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ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

**THE MILITARY BASES OF SAUDI ARABIA AND UNITED ARAB
EMIRATES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
ETHIOPIA FOREIGN POLICY**

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THE MILITARY BASES OF SAUDI ARABIA AND UNITED ARAB EMIRATES IN
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By

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my own original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Dawit Fantu

June 2020

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate.

Hussein Jemma (PhD)

June 2020

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Dawit Fantu

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAU Addis Ababa University

AMEC Afro Middle East Centre

AMISOM Africa Union Mission in Somalia

AP Associated Press

BIOT British Indian Ocean Territory

BC Before Christ

BRI Belt and Road Initiative

CNN Cable News Network

CRS Congressional Research Service

CSIS Centre for Strategic and International Studies

DIIS Danish Institute for International Studies

DP Dubai Ports

EIA Energy Information Administration

ESLSE Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Service Enterprise

FANSPS Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

GERD Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

HOA Horn of Africa

IGAD Inter Governmental Authority on Development

IPSS Institute for Peace and Security Studies

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ISPI Institute for International Political Studies

MIDROC Mohammed International Development Research and Organization Companies

MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

PMPF Punt land Maritime Police Force

PAO Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company

SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

UAE United Arab Emirates

UFRGS University of Rio Grande Do Sul

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

USA United States of America

USD United States Dollar

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Russia

Abstract

The study examines the military bases of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa and implications for Ethiopia Foreign policy. Field data were collected through key informant interviews. The findings of the study are the following; The political motives for Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansion in the Horn of Africa is related to project power to weaken Iranian influences and counter increasing influences of Turkey and Qatar in the Horn of Africa. The security motives are connected to the crisis in Yemen; protecting the security of the geo strategic Bab el-Mandeb water way and countering the threats of piracy and terrorism. The economic factors are related to ensuring food security and economic diversification; securing energy and commercial interests in the region. The military factor is to ensure the country's' long term military presence in the Horn of Africa and protect their interests in the Red sea and the Arabian Peninsula areas. Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansions brought challenges for Ethiopia's foreign policy through militarization of the region; undermine the unity of Somalia and affect Ethiopia's interests in the utilization of the port of Djibouti and in the events of tension between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Blue Nile Water. The main opportunities of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansions for Ethiopia's foreign policy are; promote Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' investment and financial sources; enhance the strategy of diversifying port alternatives and supports the anti-piracy and anti-terrorism efforts. The findings of this study imply that the Ethiopian Government needs to develop a pragmatic and assertive foreign policy strategy and strengthen multilateral cooperation so as to utilize the opportunities and to minimize the challenges related with Saudi-Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases in the Horn of Africa.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Back ground

Relations between the Horn of Africa and Arab nations east of the Red Sea date back over millennia (Awol, 2018). Centuries of shared faith and a long history of contact have placed the Gulf and the Horn regions among the world's most interdependent regions. Gulf Arabs' states view the region bordering Africa's Red Sea and Gulf of Aden as their natural sphere of influence, historically, militarily and commercially (African Confidential, 2018). The societies of the Gulf have strongly influenced the economic, political and socio-cultural landscape of the Horn of Africa and viceversa. These geography underpins a long and deep rich history of relations that had often swung back and forth between intimate partnership and prejudiced animosity (Meester *et al.*, 2018).

The Horn of Africa occupies an important and strategic position on the map of the world (Karim, 2017). The region's strategic value owing to its proximity to the Red sea, its major river system, the Nile, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean (Woodward, 1996). The Horn of Africa region looks over the Bab al-Mandeb straits which is a major marine transportation hub and crucial location for the Gulf energy exports. The Horn's geography has been essential to its political, social, and economic development for centuries and all these exposed the region to the outside influences (Karim, 2017; Sharmo and Mesfin, 2011). The Horn region has also hit by multi-faceted problems such as conflicts, wars, state crisis, draughts, famine and environmental degradation (Redie, 2013). The location of the Horn of Africa in relation to the Red sea and Gulf of Aden have invites various forms of intervention, the Arabs as a whole as regional financing power desire to extent dominant influence (Mesfin, 1991).

The use of military power to access another country's soil is not a modern practice. In fact, the use of military bases overseas dates back to Ancient Greece and its city-states. The use of foreign military base from the twenty century onwards, with the two Great Wars and consequently mounting of the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Russia (USSR) as superpowers, that the establishment of oversea military bases has assumed the

configuration we are known to today(Havarky,1989;Lersch and Sarti,2014).In recent years various aspects of the power rivalry over foreign basing access or more broadly foreign military presence have persistently drawn attention(Harkavy,1989). Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have become increasingly active in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Their involvement had increased with the aim of establishing an economic, political, and military presence(Perteghella,2018).Thus, the study was carefully examine the political, security, economic and military factors for increasing Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military bases in the Horn of Africa and their implications for Ethiopia foreign policy.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansions in the Horn region and its impacts for Ethiopia's foreign have been a source of debates among scholars. Among those scholars who argue on the challenges of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansion for Ethiopia's foreign policy were Fakude (2017); Karim(2017) and Tesfaye(2018).On the other hand, Gashaw and Zelalem(2016) and Ibish(2017) arguethat Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansion in the Horn region brought opportunities for Ethiopia's foreign policy.

Fakude(2017);Karim(2017)and Tesfaye(2018)argued that the Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansion in the Horn of Africa have adversely impacted on Ethiopia's foreign policy. They argue that Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansion had adversely affected Ethiopian interest in the region, as a result of militarization of the region and in the events of tension between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Blue Nile Water. And, as a result of the Arabs' military base consolidation in the Horn of Africa region,Djibouti's strategic geo-political influenceincreases and as a result an empowered Djibouti might untangle itself from Ethiopiaand this reduced Ethiopian leverage over Djibouti.

Furthermore, Fakude(2017);Karim(2017) and Tesfaye(2018) believe that the Gulf Arabs' military infrastructure investments in Eritrea present a serious challenge to Ethiopia foreign policy.Even though, the current rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea might be a cause for temporary regional stability(Dessu and Mahmud,2018).They believed that the close ties between Egypt and the United Arab Emirates on the one hand, and the Emirati military presence

in both Eritrea and Somaliland on the other hand from an Ethiopian perspective all these developments point towards a strategic encirclement of the country and UAE's military bases in Somaliland formalize the fragmentation of Somalia, with negative consequences for Ethiopia's foreign policy (Fakude,2017;Karim,2017:Tesfaye,2018).

Gashaw and Zelalem (2016) and Ibish(2017) on the other hand argued that Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansion in the Horn region have brought opportunities for Ethiopia's foreign. They believed that Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military bases in the Horn of Africa had opportunities for Ethiopia's foreign policy in terms of obtaining support in the field of military, exchange of intelligence, training, technology and skill. Additionally, Gashaw and Zelalem (2016) and Ibish (2017) argued that Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base presence in the Horn of Africa strengthened Ethiopia's commitment to counter-terrorism efforts in the region, and as well as infrastructural expansion in and around the military bases facilitates the efforts of regional integrations undertaken by the countries of the region, particularly Ethiopia.

There were few interesting literatures that were not well enough to construct the full image of the issue. There were also literatures that are produced on the issue area but they were not compiled altogether. This indicates that there were gaps interms of scanty and fragmented literature. The study was endeavors to fill these gaps in the literature.

1. 3. Central Argument

The central argument of this study was that Ethiopia needs a rational and assertive foreign policy to utilize the opportunities and minimize the challenges associated with Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases in the Horn of Africa.

1.4. Objectives

1.4.1 General Objective

The overall objective of the study was to examine the military bases of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa and implications for Ethiopia Foreign policy.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

The study has the following specific objectives

1. To examine the motives of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases in the Horn of Africa.
2. To identify the challenges of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansions in the Horn of Africa brought for Ethiopia's foreign policy.
3. To assess the opportunities that Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases in the Horn of Africa brought for Ethiopia's foreign policy.
4. To assess the main features of Ethiopia's foreign policy.

1.5. Research Questions

1.5.1 Core Research Question

The core Research Question of this study was that

What are the implications of the military bases of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa brought for Ethiopia Foreign policy?

1.5.2 Specific Research Questions

The study is plan to answer the following specific questions

1. What were the motives of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases in the Horn of Africa?
2. What could be the challenges of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansions in the Horn of Africa brought for Ethiopia's foreign policy?
3. How did Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansions in the Horn of Africa brought opportunities for Ethiopia's foreign policy?
4. What were the main features of Ethiopia's foreign policy?

1.6. Methodology and Methods

1.6.1 Methodology

From methodological perspectives the study pursues qualitative approach. This approach was primarily chosen as a result of the nature of the study, which requires deeper explanation and analysis of views and opinions. Qualitative approach to Research is concerned with subjective assessment of attitudes and opinions (Kothari,1990).

1.6.2 Methods

The study was consult both primary and secondary sources. The primary data was gathered from officer, researcher and academician of Ethiopian' government institutions, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ethiopian Foreign Relations Strategic studies Institute and the Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University (AAU).

The secondary sources which were utilized through review literature, such as through reviewing Books, Journal articles, and governmental and Non-governmental Institutions' reports, papers, and Media Outlets.

The primary data was collected through Informant Interview. This method was chosen to understand in depth interviews so as to generate more valid and reliable data. The primary data collection Instrument was semi-structured and open ended interviews with key informants selected from the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ethiopian Foreign Relations Strategic studies Institute and Addis Ababa University Institute for Peace and Security Studies(IPSS).The reason for planning to use semi-structured and an open ended interview is that, it is accommodative and is helpful for both the researcher and the interviewees to have more space and to generate additional data on the issue area.

1.7. Ethical Consideration

The participation of respondents in this study was solely on informed consent. In relation to this, the informants were duly informed about the subject, aim of the study and it was ensured that the informants were given their consent. The involvement of the respondents in this study was based

on voluntary cases and based on informed consent, the basics information of the interviewer was openly disclose.

1.8. Significance

This study was significant in contribute to fill the gaps of scanty and fragmented literature. The study could be relevant to the further research on the issue area and contribute forEthiopian policy makers to take the necessary measures to utilize the opportunities and minimize challenges in relation with Saudi Arabia’s and United Arab Emirates’ military base expansions in the Horn of Africa.

1. 9. Scope

The study covered Saudi Arabia’s and United Arab Emirates’ military base expansions in the Horn of Africa and their challenges and opportunities for Ethiopia’s foreign policy towards the region,since2015.The study covered the stated issue in the Horn of Africa region since 2015 to the present. This is because primarily Saudi Arabia’s and United Arab Emiratesenters in to agreement with the government of Eritrea to use and build military bases.

1. 10. Limitation

During the course of this study many limitations were encountered. Lack of willingness and collaboration to respond to an interview by foreign embassies, consulate and inter-governmental organization resided in Addis Ababa was the major one. This unable the study to incorporate the views and opinions of responsible foreign embassies’and inter-governmental organization officials and experts, however, the study had made utmost efforts with limited availability of data; analysis had been made without much effect to realize the overall objective of the study. The other limitation is related with shortage of published secondary literatures conducted on the effects of Gulf States’ military presence in the Horn of Africa and their implications on Ethiopia.

1.11.Organization

The study is organized in to five chapters. The first chapter is introductory parts that consist of background of the study, statement of the problem, core argument, objective, research questions,

methodology and methods, ethical consideration, significance, scope, limitation and organization of the study. The second chapter is the literature review, which include definition of concepts, theoretical frameworks and external relation of Ethiopia with Gulf and Horn of Africa regions. Chapter three covers Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansions in the Horn of Africa. This chapter presents the processes and motives for Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansions in the Horn of Africa. Chapter four present the challenges and opportunities of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates military base expansions for Ethiopia's foreign policy towards the region. Finally the last chapter includes the conclusion part.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter consists of two major sections. The first section provide theoretical framework of the study. To this end, the study utilize the theory of Realism, Neo Realism, Neo-liberalism and the Regional security complex as an analytical framework for Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates 'military base in the Horn of Africa and their implications for Ethiopia foreign policy. In terms of the theory of Realism and Neo Realism, issues of national interest in terms of power, survival and security of the state are addressed. While, in relation to Neo liberalism, the importance of cooperation among states in the Horn of Africa and beyond and in Regional security complex theory the issues of security is used as a central tenant to analyze the implications of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base for Ethiopia foreign policy. The second section covers literature review which assesses relevant topics in relation to the issue area.

2.1 Conceptualization

In relations with the study, vitalide as will be conceptualized as follow;

Foreign policy: has been conceptualized in international relation scholarship in various ways (Leira, 2019). However, the conceptualization of foreign policy is concerned with the behavior and actions of a state towards other states (Bojang, 2018). According to Breuning (2007) foreign policy is a sum of a country's policies toward and interactions with actors (usually states) beyond its borders. At the center of the study of foreign policy, the desire to understand and changing countries behaviors and actions towards other countries and the international environment in general.

Region

The post cold war world international relation took a regionalized character. The collapse of polarity has removed the principal organizing force at the global level. Regions are geographically clustered units embedded in a larger system, which sustain strong features of the global system. The logic of regional security rests on the assumptions that international security

is a relational matter (Buzan, Wæver and de wilde1998).The attempt to distinguish regional from the global security complex is not an easy task. The pattern of security interdependence in a geographically diverse and anarchic international system is one of regionally clustered (Buzan and Waever, 2003).

Taking in to consideration the usual uses of region to refer the Horn of Africa will similarly used throughout the study.

Regional Security Complex

The impact of geographical proximity on security interaction is strongest and most obvious in the military, political, societal, and environmental sectors. Adjacency is strong for security because many threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones and it generate more security interaction among neighbors (Buzan and Waever, 2003).

According to Buzan, Wæver and de wilde1998 and Buzan and Waever, 2003 Regional security complex as a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another. Regional security complex characterized by durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub global, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence.

