



**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**

**FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS**

**MA PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND  
DIPLOMACY**

**THE RECENT ETHIO-ERITREA RAPPROCHEMENT: CHALLENGES  
AND PROSPECTS**

**BY**

**TEREFE BESHANA BINEGDE**

**JUNE, 2019**

**ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA**

**THE RECENT ETHIO-ERITREA RAPPROCHEMENT: CHALLENGES AND  
PROSPECTS**

**BY**

**TEREFE BESHANA BINEGDE**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES OF THE  
ADDISABABA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT  
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF ARTS (MA) IN INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY**

**ADVISOR**

**DEMEKE ACHISO (PhD)**

**JUNE, 2019  
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA**

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**  
**SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**  
**THE RECENT ETHIO-ERITREA RAPPROCHEMENT: CHALLENGES AND**  
**PROSPECTS**  
**BY**  
**TEREFE BESHANA BINEGDE**

**COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL**  
**SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**APPROVED BY BOARD OF EXAMINERS**

**DEMEKE ACHISO (PhD)**  
**ADVISOR**

-----  
**SIGNATURE**

-----  
**DATE**

-----  
**INTERNAL EXAMINER**

-----  
**SIGNATURE**

-----  
**DATE**

-----  
**EXTERNAL EXAMINER**

-----  
**SIGNATURE**

-----  
**DATE**

**Declaration!**

I enclose declare that this Thesis: The Recent Ethio-Eritrea Rapprochement: Challenges and Prospects is my original work and never been presented in any other institution or university. I also proclaim that any information used in the study has been properly acknowledged and stated in the completed references.

Terefe Beshana Binegde

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Phone +251969456235

Email: [trbeshana@gmail.com](mailto:trbeshana@gmail.com)

Contents	Pages
Acknowledgement.....	i
Abbreviations and Acronyms .....	ii
Abstract.....	iv
<b>Chapter One: Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. Background of the Study.....	1
1.2. Statement of the Problem .....	5
1.3. Core Argument of the Study .....	8
1.4. Objectives of the Study .....	8
1.4.1. General Objective of the Study.....	8
1.4.2. Specific Objective.....	8
1.5. Research Questions .....	9
1.6. Significance of the Study .....	9
1.7. Scope of the Study.....	10
1.8. Limitation of the Study .....	10
1.9. Organization of the Study .....	10
1.10. Research Methodology and Method of Data Collection .....	11
1.10.1. Methods of Data Collection .....	11
1.10.2. Data Analysis .....	12
<b>Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework.....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>13</b>
2.1. Definition of Terms and Concepts .....	13
2.1.1. The Conception of Peace .....	13
2.1.2. Reconciliation .....	14
2.1.2.1. Methods and Techniques of Reconciliation .....	16
2.1.2.1.1. Forgiveness.....	16
2.1.2.1.2. Apology .....	17
2.1.2.1.3. Reparation /Compensation .....	17
2.2. Literature Review .....	18
2.2.1. The Field of Conflict Resolution .....	18
2.2.2. Interstate Conflict Resolution .....	20
2.2.2.1. Conflict Transformation.....	24
2.2.3. Understanding of Peace Building .....	26
2.2.4. Challenges to Post-Conflict Peace Building.....	27

2.2.4.1.	Systemic and Structural Challenges .....	27
2.3.	Theoretical Framework .....	28
2.3.1.	The Conflict Transformation School .....	29
2.4	Interstate Relations and Economic Interdependence .....	32
2.4.1.	Liberal Peace theory .....	32
2.4.1.1.	Economic Interdependence and Peace .....	33
<b>Chapter Three: Post 1991 Historical Overview of Ethio-Eritrea Relations.....</b>		<b>35</b>
<b>Introduction.....</b>		<b>35</b>
3.1.	Formation of Secessionist Movements .....	37
3.1.1.	Historical Relations Between the TPLF and the EPLF .....	38
3.2.	Post 1991 Ethio- Eritrea Relations .....	38
3.2.1.	Ethio-Eritrea Diplomatic Relations from 1991-1997 .....	38
3.2.2.	Causes of the Ethio-Eritrea War (1998-2000) .....	39
3.2.2.1.	Economic Causes .....	40
3.2.2.2.	Political and Security Causes .....	41
3.2.2.3.	Territory .....	42
3.3.	Courses and Consequences of the Ethio-Eritrean War (1998-2000) .....	42
3.4.	Attempts Made to Resolve the Conflict .....	44
3.4.1.	The Algiers Agreement.....	44
3.4.1.1.	The Ethiopia and Eritrea Border Commission (EEBC) .....	45
3.5.	The Five Point Peace Proposal of Ethiopia.....	46
3.6.	The Role of International Community .....	46
3.7.	Understanding the Period of ‘no war, no peace’ .....	48
<b>Chapter Four: Challenges and Prospects of the Ethio-Eritrea Rapprochement.....</b>		<b>50</b>
<b>Introduction.....</b>		<b>50</b>
4.1.	The Ethio-Eritrea Rapprochement .....	50
4.2.	Driving Factors for the Ethio-Eritrea Rapprochement.....	55
4.2.1.	Internal Driving Factors .....	56
4.2.2.	External Driving Factors.....	59
4.3.	Major Challenges for the Rapprochement .....	64
4.3.1.	Internal Challenges .....	64
4.3.1.1.	Absence of Institutions.....	64
4.3.1.2.	Absence of Inclusiveness of the Peace Process .....	67
4.3.1.3.	Internal Political Discontents .....	70

