



ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

Putting Nozick's Utopia into Practice

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Declaration

I, Betsegaw Endalew, declare that this thesis, titled “Putting Nozick's Utopia into Practice”, submitted to the College of Social Science and Humanities at Addis Ababa University Department of Philosophy for my MA in Philosophy, is all my own work. It hasn't been submitted for any other degree or examination anywhere else. I've properly credited all sources I used through citations and references, and I carried out the research. Any mistakes or oversights are my own responsibility.

Signed: _____

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Abstract

Robert Nozick, American philosopher, through his book "Anarchy, State, and Utopia", introduced the concept of utopia, a framework of an institutional structure that ensures peaceful coexistence among voluntarily established communities. When we analyse the current reality in the world, realising such a utopian framework in a given practical society appears to be highly unrealistic. However, this thesis contends that, while the utopian society appears implausible, it can be put into practice to some extent with the establishment of some practical implementation procedures. So, this paper, by presenting the main concepts and argument of Nozick's conception of utopia and by acknowledging complexities and limitations, will present possible procedural implementation strategies and will show how Nozick's utopian conception will be put into practice.

Keywords: *Robert Nozick, utopian framework, voluntary association, minimal state*

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List of Acronyms

Acronyms	Definition
ARNUS	Association for Realizing Nozick's Utopian Society
GUDS	Global Utopian Database System
UDUC	Universal Declaration on Utopian Communities

Glossary

Word	Definition
Central Authority/Agency	Are facilitators, regulators, mediators, and protectors ensuring the smooth operation and ethical governance of diverse utopian communities within Nozick's proposed framework.
Nozick's Utopian Conception	The overall concepts of Nozick, which include both the possible world model and his utopian framework.
Nozick's Utopian Framework	A system which Nozick designed to facilitate the realisation of the possible world's model, which ensures the various utopian communities can coexist within a structured system.
Nozick's Utopian Model / Possible Worlds Model	The theoretical perspective proposed by Nozick, describe how utopian visions could be imagined, operated and functioned to create a meta-utopia.
Utopian Community	A single, limited-membership community envisioned by an individual or group, which can be either face-to-face or non-face-to-face. It represents a specific utopian vision within the broader meta-utopia.
Utopian Society / Meta-utopia	A collection of different utopian communities. It represents the broader societal structure where diverse utopian visions coexist and interact.

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INTRODUCTION

Though the name “*utopia*” was designed by Sir Thomas More, its philosophical origin was traced back to ancient Greek philosophy. Plato describes an ideal state in his book, “*The Republic*”, which is run by philosopher kings, while More discusses in his 1516 novel “*Utopia*” an island that practices communal ownership of property and limited government, leading to a harmonious and equitable community (More & Turner, 2016). The word “*Utopia*” was a play on words combining the Greek prefix “*ou-*” meaning “*not*” or “*no*” and the Greek word “*topos*” meaning “*place*” (More & Turner, 2016, p. 119). This means a place which is not existing here in the world.

Utopia as an idea is applied to talk about a better future over time. There are diverse theoretical utopian conceptions created by traditional fiction and practical trials that have appeared in history, such as Francis Bacon's “*New Atlantis*” (Bacon, 2002); Tommaso Campanella's “*The City of the Sun*” (Campanella, 2001); Edward Bellamy's “*Looking Backward: 2000-1887*” (Bellamy, 2009); Aldous Huxley's “*Island*” (Huxley, 2009); and Ursula K. Le Guin's “*The Dispossessed*” (Guin, 1974). Also, communities that have established real projects based on utopia have existed for generations, like the Kibbutz movement in Israel (Britannica, 2023); Awra Amba in Ethiopia (Joumard, Zandanon & Perini-Campelli, 2021); Twin Oaks in the United States of America (Twin Oaks Community Inc., 2024); and Auroville in India (Atmos, 2024).

Nozick, an American political philosopher, offers a representation in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* so that varied utopian dreams can live together at the same time, under which individuals have rights to dream of, join, live in, and leave communities voluntarily. This is in contrast to most theorists who prefer specific utopian visions, some of which are implausible and unreliable fantasies. Although Nozick outlines a conceptual foundation for such a pluralistic utopia, he expresses doubts about the practicality of his own idea of a possible worlds model, acknowledging the “*divergences between our earthbound actual life and the possible-worlds model*” and suggesting that the “*realisation of its pale projection is the best we can do*” while the “*realisation of the model itself would be ideal*” (Nozick, 2013, p. 281). Some other critics have even questioned whether his utopian framework itself, the one acknowledged as practical by Nozick, is impossible. So, even though I may not have a viable solution at this point, the

Nozickian Utopian Model may be viable in the long run and at least partially comprehensive of everything that has been and is being created in international systems, in addition to what humans have accomplished historically. This thesis aims to reject both Nozick's doubts about his possible worlds model and other critics' doubts about his utopian conception's practicality, and to defend the feasibility of his framework as a viable path toward realising his vision of utopian possible worlds. However, there are significant challenges to implementing Nozick's utopia, and this thesis aims to argue how his conception can be implemented, effectively extending his vision within a libertarian framework.

Thus, my intention is to make Nozick's conception of utopia practical, enabling the realisation of multiple utopian visions without undue focus on their specific potential negative consequences in their internal communal living atmosphere. So, although my work has created a concrete way in which Nozickian utopianism can be realised, it only tends to support how different utopian visions might be practised, considering that others can further explore ways to mitigate any undesired negative effects of practising different utopian visions simultaneously. My intention is not to achieve Nozick's utopian model right now, because, first of all, shaping everything is not the most important goal, but only showing that we can approach it. Considering evolutionary theory and technological progress, Nozick's possible worlds model and his inclusive utopian framework can eventually be fulfilled.

My thesis is organised in three parts: (1) understanding Nozick's core arguments and detailed vision for a utopian society; (2) identifying major hurdles to realising this conception, based on critiques from other philosophical and political perspectives; and (3) presenting an extended and modified version of the utopian framework to put Nozick's ideas into practice in a contemporary context and proposing arguments on tackling potential hurdles.

I tried to carefully review Nozick's thesis, examine the limits of its practicability, and propose possible directions for future analyses inspired by his ideas. Then, this paper will advance an ongoing debate on libertarian political philosophy and try to draw policy implications from it. Utilising a method of philosophical exegesis and entering philosophical discourse, this thesis attempts to establish whether there are internally coherent strategies and revised frameworks available for us to use in overcoming impediments so that certain Nozickian ideas can be applied within our situation today.

CHAPTER ONE

Understanding Nozick's Utopian Conception

1.1 Chapter One Overview

Nozick's Utopian conception will be thoroughly introduced in this chapter. In the beginning, the chapter gives an overview of several theoretical and practical utopian views. It also talks about the critiques of Nozick's utopian visions, since it is from these critiques that his utopian perspective is derived.

This chapter explores the key components of Nozick's methodology. The first is his theoretical concept of "*possible worlds*," which aims to bring various utopian ideals to life in an ideal society. In addition to the defining characteristics, entry/exit structures, handling of non-conformity, the role of centralized authority, and how the system could dynamically evolve, Nozick's arguments for the minimal state upholding this framework are also examined. The second is his utopian framework, which he designed to facilitate this conception of meta-utopia. The chapter's conclusion will aid in understanding Nozick's utopian vision.

1.2 Diverse Nature of Different Utopian Visions

Anarchy, State, and Utopia, by Nozick, lists different utopian visions that have been conceived and attempted throughout history by different individuals and groups. These are: "*visionaries and crackpots, maniacs and saints, monks and libertines, capitalists and communists and participatory democrats, proponents of phalanxes (Fourier), palaces of labor (Flora Tristan), villages of unity and cooperation (Owen), mutualist communities (Proudhon), time stores (Josiah Warren), Bruderhof, kibbutzim, kundalini yoga ashrams, and so forth*" (Nozick, 2013, p. 288). These diverse utopian visions show how different individuals and groups envision utopian notions based on their philosophical, political, religious, and social perspectives.

He mentioned different utopian visions: communist kibbutzim in Israel, a group of people who are very friendly and support each other; the self-reliant communities envisioned by Proudhon; the phalanstère compounds proposed by Fourier; and the labor-centered utopias of Flora Tristan. This listing shows the different utopian ideas across different periods and areas (Nozick, 2013).

Some of his listings are opposing visions, showing how idealistic societies are contradictory to each other. His meta-utopian framework, on the contrary, has a stance that all diverse conceptions have the potential to coexist based on principles of freedom of choice and voluntarism.

In the history of philosophy, utopian thoughts have played a role by providing a tool for reflecting on and exploring social and political concepts. This gives philosophers room to examine diverse political systems and imagine ideal societies free from injustice, inequality, and poverty. In the allegory of the Cave, Plato used the concept of utopia to describe an ideal society characterized by enlightenment and justice; a society governed by philosopher-kings, where individual pursuits are subordinated to the pursuit of the common good (Cornford, 1941). Thomas More's vision, on the other hand, is a society where private property is abolished, and all goods are held in common. The inhabitants of Utopia do not own personal possessions; instead, they share everything for the collective well-being of the community (More & Turner, 2016). Throughout history, literature has embraced the concept of utopia as a lens to understand behavior with all its imperfections and limitations and to explore the possibility of building harmonious communities free from conflict and disharmony.

The vision of Utopia does not stop there. Going forward, Francis Bacon's "*New Atlantis*" sheds light on a community named Bensalem that esteems knowledge and scientific progress (Bacon, 2002). Similarly, Tommaso Campanella's work titled "*The City of the Sun*" portrays a city governed by logic and rationality, promoting equality, communal harmony, and technological advancements (Campanella, 2001). The 20th century saw an emergence of literature exploring utopian ideals further. Eduard Bellamy's "*Looking Backward: 2000-1887*," published in 2009, envisions a society where economic equality is achieved through collaborative production and distribution systems (Bellamy, 2009). Huxley's "*Island*," also published in 2009, integrates aspects of spirituality, sustainable living, and democratic governance to portray a utopian vision (Huxley, 2009). In "*The Dispossessed*," a book by Ursula K. Le Guin published in 1974, she presents a view on the idea of a society by delving into the struggles and obstacles experienced by a scientist navigating life in two different and opposing environments (Guin, 1974).

Utopian views are divergent when we evaluate the works of different theorists. It can be very clearly seen in the cases of Charles Fourier and Leon Trotsky. While both have a utopian vision,

the first one presents a voluntary way to reach it, and the second one is involuntary, as Nozick referred to them in his work *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. Fourier's utopian socialism was based on the idea of “*harmony*” or the “*passional series*,” which emphasized the importance of satisfying human desires and passions through social organization through his vision of communities called “*phalansteries*” (Bey, 1998). On the contrary, Trotsky's perspective of a utopian society was one where the notion of “*permanent revolution*” was the most important. It suggested a continual struggle against the forces of oppression and exploitation (SKILLING, 2023).

Moreover, aside from presenting the theoretical aspects of utopia, this thesis tries to examine real attempts to develop utopian communities. The Kibbutz movement in Israel features shared living, communal property, and equal distribution of wealth (Britannica, 2023). These collective communities that have their root in Israel provide real cases for the application of the aforementioned principles. Awra Amba, situated in our country of Ethiopia, has been recognized for its steadfast adherence to egalitarian principles and gender equality (Joumard, 2021). Twin Oaks is an intentional community located in Virginia, United States, that practices income sharing, where each member invests money and engages in some work so that these evolving communitarian trends, combined with equality, multiculturalism, and nonviolence, can be sustained (Hollick, 1998). Auroville in India stands for building a universal township where people from different countries or ethnic backgrounds work and reside together (Auroville, 2022).

The idea of Utopia can be understood very broadly and very narrowly from the practice and processes of various kinds, from the history and geography of many countries. Of course, the examples referred to above provide only a small amount of surface information on the ideal society. Each offers a slightly different perspective, thus deepening our interest in the stories of utopias and their interactions with everyday life.

Nozick states that “*the various communal provisions of utopia all seemingly at odds with one another because they originate from individual utopian authors who are very self-assured of the merits of his one vision and what is correct. Though the picture of an ideal society that each presents is much too simple, we should take the fact of the differences seriously*” (Nozick, 2013, p. 285). He further notes that “*no utopian author has everyone in his society leading exactly the*

same life, allocating exactly the same amount of time to exactly the same activities” (Nozick, 2013). Thus the goal of Nozick’s utopia is to provide a framework in which various types of utopian societies can be found, which of course welcomes all utopian visions.

This is no surprise that such layering is made possible by Nozick’s treatment of both existing and other theoretical utopias. Existing ones include the Kibbutz, Auroville, Twin Oaks, and others which may be developed in the future. The framework is capable of facilitating the coexistence of utopian communities. All utopian explorations and forms are easier to imagine and create utilizing this framework, which in essence is a theoretical construct applied to practice. Nozick's style supports and nourishes the plurality and development of these different visions of utopia, without losing the significance and influence of utopianism in the development of future societies.

1.3 Critiques of Utopian Visionaries

The Utopian conception that Nozick introduces to us is in some cases shaped as a critique of other utopian visionaries, whom he judges because of certain boundaries set by them. Nozick stresses that what one can think of as an ideally perfect utopia may not be ideal for another person, illustrating the subjectivity of these judgments (Nozick, 2013). Nozick questions the idea of a universally perfect utopian conception or way of life, arguing that *“the ambitions and goals of utopian theorists, to choose the polar opposite, it appears weak and insignificant”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 296). The criticism is that utopians want to organize all of society according to a single detailed plan, which results in a static and rigid society without room for change or individual choice (Nozick, 2013). Additionally, he asserts that *“the best of all possible worlds for me will not be that for you”* and that the world one prefers to live in will not be precisely the one another would choose (Nozick, 2013, p. 274). The most consequential question, he says in talking about the best of all possible worlds, is *“Best for whom?”* He argues that a real utopia is one that, beyond taking into account the various desires and necessities of people, assures social harmony.

Robert Nozick further deviated from utopian visionaries, who are often critiqued by Nozick for either not discussing the practical means through which their vision could be realized or focusing excessively on ineffective methods. He outlines that there are three main criticisms: One, that persuading well-off people in the existing *“Non-utopian system”* to act against their interests by

rational argument is highly challenging. The second is that idealistic dreamers think the privileged are not going to move in and crush change that threatens their privilege. Third, the idea that utopian experimental conceptions could be imposed in a new and possibly hostile external environment is unrealistic (Nozick, 2013). These critiques highlight a contrast to the ideal type approach presented by utopian visionaries. To be effective, this kind of utopian thinking needs to take the form of practical mechanisms for accomplishing the envisioned future.

1.4 Possible Worlds Model

The possible worlds model is Nozick's theoretical model for his conception of utopia that seeks to exceed the constraints of utopian ideals that accommodate specific groups of people rather than everyone. He creates a model that takes into account the imagination of one person, Mr. X, who envisions an ideal world to live in, while others have the same right to imagine living in Mr. X's world or creating their own. Nozick states that utopia *“must be, in some restricted sense, the best for all of us; the best world imaginable, for each of us”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 274). He articulated that the finest possible world for one person may differ from that of another, and that utopia must accommodate varied tastes and requirements while being unified and harmonious.

