

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

**THE US MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTER
TERRORISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**

BY
GIDEON ASSEFA

APRIL 2011

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IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**

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RELATIONS**

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APPROVED BY BOARD OF EXAMINERS

ADVISOR

EXAMINER

Dedication

To my wife and my Daughter

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Acronyms

AIAI-Al Ittihad Al Islamiyyaa	EPRDF-Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
AFRICOM-African Command	ESF-Economic Support Fund
AMISOM-African Union Mission in Somalia	EU-European Union
AQAP-Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula	FDI-Foreign Direct Investment
ARPCT-Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism	FMF-Foreign Military Financing
ASWJ-Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a	GWOT-Global War on Terror
ATA-Anti-Terrorism Assistance	HRW-Human Rights Watch
AU-African Union	ICU-Islamic Courts Union
CJTF-HOA-Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa	IMET-International Military Education Training
CPA-Comprehensive Peace Agreement	ICG-International Crisis Group
CTC-Combating Terrorism Center	IGAD-Intergovernmental Authority on Development
CTF-Counter Terrorism Financing	IED-Innovative Explosive Device
DENCAPS-Dental Civic Action Projects	INCLE-International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
DOD-Department of Defense	LRA-Lords Resistance Army
DOS-Department of State	MEDCAPS-Medical Civic Action Projects
EACTI-East African Counter Terrorism Initiative	NADR-Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs
EARSI-East African Regional Security Initiative	NSCT-National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
EIJM-Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement	OAU-Organization of African Unity
ENDF-Ethiopian National Defense Force	OFAC-Office of Foreign Assets Control
EPLF-Eritrean People's Liberation Front	OLF-Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF-Ogaden National Liberation Front	

PISCES-Personal Identification Secure
Comparison and Evaluation System

PKO-Peace Keeping Operation

SPLA/M-Sudan People's Liberation
Army/Movement

TFG-Transitional Federal Government

TIP-Terrorist Interdiction Program

UN-United Nations

UNSC- United Nations Security Council

US-United States

USAID-United States Agency for
International Development

VETCAPS-Veterinary Civil Action
Programs

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Abstract

This study focuses on the US counter terrorism endeavors in the Horn of Africa especially those that are militaristic and security related ones which are more visible and some that are semi official. The study followed a qualitative approach that deemed necessary for this kind of research which deals with underlying issues that are usually cannot be understood in a quantifiable manner. The data collection process mainly depended up on secondary data and primary data is employed to support those data. It attempts to underline the potentials that are associated with terrorism in the Horn of Africa in addition to a brief historical flashback of terrorism in the region. The potential of the Horn in terms of terrorism is associated with the underlying factors like poverty, regional conflict, the presence of large but marginalized and dissatisfied Muslim population, Somalia's state failure, etc. This study also looks in to the presence of al-Qaeda in the region which the United States is so wary of since its focus is on transnational terrorism. Moreover, it also looks in to the US counter terrorism efforts and programs that include CJTF-HOA, EACTI/EARSI, and other less official and clandestine operations. Finally, it attempts to identify gaps in the US policies in combating terrorism in the Horn of Africa by concentrating on underlying factors.

As findings of this study, three salient points can be identified. The first one is the Horn of Africa is potentially dangerous since it hosts all the features that are dubbed as underlying factors are present in addition to its geographical proximity to the Middle East. These features make the region potentially dangerous and unless proper policies are employed terrorists can find a safe haven in the Horn. The second point that this study identified is that the presence of al-Qaeda and the terrorist atrocities by this network are minimum and are very few despite the fact that the Horn of Africa possesses all the underlying factors. Finally, this study identified that the US counter terrorism efforts are misguided and most of the time are concerned with quick fixes which sometimes resulted in exacerbating radicalism that it is supposed to fight against. In general, this study concludes: as the region remains potentially dangerous since the presence of al-Qaeda is at its minimum, the US counter terrorism efforts should be geared towards addressing underlying factors in order to diminish the potential to be the host of terrorists.

Chapter One

1.1 Introduction

September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington D.C. which claimed thousands of lives put struggle against international terrorism to the fore front of United States' (US) security agenda. It has been battling terrorism in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East, and South East Asia. In addition to these regions, the Horn of Africa is given special attention by the US counter terrorism efforts because 'East Africa is perhaps the most strategic vis-à-vis the current conflict against Islamist extremists' (Chau, 2008:38). According to Kagwanja, there are several reasons for this:

First, the region's geographical proximity and bonds of history with the Middle East facilitated the movements of terrorist agents within and across the two regions. Second, countries in the region are either predominantly Muslim or have significant Muslim minorities ... [which may] expose them to sectarian conflicts and international terrorism. Third, paradoxically, the expansion of democratic space from the 1990s emboldened activism inspired by radical Islamic ideas among disaffected Muslim minorities, particularly at the coast.... Fourth, a mix of widespread poverty, chronic underdevelopment a deep sense of marginalization, accentuated by negative forces of economic globalization, enabled Islamists to export their ideas and to win allies among impoverished Muslim minorities and desperate refugees. (2006:74)

Okumu argues that there are number of reasons for the Horn of Africa's vulnerability to terrorism ranging from 'the region's proximity to the failed state of Somalia and weak counter terrorism and police capabilities to porous borders and bad governance' (Okumu in Okumu & Botha, 2007:63) which are conducive situations for terrorist activities.

The US focus is manifested by different measures. Prior to 9/11, there were two major terrorist attacks against the U.S. nationals and interests in East Africa: the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 were allegedly orchestrated by Al-Qaeda operatives. This incident drew the attention of the Clinton administration to the region. Since then, 'the United States and Britain are actively helping to train Kenyan security forces, strengthened their own local intelligence capabilities, and are training and equipping the Kenyans to watch the Indian Ocean littoral' (Rotberg 2005:20). 'After 9/11, renewed focus was brought to bear on East Africa [and] U.S. intelligence developed information that training, equipment, and fighters linked to al Qaeda

were coming from the region' (West 2005:3). The situation in Somalia, the complete collapse of the state, is also a concern for the U.S. for it 'appears to be an Islamic radical's perfect storm [and] a safe haven' (Rotberg 2005:23). Furthermore, the establishment of Somaliland as a de facto state is also a concern for the U.S. even though it is much better off in terms of stability and governance than in the south. The overall volatility of the Horn in terms of political stability, poverty, political and economic marginalization, 'largely unsecured territories provide a platform for terrorists, and [states'] internal conflicts and weaknesses create potential breeding grounds for current and future anti-American terrorism' (West 2005:1).

The United States, therefore, decided to engage in the Horn of Africa militarily by establishing the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 2002 'in order to confront terrorists directly, to help the nations of the region identify and capture terrorists, and to help host nations control their ungoverned spaces, especially borders and coastlines' (West 2005:6). CJTF-HOA was initially established with 'roughly 1400 military personnel [who] oversee a region that encompasses Kenya, Somalia, the Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen, and Ethiopia, and the coastal waters of the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean (West 2005:6). CJTF-HOA is based in strategically important Djibouti. The United States also designed other counter terrorism measures and projects like East African Counter Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) and then East African Regional Security Initiative (EARSII) where the latter replaced the former. The US was also involved in other less visible and less popular counter terrorism measures especially in Somalia that affected the whole Horn of Africa as it is a region of 'security complex'.

This study will try to investigate and focus on how the Horn of Africa is susceptible to the terrorist threat by identifying the underlying factors that can facilitate the presence of terrorists and their cells. It also tries to investigate the presence of international or transnational terrorist groups like al-Qaeda which the United States identified in its National Security Strategy of 2010 as the prime network that the US counter terrorism focuses on. Furthermore, it will look into the US military involvement and military strikes and the aforementioned counter terrorism schemes are really going to solve the terrorist threat in the region. The blanket declaration and the

overriding policy of 'War on Terror' does obviously have its own effect on regional issues like conflicts, democratization, human rights, and other basic issues. It also has a role to play for the current situation in Somalia. Terrorism is also manipulated by governments for their own purpose of state security and regime survival which sometimes is in collision course with basic human and civil rights. This study, in general, will try to investigate the US counter terrorism measures in terms of military involvement and other initiatives and its overall effect in the Horn of Africa and also its efficacy in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The Horn of Africa is considered one of the potential regions in the world vulnerable to Islamist terrorist threats especially against the United States and the West by being a base and a transit point for these terrorists. The sub region is not new for terrorist attacks. The Horn of Africa is not a stable region. The state of Somalia is in the state of total failure since the early 1990s; Kenya is said to have marginalized Muslim community which consist 10-20 per cent of the population; Sudan has been in internal conflict for about three decades and the referendum in south Sudan and the future of the oil rich Abyie province in the balance and the situation in Darfur is still problematic; the border war and the lingering border tension between Eritrea and Ethiopia is not solved yet. In addition, the Horn of Africa is suffering from socio-economic and political problems in the form of abject poverty, poor governance, war, famine etc. It is the home of a large Muslim community, in some countries overwhelming majority and in some others significantly large minority. The aforementioned situation is claimed to be conducive situation waiting to be and being manipulated by terrorist groups like al Qaeda. In order to tackle this perceived threat the United States decided to engage militarily by establishing Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 2002.

The level of the terrorist threat in the Horn of Africa must be investigated in order to justify or reject the US military presence. Secondly, the effect of this military involvement on the region in terms of politics, governance, socio-economic, human rights must also be seen. Another crucial point that should be looked at is whether only military engagement is actually going to root out the threat of transnational radical terrorism. Other alternatives, if there are any, must also be investigated.

1.3. Research Questions

This study attempts to answer the following research questions:

- What is the level of transnational radical Islamist terrorism threat in the Horn of Africa?
- Does the level of terrorist threat justify the US military involvement?

- What are the possible consequences of the US military engagement on the Horn of Africa?
- Are there other scenarios which better serve the purpose of counter terrorism other than a military involvement by the US?

1.4 Hypothesis

The Horn of Africa, by virtue of its multi faceted problems is considered to be one of potentially dangerous places on the planet in terms of terrorism. The United States, which is the leader in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), is wary of the terrorist threats that emanated and will emanate from the region especially by transnational groups like al-Qaeda. This assumption is based on these multi faceted problems like regional conflicts, pervasive poverty, porous ness of borders, presence of large Muslim population, proximity to the Middle East etc. that are considered enabling environment for terrorists. The United States, therefore, assumed that the Horn of Africa is going to be a safe haven for terrorists and responded in different counter terrorism measures.

1.5 Objectives of the Research

1.5.1 General Objectives

Generally, this study will focus on analyzing the current counter terrorism activities of the United States in the Horn of Africa especially its military involvement and its consequences and the very effectiveness of military response without a combination of other alternatives. Possible consequences may vary in the form of political, socio-economic, human rights. Therefore, the general objective of the research is to investigate the above issues and other possible alternatives.

1.5.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of this study can be summarized as:

- To investigate the threat of international terrorists in the Horn of Africa especially those emanate from transnational radical Islamist groups.
- To investigate the local response to terrorism in terms of legislation, military, social, economic measures.

- To analyze possible negative and/or positive consequences of US military involvement on the whole sub region and on the activities of IGAD.
- To investigate and analyze other possible alternatives and scenarios in addition or other than military response by the US.

1.6 Research Methods and Methodology

This study will be a qualitative study which will attempt to describe the US military involvement in counter terrorism in the Horn of Africa and try to make an understanding about the research questions that are better handled in a qualitative approach since the topic involves a lot of underlying and complex issues that can not be possibly measured in quantitative methods and statistical data. ‘Qualitative research aims to address questions concerned with developing an understanding of the meaning and experience dimension of humans’ lives and social worlds’ (Fossey et al, 2002:717). Since the issue of terrorism and counter terrorism heavily interrelated with the social world and human beings who coin different meanings to different phenomena like terrorism, it is imperative to use qualitative methodology or approach to this descriptive study. It is evident that the issue of terrorism is a difficult one in such a way that people cannot define it in a universal manner because it involves different points of view from different people, states, sub state groups, international organizations etc. Researches concerned with terrorism, thus, are better handled in qualitative manner in order to identify the meanings and underlying reasons which are very difficult to quantify and use statistical methods in order to make an understanding and reach a plausible conclusion.

As a method of data collection, this study will rely on secondary data like books, journals, scholarly articles, conference proceedings and also employ primary data like analyzing official documents, declassified original documents, United Nations (UN) Resolutions, speeches, legislations and decisions by different countries and multilateral organizations like UN and also the United States in order to supplement the secondary data obtained.

This secondary data is also considered very important in literature reviews and in formulating conceptual framework which in turn will be crucial for the collection of primary data by providing frame work and documents to be analyzed.

1.7 Scope and Significance of the Research

This study will be confined to investigating the nature of US military involvement in counter terrorism in the Horn of Africa and its possible consequences on the sub region. It also focuses on the general threat of terrorist acts in the Horn of Africa. The study will not analyze and go into each terrorist activity in the Horn of Africa due to constraints like time and budget. Rather, the study shall look into major terrorist incidents that triggered US military interest in the sub region.

The significance of this study is its attempt to contribute to the knowledge gap, about the possible or perceived threat of terrorism in the Horn of Africa that prompted the US military involvement and to investigate whether this action is effectively tackling the terrorist threat which is claimed to exist in the sub region and to suggest additional or another alternative to US military engagement in order to conduct successful counter terrorism.

1.8 Limitations of the Research

This study will not be able to conduct interviews outside Addis Ababa due to budgetary constraints. For instance, the research would have been more complete had I interview Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa officials based in Djibouti. Since they are directly involved in the military aspect of US involvement, interviewing and investigating documents would have filled lots of gaps in the study. Also, this study cannot employ interview as a primary source of data because the individuals I intended to interview from the US embassy in Addis Ababa and IGAD office in Addis Ababa failed to reply in a timely manner and I could not promise the panel which I defended my thesis proposal to that I will conduct an interview. In addition, the research cannot investigate many of the terrorist incidents deeply due to time and page limitations.

1.8 Organization of the Research

The study shall have five chapters:

Chapter one shall introduce the general features of this study and also underline what the study is all about and how it is going to be pursued.

Chapter two shall include conceptual framework and literature review on the issue of terrorism in the Horn of Africa; the potential for terrorist threat in the Horn of Africa; and the counter terrorist effort by the United States. The conceptual framework part will look at the concepts of terrorism and counter terrorism.

Chapter three will discuss the level of presence of al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa and the counter terrorism measures taken by the United States

Chapter four will focus on assessing the US involvement in counter terrorism in the Horn of Africa. In this chapter the study will attempt to analyze all data mentioned in previous section of this proposal.

Chapter five will provide summary and conclusions based on the findings of the research.

Chapter Two

Conceptual Framework and Literature Review

2.1 Conceptual Framework

2.1.1 Terrorism

The use of violence to instill fear and intimidation among the population is not a new phenomenon. Nevertheless, references to ‘terrorism’ in law and politics can only be found in more recent times [while] the word ‘terror’ was first used to describe the Jacobin ‘Reign of Terror’ that followed the French Revolution in 1789 (Golder & Williams, 2004:270). The first attempts to define terrorism were in the early decades of the 20th century. But the task is a daunting one because ‘since then lawyers, academics, national legislatures, regional organizations and international bodies, such as the United Nations, have produced a bewildering array of definitions [and a] 1988 study identified a total of 109 different definitions, and the number would be far higher today (Golder & Williams, 2004:270). But after the events of New York and Washington DC on 11 September 2001, the issue of defining terrorism came to the prominence. The definition of terrorism after those incidents ‘articulated a new concept, which involves different actors, motivations, aims, tactics, and actions, compared to the old concept of terrorism used in the mid twentieth century (Spencer, 2006:4). ‘To some extent this concentration on the incidents and on retaliating against the al-Qaeda movement has resulted in a concern with terrorism that may not be justified, given the many other problems of human and state security affecting the world (Rogers in Williams, 2008:171-172). Putting terrorism in perspective, Rogers argues that, while terrorism is awful for the victims and their families, ‘terrorism is one of the minor causes of human suffering in the world [compared to] problems arising from poverty and underdevelopment, from natural disasters, from wars, from crime and even from automobile accidents’ (2008:172). But the current attention given to War on Terror compels one to assess the definition of terrorism.

As mentioned earlier, there are a variety of definitions of terrorism from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to regional organizations like OAU/AU and EU and individual

governments. It will not be a luxury to mention some of them. The United Nations Security Council, in its Resolution 1566 passed unanimously in October 2004, defines terrorism as:

criminal acts, including (those) against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or international organizations to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature.

The European Union (EU), on its part has its own common definition. As it was stated in the report compiled by Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA):

According to the definition, terrorist offences are committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization (QCEA, 2007:7).

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) in its Convention on the Prevention and Combating Terrorism adopted in Algiers in 1999 defines terrorism as:

terrorist act means: (a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to: (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or (iii) create general insurrection in a State; (b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii).

More relevant to this study, the leading nation in the Global War on Terror, the United States of America, defines terrorism through the Department of State as a ‘premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience’ (US Department of State, 2001).

The first thing noticeable in these definitions is that they don’t consider a terrorist act perpetrated by a state i.e. state terrorism. The assumption behind these definitions is terrorist act committed by sub national groups as it is clearly stated in the definition by the United States. But state terrorism, like that of purges in the Soviet Union under Stalin and that of China under Mao ‘are actually far more widespread in [their] effects, both in terms of direct casualties and in inducing of fear’ (Rogers in Williams, 2008:174).