4.4. Divergent Political Approaches of Ethiopia and Eritrea.....	73
4.5. External Challenges: Regional Dynamics of the Horn of Africa.....	76
4.6. Prospects for the Rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea .....	77
4.6.1. Optimistic Perspectives.....	77
4.6.2. Towards Pessimist Perspectives .....	81
<b>Chapter Five: Conclusion.....</b>	<b>83</b>
<b>References.....</b>	<b>86</b>
Appendix I.....	i
Appendix II.....	iii
Appendix III.....	iv

## **Acknowledgments**

Above all I thank the almighty God! Secondly, I must also give my profoundest gratitude to my advisor Dr. Demeke Achiso, for his efforts from finding an appropriate subject in the beginning, and throughout the process of the writings of the thesis he offered me his unreserved academic comments, support and guidance. Thirdly, I would like to thank Lalise Yonas, my lovely wife, for her unreserved support both financially and psychologically for the accomplishment of this thesis. Fourth, my thanks should go to the government and non-government officials who were willing to provide me valuable information during data collection of this thesis.

Finally, thanks to my friends Zelalem Tesfaye, Fithatsidk Tadese and Addis Alemahu for their unconditional support and encouragements.

*May God bless you all!*

## **List of Abbreviations and Acronyms**

ACPEU- African Caribbean Pacific and European Union  
ADP- Amhara Democratic Party  
AIM- African Integrated Maritime  
AU- African Unity  
C-in-C- Commander in Chief  
EDF- Eritrean Democratic Front  
EEBC -Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission  
ELF-Eritrean Liberation Front  
EPLF- Eritrean People's Liberation Front  
EPPF - Ethiopian Peoples Patriotic Front  
EPRDF- Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front  
EUSR –European Union Special Representatives  
FCA -Friendship and Cooperation Agreement  
GCC- Gulf Cooperation Council  
ICG-International Crisis Group  
IGAD-Inter Governmental Authority Development  
GDP-Growth Domestic Product  
IPSS-Institute of Peace and Security Studies  
ISS- Institute of Security Studies  
LPPE -Liberal Progressive Party in Eritrea  
ML-Moselem League  
MoFA-Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
NGO-Non Governmental Organization  
OAU -Organization of African Unity  
ODP-Oromo Democratic Party  
OLF- Oromo Liberation Front  
ONLF- Ogaden National Liberation Front  
SEPDM - Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement  
TLF- Tigray Liberation Front  
TPLF- Tigray Peoples Liberation Front

TSZ- Temporary Security Zone  
UAE- United Arab Emiratis  
UNMEE- United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea  
USA- United States of America  
UN- United Nations  
UNSCR- United Nations Security Council Resolution  
UP- Unionist Party  
WWI- Second World War

## **Abstract**

*The recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement has changed the long conflicts and hostilities into peaceful relations of the two countries in particular and the region in general. The Ethio-Eritrea conflicts that had destabilized the Horn for about two decades came into an end as a result of the rapprochement. The border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea affected not only the two countries but also affected security of the region as well. A number of attempts were made to resolve the conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea either by regional or international community at different times. However, none of them able to end the conflicts. The Algiers Peace Agreement had brought the large scale war to an end in 2000. The rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been driven by both internal and external factors. Internally the change of leadership in Ethiopia and externally, the regional and international powers' competition on the strategic Horn of Africa are the prominent factors. To this end the study aimed at describing and exploring the extent to which the rapprochement has been challenged and the prospects for the peace process. In exploring the challenges and prospects of the rapprochement data were gathered from different sources. Through in-depth interviews and literature, relevant data was gathered and analysed qualitatively. The peace deal is perceived positively and welcomed by many people, international and regional organizations. The rapprochement on the other hand encounters various internal and external challenges. The current internal situations in Ethiopia; political discontents, lack of institutionalization of the peace process, 'ethnic based' conflicts which has led to intensification of civilian displacements at different parts of the country and the interests of regional powers on the Horn could be a challenge to the rapprochement. Properly managing of the peace process of the rapprochement could have far reaching positive impacts on the two states and the entire region in economic, political, security and social aspects. Ethiopia will get access to the ports of Eritrea for export and import trade items. Furthermore, the finding identified the rapprochement could help in facilitating the Horn countries economic integration projects.*

## Chapter One

### Introduction

#### 1.1. Background of the Study

The long historical ties of Ethiopia and Eritrea had deteriorated by the war of 1998 which lasted for two years and interrupted peaceful political, economic and social relations of the two. The conflict highly endangered not only the two countries but also the Horn of Africa for about two decades (Berouk, 2010; Daniel, 2013; Mohamood and Meresa, 2018). Contested borders between states, intra-states violence between and proxy war have characterized the Horn of Africa (Müller, 2016). The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea which was fought for two years, took place from 1998 to 2000, destabilized the entire region (Williams, 2011; Daniel and Paulos, 2011). The countries of this region have living with the questions of validity of each other's boundaries. This is because boundary demarcations were done by the colonial masters.