The formation of Regional security complexes derives from the interplay between, on the one hand, the anarchic structure and its balance-of-power consequences, and on the other the pressures of local geographical proximity (Buzan and Waever, 2003).

2.2 Theoretical Framework

2.2.1 Classical Realism and Neo-Realism

According to Brown and Ainley(2005) and Elias and Sutch (2007) Realism is widely applied theory of international relation in explaining states behavior in International system. The study is resort to use the basic assumptions of Realism as an analytical tool to explain Saudi Arabia's and

United Arab Emirates' military base expansions in the Horn of Africa and their challenges and opportunities for Ethiopia's foreign policy.

Classical and Neo-Realist Scholars like Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Edward Hallett Carr, argued that international politics is governed by objective on national interest defined in terms of power (Jervis, 1994). For Realists, there is no clear consensus on the concept of power, while, the essence of power is related to the ability to change the behavior of states and it often takes the form of military or physical power (Donnelly, 2004). According to the great classical proponent of Political Realism, Hans Morgenthau, the main aim of states within the international system is the pursuit of their national interest which is defined in terms of power. Realists depict international affairs as a struggle for power among States that are self-interested, who seek to maximize their power and security (Morgenthau, 1973; Hanami, 2003; Weber, 2009).

Due to the anarchic structure¹ of the international system, states are inherently self interested entities, with the aim of building power so as to gain and maintain an advantage in terms of the balance of power² (Morgenthau, 1973; Waltz, 1979). Saudi-Arabia and United Arab Emirates growing military presence in the Horn region is vital to these countries to strengthen political relation in the Horn, so as to demonstrate their military and economic muscle, in turn to contain Iranian influence in Africa. These countries have build military bases in various location of the Horn of Africa, to enhance their power projection capabilities and usually so as to balancing and countering Iran's influence. The ever increasing military presence of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates for greater influence in the region, particularly in Djibouti, Eritrea and Somaliland has greatly impacted on the foreign policy of the countries of the region (Alghoul, 2016; Ardemagni, 2018).

Both Classical and Neo- Realists have argued that the dominant goal of states in international system is survival. The only way that states can reasonably ensure their survival is to increase

¹Anarchic Structure- is referring in international relation studies for the absence of a central and supreme government capable of enforcing order across the entire system (Giriffths and O'Callaghan, 2002).

² Balance of power- is a theory of international politics within the realist perspective and it refer to a system in which the power held and exercised by states within the system is checked and balanced by the power of others (Schweller, 2016).

their power. States use the power they have to serve their interests (Weber, 2009). Realists assume that within the order of issues facing the state, national security usually come first. For Realist theorists generally define security as the security of the state and place focus on the preservation of the state's integrity and safety (Walt, 1991). To the Realist, military security is sometimes referred to as high politics, whereas economic and social issues are seen as less important or low politics. Given the state's objectives, in terms of security, it seeks and uses power, which is a key concept to realists (Viotti and Kauppi,2012).

Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases in the Horn of Africa are planned and proving to show an increasing amount of importance for their military and security (Klinfield, 2017). Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' strategy in the Horn of Africa is more of security oriented and the principle threat have always been perceived as emanating from Iran. This particular dynamic has forced these countries to develop a dynamic security strategy which recognized the critical value of Horn of Africa in terms of geo-political security. This indicates that Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military presence in the Horn region and their implications could be analyzed from the Realist and Neo-Realist assumption of ensuring state security (Ibish, 2017).

The Horn of Africa has become a battleground on which gulf Arab states have militarily engaged in the region in pursuit of their own interests. Furthermore, from economic point of view, economic security issues have driven the engagement of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa (Ulrichsen, 2011). For instance, the recent escalation in the Horn of Africa's coastal zone by the Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates has led to the rush forward in development activities at ports and in extensive agricultural investment. These have coincided with diverse actions taken by Horn of Africa states to affect the regional distribution of power to their advantage. This includes landlocked Ethiopia's strategic drive to reduce its dependency on Djibouti's port for imports and exports through the use of other, regional ports (Cannon and Rossiter, 2017; Ulrichsen,2011). Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have great interest to take advantage of the economic potentials of the region. The important issue to be raise is whether the Horn countries, such as, Ethiopia, is able to make the relationship work for them (Awol, 2018).

2.2.2 Neo Liberalism Theory

The Neo Liberal theory shared with Neo realism on the basic assumption of the anarchic nature of the international system, however, the neo-liberals argue that there are rooms for cooperation where possible for states to benefit from that cooperation (Brown and Ainely, 2005). In regard to the presence of the military bases of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia, which has currently cordial relation with both countries, has managed to benefit (Awol, 2018; Todman, 2018; Webster and Zacharias, 2018). The increasing military influences in the Horn of Africa enable Ethiopia to make their presence turn for the benefits of the country (Meester *et al.*, 2018; Zaglami, 2019).

Neo-liberalism has both concerned with low politics, economic and social issues as well as high politics, which is a security issues. For neo liberals, Political relations covers economic, social and security are hugely significant to states (Elias and Sutch, 2005). Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military bases in the Horn of Africa have primarily aim for the pursuit of political, security, economic and commercial interests. Ethiopia, the principal country in the Horn of Africa could gain through cooperation from the Gulf states presence, in the terms of attracting investment and gaining finance assistance and also diversifying port alternatives (Awol, 2018; Bridger and Bahadur, 2013; Cannon and Rossiter, 2018; Meester *et al.*, 2018; Zaglami, 2019).

Furthermore, neo liberals underline the roles of multilateral institutions in fostering cooperation between states. According to Elias and Sutch, 2005 and Viotti and Kauppi ,2012, States relation has fostered by the existence of multilateral platforms, such as international institutions. This means that there is significant room for cooperation in international affairs. The draft Ethiopia foreign policy gave primacy for diplomatic relation with neighboring countries. To this end, the country would initiate, work and took stand with Horn countries on common regional, continental and multilateral issues through regular and current political discussions and common ministerial forum and in this regard, Ethiopia would follow any changes and developments occurring in the region and neighboring states (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020:26).

2.2.3 Regional Security Complex Theory

The regional security complex theory was developed by Buzan Barry (Sharamo and Mesfin, 2011). Even though, there were difficulty, to define security complex precisely, Buzan (1983) and Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1998), conceptualized a security complex as a group of states whose security concerns attached together sufficiently and closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.

Buzan (1983) briefly outlined the main features of a security complex that link a security complex may be of various types, such as geographical, political, strategic, historical, economic or cultural. In addition to states in the security complex , states outside the complex have also play a significant role within it and Security complex also tend to be durable, but are not neither permanent nor internally rigid.

Event_though, there are difficulty to clearly identify the Horn of Africa as a security complex region as of South Asia and the Middle East, there are attributes of security complexes that the major security perceptions and concerns are interlinked and that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed and resolved apart from one another. States in the Horn of Africa shared geography, population, long standing security issues, political structure, social and cultural values and economic linkage. As a result, the fate of each state in the region has always been inextricably intertwined with that of the other neighboring states. No individual state in the Horn of Africa separated from the other states problems. Countries in this region have shared more in common and any incidents may lead them in to the brink of war (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998; Jennings, 2017; Sharamo and Mesfin, 2011).

Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' increasing military, security and economic interests in the Horn of Africa grow and their interventions become more assertive. Their increasing military presence in the Horn of Africa region has an actual and potential political, security and economic and military challenges. The militarization of the Horn region has severe consequences to the national interests and sustainable peace and securities of the countries of the region (Larsen, 2019; Khan, 2018; Melvin, 2019; Todman, 2018). Thus, the security complex theory is used to

analyzed the challenges and opportunities of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' increasing military presence in the Horn of Africa brought for Ethiopia's foreign policy towards the region.

2.3 Historical overview of Foreign Military Bases

Foreign military bases have been established throughout the history of expanding states(Lutz,2009).The first written sources related to military bases can be date back to Ancient Greece and its city-states and found in the writings of Thucydides, which narrated the Peloponnesian War³ of the fifth century BC. Furthermore, both Persians and Romans valued foreign military bases that controlled land access routes to strategic locations since this was crucial for their imperial power to control conquered territories(Havarky,1989). In modern times,with the fifteenth century maritime expansion powers, such as the Venetian and Genoa republics in the present day Italy, the colonial Iberian monarchies in Europe, France, Italy and,foremost, the British Empire have set up foreign military bases to consolidate their might and influence and to secure their vital interests(Lersch and Sarti,2014).

After World War II with the rise of the USA and the USSR as superpowers, that the establishment of foreign military bases has assumed the pattern with which it is known to today (Lachowski, 2007).The cold war⁴, which was characterized by the dispute between two poles, where the use of foreign military bases depended on the importance of alliances, enhancing the balancing of power in a bipolar system(Lersch and Sarti,2014).The West and East blocs of the cold war built up global networks of military bases in friendly and client countries as part of strategies that aimed to confront, encircle or intimidate the other side(Lachowski, 2007; Lutz,2009).

The end of the cold war weakened the previous pattern of foreign force alignments and the numbers of bases have decreased. Today, the traditional roles of bases remain relevant but are

³ Peloponnesian War- was fought between the Athenian Empire and Sparta between 431-404 BC (Sutch and Elias, 2007).

⁴ Cold War- is a period of intense rivalry between United States and Soviet Union begun at the end of the second World War and ending in the early 1990's (Giriffths and O'Callaghan, 2002).

not as highly prioritized as in the past. In contrast, at the twenty first century, new directions have been taken by the United State and western European Countries that display military bases overseas. The deepening struggle against terrorism especially after the September 11 2001 terrorist attack⁵ has become central and portraying foreign military bases as key to the projection of power (Lachowski,2007; Lutz, 2009).

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have become increasingly active in the Horn of Africa. Since the post-colonial era of the 1950s' and 1960s' there has been a record of Gulf countries engagement in the Horn of Africa to pursue mostly political objectives. In recent times, the Gulf engagement seems more sustained with the forming permanent military bases in the Horn of Africa. Since 2015 UAE has led the way in this regard with a military base in Assab, Eritrea which was followed by another base in Berbera, Somaliland. Saudi-Arabia on its part has establish a military base in Djibouti in 2016(Afric,2019;Khan, 2018).

2.4 The Basis of Establishing Foreign Military bases

The establishment of military bases on foreign territory, leased from or co-occupied with the local authorities or, rarely, held extra-territorially, is an old tradition (Lachowski, 2007). Historically speaking and taking the post-world war II developments, countries have acquired foreign base access through various means. The classifications are idealand are not mutually exclusive (Harkavy,2005;Ohtomo, 2012). These include the following:

2.4.1 Outright Conquest or Colonization: This process occurred when a powerful country forcefully occupy the land of a weaker country and set up military bases. The goal of the conquest could be justified differently and may goes beyond building bases (Harkavy,2005;Ohtomo,2012).For example, the Roman Empire had built a huge foreign military bases across the large part of the world through the process of conquest(Lutz, 2009).

2.4.2 Defeat and occupation: This usually occurs when a war is fought between a great power and its enemy, and then, the victor conquers the land and sets up a base. The relationship

⁵September 11, 2001 terrorist attack – is the most deadly terrorist attack on US soil and a total of 2977 peoples were killed in New York, Washington DC and outside of Shanksville, Pennsylvania (CNN, 2019).

between the sending country and the host country is initially characterized by enmity. Japan and Germany after World War II are a good example in this case. After some years of occupation, United States forces remained in these countries to deter a possible Soviet attack(Ohtomo,2012).

2.4.3Hand down: This occurred when a sending country can no longer afford to maintain its current overseas base system. The declining great power either simply leaves the host nation or transfers to another country (Othomo, 2012).The transfer of the former British oversea bases in Bahamas, Jamaica, and St Lucia to the United States after World War II were a good examples (BBC, 2014).

2.4.4Removing original inhabitants: This is a process that involves securing a foreign military base by the use of coercive diplomacy against local citizens of a weak country. This is particularly possible on small islands (Harkavy,1989).The case in point is Diego Garcia⁶, where the original inhabitants were forced to move to the western Indian Ocean islands of Mauritius and the Seychelles by the British during the Cold War, and also peoples in Okinawa, Japan were also removed from their homes so that the U.S. could build bases (Ohtomo,2012).

2.4.5Formal alliances or less formal arrangements: This is a process of establishing foreign military base through alliance in return for providing security or protection for the host state. During the cold war, the USA and also USSR built global base structures in ideological friendly states, driven by protection and provision of security states (Harkavy, 2005; Lachawoski , 2007).

2.4.6. Tangible quid pro quos⁷: refer to security assistance, arms transfers, subsidies, or what amount to rents. Great power presence can be permitted when the sending State and the host nation agree on the terms of compensation paid to the host country. The host country may not necessarily share the same level of strategic interest as the host country, but it may nonetheless agree to offer base sites because of the benefit gained in economic, and military or security support(Harkavy,2005;Ohtomo,2012).

⁶Diego Garcia- is strategically situated archipelago in the middle of Indian Ocean and, it is part of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT)(Sand ,2009).

⁷Quid pro quos-something given or received for something else.by Merriam dictionary.

Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base in the Horn region generally could be said achieved in return for economic and financial, social and infrastructural support provided for the host states. Following the meetings between Eritrean President and Saudi King in April and December 2015, Eritrea allowed the use of its military bases to the Saudi-Arabia and United Arab Emirates. A 30-year lease agreement for military base between the U.A.E. and Eritrea is part of the framework deal. In return, the Eritrean Government has received a financial and infrastructural aid package. United Arab Emirates also secured a renewable 25 year contract to establish an air and naval bases in Somaliland's coastal city of Berbera in return for infrastructural development support (Ardemagni, 2017; Cannon and Rossiter, 2017; Hansrod, 2016; Soliman, 2017). Saudi-Arabia has also reached an accord to establish a military base in Djibouti (Khan, 2018).

