

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
(GRADUATE PROGRAM)**

**PHILOSOPHICAL CHALLENGES FOR SECULARISM AND
ITS POST NARRATIVE**

**BY
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APRIL 2016

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY (GRADUATE PROGRAM) IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ART IN PHILOSOPHY

APRIL 2016

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Abstract

Although secularism has challenged superstitious practices (of any religion either in private or public sphere) and contributed a lot for inclusion of citizens regardless of their religious background, the hypersecularizing tendency of the secularists (such as becoming “militant” against religious practices and symbols) and their weak thesis regarding the role of religion has made contemporary philosophers to (re)analyze the challenges for secularism. The historical emancipation of the secular sphere from religion, and the role and acrimonious debate among influential philosophers of the time has shaped the nature of secularism in their particular society. The current prominent (Anglo-American and French) models of secularism resulted from their specific religious and cultural milieu, and the socio-political nature of the early modern time. Those models are much influenced by the thinking’s of the philosophers of that time. Those and other models that are described as either soft or hard type of secularism need a long time of discussion and debate, on bottom up basis, to be implemented in a particular country. If the way of introducing the secularism is on top-down fashion, without involvement of thinkers, the effectiveness of the concept in that society is poor or there is the possibility of being observed as futile end. The challenge for secularism starts in this top-down prescription of the ideology without considering the context of the intended society.

The challenges for secularism necessitated the introduction of new paradigm that balances the relation between the religious and the secular. Importantly, the prominent contemporary philosopher Jürgen Habermas declared post secularism that narrates the co-existence of religious and secular societies under secular environment. He declared that we are living in post secular age. Although he has come with a wonderful philosophical alternative considering the challenges for secularism, he does not do well with all challenges and at the same time he does not do justice to religious contents. After analyzing the gap and weakness of his philosophical alternative, this paper claim the introduction of a new paradigm that enables the real co-existence of religious and secular societies under either secular or religious environment.

Acknowledgement

I owe a debt of gratitude to the many people who helped make this thesis a reality. First and foremost, I must thank my teacher and supervisor, Dr. Bekele Gutema. He nurtured my thesis at every step of the way by devoting countless hours to make helpful suggestions. He also displayed a great deal of patience and understanding throughout this work. His consistent supervision, encouragement and unreserved guidance have been invaluable. I also learned a great deal relevant to the thesis in the course and reading materials I took from him.

My special thanks go to all my teachers in department of Philosophy: Dr. Tena (his mercy), Dr. Dagnachew (his localizing potential), Dr. Workineh (his commitment) and Dr. Christopher (his patience) whose academic contribution enabled me to conceptualize my thesis as well as their friendly approaches encouraged and helped me much.

My sincere thanks go to my friends Walilign, Nebil, Sophia (*Enabling*) and others (whose names are not mentioned) who persistently encouraged me when I became frustrated with the difficult and time-consuming process of writing this thesis and they contributed their best for the fulfillment of this thesis.

My deepest gratitude extends to my wife Seada Dessalegn (Fikir) for her consistent support, encouragement and patience to my academic-centered behavior throughout my two graduate programs (First, she feared that I will get mad out of Philosophy but finally....); to my son Ayub and my daughter Iliham for their abstract smile whenever I return home after carrying out this work.

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INTRODUCTION

Starting from long ago, philosophers have been providing philosophical alternatives to make human life simple. They have been highly criticizing and analyzing the way of human life and existence; and then deconstructing the most untouchable part of human relation with himself, the society or the transcendental power. Like many human relations, religion and politics are critically analyzed by philosophy. Religion and politics are closely related to each other and diachronically religion interferes in politics (Giannis 2012). That is this unlimited interference that motivated political philosophers to review the relation [between religion and politics]. After making a number of philosophical struggles on the view, they have finally come with the ideological framework, secularism, which shapes the relation.

What makes secularism interesting is that it is still the preeminent issue of the public, the politicians, the sociologists, and the contemporary social, political, and intercultural philosophers; everywhere we find the debate being hot, acrimonious and contentious. That is why it has many names and various manifestations or always being followed by some other related terms.

As philosophy -and ism-, secularism is an ideology that presupposes new concept of religion and politics because it emerged out from such ideological relation. Secularism, according to Asad, is nothing more than a political doctrine. As an ideology, it is a theory of truth and a doctrine of relation between religion and politics. Many philosophers categorize “the secular” as epistemological while the secularism, like others –ism, as a political doctrine (Asad 2003; Casanova 2011). It, according to Calhoun and his colleagues, can be seen as an ideology, a world view, a stance toward religion, a constitutional frame work, a project of a particular philosophical system but what they want is to pay attention that secularism is not merely the absence of religion (Calhoun et al. 2011). So, it can be understood that secularism and religion are not mutually exclusive.

Secularism as a frame work tries to demarcate between “the secular” and “the religious” but this demarcation should be conceptualized repeatedly from different philosophical processes since secularism itself contains “secularization” as one of its manifestations. This “secularization” is simply *a process* through which people are freed from the total influence of the “religious.” We

can get binary division between “the secular” and “the religious” as the former being taken for granted as “modern” with its “universal and natural” nature, while the latter being perceived as “pre-modern” with its unnatural and additive properties (Casanova 2011; Hashemi 2009; Taylor 2011).

Chapter one discusses the conceptual framework and relation of “secular,” “secularism” and “secularization.” After having the basic understanding on the (dis)agreements over the topic, the chapter proceeds to discuss the models and types of secularism that gives this paper its minimum potential, at least, to expose the possibilities of different models and types from countries to countries based on their own context and history. I want to make clear for the reader that there are different ways of applying of secularism based on their own contexts rather than a monolithic model. Since this paper aims at showing the reality of these possibilities, it is beyond its objective to either prescribe or proscribe a single model to a particular country although it can generally remind the risk of trying to imitate or import a single model. It tries to uncover the blinkered vision over the concepts and models of secularism to have perspicacious observation. Some models are blatantly “hard,” “radical,” “militant” and “assertive,” while others are “soft,” “moderate,” and “passive” (Barghava 2011; Kuru 2007; Modood 2010).

Chapter two discusses the Political theology of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes. In order to understand the current dominant philosophical disclosures on secularism, one needs to know the philosophical history of church and state separation. Although the philosophical debate on the idea of separation starts before the time of St. Augustine, this paper tries to focus on the early modern period’s political theology and political philosophy arguments. John Locke’s philosophical argument, for instance, was basing on dueling over the scripture in order to refute the other side’s stagnant belief on the trinity of church, state and politics. This is what makes the onset of secularism *political theology*. Actually, there were some prominent philosophers who totally rejected citing from revelations. They were highly obsessed with the political philosophy development of human mind to determine his/her own political fate rather than relying on political theology, as some did. The purpose and center of argument of this chapter is not whether to accept either political philosophy or political theology but to remind the “West” about the foundation of [its] secularism that was laid by its forefather philosophers. It is my interest to bemoan the fact of making any hiatus and ahistoricity in the secular evolution of the *West* since it

has a chance to mislead the contemporary philosophical solution to political [and religious] and ethical problems. I preferred to analyze the political theology of those two philosophers since both are still the center of debate for political theology as well as they were active during England's long-term clash over the relation between church and state. Their arguments regarding the position of the scripture in respect to *Politics* affected the models and types. It can be seen that Locke's political theology provides the foundation for the Anglo-American model while that of Hobbes's argument promote the hard type of secularism.

In chapter three, this paper tries to show the crisis and philosophical challenges for secularism. Secularism, willy-nilly, has challenged religion and religious persons, and has been effective in disenchanting religion from the politics at most, and at least, from the public sphere although there is no linear relationship between religion and politics. Anyone cannot deny that secularism has become essential in multi-religious state and multi-cultural and multi-value societies (like India). Its proponents such as the modernization theorists successfully led the world in their own projects and programs. The problem starts, however, when they make it the necessary prerequisite for modernity and democracy, where their essentializing dogma emerged out. This paper claims that they made modernity malaise which cannot understand contexts and differences.

Some start to feel secularism as a remedy which should only enter in to the bloodstreams where "Christianity disease" can be found. It, according to their claim, is futile to implement in the non-Western societies since it is the outcome of the Western mind which was infected by their clerical pathogen. There is also a claim that secularism is for "liberal, protestant, individualized and privatized religion" (Bhargava 2011:101). Pragmatically, this claim is not crazy for someone who tries to understand the religious person's anxiety for the myth of the secularist, though the claim might be exaggerated. Some secularists are "militants" who want no religion in their state's horizon; they are hypersensitive to religious deeds and inimical to the spiritual life. Their myth is to have religious free philosophy, politics, thinking, conscience, debate, public sphere and state. They do not have rooms for the *Church*, and secularism has become their religion. Amazingly, some become jittery when they suddenly see religion and religious persons somewhere else. Hence, they hypersecularize (becoming "militant" against any public/ private presence of religion and religious symbols) more than the frame of its concept. To the other extreme side of

the religious fundamentalists, they are sacralizing “the secular” and becoming militant. When they try to hypersecularize, they misuse its philosophy. Moreover, their bedfellows in the non-West and third world countries abuse it for their own mundane activities. Here, I want to underscore that the objective of this chapter is to show the philosophical challenges for secularism. In this case, I am not saying that secularism does not challenge religion; it is a reality that secularism is effective in limiting the role of religion but my intention is to challenge the militant *type* and forewarning the crisis of prescribing its single model, in this chapter, and to propose philosophical solution for the crisis of secularism, in the next chapter, in order to have possible coexistence between secular and religious societies.

In chapter four, this paper tries to analyze the philosophical solution declared by the eminent contemporary political philosopher, Jurgen Habermas, on secularism. I preferred his philosophy since he had preminent works on secularism and he has become known for his paradigm shift from secularism to *post secularism*. He introduced a new theoretical concept called “post-secularism” to explain the current continuous existence of religious and secular communities. So, this chapter discusses what post of secularism is, how it challenges secularism itself and what the limitations of this new meta-narrative are. Finally, this paper discusses the main philosophical outlooks on (post-) secularism to be reconceptualized. Although post-secularism is an excellent alternative after the crisis of secularism, I think that it is not sufficient to relieve the headache regarding the relation of “the secular” and “the religious.”

It has become necessary to rethink the concept of secularism and many are doing that. However, this paper tries to rethink and analyze secularism by suggesting the introduction of other philosophical alternative that can rebut decontextualization and allows adapting of secularism as a *means* of human life rather than making it an *end* in and for itself. This paper argues that secularism should not be a universal constant but be able to incorporate the culture, religion, civilization and other factors of a particular society. It also claims that the new philosophical alternative should allow separation of church and state as well as it [philosophically] tries to get rid of religious fundamentalism and sacralization of the secular. It also gives a room for secularism to be rethought since it is one of the many world views, which are exposed to evanescence and recrudescence. I need the reader’s prior understanding that it is beyond the scope of this paper to characterize all of the philosophical alternative projects. So, anybody who

has interest on the area can discuss, analyze and debate on the thesis to provide further progress on proposed concepts to be included in the next philosophical paradigms. This paper suggests the philosophical alternative that deals with how “the secular” and “the religious” can live together in harmony one accommodating the other and how possible the concept of intercultural philosophy be applied to those living in after *postsecular age*.

CHAPTER 1: DEFINITION AND MODELS OF SECULARISM

1.1 Definition

It is not easy to understand the term “secularism” as it is without having an initial clarity of its related manifestations. Importantly, but ambiguously, the terms “secular,” “secularity,” “secularism” and “secularization” are related to each other. Kosmin, for example, asserts that these terms “have a range of meanings” while Calhoun and his colleagues focus on the nature of understanding of these terms in “confusing ways” (Calhoun et al. 2011:5; Kosmin 2007:2). Calhoun et al. do not retreat in claiming that these terms tell “different things” but their main concern is on the difficulty of standardizing their usage “with clearly defined concept” that can make the “confusing ways” limpid (2011:5). For Manzoor, these terms have “close affinity” with *modernity*, *modernization*, and *modernism*. So, he tries to define *secularization* shortly as “a process of history;” *secularity* as “a state of mind and culture;” and *secularism* as “a theory of truth” (1995: 345).

1.1.1 The meaning of “Secular”

Some scholars are interested in the etymological root of the term. The term’s concept lay around “this age and this world” which “combines” a connotation of *spatial* and *temporal* since they are derived from the common Latin word called *saeculum* (Kosmin 2007). These dual senses of *time* and *location* respectively reflect the “now or present” and the “world or worldly” sense or it is precisely to mean “contemporary events” (Al-Attas, 1993:16). Quoting from Keane, Hashemi states that during the onset of modern period “the term secular... came to be understood as converting from ecclesiastical to civil use” (2009:105). This “ecclesiastical” use is attached with what is called spiritual realm of eternity while the “civil use” has a connotation of this age and this world. The term “secular” was particularly related to this historical root and it is why we got it being described in relation to “the idea of the present, temporal, mundane world in distinction to the divine and spiritual realm of eternity” (Cauchi 2009:3; Hurd 2004).

Then, the “secular” came to be understood as it seeks no manifestable “reference to” a metaphysical world or “transcendent order” (Hurd 2004). So, the “secular” is the body of thought and activity which is mainly concerned with man’s life in the non-metaphysical world (Mascall

1965). Currently, the term is “often” considered to be “simply the other of the religious, that which is non religious” (Casanova 2011:55; Cauchi 2009). Cauchi clearly states that the term has “negative definition” since it is “the non-religious” dichotomy which “leave little room for ambiguity” (2009:1).

Because it is the non religious, we can easily grasp the claim offered by Calhoun et al. as “ideas of the secular concern not only the separation of religion from politics but also the separation-or relation- between religion and other dimensions of culture and ethnicity” (2011:17). So, finally on the shore of the secular we accept what Casanova claims as a potential “central modern category-theological-philosophical, legal-political, and cultural-anthropological-” to standardize, influence and shape individuals world outlook (2011:54). Subsequently, secularism is a philosophy that emerged out from such category. It is categorized as a political doctrine, while “the secular” is seen as epistemological (Asad 2003:1; Casanova 2011:54). On this categorization, I want to concentrate on Asad’s dual characterization of the “secular” as neither “continuous” nor a “simple break”. The none “continuous” feature of the secular implies that the secular is not “continuous with the religion that preceded it (which means that it is not the last stage of something originally sacral)” while the none “simple break” feature of the secular implies that the secular is not “a simple break from the religious (therefore, it is not in opposition to the sacral, as some essence that excludes the sacral) (2003:25).

1.1.2 What is Secularization?

In contrast to secularism, which is a *philosophy*, secularization is a *process*, which is more of sociological. Etymologically “both are derived from the Latin *saeculum* –the present age” (Calhoun et al. 2011; Kosmin 2007; NA: 2)¹. Asad seems successful in giving room for secularization in his philosophical category in which secularization is “the application of” the secular and secularism “to other forms of social and political life” (2003:1). According to Casanova, secularization is “analytical conceptualization of modern world-historical process” (2011:54). Importantly, from all of the following three paragraphs, we understand secularization as “modern world-historical process.”

¹ NA: The Author is not available but the article is *Culture in Crisis*

The eminent sociologist and scholar on secularism, Casanova, gives emphasis on the “empirical-historical pattern of transformation and differentiation of the religious....and the secular...” to define secularization. The “transformation and differentiation” are required to reduce the influence of religion over the secular institutional spheres (such as state, economy and science) (2011:54).

