



ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
CENTRE FOR REGIONAL AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT
STUDIES

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION OF THE
TIGRAY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION FRONT EX-FIGHTERS
IN THE POST 1991 CONFLICT:
THE CASE OF DANSHA-DIVISION SETTLEMENT,
TIGRAY

BY
DAWIT ANAGAW



MAY 2011
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(RLDS)**

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Approved by Board of Examiners

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
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
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Examiner



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Date





DEDICATION

I DEDICATE THIS THESIS MANUSCRIPT
TO MY MOTHER KASECH BERHE FOR HER LOVE AND UNTOLD-
ENORMOUS EFFORT IN MY LIFE AND ACADEMIC SUCCESS
AND
TO ALL COMPATRIOTS WHO GAVE THEIR
DEAREST LIVES FOR A BETTER FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA

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LOCAL TERMS

Ayte (Tigrigna)	Mister
Ato (Amharic)	Mister
Belg (Amharic)	winter
Gimbar (Tigrigna)	Front
Gujjile (Tigrigna)	Sub Group
Idir (Tigrigna)	Local social association
Iqub (Tigrigna)	Credit Association
Kebele	The lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia
Kiremti (Tigrigna)	summer
Mahiber (Tigrigna)	Association
Meda (Tigrigna)	Field
Qeshi (Tigrigna)	Priest
Shemagle (Tigrigna)	Elder
Sriet (Tigrigna)	Regulation
Tabia (Tigrigna)	Local Administrative structure
Tehadisso	Rehabilitation/Entertainment
Tukul (Tigrigna)	House constructed from wood
Wereda	An administrative unit that is above <i>kebele</i>
Wishato (Tigrigna)	kitchen

LIST of ACRONYMS

AAU	Addis Ababa University
ANDM	Amhara Nation Democratic Movement
APC	All People's Congress
BICC	Bonn International Conversation Center
Birr	Ethiopian Currency
CAR	Central Africa Republic
CCDDRR	Cantonment, Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration
CRMFRDWV	Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans
CSA	Central Statistical Authority
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DR	Democratic Republic
DRP	Demobilization and Reintegration Program
E.C	Ethiopian Calendar
EFDRE	The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	The Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
ETB	Ethiopian Birr
FAA	Angolan Armed Forces
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTZ/GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HH	Household
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
ILO	International Labor Organization
LG	Local Government
LPA	Lomé Peace Agreement
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MOD	Ministry of Defense

ABSTRACT

The main objective of this thesis is to examine how the Tigray People's Liberation Front Ex-Fighters are integrated in the socio, economic and psychological dynamics of the Dansha Settlement Project and its surrounding civilian life after the civil war. More specifically it examines: firstly, the factors that contribute or hinder the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program. Secondly, identifying the relevance of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program designed, facilitates provided and its outcomes. Thirdly, it tries to show the Ex-Fighter's response to the economic, social and political environment after the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program. Fourth, it assess how the resources, services, employment, and other opportunities are distributed fairly or may become a source of conflict; and finally it tries to outline the interrelationship among the Tigray People's Liberation Front Ex-Fighters and the receiving community.

The study sample comprises six clusters, which are grouped by the target group samples are selected randomly from the frame list of the settlers in the study area called Dansha-Division. Qualitative and quantitative data collection methods were used. A semi-structured questionnaire was administered to 200 Tigray People's Liberation Front Ex-Fighters, Focus Group Discussions were conducted with key groups; and in-depth interviews with key informants were also conducted. Personal observation and available secondary data were also used during the research. Depending on the nature of data collected, both qualitative data analysis techniques and Statistical Packages for Social Scientists (SPSS) are employed to analyze and arrive at conclusions.

Findings from the field survey reveals that many of the Tigray People's Liberation Front Ex-Fighters do not have good feelings on the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program and on the other hand the overall demobilization and reintegration endeavors done by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia has positive development. From the beginning the reintegration program designed and the support measures were oriented towards solving the economic problems with the aim of strengthening their economic capacities, however it has to be stressed that the findings clearly show that the economic reintegration should complement by social support measures and in some cases by special psychosocial counseling activities. Currently there are serious errors in the implementation process of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration program particularly in realizing what the government has promised to the Tigray People's Liberation Front Ex-Fighters and the reality on the ground (expectations) were not matched. Finally, it is very difficult to conclude that the intended goals of the program are achieved and from the long-term sustainability of the Ex-Fighters, their current physical situation needs special attentions and curious follow up. The basic and strong points of the Dansha Settlement Program are carefully identified in this thesis and so much so that past predicaments will not remain part of the continuity of it.

Key Words: Demobilization, Reintegration, Ex-Fighters, and TPLF

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

In the past twenty years, more than eighty Peace Treaties have been signed and still more than thirty (30) are considered comprehensive. Increasingly, peace agreements have become important for the study of conflict resolutions. These agreements refer to situations in which the armed conflicting parties in a voluntary / agreements resolve to peacefully live with – and /or dissolve – their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against one another (Peter, 2007). In this context, conflict resolution and peace agreements aim in a particular way to achieve sustainable peace in a conflicting society and avoid the reproduction of cycles of violence in the future. A significant component to achieve this goal lies in the success of disarmament and demobilization of the irregular troops, the reform of the security sector, and the effective reintegration and rehabilitation of the former combatants (Peter, 2007). For this reason, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs have become central part of peace building processes during the last decades. This was so due to the fact that they provide for the required conditions for both dismantling illegal armed structures and help Ex-Fighters to effectively reintegrate into civilian life.

According to the United Nations, DDR processes propose,

““To deal with the post-conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development. Through a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, DDR seeks to support ex-combatants so that they can become active participants in the peace process”” (UN DDR Resource Center: <http://www.unddr.org/whatisddr.php>. Accessed on November 2010).

In this sense, DDR implies multiple transitions which could involve the ex-combatants, the governments, NGOs and the host communities (*Lisa and Kimberly, 2006*).

Ethiopia is a country situated in the Horn (North-Eastern part) of Africa with the total area of 1,127,127 square kilometers; and, results of the 2007 National population and Housing Census of Ethiopia the population projected figures for the year 2010 become 79,455,634 of which

40,083,810 are males and 39,371,824 are females. The annual population growth rate is estimated at 2.6 percent (CSA, 2007). The population is mainly rural based; and, subsistence agriculture is their economic activity. More or less, an evenly composed of Christians and Muslims, the Ethiopian population comprises 84 distinct nation, nationality and peoples with a heterogeneous cultural diversity. It is intimately related to contrasting economic and social conditions and to a rather complex history of settlement and resettlement at least since the second half of the 20th century.

Ethiopia, in addition to the significant environmental degradation, has suffered by several chronic civil wars. The war has also adversely affected the socio-economic life of every individual, family and the society at large (Cliffe, 1999). The consequences of the war were not restricted to the many thousands of deaths in combat imprisonment and civilian torture, the general repression or internal displacement, in turn, extended to the basic fabric of the economy and the day-to-day life (Cliffe, 1999). However, after the overthrow of the Derge Regime in 1991, by the coalition force lead by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the different group of the people were able to live together as citizens. The experience of Ethiopia shows that in times of the confrontation with a common enemy, apart from grave disruption and duress, a great deal of social interaction has well taken a real place. After the return of peace, the EPRDF led Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) has dealt with two basic issues. Firstly, the rehabilitation of forces of the former military regime; and secondly, establishing a modern national defense forces with the composition of the country's Nations, Nationalities and Peoples by farewelling the EPRDF fighters from the party. To establish the Ethiopian Modern Army, consideration was taken into account in line with the country's economic reality. As a result, a number of Ex-Fighters of the EPRDF were returned to normal civilian life. The process of restoring livelihood, for Ex-Fighters, involves developing short-terms survival; and, long-term adaptation strategies in accord with principles of co-operation and mutual self-help.

This thesis takes into consideration the settlement of the TPLF/EPRDF Ex-Fighters in Dansha-Division, Tigray, how far the communities, which hosted the Ex-Fighters by considering how far broader social and economic structures are in their proper place.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

This study underscore that sustainable peace requires long-term DDR programs that have at least three key elements.

Firstly, DDR programs must include and take into account all the sectors, what we could call a comprehensive inclusion, of the society affected by violence in order to create conducive spaces of reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. Those programs exclusively designed for the individual reintegration of ex-combatants are successful in the short term in the sense that they are designed to demilitarize a given society. However, it is necessary to deal with the “R” part of the DDR programs, which implies an alternative perspective that establishes a relationship between the reintegration of Ex-Fighters and the development of the host communities affected by violence.

Secondly, the community perspective of reintegration needs to be supported by a clear theory of change that clarifies and delineates the root causes of the conflict. This community perspective must be integrated in terms of what local communities need and want in order to achieve a sustainable peace and avoid the repetition of cycles of violence. Community participation creates conducive spaces which increase the likelihood that Ex-Fighters will not find new ways of organizing themselves into illegal armed structures.

Thirdly, since the communitarian component implies the inclusion of a large number of individuals and a more expensive scope of logistics and fieldwork; and, therefore more financial support governments and the international community must commit to long periods in order to achieve more sustainable results. Community reintegration appears as a key element that joins the process of reintegration of the Ex-Fighters to civilian life with the process of reconstructing the social fabric affected by violence.

In Ethiopia, the reason behind reintegrating Ex-Fighters was that social ties with their families have been displaced; and, the experiences they developed in the army struggle have made it difficult for them. This was intended to settle into normal life, which they should otherwise have had. Furthermore, their experiences during the struggle in combat have often given those skills, abilities and insight, which, if properly harnessed, can further assist in the process of the countries poverty eradication strategies. Thus, on the positive side they might be play in the poverty eradication program of the country, if their experience is properly exploited. On the negative side,

however, the Ex- Fighters may be destabilizing forces, if their expectations and their concerns are not sufficiently addressed as to the promised.

Scholars and donors such as Mulugeta (2000), Kingma (2000), Colletta *et al.* (1996), Cilliers (1995), the World Bank etc., have properly addressed the problem of the reintegration of the Ex-Fighters from the economic point of view, in which the financial and technical assistance are the two key elements. These studies have dealt with how African governments scale back their militaries, and, try to reduce their defense expenditures in their attempt for economic development. On the other hand, Dercon and Daniel (1998) have conducted researches, on the reintegration of the Ex-Fighters, in comparison with the life of other civilians (Dercon and Daniel 1998). Furthermore, scholars have also carried out a research on the reintegration of the Ex-Soldiers of the previous regime, who were demobilized involuntarily and returned into public life. Nevertheless, none has placed the analysis of the reintegration of the Ex-Fighters within the broader context of the economic, social, and psychological reintegration.

The present thesis focuses on examining the process of the settlement; and, the reintegrating programme of the EPRDF/TPLF Ex-Fighters, within the broader program of demobilization, after the overthrow of the Derge military leadership. Through the demobilization program, the Ex-Fighters often have changed their livelihood coping with military culture what they had developed, which were not matching with those of a receiving community. On the other hand, they had acquired valuable skills which could become useful input in the poverty eradication program. The thesis attempts to contribute by filling some gaps concerning the economic, social, and psychological reintegration dimension into analysis. Taking as an example, the Dansha-Division Settlement area of the TPLF/EPRDF Ex-Fighters, which is 869 Km far from Addis Ababa through Gonder and 1418 Km far from Addis Ababa through Sherie, will form the subject of this thesis.

1.3 Research Objectives

The overall objective of this thesis is to contribute to the discussion concerning the economic, social, and psychological reintegration. Given the above background and objective, this thesis will examine the reintegration process by referring to the research questions already stated. Therefore, the thesis carefully describes and examines the following objectives: -

- Factors that contributes or hinders the DDR program;
- The relevance of the programs designed to facilitate integration and their outcomes;

- The Ex-Fighter's response to the economic, social and political environment after the DDR program;
- How the resources, services, employment, and other opportunities are distributed fairly or may become a source of conflict;
- The interrelationship among the Tigray People's Liberation Front Ex-Fighters and the receiving community.

1.4 Research Questions

The research questions are-

- What were the basic reasons/circumstances forced the government to design the demobilization program, the factors influence/great challenges of the process, and what mechanisms the government has used to adapt the shortcomings?
- Were the social and psychological dimensions of the Ex-Fighters, and receiving community considered in the preparation and implementation of the settlement project?
- Was the expectation of the Ex-Fighters matched reality after demobilization?
- Is there any social conflict in securing the interests of the Ex-Fighters and host community, and how they resolve disputes emerged from social conflicts?
- What are the factors that contribute to keep the social network and structure, and to consolidate the interaction between the host communities and Ex-Fighters?

1.5 The Rational and Scope of the Research

There are two principal points for me as source of inspirations to undertake this thesis. One is for personal reason and the second institutional. Personally, I had once in late 1990s' participated in the demobilization process after which I have well remarked the importance this process as a research topic. Institutionally, mention should be made of the fact that demobilization is something which could visit now and then wherever the situation demands. To this extent, I have developed confidence that this thesis contributes at least something of importance for the Defense Forces of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The Dansha-Division Ex-Fighters settlement has become attractive as study area for it has double historical facts. Firstly, it had served as military base for the Ex-Fighters; and, secondly it had been a selected area to become an economic base for these Ex-Fighters to properly lead civilian life. Therefore, the present researcher has developed due

interest to investigate the magnitude of reintegration, in a complex situation, particularly the socio-economic aspect of the reintegration of the Ex-Fighters.

Due to time shortage and financial limitation, this thesis will only concentrate on the reintegration of the TPLF/EPRDF Ex-Fighters, who settled in Dansha-Division, Tigray. Secondly, it will only focus on the Socio-Economic, Opportunities and Challenges of the Reintegration of the Ex-Fighters in many ways.

1.6 Limitations

The first limitation was some of the Ex-Fighters in case they were not willing to co-operate by justifying that previously other researchers had asked them and nothing had come out of it. To solve the existed problem discussion were held with each *Mender* coordinators and *Tabia* administrators by explaining the objectives of the research and its future value

Second, the duration of stay in each strata of the study area was on average three days and this was too brief to locate key informants. Instead, the investigator chose to interview those well placed to know.

A third limitation was related to access to electricity for photocopying. In the settlement site the whole *Menders* had no locally generated electric light and their documents had to be taken to the nearest town where the electricity found. The documents were then photocopied and sent back to the *Tabia* Administrative.

A fourth constraint was inaccessibility by vehicles, from the central ‘mender’ to the rest of the *menders*.

1.7 Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is organized in six chapters as stated hereunder.

Chapter 1 describes the general over view of the study area which includes introduction with the outlines regarding to the (DDR/R) reintegration of Ex-Fighters universally and country wide (Ethiopia) specifically; introduces the research statement of the problem by explaining the research question spells out the research objectives and finally comes to an end after presenting rationality/scope, limitation of the study and structure of the document. **Chapter 2** is on the research design and methods. A description of selection of study sites and analysis of qualitative

and quantitative data is covered. **Chapter 3** provides the literature review and theoretical framework and its main focus is most relevant academic work related with DDR processes, especially that worked that has been focused alternative perspectives of reintegration in which the communities and victims which has been affected by violence are taken into account. For this purpose, the literature review was done by referring to the recent work developed by different scholars who, in addition to refer to previous theoretical framework, create their own concepts of DDR and reintegration in a comprehensive way. In much the same view, the documents by the United Nations, World Bank, and the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration were used for the purpose of the theoretical framework. These documents are important since they have been produced by the international organizations, as well as that the initiatives, which have accompanied, supported and tracked the DDR processes around the world during the last twenty years. In the second place, the case studies of Sierra Leone and Liberia were selected as context case studies since DDR programs were implemented in these two countries at the beginning of the 2000s as a result, of peace agreements among the warring parties to end violence. It also includes the Ethiopian military development and demobilization and/or reintegration experience of the country (Ethiopia). **Chapter 4** deals with the description of the study area profile. **Chapter 5** focused on the discussion of the designing and implementation of the DDR program using the secondary data obtained from the field survey. **Chapter 6** discerns a discussion of the fieldwork, particularly the socio-economic dimension of the Ex-Fighters by using the primary results obtained through the research methodology and the analytical component of the research will be developed in the analysis of the integration of the EPRDF/TPLF Ex-Fighters in Dansha-Division settlement site. **Chapter 7** is the final chapter summaries with some recommendations helpful for policy makers.

CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research is basically a household survey study focused on the socio-economic reintegration of the TPLF/EPRDF Ex-Fighters. The reason for the selection of this study site was two basic factors. The Dansha Ex-Fighters settlement has become attractive as study area for it has a double historical faces as first, it had served as military base for the Ex-Fighters; and, secondly it had been an area which was selected to become an economic base for these Ex-Fighters to properly lead civilian life. Therefore, it motivated the present researcher to investigate the magnitude of reintegration, in a complex situation, particularly the socio-economic aspect of the reintegration of the Ex-Fighters. Generally, data have been gathered through survey methods, focus group discussion, and in-depth interview with key informants, personal observation, and from secondary data sources.

This chapter describes the approaches and methods employed for data collection and analysis. The first sub-section of this chapter presents the pilot phase in which the questionnaire was tested and selection of site in the study area.

The second sub section indicates the details of methodology used to conduct the overall study are discussed such as sampling procedures and techniques, data collection methods and instrument used for collecting data pertaining to each of the specific objectives as well as the procedure employed for data analysis i.e., the data processing procedure.

Pilot Study: after the approval of the proposal of the study in November 2010, fieldwork was expected to be started by November 2010. Despite all difficulties encountered, however, the pilot study was conducted in the first week of December 2010, in *mender* 'Mayday' the so-called 'Mender 5'. The pilot work included selecting study sites; and, testing questionnaire content and relevance and estimating the time needed to interview. Further, it also intended the need for a translator; and, the period needed to cover the study area. Accordingly, the questionnaire was pre-tested in one of the strata 'mender' where the economic and social service rendering institutions are found and are adjacent to the local community. This site was thought adequate to test the content of the questionnaire and belonged to the same study areas of the settlement project that were studied. As a result, in the data collection the timeframe preplanned in the research proposal has been made modification.

Phase One: - in mid of November 2010, the questionnaire was translated to the local language Tigrigna which the majority of the Ex-Fighters speak and the questionnaires were printed. Finally, funds were obtained from AAU (Addis Ababa University) for fieldwork and data from the selected Ex-Fighters and secondary data related to the research collection began in December 2010. The interview took an average of three weeks continuous travel and fieldwork in the rural areas for each 'mender'.

Phase Two: - the focus group discussions and in-depth interviews with key informants were carried out.

2.1 Sampling Procedures and Techniques

Sampling Procedures

The respondents selected for the purpose of the preparation of this thesis were heads of households and usually the people involved in the settlement site. They were selected from a sampling frame, which comprise a list obtained from *Tabia* Administrative Offices of Dansha-Division. The research, randomly selected a sample of 200 Ex-Fighters from the households' list of the selected locals.

Sampling Techniques

Currently 2189 households are living in Dansha-Division - in the study area (CSA, 2007). This thesis has used cluster sampling which the study area classified into six clusters (*mender*) in turn uses to divide a population into cluster or subpopulations in line with the criteria of the name of the division of their prior unit with equal chance was given in each cluster as illustrated in Table 2.1. This sampling technique is preferred from other methods for its convenience in selecting the sample for the research. It guarantees that vital target groups incorporated in a sample. It also reduced the time and cost of collecting and analyzing data for it focuses on smaller cluster rather than on the entire population. The selection of the sample population carried out through simple random sampling by using a sample frame – a list from the local administration office. The sample size from each cluster will be taken based on the formula stated here under;

$$\text{Sample Size for each Cluster}(x) = \text{Total HH in Cluster (n)}/\text{Total HH in the Study Area} \times 200$$

Accordingly, in the cluster of the study area the bigger ‘mender’ with 46 and the smaller ‘mender’ with 22 sample size.

Table 2.1 Selections of Samples from each Cluster ‘Mender’

Tabias	Cluster/’mender’	Mender	No. Of Households	No. Of HH in mender (n)/Total HH in the study area X 200 (selected size)
Wereie	Mayday	Mender 5	361	33
	Keye Kokeb	Mender 6	249	22
Dedebit	Akaki	Mender 2	347	32
	Hawzen	Mender 1	360	33
Lekatit	Agaazi	Mender 3	502	46
	Alula	Mender 4	370	34
Total			2189	200

Source: Survey Result

2.2 Data Collection Methods

For the purpose of data collections, the thesis intends to describe and analyze the socio-economic of reintegration of the TPLF/EPRDF Ex-Fighters the household survey was employed. To make the data collection process comprehensive and all inclusive, both qualitative and quantitative methods have employed being both complement to each other and supplementing the deficiencies of each in generating the required information to answer the research questions. The combinations of both qualitative and quantitative data collection tools are recommended for social science research (Varkevisser et al, 1991). The reasons for the choice of qualitative data collection tools are that they ‘involve the identification and exploration of number often related variables that give insight into the nature and causes of certain problems and into the consequences of the problems for those affected’. The reason for the use of quantitative data collection tools is in order to ‘quantify the size, distribution and association of certain variables in a study population’ (Varkevisser et al, 1991).

The researcher administered the semi-structured open-ended questionnaire interviews for 200 Ex-Fighters. In-depth interviews with key informants on specific issues enlarged the more structured interview. Focus group discussions were used to get the views and opinions of various groups on the Socio-Economic Reintegration of the Ex-Fighters. Moreover, secondary data collected from concerned bodies.

Primary Data Collection

Primary data have been collected through formal and informal survey methods. Primary data were collected from sample household heads using survey questionnaires, interview questions, focus group discussion and in-depth interviews with key Informants.

Survey Questionnaires: - Semi-structured interview schedule was used to collect primary data from the sampled households several questions were developed around the Socio-Economic Reintegration issues for 200 selected Ex-Fighters. The basic components of the questionnaire were directly related to the social, economical and psychological issues of the Ex-Fighters. The questionnaire of the research developed based on the objectives and basic questions of the study. This can be achieved by generating data on background information, the life history of the Ex-Fighters in and after army, the process of Social, Economic and Psychological Reintegration.

In an attempt to evaluate the current condition of Ex-Fighters, after their return to their community, much consideration was given to the quality of social life. The thesis asked about the problems they had faced but related to their demobilization, their opinion of the effectiveness or the impact of integration programs on their life; and, the initiatives taken to sort out their day-to-day problems.

In general, in order to assess the socio-economic and psychological reintegration incorporate the gender, the researcher have questionnaires which includes questions regarding demographic characteristics (age, sex, marital status, number of children), socio-economic characteristics (educational level, occupation, years lived in community, housing). Furthermore, the experiences from struggle, the expectations of an acceptable lifestyle and the extent to which these have been realized, the nature and degree of relationships between the Ex-Fighters and the host community; and finally, questions regarding the economic, social and psychological situation of the Ex-Fighters are considered.

Focus Group Discussions (FGD): - the focus group discussions administered in the fieldwork survey for six groups each FGD group has 8-9 members. Initially, a preliminary analysis of information obtained from interviewing with Ex-Fighters. Based on an overview of the results of the data collected in phase one a number of issues for discussion in focus groups was made. For the FGD composed of the Ex-Fighters and other representative questions on the profile of the

members of the focus group was raised. A similar question of differences on female enrolment within the reintegration process was raised.