2.5 The Role of Foreign Military Bases

The establishment of foreign military base is a practice which has increased since the Cold War, and it is a key to understand the distribution of power (Lersch and Sarti, 2014). Foreign military base has an overall economic, political and military or security goals, alongside such roles, bases have also symbolic and psychological dimensions, but in all periods their pattern has been linked with the strategic order and relationships of the time (Lachowski, 2007; Lutz, 2009).

The traditional roles of foreign military bases aims at the defense of an ally, deterrence and counter balancing functions, defense of the home country and intelligence gathering and it had also used to being a platform for military maneuvers. These functions remain relevant but, are not as highly prioritized as in the past (Lachowski, 2007; Zeijden, 2009). In this regard the Yemen war is the main driving force behind Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansions in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military intervention in Yemen to fight Huthi rebels is aimed to counter balance Iranian growing influence in the region (Ardemagni, 2017; Criss Group, 2018).

In modern times, the establishment of foreign military bases is linked to issues regarding lines of communication. The bases are used to connect military and commercial units with its supply

base, being important to connect markets and being the main issue regarding military bases abroad (Khalid, 2012; Perteghella, 2018). In this regard, the Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' deploying military in the Horn of Africa is essential. This is because geo-strategically and economically, the Horn region has been lying in the shores of Gulf of Aden, Bab al-Mandab, and the Red Sea, a route that is one of the most important passages for world maritime and the main corridor through which four million barrels of Gulf's crude oil and petroleum products passed daily. Therefore, for Gulf States, the stability of this line of communication has significant importance (Al-Yadoomi, 1991; Ardemagni, 2017).

In the post-cold-war period, military bases abroad have the task of counter-terrorism and fighting Piracy and cementing strategic presence (Dufour, 2007; Lachawoski, 2007). Fighting Piracy and terrorism near the vital waterway and in the Horn of Africa is a security issue that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are seeking to strengthen their military presence in the Horn of Africa (Ardemagni, 2017). Their military presence in the region provides easier access to the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, along with giving them an alternative route to the Strait of Hormuz⁸ in the Arabian Gulf which is at the risk of Iranian closure, as a counter measure to the long standing antagonism with Saudi-Arabia and its Gulf allies (Alghoul, 2017). The Gulf countries' military presences in the Horn of Africa enable them to impose their power as influential actors which compete for strategic position (Khan, 2018).

Foreign military bases play a role of addressing military and security purposes (Lachawoski, 2007). Establishing a military base in the Horn of Africa is proving to show an increasing amount of importance for the military and security of the Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Since the Saudi-led operation began in Yemen since 2015, securing the Red Sea has become crucial to fighting Iranian-backed Houthi rebels and cut the possibility of Houthi engagement in arms smuggling. In 2013, UN monitors reported that Al-Shabab in Somalia received weapons from Iran via proxies in Yemen (Alghoul, 2016; Kleinfeld, 2017).

⁸Strait of Hormuz-which passes between the UAE, Oman, and Iran – is an essential passageway for maritime commerce from the east coast of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE to the outside world. Roughly 35% of all oil moved via ocean and 20% of all internationally traded oil passes through the Strait – some 17 million barrels daily (Cordesman, Shelala and Mohamed, 2014).

Foreign military bases have also economic ends, such as, providing access and control of trade and resources(Lachawoski, 2007; Lutz,2009).The more recent intensification of geopolitical interest by the Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' in the Horn of Africa, especially the coastal zone, was driven partly by efforts to secure favorable trade and resource (Ulrichsen, 2011). The United Arab Emirates is seeking to invest in sectors such as logistics, real estate, and financing as part of its strategy to reduce its reliance on oil revenue(Khan,2018).Indeed, there has been a significant increase in Saudi investments in food production and agribusiness across the Horn region. Today, more than seventy percent of Saudi investments in agriculture and food go to Africa, primarily to Sudan and Ethiopia(Perteghella,2018).

Alongside their military, political and economic purposes, bases have symbolic and psychological dimensions. They can be seen as expressions of a country's will to status and power(Lutz, 2009).Saudi Arabia's and the United Arab Emirates' military base presence meant to consolidate political relations and project power, with the ultimate aim of gaining greater influence in regional politics (Ardemagni,2018).

2.6Significances of the Horn of Africa for Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates

In a narrow geographic sense, the Horn of Africa is the North Eastern part of the African continent which faces in the east the Red Sea and Arabian Peninsula, in the southeast the Indian Ocean and in the west the Nile Basin(Sharmo and Berouk,2011).

The Horn of Africa and the Gulf regions share close geographical, historical, cultural and political links (Soiman,2017).The Horn of Africa region strategically located next to one of the world's busiest sea lanes, and is the single most geo-strategically important region of the world(Karim,2017;Telachi,2018).The Horn of Africa has an economic, security, military and geo-political significances to the Arabs' Gulf state(Ardemagni, 2017;Perteghella, 2018).

The Horn of Africa, due to the fact that, it is the gateway from and to the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arab Gulf and the Indian Ocean, attracts the interest of local, regional and global powers(al-

yadoomi,2012).The Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, which in recent years have become the battle fields of a new geo-political scramble involving regional powers, such as Saudi-Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait, but also Iran and Turkey(Perteghella,2018).

The Horn of Africa is found in the shores of Gulf of Aden, Bab al-Mandab, and the Red Sea, a route that is one of the most important passages for world maritime trade. The Red Sea is the main corridor through which Arab petroleum flows to export markets(Al-Yadoomi,1991).Bab al-Mandab is particularly important passage for a great deal of the oil and natural gas exports from the Gulf countries to the European markets. Therefore, the stability of this region has great significance for the Gulf Arab states (Ardemagni,2017;Kleinfeld,2018;Telachi,2018).

For Saudi-Arabia,the Horn of Africa is significant to contain Iran's influence in the region. Saudi Arabia offers substantial diplomatic and economic incentives to the Horn countries and it also signed a security agreement with Djibouti to build a military base there, enhancing its military projection capabilities and further countering Iran's influence. Among others reasons, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military presence in the region is geared towards detecting terrorism and piracy through which giving them an alternative route to the Strait of Hormuz in the Arabian Gulf (Alghoul, 2016; Perteghella, 2018).

There are historic connections between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa in terms of trade. The more recent intensification of geopolitical interest by Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in this region, especially the coastal zone, was driven partly by efforts to secure favorable trade and resources such as fertile land and water for agricultural items production (Telachi,2018;Ulrichsen,2011).

2.7 Ethiopia's Foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa

Ethiopia has moved towards a more focused and robust stance in its regional foreign policy, in the process of boosting its status as a pivotal regional power (Mehari,2017).Ethiopia's regional engagement and foreign policy is based on its foreign affairs and national security policy and strategy (FANSPS),launched in 2002.Domestic threats, such as poverty, lack of democracy and peace ,are the main determinants of Ethiopia's foreign policy. Externally, terrorism ,rivalry with

Egypt over the Nile River and enmity with Eritrea even though, after twenty years of flagrant animosity, Ethiopia and Eritrea decided to repeal course and give peace a chance in September 2018 (International Crises Group, 2018; Life and Peace Institute, 2017; Mehari, 2017).

Ethiopia is geographically located at the center or, at the heart of the Horn of Africa (Mesfin, 1991). Despite the country being land-locked, Ethiopia stands to play critical role in the region. The country's central geo-political location means that Ethiopia is more affected by regional issues than any other state in the Horn of Africa (Berouk, 2012; Mehari, 2017).

Sharamo and Berouk (2011) describe the entire political, economic and cultural interdependence and of common political fate among the countries of the Horn as:

All states of the Horn of Africa share social and cultural values emanating from a centuries-old tradition of interrelationships, common religious practices and economic linkages. Furthermore, the political fate of each state in the region has always been inextricably intertwined with that of neighboring states. Indeed, no individual state in the Horn of Africa has been insulated from the other states' problems, irrespective of their distance and comparative strengths or weaknesses.

Ethiopia has had a history of both friendship and hostility with the countries of the Horn. Countries in the Horn of Africa have long standing links with Ethiopia in such area as language, culture, history, and natural resources. Ethiopia's foreign policy and its regional diplomacy in particular revolve around its approach towards its immediate neighbors (Ministry of Information, 2002; Mehari, 2017).

Changes in Ethiopia affect the countries of the Horn directly, and what happens to them has an impact on Ethiopia (Ministry of Information, 2002). The Gulf engagement in the Horn of Africa affairs seems to be a strategic move by the establishment of permanent strategic military bases along the Horn of Africa's Red Sea coast. The UAE has led the way in this, with naval and air bases in Assab, Eritrea, and Berbera, in Somaliland (Khan, 2018). Furthermore, Saudi Arabia finalized a deal to build its first overseas military base in Djibouti (Todman, 2018). Therefore, the military bases of the Gulf Arab countries in the Horn of Africa are becoming apparent and bring a foreign policy issue to Ethiopia (Zeray, 2016).

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia foreign affairs and national security policy and strategy (ministry of Information, 2002:56) stipulates that Ethiopia's foreign policy aims to achieve the goals of democratization and development, however, at the short and medium term, the roles of neighboring states are insignificant as stated in the immediate paragraph below:

In general terms, it can be said that at this time, our neighbors do not have much of a positive or negative influence on our economic development. What they have of value is port service. In sum, the value of our neighbors - in the medium and short term - is limited to port service. There is little or no technical/financial support we expect from our neighbors to speed up our democratization process, as some are beginners like us and others are still alien to the process. Our neighbors could, on the other hand, play a negative role in undermining democracy in Ethiopia. This should not be underestimated by promoting religious extremism or providing the territory for religious extremists or they could disturb our peace directly or indirectly by falling under the influence of other forces.

In a globalized world Ethiopia recognizes that achieving sustainable and successful economic growth is possible with strong and mutual political, economic and social relations with the neighboring countries. In this regard, the draft Ethiopia foreign policy encourages the significances of working together with neighbor countries on bilateral economic issues that assure mutual benefits (Ministry of foreign affairs, 2020:27).

Ethiopia has to deal with foreign powers competing to set up strategic outposts and spheres of influence for different geopolitical and economic purposes in the Horn region. This region has become a military garrison⁹ where Western and Non-Western and also Gulf Arab states have already established military bases. Thus, Ethiopia needs a rational foreign policy so as to respond to this emerging development (Gashawand Zelalem, 2016).

⁹ Garrison- is a military post, especially one that is permanently established, by Free Dictionary

Chapter Three

Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' Military Base Expansions in the Horn of Africa

This chapter has two sections. The first section deals with the process of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansion in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have widened their military sphere of influence in the region since 2015. While, these Gulf Arab States relation with the Horn region had a long history, their recent renewed focus on the area has a far deeper and wider nature than ever before (Huliaras and Kalantzakos, 2017). The second section assesses the various motives that pushed Saudi Arabia's and the United Arab Emirates' military base expansion in the Horn of Africa. In this section the political, economic, security and military factors would be analyzed.

3.1 The Process of Military Base Expansions in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa region has been increasingly seen as an important strategic asset by international and regional powers including states in the Middle East; the most prominent are being Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (Karim, 2017; Neamin, 2018). The competition for influence over the Horn of Africa is manifested by a race for military bases (Van Reisen, 2018). The Horn of Africa has been experiencing a considerable expansion in foreign military bases since the onset of the US-led global War on terror in 2001¹⁰(Kanntack, 2018; Melvin, 2019). In this region, particularly, Djibouti has hosted many of the military bases of global and regional players such as the United States, France, Japan, Italy, China and also Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Melvin, 2019; Telci, 2018).

Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have expanded their military presence in the Horn of Africa (Soliman, 2017; Telci, 2018). Particularly, Djibouti, which is a small strategically significant state close to Gulf of Aden and the Bab el-Mandab waterway, has been the primary choice for Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to serve as a military base. However,

¹⁰ Global War on terror-wasan international military campaign popularized by President George W. Bush administration in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001 (Boyle, 2008).

following the late April 2015 dispute among Djibouti and United Arab Emirates¹¹, Djibouti expelled Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' troops from a military base at Haramous. Then after, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates turned to Eritrea to use the port of Assab for strategic purposes (Ardemagni, 2017; International Crisis Group, 2017; Mello and Knights, 2016; Todman, 2016).

The United Arab Emirates concluded a thirty year lease agreement for a military and air base and naval port in Assab, which is already opened in 2016. Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have agreed to provide Eritrea with a financial aid package and to undertake tasks to modernize Asmara International Airport, to build new infrastructure, and increase fuel supplies to Eritrea. Additionally, in 2017 the United Arab Emirates entered a twenty five year lease agreement with the semiautonomous government of Somaliland for building a naval and air base in Berbera, in return for infrastructural support. The UAE military base in Berbera is adjacent to the port which Dubai Ports world (DP) company is developing as part of a 442 million USD deal in 2016 and in which Ethiopia achieved a 19 percent share. Saudi Arabia has also finalized a deal to build its overseas military base in Djibouti in 2016. For Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, their military bases in the Horn region are their first-ever military bases abroad (Cannon and Rossiter, 2017; International crisis Group, 2018; Mello and Knights, 2016; Melvin, 2019).

¹¹Dispute between Djibouti and UAE-refers to the disagreement between the two countries due to an Emirati aircraft taking part in the Gulf Coalition operations over Yemen landed without authorization at Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport and the dispute escalated quickly due to pre-existing tensions concerning a long-running legal dispute over the contract for the Doraleh Container Terminal operated by Dubai Ports World (Mello and Knights, 2016).

Map 3.1: Foreign Military Base Expansions in the Horn of Africa



Source:- Danish Institute for International Studies(2019).

3.2 The Motives for Saudi-Arabia’s and United Arab Emirates’ Military Base Expansion in the Horn of Africa

While Saudi Arabia’s and United Arab Emirates' military presence in the Horn region has been consolidated following the Yemen crisis¹², the motives for their increasing military presence in the Horn region are not only associated to counter the emerging situation in Yemen. According to Al Maashi(2017), Aredemagni (2017), De Waal (2019), Larsen (2019), Peteghalla(2018) and Todman(2018) argue that there are numerous political, economic and commercial, security and military motives for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate military base expansion in the Horn of Africa.