At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, three successive agreements were signed between Ethiopia and Italy, as the colonial master of Eritrea, to demarcate common boundaries. The agreements were signed in 1900, 1902 and 1908. The border disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea lasted for about two decades, therefore, traced back to the effect of these agreements (Kidanu, 2014).

Ethiopia and Eritrea have commenced state to state relations after the *de jure* independence of Eritrea in 1993 (Kidanu and Endalcachew, 2015). In 1991 Eritrea was seceded from Ethiopia and became independent state in 1993 (Terlinden and Debiel, 2004). However, Ethiopia and Eritrea have long history of relations at least from the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952 (Tekeste, 1997). Even though it did not last longer, from 1993 to 1998, there had been diplomatic relations between the two countries. The formal diplomatic relations came to an end when war started between them in 1998 over the issues of disputed borders around Badimie (Kidist, 2011).

The unexpected new Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement has revived after two decades of hostilities as a result of Ethiopian Government internal political reforms.

The Federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia adopted in 1952 through the facilitation of the UN was turned into complete union in 1962 and Eritrea was considered as one of Ethiopian provinces

(Tekeste, 1997: Kidist, 2011). On 15 November 1962 Eritrean Assembly voted union with Ethiopia, in fact influenced by Ethiopia, was assured Eritrea as one of the provinces of Ethiopia. There were reasons for Emperor Haile Silasie I to change the federation into union. Among others, the Emperor feared that other provinces might also claim the status of federated state that could endanger the Imperial authority, characterized by centralization of government (Edwin, 2010:21). The union of Eritrea with Ethiopia had brought about resistances against Emperor Hailesillase I. Following the union, the Emperor's ban of trade unions, increment of unemployment rate and relapsing of the economy, resulted in the emergence of Eritrean opposition movements. The first armed resistant group emerged in 1961 as the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) (Edwin, 2010).

Despite the fact that Ethiopia and Eritrea share long boundaries and also people with similar culture, language and identity, they went to war in 1998 which lasted for two years. The people of the two countries have common mythology, legend and history and also blood and ancestral roots. They have shared cultural, religious and political realms under the Orthodox Christianity and the Ethiopian monarchy (Trivelli, 1998). After the Eritrean independence in 1993, there had been a sort of formal diplomatic relations between the two states. However, the relations between the two countries was deteriorated gradually and reached peak point when conventional war started between the forces of Ethiopia and Eritrea around the town of Badmie in 1998 (Kidanu and Endalcachew, 2015:1).

More importantly the leader of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the former Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, and that of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), President Isayas Afwerki initially allied to overthrow the Dergue regime. The TPLF and the EPLF had been closely working together against the Dergue regime (Lie, &Berouk, 2018:32). However, their alliance lasted only up to the collapse of the Dergue Regime. Following the down fall of the Dergue, Ethiopia and Eritrea had established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia and a Provisional Government respectively. In 1993, Eritrea gained its independence which was welcomed by the EPRDF and the leaders of the two countries, seems gave focus for economic cooperation and diplomacy. The outbreak of war in May 1998 at Badime; however, realized that economic cooperation and diplomatic issues were deteriorated

and finally it denied Ethiopia's access to the port of Massawa and Assab that made Ethiopia landlocked state (Lyons, 2009: 169).

The outbreak of war around the town of Badime at which the two countries claimed the area, intensified along borders and caused a number of deaths. The war lasted for two years, from 1998 to 2000 along the Ethio-Eritrea borders, mainly at the two battle fronts, Badime and Zalambasa. It is estimated that around 100,000 people lost their lives and large number of civilians were displaced on both sides (Dias, 2008; Reid, 2018). The two years war of Ethio-Eritrea which caused heavy losses was perceived as only border conflict by the foreigners. The engagement of the foreigners; therefore, depended on this perception. The mediation effort by the Algiers Agreement, which was considered as a binding and final, didn't address disputes between the two countries and they continued threatening each other. They began supporting each other's insurgents and opposition movements (Mosley, 2014:3).

Some major Ethiopian insurgent groups include the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Ethiopian Peoples Patriotic Front (EPPF) had been supported by the Eritrean Government. They greatly contributed to the instability of the region. As a result, both Ethiopia and Eritrea had involved in proxy war, particularly in Somalia. The Government of Ethiopia had been supporting the Transitional Government in Somalia where as the Union of Islamic Court was supported by the Government of Isayas Afeworki (Lyons, 2009: 174-175). The involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia was justified by national security objectives with respect to its Somali communities in Ethiopia and the consideration that threats from Militant Islamism from Somalia (Mosley, 2014). The Islamic court from Somalia declared Jihad war on Ethiopia backed by Eritrea while Ethiopia has supported the Transitional Government of Somalia in Bidwoa, and these calculations led to the instability of the entire region (Kalewongel, 2008:1).