More extremely, Peurson, for the first time, and Harvey Cox, then, defined Secularization as “the deliverance of man first from religious and then from metaphysical control over his reason and his language” (Al-Attas 1993:17; Kosmin 2007). Similarly, Harvey Cox (quoted in Al-Attas) explains secularization as “the loosing of the world from religious and quasi-religious understandings of itself, the dispelling of all closed world views, the breaking of all supernatural myths and sacred symbols...” Moreover, Cox claims that it is the historical processes of “maturing” and becoming capable of removing “metaphysical supports” and Divine influences on man’s day to day life (Al-Attas 1993:17; Manzoor 1995). In order to liberate himself from the “metaphysical tutelage,” man, according to Cox, should be able to free from “infantile” nature and “juvenile dependence from every level of society.” It is this evolutionary process of “the consciousness of man” that is called secularization (Al-Attas 1993:19). Briefly, Max Weber described this secularization process in short as the *disenchantment* of the world.

Kosmin, analyzing Weber’s “disenchantment” description, tells us the characterized *dialectic* nature of secularization as follows:

....the more that hearts and minds become “disenchanted,” the more institutions that have specialized in the promotion of the “enchantment” process lose plausibility and authority. The more such institutions lose plausibility and authority, the less the psycho-emotional processes of “enchantment” are inculcated in the hearts and minds of individuals (2007:5).

In secularization, it is not only man but also “society and culture” are expected to be free from the control of religious institutions (Manzoor 1995). In this regard, Peter Berger, for instance, claimed that “sectors of society are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols” (Kosmin 2007:5). Similarly, Cox claims that secularization involves the cultural in addition to the social and political aspects of life since it is manifested in “the disappearance of religious determination of the symbols of cultural integration” (Al-Attas 1993:17). Generally, Cox, considering some of the above manifestations, integrates the whole features of

secularization into “the disenchantment of nature, the desacralization of politics, and the deconsecration of values” (Ibid: 18).

Casanova, and Keddie (quoted in Hashemi) separately emphasize the need to distinguish different connotations of secularization in order to have common understanding of it and I need to summarize briefly as (1) secularization as declining of religious belief and practices, and, to the reverse, increasing of secular beliefs and practices in modern societies. The former is suggested by Casanova while the latter is by Keddie (2) secularization as “the *privatization of religion*” and a lessening of religious control or influence over major spheres of life. The former is stated by Casanova while the latter is by Keddie; (3) Secularization as the [*emancipation and*] “*differentiation of the secular spheres* from religious institutions” and “a growth in state separation from religion and in secular regulation of formerly religious institutions and customs.” Similarly, the former is stated by Casanova while the latter is by Keddie (Casanova 2006:7; Hashemi 2009:106).

Looking into Kosmin’s analysis of *dialectic*, Al-Attas integration of secularization, and Casanova’s and Keddie’s differentiation of connotations of secularization enable to comprehend that secularization’s horizon is much broader than thought and hence, I think it is proper to claim that “secularization...is more than a process in the mind, a loss of religious belief, and an acceptance of the scientific view of the world. It is institutional arrangement, a structural differentiation, and an ideational division of labor whereby the sacred is separated from the realm of power.....” (Manzoor 1995:552).

Manzoor concludes that “the idea of secularization” is already “sacralized” and secularism successfully replaced the process of secularization and it has become a sacral, a doctrine and “a faith” which is “both a secularized faith and a faith in secularization” (1995:548). This informs that the philosophical paradigm of secularism is becoming the consecutive phase of the secularization process and the ideological tool to denounce the *Divine Paradigm* as well.

1.1.3 What is Secularism?

Secularism, according to Asad, is nothing more than a political doctrine (2003). Importantly, secularism, as an ideology, is a theory of truth and a doctrine of relation between religion and politics. Like other contemporary scholars on secularism, Calhoun et al. define secularism as

“an ideology, a world view, a stance toward religion, a constitutional frame work..... a project of a particular philosophical system.” But, in addition to that, they add more emphasis on the components of Secularism which, according to them, is “not merely the absence of religion” (2011:5).

Calhoun et al. unabashedly argue that Secularism “has no ideological significance of its own, other than the-taken-for granted absence or obsolescence of religion” (2011:3). A related claim is also stated by Hurd that secularism is “beholden to religion in complex ways” (2004:236). As a political doctrine and ideology, it presupposes new concept of religion and politics because it emerged out from such ideological relation. It “separates” religion “from the secular domains of the state, the economy and science” (Hurd 2004:235). Kosmin explains it in respect to organizational and legal perspectives “that reflect the institutional expressions of the secular in a nation’s political realm and public life” (2007:1). Giannis affirms the one version of the philosophical nature of secularism by asserting that faith/belief does not remain in the public sphere of the society but in the private sphere of the individual (2012:6).

As an ideology, secularism claims its own “superiority over” religion and “it is also characterized by its universalist pretensions” (Hurd 2004:235). In this universal pretensions it tries to control and guide “the physical, moral and intellectual nature of man” and aims at the development of these human natures to the positive, possible and “perceivable higher points” (Hashemi 2009:105). To achieve this “perceivable higher points,” it might oppose religion and denounces “its misdeeds and deleterious effects” (Willaime 2010:2). Hurd claims that when secularism denounce the harmful effects of religion, it grants “to itself the right to define the role of religion in politics.” Regarding this authoritarian approach of the secularism to (re)define the “moral bases of the public sphere” and unveil the “hegemonic aspirations” of religion, she claims that secularism seems “unaware” of its “consequences” (2004:237).

Secularism, according to Hurd, “appears not only in its ostensible opposition to religion but as the enactment of a particular, though certainly distinct, theological discourse in its own right” (Ibid: 236). It strives “in the promotion of human improvement by material means,” while theology studies the spiritual fill of the religious to promote the nature of man (Hashemi 2009:106). Casanova overtly asserts that secularism is one of the “world views and ideologies” and he further claims that it may be “explicitly elaborated into philosophies of history and

normative ideological state projects” (2011:55). I suppose it is in this state project that secularism becomes what Holyoake (quoted in Hashemi) claims as “the study of promoting human welfare by material means; measuring human welfare by the utilitarian rule, and making the service of others a duty of life” (2009:105). Most importantly, I came to believe that secularism sometimes becomes the ideological instrument of the state project to interfere even in our personal choices. I also share Abdelwahab Elmessiri (quoted in Esposito) concern that

Secularism is no longer a mere set of ideas that one can accept or reject at will, it is a world-outlook that is embedded in the simplest and most innocuous cultural commodities, and that forms the unconscious basis and implicit frame of reference for our conduct in public and in private. The state, far from operating exclusively in a few aspects of public life, has actually dominated most, and at times all of them, and has even penetrated to the farthest and deepest concerns of our private lives (2008:4).

These all claims enable us, at least, to investigate the exact paradigm of secularism from the various perspectives of the relation of the secular and the religious. Finally, having all of the above explanations in mind, let me summarize its definition by combining Calhoun et al. and Willaime’s three different approaches as follows: (1) secularism as the equal treatment of its various forms or non-sectarian neutrality of the state (Secular State); (2) secularism as a secular worldview alternative to religious beliefs and replacement of religion by social values common to a secular way of life; and (3) secularism as the absence of religion, control over religion and an ideology opposing religion and denouncing its harmful effects (Calhoun et al. 2011; Willaime 2010). These approaches help us to wit the different models of secularism. So, let us look at the most commonly cited models of secularism that will make our discussion of the challenges for secularism more limpid.

1.2 Models of Secularism

There has been much debate regarding the exact relation between religion and the state. What can be claimed is that it is to be between a rock and a hard place to search the same model of secularism to the world. Consequently, when one moves from one pole of the earth to the other, he/she finds various forms of their relationship although it might become on a bit degree difference. Since this paper’s concern is more of philosophical approaches to the conceptual development of secularism, it is beyond its objective to either prescribe or proscribe a single

model of secularism to a particular country although it can remind the stress of trying to imitate or import a single model, without deep analysis and criticism, possibly leads to political and sociological schizophrenia. So, before discussing the possible philosophical divergences of secular states let me go through the prominent binary model of secularism. Beware that there are many other models in the world that can be discussed separately but it is beyond the scope of this thesis since this paper needs to show the challenges for secularism from different perspectives taking the contextual difference as one parameter.

1.2.1 Binary Model of Secularism: Hard and Soft Secularism

In order to have a good framework for the typology of secularism that can possibly exist or to exist, I think looking to its two prominent models gives us a good clue of its concept of bifurcation. Taking secularism as doctrine of relation between the state and religion let me dichotomize secularism into *Soft* and *Hard* models. (Anglo)America and France are the representatives of soft and hard secularism respectively. I think it is not right to use the phrase *European model* instead of the French model as some do since I believe that the French model cannot, by any means, fully represent the whole Europe, in general and even the Western Europe, in particular.

Both representatives-of soft and hard model- are secular states because they have political structures separated from the religious institutions and their domination, and secularism enjoys hegemony over religion, as well. In addition, “secularism is already spread and ubiquitous among educated people today” in these countries (Ippei 2007:97). We need to be quite clear on this point that the two representatives are not by far extreme to each other since we can go beyond both models and, surely, gets more extreme types. The difference is, however, that the hard secularism of France is characterized, at least ideally, by almost no connection between the state and the religious institutions and sometimes becomes fully antagonistic to religion. The American model, conversely, is identified by its points of overlap in the relation and is rarely found promoting atheism and antagonizing religion. There are claims that the state attitude towards religion is the result of “ideological struggle” in which the soft secularism has more of pragmatic political principles (Kuru 2007).

Tariq Modood calls the French model as “*Radical*” which believes in “absolute separation” and the American model as “*Moderate*” which allows “relative separation.” While the moderate secularism, according to Modood, is more of pragmatic rather than ideological, the radical one is more of ideological (2010:4). Furthermore, the soft one allows public visibility of religion while the hard one strives to confine religion to private domain. Therefore, the soft/moderate secularist, according to Kosmin, is “neither a convinced atheist nor a principled materialist, and may not be hostile to religious beliefs and institutions” (2007:7). The hard/radical secularist, conversely, can be most of the time either a convinced atheist or a principled materialist that aims to eliminate religion from the public sphere. So, they promote “comprehensive doctrine” which bases on rejection of religion rather than simple differentiation (Kuru 2007:571). Meanwhile, the hard/radical secularist aims for “*Subjective Secularism*” which, unlike “*Objective Secularism*,” “entails eradication of religion from culture and mind of the people” (Sadri 2001:268). It can be understood that secularism and religion are mutually exclusive in this argument.

Kuru talks about the *passive* and *assertive* types of secularism, which are almost the other names for the soft and hard models. When he describes the “passive and “assertive” types of secularism,” it clearly seems that he is to mean the soft and hard model respectively. By “passive secularism,” he is to mean “the secular state plays ‘passive’ role in avoiding the establishment of any religions, allows for the public visibility of religion.” Conversely, in “assertive secularism,” according to him, the state “excludes religion from the public sphere and plays an ‘assertive’ role as the agent of a social engineering project that confines religion to the private domain” (2007:571).

The assertive secularists often believe that religion has been irreversibly declining and will also evanesce leaving the space for scientific advances and secular doctrines. They are expressing the radical and combative type of secularism which, using Kuru’s words, “aim to confine religion to the home and to the individual’s conscience” (Ibid: 581). They claim that secularism owns superiority over religion and has *Universalist* pretensions. Secularism in this model stands as the vanguard of the state and the public, which “denounces” the misdeeds and harmful effects of religion. They also claim that it is secularism, not religion, which defines and redefines the moral bases of the public. Secularism, according to them, has a mandate to control and guide the

physical and intellectual nature of man and aims at the development of human nature to the positive, possible and “perceivable higher points” (Hashemi 2009).

France, as a representative of the hard secularism, is known for its banning of both students’ religious symbols and organized prayer in public schools. Meanwhile, it is not easy to get a pledge referring to God recited in its public schools. Nevertheless, all of these three activities are allowed in U.S. policies and are being practiced in its public schools (Kuru 2007). Therefore, the U.S. policy approaches religion more of in its inclusive rather than ideological [exclusive] facet and the radical secularist cannot pose serious challenge to the dominant moderate secularist. Conversely, in France the assertive secularists have dominance and they cannot be easily percolated by the passive secularist unless immigration-driven complex identities and challenges determine its final fate.

Though the American soft secularists, according to Kuru, are battling [in words] against the assertive secularist, they disagree-each other-in the manner in which soft secularism is interpreted. Consequently, there formed two groups of soft secularist. The first group is the *accommodationist* who argue for “close state-religion interactions as compatible with secularism, since that does not mean an establishment of a particular religion,” while the second one is the *separationist* who strives for disentanglement of the state from religion and seek unshakable “wall of separation” in the relation of religion and state (2007:580). As other camps on similar issue, the two camps might be in “culture wars” aiming at the “achievement of greater Common Good and Justice for American people, who all love the country” (Ippei 2007:103).

I think neither the soft secularist in France nor the separationist in America will remain in despondency. And one point is also true that secularism in USA “has been becoming a stronger minority movement than ever before” and is also becoming a tool for the minorities like the atheists (Ibid: 97). So, sometimes it becomes advantageous to understand that people living in the same state can have different attitudes towards the pros and cons, and in the way of implementing the models. Actually, this paper likes to remind the context and the possibility of pragmatic differences of two or more groups in the same state in chapters three and four in which the challenges and rethinking of secularism are to be pointed.

The American people, generally speaking, are more or less close to the philosophical term of pluralism. The religious values, in that country, are found almost “differentiated from the political ones” (Kosmin 2007:5). The people accept that “secular” institutions should not be dominated and controlled by religious institutions. Importantly, the-majority of -people are soft secularist and the state promotes soft secularism in which there is a kind of differentiation rather than rejection form of relation. So, these people wish “*objective Secularism*” which, according to M. Sadri, entails “institutional and functional separation of religion from politics” rather than “cultural and psychological decimation of religion” (2001:268).

It is important, here, to link Calhoun et al. and Willaime’s two of the three approaches of secularism, which I explained elsewhere above, to the two models. The first, which considers secularism as the equal treatment of its various forms or non-sectarian neutrality of the state, more or less characterizes the American model while the second, which approaches secularism as a secular worldview alternative to religious beliefs and replacement of religion by social values common to a secular way of life, more or less defines the French model.

Finally, it is indispensable to ask the question where the point of their divergence starts. The two models are finally begotten from the two revolutions of the 18th century: the American Revolution and the French Revolution. The French Revolution rose against religion, generally and Roman Catholic Church, particularly. The political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, who is highly obsessed with light of reason in discarding of faith, laid foundation for the thinking of the hard secularist while prominent philosophers after him, such as Voltaire and J.J. Rousseau, actively participated in the ideas promoting struggle against despotism and monarchy (Kosmin 2007; Kuru 2007). They strived to promulgate *laïcité* (the republic) which is anticlerical. Therefore, anticlericalism and republicanism, according to Kuru, were “like twins in the dual fight against the clergy and the monarchy” (2007:587). It is from this reality of anticlericalism that the French model came out.

Secularism in France was not the result of a single experience or a track of 100m and instead it took several back and forth vindicating the Secularism ideology one time and the clericalism at another time. It is also expected that sometimes the philosophers would get themselves between the Devil and the deep blue in their struggle against the Church. Kuru expresses this model’s experience as follows:

France experienced several back and forth between disestablishment and reestablishment of the Catholic Church from the 1789 Revolution to the 1905 Law that separated the Church and the state. The Catholic Church, seeking to maintain its hegemonic position, opposed Ecularism until the end of the World War II (Ibid: 587).