To explore this concept, Nozick presents a framework in which: *“every rational creature in this world (...) will have the same rights of imagining a possible world for himself to live in (...) other inhabitants of the world (...) may choose to stay in the world which has been created for them (...) or they may choose to leave it and inhabit a world of their own imagining. (...) This process goes on; worlds are created, people leave them, create new worlds, and so on”* (Nozick, 2013, pp. 274-275). This has a problem, however. Building a real utopia—the best of all possible worlds—is problematic since its process of world creation and leaving would lead to a fragmentary and inconsistent concept.

Robert Nozick evaluates whether the act of imagining, joining, and leaving different worlds can produce a stable reality. He contends that in a stable world, *“none of the inhabitants of the world can imagine an alternative world they would rather live in, which (they believe) would continue to exist if all of its rational inhabitants had the same rights of imagining and emigrating”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 275). In other words, *“no member of a stable association can imagine another association, which (he believes) would be stable, that he would rather be a member of”* (Nozick,

2013, p. 275). This exploration of a perfect world, in which individuals have the ability to live anywhere they desire without external constraints, is an essential idea for Nozick.

In the proceeding sections, we will evaluate Nozick's Utopian framework that he proposes. In order to achieve stability in the society, certain conditions should be fulfilled. All the members of a particular stable association or society shall be aided by such a society rather than one person or one set of persons ruling and oppressing others. Nozick sees this as a negative consequence of the legal monopoly of power situated in one person and states, *"You will not be able to set up an association in which you are the absolute monarch, exploiting all the other rational inhabitants; (...) for then they would be better off in an association without you"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 275). Second, for an association to admit someone as a member, that person must bring value worth at least as much as what they are receiving. *"No association will admit me if I take more from the association than I give to it"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 276). Such value can take the form of skills, resources, or connections which would justify the expense of allowing the person inside. Third, if an association does not offer a member an amount equivalent to or more than their worth, they have the option to seek membership elsewhere. *"In every stable association, each person receives his marginal contribution"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 277). This is because different utopian worlds compete like a market, and each world competes to receive anyone not receiving their marginal contribution. However, this marginal contribution can work through unanimity or another distribution form agreed upon by the utopian community. Fourth, there can be *"no collusion"* among associations to keep payments down, as individuals can imagine and join other associations offering better terms: *"No collusion among associations to keep my payment down, since I can imagine any number of other entrants into the market for my presence"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 275).

The more general claim Nozick is making is that no Utopian society would be stable if people are not constrained from deciding where they go. Or as he put it: *"The model allows you to choose what you will, with the only constraint being that others can do the same for themselves, and need not remain in the world you think you have configured"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 277). This is because a stable association is a *"mutually maximally appreciative group"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 280); where members value and recognize each other's talents and contributions. It contains *"a diversity of persons, with a diversity of excellences and talents, each benefiting from living with*

the others, each being of great use or delight to the others, complementing them” (Nozick, 2013, p. 280). Still, Nozick questions the stability process, wondering if individuals may leave an association for one where their contribution is higher, making the initial association unstable. He asks, *“Won't everyone populate his association with maximally appreciative association mates?”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 279). Anyone will pick the groups in which they feel appreciated and where their input is the most appreciated. According to Nozick, there is such a group of mutually-appreciating constituents, and a group exists for every member where none of them can be better off in any other group (Nozick, 2013). In addition to providing conditions of stability, he also asks about the existence of stable concepts and stable associations, having regard for changes in the appreciation of the group and the changes of its structure within stability.

To achieve some level of justice without necessarily creating any utility, Nozick, to his utopian idea, proposes that there are measures that ought to be imposed on people's wants. These constraints try to ignore some of the consequences, for example, that one of the residents most desires in the world to be a resident of that world and is ordered about by any of the other residents. As Nozick puts it, *“They are abject slaves (...) they will not leave your world for a better one, for in their view there cannot be a better one. No other worlds could successfully compete for their membership, and so their payoff will not be bid up in a competitive market”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 277). Anyways this means, sometimes people may want to belong to a certain group, even though it is not good for them.

To avoid this, Nozick has the following to say as possible restrictions that may work:

1. *“The world cannot be imagined so that it logically follows that (...) its inhabitants want to live in it”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 277). This pertains to the fact that the majority or any particular person in the world cannot be envisioned as wanting to live in it more than anything else.
2. *“The world cannot be imagined so that it logically follows that (...) its inhabitants (or one of them) most (or nth most) want to live in a world with a certain (kind of) person, and will do whatever he says, and so on”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 277). What this restriction does is prohibit the imaginer from describing the character or world in such a way that

they know will cause some specific consequence, say for instance, because everyone happens to like said character so much that they will want to be their friend.

3. *"The imaginer may not describe people and the world so that he knows it follows causally"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 277). What this restriction does is prohibit the imaginer from describing the character or world in such a way that they know will cause some specific consequence, say for instance, because everyone happens to like said character so much that they will want to be their friend.

The above restrictions will prevent situations from being created where people would become *"abject slaves"* or others are placed in positions of undue control in the utopian world.

Nozick accepts the fact that such violations of these restrictions might not be acceptable since it would not allow the utopian world to include certain conceptions, yet general principles can be developed within the framework. For example, *"he might imagine that everyone in the world, including himself, accepts a principle of equal division of product..."* (Nozick, 2013, p. 278). However, unanimity is required for any such principle, as *"any dissident accepting a different general distributive principle P' will move to a world containing only adherents of P'"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 278). Additionally, Nozick introduces *"each person imagining a finite number of others to inhabit his world"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 279). This is necessary because *"an infinite number of communities and potential candidates would flood the market, making it impossible to determine a fair price"* (Arrow, 1905, p. 381). If some individuals leave, the remaining ones can imagine another finite number of people to join them (Nozick, 2013).

Concerning the stability of the worlds, Nozick raises the question, *"For each person is there some mutually maximally appreciative group of which he is a member?"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 280). He suggests that *"prospects for stable associations are improved when we realize that the supposition that each person receives only what others give up to him is too strong"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 280). Nozick argues that *"no person will imagine a maximally appreciative world of inferior beings to whose existence he is crucial. No one will choose to be a queen bee"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 280). Instead, *"it will contain a diversity of persons, with a diversity of excellences and talents, each benefiting from living with the others, each being of great use or delight to the others, complementing them"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 280).

1.5 Nozick's Utopian Framework

To respond to the critiques of utopian visions that argue that Utopian visions are unachievable due to human corruption and the inability to voluntarily cooperate towards justice, virtue, and the good life, Nozick offers a possible solution through his framework. He contends that granting dictatorial powers to those who hold such views is impractical (Nozick, 2013). Instead, Nozick emphasizes that the answer should be sought in liberty. As Nozick says, society needs to be organized in such a form that it will be able to tolerate imperfect individuals combined with ideal-visionary individuals.

According to Nozick (2013), among the many merits of being in a free society is the development of the virtue, capacities, and responsibilities proper for free individuals. He realizes that though some people can be corrupt, human society is not so corrupted to an extent that it would require extreme measures. Nozick, on the contrary, offers a voluntary framework as an appropriate remedy where individuals are free to decide and act, which would bring about growth and improvement in them. In this process, there is no need to use coercive measures to attain what one wants or silence the rebellious voice. Nozick thinks of a society that respects individual autonomy while leaving room for individual and collective improvement. Nozick underlines the emphasis on freedom and personal agency as contributing to virtues and capacities, and he also questions whether coercive means of shaping and molding humans are necessary.

Nevertheless, Nozick distances the model from the utopian structure. He states that there are *"important differences between the model and the model's projection onto the actual world"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 281). The framework is the model's projection into the real world: a free association of diverse forms of communities. Individuals can enter by invitation, but they are allowed to leave at will and shape their community as they will.

According to Nozick, the ideal realization of the model would be preferable, but the best we can achieve in our actual world is its *"pale projection"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 281). He notes several ways in which the model departs from the real world: people cannot be created as one would like, the interdependence of real-world communities leads to problems of foreign relations and

defense, information about other communities is hard to obtain, and some communities may prevent their members from knowing about alternatives (Nozick, 2013).

Thus far, despite such obstacles, Nozick considers such a framework to be superior to the actually existing world owing to the opportunity for plural communities. He asserts that “*some of the ways the framework diverges from the possible-worlds model, though making the framework less desirable than the possible-worlds model, leave it more desirable than any other actually realizable situation*” (Nozick, 2013, p. 283).

In a nutshell, what Nozick's vision underlines is that the crucial importance of utopian pursuit lies in voluntary association and respect for the individual's freedom—whether practical or philosophical—against the advantages of diversity and personal autonomy.

1.5.1 Pluralistic Approach

Nozick's idea of a utopia goes against the idea of a one-size-fits-all community. He suggests a model that embraces various unique communities with their own customs and structures (Nozick, 2013). This concept highlights the importance of freedom and autonomy by enabling individuals to choose to be part of communities that fit with their values and beliefs. Nozick discusses aspects of utopian theory by suggesting a structure that embraces a range of communities instead of a singular, unified vision, focusing on valuing diversity and steering clear of imposing one ideal way of life on everyone.

The framework opposes forcing one person's beliefs on others and supports a society where people can follow their idea of a fulfilling life in their preferred community (Nozick, 2013). This approach encourages the formation of communities that draw members with similar qualities and beliefs. The focus on involvement honors independence and enables deeper personal satisfaction in chosen communities. This brings up concerns about putting these ideas into practice, organizing the allocation of resources efficiently for a wide-ranging network of communities, and ensuring fair distribution among them all, especially if certain communities gain more popularity than others.

Nozick's framework also allows for the fact that communities may grow and shrink if some kinds of activities draw more individuals to them than others. True to his libertarian principles,

Nozick admits that most people will not immediately begin joining these experimental communities; some may opt out at first while others remain active, reserving their decision pending observation of the communal outcomes (Nozick, 2013). This points out the fluidity of utopia, and also how essential it is not to fixate on one possibility early on in life, particularly before you've even really had a chance to live in a community. It is a strength of Nozick's account that it envisions society changing over time, adapting to the preferences of its citizens; however, concerns about social coherence and common purpose are also likely to arise in a system characterized by such wide diversity.

In Nozick's meta-utopia, we see the importance of a setting in which utopian experiments could be carried out. So, in a stable way, people can follow their utopias and set the framework of even more utopian visions, according to Nozick (2013). It makes for a stable society that is secure, organized under a type of pattern which makes it possible for citizens to imagine and even believe in the best society. It is this aspect of Nozick's framework that opens the way for small experiments in alternative utopias, the refining of those visions, and from there on to better social arrangements. On the other hand, this would rightly also beg the question of conflicts between communities so fundamentally engaged yet with conflicting interests.

Utopian societies, Nozick points out, include both the framework and the specific communities which inhabit it. He stresses that it is the realization of a vision of an ideal commonwealth within the framework, not an imperialistic one, which has to be taken into account as that will impel a centrifugal force in the creation of distinctive communities with end-state preferences (Nozick, 2013). It avoids the authoritarian potential of utopianism by instead advancing voluntarism and pluralism. Yet it also flags the question of how a framework might address the potential inequities that could develop between such communities. He maintains that the utopian's vision and implementation are carried a step further, taking into account and combining a wide range of concepts, with some findings being the most favorable (Nozick, 2013). This framework's integration of multiple visions allows for a more comprehensive understanding of utopian thought than any one of them could provide alone. This pluralistic viewpoint makes it more constructive to consider the better possibilities of the future, which has a significant impact on discussions about utopianism and social change. The novelty and simplicity of the idea of a Nozickian Framework gives way to the importance of diversity and individual choice in this.

Despite the numerous obstacles and real-world difficulties that could be encountered while attempting to implement Nozick's Framework.

1.5.2 Positions in Nozick's Utopian Conception

Nozick divides this category of utopians into three subcategories depending on their attitude and readiness to participate in his construction of the utopia: existential, missionary, and imperialistic utopianism. This division also illuminates the attitude toward acceptance and the level of opposition to the proposed framework, revealing the difficult and the feasible aspects of building a utopian society of a pluralistic nature.

Existential utopianism, as described by Nozick, *“hopes that a particular pattern of community will exist (will be viable), though not necessarily universally”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 290). This group can totally support Nozick's utopian framework, as they are open to the coexistence of different utopian visions. Nozick acknowledges that *“With full knowledge of their differences, adherents of diverse visions may cooperate in realizing the framework”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 290). This stance tends to favour Nozick's conception of plurality in the ideal society. The position is in opposition to the classical concepts of utopia and calls for free and non-conventional standards of sociocultural perfection.

Missionary utopianism is a middle ground in Nozick's categorization. This group *“hopes to persuade or convince everyone to live in one particular kind of community, but will not force them to do so”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 290). While their aspirations are universal, missionary utopians *“will join them in supporting the framework, viewing fully voluntary adherence to their preferred pattern as crucial”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 290). This position is interesting because it shows both the eagerness for an all-encompassing vision and restraint with regard to any individual in particular. It makes one think about the place of persuasion and education in utopian communities. The missionary utopian perspective highlights the tension between idealism and pragmatism in utopian thought.

Imperialistic utopianism contrasts with the other two positions. This group *“countenances the forcing of everyone into one pattern of community”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 290). Imperialistic utopians *“will oppose the framework so long as some others do not agree with them”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 291). This attitude does not accept the voluntary nature of Nozick's framework, trying

to impose the achievement of a single utopia on all people whether they like it or not. He does appreciate the tension and the resultant conflict, stating that, *“you can't satisfy everybody; especially if there are those who will be dissatisfied unless not everybody is satisfied”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 291). This type of imperialistic utopian position poses fundamental problems concerning the paradigm of freedom and coercion within utopianism. Or can it still be conceived as utopia? These concern us in the sense that they force us to examine the ethical concerns embedded in utopian ideas, and consider the risks posed by intangible or too homogeneous structures of social arrangements.

The classification of utopian positions that Nozick employs is a very useful apparatus in an attempt to understand the variety of utopian methods and their relation to a pluralistic social order. In itself, such recognition of the diverse standpoint is crucial for us to understand that a society can embrace many utopian visions. It also gives a glimpse into the tension between individual freedom and collective ideals in the utopian conception. Further, this categorization presses us to reflect on the position of conversation and accommodation in utopian discourse. Is there any place in which adherents to varying utopian positions can gather, or are some visions inherently incompatible?

This places the confusion and difficulty of constructing a pluralistic utopian model in the right context. It provides a starting and ending point for further philosophical and practical discourse about what utopia can be, and what it is that people want when they want freedom and order.

1.5.3 Routes to the Nozick's Utopian Framework

Robert Nozick lays out a number of hypothetical means of implementing his utopian scheme while allowing for the range of specific conceptions and states of the social imagination. These routes illustrate the complexities of human desire and how difficult it might be to create a society that is ideal for all.