¹² Yemen crisis- began in 2014 when Houthis insurgents-Shiite rebels with links to Iran took control of Yemen’s capital, Sana in 2015, forced President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi to flee out of the Country (Council on foreign relation, 2019).

According to Nega (2019, interview)¹³ and Mesfin (2019, interview)¹⁴ the background motives for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates increasing military presence in the Horn of Africa were developed before the Yemen crisis particularly, connected with the Arab spring¹⁵ which swept the Middle East and North Africa in 2011. Therefore, the assessment and analysis of the motives for Saudi Arabia's and the United Arab Emirates' military base expansion in the Horn of Africa are deepened on various interconnected factors mainly developed over the last eight years. And the motives could be a political, security, economic, commercial, and military ones.

3.2.1 Political motives

The recently increased presence of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in the Horn region goes back to the Arab Spring in 2011. The wider political developments brought about by the Arab Spring and the possible spillover effects of the uprisings made both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to gradually exhibit assertiveness in foreign engagement, and even the two countries becoming more willing to use their military power in support of their national interests. Since then Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are concerned with the US's weakened role in the Middle East and the threat emanating from Iran's policies in the region, and the increasing influences of Qatar and Turkey (Dahir, 2019; Huliaras and Kalantzakos, 2017).

The political motives for Saudi Arabia's and the United Arab Emirates' military base expansion in the Horn of Africa could be seen from the goals of projecting power to counter Iran's influences and containing the increasing influences of Qatar-Turkey alliance in the Horn of Africa.

¹³Nega Kassa, is a political, Security and Conflict Resolution Officer, IGAD Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on May 15, 2019

¹⁴ Dr. Mesfin Gebre Mekael, is a senior lecturer in peace and security, Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University (AAU). The interview was held in Addis Ababa, on May 17, 2019.

¹⁵The Arab spring- is refer to a series of pro-democracy uprisings in North and Middle Eastern countries started in 2011 (History. com, 2019).

3.2.1.1. Projecting power to counter Iran's influences

One of the primary motives for Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' military base expansion in the Horn of Africa is political. The political motive is related to the consolidation of political influence and relation in the region so as to project power which is necessary to isolate Iran and counter its influences in the Horn of Africa (Awol, 2018).

After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, considered Iran and its variants of Shia identity politics as a common enemy for the Gulf region. Iran has increasingly been at the center of Gulf monarchies threat perception with a counter political model of a revolutionary and Islamist State. Specially, Saudi Arabia elite consider Iran as an existential threat, viewing that its revolutionary, militaristic and expansionist ambitions intend to overturn the Sunni ruling order in the Gulf region (Al Maashi, 2018; Haidar, 2018; Young, 2016).

The military presence of both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa, such as at the port of Assab, in Eritrea is not limited to utilize another war front to the fighting in Yemen. Rather, it also consider as an extension of political and sectarian based ideological struggle and rivalry between Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates on the one hand and Iran on the other for regional power and hegemony. For instance, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' military presence in Eritrea reveals the ambitions of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to project power beyond their region which intend to strengthen efforts to form diplomatic and security belt against Iranian influence in the Horn of Africa (Ardemagni, 2018; International Crisis Group, 2018).

The first two decades of the twenty first century triumph the Iranian ambitions of extending its political and military influences in the Horn of Africa (Melvin, 2019). There has been an Iranian attempts to establish a permanent naval presence in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in order to increase its regional influence and open up a new security line against the Gulf countries. For instance, in 2008, it was reported that Iran made an agreement with Eritrea to establish a naval presence at the Port of Assab and in 2011 there are reports of Iranian deployment of a small fleet of surface ships in the Red Sea (International Crisis Group, 2018; Lefebvre, 2012).

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates remain cautious to use their political, economic and military leverages to pressure on countries of the Horn so as to cut their relations with Iran. So far, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates' pressure are proved successful that some countries of the region, such as, Eritrea, Sudan and Djibouti severed their relation with Iran. This has significantly reduced Iran's influence in the region, and this indicates that Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansion in the Horn of Africa are plan to project power which are vital to dismantle Iranian influence in Horn and also in the greater Saudi Iranian rivalry for regional power (Atika, 2019,interview).¹⁶

The kingdom of Saudi Arabia reportedly gave diplomatic support that lifted of sanctions on Sudan by the Trump administration in 2017, so as to encourage Sudan to distance itself from Iran (Morello, 2017).Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has transferred a considerable finance to the national bank of Sudan, which made the country to cut ties with Iran in 2016 and also sent troops to fight in Yemen on the side of the Saudi-led alliance. Likewise, Eritrea, once a close Iranian ally in the region, got increased in aid from the Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' central banks, which were crucial in Asmara's decision to cut relation with Iran in 2015. Moreover, Iran's ability to operate from Assab ended when Eritrea and Saudi Arabia agreed to establish a military base there and Eritrea contributed hundreds troops to the Saudi Arabian-led coalition against the Iranian-supported Houthi rebels in Yemen. The main political motives for Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases expansion in the Horn of Africa are essentially related with the longstanding antagonism and rivalry between Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates on the one hand and Iran on the other for regional power and hegemony in the Arab world (Hussein, 2017; International Crisis Group, 2017; Mohamed, 2011; Peteghalla, 2018; Shazly, 2012).

3.2.1.2 Defense an increasing influences of Qatar-Turkey Alliance

The other important political developments which factors the expansion of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases in the Horn of Africa is the increasing influences of Qatar

¹⁶Atika Ahmed, is a UAE Desk Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.The interview was held in Addis Ababa, on May 17, 2019.

and Turkey in the Horn of Africa(Nega, 2019, interview).¹⁷. In recent years, Qatar and Turkey have increased their economic and military presence in the Horn of Africa (Kleinfeld, 2017).

Turkey engagement in the Horn of Africa is primarily driven by economic and geopolitical in nature. From economic perspectives, domestic growth gave the Turkey the means to engage in a more assertive foreign policy, to seek markets abroad. As a projection of its expanded economic presence in the Horn of Africa, in 2016 Turkey signed an agreement with Djibouti, to establish a free trade zone and also widened its economic investment in Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia (Hosgor, 2011; Van den Berg and Meester, 2019).

While from geo political interest, the Turkey's increasing involvement in the Horn of Africa is intended to project power and to win regional rivalry in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East at large. As a manifestation of geo political rivalry, Turkey built its largest military base in Africa, which is in Mogadishu, Somalia in 2017 and also reportedly lease a naval base in the Red Sea port of Suakin, in Sudan in December 2017. This signaled Turkey's wider strategy for power projection through establishing a military stronghold in the Arabian Gulf to the Red Sea and the Horn region (Al-Makahlehand Cafiero, 2018; Gurbuz, 2018; Karim, 2017; Kucukgocmen and Abdelaziz, 2017; Melvin, 2019; Tokyay, 2017; van den Berg and Meester, 2019).

Similarly, over the last two decades, Qatar has increased significant investment in the Horn region, especially in Sudan. Qatar also enhances its regional role by acting itself as an active peace maker force in the Horn of Africa. To this end, Qatar deployed an observer of four hundred troops on the Sea island of Doumeira, claimed by Eritrea and Djibouti, until the Gulf Crisis,¹⁸ in 2017 (International Crisis Group, 2017; Soliman, 2017).

The Arab spring of 2011 has widened a gap between Turkey and Qatar on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and also Egypt, on the other. Saudi-Arabia, UAE and Egypt

¹⁷ Nega Kassa, is a political, Security and Conflict Resolution Officer IGAD Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on May 15, 2019.

¹⁸Gulf Crisis- refers to the rift occurred within the GCC that has witnessed Saudi Arabia and her regional allies, flexing their muscles against Qatar (which is also a member of GCC) due to serious differences in their world view,such as supporting Iran and Turkey as regional competitors and support for terrorist groups and day-to-day regional politics (Asisian, 2018).

accused Turkey and Qatar support for the causes of Islamist group, such as the Muslim Brotherhood¹⁹ brands in the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere in North and East Africa. Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates considered the Muslim Brotherhood groups at home and abroad as terrorist organizations and a threat to their respective national security. In the eyes of Saudi Arabia and Arab Emirates, Turkey and also Qatar are considered as traditional supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood group. Furthermore, the mistrust of Turkey and Qatar with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates was also widened due to differences over Iran (International Crisis Group, 2017; Melvin, 2019; Soliman, 2017).

Particularly, the June 2017 Qatar blockade drawn Turkey closer to Qatar and subsequently been entangled in Qatar's rift with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Following the rift both sides began a diplomatic push to secure allies in the Horn of Africa and in some situations countries in the region are pressured to take side. For instance, Somalia government under President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed faced intense Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' pressure to cut ties with Qatar, and subsequently, the United Arab Emirates pullout military and humanitarian supports from Somalia and deepen its engagement with Somaliland. However, despites all pressures from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emiratis', Somalia remain neutral. Ethiopia has also announced its neutral position and further expressed its intention that the Gulf crisis be resolved peacefully, as it could have a potential of destabilizing the entire Horn region (International Crisis Group, 2017; 2018; Peteghalla, 2018; van den Berg and Meester, 2019). While, Djibouti and Eritrea grant their diplomatic support to Saudi alliances and this probably result in Qatar withdrawal its troops stationed at Doumeira, which monitor a border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea (Royal United Services Institute, 2018).

Thus, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates_boosting military presence in the Horn of Africa is part of their greater competition for influences with Qatar and Turkey. Particularly, in Saudi Arabia's and the United Arab Emirates' views, Turkey move towards establishing military base in the region is part of an overall Turkey's ambition to power and influence in the Middle East extending to the Horn_and the Western Indian Ocean, which is the_intersection_among

¹⁹ Muslim Brotherhood- is a social and political Islamist movement, founded in 1928 in Egypt by Islamic scholar Hassana Banna. Currently, based in Egypt, the movement has a presence in 70 countries (Haaretz, 2019).

Eastern Africa, the Gulf, and Southern Asia. This is a strategic move by Turkey to weaken their position in the Red Sea, the Horn, and the Middle East regions (Africa Confidential, 2018; Ardemagni, 2018 ;Peteghalla, 2018).

3.2.2 Security motives

The issues of security are significant factors for the recent Saudi-Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases expansion in the Horn of Africa (Melvin, 2019). For Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, a more stable Horn of Africa, and in particular, having influence across the African side of the Red Sea, is part of a regional and national security strategy linked to important shifts in the last decade (Mosley, 2018). Their strategic goals in the Horn of Africa are security oriented. They want to strengthen their strategic presence in the region and to become principal actors in Horn security (Karim, 2017).

The security factors that contribute to Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, to establish military bases in the Horn of Africa are related with various rising developments in the Horn and beyond that region. The Yemen crisis since 2015, the security of the strategic choke point of the Bab el-Mandeb and the issue of countering the threats of terrorism and Piracy are the main security motives which drives Saudi Arabia and UAE to expand their military bases in the region (Todman, 2018 Ardemagni, 2018).

3.2.2.1. The Yemen Crisis and the issue of Security

In late 2014 and early 2015, the Houthis a rebels in Yemen intensified their attack and controlled much of the country and ousted Yemen President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and took control of the capital, Sanna. The Houthis control over the capital alarmed Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates on the fact that the Houthis forces' gain around the Bab el-Mandab, raising the possibility of an Iranian allied group controls the vital waterway would jeopardize the economic and political securities of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the region (International Crisis Group, 2018; Stevenson, 2018; Todman, 2018).

The war in Yemen heightened Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates' security interests in the Horn of Africa, shown by the fact that they built their first overseas military bases in the region. In this regard, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates primarily planned to utilize Djibouti as a base for their operations in Yemen. However, United Arab Emirates relationship with Djibouti becomes unhealthy over allegation of Dubai Ports World (DP) corruption scandal and unauthorized landing of UAE's military plane in Ambouli airport. Then after the two countries severed ties by the end of April 2015. Subsequently, the Saudi-led coalition entered in to agreement with the Eritrea's government in 2015 primarily to use the port of Assab as a launching ground against Houthis in Yemen. The United Arab Emirates established its first oversea military base in Eritrea, and this move is partly linked to the campaign in Yemen (Alghoul, 2016; Ibish, 2017, International Crisis Group, 2018; Mello and Knights, 2016).

Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates intervention in Yemen crisis is indirectly aimed at Iran, an effort by these Gulf States to prevent what they view as an Iranian-backed Houthi movement from taking over Yemen. For Saudi Arabia the Arab coalition intervention is launched to prevent what it traditionally perceived as its backyard from falling into the hands of Iran-allied Houthi rebels. The UAE's military base at Assab was critical in blockading the Houthi-held ports on the Red Sea and preventing Iran from supplying arms to the rebels (Mello and Knights, 2016; Peteghalla , 2018). The Yemen crisis which entered a decisive stage in 2015 following the removal of Saudi backed Yemeni president Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and the control of the Capital Aden by Zaydi Shia group of Houthis. This posed a security threat for Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' that motivated them to establish a military base in Assab, Eritrea (Mesfin, 2019, interview).²⁰ The Gulf military base in Assab, faced the South Western part of Yemen and separated with narrow strip of water at the South end of the Red Sea, is critical in preventing Iran from supplying arms to the Houthis. Therefore, the Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military presence at Assab serves beyond war logistics purpose, as an instrument of struggle in the greater Saudi-Iranian rivalry for supremacy in the Arab world. Particularly, from the Saudi's view the crisis in Yemen provides Iran a fertile ground to install a Shia led proxy group near to the Saudi territory, which would be a considerable national security threat and in turn empower

²⁰ Dr. Mesfin Gebre Mekael, is a senior lecturer in peace and security, Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University (AAU). The interview was held in Addis Ababa, on May 17, 2019.

