Hukach&ButaJira, and Yerer & Kereyu (Mesfin, 1970 and CSA 1976 cited in Cohen & Koehn, 1980, pp.20-22).



Figure 4: Map of Ethiopia in 1974

Source: Bahiru Zewudie (1991, p.190)

Following the Seizure of power by the Military in 1974, the Forteen *Teklay Ghizats* were rebranded as *Kifile-Hager*. Seven years later, Asseb and Addis Ababa provinces were introduced which , consequently, led to the increment of provinces to Sixteen by early 1980 (Cohen and Kohen, 1988). Following the adoption of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) Constitution in 1987, about thirty (30) administrative Provinces were introduced. Out of which, five of them included provinces like Eritrea, Tigray, Asseb, Dire Dewa and Ogaden (Daniel Gamachu, 1994, p.108).

Consequently, previous provinces of Gojjam, Gondar, and Wello were further subdivided in to Seven administrative regions or provinces. By the same fashion the Shoa province was also subdivided into four new administrative regions (ibid.).

Table 9: Selected Administrative Regions Representing Amhara Homelands, 1987.

Former Provinces	New administrative Regions	Capitals of the New administrative Regions	Counts of the Sub Regions(*Awrajas*)
Begemidir	1.North Gondar	Gondar	16
	2.South Gondar	Debre Tabore	9
Gojjam	1.Metekel	Pawe	5
	2,East Gojam	Debre Markos	7
	3.West Gojjam	Bahir Dar	10
Wello	1.North Wello	Weldaya	8
	2.South Wello	Dessie	9
Shoa	1.North Shoa	Debre-Birhan	16
	2.Addiss Ababa	Addiss Ababa	19
	3.South Shoa	Nazret	6
	4.West Shoa	Weliso	11

Source: Extracted from Daniel (1994, p.108).

What has often been considered to be the home lands of the Amharic speaking groups included 8 Provinces and the Eighty (80) Sub-Provinces, with the exception of Addis Ababa. At the level of the country, the Thirty Regions were divided into Three Handered Fifity Four (354) Sub Province or *Awrajas*.(see Annex 3).

Figure 5: Map of the Administrative Regions of Ethiopia in late 1980s
Sources: Wikipedia (2019)

5.2. The Transitional Government and Political Developments, 1991-1994

Ethiopia had been ruled under different form of authoritarian regimes. The 1974 revolution was a watershed to ending the overarching monarchical system. Despite the radical socio-economic reforms of the military regime spearheaded by the socialist orientation, the system failed to bring a democratic dispensation. What was evidenced was an attempt to institutionalize a kind of totalitarian system, another form of authoritarianism, which was heavily dictated by the Military junta that was often referred to as *Derg*.

The Military government of Ethiopia which reined the country for seventeenth years of repression was deposed from power due to mainly the military victory by the combined forces of the Tigrean People Liberation Front (TPLF) which rebranded itself as Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), following its alliance with the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM) in 1989, The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) (Dahala, 2012).

Few times before the collapse of the military government, a conference stewarded by USA was held in London involving the incumbent regime, TPLF, and EPLF. The conference appeared to have guaranteed the rebel forces to have mandated to hold military and political control over Ethiopia and Eritrea respectively (Harberson, 1996; Merera, 2000). As regards Ethiopia, the London Conference had demanded for the formation of all-inclusive Transitional Government that would facilitate the election for the Constitutional Assembly (CA) leading to the formulation of new constitution for the Country (Merera, 2000).

5.2.1 The Transitional Charter and Transitional Government

A month after the London Conference, the Peace and Democratic Conference was held at Addis Ababa from June 1- 5, 1991. The purpose of the Conference was to adopt the Charter for the formation of Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), set out guidelines for the operation of the interim government that would in turn facilitate the formulation of new constitution (Hovde, 1994). About thirty one leaders of political movements mainly of the Ethnic liberation fronts and smaller ethnic movements had participated in the conference (Keller, 2002, p.29). The Transitional Charter established a Council of Representatives (COR) as the legislative organ, the Presidential system as executive and the judicial system.

The Council of the Representatives (COR) were composed of Eighty Seven (87) members out of which EPRDF took the largest- having Thirty two seats(32) , and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), remained the second largest, with Twelve (12) seats (Keller, 2002, p.29). The remaining seats were distributed to representatives of smaller Ethnic Movements which, according to Akililu, "were hastily assembled and manufactured with the encouragements of the EPRDF" (2006, p.97).

What had been evidently clear was the exclusion of pan-Ethiopian multinational organizations such as the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON), the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), and the Worker Party of Ethiopia (Merera, 2000, p.183). By doing so, there was no an ethnic based party

or movement that represented the Amhara ethnic group in the formation of the Transitional Government (Maimir, 2006; Polluha, 1988). Later, amid of the election for constituent assembly in 1994, ENDM shed-out its multiethnic pan -Ethiopian nomenclature into Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) (Chichu, 2019; Mamushet, 2020).

Regarding the contents, the Transitional Charter conferred wide ranges of collective rights upon to Ethnic groups or *Nations* and *Nationalities* (Hovde**,** 1994, p.129). The *nationality question* stood out, and still is the main guiding justification for the preoccupation of collective rights (Zemelak, 2014, p.99). In this respect, the Charter explicitly stated that 'each nation and nationalities to govern its own people within its own defined territory with each having the rights to declare its independence' (Hovde, 1994, p.130). In line with such provisions, a proclamation to provide for the establishment of Regional Governments, or, to use its Amharic-version, *Killil*, was enacted by proclamation No.7/1992. Accordingly, two schemes of self-*government* were envisioned at the regional level. The first was the *national* approach which was conferred to a specific group to exercise it alone, and the second approach was the *regional* approach thereby the different ethnic groups could exercise self- government jointly as per their consent (TGE, 1992, art. 2 sub. art. 5 & 6).

5.2.2. The Formation of Amhara Region and the Territorial Surgery.

What has been known by the name Amhara National Regional state was initially envisaged as "Region Three" –*Amhara Killil*, to use its Amaharic par-lance, during the period of Transitional government. The modality of the self government which had been adopted was the Regional approach whereby the Amhara, the *Agew-Kimarigna*, the *Agew-Awongigna and* the Oromo were recognized to be the constituting member of the regional government through their consent (TGE, 1992, 3(1)).

Other ethnic groups, whose names were not explicitly stated by the Transitional government of Region Three were impliedly recognized (Constitution of the Transitional Government of Region Three [TGR3], 1993).

However, other Ethnic groups including Kimant-a group which has been known in historic Ethiopia and even got counted by the 1984 Census of Ethiopia, was not mentioned by name , let alone to be

recognized as the founding member of the Region (Belay, 2010; Yeshiwas, 2013). Scholars did not agree on the exact reason for the omission of the Kimant from the list of ethnic groups and of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia. Some contend that such omission could have been due to the minimal, if not absence of, role of the Kimant group in the fight against the former Military government by the side of EPRDF (Belay, 2010). Whereas scholars like Zelalem Liyew, a socio-linguist, found that Kimant Ethnic group's culture is "indistinguishable from the neighboring Amhara" (Zelealem, 2002, p.6). Similarly, the language of *Kimanteny*, it has been argued, was believed to be extinct or dead (Zelealem, ibid.).

Notwithstanding this, and, perhaps, other political conjectures, what had become crystal-clear in the later times is that the case was postponed to be *a time-bomb* in the future to come by the minority ruling elites of the country. It was considered as an existential threat for Kimant elites and people which overtime got political momentum after 2007-other mess-ups of the National Census, which denied Kimant as an ethnic category (Dametew, 2019; Tinbitu, 2013). And the region entered into political turmoil due to such hideous political conspiracy under the cover of National Census.

Another political ploy which could, perhaps, be considered as more scandalous than ever is the territorial mapping of the Region. As stipulated by the TGE Charter, new administrative regions would have been drawn before having the Elections for Regional Assemblies (Councils). To that end the new Regional map of the country was adopted (Chichu**,** 2019, p.345). Consequently, a new administrative map of the Regions and the country was introduced. Such a Map appeared, though dubiously stated, to have legal facades by the regional government of Region Three. In this respect, Proclamation No.2 of 1993, that served as the Constitution of the Amhara Regional State during the time of Transitional government defines the geographic location of the Region as " …bounded by the State of Tigray in the North, by Region Two in the East, by Region Four in the South and by the Region Six and Sudan in the West" (CTGR, 1993, art.2(5)).

In effect, what emerged as result of such political processes is an Administrative Region whose size has been much less than the imagined areal size, had it had included all of its traditional territories included under the former provincial administrative areas such as Gondar, Gojjam, Wollo and Shoa (especially Northern and Central Shoa areas). As shown in the map, part of Gondar (especially the northern and

western part) has been incorporated into Region One (Tigray) and Beneshangul respectively. Part of Wollo (especially the Raya Area) has been incorporated in to Tigray Region. Similarly part of Gojjam province, especially the Metekel Area has been incorporated into Region 6 (Beneshagul Gumuz). It has been disclosed that "seven fertile districts from Gondar and Wollo" had been incorporated in to Region –One-Tigray during the transitional period. These included Humera, Tselemit, Wolkait, Tsegedie, Raya Azebo, Alamata and Olfa (Daniel Kendie, 2003, p.190).

Similarly, there are claims that territories which used to be known as Amahara settlement areas were also incorporated under the Region 4 (Oromia**) (**Gashaw, 2018); Chuchu, 2019**).** This is not to mention some territories including Asseb Port which had been lost to Eritrea.



Figure 6: Map of Ethiopia in the Post 1991 Ethiopia
Source: Map of Ethiopia (2019)

The post-constitutional era did not bring change to the areal size of the Amhara region. To the contrary, the Region has also conceded more territories like places called *Gobe* and *Tsegede* in it's northern part (Chichu, 2019). Some scholars argue that territories like Humera and Welkait (formerly known under the province of Begemedir or Gondar in north) , and Wollo - the Raya areas were fertile and productive areas that attracted the Tigrean political elites who have the vision of creating an independent country out of the ruin of Ethiopia (Alemu & Sisay, 2012). Other argued that the linguistic based territorialization had been intentionally adopted to "expand Tigreans home bases by incorporating the Welkait and Humera region of Gondar" (Merrera, 2003, p.124). According to Clapham (1988) some of the areas which had been incorporated under Tigray region were due to the political strategy of the party, with the fabricated claim that the area was once part of Tigray in the past, to have an external link with the Sudan. In this regard, it is said that the TPLF "…claimed part of Northern Gondar, asserting entirely fictiously that for a couple of years in the early 1940s, this was administrated as part of Tigray. It has claimed way in the Northern Wollo on the same grounds" (Clapham, 1988, p.211). Whichever reason, these territories have remained to be hot spots of conflicts, especially between Amhara and Tigray Regional States. The newly emerging Amhara nationalists considered these areas as the *lost territories* of Amharas- their father lands (Chichu, 2019**;** Gashaw, 2018).

5.2.3. Political Participation and Elections during the Transitional Era

Ethiopian transition period occurred in the contexts of major global transformation that marked the collapse of the then Socialist totalitarian regimes (STR). Following the end of cold war, there had been much optimism for the democratic transition among what had, hitherto, been labeled as *second world* and *third world* countries. To that end, political liberalization and competitive elections were supposed to be instrumental to bringing leadership turnover (Huntington, 1991). The euphoria for a kind of *Fourth wave of democratization*[78], however, has been diluted by the emergence of a new breed of regimes - to use Andreas Schedler term "electoral authoritarian regimes"(Schedler, 2002, p.1). This kind of regimes, Schedler elucidates:

[78] The Fourth wave democratization represented the post 1990 era of political transition. For some scholars the fourth wave of democratization in Africa has happened in between 1990-1994 (Bratton & Vande Walle, 1997, p.7). The third wave democratization represented such political transitions in the period between 1974-1990 (Huntington, 1991, xiii).

> *Electoral authoritarianism regimes neither practice democracy nor resort regularly to naked repression. By organizing periodic elections they try to obtain at least as semblance of democratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external as well as internal actors. At the same time, by placing those elections under tight authoritarian controls they try to cement their continued hold on power* (Schedler, 2002, p.1)

Ethiopia's attempt of political transition in the formative stage of the regime marked the birth of electoral authoritarian regime (Ottaway, 1995, Merera, 2000). Periodic elections which had been held in the post-1990 were instrumental for the institutionalization and consolidation of EPRDF to stay in power (Dahala, 2012; Lyons, 2010, Merera, 2000). The Regime used to employ different techniques of electoral and non-electoral measures of repression against the opposition political organizations while consolidating its power (Lyons, 2010; Tronvolt, 2010). In light of these contexts, let us briefly discuss the two major election-1992 and 1994 which had set the foundations of the regime, both at regional and national level, during the Transitional Era.

5.2.3.1. The 1992 Regional Elections

Following the establishments of regional self-governing governments in January 1992, the regional and local elections were held by June 1992 without creating conducive environment to run democratic election. The requisite conditions for installing democratic regime such as civilian government, strong opposition political organizations, independent media and civil society were absent (Ottaway, 1995)[79]. The two popular political parties such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the All Amhara Political Organization (AAPO) did not participate in such founding elections. Contrary to the principle of universal suffrage, former political organization such as the Workers party of Ethiopia (WPE) and its members, members of security and military officers of Ethiopia during the military government were officially prohibited (Akililu & Tafese,2007, pp.96-98).

Furthermore, the members of the National Election Commission (NEC)[80] that was established to manage the regional elections were drawn disproportionally from the members of EPRDF (ibid. p.96**).** In the hindsight, it appeared that EPRDF had played double role serving as" referee and player" (Merera,

[79] The TPLF armies had intervened as civilian policies to take the advantage of the fragile environment, by doing so, enabled the EPRDF as vanguard party with its military, security in addition to its position as incumbent party (Harbeson, 1996).

[80] The National Electoral Board (NEB) came with procl.no.64/1993 following the amendment of NEC that was enacted in February, 1992 (Akililu & Tafese, p.97).

2000, p.184). The presence of such institutional hurdle enabled the EPRDF to control 1,108 of 1,147, which covered about 97 percent, of regional seats all over the country (Lyons, 2010, p.111).

In Amhara Region, the Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), which was one of the affiliates of EPRDF, had won all of the Regional seats. The then AAPO which could have put formidable challenge in the region was systematically excluded from participating in the election (Heberson, 1996; Lyons, 2010). The leaders of the AAPO professor Asrat Woldyes had been imprisoned under the pretext that his party had involved in act of violence against the regime (Gashaw, 2018**;** Chichu, 2019**)**. In fact the party –AAPO was formed in time when the Amhara peoples living in some part of the newly constituted Oromia Region had face ethnic based attacks and atrocities (Mamushet Amare, 2020)[81]

5.2.3.2. The 1994 Election for Constitutional Assembly

After the collapse of the Military government, the second election was held on June 5, 1994 to the Constituent Assembly (Akililu & Tafese, 2007, p.94). This Assembly was mandated for the approval of the draft constitution which in turn was formulated by a body called Constitutional Commission. The Commission was made up of mainly from the members of the COR-EPRDF dominated Transitional Government (Merera, 2000; Akililu & Tafese, 2007).

The formulation of draft constitution reflected the political programs of EPRDF with little participation of the wider section of Ethiopian populace (Merera, 2000, 2003; Dahala, 2012). The attempt to involve the general public was a failure in both supply side and demand side of the people. As EPRDF dominated the political space, an alternative views and programs were not availed to the people (Haberson, 1996; Lyons, 2010). Explaining the case in Amahara Region, Chichu Tadesse (2019) describes that the process was more of an indoctrination process where EPRDF positions were communicated to the people so that the people could endorse what the cadres have just told them. From this, one can infer that the process was largely driven by the logic of communication and indoctrination

[81] .Atrocities committed against the Amhara people in some part Arsi and Hareregi were paramount. In this regard, due to atrocities in Arsi about 140, 000 Amahara families were displaced and reported to have lived in temporary shelter at Nazret(Adama)(Mamushet, 2020, p.75). Similar trends of displacements and atrocities have continued to occur in systematic and calculated manner all through the last 27 years. The Amhara's have been displaced and attacked in different part of the regional states mainly of Oromia, Tigray, Southern Region, and Beneshangul- Gumuz (Daniel Kendie, 2003; Mamushet, 2020; Muluken, 2016; Chichu**,** 2019). See also Tesfaye Tafesse (2009).

process than of all inclusive national dialogue and discussion. Apart from the shortage in the supply side, the people, especially the rural people were neither aware nor interested to give spare time for such political discussion (Chichu, 2019). According to John Abbink only 5 percent of the population was allowed for discussions and even yet the criticism over the controversial issues has not been heeded for the formulation of the constitution (Abbink, 1995, p.155).

The draft constitution drafted and endorsed by the EPRDF dominated- Commission and COR respectively (Abbink, 1995), had to get ratified by the newly elected Constituent Assembly in 1994. But again the condition in which the election was to be held was not inviting to the opposition parties (Harberson, 1996). Consequently, similar to the 1992 regional election, the result of the 1994 election had given a sliding victory where EPRDF won 484 (88.5 percent) seats out of the 547 seat Constituent Assembly (Akililu & Tafese, 2007, pp.98-99).

As result, it appears that the constitution formulation process right from the formation of the TGE, Constitutional drafting Commission, election of the Constituent Assembly and its ratification demonstrated that the entire process of the transition was an exclusive affair of EPRDF. Consequently, euphoria of democratic transition in Ethiopia was "blocked" (Bratton & Vande Walle, 1997, p.120) as the military regime had been supplanted by "new form of authoritarianism" (Merera, 2000, p.183) or, to put it in appropriate term - "electoral authoritarianism" (Schedler, 2002, p.1).

Table 10: Election Result for Constitutional Assembly of Amhara Region, 1994

SN	List of Administrative Zones	Number of Electoral Constituencies	Name of the Winning Party/Parties	No of seat Won
1	East Gojjam	18	ANDM	18
2	West Gojjam	19	ANDM	10
3	North Gondar	20	ANDM	20
4	South Gondar	19	ANDM	19
5	North Shoa	18+1	ANDM+ANUO*	19
6	North Wollo	12	ANDM	12
7	South Wollo	24	ANDM and OPDO	24**
	Total No of seats			137

Source: National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE, 1994); African Election Data Base [AEDB] (2011)

* ANUO stands for Argoba Nation Unity Organization which Operated only during the Transitional period, specifically in between 1992-94.

** Among the 24 electorial constituencies of South Wollo Adminstrative Zone, 2 of the seats were held by the candidates of the Oromo people's democratic organization(OPDO) while the rest 22 represented candidates from Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) both of which were affiliates of the EPRDF (AEDB, 2011***)***

As indicated in the Table 10**,** with the exception of the Argoba Nation Unity Organization-a minority based party which claimed to represent the Argoba people, the remaining seats, which were supposed to fill up by the representatives from the Amhara Region, were controlled by EPRDF. The ANUO had special electoral district in place name called by *Aliyu district* which are found in the northern Shoa Adminstartive Zones.

One of the developments regarding the participation of political parties in Amahara Region was the transmutation of EPDM in to ANDM in 1994. It was pretty known that EPDM- a multiethnic political organization was not only part of COR at the central transitional government, but it was superimposed to rule over the Region of Amhara. EPDM then served as a surrogate party of EPRDF that claimed itself as representatives of the oppressed nation and nationalities of the Region (ANDM, 2006, p.46).

However, amid of the 1994 election for Constituent Assembly, the EPDM suddenly transmuted itself into ANDM (Mamushet, 2020, p.75; Chichu, 2019, p.178). The very reason for such transmutation of nomenclature was due to the emergence the All Amhara Political Organization (AAPO) - a popular ethnic -based opposition party that claimed to be a genuine representative of the Amhara nation (Chichu,2019 , p.178). Chichu contends that ANDM was formed without the through discussion of the members of EPDM as it was tactical decision to counterbalance the political movement of AAPO (ibid.).

5.3. Elections Results and Implications in the Post- Transitional Era, 1995-2015

It is often believed that post transitional stage was supposed to pave for the consolidation of democratic order where election would be "a habit" among political actors of society (Rustow, 1999, p.32). After the entrenchment of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia constitution (FDRE), Ethiopia held four series elections for the national parliaments and regional assemblies. However, without the 1995 election, none of these elections were held in democratic environment (Lyons, 2010). This does not mean the elections did not have consequences. Elections were instrumental for the consolidation of a single party rule over the last two decades (Lyons, 2010; Merera, 2000). Among other things, elections

have had far reaching implications and repercussions over wide range of issues at the national and regional level.

5.3.1. The 1995 and 2000 Elections

The two elections were held within the context of emerging ambition of EPRDF to consolidating its power without risk of losing the sport of the western powers. The 1995 election was held in the absence of opposition political organization (Tesfaye, 2006; Merera, 2000). Consequently, despite the participation of smaller, predominantly ethnic based political parties in the southern Region, Afar and Somali, the EPRDF emerged as the only strong candidate in the contest for national parliament and regional assemblies (Merera, 2000; Lyons, 2010). Consequently, EPRDF with its affiliate parties was able to control over 97 percent of the seats of the HoPR (Tesfaye, 2006, p.63).

The same trend was evident in the 2000 election, with some exceptions of political parties in the Southern Region and in Addis Ababa (Tesfaye, 2006). The Hadiya Democratic Organization was able to secure some seats, despite the presence of election misconducts and irregularies (Lyons, 2010, p.114).

Election the results at the regional level had also been dominated by EPRDF and its affiliate political organizations. The TPLF, ANDM, OPDO and SEDF dominated the regional assemblies in Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and Southern Nation, Nationalities and people's Regional state respectively (Lyons, 2010). In Amhara Region, all of the 294 seat were single handedly controlled by ANDM –one of the core members of EPRDF, in both the 1995 and 2000 elections (Public Relation Office [PRC], 2013).

5.3.2. The 2005 Election

The 2005 election had been an exception to the electoral history of the country in the post 1990s. The election was held in fairly competitive basis (Arriola & Lyons, 2016). In addition, the opposition parties coalesced into two major blocks against EPRDF (Tesfaye, 2006). EPRDF had faced staunch challenges from the two opposition blocks-the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)[82] and the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF).

[82] CUD was a coalition party of four independent parties. These were the Rainbow Ethiopia (RE), the All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP), and the Ethiopian Democratic party (EDP), and the Ethiopian Democratic League (EDL). According to the National Electoral Board, the CUD had won 109 seats at the national parliament, while UEDF-which was a collation of two parties (the Oromo National Congress-ONC and the Coalition for Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy-CAFPD), had reportedly won 52 seats (Lyons, 2010, p.115).

Despite the smooth pre- electoral atmosphere, the irregularities occurred during the Election Day and the controversies on the election results; the oppositions from both coalitions were able to secure significant number of seats at the national and regional assemblies. The official report revealed that the opposition had secured more than 160 seats (29 percent) while the EPRDF was able to secure about 323 seats (59.8 percent), which is the lowest in its electoral history. In most of urban centers mainly of Addis Ababa, the CUD had registered stunning victory (Arriola & Lyons, 2016). In the capital of the country- Addis Ababa the CUD won sliding victory controlling all of the 23 seats (Lyons, 2010, p.115).

In Amhara region, the ANDM was able to secure barely 55 percent of the 138 where key officials of the party- such as Dawit Yohaness, Tefera Walwa, Bereket Simeon, Addissu Legesse and Genet Zewude faced stunning deafeat (Lyons, 2010, p.115[83]).

With the exception of Tigray Region, the oppositions were able to secure significant number of seats at the regional assemblies as well. The result regional election for the Amhara Regional state has been shown below.

[83] The opposition claimed that CUD, UEDF, EPRDF, and OFDM had won 158, 70, 38 and 14 seats respectively during the parliamentary election (Tesfaye, 2006, p.68).

Table 11: Election Results and Distribution of Seats of the Regional Council in 2005 Regional Election

The winning Party	Seats in the Regional Council for the winning part	Distribution of Seats by Sex			
		Male	%M	Female	%F
ANDM	219	138	47	81	28
AEUP	49	45	15	4	1.4
EDP	26	24	8	2	0.6
Total	294	207	70	87	30

Source**:** Public Relation Office **(2013).**

As indicated in table 11, CUD had also won about 75 seats (25.5 percent) in Amhara Region. Out of which the AEUP which was formerly known by AAPO won 49 seats. ANDM which used to have a 100 percent control of the 294 seats in the previous elections was forced to concede a quarter of seats to the opposition parties. However, the rejection of the election result by the CUD, on the basis of its claim that it has won more than what the government and NEB announced, led to country-wide protests which were responded brutally by the EPRDF led Government. The measures went to the extent of rounding up of the top political leaders of the CUD and youths indiscriminately (Arriola & Lyons, 2016, p.81).

5.3.3. The Repercussion of the 2005 Election: The Politics of Census

Following the shocking result of the 2005 election, the incumbent party appeared to have chastised the opposition political parties so that 'filtering with elections' would not longer happen anymore. To that end, different measures were taken with the view of stifling down the opposition, civil societies and media outlets. The new media law, the anti-terrorism law, and the law governing civil societies remained the main institutional stumbling blocks which were instrumental for the re-emergence of *new authoritarianism* to prevail (Tronvolt, 2010, p.12).

Apart from this, the narrative of *dominant party* and *developmental state* was tuned up on the propaganda machine of the government so as to discredit the CUD agenda of liberal democracy and justify undemocratic practices of the incumbent party (Tronvolt, 2010). In so doing the hope for opening up for more democratic space and dispensations in the post-2005 remained a nightmare.

Furthermore, such political recession at the country level, the 2005 election have had another repercussion on Amhara and Amhara Regional state. The issue of the national census has become a

politicized issue for Amhara and the Amhara Regional State. The 2007 national census result has brought anomalous figure in the population growth and size of the Amhara population (Dametew, 2019). The 2007 population and housing census result showed that the population of Ethiopia grew at an average annual rate of 2.6 percentages between 1994 and 2007. However, as indicated in Table 13 the annual growth for Amhara Region has been documented as 1.7 perecent only which is the lowest in the country (FDRE Population Census Commission [FDRE PCC, 2008).

Table 12: Annual population growth rate by region between 1994-2007

Region	Annual Growth Rate(1994-2007)
Tigray	2.5
Afar	2.2
Amhara	**1.7**
Oromia	2.9
Somali	2.6
B.G	3.0
SNNP	2.9
Gambella	4.1
Harari	2.6
Addis Ababa	2.1
DireDewa	2.5
Country	**2.6**

Source: FDRE Population Census Commission [FDRE/PCC] (2008)

Consequently, the national contribution of Amahara has reported to be declined from that of 25.8 percent (as per the 1994 census) to 23.3 percent in 2007 (FDREPCC, 2008). The census result of the 1984 had also revealed that the contribution of the Amhara to the nation was 28.8-a number which was much greater than the later census results in the country (Transitional Government of Ethiopia Office of the Population and Housing Census Commission [TGE OPHCC]**,** 1991, pp.43-47). The Report of the Federal Census Commission had come to declare that the number of Amhara population showed a decline in number that ranged from 2 up to 3 million people (Dametew, 2019, p.47; Dawit, 2019, para.14).

Such report aroused a rage by some member of the parliament that led to the re- vising of the census result of the Region. Consequently, 96, 570 were added, yet the controversy remained unresolved (Dametew, 2019; Dawit, 2019). The political suspicion was also high as there was a total omission of Kimant ethnic group from the census lists (Dametew, 2019; Dawit, 2019). So far accurate reasons as to

such fall out have not been given publicly that consequently have opened ways for speculations and interpretation by elites of Amhara. However, the government speculated that the effect of Hiv-Aids Pandemic and immigration could have been the reason behind such drastic decrement of the population. Dametew Tessema, in his seminal articles entitled by *Dealing with the Conundrum of Amhara Population*, identifies a plethora of explanatory factors including forceful displacement (ethnic cleansing), systematic birth control mechanism, fear of disclosing identity (identity hiding due to fear of persecution) of the households, and undercounting of the population due to lack of transporting infrastructure in the region (Dametew, 2019, pp.47-50). It has also been corroborated that ethnic cleansing was not initiated by the indigenous people, but it was sponsored by the government deeds and hate propaganda machines against the Amhara ethnic group since the post- 1991 political establishment of the country (Bekalu, 2018).

However, the political suspicions and speculations were high as there was also significant number of decrement regarding the population of the Capital –Addis Ababa where the Amhara ethnic population was dominant (Dametew, 2019). Besides, a total omission of Kimant ethnic group from the census lists in the Amhara Regional state (Dawit, 2019; Tinbitu, 2013)-a factor that have been implicated for the rise of Kimant nationalism (Yeshiwas, 2013) and subsequent political unrest of the Amhara Region.

The electoral defeat of the TPLF-EPRDF by CUD- which the ruling party had branded as *chauvinis*t staff (Tronvolt, 2010), in Amhara dominant areas including the Capital –Addis Ababa, the Amhara regional state, and many of urban centers of the country could have been the contextual reason for census omissions and reductions.

The electoral defeat of the TPLF-EPRDF by CUD- which the rulling party had branded as chauvinist staff (Tronvolt, 2010), in Amhara dominant areas including the Capital –Addis Ababa, the Amhara regional state, and many of urban centers of the country could have been the contextual reason for census omissions and reductions.

Despite such interpretive lenses of the incumbent party ideologues, the voting pattern of the CUD appears to have transcended the pattern of ethnic voting (Arriola, 2008).

In Ethiopian politics, population size does not tell only demographic reality. It has economic (budgetary) and representational implication too. Population size has remained one of an outstanding parameter for

the federal budget subsidy formula to the regional states of the country (Asnake, 2009; Solomon, 2006). Furthermore, it has become crystal clear that the representation of groups especially in the House of Federation (HoF) and the House of Peoples Representatives (HoPR) are very much hinged upon the population size of ethnic groups (FDRE, 1995). When we see the constitutional provision regarding the number of constituencies, Article 54(3) explicitly stated that "member of the house, on the basis of population and special representation of minority nationalities shall not exceed 550; of these minority nationalities and peoples shall not have at least 20 seats (FDRE, 1995). Accordingly, electoral constituencies are due to the change in population size (FDRE EBE, 2007).

Thus, it appears that the logic behind the size of the parliamentary constituency has taken the population of the country into account.

5.3.4. The 2010 and the 2015 Election

The post-2005 elections occurred in the condition of renewed authoritarian atmosphere where the oppositions were weakened, journalists jailed and civil society stifled. The result of 2010 was a foregone conclusion that made the election as an exclusive affairs of EPRDF (Tronvolt, 2010).The National Election Board of Ethiopia declared that the incumbent had consummated 99.6 percent of the parliamentary seats with the exception of two seats (Tronvolt, 2010, p.1.).

The 2015 election took place three years after the death of the long-stayed dictator - Melese Zenawi in 2012. Contrary to the expectation that the democratic space would be opened up with the coming of new prime Minster, nothing had been changed. Sadly enough, the NEBE had declared that the incumbent party has won all of the seats of the parliament. It was declared that EPRDF has won 100 percent! (Arriola & Lyons, 2016).

The regional election results were not different from that of the parliamentary elections at the national level. In Amhara Region, ANDM-the incumbent party had continued controlling all of the 294 seats during the 2010 and 2015 elections (PRO, 2013). The 2005 election marked as watershed in Ethiopian politics. The hope for democracy had been arrested through electoral and non- electoral mechanism that led to the revival of the authoritarianism (Tronvolt, 2010). On top of this trend of authoritarian rule, the rhetoric of developementalism was not able to address the emerging economic problems including unemployment, uneven economic development and corruption (Arriolla & Lyons, 2016). All these added on to the existing structure of ethnic federalism that appeared to have accentuated the simmering

ethnic discontents, which ultimately, leading to the outbreak of street protests in 2016 in major towns of the Amhara Regional states.

In this chapter, attempt has been made to provide a brid eye-view about the historical genesis of Amhara Region before and after the 1990. The discussion regarding the genesis of the administrative regions of the country during the pre-1990 revealed that the country was divided along territorial provinces. An exception to this was during the five years Italian occupation where ethnic based regions were established. Yet, the post- liberation period was marked by the restoration of the provincial system of administration. Following the adoption of the PDRE (1987), however, a mixed approach was employed where there existed five autonomous provinces along with 25 non-autonomous territorial provinces.

Such trend, however, was reversed following the coming into power of the TPLF-led government in the post 1990s. Since then, Ethnicity has become the politically organizing principle for the re-organization of the state structure. Consequently, ethnic based regions were established where Amahara Region has become one among the nine regions in the country.

However, the creation of the territorial identity of the region has become problematic as the region claimed to have lost its territories to its neighboring regions. In tandem with this, the post-1990 political development has led to the consolidation of one party state where elections were merely used for foreign consumption. On top of this, election results, especially of the 2005 had serious repercussions for the national and regional politics. One consequence of this is the census controversy regarding the size of the Amhara with its likely implications on the politics of representation and distribution.

CHAPTER SIX: NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK OF MULTICULTURALISM

As scholars suggest any institutional design including federalism have certain normative or ideological construct that serve as "an interpretive framework" (Benz & Broschek, 2013, p.6) that "informs the institutional choices of a state" (Tierney, 2004 cited in Yonatan, 2008, p.95). Such normative constructs can be seen in terms of the narratives regarding the identity of state and the motives behind the reconstruction of a state and society (ibid; p.6-7). Such normative frameworks are often interwoven within the texts of constitutions (Yontan, 2008). Often these are reflected in the preamble, the flags, anthems, public holidays and even the nomenclature of the state (Yonatan, 2008, p.98).The very chapter was intended to provide answer for the first research question: '*What was and/or were the prevailing narrative(s) which shaped the institutional approaches to accommodation of ethnic diversity*? Thus, the chapter tries to identify and elucidate about those meta narratives which seem to have shaped the institutional design of accommodation of groups in the study area. Such endeavor has been done through critical readings of the texts of the regional constitutions and pertinent documents. To that end, normative meta theories served as an interpretive lens for the analysis. Accordingly, the contents have been presented into three sections. The first section touches up the value of recognition of diversity. The second section identifies the governing ideology of the regime which in turn can be characterized by the Leninist-Stalinist approach, and the communitarian focus of ethnic decentralization. The last, but not the least, section provides summary of the findings.

6.1. Recognition of Ethnic Diversity

The term recognition is a broad term which "encapsulates a process of consideration and judgment, in which the identity or attributes of an object, person or relationship are first noticed, and then acknowledged and affirmed, as belonging to one category or concept or another"(Connolly, Leach& Walsh, 2007, p.1). For Yonatan (2008, p.6) recognition is "an institutional principle" that authorize the state to "acknowledge" the fact of ethnic diversity in a society. Indeed, the issue of recognition takes a central state in defining the identity of state as whether it is assimilationist or multicultural in its orientations which would, in turn, shape the choice of institutional design towards the fact and claim of diversity in a country. To the contrary, "misrecognition" could have a deaming effect on the identity of groups (Taylor, 1994 in Parekh, 2000, p.342)

The Amhara National Regional state stands out to be one of the few regional states that are positive to diversity (Beken, 2014). Such story went back to the enactment of proclamation No.7/1992 that proclaimed for the establishment of regional governments-'Kilil' during the time of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia. This proclamation had envisaged two forms of regional governments, namely, 'National Transitional Self -government' and 'Regional Transitional Self -government' (TGE, 1992, art.2/ 4&5). The distinction between the two were elaborated as the following:

> *National Transitional Self-government means a National Transitional Self Government established by any nation, nationality or people for the purpose of administrating its own affairs within its geographical area; Regional Transitional Self Government means a Transitional Self Government which is jointly established by, and with the agreement of, two or more adjacent nations, nationalities or peoples […]* (TGE, 1992, art.2/4&5, *ellipsis mine).*

As can be understood from the above text, those regions defined as national Transitional self government are mono-ethnic or titular regions where a single group has been entitled to exercise self government at the level of Region or *Killil* .These titular regions were identified as the "owner" of the region. These included, Region One (for Tigrai), Region Two (for Afars), Region Four (for the Oromo), Region Five (for Somali) and Region Thirteen (for Hareri) (ibid., art.3/1). On the other hand, those self government units which were designated as 'Regional Transitional self government' were set to be multiethnic regions where self government rights had been conferred to different groups.

