


ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

SOCIO-CULTURAL & ECONOMIC CONDITIONS INFLUENCING
WOMEN'S STATUS & ROLE IN RURAL PLANNING DECISION
-MAKING: THE CASE OF MOJEBE DISTRICT
(WOREDA 28), ADDIS ABABA

GUDAY EMRIE

JUNE 1998

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Thank you for your usual cooperation.

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ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

**SOCIO-CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
INFLUENCING WOMEN'S STATUS AND ROLE IN
FAMILY PLANNING DECISION-MAKING: THE CASE
OF KOTEBE DISTRICT (WOREDA 28), ADDIS ABABA**

BY
GUDAY EMIRIE KASSAHUN

ADDIS ABABA
JUNE, 1998

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DISTRICT (WOREDA 28), ADDIS ABABA**

**BY
GUDAY EMIRIE KASSAHUN**

**A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE SCHOOL OF
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School of Graduate Studies

Socio-cultural and Economic Conditions Influencing
Women's Status and Role in Family Planning Decision-making:
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PREFACE

This thesis is an attempt to examine the socio-cultural and economic conditions influencing women's status and role in family planning decision-making with specific reference to Kotebe District (Woreda 28), Addis Ababa.

The body of the thesis is organized into eight chapters. The first chapter identifies the problem of the study, objectives of the study, methods of investigation, fieldwork experiences, limitation and significance of the study.

The second chapter conceptualizes and defines key concepts embodied in the title of the thesis, reviews literatures relevant to the area of family planning and fertility decline, outlines basic theoretical positions and research approaches, criticisms, and gaps which need to be filled. Chapter three describes the study area and the people. Chapter four, The Women's Society, paints a picture of women's role over the course of their social and reproductive life cycles. In this chapter, the context in which women are enmeshed; customs related to pregnancy, child-birth and baptism; relations with kin and friend-neighbour groups, the family production unit and the economic exchange system between women; and means by which women gain prestige are described.

Chapter five describes and analyses the social and economic position of a woman and a man in relation to number of children. Here childbearing and the social status of women, the social attributes of childlessness or barrenness and the social and economic position of a woman and a man in relation to number of children are dealt with in detail. Chapter six is an attempt to point out the major motives and attitudes towards planned and non-planned family size. Chapter Seven points out the possible socio-cultural and economic conditions influencing women's status and role in family planning decision-making. Chapter eight summarizes the major findings of the thesis and suggests for further research on the socio-cultural and economic factors related to gender and population issues.

GLOSSARY

AMHARIC TERMS

Ambasha:	a traditional bread
Arakie :	Local distilled liquor
Awraja :	Administrative unit higher than Woreda
Balabats:	Local official, above chickasum, and a link between the government and peasants in the conquered areas
Edir :	burial and mutual association
Equib :	revolving credit association
Injeria :	thin, large, circular bread
Kebele :	the smallest administrative division in town
Mitad :	the traditional oven for baking injera
Telk :	a local beer
Woreda:	Administrative unit higher than the Peasant Association

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CSA	: Central Statistical Authority
FAGE	: Family Guidance Association of Ethiopia
FP	: Family Planning
IPPF	: International Planned Parenthood Federation
KAP	: Knowledge, Attitude and Practice
OPHCC	: Office of Population and Housing Census Commission
PA	: Peasant Association
REWA	: Revolutionary Ethiopian Women's Association
REYA	: Revolutionary Ethiopian Youth Association
UNFPA	: United Nation Fund For Population Activities

ABSTRACT

This thesis is an attempt to examine the possible socio-cultural and economic conditions influencing women's status and role in family planning decision-making with specific reference to Kotebe District (Woreda 28), Addis Ababa.

The thesis discussed the theoretical issues and perspectives with regard to population growth as a population problem and the mechanisms of population control. A significant number of useful studies have been conducted which account for aggregate fertility trends or explain individual fertility behaviours with some degree of power. But here the most central issues are: Do the respective societies and their individual members articulate the population problem and its relationship to development in its aggregate form? Why do couples desire large families which render the notion of fertility regulation irrelevant to their lives? For those couples who perceive the need to regulate their fertility, what are the subjective and economic costs of adopting contraceptive technology?

It can be firmly asserted that the weakness of fertility research to date is not one of the poor theoretical formulation, but its failure to place fertility within its local socio-cultural and economic context. Here it should be noted that couples behave rationally within their respective socio-cultural and economic context; and their perceptions which are functions of the respective circumstances might be different from those of policy makers or scientists in a laboratory or library. In other words, high fertility persists in much of the world not because parents are foolish but because they are not disadvantaged by large families.

The primary goal of this research was to examine the status and role of women in family planning decision-making. The available literature on this topic has been identified and, to some extent, established four possible loci for this mechanisms: (a) the change in the fertility belief system, which lowers the society's optimal family size in recognition of such factors as decreased mortality or decreased child utility. (b) A downward shift in the actual and perceived economic value of children to their parents, with respect to their perceived socio-emotional value, resulting in lower desired family size. (c) A cognitive shift in the direction of increased rationality and sense of personal control over the environment, making family planning decision and implementation possible. (a) An increase in couple communication on fertility matters, which makes achieving fertility goals more efficient and effective. This thesis assumed that all four approaches above mentioned are valid to some extent. They are woven into a hypothesized three stage fertility decision models which were developed by Christine (1985). Today pure disciplinary models are somewhat rare. Social, cultural, economic, psychological and other variables are parts of the more successful models, in recognition of the complexities and subtleties of the issue. In short, economic, social, cultural and psychological factors interact on fertility. Economic circumstances affect the value orientations of the socializing generation, set constraints on family building patterns, and open or close possibilities for cultural diffusion. Educational levels of the cohorts, their mentality, and their economic planning effect fertility decisions.

The central theme of this study was that the status of women and their role in community and family decision-making, including the timing and numbering of births and choice of contraception, have an important bearing on improving the standard of living, the success of family planning and a long term reduction in the fertility level of a country.

Furthermore, the research sought answers to the following more specific questions in line with Christine's (1985) fertility decision-making model. These were: (1) To what extent are women's fertility goals motivators of their behaviour, and to what extent are they mere reflections of circumstances? (2) Is the fertility decision process like that of other family decision processes, or in what ways does it differ? (3) To what extent is the fertility decision process an active one, that is, to what extent are fertility decisions made versus simply being left up to fate? (4) What is the extent of a woman's participation in and control of the family decision-making process, and does this extend to decisions about her own fertility? (5) What gives women the ability to assert their individual fertility goals, especially in the face of a hostile family environment? (6) What factors constrain women's involvement in family planning decision-making and how can we challenge these constraints?

The present study assumed that women's control over their own fertility decision process depends substantially upon attributes which they possess which give them prestige in the eye of the family and the community, as well as upon the resources which they control which are the basis of their present and future security. Resource and attributes are both material and non-material: ownership of land or implements of production, the skills to use those implements, influential kin ties, affiliation with one's spouse, and the satisfaction of social norms for childbearing, among many others. These all may function to grant women power in the family decision-making process in general and in the family planning decision-making process in particular. However, here it should be noted that the socio-economic conditions by themselves cannot explain women's fertility behaviour. In our local social and cultural context, women's fertility behaviour is greatly influenced by the socio-cultural values attached to childbearing. Moreover, the persistent traditional negative attitudes towards a 'barren' woman is one of the socio-cultural imperatives influencing women's involvement in family planning programmes.

Finally the thesis considered the complex relationship between socio-cultural and economic conditions; and women's status and role in family planning decision-making and then warranted the need for further investigation.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The weakness of fertility research to date is not one of poor theoretical formulation, but its failure to place fertility within its local socio-cultural and economic context. Here, it should be noted that couples behave rationally within their respective socio-cultural and economic context; and their perceptions which are functions of the respective circumstances might be different from those of policy makers or scientists in a laboratory or library. After all, people react differently to insecurity and hardship. Survival strategies are moulded to fit the individual perceptions of risks and possibilities, and the social system which guides both perceptions of risks and possibilities. What matters then is how people and local communities react to their circumstances.

In this connection, Chaudhury (1982) argues that high fertility persists in much of the world not because parents are foolish but because they are not disadvantaged by large families. He further notes that the time will come when they are disadvantaged, and then fertility will fall. Caldwell (1982) asserts that parents will only become disadvantaged as a result of complex changes in family power structure, in the patterns of consumption within the family, and in the relations between the generations and between the sexes. These changes are the most momentous of our times. Their study is subtle but tremendously exciting. In one way or another the above arguments are based on the demographic transition theory.

However, hard-line population control advocates argue that most Third World countries simply do not have the resources to attain the economic level at which the West passed through the demographic transition, and what resources they do have are being eaten away by population growth. Thus population control, not improvement in living standards, is the only hope for bringing the birth rate down for the Third World, notably, African countries. Contrary to hard-line population control advocates, Machera (1997) argues that although a decline in Africa's birth rate might help to relieve pressure on land and food supplies, it will never solve the more fundamental problems at the heart of the continent's agrarian crisis. But at this point one question stands out: Why are population growth rates going up while population control programmes are heavily funded in African countries?

Of course, population growth is one of the most crucial problems affecting development in Africa countries. This has already been recognised by African governments and the first steps towards population control have been taken. Research results on family planning in Africa have revealed that these attitudes are not exclusively positive. Resistance to the idea of Family Planning could become a serious obstacle as soon as the programmes are extended to a large scale

(Marquardt 1968: 11). But what is the underlying reason behind peoples' resistance to the idea of Family Planning in Africa?

According to Ocholla-Ayayo (1988:17-21), Africa's socio-cultural imperatives must have contributed to the failure of family planning programmes. There are many cultural factors that make the work of family planning programmes in Africa, e.g. economic and security value of children, continuation of quantum lineage (Where dead ancestors are reborn through naming systems), bride-wealth as a source of wealth for a man who has daughters and higher social status for a woman with many children. Unless the programmes can infiltrate these imperatives, the failure rates for family planning programmes will still remain perplexing (Ocholla-Ayayo 1988:17-21; Machera 1997:19).

Ocholla-Ayayo further argues that programme planners did not give serious attention to socio-cultural factors as they did perhaps to the socio-economic indicators. With respect to socio-economic factors, they considered the need to educate people about family planning technology and requested more funds for obtaining and distributing contraceptive materials. He further claims that Family Planning as a persuasive policy aimed at controlling fertility in Africa, is being introduced in a socio-cultural environment not conducive to that policy. Family planning programmes working in Africa for that matter should realise that both socio-cultural ideologies and family planning programmes are operating within one of the most feared natural processes, death. This fear of infant and child mortality is justifiable from the fact that Africa still had one of the highest infant and child mortality rates in the world. It is therefore likely that a woman who has lost a child or children in the past will be unwilling to use contraceptives due to fear that she might not be able to give birth any more in the future (Ocholla-Ayayo 1988; Machera 1997:19). And that is why Shrivastava (1994:71) notes that every country cannot have a common past and a common future. As a result, each country will vary in the strategy of its family planning programmes according to its governmental policies, levels of education, available resources, and cultural patterns.

Therefore, levels of fertility continue to vary enormously among countries, with variations being almost as large within the less developed regions as those between the developing and developed countries. Cross-country comparisons of fertility shows substantial variations even within countries at similar levels of development (Machera 1997:9). In the modern industrial societies, couples tend to have a clear notion as to the number of children that they want and the vast majority have the knowledge and means of ensuring that they will not exceed that number. That fertility is more or less uniformly low in these societies attests to the general conformity of reproductive behaviour with family size preference. Conversely, in the more traditional, less industrialised societies, even when couples do have a preference for family size for a variety of reasons, many are unable or unwilling to take the steps required to realise their preference ([United

Nations 1981], Machera 1997:9). A question of overriding concern is why preferences are not supported by behaviour.

According to Caldwell (1982), the fertility decline in the West was the most far-reaching social change of the last century. He stated that it transformed "our households" radically from ones that were almost entirely focused on birth and child-rearing. For him the main reason is that the fertility decline in the West was the culmination of a series of internal changes in the family stretching back over centuries. All this change is being compressed in the contemporary Third World because of the speed with which global economy and a global society are coming into existence. Despite increasingly prevalent reports of dramatic fertility declines throughout the developing world, there exists little indisputable evidence to date of such decline, among many of the more populous developing countries (Ong Tsui 1978).

Now when we come to the African continent it is argued that the continent is experiencing rapid population growth as a result of declining mortality mainly due to imported medical technology, and persistent high fertility maintained by the socio-cultural crops (Mohloyi 1991:106). Mohloyi further noted that notwithstanding other related factors external to the continent, associated problems of crowding, land degradation, rapid urban growth and unemployment, an overall lack of development, tend to be synonymous with Africa. But does Africa have a population problem or an economic problem?

The issue of high population growth and its relationship with development has been in controversy for a long time. The views under this issue range from those who consider population growth as an obstacle to development to those who regard it as an engine for the betterment of human welfare. As early as 1817 Malthus wrote an essay which strongly asserts the direct relationship between population and development ([Hutchinson 1967; UN 1973], Yohannes 1994:1).

According to Mohloyi (1991), the relationship between demographic and economic variables in Africa is reciprocal. Mohloyi (1991) further noted that the impact of African rapid population growth on development was articulated, perhaps first recognised by scholars from the developed countries. The resulting rapid population growth itself may constitute the impediment for achieving the economic and social changes which would ultimately reduce fertility. The immediate economic and social consequences of over population in rural areas are obvious. The pressure on the land leads to fragmentation due to inheritance rights, shortage of grazing grounds, gradual decline of agricultural productivity and soil fertility, consequently to lower crop yields and finally to soil erosion. The originally favourable natural conditions may deteriorate to the point that part of the inhabitants are compelled to leave the area. Many emigrants may not find favourable living conditions in other rural areas and end up as unemployed in towns. The short and long-term

migrations of men create new problems, lead to the loosening of family bonds, and affect the social and economic conditions of the area. Immediate consequences of excessive speed of urbanisation are housing shortage and increasing unemployment. Employment opportunities cannot be created at the same speed as the urban population increases. The economic and social consequences of population pressure may in turn influence future political trends in East Africa. The succession of events, from population pressure, failures to attain planned development goals, increasing unemployment, and social discontent up to the formation of extremist groups endangering the national order is well known (Molnos 1968:94-107).

Clearly, according to Sadik (1993), the two most important population issues confronting the developing world over the course of the 1990s and beyond will be: The rapid increase in population, resulting from both relatively higher levels of fertility and successfully expanding cohorts of women in their prime, reproductive ages--a trend that will continue well into the 21st century, and the rapid increase in the urban population, particularly in large Metropolitan areas, brought on by rural-urban migration and natural increases in urban population.

Sadik further notes that within the context of the critical decade, a broad set of measures should be advanced such as the improvement of the role, status and participation of women. Under this objective, the following set of interrelated measures must be pursued during the 1990s: **a)** Securing easy access to methods of birth spacing and fertility limitation. **b)** Reducing female illiteracy. **c)** Expanding girl's enrolment in schools and keeping them in the school system longer. **d)** Providing income generating opportunities for women. **e)** Securing women's legal and social rights to free marriage, land ownership and paid employment (Sadik 1993:9-10).

In the light of the above general problems related to population and development in the Third world countries in general and African countries in particular we can grasp the reality of our local situation.

From all accounts, it is evident that Ethiopia, as in many other African countries, is experiencing rapid population growth. Ethiopia had an estimated population of about 12 million at the beginning of the present century. By 1940, the size of the population increased to 16 million and by 1960 it reached 24 million. In 1984, the census obtained a figure of 42.6 million and this increased to 55 million by mid 1994 (Assefa 1994:19). Assefa further noted that at the pace of the current rate of growth, the population may double in less than 23 years. This suggests that Ethiopia has one of the highest rates of population growth in the world and in terms of population size, it stands the third most populous country in Africa next to Nigeria and Egypt respectively (Assefa 1994:19). This trend has negative effects on the national socio-economic development and people's quality of life. High fertility constrains the limited resources that may be available for appropriate and meaningful development. In general, rapid population growth seriously constrains employment

opportunities, housing, education, health and other social services unless some concrete policy measures are taken (Azbaha 1990:110). Therefore, something must be done to slow down population growth and to keep it at pace with the country's socio-economic development and available resources.

With regard to the problem of population and development in Ethiopia, the first ever population policy for the country was promulgated in 1993. The major goal of the policy was to harmonise the rate of population growth with that of the economic and social development. Among the specific objectives is bringing down the high fertility, (an average of **7.7** children per woman) to an average of **4.0** children per woman by the year 2015 (CSA 1997:77). The primary proximate determinant that could fuel this decline in fertility can be the rapid increase in contraceptive use. The other objective of the policy is increasing the prevalence of contraceptive use from **4.0** percent to **44** percent by the year 2015. The first and foremost of the strategies to achieve the goal is upgrading the overall contraceptive knowledge of the community through extensive IEC programmes and expanding clinical and community based contraceptive distribution service (NOP 1993). The work for the implementation of these strategies should start from the identification of the target population by demographic, economic and social characteristics (CSA 1997:77).

However, the prevalence of contraceptive knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) surveys conducted by the Central Statistical Authority (CSA) indicate that about **63%** of the sample surveys mention at least one method of birth control. The same sample survey also states, out of the sample survey, about **4%** of all eligible couples practised some form of birth control (CSA 1994). The four percent level of practice is indeed very low and reveals the real challenge that there is a need to motivate potential clients not just to mention a few methods, but to go for family planning, which is beyond awareness creation and requires a change of behaviour (Yemane 1994:45). Yemane further notes that for family planning to be accepted by potential clients, infant and child mortality must be reduced. Parents must also be reassured that the fewer children they have as a result of anticipated family planning, the better their survival would be to adulthood. This can be realised, to a large extent, by raising the overall level of the standard of the population by reducing the prevalence of illnesses and deaths at all groups by taking preventive and curative health measures. This is, of course, by no means an easy task to accomplish because of a host issues including nutrition, health education and an overall improvement in the quality of life. These are related to the acceptance and appreciation of family planning which are referred to as "beyond family planning" inputs. Family planning does not take place in isolation from other development variables since it is part and parcel of them. Therefore, this very fact of underdevelopment, which places high premium on children as an economic asset is a major hindrance to the expansion and acceptance of family planning programme in Ethiopia and indeed in most of the Third World

countries. As the situation improves and life prospects brighten, many couples will avail themselves of the services of family planning (Yemane 1994:46).

Of course, various strategies are adopted to alter fertility level. Some of them are related to the family, some others require social reforms, and still others are related to laws and regulations. Among the several fertility reducing measures, extended access to family planning service, measures related to improving the status of women, schemes to safeguard children, youth and other high risk groups, restriction to child labour, education and information, and strategies to improve the age at marriage are believed to be the most effective (Assefa 1994:15). Increasing the prevalence of contraception and increasing the level of female education and literacy particularly among young female are often cited as factors most likely to lead to fertility decline (Almaz 1997:4). Coale (1973) suggested that for fertility to decline three criteria must be met: (i) fertility must be within the calculus of conscious choice of the parents; (ii) reduced fertility must be advantageous to parents; and (iii) effective techniques for fertility reduction must be available. It is now evident that education has a great bearing on all three prerequisites which Coale posited are necessary for fertility decline. However, in a society characterised by a high degree of social heterogeneity, these criteria may apply only to the elite minority who have easy access to economic and social benefits (Kawaye 1985:27-35).

It is true that the need for family planning in Ethiopia is greater today than it has been at any time in Ethiopian history. Hence, careful planning and thinking by those who matter at all levels is necessary to safeguard the hopes, aspirations, achievements and satisfaction of the future generation. The need to educate an average man about the benefits of Family Planning, i.e., the cost of bringing up children in terms of providing nourishing food, adequate education and proper clothing in the present conditions of high prices and high standards of living has become imperative. However, the realisation of our long cherished goal of spreading the social norm of small-sized families through spacing and prevention of pregnancies can only be achieved through sustained efforts on many fronts. There is the knowledge of social system and its relation to fertility levels, of the factors that promote and inhibit the acceptance of small family norms and the knowledge of the process of willingness to adopt suitable contraceptive techniques is very essential for policy formulation and implementation (Chandrasekhar 1968:v-vi). The Ethiopian Family Guidance Association which has enjoyed more than three decades of existence with the parallel highest growth rate ever in history bears testimony to this proposition. It is evident that over 30 years the Ethiopian Family Planning Programme performed poorly; one of the possible interpretation which can be given is the existence of barriers in the potential clients/users to be environment or with the way the services are delivered.

Now let us see the complex nature of the problem of population growth and its solution. The obvious solution was to effect a decline in the most important component of growth, i.e., Fertility. It is obvious that a Fertility Decline is a consequence of the deliberate use of contraception to regulate family sizes. Hence, Family Planning technology becomes handy and women--the child bearers--become the target. However, what is not obvious and must not be taken for granted are the underlying factors to the deliberate adoption of fertility regulation. This derives from the socio-cultural and economic contexts of the respective societies within countries, there is an emphasis here not only of continent or country, but community specifically (Mohloyi 1991:107).

Certainly, of all the methods, the establishment and widespread provision of family planning services have been most widely used in developing countries (Assefa 1994:15). Of course, fertility regulation efforts through family planning programmes are important elements in the set of strategies to deal with population explosion problems. There is little debate on the fact that the key to the reorientation of fertility from high to low levels would be the reorientation of reproductive behaviour towards a small family size. However, the fertility regulation efforts made so far in Ethiopia through the Family Guidance Association is minimal. This is due to socio-cultural and economic factors such as women's status, religion, ethnicity, infant mortality, son preference, the economic value of children, and the like.

Two major elements can help us understand the Ethiopian experience: **First**, until recently, social and economic conditions have not been conducive to a significant fertility decline. In the rural areas, where most Ethiopians live, children are still viewed as a source of security, both social and financial in old age. This has led to vicious cycles of poverty coupled with high fertility levels. Women, who constitute the majority of family planning users in the rural areas, also hold a subordinate position within the household and the community. Consequently the worst hit by rural poverty and the idea of having many children is very attractive for reasons mentioned. **Secondly**, the way the family planning programme in Ethiopia was conceived and organised may have to a great extent contributed to the apparent failure of the programme. It ignored the socio-cultural contexts of fertility decisions in Ethiopia. Without popular support, the family planning programme has floundered since then. Women have been reluctant to adopt birth control methods because family planning was introduced wrongly, i.e., as **birth control**, and people did not like the idea. According to Bondestam (1980), the wrong introduction to family planning could have been avoided by only mentioning the improvement of the health of the mother and child. Therefore, in the search for modifying fertility behaviour towards smaller family size, the first task would be the detection of key social sectors in the society for fertility to decline, and second, the identification in each sector of factors that determine reproductive behaviour (Kawaye 1985:27).

In line with the above view points, Negussie Teffera, in his paper entitled "Reproductive Health in Ethiopia", noted that:

One of the first priorities of the new government was to signal the importance of curbing excessive population growth rates so that economic development would be facilitated, and improve health care, especially, reproductive health, and the status of women so that the quality of life of the people of Ethiopia would be improved. The National Population Policy, which was adopted in 1993, includes as general objectives the closing of the gap between high population growth and low economic productivity by reducing population growth, raising the economic and social status of women, and improving the situation of vulnerable groups, such as the youth. Specific objectives included: reducing fertility rates by increasing contraceptive use, reducing maternal, infant and child morbidity and mortality, and increasing the participation of women in the educational system (1996:1).

Of course, Negussie Teffera has clearly detected key social sectors such as women and the youth in the society for fertility to decline, and then he mentioned the need for raising the economic and social status of women, and improving the situation of the youth among the general objectives of the National Population Policy, which was adopted in 1993. Furthermore, he noted that increasing the participation of women in the educational system is one of the specific objectives of the National Population Policy. But here the most central issues are: Do the respective societies and their individual members articulate the population problem and its relationship to development in its aggregate form? Why do couples desire large families which render the notion of Fertility regulation irrelevant to their lives? For those couples who perceive the need to regulate their Fertility, what are the subjective and economic costs of adopting contraceptive technology?

In actual fact, population dynamics is a complex phenomenon affected by social, cultural, economic, political and psychological factors. For effective implementation of the policies adopted to limit fertility, dissemination of information about the consequences of population growth and the advantages of small family size are found to be extremely useful in countries where awareness is low (Assefa 1994:17). Therefore, to tackle the population problem it is essential to create awareness about the nature, causes and consequences of rapid population growth on the quality of life at individual, family, community and national levels. With this objective in mind, many developing countries have introduced Population/Family Life Education into their educational systems during the last twenty years (Assefa Beyene 1994:i).

Furthermore, it should be noted that fertility regulation is not an end in itself. It is justified only to the extent that it facilitates the attainment of desired social and economic goals (Seyoum 1989:472). The goal of the national population policy of Ethiopia is to bring down the level of

Fertility in Ethiopia. For this policy to bear fruit considerable effort on the part of governmental and non-governmental organisations is required to overcome resistance arising from the imperatives of the high fertility norm so prevalent in the Ethiopian society. While these efforts continue in the short to the medium, long term development strategies should focus on fundamental structural changes designed to change the status of women in the Ethiopian society must be embarked upon. Among the better strategies likely to produce this result are: a) In addition to implementing a programme to increase second and third level enrolment ratios, more effort and energy must be expended to close the current gap between male and female participation in second and third level of education; b) The effort at expediting the structural differentiation of the economy should be intensified to increase, among other things, female participation in the monetized sectors of the economy (Seyoum 1989:502-503).

Seyoum further argues that female access to second and third level of education will have the effect of raising the age at first marriage for girls thus possibly shortening their reproductive period. But the benefits of this cannot be assured unless the means of controlling extramarital fertility are made widely available. Introducing education for responsible parenthood in schools and increasing the availability of effective and safe contraception will contribute to the attainment of the goal of shortening the reproductive span for females. Other things being equal increasing the female participation rate in the labour force is likely to reduce the tendency of women to take child-bearing as the only vocation in life. By redirecting the attention of women from taking excessive child-bearing as a social responsibility, increased entry of women into the labour force will contribute not only to the reduction of the wastage of human life resulting from high infant, child and maternal mortality rates usually associated with a regime of high fertility but is also likely to contribute to a more effective utilisation of available human resources (Seyoum 1989:503).

Population growth is one of the many problems connected with the position and role of women and it is a topical issue in East Africa today (Molnos 1968:26). Likewise, gender roles can be practised either as a population concern or as a matter of social development policy. Enhancing the role and status of women has proved to have, either directly or indirectly, a strong influence on fertility behaviours. Realising this fact, many developing countries have launched women's programme as integral parts of their population activities. These programmes involve education and training, leadership skills, community organisations, and finance and credit schemes designed to increase the economic and political participation of women ([UN 1993], quoted in Assefa 1994:16). In this connection, Coyaji Banoo (1987:23) asserts that: "women's ability to control their fertility is one of the most important events in the history of womankind. It gives them the opportunity for good health, for education, gainful employment, self-awareness, self-respect, and self-realisation".

To attain this degree of physical and social well-being, many more women must be able to take advantage of family planning.

The central point of this study is that the status of women and their role in community and family decision-making, including the timing and numbering of births and choice of contraception, have an important bearing on improving the standard of living, the success of family planning and a long-term reduction in the fertility level of a country (Chaudhury 1982:71).

In actual fact the status and role of women are some of the many socio-cultural factors that influence reproductive behaviour in a given society. In other words, the status and role of women in the society, the community and the family will have their impact on the reproductive behaviour. More specifically, the social and economic position of a woman in relation to child-bearing associated with having a particular combination need to be examined in order to understand some of the important population policy variables in a given country.

In most African countries the low status of women in the society, the community and the family in general and their low status and role in family planning decisions in particular is hypothesised as one of the reasons for the prevalence of sustained high level of fertility. This means better understanding of certain aspects of women's status and their roles in family planning decisions is an essential question of policy oriented research. Therefore, understanding whether there is any variation in the status of women, the source of such variation (if any), its relationship with fertility behaviour and finally, the extent to which this is related with the macro fertility policy is vital. However, in many publications women are presented as undifferentiated mass which needs to be empowered, with little recognition of the many differences between them: poor or rich, rural or urban, black or white, which in turn impact on their survival and reproductive strategies.

There is by now a widespread assumption that the restrictions and discriminations women experience in education, training, employment and community life adversely affect their power and resources available in the family context and strengthened the cultural pressures on women to define themselves as mothers and to concentrate their lives around their maternal and conjugal roles. Furthermore, lack of power and decision-making ability is perceived to be related to the lack of power and decision-making ability to control their own fertility.

In fact, in many societies, changes that affect the status of women have been particularly significant in influencing fertility (Kawaye 1985:43). However, it should be noted that a decisive and ultimately durable improvement in the status of women cannot be attained by special measures aimed at women alone. It is equally necessary to take into account the socio-cultural conditions which tend to assign certain privileges, obligations or rights to men. Therefore, one of the basic premise of this study is that the effect of a woman's status on desired family size cannot be isolated from her family's economic position within some socially and culturally acceptable range.

In most developing countries matters of fertility are usually not for debate within each household because procreation forms the whole basis for marriage. Women are seen first as potential mothers. Consequently, their status is staked on their fertility. Thus a woman who is conditioned by her parents from the moment of her birth to regard herself as without value except as a potential child-bearer for her husband's and family's satisfaction, has little chance of making an informed choice in favour of family planning. "She may know that child-bearing is ruining her health. But can she persuade her husband, family and friends? She and her children will benefit from family planning only when women themselves as well as parents and husbands, accept her right to it" (Sadik 1975:15). The husband is often the dominant power and women cannot bring up the subject of regulated procreation without at the same time challenging the internal power arrangements in the household (Kawaye 1985:45). Here, the assumption that women have little power to effect their fertility preferences due to male dominance is open for further investigation.

In fact, among the social barriers influencing women's involvement in family planning, male dominance is one of the strongest obstacles. In many cultures, wives must have their husbands' consent before they can decide to limit their fertility. And many men are reluctant to agree: They fear the possibility of their wife's infidelity or the loss of their control over her. Huston (1978), while conducting his study among the Mexican people, found that when a wife wants to do something on her own, such as trying to limit the number of months to feed in the family, the husband will become angry and even beat her. He thinks it is unacceptable that she is making a decision on her own. She is challenging his authority, his power over her and thus the very nature of his virility (Machera 1997:15).

In many Third World countries the economic subordination of women is directly linked to high birth-rates, since it both increases their need for children and impedes their ability to practise family planning. Children are often the main sources of a woman's pride and self-respect. Kathleen Neuman in her comprehensive study of women in 1979 found that- "Social systems whose positive images of women are all linked to the reproductive role leave women with only one way to achieve a sense of purpose and accomplishment" (Machera 1997:15). Children may also be a woman's only hedge against an uncertain future, especially male children, for old-age support and protection to their rights to land and other property. In Kenya for example, where roughly one quarter of rural households are headed by women, women do not generally inherit land but instead are given the right to use land owned by male family members, including sons ([Rashid et al.1983], Machera 1997:15-16). Machera further notes that children are a husbandless woman's life line, without children, her prospect is utter destitution. To a certain extent this norm is acting against the progress and success of family planning programmes in many African societies today.

However, if women's powerlessness can increase their need for children then steps toward their empowerment could presumably have the opposite effect. This appears to be true in the case of literacy. The educational level of women is the single most consistent predictor of fertility and contraceptive use, even more important than income level. Female literacy is associated with lower rates of infant mortality (World Bank 1994); not only do educated women generally marry later and have access to better jobs which compete with motherhood, they also tend to have a broader world view. Mandelbaum (1974) found that an educated woman is usually less closely confined, physically and psychologically, with her husband's family and its narrow familial concerns than is the woman who is brought into their home as an uneducated girl; she is more likely to feel that she can do something about the conditions of her life, including the conditions of pregnancies in close succession or conceiving during her later reproductive years. Furthermore, women's employment in the skilled labour force is also linked to fertility decline, not only because of competition with motherhood, but because the availability of such jobs serves as an incentive to families to educate girls ([World Development Report 1984], Machera 1997:16).

In short, there is clearly room for more research on the relationship between certain aspects of women's status such as education, employment, socio-economic background, family structure, age at marriage, family decision-making; and their impact on family planning decision-making. Although poverty and patriarchy serve as inducements to high fertility, it does not necessarily follow that women want to bear as many children as biologically possible. Many women would like to practise family planning, to space their pregnancies, or to end them altogether once their need for children is met, what then is standing in their way? This study was designed to probe the socio-cultural and economic conditions influencing women's status and role in family planning decision-making. From a socio-cultural and economic perspective of fertility decline, the holistic approach will help us to understand factors influencing the status and role of women in family planning decision-making. Furthermore, whenever services are provided and the expected beneficiaries fail to respond, then there is a problem, in this case a problem which needs to be studied.

1.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The general objective of this study is to examine the socio-cultural and economic conditions influencing women's status and role in family planning decision-making with specific reference to Kotebe District (Woreda 28), Addis Ababa.

In the light of this general theme, the specific objectives of the thesis are:

1. To investigate the socio-cultural and economic environments related to women's status and role in the society, the community and the family among rural and urban Kotebeans;

2. To examine the socio-cultural and economic factors affecting women's status and role in family planning decision-making among rural and urban Kotebeans, and to find out whether there exists any difference between rural and urban settings regarding socio-cultural and economic conditions influencing women's reproductive behaviour; and
3. to suggest the possible means for challenging the prevailing socio-cultural values which influence women's involvement in family planning and other developmental programmes.

Based on the objectives of the study listed above the following major research questions are to be answered by this study:

- 1) To what extent are certain aspects of currently married women's status motivators of their behaviour in relation to their fertility goals, and to what extent are they mere reflections of the socio-cultural and economic circumstances?
- 2) Is couple's family planning decision process like that of other family decision process, or in what ways does it differ?
- 3) To what extent is couple's family planning decision process an active one; that is, to what extent are family planning decisions made or simply left up to fate?
- 4) What is the extent of women's participation in and control of the family decision making process, and does it extend to decisions about their own fertility?
- 5) What gives women the ability to assert their individual fertility goals, especially in the face of a hostile family environment?
- 6) What factors constrain women's involvement in family planning decisions and how can these constraints be challenged?

1.3. METHODS

In order to investigate the socio-cultural and economic conditions influencing women's status and their roles in family planning decision-making a combination of various methods were employed. These included: personal and participant observations, in-depth personal discussions (intensive interviews), recording case histories (extended case studies), focus group discussions, photographs, work journal, document analysis, and simple statistical techniques such as percentage, frequency and average. A brief explanation about each method of data collection is given below.

1. Personal and participant observation of women's involvement in family planning practices and other related activities. Through participant observation more data were obtained on the various aspects of women's status and their role in family size decision, and thereby the discrepancy between what are believed to be the ideal formulations and what is happening on a day-to-day basis were observed. Furthermore, this method helped in obtaining information on insights, thoughts, attitudes, beliefs, and practices of the subjects under study.

2. In-depth personal interviews were held with 40 selected couples separately. Intensive interviews were conducted utilising a checklist to ensure optimum coverage of different issues and initiate conversations. The very essence of in-depth personal discussions is the establishment of a **human-to-human** relation with the subjects so as to understand the whole picture of their life. The in-depth interviews which covered a wide range of issues about the subjects under study were tape-recorded.
3. Extended case method was applied to study the various aspects of women's status (education, employment, socio-economic background, family structure, age at marriage and family decision-making); and their roles in family planning decision-making.
4. Focus group discussions. Focus group interviews were in the form of open discussions and were conducted in two villages in order to obtain information on breastfeeding practices, sexual taboos, pre-and postnatal residence patterns of women, and the cultural or economic importance of childbearing. Focus group discussions were preferred as a methods of data collection in research due to its flexibility, and speedy results. In this study, two focus groups consisting 5-10 women aged between 15-49 years were formed (one from rural Kotebe and the other from urban Kotebe). I had an interview schedule to guide them through the sequence of the questions. I used a tape recorder and also took notes.
5. Photographs of various occasions and activities related to family interactions, child-care patterns, social classes, income groups, family structures, employment statuses, and nature of labour force participation were used as supportive sources for the study. Here, photographs are considered as a part of culturally informed observation. However, to make the photographs "intellectually denser", the photographer must become conscious of the theory that guides his or her photography (Becker 1974:11). Given the expressive potential of photography and the intellectual ferment surrounding experiments in ethnography, the marriage of visual method and ethnography seems natural (Douglas 1994:410). Douglas further noted that most fundamentally, images allow us to make kinds of statements that cannot be made by words; thus images enlarge our consciousness (1994:411). In short, Photographing permits the study and measurement of internal dynamics of behaviour that cannot be approached adequately through direct observation. Therefore, photographic images capture a wealth of detail that an observer can only begin to describe and make possible a way of physically possessing external reality as well as possessing knowledge about it.
6. Journal of daily events and experiences were written at the end of each day. Pieces of relevant information that came in an unpredictable manner were also jotted down.
7. Documents from regional and Woreda governmental and non-governmental organisations were consulted wherever possible.
8. Simple statistical techniques such as percentage, frequency and average were employed in order to back up the qualitative data with statistical evidence.

It must be stressed however, that the methods mentioned above are not mutually exclusive. They are often used as supplements to each other. Therefore, the study represents a combination of several methods in one because different "lenses" result from the use of different methods.

Often, more than one method may be used within a research so that the researcher can gain a more holistic view of the subject under investigation. Thus, I relied on methodological "triangulation".

The approach in this research stresses households as the unit of analysis. More importantly, the household often represents "the primary site for the structuring of gender relations and women's specific experience" (Chant & Brydon 1988:8). But one cannot afford to be rigid in his or her approach, or to use Guyer's expression, "to take a stance in which, because one's only tool is a hammer, every problem becomes a nail" (1986:99). To adopt a single framework is unnecessarily restrictive, because it discounts the various aspects of women's status and confines itself to a reductionistic point of view. Therefore, the problem is also approached through the individual actors, i.e., women.

Above all, population dynamics is so complex that to cover all problems involved would require someone well-trained in demography, economics, anthropology, education, psychology, public health and administration, and several other subjects as well. More specifically, the successful incorporation of the anthropological concepts of culture into a demographic explanation requires a sophisticated theoretical approach and thorough contextualization through greater reliance on comparative studies of relatively small social units. This is to be done with reference to neighbourhoods, villages, work places, social classes, castes, ethnic groups, beliefs and values. The male-female social relations also determine the family planning decisions. In recent years efforts have been made to bridge the gap between "institutional" and "motivational" demography (Shrivastava 1994:22).

In short, the general design of the research utilizes the information synthesis approach. Today pure disciplinary models are somewhat rare. Psychological, economic, cultural and other variables are parts of the more successful models, in recognition of the complexities and subtleties of the issue under investigation.

1.4. THE FIELDWORK AND PERSONAL ENCOUNTERS

In order to investigate the socio-cultural and economic conditions influencing women's status and role in family planning decision-making, I selected Kotebe (Woreda 28), one of the five Woredas in Addis Ababa with rural farmers association, for the purpose of primary data collection or fieldwork in this study. The main reason for choosing it was to find out whether there exists any difference between rural and urban settings regarding socio-cultural and economic conditions influencing women's reproductive behaviour. The additional reason for selecting Kotebe among the five Woredas with Peasant Associations in Addis Ababa is its feasibility and accessibility since I have been working and living there more than six years.

The field work was conducted in two phases for a total of three months. The first phase (beginning August 1997 to end of August 1997) was a preliminary survey to identify the research site and key informants in the villages in Woreda 28. The second phase (beginning December 1997 to the end of January 1998) was devoted to conduct intensive personal interviews and participant observation.

Before I began my field survey, I met the local authorities at Woreda 28 Administrative Office and explained to them the purpose of my field study with a letter of support from the Department of Sociology and Social Administration. I received their approval almost automatically.

I began my field survey in 1 August 1997. One month was devoted to conduct a preliminary survey in order to identify the specific research site and key informants in the villages in Woreda 28 (Kotebe). First I selected three key informants (Ato Huluka Buta, Ato Tulu Feyisa and Ato Girma Biru) who were acquainted with the local people and who agreed to interview their extended families and friend networks. Then with the help of these key informants I visited rural villages of Kotebe and I selected four villages (**Yeka Abado, Yeka Tafo, Meri and Luke**) among seven peasant associations for the purpose of extended case studies through my key informants. Then I selected 10 households from each village. I talked to the most knowledgeable informants I could find in the villages. Among four Kebeles in urban Kotebe, I selected two Kebeles (01 and 03); and 30 and 10 households respectively for purposes of extended case studies and comparative analysis of social networks, socio-economic groups, families and women's life as a whole both in rural and urban areas of Kotebe. Households in kebele 01 were selected by myself since it is my living and working place. But households in Kebele 03 were selected with the help of Ato Tulu Feyisa since it is his living place. Ato Tulu Feyisa worked with me for the entire duration of the field study. Here it should be noted that more households were selected from Kebele 01 than other villages of Kotebe because here there are more residents than others, and the residents differ in many aspects such as ethnic background, religion, socio-economic background, and the like.

In this study, a total of 80 couples (40 from rural Kotebe and 40 from urban Kotebe) were selected based on purposeful sampling and I conducted a preliminary personal interview with each of them separately and face-to-face. The 80 couples so selected were interviewed at their homes. Individual women who were considered as the best cases in point were interviewed at their work place. Among 80 families, only 40 families (20 from rural and 20 from urban) were selected for intensive personal interviews and participant observations and these families were judged sufficiently reliable to be used in the final data set.

Focus families were selected purposefully. The selecting criteria were: willingness of the informants, diversity in family size or number of children, having or not having children, ethnic group, level of education, occupational group, family background and age group of currently

married women and their spouses. The various indicators of the status of currently married women such as place of residence, family background, ethnicity, religion, education; and their spouses educational and economic background were treated as stratifying criteria. In addition to these stratifying criteria the number of children, having or not having children, religious affiliation and ethnic backgrounds were also considered in selecting households as units of analysis. Then the selected households were stratified by stratifying variables such as employment status, educational level, religious affiliation, ethnic group, family background, number of children or having or not having children, place of residence.

Furthermore, it was attempted to stratify the selected households into two categories based on subjective and relative ranking: "poor" and "wealthy" households which was applied by Poukouta (1997:12) in his fertility study in African households. Subjective ranking simply consisted of asking a woman being interviewed to rank her neighbours' households, and to say which ones she thought were the wealthiest or the poorest in the community. In a rural environment where people know each other fairly well, this procedure gave satisfactory results. Relative ranking, on the other hand, is based on the importance of livestock and access to farm land. This approach, however, did not pay off. The rural Kotebeans are very close to each other. They regarded the fact of assessing a neighbour's property in a very specific manner as improper. Therefore, wealth ranking in the case of rural Kotebe was a difficult task. But in the case of urban Kotebe it was not so serious.

The choice finally was between urban and rural Kotebe. Both appeared equally viable sites for intensive fieldwork. Rural Kotebe in particular is an ideal site. Here the research was fully operative. It touched the life of everyman, woman and child to a extent that went beyond my highest expectations. The oral traditions of Kotebe proved to be rich and highly systematic which needs a great deal of time and energy for thorough investigation.

The second phase (Beginning December 1997 to end of January 1988) was devoted to conduct intensive personal interviews and participant observation. I began full-time field work in December, 1997. The first two weeks were spent in intensive interviewing with a few selected informants. This was followed by the main phase of the fieldwork consisting of daily interviews concerning women's lives and their reproductive histories. I spent week ends and religious holidays among rural Kotebe informants. I spent the evenings and public holidays among urban Kotebe informants because my living place is there. I observed their ways of life, especially their family and social networks. I was observing and recording most of the daily activities, coffee-gatherings, child-care patterns and the like. Over a period of time I interviewed 20 couples from rural Kotebe and 20 couples from urban Kotebe.

In the selected households husbands and wives were personally interviewed separately and face-to-face. In the case of rural Kotebe two women, one from Yeka Abado and one from Yeka Tafo, were interviewed in their mother tongue "Oromiffa" with the help of my key informants, Ato Tulu Feyisa and Ato Girma Biru, as interpreter. Whereas the remaining women and all men were personally interviewed in Amharic. Generally, women and men were interviewed in the household where they live, but occasionally, they were interviewed while they visited a relative or a neighbour, which they did not mind. Through interviews I collected detailed information on background characteristics, fertility levels, breastfeeding and Family Planning practices and fertility preferences of couples. In addition to this, educational attainment of both the wives and their husbands was obtained. The individual interviews established the birth histories of currently married women who were 15 years old or more at the time of the interview. Interviewed women were asked about the characteristics of their households (composition, head, source of income) before asking questions related to their individual characteristics: name, age, family background, education, occupation and wealth, and finally, the number of children ever born and their specific details.