Iran's power projection capabilities in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean region (Atika, 2019, interview).²¹

The Yemen crisis has become a catalyst for a strategic reorientation in Gulf States security policy to protect the Gulf States' western security border (Melvin, 2019). The conflict in Yemen coincided with a strategic repositioning of the USA in the region. The US government under Barack Obama introduced a security pivot to East Asia²², which was intended to balance China's rising military strength. As a result, of United States of America distancing itself from Gulf Arab allies in the region to address local security issues in their neighborhood and therefore, the Yemen crisis left a huge security challenges for Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (De Waal, 2016). From Saudi Arabia and UAE's perspectives the US reorientation of its security policy and much focus to Asia and USA commitment to negotiate on Iran's nuclear program during the presidency of Barack Obama would have serious security repercussions. This is because, for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates' the US security reorientation and P5+1 negotiation²³ on Iran's Nuclear program would gave Iran the opportunities to buy time to scale-up the Nuclear proliferations, which would have a serious security challenges to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and ultimately enhances Iran's power projection capabilities in the wider Middle East. In addition, the above two developments are coincided with the Yemen crisis and increased the security threat posed by the Iranian backed Houthis forces and as a result, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have increase their military presence in the Horn of Africa (Nega, 2019, interview).²⁴

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are using Eritrean and Sudanese troops to the war effort in Yemen. In return, for instance, Saudi Arabia deposited 1 billion USD in Sudan's central bank shortly after it contributed more than a thousand troops to the fight in Yemen in 2015.

²¹ Atika Ahmed, is a UAE Desk Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The interview was held in Addis Ababa, on May 17, 2019.

²² Pivot to East Asia –is also known as or rebalancing, an American policy launched in 2009 on the recognition that the lion's share of the political and economic history of the 21st century will be written in the Asia-Pacific region (Campbell and Andrews, 2013).

²³ P5+1 negotiation – refers to the negotiation on Iran nuclear program among Iran and a group of powerful world powers –the US, France, UK, Russia, China and Germany (BBC, 2019).

²⁴ Nega Kassa, is a political, Security and Conflict Resolution Officer, IGAD Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on May 15, 2019.

Hence, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have used their financial muscles to promote their security interests in the Red Sea region (Cafiero, 2015; De Waal, 2019; Khan, 2018).

3.2.2.2 The Security of the geo-strategic Bab el-Mandeb Waterway

The security of the Red sea, particularly the geo-strategic Bab el-Mandeb waterway, is a critical security issue which drives Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to expand their military bases in the Horn of Africa. The Bab el-Mandeb, a vital choke point located between Northeast Africa and the Gulf of Aden, and it is only 29 kilometers wide at its narrowest point from Djibouti to Yemen. The Bab el-Mandeb is the busiest waterway in the world and is a critical gateway for the flow of global trade, where 8 percent of the global trade has been passing through this strait both from Asia to Europe and vice versa. The strait is also crucial passage for the Gulf energy exports, where 25,000 oil ships and 4.8 million barrels of oil transit per day. However, following the onset of the Yemen crisis in 2015, the security of merchant vessels and warships in the Bab el-Mandeb Waterway has critically being affected (Aredemagni,2017:Mustafa, 2017; Stevenson, 2018; Telci, 2018).

Map : 3.2 The Bab el-Mandeb Strait



Source:-US Energy Information Administration(2019).

The Houthi rebels attack on ships in or near the Bab el- Mandeb raised serious concerns about their growing ability to interrupt regular trade traffic and this encouraged countries, such as, the US, China, European Union and also Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to send their military facilities to the Horn of Africa so as to protect their commercial and security interests in the region (Stevenson, 2018).

The United Arab Emirates' and Saudi Arabia's military bases in the Horn region have meant to secure passage for the energy supply from the Gulf region to the rest of the world. In order to eliminate possible threats to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia governments have pushed a more active policy of intervention in the region and established military bases that are capable of land, sea and air force to operate (Telci, 2018). The security of the oil trade passing through the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea and particularly the Bab el-Mandeb is one of the factors, which determine the recent Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' active engagement in the Horn of Africa. As the largest leading petroleum exporters in the global oil market and their geographical proximity to the Horn region, made the security of the Red Sea to occupy a central place in the recent Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' permanent military base expansion in the Horn of Africa(Aman, 2019, interview).²⁵

3.2.2.3 The issues of Security and Counter-terrorism and Piracy

Among the other stated security defense threats of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, which forced them to expand their military in Horn region is partly related with the efforts to counter-terrorism and piracy. Particularly, for the UAE more directly combating extremist groups such as AL Qaeda²⁶, Islamic State of Iraq and syria²⁷(ISIS), Al-Shabab²⁸ and any forms of

²⁵ Aman Lole, is a Saudi Arabia Desk officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs .The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on May 17, 2019.

²⁶ AL Qaeda- is a global terrorist organization founded by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s (Burke, 2004).

²⁷ Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) _ is also known as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is a Sunni Jihadist group with a particular violent ideology that calls itself a Caliphate and claims religious authority over all Muslims (Kelly etal, 2018).

²⁸ Al-Shabab- is an al-Qaeda-linked militant group and U.S. designated Foreign Terrorist Organization fighting for the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somalia (Masters,J, 2014).

Muslim Brotherhood brands and furthermore, the issue of piracy in the coast of Somalia have security implications that reach all the way to the Gulf region (Ibish, 2018).

3.2.2.3.1 Countering Terrorism

Counter-terrorism is a major concerns for all states in the Middle East, particularly the Gulf monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates who are directly threatened by the above extremist and pro-Iranian Shia organizations such as Hezbollah, and, the Muslim Brotherhood as well (Ibish, 2018). Terrorism is among the major threats that led to the upgrading of the Africa Horn's importance in the Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' foreign-policy agendas and those necessities the needs for military presence (Huliaras and Kalantzakos, 2017).

The terrorist attacks on the United States of America on September 11, 2001 led to shift in United States regional security policy, as the USA re-engaged its military directly in the Horn of Africa as part of the global war on terrorism. Other countries on the side of USA have also supported efforts to counter radical Islamists group, such as al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab. In this regard, the UAE deployed military officials to Somalia to rendered training for the Somali forces and maintained a military training centre in the Somali capital until 2018 as part of countering the threats of Al-Shabab (Ibish, 2017; Melvin, 2019).

The United Arab Emirates takes the hardest line of any Arab governments against radical Islamists, seeing such groups as part of national security issue. The United Arab Emirates' has good records of counter-terrorism efforts in various parts of the world (Ibish, 2018). For instance, UAE's willingness to act militarily in southern Yemen against radical Islamist groups, such as, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Muslim Brotherhood brands, the air war in Syria against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant²⁹ and support to the federal Somalia government in the fight against Al-Shabab and also the UAE's initiatives to fight alongside the global coalition ~~forees~~forces against the Taliban in Afghanistan are indicators of the Country growing

²⁹The Levant- is a term used to refer to a large geographic area located in the Eastern Mediterranean. The countries which comprise the Levant are Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, Turkey (Hatay Province), Israel, Jordan, and Palestine (World Atlas, 2019).

interventionist foreign policy and deep commitments to counter-terrorism initiatives in various parts of the world (Gambrell, 2017; Ibish, 2018; Kimani, 2017; Melvin, 2019).

One of the UAE's most far-reaching regional policies is its opposition to radical Islamists. The UAE has long distinguished itself in the Gulf region, and the Arab world more generally, by its firm opposition toward Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. For instance, UAE supported the 2013 military coup that toppled the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt. The UAE has adopted an internal and regional stance of extensive counter-terrorism agenda (Ibish, 2018). For instance, as parts of the Saudi coalition forces, the UAE forces used the port of Assab base, mainly to launch attack against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula which has fortified in Southern Yemen and it also trained and equipped Yemeni counter-terrorism forces to liberate southern Yemeni cities such as Mukalla held by AL-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in 2016 (Mello and Knights, 2016).

3.2.2.3.2 Countering Piracy

The strategic location of the Horn of Africa increases its importance for international trade and commerce. This region which is located close to the Gulf of Aden and Bab el-Mandeb is a key transit zone for ships passing to and from the Red Sea (ploach *et al.*, 2009). The Horn region is a critical gateway for the flow of global trade where around eight per cent of the global trade has been passing. The Bab el-Mandeb waterway is particularly important to Gulf energy trade where around 25,000 oil ships to cross the strait on daily bases. As a result, the Horn region has played strategic security part in the Middle East and Gulf affairs. Therefore the Babel-Mandeb shipping route is an economic treasure for Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' as the first and seventh global oil producer countries of the Gulf region respectively, and keeping this route safe from any threats, such as, piracy activities is their primary agenda (All Africa, 2018; Kimani, 1993; Stevenson, 2018; Telci, 2018).

Piracy has emerged as a global security threat, most recently in the waters off the Horn of Africa (ploach *et al.*, 2009). In the last ten years, in water route around the Bab el-Mendeb and the Gulf of Aden, freedom of navigation has faced consistent challenges (All Africa, 2018). South of the Gulf of Aden, the Somalia's offshore become the center of piracy activities (Stevenson, 2018).

Any piracy activities for the Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates' in the Horn of Africa have been viewed as a national security threat. For instance, in March 2017, a UAE's owned oil tanker was hijacked by pirates off the coast of Somalia (Aregemagni, 2017; Mustafa, 2017).

The piracy threat emanates from the offshore of Somalia in the Horn region is partly could be one of the factors which motivates Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military presence in the Horn of Africa. Saudi and UAE military presence in this region, such as, in Eritrea, Djibouti and Somaliland in particular strategic for safeguarding the flow of the Gulf oil as the bulk of their earnings are derived from the export of oil. As the issues of piracy in the Horn of Africa become a serious threat for global trade and commerce in the first decade of the twenty first century, global and regional powers, such as the US, the European Union, China and India deployed their forces on the waters of the Red sea and the Indian Ocean for anti-piracy operations. Even though, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military presence in the Horn of Africa show a significant increase following the Yemen crisis of the post 2015 periods, the threat of piracy in the Horn of Africa, in particular, in the Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden is more sounded for the US, European Union countries, the Chinese and Indians than the Saudi and UAE(Nega, 2019,interview).³⁰

The United Arab Emirates has develop strong commercial networks in the Horn of Africa, often its commercial deals, such as ports building expansions and management endeavors in the Horn of Africa, are followed with the opening of its military bases (Stevenson, 2018). The United Arab Emirates expand commercial investment on port infrastructures in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Djibouti, Somaliland and Punt land. The UAE also financed and provided anti-piracy training for the Punt land Maritime Police Force (PMPF).Therefore, among other factors partly that induce Saudi Arabia and UAE to expand their military bases in the region, is aimed at secure the commercial sea lines and the oil and gas exports from piracy threats in the Horn of Africa (Ardemagni, 2018;Stevenson; 2018: Telaci, 2018; van den Berg and Meester, 2018).

³⁰ Nega Kassa, is a political, Security and Conflict Resolution Officer, IGAD Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).The interview was held in Addis Ababa, on May 15, 2019.

3.2.3 Economic Motives

The political security factors provided the key desires in the expansion of Saudi Arabia's and the United Arab Emirates' military bases in the Horn of Africa, has also been supported by the economic and commercial opportunities connected to the significances of the Horn region (Melvin, 2019). Following the global financial crisis in 2008 and the rise of food prices, the Gulf States became concerned about food security, and the need to pursue economic diversification, and securing the energy economy as well as commercial interests connected to the Horn region are the key economic drivers for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates increasing military presence in the Horn of Africa (Dahir, 2019; Telci, 2018; Todman, 2018; van den Berg and Meester, 2018).

3.2.3.1 Food Security and Economic Diversification

The concerns about food security have been one of the factors for increased Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' economic activities in the Horn of Africa (Meester *et al.*, 2018). From 2008 onwards a dramatic rise in the global price of many agricultural commodities, prices particularly grains such as wheat and rice, the prospect for food Shortage insecurity and the associated risk of political instability, forced Saudi Arabia aggressively move on with a view to buying up or leasing productive land in the Horn region particularly, in Sudan and Ethiopia as a way out from food insecurity (Bellemare, 2005; Keulertz and Woertz, 2015).

Since the end of the 2000s, the East African region has been crucial for Saudi Arabia food security. Following the launching in 2009 of King Abdullah's Initiative for Saudi Agricultural Investment Abroad, there has been a significant increase in Saudi investments in food production and agri-business across the region. Today, more than 70 per cent of Saudi investments in agriculture and food goes to Horn of Africa countries, primarily Sudan and Ethiopia (Lippman, 2017; Meester *et al.*, 2018). Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are net importer of food products, and in this regard especially Ethiopia and Sudan in the Horn region attracted the interests of Saudi Arabia investment in food productions. Thus, the ever growing military

presence of Saudi Arabia among other intentions could be used to protect the mounting investments on agricultural food production(Nega, 2019, interview).³¹

There could be various economic motives, among other, that led Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to intensify their military presence in the Horn of Africa is going with their interest to free from the oil dependent economy. For example, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has introduced the King Abdullah Initiative for Saudi Agriculture Investment Abroad in 2009, under which large Saudi agribusiness firms are provided with credit, as well as strategic and logistical support to invest abroad. Saudi Arabia has also designed a vision 2030³²in 2016 to free the economy away from oil dependence. For Saudi Arabia, the Horn of Africa region is the primary choice as a result of the region's huge potential in terms of arable land and water resources for food productions.(Mesfin, 2019, interview).³³Saudi Arabia has widely invested in the agricultural sectors of Sub-Sahara Africa, primarily in Ethiopia and Sudan (Cooke, 2016). Saudi Arabia has reportedly invested in Ethiopia's agriculture more than any other country of the Gulf States. This includes 10,000 hectares of land leased in Gambella regional State, in Western Ethiopia for 60 years by Saudi Star Company. Similarly, Saudi Arabia is the leading foreign investor in the agriculture sector in Sudan, with investments totaling approximately 50 per cent of the foreign direct asset in the country (Cooke, 2016; Douglas, 2012).