From the routes, the first route regards various human ways of life or communities as valuable, and diversity as in itself an important dimension. Nozick presents two theses: (I) recognizes individual differences, with scenario Ia suggesting that despite these differences, one specific lifestyle could be objectively best for each person. Scenario Ib, however, posits that lifestyles are so diverse that no single community can be objectively best for everyone (Nozick, 2013). Thesis

(II) proposes that based on objective criteria, multiple very different lifestyles could be equally optimal for each individual, with no universally superior community (Nozick, 2013). In questioning utopian aspirations, this route also complicates the question of what ought to count as objective criteria in evaluating utopian societies. How do we balance individual desire with the good of many in a heterogeneous society?

Then, the second route is to accept that “*not all goods can be realized simultaneously, then trade-offs will have to be made*” (Nozick, 2013, p. 280). This attitude accepts that it is impossible to realize all the positive facets of society at once and accepts that there will be a need to rank some of these values above others. This invites us to try and imagine how such losses would be borne by different communities and what that would do for the harmony of society and for the individuals within it. How do you build a framework that could include communities that have value priorities that are likely to be in opposition?

The third route, on the other hand, describes the complexity of the human being and gives two ways: designing devices and filtering devices. The designing device means designing one society without referring to any other. Even though Nozick maintains that it is rather unreasonable to hope that every individual utopia should be designed for everyone, this method allows people to envision and design different types of societies (Nozick, 2013). This method provokes some interesting insights concerning the functions of the imagination and creativity within the social design process. But, how might individual visions of ideal societies contribute to a broader, more diverse utopian framework?

Filtering devices involve eliminating alternatives from a larger set based on selected qualities. In specifying an ideal society, this would mean considering various societies, criticizing, eliminating, or modifying them until the best one is identified (Nozick, 2013). Nozick advocates that individuals should be free to choose whether to participate in a given community or not, and also allow for the modification of those communities that individuals find to be defective. This process allows for the interaction and betterment of the filter and the products that remain, and thus facilitates improvement in quality over time as well as allows for the retesting of alternative solutions that had been ruled out under different conditions in the past. He pointed out the merits of a people-based filtering device and understood that situations are complicated and that there are exceptions that are not predefined. He states that it is inconceivable that a filtering device can

be designed to eliminate everything that ought to be cut out, with the reasoning being that it is the same as saying that laws cannot be provided without the need for judges (Nozick, 2013). This notion introduces some interesting insights concerning the application of human discretion in the engineering of societies as well as the constraints imposed by automatic, or systemic, approaches in resolving social problems.

The filtering devices approach instead offers a way that does not entail designing one society, but rather allows for the creation of many societies with conditions that help the process of evolution and improvement. This approach is in line with Nozick's focus on voluntary engagement and personal preferences, but it also raises concerns related to the maintenance and unity of the society. How should societies resolve the conflict between the requirements of their stabilization and the aspirations of their progressive development and change?

Generally, the means that Nozick suggests towards his vision of utopia are constructive. Thanks to an emphasis on multiplicity, complexity, and voluntary engagement, Nozick re-conceptualizes the idea of utopia and advocates for a more accommodative, diverse way of designing societies. These routes invite further examination of the dilemmas of personal freedom and social order, the question of social change, and the everlasting possibility of social change in a society built of many cultures.

1.5.4 Dynamics of “*Opting Out*”

Nozick considers the problem of people “*opting out*” of some aspect of the utopia, not only in the utopian communities that he drew but also in the broader framework (Nozick, 2013, 291-292). He makes clear the conflict between integrity in the community and individual freedom and explains how the nature of the communities in the framework is distinct from the current context of nation-states.

In small, purposeful communities, on the contrary, Nozick contends the very core tenets can be put in significant jeopardy due to individuals' freedom to default from the tenets. He states that, “*founders and members of a small communist community may, quite properly, refuse to allow anyone to opt out of equal sharing of resources*” (Nozick, 2013, p. 318). This view holds that the internal logic and the philosophical foundations of such communities are based on the assumption that all the members will voluntarily agree to abide by the entire philosophy all the

time. It leads to complex issues about what it means to be part of an intentional community and what restrictions there are on personal freedom in practice. How can these communities agree with each other and respect the individuals at the same time? Or how can these communities balance their need for philosophical coherence with respect for individual autonomy?

In contrast, Nozick contends that nations and larger protective associations must generally accommodate opt-outs from specific requirements and policies to preserve maximum individual liberty (Nozick, 2013). Such a separation values the unique attributes of people making up larger communities and condemns the unrealistic expectation of an unambiguous philosophy. One such view, however, has its drawbacks. How does one manage to formulate and maintain shared objectives and ideals in a society where the individuals are so diverse? What are the boundaries of tolerance, and how can a society discern the point at which individuals' refusal to accept norms begins to endanger the very fabric of society itself?

Nozick does not deny that some degree of nonconformity will be acceptable, provided that people's desire for the national structure will be strong enough for them to stay, regardless of the costs of exiting it. However, he points out that the cost in terms of administering the system wherein various preferences exist is borne by the rest, not by the persons whose preferences are different and who have no claim that the others must help them to be different (Nozick, 2013). This view presents an insightful critique on how individuals in a community ought to behave as well as the question of tolerance. How can a balance be struck between an individual's right to disassociate oneself from a certain part of the society and the obligation of the individuals in the society to share certain responsibilities?

A key principle in Nozick's analysis is that *"any individual may contract into any particular constraints over himself and so may use the voluntary framework to contract himself out of it"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 327). This illustrates the right of free men to determine the degree to which collective and external restraint is permissible. It must also create certain arrangements with regard to social contracts; the opt-out theory is further complicated. How is it possible to prevent this *"sign up or out"* approach to society from being abused? How can we make sure that all choices individuals make to be participants or non-participants in particular social arrangements are free and rational?

The enforcement of a patterned social order has its moral threshold, and issues of political legitimacy and freedom in the different contexts are inherent in Nozick's analysis. Enforcing a more philosophically homogeneous society within small territories may be justifiable; on the other hand, a country should allow more room so long as no one poses a threat to anyone else. Moreover, this demands a second look at the problem of establishing the relationship between the growth of the number and the plurality of the population and the optimal degree of individual liberties and communal integration.

In his analysis, Nozick stated it appears that “*opting out*” is a technique that has not fully resolved the tension between the emphasis on individual liberty and the preservation of the integrity of the community in utopian thinking. It also raises concerns: what does it mean to engage in voluntary association? What is the degree of social tolerance that can be exercised? And what is the role of an individual in various types of social settings? By delineating and drawing attention to the limits of individuals and communities, Nozick finds a workable strategy for a utopia within reach that does not come at the cost of either individual or societal interests.

Nozick makes use of considerations of “*opting out*,” which sheds light on the challenges of individual liberty and community integrity in utopian communities. It also brings to the issue of the meaning of voluntary association, what social tolerance would be, and the place of individual liberty within the different scenarios. By delineating and drawing attention to the limits of individuals and communities, Nozick finds a workable strategy for a utopia within reach that does not bear the cost of either individual or societal interests.

1.5.5 Confronting Non-conformity

Robert Nozick discusses the intricate issue of regulating behavior that is considered offensive or nonconforming in shared public spaces within intentional communities (Nozick, 2013). This dilemma reveals fundamental tensions between majority rule, individual freedoms, and the creation of mutually acceptable social norms, emphasizing the difficulties in fostering harmonious communities while safeguarding personal liberties.

He poses a challenging question about local rules in homogeneous communities that share ownership of the land: “*May the majority of voters in a small village pass an ordinance against things that they find offensive being done on the public streets?*” (Nozick, 2013, p. 320). Here,

the idea that residents can make guidelines and set standards for appropriate behavior in public through committee of the whole decision-making is a symbol of intentional communities. But doing so poses important philosophical and ethical questions.

Nozick challenges the claim of majority rule itself, saying, “*whence this emergent right of the majority to decide?*” (Nozick, 2013, p. 320). This issue strikes at the core of democratic principles and the boundaries of group decision-making. Even though people agree to these limits, the control they might have over how the public acts should raise some doubts for those who champion civil liberties. Nozick then ideally overextends this line of argument by asking if a majority could similarly “*require that no one appear in public without wearing a badge certifying that he has contributed n percent of his income to the needy during the year?*” (Nozick, 2013, p. 320). This helps illustrate how majoritarianism can undermine the freedom of individuals, the right to privacy, among other rights.

How to combine the public order for peaceful living together with individual freedom is a central problem of social organization. Nozick provides an example of the ethical problems that arise when majorities attempt to enforce conformity with seemingly reasonable justifications. The situation invites the usual tough questions about what to make of community, where collective decision-making should stop and personal freedom begin, and the balance between social harmony and individual autonomy.

These voluntary coordination problems only get worse as a society gets larger and more diverse, which is why broader public standards become ever harder to collectively establish. Still, people need to share some basic values to keep communities together. This makes us think harder about how groups can find things in common while respecting different personal values and actions.

Considering non-conformity in public spaces brings up many big questions to study more. These questions can be considered as examples: (1) How can a society ensure social order while at the same time encouraging individual expression and celebrating diversity without the imposition of rules and mandates? (2) Furthermore, how far is too far when it comes to the limitations on majority will in regulating public propriety, all the while ensuring minorities are protected? (3) Also, how do variations in community size from small purposeful associations to vast nation-states alter the management of social norms? (4) Is it possible to devise any principles that can be

widely applied in the control of public places, aiming at maintaining social order without trespassing on individuals' rights to freedom? In light of increasing digital connectivity and globalization, the concept of public space will also evolve.

The examination of non-conformity issues by Nozick considerably reinforces our understanding of the difficult balance in creating supportive environments while ensuring personal freedoms. It sheds light on the ongoing struggle to balance extreme individualism with essential public teamwork, a job that requires constant change as human communities grow more varied and complex. Nonetheless, such obstacles are not impassable; they rather invite new methods of fostering comprehension and cooperation among diverse communities. Nozick's examination of the difficulty of tolerating 'outsiders' in public spaces reveals the tension in the utopian vision: it moves to and fro between allowing for individual freedom and the resolve for communal harmony. It reminds us that the foundational goal of building such a perfect society is never a walk in the park; it is a resolution of conflicts and struggles all the time. Solutions to problems confronting the ideal society at a given stage are not absolute. Nevertheless, one has to appreciate the fact that there are always parameters to this process if advancement is to be realized.

1.5.6 The Role and Complexities of a Central Authority

Problems that arise with any central power in Nozick's notion of an ideal society present a glimpse into real-world issues affecting a perfect society. First, he notes the main tasks performed by this authority, such as the application of the rules and conflict resolution in cases when two or more communities cannot resolve their differences in a more civilized manner (Nozick, 2013). However, Nozick honestly acknowledges the difficulties in determining the optimal political form for this authority, whether it be a federation, confederation, or a decentralized system of checks and balances.

The key issue here is the problem of creating a governing body that has the capacity to govern but does not extend its power or fall into a totalitarian regime. Nozick understands that the ideal of people reaching some kind of consensus and eliminating the kind of central government is best considered ideal, yet unattainable. Some form of arrangement, construction of coalitions, and enforcement will be required for this to happen. This situation increases the danger of both

criminal activities carried out by the community and internal conflicts in the community, which indicates a need for effective limitations on central authority.

Many difficulties come with the implementation of Nozick's theoretical structure which will take a significant effort. These include dealing with the tension between individual choice and collectivism, creating neutral rules that allow an exit from the community even when the individual has a duty to remain, and thinking about how to present options to young people who hold certain communal values (Nozick, 2013). Such a wide range of possible ethical dilemmas renders it impossible to come to a conclusion regarding the exact design of the policy framework from the beginning, thereby showing the need for some authority.

However, still, Nozick stresses that the sort of overall control which oversees the framework itself *“should not be fixed permanently”* and that *“room be left for improvements of detail”* through an iterative process (Nozick, 2013, p. 325). This acknowledges how communities naturally function and that governments must evolve in response to time and challenges. The very design and implementation of such a perfect system will also foresee unforeseen needs and problems.

Rather than trying to impose a definitive and unrealistic scheme, Nozick prefers to suggest an indefinite and honest process of adjustment and reassessment. Such a position recognizes that social and political orders are complicated and that one cannot expect to foretell everything. It also makes it possible to bring in new ideas and rectify problems with the system which could not have been anticipated at the beginning.

This kind of evolutionary process that Nozick proposes takes one from noble ideals to workable practices, and even policies. It makes it clear that in the process of advancing or modifying society, there is always more work to be done or focused on new challenges. This vision also corresponds to the idea that utopias are not simply places or conditions to be achieved once and for all; improvement is rather a continuous work towards perfection.

Yet, this perspective brings difficult issues. Constantly adapting strategies on how to resolve disputes without partiality and respect differences while avoiding the drawbacks of such issues, and also meeting the challenge of central authority and the rights of the individual are issues that

are recurrent in nature. This problem requires not only political and legal skills but also consideration of human beings and communities.

The benefits of putting such a system into practice are enormous: an environment that promotes human development in a sustainable manner. However, the way towards achieving this mission is far from easy; it calls for enormous courage, intelligence, and dedication to putting in place self-regulating systems of total cooperation in society.

Problems surrounding a central power within Nozick's ideal society help in understanding real-world problems. By recognizing government as an entity requiring constant modification and reform, Nozick engages fully with the utopian scheme. It is limited in its vision by its perspective that is against the static ideal view and instead for progress made on earth.

1.5.7 Minimal State as a Framework

According to Nozick, a "minimal state" provides a framework for utopia: *"the framework for utopia that we have described is equivalent to the minimal state"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 328). It is unlike traditional utopian thinking that tries to impose a certain structure upon society. For him, the state would include only the protection of individual rights, protecting them from coercion, holding them all together so that each person could freely shape an ideal community according to his standards.

If a state undertakes functions beyond these minimal ones, he argues, it becomes coercive and unlawful by nature. This individualistic liberty and self-determination are in line with what most utopian thinkers have come to advocate. Unlike designs for a perfect society, Nozick's way actually leaves humanity with the challenge of its independence regarding different values and lifestyles through voluntary associations.

It *"grows spontaneously from individual choices over time,"* Nozick says regarding the *"utopian process"* (Nozick, 2013, pp. 327). This perspective shifts the focus from a fixed, end-state destination to the dynamic process of societal development. He claims that the minimal society's reconciliation of order and liberty represents a peak of moral and intellectual achievement. More importantly, unlike hard utopian models, it recognizes the fluidity of society and human aspirations, thus allowing endless improvement (Popper, 1945).

By emphasizing individual rights and limiting coercion, Nozick's scheme is a more plausible and ethically justifiable means of improving society than traditional utopian dreams. It is indeed in keeping with notions of human potential and self-actualization (Maslow, 1943). Further strengthening the case for a minimal state, his argument shows that it could make utopian ideals work with a society in which individuals could flourish.

1.5.8 Dynamic Evolution

Utopia in Nozick's understanding is a process in motion rather than a goal to be reached. It is a radical shift from classical utopianism. He denies the existence of an immutably idealistic condition, theorizing instead that the structure of societies is an endlessly evolving phenomenon driven by man and his free will (Nozick, 2013). This conceives of the fluidity that derives from various people helping make the same society at different points in time.