The presently known by the nomenclature of *Amhara National Regional state* was designated as multiethnic entity known by Region. The four groups, particularly *Amhara*, *Agew-Kamirgina, Agew Awongina,* and the Oromo were legally guaranteed to have self-government unit (ibid.). At the outset, therefore, the ethnic groups in Amhara region were not just recognized but also their right to form regional government had also been proclaimed by the central government during the transitional period (1991-1994).

Contrary to this, the failure to shortlist, let alone entitling self government rights, to other minority groups such as *Kimant, Argoba* and *Negede* or *Woyito* could, in the hindsight, could be seen as an act of misrecognition by the central government. As Charless Taylor avers "misrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe other people. It is a vital human need" (Taylor, 1992 quoted in Connolly, Leach & Walsh, 2007, p.1).

Following proclamation No. 7/1992 that proclaimed for the establishment of regional governments and the direction of the Transitional charter, the first constitution of Region Three had been enacted by 1993 (The Constitution of the Transitional Government of Region Three[TGR3], 1993). This constitution defines the identity of the regional government as " the people of region three shall mean the composition of the nations/nationalities of *Amhara, Agew Khamir, Agaw Awngi, Oromo* and others inhabiting the region" (TGR3, 1993, art.2 sub 4, italic mine). The phrase 'others inhabiting the region' could refer to those poly-ethnic groups and minority groups. Poly-ethnic groups are individual persons who live scattered and may not identify themselves from the host region. In this respect, the constitution seems to go beyond recognition of such citizens. It had been stipulated that "the freedoms and rights of all Ethiopians to live, work, and move in the region is guaranteed" (TGR3, 1993, art.13). Besides, the phrase could infer those minority groups which were not mentioned by the constitution. In this regard one of the key informants said:

> *We intentionally made it open for those groups which might flourish and come to the political stage […] groups like Argoba and even Gafat. We believe that the existence of many groups in our region is an asset that would add up to the wealth of human heritage for the region and the country at large" (Interviewee 32, Bahidar, 11th of May, 2016, italic mine).*

Even though, the central government, through its proclamation No.7, 1992 did not list out the entire minority groups in the region, the regional constitution seemed to have made due recognition to all groups implicitly and explicitly.

The adoption of the new Constitution, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), in the month of December 1994, which consequently came into force since August 1995, had put an end to the transitional government (FDRE, 1995, Preamble). Despite the nuances and details, this constitution was considered to be a phase in the consolidation of what had been envisaged and outlined in the charter and attendant legislative measures during the era of TGE (Aklilu, 2006; Zemelak, 2014). The narrative on the self- determination of nation and nationalities in line with the often mentioned ideology of national oppression remained the same between the charter and the 1995 constitution. It is like the 'old wine' in what appeared to be 'the new bottle'. Consequently, the formerly known regions were, somehow renamed and declared as member of the federation. The "Transitional Government of Region Three"

was renamed as "the state of Amhara" (FDRE, 1995, art.47/1)[84]. In light of the political developments at the national level, the regional government had to adopt its second constitution that was proclaimed in June 1995 (The Constitution of the Amhara National Region [ANRS], 1995). This constitution defines the identity of the region as "the Amhara National Regional state" (ANRS, 1995, art.1). Similar name has also been evidenced in the revised constitution of the region in 2001 (ANRS, 2001).

The nomenclature of the region as "the state of Amhara", unlike its previous name, seems to have disguised the diversity of the region. In fact this appeared to be a problem for some of the minority politicians. In this regard, some activists of the Agew Democratic Party (AGDP) have a feeling that "the region doesn't represent us. Look at its nomenclature. It represents the Amhara. Even the regional anthem celebrates the *Amhara* and its achievements, not the *Agews*" (Interviewee 23, Kosober, April 11, 2016). The chairman of AGDP had also concurred the view that ANDM and the Region did not represent the Agew people. The informant further disclosed that "the regional anthem ceremony is not being held in schools in Awi Nationality Zone" (Interviewee 24, Kosober, April 12, 2016). Similarly, the participants of Oromo teachers at *kemise* complained that "all of region-wide institutions are designated with prefix of *Amhara* such as *Amhara* Region, *Amhara* Television…etc." (FGD3, Kemise, Dec. 11, 2015).

The Amhara elites are divided on such accusation. Some of them thought that the accusations had some basis. Others rejected such accusation. In this regard, One of the key informant submits:

> *The nomenclature and the designation of region wide had only symbolic meaning. The names don't matter much. So much as Amhara region is concerned, it known for embracing all ethnic groups. The Amhara did not have any right to enjoy the same status as others did have in this region* (Interviewee 33, Bahirdar, May, 12, 2016)[85].

Similarly, some informants admitted that the name would give an impression that the region belongs to the Amhara group. Yet, it is contended that, "the incorporation of other names would become something awkward […] unless we use acronyms which by itself is illogical" (Interviewee 34, Bahirdar, May 10, 2016).

[84] The members of the federations are the state of Tigray, State of Afar, the State of Amhara, the state of Oromia, the State of Somali, the state of Beneshangul/Gumuz, the state of Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, the state of Gambella peoples and the state of Hareri people(FDRE, 1995, art.47/1)

[85] Some informants and FGD discussants from the Amhara ethnic group had also argued that the officlas representing the minority groups were privileged than the Amharas in terms of positions in the ANDM party and government offices.

Still others rejected the claims and accusations put forwarded by informants from the minority groups. They contend:

> *The nomenclature was set to be a home for the Amharas just as other do have elsewhere like the region of Tigray is for Tigrai, the region of Oromia for Oromos …and the like. This region has been designated as Amhara Region since the group is majority in terms of size. The Agews, Oromos, and other groups are minority groups. This is true everywhere in democracy […] the majority rules while the rights of the minority get protected* (FGD6, Dessie, Jan.6, 2016, FGD 11, Bure, April 21, 2016, ellipsis *mine)*.

Even though some political activists specifically the Agew political activists questioned the inclusiveness of the region.

However, a deeper analysis of the texts of the constitution provides an insight to understand the normative framing on the matter of ethnic accomodation. The preamble and national anthem could reflect the normative commitment of the constitution towards diversity or otherwise.

To begin with the preamble, the constitution of region during the transitional government included phrases like "…the nation/nationalities living in our region will surely benefit from the charter…" (TGR3, 1993, preamble, para.4). As noted above, the transitional constitution had also named the list of four ethnic groups which cohabits in the region (ibid. art.2/4). Similarly, the preamble of the 1995 constitution commenced with "We the peoples of the Amhara National Region…" (ANRS, 1995). Such provision was also kept intact in the revised constitution of the region (ANRS, 2001, preamble).

As Yonatan (2008) noted, national anthems and flags do also reflect the identity of the state. In this respect, the anthem of the Amhara National Regional state reads as:

> *The Amhara National Regional state shall have its own anthem. The anthem of the national regional state shall reflect the objectives of the constitution, the belief which the people of the regional state have to live together with the rest of the Ethiopian peoples in a democratic order as well as their future common destiny (ANRS, 2001, art.4).*

Following such provision, regional anthem was put in place. The lyric of the anthem in Amharic version goes on as:

የ ታ ታ ሪ ህ ዝ ቦ ች.....የ ታ ሪ ክ ሚ ህ ደ ር ፣
የ አ ኩ ሪ ባ ህ ል አ ምጣ.....የ ድ ን ግ ል ሀ ብ ት አ ፈ ር ፣
የ ህ ዝ ቦ ችሽ ተ ስ ፋ.....ለ ሚ ክ ል ላ ች ን ፣
በ ሰ ላ ም በ ፍ ት ህ .....በ ል ማ ት ጉ ዟ ች ን ፣
ተ ባ ብ ረ ን ስ ን ሰ ራ .....እ ን ገ ነ ባ ሻ ለ ን ፣
የ አ ሜ ራ ነ ት ክ ብ ር .....ደ ማ ቅ አ ር ማ ይ ዘ ን ፣
ከ ሌ ሎ ች ህ ዝ ቦ ች ጋ ር.....እ ኩ ል ተ ከ ባ ብ ረ ን ፣
በ ፍ ቅ ር በ አ ን ድ ነ ት .....አ ብ ረ ን እ ን ዘ ል ቃ ለ ን ::

The English translation of the lyric is equivalent to the following:

Historical archive of hardworking people
Tower of priding culture with natural resource, untouched
Our nurturing region, a hope to its peoples
We will build you working in partnership.
Holding a glorious motto of Amhara being, a pride
In collaboration with other nations, in love
With love and unison, we end up together.

As indicated, words or expressions signifying plurality of the region has come three times out of the total seven lines of the lyrics. The poem also recognized the need to join hands with “other nations” of the country on the principle of mutual respect, love and unity. The recognition of other peoples beyond the region could also demonstrate the positive attitude of the region towards diversity and unity which are at the heart of multiculturalism.

So, the source of grievances of the political elites seems to be emanated from the insertion of the term *Amhara* while the minorities have been expressed in collective terms as *peoples* or *other nations*. Contrary to such accusations, deeper analysis of the texts has shown that the region has been sensitive to diversity right from the transitional period of the TGE. Such commitment to accommodation of ethnic diversity has not been limited only to the region.

Albeit, the explicit mention of *Amahra* as a prefix in the nomenclature of “the Amhara National Regional state” appears to have qualitative difference from that of its nomenclature-‘Region Three’-

during the period of transitional government. Such difference seemed to have resulted from the labeling of the constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The FDRE constitution named the region as "the state of Amhara" (FDRE, 1995, art.47/1)[86]. Changes regarding the nomenclature of the regional government could have perhaps been attributed to the changes in name of the region by the federal constitution. As some scholars noted, regional constitutions are simply carbon copy of the federal government which resulted from the top down decision making process under a *defacto* one party state (Zemelak, 2014).

6.2. Ideology

As scholars suggest any institutional design including federalism have certain normative or ideological construct which serve as "an interpretive framework" that is instrumental to understand the socio-political and historical context as well as the motives of political actors in the designing of a particular institution (Beland & Lecours, 2011 in Benz &Broschek, 2013, p.6). Above all, it helps to throw light as to the prevailing nature or type of political discourse which can be based on either "individualism or communitarianism" (Benz & Broschek, 2013, p.6).

Perhaps, individualism versus communitarianism could be false dichotomy as multiculturalism aims at embracing the concerns of individual citizens and group claims in a manner that one should not prevail over the other. In this regard, Gerteis & Hartmann (2005) posit that group accommodation could be categorized as either "interactive pluralism" or "fragmented pluralism" (p.232). In light of this, scholars like Baumeister (2000, p.36, 38) uses the term "thin" or "thick" versions of multiculturalism. Similarly the concept of "unity and diversity" –which are the central principle of federalism and multiculturalism, are not dichotomous (Gerteis & Hartmann, 2005, p.221). Instead, they could be seen in terms of continuum.

6.2.1. The Stalinist –Leninist Approach

The Stalinist-Leninist narrative towards the accommodation of ethnic diversity remains the main stay of the ideology that appeared to have influenced the choice of institutional design. In this respect, two strands of argument are relevant to our case. These are (1) The thesis of national oppression, and (2) the

[86] Such slight change in the nomenclature of the region could also be motivated by extra constitutional factor. Following the emergence of strong AAPO, ENDM was forced to shed its multiethnic names and named itself as ANDM. So, the labeling of the region as Amhara National Regional state could be logical outcome of such political trick. Furthermore, the name change could help to mobilize the Amhara which was ill-conceived by the TPLF-led regime.

dichotomous usage of *nation and nationalities* seemed to have influenced the discourse of multiculturalism.

6.2.1.1. The Thesis of National Oppression

Stalin and Lenin, in the struggle to toppling down the feudal tsarist Russia, transposes the classical Marxist theory of class contradiction into identity politics where ethnic Russians were figured out as "oppressor- nation" while the rest groups were identified as the "oppressed nations" (Slezkine, 1994, p.414). In line with such categorization comes two contrasting forms of nationalism, namely "the oppressor nation –nationalism and oppressed nation-nationalism", have been envisaged (ibid., p.419). Pertinent to this, one would evidently see close affinity on the state of the matter. In this regard, the Constitution of the Transitional Government of Region Three [TGR3] begins with:

> *Whereas our country, where nations/nationalities have been denied equality and where the majority of the people has been suffering under national oppression, and for this used to be known as the prison of nations is now embarking upon a new chapter of victory by the struggle of her combatant children and peoples (*TGR3, 1993, para.1, *emphasis mine).*

The quote clearly shows the ideological prism that seems to have shaped the understanding of the state and society. The society has been understood in disaggregated manner using the parameters of nations which has been defined in line with the Stalinist understanding of the former USSR. During the revolutionary period, the Tsarist Russia was portrayed as "prison of nations" by the Bolshevik party (Ezergailis, 1974, p.7). According to such narrative, what appears to be the the socio-cultural bond among the ethnic groups is reduced to just mere forces, subjugation, suffering and captivity.

Furthermore, the term 'national oppression' was categorically used without explicating the meaning, scope and type of the oppression.

In this regard, the proclamation of the TGE has elaborated the problems of nations, nationalities and peoples as "political suppression, economic exploitation and cultural oppression" (TGE, 1992, para.1). The usage of national oppression, instead of cultural oppression, -which was somehow sensible, seems to be the result of the conflation of ethnic groups, often understood as cultural and sociological group, as nations and nationalities.

True to the Leninist and Stalinist teaching, if the majority is conceived as the oppressed, there should be an oppressor, often labeled as the minority. In this regard, the constitution explicates:

> *Whereas the nations/nationalities living in our region will surely benefit from the charter as any of the oppressed peoples; and whereas the other peoples and particularly the Amhara nation, in whose name they have been profiting, whom the ruling classes have made instrumental to oppress the rights and interests other peoples, and whom they have made a victim of massacre and deprivation in the name of Ethiopian unity, have been beneficiaries from the outlined equality….(*TGR3, 1993, para1& 4,).

As understood from the above, Amhara nation has been boldly labeled as the 'oppressor nation'. It also underlined that the Amhara people were the ones who unnecessarily fought for the subjugation of other nations. In a manner that appears to be an *impression management*, the constitution forwarded promissory comments to the Amhara group that they will be beneficiary from the new regime. While the condition of deprivation was common phenomena all Ethiopians, it remains vague as to how the Amhara were labeled as identified as victim of massacre. If it was meant to refer the sacrifices that had been paid for the cause of unity and territorial integrity such as *Adwa, Maychew,* or *Karamara,* that again could not be an exclusive deed of the Amhara (Interviewee 35, Bahir Dar, May 3, 2016).

Albeit a rewarding history of the past, the constitutional narrative as implied within the preamble, did not sound to be accommodative to the Amhara ethnic group. Instead of offering moral solace which probably could be taken as a gesture of cooperation and inclusiveness, the framing of the text tended to be a negative attributio*n* which is likely to inculcate remorse among the people of the Amhara.

The thesis of the oppressor and the oppressed nation has been woven into the text of the 1995 and the revised constitution of 2001 of the region. In this respect the preamble of the revised constitution narrates

> *We, the peoples of the Amhara National Regional State:*
>
> *Having been in desirous to do away with the negative impact hindering our overall development which the age old oppressive system had for long imposed upon us by cruelly suppressing our human and democratic rights and thereby exposing us all to the scourge of poverty and backwardness as result of unjustified economic and social policies; being dully convinced of the fact that we had for long been victims of an unbearable harm caused to us directly or indirectly to an atrocious national oppression which had to be committed in the past on and against the majority of our country's nation-nationalities and peoples, and henceforth needs to be corrected and rectified hereafter….(ANRS, 2001, para.1-2, italic mine).*

Here, it is necessary to note that the scope of "human and democratic rights" is all inclusive in that it subsumes the right of individuals and group rights-nation, nationalities and peoples' rights (ANRS, 2001, art.10/2).

The insertion of negative expression which are ingrained in some of phrasal words such as 'cruelly suppressing', atrocious national oppression' are strong negative expression that seems to have shown an impression that ' there had been heinous crimes with the level of genocide, or forceful extermination of nations and nationalities and peoples'.

Far less than this, Tarekegn (1996) contends that "ethnicity has emerged as an ideological weapon for political action [….] what is called ethnic democracy has become ethnic dictatorship" (p.74, ellipsis mine). It seems plausible to submit that the infusion of such provocative words and expressions could probably have been used for to appeal to the emotions of diverse ethnic groups and their elites which are instrumental for political mobilization and control.

Furthermore, if one looks into the contents, leaving aside the emotionally laden words, the content of the quoted text of the constitution underlines that the source of political, economic and social problems has been attributed to the allegedly perpetrated national oppression in the past. The attribution of socio-economic and political problems to a single problem- 'the national question', could face risk of oversimplifying the complex age old problems of the country.

This does not mean, however, that the imposition of official culture of a group over the other groups does not have economic implications. Indeed, in democratic and industrialized states who followed a nation-building project through assimilation, be it benign (like the case of U.S.A) or forced assimilation (as in the case of French) , have had economic repercussion on the minorities, besides to their fear of cultural domination (Kymilicka, 1995, 2002;Mahajan, 2002) .

However, in the context of Ethiopia, it would be less convincing to argue that the "official cultural imposition'' of Amharic language had had a meaningful adverse effect on the economic fate of those non-Amhara population of the country. The policy of linguistic assimilation happened within the context where the mode economic system was agrarian and pastoralist (Gebru, 1993). From this one would contend that the likely adverse effect of the nation building process on the socio-economic conditions of society in the area of education, schooling, health, political participation(representation), employment, business, press and media could probably have been insignificant (Kassahun, 2005).

Regarding the state of political participation, Clapham opines:

> *A multiethnic state from the earliest times, it gave relatively little weight to issue of ethnic origin, and individuals from peripheral areas as well as from humble social background could reach positions not simply of power, but equally of authority and prestige (1988, p.195).*

Perhaps, the often-mentioned issue is the land appropriation of the ruling elites, who were labeled as the Amhara, in the Southern Ethiopia[87]. Indeed, there had been severe problem of landlessness in the southern Ethiopia as compared to the peasants in the northern Ethiopia (Keller, 1998). Yet, that did not indicate that the Amhara people were better off from that of the people of the South. Nor the ruling elites reflected and protected the interest of the Amhara who were singled out as the oppressor nation. And hence, the exercise of nation building projects, as it was short-lived and not accompanied by capitalism, did not have meaningful redistributive effect on both the Amhara and non-Amhara population of Ethiopia[88].

Thus, the argumentation that every problem of the country emanates from the national question-national oppression could be termed as *'single cause* or *reductionist fallacy*'[89]. Well-thought theoretical scrutiny of the difference and nexus between politics of recognition and the politics of redistribution appears to be lacking in the discourse of Ethiopian politics in the past and as well as today. Unlocking such 'ideological deadlock' would help us to appreciate the problem of Ethiopian citizenry as whole. For Tarekegn[90], there were other sources of grievance which could have been taken as primary factor for the revolution including:

> *Problems related to regional autonomy (in the area of Tigray, Eritrea, Gojjam) , feudal land ownership and the plight of the peasantry(Gedeo and Bali), over taxation and corruption of the bureaucracy, lack of tangible socio- economic development, and the inability of the monarchy to transform itself into democracy (1996, p.77).*

---

[87] Often the ruling class had been identified as an Amhara ruling elites by some of foreign scholar .However, very few of them contend that that the ruling elites was largely composite in ethnic structure(Clapham, 1988; Levine, 1974 ; Markakis, 1974). Yet, due to Showan dominance, the local nobilities in those traditionally known Amhara provinces of Gonder, Wollo and Gojjam felt marginalized and perceived the showans as the Oromo elites (Clapham, ibid). For Clapham such composite nature of politics had been further strengthened during the Dergue regime (ibid.).

[88] Merera has also pointed that the ruling class, though disproportionately belonged to Shoan Amhara, the people of Amhara was not beneficiary out of the system (Merera, 2003)

[89].the fallacy of single cause or reduction fallacy occurs when it is assumed that a single factor has been attributed for a certain outcome while such outcome or effect could actually be caused by multiple factors. In fact reductionism has been at heart of the Marxist thinking and that legacy seems to have been kept intact in the narrative of Ethiopian politics.

[90] Tarekegn (1996) contends that the nationality question was not the primary question of Ethiopian society.

As evidently seen from the quote, the demands of Ethiopian society during 1960s and the 1970s (in the period before the 1974 revolution) were wide-ranging in scope, depth and geographic context.

In addition to identity claims, there had been questions of democracy or mass participation, resources distribution, good governance, and regionalism. Indeed, identity related questions were visibly put forwarded by ethnic elites and yet that was also limited to specific geographic context of the country. So, the *ethnicization* of Ethiopian politics in the post-1991 reflected the *one-size fits all fallacy* disregarding many other problems and contextual issues, which still are being voiced out by Ethiopian society.

The fact that many groups are still raising identity related question can also be testimony that ethnic policy has not yet resolved the problem of ethnicity itself. To the contrary, it appears to have created more problem than it claims to have solved as there has been trends of horizontal group conflicts which had been unprecedented in the past (Asnake, 2009; Abbink, 2009; Hagmann & Alemmaya, 2008; Boku & Oba, 2009).[91]

The formulation of democratic constitution, which are committed to reconstruct inclusive and just political society, are supposed to be formulated under what John Rawls termed as "the veil of ignorance" (Rawls, 1971, p19)[92] that should not clearly show the loser and the beneficiaries at least at the formulation of the document. Yet, the preamble of the constitution is pretty clear to understand the likely 'beneficiaries and losers' in the prevailing constitutional system. Commonsensical understanding would tell us that all problems are associated with national oppression, and the subject of national oppressor has been singled out. Simple of logic of transitivity would tell that the national oppressor is the Amhara ethnic group. It would be grave political venture to establish an all-inclusive political system

91. The latter scholars firmly argue that the conflict among the pastoralist communities along ethnic lines in the Southern part of Ethiopia resulted from the institutionalization of ethnic federalism; and thus conflicts among groups were found to be *policy driven* (Alemayehu & Hagmann, 2008; Boku & Oba, 2009).

92 John Rawls , in his famous book-*Theory of Justice*, has come up with certain presumptions that need to be fulfilled if *justice as fairness* is to be institutionalized in a democratic political system. One of the conditionalities is the presumption of the *veil of ignorance*. It is to mean that actors who involve in the formulation of law shouldn't take their private interest and beliefs. Instead they should strictly adhere to the principles of justice (promoting the common good for instance), as their intuition or conscience dictate them. In light of this, Rawl writes that "if a man knew he was wealthy, he might find it rational to advance the principle that various taxes for welfare measures be counted unjust; if he knew that he was poor, he would most likely propose the contrary principle"(Rawls, 1971, p.19).

by way of identifying one group as oppressor and the other as oppressed. To the contrary, one needs to be mindful of what Caleb Rosado say:

> *Multiculturalism enables us to look upon the other, especially the other that society has taught us to regard with distrust and suspicion, and to be taken advantage of, not as a potential predator, but as a profitable partner* (Rosado, 1996, Para 2).

In this regard, Husband (2000) aptly reminded us that multiculturalism does not mean "the victimization of the majority" (p.211) by the minority. In the same vein, Will Kymilcika also reminds that multiculturalism is *Janus-faced* ideology that has regressive as well as progressive sides (Kymilicka, 2002). Kymilicka explicates that multiculturalism, if it is to be part of the solution; it needs to be forward-looking instead of backward looking (ibid.). If the past was conflictive and hurtful, then such condition can only be transformed through reconciliatory mechanisms and moves that may in turn demand " the deliberate forgetting of the past in order to act effectively in the present" (Bennet& Bhabha, 1998, p.39). Surely, what one can do in the present will also determine the fate of the future.

On the converse of it, the thesis of Amhara oppression has been stringently pushed to the maximum in Ethiopian politics, especially since the post-1991 period. While the agenda of national oppression had been a secondary issue among the Bolsheviks in the former USSR, where the philosophy was born, it has become a primary agenda for some political forces in Ethiopia. The primary reason could be associated with the narrative of ethno-nationalist forces, mainly TPLF and its ally -EPDM (ANDM).

In this regard, TPLF party program , which was adopted in May 1983 at its second organizational meeting, disclosed that:

> *The people of Tigray have [….].suffered for long time from Amhara Domination. Furthermore, they have suffered since the fascist Derg came to power from fascistic brutalities and genocide. Thus the enemies of the down trodden people of Tigray are imperialism, feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism, national domination and fascism* (TPLF, 1983, Para.2, *ellipsis mine).*

It clearly mentioned that the people of Tigray have been dominated by the Amhara and the Amhara had been portrayed as *enemy of people of Tigray*. No qualification has been made as to what type of domination and how that domination happened on the people of Tigray. In this regard John Young revealed that TPLF used to believe that masses of Tigray and Amhara "have developed bitter hatred towards each other" (Revolt, No.1, 1st year, Tir, 1968 cited in Young, 1994, p.224).

However, such gross blaming seemed to have used in qualified contexts after TPLF have assumed power. There has been attempt to frame the case with the Amhara ruling elites. And the 'Amhara ruling elites had been blamed for 'national oppression'; while the masses were conceived as victims of economic exploitation and deprivation. Nevertheless, such narration has been used in intermittent fashion. Some policy statements posited that "while the majority nations and nationalities had suffered from national oppression and absence of democratic practices, the Amhara masses did suffer only from the later problem" ("Developmental Democracy", 2014, p.4). Such statement seems to have disguised the fact of economic exploitation and deprivation of the Amhara mass.

Another blunder in the narrative of national oppression regards its scope. In some context, cultural and linguistic assimilative policies have been blamed for. Yet, that does not seem to be the only reason. According some researchers, the main source of grievance of ethno-nationalist movement against Amhara elites was due to the historical narration that Tigray's past glory was lost due to the dominance of Amhara elite (Young, 1994; Aregawi, 2008; Merera, 2003)[93].

In one way or another ethno-nationalist parties in general and TPLF in particular would prioritize the nationalist struggle far beyond class struggle (Merera, 2003; Aregawe, 2008). Merera Gudina strongly argues that "the Tigrian nationalism has remained the moving spirit and guiding ideology of state transformation … under the sponsorship of TPLF" (Merera, 2003, p.119). It has been underscored that the adoption of ethnic federalism and other attendant institutional measures has been shaped in the image of TPLF as well stringently followed as mechanism of divide and rule which would to serve elites of a particular group-*Tigraawey*, to say in power (Merera, 2003; Abbink, 2009).

Here, it need to be noted that the politics of identity often blurs' class contradiction due to the over-emphasis on 'we-and they' categorization. Consequently, unlike class struggle that envisages common grounds across various ethnic groups on the basis of economic condition, ethno-nationalists will be busy in the "politics of difference" (Baumeister, 2000, p.196) and exclusionism using different attributes of identity including myths.

[93]Walelign Mekonen(1969), has also hinted that the culture of both the Amhara and Tigria had been imposed on the rest of ethnic communities

However, such politics of difference was not limited to a particular political organization. Multiethnic political organizations such as EPDM –which transposed itself into ANDM[94] in 1994, had also strong commitment to national struggle. For EPDM, national oppression had been identified as key problem of the country (ANDM, 2006 p.46). For the movements, the national struggle has been conceived as a principal manifestation as well as tool of resolving of class struggle in the country (ANDM, 2006, p.47). In this respect, EPDM detracts EPRP as:

> *National oppression has been widely accepted agenda of political struggle in the country. EPRP had a principled position in that. However, over the process of time, EPRP could not stand firm with its prior commitments and positions. It deflected in to the position that national struggle would undermine class struggle and ultimately took mixed position on the issue of national struggle (ibid.).*

EPDM claimed to have filled such gap[95]. It seems plausible that multiethnic political organizations such as EPRP and MESON recognized the nationality question but, unlike the ethnonatioanlsit organizations, wanted to resolve such nationality question within the framework of Ethiopian unity (Merera, 2003, p.98; Kifilu, 2015 , p.125,). It becomes evidently clear that among multiethnic socialist camps, there was strong assertion that class exploitation had been Ethiopian-wide problem, if not a universal problem, which required country wide solution; while ethno-nationalists stringently argued for secession as solution to what they perceived as a problem. EPDM, though it claimed to be a multiethnic organization, seems to be an exception. One would see no difference in ideological line with that of TPLF and the then EPDM, and by the same token with ANDM.

In general, it will always be a tricky to take up identity questions and redistributive questions without having clarity on the meaning and scope of national oppression vis-à-vis the socioeconomic and political

[94]Despite the changes in naming from ENDM to ANDM, the multiethnic nature remains intact so far (FGD.6, Dessie, Jan.6, 2015). And for that matter the senior members of the party have been heard saying that they represented the oppressed nations (peoples) within Amhara Region. And that was portrayed as the legacy of ENDM. Contrary to this, however, members of minority groups countered such view using the nomenclature of the Party and strengthen their perceived existence of discrimination using that tag

[95] Often the multiethnic vanguard political movements of the ex-Student union such as EPRP and MESON had recognized the 'question of nationalities' but the resolution of class contradiction believed to be instrumental for the resolution of nationality question. What appeared to be anomalous with ENDM seems to have been attributed to its affinity to TPLF both physically and ideologically. Ideologically speaking, it aligns itself with TPLF -the ethnonationalist organization which had/ and still be working for greater autonomy or and secession and physically, it was founded in Tigray under the influence of TPLF which had defeated EPRP , with the combination of ELF(Aregawi, 2008, p.230; Andargachew, 1993, p.214).

deprivation of all Ethiopian citizens. Identity questions may or may not come along with question of resource distribution. Without clearing out such a controversial issue, it would be like playing 'ping-pong' game among politicians and groups. As discussed in our textual analysis of the constitution, the term national oppression seems to have taken as genre for all sorts of problems the country had been facing in the past. Indeed, the national oppression thesis is widely used in arbitrary fashion, and hence the term remains to be one of the most elastic terms that have been liable to different interpretations by different political actors and the academicians.

6.2.1.2. The Essence of Nation and Nationalities

Another issue that is important in order to understand the Stalinist notion/theory of self-determination anchors on the notion of 'nation and nationality'. For Stalin, the term nation and nationality are not synonymous concepts (Stalin, 1953). Rather, they have been considered as two distinct communities which exist at distinct historical epochs. *Nation* represents a social category that is "historically constituted, stable communities of people formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a common culture" (Stalin, 1953, p.306). And nationality signifies "a historical community with its own language, territory, common culture and rudimentary economic ties" (Karat, 1975, p.6).

As indicated the basic difference between nation and nationality is the economic factor in that nation is assumed to have a common market or economy, while nationality does not have. Nation is envisaged to exist under capitalist society, while nationalities are imagined as facts in pre-capitalist society. The other distinguishing factor is associated with size and historicity (Engels and Marx in Nimni, 1995, p.64). Those having smaller sizes and no history of statehood are the characterization of nationality; while those larger, advanced (economically, linguistically) and had history of nationhood in the past were labled as nation (Connor, 1984).

The institutionalization a hierarchical but multilevel federalization in the former U.S.S.R. had taken such nuances into consideration. So, the Stalinist –Leninist version of nations and nationalities, both in principle and practice were hierarchical. There exists strong affinity with the principle and somehow practices of federalism in Ethiopia in general and the Amhara region in particular (Asnake, 2009)

According to the FDRE (1995) Constitution, the term 'nation, nationality and People' have been defined as "a group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory"(art. 39/5). The regional constitution has adopted the above definitions without any omission in sprit and word (see ANRS, 2001 , art.39).

As clearly indicated, focus has been given to the primordial criteria in order to define groups. In fact such definition shares strongly with meaning of ethnic group than the conventional meaning of nation. Nation represented political community which desires to attain political goals (Smith, 2001, Anderson, 2006; Hobsbawm, 1983 in Heywood, 2002). Whereas ethnic group is mere cultural or sociological community ,which according to Smith defined as "named human community connected to a homeland, possessing common myth of ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of shared culture, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites" (Smith, 2001, p.13).

From the perspective of Stalin and Leninist perspective, however, such mere cultural and sociological entities have been leveled as nationality. According to such school of thought, what distinguishes nation from that of nationality is that the former does have common market or single economy, standardized language and larger population while the latter does not fulfill such objective criteria (Stalin, 1953, p.306; Karat, 1975, p.6; Engels and Marx in Nimni, 1995, p.64).

Seen from the perspectives of sociologist and anthropologist, what have been labeled as 'nation, nationality and people' by federal and regional constitution, are ethnic groups (Daniel Kendie, 2003; Alem, 2003). Furthermore, despite the usage of the Leninist –Stalinist lexicon of nation and nationality, the distinction in between the terms has not be clearly stipulated by the federal and regional constitutions. Instead, similar definition has been given as if the three concepts are synonymous. Indeed, a strict reading and interpretation of the definition of NNP in light of the Leninist -Stalinist version, is closely resembles to the meaning of nationality than nation.

Indeed, more often the narratives of politicians and the texts of the constitution seem to have disguised the hierarchical (in developmental sense) nature of nation and nationality. Yet, the practical

accommodation of diversity hinted the existence of such nuances between nation (majority) and nationality (minority).

As some scholars, suggest those which are portrayed as *nation* have been designated region in their own names like the Tigray state, the Afar state, the Oromia and Somali (Beckon, 2014; Assefa, 2007; Asnake, 2009). According to these scholars, others groups- minorities, were allowed to be incorporated in multiethnic regional states such as Gambella, Benishangul Gumuz. Perhaps the case of Harari remained to be special case as it has a regional state despite its smaller population size (Merera, 2003; Assefa, 2007; Becken, 2014)[96].

Far more than such inductive conjectures and conclusions, there are some indications showing the difference in the connotation of nation and nationalities in the text of the constitution of the Amhara region. In this regard, article 73 stipulates "the organization of nationality administration" and details that "there is hereby established a nationality administration in those geographical areas of the National Regional State inhabited by the *Himira*, *Awi*, and *Oromo* peoples" (ANRS, 2001, art. 73/1). A critical reading of the text indicates that the Amhara are portrayed as nation while the Himira, Awi and Oromo are designated as *nationality*. As mentioned above, the word *minority* has been used indiscriminately for those groups which lacked state of their own.

However, in both federal and regional constitutions, the term "minority nationality" has been used to infer to those ethnic groups whose size is perhaps far less than even nationalities. The term has been mentioned in the proclamation that was promulgated for the establishment of Regional Government during the time of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia. According to such proclamation, "minority nationality means a nationality or people which cannot establish its own Wereda self-government because of the small number of its population" (TGE, 1992 , art.2/6)[97]. These groups who were entitled to form self-government unit, bet it regional or provincial (Zonal) levels, had not been designated as minority. However, such groups (the minorities) were permitted to have "appropriate representation in the Wereda council" (TGE, 1992, art.5/3). Albeit positive intentions, there was no empirical data supporting the practicability of the legal provisions.

[96] Vaguan (2003) contends that case of Harari cannot be considered as anomalous. For her, due to historic factors and its walls, she argues that it deserves to qualify as nation and consequently state for itself. But to the contrary, Merera (2003) contend that Hareri has gotten state due to the political allegiance and favoritism with that of the TPLF.

[97] Wereda was considered as the basic unit of self- government in the administrative hierarchies of the TGE (TGE, 1992, art.5/1).

Surprisingly enough, provisions regarding issues of national minorities are scant in the FDRE constitution. The only exception, perhaps, is the provision regarding determination of seats for the House of Peoples' Representatives of the federal government. Accordingly, 20 seats are reserved for minority groups (FDRE, 1995, art. 54/3)[98].

Apart from this, the constitution is silent about how such category of people could be represented within the regional state. However, such omission could be attributed to the generous provision which stipulates that

> *Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in the territory that inhabits and to equitable representation in state and federal governments* (FDRE, 1995, art.39/.3).

This provision, unlike the case during the transitional government, seems to have guaranteed the minorities to have self-government unit of their own.

However, as indicated in *article 39*, theoretical distinction between, nation, nationality and people seems to be blurred. Perhaps the regional constitution hints about the inherent ideological distinction, often hierarchical, between nation, nationality and people. In this regard, the Amhara ethnic group, as demonstrated in the nomenclature and many other provisions, has been designated as "nation", and the other three groups (namely the Awi, the Himera and Oromia) are designated as "nationalities". And the Amhara nation and the three nationalities have been conferred self -government rights and self-determination rights up to secession (ANRS, 2001, art.39/.1-5)[99]. The third category, probably comes at the third echelon in the hierarchy are perhaps those designated as *people* or the minorities.