3.2.3.2 Securing the Energy Economy

The Horn of Africa is strategically located next to one of the world's busiest sea lanes, the Bab el-Mandeb. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a vital economic corridor through which Arab petroleum flows to export markets, mostly to Europe. The economy Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates' depend highly on petroleum exports. Every day around 4.8 million barrels of crude and petroleum products, of which the largest from the Gulf States flow through the Bab el-

³¹Nega Kassa, is a political, Security and Conflict Resolution Officer, IGAD Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).The interview was held in Addis Ababa, on May 15, 2019.

³² Vision 2030 – is introduced by Saudi Arabia's Deputy Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman on 25 April 2016, ia an economic reform plan ambitiously aims to diversify the kingdom's economy away from its traditional oil sector by creating a sustainable, prosperous, and knowledge-based economy(Perteghella, 2018).

³³Dr.Mesfin Gebre Mekael, is a senior lecturer in peace and security, Institute f or Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University (AAU).The interview was held in Addis Ababa, on May 17, 2019.

Mandeb Strait to the Western market (Al-yadoomi,1991;Kleinfeld,2017;Telci,2018; US Energy Information Administration, 2017).

One of the motives for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to expand their military bases in the Horn of Africa is the issue of the oil economy. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates primary source of finance is originate from the export of petroleum products mainly to the European, US and Asian Markets. The Gulf petroleum export especially to the United States and European countries has passed through the strategic Bab el-Mandeb strait, which is bordered by countries of the Horn of the region. Thus, it is in the interests of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to consolidate their military foothold in the region so as to protect their economic interests(Aman, 2019, interview).³⁴

Saudi Arabia, which is the largest exporter of oil in the world as it possesses 16 per cent of the world's petroleum reserves and make up 90 per cent of the Saudi's export earnings, and also the United Arab Emirates, constitutes 10 percent of the global oil market and constitutes 35 per cent of total UAE's revenue. Therefore, for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the stability of the Horn region has a great economic importance (Pertegalla, 2018; Telaci, 2018; US Energy Information Administration, 2015; Vohra, 2017).

3.2.3.3 Commercial Interests in the Horn of Africa

Saudi Arabia's and particularly, the United Arab Emirates' military bases expansion in the Horn region has also been necessitated by commercial opportunities connected to the region. The Horn region has become important entrance to the African market by the leading countries of Asia and the Middle East. Most importantly, China's economic rise has considerably increased the significance for global commerce of the East–West trade corridor that pass across the Red Sea. The importance of this route has been further magnified by China's Belt and Road Initiative.³⁵ Given the strategic significance of the Horn of Africa, access to port facilities become

³⁴ Aman Lole, is a Saudi Arabia Desk officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs .The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on May 17, 2019.

³⁵ China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)- is an ambitious, trillion-dollar global connectivity project encompassing infrastructure, energy, and trade launched by China's government in 2013(Yang, 2018).

a source of competition and led to the need for securitization of ports. The two United Arab Emirates' economic giants, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, export significant amount of goods to Africa. The two Emirates also serve as a hub for other countries and global companies that look for business with the continent. Developing ports and infrastructure that will connect the Horn and East Africa to Asian markets via hubs in Dubai and Abu Dhabi in the Gulf has become a priority for the Gulf States, while the major investments they have made in this area have reinforced their new status as key regional powers (Melvin, 2019; Telci, 2018; van den Berg and Meester, 2018).

The United Arab Emirates' state owned commercial company P&O Ports, secured a deal with the self autonomous Somali state of Punt land's regional government for the right to develop a commercial hub at the Port of Bosaso, investing 336 million USD for its expansion and development. The Dubai Ports World signed an agreement with semi autonomous Somaliland to invest 442 million USD in managing and expanding the Port of Berbera in Somaliland (Aregemagni, 2017; Karim, 2018 ; van den Berg and Meester, 2018).

Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have used strategic economic investments, such as investment on ports facilities, to achieve their political, military and economic objectives in the Horn of Africa. In this regard, the United Arab Emirates, in particular, has utilized its superior shipping and port infrastructure capacity to become the largest Gulf State trade partner with Africa. The country manages commercial ports at Bosaso, and Berbera, close to its new military base, while Turkey operates the Port of Mogadishu near its military base and again Turkey is also investing in Suakin port near to its naval base in Sudan. Thus, especially the United Arab Emirates increasing commercial investment in the region has also been to do with the Qatar and Turkey strong presence in the Horn region. The militarization of commercial port infrastructure in Horn region is projected to offers Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates the potential to dominate maritime trade in the Red Sea and the western Indian Ocean (Awol, 2018; Gulf Business, 2018; Karim, 2018; Young, 2016).

3.2.4 Military Motives

The Horn of Africa has experienced a substantial increase in the number and size of foreign military deployments since 2001. There has also been a build-up of naval forces of global and regional powers such as the US, China, France, Japan and also Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates notably around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (Melvin, 2018). The Horn of Africa considered as strategic for many States to establish military bases in recent years (Ghuloum, 2017). This region has not only of economic interest to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, but also of military ones (All Africa, 2018).

The military presence of both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates' at the port of Assab in Eritrea is not limited to strengthening the fighting against Iranian backed Houthis in Yemen. Rather, their motives went beyond supporting the ongoing war effort in Yemen. The establishment of military bases in the Horn of Africa reveals the ambitions of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates' to strengthen their long term military presence in the region and to enhance their power projection capabilities (Al Maashi, 2017; Melvin, 2019).

The establishment of military base in Assab, Eritrea demonstrates that the United Arab Emirates military presence has not been limited to providing logistical support, but is rather a part of the UAE's strategy to operate effectively in the Arabian Peninsula and in East Africa (Al Maashi, 2017 Melvin, 2019). Obviously, United Arab Emirates' military base in Eritrea is, strategic to the Saudi-led forces commitment in Yemen. For instance, the Gulf air base in Eritrea provide logistical support to operations, such as the Golden Spear operation launched on January 2017 in Western Yemen to regain Mocha and Hodeida and to enforce the naval blockade to prevent Iranian arms from reaching the Houtis (Aregemagni, 2017). However, beyond supporting the war effort in Yemen, the Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military presence in the region also aims at protecting their strategic interests in the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula (Todman, 2018).

The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia military presence in the Horn of Africa are also counterbalance strategic measures to the widening Turkish military presence (Amin, 2018).

Turkey's growing presence in the Horn of Africa forms part of its wider Africa strategy (Melvin, 2019). Turkey's plans to establish bases in the Horn are seen as part of an effort to expand its regional military in that way to strengthen its role in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and along the East African coast (Ashkar, 2018). Turkey's move to open military bases in Somalia and Sudan have reinforced the view in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates' that Turkey has seeking, together with Qatari and Iran allies, to weaken their position in the Red Sea, the Horn, and the Gulf regions . Thus, Saudi Arabia's and the United Arab Emirates' military bases in the Horn are taken as a part of a wider struggle for influence in the Middle East, extending into the Horn of Africa (Ardemagni, 2018; Melvin, 2019).

Chapter Four

Challenges and Opportunities of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' Military Bases in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is becoming the world's most militarized region, where global and regional powers increase their military presence in the form of permanent military bases (Melvin, 2019). Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been interested in joining global actors that have already consolidated their military presence in the Horn of Africa (Telci, 2017; van den Berg and Meester, 2018). And the expansion of the military bases of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has security, military, economic and political ramifications for Ethiopia's foreign policy. (Awol, 2018; Gashaw and Zelalem, 2016). This Chapter is organized in two sections. The first section examines the various challenges of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases for Ethiopia foreign policy, while the second section deals with the opportunities of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases for Ethiopia's foreign policy.

4.1 Challenges

The Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' increasing military, security and economic interests in the Horn of Africa has been growing since 2015 and their interventions become more assertive. Their increasing military presence in the Horn of Africa region has an actual and potential political, security and economic and military challenges for Ethiopia's foreign policy (Todman, 2018). The main challenges are the following;

4.1.1. Militarization of the Horn region and its implications for sustainable peace and security of Ethiopia

The expansion of foreign military bases in the Horn region makes the region as one of the most militarized parts of Africa. The militarization of the region has severe consequences to the national interests and sustainable peace and securities of the countries of the region (Khan, 2018; Larsen, 2019; Melvin, 2019).

Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases increase the militarization of the Horn of Africa. Such a militarization has severe consequences for the national interests and sustainable peace and security of Ethiopia and further complicate the volatile and conflict torn and unsecured region. The Horn of Africa until recently has been largely characterized by the prevalence of prolonged civil war, intra- states and inter-states conflict and proxy wars. The increasing military presence of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in the region could contribute to a greater militarization and insecurity of the Red Sea region and attempts to use the Horn as a military operation launching ground is further linking the Horn security complex with wider regional security issues in the middle East and the Gulf region. For instance, the United Arab Emirates military base in Assab, Eritrea has a strategic significance for the Saudi-led coalition forces to prosecute operation against the Iranian backed Houthi insurgents' in Yemen. Particularly, after the 2017 Gulf diplomatic row Eritrea and Sudan have deployed soldiers to fight alongside the Saudi-led alliance in Yemen.

This development indicates that the militarization of the Horn of Africa has been interlinking with crisis in Yemen which would have damaging consequences for the region. Therefore, especially with the absence of regional and continental multilateral responses to the increasing Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military presence and having taking into account the volatile nature of the region, the militarization of the region would have serious challenges to the sustainable peace and securities of the region and particularly for Ethiopia, as a major political, military, and economic player in the region. The lack of sustainable peace and security in a security complex Horn of Africa region, where Ethiopia is located as argued by the regional security complex theory, threats travel more easily over short distances and render a tangible challenge for Ethiopia's endeavors to development and democracy which are the salient policy goal of the country's foreign affairs and security policy and strategy (Mesfin, 2019, interview).³⁶

³⁶ Dr. Mesfin Gebre Mekael, is a senior lecturer in peace and security, Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University (AAU). The interview was held in Addis Ababa, on May 17, 2019.

According to Leulsegid (2019, interview)³⁷ the recent increasing militarization of the Horn of Africa due to the increasing presence of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military presence could endanger the interests of Ethiopia in the region. The recent Prime Minister Abiy's Government reform in the military sector in particularly the plan to build a naval force presence in the Horn region among other things appeals to have taking in to account the changing dynamics and the possible threats of the rising militarization of the Horn of Africa, particularly in the coastal areas due to the increasing presence of foreign military bases would have an adverse impact on the national interests of the country.

The expansion of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases might not alone threaten the peace and security of Ethiopia. Rather, the national interests of the country could be threatened by a combination of internal and external factors. The country's internal political dynamics, the degree of the country's involvement in Horn politics, the Horn proxy war, and the rivalry between and among the Middle East and Gulf States could be important. The Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military presence in the Horn has been integrated into networks of military facilities that stretch far beyond the region, notably in the Middle East and the Gulf of Aden. The military bases of these two countries helps to launch and connect with the military operations in Yemen from the Africa side of the Red Sea linking it to the Gulf security complex. The interlinking of the Gulf military bases presence with the security issues outside the region further militarized the Horn and such condition increase the involvements of external actors with conflicting interests possibly undermine the long term peace and stability of Ethiopia (Kabandula and Shaw, 2018; khan, 2018; Larsen, 2019; Melvin, 2018; Melvin; 2019; Solomon, 2016; Ulrichsen, 2011; Zaghلامي,2019).

4.1.2 The Threats to the unity of Somalia with potential consequences to the national security interests of Ethiopia.

The construction of a military base in the non-recognized state of Somaliland by the United Arab Emirates, alongside its major investments in the Berbera commercial Port, has become a

³⁷ Leulsegid Girma, is a researcher in the Ethiopian Foreign Relation Strategic Studies Institute .The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on July 18, 2019.

significant source of tension between the Government of Somalia and the authorities in Somaliland. The Somalia government criticized the activities of the United Arab Emirates in Somalia as failure to respect the national sovereignty of the country (Fabricius, 2017; Telci, 2017). The United Arab Emirates military base in Somaliland and the agreement between UAE's State owned Dubai Ports World and Somaliland authorities to develop and operate Berbera Port, in which Ethiopia has also gained a 19 per cent share heightened tensions between Somalia and the self-declared independent Somaliland and prompted a furious response from Somalia's Federal government which regards Somaliland as part of its territory and that the United Arab Emirates activities have undermined its sovereignty and contested that the authorities in Berbera were secessionists that have no right to sign international agreements and adding that it risks pushing war-torn Somalia into further instability (Christian Ani, 2019; Jeffery, 2018; Kennard and Einashe, 2019; Klienfeld, 2017; Telci, 2017).

Ethiopia formally advocates for a united Somalia. The issue of Ethiopia's decision to take a stake in the multilateral Berbera Port deal is purely an economic accord that did not go against the creation of a unified Somalia State. From Ethiopia's point of view, the Berbera port is the closest and offers the potential of opening up the vast eastern region of Ethiopia to external trade, particularly in the utilization of the vast livestock resources in the area. Additionally, the deal is parts of a strategy by the Government of Ethiopia to diversify port alternatives for import and export transactions, which is not only beneficiary for the country, but, as parts of regional integration project in Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states. And such infrastructural expansion is also important for the countries of the region including Somalia. Therefore, for Ethiopia, a disunited Somalia are above all is a challenge. This is due to the fact that a weak and fragmented Somalia as State would be a center for anti-peace forces and extremist groups to disturb Ethiopia's peace. Further, unstable Somalia hinders investment and weakens strong economic integration in the region and also may destabilize the peace and stability of the Horn region. As a result, a divided Somalia has direct negative effects on the peace and stability of Ethiopia and the Horn region at large. Ethiopia advance cooperation for

economic and social advancement and integration supported by multilateral forums in the Horn of Africa (Leulsegid, 2019, interview).³⁸

The United Arab Emirates military base and Berbera Port deal and Ethiopia's decision to acquire a 19 percent stake will have a potential of destabilizing Somalia and perhaps the whole region. The possible scenarios of the deal could be result in weakening Somalia's infant state-federal relations, the propagation of Al-Shabab to exploit Ethiopia's involvement in the Berbera Port deal to rally a political support and may intensify attack against Ethiopia's interests. And in the presence of weakened Somalia, piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Somali coast may flourish and these possible scenarios have wide ~~repercussion~~ repercussion to the national securities of Ethiopia (Amin, 2018; Jeffery, 2018).