The American model, nevertheless, was the outcome of moderate approach to religion which is influenced by the movement of Puritanism, the political theology of John Locke etc. Importantly, the Protestants rather than the Catholics dominated that political arena. Unlike the French, the American movement toward secularism was smooth and not challenged by monarchist Catholic movements. So, they had no the twin principles-anticlericalism and republicanism- to fight against the twin enemies: clergy and monarchy. Accommodating religion wherever necessary instead of totally rejecting it off is their inheritance of “many ‘soft secularist’ thinkers of the Enlightenment, such as John Locke, Adam Smith, and Thomas Jefferson.....” (Kosmin 2007:8). Indeed, this paper tries to explore the political theology of John Locke that influenced the American secularism much in greater depth in chapter 2.

1.2.2 Beyond the Binary: The Turkish Model: Laiklik

Turkey is another prototype for hard secularism. Indeed, both France and Turkey are mentioned together for their hard type of secularism. I argue that it is possible to make them in the same quadrant but it is not attractive to put them on the same point. They were, of course, similarly hard secularist states because both carry out assertive secularism as dominant ideology and they have exclusionary policies regarding the relation of state and religion (Kuru 2007). Meanwhile, both strived to have social and cultural milieu filled with the hard secularists and aimed to “advance a secular ideology of republicanism or *laïcité*” (Daver 1988; Kosmin 2007:9).

Like the France *laïcité*, the Turkish *Laiklik* emerged out of being disgruntled with clericalism and exploitation of religion for political purpose in addition to their dissatisfaction with the trinity nature of church/mosque, state and politics. Furthermore, they tried much to extricate religion from the mind of the people and then to secularize the mass. In doing that in both states, radical secularism has become dominant but the Turkish passive secularists are still challenging *Laiklik* (Daver 1988; Kuru 2007; Orhan 2013). Besides, the assertive secularist in both states have implemented similar policies in their public schools in which students are expected to

strictly abide: both are known for prohibiting a pledge referring to God recited and they both banned students' religious symbols and organized prayer (Daver 1988; Kuru 2007).

The seed of Turkey's *Laiklik* was almost sown by Kemal Atatürk who founded the Republic after abolishing the Islamic Caliphate in 1924 and totally doing away with the hegemony of Islam in the republic (Daver 1988; Orhan 2013). After the aforementioned incident, he, being substantially supported by military generals and high court judges, aggressively antagonized the dominance and influence of religion, generally, and Islam, particularly, for the consecutive years.

Atatürk, who was much obsessed with the *Western* modernization and supremacy, started to take serious measurements against Islam to minimize its role on the one hand, and adopted a number of Western traditions such as the Gregorian calendar and the Latin alphabet on the other hand (Orhan 2013). In addition to that, he strengthened his measure against Islam by his policy of control over religion in contrast to the Western concept of separation of church and state (Daver 1988; Kuru 2007; Orhan 2013). Furthermore, he established and organized a Religious Affairs called *Diyanet* as a state department which implicitly aids the secularization process of his Republic (Daver 1988; Orhan 2013). Quoting Tobrak, Orhan generalizes Atatürk's project of secularization in to symbolic, institutional, functional, and legal. Paradoxically, as Orhan states, Atatürk used Islam as instrument to "the making of a single Turkish nation" (2013:37)

Generally speaking, Atatürk, according to Daver, was "a nationalist, positivist, scientific-minded, anti-traditionalist," and anticlerical secularist (1988:36). In all of his activities against religion, he and his legacy, however, didn't get a fertile ground since the protagonists of passive secularism or the pro-Islamic conservatives, who considered his *Laiklik* as pernicious, assiduously opposed it. In that struggle the assertive secularist became successful in carrying out *Laiklik* after their victory over the other (Kuru 2007). Afterwards, the passive secularists contributed lot to the ambivalent nature of the Turkish secularism although they have been dominated by their opponents.

The Turkish hard secularism is relatively more close to the French *Laicite* than the (Anglo) American soft secularism (Kosmin 2007; Orhan 2013). As I have illustrated above, there are some recognizable points where the French *Laicite* and the Turkish *Laiklik* converge. There are, however, some essential points where the two models diverge. Kuru and other scholars state that

the Turkish *Laiklik* “has been more exclusionary toward religion than has been the French state” and the banning of religious symbols in public schools is relatively difficult in society dominated by superstitions and dogmas (Kuru 2007:591; Orhan 2013). Consequently, as scholars like Daver claimed, we can say that the secularization of the Turkish society is still “the great unfinished mission of Turkish elites” and the vanguard of the Ataturk’s legacy (1988:30). Furthermore, the *Laiklik* itself didn’t get warranty from the society as it is taken in its ambivalent feature. It has been amended in both directions (either abolished or strengthened) for not less than 7 times in less than a century.

The Turkish *Laiklik*, more importantly, has been criticized for its numerous inconsistencies, irregularities, paradoxical situations, and blamed for its violation and contraction to the principle of Western secularism. Orhan, for instance, shows the paradox of this state’s secularism in its political use of religion for national unity. Additionally, he criticizes the state for its paying of salary for Imams (religious leaders) and for its unfair treatment of religious minorities and their ghettoization which “contradicted the logic of secularism that calls for state neutrality with respect to the religious affiliation of its citizens” (2013:39). Similarly, Daver points out these issues and compares it with “Caesarism.” He states that the irregularities of the *Laiklik* in the eyes of the Western scholars are due to these elaborated governmental involvements in religious issues (1988:39). As a matter of this fact, many scholars lost confidence to call the Turkish state “a secular” and similarly, others like Toprak, quoted in Orhan, claim that the state had had “semi-secular” regime since it did not know “genuine secularism” under the legacy of Ataturk (Orhan 2013:30).

It seems that nobody is sure where the Turkish secularism ends because it is at bay between the passive and assertive secularists. To keep from belaboring a point, let me conclude the crux of the *Laiklik* using Calhoun et al and Willaime’s the third of the three approaches to secularism: secularism is the absence of religion, control over religion and an ideology opposing religion and “denouncing” its harmful effects (Calhoun et al 2011; Willaime 2010).

It is also vital to ask the question where the point of divergence between *Laicite* –and (Anglo) American model–and *Laiklik* starts. The kingpin of their difference is philosophical. The *Laicite* and (Anglo) American model has made its root in hot and acrimonious debate on the relation of church and state, and many philosophers contributed to the conceptual development and

realization of secularism. Conversely, *Laiklik*, which is mainly formulated by staunch military generals, high court judges and small elite composed of bureaucrats, didn't know such kinds of philosophical arguments, and civil society engagement. The *Laicite*, nevertheless, being "realized by the evolutionary currents," it took a number of centuries to be disseminated to the majority of the society (Daver 1988:29).

The democratization nature is the other factor which differentiated the two assertive secular states. Kuru states that unlike in Turkey, assertive secularism in France "has coexisted with a multiparty democracy" and has gained significant popular support. The secularization process of the French emerged more of bottom-up rather than top-down which can be characterized as *secularization from below*. Conversely, Turkish assertive secularists, according to Kuru, have hardly "accepted policy compromises" since they have an established authoritarian regime (2007:591). More importantly, the authoritarian regime, which is backed by the Turkish military, being highly enthusiastic to modernity didn't give an opportunity to the passive secularist to criticize substantial policies and also chose to coerce the society to accept secularism grudgingly. This top-down accelerated secularization process to change the religious and cultural milieu of the society has been characterized as *secularization from above* which is state imposed and very rarely contains democratic consensus and negotiations, as well (Hashemi 2009; Orhan 2013).

CHAPTER 2: THE POLITICAL THEOLOGY FOUNDATION OF SECULARISM

2. Political Theology of John Locke and Thomas Hobbes

There are some clues that testify that the concept of political theology almost goes back to two millennia when Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BC) was trying to use it (Ohana 2012). The modern concept of political theology, however, is generally believed to have been coined in the first quarter of the 20th century by Carl Schmitt (Kofmel 2007; Ohana 2012). Unlike political philosophy, which relies on pure reason, political theology, according to Leo Strauss, is “a political theory that relies on revelation as its final justification” (Schnelle 2012:27). Consequently, from the pragmatic point of view, a political theology “will to some extent rely on the holy text” (Ibid: 27). Following Leo Strauss’s notion of political theology and political philosophy, Sadri defines the term political theology as “a form of theology that concerns the religious legitimacy or admissibility of government” (2001:257).

2.1 Political Theology of John Locke

John Locke was considered to be a founder of Enlightenment, a father of modern liberal thinking and a forefather of the American Constitution (Swanson 2011:1; Zuckert 2011). Many individuals think that Locke and other philosophers of his time were relying only on their unaided mind since their names are cited wherever the concept of “Rationalism” is discussed. This is why this paper tries to look the political theology of the preeminent Political Philosopher, John Locke.

John Locke was successful in getting wide acceptance not only in England but also in America and France. His political ideas influenced thinkers who formulated the three revolutions in these countries in 1688, 1776 and 1789 respectively (Swanson 2011:1). Locke was acting not only by casting philosophical concepts to overthrow the tyranny but also he was actively participating in revolutionary politics against Charles II and James II (Constant 1995; Zuckert 2011). Zuckert clearly expressed Locke’s situation of that particular time as “his philosophic and political activity were completely intertwined” (2011:2).

Locke is renowned for his three works: *Two Treatises*, *Letter Concerning Toleration* and *Essay Concerning Toleration*. The *Treatises* were written in order to settle the political dispute, while the *Letter Concerning Toleration* was written to settle religious dispute of that time (Ibid). In all

of his life, Locke had been much influenced by Dutch Arminian theologians, by the theology of Calvin and Puritanism, by the Philosophy of Hobbes, by the political debate of Cromwell and Ireton etc. So, in order to understand the philosophy of Locke's political theology, it is better to have some important notes on his philosophical background.

2.1.1 John Calvin and Puritanism: Theological Influence on John Locke's Political View

It is highly believed that Puritanism shaped John Locke's philosophical and political ideas (Constant 1995; Swanson 2011). This claim weighs much when one tries to consider the Puritan tradition that Locke passed through. Importantly, both of his parents were from Puritan families. We also find the fingerprint of the Puritanism in the constitution of United States as soon as we recall "the significance of biblical texts for the American founding period" (Bartky 2011:39). What was Puritanism in England? Ning Kang describes it as follows:

Originally, Puritanism refers to a movement that arose within the Church of England in the latter part of the 16th century. It sought to purify, or reform the Church and establish a middle course between Roman Catholicism and the ideas of the Protestant reformers. Those who advocated Puritanism were called Puritans. In England of the 16th century, the Puritans were the more extreme Protestants within the Church. They thought that the religious reformation in England had not gone far enough in reforming the doctrines and structure of the Church. They wanted to purify their national church by eliminating every shred of Catholic influence (2009:148).

It is not only that this movement did not get smooth ground to convince the consecutive kings of England but also we find its followers being highly persecuted due to their covenant. Additionally, it is not still uncommon to get bad connotations in English writing against Puritanism and the thought of John Calvin (Roper 2008). John Calvin (1509-1564) was known for his reformative approach regarding the relation of church and state. Although Locke did not get the chance to meet the great Geneva reformer, John Calvin, in person, he was highly affected by his doctrine when he was brought up (Swanson 2011).

The political theology of Calvin lies in the same sphere of requiring Christianity to be the sole source of civil government. Calvin clearly promoted the idea that "the purpose of the magistrate was to uphold God's glory, to preserve the divine truth, and to ensure the continuance of the Kingdom of Christ" (Cole 2009:1). Calvin is dueling to the scripture to convince his political

idea. Importantly, his political theology clearly states that one should obey magistrates but only if God needs that way (Macleod 2009). Although he “acknowledged the need for separation of church and state, he never considered the separation of state and God” (Cole 2009:1).

Calvin advocated the presence of Christian administration. In his idea of the relation of the state and God, there is an obligation on the kingdom of the former to promote true religion since the magistrates are servants of God, who gifted them with their original authority (Cole 2009; Macleod 2009). In this regard, Cole emphasizes in this concept that the separation of church and state that Calvin was advocating is somehow different from the modern secular discourse. Finally, although some claim that Calvin advocated theocracy, he, according to Cole and others, is “a reformer of secular society in part because he championed liberation from the rule of tyrants ...” and he insisted that the two kingdoms must not interfere with each other since both have their own objects (Cole 2009:4; Macleod 2009; Roper 2008).

2.1.2 John Locke and Robert Filmer: Dueling to the Scripture

The explicit political theology of John Locke is observed in the first of the *Two Treatises* which aimed to refute the claim of Sir Robert Filmer who passionately supports the divine source of the Monarchy. Filmer argued in his impressive book *Patriarcha* the divine right-of the kings generally and Charles I’s particularly-to rule over the other is established in the Bible at the very beginning. He argued that since the king's authority is from God, the king is not accountable to the people (Constant 1995). So, Filmer, according to Hashemi, is “the leading intellectual champion of the ‘divine right of kings’” (2009:71).

According to Filmer, God gave absolute power to Adam over mankind and as the first father he has a natural right to be obeyed by his offspring. The argument contains a message that Adam is a king of all posterity and this power is extrapolated to the exercise of power by fathers over their children. The claim asserts that the right of fatherhood over children began in Adam and this right descends everywhere establishing paternal government. As a result, the power of Adam over his descendants is analogous to the power of kings over their people as it is analogous to the power of a father over his children because the kings, being descendants, inherited their absolute power from Adam (Constant 1995; Zuckert 2011).

In this concept, it is believed that the absolute power which is possessed by Adam and the patriarch absolutely extends to the extent of power of life and death. Similarly, Both Adam and Kings as well as all Princes are superior to the laws. Filmer provides evidence for his main argument from *Genesis*, Bible. He duels to the scripture- or revelation- in order to underline that no man is born free, in order to settle the divine political right of the kings and confirm their inherent great champion of absolute power. Unfortunately, because of death, Filmer didn't see when his book was published. Following that, his argument was widely distributed in England and affected the mentality of many. Practically, the royalist was successful in using his collection of writings to vindicate that men are not naturally free and to safeguard their own "divine right of kings." The theory of the divine right is their business and headache. Taking Filmer's works as the golden opportunities, they did not hesitate to publish his works under the title, *The Free-holders Grand Inquest*, which would make them profitable (Ibid).

Being an ingenious political philosopher and active political actor, Locke got it necessary to detect and refute what he thought as misinterpretation of the holy text by his counterpart, Robert Filmer. Consequently, Locke wrote the *Two Treatises of Government* to extremely challenge the arguments in Filmer's works (Constant 1995). He wrote the *First Treatise: the False Principles and Foundation of Sir Robert Filmer* to refute Sir Robert's Biblical interpretations in *Patriarcha*. He explicitly stated his concern as "my business at present is only to consider what sir Robert Filmer, who is allowed to have carried this argument farthest, and is supposed to have brought it to perfection..." (2003:8). He clearly stated the aim of the *First Treatise* as "the false principles and foundations of Sr. Robert Filmer, and his followers, are detected and overthrown (1980:3).

The *Second Treatise: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government* concerns directly with claims in the *Free-holder* (Constant 1995; Zuckert 2011). Actually, the *Second Treatise* is not as critical as that of the *First Treatise* rather it is more of constructive which largely deals with the nature of civil government (Zuckert 2011). Locke himself stated the aim of the *Second Treatise* as it is "an essay concerning the true original, extent and end of civil-government" (1980:3). According to Locke, he wouldn't give, in the way he did, much attention to his counterpart's works if the doctrines in these works were not made the divinity of the time by the pulpit of late years:

I should not speak so plainly of a Gentleman, long since past answering, had not the Pulpit, of late years, publicly owned his Doctrine, and made it the Current Divinity of the Times. 'T is necessary those Men, who taking on them to be teachers, have so dangerously misled others, should be openly shewed of what Authority this their Patriarch is, whom they have so blindly followed, that so they may either retract what upon so ill Grounds they have vented, and cannot be maintained, or else justify those principles which they Preached up for Gospel..... (2003:4).