Through in-depth personal interviews I gathered a reasonably large body of data on the socio-cultural and economic conditions influencing women's status and role in family planning decision-making. The information given by the rural Kotebe women informants on the family planning methods was lacking in substance. Family planning programmes were known, but it was not clear when or where the family planning programmes take place. The structured and unstructured personal interviews were designed to throw as much light as possible on the extent of knowledge about family planning, including individual facts about it, sources of information and the circumstances of information transfer, the informant's evaluation of the source and content of messages, and the path of his or her action if any.

In short, in the field most data were collected through the ethnographic method, gathered over the period of the study by intensive participant observation, with special attention paid to focus families. Ethnographic data were used as the foundation for the construction of the personal interviews. This study is based on data gathered in two types of interviews: interviews with selected villagers of Kotebe who are currently married women's aged 15-49 and above and their husbands separately; and two focus group interviews involving five to ten women who had almost similar residential patterns and socio-economic background. Through personally conducted in-depth interviews I elicited information on childbearing and contraceptive histories, resources, women's productive role, family decision-making and socio-economic status, and women's perception of their own autonomy. In an attempt to validate and give further insight into interviews I tried to cross-check it with participant and personal observations. Furthermore, information upon decision-

making on family planning obviously had to be gathered through primary sources. The structured and unstructured personal interviews were designed to throw as much light as possible on the extent of knowledge about family planning, including individual facts about it, sources of information and the circumstances of information transfer, the informants' evaluations of the source and content of messages, and the path of his or her action if any. In most cases intensive personal interviews were conducted in more than single interviews. On average, the personal interview lasted twenty-five to forty minutes. The data through personal interviews were cross-checked by personal observation and the key informants, close friends and relatives of the interviewed person. This choice of my first interviewees turned out to be very helpful, not only because of the atmosphere of confidence, which allowed me to get good feedback, but also because women interviewed afterwards kept asking me if I had interviewed their own relatives first. The list of focus families is presented in Appendix IV.

In conducting my fieldwork in Kotebe, I have encountered many difficulties. The first problem experienced was that of lack of already established methods in urban fieldwork. In this connection, Mesfin has reported the problems of Urban fieldwork in his unpublished M.A thesis research entitled "Inter-Ethnic Relationships in an Urban Setting: A Case Study of Shashemene town", (June 1997). My problems are somewhat similar to what Mesfin has reported. The major problems are discussed below.

The first difficulty was the problem of Urban fieldwork. It has often been noted that the urban field worker is confronted with a more complex society than the anthropologist working in rural communities [Gmelch 1982:311], quoted in Mesfin 1997:n.p). This complex nature of urban areas calls for a new approach in fieldwork and the anthropologist cannot depend entirely on the traditional standard ethnographic methods developed by generations of anthropologists. Presumably the major difficulty in carrying out urban field work is determining the units of analysis. The urban area is occupied by people who can be divided along a number of lines such as religion, class, occupation, ethnicity, etc. Moreover, urban centres are inhabited by a large population. Thus it would be difficult to treat the whole of an urban area as an entity. Gmelch, quoting Eases and Goode identified five units of analysis employed by urban anthropologists. These are: (1) Units based on common residence such as neighbourhoods or a cluster of blocks in a city; (2) groups based on common culture of origin such as ethnicity or minority groups; (3) groups based on a common belief system (religious or political); (4) groups based on a common work, notably occupational groups; and (5) units based upon primary relationships such as households, kinship units, and social networks (Mesfin 1997:n.p). In conducting my field study work in Kotebe, especially urban Kotebe, I have used more or less all the above five units in dealing with different topics. This implies that the study does not provide an exclusive study on any particular unit of the

community. Employing diverse units of analysis for a single study could result in confusion and difficulty in understanding the relationships between the different issues addressed. It also gives an image of discontinuity, as the discussion seems to jump from one topic to another. These problems inevitably arise from the nature of urban fieldwork.

Gmelch wrote that "the hallmark of anthropological fieldwork has been the intensive participation of the anthropologist in the life of the community" [1982:312], quoted in Mesfin 1997: n.p). In urban fieldwork, however, living with the study community is often impossible. It is not only difficult to live with the community, but it is also difficult to have frequent contact with informants.

In my field study I met informants in a number of ways. My living and working place is the center of Kotebe. This enabled me to easily meet informants in central Kotebe and to broaden the dimension of my acquaintances. However, in my fieldwork in rural Kotebe there were some problems in getting access to informants. The first was getting access to observe family relationships, especially those between men and women. Since I could not approach them directly I had go through Key informants.

Furthermore, most informants in Kotebe were unavailable for the interview at their home during the day since they return home in the evening. I tried to overcome this problem by arranging my schedule in accordance to my informant's convenient time, mostly during the evening and holidays (religious holidays in the case of rural Kotebe informants and public holidays in the case of urban Kotebe informants who are working in the formal sector).

With regard to information from personal interviews, attempts were made to correct those sources of bias wherever possible by double checking the accuracy of first interviews by other means such as personal observation and re-interviews. Where checks were made, women were accurate in their responses for the most part but some times exaggerations occurred, specifically in matters concerning family decisions. Women considered me as one who is responsible for alleviating their family and personal problems and since I am a woman they did not hide most of their problems. In contrast to women, men (husbands) were unwilling to uncover matters pertaining to their family and their personal affairs, especially they reported joint decisions regarding family matters or problems which was totally contradicted by their wives. In most cases, husbands tried to report the ideal formulations of behaviour rather than the actual conditions. I think this was so due to the fact that I am a woman and they considered me as one who is concerned with women's affairs but not with theirs.

Furthermore, in conducting in-depth interviews I faced the problems of "not available" and unwilling husbands. Some husbands wanted to join the interview of their wives and therefore inhibited them. This problem was commonly encountered in peasant associations, especially in

Yeka Tafo. Here, the husband would naturally have to answer for his wife in such a situation. In the case of Yeka Tafo, it is very uncommon for a stranger enter to one's house and talk to his wife. As a result I tried to approach both husbands and wives through my key informant Ato Girma Biru who was born and brought up there and still lives there. Even if I approached in this way, I have reservations with regard to the validity of the personal interviews with husbands and wives together because wives were not free to air out their own words. Instead a wife first heard what her husband said and then she in turn said "I agree" with what her husband said. In view of such kind of limitations of information from interviews, I tried to cross-check information from interviews with participant observations. In the few cases where obvious conflict was detected between reported and actual behaviour, the actual behaviour was used in the measure under consideration.

The most important problem I faced during the fieldwork, however, was gaining the confidence of informants. One of the problem was that informants could not understand how they alone came to be selected for the study. Subsequently they were worried. The researcher had to spend a great deal of time explaining to them how they came to be chosen through purposeful sampling method. The other problem is that this being the first experience for many informants to be interviewed it caused some problems: many informants were suspicious thinking that the government wanted to identify them. Most people took me for a government employee trying to determine the level of their income for taxation. This was a problem I encountered especially when I was conducting a preliminary household survey in rural Kotebe villages. Since the survey included a question on family income or property, respondents were reluctant to answer. This was compounded by the age difference between me and most of the informants which made it difficult for me to form personal friendship with them. I tried to overcome this problem through my key informants in the villages under study.

In rural Kotebe all my informants were Orthodox Christians and their religion is somewhat inherited from their family of procreation. They strictly opposed the "new religion", i.e. religion which is not Orthodox Christianity. As a matter of fact in my first exposure the people in rural Kotebe were very suspicious about the objective of my study and their main suspicion was about my religious affiliation. As a result their initial question was "what is your religion?" My key informants introduced me as an Orthodox Christian and then they developed trust towards me and considered me as a member of their family or village. However, in urban Kotebe no one was concerned with my religious affiliation. This is partly because of the fact that almost all my informants in urban Kotebe knew me and partly because all of them were not Orthodox Christians. Some of them are Muslim and some are Protestants, but the majority are Orthodox Christians.

Many people also considered me a government spy who wanted to know their political opinions. This view was strengthened since I asked many question related to population problems or family planning. On one occasion a middle-aged man in rural Kotebe told me directly that they do not trust even their children, let alone a complete stranger like myself. Some people considered me as a modern Christian missionary and for them the issue of deliberate family size limitation is against their religious traditions (rural Kotebeans are basically traditional Orthodox Christians).

Yet my fieldwork in urban Kotebe had its positive sides which an anthropologist working among a remote rural community does not benefit from. It enabled me to observe the relationships between different ethnic groups at close hand, and provided the chance to see inter-relations of ethnicity, class, religion, gender etc. in a more intermixed form than in remote rural communities. The social amenities available in the town like electricity, prepared food, and the like can make urban field work less arduous and stressful. However, this can make establishing relations of confidence more difficult. The challenge for the urban fieldworker which I have attempted to take up, is to try to develop trust with enough representative individuals to comprehend the overall dynamics of the urban scene.

Finally, it should be noted that in my fieldwork in both urban and rural Kotebe I have observed that rural and urban populations in Kotebe do not yet form sociologically separate groups, but they are still strongly linked together in multiple ways, through family bonds and constant contacts and communications. In other words, attitudes of people living in 'pure' urban conditions differ only to a slight extent from the attitudes of those in countryside with whom they share the same cultural background and common problems and aspiration.

1.5 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

Due to time constraint I was not able to assess the socio-cultural and economic conditions influencing women's status and role in family planning decision-making in each area of Kotebe and in each marital status. Therefore, my study was limited to currently married women among the selected villages of Kotebe. Furthermore, the researcher is forced to study only some of the factors that are responsible for women's status and role in family planning decision-making with specific reference to selected villages of Kotebe. And this also limits the scope of the applicability of the results of the research because it is impossible to make wider generalisation based on this specific case study. Hence, the research result remains valid with regard to the target group only. In general, in order to extend the validity of the scope of the research result, the researcher needs a great deal of time and energy.

Furthermore, in this study an attempt was made to combine theory and practice in a way which illuminated the complexity and diversity of issues involved in women's status and role in

family planning decision-making. Furthermore, the study represents the combination of several methods in one in order to cross-check and supplement information gathered through various methods. However, I found that issues such as objectivity, validity, reliability and generalizability are once more problematic.

The first problem refers to the question of objectivity. In principle it is stated that a researcher should avoid any prejudice or biases he or she may have about the subject of the study. This may be difficult but clearly there is no alternative. Social research is an interactive process shaped by the researcher's personal history, biography, gender, social class, race, ethnicity, and those of the people in the cultural setting. Thus, there is no value-free social research. There are no objective observations, only observations socially situated in the world of the observer and the observed. Every individual comes with his/her own package and this represents a framework through which we observe the world. Hence, all human beings are guided by a set of beliefs and feelings about the world and how it should be understood and studied. Some of these beliefs may be taken for granted, only assumed, others are highly problematic and controversial.

The second problem is the question of validity and reliability of the research findings. How can we evaluate or testify the validity of the information given by the informants or respondents? This challenges the advantage of interviewing. The class, age, sex, religious and occupational differences between the researcher and the respondents or the informants may influence the information given. In this way, data from interviews are sometimes considered less reliable than those from participant observation. Furthermore, the interviewers themselves need to be trained in order to understand their role. This is because we all, as human beings, have our ideas or opinion on the subject matters of the interview. It is possible that we inject into the interview situation our own feelings and attitudes. The respondent or informant too may view the situation in a particular manner, probably different from the one we envisage, because of the way he/she defines social reality. All of these have implications for the result.

The last, but not the least, problem is the question of generalizability. Of course, my study is a specific one. But the more the object of study is specific, the greater the usefulness of the epistemological rationale described in the object under investigation. And specific case study can be usefully seen as a small step toward grand generalisation, but generalisation should not be emphasised in all research.

Generally speaking, some error variables in social science research are: biases or prejudice, assumptions, methodology, and fallacies of hasty or premature generalisations. In short, the sources of errors are the researcher, the research design and the source of data. All these sources of errors hold true for my research findings. Nonetheless, the above limitations does not mean that the research has no contribution.

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

In recent decades, a considerable amount of empirical research and theoretical elaboration have led to an accumulation of knowledge which changes some aspects of reproductive behaviour and determinants of fertility. However, most fertility survey studies emphasise the importance of socio-economic factors as determinants of fertility. The overall and generalised influence of socio-economic and cultural conditions on fertility decline have been increasingly asserted by various theoretical formulation. Efforts to isolate the effects of specific socio-economic and cultural traits have been "less than successful" and, at their best, inconclusive ([Ryder 1983], quoted in Azbaha 1990:110). Research on fertility has offered valuable, but fragmented, insights into the problem of reducing fertility in the developing world. Currently there is no single mechanism which adequately accounts for demographic transition as a result of socio-economic development (Christine 1985:iv).

Of course, promising ideas have been explored in recent years about factors influencing the family planning decision. Among them are: the permanent income concept, the opportunity cost of a wife's time, parents' aspirations for their children, the effect of family background, and the relative income hypothesis. It is perhaps not too optimistic to view these as signs pointing toward the development of a more integrated socio-economic framework of fertility analysis. But more research is clearly needed, research in which there is ample scope for a mutually beneficial association of economists, sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, demographers, and others.

When we come to our local socio-cultural and economic reality, a review of the literature on family planning in Ethiopia shows that so far no study has been conducted in a micro-level, i.e., the local socio-cultural contexts in relation to women's status and role in family planning. Even on a macro-level only very few studies were conducted on the socio-cultural and economic aspects related to women's status and role in family planning. In some cases, the assessment of attitudes was either mainly confined to rural areas or only to urban areas. Acceptance of the programme is evidently more in urban than in rural areas. The differences in their attitudes in terms of the traditional socio-economic variables such as religion and income were found to be only marginal. The urban-rural differences in attitudes towards the size of the families were also not large. Even though generally people are found to be in favour, they have not yet developed articulated ideas about the goals of Family Planning and means of their realisation.

Turning to the status and role of women in family planning decision-making with reference to the local socio-cultural and economic contexts, we find that the subject has been largely ignored. Women have always been present in the works of some of the researchers in population and gender issues (e.g. Almaz 1997; Eshetu 1994;) but in very different ways, i.e., the emphasis was on the socio-economic and demographic dimensions rather than on the socio-cultural factors influencing

women's fertility behaviour. The demographic literature on the study of fertility and family planning in Ethiopia societies generally emphasises the socio-economic determinants of fertility in which whether women's education and marital fertility (Almaz 1997), women' labour force status and fertility (Eshetu 1994) or economic value of children and fertility (Yohannes 1994) has often been singled out as the independent variable in trying to explain fertility differentials among a certain group of the population.

Therefore the various aspects of women's status and their role in family planning decision with reference to our local socio-cultural and economic contexts has never been envisaged as a crucial issue. It is true that the subject has been treated in a cavalier manner in some of the literatures, although--and this is an important point--not as a problem in itself nor in a complete and systematic form. Therefore, this thesis research aims to describe and analyse, at a micro-level, the status and role of currently married women in family planning with reference to our local socio-cultural and economic context.

Specifically speaking, the findings of the present study will have theoretical as well as practical significance. The outcome of the research will contribute to our theoretical perspectives on the dynamic relationships of the socio-cultural and economic conditions and women's status and role in family planning decision-making. Besides its theoretical significance, this research could serve some practical purposes. It will be of interest for those involved in socio-cultural and economic development in general and for those interested in improving the fate of women in particular.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

2.1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS

The major objective of this study is to investigate the socio-cultural and economic conditions influencing women's status and role in family planning decision-making. Therefore the key concepts embodied in the title of the thesis research are: social, cultural, economic conditions.

2.1.1. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

Social conditions are conceptualized as:

- i. **Level of education:** a woman's level of education is considered. The basic hypothesis here being that, a woman's level of education (primary, Secondary, College/University etc.) may influence her ability to practice family planning.
- ii. **Family Planning decision-making:** To use or not to use family planning methods is a crucial decision for every woman. However, the assumption of this study is that many women may be hindered from using family planning methods because of negative influence from their spouses.
- iii. **Infant and Child Mortality:** If a parent loses a child through death, they are likely to replace that child. However, if chances of mortality (infant and child) are reduced for people in the population, then they are likely to settle for fewer numbers of children and thus use family planning methods.
- iv. **Fears and Rumours:** Fear of the unknown is man's worst enemy. Individuals are socially and psychologically apprehensive of the consequences of actions they are taking especially for the first time. Either due to lack of adequate information or approach, many women are likely to refuse contraceptives because of fear. On the other hand, rumours as it is said "spread like fire" and a rumour though not factual can counteract the effort of the family planning programme.

Cultural conditions are conceptualized as :

- i. **Values and norms:** Social values attached to large family norms, son preference, etc. In our local context the social value of a woman is staked in her child-bearing potential and the father of a large family in the traditional setting has a higher social prestige than the father of a small family. Families, even the literate parents, do feel that a family is not

complete without a male child among the siblings. Also, negative attitudes towards a barren woman among other cultural factors are likely to hinder use of contraceptives.

- ii. **Religion:** Here the assumption is that people take what religion says very seriously. As a result, religious opinions are likely to influence people's attitude towards family planning use.

Economic conditions are conceptualized as follows:

- i. **Income level:** The level of income is likely to determine the standards of living which in turn may affect a family's fertility preference.
- ii. **Economic value of children:** In the rural areas the main mode of economic sustenance is agriculture using labour intensive mode of production. Therefore an extra person to a peasant farmer may mean additional source of labour to the family. Therefore the study aims to investigate whether such value can hinder the use of family planning methods.
- iii. **Occupation:** The assumption of the study is that a woman's type of occupation is likely to hinder or enhance her ability to use contraceptives.

All the above mentioned factors or conditions reveal the logical relationships between socio-cultural and economic factors and family planning acceptance. The terms social, economic and cultural are key concepts related to couples' reproductive behaviour at the local level of investigation. Each of the key concepts was conceptualized into a set of variables as presented above. However, the mechanisms of interaction between socio-cultural and economic conditions on one hand and reproductive behaviour on the other hand is not one-sided. They are mutually interrelated. Their relationship is a complex one since normally the former in this case should influence the latter, but at the same time an individual's reproductive behaviour can influence his/her social, economic and cultural statuses and vice versa. The full explanation for the variation in fertility behaviour is to be provided by supplementing the independent effect of socio-cultural and economic conditions on couples' fertility behaviour. However, in this study only the effects of husband-wife communication, cultural and social values and norms, and socio-economic development upon women's family planning decision-making are investigated.

2.1.2 DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS

Status and Role

"Status in the Linton sense", has come to be a synonym for any "position in a social system". According to Linton, a status is marked off by the fact that distinctive beliefs about, and expectations for, social actors are organized around it. The workings of society, according to Linton, depend on the existence of configuration of reciprocity between members of a society.

Linton further noted that status refers to positions within structures of reciprocity and can be regarded as the sum of an individual's rights and duties within a society. On the other hand, role refers to the behavioural aspect of status when rights and duties are acted out, an individual plays his role in society.

Role, as a concept, refers to experienced behaviour; and status to the cognitive aspect of society. The role represents the dynamic aspect of status. It follows that role and status cannot be separated--the two terms represent different aspects of the same phenomenon. Role and status are quite inseparable, and the distinction between them is of only academic interest. There are no roles without statuses or statuses without roles. Just as in the case of status, the term role is used with a double significance (Bohannan & Glazer 1988:186).

In short, Status or positions will be used interchangeably to mean rank in relation to others or in the hierarchy of prestige. Role will refer to the expectations and behaviour related to the distributions of primary and secondary responsibilities for tasks or functions carried out by society.

Sex and Gender

From the view point of anthropology, sex and gender do not have the same connotation. While "sex" refers to the biologically determined differences between males and females, such as in terms of women's reproductive role, "gender" refers to the socially and culturally determined differences between males and females. Gender differences vary between, as well as within, countries, and may also change over time. The socialization process moulds females into the role of subservient mothers and wives (Hirut Terefe 1997:154).

The simple fact that only women can bear children causes every society to recognize some differentiation between the behaviour of men and women. Beyond the behavioural differences that are directly attributable to anatomy and physiology, however, cultures vary greatly in the degree to which they view human behaviour as being properly sex differentiated (Winch 1968:6-7).

Every society uses biological sex as one criterion for describing gender, but beyond that simple starting point, no two cultures would completely agree on what distinguishes one gender from another. Thus, gender roles are culture specific. Gender not only varies from one culture to another but it also varies within cultures over time. Furthermore, gender roles are determined not only by culture but also by socio-political and economic factors.

2.2. GENDER AND STATUS: EXPLAINING THE POSITION OF WOMEN

The division and ascription of statuses with relation to sex seems to be basic in all social systems. All societies prescribe different attitudes and activities to men and to women. Most of them try to rationalize these prescriptions in terms of the physiological differences between the

sexes or their different roles in reproduction. However, a comparative study of the statuses ascribed to women and men in different cultures seems to show that while such factors may have served as a starting point for the development of a division, the actual ascriptions are almost entirely determined by culture. Although the actual ascription of occupations along sex lines is highly variable, the pattern of sex division is constant. There are very few societies in which every important activity has not been definitely assigned to men or women. Even where the two sexes cooperate in a particular occupation, the field of each is usually clearly delimited (Bohannan & Glazer 1988:188-189).

In the nineteenth century anthropologists interested themselves in questions relating to Sex and Gender, and contributed to current debates on "the question of women's role and status in a given social system". Women in traditional East Africa have often been considered from the point of view of their "status" (Molnos 1968:47). It is doubtful indeed, whether among Africans the question of high or low status ever arises as a distinction between men and women (Driberg 1932:405). The concepts of "low status" and "high status" are too simple and, therefore, inadequate to describe such differences. The forms of role differentiation between the sexes vary from society to society. The right question is not whether the status of women in a give society is "low" or "high", but whether the structure of the society provides adequate compensations to the socially sanctioned role differences (Molnos 1968:47-48).

What is to be a woman, how cultural understanding of the category of "woman" vary through space and time, and how those understandings relate to the position of women in different societies. Contemporary anthropologists who explore the position of women, whether in their own or other society, are inevitably drawn into the debate concerning the origins and universality of women's subordination (Moore 1987:12). Moore further states that the analysis of women's subordination is dependent upon some consideration of general relation. Anthropological analyses approach the study of gender from different, but not mutually exclusive, perspectives. Gender may be seen either as a symbolic construction or as a social relationship. The particular perspective taken by an individual researcher tends to determine the types of explanation they provide to the question of the origins and nature of women's subordination. According to moore, one of the most vital contribution of the anthropology of women has been its sustained analysis of gender symbols and sexual stereotypes. The main problem facing researchers in this area is how to explain both the enormous observable variables in cultural understandings of what the categories 'man' and 'woman' mean, and the fact that certain notions about gender appear in a wide range of different societies.

The formulation that nature is to culture as female is to 'male' provided social anthropology with a powerful analytical framework which had a wide impact on the discipline in the late 1970s

and early 1980s. It was powerful because it offered a way of linking sexual ideologies and stereotypes both to the wider system of cultural symbols and to social roles and experiences. Sexual ideologies and stereotypes vary greatly, but certain symbolic associations between gender and many other aspects of cultural life occur across a wide range of societies. The value of analyzing 'man' and 'woman' as symbolic categories or constructs lies in the identification of the expectations and values which individual cultures associate with being male and female. Such analysis provides some indication of the ideal behaviour of men and women in their different social roles, which can then be compared with the actual behaviour and responsibilities of the two sexes. It is in understanding how men and women are socially constructed, and how those constructions define and redefine social activities, that the value of a symbolic analysis of gender becomes apparent (Moore 1987:15-16). According to Moore, one of the features of gender symbolism which has attracted a great deal of attention from scholars who wish to explain women's inferior status' like those which many women experience after childbirth and during menstruation, provide clues as to how people categorize one another and thus structure their social world. An analysis of pollution beliefs and their relationship to sexual ideologies is revealing, because such beliefs are frequently associated with the natural functions of the human body.

2.3. CHILD-BEARING AND THE SOCIAL POSITION OF WOMEN

All customs point to the fact that child-bearing was one of the most important issues in these traditional societies and certainly the most important in every woman's life. The social status of women increased with the number of children she was able to bear to her husband, i.e. to his lineage and clan. The barren woman had not social prestige whatsoever. If there is a case of East African women being oppressed, exploited and humiliated without adequate compensation, it may be the case of the barren woman (Molnos 1968:55). Molnos further noted that the situation of the woman who failed to bear children was aggravated by two circumstances: First, even when the lack of children was due to the failure of the husband, the woman was hardly able to prove it. Secondly, once the hope of having children had faded, the woman might have been accused of being a witch: In this case she not only lost her female prestige, became a complete outcast and an object of persecution. In this connection, Roscoe clearly stated that:

Every married woman was anxious to become a mother, and expected to show signs of maternity within a few weeks of her marriage. A woman who had no children was despised, and soon became the slave and drudge of the household. If the wife was a favourable, her husband would persevere in the use of charms and drugs for months and sometimes for years; the medicine-men and the gods would be consulted and no means would be spared to obtain children...when a husband lost hope of having children, and

the woman was pronounced to be sterile, she lost favour with him; and though he seldom put her entirely away, yet, where there was a second wife, the latter came to the front, and received the attentions and affections of her husband, while the barren wife became more and more his drudge (1965:46).

Although it was not a legal ground for divorce, "the infertility of a union (among the Ganda) has often been the cause of its dissolution, both in the past and today" (Fallers 1960:30). According to Cory's (1959) description, the Sukuma considered children the main purpose of marriage. If one or two years of married life passed by and no pregnancy occurred, first diviners and then practitioners were consulted. The former were supposed to find out the reason of the childless situation and the latter to prescribe the necessary treatment. The treatment was often harmful to the woman's health, but its negative effects would finally always be attributed to forces beyond medical control.

The young married wife "...has to prove herself a proper woman by giving her husband an heir. If she fails in this, she may be accused of being a witch and therefore, not only sterile, but likely to cause disease and misfortune in the home" (Whisson 1964:18). Whisson further noted that since one of the main causes of sterility was said to be that one of the spouses was a witch and "... since witchcraft is inherited a man's family would not agree that their son, and therefore themselves, are witches and the woman would be blamed for the sterile union" (Whisson 1964:15). Whisson also stated that: "...if a woman gets a reputation for witchcraft, it will not be long before she finds that her husband is forced to send her home, and it will be most difficult for her to get another husband" (1964:15).

Ominde (1952:65) describes the situation of the childless woman as follows:

Failure to have a child is a greater disaster in the home. The idea of the perpetuation of their kin is so deeply rooted in the minds of the Luo people that a childless marriage generally culminates in the breaking up of the home concerned, the husband usually being advised by his relatives to marry a second wife. Although the results may prove that it is the husband who is defective, priority is always given to men to prove their fecundity. Thus a woman is forbidden by the social conventions to attempt to prove on her own initiative that she can give birth to children"(1952:65).

But the consequences of sterility, if it was proved, were severe also for the man. Therefore, he would have had recourse to every means in order to avoid getting such a reputation: "If through the second marriage the husband is proved to be sterile, his wives may one by one desert him. On the other hand, this great desire for children may lead him to carry on his name through the secret offices of the woman's brother-in-law. Otherwise he must face the inevitable fate of having his family broken up" (Ominde, 1952:65).

A barren woman was reputed to be very strong and hard working, as well she might be, as she was free from the exhausting labour of childbirth, and living in the knowledge that unless she proved herself in other ways, she might be accused of being a witch (Whisson 1964:53-54). According to Whisson (1964:18), "the childless woman was an obvious target for accusations of witchcraft because she had no sons to support her and because the husband may have had doubts about his potency".

In short, what we conclude from the foregoing discussion is that child-bearing was one of the most important issues in the "traditional" societies and certainly the most important in every woman's life. Furthermore, the social status of women increased with the number of children she was able to bear to her husband, i.e. to his lineage and clan. Therefore, the barren woman had not social prestige whatsoever in the traditional setting. This directly leads us to the social aspect of reproduction.

2.4. REPRODUCTION AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

In this section of the present chapter an attempt is made to examine the features of social reproduction, and applies a social analysis to the concept of fertility. It contributes to the socialisation of demography by making fertility itself a subject for theorising rather than an unproblematic biological event. In this section, an attempt is made to apply anthropological theory to the concept of fertility itself in the expectation that a sociologically informed concept of fertility is more suitable for our purposes. What it means to understand fertility as a social phenomenon through a parallel treatment of parenthood in anthropology and demography will be illustrated.

Both anthropology and demography are concerned with the relationship between elements and structures and with the co-ordinated reproduction of both individuals and the structured relationships within which they exist. The picture of reproduction in demography, represented by the concept of fertility, is essentially a biological one in which children are attributed unproblematically to the women who gave birth to them. Anthropological theory, on the other hand, has emphasised social reproduction: the recreation overtime of structures of relationships and the reproduction of social positions rather than of physical individuals (Fortes, 1958; Goody 1976; Goody, 1982; Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu and Passeron 1990). In both biological and social theories of reproduction, the relationship described as parenthood is pivotal, though the concept is differently defined. The differences and similarities of the two approaches to reproduction could be profitably developed at length to examine the multiple meanings that lie concealed beneath a shared vocabulary of "life course", "ageing", "transition", and "generation". Both disciplines, however, share the critical importance they play on the specific moment of reproduction--the

creation, production, or recruitment of a new element to the structure through a relationship with specific existing elements of the structure (Townsend 1997:96-97).

For both anthropology and demography, reproduction is a process whereby structures are maintained, even though the individual elements pass through them, because those individual elements, in the course of their passage, combine to create new elements. In both approaches, reproduction is endogenous: an integral aspect of the structure and sharply distinct from replacement as we would see it, for instance, in the population of automobiles.

The Specificity of Fertility

The basic project of linking purely demographic rates and structures to "social institutions, cultural norms, economic and environmental conditions" is most clearly illustrated in the analytic frameworks proposed for the analysis of fertility (Freedman et al. 1983:10). Within this framework, the influence of institutions and individual socio-economic characteristics operates on fertility through variables organised within the tripartite division of demand for children, supply of children, and costs of fertility regulation (Easterlin 1978). These variables have their direct effects on motivation to control fertility, on fertility regulation, and ultimately on achieved fertility.

The feedback loop may be explicitly illustrated with a causal arrow from "cumulated family size" to "reproductive history" (Freedman et al. 1983:10) or from "fertility" to "institutions; social and economic structure; norms; external conditions, etc." (Birdsall et al. 1985:13). Or the feedback may be incorporated by including "current number of children" as an independent variable in a model predicting "period births" (Cochrane, 1979:60) or "reproductive history" as a predictor of "fertility" (Rofman 1992:5).

The concept of fertility as biological reproduction is being conflated with the goal of human motivation and with the reproductive history and current reproductive situation of the people involved. However, neither reproductive goals nor reproductive status can be assumed to be equated with giving birth: goals and status to do with family size can be, and are, achieved by social mechanisms as well as by biological events. The demographic picture of fertility is not only biological as opposed to social, it is also historically and culturally specific, structured by a particular set of social assumptions. The model of fertility in demography assumes a particular family structure and a particular economic context. For instance, the entire discussion of opportunity costs and fertility not only assumes that mothers take the burden of the time costs of children, it also assumes that the productive labour of women takes place only in wage-labour market economy. In many societies, however, the distribution of child care among women, and among women of different generations, as well as the structure of productive labour for women, make the concept of opportunity costs applicable only with great modification. The theory is not,

however, modified accordingly. Similarly, concentration on marital fertility has sprung from two assumptions--that marriage is a single event, a transition at one point in time, and that a woman's marriage precedes her fertility.

One approach to the problem of defining a biological outcome in terms of social, economic, or cultural causes has been to concentrate on the strictly biological antecedents of that outcome through the analysis of proximate determinants (Bongaart 1978). Change in the proximate determinants may be understood more easily as the result of deliberate action or as the consequences of social changes than would changes in fertility levels themselves (Townsend 1997:97-98).

Anthropologists treat fertility itself as a social institution embedded in social processes. In the process of reproducing itself, a social structure recruits individuals and groups for particular positions and functions. By looking at this social recruitment, and the changes in it, as the object to be explained or understood, we can avoid many problems in contemporary explanations of fertility.

Parenthood as a Social Phenomenon

To speak of "**parenthood**" as opposed, for instance, to "parenting" is to underscore the point that the sociological discussion of reproduction is about status and roles and not only about physical individuals. "It is extremely hard for us to maintain a distinction in our thinking between status and the people who hold them" warned Linton sixty years ago (1936:113), and it has remained hard through all the subsequent evaluations and reformulations of status and role. the distinction is crucial to sociological analysis, however, and underlies the disjuncture between sociology and the individualism of microeconomics analysis.

The concern of many anthropologists have shifted since Linton wrote, focusing more attention on human subjectivity and human action (Ortner 1984), but the distinction between an individual person and a social status, and between individual attributes and aspects of social structure, has remained vital to the discipline. Where "fertility" is an attribute, "parenthood" is a status, "a collection of rights and duties" (Linton 1936:113). Because it is a collection, it may be analysed into constituent elements combined in a variety of ways.

There are three overlapping but analytically distinct senses in which parenthood can be seen as a social phenomenon. First, the ascription of parent and child is a social process, not a biologically given--the selection of persons involved in the relationship of parenthood is social. Second, the content of the role of parent varies historically, cross-culturally, and within societies. Third, the distribution of the various rights and responsibilities that might be, or have been in

different contexts, attributed to parents are, in any particular setting distributed among a number of social actors and institutions.

Ascription of Parenthood as a Social Process

The first sense in which parenthood must be considered social—that the people occupying the relevant status are socially selected—is both obvious from the standpoint of role theory and subversive of a biological paradigm (Townsend 1997:100).

The concept of fertility depends for its analytic power on the unambiguous connection of each child to its biological mother. The distinction between socially contingent relationship of fatherhood and the more essential, biological, and natural relationship to motherhood has been widely accepted within the anthropological study of kinship, which has made motherhood the core element of kinship (Fortes, 1949; Fox 1967; Goodenough 1970). This theoretical conclusion has been readily accepted because in the United States hegemonic theories of relationship in general (Schneider, 1968), and of Parenthood in particular (Modell 1986), are founded on an **ideology of blood**. It is commonly assumed that the genetic connection between parents and children brings about the social relationship between them, and occasions the transition to the status of parenthood.

Collier and Yanagisako (1987) extend Schneider's (1984) critique of kinship studies by separating all categories of **kinship and gender** from folk theories of biology. Recent theoretical approaches in anthropology question many traditional analytical categories in the light of ethnographic concerned with the processes and practices of people's everyday life. The phenomena of kinship and parenthood are discussed as constructions arising out of activity rather than as structures imposed on life. Trobriand accounts of parenthood, which deny the biological contribution of fathers (Malinowski 1929), and Arunta beliefs, which attribute the social position of children exclusively to the social relations between their parents (Montagu, 1937), demonstrate the possibility of theories of kinship divorced from biological descent (Townsend 1997:101).

Townsend argues that maternity is also a social relationship. Becoming pregnant and bearing a child do not make a woman a mother because biological destiny can be socially averted both pre-and post-natal. Use of any form of birth control brings out the social and cultural aspects of maternity because it makes clear that there are social situations in which births are seen as desirable and appropriate and others in which they are not. Birth control makes visible the distinction between biological procreation and social reproduction. Sexual relations outside marriage may not be clandestine, they may even be the norm, and the strongest contender for a universal characteristic of marriage is not the exclusivity of a bond between a man and a woman but the establishment of a relationship which provides a culturally accepted and legitimated social position for children.

The clearest evidence for the social nature of the attribution of parenthood to particular people is in **adoption**, when the full rights and responsibilities of parenthood are transferred and the child's social and kinship position is transformed. The motivating force for this form of adoption is more the desire of the adults than the anomalous situation of the child. In this case of adoption, a social person is created by appropriation, and people become parents in every sense other than the genetic.

Fosterage, which is employed as a blanket term for a variety of social arrangements (Goody 1978, 1982), is much more widespread than total adoption, particularly in Africa where it is an important feature of social structure (Page 1989). As Bledsoe argues from West African evidence, fosterage is bound up with people's life strategies and manipulation of political and economic claims on others (Bledsoe and Isiugo-Abanihe 1989; Bledsoe 1990). In some cases fosterage may be a substitute for biological fertility, but is usually deployed alongside it as part of a more general strategy. While fosterage provides further evidence for the social attribution of parenthood, at least in those variants where significant elements of the bundle of parental rights and responsibilities are transferred, its primary importance in my argument is as an example of social parenthood in the third sense--that is, the distribution of parenthood among several people or groups (Townsend 1997:102).

Social Determinants of the Contents and Distribution of Parenthood

The second and third senses in which parenthood is social are that the content of parenthood (the rights and responsibilities associated with the status) is socially determined, and that those rights and responsibilities are socially distributed. Content and distribution overlap in their application, and their relative significance will depend on the definition that is given to parenthood and on the perspective of a specific investigation.

Ester Goody, in her discussion of parenthood in West Africa, includes under "parenthood" all the things that have to be done "in producing a society's new recruits, and rearing them so that they can effectively assume adult roles in society" (1978:230). With this definition, the question of the distribution of rights and responsibilities between status and institutions become most salient, but variation in content remains both between and within societies. We ask, that is, how the content of parenthood varies between societies and within them, and how the distribution of that content also varies. For example, formal education is a necessary element of parenthood in literate, industrial societies, and must be provided if children are to "effectively assume adult roles".

Formal education has not always existed, however, and there remain some societies in which it is not necessary. It is therefore an element that may or may not be part of the content of parenthood in Goody's broad definition. In terms of distribution, different societies may distribute

responsibility for formal education differentially between individual parents, other people, churches, and the state. Distribution will vary also within societies. In the United States, the general remark that formal education is an element of parenthood that is the responsibility of the state would need to be modified to take account of class-specific notions of "responsible parenthood" which make the provision of private education a part of individual parental status.

Goody's approach of defining parenthood broadly and functionally is eminently suitable for cross-cultural comparison since it allows aspects of parenthood to be analysed within a framework or list of categories not embedded in any particular cultural context. It has the added advantage of bringing to our attention functions and elements of social organisations that we might not think of as parental. The disadvantages to so broad a definition of parenthood, and to the accompanying salience of the distribution of functions throughout the social structure, are: (1) that all elements of society may be included within parenthood, (2) that clear-cut analytic categories may be meaningless to the people being analysed. When our interest is in motivation, or in the direct provision of goods and services to children, we will want to deploy a more restricted and perhaps culturally specific definition of parenthood. In her own investigation of parenthood, Goody concentrates on those elements of the broader definition that are linked to the physical presence of the child. That is, her discussion of the distribution of parental activities follows children as they move for schooling, apprenticeship, and to create and reinforce the social position of adults (1978) (Townsend 1997:102-103).

Attention to parenthood as a socially constructed status rather than a biologically given attribute, however, allows an examination of parenthood from within a cultural context as well as from an external analytic position. Keesing (1970) describes how he used the "natural experiments" provided by atypical instances of foster, step, and adoptive fatherhood to separate "the role of the Kwaio father" into constituent identities. Keesing found that what was usually included in the single category "father" could be separated both analytically by him, and in practice by the Kwaio themselves, into the elements of head of household, jural guardian, jural father (transmitter of kinship position, rights, and property), and nonjural father (provider of support and subsistence). Keesing argues that it was through the study of the distribution of these identities among different men in atypical cases that he was able to understand the much more common case in which the identities were merged in a single man. "By focusing on the typical, we sacrifice the power to understand the atypical. The 'building blocks' approach reveals how and why the typical occurs, while rendering intelligible the full range of possibility" (1970:440).

In comparative or analytic investigations we will define parenthood broadly and focus on variation in the distribution of rights and responsibilities towards children; in investigations of local

meanings and motivations we will define parenthood more narrowly and will notice variations in the content of the **status of parent**.

Cross-cultural and historical comparisons provide evidence on the variability (104) of parenthood along all three dimensions. Demos (1986) and Pleck and Pleck (1980) describe the history of fatherhood in the United States in terms of the changing content in the role of the father, with the central aspect being variously moral guide, pedagogue, benefactor, controller, companion, moral support to the mother, child-rearer, provider, and friend. Changing cultural norms for the division of moral labour between fathers and mothers have accompanied changes in legal and social relations, with a shift in the natural or custodial parent from father to mother.

The social nature of parenthood and what is frequently labelled "fertility" in demographic models is in fact not a biological event but a socially constructed relationship of parenthood. Parenthood as a status and relationship does not require, nor is it necessitated by, a biological connection. On the other hand, social reproduction, as brought about through parenthood, does require that new individuals be created. Since demographic theories of fertility are concerned with the link between new biological individuals and social institutions, it follows that fertility must be considered a social relationship with strong similarities and connections between fertility and parenthood.

The complexities of social parenthood, and some of the consequences for analysis of fertility, are illustrated concretely in the following. Examination of this case reveals how the rights and responsibilities associated with parenthood are distributed among a variety of people, and also how the claims of these people are in conflict and competition. As this example makes clear, parenthood is contested terrain in which the unambiguous ascription of biological fertility is only one element.

Fertility and parenthood are in analogous positions in their respective disciplines, for they function similarly as key elements in those small local groups variously seen as families, households, and domestic units. It is within these small groups that the creation of new people is centred, and these groups are the focus of much attention in attempts to link social phenomena at the micro and macro levels. For demography and social science, an adequate definition must take central the fact that fertility describes a relationship and is not simply an attribute of an individual. A person does not "have" some particular fertility all on his or her own; fertility is a description of relationships with offspring. Indeed, a person's fertility is a description of a place in a web of relationships with offspring, with other kin, and with a range of social groups and institutions. The analogy between parenthood and fertility may be extended. The three dimensions along which parenthood is socially constructed may also be applied to a socialised concept of fertility (Townsend 1997:108-109).

To consider first the attribution of fertility, births can not be unproblematically attributed to the women who bore them if we are interested in either the causes or consequences of these births. Evidence of this may be found particularly in adoption, but also in fosterage and stepparenthood. It has been an accepted fact in anthropology that fatherhood is social, and much of culture and social organisation is explained by men's attempts to guarantee their rights to children. But maternity is also social, as abortion, infanticide, adoption, and stepparenthood have demonstrated for a long time and as new reproductive technologies forcibly make clear. (4). Histories of illegitimacy emphasise the social determination of the transition to parenthood within the context of a system of marriage and inheritance (Laselett, Oosterveen, and Smith, 1980; Kertzer 1993). Demographic theory has made fertility both a cause and effect--for instance, in the way achieved fertility feeds back upon contraception to produce parity-specific control as the major feature of declines in fertility. For this feedback loop to operate as proposed, fertility must be attributable to a couple unambiguously, but socialising fertility reveals that this attribution must be examined rather than taken for granted.

Variability in the content of fertility is also socially determined. This is recognised in some demographic treatments of the costs and values of children, which finds differences between populations and between men and women (5). But psychological or cultural values of children have taken a back seat in demographic analysis, and the culturally variable economic returns of child labour or old age support (Cain 1981; Nag, White, and Peet 1978) have had to compete for theoretical recognition with an assumption of unchanging tastes (Becker 1976). Seeing fertility as socially allows us to include a range of values and costs. Though not all values and costs operate in all contexts, all must be considered. Of the three dimensions of variability in social fertility, demographic studies have been most successful in acknowledging the variable content of the relationship, and in using variation in content to explain variation in fertility levels. However, lack of attention to variability in the attribution and distribution of fertility has limited the effectiveness of these analyses.

The distribution of fertility, the third dimension of variability, is the most subversive of the biologically-based definition of fertility. Attribution of fertility to a single individual is compatible with the accounting procedures of mathematical demography, and variation in the costs and benefits of fertility can frequently be handled within an economic framework (Easterlin 1978). Demographic techniques have been much less successful in attributing fertility to two people, one male and one female, simultaneously. One implication of seeing fertility as a social relationship is that the inclusion of men in fertility studies is made easier as well as more necessary. Demographic

models of fertility function adequately as accounting procedures while considering only women, but analysis of social relationships with a one-sex model is doomed to distortion (Townsend 1997:109-110).

To see fertility as a social relationship, and as distributed between people, is to see fertility not as fixed and unproblematic but as subject of negotiation and renegotiation between people: to see it inevitably as a social relationship. Bledsoe (1990) cites Berry's observations on competing claims to tree crops in Nigeria as an example of the way in which certain social relationships are better understood in terms of claims than of rights. Negotiated and renegotiated ambivalence in ownership is a source of social cohesion as well as conflict (Mauss 1967). I observed a similar process in Botswana, where discussion of cattle ownership is a major occupation, and the definition of claims on particular animals is an idiom for talking about relationships between people (Comaroff and Roberts 1981:175-215). Bledsoe, like Esther Goody, emphasises how distributed parenthood strengthens and transforms social relationships.