The investigator indicated in Table 2.2 the profile and the required number, gender, and composition of focus groups; the actual persons invited were left to the *Tabias* Administrator to choose. The total numbers of the focus groups were six one FGD in each cluster with participants ranged 6-8 members. In the mean time either key informant were identified or interviewed.

FGDs were conducted in a relatively peaceful area away from member of the public. The *Tabia* administrators helped in the arrangements. Most of the FGDs were carried out within their locals. The FGDs were tape-recorded and the investigator took notes as he facilitated the discussion. FGDs went on for nearly an hour and at times two hours. Participants were provided refreshments with either tea or soft drinks.

Table 2.2 the Profile of the Focus Group Discussion

List of the FGD Members	Number of Participant	Remark
Tabia Administrator	03	One from each <i>Tabias</i>
Male Ex-Fighters	12	Two from each cluster
Female Ex-Fighters	12	Two from each cluster
Tabia Development Agents	03	One from each <i>Tabias</i>
Local Militia	06	One from each cluster
Local service rendering institutions	03	One from each <i>Tabias</i>
Social Association Representatives	06	One from each cluster
Social Association Representatives	06	One from each cluster
Total	51	

Source: Survey Result

In-depth Interviews with Key Informants: - the key informants were individuals assumed to have particular knowledge on the demobilization and reintegration process of the Ex-Fighters. Accordingly, the persons were interviewed. Apart from FGDs, phase two of the study conducted in depth interviews with key informants. The informant was debriefed with the objectives of the research broadly. Specific issues arising from the earlier interviews were highlighted. In the course of the qualitative data analysis, they were used to fill the gap of information, or partly answer the questions not sufficiently or convincingly covered by the responses of the local interviewed. Accordingly, as indicated in Table 2.3 a total of 22 persons were interviewed.

Table 2.3 the Profile of the Key Informants

Key Informants for In depth Interview	Number of participant	Remark
Tabia Administrators	02	From Dedebit and Lekatit <i>Tabias</i>
Wereda Administrator	01	Tsegede
Agricultural Experts and DA	02	In the three <i>Tabias</i>
TPLF Representative	02	
MoND Representative	02	
Finance Expert	02	Dansha town
Ex-Fighters	06	From each clusters
Local communities	05	In and out of the settlement site
Total	22	

Source: Survey Result

Personal observation: - participant observation was employed to understand day-to-day activities of the Ex-Fighters and the host communities which help to see the actual situations.

Secondary Data Collection: -

In addition to primary data collection, secondary data were collected from different sources. The data collected from the secondary sources include necessary documents, studies and other useful written materials needed for the study. A checklist was prepared and a secondary data was collected from the TPLF/EPRDF Office, the Tigray National Regional State Office, FDRE Ministry of Defense and data from the local administration office.

2.3 Data Analysis Procedure

The data analysis for the preparation of this thesis was carried out in four major stages. Firstly, the field data are thoroughly checked to select usable questionnaire. Secondly, the qualitative and quantitative data for the remaining cases are coded using Microsoft Excel and the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), respectively. Thirdly, qualitative analysis techniques were used to analyze and interpret the qualitative information. The core issues to be considered include the description and classification of data, the identification of underlying themes and perspectives, the search for interconnections between or among different themes, and uncovering the meaning of identifiable themes. These issues are guided the analysis and interpretation of the qualitative data. Finally, the quantitative data was analyzed using a variety of descriptive statistical techniques.

CHAPTER THREE

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

In a country or region emerging from violent conflict, special attention must be paid to the long-term prospects of the military, who are about to lose their livelihoods. Ex-Fighters can be a special threat to their communities, and unless exceptional efforts are made to control them, and get their guns off the scene, they can destabilize any peace effort.

A successful DDR program for Ex-Fighters is, therefore, the key to an effective transition from war to peace. The success of this first step following the signing of a peace accord signals the end to organized conflict, and thereby provides the security necessary for people affected by war to reinvest in their lives and their country. Undertaken in a peacetime context as a planned force reduction, a DDR program enables a government to restructure its public expenditure in favor of poverty-oriented programs, and to consolidate peace efforts (Body, 2005).

In Africa, since the end of the Cold War, governments started to examine their military forces in relation to their domestic and international situations. That is, the important changes in both international order and the regional systems of alliances; and, its consequence on domestic affairs are offering governments in Sub-Saharan Africa the opportunity to reconsider their own security situation and re-deploy human, financial and material resources (World Bank, 1993). This indicates that for many African countries, it has become painfully clear that the insecurity and diversion of fiscal resources caused by civil conflict represent the primary roadblocks to return to economic and social development.

Since the beginning of the, 1980s, several armed conflicts have come to their terminal in different parts of the world. Several countries have also discharged their fighters, for example in Mozambique 90,000; in Namibia 43,000 combatants have been demobilize (Kingma, 1997). In Uganda, due to of the structural adjustment program the government decided to demobilize around 50,000 soldiers in three phases between 1992 and late 1995 (Kingma, 2000). In the Horn of Africa, following the dawn fall of the Derge regime in Ethiopia in 1991, about 496,000 ex-soldiers of the previous regime demobilized and 21,000 fighters of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) which were captured by the EPRDF led government in 1992 and 50,000 EPRDF fighters from

Ethiopian National Defense Force (FDRE MOND unpublished document, 1992). Further more in Eritrea around 50,000 former EPLF fighters have been demobilized (Kingma, 1997).

In this chapter the key concepts and ideas pertinent to the theme of the thesis are discussed. The first sub-section will deal with the conceptual and theoretical literatures on DDR. Second sub-section focused on the review of related works on the DDR and reintegration as it has worked in practice, African experience of reintegration particularly Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ethiopia. The final sub-section of this chapter pays attention for the analytical framework on the DDR.

3.2 Concepts and Theoretical Literature on DDR

Demobilization is the initial basic component of reintegration of Ex-Fighters in countries emerging from war. It is a critical step in the process of overall rehabilitation and a major challenge for authorities and donor agencies supporting rehabilitation efforts. The presence of a large number of ex-combatants creates a serious threat to peace-making and reconciliation efforts. Thus, properly addressing demobilization of fighters is generally considered to be a precondition for lasting peace in war-torn societies. The process of demobilization is mainly concerned with the disarming of former soldiers and other armed groups and the facilitation of voluntary return of Ex-Fighters and their families, whereas reintegration involves supporting their re-entry into productive civilian life. The World Bank studies of 1993 show that up to 90 percent of demobilized fighters lack transferable skills and have little or no formal education since often most of them are recruited in the rural areas.

In the case of a negotiated settlement, high priority is given to demobilized fighters (World Bank, 1995). However, if the settlement of conflict is reached by a total military victory usually there tends to be little or no direct targeting of defeated Ex-Fighters beyond whatever general programs exist for rural returnees. Nevertheless, what applies to all categories of returnees is that the key factors for successful social integration are good relations with family, friends, church, and community, which in effect constitute the returnees' social capital (World Bank, 1996).

Definitions of Demobilization and Reintegration

In the last decade in relation with the post conflict reconstruction and development the need for demobilization of fighters have received attention by different writers from different angles while for the purpose of the study the definitions stated here under are taken:

***Demobilization** is the process by which armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces) either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace. Typically, demobilization involves the assembly, quartering, disarmament, administration and discharge of former combatants, who may receive some form of compensation and other assistance to encourage their transition to civilian life (UN DDR Principles and guidelines, 2000).*

This is regularly accompanied by support provided to fulfill their immediate needs. According to this definition, demobilization is a short-term measure, geared to combatants (sometimes their families) (Adechi, 2004).

***Reintegration** refers to the process which allows Ex-Fighters and their families of adept, economically and socially, of productive civilian life. It generally entails the provision of a package of cash or in kind compensation, training and job and income-generating projects. These measures frequently depend for their effectiveness upon other, broader undertakings, such as assistance to returning refugees and internally displaced persons, economic development at the community and national level, infrastructure rehabilitation, truth and reconciliation efforts and institutional reform. Enhancement of local capacity is often crucial for the long-term success of reintegration (UNDPKO, 1999).*

Reintegration is therefore a medium- to long-term measure both geared towards ex-combatants and civil society into which they are supposed to return (Adechi, 2004). In the transition from demobilization to reintegration, there are again other parts of processes:

"Reinsertion" comprises the immediate, short-term needs of fighters and their relatives, if applicable, such as medical care, food aid, interim financial aid, etc (Adechi, 2004).

***"Resettlement"** is the transfer and the repatriation of the demobilized combatant into his/her usual familiar surroundings or to a place of his choice. The term repatriation is used in particular with combatants involved in a conflict who are from another country and are being transferred to their home country after having been demobilized (ICG Africa Report No.63, 2003).*

Whatever definition is given for demobilization and reintegration, both are processes which are essential for Ex-Fighters both political and economic reasons. Moreover, both are parts of a natural field in the peace process and require a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated approach in their planning and implementation. Where disarmament terminates, demobilization begins and where demobilization ends, reintegration commences (UN, 2000). Successful Demobilization and Reintegration efforts can build mutual confidence among former adversaries, thereby reducing the risk of renewed hostilities. The experience of many war-torn societies indicates that when effective Demobilization and Reintegration programs were not or could not be implemented, fragile peace arrangements could be jeopardized and conflicts re-ignite (UN, 2000).

Role of Foreign Aid

The role of outside assistance in reintegration process as it has worked in practice, with a few examples from West Africa countries. Rehabilitation assistance is meant to accelerate the transition from a war economy to a livelihood and development friendly economy. The dilemma is the introduction of a credible third-party guarantee that could an outside actor that monitors the terms of the peace agreement, verifies the actions taken by each side, and sanctions violations with force if necessary. Third-party enforcers can offer assurances that warring factions will be protected, terms will be fulfilled, and promises will be kept (at least as long as they exert some authority in the post-conflict environment). With external enforcement, cheating becomes difficult and costly, and the payoffs to implementing a peace agreement rise (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2005).

The critical role for external actors in enabling the reciprocal demobilization of competing forces at the end of a conflict: external intervention is associated with a more stable peace, in part, because it provides an environment in which warring partners can dismantle their structures of command-and-control. At the micro level, this logic suggests that *ceteris paribus*, the presence of external troops should be associated with higher levels of successful DDR.

3.3 Review of Related Works on DDR

Africa was among the first battlefronts and final casualties of the cold war. Many devastating conflicts have persisted for 20 years or more. Some countries (such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Namibia, South Africa, Uganda, and more recently, Angola, Chad, Liberia, and Mozambique) are emerging from years of cold war politics and internal civil strife, but pernicious internal struggles continue to plague others (Sierra Leone, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, and the Sudan).

The damage inflicted on the social and human capital as well as the economic potential of these countries has been horrific. The impact of warfare on disinvestment, the destruction of physical infrastructure, and the deterioration of social and human capital through disability, death, and displacement is impossible to quantify. Armed conflict is surely one reason why at least 250 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa - nearly half the population- are living below the poverty line in the mid-1990s. Despite the destructions caused by conflicts, the governments of the Africa continent have devoted a substantial percentage of GDP to military expenditures (Colletta, 1996).

A DDR program for ex-combatants is the key to an effective transition from war to peace. The success of this first step following the signing of a peace accord signals the end to organized conflict and provides the security necessary for people affected by war to reinvest in their lives and their country. Several demobilizations have taken place since the late 1980s in Africa, particularly the end of Apartheid and the peace processes in Southern Africa, as well as the fall of the Derge regime in Ethiopia, have created opportunities for several major demobilizations in Southern and East Africa. Each case of demobilization involves a distinct political and socio-economic context. Decisions to demobilize have been based on specific military, political, and socio-economic circumstances (BICC, 1994 and 1995). For the purpose of the objectives of this thesis Sierra Leone and Liberia will be discussed in detail.

Sierra Leone

The war in Sierra Leone began the very moment when a small group of combatants calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) entered Sierra Leone from neighboring Liberia, backed by Charles Taylor. Over the course of nearly ten years of fighting, Sierra Leone experienced violence of horrific proportions. Tens of thousands of civilians were killed, and hundreds of thousands were displaced from their homes. Accord was signed, and it continued until 2000 when the war broke out anew. During this period, slightly more than 20,000 combatants turned up to be demobilized. The bulk of demobilization took place after UNAMSIL was beefed up, following the British intervention, in 2001-02. In the third and final phase close to 50,000 combatants were disarmed. This brought the total caseload to nearly 74,000 fighters (Humphreys, 2005).

The Reintegration Process: - The first attempt to frame the DDR process was in, 1996, in the Abidjan Peace Agreement (APA) signed between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF (*Abidjan Peace Agreement, 1996. See: <http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/peace/SiL%2019961130.pdf>*) in which it was established the Commission for Consolidation of Peace, which was in charge, along with the government of Sierra Leone and the international community, of creating the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDRR) of the RUF combatants. The agreement does not contain any provision for the process of reintegration. The DDR process in Sierra Leone was characterized for having been a long process since “it was not clear that the parties signing the accord were not fully committed to the peace. Demobilization took place but on a very limited basis” (*Peters, 2006*).

By the end of that year, a total of 3,183 former combatants demobilized under the APA (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2009). According to Peters, “the few demobilized combatants, including many of the ex-child combatants, rapidly re-enlisted. After the fall of the military junta in 1998, about 5000 AFRC soldiers surrounded to the Kabbah government. Nearly 3.000 then took part in a DDR program and were based in so called reorientation camps” (Peters, 2006).

On July 7 1999, the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF signed the Lomé Peace Agreement (LPA). The DDR dispositions in the agreement sought to disarm the RUF forces, the CDF and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). The Article XVI of the LPA (*Lomé Peace Agreement, 1999*), establishes three points related to the DDR process: 1. The creation of a peace keeping force composed by the United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the Community of West African States to monitor and conduct the DD program; 2. The creation or an armory to place all the weapons and ammunitions turned back by the combatants; and 3. Payment for the weapons turned in (*Department of State, USA, 2006*).

The actual DDR process that was carried out, which was composed by five phases, it was taken into account the host communities. In fact, after the assembly of combatants, collection of personal information, the verification and collection of weapons, the certification of eligibility for benefits, and transportation to a demobilization center combatants were prepared to return to civilian life in demobilization site where they received basic necessities, reinsertion allowances, counseling and, eventually transportation to a local community where they elected to live permanently. In the community, combatants benefited from training programs designed to ease their re-entry into the local economy (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2009).

The outcomes of the Reintegration Process: - One can identify at least five general aspects of the DDR process in Sierra Leone that had some impact on the outcomes of the reintegration of former combatants into civilian life. First, there is not any evidence that the reintegration activities developed between 1998 and 2002 in Sierra Leone aimed to break the existing linkages and the structure of power within the illegal groups (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2009). Secondly, some leaders from the communities affected by “violence that ex-combatants have held property looted during the conflict, despite the presence of the rightful owners in the community” (Ginifer, 2003) alleged it. This situation occurred with former members of the RUF because some of them retained their attachment to the RUF leader who, although he was in jail, he was a figure that still inspired

fear among the community (Ginifer, 2003). In addition some ex-combatants who acquired authority during the RUF occupation of chiefdoms are reluctant to relinquish their authority” (Ginifer, 2003). The DDR program did not target this feature among the former RUF members either in spite that it created resentment among the communities.

A fourth element in the DDR program did not include either any political measure to promote democracy or conflict resolution through democratic means. On the contrary, they considered that to appeal to their old factions and outside illegal actors is the most effective way to deal with the problems at the community and to have a change into society (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2009).

Finally, the reintegration program in Sierra Leone as an economic oriented process since most of the measures adopted by the NCDDR were exclusively targeted to reintegrate former combatants into the economic system. In addition to that, the reintegration program aimed to train former combatants in productive skills and employment options. Moreover, the NCDDR provided counseling assistance on job-seeking strategies, training and employment opportunities to those who demonstrated to have some employment skills (*Mark, et. Al., 2003*). Another measure adopted by the NCDDR was the support on formal education by sponsoring school fees, textbooks, uniforms and a subsistence allowance for one year (*Mark, et. Al., 2003*).

However, the monthly subsidy directed to the demobilized people during the first three months of the reintegration program was one of the major challenges for the NCDDR since; they first estimated that they would have around 45,000 ex-combatants which resulted on more than 70,000 people. This situation, plus the lack of funding put at some point into risk the sustainability of the program and could have done former combatants to come back to the bush. The problem had in part a “historical” record since in the 1999 agreement the government made some promises that did not met. This situation largely contributed to “shortfalls in the funding of reintegration” which was filled sometimes by some international organizations as well as NGOs (Ginifer, 2003).

In terms of employment, a broader definition of unemployment which recognized the underemployment of the individuals cultivating land for subsistence purposes, would record a much higher number (*Humphreys and Weinstein, 2005*). However, this is a problem that faces the whole population in Sierra Leone since they have suffered from lacking of job opportunities, especially in the aftermath of the war, so there have been limited job opportunities for trained ex-combatants as well (*Ginifer, 2003*).

It is clear that the NCDRR made an effort to provide former combatants with tools in order to create their own income as a means of reintegrating into civilian life. Nevertheless, the percentage of the people that benefited from these training and educational programs were not so high. Furthermore, many ex-combatants were not able to take advantage of the opportunities in the post-conflict reconstruction due to the fact that most of them have limited or non-educational background, and no marketable skills (Ginifer, 2003).

Finally, one of the main challenges that NCDRR faced was to train people in relevant skills to support sustainable livelihoods, needs and interests of the ex-combatants. However, although an important percentage of the former combatants came from agricultural backgrounds, they were not interested in this agriculture at all. This problem was directly related with the lack of data on the needs of the labor market, which undoubtedly constituted an obstacle for the planning of the DDR.

The Social Dimension of the Reintegration Process: - The reintegration at the community level is claimed as the most successful dimension of DDR in Sierra Leone. Undoubtedly, the case of Sierra Leone meets, at least in this dimension, one of the main objectives proposed by the SIDDR in terms of including communities and victims into the reintegration programs. In fact, according to the survey conducted the measure of acceptance of ex-combatants within the communities and families they belong to, recorded the highest levels of successful reintegration in resettling and gaining acceptance in the host families and communities (*Humphreys and Weinstein, 2009*).

According to Ginifer, one of the facts that help the reintegration program to be successful at the communitarian level is that the NCDDR focused on the economic reintegration, while international agencies, such as GTZ focused their work on the support of social initiatives to achieve social acceptance, social reconciliation, and sensitization processes. In fact, GTZ's reintegration activities were extended "to all sectors of communities in Sierra Leone, including residents and internally displaced persons (IDPs). It also has a strong engagement in rural areas and communities" (*Ginifer, 2003*). In this way, the involvement of communities affected by violence, victims and former combatants in the reintegration program made a difference in Sierra Leone.

This positive point in the whole process was the NCDRR and GTZ, in which they identified a set of problems that they should overcome in order to succeed on the reintegration process. As a result they identified that "a major challenge has been to repair relations between Ex-Fighters and their

communities” (Ginifer, 2003). That means that a previous planning in this specific issue had positive effects on the outcomes in the reintegration process.

There were five specific measures which made possible Ex-Fighters to be accepted by their families and their host communities. The first one was the fact that the NCDDR set up reconciliation programs by information dissemination exercises to try and foster trust between communities and ex-combatants. The second measure, ex-combatants during the pre-discharge phase received counseling with special community orientation in order to make them conscious. Third, ad hoc community reconciliation meetings in various parts of the country, the NCDDR acted as a mediator or facilitator along the traditional leaders of those communities (Ginifer, 2003).

Moreover, as a fourth measure, the NCDDR and GTZ organized some activities to encourage ex-combatants to design and implement tasks that may be beneficial to communities (Ginifer, 2003).

It is of considerable importance to remark that the reintegration community oriented in this country was not drafted in the initial DDR plan. The initiatives that involved the communities emerged basically as part of the work that the international agency GTZ carried out in Sierra Leone. In addition, it is important to take into account that the activities that were implemented in the communities were not addressed to promote development within the communities. They were activities to create spaces in which between communities, including victims, and perpetrators, can coexist, but they did not aim to transform the conflict by addressing its main causes.

Liberian Experience of Reintegration

The Americo-Liberian elite dominated Liberia since 1847, when it was founded as an independent republic. Although the Liberian state was modeled following the Constitution of the United States, it became a one-party regime dominated by the True Whig Party (TWP). The TWP was mainly composed by American-Liberian elite (a tiny proportion of the population), who was direct descendants of the first settlers. This shape of the state created a “system based on patronage, with leaders dispensing favors and positions to relatives and friend. Leaders amassed great fortunes by extracting the wealth of Liberia’s national resources, made up primarily by rubber, timber, ore and diamonds, whilst the general population lived in deep squalor” (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Liberia. http://www.pcr.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=94®ionSelect=2Southern_Africa#. Accessed on November 2010). These general features of the socio political and economic system can be considered as the main roots of the conflict in Liberia. After the end of the civil war, all the

warring parties, including the government troops, signed the Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in August 2003 (*Pugel, 2009*).

The Reintegration Process: - The CPA included on article VI the provisions for the Cantonment, Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (CCDDRR) of former combatants coming from the LURD, MODEL and the government and paramilitary troops (*Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement, August 2003*). Article VI contains eleven points related with the logistic of the disarmament and demobilization process, as well as the institutions involved and the timeline. However, there is any mention of what do the rehabilitation and reintegration processes mean (*Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement, August 2003*). As Pugel mentions, “while the rehabilitation component was introduced by peace negotiators, its specific purpose and expected outcomes were never clarified. This lack of clarity persisted throughout the implementation of the DDR process. The only tangible indication of rehabilitation appears to be the provision of a short session with a psychological counselor during demobilization”. In addition, the process of framing the DDR program in Liberia was in charge of centralized committees, as well as an interim secretariat to create a DDR strategic framework (*Pugel, 2009*).

The Outcomes of the Reintegration Process: - The most outstanding feature of the process in Liberia is that the draft of the DDR strategic framework was focused on the objectives of the process, and there were no precise definitions and outcomes for the program. For instance, indicators for economic reintegration were expressed as activities and opportunities rather than concrete outcomes that could have been measured or quantified. The political dimension, on the other hand, was summarized a reduction in socio-political instability risk (*Pugel, 2009*).

By looking at the data related with the DDR program in Liberia, one can confidently argue that it was not only security oriented, but also it didn't have a clear definition of reintegration since the interim secretariat described them as “high risk groups whose adjustment to civilian life must be assured with targeted interventions and be monitored carefully” (*Pugel, 2009*). In addition, “reintegration of these high risk groups was to be achieved through community-based support to support ex-combatant reintegration to the greatest extent possible” (*Pugel, 2009*). In this respect, the SIDDR produced a document in 2004, pointing out that the security perspective, as well as the lack of a clear concept of the components of DDR, put into serious risk the stability of the country and the sustainability of the CPA (*SIDRR, 2004*). Moreover, the socio-economic and political

conditions of the country after Taylor's regime were precarious and the country was devastated physically and institutionally. In addition to this bad perspective, the DDR as it was drafted on the CPA, lacked of acceptance by some of the main warring parties (Jennings, 2008). However, the economic dimension of reintegration is the most developed were related with vocational training and access to formal education. It was estimated that around 23.000 disarmed had not access at all to training programs (Pugel, 2009).