Nozick notes that it is pointless to try to plan or maintain a particular utopia in a top-down manner. He maintains that this, in his opinion, is against the nature of utopia, which he characterizes as *“substitut[ing] for the utopian end state of other static theories”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 327). He does not talk about the end of the project; in fact, he says that the true utopian impulse lies precisely in the process of rebuilding society through human creativity and freedom.

The framing of utopia in such a way suggests moving away from a thorough blueprint for a fixed society towards a political economy that is rather for *“what grows spontaneously from the individual choices of many people over a long period of time”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 327). Robert Nozick's position holds that there is no real end in itself; rather, the end is to create conditions whereby different *“communities will achieve many different characters”* through an unfolding of *“the utopian process”* over generations (Nozick, 2013, p. 327). This stance proposes turning down discussions on which utopia is better than the others and trusts faith in human alternate visions as an *“interplay of human choice, experimentation, and evolution”* (Ritzer, 1988). In this view, the very attempt to achieve control in its strictest form becomes counter to the goal of realizing the utopian possibilities of humanity.

This understanding of utopia fits with the modern perspective: societies are complicated and constantly evolving. It accepts that human societies cannot be designed ‘to the last detail’ as they are constantly evolving and developing due to millions of interactions and decisions. This

complexity and unpredictability of human behaviour is welcome in Nozick's paradigm in that it improves flexibility and the ability of the system to thrive under challenges and changes not envisaged earlier.

Additionally, the strategy adopted by Nozick considers and values the multiplicity of human aspirations, objectives, and lifestyles. It does not seek to monopolize the good; instead, it embraces differences by permitting many utopian endeavors to flourish. This respect for diversity in the conception of utopia does not seek to deny that different individuals and groups may conceive of the ideal society in different ways; instead, it appreciates the existence of these different ideal societies and encourages their pursuit at once.

Moreover, this unrestrained vision of utopia raises serious issues as well. How can one be confident that this particular evolution of society will be beneficial for each and every member of this society? What sort of safeguards can be instituted in this situation in order to avoid degenerative or repressive regimes? These difficulties pointedly illustrate the necessity for ethical thinking and public debate about the future realized order of society.

This concept of utopia as a pillar of ideology that is always in change, a concept which ontologically stands in opposition to linear blueprints, is indeed a better proposition. It has room for change in a positive way due to the wild nature of human beings and their social systems. This sort of thinking allows us to view utopia not as a final and complete state of all that is desired being achieved, but rather as a 'work in progress' which involves constant collaboration between striving individuals, who make choices and act, bringing forth certain results.

1.6 Virtues of Nozick's Utopian Conception

1.6.1 Accommodating Diverse Utopian Visions

The inclusive nature, which can even embrace almost any utopian vision or experimental utopia, forms one of the prominent virtues of Nozick's utopian conception (Nozick, 2013). Instead, it is an environment conducive to the growth of many ideal societies as derived from voluntary associations and their replication and evolution instead of the imposition of one ideal blueprint. This pluralistic flexibility uniquely positions the conception to serve as a broadly attractive

common foundation for both committed utopians adhering to specific philosophical traditions and their critics alike.

The main point is that rational individuals will self-select into whichever community pattern they find most desirable and fulfilling based on their values and aspirations. Nozick avoids the argumentative value question as to whose ideal society is better or the universal imposition of any one societal structure. This position of neutrality and healthy coexistence allows for different utopian communities to flourish side by side without enforced uniformity.

Undoubtedly, outliers, such as expansionist totalitarianism which seeks enforced homogeneity, represent one such worldview that simply cannot be accommodated in Nozick's conception. Because the very nature of the system is interdependent, multiculturalism is collectively expressed in enabling everyone's voluntary valuation of the other's potential contribution. Yet, this is not the case for older variants of utopian thought that have everything to do with the ethical exploration of new territories of human life; it is in this regard that Nozick's notion provides an amazing enhancement of the previously existing constraining parameters of other or his predecessor utopian conceptions.

1.6.2 Promoting a Truly Pluralistic Society

Nozick's framework allows for the smooth interactions of different viewpoints, values, ways of living, and cultures (Fowler, 1980). His conception does not promote cultural imperialism but rather acknowledges the right to self-determination and individual expression irrespective of people's cultural organization. This kind of tolerance inspires a sense of solidarity made possible by the appreciation of the diverse portions of the world and the appeal of human variability.

Here, pluralism is understood to be a principle of 'live and let live.' In Nozick's picture, this is a very democratic sociopolitical device allowing full articulation of all possible variants of communal types to be realized. If there is freedom to self-organize, societies will develop in which different pictures of the good society will coexist, compete, and develop without needing any single blueprint or center able to impose it.

The paradigm develops beyond the simple considerations of justifying the endorsement of one all-embracing utopia to the creation and acceptance of many changing utopias over time. The

ultimate utopian accomplishment is no longer preserving one reigning ideology, but rather the maintenance of a society's ever-changing culture that fulfills the desires of its members.

1.6.3 Upholding Key Liberal Values

Nozick's conception preserves and enables several fundamental liberal principles recognized by many scholars to be nearer to humanity's fantasy ideas:

- **Self-Ownership and Liberty:** In Nozick's utopian conception, each individual has full control over his or her life, work, and legitimately owned property, free from force from other people. This is an important point that enables a condition for pursuing diverse self-actualized visions.
- **Community Autonomy:** Similar to individual self-ownership, communities can also craft and revise their own internal norms, rules, and organizational structures through participatory processes without any external imposition, unless allowed by the community in its internal rules.
- **Limited Government:** Nozick's utopian idea is highly compatible with another primary libertarian value, which is: the primary role of centralized authorities is safeguarding individual rights and administering impartial decision-making services, not dictating comprehensive civic philosophies.
- **Free Association:** Nozick's utopian conception is also aligned with people's free association. In his conception, people freely opt into communities aligning with their values through the voluntary investment of efforts, resources, and interpersonal commitments. Moreover, viable exit options remain.
- **Economic Freedom:** The framework and the model proposed by Nozick encourage decentralized free markets and entrepreneurship, rather than centralized bureaucratic control, to drive innovation, exchange, and resource allocation across communities.

By enabling these classical liberal principles within a dynamically pluralistic societal framework, Nozick avoids constant philosophical clashes between individualism/collectivism and

state/market absolutism. The final result of this synthesis may signify, for many, the highest possible attainment of a utopian plan, people's liberation, and economic development.

1.6.4 Embracing Continual Evolution

The philosophy associated with Nozick's utopian conception does not view utopia as the final stage of human society. Nozick perceives it as a never-ending quest for building a better society (Nozick, 2013). He does not seek to condense some paradoxical unchangeable description of social relations of the utmost improvement; instead, he pays respect to the creative, restless nature of anyone who has the vision and considers more progressive conditions achievable through generations of improvement.

This character of Nozick's vision resonates with our deepest individual and collective self-perception that comprehends there is still always something more, some higher level to conquer. It shows our infinite capacities for re-invention and self-transcendence towards continually refining societal mechanisms and patterns in productive ways.

Nozick's conception's decentralized, voluntary nature equips it with a unique brand of evolutionary strength. It is like a vast, natural order; desirable new norms, practices, and organizational models can spread rapidly across communities. And from this practical vantage, Nozick's conception of utopia is not a final model, but one that can help to attain people's infinite dream-production potential. It is a safe, liberty-safeguarding soil for the unlimited productive manifestation of reason's growing genius in every sphere of social life.

1.7 Chapter One Summary

From beginning to end, in this chapter, I have tried to examine Robert Nozick's approach to utopia, which is different from the traditional concept of a perfect society that is mandatory and monopolized by some group or person. Against such uniform theories, Nozick advances a multi-utopia which he first pluralistically, and then meta-pluralistically, theorizes as a system within which many different utopian communities and aspirations might exist together and without conflict. This provides the skeleton for the formation, withdrawal from, and management of different utopian groups according to their own principles and governing standards.

I tried to discuss instances of the framework and its components, such as the characteristics of the communities, the processes of opting out or dealing with deviation, the existence of hierarchy, and Nozick's justifications for the evolutionary nature of the system. At its core, this ideology is based on the concepts of voluntarism, the freedom of association, and the personal choice of people as to which utopia's environment they would like to inhabit.

Nozick's conception of the utopian idea is a radical revision in the way utopian theory has previously been conceived. Instead of offering an unambiguous design of the perfect order, he proposes a means through which different utopian concepts can co-exist, of course with mutual tolerance and willingness to fit in with one another. Such a proposition upsets the traditional perception of the proponents of utopias who give their ideas in the form of a perfect society, but one that is always singular in its approach and vision.

But the questions of "*what challenges could face putting such a conception into practice?*" and "*is it possible to put into practice Nozick's possible utopian model and framework?*" will be answered in the upcoming chapters.

CHAPTER TWO

Analysis of Challenges in Bringing Nozick Utopia in to Life

2.1 Chapter Two Overview

Chapter Two is concerned with the challenges to realizing Robert Nozick's libertarian utopia, as outlined in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (1974). For Nozick, there is a "meta-utopia" whereby free individuals construct pluralist communities based on their value hierarchies within the minimal state. The chapter begins by examining Nozick's own self-critical limitations of his "possible worlds" approach, derived from pragmatic theory-practice shortcomings.

The chapter goes on to address a range of objections by leading critics, from philosophical, political, and social to governance, economic, and cultural. These include Derek Parfit's concerns about identity and sorting, Samuel Scheffler's critique of moral obligations, Joseph Raz's autonomy objections, Peter Singer's warnings against moral relativism, Susan Moller Okin's feminist perspective on gender inequality, Michael Walzer's fears of instability, Ruth Sample's membership exclusion issues, Michael Otsuka's governance challenges, Barbara Fried's public goods provision problems, Peter Sabatini's critique of inequality, Thomas Nagel's doubts about practical feasibility, Dudley Knowles's philosophical and governance issues, G.A. Cohen's focus on power inequalities, and Michael J. Sandel's on civic ties. They demonstrate the abundant moral, philosophical, and pragmatic richness of implementing Nozick's theoretical model within a specific society, confronted with threats to individual freedom, social cohesion, and equal powers.

2.2 Exploring Nozick's Critique: Limitations of the Utopian Possible Worlds Model

Robert Nozick presents limitations and challenges involved in realizing his Utopian Model (Model of Possible Worlds) in the real world. The argument, put forth by Nozick himself, sheds light on the potential obstacles faced in implementing his visionary model. The difference between the actual world and the possible worlds model is shown in the discussion ahead.

The first one is the issue of creating people as desired within the model: "*Unlike the model, we cannot create all the people whose existence we desire*" (Nozick, 2013, p. 281). Nozick argues

that in reality, it is not possible to perfectly create individuals who fit specific criteria. This limitation leads to a potential lack of support or the absence of desired community members. Although the Utopian Model aims to ensure a sufficiently diverse community, the inherent constraints of reality make this a difficult task.

The second challenge Nozick highlights is the interdependence and impact of real-world communities: *“Unlike the model, in the actual world communities impinge upon one another, creating problems of foreign relations and self-defense and necessitating modes of adjudicating and resolving disputes between the communities. (In the model, one association impinges upon another only by drawing away some of its members.)”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 281). While the model portrays member attraction as the only interaction, in reality, communities possess very complex interrelationships. This introduces foreign and defense issues that require solutions well beyond member attraction.

Understanding the nature of other communities and gathering information about communities is also difficult in the real world: *“In the actual world, there are information costs in finding out what other communities there are, and what they are like, and moving and travel costs in going from one community to another”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 281). In fact, knowing about alternative communities and even traveling to them requires effort and resources. Such a restriction contrasts with the model, wherein there are no such barriers.

Additionally, Nozick points out how a few real communities may restrict the knowledge of members to alternative communities, with a view to retaining such members within their own communities: *“in the actual world, some communities may try to keep some of their members ignorant of the nature of other alternative communities they might join, to try to prevent them from freely leaving their own community to join another. This raises the problem of how freedom of movement is to be institutionalized and enforced when there are some who will wish to restrict it”* (Nozick, 2013, p. 281). Such assigning of restrictions is against free movement and creates problems in the implementation of unrestricted movement. Such restrictions stand directly opposed to the fundamental presupposition of the model, namely the autonomy and freedom of individuals.

Despite these limitations and deviations from an initial model, Nozick maintains that the framework he presented and which was discussed in chapter one of this paper remains the best alternative to the existing world society. He sees the framework that provides different kinds of communities as giving people more options and freedom than the present social structure affords them. The very thought of the limitations and difficulties of his Utopian Model shows that Nozick is conscious of the difficulties and constraints of putting up that kind of society in practice. Those limitations, like the impossibility of creating humans to specification and problems arising from the interdependence of communities in the real world, present serious obstacles to the realization of such a model. However, even with those limitations, his framework offers promise for an alternative to the existing structure within which humans organize their society.

2.3 Challenges Drawn from Critics of Nozick's Utopian Conception

2.3.1 Identity, Change, and Sorting Issues (Derek Parfit)

According to Robert Nozick's theory of the ideal society presented in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (1974), individuals are free to associate with groups that share their values and preferences. He refers to this as a "meta-utopia," where "*many different utopian visions [can] be tried*" (Nozick, 1974, p. 312). A happy society in which everyone freely chooses their path, with no blueprint laid down for everyone, is the goal. However, Derek Parfit argues in *Reasons and Persons* (1984) that there are many flaws in Nozick's theory, particularly in its treatment of the evolution of people's identities and choices. According to Nozick, if a person's future self is the most like their current self, then their identity remains unchanged. Parfit disagrees, stating, "*This pattern of concern seems to me irrational. It rests on the false assumption that identity must be determinate*" (Parfit, 1984, p. 215).

According to Parfit, identity is a dynamic concept that evolves over time. He says, "*We can describe what happens to us in ways that do not claim that personal identity is determinate*" (Parfit, 1984, p. 217). This calls into question Nozick's strategy of grouping people into communities according to consistent identities or preferences. Parfit argues that people are often committed to one society or system that, he claims, may not fit their future selves, because people change their wishes and beliefs over time.

Parfit also argues that a sorting mechanism like the one envisioned in Nozick's utopia may inhibit some forms of freedom. It prevents people from making free choices later if it places them according to their current preferences and does not update. This is a significant issue if identity keeps changing. Parfit warns that such a system “*arbitrarily pigeon-holes*” people by assuming their selves remain simple and fixed (Parfit, 1984, p. 214).

Parfit demonstrates that Nozick's sorting concept may not be successful, despite his desire to give people options. Placing people in predetermined communities may rob them of the freedom Nozick seeks to preserve if their preferences and identities change.

2.3.2 Moral Constraints in Utopian Theory (Samuel Scheffler)

In *Relationships and Responsibilities* (1997), Samuel Scheffler offers an insightful critique pertinent to libertarian viewpoints such as Robert Nozick's. Although Scheffler's work does not specifically target Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, it does challenge fundamental libertarian tenets, particularly the notion that moral obligations and societal structure should be determined solely by individual choice.