The most important question in defining terrorism is “whose terrorist”. There is a famous phrase about terrorism – one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter. ‘Nelson Mandela was considered a terrorist by many for years [but] now [he] receives levels of international reverence usually reserved for the UN Secretary General’ (QCEA, 2008:8). The same is true about the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) where the British government used to consider them as a terrorist organization. But at the moment, ‘some of those with close links to PIRA became accepted members of a power sharing system, translating from terrorists to legitimate political figures’ (Rogers in Williams, 2008:175). Both in the case of Mandela and PIRA, they enjoyed a good amount of support from the black population suffering from apartheid and the rest of the world, and the catholic minority in Northern Ireland and elsewhere respectively even though they were depicted as terrorists by the powerful ones they stood against. Therefore, most definitions are ‘definitions viewed through the lenses of the most powerful’ (QCEA, 2008:7).

2.1.2 Counter Terrorism

Counter terrorism is not a recent phenomenon contrary to what is widely believed. In fact, ‘what could be called the first international conference on counterterrorism took place in Rome in 1898, to deal with a wave of anarchist assassinations that had been going on worldwide for several years (Pillar in Williams, 2008:376-377). But counter terrorism focused at terrorism by radical Islamism can be described as a recent phenomenon.

According to Rogers (2008:175-176), there are three broad approaches to countering terrorism:

- Traditional counter terrorism rooted principally in policing, intelligence and security.
- Direct military action against paramilitary organizations, especially when they have distinct physical locations.
- Concentrates on the underlying motivations of terrorist groups and the environment from which they draw support.

The first approach, which is a traditional counter terrorism one, involves identifying possible terrorist actions and terrorists before they carry out the actual attack and take them into custody or apprehend them and bring them to justice when prevention fails. The second approach refers to attacking terrorist groups at their base even to the extent of taking a punitive action to a state sponsoring them, if there is any. The third and final approach is embedded on the assumption that terrorist groups do not exist in isolation and in approaching the society that support them in order to drain the support or find a possible way to settle differences by negotiations. ‘Most responses to terrorist campaigns employ a combination of these methods, but the balance may vary’ (Rogers in Williams, 2008:176).

For scholars like Pillar, counter terrorism is divided into two courses of action – Defensive Counter Terrorism and Offensive Counter Terrorism. Defensive Counter Terrorism usually refers to making it difficult for terrorists to carry out their goals. They are usually methods such as airport security, security for public properties like electricity and water supply, financial security like protecting electronic systems etc. ‘The most general level of defensive security measures is

the protection of an entire country, particularly by keeping terrorists, and to some extent the wherewithal for conducting terrorist attacks (especially nuclear material) outside its borders' (Pillar in Williams, 2008:380). This defensive method can work in such a way that they may be successful in deterring attacks if not the attempt. Also, terrorists may abandon their plan because security is too tight. Furthermore, it may slow them down or increase their effort to breach that security so that they will be detected by security forces. But defensive counter terrorism is far from being infallible. It is expensive e.g. equipments used for airport security are very expensive. In less tangible way, airport security can be cumbersome that the speed of doing other businesses is hindered. The most important weakness of this method lies in the fact that the initiative is in the hands of the terrorists. 'Terrorists will always have the advantage of choosing where to attack, with that choice reflecting in part where security is strong and where it is weak' (Pillar in Williams, 2008:382). Operationally speaking, detecting everything is impossible.

Even though defensive and offensive counter terrorism are complimentary, the later methods have advantage over the former. This means, 'going on the offensive means not surrendering the initiative to terrorists and not trying to guess where and how they will strike next [and] a successful offensive operation that puts a terrorist cell out of business prevents it from ever attacking any target' (Pillar in Williams, 2008:382). Diplomacy is dubbed one of the most important tools in offensive counter terrorism be it in multi-lateral or bi-lateral levels. Multi-lateral diplomacy is practiced through conventions against terrorism. More importantly, they are useful in creating awareness and in creating conducive situation for counter terrorism. But bi-lateral diplomacy is considered an effective method because 'individual terrorist cases typically involve only two or three states at a time, and the handling of secret material becomes more difficult the more states that are involved' (Pillar in Williams, 2008:383). This kind of diplomacy is more effective in draining financial support for terrorists like freezing assets used for terrorism, to arrange special rendition for extradition purposes etc. Intelligence is also the major tool of offensive counter terrorism. According to Pillar, intelligence provides three major functions:

One is to provide a more strategic sense of terrorist threats— are they increasing or decreasing, which groups or states pose the greatest dangers, which areas of operation are of most concern, and so forth. Such strategic appraisals help to guide policy-making on all aspects of counterterrorism, including security countermeasures as well as offensive operations. A second function is to provide detailed support to all the other tools. Diplomatic demarches about terrorism, for example, are nearly always based on – and very often convey – information collected by an intelligence service. Intelligence is also important in identifying and locating terrorist financial assets. And intelligence provides critical input to law enforcement and military Operations (2008:384).

But for literatures like Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA), most counter terrorism measures are the “sharp end” of counter terrorism and they are the “last line” of counter terrorism efforts with their own limits. Criticizing intelligence-led counter terrorism QCEA report cited the Intelligence and Security Report in to the London Bombings of July 2005 to argue that ‘the Agencies cannot know everything about everyone, nor can they intercept and read every communication (which in any event would be a gross violation of human rights) [therefore] there will always be gaps in the Agencies’ knowledge’ (2008:22). ‘Terrorism is a multifaceted problem and, accordingly, requires an aggressive, multifaceted and long term solution’ (Lansford, Watson & Covarrubias, 2009:10). The long term solutions refer to addressing the underlying reasons for terrorism. QCEA (2008) recommends measures like strengthening failed states through good governance, development assistance, promotion of democracy and equality, effective and equitable resource management, consensus building, multilateral activity and strengthening UN apparatus.

2.2 Literature Review

2.2.1 Terrorism in the Horn of Africa

According to West, ‘terrorism in East Africa, particularly the Horn of Africa and Yemen, has been of concern to the United States since the early 1990s [where] in 1993, two military helicopters that were part of the peace keeping mission were shot down in Mogadishu, resulting in deaths of eighteen US soldiers and hundreds of Somalis’ (2005:3). But Shinn claims that terrorist activities like ‘[t]he Black September organization [assassination] of the American ambassador to Sudan, Cleo A. Noel Jr., and his deputy chief of mission, George Curtis Moore, in 1973’ (2004:36-37) were there before Americans gave attention to terrorism. ‘In a revenge attack on Kenya for allowing an Israeli rescue mission to use its facilities to foil the 1976 hijacking of an Air France plane and its 258 passengers the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) bombed the Jewish-family owned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi on 31 December 1980, killing 15 people and injuring 80 others’ (Kagwanja, 2006:74). Kagwanja also claims that ‘analysts suspect that Islamic terrorists had a hand in the killing of 18 US army rangers in the “Blackhawk Down” episode in Mogadishu in 1993 prompting the withdrawal of US troops from the country in March 1994’ (2006:74). But Ploch claims that ‘the extent of the al-Qaeda ties with the actual perpetrators is unknown’ (2010:5). Further strengthening Ploch’s argument, Moller argues that ‘most analysts dismiss this as highly unlikely and unsubstantiated by any evidence’ (2009:21). Another example, to the presence of threat of terrorism in the Horn is ‘the attempted assassination in 1995 of the Egyptian president Hosny Mubarak in Addis Ababa by the Egyptian terrorist group Gama’at al Islamiyyaa’ (Shinn, 2003:79).

Kagwanja claims that, ‘the bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on 7 August 1998 and the foiling of another planned attack on the US embassy in Kampala pushed the Horn to new level of insecurity’ (2006:74). These incidents resulted in ‘killing 224 people – including 12 Americans – and injuring 5,000’ (Lyman & Morrison, 2004: 75). ‘In retaliation for these attacks, the United States, in addition to an attack in Afghanistan, bombed [al-Shifa] chemical plant in Sudan, claiming that it was producing elements for chemical weapons for al-Qaeda’ (Lyman, 2008:1). ‘Yemeni terrorists also hit the USS Cole [in Yemeni port] just off the East African Indian Ocean seaboard in October 2000, killing 17 American sailors [and] at least 15 people died

when suspected al-Qaeda agents bombed the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombassa on 28 November 2002 and within minutes, terrorists using shoulder-fired SA-7 missiles narrowly missed an El Al passenger plane taking off Mombassa airport' (Kagwanja, 2006:75). According to Lyman and Morrison, 'the Bush administration has designed the greater horn of Africa a front-line in its global war against terrorism and has worked to dismantle al-Qaeda's infrastructure there' (2004: 75).

West states that, 'to combat terrorism in the greater Horn of Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was set up in late 2002 in order to confront terrorists directly, to help the nations of the region identify and capture terrorists, and to help the host nations control their ungoverned spaces, especially borders and coastlines (2005:6). Shinn also states, 'in 2003 the U.S. created a \$100 million East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) [which] encompasses military training for border and coastal security, programs to strengthen control of the movement of people and goods across borders, aviation security, assistance for regional programs to curb terrorist financing, police training, an education program to counter extremist influence and there are separate programs to combat money laundering' (2004:41). For Rotberg this greater Horn of Africa includes Yemen, as he argues that, 'for geostrategic reasons, especially in an era of terror, Yemen belongs naturally to this greater Horn of Africa region, adding another 20 million people, virtually all Muslims' (Rotberg in Rotberg, 2005:1). Rotberg further states that:

the greater Horn of Africa and Yemen region is bound by its recent history as a sometime target, by its geographical proximity to the homeland of Osama bin Laden and the primary regional object of his political anger, by long and continuing interrelationships of licit and illicit trade, by religion, by centuries of Muslim-Christian accommodation and antagonism, by renowned resistance against Western colonizers (in the Horn), and by shared poverty, poor governance and underdevelopment. This complex provides a tasting menu for potential terrorists (2005:2).

2.2.2 Potential for Threat of Terrorism in the Horn

According to Shinn, 'there are underlying factors in East Africa and the Horn that contribute directly to conflict and terrorist tactics' (2003:80) by radical Islamist groups. Illustrating those underlying factors, Shinn states that, 'poverty and social injustice are widespread, borders are porous even by African standards - Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, and Eritrea have long and poorly patrolled coasts on the Red Sea or Indian Ocean, weapons are readily available throughout the region, but especially in Somalia, all of the countries have a severe shortage of financial resources and trained personnel to counter the activities of terrorist elements, and corruption is endemic in the region and a particularly serious problem in several countries' (2003:80).

The Harmony Project report states that, 'for more than 40 years, the Horn has been plagued by strife and conflict - civil wars in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan have been compounded by several interstate wars between Ethiopia and Somalia (the 1977-1978 Ogaden War) and between Ethiopia and Eritrea (the 1998-2000 border war)' (Harmony Project, 2006:4). 'Sudan's Islamic government actively sought and partly obtained peace with Washington immediately after 9/11 [which resulted] in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Khartoum and the Sudan's People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA/M) but US-Sudan relations dipped following Khartoum's proxy war in Darfur' (Kagwanja, 2006:76). This complicates things further in the Horn.

For West, 'Somalia's lack of central government and its largely ungoverned territory and coastline should provide the right mix for a terrorist haven and a source of recruitment for radical Islamists [as] the perfect storm [which] got everything an Islamic terrorist would want-a long un-patrolled coastline, un-patrolled borders leading to interesting targets, an Islamic country with radical movement, immiseration and desperation' (2005:19). 'As al-Qaeda was attacked and driven out of Afghanistan, Somalia quickly earned a spot on the shortlist of countries that might be targeted in an expanded war on terrorism' (Menkhaus in Rotberg, 2005:38). But Piombo argues that, 'terrorist groups tend to use the failed states like Somalia as more as staging ground and transit points, rather than places where the groups build long-term organizational and

financial networks' (2007:2). 'Terrorist organizations are not entirely comfortable operating in a failed state, where their own security is in jeopardy, where outside intervention can take place without much public attention and outcry and where various militia can be paid to search them out' (Lyman, 2008:3). But Lyman also states that, 'the worst fears about Somalia after 9/11 seemed about to become true [when] Islamic Courts Movement unified control of Mogadishu' (2008:3).

Moller states that, 'it has become a common place in the US discourse, including the academic literature, that the Horn of Africa (or, more broadly, East Africa) is a particularly dangerous place, i.e. a hotspot of terrorism, particularly the "jihadist" kind' (2009:7). 'In 1989, the National Islamic Front (called the National Congress Party after 1999) seized power in Sudan, marking the ascent of militant Islamism as a powerful force in the Horn of Africa [which made Sudan] a new epicenter of the militant Islamic world, providing shelter to Islamist fighters' (Kagwanja, 2006:75). 'The open door policy attracted radical Islamists from all over the Middle East and North Africa [and] in addition to Al Qaeda, these entities included Abu Nidal, the Islamic Jihad, and Hamas from Palestine; Hezbollah from Lebanon; Iran's Revolutionary Guards; Egypt's Gama'a Islamiya and Islamic Jihad; as well as individual radicals from Algeria, Libya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Tunisia' (Carney in Rotberg, 2005:122). According to Carney, 'bin Laden, his four wives, their children, and dozens of Arab veterans of the Afghan war arrived in Khartoum in 1991' (2005:122). 'The Clinton administration placed Sudan in 1993 on the list of states that sponsor terrorism' (Shinn, 2003:82).

According to Rabasa, 'the development of radical Islam [in the Horn] is due to the confluence of a number of socio-political factors—some of them at work in the Muslim world at large and others specific to the East African region' (2009:39). Among the external ones, the revival of Islamic ideals, the influence exerted by organizations like Muslim Brotherhood, the Iranian Islamic Revolution, ideology and funds which are exported from Saudi Arabia, and the expansion of "international Islamic networks". Rabasa states that, 'the internal dynamics that contributed to the growth of radical Islamism included the growth of domestic Islamist movements; Muslim

reaction to perceived threats to Islam, Christian missionary activity in particular; and such political events as the Islamist-military coup in Sudan in 1989, the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, and the onset of the US-led global war on terrorism' (2009:39).

Menkhaus states that, 'Somalia has been without a functional central government since early 1991, making it the longest-running instance of complete state collapse in post-colonial history' (in Rotberg, 2005:27). Dempsey defined state failure or collapse as a situation where 'the state loses the ability to perform the basic functions of governance, and it loses legitimacy . . . the inability of political institutions to meet the basic functions of legitimate governance is also accompanied by economic collapse' (2006:2). Menkhaus argues, in 2005, 'Somalia cannot at this time be depicted as a hotbed of Islamic radicalism; [rather] it is a hotbed of competition and debate among Islamic movements for legitimacy and public support' (2005:33). Further strengthening this argument, Moller argues that just as its intervention in Iraq, 'when the United States sponsored a warlord alliance against terrorism it inadvertently helped bringing to power and subsequently radicalizing Islamist forces' (2009:39). But al-Qaeda tried to establish its operation there. But 'the most important obstacle to a closer alliance has been that local Islamist groups have a primary loyalty to their clans and ethnic tribes that has not always been compatible with al-Qaeda's transnational agenda' (Piombo, 2007:4). But Ploch argues that 'several known al-Qaeda operatives are reportedly part of [Al Shabaab], including Harun Fazul and at least several hundred foreign fighters predominantly from Kenya but also from Tanzania, Sudan, Bangladesh, Chechnya, and Pakistan, as well as Europe, Australia, Canada, and the United States' (2010:8).

According to Kagwanja, 'Islamic charities from the Gulf region have been accused of aiding radical Islamic activities and funding terrorism in the Horn' (2006:77). 'Charities sponsored by Saudi Arabia and several other Persian Gulf states have probably financed most of the international terrorist activity in the region, with funds coming both from private individuals and governments' (Shinn, 2004:39). Many scholars agree that in the region where pervasive poverty is entrenched, Muslim charities can fill the gap left by local governments. Lyman argues that the rise of ICU in Somalia coincide with the 'the rise of Islamic charities that fulfilled some of the social, educational, and humanitarian needs of the population [which] consciously compete with

Western NGOs for influence' (2008:5). Rabasa also shows how important Islamic charities are in Somalia. 'In Mogadishu alone, Islamic charities manage or support three universities, a management training institute, two hospitals, and numerous schools [and] together these institutions enroll more than 100,000 students' (Rabasa, 2009:44). 'Although poverty and despair do not cause terrorism, they provide a fertile environment for it to prosper' (Shinn, 2004:38).

Many scholars on the Horn of Africa stress up on the role Islamic charities play in their potential in spreading radical Islamic ideas. Menkhaus argues that 'Islamic institutions, including schools, hospitals, charities, and local Shari' a courts, are among the most functional and effective sources of services and security in Somalia' (in Rotberg, 2005:25). The spread of Wahhabism is considered by many scholars as dangerous. 'Wahhabism is a stream of Islam native to Saudi Arabia that links religion and political action' (West, 2005:8). West also argues that, 'Wahhabism does not equate terrorism, but it embodies a fundamentalist philosophy whose adherents are more likely to be attracted to terrorism and jihad' (2005:8). The spread of Wahhabism is believed to be propagated by some Islamic charities. 'In 2004, Saudi Arabia and the United States named the Ethiopian branch of the Saudi-based charity al-Haramain as a channel of terrorist financing, and Riyadh consequently ordered the dissolution of that organization worldwide' (Shinn in Rotberg, 2005:110).