As it happened in Sierra Leone, the main problem with the attempt to train Ex-Fights, as a measure to reintegrate them into the economic system, is the fact that "the essential problem was to prepare Ex-Fighters or jobs that didn't exist" in addition to the fact that "the efficiency of job training programs for employment diminishes as more people receive the same training" (Jennings, 2008). This situation reveals a lack of planning and even lack of reality from the people in charge of designing and implementing the reintegration program.

A big disconnection between the program activities and the expected outcomes "although Liberian DDR strategy documents carefully do not linked participation in training to job provision, most (former combatants) operated with the understanding that if they completed the training, they would receive employment. This understanding was partly due to their misinterpretation, but also to misinformation they received from implementing actors" (Jennings, 2008). In this way, although the economic dimension is the level that reports more achievements still reveals lack of planning and monitoring of the situation of the people.

The Social Dimension of the Reintegration Process: - There was no a social perspective on the CPA and DDR guidelines for Liberia. However, Pugel found in his research "that ex-combatants who registered with the NCDDRR were more likely to feel accepted within their chosen resettlement communities than those who choose not to formally disarm" (Pugel, 2009). In spite of the fact that this dimension was not promoted by the NCDDRR, it is important to mention that the UNDP developed the UNDP's Community-Based Recovery (CBR) program in Liberia in order to support the government in the process of resettlement of former combatants into the community level (UNDP. See: <http://www.lr.undp.org/cbr.htm>). This intervention includes-

Support to local governance structures and ensuring community participation by establishing and strengthening District Development Committees (DCCs) in Liberia; capacity-building for target communities in the planning and management of recovery activities; support for the creation of sustainable livelihoods through training, farming and micro-enterprise development; assistance with the provision of basic services through rehabilitation of infrastructure at the community level, including water and sanitation services, education, and health facilities (UNDP. See: <http://www.lr.undp.org/cbr.htm>).

In spite of the importance of the initiative, there is not available data related with the outcomes of this program and the impact that it has had into the communities, as well as in the former combatants.

In general, the reintegration process in Liberia was a very difficult one, which can be explained basically by the conditions under it was designed and implemented. From many points of view, the process in Liberia just did not work and this is reflected on the fact that the country is still very vulnerable to crime and violence. According to Jennings “Poverty and unemployment are pervasive; the formal and private sectors are inchoate; and most infrastructure has been ransacked or destroyed the nation remains polarized, and in some areas ethnicity is politicized a feeling of insecurity and unpredictability persists, exacerbated by high numbers of ex-combatants and rumored weapons caches” (Jennings, 2007).

Moreover, some of the main obstacles that the process in Liberia faced were the lack of funding, that of monitoring, and, more importantly, the lack of clear, concrete and realistic guidelines to design and implement the DDR program in a country devastated by civil war, as it was the case of Liberia. One of the main problems in the Liberian case was the concept of reintegration was not clear at all. This point supports the thesis of this paper in relation with the need of having a clear and systematic concepts is required to identify and designed the measures and activities needed to achieve the expected outcomes of the DDR program (Jennings, 2007).

DDR Practice in the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

A Brief Historical Summary of the Ethiopian Army: - The dominant feature of the long time depth history of Ethiopia has been warfare and the armies remained largely traditional forces. The modernization of the Ethiopian army was started by Tewodros's efforts, which was highly centralized which includes marshalling the soldiers into regiments, appointing officers of different grades, fixing their pay and the number of their private servants and mixing up soldiers from several provinces at random in those regiments (Robenson, 1966). In the history of the country, the modern and proper military came into existence after liberation of the country from the Italian occupation in 1941 and was to show dramatic transformation both in terms of size and possessions of weaponry after the outbreak of the revolution in 1974 (Tekeste, 1991). Following the downfall of the monarchy and the subsequent military power which was largest and well-equipped force in Sub-Sahara Africa was take-over in 1974 (Tekeste, 1991). The army has the feature of forced

conscription, poor training and organization, corrupt and inefficient supply and communication system, poor military discipline, abuse of civilian rights, decline in fighting zeal and combat readiness, false information and misleading propaganda works. The protracted war which had immersed the country into all sorts of crises has come to an end in 1991. Post 1991's the new army was established in the country, in view of this, it is indisputable that the present TPLF dominated EPRDF army should not continue to exist, but instead a new multi-national based which is the reflect the real picture of the country in terms of composition and centrally controlled army be set-up to guarantee long-lasting peace and stability in the country (Tekeste, 1991).

The Demobilization and Rehabilitation Program of Ex-Soldiers: - In view of the efforts that had to make to maintain peace and stability in the country one of the serious challenges to the Transitional Government of Ethiopia was the rehabilitation of the demobilized forces. The estimated total number of demobilized army which were members who served under the Derge regime was almost half million. In the history of the country modern demobilization was introduced by the EPRDF led TGE. When it came to power in 1991, were demobilized.

The earliest measures taken by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia was the establishment of an institution which could be in-charge of the overall process of rehabilitation. As a result, in June 1991 the Commission for the Rehabilitation of member of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans (CRWFRDWV) or commonly called Tehadisso (rehabilitation) Commission was set up (CRWFRDWV, 1993). Following the establishment of the Commission, the demobilization of the ex-soldiers was implemented in two stages. The first rehabilitation phase was designed to enable ex-soldiers part with undesirable habits they might have acquired while in the service with the army and at the same time to prepare them for new productive life. The second reintegration phase involved provision of initial support to help ex-soldiers become productive and self-supporting members of the society (CRWFRDWV, 1992).

The Commission initially opened 36 branches Office and later on these branches was reduced to twenty-eight for convenience purposes (CRWFRDWV, 1992). The rehabilitation efforts began with the establishment of the makeshift camps in the different parts of the country: Tigray, Wello, Shewa and Gonder for the larger number of ex-soldiers coming from Eritrea. Others also found in the capital and other regions.

The Demobilization Process: - Once the Commission organized its branch offices and establishments of the camps for the ex-soldier. The demobilization process was started by the announcement of that the ex-soldiers should report to their nearest camps set up by the government. These centers had been military training centers in the past were prepared for the reorientation program. The Commission then set up a three-phase demobilization process, namely assembling, pre-discharge orientation and transportation. In the reorientation program, around 320,162 ex-servicemen of the former soldier were reported (CRWFRDWV, 1992). In the first phase 70,162 ex-soldiers who served for less than 18 months in army and who were considered to be requiring relatively lesser support of reintegration were directly repatriated (Tekeste, 1991). In general, the total number of ex-servicemen including those who were repatriated from the Sudan, who preferred to be rehabilitated in the rural and urban areas, was 169,628 and 156,710, respectively (Tekeste, 1991).

The Reintegration Process: - The Council of Representatives of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia stated that:

The Government's responsibility with respect to these nationals (ex-soldiers), beyond relieving them from the fire of war to return them from Fox ditches to peaceful life, loneliness to healthy family life, pulling trigger to holding the plough, in general to bring them back to productive and peaceful life and make them be beneficiaries from the charter (Tekeste, 1991).

To this effect, the government worked out a general plan of rehabilitating the ex-soldiers. Those who wanted to engage themselves in the agricultural sector will be provided with cultivable land, instruments of production and relevant professional training. Those who prefer to be employed in other working sectors will be given priority of employment on the condition that the eligible rehabilitee meets the requirements of available vacancies as of the day of their completion of the reorientation program. Those whose preference is to push their studies further will be allowed to do so without any problem and the government will create favorable circumstances to this end. Finally, the council of Representatives called upon public assistance to those disabled war veterans, who have been victims of the protracted war (Tekeste, 1991). The NGOs and government affiliated bodies which positively responded and have been supporting the rehabilitation process (CRWFRDWV, 1993). On the base of the assessments made by the commission, the whole processes of the second phase of rehabilitation become beyond the financial capabilities of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia and the government request potential Donors to involve in supporting the reintegration process. As a result, on October 2, 1991 the Regional Director of ILO

submitted a project entitled 'Reintegration of ex-soldiers into economic activities through training and related technical and financial support' (Tekeste, 1991). However, the donor agencies come out with their own projects contrary to the commission's expectation. The commission, despite its reservations, accepted the new project design. In the new strategy designed to reintegrate 250,000 ex-soldiers over a period of one and half years. In the first case, it aimed at reintegrating 160,000 ex-soldiers into the rural areas who were in turn sub divided into crop producers and pastoralists. In the second case, 90,000 ex-soldiers were considered to be reintegrated into the urban center. They were entitled to in the small-scale industry sector (Tekeste, 1991).

The commission then repatriated ex-soldiers to different places according to their own choices. Those returning to the rural areas were provided with transport facilities, travel allowance and food ration card for 10 months. Others who returned to the urban areas were given food ration card for seven months and cash coupon that could enable them to collect Birr 50.00 monthly for seven months. The actual process of reintegration has however, been conducted with certain differences from the proposed project. These differences seem to have stemmed from the discrepancies between the estimated and actual number of rural-urban rehabilitee, financial and material capabilities and methods employed in the project implementation (Tekeste, 1991).

The basic constraints to the rehabilitation program have been among other things financial and material restrictions, abuse of different kind, reluctance, or indifferent view of the institutions etc. Abuse by employees of NGOs at the time of distribution of support items to beneficiaries, on the other hand abuse among the beneficiaries themselves and pension rights were found involved in robbery, brigandage and other sort of social and political instability (Tekeste, 1991).

3.4 Analytical Framework for DDR Program

Reintegration is the process which should allow the demobilized ex-combatants to reintegrate themselves into family and society and to earn their living by productive work. Instruments for this are regular support payments, payments in kind, such as seeds, tools, education in schools or other training programs, advice on which job might be suitable, whether self-employment or the foundation of small businesses could be an option (Adechi, 2004).

UNDPKO did formulate conceptual approaches with the title "Integrated Approach" which are supposed to be understood as general guidelines and principles for DDR. In the Integrated Approach, Integrated and Coordinated Approach – DDR programs represent a part of a 'natural


continuum in the peace process' (UNDPKO, 1999). This implies on the one hand that a DDR process necessarily contains all three sub-processes and, on the other hand represents a time sequence where demobilization follows disarmament and reintegration follows demobilization (UNDPKO, 1999). The Integrated Approach of UNDPKO reflects a broad basic consensus on the conceptual direction of DDR.

The general concept of the reintegration diagram, the disarmament, and demobilization are positioned at the beginning of the peace process, according to UNDPKO (1999), as in Gleichmann et al. (2004) while reintegration is to be allocated to the long-term development phase. At the transition of both central phases of the peace process is the repatriation of demobilized combatants into a civilian environment and the necessary interim financial aid (resettlement and reinsertion). Largely, disarmament and demobilization are a matter of the military and mostly lie within the responsibility of a PSO. They are designed for a period of weeks or months and are accompanied by measures to secure the ceasefire and often the appointment of a transitional government. In contrast, in the longer-term reintegration process, different – mostly civilian – national and international actors are involved. In parallel to this, peace-building activities, such as the holding of elections, capacity-building, economic and social reconstruction, etc take place. (Figure 3.1 of UNDPKO indicated hereunder). The following points are of particular importance within the entire concept (UN-DPKO, 1999 and Gleichmann et al., 2004):

- The most important basic data and framework conditions of the foreseen DDR processes are to be anchored in the peace agreement (period, organization and implementation, responsibilities, monitoring, number of weapons to be collected and combatants to be demobilized, conditions for entry into the reintegration process, etc). With this, a degree of transparency, security, and predictability is to be created that binds the conflicting parties to the DDR process.
- An effective coordination of the various activities within the DDR process and also between DDR and various activities within the post-conflict peace building process must be guaranteed. Central to the process in particular is the cooperation between military and civilian authorities and actors and the guaranteeing of a "smooth transition from emergency humanitarian assistance... to long-term development" (UNDPKO, 1999).
- The national, regional, and local governments and civil society ought to be integrated as widely as possible and the political will of those directly affected is to be fostered.
- The need of particularly vulnerable groups of persons both within the units of combatants (child soldiers, female combatants) and within civil society (victims of war, IDPs, etc.) must be taken into account.

- Adequate financing from the international donors is to be secured and the impartiality of the PSO must be guaranteed.

Figure 3.1 Integrated Approach of the Reintegration of Ex-Fighters



Source: DPKO (1999)

The Social Dimensions: - Socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants is a complex part of DDR. In most post conflict societies, insecurity persist and the economy still weak to absorb demobilized combatants. In addition, a large number of returnees, IDPs and other war-affected populations also need to be reintegrated into communities. In order to enable communities to cope with ex-combatants and other war-affected populations without creating disparity in unfair treatment among them, the reintegration of Ex-Fighters must be inclusive and part of wider recovery strategies.

In formal implementation of peace after signing or cessation of hostility does not mean necessarily a return to normal life, especially countries under civil wars, as there may still be major differences between the warring groups and even substantial violence (Green and Ahmed, 1998: 39). Especially in societies, having suffered from civil war political rehabilitation takes place in highly

polarized settings where there are deep suspicions between warring factions. The truth is that during transition periods, war-torn societies tend to remain extremely polarized. The extremist factions of warring parties constantly strive to undermine the peace accords.

In the transition from a highly distorted survival oriented war economy to a more household friendly market and livelihood-oriented economy at the macro level, priorities for economic rehabilitation will include macroeconomic stability and economic reform in order to reverse the extreme macroeconomic disequilibria inherited from the economic policies followed (often necessarily) during the war (Green and Ahmed, 1998). This is important for reviving savings and investment, economizing on scarce revenues, containing inflation, and removing regulations and controls, which are often introduced during the conflict. At the micro-level, this means providing support to households to rebuild their livelihood systems and paying greater attention to excluded segments of the society such as single woman and women headed households. Therefore, strategically and macro economically as well as socially and politically important for a countries were within prolonged civil war like most of the African countries. However, for many countries priority that is more urgent might be removing landmines before they can start rebuilding their key infrastructure. Moreover, it is now increasingly recognized that rebuilding the social capital and institutional infrastructure shattered during conflict is as important as replacing physical infrastructure. Unfortunately, this is an area that has been largely overlooked (Kumar, 1997).

In post-conflict environment, rehabilitation of civil society structures and livelihood systems is one of the most important components of rehabilitation. Violent conflicts undermine social networks and often leave a legacy of divided societies at all levels from family outwards. As a result, for reviving livelihoods and civil institutions previously suppressed, eroded or rendered powerless by war needs rehabilitate with the aim of strengthening local capacities to participate in the rehabilitation process and as a result to attain overall integration.

Generally, community is a critical adjunct to assistance for Ex-Fighters. Community sensitization and political awareness are paramount in the integrating efforts. Informal networks of Ex-Fighters discussion group, association, and joint associations can be extremely helpful when social capital has been exhausted.


Economic Dimensions: - there are key determinant factors like the state of the economy in terms of demand for labor, business opportunities, and the availability of land and credit; and, the

characteristics of the target population of ex-combatants in terms of education, skill levels, age, gender, entrepreneurial ability, and aspirations (Body and Brown, 2005).

The main economic reintegration options are either training followed by wage-or self-employment, or proceeding directly to the employment stage. Self-employment could be in agriculture, or operating a small business. The potential means of supporting each of these options by aid organizations or host governments are shown under each option in figure 3.2 below. The ultimate reintegration option will be chosen by the Ex-Fighters, based on his/her skill level, entrepreneurial ability, age, needs and aspirations; available information on training and employment opportunities; and the level of income is perceived to generate (Body and Brown, 2005).

The alternatives to these options are often the pursuit of illegal activities and banditry in order for the Ex-Fighters to support themselves and their families, or unemployment /idleness which may result in increased domestic violence and political unrest. Both of these alternatives imply increased cost of internal security forces for the government.

Figure 3.2: Economic Reintegration Options for Ex-Fighters



Source: Reintegration of Ex-Combatants through Micro-Enterprise, August 2005.

Furthermore, there are also researchers, who think that demobilization of regular army mean wastage of professional human resources, vulnerability of security, and above all uprooting the soldiers and their families from what they consider it 'normal life'. However, demobilization is the initial basic component of reintegration of returnees in countries emerging from war. This is a

critical step in the process of reconstruction country's economic growth. The presence of a large number of ex-combatants creates a serious threat to peace-making and reconciliation efforts. Thus, properly addressing demobilization of fighters is generally considered to be a precondition for lasting peace in war-torn societies. The process of demobilization is mainly concerned with the disarming of former soldiers and other armed groups and the facilitation of voluntary return of ex-combatants and their families, whereas reintegration involves supporting their re-entry into productive civilian life. World Bank studies of 1993 show that up to 90 percent of demobilized combatants lack transferable skills and have little or no formal education since often most of them are recruited in the rural areas.

3.5 Summary

Rehabilitation after a protracted armed conflict has to address all dimensions: political, economic and social. Indeed, it should address the Institutional as well as the material reconstruction at all levels, from the national to the local, including the household level. There is almost no other field where a holistic approach is quite needed, encompassing all sectors and levels in an overall conceptual framework. In most cases, it is missing due to lack of the necessary funds, the needed data, and the appropriate timeframe for planning and implementing the designed plan. Although, with the assistance of international organizations, some transition governments have formulated comprehensive proposals for rehabilitation and reform, most are little more than a compilation of sectoral targets and planned measures rather than integrated conceptual frameworks. In reality, we face a multitude of different post-conflict situations, where rehabilitation co-exists with relief and development, and each needs a distinct response.

Integration demobilized combatants - is an integral part of overall rehabilitation and has to be dealt with it. Until recently, little effort has been made to find out what happens to combatants, after they have been demobilized. It seems that they have been expected to solve their own problems, with the help of relatives and village networks. Re-integration addresses the human dimension of rehabilitation. The term re-integration is here used to describe the process in which people - combatants are rejoining and gradually becoming an integral part of the mainstream. During their long time absence, they have developed values, norms, and attitudes which are different from those of host communities, but this does not mean that forming the mainstream have not themselves

changed. Post-conflict countries are characterized by fragmented societies, and ex-combatants are just two fragments. The intention of re-integration is to facilitate all fragments of the society learning to live together, and with the differences which developed while they lived apart. In post-conflict situations, all categories of the population are generally in need, but those who had been away need special attention and assistance to rebuild their life. This is the aim of re-integration support measures. Nevertheless, from the beginning it must be clear that these measures can only be of limited duration and that they should not entail discriminating against other citizens.

The balance between the needs of both the host communities and the ex-fighters are not easy to strike, as examples from various countries show. If one group feels neglected or discriminated, the overall re-integration process can be put in danger. In order to accommodate interests of all categories, for example, issue that eventually might lead to controversies, such as land allocation, water supply, capacity of social services should be addressed before the arrival of the Ex-Fighters. It is generally agreed that the target group approach, which certainly is needed from the very outset will have to be abandoned, as soon as possible, but in practice, the determination of the right moment to do so proves the difficulty.

Apart from lack of an overall conceptual framework, insufficient funds, and rather short time-frame, the overall re-integration exercises reviewed seems to have suffered from lack of participation of all concerned. The Ex-Fighters and members of the received community have little say in the planning of the programs and do not participate actively in their implementation. This leads bad things for the implementation of the program. In all of the case studies hitherto reviewed, the re-integration of returnees is considered as a precondition for the stability and security of the country, the further consolidation of the surrounding society and the beginning for normal life. Nevertheless, even if a community-based approach is applied, the case of re-integration is rarely seen as an essential component part of the broader nation building process.


CHAPTER FOUR

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY AREA

4.1 Location

Dansha – Division Settlement Site is located in the North Western Administrative Zone of Tigray, in the wereda called Tsegede. It is situated in the Northwestern flank of Ethiopia about 95 Km to the North West of Gonder and 75 Km to the South of Humera which is almost half way between Gonder and Humera, and is 17 Km far from the city of Dansha. Dansha-Division, which is the settlement area, located at an altitude of 2061m above sea level. Moreover, according to Tesfaye, 1996, it is situated 13°32'N - 15°55' North latitude and 36°41' - 36°59' East longitude (Tesfaye, 1996). The settlement site is near the highland of Welkait and Tsegede which bounded by the Kaza River to the East and the Ruwassa River to the West and the Gonder Humera main road to the North-East (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 Location of the Study Area



Source: MoFED GIS-Cartographer Unit 2001 E.C

4.2 Rainfall and Water Source

In general, two rainfall seasons can be distinguished in Tigray: the 'Belg' or small rains, which generally occur from March until May, and the 'kiremti' or big rains that take place from July to September. Irregularity of the rainfall distribution within a growing season and the variability of the onset of the rainy season are main constraints for the dry land crop production (Mintesinot, 2002). Drought periods of several weeks during the rainy season are also frequent and affect the final yield of crops largely. Dansha-Division and its surrounds are characterized by rolling plains and a gentle slope with an elevation ranging between 600 and 800mt above sea level. As a result, the mean annual rainfall in Dansha settlement spans between 900 and 1100 mm per year.

The Main sources of water for the study area are Kaza River which located to the East part and the Ruwassa River to Western of the settlement site. These are the main rivers in the study area suitable for large and small-scale irrigation.

4.3 Command Area History

As stated in the above since the location of the study area is the Western part National Regional State of Tigray the locals were Tigrigna speaking people. According to the Report on the project progress review, 1998 Wolkait Tsegede was abandoned from Tigray to Gonder at the beginning of the 20th century. For decades, the inhabitants revolved repeatedly against the administration. During 1982, the area was mostly liberated by the EPRDF-TPLF. Starting from the time onwards, it was considered as part of the liberated zone of Tigray, and it served as a base for the TPLF fighters. In 1988, a huge army of the Derge attempted to penetrate to the base area of TPLF. However, it was defeated in Dansha and the area continued to be administered by the EPRDF-TPLF.

After the Downfall of the Derge regime, according to the Transitional period and later the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Wolkait Tsegede was ceded from Gonder and become administratively part of the National Regional State of Tigray. Thus cessation of Wolkait area (to which the settlement site belongs) from Gonder to Tigray is assured and accepted as final by both regional governments (Mintesinot, 2002).