Scheffler contends that many of our most significant obligations arise from the relationships themselves rather than from contracts or agreements. He states: “*To value one's relationship with another person is to see it as a source of reasons for action of a distinctive kind. It is, in effect, to see oneself as having special responsibilities*” (Scheffler, 1997, p. 201). This contrasts with Nozick's utopia, which may overlook the moral significance of shared social ties and features communities that are freely selected and obligations that are voluntary.

In addition, he questions voluntarist libertarianism by pointing out its questionable assumptions: that one's identity is basically shaped by the social roles and ties people are born into. “*The idea that the significance of our personal ties and social affiliations is wholly dependent on our wills... can only be regarded as a fantasy*” (Scheffler, 1997, p. 204). This thus criticizes Nozick's model of utopian free association for ignoring the actual and inevitable ways that our moral obligations are ingrained because of the social interactions in which we live.

Moreover, if a society recognizes only commitments made of free will, Scheffler warns of the dangers of distributive injustice. “*Special responsibilities may also provide significant*

advantages for the participants in interpersonal relations, and significant disadvantages for nonparticipants” (Scheffler, 1997, p. 207). A Nozickian utopia would mean certain groups could obtain power or advantages simply on account of whom they associate with, while others are excluded, raising ethical questions about its fairness.

Scheffler's critique, then, represents a very strong moral case for bringing nonvoluntary responsibility and justice into our vision of a good society—issues that do not feature adequately in Nozick's vision of the libertarian utopia.

2.3.3 The Autonomy Objection (Joseph Raz)

Raz formulates a basic critique of Nozick's utopian scheme, arguing that for an individual to claim true personal autonomy, it is not enough to enjoy freedom of initial choice: one must also be able to sustain that freedom through the ability to reconsider values in light of a variety of life options. Raz states that autonomy is *“the condition of having a life one authors, by making choices among a range of valuable options”* (Raz, 1986, p. 370). With this, he underscores that autonomy is not about a single option but about having *“an adequate range of options”* and the *“mental abilities necessary for an autonomous life”* (p. 425). This challenge, therefore, undermines Nozick's model, which theoretically allows individuals to cluster into communities according to fixed preferences. Raz suggests that such a system may *“fail to accommodate the dynamic nature of human preferences,”* and thus serve as an impediment to people's capacity to adapt and reconstruct their own lives in an autonomous way (p. 425).

Coercive systems, though under the guise of choice, can impose certain community standards, warns Raz: *“One may not pursue any goal by means which infringe people's autonomy unless such action is justified by the need to protect or promote the autonomy of those people or of others”* (p. 426). This view suggests a utopia could turn into a subtle kind of coercion if it does not establish a continuing freedom to change life paths.

Pluralism is essential for autonomy, as Raz points out. A just society should support *“a plurality of incompatible and competing pursuits, projects and relationships”* (p. 426), not enclose people in static communities according to their childhood preferences.

In short, Raz's critique of autonomy shows that Nozick's utopia may not be defensible, because the evolving nature of autonomy and the conditions necessary for it have not been taken into account.

2.3.4 The Moral Relativism and Intuitionism Critique (Peter Singer)

Singer's critique in *Ethics and Intuitions* does not confront the utopian context proposed by Nozick directly, but it offers a challenge to the philosophical basis that may provide a rationale for moral relativism in such a framework. Singer interrogates the epistemological reliability of moral intuitions granted by culture as grounds for ethical theories, giving fair warning that *“there is little point in constructing a moral theory designed to match considered moral judgments that themselves stem from our evolved responses to the situations in which we and our ancestors lived”* (Singer, 2005, p. 348).

A critique of this sort has serious consequences for utopian models like Nozick's because such models empower communities to set their own moral codes. In the absence of shared moral constraints, relativism could permit horrible practices under the guise of cultural legitimacy. Singer seems particularly hostile toward Kantian constructivism and Rawlsian reflective equilibrium for their alleged acceptance of cultural relativism. He states, *“Cultural relativism has had many defenders in ethics, including many who misguidedly believe that it offers a defense against cultural imperialism”* (Singer, 2005, p. 346).

Singer uses the popularization of neuroscience and psychology to prove that there are times when moral decisions surface as emotive intuitions devoid of rational deliberation. He then comments that *“advances in our understanding of ethics do not themselves directly imply any normative conclusions, but they undermine some conceptions of doing ethics which themselves have normative conclusions”* (Singer, 2005, p. 348). These conceptions, according to Singer, are *“too respectful of our intuitions”* (p. 348). Instead of taking these intuitive judgments as moral facts, Singer advocates for rationalist approaches that discover universal principles. He posits *“the ambitious task of separating those moral judgments that we owe to our evolutionary and cultural history, from those that have a rational basis”* (Singer, 2005, p. 351). This indicates that ethical theory needs to transcend both moral pluralism and relativism to develop genuine moral progress.

Generally, Singer's critique of intuitionism and cultural relativism serves as a strong warning against theories like Nozick's that might empower communities to adopt radically divergent and potentially harmful moral norms. According to Singer, a utopia devoid of universal ethical constraints risks stagnation or regression.

2.3.5 The Feminist Critique (Susan Moller Okin)

In a feminist critique of Robert Nozick's libertarian Utopian framework, Susan Moller Okin (1989) criticizes it for ignoring gender inequality and family justice. Okin argues that Nozick's utopia perpetuates unjust family structures without reform. She states that *"the framework, by refusing to regulate the basic structure of families, would permit precisely the same kinds of injustice that the libertarian model permits"* (Okin, 1989, p. 75). According to Okin, Nozick assumes that families are private and should not be controlled by the rules of justice, but this ignores the reality that the traditional family system keeps women in subordination. Most critically, Nozick's utopia would allow for a system through which women's unpaid labor and second-class status would remain unchecked (Okin, 1989).

Okin (1989), on the other hand, argues that all societies, including a utopian community, must address gender inequalities even within households as a matter of justice. She says, *"families in a just society must themselves be just institutions"* (Okin, 1989, p. 171). Without justice inside the family, she warns, women would still suffer from economic and social disadvantages even if all other parts of society improved. According to Okin, freedom and fairness should first coexist at home; otherwise, Nozick's libertarian utopia would merely serve to recreate older modes of domination and inequality (Okin, 1989).

2.3.6 Lack of Stability (Michael Walzer)

Michael Walzer (1983) criticizes Robert Nozick's idea of a utopian society for being too focused on freedom without protecting people from unfair domination. Walzer believes Nozick's system would allow powerful people to acquire control over essential spheres of life such as politics, social affairs, education, and health. He goes on to predict: *"the different spheres of justice ... are likely to come into conflict with one another, as individuals and groups seek to dominate or exploit particular goods"* (Walzer, 1983, p. 20). Thus, it may be said that Nozick's property

model proves inadequate for protection against strong groups seeking to use advantages held in one sphere to control others, thereby destroying fairness and equality for all in society.

To fix this problem, Walzer (1983) proposes the implementation of different regulations for various sections of society to prevent advantages in one sphere from being converted into political power. *"Justice requires that we prevent the conversion of one good into another in ways that destroy the autonomy of the separate spheres,"* (Walzer, 1983, p. 17). Walzer contends that Nozick's minimal government would not prohibit unfair advantages from spreading. That is, it shows that, without strong protections, Nozick's utopia could turn out to be a society where the rich and powerful control everything, rather than a truly fair and free community (Walzer, 1983).

2.3.7 The Problem of Membership (Ruth Sample)

Ruth Sample (2004) in her review of *Robert Nozick*, edited by David Schmidtz, discusses the challenges that Nozick's (1974) libertarian utopian framework poses regarding possible exclusionary practices in communities with distinctly different visions of the good. The framework admits various communities, but it risks exclusion, as Sample notes, citing Loren Lomasky's argument that *"a libertarian world ... is fully consistent with joint expressive activity"* yet may not ensure inclusive membership (Sample, 2004, p. 346). Such conditions might lead to communities that are homogenous, and thus not truly diverse and fair (Sample, 2004).

How does Sample (2004) propose dealing with this? Nozick's utopia might feature cooperative linking devices. Sample points to Loren Lomasky's counter that *'a libertarian world...is fully consistent with joint expressive activity'* and possibly need not necessarily provide for membership inclusiveness (Sample, 2004, p. 346). Lacking just procedures to regulate membership, the looming power of exclusion threatens to undermine Nozick's conception of a free and fair society, thus requiring inclusive measures aimed at enhancing diversity within communities (Sample, 2004).

2.3.8 Governance Challenges in Nozick's Utopia (Michael Otsuka)

Michael Otsuka says Robert Nozick's utopian idea has trouble creating a system for managing different communities. Nozick's utopia envisions a minimal state where people form

communities based on their own values (Nozick, 1974, p. 312). Otsuka argues it is hard to make a fair system that lets communities stay independent but also work together and resolve conflicts.

Otsuka explains that Nozick's plan needs a way to handle community interactions. He writes, "*Nozick's utopian communities, each pursuing its own vision, require a framework to manage interactions, but his minimal state offers no such structure, leaving disputes unresolved*" (Otsuka, 2003, p. 79). For example, two communities might argue over land or trade rules with no one to settle them.

Getting all communities to agree on rules is difficult. Otsuka notes, "*Consensus on principles governing inter-community relations is vital but difficult, given the diversity Nozick celebrates*" (Otsuka, 2003, p. 80). Some groups might want strict rules, while others want freedom, and they might not be able to come to an agreement.

Otsuka also warns that stronger communities might take over and assert rules that are favorable to them. According to him, "*Stronger communities may impose their preferences, creating power imbalances that Nozick's framework cannot correct*" (Otsuka, 2003, p. 81). This can create unfairness, especially for small or weak communities.

For Nozick's utopia to work, Otsuka suggests it needs a clear system for arbitrating disagreements and guaranteeing fairness. In his words, "*A harmonious and just system requires institutions to resolve conflicts and ensure equality, but Nozick's utopia resists being controlled this way*" (Otsuka, 2003, p. 82). Otherwise, the communities would conflict or treat each other unjustly, and the utopia would fall apart.

2.3.9 Issues of Public Goods Provision in Nozick's Utopia (Barbara Fried)

Nozick's utopia is unable to provide all individuals with public goods that they require, such as roads, police, or clean air, due to the heterogeneity and autonomy of communities. Nozick's utopia features a minimal state in which individuals are allowed to choose and select communities of their own (Nozick, 1974, p. 312). Fried argues that no means of agreement on funding common goods would be possible.

Fried shows that Nozick's system cannot guarantee the provision of public goods. She continues, "*Nozick's minimal state cannot provide public goods such as defense or roads because voluntary*

communities have no way of forcing contributions" (Fried, 2004, p. 77). For example, one community might desire police protection, but another might not, and this can lead to conflict concerning funding.

She also warns against individuals who utilize such resources but do not contribute, a situation known as free-riding. Fried states, *"Free-riding is a serious threat in Nozick's system, under which individuals or groups can benefit from public goods without contributing, resulting in underproduction"* (Fried, 2004, p. 78). This can lead to bad roads or no clean water because some individuals do not contribute.

For Nozick's utopia to be effective, communities must make collective decisions and compromise. Fried says, *"Effective collective decision-making and enforceable agreements are needed to fund public goods, but these conflict with Nozick's non-interventionist state"* (Fried, 2004, p. 79). Without rules to prevent free-riding and compel contributions from everyone, the utopia would lack needed resources, thereby creating severe problems.

2.3.10 Why Nozick's Utopia Doesn't Work for Everyone (Peter Sabatini)

In his essay *Libertarianism: Bogus Anarchy*, Peter Sabatini (1994–1995) offers a short but incisive critique of Robert Nozick's vision of a utopia. Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (1974) offers a vision of society in which people are free to leave or join communities of their choice, and in which the state interferes only to protect basic rights. This vision was extremely trendy during a period when people were dissatisfied with government and experiencing economic problems.

Sabatini believes that Nozick's utopia is neither radical nor new. He says it is basically a repeat of what was said before by libertarian ideologues, especially John Locke. Sabatini thinks that Nozick's book is *"nothing more than old wine in a new bottle, an updating of John Locke"* (Sabatini, 1994–1995, p. 8). Nozick's utopia cherishes the same things previous libertarian ideologues cherished most: private property, inequality, and limited government.

Sabatini also shows that Nozick does not promote real freedom for everyone. According to him, while Nozick is concerned about limiting the power of government, he nonetheless wants strong institutions of law, police, and the military. Sabatini cites, *"Nozick makes pointed reference to*

the US individualist anarchists, and summarily dismisses them" (p. 8). This shows that Nozick would not accept more radical or communal ways of structuring society.

Instead of realizing true freedom, Sabatini argues that Nozick's utopia simply replaces public power with private power. Wealthier individuals can control more resources, including security and justice. This would render Nozick's utopia unequal and unjust. It would still have the same problems associated with capitalism, but wrapped up in the guise of "*freedom*."

Nozick's utopia, then, is not a society where all individuals are free and equal. It is simply a society in which rich individuals have more control, and poor ones have less assistance and fewer options.

2.3.11 Why Nozick's Utopia Isn't Convincing (Thomas Nagel)

In his criticism, philosopher Thomas Nagel (1975) discusses Robert Nozick's vision of a libertarian utopia, where every person can choose the kind of community they would like to be in. While the idea is meant to favor individual liberty, Nagel sees many shortcomings in Nozick's argument.

Nozick dreams of a society where people are able to freely enter or create communities that reflect their values, as long as no one's rights are being violated. That sounds good, Nagel argues, but it is unrealistic. His criticism is that Nozick's idea of starting with individual rights and building society around them fails to take into account how complicated real societies are. Nagel explains that "*Nozick's book is theoretically insubstantial: it does not take up the main problems*" of political theory (Nagel, 1975, p. 138).

Nagel is especially critical of the way Nozick builds his utopia from a premise concerning individual rights without ever stopping to think how those rights would function in a broad, pluralistic society. Nagel states that, "*It is hard for anyone to make firm moral judgments on general principles of human action without thinking about what it would be like if they were accepted and obeyed everywhere*" (Nagel, 1975, p. 143). This suggests that Nozick's proposal reads well on paper, but would not work in practice.

Nagel also points out that Nozick assumes that everyone will agree on fundamental rights and not interfere with each other. But in real societies, this is often not the case. Nagel is skeptical

that an optimal utopia of minimal government and voluntary cooperation would actually protect individuals' freedoms. He states, "*It is doubtful that a government limited to the functions of police, courts, prisons, and national defense would be conspicuously benign*" (Nagel, 1975, p. 140).

Nozick outlines his concept of a "*pluralistic libertarian utopia*," in which many different kinds of communities can peacefully coexist. Nagel is intrigued by this concept but still remains unconvinced. He does admit that Nozick is imaginative and concise, saying the book is "*funny, fast-paced and a pleasure to read*" (Nagel, 1975, p. 160), but determines that the utopia is flawed because it is constructed upon weak moral principles and ignores practical factors.