According to Shinn, 'every country [in the Horn of Africa] has either a predominantly Islamic population or has a significant Muslim minority' (2003:81). In the case of Ethiopia, Muslims are a significant minority where 'some 40 percent of Ethiopians are Muslims who live mostly in the lowland regions and Muslims predominate among the Oromos, Ethiopia's largest ethnic group, who constitute about 40 percent of Ethiopia's population and live largely in the southern part of the country, and among ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden' (Rabasa, 2009:33). On the other hand, 'Kenya's Muslim community constitute only about 10 percent of its population, roughly 3 million people, but it is highly concentrated in the northeastern part of the country and along the Indian Ocean coast' (Carson in Rotberg, 2005:185). Carson also states that, 'today, Kenya's Muslim community holds both economic and political grievances against the government in

Nairobi, composed largely of ethnic Africans, for not providing the coastal peoples with their fair share of the country's social service and financial benefits' (in Rotberg, 2005:186). Many scholars like West agree that 'support for al-Qaeda comes from Kenya's Muslim community' (West, 2005:17). Shinn Claims that 'Eritrea's 4.3 million people are divided about equally between Christians and Muslims' (2003:82). Connell argues that Islamist groups like Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) 'has lately found fertile soil in which to grow by capitalizing on Muslim dissatisfaction with the secular regime in Asmara' (Connell in Rotberg, 2005:76).

Rabasa states that 'state presence in border areas is marginal throughout East Africa, reflecting a general inability of the governments to police the outer reaches of their territories' (2009:20). Shinn stresses that 'Kenya has a particularly porous border with ungoverned Somalia [and also] a support network for terrorists has developed along the coast where persons coming from the Gulf States, Pakistan, Somalia, and the Comoro Islands can blend in with ease' (2003:88). Lyman described the north-eastern border of Kenya as, 'armed convoys are required for overland travel to border towns and refugee camps, and for most of 1990s, the Kenya side of the Somali border was more lawless and dangerous than the Somali side' (2008:10). Yemen is said to be a major arms transition point to the Horn especially to Somalia. According to Rabasa, 'Yemeni arms-trading networks sent large shipments of arms to all sides of the Somalia conflict and to the Puntland administration' (2009:21). As a routine, different kinds of weapons in large quantities passed through the famous network of weapons market known as "Bakaaraha Arms Supermarket)". Rabasa also stresses that this trafficking does not end in Somali border. 'Arms suppliers meet the needs of the various rebel armies in Sudan [in addition], according to a Nairobi press report; there are 100,000 illegal guns in Kenya' (Rabasa, 2009:22). In general, porous borders are considered one of the ideal situations for terrorists who wish to mount an attack in the region and also exacerbate conflicts in the region which in turn open an opportunity for terrorism.

According to Healy, 'the magnitude of violent conflict in the Horn of Africa , taken over time, is greater than in any other African region and has been both prevalent and persistent, with multiple examples of both civil wars and inter-state war' (2008:9). After 'the Ethiopian People's

Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) cooperated closely to overthrow the brutal Mengistu Haile Mariam regime in 1991, the relations between that two countries had degenerated [in 1998]' (Lyons, 2006:6). Sudan also ended its long civil war recently. 'The Horn constitutes a regional security complex in which the security problems of each country impacts on the security of all' (Healy, 2008:44). Shinn, based on his own personal experience argues that, 'all countries of the region, they frequently lead to support for a dissident group in one country by a neighboring country [and] that support, in turn, causes the affected country to back another dissident organization against the offending government' (2003:81). Terrorism issues should be considered from these complex regional issues.

Lyons argues that 'the stalemate [between Eritrea and Ethiopia] remained stable because neither Asmara nor Addis Ababa had compelling incentives to break the ceasefire' (2006:9). But both countries are engaged in a proxy war in Somalia especially in 2006. Healy insists that these kinds of interventions are like norms in the region; 'throughout the Horn of Africa, one country's "periphery" is its neighbor's backdoor – with plentiful opportunities for troublemaking [and] pursuing (regional) foreign policy through proxy forces in neighboring countries has been the "normal" pattern of relations for decades' (Healy, 2008:39). This stalemate over the border issue and the case of proxy war can negatively affect counter terrorism activities because 'the deteriorating situation in Somalia is already derailing US counter terrorism efforts by CJTF-HOA, scuttling early hopes that regional cooperation would be possible' (Lyons, 2006: 4). 'The long history of tit-for-tat support of opposition groups by one country against its neighbors complicates an effective counter terrorism strategy and underscores the need to end this practice' (Shinn in Rotberg, 2005:112). One of the victims of the Ethiopian – Eritrean border conflict is the US–Eritrea relation where the later accused the former favoring Ethiopia. The situation deteriorated to the point that 'the United States has hinted it might place Eritrea on the list of countries supporting terrorism' (Lyman, 2008:7). Lyman further notes that 'with Eritrea's withdrawal from American plans and programs in the Horn, the regional counter terrorism structure has suffered a serious blow' (2008:7). This shows how regional security complex can affect the US counter terrorism endeavors.

In general, this section tries to highlight the major underlying reasons discussed by different literatures that can be conducive and potential for the use of terrorism and terrorist tactics in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, the scholars argue that the Horn can be a breeding ground and be used as a safe haven and launching ground for terrorists unless these underlying reasons are addressed in a proper manner. According to many scholars, counter terrorism measures should consider these underlying issues seriously. ‘Countering terrorism will never succeed unless it is part of a broader approach that focuses on the fundamental problems that prevent African governments from effectively controlling their territories, ruling capably and accountably, and in conditions of dire poverty’ (Piombo, 2007:5).

2.2.3 Counter Terrorism in the Horn of Africa

According to Dempsey, the United States had been engaged in counter terrorism in Africa before September 11 by direct military action and ‘examples include the bombing of Libya in 1986 by the Reagan administration in response to Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks against U.S. targets in Europe; the U.S. cruise missile attacks on targets in The Sudan and in Afghanistan in 1998 in response to the Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania’ (2006:19). But the US effort became much more vigorous after the events of 9/11 and the declaration of America’s Global War on Terror (GWOT) that involve the US forces in battle grounds like Afghanistan and Iraq. Shinn states that, ‘the US has identified East Africa and the Horn as the priority region in Africa for counter-terrorism cooperation because of its past history of terrorist acts’ (2003:89).

Piombo states that the US counter terrorism policy in Africa, in general, revolves around ‘the four “D’s” of fighting terrorism: defeat terrorists and their organizations; deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; diminish the underlying conditions that terrorist seek to exploit, and defend US citizens and interests at Home and abroad’ (2007:5). Piombo also went further in explaining how this counter terrorism effort is supposed to be carried out:

Accordingly, counterterrorism efforts operate at several levels: militarily, governmental, and societal. Programs take the form of direct security sector assistance, capacity building programs and economic assistance, and are overseen by the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS, or State), Department of Treasury (Treasury) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Security sector assistance primarily

refers to combined exercises and programs that train foreign militaries and security forces to operate more efficiently and professionally, though the Department of Defense also considers humanitarian and preventative measures as part of the war on terror. Governance and capacity programs include both traditional democratization efforts, which help to inculcate norms of inclusion and participation, and governance assistance, which are programs that attempt to train governments, both national and local, in how to carry out their activities. State and USAID tend to oversee most of these efforts, either directly or through a range of subcontractors. Economic programs include traditional development assistance and the more recent wave of “post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization” programs that have become popular with the U.S. government, undertaken primarily by USAID. Because conditions of poverty make people vulnerable to recruitment, in a very broad sense, developmental programs also serve counterterrorism goals. Treasury’s activities focus mainly on countering terrorist finance, and are the most narrow of the programs (2007:5).

According to West, ‘the United States established Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti outside of the capital city. CJTF-HOA is based in Djibouti, in part because of its location on the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the second busiest shipping lane in the world and a potential conduit for terrorist activity (2005:6). It also has a training camp in Ethiopia, near Dire Dawa, for the purpose of training Ethiopian forces in countering terrorism. ‘Since 2002, the United States has stationed between 1,200 to 1,800 troops’ (Lyman, 2008:3). ‘It is responsible to fighting terrorism in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Yemen, and in the coastal waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean’ (Shinn, 2004:41). Initially ‘US Central Command backs the CJTF-HOA to achieve its mission: detecting, disrupting, and defeating transnational terrorist groups; countering the resurgence of international terrorism; and enhancing long term stability of the region’ (Kagwanja, 2006: 82). But, recently, CJTF-HOA came under the African Command (AFRICOM). ‘CJTF-HOA is comprised of service members from each military branch of the U.S. Armed Forces (Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen), civilian employees, and representatives of coalition and partner nations [and] in addition to Civil Affairs missions (drilling wells, medical care, renovation of schools and clinics, etc.), CJTF-HOA also conducts military-to-military training, which includes counterterrorism training’ (globalsecurity.org).

Lyman claims that CJTF-HOA is ‘the most intense and the militarized US response to terrorism in Africa’ (2008:3). CJTF-HOA has been involved in direct military operations at the early stage of its establishment. ‘Without providing details, the [former] commander stated that they have captured “dozens of terrorists” and averted at least five terrorist attacks’ (Shinn, 2004:41). Ploch claims that ‘the US government response to terrorism has evolved in the past twenty years, from a primarily law enforcement response to one guided by a broad US strategy to lead an international effort to deny violent extremist networks the resource and functions they needed to operate and survive’ (2010:13). Copson states that the mission of CJTF-HOA evolved that ‘today it is not a ‘direct action’ military force conducting operations against enemy forces, but rather a military cooperation effort building local military capacity and seeking to improve underlying social conditions, principally in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti’ (2007:114). But one has to bear in mind that after the invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia in the aftermath of the seizure of power by radical Islamic forces, ‘the United States bombed what they hoped were terrorist leaders [and] in March 2008, the US again bombed southern Somalia, seeking in particular to kill one of the persons suspected of the embassy bombings of 1998’ (Lyman, 2008:3).

According to Schermerhorn, the creation of East African Counter Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) ‘acknowledged that remedial attention was needed so that host nations could help themselves to develop their own capacities to counter terrorism’ (in Rotberg, 2005:57). This is a 100 million USD initiative with the purpose of sending ‘the bulk of the money to hard aspects of counter terrorism, including US\$ 50 million for security programs administered by US Department of Defense for military training for border control and security of coastline, police training and aviation security capacity’ (Kagwanja, 2006:82). As Rabasa explains, EACTI aimed in channeling funds and finance for the purpose of reinforcing security in the Horn by identifying key areas like: ‘(1) military training for border and coastal surveillance;(2) programs designed to strengthen the control of the movement of people and goods; (3) aviation security capacity-building; (4) assistance for regional efforts to counter terrorism financing; and (5) police training (2009:73). ‘Significantly, the EACTI has also provided funds for teacher education in disadvantaged Muslim communities, greater access to education for girls and community involvement in education’ (Chau, 2008:20). Kenya benefited from EACTI because it is part of

‘US Interdiction Program’ – ‘a comprehensive anti-money laundering/counter terrorist financing regime – [conducted by] State Department [which] has established a computer system that is now operational at select airports in Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia’ (Shinn, 2004:41). According to Ploch, ‘in 2009, the State Department launched a new regional program, the East African Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI), to replace EACTI and aims to foster regional counter terrorism effort, build partner capacity, and diminish support for violent extremism’ (2010:24).

According to Shinn, governments in the Horn also participate in counter terrorism in collaboration with the United States and CJTF-HOA: ‘in the case of Ethiopia, CJTF-HOA has provided infantry skills training and small unit tactics against terrorism to the Ethiopian National Defense Forces at the Hurso training camp, northwest of Dire Dawa’ (in Rotberg, 2005:111). Lyman claims that ‘the United States gave at least tacit backing and intelligence and material support to an Ethiopian invasion of Somalia to dislodge a radical Islamic government that had taken power in the capital’ (2008:3). Furthermore, according to Chau, ‘the U.S. military used an airstrip in eastern Ethiopia to mount air strikes against Islamic militants in neighboring Somalia, launching two AC-130 gunship strikes on January 6 and 23, 2007 [and] significant sharing of intelligence with the Ethiopian military occurred on ICU positions, including the use of American satellite information’ (2008:16). Cooperation between Kenya and the United States is gradually increasing especially in counter terrorism. ‘The Kenyan military has received larger amounts of US military assistance to purchase equipment for its army, and a growing number of Kenyan officers have benefited from training opportunities in the United States under International Military Education and Training program (IMET)’ (Carson in Rotberg, 2005:177).

Connell claims that, ‘between 1994 and 2001, Eritrea received \$6 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and \$2 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET) assistance’ (in Rotberg, 2005:69). As Connell further explains, ‘this evolving relationship was hindered, however, by growing concerns that the Eritrean leadership was still operating as if it were a band of bunkered guerillas running a liberated zone, rather than officials governing a modern state’ (2005:69). The United States had difficult relations since National Islamic Front

(NIF) took power in Khartoum. Sudan hosted Osama bin Laden for five years and suffered a US cruise missile attack in the aftermath of the East African embassy bombings in 1998. But things began to change for US-Sudan relations after 9/11 and both began to cooperate in counter terrorism. 'In addition, [the government of Sudan] and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, under pressure from the U.S. and others, have also made enormous progress in ending the civil war' (Shinn, 2004:40). Consequently, the US removed Sudan from the list of countries that sponsor terrorists. But the crisis in Darfur complicates this cooperation. This clearly shows that regional issues can adversely affect the counter terrorist efforts by the United States.

Chau described American counterterrorism campaign in East Africa as 'a double-edged blade, catalyzing and supporting peace processes while also undermining democracy and stability' (Chau, 2008:37). This is to indicate the concern that counter terrorism is being used for regime survival and state security. Connell states that, the Eritrean government accused the United States 'for coddling [Ethiopia] rather than pressuring it to follow through on its commitment to abide by the results of [border] arbitration' (in Rotberg, 2005:70). The fear is that the US Global War on Terror may override issues like democratization processes and Human Right issues. As it was described by Lyman, the most militarized US presence is in the Horn of Africa. This security and state centric approach raises some concerns. West exemplifies these concerns: 'the American preoccupation with counter terrorism gave the Eritrean government a chance to crack down on internal threats under the guise of combating transnational terrorism' (2005:11). In addition, 'Ethiopia branded the Oromo Liberation Front, the Ogaden National Liberation Front and The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia as 'terrorist groups'' (Kagwanja, 2006:78). Kagwanja also argues that 'governments across the Horn utilize the 'war on terror' to further their political ends, closing down channels of peace talks to end conflicts' (2006:78). Tynes also stress upon this issue by taking allegations against Ethiopian government about Human Right abuses in its region of Oromia. He states that:

Even though this abuse has been well documented, the US still nurtures its tight partnership with Ethiopia for the 'war on terror', and the US government remains the largest donor of bilateral aid to the African country. The US has yet to press Ethiopia on human rights violations and in both Ethiopia and Eritrea, helping the US combat terror has sometimes become a rationale for African leaders to commit their own human rights abuses (2006:111).

Furthermore, scholars like Menkhaus criticize certain American counter terrorism strategies particularly in Somalia. He criticizes the US backing of Somali war lords in its fighting against terrorist cells – namely al-Qaeda. The United States, since 2001, ‘relied on local militia leaders to help monitor and apprehend suspects, has had only limited success, may be producing a public backlash, and now is on collision course with local state-building initiatives’ (Menkhaus in Rotberg, 2005:25). The United States supported the alliance of warlords known as ‘Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism’ (ARPCT) which was defeated by Islamic Courts Union which led to the Ethiopian invasion that further complicate regional conflicts that led Ethiopia and Eritrea’s proxy war in Somalia. Eritrea’s support for ICU leaders ‘has incurred a warning that it will be designated a state sponsor of terrorism’ (Healy, 2008:39) which pushed Eritrea out from US counter terrorism plan.

Chapter Three

Al-Qaeda and the US Counter Terrorism in the Horn of Africa

3.1 Al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa

The National Security Strategy of 2010 clearly identifies al-Qaeda as a threat for the security of the United States. The document states that ‘We are at war with a specific network, al-Qaeda, and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States, our allies, and partners’ (National Security Strategy, 2010:20). This shows that the biggest US terrorism concern in the Horn of Africa is the presence of al-Qaeda. Therefore, it is imperative to look at al-Qaeda’s activities and its relation with other terrorist organizations in the Horn of Africa.

The presence of al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa can be traced back to late 1980s to early 1990s in Sudan after the National Islamic Front (NIF) took power in 1989. ‘Between late 1989 and late 1991 al-Qaeda moved most of its best trained and experienced fighters, numbering 1,000 to 1,500 to Sudan’ (Shinn, 2008:6). The leader of al-Qaeda, ‘[Osama] bin Laden, his four wives, their children, and dozens of Arab veterans of the Afghan war arrived in Khartoum in 1991’ (Carney in Rotberg, 2005:123). Shinn described bin Laden’s activities in Sudan as:

Bin Laden established in Sudan some 30 businesses ranging from agriculture to construction. The primary holding company was Wadi al-Aqiq, to which Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir provided a letter that offered protection of al-Qaeda while operating in the country. Al-Qaeda purchased two large farms and built as commercial projects roads and bridges with its construction company. Al-Qaeda used one of the farms for refresher training in weapons and explosives. One of the groups that used the facility was the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Bin Laden cultivated senior officials in the government and military and reportedly invested \$50 million in a bank closely linked to Sudanese leaders. [Its] noncombatant component of al-Qaeda in Sudan eventually reached about 1,000 while trained recruits grew to some 2,000. Al-Qaeda trained several hundred Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) fighters in its Sudanese and Afghan camps, and established links with African Islamist political parties and armed groups, especially during 1992-96 (2008:6-7).

‘Al-Qaeda’s increased penetration of East Africa, and its preoccupation with derailing the U.S. and UN intervention in Somalia, is in part a function of al-Qaeda’s physical presence in Sudan at

the time' (Harmony Project, 2006:38). Osama bin Laden was expelled by the Sudanese government due to, according to Carney, 'unsuccessful initiatives to ease relations with [the United States]' (in Rotberg, 2005:121). Al-Qaeda was also implicated in the US embassy bombings in 1998 in Kenya and Tanzania which makes it a US target in the Horn of Africa.