On 18<sup>th</sup> June 2000, the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea was officially ceased by the Algiers Peace Agreement. This was when the two countries signed Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities. The agreement opened the way for another agreement, the Algiers Peace Agreement. Before the Algiers Agreement, however, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea

(UNMEE) was set up by the UN Security Council as to put Agreement on Cessation of Hostility of the two countries into practice (Daniel and Paulos, 2011:69).

After the end of the conventional war, a number of attempts were made at different times to resolve the state of conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Ethio-Eritrea relation had been characterized by ‘no war no peace’ situations. The Algiers Agreement of 2000 concluded the conventional war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Daniel and Paulos, 2011:87). The Algiers Agreement created; a Boundary Commission, later named “Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission” (EEBC) as a final binding. Claims Commission, was also set up to arbitrate the loss and damage made against each other by the two countries, and one un-named body to be created by the Organization of African Unity (OAU/AU) and the UN (Lencho, 2004; Security Council Report, 2005).

The two countries, therefore, agreed to binding arbitration of the dispute through boundary commission and creating a Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). However, frequent attacks and incidents became common for the next decades along the Ethio-Eritrea borders. In March 2012 Ethiopian troops penetrated into Eritrean territory and made an attack and another small scale conventional clash happened between the forces of the two countries in June 2016 at Tsorona (Lie &Berouk, 2018). These events confirmed that the violation of the TSZ which was supposed to keep apart the forces of Ethiopia and Eritrea within twenty five kilometres (Reid, 2018). The relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea therefore, was characterized by ‘no war, no peace’ since the Algiers Agreement.

Unexpectedly the state of ‘no war no peace’ came to an end when the leaders of the two countries, the new Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Dr Abiy Ahmed and the Eritrean president Isayas Afeworki signed a Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship on 9<sup>th</sup> July 2018. On the other hand, Tesfa news reported on 8 September 2018 that the current Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement has started since June 5, 2018 when the new Prime Minister of Ethiopia, decided to accept the Algiers Agreement unconditionally. These events led to the opening and resumption of air flights between Addis Ababa and Asmara, telecommunication connectivity. The borders were reopened particularly through Zalambasa and Bure (Belete, 2018). The new Ethiopian Prime Minister,

Abiy Ahmed, and the Eritrean President, Isayas Afeworki spoke to the people of the two countries on TV as follows:

*We have to join our hands and start cooperating as one people first; the rest will be settled side by side. There is no border to divide us, today's spirit of love will bridge us, said Dr. Ahmed at a formal dinner in a speech broadcast by the Ethiopian and Eritrean state TV stations. "The government and people of Eritrea will stand by your side, in all aspects of your effort and challenges, to maintain love and togetherness between the peoples of both nations, Mr. Afwerki said. (Gridneff, 2018).*

From the above statements one can understand that the leaders of the two countries showed their high concern to cooperate for their mutual benefits. It seems that the leaders of the two states give priority for peace hoping that other problems will be solved through time.

Despite the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement seems promising in the future relations of the two countries as some writers believe, it cannot be scaped from challenges. Among others, the internal political turmoil in Ethiopia and the move of the TPLF against the government of Abiy Ahmed, the divergent political approaches of the two governments, and lack of infrastructure and facilities along the borders, including the Eritrean ports, of the two countries can be seen as challenging in making the Ethio-Eritrea diplomatic relations sustainable. This study intends to explore the challenges and prospects of the new Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement following the political transformations in Ethiopia.

## **1.2. Statement of the Problem**

As depicted on the background of the study, different authors and researchers asserted that diplomatic relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia had deteriorated and closed for about two decades and they had been in 'no wars, no peace' situations (Kidanu&Endalkachew, 2015; Abebe, 2016). The Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea had ceased their formal diplomatic relations after the end of the war of 1998 that finally led to closing of their respective Embassies in Addis Ababa and Asmara through time. Even though the Algiers Agreement of December 2000 was expected to secure as a ground for the next political dialogue between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in reality, for three consecutive years their relations were nonexistence. Communication

between the two governments was ceased. Finally, in 2003 Ethiopia closed its Embassy in Eritrea (Solomon, 2004).

There had been economic ties between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the early independence of Eritrea until 1998 when the war broke out. The war had brought to an end the economic cooperation of the two countries. Among the major areas of economic cooperation were free trade area, using similar currency, Birr and monetary unions and partial custom union. Before the war, Eritreans had invested freely in Ethiopia and in return Ethiopia had an access to use the Assab port freely (Kidanu, 2014).

