

Addis Ababa University

College of Social Sciences

Center for African Studies

**Challenges to Re-Building Nation- State
in Somalia Since 1991**

By: Endale Mulatu

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Table of Contents

Content	page
Acknowledgement.....	I
Acronyms.....	II
Abstract	III
CHAPTER ONE	
Introduction.....	10
1.1 Back Ground to the Study	10
1.2 Statement of the problem	12
1.3 Research questions	13
1.4 Methodology	13
1.5 Method	14
1.6 Objective of the study	14
1.7 Scope and significance of the study	14
1.8 Limitation of the study	15
1.9 Organization of the paper	15
Chapter Two	
2. Review Literature and Conceptual Frame Work	16
2.1 The Concept of the "Nation-State"	16
2.1.1 Empirical and Juridical statehood.....	17
2.1.2 Positive and Negative sovereign states.....	18
2.1.3 Vital Elements of Western Derived Nation- State.....	19
2.2 The Rise of Modern States	21
2.2.1 Contending Theories on the beginning of State	22
2.3 The Basic Normative Functions of State.....	24
2.4 Categorization of States	25
2.4.1 "Strong States"	25
2.4.2 "Weak States"	26
2.4.3 "Failed States"	27

2.4.4 "Collapsed State"	28
2.5 An Overview of the Situation and Nature of Pre-Colonial Polities in Africa.....	29
2.6 The General Nature of the Colonially Created Nation-State in Somalia	33
2.6.1 Realism	33
2.6.1 Idealism	34
2.6.3 Post-Modernist Theory	34
2.6.4 State-Society Relations.....	35
2.7 The Early Occupation of Somali Coast.....	37
2.8 European Colonial Legacies on Somali Society	39
2.9 Society and Culture	41
2.9.1 Traditional Division of Somali Nation	44
2.9.1.1 The Pastoral-Nomadic Communities.....	45
2.9.1.2 Agriculturalist Community.....	45
2.9.1.3 Minority communities	47
2.9.2 Clan System.....	49
2.9.2.1 Territorial Distribution of Somali Clans.....	50
2.9.3 Traditional Political and Legal System	51
2.9.3.1 Clanship and Contract	51
2.9.3.2 Pre- Colonial Somali Political Structures.....	53
2.10 State Building Approaches.....	55
2.10.1 Bottom-up state formation.....	55
2.10.2 Top-Down State Formation	56

Chapter Three

The Modern state experience and 'collapse' in Somalia	59
3.1. Colonial state experience	59
3.1.1. Somali National struggle and Road to Independence.....	60
3.2. Civilian Government (1960-69).....	62
3.3. Military Regime 1969-1991	66
3.3.1. 'Greater Somalia' Ideology	69
3.3.2. Civil war in Somalia	71

3.4 State 'collapse' in Somalia	73
3.4.1. Factors that brought to the state 'collapse' in Somalia.....	76
CHAPTER FOUR	
The Somali Peace Process and Its Outcomes	80
4.1. The Unitary Versus Federal Approach.....	81
4.2. The 1993 Addis Ababa Conference	83
4.3. Arta Peace Process of 2000.....	87
4.4. Mbagathi Peace Process	92
4.5 Djibouti peace process of 2008	96
4.6. The 1993 Boroma Peace Process	98
CHAPTER FIVE	
Challenges to Re-Building Nation-State in Somalia since 1991	101
5.1 Internal Challenges.....	101
5.1.1 Legacies of Military Regime	101
5.1.2 Clan Dynamics	106
5.1.3 Radical Islam	111
5.1.4 Discriminating of Minorities in Southern Somalia.....	116
5.1.5 Proliferation of Weapons in Southern Somalia	124
5.2 External Challenges.....	127
5.2.1 The Role of Regional States	128
5.2.2 The Ethiopia Interests and Involvement.....	130
5.2.3 The Role of International Actors	134
5.2.4 The Interests and Involvement of the USA	136
CHAPTER SIX	
Conclusions and Recommendations	139
6.1 Conclusions	139
6.2 Recommendations	143
Bibliography	
Appendix	

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ACRONYMS

ALAL	Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya
AMISOM	Africa Union Peace Keeping Mission in Somalia
ARPCT	Alliance for Restoration Peace and Counter Terrorism
ARS	Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia
ARS-A	Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia-Asmara
ARS-D	Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia-Djibouti
EEC	European Economic Commission
EJI	Eritrea Islamic Jihad
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority of Development
IC	International Community
JVA	Juba Valley Alliance
MOD	Marehan- Ogaden- Dulbanate
NFD	North Frontier District
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSS	National Security Service
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front

ORH	Operation Restore Hope
SNM	Somali National Movement
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRC	Supreme Revolutionary Council
SRSP	Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SYL	Somali Youth League
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNC	Transitional National Council
TNG	Transitional National Government
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UN	United Nation
UNHCR	United Nation Higher Commissioner for Refugees
UNITAF	United Nation Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nation Operation in Somalia
USA	United States of America
USC	United Somali Congress
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
UWSLF	United Western Liberation Front
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front

Abstract

Since the fall of Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia has become disintegrated and divided into various fighting warlords. Since then, with the disintegrations of state institutions and structures, the state of Somalia came to an end as functional government. The situations in Somali have invited different interesting groups with different competing goals. Thus, over the last several years, many attempts have been made to establish effective central government in Somalia. All of the efforts were failed from the beginning.

Therefore the main objective of this study is to identify the challenges that worked against to re-establish effective functioning central government in Somalia. The study also has tried to explore what types of state building approaches have been conducted and its outcomes.

To accomplish this work, the study is based on qualitative research approach. Therefore, it relied on the use of secondary sources, which involve books, Journals, published and unpublished materials, and the internet sources. To consolidate the secondary sources, this study has used primary sources, interviews with relevant persons.

The main findings of this study are the internal and external challenges which have prevented state re-building in Somalia. The internal challenges include: legacies of military regime, clan dynamics, radical Islam, un equal treatment of minorities and availability of weapons whereas the external challenges are the international and regional actors who have their own competing interests in Somalia.

The study also recommended possible solutions as alternative approaches to the Somali problems. Among these recommendations: the bottom up state building approach, disarmament fighting factions and local people, inclusive peace process, avoiding discrimination are the major ones.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 Back Ground to the Study

Geographically, Somalia is situated in Eastern Africa, between Ethiopia to the west, Kenya to the southwest, Djibouti to the northwest, Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula to the north and the Indian Ocean to the east. Somalia is strategically located in the Horn Africa, which dominated the Sea lanes of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the corridors between the Middle East and Africa. Somalia has the longest coast line in Africa, stretching from Kenya in the south to Djibouti in the north, where a large of US task force is now based.

Somalia has a surface area of 637,540 squares kilo meter and its terrain consists mainly of plateaus, plains and highlands. In the far north however, the rugged east-west ranges of the Karkaar Mountains lie at varying distance from the Gulf of Aden. Somalia's lowest point goes down to zero meters in the Indian Ocean and the highest point rises up to 2,416 meter in Shimbris. The capital Mogadishu is found at an altitude of twelve meter (UNHCR, 2008: 9).

The country has a hot and arid climate, which frequently gives way to drought, dust storms over the eastern plains in the two dry seasons and floods during the two dry seasons. Extremely hot in northern and southern regions, Somalia has warm and humid periods during the north eastern monsoon from December to February and the southwestern monsoon from May until the October. April is the hottest month in Mogadishu with temperature ranging between 26-32c⁰; while July and August are the coldest months in Mogadishu with temperatures dropping to 32c⁰ January and February are the driest months in Mogadishu with 1millimeter average rain fall compared to June, which is the wettest month with the average rain fall of 97 millimeter (ibid).

In 2004, the population of Somalia was estimated at 11.1million. Limited by various constraints including serial refugee movements and the fact that a large number of people are nomads, the last official census undertaken by the government was in 1975.

The pre-colonial Somali society was organized and divided along clan-lines. Though there are settled minority communities in coastal area in southern part of Somalia, the society was predominantly nomadic –pastoralists that led their life in moving with their herds from place to

place in search of water and pasture. This society was not politically well organized and had no experience of central government except that of coastal communities. The state of Somali like most of African countries is the creation of colonialism. Both colonial and pre-colonial systems have had paramount effects in terms of molding and determining the post-colonial Somali state (Brons, 2001).

In the 19th century, the Somali people were partitioned by European colonial powers and became victims for alien culture that was new for traditional way of life of Somali society. Consequently, the Somali society is remained divided since the colonial era.

The British and the Italian Somaliland had got independence and they were united together to create a Republic of Somalia in 1960. For a decade of its independence, Somalia was a democratic state, but it remained weak and fragile. The parliamentary system was characterized by political instability, inefficient and corrupted government, and divisive clanism (Ginnaou, 1993). At this time the effect of colonialism were manifested in the form of Somali irredentism, and north- south division. Moreover, the state lacked domestic socio-political cohesion or unity. It was unable to integrate the majority of the society within its frame work. In short, the 1960's Somalia sustained weak and was dependent on the former colonial powers (ibid).

The civilian government was overthrown by blood less coup in 1969, and the military dictatorial regime reigned over Somalia from 1969 to 1991. In the early years of military regime, Somali people had trusted on Barre expecting the unity of all Somali inhabited territories under 'Greater Somalia' ideology. However, this time the Siad Barre failed to bring basic changes in terms of state capacity. This was mainly due to the regime's inability to consolidate state structures and institutions since it diverted the necessary resources to establish extended security apparatus to maintain its power.

Hence, the state of Somalia continued to be weak in the 1970s. In addition to this, though it publicly denounced clanism and declared 'Scientific Socialism', the military regime heavily depended on clan politics. The regime of Barre effectively manipulated the clan politics in order to hold on to state power (Dualeh, 1994).

The use of excessive force by military regime in the mid of 1970's, reduced the earlier popularity of the regime. Then, in order to regain legitimacy and to divert the public attention to an external issue, the Barre government mobilized large military forces and waged war against Ethiopia with aim to incorporate Ogaden region. However, disastrous defeat of Somalia in the war largely exposed the weakness of the regime and state (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). As a result, in the 1980's the military regime faced various clan based anti-government oppositions. The oppressive responses of regime alienated the people from the state and exacerbated the negative effects of clan system (Mnsur, 1995). Finally, the intensification of anti-governmental oppositions from various angle of the country brought about the down fall of the military regime and the 'collapse' of Somali state in 1991 (Brons, 2001)

After the down fall of the Barre regime, the Somali state ceased to exist and entered the situation of statelessness. Since 1991, Somalia has lacked a functional central government. Accordingly, a collapsed state, it has been characterized by the “prolonged absence of central government, armed conflict, and criminal lawlessness” (Menkhaus, 2005). Over the past several years, there have been many attempts to establish the national government in Somalia. However, all of them were unsuccessful in terms of creating effective central government and thus failed to reconstitute the state of Somalia. Therefore, this study intends to identify and analyze the State Re-Building Approaches in different peace processes, and challenges that prevented the re-building of the state in Somalia and that prolonged the situation of the state collapse until this day. Moreover, the thesis has tried to assess the external and internal challenges that sustained the state failure in Somalia.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The Somali society is unique in sharing common values than other African counter parts in terms of language, religion and other culture and traditions. Hence, in Africa, “the sense of ‘natural’ nation hood can be best claimed by Somalis” (Ginnaou, 1993:50). The people of Somalia have shared social and cultural traits that are common for them to led stable political and social traditions. In addition, they have also a common sense of belonging to a single ethnic group, Somali nation. These commonly shared social features of Somali society were assumed to be crucial elements for the development of strong and viable state in Somalia (Samatar, 1999).

However, in the post independent period, the Somali state was weak and fragile one and lacked capacity to develop viable Somali state .Moreover, despite linguistic, and religious homogeneity of the Somalis, the state of Somalia ceased to exist as a strong state in 1991. Since then, instead of creating and maintaining some form central state, the Somalis have divided into smaller warlord fiefdoms. Here, on the one hand, there are commonly owned societal characteristics which could be used as a base for the establishment of the strong state in Somalia. However, on the other hand, Somalis are divided into various clans that hindered them to re-building a viable and strong state in Somalia. Therefore, this study tries to assess the challenges that deteriorated these commonly shared societal features and prevented the re-building of state in Somalia.

1.3 Research questions

As this study intends to analyze the challenges that has prevented of re-building state of Somalia, the study poses some basic research questions, which the study attempts to answer. These research questions include:

- ❖ What are the main challenges that have worked against to Re-Building state of Somalia?
- ❖ What types of state re-building approaches had been conducted?
- ❖ Who are the initiators of state- building process?
- ❖ What are the roles of international actors in the efforts to re- build the state of Somalia?

1.4 Methodology

This study has employed both descriptive and analytical approaches. In this regard, the study intends to describe and analyze the challenges that prevented Re- Building state of Somalia. Accordingly, it tries to assess and discuss thoroughly how these challenges have undermined the peace processes to re-build state of Somalia.

Note: since this study is based on document analysis, there is no need to include all important components of methodology in data gathering. However, the study uses some important components of methodology to this study as it was mentioned above.

1.5 Method

This study is based on qualitative research approach. Here, the secondary sources have been extensively used. These sources include books, journals, published and unpublished materials, articles and internet sources. In addition to the secondary sources, primary sources have been used to consolidate the secondary sources. This has been conducted through interview of relevant persons

1.6 Objective of the study

➤ General objective

The general objective of this study is to identify and analyze the deep rooted challenges that worked against re-building state in Somalia

➤ Specific objectives

- to find the real source of challenges to Somali state building
- to describe the nature of state building approaches of post-Barre Somalia.
- to investigate and assess the response for state 'collapse' in Somalia
- to evaluate the roles of external actors in Somali state re-rebuilding processes.
- to suggest recommendations for the policy makers as a solution to the problem.

1.7 Scope and significance of the study

Due to the time limitation, this study has focused on the 20 years political development in Somalia since the fall of Siad Barre regime in 1991. Moreover, as the problems of Somali people is very vast, it is specifically inclined to investigate the challenges that hindered the re-building state of Somalia and assess the failed peace processes that made to re-build state. Hence, other significant issues have left purposefully to be investigated by other researches. In fact this study is carried out for the academic purpose and it is conducted to discuss and analyze the challenges that negatively affected the re-building state of Somalia and these by relatively contributing to the augmentation of the existing body of knowledge on the subject. In other word, the study is based on existing literatures in which the researcher critically reviews and analyzes to add knowledge for the readers.

1.8 Limitation of the study

Here are some crucial factors that have challenged this study. These are financial constraints which blocked me not to visit to the study areas and getting first hand information. Other one is shortage of time which is created simply rushing to complete the work at fixed time frame work. In addition, unavailability of recently published books and the complicated dynamic nature of Somalia problems which are still going on prevented to arrive in a certain conclusion. However, this study tries to overcome these constraints by limiting the study problems as much as manageable way considering the above limitations.

1.9 Organization of the paper

This paper is organized into six chapters. The first chapter deals with the introduction which includes the background, the statement of the problem, objectives, the research questions and the others. Chapter two pays attention to the conceptual framework and literature review. Here various theoretical views about state formation will be discussed. In this section, this study argues on two theories of state formation. These are the force theory and consent theory whose approaches are mentioned in this part of this study. The third chapter has tried to discuss on the modern state experience and state 'collapse' in Somalia. This chapter explains how Somali society has experienced the colonial, civilian and dictatorial military state structures, and how the state collapse occurred in Somalia. The fourth chapter discusses and analyses the unsuccessful peace processes and its outcomes in Somali state re-building processes. The fifth chapter analyzes the challenges that has sustained against the re-building state of Somalia. In this regard, the internal and external factors that hindered the re-constructing state in Somalia have been analyzed thoroughly in this section. Internally, the legacies of military regime, clan dynamics, Radical Islam, proliferations of small arms and discriminatory of minority communities in southern central Somalia are the main ones in this line. Externally, the roles of international and regional actors in re-building state in Somalia have been analyzed. Finally, the last chapter presents the conclusion and recommendations after completion of the study.

Chapter Two

2. Review Literature and Conceptual Frame Work

2.1 The Concept of the "Nation-State"

The definition of what constitutes a nation-state is not universally agreed upon; however, various scholars have tried to define the concept of 'State' from different perspectives. As a result, the attempt of defining the term 'state' with a universally accepted meaning has become very difficult task (Hay and Lister, 2006).

Nonetheless, the impact of the Western derived-Westphalia Nation-State on the daily life of the society has brought to the common agreement. In short, there is little difference over the impact of state on the habitual people's activities. For instance, the State involves in activities that range from safeguarding of domestic order to external defense, from provision of social services to economic management, to mention some clear functions of state and its governance institutions. The primary functions of State are discussed in details in the sub- topic of state functions. Hence, for better or worse, one may define the State in terms of its primary functions.

Even though there are different definitions by various scholars, for the purpose of this study the organizational approach to the definition of state is adopted. The Organizational Approach views the State as a particular form of political organization of society. Hence as a concept, the Contemporary State may be best defined as "A political association that establishes sovereign jurisdiction within defined territorial borders, and exercise authority through a set of permanent institutions. These institutions are recognizably 'public' in that they are responsible for the collective organization, of social existence" (Heywood, 2002:86-87).The State, thus, embraces the different institutions of government, but it also extends to the bureaucracy, the military, the police, the courts, the social security system and so on; it can be identified with the entire 'body politic'(ibid).

According to this definition, Heywood, took a State as a Political Organization with sovereign power. He added that, it contains an apparatus of institutions what exercise authority over a population living within a recognized geographical area. In the same way, Hey and Lister have defined the Nation- State as "an institutional complex claiming sovereignty for itself as the supreme political authority for whose governance it is

responsible"(2006:6). They understood state as a complex set of institutions and emphasized that it claims the supreme authority within a given definite territory.

Harrison and Boyd on their part have made an effort to define state as "a political association that establishes sovereign power within defined territorial area and possesses a monopoly of legitimate violence"(2003:17).

The second aspect of this definition takes us to the Max Weber's powerful definition of State. According to Weber,

a state is a human community successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Morris, 1998:43). What differentiate Weber state definition from other institutions in that they claim "a monopoly of force and the sole right to determine who may legitimate use force (ibid).

In addition to this, Weber took state as "an obligatory political association with continues organization"(Rush, 1992:20). According to Weber, states may be created willingly through different ways, but, once States are established 'ultimately' they become compulsory associations (ibid). In short, Max Weber analyzed the state, in terms of its modes of function i.e. its capacity to deploy coercion or to exercise physical force (Jackson and Rosberg, 1989). This definition leads us to the conceptions of empirical and juridical statehood.

2.1.1 Empirical and Juridical statehood

The term 'state' has both an empirical and juridical meanings. Which is political entities can be states either empirical (de facto) or juridical (de jure) or both (Axtman, 2004). Accordingly, the "empirical statehood", indicates that the State possesses actual internal capacity to rule over the citizens within its territory. This is related to the states capacity to exercise effective control (Jackson and Rosberg, 1989). In other words, the empirical sense of the state exists when the state has "a monopoly on legitimate violence over a specific territory...thus, imposes its own legal order over territory, even if it is not legally recognized as a state by other states" (ibid)

However, several states which were formed as the result of Decolonization process lack empirical quality of Statehood. They possess no internal capacity to operate effective control over their territories (Jackson, 1990). This indicates these States are Quasi-states characterized

by "deficient and defective apparatus of power. These states are not viable entities to function effectively. They are simply, "upheld by external covenant among sovereign states"(ibid).

The concept of 'Juridical Statehood', on the other hand, implies the recognition of the state by other states. It does not care whether the state possesses the actual power to rule over the people or not (Axtman, 2004). It simply enables the state to enter into relation with other states and to become part of the international state system (Jackson, 1990)

Then, necessary conditions for the existence of a given state, it can be said that a state to be viable and to enjoy opportunities area, it should fulfill both 'empirical' and 'juridical' qualities of statehood. The concept of empirical and juridical statehood is more understood through positive and negative sovereign states.

2.1.2 Positive and Negative sovereign states

The notion of 'Positive sovereignty' presupposes that States have capabilities to actively rule in which their territory is bounded (Jackson, 1993:270). 'Positive sovereignty' is the true Weberian Western definition of a state, as it entails the actual monopoly over the use of violence, and therefore, the actual monopoly of power, 'positive monopoly' is thus the process of the state actively providing services, such as security, welfare and representation to the citizens in its territory. If that state is actively providing services to its citizens and at the same time is recognized through negative sovereignty, the state is totally exercising effective sovereignty (Clunan, 2010:17). If it is providing positive sovereignty but it is not recognized, it is called a de facto state. Positive sovereignty is closely in line with Weber's definition: "Max Weber and his followers, focuses on the quality of state control and its coherence"(Hameriti, 2009:59).

'De facto States' are usually bottom-up structures, providing state services to the local population as the result of indigenous pressures and capacity-building. This bottom-up state structure provides first and foremost order and security, but also representation, and welfare for its citizens (ibid: 135).

The 'de facto state' structure, in that it fulfills Weber's definition of a state. It exhibits all the required positive sovereignty criteria for effective sovereignty statehood, but lacks recognition from other states and therefore has no negative or juridical sovereignty. Typically a positive sovereign (de facto) state controls a part or the territory an existing sovereign state. On the basis

of this territory it claims and strives for recognition by other states as the legitimate ruler of this territory. The 'de facto state' is not considered legitimate and therefore cannot participate in international institutions. Nor is it considered to be an equal partner in IC. Pegg uses this very astute quote to highlight this discrepancy, defining them as the inverse of the quasi-state: "The quasi-state is legitimate no matter how ineffective it is. Conversely, the de facto state is illegitimate no matter how effective it is"(Pegg, 1998).

On the other hand, "negative sovereignty" (de jure) states are internationally recognized states. In the modern notion of statehood this recognized 'sovereign' right to exercise violence has assumed a legal standard, belonging only to sovereign states. The sovereign state decides whether or not they want to 'recognize' other states. This recognition is then codified by membership of the states' 'Club'-the United Nations (UN). Social acceptance as a state in the International Community (IC) of states means that the government is recognized as the sole legal holder of legitimate violence (power) in a defined territory. Membership in the IC 'social club' means that the state is being socialized to act according to a set of norms, laws, rights and duties of states. Jackson defines this social normative right to the monopoly of violence granted by the IS as negative sovereignty. Fundamentally this is a recognized right to the monopoly of violence (but not necessarily mean that the government holds the 'actual' monopoly of violence) (Sand, 2011).

When recognized the negative sovereignty, officially gives the state freedom outside interference and recognition as legally representing the state internationally. This mutual recognition between states is the basic socialization procedures of the international society. With negative right to legal sovereignty statehood recognized, a state with negative sovereignty can make binding social contracts with other states. All international relations are premised on the social expectation that these agreements will be kept (ibid). This unitary view of what a state is and what it is supposed to do is codified in the Montevideo Convention on the rights and duties of states of 1933. This convention contains crucial state elements.

2.1.3 Vital Elements of Western Derived Nation- State

According to the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties, the state as a legal person of international law should possess the following essential elements. These are a permanent

population, a defined territory, the government and capacity to enter into relations with the other states (Jackson, 1990). These elements can briefly be discussed as follow:

The first element of the state is a permanent population, which refers to people living together permanently and over whom the state rules. The number of people required to comprise the population of a state "... is not as important as the degree to which the society is willing and able to work for the furthering of its cumulative interests" (Khan and Mcniven, 1990:21). Here, what is needed is that the population has to act as a single political community to promote its common interests (ibid). In addition, the people are expected to give their political loyalty to their state. As a result, they "...are the primary subjects of its laws and have a general obligation to obey by the virtue of their membership" (Morris, 1998:46).

The second vital element is a defined territory upon which the people of the state "...permanently settled... and to which they hold perpetual claim" (Khan and Mcniven, 1990). This component of the state includes not only the land itself, but also the water bodies, the air spaces, the natural resources pertaining to the land, the climate and so on (Jackson and Lipman, 1955). Here, what is the most important is the territory has to be "recognized as being under the control of a state by the inhabitants of that state and by other states-especially the great powers and the states most closely bordering on it" (Harrison and Boyd, 2003:24). In relation to this the boundaries of the states are "...mutually acknowledge but entirely artificial lines where one government's property rights end and another's begin" (Jackson and Rosberg, 1989:129). Therefore, a territory with a defined and recognized boundary is basic feature of the state system and an important legal element of any state.

The third element of the state is the government. Government is, simply, the agent that acts on the behalf of the state (Khan and Mcniven, 1990). Hence, it is expected to be effective in the sense that it should exercise effective control over the territory and population of the state. By this it means, the government should possess "...the ability to pronounce, implement, and enforce, commands laws, politics, and regulations" (Jackson and Rosberg, 1989:125). The means to exercise control can be derived from "...the domestic authority or right to govern /legitimacy/ on the one hand, and the power or ability to govern on the other" (ibid).

The government is entitled to direct and exercise the state power or authority. But this does not mean the government is the same thing as the state. Government is temporary, while state is permanent. The government is the means by which state authority is brought into operation whereas the state is an abstract entity (Harrison and Boyd, 2003). In this line, Hey wood said that, "in making and implementing state policy, government is the brain of the state, and it perpetuates the state's existence" (2002:88).

Finally, the fourth essential element of the state is its capacity to establish relations with other states. This raises the idea of state's sovereignty. Sovereignty is, according to Weber, "the absolute authority a state holds over a territory and people as well as independence internationally and recognition by other sovereign states as a sovereign state"(1995:1). The state, by virtue of its sovereignty, has the absolute and supreme power over all matters and is not subject to any power outside of itself (Axtman, 2004).

2.2 The Rise of Modern States

The defining features of modern states are their well-established political and administrative apparatus and the existence of clear-cut territorial boundaries. In other words, the modern state differ from the earlier political organizations in that they are characterized by a highly organized political and administrative structure that enforce their authority within defined territory (Buzan and Little, 2000).

The rise of states has related to the growth or organized agriculture along the river valleys. This, in turn, encouraged the permanent settlement of people and the development of politically organized societies (Hay and Lister, 2006). Later on, the ancient Greek and Roman city-states came to exist as self-fledged states that resemble the modern states, rather simply organized communities (Morris, 1998).

In addition, the empires of ancient world had also different form of rule and political formation. According to Morris, "the empires lacked integration that prevented them from developing much political unity", which is the basic feature of modern state (1998:29). The territorial limits of the empires were also not clearly defined boundaries but merely frontiers (ibid).

With the breakdown of empires, the medieval Europe, a political society with a highly fragmented and decentralized political power emerged. Then, according to Axtman, came "the modern state project aimed at replacing the overlapping and multifaceted political relations that characterized medieval Europe through the institutions of a centralized state" (Axtman, 2004:260). Therefore, the rise of modern state was mainly the result of the domination of central authority over fragmented local authorities. Besides this, it was also related with the state authority over multi faceted religious and secular authority relations (Puchala, 1989)

2.2.1 Contending Theories on the beginning of State

Over the past many years, various theories about the origin of state have been developed by political philosophers, theologians, and social scientists. For instance, in ancient times, state was viewed as a natural to organized and settled social life. It was claimed that the state gradually evolved out of earlier forms of settled human communities such as the family, the clan and the tribe. Accordingly, in ancient Greek it was believed that "the state was a natural, inevitable, and dynamic institution" (Khan and Mcniven, 1990:23).

In medieval Europe, again, there was a belief that the state was a divine creation. It was seen as an institution created by God. The belief also gave rise to the theory of 'divine right of kings'. The theory claims that "if the state was of divine origin, then its rulers were naturally vested with a divine authority and sanction of rule" (ibid).

However, later on, as opposed to earlier traditional and religious beliefs, other more rational theories about the origin of the state became popular. One of these theories was a Social Contract Theory. It was developed and popularized in the 17th and 18th centuries. The proponents of this theory were Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau (Heywood, 2002). According to this theory, the state is an artificial creation based on the voluntary agreement among people. It holds that before the emergence of state of affairs, people possessed absolute natural rights and unlimited freedom. But they were not secured and their life and properties were without protection. In short, the state of nature was characterized by anarchy and chaos, in which the powerful exploited the weaker (ibid). As a result, to eliminate this situation, "... people enter to mutual contact or agreement with other to form state and establish government to which they agreed to surrender their freedom in return for security" (Khan and Mcniven, 1990:24). Thus state is created for the sake of people's security and orderly existence.

Another competing theory on the origin of state is the Force or Conflict Theory. Here, the origin of the state is associated with war and conflicts that have been endemic in history of human beings. Hence, "the state originated as the result of Force by the strong over the weak, settled them in a specified territory and arrogated to themselves the power of governing" (ibid). According to this theory, the stateless societies were changed into state due to the power struggles between groups of individuals which resulted in "... a concentration of power in the hands of a particular group who then consolidated their position..." by establishing the state apparatus (Rush, 1992:26).

Based on these both social contract and force theory, the modern state building approaches are developed. These approaches or state building projects are bottom-up and top-down which have their own effects on the state building. Accordingly, the bottom-up approach in state building tends to relate with the social contract theory while the top-down approach more related to the force or conflict theory. Therefore, both approaches have been used in this study because one of the main challenges to re-building state in Somalia is miss-guided externally driven state building project i.e. top-down approach that was totally failed in Somalia context. On the other hand, the most effective approach in state building (in Somalia context) is bottom-up which has brought relative peace and stability to the Somaliland is the part of this study.

In conclusion, the theories discussed above are meant to provide credible explanations as to why and how the state has emerged. But there is no single universally accepted theory about the origins of the state.

In this day, the Modern State has expanded and became a Universal Model. But this model of the state is not the same across the world. This is due to the existence of different historical, social and cultural factors as well as forces. As a result, the States in Africa, Asia and Latin America are different from Europe. These states are largely creations of European colonial powers. Above all, the geographical boundaries, ethnic make-up, and the nature and types of governments of these post-colonial polities reflected the effects of the Impositions of the Imperial powers and their colonial systems (Weber, 2001).

2.3 The Basic Normative Functions of State

This basically related to the roles or responsibilities of the state in the life of its individual members. Then, the question is what should states do? What functions or responsibilities should the state full fill and what not? This has to do with the functionalist approach to the state. There is no common idea about the exact role of state and that led to disagreement to the necessary of it.

Nevertheless, despite the absence of agreement over the exact roles of the state and its government institute. There are certain basic functions or responsibilities which almost all states are at least expected to full fill so as to see confidence as the normative state. These are simply, public goods or collective goods which states provide to their citizens in the daily operations. Accordingly, the primary function of a state is the provision of Security to people and institutional fund with in its territorial boundaries. Here the state is expected to maintain domestic order, law, peace and security and protect its citizens from foreign aggression (Harrison and Boyd, 2003). With this regard, Robert Rotberg agrees that "the most important function of State is security. According to Rotberg, a state is an entity which delivers some positive political goods to its population and the most important political good is security. Avoiding domestic violent threats and preventing crimes and other dangers to the security is a top priority for any state to ensure its sovereignty. As appropriately explained by Rotberg, other political goods can be delivered only when security is provided (Mentes and Hagerty, 2011).

The next essential function of Sovereign Nation- and governance institution is Dispute Settlement or Negotiation through the formulation and execution of legal frameworks. By this definition state sets a recognizable and an enforceable rules of law upon which the state makes authoritative decisions to solve disputes. It also enables the enforcement of voluntary contacts between individuals or groups without restoring to the use of coercive or violent action or force (Eagles, 1999).

In addition to the above, there are also other functions that states are often expected to provide to their people. Thus, the first one needs the state to protect and respect the basic natural and civil rights of its peoples. This public goods "enables citizens to participate freely, openly, and fully in politics and the political process, in order to make decisions with regard to issues of common interests"(Rotberg, 2003:3). Rotberg argues that other important political good for a state is free

participation. In order for a state to function properly, citizens should be able to participate in the political process freely. This participation provides respect and support to key institutions like courts and legislatures, including tolerance to opposition and differences.