Sexual relationships are subject to cultural norms and rules, creating new social units and linking existing ones. Children are born into a nexus of social links, and the way they are socially positioned transforms the network. One specific anthropological contribution in this area has been to emphasise the importance of other people, particularly senior kin, in decisions about sexual relations, use of birth control, and resource allocation to children, which demographic theories have assumed to be the province of couples alone. Another contribution has been to demonstrate that the costs and benefits of children accrue to others besides the biological parents. A broad approach to the distribution of fertility in all its aspects will allow, among other benefits, a more realistic treatment of the externalities of childbearing, of intergenerational relations and equity, and of the relationship between the family and the state. To understand fertility motivation and fertility levels, we must investigate the claims made on children, the negotiation of these competing claims, and the alternative strategies for achieving the values that are claimed from children. To do so involves us immediately in analyses of relations of power, and gives a redefined notion of fertility a central place in political economy (Townsend 1997:110). Townsend has argued that, for anthropology, parenthood is a social relationship embedded in a matrix of other relationships. Who is defined as a parent, the rights and responsibilities associated with that status, and the ways in which those rights and responsibilities are shared or competed for, are all social phenomena. He further noted that if fertility is to be a theoretically useful category for linking biological reproduction to social forces, human action, and motivation, it must also be reconstructed as a social category.

2.5. PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMME

Among the early 19th century social and political philosophers, Stuart Mill was one of the first propagandist of family planning movement, declaring in 1821 that: "the great political problem is thus to find out how to limit the number of births". He was perhaps the leading advocate of women's rights in his time. In "The Subjugation of Women" (1869), he disagreed sharply with widely held assumption that the restriction of women to child-bearing, child-rearing, and housework was "natural" and "inevitable" .

Sociologists and economists do not agree that "biology" is the destiny of women and that they are destined to keep on producing children. Differential fertility is not because of the ordinance of "nature". The Law of Population, according to the sociologists, is subordinate to the Law of intellectual development. Fertility decisions are the mental decisions of rational persons who have social ambitions and progressive mentality. In the case of the "non-rational" persons "afflicted with boorish rural mentality", high fertility is due to "no decision to limit the population" (Shrivastava 1994:45).

Arsene Dumont (1890) argued that low fertility is characteristic of those rational persons who have a strong desire for "social capillarity", i.e., a desire to go up in socio-economic status. According to Dumont, the more people desire to scale the social ladder, the fewer children they have. However, for him, societies with more rigid stratification systems have low capillarity and therefore no tendency for fertility to draw and population to decline. Francesco Nitti (1894), Henry George (1905), Ungern-Sternberg (1931), and others argued that progressive mentality and higher social status of women bring low fertility and vice versa.

More recently, Margaret Sanger founded the birth control movement as an attempt to improve the condition for women. She held the view that "if women could control their own reproductive careers they would then achieve equality and control in the larger political sphere" (quoted in Bradshaw 1975:1239).

From the global perspective, there are three major rationales for the organised family planning movement: a demographic rationale, a health rationale and a human rights rationale. The three rationales have evolved separately, at different times and for different objectives (Mohamound Fathalla, 1987: 11). Fathalla further notes that although many people are willing to embrace all three, each rationale has strong advocates who sometimes find themselves in conflict with enthusiastic supporters of another rationale. It is important therefore to deal with the issues of health and family planning from three perspectives (Fathalla 1987:11).

Furthermore, Kawaye (1985:4) notes that family planning programme can be perceived from three different perspectives: (1) The developmentalist; (2) The family planner; and (3) The survivalist.

The developmentalists believe that the best way to lower fertility is through economic, social and political development. This school of thought includes most writers on political economy: Marxists and Neo-Marxists. It is the view of the developmentalists that without better education, nutrition, income distribution and land reform, the poor will not be motivated to have small families. They advocate restructuring of economic relations between rich and poor nations. They are not opposed to family planning programmes as such, but argue that this programme should not be given high priority until developmental conditions are met. They reject coercion and insist that the means for as well as ends of family planning programmes should be social justice and human welfare.

The family planners generally believe that high fertility rates impede development and imperil individual or family health and welfare. They believe that the most effective method for lowering fertility is the provision of supplies and services and the motivation of communities to make use of such supplies and services. They, too, reject coercion but are split on the question of incentives. Family planners believe that family planning and development are not either/or options but rather complementary strategies in realizing and enhancing the quality and dignity of human life.

The survivalists, on the other hand, are inclined to coercion and believe that population growth presents a threat to terrestrial life. Some favour the use of all aid to force developing countries to adopt strong positions to government-to-government coercion, others advocate restrictions on the reproductive behaviour of individuals by means of compulsory sterilisation, licenses for having children, and so on.

Generally speaking, a family planning programme is viewed from various perspectives. But here family planning is considered as the provision of birth-control services in order that individuals may regulate their fertility for reasons of personal convenience or welfare. In the past such services have been offered for many different purposes ranging from charity to politics. But today, the only acceptable goal must surely be a reduction of fertility in order to enhance human well-being and reduce population growth rates (Swetters 1972:49). Therefore, in this study the emphasis will be on the fertility reduction rationale of family planning programme. But this does not exclude the health and human right rationales because the three rationales are closely related to each other. Furthermore, in this study an attempt is made to critically synthesis the combined effect of socio-cultural and economic settings plus the family planning programme indicator variables.

2.6. PERSPECTIVES ON FERTILITY DECLINE

Until the time of Malthus, population growth was considered an indicator of societal health. Then Malthusian demographics framed population growth as a crucial problem to be solved. The demographic transition theorists who followed provided a structure from which general solutions to this problem could be inferred. This structure was based upon the historical effects of socio-economic development upon Western societies. While a number of researchers have questioned the validity of this approach, a greater number turned their attention to determining the "how" and "why" underlying this process (Christine 1985:62-63).

According to Christine, the relevant research question has become, "What makes women have large numbers of children, and how does socio-economic development induce them to have fewer children?" To answer this question social science researchers have tried a variety of approaches. These approaches typify four theoretical perspectives: Communication perspective, socio-cultural perspective, value of children perspective, and the psychosocial perspective. Each offers something substantive toward the development of a mid-range fertility model which bridges existing macro and micro models of fertility behaviour.

Communication theorists established the rationality of the fertility decision process and identified that process as a relevant focus of research. They established the importance of the fertility message in the decision process and induced the notion of feedback into the system. Most importantly, communication theorists established that each party in the communication-decision process has some degree of empowerment over the interaction and, therefore, the resultant action. According to communication theorists, economic development lowers family size by promoting communication about fertility within the marital dyad and by increasing access to contraceptive technology across the society. It is clearly a "how" more than a "why" of fertility change. The other research perspectives discussed more equally balance the questions of "why" and "how" (Christine 1985:65-66).

The sociocultural perspective contributed the notion that there is a "fertility belief system", supported by ideology and practices which ensure group survival, that affects norms for family size. Socio-economic development affects this belief system by altering the ideology and practices supporting it. For example, as economic development proceeds through a society, so does secularisation, and the effect of pronatalist religious ideology upon family size attenuates (Christine 1985:66). According to the value of children literature, socio-economic development alters family size by changing the nature of the needs children satisfy for their parents. In most cases this means that children's economic utility is lowered with development. This perspective contributes the two notions that children have value to their parents which may be conceived of in an economic

framework and that fertility decisions are consequently motivated by costs and incentives. This literature substantiates family size as something which may be manipulated rationally to take advantage of economic opportunities, possibly resulting in differential family formation strategies for rich and poor (Christine 1985:66-67).

Psychosocial theories contribute two valuable notions: First, the notion that it is the perception of costs and benefits of childbearing, rather than the actual costs and benefits, which motivate fertility decisions; and, second, that personality variables affect the fertility decision process. Personality variables may alter the content of the fertility message, individual effectiveness in decision making, or the ability of the couple to implement their fertility preferences. According to this perspective, socio-economic development alters family size, first, by increasing for parents the socioemotional needs which children satisfy relative economic needs and second, by giving individuals an increased sense of personal efficacy, enabling them to set and achieve fertility goals (Christine 1985:67).

Taken as a group, these differing perspectives imply a three-stage cycle of fertility decision making. In the first stage, perceived and actual costs and incentives of childbearing lead to the development of an individual's fertility goals. This entire stage may be thought of as constituting the fertility message that each party in the marital dyad brings into the process of fertility decision making. In the second stage the parties in the decision process communicate their respective messages to one another and reach a decision. In the third phase one or more parties to this decision act to see it implemented, and the outcome of this phase is fed back into the next fertility message cycle. Socio-economic development alters fertility by shifting the social, economic and political relationships which underlie this process (Christine 1985:67-68).

In sum, according to Christine, the question, "What makes many couples (in developing nations) want and have large families, and how can socio-economic development induce them to want and have smaller ones?" has been answered with some degree of power by researchers from a variety of disciplines. She further noted that today pure disciplinary models are somewhat rare. Psychological, economic, cultural and other variables are parts of the more successful models, in recognition of the complexities and subtleties of the issue. For this reason, models and research strategies discussed here will be organised in terms of the most general locus of their answer to the above question. Each perspective proposes a different aspect of socio-economic change as the intervening variable between grand scale economic development and individual fertility behaviour: communication of technology, the value of children (primarily a microeconomics approach), psychology and decision making, or cultural practices and beliefs (regulating fertility and the acceptability of contraceptives) (Christine 1985:26-27).

Christine (1985) argues that a significant number of useful studies have been conducted which account for aggregate fertility trends or explain individual fertility behaviours with some degree of power. Of the research perspectives discussed, the psychosocial offers the greatest promise for bridging the gap between aggregate and individual behaviour, offering hope for a unified theory of fertility in the near future. In the meantime, population planners have sufficient insights to continue their work.

Scrimshaw (1980a) recommends researching aspects of what she calls the "cultural Population Policy" (the norms regarding family size and the behaviours which maintain them) as well as values influencing family size, strategies for obtaining them, acceptability of both contraceptive delivery system and method, and others. Beckman (1983) recommends three areas for further research which interlock with the cultural population policy: (1) primary studies of how people make fertility decisions, including preference formation and change over time, (2) the rationality (i.e., consciousness) of fertility decisions, (3) individual characteristics or personality traits related to (a) whether people decide rationally and (b) how they make those decisions. Included in (3) above would be assessments of traits of rationality, locus of control, modernity, and competence and their effects upon fertility decision making (Christine 1985:62).

Christine further noted that there is confusion as to the relative importance of a "normative" versus an "interactional" view, (in the sense used by Joseph, 1976). Theories based upon normative principles predict normative fertility behaviour, but they cannot predict the behaviour of individual families. To get a better picture of what actually happens in developing nations, models will have to incorporate the influence of significant others in the fertility decision-making process. To initiate the change in behaviour and norms on the societal level that population planners desire, one must have a clear view of the web of competing and complementary goals and decision-making processes of those who affect the fertility of others. In this process the type and degree of power accorded to individuals remains unspecified for the most part. While there has been some research in these areas, more work needs to be done.

Policy planners and researcher of the Clinic Era too often confused the good of society with that of the family, as well as with that of individual women, in presuming that limiting births is a desirable outcome at all levels. In societies where women depend upon children as a symbol of current prestige or future economic support, the accuracy of this statement is in considerable doubt. Women may desire more, rather than fewer, children, and fertility theories which do not take this into account will be incomplete. Promoting curtailment of fertility in the absence of desirable alternatives by which individual women can maintain or increase their prestige and by which women, as a group, can improve their overall social status is irresponsible. Three further areas of future research and development need to be explored: (1) population ethics, (2) changes in

women's status and role as a result of fertility manipulation by population planning groups, and (3) the introduction of alternative roles by which women can gain prestige in developing societies.

Several other theoretical formulations have been proposed to show how various background socio-economic, socio-cultural and demographic variables and family planning programme efforts interact. Fertility control has been viewed in relation to the demand and supply of children since it is these two concepts that determine motivation for fertility control. At the same time, social, cultural and economic affect fertility through the influence of demand and supply on the motivation to accept and use fertility regulation. Moreover these social, cultural and economic conditions affect family planning programme activities (Machera 1997:19-20)

In fertility models such as Easterlin's Framework for Fertility Analysis, it is argued that if the demand for children and the potential output falls short of demand, then there is no desire to limit fertility but if the potential output exceeds demand of 'excess supply' then parents would be motivated to regulate their fertility (Easterlin 1978). It is therefore important to keep in mind the proponent of the Demographic Transition Theory that family planning is only likely to be widely adopted where there has been enough social and economic development to lessen the dependence on local and familial institutions. The point of departure in this study is that Kenya is in the transition and individual response to social changes have already started to be felt and as such the concept of supply and demand should be viewed in this light (Machera 1997:20).

Conceptually, it is important to examine how a planned family planning programme operates within a socio-economic setting. The conceptual framework at micro-level draws on work done by Lapham and Mauldin (1985) and earlier theoretical work done by Easterlin (1978) and Freedman (1961). A number of theoretical formulations have been proposed to show how the various background socio-economic, socio-cultural and demographic variables and family planning programmes efforts may relate to contraceptive use at the micro-level. King (1979) in a comparative study involving 19 developing countries setting and the family planning programme efforts. He analysed the effects on contraceptive use on a variety of quantified indicators of family planning programme effort and socio-economic setting (Machera 1997:20).

2.7. THE EFFECT OF HUSBAND-WIFE COMMUNICATION UPON WOMEN'S FAMILY PLANNING DECISION-MAKING

It has been hypothesized that the higher the degree of inter-spousal communication and husband-wife participation in family decision-making, the higher the use of contraception and the lower the fertility. Studies conducted in developing and developed countries, and in rural and urban areas, have consistently shown that the couples characterized by an egalitarian decision-making where predominant activities centering around the marital life are carried out by husband and wife.

Another degree of inter-personal communication is where the same activity is carried out by either partner at different times taking interchangeable role relationship and higher inter-spousal communication. When this happens the spouses have greater knowledge of and are favourably predisposed towards family planning. This leads to frequent practise of contraception and the desire to have smaller families compared to those who are characterized by segregated sex roles which tend to emphasize a formal division of labour in the family rather than solidarity based on interchangeability of role activities (Mukherjee 1975; Chaudhury 1976; Shah 1974).

Women's participation in family decision-making has an important bearing on the knowledge, attitude and practice of contraception and therefore, indirectly, on fertility. Studies have shown that women usually prefer fewer children than men, but lack the authority to determine whether they will practise contraception [Driver 1963; Goldberg 1959]. Chaudhury 1982:91). Chaudhury further argues that decisions with regard to number and spacing of children and the use of contraception are usually male prerogatives in patriarchal sex-segregated societies, particularly those of the developing world. It has been argued that one of the cultural factors that tends to keep fertility high is that in such societies, there appears to be a high degree of male dominance and female subservience in reproductive matters. A study in Sierra Leone showed that about half the women who had approved family planning felt that their husbands would disapprove. Objection by the husband to his wife's use of contraceptives was also observed in a recent study in India (Mukherjee 1975). If women were given the right to participate in family decision-making, the use of contraception would have been accelerated. Conjugal role relationship and inter-spousal communication are highly correlated. For example, joint decision presupposes a higher degree of communication between husband and wife. Similarly, the degree of inter-spousal communication would be lower in a segregated family structure (Chaudhury 1982:91-92).

In short it is often assumed that the 'lower' the status of women in a society the more difficult it is to implement family planning programmes. This view implies the assumption that men are less in favour of birth control than women. Such assumptions are partly incorrect, and partly they represent an over simplification.

In this connection, J.A and O. Banks conclude in their historical study that:

....it is not at all necessary to have achieved equality between men and women for the acceptance of family planning. So far as we can tell from the literature at our disposal there is no evidence that 'emancipated' women in the feminist sense of the term, once married had fewer children than those in the same social class who were 'unemancipated' although they were in the early years of feminism, more likely to stay unmarried. In any case, family planning became established amongst English middle class families while feminism as an organized movement was in its infancy and while all the evidence points to the initiative in the matter being

taken by the man in a society largely dominated by masculine values (1964:130).

Stycos speaks of the 'feminist bias' in planned parenthood programmes and points out that:

Although there are several a priori reasons for believing the husband to be less motivated for family planning than the wife... there are equally plausible reasons for believing the male might be more motivated for family planning...the major disadvantage of children is viewed as economic rather than medical. In this sense the burden of children falls more heavily on the shoulders of the person responsible for food, clothing, education, etc.- the father. Moreover, in areas of rapid population growth, where land supply is scarce and holdings have become fractionated, the advantage of additional children as farm hands easily turns into a distinct disadvantage--once which the land-astute peasant male can hardly fail to see. Third, especially in modernizing areas, it is the male population which first experiences the greatest gains in education, which is most likely to be exposed to urban influences, which has greater social freedom to profit from innovations. Thus the male is in a much more favourable position than the female to be exposed to and influenced by the social changes occurring around him. At the very least, the disadvantages of the large family would seem to be as great for males as for females. The empirical data available, while not clear cut, tend to favour this proposition (1962: 490-491).

Experts in family planning who work in East Africa report on the opposition of husbands to let wives go to family planning clinics. Also in other developing areas women often make their readiness for birth control dependent on the husbands' consent:

... a number of females told us that they would be prepared to learn about family planning only when their husbands did not oppose. It will, therefore, be desirable to know the attitudes of the males regarding family planning. Male is the dominant partner in the village and it will be necessary to enlist his co-operation in family planning work (Family Planning in selected villages, No.6, 1962:29).

In line with the above view points, Agarwala writes:

The men appear to be less interested than the women in family planning. This is presumably ascribed to the fact that men regard the bearing and rearing of children as the concern solely of women. Since the men make all important decisions concerning the family, the women are not in 'a position to undertake contraception unilaterally. Very little investigation has been directed towards discovering male attitudes concerning family planning, but it would seem to be a promising area for future surveys (1962:37).

A further important aspect is the communication between wife and husband. Stycos found in Puerto Rica that:

although in general both husbands and wives have small-family ideals, lack of communication between the sexes often obstructs the awareness of a common ideal. That is, the general lack of communication,... typical of many lower-class families, and the specific lack of communication on sexual matters often results in the peculiar situation where both adults want few children but neither is aware that the other feels this way (1955:166).

Observations made in India lead to analogous conclusions:

The attitude of the men,..., is not yet sufficiently known. Nevertheless, since the Surveys show that women in the rural areas seldom discuss such subjects as the desirable number of children, the use of contraception, etc., with their husbands, it is quite possible that the husbands do not know the true feelings of their wives (Agarwala 1962:38).

The extent to which one couple correctly perceives the ideas and attitudes of the other is considered a salient feature of an egalitarian family structure. The concepts of empathy and concurrence are mostly relevant to the Western middle class family where formal marriage is preceded by spouses getting to know each other well and marriage patterns are most equal. But they may not have any relevance in societies where marriage is arranged and the female is the weaker partner of the union. Interchangeability of views and ideas between husband and wife is likely to emerge in a situation where they enter into marriage partnership through mutual agreement and where both play complementary roles in family decisions. Concurrence between husband and wife on family planning issues is also used as an indirect measure of communication between them. But this could be highly misleading. Communication is not the only way through which couples reach agreement on certain issues, or form common attitudes. There are other ways to arrive at these. Concurrence on some issues may be reached simply by coincidence or through projection or result from common responses to common family situations (Chaudhury 1982:92). Chaudhury further argues that in a situation of little divergence of opinion, one would certainly expect identical views between a husband and wife. Yaukey et al.(1967) analyzing data from Dacca city, Bangladesh concluded that, "most of the identical views of husband and wife can be attributed to chance factor alone" or what they call concordance. Therefore, identical views should not be used as a proxy measure for inter-spousal communication. Degree and type of inter-spousal communication should be directly collected from spouses.

Studies conducted on the relationship between inter-spousal communication and use of contraception have shown, in unqualified terms, that the higher the inter-spousal communication,

the greater the use of contraception. But a subtle methodological issue remains unresolved with respect to the degree of inter-spousal communication and the use of contraception. That is, most studies obtained information from one spouse only with regard to his (her) contact or communication with the other spouse. This kind of information may not be sufficient to gauge the degree of empathy between husband and wife, i.e. the extent to which both share, understand and value each other's views, and whether they really discuss their problems mutually. Some studies show almost identical views between husband and wife with regard to some aspect of children even though information was collected separately from them (Arnold et al. 1975). For this, it would be worthwhile to collect information from both spouses with respect to degree of communication and concurrence on issues (Chaudhury 1982:94-95).

In short, according to the communicationist theory of fertility decline, the couple when they report they have discussed an issue (in this case, family planning) together are more frequent users of contraception than where only one of the spouses claims to have talked with the other. This, therefore, illustrates that **two-way communication** (joint decision) is more important in the adoption of family planning. But who dominates the decision to use contraception when there is divergence of views between spouses with regard to family size in spite of a good level of communication between them? This depends mainly on the power structure of the family, culture of the society and type of contraception debated. One criticism against using inter-spousal communication as an independent variable to study the use of contraception, is that it implies that communication is a necessary antecedent to its use. This may be true for some cases but is not necessarily so for each and every situation. Communication between husband and wife may not necessarily precede the adoption of any family planning method; and may even occur after adoption of a particular method.

We are now left with an important question--to what extent does a conjugal role relationship independently influence fertility behaviour in isolation from the host of other factors which are related to both conjugal relationship and fertility behaviour? For example, socio-psychological factors like female education, labour force participation status, marital adjustment, etc, are related to both conjugal role relationship and fertility behaviour and these intervening variables may also explain away the relationship between conjugal role and fertility. Therefore, to find out the net effect of the former on the latter, we need to control for those variables which are related to both independent (conjugal role relationship) and dependent (fertility and use of contraception) variables. The communication theorists of family planning have not taken into account important socio-cultural and psychological variables such as marital satisfaction, communal interests, etc. Thus the dynamics of the net effect of conjugal role relationship or husband-wife

communication on family planning decision-making needs to be further explored. Having this in mind let us proceed to the effect of culture on fertility behaviour.

2.8. THE EFFECT OF CULTURE ON FERTILITY BEHAVIOUR

As the literature on fertility decline suggests, the socio-economic determinist view of the influence of women's employment participation and education on fertility has been criticized because of its neglect of the cultural context, especially the way costs and benefits of children are shared by kin or affinal groups.

The thesis on the traditional cultural influence on reproductive behaviour can be summed up as follows: "women obtain support from a network wider than the nuclear family to reduce role conflicts, but there is a price to pay in terms of high fertility for maintaining this network of support" (Palmer, 1991:63). Palmer further noted that the notion of African family systems as being basically bounded conjugal units has little support in the African Anthropological literature. Realization is spreading that in Africa the conjugal pair may not be multifunctional. It may not be co-residential, it may not eat from the same pot, or to the exclusion of others, it may not be the locus of decision-making. Units of consumption and production relations are governed by social norms and affinal expectations. Husband's lineage and the extended family are the source of land and flows of money and assistance. In this situation status is acquired through having many children. For women especially the lineage may provide a court of appeal against perceived unfair treatment over crop disposal (Locoh 1988:57).

Kinship ties provide a wide network in which people share problems and success in life. Affiliation can help with job opportunities, and migrants to cities can live with a relative or friend until they find a job. These considerations of support from and loyalty to the wider group do not rule out the possibility of couples making conscious decisions about fertility, but they could be incorporated in costs and benefits. This bonding has to be confirmed and renewed through a multiplicity, of exchanges by assuring the next generation of the group. Women in particular must be careful to fulfil the expectations and meet the norms of the patrilineal group that they have married into and to demonstrate their loyalty to it. There is hardly a better way of doing this than by producing sons for the lineage. Another way of achieving this is to share the parental responsibility for other children. In the process "Children learn the art of maintaining multiple links with several family units in the kinship group" (Locoh 1988:55). Locoh also argues that the trend in Africa (rural Africa) is from large extended compounds (a segment of the lineage to nuclear families enlarged by more distant relatives). Group child care practices are more restricted, but child care can still be shared beyond the parents.

What all this means is that while conflicts between women's employment and child-rearing may not be as great as implied in formal theories and therefore the negative relationship between fertility and employment is to be questioned, the basis to these work-sharing arrangements actually exercises a pro-natal pressure. As long as women receive assistance from this network and not from a source which does not require numbers of children, fertility will remain high no matter that the socio-economic signals indicate that matters should be otherwise. To this extent Caldwell was correct in basing the demographic transition to nuclearisation of families. However, in as much as women's autonomy is increased by it, employment participation may allow women some independence from consanguineous and affinal ties without clear nuclearization of the family, and this could encourage a decline in fertility (Palmer 1991:64). Palmer further argues that while demographers and anthropologists rightly point out the cultural influence on fertility behaviour it would be wrong to have this discussion hanging on the assumption that nuclearisation will always encourage fertility reduction. Much depends on modes of production and in farming communities, land tenure systems. Nuclearisation of the rural African family means a small-scale production enterprise dependent on its own family labour as much as possible before utilizing exchange or wage labour. Any thing which encourages this, such as land registration or incentives to increase production, will buttress the forces-inducing high levels of self-exploitation. The nuclear family can therefore be seen to gain from enlarging its own labour force.

Of course, the cultural environment varies between situations and can be altered by level and form of socio-economic development. It is difficult to calculate the costs and benefits of children when resource use and the sharing of parental responsibilities are continually changing. But it remains possible for the cultural environment to prevent any inverse relationship between women's education and employment, on the other hand, and fertility, on the other. Socio-economic variables such as education and employment may have to alter very substantially to subdue cultural factors. And for many women in developing countries they doubtless have not altered sufficiently (Palmer 1991:64).

Women's education is also believed to introduce a cultural effect which depresses fertility because of the greater access of educated women to knowledge of better nutrition and child-care practices. Sadik (1989) noted that the families of educated mothers are likely to be healthier as well as smaller. She claims that "Mothers' education may be even more important to her children's health than flush toilets or piped water or even food intake". Educated women also tend to marry at a later age. On the face of it this represents a change in the cultural environment, rather than an alteration in costs and utilities of having children (Palmer 1991:63).

Value Attached to Children

According to the value of children literature, parents value their children for many reasons, both emotional and economic. In some ways, especially in rural areas, children are viewed as a resource, bringing a variety of benefits to the household. Children, also however, represent costs to the family for their sustenance but this is true in the case of the well-to-do urban families who have higher aspirations for themselves and their children. In this situation children have mainly emotional/psychological values. The emotional/psychological benefits of children include: a) carrying on the family line; b) providing status and prestige to parents and grandparents; c) honouring ancestors; d) pleasure of nurturing. Economic benefits from children include: a) providing labour in family enterprises; b) providing social security for parents' old age; c) for their marriage value; d) providing a place for the family inheritance. Each of these values depends, in part, on the sex of the child, and some are assessed differently depending on the sex of decision-maker. But who are the decision-makers about family size across cultures?

Across societies different people are responsible for decisions about family and family size. The options include: (1) Male Partner: In many societies both men and women agree that men play the primary role in deciding about the number and spacing of children. The decision is seen as the male prerogative, and a woman complies with it. (2) Female Partner: Sometimes women, especially single women, assume to themselves the decision regarding children. With contraceptive techniques that do not require male knowledge or agreement, this option has become increasingly available. But, the assumption of the primary role in decision making by women is still rare. (3) Both Partners: Increasingly, with the rise of the nuclearization of the family through urbanization and increasing educational levels for both men and women, husbands and wives are deciding together about child bearing and spacing. This pattern is concentrated in urban and educated sectors, however. (4) Other individuals: In a number of societies, other community members play very large, if not dominant, roles in deciding how many children newly married couple should have and when they should have them. In some places, for example, the husband's mother is very active in counselling her son, and her daughter-in-law, about family size. Often this takes the form of pressure to conceive immediately after marriage, to prove fertility and to assure family lineage. There is also pressure for birthing a son. But, as often as the mother has urged births, she also has had an important role in decisions about child spacing. In parts of Africa, for example, the mother-in-law took her son's wife, after she had give birth, into her own home and kept her there for several years to ensure that she did not conceive again too soon. The role of this mother was to keep her son and his wife apart for what was considered, traditionally, a decent interval between births.

Many of the emotional/psychological values placed on children are determined by culture and tradition. Some societies value males more than females to the point of carrying out female infanticide. In many, prestige for both mother and father is greater when sons are born than with daughters. Some religious beliefs hold that boy children honour their highly respected male forebears. Hence boys are preferred to girls. However, in many societies, emotional value is placed on having some children of each gender--to have only boys or only girls is not as satisfying or as prestigious as having a mix. These traditional values related to the gender of the child are important in decisions about the numbers of children to have. Men and women agree to a surprising extent on these values; they share the cultural context of their societies and these shape their sense of the value of children. Cultural and political factors also shape the value placed on children as carriers of the family line. When women, through cultural traditions surrounding marriage, are seen to become members of their husband's families, then boys are valued as carriers of the family lineage. Laws may codify family lineage for the purpose of adoption or parental responsibility in case of divorce or the death of one spouse.

Activities analysis gives important insights into the valuation of children in the economic sphere, especially as they provide labour to the household. For example, given the gender division of labour, male children provide labour for some family enterprises and female children provide labour for others. Thus, a female child will assume some work of the mother. Perhaps when he is young, a male child will also do women's work, but as he gets older, he will more often work alongside his father.

Differences in the value placed on children by men and women also arise from their expected contributions as workers. The motivations of fathers and mothers vary to the extent that they have distinct and different roles. In addition, the perception of the costs represented by children will vary between fathers and mothers. For example, if women rely heavily on children for assistance with many of the household production jobs, then they will value these children as labourers. However, as women also are responsible for supplying most of the household needs (water, fuel, food) and each of these needs increases with additional children, then children represent both consumers and producers in a mother's calculus. If universal primary education is instituted by a government, the entire calculus can change. Children become primarily consumers and not producers for the time that they are in school. They still eat, wash, and need to be warmed with fuel, but they are less available to help carry water and fuel and cultivate crops. A man who is not responsible for household production may not recognize this change in the value of children as labourers. In fact, if he thinks that educated children will be more productive, then he may calculate that their future value is rising. Thus, men and women may assess the value of children quite differently reflecting their own work and responsibility roles (UNFPA, 1989:22-23).

Patterns of resource access and control often are determined by cultural, economic, and political factors. Analysis of the allocation of resources and the means by which people gain access to and control over resources increases understanding of the value placed on children and the relative value placed on boys and girls. For example, resource analysis helps us understand differences in the value of children as providers of social security. Boys often assume the responsibility for their parents, while girls, by marrying into other families, assume responsibility for the elders in their husband's families. In other societies, girls are expected to return home or to take parents into their home as the parents age or become ill, but boys may not be held responsible in this way for elderly parents.

Boys and girls are valued differently as means for increasing family wealth. Girls are valuable if tradition or law dictates that bride prices are paid; boys are valuable if dowry is the norm. Finally, if the laws of inheritance stipulate that it only follows the male line, then boys provide this security for family holdings and girls do not. However, in societies where inheritance is through the female line, the opposite is true. In each case, however, the calculus of value differs for boy children and girl children.

The gender of the decision-maker does not appear to make a difference in the value placed on these economic functions of children. Fathers and mothers agree on the relative value of boys and girls in terms of their provision of social security and in terms of their value through marriage. Again, this agreement arises from the fact these resource patterns are set by determinants based in culture, in which all members of society share, and in law to which they all are subject (UNFPA 1989:23).

Research shows that women's roles affect their fertility. Activities analysis provides an informed basis for understanding these roles and how changes in them might affect fertility. For example, if women require children's labour for household survival, they will maintain high fertility. But, if the time and effort required to perform these activities could be reduced, women could be influenced to reduce fertility. As other options for their activities open up, women would be further induced to assess the costs and benefits of additional children differently. If women can look forward to certain types of careers, they may delay marriage for a time, thus reducing the number of children they bear in their lifetimes.

Women's access to and control over resources affect their status, and women's status influences their fertility. We have mentioned the proven linkage between women's attainment of education and their reduced fertility. Projects focused on improving female access to education can be expected to have an effect on population somewhere down the line. The effect occurs both through delayed marriage, as girls stay in school longer, and through their application of the

knowledge they gain in school to their activities as mothers. Nutrition of children improves as women are educated, and because child mortality falls, women choose to have fewer children.

2.9. THE EFFECT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UPON WOMEN'S FERTILITY DECISION-MAKING

In this part of the present chapter an attempt is made to explain how socio-economic development affects the fertility of women in a variety of social strata. In order to attain this goal I relied basically on Christine's (1985) fertility decision-making model. According to Christine, the fertility decision making process has three stages, which encompass setting individual fertility goals, negotiating for competing goals by participants to the process, and enacting fertility goals by the individual childbearer. And the thrust of her work was that development alters fertility by affecting the parameters of the fertility decision making process.

Phase One: Setting individual fertility goals

This phase of fertility decision-making is concerned with rationale behind childbearing. Women consider the needs which childbearing may satisfy for them as well as their particular preferences regarding children. Then they formulate a childbearing rationale, which reflects their reasons for having children suffused with their perception of the costs and benefits of having another child at the present time. This rationale together with local family size norms figure into the establishment of the individual's ideal family size. Existing family size and the rationale are both considered in composing the immediate fertility "message" which an individual conveys to other participants in the decision process during the later negotiation phase.

Christine's assumption was that the socio-economic environment which surrounds women determines both their needs and opportunities for meeting those needs through childbearing. It consequently affects women's fertility goals and their reasons for having children. As many researchers have discovered, women manipulate various aspects of their fertility strategies to take advantage of opportunities which benefit themselves and their families (Das Gupta 1977, among others). For example, in Carvajal and Gaithman's (1976) study of Latin American fertility aspirations, economic aspirations for the oldest child in a family were satisfied by a desire for more children among those practising contraceptive methods from lower socio-economic groups, and fewer children among those from the higher socio-economic groups. But what are the underlying motives for childbearing?

Individual reasons for having and not having children are: old age support, generate income, family prestige, establish womanhood, preserve marriage, spouse objects to more children, relaxed homelife, lack of funds, win spouse affection. This wide range of possible childbearing

motives may be divided into three groups: economic, emotional, and ideological. Economic motives include the desire for children to provide future economic security, to generate income for the family, or to provide replacement labour for home use. Emotional motives include the desire for companionship and a desire to strengthen the bonds between a woman and her spouse or his family. For this reason emotional motives will be referred to collectively as a "bonding rationale". Ideological motives for childbearing reflect gross social values and norms the society places upon childbearing. They include fulfilment of one's female role, in accordance with religious or social precepts, and consequent enhancement of the family and individual prestige in the wider society belong the family (Christine 1985: 84-85).

In setting individual fertility goals, women's environmental circumstances are reflected in their motivations for childbearing. With economic development the balance between economic and psychological or "bonding" motives for childbearing is expected to shift toward the latter. A bonding rationale should be especially important to (a) young, recently married women, who are in the early stages of family formation and concerned with forming a close emotional bond with their spouses, (b) women whose future economic security is mediated through their spouses instead of through their children, and (c) upper socio-economic status women, who would be expected to be relatively unconcerned with economic motives in childbearing (Christine 1985:230). Christine further considered the strength of bonding and economic rationale elements in fertility decision-making and asserted that the strength of the bonding element increased with spouse-dependent security status, while the strength of the economic element declined. The converse was true for agegroup of respondent. Due to the heavier loading of the lower socio-economic ranks with older women, it is difficult to separate age from socio-economic status effects, except on a theoretical basis.

Recall as well that Christine's model implies that change in family from extended to nuclear should affect motivations for childbearing. However, nuclear living alone did not affect fertility decision-making process. But when it is viewed together with women's employment status and the relationship between spouse-dependent security status and the strength of the childbearing rationale elements it could have its relative effect. In the literature on fertility decline it was also hypothesised that expectations for a rising standard of living would be more marked among the upper socio-economic strata, and that this would be reflected in increased reports that children were expensive for this group, thus providing further justification for their lower fertility. Furthermore, reports that children were expensive as a justification for stopping childbearing increased as ideal family size also increased for women of the upper-middle rank, presumably an upwardly mobile group. Children's expense was unlikely to be cited as a motivator for dropping childbearing as ideal family size increased for lower ranked women. This supports the notion of differential

reproductive strategies for different socio-economic groups, such as that alluded to by Carvajal and Geithman (1976) and Das Gupta (1977), among others. Less economically advantaged women apparently do not see more children as detrimental to economic advancement, while economically advantaged or upwardly mobile women do (Christine 1985:234-235).

Christine further noted that major environmental constraints or their markers, such as socio-economic status, spouse-dependent security status, and age, are indeed reflected in women's fertility rationale, goals and outcomes. The relationship of fertility goals to outcomes is also direct and clear. However the relationship of the childbearing rationale to long-term fertility goals, at least as measured by ideal family size does not appear to be a direct one. While the data support this phase of the model, there is some question as to the extent that women's reported childbearing rationale motives their behaviour, as opposed to being merely a reflection of it.

The effects of socio-economic development upon Setting Individual Fertility Goals

It was assumed that socio-economic development affects the fertility decisions in general by changing the nature of the economic, social and psychological relationships underlying it. Specifically, it alters the material conditions surrounding families, expectations they may have for the future in which children play a role, people's ability to plan for the future, and parameters for decision making power within the family. However, socio-economic development is a complex web of societal changes which affects all strata of society, though responses to it may differ across different strata.

By considering the complex web of societal changes which affects all strata of society, Christine (1985) pointed out seven concomitant of development which are especially pertinent to fertility. These are: 1) The rise of non-farm sector demanding educated or specialized labour force; 2) Expectations for a rising standard of living; 3) A shift in the locus of economic activity from familial to non-familial enterprise, resulting in 4) A shift in the predominant family form from extended to nuclear and 5) A shift in the source of present and future economic security from families to extra-familial institutions; 6) A reduction in environmental uncertainty and a positive social valuation of individualism, resulting in 7) an increased sense of ego strength future is considered plausible. She further noted that these changes have profound implications for the fertility decision process by altering levels of choice parameters. This reveals the inadequacy of each theory or perspective on fertility and the need for explaining fertility in the light of the complex web of so societal change. The effects of the configuration of development changes becomes explicable:

First, with an increase in the demand for skilled labour, society comes to play a premium upon education. The need to educate children for the future under the expectation of a rising

standard of living and the expense of doing so, while maintaining one's own standard of living lowers children's immediate economic utility, making large families an economic liability in most cases. This implies that: Ideal family size will be smaller for women in upper socio-economic status groups. Reports that children are expensive will correlate positively with upper socio-economic status.

Second, with the shift from an extended family lifestyle to a nuclear family lifestyle there is an increase in the isolation of women. Psychological needs for companionship (especially adult companionship) increase. This implies that nuclear family living will increase the strength of the bonding rationale for childbearing. Third, but perhaps most important, as the locus of productivity moves outside the family, the source of economic security (especially of future security) also shifts from family to other institutions, say to national social security programmes or to company pensions. In societies in which women take jobs outside the home, they may have direct access to these other sources of economic security, but in cases where women remain within the home, present and future economic security comes to be mediated by their spouses. As women's and children's contributions to family income decline, there is a relative increase in the importance of husbands' productive role. Husbands become the sole providers of present and future income and the ultimate source of future economic security for their wives. For women homemakers, this means that security depends almost exclusively upon their status as mothers or producers. Women's concern for maintaining the spousal bond, more than ever, is reflected in a change in decision making style from autocratic to joint, even in areas traditionally ascribed to them. There is, as well, a reluctance to voice disagreement with their spouses. Male decision making prerogatives, however, do not necessarily show evidence of such a decline. This leads to the following effect: Bonding motivations increase, relative to economic ones, with the shift to spouse-dependent forms of security. All this suggests the complex web of the societal change and its effect on individual fertility goals.

With regard to the effect of economic development in individual fertility goals, Christine concludes that economic development, in altering the socio-economic conditions surrounding women, alters the relative importance of the needs which children satisfy for them, changing their motivations for childbearing and, finally, long-term fertility goals. Eventually these affect societal or reference group norms for family size and importance consideration, as they define socially acceptable levels of childbearing. At this level fertility decision-making process Christine's assumption is in most cases valid but does it hold true at the next phase of fertility decision-making process?

Phase Two: Negotiating Collective Goals

Once a woman sets her immediate fertility goal, she must decide upon its implementation. While it is certainly possible for a childbearer to make this decision autonomously, in most cases her spouse will be involved in the process. In laws and natal family members may also have considerable influence in the couple's decision making, at least until the couple has satisfied local family size norms. This is especially likely to be true in cultures in which newly married couples reside with such kin and contribute labour to an extended family group.

The above points may suggest that having met local family size norms will decrease external influence in the couple's fertility decision process or the fertility decision process in this respect may be an active one, in which parties openly discuss their concerns, or it may be in which parties openly discuss their concerns, or it may be passive, in which case little or no discussion takes place and no decision is formally made. According to Beckman (1982) there may be little need for discussion when strong shared social norms support certain levels of fertility. Behaviour is then based upon norms or upon assumptions about the views of significant others, such as spouses, in-laws, and natal kin. Hollerbach (discussed in Beckman, 1982) calls this process of non-decision "**passive decision making**". She theorises that it is common in the early stages of marriage, when couples want children or lack contraceptive knowledge. This implies that: The proportion of reported fertility non-decisions will be highest in marriages of short duration. And its corollary: Women who have met or exceeded local family size norms will report fewer fertility non-decisions.

Given that the decision making process is an active one, the role which an individual may play ranges from mere participation to autonomous control. What makes the difference, especially if the individual goals of the parties differ, is the relative power of each. As Scrimshaw said, "Power is the small gap between desire and reality". Blood and Wolfe (1960) define power as "the potential ability of one partner to influence the other's behaviour, manifested in the ability to make decisions affecting the life of the family."

In line with the above argument, Bardsley points out that:

Since conflict is present to some degree in most conjugal decisions, then to the same degree power enters into almost all interactions between spouses. Though affectional bonds may temper the assertion of power, the importance of power in even the closest of relationships must not be underestimated (1983:7).

French and Raven, discussed in Beckman (1982), identify six types of social power which may be applied in cases of disagreement: reward, coercion, reference, legitimacy, information and expertise. While all are conceptually distinct from each another, they may overlap pragmatically and may be glossed under a smaller number of headings. Reward and coercion refer to the ability

of one partner to reward or punish the other. These may be glossed into the dimension of "enforcement". Information power, the ability of one partner to change the views of the other by reasoning or the presentation of new information, is similarly linked to expert power, the perception that one partner has greater relative their ends through the hypothetical or actual communication of information, and may be glossed as "communication power". Reference and legitimacy are simpler cases. Reference power refers to the level of identification or affiliation between partners, while legitimacy is that which is traditionally regarded as authority, control the behaviour or the other (Christine 1985:89).

Authority to make certain types of decisions may be allocated buy precedent based upon prior negotiation or by taking recourse to culturally accepted norms. For example, in societies with a strong sexual division of labour, there is likely to be a parallel division in decision making rights and obligations. In areas in which there is weak or no normative allocation of decision authority to one sex or individual within the family, the relative balance of other types of power between parties becomes especially important. It is the nature and amount of women's power, implied by the nature and amount of the social and economic resources which they possess as individuals, which determines the extent of a woman's participation in the decision process about her own therefore, whose individual goal is likely to become the collective goal, the final output of this phase of the process (Christine 1985:89-91).

The total of a woman's resources, her resource base, is a collection of any type of asset which she may make available to her spouse to further his own ends (Blood & Wolfe 1960), including the attainment of prestige. Certain of these resources may be considered indicative of the presence of certain types of power, For example, affiliative or referent power is implied by resources which operate through the psyche, in many cases through guilt: Mutual care, intimacy in marriage, and others which F.M. Cancian (1984) refers to as elements of "styles of love in the game of gender politics". Legitimacy is implied by a woman's satisfaction of social norms for acceptable behaviour, say, by having borne as many children as is usual in her community or by being in the status group which is customarily accorded control over a particular decision making sphere (Christine 1985:91-92).

Beckman (1983) reports that fertility itself is one factor which increases a wife's power, even when the effects of age are controlled" "Data suggest a progression from the enforced dependence to greater independence for wives over time; this change in status is linked to fertility". Namboodiri (1983) reports that cross-sectional data support the notion that "the effect of individual factors on fertility plans and behaviour changes with parity". Communication power is implied by resources which pertain to a woman's access to information and her ability to manipulate that information to her advantage, say, through education, travel, the media, or person-to-person

contact. Enforcement power is implied by resources which are both social and economic: contributions to family income, control over land, wealth, or implements of production, kin ties to political figures, and degree of integration into support networks. Age may be considered an indicator of women's power, as it implies differential access to resources over the course of the life cycle (Christine 1985:92-93).