As to consolidate these economic interests the leaders of the two countries, Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Isayas Afworki of Eritrea signed the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement in July 1993. The Asmara Pact as it was known, was another agreement signed in September of the same year, aimed at harmonizing economic policies of the two countries (Worku, 2016:56). Moreover, in the 1990s additional agreements were signed for widening their cooperation in economic, security and politics though they lacked practical applications on the ground due to their divergent political approaches and suspicion (Worku, 2016). In 1997, the Eritrean Government introduced its own currency, Nakfa, instead of using Ethiopian currency, Birr, which deteriorated the economic ties between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopia refused to accept the introduction of new currency and this situation negatively affected the previous economic relations of the two countries (Lasley, 2006). Evidences show that when these economic ties, specifically the use of the port of Assab, came to an end, Eritrea lost around 2 billion Birr (\$US 102 million) per year (Healy, 2011: 43).

The recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement has restarted after 20 years of hostilities through the initiative of new Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Dr. Abiy Ahmed. The recent diplomatic thaw of the two countries comes with a fresh approach believing that external involvement didn't solve any disputes particularly in Africa through history (Eritrea Profile, 2018). Unlike the previous attempts, there is no involvement of third party in the new relations. Addis Standard news on July 30 2018 reported that such inter-state peace negotiations are almost none in Africa. On 5 June 2018 the executive Committee of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) announced to accept the Algiers Agreement and the EEBC (Belete, 2018). This is

realized when the Premier visited Eritrea's capital, Asmara on 8 July 2018 and a Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship was signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea on 9 July 2018. It was a historic visit after the end of the Ethio-Eritrea war. In return after a week Eritrea's president, Isayas Afeworki, was also welcomed by Ethiopia (Mahmood and Dessu, 2018).

On 18<sup>th</sup> July 2018, historical flight of Ethiopian Air Line was started its normal functioning to Asmara, Eritrea and on 16<sup>th</sup> July 2018, Eritrean Embassy was reopened at Addis Ababa (Stauffer, 2018; Eritrea Profile, 2018). After few months on 6 September, Ethiopia's Embassy was reopened in Asmara, Eritrea (Xinhua, Dec.31, 2018). Despite this positive rapprochement of the two countries there exist problems and challenges in the peace making process. Even though many have welcomed the rapprochement there are some who oppose the new Ethio-Eritrea diplomatic thaw and the acceptance of the Algiers Agreement and the EEBC decision by the EPRDF Executive Committee.

TPLF on June 13, 2018 announced that the recent decision, made by the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) Executive Committee led by the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to accept the Algiers Agreement, has "fundamental flaws" and requested for reconsideration of the decision. Despite the fact that the party has participated through its members in the Committee, later on it undermined and opposed the new peace initiative (Tesfa News on September 2, 2018). The party criticized the peace making process between Ethiopia and Eritrea. As a result, public protests broke out in some parts of Tigray Regional State and along Ethio-Eritrea borders including the town of Badime (Dahir, 2018). The resumed cooperation has faced challenges around border of the two countries particularly through Zalambasa. Recently, in December, the opened border by the Governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia was again closed. Starting from 26 December 2018 the crossing borders of Ethiopia and Eritrea has closed by the government from Asmara. However, neither of the Government of Eritrea nor the Government of Ethiopia gave clarification about the closing or restriction of the boundaries specifically through Zalambesa and Rama (the Reporter on Dec. 29, 2018; Xinhua 27 Dec 2018; Reuters 28 Dec 2018). It was later that the close of the border justified as to put under legal basis by the two governments.

On the other side, Eritrean Diaspora and government opponents have resisted the rapprochement. The Eritrean Diaspora and the opposing parties criticized the rapprochement for the reason that the President Isayas alone should not decide without the involvement of the Eritrean people. They undermined the legitimacy of the rapprochement (Eri-platform, 2018).

Furthermore, the Ethio-Eritrea diplomatic relation is a new development that could have a far reaching consequence for the two countries in particular and for the Horn of Africa in general. However, the existing literatures mainly focus on causes of the conflicts and describe attempts made to end the tension between the two countries through arbitration and mediations. To the best of the knowledge of the researcher most literatures assess and focus on the issue of ending the situation of “no war, no peace” rather than searching for possible challenges that could face the possible peace making process between Ethiopia and Eritrea that means challenges and prospects of the recent rapprochement between Ethiopia and is not yet assessed and explored adequately. To this end, challenges and prospects require to be explored in the resumed diplomatic thaw of the two countries. Therefore, this study was conducted to explore challenges and prospects of the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement.

### **1.3. Core Argument of the Study**

This study argues that there are challenges to the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement from internal and geo-political dynamics of the Horn of Africa on one hand, and prospects on the other hand.

### **1.4.Objectives of the Study**

#### **1.4.1. General Objective of the Study**

An overall objective of this study is to explore challenges and prospects of the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement in the process of sustainable peace buildings.

#### **1.4.2. Specific Objective**

Specifically, this study is intended to:

- Assess the contribution of the Algiers Agreement of December 2000.
- Examine the factors contributed to the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement.