Secondly, the states are the primary providers of physical infrastructure such as transportation, communication, water supply and electrical networks. They are also expected to deliver social services like health care and education to their citizens (Lange, 2005). Thirdly, for functioning the economic activities state supplies certain necessary requirements. These include the provision of money, banking system, an enabling fiscal and institutional situation and others. The state also attempts to ensure the normal operations of economic life by taking regulative and managerial mechanisms (Rotberg, 2003).

2.4 Categorization of States

The classification of states is made on the basis of the state's ability and willingness to provide essential functions or 'public goods' associated with "Statehood". These classifications are mainly done for the purpose of this study. Thus, according to Rotberg, the capacity of a State may be categorized with on a state's abilities to reliably provide a number of what he called the 'fundamental political goods', (2003:2). The basket of political common goods that serve as indicators include 'human security', a regularized system of dispute resolution, mechanisms for political participation, and various components of physical infrastructure and social services (ibid). Consequently, the Modern State may be classified into four types. These are 'strong', 'weak', 'failed' and 'collapsed' States based on their abilities to provide vital functions they provide/ not provide to their citizens.

2.4.1 "Strong States"

Strong states are those with high capabilities to provide public goods to their citizens. These States, exercise effective control over their territories and populations. They deliver a large-scale 'public goods' with acceptable quality to their citizens (Abdullahi, 2007). In short, according to Rotberg, "strong states offer high levels of security from political and criminal violence, ensure political freedom and civil liberties, and create environments conducive to the growth of economic opportunity" (2003, :4). The manifestations include among others- presence of impartial judicial system and rule of law are also stand to be the features of strong states. In addition, these states ensure the provision and maintenance necessary physical infrastructure

such as transportation, communication, water, and electrical networks and social services like health care and education (Lange, 2005). On their part, Buzan and Little have also characterized strong states as states with "...high level of socio-political cohesion, are usually democratic, and tend to have peaceful domestic politics" (2000: 255). Hence, a strong state is one with high degree of internal order and peace, and it "... defines itself from within and fills the gap between its neighbors with a solid socio-political presence" (Buzan, 1991:103).

2.4.2 "Weak States"

Contrary to the notion/features of 'strong' or successful states, 'weak states' or "quasi-states" are typically characterized by conflict rampant and competitions over the control of the political and economic arenas, but that conflict is not generally expressed through violence means. Weak states are those states with low capacity and poor performance in their duties to provide fundamental political goods to their citizens (Patrick, 2006). This category of state, according to Rotberg, includes a wide spectrum of state that are "Inherently weak because of geographical, physical, or fundamental economic constraints, basically strong, but temporarily or situational weak because of internal antagonisms, management of flaws, greed, despotism, or external attacks; and mixture of the two. Weak states typically harbor ethnic, linguistic, or other intern communal tensions that have not or yet get thoroughly, became overtly violent" (2003:4)

Such states are characterized by manipulation of extensive criminal acts, absence of the rule of law, violations of fundamental human rights, high level of corruption, and population displacement. Weak states are often ruled by illegitimate, unrepresentative political elites and authoritarian dictatorial regimes (Patrick, 2006; Rotberg, 2003). Besides, weak states are states with low level of internal socio-political cohesion. Hence, they are called 'fragile' states, and this is basically due to their failure "...to integrate society and government, they typically have authoritarian governments and violent domestic politics" (Buzan and Little, 2000:255). Based on this, the most defining feature of weak state is,

Their high level concern with domestically generated threats to the security of the government, in other words, weak states either do not have, or have failed to create, a domestic political, and societal consensus of sufficient strength to eliminate the large scale use of force as major and continuing element in the domestic political life of the nation (Buzan, 1991:99).

Therefore, according to Buzan, a weak state may be defined more as "the gap between its neighbors, with little of political substance underlying the face of internationally recognized statehood"(ibid: 103).

2.4.3 "Failed States"

These states are defined by undergoing continuing violent conflicts. Generally, these states have little or no effective over outlying areas little connections to or support from, most of its citizens (Abdullahi, 2007).The so-called "failed states" are, tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions. In most failed states, government troop's battle armed citizen groups' revolts led by one or more rival factions. Occasionally, the official authorities in a failed state face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrests, different degrees of communal discontent, and a overabundance or plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state (Rotberg, 2003:5).

State failure is "the inability of the institution to control actors and processes within the given (state) territory" (Williams, 2005:1). Then failed state is one which is unable to control its internationally recognized sovereign territory and to guarantee the security of its citizens. Accordingly, unlike strong states,

Failed states cannot control their borders. Often the expression of official power is limited to a capital city and one or more ethnically specific zones. Plausibly, the extent of a state's failure can be measured by how much of its geographical expanse is genuinely controlled (specifically after dark) by the official government (Rotberg, 2003:56).

Here, the idea of control and failure should not be seen as absolute. A failed state, rather, might successfully control some parts of its state territory, but not all of it (Williams, 2005). In a failed state, citizens do not feel safe and secure, since these states are no longer able to function and maintain domestic order and security (Abdullahi, 2007). Thus, citizens are victims of wide spread criminal violence, lawlessness, proliferation of arms and drug trafficking, flourishing of criminal gangs in cities and rural areas and socialized 'anomic behaviors' and by ruling elites (Aguire, 2006;Williams,2005).

In addition, failed states are incapable of providing other essential political and public goods to its citizens or creating the conditions for such provision. They are known by their highly politicized judiciary, internal use of military coercive forces for political ends, non-professional bureaucratic apparatus, and wide spread violation of fundamental human rights such as civil, political and social rights. In short, failed states usually ruled by dictatorial or military regimes (Rotberg, 2003; Williams, 2005; Abdullahi, 2007).

Furthermore, there is a progressive deterioration and destruction of physical infrastructures in failed states. And the capacity of developing education and health facilities and services is increasingly neglected by the Authorities. Moreover, the prevalence of unequal economic opportunities or access to important means of production or basic resources such as land, natural resource public wealth among citizen, manifestation of endemic corruption with a destructive scale and serves economic declines which sometimes leads to chronic food shortage and poverty are among the common manifestation of failed states (Rotberg, 2003).

2.4.4 "Collapsed State"

A collapsed state is an extreme form of a failed state, in which there is a vacuum of legitimate government authority. It is expressed only by existence of territorial area, "a black hole into which a failed policy has fallen" (ibid: 9). In short, a collapsed state is characterized by the absence of functioning central government. According to Raeyaekers, state collapse is "a situation where the structure of authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart ...He further added that,..."there exists several inability to refill the institutional gaps left by withering government structures: the organization and allocation of political assets thus easily fall in to the hands of warlords and gang leaders" (2005:2). In other words, when a state collapse occurs, i.e. when state loses its monopoly over the means of force totally; the non-state armed actors take over the arena.

Hence, they have controlled over some territories within what had been a state, these actors establish their own security system and attempt to provide certain political goods to inhabitants within their respective areas (Rotberg, 2003). Here, the non-state actors, for the sake of economic benefits,

Commonly develop a number of extremely lucrative alliances with external players including transnational crimes syndicates and armies from neighboring states, which at the same time provide an important incentive for the prolongation of armed struggle (Raeymakers, 2005:3).

In addition to this, war lords, though defined as illegitimate and unrecognized, may form their own independent quasi-states. However, regardless of the partition of the collapsed into smaller units ruled by war lords, the situation there is still characterized by the existence of "...disorder, anomic behavior, and the kinds of anarchic mentality and entrepreneurial endeavors-especially gun and drug trafficking-that are compatible with external networks of terror" (Rotberg, 2003:10).

Lastly, none of these state categories characteristics indicated are static. Rather these features/ change with the changes of circumstances, overtime at local, national, regional, international level change in the types of Authorities etc. The feature of failed or collapsed state is real, but not everlasting and permanent. In fact, state failure and collapse are neither inevitable nor unavoidable. State failure is not predetermined, but as compared to strong states, weak states are much easier to fail.

In general, state failure can be prevented, because the root causes of the state failure or collapse are mainly the human factors instead of structural and institutional problems of the state (Rotberg, 2003:10). In short, the only solutions to prevent state failure are identifying the root causes and the nature state of affairs that sustained state failure or collapse.

2.5 An Overview of the Situation and Nature of Pre-Colonial Polities in Africa

Before the arrival of European colonial powers, the societies of African Continent had their own Autonomous polities, which the distinctive indigenous structures and problem solving mechanisms and institutions. There were a variety of social, economic and political organizations that performed a range of political, legal and administrative functions at the local levels (Abenethy, 1988).

In addition, there were also "several polities which have developed their own distinctive types of political structures and practices that could have led the rise of territorially oriented or based

sovereign states" (Warner, 2001:78). But, these were undermined by the European colonial rule which imposed their own structures over that of the African societies.

The modern Nation- State has everywhere in Africa been molded and created mainly on the European model, with all its contradictions for the post-colony (Chatterjee, 1993:14). Put differently, the historical patterns and global conditions which gave rise to the Nation- State and governances in Africa have not been fundamentally altered (Cooper, 2006:183). This is a major limitation of the nationalist response to the colonial intervention (Chatterjee, 1993:34). Nation- State building in the African Continent therefore, operated with in the frame work of a derived borrowed knowledge systems externally, and alien institution and philosophy whose representational structure corresponds to the very structure of power, which intellectual and nationalist political leaders on the continent seek to reject (Chatterjee, 1986).

The continent of Africa currently is home to 55 Sovereign Nation- States. The territorial integrity of almost all contemporary African states and their territorial borders were organized as perceived as very sacred. This principle, enshrined in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU): The OAU 1963, Charter has fundamentally legitimated the colonial created state and heir defined boundaries (Warner, 2001). The post colonial states in Africa were the successors of the colonial state, inherited the political and economic colonial structures and administrative practices.

Africa has inherited the European colonial system of government and administration in their original form based on 'imitated' western derived constitutional principles, created by deploy 'borrowed' technologies of power and administration, merely replacing the personnel Europeans by western educated and trained Africans. The elites of the 'new States' could not think of an entirely new system (Pylee, 1967:1). Having the inherited the western model, 'the state in Africa' remains an imposed institution inappropriate to the objective -reaches conditions of Africa (Cooper, 2006:186).

According to Archie Mafeje (1999) wrote as,

at independence it was assumed that most African polities would evolve towards a unitary nation-state more or less along the same lines as 18th c Europe. Indeed, "Nation-Building" became rallying call among African nationalists

after independence. Apart from European predispositions, this was born of the desire to bring about uniformity in what was believed to be "tribal, or "ethnic" diversity in Africa. This in itself was a reflection of European perception about African social formations. In the end far from solving the problem of diversity or plurality in Africa, this gave rise the invention of even more identities as is attested to by schism and intensified political fragmentation in contemporary Africa. This might appear to be a resurgence of primordial identities, and yet not (Mafeje, 1999:67).

He further wrote,

the constitutions which African governments adopted at independence were written for them by Europeans who, relying on their own historical experience, imposed ready-made formal structures on African political reality. As known this had disastrous effects for which Africans now blamed and judged. Admittedly, Africans are guilty of the worst perversions of the European models of they tried to ape (ibid).

However, it is arguable that, like in so many other important areas, they were misled by departing colonial advisors. Given their objectives situation, which is very un-European like, ascent to power African leaders should have adopted a more substantive approach. This would have made them realize that the (ibid:73) colonial state was an artificial imposition on different peoples with different forms of political organization, and that anti-colonial movement was aimed primarily at regaining lost autonomy, or freedom of choice.

There is a subtle difference between anti-colonialism and replacing the colonial government. The former is the negation, and the latter is a re-affirmation. In redressing past grievances and restoring lost rights, the leaders of the anti-colonial movement would have soon discovered that this was in compatible with a monolithic structure. In other words, it would have necessitated the dismantling of the colonial state"(1999:67-74).

Africa's dependence in the sphere of knowledge on ex-Imperial Rulers has serious implications for the untransformed character of the post- colonial Nation- States, the spread of violent conflicts and the continent's lack of developments. It is the failure to imagine alternative forms of

modern state independent of the European model that underpins Africa's continued dependence on the west for 'inspiration' and 'solution' to its problems. State building and knowledge production in Africa operates within a borrowed context rather than operating endogenous or local knowledge (Kaviraj and Khilnani, 2001).

State transformation is an urgent task on Africa's agenda, and the question of 'Africanizing the state' through endogenous knowledge-production is critical in this regard. Crucial considerations for Africa include: (a) what kind of state should be constructed (b) what kinds of relationships should be forged across stateliness (c) what kinds of recognition within states should be given to the affinities to which the citizens subscribe (Cooper, 2006:186). The political processes in African states should also be reconstituted in a manner that genuinely engages and incorporates their citizens in the state re legitimating process. While their overall frameworks remain largely based on imitations developed in the west, efforts should be made to indigenize these existed African "states" and government system of states by evoking western derived model innovative practices at the local level.

In addition, in the immediate post-cold war period (post 1989 Era), some of weak or quasi-states in Africa have experienced state failure. In countries like, Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leon and the Sudan the formal have failed during the early years of the 1990's (Rotberg, 2003; and Weber, 2001). In the 1990's, these States were characterized by wide spread civil wars in which they lost control over large part of their sovereign states. Moreover, they were also unable to provide state security, stability and basic human well-being for the majority of their citizens. Further, as extreme case, ex- the Republic of Somalia state still exemplified as collapsed state in Africa. This is mainly because, ceased to exist as a functioning central government since 1990. The fall of the dictatorial military government of Siad Barre marked the state failure and the rise of factional groups led by war lords, which fighting to control state political and economic power in Somalia. Though, with the absence of modern government style of institutions, people shifted to rely for the day to day human activities and safety through the already established traditional institutions.

2.6 The General Nature of the Colonially Created Nation-State in Somalia

Before reviewing the essential features of Somali society, it is important to mention the relevant state building perspectives in order to understand the advantage and disadvantage of both Top down and Bottom up state building Approaches. As this study has tried to elaborate one side fit the Westphalia Model state formation which has been imposed on the post-colonial Somali Society has brought nothing important rather than it has created illusion to the Somali society. This model does not match with the traditional Somali society, which never experienced such kind centralized state structure before the advents of the European colonial powers who influenced the pre-existed social order. Therefore, here are two perspectives to state formations are presented briefly. These are Realism and Idealism.

2.6.1 Realism

Realists believe that struggles between states to secure their frequently conflicting national interests are the main action on the world state. Since realist also believe that power determines which country prevails they hold that politics is aimed at increasing power, or demonstrating power.

Given the view that the essence of politics is the struggle for power, realists maintain that the strong countries and their leaders have imposed the particular interests on the weak countries using their military and economic might. According to this perspective the power is key the instrument to the National survival. In short, the powerful nations can impose their own to exhaust other weak independent states that have their own governance system to the contrary of powerful countries. In this regard, Somalia is the one who suffering its sovereignty from the other strong states to secure their national goals. To achieve their national interests the powerful countries imposed their norms on weak states. From this point of view, the national interest can be defined for the most part as whatever enhances or preserves the state's security, it influences, and military and economic power. In the world that exists and probably has always existed, realists would argue, might makes right-at least it makes success (Rourke and Boyer, 1998:17). In short, this view has focused on the global or international norms to create strong central state in the world and to incorporate people with in the global system by international law.

2.6.1 Idealism

Idealists reject the notion that all or the most humans are inherently political predators. Instead, idealists are prone to believe that peoples and their countries are capable of achieving more cooperative, less conflictive relation. In this sense, idealists might trace their intellectual lineage to political philosophers such as Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). He argued in the social contract that humans had joined together in civil societies because they "reached the point at which the obstacles (to bettering their existence) were greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual"(Rouke and Boyer: 18). Like Rousseau, contemporary idealists not only believe that in the past people joined together in civil societies to better their existence; they are confident that now and in the future people can join together to build a cooperative and peaceful global society.

Idealists do not believe that acquiring, preserving, and applying power must be the essence of international relations (Forde, 1995). Idealists argue that, instead of being based on power, foreign policy should be formulated according to cooperative and ethical standards. They believe that humanity can and must successfully seek a new system of world order. Realists have never been comfortable with a world system based on sovereignty, but they now argue that it is imperative to find new organizational paths to cooperation (Rouke and Boyer, 1998:18).

In short, Idealism Theory believes in consent perspective to create a stable society and state. For the Idealists the central argument is cooperation contrary to competition and conflict to the Realism theory. More over Idealists have focused on the interest of the people to build their own state with their interest and let people to form state by themselves. Therefore, according to Idealists view whatever state structures have emanated from the will of the people within the given society. But in the Somali reality there is need transformation in some significant areas. Hence, in addition to the above mentioned theories to state building, here is another alternative theory in the contemporary world. This is the post modernism theory, which is the most suitable perspective to deconstruct pre-existed assumptions.

2.6.3 Post-Modernist Theory

Post-modernist theory is a product of the wide spread disappointment during the last three decades or so with politics and many other aspects of society. At its core, post-modernism holds that reality does not exist as such. Rather, reality is created by the ways that we think and our

discourse (writing, talking) about our world. Post modernists believe that we have become trapped by set ways of conceiving of how we organize and conduct our selves. They wish, therefore, to "deconstruct" discourse so as to escape all our preconceptions. In other words, deconstruction is the research methodology used by post modernists to analyze social phenomena.

There is strong post modernist element in feminist thought. Many feminists, for example, deconstruct our notions of male and female by distinguishing between sex and gender. Sex is biological, post modernists say; gender is attitude and behavioral. As with much of post modernism language is an important element because it stereotypes images. Not long ago, many people would have viewed the phrase "female (sex) warrior (gender)" as incongruent, even an oxymoron. Under the impact of post modern feminist thought, the phrase now seems odd to fewer people and there is much greater care to use non-gender specific words, such as diplomat, instead of gender-specific words, such as states man.

Postmodernism is also important for transnationalism because it seeks to deconstruct the ways that we organize ourselves politically. Post modernists believe that the way that we organize our selves politically around a territory is only an image in our mind reinforced by the way that we discuss politics (Rourke and Boyer, 1998:120).

In short, the aim of this view in this study is to relate the case of Somali society that have been perceived as entirely homogeneous overlooking the heterogeneous nature of minority communities in southern Somalia. Moreover, deconstruction is needed in the areas of male domination over female neglecting their values in Somali society.

2.6.4 State-Society Relations

In the contemporary world, it is very difficult to understand the intensive 'state' without looking its relations with the 'society'. But before directly going to the discussion of state- society relations, let us define the term 'society' brief.

The term 'society' may be defined as "the outer most social structure for a certain groups of individuals who, whatever might be their attitude toward it, view themselves as its members and

experience their identity as being determined by it" (Migdal,1994:18). Then, it is the state that defines these outer most social boundaries with which the people identify and relate themselves. However, it does not mean that the society is simply shaped by the state (ibid).

The state and society are neither organic nor undifferentiated entities. The state includes a complex set of institutions or agencies that operate a different levels and arenas, and interact with society. Similarly the society encompasses, on its part, the social forces or actors. The society involves both informal organizations (ethnic or class movements or patron-client network or others) and formal organizations (such as business and churches) which significantly differ in terms of their purpose, composition and resources (Bratton, 1994).

Based on this, regardless of the claim state centric approach that gives primacy to the state, the state society relation are the dynamic mutual interactions of the state and society (Kohli and Shue, 1994). Therefore the relations between state and society are mutually transforming. This is due to the fact that the outcomes of the relations, seldom reflect the goals and interests of one or the other (Lange, 2005). The interactions between state agencies and social actors are determined by the struggles and accommodations over numerous arenas within the society. Then, these interactions in the multiple arenas cumulatively reshape the state or the society (Kohli and Shue, 1994).

There is a necessary mutual relationship between the state and the society. They are or should be looked upon as constituent parts of any social formation. At the best times the state is the product of the society in which it is found, and should reflect the overriding ethos of that society. When this link does not exist, then there is reason to believe that there is something fundamentally wrong with affected social formation.

Note that there can be a society without a state but no state without a society. This is because the state is the creation of the society. Here, we should be careful not to confuse governments with the state. The difference between the state and the government is already explained in this paper in the elements of state. Hence, government is one of the elements of the state and it is an agent of the state.

In general, there is a dynamic link between the state and the society; they cannot be treated as mutually exclusive. In fact, they can be looked up on the political character of any emerging

social formation. In the absence of such an interaction we should expect a prolonged political crisis, if not threatened social disintegration. But under all conditions civil society remains the generative force (Mafeje, 1999:80).

2.7 The Early Occupation of Somali Coast

Here, this study has tried to display the situation in coastal areas before the arrival of European colonial power and partition of Somalia in their respective areas. The early foreign occupation of the coastal areas had its own social, political, economic and cultural effects in the Somali coastal communities in particular and in the whole Somalia in general, in which the north and the south have their own distinctive way of life.

The occupation of the peninsula up to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean coasts brought the Somali into intense and sustained contact with Persian and Arab immigrants who had formed a string of settlements along the coast. These immigrants almost certainly predate Islam. The regular traffic of people, commerce, and ideas between the two shores of Red Sea is known to extend back to pre historic times.

Somali contact with coastal Muslims began near the end of the eighth century and Somali society in a number of creative ways. The contact introduced Islam, which was to become the universal faith of the Somalis. The beginnings of Islamic culture and technology have opened new horizons of initiative and action to the Somali society. The contact also led to the development of a new hybrid culture-the Somali version of the Swahili further south-in which cities , such as Zayla and Berebera in the north, Mogadishu, Merka, and Baraawe in the south emerged as emporia of trade and ideas, connecting the Somali coast to regional trends. Finally contact with coastal communities helped transform the Somali economy from single mode based on pastoralism tone in which pastoralism went hand in hand with long distance trade. These elements had stimulated to create a centralized state in the history of Somali for next centuries (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:15).

The Portuguese arrival along to the east African coast began when Vasco da Gama on his way to Indian, rounded the cape of Good Hope in 1497 and stumbled on the rich trading cities of eastern Africa until 1728 when the last Portuguese foot hold was dislodged from the Great Mombasa

coast of Fort Jesus by Omani and Swahili resisters, the Portuguese had enjoyed what amounts to two centuries of open season on East Africa.

The Portuguese plunder of Somali coast and destructed vital trading coastal cities. For instance, Berbera, Zayla Baraawe sacked and razed to the ground in 1518. In the same year Mogadishu was attacked but not ruined. In mean time, Baraawe "great city of fine stone and mortar house" was pillaged by Portuguese (ibid: 17).

Having ousted the Portuguese, the Omani ruled the Somali coast along with much of the East African coast. Although Omani authority on the Benaadir coast continued until the "European Scramble" in 1880s, Omani rule throughout was a light-handed one. As long as the Somali cities paid their yearly tribute, flew the Omani flag, and accepted Omani overlord ship, the Omanis allowed the Somalis to run their internal affairs. The role of the Omani governors in Mogadishu, Merka, and Baraawe was largely a ceremonial one. However, when Omani authority was challenged, the Omanis could be severe.

In the 19century, the Somali Benaadir coast came under the nominal authority of the sultans of Zanzibar. Zanzibari sultans, like their Omanis forebears, had neither the incentive nor the resources to take direct control of their Benaadir possessions, a circumstance that predisposed them to rule through Somalis intermediaries (ibid: 18).

From the fifteen century onwards, the northern ports of Zayla and Berbera played an important role in the Arab economy. Military equipment, slaves, hides and skins gums, ostrich feather, and ivory were traded at these ports. On the Benaadir coast, especially in Mogadishu but also in Merka and Baraawe, a lively trade with China, India, and Arabia is well recorded beginning in the fourteen century (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:101).

Finally, this brief history which has been mentioned above is mainly to create awareness that how Somali coastal areas had experienced various political, social, economic and cultural influences from very early periods. Hence, the Somali society in coastal towns had experienced centralized state structure before the advent of European colonial powers. But many social anthropologists and historians did not want to study the background history of Somali society before European Colonialism and they regarded Somali society as to homogenous in terms of

mode of production, political, social and cultural aspects. These scholars did not need to accept the heterogeneous reality of Somali society as many aspects.

However, in the 19th century, the whole Somalia including the coastal areas came under the control of European colonial powers. The European Imperial powers had introduced their own Westphalia state model to Somali society. This model mainly undermined the Somali people's traditional governance system and had created social, political and economic instability and disorder in that country. Therefore the western driven state structure has become the part and parcel of present problems of Somali society. The current Somali instability and disorder is not originally created by Somali people but rather it is the product of colonial misruling. Here are some negative impacts of colonial legacy on the Somali society.

2.8 European Colonial Legacies on Somali Society

'Colonialism' in Eastern part of Horn Africa had significant negative political, economic and administrative impacts for Somalia. The European Imperial power Scramble for Africa, in the late 19th century, split Somalia and Somali peoples in five different colonially created polities namely Southern Somalia ruled by Italy; northern Somalia administered by Britain; Djibouti ruled by France, and Ogaden fall under Ethiopian control. They were paralleled into four different countries including Djibouti, Ethiopia (Ogaden), Kenya (north frontier district), and Somalia (Lewis, 1988).

The Britain's in the Somalia region stemmed from her control of Aden which had been acquired by force in 1839 as a posting on the short route to India. The British government was only interested in the Somaliland's Beef supplier as a necessary supplementary to the garrisoning of Aden. To achieve this interest, Britain established a Somaliland protectorate in 1887.

On the other hand, the main British rival in the region was France which was able land at the port of Obock in 1859 and since this time on wards started to challenge Britain in the region. However, in 1888 both Britain and France reached an agreement in which they defined their protectorate borders between Zayla and Djibouti.

Finally, Italy was able to take the possession of southern Somalia, the Benaadir region from the sultan of Zanzibar in 1892 (Brons; 2001 and Lewis; 2002). In this way the colonial powers had divided Somalia and its people in different provinces.

Among others, the European colonial powers had bad negative impacts on territoriality, institution building and in ideology. As they are imposed by European colonial powers, Somali people failed to realize these vital factors in state.

Based on three factors, Brons analyzed the transformation of Somali society from a stateless to state. These three factors are territory, institutions and idea of the state, which were defined as crucial for the state formation.

Regarding territory, the introduction of international borders by colonial powers, splitting the Somali region into five parts, created a fact of international law with far-reaching implications. Somali people, clans, and communities were only marginally involved in this process through protection treaties. The concept of an exclusive or undivided colonial state sovereignty of the Somali people that consisted de facto of divided sovereign political entities. The Somali concept of territoriality, reflecting the environmental conditions, economic adaptive strategies and socio-political structures of Somali society described earlier, was in effect completely ignored in the process of colonial partition (Brons, 2001:154).

The colonially imposed institutions on Somali society are very challenges. Accordingly, the introduction of new institutions that were rooted in the modern state system partly marginalized or decreased the actual power of political authority of pre-state times, such as sultans. A central judiciary was introduced that referred to colonial laws of British and Italian origin and only partly to customary and Sharia laws. The two legal systems, the pre-state and the state system, were not necessarily in conflict with each other, but the establishment of colonial state law introduced a perception of the superiority of the modern over the so-called traditional system.

Centralized colonial administration was likewise super imposed on localized clan- or village-rooted administrative patterns and structures. These political institutions claimed an undivided sovereign authority over the Somali people who, by then, had become Somali colonial subjects. With regard to control over the use of force, the establishment of colonial policy and military units prepared the ground for the diminishing authority of the elders in clans and village communities.

In the sense of ideology, the state that might have been able to bind the Somali people together on the eve of independence, including the people who are living outside Somalia. The colonial

heritage established a pattern of rising Somali political nationalism. This, however, did not necessarily reduce social fragmentation within Somali society. Instead, new layers of fragmentation were added through five different states. Another aspect of social fragmentation that was consolidated rather than reduced through colonial policies was the rift between the nomadic Samale and the settled Sab populations. Colonial policies in the south sanctioned discrimination against settled and particularly Somali-Bantu communities (Brons, 2001:156).

2.9 Society and Culture

This thesis first tries to argue about Somali society with two perspectives. The first one is the traditional social anthropologists view and the second one the contemporary view. In this what this study meant that the modern or contemporary view argues that the old notion about Somali homogeneous view has to be deconstructed.

The first traditional school of thought was led by Lewis and his followers. In 1961 Lewis wrote a book entitled "pastoral democracy". Since the appearance of *A Pastoral Democracy* in 1961, Lewis work has promoted passion and certainly almost all of the handful of scholars of area have taken his assumptions, methods, and conclusions not only as the gate way to a comprehension of the field, but also as truism that are indispensable to any intelligent discussion of Somali life. For instance, two notable researchers concluded a recent monograph by reasserting the doyen's insight.

David Laitin and Siad Samatar(1987) wrote, "For years the eminent European anthropologists Enrico Cerulli and I.M. Lewis have been telling us that to understand Somali politics, it is necessary to understand Somali clanship and kinship". But the established scholarly paradigm suffers from grave deficiencies. These are:

1. Notwithstanding its identifiable distance from the ideology of imperialism and attention to, for example, the import of Somali nationalism, there is powerful undertow that seems to pull the tradition's moorings toward that same epistemology. For instance, while Lewis and many of his epigones aim countless salvos at colonial mischief in horn, such as the debilitating partition of the Somali territory, there is little evidence in this writings of an awareness of the structural basis for the European onslaught of Africa.

2. This school treats pastoralism as a historical and unchanging set of relationships among members of such a community and their relationship with nature.

3. Because these scholars are captivated by partially open and participatory nature of early pastoral political culture and its strong cast of primitive communitarianism, they tend to overlook internal, and newer, contradictions.

4. Most of this literature, despite rare moments of overt advocacy, sees Somali nationalisms the optimum sources of human early for development.

5. In conclusion, this kind of Somali studies, notwithstanding some of its earlier accomplishments, seems to get bogged down in the same difficulties.

Contrary to the established traditional school, the contemporary view argues or suggests that kinship is not characteristically unique to Somali culture; rather, it is a form of human association identifiable with communal societies not yet thoroughly raked and, subsequently, atomized by the forces of commodity production and exchange. Consequently, this view starts with thinking a fundamental conceptual distinction between kinship and clanism.

Kinship denotes a central relationship buttressed by both blood-ties and deeply revered tradition and custom (Xeer) –one which mediates among individuals or groups. This is part of dominant ideology in some pre-capitalist social formations. Clanism on the other hand, is the transformation of kinship by detaching blood-ties from tradition and custom. This bifurcation (divided into branches) results from forceful intrusion of an alien type of social and economic organization and its concomitant (accompany) norms and values (Samatar,¹ 1989).

The implications are many. For first, given the separation, tradition and custom that have seen a society through centuries now atrophy (wasting away of body part) and wither away; and unhinged blood-ties get hitched to the new material conditions. Second, deprived of the attach of archetypal myth and devoid of alternative form of genuine and codified lore-such as constitution-clanism becomes dangerous loose cannon, partly responsible for falling apart of society in the area.

¹ North East African Studies by A.I. Samatar, 1989 Vol.11, no.1.

It seems to this school of thought, then, that while one could read Somali history back to an ancient and pure age, contemporary society has gone through deep mutations. For instance, there is evidence of gender inequality and increasing marginalization of women-one of the most neglected aspects of an intensity patriarchal culture; insertion into the international order-initially, to the colonialism or imperialism; and the post-colonial state and its economy. These are consequences of struggles between social forces caused by a particular kind of socio-economic development (Samatar, 1989:7-8).

To consolidate the above argument, this study has made focus on Lewis's and Samatar's debate on the identity of Somali society. Accordingly, Lewis argued that Somalis receive their fundamental social and political identity at birth through membership of their father's clan. Clan identity is traced exclusively in the male line through their father's paternal genealogy. Children at an early age are taught to recite all their paternal ancestor of their "clan-family". This is a technical term, which he uses to designate the largest clan groupings in the Somali nation. These largest nations are Dir, Darod, Isaq, Hawiye, and Digil and Rahawyen (Samatar, 2006)

Here, what Lewis failed to address is, mentioning the coastal communities as insignificant social classes of Somali society. These coastal communities are economically very important from the early period to now. Another problem of Lewis is regarding Somali as unique in mode of production, in which he could not address the dynamic nature of Somali society. There is also another area where he ignored to mention that the impact of colonial legacy in Somali society's way of life.