2.3.12 Philosophical and Governance Challenges to Nozick's Utopia (Dudley Knowles)

Dudley Knowles, in his review of Jonathan Wolff's *Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State*, observes that Wolff critiques Robert Nozick's vision of utopia as difficult to implement due to its moral and governmental shortcomings. Nozick's utopia would exist with a minimal state ruling over freely contracting communities formed by individual will (Nozick, 1974, p. 312). Wolff, Knowles reports, is intrigued by the vision but remains skeptical about its feasibility.

Knowles says Wolff disparages Nozick's handling of those who resist state control, for example, the "*John Wayne*" character who wants to mete out his own justice. Nozick suggests paying these individuals to stay out of it, but Wolff is not so sure, with Knowles asserting, "*no matter what kind and how much compensation is showered upon John Wayne, this cannot establish an obligation on his part*" (Knowles, 1993, p. 568). This is a philosophical flaw: compensation is not morally justifiable for restricting rights, which undermines the utopia's voluntary nature.

Knowles also suggests that Wolff finds the utopia insufficient in advancing justice between communities. He remarks that Wolff criticizes "*Nozick's own 'inspiring' vision of Utopia*" but also criticizes its reliance on freedom (Knowles, 1993, p. 569). Without means for settling disputes or attaining fairness, the minimal state struggles to keep complex communities together, rendering its governance problematic.

2.3.13 Political and Social Challenges to Nozick's Utopia (G. A. Cohen)

G. A. Cohen criticizes Robert Nozick's utopian vision as impossible since it creates unfair power differences and social injustice. Nozick's utopia is a minimal state in which people voluntarily organize communities based on their values (Nozick, 1974, p. 312). This is impossible, according to Cohen, since voluntary exchanges, as in the example of Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain, lead to outcomes that are not in the best interests of society.

Cohen uses the parable of Chamberlain, where fans pay 25 cents per head to watch a basketball superstar, shelling out \$250,000 (Cohen, 1977, p. 6). Nozick claims that this is just because the exchange is voluntary. Cohen disagrees, arguing that *"the access of the fans to resources in the future may be prejudiced by the unequal access Chamberlain's wealth provides him, and the resultant power over others he now exercises"* (p. 11). That is, Chamberlain can control more resources with his wealth, making the utopia less equal and less just for others.

Cohen also says people in an equal society would not agree to such exchanges if they knew what was at stake. He says, *"Reflective people would have to consider... the fact... that their society would be set on a road to class division"* (p. 11). This means Nozick's utopia requires individuals to act without worrying that their choices create inequality, and this may lead to social conflict and instability. Cohen believes a socialist society, with rules to regulate wealth, would be able to maintain equality without necessarily prohibiting all voluntary choices.

2.3.14 Philosophical and Social Objections to Nozick's Utopia (Michael J. Sandel)

Michael J. Sandel is critical of Robert Nozick's utopian ideal, which he argues will not succeed because it does not address the requirement for community and shared identity and therefore produces a society that lacks moral depth and social stability. Nozick's utopia envisions a minimalist state with people forming communities voluntarily as a product of their voluntary decisions (Nozick, 1974, p. 312). Sandel says this vision will not work because it relies on the premise that people are totally isolated individuals with no strong ties, which would make it hard to establish long-term communities.

Sandel argues that Nozick's understanding of the self—where people own their skills and what they acquire—is ignorant of how identity consists of family, history, and community. He frames

it thus, *"To imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments... is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without character, without moral depth"* (p. 155). Individuals in Nozick's utopia act only for themselves, and this undermines the social bonds that cement communities.

This generates a social dilemma: without any such shared attachments, Nozick's voluntary communities would collapse. Sandel notes, *"As the independent self finds its limits in those aims and attachments from which it cannot stand apart, so justice finds its limits in those forms of community that engage the identity as well as the interests of the participants"* (p. 157). If people consider themselves as belonging to a community, then they might prioritize collective needs over personal gains, in contrast to Nozick's minimal state that does not interfere with individual choices. This would make it hard to keep the utopia stable and equitable.

2.4 Chapter Two Summary

Robert Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (1974) provides a libertarian "meta-utopia" where plural, consensual communities pursue their various conceptions of the good life under a minimalist state. Chapter Two shows that actualizing this conception is fraught with philosophical, practical, and moral challenges, as pointed out by some critics.

Philosophically, critics such as Derek Parfit and Joseph Raz contend that Nozick's paradigm erodes autonomy by categorizing people into fixed communities, without regard for the dynamic qualities of identity and preferences. Peter Singer states that permitting communities to establish their own moral codes could lead to dangerous relativism. In practice, Michael Otsuka refers to the difficulty of holding together heterogeneous groups without a robust institution, and Barbara Fried notes the difficulty of paying for common goods like roads or protection in a non-interventionist state. Socio-culturally, Susan Moller Okin cautions against replicating gender unfairness within the family, and Michael J. Sandel argues Nozick's focus on individual choice does not provide the collective bonds required to hold communities together. Politically, Michael Walzer and G.A. Cohen emphasize power imbalances and instability, as optional bargains or powerful groups may result in inequality and strife. Ruth Sample is concerned with exclusionary membership policies, while Thomas Nagel calls Nozick's rights-based society impractical in

pluralistic, intricate societies. Dudley Knowles and Peter Sabatini condemn the ethical and structural deficiencies, listing issues such as unequal pay and capitalist imbalances.

CHAPTER THREE

PUTTING NOZICK UTOPIA IN TO PRACTICE

3.1 Chapter Three Overview

Chapter Three lays out practical steps to achieve Robert Nozick's idea of utopia based on the theory we discussed in Chapter One and the challenges we noted in Chapter Two. It points out three key requirements for a viable solution: ensuring stability, sticking to libertarian principles, and tackling the challenges we have already mentioned.

The solution must agree with libertarian ideals of individual liberty, voluntary association, minimal state intervention, and diversity to be in line with Nozick's doctrine. By proposing solutions such as a design and filter tool, an international treaty, and advanced technical tools, this chapter aims to overcome philosophical, political, and practical challenges, thereby rendering the construction of diverse, autonomous utopian societies a reality.

3.2 Constructing the Building Blocks: Implementing Nozick's Utopian Vision

3.2.1 The Essential Ingredients Required of the Practical Solution

Based on Nozick's utopian society as discussed in Chapter One and keeping in mind the challenges brought forth in Chapter Two, we can identify three essential ingredients required for the practical solution in this chapter. These elements are crucial for establishing the practicability of Nozick's utopian framework.

First, the suggested practical solution must satisfy the condition of stability. Second, it should adhere to libertarian ideals so as not to conflict with Nozick's vision. Next, we need to tackle the challenges raised in Chapter Two.

A. Fulfilling the Stability Condition

For Nozick's idea of a perfect society to work, we must meet a key stability requirement: “*None of the inhabitants of the world can imagine an alternative world they would rather live in, which (they believe) would continue to exist if all of its rational inhabitants had the same rights of imagining and emigrating*” (Nozick, 2013, p. 275). This condition is important for understanding

how his ideal society is meant to work, since it explains the basic rule for determining if these imagined communities would actually work.

In simpler terms, a successful and sustainable utopia must be structured so that people cannot imagine or wish to live in another community they would rather be in. This ensures that all the inhabitants are so contented and fulfilled with their world that they cannot think of any other world that would still exist if all individuals were given equal rights to immigrate and dream.

By satisfying this requirement and rendering all the people living in the utopian world unable to conceptualize something better, the utopian framework is able to function effectively. This requirement assists in maintaining stability, harmony, and satisfaction in the society because people are fully occupied with and devoted to their current world. It prevents dissatisfaction, conflict, or the need for change from emerging and ruining the utopian society's equilibrium.

Therefore, it is important to uphold the principle that none of the residents can imagine a better alternative world. It guarantees that the utopian design will be capable of generating a sustainable and peaceful world in which individuals are satisfied and fulfilled within the society they inhabit.

B. Incorporating Libertarian Principles in the Process of Realizing Nozick's Utopian Conception

For Nozick, what is utopia for one person may not be utopia for everyone else. So, people must be permitted not only to form and articulate their own concepts of utopia but also to make their own decisions among the available choices without intervention. This position is based on libertarianism, which firmly insists on the principles of individual liberty, government non-intervention, and the protection of individual rights.

As Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. put it, "*Your right ends when the rights of others begin*," a belief that is in line with libertarian principles. Libertarianism advocates that an individual can do what they please, provided that their actions do not impinge upon the rights of another (Boaz, 1997; Rothbard, 2006).

The model supports libertarian values in a number of key principles. Firstly, it maximizes individual freedom and rights so that people are not reduced to being submissive resources or

tools for other individuals, since libertarianism holds autonomy as a core value (Nozick, 2013; Boaz, 1997). Secondly, it supports voluntary cooperation so that individuals are free to choose their communities and lives without coercion, consistent with the libertarian virtues of voluntary choice and non-coercion (Nozick, 2013; Rothbard, 2006). Third, it encourages minimal state action, limited to arbitrating disputes and protecting from external harm, which resonates with the libertarian ideals of minimal state intervention and self-defense (Nozick, 2013; Friedman, 1962). Finally, it embraces pluralism and diversity via the merging of diverse communities with disparate lifestyles, values, and systems of rule, promoting experimentation and self-governance in harmony with libertarian ideals (Nozick, 2013; Boaz, 1997).

The viable solution must align with the libertarian system; however, if it is a case of imposing libertarian values on individuals, then the issue is whether imposition is legitimate. For Nozick, imposing anyone's values upon others would be imperialistic, necessitating adherence to a process of voluntary indoctrination as detailed below. Essentially, the working solution in this chapter must focus on libertarian aspects like respecting individuals' rights, voluntary cooperation, minimal government intervention, and fostering diversity in the utopian society. Adhering to these aspects enables the implementation plan to truly represent and maintain Nozick's libertarian utopia.

C. Developing Strategies for Overcoming Challenges in the Adoption of Nozick's Utopia Concept

Nozick's vision of utopia is confronted by formidable challenges, as depicted in Chapter Two: for instance, challenges in creating ideal communities, resolving inter-community conflicts, ensuring access to other communities' knowledge, and addressing philosophical, social, and governmental criticisms by scholars like Parfit, Cohen, and Okin. Therefore, the solution or practical strategy necessitates pragmatic strategies to overcome these different challenges, demonstrating the feasibility of Nozick's utopian project despite the complexity of resolving all these problems comprehensively. So, while we cannot tackle every problem, these steps together create a solid plan for making Nozick's idea work, allowing different, independent communities to exist together and test the model over time.

3.2.2 The Design and Filter Device as a Central Rationale for Utopia's Realization

Nozick identifies the "filter process" of building societies with an evolutionary process, whereby a "*modest deity*" constructs living beings by iterative selection without knowledge of the eventual form the creation will take (Nozick, 2013). This evolutionary philosophy forms the foundation of Nozick's proposed "*Design and Filter Device*" as a fundamental rationale for constructing and forming his utopian system and the various utopian communities at its terminus.

The design device and filter can be called a focal justification for the realization of Nozick's utopian ideal. Nozick is challenging us to experiment with his utopian concepts, starting with the devices he provided: the design and filter. The devices offer the potential for experimenting, creating, and rebuilding from evolutionary perspectives toward his vision.

This device serves as a means to ultimately achieve viable utopian societies that can harmoniously coexist, mirroring the processes that have shaped our current environment, universe, and human institutions over multiple generations. In the same way that technology has experienced numerous stages of development with experiments, setbacks, and incremental progress (Basalla, 1988), and governments and nation-states have experienced revolutions and reorganized themselves throughout history to reach where they are now (Tilly, 1990), modern world organizations like the United Nations, African Union, NATO, and BRICS were established through processes involving negotiations, controversies, battles, and peace negotiations (Weiss & Daws, 2018).

Nozick's blueprint and filtering mechanism provide a systematic process whereby all utopian ideals may be tried, tested by willing members, new models conceived, and open traffic among societies permitted. This cyclical system is necessary as an underlying argument to transform Nozick's theoretical utopian idea into a tangible reality.

Since Nozick's utopian framework is an experimental, evolutionary one employing the "*design and filtering device*," its realization is a process in which many utopian visionaries introduce their visions, experiments are attempted and mistakes are made, and a firm framework crystallizes over time to fulfill the condition of stability. As Nozick mentions, it is true when "*none of the denizens of the world can conceive of another world they would prefer to inhabit*,

which (they believe) would subsist if all its rational denizens had such equal imaginal and migrational rights" (Nozick, 2013, p. 275).

3.2.3 Foundational Assumption

To realize Robert Nozick's utopian conception, which encompasses his Possible Worlds Model and utopian framework, it is essential to consider existing global frameworks that can support this vision. The foundational assumption for achieving this conception is the creation of an initial community, potentially named the "Association for Realizing Nozick's Utopian Society" (ARNUS), dedicated to initiating and facilitating the practical implementation of Nozick's vision. ARNUS is a virtual community where people from around the globe can come together and turn Nozick's ideas into reality. His ideas work well for non-face-to-face meetings and online events, so creating a virtual network to connect people from different places is a practical way to begin.

ARNUS would handle the virtual and AI design tools introduced based on Nozick's idea. These tools help build and maintain different utopian worlds in his universe. ARNUS would ensure sustainability until stability is reached, since the virtual design and filter system operates under its management. It would also supervise the design of communities with the voluntary consent of their members, preventing individuals without the capacity for informed consent, such as children or those with severe mental illnesses, from joining without proper guardianship. Additionally, ARNUS would ensure that those unable to give informed consent have the right to survive under the guardianship of their families or caregivers until they can make informed decisions during community formation and membership. Thereafter, ARNUS would serve as the central agency responsible for protecting these individuals' rights within the communities.

Members of ARNUS must possess three key attributes: a deep understanding of Nozick's utopian vision, a willingness to work toward its realization, and the ability to influence major global actors through monetary, political, or social power to lobby world governments and organizations. The goal is to set up some basic rules that everyone can agree on to support Nozick's ideas. Creating a real-world utopia is a big task, so we need key players, especially at the start, to influence current power systems. We do not have to pinpoint exactly who will initiate this, but what is important is that a group of people comes together to bring different utopian ideas together under Nozick's approach.

3.3 From Theory to Practice: Means to Realize the End

The proposed mechanism to introduce Nozick's utopian ideal can be divided into three interconnected blocks: establishing a global convention in the form of a United Nations Declaration on Utopian Communities to bind states to ratify protocols that enable the establishment and operation of face-to-face and non-face-to-face utopian communities on their lands; establishing a virtual system with Neuralink-like and AI-based components to record people's utopian conceptions, to analyze preferences, suggest matching communities, and triangulate interests to provide optimal matching to facilitate the operationalization of Nozick's "design device" and "filter device" mechanisms; and establishing and enforcing a global voluntary indoctrination process using a variety of scientific methods and interventions, including biological (brain stimulation, psychopharmacology, neurofeedback, deep brain stimulation) and psychosocial (cognitive-behavioral therapy, motivational interviewing, social skills training, environmental modifications) approaches, to bring persons holding "*imperial*" utopian roles into alignment with the norms of voluntary membership and respect for individual autonomy, while allowing unaligned persons to still exist within the existing state or national system under the supervision of the central authority.