- Identify fundamental challenges in the process of the rapprochement.
- Explore prospects of the new diplomatic thaw of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

### **1.5. Research Questions**

The research question of this study is designed as to enable the researcher to respond to the listed objectives under the study. Accordingly, the core research question of the study is to what extent the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement could be challenged by a combination of factors? Based on this general question the research addresses the following four specific questions:

- Why the Algiers Agreement was unable to end the hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea?
- What are pushing factors contributed for new Ethiopia and Eritrean rapprochement?
- What are fundamental challenges of the new Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement?
- What prospects could be observed in the newly emerging peace relations of Ethio-Eritrea?

### **1.6. Significance of the Study**

As a result of recently happening phenomena, there is no adequate study on challenges and prospects of the recent Ethio-Eritrea Rapprochement. Therefore, the result of this study may provide the following significances:

- The study might contribute to the existing literature through exploring the challenges and prospects of Ethio-Eritrea reviving relations.
- The study can be used by similar stake holders as an input for further study and to investigate more in the area; in a broader and wider scope.
- This study has both academia and social contributions.

Moreover, this study can be used as springboard for further studies and investigations by any entity who may deal with the inter-state relations, conflict resolution and regional integration plan particularly in the Horn of Africa.

### **1.7.Scope of the Study**

This study focuses on the assessment of the Recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement: challenges and prospects since July 2018 in the process of sustaining peace. The method of data collection was limited to semi-structured, in-depth interview with limited key informants. In-depth interviews was conducted with key informants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Eritrean Embassy, Inter Governmental Authority Development (IGAD), Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD), the House of People's Representative, Political parties, and concerned Scholars from Addis Ababa University who are supposed to be the main data sources of this study.

### **1.8. Limitation of the Study**

It is important to address some major challenges that the researcher encountered during the study to know under what situations the study was conducted. The major limiting factors include lack of literatures concerning the study area as far as it is the recently happened phenomena. There are no adequate secondary sources as far as the issue under study. On the other hand, in conducting in-depth interview, the researcher faced a challenge of reaching Eritrean key informants except from the Embassy of Eritrea to balance the views concerning the issue under the study. Unwillingness of some concerned bodies to provide information was also another challenge during the study. Finally financial problem encountered the researcher to access Eritrean informants in their natural environment, Eritrea.

### **1.9.Organization of the Study**

This paper is organized into five chapters. The first chapter comprises introductory part, which includes background, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, Significance of the study, scope of the study, limitations of the study, and organization of the study. The second chapter is all about Literature Review and Theoretical Framework, and the third chapter is about post 1991 Historical overview of Ethio-Eritrea. The fourth chapter is devoted to with the Challenges and prospects of the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement. This chapter the main body of the paper in which data analysis, interpretation and presentation

conducted and try to link them with the theories suggested in the literature. Finally, the fifth chapter ends with concluding remarks.

## **1.10. Research Methodology and Method of Data Collection**

The methodology of this research is qualitative approach. Qualitative research attempts to explore, explain and understand situations, feelings, perception, attitudes...etc of group of people in specific area (Kumar, 2011:104). The reason for this approach is that enormous information is required and was gathered concerning this particular issue- challenges and prospects of the new Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement. To draw a sound conclusion about the research problem raised in the study, different data collection methods were used to obtain relevant qualitative information from different concerned bodies.

### **1.10.1. Methods of Data Collection**

This research is based on information from both primary and secondary sources that could be obtained from interviews, archives, official statements, treaties, peace accords, newspapers and maps. Qualitative data was gathered by using interviews. Primary and secondary sources were used. Primary data was collected through interviews that are complemented by secondary data. Secondary data was gathered from relevant literatures, such as books, internet sources, journal articles, published and unpublished materials, newspapers, agreements concluded and other documents dealing with Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement.

Most commonly qualitative data is acquired through semi-structured and unstructured interviews and observation (Kothari, 1989). In this study semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted in order to obtain detailed information from key informants and expertise in different organizations.

To obtain pertinent information from respondents, purposive sampling technique was used because of the fact that the issue needs further and detail information which cannot be expected from anybody but from knowledgeable, expertise and concerned scholars. Accordingly, in purposive sampling selection of sample member is based on their knowledge, relationship and also concerned experts of the issue that is under investigation (Langkos, 2014). In-depth interview was carried out with a knowledgeable and experience-rich personality, particularly. In

addition, relevant researchers and scholars were interviewed regarding the new Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement. Semi-structured interview was presented for key informants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, the Embassy of Eritrean in Ethiopia, Ministry of Trade and Industry, IGAD, the House of People's Representatives and concerned bodies from higher officials of the FDRE government and concerned scholars. Interview guide questions were prepared in English language since almost all of the interviewees are able to communicate in English. Accordingly, from different sources of interviews 13 informants were interviewed for the purpose of this study.

### **1.10.2. Data Analysis**

The data collected through interview were summarized and analysed qualitatively to draw a sound conclusion. Collecting, organizing, processing, analysing and interpreting of primary and secondary data of were the main task of the researcher. Qualitative data comprises of feelings, attitudes, perceptions and judgments. Thus, analysis of qualitative data requires following three important flows of actions: data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing (Walliman, 2011:132).