On the other hand, Samatar argues that Somali genealogical groups are the same ethnic and racial group. His thesis is that Somali identity is more complex than genealogy. The key distinction he makes is between genealogical heritage and clan politics. He accepts the importance of genealogy but argues that if it were the only item needed to define a Somali's identity, then other constituent elements of Somalis' social and cultural repertoire would not have developed. Thus, maintains that the key ingredients that defined traditional Somali identity was shared language, culture, religion, and means of livelihood, in addition to genealogy. Genealogy is one of these components; and its role was dependent on context. Furthermore, he notes that social and cultural variation among Somalis is regional rather than genealogical (Samatar, 2006).

Samatar also argued that Lewis and his followers exaggerated Somali's homogeneity by overlooking the existence of significant communities in the south of the country who have different histories and social organizations. Despite such variations, the vast majority of the people in the country share the same fundamental social, cultural and religious values that defined the nature of traditional Somali identity. Islam, Somali language, genealogy, oral and poetic literature, Xeer (customary law), and sharing material risks. Collectively these traits bounded Somali identity. Somali genealogies embedded in that old tradition, which was grounded in inclusive shared values, must not be conflated with instrumentally induced recent political practice and concept-clanism. This practice was invented by competing elite factions in their struggle to illegitimately privatize public resources, including political power (ibid)

According to Samatar, clanism (the modern Somali behavior), as the political mechanisms for manipulating community sentiment along sectarian lines, is one of the elements of Somali tradition but it never induced the kind of confusion that ruins this society. The clan centered misrepresentation of the dynamics of the Somali culture and politics leads to the invention of racial and ethnic categories that have no bearing on Somali social history.

Finally, though Lewis's contribution is paramount in reflecting Somali social, cultural, political and economic feature, he could not insight the dynamic nature of Somali people. Even if he wrote "pastoral democracy in 1961". However, the term of democracy does not fit with modern sense of democracy because it failed to include important social groups, women. This democracy constitute only male. This and other related situations become the part and parcel of current problem in Somalia.

2.9.1 Traditional Division of Somali Nation

One feature of Somali society that strikes the eyes of even the most casual observers is the homogeneity of Somali culture. The Somalis essentially constitute of one nationality state, and one of their major post independence predicaments has been, ironically, to create a large state whose boundaries embrace those of the entire nation. Whether Somali ethnic and cultural uniformity has proved a blessing or their missing kin in Kenya and Ethiopia have trapped them in unrewarding friction with their African neighbors (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:21).

However, as many scholars argue that Somali society are not entirely homogeneous. They are heterogeneous in certain areas in terms geography, economy, language (to some extent), and politics. Here, this study briefly presents traditional divisions of Somali society.

2.9.1.1 The Pastoral-Nomadic Communities

The Somalis have been called a nation of nomads whose world is defined by a wary cycle of transhumant migrations between camp sites, water wells, and grazing grounds. These pastoralist groups provide the stereotype of traditional Somali socio-political organization. The main branches of these groups include Dir, Isaq, Darod and Hawiye (Lewis, 2008:4). Somalia is the only sub-Saharan African state in which an estimated two-third of the population earns their livelihood from animal husbandry and related enterprises. The pastoral attitude and outlook wield a pervasive influence in national life, impinging on plans for economic development as well as on almost every case of social interaction (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:22).

The Somalis raise a variety of animals including cattle, sheep, goats, and camels. Although cattle, goat, and sheep herding play a considerable part in the Somali economy, the camel is the true hero of Somali material life. The camel forms the mainstay of Somali pastoralism, the "mother of man "in the words of the Sayyid Mohammed Abdille Hassan, the great Somali poet, patriot, and warrior who is universally regarded as the founder of modern Somali nationalism (ibid).

Here one should not miss that the ecology the contributing factor to give birth both pastoralist community and agriculturalists in the north and south respectively. The arid nature of land in the north creates a favorable condition for moving people with their herds in search of pasture and water whereas along the rivers of Juba and Shebelle there are settled agriculturalist communities.

2.9.1.2 Agriculturalist Community

The distinction between nomad and cultivator coincides roughly with most marked internal cultural division in the Somali nation. The fertile area between the Shebelle and Juba Rivers is occupied mainly by farmers and agro-pastoralists who, while they often understand the standard spoken Somali current elsewhere, speak their own distinctive tongue, known as Af-Maymay. These agriculturalist community form two confederations of clans called Digil and Rahawyen, or Digil-Mirifle, known collectively, in some parts of Somalia, as Sab. As the name Rahawyen

suggests, the Sab are of mixed origin and include elements drawn from almost all the other Somali groups, as well as some Oromo and East African Bantu (Lewis, 2008:4).

The Digil Mirifle social structure is based on the adoption or assimilation foreign clans men to a local clan core whose names and identity the immigrants assume, thus acquiring local land rights. The Digile- Mirifle is thus the most open and politically hospitable of all Somali groups. Indeed their heterogeneous 'melting pot' organization makes them theoretically an ideal model for Somali nationalism (ibid).

The emphasis on pastoralism in Somali life and knowledge should not lead us to underestimate the influence of other elements on Somali society. The culture of southern Somalia, for example (and to some extent that of the packets of fertile lands between the towns of Gabi lay and Boorama in the northwest), has a strong agricultural component. Here, wealth and its attendant social prestige derive from the ownership of cultivable land, not the possession of a herd of milch-camels. Where in the pastoral north and center of the country the popular proverb holds that "camel lessens is death", landlessness promises a similar misfortune in the south. This contrast in life-style and economic pursuit is, once again, largely a function of ecology (Laitin and Samatar 1987:27).

The extended tradition of agricultural economy gives southern Somalia some unique cultural patterns. In contrast, for example, to the segmented, decentralized social world of the pastoral regions, chieftaincies and chiefly institutions proliferate in southern Somalia, especially among the Digil and Rahawyen clans. The organizing principle of clan life in this region is the central lineage, whose position of social and political primary stems largely from its spiritual charisma or ritual attachment to the land rather than from any genealogical preponderance (as among pastoralists) (Samatar, 2006).

Chiefs of agricultural clans, needless to say, exercise real authority as compared to the largely ceremonial- and therefore powerless-sultans of pastoral clans. Moreover, although genealogy and genealogical relations serve to shape group identity and loyalty among Somalis in general, these do not play as crucial role in defining a group's corporate existence in settled communities as they do among pastoral ones. Unlike pastoral clans where an individual place in a group and the group's relation to the larger society is primarily determined by blood ties, agricultural clans tend

to consist of units of village communities that combine around a central lineage by reasons of economic interest or spiritual primacy or both (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:29).

2.9.1.3 Minority communities

These main cultural divisions –nomadic pastoralist and cultivator-include significant numbers of people generally referred to by Somalis by a variety of derogatory names associated with servile status, and known by foreigners as 'minorities'. These do not strictly belong genealogically to the two main populations, but live in association with them. Physically the most distinctive are those known generally as Jareer (or 'hard haired')- Somalised Bantu, who derive from pre-Somali populations, and more recent immigrant Eastern Swahili groups originally brought to Somalia as slaves (Lewis, 2008:6).

These minorities lead their sedentary life along Juba and Shabelle River valleys in the southern Somalia. Most of the Bantu resident in the Shabelle river valley are indigenous to Somali's. On the other hand, the Bantu sub-stock living in the Juba river valley is largely made up of the descendents slaves from Tanzania and Malawi (O.Eno, 2004). Various hybrid Somali-style groups have developed in the inter-riverine area and along the Shebelle and Juba river basins. Some are bilingual in southern Somali (Af-Maymay) and Swahili (Lewis, 2008:6).

Due to their lack of political and military power, the minorities has been and continue to be economically exploited, their human and civil rights violated, and politically and culturally subjugated with impunity by dominant clan militias and religious extremist groups. The international communities, including donors and non-governmental organizations that in good faith provide legitimacy and development assistance in the south through disingenuous Somali government agencies and NGOs, could very well be unintentionally contributing to the subjugation and exploitation of the minorities (Farah et al,2002).

During the savage wars waged by Hawiye and Darod war lords and their clan militias in southern Somalia after the collapse of the state in 1990, these traditionally despised groups, largely dependent on farming for their livelihood and having no armed militias to defend them, were mercilessly slaughtered, and many sought asylum overseas. Indeed several large group of Jareer eventually found refuge in the United States, where they were welcomed as victims of racist operation (Lewis, 2008:7).

The dominant clans have conspired with one another to create and maintain a social, civil and economic system in Somalia in which they place themselves at the top of society while minority groups occupy the lower rungs. The unwritten but systematic allocating of national wealth and opportunities to the dominant clans resulted in the minorities being methodically discriminated against or frightened from accessing higher education, prominent government posts, and political representation (M. Eno, 2008).

Finally, this section of this thesis has tried to address that Somali people are not entirely homogenous in terms of political, economic and culture. In this regard, the pastoralist, agriculturalist and other occupational communities have their own distinctive way of life. Hence, one has to accept the truth of heterogeneous feature of Somali society in order to address the problems of Somalia. The myth of one people, one culture that highly propagated by Somali Nationalists and Western scholars should be reconsidered to accept the distinctive nature of Somali society. It is clear that the nomadic or pastoralist community constitute a large number of Somali societies. However, the southern agriculturalist and coastal business communities have a paramount effect in Somali economy. Therefore, the interest of these communities should be respected and treated as their counter parts in order to stabilize the situation in the whole of Somalia.

The Somalis are usually considered as a homogeneous society, though this has become contentious. They share the history of long-term occupation of common territory, mainly an arid semi-desert, generally called the Somali peninsula. The people of Somali speak same language, follow same religion and practice common culture and tradition (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). Thus, they are attributed with having a common national identity. In addition, the Somalis have also a common sense of kinship which extends to all Somalis (Mansur, 1995b). They share according Laitin and Samatar, "a deeply held belief that nearly all Somalis descend from the same source and share therefore drawn together by emotive bonds of kinship and genealogical ties" (1987:21).

Nevertheless, the Somalis are deeply divided along clan lines. Clanship, through a system of segmental lineage, is the defining feature of the Somali social system. Accordingly, an individual member of the society is defined by his or her genealogical tree (Lewis, 1961). Based on these the Somali society is divided into six main clan families. Among these the Darod, Hawiye, Isaq

and Dir are largely pastoral nomads. The remains clan families are the Rahawyen and Digil are mainly agricultural communities (Laitin and Samatar, 1987).

2.9.2 Clan System

The clan system is the most defining criterion of the Somali social system and organization. According to Lewis, the term clanship refers to "corporate agnatic identity at all levels of political cleavage" (1961:4). The functional basis of Somali society is an agnatic kinship organization. The relationships between all social units are in principle expressed genealogically in terms of agnatic descent from eponymous ancestors (Lewis, 1955). In short, clan affiliation is highly interlinked with social, economic and political life of the Somali society.

The Somali society, in terms of social organization, is a segmentary lineage society. Hence the above larger families are divided into clan family, clan primary lineage or sub-clan, Dia-Paying group and immediate family (Brons, 2001). As determined individual's membership of lineage is determined patrilineal descent (tol). Internally, the whole structure is characterized by a complex web of lineage ties (Lewis, 1961). As far as the levels of political identity are concerned, Somalis are loyal primarily not to the clan family, rather first to their immediate family. Accordingly, they "usually identify themselves as members of even more inclusive entities, beginning with their extended family and extending outward through their Dia-paying group and sub-clan up to the clan family level" (Brons,2001:100).

Therefore, the commitment to any level of lineage membership is fluid. Thus, the Somali society is characterized by a changing system of lineage attachment and constantly shifting political alliances (Laitin, 1977). However, regardless of this "the most binding and most frequently mobilized loyalty is to 'Dia' paying" (Lewis, 1961:11).

On the other hand, there is a difference between the pastoral and agricultural clans with regard to the importance of clan affiliation in shaping their social, economic and political life. Accordingly, "for the pastoral clans, the primary perception of social reality is constructed along patrilineal clan affiliation as it defines the rights, duties and securities of people in the social, political and economic spheres" (Brons, 2001:107). In case of agricultural communities, however, "the importance of clan structure must be seen in relation to the importance of the village" (ibid). In other words, the social and political activities of the agricultural communities

are organized in relation to ritual attachment to the territory that they inhabited for generations (Laitin and Samatar, 1987; Brons, 2001).

2.9.2.1 Territorial Distribution of Somali Clans

The original territorial distribution of Somali clans has been transformed during recent decades and is no longer as distinct as it was at the end of the 19thc. Still, in the contemporary political setting clans do claim specific territories, which refer back to traditional rights of access and control (Brons, 2001:101).

However, the Somali nation as a whole thus consists of six divisions, which are to some extent geographically distinct. The main Dir Clans, principally the Esa and Gadabursi, are Harar-Borama-Zeila area; but the Biamal are a historically important Dir group based round Merca in the southern Somalia. The neighbors of the Dir in the North West are the Isaq, whose center is now the Somaliland of Republic. The Darod, the largest and most widely distributed of all the Somali groups, inhabited the north eastern (the present Puntland), north eastern Kenya and the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia (western Somalia). The Hawiye clan in turn occupy the Hiran and Mudug regions of the Somalia and part of the Benaadir (or southern coastal littoral and its hinterland), where Mogadishu, the capital city is located. Beyond Mogadishu, Hawiye clans stretched across the Shebelle River into the region occupied by the Digil and Rahawyen, where some have become Farmers (Lewis, 2008:5).

The Sab, or Rewin, with their main sub-groups Digil and Mirifle, are cultivators who live settled communities in the inter-riverine areas between the Shebelle and Juba River. Their major town is Baidoa (Brons, 2001:101). Note that the geographical division underlying the clan structure as presented above reflects the strong holds and traditional locations of the different Somali clans. However, underwent transformation during the last four decades, People have always within and outside the Horn. Furthermore, there have been larger-scale factors that have altered the territorial distribution of clan families since independence. Such factors like wave of migration, drought that created difficult life situation for pastoralists, internal migration in the Somali region aggravated due to Somali Ethiopian war of 1977/78(ibid:103). This contemporary dynamic situation disturbed the healthy traditional way of life of Somali clans.

2.9.3 Traditional Political and Legal System

As mentioned in the preceding section, Somali politics is defined by the clan system. The political units are founded on the basis of political clanship. However, the political clanship alone does not explain the Somali politics. Thus, it has to be complemented by explicit contract called Xeer.²

2.9.3.1 Clanship and Contract

Clanship and contract are fundamental principles in the constitution of Somali political units. For clanship alone neither explains political solidarity, nor does contract act by itself. It is only when both clanship and contract taken together that it is possible to understand the political institutions of the pastoralists (Lewis 1961: 162).

To understand how these two distinct principles interact and jointly contribute to the political solidarity of groups it is first necessary to consider the meaning of the word Xeer. In short, it is contract, agreement or treaty in the bilateral sense. It can be described as unwritten but formal political contract including the statement of common responsibilities and norms of conduct as well as fixed penalties for crimes (Brons, 2001:120). For contractual obligations may be entitled by a prior agreement binding the ancestors of persons or groups. And agreements can be contracted into and contracted out of. As need arises the terms of contracts are abrogated, existing treaties modified or withdrew, and new agreements made. The majority of Xeer agreements binding groups relate principally to collective defense and security and to political cohesion in general (Lewis, 1961:162).

By the extension Xeer means customary procedure founded up on contractual agreement. In its widest sense, both clan and Xeer are describing general cultural features of Somali life whose concepts emphasis security and cohesion of Somali people. The difference is that clan/tol/ solidarity derives from agnatic status in the lineage system and Xeer from egalitarian contract. Both are complimentary. Xeer then denotes a body of explicitly formulated obligations, rights and duties. According to Lewis, Xeer "binds people of the same treaty (Xeer) together in relation to internal delicts and defines their collective responsibility in external relations with other

²The Xeer is a customary code and procedure founded upon contractual agreement, and denotes a body of explicitly formulated obligations, rights and duties. It binds people of the same treaty (Xeer) together and defines their collective responsibility in external relations with other groups (Lewis, 1961:161)

groups" (Lewis, 1961:162). Further he also characterized Xeer as a sort of social contract which did not lead to the establishment of a state (ibid: 3).

In Somali society, at all levels of lineage segmentation, Xeer can be made modified or abrogated as mentioned above. But it is entered and enforced commonly at the level of Dia paying group (Lewis 2002). Here the Xeer agreement operates in the context of an ad hoc meeting of clan elders, called Shir Council. The deliberative Shir council meets in order to settle disputes or to decide on criminal accusations, or end violent conflict between rival clans. In pre-state Somali society the informal Shir-council is considered the fundamental institution of government (Lewis, 1961; Laitin and Samatar, 1987; and Brons, 2001). The Shir council "has the right to declare war or to make peace. The Shir councils sometimes arrange for settlement of debts incurred collectively in trade. In the dry season, the construction and maintenance of wells and the regulation of watering are considered; and in all seasons movement to new grazing areas is debated (Brons, 2001:111). In the discussion of Shir-council all male members are allowed to participate. However, the individual's age, wealth, and knowledge of customary and religious law, bravely and oral poetry determine, the value of this vote (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). The Shir council meetings are presided over elected Sultans (ibid).

However, it should be noted that the Shir is not an institution of continuous jurisdiction, but an ad hoc gathering responding to particular needs. In the case of conflict, special committees are formed at Shir-council meetings. These are the highest traditional authority and are called guurti. The guurti council of elders is needed to solve the conflict or reach at compromise (Brons, 2001:111).

The traditional Somali conflict resolution mechanisms are embedded in the clan structure. It is also important to differentiate between types of conflict. Conflict between pastoral clans mostly occurs over control grazing territories, problems with common exploitation of water resources, particularly deep wells, and criminal activities such as looting of livestock. Conflicts in areas where agro-pastoralists and farmers meet tends to involve land disputes, infringement of grazing reserves, a destruction of parts of the harvest by livestock, and occupation of farmland (Ibid:110). In order to solve these disputes, both customary and Sharia law were employed by the clan elders. These laws included legal matters emanating "from resource-competition over land, pasture or water, family affairs, criminal offences and compensation payments"(ibid: 120). In

cases of unresolved conflicts, there was an ad hoc panel arbitrator that had power to decide upon legal issues (Lewis, 1961). Hence, in pre-colonial period, most legal affairs were determined by Wadaado or by sheiks in nomadic areas. In agricultural villages and coastal towns there were permanent traditional local courts controlled by Kadis (Brons, 2001).

Another traditional political unit in Somali society is Dia paying groups. The compensation for physical injuries and homicides is based on the Sharia, being assessed by sheiks and government Kadis according to standard shafite authorities. The Sharia tariffs apply generally with local variations and the specific compensation rates embodied in the Xeer treaties of different groups are based upon them. The rates most generally current today in northern Somaliland are 100 camels for the homicide of a man and 50 camels for a woman (Lewis, 1961:162). The blood money payment rests on the understanding that the clan compensates for a homicide committed by one of its members. The perception collective responsibility often leads to acts of revenge that are in turn directed against a clan as a whole. This a major factor in the dynamics of violence that unfolds in crisis situations (Brons, 2001:120).

2.9.3.2 Pre- Colonial Somali Political Structures

As far as the political structure was concerned, the traditional Somali society experienced various forms of political institutions. For instance, the pastoral-nomads lacked centralized government. There were simply ad hoc councils headed by nominal sultans. Thus, they had no formal and stable authority structure and roles (Lewis, 1957). According to Laitin and Samatar, the political structure of the nomadic society was characterized by "...a lack of institutionalized authority rules..." (1987:42). In short, there was no clearly defined and instituted hierarchy of authority. This absence of well-defined and stable political structure is mainly explained in terms of "...the extreme fluidity of political groupings"(Laitin, 1977:27).

Hence, Lewis also characterized the pastoral Somalis as "...extreme independent and individualistic. If they subject to authority and it was undermined by the shifting character of the nomad's political allegiance..." (1961:1). Thus, the resulting political structure were dynamic and anarchic (Laitin and Samatar, 1987) in addition to this the pastoral-nomads also lack a clearly defined political structure, hence, failed to define their boundaries (Lewis, 1957).

Therefore, although it seems consistent with their economic system and need to adapt to the arid environment, the pastoral-nomads had developed no permanent and centralized institutions of government (Doornbos, 1993). As a result, the pre-colonial nomadic Somali society could be taken as a stateless society (Brons, 2001).

On the other hand, the agricultural communities had relatively more formal and hierarchal political structure (Lewis, 1961; Doornbos, 1993). There were governmental structures with more formal councils and chiefs. There was hierarchy of officials, and the sultans were exercising greater authority (Lewis, 1957). The agricultural communities, thus, were organized as chiefdoms. They experienced some sort of "...chieftaincies and chiefly institutions..." (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:28). They were less individualistic and had a sense of respect for authority (Laitin, 1957)

In addition, they had strong ties to their particular locality and developed territorially structured units (Lewis, 1957). Accordingly in areas between Shebelle and Juba rivers, there are sultanates, such as Ujuuraan and Geledi sultanates that had evolved and attained high level of centralized political authority (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). Therefore, the sedentary Somali society was not totally without relatively well-organized political institutions. Rather they could be considered as living partly in state like entities and partly in a pre-state society (Brons, 2001).

Furthermore, apart from the nomadic and agricultural Somali societies, the coastal communities had developed their particular types of political system. The coastal communities were heavily intermixed with immigrants from Arab and Persian (Lewis, 2002). The communities give rise to the city-states with a highly centralized political authority (Lewis, 1961; Laitin and Samatar, 1987). These city-states were mainly sultanates or emirates. They developed around coastal religious or trading places. They had some form of government, Islamic legal system, and educational institutions (Brons, 2001). Accordingly, cities like Zeila, Berbera, Mogadishu, Merka, Brava during their age of economic and religious significance, "...either developed into centralized states themselves or inspired state system further inland"(Laitin and Samatar, 1987:10).

To sum up, with regard to the political structure, the pre-colonial Somali had involved not a single but a variety of political entities, some more formalized than others. In addition, in the

mean time, there were no signs of a Somali state formation, which could have brought the nomadic, agricultural and coastal population under single centralized political authority (Doornbos, 1993; Brons, 2001). There was no well established political organization that evolved the politics, economy and social makeup of the Somali population in an integrated and politically united manner (Brons, 2001)

2.10 State Building Approaches

Before closing this chapter, this study has tried to assess the state building approaches and their impact in Somali society context. Thus, in the contemporary world there are two state building approaches. These are locally driven Bottom up and externally imposed Top Down state building approaches.

2.10.1 Bottom-up state formation

The bottom-up state building approach is related to Consent Theory in which society is considered the ultimate initiator of State Formation, with containment of violence as the prime motivation. The Political Theory of Social Contract developed by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) is particularly pertinent here, for the following reason. Hobbes went in search of the fundamental reason for the establishment of a political contract, a covenant where the individual members of society decide to relinquish their Sovereign Rights to a political authority. In that sense Hobbesian Contract Theory is basically Society-Centered. Hobbesian contract theory thereby assists in identifying the fundamental factor linking society and state, or in other words, the basic function of a state for society.

Hobbes developed his Social Contract Theory in his major work, *Leviathan*, published in 1651. Hobbes took as his starting point a state of nature in which individuals live according to their personal needs and desires, but continually threatened by others. The establishment of sovereign political authority derives from the individual's decisions to give up individual freedoms in exchange for a common rule of law that applies compulsorily to everybody. Only in this way can the insecurity of life in the 'state of nature' be overcome.

According to the Social Contract Theory, sovereign state power established in order to safeguard a social order, which puts an end to the insecure conditions of a state nature. A Sovereign Authority is only legitimate if the life and security of members of society are guaranteed (Brons,

2001:42-43). The bottom-up State Building Approach is mainly related to the endogenous one in which the society become the main decision makers in their issues.

"The Endogenous State Building Approach" does not exclude involvement of external actors in the State Reconstructing Process, but it heavily emphasizes the importance of State/Governance and Institutions building being locally rooted. The Endogenous Approach views the international community as waiting to replicate a Weberian State Model, which is a State "that enjoy the international recognition and exercises control over people and territory through formal and strong, preferable democratic institutions"(Ottaway, 2002:3) that is a de jure state, which she defines as a raw power state. In this sense the raw power indicates a state that has actual power to function effectively in its people. Such states are also known as de facto states having this raw power. For instance, Somaliland is claiming the international recognition because it could achieve in providing important political common goods such as the rule of law, peace and security, and social well-being to its citizens. In the Endogenous Approach, external intervention is viewed as having a great risk of undermining local governance structures and replacing them with new, less sustainable and less legitimate organizations (Ottaway, 2002). In short, the role of international actors should only be assisting rather than leading the situation for the process of State Building by understanding the interests of local peoples to decide on their own affairs.

2.10.2 Top-Down State Formation

In the construction of political authority by Consent Approach internal security is considered the prime determinant and the process is a bottom- up one. In the State Formation by Force Approach it is the element of external violence and conquest that are central. This process is essentially a top- down, which puts the militarily strong in an advantageous position from which to claim political authority.

The top-down dynamics that is prevalent in State formation by conquest ascribes a passive role to the society vis-à-vis the establishing of political authority. The Sovereign authority does not draw from members of society but rather political leadership is imposed on society (Brons, 2001:45).

The state formation process during the decolonization of developing countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s and after were often externally driven processes and influenced by policies derived from imperatives of the international system.

Colonialism has disrupted evolutionary process of state formation that was ongoing in numerous societies in Africa. Other societies including mostly pastoral, segmented lineage societies had never gone through the experience of state formation. In the process of de-colonization the newly politically independent countries inherited the colonial state- frame- work and its underlying ideological assumptions. The new States thus embarked on a process of nation-state building in which the ideas and ideologies of the state either followed in the footsteps of their ex-colonial masters, or shifted away from the capitalist political ideology towards the socialist, the second dominant political ideology in the post-colonial era (Brons, 2001:46).

Hence, the state formation process in post-independence Africa that evolved in the early post-colonial period was thus mostly top-down externally imposed processes driven by force rather than bottom-up consent based peaceful legitimate processes that driven by consent. In many cases large section of societies were victimized by their own, now independent state authorities, and were denied the chance to play an active part in political life as an expression of their sovereignty.

Finally, this study has assessed both bottom-up and top-down state building approaches referring Somalia and Somaliland respectively so as to look for to the challenges that sustained worked against state building in Somalia. These both externally driven and internally sponsored approaches have been analyzed in chapter four in Somali peace processes. Considering these both approaches, this study argues the bottom-up state building project as the most suitable approach to Somalia state Re- construction.

Since 1991, when the central government ceased to function, several state rebuilding have been attempted and tried out by External Actors with different interest. The major actors in this regard were international communities and regional neighboring countries. Such actors are UN, USA and IGAD and Ethiopia, Kenya and the like. Even though whatever efforts had been done to create strong effective central government in Somalia, all of them failed. Let alone creating an effective government, the external intervention has aggravated and facilitated state disintegration

that is why the problem is going on. The failed Peace Processes and their outcomes have been intensively discussed and analyzed in chapter four of this study.

Therefore, this study also argues that the state building process in Somalia should be based on at grass root level addressing the interest of local people. Accordingly, the state making process should not miss the importance of clan issues, which is the main component of Somali tradition political unit. Without clan consideration, building functional state in Somalia is simply wasting resources and creating problems in Somalia as well as in the region. Hence, bottom-up state building approach is the best way by incorporating and appreciating the existed Somali traditional culture. In short, the state building approach to Somalia should not be imported but it should be an endogenous one.

Finally, this study has found some research gaps that the former researchers lack to address and left as the significant problems until this study. These are: the first gap what this study did find is lack of to understanding clan dynamism. Many researchers misunderstand clan and clan dynamism. The second one is claiming by several researchers that of homogeneous feature of Somali society by ignoring heterogeneous situations of Somali people, especially who are living in southern Somali coastal areas. The third is the international state building norms which externally imposed top down state building approach before settling on going conflicts among various clan groups. The fourth and the last one, what this study has investigated research gap is lack of incorporate all social classes in political decision making processes. In this regard the minority communities, women and youth are excluded deliberately by international community and dominant clan groups.

Chapter Three

The Modern state experience and 'collapse' in Somalia

The essence of this chapter is to display how the Somali society has experienced externally driven modern state and why the so-called state 'collapse' has occurred in Somalia. The decentralized Somali society who led their life freely moving from one province to other in search of water and grazing lands were disturbed by newly emerged colonial state experience. Even after the independence Somali elites had experienced the colonial divide and rule policy that heavily affected the Somali traditional peaceful way of life.

3.1. Colonial state experience

In the colonial period, the Somali populated region was carved up and divided among colonial powers. Accordingly, the French controlled Djibouti, the Somaliland and Kenya became under British control, the Italian occupied the south-central Somalia and Ogaden remained under the control of Ethiopia (Lewis and Mayall, 1995:4).

Britain's interest in Somaliland was mainly strategic in order to protect its line of communications with India, as well as geo-strategic to counter French influences. The British never promoted immigration and white colonization of Somaliland but ruled Somaliland with a fairly light hand. They had some trouble with control as their preferred method of indirect rule (tapping in to the local structure and controlling it) did not initially work well in the decentralized Somali structure (ibid: 5).

The Italians established a fascist colony in southern Somalia and developed (banana) plantations and promoted the settlement of thousands of Italians to the colony. They established centralized administrations with Italians were thus far more involved in building bureaucratic capacity to foster Somali elites than the British.

Ethiopia was one of the only African countries to avoid colonization and fostered (strong, effective sovereignty) state structure on their own. Ethiopia rules the Ogaden province inhabited by Ethnic Somalis (Lewis, 2008:29). Since Somalia's independence in 1960 and the rise of pan-Somalia nationalism, the situation with Ethiopia has often been tense or at war, because of this

ethnic Somalia enclave Ethiopia is the local, super power, and continues to this day to have strong interest in the situation in Somalia (ibid).

Colonial ambition in East Africa flared up again in the 1930s , when fascist Italy briefly conquered Ethiopia in 1935 and British Somaliland in 1940 (ibid :31). In 1941, during WWII the Italians lost all of their acquired land and the British took over Italian Somalia. In 1950 Italy returned to Italian Somalia and ruled the areas as UN trusteeship until independence in 1960 (ibid: 32).

3.1.1. Somali National struggle and Road to Independence

The root of Somali Nationalism can be traced back to the 1890,s. It was the time when Said Mohammed Abdulle Hassan first waged anti- colonial struggle against the colonial powers, however, the anti-colonial struggle was not united under the pan- Somalia nationalism due to the clan divisions and relations differences (Brons .2001). Then national struggle came to an end in 1920 as a result of military strength of the British (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). Nevertheless, then this sense of nationalism was shaped by the increasing opposition to the colonial powers. In addition, the negative treatment of the Somalis by colonial officials had also increased the national consciousness of the former (Ayoob, 1980).

Then, during and after WWII, all Somali inhabited areas including those in Ethiopia and Kenya came under the British military administration (with the exception of French ruled Djibouti). This created a favorable condition for the development of the Somali nationalism. The incorporation of almost all Somalis under the British rule had facilitated the growth of the ideas of Somalia nationalism, especially among the urban population. This culminated in the activities of a group of young Somalis who succeeded in forming the first modern Somali political movement, Somali youth club in 1945. It was later changed to Somali Youth League (SYL) with the aim to lead the National struggle to independence (Ayoob, 1980; Laitin and Samatar, 1987).