Scrimshaw (1978) discusses changes in decision making power over seven life cycle stages among Latin America women. Of these, four are relevant to Christine's model: **Young Wifehood, Transition, Matriarchy, and Old Age**. Christine renames and somewhat redefines these categories to: Young Wives (aged 18-29), Established Wives (aged 30-39), Matriarchs (aged 40-49) and Older Matriarchs (over 50 years). She finds that power to make decisions autonomously increases with age, at least until Old Age, a stage that all individuals may not reach. The relationship of decision making power to age in Christine's model of decision making is curvilinear, with Matriarchs and Established Wives being in the best position to contribute to family decisions of all types. These two groups are considered most powerful because: (a) they have satisfied norms for family size, (b) they may be deriving value from the labour of adult or near-adult children, (c) their marriages are well-established, and (d) they are still in active control of their own households, which is not likely to be true of either Young Wives or Older Matriarchs. Since women over 40 have little opportunity to make choices concerning their own childbearing, they may be in a position to make fertility decisions for other females over whom they have authority. Therefore they will be considered as their preferences may impact upon later generations of childbearers. In short, according to Christine, a woman's degree of legitimate power is reflected in her agegroup and her satisfaction of community norms for childbearing.

The Effect of Socio-economic Development upon Negotiating Collective Fertility Goals

According to Christine, economic development alters negotiating collective fertility goals by changing the level of the decision making parameters. Specifically, the pool of effective decision makers shifting to include the marital couple only, and the need to maintain the spousal bond to ensure future economic security (for spouse-dependent security women) tips the balance of power further in the direction of husbands. This segment of Christine's model will be discussed in terms of two issues, which will be dealt with sequentially. First, what determines whether a decision will be made or left unmade, and, second, what determines who will be the formal decision maker?

Fertility decision made or unmade?

In order to answer this question, it is important to view fertility decisions in the larger context of family decision making. Fertility decisions are reportedly made for about a substantial

proportion. However, when compared to decisions in other areas of family decision making, the proportion of reported non-decisions is higher in the area of fertility decision making than in, say, childbearing decision making. And financial decisions were reportedly never non-decision. While fertility decisions are primarily "made" decisions, then, they are less likely to be made than other types of family decisions. But what is the reason behind this difference?

According to Hollerbach (1983), reported fertility non-decisions, if they may be considered a subset of passive decisions, should take place early in a marriage, before family size has reached societal norms. Fertility non-decisions increased with increasing duration of marriage as well as with attaining or surpassing the community family size norm of for children. When dichotomous agegroup of respondents variable was used to control the relationship between the number of fertility non-decisions and duration of marriage, the correlation remained significant for women under 40 years of age, but not for women forty years and older (Christine 1985:245).

Many fertility non-decisions reflect an inability on the part of some couples to reach agreement on fertility decisions. For women who depend upon their spouses for security, there is no significance relationship between spousal agreement and reported fertility non-decisions. This is likely due to several factors, including the fact that spousal agreement is very high for this group, and non-decision low. Agreement with spouses on fertility matters somewhat increased with spouse-dependent security status, as the model implies.

Who will be the formal decision maker?

Given that a decision is to be actively made, there are a variety of ways that the inputs of the various parties interested in the decision process may be combined and decision-making authority parcelled out. One possible parcelling is along sex role lines. Christine (1985) hypothesised that the area of household finance appears to belong to the male decision domain, while childbearing belongs to the female domain. In the area of fertility, however, there does not appear to be a clear assignment of decision making authority, contrary to one's prediction of negotiating collective fertility goals. More fertility decisions are left up to fate than are controlled by either party. Joint decision making is also likely to be somewhat overestimated. Joint decisions, while always in abundance, are lowest in the area of household finance, highest in the area of childbearing, closely followed by fertility. One other area of concern is the extent to which others outside the marital dyad influence the decision-making process.

In summary, it may be said that on the basis of reported behaviour, the structure of fertility decision making is distinguished in several important ways from that of other areas of family decision making: (1) Fertility decisions are more likely to be reported made solely within the marital dyad than are other household decisions. (2) Fertility decisions are more likely to be

reported left up to fate than are other household decisions.(3) Women participate in and control the fertility decision process on an almost equal footing with their spouses, by their own reports. Fertility is an area which does not appear to be a prior within the proscribed domain of either sex (Christine 1985:250).

Furthermore, there were no significant relationships between a woman's having satisfied local family size norms and intra-dyadic fertility decision making with specific reference to currently married women who have a relatively higher socio-economic status. Communal decisions (those in which the marital dyad participates in the decision with others) decreased with nuclear living, as did decisions made by others outside the marital dyad. However, it is found that the interaction between family size, nuclear living and external influences in a couple's decision making is a complex and important one, although there are apparently no direct influences upon fertility decision making. In fact, nuclear family living is a much desired state, as it gives women independent control of their own households and removes them from the interference of their in-laws. But in turn family size affects the probability of living nuclearly differently. This seems to imply that having children may be a key to obtaining the desired nuclear family living situation, and that this may be fulfilled by fewer children for women with spouse-dependent security status. Once in a nuclear family living situation (Christine 1985:255). Here Christine clearly revealed the observed complex relationship between family size and nuclear living. This relationship is not as simple as the theory of demographic transition suggests.

In the actual process of negotiating collective fertility goals it is strictly observed that the increases in legitimate power, specifically age and the satisfaction of local family size norms for childbearing, give women more decision-making power. The extent of this power may be manifest through increased control of the decision process or more participation in family planning decision-making. In examining these results one should remember that, when dealing with the age issue, the fertility of women over 40 years of age is questionable; that is, while women in the 40-49 year old agegroup may claim the right to participate in or control decisions regarding their own fertility they are less likely to be fertile. Women with whom one should be concerned are those under the age of 40, those in the active stages of family formation.

To briefly summarize these foregoing results, both legitimacy variables agegroup and having met the local family size norm affect women's participation in and control of the family decision process, when general family decision making is considered. Therefore, Christine's fertility decision making model examines the effects of two sources of legitimate power: age and having achieved a family size equal to the community norm which were thought to increase women's meaningful contribution to decision making. However, by the time women are at the peak of their power curve, displayed in expressions of control over particular family decisions, they have already

completed the normative family size of four or more children and are approaching menopause. Furthermore, socio-economic development gives economic advantage to certain younger couples, those who possess modern sector jobs. The increased resources possessed by them enable them to establish nuclear households in earlier stages of family formation. As many higher-status couples do this over time a new norm for optimal family size may come to be established across society. Once in nuclear households, women's control of the decision making process declines in favour of an increase in joint decision making. This, in turn, will be expected to impact upon a woman's likelihood of attempting to enact fertility goals, which is explored in Phase Three of the fertility decision model.

Phase Three: Enactment of collective goals

With regard to the enactment of fertility goals Christine suggested that (a) fertility goals are more effectively achieved when they are jointly decided, and (b) in the absence of discussion, women have been found to overestimate the number of children their spouses desire. In this connection, Beckman and Bardsley (1981) found that couples who communicated more freely and openly with their spouses were more likely to make decisions on fertility issues.

Researchers often take the position that individuals are "**victims**" within the context of their social environments, governed by laws of supply and demand and little else. They are then disturbed to find that the laws of behaviour so carefully arrived at apply only to the group and not to the individual. While it is true that some people may be victims of their societies and may also perceive themselves that way, there are others who are, and perceive themselves to be, actors ([Rotter 1966; Schultz 1976]). This actor-victim dichotomy is too simple-minded. People's beliefs about themselves are ambiguous, in some cases bearing little relation to their overall status in society. A woman's place in society sets the parameters of possible decision alternatives, and individuals make choice between those alternatives. For different social strata the range of alternatives may be larger or smaller, or consist of non-contiguous sets. People perceive themselves in control to the extent that they believe they can exercise any alternative they perceive available to others in their particular reference groups. But it is the woman who learns to manipulate the parameters of choices and expand her range of alternatives who is person of true power (Bledsoe 1976). This range-expanding ability is an attribute of what is referred to in psychological literature as ego strength. Hollerbach (1982) finds subjective efficacy and autonomy, or internal locus of control, and their converse, meaninglessness and powerlessness, to be related to fertility, ideal states "On an individual level, however, one's attitude toward planning, orientation toward the future, or feelings of subjective efficacy are also determined by prevalent cultural values, socio-economic status, and individual experience".

Fertility goals may be set with a great deal of confidence and implement with a great deal of care, but the World may not always cooperate. Regarding contraception, product defects, misapplication of methods by health professionals, physical incompatibility between method and user may all contribute to failures in achieving fertility goals, and all are out of the user's control. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that ego strength or autonomy would correlate with the attempt to attain those goals, given the tools which one has available to them (Christine 1985:99-100).

With regard to the realization of fertility decision, Christine further noted that enacting fertility goals is concerned with delineating the factors which give women the ability to enact their won fertility goals, especially in the case of a hostile social environment. She further argued that the likelihood that an individual childbearer will engage in action consistent with her own fertility goals is dependent upon five interrelated factors: (1) the extent to which her personal goal is consistent with the collective fertility goals, (2) her agreement or lack of agreement with her spouse on the matter, (3) the extent to which she participated in making the decision (4) her perception of her ability to plan and act effectively (perceived autonomy), and (5) the resources she has available to offset the results of a poor decision. Given that in all but a few cases the pool of effective decision makers in fertility decisions is limited to the marital dyad, the issue of congruence between personal and collective goals reduce to one of agreement between spouses on the matter. The hypotheses pertaining to enacting fertility decision goals will therefore be grouped according to whether they pertain primarily to effects of agreement between spouses, women's participation in the fertility decision, or perceived autonomy. There are two ways to interpret these findings: First, perceived autonomy may be more a function of decision making participation or satisfaction of local family size norms than a newly acquired sense of control over one's environment introduced into the society via socio-economic development. For example, perceived autonomy is highest for women with exactly the community norm of four children, regardless of nuclear family residence. Furthermore, perceived autonomy correlates well with respondent's duration of marriage, accounting for the upward bump in the data for 40-49 year old women, by most accounts the most powerful women in the society. Perceived autonomy also increases somewhat with spouse-dependent security status, this relationship holds for women under 40 years, but not for older women.

In brief, according to Christine, what we have is a situation in which participation in fertility decision making, spousal agreement over fertility matters, and a higher level of perceived autonomy, at least for some women, significantly increase the likelihood that a fertility decision will be made, and, once made, that it will be carried out. This signifies that those factors which have been shown to increase goal consistent behaviour in groups of women not having particular advantages from socio-economic development appear in abundance among those best in a position to benefit materially from development, i.e., young, spouse-dependent security status women.

CHAPTER THREE

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA AND THE PEOPLE

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Currently Kotebe district (Woreda 28) is found in Addis Ababa Administrative region. The region consists of six Zones and 28 Woredas. Among the 28 Woredas, five woredas have rural farmers association. The study area is one of the five Woredas in Addis Ababa with rural farmers association. It consists of four urban Kebeles (Kebele 01, 02, 03 and 04) and Seven rural farmers association (**Yeka Abado, Yeka Tafo, Yeka Luke, Meri, Yeka Bole, Bole Kotebe, and Ankorch**a). (See Appendix I: Map 1&2).

Kotebe District (Woreda 28) is located in Zone 3 just at the Eastern tip of Addis Ababa. Central Kotebe is 12 km far away from the center of Addis Ababa. The road that runs from Addis to Dessie divides Kotebe into two. It is bounded by Entoto mountain to the north, Akaki river to the south, Tafo river to the east and Kotebe river to the West. The district is located between $8^{\circ} 56' 20''$ and $9^{\circ} 05'$ north latitude and between $38^{\circ} 49' 30''$ and $38^{\circ} 54' 45''$ east longitude.

The land configuration varies widely from north to south. The northern part of the district (north of Addis Ababa Dessie road) shows a rugged land profile with steep slope landform. As a result most parts of all Kebeles (01, 02, 03, and 04) found along rivers and streams are highly susceptible to gully erosion, and flood hazard during rainy season. Particularly, Luke, Kotebe and Jelesa rivers have made deep and wide gorges around the places where the soil is thick. The Land configuration of the northern part of the district is highly heterogeneous; it is dominantly mountainous, which makes construction activities difficult and expensive. Thus, the northern highland of the district can be more suitable for source of construction material and firewood supply for Addis Ababa. On the other hand the southern part of the district lies in a relatively flat topography. This area is found to be suitable for future urban promotion with some constraints (quarry, gullies and gorges) compared to the northern part of the district. In general, the gradient change decreases south-ward but the soil depth increases from north to south. The Rugged configuration of the northern Kotebe land-form and the plain nature of the southern part of the district is expected to bring slight variations in temperature and rainfall distribution.

The dominant type of farming system in the rural area of Kotebe is mixed farming which consists of two main components: Crop production and livestock raising. Crop production refers mainly to the cultivation of different types of grains in 'Meher' season, since the contribution of 'Belg' season is rather insignificant. The data obtained from the local Department of Agriculture

indicates that about 3,765 hectares of land under peasants holding is presently covered with a variety of agricultural crops. The major types of crops cultivated are cereals and pulses accounting for about 82 and 18 percent of the total tilled land, respectively. Existing livestock economic activities in the study area can be divided into two: Livestock raising by the peasantry and dairying activities mainly by urban dwellers. In rural Kotebe, livestock are used as sources of food and draught power, offer transport services and provide insurance against possible crop failure. Furthermore, their manure is mainly used as a source of domestic energy.

The district is highly dominated by trees such as Eucalyptus and Junipers but along Akaki escarpments scrubs and bushes are observed. The Northern part is richer in vegetation cover than other parts of the district.

In Kotebe district **Tafo** and **Kotebe** rivers are the major perennial rivers, whereas Micheri (**Beshale, Lemi or Meri**) and **Luke (Weji)** are intermittent streams in the study area. Most of these and other streams and rivers originate from the northern highland (Entoto ridge) area of the district and flow to the southern direction until they join Akaki river. Along the upper course of Tafo river there is a practice of irrigation scheme. But most of the urban dwellers in the district utilise these streams as a means of waste disposal and some rural settlers utilise them for washing and drinking purpose.

Kotebe District (Woreda 28) could not be conceived of as a separate entity but it should be seen as part of Addis Ababa city with integration of adjacent Woredas and other regions. Addis Ababa is a national and international city and an important center of commerce and Industry. Kotebe district is examined in relation with the 27 Woredas of Addis Ababa and Bereh-Aleltu Woreda of Oromyia.

Among the 28 Woredas of Addis Ababa the project area (Kotebe District) covers the larger space of Addis Ababa. The population density decreases as one goes from the center of the town (Merkato) to any direction of fringe area. In fact the population density gradient decreases and the least population density (5 and 7 persons per hectare) was observed in Woreda 28 and 26. There is also a wide difference in population density among the urban Kebeles and Peasant Associations of the study area. For instance, the highest density was observed in Kebele 01 (49 persons per hectare) than Kebele 02 (48/hectare) and Kebele 03 (26/hectare) of Woreda 28 (See Appendix II: Table.19). Table.19 summarises the population density, distribution of schools and Health Services in Addis Ababa based on data from Office of Population and Housing Census Commission (OPHCC).

Kotebe District could be viewed in relation to its adjacent Woreda, i.e., Bereh-Aleltu Woreda of Oromyia. Sandafa is the administrative capital of Bereh-Aleltu. This Woreda consists of 104 Peasant Associations and four small towns (Beke, Mikawa, Dire and Fiche). The total

population of Bereh-Aleltu Woreda was 146,00 in 1994 (CSA, 1995). This adjacent Woreda is separated from Addis Ababa region by Akaki and Tafo rivers. In Bereh, there are four clinics, but there is no health center or hospital. As a result most of the people utilise adjacent health institutions of Addis Ababa for serious health problems. But the distribution of schools are better than health institutions. There are 16 primary, 5 primary and junior and one senior secondary school in the Woreda. Specially, Lege Tafo Junior School is found near the boundary of Addis Ababa Administrative region along the main road. Nearly 20 percent of the students in Tafo school are from Yeka Abado and Yeka Tafo of Kotebe District (Woreda 28). On the other hand 4 percent of Wendirad Junior and senior school students originated from Bereh-Aleltu. Most of the rural dwellers in Kotebe District send their children go for education in the nearby schools (Tafo Junior school, Wendirad Junior and Senior Secondary, Bole and Kara Junior Secondary Schools) which are located at Kotebe District, Bereh-Aleltu and Woreda 17. Thus, planning social services in the peripheral area of Kotebe should also consider the adjacent Woreda utilizer. Bereh-Aleltu is a purely agricultural area, there is only one grain processing industry. The district supplies Teff and barley for Addis Ababa market and in turn satisfy their major industrial demand from Merkato, Gurd-Shola and Shola market centers. It is from this Woreda, specifically at Legedadi Dam where the majority of the urban society of Addis Ababa get its water source. The main water pipe line from Legedadi crosses the district along the road of CMC. Bereh-Aleltu and Kotebe are directly linked only by the Addis Ababa Dessie road. Except for trails there is no alternative route that integrate this Woreda. Overall, Bereh-Aleltu and major parts of Addis Ababa have high socio-economic interaction with Kotebe area. Furthermore, provision of an open market along eastern margin could also enhance the rural-urban exchange.

3.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KOTEBE DISTRICT (WOREDA 28)

According to available documents from Woreda 28 administrative office, currently Woreda 28 area is found in Addis Ababa. However, historically the same area was called by different names.

Before 1975 (E.C) this area was known as "**Kotebe Liu Kefetegna**". During this time the area was included in Menagesha Aweraja, Shewa Administrative region. Starting from 1975 (E.C) to 1984 this area was known as Kotebe Aweraja Administrative Region which was again under Shewa administrative region. During this period, Kotebe Awaraja Administrative region had been divided into only two Kebeles, 01 and 02, and rural parts such as Ankorcha, Yeka Abado, Luke, Meri, Bole Kotebe and Yeka Bole.

Later on two new Kebeles were formed partly from Kebele 02 and partly from rural parts. Kebele 04 is formed partly from Kebele 02 and partly from Bole Kotebe. This was done during

1982 (E.C). According to Woreda 28 administrative office, Kebele 03 was initially known as Luke Peasant Association but during the end of 1979 (E.C) it took the status of Kebele and the remaining part of Luke is now called Luke Peasant Association. Starting from 1984 (E.C) till now it is known as Woreda 28 administrative region. In this study the name "Kotebe" is used rather than "Woreda 28". This is simply for the sake of simplicity and due to the fact that the current areas under Woreda 28 are the same as previously called by Kotebe Aweraja Administrative region.

The present Kotebe District (Woreda 28) before 1974 (Pre-revolutionary Ethiopia), was in the hands of a few landlords and structured by two districts named Akaki and Berech. During this period, not more than 100 peasants had rented and occupied the district (Addis Ababa Administrative Office, 1988). In general, the total resident population in Kotebe area had reached 500 in 1971-1977 G.C. In fact, the extension of piped water and electricity service from Addis Ababa to Kotebe area in early 60's gave an impetus for rapid urban development towards it.

After the nationalisation of urban land and houses on July 27/1975 the urban nucleus of Kotebe was structured in to two Kebeles (01 and 02). Hence then, Kebele 01 was structured under Akaki Woreda and Kebele 02 (starting from Gurd-Sholla excluding Kebele 01 upto Kara Allo) was administered by Bereh Woreda. Such fragmented administrative division gave fertile ground for fast horizontal growth of the district. Thereafter, people were encouraged to construct houses and were able to get large plot of land. Specifically, administrators of Kebele 01 gave plots of land freely without any plan, with the absence of legal right recognised by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development. After some times this kind of construction was forbidden but the effect still remain challenging for the development of Kotebe District (Addis Ababa Administrative Office, 1988).

As time passed, a serious housing shortage appeared in Addis Ababa due to population growth coupled with policy constraints. Among major development potentials of the city, Kotebe district become the best outlet of urban development. This brought the attention of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development and then Kotebe had got recognition of urban status and was registered under Shewa Administrative Region (Housing and Urban Development Office: 1977 G.C.) Consequently, the number of urban residents in Kotebe reached about 5000, then Special Higher was established. This special Higher Urban Dwellers Association was under Shewa Administrative Region (Housing and Urban Development Office from 1977-1983).

In the 1983 urban land management was entertained by the above office and started to give standard plan and permission for construction of residential houses and other activities. This facilitated the spread of different socio-economic institutions in the district and the total population reached about 10,000 in 1983. In addition, this Special Higher had got a municipal endorsement in order to facilitate urban development in the present district. Since then migrants from different

regions have been gravitating towards Kotebe area. Thereafter, hotels, bars, butcheries, tea rooms and others planned and unplanned informal sectors started flourishing along the main highway (Addis Ababa to Sandafa). (Housing and Urban Development Office: 1977 G.C.) Consequently, the number of urban residents in Kotebe reached about 5000, Then the population size increased at a faster rate and the population was estimated to be 33,000 in 1987 G.C (Addis Ababa Administrative Office (1988), Survey Result).

According to the present Administrative subdivision, Kotebe became one of the Woredas in Addis Ababa and now it is named as Woreda 28. Currently, the district consists of four Urban Dwellers Associations and Seven Peasant Associations with the total Population of 68,302 in 1994 (CSA,1995).

Houses constructed in pre-revolution Ethiopia (before 1974 G.C.). In this condition land allotment was carried by land lords and houses of their own and those provided by landlords are grouped in this category. Therefore, houses of this type are in general planless and were constructed upon the written agreement of the landlords. And among these types of houses some were nationalised according to Urban land proclamation of 1975 G.C. **But who were the landlords and Why is the area named Kotebe?**

In order to know about the historical background of Kotebe, I personally interviewed two elders who are permanent residents of Kotebe. The one is Ato Huluka Buta, 72 years old. He had been the proctor for about 37 years at Kotebe College of Teacher Education before it has been recognised as a college. He retired 10 years ago. The other key informant is Ato Tulu Feyisa, 49 years old and currently a gardener at Kotebe College of Teacher Education. Both of them were born and brought up at Kotebe and they still live there.

Initially I was interested to know why the area is called Kotebe. For this purpose, I asked Ato Huluka and Ato Tulu why the area is named Kotebe. They stated that it is not well-known why it is named Kotebe. But there is a legend which says that when the merchants from different corners of the area came to Addis Ababa through the main road which divides Kotebe into two, they settled there and called it Kotebe which is derived from an Oromo word "Kotu-Abe" meaning entrance. Here it should be noted that the above legend is what the people say about the origin of the name "Kotebe" and this may not be the only and the right reason as to why the area is called Kotebe. For further information I referred to documents on the History of Addis Ababa but I did not find any written document about the history of Kotebe area. This was one of the problems I have encountered in this study.

My next search was to know about who were the predominant settlers in Kotebe. According to my key informants, the settlers were predominantly Oromos (Shewa Oromo). They further stated that some areas are named after the Balabats e.g., Yeka, Furi, Kara Allo (currently

Kebele 03), etc. Others got their names after the physical features like mountains and rivers such as Anchorcha and Luke surrounded by mountains and rivers respectively. According to Ato Huluka, the immigrants were welcomed by the Balabats and allowed to settle there. He further stated that settlers were pastoralists and agriculturalists. Farming a small plot of land was sufficient since there was no population pressure during that time.

With regard to the form of marriage, Ato Huluka said that marriage was exogamous, e.g., Yekas intermarrying with Furis/Zikualas/Menageshas. He heard about the existence of polygynous marriage system but which was different from a formal definition attached to the term. He said that polygyny does not mean to have more than one wife at one house or homestead but a wealthy person could have wives at different places or villages as many as he properly manages them and it still exists. But he considered such form of marriage as "traditional" or appropriate for the Balabats or the rich; and monogamy is equated with "modernity" or appropriate for the poor.

Ato Huluka and Ato Tulu noted that before Derg came to power each Balabat owned one village or area in Kotebe. However, no written documents are available regarding the Balabats and their subjects. Ato Huluka stated that there were well-known Balabats, but he did not recall their names. But Ato Tulu tried to mention some of them.

According to Ato Tulu, the present Meri Peasant Association was previously (before Derg) known as Guri and was predominantly an Oromo area. This area was owned by one Balabat known as Graazmach Emeshaw Awake who was from Menz (Amhara). He further added that Graazmach Emeshaw had fought with the Italians and there is a cave in Meri which is called by his name. Ato Tulu did know this person very well. This Balabat was well known in the area and his wife was W/ro Askale Dadi who was born and brought up at Ankorch (Kotebe). Ato Tulu further noted that the balirist was the wife but the husband had the right over his wife's irist land. Consequently, the husband had sold part of it to the private investor, Ato Mekuria W/Selassie, with whom Ato Tulu had been working. But during the Derg the irist-land was confiscated and Grazmach Emeshaw Awake became sick and died.

Ato Tulu further mentioned three Balabats at Kotebe. One was Allo Buni who was born and brought up at Kara and owned Kara (currently Kebele 03). Allo Buni inherited the area from his father and still now the area is called by his name "Kara Allo". Kara refers to the physical feature of the area whereas Allo is the name of the Balabat of that area.

The other Balabat was **Grazmach** Taye Begashaw (Amhara) who owned Abado (currently Yeka Abado Peasant Association). According to Ato Tulu, Grazmach Taye had fought with the Italians and died during the period of Derg but his tenants still exist.

An other Balabat was known as Gudeta Fetenu; he was born and brought up at Tafo and owned Tafo (Currently Yeka Tafo Peasant Association). This Balabat, said Ato Tulu, died during

the time of Derg. Yet another Balabat was known as Werku Gudeta who was born and brought up at Yeka Abado and owned Meri, Luke and Anchorcha areas of Kotebe before the 1975 Ethiopian revolution. Ato Tulu further mentioned the Balabat of Bole Kotebe who was known as Hundie Regassa who owned Bole Kotebe.

In the final analysis, I was concerned with whether there is any rapid population growth at Kotebe. Both Ato Huluka and Ato Tulu realise that the population of Kotebe is growing very fast. For them, it is not possible to say how the population increased. But they noted that the population increased dramatically during the Derg. When land was declared to be public property everyone came and built his own house. They further added that Kebeles and Peasant Associations were introduced during the Derg and it still applies. In this connection, it should be noted that Kotebe's population is rapidly growing and as to my knowledge the main reason is migration.

3.3. SOME CURRENT FEATURES OF KOTEBE DISTRICT (WOREDA 28)

3.3.1. Settlement Patterns and Growth Trends

Settlement is treated in two major settings: urban and rural settlement. Urban settlement again is divided into planned and unplanned settlements. The planned ones have more or less access to roads and social amenities such as power, water, telephone services. Illegal settlements are mainly located in the outskirts of the district in all directions in a disorganised manner. Absence of social services and infrastructural facilities are mostly manifested in these areas. These settlement patterns are strictly observed in Kotebe area.

Kotebe area is a new settlement site and is less than 20 years old. The whole of Kotebe grew into a residential complex. The residents have come from different regions and various areas of Addis including Kotebe itself. Almost all my informants in urban Kotebe (01 and 03) are migrants from different corners of Addis Ababa. The reasons for their relocation to Kotebe is that some built, others bought their own houses, and still others were looking for cheaper rents. Newly married couples from the kebele centre move out to the outskirts within the same kebele. Reasons for leaving original settlement area and settling in Kebele 01 and 03 are: Selling out house constructed on co-operative bases and constructing cheaper houses, Selling out houses constructed on co-operative bases and constructing cheaper houses, looking for rented house or constructing new houses for trading activities, especially butcheries, looking for rented houses or buying houses to use them as shops and kiosks, and proximity to Kebele 01 and 03. Especially in Kebele 03, there are free accommodation services in unfinished houses /live-in and keep-an-eye arrangement/. Some unfinished houses can be rented for 5.00-20.00 Birr per month. Casual labourers take group contacts for such accommodations.

According to the Woreda office, there are 69,016 officially registered housing units and 11,938 households. The number of unregistered houses is estimated to be much higher than the registered ones. The illegal settlements are mainly located in the outskirts of the district in all directions in disorganised manner. Absence of social services and infrastructural facilities are mostly manifested in these areas. In the northern part of the district settlements are mainly found in the plateau and spur areas. Similarly, in the southern part settlements are sparsely settled along Tafo and Akaki river escarpments, and along the gentle slope banks and gully sides.

Recently the main urban development of Addis Ababa city is horizontal towards Kotebe district. Especially, it concentrates along the main road to Tafo and CMC road. In general, the settlement pattern along these roads is sparse. Dense settlement are observed from Megenagna up to Kara Allo ridge. Some living quarters have their own names of identities, such as Lemlem-Amba sefer, Gebriel sefer and Mesalemia sefer, Gurde sholla, Kara, Hana sefer, Kidane mehret sefer, Michael sefer etc.

Some government and non-government organisation secured large plots of land beyond their present requirements. The best examples are the Civil Service College, Selam Children Village, ELPA, Security Training and Geter Menafesha, which created extensive vacant land and go between settlements. Kotebe district is the best example of squatter settlement in Addis Ababa. Perhaps, the reasons for the wide spread of such settlements might be due to poor urban land management and corruption of responsible groups for a long time.

Urban rural conflict is becoming a serious challenge in most towns of the country as large prime arable lands are consumed by urban development from time to time. This is also manifested and particularly serious at Kotebe District. Because of the fast horizontal growth of the town, formerly defined boundaries of Peasant Associations like Bole Kotebe, Luke, Yeka Abado, Yeka Tafo, Ankorchia and Yeka Meri are shrinking steadily. As a result there is isolated, scattered and elongated Peasant Associations in the Project area. Generally, there seems no stable boundary in this district due to continuous urban expansion towards Peasant Associations. Such urban growth trend is believed to intensify and aggravate the urban rural conflict and create administrative problem in the area.

Construction of legal and illegal houses in peasant land holding has also minimised the former arable land size and agricultural production. For instance, CMC special houses, resettlers from Fileweha, Region 14 low cost houses and Ayat housing project are some of the cases which have consumed large agricultural land.

In the fringe area of the district along **Kara Allo** ridge and Tafo river there are incompatible activities like (recreation, cattle fattening, dairy farm) concentrated along the road

side. Similarly, there are incompatible establishments such as the Kara Allo Abattoir around the residential area of Kebele 03, school and plastic factory, cattle market and residence etc.

Generally Kotebe is a thinly spread out new settlement area. For instance Kebele 03 at Kotebe was only nine years back that it got the status of a kebele. Although, half of Kebele 03 was occupied by urbanities, it was considered as a Peasant Association for a minimum of 10 years. Yet, people have started to flow into this area from back before it was recognised as a kebele. The residence of this kebele have come from almost all parts of Addis Ababa. The group I discussed with have identified 10 places of origin. These are: Gerji, Bole, Sidist-Kilo, Arat-Kilo, Marcato, Kebele 02, CMS, Gurd-Sholla, Megenagna, and Lam-Beret.

Since the kebele is a relatively new settlement area, its infrastructures are poor. A few years back people had to travel by taxi to get water. Now they walk 15 minutes to get water from a distribution point. The supply is irregular and sometimes the queuing time is long (1-2 hours). Young women fetch water and fuel wood for self consumption.

The problem of service provision in the project area is associated with lack of an equitable and sufficient distribution among Kebeles and with a complete absence of basic services in all Peasant Associations (See Appendix II: Table.24). As illustrated in Table 24, in the district there is no hospital or health center. Except for Kotebe Clinic others are private and organisational health institutions. Most of the rural and urban dwellers utilise these health institutions. In the district as a whole there are 12 Kindergartens, 3 primary schools, 3 Junior, 2 Senior Secondary, 1 technical/vocational school and 2 colleges (Kotebe College of Teacher Education, kebele 01, and Ethiopian Civil Service College, Kebele 02). Most of the rural and urban population of the district is expected to utilise Wendirad Senior Secondary School (Kebele 01) and other adjacent schools outside the district. As a result travelling long distance, consuming time and money are needed. Most of the rural dwellers in Kotebe District send their children for education to the nearby schools (Tafo Junior School, Wendirad Junior and Senior secondary, Bole and Kara Junior secondary schools) which are located in Kotebe district, Bereh-Aleltu and Woreda 17. Most families in rural kotebe do not send their children to school, especially daughters are the victims of illiteracy in the rural villages. The reasons for it are high cost for schooling /materials, uniforms, and costs of transportation in the case of boys and domestic activities and early marriage in the case of girls in rural kotebe.

In the case of urban Kotebe, the number of unsuccessful twelfth grade graduates is rising yearly. It is not uncommon to find 1-2 cases in poor families and 2-4 cases in well to do families. Those from well-to-do families have better opportunities to be engaged in vocational informal training through apprenticeship arrangements. This situation clearly indicates the need for establishing co-ordinated spatial organisation for the delivery of services.

Overall, Kotebe District has lowest population density and a low number of health and school service in Addis Ababa and for most part of it is not yet developed. The major change that has influenced the livelihood of the urban Kotebeans positively is the improvement that has been made this year on the city public transport facilities. The number of buses have increased, new lines have been included and the quality of the roads have improved. The buses come more frequently now than ever before. People can travel long distance, with more comfort and less cost. Now people are more punctual at their work places than ever before.

3.3.2. Livelihood and Coping Mechanisms in Kotebe District

Kotebe, due to private and public civil work activities with seasonal variations, attracts skilled, semi-skilled and casual labour forces from all corners of the city including Kotebe itself. The casual labourers of Kotebe usually do not move out-side kotebe for similar activities. The skilled and semi-skilled ones, however, travel outside as far as Akaki in Addis and Wollo and Bale in the regions.

The availability of jobs for casual labourers varies over the year. The peak time for men is May; when the job of loading and unloading is available. In June men would be involved in arranging construction materials and the actual construction works of mud-houses begins in July and August. The number of women working as casual labourers increases at this time as women are preferred for transporting light construction materials.

Since the construction activities of the mud-houses are finalised from September to December, the demand for casual labourers would increasingly decline as water (used for mixing the earth) is in short in supply. In January and February, the demand for causal labour on-farm activities would increase. A casual labourer, engaged in construction activities, earns on the average 5.00-8.00 Birr, a semi-skilled are 6-12 Birr and a skilled once 25-30 Birr a day. Some construction firms/ ALTAD/ which is located at Yeka Abado peasant association pay similar rates for both men and women casual labour workers. Others/'SUR' Company/ used to pay for identical responsibilities Birr 4-00-4.50 for casual labour workers.

Over the past 2 years individual construction activities around Kotebe have scaled down. A private company is making plan to start up a 25,000 residential complex construction partly in Kebele 03 and partly in Luke, Meri and Yeka Tafo. The kebele residents are on the priority list for employment and there will be availability of jobs for casual labourers and semi-skilled workers at construction sites. At present, the only hope the unemployed see is the realisation of 'Ayat' construction company, which is said to have planned to construct 25,000 houses over the next ten years.

In rural parts of Kotebe, agriculture is the main source of livelihood. Women are dominantly engaged in domestic activities. Some of them are potters. Especially, almost all women in Yeka Tafo were potters in addition to domestic activities. Men are dominantly engaged in agricultural activities with the help of some hired workers/adopted children or their own sons. In addition to agriculture, some men work in governmental and non-governmental agencies such as guarding, building and construction. Most farmers at Luke, Meri and Yeka Tafo have sold their lands to private construction agencies such as "Ayat".

The most important but the lowest paying and least liked activities at Kebele 03 are casual labour, fire-wood, ambasha and tea selling and cattle herding. There are a relatively more butcheries in Kebele 03 than Kebele 01. This is due to its proximity to rural areas of Kotebe and the area was itself a Peasant Association 9 years ago. The most preferred activities at Kebele 01 are engineering, government employment and shop keeping, teaching and so on. It is due to the fact that the kebele is at the center of Kotebe (See Appendix II: Table. 7). Table.7 illustrates percentage distribution of spouses' occupation by place of residence based on my field observation of 40 couples (20 from rural and 20 from urban Kotebe).

In terms of wealth ranking Tella/ Araki/Ambasa sellers and the casual labourers belong to the very poor group. Guards, carpenters, gardeners are in the poor class. Government and non-government employees are in the average and economically well-off class. But my difficulty lies in ranking the farmers in rural Kotebe. Because almost all have the same types of property such as a self-owned house, arable land, livestock and the like with little variations in size. (See Appendix II: Table 8 & 9).

As already pointed out, Kotebe covers a very wide area and, accordingly, the problems people face vary from village to village. Households identified as poorer households in one part of kotebe differ from those in the other parts of kotebe. In the case of Kebele 03, for instance, the poorest households are those whose livelihood depends on Arakie/Tella,/Ambasha and tea selling. In Kebele 01, 'gulit' markets are the livelihood for the poorest households. I had a discussion with three women who live from selling Arakie/Tella/Ambasha and tea and other related activities at Kebele 01 and 03. They attribute their vulnerability to the following three problems.

First, they said, there are too many people engaged in similar trades. The women wondered who would be the buyer if everyone is engaged in similar trade. Particularly, the number of young boys and girls entering into these activities is rising alarmingly, out-numbering and displacing the middle aged and older women.

The second problem is lack of an appropriate place for carrying out the trade activities. The women pointed out that they would have switched to better trades like selling of onions and other items in 'gulite' markets had they been living near the main road. These women observed that they

have tried works like making tella and araki but had difficulty to sell the products. A similar view was also expressed by women in Kebele 01. They made a reference to a specific tella house. The tella that was already five days old was not yet sold out. A group of young men at Kebele 01 and 03 have pointed out the lack of appropriate places for trade activity as one of the serious problems for poorer households. According to these men the most appropriate place for trade is a place close by the main road.

The third constraint identified by the women at Kebele 01 and 03, Kara sefer, is lack of money. Even if one gets the appropriate place for better trading activity, poorer household do not have the money to launch the business. They do not have the access to credit at times of stress (e.g. the rainy season).

In the past, some people used to borrow money during stress times by giving away collateral like blankets, beds, radios and cupboards. But now, there are no money lenders. Even if money lenders exist the very poor do not have access to collateral. One of the women, W/o Tsehay Woldetsadik at Kebele 03 said bitterly that the very poor like her do not have collateral; their only collateral is death.

Access to adequate health care is a problem for poorer households. The kebele administration provides poverty certificates for the poor, so that they can get free treatment. However, since the process to acquire poverty certificate takes a long time, patients are compelled to resort to traditional healers. Generally the kinship/family/ links within the villages are relied upon for support when one is sick and or facing stressful circumstances.

According to women informants at Kebele 01 and 03, when poorer households do not have anything to eat or when they fall sick, they would at least resort to their relatives for help. Those who cannot count on employment opportunities have contributed to the intensification of the problems of poorer households.

The majority of the unemployed are young men and women. The unemployment situation has in turn exposed these young people to different conditions. Each situation may be expressed at different levels. Duruyenet is taken as one of the situations to which the unemployed are exposed. /Duruyenet=behaviours/acts/ that are morally unacceptable or disapproved by family, kinsmen, neighbours, colleagues or the community at large/. The local people themselves believe that unemployment would lead to a potentially worse situations. The unemployed are therefore vulnerable to street life. Prostitution and various addictions such as alcoholism, smoking, Chat chewing and gambling.

Some better-off households can have access to small amounts of loans from money lenders using certain collateral. Other than this, most of my informants at Kebele 01 and 03 have information on other forms of credit schemes within or outside the kebele. They are willing to

receive credits provided the offers are within their resource and competence limits. Having collateral is not a problem for most middle class people. If the very poor have the opportunity to access credit, they would like to start gulite trade, open food and drink establishments and small shops.

Edir and Equb prevail in the area, serving as coping mechanisms. Those who are not members of these two self-help institutions are few. Most of the households in Kebele 01 and 03 are Edir members and some of them have Equbs. However, some poor households are neither Edir nor Equb members. Furthermore, there are some community members who have failed to pay contributions to Edir and were excluded from membership. Whenever a non-member household loses one of its family members, neighbours would raise money to cover the expenses for funeral ceremony.

The saving mechanism is Equb. There are weekly and monthly Equbs for better-off households in both Kebele 01 and Kebele 03. A considerable number of people in their localities make savings in the form of Equib in order to cope with problems in the rainy season. During the rainy season jobs are not available easily. Thus, people would, at the expense of their daily needs, save in the dry season in order to cushion the difficulties of winter time. Here savings are used to add more rooms to the houses, to cover medical expenses whenever any family member falls ill, to spend on hosting a relative from far off places and to pay back one's debt or raising sheep and cattle.

As noted above Equbs are not accessible to all people across the board. Only better-off households can be members of Equb. Membership depends on one's income. It was stated that a person or households must have a constant monthly income in order to join Equb. In this case, female labourers and those who are engaged in tella selling and the like, do not venture to join an Equb since their income can be interrupted at any time.

3.3.3. Family planning Services in Kotebe District

The Kotebe Public Clinic which is located at Kebele 02, central kotebe, started its health service in 1975 E.C. But the clinic started the family planning service in 1978 E.C. And now it is providing only four modern methods of family planning: oral pills, depo injection, Loop/IUD and Condom.

In Kotebe family planning programmes are facing serious barriers. In this study, available data implies that most women who were supposed to be beneficiaries of the programme did not participate in the programme. According to Ato Lemissa Edessa, director of Kotebe Public Clinic, very few clients are practising family planning methods. Furthermore, he noted that even the few clients are almost all users of oral pills and the users are almost all from the nearby Kebeles, 01

and 02. In this case, women who live at Kebele 03, 04 and rural areas of Kotebe are very far from the Public Clinic which is located at Kebele 02, Central Kotebe. Consequently, the message drawn from such results is that the majority of the population in the reproductive ages has not responded to family planning significantly.

Based on my field experience both in rural and urban Kotebe, there are some factors possibly responsible for the high fertility norms. First, many cultural factors which traditionally operated to control the sexual and reproductive behaviour of society have collapsed. On the other hand, modern family planning ideas are not being accepted fast enough to counter the effects of the collapse of the traditional controls. Modern family planning practices probably will penetrate the rural Kotebeans only gradually as the population's education level rise, and the communication systems, and other socio-economic factors improve. This is likely to be a long term process.

The perceived optimum number of children for a family is four in the urban setting and six in the rural setting of Kotebe. Most women in the villages have information from schools/health centers/ neighbours/mass media/working places and so on about modern contraceptives. But very few women practice modern contraception. The poor and less educated women receive the service from the public clinic at Kotebe whereas the better-off and educated women receive the service from private clinics.

With regard to the natural family planning method, breast feeding is practised until six months of age in the case of women employed in the formal sector but women engaged in domestic activities/ informal sectors practice breastfeeding until three years of age. In rural parts of Kotebe, breast milk is provided on demand. If the situation permits, young children are fed 4 times a day. Mothers say the children should have been provided with specially prepared foods, but this is not what is practised. Most women have the know-how as to what and when they should be fed, but the limiting factor is the access to resources.

3.4 THE POPULATION OF KOTEBE DISTRICT (WOREDA 28) AND SOME BACKGROUND VARIABLES

3.4.1 The Estimated population

According to the 1994 Population and Housing census, the Woreda population is estimated at 68,302. The total population of the urban Kebeles is estimated at 59102, (28,735 male and 30,367 female); whereas the total population of the Farmers' Associations is estimated at 9200 (4,648 male and 4,552 female). Generally, Women constitute 51.12% (34,919) and men 48.88% (33,383) of the Woreda's population (CSA, 1995) (See Appendix II, Table. 20). Table. 20 reveals the estimated population of the Woreda based on place of residence and sex.

2.4.2 Religious Composition

According to the 1994 population and Housing census, the religious composition of Woreda 28 population is as follows: Orthodox Christian (60,764), Protestant (3,636), Muslim (2,658), Catholic (680), others (436), traditional (30), and non-stated (98) (See Appendix II:Table 22). Table 22 indicates the percentage distribution of religious composition of the population of Woreda 28. Among the total population of the Woreda, 88.96% are Orthodox Christians. The remaining are from other religious groups.

The Kotebeans differ in religious denominations. However, diversity in religious denominations is observed mainly in urban Kotebe. In the case of rural Kotebeans, almost all of them are followers of Orthodox Christianity which is simply inherited from their family of procreation. Moreover, in rural Kotebe, Orthodox Christianity is somewhat mixed with some traditional value systems. (See Appendix II:Table 25).

3.4.3 Ethnic Composition

Among the total population of Woreda 28 (68,302) 37,806 are Amhara, Oromo (19,385), Tigraway (4383), Gurage (3,687), Dorzie (119), others (2031) and foreigners (568) (CSA, 1995) (See Appendix II: Table.21). Table. 21 shows the percentage distribution of ethnic composition of the Woreda. Among the total population of the Woreda, 53.35 % are Amharas and 28.38% are Oromos. The remaining are from other ethnic groups.