In this respect, the constitution stipulates that "….the representation of other nationalities and peoples settling in the regional state shall be taken care with special consideration" (ANRS, 2001, art.45/3). Such and such provisions have not failed to show the different level of accommodation that pertained to the ideological focus of the regime. While the territorial accommodation has been given to Amhara, Awi

[98] Despite such provision, the constitution made it open as to the determination of who are the minority nationalities and peoples. However, art.54 sub article 1-3 hints that minority nationality is that whose population is less than 100, 000 which so far served as electoral constituency for the HPR.

[99] This contravenes with the experience of former USSR where some nations were proffered to enjoy secession rights while many of nationalities have been conferred only limited autonomy.

and Oromo, the remaining groups seem to have been entitled to have only special representation right rather than self-government rights as it has been practiced in the form of limited territorial autonomy.

But the practices do not seem to be corroborated with such analysis concerning minorities in all cases. The Argoba case could show the dilemma of the regional government. The Argoba community for long period of time, used to have a representative, using special electoral district from the province of *Semene Shoa* in Amhara region, to the HPR. It appeared that its minority status seemed to have prevented them for demanding territorial autonomy for long period of time. However, perhaps due to the constitutional lacunae of both the federal and regional constitution, Argoba community demanded for territorial autonomy and, finally in 2006, was able to secure territorial autonomy at the level of district in Amhara Region.

So, though similar definitions have been given to nation, nationalities and people, there have been ample cases that showed the discrepancy between the words and deeds on the ground. It has been evidently shown that the term *nation* has been designated to the Amhara ethnic group, *nationality* to the Awi, Himera and the Oromo, and below these are other minority groups. While for those nation and nationalities, whose names have been listed out have conferred to exercise self government and self - determination rights including the right of secession, other groups which are not listed out by names seem to have only special representation rights like having reserved seats. In what appears to be inconsistency and unconstitutional, some groups have won special wereda and while the other like the Kimant has almost won territorial autonomy at the level of *Liyu* Zone[100].

6.2.3. Communitarianism

The communitarian school takes up the Herderian conception of culture which has been understood as " […] well-integrated, well-bounded, and largely self-generated entities, defined by a set of key attributes, including a shared language, history, and values (Song, 2007, p.17**).** In so doing, communitarian scholars equate culture with primordial conception of ethnic group which is understood in terms of members having a common name that shares exclusively common language, descent , history, identity, custom and territory (Narrol, 1964 cited in Polluha, 1998, p.32; Smith, 2011**).** Such

[100] Such inconsistency and political fighting seems to have attributed to the absence of further legal frameworks as to the determination of which groups are minorities. In this regard, both the regional government (art.45/3; art 48/2), and the federal government (art.54/3) promised to enact further laws on the matter. Surprisingly enough, none of them have introduced a law yet. Neither the elites of minorities have fond of such a move. However, legal point of view, may not be sufficient in explaining double standards. So the political factor could in envitably determine the facts on the ground.

primordial narrative seems to have hugely shaped the meaning of nation, nationality and peoples as defined by the constitution. Accordingly,

> *Nation-nationality or people … is a group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identity, a common psychological makeup, and who inhabit an identifiable, pre-dominantly contiguous territory (*ANRS, 2001, art.40/7).

By focusing on what are often portrayed as objective indicators of ethnic groups, the formulaic definition of NNP obviously neglects other sources and types of identities that emerged through evolutionary process of interaction over millennia. Perhaps with the exception of language many groups of the country, let alone the region, have shared culture and identities (Levine, 1974, Miamer, 2006).

Despite this, each ethnic group has been portrayed as "billiard balls" having distinct colour and boundary (space) separating them (Mason, 2007, p.225).

Yet, the promotion of difference, rather than commonality, remains to be the logical consequence of communitarian assertion. Indeed, the strategic plan document of the Amhara Mass Media Agency of the regional government clearly states that "magnifying the images of national diversity" remains the strategic goals of the organization (Amhara Mass Media Agency [AMA], 2014, p.6).

In fact such narrative could be the reflection of the agenda of central government owned Media, especially EBC, which still considers itself as "the voice of diversity" which of course neglected 'unity'. The narrative of multiculturalism need to be seen in light of the balancing of unity and diversity. As some scholars suggested, the promotion of diversity should not be at the cost of unity (Assefa, 2007; Tarekegn, 1996).

The communitarian accommodation can further be shown in the conferment of self- determination right, including secession to all nation, nationalities and peoples (NNP) , without consideration of history, context, settlement patterns, and will or interest of the concerned people. As scholars of nationalism suggest nationalism is not morally desirable thing. But, it could emerge as response to injustice or will of the people. Multiculturalism then is a solution to address such ethnonationalistic demands through democratic deliberations (Kymilicka, 2002; Song, 2007). Neither the Amhara nor other ethnic groups demanded self-determination rights including secession in the region (FGD7, Desie, Jan. 8, 2016). If

peoples have not claimed self-determination rights, thus, what happened appears to be "pre-determination" instead of "self-determination" of ethnic groups (Lijphart, 1995, p.276)[101].

On top of that, there was no any meaningful discussion on the formulation and adoption of the constitution of the region and the Federal Government (Teguadda, 2011) In fact, the incorporation of self- determination rights of any form seem to be an imposition from the above (Zemelak, 2014). As proclaimed by the TGE, the recognition of groups and the determination of entitlements as to which ethnic group should have or should not have territorial autonomy had already been decided by the transitional government of the central government (see TGE, 1992, pro.no.7).

What has been incorporated in the regional government constitutions, during the transitional time and afterwards, was just the endorsement of the decisions made at the center through different instruments such as the transitional charter, proclamations, and constitutions.

Consequently, one would argue that constitution lacks democratic credence both procedurally and content wise (Yohaness, 2010). Procedurally, there was no meaningful participation of peoples of the Amhara Region, and as result of which, it has failed to reflect local contexts and interest (Zemelak, 2014; Teguadda, 2011) which are believed to be as substantive elements of democratic deliberation.

Often nationalism and democracy are understood as irreconcilable values particularly in multiethnic society (Polluha, 1998). To the converse of this, the marriage of nationalism with democracy might probably be relevant and viable in relatively homogenous Society or in a society where there exist a dominant nation-*staatvolks* (Miller, 1995; Tamire, 1993 cited in Tonkiss, 2012; O'Leary, 2001, pp.284-85**).** But, in what appears to be oxymoron in Amhara region is that the politicians have been advocating "Amhara Nationalism" and "democratic nationalism" as guiding principle of the region. The slogan '*long live for Amhara Nationalism*!' has been the signpost in front of the office of ANDM for many years. Most recently, that narrative has been used in conjunction with democracy. In a region which claims to ensure the self- determination of nation and nationalities, advocating Amhara nationalism seems to be anomalous from theoretical point of view. Amhara nationalism would mean that the majority Amhara and its language and culture would be promoted, that in turn would inevitably have

[101] Arend Lijphart has come up with the contrasting terms of *self-determination* and *pre-determination* ethnic groups. while self- determination implies a democratic process where ethnic groups decides on their destiny using democratic procedures referendum or election, pre-determination implies a process where groups for self- determination are made in advance , without getting into the democratic process(Lijphart, in Kymilicka, 1995, p.276)

negative repurcasion on the language and culture of the minority groups. So, Amhara nationalism would question the credibility of 'multiculturalism' in the region.

However, as some of the Focus Discussants suggest, there appears to be political reason, which probably transcends the above criticism. Accordingly, ANDM-the ruling party of the region promotes Amhara nationalism to delink Amhara's adherence to *Ethiopianism*- which has been believed to be antithesis to the agenda of the ruling party, mainly the TPLF core (Chichu, 2019). This view is further consolidated by the EPRDF official training documents as well. It was believed that Amhara patriotic feeling towards Ethiopia has been labeled as "chauvinism" that the ruling party fights against ("Developmental Democracy", 2014, p.25). The change in the nomenclature of EPDM into ANDM in 1994 at a time when AAPO was established as counterforce to EPRDF could also strengthen the reason why Amhara nationalism has been pushed forward by the ruling elites.

So, one would confidently argue that the promotion of Amhara nationalism, or ethnic nationalism of other groups in the region could be seen as a tactical ploy used by the ruling elites to counterforce the force of unity in general and Amhara's patriotic feeling to Ethiopia in particular. Furthermore, it could be added that once ANDM emerged as ethnonationalist force, then it is inevitable that the agenda of ethnicity, in one form or the other, will prevail. The inevitability of ethnonationalism is beyond reasonable doubt. Once ethnicity becomes the chief principle of organizing politics and governance, ethno-nationalism would be seen as the logical consequence of the institutionalization of identity politics itself. That is what happened elsewhere in the former U.S.S.R, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia (Brubaker, 1994)

Communitarianism seems to be a superficial ideology. Below the narratives of equality culture and self determination of NNPs, there exist nasty politics where ethnicity was employed as tactical ploy for consolidating the power (Akililu, 2006; Merera, 2003). Such disguised form of multiculturalism would have unintended consequence for the region and the country at large. Indeed, the ruling party could have used it as temporary solution to stay in power. Yet, ethnicity is such a janu ce-faced thing that would lead to unintended consequence in the long-run (Kymilicka,2002a).

The rise of Amhara nationalism[102] in the region and elsewhere these days cannot be seen in isolation with the politics of the ruling party and the political system at large.

The last, but not the least aspect of communitarianism is the assumption of each group as "internally homogenous" (Mason, 2007, pp.222-7). Such assumption obviously fails to appreciate what Shacher creffred to as "paradox of multicultural vulnerability" (2004, p.2). He contends that implementing "strong version" of multiculturalism in society would enhance "group competition which may hide the condition of in group oppression" (Shacher, 2004, p.28)[103].

Cognizance of such challenge, Sara Song has called for "right –respecting accommodation" to address the problems of internal minorities (Song, 2007, p.42). In this regard, the constitution seems to be sensitive to civil and political rights of individuals and women rights. Basic civil and political rights such as legal equality, freedom of religion and expression, assembly, association and movement have been granted (ANRS, 2001, art. 14 -33**).** There are also provisions that guarantee poly-ethnic groups to "reside and earn a living, "engage in public and government occupation" (ibid., art.32-33). For the poly-ethnic groups, the only requirement to work in the bureaucracy and hold political office is the language requirement. Women are often considered to be victim of communitarianism (Shacher, 2000, 2004). But the constitution does not only grants exit-right to women, but also grants special rights such as affirmative action, property right, and maternity leave (ibid., art.34-35)[104].

Despite such positive constitutional provision, there hardly exist any legal and constitutional protection to those ethnic groups that lives within *nationality Zones* and Liyu *Weredas*. Individual rights cannot be enough to protect *new minorities* which are founded within those territorially delimited nationality zones and liyu weredas. As Green (1995) argues individuals are also member of ethnic groups and hence might require robust regime to protect both their individual and group rights. As will be discussed in chapter 9, there are internal minorities in Awi, Himera, and Oromo zones which so far do not have robust regime to protect their rights as individual as well as groups. As result, the proclivities of homogenization from below appear to be logical outcome of such institutional design. Probably, more

[102] . The core of the Amhara youth protest in 2008 has centered upon the identity related claims pertinent to Welkyite and its environs, which had allegedly been forced to be incorporated with the Regional state of Tigray(formerly known by Region 1), could be taken as signpost for the rise of Amhara nationalism in recent times.

[103] Strong version of multiculturalism is another version of communitarianism. Other scholars use suffixes like "thick" and "thin" to distinguish between strong and weak version of multiculturalism(Baumeister, 2000, P.58)

[104] The constitution provides that the government has an obligation to protect those cultures that violates fundamental rights (ANRS, 2001, art.112/1). It also adds that the government has responsibility to assist women so that they can exit from oppressive customs and culture (ANRS, 2001, Art.35/.4).

worse than this would be the granting of the right of secession to all groups (nations, nationalities and peoples) which goes against the principle of living together with differences. As scholars contend, secession is not considered as multicultural accommodative mechanism which has to be dispensed for (Cornell, 2002; O'Leary. & McGarry, 1994).

As discussed in the literature review section of this dthesis, multiculturalism is about mutual accommodation, living together, not separation or secession[105]. Secession represents mechanism of eliminating diversity, and hence can be considered as a measure that is antithetical to the essence of multiculturalism itself.

6.3. Summary

Corollary to explicit recognition of diversity, the Stalinist-Leninist –cum communitarian doctrines served as the meta-narratives shaping the institutional setting of ethnic accommodation. As discussed in the theoretical literature review, communitarianism takes up the essentialist or primordial assumption of culture and ethnic groups which overlooks the interactive and processual nature of identity formations.

One aspect of communitarianism and primordialism has been evidently seen in the articulation of the meanings of *nation*, *nationality* and p*eoples* as "… a group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological makeup, and who inhabit an identifiable, pre-dominantly contiguous territory" (ANRS, 2001, art.40/7).

It is obvious that such notion of ethnic groups underestimates the composite culture of Ethiopian society which was resulted due to the *criss-crossing* of ethnic groups over centuries. The logical consequence of communitariansim seemed to have justified for the recognition of self-determination rights including unconditional secession rights to groups in the region as groups are presumed to have incommensurable values and interests.

[105] Both the federal constitution and its carbon copy-regional constitution have permitted unilateral secession, in both internal- and external self determination. In both cases the decision of the council and the referendum of the concerned group are the only actor, denying the deliberative role of the center or other Ethiopians. The only country that allowed unilateral secession and is willing to dismember itself, if claimants are so willing by its constitutional fiat, is Ethiopia.

In tandem with the communitarian flavor, one would also scrutinize the dominance of Stalinist-Leninist narratives underpinning the meanings and motives behind the institutional design of accommodation of diversity. An aspect of such ideological prism has been evidently seen in terms of the framing the meaning of ethnic groups as *nation* and *nationality*, the blanket recognition and granting of self - determination rights to these groups. At the heart of such framing was the attempt to hierarchical leveling of ethnic groups as *Nation*-as first class to enjoy statehood; *Nationality*-as second echelon which has to enjoy territorial autonomy(titular) within the National Region; and *other minorities* which were supposed to enjoy special representation. The automatic granting of territorial autonomy for some of the ethnic groups such as *Agew- Awi, Agew- Himira, the Oromo, Argoba,* and the *Amhara* appeared to be carried out through the process of "pre-determination" , rather than " national self-determination" (Lijphart, in Kymilicka, 1995, p.276), and such process could vividly demonstrated the centralized decision making culture of the EPRDF- ANDM. Such monopoly of decision making procedure has been paralleled to the role of the Communist party in the former U.S.S.R.

Above all, true to the Stalinist-Leninist ideological stance, the dialectics of *oppressed nation* and *oppressed nation* has been envisioned as the governing ideology of EPRDF and ANDM. In this regard, the Transitional Government of Region Three –which served as constitution of the region during the transition period boldly, described the *Amhara nation* as oppressor and others as the oppressed nations (GRT, 1993, Para 1& 4).The thesis of the oppressor and the oppressed nation has been impliedly woven into the text of the 1995 and the revised constitution of 2001 of the region as well.

In this regard, contrary to the appeals of inclusive accommodation, it appeared that "the victimization of the majority" (Husband, 2000, p.211) by the minorities seemed to be the guiding and operating ideology of the system of governance in the post 1991 Ethiopia in general and the Study Area in particular.

CHAPTER SEVEN: INSTITUTINAL ACCOMODATION AND CHALLENGES.

The institutional accommodation is pertinent to different policies, programs and established legal-structural set ups of the government, with the view of addressing the claims of ethnic diversity. In light of this, this chapter was intended to provide answers for two of the research questions, namely, first, *what were the legal-institutional mechanisms of accommodation of ethnic diversity*? And, second, *what were the challenges of ethnic accommodation in the study Area?* Accordingly, the content has been organized into four sections. The first section deals about the representation of groups in those region-wide public spheres. The second section emphasizes on the modalities, structures and the scopes of autonomy which has been conferred to minority ethnic groups. The third section has been devoted to the discussion of the challenges of multiculturallism from below by way of taking the condition of internal minorities within the local majorities. And the fourth section summarizes the main findings of the research questions.

7.1. Representation of the Majority and Minority in Region wide institution

As discussed in chapter five, during the transitional period both the central transitional government and the regional transitional government had recognized the existence of diverse ethnic groups in the region and promised that all ethnic groups would be beneficiaries of the political system.

Indeed, the transitional constitution of the Region had *explicitly* recognized the major ethnic groups such as *Agew Himira, Agew Awi, Oromo* and, of course, *Amhara*; while the remaining groups were implicitly recognized by the phrase "others" (TGR3, 1993, Article 2/4). Unlike the proclamation of the central government which failed to recognize other ethnic groups such as Argoba and Kimant, the insertions of the phrase "others" in the text of the regional constitution could affirm the sensitivity of the regional government towards diversity. In addition, cultural, linguistic, and self government rights including the rights of secession have been guaranteed by the constitution.

With regard to the institutional dispensations, the constitution had established legislative "council", "executive committee" and judiciary body. The members of the regional council were elected from each districts (Wereda) in the region. The Woreda served as electoral constituency and each Wereda was supposed to be represented by three individuals (TGR3, art 24/2). The executive committee was established among those members of the legislative council (TGR3, Art.9). Apart from such fusion of power, the regional constitution established dual accountability of the executive and the legislative

council in manner that appears to be unitary structure. Regarding the regional council, it was provided that structure was accountable to the regional people and to the council of representative of the central Transitional Government (TGR3, Art.23). By the same token, the executive body was also accountable to "the Council of Ministers as concerns with the implementation of laws and policies of the central transitional government and to the regional council as regards to the implementation of regional laws and polices"(TGR3, art.30). Furthermore, the regional council was mandated for the creation of independent judiciary and three administrative structures at Regional, Zonal and Wereda levels **(**TGR3, art.27/7).

Despite the adoption of such structures for the regional government, the institutional modalities of accommodation of diversity remained obscure and left to the dictate of *real politic*. As matter of fact, the representation of the minorities especially from the Waghimra area remained significant, mainly in the executive branch of the government. As the nationality zones were not instituted, the dominant group was commonly referred to as the *Wolloyees (*Interviewee 36, Bahirdar, May 6, 2016*)*. Infact, what was referred to as the *Wolloyees* were those from North Wollo administrative zone from which the Wag himira Nationality zone was carved out some times later. The dominance of the Agew was also evident in the political party (Interviewee 2, Sekota, Dec.4, 2015).

Cognizance of this, the naming of Amhara National Democratic Movement could be criticized as a misnomer. The then 'Agew National Democratic Movement'-instead, could perhaps be appropriate to describe much of local politics in the region (Vaugen, 2003). Such labeling explains the historical relationship of the EPDM with the local peoples of Wag himira during the time of guerrilla fighting. And for that matter my informants in the area did not reject the claims of the Agew dominance within the party, yet, they recently have questioned the legitimacy of the party due to the gap between expectation and achievements so far. In this respect, some contend that "ANDM has not only failed to deliver development to the *Waghimira,* but also was the reason for the failure of the entire region" (Interviewee 2, Sekota, Dec. 4, 2015**)**.[106] Still, other informants who were veteran members of the ANDM did not agree with such accusation. For them ANDM have brought significant positive change in the areas (FGD2. **,** Sekota, Dec..6, 2015).

[106] One of my key informant opined that ANDM and TPLF worked in unison to get the Dergue toppled down from office, yet both party departs in sharing the national cakes (Interviewee 2, Sekota, Dec. 4, 2015)

The difference in the interpretation of actual politics is normal to identity politics because the presence of formal, or "descriptive representation" (Pitkin, 1969, p.59) may not be sufficient to guarantee "substantive representation" (ibid., p.112). Of course, no one would question the validity of Pitkin's argument. Yet, quality decision could come along with empowerment of human agents in tandem with the necessary institutional reform.

But to be realistic, multiculturalism requires the "politics of presence" (Philips, 1997, p.175) where groups share powers and participate in the realm of public affairs (Bogaards, 2006; Lijphart, 1995; Wolff, n.d.). In this regard, the presence and participation of groups have explicitly and implicitly been felt in region-wide institutions such as the Regional Council, the civil service, the political party, and Media.

7.1.1. Representation in the Regional Council

The Regional Council is the highest region-wide legislative organ which is entrusted with wide-ranging powers related mainly to appointments, enactment of laws and developmental programs; establishment of institutions and monitoring their performance; and imposes taxes and collect revenues as per its jurisdiction (ANRS, 2001, art 49). Some of the appointive function of the Council include, appointing the head of government-the president and his/her executive councils, the president and vice president of the regional Supreme Court, the Auditor General and Deputy Auditor General.

Unlike the case during the transitional government, where the head of the regional state served as speaker of the council, the 1995 constitution and the revised constitution have mandated the regional council to elect its speaker and deputy speaker so that there could prevail "separation of power" among the executive and the legislative branch of the regional government (Interviewee 36, Bahir Dar, May 6, 2015)[107]. It is also to be mandated to appoint judges for the courts which are organized at three levels - Supreme Court, High Court and First Instance Court. The appointment of judges in those of nationality councils (titular autonomous units) , however, takes into account the opinion of the nationality council (ANRS, 2001, Art.74/ 3(g)).

[107] The usage the phrasal term *separation of power* need to be qualified here. What appears to be the case is the reduction of duality of functions. Otherwise, as far as the executive branch and its heads are appointed out of the regional councils, there exists fusion of power which is replica of the structure at the federal level. The fact that the regional heads are designated as 'president' cannot make them presidential sytem in the absence of built -in -mechanisms of checks and balances among the excutive-legistlative and of course the judiciary organs.

In such important political organ, the types of the electoral system and the modalities of representation do matter on the political participation of groups in the region. Regarding this matter, it is stated ,

> *Members of the council shall be elected in an electoral system, whereby a candidate with the majority vote wins, amongst candidates within one electoral district. The minority of nationalities and people that are believed to deserve special representation shall be represented in the council through an election. Particulars shall be determined by law (*ANRS, 2001, art.48/2).

As mentioned above, two schemes of group representation have been envisaged. The first scheme is based on *the first –past- the post* electoral system where 2 to 3 candidates represent 100, 000 residents (ANRS, 2001, article 2)[108] . What matters most in determining the number of representation in the regional council having 294 seats, is population size (see Table 14 below)[109]. The second scheme of group representation regards what is often termed as "minority nationalities" with the population lacking the required size of population to fulfill an electoral constituency. For such type of groups, the constitution reserves unspecified number of seats.

However, unlike the federal constitution which limits the number of reserved seat to the minimum of 20 seats, the regional constitution did not limit the threshold. In explaining why the constitution did not put some limit, one of the key informant responded that "we believe that other minorities could colorfully flourish and made claims in the feature. We would like to protect groups like *Gafat* and others if they demand so in the future" **(**Interview 37, Bahirdar, May 16, 2016**)**[110].

A case in point is the *Argoba* ethnic group, which has been granted one seat both at the regional council and the Federal House of Peoples Representatives (HoPR). Argoba ethnic group have had special electoral constituency in the Northern Shoa administrative Zone. Following the establishment of *Liyu Wereda*-known as *Serkele Wereda* in the year-2006, *Argoba* has also secured a seat in the regional Council since then.

---

[108] The size of the HPR of the Federal Government has been set by the assumption that 100,000 persons form a single constituency. In addition, first past the post electoral system on the basis of single member district system where 100, 000 forming a single constituency has been the standard at the conception (see FDRE, 1995,art,54).

[109] The constitution sets out that the minimum and maximum limit of the seats of the council in between 276 and 414(Article 2)

[110] Gafat ethnic was believed to one of the ethnic groups in the past whose language has found to be non- existent in the country.

As mentioned above, under article 48/2 the constitution has provided that law governing minority issue would be enacted. Despite such promissory notes, however, there still lacked detail laws governing as to who and how the minority issues get addressed in the region. What appears to be the modus operandi seems to be contextual and case-based approaches.[111]

Table 13: Number of representative in the Regional council for the Fourth Round Election, 2010-2015

Category	2014		Member of Council		Ratio council to population
	Population	%	Number	%	
Majority	18,045,100	89	261	89	.001
Minority	2,257,827	11	33*	11	.001
Total	20302927	100	294	100	

Source: (ANRS, 2016,).

*The figure excludes Argoba, which has secured a seat due to special electoral arrangement since 2006

As indicated in Table 13**,** the number of representatives that the Amhara and the minority groups are proportional to their respective population sizes. And hence one would say, at least descriptively, that there seems to be 'parity' of representation of groups.

Effective participation obviously depends on the human agency of the representatives regardless of their size in the regional council. However, the mere presence of groups, especially the minority groups could not be sufficient for effective political participation (Ghai, 2003).

[111] As result of this, the decision on the claims of groups seems to have been dictated more by political fiats than set of predictable and known rules or laws in the region. The absence of country wide proclamation as to the determination of the minority is more likely to contribute for such gaps. However, still, the federal government, despite the constitutional promised to do so, seems to have shied away from it (Interviewee 32, Bahirdar, 11th of May, 2016).

Indeed, prominent scholars have underlined on the relevance of decision making procedures in terms of improving the positive influence of the minority group in decision making (Ghai, 2003; Lijphart, 1995**)**. On this matter, the constitution stipulates that "all decision of the council shall be passed by a majority vote of its members present and voting at a meeting" (ANRS, 2001, Article 55). Obviously, the minority groups lacked what Lijphart would advise to have, "veto power" in the regional council (Lijphart, 1995, p.276). The majoritarian electoral system may not be favorable for the minority groups who have only 33 seats as compared to the majority ethnic group which occupies 261 seats.

However, as members of council, there appeared to be the possibility of participation in law making process through initiating bills and setting agenda. In this respect, the Rules of Procedure and Members' Code of Conduct of the Regional Council Regulation states that "a draft law shall be presented in writing and supported by at least *20 members of the council* and be submitted to the speaker" (ANRS 2011, art. 38/4, *italic mine*)[112]. These requirements might not be attainable for each minority ethnic group in the council; yet, coalition among members of minority groups would enable them to initiate bills. Furthermore, it is stated that the speaker, the members of the council, the parties who have seats in the council, the Supreme Court, nationality councils, and other institutions which are accountable to the council have the right to initiate bills (ibid. art.38/2). Accordingly, the minority members of the council have got multiple avenues through which the minorities can air out their voices and concerns. Particularly, the nationality zones, the political party and the different committee could strengthen the participation of the minority and the majority groups.

So, the fact that decisions are passed through majority vote could probably limit the capacity of the representatives to promote the interests of their groups. Yet, the representatives of minority groups could influence decisions through the process of deliberation where they "can speak for every group that might inturn provide new information, perspectives or ongoing insights relevant to the understanding that leads to a decision" (Mansbridge, 2000, p.103).

However, such assumption would not be taken- for- granted given the nature of the ideology of the government and the incumbent party. In this respect, the internal party rules stipulate,

[112] Despite the fact that members of council do have the right to initiate bills, their mandate has been limited to nonfinancial bills. The rights to initiate financial bills are the prerogative of the executive organ of the regional government (.ANRS, 2011, art.38 /3).

> *Those members of the council at each level of administration shall not vote or take position against the position of the party. They need to vote in line with the party decision or positions which would be taken in advance before the agenda is tabled to each assembly for voting. If members fail to vote against that, then they have no option but the for sake of the seat and the party on voluntarily basis (EPRDF, 2012, p. 66*).

It is evidently seen that the adherence of strong party discipline as in the form of *democratic centralism* would definitely discourage the members of the regional council from dissenting the positions promoted by the party leadership. Furthermore, there has been the tendency to label group- based claims as "narrow nationalism" or "chauvinism". This has constrained the possibility of raising ethnic based issues in formal institutions such as the regional council and different committee meetings (Interviewee 38, Bahirdar, May 14, 2016).

Table 14: Representation of Women in the Regional Council by Group Category, (2015 -2020)

Category	2014 *		Women in Reg. Council		Ratio of council to population
	Population	%	Number	%	
Majority	9, 022, 550	89	112	88	0.0012
Minority	1, 128, 914	11	15	12	0.0013
Total	10151464	100	127	100	

Source: (ANRS, 2016).

*The figure of total population of women is taken based on the assumption that female constitutes half of the total population in the region.

The representation of women in the regional council is often taken as a yardstick to know the participatory nature of the political process. In this regard there were ninety (90) women representatives in the fourth round term (2010-2015). As indicated, the figure was increased to 127 reaching 43% of 294 member council during the fifth term. This could be taken as remarkable development in terms of the representation of women. From the table above, one would also learn that the participation of women among the minority was found to be slightly greater than the participation of women among the majority.

7.1.2. Participation of Groups in Political Party

In Africa, where there exist weak institutional frameworks of participation and representation, political parties could provide avenue for political participation and representation of ethnic groups. When we see the type of parties in light of their roles in the region, the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) dominated the political landscape that remained in power since the formation of the Regional State. As revealed by the following table, with the exception of third round of general election (2005-2010) where about 75 or 26 % of seats were controlled by the opposition parties, the ANDM dominated the politics of the region. Indeed, one would say that the region remained under the monopoly of a single- party government right from its conception up to now.

Table 15: Political Parties and their seats in the Regional Council, 1995-to date (2020)

SN	Term of Election	Name and Seats won by Political Parties					
		ANDM		EDP		AEUO	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
1	1995-2000	294	100				
2	2000-2005	294	100				
3	2005-2010	219	74	26	9	49	17
4	2010-2015	294	100				
5	2015-2020	294	100				

Source: (ANRS/PRO, 2013). *Percentage calculation by the researcher (2016)*

The dominance of a single party in the region might have advantages and disadvantages. The advantage might be seen in terms of its role in ensuring stability in the region. As the experience of regions such as Gambella, Beneshangul and Oromia indicated, the prevalence of more parties, often mono-ethnic might have contributed for the instability of multiethnic regions. On the other hand, the dominance of the ANDM could also show the deficits in democratization process of the region and the country at large.

As scholars disclosed, despite the euphoria and rhetoric for installing democratic system, what the EPRDF actually installed was an electoral authoritarian regime (Aallen, 2006; Keller, 2002; Merera, in Prah &Mohammed, 2000; Ottaway, 1995).

Regardless of the deficit in democracy, however**,** parties could be inclusive or exclusive in there orientations and compositions. As Bieber (2008, p.13) indicates "mono-ethnic parties" are exclusive in

their orientation and composition while "diversity sensitive" civic parties and "multiethnic" parties are all inclusive. In other words, while mono-ethnic parties stand exclusively for either the majority or the minority group, diversity sensitive civic parties and multiethnic parties could appeal to diversity and embrace both members of the minority and majority.

When we see the nature of political parties which have been operated and still operating in the region, there were and still are few in number and visibility. During the early 1990s, the All Amhara Political organization (AAPO) had strong hold in the region. However, it did not sustain long following the death of its leader-Professor Asrat Woldeyes-who was prominent opposition figure against the EPRDF since the time of the transitional era (Gashaw, 2016). Despite its popularity, it was not able to secure a seat in the regional council. Following the opening up of electoral process during the 2005, multiethnic parties like EDP and AEUP had able to secure seats. Since then, ANDM had a full monopoly over the council and the government of the region.

Very recently, AGDP has emerged as "pan-Agew" Nationalist Party with an exclusive agenda for what the party claims to stand for-the Kimant, the Awi and the Himira Agews (interviewee 24, Kossober, April 12, 2016)[113]. The party was active in the mobilization of support for the Kimant identity quest in North Gonder Administrative Zone (ibid)[114].

In the same token, there had been different attempts at different times to have political organization for the mobilization of the Argoba people. Before the 2005 election, two parties were operating, one in the Amhara Region and the other in Afar. However, following the granting of *special districts (Wererdas*) in Amhara Region in the year 2006, the party operating in the Amhara Region ceased to exist, while the other party limited itself in Afar Region, wining its own special Wereda- *Gasene Liyu Wereda*. Still another party has been operating in *northern* Shoa administrative Zone claiming to have a special wereda in the area.

Such and such ethnic parties were active in mobilizing the minority groups so as to achieve "self-determination rights" which have been enshrined in the Regional and Federal Constitution. As such,

[113]The politicians claim that the three ethnic groups were one in the past and still shares cultural and linguistic affinities

[114] . Even they were rallying support for Kimant to have won Nationality Zone. Some officials of Agew Democratic Party were calling for internal self -determination (Muse Abraha, 2015). The chair person of the party has also hinted when he said " The Amhara region is so large to govern and suggested that that the Agews could have a Region"(Interviewee 25, Kosober, April 13, 2016).

these parties were either "mono-ethnic" as in the case of Argoba or coalition of minority groups like the Agew Democratic Party claimed for. Consequently, these parties were neither sensitive to diversity nor inclusive of both majority and minority groups in the region.

Perhaps, the nature and experience of Amhara National Democratic Movement has been quite unique and controversial. One source of the controversy pertained to its nomenclature. Indeed, respondents have, especially from the minority ethnic groups, had strong apprehension that the party represented the Amhara (FGD 4, Kemisse, Dec, 10, 2015; FGD8, Kosober, April 6, 2016). Officials of mono-ethnic parties such as *Argoba* and Agew Democratic Party have a position that ANDM's association to the Amhara people was not restricted to nomenclature *per se*. Far beyond that, it has been contended that the party stood for, and served, the Amhara People more than anybody else (ibid). In this regard, some politicians within AGDP expressed their discontents as,

> *The party and the regional government do not serve as equally. It discriminates us in terms of resource allocation and infrastructure development. Our zones received lower budget as compared to Amhara Zones. When we compare it [our zone] to some regions, we have comparable size, if not much greater number, of population with some regional states. Yet, regardless of the size of population, we received lower budgets that is even less than the budget some regions with lower population received (*Interview 23, Kosober, April 11, 2016*)*[115].

It appeared that the formation of mono-ethnic parties for respective ethnic groups has been justified in light of such 'perceived gap' among the political elites. It is also quite obvious that ANDM emerged with its new 'ethnic brands' out of the EPDM –which was claimed to be multiethnic party during the early 1990s (ANDM, 2013).

However, a critical scrutiny of the party memberships and programs did not appear to confirm the apprehension that the party stood for a single ethnic group-the Amhara, as other mono-ethnic parties appeared to be. In this regard, it has been stated that "anyone who is an Amhara or members of other nation and nationalities within the Region, by virtue of birth, or any Ethiopian citizen residing in Amhara Regional state" can be member of Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM, 2013, Article 8/ 1).

[115] Some officials of the party who are operating abroad has also expressed their concern about the "economic discrimination" in the region and called for internal secession where all Agews can form regional state (Muse Abrahm, 2015).

In addition to membership, the party program revealed that ANDM has mobilized and struggled for benefit of the Amhara nation and those nation and nationalities within region since that of its foundation during the 1990s (ibid. , para.3) [116]. Apart from such prescriptions, there has been an attempt to institutionalize the representation of groups in the decision making structure of the party that consisted of three bodies, namely General Assembly, Central Committee and Executive body. As the officials of ANDM stated, the representation of the minority groups has been guaranteed in the General Assembly and Central Committee (Interviewee 38, Bahir Dar, May 14, 2016) [117].

However, the official added that, "the members of the executive were selected on the basis of *capacity*, as a result, the procedure did not necessarily guarantee for the representation specific group or groups" (ibid. emphasis *mine*)[118]. The Executive committee assumed central role in shaping not only the political direction but also decided who should be appointed in the regional offices and zonal administrative offices. In doing so, the executive committee of the party hugely curtailed the appointment function of the president of the region (Interviewee 38, Bahir Dar, May 14, 2016).

Consequently, the ethnic composition of the leaders at regional and zonal offices of the regional government was subject to the decision of the executive committee of ANDM and no rules have been put inplace about the representation of minority groups during appointment by the executive organs of the regional government (Interviewee 38, Bahir Dar, ibid.).

Despite this, it has been stated that the "equity issue has always been considered in the appointment of the executive council of government both at federal and regional level" (ibid.); and hence, minority groups were likely to share executive offices.