4.4 Demographic Features of the Study Area

The Wereda is the least populated area among the others found in The National Regional State of Tigray. Wolqayt has a population density of 29.2 people per square kilometer, which is less than the Zone average of 86.56. According to the population census of the population census of the Central Statistical Authority (CSA) of 2005, the total population of the Wereda has an estimated total population of 151,254 of whom 60,763 are men and 60,092 are women; 7,985 or 6.61% of the population are urban dwellers, which is less than the Zone average of 14.7%. The *wereda's* population has been organized in 19 peasant associations (PAs) out of these less than five are in the lowland flank of Dansha, May Deli, Debre Harya, Serquea are some of the PAs adjacent to the settlement site. According to the Population census of EFDRE (2007), the total size population size of the Settlement Area is stated in table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Population Size of the Settlement Area

	Tabia	Sex		Total
		Male	Female	
1	Lekatit	2219	2111	4330
2	Dedebit	1704	1582	3286
3	Werie	1452	1424	2876
4	Hadnet	338	352	740

Source: Central Statistical Agency, 2007

4.5 Ethnic Composition of the Wereda

According to the population census, the Wereda has different ethnic groups from various parts of the country. The ethnic distribution of the Wereda consists of Tegray, Amhara, Argoba, Agaw, and others. Some of the factors which contributed to the population movement was the boundaries with Amhara regional states, Sudan and Eritrea, and the area has a vast farming land with sufficient rivers it attracted various people from the neighboring areas. The predominant religion of the locals is Christian (Ethiopian Orthodox Church) and has its own peculiarities.

4.6 Vegetation

The area its surroundings covered with grass, bushes, and lowland trees. The lowland area of the western flank is potentially rich for agricultural production. Most of the lowlands of the western Tigray were hitherto sparsely inhabited. Nevertheless, the adjacent highlands of Wolkait Tsegede, including the people who settled around the small towns such as Humera, Baeker and Dansha use the vast land for grazing purposes for their cattle. Therefore, nomads and transhumant farmers used the area.

CHAPTER FIVE

DESIGN and IMPLEMENTATION of the DDR PROGRAM

5.1 Introduction

After the downfall of the Derge regime through the popular struggle, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) led by EPRDF listed its priorities in 1991; among the priorities the first was to endorse new Federal Constitution through the participations of the Nation, Nationalities and People's of the country. The Ethiopian Government has started to arrange a thing in line to it, one of these arrangements was the restructuring of the National Defense Forces by downsizing of the TPLF dominated EPRDF irregular army.

This chapter tries to investigate the DDR program design, the processes the implementation and to establish new national regular modern army and the institutions put in place to achieve the settlement program for the TPLF Ex-Fighters. The following questions have been raised: What was the designed DDR program and what kind of approaches was followed to implement the programs? How far it was properly developed before and after the implementation? What kind of monitoring mechanisms applied?

5.2 Planning of the Demobilization and Reintegration Program

The demobilization of former fighters represents great challenges for the Transitional Government of Ethiopia. However, one thing was obvious that the transfer from a war-torn society to a reconstructed country could not be achieved without reintegrating the Ex-Fighters back into the mainstream communities (Unpublished Document).

According to an interview with the TPLF representative in the organizations headquarter: Mekele, the reasons and objectives of the DDR plan were:

The new armed forces will have the main objective of serving for the people's interest on equality basis, the future army needs to be a new defense force quite different from the previous one and it needs to become the reflection of the diversity and unity of the country. This was the baseline for the demobilization. Above all the basic reason for the demobilization was the country's constitution Article 87, which states that 'the composition of the national armed forces shall reflect the equitable representation of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia'. As a result, in order to implement the principles of the Federal Constitution on the establishment of new national regular army the demobilization of about 30000 TPLF Ex-Fighters was required and was implemented.

Following the endorsement of the new constitution of the country, new National regular army of Ethiopia was formulated with a proportional representation of all the Nation, Nationality and Peoples of Ethiopia. Interview with one of the TPLF representatives and the contemporary situation of the country, the TPLF dominated EPRDF force dealt with two major things. Firstly, in order to implement Article 87 of the Constitution the TPLF dominated army needs to be demobilized. Secondly, there was the need for the establishment of the Ethiopian Regular Army, which should be in line with the country's economic reality.

As a result, the EPRDF decided and plan to demobilize and reintegrate its fighters to the mainstream of the society and the demobilization and reintegration program was officially declared in 1993. TPLF plan to demobilize about 30000 of its fighters phase by phase. A committee was established comprising the TPLF led institutions; the Commission for the Rehabilitation of the Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans (CRMFRDWW) and the representatives of the Ministry of National Defense of the FDRE was set up to facilitate the processes of the demobilization and reintegration program (Interview with one of the representatives of the TPLF date November 2010).

The task of the committee was to set the procedures of the Demobilization and Reintegration and to prepare a survey in order to obtain a general picture of the fighters. Particularly the commission was assigned to resettle the Ex-Fighters and facilitate their social and economic reintegration into peaceful, productive and self-sustained lives in the long-term (CRMFRDWW Report 1998).

The design of a Demobilization and Reintegration program depends largely on the political and socio-economic context in which it will have to be carried out. In order to successfully achieve the demobilization and the reintegration program the Ministry of National Defense has been a duty to identify and establish the discharging centers, to develop transparent criteria for the selection of fighters that would be demobilized and disarmed, and to pay their salaries until the period of reintegration (Interview with one of the representatives of the MoND date November 2010).

The Government also had designed to settle the Ex-Fighters in collective settlement village to do agricultural work in a cooperative form and to assist them on the following packages: agricultural settlement, housing construction, self-employment in rural or urban small-scale business, employment opportunities in the their respective local areas and private owned sectors and on the job training, and pension schemes.

5.3 The Demobilization and Reintegration Approach

The Government had followed three phases. In the first phase i.e., before 1995, a number of Ex-Fighters had demobilized and most of them would go back to their families but later on, some of them were admitted to the Dansha Settlement Project. The second phase of the demobilization, which is during the official implementation of the program (1995/96) by the Government of the country, involves a number of fighters who had served mostly between seven and 20 years or more during the army struggle, were demobilized in 1995/96. The third phase (after 1996) has involved Ex-Fighters who are late due to the security situation around their area of responsibilities (Unpublished data from MoND).

In line to the demobilization plan, the MoND has listed out the selection standards. Accordingly, the first criteria were based on the willingness of the fighters and more weight was given to the health and physical status; and, gender. Armed forces commanders also played three essential roles: identifying the person to be demobilized; they prepared the person psychologically for the demobilization by giving orientations and counseling; and, they tried to ensure that remuneration packages, pensions and to supply medical aid. The government also promised to distribute farm lands with farming instruments (including tractors); to build a house with kitchen, toilet and shower rooms for each Ex-Fighter, to secure their medical board and pensions, to be employed as a civil servant, to provide training and education on the spot, to fulfill the infrastructural facilities (like telecommunications, electricity, roads, etc). Furthermore, since most of the Ex-Fighters are physically disabled and the climatic condition of the settlement site is difficult additional hospital with full of health workers to be constructed and every Ex-Fighter will get health service for free. Special attention was given for female Ex-Fighters during the DDR program, etc. (Interview with one of the representatives of the MoND).

5.4 Process of the Reintegration

As Colletta, et al, (1996), indicates the demobilization process, have the following segments Cantonment, pre-discharge Orientation, discharge, transportation, and post-discharge Orientations. These steps were fully applied with the demobilization of the TPLF Ex-Fighters. As compared to the Sub-Saharan countries, DDR programs the demobilization process of the TPLF Ex-Fighters in Ethiopia was easy to implement, because it was the Ex-Fighters were disciplined.

In line to the pre planned demobilization process in order to prepare the fighters for demobilization:

In every corner of the country where the TPLF army found meetings were held to discuss about the need for demobilization and to inform them about the plan and the help that they could expect. However, in the hot debate the basic question was who is going to be demobilized. Finally, in each military structure and in every fighter an agreement was reached on the necessary of the program and the criteria developed (interview with one of the representatives of the MoND).

Parallel to the orientation program of the TPLF army, the CRMFRDWV developed the settlement proposal. The commission encouraged the Ex-Fighters to accept the resettlement in the uninhabited lowland of Dansha. Interview conducted with the one of TPLF representatives' shows:

As a result of the establishment of the institution in charge of the demobilization and reintegration of the Ex-Fighters CRMFDWV in 1993 identified and planned to settle them in the area around Dansha.

After the orientation and screening program the Ex-Fighters has been taken to a place called Azazo which is closer to the settlement site that established as a discharging center (unpublished document of the MoND). In this regard, an Interview with one of the representative of the Ministry of National Defense stated like this:

The demobilization process has been taken place fairly and voluntarily inline to the future regular army of the country demanded. However, more emphasis was given for physically disabled, and female. Finally, from every army division and section all the demobilized fighters have been gathered in Azozo-Gonder, in 1993.

The establishment of the encampment has the purpose for initiating activities such as counseling, set up to running of a credit scheme, help as a facilitator, and provides Ex-Fighters to make ready for their future situations. In such a case interview with representative of the MoND Azazo was established as encampment in the process of demobilization with the purpose of as stated hereunder;

Azazo was selected as encampment due to the following purpose: in the first place, to carry out studies and investigations concerning the situation of fighters with the aim of obtaining data to be used for supportive measurements. Secondly, to arrange loan schemes and settlement projects. Thirdly, to look for appropriate areas of training and settlement site. Fourthly, to provide services to the Ex-Fighters to facilitate reintegration into civil society. Finally, the purpose was to facilitate the medical fitness of the Ex-Fighters.

As Colletta, et al (1997), wrote after the demobilized Ex-Fighters gathered at Azazo-Gonder, a team was set up comprising representatives from the army, TPLF, the Regional Governments of the Tigray and Amhara States, and elders from local communities who would participate in

convincing the people adjacent to the settlement site in 1993. They usually explain the people about the necessity of the settlement and the advantages the local communities would benefit from the infrastructure of the resettlement. Then the people of Tigray particularly the local communities of Tsegede reached with a common understanding on their discussion. Orienting volunteers and discussing the process of demobilizing and reintegrating programs, with the local communities was one aspect of the rebuilding of social capital and it is a key for the success of the given program. A strong relationship with the community is a vital entry point for reintegration activity. Receiving communities are a principal partner in the DDR programs, not only as beneficiaries, but also as participants in the planning and implementation of reintegration strategies and as stakeholders in the outcome. The community becomes the stakeholder and owner of reintegration. The national and international support is essential to create the basis for reintegration; it ultimately comes about because of sustainable community-driven efforts.

After the demobilized Ex-Fighters gathered at Azazo-Gonder while the subsequent registration and disarming of the fighters were going on the fulfillments of the temporary residence, the construction of the road infrastructure in the settlement site was in progress. Moreover, the military identification cards of the demobilized Ex-Fighters were taken and replaced by civilian identification cards. This was important in providing equal treatment with their civilian counterparts.

5.5 Implementation of the Reintegration Program

The overall coordination and responsibilities for the reintegration programs were initially vested by committee with the TPLF led institutions; the Commission for the Rehabilitation of the Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans (CRMFRDWV) and the representatives of the Ministry of National Defense of the FDRE. However, later were taken over by CRMFRDWV, the Tigray National Regional State, and the Zonal Administration of the Region (CRMFRDWV Bulletin, 1998). The Ministry of National Defense commenced the actual implementation of the reintegration by engaging in clearing the bushes; interview with one of the representatives of the Ministry of National Defense stated like this:

In 1993, Members comprised from three divisions of the FDRE Defense Forces have arrived in the settlement area to clear out the bushes as a result large portion of the settlement project were cleared and a temporary residence for the Ex-Fighters tents were erected and the road was constructed

After 1996 the implementation was done through the collaboration of the Ministry of Defense, CRMFRDWV and the GTZ (now GIZ) operation with capacity building and institutional strengthening assistance being provided by the development partners.

Supportive Activities for the Reintegration

The interview conducted with one of the representatives of the MoND shows that, assistance to the demobilized Ex-Fighters was provided along the following packages: agricultural settlement, housing construction, self-employment in rural or urban small-scale business, employment opportunities in the local government and private owned sectors and on the job training, and pension schemes.

Agricultural Settlement

Agricultural settlement projects play a major role in sustainable reintegration of the Ex-fighters. They make it possible to transfer a large number of people and are expected to ensure their livelihoods and raise agricultural production. Agricultural settlement was initially expected to attract a significant number of Ex-Fighters considering that most of them were of rural origin. However, for the fulfillments of assistance to be provided in the future agricultural settlement demand identifying the socio economic status or/and background of the settlers and request careful handling because in most cases settlements are created conflict with the host communities. In this regard as interview conducted with one of the representatives of the MoND social survey was not carried out on the fighters to be demobilized, the only thing done was to identify their voluntaries to settle in Dansha. The preparation of the agricultural settlement site was selected according to the following lines:

1. A major criterion for selecting resettlement site was suitability for agricultural activities. The site is endowed with rivers for irrigation purpose and has suitable weather condition for farming activities.
2. Permanent social and economic infrastructure would be established when the Ex-Fighters had demonstrated their intention to stay on the site;
3. A range of rehabilitation packages would support different livelihood strategies.
4. The settlement area selected was uninhabited which had served in the army struggle as a base for the TPLF army.

As a result, a site which is located in Western part of the National Regional State of Tigray was selected:

Dansha settlement currently known as the Dansha-Division is situated in the western part of Tigray about 15 Km from the town of Dansha and it is bordering to Amhara National Regional State and Eritrea. It is one of the districts in Tsegede Wereda of Western Zone with the most dispersed population settlement and previously it was an irrigated cotton plantation. Dansha-Division was one of the biggest military aggressions in Western Tigray. Dansha-Division has a more hostile environment with Malaria.

The unpublished document of the Ministry of National Defense indicates initially, the settlement site was planned to house 4000 Ex-Fighters. However, currently there are about 2189 households in Dansha-Division (CSA, 2007). Almost all the Ex-Fighters have a Tigray ethnic composition.

The unpublished document of the MoND indicates a total of 31,710 hectares of land was prepared for the sustainable development of the Ex-Fighters. Out of this 5500 hectares were used for farms, 600 hectares for settlement, 600 hectares for forestry development, and 1200 hectares for grazing. Furthermore, 1.5 hectare of cultivable land was allocated for each Ex-Fighter and six villages were established at kebele standards. The agricultural system was designed as collective agricultural work accordingly the Project Commission delivered agricultural activities while the settlers supplied labor force. As a result, cotton-production as cash crop was started in 1995/1996. In addition to the farmland, agricultural inputs were distributed to the Ex-Fighters. After the introduction of the individual way of life 35% of the total households were given one oxen for each Ex-Fighters, based on the lottery system. As Colletta, et al (1996) wrote, in addition to the oxen distribution the commission of rehabilitation covering all costs managed to help all the settlers by ploughing their plots using tractors rented from Hiwot Mechanization S.C. seeds were also distributed to the Ex-Fighters.

House and Infrastructure Facility Constructions

The data obtained from the MoND and the interview carried out with the representative of the Ministry of Defense, in order to enhance the reintegration program of the Ex-Fighters basic social, and health centers were fulfilled. In collaboration of the MoND, CRMFRDWV, the local Administration and GTZ for every Ex-Fighter a residences with two-room brick houses were constructed. And given around the homestead approximately 0.2 to 0.3 hectare of land for garden trees and livestock. Furthermore, one district Hospital, three 3-health centers for the three *Tabia*

(i.e., two *Menders* together) was constructed. In order to have enough water supply three boreholes each yields 5 liters per second and 3 hand pump wells per village were prepared. Besides of the construction of the seasonal road with approximate 25 kilometers which connect each Mender to the main road Hummera-Gonder one preparatory and comprehensive secondary high school and four elementary and junior schools were built (Unpublished document of the MoND).

Credit and Saving Scheme

For the sustainable reintegration of the Ex-Fighters a credit facilities were given attention. Loan scheme facilities were arranged for the Ex-Fighters' payment as non-collateral. Interview with the head of the credit institution in the settlement site the credit scheme started in mid 1997 under the Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution which is private owned company. In addition, the purpose of the institution in the settlement site was to help the self-help program of the Ex-Fighters. The institution did not ask security guarantors or collateral, it only gives credit not on individual level rather to group locally called *gujjulle* which had certification from the *Tabia* Administrators. According to the head of the institution, every Ex-Fighter can take a loan to a maximum Birr 2500, with an interest rate of below the commercial bank of Ethiopia and special attention was given for female Ex-Fighters. From the field survey, the Ex-Fighters have granted loans from rural credit institution and were facilitated the access to loans with technical and administrative assistance. The aim was in helping of the demobilized Ex-Fighters to carry out economically viable activities. As interview with one of my key informants, employer of the Ethiopian Commercial Bank Dansha Branch the Ex-Fighters who settled in the Dansha –Division can have access to get loan and save their income in the Commercial Bank according to their collateral. Moreover, there are Ex-Fighters who organized in Joint Cooperatives who saved in Millions.

Training

The main economic reintegration options are either training followed by wage-or self-employment, or proceeding directly to the employment stage. Self-employment could be in agriculture, or operating a micro/small business. Training is a potential means of supporting Ex-Fighters in reintegrating them in sustainable livelihood. The civil war (before 1991) in Ethiopia damaged the basic economic infrastructure and institutions of the country and had an effect on the labor force. According to an interview conducted with one of the representatives of the MoND and Tsegede wereda Administration in order to assist the demobilized Ex-Fighters one station of extension

agent and animal health post were established, and 80 Ex-Fighters were trained as pest scouts for cotton. Furthermore, for at least two months orientation and agricultural demonstration was given for those with no agricultural backgrounds.

Employment Creation

Despite the fact that the reintegration efforts are usually less visible than the demobilization itself, reintegration generally appears to be the major challenges in the overall processes. All the demobilized and their families have to build up the livelihood after many years in the army. Ex-Fighters with few skills face large problems in societies where it is difficult to start a small enterprise or find employment. To have secure livelihood the availability of employment and income generating opportunities/employment appear to be critical factors for the success of economic reintegration. Data obtained from the Ministry of National Defense the Ex-fighters were transferred from joblessness to reemployment through allocating of land for farming and creating favorable conditions for self-employed activities. Based on an interview with the Tsegede administrator, an effort was made to create job opportunities at the local level as a result the Ex-Fighters were involved in government and private owned organization. For example, they are employed in local administration tasks, local security tasks as local militia; local health centers as health workers and guards and in the other government social service sectors. Furthermore, they serve in the private owned organizations and in the local farming activities like the Hiwot Mechanization S.C., Dedebit Micro Finance, and other local private business sectors. Other employment opportunities were designed in enhancing the credit and saving capacities of the Ex-Fighters and to engage in the self-owned small-scale business.

Safety Net

The other supportive measures which were designed by the government were food for work under the safety net program. The money given to the former fighters was supposed to serve as a safety net in their transition from military to civilian life. Interview with one of the representatives of the MoND indicates that the Government provided all settlers with food ration, blankets, tents and kitchen tools for the first year. The Ministry of defense has continued to provide salaries until the period of reintegration (i.e. 6 to 12 months) and ensure their remuneration packages; pensions and medical care which enabling the Ex-Fighters to keep their livelihood.

5.6 Social Distribution to Networks and community

In order to keep the social networking among the Ex-Fighters, they were organized in to villages depending on the relationship they had in the army units. Furthermore, the local institutions provide social security's and safety net for the settlers. In addition to these, the local social organizations like *Idir*, funeral process are facilitated and closely attended, financial expenses are covered multiple form of solidarity and supports were offered to the mourning family. *Idir* memberships have equally opened to all the village community members.

In order to integrate the Ex-Fighters to the main stream of the societies the local community was given equal and mutually using the common property assets and a continuous discussion was carried out with the local communities. A joint committee, voluntary local institutions and associations were established to solve any potential conflict which can be raised in the settlement project and to discuss in their local issues.

In order to reintegrate the Ex-Fighters, they have all, economic, political and social rights. The Ex-Fighters also participated in the party and government political activities and have a right to form any association and to vote in election are respected.

5.7 Involvement of the External Donors

In DDR program, the external donors have the role in accelerating the transition from a war economy to a livelihood and development economy. Particularly in the reintegrating process the economic and community reintegrating efforts have great part in providing financial and technical supports? Similar to the other African countries experienced in the demobilization and reintegration program of the TPLF/EPRDF Ex-Fighters in Ethiopia external donors have been involved in the program. Interview with the representative of the TPLF, the involvement of the Non Governmental Organizations were late which become visible after the failure of the communal way of life. When the reintegration program designed, more focus was given to internal capacity other than the foreign aids. However, after the social pre-assessment GTZ (now GIZ) has been started to contribute financial and technical supports, Other than GTZ (now GIZ) other local NGOs like the REST (Tigray Relief Association), Dedebit Micro Finance, Hiwot Mechanization Enterprises, and the local community Elders.

As briefly discussed before the failure of the communal way of life and replaced by the individual way of life. In such case, the needs for financial and technical aids were essential and in 1994, the request for financial support was offered to Germany Embassy but the response was delayed. The basic reason for the delay of the support was the issue in regarding to the claim on the settlement wereda between the Tigray and Amhara Region as a result GTZ (now GIZ) and other donors was uncertain to involve in the program. Finally, after the discussion and agreement reached in both Regions the promised aid was obtained from the external NGOs.

From the field survey, even though there is no information about the total amount spent for the settlement project GTZ (now GIZ) and the other donors involve in the construction of home, health centers, water reservoirs, and supplying of agricultural facilities and seeds.

5.8 Success and Challenges on the DDR Program

Based on the interview with the representatives of the MoND and TPLF, and the local administrators the factors, which contribute, and hindrances for the program were summarized hereunder.

Success of the DDR Program Designed

The basic factors for the success of the program were

- The political commitments of the Government of the Federal Democratic of Ethiopia to demobilize the irregular fighters.
- The voluntary principle of the resettlement program and appropriate leadership of the project management to achieved the program with short period of time,
- High participation of settlers and high consent of the host community and the participation of the civilians in the structural organization of the Ex-Fighters facilitate the reintegration process of the Ex-Fighters into civilian way of life.
- The efforts made to concentrate the Ex-Fighters in one village depending on the relationship they had in the army units with their neighborhood structure has proved to have a very positive and stabling impact in terms of the development of communitarian and co-operation structure, which are one of the most impressive social features of the settlement.

Challenges of the DDR Program

However, the positive factors of the reintegration program were challenged and hindered by the following factors-

- When the program was designed the purpose was to settle the Ex-Fighters in collective type of agricultural system. However due to the shortcomings in the designing of the program and the communal way was failed. The basic hinder factors were absence of the socio pre-assessment surveys in the program designing.
- Shortage of time for the preparation of the institution to be assigned to perform the reintegration program and have faced lack of experience.
- The communal system was created senseless belongingness on the part of the settler brought about resentment in the settlers' community at large and the demand for a strict attendance.
- In designing a DDR program an integrated approach have a positive implication in the implementation process, when we see the community participation in the TPLE/EPRDF Ex-Fighters planning local community was participated when the Ex-Fighters transported to the encampment area Azazo-Gonder i.e., when the fighters closer to the settlement site. In this case, the fighters were arrived in the settlement area when the community discussion on process and the locals did not have awareness on the situation.
- The hesitation of the NGOs to provide the financial and technical support promised because of the conflict in the Welquit Tsegede.
- Most of the Ex-Fighters have been oriented in unrealistic manner by their commanders. This distorted orientation and promises was a system developed by their commanders to convince the fighters to be demobilized.
- Following the distorted orientation the Ex-Fighters also developed in their mind unrealistic expectations; and the Ex-Fighters feel that they have made sacrifices for are not owned something for their sacrifice;
- The military cultures developed in army have their own implications on the reintegrating of the Ex-Fighters to the mainstream of the society.