Locke was surprised by the way Filmer, in his *Patriarcha*, subtracted the nature of men as thralldom: “and truly I should have taken Sir Robert Filmer’s *Patriarcha*, as any other treatise, which would persuade all men that they are slaves.....” For him, Filmer’s book aimed to “blind the people” then mislead them from the reality of their nature and the truth of the *Bible* by raising a dust (2003:7).

In his essays it is not difficult to comprehend the religious inclination of John Locke.

First, it is false, that God made that grant to Adam, as soon as he was created, since, though it stands in the text immediately after his creation, yet it is plain it could not be spoken to Adam till after Eve was made and brought to him; and how then could he be monarch by appointment as soon as created, especially since he calls, if I mistake not, that which God says to Eve, Gen. iii. 16... (Ibid: 16).

At the very beginning, Locke “reflected his deeper beliefs about religion” and he cannily duel to the Scripture, including the Decalogue, against his counterpart (Constant 1995). He did not have a problem with biblical messages but its interpretation by Filmer: “For I find no difficulty to suppose the freedom of mankind, though I have always believed the creation of Adam. He was created, or began to exist, by God’s immediate power....” (2003:15). So, he inclined to the revelation to argue against “the divine right of kings.” He was extremely effective in quoting the *Bible* to show that God didn’t grant paternal right to Adam. Regarding Adam’s Royal Authority, Locke endeavors to overthrow the Biblical foundation of Filmer as evidence not from scripture but from interest:

If he has in that chapter, or anywhere in the whole treatise, given any other proofs of Adam’s royal authority, other than by often repeating it, which, among some men, goes for argument, I desire anybody for him to show me the place and page,that it is not the force of reason and argument that makes them for absolute monarchy, but some other by interest..... (Ibid: 14).

Through his *First Treatise*, Locke succeeded in overthrowing Scriptural foundations for the divine right of kings. Constant argues that the “*First Treatise* reads more like a theological work than a political discourse” (1995). A “theological tone”, according to Constant, determined the *First Treatise* (Ibid: 7). Both Filmer and Locke relied on the Bible to argue for Biblical and non-Biblical foundation of divine right of kings respectively. To deconstruct the political theology of Filmer, basing on this theological approach was important to Locke since, similarly, the former based his argument predominantly on the Scripture-proofs.

During the time of Locke, relying on the Scripture-for one’s political thinking-was by no means unique since it was political theology that predominated the political philosophy of Europe generally [and England particularly]. This point is important to remind the “West”, Nadeer Hashemi argues, that John Locke’s political theology did not emerge in rejection of religion/Christianity:

All of his arguments—whether about freedom of conscience and belief, the moral basis of legitimate political authority, family, consent, property, and equality—can be understood as emerging from a political theology that was rooted not in a rejection of Christianity but rather in a reinterpretation of it. An inherent part of his political methodology, therefore, was a recasting of religious norms as an antecedent to advancing a new theory of government. The relationship between religion and political development might seem bizarre to undergraduate students studying political philosophy today; however, historians of Western political thought can certainly appreciate its significance (2009:68).

It is also important not to forget Locke’s acknowledgement regarding the potential advantage of Scriptural Revelation to guide men’s reasoning. Swanson strives to expose the theological foundation of Locke’s theoretical centrality by reminding his claim that “reason was the gift of God and that it was always subordinate to the Revelation revealed in the Scriptures” (2011:2). Locke, however, did not want to be at the betwixt and between regarding atheism, as some claim, and religious mentality. He, according to Constant, is accepted as sincere Christian although his *Two Treatises* are “often characterized as the first secular expression of political theory in the modern era” (1995:7). Actually, he was between a rock and a hard place in refuting the divine rights of Kings and some looked his argument as heresy or attack on the Scripture. He has been also considered as “a secular thinker” although many accept him as “a Christian thinker” and it is

necessary to remember that political activity was considered as the duty to God during that time (Constant 1995; Zuckert 2011). Regarding Locke's approach to the Scripture, we can call it "rational theology" (Zuckert 2011:6).

2.2 Political Theology of Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes, who is a figure of 17th century [political] philosophy, is well known in his intellectual developments of *The Elements of Law Natural and Politic* (1640), *De Cive* (1642) and *Leviathan* (1651). Religiously, he has earned a reputation in different facet by different commentators: starting from those saying he is a "Christian thinker" to those who claim that he is an "atheist." Pangle, for instance, describes him as a rationalist who, even, argues that "reason alone....is the sole, pure, sufficient judge of the meaning of Scripture" (1992:34). Likewise, Curley calls him as "the heroes of the radical enlightenment" (2007:3). Radically, Jesseph tries to ostracize him from the religious domain by concluding that "Hobbes was an atheist" who was reluctant to "acknowledge the existence of the God of traditional Judeo-Christian monotheism" (2002:140). Grcic interprets some of Hobbes' works as secular which make him out of the "Christian thinkers" sphere (2002). Similarly, Dumouchel tries to expose these secular thinking from Hobbes's own claim of the rationally acquired natural belief in God as secular (1995).

It seems to me that it is difficult to totally excommunicate him from-Christianity since there are various clues in his writings that enable him to be called a Christian. Both his self-inclusive approach in his writings as "we who are Christians" and his dueling to the scripture are clues that show his sentiments to Christianity. Additionally, he tries to demarcate Christianity from other religions/pagans by premising its specific teachings. For such kinds of extreme commentaries on Hobbes, Grcic, nevertheless, reason out by conferring to Hobbes's vague beliefs "and generally considered idiosyncratic and outside mainstream theological orthodoxy at the time" (2002:376). Similarly, Nauta lists some of the claims against Hobbes are to be due to "polemical and sometimes highly abusive tone of *Leviathan*." Pope (quoted in Nauta) pinpoints as "...in his *Leviathan* he spreads his butter so thin, that the coarseness of his bread is plainly perceived under it" (2002:594). There are some who claim that the political thought of Hobbes dynamically changes in *Leviathan* which contains substantive shifts in his religious outlook and interpretation than the previous works. Relatedly, Pangle states that Hobbes incites controversy in his extraordinary provocative and obnoxious biblical commentary in *Leviathan* (contrary to other

previous works) which has the tendency of bewildering the reader (Pangle 1992). Nauta, nevertheless, [argued against this view and] underlines the more continuity in Hobbes's political thought in his famous writings than the claimed less important drastic change since the main goal of the philosopher was the issue of subjugating the ecclesiastical power to the civil sovereign (2002).

It is not difficult to understand the concern of Hobbes in *Leviathan* which clarifies the superstitious (like Horoscopy, Necromancy, Palmistry, Metoposcopy etc.) practices of the people and the scandalous, supercilious and covetousness of the authors of the religions. So, he is obsessed with disenchanting of the world and then rationalization of the belief which keeps away the people from becoming a target for false prophets, charlatans and magicians. That is why, according to Dumouchel, Hobbes wrote *Leviathan* to bring a perfect separation of religion and politics that makes the rationalization process possible (1995). It is in this disenchantment strife that Hobbes apparently involved in destroying the pillars on which the Church was founded (Nauta 2002). Hobbes's clash with the basic doctrines of the Church arises in his argument that not only superstition but also religion arise from the "fear of invisible powers." So, the fear of those invisible powers must be replaced by the fear of a *visible* power (Negretto 2001).

In Hobbes' writings, clergymen are figured as the member or activists of the "confederacy of deceivers" who are themselves involved in practicing perfidy activities that mislead the people. The pope of the Church, for instance, might claim as the responsible Christ's vicegerent on earth and consequently grants for himself the right of, almost, everything over the Christians on the one hand and over the king on the other hand. Consequently, Hobbes, according to Curley, views the clergy as not less than malignant threat to both the Christian society and the king. So, Hobbes's aim was to see the clergymen being far away from controlling the power which becomes a tool for their access to wealth and honor (Curley 2007). Subsequently, Hobbes's stress is not "episcopacy" itself but getting rid of the bad manifestation of the then clericalism such as supercilious and covetousness.

Hobbes, in his *Leviathan*, promoted the concept of anticlericalism and stood against those actions which are implemented to the advantages of the pope and of his spiritual subjects. Those actions, according to Hobbes, include a king is not legal unless a bishop crowns him, he can't marry if he is a priest and a pope can depose him for no reason etc. (Hobbes 1999). Nauta,

moreover, adds to this point that Hobbes, in his *The Elements*, also described the intent of God as not to strengthen the political power of the clergymen but to allow a sovereign authority who is the lieutenant of God on earth. So, in both *The Elements* and the *Leviathan* Hobbes is consistent in his teaching that the clerics have roles only the civil sovereign has granted it to them (Nauta 2002).

2.2.1 Why Political Theology in Hobbes's Political Philosophy?

In order to describe the authority of the political right, Hobbes's writings in general and *Leviathan* in particular are in conformity with political theology. Accordingly, John Milbank argues that the political philosophy of Hobbes is encompassed with a form of "theological reflection" (Dumouchel 1995: 40).

It is in the nature of the clergymen, their relationship with the king and their extent of proximity to power that Hobbes seems to be instigated to duel to the scripture. Hobbes, by himself, underlines that his political philosophy is consistent with revealed religion and he refers to the scripture in order to disprove the supremacy of the religion over the civil sovereign which is the political problem of religion. He [clearly refers and] interprets the scripture (such as Exodus 32:1-2, Judges 2:11, 1 Samuel 8:3 etc.) to support his own philosophical argument concerning the sovereignty. Actually, and amazingly, Hobbes's argument, as Dumouchel clarifies, shows that the [purely religious] fall of Adam is the cause of political philosophy (1995). It, according to Hobbes, is in this origin of political philosophy, the erection of the *Mortal God, Leviathan*, became possible:

I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a Commonwealth; in Latin, Civitas. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad (1999:6/XVII).

Pargle gives emphasis for the political theology of Hobbes's intellectual development by comparing his three writings and then deduces that Hobbes, finally on the shore of *Leviathan*,

exposed his [theological and philosophical] argument in a more rhetorical strategy by conferring to the biblical exegesis (1992). Farneti is one-upmanship in claiming that salvation is the important concept in Hobbes's "political theology in which salvation functions as the connecting link between politics and theology" (2007:292).

According to Negretto, "Hobbes used religious images and theological concepts to solve the problem of how to create political power and enable the sovereign to impose his authority...." (2001:183). Hobbes understood the nonreligious political power in the way that it becomes possible only through religion, which was the inescapable part and "a form of social organization, the bond which unites people together, the frame of reference...." and he came to give concern for instrumentalizing of religion for legitimizing of political institutions (Dumouchel 1995:55). Importantly, Hobbes used both the scriptures and religion as a strategy of creating a stable political authority (Negretto 2001). In this strategy of creating stable political authority, Hobbes insisted in his belief that "theology is central to political philosophy" (Pangle 1992:25). In this centralization of theology to political philosophy, Hobbes's concern seems simply at the "transformation of politics into a secularized theology" rather than aiming at the rationalization of religion (Negretto 2001:190). Subsequently, Hobbes's aim can be rigorously explained that the contribution of religion is not only in its tendency to be instrumentalized, positively, but also in its nature to be abused, negatively, if it is not properly controlled by the civil sovereign. So, analyzing the claim that supreme authority in this world is "a secular state," it can be pinpointed that the main purpose of Hobbes's "central naturalistic arguments" of political theology is not in the direction of making theology indispensable for the life of the society rather these arguments play a secondary role (Ibid). In Hobbes's "central naturalistic arguments," he is supposed to show the preexistence of two powers: the political and the ecclesiastical by which both converge to create a well ordered Commonwealth.

Dumouchel describes that in the prescription of Hobbes for the formation of a [purely] rational politics it is understood that secularization is regarded as the possible outcome of Christianity. In this secularization process, the subject should persistently endure to the law of the civil sovereign to the extent that the law of men and the revealed law of God contradict each other (1995). It is explained in *The Elements* (quoted in Nauta) that it is not only the subject, however, who should endure to the sovereign but also the Church itself since "in no case can the sovereign power of a

commonwealth be subject to any authority ecclesiastical, besides that of Christ himself....” By any means, Hobbes does not want to see the absolute power of the civil sovereign being compromised by the Church which claims to represent the Kingdom of God on earth formed. He characterizes such claim as the “greatest and main abuse of Scripture...” (2002:587).

The metaphysical doctrine of “mortalism,” as Johnston points out, is part of a political strategy that enables Hobbes to proclaim the absolute authority of the sovereign by getting rid of the common but dangerous conflict between the civil and ecclesiastical power (Negretto 2001). And one of the crux of the *Leviathan*, which I claim it to be more of political philosophy than metaphysical, is to defend the supremacy of the civil sovereign over the ecclesiastical by attacking what he considered as the most stumbling block (i.e. source of conflict) that limit the dominancy of the former. So, Hobbes is a sole promoter of *Erastianism* which is the doctrine of the entire subordination of the Church to the State in political and religious matters. By this *Erastianism*, the sovereign, as the dominant leader of the Church, has sole authority to carry out and prioritize those practices which initially seem only religious (Hobbes 1999).

In these supremizing processes of the sovereign, Hobbes is criticized not only for denuding the power of the Church but also for presenting a highly unorthodox interpretation and implementation of the scripture (Nauta 2002). Grcic describes Hobbes’ political model as which does not allow the separation of Church and state by instrumentalizing the Church for the all-powerful arms of the state as well as by granting the sovereign “unlimited power to determine the content and expression of religious beliefs” as well (2002:377).

2.3 Hobbes and Locke *vis-a-vis* Political Theology

Although Hobbes’s claim of patrimonial kingdom in the *De Cive* and *The Elements* is analogous to Filmerian patriarchalism (which is discussed above), his concern (in the *Leviathan*) regarding the supremacy of the sovereign is “different from patriarchalism which leaves no room for consent in legitimizing political authority.....we know that Hobbes rebuked the idea that *God* had something to do with generation and patrimonial authority for the first time in *Leviathan*” (Dumoulin: 23). Grcic adds to this point that Hobbes rejected the theory of the divine right of kings which Filmer was debating for (2002).

Like John Locke, Thomas Hobbes carried out the strategy of political theology for his political philosophy. Both are renowned for their rational approach and their indispensable contribution for the *Enlightenment*. Similarly, both received opprobrium which makes them atheist, on the one hand, and secularist, on the other hand, although the reprimand on Hobbes is so strong. One thing, however, makes them intrinsically different in their approach to the interpretation of the scripture. Hobbes, unlike Locke, duels over the scripture in order to affirm the lieutenancy of the king on earth's affair which subordinates the Church to the state. Locke, conversely, duels to the scripture in order to refute the divine rights of the king and in order to advocate the separation of the Church and state regardless of any subordination of the Church to the state. As a result, Curley identifies Locke as a "saint of liberalism" which is certainly not a similar characteristic of Hobbes (2007).

I suppose that the political theology of Hobbes is not as pure as that of Locke since the former's cyclorama seems to champion his political philosophy of that time regardless of his degree of respect/disrespect and pretence to the scripture. The latter, nevertheless, seems very humble in his assiduous approach to the scripture. Actually, Locke might have gotten enough time, which is more than a quarter of a century, to internalize how really the Filmerian group, theological society and the Christian mass react to the Hobbesian argument. Finally, their main difference can be understood as Locke was arguing being in the circle of political theology while Hobbes, who strangely raised the fundamental question on the "canonicity" and the "authenticity" of scripture, was arguing being out of the circle of political theology even though both were practicing political theology. So, Hobbes, who met social upheaval in the self-centered interpretation of the scripture for political implementation, was using political theology as instrument to load his political thinking while Locke was seeking permanent solution through his political theology. Locke's political theology provides the foundation for the Anglo-American secularism model while that of Hobbes's-and his following Marxian view on religion-argument promote the hard type of secularism (might not be the French model exactly, although).