In 1946, the British foreign minister, Bevin, proposed the re-unification of all the Somaliland under the British. But it was rejected by the other members of the four power commission (France, US and the Soviet Union). The rejection was based partially on their suspicion that Britain might have an agenda to create a new colony under the cover of Somali unity. But it was mainly due to Ethiopia's effective diplomatic campaign for the return of the Ogaden then it

became the part of Ethiopia (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). As a result, Ogaden returned to Ethiopia, North Somaliland to Britain, the North Frontier District (NFD) to British- Kenya, and Southern Somaliland to Italy as a trusteeship in 1950 on the condition that it should become independent in ten years (ibid). With this the formation of united Somali state, encompassing all Somali inhabited territories failed to be realized (Browns, 2001). But the idea of 'Greater Somalia' or Unification of all the Somali people and territory remained to influence the politics of successive Somali governments (Mesfin, 1977).

In the 1950's, the SYL and other nationalist groups in both southern and northern Somalia had cooperated together their efforts and waged national struggle for independence of Somalis (Laitin and Samatar 1987). In the meantime, on the other hand, the Italian UN trusteeship authority and the political colonial authority were engaged on preparing their respective territories for self- government. There were partly politics and elections that took place at different levels. The authorities introduced new governmental structures and bureaucratic apparatus as institutions of future independent state (Brons, 2001). In addition, they were busy to produce modern Somali political elites and urban educated class for key administrative positions of state leadership (Doornbos, 1993). On the eve of independence, the colonial police and military units of both territories were made to constitute the national army of future Somali state (Brons, 2001).

Accordingly, in 1960, the Italian Somalia and British Somaliland got independence and joined together to create a Unitary Democratic State. The Somali state emerged independent with a strong sense of Somali nationalism. It came to exist with the goal to realize the idea of 'Greater Somalia' (Latin, 1977). The five pointed star national flag symbolized the five different territories inhabit by Somali nation and thus, reflected the idea of 'greater Somali' (Laitin and Samatar, 1987).

Finally, the southern Somalia and northern Somaliland, which were the integral part of newly independent state, had very different administrative systems. They inherited different governmental, judicial, military, financial, civil service and educational systems. Furthermore, there were two different administrative and educational languages in these two territories (Laitin and Samatar, 1987).

3.2. Civilian Government (1960-69)

The independence of the new Republic of Somalia in 1960 was part of the general decolonization process demanded by the UN (Yamane, 2009:117). The international community wanted a sovereign 'Westphalia' state and that state was comprised of the former Italian and British colonies (Lewis, 2008:33). In structural view the situation was not perfect, as the ethnic Somali living in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti would not be part of the new Nation-State (ibid: 29). The flag of the new Republic of Somalia, a five pointed star on a light blue back ground, represents these five divisions of the Somali people as has been mentioned above (ibid). This incomplete nation state building left ill feeling among many Somalis both in and outside the new state and this rise of Pan- Somali Nationalism has cast long shadows and provoked conflict especially in their relations with Ethiopia.

Although the UN, experiment in Somalia had worked in the simple sense of providing a European style centralized state framework and a corresponding administrative organization , on serious thought had been given to considering how appropriate these would prove in the local setting, or above all in conjunction with the highly decentralized nature of traditional Somali political institutions. This was an entirely Eurocentric exercise which assumed that all case of self-determination were essentially the same and posed the same problems. It is easier, of course, to appreciate these issues in retrospect after the collapse of Somalia and failure of every effort to resurrect a functioning state (Lewis, 2008:34).

The state of Somalia established a highly centralized Nation-State based on a Eurocentric view of a Westphalia state (ibid). Italian bureaucratic tradition was used as it held the strongest institutional capacity in southern Somalia and favored this region at the expense of the north (Kaplan, 2009:147). The UN notion of self-determination and sovereignty for new states meant that Somali nationalism was flourishing and this pan-Somalia struggle engendered conflict and some military confrontations between Kenya and Somalia, as Somalia encouraged the Somali inhabited provinces in Ethiopia and Kenya to revolt (Lewis, 2008:36) This Somali state was initially parliamentary democracy. This democratic system brought free and regular elections, independent press, and a competition of political parties for office. It also created an opportunity for peaceful changes in government (Laitin and Samatar, 1987:122).

However, despite their democratic institutions, from the onset, the Somali state was not free from political instability (Spears, 1998). The state was defined by conflicts over the control of the political and economic arena. It was unstable, primarily, due to the north-south tensions over the distribution of state power. There was unfair division of power. Most state powers were concentrated in the hands of political elites from south (Dualeh, 1994). For instance, the 1961 constitution was mainly drafted in the south and failed to reflect regional balance in the definition of the country's political agenda. As a result, the north voted forcefully against it (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). This had shown the existence of sense of dissatisfaction on the part of the North.

Hence, the southern dominated state power coupled with the adoption of the constitution regardless of the northern opposition, had increased the alienation and marginalization of the latter (Brons, 2001). Then, the political hostilities between the two regions began to reinforce the political instability of the state. Accordingly, there was a coup attempt in December 1961 by a group of junior army officers in the north in order to abrogate the union (Dualeh, 1994). Here, the coup, though countered, in the words of Laitin and Samatar, “reflected deep fractures in the Somali body politics “(1978:7).

On the other hand, the Somali state lacked problem solving institutional mechanisms. It was full of institutional hurdles and remained weak with regard to solving conflicts. The aim to bring socio-political integration of the regions was far from reality (Brons, 2001). Therefore, the discontent in the north persisted and the resulting cleavages continued to hunt the stability of the state. For example, the Northern rejected the 1963 new taxation law and went to demonstrate against it. They rejected it on the ground that large part of ‘new tax system was taken from the Italian – oriented southern taxation law ‘(ibid: 27). There was also disagreement over the role of the civil servant in the political activity of the state (Laitin and Samatar, 1987).

In the second half of the 1960's, "the biggest division was based on official language policy" (Laitin, 1977:126). The challenges that Somalia faced after independence concerning language were daunting. Somalia had no indigenous written language and the colonial legacy left Somalis in south that did not speak or write English and Somalis in the north that did not speak or write Italian. Hence, the parliamentary government was unable to adopt common official language. This gave English the chance to become the dominant language of state administration.

Consequently, the northern got an opportunity to have better jobs within the state apparatus. In contrary, the southern felt disadvantageous and found their skills decreasing in importance (ibid). Then, according to Laitin and Samatar, in the final year of the 1960's " almost in reverse of what occurred in the response to the 1961 constitutional southern identity began to form ..." (1987:75). This had again reflected the sense of enmity between the north and south in return, the states inability to integrate them (Laitin, 1977).

Apart from the regional division, the Somali state was characterized by inefficiency and instability of government. This was basically related with existence of traditional clan fissures and policies (Giannou, 1993). It is to say that " ' clan fission and fissure, so apparent in traditional Somali politics, were transferred to a modern arenas (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). The nature of traditional clan structure was clearly observed in modern party politics. Accordingly, "most of the parties were explicitly clan -based, and even those parties which claimed to be pan-Somali, were built up and maintained on clan foundations" (Laitin, 1977:81). The parliamentary structures were weak and in capable to accommodate this effectively. But the system provided the balance of clan representation as "a standard operating procedure in democratic Somalia, as government jobs necessarily meant presentation for any clan" (Laitin and Samatar, 1987):70). Then clans which were left out of government positions were quick to express their sense of a lineation (ibid).

Accordingly, the parliamentary democratic state of Somalia became an arena of competition for clans in order to secure state power and resources. Giannou on his part characterized the clan competition and its effects on Somali state in the 1960,s as follows:

If in the desert clans fought over water holes, in the city of the past- colonial Nation –State clans fought over the biggest water hole of all the state, its institutions, and its power to dispense the spoils of foreign and military aid, Nepotism, corruption, inefficiency, non-ideological political discourse, clan politics ruled Somalia. A constantly shifting alliance of clans in power and another constantly – shifting clan opposition dominated the public one either part took of the watering role or one did not but the entire concept of the centralized nation state was level put into question as long as the clans alternately part took of power (1993: 353).

This dynamics throughout the decade of 1960's weakened the Somali state. It deteriorated the military state structure into a unitary state. It also led to the rampant nepotism and corruption by the political officials, as it was clearly seen during the 1969 elections (Mansur, 1995).

Furthermore, the Somali state during the civilian rule was weak due to its failure to incorporate the large section of the society. It was controlled by the small need urban based political and bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Thus, the majority of the Somali rural population remained marginalized or alienated (Doornbos, 1993). In other words, the Somali state provided, "some Somalis with educational, linguistic, military, political and financial resources which made them more equal than the others" (Laitin 1977:130). As a result, the state society relations were not mutually transforming rather continued around the capital city. The majority of the society existed outside the state fragment (Doornbos, 1993). Accordingly only the majority of people and lineages could link up with these Mogadishu based state institutions by having at least one member of the family positioned within the state apparatus (Brons, 2001). The state was unable to integrate the society in its institutions.

As a result, the societies' "... socio-political organizational structures continued to operate, creating a dispersed rather than an interpreted domination over social control" (ibid). Therefore, the Somali state remained weak and lacked domestic socio-political cohesion. It exercised little actual power over the people within its jurisdiction and thus, had low level of empirical state hood.

On the other hand, in 1960's, the Somali state's national security policy was primarily defined by external threats. This was mainly due to the state emphasis on small irredentism to incorporate Somali inhabited territories that were left outside national boundary (Clozier, 1975). Thus, it actively engaged on building and developing strong national army. As any weak state, in order to finance the military expenditure, the Somali state heavily relied on external source of aid particularly from the USA, Italy and Germany, and later the Soviet Union (Mesfin, 1977). Then, the increasing capacity of the national army increased the states potential for violence, which could be employed against the external or an internal enemy. Hence, it also increased the insecurity potential of the Somali people (Brons, 2001).

Finally, as far as the provision of the other public goods was concerned, the Somali state under the civilian rule could be taken as weak (Awad, 2005). The state was not able to fully deliver on the needs of the people in social services and other physical infrastructures (ibid). There was low level of state investment on education, health and other infrastructure. If there was an attempt, it was concentrated around the capital city and adjacent areas. In addition, there were regional disparities between North and south in terms of the allocation of state investment on the provision of public goods (Brons, 2001).

With regard to the economic progress, the state lacked genuine economic program that could mobilize the people towards the economic development (Laitin and Samatar, 1987). For instance, "the success rate of the policies formulated in the first (1963-1967) and the second (1968- 1970) development plans was generally very low..." (Brons, 2001:165).

In addition, the state did not change the economic structures of the society. Thus, the subsistence agricultural economy was largely neglected. Trading activities remained as they were before the independence (ibid). As a result, the economy remained backward and characterized by absence of economic opportunities (Ricci, 1995).

3.3. Military Regime 1969-1991

General Mohammed Abshir Barre took power in Somalia in a coup d'etat in 1969. Barre tried to advance the nation – build through socialism and a development program called 'Scientific Socialism' (Ahmed, 1999:117). Officially socialist, it was also to large extent meant as a nation – building process, trying to foster loyalty to the state, and to abandon 'backwards' traditions such as clan identity and other 'un- socialist' tendencies. Collectivization and control over the economy was established also to reassure the USSR that they were truly a socialist ally and therefore worthy of continued Soviet support Barre's security forces upheld brutal 'justice' and surprised all potential opposition to him (Lewis, 2008 :40). Barre was in general, however, fairly popular as he spoke to Pan- Somali Nationalism. This nationalism led to the war with Ethiopia in 1977-78 over the Somali inhabited Ogaden province of Ethiopia (ibid: 64).

Somalia and Ethiopia switched cold war allegiance in 1974 with Ethiopia becoming pro-USSR, and Somalia was forced to become more of a US proxy (Moller, 2009; 10). Somalia's war with Ethiopia in 1977 -78 was mainly a result of gaining control of the Somali populated Ethiopian province of Ogaden but can also be seen as a cold war move in which Barre failed to gain US support due to Jimmy carter's dislike for brutal regime, and the fact that Somalia was pro-forma aggressor (ibid).

Following the 1969 coup, power was assumed by the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), consisting of twenty five military and a few police officers with Siad as its president. The national constitution, all political parties, court, trade union and voluntary associations were abolished. The army, assisted by the police, ruled the country; military officers served as regional governors and district commissioners. The SRC ruled with the help of a largely Civilian Council of Secretaries as state (CSS) to administer ministries (Adam, 2008:45).

The military participation in state affairs increased even when the SRC was disbanded and a socialist vanguard organ, the Somalia Revolutionary socialist party (SRSP), was established in 1976. In 1980, the SRC was reconstituted as an element of the ruling power structure, and military officers were appointed to administer most of the Somalia's districts and regions. Siad preferred subordinates who would take orders rather than convey popular wishes. Thus military officers were easier to manage than civilian officials (ibid). on the first anniversary of the coup (21 October 1970), Siad declared Socialism as the Ideology of the military regime and he started major measures and reforms.

Reform and galvanization of the nation's emerges were pursued by a battery of new measures. Civilian districts and provincial governments were replaced by military personnel who were installed as chairmen of local revolutionary councils modeled on that in Mogadishu. Unemployed urban tribal drop-outs were recruited for a whole series of public work projects. The death sentence was re-introduced to replace blood compensation (Dia) paid traditionally in inter- clan feuds. This was part of a wider strategy aimed at abolishing traditional clan divisions and so strengthening the nation (Lewis, 2008:38).

The scientific socialism which was adopted in 1970 was literally in Somalia, wealth sharing based on knowledge. This change of direction reflected the army's growing dependence on

Russia and the idealistic orientation of young intellectuals unimpressed by Somalia is previous pro-western policies. This development was coupled with national campaigns and, crash programmers, against corruption and tribalism. The word Jalle-literally comrade or friend was officially launched as the approved terms uncle, and cousin with their unacceptable clan references.

The political office of presidency was expanded into a national organization of apparatchiks staffing local orientation centers, established in all main settlements. The walls of these, in common with public posters, featured the new ruling trinity of Jalle Makis (Marx), Jalle Lenin and Jalle Siad. Revolutionary vigilance was maintained by the national security service (NSS, headed by Siad's Darod / Dulbanate son-in law 'Duflen'), with arbitrary powers of arrest and detention, and the national security courts which dispensing with legal safe guards on individual liberty, dealt out a rough justice .

In a farther effort to reduce the continuing influence of clan ties acknowledged in a number of the presidents bitter addresses, the eight provinces of the republic were reconstituted as 15 new regions, comprising 78 districts, re-named where necessary to exclude clan names for example, Mijertinia became Barri. Stress was placed on the local settlement as a basic unit of identification in places of clan allegiance and marriages, traditionally inter clan affairs were to be celebrated in orientation centers and stripped as clan significance. In the same spirit the former lineage and clan heads ('chiefs and elders') were renamed into part of the state bureaucracy.

This attack on the traditional structure of the society in an effort to secure modernization was coupled with a policy of State Control of the Economy. The export of the banana crop grown in the riverine areas south of Mogadishu was controlled by a state agency not greatly different from the monopoly established by previous civilian governments. Similarly grain production was controlled, farmers being allowed to keep a small quantity of grain for their own use and obliged to sell the rest at fixed prices to the Agricultural Development Corporation which stored it and arranged for its distribution and sale to the public. Imported goods were similarly regulated through a state agency. The major local industries, the sugar factory at Jowhar and the meat processing plant at Kismayu were likewise state enterprise (Lewis, 2008:40).

However, nevertheless, Barre had made these all reforms and new policies to sustain his rule, gradually his early popularity came to decline. Therefore, he turned to traditional clan ties once again to divide and surplus any challenging movements.

3.3.1. 'Greater Somalia' Ideology

One of the most emphatic nationalistic impetuses for all Somalis was the pursuit of 'Greater Somalia' or the Unification of all Somalia People, which stems from all Somalis regardless of where they live. In addition to residing in Somalia, people belonging to the Somali ethnic group also inhabit parts of what is to day Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. In fact the Somali flag which has a five pointed star on it represents the various place that Somalis live. Two points are for the British and Italian Somaliland, now united as one and the other three points represent Somali claims to Djibouti, the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, and the north east corner of Kenya. All of these regions have large Somali ethnic populations and unifying them has always been a basic goal of Somalis.

The desert region of Ogden is located in south eastern Ethiopia. Somali nomads arrived in the region over 500 years ago and have historically utilized Ogaden's water hole for their herds. Somalis have always viewed the region as theirs, mostly because the population comprised of typically Somalis, and also because the region only ended up being given to Ethiopia when Europeans divide up Africa. Aden Abdulle Osman, president of the Somali Republic from 1960 – 1967, stated: "un like and border problem in Africa, the entire length of existing boundaries, as imposed by the colonialists, cut across the traditional pastures of our nomadic population. The problem becomes unique when it is realized that no other nation in Africa finds itself totally divided along the whole length of its borders from its own people." There have been numerous conflicts between Somalia and Ethiopia concerning rights to the region throughout past five hundred years but, in the early 1970s, the creation of the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), a Somali separatist organization with in Ogaden combined with political transitions with Ethiopia provided spark which ignite the Ogaden war of 1977-78.

As affirmationed, Somalia was also an ally of Soviet Union. In addition to the aid they had been receiving since the mid-1960s, and their transition to scientific socialism, Barre signed the treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union in July 1974. In exchange for protection and military and economic assistance, the Soviets were able to build military structures and

utilize Somaliland. Barre's confidence in his groups with Soviet military assistance, coupled with his desire to gain the ultimate victory in Somali nationalism and united Greater Somalia, led him to support the WSLF with resource and , as the conflict progressed in to 1978 eventually declared war on Ethiopia (Moore ,2007).

The WSLF had such striking initial success that by mid-1977 they had gained control of almost all Ogaden regions. However that originally had begun as separatist movements was evolving in to a full scale war. However, this success did not stay long because the Soviet Union turned her face to Ethiopia. As the result, in Nov 1977, the Somalis officially broke off diplomatic ties with USSR claiming that they had violated the 1974 treaty of friendship. The Soviet switch signaled the end for Somalia in the Ogaden war. Over the next 12 months Moscow airlifted over one billion dollars of military aid to Ethiopia. Additionally, the Soviet Union government convinced the Cuban government and provided Ethiopia with 18,000 Cuban troops (ibid).

After the conclusion of the Ogaden war, Siad Barre entered the second phase of his regime, that of opposing and tribalism. Whereas tribalism had previously been an offense punishable by jail time, Barre now used it to control the people. Barre created clan rivalries by using violence and financial and promotional incentives to keep the various clans competing and distracted. Moreover, Barre began to actively oppress all clans, that were not his own. The two major clans that Barre relied up on were his own Marehan clan, the Ogaden clan to his mother and the Dulbanate clan of his favorite son- in – law, which earned him, the nickname MOD these three clans made up a majority of key governmental positions that ensured Barre's power. His fellow Marehan clan members made up his special forces, The Red Berets (Duubcas) and his son –in law was the head of the national security service (NSS). Barre's new reliance on clan conflict sparked a revival of opposing clan activity and the recreation of clan based political parties.

In 1978, in short after the conclusion of the Ogaden war, officers from the Majerteen clan attempted a coup, which was quickly suppressed and seventeen alleged ring leaders executed. All but one of the officers executed were members of the Majerteen clan one of the few officers to escape was Lt, Colonel Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed, who formed the Somalia Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which operated out of Ethiopia, with Ethiopian backing. In response to the SSDF, Barre's Red Berets Destroyed water reservoirs to deny water to the clansmen and their herds. In May and June 1979, 2000 Majerteen died of plague and Somali military raped

large numbers of women. Then after different clan based parties established against Barre regime (Moore, 2007).

In 1981 the Somali national movement (SNM) was formed and launched an insurgency in the North West. The regional and clan based support for these insurgencies, and the fact that they were based in Ethiopia, was indicative both of the lack of opportunity for expressing internal opposition and the demise of national unity. As the political and economic crisis developed in 1980s and as Somalia became more indebted to military and financial assistance from the west, the regime's socialist ideology began to wear thin and the reality of political autocracy became apparent (Bradbury, 2008:39).

3.3.2. Civil war in Somalia

The failed Ogaden war severely weakened Barre's regime as Barre and Somalia were seen to have clearly defeated. The peace agreement with Ethiopia after the war weakened Barre's appeal as the defender of the Pan- Somalia Nation project. Opposition to Barre gained strength, and the regime responded by using increasingly brutal and draconian measures. Barre's regime increasingly went from having a somewhat national Somalia appeal to becoming increasingly clannish as Barre increasingly based its power on his own and allied clans. Barre tried to reconsolidate his power in the Marehan, Ogaden and Dulbanate clans or 'MOD' rule. All other clan borders were systematically suppressed or eliminated. This led to the full scale rebellion of several regional clan based rebel movement to rid of Barre's regime (Lewis, 2008: 68). This resulted in a full scale civil war in Somalia from 1988-1991.

During the second half of 1980's, with the increasing anti- government guerilla activities of the SNM in the north, the regime's measures also increased its level of brutality. The people suffered due to open hostilities and state terror. The group of people in the north and North West parts of the country suspected of being the supporters of the SNM were punished painfully (Brons, 2001). Their cities become unsecured and unsafe. For instance " ... Hargesia had the atmosphere of a town under military siege special emergency regulations were put in to effect and civilians were put under the jurisdiction of military tribunals and the military police" (Brons, 2001:187).

Finally, in 1988 when SNM attacked the towns of Hargesia and Burao, the regime lost its control over some parts. But it used all its fire power to 'regain' control of the region (Samatar, 1999).

The regime employed heavy and ground weaponry to dislodge the guerrillas without any regard for the civilian population. The population was devastated and the two cities thoroughly destroyed. Thousands of people perished in the hell and hundreds of thousands fled across the border to Ethiopia (ibid).

The SNM's attacks on the northern cities of Hargesia and Burco in May 1988 proved to be the opening battles of a civil war that is continuing in Somalia. The savage government counter-offensive killed tens of thousands of civilians, forced hundreds of thousands to seek refuge in Ethiopia, and severed to unite the Isaq behind the SNM. The SNM in turn encouraged other groups to take up arms against the ailing regime. The Somalia- Ethiopia peace agreement of 1988 also had an impact on the Ogaden, because in theory it canceled Somalia's claims to the territory. Even though they had agreed not to provoke the Ogaden issues, in 1989 the Somali patriotic movement (SPM) and the united Somali congress (USC) were formed to mobilize the Ogaden people and the Hawiye against the government.

In July 1989, these troubles were brought home to Mogadishu when the catholic Bishop was assassinated and the subsequent arrest of several Islamic leaders sparked antigovernment riots in the capital. The ruthless suppression of the riots with mass arrests and summary executions of some 450 civilians shattered any remaining loyalty to the regime. Even Marehan elder petitioned the president to restore democracy. In other indication that the state was imploding, the central bank ran out of money. In May 1990, more than one hundred prominent Somali citizens with opposition groups to end the political turmoil. Forty- five of signatories were arrested, but late released under pressure from the Italian government and the threat of further demonstrations. The regime had tried to offer political reforms and dialogue, but this were rejected by the opposition groups who viewed them as a last ditch attempt by the regime to cling to power.

On 6 august 1990, the SNM, USC and SPM, meeting in Ethiopia, agreed to form a united front against the regime. Rejecting offers by Italy and Egypt to mediate, the USC led by General Mohamed Farah, Aideed, fought its way in to Mogadishu on 3 December 1990 (Bradbury, 2008:45).

On 27 January 1991 Siad Barre fled from Mogadishu. Two days later, one faction of the USC appointed Ali Mahdi Mohammed as president, with Omar Arteh Ghalib as his prime minister.

This unilateral action broke a deal between the USC, SNM and SPM to form a joint administration and precipitated an irrevocable rift within the USC the SNM chairman and General Aideed denounced, unfairly, the self-appointed government as an extension of the deposed administration. In May the SNM declared Somaliland independence. Attempts by the Italian and regional governments of the Inter-governmental Authority on Developments (IGAD) to reconcile the factions at two conferences in Djibouti in May and June failed. The second Djibouti conference was probably the last and best opportunity to avert an escalation of the crisis. But Aideed refused to attend and Somalia slipped in to a bloody civil war between clan based military factions who were fighting over the remnants of the state. Militias, mobilized by political entrepreneurs such as Aideed , Ali Mahdi Mohamed, colonel Omar Jess, General Aden, Gabiyo, and General Mohamed Hersi 'Morgan' a mixture of soldiers, politicians and business men who were given the nomenclature of 'war lords' by Journalists embarked up on a spree of killing, rape population eviction and the looting a public and private property (Ibid: 47).

Lastly, the dictatorial military regime of Barre, who ruled Somalia from 1969-1991 came to cease functioning and this led the country into bloody civil war. In 1991, he was forced to leave the capital and fled to his birth village, Gedo. Consequently, Somalia left without functioning central government and anarchy was reign with fighting among various war lords which based on clan. Different clan based factions fighting each other to take the political power and to control resources. Finally these situations had brought the so- called state 'collapse' in Somalia.

3.4 State 'collapse' in Somalia

From 1988 to 1992 the country curved into civil war. On 26 January 1991, Barre fled the capital just before the USC took over his palace. However, the civil war had devastating effect: the rise of war lords, weaponization of society and destruction of most of Mogadishu (Menkhaus, 2007: 81).

The fall of Barre left a political vacuum in which several militias compete for state power. Intensive fighting over the following years entrenched state collapse in Somalia .In particular, the ensuing armed conflicts were 'inter clan in nature' pitting large lineage groups against one another (Menkhaus, 2004:29). In the southern region, this mostly meant fighting between the Darod and Hawiye clans. Additionally, a sub clan rivalry between Mohammed Fara Aideed and

Ali Mahdi grew over control of Mogadishu, typically a Hawiye stronghold. In July 1991, Djibouti hosted a peace conference but failed to stop growing violence (Quaranto, 2008: 21)

After two weeks of intensive fighting between the USC and government troops, Siad Barre and his remaining loyalists fled Mogadishu to join his kinship people in Garabharey, taking all gold deposits from the central Bank. Once in Garabharey, Barre started to regroup his forces, his son and son-in-law went on arms purchasing mission and allegedly bought \$ US 27 million worth of arms and petroleum on the Black market (Samatar, 1995:21) . Barre thus remained a force in the hand hoping to be able to restore his power. However, after some failed attempts he finally died of natural cause on January 2, 1995 in exile in Nigeria.

In the aftermath of Barre's flight from Mogadishu a leader of the USC, Ali Mahdi Mohammed was proclaimed president by close associates. His appointment was however not accepted by other groups, even within the USC. Since early 1989 two USC branches existed and the internal branch under the control of General Farah Aideed refused to accept the election of Ail Mahdi. Civil war eventually broken out in Somalia and the fighting took place between several clan political organizations, while yet these clan based organizations cannot be understood as traditional clan structure as most did not appear before 1990, they are not 'modern' political organizations either (Prunier 1995).

Based on clan recruitment they operate as armed militia which prunier (1995) describes some clan organizations as primarily defensive, especially in the south most of them were aggressive. They fought a brutal war against each other in which thousands of people lost their lives. Prunier lists in 1995 a total thirteen clans- based political organizations, however the number changed over the time as new fractions arose and alliance were made.

When fighting first occurs in Mogadishu, the brutality soon Mushroom state wide. Warlordism arose and former allies began to fight each other with horrific consequence. The lack of organization of the opposition and the destruction of the centralized state were supplemented by the militarization and militarism (Adam 1992). Referring to the events in Mogadishu already in 1989 Simons (1994) describing that individuals behavior changed 'overnight'. She identified the feeling of dissolution among the Somali people probably because they had so much information without but so little credible accounting from within, the residents of Mogadishu did not know

whether to consider the mounting crime and lawlessness as matter of temporary dysfunction or significant disjuncture or whether dissolution would merely continue to threaten without actually leading to any fighting else (Simon 1994:820)

Somalia has remained an arena of continuous armed conflict & insecurity since early 1990's (Spear 1998). However, the intensity of the armed clashes varied across the regions. For instance, as Brons has noted "The central regional witnessed sporadic warfare and the northeast and North West were calmer and safer by comparison, but people in southern region were faced by a complete breakdown of law and order and by continuous violence" (Brons, 2001:217)

As a result, in the early 1990's, the southern region was mainly characterized by much intensified warfare that took place between clans and or clan- families. This was because of the presence of violent competitions among the clan war lords with the aim to control political power and the territorial resources in south central areas. The issues of controlling the rich fertile land in the south and to some extent the urban property in case of Mogadishu were ever very important (Brons, 2001). The war fare involved atrocities, massacres and rape that were committed against the civilians. It was also defined by pillaging and looting of the captured territories (Menkhaus, 2003).

The armed conflict in southern Somalia had brought much destruction. For instance, it destroyed farm land, and caused huge damage to the harvests and stores of farming communities. In addition, the violent armed conflict also killed and displaced large number of people in south central Somalia (Bestman, 1996).

This in turn, invited the United Nations (UN) humanitarian intervention in 1992 and the US-lead Operation Restore Hope (ORH). The interventions succeed in distributing the humanitarian aid, but failed to restore security (Lewis and Mayall, 1996). Thus, after the withdrawal of the UN, the situation in the south remained to be unstable with repeated fighting in Mogadishu. The southern regions were defined by sporadically fierce fighting between various armed factions (Brons, 2001). However, despite the continuity of armed conflict to plague large parts of Somalia, since late 1990's there had been a significant change with regard to the intensity, nature and duration of warfare (Menkhaus, 2003).

There were positive changes with regard to the dynamics of armed conflict & criminality until 2006 when another civil war came to define Somalia (Ibid).

In short starting from late 1990s coup up until the 2006 civil war, the armed conflicts in Somalia had been characterized as sporadic and in short lived skirmishes(Lesage,2006).Thus the general direction was “favored greater local interests in improved security, rule of law predictability” (Menkhaus,2005:2).However, it was reversed when another civil war broke out in 2006.

Finally, as Siad Barre’s divide -and -rule tactics facilitated the spread of weapons, the power struggle became increasingly violent and was projected along clan lines. The fragmentation of patronage networks laid the foundations for the violent war lord politics that took hold of Somalia after the regime was overthrown. Foreign assistance had helped the Barre regime maintains its grip on power for the twenty -one years. At the end of the cold war, as Somalia lost its strategic importance and the international community began to disengage from the region, the regime's authority dissipated and the state collapsed (Bradbury, 2008:45).

3.4.1. Factors that brought to the state 'collapse' in Somalia.

As have mentioned above in this study, the Somali state came to cease functioning as a strong central government with the fall of Barre regime 1991. The 'collapse' of the state in Somalia has been attributed by various factors. Some of these factors are as follows:

First, the personal rule of Barre, like other Africa rulers, Siad installed a personal ruler ship which lasted from 1969 to 1991 (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982). Over time, he was able to manipulate and modify his ruler ship style, from being a prophetic ruler advocating "Scientific Socialism" (1970 - 1977), to an autocrat (1978-1986), and finally a tyranny (1987-1991). During his earlier years, Siad utilize mediatory mechanisms that postponed final confrontation, but his prolonged dictatorial rule damaged and distorted state civil society relations. Later, as an outright tyrant, he applied absolute principles of governance, irrespective of human cost (Adam, 2008; 9).

Second, military rule, Siad's dictatorial rule did not function in an institutional vacuum. The Somali military structure was considered to be one of the best in sub Saharan Africa and Siad also understood the importance of controlling other state sectors and civil society, through institutions and organizations such as the military, security, parliamentary, an elitist vanguard

political party, and so-called mass organization. As a personal ruler, he had the autonomy to operate above institutions (Adam, 288:10).

Third, from Nomenklatura to clan-klatura, essentially, nomenklatura involved appointing loyal political agents to guide and control civil and military institutions. The introduction of Nomenklatura to Somalia by the Soviet involved politicization of institutions that were beginning to function reasonably well, relying on education and training, technical competence specialization and experience. As early as 1972, the military regime began to appoint political commissars for the armed forces, administrative institutions, and social organizations for workers, youth and women, and cooperatives.