The biggest concern for the US in the Horn of Africa especially after September 11 in relation to al-Qaeda is the state of Somalia. 'As al-Qaeda was attacked and driven from Afghanistan, Somalia quickly earned a spot on the shortlist of countries that might be targeted in an expanded war on terrorism' (Menkhaus in Rotberg, 2005:38). According to declassified Harmony documents on al-Qaeda by Combating Terrorism Center (CTC), al-Qaeda was trying to establish itself in early 1990s in Somalia by collaborating with domestic Islamist organizations especially with Al Ittihad Al Islaamiyya (AIAI) and in its military camp at a place called Ras Kimbooni. This is in order to 'thwart a dangerous precedent of American armed intervention in the Horn which would endanger al-Qaeda's base in Sudan' (Harmony Project, 2006:39). This shows that al-Qaeda began cooperation with AIAI in the early 1990s. But AIAI was not established with the help of al-Qaeda. In fact, according to International Crisis Group (ICG), the top leaders of AIAI were leaders of precursor Islamic organizations like al-Jama'a and Wahdat al Shabaab al Islaamiyya (ICG Africa Report No. 100, 2005:3). 'In 1996, Ethiopian cross-border raids against AIAI strongholds at Luuq and Buulo Haawa in Somalia severely weakened the organization' (Shinn, 2008:11). Therefore, the attempted cooperation between AIAI and al-Qaeda also ended. Somalia was inhospitable for al-Qaeda plans due to, as Menkhaus states:

First, terrorist cells and bases are much more exposed to international counter terrorist action in zones of state collapse. Violations of state sovereignty by US Special Forces are less problematic (or might even go undetected) where a central government either does not exist or is unable to extend its authority to large sections of the country....Second, areas of state collapse tend to be inhospitable and dangerous, so few if any foreigners choose to reside there. The fewer the foreigners, the more difficult it is for foreign terrorists to blend in unnoticed....Third, the lawlessness of collapsed states such as Somalia is a double-edged sword for terrorists. On one hand, it reduces the risk of apprehension by law enforcement agencies, but on the other, it exponentially increases vulnerability to the most common crimes of chaos-kidnapping, extortion, blackmail, and assassination.... Fourth, foreign terrorists would be susceptible to betrayal by Somali eager to reap the rewards of handing over a terrorist suspect to the United States.... Fifth, the external actor-whether an aid agency or terrorist cell-can quickly become

embroiled in [local] disputes and as seen as choosing sides simply by making hiring, rental, and contract decisions.... Finally, Somalia's state collapse and poor security have virtually emptied the country of Western embassies and other soft targets, making it far less interesting as an operational base than neighboring Kenya (in Rotberg, 2005:39-41).

Although Somalia is not hospitable for longer term operations due to the aforementioned reasons, it still served a purpose for al-Qaeda. It should not be forgotten that the country is used as a transit for materiel such as bombs in the US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 and also the Hotel bombing and an attempt to shoot down a passenger plane in Mombassa in 2002. Also, Somalia served as escape route for suspected perpetrators of these attacks like the Comoros citizen Fazul Abdullah Mohammed.¹

Another more recent concern in Somalia is the emergence of al-Shabaab and its relation with al-Qaeda. There are disagreements over how al-Shabaab or Harakat al Shabaab al Mujahidin (Mujahidin Youth Movement) has emerged but is believed to have been founded by younger former AIAI commanders. The leadership of al-Shabaab includes individuals like Aden Hashi Ayro (killed in the US air strike in 2008), Ibrhahim al Afghani, and Mukhtar Robow who were involved in Afghan war or the Taliban or allegedly have fought and trained with al-Qaeda before.² Its composition is said to be a hybrid of local Islamists and transnational affiliates of al-Qaeda and also 'referred as a sprawling coalition of jihadists, business interests, and clan militias, but some recent analyses suggest that the group has become more centralized under the control of a group of hardliners, with significant influence from foreign operatives including Harun Fazul' (Ploch, 2010:7-8). 'The Shabaab traces its roots back to the erstwhile irredentist Islamist movement, which for years aimed at recovering the Somali-inhabited regions of Ethiopia and Kenya [and also] continues to use a hybrid of irredentism and global Jihad' (Ali, 2010:8). Al-Shabaab pursues 'religious ideology as a tool for a social transformation using Salafi-Wahhabism as a way to refute local social structures, create cross-clan alliances, and thus providing a truly revolutionary alternative' (Roque, 2009:3). 'Upon the falter of the irredentist

¹ See Rotberg (ed), 2005, *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*, p.41

² for detailed information on al-Shabaab and UIC leadership, see Markus Virgil Hoene, 2010, *Counter Terrorism in Somalia: How External Interference Helped Militant Islamism*, pp. 13-18

Islamist movement after the withdrawal of Ethiopia from Somalia at the end of 2008, al-Shabaab began to rapidly mutate into global jihadist movement' (Ali, 2010:8). According to Human Rights Watch, al-Shabaab employs fear on the population under its control and failing to observe its rules result in 'punishments that include floggings, head shavings, and, in some cases, amputations and execution by stoning' (2010:20).

The relation between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab and the extent of influence of the al-Qaeda is unclear. But the United States has strong suspicion that al-Shabaab has link with international terrorism which is central to its argument for involving in the affairs of Somalia. 'In August 2008, Mukhtar Robow, one of al-Shabaab top leaders, publicly acknowledged the groups growing ties to al-Qaeda, saying "We are now negotiating to unite as one. We will take our orders from Sheik Osama bin Laden because we are his students" (Ploch, 2010:9). After the attempted Christmas day bombing on a US-bound (Detroit) Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam in 2009 which was organized in Yemen, 'al-Shabaab offered to send fighters to Yemen to help [the al-Qaeda cell] counter US-assisted air strikes by the Yemeni government, and a top al-Shabaab leader affirmed support for "the international jihad of al-Qaeda." Bin Laden, in turn, has repeatedly voiced rhetorical support for al-Shabaab' (HRW, 2010:18). The 2009 message by Osama bin Laden in support of al-Shabaab 'galvanized global Jihadists and markedly catapulted al-Shabaab's stature among them [and] as expected, al-Shabaab did not only welcome the call, but it responded with an oath of allegiance to bin Laden' (Ali, 2010:38). But there is no clear evidence that these rhetoric is not matched by clear and concrete involvement by al-

Qaeda. In fact, the extent of al-Qaeda's support for al-Shabaab is not clear. Menkhaus states that:

At least for the moment, al-Qaeda seems to be dabbling in Somalia, using a modest level of resources to leverage a maximum amount of discomfort and insecurity for the US and its ally Ethiopia. Compared to a number of other theaters of operation in the world, al-Qaeda has not demonstrated an intent to make Somalia a major priority. There is, for instance, no evidence at all that Shabaab-held territory is being planned or used as a major safe haven for al-Qaeda leaders long the lines of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas. The main security threat from al-Qaeda in the region continues to be the prospect of terrorist attacks on soft Western targets in Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, or Somaliland. To launch those attacks, exploitation of Somali

territory and operatives would be useful but not essential for al-Qaeda. The biggest new development with regard to terrorist threats in the region is this – for almost two decades, the only jihadist terrorist threat in the Horn of Africa came from outsiders in the East Africa Al-Qa'ida cell. Now, the Shabaab amounts to the first serious “home-grown” terrorist threat targeting US interests in the region. This has the potential to be quite dangerous, but only if Shabaab itself can thrive (2009:7).

Kenya has been the recipient of the worst terrorist attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa. Al-Qaeda had been engaged in Kenya since it has been based in Sudan particularly from 1994 when it started planning the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. ‘Abu Ubadiyah al-Banshiri and, following his death on Lake Victoria, his deputy and successor, Abu Hafis, did the planning together with Ali Muhammad, who surveyed the US embassy in Nairobi as a possible target [where] he took photographs and made reconnaissance sketches [and] Bin Laden, then in Khartoum, applied his engineering knowledge to identify the best entry for the explosive laden vehicle’ (Shinn, 2008:31).

The Kenyan authorities were reluctant to admit the presence of al-Qaeda cells in their country. But the two major bombings in Nairobi and Mombassa put things in perspective. ‘It was not until after the second major bombing that American and Kenyan investigators [were] able to confirm at least one al-Qaeda cell in Kenya and the full extent of the interlocking connection between al-Qaeda terrorists and a number of Kenyan families (Carson in Rotberg, 2005:182). The success of al-Qaeda is claimed to be impossible without getting help from the local people. ‘Their ability to organize and operate clandestinely for months and years at a time demonstrate how deeply al-Qaeda operatives are allied with some parts of Kenya’s Muslim population (Carson in Rotberg, 2005:185). Harmony Project stresses that Kenya has been a venue for al-Qaeda operations due to four important factors. First it provides rich Western targets due to its good relations with the likes of United States, United Kingdom and Israel; second, Kenya has a functioning sovereignty that checks Western interference unlike Somalia and does not want to look like they are working for the West; third, Kenya “suffers” from weak governance including in terms of security and

criminal justice system; and finally, Kenya has a disaffected Muslim population along its eastern part which is ideal for al-Qaeda.³

Ethiopia also experienced al-Qaeda affiliated attacks by Al Ittihad Al Islamiyyaa (AIAI) as it was mentioned earlier. According to declassified documents by Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point's Harmony Project the al-Qaeda operator Abu Hafs (a.k.a. Mohammed Atef)⁴ was organizing training, financial arrangements, supply of weapons in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1993.⁵ Even though al-Qaeda was collaborating with AIAI, there is no evidence that it is controlling the mission. 'Following Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia [in 2006], al-Qaeda, or at least organizations claiming to speak for al-Qaeda, threatened to step up attacks against Ethiopia [i.e.] a previously unknown Islamic group in Ethiopia calling itself the Mujahidin of the Land of Two Migrations announced its formation on an Arabic language web site at the end of 2006...there is no evidence so far that it has a functional link with al-Qaeda' (Shinn, 2008:12). In general, Ethiopia remained resistant to radical Islam and experienced very few attacks attributed or affiliated to al-Qaeda.

As mentioned earlier, Yemen is considered as part of the Horn of Africa for "geostrategic" reasons by the US in its counter terrorism strategy because of the presence of al-Qaeda and its proximity to the Horn proper. Al-Qaeda was blamed for the USS Cole bombing 'which cost seventeen American lives and left a gaping hole in the destroyer's side' (Burrowes in Rotberg, 2005:160). Burrowes lists down events in 2002 that show linkage between al-Qaeda and Yemen: '(1) the October suicide bombing of the French oil tanker Limburg off the South coast of Yemen; (2) the assassination about three months later of Jarullah Omar, Yemen's leading socialist thinker-activist, by an Islamic militant; and (3) the murder two days later of three American medical missionaries in their hospital in rural Yemen' (in Rotberg, 2005:160). A few weeks after

³ see Harmony Project, 2006, Al Qa'ida's (Mis) Adventure in the Horn of Africa, p.47

⁴ killed in an al-Qaeda safe house in Kabul and bin Laden considered him as his replacement named a brigade in his honor (Shinn, 2009)

⁵for the report by Abu Hafs see CTC's declassified Harmony Document AFGP-2002-800597

these incidents, Qaid Salim Talib Sinan al-Harithi (a.k.a. Abu Ali al-Harithi), a Yemeni al-Qaeda leader, was killed by the US Hellfire missile near Marib.

In the aftermath of al-Harithi's death, with collaboration between the governments of Yemen and the United States, al-Qaeda seemed to be defeated in Yemen. But al-Qaeda revives itself especially after the prison break by twenty three of its members in 2006 particularly of Jamal Ahmad Badawi, Jaber al-Bana (both of them in the US most wanted list), Nassar al-Washiri, and Qasim al-Raimi. Al-Washiri and al-Raimi subsequently reestablished al-Qaeda in Yemen which was strong enough to assassinate a chief investigator in Marib and mount attacks in US embassy in Sana'a in 2007/8 and also be able to merge the al-Qaeda branches of Yemen and Saudi Arabia to form al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This resurgence is attributed to the assumption by US and Yemeni officials that al-Qaeda was defeated in Yemen for good.⁶ 'The fact that the 23-year old Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab who attempted to detonate a bomb on an aircraft en route from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009 had allegedly been inspired and trained by AQAP has catapulted Yemen once again onto the headlines of newspapers' (Berouk, 2010:2). Generally, al-Qaeda in Yemen is getting stronger due to the Yemeni governments priority to al-Houthi rebellion and the secessionist movement by the disgruntled southerners and the government's ability to effectively govern its territory and according to Johnsen and Villarosa, al-Qaeda evolved from a reactionary force to 'the organization that al-Washiri commanding was built for exactly this type of war, and now, al-Qaeda is the one initiating the fight' (2009:6).

The Horn of Africa is dubbed as an ideal place for terrorist activities conducted by the likes of al-Qaeda. 'It has become a common place in the US discourse, including the academic literature, that the Horn of Africa (or more broadly, East Africa) is a particularly dangerous place, i.e. a hotspot of terrorism, particularly of the jihadists kind' (Moller, 2009:7). The following table will show all the terrorist incidents in East Africa between 1998 until 2005:

⁶ see speeches by Gregory D. Johnsen and Shari Villarosa, 2009, on "Al Qaeda in Yemen" at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, transcription by Federal News Service, Washington D.C.

Country	Year	Date	Incidents	Injuries	Fatalities	Perpetrators	Nature	Targets
Djibouti	2004	18/01	Bomb	6	0	?	?	Train
Eritrea	2003	10/08	Assassination	1	2	EIJM	Islamist	Car
	2004	01/03	Bomb	12	3	EIJM	Islamist	Hotel
	2004	24/05	Bomb	50	3	?	?	Government
Ethiopia	1999	03/04	Kidnapping	0	0	ONLF	Political	Aid
	1999	13/11	Bomb	1	2	?	?	Train
	2000	22/03	Land Mine	1	14	OLF	Political	Kenyans
	2000	17/08	Rocket	0	6	?	?	El. Mon.
	2002	23/07	Bomb	?	?	OLF	Political	Vehicle
	2002	11/09	Bomb	38	1	?	?	Hotel
	2003	19/01	Mortar	1	0	?	?	?
	2003	20/03	Bomb	12	0	?	?	Hotel
	2003	10/09	Armed Attack	?	1	?	?	Aid
	2003	26/09	Bomb	9	2	?	?	Train
	2004	04/01	Bomb	0	0	?	?	Vehicle
	2004	05/04	Armed Attack	0	0	OLF	Political	Education
	2004	02/05	Armed Attack	3	1	OLF	Political	Business
	2004	24/06	Bomb	?	?	OLF	Political	Government
Kenya	1998	07/08	Bomb/Suicide	5000	291	Al-Qaeda	Islamist	US Embassy
	2002	28/11	Rocket	0	0	Al-Qaeda	Islamist	Aircraft
	2002	28/11	Bomb/Suicide	80	13	Al-Qaeda	Islamist	Hotel
	2002	18/12	Bomb	0	0	?	?	Discotheque
	2002	20/12	Arson	0	0	?	?	Discotheque
	2003	08/03	Bomb	0	0	?	?	Mosque

Somalia	1998	15/04	Kidnapping	?	?	?	?	Aid
	1999	19/09	Bomb	0	0	ULA	Islamist	Oil Pipeline
	2001	16/11	Armed Attack	9	18	?	?	Quran School
	2003	28/07	Bomb	0	0	?	?	Hotel
	2004	20/06	Kidnapping	?	?	?	?	NGO
	2004	04/10	Assassination	0	1	?	?	Aid Worker
	2005	09/02	Assassination	0	1	AI	Islamist	Journalist
	2005	17/02	Bomb	6	2	?	?	Hotel
	2005	03/05	Bomb	38	15	?	?	Government
	2005	11/07	Armed Attack	?	1	?	?	NGO
	2005	06/11	Armed Attack	?	5	?	?	Government
Sudan	1998	02/07	Bomb	?	?	?	?	Airport
	1998	02/07	Bomb	?	?	?	?	Power Plant
	1999	18/02	Kidnapping	0	4	SPLA	Political	NGO
	2001	23/01	Bomb	0	0	SPLA	Political	Oil Pipeline
	2001	05/08	?	?	?	SPLA	Political	Oil Pipeline
	2002	26/04	Armed Attack	0	60	LRA	Christian	Funeral Party
	2002	15/10	Hijacking	?	?	?	?	Saudi Aircraft
	2005	05/07	Armed Attack	0	5	LRA	Christian	Vehicle
	2005	05/07	Armed Attack	11	6	LRA	Christian	NGO
	2005	05/11	Armed Attack	1	1	LRA	Christian	Air Worker
Tanzania	1998	07/08	Bomb/Suicide	77	10	Al-Qaeda	Islamist	US Embassy
Tanzania (Zanzibar)	1999	23/12	Bomb	0	0	?	?	Beer Depot
	2004	20/03	Bomb	0	0	?	?	Restaurant
	2004	20/03	Bomb	0	0	?	?	Government
	2005	12/11	Bomb	1	0	?	?	Government