CHAPTER 3: CHALLENGES FOR SECULARISM

For a long period of time it has been accepted that secularism will triumph over religion and it will control every aspect of political, cultural, educational, literature, art, science etc milieu (Calhoun et al. 2011; Casanova 2011; Kosmin 2007; Lechner 2003). A number of philosophers and other social scientists became advocates and promoters of secularization and involved in the claim that religion will decline sooner or later. The then and present negative realities of religion gave them good ground to challenge the essential or possible presence and any significance benefit of religion. The negative realities of religion that are challenged by secularists and necessitated the reproaching of superstitious tradition are the rampant religious fundamentalism that seldom tolerate other ideologies and (the religious monotheism that) give little chances for other views, and the despotic tendency, perfidy and covetousness of the religious leaders (that ignited Locke and Hobbes, which was widely discussed in the previous chapter). The theocracy alternatives of religiously affiliated parties/rulers/institutions hardly consider not only religious pluralism and multiculturalism but also some do not entertain differences of idea within themselves.

Different thinkers of the world and regimes, from all horizons, obsessed and contemplated the secularism claim to adopt it to their specific societies. Finally, however, they got it difficult to baptize their own societies since the implementation process was carried out in top-down fashion without considering the possible cultural and ideological perspectives that might challenge their dream. They have oversimplified the implicit impact of religion in everyday world activities and remained in their position without the empirical facts regarding the presence of private/public religion. Secularism was taken for granted as the only philosophical alternative to shape the world affairs and religious inheritance was to be abated once and for all. The “*prophets of secularization*” came with *secularization thesis* that declares the decline of religion (Stark 1999).

So, in this Chapter, the paper discusses the philosophical challenges for secularism and it will come with its philosophical extension by Jurgen Habermas in the next chapter. Those challenges include: considering religion as an artifact of the past that has no business with the present and future, paralleling privatization of religion with extinction of religion, return of religion and devoid of empirical facts, conceptual and ideological crisis, crisis of context, crisis of inclining to modernization theory and crisis of morality. In order to have a good understanding of these

challenges and crises, this paper tries to explain the *secularization thesis* concept. Since the concept of *secularization thesis* is incomplete without the modernization theory, let us first shortly discuss about the latter.

Modernization Theory

Modernization theory is a theory or a collection of theories that suggests that there are coherent and consistent parallel changes in cultural developments following economic and political changes. In the modernization process, it is believed that, the rise of rationalism diminishes the religious exercises and undermines active superstitious engagements. It was conceived that “conceptions of the supernatural” gets little room in science, art and literature, and no religious attachment is believed to standardize society’s knowledge [and morality], and secular institutions dwarfed the influence of religion on “modern media, education, or business” as well (Lechner 2003:2). This meta-narrative underlines that modernity rests on “four pillars: democratization, individualization, functional differentiation and secularization”. So, the theory of modernization was taken for granted as a theory of all these pillars and if any of them went missing, it was considered that there would be no longer modernity (Stoeckl 2011).

All these processes become possible in this modernization process since, according to Max Weber, religious cultures become less and less crucial as the religious ideas become more and more useless. Max Weber calls this process *rationalization* where modernity advanced and “less space is reserved for God” which finally results in “*disenchantment*” in which scientific standard of knowledge dominates and matters of faith are simply regarded as irrelevant (NA:4-5).

This thesis being strongly predated by Max Weber, got an attention of a number of social scientists like the recent Norris and Inglehart who admitted “the process of human development has significant consequences for religiosity” by which industrial and postindustrial societies undermine the “importance of religious values.” In their prediction of religious decline, they have emphasized that serious challenges to religious participation will occur in wealthy and secure nation since the ideal “importance of religion has faded most” and is being replaced by the real industrial/materialistic (science and technology) advancements:

.....*Workers did not passively wait for the sun to rise and the seasons to change. When it got dark, people turned on the lights; when it got cold, people turned up the heating. Factory*

workers did not pray for good crops – manufacturing production depended on machines created by human ingenuity. With the discovery of germs and antibiotics, even diseases ceased to be seen as a divine visitation; it became a problem within human control (2004:18-19).

Indeed, the secularist claim that in the modern world, a modernized individual/society that is supplied with daily material requirements (such as lights, heating, fertilizers, machines, antibiotics etc.) is expected to be less obsessed with the necessity of supernatural being and “pointless prayer”. In some literatures, demanding religious rewards has been considered like “expecting people who continue to buy soccer tickets and gather in the stands to watch players who, for lack of a ball, just stand around” (NA:9). Nevertheless, the daily material supplies, which are listed above, in the modern world are facing difficulties that cannot be solved easily and early, as well.

The modernization theory is also explained in other words by *functional theorists* (the prominent being Steve Bruce, Thomas Luckman, Karel Dobbelaere etc.) that religious institutions more and more lose their centripetal forces in community as there is more and more rationalization and functional differentiation emerges in industrialized societies. Functionalists do not simply involve in decrying the role of religion in collective belief (such as the solidarity and cohesion) of a community (as Durkheim suggested) rather they affirm its character as both system of belief and system of action (such as “rituals and symbolic ceremonies”) (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Subsequently, their major effort would be in explaining how religion loses such of its role and evolutionarily extinct as modernization results in rationalization; rationalization results in functionalization; functionalization finally results in privatization which figures the characterized single pathway in the modern secular democratic state.

Secularization Thesis

A proposition which claimed the inevitable decline of superstitious/sacred practices and the future less significant and /or useless social and political role of religion in the modern society came to be known as *secularization thesis* (Dusche 2013; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Stark 1999). Religion was expected to be less significant since it was believed that it promotes notions of tradition such as “fatalism, superstition, and otherworldliness.” These traditional notions are regarded as the stumbling block for creativity and linear progress (Hashemi 2009). The dialectic of this thesis then circles on the idea that people generally become less religious on the one hand,

and functional differentiation of society, which can be explained using Casanova's words as "the transformation of the Church from a state-orientated to a society-orientated institution," occurs on the other hand (Abazović 2008; Casanova1994:220; Dusche 2013).

It was, according to Alexander Murray, the "scientific enlightenment" that resulted in considering of faith as "original sin" by which "the Messiah of knowledge" came to rescue it from the clericalism centered bogus bids (NA:11). This age of scientific enlightenment is believed to result in "a rational view of the world" based on empirical facts, scientific knowledge, and technological advancement (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Getting a number of postulates from philosophers and anthropologists, generations after the age of the scientific enlightenment, who were active proponents of the thesis, were waiting for the last date when religion withers and both the societal importance of religion and the personal piety becomes history (Ibid).

Some of the foremost advocates of this thesis, whom Stark calls "*prophets of secularization*" (such as Thomas Woolston, Voltair, Auguste Comte, Anthony Wallace and Max Weber), confidently tried to set their own "dates by which time modernity would have triumphed over faith" and the ephemerality of religion occurs. Auguste Comte, for instance, states that "...human society was outgrowing the "theological stage" of social evolution and a new age was dawning in which the science of sociology would replace religion as the basis for moral judgment" (Stark 1999:250). Similarly, Peter Berger argued that by "the 21st century, religious believers are likely to be found only in small sects, huddled together to resist a worldwide secular culture," although he finally came to review his thesis and ended with a shift in his paradigm and recanted, at least, and repented, at most (1968:3).

The secularization thesis is regarded as the essential condition of modernization theory (Hashemi 2009). Hence, as this theory was taken as the essential byproducts of modernization theory, it was highly believed that modernization facilitates the way for secularization of the individuals (and societies as a whole) by acting, according to Stark, as the "causal engine dragging the gods into retirement" (Dusche 2013; Stark 1999:251). In this modernization process, since secularization is considered as "an absorbing state - that once achieved it is irreversible," the rationalization of the societies realizes the self sustaining potential of the (secular) framework (Lechner 2003; Stark 1999:253). The rationalization of the society realizes secularization by

broadly defining that secular enterprise while pluralizing religious culture (Lechner 2003). According to the premise of most theories of secularization, this taken “absorbing state” nature of secularization ends the community in viable by the “long run processes of modern societal rationalization” (Casanova 2006:18). Finally this thesis was taken for granted as “the master model of sociological inquiry” by which every societal need can be satisfied by modernization and/or rationalization during and after the inevitable death of religion (Norris and Inglehart 2004:3).

Challenges for Secularism: Is Secularization Thesis Possible?

Philosophers and Sociologists have already started to review and criticize the secularization thesis and its sustained theories linked with modernization, rationalization or industrialization. The rise of religious participation and the escalated/consistent influence of religious institutions, on the one hand, and the failure of modernization to bring the dreamed unidirectional sphere of secularized and modern world, on the other hand, made contemporary philosophers to appeal on the possibility of such thesis. There are various claims raised regarding the possibility of this theory on its assumed track and some claim its serious crisis. In this regard, only those, according to Bhargava, with narrow vision might deny its crisis (2011:93). Subsequently, this paper tries to present some of those claims against the thesis which put the proponents in anxiety, at most, or enforces them to rejuvenate their theories, at least. For instance, one of the prominent advocates and prophets of secularization, Peter L. Berger, who was the first to admit his fault, rescinded his earlier claims as “the world today, with some exceptions...is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled ‘secularization theory’ is essentially mistaken” (1999:2).

3.1 Conceptual Crisis: It Is Ideology Not Theory

A serious reprimanding of the secularization theories comes from those who claim that this theory is nothing more than “a doctrine,” “a dogma” (Norris and Inglehart 2004), “inadequate category,” “a hodgepodge idea” (Manzoor 1995), “a failed theory” and a product of “wishful thinking” (Stark 1999). The leading philosophers critique always remains to the vicissitude definition of secularization which makes the concept abstract and a means of escape for its

proponents (Stark 1999). This variability in the definition and concept made secularization a “complex phenomenon” more or less like religion (Abazović 2008). Some Philosophers of secularization are accused for *sacralizing* or *hypersecularizing* of the secularization concept itself.

Manzoor, for instance, argues that there is no any loyalty between secularization thesis and scientific method since it is ideological commitment than scientific evidences that resulted in the modern advocacy of the thesis (Manzoor 1995). Similarly, Jeffrey Hadden (quoted in Norris and Inglehart) states that since secularization “is not happening as predicted” and there is recrudescence of superstitious movements instead, the thesis is “a taken-for-granted ideology rather than a systematic set of interrelated propositions” (2004:11). The loose set of interrelated propositions also provides good ground for the recent opponents of the theory that take the theory as inadequate philosophical category and only a tool for “counterreligious ideologies” and this is observed in its lack of “objective description of the modern society” (Manzoor 1995: 546; Stark 1999).

Some recent critique concentrate that in addition to the antireligious passion of the theorist, secularization fails to objectively describe the modern society in that the assumption that religion will complete its life span recently was a product of the social –and cultural–condition of that age and both the presence of religion in the hearts of the secularized [European] society and the mere existence of religion entangled in politics make the theory a “hodgepodge of idea” (Manzoor 1995:547; Norris and Inglehart 2004). Stark concludes that secularization doctrine is nothing more than the grave yard of failed theories: “after nearly three centuries of utterly failed prophecies and misrepresentations of both present and past, it seems time to carry the secularization doctrine to the graveyard of failed theories and there to whisper ‘requiescat in pace’” (1999:270).

Some others claim that the self-definition of secular is incomplete since it is still failed to recognize the reality of other societies and the thesis is “inconsistent with plain facts from the very start” (Görmez 2012: Stark 1999). Lastly, it is better to conclude accepting Stark’s claim that secularization theory “was the product of wishful thinking” (1999:269).

3.2 Religion as an Artifact of the Past

The [academic and political]-Western-world was dominated by secular perspectives propagating the claim that we live in an increasingly secularizing world but which fail to consider the other alternative forms of spirituality, the still alive religion (Christian) heritage in Western countries, and the social and political implications of the religion. The thesis undeniably considers religion as an “artifact of the past” and “neglects the everyday realities of religion” maintaining that religion will evanescent and “complete its lifespan....become reduced to a mere historical myth” (Görmez 2012:4). Norris and Inglehart, however, remind us an amazing reviving role of religion in wide range of health care activities (such as yoga, aroma therapies, meditation etc.) for psychic and other personal growth purpose (2004:21). Importantly, Görmez focused on the daily realities of religion in aiding people for both materialistic and spiritual life in different parts of the world. Religion, amazingly, “still remains the only source of hope for humanity despite many such attacks against it” (2012:8).

It seems that we are in the age of facing some roles of religion in different corners of the world. Importantly, we cannot totally become sure that the modern and secularized Europe will permanently remain nonreligious and stay without its religious heritage. Here, Pope Benedict came with other new claim that the British people are a good example for showing us that the [Christian] Europe still has religious feelings in the religious heritage (Egan 2014). So, we might become in the age where religion is the artifact of both the past and the future or the reality of both the past and the future.

3.3 Is Privatization Extinction?

The Prophets of Secularization were successful for a time being in their claim that religion is declining in the irreversible form although they were the sole developers of the measuring standard for such scenarios and they then concluded that dwindling of Church attendance is the egregious figure of modernity that resulted in fall of religion (Egan 2014). Amazingly, Stark points that there is in-the-home religion in Iceland today, although only two percent of its people is attending Church weekly which misguided the secularists-and others- to consider Iceland as an extremely secularized country (1999:264). So, here, it is appropriate to ask “is privatization of

religion extinction of religion for granted?” by which empty [European] churches cannot become “*self-evident*” for extinction of religion from private spheres.

Casanova clarifies this point that Europeans are still the implicit member of their churches even though they have been explicitly jettisoning them. It is conspicuous that they use their religion/Church to celebrate birth, wedding and death related phenomena but there is “absence of a truly competitive religious market in Europe” (2006:16). This implicit membership to the Church has been described by Grace Davie as “believing without belonging” in which she herself confirmed that in Europe although low level of Church participation and attendance, there is high levels of belief in God (1994). So, we can have a clue that this subjective religiousness of the Europeans does not become “*self-evident*” for the arrival of age of secularization. Actually, after some decades of unexpected-full-presence of religion, some of the advocates of the thesis started to redefine the secularization to the privatization of religion without the necessity of extinction. Manzoor and Stark took this of the secularists’ final analytical destination as a loophole though there is still some lacuna in the thesis regarding this claim (Manzoor 1995; Stark 1999).

Stark came with other arguments to challenge the claim regarding the decline of religion as evidence for secularization. He argues that even an age of decline of religion is not necessarily to mean the age of secularization since there were periods (centuries) in history where there is poor faith but no secularization (1999). In this respect, Lechner asks a fundamental question that “did secularization happen?” as the timing of the secularization is “left fuzzy” and even “heterodoxy” was pervasive in salad days of “medieval Catholicism” (2003:3). Accordingly, Stark calls back with some historical evidence and concludes that “there never was an Age of Faith,” there was no real Christian Europe and it is a simple “myth of past piety.” He argues that “de-Christianization of Europe” is not possible in the absence of Christian Europe at the first place. Finally he regards this dream of the secularists as mere “nostalgia”. Church participation, according to Stark, has varied “.....in response to profound social dislocations such as wars and revolutions, but the far more important point is that religious participation was very low in Northern and Western Europe many centuries before the onset of modernization” (1999:254-255).