Kawulich (2004) described several approaches of data analysis in qualitative research. Ethnographic analysis, narrative analysis, phenomenological analysis and constant comparative methods are among the major ones. She added that Narrative analysis approach is used in various social fields. In this case the study employed analytical and descriptive data analysis. Each detail in this study is analytically investigated. The gathered data is analysed by cross-checking mechanisms of validation through comparing information obtained from in-depth interview with books, journals, newspaper, reports and official documents. This analysis was only limited to the challenges and prospects of the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement. Documentary reviews were triangulated with semi-structured in-depth interviews.

## **Chapter Two**

### **Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

#### **Introduction**

In every academic research theoretical understanding is crucial to provide basis of the issue under the study. This chapter offers theoretical frameworks for the study by defining conflict resolution, reconciliation and similar concepts in the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement process. Similarly, it identifies concepts such as inter-state relations, economic interdependence and conflict transformation, Peacemaking and peace building. On the other hand, the chapter covers an inquiry into how concepts and theories are understood and how they help in conflict resolution and peace building process in relation with the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement. Accordingly, this chapter is organized under three sections; concepts, literature review and theoretical framework for the purpose of the study. According to Charles A. Kupchan (2011), rapprochement comes as an output of engagement and commitment. A situation in which one of the conflicting parties imposes force on the other party, peace could not be achieved. Rather peace is the result of settling differences. For Kupchan Diplomacy is the currency of peace (Kupchan, 2011). Rapprochement requires internal political management that could determine securing of reconciliation.

#### **2.1. Definition of Terms and Concepts**

##### **2.1.1. The Conception of Peace**

The term peace was perceived and defined as the absence of war as originated from the disastrous effects of the WWII. The definition from this concept therefore narrowed the definition to comprise only one peace value that is the absence of war (Matsuo, 2001). However, since values of peace can be numerous the definitions of peace go beyond that. Peace can be defined in many ways based on its context. Politicians, researchers, artists all may use the term peace in not similar ways. There is no single and generally accepted definition for peace but context specific (Bergh Foundation, 2012).

In its literary meaning peace may refer to bring to an end war and hostilities, reconciliation and the setup of order among societies. Circumstances in which conflicts are peacefully resolved

through dialogue, debates and compromise illustrate the existence of stable society (Daley, 2006). The goal of any peace building approach is to ensure stability in a society. Some scholars argue that in Africa political elites, for the sake of their personal goals of accumulation of wealth, and regime survival, shifted to Ethnic based politics (Daley, 2006). For Jhon Gultang peace has two sides; the absence of personal violence and absence of structural violence. According to him absence of personal violence is to mean negative peace and absence of structural violence refers to positive peace (Galtung, 1969). In explaining his 'structural violence' Galtung distinguished that powerlessness and poverty can trigger violence or war among society. The existence of positive peace and social justice, for him, rely on the reduction of poverty and enhancement of power of the society (Daley, 2006).

Peacemaking involves diplomatic efforts which help and attempt to convince the other parties in order to give up war and hostilities and to make rapprochement for negotiations to resolve the points of disagreement. Peace building on the other hand is defined by the UN as follows;

*“All external efforts to assist countries and regions in their transitions from war to peace, and includes all activities and programmes designed to support and strengthen these traditions”*(Daley, 2006)

### **2.1.2. Reconciliation**

The term reconciliation has been defined in various ways by different scholars. Thus, there is no a consensus on definitions of reconciliation. One defines reconciliation as a goal striving, inspiration, hope and as utopia (Adamovićet et al. 2017). According to Kelman (2010), “reconciliation is a consequence of successful conflict Resolution”. This definition of reconciliation implies that effective accomplishment of resolving conflict at which mutual agreements and acceptance of peace setup (Kelman, 2010). Brounéus (2003) also defined reconciliation as follows: “Reconciliation is a societal process that involves mutual acknowledgment of past suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and behaviour into constructive relationships toward sustainable peace”.

It is believed that reconciliation help and develop genuine and peaceful relationship in both societies of the conflicted parties (Bar-Tal, 2008). Reconciliation requires the changes of societal

beliefs in group goals, the rival group and the images of those who were considered as adversaries, the relationship with the past opponents, and history of the conflict. Daniel Bar-Tal pointed out that formal conflict resolution may not be inclusive of the societies since most of the agreements in formal conflict resolution are between leaders of the conflicted parties. Thus, majority of the people could not be involved which in return results unwillingness of the majority to accept the decision or points of compromise. The cases of Angola and Israeli-Egypt relation were cited as examples in which the process of resolving the conflicts seems lack of proper reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 2008).