- Once the Ex-Fighters settle in the settlement area they eager to have more assistance programs from local and foreign agencies;
- The situation made them resistance and defensive to the orientation given in the discharging centers and;
- In addition to the settlers physical disabled the harsh climatic condition of the settlement area created a shortage of labor particularly the daily laborers. This was due to the most of the Ex-Fighters depending on paid labor. This problem also reflected in non-farming activities.
- The remobilization of the Ex-Fighters as defense forces due to the Ethio-Eritrean boarder conflict, which deteriorated the socio-economic situation of their families. Some of are affected households to leave the settlement.
- The establishment of the rural credit and saving financial institution in the settlement site have had its own positive impact in improving the livelihood of the Ex-Fighters; however, due to the rules and regulation of the institute the Ex-Fighters are faced a problems.
- The pension fee for the Ex-Fighters was not paid for all.

Mechanisms Taken to Solve the Challenges

In order to solve the problems occurred in the designing of the program a post evaluation and the socio-economic survey has been taken, and comes to agreement that the collective type of agricultural work program was not relevance. As a result, a corrective action has taken and the system was revised, and the communal farming system changed to individual type of farming practices.

To solve the problem related to the distorted orientation a series of discussion and meetings has been conducted with the Ex-Fighters and local communities to have a common consensus.

To facilitate the financial support from the donors particularly from GTZ, the problem raised in Welquit Tseged in relation to the settlement site both the Tigray and Amhara Regional States have made discussions on the problem and solved immediately. Moreover, the Germany Government showed a positive response to help the program financially and technically.

CHAPTER SIX

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL and PSYCHOLOGICAL REINTEGRATION

6.1 Descriptions of the Surveyed Ex-Fighters

The demographic profile of the sample Ex-Fighters includes sex, age, and duration of stay in the army, origin of the Ex-Fighters, marital status and children, level of education, and skills the Ex-Fighters gained in the army. The same proportion of each sex was selected from both categories of the Ex-Fighters: 85 percent males and 15 percent female that are 170 male and 30 female Ex-Fighters. The sampling unit within the population was the head of a household.

Age Categories: - The age categories of the sample as shown in Table 6.1, the lion share of the male Ex-Fighters are within the age group of 50-59 which is 98.8% while the female are within the range of 40-49 age. This constitutes 44.8% of the total female Ex-Fighters.

Table 6.1 Age-Sexes of the Respondents

Sex		Age				Total
		30-39	40-49	50-59	60 and above	
Male	Count	16	60	82	12	170
	%	9.4%	35.3%	48.2%	7.13%	85%
Female	Count	13	15	1	1	30
	%	43.33%	50%	3.33%	3.33%	15%
Total	Count	29	75	83	13	200
	%	14.5%	37.5%	41.5%	6.5%	100%

Source: Survey Results

The age categories of the surveyed Ex-Fighters shown in Table 6.1 the majority of the Ex-Fighters are in the age group of 50-59 for male and 40-49 for female. These age groups of relatively easily to train in different skills that can be ease their reintegration process. This age group helps Ex-Fighters move away from the roles and positions that defined them during the conflict towards identifying themselves as citizens and members of local communities. In this age situations, employment and income generation are often the principal concerns of both local people and Ex-Fighters identically, and are among the key determining factors as to whether those who have been living by the gun are willing to disarm and reintegrate into society. Furthermore, in such age group if training is provided it help the Ex-Fighters to play a constructive economic role in the communities to which they return, and their presence tends to be seen in a more positive light by

these communities. In this context, economic reintegration can also contribute to the complex, long-term process of social reintegration.

Year of Service and Position in Army: - Table 6.2 shows that the majority (43%) of the Ex-Fighters surveyed have stayed in the TPLF army between 13-16 years and 34% have had the position of Platoon leaders.

Table 6.2 Year of Service and Position in the Army

Year of service		Position							Total
		Simple	Unit/Team	Platoon	Company	Battalion	Brigade	Staff	
8 and below	Count	8	3	19	4	0	0	0	34
	%	23.5	8.8	55.9	11.8	0	0	0	17
9-12	Count	7	3	27	18	2	0	2	59
	%	11.9	5.1	45.8	30.5	3.4	0	3.4	29.5
13-16	Count	3	2	18	30	29	2	2	86
	%	3.5	2.3	20.9	34.9	33.7	2.3	2.3	43
17 and above	Count	0	0	4	2	9	6	0	21
	%	0	0	19.0	9.5	42.9	28.6	0	10.5
Total	Count	18	8	68	54	40	8	4	200
	%	9	4	34	27	20	4	2	100

Source: Survey Results

In addition to the age category of the Ex-Fighters, the majority have served and stayed in the TPLF army for long years with a higher position of Platoon leader. This by itself has a constructive role in realizing the reintegration, particularly in resolving social conflicts and to lead the demobilized Ex-Fighters in organized manner for the economic and social reintegration.

Origin of the Ex-Fighters: - The data collected and are organized in Table 6.3 indicates that the majority of the surveyed Ex-Fighters (73 percent) are with rural background. Moreover, after having stayed for long years in the field they are living in rural areas.

Table 6.3 Origins of the Ex-Fighters

Sex		Origin			Total
		Urban	Semi-Urban	Rural	
Male	Count	10	35	125	170
	%	5.9	20.6	73.5	100
Female	Count	0	9	21	30
	%	0	30	70	100
Total	Count	10	44	146	200
	%	5	22	73	100

Source: Survey Results

Recognizing the origins of the Ex-Fighters is one of the fundamental pre conditions in DDR for different economic and social motives and opportunities. Ex-Fighters are not a homogenous group

and this means that the type of support, training and skills that they will need to secure employment will vary greatly. One of the factors that help to identify the opportunities is to pick-out the origins of the Ex-Fighters, which have its own implication in the demobilization and reintegration process.

Part of the data collected which are organized in Table 6.3, indicates that the majority of the Ex-Fighters have a rural background with less urban origin. This may have positive implications over the agricultural settlement which the government designed and helps for the majority of the Ex-Fighters to involve in farming activities. However, these Ex-Fighters after having stayed for long years in the field they are living in rural areas. This situation may not be favorable for those who do not have experience and those who forget the practice of farming activities.

Marital Status and Number of Children: - A careful analysis of the opportunity structure for Ex-Fighter for labor and the availability of land, credit and provision for skill development is a precondition not only for program design but also for targeted counseling and adequate placement. However, the particular challenges confronting Veterans depends on family warrant the development of specially targeted intervention. Table 6.4 shows that the majority (80.5%) of the Ex-Fighters are married, but widows and separated are numerous among women. 23.3 percent of the sample survey of women Ex-Fighters are divorced. The interview with the Tabia administrator indicates that most of the TPLF demobilized Ex-Fighters had married before they joined to the army struggle and the Ex-Fighters children are categorized into three groups. The first group consists of those children who were born their parents joined to army. The second groups were born during the armed struggle i.e., within the organization. The third group consists of children of Ex-Fighters who were born in the Settlement site. Currently, the majority (36%) of the surveyed Ex-Fighters have more than four children (see Table 6.5).

Table 6.4 Marital Statuses of the Ex-Fighters

Sex	Marital Status				Total
	Single	Married	Widow	Separated	
Male	6	142	16	6	170
	3.5%	83.5%	9.4%	3.5%	100.0%
Female	4	19	6	1	30
	13.3%	63.3%	20.0%	3.3%	100.0%
Total	10	161	22	7	200
	5.0%	80.5%	11.0%	3.5%	100.0%

Source: Survey Results

Table 6.5 Numbers of Children

Sex	Number of children						Total
	None	One	Two	Three	Four	More than Four	
Male	1	1	17	37	47	67	170
	.6%	.6%	10.0%	21.8%	27.6%	39.4%	100.0%
Female	1	1	10	6	7	5	30
	3.3%	3.3%	33.3%	20.0%	23.3%	16.7%	100.0%
Total	2	2	27	43	54	72	200
	1.0%	1.0%	13.5%	21.5%	27.0%	36.0%	100.0%

Source: Survey Results

Level of Education and skill Acquired in Army: - The Ex-Fighters level of education has an important role in the reintegration process, in this regard from the field study as Table 6.6 shows the majority (74.5%) Ex-Fighters have an elementary educational background.

Table 6.6 Level of Education of the Ex-Fighters

Sex	Educational Status					Total
	Read and Write	Elementary	Junior	Secondary	Above secondary	
Male	1	130	31	5	3	170
	.6%	76.5%	18.2%	2.9%	1.8%	100%
Female	0	19	10	1	0	30
	.0%	63.3%	33.3%	3.3%	.0%	100%
Total	1	149	41	6	3	200
	.5%	74.5%	20.5%	3.0%	1.5%	100%

Source: Survey Results

Furthermore, other than the formal education 40% of the surveyed Ex-Fighters have developed deferent skills other than the military tactic in the army as indicated in Table 6.7 below.

Table 6.7 Skills the Ex-Fighters gained in the Army

Sex		Skill																	Total	
		Military Tactic	Auto Mechanic	Logistics	Farming	Purchasing	Blumberg	Construction	Leadership	Animal care	Mill Mechanic	Public Affair	Medical care	Engineering	No at all	Radio operator	Art	Administrative		Driving
Male	Cou.	97	5	0	1	1	1	2	5	1	1	12	15	1	1	4	2	20	1	170
	%	57.1	2.9	.0	.6	.6	.6	1.2	2.9	.6	.6	7.1	8.8	.6	.6	2.4	1.2	11.8	.6	100
Female	Cou.	20	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	2	1	30
	%	66.7	3.3	3.3	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	3.3	13.3	.0	.0	.0	.0	6.7	3.3	100
Total	Cou.	117	6	1	1	1	1	2	5	1	1	13	19	1	1	4	2	22	2	200
	%	58.5	3.0	.5	.5	.5	.5	1.0	2.5	.5	.5	6.5	9.5	.5	.5	2.0	1.0	11.0	1.0	100

Source: Survey Results

From the Table 6.8, out of the total surveyed Ex-Fighters, the majorities (90%) are demobilized in 1995/1996 which is in the phase two, and the rest are those who demobilized before and after

phase two accounts 6% and 4% respectively. Moreover, the majority of the surveyed Ex-Fighters (84%) are feeling proud being a fighter.

Table 6.8 Date of Demobilization and Feeling being a Fighter

Feel being a Fighter		Date of Demobilization					Total
		Before 1995	1995	1996	1997	1998	
No proud	Count	1	3	11	0	0	15
	% Feel being a fighter	6.7	20	73.3	0	0	100
	% Date of demobilization	8.3	7.1	8	0	0	7.5
Proud	Count	11	36	115	5	1	168
	% Feel being a fighter	6.5	21.4	68.5	3	6	100
	% Date of demobilization	91.7	85.7	83.3	71.4	100	84
No comment	Count	0	3	12	2	0	17
	% Feel being a fighter	0	17.6	70.6	11.8	0	100
	% Date of demobilization	0	7.1	8.7	28.6	0	8.5
Total	Count	12	42	138	7	1	200
	% Feel being a fighter	6%	21%	69	3.5	.5	100
	% Date of demobilization	100%	100%	100	100	100	100

Source: Survey Results

6.2 Economic Dimension of the Reintegration

To reintegrate the Ex-Fighters to the mainstream of the society economically they have to earn a living, be it wage employment or a farm, or by combining different sources of income, such as petty trade and off-farm earning activities. They need equal opportunities for employment as with any other member of the receiving community. It is believed that the mobilization of the economy and labor forces is decisive for successful reintegration in this regard the government of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was designed economic support programs to help the demobilized Ex-Fighters of the TPLF army to integrate economically to the main stream of the society. In this section, the fulfillment of what the government designed to do for the Ex-Fighters to secure their livelihood? When designing reintegration programs, did the government take into consideration the capacities of the returnees as well as the needs of the labor market. Are returnees' capacities properly used and if not, what has to be done to up-grade their skills and make them more marketable? What resources have been made available to help the returnees to rebuild their lives? What kind of safety net is put in place to help returnees who cannot secure livelihood? How do returnees see their situation compared to the host community? On the base of the field study, the researcher answers these questions.

Agricultural Settlement

One of the programs designed by the Government to reintegrate the Ex-Fighters economically was through agricultural settlement project. The Settlement project has a total of 62,150-hectare land surface (Unpublished Document from Dansha *Tabias* Administrators).

Table 6.9 Land Use Pattern of the Settlement

<i>Tabia</i>	Cultivable land	Forestry	Irrigated Land	Total
Tabia Werrie	1525	3500	48.625	37241
Tabia Lekatit	2180	1740	34.87	13928
Tabia Dedebit	2645	>1000	156	10981
Total	6350	>6240	239.495	62150

Source: - Field Survey

When the author was asking whether the Ex-Fighters could get land in the settlement site, a discussion conducted with the focus group in *mender* two shows that:

At the very beginning of the settlement the farming activities was a communal type, but the Ex-Fighters frustrated by the communal type. As a result after two years it comes to an end. Following the failure of the communal type of agricultural system a farming land was distributed on a household level. So that 1.5 hectare of area from the cleared farmland was given for every Ex-Fighter and was allocated 1 hectare to clear ourselves for farming in addition to these each household around the homestead allowed to use approximately 0.2 to 0.3 hectare of land for garden trees and livestock.

One of the key informants aged 48, in Mender 3 said;

"In 1997 I have received a 1.5 hectare of farming land as promised by the government and I am using the land for the cultivation of rice, sesame, sorghum and cotton. And I started to lead my livelihood by the income I got from the farming lands."

One key informant, who joined the army in 1981 said about the land use problem as follows: -

The land given for every Ex-Fighter was more than enough however, I am a disabled person how could I cultivate the land the only alternative I have was to rent the land for other fighters. With regard to the problem at the very beginning of the process there was a conflict in relation to the land distribution but later on it have been solved through continuous dialogue between the community and the Ex-Fighters. However, our potential problem is the expansion of the civilian settlers)

From personal observation, government assigned Development Agents who are giving special assistance for the improvement of the farming production in each *Tabia*. In addition to the farmland distribution, agricultural inputs were distributed to the Ex-Fighters. As interview with selected Ex-Fighter,

Oxen were distributed for few Ex-Fighters based on the lottery system. However, I was not clear with the reason why they distributed them by lottery system.

As Colletta, et al (1996), wrote in addition to the oxen distribution the commission of rehabilitation covering all costs managed to help all the settlers by ploughing their plots using tractors rented from Hiwot Mechanization S.C. seeds were also distributed to the Ex-Fighters.

When the researcher visited the farming, area there are settlers who came to the area before the Ex-Fighters was settled in Dansha–Division. I have interviewed one of the local civilian settlers and he said:

At the very beginning of the Ex-Fighters settled here, I was not in good position towards of the Ex-Fighters settlement nearby to our farming land because my I expectation was the Ex-Fighters would confiscate our land. There were conflicts on the interest of land. However, later on we solved the conflict peacefully and we are cultivating the land together.

From the field survey and interview with key informants conflict on the interest of the resource (land) was happened because of the local community was not aware of the project. However, such conflict does not currently exist and solved through mediation and meetings.

As shortly briefed in the designing of the program, the government had designed to settle the Ex-Fighters in communal type of farming. However, this designed program was failed and was not relevant to the Ex-Fighters. The discussion with the Tseged Administrator the collective agricultural work was started in 1996 approximately on 6000 hectare of land. The farming activity was continued for two years. In order to facilitate the activities, the government in collaboration with the Hiwot Mechanization farming materials like tractors was fulfilled while the Ex-Fighters supplied the labor. Cotton plantation was started and the cotton was sold to the Hiwot Agricultural Mechanization Enterprises. In addition to the cotton-production the Ex-Fighters were paid salaries and food rations for their work. However, in these two years of harvesting the Ex-Fighters have been frustrated by the communal system.

As discussion with the representative of the Ministry of defense regarding to the reasons for the frustration of the Ex-Fighters on the communal type of farming, before the implementation of the farming system social survey was not carried out on the fighters to be demobilized, the only thing done was to identify their voluntaries to settle in Dansha. So that the different background of the Ex-Fighters and lack of farming experience caused the Ex-Fighters discourage to work together. From this situation we can conclude that the absence of pre-assessment on the social background

of the Ex-Fighters have a negative implication on the sustainable reintegration of Ex-Fighters in agricultural settlement.

Following the failure of the communal type of farming the responsible institution for the project CRWFRDWV designed another type of farming which is farming individually in his/her farming plot. As a result, 1.5 hectare of cultivable land was distributed and agricultural inputs (oxen, seeds, and tools) were given for each Ex-Fighter as designed by the Commission. However, after the distribution of the farmland at household level the problem of the Ex-Fighters in relation to their origin and background comes more on the ground. In this regard, as interview conducted with one of my key informants, recount his experience as follows with particular emphasis how origin came to influence his life in the reintegration process: -

When the process of Demobilization and ultimately reintegration started, usually a dilemma emerges in adapting to a new way of life. Therefore, there is a need to accommodate and understand the lifestyle of Ex-Fighters by identifying and choosing those 'positive' experiences that might help returnees' reintegration.

Another key informant, who joined the army in 1979, recounts the situation as follows:

I joined the TPLF from a city; I did not have previous experience about agriculture. However, I decided to come to Dansha but things were not as I expected, everything was dark to me. I am anxious about my future live then I came back to the town of Dansha as daily laborer renting my farmland. However, with the help of my comrades my ability and perception of the agricultural activities were changed.

On the other hand, the problem was not only limited to the male Ex-Fighters but also it had affected the female Ex-Fighters. An interview carried out with key informant, he reached the settlement area as follows:

Thank to my comrades even after the demobilization they are all to me. When I arrived at the Dansha Settlement the phenomenon was more difficult than the armed struggle. I do not have knowledge about farming because I joined the army from semi-urban area, so that the situations were not favorable

Part of the data collected, which are organized in Table 6.3, indicates that the majority of the Ex-Fighters have a rural background. The origin of the Ex-Fighters, have a positive implications over the agricultural settlement and helps for the majority of the Ex-Fighters to involve in farming activities. However, most of the Ex-Fighters have stayed for long years in the field (bush) so that they would forget the farming activities. On the other hand, there are Ex-Fighters with no background of farming so that the situation was not favorable for them.

Education and Training

Education/training is unreservedly understood as formal transfer of vocational, technical basic and general skills. Human capabilities and competence related to knowledge, abilities, skills, as well as to values, attitudes and norms are the results of both the educational and the employment opportunities in which experiential learning usually has no place. In the TPLF/EPRDF, the broad educational arena relates to both formal and non-formal learning to efforts at consciousness rising, including those that occur outside of schools and to all opportunities for building skills.

Detailed discussion with the representatives of the TPLF

During the armed struggle, education and literacy were not limited to introductory courses. The TPLF fighters were involved in vocational and educational programs in their base camps commonly known as 'Bet Temerti Woyana' and in their liberated areas. Besides, the task of front line combat, female and male fighters established small-scale workshops, schools, hospitals, and public services department etc. This was based on participatory management systems. Through these activities, the fighters had obtained pool of qualifications. Sharing of skills and experiences was also considered as a natural part of social life in the field.

Around 40 percent of the interviewed Ex-Fighters have acquired skills during the armed struggle, the significant area being administration, in which 22 percent of the skilled Ex-Fighter acquired competence but not certified (Table 6.10). Other than the formal and on the job training, the Ex-Fighters have developed military skills, discipline, organizational competence, and teamwork capacity. Therefore, Ex-Fighters constitute a pool of valuable managerial experiences for all sorts of modern bureaucratic organizations. The Ex-Fighters' experiences with different public services, communication, transportation and finance are not only useful for both public and private enterprises; it would help them to increase their employment opportunities and their capacity to sustain their livelihood and that of their families.

From the field study as indicated in the description of the sampled Ex-Fighters the majority demobilized Ex-Fighters have an elementary educational background. Furthermore, other than the formal education the Ex-Fighters developed their skills in internal learning, learning-by-doing and the socialization process in the education and training system, as well as the employment system. However, the upgrading of qualifications, especially of Ex-Fighters would have enhanced their reintegration in terms of civilian identity and livelihood. The question is when the government designed the program to create job opportunity for the Ex-Fighters, what was the ground to

manipulate the skill they acquired during the army and is there any training was given for the Ex-fighters to sustain their livelihood.

One of my key informants who working in Hiwot Mechanization said

'I had gained Mechanical skill in the army and after demobilization I have got job opportunity in Hiwot Mechanization unfortunately my practical experience and skills acquired during the struggle are not certified or recognized.

Interview with one of the *Tabia* Administrator in the settlement area,

.... Our government in association with the Ex-Fighters has constructed four elementary schools, and one secondary comprehensive high school and preparatory school. Therefore, assistance has been given in securing admission into schools for our children. Currently these schools are not only serving for the Ex-Fighters rather students from neighbors' cities Dansha and Baeker also learn here. However, during the demobilization no training was given. The only training provided was trained as pest scouts for cotton. Furthermore for at least two months orientation and agricultural demonstration was given for those with no agricultural backgrounds to solve their problem.

Head of the Tsegede Wereda Rural Agriculture said that:

Farmers training center was established, it is offering an agricultural training for the Ex-Fighters in each Tabias.

The best practice models unanimously emphasize well-designed training and reintegration programs based on detailed evaluations of Ex-Fighters and community needs; this has only weakly translated into practice on the ground. This can be realized in the Table 6.10, more than two third of the interviewed Ex-Fighters do not get any training for their future endeavor. However, as indicated in Table 6.9 training on different skills was given for few numbers of the Ex-Fighters (24.5 percent of the surveyed Ex-fighters). Such trainings have been given by the local administration for the Ex-Fighters who assigned on different position to provide service for the settlement site.

Table 6.10 Training after Demobilization

Responses		Kinds of training														Total	
		No answer	Livestock farming	Saving	Public administration	Agricultural farming	Business	Medical	Driving	Co-operatives management	Local militia leadership	Training for disable	Construction	Carpenter	Electrician		Rural Banking
Yes	Count	0	1	1	7	17	5	5	3	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	49
	%	0	2	2	14.3	34.7	10.2	10.2	6.1	2.0	4.1	4.1	4.1	2	2	2	100
No	Count	151	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	151
	%	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Total	Count	151	1	1	7	17	5	5	3	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	200
	%	75.5	.5	.5	3.5	8.5	2.5	2.5	1.5	.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	.5	.5	.5	100

Source: Survey Results

From the field survey, as shows in Table 6.11 on the job trainings like the carpentry, mechanics, embroidery, driving, construction, farming activities, business administrative, plumber, livestock raring were given afterward for a few of the Ex-Fighters (17 percent of the surveyed Ex-Fighters). However, due to the health problem, lack of labor market and financial assistance most of the training was not actually/practically implemented.