Finally, let this topic also be challenged in relation to the nature of atheism. Some secularists inappropriately considered atheists as secularist or vice versa. *Prima facie*, atheism (or agnosticism) is “not *per se* anti-religious” (Egan 2014:2). Even reversibly one can argue that a state which is secular is not intrinsically an atheist’s state which excludes religious values. Chaplan emphasizes on the British Humanist Association (BHA) statement that “a secular state is not an atheist state” as well as “a society governed by a secular state is...not a society dominated by secular beliefs and values in contrast to religious beliefs and values” (2008:21). Relatedly, Stark points out that to be “convinced atheists” are not to mean “secularized society.” He also adds to the point that since secularization never has been limited to Christianity, one cannot make hasty generalization by regarding only the fall of religion in Christian states: “...all beliefs in the supernatural are pertinent and even a massive shift from belief in Jesus to the worship of the goddess Kali would not constitute secularization” (1999:264).

3.4 Empirical Facts and Return of Religion

The far important challenge is that the current empirical facts do not prove the claim that the large majority of world population has abandoned religion and turned its face towards secularization perspectives. The increased level of private or public religion, religious fundamentalism, the immigration of religious people to the secularized nations (which increases the number of religious persons in the public sphere), and high level of fertility rate in religious nations are some of the main points that are raised by contemporary philosophers and sociologists to challenge the secularization thesis. The aforementioned subjective religiousness instead remains in its high level and the age of “scientific atheism” is still nostalgia (Stark 1999). So, the absence of data for its authentication makes the secularization theory to be “ludicrous phenomena” (Manzoor 1995). Indeed, some advocates of secularization interpret doctrinal/religious changes as a process of secularization, which cannot be equated with decline of religion since rise, stability and fall of religion has to be distinguished in various perspectives rather than a single doctrinal change (which is from religion to religion).

More profoundly, we may be more attracted by the religious revivalism the world is facing. This revivalism, according to Giannis, is expressed by religious fundamentalism, “*desecularization*” of the secular frame or *post secular age* which is claimed by Jürgen Habermas (which will be discussed in the next chapter). As a matter of fact, the “*desecularization*” of the secular

dimensions is not only manifested by privatization of religion but also the unexpected presence of religion in the public space offered a “fertile ground” for proponents of counter secularization thesis (Giannis 2012).

Instead of the claim that religion is evanescing from the globe, the opposite is happening in which the world is “becoming more religious”. This amazing incident is analyzed by Norris and Inglehart in respect to family size by which the religious people are doubling (or tripling) of their family size than the expected level of replacement, while those of rich (or secular) nations “show fertility rates far below the replacement level”. This expanding difference is due to the serious forbidding of abortion and divorce in religious people, on the one hand, and the encouraging of marriage among these people, on the other hand, while the opposite is occurring in secular nations. This huge gap leads the secular world shrinking while leaving the whole world to be dominated by the sacred (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Hence, we are now looking those who were once up on a time prominent proponents and advocates of secularization thesis recanting their former thesis and proclaiming religious revivalism. Like Peter Berger, Harvey Cox recanted as follows:

...the world of declining religion to which my earlier book was addressed has begun to change in ways that few people anticipated. A new age that some call the ‘post-modern’ has begun to appear. No one is quite sure what the postmodern era will be like, but one thing seems quite clear. Rather than an age of rampant secularisation and religious decline, it appears to be more of an era of religious revival and the return to the sacral. No one talk much today about the long night of religion... (NA: 12).

3.5 Contextual Crisis: It Does Not Consider Non-Westerns and Non-Christians

The other challenge for secularization theory turned out to be the question of the context regarding difference in hemisphere (East-West Category), various political experiences and religious background of the particular nation. Subsequently, the critique on the theory regarding these claims pinpoint on the parochiality of the thesis or the failure to consider the multiple factors in relation to prescribing secularism. The political-religious experiences and cultural milieu of most nations are seldom surveyed since most systematic studies are limited to the affluent “Western” hemisphere societies (Norris and Inglehart 2004). In our global age, however, we are facing the dynamic presence of all “primitive” [or religious] and “modern” [or

secularized] societies. As a result, the philosophers have started to beseech the consideration of the Western [Christian] and the non Western [non Christian] perspectives alike.

Casanova argues that the secularization debate often focuses on Western zone with little attention to the whole global perspectives. Hence, the strife to solve terminological disagreements in the secularization theory has limits of historicizing and contextualizing all dimensions (2006). In addition to historicizing the relation of the particular religion and state, how that religion (society) has been affected by *Reformation*, the societal rationalization efforts and consequences, the European colonization effects, the conflict experiences of those religions etc. have to be characterized properly (Casanova 2006; Lechner 2003). These considerations expose the experiences how secularism was accepted, implemented and practiced. Manzoor reminds us that these experiences guide us how secularism can hardly be transferred to other [non-Western] cultures since they do not, historically, share “the mediaeval experience of ecclesiastical tyranny and obscurantism” (1995:554). Actually, I share Manzoor and Casanova’s concern that how those societies with either different form of ecclesiastical organization (e.g. Islam) or no ecclesiastical organization (e.g Confucianism or Taoism) facilely be applied with the secularization category? (Casanova 2006; Manzoor 1995). Manzoor further describes the [Western] “ecclesiastical tyranny” that created the Western patient whose remedy is appropriate for this particular malaise only as follows:

.....it does not represent humanity’s ultimate longing for vacuous emancipation and enlightenment-both the malaise and the remedy are appropriate only for the Western patient. It would be appropriate to point out that the Western individual’s loss of faith represents the logical fulfillment of the secularistic dogmas of the Western creed (1995:552).

The secularization thesis is also rebuked for giving little room for the recognition of the role and influence of Christian historicity in the secularization process [of Western nations] (Casanova 2006). I think it is appropriate to have a good picture of the secularization dimensions of those Western nations in relation to Christianity. Most discussions of secularization focus on Christendom and hence, there are some who suggest that philosophy of secularization by itself “is a horizontalised version of the Christian world-view” (Egan 2014:2; Stark 1999). In this regard, Davie states that the Christian culture has had “irreversible effect on the shaping of time and space in this part of the world.” She argues that Christian churches remain “huge symbolic

value” and their past legacies penetrated and highly influenced both the “physical and cultural” milieu of the West (2006:24). So, understanding this irreversible influence of the Christian [West] historicity on the current socio-political consequences provides a fertile ground to categorize secularization.

Giannis states that although “the European Union generally remains secular,” there are some Member-States that are “constitutionally church-states” (2012:7). Graeme Smith, interestingly, argues that although European societies are nowadays passively engaged to churches, “they do still believe in Christian ethics” and secularism is “essentially Christian” whom the valuable secular values emerged out of Christian values (Egan 2014:3). This idea is equally shared by Casanova who argues that the European Churches still serve as “public carriers of the national religion,” although there is seldom active participation. This “public carriers of the national religion” shows how the sacred [Christianity] and the secular dimensions are intermingled in complex ways (2006). Hashemi’s concern parallels with this notion that Muslim thinkers, for example, get it very hard to recognize secularism concepts out of “Christian (Western colonial) supremacy” (2009:137). In this respect, there is a claim that “Islamic societies” cannot go hand in hand with secular regimes since there is an argument that “the secular is an old category of Christian culture” (Taylor 2011:32). So, it has to come in our mind that since most of the dimensions that we categorize under the “secular” sphere are “in fact accommodations Christian religion,” many values that we call “secular” are not “really secular” (Stoeckl 2011:5).

Casanova focuses on the unique and exceptional character of “both European secular developments and American religious developments,” although he believes that the characterizations are not by themselves without a problem (2006:17). Religiosity can either thrive or linger in countries with strong walls of separation between church and state (e.g. USA vs. France) and with close church-state relations (e.g. Poland vs. Germany) (Dusche 2013). The concept regarding how the secularization process of USA and that of France is significantly affected their wall of separation between church and state has been widely discussed in the previous chapter. So, it can be concluded that USA “has secularized without becoming fully secular” and the success of “the secular” in this country “came aided by religion rather than at its expense” (Casanova 2006:12; Lechner 2003:5). Similarly, the philosopher Jean-Marc Ferry (quoted in Willaime) compares the secularization context of Germany and France as follows:

The secularization (laïcisation) of French society is not the secularization (sécularisation) of German society. They are two different processes in the political neutralization of religions: the Catholic or post-Catholic process is effected through separation rather, while the Protestant one proceeds more by interiorizing and absorbing elements [that were] initially religious (Willaime 2010:3).

Conceptualizing and categorizing of secularization, according to Casanova, gives sense “within the context of the particular internal and external dynamics of the transformation of Western European Christianity from the Middle Ages to the present.” The secularization thesis makes a mistake when it forgets the “different dynamics of structuration of the relations and tensions between religion and world” (2006:12). The de-contextualization of the internal and external dynamicity of the secular development, implicitly or explicitly, denies the universal dimensions of religion, on the one hand, and instead advocates the “*secular humanism*” as universal alternatives and common view, on the other hand. It is accepted that “*secular humanism*” prospers universally as culturally constructed identities sheds due to the shedding of religion and becomes “a neutral antidote for religious conflict” (Calhoun et al. 2011:9; Cauchi 2009). It can always be claimed, however, that “*secular humanism*” cannot become a universal and common view since the secularization process is intertwined with religion in complex ways borrowing from both “secular inheritance” and “religious inheritance” (Willaime 2010). Manzoor seriously rejects the claim that the secularist solution, “*secular humanism*,” can be a common and universal solution since the “bitter Western experiences” of religious tensions renders for that particular [Western] “sacred and secular tension” (1995). Accepting Ecularism as a universal constant is passing away since it takes various forms in relation to various religions and cultural milieu (Calhoun et al. 2011).

3.6 Crisis of the Secular Morality

Harrington (quoted in Manzoor) explained the attributes of [Judaeo-Christianity] as the legitimization of established power, symbol of common consciousness, the organizing principle of a system of the authoritative allocation of social rules, the guarantor of personal, ethnic and national identity, a philosopher for the non-philosopher etc. Consequently, religious banishment from the public consciousness, according to Harrington, resulted in a crisis of legitimacy, a shift to compulsory hedonism, the appeal of totalitarian movement than religious solidarity, the loss of

philosophic “commonsense” basis of responsibility before the law, the danger of purely technological and instrumental attitude towards nature, the decline in the sense of duty towards “unborn generations,” the loss of one of the most important constituent elements in both group and personal identity, the weakness of the “superego,” and the cult of the self, the relativisation of all values and a resultant crisis of individual consciousness etc. (1995:550). In this respect, Charles Taylor (quoted in Hashemi) calls these modernization effects as “malaise of modernity” (2009:41). The religious morality, however, cannot be claimed as free from any crisis since the instrumental attitude towards nature is also more evident in religious thinking.

The main challenge for secularism regarding “moral value” perspectives is the “privatization of ethics” which causes “psychological and social disintegration.” Accordingly, Pope Benedict “criticizes post-Enlightenment philosophers, who reduce human reason to the empirically or mathematically demonstrable” (Egan 2014:6). Kitcher adds the lack of the substance of community life in the secular world unlike that of the religious world. He argues that genuine community can only be achieved with the acceptance of “transcendent” entities. Even there is a claim that *secularism* can find “no place for value,” it cannot set “purpose or significance in human lives” and it is difficult to have scientific explanations for different causes that can be described by “potential psychological explanations” although I accept Taylor’s claim that secularism lacks a sense of full *purpose* or *value* rather than a total absence of significance (Kitcher 2013:44).

We do not have to forget that religion, until recently, established “moral values” for many people in the West and indeed applicable, still now, for the non-West. We have to understand the serious pitfalls in trends of establishing political secularism in the society whose “moral values” are deeply framed by religious principles and that religion defines those moral standards (Hashemi 2009).

3.7 Crisis of Inclining to Modernization Theory

The other challenge for the secularization theory emerges from its stagnant position held in relation to modernization. The dichotomy formed as the “sacred” and the “secular” are considered as the absolute versions of the “traditional” and the “modern” dichotomy. This absolute version is believed to express the idea that modernization and secularization go hand in

hand. And this doctrine finally came to be known as *Secular cosmopolitanism*. Subsequently, this simple dichotomy led the scholars to engage in contentious and hot debate. Recent scholars started to claim that there is no either “simple cause or effect relationship between modernization and secularization” or a “reciprocal relationship between secularization and religious belief” (NA: 11). This reciprocal relationship between religion and secularization cannot be directly inferred as the effect of modernization (Stark 1999). Casanova tries to disprove this direct relationship between modernization and secularization by stating that there can be secular countries that are deeply religious (Such as USA) and there can be also deeply secular countries that are irreligious (such as China). So, theorizing as there is direct relationship between modernization and secularization is “highly problematic” (2006:13). Claiming for such kind of cause and effect relationship is expressed by Berger as “basically wrong” if not “a crazy theory:” “.....Our underlying argument was that secularization and modernity go hand in hand. With more modernization comes more secularization. It wasn't a crazy theory. There was some evidence for it. But I think it's basically wrong. Most of the world today is certainly not secular. It's very religious” (1997: 974).

Berger denoted this furious religiousness of the world with less of the expected secular influence as “*desecularization*” (1999:2). He stood on the point that modernity very likely results in pluralization of worldviews but it does not necessarily lead to secular choices (Berger 1997). Casanova asks whether there can “be a non-Western, non-secular modernity..?” (2006:10). Stark came with indications that are in line with the possibility of non-Western, non-secular modernities, which challenge the earlier claim [of cause and effect relationship]. He uses the “religious trends in Islam” and the “Asian folks” to show that modernization and religious trends can go hand in hand instead of the aforementioned opposite claim. Based on several studies done, “Muslims commitment” to religious practices increases with modernization (such as educational progress) which shows that “Islamic faith” is compatible with modernization. Similarly, unlike the elderly and uneducated peasants, folk religions in Asian countries flourish among the educated and urban young (Stark 1999).

The main problem, according to Hashemi, lies in the struggle to “reconcile tradition with modernity” and in the strife to bring “*rapid but socially disruptive modernization.*” Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker of Sep. 11, for instance, was not produced out of Islam but in that struggle

of reconciling “tradition with modernity.” Unlike in the West, modernization in the non-West is often linked with “dictatorship, repression and corruption-in short social injustice.” The “crisis of Ecularism” in the non-West countries results not from the incompatibility of their tradition with modernity but from the “failure of modernization program and policies” (Hashemi 2009:133). After all, I came to believe and it can be obvious that modernity and religion might be compatible (Stoeckl 2011).

The critics go on to analyze the correlation of modernization and secularization that “complex historical and cross-country patterns” and factors affect the rise and fall of religion rather than the proposed consistent decline of “spiritual faith” due to modernization (Norris and Inglehart 2004).

CHAPTER 4: THE PHILOSOPHICAL ALTERNATIVE

In this Chapter, this paper discusses the new paradigm which acts as a philosophical alternative to the existing Philosophical thinking regarding secularism. This philosophical alternative is *post-secularism*, which is proposed by Jurgen Habermas. Before discussing the philosophical concept of *post-secularism*, let me state my stands in relation to those aforementioned philosophical challenges in chapter three and the expected subsequent solutions after the new paradigm.

First: the first philosophical solution to the crisis will be to comprehend the reality that we don't have choices other than accepting the social and political implications of religion all over the world and the increasing revivalism of religion in the non-West countries or the still alive Christian heritage in Western countries. Although there are some social scientists who still argue against the return of religion, the empirical facts have shown that religion is not "the artifact of the past" (borrowing Görmez's word). The absence of data for the authentication of the secularization theory, on the one hand, and the increased family size of the religious nations, on the other hand, enforced me to consider the secularization thesis (not secularism) to be ludicrous phenomena, although both Asad and Taylor disagree with the extensive project on counter secularization (Manzoor 1995; Mozmuder 2011; Norris and Inglehart 2004). The empirical data challenge the secularization thesis basing on the increased level of private or public religion, religious fundamentalism, the immigration of religious people to the secularized nations and high level of fertility rate in religious nations.