Ethnic diversity is strictly observed in Kotebe District (Woreda 28), mainly in the urban parts of it. Moreover, there are foreigners in Kotebe. But the rural Kotebeans are predominantly Oromo. (See Appendix II: Table.26). Table. 26 shows the percentage distribution of ethnic composition of my informants (20 couples from urban and 20 couples from rural Kotebe) by place of residence. Among my informants both in rural and urban Kotebe, 47.5% are Oromos and 25% are Amharas. The remaining are from other ethnic groups.

3.4.4 Level of Education

According to the 1994 Population and Housing census, the population of Woreda 28 aged ten years and over by literacy status is as follows: all persons (52,106), Illiterate (11,274), all literate (40,832): Primary:(15,124); Junior secondary:(6,889); Senior secondary:(12,574); Above secondary (3,980); and non-formal (2,265). (See Appendix II:Table.23). Table 23 summarises the information on the literacy status of the Woreda's population.

Based on my field observation of 40 couples (20 from rural and 20 from urban Kotebe), I can say that the urban Kotebeans are characterised by different literacy statuses. The majority of my urban Kotebe informants (both husbands and wives) are literate. However, the majority of my informants in rural Kotebe mainly wives are illiterate or can read and write through non-formal education. (See Appendix II, Table.6).

CHAPTER FOUR

THE WOMEN'S SOCIETY

Customs related to pregnancy, child-birth, baptism and marriage are briefly discussed in this chapter. The life cycle of the Kotebean and women's place, women's work is also discussed. The aim is to place in context the major resources which give women decision-making power in their families. These will ultimately affect a woman's fertility decisions. To flesh out an account of otherwise deep-rooted traditions, experiences of individual Kotebeans are recounted where appropriate. Reference is also made to the focus group discussion with the village women. Before directly proceeding to the above mentioned subsections of this chapter, let us have the general highlights embodied in the title of the chapter itself.

The women's society constitutes a women's primary reference group. She further notes that women judge the appropriateness of their behaviour and goals by what they perceive being done by other women of similar age, marital or child-bearing status, socio-economic rank, friend-neighbour group, natal family, or position within their affinal family (Christine 1985:147-148).

At the grassroot-level, the principles of relatedness, sex, age, marital and childbearing status, which are active throughout Ethiopian culture, determine an individual's status in village society. Individuals are first female versus male, then kin versus non-kin. Christine (1985:147-158) describes that females are either girls or women (non-married/presumed virginal versus ever-married/presumed non-virginal). Girls may be young, pubescent or engaged, increasing in value within the system of honour that structures Ethiopian society in general and Kotebe in particular. As women, females are presumed fertile or menopausal, with decreasing value with that same system. Further, they are either married, divorced or widowed, (loosely) presumably sexually active, potentially active, or presumed inactive. Beyond that, women are divided according to their childbearing status: wives only (newly-married brides and wives without children) versus mothers. As mothers, they are segmented according the number, sexes and ages of their children, with differing degrees of prestige accorded to each: women having at least four children, versus those having fewer than four, having sons versus daughters, and having young children versus children raised to adulthood. Within the context of this section, attitudes toward work and the education of women, and a woman's position of influence within her affinal group will be examined.

Women's place, women's work, property owned, support groups, and influential kin connections may affect a woman's position within her affinal group. The segmenting principles discussed earlier establish the basis of an individual's position. According to Christine (1985:150),

the single most powerful position in the family, next only to the "paterfamilias", is that of the "materfamilias", head of the home production unit. It is she who organizes and controls the labour of all females, preadult males and children under her roof. The variety and extent of women's productive and maintenance contributions are briefly discussed below.

Briefly, between household maintenance tasks and activities which produce goods and services consumed within the home or sold and exchanged in the market, women's work in rural Kotebe is as time-consuming as holding down a full-time job. While women rarely have official "jobs" outside the home, they produce a variety of goods and services essential for village life. The exchange of goods and services between women, coupled to their tendency to be "village bound", if not strictly "household", has created cohesive power-information networks by which women maintain the relative equity of their status in the larger Kotebe society. An exchange system coupled to visiting are the markers by which social rank is reckoned. In terms of maintaining village cohesiveness, it is second in importance only to marriage alliances, in which women also have a considerable role.

4.1. CUSTOMS RELATED TO PREGNANCY, CHILD-BIRTH, AND BAPTISM

Pregnancy and Child-birth

In the local cultural traditions, during pregnancy, a woman is expected to carry out limited and light tasks. When her day of delivery approaches, the necessary food items like, flour for porridge, butter and ground pepper; are prepared. For those who are well-off, a sheep might be killed at the day of birth. It is the tradition of the rural Kotebeans, specially the Tafos that mother-in-laws serve as midwives. When a woman gives birth to a child, fresh butter is applied to her head. This is done thinking that the woman's head cleaves as she gives birth to a child. The feelings and repeated expressions of happiness over a new-born baby is usually expressed by making a loud noise of 'ilita'. This is different for baby girls and baby boys. If the woman gives birth to a baby boy, the 'ilita' will be said three time; if it is a baby girl it will be said four times. According to my informant, Ato Girma Biru who was born and brought at Yeka Tafo peasant association, the number doesn't carry any special meaning. It is simply done to identify the sex of the new born baby. The Tafos are happier when a woman gives birth to a baby girl. A woman who gives birth to a baby boy is also given much respect. This is because a boy is regarded as a protector of his vicinity, as contrasted with a daughter who may leave the place.

After giving birth, no one is allowed to visit the woman except the mid-wife and those who were present during the delivery. This continues for a month after which a small ceremony is arranged. For this ceremony the traditional liquor 'tella', coffee, and 'Difo dabo' (a big bread role)

are prepared. Neighbours, the mid-wife, and those who were present during the delivery gather and are served the 'tella', coffee, and 'Difo dabo'. This happens early in the morning at 6:00 A.M.

Baptism among Orthodox Christians in Kotebe

Originally, the term "Baptism" is derived from the Latin meaning "that which is dipped". When this term is applied to the Christian religious tradition, it means the application of water to a person as a sacrament or religious rite. As a religious rite, it is the ceremony or sacrament of admitting a person into Christianity or a specific church by dipping him/her in water or sprinkling water on him/her, as a symbol of washing away sin. Therefore, the rite of baptism is the means of initiation into the Christian community.

According to the New Testament, the benefits of baptism are the inauguration of the new life in Christ, "rebirth" or "regeneration" and the gift of the Holy Spirit. In the later practice, in the West, the laying on the hands, which frequently accompanied baptism in the New Testament period, was separated from it, and became a rite of confirmation, usually administered at the beginning of adolescence and admitting the christian child to the Holy Communion. In the East, Confirmation follows at once in infant baptism,. As a rule, adult baptism is followed everywhere by confirmation and First Communion; as it is preceded, especially in the mission field, by a period of instruction and spiritual preparation for admission into the church. And the usual formula is: "I baptize you in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit". But it has been argued that the usual New Testament formula was: "I baptize you in the name of Christ", and this came as a later interpretation.

In general, in a modern world various forms of baptism are observed. These include Immersion (dipping or submerging the person in a pool or stream); Pouring ("affusion"), either from the bare hand or from a shell or saucer; and Intinction (the minister moistens one finger and touches the candidate's head, usually his/her forehead). The Baptists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and some other groups practice mass baptism by immersion. But what are the reasons behind such variations within one christian tradition? The great diversity in belief systems and practices may be related to variations in peoples' social, environmental, and technological contexts and may be seen as helping them adapt to those particular circumstances.

In other christian bodies, such as the Roman Catholic, the Eastern Orthodox, the Episcopal, and the Lutheran, infant baptism is practised. In these churches baptism is a Sacrament that works as well as signifies. They believe that the infant, though unaware of the meaning of the rite, becomes incorporated into the invisible body of Christ and into the church as the visible body of Christ; thus in spite of the capability to understanding something happens to the infant in baptism that is subsequently deepened and brought into consciousness through the child's spiritual growth.

And the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, being one of the five Oriental or Eastern Orthodox Churches, shares this view of baptism.

The rite of Baptism in the Ethiopian Orthodox Christian Church and its Socio-cultural Dimension

Baptism in the Ethiopian Orthodox church is more than a sacrament. It is a mystery, i.e., one of the seven heavenly gifts of the Holy Spirit that descends from Heaven on the water into the baptismal font in an invisible manner. It is believed that through the mystery of baptism, the baptized is freed from the original sin and from any other sin that the baptized had committed before baptism. And through baptism the baptized is initiated into the kingdom of Heaven and becomes one of the Christ's members in His church. And it is also believed that baptism prints on the soul of the baptized an indelible mark, an unbreakable seal. Therefore, it is one of the three mysteries not to be performed more than once. Furthermore, baptism is believed to be the first of the seven sacraments since it is considered as the entrance gate into faith in God.

Baptism is to be performed in the church building, i.e., in the baptistery which according to the church canon Law should be place on the Western side of the church. It is not allowed in house unless the child is dying. This is again strictly observed. Before the rite of baptism is performed the priest, the deacon and the one prepared to receive must fast, abstain from food and water.

The child's mother is not allowed into church unless 40 days elapse after her male-child's birth or 80 days after her female-child's birth. The absolution is to be uttered by the priest over the mother and the mother's child on condition that 40 days had passed after the child's birth if it be a male-child, 80 days if it be a female-child. But why this is so? According to the Old Testament and that of the priests of the Ethiopian orthodox church, this sex differentiation in the rite of Baptism is based on the "order of creation" and the "order of transgression". It is believed that Adam was created first, and then Eve was derived from him. In addition to this order of creation, the order of transgression stated that Adam was not deceived, but the woman was deceived and became a transgressor. This view is commonly held by Ethiopian traditional christians and it has its own impact on the socio-cultural life of the people.

Women who are in their menstrual periods and those who have delivered children recently and people who were copulating the night before are not to take part in the rite of baptism; even they are not allowed to enter a church because they are considered as impure or polluted. Menstruating women can take part in the Holy rites of the church and get into a church after having finished their period. But the other women must be sprinkled with Holy water which is blessed by a priest and can enter the church. Then the priest signs over the water three times with

the sign of cross and recites. As the priest stirs the water with the cross, he recites some suitable verses from different Psalms. Then the deacon leads the child from the West to the East so that to be on the left hand of the priest near the baptismal water. Then the priest asks about the name of each the children. At baptism the baptized receives a second name, usually that of the Saints of the day unless the priest or the parents of the child or the grown-up baptized prefers the name of a favourite Saint. Then the water is poured over the child's head three times, while the following is said: "I baptize You in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit". And then the priests immediately proceed to administer confirmation. The rite of confirmation confirms the baptized in the state of liberation and salvation that he had reached through baptism. The clothes of the child are then blessed and the plaited tricoloured (red, yellow and green) thread is placed around the child's neck. According to the priests' explanation, the red colour is the sign of sacrifice, the yellow signifies belief, and the green that of good future. And then the child is returned to the god- parent and given communion. According to the Ethiopian Orthodox tradition, since the infants cannot witness to their faith a god- father and god-mother are named for them respectively. The priest impresses on the parents and the sponsors how great their responsibility with regard to the proper religious instructions and that they will answer for the newly baptized on the day of judgment if they neglected teaching and watching them in the fear of God. Then the child is brought to the door of the church and the priest says a special prayer over both the child and its mother following which the child is placed on the altar steps and then returned to its mother.

In accordance to the Holy Scripture, the Ethiopian Orthodox church baptizes male infants at the age of 40 days and female infants at the age of 80 days. Yet if an infant is sick so that the infant may not die before being baptized and be subjected to the unchangeable order of the Lord Jesus Christ, "...Unless one is born of water and spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God..." Having this in mind, the Ethiopian orthodox church baptizes infants just as they come even prior to the above fixed baptismal dates. In addition, if an adult believes and requests baptism, the church willingly complies and baptizes him or her.

All rural Kotebeans are Orthodox Christians. As per this tradition. The parents of the new baby ask others to be the god- parents of their child. The choice of god parents is usually made on the basis of strengthening ties and friendship with people whom the parents choose to have some relation with. The choice of god parents could sometimes be made before birth, where other families may demand that the fetus, either male or female, be given to their daughter or son.

The Socio-cultural Dimensions of the rite of Baptism

Modern scholars agree that societal values and patterns of social intercourse profoundly influences the religious symbol system and at the same time religion has its own relative influence on the social systems. Thus society and religion are dialectically related to each other.

Holy rites in general and rite of baptism in particular are social rather than private and exclusive. Their intent is communal in that they preserve cultural values and seek contact with ultimate existence. Besides the obvious social aspect of collective rites, ceremonies are social in a second and more profound sense. Ritual is one of the principal vehicles that bind peoples together in a community of shared interest and tradition.

Ritual and ritual elements provide group-associational pattern through which people learn what is expected of them and to whom or what they belong. Communities are formed around and sustained by shared rites and symbols. Where common symbols are weak or non-existent, an experience of community is unlikely. In religious groups with a strong sense of community, ritual practice even more than belief provides cohesiveness and set group members apart from other who do not share their customs. The Jewish community is a good case in point.

The rite of baptism as a socially shared experience renews and fortifies the sense of linkage with a tradition and the continuity with a community spanning centuries. Woven into the daily texture of one's life, it is a reminder to man of who he is, and what his supreme goals and duties are. Therefore, ritual meanings are codings of social meanings and such ritual codes have immense influence on the mind.

The rite of baptism as socially shared experience also testifies that children inherited their parents' religion by tradition without understanding the vital teachings of the Gospel. Not only children but also the traditional christians learn the order and traditions of the church not from the church but they are assimilated in the people as part of their culture; so they are taught by the culture of the parents as well as from the socio-cultural environment. In this context, the religious life of the people and the socio-cultural contexts are closely related. Therefore, any religious practice of a society cannot be seen in isolation from the cultural attributes of the society. Religious phenomena are thus closely interwoven with social, psychological and moral dimensions of human life.

4.2. LIFE CYCLE OF WOMEN IN KOTEBE

(a) Infancy, Girlhood and puberty. In the village of rural Kotebe, a woman's life is divided into segments based upon her age and marital status. To each is accorded an amount of prestige (or at least, social acceptance), freedom of mobility, and autonomy in decision making. These segments are consistent with those identified independently by Scrimshaw (1978) in Latin

America: Infancy, Girlhood, Puberty, Young Wifehood, Transition, and Matriarchy. Autonomy in decision making increased with each of her stages. A potential seventh stage, Old Age, in which a woman's autonomy decreases, may never be realized for a given individual (1978:43).

Differences in the treatment of boy and girl children begin in the cradle, where boys receive a great deal of attention from friends and relatives. There is a common assumption that women tend to nurse boy babies for more months than girl babies, which may have an effect upon their relative survival in their critical first year (a year of high infant mortality). But that is not to say that mothers necessarily love their boy children more than their girls. This differential treatment seems imposed more by societal expectations than by individual preference. In my field study in rural Kotebe some women expressed the preference to have at least one girl child. One young mother expressed her reservations about being able to relate to a boy baby at all, and the only women entirely unhappy with childbearing were mothers of only sons.¹ In contrast to women's sex preference, almost all rural kotebe male informants expressed the preference to have lots of boy children.¹ These sentiments are exhibited concurrently with the social maxim that it is a good thing to have lots of boy children.

According to Christine (1985), the pubescent girl, unless she is the daughter of an upper-status family, is likely to drop out of school. Once out of school, the pubescent girl may engage in work for cash or kind to help out her family. With rare exceptions the work is sex-segregated. Thus begins a period of waiting for a firm proposal of marriage. This view holds true for rural Kotebe village.

For most women in the village there is a trade-off between education, money making, and proper comportment. The "proper" rural Kotebe girl (the ideal candidate for marriage in the eyes of the villagers) is young, beautiful, from a wealthy family with a good reputation, virginal, and content to remain within the home. Education is considered a plus only insofar as it is necessary for a young woman to aid the advancement of her children. Reading is a nicety, not a necessity. Advanced education in the absence of other attributes is a deficit, since a well-educated woman is not likely to be content to remain within the home and be properly obsequious to her in-laws. If her education allows her to have a well-paying job in the modern sector, she may be an asset in her family's search for upward mobility. However, a job outside the home is likely to expose her to men and is frowned upon by proper families. Among poorer families, educating daughters wastes resources that they believe would be better spent educating sons; the girls are withdrawn from school. It is strictly observed that in rural kotebe parents, especially fathers, did not want to send their daughters to school. The underlying reason was that daughters will marry and leave their family of procreation.

In rural Kotebe when children were young, parents may have paired their children off to one another for future marriage informally, but the teen years are the time for formal proposals to be made. Traditionally this is done when the young man is old enough to assume the responsibilities of adulthood, demonstrated by completing his education and procuring a full-time job. Once betrothed, an older man is unlikely to be patient enough to wait for a girl to complete her education. Ready to begin their families, they seek marriage at the earliest socially acceptable time. At the time of the study, 13 years is considered minimally acceptable in the rural Kotebe villages. (See Appendix II: Table 13). Almost a quarter of the cases of rural Kotebe women, presumably older ones, were married by or before age 16. Age difference between spouses in the cases averaged 8.65 years (See Appendix II: Table 10).

(b) Young Wives. In keeping with the importance of marriage as the hallmark of adult status for women and men, weddings are the biggest, most festive, most costly, and longest of all occasions in a woman's life. In many respects it is a theatrical production put on by the family and friends of the bride and groom for the village at large. Marriage among the Kotebeans is of different types such as arranged marriage, marriage based on the choice of the partners' and Abduction. Among the urban Kotebeans, girls may be consulted in the selection of their spouses.

Marriages are, then, significant for both male and female Kotebeans. The married state is the mark of adulthood for women and, to a lesser extent, men. Marriages are also tools in the quest for prestige. Individuals in a position to arrange marriages are in a position of power.

Formerly parents alone chose spouses for their children, who may have been told nothing about their fiances. Today young men sometimes request that their parents arrange a match with a specific girl. This will usually be acceded to, providing that the girl comes from a good family and that neither set of parents already has another match in the offing. Girls, however, are not supposed to--and usually do not-- select their own spouses. Many modern young women have begun to internalize European ideals of love and romantic choice and may misrepresent as their own choice their parents' consulting them regarding a spouse the parents have already selected. However, there may also be a real increase in the number of women gaining a true voice in their marriage arrangements.

There is still a considerable number of women who do not choose their spouses. Some of them have no desire to do so, either due to "feminine modesty" or, more likely, to lack of information about potential partners. Although their family would have allowed them to marry a man of their choosing, they said that they preferred that their parents decide, since they had sufficient experience to make the better choice.

Weddings in the various social strata tend to differ according to the type and amount of refreshments provide to guests, entertainment, general elaborateness, and the amount of the

bridewealth. While girls may be raised traditionally or as "modern" children with more education, mobility and freedom of choice, the significance of the wedding unites them. As we have already seen in the previous section of this chapter, marriage in Kotebe, like many parts of Ethiopia unites the families the husband and the wife. Levi-Straus's alliance theory is used to explain this condition.

Until the young woman conceives a child, her fertility is in question. A barren woman can be divorced and is unlikely to find a suitable mate. Because her husband's parents are concerned with their family prestige and the future security of their son (who may depend upon his children for old age support), they encourage an early divorce in the case of barrenness, before deep attachments have been formed within the new couple. Most of my women informants report wanting to have children to preserve their marriages. Both women and men informants desired children to increase the prestige of their families. Conception within the first year and a half proves the young woman's fertility, even if she is unable to carry the child to term, as is common with young brides. Once a bride is firmly pregnant, she is accorded better status in the household, gaining a reprieve from some household work.

With the birth of her first child, a young wife is accepted as a true member of the family, especially if the child is a boy. Women often voice their desire to have girl children for companionship, but they are also aware that their husbands want sons for the same reason. Rural Kotebe women reported wanting children for companionship and to provide help around the house, whereas urban Kotebe women reported wanting children for psychological satisfaction. Nonetheless, both rural and urban Kotebe women sought to win their spouse's affection by children.

(c) **Established Wives.** With each succeeding birth, a woman solidifies her place within the family. Unless she and her husband quarrel violently, her chances of being divorced, at least until she reaches her middle years, are extremely limited. She has proven herself a woman: she has borne children for the family, she works well, she is to be trusted. She gains more freedom to move through the village without harassment or comment from idle males, and she has a household budget of her own to command. However, growing childcare responsibilities give her less time to exercise these prerogatives (Christine, 1985:183). Christine further states that by the time a woman has established a family of the socially desirable size of four children, she is in her mid to late thirties. She is likely to be living nuclearly as the head female in her own nuclear household. Her next decade can be a very good one, as her children become able to assist her in maintaining the household and in generating income. A majority of the women desired daughters for this reason. This view holds true for the rural Kotebe women.

According to the rural Kotebe women informants, the four-child family is the ideal family size. But for the urban Kotebe women informants a two-child family is the ideal one. Most of the urban Kotebe women desire less than four children. The average desired number of children in rural Kotebe is 4.92, whereas in urban Kotebe it is found to be 2.56 (See Appendix II: Table 16).

Women may have a difficult time in achieving their ideal family size. Pregnancy wastage--the death of a child or fetus--is a significant concern. More than a third of the cases among rural kotebe had lost at least one child. Almost half had experienced between one and four miscarriages and/or abortions. Infertility is another problem. Seven percent of the informants among rural kotebe were barren. In contrast to rural kotebe women informants ideal family size, rural kotebe male informants (peasants) mentioned as many children as God gives. However, for urban kotebe male informants (working in formal sectors) a two-child family is the ideal one.

(d) Matriarchs and other statuses of womanhood. In the case of rural Kotebe, by the time a woman is 40, her first children may be ready to assume adult status. As a general rule, her prestige increases with the numbers of her children (especially those raised to adulthood and most especially her sons). She further argues that a woman with sons can look forward to her older years with some certainty. Likewise, roughly two-thirds of the rural kotebe informants cited old age support as one of their reasons for having children. Unless her spouse is one of the relatively few covered by the young Ethiopian social security system, a woman without children has no old age support. She is pitied by her neighbours (Christine 1985:185).

Christine (1985) further notes that between 40 and 50 years of age a woman is at the peak of her personal power, with adult children to care for her and approaching menopause giving her considerable immunity from social scrutiny. Consistent with Scrimshaw (1978), she is more likely to exercise power overtly. She probably has daughters-in-law to do household work. However, she is, once again, vulnerable to divorce, as her husband may seek a younger mate. This is of course strictly observed in the study villages, especially in rural kotebe areas.

According to Schrimshaw (1987), after age 50 a woman's powerbase begins to erode. Her married children may have established separate residences, though one married son is likely to remain at home to care for his parents. Her daughters-in-law who now have children are not likely to be free to provide labour for the home production unit which she heads. Indeed, this role may be subsumed by one of her son's wives if she becomes incapacitated or she must move into the home of a married son because of divorce or widowhood.

As is evident from the foregoing, a female achieves the status of adult, her womanhood, from having once been married. The Kotebeans place great emphasis upon marriage as a positive good for both sexes. The religious leaders deal extensively with duties and rights of spouses towards one another. Girls who reach the age of 24 without having a serious engagement in force

are viewed as old maids, pitiable because they are not likely to achieve adult status. Older unmarried of either sex are viewed as somewhat aberrant and not to be trusted. This is especially true of divorcees, who are eligible for remarriage and who do not have the tight restrictions of maidenhood placed upon them. Understandably, there is a reluctance on the part of women to report that they had once been divorced. Widows, on the other hand, are not encouraged to remarry if they have born children, unless their financial position is extremely precarious, and they lack adult children or natal kin to support them. The status of widow, then falls somewhat below that of wife, but above that of divorcee.

A woman with an absentee spouse, even one who has children, who does not live with her-in-laws or natal kin is in a socially vulnerable position. With no adult male to guard/protect her, she is presumed sexually available. Unless she has older children to do her bidding, she must handle public economic transactions herself, entering the domain of men, who are frequently forward. Ironically, it is the marriage system itself which puts women into this unenviable position. The women of rural Kotebe had a reputation for marital trustworthiness, maintained by a tight social network, through which gossip spreads like wildfire. The integrity of this network is maintained in part by the exchange of goods, services, and food between women.

4.3 MARRIAGE AND WOMEN

Marriage is regarded as the universal destiny of a woman. It was valued as a process that united not only the two young people economically and sexually, but marriage united the two families, too. Here, Claude Levi-Straus's "alliance theory" explains the nature of marriage in Ethiopia in general and in Kotebe in particular. Levi-straus's alliance theory stresses the importance of marriage in society as opposed to the importance of descent. Its basic premise is that the exchange of women between groups of men in a society results in greater social solidarity and a better chance of survival for all members of this society. The regulation of marriage through cultural prescription or preference and the proscription of other types of marriage creates a "flow" of women in simple societies. This flow, accompanied by exchanges of gifts, ensures the cooperation of the members of such a society (Bohannan & Glazer, 1988:424). Therefore, the bride-to-be had no say in matters regarding her marriage, as it was the parents who were in control of her "destiny" and regulated the future of the bride (Lishan Bekele, 1991:3). This is strictly observed in Kotebe.

Although each law sets a different age for both men and women, all of them establish a lower age for women than for men (Lishan Bekele, 1991:3). Kotebe is the case in point. (See Appendix II: Table 14). Table 14 shows that the average age difference for rural couples is **2.95** whereas the average age difference for urban couple is **8.65**. This finding is contrary to my

common assumption, because I did not expect the existence of a higher age differences between urban wives and husband than that of the rural ones. I tried to understand why such age differences occur. The main reason is that women get older earlier than men. It is the biological fact that after the age of 49 women cannot give birth. But this is not true in the case of men's reproductive capacity. And almost all my informants in Kotebe are aware of this biological fact.

In the household, women prepare the food, fetch fire wood for cooking, heating and light, draw water from far away wells, do all the financial management, help in agriculture and animal husbandry, raise the children and do other jobs like weaving. Thus, marriage brings with it many duties beyond caring for the husband. The men hold income generating jobs like soldiering, ploughing, trading and weaving for commercial sale. Men dominate the income generating jobs and women's work is considered unimportant. This is the traditional division of labour in marriage and keeps the women dependent and subservient (Lakew Woldetekle and Hirut Terefe, 1984; Lishan Bekele 1991; Hirut Terefe 1997; Almaz Eshete 1997). This is partly true for the rural Kotebeans. However, in urban Kotebe the reality is somewhat more complex (See Appendix II: Table 7). Table 7 reveals the heterogenous nature of urban wives' activities.

The role of a man as wage earner and his older age at the time of marriage sets up a paternal role for him with regard to his young and dependent wife. In fact, women marry before reaching the legal age more often than not and is considered an old maid if she is over 16 and unmarried. The man becomes dominant quite early in life (Daniel Haile 1987, No. 2). This is again the case in rural areas of Kotebe, but not for the urban Kotebe wives. Even within the rural Kotebeans, I found two wife-dominant families. (See Appendix II: Table 5 A,B&C)

The right to divorce is granted solely to the male, including cases which concern the use of contraceptives or abortions. A man can divorce a woman he discovers to be using a contraceptive or who has had an abortion. W/ro Tsehay Woldetsadik at Kebele O3, Kotebe, is the case in point. She has five children. Her husband is a traditional mediciner. According to w/ro Tsehay, her husband's income from selling traditional medicines does not cover the household budget. Therefore, she prepares and sells Arakie, Tea and Ambasha. Their low income forced her to practice FP. She is currently using injection. But she said that her husband is against this practice since he suspected her of committing adultery. Now the couple are in conflict and they shared their two room house into two (See Appendix III. Plate 5).

As women are reared to be totally dependent upon their husbands for their livelihood, so they choose to stay within the bonds of marriage withstanding all kinds of mistreatment (Daniel Haile, 1987, No.2). Daniel further noted that in the eyes of the society, divorce was always the woman's fault. For instance infertility is considered as the fault of a woman and it leads to divorce. When seen from the economic viewpoint, women's role is determined by her reproductive and not

by her productive importance. All criteria describing an ideal woman are domestically oriented social descriptions like motherhood. Women were important to their husbands only as "mothers of his children" ([Tsehai Berhane Selassie 1986, No. 8], Lishan Bekele, 1991:4). It is commonly observed both in rural and urban Kotebe that the social status of a woman is always stacked in her child-bearing status.

Marriage in Rural Kotebe (Tafo)

Tafos get married not only amongst themselves but also to people from other villages. When the marriage is arranged among Tafos, it should not be among people who have blood relation. The marriage is usually arranged by parents or relatives.

Pre-marital sexual intercourse is highly prohibited for a girl. If found disvirgined on the day of her marriage, a skirmish can ensue among the families, and the newly wed woman is expected to flee. The man, on the contrast, is not expected to be virgin. He is rather expected to have some 'experience' before marriage with a 'galemota'--a divorced woman, or a widow. This tradition has been preserved for too long.

In contrast to the above, those who live in the urban setting do not regard virginity as the major criteria for marriage. The man is rather more interested in the fertility of the woman specially when her age is higher than the expected/conventional age for giving birth.

During marriage, the would-be husband is expected to present dress, bracelet, necklace, etc. in the form of dowry to the bride. He is also expected to offer a 'gabi' (a long and whit cloth made of cotton worn over clothes) to his father-in-law and 'netela and kemis' (full dress made of a cotton) to his mother-in-law. On the third day, the husband is expected to take a sheep and a white cloth to the family of his new wife. The sheep is finally taken back to his house. Though this doesn't give any sense, the Tafos say that it is just a custom, and it will have to be respected. Once they are married, both the husband and wife receive support from both families. The woman's family give cattle, and the man's family give cattle and land to the newly weds. If the husband's father doesn't have enough land to offer, the peasant association will have to give the land as the new husband would by then be considered as a man over 18, and liable for getting some land.

4.4. THE FAMILY AND WOMEN'S DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES

The family, as the main socializing agent, is responsible for childhood socialization and non-school education in Ethiopia in general and in Kotebe in particular. In the family, children are taught the basic skills, the societal values system. In rural Kotebe as soon as they reach the age of five, boys are trained to perform productive activities to become successful farmers and husbands while the girls receive training in domestic work in preparation for a married life as

diligent housewives. In short, children are trained to make them fit for life in the society. Male and female children are trained in the men's and women's basic skills by the senior members of the respective groups to which they belong.

Daughters are usually expected to help their mother with household chores. When a family has the capacity to educate children, it is the son who gets the chance to get educated. The reason why sons are chosen over daughters for education is that they are thought to stay with and could eventually turn out to be assets to the family. Daughters, on the other hand, are meant to go to another family when they get married.

Children are also taught to conform to the basic societal values. They are taught the qualities which are supposed to be typical of one or other sex. Through their relationships with each other, family members come to have certain expectations about how to behave towards each other. These expectations are associated with feelings of rightness or wrongness and children are taught which is right and which is wrong and women play important roles here.

The family is not only a socializing agent but also a traditional means of control. Parental, and especially maternal, control plays a critical role in shaping the behaviour of children since the children pass the early years of their life with their mothers. Despite their considerable role in the upbringing of children, women are thought to be incapable of bringing up children well by men as well as by women. A child, especially a boy who is brought up with his mother is thought to be "spoiled" and is insulted as "son of a woman".

One of the roles of women in the family is the upbringing of children includes the care, training and education of children when they are growing up. The care, training and education of especially small children of two or five years of age are women's tasks. Due to the lack of knowledge and absence of family planning services together with social and cultural values attached to children as wealth, rural women have successive births and it so happen that a nursing mother gives birth to a new baby before the first one is weaned. As the practise of feeding children with supplementary food is virtually unknown, this is a very serious problem involving both children. This holds true for both rural and urban Kotebe family (See Appendix III: Plate 16, 34 & 36). But here it should be noted that women in urban Kotebe get married late and immediately after marriage or even before their marriage ceremony they get pregnant and under normal circumstances the practice successive births with a maximum of two years of spacing. This is partly because of their late age at marriage they want to bear children before age 35 or above, partly children serve a bonding element between husband and wife in the case of newly married couples.

Peasant women must take care of their babies and small children while they are at work on the farm and at home. For example, women must carry their children on their backs, lull them to sleep, cradle them in arms, or leave them on the floor and make sure that the children are not

burnt by fire, which is a very common occurrence among children, while women are cooking. Should family members including children fall sick, it is the mother who becomes worried and tries to cure them using traditional medicines. In addition to the role of women in the upbringing of children, there is biological reproduction, childbearing and nurturing of infants. When a couple cannot produce children, it is the women who is said, or rather accused, of being barren and the sisters of the husband and the community insult the woman as a "mule" and the threat of divorce hangs over her. Sexually transmitted diseases often cause sterility and are referred to as "women's diseases"

When asked to define who is the ultimate decision maker in family matters including the number and spacing of children, informants explained that the decision maker ranges from men or women to both wife and husband jointly.

Generally, the tasks associated with the domestic category of activities are assigned to women. The participation of males in the domestic activities symbolized by the Kitchen, that is, the processing and preparation of food is severely restricted. A male who enters the kitchen or prepares his own food is thought to be "Womanish". A male is not allowed even to help himself to prepare food, let alone prepare. The custom is that males must be served by females. Similarly, cleaning, water and fuel collection, mending and washing clothes, and child care and upbringing are predominantly, women's tasks. The only domestic activities that men participate in are handicraft production for household use such as the making of wooden household implements and the grinding stone, and house-building and repair. Women's domestic activities are also considered as "very important" and "absolutely necessary which men could not do". The phrase "A house without a woman is like a deserted house" and "A woman is the beauty of the house" illustrate that women's domestic work is highly valued. The paradox is, however, that the work of women at home is not recognized as contributing to social production. However, in my field investigation I have observed husbands taking care of their children. The case in point is Ato Tsegaye Kifile, a baker, at Luke Peasant Association (See Appendix III: Plate 8).

4.5 WOMEN'S PLACE AND WOMEN'S WORK

(a) Formal and Informal Power Structures. The organizing principles of sex, age and relatedness, which characterize Ethiopian culture, are evident in the families of Kotebe. While researchers taking a formal approach to the study of Ethiopian culture have argued that women have little effective decision-making power and others have effectively challenged that position. The evidence they present suggests that, at least in some areas, the power and decision making are bilateral, with women possessing considerable power, even if its exercise is less public than that exhibited by men (See Appendix II: Table 5 ABC).

The sexual division is primary, with males (except the very young) having power over females. This is crosscut by an age dimension, with elder being more powerful than younger. The relative positions of daughters-in-law and adult daughters is somewhat more ambiguous. However, after two months of observation, the rural Kotebe family's power structure more closely, the "paterfamilias", again the acknowledged head of the family, rarely exercises his authority. The age principle predominates in an otherwise bilateral (along the sexual dimension) system. In rural Kotebe daughters-in-law without children of their own are not accorded the full authority granted to them by their adult status, but seem to gain this as they have children for the family. The only practical control they have is over young children, though some deference behaviour is expected from younger, unmarried daughters of the household. Similarly, adult daughters have no authority over daughters-in-law, though in conflicts their wishes are likely to hold sway. The rural kotebe family provides a case in point.

Usually the "materfamilias", as head of the home production unit, controls the labour of all females in the household, children of either sex, and sons who are not otherwise employed. She also has complete control over the daily operating budget. Although she rarely shops in person, the materfamilias usually directs the purchase in what to buy.

(b) The home production unit. While the focus of women's tasks is usually thought to be maintenance-oriented, this has not always been so in Kotebe. Even today, many women produce goods which are either consumed at home, exchanged with neighbours, or sold on the market--goods which families would otherwise have to purchase.

With the growth of the town's population, the taking of considerable agricultural land by the state, and the building of hotels, families were unable to grow all their own food. The exchanges between women became largely limited to sporadic exchanges of labour and reciprocal gifts of food on significant occasions (such as birth, deaths, and weddings). These exchanges are still practised, and, while few of the older women can read and write, they keep amazingly accurate tallies of who gave what to whom and on what occasion. Insufficient reciprocation causes tongues to wag and signals a status differential.

Now that farming is no longer the livelihood of most village men, much of the opportunity for men of the family to work cooperatively has disappeared. Unless they are among the lucky few who are well educated with good connections, their jobs are usually lower-status modern-sector jobs: taxi-drivers, guards, gardeners, etc. Except for the sons of local artisans and shopkeepers, some of whom may be trained to take over family businesses, sons today may work in different companies than their fathers and in different occupations. This can result in an increase in income for the family, whose members pool at least some of their earnings. A gradual proletarianization of the male labour force is occurring.

Generally it is acceptable for females to work outside the home in humanitarian positions in which their nurturing talents are involved: social work, teaching children, and nursing. Today these are considered modern-sector occupations, since all require educations. Most of the remunerative occupations women undertake fall into one of three categories: performed for a female clientele, extensions of their homemaking talents, or done by families of specialists. Basketry and pottery are two examples of the latter. Cottage crafts are extensions of women's homemaking role, as are such activities as taking in laundry or providing laundering services at hotels and hospitals, baking traditional round-loafed bread (Ambasha) selling Arakie, Tella and so on. (See Appendix II: Table 10)..

Some activities are not generally considered to be "women's work" but may be performed by women. Agricultural work is a prime example, taking a variety of forms in which women participate with varying degrees of social acceptability. Many women tend small gardens of vegetables and fruit trees in their courtyards. Because of its highly public nature and hard work, hired field labour is status lowering, only performed by women and girls from poor families.

(c) Source of power and prestige for women. Carrying out their daily role competently gives women some power within their families. With the exception of the aged, all women share a heavy household maintenance, productive and reproductive burdens. Some older women have young relatives to do household maintenance. Apart from maintenance and productive labour, women may gain influence in the family by possessing property such as agricultural land, houses, business buildings, refrigerators, tape recorders, televisions, radios, and large formal sets of furniture.

The prestige of a woman's natal family may also carry over to improve her position in her affinal family. Marriages are, after all, more affairs of families than of individuals in Ethiopia. According to Christine (1985:212), certain families are known for being honest/pious/old/well-educated/wise/ wealthy/large, etc. She further notes that like bloodlines of a thoroughbred, families are thought to breed true. The sources of prestige differentials are many, but qualifiable. Large families, especially those with many brothers and uncles in influential occupations, are prestigious. A woman's brothers, father, or uncles are the chief source of her physical protection. In addition, they can reasonably be expected to assist her in-laws in securing employment, school acceptance, etc.(Christine, 1985:212). This holds true for the Kotebeans.

Christine (1985) states that by the time a woman's children are grown, she is, indeed in a better position to make such a choice. In arranging her sons' marriages, the "materfamilias" has the richest sources of information in the household available to her, and her word is likely to be trusted. Despite her apparently housebound status, she is linked to the outside world through her children and daughters-in-law, friends and neighbours.

(d) Support Structure within women's society. Formerly friends and kin tended to be one and the same, when rural Kotebean families settled together in large lineage compounds. These compounds were sub-divided as new nuclear households grew within them. Eventually small streets and impasses formed in which the residents were related. Visiting and mutual labour flowed freely, as women interacted through open doorways. Neighbours may deliver a woman's child, provide care when she is ill, share family planning information, and gossip about her husband if he mistreats her. Friend-neighbour groups also become a means of transmission of societal, rather than uniquely familial, values. For example, in rural Kotebe, families have pronatalist tendencies completely apart from the desires of individual woman members regarding their own fertility. Families have prestige values attached to them which only in part depend upon the actions of their individual members. Large families have a large operating budget and are thought to be more prestigious than small ones. As a general rule, it is in the best interests of the family that its individual members have as many children as possible.

In urban kotebe, the village stratification system is a mixture of socioeconomic status coupled to notions of honour. Individuals assume the rank of their families until they prove otherwise. Today socioeconomic status seems to predominate in the scheme, and with the development of modern-sector occupations and foreign employment, incipient classes may be seen. While individuals may be uncertain as to their precise rank, they know others with whom they share little. Those with whom they share much, they visit.

Visiting is one way villagers keep track of rank. Families of equal status visit each other with roughly the same frequency. Non-reciprocated visiting is an indicator of rank disparity. A higher-status person is visited by lower-status individuals, but does not visit in return, since it is presumed that the visit was repaid by some form of favour granted to the lower-status individual. Visiting among women creates informal power-information blocks, paralleling those in men's society (Christine, 1985:219). Nelson (1974) also reported finding these among Berbers in Morocco. In rural Kotebe female power-information blocks may be more cohesive than similar male blocs, as women interact more frequently with one another during the day than do their menfolk.

In rural Kotebe, women are proud of their role as keepers of tradition, understandably, as it is their access to channels of power within the village. While visiting outside the village is relatively infrequent, the outside world reaches rural Kotebeans through the media. Most of the urban Kotebean informants have television, tape recorder and radio in the household. But the rural Kotebean informants, except one case, have no television, but most of them have radio. The power-information blocs of the Kotebeans are, most likely, similar to those found elsewhere in Ethiopia.

In Ethiopian actual socio-cultural context, women have been given little attention in all activities except in domestic ones. This is based on the traditional sex role concept, which confined women's potential to household work. And it is strengthened by the church which deprives women of their right of equality with men. This view which holds that women are inferior to men has been prevalent in the society. Women accept and internalize their lack of potential to take part in activities equally with men. This has a great psychological effect. They became psychologically weak; and they underestimate their competence. This will later force them to require another means of compensating this imposed weakness, they marry and look after the house. This culture directly or indirectly puts its impact on the educational life of women.

In Ethiopia, since 1974, women have been encouraged politically and socially to be on equal footing with men. Women's Association has been set up to increase the level of awareness of women. This created opportunity for few to exercise their rights as individuals. Despite the endeavour and the passing of law which confirms their equality in legal matters, it has never been realized. This is because of the deep-rooted beliefs, cultures, norms and expectations of the society that women are inferior to men. As a result the deep-rooted influences of tradition in the cultural expectation of women were not changed by passing of laws. The knowledge, attitude and practice of the people of Ethiopian society reflect the old religious views of women and these influences take a very long time to die out. These values have been prevalent and being practice now-a-days reflecting the old traditional life of women.

There is a certain romantic view of tradition that many adhere to carry it to its extreme, this view supports the idea of preserving the ethnic purity of groups and cultures, and encourages only those technologies and projects that are "appropriate to that culture". No doubt there is much that is good about tradition and continuity. But there is also a lot that is wrong with it. Tradition along with religion is what has given power to men. And it is usually tradition which keeps women oppressed. Therefore, the inequality with which we now live is approved by tradition and religion. This has created a sort of mental oppression. A woman may be unable to consider herself as oppress, because she believes that tradition is the source of her responsibilities and problems. Therefore, she is not in conflict with men and does not consider men as her enemy. In the same way, men do not consider women as particularly oppressed because tradition and religions have made men powerful individuals. Thus the existence of gender inequality is accepted without argument. In this context, gender roles are seen to lie at the centre of people's cultural and religious heritage. And challenging gender inequality is seen as tampering with traditions of culture, and this is a taboo.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POSITION OF A WOMAN AND A MAN IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF CHILDREN

In this chapter an attempt is made to assess the social and economic position of a woman and a man with regard to childlessness, having one-child and having many children.

5.1 THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POSITION OF A WOMAN IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF CHILDREN

5.1.1 The Childless Woman Under Social Pressure

In Kotebe, like other parts of Ethiopia, a woman who has no children is called "barren". In the local context, a married barren woman is known as 'mesina'. This name, both an Amharic and Oromiffa term, equally applies to cattle such as mule in a similar position. Thus in its extreme sense a married barren woman is called a "mule", and when she hears the name she gets angry and begins at once to accuse God.

In our local context, the society sees the childless woman as being in a very unfortunate situation or a bad, despised person or both. Often she appears as an outcast. In contrast, a woman with many children receives great respect from the society.

For a woman to have children is to enjoy a high social status. Feminine prestige depends directly upon child-bearing and the number of living children. This attitude is shared by the whole community and this "traditional" idea may persist even after social and economic conditions have radically changed.

According to many informants, when a woman is childless, her thoughts are constantly directed to other more fortunate women who have children. She may face this painful comparison in different ways. She admires other women's children, feels sad and depressed seeing them, or is envious of them, and reacts with hatred or asocial behaviour, ill-treating other people's children, even killing them. These attitudes and feelings of the childless woman are not one-sided. There are tense interactions between her and her environment. People irritate her with questions wondering why she did not bear children, calling her by contemptuous names, laughing at and even ill-treating her. These attitudes held by the people in the community with regard to how the childless woman compares herself with others is highly indicative of the existing social pressure.