Uganda	1998	04/04	Bomb	2	0	?	?	Hotel
	1998	04/04	Bomb	5	2	?	?	Hotel
	1998	12/07	Bomb	3	1	?	?	Restaurant
	1998	18/07	Bomb	?	?	?	?	Civilians
	1998	25/08	Bomb	6	30	NALU	Political	Bus
	1998	27/11	Armed Attack	17	16	LRA	Christian	Aid
	1999	01/03	Bomb	4	0	?	?	Restaurant
	1999	01/03	Kidnapping	0	8	IH	Political	Tourists
	1999	10/04	Bomb	4	0	?	?	Taxi Park
	1999	11/04	Bomb	13	2	?	?	Taxi Park
	1999	14/04	Bomb	35	4	?	?	Restaurant
	1999	06/05	Bomb	16	5	?	?	Stadium
	1999	07/05	Bomb	1	0	?	?	Civilians
	1999	30/05	Bomb	10	1	?	?	Civilians
	1999	04/05	Bomb	12	2	AMM	Islamist	Restaurant
	2000	01/10	Kidnapping	0	0	LRA	Christian	Religion
	2000	09/10	Assassination	?	1	LRA	Christian	Religion
	2000	14/03	Bomb	60	9	LRA	Christian	Disco
	2001	16/03	Bomb	3	2	?	?	Civilians
	2001	07/07	Bomb	4	1	?	?	Civilians
	2001	24/07	Bomb	13	1	?	?	Civilians
	2002	01/09	Kidnapping	?	?	LRA	Christian	Government
	2003	13/10	Ambush	?	22	LRA	Christian	Vehicle
	2003	18/11	Armed Attack	20	22	LRA	Christian	Restaurant
	2003	01/02	Armed Attack	?	12	LRA	Christian	Civilians
	2004	21/02	Armed Attack	?	8	LRA	Christian	Civilians
	2004	05/02	Bomb	60	239	LRA	Christian	Refugees
	2004	14/04	Armed attack	50	47	LRA	Christian	Refugees
	2004	18/04	Armed Attack	8	13	LRA	Christian	Vehicle

Uganda	2004	17/05	Kidnapping	0	0	LRA	Christian	Religion
	2004	20/12	Armed Attack	10	7	LRA	Christian	Vehicles
	2004	19/01	Armed Attack	1	2	LRA	Christian	Vehicle
	2005	23/02	Assassination	0	1	LRA	Christian	MP
	2005	26/02	Armed Attack	7	1	LRA	Christian	Civilians
	2005	09/03	Assassination	8	1	LRA	Christian	Civilians
	2005	15/03	Armed Attack	16	6	LRA	Christian	Civilians
	2005	26/03	Armed Attack	7	2	LRA	Christian	Civilians
	2005	05/05	Kidnapping	13	?	LRA	Christian	Civilians
	2005	05/05	Armed Attack	?	4	LRA	Christian	Vehicle
	2005	10/07	Armed Attack	14	10	LRA	Christian	IDPs
	2005	18/11	Armed Attack	?	14	LRA	Christian	Civilians
	2005	21/11	Armed Attack	?	5	LRA	Christian	Vehicle
	2005	13/12	Armed Attack	5	12	LRA	Christian	Vehicle
	2005		Armed Attack	?	8	LRA	Christian	Vehicle

Table 1: Terrorist Incidents in East Africa, 1998-2005.⁷

We can observe from the above table that the numbers of persons who are injured or killed in these terrorist incidents are not comparable to the numbers killed by wars, internal conflicts, disease or famine in East Africa. As mentioned earlier, the US concern in the Horn of Africa and more broadly East Africa is the presence of al-Qaeda. But the numbers of incidents directly attributed to al-Qaeda are only four and also the numbers of incidents perpetrated by Islamists are fewer than politically motivated terrorist incidents or that of those committed in the name of Christianity by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Uganda is the highest recipient of terrorist incidents which almost all of them are not connected to al-Qaeda or Islamism except one. The terrorist problem connected to countries like Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda are political or regional with no evident connection with terrorism by international jihadists like al-Qaeda. However, there are lot of unknowns about the perpetrators and their motives. These unknowns

⁷ Taken partially, with little modification for convenience, from Bjorn Moller, 2009, "The Horn of Africa and the US 'war on terror' with a special focus on Somalia"

may or may not be connected to international terrorism. In general, from the table we can observe that East Africa, particularly the Horn of Africa cannot be dubbed as the hub of international terrorism, especially of al-Qaeda, compared to other places like the Middle East where 1559 terrorist incidents occurred between 1998-2004 i.e. on the average of over 222 per year where as in East Africa 73 incidents were recorded for the same years with the average of over 10 incidents per year.⁸ Rather most terrorist attacks in East Africa seem to stem from domestic or regional problems.

3.2 The U.S. Response

The United States responded in several ways to the threat of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. These are overt and covert or clandestine responses. In countering terrorism, the United States, in addition to democratization as a long term strategy for countering terrorism, laid out four priorities in its National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) which was revealed in 2003 and later upgraded in 2006. These priorities are:

- Prevent terrorist attacks by attacking terrorists and their capacity to operate and travel, and by defending potential targets;
- Deny weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to rogue states and terrorist allies
- Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; and
- Deny terrorists physical, legal. Cyber and financial safe havens.

The National Security Strategy by the Obama Administration states that:

The United States is waging a global campaign against al-Qa'ida and its terrorist affiliates. To disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, we are pursuing a strategy that protects our homeland, secures the world's most dangerous weapons and material, denies al-Qa'ida safe haven, and builds positive partnerships with Muslim communities around the world. Success requires a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that judiciously applies every tool of American power—both military and civilian—as well as the concerted efforts of like-minded states and multilateral institutions (2010:19).

⁸ For detailed terrorism incidents, see Tom Lansford et al, 2009, *America's War on Terror*, 2nd Ed.

This clearly shows that ‘the current Administration’s counter terrorism policy emphasizes counter radicalization efforts, an area in which officials suggest US efforts have lacked sufficient focus [i.e.] specific political, economic, and social factors that may radicalize individuals in a particular community’ (Ploch, 2010:14). These are what the USAID calls “Drivers of Violent Extremism” in its study entitled Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism.

The USAID guide refers to addressing the root causes of violent extremism i.e. Socioeconomic Drivers and Political Drivers. Socioeconomic Drivers can be reasons for people to resort to violent extremism because of the public’s interpretation of total abandonment from basic public services by the state and the ruling elite. Mentioning the case of Morocco, especially the shantytowns of Casablanca where basic public service like housing, running, water, sewer, electricity, etc are very much limited and where crime and drug trafficking are rampant, people applauded the 2003 suicide attack in Morocco.⁹ As mentioned earlier, these kinds of marginalization can be found in the Horn of Africa in abundance. For instance, ‘in countries like Kenya many Muslims express a sense of social, cultural, political, [and] economic exclusion from the rest of the country [where] social service delivery and infrastructure investments have been historically poor in these areas, in comparison with other parts of the country’ (Ploch, 2010:16). In these Muslim populated areas of northeastern Kenya, Islamic charities used to play very important role until some of them were banned after 1998 embassy bombings and September 11.

The USAID Guide also identifies different Political Drivers of violent extremism. It lists down seven important factors:

- A.** Denial of basic political rights (“political exclusion”) and civil liberties.
- B.** Highly repressive regimes that engage in gross violations of human rights.
- C.** Endemic corruption and impunity for well-connected elites.

⁹ See the study by Guilain Deneoux with Lynn Carter, 2009, ‘Guide to Drivers of Violent Extremism’ prepared for USAID

- D.** The presence of safe havens, poorly-governed or ungoverned areas.
- E.** Pre-existing, protracted and violent local conflicts that can be exploited by violent extremist organizations seeking to advance their own agendas.
- F.** State sponsorship of [violent extremist] groups.
- G.** Discredited regimes with weak or non-existent opposition (2009:27).

These Political Drivers cannot be separated from one another. ‘Harsh government repression and systemic political exclusion usually go hand in hand [and] resentment at pervasive impunity for well connected elites may compound rage created by gross violation of human rights’ (Deneoux & Carter, 2009:27). Sometimes these Political Drivers can be connected to Socioeconomic Drivers in such a way that ‘corruption may sap state capacity by undermining the government’s ability to confront the social exclusion which often fuels [violent extremism]’ (Deneoux & Carter, 2009:27). The Horn of Africa experienced all these Political Drivers. Political exclusions, repressive governments, corruption (especially in Kenya), porous borders, violent local conflicts- both inter state (Eritrea and Ethiopia) and intra state (Sudan and Somalia), state sponsorship of violent extremists (allegedly in Sudan), discredited regimes with no or weak opposition are all present in the Horn.

The United States is trying to mitigate violent extremism using different counter extremism programs in East Africa. According to Ploch, these counter extremism programs include influence operations/public diplomacy, financial sanctions and travel restrictions, assistance to counter terrorist financing, constraining terrorist mobility, and building regional partners’ counter terrorism capabilities.¹⁰ The public diplomacy component of these programs deals with changing the ‘attitude and perception of foreign population’ so that they become supportive of US policies and interests. In East Africa, it implements things like using State Department’s website which is available in seven languages about the US policies and American societies, organize ‘a Multicultural Ramadan’ with American Muslims, opening American Corners in cities like Mombassa, outreach efforts like American Reference Center in Nairobi, deploying members of

¹⁰ for detailed discussion on these programs see Lauren Ploch, 2010, ‘Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response’, pp 17-22

US Special Operations Command Military Information Support Teams (MIST) with special training in understanding the region into countries like Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, and broadcasting Voice of America (VOA) in seven languages.

The financial sanctions and travel restrictions component refers to implementing Executive Order (E.O.) 13224 which orders prosecution and freezing of assets of terrorist organizations and of those financing terrorist organizations led by Department of Treasury and Office of Foreign assets Control (OFAC) in consultation with other governmental institutions like the State Department.¹¹ In East Africa this financial ban and travel restriction applies to the likes of al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab, al-Ittihad and Lord Resistance Army (LRA). Organizations like the Islamic charity Al Haramain Foundation and Al Barakaat Bank, in connection with the embassy bombings of 1998 and support of bin Laden and his groups, are designated to be under these restrictions. In addition, Executive Order 13536 by President Barack Obama refers to the ongoing problem is Somalia. It orders the blocking of the assets of those who threaten the peace, stability, and security of Somalia including the efforts of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), or humanitarian activities.¹² Related to this component, United States also give assistance to counter terrorist financing in order to improve capabilities of African states for prevention of ‘transnational financing of terrorism.’ It helps African countries to track the flow of funds, monitor remittances, and be able to freeze suspicious assets. This is important for the case of Somalis that usually use informal money transfer-hawalas.

Constraining terrorist mobility is one of the counter terrorism measures taken by United States in collaboration with East African countries. ‘The States Department provides assistance to improve foreign governments’ watchlisting capabilities through the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), a global initiative created in the aftermath of the 1998 embassy bombings to provide countries with system for identifying and apprehending suspects who might attempt to flee after terrorist attack’

¹¹ see Executive Order 13224-Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Committing, Threatening to Commit, or Supporting Terrorism-Notice of September 24, 2001

¹² see Executive Order 13536-Blocking Property of Persons Contributing to the Conflict in Somalia-April 12, 2010

(Ploch, 2010:22). It includes providing partner states with a computer system known as Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES). Finally, as efforts to build regional partners' capabilities of countering terrorism, the US helps to improve partner governments' security organizations as they are viewed as "crucial" in defeating terrorism.

There are also regional programs designed by the US government for counter terrorism purposes in East Africa. The major ones are The East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSi) and Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). EARSi, which was launched by the United States State Department in FY2009, 'is an interagency and inter-country program to: undermine, marginalize, and isolate terrorists; discredit their violent ideology; and empower groups opposed to extremism through threat identification and joint collaboration strategies, policy recommendations and actionable initiatives achieved through the use of targeted development, military, counterterrorism and strategic communications assistance' (USAID Impact of FY 2007). 'EACTI became the East Africa Regional Security Initiative (EARSi), designed to unite several agencies' resources and expertise to increase East African countries' border security, immigration control, aviation security, and regional intelligence sharing [and] EARSi also constructed social and economic development programs intended to offer alternatives to terrorism and thus reduce terrorists' recruitment capacity' (Frazer, 2010:104). The participant countries of EARSi include Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. 'EARSi aims to foster regional counter terrorism efforts, build partner capacity, and diminish support for violent extremism

EARSi provides assistances for activities which were under EACTI like border security i.e. providing vehicles for Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya and also strengthens immigration and border control for Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda where trainings and equipments are provided with INCLE and NADR funds.¹³ Moreover, coastal security is another area which was under EACTI and now continued with EARSi, PKO and FMF funds which provided countries like Djibouti, Eritrea and Kenya with equipments for navies and coastal patrol and now under EARSi Djibouti

¹³ for detailed discussion on these programs see Lauren Ploch, 2010, 'Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response', p 24

and Kenya continue to receive these assistances. Police training is another area provided by EACTI which continued under EARSII. Aiming at giving support to partner countries to enable them draft Counter Terrorism Financing (CTF) and money laundering legislations, EACTI provided technical assistance. Furthermore, interagency counter terrorism coordination is provided with 'Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) funds [where] EACTI supported the establishment of national counter terrorism coordination cells, including joint terrorism task forces, in partner nations to facilitate communication and information sharing among various government entities to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks' (Ploch, 2010: 25) which continued under EARSII. Finally, education initiatives for Muslim communities like teachers training, "adult literacy", girls' education, etc are provided in its counter extremist influence scheme. 'In FY 2009 the interagency has requested \$27.177 million [which] represents \$10 million in PKO, \$10 million for soft-side counterterrorism programming in ESF and \$7.177 million for NADR (Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Counterterrorism Finance (CTF), and TIP/PISCES)' (USAID Impact of FY 2007).

Another important regional program in the Horn of Africa is the establishment of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 2002 at Camp Lejeune in North Carolina which now is based at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti since 2003. According to CJTF-HOA official website¹⁴, its mission is to build capacities regional partners in order to 'promote regional security and stability', 'prevent conflict', and 'protect US and coalition interests through indirect approach that focuses on populations, security capacity and basic human needs to counter violent extremism, CJTF-HOA operations build and call upon enduring regional partnerships to prevent conflict'. These are usually called the '3-Ds'-Development, Defense, and Diplomacy. This implies that CJTF-HOA's initial 'capture-kill' mission has evolved into regional stabilization and reconstruction, and recently, it also focuses on trainings and 'military exchanges'. Projects are coordinated with Department of State and USAID in order to combine 4-Ds (Defeat Terrorists, Deny sponsorship, sanctuary and support; Diminish underlying conditions that terrorists would like to capitalize on; Defend US citizens and interests), which is more of a military component, with 3-Ds. 'This integration has improved steadily and the presence of DOS and USAID

¹⁴ See www.africom.mil/hoa

representatives in the CJTF-HOA Command Element has aided in coordination [and] DOD and USAID personnel have facilitated the completion of hundreds of humanitarian projects throughout the Horn' (Delventhal,-:1). This change of strategy is in line with AFRICOM's strategy of Active Security which Ward defined as 'a persistent and sustained level of effort oriented on security assistance programs that prevent conflict and foster continued dialogue and development [whereas] the goal of Active Security is to enable the work of Africans to marginalize the enemies of peace and prevent conflict, thereby enabling the growth of strong and just governments and legitimate institutions to support the development of civil societies' (2008:7).

'The basic model of operations is that the command and control element stays at the base in Djibouti, and projects are carried out by groups of military members located within the various countries [while] smaller groups are most often composed of Civil Affairs teams and/or Seabee detachments, based in outlying areas within the country in which they operate' (Piombo, 2010:5). CJTF-HOA gets funding for its civil affairs and humanitarian assistance projects from three major sources: the Humanitarian Assistance Other, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, and Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Assistance programs. While the official rhetoric focus on '3-Ds', 'Unofficially, these projects are supposed to provide access for the U.S. military, should they need to engage in more aggressive activities in the region, and to open up areas for U.S. influence more broadly [but] CJTF itself does not expect its actions alone to create these ends nor does it know how to evaluate its successes, but it generally sees itself as contributing to [the] overall U.S. government effort' (Piombo, 2010:6).

The US Africa Command (AFRICOM)-CJTF-HOA Fact sheet¹⁵ claims that between 2007 and 2010, it completed projects worth of 24.3 million USD. These include: Education projects (146), Medical projects (77), Essential services (62), and also Military to Military engagements totaling 3,788 contact days (77). Education projects involve 'building or renovating schools, libraries or other educational facilities. Medical projects involve 'building or renovating medical clinics or

¹⁵ see US Africa Command, Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, Projects on www.africom.mil

hospitals; Medical and Dental Civic Action Projects (MEDCAPs/DENCAPs); Veterinary Civic Action Projects (VETCAPs). Essential services involve 'well or water projects; community service projects; delivery of humanitarian assistance supplies; disaster response. Going into the details of the countries which these projects were conducted, Djibouti received 27 education projects, 27 medical projects and 19 essential services; Ethiopia received 16 education projects, 13 medical projects, 13 essential projects; Kenya received 66 education projects, 17 medical projects, 16 essential projects; Tanzania received 7 education projects, 10 medical projects, 7 essential services; Uganda received 4 education projects, 9 medical projects, 56 essential services; Islands of Comoros received 25 education projects, 2 medical projects, 3 essential services.

The United States also implements other means of counter terrorism measures that some of them are very much criticized. As it was mentioned above, the US concern is very much on Somalia regarding al-Qaeda's presence in the Horn of Africa. The US employed different mechanisms in order to prevent the ascendancy of Islamist forces in Somalia which might culminate in being a safe haven and being the sanctuary of terrorist cells particularly al-Qaeda. Menkhaus argues in 2005 that 'American counter terrorism policy since 2001, which has relied on local militia leaders to help monitor and apprehend suspects, has had only limited success, may be producing a public backlash, and now is on collision course with local state-building initiatives' (in Rotberg, 2005:25). By mid-2000s the power of Islamic forces grew particularly the influence of Sharia courts especially in Mogadishu and the feud over the control of Mogadishu with warlords exacerbated. 'The US became increasingly concerned with the growing power of the Islamic Courts and in February 2006 aided the creation of the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), a coalition of Mogadishu warlords opposed to the courts' (Shinn, 2008:22).