The various spiritual choices that are knocking the daily life of world society are alarming all the sociological, political and philosophical faculties (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Subsequently, the philosophical solution should underscore the possibility of religion to become the artifact of both the past and the future (present). Those Philosophers who were highly engaged in secularism ended up with either frustration like Peter Berger, who finally recanted and introduced *deseccularization* concept, or reviewed their previous works like Harvey Cox, who, without hesitation, proclaimed the era to be more of religious revival and the return to the sacral.

Second: the Philosophical world has to [re]challenge the tendency of interpreting privatization of religion as extinction of religion. The implicit membership to the Church (there is low level of

church attendance, although) which is described by Grace Davie as “believing without belonging” is a good point to be considered in our analysis of the current and future individual and communal phenomenology (Davie 1994; Stoeckl 2011). My revision of the secularization thesis in this regard considers Stark’s claim that even the age of decline of religion is not necessarily to mean the age of secularization and “there never was an Age of Faith” in the history of Europe in spite of Lechner’s extreme position that asks “did secularization happen?” (Lechner 2003:3; Stark 1999). The *deseccularization* concern of Berger is not only manifested by widespread practice of privatization of religion but also by the unexpected presence of religion in the public space.

Third: the third philosophical solution to the crisis of secularism revolves to provide a meaningful definition of secularism rather than of making it a simple wishful thinking. I accept Asad’s idea that the secularization theory is not totally a failed theory rather it is weak thesis that failed to properly construct its assumptions based on the historical, social, cultural and political arena of the religious development axis. Actually, it became one of the world’s ideology that used to establish the political supremacy of the West but the vicissitude definition of the concept and the tendency of sacralizing or hypersecularizing of the idea made it a “complex phenomena” (Abazović 2008; Stark 1999).

In order to describe the world society objectively, the solution beseeches scientific method to systematically interrelate the propositions than simple ideological commitment that seems to establish counterreligious thesis.

Fourth: the other focusing point for our philosophical alternative is demystifying the parochial (and stagnant) the “sacred” and the “secular” parallel of the “traditional” and the “modern” dichotomy. The purpose of deconstructing this absolute version is to disprove the idea that modernization and secularization go hand in hand while, at the same time, showing modernization does not directly cause reciprocal relationship between religion and secularization (Stark 1999). I also argue that there can be both 1) non Western and non secular modernity and 2) non Western and non modern secularity.

Fifth: my philosophical standpoint regarding the solution to the crisis of moral values due to malaise of modernity (borrowing Taylor’s word) concentrates to reduce the danger on nature due

to the technological and instrumental effects (the Judeo-Christian religion is equally responsible, although), to provide psychological and social integration (a shift from compulsory hedonism, the increase sense of duty towards “unborn generations, ” to develop the thinness of the ego and the cult of the superego, strengthening of commonsense consciousness and the less relativisation of common values), strengthening of ethical issues related to sex and drug etc.

Sixth: the most important part of my philosophical solution to the crises of secularism focuses on contextual challenge. The solution encompasses surveying of the political-religious experiences and cultural-religious milieu of world nations before adapting (adopting) and implementing of secularism as it is. It awakens philosophers and other social scientists to contemplate the Western [Christian] and the non Western [non Christian] perspectives before universalizing the sacred-secular relation. I accept Casanova’s argument that struggles to reach on (dis)agreements regarding terminological differences has to overcome historical and contextual limitations (Casanova 2006). In chapter one, we have discussed how much the Western world has *within* difference based on their own given contexts, their specific secularism model and their experience of secularization process.

It is always important to remember the irreversible influence and the permanent legacy of Christian churches on socio-political environment of the Western world in order to get fertile ground to categorize secularization (Abazović 2008; Davie 2006). The challenge of accepting secularism in different nations will continue as long as the world fails to bring philosophical alternatives that can convince how secularism is not ideological mechanism that realize Christian supremacy and the possibility of its open nature, if there, to accommodate non Christians in their demarcated “secular sphere” (Hashemi 2009; Stoeckl 2011).

The Failure of comprehending contextual dimensions makes the philosophers to prescribe Western remedies to the non-Western patient (like that of prescribing hypertensive drugs to hypertensive patient) which either exacerbate the crisis or becomes highly toxic which I would like to call it *westoxication*. The political theology, that we discussed in chapter two, tries to show how the then situation of Europe (England) affected the political-religious thinking of those two prominent Philosophers (Locke and Hobbes). I strongly suggest the consideration of the West’s history regarding its ecclesiastical organization and its tyranny whose process shaped Locke and Hobbes to philosophize in the given context. Since the ecclesiastical organization in

the West was highly corrupted, understanding of this [Christian] organizational crisis in the spatio-temporal perspectives enable us to have both clear concept of secularism and appropriate implementation of its merits. So, I think, the world needs philosophers and other social scientists that strive to make many values that we call “secular” (but which are not) “real secular.”

POST SECULARISM

Post secularism is a new theoretical concept which was introduced by the contemporary German political philosopher Jurgen Habermas to explain the contemporary status and impact of religion in the pre-perceived secular society. His declaration of “*we are living in a post-secular age*” has recruited a number of scholars to engage in contentious debate regarding the (non-)reality of return of religion on the one hand, and the end of secularization, on the other hand (Giannis 2012). As a result of his declaration of the term “post secular age,” Post secularism as an ideology could attract the attention of different social science professionals to have a role in analyzing and (re)defining its concept

It seems that the sudden (unperceived) resurgence and (re)presence of religion instigated Habermas to advocate the arrival of “post secular age.” Actually, both Habermas and Taylor (in his book: *A secular Age*) reject the continuity of secularization process, although the latter claims that we are still in a *secular age* in spite of the revival of religion and the new phase of co-existence. Habermas clarifies the “post-secular society” term as it “refers not only to the fact that religion continues to assert itself in an increasingly secular environment and that society, for the time being, but also referred to the continuing existence of religious communities” (2006:258).

Habermas’s main points transfer a message that both religion and secularization continue to exist. In order to make it clear, let us look at the three phenomena that are used by him as reason to call the secular (and also religious) society as “postsecular”: 1) the secularization thesis lost its significance when religion is observed shaping the world conflicts; 2) the influence of religion over public sphere is growing despite the opposite was postulated by secularists; 3) the increased number of immigrants (as “guest-workers”) in a secular Europe society from the “traditional cultural backgrounds” (2008:5-7).

Post-secularism can be taken as one of the post-narratives (such as post-modernism, post-feminism, post-Islamism, post-structuralism etc.) after their famous meta-narratives (such as modernism, feminism, Islamism, structuralism etc) which aimed to review the concepts and fill the gap of its (parent) grand narrative (i.e. secularism) rather than deconstructing it unlike the remaining most post narratives do (Badr 2012). I do not comprehend Habermas's Post secularism in the way Giannis expressed the concept as it underscores the end of secularism rather, I claim that, it proclaims the continuity of the secular milieu (Giannis 2012).

Stoeckl asks whether the hyphenated *post-secular* or the nonhyphenated *postsecular* concept is intended to be expressed in Habermas's declaration. She claims that the hyphenated *post-secular*, which is not the type of her proposal, suggests a time succession after the secular (giving as an example the current role of religion in Turkey and Russia after extreme trial to weaken religion). The definition of the nonhyphenated *postsecular*, which she wants to propose, is the co-existence of secular and religious worldviews instead of "before-after" kind of time succession (Stoeckl 2011:2-3). Indeed, I could not get the real difference in the two approaches since both definitions, either implicitly or explicitly, have *before- after* dichotomy in that the contemporary co-existence of religious and secular worldviews comes either *after* the postulated supremacy of secular (or the less commanding role of the religion) or *after* a period of less co-existence. We can understand this explanation from the first two phenomena that are listed by Habermas.

Harrington defines post-secular as implying a time when religious values (re)started to command the public and private spheres after losing of their previous long time (during the first half of the last century) widespread influence on the societal life. Joas (quoted in Harrington), in contrast, states that post-secularism is a revision of the stagnant position held by the secularization theorist instead of admitting the revival of religion to (re)capture its lost stage during that half century (Harrington 2007). Whatever the case, however, the post secularism narrative of Habermas does not escape from making simple dichotomy between (pre)secular and (post)secular ages, which is also criticized by Asad as modern construction, that describe the society in it homogenized and linear manner resulting "false, structural and evolutionary necessities" (Asad 2003; Badr 2012:5).

One of the drawback feature of this new paradigm is that it necessitates the inevitable evolution of society from the *before* secular phase to the *after* post secular age without considering the

historical, contextual, socio-political and religious experience of a particular society. Even, Habermas concentrated on the European situation of secularization process since he does not believe that post secularism can happen in non-European societies due to the seeming inability of those societies to handle the co-existence of secular and religious worldview. He did not come with how secular ideologies can be accommodated with religious worldviews in nonsecular society. In addition to that, his suggestion to include religious societies in secularized European societies is almost on the level of the “*others*” (2008).

Habermas’s declaration of the term is already linked with the unexpected presence of religion, and he deals with this revival of religion in order to assure the continuity of the secular environment. So, his concern is not the religious “new” but fearing the possibility of getting the secular “old” being shaken, although his position needs to be properly acknowledged because he is one of the few philosophers that call for reconciliatory step between secularization and counter-secularization thesis after almost a century (Harrington 2007). The problem lies in his limited concern that restricts the merit of his philosophy to much bounded sphere. This bounded sphere necessitated the co-existence of previously quarreled or improperly treated worldviews.

This co-existence in this sphere is expected to create permanent tension. Subsequently, postsecularity, according to Stoeckl’s description, is “a condition of permanent tension” (2011:3). Then, post secular society is a society which coexists under this permanent tension and Post-secularism is a new ideology that deals and takes sides with this condition. This ideology tries to make religion compatible with secular principles instead of making both to be compatible with each other. This compatibility is to be made possible by translating religious language (to become “reasonable” religion based on scientific principles) to “secular language.” In order to make the former (religious language) part of formal discussion, the burden of translating has been loaded on religion itself while freeing the secular reason as privileged (Mozumder 2011). Actually, some claim that the post secularism term can also be used as a tool to fight the “militant secularism,” which adamantly denies the public presence and increased influence of religion (Badr: 2012).

Importantly, post-secularism is reproached as a result of Habermas’s Eurocentric view. His Eurocentrism can be persistently observed in his both unchanged *modernist* view and selective prescription of post secularism to the wealthy European society as: “a post-secular can only be

applied to the affluent societies of Europe or countries such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where people's religious ties have steadily or rather quite dramatically lapsed in the post-War period” (2008:5). Additionally, based on his own *modernist* criteria of “spearhead of modernization,” he also includes USA to his post secular society. Indeed, it can be suggested that his post secularism is grounded and framed by Eurocentrism and modernism that leave him in his prior secular worldviews (“*exclusivist secularism*”) with only slight modification (Stoeckl 2011).

Phenomenologically, we can see Habermas’s “modern,” protestant based liberal thinking, that excludes the significant role of community leaving religious experience almost to the level of individual (subject) will only (Ibid). Habermas’s protestant based religious experience reproduces the (un)common equalization of privatization and individualization of religion and European based essential functional separation of institutions (Badr 2012). It is also expected that Protestant based Western secularisms are hostile to “nonliberal, nonprotestant believers” (Bhargava 2011:101). Those (his own) prior secular worldviews reflect the protestant based belief-centered religious outlook that hardly comprehends other [belief and practice-centered] religions (Badr 2012). The paradox of his strife to form societal universalism lies in his statement of decrying the role of cultural particularism while, at the same time, underscoring the singular European rationalism or Christian based Western civilization alone as the only tool (with no alternative) to form “universal egalitarianism:”

.....the individual morality of conscience, human rights and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of a continual critical reappropriation and reinterpretation. Up to this very day there is no alternative to it. And in light of the current challenges of a post-national constellation, we must draw sustenance now, as in the past, from this substance. Everything else is idle postmodern talk (2002:149).

Accordingly, Harrington and Mozumder are excited with respect to Habermas’s resistance to pluralism world-outlook that is presented by multiple modernity theorists. It seems that Habermas deliberately became reluctant to accept the various criteria of modernities in relation to their specific context. He believes that the West’s “own rootedness in the Judaeo-Christian tradition” is sole determinant of the world’s *modern* outlook and other religions are suggested to

follow the unidirectional Christian path of Western modernity. So, this *modern* outlook has to be essentially safeguarded and then be continued towards its destination by putting it back on its track (“de-railing modernization”) if there is any shaking (Harrington 2007; Mozumder 2011). Subsequently, his post-secularism does not flow in the way postmodernism does but in modernism and slightly modified secularism. He, in his new paradigm, is obsessed with rescuing of secularism (and its supremacy) than modifying of the modern and secular criteria unlike other post narratives that deconstruct their grand narrative. He needs religion to rescue the crisis of secularism in relation to public morality, for instance. He (quoted in Mozumder) states that “in moments like these, the unbelieving sons and daughters of modernity seem to believe that they owe more to one another, need more for themselves, than what is accessible to them, in translation, of religious tradition – as if the semantic potential of the latter was still not exhausted” (2011:17). It is, however, not secularization thesis since it does not necessitate evolutionary development of “non-metaphysical” reasoning (after metaphysical rationality); instead it came with a paradigm shift of accepting evolutionary “post-metaphysical” reasoning (after non-metaphysical rationality) (Mozumder 2011). This post-metaphysical reasoning, however, is the extension of secularization thesis.




Fig 1: Representation of post secularism. S=Secular; R=Religion. This figure represents the philosophical extension of post secularism from secularization thesis which still admits the supremacy of the secular over the religious (S is always over R but with consideration of some religious constituents).

We can easily capture how Habermas violates interdependence and mutual recognition principles when he implicitly (explicitly) proclaims the supremacy of the secular reasoning over religious reasoning during translation of religious language as the prerequisite to have formal discussion (Mozumder 2011). Additionally, I want to emphasize Harrington’s concern and reply in the way that Habermas’s neither latest (post secularism) nor earlier work (secularization thesis) do

justice to the religious contents, although his latest work was obliged to consider the inevitable presence and influence of religion. Habermas's "*methodological atheism*," for instance, calls social scientists to forget the existence of God while they are practicing their research. This means is that those scientists who have belief in transcendental power are advised (normatively told) not to assume the reality of God but those scientists who are atheist are not expected to use methodological theism and to assume the reverse (the existence of God).

Generally, all of these Habermas's world outlooks, which are founded on *Eurocentric modern* consciousness, inform us the sole purpose of his declaration of post secularism: it is to assure the continuity of the modern legacy with the untouchable supremacy of the West.

The Way Forward

As this paper discussed above in detail, the gaps of *post secularism* that make it immature to allow the [real] co-existence of religious and secular [global] societies can be presented as follows: one, it is an ideology that create a condition of permanent tension in postsecularity; two, it forms a simple dichotomy between ages and between societies (as primitive/modern etc) and necessitates the homogenized evolutionary development of a society ignoring societal dynamics; three, it is still almost excluding term to the Western [and Christian, as well] religious societies. As we saw above, it tries to make religion compatible to secular principles instead of making both to be compatible with each other; four, it is a project to be applied only to the affluent European countries (and North America, based on modernization); five, extending from number four, it less recognizes the non Western and non Christian religious societies (regards Christian concept of religion); six, it can be a medium to insure political supremacy of the secularist; seven, it considers more of individual will of a society than the significant influence of communal life; eight, it forgets historical contingency in Christian and secular relation; nine, it is a philosophical alternative that rarely does justice to religious content; ten, it prescribes only methodological atheism but does not give a room for methodological theism in social science research; eleven, it is the byproduct of modernism which preaches universalism but based on *European ethnocentrism* (borrowing Dussel's terminology) that has a normative criteria of linear and simple Eurocentric rationality.