Somalia Federal Government officials have rejected and call illegal the entry of Somaliland into official agreements with any country, by implication to Ethiopia. Therefore, the Ethiopian deal with the semi-autonomous Somaliland where United Arab Emirates has took the lion share of the deal over the Port of Berebera is illegal and unacceptable on the eyes of the Federal Government, such accord is goes against the territorial integrity of the country and further, the deal means that the long hold Mogadishu's claims over Somaliland have undermined significantly. The Ethiopia-Somaliland deal over the port means that Somaliland has partly broken the challenges of international recognition by entering into substantive deals with viable business partners, such as, DP World and Somalia aspirations can no longer pretend to controls the government in Somaliland (AMEC, 2018; Cannon and Rossister, 2018; Press TV, 2017).

As Ethiopia is a landlocked country, its import and export transactions are determined by the stability of the sea trade in the Gulf of Aden and the Somalia shore. The United Arab Emirates military base and the Berbera Port agreement may potentially reduce Djibouti's revenues and if Ethiopian imports and exports are shipped through Berbera Port, Djibouti will most likely side with Somalia thus, further complicating the matter. On the other hand, ~~eventhough~~ even though, Egypt was a close ally of the United Arab Emirates and Saudi-Arabia, Egypt had been a

³⁸ Leulsegid Girma, is a researcher in the Ethiopian Foreign Relation Strategic Studies Institute .The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on July 18, 2019.

supporter of Somalian unity and a strong Somali state that can serve as a counterweight to Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, in a security complex Horn of Africa, where the primary security concerns of countries are linked together substantially and the national security of states in the Horn cannot be considered apart from one another, and the aforementioned possible scenarios due to the presence of United Arab Emirates' military presence could pose a potential challenge to the national security interests of Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa (Amin, 2018;Shinn,2002).

4.1.3. Ethiopia's interest in the utilization of the port Djibouti.

According to Nega(2019,interview)³⁹ and Leulsegid(2019, interview)⁴⁰ argued that the Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military presence in Djibouti may have a potential challenge for the national economic security interests of Ethiopia. However, both Nega and Leulsegid stressed that the challenge comes from Djibouti due to the factors emanate from the presence of foreign military bases are also endanger the interests of Djibouti. The presence of Saudi Arabia military base in Djibouti, and taking into account recent Gulf States influences in the Horn of Africa especially after the Yemen crisis in 2015 and the Gulf diplomatic stalemate in 2017 may in the future also makes Djibouti to fall under their influences. There may be a possibility that the increasing presence of foreign military bases of France, US, Japan, China, Japan, Italy and Saudi Arabia in Djibouti may create a rivalry and tensions among them and, Djibouti's inability due to low profile in military, economic and diplomatic power in managing such rivalry may have a potential challenge to the Horn of Africa and particularly to the national economic security interests of Ethiopia. However, any Djibouti's attempts to disentangle itself from Ethiopia and the regional economic cooperation endeavors may make Djibouti a huge loser.

The financial flow which accounts about \$300 million in annual income made by the countries which establish military bases in Djibouti may reduce Ethiopian leverage over Djibouti. Furthermore, the potential tension between the states with military bases in Djibouti and inability

³⁹Nega Kassa, a political, Security and Conflict Resolution Officer IGAD Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on May 15, 2019.

⁴⁰ Leulsegid Girma, is a researcher in the Ethiopian Foreign Relation Strategic Studies Institute .The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on July 18, 2019.

of Djibouti to deter the future tensions has effects on Ethiopia's access to and utilization of the Port of Djibouti. The presence and influence on Djibouti under foreign powers and in the near future Djibouti alone may not determine its own fate and parallel Ethiopia reliance on the port of Djibouti and the increasing militarization of Djibouti and the potential destabilizing effects due to the presence of foreign military bases risk Ethiopia's national economic security interests (Fakude, 2017; Life and Peace Institute, 2018).

Djibouti's port infrastructure is the lifeline to the Ethiopian economy, through which where 95 percent of the country's import and export pass. However, Ethiopia has become more concerned about its future relationship with Djibouti as the latter continues to become a foreign military garrison. The concerns became more pronounced when Saudi Arabia and the UAE forced countries of the Horn to take a negative stance against Qatar after the Gulf Crisis. Thus, the Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military base presence in Djibouti and taking into account the current interventionist tendency of Gulf states in the region could affect Ethiopia's policy towards Djibouti that assure the long lasting and reliable port services with reasonable fees (Cannon and Rossiter, 2018; Fakude, 2017; Ministry of Information, 2002).

In interview with Bloomberg (in June, 2018), head of the state-owned Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Services Enterprise (ESLSE), Roba Megerssa expresses his concern about the challenges

Ethiopia was concerned that Djibouti is controlled by foreign naval forces that surround the area. We are afraid perhaps in the future that even Djibouti may not have its own say to really decide on its own fate. This is quite a threat to Ethiopia (P.1).

4.1.4 Challenges to Ethiopian interests in the events of tensions between Ethiopia and Egypt over the Blue Nile water.

The relations between Ethiopia and Egypt over the issue of the Nile River has been tense especially following the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The support of the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is understood to have been essential to the success of the Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement. The Current good diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and

the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries(GCC) makes things difficult for Egypt at least for now to manipulate Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over the issues of the Nile water. However, as the Nile has remained a determine factor in the foreign relation of Ethiopia and the Arab world for long period of time and the changing diplomatic dynamics in the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa and as usually argued by realist proponents that in politics there no permanent friends or permanent enemies rather there are permanent interests. The realist core assumption has been practically observed in the behaviors of the Gulf States with forming and changing alliance with the countries of the Horn particularly following the Gulf diplomatic crisis in 2017. Therefore, the recent Ethiopia-Eritrea rapprochement and the roles played by United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in this regard makes Egypt to lose an important source of potential leverage over Ethiopia and may reduce Ethiopia's suspicions towards the Gulf military bases in the Horn region. But, still the Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases in the Horn of Africa remain a concern for Ethiopia in connection with its tense diplomatic relation with Egypt over the issues of the Nile(Leulsegegid, 2019, interview)⁴¹

The Gulf military bases in the region arose a concern from Ethiopian perspectives in connection with its old aged rivalry with Egypt, and especially following the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). This imply the possibility that the Gulf States with military bases in the Horn possibly would collaborate with Egypt with future confrontation with Ethiopia(Fabricus, 2018; Middle East Observer, 2018).

The Gulf crisis which erupted in 2017 and the subsequent increasing Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' influence in the Horn of Africa has magnified Ethiopia's suspicions regarding Egypt's ambitions in the Horn. The Gulf engagement in the Horn of Africa has been increased following the Gulf crisis where Egypt sided with Saudi block which hold a military bases in the region. As a result of the Gulf crisis, Yemeni conflict and other geo political developments in the Arabian Peninsula caused the increase in the military presences of the Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia's concern with the Arab military bases in the Horn is also linked to its historical rival, Egypt, which has close ties to the United Arab Emirates and

⁴¹Leulsegid, a researcher in the Ethiopian Foreign Relation Strategic Studies Institute .The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on July 18, 2019.

Saudi Arabia. From an Ethiopian perspective the Gulf countries' military bases in the Horn of Africa and in view of the leading roles of Egypt in the Arab's world may bring a potential threat for Ethiopia in the future confrontation with Egypt. The age-old Egypt records of using any forces as a proxy against Ethiopia which point toward a strategic encirclement of the country (Africa Confidential, 2018; International Crisis Group, 2017; Karim, 2017; Tesfaye, 2018).

Among other factors that determine the tense relations between Ethiopia and the Arab region for a long period of time was the issue of the waters of the Blue Nile. The Nile had a special and forefront place in the thousands of years long relationship between Ethiopia and Egypt. The Egyptians have been imposing their will so that no one but themselves would use the waters of the Nile. On the other hand, Ethiopia has struggled to ensure that its rights to the use of the Nile's waters mutually. As Egypt is the centre of leadership in the Arab world, the subject of the Nile waters began to influence Ethiopia's relations with Arab and still continues to do so (Ministry of Information, 2002; Mosely, 2018).

4.2 Opportunities

Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' have consolidated military presence in the Horn of Africa for the pursuit of their political, security, economic and commercial interests. The increasing military influences in the Horn of Africa enable Ethiopia to make their presence turn for the benefits of the country (Awol, 2018).

Ethiopia has managed to benefit from Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' increased presence in the Horn of Africa (Awol, 2018; Todman, 2018; Webster and Zacharias, 2018). The Opportunities that Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' Military Bases Expansion brought for Ethiopia's Foreign policy can be summarized into the following points.

4.2.1. Promotes the Gulf Investments and financial source for Ethiopia

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia foreign affairs and national security policy and strategy document clearly stipulate that the relation the country conducting with any country or group of countries is based on the protection of national interests and such interests are

associated to country's democratization and development goals (Ministry of Information, 2002). Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military presence in the Horn of Africa could positively affect Ethiopia's foreign policy towards the Horn region in a way that their increasing military presence in the Horn of Africa are supposed to be understood to protect their economic interest in the this sub region and beyond. Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are the largest oil producer and exporter which make them an attractive source of investment and finance for development in the Horn of Africa. Taking in to consideration their military presence in the Horn of Africa among others things are aimed at protecting their economic interests and this possibly creates opportunities for Ethiopia to benefit from the investments, particularly in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, infrastructural expansion, such as the UAE's support in the construction of the road connecting the boarder area of Ethiopia with berbera port in Somaliland and also as an important source of developmental finance. Therefore, from economic point of view, the Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases in the Horn of Africa inturn promote Ethiopia's economic foreign policy objectives towards the Horn of Africa(Nega, 2019, interview).⁴²

The need to achieve food security and diversify the economy is the key economic drivers for Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates increasing military presence in the Horn of Africa (Dahir, 2019; Telci, 2018; Todman, 2018; van den Berg and Meester, 2018). Among other factors, that the Gulf military bases in the Horn of Africa are planned to protect Gulf economic interests in this region. The global financial crisis in 2008 motivated Gulf Arab states to deepen their economic ties with Africa and have advanced their strategies of economic diversification by investing in African markets, which became even more critical when oil prices fall in 2014. Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have advanced their strategies of economic diversification and reduced reliance on oil by investing in Africa and also they recognized that investing in Africa as a way to achieve food security and the agricultural investments in Africa's geographic proximity to the Gulf is beneficial where the continent has 60 percent of the world's uncultivated arable lands (Awol, 2018; Meester *et al.*, 2018; Plaizier, 2016; Todman, 2018).

⁴²Nega Kassa, is a political, Security and Conflict Resolution Officer, IGAD Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on May 15, 2019.

Saudi Arabia's and the United Arab Emirates' military bases in the Horn of Africa as a way of protecting their diverse interests in the region and beyond have brought opportunities for the states in the Horn region (Todman, 2018). Ethiopia, which was the main recipient of the Gulf investment in the Horn region, had benefited from massive agricultural plantation investments in south-western Ethiopia (Meester *et al.*, 2018; Zaglami, 2019). The Mohammed International Development Research and Organization Companies (MIDROC), invested in a diverse range of sectors, including agriculture, manufacturing, mining and real estate. Within Ethiopia, the Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' investments are estimated to have created close to 300,000 jobs between 2000 and 2017, about one-third permanent and two-thirds temporary jobs in Ethiopia. In Agriculture and manufacturing sectors, Saudi-led projects created most of the jobs, followed by those initiated by Emirati actors. Thus, the military bases of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa play important roles in fostering Ethiopia's foreign policy objective of achieving development through attracting Gulf investment and financial assistance, and that Ethiopia needs to strengthen cooperation over common economic and social issues so that the country could utilize the opportunities emanating from the presence of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military bases in the Horn of Africa (Meester *et al.*, 2018).

The Saudi bloc's growing interest in the Horn region appears most promising for Ethiopia. In June 2018 Ethiopia exploited its diplomatic power to simultaneously strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates which have built military bases in the Horn of Africa. The United Arab Emirates agreed a three billion US Dollar in which it would deposit one billion into Ethiopia's National Bank to help with the foreign exchange crisis and invest the remaining two billion in the country. Saudi Arabia has also been considering Ethiopian requests to supply it fuel for a year with delayed payments (Awol, 2018; The Economist, 2019; Jeffery, 2018).

As among things the expansion of Saudi Arabia's and the United Arab Emirates' military bases in the Horn of Africa are intended to protect their economic interests. This made investment opportunities and financial support to be poured towards Ethiopia and this supports the country's development efforts. The success of Ethiopia's development has a positive contribution and benefits not only to Ethiopia but also to all neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia's development would provide countries in the Horn of Africa with market opportunities and the

efforts to build the economy will have a positive impact on the countries and would bring about the transformation of the region as a whole (Leulsegid, 2019, interview).⁴³

4.2.2 Ethiopia's strategy of diversifying Port Alternatives

The needs for access to port facilities and commercial interests in the Horn of Africa have become a source of increasing military presence in the region. The United Arab Emirates, in particular, has leverage its superior shipping and port infrastructure to boost its presence at the ports of Berbera, and Bosaso in Punt land, close to its new military base. This possibly enables Ethiopia also to take advantage of the complex competition for Red Sea ports. This is because, Ethiopia has been rely on Djibouti for nearly 97 per cent of its imports and exports, but now the country has got an opportunities for diversifying its routes to sea outlets. Ethiopia, the landlocked country in the Horn of Africa, taking the advantage of the UAE's investment in Berbera port. From a geostrategic perspective, Ethiopia has a great interest in the Berbera Port as it is the closest to the eastern region of the country where the export of livestock and the newly found oil resources would originate. As a result of this, the United Arab Emirates military base expansions in the Horn of Africa, which was supposed to secure the commercial interests of the country created an opportunity for Ethiopia's efforts to diversify port alternatives, as materializing in the berbera Port deal and may also to Assab port in Eritrea in the future and all these support Ethiopia's efforts towards regional integration (Mesfin, 2019, interview).⁴⁴

Ethiopia has attempted to take advantage of the recent involvement of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa's coastal zone to reduce its dependency on Djibouti's port. The country has done so by actively trying to concern partners in the refurbishment and development of other ports in the region: Port Sudan in Sudan, Berbera in the Somaliland region of Somalia, and Mombasa in Kenya and Assab and Massawa in Eritrea. However, it is Berbera, in particular, that will prove the most radical in terms of challenging regional power dynamics.