Table 6.11 on the Job Training after Demobilization

Response		Kinds of training											Total
		Carpentry	Mechanics	Embroidery	Driving	Construction	Farming	No answer	Business	Administrative	Plumber	Animals health	
Yes	Count	5	3	2	0	2	16	0	3	1	1	1	34
	%	14.7	8.8	5.9	0	5.9	47	0	8.8	3	3	3	17
No	Count	0	0	0	0	0	0	166	0	0	0	0	166
	%	0	0	0	0	0	0	83	0	0	0	0	83
Total	Count	5	3	2	0	2	16	166	3	1	1	1	200
	%	14.7	8.8	5.9	0	5.9	47	83	8.8	3	3	3	100

Source: Survey Results

Training has its own implication on the effectiveness of the DDR in developing effective transitional livelihood options to improve income earning / livelihoods opportunities for Ex-Fighters and has contribution on their current poor economic prospects. In such case the government had designed to provide training on farming in relation to the communal type of the farming. However, after the failure of the communal type of farming, trainings were provided for the Ex-Fighters were not updated in line to the new land use system which the situation demanded. To sum up, government had taken the construction of schools and farmers training centers to improve the farming production of the Ex-Fighters. However, in relation to the social background and physical abilities of the Ex-Fighters trainings were not designed on non-farming activities which can help the Ex-Fighters to expand their job opportunities and as means of income generating. Furthermore, the commission did not manipulate the Ex-Fighters skill acquired in the army which can help the Ex-Fighters easily to engage in similar tasks. In such the reintegration program of the TPLF/EPRDF Ex-Fighters was not supported by training and accessibility of market labor.

From the literature review and the DDR exercise of the African countries reintegration program is a long term to sustained fighters in economic aspect. However, the case of the Dansha Settlement other than the farming activities for the other non-farming activities engagement was given less attention in the program designed. In such case as in the Table 6.13 indicated most of the Ex-Fighters are engaged in the whole year farming activities and livestock rearing out of the surveyed Ex-Fighters only 16 percent are engaging in other job opportunities: - occasional jobs like the daily laborer, petty trade, remittance from abroad, economic activities like the commission, and local social and public associations (Cooperatives, Idir, Mahber, Youth association...). The current and future welfare is strongly determined by the level of physical and human capital, however, the present physical condition and their age create a problem, and the Ex-Fighters are trying to be become self-reliance. In addition, they are trying to solve their problem by their own efforts and are cooperative each other.

Table 6.13 Engagements of the Ex-Fighters to Manage their Livelihood

Response		Engagements								Total
		Occasional job	Petty trade	Remittance	Farming activities	No answer	Public tasks	Nothing	Social associations	
Yes	Count	9	1	1	6	149	1	1	0	168
	%	5.4	.6	.6	3.6	88.7	.6	.6	0	100
No	Count	14	9	3	2	1	0	2	1	32
	%	43.8	28.1	9.4	6.3	3.1	0	6.3	3.1	100
Total	Count	23	10	4	8	150	1	3	1	200
	%	11.5	5	2	4	75	.5	1.5	.5	100

Source: Survey Results

Safety Net

In the DDR program particularly in the insertion period, the transitional safety net payments which are usually as assistance will help Ex-Fighters to establish a civilian household. In such case, the discussion with the focus group and the interview with Ex-Fighters around 86.5 percent of the surveyed Ex-Fighters did not get any demobilization payments. However, according to the program designed by the commission salaries until the reintegration program and the assistance in kind were given. Furthermore, those who retired have been gotten their monthly pensions which range from 200-250 birr. As discussion with focus group there are Ex-Fighters did not received their pension as to the government promise.

Credit and Saving Scheme

As Colletta (1996) indicates, in the process of reintegration the availabilities of credit are the necessary factor to solve the financial problem of the Ex-Fighters. In order to solve the financial problem and achieve the reintegration financial institutions like Dedebit rural credit and saving was opened in the settlement area. One of my key informants expresses the support given for the Ex-Fighters:

In the middle of 1997, a rural credit and saving institution which is a Non-Governmental Organization called Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution was opened and offered credit for the Ex-Fighters in-group without collateral.

The presence of credit scheme will help the Ex-Fighters for their sustainable livelihood and helps them to engage in the commercial activities as a secondary activity. This also realized by the Ex-Fighters interviewed in different Menders have said the following:

By the credit we get from the Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution, we start to lead our livelihoods, we bought agricultural facilities like the water pump, we opened a small-scale enter prices, furthermore it helps us to create employment for others in our farming land and help us to participate in non farming activities....

However, as the Ex-Fighters indicated the obligation to return the money on time have problems; the institution did not considered the situation we have during the closing date of the credit. Key informants explain their disappointment on the credit system as follows: -

Even though it is my obligation to repay the amount I debt when the institution forced me to repay the amount by selling my bed, tape-recorder...by know I am decided not to take credit.

House and Infrastructure Facility Constructions

The data obtained from the MoND, the interview carried out with the representative of the Ministry of Defense the Ex-Fighters basic social, and health centers were fulfilled in order to enhance the DDR program. The MoND, CRMFRDWV, the local Administration and GTZ (now GIZ) have provided residences with two-room brick houses and constructed and given around the homestead approximately 0.2 to 0.3 hectare of land for garden trees and livestock. As Table 6.14 shows the majority, 95 percent of the sampled Ex-Fighters are privately owned the residence room.

Table 6.14 Ownership of the House the Ex-Fighters are living in

Sex	The Owner of the House				Total
	Family	Private	Friend	Government	
Male	4	163	2	1	170
	2.4%	95.9%	1.2%	.6%	85%
Female	2	27	1	0	30
	6.7%	90%	3.3%	0%	15%
Total	6	190	3	1	200
	3%	95%	1.5%	.5%	100%

Source: Survey Results

However, from my own personal observation, there are houses completely damaged and there are houses with less quality as you can see in Figure 6.1. In this regard, one of the key informants' said:

Currently I am engaging in construction works. These residence houses were constructed by the group efforts of Ministry of Defense, GTZ and the Ex-Fighters labor. The information I have got from the Experts of the construction each block (one block for four households) have been constructed at a cost of more than Birr 65,000. However, as you have seen after 4 years all the houses were started to crack down and washing away whenever there is rain. So that, currently these are not in good situation. The basic reason for these problems is the materials used for the construction purpose have less quality.

Key informants from Mender 2, said ten years later premises are still not finalized. The reason was,

The government promised us a finished building with kitchen and toilet room and as you can see after 6 years the constructed house was started to crack down and there are rooms completely demolished because of bad quality of the material they constructed, we are suffering from the failed Government promise.

In the reintegration process of the Ex-Fighters fulfilling of residence house in a sustainable way have a great role. In this case, from the field survey, the government had made efforts in reintegrating the Ex-Fighters by designing to construct houses for the Ex-Fighters and these were realized in the settlement area. Although there is no information of the total cost spent for the construction of these houses, based on the unpublished document obtained from the Ministry of National Defense indicated 12 earth block making machines were installed in the area and were able to produce 500,000 blocks per month which helps to produce 100 housing units per month.

To sum up, as compared to previous housing situation of the Ex-Fighters, out of the surveyed Ex-Fighters as indicated in Table 6.15 the majority (65.5%) are said the current housing situation is better, however as compared to the financial cost spent for the construction of the houses the situation is not good. From my own personal observation, the quality of the houses will have a great risk for the sustainable life of the Ex-Fighters in the future (see Figure 6.1).

Table 6.15 Ex-Fighters rate to their Current Housing Situations

Sex		Rating of current housing situations			Total
		All the same	Now it is better	It was better before	
Male	Count	32	114	24	170
	%	18.8	67.1	14.1	100
Female	Count	7	17	6	30
	%	23.3	56.7	20	100
Total	Count	39	131	30	200
	%	19.5	65.5	15	100

Source: Survey Results

In addition to the housing construction, one district Hospital, three 3-health centers for the three *Tabia* (i.e., together with two *Menders*) were constructed. From my own personal observation, the district hospital is located almost at the center of the settlement site and each *Mender* from the district hospital has a distance of 5 – 9 kilometers. The hospital has one Ambulance which serves for all the *Menders* however; there is no means of communication like telephone or communication radio to give an immediate service for the Ex-Fighters. On the other hand the physical and health situation of the Ex-Fighters need closer attention and the environmental situation of the area are so harsh, so the Ex-Fighters need to be given more attention. Moreover, during the group discussion with focus groups, the government was designed to fulfill the hospital with health professionals and medical facilities and equipments to provide health assistance for the Ex-Fighters with their family for free. However, with the last two years the hospital requested the Ex-Fighters and their families to pay for the service they gained and the hospital do not have enough health professionals. The government had designed a positive program in relation to the environmental situation of the settlement site and the physical and health situation of the Ex-Fighters. It has constructed district hospital and health posts. However, no other things are in line to what promised before.

In order to have the Ex-Fighters enough water supply three boreholes each yields 5 liters per second and three hand pump wells per village were prepared. Seasonal road with approximate 25 kilometers which connect each *Mender* to the main road Hummera-Gonder was constructed. However, from my own personal observation the road has played a vital role in the transportation of the agricultural products to other parts of the country from Dansha Settlement. According to the financial expert of the Dansha town, in winter season the road gives service on average for 30 heavy vehicles daily. When road was constructed the purpose was to give service for the Ex-Fighters. Currently the road also serves for other private investors in the area as well. Therefore, the quality of the road degraded from time to time and it may have a negative impact on the settlement area.

Figure 6.1 the Current Situation of the Residence



Source: Survey Result

During the long years of armed struggle, Ex-Fighters built up strong expectations to live ‘decent life’. They believed that all problems would be solved once after the remarkable success of the armed struggle. Especially, their expectations concerning professional and social opportunities were high. After the end of the armed struggle majority of the Ex-Fighters are facing problems in gaining their way of life, and their expectation of to lead decent livelihood is fading in front of their eyes. Expectations of a better livelihood with peace and a popular government seem particularly high among the Ex-Fighters.

As Table 6.16 indicates, more than half (67.5 percent) of the surveyed Ex-Fighters responded that their expectations were not matching reality and are disappointed.

Table 6.16 Fulfillment of Expectation after the Demobilization

Sex	Response		Total
	Yes	No	
Male	54	116	170
	31.8%	68.2%	100.0%
Female	11	19	30
	36.7%	63.3%	100.0%
Total	65	135	200
	32.5%	67.5%	100.0%

Source: Survey Results

Key informants said about the promise given by the leaders,

‘Our government promised us through our commanders several things. Some of these were to distribute farmlands, build a house with kitchen, toilet and shower rooms for each Ex-Fighter,

securing our board and pensions, transformation to a civil servant life, training and education on the spot, fulfill the infrastructural and farming facilities (like telecommunications, electricity, standard road, etc). Furthermore, since we are physically disabled; and, the climatic condition of the settlement area is difficult, the government will construct further Hospital and will be a well equipped by health workers, and enough Medicare. A special attention will give for female Ex-Fighters, etc.

Ex-Fighters may have high expectations about life in the time of peace. During the struggle, leaders often promise their subordinates access to education, work and land. When peace was resorted, Ex-Fighters have expected to receive the benefits they were promised or that they will be taken care of because of the sacrifices they paid in the armed struggle. Such promises are however, occasionally met, and this was considered as sense of bitterness among Ex-Fighters (NILSSON, A. 2005). This is really, what happened in the case of the Ex-fighters who are currently settled in the study area. The majority of the respondents (77 percent) of them are disappointed because the government did not keep the promise for them.

One of the key informants expresses such frustration:

Firstly, when I joined the army my expectation was to scarify my life for the sake of my people. However, thank God I am personally, as a fighter achieved the prior objective of my Organization. When my TPLF Organization told me to demobilize, I accepted it proudly. Nevertheless, when I come to the Dansha things were not as expected and I extremely dislike my organization.

From the field survey, the researcher observed after the end of the army struggle substantial improvements have taken place in different sectors but the speed of development is not as fast as the expectation created during the orientation given for the fighters to be demobilized. Among the demobilized fighters (both male and female) those who had stayed for 13-16 years in the field the number of dissatisfied is much higher. In addition, more than half of the respondent of the Ex-Fighters perceives their current situation is not good.

Concerning the reinsertion, situation three of my key informants elaborated this by saying:

When we moved from Azazo to Dansha, the numbers of Ex-Fighters were around 7000. However, when we arrived in the settlement area the bushes did not completely cleaned, our comrades who remained in the regular army are coming there immediately we also joined them to clear out the farmland. Nevertheless, I remember the orientation which was given during the discussion on the need for demobilization was not realized on the ground.

After we are gathering from different corner of the countries in Azazo, in 1994 around 7000 ex-fighters was moved to Dansha. However, when we reached in the settlement area except certain areas the large part of the site was remains the same as of 13 years before. I am so frustrated by the situation because things were not as of promised.

When we transferred from the temporary shelter to our future residence, things were not the same as to the orientation given for us by our leaders. Here in Mender 4 I have found another fighting

a fighting with snakes within one-day three snakes had been killed. We all Ex-Fighters involved in clearing our residence and farming lands with the help of our comrades in the regular army.

One of the 'Tabia' administrators expressed the trend as follows,

When we moved from Azazo to Dansha things were not as we were oriented. After we arrived here 'Dansha', the clearing of the farmland was carried out together with the regular army. Moreover, the clearing out of the land was taken around four months. Then once we finished the clearance of the land the construction of 'tukuls' were started. I am not sure the exact number but it could be around 7000 Ex-Fighter were shifted from Azazo, however because of the harsh climatic condition almost 1000 Ex-Fighters leave the settlement areas. In short, at that, time things were bad or it is possible to say it was another front line.

Representative of the *Wereda* administrators expressed the reinsertion situation as follows,

In the reinsertion situation, when the ex-fighters was arrived in Dansha settlement project almost all of them have been participated in the clearing of the farming land and also they participated in the intensive construction of residence, health centers, water reservoir and schools. However, the constructions of the infrastructures were started later than the expected time, almost after one year and it created certain problems in their living conditions.

Therefore, a reintegration program may have partial importance for the fulfillment of Ex-Fighters expectations and it needs special attention.

From the objectives of the reintegration program, these Ex-Fighters expected to be self-sufficient at the household level and become an economic actor in the development of the country. This will achieve if and only if the credit schemes support with short training as to how invest it. Therefore, in addition to the credit, it is necessary to assess income and expenditure at household level, to ensure their reintegration and control them if they are engaging in economic activities other than consumption. From the field survey as indicated in Table 6.17 and the researcher personal observation, the majority of the Ex-Fighters are owned residential house and have farming land. Furthermore, there are Ex-Fighters who have owned modern houses out of the settlement area in the neighboring cities and towns. The Ex-Fighters also engaged in the livestock, mill, sewing machine, mini business centers and even they possess Mini bus.

Table 6.17 Property Owned by the Ex-Fighters

Sex	Property type								Total
	Car, House and livestock	Modern house out of the residence area	Not voluntary	House and farming land	Mill	Livestock, house, Sewing machines	Mini business center and house	House	
Male	0	4	2	142	2	2	2	8	170
	.0%	2.4%	1.2%	83.5%	1.2%	1.2%	1.2%	4.7%	100%
Female	1	0	0	24	0	0	1	3	30
	3.3%	.0%	.0%	80%	.0%	.0%	3.3%	10.0%	100%
Total	1	4	2	196	2	2	3	11	200
	.5%	2.0%	1.0%	76.5%	1%	1.0%	1.5%	5.5%	100%

Source: Survey Results

To sum up: to integrate the Ex-Fighters economically the government has designed different program. On the base of the designed program the communal way of life have been practiced however due to lack of the social survey the designed was resulted with failure. Following the failure, the individual type of farming practiced and this made progress and shows remarkable result. The infrastructural facilities like road have been newly constructed. Different schools, residences and health centers were built. Water supply has been fulfilled. These achievements have enabled the Ex-Fighters to start rebuilding their livelihood. Nevertheless, the expectation of the Ex-Fighters is not matched by the reality on the ground, for over time they had developed great expectations of new prospects of social life after Demobilization.

One of the shortcomings of the overall reintegration program is that the idea was given more emphasis for economic reintegration. Where economic reintegration is regarded as the key factor to full reintegration of the Ex-Fighters into the mainstream of the society but as we had already observed social and psychological problem are impeding the smooth transition. For example, although many of the Ex-Fighters have a rural background they lack the experience and the knowhow of the farming activities by returning to rural areas. This plays a negative role in the process of their reintegration.

Furthermore, the majority of the Ex-Fighters have been acquired different skills where they are in army by participating in military training or civilian activities. Thus by staying in the army, the Ex-Fighters have accumulated a wealth of valuable skills and other related experience which could be used in different sectors. However, the results of the study clearly show that their informal experiences were obviously not manipulated in the reintegration as a result it leads to a waste of accumulated human resources. Developing a system able to assess and acknowledge results of experiential learning and training of ex-fighters to turn them into formal qualifications would have influential consequence and thus missing an opportunity of their successful integration.

6.3 Social and Psychological Dimension of Reintegration

This sub topic of the analysis will discuss the social and psychological reintegration process of Ex-Fighters by raising the social, psychological, and political aspects of the reintegration process. The Ex-Fighters had developed military culture by participating in the army. According to the interview conducted with one of the TPLF representatives, and as confirmed by my own observations in charge of implementing the reintegration program of Ex-Fighters in the early 1993,

it was oriented more towards dealing with economic problems than resolving social and psychological issues.

It was believed that ensuring livelihoods for Ex-Fighters is a primary condition, and if this were achieved, all other problems would gradually become less pressing. Interviews with Ex-Fighters, in particular, have provided persuasive evidence that an integrated approach is needed.

It can be argued that economic opportunities in the early phases of adjustment are necessary because they can facilitate the rate and the scope of reintegration. However, they are not a sufficient condition for the overall integration and thus social and psychological integration needs to be taken seriously. The social structures of the receiving society and their attitudes towards the Ex-Fighters are variables that determine the speed, the direction, and level of socio-cultural reintegration.

The reintegration of the Ex-Fighters would not be complete if it did not take into account their fears, hopes, and attitudes about adjustment or maladjustment within new environments. Adjustment refers here to the individual's/group's ability to live and perform various social roles and activities without suffering extreme or unbearable psychological stress. As in, the Table 6.18 indicates the majority of the Ex-Fighters (73.5%) were not expected demobilization. Under such situation, it is clear that the resistance from individual was difficult. From the literature, demobilization and reintegration help the Ex-Fighters to start their reintegration. However, if the Ex-Fighters blame or not ready to demobilize, it was clear that demobilization and reintegration would not be easy.

Table 6.18 Expectations of the Ex-Fighters to Demobilize

Sex	Responses				Total
	It was unexpected	I had expected it	I was asking	I had panicked	
Male	122	34	3	11	170
	71.8%	20%	1.8%	6.5%	100%
Female	25	4	0	1	30
	83.3%	13.3%	0%	3.3%	100%
Total	147	38	3	12	200
	73.5%	19%	1.5%	6%	100%

Source: Survey Results

One of my key informants, who joined the army in 1979, described the situation as follows: -

When informing the fighters that they were to be demobilized, I am confused and directly told my family to made preparation to receive me, at the same time I remembered the situation and

as to how passed them. So that I am personally convinced, my mind and I hope to overcome difficulties on my daily way.

Similarly, one of the TPLF representatives in the study area also elaborated the situation as follows: -

When discussion and meeting held in every section of the military organization from every corner the Fighters were ensure to realize the need of the Organization (TPLF). However, when the list of the Fighters to be demobilized sent for every Division and Military Units, and when informing the fighters that they were to be demobilized no fighter was happy, because the fighter have dual-families: the Organization (TPLF) and the family in his origin.

From the field survey and personal observation, the situation was very difficult to disconnect the Ex-Fighters from the army and send to their families and return to the stream-community. Convincing the Ex-Fighters to demobilize and reintegrate to the society was one of the hindering factors.

Ethnic and Geographic Distribution

Out of the surveyed Ex-Fighters, almost all (99%) belonged to the *Tigray* ethnic group (Table 6.19). This pattern has its own impact on their reintegration process and changes the demographic composition of the locals. As the interview carried out with representatives of the TPLF, the majority of Tigray ethnic group who are originally from highland had settled in the western lowland areas of the region thus changing the demographic balance of areas of their return.

Table 6.19 Ethnic Distribution of the Ex-Fighters

Sex	Ethnicity		Total
	Tigray	Amhara	
Male	170	0	170
	100%	0%	100%
Female	28	2	30
	93.3%	6.7%	100%
Total	198	2	200
	99%	1%	100%

Source: Survey Results

One critical task in Army was to work with communities to make them aware of current developments which affect their daily life. The discussion with focus group; at the very beginning of the demobilization in order to gather the local/host community for common objective i.e. reintegration of Ex-Fighters was another factor which hinder to the process of reintegration because Ex-Fighters from the highlands were usually considered as foreigners in lowland areas.

As one key informant from local community who is living in the Baekar city neighbor to the study area said:

To receive the Ex-Fighters of the TPLF, persistent explanation and persuasion were carried out through representatives of the party organization and the Regional State. During this discussion I remembered that in order to avoid the difference that could be exist between the Ex-Fighters and the local community special attentions was given in developing of conflict resolution mechanisms

The Reintegration process should not assume a division between Ex-Fighters and host community because they often have common needs. Moreover, they must all be integrated into the same communities and society. At the same time, it cannot be denied that they have had separate experiences, which need to be taken into account. For example, the issue is usually more complex when gender, ethnicity, language, and religion are taken on board. Political and economic values can also bind or divide individuals or groups.

Reception and attitudes of host community towards the Ex-Fighters

When they first came home, Ex-Fighters remember the attitude of the civilian population towards them, as one key informant from 'Mender' 2 expresses the situation:

Everybody was joyful, those who came back and those who received them, all showed how happy they were although they might express it differently. The homecoming of their sons and daughters who fought for the country's peace, democracy and development was a great event for all community members. Nevertheless, from the beginning some former fighters were not warmly welcomed. They intensely remember that some family members were not eager to have them back. Because they feared, they eventually would have to share housing, land, and other property. It would however, be misleading to interpret the difficulties faced by both male and female Ex-Fighters in isolation from problems experienced by other civilian population.

The spontaneous Ex-Fighters did not expect any support from the government and thus took initiative to protect their livelihood. Although with time this attitude is changing, both group expected the government to solve their problems.

In line with the discussion carried out with the host community about the perception, they have towards of the Ex-Fighters:

...After the meeting with locals, the representatives of the party and the Regional States of Tigray and Amhara the local people had decided to receive the Ex-Fighters. However when the Ex-Fighters arrived in the settlement area due to the poor communication and wrong perceptions there were conflicts of interest with host community.

As we can learn from different authors and writers as well as researchers, let alone in the heterogeneous societies, in homogenous societies, differences can arise for variety of reasons. That

is, difference in age, sex, wealth, and status. From the field survey, the local communities around the settlement area have difference from the Ex-Fighters.

As in, the Table 6.20 clearly indicated the majority of the Ex-Fighters (75.5%) have good perception towards of the receiving community and their perceptions of the current situation rated well but this is not mean without conflict.