We need a new paradigm and meta-narrative that used to signify a real global network between religion and secularism based on a large frame of reference than secularism. This new paradigm

can be the extension and sister liberation project of Enrique Dussel's *transmodernism*². I have liked to use his *transmodernity* philosophy since the present and future tension between religion and secularism can be overcome by applying a globalized culture of interconnectedness than simple dichotomy as secular/sacral, East/West, Europe/non-Europe, modern/traditional, primitive/civilized etc. So, the new philosophical alternative requires the political and intercultural philosophy approach to religion and secularism with multiple dimensions of political, economical, religious, pedagogical etc following the footsteps of Dussel's new paradigm than "a scattered guerrilla war" (borrowing Alcoff's terminology)³.

The main purpose of using intercultural philosophy and Dussel's new paradigm is to abrogate the supremacy of Eurocentric secularism and to call for holistic kind of interdependence and understanding, as well as flourishing of solidarity between the taken for granted previous animosity of religion and secularism. One can question the significance of this meta-narrative as there is already declared post-secularism by Habermas, which is discussed above. I accept(ed) that Habermas strived for accommodation of religion in secular environment but his main ground is *Eurocentrism and modernism* which cannot provide real solution to the tension between *secular* and religious thinking. This real solution requires a universal reference which [trans]cends the exclusive Eurocentric secularism.

The very category of secularization becomes deeply problematic once it is conceptualized in a Eurocentric way as a universal process of progressive human societal development from "belief" to "unbelief" and from traditional "religion" to modern "secularity" and once it is then transferred to other world religions and other civilizational areas with very little dynamics of structuration of the relations and tensions between religion and worlds or between cosmological transcendence and worldly immanence (Casanova 2011:63).

² See Dussel: "the transmodern project is the mutual fulfillment of the "analectic" solidarity of center/periphery, woman/man, mankind/earth, Western culture/peripheral postcolonial cultures, different races, different ethnicities, and different classes. It should be noted here that this mutual fulfillment of solidarity does not take place by pure denial but rather by subsumption from alterity" (2000:474); Alcoff: "the concept of the transmodern is a concept with much greater explanatory value than the myth of Eurocentric modernity, and, because of its pluri- and trans-versal character, it avoids the exclusionary, hierarchical effects of totalizing systems" (2012:65).

³ "Dussel rightfully argues that we need a new paradigm, not simply a scattered guerrilla war. The concept of the transmodern is meant, in part, to allow for a broad, even global relationality among elements, so none are irreducibly local. When we make cultures or knowledge systems irreducibly local, we truly risk ahistorical reifications" (Alcoff 2012:65).

The new paradigm is not to be a presecular, antiseccular or postsecular project: 1) it cannot be antiseccular in that it does not carry out conservative (or fundamentalist) religious projects and it does not prescribe theocracy; 2) it cannot be presecular since it would not forward superstitious practice of the past; 3) it cannot be postsecular that bases on the Western mind or reasoning and requires the continuity of Christian legacy. So, we need a new philosophical alternative that results from real inclusion of the rational progression (or positive) aspect of secularism character and its ignored alterity (the other of secular) by denying the totality and myth of secularism.

Like other secularism concepts, post-secularism never or seldom considered the “*other*” (religious or nonsecular) reality and hardly incorporated the non-European version of secularism. Post secularity indicates the process of co-existence between religious and secular societies “*within*” secularity and grants a myth of supremacy to secularism, which I like to call to the “*myth of secularism*”. We have to work to strongly admit the incorporation of the non-European version and subsuming the positive of European (and USA) type of modernity and secularity by “new interpretation of modernity” and secularity (Dussel, 2002). I am deliberately including the term *modernity* since the secularization theorists claim under *its* umbrella and it is difficult to separate (most of) Eurocentric thinking (such as secularism) from the myth of modernity.

Any new narrative should subsume the positive of secularity and emancipates from the tyranny and violence of secularism. Some of the main positive aspects of secularism which are mentioned by Jean-Paul Willaime and can be suggested to be included in consecutive narratives are: a) *Freedom of conscience, thought and religion* which includes the freedom to practice or not to have a religion as well as to change one’s religion (subject solely to respect for law, democracy and human rights); b) *Equal rights and duties for all citizens regardless of their religious or philosophical beliefs*, in other words, non-discrimination by the State and public authorities on such grounds (2010:7).

I suppose it is better to develop an *alternative secularism* (and *alternative to secularism*) in the 21 century by affirming “from without” the essential elements of secularity’s own excluded religious experiences and historical contingencies. It used to shift the interpretation and standardization of religious-secular diachronic from European hegemony to non-European and European interpretation of history. The “*myth of secularism*” makes initial simple dichotomy between traditional (religious) and secular societies as barbaric/humane, senseless/sensefull,

uncivilized /civilized, primitive/modern, irrational /rational, insignificant/significant etc to rationalize its principles and ongoing missions. Some of the main implicit “myths of secularism” (under the umbrella of modernism, which explained by Dussel) that are not considered by post secularism but which have to be seriously rejected are:

1. Secular praxis can carry out tyranny over the religious (“barbaric”) people, who oppose secularization mission, to clear the stumbling block impeding the mission
2. The suffering and loss of the traditional, “barbaric”, primitive religious people are regarded as inevitable in the secularization mission
3. As the modernization and secularization mission results “a wide array of victims” (borrowing Dussel’s expression), its tyranny consequence is taken for granted as unavoidable. In this regard, then, the secularizing heroes (in new secularizing non Western countries) make their “victims part of saving sacrifice” (remember how the East is being victimized in the form of top-down way of secularization by the West’s bedfellow governments and Western brainwashed elites)
4. The “barbarians,” the religious, traditional, “backward,” uncivilized one, are rebuked for their reluctance or opposition to the secularization process. In this process, the secularity presents itself as innocent and takes no responsibility for the victims blame⁴.

Post-secularism cannot avoid such kinds of simple dichotomy between societies and it cannot develop a “trans”-secular horizon which is beyond the simple secularity’s internal possibility. This “trans” shows the take-off point (Dussel calls this point *exteriority*) from what secularity excluded and ignored considering as “barbarous,” “insignificant,” “irrational,” “senseless,” “uncivilized”, “primitive,” etc.⁵ We have to, then, overcome Eurocentric standardization of religious-secular relation and give a seat for religious societies by prior consideration of two religious moments: one, the religious moments located “inside of” Europe; two, religious moments located “outside of” Europe and non-Christian tradition. So, recognizing of both

⁴ See Dussel’s description of the “myth of modernity” (2000:472-473).

⁵ See Dussel: “...they are cultures that have developed on a “trans”-modern horizon, something beyond the internal possibility of simple modernity. This “beyond” (“trans-”) indicates the take-off point from modernity’s exteriority, that is, from what modernity excluded, denied, ignored..” (2002:234).

“inside” and “outside of” Europe eliminates exporting of Eurocentric standardization of religion⁶. So, Mozumder warns that

Western secularity does not have to be exported to the rest of the world in the name of civilization, modernization, or secularization. The entire world does not have to follow Habermas’ or Taylor’s prescriptions of secularism. Rather, the multitude of ideas, suggestions, or principles cherished in different corners of the globe need to be recognized. Instead of labeling certain knowledge, wisdom, and culture as essentially superstitious, traditional, or dogmatic, the universal capability of the mass people needs to be appreciated (2011:74).

The philosophical world is expected to strive to do justice to religious content and facilitates translation of religious languages to secular languages as well as secular languages to religious languages by sharing the load of translation to both groups. Our new philosophical tradition should not necessitate the exclusion of religious languages from formal dialogue. Unlike post secularism, the new narrative can do better to foster the co-existence of secular and religious societies under either secular or religious societies or both. It can do justice to both the religious and secular societies by revealing methodological theism, methodological atheism and methodological *other-theism*. In this regard, it can do justice to the religious content by reminding consideration of methodological theism by [atheist] social scientists in their study about religion-secular tradition; it can do justice to secular societies by accepting the methodological atheism prescribed by post-secularism; and it can also do justice to *other* religious societies by revealing methodological *other-theism* for those (a)theist social scientist studying the tradition of “*other*” religious societies.

The secular world has to recognize multiple modernities of multi cultural societies (Casanova 2006; 2011). Those multiple modernities can result “*contextual secularism*” as an *alternative secularism* in different countries (Badr 2012). What I suggest, however, is not equal to “*contextual secularism*,” though *contextual secularism* is supposed to be one of the component of my suggestion in that our philosophical alternative becomes effective if it regards all other challenges for secularism in addition to contextual crisis. It is the prescription of not only

⁶ See Dussel: “this will allow the emergence of the enormous cultural and human richness that the transnational capitalist market now attempts to suppress under the empire of “universal” commodities that materially subsume food (one of the most difficult things to universalize) into capital. The future “trans”-modernity will be multicultural, versatile, hybrid, postcolonial, pluralist, tolerant, and democratic (but beyond the modern liberal democracy of the European state)” (2002:236)

alternative secularism (which is Bhargava's preference) but also *alternative to secularism* (Bhargava 2011). To make it clear, we need a new narrative that combines the philosophies of *alternative secularism* and *alternative to secularism*: it can have *alternative secularism* since it takes the positive notions of secularism which is to be implemented in previously secular societies that have limitations of including religious principles and societies (in short it is modified post secularism that considers religious values in Western countries); and it also can contain *alternative to secularism* as it brings positive religious and philosophical solution to challenges of secularism and then it will be implemented in those "Eastern" societies that are fade up with *top down* implementation of noncontextual and exclusive type of secularism, which never allowed the return of religious and nonsecular societies to their values considering socio-cultural complexities. But in countries like Turkey it considers both *alternative secularism* and *alternative to secularism* concepts. Furthermore, it beseeches the recognition of the socio-cultural complexities and historical contingencies of secularism in European Latin Christendom and the past and present realities of non-Western and non-Christian societies, as well:

Instead of being the norm, the historical process of secularization of European Latin Christendom is the one truly exceptional process, which is unlikely to be reproduced anywhere else in the world with a similar sequential arrangement and with the corresponding stadial consciousness. Moreover, non-Western and non-Christian societies, which did not undergo a similar process of historical development and always confronted Western secular modernity from its first encounter with European (Christian) colonialism as "the other," are more likely to recognize the European process of secularization for what it truly was, namely, a particular Christian and PostChristian process, and not, as Europeans like to think, a general or universal process of human or societal development (Casanova 2011:64).




Fig.2: New philosophical alternative. S=Secular; R=religion; H=horizontal; 1 used to represent secularization thesis; 2 represents the failure of secularization thesis: religion and secular are still separated but no supremacy one over the other; 3 shows the outcome of the new paradigm which makes both R and S horizontally aligned with no supremacy one over the other but mutual interdependence.

Our new philosophical alternative is expected to be not only a philosophical project but also a political one. As a political project, it forewarns the danger of implementing political secularism (the “myth of secularism”) taking the advantage of political domination of the “West” on the “East.” Political and material support of the “west” to their dictator bedfellows in the “East” and the consequent forceful implementation of *Eurocentric secularism* in the “East” and their “unholy” alliance for economical exploitation of the East, which is expressed as “coloniality of power” syndrome by Aníbal Quijano (quoted in Dussel, 2002), is damaging the positive aspect of secularism (to be preached in the East) by equalizing secularism with *Westernism* (which I call it before *westoxication*).

CONCLUSION

Secularism as an ideology has been able to challenge religion and became effective in separating religion from social institutions, although it is facing failures in some countries who introduced it in top-down rather than bottom up manner. It challenged the rampant religious fundamentalism that seldom tolerates other ideologies and it evacuated the despotism and covetousness of the religious leaders.

Whoever is interested to study the real feature of secularism gets the unique historical and socio-political evolution of a particular society. The nature of tension between religion and politics and among a number of religions/sects affects the type of secularism to result in that society. The thinker's moderate approach to religion and the political theology of John Locke affected the American model of secularism which is almost *soft* secularism, while the monarchist Catholic movements challenge to the politics, and the political theology of Thomas Hobbes affected the French model of secularism which is the *hard* type. Similarly, The Turkish *Laiklik* is characterized by its numerous inconsistencies and irregularities which violate the principle of Western secularism. These irregularities resulted from its failure to understand the historical development of the Turkish societies and its hiatus to involve elites in interpreting the Western secularism in relation to the society's cultural milieu.

When secularism became dominant in some parts of the world, the secularization theorists declared *secularization thesis* that forecasted the inevitable decline of superstitious/sacred practices and the thesis was taken for granted as the essential condition of modernization theory. They were sure that rationalization and industrialization speeds up the secularization process and secularism as an ideology remains the irreversible supreme model of socio-political milieu. Finally, however, factors emerged out that require the (re)conceptualization and ask the possibility of the thesis by contemporary philosophers and other social scientists. Those challenge factors are 1) the unexpected (re)presence of religion, which appeared on the bed side of the secularists when they suddenly awake from their deep sleep, influencing the public sphere; 2) unfair equalization of privatization with extinction of religion, enforced the secularist to make hasty generalization without considering empirical facts; 3) the vagueness of the secularism concept and its ideological crisis, which is criticized extremely by some scholars, although it cannot be concluded as it is a failed theory; 4) The crisis of context, which showed the

inadequacy of the secularists strive to consider the context of the particular society they are prescribing for. They seldom remembered the Christian origin of the secularism history and its Eurocentric perspectives; 5) the unexpected co-existence of some religious societies with the modernization process and their adaptability to the positive influence of the modernization impact, refuted the essentiality of secularism for modernization; 6) Some moral crisis observed in the secularized societies due to rampant ego-centric decisions required religious solutions.

Those challenges necessitated the declaration of new paradigm. Subsequently, Jurgen Habermas introduced the *post secularism* term after looking the sudden resurgence and (re)presence of religion in the public sphere. This post-narrative considers the unexpected role of religious values to command the public and private sphere. This philosophy, however, makes simple dichotomy between (pre)secular and (post)secular ages. It necessitates the inevitable evolution of society from the *before* secular phase to the *after* post secular age without considering the historical, contextual, socio-political and religious experience of a particular society. Habermas's new paradigm emerges from his Eurocentric view. His Eurocentrism can be persistently observed in his both unchanged *modernist* view and selective prescription of post-secularism to the wealthy European society. He is much influenced by the protestant based liberal thinking; European rationalism or Christian based Western civilization. His *methodological atheism* order for social science researchers has a gap of properly considering the religious society. All of postsecularist perspectives tell us the new paradigm is not applicable to the different societies of the world who require persistent co-existence under both secular and religious environment. Consequently, this thesis proposes new perspective that facilitates the compatible relation of religious and secular values. We have to have a new Philosophy that believes in abrogating the supremacy of Eurocentric secularism and fostering solidarity between the taken for granted previous animosity of religion and secularism. This new Philosophy aims at universal tradition of interconnectedness, holistic attitude, inclusiveness, and participation. So, it recognizes multiple modernities of multi cultural and multi value societies. It does justice to both religious and secular contents by revealing methodological theism, methodological atheism and methodological *other theism*. It can avoid a simple dichotomy between societies and it develops a "trans"-secular horizon.

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