The reactions of people in the local community against the barren woman may be even more specific. There are some informants who indicated the association between childlessness and witchcraft and consequently the childless woman thinks herself bewitched by her neighbours or

God. In the local community the childless woman is often regarded as a source of harmful witchcraft. But this fear is presumably underlying most of the informants' ideas stating that the childless woman would harm or even kill children of others. However, it is difficult to know how widespread the association between the childless woman and witchcraft still is. Whether it is empirically verified or not the belief is particularly relevant to the social position of women in the local setting.

Analysing partly stereotyped, partly colourful ideas related to a childless woman, I have the impression that in the informants' (including the childless women themselves) view, there is something deeply wrong with a woman who has no children. She appears to be as being "incomplete" and "useless". "She is like a tree without branches" and she is never happy. "She is like a barren land which yields no crop". She is qualified as 'poor', 'barren'. In short, my informants, including the childless women themselves, have negative attitudes towards a childless woman. But what is the underlying reason behind the negative images the informants hold of the childless woman?

In my search for the underlying reason behind the informants's negative attitudes towards a childless woman, I found that the core of the very negative image my informants hold of the childless woman is the social pressure put on her, the problematic relationship between her and her environment. Furthermore, informants' ideas of "social pressure" appear to be mixed with almost all other negative ideas such as "unhappiness", "poverty", "lack of help", "badness", "being asocial", "criminal behaviour", "witchcraft", "divine punishment", etc. All these are nothing but the "social pressure" associations which are the key-reactions to the childless woman.

Taking into account the society's negative attitude towards a barren woman, my informants, including the childless women themselves, suggest that the only thing a barren woman can do is to keep on hoping, praying to God and trying medicines of native and trained doctors. Some informants from rural Kotebe think of the possibility that she may adopt children of relatives or other people. To a few informants from urban Kotebe the idea of a sort of professional compensation occurs: "she can be a good trader because there is no child who can prevent her from spending nights outside". But it is doubtful whether it is meant as a good solution. Some informants say she may become a prostitute. This is obviously not meant as a professional outlet, but it is simply a negative ideal connected to the childless woman. In short, from the view point of the local people, there is no any real possibility that the married childless woman might find some interests or activities to give meaning to her life.

Under this enormous social pressure the childless woman may turn to God, pray to Him for grace, ask Him why He is punishing her whilst favouring other women or blame Him for her condition. The cases in point are W/ro Bogie Gizaw, a childless women at Kebele 03 (See

Appendix III: Plate 28) and W/ro Wudenesh Manyazewal, a childless woman at Meri peasant association (See Appendix III: Plate 6).

Both Bogie and Wudenesh blame God for their condition. God's punishment consists in not having given them the status other women enjoy: they think that God didn't like them as others, they are very sad in their life, for they envy the other women for what God has given them.

The reasons given by the above mentioned childless women as to why their situation is so unbearable are partly emotional and partly practical. One of the emotional motives is their loneliness. They have nobody to talk to, they eat alone, especially when her husband is not around. All these are nothing but the "social pressure" associations which are the key-reactions to the childless woman

W/ro Wudenesh, a childless woman from Meri Peasant Association, points out the disturbed relationship with her friends and fellow women. She does not feel well in their company, tends to isolate herself, thus increasing her already great loneliness. She says: "I am never happy while I am with others and I am always worried because people go about saying and asking why I have no children, and I am called a barren woman." Furthermore, her main practical problem is that she does not get help. Not having children to fetch water and firewood for her, she has to do everything by herself. She further said that, "the lack of support in my old age is a drawback without any compensation". Nonetheless, loneliness and lack of help are only superficial aspects of the situation of the childless woman. The real situation of the childless woman is the social pressure put on her or the problematic relationship between her and her environment

The direct pressure on the childless woman is exerted by her husband and his relatives. The husband may ill-treat, leave her, or chase her away. But even if he does not take such extreme measures, their marriage cannot be happy. She is always bothered by her in-laws and her husband. She is very depressed because sometimes she can be repudiated by her husband. She is often sad or beaten by her husband if he is a cruel man. It should be noted that this pressure exerted by the husband and his mother upon the wife is typical of a patrilineal society. The man has to secure the continuity of his family line by begetting children. If his wife proves unable to bear children, he will divorce her and he remarries to have children. She cannot be happy in her marriage and thus she is not well in her married life. The case in point is W/ro Wudenesh Manyazewal.

W/ro Wudenesh is a childless woman who remarried three times and currently lives with her third husband in Meri Peasant Association. With regard to her childlessness situation, she said that: "I suffer a lot from inferiority complex in front of other women, and I am said to be barren who is useless to the local community, to my family, and to my husband and his relatives". Now let us see the short history of W/ro Wudenesh's childlessness conditions.

W/ro Wudenesh divorced her first husband within two years of married life due to her husband's and his mother's reaction to her childlessness, and she remarried a second husband whose first wife died after giving birth to two daughters, but within two years of married life she divorced her second husband because the husband and his daughters ill-treated her, and then she remarried the present husband whose wife died after giving birth to three children (one son and two daughters).

According W/ro Wudenesh, the present husband treats her well, but her life is meaningless for herself. In this connection, she said that: "the love, the attention of my husband or a strong companionship with him could not alleviate my sad situation".

I had the opportunity to discuss with her present husband, Ato Birbo Gebrie, about the condition of his childless wife and he said that:

"On my part I did not bother about her childlessness because I have had three children from my first deceased wife and I told her that I was not in need of having more children, but she is always unhappy and blaming God for her childlessness." (Personal discussions with a childless woman and her third husband from Meri Peasant Association, rural Kotebe, 30 January 1998).

Ato Birbo further revealed his contradictory motives by saying that: "I would have liked to have more children from my present wife, who is barren. But this has not been a problem for our marriage as I have my own children, grand-children and an adopted child. However, my wife has always been unhappy about not having her own children". His wife blames God for her being barren. She thinks that her step grand-children and the adopted child are not as supportive as her own children would have been. Now she has to do all the housework on her own. She does not have time to socialise even with her neighbours. Generally speaking, the strong negative image the people in the local community hold about the childless woman and her situation is dominated by the social pressure to which she is exposed. All other aspects, emotional motives such as frustrated maternal instinct and loneliness, practical disadvantages such as lack of present and future help, are closely interrelated and clustered around this central problem which constitutes the core of the image. Having the situation of a childless woman in mind, let us proceed to the position of the one-child mother.

5.1.2 The One-Child Mother Under Social Pressure

Like the childless woman so also the one-child mother has to face a certain amount of social pressure, even if she manages to bring up the child without losing it because the one-child is not enough to reach the social status desired for a woman.

In the eyes of the people in the local community, the one-child mother is not a good woman, always complains that God has forsaken her, is jealous of other women who have many children, is considered to be unfaithful to her husband, will always wonder why God doesn't give her many children like other people. The one-child mother also belongs to a marginal, not quite accepted social category.

When we try to scrutinise the condition of the one-child mother, we find that she is in a conflicting situation. On the one hand, she is extremely attached to her child, and on the other hand she feels unhappy about not having more. She prays to God to give her other children. Her idea reveals resignation, a fatalistic feeling before God's will, i.e., the idea that child-bearing depends on God's and not on human intentions. Some people in the local community combine this fatalistic attitude with the social rejection of the one-child mother because according to the local community the one-child mother does not fit in the community which defines the social position of women by their childbearing potential.

Some informants say that to have only one-child is a bad luck and is considered to be the will of God. Only very few informants, mainly in the urban setting of Kotebe, believe that it is better for a woman to have one child than more. The reasons are partly the advantages to the child who can be better looked after, and satisfied in its material, educational and emotional needs. This view was held by parents with a higher aspiration for themselves and for their children. However, only very few informants see the one-child woman in connection with the modern situation and recognise the advantages of not having more children.

Depending on local traditions, two, three, and even 4 and more children may be considered as 'too few'. In this respect childlessness is only the one extreme end of a continuum where the other extreme is represented by an unlimited number of children. As a result, the one-child mother is considered as 'incomplete'. There is an expression which reflects this sense of incompleteness: "A one-child mother is like somebody who has one eye" and usually she demands more children. But what is the underlying reason behind her demand for more children?

In the traditional set-up several children of different ages and both sexes are needed in order to carry out the daily work on the homestead. Consequently, informants from rural Kotebe point out that one child is not enough to help the mother. One of the tasks allotted to the daughters is to nurse the younger brothers and sisters. Moreover, siblings would keep company and play with each other. Having only one-child, the family is not only too small, but also incomplete because children of the other sex are lacking. The desire for having children of both sex is universally held by informants from both rural and urban areas of Kotebe. In the urban setting of the well-to-do family, it is of pure psychological or emotional satisfaction. In the rural setting, it is also of practical importance to have daughters and sons because boys and girls are needed for different

tasks allotted to them according to a division of labour between the sexes. There is a widely held view that a woman who has only one child takes great care of her child because she knows that if the child gets lost she would be like a barren. According to the informants' view, the one-child mother loves her only child, takes care of it, gives everything it wants and needs, protects it and is proud of it. However, it does not mean that the people in the local community find one child as a good, let alone, the best solution for a woman. Obviously this means that the maternal love and attentions are concentrated on the only child and this actually occurs. Often the maternal love and attentions concentrated on the only child are connected with the mother's fear of losing her child. As a result the one-child mother is worried over its health and any danger such as accidents, ill-treatment by others, and she herself would not ill-treat or beat it. Some of the informants state that the mother's great love and attachment to her only child could also have the negative effect of spoiling it, and further, the only child may end up having a bad character. In short, the widespread view is that: "if the child dies, the mother will have to face the same difficulties a childless woman has, she will become just the same as a woman who never gave birth, people would consider her again as being 'barren' and 'useless', 'unimportant', and the lack of children may destroy the marriage and lead to the practical problems arising from childlessness". This directly leads us to the societal view of being a one-child mother.

All the above mentioned negative motives, i.e., the fear of losing the child, the social pressure, as well as the emotional and practical drawbacks, explain the stereotyped statements that the woman who has only one child is 'unhappy', has trouble and worries and demands for more children.

5.1.3. The Mother of Many Children and Her Social Position

When we come to the idea held by people in the local community in connection with a woman who has many children, the maternal happiness and the idea of God is linked with the blessing of children. According to some informants, "God loves this woman and she is thankful for the gift received".

Furthermore, the practical privileges deriving from having many children secure in the meantime high social status to the mother. Therefore, according to the informants, the mother of many children is conscious of her social position and is proud of her children. Unlike a barren woman who is always in danger of being repudiated as a wife, the mother of many children is loved by her husband. She is "like a tree with many branches and good fruit" if the children are of help to the community. Some informants describe the woman's good relationships with other people, showing how well she fits into the community: "She is always friendly to the other children belonging to other people, and loves people".

W/ro Kur Gurumu, a married woman who has 12 adult children in Yeka Tafo, said: "I am always thinking of how God loves me because He has given me many children". She is also considered by the local community as a good person who has fulfilled her duty towards the Almighty and she is fulfilling the Commandments of God "to bear children and to fill the world".

According to many informants in the rural setting, the mother of many children has the great advantage that the children help her in her work and thus she is always happy because she can send one to gather firewood, one to fetch water, etc. They obviously consider the children as the mother's helpers, making her rest and leisure time possible, making her life easy and enjoyable. Children are also a good 'life insurance'. The mere existence of many children is guarantee enough that the mother will not have difficulties in her old age. This is not only a guarantee for the parents' good life in old age, but it is also necessary for the functioning of the homestead. To have many children also means that at least some of them will be successful in life and remember their duties towards the old mother. There is a widely spread fatalistic view in the local community that "talents, intelligence, good behaviour, and luck in life" are not given to all children of a family but only to some of them. The implication is that one has to have many children in order to increase the chances of getting some of the 'right type'. These informants are thinking of the traditional setting.

The traditional values attached to the mother of many children are opposed by many informants in the urban setting and even by a few informants in the rural setting, describing the hard work of the woman. These informants held the view that children must first be brought up before they are able to help. In other words, for all the present and future, material and immaterial advantages they give, children have to be looked after and brought up properly. There seems to be a tacit rule of "reciprocity in helping": the mother ought to take care of them well in their life, and they themselves will take care of her later on in her life. Also the education of the children is often seen in terms of future advantages to the mother.

In actual fact, the children need food, clothes, and education. They must also be kept clean, have enough room to sleep in, and the mother has to care about their manners, teach them good behaviour. Some informants describe these duties implicitly if they are too much for the mother or not: "the mother is always busy preparing food for them and washing their bedsheets, and clothes".

Some of the above considerations make explicit the fact that she has too much work to do. Many informants emphasise how busy a mother of many children is and how much effort she has to exert:

"She has very difficult duties to perform; caring for them and nursing them. She is dirty because she has to work hard to look

after them. In other words, she must work like a donkey and even so all her efforts may prove unavailing."

Here it should be noted that, very few informants point out that the woman who has many children should have or ask for the support of her husband: "she needs a great deal of support from the husband to feed the children. Otherwise starvation occurs". Others say that she cannot rely upon his co-operation: "She has a lot of trouble even if her husband is there to help because men here do not play a good part in children-caring". These arguments reveal informants' ambivalent perception of parenthood.

Besides material worries and work, there are some other problems linked with having many children. It seems difficult for the mother to treat them equally. Even her love is not directed to all of them equally. This is strictly observed in the local community. The character and behaviour of the children may be the objective ground for the maternal predilection or rejection: she loves some of them and dislikes others according to how they behave. She always likes those who obey her. Furthermore, fighting and hostility among the children themselves can make the mother's life difficult. According to my personal observation, many children trouble the mother and make her angry and she has no peace and this evokes the feeling of the hostility, and even hatred for her own children. She is always beating them and sometimes wishes that she had not given birth.

Some informants describe her "failure" and "miserable" situation:

She may die of hunger and she may have no clothes. She may not have enough clothes or food for them. If the mother fails to take care of the children properly, they will begin to steal. She must see that they are well-fed, or else some will begin stealing. She has to work very hard so that her children may not steal.

It is a rather common belief in the local community that if children are not fed and kept properly, they will become thieves. The above arguments which we have already seen also reveal the belief.

The pros and cons of having many children appear in a relatively great number of ambivalent reactions, placing positive and negative arguments side by side: the mother has a heavy burden because she ought to take care of all of them equally. On the other hand, she is happy because she gets their help in the small tasks which are allotted to them, and she feels comfortable and proud, but if she thinks about food and clothes she begins to cry. .

Generally speaking, in the case of Kotebe almost all informants in the rural setting but very few informants in the urban setting show a positive attitude towards the situation of the woman with many children. Apart from the mere maternal love and happiness, the most frequent positive motives lie in the present and future help from the children. Because of these and other privileges derived from many children, the mother enjoys the respect and admiration of the community. The

main argument against her situation is that she has to work too much, and even doing her best, she may fail to provide the many children with all they need. The two types of motives seem to contradict each other. But, in fact, the positive ones reflect the 'traditional' and the negative ones the 'modern' situation. A relatively high number of ambivalent reactions indicate the conflict between old values and present requirements.

5.2. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POSITION OF A MAN IN RELATION TO NUMBER OF CHILDREN

5.2.1 The Social and Economic positions of a "Childless Man"

With regard to the man without children, the widely spread view is that: "the man who has no children is more extinct when he dies than the man who has children". This reveals the fear of dying without children. However, most people in the local community do not consider the man who has no children as "a childless person". Rather, they simply assume that: "if a married man has no children it is because he has not yet found the right woman to bear children to him". This reveals the traditional belief that the local people have in their minds rather than the reality of being "a childless person".

As a result, if a marriage remained without children, this was with good reason attributed to the barrenness of the woman. This view is shared by the whole community. Hence, the possibility that the man himself could be sterile is rarely considered. Unfortunately in my field investigation I did not come across "a childless man" so I could not have the view of the subject under consideration.

Sometimes the conflict between the old custom and the new principle of monogamy is manifested. Like a childless woman, the man without children is often seen as unhappy and depressed. The reasons for this state of mind may be emotional such as loneliness, missing the happiness brought by the presence of children or practical such as lack of help; or the combination of both.

According to the people in the local community, the man with no children:

"has no helpers in the house to make his life more comfortable.
He would need children to help him in grazing the cattle, in house
building, working in the fields and fetching things for him...in his
old age he will be without support and company".

With regard to the man without children, the most serious problem arises when he dies. Association of "death", rare in the case of the childless woman, is relevant in relation to the man without children. The true reason for this fear is that after death the name of the man will be forgotten, his place will remain vacant and his family line will end. The key for understanding the "death" associations is given by male informants who state that: "a man who has no children is

more extinct when he dies than the man who has children". Furthermore, the idea of "death" is more frequently associated to problems related to the subject "man" than to those with the subject "woman" and in both cases more frequently by male than by female informants. This obviously reflects the ideology embodied in a patrilineal society.

Male informants explain the situation of "a childless man" by saying that the man would not have anybody to inherit his property: "the man is always full of apprehension in his heart because he has nobody to leave his property to when he dies and he is unhappy because when he dies, there is no person from his own flesh and blood to take his wealth, and he is in danger because he has nobody who will be his heir".

Most informants relate the idea of "lack of heirs" with the view that the man is a bad person: "he is not regarded in the community as a good man and when he dies there is none to inherit his things". And other informants connect the idea of 'poor' with the fact that the man will not have anybody 'to take all his property' after death. The reason for all these ideas is that the man could survive his own death in a rather concrete way if he had children. He would live in them and continue enjoying terrestrial existence and comforts with them. Without children belonging to him and to his family line, he disappears forever: "he is more extinct when he dies than the man who has children. He loses his life once he dies and the family line will not continue". This is also the deeper meaning of the beliefs that the man is in danger, wants to have children before dying, may die without children, thinks of his heirs that his place will remain vacant, nobody will succeed him, or remember his name, his name will not be known any longer. His 'name', which would disappear after death, is likely to stand for his person.

But the most important questions from a socio-cultural perspective are: What is the underlying reason behind such a problematic situation of a man without children? Is the situation of a man with out children somewhat different from that of a childless woman? If so, how and why?

The social pressure the man without children has to face is directly linked with the problem of lack of heirs. According to the view of the local community, the childless man did not fulfil his duty towards his race. The same relatives of the man who urge the wife to bear children exert pressure also on him: "he is blamed by other people of his race". Ideas held by most informants that: "he is regarded as an 'unimportant', a 'dishonest', and a 'useless' man" as well as other ideas indicating social pressure are linked with the central idea that the childless man failed to fulfil his duty.

The contempt of the local community for the man is often expressed by the qualification 'poor'. According to most of my male informants, they call him a poor man because he hasn't

produced any child. He is a poor man because he will not get the support that he would get if he had children. He considers himself "poor" in children because he has nobody run errands for him.

Here it should be noted that the qualification "poor" can simply mean the opposite of "rich" in a material sense, children being the wealth of a man in the traditional setting.

We have already seen associations connecting the idea of poverty with the idea of death. In this connections, Ato Hailu Demie and Ato Biru Chache, from Yeka Abado and the other from Yeka Tafo respectively, said that:

"The childless man is 'poor' even if he has property, which means that he is not poor in a material sense, but he is 'poor' because he has no children to take his property after his death. More clearly 'poor' can be understood in a non-material sense: a childless man is like a poor man and he often thinks he has perhaps some disease which prevents him from procreating. He often goes to be treated in hospital. He thinks that he is the poorest man in the country even if he is having much affluent."

When we try to compare the association of 'poor' with a childless person in relation to children being wealth and the association of 'poor' with a childless person in connection with having nobody to inherit his property, a linguistic digression may help to clear the non-material, figurative meaning of 'poor' as it is applied to 'a childless person'. In other words, the childless man, like the childless woman, is lacking in something essential. Therefore, he is despised and associated with evil forces. The descriptions that the man would ill-treat, hate, poison, or even kill other people's children seem to be indicative not only of his jealousy but also of the evil associated with this person:

"He can beat somebody's children to death so that they can become childless like him. He tries to think of ways of killing some other people's children. He sometimes hates the children of others and even poisons them. He is the one who kills his friends' family."

The counterpart of the childless woman, who is or becomes a prostitute, is the man who is wasting his money in a useless way, on drinks, women, and other things. The reason for this behaviour seems to be the lack of a family which would motivate him to work and be a responsible person. Without children life and efforts appear aimless:

"He likes very much to waste money because he has no children to pay school fees for or to clothe them. He cannot save his money even if he gets much money. He forgets about the community, for he thinks that after all there is nobody to have his properties after death. He spends his money on drinking, buying sweets because he cannot keep his money. No child can have his money if he dies. He does not like to stay at home. He strolls about aimlessly, coming back late at night and he neglects his wife."

The ideas attached to the childless man reflect the "modern" situation. It is worth noting that most of these descriptions were given by informants in urban Kotebe.

Among the informants who reacted positively, some think of substitute solutions:

"The man may find satisfaction in his work, look after his wife well, help his parents, other people's children, the poor, make friends, adopt children or keep animals. Money is the man's most important compensation for not having children".

The above positive reactions to the idea of a childless man are indicative of the fact that the childless man has more money, as it is not necessary for him spend it on food, clothes, and school fees for the children. Thus he has an easier life, spends his money only on himself and his wife, can afford to build a house, buy clothes and eat better. These informants do not regard the lack of economic pressure as leading him to a selfish attitude and an irresponsible management of money: the man has no 'trouble' in the sense that he has no 'financial difficulties.'

Furthermore, only very few informants refer to "the release from other burdens, such as child care, home education and disturbance caused by the children". Ambivalent attitudes towards the childless man show the conflict between the advantages of not having children and the desire for them.

Generally speaking, the concept "childless man" does not exist in the same sense as that of a childless woman. Some of the informants did not understand the childlessness of the man as an irremediable fact. They meant that he could solve the problem by marrying the right wife. Furthermore, it seems that most informants do not hold a definite image of a childless man. This presumably reflects the traditional situation in which a man could hardly fail to have at least a few children. The main problem of man without children is seen by informants in the danger that he might die before begetting one. In this case, according to the traditional view of patrilineal societies, he has failed in his most important duty towards his lineage and clan. By interrupting the continuous life unit of his people, he himself would become irreparably extinct. Because of this, he is considered an 'incomplete' person, i.e., 'poor'. He is also materially 'poor' because there are no children working in his homestead. But other informants see the man without children in the "modern" situation and find it advantageous for him, to have less of a financial burden than if he had children.

5.2.2 The Only One Child Father: Problems and Advantages

The negative reactions towards the man with one child are only slightly, and not significantly, higher than towards the one-child mother. This is mainly due to the fact that many informants recognise the new situation, determined by the modern cash economy, in which,

because of the financial difficulties the man has to face, it is preferable for him not to have a great number of children.

As in the case of the One-child mother, the one-child father pays much attention to his only child. The deeper reason for paying so much attention to the child is the father's fear of losing it.

Most of my informants explain the situation of the one-child father as follows: "He always feels very unhappy thinking that his child may soon die and he may be left with nothing and he expects another from God since he will be left with no child should the one child die." The fear of losing the child may be motivated by utilitarian reasons, for example, the man would not have anybody to look after him when he is old. But generally, it has deeper roots than mere practical considerations. Similar ideas to those associated with the man who has no children appear: "He is always sad because when that one child dies, no one will inherit his belongings". However, the one-child mother fears the child's death first of all because this would place her again into the low social status of a barren woman. The idea of "only one child" and the danger that the father may disappear, die before having begotten a sufficient number of children to guarantee the continuity of the lineage, is the reason behind the fear of only one-child father. Therefore, this shows that the fundamental problem for a man who has no children, or a dangerously small number, namely one, is to die without descendants. Thus the main negative motivation with respect to a father with only one child is the same as that of the man who has no children.

As in the case of the woman, to have only one child means a further risk. The implication is that the more children one has the greater are the chances that at least some of them have the character desired by the parents. Also the wish to have descendants of both sexes appears. Some of my informants consider him sterile, a man who "did not produce well", or state that to have only one child is the same as to have none, or be "barren". On the other hand, the man is likely to attribute the responsibility for the situation to his wife rather than to himself. Most of my informants consider the situation of the one-child man as follows: "he blames his wife for not having many children. He is always quarrelling with his wife thinking there is something wrong."

The implication is that the man's lack of further children is due to the failure of his present wife. Whatever the reasons are, the man with only one child is sometimes seen in negatively. Some characterisations reveal a certain social pressure upon him, others depict him as an irresponsible person who neglects his only child even when he has the capacity to care for it properly. Also, the man with only one child is not conceived as a real father with a real family. Rather, he is considered rootless like the man without children. Sometimes he is despised as being "poor" which explains the idea of incompleteness attached to a childless person.

In short, nearly half of my informants mainly in urban Kotebe react positively to the man who has only one child. The advantages of having only one child are seen either from the point of view of the man or the child or both.

"The father does not beat his only child, he cares for it well and teaches it good manners, buys it things. It is easier for the father to satisfy an only child's needs, to educate it; he succeeds better in his efforts than if he had more. He may be proud of his child. The man can save money, receives much money, has a large farm, a big house, buys a car and is richer than others with more children".

The informants who have positive ideas are at least not shocked by the idea that a man may have only one child. In other words, they begin to overcome the traditional valuation of having many children. The reason is that they recognise the compelling material pressure; having many or more children would cost much money. The one-child family is rarely an ideal condition, but it may be a necessary or even a comfortable solution. On the other hand, we see the curious phenomenon that some informants react positively to the only child, but see its value in traditional terms such as the one-child father sends his child to school so that it may be able to help him in future. Ambivalent reactions show the conflict between the traditional preference for more children and modern motivations.

Generally speaking, a great number of informants mainly in rural Kotebe consider having only one child as insufficient for a man. The main reason for this is the fear that this child may die leaving the father without descendants. It seems that to have only one child is less tolerable a situation for a man than for a woman. This view is likely to arise from the traditional family system. However, almost half of the respondents react positively realising that in the modern situation children cost money which has to be raised by the man. Some hybrid attitudes appear, too, showing a positive reaction together with the motivation that the only child would fulfil the traditional duty of the father.

The Father of The Big Family

Discussing the issue of having many children from the point of view of a man, my informants express ambivalent ideas: "He is not able to educate all of them unless he is highly paid".

In the case of a man, significantly fewer informants react positively to the idea of having many children than in the case of a woman. Among the positive associations the idea of "rich", seldom associated with the mother of many children, appears more specifically connected with the father: "he is very happy because he is a rich man". The association "rich" shows that connection between having many children and wealth, no matter how clearly informants realise a causal link:

either the man is rich because of his many children, or he can afford them because he is rich. Other ideas which appear together with "rich" allow us to assume that the concept is understood in a merely economic sense, but is rather a condensed verbal expression of the image respondents hold of the father of a big family: "He is a very good and rich man". A few informants also mention that many children guarantee the continuity of the clan. These characterisations are especially interesting because they show associative links between the idea of descendants and the ideas of "profit", richness as well as social status:

"He has the profit of the grandchildren and increase the number of his clan. He is rich and he can't be forgotten in future. He is proud because even when he dies, he says "I have left my clan there". He is called a rich man."

The idea of "rich" appears a key concept indicative of the positive image of a man with many children in the traditional setting. His wealth, a big homestead with many people working in it, is coupled with the continuity of life after his death and yields social status. The connection between many children, prestige and influential power in the community is evident in the following ideas held by most informants in rural Kotebe: "He considers himself a great man and wishes to be respected. He must have a big home as an important man. He is now the chief. He is called a 'parent', 'prolific', or 'father'".

The idea of "parent", "prolific" or "father" is indicative of the social status of a father of a big family. The material side of his "richness" consists in the present and future help the children give to the father of a big family. The material advantages are an element of the high social position: "The father of the big family boasts because he does not do much work". The main help children give to their father in rural area is in agricultural work, looking after cattle and house-building: "... they always help him in works such as cultivating, building houses and providing animals with water". Many children helping with cultivation can provide sufficient food for the homestead.

On the other hand, mothers want the children to help them mainly with shopping and fetching water, firewood and other things. Father also expects help from the children in the future. But these ideas are less frequent and refer less explicitly to his old age than in the case of the mother of many children. The efforts, especially in educating the children, are frequently made in the hope that their education will enable them to help the father in his old age: "... All efforts to feed, clothe, and educate children are made in anticipation of receiving help from his children in the future. With all these privileges, the man can be proud of his many children but seldom worries about their future. People may be jealous of the man who has many children. These last reactions seem to indicate that the traditional image of the father of a big family has also its own negative aspects.

A great number of informants see the drawbacks of the man's situation in present times. Too much physical work is the main problem of the woman with many children. The father's heaviest burden is to raise the money for all those needs. The most problematic point is educating all the children which is regarded as an eminently paternal duty. According to the informants' view, all the children, no matter how many there are, have to be sent to school. Only a few informants consider to compromise educating only some of the many children. The difficult issue, as obtained from informants, is one of reconciling the problem of getting money to the need for educating all the children.

He is poor and cannot afford to bear the cost of teaching his children by sending to school. He must work hard to find them food when they are at school; to buy them exercise books, pens, and pencils; to clothe them; and to pay for schooling. He suffers from heavy physical work yielding him very small amount of income. Due to all these the father is always poor.

Therefore, the father of many children has to "work hard" in order to satisfy their needs. Very often it is pointed out that to provide all the food that many children need may be difficult or even impossible. Children also need to be dressed, especially if they go to school. The basic needs --food, clothes, education--are often mentioned together. But the "hard work" of the father consists not so much in a physical effort, for example, in agricultural work, as in the struggle for money, in the effort to find a job: "He is always worried if he is jobless because he is thinking how he will feed them or clothe them; he tries to find a good job so that he might get enough money to educate all of them". Relative to his income, his expenditures are high and, therefore, he is always poor. Mention of lack of money, of poverty is far more frequent by the father than mother of many children. This can suggest that the father has more responsibility than the mother in this respect. Poverty appears here to be meant literally in a financial rather than in a contemptuously figurative sense. The descriptions of the economic strain are simply realistic.

According to some informants, if a man is financially unable to educate all his children, he should be helped by the Government. This suggestion appears mostly in the rural Kotebe where the Government is considered as one who is responsible for the people of his nation.

Further problems of having many children are in respect to housing and accommodation and the health care of the children. Another worry is that the children may become thieves. We have already seen the belief that children may become thieves if they are not taken care of properly. Education is seen as a means of preventing this danger, since it is supposed to secure a good job and a decent income. In this connection most informants suggest that the father of many children: "...should educate them all because if he leaves them uneducated, they become thieves and/or somebody who will be roaming about in the towns". The idea that some of the children will be talented, successful and good, and some not, also appears. This haphazard distribution of gifts

among many children may be looked upon as something bad, but also as something positive: "...is better because some of them may become good while others may not.". These notable differences between his children may be the reason, but not necessarily the only reason, why the father would not love them all equally: "... never loves all of them, but he loves those who have good character and good manners". Finally there is the view that a man who has many children: "...is considered unwise in modern times".

Generally speaking, less than a third of the informants react positively to a man having many children. Among these respondents the image of the father of a big family as an influential figure of good standing in the community still exists. He is seen as "rich" in a figurative as well as a literal sense. However, this image is contrasted with negative and ambivalent reactions which out-weigh the positive ones and are also significantly more numerous than in the case of the mother of many children. The reason is that most informants recognise the difficulties of a man who has many children in the modern setting. Education, an indispensable necessity for every child, is his responsibility. He has to raise the money for school fees which he can hardly manage with many children to take care of. Other difficulties the father of many children has to face appear relatively irrelevant compared with the struggle for education.

/ In conclusion, it is found that the idea of "social pressure" is more attached to the woman who has no children or only one child than to the man under the same condition. On the other hand, the difference between female and male informants within the "social pressure" ideas do not deviate from pure chance. This suggests that, according to the idea the informants (and probably also the local community in which they live) hold of childlessness and 'only one child', the social pressure is directed more against the woman than the man and that both female and male respondents equally make to the same extent feminine prestige dependent on child-bearing. It also indicates that, in case of childlessness or 'only one child', the informants see the possibility more frequently for a man to find substitute solutions than for a woman. This results lead to the conclusion that the people in the local community hardly know of any means, besides child-bearing, of securing social status for a woman.

Furthermore it should be noted that the idea of 'death' is more frequently associated with the man than with the woman. The difference between female and male informants within the idea of 'death' is also significant: Female informants associate less frequently the idea of 'death' than male informants. This means that, according to the informants' views, the danger of dying without children concerns more directly the man and that male informants themselves are more worried about this problem than female informants. As has already been analysed, this consistent trend can only be explained by the fact that the informants come from or live in a patrilineal society.

The different reaction to the ideas of "a mother of many children" and "a father of a big family" show that the advantages and problems linked with having many children are different for the mother and for the father. The children's help with the work is associated more to the mother than to the father of many children. Also the support they will give their parents later on appears more relevant in the case of the mother than the father. Present and future help are the practical advantages the mother of many children enjoy in the traditional setting. The view that a parent who has many children is a "rich" person is more frequently expressed in the case of the father than the mother. The concept "rich" expresses the materially and socially privileged position of the father of a big family in the traditional homestead economy.

As to the motives against having many children, it is found that "too much work", is more frequently mentioned in the case of the mother than in the case of the father. On the other hand, the difficulties of educating many children and raising the money necessary to cover all their needs, concern the father more than the mother. Both problems of education and money are more frequent to the father of a big family than to the mother of many children.

The above differences mean that the woman's advantages and problems as a mother of many children are related mainly to the amount of work she has to do, while the situation of the father of a big family is considered more under financial and material aspects. This view is equally shared by female and male informants.

Furthermore, there is a significant difference between the reactions to the idea of "a childless woman" and "a man who has no children": the informants are more against childlessness in the case of a woman than of a man. The fact that respondents consider childlessness a far worse situation for a woman than a man is not only a stereotyped view, but a real problem of female's direct concern. Females obviously fear the social pressure a childless woman has to face and they do not perceive any means of alleviating their situation except child-bearing itself.

With regard to the idea of "a mother of many children" and a "a father of a big family", there is a significant difference between the informants'. The negative attitudes towards "many children" are more frequent in the case of the father than the mother, i.e., the situation of the man having many children is more frequently seen as bad than the situation of the woman. This view is equally shared by female and male informants. Taking into consideration the different types of motives relevant in connection with the mother and the father of many children, these results suggest that the woman is more frequently seen within the traditional rural setting and the man in the modern situation. As to the idea of a "childless woman", there are significant difference between the attitudes of female and male informants. The negative reactions are significantly less frequent among female informants than among male informants. Nevertheless, there are not much differences between female and male informants' reactions to the ideas of one-child mother, a "childless man", and a man who has only one child. On the other hand, female informants seem to be more interested in the whole problem of child-bearing than male informants.

CHAPTER SIX

ATTITUDES TOWARDS FAMILY PLANNING

This chapter presents major motives and attitudes related to the idea of family planning. In the first part of this chapter an attempt is made to describe and analyse the attitudes and motives towards non-planned and planned limitations of family size. The second part discusses demographic and other characteristics relevant to attitudes towards family planning.

6.1 ATTITUDES TOWARDS NON-PLANNED AND PLANNED LIMITATIONS OF FAMILY SIZE

6.1.1. The Non-Planned Small Family: A Family with Two or Three Children

With regard to the informants attitudes towards the non-planned small family size (two/three children family), Some informants consider the general advantages of having children, others consider advantages deriving from their small number. Some informants compare the couple with two (three) children with people who have fewer or no children.

Furthermore, ideas similar to those held by informants in favour of many children are expressed. The children are a gift for which the couple have to be thankful to God. The main material advantage to the couple is that their children help them. But even more frequent are those ideas which reveal the advantages of having only two (three) children instead of more. It is easy to take care of them, feed them, clothe them, and raise the money necessary for all this.

According to my informants from urban Kotebe, the parents of the small family are very lucky because they do not need to spend much money for buying their clothes and food and it is easy for them to send them to school. These ideas generally imply that:

"the couple have few or no worries, no difficulties in taking care of the children or that the couple can or must take good care of them. They are happier than the couple which have many children because they have less trouble".

More specifically, the couple with small family can send all the children to school which would be more difficult or even impossible if they had many. In this connection the couple:

"find life not too difficult, especially education for the children and clothes. They find life comfortable. They are better than a couple who have many children because they cannot all go to school. They can make their children learn because they can get money for them but if you have many children you cannot get money for them."

In fact, what we grasp from the above statements is that to feed, clothe and educate a few children is a lesser problem. Because the needs of the family are not excessive, the money can be

raised. Therefore, the couple with small family: " are very lucky because they do not need to spend much money for buying clothes and food for their children and it is easy for them to send their children to school".

Also the idea appears that children would not become thieves: " they can be happier than the one who has five or more children who are thieves". As we have already seen, the causal implication is that if one has many children and cannot satisfy their needs, some of them would begin to steal.

There are some further advantages in having only a few children: fewer problems with land, housing, their marriage, and the children can be kept in good health. The children themselves are less troublesome, have better understanding of each other, can be taught more easily good manners and behaviour: "....can live a good life because they are more able to have mutual understanding than if there are many....may live better while so many children may cause troubles in the house".

It is important to note a few descriptions which indicate that the idea of a happy small family does exist in the minds of some informants. According to the informants who are in favour of small family:

"The couples with small family live happily in their home. They enjoy living with their small children as much as those having ten children. They form a family which lives joyfully because each gets enough for herself/himself. They still love each other very much and also their children.

The ideas revealing a co-operative spirit between husband and wife should also be taken as indicative of a positive image of the small family: "the couple of small family are always together talking about them to send their children to school and help each other very much in looking after those children."

Even a few children may be enough to ensure the social status of the parents. But, of course, this type of prestige is not the traditional one. The following ideas illustrate that the small family can be linked with the idea of good social position, mainly acquired through education, in a modern set-up. According to the informants in the urban setting, the parents with small family who are able to educate all of their children are considered as strong because all their children are educated and they are people who have been civilised because they want all of them to be educated.

The higher educational and professional aspirations associated with the small family size indicate that social position may be achieved by concentrating all efforts on a few children only.

"The couples with small family would like to have a teacher and a priest from their children. They are happy because they hope one day the children would be big important people. They are very

lucky because they will educate them all to tertiary level and expect from them many things in the future."

Some informants find that the couple with two or three children have enough children and can begin 'birth control': "they should stop having more so as to avoid overpopulation.... They can control birth, because the population in Ethiopia is growing rapidly". Of course, this view was mainly held by well-educated informants in urban Kotebe and this informs us that some informants are aware of the population problem in Ethiopia. However their number is very insignificant when compared to other informants who are in favour of large family size without considering the population problem at the macro-level.

Well-educated informants in the urban setting express their reactions to the couple with three (two) children by saying that this number is too many and consequently:

"The couple has to work more than the couple who has one child so that they can feed them. The couple find it difficult to look after them when it has not enough money. The children do quarrel in the home. The family is not happy..."

The idea that the children are not equally loved by the parents also comes up. Analogous associations have been found in the case of having many children. Seen from the stand point of the children, the unequal love can be one of the disadvantages of belonging to a family with more than one child. Many informants find that three(two) children are not enough, or recognise the advantages of having only three (two), but add that more would be desirable (ambivalent reactions): "... are short of children because those children are not able to cover all their needs....may be able to look after them nicely and educate them well although more are a bit better".

The resignation conveyed by the following view held by some informants also implies that having more children would be better: "...God liked it so and probably he saw they are able to look after those only". One of the reasons why more children should be born is the need of extending the family line: "...consider themselves as not having more children and their family will be big....are better off but they are not enough for them, they still need others to extend the family line".

There are also a certain number of associations implying the idea of death. Some informants show the connection between an insufficient number of children and the fear that the continuity of the family line could be interrupted.

Some informants held the view that because of having only two (three) children, the couple may be characterised as being 'poor', not fertile enough or by some other contemptuous remarks: "...it is certainly so but the fact is that they are called poor....are people who are not fertile....have not good manners."

These associations reminds us of those revealing the social pressure upon a person who is childless or has only one child. Other informants, mainly in the traditional setting, state clearly that the couple with so few children does not fit into the community: "...are very rare to find in our village..."

An interesting reason why it is not good to have three children is that this is an uneven, 'odd', 'sterile' number: "...are not happy because it is a barren number....yearns for the fourth child so that the number becomes even". The idea is implied in some other associations too. It is possible that a feeling of incompleteness has been provoked by the idea of having only three children and then referred to the number itself. In other words, no informant desired to have three children. (See Appendix II:table 16). Table 16 reveals the percentage distribution of desired number of children by place of residence and it is found that no informant desired to have three children.

In contrast to the informants' desired number of children, in actual fact, the idea of three (two) children aroused a great number of positive reactions. For well-educated urban informants, the small and happy family has a positive value of its own. The overwhelming majority of the positive reactions are, however, rooted in the usual, externally compelling, material motives such as lack of money, difficulties in feeding, clothing and educating a large number of children. The informants who find that a few (three/two) children are not enough either leave their view without a further explanation or refer to traditional reasons such as low social status and fear of dying without a sufficient number of children.

6.1.2. Planned Limitation of Family Size: Married Couples who decided not to have many children

In my field observation young couples who decided not to have many children practise modern family planning. Those practising modern family planning methods are well aware of some forms of religious views attached to artificial birth control methods and they thought that "artificial birth control is against nature." This reveals a contradiction between the ideal formulation of behaviour and the actual pattern of behaviour. In this connection, most informants react negatively to the idea of "birth control" but at the same time they react positively to the idea of "small family size". In this case one could assume that this difference may depend on the negative idea embodied in the phrase "family planning", i.e., the idea of "birth control" or "stopping birth" which is commonly understood as "destroying fertility".

Married couples who decided to have only a "few children" and married couples who decided "not to have many children" are found to be different in the image of the informants. However, the results refute this explanation. We have already seen that the idea of "many children"

is far from being only positive. The negative and ambivalent reactions to both "having many children" and deciding "not to have many children" show that informants realise the drawbacks of a large family. Thus "not to have many children" should be felt by urban informants as a good thing, a release from worries and difficulties for the couple. If this is not so, it depends, as we shall see, not so much on the conviction that many children are desirable, but on the rejection of the idea of a "deliberate limitation of family size".

The fact that the couples decided not to have many children does not necessarily mean that informants find the planned limitation of family size an ideal solution, but they at least recognise the problems linked with an unlimited number of children. The difficulties which compelled the couples to make their decisions are the same as those we have already seen in connection with having many children. The difficulty of providing food, clothes, housing, education as well as of raising the money necessary for all this. Furthermore, many children are 'troublesome' and it is difficult to maintain discipline among them. Other informants bring the same arguments, but in a more positive form. They seem to approve fully the couples' decision rather than considering it only as a lamentable necessity.

According to the informants who are in favour of the planned small family size, the couple with small family:

"will educate their children very easily. They are happy in their lives because they do not have much trouble. They will not be faced with the starvation that broke out later on. They may live a peaceful life because they will be able to prevent their children from disease."

Some informants express a plain agreement with the decision of the couples without giving reasons. Others reveal the existence of a positive image about a happy 'planned' family, happy life, love and co-operative spirit within the small family: "...are working together....lead a happy easy life with their children....live happy life and love their few children....will always be proud of their few children".

However, the image of the planned family has a special colouring. In some informants' view it seems to be linked with urban life: "the couple who decided not to have many children can go to town and be one of the people who live there". This connection is not necessarily meant in a positive sense. Urban life may be such that it compels the couple to renounce having more children. It means that the couple may be living in a town and has not enough money to feed them.

Here it should be noted that the planned family may be looked upon as alien to life in the local tradition, as an imported, foreign custom. This again can be meant in the sense that the new custom is progressive, promotes education, and is good for the country. Therefore, the couple who decided not to have many children:

"are people who have a predilection for modern life.... as they are educated they have copied the modern styles of lifebecause this generation needs educated people, so if they have many children they won't be able to send them to school."

In connection with the association between planned family size and urban or modern orientation of life, it is important to see variations in number of children between two successive generations within any given cultural context. In the case of Kotebe, I found that the second generation (the informants generation) has smaller number of children than the first generation (the informants' parents generation). (See Appendix II: Table 18). Table 18 clearly indicates variations in number of children between two successive generations by place of residence. In the case of urban Kotebe, the average difference between the two successive generations is found to be 8.45 children, whereas in the case of rural Kotebe the average difference is 3.7. Even though couples in the urban setting have smaller number of children than their counterparts in the rural area, it is true that in both areas of Kotebe a relatively smaller family size is found to be the norm in the second generation.

Based on the above findings, one can raise the issue of population growth at the macro level and at the family level. Here it can be firmly asserted that at the family level the family size is decreasing, but at the macro-level the population is growing. It means that the couples are planning their family size for reasons of personal convenience.