3.3.1 Establishing a Universal Convention

Enacting Robert Nozick's utopian vision, along with his Possible Worlds Model and utopian framework, entails establishing an internationally recognized system of law. This would allow for the creation and operation of an extensive range of utopian visions and communities. Although Nozick did not detail operational provisions, one proposed approach is seeking United Nations endorsement of a "*Universal Declaration on Utopian Communities*" (UDUC).

The UDUC would oblige states to sign and implement protocols permitting the creation and operation of both co-present and virtual utopian communities within their territory. The Declaration would permit governments and international institutions to support such communities. It would lay down guidelines for achieving a fair distribution of land between utopian communities and establish criteria to control the free movement of members of such communities across international borders.

A virtual system would be created to make the design process possible, through which people all over the world could think through, share, and recruit members for their utopian imaginings. The declaration would make the virtual system free and open to everyone, so anyone could imagine and share their utopian thoughts with the entire world.

The declaration would also state that utopian communities have the right to apply their internal law and practice without interference from the state. It would institute voluntary indoctrination of some imperial utopian visionaries, with respect to individual choice. Governments would cooperate with central agencies to address breaches of law or regulation during the movement of members of virtual utopian communities or to integrate utopian communities into state laws. Governments would function as protective agencies, in competition with protective agencies created by utopian communities. Governance issues such as tax collection would be established through agreements between the communities and the protective agencies that they select.

Face-to-face groups would be permitted to organize unions or federations in one country, unless there are agreements between countries for cross-border unions. This limitation is to avoid conflicts of interest and issues of law due to differing national laws. If a federation intends to operate in more than one national boundary, the convention will have to address the operational procedures.

The reasoning behind the proposed UN declaration on utopian communities rests in the idea that human beings have the ability to exercise their rights and follow their aspirations because they are rational beings. This would be consistent with the principles of democracy, individual freedom, and protection of minority rights. From a libertarian perspective, the declaration would safeguard individual rights, prevent violence, and ensure the enforcement of contracts across borders.

The experience of international organizations like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank in negotiating global agreements and declarations (e.g., the Bretton Woods Agreement, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and disability acts) demonstrates the feasibility of having a similar framework for realizing Nozick's utopian vision.

The convention must address vital issues to become effective. It ought to define procedures for those entering communities within other countries, institute methods of safeguarding members

against community suppression and inter-community disputes, and offer guidelines on the fair distribution of resources, such as land and capital. The declaration ought to avert modifications of a community's nature without the consent of all members and safeguard dissidents from forced systems. Provisions to support non-physically existing communities and regulations for travel across countries and utopian experiments are also essential. Utopian community visionaries need to follow the UDUC to acquire immunity from current governments and be able to operate efficiently. By addressing all these issues in a holistic manner, the Universal Declaration on Utopian Communities would be a solid framework for the actualization of Nozick's vision of utopia in today's global environment.

3.3.2 Technological Solution to Facilitate the Design and Filter Device

To surpass the limitations and doubts raised by Nozick for his "*all possible utopian worlds*" model, an internet-based virtual database system, referred to here as the Global Utopian Database System (GUDS), is proposed. The GUDS would provide utopian thinkers with the means to promote their ideas, design ideal communities, and interact with fellow thinkers across the globe. The GUDS' primary purpose is to act as a marketplace for utopian communities, providing a means for the trading of visions and making it simple for individuals to find and join communities that are best aligned with their desires and needs.

Nozick did acknowledge the difficulties of his utopian model being realized in the real world, e.g., the impossibility of getting the desired cluster of people together, the lack of suitable communities, and the potential for communities to restrict information on available options (Nozick, 2013). However, recent developments in technology provide feasible solutions to these issues. For instance, the development of brain-computer interfaces like Neuralink can enable individuals to convey their utopian visions directly through thought experiences, bypassing the limitations that traditional communication channels impose (Neuralink, 2019).

Furthermore, quantum computing and AI developments can facilitate the analysis and matching of intricate features of various utopian visionaries and potential members on a global scale (Biamonte et al., 2017). The AI application can triangulate the interests of diverse visionaries and members, and rank and suggest the best matches based on provided visions and inclinations.

GUDS would involve two key aspects. First, a Neuralink-like system would capture individuals' utopian visions through various input methods like writing, voice, images, or even direct thought patterns. This would make it accessible for individuals with different capabilities and disabilities to input their unique visions (Goering et al., 2019). Second, for individuals who want to join already created utopian societies rather than create their own, the system would have a catalog of pre-existing utopian visions. Using AI algorithms, it would match individuals' preferences and suggest the most suitable communities based on percentage or level of compatibility with their wants and needs (Osburg & Lohrmann, 2017).

All the utopian designs and ideals, both practical and theoretical, would be listed and displayed in GUDS, so that any person could envision his or her utopian ideals or search for and join already established communities. As Nozick's model assumes the free flow of information about utopian societies (Nozick, 2013), the system would facilitate the flow of information, such that members of societies could learn about other alternatives and make their decisions accordingly.

GUDS would be rendered self-sustaining, self-developing, and capable of processing and triangulating a diversity of visions, presenting these vision concepts to interested individuals across the world.

3.3.3 Aligning the Unaligned: Voluntary Indoctrination for Utopian Harmony

Though Nozick excluded utopian imperialists from his constructed framework, I propose a voluntary indoctrination process as an option. Even though Nozick's utopian framework does not expressly include the issue of coercive "imperial" utopian visionaries, aligning such individuals with the framework's values is necessary, and I perceive no other choice.

To address this challenge, a voluntary indoctrination process is proposed. This approach aims to indoctrinate individuals with their own knowledge and approval, thus getting them to sign up willingly for the utopian program and its terms and conditions. Various scientific methodologies and interventions have been experimented with and validated for such purposes: Biological interventions include brain stimulation techniques (Lefaucheur et al., 2014), psychopharmacology (Stahl, 2017), neurofeedback (Thibault & Raz, 2017), and deep brain stimulation (Kuhn et al., 2015). Psychosocial interventions include cognitive-behavioral therapy

(CBT) (Hofmann et al., 2012), motivational interviewing (Miller & Rollnick, 1995), social skills training (Segrin, 2003), and environmental modifications (Ulrich, 1991).

Through these or other emerging scientific methods, it will be feasible to direct a high percentage of the individuals who possess "*imperial*" utopian thinking toward more missionary or existential-type utopian beliefs, which will align them with the system's principles of voluntary consent and respect for individual freedom.

Still, there may be instances when the voluntary processes of indoctrination fail to work for others. In that regard, they would remain in their present state or national system, as they cannot be compelled into the utopian system. Their continued "*imperial*" status would then become a problem for the central authority to handle, as it could adversely impact the functioning of the entire system and model.

Finally, the resulting society would most likely be a coexistence of utopian communities, central agencies, and current state structures. Individuals who enjoy the current system would be free to remain within it, and utopian dreamers could build and join communities according to their vision. This is in line with Nozick's belief that "*the utopia I prefer is not necessarily the utopia for others*" (Nozick, 2013, p. 311), as both would be living according to their own ideas, either within the utopian communities or the current state structure.

3.4 The Role of the Central Agency in the Practical Solution

One of the many concerns in realizing Nozick's utopian conception is the formation of a protective agency. Nozick (2013) asserts that individuals have rights that they will protect either by themselves, with the support of others, or through a protective agency. Libertarian thinkers like John Locke and Friedrich Hayek have backed this idea, stressing the importance of individual rights and the need to defend them. Locke talks about individual rights and the government's role in his work, *Two Treatises of Government*, from 1689. Hayek took these ideas further in *The Road to Serfdom*, where he warns against too much government control over the economy and personal freedoms. Nozick added to this in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, suggesting that people will look out for their rights in different ways, such as through protective agencies.

Nozick began his work in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* by stating, *"individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights)"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 17). He envisioned a practical approach to realizing this utopian conception, with a central agency playing a significant role in safeguarding individual rights. According to Nozick, *"some central authority (or protective association) ... The major role, as I see it, would be to enforce the operation of the framework ... for example, to prevent some communities from invading and seizing others, their persons, or assets. Furthermore, it will adjudicate in some reasonable fashion conflicts between communities which cannot be settled by peaceful means"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 298). Additionally, Nozick stated that the central agency would also enforce an individual's right to leave a community (Nozick, 2013).

Nozick provided room for further improvement in forming and operating central authorities or protective agencies, suggesting three possibilities: the protective agency could be a utopian community itself, each utopian community could have its own protective agency that also works for others, or the protective agency could be formed through an association of different utopian communities (Nozick, 2013). Based on this flexibility, the protective agency or central authority could take several forms:

1. A utopian community itself, with the objective of serving as a protective agency.
2. Each utopian community having its own protective agency that also works for others.
3. An association of different utopian communities forming a protective agency.
4. Existing government structures that could work with utopian communities.

In any scenario, if we plan to realize Nozick's utopian conception, the role of the protective agency lies in the hands of existing governments or will be subject to a universal convention that will be designed to formulate the relationship between existing governments and utopian communities. We need some kind of agreement with utopian communities, and it should be part of the resolutions or conventions approved by the UN. A central agency is key in tackling various forms of violence and making sure people who cannot make informed decisions, like those with mental disabilities or children, are protected until they can make their own decisions. Nozick pointed out that this agency is important for preventing violence and keeping these

vulnerable individuals safe (Nozick, 2013). This fits with a universal convention set up by the UN, which ensures that they are not forced into ideologies or practices they do not agree with. They should have the right to decide if they want to stay in a community or move to a different one once they are able to make their own choices. The central agency's role is to protect these individuals in voluntary communities, without pushing any particular beliefs or practices on them. This way, they can choose whether to stick around, join somewhere else, or even start a new community when they are ready.

Nozick also argued that people should have the right to opt out of what a community wants them to do (Nozick, 2013). In traditional or existing law and order systems funded by taxes, communities that do not wish to pay such taxes may face challenges in maintaining law and order. Thus, services from protective agencies should be provided based on the communities' consent and willingness to pay for them. Making communities pay for services from protective agencies goes against libertarian ideas, which stress that association should be voluntary and based on consent (Nozick, 2013). If a community does not want to pay for those services, they should have the right to choose. Forcing payment contradicts libertarian values. It is important for agreements between utopian communities and current governments, possibly with help from the UN, to put Nozick's ideas into action.

As for trust in these central agencies, communities should be allowed to pick their own protective agency through open competition, without any pressure involved. This ensures that the chosen agency is trusted and preferred by the community. Trust in the central agency is ensured by allowing communities to choose their protective agency through a competitive and non-coercive process (Nozick, 2013). This competitive selection ensures that the chosen agency is trusted by the community.

When conflicts come up in a community or between different groups, or if there are problems with sharing resources, it is up to the central authority to step in and handle it. This is important to make sure that Nozick's idea of a utopian society can work in real life, keeping in mind the need for safety, voluntary associations, and fair ways to manage conflicts and resources (Nozick, 2013).

Basically, the central agency in Nozick's vision is there to protect people's rights, tackle any violence, and ensure that everyone can join together willingly and with clear consent. Setting up and running this agency needs to be adaptable, competitive, and work alongside existing government systems to stay true to libertarian values.

3.5 Argument on Tackling Challenges for the Practical Solution

Just stating assumptions and laying out a step-by-step plan is not enough to prove that Nozick's idea of a utopian society can work. The arguments below tackle the criticisms and issues about its feasibility. This part is not about finding a one-size-fits-all answer for every problem now or in the future, but about showing that practical solutions can address both current and upcoming challenges. The arguments to tackle these hurdles are presented below:

3.5.1 Addressing Nozick's Critics on his Possible Worlds Model

Nozick's utopian framework faces certain real-world challenges, as he acknowledges in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. He notes that creating people to meet a society's ideal requirements is nearly impossible, which can result in insufficient support or unsuitable members (Nozick, 2013). To address this, I have already proposed an online intelligent platform that assists community visionaries in identifying and recruiting members whose traits match their vision. The platform helps visionaries define desired community traits and filter potential members, addressing the constraints of diversity in the real world.

Additionally, Nozick indicates that real communities are interconnected, creating complex foreign affairs and defense issues beyond enlisting members (Nozick, 2013). To resolve such conflicts, I also suggested a universal declaration for utopian communities to provide a uniform framework for conflict resolution. Similarly, the protective agency would also help in mediating disputes and promoting peaceful resolutions between communities.

Nozick highlights the limitations of his all-possible-worlds model, particularly the difficulty of obtaining information about other communities (Nozick, 2013). The proposed internet platform addresses this by allowing communities to share information, text, audio, or video using current and future technologies to make such information more open and accessible.

Finally, Nozick warns that some societies might restrict members' access to information about other communities, limiting autonomy and freedom of movement (Nozick, 2013, p. 309). Societies that limit information access may adopt an insular position. They should either undergo a voluntary re-education process or maintain their closed ways, potentially limiting their ability to attract members. Ensuring information is freely available is important for maintaining personal choice and for communities to grow.

3.5.2 Addressing Challenges Raised by Critics of Nozick's Utopian Vision

Robert Nozick's utopian ideal of a libertarian society where people self-select into groups based on their values and have only a minimal state to protect their rights (*Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, 2013) is interesting and controversial. It promises a world where everyone is able to live according to their ideals, but others think that it has serious problems that will complicate its real-world implementation. Philosophers including Derek Parfit, Samuel Scheffler, Joseph Raz, Peter Singer, Susan Moller Okin, Michael Walzer, Ruth Sample, Michael Otsuka, Barbara Fried, Peter Sabatini, Thomas Nagel, Dudley Knowles, G. A. Cohen, and Michael J. Sandel identify issues like power imbalances, weak communal ties, and difficulties in responding to heterogeneous populations. These issues evoke basic philosophical questions concerning identity, liberty, justice, and society. Here, I combine their criticisms and show how a pragmatic solution using a Universal Declaration for Utopian Communities, a protective agency, and an AI-based online filtering system can address these problems while remaining true to Nozick's conception of a free society.

Nozick's utopia is based on the idea that people need to be able to form or enter into communities based on what they value, with intervention by the state only to prevent harm. The focus on choice is appealing, but it is attacked for not taking into account the complexity of people and society. These problems fall into three general categories: philosophical problems of identity and liberty, social problems of justice and social relations, and problems of governance, such as conflict resolution and public needs. If we understand these problems, we can see that Nozick's vision must have pragmatic answers if it is to succeed.

Let us begin with the philosophical problems. Derek Parfit (1984) argues that Nozick's utopia is rooted in the belief that individuals' values do not change over time, but our identities and desires

can change. He calls Nozick's way of grouping people into communities "*arbitrarily pigeon-holing*" because it puts them into categories that may or may not be a good fit for their future selves (Parfit, 1984, p. 214). This could make individuals feel trapped and therefore not truly free. Similarly, Joseph Raz (1986) asserts that true freedom is the ability to reconsider your choices throughout life, not being able to select a community just once. He is worried Nozick's communities would turn totalitarian and restrict people from having new options, and he calls for a society that contains many different options so that freedom may thrive (Raz, 1986). Thomas Nagel (1975) also argues that Nozick's plan is too naive in thinking that individuals will all agree on basic rights without any disagreement. This, he thinks, neglects the fact that real societies are messy and makes the utopia seem unattainable (Nagel, 1975). Such critiques challenge Nozick's utopian fantasy, demanding it show how his utopia can adapt to changing identities and complex moral conflicts.