⁴³Leulsegid, isa researcher in the Ethiopian Foreign Relation Strategic Studies Institute .The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on July 18, 2019.

⁴⁴Dr. Mesfin Gebre Mekael, is a senior lecturer in peace and security, Institute of Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University (AAU). The interview was held in Addis Ababa, on May 17, 2019.

This is because, Ethiopia has ensured its presence in the running of the port involving and this will challenge Djibouti's virtual monopoly over maritime trade (Cannon and Rossiter, 2018).

The Ethiopian Government has made port development as a key priority and calling for investments across the Horn region (Klienfeld, 2017). There are plans for DP World to upgrade the connectivity infrastructure linking Berbera to the Ethiopian border and the 750 kilometers railway linking Addis Ababa to Djibouti has drastically cut the time and cost of shuttling containers between Ethiopia's capital and Djibouti's ports, which would have significant strategic implications for regional geopolitics (Khan, 2018). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates were the broker in rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2018, raises the possibility that the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa could be rehabilitated (Stryn, 2018).

Thus, Saudi Arabia's and the United Arab Emirates' military bases expansion in the Horn of Africa, was among other factors supposed to be secure their commercial interests in the Horn of Africa provides an opportunity for the Ethiopia's efforts to diversify port alternatives, on which broader regional integration and prosperity relies. This is why diversifying port alternatives has been one of the foreign policy priority of Ethiopian governments. The strategy that Ethiopia has engineered regarding to port access enhanced its security and strategic economic maritime interests and played a key role in the wider Horn of Africa to promote a deeper economic integration. Therefore, in security complex Horn of Africa where the fate of one country is closely connected with the others, the opportunity in which Saudi Arabia's and the United Arab Emirates' military base expansions in the Horn of Africa provide for Ethiopia's efforts to diversify Ports alternatives would ultimately realize strong regional economic integration (Nega, 2019, interview).⁴⁵

The current active Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' military engagement in the Horn of Africa has intended to ensure their commercial interests in the region. The United Arab Emirates with good records of port administration has widely engaged in port building and management

⁴⁵Nega Kassa, is a political, Security and Conflict Resolution Officer ,IGAD Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on May 15, 2019.

across the Horn of Africa. Thus, Ethiopia positioned itself well to benefit from the complex scramble for Red Sea ports between and among the Gulf and Middle East Countries. Ethiopia has been rely on Djibouti for nearly 97 per cent of its imports, but now has clear avenues for diversifying its routes to sea. The rapprochement with Eritrea may give Ethiopia access to Eritrean ports, while the United Arab Emirates development of Berbera Port in Somaliland will give it another crucial option. The draft Ethiopia's foreign policy emphasizes the needs for efficient Port service and the issue of Port is a key foreign policy agenda. Thus, the country would work together with countries that have Sea outlet in global and regional cooperation which would assure its rights to Sea outlet and sustainable Port services (Awol, 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020:29).

4.2.3. Protection of Ethiopia's national interests through supporting Anti- Piracy efforts in the Waters coast off Somalia

The issues of piracy in the waters of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean had been a pre-occupied agenda for global and regional economic powers. As a result of the increasing level of piracy activities global and regional powers such as the USA, China, Japan, India, and the European Union and also Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had consolidated their military presence in anti -piracy operations in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia's military base in Djibouti and the UAE's military presence in Eritrea and Somaliland allow them to secure navigation in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. As Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' economic interests in Africa had grown, the iranti-piracy efforts had strengthen, and this would protect Ethiopia's national economic interest on the international sea route (Leulsegid, 2019,interview).⁴⁶

Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military presence in Horn of Africa support commercial sea lines in the straight of Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, as well as to secure freedom of navigation (Ardemagni,2018). The United Arab Emirates provided training support in Punt land, to defend its trade routes and fight piracy and had a significant role in confronting piracy through supporting Somali government, in providing logistical support at sea, training Somali forces and

⁴⁶Leulsegid, is a researcher in theEthiopian Foreign Relation Strategic Studies Institute .The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on July 18, 2019.

contributing to improving the infrastructure of seaports to counter the threat of pirates (Todman, 2018; Zaglami, 2019).Therefore, as Ethiopia's export and import transaction have been mainly carried out through maritime trade, the expansion of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates military presence in the Horn of Africa and their increasing efforts in the anti-piracy operation promotes the security of the Sea trade in the region. In this case, the anti-piracy efforts made by Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates protect Ethiopia's national interests and security in the Horn of Africa. This in turn support country's development endeavors, which is the core foreign policy objectives towards the Horn of Africa(Aman, 2019, interview).⁴⁷.

The United Arab Emirates has develop strong commercial networks in the Horn of Africa, often its commercial deals, such as ports building expansions and management activities in the Horn of Africa, are followed with the opening of its military bases such as in berbera Somaliland (Stevenson, 2018). The United Arab Emirates has expanded commercial investment on port infrastructures in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Djibouti, Somaliland and Punt land. The country also financed and provided anti-piracy training for the Punt land Maritime Police Force (PMPF). Therefore, among other factors partly that induce Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to expand their military bases in the region, is aimed at securing the commercial sea lines and the oil and gas exports from piracy threats in the Horn of Africa .The commitment made by the United Arab Emirates through establishing military bases in the Horn of Africa has a played a significant role in countering piracy activities, and in turn the security of the maritime trade in the region(Ardemagni, 2018; Stevenson; 2018: Telaci, 2018; van den Berg and Meester, 2018).

To support the anti-piracy efforts, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have enhanced their military projection capabilities by building their first overseas bases in the Horn of Africa. Particularly, the United Arab Emirates provided supports to semi-autonomous territory of Punt land and Somalia, to defend trade routes and fight piracy (Todman, 2018).The security of the economically vital Bab el-Mandeb waterway, through which nearly four million barrels of crude oil the majority being Gulf oil to Europe pass daily. Thus, Piracy near this vital waterway is a

⁴⁷Aman Lole, is a Saudi Arabia Desk officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs .The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on May 17, 2019.

security issue that the Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' are seeking to control and such needs considerably contributes to the safety of maritime trade in the region (Ardemagni, 2017).

4.2.4 Protection of Ethiopia's Peace and Security through Supporting Anti-terrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa

According to an Leulsegid (2019, interview)⁴⁸the presence of United Arab Emirates military bases and its efforts to counter terrorism in the region, particularly, in fighting against Al-Shabab had remained significant to the efforts of the federal government of Somalia and to Africa Union Mission in Somalia(AMISOM). As a result, the United Arab Emirates military bases in the Horn of Africa facilitates its strong stand and supports counter terrorism efforts in Somalia and elsewhere in the Horn contribute to Ethiopia's peace and security. This is due to the reasons that one of the major external threats to Ethiopia's peace and security emanates from terrorists and their activities in the Horn of Africa. The instability and lack of well functioning government in Somalia had allowed terrorists to take hold and Somalia become sa base for terrorist groups in order to threaten Ethiopia's peace and security. Thus, the United Arab Emirates' counter-terrorism support in Somalia in particular and the Horn of Africa at large promotes Ethiopia's foreign policy objectives of achieving developments and Democracy, which ultimately ensure peace and security.

Countering terrorism is among the major factors that led to the upgrading of the Africa Horn's importance in the Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' foreign-policy agendas. Considering threats from al-Shabab movement in Somalia that had developed close ties with the Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognized the threats and consolidated their military presence in the Horn of Africa (Huliaras and Kalantzakos, 2017).

Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have increased their commitments to counterterrorism operations in the Horn. They had shown the most consistent interest fighting terrorism in Somalia. As part of an African Union military mission to defeat terrorism, the United Arab

⁴⁸Leulsegid, is a researcher in theEthiopian Foreign Relation Strategic Studies Institute .The interview was conducted in Addis Ababa, on July 18, 2019.

Emirates trained and equipped hundreds of Somali troops from 2014 to 2018. Saudi Arabia launched the Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition in 2016 and announced it would provide Somalia with capacity-building support and training (Bridger and Bahadur, 2013; Reuters, 2018; Zaglami, 2019). Therefore, according to the assumptions of both the realist and neo realist, the protection of national interest is the primary goal of any State and that way the anti-terrorism efforts made by the Gulf States in the Horn of Africa are crucial to safeguard Ethiopia's national interest which is directly related with development and democracy objectives and this promotes Ethiopia's foreign policy objectives (Ministry of Information, 2002).

5. CONCLUSION

The Horn of Africa has become a playing ground for global and regional powers. The increasing influence over the region is manifested by competition for military bases. Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates who joined global military and economic powers including the US and China through establishing military bases. Saudi Arabia has entered an agreement with the government of Djibouti to build its first oversea base in 2016. Similarly, the United Arab Emirates has built a naval and air base in Assab, Eritrea in 2016, and also a military base in the self declared republic of Somaliland in 2017.

The findings of this study indicate that the political motives of the expansions of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base in the Horn of Africa relate to projecting power to weaken Iranian influence in the Horn of Africa and as a struggle for regional hegemony in the Arab world. The other political factor is attached to defense the increasing influences of Turkey and Qatar in the region. The security motives are related to the crisis in Yemen, protecting the security of the geo-strategic choke point of the Bab el-Mandeb water way and countering the threats of piracy and terrorism in the Horn. The political and security factors for the increasing military presence of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa are mainly caused by the pursuit for power projection and balance of power, and is a manifestations of regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and its ally United Arab Emirates on the one hand and Iran and also Qatar and Turkey on the other hand. The political security motives for the expansion of the Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military bases in the region are mainly seen from power projection perspectives.

The issues of food security and the needs to economic diversification and securing energy as well as commercial interests are the main economic factors that dictate the expansion of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military bases in the Horn of Africa. The increasing military presence of these two countries in the region are not limited to mainly the crisis in Yemen, rather the military motives is intended to ensure long term military presence in the Horn and protecting their interests in the Red Sea and the Arabian Peninsula Areas.

The findings of the study have also indicate that there are various challenges and opportunities that Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansion have brought for Ethiopia's foreign policy. The major challenges are related to the militarization of the region that affects the sustainable peace and security of the country, undermine the unity of Somalia with adverse potential effects on the national interests, affects the country interest in the utilization of the Port of Djibouti and challenge Ethiopia's interest in the events of tension with Egypt over the blue Nile water.

The main opportunities for Ethiopia's foreign policy are concerns to promoting gulf investment and financial assistance for Ethiopia, support the country's strategy of diversifying port facilities and protecting national interests through supporting the anti-piracy and anti-terrorism efforts in the region. The increase economic opportunities emanates from the presence of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa foster Ethiopia's foreign policy objectives of development, and this could be strengthened through bilateral and multilateral cooperation between and among countries of the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia with huge economic potential in the region could benefit more through cooperation from the presence of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military bases in the Horn of Africa.

The increasing military presence of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa indicates the strategic significances of the Horn of Africa. Saudi-Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases brought many challenges and opportunities for Ethiopia's foreign policy. The findings of the study imply that the Ethiopian Government needs to develop a pragmatic and assertive foreign policy strategy which carefully recognize and examine the increasing presence of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates military bases in the Horn of Africa and accordingly taking the appropriate policy measures that promote the national interests of the country. Ethiopia should also strengthen bilateral cooperation on mutual political, economic and social issues with the neighboring countries, and utilize regional and continental multilateral arrangement so as to exploit the opportunities and minimize the challenges related with Saudi-Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military bases in the Horn of Africa.

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Appendixes

Appendix1: Interview Guideline

A. For Key Informants from Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations and Strategic Studies Institute

1. What are the motives for Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' Military base expansions in the Horn of Africa?
2. What could the challenges of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' Military base expansions in the Horn of Africa for Ethiopia's foreign policy?
3. How did Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansions in the Horn of Africa brought opportunities for Ethiopia's foreign policy?
4. How do you see Ethiopia's foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa?

Appendix 2: Interview Guideline

B. For Key Informant from Addis Ababa University, Institute for Peace and Security Studies.

1. What are the motives for Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' Military base expansions in the Horn of Africa?
2. What could be the challenges of Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' Military base expansions in the Horn of Africa for Ethiopia's foreign policy?
3. How did Saudi Arabia's and United Arab Emirates' military base expansions in the Horn of Africa brought opportunities for Ethiopia's foreign policy?

Appendix 3: Key Informant Interviewees

No	Name	Sex	Organization	Position	Date	Remark
1.	Amane Lole	M	Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Saudi-Arabia Desk Officer	May 17, 2019, 10:50-11:55 AM	Personal Interview
2	Atika Ahmed	F	Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	UAE's Desk Officer	May 17, 2019, 10:50-11:55 AM	//
3	Leulsegid Girma	M	Ethiopian Foreign Relation Strategic Studies	Researcher	July 18, 2019, 9:30-10:30 AM	//
4	Mesfin Gebre-Mekael (PhD)	M	Institute for Peace and Security Studies, AAU.	Lecturer	May 17, 2019, 2:15-3:10 PM	//
5	Nega Kassa	M	Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Political, Security and Conflict Resolution Officer, IGAD Department	May, 15 2019, 2:15-3:50 PM	//