Siad soon substituted clanism for ideology as criteria for such appointments. Foreign aid provided the glue that held the system together in spite to internal waste and corruption ("selective misallocation"). Clanklatura involved placing trusted clansmen and other loyalist in positions of power, wealth, control or espionage. It also involved creating Clanklatura organizations. One such organization Hangash, conducted military intelligence; the Dabrjebinta, literally, the backbone breaks, was military counter intelligence; then there were the military police identified by their Red Berets. The majority of these forces were drawn from the president's clan, the Marehan of the Darod. In such a situation of divided and rule, State institutions were thrown into grid lock, jealousy, confusion, and anarchy.

From its inception the Siad regime rested on the three clans from Darod clan family Lewis (1988) describes how this background was reflected in the clandestine code name (M.O.D) given to the regime, M (Marehan) stood for the patrilineage of the president, O (Ogaden) for that of his mother and D (Dulbanate) for that of his principal son-in-law head of the national security service. Although no one could utter the secret symbol of General Siad's power openly, the M.O.D, basis of his rule was public knowledge and discussion and criticized in private (Lewis 1988:222).

Fourth, from Class rule to clan rule – once he dropped socialism as his guiding ideology, Siad did not resort to Islam, but he resorted to clanism. Hardly any members of his clan gained strong bourgeois roots during his long regime neither educational qualification, economic knowledge, nor professional competence premising clan members were plucked out of educational

institutions to fill clan katura posts. Siad systemically sought to destroy the bourgeois elements of other clans – sending them to jail or to exile abroad. The damage done to the Somali elite class partly explains both the total state collapse and the delay in Somali state renewal (Adam 2008:11).

Fifth, poisoning clan Relations, the clan katura have with in state institutions was exported in to rural civil societies. After the Ogaden war (1977-78), Siad practice brutal divide and rule, encouraging clan war fare. At first he used his army to conduct punitive raids, similar to those under early colonial rule. Later his troops armed so called loyal clans and encouraged them to wage wars against "rebel" clans. The damage caused by elite manipulation of clan consciousness and clan conflicts contributed to the inability of civil society to rebound when Siad fell from power. It will take years to heal these societal wounds (ibid: 12).

The above listed factors that led to the state collapse in Somalia are regarded as to internal factors. Of course, the mentioned factors are not the only contributing elements for state collapse but there are many factors which directly or indirectly facilitating to the fall of state in Somalia which are not mentioned in this topic. Moreover, there are external factors that attributed to Somali state collapse. Some of these are foreign assistance which includes, military, technical, and financial foreign support played a key role in prolonging the life of Siad Barre's regime. Somalia's Strategic position on the Red sea and India Ocean has long attracted foreign interests. In the Early Siad's rule, USSR provided substantial military and economic assistance, including fuel, supplying financing for project local costs that helped cushion the Somali economy from international economic conditions.

Italy provided the regime with bilateral aid, and was also a conduit for other European Economic Commission (EEC) assistance. During the mid 1980s, Italy launched a 1 billion lira project in the Bari (Northeast) region of Somalia. Italian parliamentary investigations later showed that Italian officials and the Siad family siphoned off most of the funds (Adam, 2008:14).

China invested in a series of remarkable project, including the north-south tarmac road, cigarettes and matches factory, a sports and theater complex, and rice and tobacco farms. China also provided light arms and spare parts.

The military regime also benefited from significant financial assistance from the United Nation system and the World Bank. Siad maneuvered Somalia in to Arab League in 1974 and the regime received generous Arab petrodollar assistance (ibid).

Finally, these both internal and external factors that had been operated during the rule of Barre consolidate his power to oppress and exploit his opponent classes. His dictatorial rule lastly had mushroomed various clan based opposing groups in Somalia. The civil war broke out in the country here and there against Barre regime. As a result, the state collapse was invited and opened for different interesting foreign groups to manipulate their agendas in Somalia.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Somali Peace Process and Its Outcomes

The community base agreement strategy is the alternative conceptual approach to the resolution of Somali conflict. This is because the fixed peace building process brings nothing important to Somali conflicts. The conflicts in Somalia still unresolved that will have further negative effects on the civilian population of that country. Since 1991, disputants lack to have enough capacity to reach a settlement without third-party intervention. Therefore, a mediation process that focused specifically on the resolution of the conflict has a good chance of succeeding providing the legitimacy of the disputant is recognized by everyone involved in process. The argument that negotiation is the interaction between people trying to meet their respective needs or accomplishing their goals by reaching an agreement with others who are also trying to get their own needs met (Mayer, 2000: 142). Negotiation as a process of give and take is sharp contrast with the zero-sum approach, which does not lead to the sustainable resolution of the conflict.

Diplomacy has always been an integral approach to conflict resolution and according to Jonsson and Aggestan (2009: 34) is often seen as the contrast of war. In this vein, Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 1) explain that diplomacy is the peaceful conduct of relations amongst political entities, while Berridge (2001:1) indicates that diplomacy is the conduct of international relations by negotiation rather than by force, propaganda, and by other peaceful means. Richelieu (1961: 94) sheds further light on diplomacy by alluding to the fact that it involves continuous negotiations considered safe remedies. The basic principle of diplomacy, as articulated by the above mentioned authors, is that negotiations are fundamental to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. To this end, many unsuccessful attempts had been made to bring peace and functioning strong state structure in Somalia by different international actors.

The record of externally sponsored state building initiatives in Somali since 1991 is one of failure. Most of these initiatives have sought to restore a unitary state, an effort that has been unsuccessful.

Somalia has become the graveyard of externally sponsored state building initiatives. It is not just that more than fourteen attempts to restore a unitary state have failed miserably, but that these

efforts have been followed by more rather than less war in the country. This track record should in itself encourage international stakeholders to rethink their current state building approaches to Somalia. Events in Somalia itself also lend support to such rethinking. Somaliland is the clearest illustration of this and Puntland confirms it: both areas have established relatively stable systems of local governance (Boas and Rotwitt, 2010: 2).

Before analyzing various peace processes in Somalia, this study has made an attempt to address, two camps of debating on state building structures. These are the unitary versus federal approaches with their own interest to achieve their expected goals. In this regard different interesting groups proposed their own type state structure models to Somalia to create functional strong government but the inverse happen at the end of the attempts.

4.1. The Unitary Versus Federal Approach

The long standing debate about a unitary or federal state as the solution to the Somali tragedy is exacerbated by the fact that Somali tend to belong to deeply divided centralist and federalist camps. In general, the position Somalis adopt depends on how they perceive their own clan's strength and options. Those belonging to weaker groups (such as the Digil-Mirifle) are often forceful advocates of regional autonomy, as they see this structure as a protective shield against their stronger counter-parts; by contrast, members of larger and strong clans (such as the Hawiye) tend to perceive Federalism as an attempt to erode the political and economic power that they have come to see as rightfully theirs.

The advocates of decentralization argue that local administrations tend to be more representative and hence more legitimate. They often cite the case of Somaliland, where elders from different clans have been able through a series of meetings and negotiations to come together and establish relatively legitimate and representative forms of governance. The very limits of the region (in terms of size and the number of parties involved) also reduced the stakes and eased the reconciliation process. The argument for decentralization also makes the point that local administration tend to be more efficient and capable of responding to local needs. This too makes them better at generating revenues considerations of proximity and legitimacy mean that the income from taxes that can be secured in Somalia is likely to be larger at the regional rather than at national level. In sum, federalists argue that regional power-structures are better equipped to

diffuse political tensions, and that working through them is consequently a better route to national reconciliation and the re-establishment of the Somali state (Boas and Rotwitt, 2010: 3).

But the critics of this decentralization approach concern that it can have serious draw backs and unintended consequences. The greatest fear is that it will permanently divide Somali into ever smaller units. Somaliland's aspiration to full secession supports this argument. The Somaliland polity has from the time of its declaration of independence in 1991, matured and became a semi-functional democracy. As its sovereign attributes have been consolidated, so it claims to full separation from Somalia have been increased (ibid).

A further common anti-federal argument is that local and smaller administrations are more vulnerable to the monopolization of power by unrepresentative function leaders. This notion gained weight when, after Siad Barre's fall in 1991, various warring factions and militia groups arose to fight for control over assets and territories, both rural and urban. For the supporters of centralization, proof that federalization promotes secessionism and institutionalizes fragmentation. The main differences of opinion between these two positions seems to be that while the federalists see the risks of restoring a unitary centralized state as too high, the supporters of a unitary centralized approach fear that a Somalia of ever smaller fragments may lead to the country's permanent division (ibid).

These both debating camps have forwarded their own interest to re-building state in Somalia. What is taken into account from the above argument is there is needed another alternative means to re-building state in Somalia. As this study has argued in the review literature parts, the Confederal State Building Approach has emerged as alternative solution to the Somali problems. In this regard, loose unfixed which could allow in and out as the society interests are important.

In short, the above debates based on Somali state building structures, lead us to clear assumption that it lacks to create a viable functional state in Somalia. The clear traces of this debate can be found in the many peace and reconciliation conferences held in the post-Siad Barre years. The first meetings in the 1990s in which the participants were mainly faction leaders and warlords-bent towards centralized approach and focused on finding a solution for the whole of Somalia. In effect, these meetings over political influence and status: at each successive one, the number of factions taking part increased; the majority of the agreements they reached were never implemented or respected; and no lasting settlement was ever achieved. Instead this approach

contributed to making the factions the centerpiece of “natural reconciliation”, while other and potentially more peaceful actors were ignored.

After having this general outlook about Somali state building approach and debate on state structure, this study now describes and analyses some selective important peace conferences and their outcomes. Accordingly, the 1993 Addis Ababa peace conference, the 2000 Arta, the 2004 Mbagathi, the recent one of 2008 Djibouti peace process, as well as the 1993 Borama conferences or reconciliation process have been analyzed. Then, the consequence of this chapter has led us to describe and analyze the challenges to re-building state in Somalia in chapter five.

4.2. The 1993 Addis Ababa Conference

The 1993 Addis Ababa Conference on National Reconciliation was convened by the UN based on what Bradbury (1994: 22) contends was the analysis of the Operation Restore Hope (ORH) dramatic changes brought about by the US military presence. (Lewis 2005: 270) argues that the UN secretary-general at that time, Boutros Boutros Ghali, took advantage of the relative cool in fighting, which considerable American presence had produced and pressed ahead with the so-called “reconciliation” process. Certainly, one therefore concludes that the Addis Ababa process was not informed by a strategic planning on the part of the UN.

The structure of Addis Ababa peace conference was the subject of criticism even before it was officially inaugurated. Bradbury (1994: 23) reports that the main concern was that the signatories at the conference were the fifteen political faction leaders, who were the warlords that had been responsible for much of the suffering in Somalia and regarded as criminals by many Somalis. The war lords invited to the conference as the UNITAF needed to protect its own forces in Somalia and not because of the need to secure a successful outcome, thereby conferring level of legitimacy on the war lords.

The fifteen leaders, who participated in the conference, signed the final agreement on 27 March 1993. The Addis Ababa agreement reaffirmed the January 1993 agreement on cease-fire and disarmament and reached an agreement on the formation of transitional mechanisms for the restoration of political and administrative structures. In particular, it agreed upon the formation of: a transitional national council (TNC), central administrative department, to re-establish civil

administration, regional councils in 18 regions of the country and direct councils in all districts of the country.

The TNC was supposed to consist of three representatives and to include one woman from each of the 18 regions, as well as five seats for Mogadishu, and one seat nominees from each of the 15 factions present in Addis Ababa conference. The structure was to be effective for a period of two years. Subsequently, four committees, namely the charter drafting, the peace settlement of disputes, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and cease-fire and disarmament committees were also established respectively. A charter for the TNC was to be ready for approval at the second session of national reconciliation on 8 June 1993. In addition, the TNC was expected to be established by July 1993.

The scope of Addis Ababa agreement was generally wide signatories. However, there were no firm commitments by the international community to under-write the process financially. It was during the implementation process that it became evident that the very same international community that has spent US\$1.5 billion on the ORH was failing to show similar commitment and leadership with regard to the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. It was during the Addis Ababa process that international diplomacy first gravitated towards the idea of establishing a central government as opposed to focusing on the resolution of the conflict before state-building. The international community's preference was caused by what Moller (2009: 14) describes as a relentless quest for state-building because the entire international system is constructed around states to such an extent that it cannot handle stateless territories inhabited by people who cannot be classified as citizens of any state. Failure to under-write the process finally resulted in delaying the implementation of the peace process, thus creating a breathing space to allow factional leaders to resort to strategy, to ally and strengthen their support bases in the run-up to the formation of the TNC.

The strategic objective of the political realignment of forces was to incline the balance of forces and power in favor of those who might become powerful with regard to the control and commanded of key territories. Factional leaders initiated internal regional peace conferences primarily to attain political superiority over their rivals. To this end, two peace conferences were initiated, one focused on Kismayu and the lower and middle Juba regions, and the second one focused on Galkaiyo and the central regions of Mudug and Galgabuud (Brad Bury, 1994: 26).

The Kismayu peace process led to Jubaland peace agreement and was supported by UNOSOM. The Galkaiyo process was locally driven and did not enjoy UNOSOM support mainly due to the involvement of General, Mohammed Fara Aideed. It was convened by the predominately Habr Gedir, Majerteen and Marehan sub-clan elders in Mudug region. The initiatives followed the defeat of General Aideed by the Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed forces. The dispute was over the rich grazing land in Mudug region. Significantly the SSDF victory over General Aideed was a turning point for the party's participation in the Addis Ababa Conference (Lewis, 2005: 287). Both General Aideed and Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed participated in the Galkaiyo peace conference and Bradbury (1994: 28) points out that it was not clear where the initiative came from for this peace conference. One assumption is that it was initiated by General Aideed and Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed, while another possibility is that it was initiated by the clan elders and was hijacked by the two warlords to strengthen their own support bases with special focus on the Addis Ababa peace process, particularly the transitional political power configuration. General Aideed called a meeting on 29 May 1993 to draft a peace agreement for the central and Southern Regions of the country with the hope that UNOSOM would provide the financial and logistical support he had requested earlier.

However, UNOSOM had not been involved in the Galkaiyo initiative and refused to recognize the conference as an official process or support it. There were suspicions that Aideed was prepared to Bargain over Kismayu, in return for a settlement in Galkaiyo (Bradbury 1994: 28). UNOSOM was also concerned about the participation of Omar Jess, who had been marginalized at the Kismayu conference. UNOSOM made a strategic error by trying to marginalize General Aideed exposed the lack of clarity regarding a role for General Aideed in conflict resolution in Somalia. He had the ability to influence the conflict resolution process either positively or negatively. What this study perceives from the UNOSOM strategy towards Somali factional leaders that it aggravated the conflicts among these rival groups rather than finding solution to it. It was not new for external actors to support one group and against the others.

In order to understand the significance of the Galkaiyo and Kismayu conference, it is necessary to recall that, after the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991, two blocs emerged in Southern Somalia, with General Aideed and Ali Mahdi as central figures. The division between the two had its root in a dispute between the Manifesto Group of businessmen, politicians and intellectuals who

sought to persuade Siad Barre to hand over power peacefully and the more radical military wing of General Aideed, who sought Barre's removal by force (Bradbury, 1994: 26). The division between the two Hawiye leaders became a defining feature of the political formation with clan affiliations assuming a dominant polity in Somalia.

The clan based political affiliation a characteristic of the Somali body politics that is encouraged and nurtured by the Siad Barre regime and has become a defining factor in Somali politics. However, the clan based political affiliation changes frequently, thus complicating the mediation process, as the enemy divided is distorted and is often not issue based. Lewis (2005: 287) refers to the division of the SSDF in 1993 following the defeat of General Aideed in Mudug when Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed entered into an alliance with the Hawiye's Habr Gedir Saad he had just defeated, which was not unusual practice for the Somalis. There are no permanent enemies in the Somali conflict, a matter which mediators and external stakeholders are unable to manage. The fact that there are no permanent enemies in Somalia provides both challenges and opportunities for mediators; the opportunities arise from the fact there are no cultural, religious and societal values, which are often difficult to contend with in conflict resolution process.

To explain this more, Mohammed Abdi with interview stated the nature of Somali people "there are no permanent enemies in Somali clans, today's enemy become friends of tomorrow". This dynamic nature of Somali clans is a serious problem for any peace processes, especially for those pre-determined externally driven peace processes.

The Galkaiyo conference passed some important resolutions intended to normalize relations between the Habr Gedir and the Majerteen. These included amongst others, the request that UNOSOM should assist in the demobilization of encamped militias and, to restore and maintain all the technical equipment. Importantly, the conference resolved to re-open the route connecting north and south Galkaiyo and the return of property seized during the conflict.

The most positive outcome of the Galkaiyo conference was the return to Addis Ababa Conference as far as the UN was concerned. UNOSOM could not look beyond its narrow interests to assist with implementation of the conference outcome aim at the demilitarization of militia groups as agreed by the conference in the Karaan district of Mogadishu, UNOSOM was

quick to support it. Because of the preferential treatment shown by UNOSOM to the Ali Mahdi Conference, General Aideed began to spread anti-UN propaganda (Bradbury, 1994: 29).

The centrality of General Aideed in the resolution of the Somali conflict was illustrated by the collapse of the Addis Ababa process once he withdrew from it. It also transpired that UNOSOM had colonial power relations with the Somalis; this was one of the factors that played a role in the collapse of the Addis Ababa Peace Process. In addition, the 5 June 1993 killing of the Pakistani peace keeping contingent of UNOSOM dealt a heavy blow to Addis Ababa Peace Process. The situation then turned into an urban war of attrition in Mogadishu between the UN and a faction of Somalis local to General Aideed.

The TNC could not be conceptualized because of the various role-players' political manipulation and hidden, evident in the holding of internal peace conferences, some supported and encouraged by the UN. The TNC could have been rendered ineffective if it had been constituted given the fact that the signatories to the Addis Ababa Conference were still cognitively, emotionally and physically at war with each other. Relations in terms of these three dimensions are critical for sustainable peace and security in Somalia. This study now focuses on the 2000 Arta peace process and investigates whether lessons were learned from the Addis Ababa Process or it has been once again repeated to sustain the ongoing war leaders' conflicts.

4.3. Arta Peace Process of 2000

Before analyzing the Arta peace process and its result, this study is going to high light both Ethiopia and Egypt initiative peace processes. These countries have their own conflicting interests towards Somalia. In doing so, they prolonged instability in Somalia.

After the UN left Somalia in 1955, the first round of Somalia peace negotiations was concerned by Ethiopia in Sodere in 1996, where various Somali factions signed an accord for the establishment of national institutions. However the leader of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), Hussein Aideed, did not agree with conclusion of the conference, leading to a dead lock. A consequent attempt in 1997 by Egypt to convene the same factions that participated in the Sodere process in Cairo to reconcile them with Aideed equally failed. The competition regional powers had sustained problems in Somalia rather than finding a reasonable solution to that country (UNHCR, 2008: 25).

The Somalia which is both a member of the League of Arab states and the African Union is caught between diverging African and Arab interests in relation to its political arrangement. While the Arab states and Djibouti seems to favor a strong central authority in Mogadishu, Ethiopia's preference for federalism and the establishment of regional entities for many Somalis prove that it fears the re-emergence of a strong, United Somalia and seeks to continue instability and division (ibid: 24).

Hence, once again both Soderre and Cairo Peace Processes had failed to address the real interests of the Somali people as the Addis Ababa peace process did. From this situation, one can draw conclusion whether unitary or federal state structure could not be effective unless the wish of the people respected. By now this study describes and analyses the Arta peace process.

In August 2000, Djibouti president Ismael Omar Guelleh, endorsed by IGAD, convened the Arta peace conference, which paved the way for the formation of a Transitional National Government (TNG). The TNG at that time only controlled a limited part of Mogadishu and its surrounding areas (UNHCR, 2008: 25).

The Arta conference, where almost 5,000 delegates came from every region in Somalia and from Diaspora to deliberate on the future of their country, was therefore a return to unitary approach to establishing. It was the first attempt in the new millennium-though the form it took still different somewhat from its predecessors. Even though it was externally driven top down state building approach, the Arta conference was able to incorporate civil society, such as intellectuals, clan and religions leaders and members of the business community that are largely participated in the conference (ibid).

Arta's most important political break through was the creation of a Transitional National Government (TNG). This government became the first to fill the Somalis seat at the UN since the removal of Siad Barre. It was created on the basis of a principle fixed proportional representation, in the conference established. A number of places were allotted to each of the four major Somali clan families such as Hawiye, Darod, Dir and Dgil-Mirfile, and a half-place to minorities and women (according to the "4.5 formula") (Boas & Rotwitt, 2010: 5). However, the notorious war lords from Mogadishu were absent. The war lords had been invited, but not as veto holders, and therefore most stayed away, complaining that they were devalued by not being

treated as the top leaders of their respective communities. Abdullahi Yussuf objected to the lack of a federal structure at the meeting, and also did not take part (ibid).

Establishment of a government without first resolving the Somali conflict or addressing the sources of the conflict cannot provide guarantees that such a government will survive the test of time. It is important to note that the Arta peace process was an initiative of the president of Djibouti, Ismail Omar Guelleh who strongly advocated the creation of centralized state in Somalia. The IGAD that included Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda was the main sponsor of the process, though Ethiopia worked actively to undermine the outcome of the process due to the perception that Islamists dominated the outcomes. The argument by Tadesse (2002: 42) that al-Ittihad succeeded in hand-picking representatives for the Arta peace conference lacks credibility as it is based on the fact that Abdulqasim Salat Hassan had a relationship with the al-Ittihad group.

The EU, the UN and the US as well as Egypt, Italy and Libya, later endorsed the Arta peace process. Support of the peace conference was based on the expectations of the international sponsors that out of the process, a form of government structure should emerge. In this regard, the government formation is seen as available approach to drive the conflict resolution process. The assumption that government formation is equal to conflict resolution in Somalia is without and basis what so ever and this assumption have since driven the conflict resolution processes in Somalia, with the emphasis shifting from conflict resolution to state building. There are some merits to Moller's (2009) argument on state-building approach in this regard. The state-building approach to the Somali conflict resolution has introduced challenges with regard to the nature and form of such an eventual government and state.

The top-down process of state-building adopted by the Arta process was damaged given that Somali society has historically enjoyed a decentralized form of government base power sharing by clans. To some extent, the clan is an example of an autonomous and cohesive system of government revising when dealing with government building process. If this conference managed properly, it was crucial move to rebuilding state in this fragile state.

For the first time openly reflecting political realities, membership of resulting assembly was based on clan quotas. This clan quotas indicate the power distribution among main clans family

such as Darod, Hawiye, Dir and Digile-Mirifle (4.5 formula) half to minority. In the event, the assembly chose as president of the resulting national assembly and Transitional National Government (TNG) Abdiqasim Salat Hassan, a former enthusiastic exponent of Siad's Scientific Socialism and at one point minister of the Interior (Lewis, 2008: 82). The establishment of TNG with Abdiqasim Salat Hassan (Hawiye) as president was perhaps another compromise to manage and appease the Hawiye opposition to the process outcomes.

The compromise involved with the election of Abdulqasim Salat Hassan as president of the TNG meant that the transitional government was in crisis management mode before dealing with the challenges of creating a functioning system of governance and the pacification of one of the militarized countries in the African continent. Creating a government adhering to some semblance of democratic values in terms of the Arta process was another challenge as the delegates were not representatives of a democratically constituted body of the Somali society. Lewis (2008: 81) argues that, in practice, many people who claimed to be legitimately appointed representatives were simply self-appointed, and he views this as the most obvious error in the process, which never the less sought to appeal to every section of the nation in the widest sense.

The delegates did not have a role to play in the resolution of the conflict. However, it does not necessarily follow that such a role can be transformed into the formation of a representative government. People who have the means and capability to engage in violent conflict may not necessarily represent any specific constituency in Somalia. The Arta peace process elevated groups, which had no strategic vision for resolving the conflict ravaging the country.

The Arta peace process sponsors assumed that appointing a Habr Gidir as president of the transitional government, was expedient, as he was someone who could lead and control his faction's clansmen in Mogadishu. This assumption did not take the political background of Abdulqasim Salat Hassan into account; in addition, 60% of the 245 members came from Siad Barre's carefully selected parliament (Lewis, 2008: 82). Consequently, the TNG did not enjoy the support of the Mogadishu citizens, let alone that of the lords. In reality, the TNG only had control of a few streets in Mogadishu, while the greater parts of the country was divided among the dominant war lords, such as Mohammed Qanyere Afrah, Musa Sudi, Ali Osman Atto, Hussien Aideed and Mohammed Dhere.

The monumental failure of the Arta peace process lay in the lack of focus on conflict resolution and failure to create a mechanism to ensure that the underlying causes of the conflict were addressed in a systematic and coherent manner. The focus of the conference on the creation of a government before the resolution phase was short-sighted to say the least. The conceptual framework for creating a government before making peace has since become a defining feature of international diplomacy in the resolution of Somali conflict despite its shortcomings.

The other lessons of the Arta peace process is that the top-down approach of government formation has not resonated well with the Somali since the Addis Ababa Process. The international diplomatic focus on the top-down approach was also not generally accepted by all the international role-players, thus when Mohammed Sahnoun criticized to step down as the UN special representative for Somali. Adam (2003: 24) points out that Mohammed Sanoun had begun to win Somali cooperation advocating a gradual approach in harmony with traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.

Failures of the Arta peace process are not only limited to the conceptual approaches of the Somali conflict resolution. Spoilers and external interests are also to blame for the collapse of the agreement. The Mogadishu war lords have been the most active military force involved in sabotaging the agreement on as they stand to lose their economic strangle hold on the country, lose their illegally acquired wealth, and political domination of the country's body politics. In addition, the war lords also stand to lose the advantages they gained from war such as profiteering from the diversion of food aid exporting scrap metal, and selling guns, particularly small arms to illicit traders in the region.

Theoretically, the Arta peace process was a government making process. The neo-liberal assumption that creation of a government system would lead to the resolution of the conflict proved to be false during and particularly after the Arta conference. It is important to note conflict straddles across various theoretical paradigms. The conflict has not produced a victor, in spite of the assumption of some realists that allowing the disputants to engage in unending conflict would lead to some form of exhaustion and compel them to reach a resolution agreement on their own without any third party intervention.

The Arta peace process made similar mistakes to those during the Addis Ababa Peace Process by equating the concept of 'state-building'. The Arta Peace Process, like the Addis Ababa Peace Process, failed to persuade disputants to develop concrete measures to resolve the conflict, though it agreed on the cease fire agreement, which cannot be successful without clearly defined implementation mechanisms involving major role-players in the conflict.

In fact, Arta conference could not even develop any basic conflict resolution structures. The argument by Moravosik (2008: 249) that for some, the central liberal claim "what states want determine what they do" is a classical summation of the obsession of international diplomacy with the state-building approach to the Somali conflict resolution. Ironically, the Mbagathi peace process is also based on the assumption that building a Somali state institution will translate into peace-making.

4.4. Mbagathi Peace Process

The 2004 IGAD sponsored Mbagathi Peace Process was also founded on the basis that creating state institutions will transform the Somali conflict. Lewis (2008: 91) alleges that the process that led to the formation of the TFG, had repeated all the major mistakes made during the circular and unproductive Somalia Peace Process.

The Mbagathi Peace Process was supposed to adapt a Federal State Structure in which local "state governments" would retain some local power. It was a clear shift in power from the Mogadishu Centered, Hawiye-and Isalmist dominated coalition which had the upper hand in the TNG negotiations, towards the federalists, Darod-and Ethiopian-backed alliance with Abdullahi Yussuf at the forefront. It was furthermore a top down approach, in that a small number of war lords once again were allowed to set the terms. The result was a weak government, with constant fighting and little public support. In fact, the lack of support made it impossible for the government to relocate from Kenya to Mogadishu. The 4.5 power-sharing formula was again used to allocate seats for MPs and Cabinet Ministers (Boas and Rotwitt, 2010: 5). The most critical mistake was the failure to insist on the parties making peace before trying to form a government.

The Mbagathi process took place in a period of challenging international security threats, characterized by the post 11 September 2001 attacks in the US. The fact that Somalia is a

Muslim state meant that America government would have a strong interest in the direction the peace process was taking, mainly due to the Bush Administration's global strategy and war on terrorism. Like Afghanistan, the protracted failed state of Somali was viewed by the Bush Administration as a safe haven for Al-Qaeda inspired groups. The US policy applied/ exerted considerable pressure on the state-building approach to the Somali conflict resolution efforts. Menkhaus (2003: 19) contends that for external actors, conventional wisdom holds that a responsive and effective state is an essential pre requisite for development, a perfectly reasonable proposition enshrined in virtually every World Bank and UN strategy on development. For Somalis, the state is an instrument and empowering those who control it, while exploiting and harassing the rest of the population.

The application of this neo-liberal theoretical approach to the resolution of the Somali conflict has created some opportunities for developing alternative frameworks for the conflict resolution informed by local dynamics.

As have mentioned so far, the external mediation tends to focus on state-building; and not on peace-building, despite the fact that the average Somali needs and would benefit more immediately from a state of peace than a revival central government (Menkhaus, 2003: 21). The Mbagathi process was initiated in 2002 when it was apparent that the TNG had failed and the Mogadishu warlords were become a dominant force threaten the national security of Kenya and Ethiopia. The EU and UN were once again financial sponsors of the peace process, which first look peace in the Kenya town of Eldoret. Kenya and Ethiopia are key actors in all the solution. The involvement of the two countries has to do with their national interests. These interests cover a wide range of issues that are not just limited to security, commercial and political issues; therefore, at time their parochial definition of national interests has become an obstacle to the resolution of the Somali conflict.

The focus on state-building the Mbagathi process was a strategic mistake in terms mediation as the Somali conflict is not mainly about government formation as this mediation approach appeared to imply. As mentioned earlier, the focus of the conference was determined and driven by external state holder, who was often too removed from the conflict to understand its dynamics. Therefore, no progress was made with regard to the renewed fighting inside Somalia that was exacerbated in fact, by the posturing during the Mbagathi peace process. Subsequently,

the disputants tried to settle the differences that came to the forefront during the conference by means of military force on the battle fields. Menkhaus (2003: 12) comments that this state of affairs has continued for over a decade from the 1991 Djibouti peace accord (which is held responsible for sparking the highly destructive war on Mogadishu in the latter part of 1991 between the militias of General Aideed and Ali Mahdi) to the 2002 Kenya-mediated peace process sponsored by the IGAD.

The Mbagathi peace process was mainly dominated by Ethiopia and Kenya among the IGAD members. As usually there were division among Somali warlords concerning state building approach in which some of them supporting the Ethiopian approach and the others opposing it. The pro-Ethiopian group led by Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed whereas anti- Ethiopian groups were led by Mohammed Qanyere Afran who representing the Mogadishu warlords. Hence, Ethiopia has played a significant role in creating weak federal government in Somalia.

The elected delegates at the Mbagathi peace process created the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), the TFC a legislative branch TFP and an executive branch TFG. The Ethiopian lobbied hard for Abdulahi Yussuf Ahmed to become president of the TFG. It needs to emphasized that Ethiopia support of the process was critical in ensuring the success of the Mbagathi process as indicated by the IGAD desire to address Ethiopia's interests, without due regard to the interests of the disputants. When Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed was elected president of the TFG, his first act was to appoint a pro-Ethiopian Prime Minister, namely Mohammed Ali Ghedi (Abagal). Adam (2008:180) asserts that Ghedi can be linked with the late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi. However, whatever efforts has been made by Ethiopia to support the transitional federal government in Somalia, this systematic elimination of Mogadishu warlords from political power undermine state rebuilding in Somalia and prolonged instability.

Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden was elected speaker of the transitional parliament is an attempt to strike a balance of power between the two factions in the TFG. The rationale for this was based on the perception that he was not aligned to the pro-Ethiopia faction of the president and the Prime Minister. However, he did maintain some level of neutrality with regard to the two factions that emerged from the Mbagathi Peace Process. Nevertheless, he did not escape criticism from the pro-Ethiopia group as he was labeled an Islamic because of his proposal that the TFG should start negotiation with the UIC. Reaching out the UIC was an issue to which the Ethiopian

government was opposed; therefore, this led to stigmatization of the speaker. The US and Ethiopia governments expressed the opinion that the Somali Islamic movement was under the ruler of the extremist who were harboring terrorists, which included the suspects in the 1998 bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Adam, 2008: 180).

Importantly, the US and Ethiopia's perceptions of the Somali Islamic movement have since influenced their foreign policy formulation and implementation of these two countries. Their policies have revealed a neo-liberalist approach, which viewed the conflict as a dangerous, high stake game that can be won through domination, control and counter control strategies (Coleman, 2006: 547). The notion that the Somali conflict can be won by means of warfare is displaced by the behavioral pattern of the conflict since the fall of the Barre government in 1991. In essence, this realist approach has contributed to the eventual collapse of the TFG as constituted by the Mbagathi Peace Process. Here one has to note that as this study has addressed as it is only focusing in the 20 years political situation in Somalia since 1991, then the current (of 2012 democratically elected) government is not the part of this study.

The Mbagathi constituted TFG was similar to the previous peace process in that it focused on a government building approach to the Somali conflict resolution process. Because of this approach, the creation of the cabinet was not aligned to challenge of creating a climate conducive to free and fair political activities when the mandate of the transitional government ends. The reality was that the Mbagathi Process was a gathering of disputants who were still at war with each other for all practical purposes. However, the Mbagathi process failed to acknowledge that the conflict resolution process was not yet ripe to allow a fundamental shift to initiate a successful government building process. Disputants and mediators should have taken advantage of the moment when the warlords and other role-players in the Somali conflict gather to define a conflict resolution process. The fact that all the stakeholders in the conflict gathered in Mbagathi to negotiate the successful resolution of the conflict, is an affirmation that the conflict was indeed ripe for a negotiated settlement.

Finally, the government seat became the issue of discussion as the transitional government still is not arriving to Mogadishu from Kenya. The TFG relocated its seat first to Johwar and then to Baidoa this was seen by the Mogadishu war lords as an attempt by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed to

marginalize the Hawiye clan. However, thanks to Ethiopian military intervention that ousted the UIC from Mogadishu and installed the TFG.

The Mbgabthi peace process was not distinct from its predecessors in that it mainly focused on government establishment rather than resolving conflicts among faction leaders. Moreover, this process was externally driven for their own interests especially USA pressure on the regional states to achieve her national interests that anti terrorism campaign in Somalia. This top down state building approach could not address the Somali society interests as it was designed by external actors, and hindered the re-building state in Somalia. After the Mbgabthi peace talk, there was heavy fighting between TFG, supported by USA and Ethiopian forces and UIC in south central Somalia, especially in Mogadishu and its surrounding. Then in this critical time, the 2008 Djibouti peace process was conducted. This is the most recent peace conference between TFG and parts of UIC in Djibouti.

4.5 Djibouti peace process of 2008

The obvious defects of the TFG, the escalation of the attacks, and the tragic humanitarian disaster led the international community to consider new peace talks. The aim was to reach out to the moderate elements of the Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), broaden the base of the TFG, and marginalize the radicals. With these objectives, the Djibouti peace process was started in Djibouti on May 9, 2008. However, the peace process divided the ARS between ARS Djibouti, which was willing for negotiation, and ARS Asmara, which was opposed to any dialogue with the TFG before the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

It was in this difficult situation that the Djibouti peace process was initiated by the UN intended to stabilize the country by forging a political alliance between the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) and the TFG. However, ARS-Asmara rejected any peace agreement with the TFG and vowed to fight until all foreign troops leave Somalia. Its leader, Sheik Dahir Aweys, went back to Somalia and joined Hizbul Islam to achieve this objective in April 2009; only a few months after the TFG II took over (Kidist, 2009:17).

In October 2008, the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation Somalia-Djibouti (ARS-D) signed the Djibouti Agreement and created a new Somali TFG II. In January, the new

government expanded its parliament to include some 200 ARS members and seventy-five civil society and opposition representatives. Sheikh Sharif from the Hawiye/Abgal clan was elected as the new president by the expanded parliament and Ali Sharmark, from the Darood clan, was selected as a prime minister, which was followed by the formation of thirty-six cabinet members (Dangne, 2009).

One of the points of agreement between the TFG and the ARS-D was the full withdrawal of the Ethiopian military forces from Somalia. The Ethiopian withdrawal was eventually realized in January 2009. Now the responsibility for stabilizing and protecting peace in Somali fall under the African Union peace keeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

The ARS-Djibouti and the TFG agreed to form a new unity government by expanding the number of Somali parliamentarians to 550 and elected the former leader of the UIC, Sheikh Sheriff and Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as the new President and Prime Minister of the TFG, respectively. The two sides also agreed to establish a Joint Security Force. Ethiopian forces fully withdrew as agreed by the Djibouti peace process. Despite the establishment of the new government, the security situation remains insecure.

The Djibouti peace process took place under the sponsorship of the UN. However, IGAD, aware of the serious problems of the TFG fully supported the peace process, which aimed to broaden the base of the Somali government by reaching out to the moderate elements of the ARS. It also sent a clear and strong political message to the former TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf, who opposed the process. This contributed to the resignation of President Abdullahi Yusuf, which facilitated agreement between the TFG and the ARS-D. IGAD also established a Facilitators Office for Somalia Peace and Reconciliation to keep a close eye on the developments of the peace process in Somalia (Kidisit, 2009: 17).

However, TFGII was able to create the so-called democratic elected government in Somalia in September 2012 for the first time after the fall of military regime of Siad Barre in 1991. The effectiveness of the newly elected government of Sheikh Sharif Mohamud will be seen in the near future in Somali politics. The last analysis of this chapter is the Borna peace process of

1993 which more or less has brought peace and stability to the Somaliland Republic since 1991. The main aim of this peace process to learn lessons why this state is enjoying peace while the south central Somalia suffering from prolonged war and conflicts with various failed attempts to bring peace and stability, and to create functional government in Somalia.

4.6. The 1993 Boroma Peace Process

In this section this study has analyzed that what lessons learnt from the 1993 Boroma Peace Processes and its outcomes to the Somaliland society. The main intention of this section is to address that what the former peace processes had failed to take into considerations; and what consequences they had after many peace processes had been conducted. Moreover, this part of this study will address what type state building structures should be conducted to restore peace and stability in Somalia.

The 1993 Boroma Grand conference of National Reconciliation provided a solid function for the establishment of the Somaliland secession from the Somali Republic. Boroma is a Gedbaursi town chosen to host the peace conference. Bradbury (1994: 73) explains that the town provided a relatively secure environment away from Hargesia, Berbera, and Burco, where security and peace were still fragile. The conference was concerned following the unilateral declaration of independence on 18 May 1991, just after the fall of the Siad Barre regime in the same year. The Boroma conference produced a peace charter (a kind of national Xeer) to strengthen security and regularize the role of the traditional local elders in all aspects surrounding peacemaking (Lewis, 2002: 283). The Addis Ababa, Arta, Mbagathi Peace Processes did not have made procession for the structural representation of the clan elders regarding decision making during the peace conferences. Importantly, the focus of this conference was not on peacemaking as we have seen in the previous sections rather it is empowering the clan elders regarding decision making and the conference was critical in ensuring ownership of the process during the Boroma Peace Process.

In effect, the conference created a bicameral legislature, with a non-elected upper house consisting of traditional elders (the guurti), and an elected lower house consisting a public representatives. Lewis (2002: 283) argues that the compromise is aligned with the old clan-based SNM and the exigencies of modern government administration. The other achievement of the

Borama process was the agreement that the draft constitution would be tested in a referendum to evaluate its acceptance by the general public. The peace processes in southern Somalia discussed earlier had no mechanism to test their public acceptances. The mediators did not venture to test the acceptance of the outcomes of the process, perhaps because the conference was driven by external interests more than internal essentials/ imperatives, inevitably, this would lead to resentment by the local population.

The Boroma Peace Conference Principles were replicated in other regions of the Somaliland, particularly in the Sanag region where the traditional mutually hostile local Habr Ja'lo, Dulbanate and Warsangeli Clans has joined the Sanag Grand Peace Conference. The process in south did not ensure that the bottom up parallel peace processes that focused on conflict resolution among the clans were successful. The success of Boroma conference was due to the lack of international interest and interference in the negotiation process to some extent. Moreover, the international community did not provide any financial support for the peace conference.

The process was sponsored financially and materially by the local population and the Diaspora, thus ensuring local support for the conference outcome. The visionary leaders driving the Boroma process were Mammed Haji Ibrahim Igal (Habr Awal) and Abdarhman Tur (Habr Yunis). Leadership of the process is fundamental to transformation of the conflict. Leaders in the Boroma Peace Process were equally critical of instituting a demilitarization programme without any contribution from the UN. Lewis (2008: 93) points out that, instead, the UN supported the unrealistic and impractical demilitarization campaigns in Mogadishu, seeking to re-establish a local police force in the absence of government and political order.

The Peace charter was the outcome of the conference deliberations on reconciliation and security and was an attempted to correct past mistakes that had resulted in a situation of insecurity and ineffectual government, and to promote stability and peaceful co-existence among the communities of Somaliland (Bradbury, 1994: 73). The peace charter requires all communities to take a Solemn-Oath not to attack another community and sets out the responsibilities of elders in the mediation process and when setting outstanding disputes and any conflict that might occur in future. The peace charter incorporates a local conflict resolution concept, known as Xeer in the

Somali language. The processes in Somalia were completely different to the approach followed at the Boroma conference.

Contrary to what might reasonably have been expected, the successes of the Somaliland driven peace process did not influence the processes reviewed earlier incorporate the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral dimensions. The question regarding why internationally driven and sponsored processes failed to learn from the Boroma Peace Process, remains to be answered. Then, the international community has to rethink why their diplomacy failed to bring positive solution for Somali conflicts as Somaliland did achieve it. Also they are expected to tell Somali people what mistake they did in past peace process and why they failed to accomplish peace that the Somaliland successfully achieved.

In conclusion, since the Somali state 'collapsed', there have been around fifteen conflict resolution efforts organized by different states, as well as regional and international organizations. Some of the major conferences supported by the regional states and the international community include: the Addis Ababa conference in 1991; the Arta conference in 2000; the Eldorate process in 2002, which gave birth to the first transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004; and the recently held Djibouti peace process in 2008, which led to the establishment of the second Transitional Federal Government (TFGII) by combining the TFGI with ARS-D (Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia-Djibouti) (Dagne,2009:19).

Even though many efforts have been made to conflict resolution and establish functioning government in Somalia, the last fourteen resolution efforts failed to establish a practical authority in Somalia and the results of the most recent of 2008 peace process remains to be seen as it has carried out as strong functional government.

CHAPTER FIVE

Challenges to Re-Building Nation-State in Somalia since 1991

Several attempts have been made to Re-Build Nation- State of Somalia since the fall of military regime in 1991. However, they failed to actually realize the revival of Nation- State in Somalia. Therefore, this study tries to identify and analyze the major challenges that undermined the efforts to remake state in Somalia. Thus, there are both internal and external challenges that worked against the reconciliation and state revival in Somalia. Therefore, these challenges have been described and analyzed throughout this chapter in detail. However, all the challenges which prevented reconstructing the functional central government in Somalia could not be mentioned here with in this limited paper. Such problems like piracy, terrorism, war economy and the others. But this paper has tried to address the core problems and analyzed them.

5.1 Internal Challenges

These are domestic factors that determined and shaped the political and economic interests of local actors in a conflicting and antagonistic manner. By this they undermined the commonly shared values of the Somali society and prevented the development of political unity which is necessary for the re-construct of state. This, in return, challenged the re-building of state of Somalia. Accordingly, among these internal challenges the Legacies of Military Regime, the Clan Dynamics, the Radical Islam, the Unequal Treatment of Minorities and the Availability of Weapons are the major domestic factors which against the rebirth of the state of Somalia.

5.1.1 Legacies of Military Regime

The Somali societies have inherited more centralized state structure from military regime of Siad Barre, and that has created different fighting factional groups to control state power. The military dictatorship of Siad Barre regime had ruled Somalia for more than two decades. Its brutal administration has had far reaching effects on the attempts to revive the state of Somalia. The state experience under the military regime has significantly shaped the attitudes of Somalis towards the centralized state (World Bank Group, 2005). Accordingly, for the Somalis, the state was not an institution that promotes the interests of the society at large but rather than it is "an instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching and empowering those who control it and exploiting and oppressing the rest" (Menkhaus, 2003:409). Accordingly, the competition among

the rival war lords is not aimed at creating functional government to provide security service social welfare to the Somali society, but it was to satisfy their own interests.

The clans had become to be manipulated and politicized during the military era to prolong its brutal regime in power. The Somali state under the Siad Barre regime was primarily dominated by a small group of elite from Marehan, Ogaden, and Dulbhante sub-clans of the Darod (hence the derogatory term 'MOD'), who used the state to dominate and exploit the rest of the population (Moller, 2009) this is the only experience the Somalis have had with the centralized state. This, in turn, has very negative effect both on the political leaders and people of Somalia with regard to their view of state. In this regard, on the part of the political or factional leaders, the revival of state became to be viewed in Somali politics as:

a zero-sum game, creating winners and losers in a game with potentially very high stakes. Groups (i.e. clans) who gain control over a central government will use it to appropriate economic resources at the expense of others, and will use the law, patronage and the monopoly of legitimate use of violence to protect this advantage (Menkhaus, 2003:408).

Thus, the faction leaders, after they removed Barre's regime, came to compete for control of state for the sake of political and economic power that the state could generate (Mohammed, 2008). According to Giannou, they "... fought amongst themselves to see who would gain control of the state and who would replace the dictatorship of the former clan coalition by the dictatorship of their own clan" (1993:354). This adversely affected the re-building state in Somali and sustained the ongoing conflict and instability.

The British and the Italian colonial administrative policies or systems have been still alive with the newly independent Republic of Somalia. The Barre regime had inherited the colonial style of governance by replicating the more centralized and divide and rule system. This type of the state experience had marginalized majority of population from participating in political and any other institutions. The manipulation clans into new political system undermined the traditional Somali society way of life and created division with conflicting factional groups. These situations have created disagreement and mistrust among clans and sub-clans that resisted the national reconciliation process in Somalia.

For instance, in February 1991, the unilateral declaration of a government by Ali Mahdi Mohammed (USC) with himself as the Interim President antagonized the SNM Isaq faction in the Northwest of the country (Brons, 2001). This "...confirmed the 'northerners' suspicion of renewed political domination by southern political forces" (ibid: 275). Then it became one of the factors that facilitated the May 1991 separation of Northern West Region and declaration of the 'Republic of Somaliland'. In addition, the act of Ali Mahdi also faced serious opposition from the other Hawiye USC forces under Mohammed Farah Aideed. This led to intensified fighting between USC factions headed by Ali Mahdi and Farah Aideed over the control of Mogadishu in 1991. It was part of struggle among the political elites to control the state power (Spears, 1998). The contending interests among faction leaders after the don fall of Siad Barre's regime had negative impact on Somali reconciliation processes for more than two decades.

There is strong power competition in Somalia among the political faction leaders with their own interests that prevented Re-Establishment of all embracing government in Somalia. These interested groups in Somalia still the part of the problems in escalating the ongoing situations and making it more complex. It has reinforced division of the interests of these faction leaders. This, in turn, problematizes the issues of power sharing in any attempt to establish government (Spears, 1998). As a result, the previous attempts (reconciliation conferences) made to establish government and their outcomes were not inclusive (Awad, 2005). Thus, they were bound to fail or result in violence. This was due to the fact that the groups left out of the agreement and the government, have the capacity to destroy it (Menkhaus, 2003). That is why this study has tried to discuss and analyze the peace process and its outcomes in chapter four. As have been discussed in this section all the attempted reconciliation processes failed to be realized.

Accordingly, this could partly explain the failure of both TNG and TFG. For instance, in the case of TNG, "almost all the forces that practically controlled the country were outside the government" (Awad, 2005:20). Thus, they undermined the establishment of the TNG as a national government. Regarding the TFG, it largely excluded the political factions in and around Mogadishu, hence failed to be inclusive. Then the opposition from these factions made the TFG weak and dysfunctional (Menkhaus, 2008).

In short, the continuing competition for state control accompanied by zero-sum game politics remains to haunt the country and prevent the formation of a government of national unity. It is to say that,

The legacy of the Barre regime is still alive, and groups continue to view the state as institution that will enable them to acquire political and economic control and provide benefits to their clan kin. On the part of armed faction leaders, there seems to be no real commitment to accepting a state structure that does not give them a prominent role (World Bank Group, 2003:22).

Consequently, the prevailing political culture of zero-sum game in Somali politics was again one of the factors behind the failure of both TNG and TFG that came into conflict with UIC over state power (Menkhaus, 2008). Recently, the power competitions between the TFG and UIC coupled with the politics of zero-sum game have prevented them from reaching at agreement. Due to this they together failed to create government of national unity and thereby prolonged the situation of the state 'collapse' (ibid). This was because both TFG and UIC state structures have different conflicting interests in state re-building in Somalia. In this regard, the TFG is more externally driven and sponsored whereas the UIC is locally created and sponsored state structures with their own interests.

On the part of the masses, the experience with a repressive state has had made many Somalis suspicious of the central government. They become "...distrustful of a strong central state" (World Bank, 2005:19). Thus, popular rejection of the Siad Barre dictatorship transformed itself into the rejection of centralized authority imposed by any 'other' clan" (Giannou, 1993:354). This, in turn, resulted in violence and conflict whenever attempts to establish national government are made (Menkhaus, 2003) that is some argued that "the process of attempting to establish a new national government has led to more violence and divisiveness and has not resulted in any meaningful progress towards creating a functional government" (Baxter, 2007:4).

Indeed, the per-colonial Somali society has experienced decentralize state structure, which had been disturbed and influenced when European powers introduced their own centralized state structures.

The Somalis become hesitant to the emergence of a new central government in Somalia. Instead they tend to rely on sub-state structures "in order to keep law and order, exercise a certain degree of control over the use of violence, achieve social security and economic recovery" (Brons, 2001:283). Here, the Puntland is the best example of sub-state structure. However, the case of Somaliland may be beyond the level of sub-state structure, since it has developed its own state identity. Somaliland is a political entity waiting for international recognition to be an independent state. This has brought a challenge to the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia, despite the existence of the de jure borders of the Somali state (Bradbury, et al, 2003).

Beside this, according to Awad, the oppressive rule of Siad Barre military dictatorship "have destroyed all bounds of communal solidarity and national cohesion, and have caused rooted suspicions and wide spread fragmentation at all levels of society..." (2005:16). This makes the effort to form Somali national government and the process of reconciliation more difficult and challenging (ibid).

Moreover, the ordinary local society has become militarized and the violence becomes an accepted form of conflict resolution during the military regime in Somalia (World Bank Group, 2005). The culture of militarization has contributed to affect the revival of state. Here, the militarization of the society particularly in south central Somalia has strengthened the culture of conflict. This was due to the fact that , unlike the Somaliland and Puntland, the south central Somalia lacked regional authority that could have to some extent prevent the follow of weapons, demobilize militias, and punish crimes.

This, in turn, created a favorable condition for the political war lords and war economic groups to advance their respective interests. The faction leaders instigate conflicts instead of negotiation to establish power base and promote political goals. They act as security providers in the situation of conflict and thereby exploit it in order to achieve their political interests. The war economic groups, on their part, facilitate conflict with the aim to gain economic profits through illegal ways (Spears, 1998). Then, these groups become destroyers of attempt to establish government that will ensure peace and enforce the rule of law (Osman and Souar'e, 2007).

Finally, the Somali society had inherited from the military regime oppressive and exploitative experiences in which manipulated and politicized clans fighting against each other in order to

control resources and power at the expense of weak clan groups. The dominant clan wanted the status quo remains as divided to the sake of personal interest rather than social wellbeing. The present day clan division to some extent traced to the divisive rule Barre regime that being the obstacle to reconstructing Nation-State in Somalia.

5.1.2 Clan Dynamics

Conflicts and competitions over scarce resources of grazing land and water is common in traditional Somali society (Lewis, 2002). The competitions and conflicts in Somali society culture are often known. Nevertheless, the conflict and competition among the Somali society was common, they had their own conflict resolution traditional formal and informal mechanisms. These institutions had maintained peace and order for life until the colonial era. During colonialism, clan divisions were exploited by the colonial powers in order to rule the people effectively (Piger, 1994). The manipulation and politicize of clan dynamics by the colonial powers made the local resistance weak and fragile.

As this study has argued in the review literature part, that on the myth of nature of Somali society. In this regard, two competing school of thought have been mentioned: One that defines Somali political conflict as quintessentially traditional clanism and its opposite, which contests the conflation of political dispute with genealogical differences. The central bone of contention in this debate is the nature of Somali political identity.

One thesis claims that Somalis consist of ethnically distinct groups and that any political, social, or professional association among Somalis should balance its membership, if it is to be legitimate, on the basis of these distinctions. The contrary scenario posits that Somalis are one ethnic group sharing broad, regionally based cultural and social values but differentiated into several genealogical groups. Those who advance this thesis contend that transforming Somalis' genealogical differences into political, social, and professional instruments will destroy values they share and will undermine their sense of civic belonging. Furthermore, they add that accepting genealogical variation as the basis for political intercourse and public policy is not part of the old Somali tradition but a legacy of the colonial strategy of "divide and rule" (Samatar, 2006:2).

Accordingly, considering Somali society as static in terms of political, economic, social and other values, has led to miss understanding the heterogeneous nature, especially those people who are living in southern Somalia with their own way of life. Hence, this dynamic nature of Somali people should be taken into account to Re- Building viable Nation- State in Somalia. Here one should not deny that Somali have shared common cultural values in terms of religion and language at large. Moreover, Somali society is relatively same people as compared to other African countries. But, that does not mean Somali peoples are entirely homogeneous.

In the post-colonial period, the state has become an arena up on which the clans compete for powers and resources. The clan dynamics came to dominate the state of Somalis from the early 1960's. Thus, the weakness of the civilian government due to the clan politics had led to the 1969 coup, which brought the military regime to power (Giannou, 1993). The Barre's regime despite its official denouncement of clan politics also effectively manipulated clan identities and put one clan against other to stay in power (Dauleh, 1994). This has resulted in a deep division and suspicion among the society, which have had far reaching effect on the process of re-building State in Somali (World Bank Group, 2005). In addition, the Barre's oppressive measures against the Isaq clan, in the North West region of the country, had reinforced the secession of Somaliland in 1991 (Spears, 1998).

To stress the clan dynamic challenges or clan division in Somalia, Mohammed Abdi, the military attach in Republic of Somalia, with interview stated that " the disproportional power division between north and south during independence had created enmity, in which south dominated the majority of power. This situation finally led to disintegration North Somali, Somaliland Republic in 1991 under the Isaq clan, though still it is waiting international recognition". He added, "Somalia and Somaliland as husband and wife to mention without Somalia will, the Somaliland independence will not be realized"³. In his interview, he has stressed that in his word "the serious internal problem in Somalia is clan division in which the dominant clan groups oppressed and exploited the weak clan groups. He said also, if we forget clanism and clan based-division, we will be strong and good people". Therefore clanism is one of the main challenges to re-building state in Somalia.

³ Interview with Mohammed Abdi, the military attach in Republic Somalia Embassy

In the post-1991 period, again clanism remains the powerful disintegrating force. In this regard, clanism became one of the major factors that prevented re-building state in Somalia. To stress the role of clanism Abdullahi, stated that "the centrifugal force of Somali clannish particularism overwhelmed the centripetal force of the nationalism and Islam" (2007:45). It makes the attempt to re-build the state of Somalis problematic (Menkhaus, 2003). It is to say that the existence of clan based "parochial competition for power and resources" has challenged the revival of Somalia (Bryden, 2002:14). In this connection, according to the world Bank Group, "clannism and clan cleavages are a source of conflict –used to divided Somalis, fuel endemic clashes over resources and power, used to mobilize militia, and make broad based reconciliation very difficult to achieve" (2005:9).

In the 1990's most of the armed conflicts in Somali were clan-based conflict. Clan identities are not bases for conflict; rather, their deliberate manipulation creates and exacerbates division. In other words, clan identity is not fixed but is shaped according to the changing situations. It can be manipulated purposefully to acquire control over resources and power. Accordingly, "war lords and divisive leaders emphasize differences among clans and formulate demands that play on these differences" (ibid: 15).

Consequently, clan and sub-clan differences can be a force for division and fragmentation, particularly when manipulated for the political purposes. In general, the competition and "conflicts among Somali clans and sub-clans seem to be for political ends- quest for power, position in potential new government and material ends especially, the control of resources" (ibid:16). This has challenged the process of re-constructing state of Somalia.

After the state of collapse, clanism in Somalia continued to be a serious problem. Clan-based competition for power, territory and resources characterized Somalia, particularly south central Somali (Osman, 2007). Hence, most of national political reconciliation efforts in the 1990's were failed partly due to the clan-based divisions and competitions (Awad, 2005). Regarding, the attempts to create the government of national unity of Somalis, the clan dynamics continues to be one source of the failure.

The south central region has been under a constant competition among various clans in Somalia, since 1991. Specifically, it has been characterized by the struggle between Darod and Hawiye

for political and material resources (Osman, 2007). These two major clans in Somalia have antagonistic interests. Thus, their competitions have created a zero-sum game politics. According to Osman and Sourar'e, the leaders of these clans "stress winning the war at any cost, as losing the war would be deadly for the clans" (2007:19). Such state of affairs has brought about a situation where a political dialogue and agreement are difficult.

In this regard, Bashir Aden Ali, the Secretary in Republic of Somalia Embassy with interview stated that "one of the main challenges to re building state in Somalia is clan conflicts, especially between the Hawiye and Darod clans. These clan factions were supported by western powers to weaken the Somali unity. Accordingly, the western powers manipulating clans for their own interests. He added that "the tactic full division of clans by external agents is not to support Somali people rather than they used this opportunity to confuse Somali society⁴". Hence, any attempts that have been conducted to create functional central government in Somalia failed to be realized. He added that "the main 'Window of Target' of western powers to divide Somali people provoking one clan groups against the others. In this regard, two clan groups have become the main playing ground of western powers, which are the Hawiye and Darod".

On the one hand, the Darod's has dominated the state power since 1960's. As a result, they have secured access to political power and economic resources (Brons, 2001). More importantly, "they have developed a dynamic view of politics, in which they only can effectively rule the Somali state, often citing their 30 years of experience (1960-1991) as proof" (Osman and Sourar'e, 2007:19)

On the other hand, the Hawiye, who were not actually absent from political power since 1960, have mobilized themselves as the victims of the Darod dominated politics. After 1991, despite this, the Hawiye experienced the split between the beneficiaries during the old regime, and those who were in a disadvantageous position and wanted real change. The former group wanted to increase its power at the expense of the latter (ibid)

The clan dynamics in general and the competition between Hawiye and Darod clans in particular were partially the factor for the failure the TNG, TFG and UIC to some extent. Accordingly when in 2000 the TNG came out of the Arta conference, it was taken as a vehicle for the Hawiye

⁴ Interview with Bashir Aden Ali, the second secretary in Republic of Somali Embassy,2013 Addis Ababa.

interests, particularly that of Habr Gidir Ayr sub- clan, the president's clan (ICG, 2007). Thus, it faced opposition from other clans, mainly Darod, and failed to become government of national unity (ibid).

On the other hand, when we look at the formation of TFG in 2004, it was viewed by other clans, mainly at this time, the Hawiye clans, as a narrow coalition of clans dominated by Darod (Menkhaus, 2009). The Hawiye took TFG as a Darod led initiative intended to revenge against them. Consequently, "The formation of TFG and dismantling of its predecessor, the TNG-left many Hawiye feeling resentful, disenfranchised, and fearful that president Yussuf, a prominent Darod leader, would use it as a platform for revenge against their clans" (Bryden, 2002:15)

The Hawiye has felt that it was alienated from TFG which was further "reinforced by Yussuf's appeal, immediately following his inauguration in October 2004, for 20,000 foreign troops to protect his government and the decision to relocate that government from Nairobi to Jowhar (and subsequently Baidoa), rather than Mogadishu" (ICG, 2007:3). Here, it is important to note that the Hawiye are the dominant clan in and around Mogadishu and they refused to give power to the government dominated by a clan with whom they had the history of enmity (Baxter, 2008).

Accordingly, the TFG failed to obtain the support of the Hawiye community, and was unable to exercise effective control over most of Hawiye dominated areas. This left a political vacuum that the Islamist movement in the form of the UIC was able to exploit (Byrden, 2007).

Within the Hawiye, support for the UIC was strong among the Habr Gidir. The dominance of Habr Gidir created a dispute between the sub-clans of the Hawiye. This was clearly seen in the UIC's internal division and policies (Menkhaus, 2007). Despite the appointment of many Abgal to the higher positions in the courts, UIC remained under the control of Habr Gidir. Even within the Habr Gidir, it was Ayr that had upper hand in the UICs political and administrative units (Bryden, 2007). This reduced the acceptance of UIC in the eyes of other clans (ICG, 2007). In short, the domination of UIC by the Hawiye clan, particularly, Habr Gidir Ayr "posed an important constraint on the growth of the UIC beyond the Hawiye clan and reportedly has contributed to tensions between different sub-clans of the Hawiye" (IAG, 2007:5). In short, the dynamic or shifting alliance nature of clans system remains the challenge of re constructing state in Somalia. In this regard, to create strong functional government in Somalia has required

understanding the interests of Somali society with their dynamic nature and funding the real solution for the clan conflicts to re-building functional government in Somalia.

Finally, after the down fall of UIC as an organization, clanism has also remained a defining feature of Somali politics. Thus, the opposition to the TFG was primarily clan-based instead of Islam ideology. On the whole, "though the situation is actually more complex, it involved a Darod dominated TFG and Hawiye based opposition" (Menkhaus, 2008). Therefore, the clan dynamics particularly that of Hawiye and Darod, remain a significant challenge to the state-building agenda in stateless Somalia.

5.1.3 Radical Islam

Islam has deep rooted in Somalia due to the very old trade connection to Arabia. Because of this connection, the Somalis were converted to Islam very early after the Prophet Mohammed in 632 A.D, and remain to this day staunch Muslim by culture. Somalis have traditionally subscribed to the moderate Sufi interpretation of Islam, blending local traditions and culture with the religion.

The Somalis are firmly attached to Islam and divided traditionally into three main denominations: the Qadiriya, the Ahamadiya, and an Ahamadiya derivative, the Salihiya. These are the Sufi order (tariqa) found throughout the Muslim world. The Qadiriya is one of the oldest and least puritanical among other denominations. The Salihiya is the a nineteenth-century reformist movement with a fundamentalist orientation (Lewis, 2008:16)

In Somalia, 'radical Islam' as a political movement has its root in the 1980's. Traditionally, Islam in Somalia has remained moderate and tolerant (Medhane, 2002). Somalis follow Sunni Islam and their religious practices have been greatly influenced by Sufism. Sufism has given Somalis space to incorporate several aspects of their pre-Islamic customs and practices (Adam, 2008:216). The Somalis "stuck to their own Sufist version of Islam (sufism)⁵..." (Moller, 2009:8). But Somali fundamentalist movement has become active since 1990's. According to Medhane, it was:

reinforced by the state collapse in 1991 and the resultant civil war, international intervention, external influence, and the subsequent efforts made by the Somali

⁵ Sufism is a moderate, tolerant and political form of Islam (see Medhane, 2002:78).

themselves at new patterns of political reconstruction in a bid to shape their own destiny (2002:12-13).