Subsequently, societal problems are all about fairness and power. G. A. Cohen (1977) also thinks that Nozick's idea of free trade, e.g., how fans will pay to see Wilt Chamberlain, creates large disparities of wealth. Chamberlain's affluence gives him greater power over others, thereby splitting society into classes (Cohen, 1977). Peter Sabatini (1994) agrees, saying Nozick's utopia only replaces government power with the power of the rich, leaving the same inequality under capitalism (Sabatini, 1994). Susan Moller Okin (1989) warns that granting communities the freedom to create their own laws may allow some to act unfairly toward women, enforcing ancient patterns of subordination. Michael J. Sandel (1982) criticizes Nozick's vision of people as private creatures for undermining the communal ties like family or history that hold communities together. With these absent, he argues, communities could break down, lacking the "*moral depth*" required for a good society (Sandel, 1982). Samuel Scheffler (1997) adds further that Nozick is blind to the debt we owe to those relationships we do not choose, like being part of a family, which can lead to unfairness if some are privileged at the expense of others (Scheffler, 1997). Ruth Sample (2004) is concerned that some people will be shut out of groups, creating overly homogeneous and unjust communities (Sample, 2004, p. 346). These critics show that Nozick's utopia must encourage justice and form solid, cohesive communities.

Finally, the governance issues concern how Nozick's utopia would work in reality. According to Michael Otsuka (2003), Nozick's minimal state has no way of settling wars between

communities, which could enable dominant communities to exploit weaker ones (Otsuka, 2003). Dudley Knowles (1993), through Jonathan Wolff, points out that Nozick's proposal of paying people to follow norms, e.g., a "*John Wayne*" type who wants to get his own way, does not result in real agreement and damages the conception of free choice (Knowles, 1993). Barbara Fried (2004) argues that it is impossible to supply all public goods, like roads or police, as some people will use them without paying for them, which is called the free-rider problem (Fried, 2004). Michael Walzer (1983) warns that powerful groups can dominate spheres such as education or health and render the utopia unfair (Walzer, 1983). Peter Singer (2005) is worried that if each community is free to establish its own moral rules, there could be risky practices because there is no universal standard to guide right and wrong (Singer, 2005). Such critics cite the need to have specific rules and structures to govern Nozick's diverse communities.

To realize Nozick's utopia, we need solutions that preserve its focus on freedom while addressing these problems. Below are three complementary tools: a Universal Declaration for Utopian Communities, a protective agency, and an AI-based online sorting system. The proposed tools address social and political issues while keeping in mind Nozick's idea of a society where people can choose their own paths and decide where to live.

The Universal Declaration for Utopian Communities sets out some basic rules that all communities should follow as they join together. These principles avoid violence, discrimination, or abuse of power by one person over others. For example, they protect women from unequal treatment in response to Okin's concerns about gender unfairness. They also stop wealthy people from controlling too much, which helps with Cohen's and Sabatini's concerns about inequality. The rules make sure everyone has basic rights, like access to things they need to live, which keeps Scheffler's non-voluntary duties in mind. By setting these shared standards, the declaration stops Singer's worry about communities doing harmful things, as it creates a moral baseline everyone accepts. It also simplifies Nagel's concern about society being overly complicated by giving a solid foundation upon which to agree, and it protects against Walzer's problem of powerful groups dominating by ensuring fairness in every respect. Since the communities adopt these rules willingly, the declaration fits Nozick's theory of liberty without authorizing coercive domination.

The protective agency is like a fair referee who enforces the rules of the declaration. It acts only when a person's rights are being infringed, which keeps Nozick's government minimal. It settles disputes between communities, like disputes about commerce, so that no group is coerced, fulfilling Otsuka's need for better management. It sees to it that people agree to rules voluntarily, without bribery, addressing Knowles's objection to false agreements. The agency stops Sabatini's worry about rich people taking over by making sure no one controls justice or security unfairly. For Okin, it protects women if a community tries to limit their rights. It helps Sandel's need for stable communities by solving conflicts that could break them apart, and it supports Scheffler's fairness by protecting everyone, not just those in powerful groups. By upholding justice and harmony, the agency keeps Nagel's complex society running and keeps Walzer's utopia peaceful, yet it never oversteps Nozick's conception of limited government.

The AI-facilitated online filtering mechanism is an instrument whereby people find and group with communities compatible with their beliefs, and they may be able to change their choices as their beliefs change. This solves Parfit's problem of changing identity, as people can move to new communities if their present ones no longer fit them, so they are not "*pigeon-holed*." This supports Raz's idea of freedom, as it enables people to experiment with many things in life, leaving several choices for communities open. To Sandel, the system unites communities by matching people with others who share the same family or cultural heritage and thus creating the bonds that he contends are necessary. It addresses Sample's concern about exclusion by offering an overabundance of communities so everyone can belong, and it supports Scheffler's social roles by bonding persons who share similar backgrounds. For Fried's problem of public goods, the system makes it possible for communities to plan collectively, for instance, splitting road expenses or hiring the protective agency for protection, and imposing definite rules to guard against free-riding. By making decisions simple and accommodating, the system makes Nagel's society realistic and Nozick's utopia feasible in the real world.

These three mechanisms—declaration, agency, and sorting system—work together to address the critics' problems. The declaration creates equal laws to keep society moral and just, addressing problems of inequality, injustice, and harmful customs. The protective agency keeps things stable by fixing fights and protecting rights, addressing problems of authority and management. The filtering system gives people independence to move and settle, addressing problems of

identity and belonging to social groups. Together, they render Nozick's utopia strong, equitable, and responsive, but not by sacrificing its focus on free choice.

Ultimately, this is sufficient to show that Nozick's free society can work even in the face of challenges brought by critics. The Universal Declaration treats everyone fairly and upholds high moral standards. The protective agency secures communities' cooperation and rights, leading to a stable society. The AI filtering technology enables people to pursue their changing values and build lively communities and preserve freedom. By combining these elements, we may build a utopian society that is realistic yet true to Nozick's vision, where people live freely, equally, and as one despite the diversity of their goals.

3.6 The Final Outcome of the Utopian Process within the Practical Solution

As Nozick describes, *"Not everyone will be joining special experimental communities, and many who abstain at first will join the communities later, after it is clear how they actually are working out"* (Nozick, 2013, p. 285). With the virtual AI-based designing and filtering supportive system I have put forward, as Nozick pointed out, even those who at first would think one kind of community is optimal will find their way, in the context of the voluntary nature of the system. Even if there is one optimal kind of community for everyone, the system created is the best mechanism for finding the nature of that community.

As Nozick explains:

"The point generalizes: there is a way of bringing about various micro situations through the voluntary actions of individuals in a free society. Whether individuals will want to carry out those actions is another question. But in a free system, any extensive, popular, revolutionary movement ought to be able to achieve its goals by such a voluntary process. As more and more individuals comprehend how it works, more and more will want to join in or contribute to it. And so it will spread, without having to coerce everybody or a majority or anybody into the pattern" (Nozick, 2013, p. 296).

The filtering system will run evolutionarily, as in the case of Awra Amba in Ethiopia. After observing the experience of the Awra Amba people, others started their own conception of an

egalitarian utopian concept adjacent to Awra Amba. This system will continue running if provided with legal processes and legislation.

The filtering system will run evolutionarily, like what happened in Awra Amba, Ethiopia. A nearby village called Lulista Mariam started copying Awra Amba's egalitarian model after a training session on gender equality in 2006, and after a couple of residents visited Awra Amba, the village, led by an Orthodox priest, decided to take on some of the community's values and practices (Joumard, 2021). This example is a depiction of how the filtering process works, as Nozick explained, "*As more and more see how it works, more and more will want to join in or contribute to it. And so it will expand, without needing to push everyone or a majority or anyone into the mode*" (Nozick, 2013, p. 296).

While many utopian societies will emerge in the long term, current country frameworks will be reduced to protective agencies, as imagined by Nozick. Their sole purpose will be to provide protection and order services for utopian communities at a certain rate by competing with other protective agencies formed by communities; their existence will diminish over time. Based on the above argument, human rationality, and libertarian positions, it is presumed that existing states will cooperate with utopian communities and allow them to exist within their territories.

But, what about those who do not want to be in the current system? The best answer is: "*To them, the current system is their utopia.*" Because, according to Nozick, "*The best possible world for me is not the best possible for you*" (Nozick, 2013, p. 312). The fate of existing states and governments, like unindoctrinated and unchanged imperial roles, will remain within existing laws and mechanisms. Those who want to stay within the current global and state structures or those that do not desire to be part of other utopian ideals will be under a structure that is in the form of the current state structure, yet building their own utopian community, or we can refer to it as, "*A Community that Preferred to Stay in the State Frameworks.*" Because, Nozick's utopian government is for volunteers only and not for non-volunteers.

Even though Nozick feared the realization of his utopian model, especially with regard to the imperial positions and non-availability of resources to guide his conception, with time passing, the evolutionary process will result in a state that has the following possibilities:

1. A collection of utopian communities and central agencies.

2. The existing state or national formats if the utopian visionary process using the design and filtering device fails.
3. Utopian visionary communities living on one side and the existing state structure on the other.

In all cases, utopian visions exist. The filtering and planning process creates a voluntarily chosen community without force. Regardless of whether the existing state structure works and utopian visions fail, it is the society everyone wants to live in. If others and the utopian visionaries are living apart, then both are living in their preferred vision.

There may be issues in the future, but as the filtering and design process declares, in due time, things will harmonize, even if not necessarily in the way we understand harmony today (absence of chaos). There may be a chaotic space that everyone agrees to, and the product of the filtering and design process will be embraced by the utopian future society.

Finally, the communities will be a form of utopian society, as imagined by Nozick, designed by some kind of demigod or wise person, building societies that are currently indefinable. This society may be socialist, libertarian, egalitarian, capitalistic, or a system that folds all the systems into one. Nozick's ideal society will be achieved with justification based on fundamentals, proper utilization of the design and filter devices, and associated technological developments, such as voluntary indoctrination science and technologies, and a steadily improved Universal Declaration for the Rights of Utopian Communities. Nozick appears to be in agreement with evolution theory by accepting that nobody can tell what direction the process of evolution is going to go.

3.7 Will the Practical Solution Provided Help Meet the Stability Condition?

No one can imagine or desire your exact imagination, or want something beyond what you are able to imagine, because no one is you. Other individuals can only attempt to match their imagination or want as closely as possible with yours, but no more. The role of the automated system is to understand the utopian dream as much as possible, compare it with others of the same kind, and offer options for the construction of a community with others with the same dream. However, this totality condition is unattainable until the system is perfected by the

filtering process. But stability improves with time as the virtual system developed to support the filtering and design process gets more advanced.

As Karl Popper has stated, *"Just as in science there is no absolutely true theory, so in politics, there is no perfect society; just as science may advance by appealing to ever better but never ultimate theories, so society may evolve by adopting ever better forms and political assets, but these are never final"* (Popper, 2002, p. 142). Therefore, it is not realistic to anticipate a 100% fault-free realization of Nozick's utopian system and model because no functional system can be entirely faultless. The world actually develops through the process of minimizing errors over time, and given the advancement of technology and human understanding, the result will move more in the direction of the completeness of conditions.

One of the major issues regarding stability is the issue of the new generation. What about others whose visions and ideas we are not yet aware of? Will they not have visions too? And if so, how will we fulfill the totality condition? The new generation is also expected to have its own ideas, but with the intended smart virtual planning tools out there, a lot of these ideas will likely happen in existing communities. It makes sense for rational people to join up with what is already there instead of trying to start something from scratch; why build your own community, since what you want to build is already there? Fresh ideas will also not be prone to cause huge deviation from existing communities due to the filtering device, which picks up closely matched visions within already existing communities. In both instances, therefore, the stability condition will be met, even if not 100% globally.

3.8 Contribution and Implication that the Realization of Nozick's Utopian Conception will have toward the current Global and National Context

The practical approach outlined in this thesis is a pioneering endeavor to take in and encompass the richness of political ideology, religious faith, ethnicities, genders, and other variations in societies worldwide. With at least 4,300 religions worldwide, over 5,000 ethnic groups, and numerous races, such an approach seeks to unite these diverse communities and other idealistic notions under one umbrella (Smith, 2020; United Nations, 2023).

This practical solution brings harmonious existence among individuals who share similar visions, in which they can live together in communities structured around their similar values and

visions. It also enables individuals from various backgrounds to join hands and become united since they have similar visions for their desired communities.

In allowing communities to operate by their own devised principles without imposing on them, this process promotes peace and reduces conflicts caused by different visions of life in societies. This is done in accordance with Nozick's vision of enabling different utopian visions to coexist peacefully while upholding the sovereignty of each community and allowing the outcome of such a process to occur naturally.

3.9 Chapter Three Summary

Chapter Three gives practical ideas on how to create Robert Nozick's vision of independent, diverse communities with as minimal control as possible. This builds on the theory discussed in Chapter One, which introduced Nozick's model about different ways communities can exist, focusing on diversity and personal freedom. Chapter Two looked at the various challenges we might face, including philosophical, political, and social issues. These can be overcome, Chapter Three suggests, by mechanisms like the design and filter device to align conflicting utopian visions, the Universal Declaration for Utopian Communities to regulate relations, and the Global Utopian Database System to match individuals to appropriate communities. Voluntary agreements help align those with big ideas with libertarian values, while a central agency makes sure rights are respected and disputes are settled. These plans make good use of what is already in place in society, and trial and error can happen thanks to this filtering approach. The chapter suggests we need more research and collaboration to improve these ideas, building on Nozick's thoughts about a free society.

4. CONCLUSION

This thesis addresses Robert Nozick's utopian concept, as presented in his book *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, and maintains that the ideal concept can be made practical in the real world in spite of formidable challenges. Chapter One addressed Nozick's Utopian Conception, a utopian society with a minimal state where various voluntary communities can exist. The second chapter then considered diverse philosophical, political, and social arguments or challenges against such an idea, for example, the possibility of inequality and differences in power. In response to such objections, the third chapter then sketched solutions that can be applied to make the vision practical: a system for planning and selecting through communities, an international treaty to safeguard them, and an argument for how a central body can resolve disputes, demonstrating how Nozick's conception could in fact work in practice. Even granting that not everything can be solved, this essay contends that Nozick's paradigm gives us an achievable way of examining our way to a pluralistic and free society through a trial-and-error, evolutionary process. With the technology and social arrangements of today, we can construct, step by step, a world where multiple possible conceptions of the good life can peacefully coexist. Finally, further research and cooperation are essential to improve these steps so that they protect individual freedom without causing damaging effects but instead improving Nozick's vision of a just society.

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