Craig Timberg, reporting from Mogadishu for Washington Post, described the situation as: 'the warlords, feared and hated by many Somalis, bragged about the money [they received from US] as they armed themselves as never before [where] the infusion of cash upset a fragile balance

between the two sides-but not in the direction the Americans had hoped'.¹⁶ Even though the aim of United States in establishing this Alliance is for very much narrow purpose of apprehending al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia, 'the new organization of warlords used the ARPCT, however, to wage war on the courts [, and eventually,] the warlords had lost the support of most Somalis who just wanted an end to conflict where ARPCT military effort fared badly and by June 2006 the Islamic Courts [Union] had defeated the ARPCT decisively' (Shinn, 2008:22). This led to another much criticized US counter terrorism strategy of giving support for the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in the same year.

After the Islamic Courts Union took control of the Somali capital Mogadishu, they began to control more territories and eventually reached the town of Baidoa, where the internationally recognized and US/Ethiopia-backed ineffectual Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was located. 'The spread of the ICU, whose more radical elements had declared jihad on Ethiopia, prompted Ethiopia to invade Somalia in December 2006 and drive the ICU from power' (Harnisch, 2010:11). There is a claim by Abdirahman Ali that the declaration of jihad by ICU forces was a deliberate move to provoke Ethiopia into invading Somalia so that 'it can over stretch the enemy's military resources, expose its weakness, harness the popular anger that results from the invasion, and in the end create a brutal savagery that will force people to yearn for someone to manage it' (2010:10).

The Ethiopian forces installed TFG in the capital Mogadishu which weakens the credibility of the government because of its dependency on Ethiopia for its survival. 'Shabaab easily exploited public anger at the TFG, conflating its radical jihadist ideology with Somali nationalism, anti-Ethiopian and anti-Western sentiment [and] the two year Ethiopian military occupation which some believed would cleanse Somalia of Islamic radicals did much to radicalize a much broader portion of the Somali population and legitimize Shabaab' (Menkhaus, 2010:3). The Ethiopian

¹⁶ See the article by Craig Timberg, 'Mistaken Entry into Clan Dispute Led to U.S. Black Eye in Somalia', Washington Post Foreign Service, July 2, 2006

invasion created anger among Somalis living in Somalia and living abroad. ‘US policies during and after the Ethiopian offensive were seen as silent on the extraordinary human costs, and Somalis took the silence to imply consent’ (Menkhaus, 2009:4). This created the ideal situation for al-Shabaab and it presented itself the only viable resistance to the Ethiopian occupation. ‘[Al-] Shabaab was able to conflate its jihadist rhetoric with Somali nationalism and anti-Ethiopianism to win both passive and active support from many Somalis, including those who were personally appalled at the movement’s extremist interpretation of Islam or its assassination of civic leaders’ (Menkhaus, 2009:4). The United States took the opportunity of the Ethiopian invasion by conducting military strikes inside Somalia particularly in 2007 amid international criticism. But ‘Washington has dismissed the international criticism, saying it was necessary to defend the US and the international community from further al-Qaeda attacks [and] Somali officials say leading al-Qaeda suspect, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, accused of masterminding the bomb attacks on US embassies in East Africa nine years ago, may be among those killed in the earlier raids’ (BBC News, January 10, 2007).

The problem of Somalia is very much intertwined with regional conflicts and tensions in which the Horn of Africa is described as a ‘security complex’. Ethiopia and Eritrea are both engaged in a proxy war in Somalia where Ethiopia has been supporting the TFG directly while Eritrea supports ICU and al-Shabaab. But Ethiopia is said to be playing an indirect role since its withdrawal from Somalia. Human Rights Watch claims that ‘Addis Ababa continues to regard Somalia as source of insecurity, not least because it fears al-Shabaab and other groups could try to expand their reach to Ethiopia’s own troubled Somali region [and] as of early 2010 Ethiopia was reportedly providing training to Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca’ (2010:61) in order to balance the advance of al-Shabaab or Hizbul Islam into central Somalia. Eritrea’s engagement in Somalia can be understood only in terms of Asmara’s broader regional policies, most importantly its continuing dispute with Ethiopia.¹⁷ Eritrea’s support of these forces incurred a warning from the United States. In her visit to Nairobi, Kenya and meeting with the TFG President Sheikh Sharif, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned that ‘Eritrea's actions are unacceptable...we intend to

¹⁷ Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant of to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008)

take action if they do not cease'.¹⁸ But the warning seems to be ignored. 'It is the opinion of Monitoring Group [on Somalia] that the Government of Eritrea has continued to provide political, diplomatic, financial and-allegedly-military assistance to armed opposition groups in Somalia'(2010:21). According to sunatimes.com, 'a plane carrying weapon supply has landed at airport of Kismaayo town of southern Somalia which is under control of Al-Shabaab militant group ... [and] reports close to Al-Shabaab officials said that the plane flew from Eritrea which supports the Islamic rebel movements in Somalia'.¹⁹

Menkhaus argues that the appeal of al-Shabaab to the Somalis is going to decline after the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia and the coming to power of the former moderate leader of ICU Sheikh Sharif and that eventually weakens al-Shabaab.²⁰ But al-Shabaab was able to strike outside of Somalia for the first time in Uganda, which has a peacekeeping contingency in Somalia under AMISOM, by two simultaneous blasts on civilians who were watching the 2010 football world cup final on July 11, 2010. Al-Shabaab took responsibility for the attacks the next day through its spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage saying that 'we will carryout attacks against wherever they are [and] no one will deter us from performing our Islamic duty' (BBC News, July, 12, 2010).

¹⁸see Sarah Childress, 'US Promises Somalia More Aid to Help Fight Terror', Wall Street Journal, August 7, 2009, www.wsj.com

¹⁹ see Sunatimes report entitled 'Al-Shabaab Receives Weapons Supply from Eritrea', Friday September 3, 2010, www.sunatimes.com

²⁰ see testimony by Ken Menkhaus on hearing before the committee of Homeland Security and Government Affairs, United States Senate under the title 'Violent Islamic extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America', March 11, 2009

Chapter Four

Assessment of the US Counter Terrorism

The presence of al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa which the United States is so wary of is at its lowest compared to other 'terrorism hotspots' like the Middle East and countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, or Iraq. In fact, we can observe that many of the terrorist incidents in the Horn of Africa and East Africa at large are perpetrated by groups with national or regional agendas. The fear that the Horn of Africa, especially Somalia, will be a safe haven for terrorists and terrorist organizations those flee from other areas where aggressive counter terrorism measures are taking place like Afghanistan and Iraq did not materialize. Failed states like Somalia proved to be as inhospitable for terrorists as it is inhospitable to aid agencies and other Western organizations because of the dangers they pose in terms of security for both. Al-Qaeda also lost its biggest ally in the Horn of Africa-Sudan-which was its base of operations in this region especially from early until mid 1990s. Moreover, Sudan was collaborating with the United States in countering terrorism, even though it is still in the US list of states that sponsor terrorism, until their relationship is strained by the Darfur crisis which the United States dubbed as genocide. Kenya which incurred the worst al-Qaeda attacks in the Horn of Africa can be cited as the best example that terrorist organizations thrive and operate more effectively in a country where there are marginalized and dissatisfied sections of the population, corruption, weak governance etc. This does not mean that the threat of terrorism in the Horn of Africa is diminishing.

When we look at states like Yemen and Somalia, terrorism especially the transnational one is reviving. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is posing a serious threat and considered very dangerous. The divergence of the attention of the Yemeni government to its own internal problems attributed revival of an al-Qaeda network which was considered to be defeated by the earlier counter terrorism efforts. In Somalia, terrorist/insurgent organization like al-Shabaab, which swore allegiance to al-Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden, became prominent due to misguided counter terrorism measures like supporting the Somali warlords, the Ethiopian invasion and other military measures. This growing in stature among the Somalis and international jihadists resulted in bold actions like bombing civilians in Uganda, where al-

Shabaab has stroked for the first time outside Somalia. This clearly indicates that the current counter terrorism activities are either inadequate or misguided in terms of achieving their goal. Since the Horn of Africa is not the 'hotspot' of terrorism and a safe haven for terrorists, as it is claimed by some politicians and scholars, the US counter terrorism should have been focused on addressing the underlying issues and reasons which make the sub region potentially susceptible to terrorism. The US counter terrorism efforts fail to address these underlying factors that may contribute to the spread of terrorist activities in the region which emanate from the region.

4.1 Failure to Address Regional Conflicts

The Horn of Africa is a region where one can find relationships in terms of culture, economy, politics, and religion which existed for centuries. It is also a place where we find such a security complex that 'no state in the Horn of Africa has been insulated from the problems of the other states no matter how distant, no matter how strong or weak' (Berouk, 2010, 2). The Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict is no exception i.e. like any crisis in the Horn of Africa it has its own spillover effect which is going to affect the whole region. The US counter terrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa has also been affected by this conflict.

The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea that ignited in 1998 following the dispute over a small village called Badme which evolved to a full fledged war that claimed about 70,000 lives in addition to the tremendous cost on their economy. But the real reason for the war between these poorest countries can be traced back to factors beyond the symbolically important village of Badme. What seemed to be a cordial relationship between the two ruling elites of Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and Eritrean People Liberation Front (EPLF) was indeed plagued by numerous differences. These include 'disputes arose over access to the Eritrean ports, how the new Eritrean currency related to the Ethiopian currency, the precise location of their poorly demarcated border...the historical links and rivalries between the two states, peoples, ruling parties, and [personal animosity between the two] leaders' (Lyons, 2006:6-7). The war officially ended by the signing of the December, 2000 Algiers Agreement. 'Central to the peace agreement was a mechanism to decide the location of the border between the two countries' (Healy & Plaut, 2007:2) which later became the most difficult task to achieve.

The US-Eritrean relation began to decline after the Algiers Agreement particularly after the decision by the Boundary Commission which awarded the symbolically important Badme to Eritrea which was rejected by Ethiopia. The United States and Eritrea had a friendly and cooperative relation especially during the 1990s in order to tackle the Islamist government in Sudan which hosted Osama bin Laden. Dan Connell claims that the strategic change during the George W. Bush administration and the behavior of the Eritrean government were responsible for their relation to deteriorate. Connell states that:

Eritrea's importance declined with a change in regional strategy under President George W. Bush, whose administration invested heavily in a peace process to end Sudan's longrunning north-south civil war and moved to dismantle the sanctions on Sudan in place since the mid-1990s. And it declined despite the fact that the country nominally supported US intervention in Iraq and repeatedly invited the United States to develop military facilities along its coastline so as to combat regional terrorism. This evolving relationship had been hindered even during the time of the Clinton administration by growing concern that the Eritrean leadership was operating as though it were a band of bunkered guerrillas running a liberated zone rather than officials governing a modern state. Each time a dispute arose with one of its neighbors, Eritrea rolled out the artillery – first against Sudan (1994), then Yemen (1995), Djibouti (1996) and finally Ethiopia (1998). And when US diplomats raised questions about this behavior, they were spurned and often publicly insulted. This helped to cement Eritrea's reputation as a volatile and unpredictable warrior-state and made the US wary of getting too close, especially after Eritrea went to war with Ethiopia and balked at American efforts to end the fighting (2009:136-137).

In addition to this, the United States chose to side with Ethiopia in the aftermath of the Border Commission's decision which Ethiopia refused to accept and implement. 'Eritrea thinks the United States, which was the guarantor of [the Algiers agreement], should compel Ethiopia to adhere to it'.²¹ Eritrea's rather undiplomatic and forceful appeal to the United States and the international community was ignored and that angered the Eritrean leaders and played them into the more experienced Ethiopian diplomatic hands. 'As a new country, with no experience of getting its way in international politics, its blunt demand that the international community compel Ethiopia to comply with [Border Commission's] ruling (and give up Badme) has largely fallen on deaf ears... [and] Eritrea find it hard to accept the reality of its weak international standing vis-à-vis Ethiopia' (Healy & Plaut, 2007:4-5) made matters worse for Eritrea in its relation with the

²¹ See Terrence Lyons' interview with Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor of Council on Foreign Relations, entitled 'Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict Fueling Somalia Crisis', August 22, 2007.

United States and other powers. This is because, as Lyons²² puts it, the United States has no better partner than Ethiopia in its ‘War on Terror’ endeavors in the Horn of Africa since it has difficult relations with Sudan and obviously Eritrea while Djibouti is so tiny and obviously cannot have a reliable partner in Somalia.

The relation between the Eritrean government and the United States government took another wrong turn as they were involved in a diplomatic war. As Ted Dagne²³ described the situation, both countries were involved in actions ranging from restricting the movement of their respective diplomats out of their respective capitals by demanding special permissions; closing down USAID offices in Eritrea by the Eritrean government; mutual visa restriction for government officials; to US closing down its Consular Section in Asmara. But efforts were made to improve relations between the two governments especially after the Obama Administration came to the White House. But these efforts scuttled. ‘In late 2009, the Obama Administration threatened the Eritrean government with U.N. Security Council sanctions if the Eritrean government continued its support to armed groups in Somalia’ (Dagne, 2010:6). Even though there was an attempt by the Eritrean government to meet Secretary Clinton, the request was declined. ‘However, in October 2009, Eritrean Foreign Minister Osman Saleh, Eritrean Presidential Advisor Yemane Ghebream, and U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Susan Rice,...At that meeting, the Eritrean delegation was asked to state that the Eritrean government would end its support to armed groups in Somalia’ (Dagne, 2010:6) which was denied by the Eritrean government claiming that they are not supporting any groups in that country.

The Eritrean government in response to the state of stalemate with Ethiopia ‘deepened its involvement with Islamist political groups in Somalia and stepped up its support for armed Ethiopian opposition groups operating from there, notably the Oromo Liberation Front and the Ogaden National Liberation Front’ (Connell, 2009:138). As discussed before, the involvement of

²² See Terrence Lyons’ interview with Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor of Council on Foreign Relations, entitled ‘Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict Fueling Somalia Crisis’, August 22, 2007.

²³ See Testimony by Ted Dagne before the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health, House of Foreign Affairs Committee entitled ‘The Horn of Africa: Current Conditions and U.S. Policy’, June 17, 2010, Congressional Research Service.

the Eritrean government in supporting Islamist movements like Islamic Courts Union (ICU) emanates not because the Eritrean government is an Islamist one but rather from its regional policy especially with its no war-no peace status quo with Ethiopia. It is an established fact that the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict is more than a mere claim over symbolic villages like Badme. As Healy and Plaut rightly observed, the major flaw of the Algiers Agreement, which the United States was very much involved with, is its emphasis on border demarcation. As a background for the war in 1998 between the two Sally and Plaut state that:

In reality deep differences had plagued relations between the [former] rebel groups for many years, leaving a residue of resentment and distrust. Some differences were over military strategy and tactics. Others were ideological. At times relations had deteriorated into open confrontation and occasional clashes. While the outside world was largely unaware of these difficulties, they were never forgotten by the political elites. All of this went largely unspoken, and was not open to public scrutiny. Formal arrangements were made for Ethiopia's continuing use of Eritrean ports. Eritrea also used Ethiopia's currency. But little was done to develop the institutions required to manage complex and increasingly divergent interstate interests. Serious economic rivalry developed, particularly between party elites in Eritrea and the adjoining Ethiopian region of Tigray. Eritrea decided to adopt its own currency in 1997. This move brought simmering economic tensions surrounding bilateral trade and investment to the boil, rupturing the informal channels of communication and negotiation between the two political elites (2007:2).

Another reason which contributed for the stalemate on Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict can be understood from the internal divisions within the ruling parties of both countries especially on the way the war was conducted and handled. 'Shortly after the Algiers Agreement was signed, a group of fifteen senior officials signed a letter that criticized President Isaias and called for greater democracy' (Lyons, 2006:11). After arresting eleven of those dissenting officials (three of them were abroad and one retracted his position), other political crackdowns followed like closing down the private press, arresting students and other critics of the Isaias government, postponing elections etc. In a similar situation in Ethiopia, the ruling EPRDF party especially 'the Central Committee of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (historically Meles's support base) split into two rival factions... [and] Meles took advantage of his central position within the broader EPRDF coalition to outmaneuver his rivals, sack and arrest a number of senior officials, and successfully weather the storm' (Lyons, 2006:13). This political dissent in the ruling parties

over the issue of Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict makes both leaders to be more careful in handling the peace process where they do not want to look like giving in to the other which might further threaten their position as leaders.

In addition to Ethiopian and Eritrean involvement in the proxy war where one opposes which ever the other supports, the conflict between the two also spread into Djibouti where the US military contingency-Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)-is based. Eritrea has a border dispute with Djibouti in 1996 in a place called Ras Doumeirah which Djibouti claimed to be shelled by Eritrea. But both countries agreed to solve the issue in a peaceful manner especially after the ascendance of the current president Ismael Omar Guelleh. But, there are tensions between Eritrea and Djibouti since the latter is the largest beneficiary of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war because Ethiopia rerouted its imports almost completely to Djibouti. Furthermore, it is to be noted that both countries compete to host the US military base which has its own benefits. As observed before, the Eritrean government policies in the Horn of Africa revolve around its stand off with Ethiopia. There was another confrontation between Eritrea and Djibouti in 2008 after 'Eritrean forces had begun preparing military positions in the Ras Doumeirah area of the Eritrea-Djibouti land border... [and] Djibouti had little choice but to respond by sending troops to the border as well' (Berouk, 2008:6). Considering the importance of Djibouti to Ethiopia, the confrontation is directed towards Ethiopia. It can be concluded that the 'border dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti is not an important dispute in itself and that the value placed on the area being contested was never high [rather it is the] continuation of the unfinished Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, which has proved too intractable to accommodate the divergent interests of both Eritrea and Ethiopia (Berouk, 2008:11).