Hence, in the early 1990's one earlier group with an Islamist agenda, the Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (Al Al, or Islamic Union), became the most visible and radical group in Somalia. It was founded in the mid-1980s (Marchal, 2004). Al-Ittihad has its root in Saudi Arabia with Wahhabia School, or Salafiya. From the very beginning Al-Ittihad sought to establish an Islamic republic in Somalia, including the Muslims in the Horn of Africa (Menkhaus, 2004). In this regard, Al- Ittihad is viewed as an extreme group that believes in armed revolution and absolutism.

Ittihad calls for the establishment of an Islamic State, including a justice system based on Islamic Principles and Sharia law. They also advocate a "greater Somalia" that including the Ogaden and parts of Kenya; and they rejected Federalism. As an instrument for the realization of its objective, it advocated and employed violence (Medhane, 2002).

At present, the most violent expressions of the al- Ittihad view are articulated by al-Shabab and Hizbul-Islam. Both groups are offshoots of the Islamic Courts Union. They describe themselves as waging Jihad against enemies of Islam, and fight against the TFG, Ethiopians and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Hence, the idea of 'grater Somalia' and the Ethiopian Ogaden is negatively married that posed threat to Ethiopia national security, and Ethiopia has followed seriously any political developments in Somalia for her security interests.

Nevertheless, Al-Ittihad failed to become a powerful group that can create state in Somalia. And, regardless of its relative strength in terms of resources, manpower and organizational skill, Al-Ittihad fall short of exercising effective control over at least some parts of Somalia. Besides this, due to its radicalist tendency, Al-Ittihad was unable to use Islam as a common ground to bring agreement among Somali political forces. Rather, it remained a party to conflict and continued to compete over resources and authority (ibid).

In short, Islamic groups with external funding from the Gulf states operating in the 1990's and have led to a proliferation of more extreme Wahhabis and Salafist views, and some militant Jihadist organizations started to spring up .Al-Qaeda tried to establish itself in Somalia from 1991 but found it hard to operate in the anarchy.

To consolidate this issues, Bashir Aden Ali, Secretary of Republic of Somalia Embassy stated that "the Somali society almost all Muslim community and they are not fundamentalists in nature. The Islamic radicalism is not origin to Somali society but rather than it is imported from Middle East and Afghanistan". He added that "the Somali Islam is more moderate who often fighting against some radical groups in Somalia". Moreover, Aden Ali stressed that "the western powers have used this opportunity to divide and destabilize in the name of terrorism which in turn undermine to re-building functional government in Somalia".

Al-Ittihad's social activities and religious objectives in Somalia seemed inconsistent with its activities in support of armed groups in the Somali-inhabited region of Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, Al-Ittihad was reportedly engaged in military activities in support of ethnic Somalis. Several anti-Ethiopian groups are active in the Somali region and Al-Ittihad cooperated with these groups in carrying out attacks against Ethiopian targets. In 1999, the Ogaden Islamic Union, under the leadership of Muhammad Muallem Omar Abdi, the Somali People's Liberation Front under the leadership of Ahmed Ali Ismail, and the Western Somali Liberation Front under the leadership of Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Hussein formed a coalition called the United Front for the Liberation of Western Somalia, their term for the Somali-inhabited region of Ethiopia. The Ogaden National Liberation Front was engaged in military activities in the region, and in the past formed alliances with other Ethiopian opposition groups (Ted, 2011:28).

The aim of Al- Ittihad was not only reconstituting the already collapsed state of Somalia, but also creation of Islamist state incorporating all Somalis and Muslims in the Horn (ICG, 2007). This made Al-Ittihad at odds with Major Somali neighbor, Ethiopia, which has large territory inhabited by Somalis and large number of Muslim population across the country. This pushed Ethiopia to form alliance with some political factions and helped them in order to weaken Al-Ittihad. Hence, Ethiopia came to play the role of a divisive force in Somalia. In fact Ethiopia repeatedly intervened and destroyed the Al-Ittihad bases since the mid-1990s (Marchal, 2004). Thus, "Ethiopia became the deadly opponent of the Islamists in the Somalia; hence its actions greatly weakened al-Ittihad militarily" (Medhane, 2002:104).

As it is clear that, both Ethiopia and Somalia have shared the same ethnic groups, the Ogaden Somalis of Ethiopia. Then, Ethiopia has justified any conflict with Somalia as the national

security issues; this is because Somali radicalist claiming the united Somalia including all Somali inhabited territories in the region.

Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya was suspected of having link with terrorists (Moller, 2009). This was based on its contribution "through some of its members to the preparation of the attacks against the American embassies in Nairobi, and Dare Salam in August 1998" (Marchal, 2007). This attracted the American attention and their policy of counter-terrorism. This reinforced the policy of supporting some war lords against the other which influenced the agenda of state building in Somalia adversely.

Soon after, in 2000 the formation TNG at Arta had aroused hostility on the part of Somali political factions and neighboring states like Ethiopia. This was mainly due to the domination and manipulation of the Arta process and its outcome by the Somali Islamists, particularly Al-Ittihad.

The 2000 Arta peace conference has created both internal and external oppositions. Internally this generated opposition against TNG, and led to the formation of Somalia Restoration and Reconciliation council (SRRC) in 2001. Externally, Ethiopia was "critical of the composition and organizational makeup of Islamic extremists...but also due to the overt and covert pronouncements made during Arta and the orientation of its leaders" (Medhane, 2002). The Arta conference clearly manifested the Somali irredentism, and TNG was based on the pan-Somali radical Islamic movement. Thus, this partly explains Ethiopia's critical support of the Arta process and its subsequent diplomatic scheme against the TNG (ibid).

Furthermore, with coming of UIC to a forefront, the radical Islamists came to influence the political development in Somalia. Initially, the UIC provided public security and social services and maintained law and order. However, later on, the radical Islamists hijacked the UIC from its original aims (Medhane, 2007). In other words, "the initially moderate stance of the UIC soon gave way to the much harsher reality of hard core fundamentalists..." (IAG, 2007:4).

The UIC came to use Islam and fill the ideology vacuum created by the state collapse. But, UIC introduced a new form of Islam that is a layer to most Somalis. The UIC composed the strict

Sharia law or Wahabism⁶ to be implemented as the only form of Islam. This was made regardless of the Somalis' tradition of tolerance with regard to religious practice (Medhane, 2008). Thus, according to IAG report, "the UIC leadership had thoroughly alienated most of the population by its erratic behavior, and attempts to impose an extremist version of Islam, previously un known in Somalia" (2007:2). In addition, the radicalist acts as a global Jihadist fighting for Islam not for the problem of Somalia only (Medhane, 2008).

As far as the leadership of the UIC as concerned, though these were many moderate elements, it was dominated by the radicalists (IAG, 2007). These radicalists initially kept lower profile and, later on, become influential within the UIC. These include Sheikh Hassen Dahir Aweyes, a man who was in a leading position within the AIAI in 1990's. He had a political irredentist as well as Islamist agenda for Somalia (Menkhaus, 2004). In addition, Aden Hashi Farah, known as 'Ayro' (head of the military wing, Shabab) was a radical leader of the UIC and Jihadist agenda (Moller, 2009).

The division of UIC between the moderate and the radicalist and the dominance of the latter complicated the decision making process and challenged the cohesiveness of the union. It also prevented any form of dialogue between the UIC and TFG. Externally, the opposition of the radical elements or hard liners contributed to the negative reactions with Al Qaeda; hence, international recognition was denied (ICG, 2007).

In addition, the hard liners pushed the UIC into increasingly extreme position that shocked neighboring Ethiopia and the US. The UIC even declared a defensive Jihad opposition to what it saw as a clandestine Ethiopian military presence (Moller, 2009). It also gave support to two armed opposition groups Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia, just as the UIC enjoyed support from Ethiopia's arch-enemy Eritrea, who was eager to use the UIC to wage a proxy war (ICG,2007; Moller, 2009). With regard its relation with the US, the UIC failed to be cooperative in terms of combating the suspected foreign Al Qaeda operatives in Mogadishu. Thus, US became more accommodative, and supportive of an Ethiopian military intervention (Menkhaus, 2008).

⁶ Wahabism is a derivative of the Hanbeli sect and forms the basis of the political and spiritual ideology of the Sandi monarchy. The moment is centered on spreading its mission by force. It is a rigid and puritanical religious creed. It is a militant and radical form of Islam (see Medhane, 2002:77).

The use of the Islamic law greatly enhanced the legitimacy of the courts. However, Islam was employed as an instrument against Ethiopia. This was clearly seen in the declaration of Jihad, a holy war, against Ethiopia (Seifert, 2008). But the extreme emphasis on religion had resulted in negative international relations and the actual Ethiopian intervention. Hence, it was "a double-edge sword, strengthening internal support and effectively cutting most of possible support from outside the country" (ibid: 37-38). Therefore, despite its earlier popularity and its ability to control much of south central Somalia, the UIC was hijacked by the radicalist elements for political ends. Thus, the role of the Islamists has been undermining one. They prevented the realization of the original objectives of the courts (Medhane, 2007). Above all, the radicalists undermined the bottom up attempts of state building by UIC.

5.1.4 Discriminating of Minorities in Southern Somalia

The failure to establish a functioning government and put an end to the violence in Somalia over the past 20 years suggests the warring parties do not want to change the status quo and that the international community does not fully understand some of the underlying causes of the hostilities. If the problem has not been clearly defined, any strategies to solve it will most likely not succeed, which the multiple-failed governments and international peace conferences bear out. While Somalia can be classified as a 'failed state', describing it as in a state of chaos is mistaken. The northern west region of Somaliland and the northeast region of Puntland are and have been politically stable and peaceful for most of the past 20 years.

On the other hand, the current armed occupation of southern Somalia by Al Shabab, and earlier by other clan-based militias from central and northern Somalia, fits a predictable pattern of hostile takeover and exploitation of the south's arable land and labour by outsiders that has occurred in this region for hundreds of years. The sedentary and unarmed ethnic minority groups in southern Somalia are not even engaged in the fighting over control of their home region. Like Somaliland and Puntland, southern Somalia needs to be free of violent outside occupation so as to govern its own people and provide for its own security. For a just and sustainable peace in Somalia to prevail, the international community must recognize the rights and wishes of southern Somalia's minorities and intervene to empower them to reach these goals.

Somalis and the international community hoped that the latest political solution in the country would finally achieve its goals, thus bringing stability to a country that has been in anarchy and

lawlessness since the early 1990s. This latest manifestation came in the form of the recently selected president, Mr. Sheikh Sharif, who promised to unify the clans and bring peace to this devastated land. The international community has endorsed Sharif's new administration and pledged millions of dollars to support it.

The people and process responsible for elevating Mr. Sharif to the presidency mirror those that selected previously failed administrations and paradigmatically favors ethnic groups from the politically and militarily dominant nomadic clans from the central and north of Somalia at the expense of the numerically equivalent – but politically and militarily weaker – southern "minorities" such as Bantu, Bajuni, Banadiri, and Barawa, who are the backbone of Somali crop agriculture and coastal commerce and fishing. An example of this flawed political process is the discriminatory and disempowering practice of reducing the southern minorities' share of political representation. This formula, known as the "4.5 system," reduces their share of political representation to 50% of that allocated to each of the four other major umbrella clan groups, namely Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Digil-Mirifle or Rahawyen ignoring the significant coastal communities from participating in politics.

Without democratizing the political process to ensure the economic, civil and security interests of the southern minorities, it is clear that the dominant clan militias from the centre and north to continue fighting over Somalia's most productive and valuable assets in the south. This void in political and physical security helps to perpetuate the human rights abuses and anarchy that have plagued Somalia and the entire Horn of Africa for so long. It is not coincidental that the fighting in Somalia is entirely confined in the south while the central and northern regions are relatively peaceful and stable. Although the southern minorities have a history of defending themselves against subjugation and armed attacks, they are neither armed, nor organized enough to forcibly oust their oppressors. A stable and secure south would remove dominant clan militias of a lucrative battle ground over which to fight and eliminate a fertile breeding ground in which extremist groups can increase. A just and sustainable peace in southern Somalia would also allow the long-persecuted southern minorities to continue production and marketing of food sufficient to feed the nation and enable refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia and Yemen to finally return home.

The myth that Somalia is composed of one people with the same culture, one language and one religion has been promulgated by Somali nationalist ideologists and Western scholars (M. Eno, 2009). In reality, Somalia has many distinct languages, ethnic groups, and theoretically the same Sunni sect of the Islamic religion. The Somalis from the dominant and historically nomadic ethnic groups predominantly inhabit areas in central and northern Somalia that are largely unfit for large-scale crop agriculture. These nomadic groups speak the Somali Maha language and, while not having blood links with the Middle East, borrowed heavily from nomadic Arab culture (M. Mukhtar, 1995). Of course, they are dominant clan groups of Somali society.

The Digil and Mirifle is not a dominant clan group but since the 1992 war has armed itself to earn equal political status, though not yet equal social status, with the three other self-ennobled groups. The Digil and Mirifle, who overwhelmingly speak the Maay language and are composed of agro-pastoralists within southern Somalia, is a united clan comprised of members from a variety of lineages. In fact, many members of this clan have Negroid physical features and are indistinguishable from the Bantu minorities who live farther south. During the war in the early 1990s, the Reewiin were severely affected by much of the mass starvation and warfare devastating its members

Southern Somalia's Juba and Shabelle River valleys are predominantly occupied by the sedentary farming people known as the Somali Bantu or locally called the Jareer. Most of the Bantu resident in the Shabelle River Valley are indigenous to Somalia and predate the arrival of the nomadic Somalis (Cerulli, 1959; O. Eno, 2004). On the other hand, the Bantu sub-stock living in the Juba River Valley is largely made up of the descendants of slaves from Mozambique, Tanzania, and Malawi (Menkhaus, 1989). The coastal commercial and fishing communities in the southern coastal cities comprise the Bajuni, Barawa and Banadiri and are possibly the only groups in Somalia with a credible claim to Middle Eastern ancestry (Mukhtar, 1995). They primarily speak different dialects of Somali Maha and Maay, Bantu languages indigenous to southeast Africa, Swahili and Swahili-like languages such as Bajuni and Chimbalazi (Ahmed, 1995). In addition to the disdain and discrimination exerted against the minorities by the "nobles," the minority communities are also treated as asset readily available for the exploitation and economic gains of the pastoral nomad. While this social system was

discriminatory, it has been more devastating to the minorities during times of war. Due to their lack of political and military power, the minorities have been and continue to be economically exploited, their human and civil rights violated, and politically and culturally subjugated with impunity by dominant clan militias and religious extremist groups. The international community, including donors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that in good faith provide legitimacy and development assistance in the south through disingenuous Somali government agencies and NGOs, could very well be unintentionally contributing to the subjugation and exploitation of the minorities.

The sedentary minority groups built the valuable agricultural, maritime trading and fishing industries in Somalia that helped drive the nation's economy. Control of this southern region has long been coveted by Somalis and foreigners for its productive assets. Today, with little economic activity beyond exporting goats, piracy, NGO projects and the unregulated urban trade of imported goods, Somali militias and Islamic extremist groups are once again fighting in the south for control of this region, implying that whoever wins control of this area will ultimately gain the power to control the rest of the country (Farah et al, 2002)

The dominant clans have conspired with one another to create and maintain a social, civil and economic system in Somalia in which they place themselves at the top of society while minority groups occupy the lower rungs. The unwritten but systematic apportioning of national wealth and opportunities to the dominant clans resulted in the minorities being methodically discriminated against or intimidated from accessing higher education, prominent government posts, and political representation (M. Eno, 2008). This ethnically-based hierarchical system has ensured that few minorities climbed the socioeconomic ladder in Somalia and that economic, land tenure, security, civil rights, and other interests of the minorities were inadequately represented

Since independence in 1960, southern Somalia has experienced a disproportionately high level of violence and conflict compared to the central and northern regions. Fighting over the south's arable land and labour has been perpetrated by clan-based militias and extremist groups from the centre and north of Somalia. Although the southern minorities fought for independence, with some leaders like Abdulkadir Sakawaddin and Hagi Mohamed Hussein even being founding

fathers of ant colonial social institutions (Robert Hess, 1966), they were deliberately excluded from playing a meaningful role in the independent Somali state. Somalia's first president, Aden Abdulle Osman, a Hawiye hand-picked by the departing Italian colonial regime, was instrumental in sustaining the colonialists' policy by denying southern minority - particularly Bantu-representation and power, thus excluding them from the official government political process (Ali, 2004). This clearly tell us the seeds for present problems was sowed during the colonial era and it sustained to continue until today by passing from one government system to another.

In 1969, Siad Barre, a Darood from the Marehan sub clan, took power in a military coup. Throughout his tenure, Barre maintained a tight grip on the political administration of the country. Some southern minority politicians were included in the government to provide a façade of ethnic inclusion under Barre's socio-political trademark of pseudo "equality and justice". Barre's true intentions to exploit the southern minorities played out in the laws and policies that were implemented during his time in office, specifically land tenure laws.

In the early 1970s, Siad Barre nationalized all land belonging to the sedentary Bantu peoples along the Juba and Shabelle Rivers. This official government policy of land expropriation was only directed at arable minority farming regions and didn't apply to the semi arid and arid regions of Somalia home to and controlled by the dominant nomadic clans. Registration of the land was required by law, which meant that illiterate and non-Maha-speaking rural farmers had to travel to far away cities to "legalize" land that had been their ancestrally-inherited property for generations (Besteman, 1999; Menkhaus & Craven, 2000). In many cases, farmers were confused and frightened by the process and did not manage to make any claim to their land. In others, the Bantu found their farmland had already been registered by politically connected dominant clan members resident in Mogadishu (Ali, 2004).

In the late 1970s, Siad Barre decided it was in Somalia's best interest to wage war on Ethiopia. Bantu men and boys, as well as Barawa and Banadiri youth, were forcibly conscripted at a disproportionately high rate of their population in Somalia to fight on the front lines against the Ethiopians. The Bantu, Banadiri and Barawa conscripts were particularly targeted because their

respective Negroid physical features and light Asiatic skin pigmentation (Besteman, 1999). This was mainly done because Somalis considered themselves as unique people in Africa. Internally-displaced nomadic Somalis fleeing the fighting were settled in southern agricultural areas thus displacing Bantu farmers and disrupting agricultural production carried out by the Bantu peasants. This relocation effort was seen as another attempt to diminish the percentage of the minority population in the south in favor of the dominant clans.

The war in Somalia that started in 1990 has been widely referred to as a civil war. A geographical view of the war map, however, reveals that it was more accurately a “southern regional war.” When the government of Siad Barre finally fell to Hawiye clan militias in 1991, these armed groups immediately scrambled to control the capital city, the southern coastal port towns and the productive agricultural lands in the Juba and Shabelle River Valleys. Remnants of Siad Barre’s Darood clan army, led separately by Barre’s son-in-law General Mohamed Said Hersi “Morgan” and Colonel Ahmed Omar Jees, did not want the valuable Juba River Valley to fall to Hawiye clan militias. Rather than defending it, though, the Darood clan militias committed obvious human rights violations against the Bantu farmers and other coastal minorities, resulting in thousands of deaths through starvation, murder, and exhaustion due to forced labour. These human rights violations also caused a mass exodus of people into refugee camps in neighboring countries.

The uprooting of the Bantu land owners was seen as another attempt by the dominant clans to depopulate the Juba Valley of the Bantu in favour of the Darood Clan. Subsequent fighting between the Darood and Hawiye clan militias over the fertile Juba and Shabelle River Valleys resulted in the unarmed local Bantu farmers again being victims of mass looting, rape, starvation and mass killing.

From 1992 until 2006, these dominant clan militias reportedly agreed and settled on a forced occupation arrangement with each other called the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA). Bantu farmers were forced to work without pay on their own expropriated land as labourers of the militias, while other Bantu claim that they were forced to pay their dominant clan militia tax on the value

of the agricultural produce. Bantu farmers who resisted paying the extortions were humiliated and beaten in public, or had their female relatives raped or even murdered.

In 2006, this extortion (heavy tax) changed hands when the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) drove out the militias from the Juba and Shabelle River Valleys and the southern coastal cities. While the ICU did bring order to southern Somalia, it came at a disproportionately high price for the southern minorities. The ICU, which was primarily a Hawiye clan (Abgal sub clan) militia cloaked in the white Islamic garb of benevolent sheiks, adopted the same extortion tactics as the militias they had just ousted. The ICU reportedly demanded a similar tax on agricultural production, with the same consequences for nonpayment as was imposed by the previous militias.

The Ethiopian invasion of southern Somalia expelled the ICU, which temporarily brought peace and an end to the extortion of the Bantu groups. Eventually, however, the Ethiopian incursion made life worse for all Somalis. Despite the expulsion of the ICU, the Ethiopian troops did not provide long term security in the south. Consequently, dominant clan militias capitalized on this void in security and once again vied to occupy Bantu farming areas and southern coastal port cities.

The current lack of law and order in the south has enabled extremist groups such as Al Shabab, reported to be covertly backed by the Hawiye's Habir Gidir sub clan and funded by foreign Jihadists, to establish itself first in the southern coastal cities before expanding its control over the inland farming regions. Al Shabab partly supports its operations by exploiting the minority farmers in the south and controlling trade in and out of the port cities. Further disregard for the southern minorities by Al Shabab was the desecration and demolition of revered Bantu religious leaders' graves and monuments, such as those of Jamama and Kamsuma. The reason for this destruction of Bantu graves, which were not shrines to be worshipped, was that they violated Al Shabab's extremist interpretation of Islam.

Southern Somalia has borne the brunt of dominant clan-based fighting and violent occupation for nearly 20 years. The southern minorities there desperately want a just and sustainable peace,

preferably in a Somalia where they have the same rights and opportunities as other Somalis. However, without an international force to defend or empower the minorities, the practical experience on the ground indicates that the minorities will continue to be exploited and terrorized by either the religious extremist groups or the customary dominant clan militias.

By securing a just and sustainable peace in the south, the dominant clans will no longer be able to fight over the productive assets there. Future disputes between militias from the opposing dominant clan militias would be forced to fight in their own central and northern regions thereby directly having an impact on dominant clan villages, nomadic groups and trade networks. The current opposing sub clans fighting in the south are the Abgal and Habir Gidir, both of which fall under the major Hawiye clan. The dominant clans have a sophisticated and long-enduring system of decentralized conflict resolution and treaty-making by elders that is employed to resolve fighting between their clan militias. Since no such treaty system exists between the dominant clans and the southern minorities, mainly because the minorities hold no power, elders from both groups are not able to form such treaties as a suitable avenue toward reconciliation and mutual coexistence.

Internationally brokered peace agreements held in Nairobi and Djibouti excluded the best interests of the minority inhabitants in the south in favour of warlords who represented the armed clans (M. Eno and O. Eno, 2009). Such agreements will continue to give the same unjust and unsustainable results. For instance, the newly chosen leader, Mr. Sheikh Sharif, has already endorsed the discriminatory 4.5 political power-sharing policy in Somalia, one which he promised to abolish prior to his nomination. Considering the silence over the issue of discrimination in general and the 4.5 in particular, it is unlikely that the new president has any plans to bring justice to the minorities in the south. Throughout history, the southern minorities have prospered and lived in peace when they were able to provide for their own security. An international force to provide such security seems unlikely given the fact that only a few African peacekeepers are stationed in Mogadishu where they are barely able to protect themselves in secure compounds. Nevertheless, an internationally approved process to free and secure the south may be the only way to help break the grip of dominant clan militias and extremist persecution and exploitation of the minorities.

If the south is secured and the minorities who live there can farm, trade and fish in peace, then this region could once again be a driver for economic development and political stability for all of Somalia. This model, which must this time include equal rights for the minorities, has been the dominant economic paradigm in Somalia throughout its history. Agriculture represents a significant regime of the Somali economy, a majority of it traditionally coming from crop agriculture, livestock and fishing in the south. Without the economic engine the south provides for Somalia, it is hard to imagine how the relatively unproductive central and north can meet its own food needs, let alone build a sustainable economic system capable of supporting the most basic of government functions.

The economic activity that the south could generate in Somalia would, for the first time in nearly 20 years, provide many Somalis with an opportunity to participate in legal commerce and move away from dependence on international aid and extortion. Although marketing and logistical infrastructure must be rehabilitated, a return of peace will motivate the farmers and traders to respectively grow and market the produce. The critical missing variable in this equation is law and order in the south so that the industrious minority group members can work without the fear of being exploited.

5.1.5 Proliferation of Weapons in Southern Somalia

Since the end of the Cold War, interest has turned to small arms primarily as a result of the dramatic increase in the number, duration and destructiveness of intrastate and communal conflicts, many of which called for costly United Nations peacekeeping missions. The change in the international security landscape from a few large-scale interstate wars to frequent small-scale intrastate conflicts, has occurred at a time when international norms, export controls regimes, and treaties to control or eliminate weapons of mass destruction are making substantial progress. At the same time, the proliferation and criminal misuse of small arms and light weapons are posing increasing threats to national and regional security.

The negative effects of the proliferation and illegal trafficking of small arms and light weapons have been far-reaching and diverse. Although most important are the increased threats to international and regional security, direct effects are also felt through dramatic increases in

peacekeeping costs resulting from the increased number and intensity of intrastate conflicts. Other negative effects of these weapons include their increased use by terrorists, the heightened threats to UN peacekeepers and humanitarian relief workers, and the undermining of the implementation of peace agreements. While small arms play a significant role in escalating communal conflicts that exact enormous human and socioeconomic costs, the roots of such conflicts lie in political, economic, ethnic and religious differences and disparities. These are often aggravated by governance-related deficiencies, such as exclusionary and repressive policies, and lack of, or weaknesses in, democratic institutions, respect for the rule of law, and human rights observance. Conditions of endemic insecurity and weak national and interstate regulatory and law enforcement structures, together with the fact that these weapons are cheap, widely available, easily concealed and transportable across porous borders, and require little maintenance and training, further compound the problems of widespread proliferation, illicit trafficking and possession, and criminal misuse. In the case of Somalia, possessing guns is not new phenomenon rather it is the culture of Somali society especially to the pastoralist communities.

Fire arms were first introduced to Somalia by imports and trafficking from Arab countries and during the cold war from the Soviet states. The culture was badly affected and inter-clan conflicts increased both in number in security. The value attributed to a gun has escalated, such that guns have even been presented as offering (Ments and Hagerty, 2011). If some has been killed, the first question asked by his clan member is if the gun was lost or not. Likewise, the gun that fired the fatal shot is required from the doer as Dia, and if it is not submitted could cause a war between the tribes (ibid). In short, people like having guns and fighting to win over scarce resources and controlling political power. Accordingly, the available small arms in individual hands created a serious challenge to reconstruct state in Somalia. Therefore, disarmament of local people is the pre-requisite to bring sustainable peace and security in Somalia.

The proliferation of small arms in Somalia especially among ordinary citizens, poses a dangerous threats to public safety, human society, and development. The Somali conflict is exacerbating cross-border crime and banditry, the influx of refugees and the proliferation of arms thus creating instability in the region. The arms do not only circulate in Somalia, but also find their way into neighboring countries. Hargesia is a flourishing arms market; while Burao is open arms markets

that serves the whole region and from here rearms find their way to Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and other countries⁷. The possession of arms by local people not only disturbing Somali society, but also it might affect the neighboring countries. The source regions that supply arms to Somalia are the Gulf States, mainly Muslim countries.

Continued proliferation of small arms from neighboring countries has made small-scale conflict more dangerous and has strengthened the militarization of a society in which violence is a norm and guns an accepted form of conflict resolution. Lack of accountability creates a culture of impunity, which further exacerbates conflict. This has been most acute in south-central Somalia. In Puntland, in fact, a general version to weapons is growing and large groups are voluntarily demobilizing. Somaliland has made big steps in demilitarizing its society through systematic demobilization, although disarmament lags behind and the small arms market remains active (World Bank, 2004:4).

Accordingly, this study argues that the international community first has to think the availability of small arms in the hands of ordinary local citizens and war lords. In this regard one should note that military intervention is not necessary to disarming local people. Instead, conducting effective diplomatic means could bring an expected goal to Somali problems. In his words, Samatar states that,

*The prospect for rebuilding political and civic life in Somalia is absolutely dim without disarming the warlords and the population. This process, fully supported by the international community but implemented by Somalis should start once a recognized government is selected. Disarmament must be thorough. In addition, the international community **should** be fully engaged during the first five years to help establish an effective police force and help rebuild the administrative and physical infrastructure of the country. The combined use of diplomatic and material resources will make the task of establishing a democratic national government in Somalia a feasible project (Samatar, 2002:21).*

⁷ Fractionalized, Armed and Lethal: Why Somalia Matters, by Kimenyi, Article, Feb 3, 2010
website: www.brookings.edu/research/article/2010/02/03-somalia-Kimenyi, accessed 14-05-2013

Therefore, avoiding weapons from individuals' access and building physical infrastructures further assist to bring peace and security in Somalia. This thesis also argues that both elements those are external powers and Somali Diaspora are responsible for excessive availability of arms in Somalia.

Externally, during the cold war, the former Soviet Union and the United States who dumped hundreds of millions of dollars in weapons and that supported a brutal dictatorship bear some responsibility. Moreover, the Gulf Arab countries have equipped different factions for their own interest that worked against the re-establishing state in Somalia.

Somali Diaspora has played a great role in supporting various fighting groups against each other to take control resources and power in Somalia. Evidence shows that civil wars are likely to last longer and be more intense in countries that have large populations outside of their own, due to support that members of the Diaspora provide to warring factions. Somalia is a case in point. Although the Diaspora can and has played a critical role in facilitating peace building and local reconciliation in some cases (especially in Somaliland and Puntland), in other cases the Diaspora has also provided financial support to warring clans that aggravating conflict. Without financial support from the Somali Diaspora, many clans lack the resources to wage war against each other. In short, Diaspora has played a significant role in Somali politics either positively or negatively by dumping millions dollars to their respective clans.

5.2 External Challenges

Somalia has been without a functioning state ever since 1991, when the former dictator, Siad Barre, was overthrown. None of the competing factions were strong enough to take his palace as ruler of the country. Consequently, the chaos, instability, war and stateless order reigned in the country. The international interventions have ever since the failed and counterproductive intervention by the United Nations and United States in the early 1990 exacerbated rather than mitigated the problems, which produced utter, chaos and sever humanitarian crisis. This misunderstanding the interests of Somali society in trying to establish functioning strong government in Somalia, had led to the prolonged clan based conflicts and failed any attempts that had made to bring peace in Somalia.

The external challenge to Somalia involves the participation and the interests of both regional and international actors. These powers are basically state actors which have their own particular interests in Somalia that influenced the state building process negatively.

Accordingly, the harsh problem on the parts of external states is the tendency to support one or some groups or factions in order to promote their specific interests. This has challenged the attempts of creating all embracing national government in Somalia from all regions (Menkhaus, 2008). The act of imposing a ruling group of clan through one factional sponsor has a very limited chance to sustain and to become national government of the country (Weber, 2008). According to Weber, "In this unilateral partial support the interest of the war lords is often overlooked. In their neo-patrimonial setting of oligopolies of violence controlling fiefdoms but not a state, their interest might be the maximization of short term profit but not the transition into a national government" (ibid:20)

Besides, due to the existing mistrust and suspicion between clans and sub-clans, the possibility to create a government through the support of one clan against the others cannot turn into a national government (ibid). However, both the regional and international actors, especially Ethiopia and USA, continued to favor one group or clan against others in order to promote their own interests. In this regard, the main Ethiopia's interest is national security matter because both countries share the same ethnic groups of Ogaden Somalis of Ethiopia. For USA anti terrorism struggle is the main justification to disunity and disturb Somali society. This irresponsible interference in Somalia has its own negative impact on the process of establishing national government and reviving the state of Somalia.