Some of the associations stating that the couples who decided not to have many children do not want to be tied up, but to be free, to go anywhere, spend money on their own and enjoy life, seem to suggest a modern urban life style. Reviewing the negative reactions to the idea of planned limitation of family size, the young couples who decided not to have many children are considered as 'foolish', 'stupid', 'unwise'. Even the couples' inability to provide for more children is put down to their stupidity rather than to external circumstances: ".... because they were stupid as if they had no money to send them to school and to dress them". Poverty may be an acceptable reason, but otherwise one must be mad to make such a decision: "....was either poor to feed them or mentally unbalanced". The stupidity of the couples may lie in not realising the material advantages such as present and future help, which would derive from more children. But while such practical motives against small planned family only rarely appear, other types of negative reactions such as 'social pressure' and negative descriptions of the couples' personality and marriage, are strikingly frequent. These couples are selfish, lazy, even cruel and do not like children: "....they are very greedy....is always cruel with friends' children."

Such statements are likely to reflect general opinions, prevalent in the informants' social milieu. The social pressure the couple who decided not to have many children have to face because

of their 'foolish' decision becomes directly evident: "...people say that the woman is barren or has been bewitched....were despised by their native neighbours because they say that to have many children is wealth....is not wanted in our location tradition". The idea declaring that such people are few shows that the couples who decided not to have many children do not fit into the established social pattern. Furthermore, the couples' decision also contradicts the substantial, socially sanctioned nature of marriage. The idea of social pressure and negative descriptions is also associated with the sentences suggesting childlessness and having only one child.

On the other hand, as has already been pointed out, the logical equivalent of 'not many children' would be three or two children. Why does the idea of planned limitation of family size provoke more negative reactions than the idea of the non-planned small family with two/three children? Why are types of associations to the idea of "planned limitation of family size" analogous to those related to childlessness?

The reason is not to be found in the number of children, but in their deliberate limitation. The informants are not shocked by the idea of a small number of children, but by the fact that the couples dare deliberately to restrict the number of children. The couples' alleged stupidity consists first of all, in pretending to plan something which depends on natural and divine forces beyond human reach. The couples' attempt is at the same time a sin. Conception and childbearing are matters of nature and God and not of human will. Thus couples who decided not to have many children: "...were wrong because it is not their will to produce many or less children but God's will....it is impossible because you cannot know how nature is created".

The statements that this couple had a lot of children later on are rather amusing. Many of these statements show the intervention of the Almighty. By means of a benevolent gesture, God proves how futile the couples' decision was:

"....but God blessed them and now they have many sons....they have got many children because of God's love....have many children now like stars...are those who get many children (In the local tradition there is a popular saying according to which those who do not want to have children (many) are the ones who get them).

The calamity begins when the mistaken decision is directed by the fate to the opposite end, when the couples cannot produce even the number of children they planned to have, often not even one. This unfortunate turn shows not only the power of supernatural forces, but also their vengeance: "...do not get even a single child....did not get even those whom they would have liked to have....got only one child...will never get any....".

The association of 'death', apparently unconnected with the decision of limiting the number of children, is obviously of the same type which appeared in the case of childlessness or

'only one child'. Only a personal interview could have cleared the associative process which led to it. The idea of a deliberate limitation of children arouses the fear that one could be leaving behind only an insufficient number of children or no children at all:

"...had his one child dead....were must worried after their first-born child died....died without having any child....they had many children at first and they were very proud so God took back all their children..."

According to some informants couples who decided not to have many children have decided to "kill themselves". This association illustrates the connection between the deliberate limitation of children and the idea of self-destruction. A person who dies without children, having deliberately prevented himself from having as many as possible, is presumably looked upon as if he had committed suicide, not only with pity but also with a sense of obscure horror. To defeat the couple's decision, by giving them fewer children than they wanted, or by letting them die before time, is more than a blind game, played by fate. Taking into consideration what childlessness and the association of 'death' mean, it is obvious that most of the above statements imply the idea of punishment. This punishment may be put into effect also by fellowmen or by the society.

There is absence of guilt connected with the idea of deliberate limitation of the number of children. This sense of guilt is certainly rooted in old values and beliefs related with christianity. However, the frequent references to religious rules and biblical-divine recommendations to 'fill the earth' are striking: "deliberate family limitation is against nature, for God said marry and produce children to fill the earth. Those who deliberately limit their family do not fulfil the 10 commandments and they break the commandments of God which prohibit them from stopping themselves to produce children." It is difficult to say to what extent the idea of the Christian God, of His will and words, is a true motivation in itself or rather a rationalisation used to legitimise in a modern way emotions and fears rooted in old beliefs.

We may assume that the above quoted expressions are 'old fashioned'. But in many parts of Africa, especially in the rural areas the teaching of missionaries, the Bible and its language are still having a high, prestigious value of modernity. Missionaries brought and are still bringing, together with religious teaching, modern education, new knowledge and skills, up to date health services in opposition to old 'traditional religions' and 'tribal traditions' which are generally looked upon by christianised Africans as backward. The contamination of new religions by former beliefs is a generally encountered phenomena, often surviving many generations. The newly introduced God may be called by His proper name, but the ideas connected with a traditional Supreme Being (or Spirits) are sometimes less easy to exchange. Even if some Christian teachings have had a direct influence, it is not necessarily the deepest cause for such attitudes against family planning

(Molnos 1968:154). Kotebe is the case in point. In rural Kotebe all my informants were orthodox Christians and their religion is somewhat inherited from their family of procreation. They strictly opposed the "new religion" i.e religion which is not orthodox and they also opposed the idea of deliberate limitation of family size.

Another rationalisation in favour of large family or a negative attitude towards planned limitation of family size could be viewed in the light of the informants' perception of the people as the basic resources of one nation. According to some informants in rural Kotebe the nation is seen as a large scale family unit, a macro homestead or a magnified clan, without recognising qualitative, structural differences. What is bad for the traditional family, the limitation of children, must necessarily be bad also for the new big family unit, the nation. But this argument is likely to be a rationalisation too. The patriotic sense of responsibility is pushed forward to conceal the traditional preference for having many children. Here again old patterns of thinking are applied directly, and therefore improperly, to completely change the situation.

The informants who reacted against modern family planning methods were asked to suggest the possible means for avoiding unwanted conception or pregnancy. With regard to rural informants the most frequent idea about methods of birth planning is that the couple should not stay together if they want to avoid having children or they should abstain from sexual intercourse. But some informants in the urban area show clearly that this solution is not very conducive to a happy and stable marital life. Also coitus interrupts and safe period are mentioned as natural methods of birth planning by some urban Kotebe informants. Other informants suggest abortion. In the case of rural Kotebe, not only is lack of knowledge of modern birth control methods apparent, but the contents and wordings of these ideas show again the associative link with the idea of death and unnatural, sinful act-killing. Ato Birbo Gebrie is the case in point.

Ato Bribo, 70 years old, and a father of three children (two daughters and one son) at Meri peasant association, is not in favour of modern family planning methods under any circumstances since God will take care of His own creation. According to him, those who try to limit the number of their children are acting against the will of God, which is to "fill the earth". He said that: "If people don't want to have children, their only choice is to become nuns or monks". The another person who is not in favour of modern family planning methods is At Huluka Buta.

Ato Huluka Buta, 72 years old, and a father of 10 children (eight sons and two daughters) at Kebele 01 (urban Kotebe) claims that the question of having or not having a certain number of children should not be asked. He seems to believe that this is not within the power of human beings. He adds that the purpose of having children is to "fill the world". He realizes that the population is growing very fast. But he does not consider it to be his problem. He thinks the younger generation has to find a solution to this problem. He added that during the time he got his

ten children the use of modern contraceptives was not known. Even those who knew about it were not allowed to use them. He noted the fact that: "fertility was not as high as it is now. Women did not use to bear children immediately they got married. Even when they started bearing children they gave birth with sufficient intervals between successive births".

Ato Huluka' last statement reminds us the influence of certain cultural changes on fertility. It is true that many cultural factors which traditionally operated to control the sexual and reproductive behaviour in society have collapsed. On the other hand modern family planning ideas are not being accepted enough to counter the effects of the collapse of the traditional controls such as a prolonged-period of breastfeeding.

In the case of rural Kotebe, most informant have no the knowledge of modern family planning methods, it will penetrate the rural Kotebeans only gradually as the population's education level rise, and the communication systems, and other socio-economic factors improve. This is likely to be a long term process.

With regard to my rural informants' knowledge of modern family planning methods, those informants who seem to know about the existence of these methods, have two misconceptions: a wrong idea of contraceptives and the ignorance of the possibility of 'spacing' births. Some informants simply state that the couples who decided not to have many children could consult the medical doctor or the couples would find it without the doctor. But the medicine for birth control, whether given by a native or a trained doctor, is seen as a means of destroying fertility:

"....they use a certain medicine to kill the productive egg....always use some medicine so that the woman will not have more children....go to the native doctor to get medicine for destroying the eggs in the abdomen....may go to the hospital and kill her eggs."

Sometimes a 'partial' destruction is expressed. The view that birth control is something against nature seems to be linked with wrong ideas about contraceptives: "...drank medicine and that was very bad on the side of nature." The conviction that contraceptives destroy fertility, is, in turn, related to the idea that the young couples would begin the planned limitation when they already have enough children. These attitudes towards planned limitation of family size through modern contraceptive methods very much reflect the real situation. Most of the women who consulted the Family Planning clinic at Kotebe and Family Guidance Association of Ethiopia in Addis Ababa already had five and more children. Only an insignificant number of women consulted in the first year of their marriage. Thus, birth control means to stop having children, i.e., stop being fertile: "....stop conceiving after giving birth to the number of children they want and as soon as they had the children they wanted they prevented themselves from getting more".

Here we should remember those ideas which expressed the fear that the 'planned' children may die. If this happens there would be no more substitutes because after having started birth control methods the couple will be barren. Only a very few number of informants from rural Kotebe expressed the idea that the young couple who decided not to have many children would first control birth and then if they want to have more children they can have children. This idea, whatever the method to control birth is, implies that birth control does not cause the destruction of fertility. Some informants, especially in urban Kotebe, give some idea of spacing. Generally speaking, some informants recognise the necessity of limiting one's family size. The main reasons are poverty and the desire for education. However, the small planned family is rarely seen as an ideal life pattern on its own. On the other hand, there is much psychological resistance to the idea of a deliberate limitation of the family size. This resistance is rooted in a combination of traditional beliefs about life and death and prejudices against contraceptive methods which are believed to destroy fertility.

However, it should be noted that the informants' resistance is directed not so much against the idea of a 'naturally' small family as against birth planning. Furthermore, there is no significant difference between female and male attitudes in relation to a 'naturally' small family. But as to the deliberate limitation of children, male informants are more against it than female informants. The difference is very significant in the case of rural Kotebe informants. Female informants, as we have seen in the former chapter, reject childlessness; their desire for children is stronger than that of male informants. Yet, female informants show less resistance to family planning than male informants. But here it should be noted that male informants who are against the planned limitation of family size are those who live in the traditional setting whereas male informants who are well-educated and engaged in gainful employment have higher aspirations for themselves and their children, so they are in favour of planned limitations of family size. On the other hand, female informants in the traditional setting are in favour of planned limitation of family size but they do not practise it because the idea is not socially and culturally accepted in their setting. Female informants in the urban setting are well aware of the advantage of planned limitation of family size, but the realisation of this knowledge into practice depends on other variables among themselves. For instance, it is not uncommon to find currently married women with three or two children of only one sex hesitate to strictly adhere to family planning programmes. In short, the idea of planned limitation of family size is somewhat ambivalent and it is affected by so many variables ranging from socio-cultural values attached to childbearing to having the socially and culturally acceptable family size of both sexes.

6.2. DEMOGRAPHIC AND OTHER CHARACTERISTICS RELEVANT TO ATTITUDES TOWARDS FAMILY PLANNING

In line with Molnos' (1968) findings, in the present study the attitudes revealed by the informants in relation to the idea of family planning are various and even contradictory and could be classified into one of the following three groups: 1) Positive attitudes related to Family Planning. These are informants with a consistently positive attitude to birth planning and/or few children, i.e., negative attitude to many children; 2) Middle Group. These are informants whose reactions are either neutral/indifferent, or are inconsistent and who contradict themselves; or c) do not reveal clear attributes; 3) Negative attitudes related to Family Planning. These are informants with a consistently negative attitude to birth planning and/or few children, i.e., positive attitude to many children. This grouping of all the 80 informants (40 male and 40 women) from both rural and urban Kotebe into three categories has been done for analytical purpose.

Reviewing the ideas of those informants classified under three groups, the proportion of informants who revealed positive and negative attitudes is relatively small, whereas the middle group is rather large. This is due to the fact that the positive and negative groups contain only those informants whose ideas about planned limitation of family size revealed a clearly consistent attitude. All others were put in the middle group, which, therefore, contains not only informants whose attitudes are relatively indifferent, but also those who gave contradictory and inconsistent views. It has to be pointed out that inconsistency can be closely related to indifference: the less interest we take in a problem, the less elaborate, the less consistent, our view about it will be. In other cases, inconsistency is due to a conflict of opposite values. The proportion of those informants in the middle group whose real attitudes to family planning are consistently positive or negative, but have not been revealed by their views, is certainly very small. Several arguments lend support to this reality:

First, because of the great spontaneity of the reactions, the neutral, indifferent attitudes are very unlikely to hide any extreme attitudes. These reactions can be trusted to be indicative or relatively indifferent attitudes. Secondly, an informant whose reactions clearly contradict each other obviously cannot have a consistent attitude, positive or negative. Thirdly, the number of those informants within the middle group whose attitudes could not be ascertained is very small. Moreover, it can be assumed that most of them hold neutral or inconsistent attitudes too. In fact to this last residual group belong informants who either did not answer some questions or gave unclear views or attitudes. But 'no idea' and 'unclear idea' are mostly due to the fact that the informants do not have a definite idea to connect with the idea of planned family size or find themselves between conflicting ideas. The number of informants who did not have an idea about family planning or gave unclear ideas about it because of difficulties of understanding or verbal

expression is certainly negligible. These problems were approached through verbal expression or examples. In the final analysis these are the only ones who may hold extreme attitudes although they are included in the middle group.

In conclusion, it can be assumed that the middle group is composed of informants who are either relatively indifferent to problems related to family size and family planning or are under the influence of conflicting values. Since the number of children, i.e., family size, has been one of the most vital issues in the traditional setting, a 'relative indifference' is likely to indicate an incipient attitude change. The conflicting values underlying inconsistent contradictory reactions are the "traditional" against the "modern" ones. Thus the whole middle group represents a transitional stage between traditional negative and modern positive attitudes in relation to family size and deliberate limitation of children.

6.2.1. Sex

With regard to the informants' attitudes towards family size or desired number of children, there is no significant difference between female and male informants as a whole. In analysing the attitudes in the light of sex, it has been found that more women than men reject childlessness. At the same time, men are more against the deliberate limitation of the number of children. These differences between the sexes necessarily tend to disappear in groups of informants whose attitudes are consistently either positive or negative. We could find, however, sex differences in attitudes to family planning within single ethnic groups.

6.2.2. Educational Level and Age

There is a significant difference between the attitudes of well-educated and uneducated informants. Informants with secondary and tertiary levels of education are more frequently in favour of family planning, and less frequently against it, than informants with primary level or with no formal education at all. This difference could be hypothetically explained by their age, their family background, higher level of information and knowledge and/or greater distance from traditional values, or a combination of these factors. Among all these possible reasons, the assumption that attitudes to family planning become more positive with increasing age does not prove to be true. The age does seem to play a role the other way round. Within any educational level the distribution of attitudes changes significantly according to age.

Among currently married informants with primary, secondary and university/college education, those between the ages 35-40 are more in favour of family planning than informants belonging to the age group of 19-35. Therefore, it is unlikely that the more positive attitude to informants with formal education depends on their age. Two assumptions can be made to explain

the above age-trend: first, it is possible that with increasing age, i.e., as one approaches adulthood, the desire for children and the rejection of their limitation increases. Secondly, it is also possible that the younger group represents an intellectually positive selection of respondents who have more understanding for real problems and accept progressive ideas more easily.

6.2.3. Ethnic Groups

Within the ethnic groups included in the study such as Oromo, Gurage, Amhara and Tigraway, the difference in the attitudes towards family planning is found insignificant provided that the level of education and the patterns of residence remain the same.

6.2.4. Rural and Urban Living Conditions

There is a wide-spread assumption that urban conditions tend to increase the number of positive attitudes towards family planning and diminish the negative ones. However, the difference is found to be insignificant. The frequencies of positive and negative attitudes of the rural and urban groups among female and male informants in Kotebe is not as it was commonly expected or assumed. The lack of a fundamental relation between urban life conditions and positive attitudes to family planning could depend on the way the 'rural' and 'urban' groups have been defined.

The most plausible explanation is to be found in the real conditions, namely in the fact that rural and urban populations in Kotebe do not yet form sociologically separate groups. Rather they are still strongly linked together in multiple ways, through family bonds and constant contacts and communication. In other words, attitudes of people living in 'pure' urban conditions differ only to a slight extent from the attitudes of those in the countryside with whom they share the same cultural background and common problems and aspirations.

6.2.5. Religion

The informants have been classified according to the dominant religions which they adhere to or follow such as Orthodox Christians, Protestants, and Muslims. This classification, however, does not show any significant differences regarding the frequency of positive and negative attitudes related to Family Planning. Here, it should be noted that the ideal formulations of behaviour and the actual patterns of behaviour are not always the same. As a result, religion does not seem to have a significant bearing on attitudes to family planning. This result--that religion does not seem to correlate with the informants attitude--depends presumably on the different influences exerted by the various missions within each religion. In other words, the classification into: orthodox, Protestant, Moslem and other religions is possibly too broad a framework to find out religious influences. The distribution of attitudes by the level of education of the informants within one and

the same religion show that there are important differences among different levels of education which go beyond the dominant religion of the informants.

In conclusion, the acceptance of the small family is mainly motivated by the fact that the parents would be able to educate all their children. The ease of providing for other needs such as food and clothing is also mentioned, but less frequently than education. Most informants recognise the difficulties of having many children in the modern situation. This result may give the impression that the informants would not generally object to the idea of Family Planning. Unfortunately, the reactions to the idea suggesting the deliberate limitation of the number of children contradict this assumption. Whereas the 'naturally' small family is easily accepted, there is specific resistance to a deliberate planning of births. This resistance is rooted in the traditional social structure and the concomitant, still operating, religious beliefs. Furthermore, there is a widespread notion of contraceptives sterilising their users. As a result, the deliberate planning of the family size appears as an act of self-destruction, an outrage against the living and the dead relatives and against the whole community.

The resistance to Family Planning is, however, significantly less frequent among female informants than male informants. This, together with the reactions to the other attitudes analysed above, suggests that female attitudes are more consistent and more positive to the realisation of the planned family size than male attitudes. What matters to women is to secure their social position by producing some children. But they also seem to be prepared to limit the numbers of their children if the circumstances require it. Male informants are much aware of the practical difficulties of having many children, even more than female informants, but they are likely to shrink from the idea of doing something about it. There are several other motives in favour and against the different numbers of children and their deliberate limitation. They are, however, secondary motives, more or less subordinate to the above described ones.

The main factors which seem to correlate with attitudes towards Family Planning are educational level, ethnic group, actual living conditions, and exposure to information and propaganda on family planning. The higher the educational level of the informants, the more positively inclined they are towards family planning. Within the same educational level, the younger informants show even more favourable attitudes than older one. This may simply indicate that attitudes towards family planning correlate not only with educational level but also with future aspirations of educated people.

There are no significant differences between the attitudes of informants from different ethnic groups. The motive 'social pressure' against family planning is commonly shared by each ethnic groups included in this study. Therefore, in this study the ethnic factor is clearly irrelevant to attitudes towards family planning. Furthermore, various religions do not correlate with such

attitudes. This suggests that traditional value systems are still operating on a deeper and more effective level than new value systems may do.

Generally speaking, with regard to the major motives and attitudes towards family planning, we can say that most of my informants in Kotebe have no consistent attitudes. This is nothing but the ideal formulation of fertility behaviour and its actual manifestations are not always the same. As a result, it is very difficult to arrive at one conclusive idea about attitudes towards family planning based on the present study. Hence, it remains open for further investigations.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SOCIO-CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS INFLUENCING WOMEN'S

FAMILY PLANNING DECISION-MAKING

In this chapter an attempt is made to examine the effect of socio-cultural and economic conditions upon women's family planning decision-making.

7.1 THE EFFECT OF HUSBAND-WIFE COMMUNICATION UPON WOMEN'S FAMILY PLANNING DECISION-MAKING

In the literature of communication theory of fertility decline, it has been hypothesized that the higher the degree of inter-spousal communication and husband-wife participation in family decision-making, the higher the use of contraception and the lower fertility. Furthermore, it has been argued that women usually prefer fewer children than men, but lack the authority to determine whether they will practise contraception.

In light of our local socio-cultural and economic context, W/ro Aziza Abdullahi, Head Department of Home Economics, at Kotebe College of Teacher Education, argues against the assumption that men are less in favour of birth control than women. In my personal discussion with W/ro Aziza, the following points were noted. She is of the opinion that it is the women themselves who resist the use of modern family planning methods. This, according to her, is for the purpose of maintaining their marriage. But she added that this holds true only for spouse dependent urban women. But in rural areas men want to have many children more than women because child labour is needed there. She observed the contradiction among some urban husbands that on the one hand, they do not want to have more children and, on the other hand, they do not let their wives use modern family planning methods. This is because they suspect that this will possibly tempt their wives towards committing adultery.

W/ro Aziza's argument about the role of women and men in family planning decision-making is in conformity with my field observations both in urban and rural parts of Kotebe. Most of my informants in urban Kotebe are newly married couples so that the wives, especially spouse-dependent wives, desire to have at least two children of each sex in order to win their husbands affection and assure the continuity of the marriage. However, the husbands in urban Kotebe do not want to have more than two children because the burden of children falls more heavily on their shoulders; but this doesn't hold true for husbands of educated and well-paid wives since wives also

share the burden of child rearing. In this connection, it should be noted that in Kebele 01, urban Kotebe, a father of three children (all daughters) reported that he did not want any more children. To this effect, he reported that he had discussed the issue with his wife and urged her to practice a modern family planning method. But he said that his wife is not in favour of it because she wants one more child preferably a son as she does not have one. However, this is not the case in rural Kotebe. Almost all husbands (my informants) in rural Kotebe, desire to have as many children as 'God gives them' preferably sons because of the advantage of additional children as farm hands. In contrast to husbands, most rural Kotebe wives are in favour of limiting the number of their children due to the burden of child bearing and rearing and other domestic activities. This indicates that the couples' fertility behaviour reflects their own local socio-cultural and economic conditions.

Results everywhere indicate that the financial problems children create are among the strongest male motivations in favour of family planning. On the other hand, the basic "natural attitude is likely to be more negative among men than women in traditional settings. Several Surveys indicate that women fear their husband's opposition. The following answers from women in rural Kotebe illustrate such fear:

Some husbands do not like it (modern family planning). They do not like their wives to practise it and when they discover that their wives are planning to control birth they would not be pleased.

...it does not concern them as child bearing and rearing is our burden. ...husbands would not agree to control birth. They are difficult to convince because they need as many children as possible not only by their wives at home but also by other women out of marriage. What they want is simply to have many children...

The above statements reveal the patrilineal ideology which is a manifestation of an element of polygyny in a modified form and the persistence of successive monogamy. Men may justify their traditional preference for many children by adducing 'rationalized' arguments. A curious illustration of this phenomenon is given by Ato Hailu Demie, a 46 years old rural Kotebe (Yeka Abado) farmer, who remarried three times expressed the begetting of children, even in extra-marital relations, as a patriotic duty. In general, this man is not in favour of family planning under any circumstance since God will take care of His own creation. He argues as follows: "Those who try to limit the number of their children are acting against the will of God, which is to "fill the world". If people do not want to have children, their only choice is to become nuns or monks".

In connection to the above views, W/ro Aziza advocates the need for family planning education in order to create awareness in rural areas. She reported that in rural areas of Harar, her birth place, both husbands and wives have no knowledge of family planning to the extent that the

husband may not know his wife is pregnant until up to six months. However, in the case of rural Kotebe most husbands are aware of the existence of a modern family planning method, most commonly pills. They have heard people say that some wives in their areas are using pills for birth control. But they are unwilling to allow their own wives to practice it. In fact, it is the women who want to take pills without the knowledge of their husbands since the burden of childbearing and rearing falls on them.

In line with the communication theory of fertility decline, Chaudhury argued that in a situation of little divergence of opinion, one would certainly expect identical views between a husband and wife. This argument partly holds true for the Kotebeans who are characterized by diverse ways of living. In the case of well-educated women who are employed in gain-ful jobs in urban Kotebe and even in the rural parts, Chaudhury's argument remains invalid. I found that some wives in Kotebe are dominant in family matters including decisions about family planning (See Appendix II:Table 5 A,B & C). However, as it is indicated in Table 5 when we compare wife-dominant decisions to that of male-dominant ones their number is very few. Table 5.C clearly shows the overall difference between husband and wife decisions.

Table 5.C also indicates the overall couple's joint decisions next to husband decisions. But are couples who discuss on all matters more prone to accept family planning than those who discuss only family planning? Theoretically, one would expect that the couples who share their views on all matters are more liberal and open-minded and therefore more egalitarian in type than those who discuss only specific issues and that therefore, the former would be more willing to accept family planning than the latter. Unfortunately, there is no data to disentangle the relative effectiveness of the above two types of inter-spousal communication on the use of contraception. However, it is unlikely that couples discuss only family planning and nothing else. In the case of Kotebe family planning decisions are relatively unmade when compared to other family decisions such as finance and childbearing (See Appendix II: Table 5 A,B&C).

The present study indicates that a couple when they report they have discussed an issue (in this case, family planning) together are more frequent users of contraception than where only one of the spouses claims to have talked with the other. This, therefore, illustrates that **two-way communication** (joint decision) is more important in the adoption of family planning (See Appendix II, Table 2 A,B&C). But who dominates the decision to use contraception when there is divergence of views between spouses with regard to family size in spite of a good level of communication between them? This depends mainly on the power structure of the family, culture of the society and type of contraception debated.

In this study it is found that fewer wives used contraception when their husbands desired more children but when a wife desired more children and her husband did not, a higher proportion

of wives used contraception. In other words, male preferences are more important than female, in a cultural conflict situation. However, this cannot be generalized in situations where the wife is highly educated and/or engaged in a well-paid job. Moreover, whose decision would ultimately prevail in adopting family planning in a situation of diverging opinions, also depends on the type of method used. For example, if the pill is selected as a method, the decision of the wife may be very important. However, there is no information on these issues and we therefore need to explore them further.

Here it should be noted that communication between husband and wife may not necessarily precede the adoption of any family planning method; and may even occur after adoption of a particular method. For example, in the case a husband dominant urban family at Kotebe, a husband initiates the discussion and ask the wife to select a method. Again in the case of a wife-dominant urban family at Kotebe, a wife decides independently of her husband. It therefore appears that inter-spousal communication may not necessarily be an antecedent variable to the use of contraception, as implied.

We are now left with an important question--to what extent does a conjugal role relationship independently influence fertility behaviour in isolation from the host of other factors which are related to both conjugal relationship and fertility behaviour? For example, socio-psychological factors like female education, labour force participation status, marital adjustment, etc, are related to both conjugal role relationship and fertility behaviour and these intervening variables may also explain away the relationship between conjugal role and fertility. Therefore, to find out the net effect of the former on the latter, we need to control for those variables which are related to both independent (conjugal role relationship) and dependent (fertility and use of contraception) variables. The communication theorists of family planning have not taken into account important socio-cultural and psychological variables such as marital satisfaction, communal interests, etc. Thus the dynamics of the net effect of conjugal role relationship or husband-wife communication on family planning decision-making needs to be further explored. Having this in mind let us proceed to the effect of culture on fertility behaviour.

7.2. THE EFFECT OF CULTURE ON FERTILITY BEHAVIOUR

The thesis on the traditional cultural influence on reproductive behaviour can be summed up as follows: "women obtain support from a network wider than the nuclear family to reduce role conflicts, but there is a price to pay in terms of high fertility for maintaining this network of support" (Palmer 1991:63). In this situation status is acquired through having many children. For women especially the lineage may provide a court of appeal against perceived unfair treatment over crop disposal (Locoh 1988:57).

Some situations in Kotebe would indicate that culture overwhelmingly determines reproductive behaviour. The literature on population variables specifically the theory of demographic transition deals with the impact of "modern" and "traditional" culture. The influence of "modern" culture, which is allegedly anti-natalist, is found in new settings. For instance, participation in some of the more formal kinds of employment can bring women into contact with new role examples, knowledge of women with smaller families and of the means of family planning. Thus, female participation in a formal labour force can also be a proxy for women gaining access to new ideas regardless of the extra sum that is earned.

Employment might be supposed to built on the foundations laid by education to allow a woman to become independent and self-sufficient member of society. In the event, however, too much of this modern cultural influence was expected from woman's entry into modern employment, and the model of transformation has not always been backed up by data. This cultural change has mainly clearly seen among insignificant number of well-educated and well-paid women in the case of Kotebe (See Appendix II:Table 6&7).

Women's education is also believed to introduce a cultural effect which depresses fertility because of the greater access of educated women to knowledge of better nutrition and child-care practices. Educated women also tend to marry a later age. On the face of it this represents a change in the cultural environment, rather than an alteration in costs and utilities of having children (Palmer 199:63). However, in the case of Kotebe, this cultural change is not so much strong in influencing fertility behaviour as it was theorized in the literature. This might be due to the fact that the strong influence of culture on fertility behaviour is deep-rooted in the life of the community under investigation. One of the strong cultural influence lies in the values attached to children.

Value Attached to Children

In Kotebe, parents value their children for many reasons, both emotional and economic. In some ways, especially in rural Kotebe, children are viewed as a resource, bringing a variety of benefits to the household. Children, also however, represent costs to the family for their sustenance but this is true in the case of the well-to-do urban Kotebe families who have higher aspirations for themselves and their children. In this situation children have mainly emotional/psychological values.

Many of the emotional/psychological values placed on children are determined by culture and tradition. Some societies value males more than females to the point of carrying out female infanticide. In many, prestige for both mother and father is greater when sons are born than with daughters. Hence boys are preferred to girls. In the case of rural Kotebe, peasant farmers are happier when a woman gives birth to a baby boy. A woman who gives birth to a baby boy is also given much respect. This is because a son is regarded as a protector of his vicinity, as contrasted

with a daughter who may leave the place when married. When a family has the capacity to educate children, it is the son who gets the chance to get educated. Daughters are usually expected to help their mothers with household chores. The reason why sons are chosen over daughters for education is that they are thought to stay with and could eventually turn out to be assets to the family. Daughters, on the other hand, are meant to go to another family when they get married. Ato Birbo Gebrie, an informant at Meri peasant association, is the case in point.

Ato Birbo has got three children, two daughters and a son. But he would like to have six children, four sons and two daughters. Asked why he preferred more sons, he said that girls would get married and leave the family whereas boys would always be around and safeguard the family. Sons are also inheritors of the homestead.

Furthermore, Ato Birbo would have liked to send all of the children to school. But he didn't have the economic strength to do so. So only the boy was given the chance. He hoped that after school, the son would earn his own living and even support the family. Thus, the first child, a son, was sent to school but the other two, who were girls, didn't have this opportunity, for they were needed at home.

According to Ato Birbo, farming is the only source of family income. He had three hectares of land but now he has only two because one hectare of land was confiscated after the death of his only son. He owns a pair of oxen and two heifers. His daughters are unable to support him. In fact, he shares the burden of one of them whose husband has died.

The above statements indicate that in the rural setting of Kotebe, the emphasis is on the economic and cultural values attached to children. Activities analysis gives important insights into the valuation of children in the economic sphere, especially as they provide labour to the household. Boys and girls are valued differently as means for increasing family wealth. Cultural factors shape the value placed on children as carriers of the family line. When women, through cultural traditions surrounding marriage, are seen to become members of their husband's families, then boys are valued as carriers of the family lineage. Furthermore, laws may codify family lineage for the purpose of adoption or parental responsibility in case of divorce or the death of one spouse. This is strictly observed in rural Kotebe.

However, in the urban settings of Kotebe, emotional value is placed on having some children of each sex--to have only boys or only girls is not as satisfying or as prestigious as having a mix. These traditional values related to the sex of the child are important in decisions about the numbers of children to have. Men and women agree to a surprising extent on these values; they share the cultural context of their societies and these shape their sense of the value of children. In each case, however, the calculus of value differs for boy children and girl children.

7.3. THE EFFECT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UPON WOMEN'S FERTILITY DECISION-MAKING

In this part of the present chapter an attempt is made to explain how socio-economic development affects the fertility of women in a variety of social strata based on Christine's (1985) model of fertility decision-making. According to Christine, the fertility decision making process has three stages, which encompass setting individual fertility goals, negotiating for competing goals by participants to the process, and enacting fertility goals by the individual childbearer. The thrust of her work was that development alters fertility by affecting the parameters of the fertility decision making process. But does this assumption hold true for the Kotebeans? This will be discussed in line with the three phases of fertility decision-making models developed by Christine.

Phase One: Setting individual fertility goals

This phase of fertility decision-making is concerned with rationale behind childbearing. This rationale together with local family size norms figure into the establishment of the individual's ideal family size. As it has been repeatedly discussed, in the traditional setting, childbearing and childrearing constitute the primary arena in which women earn prestige and socio-economic rewards. In Kotebe, as in many other parts of Ethiopia and other developing nations, the presence of children implies womanly wealth and security. But is this socio-cultural value which is deep-rooted in the traditional evaluation of women's status altered by the level of socio-economic development?

Christine's assumption was that the socio-economic environment which surrounds women determines both their needs and opportunities for meeting those needs through childbearing. It consequently affects women's fertility goals and their reasons for having children. But what are the underlying motives for childbearing?

Individual reasons for having and not having children are: old age support, generate income, family prestige, establish womanhood, preserve marriage, spouse objects to more children, relaxed homelife, lack of funds, win spouse affection. All these reasons were mentioned by my informants both in rural and urban Kotebe. However, the reasons vary from area to area within one community. For instance, among rural Kotebe women the major reasons are: economic, bonding and ideological. But well-educated and well-paid women in urban Kotebe did not stress the economic and the ideological rationales rather their main motive for childbearing remained purely bonding.

In both rural and urban Kotebe, despite of all variations in women's status such as economic, educational, employment status and the like, there was a striking similarity among currently married women with regard to their primary motive for childbearing. This was

discovered to be the bonding element, i.e. to win spousal affection. This by itself does mean a lot. In the first place the goal of married life is childbearing and if this was the case then not to be able to bear a child would mean lacking the essential quality of a "woman" or the societal value attached to "womanhood" and in turn it means the marriage would be broken. This reveals the interwoven nature of the various rationales for childbearing. Furthermore, the patterns of correlation observed supports the notion of reciprocally related bonding and economic motivations underlying childbearing: The desire for children to provide old age support and to generate income for the family were pitted against the desire to preserve one's marriage, win spousal affection, and have a relaxed and harmonious homelife. But the economic rationale is not universally valid for all women in a various social strata. This again explains the complex nature of fertility behaviour.

Recall as well that Christine's model implies that change in family from extended to nuclear should affect motivations for childbearing. however, nuclear living alone did not affect fertility decision-making process. But when it is viewed together with women's employment status and the relationship between spouse-dependent security status and the strength of the childbearing rationale elements it could have its relative effect. For instance, in urban Kotebe, women engaged in a gainful and full time job found childbearing and childrearing difficult because the two roles are incompatible. On the other hand the bonding motive was found to be very important for all women in various social strata. In short, at the level of setting individual fertility goals nuclear or extended family structure can not be considered as a determinant factor. Above all in Kotebe the term "family structure" is not the same as a formal definition attached to it and its being either nuclear or extended. In my field investigation I found seven different types of family structures.(See Appendix II:Table 15). Table 15 indicates the percentage distribution of each family structure by place of residence.

In the literature on fertility decline it was also hypothesised that expectations for a rising standard of living would be more marked among the upper socio-economic strata, and that this would be reflected in increased reports that children were expensive for this group, thus providing further justification for their lower fertility: The relationship proved significant only for women living nuclearly, and then it was contrary to the prediction. However, when the effect of reports that children are expensive as justification for ceasing childbearing upon ideal family size was explored. This is strictly observed among currently married women in Kotebe. But here it should be emphasised that aspirations for higher status for both parents and children by itself did not affect childbearing rationale because societal values and the bonding elements are found to be more important in most cases.

Furthermore, children's expense was unlikely to be cited as a motivator for dropping childbearing as ideal family size increased for lower ranked women. Less economically advantaged

women apparently do not see more children as detrimental to economic advancement, while economically advantaged or upwardly mobile women do. This is what is commonly observed in our local social setting. As to my knowledge of the local condition, most women categorized under the 'poor' people are not so much worried about the future fate of their children and themselves, and their immediate source of satisfaction or wealth is their child bearing potential (See Appendix II:8).

Given that women's reasons for having children do differ by age, socio-economic rank, and spouse-dependent security status, it is left to be seen whether this will have any effect upon women's long-term fertility goal (ideal family size) and its outcome (actual family size). Both ideal and actual family size decreased with increasing socio-economic rank and spouse-dependent security status. Both these variables predicted fertility intentions (ideal family size) better than outcomes (actual family size). In the case of Kotebe desired family size and actual family size were not found to be the same. In most cases the actual size was greater than the ideal one. (See Appendix II: Table 16 & 17). This explains the observed fact that behaviour is not supported by preference. But why is behaviour not supported by preference? This issue will be vivid when we proceed further following each stage of fertility decision-making process.

Major environmental constraints or their markers, such as socio-economic status, spouse-dependent security status, and age, are indeed reflected in women's fertility rationale, goals and outcomes. The relationship of fertility goals to outcomes is also direct and clear. However the relationship of the childbearing rationale to long-term fertility goals, at least as measured by ideal family size does not appear to be a direct one. While the data support this part of the model, there is some question as to the extent that women's reported childbearing rationale motives their behaviour, as opposed to being merely a reflection of it.

It was assumed that socio-economic development affects the fertility decisions in general by changing the nature of the economic, social and psychological relationships underlying it. Specifically, it alters the material conditions surrounding families, expectations they may have for the future in which children play a role, people's ability to plan for the future, and parameters for decision making power within the family. However, socio-economic development is a complex web of societal changes which affects all strata of society, though responses to it may differ across different strata.

In the individual goal-setting phase, changes engendered by socio-economic development center on the declining economic utility of children in favour of their increasing psychological utility, with a concomitant decline in family size as the value of children perspective in fertility control suggests. Socio-economic circumstances establish the preconditions for women's perception of their needs, as well as their options for satisfying them through childbearing. The effects of the

configuration of development changes becomes explicable: first, with an increase in the demand for skilled labour (and proportionate decrease in the demand for unskilled labour which both children and adults may satisfy), society comes to play a premium upon education. The need to educate children for the future under the expectation of a rising standard of living and the expense of doing so, while maintaining one's own standard of living lowers children's immediate economic utility, making large families an economic liability in most cases. This implies that: Ideal family size will be smaller for women in upper socio-economic status groups. Reports that children are expensive will correlate positively with upper socio-economic status. Second, with the shift from an extended family lifestyle to a nuclear family lifestyle there is an increase in the isolation of women. Psychological needs for companionship (especially adult companionship) increase. This implies that: Nuclear family living will increase the strength of the bonding rationale for childbearing. Third, but perhaps most important, as the locus of productivity moves outside the family, the source of economic security (especially of future security) also shifts from family to other institutions, say to national social security programmes or to company pensions. In societies in which women take jobs outside the home, they may have direct access to these other sources of economic security, but in cases where women remain within the home, present and future economic security comes to be mediated by their spouses. As women's and children's contributions to family income decline, there is a relative increase in the importance of husbands' productive role. Husbands become the sole providers of present and future income and the ultimate source of future economic security for their wives. For women homemakers, this means that security depends almost exclusively upon their status as mothers or producers. Women's concern for maintaining the spousal bond, more than ever, is reflected in a change in decision making style from autocratic to joint, even in areas traditionally ascribed to them. There is, as well, a reluctance to voice disagreement with their spouses. Male decision making prerogatives, however, do not necessarily show evidence of such a decline. This leads to the following effect: Bonding motivations increase, relative to economic ones, with the shift to spouse-dependent forms of security. All this suggests the complex web of the societal change and its effect on individual fertility goals.

With regard to the effect of economic development in individual fertility goals, Christine concludes that economic development, in altering the socio-economic conditions surrounding women, alters the relative importance of the needs which children satisfy for them, changing their motivations for childbearing and, finally, long-term fertility goals. Eventually these affect societal or reference group normal for family size and importance consideration, as they define socially acceptable levels of childbearing. At this level fertility decision-making process Christine's assumption is in most cases valid but does it hold true at the next phase of fertility decision-making process?

Phase Two: Negotiating Collective Goals

Once a woman sets her immediate fertility goal, she must decide upon its implementation. While it is certainly possible for a childbearer to make this decision autonomously, in most cases her spouse will be involved in the process. In-laws and natal family members may also have considerable influence in the couple's decision making, at least until the couple has satisfied local family size norms. This is especially likely to be true in cultures in which newly married couples reside with such kin and contribute labour to an extended family group. The socio-cultural environment of women among rural Kotebe is the case in point. According to the local tradition, a newly married woman is expected to prove her fertility within the first two years of her marriage in order to avoid divorce on the grounds of barrenness. If a woman does not conceive within this period, her in-laws press her husband to divorce her before deep attachments have been formed within the couple. In spite of such apparent influence, today most fertility decisions among currently married women in urban Kotebe are made primarily within the marital dyad.

The above points may suggest that having met local family size norms will decrease external influence in the couple's fertility decision process or the fertility decision process in this respect may be an active one, in which parties openly discuss their concerns, or it may be in which parties openly discuss their concerns, or it may be passive, in which case little or no discussion takes place and no decision is formally made. According to Beckman (1982) there may be little need for discussion when strong shared social norms support certain levels of fertility. Behaviour is then based upon norms or upon assumptions about the views of significant others, such as spouses, in-laws, and natal kin. Hollerbach calls this process of non-decision "**passive decision making**". Women who have met or exceeded local family size norms will report fewer fertility non-decisions.

Given that the decision making process is an active one, the role which an individual may play ranges from mere participation to autonomous control. What makes the difference, especially if the individual goals of the parties differ, is the relative power of each. Authority to make certain types of decisions may be allocated by precedent based upon prior negotiation or by taking recourse to culturally accepted norms. For example, in societies with a strong sexual division of labour, there is likely to be a parallel division in decision making rights and obligations. In areas in which there is weak or no normative allocation of decision authority to one sex or individual within the family, the relative balance of other types of power between parties becomes especially important. It is the nature and amount of women's power, implied by the nature and amount of the social and economic resources which they possess as individuals, which determines the extent of a woman's participation in the decision process about her own. The total of a woman's resources, her resource base, is a collection of any type of asset which she may

make available to her spouse to further his own ends. Including the attainment of prestige. Certain of these resources may be considered indicative of the presence of certain types of power.

When we turn to the study community, all the above arguments about the effect of socio-economic development upon negotiating collective fertility goals were strictly observed. But the reality is far more complex than the model which simply represents it. According to Phase Two of Christine's fertility decision model, the individual fertility messages of all parties to the decision process are entered into a negotiation procedure to set the fertility goal of the group. A series of decision making protocols establish who will have the right to make the formal decision. These include the normative decision style for that particular decision domain, the available pool of effective decision makers, and the balance of power between them. According to Christine, a woman's degree of legitimate power is reflected in her agegroup and her satisfaction of community norms for childbearing. Here it should be noted that the societal value attached to childbearing prevails elsewhere in the case of Kotebe be it rural or urban. In other words, the underlying motive for childbearing is discovered mean that the individuals' fertility behaviour is passively determined by social circumstances.

Socio-economic development affects negotiating collective goals of fertility by restricting the pool of potential fertility decision makers and by shifting the balance of power between them, as the Psycho-social literature suggests. According to Christine (1985), economic development alters negotiating collective fertility goals by changing the level of the decision making parameters. Specifically, the pool of effective decision makers shoring to include the marital couple only, and the need to maintain the spousal bond to ensure future economic security (for spouse-dependent security women) tips the balance of power further in the direction of husbands. This has the effect of over-riding the normative decision making style for the fertility decision domain, which is hypothesised to belong a priori to the female sphere of influence. This segment of Christine's model will be discussed in terms of two issues, which will be dealt with sequentially. First, what determines whether a decision will be made or left unmade, and, second, what determines who will be the formal decision maker?