Table 6.20 Perception of the Ex-Fighters on the Host Community

Sex	Perception			Total
	Good	Medium	Bad	
Male	133	37	0	170
	78.2%	21.8%	0%	100%
Female	18	12	0	30
	60%	40%	0%	100%
Total	151	49	0	200
	75.5%	24.5%	0%	100%

Source: Survey Results

The frequency of conflict between the Ex-Fighters and members of the host society is a good indicator of their broad-mindedness, acceptance and ultimately integration. As shown in Table 6.21 the return of Ex-Fighters to their local communities does not occur without conflict. Interestingly the majority (60.5 percent) of the Ex-Fighters have not encounter a hostile attitude from the community.

Table 6.21 Conflict Encountered by Ex-fighters after Return

Sex	Responses		Total
	Yes	No	
Male	68	102	170
	40.0%	60.0%	100.0%
Female	11	19	30
	36.7%	63.3%	100.0%
Total	79	121	200
	39.5%	60.5%	100.0%

Source: Survey Results

One of the reasons could be that most of the Ex-Fighters stayed in their place of safety in the different part of the country and thus had less contact with local society. The political indoctrination they had experienced in the struggle during the armed struggle has also played a positive role. The Ex-Fighters have good relationships with the local communities which indicate as to how they are integrated to the main stream of the societies. This can be ensuring that 92% of the Ex-Fighters are in a good situation with their local communities (See Table 6.22).

Table 6.22 Ex-Fighters - Host Community Relationship

Sex	Good Relation		Total
	Yes	No	
Male	154	16	170
	90.6%	9.4%	100.0%
Female	30	0	30
	100.0%	.0%	100.0%
Total	184	16	200
	92.0%	8.0%	100.0%

Source: Survey Results

In the social reintegration process of the Ex-Fighters factors like religion, tribe, and other social aspects of the receiving community need special concern. From my own personal observation, most of these are not an issue among the Ex-Fighters. However, after their return to the society all these issues need proper handling. As to the finding presented in Table 6.23 difference in perception, particularly the political ideology played a major role in creation of gaps among the Ex-Fighters and host community. Culture and custom have also their own role for the differences.

Table 6.23 Types of Conflict Faced by Ex-Fighters

Sex	Kinds of the conflict						Total
	Cultural	Religious difference	Economic factor	Difference of perception or understanding	Security problem	No answer	
Male	3	3	13	61	1	89	170
	1.8%	1.8%	7.6%	35.9%	.6%	52.4%	100%
Female	0	0	5	6	0	19	30
	0%	0%	16.7%	20%	0%	63.3%	100%
Total	3	3	18	67	1	108	200
	1.5%	1.5%	9%	33.5%	.5%	54%	100%

Source: Survey Results

However, as indicated in Table 6.24, the great majority Ex-Fighters believed that economic factor and difference of perception between the Ex-Fighters and the host community was decreasing (78.5%). This is an improved sign and shows that slowly they are learning to co-exist together and thus were developing tolerance. This was observed in all the fieldwork sites and if there is any misunderstanding or conflict, it is little different from that within the society in general. In the field study, one of the key informants who had joined the army in 1981 expresses his feeling as follows:

The people of Tsegede have a good perception to us; at the time of the armed struggle, the people send his/her son/daughter to 'meda' to fight against the Derge regime. In addition, in the armed struggle in the area of our command post was here in Tsegede the people share with us all bad and good things. However, after demobilization particularly when we come to this area the

people have both good and bad perception: they have a feeling of good to receive the Ex-Fighters. On the other hand, those who have agricultural land in the area have bad reactions. Later on when we constructed elementary and high school and a referral hospital were constructed in the area the people started to secure and started to help us in the process of reintegration.

Some Ex-Fighters however, have faced absolute hostility from the host community. In a group discussion with a group of Ex-Fighters in Dansha-Division, most of them reported that at the very beginning of the reintegration process few of the receiving community was hostile towards them. At the same time, they had experienced a warm welcome from others. Neither did they get any help by the receiving community in dealing with the hardships of re-establishing their livelihood nor did the Tsegede administration assist them to speak the truth.

Nevertheless, social reintegration is also not easy to plan or to implement. It cannot be determined by government decrees, since much of its success depends on socio-cultural compatibility between Ex-Fighters and the host community. The level of understanding is basic to for coexistence of Ex-Fighters and their host community and a benchmark for successful reintegration.

Table 6.24 Trends of the Conflicts

Trend	Sex of Respondent		Total
	Male	Female	
Yes, they are increasing	37	6	43
	21.8%	20%	21.5%
No, they are decreasing	133	24	157
	78.2%	80%	78.5%
Total	170	30	200
	85%	15%	100%

Source: Survey Results

Integrating in the Local Social Associations

In order to reintegrate the Ex-Fighters to the mainstream of the society the social organization exercised by the community can help to have smooth relationships among the new comers and the host communities. In the case of the Dansha settlement the government has outlined the social networking on the DDR plan. Some of these efforts were made to organize the Ex-Fighters in the local social voluntary associations like *Idir*, *Mahber* and *Iqubr*. According to the interview with the Tabia administrator, 'our government was supporting us in facilitating funeral process and also the regular army and the local community around the settlement site were closely attending it, and the financial expenses were covered by the government'.

From the field survey as indicated in Table 6.24 the majority of the Ex-Fighters (80%) are members of the social voluntary association locally called as *Mahber*. *Mahber* is a voluntary association with the aim of enhancing social relationship and inter household interaction and it is a boarder less association i.e., anyone can be a member in line to the *Mahber* regulation (locally called *Serit*). In most of the time, the name given to the *Mahber* is taken from the nearby church and have great role in the social assistance. One of my civilian key informants who is living in Dansha Town, when the researcher asked about the social relation he has with the Ex-Fighters, he said:

We have 'Mahber' in the name of Saint Gebreal in Dansha-Division and this Mahber have 120 members out of these the majority are the demobilized Ex-Fighters. Twice in a year all members together with others celebrate the day of Saint Gebreal at the church i.e. in Mender 4.

On the other hand, the researcher asked other key informants from the adjacent small town call Baeker, and he stated the social relation they have with the Ex-Fighters as follows:

Locally we have several social associations like Iqub, Mahber, Idir, Sewa Senbet... my wife is the member of the Abune Aregawi Mahber, which is in the Dansha-Division Mender 6, and every year in October I participate in the festivity of the Mahber.

The Ex-Fighters have different social interests from these social associations. One of the Ex-Fighters noted the importance and the relation they have with the local community

In the settlement area, we have several public associations and it is possible to say in all these association, there are local non Ex-Fighters and local community as membership. Moreover, in every celebration of these Mahbers and when member of the Mahber sick, died or when he/she faced a problem social assistance will be given without discrimination. Therefore, we have good relationships with the community through these social associations.

In addition to the *Mahber*, the Ex-Fighters have a traditional joint credit association which is local named as *Iqub*. *Iqub* is a rotating credit system among the members as in Table 6.25 shown 29 percent of the surveyed Ex-Fighters are joined in the *Iqub*. This association has the role in solving the financial problem of households. In addition, members of the *Iqub* are the Ex-Fighters and the local community members (people).

Table 6.25 Ex-Fighters' Participation in the Local Social Association

Responses		Type of association/organization						Total
		Religious	Equb	Political	Mahber	Women Association	Not at all	
Yes	Count	1	55	49	80	1	0	186
	%	.5	29.6	26.3	43	.5	.0	100
No	Count	1	5	1	2	0	5	14
	%	7.1	35.7	7.1	14.3	.0	35.7	100
Total	Count	2	60	50	82	1	5	200
	%	1	30	25	41	.5	2.5	100

Source: Survey Results

Generally, from the field survey and my own personal observation the Ex-Fighters are integrated to the local communities through different local social associations like *Mahber*, *Idir* and *Iqub* and this all shows they have good relationships. In addition to the social voluntary association out of the surveyed Ex-Fighters 75.5 Percent, have a good relationships and friendships' with their previous comrades and members of the local community. (As indicated in Table 6.26)

Table 6.26 Ex-Fighters Relationship and Friendships with their Surrounding

Friend		Qualifying of the Relationship		Total
		Good	Medium	
Fighter	Count	58	22	80
	%	72.5	27.5	100
Civilian	Count	4	0	4
	%	100	0	100
No difference at all	Count	89	27	116
	%	76.7	23.3	100
Total	Count	151	49	200
	%	75.5	24.5	100

Source: Survey Results

Family Reintegration

Family relations are a vital element of social unity. Previously, most fighters were forced to cut all relations with their families, often for the whole time spent in the armed struggle. Therefore, one of the important problems faced by Ex-Fighters is the loss of ties with family or relatives during the long time of war and subsequent disorientation. For many of the Ex-Fighters the TPLF replaced the family of many fighters and after the demobilization they felt being abandoned, or even sent away and this sentiment is especially strong with the former female Ex-Fighters.

Table 6.27 Ex-Fighters' Family Contacts

Contact	Time					Total
	Rarely	Often	At least once a year	After two years	No answer	
Yes (78%)	25	62	67	2	0	156
	16%	39.7%	42.9%	1.3%	0%	100%
No (22%)	0	0	0	0	44	44
	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	100%
Total	25	62	67	2	44	200
	12.5%	31%	33.5%	1%	22%	100%

Source: Survey Results

Table 6.27 shows that the great majority of Ex-Fighters 78 percent have had contact with their families when they were in the armed struggle. Therefore, after long years of absence and a drastic

change in values and life style, it seems quite understandable that many Ex-Fighters felt separated from their families. In the informal discussion conducted with Ex-Fighters it was emphasized that the situation at the initial stage of the end of the civil war the communication conducted between the Ex-Fighters and host societies were as if in different wavelength. Nevertheless, through time it was changed.

After demobilization/reintegration, it would have been not only useful but also even necessary to work out appropriate mechanisms to bring the different experiences of Ex-Fighters and members of the local communities out into the open. This might serve to minimize misunderstandings, which as Table 6.23 indicates is the main cause of conflict between Ex-Fighters, and host community.

One of the social reintegration of Ex-Fighters was to integrate them to their family. In this regard, the majority of the Ex-Fighters visited their families at least once in every year See Table 6.28. However, the Ex-Fighters have shortage of money and transportation problem to visit and see their families located at far distance from the settlement area.

Table 6.28 Ex-Fighters' Visit their Family

Response		How often					Total
		Rarely	Often	At least once a year	No answer	After two Years	
Yes	Count	25	62	67	0	2	156
	%	16	39.7	42.9	0	1.3	100
No	Count	0	0	0	44	0	44
	%	0	0	0	100	0	100
Total	Count	25	62	67	44	2	200
	%	12.5	31	33.5	22	1	100

Source: Survey Results

Marriage Reintegration

In the DDR program particularly in reintegrating the Ex-Fighters to the mainstream of the society marriage reintegration is one of the social factors that need a careful handling because the Ex-Fighters could have their own military culture (socialization) on marriage system. On the other hand, the receiving community could have their own marriage culture. When we see in the case of Dansha settlement, the Ex-Fighters have developed different marriage system which is different from the receiving community. In Army, the fighters had learned to disregard ethnic and religious differences, but unfortunately, their civilian relatives had not reached this reasonable stage; and,

they often-rejected the sons and daughters in-law for not belonging to their ethnic or religious affiliation.

According to the rules and guidelines TPLF/EPRDF, during the army struggle, marriage was not allowed. The Marriage Law was introduced in 1979. The new marriage law is also based on the free choice of both partners. The following response from an in-depth interview conducted with one of the *Tabia* Administrator, he points out that:

Before 1979 it was forbidden to marry, even after the publication of the marriage law you could have girl/boy friend however to have families was not allowed. Therefore, fighters had no households during that time. Nevertheless, those who have joined the armed struggle separating from their households they may have families in their home.

The culture, norm, value, ethnicity, and religion were not having difference. Even though, marriage is the basic thing in life, everybody thinks about how to achieve the given objectives of the organization.

In the army, the fighters' community has gone beyond the traditional norms of marriage; and intercultural marriage became slowly the order of the day. However, after the demobilization, this has created a big problem. The discussion with focus group shows that there has been lack of acceptance by priest (locally called Keshi) his or her son/daughter being married to someone belongs to another religion. In some minor cases, families could not accept a marriage partner who came outside their region. This was one factor which hinders the Ex-Fighters to integrate to the society and to some extent; there was divorce among the Ex-Fighters.

As previously discussed about the marital status of the Ex-Fighters (Table 6.4), majority of them have been married. Based on the interview with the discussion group marriage in the armed struggle was quite different from the civilian society. It did not demand a special arrangement rather the agreement between the female and male Ex-Fighters. In this regard, the fighting time culture has its own implication on the reintegration process. One of the key informants stated the situation as follows: -

In the very beginning of the settlement, the culture we had developed in the armed struggle created social conflict. For example, when we need to marry with civilian the prior arrangement for marriage like gezmi, has a negative impact because it was not familiar in the armed struggle marriage system. This culture was not only having an impact on the Ex-Fighters rather it also created a problem in our household. However, this situation was solved.

Similarly, in the group discussion one person said;

The marriage system in the settlement area have had bad situation for female Ex-Fighters, because in armed struggle female Ex-Fighters have equal right with male and they were

independent, such condition was not conducive for the local community which the male dominancy is acceptable by the local community. The community had negative perception on female Ex-Fighters. The communities do not have interest to marry female Ex-Fighters

Another key informant who joined the army in 1980 commented as follows:

In the armed struggle, the men respected us, our ideas, our strength... but in a society of ours, they now respect make-up, nice hair, being a proper housewife...If we kneel down to what they want, we'll end up back in the 'wishato' (kitchen).

In the reintegration process, the cultural differences in the marriage system have negative impacts on the social reintegration. However, from the field survey as shown in Table 6.29 the problem have been solved and the intermarriage between Ex-Fighters and civilian did not have differences and it is common in both female and male. Therefore, we can conclude that the marriage issue between the Ex-Fighters and civilian were very difficult in the settlement area in the beginning however, currently such cultural difference was no more in the area and the Ex-Fighters are socially integrated with the local societies.

Table 6.29 the Intermarriage between Ex-Fighters and Host Community

Response		Usually Common in				Total
		Male	Female	No difference	No answer	
Yes	Count	14	17	152	1	184
	%	7.6	9.2	82.6	.5	100
No	Count	0	1	5	10	16
	%	0	6.3	31.3	62.5	100
Total	Count	14	18	157	11	200
	%	7	9	78.5	5.5	100

Source: Survey Results

Other than the marriage, in reflection to the gender relations' experiences from different countries illustrated, shown countries that are in case of patriarchal societies and where women fought as combatants, women have often been unwilling to return to their previous subservient positions, once peace and security have been restored. In other cases, women and girls who were associated with fighting forces and/or became "bush wives" often encounter huge difficulties, discrimination and stigmatization when they try to return to their communities of origin. Based on observation, the female Ex-Fighter of the TPLF in the study area the experience they had gained in the army never influenced to lead their livelihood.

It is argued that children had to be brought up in a normal atmosphere outside the military and that their mothers should have the opportunity to devote the necessary time to childcare. This does not make sense for the responsibility should be equal for both sexes.

One of my key informants who was demobilized after her service years of 12 years in the armed struggle underscores the current situation concerning the childcare responsibilities as follows: -

In the army children born from fighters, their rearing falls on both male and female members of the unit. The Unit, which was taking care of the kids, was called kindergarten. Both men and women were equally assigned to take care of our kids. I do not think that can be replicated now for couples currently live together and should take the responsibility together.

Dispute Resolution

Dispute resolution is also important at the community level. Here, the role and moral authority of community leaders and traditional leaders may prove particularly important. The most common practice used by a community in dispute resolution in the region is mediation through which a neutral third party helps others resolve a dispute or difference. Traditional elders from the community spoke of the process of mediation as follows:

Third party mediators provide rural residents with access to justice and settling disputes which otherwise would have been a big problem. Usually people who are accepted as mediators are known for their honesty or they are individuals gifted by God and who can persuade disputants to comply. Usually mediators educate, criticize and effectively encourage disputants towards their own position.

They accordingly forward the following:

We, who are engaged in mediation work, should use our mouth, legs and eyes and be very attentive to the sadness, worries, grief's...etc., of the population mostly. My son, this means we should constantly explain the importance of living together in harmony and tolerance without fatigue. For example, in order to understand the current situation of my people, I pay frequent visits to individual houses. When I hear or sense any symptoms of dispute, I attempt to settle them immediately before they create problems and become too serious.

Table 6.30 Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

Sex	Mechanism					Total
	Intervention from police	Intervention from the army	Mediators	Meeting	Court	
Male	5	1	81	75	8	170
	2.9%	.6%	47.6%	44.1%	4.7%	100%
Female	3	0	9	13	5	30
	10%	0%	30%	43.3%	16.7%	100%
Total	8	1	90	88	13	200
	4%	.5%	45%	44%	6.5%	100%

Source: Survey Results

This persuasive role of the 'shemagle' (go between) was observed in nearly all the villages visited during the fieldwork. Mediation centered on consensus-building intervention is an appropriate model that has survived in the locals. As Table 6.30 clearly demonstrates, the majority 45 percent

of Ex-Fighters surveyed reported that the contradictions they faced in their day-to-day reintegration efforts were most commonly sorted out by mediation. The existence of mediators and mediation procedures could be seen as evidence that the moral authority of the elders continues to make a positive contribution and can serve as an indicator of socialization. In addition to the mediators, meetings also have a great value in solving the problems which exist in the settlement area. This indicates that the social reintegration process have a positive remark especially the ability both (the Ex-Fighters and the local community) developed to solve their problem without the intervention of security organs like police, army and courts. If reintegration is to be successful, Ex-Fighters need to negotiate their way through diversified processes.

Psychological Reintegration

Many war survivors have endured multiple disturbances like physical misery, injury, torture, rape, and imprisonment, witnessing torture or massacre, as well as the death of family members. In some cases, this has resulted in irregular/anti-social behavior. Ongoing psychological counseling can assist in limiting the range of anti-social behaviors which adversely affect the social reintegration of the Ex-Fighters in particular. Thus, an adequate number of people need to be trained in counseling techniques to help Ex-Fighters to solve their own problems.

One of my key informants said:

In the demobilization and reintegration process, attention was not given for counseling. There was no any trained social counselor who could solve our psychological problems in the reintegration processes.

Obviously, it is well known that counseling assist the reintegration process specially to meet the psychosocial needs of the Ex-Fighters as a whole and particularly those disabled in consequence of the war and Ex-Fighters with mental disturbances. From the field survey Ex-Fighters with little education and skills face tremendous problems in finding a job. Female household heads, widows, or women who are divorced or separated from their husbands usually have financial problems and wounded, disabled, and distressed individuals will have to be helped to get appropriate medical care.

From the field survey and group discussion with the Ex-Fighters, the problems they had encountered after their demobilization have been to issues related to land. According to a key informant of the study area dispute brought to the attention of the governor was related to land use.

The maximum number is an indicator that land issues need careful attention and systematic and wise handling.


The majority of the Ex-Fighters (i.e., more than 75%) recognized that their perception of personal situation is better than what they had before the army. From the field survey as indicated in Table 6.31 the majority of them (83 %) did not changed their place of residence and their reason is basically 'no alternative'. However, around 57 percent of the surveyed Ex-Fighters are not intended to stay in the settlement area (Dansha-Division) due to the problem they have ranked in Figure 6.1.

Table 6.31 Ex-Fighters Interest to Stay in the Area

Sex		Number of times you changed sites.				Total
		One	Two	Three	More than three times	
Male	Count	139	18	10	3	170
	%	81.8	10.6	5.9	1.8	100
Female	Count	27	2	1	0	30
	%	90	6.7	3.3	.0	100
Total	Count	166	20	11	3	200
	%	83	10	5.5	1.5	100

Source: Survey Results

Figure 6.2 Basic Problems of the Ex-Fighters



Source: Survey Results

As indicated in Figure 6.2 the major problems of the Ex-Fighters are lack of financial and health problem together covers about 66% of the problem. Moreover, these enforced the Ex-Fighters to request for economic advice from their families (41% of the surveyed Ex-Fighters), they could not help their families financially (54% of the surveyed Ex-Fighters), and are unable to visit their families due to financial constraints (79.5% of the surveyed Ex-Fighters).

To sum up to achieve the reintegration program of the Ex-Fighters the social and psychological aspects should have to take into consideration. As discussed in the dimension of the economic reintegration, the efforts made are playing a role of safety net. However, the social aspects of the Ex-Fighters were not given due consideration when designing the reintegration program. From the field survey and in-depth interviews, shows that if economic intervention is not incorporated with social and psychological intervention cannot lead to successful reintegration. However, the more emphasis of the program as well as of concrete measures was on economic interventions. It was believed that ensuring economic livelihoods of the Ex-Fighters is a primary issue, and once this was achieved, other problems would gradually became less pressing. But interviews with the Ex-Fighters have provided persuasive evidence that social and psychological aspects have not been given due consideration in the design of re-integration programs and that this lack has had negative effects on the re-integration process.

Due to a far more drastic change in values and attitude, which they experienced in the field, ex-fighters initially faced greater conflicts with the local community but currently the trend of misunderstanding between the Ex-Fighters and the receiving community is decreasing. This positive trend is largely due to the traditional conflict solving mechanism like mediation and meetings. As field findings show, female Ex-Fighters face more problems in trying to adjust to their new environment than do their male counter parts. The tremendous social transformation female fighters experienced during the armed struggle were not given its due weight when the process of reintegration of ex-Fighters was planned and implemented. Field findings show that the traditional structures of mutual support like the local associations and organizations *Mahber*, *Iqub*, *Sewa-Senbet*, and other moreover, that new support networks were created and brought to play an important role in reintegrating the Ex-Fighters to the main stream of the community. Almost all the Ex-Fighters have owned their house and more than half of them are joined in the local voluntarily associations. Furthermore, the infrastructures and the schools and health centers constructed have played positive roles in reintegrating of the Ex-Fighters to the local societies.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Summary

This thesis assesses the demobilization and reintegration of the TPLF Ex-Fighters. The position taken in this thesis is that reintegration must be understood as the human dimension of a broader process of rehabilitation, which in the case of TPLF/EPRDF has been underway throughout the post-conflict 1991 period.

After the two decades of armed struggle, efforts were made to endorse the Constitution that realizes the equalities of all the Nation, Nationality and People of the Ethiopian and to do other things in line with the FDRE 1994 Constitution. The demobilization and reintegration program was one of the priorities to demobilize the TPLF/EPRDF fighters.

As several authors, writers and researchers have argued that demobilization and reintegration can be only successful if it is planned and implemented as part of a long-term development concept. The TPLF lead Transitional Government of Ethiopia has placed strong emphasis on mutual commitment, reconciliation and building a country in the will of all the Nation, Nationality and Peoples' of the country. Thus the demobilization and reintegration have been done as part of the overall development process of the country and all the Nation, Nationality and Peoples' of the country can be brought together to contribute their own efforts in the future Ethiopian National Modern Defense Forces.

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopian DDR program was not because of the external push factor rather it was mainly due to the constitutional enforcement and the political will of the EPRDF party and its' fighters. This can be realized from the objectives of the party which had stands for the equalities of the Nation, Nationality and People of the country. Although the program was given more emphasis to economic reintegration as compared to the other experiences, for the achievement of the program the Party and its Fighters had a strong feeling in accepting and implementing the decision.