[116]The Logo or emblem of the party has also memorial statute which symbolized the martyrs of "Amhara nation and other nation and nationalities" in the region (ANDM, 2013, Article 4/.3)

[117] The General Assembly consists of 1000 members representing ethnic groups, youths and leaders from which 65-membered Central Committee will be elected. And true to Leninist –stalinist culture of democratic centralism, 13 membered Executive will in turn will be selected out of the Central Committee (Interviewee 38, Bahir Dar, May 14, 2016). The chair and vice chair person of the ANDM is elected from the Central Committee. In addition, 45-members of the Central Committee and 9-Executive Committee to EPRDF are elected from the Central Committee(ANDM, 2011 , p.23).

[118] The requirement of "capacity" does not be equated with merit or meritocracy. In fact beliefs and political commitments are primary requirements for for recruitment of leaders while profession and experience are relegated as secondary and territory requirements ('Revolutionary Democracy[RD]', 2014, .p.19)

So, regardless of its nomenclature, the ideological and institutional standing of ANDM approximated to Bieber's typology of "multiethnic political party" which denotatively distinct from other typologies namely, mono-ethnic party and civic party establishments (Bieber, 2008, p.13). Multiethnic party is meant to be accommodative of diversity.

Nevertheless, participants who belonged to majority ethnic group did not feel contented with ANDM. The following table indicates the response of groups for the question- *Do you believe that your ethnic group has been fairly represented in the Incumbent party?*

Table 16: Perception of Respondents on the Representativeness of ANDM by Group Category

Group category	Yes		No		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Minority	48	48	51	52	99	19.1
Majority	200	48	220	52	420	80.9
Total	248	48	271	52	519	100

Source: Computed from the Survey (2016).

As revealed, about 48% of the total respondents of the minority and majority groups felt that their group has been fairly represented within the party. And, 52% of groups in both categories did not believe that they were fairly represented in ANDM.

When one looks into the underlying justifications as to why respondents answered negatively, the following factors were mentioned. In this regard, some respondents from minority groups contended that those members of the party who were considered as *representatives of minorities* were either "'not members of our group" or "do not know our language". In the same token the respondents in the category of majority listed out that some key officials of the ANDM are either (1) "not Amhara", or (2) "do not protect the interest of the Amhara". Furthermore, it has also be mentioned that "ANDM is mere agent of TPLF" than serving the people of the region (FGD7, Dessie, Feb 23, 2016). The data from the FGD has also disclosed that peoples did not know the ethnic origins of the politicians to accurately provide data as to who was representing which group.

As indicated above, there appear to be *descriptive representation* within the party. It appeared that much of the discontents of the respective groups seemed to have been attributed to matters pertinent to

what scholars referred to it as "substantive representation" of the party. The substantive representation has something to do with whether the group represented and protected the interst of the groups it stood for. Obviously, these requires not only democratic orientations and practices, it also requires human agency as well. .

It is evidently seen that a single party like ANDM , with its leftist ideological inclination and attendant practices of "democratic centralism" , is more likely to have a constraining role in terms of ensuring not only pluralism in its policies and practices, but also highly discouraged different voices within the regional council(assembly) as well. The decision-making procedure, which was simple majority, both within the party and the assembly could constrain the possibility of reasonable deliberation that could have led to consensual decisions among majority and minority.

7.1.3. Media

Language is often considered to be the conduit of culture; and the recognition of the same remains to be one of the mainstays of multiculturalism (Husband, 2000; UNRMI, 2017). In light of this, the regional constitution stipulates that "all languages spoken throughout the regional state shall enjoy equal recognition on the part of the state" (ANRS, 2001, art.5/1).

In what appeared to be contradiction to this was the provision which stated "Amharic shall be the official working language of the National Regional state" (ibid., art.5/2). Given such seemingly contradictory provisions, the implementation of language equality could probably be thought of at sub-regional and local level more than what is expected to be at regional level.

Yet, in actual cases, there appeared to be two region-wide institutional avenues within which language equality have been exercised. The first avenue has been the regional council (assembly) which granteed members the "right to speak by his [and her] own language during the meeting of the council" (ANRS, 2011, art.83/1). The second avenue which found to be critical institution for the prevalence of multiculturalism is media. As scholars highlighted, the function of institutional support to both minority and majority languages in all forms of media, including print, electronic and broadcast media are not limited to communicative purposes. It has symbolic, material and solidarity functions as well (Carmack, n.d; Husband, 2000).

The Amhara Mass Media institution has been providing media services in four regional languages and one foreign language. English service has been provided, in addition to the indigenous languages, namely, *Amharic*, *Affan Oromo*, *Awigna*, and *Himitegna* (AMA, 2014, p.6). Print media was the first form of Regional media which commenced service with a Megazin known by *Bekur*, ever since 1994. *Bekur* served as a weekly -Amharic Magazin since then. Furthermore, three magazines have followed suit in minority languages ever since 2010. These are *Herco*- publishes in *Afaan Oromo*, *Cherbewa*- publishes in *Awigni*, and *Hemetewikina*- published in *Himirgna* languages (AMA, 2014, p.13). The patterns of production of these Magazines has been indicated below (see the Table 17 below).

Table 17: Patterns and intended plans of Weekly production of Magazines in Copies from 2014/15-2020/21 Fiscal Years

Fiscal Year		2007 /2014/15		2008 2015/16		2009 2016/17		2010 2017/18		2011 2018/19		2012 2020/21	
Number Copies per Week		No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Language Category	Majority	6500	48	7000	49	17000	54	20,000	57	23,000	60	25,000	62
	Minorities	71000	52	7100	51	14100	46	15300	43	15300	40	15300	38

Source: Modified and adopted from AMMA (2014, p.55). Percentage calculation in line with majority and minority categories is done by the researcher.

Radio services have begun in 1997, after two years of the launching of the print media, with an hour Program- "Amhara Voice" (AMA, 2014, p.12). Such program was delivered on daily basis with a single hour air space from Ethiopian National Radio (ENA) on rental basis. Due to such limited air space, it appeared that the service in minority languages was practically difficult.

However, following expansion of air space and the capacity of the region to own its own Media Agency, it could be able to deliver services in three minority languages, in addition to Amharic as of June 2005(ibid.). For the first two years, the air space allotted to three of minority groups was limited to 45 minutes which latter have been expanded to 6 hours per week by the time when field research was run in 2014. By that time, respondents and discussants especially member of the minority group have expressed their discontents over the limited time allotted to their group (FGD 3, Kemissie, Dec., 11,

2015; FGD 9, Kosober, April 14, 2016; FGD 1, Sekota**,** Dec.6 , 2015). However, as indicated below, the air time allotted to the minority has doubled its time coverage within a year difference.

Table 18: Weekly Radio Transmission Programsby the Languages of Groups

Weekly transmission in hours	2007 /2014/15		2008 2015/16		2009 2016/17		2010 2017/18		2011 2018/19		2012 2020/21	
	Hrs	%	Hrs	%	Hrs	%	Hrs	%	Hrs	%	Hrs	%
Amharic	77	100	118	97.5	157	96	152	96	152	94	146	90.7
Language of minorities	Nil	Nil	3	2.5	6	4	9	4	9	6	15	9.3

Source: AMA (2014, p.55).

As indicated in Table 18, the air space allotted to minority appeared to be restricted as compared to the time left for the Amharic language. Nevertheless, when one sees the percentage ratio with the population of the minority population, it was almost proportional and could be labeled as 'fair'. In fact, what has been done so far, and proposed to be done in the future appeared to be encouraging. The issue of fairness could be sensitive as the media has been funded by the government. In fact, the nationality zones often sponsored some of the programs in their respective languages (Interviewee 32, Bahirdar, May 11, 2016**).**

Furthermore, some groups like Awi Himira do have 'Community Radio' stationed at Sekota town and funded exclusively by the Wag Himira Nationality Zone (Interviewee 3, Sekota, Dec.5, 2015**).**[119] In relative terms, Television Broadcast at regional level only began in 2014. And at the time of the field research, there was no program in minority languages. Consequently, some respondents in the Nationality Zones were furious about the absence of any televised program in their languages (FGD1, Sekota, Dec.5**,** 2015; FGD8, Kosober, April 6, 2016**)**. Broadcasting in minority languages was started in 2015; a year after the Amhara TV was launched (see the table 19 below).

[119] According to the managing director of the Sekota Community Radio,the Community Radio has been launched by 2010 Fisical Year. Both Himitegna and Amharic have been employed by the media (Interviewee 3 , Sekota, Dec.5, 2015). The Awi Nationality Zone has also been in the process to have community Radio just like that of Wag himira Nationality Zone (Interviewee 39., Bahirdar, May 15, 2016).

Table 19: Television Broadcast Transmission Programs by the Languages of Groups

Weekly transmission in hours	2007 /2014/15		2008 2015/16		2009 2016/17		2010 2017/18		2011 2018/19		2012 2020/21	
	Hrs	%	Hrs	%	Hrs	%	Hrs	%	Hrs	%	hrs	%
Amharic	57	90.5	114	90.5	114	90.5	111	88	105	83	105	83
Language of minorities	6	9.5	12	9.5	12	9.5	15	12	21	17	21	17

Source: AMA (2014, p.52).

As demonstrated in Table 19, above, the time allotted to minority languages did not appear to be proportional to their population size. Yet, the trend showed steady progress. Indeed, looking into the institutional mechanism of accommodation, there appeared to be a robust form of accommodation.

However, the perception of respondents were not up to the institutional set ups. The Following Table indicated the respondents view on the question – *Do you feel that the Amhara Radio and Television has given equal chance to freedom of cultural expression to all ethnic groups in the Region*?. The response has been revealed in Table 21.

Table 20: Response of Groups perception on the Freedom of Cultural Expression

Group Category	Yes Percentage	No Percentage	Total Percentage
Minorities	43	57	100
Majority	56	44	100
Hybrid	47	53	100
Polyethnic	41	59	100
Total	52	48	100

Source: Computed from the Survey Research (2016)

While the majority (52%) of the respondents responded affirmatively, there was variation among the majority and minority. In this regard, 56% of the majority responded positively, the majority of the minorities (57%) believed that the media did not serve ethnic group equally.

For those who responded negatively, the following factors were mentioned: (1) the media gives more emphasis given to the Amhara culture, (2) gives limited air time to minority languages, and (3) serve only as propaganda.

Table 21: Groups' Response Rates of Factors affecting Freedom of Cultural Expression

	More emphasis to Amhara culture	Limited Air Space to minority	Propaganda channel	Total
	%	%	%	%
Minority	29	19	54	100
Majority	21	26	53	100
Mixed	0	11	89	100
Polyethnic	75	25	0	100
Total sum	24	24	52	100

Source: Computed from the Survey (2016)

As indicated, there appeared to be high degree of convergence among majority and minority on the view that the regional media served only as propaganda machine of the party or the government.

As Husband (2000) strongly noted, media in multiethnic society plays vital role in terms of exchanging cultures and views among groups so that there prevails mutual understanding and solidarity. Yet, the findings from focus group discussion confirmed that media did not serve its societal functions. It was disclosed that electronic media have been hijacked by the politicians and remained as a negative

propaganda machine of the party (FGD6, Dessie, Jan.6**,** 2016; FGD12, Bahirdar, May 14, 2016; FGD3, Kemissie, Dec.11**,** 2015).

7.2. Titular Autonomy

Autonomy basically implies "limited self- rule" (Lapidoth, 1996 cited in Basta, 2012, p.9) or "self-administration" (Bendikter, 2009, 12) often granteed to minority group "as counterweight to the groups right already enjoyed by the majority population" (Wright, 1999, *abstract*). In this respect, the constitution of Amhara region has granted limited autonomy to the extent of "secession" right to minority groups "within the geographical limit of its territory" (ANRS, 2001, art.39/1&2). Accordingly, minority groups who were found to be concentrated or share contiguous territory have been granteed autonomy -which was labeled as "Nationality administration", at sub-regional levels including Zonal administration and Wereda administration.

To describe the asymmetry of power among other provincial or Zonal and Wereda (district) administrations, such autonomous units were termed as 'nationality zones' and 'Liyu (special)' Wereda. Such autonomous units have been entitled to enjoy cultural and linguistic rights.

In addition, they were guaranteed to participate in to different socioeconomic and politico-administrative spheres of public life which other administrative provinces and districts representing the majority have concomitantly been entitled to. Most of the minority groups in the Region, the Agew Himra, Agew Awi, and Oromo, have been entitled with territorial autonomy, which can also be reffred to as , *titular autonomy*, at the Zonal (sub-provincial) level, where as some of the minority groups such as Argoba and Kimant were entitled the same at district level-called by Liyu Wereda.

7.2.1. The Structure of 'Nationality' Zones: The Case of Awi, Himira and Oromo Nationality Zones

As mentioned above, Nationality Zones were titular *Zones* which have, so far, been conferred to respective ethnic groups such as Agew Himira, Agew Awi and the Oromo. These groups have gotten their territorial autonomy by the mid 1990s, specifically after the adoption of the 1995 regional constitution (ANRS, 1995). Such autonomous units do have three organs, namely, "the nationality Council", "the nationality administrative council", and the judiciary (ANRS, 2001. art73/2). The nationality council represented the 'law making function' on the matters given to it, whereas the

administrative council represented the executive arm of the Zone. Other zones did not have such law-making body; and hence can be referred to as 'functional' zones whose purpose has been limited to coordinating the activities of Weredas below their hierarchy (Interviewee 32, Bahirdar, May 11, 2016).

The nationality council has been portrayed as the highest political authority of the concerned specific ethnic group. And the horizontal relations between the executive and legislative body resembled to the parliamentary model, akin to other regional states and the federal government.

As a result, there existed fusion of power. Accordingly, similar to the regional council, the nationality council has a power to "designate the speaker, the deputy speaker and the chief administrator of the nationality administration" from among its members (ANRS, 2001, art.74/ 3-e).

Apart from such structural affinity with regional council, what probably made the nationality council unique from that of any sort of legislative assembly, including that of the regional council, regarding the accountability of the institution. In this respect, it has been provided that "… each and every nationality council shall, being accountable to the Regional Council" (ANRS, art.74/3)[120]. It appeared anomalous to see that 'legislative assembly', which was meant to be representative of people, have been subordinated to higher authorities. As can be evidenced in both federal parliament and the regional council, members of such house were only accountable to "(a) the constitution, (b) the will of the people, and (c) their own conscience" (FDRE, 1995, art.54 /4; ANRS, 2001, art.48/.3).

Another unique, perhaps anomalous feature of the nationality was pertinent to matters related to the composition of the same. The constitution stated that "every nationality council shall be established in a manner that would render it to be constituted out of especially elected members of the wereda councils within its territorial limit, in addition to those already elected for membership of the regional council" (ANRS, 2001, art.74/1). This was further elaborated that "the nationality council members, other than those elected for the Regional council, shall be elected from each Wereda and city Councils in the nationality administration, considering the number of council members of every council by each Woreda or city council"(ANRS, 2006, art.3/.2).

[120] Nationality councils are not the exception. The Wereda councils in the region are also accountable directly, in cases of those wereda under the jurisdiction of non titular zones, to the regional council. The accountability of those weredas which falls under the jurisdiction of titular zones is directly to the nationality council and through it they are accountable indirectly to the regional council (ANRS, 2001, art.86).

Table 22: Composition of Nationality Council in Three Zones

Zone	Delegated from Woredas in Number	Members of Regional Council	Number of Nationality Council
Awi	63	17	80
Oromo	57	3	60
Sekota	57	3	60

Source: ANRS (2006).

The total number nationality councils have been determined in the following manner:

> a) *Nationality administration with a population of 600, 000 and below , shall have 60 Nationality council members, including members to be elected for the Regional Council ; (b) Nationality administration with a population greater than indicated herein above shall have 80 Nationality council members , including members to be elected for regional council(ANRS, 2006, art.3/1. a&b, emphasis mine).*

The 1995 constitution, before it was amended, had also set out that "each council of the nationality zone shall consist, including members elected for the regional council, of 30 to 40 members elected in special conditions from each wereda" (ANRS, 1995, Chapter 8, sub.9). There appeared to be no magic formula in this regard. The revised constitution which was introduced after six years has just doubled the previously set number without giving any logical reason.

As reveled in the Table 22**,** members of the nationality councils were not directly elected representatives. And that has been common to the establishment of democratic organs. They rather were delegated from members of districts (weredas) and city councils, and the ex-elected members of regional councils.

Such arrangement seemed to have compromised the principle of "democratic representation" which is set to be one of the requirements of modern territorial autonomy (Bendikter, 2009, p.11). So, the manner of representation could probably have contributed to the limited locus of political authority of the nationality councils of the minority groups.

7.2.2. The Structure of *Liyu Wereda:* The Case of *Argoba* Wereda

The Argoba Special District was founded in 2006 following the conference held in Kemissie Town. The quest for the same had started as central agenda of ANDO in 2000. The party, after six years of

mobilization and quest, has succeeded establishing a special Districs-Argoba Liyu Wereda, for their own constituency in 2006, following the conffrence called 'declaration of Kemeissi conference'[121]. The District was curved out of South Wollo Zone and Oromia Nationalaity administration. The newly created Wereda has constituted only seven Kebeles Wereda out of which two were from Oromia Zone and five from South Wollo Zone. These kebeles have been listed down as *Fetekoma*, *Arra nechero*, *Chomye*, *Emeyeserte*, *Killkilo*, *Yaseneager* and *Gobera* (Amhara National Regional state Argoba Nationality Wereda [ARNW], 2006, part 2/6, italic mine)[122].

The structure of Nationality districts or *Liyu Wereda* was prototype with that of the nationality administrations of the three zones. It has a 'legislative' council, "administrative council" , and judicial body (Argoba Nationality Wereda[ARNW], 2006, Art.8). The nationality council has been the highest political body of the Argoba people in the locality (ARNW, 2006, art.10/1).

Accordingly, similar to the regional council and nationality councils in titular Zones, the nationality Wereda council has a power to "designate the speaker, the deputy speaker and the chief administrator of the nationality Wereda by election from among members of the Wereda council" (ARNW, 2006, art.10/4).

Unlike the case of the nationality council of titular zones, the member of the council of the Liyu Wereda was "directly elected among the inhabitants of the kebele embraced in the territorial areas in which the nationality wereda has been organized" (ibid. art.9/1). This held true to other –non titular districts in the region as well. In both cases, there appeared to be a kind of dual accountability of district council regardless of their status. That is to say that members of the councils at wereda level, be it titular or non titular, were accountable to the electorate –to the kebele residents and concomitantly to the regional council (ARNW, 2006; ANRS, 2001).

[121]The paraticpants of the conference were some officials at region-wide offices and the activists (ANDO ledareship).

[122] The Argoba people still resides in many areas and *kebeles* of the Oromia Nationality Zone and North Shewa Administrative zone. In Oromia Nationality Zone, the Argoba community which has not been granted self government so far is claimed to have settled mainly in six kebeles of the Dewa chefa district including Shonke, Toleha, Fereja, Kuni, Megareja, and Jirota. In addition, two kebels were also claimed to have settled in the District of Bati, including Cheleka, and Deirtu kebeles (A telephone interview with Ahmed Hassen, May 30, 2016). In North Shewa also the Argoba community has been estimated to have residing in Kewet, shewa Robit, Goze, Yifat, Minjar, Shenkora and Gidem areas (Ahmed, May 30, 2016).

Apart from such apparent structural affinity with non titular districts, members of council of the Liyu Wereda-special districts, include "elected members of the Regional Council", in addition to those members elected from *kebele*-residents to the concerned district (ARNW, 2006, art.9/2). Such system of representation allowed a single person to assume 'three seats' at different levels of government, namely, the wereda council, the regional council and th House of Federation at the federal level (Interviewee 14, Jan 29,2016).

As some scholars suggested, such system of representation might offer "an institutionalized device for vertical intergovernmental relations" (Beken, 2013, p.9).[123] In so doing, the process could enhance vertical communication between the center and the local people.

However, the converse could also be true, i.e., it could also serve as mechanism of control or domination by the center and single person, as in the case of Argoba, or few persons who already secured seats in the regional council. If that is so, the voices and interests of the local people would be supplanted by the interest of few political entrepreneurs'. Such accusation, however, was not a hypothetical argument. There were practical grievances too. In this respect, one of my key informants complained:

> *There had been parties at different times for the cause of Argoba people since the time of the Transitional Government. There had been ups and downs with us. In some instances we were successful in Afar, and in Debub Wollo, for instance, we have gotten two special Werdas. The problem in these areas is that once the politicians got Wereda for their own, and then they ceased to fight for the people. […] Now, we have representative in both House of Federation and House of People Representatives …but none of these people are airing our voices for the culture and development of the Argoba people. There have still been discriminations and conflicts in the North Shew. None of them were able to protect our people* (Telephone interview, Addis Ababa, May 30, 2016).

True to the nature of ethnic entrepreneurs elsewhere, it appeared that the tides and flows of identity based mobilization ebbs away once the elites secured a niche in some part of the country and the region. In this regard, for instance, the elites of then the Argoba People Democratic Movement (APDM) (from 1995-2008) , which renamed itself into the "Argoba People democratic organization (APDO)" since 2008, has been able to secure special district -*Gachene,* within the Afar Regional state .

[123] Such system of overlapping representation has become the trend in the SNNPR region as well. For instance the Hadiya Natiolaity zone council has a total of 83 members, and 28 of them are also member of the regional council and the remaining 55 members are delegated from Wereda councils which were already elected by the electorates (Beken, 2013, p.9).

However, leaders of this particular political organization have been blamed for by some politicians as "inactive in mobilizing the whole Argoba population in the region and the country" (Interviewee 13, Medina, Jan.2 , 2015). Some groups then defected from the party and formed another faction called by The Argoba Nationality Democratic Organization (ANDO)' under the leadership of Sheh Yesuf in 2000. ANDO had actively operated in the mobilization of Argoba peoples in the Debub Wollo administrative Zone and became defunct after having won special Wereda –Argoba or Serekele Wereda with its capital called by *Medina* (Interviewee 7, Kemise, Dec.11, 2015; Interview 14, Medina, Jan.2, 2015). Active members of ANDO had joined the incumbent party of the region-ANDM-EPRDF.

Interestingly enough, former leaders of ANDO were not free of critics as well. For some, the disbandment of ANDO by the party leader has been interpreted as "act of innocence" while other saw it as "moment of betrayal of the Argoba people" (Interviewee 15, Medina, Dec.28, 2015).

Indeed, the fact that the establishment of another new party - the 'Argoba Nationality Democratic Movement (ARNDM)' in 2009 could be taken as living testimony as to the prevalence of 'public grievance' of the Argoba elites. However, the interest of the new party seems to be preoccupied with the people of Argoba who live in *Semen Shoa(*Interviewee 8, Kemissie, Dec.13, 2015) and is likely to be defunct once it secured its own niche in the Area.

Given the fact that the population of Argoba has been widely spread all over the country, such local based movements could only ended up in carving some niches for the politicians, instead of reaching the people and the culture. Perhaps the usage of non territorial autonomy model could have been crucial in protecting the language and culture of the widely spread population of the Argoba people.

What matters, however, is not the interest of the people at large; it is rather the interest of the elites that matter most. Elites prefer to go for territorial Autonomy.

Furthermore, this new brands of elites have also envisioned the creation of wider zone and claims: " …look! Our population is far greater than the population of Harari Region and all the three Weredas are contiguous and thus, there is a possibility of having a Zone" (Telephone Interview, Addis Ababa, May30, 2016).

The possibility of having autonomous zone in Amhara Region perhaps is easier thing to do. Yet, the crux of the matter would be that realizing such ambition may require the restructuring of the two regions- the Afar and Amhara.

7.3. Challenges on Internal Minorities

Internal minorities refer to "those whose rights might be threatened by the authority vested in minority communities by the theories and practices of mutual accommodation" (Wienstock, 2007, p.243). Sometimes, term internal minorities' best refer to "minorities within minorities" (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev, 2004, p.2). As diversity may not be bounded territoriality, it is natural that different groups can cohabit in a certain territory or locality. Often, the application of territorial principle to accommodation of a specific minority group would turn the group into local majority. It has been argued that such titular accommodation of local majority could be harsh to the internal minorities (Birsch, 1989, p.46). In those countries that lack adequate human right protection, it is more likely that discriminatory practices and exclusion would be common.

7.3.1. Decline in the Size of the Internal Minorities

When we looked into the situation of titular nationalities, one would learn that they have contained substantial number of internal minorities within their territorially jurisdictions (See table 23 below). Fortunately enough, no widespread conflict has so far been registered in nationality zones (wereda) between local majorities and other minorities in the Region. The only exception to this was the limited clashes that happened between the Awi and the Gumuz Local populations in Awi Nationality Zone (interviewee 28**,** Kosober , 17 July, 2018).[124]

Due to the intermeshing and sharing of culture and its vitality for humanity, it appeared that the protection and promotion of historical heritages and cultures required the ownership of the whole stakeholder at different levels and hence did not appear to be the sole affairs of the local authorities.

[124]The Gumuz minorities in Awi nationality Zone lives in substantial number in Zigem Wereda. There had been repeated cycle of violence between the members of the Awi and Gumuz in few kebeles. Recently it has been reported that such conflict broke up and allegedly took the life of 9 persons (ESAT, 17 July, 2018).

Contrary to this tradition, there has been tendency of 'going alone' where every nationality official thought that they were the only owners and guardians of the culture and language of their respective nation and nationalities.

Consequently, for officials of some zones, for instance, of Oromo Zones, the prevalence of diversities in Kemissie has been conceived as "a threat to the culture of Oromo in the Zone" (FGD 4, Kemissie, Dec.10, 2015). According to these officials, "the very reason for the establishment of the zone is nothing but for the protection, promotion and revivalism of the Oromo culture which had been suppressed in the past" (ibid.).

Like the case of the Oromo nationality zone, the newly established Argoba Liyu wereda did not appear to be tolerant to other religions other than Islamic religion. There had been resistance for the establishment of churches at *Medina*-capital of the Argoba Wereda. The founding elites opined that "Argoba is nothing without its Quran and Mesjid" (Interviewee 13, Medina, Jan 2, 2016)[125].

Indeed, there had been grievances from the local government employees about the suppression of the right to exercising their religion through the establishment of churches for their own (FGD.5, Medina, Jan.2, 2016).

Similar trend of religious intolerance widely prevailed in some of the town of Oromo zones including Kemissie, and Bati. Especially, the protestant people residing in the zone had complaints regarding places of worship and funeral function (Interviewee 10, Kemisie, Dec..14, 2015).

Among other things, as indicated in Table, 23 the trend of assimilation of internal minorities seemed to have been practiced in the region.

[125] The naming of "Medina" to the capital of Argoba Wereda could be an indicative of the Islamic, if not the Arbic, to the conservative orientation of of the Wereda.

Table 23: Trend of Population Growth within Titular Nationality Zones 1994& 2007

Zone	Ethnic groups	1994		2007		% change between 1994& 2007
		Population size	% to total	Population	% to total	
Wag Himira	All persons	275,615	100	426,213	100	54.6
	Agew Himira/Titular Group	141,214	51	225,564	53	60
	Amhara	130,046	47.2	193, 719	45.5	32.9
	All non-titular groups	134,401	49	200,649	47	49
Awi	All persons	717,085	100	982,942	100	37.1
	Awi/Titular Group	358,316	50	587,943	60	64
	Amhara	348, 516	49	377,864	38	7.8
	Gumuz	7040	1	6830	0.7	-0.3
	Oromo	1693	0.2	1256	0.1	-25.8
	All Non- Titular groups	358,769	50	394,999	40	10
Oromo Zone	All person	462, 951	100	457, 278	100	-1.2
	Amhara	147,188	32	57,330	12.5	-61.1
	Argoba	10,593	2.3	2896	0.6	-72.7
	Oromo	302, 482	65	393,584	86	30
	All Non-Titular Groups	160, 469	34.7	63695	14	-60.3

Source: Adapted from (CSA, 1994, 2010).

As shown in the table there has been declines in the number of the internal minorities over the two census eras within three nationality zones. The general decline in the size of the internal minorities have taken two patterns. The first pattern showed that in some of the nationality Zones, specifically Oromia, the rate of population growth in the 2007 Census regarding internal minorities was found to be negative as the population size of non-Oromo decreased from 160,469 to 63,695. In the remaining two nationality zones, both the size of the local majority and internal minority have shown increment both in the 2007 and 1994 censuses. As clearly indicated, the rate of the population increment regarding the local majority has found to be faster than the changes of the internal minorities.

Likewise, the population sizes of the internal minorities have also declined over the previous ten years in non-titular zones of the Amhara region as well. What probably distinguished such development in non titular zones was, relatively speaking, the slow population growth of the Amhara population (FDRE

PCC, 2008)[126]. Otherwise, like the case in Titular Zones, the population of internal minorities within the non titular Zones was also declined. The factors for such decline of population need further investigation. But at this level, one would safely argue that there appeared to be a challenge to internal minorities[127].

7.3.2. Challenges of Segregation at Schools

Bilingual education program in schools has been a key for the maintenance of minority language (Fang, 2017, p.6). Besides to this, it has commendable effect towards building up tolerant and harmonious society. In this respect, Tingting Fang opines that "those who speak more than one language and own more than one culture are more sensitive and sympathetic, more likely to build bridges than barricades and boundaries" (Fang, 2017, p.5).

In the Amhara region, there had been efforts to use the language of the minorities in schools following the introduction of the New Training and Education Policy (Interviewee, 39, Bahir Dar, 14th of May, 2016). Consequently, all titular zones have adopted their languages as medium of instruction in primary schools. In some of the urban centers, there has been bilingual education programs allowing some freedom of language use for internal minorities (ibid.). In all of the nationality zones, there have been practices where either of two languages –language of the titular group and Amharic- were used as medium of instruction within a single school sytem or separately given (ibid.).

Accordingly, one would observe three patterns of school systems, including, *minority Language School*, *integrated school*, and *Amharic schools*. In the case of minority Language School, the medium of instruction would be done using the language of the titular group and Amharic would be given as a single *subject* commencing from Grade Three. Likewise, the Amharic schools adopted the language of the titular group as a subject while using Amharic as medium of instruction. Both approaches have also

[126] The 2007 population and housing census result shows that the population of Ethiopia grew at an average annual rate of 2.6 percentages between 1994 and 2007. However, the annual growth for Amhara Region has been documented as 1.7 which is the lowest in the country (FDRE PCC, 2008).

[127] Different reasons could be attributed for the population changes such as assimilation, migration to "own home land" and displacement. In Amhara region, the possibility of displacement has not been recoreded during the two census era. So, assimilation and migration could be plausibile, and yet, tentative, reasons. Beyopund this, given the ethncization of the poltical economy in the country, the possibilities of ethnic switching would not be precluded as an alternative reason. In Ethiopia population size is associated with budget allocation and hence manipulation of the former for the purpose of the latter could also be happening. As result, exagguartion or underreporting is most likely to happen.

been implemented within a single school system in all of the nationality Zones (Interviewee 4, Sekota, Dec.7., 5, 2015; Interviewee 11, Dec. 12, 2015,).

Indeed, availing bilingual education programs could be essential in building bridges among students and apart from empowering the local communities[128]. In this regard, the practices in Waghimira and Awi have found to be smooth and encouraging.

However, in Kemissie, the capital of Oromia Zone, there had been trends of segregation in some schools (Interviewee 11, Kemissie, Dec. 12, 2015). Such mal-practice happened in two systematic ways. Firstly, there had been unwillingness to avail Oromiffaa language course in Amharic Schools. There had been struggle as to why that did not happen in schools. Oromiffa language was finally allowed to be given as a course at level of grade five. This has been contrary to the trends in other zones where second language has been introduced at Grade three (Interviewee 9, Kemissie, Dec.13, 2015).

In explaining such exceptions in Oromia Zone , my key informant opines that "in Oromia , the skill of Oromiffaa would guarantee access to bread[office] and cognizance of this the Amhara families were demanding for the language but the Oromos saw such claim as threat to their privileged status in the zone" (Interviewee 11, Kemissie, Dec. 12, 2015**).**

The second source of segregation was related to the practice shifting systems that has been taken place within single school system. While schools in other Zones adopted an integrated approach within a single school system, schools such as *Sadisa* primary school at Kemissie adopted shifting system that effectively barred student as well as teacher contacts among the two language school communities (Interviewee 7, Kemissie, Dec.11, 2015).

In addition to shifting system, separate gate were used for exit and entrances for students so that student could not interact within the school compound. Consequently, there had been mutual suspicion and intolerance among the school communities. On top of that, incidences of fights and ethnic bullying have been common even at sport tournaments between students (Interviewee 8, Kemissie, Dec.8, 2015**).**

[128] It is often argued that education in minority language has been considered as the choice of the concerned people. However, the minority language policy was just imposed from above, without soliciting consent from the language users - parents , students and experts. Consequently, there had been fierce resistance against it especially in all of the nationality zones. Even the cadres did not have the commitment to send their children to minority language schools. it is reported tha "Heads of the education department , while advocating the use of minority language, did send his children's to Amharic medium school"(interviewee 10, Kemissie**,** Dec.14, 2015; interviewee 29, Kosober, April, 15, 2016)

Obviously, such practices have clearly contradicted the warnings that "language difference must not be used as an excuse to segregate students along ethnic or racial lines in education" (UNSRMI, 2017, p.20).

7.3.3. Preferential Treatments in the Bureaucracy

Affirmative action is one of the most controversial policy issues. Often affirmative action measures have been justified under the logic of fairness (Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen, 2006). In this sense, it can be considered as compensatory measures to past injustices. In addition, affirmative action measure especially in employment is believed to "assure the diversity of work force" (Miller, 1997 cited in Crosby, Iyer and Sincharoen, 2006, p.588).

On the other hand, critics warned that affirmative action can "function as a form of reverse discrimination and thus increase intergroup tension" (Lynch, 1992 in Ibid., p. 593). Other scholars considers the negative side of affirmative action as 'side-effects' and they called for clarity and effective persuasive communication about the goals and mechanisms of its enforcement if affirmative action is to be successful (Brown and Bok, 1998 in Crosby and Alison, 2002, p.593).

In Amhara region measure of affirmative action has been taken to minority nationalities and women in the civil service. Regarding this, the guiding regulation of human resource development of the region states the following,

> *With the intention of building the capacity of human resources, training shall be offered only to those three nationalities zones and one special district [Liyu Wereda] on issues which are not generally relevant to the region wide strategic issues , but directly affects the concerned nationalities such as language and culture. Furthermore, special affirmative measure of 5 point shall be given only to those members of nationalities or Tewelaj who are currently working within those nationalities Zones and special Wereda. ….And those trainees who are to be selected using such affirmative action from among respective nationality zones and special Wereda are expected to serve the same institution after they have completed the training(Capacity Building and Civil service Bureau[CBCSR], 2010, p.8).*

As shown above, the training regulations seemed to have guaranteed two opportunities to be enjoyed for the minority groups. The first privilege pertained to the access of training on issues which were specifically minority- oriented such as language and culture. The second opportunity was related to accessing of any training for those minority nationalities public servants who were currently working within nationality zones and Liyu Wereda.

Two schemes of training- long term (which took the length of one year and above) and short term (with duration taking less than a year) have been envisaged with more or less similar criteria, with exception of some nuances on the affirmative action of women.

Table 24: Training Requirements of Civil Servants in Amhara Region

No	Selection Criteria/	Value/Weight	
		Short-term	Long-term
1	Efficiency	50	50
2	Job relatedness with the training	30	30
3	For Women	10	5
4	location of the employee	5	5
5	Focus for Nationalities	5	5
6	Age		10

Adopted from (CBCSB, 2010, pp 8- 10).

As indicated, both minority nationalities and women were the beneficiaries of affirmative action. Affirmative action measures for women have been almost global phenomena and thus could be less controversial.

But a closer scrutiny of the above table (24) could privilege women in minority groups over women of the majority. That would probably arise out of rhetoric of national oppression of Amhara- which has been reductionist explanation for everything in Ethiopia[129]. Empirical evidences in the region showed that women of Amhara Region have been victim of traditional harmful practices **(**Jones, Lyytikainen and Presler, 2006**)**[130]. The rhetoric of national oppression however, seemed to have camouflaged such empirical facts.

In explaining why affirmative action was necessary for titular groups, it has been submitted that "filling up the gap between the job requirements and educated man power so that they can serve the community

[129] In what appears to be the carbon copy of the Federal Constituion , the Regional constitution has stated that "the state shall provide special assistance to those nationalities and peoples left behind interms of development"(ANRS, 2001, art.110 /.3).