Fertility decision made or unmade?

In order to answer this question, it is important to view fertility decisions in the larger context of family decision making. Fertility decisions are reportedly made for about a substantial proportion. However, when compared to decisions in other areas of family decision making, the proportion of reported non-decisions is higher in the area of fertility decision making than in, say, childbearing decision making. And financial decisions were reportedly never non-decision. While

Furthermore, it should be noted that in the urban setting of Kotebe, the size of a family is decided by the husband and wife.

Research shows that women's access to and control over resources affect their status, and women's status influences their fertility. In Kotebe, there appears to be a similar correlation between access to income and fertility. As they become better off, families often decide to have fewer children because they do not need to rely on them for old-age security. Thus at this point the economic theory of fertility does not explain the situation. However, the socio-psychological perspective is found appropriate to give explanation for the inverse relationship between income and fertility (See Appendix II: Table 8). Table 8 clearly shows that income and family size are inversely related.

However, it is found that the interaction between family size, nuclear living and external influences in a couple's decision making is a complex and important one, although there are apparently no direct influences upon fertility decision making. Furthermore, in the actual process of negotiating collective fertility goals it is strictly observed that the increases in legitimate power, specifically age and the satisfaction of local family size norms for childbearing, give women more decision-making power. The satisfaction of local family size norms improves the position of women in the study community.

Phase Three: Enactment of collective goals

Once the collective goal has been decided, the individual childbearer is placed in the position of attempting to carry it out or not. Researchers often take the position that individuals are "victims" within the context of their social environments, governed by laws of supply and demand and little else. This actor-victim dichotomy is too simple-minded. People's beliefs about themselves are ambiguous, in some cases bearing little relation to their overall status in society. A woman's place in society sets the parameters of possible decision alternatives, and individuals make choice between those alternatives. For different social strata the range of alternatives may be larger or smaller, or consist of non-contiguous sets. People perceive themselves in control to the extent that they believe they can exercise any alternative they perceive available to others in their particular reference groups. This range-expanding ability is an attribute of what is referred to in psychological literature as ego strength.

Fertility goals may be set with a great deal of confidence and implement with a great deal of care, but the World may not always cooperate. Regarding contraception, product defects, misapplication of methods by health professionals, physical incompatibility between method and user may all contribute to failures in achieving fertility goals, and all are out of the user's control. It is reasonable to suppose, however, that ego strength or autonomy would correlate with the

attempt to attain those goals, given the tools which one has available to them. In this light, autonomy affects the achievement of fertility goals because it determines the likelihood that goal-achieving behaviour will be attempted. With regard to the realization of fertility decision, Christine further noted that enacting fertility goals is concerned with delineating the factors which give women the ability to enact their won fertility goals, especially in the case of a hostile social environment.

In summary, Christine's fertility decision making model synthesised from the literature and the proposed effects of socio-economic development upon it have been supported, in large part, by the data. In the process of doing so, some subtle and not-so-subtle twists in the piecemeal conceptions of how socio-economic development lowers fertility have taken place. Nonetheless, the socio-cultural and economic reality of the Kotebeans is found to be far more complex than the synthesis model developed by Christine. Therefore, it should be noted that fertility behaviour is a very complex area which requires a far more complicated methods of investigation. In other words, even if the synthesis approach is found to be better than any single framework in explaining fertility, it is found that this better approach is still insufficient to fully explain human fertility behaviour in general and women's fertility goals in particular. This suggests that the issue under investigation is open for further investigation not because of poor theoretical formulations or perspectives to explain it but due to the complex nature of fertility behaviour itself.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, a summary of the main findings of the study is presented. An overview of what was found out during the study, conclusions and major lessons learnt from the study are underlined. The chapter ends with suggestions regarding possible areas of future study on socio-cultural and economic conditions influencing women's status and role in family planning decision-making.

Summary of Findings

It should be recalled that the present study was done to identify the socio-cultural and economic conditions influencing women's status and role in family planning decision-making with specific reference to Kotebe District (Woreda 28), Addis Ababa.

The study was based on 40 couples (20 from urban and 20 from rural Kotebe areas). The focus of the study was currently married women who were 15 and above years and purposively selected from six villages. The villages were selected among the 4 Kebeles and Seven Peasant Associations of Kotebe District. Two urban Kebeles (01 & 03) and four rural Peasant Associations of Kotebe (Yeka Abado, Yeka Tafo, Meri and Luke) were selected due to their accessibility and feasibility.

Data collection was done using the participant observation coupled with photographing, extended case studies, and in-depth personal interviews and focus-group discussions coupled with tape-recording as the main research instruments. Additional data were collected using document analysis.

The principal findings of the study are summarized under various headings namely women's traditional roles and concept about family planning, domestic chores, level of education, occupation, property ownership and economic status, place of residence, age, religion, knowledge about family planning and husband-wife communication.

Women's Self Concept and Traditional Roles

It was generally found out that women's traditional roles and self concept influenced their participation especially with regard to family planning decision-making. The results indicated that traditionally women preferred to bear children so that to maintain their marriage and their social

status. It was found that even in the urban setting of Kotebe, well-educated and well-paid women without children could not have socially and culturally acceptable position or value in the local community. In most cases women's self concept of having no social value without bearing children were partly the result of social and cultural values.

With regard to traditional activities like care of children, food preparation, firewood and water collection were found to have a less impact on women's desire in childbearing. In other words, the incompatibility of childbearing and women's domestic activities is one of the reasons for the lack of desire in deliberate family size limitation. However, women employed in the formal sector outside their home were practising modern family planning methods being forced by the incompatibility of childbearing and work. Here it should be noted that even well-educated women with gainful employment were not in a position to participate in deliberate limitation of family size before having at least one or two children since their social value is stacked in childbearing and maintaining their marriage or winning their spouses affection through childbearing.

Level of Formal Education

With reference to level and possession of formal education, it was found out that this had effects on the level of participation in family planning decision making. Secondary/higher education was the highest level of education possessed by the urban women informants while the majority of the rural women informants had no formal education. Most of those who hardly participated were illiterates. It was also found that the majority of the informants gave suggestions relating to provision of education as a way ahead to step up women's participation in family planning decision-making.

Occupation, Economic Status and Property Ownership

It was further discovered that for the majority of rural women, occupation and economic status seemed irrelevant with regard to their participation in family decision-making. Informants were concentrated in almost similar occupations with the majority as Peasant Farmers. Nevertheless, it was found in some cases that the economic status of women affected their participation in family decision-making. Differences in participation occurred when some other occupations were considered. Women in business/trades, teachers, and in other formal sectors with better education highly participated in family planning decision in comparison to their counterparts.

Age

Age was found to influence greatly the level of women's participation in family planning decision-making. Women participated most highly in middle (30-34). The findings also indicated that beyond the age of 49 women's participation declined and it was evident in increasing

percentages of those who hardly participated. Participation level was found to be low in ages 24-29 implying that certain factors were at play.

Awareness of Modern Family Planning Methods

The findings of this study revealed that the majority of the informants in urban Kotebe were aware of modern family planning methods. Almost all were aware. However, informal discussions with Kotebe Clinic workers showed that most women lacked knowledge on modern family planning methods. Some rural Kotebe women also suggested education in this area as a way of enhancing their participation in family planning decision-making.

Participation of Women in Family Planning Programmes

The findings indicated that the majority of women believed that participation in deliberate limitation of family size was good. Just small informants in urban Kotebe believed that family planning programmes were not respected in the local traditions.

It was found that the general participation of women at Kotebe family planning clinic was very low despite most women's awareness of modern family planning programmes. Observations of different families among the Kotebeans showed that women did not discuss about family planning like that of other family matters. Some women were also found to lack interest in the idea of modern family planning methods and this affected their participation in family planning decision making.

Religion

Religion did not have significant impact on some women's participation in family planning programmes. This indicates a controversial view calling for further investigation.

Conclusions

A number of conclusions have been drawn from the findings as far as the participation of women in family planning decision making is concerned. These conclusions relate to the factors observed to affect this participation.

1. Domestic activities appear to play a role, however, little in affecting the level at which women participate in family planning activities. The domestic activities limit women's time and especially so when the women has produced some few children.
2. Women's self concept tends to be instrumental with regard to negatively influencing their participation in modern family planning programmes. Rural women seem to still be enslaved by the cultural and traditional values attached to large family size. Lack of enough

knowledge of family planning methods and hence of women regarding the part they can play in national development contributes to women's poor participation in any developmental activities in general and family planning programmes in particular.

3. High level of illiteracy among the rural women concentrates negatively to women's participation in family planning programmes. It seems to be partly a function of socio-cultural attitudes towards women and their status and also partly due to poverty.
4. Husband-wife communication or conjugal relationships and rumours seem to be a factor important in explaining women's participation in family planning programmes. The attitudes of the people towards family planning appears to negatively affect their participation.
5. Occupation can influence women's participation in family planning decision-making. However, in rural areas and at village level, it seems not to be a major factor affecting women's participation as almost all are Peasant Farmer.
6. Age is yet another factor which affects women's participation in family planning decision-making. At older ages women participation goes low partly due to reduced energy and interest.
7. Most of the rural women are aware of family planning activities but they lack knowledge with regard to modern family planning methods. Women's participation in family planning is very low partly due to negative self concept and partly due to lack of interest.
8. Economic status is a less important fact in explaining the participation of women in family planning but it can have some negative effects on the participation of women in self-help development activities.
9. The suggestions women gave as to enhance their participation in family planning indicate their needs and problems. Their needs appear to be need for more equitable formal education, freedom from men in decision matters regarding their participation and need for knowledge on their rights and duties in family planning.

Finally, it appears from the findings that women's participation in family planning decision-making is affected by multiple factors such as social, cultural, and economic or personal. It should be noted that this study did not exhaust the possible influence of all these conditions on women's family planning decision-making. This implies the need for further investigation in this area of study. Bigger samples and more data would be required in order to reach wider conclusions about factors related to women's participation in family planning. Nevertheless, the results of this study cannot be underrated or ignored especially that they give base for further research in the field.

Since it was found out that women's self concept had a strong influence on their full participation in family planning, it would be logical to deal with the environment in which it thrives best. This relates to the area of cultural values and beliefs in relation to women. To enhance women's participation would thus require that we change public opinion and attitude towards women and their status in society. Such change should aim at reaching the parents and husbands and then the community in general as these have great roles to play in overcoming the negative self-concept in women or and other factors directly hindering women's participation in family planning activities.

One other recommendation for action is that family planning should be accessible to the local rural people and be in their local languages. This would help create a sense of consciousness of what the family planning can do for the development of the community. Women should be helped to look at family planning as wind of change to the promotion and elevation of their status which has long been availed by negative cultural values and beliefs. Women are at the core of society. There is need to legislate against those men who refuse their wives or daughters chances to participate in family planning. This, however, should be handled with care so that it does not affect the social setting of society. It was an issue raised by women themselves and it reflected their need. On the whole, all strategies to enhance women's participation in family planning should consider the social, cultural, economic and even personal conditions which render women's participation a failure. The family planning system is still a potent force to bring about social change provided measures are taken to encourage popular participation free of political manipulation or socio-cultural hinderance.

Given the findings and the limitations of the study, it is necessary to provide some proposals on certain aspects that have to be taken into account by studies that are substantively analytical on all factors influencing women's participation in family planning decision-making. These would also provide some guidelines on which future researchers could draw. These are as follows:

1. To consider all possible factors or conditions influencing women's involvement in family planning decision-making with reference to both urban and rural women such that the results obtained would be relatively exhaustive.
2. Future studies should consider both the participation of men and women in family planning decision-making in both rural and urban areas such that differences in participation could be established and accounted for.
3. Investigations should be made to find out the attitudes of men towards increased women participation in family planning decision-making.

4. Studies should be made in future to compare rural and urban women's participation in family planning decision making and also to account for any differences found.

In general, considering the complex relationship between socio-cultural and economic conditions and women's status and role in family planning decision-making, and the inconclusiveness of the present study on this complex issue, the need for further investigation is warranted.

fertility decisions are primarily "**made**" decisions, then, they are less likely to be made than other types of family decisions. But what is the reason behind this difference?

According to Hollerbach (1983), reported fertility non-decisions, if they may be considered a subset of passive decisions, should take place early in a marriage, before family size has reached societal norms. This occurs during a woman's thirties in the study community. Fertility decisions should be actively made after this time. Fertility non-decisions increased with increasing duration of marriage as well as with attaining or surpassing the community family size norm of for children. When dichotomous agegroup of respondents variable was used to control the relationship between the number of fertility non-decisions and duration of marriage, the correlation remained significant for women under 40 years of age, but not for women forty years and older. This would seem to imply that Hollerbach's theory of passive decision making is not borne out; however, it may simply be the case that (1) reports of non-decision do not include much of what Hollerbach calls passive decision making coincidentally similar views on the part of spouses with little or no joint discussion; (2) actual decision making is a relatively recent phenomenon in the study community, made possible by access to Western contraceptives and media discussion of the issue; or (3) reports of non-decisions may be a cloak for hiding disagreement with spouses in fertility decision making. The first option is unverifiable, due to limits of the database, but there is support for the remaining two options (Christine, 1985:245). However in the case of Kotebe all the three options were strictly encountered. It may be due to the fact that the study community consists of diverse spheres of life.

Many fertility non-decisions reflect an inability on the part of some couples to reach agreement on fertility decisions. The correlation between the number of fertility non-decisions and spousal agreements is strong, negative, and highly significant, and this relationship holds for all agegroups. For women who depend upon their spouses for security, there is no significance relationship between spousal agreement and reported fertility non-decisions. This is likely due to several factors, including the fact that spousal agreement is very high for this group, and non-decision low. Agreement with spouses on fertility matters somewhat increased with spouse-dependent security status, as the model implies. Over eight-three percent of the spouse-dependent security women made no fertility non-decisions, as opposed to the child-dependent women (Christine 1985:246-248). As to the study community this finding does not hold true. Because it seems somewhat general about the spouse-dependent security status and women's fertility decision-making power. In other words, this general consideration avoid some exceptional cases. For instance in the study community I found that some women did not completely agree with their spouses in matters of fertility even if they depended on their spouses for security.

Christine's suggestion that the fertility decision making process may be negotiated early in the marriage is strictly observed in the study community. Once the parameters determining who

will decide the issue are established, they are not likely to be re-negotiated unless one party is sufficiently unsatisfied with the prior outcome. Fertility decisions are largely made decisions, but in the event that the couple disagrees internally, decisions may be reportedly left up to fate, especially for young wives, who are concerned with strengthening their ties to their spouses.

Who will be the formal decision maker?

In the case of Kotebe different people are responsible for decisions about family and family size. The options include: Male Partner, femal partner, both partners, god (no one) or others. In most cases both men and women agree that men play the primary role in deciding about the number and spacing of children. The decision is seen as the male prerogative, and a woman complies with it. This view partly holds true for the case of Kotebe.(See Appendix II: Table 5 A,B&C). Sometimes women, especially single women, assume to themselves the decision regarding children. Women in Kotebe is the case in point. With contraceptive techniques that do not require male knowledge or agreement, this option has become increasingly available. But, the assumption of the primary role in decision making by women is still rare. Table 5 (A,B&C) clearly reveals the case in point. Increasingly, with the rise of the nuclearization of the family through urbanization and increasing educational levels for both men and women, husbands and wives are deciding together about child bearing and spacing. This pattern is concentrated in urban and educated sectors, however. This is again strictly observed in Urban Kotebe families. In a number of societies, other community members play very large, if not dominant, roles in deciding how many children newly married couple should have and when they should have them. In some places, for example, the husband's mother is very active in counselling her son, and her daughter-in-law, about family size. Often this takes the form of pressure to conceive immediately after marriage, to prove fertility and to assure family lineage. There is also pressure for birthing a son. But, as often as the mother has urged births, she also has had an important role in decisions about child spacing.

In rural parts of Kotebe, for example, the husband's mother and father took the initiative to counsell their son and their son's wife about family size. A case in point is Ato Girma Biru, my key informant at Yeka Tafo. He is an informant with some modern orietation and education. But he has 12 children because of the will of his father and mother who had only a son (the informant himself) and a daughter (who recently died). When asked why he had to do this, the informant, said he respected his father and mother and had to do what they said. In the rural setting such decisions, are usually made by the husband and the wife has no any say on the matter. On the other hand it is not uncommon to find a wife-dominant family in the urban setting of Kotebe. This appears to be so specially in a family where the woman is educated. (See Appendix II: Table 4&5).

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
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APPENDIX I: LIST OF MAPS

LOCATION OF THE STUDY AREA




LEGEND

-  Study Area
-  Wereda 28
-  Addis Ababa Administrative Boundary
-  Wereda Boundary
-  Kebele Boundary
- 23 Wereda Code
- 03 Kebele Code (UDAs)
- LUKE PAs Name

1 0 1 2 3 km


SOURCE: CSA Base Map, July 1995

LOCATION OF THE STUDY AREA



SOURCE: CSA Base Map, July 1995

LOCATION OF THE STUDY AREA




LEGEND

-  Study Area
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
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LOCATION OF THE STUDY AREA




SOURCE:- CSA Base Map, July 1995


Appendix I
Map 2



Appendix I
Map 2



Appendix I
Map 2



Map 2




Table 9: Monthly Family Income property owned and Number of Children. Rural Kotebe 1997/1998

Site	S. N	Number of Children	Land holding hectare	Income cash	Number of Livestock and Draught Animals				
					Ox	Cow	Donkey	Sheep	Goat
LUKE	1	3		500					
	2	6	2	200	2			3	
	3	12	3		2	1	2		
	4	3	3		2	2	1		
	5	7	3		2	2	2		
MERI	1	1		300					
	2	3	2		4	5	1	3	
	3	5	3		2	2			
	4	0	2		3	2	1		9
	5	3	3		2	2			
TAFO	1	12		153	2	4	1		
	2	2	3				1		
	3	3	2		2	1	1		
	4	5	4		4	4	1	2	2
	5	7	4		2	3	1		
ABADO	1	8		120		1	1	1	
	2	8	3		2	2	2	2	
	3	1	4		2	3	1		
	4	0	5		3	3	1		
	5	2	2		1	1	1		
TOTAL		91	48	1273	37	38	18	11	11
AVG.		4.55	2.4	63.65	1.85	1.9	0.9	0.55	0.55

TABLE 10: Spouses' Age at First Marriage by Place of Residence (1997-98)

Age at first Marriage	RURAL				URBAN				RURAL AND URBAN			
	H		W		H		W		H		W	
	Frc	%	Frc	%	Frc	%	Frc	%	Frc	%	Frc	%
13			2	10							2	5
14							2	10			2	5
15			6	30			2	10			8	20
16			1	5							1	2.5
17	1	5	4	20			1	5	1	2.5	5	12.5
18			4	20			1	5			5	12.5
19	1	5	1	5					1	2.5	1	2.5
20	3	15					1	5	3	7.5	1	2.5
21	2	10	1	5			1	5	2	5	2	5
22							1	5			1	2.5
23	2	10					1	5	2	5	1	2.5
24	2	10	1	5	1	5	5	25	3	7.5	6	15
25	2	10			1	5			3	7.5		
26							1	5			1	2.5
27	2	10					2	10	2	5	2	5
28	1	5			3	15	1	5	4	10	1	2.5
29	1	5				2	10		3	7.5		
30	1	5			1	5			2	5		
31					2	10	1	5	2	5	1	2.5
32					1	5			1	2.5		
33	1	5			1	5			2	5		
34					1	5			1	2.5		
35					3	15			3	7.5		
36	1	5			1	5			2	5		
39					1	5			1	2.5		
40					2	10			2	5		
Total	20	100	20	100	20	100	20	100	40	100	40	100
Avera	24.6		16.8		32.1		24.2		28.35		19.3	

Table 11: Age Differences Between Husband and Wife by Current Age and Place of Residence 997/98)

Serial No.	Rural			Urban		
	Husband	Wife	Difference	Husband	Wife	Difference
1	25	19	6	33	30	3
2	26	22	4	33	31	2
3	32	26	6	36	29	7
4	34	25	9	36	31	5
5	35	57	28	37	32	5
6	36	26	10	38	27	11
7	37	25	12	38	33	5
8	40	27	13	42	32	10
9	40	35	5	42	28	14
10	43	29	4	43	35	8
11	44	35	9	44	40	4
12	46	44	2	45	32	7
13	48	40	8	46	40	6
14	49	39	10	49	34	15
15	50	35	15	49	35	14
16	57	50	7	50	50	0
17	60	50	10	50	28	22
18	65	50	15	55	47	8
19	75	68	7	70	55	15
20	79	74	5	72	60	12
Total	921	746	59	908	729	173
Average	46.05	37.3	2.95	45.4	36.45	8.65

Table 8: Monthly Family Income and Number of children, Urban Kotebe 1997-1998

Site	S.N	Number of Children	Monthly Salary Income		
			Husband	Wife	Husband & Wife
Kebele 01	1	2	1440	3400	4840
	2	2	1700	1290	2990
	3	1	1440	1290	2730
	4	2	1290	1100	2390
	5	1	1440	800	2240
	6	4	800	1440	2240
	7	4	980	980	1960
	8	0	1290	630	1920
	9	1	1440	420	1860
	10	3	1440	420	1860
	11	0	1440	0	1440
	12	3	1440	0	1440
	13	4	670	470	1140
	14	10	885	0	885
	15	2	200	560	760
Kebele 03	1	8	153	100	253
	2	2	160	90	250
	3	3	120	90	220
	4	8	90	100	190
	5	4	90	100	190
Total	20	4470	18508	13280	31798
Average		3.2	925.4	664	1589.9

Table 12: Age at first Exposure to Child Bearing By Place of Residence (1997/98)

Age	Rural		Urban		Rural and Urban	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
14	1	5.9			1	2.9
15			1	5.6	1	2.9
16	1	5.9			1	2.9
17	3	17.6			3	8.6
18	1	5.9			1	2.9
19	4	23.5	1	5.6	5	14.3
20	1	5.9	3	16.7	4	11.4
21	2	11.8	1	5.6	3	8.6
22	1	5.9	2	11.2	3	8.6
23	1	5.9	1	5.6	2	5.7
24			1	5.6	1	2.9
25	2	11.8	3	16.7	5	14.3
27			1	5.6	1	2.9
28			3	16.7	3	8.6
29			1	5.6	1	2.9
Total	17	100	18	100	35	100
Average	18.1		23.4		21.5	

Table 13 Forms of Marriage by Place of Residence

Forms of Marriage	Rural		Urban		Rural & Urban	
	Fre.	%	Fre.	%	Fre.	%
Partners' choice	3	15	17	85	20	50
Arranged by parents	15	75	3	15	18	45
Abduction	2	10	--	---	2	5
Total	20	100	20	100	40	100

Table 14: Duration of Marriage by Place of Residence (1997-98)

No. of years	Rural		Urban		Rural and Urban	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
1/4	1	5			1	2.5
1/2			1	5	1	2.5
1	1	5			1	2.5
2	1	5			1	2.5
3			2	10	2	5
5			3	15	3	7.5
7	1	5	1	5	2	5
8	3	15	1	5	4	10
9	1	5	3	15	4	10
11	2	10	1	5	3	7.5
12	2	10			2	5
15			1	5	1	2.5
16			2	10	2	5
20	2	10			2	5
21			1	5	1	2.5
22			1	5	1	2.5
24	1	5			1	2.5
26	1	5	1	5	2	5
28	1	5			1	2.5
29	1	5			1	2.5
37			1	5	1	2.5
49			1	5	1	2.5
51	1	5			1	2.5
59	1	5			1	2.5
Total	20	100	20	100	40	100
Average	17.31		13.83		15.57	

APPENDIX II: LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Users and Non-users of Family Planning Methods by Place of esidence (1997/98)

Family	Rural		Urban		Rural and Urban	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Users	2	10	12	60	14	35
Non-Users	18	90	8	40	26	65
Total	20	100	20	100	40	100

Table 2: Currently Married Women Who never Used Modern Family Planning by Reason and Place of Residence 1997/98)

Reasons	Rural		Urban		Rural and Urban	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Husband's Disapproval	2	11.1	1	12.5	3	11.5
Side effects	2	11.1	2	25	4	15.4
Lack of Knowledge	2	11.1			2	7.7
Fatalistic	2	11.1			2	7.7
Menopause	1	5.5	1	12.5	2	7.7
Want children	9	50	4	50	13	50
Total	18	100	8	100	26	100

Table 3: Currently Married Women Who ever Used Family Planning Methods by Specific Method and Place of Residence (1997/98); Out of 20 Women from Each

Types of Methods	Rural		Urban		Rural and Urban	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Oral Pills	1	50	2	16.7	3	21.4
Depo Injection	1	50	2	16.7	3	21.4
Condom			3	25	3	21.4
Safe Period (Rhythm)			2	16.7	2	14.3
JUD /Loop			2	16.7	2	14.3
Norplant			1	8.3	1	7.1
Total	2	100	12	100	14	100

TABLE 4: Percentage of Currently married women who are currently using Modern Family Methods by Selected background characteristics. Kotebe 997.98

Background Characteristic	Fre.	%
1. Wives' Education		
Illiterate	-	-
Non-formal	-	-
Primary	-	-
Junior Secondary	3	21.43
Senior Secondary	1	7.14
College/University	10	71.43
Total	14	100
2. Husbands' Education	Fre	%
Illiterate	1	7.14
Primary	2	14.29
Junior Secondary	-	-
Senior Secondary	1	7.14
College/University	9	64.28
Total	14	100
3. No. of Living Children	Fre	%
0	1	7.14
1-2	6	42.86
3-4	4	28.57
5 and above	3	21.43
Total	14	100
4. Religion	Fre	%
Orthodox Christian	10	71.43
Muslim	3	21.43
Protestant	1	7.14

Total	14	100
5. Ethnic Group	Fre	%
Amhara	9	64.28
Oromo	-	-
Tigraway	3	21.43
Adari	2	14.29
Gurage	-	-
Total	14	100
6. Labour Force Status	Fre	%
Working in formal sector	11	78.57
Working in informal sector	2	14.29
Non-Working	1	7.43
Total	14	100
7. Age Group	Fre	%
24-29	1	7.43
30-35	7	50
35-39.....	3	21.43
40-45	2	14.29
45-49	1	7.43
Total	14	100

Table 5: Family Decision Making

A) For Urban

Decision Makers	Family Decisions											
	Finance				Child-Bearing				Family Planning			
	Budget		Purchases		Educating Childeren		Health of Children		No. of Children		Spacing in Pregnancy	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Husband	10	50	10	50	10	50			7	35	7	35
Wife	3	15	3	15	3	15	3	15	3	15	3	15
Joint	7	35	7	35	7	35	17	85	7	35	7	35
No one (God)									3	15	3	15
Others												
Total	20	100	20	100	20	100	20	100	20	100	20	100

B) For Rural

Decision Makers	Family Decisions											
	Finance				Child-Bearing				Family Planning			
	Budget		Purchases		Educating Childeren		Health of Children		No. of Children		Spacing in Pregnancy	
	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Husband	15	75	15	75	15	75	2	10	4	20	1	5
Wife	2	10	2	10	2	10	5	25	2	10	1	5
Joint	3	15	3	15	3	15	3	15	2	10		
No one (God)							10	50	10	50	18	90
Others									2	10		
Total	20	100	20	100	20	100	20	100	20	100	20	100

C) Rural and Urban

[illegible]

Table 6: Percentage Distribution of Spouses' Level of Education by Place of Residence, Kotebe 1997-98

Level of Education	Rural				Urban				Total			
	Husband		Wife		Husband		Wife		Husband		Wife	
	Fr	%	Fr	%	Fr	%	Fr	%	Fr	%	Fr	%
Illiterate	4	20	11	55	0	0	1	5	4	10	12	30
Non-formal	9	45	5	25	2	10	3	15	11	27.5	8	20
Primary	3	15	1	5	2	10	1	5	5	12.5	2	5
Junior secondary	2	10	2	10	1	5	1	5	3	7.5	3	7.5
Senior secondary	2	10	1	5	1	5	2	10	3	7.5	3	3.5
College/University	0	0	0	0	14	70	12	60	14	35	12	30
Total	20	100	20	100	<u>20</u>	100	20	100	40	100	40	100

Table 7: Spouses' Occupation by place of Residence, Kotebe 1997-98

S.N	Occupation	Urban				Rural				Urban & Rural			
		Husb.		Wife		Husb.		Wife		Husb.		Wife	
		F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
1	Retired	2	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	5	-	-
2	Technician	2	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	5	-	-
3	Military	2	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	5	-	-
4	Teacher/ Lecturer	10	50	5	25	-	-	-	-	10	25	5	12.5
5	Trad. Mediciner	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2.5	-	-
6	Guard	1	5	-	-	1	5	-	-	2	5	-	-
7	Gardener	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2.5	-	-
8	Miscellaneous Merchant	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2.5	-	-
9	Farmer					16	80			16	40		
10	Carpenter					1	5			1	2.5		
11	Baker					1	5			1	2.5		
12	Clerk/Cashier	-	-	3	15	1	5	-	-	1	2.5	3	7.5
13	Home maker/House wife	-	-	3	15	-	-	13	65	-	-	16	40
14	Librarian			2	10							2	5
15	Secretary			2	10							2	5
16	Tella/Araki/Amba sha seller	-	-	5	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	12.5
17	Potter							6	30			6	15
18	Embroidery/Bask- etry	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5	-	-	1	2.5
Total		20	100	20	100	20	100	20	100	40	100	40	100

Table 15: Percentage Distribution of Family Structure by Place of Residence, Kotebe 1997/98

Family Structure	Rural		Urban		Rural & Urban	
	Fre.	%	Fre.	%	Fre.	%
Husband and Wife	1	5	0	0	1	2.5
Husband, Wife and Servant	0	0	2	10	2	5
Husband, Wife and children	6	30	2	10	8	20
Husband, Wife, Children and	10	50	7	35	17	42.5
Husband, Wife, Children and Relatives	1	5	1	5	2	5
Husband, Wife, Children, Relatives and Servant	0	0	7	35	7	17.5
Husband, Wife, Grand Children /Adlpted /Adopted	2	10	1	5	3	7.5
Total	20	100	20	100	40	100

Table 16: DESIRED NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE (1997/98)

Desired Number of Children	Rural		Urban		Rural & Urban	
	Fre.	%	Fre.	%	Fre.	%
0	0	0	1	5	1	2.5
2	2	10	11	55	13	32.5
4	8	40	5	25	13	32.5
6	3	15	1	5	4	10
Will OF GOD	7	35	2	10	9	22.5
TOTAL	20	100	20	100	40	100
Avg.	4.92		2.56		3.29	

TABLE 17. ACTUAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE (1997-98)

Actual Number of Children	Rural		Urban		Rural & Urban	
	Fre.	%	Fre.	%	Fre.	%
0	2	10	2	10	4	10
1	2	10	2	10	4	10
2	4	20	8	40	12	30
3	4	20	1	5	5	12.5
4	1	5	3	15	4	10
5	2	10	1	5	3	7.5
6	2	10	0	0	2	5
8	1	5	2	10	3	7.5
9	1	5	0	0	1	2.5
10	0	0	1	5	1	2.5
12	1	5	0	0	1	2.5
Total	20	100	20	100	40	100
Average	3.85		3.2		3.53	

TABLE 18: Variations in number of children between two successive generations, by Place of Residence, Kotebe 1997/98

Ser.No.	Urban			Rural		
	First	Second	Variation	First	Second	Variation
	No. Children	No.	No. Children	No. Childr-	No.	No. Children
1.	2	2	0	2	1	1
2.	6	2	4	2	2	0
	7	1	6	3	0	3
4.	7	2	5	4	3	1
5.	8	0	8	4	0	2
6.	9	2	7	5	0	5
7.	9	3	6	5	3	2
8.	10	10	0	7	5	2
9.	10	2	8	7	2	5
10.	11	8	3	7	8	1
11.	12	1	11	8	5	3
12.	12	5	7	8	4	4
13.	12	4	8	8	6	2
14.	12	1	11	8	2	6
15.	13	4	9	8	5	3
16.	14	2	12	8	5	3
17.	14	0	14	8	2	6
18.	15	4	11	10	3	7
19.	21	4	17	11	1	10
20.	22	0	22	13	3	10
average	11.3	2.85	8.45	6.8	3.1	3.7

Table 19: Population Density, Distribution of Schools and Health Services in Addis Ababa, 1996

Addis Ababa Wored- as	Number of popula- tion	Population density per hec.	Number of Schools & Percentages			Health Services & percentages			
			Elementary	Junior	Senior	Pharmacy	Cline	Health Center	Hospital
1	52,927	269	11 (5.0%)	8(4.7)	1(2.4)	4(2.9)	5(1.7)	--	--
2	41,430	197	8 (3.6%)	6(3.5)	4(9.5)	9(6.5)	23(7.8)	1(4.0)	---
3	32,513	368	5 (2.3%)	5(2.3)	---	8(5.8)	13(4.4)	2(8.0)	2(1.8)
4	74,028	380	12 (5.4%)	6(3.5)	1(2.4)	2(1.4)	6(2.0)	--	2(11.8)
5	85,187	507	5 (2.3%)	3(1.7)	---	16(11.6)	19(6.5)	--	--
6	74,028	433	6 (2.7%)	4(2.3)	---	3(2.2)	5(1.7)	1(4.0)	1(5.9)
7	86,162	364	5 (2.3%)	5(2.9)	2(4.8)	4(2.9)	15(5.1)	---	---
8	87,895	71	9 (4.1%)	6(3.5)	3(7.1)	4(2.9)	4(1.4)	1(4.0)	1(5.9)
9	52,994	223	10 (4.5%)	7(4.1)	1(2.4)	4(2.9)	5(1.7)	---	---
10	80,404	93	5 (2.3%)	5(2.9)	1(2.4)	1(0.7)	5(1.7)	---	---
11	89,766	69	8 (3.6%)	8(4.7)	3(7.1)	3(2.2)	4(1/4)	1(4.0)	2(11.8)
12	59,739	45	6 (2.7%)	3(1.7)	1(2.4)	3(2.2)	---	2(8.0)	---
13	64,853	185	16 (7.2%)	12(7.0)	3(7.1)	8(5.8)	10(3.4)	1(4.0)	2(11.8)
14	54,886	230	4 (1.8%)	3(1.7)	--	6(4.4)	--	2(8.0)	--
15	66,402	182	8 (3.6%)	9(5.2)	--	5(3.6)	10(3.4)	1(4.0)	2(11.8)
16	74,632	60	7 (3.2%)	4(2.3)	2(4.8)	4(2.9)	7(2.4)	2(8.0)	--
17	130,402	18	10 (4.5%)	8(4.7)	2(4.8)	5(3.6)	10(7.1)	1(4.0)	--
18	74,973	178	10 (4.5%)	7(4.1)	3(7.1)	5(3.6)	7(2.4)	1(4.0)	--
19	119,650	28	11 (5.0%)	10(5.8)	2(4.8)	5(3.6)	21(7.1)	1(4.0)	1(5.9)
20	82,078	139	8 (3.6%)	8(4.7)	2(4.8)	5(3.6)	8(2.7)	1(4.0)	--

Table 20: The Estimated Population of Woreda 28 by place of residence and sex

Place of Residence	Sex					
	Male		Female		Total	
	fre.	%	fre.	%	Fre.	%
Urban	28735	86.08	30367	86.97	59102	86.53
Rural	4648	13.92	4552	13.03	9200	13.47
Total	33383	48.88	34919	51.12	68302	100

Source: CSA, 1995

Table 21: Ethnic composition of Woreda 28 population

Ethnic Groups	Frequency	Percentage
Amhara	37806	53.35
Oromo	19385	28.38
Tigrawy	4383	6.42
Gurage	3687	5.4
Gamo	323	0.47
Dorize	119	0.17
Others	2031	2.97
Foreigners	568	0.83
Total	68302	100

Source: CSA, 1995

Table 22: Religious Composition of Woreda 28 population

Religion	Frequency	Percentage
Orthodox Christian	69764	88.96
Protestant	3636	5.32
Muslim	2658	3.89
Catholic	680	0.99
Others	436	0.64
Traditional	30	0.44
Non-stated	98	0.14
Total	68302	100

Source: CSA, 1995

Table 23: Population of Woreda 28 aged 10 years and over by literacy status

Educational Status	Level of Education	Frequency	Percentage
Literate	Non-formal	2265	4.35
	Primary	15124	29.03
	Junior Secondary	6889	13.22
	senior Secondary	12574	24.13
	Above Secondary	3980	7.64
	Total	40832	78.36
Illiterate		11274	21.64
Total		52106	100

Table 24: Spatial Distribution of Schools, Health and Religious Facilities by Kebele, Kotebe 1997/98

Social Services	Kebele 01	Kebele 02	Kebele 03	Kebele 04	Total
1. Schools					
Kindergarten	3	3	2	4	12
Primary School	2	1	2	1	6
Junior Sec. School	2	-	1	1	4
Senior Sec. School	2	-	-	-	2
Technical School	-	1	-	-	1
College	1	1	-	-	2
2. Health Services					
Pharmacies	1	1	-	-	2
Clinics	2	2	2	-	6
Religious Institutions					
Churches					
Mosques	1	1	1	1	4
	1	-	-	-	1

Table 25: Spouses' Religious Denomination by Place of Residence, Kotebe 1997/98

Religion	Rural				Urban				Total			
	Husb.and		Wife		Husband		Wife		Husband		Wife	
	Fr	%	Fr	%	Fr	%	Fr	%	Fr	%	Fr	%
Orthodox Christian	20	100	20	100	16	80	14	70	36	90	34	85
Protestant	0	0	0	0	1	5	3	15	1	2.5	3	7.5
Muslim	0	0	0	0	3	15	3	15	3	7.5	3	7.5
Total	20	100	20	100	20	100	20	100	40	100	40	100

Table 26: Percentage Distribution of Ethnic groups by Place of Residence, Kotebe 1997/98

Ethnic groups	Rural		Urban		Total	
	Fre.	%	Fre.	%	Fre.	%
Oromo	16	80	3	15	19	47.5
Amhara	3	15	7	35	10	25
Tigray	1	5	3	15	4	10
Gurage	0	0	2	10	2	5
Hadari	0	0	2	10	2	5
Oromo & Amhara	0	0	1	5	1	2.5
Tigray & Amhara	0	0	2	10	2	5
Total	20	100	20	100	40	100

APPENDIX III: LIST OF PLATES



Plate 1: T. V. S. S. S. S.





Plate 2: T. V. S. S. S. S.



Plate 3 : A short visit to Luke



Plate 4 : Traveling to Yeka Abado field Site






Plate 7 : Luke peasants grazing their cattle





Plate 10 : The researcher at a coffee-gathering among her informants at Luke



Plate 11 : A gathering of relatives for coffee-ceremony at Luke




Plate 12 : Ato Semy Hundie and W/ro Diski




Plate 13 : A picture of an extended family at Luke with the researcher and her key informant




Plate 14 : The researcher with Ato Worku Debelie and W/ro
Hishmatouddin Samir, Mercha




Plate 13 : A picture of an extended family at Luke with the researcher and her key informant




Plate 14 : The researcher with Ato Worku Debelie and W/ro
W/ro Ato Debelie family in Luke




Plate 15 : W/ro Hidaga Amdie with her three daughters
at Meri



Plate 16 : W/ro Yesshi Lemma taking
care of her child at Meri




Plate 17 : The researcher and her informant with a father and mother of 12 children at Luke




Plate 18 : The researcher with a typical Suburb family at Meri. The father farms and serves as a night watchman to supplement



Plate 19 : The Researcher and her informant observing young female children tending their younger brothers when the mothers are busy with their craft at Yeka Abado.




Plate 20 : The researcher with her key informant observing children fetching water from a small pond at Yeka Abado




Plate 21 : The researcher with a potter and her family at Yeka Abado. The potter is making the traditional oven for baking “iniera”



Plate 22 : The researcher with a childless woman with her own products of



Plate 23 : W/ro Atsede Dechasa, a potter at



Plate 24 : Young women carrying firewood on their way to
the market at the center of the town.



Plate 25 : An interview with W/ro Tsehay Woldetsadik
at her home in Kebele 03




Plate 26 : The researcher with an old woman fetching
water at Yeka Abado




Plate 28 : W/ro Bogie, a childless woman, at




Plate 29 : Ato Tulu Feyisa and W/ro Belaynesh Yimam with their six children at Kebele 03. Two of their children are not included in the picture.



Plate 30 : Ato Abraham Hagos and W/ro Kelemua Teklearegay with their daughter at Kebele 03.




Plate 31 : A partial view of focus group discussion at Kebele 01.



Plate 32 : W/ro Hanisa Teka and Ato Birhanu Belachew with their two daughters in their living room at Kebele 01.



Plate 33 : The researcher at a coffee-gathering in the middle of her informants at Kebele 03.




Plate 34 : W/ro Aklile Haile Michael breast feeding her one month infant and taking care of her two years old daughter in her bedroom at Kebele



Plate 35 : W/ro Aklile Haile Michael and Dr. Fekade Shewarega with their two daughters in their living room at Kebele 01.



Plate 36 : W/ro Debitu with her son and daughter, and her sister who helps her in taking care of the children, in their verandah at Kebele 01.




Plate 37: W/ro Abeba Tesema relaxing with her daughter and son at Kebele 01

APPENDIX IV: LIST OF FOCUS FAMILIES

APPENDIX IV

List of Focus Families

S.N.	Name		Number of Children
	Wife	Husband	
1	W/ro Aziza Abdulahi	Ato Kemal Abdulie	4
2	W/ro Abaynesh Woldegiorgis	Ato Boshera Tolossa	4
3	W/ro Semira Alhadi	Colonel Alhadi Mohamed	2
4	W/ro Amira Abdurahim	Ato Abdurahman Ahmed	0
5	W/ro Meskerem Gebremeskel	Ato Sintayehu Abate	2
6	W/ro Hanisa Teka	Ato Birhanu Belachew	2
7	W/ro Alemshet Lemma	Ato Birhanu Tekleyohanes	0
8	w/ro Abeba Tesema	Ato Dagne Araya	4
9	W/ro Debritu Mamo	Ato Fiseha Mekonen	2
10	W/ro Aklile Hailemichael	Dr. Fekade Shewarega	2
11	W/ro Hiwot Mengistu	Ato Sebsibie Teferi	1
12	W/ro Almaz Gebrekidan	Ato Bekele Tekola	3
13	W/ro Meseret Firew	Ato Tasew Agidew	1
14	W/ro Tsedale Wodajo	Ato Huluka Buta	10
15	W/ro Kebebusch Bekele	Ato Tadesse Terefe	3
16	W/ro Tsehay Woldetsadik	Ato Bekele Malede	5
17	W/ro Bogie Gizaw	Ato Reta Senbet	8
18	W/ro Kelemua Teklearegay	Ato Abraham Hagos	2
19	W/ro Belaynesh Yilma	Ato Tulu Feyisa	8
20	W/ro Askale Bekele	Ato Tadele Birhanu	8
21	W/ro Hidaga Amdie	Ato Worku Debelie	5
22	W/ro Abebech Getu	Ato Cherinet Worku	0
23	W/ro Wudnesh Manyazewal	Ato Birbo Gebrie	
24	W/ro Gorfie Gameda	Ato Debelie Gebrie	3
25	W/ro Yeshi Lemma	Ato Habtie Gebrie	1
26	W/ro Yeshi Gebrie	Ato Legese Sema	6

S.N.	Name		Number of Children
	Wife	Husband	
27	W/ro Dinkie Mamo	Ato Semu Hundie	6
28	W/ro Enani Gebrie	Ato Tsegaye Kiflie	3
29	W/ro Mulu Tesema	Ato Megre Hundie	3
30	W/ro Demie Geletu	Ato Yimer Abebe	7
31	W/ro Megartu Debi	Ato Ayele Maleda	0
32	W/ro Zinash Temtimie	Ato Jifarie Melka	1
33	W/ro Atsede Dechasa	Ato Teshome Asefa	2
34	W/ro Dansie Tufa	Ato Hailu Demie	8
35	W/ro Yeshe Gizaw	Ato Simie Bado	8
36	W/ro Lomi Belbelu	Ato Amdie Degefa	5
37	W/ro Ayelech Demie	Ato Abebe Kebede	7
38	W/ro Densu Tsegaye	Ato Mitiku Melka	2
39	W/ro Kur Gurmu	Ato Girma Biru	12
40	W/ro Kuli Geletu	Ato Biru Chache	2

DECLARATION

I the undersigned, declared that this thesis is my work and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Name GUDAYIMUSS KASSAHN

Signature GKS

Place ADDIS ABABA

Date of submission JUNE, 1998