In general, the United States, in order to implement successful counter terrorism in the Horn of Africa, should make an effort to solve these regional conflicts. As it was mentioned and shown earlier, the Horn of Africa, as a 'regional security complex', every conflict affects the whole region. With the magnitude of Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, with its real reasons, and looking at what is at stake, it is not that difficult to observe that it is going to be a huge problem in the Horn of

Africa. The United States, by siding with Ethiopia for the sake of its own agenda of War on Terror, alienated the Eritrean government. This sense of betrayal along with other aforementioned factors pushed Eritrea to engage in proxy war in Somalia by helping the Islamist forces which the United States strongly believes that they have connection with al-Qaeda. Eritrea also uses less important issues like its border dispute with Djibouti as a means of undermining its biggest enemy-Ethiopia. This clearly indicates that both Ethiopia and Eritrea will use whatever necessary means available in order to make it harder for one another and, if possible, achieve a regime change which is the ultimate goal pursued by both. Recently, the Ethiopian government accused of Eritrean government of terrorist actions. Ethiopia's State Minister of Foreign Affairs, Berhane Gebrekirostos²⁴, claimed that Eritrea has been sending 'terrorist elements' who were apprehended by the Ethiopian security forces and his government cannot let Eritrea to turn Addis Ababa into Baghdad and further said that his government will 'take series of offensive measures'. Prime Minister Meles²⁵ reinforced this in his appearance in the parliament on April 5, 2011 by saying his government will take necessary actions to make regime change possible in Eritrea short of using its military force. This shows that there is going more confrontation and may be a change of tactic in the thirteen year old dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The United States should find a way in its policy in the Horn of Africa that will resolve the situation of no-peace no-war into the permanent peace process. Had the United States follow the proper policy that settles the matter ones and for all rather than siding with one party for the narrow purpose of chasing terrorists in the region, it would have retained the cooperation of Eritrea in its counter terrorist endeavor. Furthermore, it would contribute a lot to the stability of the Horn of Africa which could diminish the region's susceptibility to terrorism. As Kenneth Menkhaus rightly observed:

US policies which help resolve the ongoing Ethiopian-Eritrean impasse, and which encourage rapprochement between the Ethiopian government and the Ogaden National Liberation Front, would go a long way to creating a more conducive regional environment in which to successfully address the Somali crisis. In the long run, peace in both Somalia and the Horn will require recognition by all actors in the region that they cannot threaten the security of

²⁴ See the monthly press briefing by Berhane Gebrekirostos on March 30, 2011, 'MoFA: Ethiopia Would Take Measures to Deter Terrorist Acts of Eritrea', www.ertagov.com

²⁵ Ethiopian Television live broadcast of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's parliamentary report on April 5, 2011

their neighbors, nor can they pursue their security interests at the expense of their neighbors (2010:6).

Helping to resolve the Ethiopian-Eritrean stalemate will help in resolving the Eritrean-Djibouti dispute because Eritrea is using this dispute as a weapon against Ethiopia. It will also help to have a stable region which can contribute for development, good governance, and democracy. Stable and peaceful region means governments will not have excuses such as war, conflicts (internal or external), and terrorism not to provide what is expected of them. The United States should intervene and play a positive role, like being evenhanded, in order to resolve this conflict because there seems no initiative to end it especially coming from both countries.

4.2 Lack of Proper Strategy for Somalia

Somalia has been without central government for the last twenty years and considered a failed state in international arena. It also witnessed two decades of unrest due to clan conflicts, war lords' rivalry, Islamist movements etc. The country also faces disintegration as Somaliland, which is located at the northwest part of the country seceded and declared independence even though no state and no international organization formally recognized it as a full-fledged state. But Somaliland is a more stable region where the defacto government performs the role of a government and provides services to the population. Recently, in the central part of Somalia another region-Puntland-seceded from Somalia and declare itself as a state. But the southern part of the country where the capital city Mogadishu is found is still exists without a central government.

This statelessness of Somalia is a considerable concern for the United States especially after its declaration of war on terrorism and went to war in Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States was involved in Somalia in the early 1990s for humanitarian purposes that backfired and culminated in the famous shooting down of Black Hawk helicopters. After 9/11, the United States considers Somalia as a possible safe haven for jihadist terrorists like al-Qaeda fleeing from those places where counter terrorism by the US is high. On paper, this is a sound argument considering the chaotic situations in Somalia and large number of Muslim population. Furthermore, Somalia was

used as a transit route for the 1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa and also used as an escape route for the perpetrators too. Against this background, the United States formulated different counter terrorism schemes in Somalia especially in and after 2004 when the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed. But these schemes are criticized very much because they are accused of fueling extremism rather than countering it. In addition to, recognizing and supporting the TFG which is very unpopular and questionable legitimacy, the United States was also very much involved in sponsoring the war lords by establishing Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT) and also supporting the Ethiopian military intervention after Islamic Courts Union (ICU) seized power in Mogadishu and subsequently conducting military strikes in Somalia against terrorists where innocent civilians are reportedly targeted indiscriminately. These measures are considered misguided and inappropriate as they have spread extremism and anti-American sentiment among the Somalis who live in Somalia and abroad.

4.2.1 Supporting the TFG

The establishment of the Transitional Federal Government is the fruit of a very difficult two year negotiations facilitated by Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Kenya. It resulted in establishment of a transitional government with 275 members of parliament and 89 members of cabinet led by a former army colonel Abdullahi Yusuf as president with a five year mandate. The TFG is designed as a power sharing arrangement between the rival factions and clans in Somalia rather than a national reconciliation where key issues in the Somali conflict left untouched. According to Menkhaus²⁶, the newly established TFG had its own distinct features: it is considered as pro-Ethiopian and this was used by its opponents as a rallying point painting TFG as ‘a tool’ of Ethiopians; it was also dominated by the president’s clan-Mijerteen/Darood as opposed to being a national unity government most importantly excluded another very powerful Hawiye clan; and the leadership of TFG was a strong opponent of Islamists that makes their relationship difficult. The president, Abdullahi Yusuf, is also a divisive figure himself. He ‘called for the deployment of foreign troops in southern Somalia immediately after his inauguration [which] clearly sent the message home that he did not believe in peaceful negotiations’ (Hoene, 2010:8). From its inception, the TFG faces strong opposition from powerful clans especially in and around Mogadishu and Islamist figures like Sheikh Hassan

²⁶ See Kenneth Menkhaus, ‘Somalia and Somaliland: Terrorism, Political Islam, and State Collapse’, in Rotberg, 2005, *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa*.

Dahir Aweys and also did not earn legitimacy from the Somali people particularly due to its association with Ethiopia which Somalia went to war over Ogaden twice. The TFG is so weak that it cannot even relocate to Somalia even though it appealed to the international community for peacekeeping force which was in vain. The Ethiopian armed support ‘allowed it, in January 2006, to move its head quarters to Baidoa in Somalia, whilst denying that any Ethiopian troops were present’ (Moller, 2009b:15). The US collaboration along with Ethiopia in the support of this weak and illegitimate government undermined the image of America among the Somalis.

4.2.2 Establishment of ARPCT

Another blunder by the US counter terrorism in Somalia is the establishment of Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT) in February 2006 in collaboration with the Somali warlords (led by Mohammed Omar Habre a.k.a. Mohammed Dhere) for a parochial purpose of apprehending terrorists in Mogadishu. By the time this Alliance was formed the power and legitimacy of the warlords was at its lowest due several reasons. As Prendergast²⁷ puts it, failure to provide basic services to the public and failure to rule the areas they control along with the emergence of rival ‘business elites’; and also their inappropriate use of counter terrorism partnerships for their own narrow interests eroded their remaining credibility. This erosion of power along with the gradual ascendancy of the Sharia courts into prominence by providing a sense of law and order contributed a lot to the down fall of APRCT by the hand of what later is known as Islamic Courts Union (ICU). During the time of ICU’s reign, ‘Mogadishu was reunited, militia checkpoints were torn down, weapons were removed from the streets and the international port and airport reopened for business’ (Nzau, 2010:169). The ascendancy of the ICU and its subsequent control of Mogadishu and further advances to the seat of the ineffectual TFG-Baidoa-along with either calculated or miscalculated declaration of jihad on Ethiopia triggered another regional dimension of the Somali conflict i.e. the intervention of Ethiopia in order to salvage the TFG.

²⁷ See John Prendergast’s testimony entitled ‘Somalia: Expanding Crisis in the Horn of Africa’ in a Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations and the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, June 29, 2006.

4.2.3 The Ethiopian Military Intervention against ICU

The military intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia in December 2006 with the ‘invitation’ of the TFG was given a tacit support by the United States which considers the leadership of the ICU is linked with al-Qaeda. When asked by the Joint Hearing of the US House of Representatives about ICU, the former Assistance Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer²⁸ replied that even though the ICU ‘is a heterogeneous group of courts’ there are jihadist and hard-liner militants that provides a safe haven for terrorists in Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia. Furthermore, in her prepared statement for the testimony, she claimed that terrorists like Abu Tahla Al Sudani, Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, and Saleh Ali Saleh Nebhan which are responsible for the 1998 embassy bombings and the 2002 Hotel and attempted airliner attacks ‘have taken refuge’ in Somalia. The ICU was indeed a heterogeneous group as it was described by the Assistant Secretary. According to Markus V. Hoene²⁹, the ICU is a collage of about fourteen courts which includes some extremist elements with jihadist and militant agenda. It included groups like al-Shabaab which started as ICU’s youth wing with 400 fighters and reached 2000 just before Ethiopian invasion; former AIAI members who prefer to keep low profile after 9/11; Majuma Ulema which started by religious leaders (Ulema) in order to provide security for Mogadishu neighborhoods with a vision of establishing an Islamic state; and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) which was an offshoot of Majuma Ulema in order to help the late warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed in his quest to defend the traditional Somali Islamic practices from ‘foreign, and especially Salafi/Wahabi encroachment’.

Hoene³⁰ also states that the ICU also included diverse individuals like Haji Abukar Omar Adaani who is from Hawiye/Abgal/Warsageeli sub-clan who is considered the financier of the ICU and an established businessman whose major interest is to protect his business; Hassan Dahir Aweys from Hawiye/Habr Gedir/Ayr/Ayaanle who was a former Somali army colonel in Siad Barre

²⁸ See Jendayi Frazer’s testimony entitled ‘Somalia: Expanding Crisis in the Horn of Africa’ in a Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations and the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, June 29, 2006.

²⁹ For detailed information on ICU leadership see Hoene, Markus Virgil, 2010, ‘Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: How External Interference Helped Produce Militant Islamism’, pp 13-16.

³⁰ Ibid

regime and former military commander of AIAI that earned him an inclusion in US terrorist list; Sheikh Sharif who was formerly a member of Majuma and ASWJ and was elected a chairman of Supreme Council of Islamic Courts SCIC in 2004 which later became ICU and considered a moderate who finally became the current TFG president; Hassan Abdullahi Turki from Darood/Ogadeen clan who was a militant and an early member of AIAI and later controlled the area in southern Somalia called Ras Kimbooni and also linked with political assassination and killing of a foreigner; Adan Hashi Ayro from Hawiye/Habr Gedir/Ayr sub-clan like Aweys who fought for AIAI in Mogadishu, northern Somalia and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and then went to Afghanistan for military training who allegedly has a link with al-Qaeda and the Taliban and later in 2005 became the leader of al-Shabaab but killed by US attack in 2008; Ahmed Ali Godane of Isaaq/Arab clan from Somaliland who worked for the remittance company called Al Barakaat and attended military training and considered as international jihadist who was implicated with Ayro in the killings of foreigners; Ibrahim Al Afghani of Isaaq/Sa'ad Muuse also from Somaliland who reported to have fought in Kashmir and Afghanistan before becoming AIAI commander and later joined al-Shabaab and who was also implicated with Ayro and Godane in the killings of foreigners; Yusuf Mohamed Indhoade from Hawiye/Habr Gedir/Ayr who used to be a warlord who controlled a Sharia court in lower Shebelle region and later became ICU's chief of security; Mukhtar Robow from Rahanweyn/Leysan clan who was allegedly trained Somali militants, also fought along side with Taliban and al-Qaeda in 2001, later became ICU's deputy Defense Minister and finally joined al-Shabaab as spokesman and deputy commander; and Sheikh Ali Warsame from Isaaq/Habr Je'lo clan who is a conservative religious leader educated in Sudan and later became a military leader in AIAI with a suspected connection with ICU.

The ICU, as shown above, was composed of different groups and personalities with different agendas which can become problematic in their relation. Some of the groups are established to preserve the traditional Islamic practices like ASWJ while others like al-Shabaab aspired to global jihad. There are also individuals in the ICU leadership that pursue different interests ranging from business interests like that of Haji Abukar Omar Adaani to Islamists with national and regional agenda like Aweys who coalesces Islamism with irredentism and also international

jihadist militants like Ayro, Robow, and Al-Afghani. There are also elements that are considered moderates like the former ICU chairman and the current TFG president Sheikh Sharif. Since ICU is a 'heterogeneous group' as Frazer puts it there is a chance to engage by the United States some of the members in order to influence. Prendergast advised the US House of Representatives before the Ethiopian invasion in June 2006 as:

the worst-case scenario is unfolding for United States interests in the Horn and Eastern African region. United States aid to our warlords emboldened radicals in the Islamic Courts and gave them a recruitment tool and an anti-U.S. rallying point over the last year. Our aid to these warlords increased the popularity of these Islamic Courts conversely, as the courts have become synonymous now with law and order, the opposite of what the warlords we were supporting were able to do in Somalia and Mogadishu. We couldn't have done worse in Somalia, I think, over the past 3 years to increase our vulnerability and reduce our access as well as to hurt nation-building prospects in Somalia. Our short-term national security interests in locating al-Qaeda suspects have been undermined and the risk of a new safe haven for international terrorists has been greatly enhanced.... It is crucial, I think, for us to engage with all elements of the Islamic Courts, but particularly the Courts Executive Committee which is headed by Sheikh Sharif (House of Representatives, 2006:33).

The US did not follow these advises and end up categorizing the ICU leadership as extremists which have a close relation with al-Qaeda elements. Since there was confusion and lack of knowledge about the dynamics of the ICU and its leadership the Ethiopian government and the TFG seized the moment and 'decided that the Somali Islamists were 'terrorists' and a threat to regional and potentially international security [and] the Bush administration accepted this position, which was, in the eyes of many Somalis and most external observers, based less on facts and more on the parochial self-interest of Ethiopia and the TFG' (Hoene, 2010:19). Stressing the lack of knowledge about ICU, Ted Dagne in the Joint Hearing of the House of Representative admitted that 'what we know of the leadership is very limited except for a few individuals who have emerged recently' (2006:63). It is under these circumstances the United States classified the ICU leadership as a bunch of extremists and supported the Ethiopian invasion that saw the installation of the TFG in the capital Mogadishu. The presence of the Ethiopian military with the blessing of the US on Somali soil is the most unpopular issue among the Somalis that gave the momentum for the propaganda machine of al-Shabaab that legitimizes their struggle against the Christian invaders of Ethiopia with the help of the United States. The invasion also damaged the

reputation of the TFG, or what's left of it, because of its dependence on the historical enemy-Ethiopia.

What followed the Ethiopian invasion and the relocation of the TFG to the capital is a determined and complicated insurgency by al-Shabaab in combination with terrorist tactics reminiscent of the Iraqi insurgents who employed mixture Innovative Explosive Devices (IEDs), suicide bombers and conventional methods. Nzau described the situation in Somalia in the subsequent months of the Ethiopian invasion as:

The insurgents adapted Middle East style suicide bombings. At least one person blew himself on April 19, 2007 near an Ethiopian military compound. At least two Ethiopian vehicles entering the compound were destroyed to small pieces. On April 24, a suicide bomber attacked an Ethiopian forces compound in Afgoye town, 30km south of Mogadishu. There were no immediate casualty reports. On April 25, 11 people were killed in a suicide attack on a major hotel around KM4 roundabout, south of Mogadishu where the Somali government officials are based. On June 3, a truck bomb exploded outside the residence of the Somali interim Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Ghedi. At least six people were killed and 10 injured - most of them bodyguards (2010:170).

This clearly shows that the US policy of supporting the Ethiopian invasion and the decision not to be involved with ICU leadership is made in haste and without understanding the situation on the ground. What supposed to be a counter terrorism policy has backfired and resulted in creating a situation where the emboldened al-Shabaab continued its attack not only on the Ethiopian forces but also in the African Union peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) extending to the Capital of Uganda, Kampala which contributed a military contingent for AMISOM. 'It need not have been surprising when al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the Kampala 11th July terror attacks [which] now meant that international terrorism in the region was alive and fully operational; with its epicenter being Somalia' (Nzau, 2010:171). These situations can open door for international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda with strong regional jihadist group which swore allegiance to it in a country where al-Qaeda could not itself due to several reasons mentioned before.

The United States also derailed regional efforts especially by Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to mediate some kind of deal between the Islamists and TFG. The Transitional Federal Government is the product of the efforts of IGAD. With the rapidly changing situation in Somalia in 2006 with the increasing power of the ICU, in addition to deciding in favor of deploying Ethiopian and Ugandan peacekeepers it also ‘cautioned the international community against offering any form of support to any parts in Somalia without consulting it and the TFG ... they called upon the USA to stop any unilateral and parallel initiatives on Somalia’ (Nzau, 2010:172). But the United States was already siding with the warlords’ alliance against the Islamists. When we see the overriding ‘War on Terror’ policy of the United States which considers Ethiopia as a viable regional ally that thorns Eritrea, created considerable tension within and among members of IGAD especially between Ethiopia and Eritrea. These heightened tension culminated in, according to sudantribune.com³¹, Eritrea suspending its membership in IGAD after a ‘rift’ over the issue of Somalia with ‘arch-foe’ Ethiopia and also claimed the east African organization is ‘manipulated’ by external forces without naming any but singled out the United States for its policies in the Horn of Africa. This is why the US policy in the Horn of Africa is described as ‘double edged knife’ which supported IGAD in its effort in brokering Comprehensive Peace Agreement of Sudan and on the other hand exacerbate a heightened tension between IGAD members. IGAD’s relation worsened with Eritrea to the point of accusing Eritrea of arming the Islamist forces which are against the TFG and, according to BBC News³², recommended sanctions against Eritrea.