[130] A report on *Child Marriage in Ethiopia* have shown that the median age of child marriage in Amhara Region was found to be 14.5 years which was the lowest of all the nine regions and two city adminstartions. Beneshangul Gumuz, Afar , Tigray and Oromia regional state registered 15.7, 16.5, 16.6, and 16.9 years respectively. The remaining regions and city adminstartion have scored a median age ranging between 17 to 21 years. Addis Ababa ranked first (21.4 years) (Jones, Lyytikainen and Presler, 2006, p.15**).**

in their own language" (Interviewee 40, Bahir Dar, May 15, 2016). The human resource gap argument has also been by the officials of the Waghimira Nationalities Zones. In this respect, one of the key informants elaborated the problem as the following,

> *Our Zone has been generous to all. In this Zone, you find peoples around Ethiopia. Especially people from Tigray are the largest employees here. But they don't stay more. They come only for job experience. We cannot depend on them. The language-based support is critical in mitigating the problem in the long run (Interviewee 5, Sekota, Dec.8, 2015).*

Officials in *Awi Nationality Zone do not* believe on the necessity of affirmative action. According to some, "affirmative discourages competency of human resources and thus is not recommendable in the region" (interviewee 29, Kosober, Aprill 15, 2016)[131].

Table 25: Per-capita Distribution of man power, by Population and Wereda between Titular and Non-Titular zones, 1992

Category	Population		No of Woreda	Man power		MP/W	P/MP
	Number	%	(W)	(MP)	%		
Titular	1,626,078	9.7	13	23,342	13	1795.5	69
Non-Titular	15,094,822	90.3	88	156,852	87	1782.4	96.2
Total	16720900	100	101	180,194	100	1784.1	93

Source: (ANRS/PC, 2015 ; ANRS/CBCSR, 1992).

As clearly seen in Table 25, the Per capita distribution of man power in the region has shown significant gap between titular and non titular Zones. Contrary to the official position on the matter, the man power distribution among non-titular districts was found to be lower than the case in titular districts. It was found to even lower than the region wide standard.

The above data in the table seemed to have reversed the 'talk of shortage of man power' in the Nationality Zones.

[131] The Informant also disclosed that the dominanace of persons from awi ethnic group in the civil service at region wide level has been public knowledge(Interviewee 34, Kosober, May 10, 2016)

In explain such paradox my key informants from the regional Civil Service Bureau disclosed the following,

> *Often claims associated with budget, affirmative action, recruitment of man power with the minimum ranks of job requirements have been aired out among nationalities zones. The officials in these zones pretended that all these are their constitutional rights. However, the fact of the matter shows that Awi and Oromia Zone do not have man power shortage. Our office knew that Awi has a great deal of educated persons beyond some one's imagination in the region. Oromia zone does not have man power problem as people used to migrate from Oromia since the zone was formed. But the situation of Waghimira Zone seems to be convincing (Interviewee 40, Bahir Dar, May 15, 2016; Interviewee 19, Dessie, Jan.12, 2016).*

The informant added that different measures including exemptions of the job requirements have been taken to address the man power problem in WagHimira nationality Zone. However, "they [officials within Wage himira zone] usually resisted to recruit persons outside their ethnic-kins" (ibid).

As data showed so far, the training policy of the Civil service has not been context sensitive. In addition, no appropriate mechanism of ensuring proper implementation of the civil service policy has been put in place[132].

Consequently, the policy has been practiced differently in different Zones. As FGD discussants told me the 5-point(5%) quota has been used not just for man power training purpose but also for recruitment(placement) and promotion of employees within the offices (FGD 4, Kemisse, Dec.10, 2015; FGD9, Kosober, Aprill 14, 2016).

The internal minorities, especially Amhara employee perceive that 5-point quota is reward for '*Tewelaj*'- 'indigenous group'[133] and titular group members perceived that it was their inherent right because of their ties to the 'soil'.

In Awi Nationality Zone, due to lucrative nature of identity politics in the bureaucracy, there had been case of *identity switching*. Such identity switching has been evidenced due to the condition that some

[132] In fact polcy proposal of affirmative action has not been legislative bases. There had been intitiave over the years; however, the regional council has been repeatedly striken down all of them. So affirmative action rules set by Civil Service Commission could demonstrate the commitment of the executive branch of the regional government.

[133] The term indigenous group applies to the marginalized peoples due to the white settler colonialism in countries such as USA, Canada, Australia and NewZealnd. In the absence of such realities in Ethiopia and most parts of Africa, the usuage of the concept-indigenous group can be considered as a blind conformism to the flaws of eurocentrism. In light of this Patrick Thornberry, in his *Indegenous Peoples and Human Rights*, contends that the notion of indigenous people "makes littile sense in the context of Africa and Asia, where all are indigenous"(Thornberry, 2002, p.34).

employees have changed their biography- life history that is often documented in human resource personnel at the time of placement, to be entailed for 'citizenship to the soil' (Interviewee 28, Kosober, April 17, 2016) .

In Oromia, the language factor has been sensitive commencing the establishment of the Zone. Oromiffaa has been used as the official language of the zone since then. Usually people from the Oromia regional state used to be migrating to the area- kemise-capital of the zone, for employment (Interviewee 20, Dessie, Jan.13, 2016). That could be described as honey- moon period for the Oromo migrants as they were able to exploit the opportunities that identity politics offers them in such localities. They were the beneficiaries of affirmative action as well as privileged once due to their mother tongue. Consequently, "the Amhara were relegated inferior jobs which the Oromos did not have an interest (Interviewee 10, Kemissie, Dec. 14, 2015).

As a result, the inter-group relation had been tense between the Amhara and the Migrant Oromos. However, due to the rise of new localism as emerging identity, former enemies are forced to join hand to defend their interests. What has been happening since the late 1990s was that new breed of Oromo claiming as indigenous group stood against senior bureaucrats who came from Oromia Region and consequently affirmative action now is applying to the local Oromo not the migrant Oromos (Interviewee 10, Kemissie, Dec. 14, 2015; Interviewee 21, Dessie, Jan.15, 2016; Interviewee 17, Medina, Dec.26, 2015). The claim of students in Amharic schools to take up Affan Oromo, of course, has been motivated by the job market in the Zone.

Indeed, the affirmative action policy to titular groups seemed to have contributed for the dynamics of identity politics. Thus, one would conjure that the decline in the population size of the internal minorities could be considered as the likely consequence of identity politics.

7.4. Summary

The institutional accommodation is pertinent to different policies, programs and established legal-structural setups of the government, with the view of addressing the claims of ethnic diversity. The second research objective of the study was concerned with the examination of the institutional mechanism of ethnic accommodation in the study area. Multiculturalism requires the "politics of

presence" (Philips, 1997, p.175) [134]where groups share powers and participates in the realm of public affairs (Bogaards, 2006; Lijphart, 1995; Wolff, n.d.). In this regard, the findings showed that the presence and participation of groups were explicitly and implicitly felt in those region-wide institutions such as the Regional Council, the Civil Service, the Political party, and Media. In addition to this, minority groups were also accommodated at sub- regional and district level autonomous units which are commonly referred to as Liyu *Zone* and *Liyu Wereda* respectively.

The Regional Council is the highest region-wide legislative organ which has been entrusted with wide ranges of powers related mainly to appointments, enactment of laws and developmental programs, establishment of institutions and monitoring their performance , and imposes taxes and collect revenues as per its jurisdiction (ANRS, 2001, art 49). In such important political organ, the types of the electoral system and the modalities of representation matters the political participation of groups in the region. Accordingly, two schemes of group representation have been envisaged. The first schemes was based on *the first past -the post- electoral system* where 2 to 3 candidates represent 100, 000 residents (ANRS, 2001, article 2) so as to fill up the 294 seats of the council.

Taking the fourth round election (2010-2015) into consideration, it was found that about 261 (89%) of the councilors were representatives of the Majority (Amhara) while the remaining 33(11%) were found to be the representatives of the minority ethnic groups including Agew Awi, Agew Himira and Oromo. The ratio of councilors to the respective population was found to be 0.001 for each category indicating the prevalence of parity of representation among the majority and minority groups in the regional council.

However, prevalence of the majority decision making procedure in the council seemed to have discouraged the likely influence of the minority groups in the legislative activities. The numbers of women representatives were about 90 counting 30 % of the total representatives in the region in the same terms of election. Such figure has increased in to 127 which counted about 43% of the council members in the fifth election period (2015-2020).

The second scheme of group representation regards what is often termed as "minority nationalities" with the population lacking the required size of population to fulfill an electoral constituency. For such

[134] . Often the *poltics of presence* is contrasted with *the politics of ideas*. Such contrasting expressions could be taken as synonymous expression with *descriptive represenation* and *substantive represenation* correspondingly

type of groups, the constitutions guarantees reserved seats. However, unlike the federal constitution which limited the number of reserved seat to the minimum of 20 seats, the regional constitution did not limit the threshold. A case in point is the *Argoba* ethnic group where it has one guaranteed seats at the Regional Council and the Federal House of peoples Representative. *Argoba* have had special electoral constituency in the *Northern Shoa (*Interviewee 15, Medina, Dec, 25, 2015). Following the establishment of *Liyu Wereda*-known as *Serkele Wereda* in the year-2006, *Argoba* has also secured a seat in the regional Council since then (Interviewee 16, Medina, Dec, 26, 2015; interviewee 22, Dessie, Jan.14,2016). What appears to be the modus operandi of the regional state towards the institutionalization of other minority group claims, so far, seems to be contextual and case-based approaches.

When we see the nature of political parties which have been operated and still operating in the Region, there were and still are few in number and visibility. During the early 1990s, AAPO had strong hold in the region. However, it couldn't sustain long following the death of its leader-Professor ASrat Woldeyes-a prominent opposition figure who had stood steadfastly against the EPRDF since the time of the transitional era (Gashaw Mersha, 2016). Despite its popularity, it was not able to secure a seat in the regional council. Following the opening up of electoral process during the 2005, liberal parties like EDP and AEUP had able to secure seats. Since then, ANDM had a full monopoly over the council and the government of the region.

Very recently, AGDP has emerged as *pan-Agew* nationalist party with an exclusive agenda for what the party claims to stand for-the Kimant, the Awi and the Kimira Agews. The party was active in the mobilization of support for the Kimant identity quest in North Gonder Administrative Zone. In the same token, there had been different attempts at different times to have political organization for the mobilization of the *Argoba* people. Before the time of 2005 election two parties were operating, one in the Amhara Region and the other in Afar.

However, following the granting of *Special Wererda* in Amhara Region in the year 2006, the party operating in the Amhara Region ceased to exist, while the other party limited itself in Afar Region, wining its own special Wereda-*Gasene Liyu Wereda*. Still another party has been operating in *North Shoa* administrative Zone claiming to have a *special District* in the area. Such and such ethnic parties were active in mobilizing the minority groups so as to achieve what they have been entitled to *self-*

determination rights by the Regional and Federal Constitution. As such, these parties are either "mono-ethnic" , as in the case of *Argoba*, or coalition of minority groups like the *Agew Democratic Party* claims for. Consequently, these parties are neither sensitive to diversity nor inclusive of both majority and minority groups in the region.

The incumbent party-ANDM, despite some controversies on its nomenclature, appeared to be accommodative to diversity in terms of its orientations and party membership. Apart from such prescriptions, there has been an attempt to institutionalize the representation of groups in the decision making structure of the Party which consists of three bodies, namely General Assembly, Central Committee and Executive body. As the officials of ANDM stated, the representation of the minority groups is guaranteed in the General Assembly and Central Committee.

Nevertheless, the majority of the participants of the study expressed their grievances that the respective groups were not fairly represented within the party. In this respect, only 48% of them endorsed the view that the party represented their groups; while the remaining 52% the respondent responded negatively. Both groups accused the party from two vantage points. The first was their felt perception that the party did not promote the interest of their group. The second was related to the information gap that they did not know the ethnic origins of the officials at different level of the government.

The other institutional mechanism for the accommodation of diversity in the public sphere includes media. As Husband (2000) strongly argues media in multiethnic society plays vital role in terms of exchanging cultures and views among groups so that there prevails mutual understanding and solidarity. In this regard, it has been found that three of the minority languages and the majority lanaguge enjoyed institutional support in the form of Print, Radio and Televison broadcast programs at the regional level. These languages included *Amharic*, *Affaan Oromo*, *Awigna*, and *Himitegna* .

Print media was the first form of Regional media which commenced service with a Megazin known by *Bekur*, eversince 1994. *Bekur* serves as a weekly -Amharic Magazin since then. Furthermore, three magazines have followed suit in minority languages ever since 2010. These were, *Herco*- publishes in *Afaan Oromo*, *Cherbewa*- publishes in *Awigni*, and *Hemetewikina*- publishes in *Himirgna* language. Radio services have begun by the 1997, after two years of the launching of the print media, with an hour Program- *Voice of Amhara* (AMA, 2014, p.12). Such program was delivered on daily basis with a single hour air space from Ethiopian National Radio (ENA) on rental basis. Due to such limited air-

space, it appeared that services using minority languages was practically inconvenient. However, following expansion of air space and the capacity of the region to own its own Media agency, it was able to deliver services in three minority languages, in addition to Amaharic as of June 2005(ibid.). For the first two years, the air space allotted to three of minority groups was limited to 45 minutes which latter have been expanded to 6 hours per week by the time when field research was run in 2014. As per the report of the Amhara Mass Media Agency(2014), the weekly Radio transmission hours were planned to reach about 21 hours(17%) and 105(83%) by the languages of the minorities and the majority respectively in the year 2018/19. Regarding television broadcast, the air coverage to the minority languages a year later in 2015/16 using 3 hours per week only as compared to 118 hours allotment for the majority language. The institution had envisioned to improve the air coverage by the minority languages to 9 hours(6%) per week while, at the same time , reducing the air time of the Amharic coverage to 152 hours (94%) per week.

Despite these institutional practices, the perception of the participants of from both of the majority and minority groups did not appear to converge. For this matter, 52% of the respondents from majority had a positive endorsement on the fair allocation of time for all ethnic groups. However, about 56% of the respondents from the minority groups did not have affirmative position on the question of equal treatment of ethnic groups in the media.

Despite such divergence, there appeared to be convergence among respondents as to the main weakness of the media institution to serve as expression of cultural diversity. In this respect, the majority (52%) of had a perception that the media was hijacked by the government and hence served as propaganda channel, instead of serving as expression of diversity and tolerance.

The last, but not the least, institutional mechanism of accommodation of diversity in the Region involved territorial autonomy to specific ethnic groups mainly for Agew Awi, Agew Himira, Oromo and Argoba. The first three groups had been conferred such autonomy at Zonal levels and hence referred to as Nationality Zones and / or Liyu (special) Zones. Such autonomous units were formed since 1995, following the enactment of the Federal Constitution and the regional constitution. Since then district level autonomy in the form of *Liyu Wereda-Special district* has been conferred to *Argoba* Community.

Regardless of the difference on the jurisdiction of the local governments, such autonomous units did have three organs, namely, *the nationality Council*, *the nationality administrative council*, and the *judiciary*. The nationality council represent the 'law making function' on the matters given to it, whereas is the administrative council represents the executive arm of the the autonomous units.

The Third objective of the study was intended to identify the institutional challenges of accommodation on internal minorities. As stated in Chapter 2, the concept of internal minority (ies) subsume(s) those groups of persons who reside in jurisdictions that were considered to be the exclusive domain of minority or the majority group. It has been argued that titular accommodation of local majority could be harsh on those internal minorities (Birsch, 1989; Baubok, 2001). When we look into the situation of titular nationalities, one would learn that they have contained substantial number of internal minorities within their territorially jurisdictions.

However, so far actions related to the scale of violence or genocide has not been registered. But, limited scale clashes happened in limited area, for instance, between the Awi and the Gumuz Local populations in Awi Nationality Zone. Apart from these, however, three basic problems have been commonly observed as challenges to internal minorities. These were; 1) trends of decline in the size of the population of internal minorities, 2) tendencies of segregation at schools, and 3) preferential treatments in the bureaucracy.

CHAPTER EIGHT: MULTICULTURAL ORIENTATION OF MAJORITY Vs MINORITY

Multiculturalism is a vision or ideology that asserts the view that "cultural diversity is good for a society and for its individual members and that such diversity should be shared and accommodated in an equitable way" (Berry, 2011, p.9). It also signifies equitable participation by all groups. This chapter is concerned with the findings related to inter- group orientations towards the construct variable of multiculturalism, using the instrumentation of *modified form of the multicultural Ideology Scale*. The main trust of the chapter is to test the hypothesis *that there existed statistically significant difference among the majority and minority to the ideology of multiculturalism*. Aside from this, a qualitative investigation has also been made to shade light to those factors that contributed for the prevalence of the gaps in group orientations. The chapter comprises four sections. The first section is concerned with brief description of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents of the survey. The second section emphasizes on the multicultural orientations of majority and minority groups. The third section of this chapter outlines and discusses the factors which might have contributed to difference between the majority and minority groups regarding the ideology of multiculturalism. The fourth section provides a summary of the findings of the chapter.

8.1. Profile of the Respondents of the Survey

One of the preconditions for the discussion of institutional and normative multiculturalism is the prevalence of the fact of diversity. This helps to capture the presence of "descriptive" aspect of multiculturalism" within the sampled population (Inglis, 1996, p.6). The survey research was carried out taking this fact into consideration. Among other things, the sampled population is supposed to be the reflection of the characteristics of the target population of the study. Accordingly, participants were asked to provide socioeconomic and demographic facts about themselves. Consequently, the most salient features of the respondents' characteristics are summarized using frequency counts and percentage contributions.

8.1.1. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

The most salient demographic features of respondent include sex, age, marital status and religion. The following table revealed the frequency and percentage distribution of such characteristics for all of respondents.

Table 26: Summary of Frequency and percentage Distributions of Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

		Frequency	percentage
Sex of Respondents	Male	391	67
	Female	190	33
	Total	581	100
Age of Respondents	20-30	141	24.2
	31-40	183	31.4
	41-50	159	27.3
	51-60	98	16.8
	Total	581	100
Marital status	Married	425	72.9
	Single	116	19.9
	Divorced	40	6.9
	Total	581	100
Religion	Orthodox Christians	446	76.5
	Muslims	91	15.6
	Protestant Christian	32	5.5
	Chatolic Christian	8	1.3
	Waqifta	4	0.7
	Total	581	100

Source: Computed from the Survey (2015).

As indicated in the above table, out of the total number of respondents, 67% of the respondents were males. Female respondents constituted only 33% females respondents. This shows that the gender compost ion of the respondents was not balanced. Indeed, the dominance of men respondents was evidently seen. The other characteristic of respondents was Age. In this respect, age of the respondents has fallen into four age groups. It has been revealed that the majority of them which is 183 (31.4%) of the total 581 respondents falls within 31-40 age intervals. Next to this, about 159 (27%) and 141(24%) of respondents fall in between two age groups-41-50 and 18-30 respectively. The least number of the

respondents (16%) were found within the age interval of 50- 60. The data shows that both age groups are fairly represented.

The data on marital status showed that the largest portion of the respondents were married (73%), followed by single (20%) persons. Divorced persons represented only 7% of the total respondents. Religious diversity is an important component of multiculturalism in any society. In this respect, the largest proportions of the respondents (76.5%) are member of the Orthodox religious dominations. The second largest were Muslims which represented about 16% . Those followers of Catholic Church and 'Waqe feta'[135] represented 1.3% and 0.7% of the total respondents.

8.1.2. Socio-Economic Characteristics of Respondents

Socio-economic characteristics of respondents subsume factors such as educational levels, Employment status, income and ethnicity of the respondents.

Table 27: Summary of Frequency and Percentage Distributions of Socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents

		Frequency	Percentage
Educational Status	Illiterate	37	6.3
	12-Jan	57	9.8
	Certificate	96	16.5
	College Diploma	38	6.5
	Degree and Above	352	60.4
	Total	581	100
Monthly Income(in Eth. Birr)	400-2000	99	17
	2001-5000	319	54.7
	5001-7500	105	18
	7501-15000	27	4.6
	Total	581	100
Ethnic Origin	Amhara	420	72.2
	Agew Awi	39	6.7
	Agew Himira	35	6
	Oromo	36	6.1
	Hybrid	34	5.8
	Others	17	2.9
	Total	581	100

Source: Computed from the survey (2016)

[135] Waquefeta is taken as 'tradtional religion' which is known to be practiced especially among the Oromo community.

The respondents were asked to tick out the levels of education out of the given five categories as indicated in the above table. Accordingly, it is found that 60% of the respondents have attained first Degree and above. Next to this stood certificate holders constituting 16.5% followed by those schooled ones, in between 1 and 12 grades, who constituted 9.8 %.

Far less than these figures, the diploma holders and those lacking formal education represented 6.5% and 6.3 % of the total respondents respectively. As indicated, size of the educated persons especially those having degree and above took the highest share. As the data was collected in urban centers, the predominance of educated persons could not be surprising. Obviously, multiculturalism is bounded to urban life. So, it sounds logical to see more educated respondents in those study areas which are predominantly in urban centers.

Regarding income distribution, the respondents monthly earnings ranges from 400 to 15, 000 Ethiopian Birr. For the sake of simplicity, those persons who earn an income ranging from 400 to 2000 can be leveled as 'low' income earners and those earning an income with the range of 10, 000 to 15,000 can be leveled as 'high' income earners. Those in between these extremes laid 'medium' and 'high medium' income earners. As clearly indicated, about 319 (54.7%) of the respondents fall between the income range of 2001-5000 Birr indicating that the highest number of respondents are medium income earners. The percentage contribution of the low income earners and middle medium earners are almost similar representing 17% and 18% of respondents respectively. The lowest number of respondents-27 persons (4.6%) belonged to high income earners.

The other most important characteristic feature of respondents is the ethnic origin of the respondents. Respondents were asked to freely label themselves regarding their ethnic origin. Accordingly, those who labeled themselves as Amhara constituted 72% of the total respondents. By the same fashion, Agew Awi, Agew Himira and Oromo represented 6.7%, 6% and 6.1% respectively. Those who were labeled as 'hybrid', and 'others'[136] have constituted 5.8% and 2.9% of the respondents. As discussed earlier, the Agew Awi, Agew Awi and the Oromo are categorized as minority and the Amhara as majority. The following bar chart showed the percentage distribution of respondents in light of such group categories.

[136] Those respondents who are labled as 'hybrid' are those whose parents and families mixed across ethnic boundaries and hence difficult to associate with a single ethnic origin. On the other hand, those categorized as 'others' included those polyethnic groups living in the region, other than those titular groups in the Region.



Figure 7: Bar Charts: percentage distribution of respondents by group category

Source**:** Computed from the Survey (2016).

As shown, the majority group constituted 72% of the total respondents and the minority group constituted about 20%. Such figures showed that both groups were fairly represented. In this regard, the proportion of the minority groups was slightly higher in the survey than their actual population size in the region. Those hybrids and other polyethnic groups constituted 5.8% and 2.9% of the respondents. The following table summarizes percentage contribution of the profile of respondents along with group categories. Such result was secured by a simple cross tabulation of characteristics of respondents and their categories.

8.2. Groups' Orientation to Multiculturalism

8.2.1. Orientations of the Majority Vs the Minority

Descriptive statistical tools such as calculation of mean for individual and groups provided results indicating whether respondents have endorsed multiculturalism or not. In this respect, the following histogram showed the mean distribution of the total respondents.



Figure 8: Mean Distribution of Respondents.
Source: Computed from the Survey (2016)

As clearly indicated in the above histogram, the mean distribution falls between 1.72 (minimum mean) and 4.78(maximum mean). The highest frequency (28 counts) is located at the mean result of 3.88 and 4.16 which covers 10% of total respondents combined. As one can envisage the likely shape of the central tendency from the above, the patterns of distribution of mean is more or less look like normal distribution except some tendency to lay in to the right direction. Indeed, only 28% the result were distributed to the left side of the mean (3.64) while the remaining 78% of the distribution has been located after the mean –to the right direction. In other words, the individual mean score of about 28% the respondents' falls far less than the mean score of total respondents, and the remaining 78% of respondents mean score was found to be greater than the mean score of the total respondents.

When we see the multicultural endorsement of the respondents, only 10% of respondents scored below the average (2.5) out of 5. So, 90% of the respondents have endorsed multiculturalism positively.

Table 28: Result of Group Means

Group	Mean	Standard Deviation
Minority	3.78	.47
Majority	3.60	.94
Total	3.64	.86

Source: Computed from the Survey, 2016

As the Table 28 showed the minority group and the majority has endorsed multiculturalism. In this repect, the aggregate mean for minority and majority resulted in mean score of 3.78 and 3.60 out of the five scale likert scale. Consequently, the level of endorsement of total respondents has found to be positive (3.64). The mean score distribution of total respondents are indicated below.



Figure 9: Group Means by Groups
Source: Computed from the Survey (2016)

As the plot above indicates the statistical test indicated that the mean of minority group was found to be 3.78 and the mean of majority 3.60. The result revealed that both majority and minority have endorsed multiculturalism positively. But the minority group endorsed multiculturalism more positively than the majority. This result has been found to be similar to the findings of studies made in most of the continental Europe and in the United States of America. The white majority perceived multiculturalism as a concern of minority only and consequently failed to approve it strongly in comparison to the immigrants -minority (Vertkuyten, 2005; Stevens, Plaut, &Sanchez-Burks, 2008 cited in Morrison and Chung, n.d.). A particular case in point was a study in the Netherlands by Van de Vijver and Schalk-Soeker (2008) who found that the ethnic Dutch- majority attitude towards multiculturalism was slightly positive, if not neutral than the minorities (Van deVijver and Schalk-Soeker (2008).

Similarly, Martinovic and Verkuyten (2006) found that multiculturalism was more strongly endorsed by minority than the majority Dutch in Netherlands. Then, the next logical question to be answered is the

hypothesized view (Ha) that there was significant difference between the majority and minority. To undertake significance test statistically, Independent Sample Test (IST) was used.

Table 29: IST test Result

Multicultural Attitude	Sum of Square	Df	F-Value	P-Value
Between Groups	3.037	1	4.09	0.043

Source: Computed from the Survey (2016)

As shown in the table the P- value was found to be 0.043 which is less than 0.05 at 95% confidence level. So, there has been significance difference between majority's and minority's attitude towards multiculturalism. Alternatively, an independent sample test was also employed and the P value revealed 0.04 confirming the existence of significance difference between majority and minority groups of the study.

8.2.2. Women and Multicultural Attitudes

The issue of gender is a crosscutting issue. In Eurocentric thoughts, women are considered to be a victim of multiculturalism (Shacher, 2004) and some feminist scholars are skeptical of multicultural movements. Indeed, some theorists considered women as the "conduit of culture" that is oppressive to them (Shacher cited in Kymlicka and Norman, 2000**,** p.202**)**. Regardless of the theoretical fantasy, one would see if there was any empirical evidence to such theoretical speculations. The following table shows the statistical mean of male and female respondents.

Table 30: Group Mean Score of Respondents by Sex

Sex	N	Mean	S,D
Female	190	3.58	.88
Male	391	3.67	.86
Total	581	3.60	

Source: Comupted from the Survey (2016)

As shown in table 30, both sexes have endorsed multiculturalism positively. However, women, with mean of 3.58, seemed to have favored it less strongly as compared to male who scored a cumulative mean of 3.67. The following result levels showed whether there existed significance difference between men and women among majority, minority and between majority and minority groups.

Table 31: Significance Test Result Among and between Majority and Minority by Sex

Groups	Sum of square	F-value	P value
Within groups (Majority)	1.89	0.71	0.54
Within groups (Minority)	0.21	0.31	0.82
Between Groups (majority and minority)	1.94	0.65	0.63

Source: Computed from the Survey (2016)

The Independent Sample test results showed P-value of 0.54, 0.82, and 0.65 among majority, minority and between majority and minority groups of respondents respectively. It is evidently seen that none of the differences was found to be less than P value of 0.05 (at 95% confidence level). So, one would infer that there was no statistically significant difference of multicultural attitudes among and between groups owing to sex.

8.3. Factors for the Prevalence of the Gap in Multicultural Orientation

As revealed in the quantitative analysis there existed significance difference on multicultural attitudes between the majority and the minority groups. Then the next logical question would be to look into the reasons why that happened. An exhaustive examination of the reasons would be beyond the scope of this study. Yet, one would identify possible contributing factors for the very gap between groups.

8.3.1. The Cultural Thesis

One of the commonly mentioned factors is pertinent to culture and social status. In this respect, some scholars contend,

> *For minority group, multiculturalism offers the possibilities of maintaining their own culture and obtaining higher social status in society. Majority group members, on the other hand, may see ethnic minorities and their desire to maintain their own culture as a threat to their group identity and status position (Martinovic&Verkuyten, 2006, p.3).*

Such explanation could perhaps be valid to the experience of Europe and America where the white (majority) might feel threatened by presence of immigrants with new culture (life style, language, religion). A part from this, the prevalence of terrorist acts and the policy perspective against immigrants in many of European states might have its own role in shaping the attititude of groups towards the agenda of multiculturalism (Verkuyten, 2005). Consequently, as the study of Verkuyten (2005)

confirmed that the majority (white) tends to affirme assimilation than multiculturalism; while the minority upholds multiculturalism.

Such cultural explanation could shade light more to the experiences of continental Europe than Ethiopia. In Ethiopia in general and the study area in particular, there was no social categorization between host and incoming immigrant peoples as such. In the study area neither the majority nor the minority could be labeled as immigrants. As there is no 'stranger', the threat of culture is inconceivable. So, the cultural explanation may not be relevant to the context of Ethiopia and the Amhara Region.

8.3.2. The Normative (Ideological) Factor: The national oppression thesis

The other possible reason which is likely to shape the attitude of groups differently is associated with the ideological (normative) standing of the political system towards groups. As scholars suggest any institutional design including federalism have certain normative or ideological construct which serve as "an interpretive framework" (Benz & Broschek, 2013, p.6). In this regard, two interrelated narratives seemed to have dominated the very logic of ethnic federalism and its practices. The first normative perspective, which seemed to have assumed a paradigmatic stance in Ethiopian politics since 1960s, pertains to what can be referred to as 'strategic Marxism' or the Leninist-Stalinist approach to diversity management. This school of thought anchors, among other things, on the assumption that there existed two diametrically contrasted nations and nationalisms-"the oppressor nations and nationalisms, and the oppressed nations and nationalisms" (Slezkine, 1994, p.419). The Marxist politicians, as evidenced in the former USSR favored the minority nationalism thinking that it has been oppressed. The majority Russians were portrayed as the oppressor and chauvinist that should be oppressed in its turn (Slezkine, 1994).

In Ethiopia, the adoption of ethnic federalism has been largely justified in line with the thesis of National oppression where the Amhara has been portrayed as oppressor and chauvinist while the remaining groups has been represented as oppressed nation and nationalities. Such narrative has been constitutionally enshrined and has been perpetuated by incumbent politicians. The following extract the constitution captures such ideological tones,

> *Whereas the nations/nationalities living in our region will surely benefit from the charter as any of the oppressed peoples; and whereas the other peoples and particularly the Amhara nation, in whose name they have been profiting, whom the ruling classes have made instrumental to oppress the rights and interests other peoples, and whom they have*

*made a victim of massacre and deprivation in the name of Ethiopian unity, have been beneficiaries from the outlined equality**….**(TGR3, 1993, para1&4,).*

As can be drawn from the above text, Amhara has been boldly labeled as the 'oppressor nation'. It also underlined that the Amhara people were the ones who unnecessarily fought for the subjugation of other nations. In a manner that appeared to be an impression management, the constitution forwarded promissory comments to the Amhara that they would be beneficiary from the new regime. Indeed, scholars who have written on Ethiopian federalism underlined that the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of national question has influenced for the choice of ethnic federalism that recognized the self - determination of NNP of Ethiopia (Asnake, 2009; Aalen, 2001; Abbink, 2009; Assefa, 2007).

Such narrative seemed to have influenced the attitudes of the Amhara respondents. Indeed, such feelings have reflected by the Amahra group discussants. In this respect, it has been contended that "multiculturalism is the political cover that the ruling party uses to buy support from non Amhara in the region and beyond" (FGD6, Dessie, Jan 6, 2016; FGD 10, Bure, April 13, 2016; FGD 13 & 14, Bahir Dar, May 15&16, 2016). Contrary to what has been officially argued, focus group discussants have added that the main thrust of ethnic federalism was to ensure the continuation of Tigrian domination in Ethiopian politics in general and oppress the Amhara in particular (ibid).

In contrast to this, the opinions of the FGD participants coming from minority groups were supportive of ethnic federalism (FGD 11, Bure, April21, 2016; FGD 3, Kemissie, Dec11. ; FGD8, Kosober**,** April.6, 2016; FGD 1, Sekota, Dec,5, 2015 **;** FGD 5, Medina ,Jan2, 2016 **).** They, however, complained about the gaps that prevailed between constitutional provisions and their implementations regarding rights of nation, nationalities and peoples (ibid.). They contended that nations and nationalities in the region have not been fully and fairly represented in important institutions such as the media, bureaucracy, courts, the ruling political party and executive offices both at federal and regional levels (ibid).

As all of my key informants from the minority groups disclosed to the researcher, the budget remained to be one of the most outstanding demands of the nationality administration in the region as well. The above discussion clearly showed that there was divergence of opinions and views of the majority and minority groups towards the nature, orientation and practice of ethnic accommodation. Corollary to this,

the following responses were found on the question: *Do you think that your kin have been discriminated unfairly by others beyond the Amhara Region?*

Table 32: Response on the Perception of Discrimination by Groups in percent

Category	Yes	No	Total
Majority	58.6	41.4	100
Minority	33	67	100
Others	59	41	100
Total	53	47	100

Source: Computed from the survey (2016)

As indicated in the above table, 53% of the total respondents agreed that their ethnic kin have been discriminated beyond the region. Yet there existed divergence between the views of the minority and majority. In this regard, while about 57% of the majority believed that its kin have been discriminated elsewhere, on the side of the minority group the percentage contribution that endorsed similar view was found to be only 33%.

To further appreciate the gaps, respondents who answered 'Yes' were asked to explain the reason that might have contributed for the prevalence of the problem. The following table (36) showed the result.

Table 33: Perception on the Factors for Discrimination in percent

Category	Narrow Nationalism	Ideology/propaganda of the government	Nature of federalism	Total
Majority	18	57	25	100
Minority	42	18	40	100
Others	34	40	26	100
	22	51	27	100

Source: Computed from the Survey (2016).

As clearly shown 57% of the respondents of the majority believed that the source of the ethnic discrimination in other regional states has been attributed to the propaganda of the government. In this regard, only 18% of the respondents of the minority concurred with the view of majority. On the contrary, 42% of the minority respondents believed that the problem emanates from behavior of elites in the host regions.

The above data clearly showed the divergence over the understanding and framing of facts on the ground and the likely the source of the problem between the majority and the minority group. This empirical data added to the thesis that the normative orientation of ethnic federalism in light of the

Marxist and Leninist version seems to have shaped the views of majority and minority differently. The rhetoric of national oppression seems to have affected the majority and the minority differently. From this, one would fairly argue that the portrayal of Amhara as 'oppressor group' has adversely impacted the Amharas more than the minority group in the region. Such perceptions would have contributed for the attitudinal gap between the groups on 'multiculturalism'.[137]

8.3.3. The Politics of Redistribution

What is commonly considered to be 'the politics of redistribution' refers to an egalitarian movement or orientation which "seeks to have more just allocation of resources and goods" in a society from the 'haves to have not's (Fraser, 2001, p.21). Often the issue of redistribution has been considered as the preoccupation of "class politics" while the politics of recognition is equated with "identity politics" (Fraser, 2001, p.24). Multiculturalism has been linked to the latter. Conceived this way, the politics of redistribution and politics of recognition appeared to be mutually antipodes at conceptual level (Owen & Tully, 2007). Yet, as matter of practices multiculturalism may encompasses the politics of redistribution and hence both can be reinforcing each other. In such state of condition, the "struggle for, or over, recognition always have a redistributive dimension and struggle for, or over, redistribution are always already struggles for , or over, recognition"(Owen & Tully, 2007, p.267).