5.2.1 The Role of Regional States

The regional states for better or worse have been actively involving in the situations of Somalia. These states are Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, Djibouti, and others have their own interests in Somalia. Hence, these countries support clan groups in Somalia that may extend their influence. In other words, they take sides in Somali conflicts by collaborating with groups who are concerned to their interests. The conflicting interests of the states created regional rivalry which negatively affected the revival of Somali state (World Bank Group, 2005).

The conflicting regional interests have been important in affecting Somali national reconciliation process. For instance, most national reconciliation in Somalia in the 1990's failed due to the regional competition between Ethiopia and Djibouti (Awad, 2005). In addition, it was the regional competition between Ethiopia and Djibouti that has badly plagued the TNG. TNG was formed in 2000 in Djibouti, during the Arta conference, which was organized and dominated by the president of Djibouti (Medhane, 2002). On the other hand, this created a sense of dissatisfaction on the part of Ethiopia as it was dominated by radical Islamists. Hence, Ethiopia effectively undermined the Arta conference and its outcome by helping the formation of the Somali Restoration and Re-liberation Council, SRRC (Awad, 2005).

Moreover, in 2006 the regional division had polarized in the opposing position of the UIC and TFG. Hence, it partly prevented the possibility of dialogue and agreement between these two political actors. Above all, the proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Eritrea, who has no actual direct interest in Somalia), through the active support of TFG and UIC respectively, had aggravated the situation of the conflict (Shinn, 2006). This avoided the chance of agreement between the TFG and the UIC.

Rather than carrying on the direct war, the two countries seem to have been waging proxy wars against each other ever since 2000, one of the main battlefields being Somalia. As Ethiopia is supporting the TFG it was thus a foregone conclusion that Eritrea would support the UIC. This is certainly not due to ideological or religious affinity, as the government in Asmara is secular and Christian. Indeed, it is at war with a jihadist movement on its own territory, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EJI, sometimes referred to as EJIM: Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement). It was founded in 1988 and based in Sudan, but has been operating in Eritrea since 1989, i.e. prior to independence, and is allegedly related to *al-Qaeda*. Nevertheless, Eritrea seems to have provided the remnants of the UIC with both the right to establish base-like facilities on its territory and arms, the latter in violation of the UN arms embargo (Moller, 2009:29).

5.2.2 The Ethiopia Interests and Involvement

Before directly describing and analyzing the interest and involvement of Ethiopia in the issues of Somalia, it is important to mention and analyze the general relations between Ethiopia and Somalia briefly.

For over four decades, relations between successive Ethiopian governments and Somalia have been poor. Somalia invaded Ethiopia twice in the 1960s under Emperor Haile Selassie and in 1977-78 during the Mengistu Haile Mariam military rule. In the first war, the Ethiopian military commander General Aman Andom defeated Somali forces, but his request to go inside Somalia was rejected by the Emperor, and he was ordered to remain behind the border. The 1977 invasion of Ethiopia by Somali forces and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) initially succeeded, leading to the capture of many Eastern Ethiopian towns by Somali forces. Somali forces briefly captured the crucial city, Dire Dawa, in Eastern Ethiopia. However, Ethiopian forces, with the support of Cuban and South Yemeni forces, were able to defeat the Somali forces, although elements of the Somali rebel forces remained in control of remote areas in the largely Somali inhabited areas of Ethiopia. Both Ethiopian and Somali governments intervened in the internal affairs of the two countries, and successive governments on both sides supported each others' armed opposition groups. The president of the Transitional Federal Government, Abdullahi Yusuf, was one of the first to receive Ethiopia's assistance after he fled Somalia in the late 1970s. He was one of the first senior officials to challenge the Siad Barre government. Ethiopia was also the principal backer of the Somali National Movement (SNM), the group that liberated the northwest region of Somalia, currently known as Somaliland. The change of government in Ethiopia did not end Ethiopia's intervention in Somali affairs. The governments of Ethiopia became key backers of a number of Somali factions and leaders, including the president of the TFG Abdullahi Yusuf, Hussein Aideed, and other Somali factions (Ted, 2011:31).

The Barre government was also a major sponsor of Ethiopian armed rebel groups. The current ruling party of Ethiopia, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), received assistance from Somali authorities and a number of the EPRDF leaders reportedly carried Somali-issued passports. Other rebel groups, including the Ogaden National Liberation

Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), also received assistance from Somalia (ibid). The ouster of the Siad Barre government and the absence of a central government in Somalia ended support for Ethiopian armed groups, although some Somali factions continue to support the ONLF. For most of the 1990s, Ethiopia's primary concern was Al-Ittihad in Somalia and its activities in support of the ONLF (ibid). In short, the conspiracy between two countries has clearly indicated that there is long time mistrust between themselves which has led mutually disregarded each other. After this brief introduction, this study has tried to analyze the interests and engagement of Ethiopia.

Among the regional countries, Ethiopia was the most concerned by the developments in Somalia (Marchal, 2004). Ethiopia and Somalia had mutually destructive relations since the independence of both British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland in 1960. The states fought one minor war in 1964 and bloody war in 1977-78, over the Somali inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia as has mentioned above. Ogaden was claimed by the Somalis as part of their state and the relations between both countries were full of hostility (Shinn, 2006). On the part of Ethiopia, there is always a worry that a hostile and strong government in Mogadishu would strongly promote the agenda of 'Greater' Somalia and thereby encourage the incorporation of Ogaden into Somalia (Moller, 2009). Since 1991, Ethiopia has repeatedly involved in Somalia issues in order to protect her national interests. Ethiopia has security interests concerning developments inside Somalia (ibid). Accordingly, Ethiopia has worried with the security threats that emanated from the arms flows, refugee flows, armed criminality, contraband and smuggling, partial loss of control of border areas and other spillover effects of state collapse (Menkhaus, 2005). More importantly Ethiopia has concerned with operations of Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and United Western Somalia Liberation Front (UWSLF) in Somalia. Both ONLF and UWSLF are struggling for self determination for the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (Shinn, 2006). They received shelter and support in Somalia. In addition, Ethiopia feared that the spread of radical Islamists in Somalia might encourage radicalization of its own large Muslim population (ICG, 2007). Here, the operations of the Al-Ittihad in the 1990's could be taken as an example of this security threat (Medhane, 2002). These security threats made Ethiopia the most concerned state with regard to developments in Somalia.

Here one thing should be noted that as any country does, Ethiopia has often claimed that the national security interest has to be given priority. This mainly troubled, both countries because they have shared the same ethnic groups, Somalis inhabited Ogaden in Ethiopia. Therefore, Somalis have long interested to incorporate this area under 'Greater Somalia' ideology. The five stars are embedded in the Somalia flag since its independence, intended to incorporate five Somali inhabited regions into 'greater Somalia' ideology in the Horn of Africa. One of these stars indicated the Ethiopian Ogaden Somalis, still the flag alive with five stars. This clearly shows that the claim of Somalia is not terminated to Ethiopian Ogaden region. These concepts had been originated during the colonial period and it has got wide room since independence of Somalis from European colonial rule. Accordingly, the sense of national security interest created Ethiopia to follow Somali's issues seriously. Then, both countries have become mutually distrust each other, which adversely undermined the national reconciliation process in Somali to rebuilding functional government.

Hence, Ethiopia wanted to determine the nature of state that would be established in Somalia. Consequently, many people argued that "Ethiopia seeks a weak and disunited Somalia so that it does not pose a security threat" (Shinn, 2006). However, a strong and friendly state in Somalia, instead weak, would be effective to deal with groups that threaten Ethiopia's security interest (Moller, 2009). In addition to its inability to stop security threats, the weak government in Somalia would not be popular and legitimate.

Even though, in spite of this contradiction, the Ethiopian government has continued to support the establishment of a weak and friendly government in Somalia. Thus, the Ethiopian government, time and again, supported political groups that promote the interest of Ethiopia in Somalia. Hence, in pursuit of this goal, the Ethiopian government always found willing Somali partners, who usually had their own domestic agendas in the country.

On the basis of this, Ethiopia played a significant role in hosting peace conference during UN-led reconciliation efforts in the early 1990's. After the withdrawal of UN-forces, Ethiopia continued the Soderre peace process at which a group of Somali factions agreed to establish interim national institution (Kinfе, 2002). However, the peace process failed without significant result (ICG, 2007).

Despite the failure, Ethiopia again seized the political initiative in Somalia in 1998 with a new approach. This approach called for a Federal formula to political reconstruction through the support of existing local authorities such as Somaliland and Puntland, by encouraging others to follow the same pattern (ibid). However, this formula was rejected since it was assumed to be Ethiopia's attempt to balkanize and weaken Somalia (Marchal, 2007). From this angle, according to ICG report, "the TFG's federal orientation is an Ethiopian device to weaken the Somali state, while Puntland and Somaliland are simply Ethiopians intended to further divided its people" (ICG 2007).

Therefore, Ethiopia remains the most obvious, but not sole example of external actor who possesses the interests and capacity to destroy political initiatives they do not like (Menkhaus, 2003). For example, the TNG's linkage with Islamists and "its reliance on aid from Gulf states guaranteed Ethiopia to view the TNG as unacceptable threat and exercised its 'veto' by supporting anti-TNG elements"(ibid:418). Then Ethiopia backed militias and coalitions that effectively blocked TNG efforts to establish it in and around Mogadishu (Awad, 2005). And it thereby prevented the establishment of TNG as a national government of Somalia.

In 2001, Ethiopia played a significant role in forming the SRRC. This was a coalition of faction leaders that oppose the establishment of TNG as a government of Somalia. In October 2002, the Eldoret (Mbagathi) peace talk was organized under the sponsorship of Intergovernmental Authority Development IGAD), with the aim to reconcile the TNG with its opponents. But the process was directed towards the formation of an SRRC-dominated the government due to Ethiopia's influential role (ICG, 2007).

The Eldoret peace conference was dominated by Ethiopia. Regardless of disagreement with other IGAD members such as Djibouti, Ethiopia effectively controlled the conference and reflected her interests. Accordingly, the president and prime minister were elected under the pressure from Addis Ababa. In addition the majority of the ministers belonged to the coalition factions that Ethiopia used against the TNG in 2001 (Marchal, 2007).

The formation of TFG is mainly supported and influenced by Ethiopia to created internationally recognized independent state in Somalia. Hence, TFG was totally Ethiopia's creation through the support of small coalition of clans. This in turn reduced the legitimacy of the TFG in the eyes of

Somalis (Mohammed, 2007). But Ethiopia continued to support TFG and attempted to impose TFG rule the Somalis. This act of Ethiopia, however, had negatively influenced the fate of TFG in terms of its popular acceptance. As a result, according to Moller, "the TFG lost most of what ever legitimacy it might have enjoyed in the first place by aligning itself so closely with what was seen by most Somalis as hostile invader and occupier" (2009:17). Thus, TFG faced opposition when it tried to establish itself in Somalia through Ethiopia's active support. The opposition mainly came from UIC which at the time was able to control much south central Somalia and establish popular administration (Baxter, 2007).

In the mean time, regardless of the UIC's effective response to the situation of state collapse, Ethiopia aggressively intervened and attacked UIC. However, the effect of the Ethiopia intervention has resulted in counterproductive. On the one hand, it failed to establish and legitimize the weak, fragile and unpopular TFG (Baxter, 2007). On the other hand, Ethiopia was unable to eliminate the radicalist elements. Rather, according to Moller, the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia has resulted in "a relative strengthening of the extremist forces in the Islamist movement, both by allowing militant militias such as the al-Shabab to gain ground and promoting more Salafist versions of the Sharia" (2009:25). Finally, Ethiopia left Somalia without creating a central authority and country in much worse shape than before its intervention (ibid). Therefore, the role of Ethiopia government continues to be negative in Somalia. And thereby remains a serious challenge to the revival of the state of Somalia (Mohammed, 2007).

In short, unless both countries stop provoking one another with conflicting interests, the long lasting peace and stability be in questions. This is mainly because there are unsolved problems still is going with open secret, which is the case of Ogaden. Therefore, both Ethiopia and Somalia elites have to make inclusive diplomacy to provide solutions for the problems so as to create peace and stability in the region.

5.2.3 The Role of International Actors

With the regard to the involvement of international actors, USA played a significant role in Somali politics at large. But before directly dealing with the role of the US, this study briefly analysis the UN-intervention in Somalia in the early 1990's and its effect on the re-establishment of the state of Somalia

Under the media pressure and other humanitarian pressure, in 1992 the UN Security Council authorized the first of a series of peace-keeping and famine relief operation to Somalia. The first, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), was a relatively small operation, designed to monitor and help sustain the cease-fire between the warring factions that had been negotiated by the UN in March 1992 (Lewis, 2008:78).

In December 1992 the UN intervened in Somalia to deliver humanitarian aid to the victims of starvation. The international intervention was successful in terms of the provision of humanitarian assistance. However, it failed to achieve positive results with regard to the political reconstruction of the state of Somalia (Brons, 2001).

The role of UN was against the re-establishment of the Somalis state since it provided support to the war lords. There was a recurrent problem in the UN's dealings with the factions in Somalia, mainly their dependence on the war lords (Lewis and Mayall, 1996). The UN granted political legitimacy on faction leaders and made them prominent actors in the reconciliation process (Samatar, 1999). In this case, the UN mission had aggravated the situation of state collapse, "as its treatment of the war lords as legitimate interlocutors had granted them a status they did not deserve" Moller, 2009:12).

In addition, the UN intervention under the United Nations Mission in Somalia I (UNOSOM-I), United Nations Mission in Somalia II (UNOSM-II) and United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) operations created a lucrative business and in turn facilitated warlordism in Somalia (Osman, and Souar'e,2007). These operations poured billions of dollars into Somalia which was exploitable by the arms militias. Thus, the UN intervention enriched and empowered the clan war lords, not help to reach political agreement (Spears, 1998). In the words of Spears, "the provision of external resources increased both the incentive to fight and |or alternatively, disincentive to find political accommodation and provided the means by which continued war could be financed " (1998:328).

The UN mistake in supporting one clan group against the other had aggravated and divided different warring factions. In this regard, the UN support Ali Mahdi, and Farah Aideed were in fighting. This situation had led Aideed to attack American soldiers in Somalia. At the beginning of October 1993, in the bloody incident which became known as 'Black Hawk down', Aideed's

forces succeeded in shooting down helicopter gunships as they strafed the streets of Mogadishu. In this event Farah Aideed left eighteen US soldiers dead—an episode dramatized in the film 'Black Hawk Down' and dead US personnel being dragged through the street of Mogadishu. Then, U.S. was forced to leave her soldiers from Somalia without accomplishing its mission (Lewis, 2008:79).

As a result, the UN operations created a situation where war lords and war economy groups operate to continue the conflict in order to increase their relative power and resource. Hence, UN intervention undermined the process of establishing central authority in Somalia (ibid).

Furthermore, the UN was not impartial in its dealings with political factions in Somalia. In its attempts to bring political reconciliation, the UN threatened to undermine some of the Somalis aspiring war lords. The UN itself was a significant military and political threat to some of the factions (Spears, 19998; Brons, 2001). This, in turn, adversely affected the efforts to reconstruct Somalia in the early 1990's. Finally, UN left Somalia without any political solution to the existing crises of the state collapse. Moreover the UN troops were unable to provide adequate protection against the various warring factions for the UN and NGO activities, thus even failing in the modest objective of establishing "humanitarian corridors" and "zone of peace" where aid might be distributed.

5.2.4 The Interests and Involvement of the USA

Americans had good relations with military regime of Barre before its demise in 1991. They had military base in Somalis in service of their global rivalry with the Soviets, who were also anchored in neighboring Ethiopia at the time (Spears, 1998). The Americans left when the military regime fell and the country started to disintegrate into fiefdoms ruled over by rival war lords. The Americans came back two years later at the head of massive humanitarian mission, to facilitate 'food delivery' to the starving Somalis affected by the civil war (Mohammed, 2007). The UNITAF was effectively a unilateral USA intervention (Moller, 2009).

However, the Americans have not had assisted the political process to solve the Somali problem. Rather they had become part of the conflict and entered into serious confrontation with one of the war lords in Mogadishu. In March 1993, "the US had unilaterally declared war against one of the competing war lords, Mohammed Aideed , thus transforming the mission into a man hunt"

(ibid:12). Later on, they left Somalia to itself and ignored the horrible civil strife that the country descended into and kept silent in the turmoil of Somali situations (Moller, 2009). Then, the US abandoned Somalia crises for a long period of time.

Nevertheless, in August 1998, the terrorist attacks of Americans embassies in Nairobi and Daresalam once again renewed the US interest in Somalia. In other words, the US suspected that some of the operatives behind the attacks were sheltering in the law less Somalia (Mohammed, 2007). Accordingly, specifically after September, 11, 2001, the US came up with containment policy with the aim to capture terrorists suspected to have linkage with al-Qaeda. Hence, "the US focused its policy towards Somalia almost exclusively on concerns about counter terrorism" (Shinn, 2006). Hence, the US interest in Somalia is not willing better to Somali society rather than to protect her own national interest and hunting the suspected terrorists. In doing this, US have prolonged conflicts and instability let alone creating strong functional government in Somalia.

The establishment of a legitimate and functional government in Somalia was not part of America's policy towards Somalia. Instead the American's simply engaged on supporting the local factions to enact their counter terrorist's policies (Marchal, 2007). According to Marchal, "for the US, the existence of a government was not a real priority ..." (2007). The Americans established alliance with the local war lords in the country, to hunt the al-Qaeda operatives allegedly hiding in the country (Mohammed, 2007). The US mainly relied on the military means to achieve its policy goal instead of political solution in Somalia.

The US continued to support the war lords partially and in February 2006, ARPCT was formed with the involvement of US, counter-terrorism officials in order to encourage more cooperation in capturing terror suspects. This put the ARPCT in antagonistic position with UIC. It also deepened the perception that the US was supporting war lords in a fight against Islam. And, the court took the assistance given to the ARPCT as a declaration of war, since US assistance was often "redirected to suit the more parochial agendas the local partners" (Baxter, 2007). In this case, that agenda was to wage war against the Islamic courts in Mogadishu (ibid).

In the mean time, the assistance decreased the legitimacy of the factions. Finally, the ARPCT was defeated by the UIC. This initiated the American to give green card for Ethiopia to invade

Somalia, rather than engaging the UIC diplomatically. The US also used air strikes to attack the suspected terrorist basis in southern Somalia. However, the American- Ethiopian invasion of the Somalia removed the conditions of national authority, rather than eliminating the suspected extremist group. As a result, the dissolution of the UIC marked the provisional end of the centralization that took place in June 2006 with the arrival of a single influence over a large portion of the country (Marchal, 2007). In other words, for the mere reason of terrorism, the US destroyed the local popular type of governance in Somalia (Baxter, 2007). However, by doing this, the US paved the way for the growth of Islamist militancy and perhaps even of terrorism (Moller, 2009). Since then, the already existed Islamic fundamentalists take the case as serious to be more radicalists to attack any pro-US and pro-Ethiopian movements in the region.

Then, the Ethiopian military occupation and installation of the TFG in Mogadishu provided US with new partnership for its policy. At this time, US formed alliance with selected TFG security forces. The counter terrorism partnerships were channeled through specific security sector leaders, instead the TFG ministers. However, these leaders had operated largely independent of TFG. This, in turn, significantly affected the capacity of TFG in terms of ensuring stability through the control of security sector (Menkhaus, 2008). Thus, US counter terrorism support is not in line with the state building agenda, rather it is against it. Accordingly, the American's, throughout 2007, helped the armed paramilitaries with financial and logistical aid. However, though they nominally wear a TFG uniform, these groups are actually against the TFG's authority (ibid).

Generally, all the measures taken by the US in order to counter terrorism were short term and failed to bring long term solutions. But these measures have negatively influenced the re-establishment of the state of Somalia. This is mainly due to the US's unilateral support of one or some group against the other to achieve its specific interests. Thus, the absence of comprehensive on the part of US towards Somalia its short term military measures have adversely affected the re-building of the state of Somalia.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 Conclusions

The state is needed for various functions within the given society. Citizens of a given polity need it because it is expected to deliver political and public goods, i.e., security, law and order, social and economic infrastructure. The political elites of a given society need the state because it generates for them economic and political opportunities. Other countries, poor regional neighbours and distant sole superpowers alike, need the state of a given society because the state is the main vehicle for other countries to secure their security, and political and economic interests in the country in question.

When the state of a given country collapses the consequences for the citizens, leaders, and international community could be very severe. Insecurity and hunger are obvious consequences for the citizens of the collapse state not only lose their economic and political opportunities but may also end up in misfortune. In today's increasingly interconnected world, a collapsed state does not threaten the security and interests of its neighbours alone but may pose an acute risk to geographically distant and powerful nations. Hence, the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 concluded that "America is now threatened by conquering states than we are failing ones". Therefore, U.S. and UN are working to create externally driven Westphalia state model in Somalia to achieve their own interests rather than respecting and protecting interests of Somali society.

Somali societies have been disturbed and lost their traditional peaceful way of life since the colonial era. Since this time Somalis had experienced centralized state structure that they perceived as surrendered to the alien imposed political cultures. To the worst the Siad Barre regime had created clan based division in favoring some groups at expense of others, which led to the endless civil war and warlordism in Somalia. Thus, the state 'collapse' occurred in Somalia since the fall of military dictatorship regime in 1991 creating various fighting faction leaders to take state powers that had been left vacuum after the fall of Barre regime. This political

instability had paved the way for external intervention in Somali situations in the name of state rebuilding, though the consequence is disastrous one.

After 20 years of conflict and various attempts at peace building and state building, Somalia is an insecure and divided along various factional groups as it was in the early 1990s. Most of these peace building efforts have been attempted at creating a centralized unitary state. This study argued that it is now time to rethink this strategy, and that a bottom up state building approach offers a more promising chance of progress. Indeed, the way that Somaliland and Puntland are consolidating their regional structures makes a revival of the bottom up approach which is based on the interests of local people look like the only possible solution. Hence, the international society's state structure model does not match with traditional Somali societies who have more decentralized social structure except the southern minority communities. Here, the coastal communities have experienced settled life from very beginning and have respect for central authority.

The Somali tribal governance culture is not naturally compatible with the centralized state-norms of the IC, and therefore these norms do not naturally work to the advantage of the Somali peoples. In this regard, any attempt to state building in Somali culture should incorporate with traditional governance system based on society's needs and interests. In addition, the actors in state building in Somalia have to learn from the past failed state building approaches and from the bottom up effective state building based on traditional and modern, hybrid one of Somaliland state.

Every time Somalia had been under a strong central government they have suffered, as the central state was oppressing them. Therefore a strong central state is viewed by most Somali society as negative thing, as it has not historically provided them with governance services. The traditional clan based system of governance has historically, even when a central state has been present, been the reliable provider of security, representation and welfare. This means that these traditional governance-structures are still trusted and relied on by the ordinary Somali people. Transferring these traditional governance-structure and loyalties into the new state-structure therefore gives this new state-structure great legitimacy. In Somalia that of externally driven

state building approach has often lack local legitimacy and could not bring functional government as that international society need.

The IC state-structure initiatives for Somalia (the TFG) have however not produced anything good for the ordinary citizen of Somalia. The TFG solely represent the interest and actors of the IC, and cooperates with and exercises influence through the powerful but predatory warlords and (some) clans in Somalia, who is only participating in the TFG to secure personal gain and resources for themselves. Therefore, the TFG is not representing or providing effective government services to the ordinary Somali people since its foundation in 2004 in Kenya to 2008 here another TFGII was established in Djibouti and agreed to oust foreign forces from Somalia. Hence, the Ethiopian forces left the country in 2009. However, the sustainability of peace and stability of new government is in challenge because the Al-Shaba still in controlling parts of Somalia. The Somali societies feel that the legitimacy of the TFG is extremely low, in part due to the fact that Somalis feel TFG have often effectively acted as an externally created puppet regime and promoted foreign interest in Somalia more than the interests of Somali majority.

As this study argued that the 'Somali local people can expect nothing good from external actors', but have to rely on their own capabilities to survive. In this line, when TFG fail to provide peace and security to its people, UIC was able to establish itself and became popular in providing peace and security to the majority Somali societies, though it was later divided to radical and moderate Islamic groups. They united their existing local based and de-centralized Islamic Courts into a Union (the UIC) and threw the warlords and TFG out of Mogadishu. After that the UIC successfully established a monopoly of violence, and formed a very successful domestic and popular legitimate state-structure. The Somalis initiative to improve their own situation by creating the UIC could however not be accepted by the IS, especially the US and Ethiopia, who saw UIC as a terrorist' organization. This led to the Ethiopian invasion and the overthrow of the UIC. Here, the Ethiopian justification to interfere in Somalia is UIC declared Jihad in Ethiopia and this situation enforced here to protect and defended the national interests. Ethiopia's justification is accepted by most of IGAD members except Eritrea and Djibouti. Any how the effects for many Somalis are not creditable.

This study also argued that the main challenges to rebuilding state in Somalia are internal and external factors. Internally, the legacies of Barre regime have sustained state collapse of Somalia. It created clanism and clan factional fighting one against the others. Siad Barre introduced a clan based divide and rule policy. Barre developed his own mechanism of appointing loyal political agents from his own clan to guide and control civil and military institutions. Besides the political favoritism, his clansmen—the Marehan clan of Darod—also benefited from the economic system. Barre’s policy instigated suspicion and hatred among the clans and finally led the country into deep statelessness. Moreover, the struggle for scarce resources between different clans and sub-clans left Somalia divided. The others are clan dynamics, radical Islam, discriminatory of minority communities and available of weapons all these have negatively affected state re-building in Somalia. Externally, the international and the regional actors with their conflicting interests towards state re-constructing in Somalia prolonged conflict and instability that came one of the main challenges to Somali state building.

This study has also argued that any successful state-structure in Somalia has to be constructed bottom-up, and in accordance and corporation with the traditional Somali governance-structures and norms. This is the only way the Somalis will believe that it is representing their interests. This suspicion towards international society (IC)-norms and central states is due to the Somalis previous bad experiences with top-down controlled central-states and actors serving outside interests and actors. IC-norms of state-construction therefore cannot be used in the construction stage of a bottom-up state-structure, as they have no legitimacy. After the state-structure is successfully formed, as the example of Somaliland has shown us, it can however successfully be transformed into a democratic and economically liberal de facto state (just as the IC likes it) to the benefit of both its citizens and the stability of the IC. The best thing the IC could therefore do is to allow these locally based bottom-up state-structures to emerge by their own initiative. Allow them to gradually transform themselves into states-structures that live up to the IC-norms and can be beneficial to the IC like Somaliland is. The IC and especially UN need however to change its stance against de facto states in order to do this, and also need to recognize them as sovereign states – as state-structures like Somaliland have proved their right to live through positive sovereignty. It makes no sense that the IS continues to insist on reviving an (illusional) central government/state of Somalia.

Local legitimacy and initiative is however not enough to guarantee the success of a popular bottom-up state. As the Example of UIC has shown, a state-structure that is perceived (rightly or wrongly) as a threat to powerful actors in the IC (such as Ethiopia or US) are not allowed to live. The security interest of these powerful states-actors of the IC overrules the local right to security (the security the UIC was providing them) and the UIC was militarily destroyed. This is despite the fact that the UIC was very successful and popular among the Somalis because it effectively provided them security, representation and welfare.

A further point is that toppling the UIC state-structure did not benefit the IC agenda at all. The radical jihadist groups like al-Shabab have gained in strength thanks to the U.S. anti-terrorism fighting, as they can now justify their jihad by referring to the Christian Crusaders' invasion. In this regard, U.S. and Ethiopia are labeled as the Christian invaders of Somalia.

6.2 Recommendations

After concluding the main findings, this thesis has recommended as solutions for Somali problems in the following areas. One has to note that these are the options for the Somalis prolonged conflicts hoping to peace, but they are not fixed choice to be implemented. Therefore, this study recommends the following points.

- **Bottom-up state building approach-** as internationally fixed top down state building approach does not work in Somali society context, there is needed looking for another alternative state building approach, which is locally driven based on society interests is bottom up one.
- **Hybrid state structure-**as this study has mentioned the Westphalia western state model failed functioning in Somalia, especially in south central Somalia. Accordingly, many externally enforced /imposed state building attempts have failed to be effective in Somalia. Hence, both modern and traditional model should be integrated to create effective state in Somalia as Somaliland did.
- **The role of external actors-**the role of external actors needs to be assistance the peace processes to create strong government in Somalia. They are expected to be neutral while peace process taking place. This is because the Somali people are hesitant any external

interference that undermine their own way of life, and they perceived externally imposed centralized state bring nothing important to Somali society except mistrust and conflict each other.

- **Inclusive peace process is needed**-from the fall of Siad Barre regime many peace processes have been conducted to bring peace and stability in Somalia. This process of peace failed to incorporate significant Somali social classes including women and minority communities. The only certain war lords and faction leaders representing in various peace talks. As a result, limited representatives after the peace process lack legitimacy from majority social classes, which led to the conflicts one against another in Somalia.
- **Peace building before state building**-it is clear that state is crucial to provide its citizens with peace and security. International community i.e. UN including USA has rushing to create state before making peace to achieve their own agendas rather than Somali society's interests. The first thing has to be building peace then state can be created with safe environment. Identifying source of conflicts and finding solutions is primary issues for international community rather than rushing to build government.
- **Disarmament**-the prospect for re-building political and civic life in Somalia is absolutely dim without disarming the warlords and the population. This process fully supported by the international community but implemented by Somalis should start once a recognized government is selected. Therefore, disarmament must be thorough. If this is not done, small arms remain in door that will be serious challenges for Somali peace and security.
- **Avoiding Discrimination**-traditionally perceiving Somali society as homogeneous has a paramount negative impact on those minority communities who are living along coastal areas with their own distinctive cultures. In this regard, the pastoralists, the dominant communities in Somalia exploited and oppressed these economically very important social classes. Not only minority communities who are discriminated but also women and weak agricultural societies are marginalized. Therefore this situation has to be reversed to build effective government in Somalia. Moreover, the myth of one people one culture propagation needed to be deconstructed to accept distinctive feature of Somali society
- **Accepting heterogeneous feature of Somali society**-it is clear that the Somali societies are unique in their common sharing cultures in terms of language, religion, and other

values. That does not mean Somali people are homogeneous in all aspects. Accordingly, the pastoralist communities have their own distinctive cultures that distinguish them from agriculturalist community. In this regard, the pastoralists lead their life in moving whereas agriculturalists lead their settled life permanently. There are also coastal city-states with their own distinctive mode of productions with their own language. However, many scholars could not accept this differences and regarding Somalis as one people.

Finally, this study has completed by suggesting alternative state structure to Somali state rebuilding if only the current federal government fail once again to create comprehensive viable state in Somalia. **Confederal** state structure is recommended to be effective with Somali context. This is because many attempts have been made with Unitary versus Federal Approaches before a current government. Both state structures have been failed to create viable strong government in Somalia.

Therefore, confederal state structure model is suggested. Now, this study tries to highlight the nature of confederal state. The Confederation is co-Sovereign with the several states. This means that within the limits of the constitution it can act independently of the states. It can appoint its own officers, pass its own legislation and so forth. In confederation, the states have no right to interfere.

Confederation state is flexible, anti-monopolistic and consensus oriented. It can be described as a kind of self-administration in contrast to the administration by the nation-state. However, under certain circumstances peaceful coexistence is possible as long as the nation-state does not interfere with central matters of self-administration. Confederations will not be limited to organize themselves with in a single particular territory. They will become cross-border confederations when the societies concerned so desire.

There are some principles of Confederal states. These are it is a non-state social paradigm. It is not controlled by state; the right of self determination of peoples includes the right to a state of their own, it is based on grass-roots participations. Its decision makes process lie with the communities (Ocalan, 2011). In short, in Confederal state structure there is no fixed territory rather it is loose in which people are able to move freely in and out as much as important.

Lastly, this study does not fix state structures for Somalia but rather than it argues that whatever types of state should not be forced on Somalia. Besides, the choice let to the Somali society to determine types of state structures for themselves.

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