The Ethiopian invasion and the subsequent US military attacks targeting terrorists hiding in Somalia are conducted at the expense of the lives of innocent civilians. Human Rights Watch (HRW) accused the Ethiopian National Defense Force of killing indiscriminately. According to HRW Country Report, ‘throughout 2008 ENDF forces in Mogadishu participated in widespread acts of murder, rape, assault, and looting targeting ordinary residents of the city, often alongside forces allied to the Somali Transitional Federal Government’ (2009:2). Furthermore, HRW also claims that when the Ethiopian forces ‘were hit by road side bomb near the town of Afoogye and

³¹ See ‘Eritrea Suspends Its Membership in IGAD over Somalia’, on sudantribune.com citing Reuters, Monday 23, April, 2007.

³² See ‘Call to Blockade Somali Islamists’, BBC News, 20/05/2009, news.bbc.co.uk.

responded by firing wildly; in the resulting bloodbath as many as 60 civilians were shot and killed, including the passengers of two crowded minibuses' (2009:3). The United States is also accused of killing indiscriminately while trying to eliminate terrorists which they claimed are hiding in the southern part of Somalia. This loss of civilian life in the US attack resulted in the public anger which is against the US 'winning hearts and minds' campaign.

4.3 Failure to Address Structural Problems

In the Horn of Africa, structural problems which are assumed to be the underlying reasons of terrorism are in abundance. These are political, social and economic issues like poverty, governance, hopelessness, disaffection, marginalization, etc. All these do not cause terrorism directly but they provide an ideal environment for terrorists to hide and establish terrorist cells. These are the situation where terrorists thrive on. The United States did little in order to improve these underlying issues that will make the Horn of Africa potentially the future hot spot of terrorist activities.

The Horn of Africa is characterized by deterioration of governance in different aspects. Politically, the region saw deterioration especially in the aftermath of mandatory elections. The best examples are Ethiopia and Kenya-the two cornerstones of the US counter terrorism strategy in the Horn of Africa. The 2005 and the 2008 elections in both countries are marred in post-election violence which resulted in fatality, in maim, or in imprisonment of political dissidents. They also ended up in criminalizing dissent which eroded the legitimacy of both governments. The 2010 election in Ethiopia resulted in the ruling party controlling all the seats except for two which is a far cry from the earlier election where the opposition got more than 160 seats. But the 'pre election conditions were marred by the harassment, detention, and in some cases killing of opposition members' (Dagne, 2010:7). 'The fact that elections appear to be playing a role as triggers (but not underlying causes) of political deterioration in [these] polities in the Horn of significance, and could be interpreted as a reflection of the reduction of political life in these countries to regime survival' (Menkhaus, 2009b:2).

Despite all these problems, the US still considers these countries as bulwark of its counter terrorism policies in the Horn of Africa. But it is noteworthy that ‘in late 2007, the House of Representatives passed legislation condemning human right abuses and lack of democracy in Ethiopia (H.R. 2003) [which] the Ethiopian government hired lobbyist groups in an attempt to defeat the bill’ (Dagne, 2010:8). Turning a blind eye on these kinds of issues may hurt the US relation with these countries in the long run vis-à-vis its long term policies in the region and may encourage anti American sentiments among the general public. The US counter terrorism efforts also undermined governance in Somalia. It is a known fact that Somalia has been without a functional government for the last twenty years but there were some sort of governance that provide basic services like Sharia courts which are useful in providing stability. These are usually what scholars describe as ‘governance without government’ which Somalia was famous for. Ironically state building efforts undermined these informal governances. ‘The TFG eliminated most local systems of governance, including the highly successful local-level Sharia courts, and inserted its own appointees in towns and districts [where] the result was serious deterioration of security and rule of law’ (Menkhaus, 2009b:2-3). It is notable that the US support for the warlords was also a challenge to local governances which are very important in order to provide semblance of stability.

Poverty is considered one of the major underlying causes of terrorism as it created hopelessness and disaffection among the society where terrorists could utilize to recruit foot soldiers. The securitization approach of the United States does not help the Horn of Africa to address the issue of poverty. The United States, of course, provide aid for economic, humanitarian and security purposes. It has been shown in the previous chapter; the US approach of counter terrorism is usually concerned with security and state centric. Efforts like EARSI and military involvements like CJTF-HOA are mostly concerned with strengthening regional partner governments. But the United States did not engage itself in the Horn of Africa in a more positive and long term activities like investment. In fact, the lack of investment by the US companies is not confined to the Horn of Africa. Rather, the US investments are very much concentrated in a handful of Sub

Saharan countries which are endowed with minerals and rich with oil. US-Africa Trade Profile³³ reveals that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by the US is in countries like South Africa (36.5%, 4.8 billion USD), Mauritius (21.9%, 2.9 billion USD), Equatorial Guinea (16.2%, 2.2 billion USD), Angola (6.6%, 876 million USD), Liberia (3.4%, 456 million USD), and Gabon (3.2%, 421 million USD) which combined account for 87.8 % of the US FDI to Africa but Sub Saharan Africa accounts less than 1% of the US direct investment around the world. The above mentioned Sub Saharan countries with the exception of South Africa are either mineral rich or oil rich countries. No country from the Horn region is mentioned since the US is concerned with mineral extraction and the region is not famous for its mineral endowment. This shows the securitization of US approach in the Horn of Africa which fails to help address huge problem of poverty which can go a long way in tackling terrorism in the Horn.

In general, helping to solve governance and poverty issues in the Horn of Africa can help the United States in fighting extremism. Improvement in governance can contribute to democratization processes and embolden the legitimacy of the governments that the United States desperately is trying to empower so that they can tackle terrorism more effectively. Alleviating poverty can help in producing a satisfied society that rejects terrorists and refuse safe havens for them. Despite the fact that governments opt for quick fixes like military action for terrorist threats, addressing structural issues like governance and poverty can be helpful in diminishing terrorism to the point that it becomes meaningless. The United States, therefore, should work towards reducing the underlying issues even though they seem very difficult.

4.4 Regime Survival and Counter Terrorism

The 'War on Terror' declared by the United States and the subsequent military and other counter terrorism initiatives have introduced different challenges in the Horn of Africa. One of the challenges of US counter terrorism efforts in this region is using the paradigm of terrorism for the purpose of regime survival and state security against human security. In the Horn of Africa, using global agenda for the purpose of state security and regime survival is not new. Here, the best examples are Ethiopia and Somalia which were swinging back and forth between the super

³³ See 'U.S.-Africa Trade Profile' prepared by J. Diamond, U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Market Access & Compliance Office of Africa.

powers during the Cold War for their own regime survival and regional agendas like keeping territorial integrity and irredentism. Sally Healy rightly observed that ‘the underlying conflicts in the region are older than the contemporary war on terrorism and will probably outlast it’ (2008:44). Since the Horn governments used the global agendas like the Cold War before, the current ‘War on Terror’ will not be an exception.

Regimes in the Horn of Africa are usually criticized for utilizing counter terrorism for the purpose of state security especially by pinning the name ‘terrorist’ on their local opposition. These activities are evident across the Horn of Africa. Kagwanja argues that this trend is sort of a norm than an exception: he states that:

Governments across the Horn utilize the ‘war on terror’ to further their political ends, closing channels of peace talks to end conflicts. Ethiopia branded the Oromo Liberation Front, the Ogadeni National Liberation Front and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia as ‘terrorist’ groups. Eritrea’s president, [Isaias] Afewerki, also labeled his more democratically-minded former colleagues in the nationalist trenches terrorists. Similarly, Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni branded as terrorists both the LRA and the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) – blamed for the orgy of bomb throwing in pubs, taxi parks, markets and other public spaces in 1997-1999 that killed over 50 people and injured 160. Museveni also invoked the Anti-Terrorism Act against Kizza Besigye, his worthy rival for the presidential slot during the 2006 polls, in a move aimed at weakening his bid for power. While this utilization of terrorism blurred the line between legitimate acts of resistance and terrorism, many governments rejected to enter into peace talks as a way of resolving conflicts (2006:78).

There is also the problem of divergence of outlook over the genuine concern of terrorism and its handling between the United States and its regional partners in the Horn of Africa. The governments of the Horn countries seem to go along with the US plans in order to secure the benefit that comes along with it be it economic, political or military. For these governments state security takes precedence. Medhane Tadesse argues that ‘terrorism is not the main security concern for [them] and if there is terrorism at all American way of handling it is not liked’ (2004:6). This is to say that the American heavy-handed and militaristic approach is less suitable to handle terrorism. ‘Most of the countries concerned believe that this is a political problem and needs political solution [and] running after al-Qaeda is not the answer ... [rather]

poverty alleviation and broad approaches at conflict resolution should be applied' (Medhane, 2004:6). This difference in point of view is crucial in the counter terrorism efforts because the regional partners of the United States in counter terrorism have other priorities like regime survival and state security and they are cooperating with the US effort so long as it is beneficial to achieve their primary objectives. We can exemplify this line of argument with the actions of Eritrea in the aftermath of the decision by Border Commission. Eritrea used to be the US ally in countering terrorism in the Horn. But the moment it felt that the US is against its regional agenda vis-à-vis its conflict with Ethiopia it completely turned against the US interests in the region. This shows that the Eritrean government's primary concern was not terrorism. In fact, it ended up supporting the Islamists in Somalia that the US is trying to undermine. These kinds of discrepancies can be considered as a weak link in the US effort in the Horn of Africa in tackling the spread of transnational terrorism.

Governments in the Horn of Africa are also criticized for their legislations on terrorisms as they are not only targeting terrorists or their organizations but also political opponents to the extent of criminalizing stone throwing. In Kenya, the Kibaki administration introduced anti-terrorism legislation known as the Suppression of Terrorism Bill 'but parliament shelved the law due to strong resistance from Muslim lobbies and human rights groups who, eager to fiercely defend their newly won civil liberties, criticized the draft bill as a breach to the Bill of rights' (Kagwanja, 2006:78). Human Rights Watch³⁴ criticized the proposed Ethiopian anti-terrorism law over concerns like its very definition of terrorism that include property damages and disruption or interference of a public service that can easily can happen in political protests; the expansion of police power that reduces judicial oversight; admission of indirect evidences like hearsay into courts; criminalizing moral supports to terrorist actions that can be political protests according to the broad definition of terrorism etc. The governments of the Horn of Africa are trying to criminalize dissent and try to scare off their opposition with terrorism clauses in their laws. But this is against what the United States claims it stands for i.e. civil liberties.

³⁴ See Human Rights Watch press release entitled 'Ethiopia: Amend Draft Terror Law', June 30, 2009, www.hrw.org

Therefore, the divergence of interests between the United States and its regional partners in the Horn of Africa is crucial in the success or failure of the US counter terrorism efforts since it compromises the stance of partner governments in fighting terrorism in the region. The US counter terrorism is designed to work with regional states as partners. It seems that the Horn governments are merely using the US support for their own benefits like advancing their regional issues, suppressing their local or domestic oppositions, or as an excuse to trample human rights.

Chapter Five

Conclusions

The study tried to show the involvement of the United States in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa that it considers susceptible to terrorism. From the outset, it demonstrates that terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the Horn of Africa but things began to change in the aftermath of the US embassy bombings in 1998 and the September 11 attacks on United States soil in terms of American approach in the region. After about a decade long disengagement by the United States from this region, the 'War on Terror' brought back the US military and other official and less than official counter terrorism measures in the Horn of Africa. But this study, in trying to establish the theme, attempted to look at the potential of the region to be a terrorist safe haven and launching ground.

The Horn of Africa has a potential to be a terrorist safe haven because of its multi-faceted political, economic, social, cultural, regional problems that are rampant in the region. These are what scholars and experts in the area of terrorism called as underlying factors like poverty, social injustice, regional conflict, economic and political marginalization, porous ness of borders, proximity of the region to the hotspots of terrorism, etc. All these 'underlying factors' are present in the Horn. Besides, they are very much interrelated in such a way that they sometimes become confusing. Considering all these factors it is right to assume that the Horn of Africa is going to be a safe haven for transnational terrorists to launch their attacks on their enemies especially those fled from other places where stronger counter terrorism measures are conducted. The most obvious destination for these running terrorists could be assumed to be Somalia where there is no viable government since the beginning of 1990s with the presence of huge amount of Muslim population and some sort of anti American sentiment reminiscent of the earlier disastrous peacekeeping mission. The United States, wary of these situation, established its military presence in Djibouti in the form of CJTF-HOA which is the most militarized and visible presence the Sub Saharan Africa. It also put several initiatives like EACTI and EARSII in order to improve the capacity of the regional governments in order for them to be able to tackle terrorism in a more effective way. It was also involved in some other less official counter terrorism measures. But the

fear that international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda would be based in this region especially Somalia proved to be a bit exaggerated.

Al-Qaeda found the statelessness of Somalia inhospitable because of the insecurity it posed in terms of betrayal and unmonitored counter terrorism operations from the United States and its partners in the region as experienced by AIAI when Ethiopian forces attacked inside Somalia because of the absence of central government. Rather, al-Qaeda found it suitable in operating in countries like Kenya where there is a functional but weak sovereign government with operational and judicial shortcomings and more importantly a dissatisfied and marginalized Muslim population. Kenya also provides key Western targets which are non-existent in chaotic places like Somalia. But this does not mean that the terrorist threats are diminishing in the Horn of Africa. The emergence and prominence of groups like al-Shabaab with global jihadist aspiration is somewhat recent development which can be blamed on the US misguided counter terrorism policies. It is also observed the resurgence of al-Qaeda in Yemen in the form of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). These are issues that should worry the United States.

The US counter terrorism policies in the Horn of Africa are evidently militaristic, state centric, and usually designed to achieve parochial purposes. As mentioned before, the most visible US military involvement in Sub Saharan Africa is CJTF-HOA with initial purpose of hunting down terrorists and their cells seemed an impossible task in a vast and inhospitable area like the Horn with the number of personnel at its disposal. But it was a sensible move to make it more of a supporting and less aggressive outfit that helps regional governments in fighting terrorism. Of course CJTF-HOA is involved in development projects 'to win hearts and minds' of the local population but the amount of the projects and the overwhelming problems of the Horn of Africa, the poorest region in the world, do not match. Besides it is not exactly a developmental organization even though it works in collaboration with organizations like USAID. Still, it is a military unit. Moreover, the US counter terrorism follows a state centric approach especially with initiatives like EACTI and EARSII. These are geared toward strengthening regional governments' capacity. These governments, with questionable motives, use these much needed

assistance for their own purpose of state security to insure the survival of the regimes. Governments in the Horn of Africa are not known for democracy, good governance, transparency, human rights etc. Strengthening these governments is against the ideals the US stands for. But the US is usually observed in turning a blind eye for misdemeanors by these governments in order to secure their cooperation. Other counter terrorism issues like support for the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia; establishing warlords' alliance; support for the 2006 Ethiopian invasion; and US air strikes which killed civilians did nothing but embolden what the US was trying to destroy. These measures gave impetus for militant Islamists like al-Shabaab which is more than ready to embrace al-Qaeda in its struggle. Now, al-Shabaab has shown its capacity to strike out side Somalia by terrorist attacks in Uganda and be able to recruit personnel even from United States.

The basic argument of this study is the US militaristic and state centric approach do not address the issue of terrorism since the Horn of Africa is not the 'hotspot' of terrorism and the issue of terrorism in the region can be rightly handled by addressing those underlying factors i.e. regional conflicts like that of Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict which can solve a lot of minor issues and of course be a step closer to finding a solution for Somalia; finding the right policy for Somalia; by involving in the region in more positive manner by assisting to establish good governance and bring about development to alleviate poverty; and finding a balance between their counter terrorism efforts and the primary interest of regional governments which is regime survival. Therefore, the United States must find a nuanced and less visible and non militaristic approach or policy in the Horn of Africa that addresses the terrorism issues. It must follow a long term approach that will help the region to emerge from abject poverty that opened the door for Islamic charities with jihadist agenda by engaging in investment, trade, and other development schemes. The United States should also exercise its position in international system as a super power to pressurize both Ethiopia and Eritrea to find a lasting settlement that can solve their current stand off. The Algiers Agreement, which the US was one of the guarantors, stresses on border demarcation did not address the basic issues surrounding the conflict. The US must engage itself in solving those issues rather than siding with one party. Evenhandedness in this situation can go a long way in solving the conflict once and for all. The US must also be wary of the stance of

the governments on the issue of terrorism. The US must push these governments to be more open and transparent and bring about good governance and economic development especially for those marginalized sections of the population.

The United States must also find a right policy to Somalia rather than quick fixes. It must involve in slow and long term state building process which is acceptable to the Somali people rather than pursuing parochial objectives like using the most hated war lords in chasing a handful of alleged terrorist. Helping the people of Somalia to achieve an ever elusive peace and stability can go a long way in winning their hearts and minds and tackle terrorism. The Somali people supported ICU because it brought about a sense of stability and peace which the war lords failed to do. This shows that any one who brings peace and stability to Somalia is likely to be acceptable. The United States should work towards achieving exactly that. In general, the United States must help the people of the Horn of Africa and help itself in the process.

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Gideon Assefa

April 2011

This thesis submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate.

K. Mathews

April 2011