When both identity and resources claims have been used in an intermeshing manner, then the resource factor wouldnot be downplayed in shaping the multicultural attitude of groups. In this case, the financial resources distribution to groups, among others, took center stage. The following picture showed the trends of capital budget allocation per-capita among groups.

[137] Through out the field research, it has been observed that multiculturalism is equated or mistakenly taken as the official ideology and practice of the government. Such misperceptions could have its contribution in shaping the attitudes of the respondents.



Figure 10: Trends of Capital Budget Allocation per capita, 1994/95-2014/15
Source: (BoPED, 1998; BoFED, 2004, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, and 2016)

As indicated above the gap in capital budget distribution per individuals (per capita) among the groups has been evidenced over twenty consecutive years. In the first five years of early 1990s, especially in the years between 1994 to 1998 the minority group seemed to be more favored but such trend appeared to be reversed in the years between 1999 and 2007 in favor of the majority. In the remaining years seven or eight years, i.e, 2008/9 to 2014/15 the gap between the two groups was in favor of the minority. The trend showed the general pattern of per capita distribution of capital expenditure and did not show us the net beneficiaries.

The following line graph depicted the trends of per capita revenue contribution of groups over two decades.



Figure 11: Trend of per capita Revenue Distribution per capita, 1994/95-2014/15

Source: (BoPED, 1998; BoFED, 2004, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, and 2016).

As indicated in the line graph (figure 11) the trend of per capita revenue distribution has been, more or less, uniform and consistent across groups. Yet, it showed that there exist narrow gaps between the two lines. The lines representing the per capita revenue contribution of the minority laid beneath the line representing the majority counterparts indicated that contribution of the minority has been slightly lesser than the majority up to the year 2012. After the middle of 2012, the two lines have shown wider divergence disclosing the trend of ever-increasing gap between the two groups.

The findings related to per-capita revenue contribution and capital expenditure appeared to be, some how, disproportional to between the majority and minority ethnic zones. The majority seemed to have contributed more revenue than the minority did but the former were more likely to have received much

lesser than the latter. Such financial resources and affirmative action measures in the bureaucracy might have shaped the perception of the minority groups positively than what the majority might have perceived.. Similar studies in Europe revealed that "multicultural ideologies were not only about the support for cultural diversity but also about equal chances and opportunities" (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2006, p.8)[138]. In Ethiopia research has pointed out the instrumentality of budget as incentive and disincentive to the claims of Liyu Wereda (special districts) and nationality Zone (special Zone) for dozen of the minority groups in the SNNPR (Vaughan, 2006). So, the nexus between politics of redistribution and politics of recognition has been established empirically. Thus, the logic of economic distributions, not withholding other explanations, was likely to be a factor behind the difference in multicultural attitudes or orientations between minority and majority groups. Indeed, it logical that the minority would tend to approve multiculturalism more strongly than the majority would.

8.4. Summary

The fourth research objective of the dissertation was aimed at exploring the gaps in the multicultural orientation between the majority and the minority groups. At the inception, it was hypothesized that there would be a statistically significant difference between the majority (Amhara ethnic group) and the minorities with respect to their attitudes to the ideology of multiculturalism. Prior to undertaking significant test, analysis of group means was made and the result showed that the mean of minority groups and majority groups were found to be 3.78 and 3.60 respectively. The result revealed that both majority and minority have endorsed multiculturalism positively. In addition, one would see that the minority group endorsed multiculturalism more positively than the majority. Then followed, the hypothesis test. To undertake such endeavor, *an independent sample test* was employed at tool of analysis. The result table yielded P- value of 0.004 at 95 % confidence level, which was below 0.05 confirming the hypothesized statement that there existed significant difference between the majority and minority groups. Consequently, the null hypothesis was rejected. Similarly, statistical tests were also employed to check whether there existed significance difference across gender lines both within groups

[138] The impacts of the immigrants on the host society could not be limited to cultural factor; it could also have economic impacts. The host society (majority) might feel insecure to job market due to the massive influx of economic immigrants.

(i.e., within majority, within minorities) and between groups (i.e., between the majority and minority). The result revealed that the *P-value* of 0.54, 0.82 and 0.63 respectively, indicating that there were no statistically significant differences both within and between groups across gender lines.

The last, but not the least, research objective of this dissertation was intended to identify factors which were more likely to contributing for existing attitudinal gap between the majority and minority groups. In this regard, one would scrutinize three contending explanatory factors including, the cultural arguments, the normative arguments and the economic arguments.

The cultural argument was found to be powerful factor in the case of the West which has been considered to be safe haven for immigrants' populations from all corners of the world. The absence of immigrant population in the context of Ethiopia and the study area lessens the significance of cultural arguments as explanatory factor.

However, the normative argument and the politics of redistribution seem to have contributed for the attitudinal divergence between the majority and minority groups in the study area. More specifically the Stalinist narratives of *oppressor -nation and oppressed -nations* and the economic incentives attached to minorities in the form of block grants affirmative action and appointments seemed to have significant role in shaping the attitudes of the majority and minority groups.

To put the story in a nutshell, the Stalinist cum communitarian meta narratives of multiculturalism seemed to have shaped the institutional modalities of accommodation of ethnic diversity. In this regard, territorial autonomy for each ethnic group seemed to have reinforced the diversity, instead of unity or commonality. On top of this, the politics of redistribution have also had its own working in terms of incentivizing diversity for those minority groups. Such institutional frameworks seem to have its own effect on shaping the orientations of the groups towards what is commonly referred to as multiculturalism.

CHAPTER NINE : CONCLUSION

In the Western countries, multiculturalism signifies the recognition as well as the accommodation of minority claims (Kymilicka, 2002, p.349). Such process goes through "democratic deliberation" and procedures (Song, 2007, p.42). Consequently, the responses to group claims are likely to be "through contextual inquiry" (Song, ibid.) instead of straight jacket imposition. The policy and practice of accommodation of ethnic diversity in Ethiopia in general and in the Amahra National Regional State in particular was not implemented through democratic dispensation.

Furthermore, the constitution , both the federal and regional ones were based upon the logic of symmetrical accommodation where all groups-*nation, nationalities and peoples*-were entitled to enjoy the right to territorial self –government, including the right to secession which , again, happened without the proper analysis of the context, feasibility, and its likely implications and repercussion on peace, democratization and inter-group relations on the ground.

Had due considerations were given to the above mentioned parameters, there would have been innovative ways such as non-territorial autonomy, consociationalism and other asymmetric tools of accommodation. Such constitutional laxity and insensitivity towards approaching diversity could, perhaps, be made Ethiopian federation unique.

In fact, the practices of accommodation under the context of competitive authoritarian system and tradition of democratic centralism is very much akin to the practices of the then Socialist Federations such the USSR and Yuogoslavia. In the former USSR, the ethnic Russian dominated region had been repartitioned into 16 autonomous territorial units whose names were designated by ethnic minorities. Such partitioning of the Rusia dominant region into different pieces was designed to weaken, what the Marxists claimed as, Russian nationalism. Russian nationalism was labeled as "the oppressor-nationalism" (Slezkine, 1994, p.414) which, according to the political ideologues, deserves "oppression" (ibid. p.419). True to this, what the former EPDM and later ANDM were trying to make was to build up a kind of *minority nationalisms* which were cultivated to counter back *Amhara nationalism*.

Similar to the case of former USSR, a multilevel titular approach was employed to treat the fact of diversity in the region with the ill- intended objective of divide and rule device of the rulling elites, which in away helped to weaken the Amhara elites.

In addition to this, just like of the case in the former socialist federations, the practices of accommodation of minority groups was found to be a top-down process. It was found that neither the majority-Amhara nor did the minorities have claimed for self-determination rights. The whole processes could be referred to as, what Arend Lijphart called, "pre-determination" (Lijphart cited in Kymilicka, 1995, p.276). The decision was made by the TPLF-dominated ruling party from above. It was altogether the straightjacket imposition of the EPRDF to institutionalize a 'multinational region' out of the existing ethnic diversity, so to say, whose difference could only be expressed in terms of linguistic diversity. Apart from the linguistic diversity, the ethnic groups in the region did share a kind of composite culture. So, the recognition and establishment of titular autonomies, particularly, of Awi, Wag, and Oromo nationality *Zones* by the central government could only be described as kind of divide and rule exercise.

Despite the existence of such institutional anomalies, ill intentions and tricks, various tools and institutional mechanisms were adopted with the view of accommodating minority groups in Amhara regional state. Indeed, the discussion on the institutional facet of accommodation revealed that minority groups were allowed to be represented at different levels and spheres of government structures. While there was no clear legal and administrative procedures setting the modalities of their representation in the region-wide bureaucracy, executive, and judiciary branches of the regional government; the representation of the minority at the regional council and the incumbent political party was evidently seen.

Regarding, the region-wide media institution, the presence of the minority groups was found to be beyond their proportion. Besides, in similar fashion to the practice of the then Russian Federation of the Soviet Union, there were multilevel autonomous units below the regional government where a specific ethnic community exercised some degree of cultural and linguistic autonomy over a limited territory. Accordingly, groups such as Agew Awi, Agew Himira, and The Oromo were conferred titular or territorial autonomy at provincial level called by Nationality Zones; where for others such as Argoba and Kimant district level autonomy was conferred. Such autonomous units enjoyed special privileges to

have access to budgetary subsidies from the regional government and affirmative action, especially in the bureaucratic offices limited to their administrative jurisdictions. Corollary to this, these minority groups had also been given to practice consultative power over the appointment of judges by the regional government, in their own territorial jurisdictions. The prevalence of such and such institutional mechanisms of accommodation would contribute, undoubtedly, to empowering the minority groups in the region.

With regard to the perception of groups to multiculturalism, one would say that the general orientation of the persons belonging to minority groups were found to be positive and more favorable to multiculturalism as compared to the orientations of the majority-Amhara ethnic group. As discussed in chapter Eight, the attitudinal difference on the ideology of multiculturalism was found to be statistically significant among the two groups.

The benefits of accommodative practices for the minority groups in the form of budget, affirmative action in the bureaucracy and the use of mother tongue in different spheres , such as media and schools, seemed to have been the inducing factors, if not an incentive package , for the enhancement of positive attitude among the minority groups.

Similar studies in Europe revealed that minority immigrant groups favored multiculturalism due to, not only for cultural equality, but also the incentive it offers (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2006). Likewise, in Ethiopia Sarah Vaughan (2006) has confirmed the instrumentality of budget or financial resources as incentive and disincentive mechanism to the claims of special provincial autonomy- *Liyue Zone* among dozens of minority ethnic groups in the Southern nation, nationality and peoples Regional State.

Indeed, the politics of resources distribution as manifested through budgets, disproportional allocation of revenue and expenditure, and affirmative action measures are factors which are more likely to be considered as opportunities that 'multiculturalism' offers to the minority groups in the Region.

Apart from this, the narrative of *the oppressed nations and nationalities* of the minority nationalities seems to have reinforced 'sense of victimhood of the past' with a likely effect of 'the valorization of the present' which ultimately might have led to development of more favorable attitudes towards the ideology of multiculturalism.

On the contrary, the thesis of oppressor nation and oppressed nation, which was loudly propagated and institutionalized as *modus operandi* of national and regional politics, seemed to have created a counter vailing feeling from the side of the Amhara. Consequently, the Amhara nation has been impliedly, if not boldly, labeled as the 'oppressor nation' during the past. Such narrative seemed to have influenced the attitudes of the members of Amhara ethnic group adversely. In doing so, thesis of oppressor nation and oppressed nation, which again represented as the replica of the Stalinist thesis, seems to have had a repercussion in shaping the attitudes of the majority and minority.

Indeed, member of the Amhara felt that the adoption of ethnic federalism and the displacement of Amharas in different regional states was belived to be a political ploy of the TPLF-led government over the Amharas. Indeed, the practice of multiculturalism in the study area was perceived to be largly as a disguised form of oppressing the Amhara Ethnic groups, if not a divide and rule tactic by the Tigrian elites. The prevalence of such perception would have contributed towards shaping the attitude of the majority towards the ideology of multiculturalism.

Corollary to the Stalinist narrative of oppressor nation and oppressed nation, which probably was used as hegemonic ideology or meta narrative of the TPLF-led regime, communitrainism was also used as operative tool of accommodation of diversity as if each ethnic group is having incommensurable, if not irreconcilable, culture and values. Such bold assertion seems to have fallen into the trap of group essentialism which advocates that each group culture is clearly "demarcated", "separated" and" internally uniform" (Mason, 2007, pp.222-7). And that seems to have blurred the distinction between *segregation* and *accommodation*. While accommodation invokes and underlines on the overlapping nature of identities among groups, segregation tended to break the bridges that serves as glue for mutual existence and mutual accommodation.

The communitarian induced assumptions and narrations evidently was found to be antipodal to the narration of cultural hybridity or cultural compositeness of Ethiopians which had been developed through different mechanism of engagements through war, trade, marriage, migrations and religion over the millennia as many scholars have found out (Daniel, 2003; Levine, 1974; Maimire, 2006). Indeed, the constitutional stipulations of rights regarding ethnic groups, and the institutionalization of multilevel territorial autonomy to each group seems to have been driven by the normative assumption of communitarianism.

The logical consequences of communitarian assertion have brought the narrative of difference and diversity in unprecedented level. Often *unity- in –diversity*, as opposed to *diversity-in-unity*, remained the leitmotif of the official multiculturalism of the ANRS and the country. Unity out of diversity is really precarious framing for ensuring stability and unity. If it ensures it could only be *a modus-vivendi* whose workability will be temporal, if not conditional. That will remain an inherent challenge to the survival of the country.

Over all, the Stalinist narrative of *the oppressed and the oppressor nation* and the communitarian understanding of ethnic groups seemed to have contributed for divergent views among majority and minority groups. Indeed, the institutionalization of multilayered territorial autonomy, in particular, could be taken as logical consequences of the Marxist-Leninist cum communitarian narratives.

As scholars suggested the institutionalization of ethnicity will have unbearable consequences if it is not well-manged through crafting of instituions. In this respect, Lieberman and Singh (2012) have underscored the possibility of ethnic conflict in states where ethnic differences have been institutionalized. More importantly, titular or territorial autonomy to specific groups in multiethnic regions, as in the case of Amhara Region, will be fatal and conflict prone due to "competition and zero sum politics and discrimination by the local majority" (Cunningham & Weidmann, 2010, p.1040). Such competitive tendencies, short of ethnic violence, seemed to have prevailed among ethnic groups in the study area.

However, due to the prevalence of one- party- dominance and the entrenchment of competitive authoritarian system, conflictive tendencies over resources and power were not overtly channeled through formal institutions such as media, and regional political parties. But the formation of mono-ethnic parties such as the Agew Peoples Democratic Party and The Argoba People Democratic Party could be taken as symptomatic of the ethnic tensions in the region. The prospective scenario would be that the democratization of the regional politics would like to exacerbate ethnic tensions among groups due to the likely multiplication of mono-ethnic parties in the region in the future.

Furthermore, the trend of localism by the local majority and its adverse effects on the so called *internal minorities* was pervasively felt. Some of the manifestations of the discrimination of the internal minorities included the decline in the size of internal minorities, linguistic or ethnic segregations among

some of the schools, and preferential treatments of the members of the local majorities in those titular autonomous units.

Most importantly, the special treatment of women of the minority vis-a-vise the majority symbolized one of the appalling case which required judicious consideration. The principle of "intersectionality" (Shields, 2008, p.304)[139] of women oppression which probably could be relevant case in North America as surrogate between, for instance, Black women and White women, seems to have been adopted inappropriately without the consideration of rural women conditions in the Region. As well indicated in chapter Seven, there appeared to be participatory parity between women represenating the majority and minority. Such finding could be taken as a testimony negating the prevalence of special affirmative action for women of the minority groups in the study area. Furthermore, empirical evidences in the region showed also that women of *Amhara Region*, regardless of their ethnic origin, have found to be victim of *traditional harmful practices* **(**Jones, Lyytikainen and Presler, 2006**).** Here, again the rhetoric of national oppression seems to have camouflaged such empirical facts.

Overall, the divergence of attitudes among the majority and minority and the discriminatory practices observed among titular administrative units over internal minorities remained some of the outstanding challenges of accommodation of ethnic diversity in the Amhara Regional State.

Such state of conditions appeared to be the result of communitarian cum -Stalinist-Leninist narratives which, in turn shaped the institutional design of accommodation of diversity in the country in general and Amhara Region in particular. The prevalence of multilevel territorial autonomy, and the marriage between the *politics of recognition* and *redistribution* reflected not only the legacy of the ex-Socialist Federations, but also could be taken as some of the key institutional manifestations of such exclusivist narratives of multiculturalism.

Indeed, this would call for, first and foremost, the re-thinking of such essentialist and exclusivist narratives which appeared to be antithetical to the essence of multiculturalism. As Caleb Rosado (1996)

[139]Intersectionality is often used by feminist scholars to capture the view that women could face double oppression. In this regard it is contended that women of white and black category could not be treated equally as women of the black faces double oppression due to their colors.(Shields, 2008, p.304).

rightly argues, multiculturalism is about inclusiveness and empowering all-be it the majority or the minority. It is not about ethnic segregation, but mutual accommodation.

Thus, the search for an inclusive narrative which is attractive to all waits for a clarion call to the concerned bodies including the political elites and the academia at all levels in the country.
Corollary to this, practical measures could be taken towards delinking the sphere of economics and sphere of identity politics so that the adverse effects of elites entrepreneurs would be minimal in terms of disturbing interethnic relations and orientations. As it stood so far, identity claims seems to have been reinforced by the economic incentives, and such trend would adversely affect interethnic harmony and stability.

Furthermore, attention needs to be given to the condition of internal minorities. There had been un conducive condition in the form of administrative male- practices, discrimination, preferential treatments, and segregative practices in the work environment and some of schools in minority dominated districts and provinces. These states of conditions required, at least, emplacing strong regimes for the protection of internal minorities. Otherwise, a sort of *decentralized local tyranny* would continue endangering conditions of internal minorities. In fact what appears to be multicultural from above seems to be diluted by its antithesis- assimilation from below. If multiculturalism is to flourish, then local diversities need to be appreciated, rather than being eliminated. Among other things, "ethnic self assertions and the exaltation of what divides people at the expense of what unites them" (Barry, 2001, p.8) needs to be rectified with sense of solidarity, mutuality and inclusiveness.

Last, but not the least, the relevance of using other ways of accommodation such as non territorial autonomy(NTA) as complementary, if not as alternative, to the territorial autonomy to addressing the claims of internal minorities especially to those dispersed and very small-sized minorties where territorial autonomy(TA) is not feasible. The application of NTA would enable individual members of ethnic groups to enjoy group related rights regardless of the place of origin or administrative jurisdiction. And this would allow different groups to share common spaces and consequently, encourage interethnic harmony among them. Especially in ethnically mixed areas which appear to be a characteristic of many localities in the region, consociation political arrangements could be taken as most accommodative mechanism, instead of territorial autonomy. At sub-regional level, territorial

autonomy invariably creates not only less feasible local governments but also fuel disputes between groups and administrative units over borders and territories. The current conflicts between Amhara and the Kimant community demonstrated such logic.

If the aforementioned challenges were to be rectified in due time, then the *Amhara Regional State* would emerge as role model for the practice of genuine multiculturalism which appears to be lacking at this particular time. In most of the regional states, the trend to accommodate minorities groups appeared to be gloomy. In most of regional state, there were ample evidences of internal displacement, ethnic cleansing and marginalization which could be considered as road-block for not only local peace and harmony, but also could catalyze inter-regional tensions with its adverse repercussions for the stability of the country at large.

In general, an inclusive narrative, and the adoption of NTA approaches (hybrid systems) of self-government would help to assuage the strains and potential conflicts between the majority and the minority groups in the Region in the future. This might require constitutional revision of both the regional and federal state.

More importantly, the divorce between the *politics of identity* and the *politics of distribution* could have adding effect to tone down identity claims and existing attitudinal gaps between the majority and minority groups. Furthermore, a strong regime for the protection of internal minorities appears to be clarion-call of the time to minimize discriminatory practices in public institutions such in schools and bureaucracy.

As it stands now, the proliferation of mono-ethnic parties that claim to representing Argoba, Kimant, and Agew, would inevitably lead to violence in the Amhara National Regional State unless the overdue political orientation is revisited and the old institutional framework get reformed, both at federal and regional level..

REFERNCES

Aalen, L. (2002). *Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party state: The Experience of Ethiopia 1991-2000*. Bergen: Chr.Michelsen Institute.

Aalen, L. (2006). Ethiopian Federalism and Self-determination for Nationalities in A semi-Authoritarianism State: The case of Ethiopia. *International Journal of Minority and Group Rights. 13*(2/3), 243-261.

Abbink, J. (1995). Breaking and Making the State: The Dynamics of Ethnic Democracy in Ethiopia. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*. *13*(2), 149-163.

Abbink, J. (2009). The Ethiopian Second Republic and the Fragile Social Contract. *Africa Spectrum*. *44*(2), 3-28.

Adeno , A.(n.d) . *Deliberative Democracy in Severely Fractured Societies*. Retrieved on April, 2016, from *Project Muse* www. http:muse.jhu.edu.

Adeney, K. (2007) *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan*. New York: Macmillan.

African Elections Data Base (January, 2011) . *National Election Results, 2000-2010*. Retrieved on April 2020, from http://africanelections.tripod.com/et_2010state.html

Agenda 21. (n.d). *Agenda 21 for Culture*. United Cities and Local Governments. Ajuntament De Barcelona: Institute de culture. Retrieved from http/www.bracelona2004.org/esp/banco_delconaimento/docs- poroto-alegreen.pdf

Aklilu Abraham. (2006). Ethnicity and Dilemma of state making: Ethnic Federalism and Institutional Reforms in Ethiopia. *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies.* 2 (1/2), 77-111.

Aklilu Abraham and Tafesse Olika. (2007). Legislation, Institutions and the Post-1991 Election in Ethiopia. In Asnake Kefale, Jalele Erega, Kassahun Berhanu and Tafesse Olika (Eds.). *Electoral Politics, Decentralized Governance and Constitutionalism in Ethiopia* (pp.89 120).Addis Ababa: Department of Political Science and international Relations.

Alemmaya Mulugeta &Hagmann, T.(2003). Pastorial Conflict and State Building in the Ethiopian Low Lands. *Afrika Spectrum*. *43*(1), 19-37.

Alem Habtu.(2003, July). Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Background, Present Conditions and Future Prospects. *Contemporary Development Issues in Ethiopia*. Symposium Conducted at Ghion Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Retrieved on June 2016, from http://homepages.wmich.edu/~asefa/Conference%20and%20Seminar/,

Alemante G/Sillasie.(2003). Ethnic Federalism: Its Promise and Pitfalls for Africa. *Yale Journal of International Law*. *28*(4), 51-107.

Alemu Kassa and Sisay Mengistie.(2012). *Ye Raya Hizib ye Maninet Tiyake Ena ye Makelaw Mengist Milash(Amharic)*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Alison, K.M. and Crosby, F.J.(2002). Affirmative Action in Employment. *Diversity Factor, 10*(2), 5-9. Retrieved on February, 2014, from www.researchgate.net/publication/2409984.

AMA **(** Amhara Mass Media Agency). (2014, May). *Yehuletegnaw Ediget Ena Transformation Strategikawi Ekid Senedi* [The Second Growth and Transformation Strategic Plan], 2015/16- 2019/20 F/Y. Bahirdar, Amhara National Regional State, Ethiopia.

Andargachew Tiruneh. (1993). *The Ethiopia Revolution, 1974-1987: A Transformation From Aristocratic To a Totalitarian Authority*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Anderson, B. (2006). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (Rev.ed.)*. London: Published by Verso.

Anderson, M.L. & Erk, J. (2010). *The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self- Rule Accommodates or Exacerbates Ethnic divisions*?. London: Rutledge.

Anderson, J. & Kaurstubbs, S.(2010). Inter-cultural Dialogue Enabling free, full and equal Participation: platform for intercultural Europe. Retrieved on October 2014, from, http://www.intercultural-europe.org/docs/201103-pie-discussionpapers-1-2.pdf.

Ahmed, A.R., Azman, N.,Karim, F., Lubis, A.M. & Mustapha ,R. (n.d). *Social Integration Among*

Multiethnic Students at selected Malaysian Universities in Peninsular Malaysia: A Survey of Campus Social Climate. Retrieved On December, 2015 from http://www.ukm.my/jtlhe/pdf/MAIMUN%20MS%201.pdf

ANDM (Amhara Nation Democratic Movement). (2006). *Tsinat: Befashistawi Chifchefa Ena Afena Yaltenberkekew Ye Itiopia Hizboch demoraciawi nikinake -Ehdin* [*Endurance: The Struggle of Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement -EPDM], 1979- 1988/9* (1st ed.). Bahir Dar, Amhara National Regional State, Ethiopia.

ANDM (2010). *Ye Biaden Metedaderia Denb, Yeaderjajet Ena Aserar Memeriawoch*. [*Regulations and Structures of the Amhara Nation Democratic Movement]*. Amhara National Regional State, Bahir Dar, Ethiopia.

ANDM. (2013). *Yebiaden Metedaderia Denb, Yeaderejajet Ena Aserar Memeria:Letachignaw Amerar Siltena Yetezegaje* [*The Organizational Structure and the Working Procedures: Training Manuals for The Lower Level Leadership]*. Bahir Dar, Ethiopia.

ANRS (Amhara Nation Regional State). (1995). *A Proclamation of the Constitution of the Amhara National Region*. Proclamation No.2/1995, *Zikre Hig* . Bahir Dar.

ANRS. (2001). *A Proclamation Issued to Provide for the Revised Constitution of the Amhara National Regional State*. Proclamation No.59/2001 , *Zikre Hig* , Bahir Dar.

ANRS.(2004). *A Proclamation Issued to Provide for the Approval of the 2004/5 Fiscal Year Budget and the Determination of Budget Administration of the Amhara National Regional State.* Proclamation No.105/2004, *Zikre Hig* , Bahir Dar.

ANRS.(2006). *A Proclamation Issued to Provide for Council Representatives Number of Every Level in the Amhara National Regional State*. Proclamation No.140/2006, *Zikre Hig* , Bahir Dar.

ANRS.(2010). *The Revised Zonal Administrative Re-establishment and Determination of Power and Duties Council of Regional Government Regulation*. Regulation No.78/2010. *Zikre Hig* , Bahir Dar.

ANRS.(2011). T*he Amhara National Regional Council Rules of Procedure and Members' Code of*

Conduct Re-Amendment Regional Council Regulation. (Regulation No. 12/2011., Year No.11). Bahir Dar, Ethiopia.

ANRS/ CBCSR **(**Capacity Building and Civil Service Bureau). (2008). *Yemengist Serategoch Yesiltena Afetsatsem Memeria* [*Human Resource Training Manual for Civil Servants]*. Bahir Dar, Capacity Building and Civil Service Bureau.

ANRS/CBCSR.(2013). *Ye Mengisst Serategoch Stasticawi* [Statistical Report on Civil Servants of the Amhara National Regional State] . Augest, 2013, Bahir Dar, Ethiopia.

ANRS. (2016). *Yemikir bet Mezgeb* [*The Regional Councilor's Registry, 2015-2020]*, (the 5th Round), Amhara National Regional State, Bahir Dar, Ethiopia.

ANRS/ PRO.(Public Relation Office). (2013, October). *Ye Partewoch Mekemecha Dirsha Be mikir Bet* [Parties having seats in the Council]. *Gubaye,1*(2), 18-21.

ANRS/PC (Plan Commission). (2015, December). The 20014/15 Budget Year. *Annual Statistical Bulletin*. Bahirdar.

Aregawi Berhe. (2008). *A Political History of Tigray People's Liberation Front (1975-1991): Revolt, Ideology and Mobilization in Ethiopia*.(Doctoral dissertation). Amsterdam: Vriji Universiteit.Retrieved on November, 2014, from http://www.harep.org/Africa/7219.pd.

Arel, D. (2001). Political Stability in Multinational Democracies: Comparing Language Dynamics in Brussels, Montreal, and Barcelona. In Alain.G.Gagnon & James Tully (Eds.), *Multinational Democracies* (pp.65-90). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

ARNW (Argoba Nationality Wereda).(2006). *A Proclamation Issued to Provide for the Establishment of Argoba Nationality Wereda of the Amhara National Regional State.* Proclamation No.130/ 2006. *Zikre Hig* , Bahir Dar.

Arriola, L.R. (2008). Ethnicity, Economic Condition, and Opposition Support: Evidence from Ethiopia's 2005 Elections.*Northeast African Studies*.*10* (1), 115-144.

Arriola, L.R & Lyons, T.(2016). Ethiopia: the 100% Elecetion. *Journal of Democracy*. *27* (1), 76-88.

Assefa Fiseha. (2007). *Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study*., Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers.

Assefa Fisha. (2006). Theory Versus Practice in the Implementation of Ethiopia's Ethnic Federalism. In David Turton (Ed.), *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective* (pp.131-165). Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.

Assefa Tolera. (1995) .*Ethnic Integration and Conflict: The Case of the Indigenous Oromo and Amahara Settlers in Aaroo Addis Alem, GidaKiramu Area, Northern Wallaga* (MA Thesis, Addis Ababa University).

Asnake Kefale. (2009). *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia. A comparative Study of the Somalia and Benishangul Regions*(Doctoral Dissertation, Leiden University).

Axford, B., Browning, G.K., Huggins, R., Rosamond, B., & Turner, J. (1997*). Politics: An Introduction*. New Fetter Lane, London: Rutledge.

Ayalew Sisay. (2015). *Ye Agew Hizboch Ena Ye Zaguwe Sirwo Mengist Tarik* [*The History of the Agew Peoples and the Zaguwe Dynasty]*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Damel Printing plc.

Ayirtman, S. (n.d.). *Beyond Multiculturalism: Conditions for a Deliberative Accommodation of Cultural Diversity*. Retrieved on March3, 2013 from http://interdisciplinary.net/ati/diversity/multiculturalism/mcb1/Ayirtman%20paper.pdf

Bader, V. (2004). Associative Democracy and Minorities within Minorities. In Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner –Halev (Eds.), *Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity* (pp. 319- 340). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bahru Zewude.(1993). Hailessilasse: From Progressive to Conservatism. *Journal of Addis Ababa University*. *2*(1), 35-54.

Bahru Zewde. (1998). *A Short History of Ethiopia and the Horn*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Addis Ababa University.

Bahru Zewde. (2001). *A History of Modern Ethiopia: 1855-1991 (*2nd ed.). Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Addis Ababa University.

Bahru Zewde. (2014). *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movementc.1960-1974*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Addis Ababa University.

Baldwin, C., Chapman, C., & Gray, Z.(2007). *Minority Rights: The Key to Conflict Prevention*. (Report by Minority Group International(MRGI).Retrieved on July 2015, from https://minorityrights.org/wp /content/download-174-Minority-Rights-T.pdf

Barry, B.(2001). Culture and Equality: an Egalitarian critique of Multiculturalism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Basta, K. (2012). *Accommodative Capacity of Multinational States* (Doctoral Dissertation). Department of Political science, University of Torontos. Retrieved on February, 2016 from https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/32661/3

Baubok, R. (2001). Multinational Federalism: Territorial or Cultural Autonomy. Retrieved on June, 2014 , from https://muep.mau.se/bitstream/handle/2043/690/Workingpaper201.pdf

Baumeister, A. T. (2000). *Liberalism and the Politics of Difference*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Barth, F.(Ed.).(1969). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture and Difference*. Boston: Little , Brown and Company.

Bartinkis, A. & Niyachico, Y.M.(2018). *Ye Ityopia Tarik Kemejemeriaw Eske Ahunu Zemen*.(Amharic) Alemayehu Abebe (Trans.). Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. (Original Work Published 1978).

Baye Yimam. (1995) .*Ye Amarigna Sewa Sew*[*Amharic Grammar]*. Addis Ababa: Culture and Art Society of Ethiopia.

Begashaw Mersha.(2016). *Antsebarakiw Kokeb[The Shining Star]: Professor Asrat Woldeyes* . Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Nabadan Publication.

Bekalu Atnafu.(2018). Ethnic Cleansing in Ethiopia. *Journal of Peace Research and Conflict Studies. 50*(1), 77-104.

Beken, V. C. (2013). Federalism in a Context of Extreme Pluralism: The Case of Ethiopia's Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region. *VRU*, 46, 1-56. Retrieved on januray, 2015, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276056034

Beken, C. (2014). *Unity in Diversity: Federalism as a Mechanism to Accommodate Ethnic Diversity: The Case of Ethiopia*. Retrieved On January 20, 2013, from http//www.books.google.com.et/books.

Belay Shibeshi Awoke. **(** 2010). *Minority Rights Protection in the Amhara National Regional State : The Case Of The Kemant People in North Gondar* (MA Thesis). Retrieved on January, 2010 from https://chilot.me/wp-content/uploads/2013/05

Bendikter, T.(Ed.). (2009). *Solving Ethnic Conflict through Self -Government: A short Guide to Autonomy in Europe and South Asia*. Bozen: EURAC. Retrieved on June 2008, from http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/autonomies/minrig/Documents/Eurasia/Deliverable

Benhabib, S. (2002). *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in Global Era*. UK: Princeton University Press.

Bennett, D.(Ed). (1998). *Multicultural States: Rethinking Differences and Identity*. London: Routledge.

Benz , A. and Broschek, J.(Eds.). (2013). *Federal Dynamics, Continuity, Change and the Varieties of Federalism*. U.K.: Oxford University Press.

Berihun Mebratie. (2004). The *Past in the Present: The Dynamics of Identity and Otherness among the Gumuz of Ethiopia* (Doctoral Dissertation, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim).

Berman, B., Eyob, D. & Kymilicka, W.(Eds.). (2004). *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa*. Oxford, U.K.: James Currey LTD.

Bertram, D.(n.d). *Likert Scale*. (CPSC Report no,681).Retrieved on October, 2017, from http://poincare.matf.bg.ac.rs/~kristina/topic-dane-likert.pdf

Berry, W. J. (2011). Integration and Multiculturalism: Ways towards Social Solidarity. *Social Representations*. *20*, 1-21.Retrieved on Jun, 2007 from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9ba5/bd9f79cc66f86507e2226478c38d76dbdc4c.pdf

Beza Desallegn. (2013). The Right of Minorities to Political Participation Under the Ethiopian Electoral System. *Mizan Law Review*, *7*(1).

Bhargava, R. (2006). The Evolution and Distinctiveness of India`s Linguistic Federalism. In David Turton (Ed.), *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative perspective (*

pp.93-119). Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.

Bieber, F. (2008). *Political Parties and Minority Participation*. Skopje, Macedonia: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. .

Bird, K. (n.d) . *The Political Representation of Women and Ethnic Minoritiesin Established Democracies***.** Retrieved on June, 2014, from http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/stm103%20articles/.pdf

Bird, K.(2007). *Pattern of Substantive Representation among Visible Minority MPs: Evidence from Canada's House of Common*. (Work Shop on Immigration, Minorities and Multiculturalism in Democracies Project, October 25-27 held in Montreal, Canada). Retrieved on December, 2014, from https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/kbird/documents/ECPR.pdf

Birch, A.(1989). *Nationalism and National Integration***.** London, U.K.: Unwin Hyman. Ltd.

Bogaards, M. (Ed.). (2006). Democracy and Power Sharing in Multi-National States. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* (IJMS). .*8*(2),119-127.Retrieved On September 2014, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/26592571

Boku Tach & Gufu Oba (2009). Policy Driven Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in Southern Ethiopia. *Review of AfricanPoltical Economy*. 121, 409-426.

Bougie, R, and Sekaran, U. (2009**)**. *Research Methods for Business: A Skill Approach*.UK: John Wileg and Sons.Ltd.

Bowering, B. (2005). Burial and Resurrection: Karl Renner's Controversial Influence on the National Question in Russia. In Ephraim Nimni (Ed.), *National Cultural Autonomy and Its Contemporary Critics* (pp.162-173).London: Routledge.

Bratton, M. & Vande Walle, N.(1997). *Democratic Experiments in Africa; Regime Transition in Comparative perspective*. Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press.