Immediately after the endorsement of the Constitution, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia has decided to demobilize some of the TPLF fighting forces and to support the reintegration of the Ex-Fighters.

In the development of demobilization and reintegration of Ex-Fighters, planning has a crucial part for that achievement. In this regard when the program was designed, the socio economic situations of the Fighters were not taken place. From the very outset the reintegration support measures were oriented towards solving the economic problems of the Ex-Fighters and strengthen their economic capacities without any intention of the social support and in some aspects by special psychosocial counseling activities. If it had been carried out, earlier this might help the project designers to mitigate different costs and failures. In the reintegration process when Ex-Fighters initially started their new life either after Demobilization, they had high expectations which sometimes had been fostered by promises and which were not always fulfilled. From the field survey, this research also confirmed that the orientation which was given for the Ex-Fighters in the early stage of the program was over ambitious and somewhat exaggerated. These were the basic hindrances of the achievement of the program and created disappointment and frustrations, among the Ex-Fighters.

In the Demobilization and Reintegration Program external assistance, particularly the financial one contributed positively special particularly for the war torn society like Ethiopia. So that the TGE had find out the financial constraints and the need to develop its capacity, the government choose for national execution, with international organizations being asked to provide financial support and technical services, mainly in the field of capacity building, rather than substituting local capacities. However, in the demobilization program the response and promise given from the International donors was late, mean while the concerned body who have given the responsibilities of the program also lack experience in such situation. As a result, the implementation of the program especially at the early stage was weak forced to rely entirely on the internal capacities.

Reintegration of Ex-Fighters, by its nature, needs an integrated approach to be successful. In this regard, the field survey ensured that the actions taken by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia shows that the participatory of the host community, local elders, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), the Regional States of both the Tigray and Amhara National Regional States, the members of the TPLF/EPRDF party etc. Due to the shortcomings happened at the early stage of the demobilization and reintegration program the communal way of life in the settlement area was failed particularly in 1994-1995. Later on, corrective measures were taken like the facilitation to collect the financial and in kind, premises from NGOs and to use internal capacities like the involvement of the regular army. For example, after the correction actions individual way of life were assured by land ownership, employment creation, health centers and house construction.

In the reintegration process, orientations, discussions and training have contributed a lot to the improvement of qualifications of the Ex-Fighters, and to their chances of becoming self-employed. Except the agricultural farming that was introduced later the Ex-Fighters were not trained in any type. On the Other hand, the Ex-Fighters skills and knowledge acquired informally during the struggle were also not taken to consideration to be used and applied in the different economic sectors. The presence of the Hiwot Agricultural Mechanism and the activities of different investors around the settlement area can be taken as positive potential for the Ex-Fighters in creation of job opportunities.

Demobilization and Reintegration Program have special value for the war torn societies, particularly for the fighters, who are departing from their families and relatives social settings. From the field survey, the Ex-Fighters of the TPLF/EPRDF have faced problems in their attempts to join the mainstream way of life mainly because of difference in perception and understanding in their relationship with the host community. However, these problems have tended to decrease progressively when they started merge with the receiving. At the same time the study show that female Ex-Fighters experience more problems in relation to the traditions which are deep-rooted in the mind of the society. Female Ex-Fighters although they have land, they complain that they were not treated in line with their physical disabilities. In such a way the demobilization and reintegration activities, the gender perspectives need to take into account.

The Ex-Fighters are mainly involved in the agricultural activities because most of the Ex-Fighters are originated from rural areas having with farming experiences. Although the credit scheme has its own problem, the presence of rural credit institute in the settlement site it had positive impact on their daily life. As a result, in addition to the farming activities, they are involving in non-farming activities. The Settler are adopted the new environment in different ways.

The reintegration of the Ex-Fighters to the civilian life could not be easy for different social settings have been developed during the armed struggle. In the armed struggle, the Ex-Fighters developed an opened mind to adopt with new social settings that have positive impact for relationships and helped the reintegration process. On the other hand, the social and public organization (like Idir, Iqub, Mahber, co-operatives, gender associations...) established in the settlement area has had a positive impact on the process of reintegration. Furthermore, the

infrastructures and the schools and health centers play a positive role in reintegrating of the Ex-Fighters to the local societies.

Conflicts concerning to land rights, economical, political beliefs etc were solved using the local mediators and through local meetings with the involvement of both the Ex-Fighters and the host community members located in the settlement area and its surroundings.

Findings from the field survey reveal that many of the Ex-Fighters feel bitter. The overall demobilization and reintegration endeavor by the Government of Ethiopia shows positive development. However, the designed programs were full of shortcomings and are unable to achieve the intended program. Furthermore, still there are serious errors in the implementation process particularly in realizing what the government has promised to the Ex-Fighters after demobilization. Finally, from the long-term sustainability of the Ex-Fighters their current physical situations need special attentions and curious follow up and assistance and support.

7.2 Recommendations

From the field survey, the discussion carried out with the focus group and key informants and representatives of the local and the TPLF and other relevant sources. This thesis positioned that the overall situation of the demobilization and reintegration program which emanated from the good willing of the Nation, Nationality and People of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia realized in the Constitution have a positive impact on the future Ethiopia. The researcher would like to recommend the following points: -

1. Reintegration especially in countries with less economic development like Ethiopia should be done jointly, coordinately and integrated and community-based approaches should be followed). To avoid the problems faced in the demobilization and reintegration process of the TPLF Ex-Fighters all stakeholders should work together.
2. Ex-Fighters have had better experienced and acquired skills in the armed struggle so that it was important to take into consideration for the DDR to be successful. If well-planned and organized efforts were taken Ex-Fighters might be effective in their future economic activities.
3. Reintegration Process is not a short-term one. It is rather a long term which needs an integrated efforts and continuous follow up. From this point of view, the gender, physical,

social and economic situations of the Ex-Fighters to be demobilized and the receiving community need to consider and to identify the assistance (economical, social and political) they need in the short and long-term reintegration.

4. To sustain the lives of the Ex-Fighters and to make them self-reliance training has its own value. Financial support alone could not be a sole problem solving mechanism. Like one of my key informant said 'well without water is valueless' establishment of rural credit institution are important instruments so as to make it fruitful the Ex-Fighters need to get different trainings.
5. Fighters, who served in the army for long time, did not want to separate from their service unit and think their life out of the army will be dark. At the very beginning of the process it needs to give psychosocial counseling and make preparation. One of the factors which frustrate the Ex Fighters was lack of Counselors which helps them in social and cultural relevant issues.
6. In the social reintegration, process of the Ex-Fighters to avoid any other conflicts which can exist in the settlement area all interventions designed must address their issue together with the host community.
7. The role of EPRDF/TPLF Ex-Fighters role in the armed struggle and their involvement throughout Ethiopian political, economic, social, cultural and military history is a topic that has government received scant attention in literature, and research works. So, I strongly recommended researchers to work and do on this area and come up with new and better findings and solutions.

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Annex I
Questionnaire For household Survey of the Ex-Fighters

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

INSTITUTE of REGIONAL AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Questionnaire for the survey on the Socio-Economic Reintegration of the TPLF/EPRDF Ex-Fighters in the post 1991 Conflict: the case of Dansha-Division Settlement, Tigray

Code _____

Respondent identification number _____

Wereda _____ Tabia _____ kebele /Mender _____

Name of interviewer _____

Name of supervisor _____

Date of interview _____

INTRODUCTION:

I am one of the students of Addis Ababa University studying regional and local development studies. As partial requirement of the program I am undertaking a research study titled the Socio-Economic Reintegration of the Ex-Fighters in the post 1991 Conflict the case of Dansha Settlement, Tigray.

The purpose of this questionnaire is to better understand concerning the economic, social, cultural, and psychological reintegration and also incorporates a gender dimension.

This research is being undertaken in the Dansha-Division Settlement, Western Zone of Tigray, the results will be used to inform policy makers and development planners in the country with practical facts about the reintegration of the ex-fighters which have a value for the Ministry of Defense because of the fact that demobilization is something which could visit now and then wherever the situation demands.

Thus, your genuine response is of paramount importance for the success of the study, and the researcher kindly requests your cooperation in so doing. Please be sure that all information you provided will be treated as strictly confidential and be used purely for the purpose of the study.

Thank you very much for your time and co-operation.

(1) Basic information or Profile of the Ex-Fighters

- 1.1 Name _____
- 1.2 Sex (A) Male _____ (B) Female _____
- 1.3 Origin (A) Urban _____ (B) Semi-urban _____ (C) Rural _____
- 1.4 Ethnicity (A) Tigray _____ (B) Amhara _____ (C) Afar _____ (D) Oromo _____
(E) NSSNP _____ (I) Other _____
- 1.5 How old are you? _____
- 1.6 Marital Status (A) Single (never married) _____ (B) Married _____ (C) Widow _____
(D) Separated _____ (E) Divorced _____ (F) living with some one _____
- 1.7 Number of children (A) None _____ (B) One _____ (C) Two _____ (D) Three _____ (E) Four _____
(F) more than four _____
- 1.8 What was your level of education at the end of the army struggle?
(A) Elementary _____ (B) Middle school _____ (C) Secondary school _____
(D) Above secondary _____ (E) Other _____ Specify _____
- 1.9 Have you acquired skill? (A) Yes _____ (B) No _____
- 1.10 If yes, what kind? (A) Craftsmanship _____ (B) Barefoot doctor _____ (C) Radio operator _____
(D) Mechanic _____ (E) Petty-trade _____ (F) Administration _____ (G) Construction _____
(H) Other _____ (I) specify _____

(2) Information about the life history in the struggle and after

- 2.1 What was the reason to join the struggle? _____
- 2.2 Number of years of service in the army struggle. _____
- 2.3 Position held in the military. (A) Simple _____ (B) Unit _____ (C) Platoon _____
(D) Company _____ (E) Battalion _____ (F) Above _____
- 2.4 While active in the army what skill had you developed? _____
- 2.5 How do you find life in the struggle? (A) Bad _____ (B) Good _____ (C) Not bad and not Good _____
- 2.6 Did you have contacts with your family or relatives during the struggle?
(A) In between 1-12 months _____ (B) Yearly _____ (C) Once in Two years _____ (D) Once in three
years _____ (E) Once in four years _____ (F) More than four years _____ (G) Not at all _____
(H) Other _____ Specify _____
- 2.7 How do you feel being a fighter?
(A) I feel embarrassed being a fighter _____ (B) I feel proud _____ (C) No comment _____

(3) Information about the demobilization and Living condition

- 3.1 When was your date of Demobilization? (A) Before 1995 _____ (B) 1995 _____ (C) 1996 _____
(D) 1997 _____ (E) 1998 _____ (F) Others _____ specify _____
- 3.2 Were you expecting Demobilization?
(A) It was unexpected _____ (B) I had expected it _____ (C) I was asking _____ (D) I had panicked _____
- 3.3 What type of house are you living?
(A) Tukul _____ (B) Hidimo _____ (C) One room house _____ (D) More than one room _____
(F) Other _____ specify _____
- 3.4 How do you rate your housing situation to the one existing before joining the struggle?
(A) All the same _____ (B) Now, it is better _____ (C) It was better before _____
(D) Other _____ Specify _____
- 3.5 Who owns the house you are currently living in?
(A) My family _____ (B) I own it _____ (C) My friend _____ (D) It is owned by my relatives _____
(E) Government owned _____ (F) Other _____ specify _____
- 3.6 What are you doing currently? (A) Employed _____ (B) Self-employed _____ (C) Family enterprise _____
(D) Working with a partner _____ (E) Unemployed _____ (F) Other _____ specify _____
- 3.7 After Demobilization what problems did you encounter?
(A) Land _____ (B) Lack of skill _____ (C) House rent _____ (D) Lack of fund _____ (E) Health Problem _____
(F) Family/relative acceptance _____ (G) Child-care _____ (H) Other _____ specify _____

- 3.8 Did you settle in one area after Demobilization? (A) Yes _____ (B) No _____
- 3.9 If yes why? _____
- 3.10 If not, why not? (A) To join relatives/family members _____ (B) In search of a Job _____ (C) In search of training _____ (D) In search of land _____ (E) Because of not being accepted by the community _____ (F) Other _____ specify _____
- 3.11 Number of times you changed sites.
(A) One _____ (B) Two _____ (C) Three _____ (E) More than three times _____
- 3.12 How long do you intend to stay in your present place of residence?
(A) I have no intention of staying here at all _____ (B) Until I have enough money to return to my place of origin _____ (C) I had selected as my residence place _____ (D) Other _____ specify _____
- 3.13 If you intends to move to another place why?
(A) Because of health problem _____ (B) Economic problem _____ (C) Family Problem _____ (D) Administration problem _____ (E) Other _____ specify _____
- 3.14 Perception of personal situation at present. (A) Bad _____ (B) Medium _____ (C) Good _____
Why? _____
- 3.15 Did your expectation-matched reality after Demobilization?
(A) Yes _____ (B) No _____ (C) Give reasons _____

(4) Information about the economic situation

- 4.1 Did you receive Demobilization money?(A) Yes _____ (B) No _____
- 4.2 If yes, how much? _____
- 4.3 How did you spend it? (A) To sustain livelihood _____ (B) To help my parents _____
(C) Other _____ specify _____
- 4.4 Did you get any support to enable you to carry out your present activity? (A) Yes _____ (B) No _____
- 4.5 If yes, who helped you? (A) Family _____ (B) Friends _____ (C) Community leaders _____
(D) Administration _____ (E) Others _____
specify _____
- 4.6 If you encounter a problem whom do you refer to?
(A) Family _____ (B) Friends _____ (C) Community leaders _____ (D) Administration _____
(E) Others _____ specify _____
- 4.7 Are you able to help your family financially? (A) Yes _____ (B) No _____
- 4.8 If yes how often? (A) Regularly _____ (B) Some times _____ (C) Rarely _____ (D) Other _____ specify _____
- 4.9 Are you engaged in work the whole year? (A) Yes _____ (B) No _____
- 4.10 If not, how do you manage to make ends meet?
(A) Occasional job _____ (B) Petty trade _____ (C) Remittance _____ (D) Other _____ Specify _____
- 4.11 What property do you own? _____
- 4.12 Did you get any training after Demobilization? (A) Yes _____ (B) No _____
- 4.13 If yes, what kind? _____
- 4.14 Did you get on the job training after Demobilization? (A) Yes _____ (B) No _____
- 4.15 If yes, what kind? (A) Carpentry _____ (B) Mechanics _____ (C) Embroidery _____ (D) Driving _____
(E) Construction _____ (F) Others _____ specify _____
- 4.16 Are you using the skill you learned? (A) Yes _____ (B) No _____
- 4.17 If not, why not? _____
- 4.18 How is your economic situation compared to your friends?
(A) Better _____ (B) Equal _____ (C) Worse _____ (D) No comment _____
- 4.19 If worse can you specify it? _____

(5) Information about the socio-psychological and community situation

- 5.1 How do you spend your extra time?
(A) At home _____ (B) Social obligation _____ (C) Work _____ (D) Other _____ specify _____
- 5.2 Do you belong to local association/Organization? (A) Yes _____ (B) No _____
- 5.3 If yes, what type of association/organization? _____

- (A) Cultural____ (B) Religious____ (C) Economic (Ecube)____ (D) Political____
 (E) Village organization (Mahber)____ (F) Other____ specify_____
- 5.4 Do you have your own household? (A) Yes____ (B) No____
- 5.5 If yes, who are the members?
 (A) Husband____ (B) Wife____ (C) Children____ (D) Parents or in laws____
 (E) Dependent____ (F) others____ specify_____
- 5.6 Do you visit family members? (A) Yes____ (B) No____
- 5.7 If not, Why not? _____
- 5.8 If yes, how often?
 (A) Rarely____ (B) Often____ (C) at list once a year____ (D) Other____ Specify_____
- 5.9 Do you ask family members for advice? (A) Yes____ (B) No____ Specify_____
- 5.10 If yes, what kind of advice? (A) Economic____ (B) Personal____ (C) Social related problems____
 (D) Others____ specify_____
- 5.11 Do family members come to you for visit/help? (A) Yes____ (B) No____
- 5.12 Who is your best friend? (A) Fighter____ (B) Civilian____ (C) No difference at all____
- 5.13 Do you feel your experience in the struggle had helped you to create good relation with the receiving community? (A) Yes____ (B) No____
- 5.14 Is intermarriage common between fighters and Civilians? (A) Yes____ (B) No____
- 5.15 If yes, whom do they usually marry? (A) Male____ (B) Female____ (C) No difference____
- 5.16 Are there conflict among the ex-fighters and host community? (A) Yes____ (B) No____
- 5.17 If yes what kind? (A) Cultural____ (B) Religious difference____ (B) Economic factors____
 (C) Difference of perception or understanding____ (D) Other____ specify_____
- 5.18 Do you think that these conflicts are increasing?
 (A) Yes; they are increasing____ (B) No; they are decreasing____ (C) No change____
 (D) Other____ Specify_____
- 5.19 How are conflicts resolved? (A) Intervention from the police____ (B) Intervention from the army____ (C) Mediators____ (D) Meeting____ (E) Court____ (F) Other____ specify_____
- 5.20 Concerning female ex-fighters, how is their situation compared to that of struggle?
 (A) Good____ (B) Medium____ (C) Worse____ Why?_____
- 5.21 As demobilized fighters how do you qualify your relationship with your surrounding?
 (A) Bad____ (B) Medium____ (C) Good____
- 5.22 If good, why?
 (A) For we fought brought freedom____ (B) Because we help them in day to day activity____
 (C) For we are their sons and daughter____ (D) They respect fighters____ (E) They had respect for the Arm Struggle____ (F) Other____ Specify_____
- 5.23 If bad, why? Chose one only
 (A) Our livelihood depends on them____ (B) Economic reasons____ (C) We have different Perception in understanding things____ (D) Their attitude towards fighters is bad____ (E) Other____ specify_____
- 5.24 If medium, why? _____

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION. I WISH YOU ALL THE BEST.

Annex II
Interview Guide for an in-depth interview with TPLF, EMoND
representatives/NGO

1. What were the reasons and essential requirements for the demobilization of the ex-fighters?
2. What were the preparations made for the success of the demobilization program at state, community and individual level?
3. Were the programs properly developed before and monitored during their implementation?
4. What looks like the psychological readiness of the ex-fighters before the demobilization process?
5. Reintegration by its nature slow social, economic and psychological process, what are the short and long run plan to make the process successful?
6. Are the local communities participated (particularly the receiving community found in the settlement area) in developing the demobilization and reintegration process?
7. What factors influence/greater challenges of the reintegration program?
8. What are the mechanisms the government has been using to adapt the shortcomings?
9. Which government body was taken the responsibility and coordination of the reintegration and demobilization program?
10. What supports have been given for the ex-fighters during and after demobilization specially to avoid prolonged dependency on relief?
11. How effective has been the intended and unintended results of the reintegration program?
12. In assessing the economic benefits of the project, how do you see the individual benefits and general economic achievement?
13. In most cases donor agencies have their own approach in DDR, how far the International Aid Agency affected the success of the process?
14. How were the relationship of the donor countries with the national government, and coordination of the various interventions?
15. When designing reintegration programs, did the government take into consideration the capacities of the ex-fighters and what has to be done to up-grade their skills and make them more marketable?
16. What resources have been made available to help the ex-fighters to rebuild their lives?
17. What kind of safety net is put in place to help ex-fighters who cannot secure livelihood?

Annex III
**Interview Guide for an in-depth interview with local administrators/
associations**

1. Are their factors that causes for frustration and disillusionment among Ex-Fighters?
2. What are the efforts made to consolidate (build-up) the interaction with neighboring village community?
3. Are their factors, which may have contributed to keeping the networks and social structures intact among the ex-fighters and the receiving community?
4. What were the role of local administrators to be aware of the importance of fostering an understanding between ex-fighters and their community?
5. In assessing the economic benefits of the project, how do you see the individual benefits and general economic achievement?
6. The ex-fighters have been exposed to different ways of life and experiences and thus have developed different norms; values and attitudes, putting them together in settlement are not conducive to them entering into main stream society, what was the situation at ground?
7. What resources have been made available to help the ex-fighters to rebuild their lives?
8. What kind of safety net is put in place to help Ex-Fighters who cannot secure livelihood?
9. What are the major social organizations created by ex-fighters or neighboring community in the area and what are their roles?
10. How do you view the strength and weaknesses of the reintegration process (in relation to the social, economical, and psychological aspects)?
11. Did the community participate in the reintegration process (planning, implementing and evaluation of the program)?
12. How conflicts (be it subjective or objective) are resolving whenever existed (between ex-fighters and local community, among the Ex-Fighters)?

Annex IV

Interview Guide/Check list for the Focus Group/group Discussion

Date

Group Members

Name

1	Age.....	Sex
2	Age.....	Sex
3	Age.....	Sex
4	Age.....	Sex
5	Age.....	Sex
6	Age.....	Sex
7	Age.....	Sex

1. What were the reasons to join the struggle?
2. How far your attitudes towards the communities have changed due to participation in the struggle?
3. What could you say about the positive/negative implications of family ties during the struggle against the Derge Regime and after demobilization?
4. Before you had joined to the army struggle what was your economic and social base?
5. During the army struggle you and you wife/husband had shared the good and bad moments, can you tell me current household life?
6. How do review the social and cultural networking with the community and among the Ex-Fighters during the struggle and after demobilization?
7. How do you view the role of your comrades during in the battlefield and in your current situation (after demobilization)?
8. Geographically the settlement area is harsh climate with a serious malaria problem; however, what factors causes you to move Dansha?
9. Do you get support from the local government/community or one another?
10. What problem did face before and after demobilization and how you cope with the new environment?
11. What benefit do you get after demobilization?
12. How social conflicts were solved in the army struggle, are they currently (after demobilization) exercised in solving conflicts with in Ex-Fighters or with local communities (try to elaborate the social organizations and their roles in solving social conflicts)?
13. Do you feel that the ethnic composition of the Ex-Fighters and the receiving community had created conducive atmosphere in the re-integration process?

14. How do you see the current economic base situation compared to the host community?
15. How do you view the different accumulated wealth of valuable skills and other related experience in contrast of the life you exercising after demobilization?
16. TPLF as a member party of the EPRDF, there was a group collection with consists of different cultural, economical, socio-psychological views and practices can you tell me the implications created in your way of life particularly in interrelation with the receiving community?
17. How can you view the gender equality in the army struggle and what you comment with regard to the demobilization of women fighters if it was up to the standard of the armed struggle and currently engendering process?
18. What resistance does face women Ex-Fighters from the receiving community?
19. What looks like the sustainability after the termination of the support interventions?
20. Were the expectations you have before demobilization matching reality (economical, social and psychological)?

DECLARATION

I declared that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university, and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Dawit Anagaw Signature _____ Date _____

Addis Ababa University

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as a university advisor.

Woldeab Teshome (Ph. D)

Signature

Date