Breugelman, S., Shalk-Soeker, S., & Vande Vijver, F.(2009). *Stability of Majority Attitude towards Multiculturalism in the Netherlands between 1997 and 2007*. *58*(4), 653-671.

Bunce, V. (2005). *Status quo, Reformist, or Secessionist Politics: Explaining Minority-State Bargaining in Multinational State*. Cornel University, Washington : National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEER). Retrieved on June, 2014 from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ec46/0e27fd4d8056051f76b6debd42fa074e2bbd.pdf

Bo FED (Bureau of Finance and Economic Development). (2004). *Development Indicators of Amhara Region* (Year 2004). Bahirdar, Ethiopia.

BoFED. ((2011). *Development Indicators of Amhara Region* (Year 2011). Bahirdar.

BoFED. (2012a). *Development Indicators of Amhara Region* (Year 2012). Bahirdar.

BoFED.(2012b). *Le Kilil mikirbet Yekerebe Ye 2009 Bujet Amet Megilecha* [Budget Proposal Submitted to the Regional Council]. July, 2012, Bahirdar.

BoFED.(2015). *Development Indicators of Amhara Region* (Year 2014/5). Bahirdar.

BoFED.(2016). *Capital Budget By Class of Account : Functional and Sub- Functional Classification Approved, Table.2.16* (Data Series from 2003-2014 Fiscal Years Set in Software Program). Bahir Dar.

BoPED (Bureau of Plan and Economic Development). (1998). *Ye 1991 Bujet Amet YeHabit Dildil Kemer Ena Ye Bejet Taria* [Budget Ceiling and allocation Formula for the 1998 Fiscal Year]. February, 1998. Bahir Dar, Ethiopia.

Burgess, M. (2006). *Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice*. London: Rutledge.

Braasch, S., Degol, A., Mabako, C. , Morgan, M., Segura, F., & Teramed Tezera. (2008). Silencing the Ethiopian Court: Non Judicial Constitutional Review and its Impact on Human Right. *Fordham International Law*. 32(1). Retrieved On November, 2015 from https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2193&context

Brock, L.K. (2011, May). *A double Take: Quebec Within the Canadian Federation or Racing in the Rain Canadian Style. Annual Conference.* (A paper prepared for the 2011 CPSA at Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario. May 16-18, 2011). Retrieved on October 2015 from https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2011/Brock.pdf

Brubaker, R. (1994). Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Eurasia: An Institutional Account. *Theory and Society*. 23: pp.47-78.

Brubaker, R. (1996). *Nationalism Reframed; Nationhood and National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Brubaker, R.(2004). *Ethnicity without Group*. U.K: Harvard University press.

Campbell, I. (2014). *The Massacre of Debre Libanos Ethiopia 1937: The Story of one of Fascism's Most Shocking Atrocities*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.

Cassif, O.(2014). *On Nationalism and Democracy: A Marxist Examination*. (Doctoral Dissertation). U.S.: UMI Dissertation Publishing.

Cederman, L.E., Min, B. And Wimmer, A.(2009). Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurationally Analysis of A new Global Data Set. *American Sociological Review*, 74, 316-337. Rerieved on September, 2014 from https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/000312240907400208.

Chandra, K(Ed.). (n.d). *Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics*. Retrieved on December 10, 2007 from http/www Politics, as.nyu.edu/docs/10/2587/chapter 1-introduction-09-28-10-pdf.

Chandel, S., Kale, S., Joshi, A., & Pal, D.(2015). Likert Scale: Explore and Explored. *British Journal of Applied Science and Technology*. *7*(4), 396-403.

Chichu Alebachew.(2019). *Daget Yaberetaw Ye Amara Finot*. Bahir Dar, Ethiopia: Birana Book Storage.

Clapham, C. (1988). *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia*. Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press.

Clason, D.L. & Dormody,T.J.(n.d.). Analizing Data Measured by Individual Likert-Type Items.*Journal of Agriculture Education.35*(4), 31-35.

Coakley, J. (1994). Approaches to Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: The Strategy of Normative Autonomy. *International Political Science Review*. *15*(3), 294-314.

Coche, O., Court, V.F., Cadieux, A.M., and Ronson, L.J.,(2012). *Official Language Policies of the*

Canadian Provinces: Cost and Benefits. Canada: Fraser Institute. Retrieved on July 20, 2015 from https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/official-language-policiespdf

Cohen, G. (2006) . The Development of Regional and Local Languages in Ethiopia's Federal System. In David Turton (Ed.), *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective* (pp.165-181*)*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.

Cohen, J.M. and Koehn, P.H.(1980). *Ethiopian Provincial and Municipal Government: Imperial Patterns and Post -Revolutionary Changes*. Michigan: African Studies Centre.

Connolly, J., Leach, M. Walsh, L. (2007). *Recognition in Politics: Theory, Policy and Practice*. Newcastle, U.K: Cambridge scholars publishing.

Connor, W. (1984). *The National Question in Marxist Theory and Strategy*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Conway, P. Daniel & Simeon, R. (2001). Federalism and the Management of Conflict in Multinational Societies .In Alain G. Gagnon & James Tully (Eds.). *Multinational Democracies* . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cormack, M. (n.d). *Developing Minority Language Media Studies*. Scotland: Stirling Media Research Institute, Stirling University. Retrieved on November , 2015 from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.525.84&rep=pdf

Cornell, S.E. (2002). *Autonomy and Conflict: Ethno-Territoriality and Separatism in the South Caucasus Case in Georgia*. Uppsala, Sweden. Retrieved on November, 2013, from http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2002 .

Craig, A. M. & Richeson, A. J. (2011). Intra-Minority Intergroup Relations in the Twenty First Century. *Race, Inequality and Culture*. *140*(2), 166-175. Retrieved on November, 2013, from www.jstor.org/stable/23047459

Crenshaw, K.(1991). Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, Violence against Women of Color. *Standard Law Review*. *43*(.6) , 1241-1299.

Cresswell, J.W.(2009). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. (3rd ed.). London: Sage.

Crosby, F.J., Iyer, A., & Sincharoen, S. (2006). Understanding Affirmative Action. *Annu. Rev*.

Psychology, 57, 585-611. Retrieved on June, 2014, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/7449579_

CSA (Central Statistics Agency). (1995). *The 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia. Result for Amhara Region*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

CSA . (2010). *The 2007 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia: Statistical Report at Country Level.* Addis Ababa. Retrieved on Aprile, 2014, from http://www.csa.gov.et.

Cunningham, G.Kathleen & Weidmann, B.Nile. (2010) Shared Space: Ethnic Groups, State Accommodation, and Localized Conflict. *International Studies Quarterly.54*, 1035-1054. Retrieved On May, 2013, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227602905

Dahala, C.(2012). *The Ethiopian Quest for Democracy in a Dominanat Party State: A Case Study on Democratization since the Implementation of Ethiopian Federalism in 1995* **(**MA Thesis, Leiden University). Retrieved on Feburary 2020, from www// https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/15606916.pdf

Dametew Tessema.(2019). Dealing with the Conundrum of Amhara Population Growth. *International Journal of Social Science and Technology*. *V*(II), 42-52.

Daniel Gemechu. (1994). A Nation in Perpetual Transition: The Politics of Changes in Administrative Divisions and Subdivisions in Ethiopia. In Harold G.Marcus (Ed.), The *12th international Conference of Ethiopian Studies*. Vol. ii, *Social Science* (.pp.83-113).

Daniel Kendie. (2003). The Cause of the Failure of the Present Regime in Ethiopia. *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies*, *1*(1), 177-213.

Dawit Endeshaw. (2019, Feburary 23). Census in Ethiopia: a Contentious undertaking. *The Reporter. Retrieved on November, 2020 from* https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/census-ethiopia-contentious-undertaking

Dea, D. (2006).Enduring Issues in the Society Relation in Ethiopia: Acase Study of the WoGaGoDa Conflict in Wolaita Sothern Nation.*International Journal of Ethiopian Studies.* 2 (1/2), 140-157

De blij, H.J., Glassner, M.I., Yacher, L.(1967). *Systematic Political Geography*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Dessalew Abawa **.** (2002). *Factors That Affect The Implementation of Using Awingi as A Medium of Instruction in the Lower Primary Schools of Awi*

Administrative Zone.(MA Thesis, Addis Ababa University).

Deschouwer, K. (2004). Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public sector in Belgium. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). Retrieved on January, 2014, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/242352449.

Deveaux, M. (2004). A Deliberative Approach to Conflict of Culture. In Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner –Halev (Eds.). *Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity*.(Pp.340-365).: New York: Cambridge University Press.

Developemntal Democracy (2014 , July). *Yelimatawi Democraciawi Sirat Ginbata Tiglachin ena Fetenawochu* [The Struggles and Challenges for Building up Developmental Democratic System]. (Training for the University Community held, from September 20- 30/ 2007 E.C, at the Hall of the Regional Council, Bahirdar, Ethiopia).

Dunn, K., Forest, J., Kamp, A., Paradies, Y. & Shaw, W.S. (n.d). Indigenous Australians' Attitudes Towards Multiculturalism, Cultural Diversity, Race and Racism. Retrieved on decmber, 2013, from www.uws.edu.au/_data/assets/pdf_file/../ pdf.

Dunn, K and Forest, J.(2005**).** Constructing Racism in Sydney, Australia's Largest EthniCity. Retrieved on December, 2013, from http://www.uws.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/29408/A291.pdf

Dryzek, J. (2000). *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Eisenberg, A. (2004). Identity and Liberal Politics: The Problem of Minorities within Minorities. In Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner –Halev (Eds.). *Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity*. (Pp.249-271. New York, : Cambridge University Press.

Elazar, D.J.(1987). *Exploring Federalism*. Tuscaloosa: Alabama Press.

Endalamaw Chekol .(2015). *Ethnic Federalism and Nation Building in Development: The Case of Ethiopia*(M.A Thesis**,** Addis Ababa University).

EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples` Revolutionary Democratic Front). (2003).*Yeselam, Limat Ena Democracy Alamawoch Masfetsemia Siltoch ena merohowoch* [Implementation Strategies and Principles for the Realization of Peace, Development and Democracy]. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Eriksen, H.T. (1994). *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspective* (3rd ed.). Pluto Press.

Erk, J. (2008). *Explaining Federalism: State, society and congruence in Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany and Switzerland.* London: Routledge.

Erk, J.(2003). *Federalism and Non-Territorial Representation*. Published by the Forum of Federation.

Retrieved on November, 2014, from www.forumfed.org.

Ezergailis, A. (1971).The Nationality Question in Bolshevik Ideology.*Bulletin of Baltic Studies*, 2(5), 3-19.

Ezgi, D**. (**2014). *Making Secession Possible: Federalism as a Capacity Building Instrument*. Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th *Annual National Conference,* the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago. Retrieved on July, 2016 from from http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p364233_index.html

Ewiegand, K. and Khelko, I.(2010). Government Repression in Ethnic Conflict: Institutional Incentives and Cultural Legacies. *International Journal on World Peace*. *27* (2), 7-34.

Fang, T.T. (2017). How to Maintain a Minority Language Through Education. *Chinese Studies, 6* ,1-11. Scientific Research Publishing: Shanghai, China. Retrieved on October 2016, from https://file.scirp.org/pdf/ChnStd_2017032314183015.pdf

FDRE (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia). (1995). *The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*. A Proclamation to Pronounce the Coming into Effect of the Constitution of FDRE, Proclamation No.1/1995 , Federal Negarit Gazeta, Addis Ababa.

FDRE. (2001). *Consolidation of the House of the Federation and the Definition of Its Powers and Responsibilities*. Proclamation No.251/2001, *Negarit Gazeta*, 7th year, No.41. 6th July, Addis Ababa.

FDRE/EBE (Electoral Board of Ethiopia). (2007). *Ye Teshashalew Itiyopia Ye Mirch Hig* [The Revised Electoral Law of Ethiopia]. Addis Ababa: Branna Printing Press.

FDRE/HoF (House of Federation). (2007). *The New Federal Budget Grant Distribution Formula*(FDRE House of Federation. May, 2007). Addis Ababa: Birhanina Selam Printing Press.

FDRE/HoF.(2010). *Ye Federal Digoma Bujet Makefafeya Kemer* [Subsidy Allocation Formula of the Federal Government]. The House of Federation, Addis Ababa: Central Printing Press.

FDRE/HoF. (2012, November). *Hig Mengistachin le Bizihanetachin, le Andinetachin Ena Le Hidasachin* [Our Constitution for Our Diversity, Unity and Renaissance]. *Hibrebiher*. Addis Ababa.

FDRE/ MoI (Ministry of Information). *Be Itiyopia Yedemocraciawi Sirat Ginbata Gudayoch* [Issues For Building up Democratic System in Ethiopia]. Addis Ababa: Press and Audiovisual Department.

FDRE/PCC(2008). *Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing Census:*

population size by age and sex.(Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Population Census Commission. Dec.2008). Addis baba: United Nations Population Fund.

Fikre Tolessa. (2016). *Ye Oromo Ena Ye Amara Ewinetegnaw Yezer Minch* [*The Authentic Origin of Oromo and Amhara]* . Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Nabadan Publication.

Fikre Tolessa. (2018 .). *Siwuru Ena Yaltenegerew Yeayhudawian ena Ye Itioypiawuyan Tarik [The Hidden and The Untold History of Ethiopians and Jews]*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Nabadan Publication.

Finer, S.E.(1975). State-and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military. In Charles Tilly(Ed.) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (pp.84-164). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fraser, N.(2001). Recognition without Ethics. *Theory, Culture and Society*. 18(2-3), pp.21- 42.

Fukuyama, F.(2006). Identity, Immigration and Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*. *17*(2),

Gagnon, A-G., & Tully, J.(Eds.).(2001). *Multinational Democracies*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Gashe Mersha.(2018). *Ye Amara Tegadilo: Amaran ye Hager Balebet yemadireg Niknake*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Gebrehiwot Baraki. (n.d). *The Making of State and Local Government in the Multiethnic Federation***.** Retrieved on December, 2014 from https://doc.rero.ch/record/235925/files/BarakiGT.pdf

Gebru Tareke. (1991). E*thiopia: Power and Protest, Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. UK: Blackwell Publishing.

Gergen, K. (n.d). *Social Construction and the Transformation of Identity Politics.*Retrieved from http://www.swarthmore.edu/Documents/faculty/gergen/Social%20C.pdf

Gerteis, J. and Hartmann, D. (2005). Dealing with Diversity: Mapping Multiculturalism in Sociological Terms: Sociological Theory.*American Sociological Association*. *23(2)*, 218-240.

Getachew Haile (1986). The Unity and Territorial Integrity of Ethiopia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 24(3), 465-487.

Ghai, Y. (2003). *Public Participation and Minorities*. (Report by Minority Rights Group International).Retrieved on November, 2014, from https://minorityrights.org/wp- content/upload/pdf

Gilbert, G. (2002). Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law. *Cornell*

International law Journal. 35 (2), 307-352.

Gilbert, G.E, & Prion, S. (2016). Making Sense of Methods and Measurment: Lawshe's Content Validity Index. *Clinical Simulation in Nursing*. *12*(12) ,530-531.

Girma Awigichew. (1999). *The Origin of Amharic*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Centerfrancais de Etudes Ethiopieness.

Goodin , R & Pettit, P.(Eds.) . (1997). *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology*. Canberra: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Goren, J.M,. Plaut, C.V., & Thomas, M.K. (2009). *Is Multiculturalism* or Color Blindness Good for Minority? Retrieved on November,2013, from http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/plaut_thomas_goren_2009.pdf

Green, L. (1994). Internal Minorities and Their Rights. In Judith Baker (Ed.), *Group Right* (pp.100-118). Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.

Green, L.(1995). Internal Minorities and Their Rights. In *Will* Kymilicka (Ed.), *The Right of Minority Culture* (pp.256-275). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Gupta, S.(2007). *Research Methodology and Statistical Techniques*. New Delhi: Deep& Deeep publications PVT. LTD.

Gurin, P, Negda, A., MaxWell, K.E., & Sorensen, N. (2009). Taking a Hands On Approach to Diversity in Higher Education: A Critical- Dialogic Model for Effective Intergroup Interaction. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 9(1), 3—35.*

Habib, I. (1975). Emergence of Nationalities. *Social Scientist*, *4*(1), 14-20.

Haileyesus Taye. (2012). *Issue of Minorities Rights in the Ethiopian Federation*. (European Center For Minority (ECMI), Working Paper 59, April, 2012). Retrieved on October, 2007 from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/142792/Working_Paper_59_Final.pdf

Harberson, J.W.(1988). *The Ethiopian Transformation: The Quest for the Post-Imperial State*. London: Westview Press.

Harberson, J.W.(1996). *Election and Democratization in the Post-Mengistu Ethiopia*. (A Report prepared by the United States Agency for International development project on election in wartorn societies, September, 1996).Retrieved on April, 2016, from http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/Elections%20and%20Democratization%20in%20Post-Mengistu%20Ethiopia.pdf

Heywood, A. (2002). *Politics* (2nd ed,). New York: Palgrave.

Hooker, J. (2009). *Political Solidarity, Cultural Survival and the institutional design of autonomy in Nicaragua: From Heterogeneous Multiethnic Space to National Home lands*. (Working paper, July, 2009, Kellogg Institute for International Studies). Retrieved from June 2017 from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/44b2/73201467b153bade0.pdf

Hooghe,L.(n.d.). *Belgium:Hollowing the Center*. Retrieved on December, 2014, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/pdf_

Hooghe, M. and Reeskens, T. and Stolle, D. (n.d.). *Diversity, Multiculturalism and Social Cohesion: Trust and Ethnocentrism in European Societies*. Retrieved on March, 2013 from , http://www.kuleuven.be/citizenship/_data/diversity_irpp.pdf

Horowitz, D.(1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. London, England: University of California Press Ltd

Horowitz, D. (1997). Self-Determination, Politics, Philosophy, and Law. In Will Kymilicka, W. & Ian Shapiro (Eds.) , *Ethnicity and Group Rights* (pp.421-464). New York: New York University Press.

Horowitz, L. D. (2014). Ethnic Power Sharing: The Three Big Problems. *Journal of Democracy*. *25*(2). Retrieved on November, 2013, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265828843

Horsti, K.(n.d) .*From Multiculturalism to Discourse of Cultural diversity: European Public Service Broad casting and Challenge of Migration*. Retrieved December 20, 2013, from .http://imiscoecrosscluster.weebly.com/uploads/4/6/9/4/469440/l.pdf

Hovde, R.(1994). Democracy and Governance in Ethiopia: A survey of Institutions, Issues and Initiatives in the Transitional Period.In Harold G.Marcus (Ed.), *The12th international Conference of Ethiopian Studies*. Vol. ii, *Social Science* (pp.127-150).

Hughes, M.M.(2011). Intersectionality, Quotas, and Minority Women's Political Representation Worldwide. *The American Political Science Review*. *105*(3), 604-620.

Huntington, S.(1991). *Third Wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century*. Norman, London: University of Oklahama Press.

Husband, C. (2000). Media and the Public sphere in Multiethnic Societies. In Simon Cottle (Ed.), *Ethnic Minorities and the Media: Changing Cultural Boundaries* (pp.199-213). Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press.

Inglis, C. (1996). *Multiculturalism: New Policy Responses to Diversity* (Policy Paper 4). United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Retrieved on October, 2013, from https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000105582

Israel, G.(1992). *Determining Sample Size: Fact Sheets*. University of Florida. Retrieved on July, 2012 from http://sociology.soc.uoc.gr/socmedia/papageo/metaptyxiakoi/ pdf

Jenne, E.K., Lowe, W. & Saideman, S.M. (2007). Separatism as a Bargaining Posture: The Role of Leverage in Minority Radicalization. *Journal of Peace Research*. *44* (5) , 539-558.

Jones, N., Lyytikainen, M. and Presler, M. E. (2016). *Child Marriage in Ethiopia*: *A Review of the Evidence and Analysis of the Prevalence of Child Marriage in Hotspot Districts.* Retrieved on July, 2014, from https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-.pdf

Karat, P. (1975).Theoretical Aspect of the National Question: National Question in India**.** *Social Scientist*, *4*(1),5-13**.**

Kasahun Woldemariam.(2005). *Myths and Reality of Socioeconomic Resources and Poltical power in Ethiopia*. NewYork: University Press of America.

Korostelina ,K.V. (2009) , *Identity Conflicts**: Models of Dynamics and Early Warning***.** New York: Routledge.

Keiich, K. (n.d). *Democratization and Inter-ethnic Relations in Multi-Ethnic Countries: a Comparative Analysis of Croatia and Macedonia*. Retrieved on December , 2013,from http://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2115/39436/1/ASI21_008.pdf

Keller, J. E. (1988). *Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Keller, J. E. (2002). Ethnic Federalism, Fiscal Reform, Development and Democracy in Ethiopia. *African Journal of Political science*, 7(1), 21-50.

Khanna, V.N. (1972). *Comparative Study of Government and Politics*. New Delhi, India: R.Chand &Co.

Kiflu Tadesse.(2016). *Ityopia Hoye (*Amharic*)*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University.

Killian, L.,M. (1996). What or who is a minority? .*Michigan Sociological Review*, 10, 18-31.

Kymilicka, W.(1994). Individual and Community Rights. In Judith Baker (Ed.), *Group Right* (pp.17-34). Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.

Kymilicka, W. (Ed.). (1995 a). *The Right of Minority Cultures.* Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Kymilica , W. (1995b) . Community. In Robert E. Pettit and Philip Pettite (Eds.), *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy (*pp. 366-379*). USA:* Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Kymillika, W. and Norman, W.(Eds.).(2000). *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kymilicka, W.(2001). Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe. In Will Kymilicka & Magda Opalski (Eds.), *Can Liberal Pluralism Be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe* (pp.13-107). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kymilcika, W. (2002 a). *Contemporary Political Philosophy* (2nd ed). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kymilica , W. (2002 b). *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction*. New Delhi : Oxford University Press.

Kymilicka, W. (2012). *Multiculturalism: Success, Failure and the Future. Migration Policy Institute (MPI) , Europe*. Retrieved on February 2017 from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268290572

Kymilicka, W. (2004). Introduction: Ethnicity and the Politics of Democratic Nation Building in Africa. In Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyob and Will Kymilicka (Eds.), *Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa* (pp. 1-22). Oxford: James Currey Ltd.

Kymilicka, W. (2006). Emerging Western Models of Multination Federalism: Are They Relevant For Africa? In David Turton (Ed.) *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*, (pp.32-65). Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.

Krylow, A. (1994). Ethnic Factor in Post-Mengistu Ethiopia. In Abebe Zegeye and Siegfried Pausewang (Eds.) *Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, Nationalism and Democracy* (pp.231-242). London: British Academic Press.

Lake A. D. and Rothchild, D. **(**n.d**.).** *Territorial Decentralization and Civil War Settlement*. Retrieved on October 2017 from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.414.5071 df**.**

Lapiso Gedebo. (1991). *Ye Itioyopia Yegebar Sirat Ena Jimir Kapitalism, 1900-1966* [*The Ethiopian Feudal system and the Beginning of Capitalism*, 1907-1974]. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Lawshe, C.H.(1975). Aquantitative Approach to Content Validity. *Personal Psychology*. 28, 563-575

Levine, N.D. (1974). *Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Levy, J. (1997). Classifying Cultural Rights. In Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (Eds.) ,*Ethnicity and Group Rights* (pp.22-68). New York: New York University Press.

Lieberman, E.S. & Singh, P. (2012). The Institutional Origin of Ethnic Violence. *Comparative*

Politics.45(1), 1-24.

Lijphart, A. (1982). *Democracy in Plural Societies: A comparative Exploration*. Bombay: Prakashan.

Lijphart, A. (1995). Self- Determination versus Pre-Determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power-Sharing Systems. In Will Kymillicka (Ed.), *The Right of Minority Culture* (pp.275-288). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Linz, J., Stepan, A., Yadev, Y.(2011). *Crafting State-Nation*. Baltimore, Marry land: The John Hopkins University Press.

Lipsky, G.A. (1967). *Ethiopia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture* (3rd ed).New Haven: HRAF Press

Longers, J.F.(1982.). Minority Groups: An Interests-Group Perspective. *Social Work*. *27* (1), 7-14.

Lyons, T. (2010). Ethiopian Elections: Past and Future. *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies*.*5* (1), 107-12.

Mahajan, G. (n.d). *Negotiating Cultural Diversity and Minority Rights in India*. Retrieved on October, 2014, From https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/87f8/7d4bc9dbddb956b71341cd3ca99609de1487.pdf

Mahajan, G. (2002). *The Multicultural Path: Issue of Diversity and Discrimination*. New Delhi: Sage Publication.

Maimire Mennasemay. (2006). Ethiopian Political Theory, Democracy, and Surplus History. *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies.2* (1/2), 1-27. U.S.A: Tsehai Publisher.

Mamushet Amare.(2020). *Yetegaredew Jegininet*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Mansbridge, J. (2000). What Does a Representative Do? Descriptive Representation in Communicative Settings of Distrust, Uncrystallized Interests, and Historically Denigrated Status. In Wayne Norman & Will Kymilicka(Eds.), *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* (pp.99-124). New York: Oxford University Press.

Map of Ethiopia (2019). *Map of Ethiopia Regions: 30 Old and New Ethiopian Maps*. Retrieved on February, 2019 from https://allaboutethio.com/30-old-and-new-ethiopian-maps-you-have-to-see.html

Marcus, G.H. (1994). *A History of Ethiopia*. California, U.S.A.: University of California Press.

Markakis, J. (1974) .*Ethiopia: Anatomy of Traditional Polity*. Oxford, London: Oxford University Press.

Markakis, J. and Mohammed, S.(Eds). (1998). *Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Marsh, D. & Stoker, G.(1995).*Theory and Method in Political Science* (Eds.). London: MacMillan Press.

Martinovic, B. & Verkuyten, M. (2006). Understanding Multicultural Attitude: The Role of group

Status, Identification, Friendship and Justifying Ideologies. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations,30*(1).

Mason, A. (2007). Multiculturalism and the Critique of Essentialism. In Anthony Simon Laden and David Owen (Eds.), *Multiculturalism and Political Theory* (pp.221-244). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mathew, B. and Ross, L.(2010) . *Research Methods: a Practical Guide to Social Science.* Harlow, England: Pearson Education Limited.

McNabb, D. (2005). *Research Methods For Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods*. New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India.

Merera Gudina. (2000). Authoritarian Populism and Democratization in Ethiopia. In Kwesi Kwaa Prah & Abdel Ghaaffar Mohammed Ahmed (Ed.s), *Africa in Transformation: Political and Economic Transformation and Socio-Political Responses in Africa.* Vol.2. (pp.179-193). *The Fifth Congress Proceedings of the Organization for Social Sciences Research in Eastern and Southern Africa* (OSSREA). South Africa: OSSREA.

Merera Gudina. (2003). *Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Quest for Democracy, 1960-2000*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Chamber Printing Press.

Merera Gudina. (2006). Contradictory Interpretation of Ethiopian History: The Need for New Consensus.In David Turton (Ed.), *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective* (pp.119-131). Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.

Merera Gudina. (2011). *Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolutionary Democracy, 1960s-201*1. Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa: Chamber Printing Press.

Meer, N. & Modood, T. (n.d.). *How Does Inter-Culturalism Contrast With Multiculturalism*? Retrieved October 10, 2013, from http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjis20

Mesfin W/ Mariam.(2011). *Siltan, Bahili Ena Agezaz*, [Authority /*Power, Culture and Government*]. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Commercial Printing Press.

Miksell, M.W. & Murphey, B.A. (1991). A Framework for Comparative Study of Minority Group Aspiration. *Annals of the Association of America Geographers*. 81(4), 581-604.

Mill, J.S. (2001). *On Liberty*. Ontario, Canada: Batoche Books Limited. (Original work published 1859).

MoI (Ministry of Information). (2002). *Issues in Building up Democratic System*.(Amharic). Press and Audiovisual Department. Ministry of Information, Addis Ababa, FDRE.

Paulos Milikias (2001**).** Ethiopia: The TPLF and Roots of the 2001 Poltical Tremor**.** *International*

conference on Africa (Paper 4). Retrieved on January, 2016, from https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=africancenter_icad_archive

Mishler, W.& Schwindt-Bayer, L.(2005). An Integrated Model of Women's Representation. *Journal of Politics*. *6*(2), 407-428. Cambridge University Press.

Moges Yigezu (2010). *Language Ideology and the Challenges of Multilingual Education in Ethiopia: The Case of Harari Region*. Organization for Social Sciences Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA).

Mookherjee, M.(Ed.). (2008). *Issues in Political Theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Morrison, K and Chung, A..(n.d). Self- identification and Interethnic Attitudes: "White" or "European American"? Self -identifying Labels Influence Majority Group Members' Inter-ethnic attitudes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*. Retrieved on January, 2013, from *www.reserch.chicagobooth.edu/cdv/workshop/Morrison..(pdf*)

Moreno, L. (2001). *Ethno Territorial Concurrence:* Spanish *Comunidades Autonomous.* In Alain G. Gagnon & James Tully (Eds.). *Multinational Democracy* (pp.201-222*)*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morrilas, M. (n.d.) Failed Ethnic Federalism: The Accommodation of Constituent Nationalities in Yugoslavia Before and After Tito's Leadership (1968-1980 and 1980-1992), (Working Paper) . Retrieved on April 2017, from https://www.slideshare.net/atahualpa61/working-paper-failed-ethnic-federalism-yugoslavia

Mulluken Tesfaw.(2016). *Yetifat Zemen: be Amara Hizib Lay Yetefetseme Zer Matsidat: 1983 -2007 E.c. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Amharic).*

Muse Abrha (2015, November 17). An Interview with SBS [Radio]. Retrieved on November, 2015, from https://www.Youtube.sbs.com.au/radio/

Newton, K. & Vend eth, J.W.(2003). *Foundation of Comparative Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nimni, E.(1995). Marx, Engels, and the National Question. In Will Kymilicka (Ed.). *The Right of Minority Culture* (pp.57-78). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Nimni, E.(Ed.). (2005). National *Cultural Autonomy and Its Contemporary Critics.*London: Routledge.

Norman, G.(2010*). Likert Scales, Levels of Measurment and the Laws of Statistics*. Retrieved on July, 2014, from

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/41420484_LIkert_scales_levels_of_measurement_adn_the_laws_of_statistics.

Norman, W.(2006). *Negotiating Nationalism: Nation Building, Federalism, and Secession in the Multinational State*. New York: Oxford University.

O'Leary, B. (2001). An Iron Law of Nationalism and Federations? A(neo-Diceyian) Theory of the Necessity of a Federal Staatsvolk, and of Consociational Rescue . *Nation and Nationalism*. *7*(3), 273-296.

O'Leary, B.& McGarry, J.(1994). The Political Regulation of National Ethnic Conflict. *Journal of Comparative Politics*. *47*(1). Oxford, London: Oxford University Press.

Ottaway, M. (1995). The Ethiopian Transition: Democratization or New Authoritarianism? *North East African Studies*, 2(3), 67-84.

Owen, D. & Tully, J.(2007). Redistribution and Recognition: The Two Approaches. In Anthony Simon Laden and David Owen (Eds.), *Multiculturalism and Political Theory* (pp.256-292). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pagagianni, K.(n.d.). *Accommodating Diversity: Federalism and Other Options*. Oslo Forum. Retrieved on June, 2014, from https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/135

Parekh, B. (2000). *Re-thinking Multiculturalism*. London: Macmillan Press.

Parekh, B. (n.d) . *Political Theory and the Multicultural Society*. Retrieved on December 2012, from http://red.pucp.edu.pe/ridei/wp-content/uploads/biblioteca/081232.pdf

Passerin, M. (1999).*Multiculturalism and Deliberative Democracy*. Retrieved on December 2012, from http://www.recercat.net/bitstream/handle/2072/1301/ICPS163.pdf?sequence=1

Pearson, F.S. & Rochester, J.M.(1992). *International Relations: The Global Condition in the late Twentieth Century* (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill, inc.

Peters, B.G. (1999). *Institutional Theories in Political Science: The new Institutionalism*. London: Wellington House.

PDRE. (1988). The Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. *Review of Socialist Law*. *14*(2), 181-208.

Philips, A. (1997). Dealing with Difference: a Politics of Ideas or Politics of Presences? In Robert E. Gooddin and Philip Pettit (Eds.) *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology (* pp.174-185). Canberra: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Philips, A. (2004). Dilemma of Gender and Culture: The Judge, the Democratic and Political Activist. In Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner-Halev (Eds.), *Minorities within Minorities: Equality Rights and Diversity* (pp.113-135). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Phillips, L.D. (2009). *Legal Standards, Power Sharing and Autonomy Options*. June 2009. (Working Paper prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations). Retrieved on August, 2012, from https://krisisberaad.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Power-Sharing-and-Autonomy-.pdf

Pitkin, H.F. (1967). *The Concept of Representation. London*: University of California Press.

Polluha, E. (1998). Ethnicity and Democracy-A Viable Alliance? In M.A. Mohamed Salih and John Markakis (Eds.), *Ethnicity and the State in Eastern Africa* (pp.30-40). Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikaiinstitutet.

Protsyk, O. (2008). Majority –Minority Relations in the Ukraine. *JEMIE*, 7. European Center for Minority Issues. Retrieved on September 2012 From http://www.policy.hu/protsyk/Publications/MajMinRelationsUKR

Rabushka, A., and Shepsle, K .(1972) . *Politics of Plurality: A Theory of Democratic Instability*. Ohio: E.Merill Publishing Company.

Reilly, B. (2000) . *Democracy in Divided societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*. New York: Cambridge University.

Ree, V. E. (1994). Stalin and the Nationalist Question. *Revolutionary Russia.7*(2), 214-238. London: Published by Frank Cass.

Reitman, O. (2004). On Exit. In Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner –Halev (Eds.), *Minorities Within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity* (pp.189-209). New York:Cambridge University Press.

Requejo, F. (2001). Political Liberalism in Multinational State: The Legitimacy of Plural and Asymmetrical Federalism. In Alain G .Gagnon & James Tully (Eds.), *Multinational Democracy* (pp.110-133). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

R.D.(Revolutionary Democracy). (2007, May). *Abiyotawi Democrace Ena Ye Amerar Tiyake* [*The Question of Leadership in Revolutionary Democracy: Leadership Recruitment Policy*]. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Roeder, E.P. (1991). Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization. *World Politics*. 43(2), 196-232. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved on June, 2013 from http//www.jstor.org/stable/

Rosado, C. (1996). *Towards A Definition of Multiculturalism*. Retrieved on June ,2013 from . https://www.academia.edu/777187/

Rosado ,C.(2006). *What Do We Mean by "Managing Diversity"?* New Haven: Rosado Consulting for Change in Human System. Retrieved on June, 2013, from http://www.edchange.org/multicultural/papers/pdf

Rawls, J.(1971). *A Theory of Justice*. U.S.A: Harvard University Press.

Ryan, C., Casas,J. and Thompson. (2010). Interethnic Ideology, Intergroup Perceptions, and Cultural Orientation. *Journal of Social Issues. 66(*1), 29-44.

Ryan, S. (1990). *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*. USA:Dartmouth Publishing Company ltd.

Rustow, D.A.(1999). Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamc Model. In Lisa Anderson (ed..), *Transition to Democracy*, (pp.14-41). New York: Columbia University Press.

Sabacci, A.(1995). *Ye Mussolini Werera be Ethiopia: Fashizim ena Ye Kign Agezaz Temokiro*. (Amharic). Garedew Demise (Trans.). Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Zega publishing and promotion.

Safran, W. (1994). Non-Separatist Policies Regarding Ethnic Minorities: Positive Approaches and Ambiguous Consequences. *International Political Science Review*. *15*(1) , 61-80. Saga Publications ltd.

Sandel, M. (1997). The Procedural Republic and The Unencumbered Self. In Robert E. Gooddin & Philip Pettit (Eds..), *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology*,(pp..247-256). Canberra: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Schalk-Soeker, S.R. & VandeVijvuer, F.(2008). The Concept of Multiculturalism: A Study Among Dutch Majority Members. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*. *38*(8) , 2125-2178.

Schedler, A. (2002). Elections without Democracy: The Menue of Manipulation. *Journal of Democracy*. 13(2), 36-50.

Schmidt, V.(2006). Institutionalism. In Colin Hay, Michael Lister & David Marsh(Eds.), *The State: Theories and Issues* (pp.99-117). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sergew Hable Sellassie.(1972). *Ancient and Medieval Ethiopian History to 1270*. Addis Abeba: Haile Sellassie I University.

Seyoum Y.Hameso. (1997). *Ethnicity in Africa: Towards a Positive Approach*. New York: I university Press.

Shacher, A. (2000). Should Church and State be joined at the Altar? Women's Rights and the

Multicultural Dilemma. In Wayne Norman and Will Kymilica (Eds.), *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* (pp.. 199-224). New York: Oxford University Press.

Shacher, A. (2004). *Multicultural Jurisdiction: Cultural Differences and Women Rights*. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.

Shields, S. (2008). Gender: An Intersectionality Perspective. *Sex Roles*. 59, 301-311.

Skobla, D. (2001). Nation States, Ethnic Minorities and Human Rights; Some Conceptions and Misconceptions. *Polish Sociological Review*. 134, 139-155.

Slezkine, Y.(1994). The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism. *Slavic Review*, 53(2) , 414-452.

Smith, D.J.(2013). Non-Territorial Autonomy and Political Community in Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of Ethno- Politics and Minority Issues in Europe* (JEMIE). *12*(1), 27- 55.

Solomon Negussie. (2006). *Fiscal Federalism in the Ethiopian Ethnic –Based Federal System*. Netherlands, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers (WLP).

Smith, D.A.(1986). *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*. USA: Blackwell Publishing.

Smith, D.A. (2001). *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*.: Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell Publishing.

Smith, D.A. (2009). *Ethno symbolism and Nationalism: A cultural Approach*. London: Rutledge.

Smith, J. D. (2013). Non-Territorial Autonomy and Political Communities in Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of Ethno politics and Minority issues in Europe (JEMIE*). *12*(1) , 27-55. Retrieved on December 2014 from http:// ww.ecmide/fileadmin/downloads/publications

Song, S.(2007). *Justice, Gender and the Politics of Multiculturalism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Spears, I.S. (2013). Africa's Informal Power Sharing and the Prospects for Peace. *Civil Wars*. *15*(37), 37-53.

Spinner Helev, J. (2004). Autonomy, Association and Pluralism. In Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner- Halev (Eds.), Minorities Within Minorities: Equality , Rights and Diversity (pp.157-172). NewYork: Cambridge University Press.

Stalin.J.(1953). *From Marx to Mao*. Vol.2. Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House. Retrieved from http://www.marx2mao.com/PDFs/StWorks12.pdf f

Stepan, A. (2001). *Arguing Comparative Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Stojanovic, N. (2003). Swiss Nation-State and its Patriotism: A Critique of Will Kymilicka's Account

of Multination States. *Polis,11*, 45-94.

Swenden, W. (2006). *Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe: A Comparative and Thematic Analysis*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tesfaye Aaron (2006). Identity Politics, Citizenship, and Democratization in Ethiopia. *International Journal of Ethiopian Studies. 77-179*. USA: Tsehai Publisher.

Tesfaye Tafesse. (2009). The Predicaments of Amhara Migrant Settlers in East Wollega Zone, Ethiopia. In Sveln Ege, Harald Aspen, Birhanu Teferra and Shiferaw Bekele(Eds.), *Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*.Retrieved on June, 2015 from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d540/decc20b50605e05fa24d226ec2a3db2c9637.pdf

Taddess Tamrat. (1972). *Church and State, 1270-1527*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Tadesse, D and Girma, A.(1990). *Ethiopian History: From Early Axumite Period to Downfall of Emperor HaileSellassie I*. . Addis Ababa: Aster Nega Publishing Enterprises.

Taherdoost, H.(2016). Validity and Reliability of the Research Instrument; How to Test the Validation of a questionnaire/ Survey in Research. *International Journal of Acedemic Research in Managment*. *15*(3), 28-36.

Tarekegn Adebo .(1982). Ethnicity versus Class: Concepts in the Analysis of the Ethiopian Revolution. In Seven Rubenson (Ed.), *Proceedings of Seventh International Conference of Ethiopian Studies* (pp.540-550), held in the University of Lund on April 26-29 April. Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies.

Tarekegn Adebo . (1996). Democratic Political Development in Reference to Ethiopia. *Northeast African Studies, 3*(2),3-96.

Taye Assefa & Tegene Gebre-Egziabher (Eds.) .(2007). *Decentralization in Ethiopia*. Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies (FSS).

Taylor, C. (1994). The Politics of Recognition. In Amy Gutman(Ed.), *Multiculturalism* (pp.25-75). Princeton, New Jersy: Princeton University Press.

Tegegne Teka.(1998). Amhara Ethnicity in the Making. In Mohammed Salih and John Markakis (Eds.), *Ethnicity and The state in Eastern Africa* (pp.116-126). Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikaninstitutes.

Teguadda Alebachew (2011). *When Constitution Lacks Legitimacy in the Making: The Case of Ethiopia* (M.A Thesis). Retrieved on December,2015, from www.chilot.me

Tilahun Bejitual (2007) .*Management of On-campus Conflict among Students of Diverse Background: A Multicultural Perspective – the Case of Bahir Dar University*(MA Thesis, Addis Ababa

University).

Tilly, C. (Ed.) (1975). *The Formation of National State in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tinbitu Derese.(2012/13). *Ye Ityopia federalawi Sriat Ena ye Kimant Behereseb Years Astedader Tiyake* The Federal System and the Quest of Kimant Nationality for Self- administration]. s.l: s.n.

Thornberry, P.(2002). *Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Tonkiss, K. (2012). *Constitutional Patriotism and The post National Paradox: an Explanation of Migration: Identity and Locality at the Local Level* (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Birmingham). Retrieved on January, 2015 from https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/9256546.pdf

Topperwien, N. (2008). *Power Sharing: Lessons Learned from Swiss Experience. Switzerland: Swiss Department of French Affairs*. Retrieved from . https://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Topics/Publicationspdf.

TGE (Transitional Government of Ethiopia). (1992*). A Proclamation to Provide For the Establishment of National / Regional Self-Government*. (*Negaret Gazeta*. No.2, Proclamation No.7/1992). Addis Ababa.

TGR3 (Transitional Government of Region 3).(1993). *Constitution of the Transitional Government of Region Three*.(Zikre Hig, No.2, Proclamation No.2/ 1993). Bahir Dar.

TGE/ OPHCC (Office of the Population and Housing Census Commission). (1991, December). *The 1984 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia, Analytical Report at the National Level.* Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Tronvolt, K.(2010). The Ethiopian 2010 Federal and Regional elections: Re-establishment of the One Party State. *African Affairs*. *1*(6).

Tsegaye Tegenu. (2006). *Evaluation of the Operation and Performance of Ethnic Decentralization System in Ethiopia: A Case Study of The Gurage People, 1992-2000*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Addis Ababa University Press.

Tully, J. (1995). *Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in Age of Diversity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

UNRMI (United Nations Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues). (2017, March*). Language Rights of Linguistic Minorities: A practical Guide for the Implementation*. Geneva, Switzerland: UN.

Retrieved on July 2014 from https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Minorities/SR.pdf

UNESCO. (2006, March). *Local Policies for Cultural Diversity. Systems, Citizenship and Governance with an Especial Emphasis on U.K and Australia.* Barcelona: UNESCO. Retrieved from http/www.papers.ssn.com/so/3 /papers cfm? _id215446

U.S.S.R.(1936**).***The Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of SovietSocialist Republic*.Vol.14. London: Red Star Press Ltd. Retrieved on September, 2015, from https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1936/12/05.htm

U.S.S.R.(1977). *The Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic.* (Adopted at the Seventh sepecial Session of the Suprem Soviet of the USSR, October, 1977). Retrieved on November, 2015, from https://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons03.html

Uthman Hassen. (2006). *A New Frontier in the Inter-ethnic Relationship in Multi-Ethnic Ethiopia: A Study on the Role of Religion in the Promoting Social Integration in Beni-Shangul*(M.A Thesis, Addis Ababa University). Retrieved on June, 2014 from http://etd.aau.edu.et/dspace/bitstream/123456789/2285/1/56

Ullendorff, E.(1973). *The Ethiopians: An Introduction to Country and People* (3rd ed.). Oxford, London: Oxford University Press.

Vasta, E. (2007). *Accommodating Diversity: Why Current Critiques of Multiculturalism Miss The Point*. (Working paper, No.53). Retrieved on November 20, 2013, from http// www.compas.oxac.uk/fileadmin/files/publications/working_papaer/pdf

Vaughan, S. (2003). *Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia* (Doctoral Dissertation, the University of Edinburgh). Retrieved on October 2012, from https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/id/1299/vaughanphd.pdf.

Vaughan, S. (2006) . Response to Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia`s South. In David Turton (Ed.*), Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experiences in Comparative Perspective* (pp.181- 207). *Eastern African Studies*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.

Verkuyten, M. (2005). Ethnic Group Identification and Group Evaluation Among Minority and Majority Groups: Testing the Multiculturalism Hypothesis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88 (*1) , 121–138

Virgova, R.(2015). Census, Identity and the Politics of Numbers: The Case of Macedonia. *Contemporary South Eastern Europe*. *2*(2), 107-125.

Walelign Mekonnen. (1969, November 17). *On the Question of Nationality in Ethiopia*. (Arts IV, HSIV). Retrieved on September, 2014, from https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ethiopia/nationalities.pdf

Weinstock, D.M. (2004). Beyond Exit Rights: Retraining the Debate. In Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner –Halev (Eds.), *Minorities within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity* (pp.227-249). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Weinstock, D.M. (2007). Liberalism, Multiculturalism and the Problem of Internal Minorities. In Anthony Simon Laden and David Owen (Eds.) , *Multiculturalism and Political Theory*(pp.244-265). Cambridge, NewYork: Cambridge University Press.

Wikipedia, 2019. *Maps of Ethiopia in the post 1990*. Retrived on Februraray, 2019, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regions_of_Ethiopia#/media/File:Regions_of_Ethiopia_EN.svg

Wright, J. (1999). Minority Groups, Autonomy and Self-determination. *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*. *19*(4) , 605-629.

Wolf, S. (n.d). *Complex Power Sharing as Conflict Resolution: South Tyrol in Comparative Perspective*. Retrieved on October, 2006 from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265272053_

Wolf, S. (.n.d). *Power Sharing and the Vertical layering of Authority: A Review of Current Practices*. Retrieved on May 2013, from https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004164826.i-794.81

Yared Ayalew**.** (2017). *The Quest of for Self-Determination Under Ethiopia`s Ethnic Federalism: The Case of The People of Konso* (M.A Thesis, Department of Political Science and International Studies, Bahir Dar University).

Yeshiwas Degu . (2013). *From "Melting Pot" to Quest for Recognition: The Kemant People in Ethiopia* (M.A Thesis, The Hague, Netherlands). Retrieved on December, 2015 from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1405/b2fa7cc2f785c1986dd2e2272f7ae43b7cc3.pdf

Yohanes Yitayih**. (**2010). *Legitimacy of Sub-national Constitution in the Ethiopian Federations: The Case of Amhara Regional Government Constitution*(M.A Thesis , Addis Ababa University). Retrieved on February 2015, from www.chilot.me

Yonatan Tesfay. (2008). *Institutional Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity: Federalism in the South Africa and Ethiopia* (Doctoral Dissertation, The Faculty of Law, University of the West Cape). Retrieved on November 2015, from https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/58913449.pdf **.**

Young, J. (1994). *Peasants and Revolution in Ethiopia: Tigray 1975-1989* (Doctoral Dissertation, Simon Fraser University, Canada). Retrieved on November, 2015, from file:///C:/Users/DELL/Downloads/b16952741.pdf

Young, M.I. (1997). Polity and Group Difference: Critic of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship. In Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit (Eds.),*Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology* **(** pp.256-273). Canberra: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Zelealem Leyew. (2002). *Sociolinguistic Survey Report of the Kemant (Qimant) Language of Ethiopia*. *SIL International.* Retrieved on February 2017, from https://www.sil.org/system/files/reapdata/23/15/14/1.pdf

Zemelak Aytenew. (2014). The Politics of Sub-national Constitutions and Local Government in Ethiopia. *Perspective on Federalism*. *6*(2).*Centro Studisui Federalismo.* Retrieved on December 2017, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312630953..

APPENDICES

Appendix - 1. : Ghizats (Administrative Regions of The Ethiopian Empire in Early 1930S before the Italian invasion.

S.N	Name of the Ghizats/provinces	Ethnonyms or physionyms
1	Western Tigre	Ethnonyms
2	Eastern Tigre	Ethnonyms
3	Northern Amahara	Ethnonyms
4	Wag	Ethnonyms
5	Angot, Gura, Kelem	
6	Wello Teru, Biru and Awsa	
7	Yeju	
8	Nothern Beneshangule	
9	Gojjam	
10	Central Amhara and selale	
11	Eastern and Southern Shoa	
12	Nono and Gurage	Each Represented Ethnonyms
13	Southern Beneshangule	
14	Western Sibu	
15	Guduru and Leke	
16	Sayo and Anflo	
17	Wallaga	
18	Illubabor	
19	Eastern Sibu and Goldya	
20	Limu and Enarya	
21	Gera	
22	Jimma, Guma and Janjero	
23	Gurafarda	
24	Kafa, Maji and Gimira	Each represented Ethnonyms
25	Bako and Gofa	Gofa represented Ethnonyms
26	Konso and Gardula	Each represented Ethnonyms
27	Welayita	Ethnonyms
28	Kembata	Ethnonyms
29	Sidamo and Borena	Sidamo representes ethnonyms
30	Arussi	
31	Bale	
32	Harerge and Ogaden	

Source: adopted from Daniel (1994 , p.93).

Appendix -2. : Teklay Ghizat/Province and Awraja(sub-province) in 1970s

S.N	Name of province	Name of sub province
1	Eritrea	Sahil, Akordat,Keren,Massawa,AkaleGuzay, Asseb, & Serae
2	**Tigre**	Shire, Adwa,Aksum,Tenben,Inderta,Agame, WuletAwlallo, **Raya and Azebo**

3	Begemidir	Chilga, Gondar, Wegera,Semene,Libbo, Debretabore, &Gayint
4	Gojjam	Metekel,**Agewmidir**,Bahirdar,Damote, Mota, Bichena, D/markos
5	Wollo	Lasta, Wag, **Qobo and Raya**, Wadladelanta,Yeju,Borena&Sayint, Werehemeno, Desie, Ambasel, Wereilu, Awsa, &Qualu
6	Wellega	Assosa and Beneshangul, Quelem, Ginbi, Guery, Lekemet, Arjo
7	Hareregе	Adal&Issa , Churcher, Wonbera, Garamuleta, Diredawa, Harar, Gursum, Jijiga, Deghabur, Qubri-Deharre, Wardor, Qelaffo
8	Illubabore	Gambella, Gore, Bunobedele, Mocha
9	Arusi	Arbagugu, Chilalo, Ticho
10	Bale	Genale, Delo, Fasil, Ginbir, Ellerre
11	Shoa	Selale, Merabete, Menz and Yifat, Jura, Tegulet and Bulga, Mengesha, Jibetand Mecha, **Cheho** and **Guragie**, **Kembata**, Hykoch and Butajira, Yerer and Kereyu
12	**Keffa**	Limmu, Jimma, Kullo **Konta**, **Kefa**, **Maji** &Ghimira
13	**Gamo Gofa**	
14	**Sidamo**	**Welayita**, **Sidamo**, **Derese**, Jemjem, Arero, Borena

Source: (Mesfin, 1970 in Cohen and Koehn, 1988, p.21).

Appendix 3: Autonomous and Administrative Regions of Ethiopia in late 1980s

S.N.	Name of provinces	Status of the province
1	**Eritrea**	Autonomous Region
2	**Tigray**	Autonomous Region
3	**Asseb**	Autonomous Region
4	**DireDewa**	Autonomous Region
5	**Ogaden**	Autonomous Region
6	North Gondar	Administrative Region
7	South Gondar	Administrative Region
8	North Wello	Administrative Region
9	South Wello	Administrative Region
10	East Gojjam	Administrative Region
11	West Gojjam	Administrative Region
12	Metekel	Administrative Region
13	Assosa	Administrative Region
14	Wallaga	Administrative Region
15	North Shoa	Administrative Region
16	Addis Ababa	Administrative Region
17	West Shoa	Administrative Region
18	South Shoa	Administrative Region
19	East Shoa	Administrative Region
20	West Harerge	Administrative Region
21	East Hararge	Administrative Region
22	Arsi	Administrative Region
23	Bale	Administrative Region
24	Gambella	Administrative Region
25	Illubabore	Administrative Region
26	Keffa	Administrative Region

27	North Omo	Administrative Region
28	South Omo	Administrative Region
29	Sidamo	Administrative Region
30	Borenna	Administrative Region

Source: modified and adopted from Daniel(1994, p.108)

Appendix-4: The List of Ethnic Groups, and Their Self Government Status During the TGE

Region	No of NNP recognized	Name of NNP allowed to exercise self government	Name of NNP NOT allowed to have self government entity	Region	No of ethnic recognized	Name of NNP allowed to exercise self government	Name of NNP NOT allowed to have self government entity
	1	1. Tigray		9	32	8. Bussa	
1	2		2.Saho		33	9. Konss[so]	
	3		3.Kunama		34	10. Gamo	
2	4	**1.** Afar	-		35		11.Zoyisse
	5	1.Amhara			36		12. Gobez*
3	6	**2.**Agew Kamirigina			**37**		13. Gidole
	7	3 . Agew Awongigna			38	1.Basketo	
	8	5. Oromo			39	**2.**Murssi	
4		Oromo	_		40	3. Ari	
5	9	10. Somali		10	41	4.Hammer	
	10	1. Gumuz			42	5.Dasenech	
6	11	2. Berta			43	6.Maley*	
	12		3.Koma*		44		7.Arbore
	13		4.Mao		45		8.Gnangatom
	14		5.Shinasha		46		9. Tsemai
7	15	1 Gurage			47		10.Dimme
	16	2. Hadiya			48		11. Bode*
	17	3. Kembata			49	1.Shekocho/Mocha	
	18	4.Tembaro			50	2.Chara	
	19	5. Yem*			51	3.Benchi*	
8	20	**1.**Sidama			52	4.Keficho	
	21	2.Gedio			53	5. Dizo	
	22	3.Burji			54	**6.**Surma	
	23	4.Amaro /Kore		11	55		7.Zelmama
	24	5.Gedicho*			56		8.Minit*
	25	1**.** Wolaita			57		9. Sheko
	26	2.Dawuro*			58		10. Nao
9	27	3.Konta		12	59	1.Agnwak	
	28	4.Aydi			60	2.Nuer	
	29	5.Gewada			61	3.Majenger*	
	30	6.Melon*		13	62	1.Hareri (Adere)	
	31	7.Gofa		14			

Source: (TGE, 1992, Proclamation No.7).

Appendix-5: Survey Questionnaires

Invitation to participate in a research on Multiculturalism

Dear sir/madam,

I am Tadesse Aklog , an academic staff in Bahirdar University, department of Civic and Ethical Studies, currently doing my PhD dissertation on Multiculturalism at Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia.

The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect data from different individuals representing diverse groups working at different capacities in society and institutions in Amhara National Regional State. The result of this research is expected to fill the possible gap between the theory, and or policy and practice of accommodation of diversity in the region. In doing so, the finding expected to contribute towards the efforts of government and different actors toward the creation of democratic, harmonies and all inclusive atmospheres among different communities in the region in particular, and the country in general.

In addition, the data that you provide to, is critically vital for the success and completion of my PhD study.

Therefore I kindly request you to answer every question genuinely and freely as your name and personal backgrounds will be kept confidential so as to make you free and comfortable and well-secured in the process of the research. For this ethical consideration, you are not required to write your name in the questionnaire.

I thank you very much for your cooperation!

PART I: PERSONAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND

I.A. PERSONAL DATA

1.) Identification of Respondents

1.1. Name of the residential *Zone*_____

1.2. Name of *Woreda* you live in_____

1.3. Name of the town _____

1.4. Name of kebele_____

2. For how long have you stayed here?_____(in years)

3. Residential address of your family (parents)

3.1. Name of the Region/Kilil they live in _____ ☐

3.2. Name of the residential Zone _____ ☐

3.3. Name of the Residential Woreda_____ ☐

4. Respondents Age _____ (in year) _____ ☐

5. Respondents Sex (Put `X` in the Box) 1. Male _____ ☐

2. Female _____ ☐

6. Respondent`s Marital status

1. Married ☐ Window/divorced ☐

2. Single ☐

I.B. Socio-economic and Ethno-Linguistic background

Please make your choice by checking "X" in the appropriate Box

7. Educational background

7.1. unable to read and write ☐

7.2. able to write and read only ☐

7.3. Primary school (first cycle) ☐

7.4. Secondary primary school (second cycle) ☐

7.5. General secondary school ☐

7.6. Preparatory ☐

7.7. TVET ☐

7.8. College diploma ☐

7.9. First Degree and Above

8. Educational background of parents ☐

8.1. unable to read and write ☐

8.2. able to write and read only ☐

8.3. elementary school ☐

8.4. secondary school ☐

8.5. Certificate ☐

8.6. College diploma ☐

8.7. Degree and above ☐

9. What is your current occupation and status?

9.1. Self-employed ☐

9.2. Employee in government ☐

9.3. Employee in private business ☐

9.4. Employee in None Governmental Organization ☐

9.5. Unemployed Employed in Government office ☐

10. The name of the organization/office you are employed in:_____

11. The title of your job in the office_____

12. .Monthly Income: Below 1000 ☐ 1000-2000 ☐ 2000-3500 ☐ 3500-5000 ☐

5000- 7500 ☐ 7500-10000 ☐ Above 10000 ☐

13. Religion : Muslim ☐ Orthodox Christian ☐ Protestant ☐

Catholic ☐ Wakefeta ☐ Other ☐

14. Your Mother Tongue? Oromifa ☐ Amharic ☐ Awigna ☐ Hemitegna ☐

15. How many Ethiopian languages you are capable of communicating?

Only one ☐ Two ☐ More than two ☐

16. Based on Question number 16, list out a language or languages that you are capable of communicating _____ _____, _____, _____

17. Which ethnic group do you belong to ?_____

18. If you find it difficult to categorize your ethnicity to one group, then explain the reasons briefly? _____

19. to which ethnic group your friend or partner belongs to? _____

20. Have you ever moved to other region or town in the country in your life?
Yes ☐ No ☐

21. If you get the chance /opportunities, which place do you want to visit as a Tourist? (Mention the place, the name of the region or zone in which the Tourist site is located)_____ _____

PART II Multicultural Attitude Scale

Read the following statements carefully and rate your level of agreement and disagreement by checking (X) in the appropriate box

Note: 1= strongly Disagree 2= Disagree 3= Neutral 4= Agree 5= strongly Agree

		1	2	3	4	5
1	Homogeneity is good but our country is not fortunate enough to have that.(Reversed) .					
2	It is good that government is creating homogenous communities at different levels.(Reversed)					
3	My Ethnic community is quite different and unique than other ethnic groups in the region.(Reversed)					
4	It is regrettable that the culture of my community has lost its originality due to the historical process of assimilation. (Reversed)					
5	We have to accept the fact that ethnic identity is natural that it can`t change (Reversed)					
6	I don't feel comfortable to criticize every traditions and customs of my community.(Reversed)					
7	In every ethnic group`s culture there could be harmful cultural practices as there are good things to be cherished.					
8	Inter-group contacts leads to conflict. (Reversed)					
9	Free mobility of labor within the region and beyond will threaten the economic and cultural security of ethnic groups(NNP).(Reversed)					
9	Ethnic diversity may lead to inter-ethnic harmony					
10	It is painful to hear that the rights peoples from other ethnic groups have been violated.					
11	In every society it is good to recognize and protect diversity of any form.					
12	There should be equitable participation of all ethnic groups at any level of government.					
13	In every ethnic group there is internal diversity.					

14	I enjoy music of other ethnic groups.					
15	I am interested to know the history of other groups.					
16	Every community has its own indigenous knowledge that must be tapped.					
17	I don't feel comfortable when I see individuals speaking different langue coming to my town or , province. (Reversed)					
18	Inter-group dialogue improves understanding and knowledge					
19	I enjoy funny ethnic jokes, even if some people might find it offensive					
20	If you know the language and culture of other ethnic groups then it means you acquire the identity of others as well as yours					
21	Ethnic recognition gives me confidence in myself					
22	The government should encourage the use of multilingual working language at federal and regional level					
23	I don't trust persons from other ethnic group to represent my interest during election.(Reversed)					
24	I am Willing to share any view, including any political issues to individual persons, regardless of their ethnic background.					
25	I will be happy to learn and know about the languages of other ethnic groups.					
26	Cultural and linguistic factors are the barrier to social relations among ethnic groups in Ethiopia.(Reversed)					
27	The fact that every members of ethnic group understands Amahric fosters intergroup communication among groups in Amahara Region					
28	I believe that mutual recognition of ethnic diversity may enhance trust and cooperation in Ethiopia.					
29	Century old values and traditions of ethnic groups should not be respected as it is sign of backwardness.(Reversed)					
30	I believe that different ethnic groups rights should not be recognize in the region as the region belongs to the Majority Amahara people.(Reversed)					
31	Inter-ethnic cultural fusion will ultimately erode the customs and values of my ethnic group					
32	My ethnic group does share some commonalities as it has its own unique features.					
33	I feel annoyed when I learn that persons from other ethnic groups uses my mother tongues imperfectly.(Reversed).					

PART III. Perception of Political Participation and Representation

Read the following statements carefully and indicate your agreement or disagreement by putting X in the appropriate box

1. Had you ever participated in local elections (woreda and kebele) as a voter in your residence?

   Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know ☐

2. If your answer for Q.No.1. is Yes, then how many times you had participated in the election?

   ._____
   _____
   _____

3. If your answer for Q.No.1. is No , then do you have any interest to participate in the elections to come?

   Yes ☐ No ☐

4. If your answer for Q.No.3 . is No , then explain why?

   _____

   _____-

5. Had you ever participated in local elections (woreda and kebele) as a candidate ?

   Yes No

6. If your answer for Q.5 is Yes, at what capacity did you participate?

   Representing the incumbent party ☐

   Representing opposition parties ☐

   As individual candidate ☐

7. Based on your response to Q.6, Had you gotten a chance to win in such elections?

   Yes ☐ No ☐

8. If your response for Q.no.7 is Yes, at what level of administration you had hold office or seat?

   Woreda Level ☐

   Kebele level ☐

   Town administration/municipal councils ☐

9). which levels of election do you give priority?

   kebele elections ☐ Woerda elections ☐

   Regional elections ☐ Nation-wide elections ☐

10). On the basis of your response to Q.No. 9, explain Your the reasons ?

_____

_____

11.). Do you feel that your ethnic group has been fairly represented in the federal government?

   Yes ☐ No ☐

12). If you answer for Q.11 is No, then state your reasons

   _____

   _____

13). Do you feel that your ethnic groups have been fairly represented in the Regional Government?

   Yes ☐ No ☐

14.). If you answer for Q.13 is No, then state your reasons?

   _____

   _____

15.). Do you feel that your ethnic group have been fairly represented among Beherseb zonal levels ?

   Yes ☐ No ☐

16.). If you answer for Q.15 is No, then state your reasons?

   _____

   _____

17.). Do you feel that your ethnic group have been fairly represented at Woreda level ?

   Yes ☐ No ☐

18.). If your answer for Q.17 is No, then state yours reasons ?

   _____

   _____

19.).Do you feel that your ethnic group have been fairly represented at kebele level ?

   Yes ☐ No ☐

20.).If your answer for Q.19 is No, then state the reasons?

   _____

   _____

21.).Do you believe that affirmative action is needed to be given to all minority ethnic groups in the regional civil services offices? Yes ☐ No ☐

22.). If your response to Q.no.21 is Yes, state your reasons?

_____
_____

23.).If your response to Q.No.21 is No, state your reasons?

_____
_____

24.).Do you believe that your group has been fairly represented in the governing party structure?

Yes ☐ No ☐

25.). If your answer for Q.24 is No, then what do you think is the reason?

_____
_____

26.). Do you think that there is a political party, within the region and outside, that promotes the political aspirations of your ethnic group? Yes ☐ No ☐

27.). If your response to question No.26 is 'Yes' ,please list the name of the political party?

_____

28.).If your response to question 26 is No, then state your reason?

_____

29.). Do you believe that every child should get primary education using their mother tongue?

Yes ☐ No ☐

30). If your response to Question No. 29 is No, state your reason?

_____
_____

31.). Do you believe that children of other ethnic groups who reside in your locality should be taught in their mother tongue? Yes ☐ No ☐

32). If your response to Q.no. 31 is No , what is your justification?

_____
_____

33.). Do you believe that the current federal arrangements help to build tolerance and mutual inclusiveness among different ethnic groups in the region and beyond? Yes ☐ No. ☐

34.). If your answer for Q.33 is "No' then what is your justification?

_____
_____

35.). In reference to the problems you mentioned under Q.No. 33, what should be done to solve the problem?

_____
_____

*Part **IV** **Perceptions of discrimination of Ethnic Groups***

Read the following statements carefully and indicate your agreement or disagreement by putting X in the appropriate box.

1). Do you feel discriminated if a person who is in condition of dialogue with you suddenly switch their mother tongue when they meet someone from their kin? Yes ☐ No. ☐

2). Do you think that members of your ethnic group face discrimination outside of their Zones ? Yes ☐ No ☐
3). Do you believe that members of your ethnic group living outside Amhara region, face discrimination?
Yes ☐ No ☐
4).Do you think that government offices provide services free of ethnic biase? Yes ☐ No ☐

5). If your answer for Question 4 is No , then what is your justifications?

_____
_____

6). Do you feel that the Amhara Radio and Television has given equal chance to freedom of cultural expression to every ethnic group in the region? Yes ☐ No ☐
7.). If your answer is No to Q. No. 6 , state the possible reasons ?

_____
_____

8). Do you think that the Amhara Television and Radio has helped to enhance inclusiveness and unity among different ethnic groups? Yes ☐ No ☐

9.). If your answer for Q.No. 60, then state your reasons?

_____
_____

10.).In reference to Q.No. 8 , state measures that can be taken to enhance inter-ethnic unity and tolerance in the region?

Appendix 6: Focus group Discussion Checklists

1. What do you think was the motive for the adoption of Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia?
2. Do you think that ethnic federalism reflects the interest of the 'NNPs' in the region? If not why?
3. Do you think that all ethnic groups have been fairly represented at federal level, regional and local government levels?
4. How do evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of ethnic based decentralization practices in Amhara the Region?
5. Do you think that every ethnic group has been fairly represented at regional, zonal, district and kebele level? If not why?
6. How do you evaluate the representation of groups in the incumbent party (EPRDF/ ANDM) at federal and regional and sub regional level?
7. Do you think that the incumbent party-ANDM and the regional Government represent and defends the interest of all groups in the region? If not why?
8. How fair are the media institutions in terms of accommodation diversity both at federal and regional level?
9. Do you think that the media works for tolerance, mutual respect and unity? If not why?
10. How do you evaluate the practice and importance of affirmative action in the Bureaucracy?

11. What are the challenges of practicing accommodation in the working environments? How do evaluate the practice of accommodation in terms of alleviating or exacerbating discriminatory practices?
12. How do you evaluate the relevance of mother tongue education in the country and the region?
13. What are the challenges and opportunities of practicing mother tongue education in schools in the region and beyond?

Appendix -7: Checklist for Key Informants.

1. How do you describe the practices of multiculturalism /ethnic accommodation/ in the region?

Probing . How do you evaluate the practices of ethnic based decentralization to the level of district in terms of ensuring unity and diversity in the region?

Prob. What drives the region to go for creating special districts and *Zones* unlike many Regions in the country?

2. What are the mechanisms and modalities to conferring self governing statutes to some ethnic groups in the region?

Prob.. What do you think is the reason (motives-socio-economic , Political and legal) for the demand of self- government?

Prob. What do you think is/ are the requirement(s) to grant self government status to the claimants?

3. Do you think Ethnic decentralization is a panacea for the economic, political, and social problems of the region?

Prob. What do you think are the challenges of ethnic decentralization?

Prob. How Do you describe its positive achievements of ethnic decentralization?

4. How do you examine the role of the regional media in terms of ensuring multiculturalism?

Prob. Do you think media serves all groups and interests?

Prob. What areas of improvements?

5. Do you think ANDM accommodates diversity?

Prob. How do ANDM reflects such diversity?

6. How is the condition of multilingualism being reflected in Education in the region?

Prob. What are the challenges and successes of mother tongue education in schools?

SN	Question Items	Expert 1	Expert 2	Expert 3	Content Validity Ratio(CVR)
1	Homogeneity is good but our country is not fortunate enough to have that(Reversed	E	R	E	
2	It is good that government is creating homogenous communities at different levels	E	E	E	1
3	My Ethnic community is quite different and unique than other ethnic groups in the region(Reverse)	E	E	R	0.66
4	It is regrettable that the culture of my community has lost its originality due to the historical process of assimilation (reverse)	E	E	E	1
5	We have to accept the fact that ethnic identity is natural that it can`t change (reverse)	E	E	E	1

Appendix-8 : Lawshe's Content Validity Index

6	I don't feel comfortable to criticize every traditions and customs of my community.(reverse)	E	E	E	1
7	In every ethnic group`s culture there could be harmful cultural practices as there are good things to be cherished.	R	E	R	0.33
8	Inter-group contacts leads to conflict (reverse)	R	E	E	0.66
9	Free mobility of labor within the region and beyond will threaten the economic and cultural security of ethnic groups(NNP)(reverse)	E	E	E	1
10	Ethnic diversity may lead to inter-ethnic harmony	E	E	E	1
11	It is painful to hear that the rights peoples from other ethnic groups have been violated.	E	E	E	1
12	In every society it is good to recognize and protect diversity of any form.	R	R	R	0
13	There should be equitable participation of all ethnic groups at any level of government.	E	R	E	0.66
14	In every ethnic group there is internal diversity	E	E	E	1
15	I enjoy music of other ethnic groups	R	E	E	1
16	I am interested to know the history of other groups	E	E	E	1
17	Every community has its own indigenous knowledge that must be tapped	E	E	E	1
18	I don't feel comfortable when I see individuals speaking different langue coming to my town or , province. (Reverse)	E	E	E	1
19	Inter-group dialogue improves understanding and knowledge	E	E	E	1
20	I enjoy funny ethnic jokes, even if some people might find it offensive	E	E	E	1
21	If you know the language and culture of other ethnic groups then it means you acquire the identity of others as well as yours	E	E	E	1
22	Cultural recognition gives me confidence in myself	E	E	E	1
23	The government should encourage the use of multilingual working language at federal and regional level	E	E	E	1
24	I don't trust persons from other ethnic group to represent my interest during election.(Reverse)	R	R	E	0.33
25	I am Willing to share any view, including any political issues to individual persons, regardless of their ethnic background	E	R	E	1

26	I will be happy to learn and know about the languages of other ethnic groups.	R	R	E	0.66
27	Cultural and linguistic factors are the barrier to social relations among ethnic groups in Ethiopia.(Reverse)	NR	R	R	0
28	The fact that every members of ethnic group understands Amahric fosters intergroup communication among groups in Amahara Region	E	E	E	1
29	I believe that mutual recognition of ethnic diversity may enhance trust and cooperation in Ethiopia.	E	E	E	1
30	Century old values and traditions of ethnic groups should not be respected as it is sign of backwardness.(Reverse)	E	E	E	1
31	I believe that different ethnic groups rights should not be recognize in the region as the region belongs to the Majority Amahara	E	E	E	1
32	Inter-ethnic cultural fusion will ultimately erode the customs and values of my ethnic group	E	E	E	1
33	My ethnic group does share some commonalities as it has its own unique features.	E	E	E	1
	Total				30.3
	Content Validity Index(CVI)				0.92

Experts' decision as per Lash's Content Validity:

- Essential (E)
- Relevant(R)
- Not Relevant (NR)