Like Bar-Tal, Bennink (2004) also describes that reconciliation as social outcomes which require a high degree of societal consensus and involvement. Structure based formal communication and dialogue between the leaders of the conflicted parties is important as to run smoothly the process of reconciliation (Adomovic et al, 2007). Major issues under discussion could be like development of free trade, economic projects, information exchange and cultural elements of the societies from both sides. Reconciliation considers common values and human rights aspects of the societies since it emerges from society and social institutions (Senehi et al, 2010).

Reconciliation requires preconditions that have to be accepted by both parties those in conflict relationships. Kelman (2010) mentions five major steps or prerequisites that could facilitate reconciliation. Firstly, mutual recognition of other's nationhood and humanity which implies being comprehensive in terms diversity. The Second requirement is developing a common moral basis for peace making and peace building. The conflicted parties require common basis to reconcile which could help them in accepting facts. Thus, the concept of fairness and justice has to be given emphasis. Thirdly, confrontation with history helps the conflicted parties in order to account each others' historical facts. The fourth step is acknowledgment of responsibility. Finally, the establishment of patterns and institutional mechanisms of cooperation is also crucial in peace making and peace building as far as reconciliation is aimed at working for mutual acceptance of future relationship of the conflicted parties (Kelman, 2010). The Ethio-Eritrea diplomatic thaw and reconciliation cannot be scaped from the aforementioned prerequisites.

### **2.1.2.1. Methods and Techniques of Reconciliation**

‘Peace begins internally within the self’ is the idea provided by M, Ghandi in order to empower and encourage individuals not to take part in violent actions and rely on truth in contributing peace to the world. Everyone wants to enjoy peace. Thus, working for peace building is not only a duty of someone else but also that of all individuals. The responsibility of maintaining the world peace resides on every one (Senehi et al, 2010).

#### **2.1.2.1.1. Forgiveness**

Reconciliation is an act which occurs after hostilities of two or more entities whereas forgiveness is a private act and normally considers morality. Reconciliation and forgiveness are usually interrelated. Even though some consider forgiveness as precondition for f reconciliation, still there is a debate on whether it is possible or not for reconciliation to occur discarding forgiveness and the vice versa (Hamber, 2007). For Transitional justice field forgiveness is understood as it cannot be a pre-condition for reconciliation. Rather it is a language through which political leaders attempt to ignore or hide the fact of the past. In case of South Africa, the South Africa Truth Commission was set up and it was aimed at facilitating grounds for reconciliation in peace building. However, some people who were victims tested to the commission criticized it as “false reconciliation” (Hamber, 2007). The victims explained that reconciliation through the commission was not based on the will of victims but by imposition of the leaders either to reconcile or to forgive.

Forgiveness does not mean that forgetting the past. If someone forgets he or she cannot forgive since forgiveness requires to remember and being conscious about the acts of the past. Usually forgiveness becomes effective when it comes from the victims. Forgiveness facilitate for smooth relationships which in return helps for avoiding hospitalities and peace building. Archbishop Dismond Tutu, said about forgiveness as follows;

*“There is no future without forgiveness, but to forgive, one must know what happened. In order not to repeat what happened to others, we must remember”*. Nelson Mandela also asserted that the importance of remembering the misdeed of the past to forgive. He said, *“ South African people must remember their dreadful past in order to be able to deal with it, to forgive when it is necessary , but never to forget ”* (Moolakkattu, 2016).

#### **2.1.2.1.2. Apology**

Apology refers to the formal acceptance of responsibility to the past misdeed by the offender through which requests reach the victims to get forgiveness (Fireweini, 2016). Apology depends on heartfelt expression to regret in which the offender is being in state of sorrow. Through such expressions, the offender could come back to the community morally (Jeong, 2010). Humanity is the most to be considered shared identity in the process of offering apology and forgiveness. National or group boundaries, identities and other categories can be reconstructed along with the existing circumstances and demanded coexistence and mutual advantages. Countries can make diplomatic ties after conflict considering their mutual benefits and prosperity in future as in the case of Franco-German rapprochement after the end of the WWII, having the vision of peaceful and prosperous continent, Europe (Jeong, 2010). Currently a shift from conflict resolution to conflict transformation as a new development is welcomed. Apology and forgiveness is important points to be included in reconciliation process (Moolakkattu, 2016).

#### **2.1.2.1.3. Reparation /Compensation**

The Hague Convention under Article 3 states that; “[a] *belligerent party which violates the provision of the (...) Regulations [respecting the Laws and Customs of War On Land] shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation...*”.(Gillard, 2003).

In conflict resolution and peace building after the hostilities, politics of memory like reparation apology, regret and forgiveness play a great role (Moolakkattu, 2016). The range of reconciliation goes beyond peaceful coexistence between the conflicting parties to further absolution and forgiveness for misdeeds in the past conflicts (Wilson, 2017). Truth commissions provide reparations for those who survived from the past sufferings and forgiveness for the perpetrators on the other hand.

Reparations can be provided for the survivors in the form of financial payments, medical treatment, pensions and educational scholarships. Restitution is made in the form of restoration of fundamental rights, releasing wrongly detained people, restoring wrongly owned properties of the survivors (Gillard, 2003). It can also be in the form of memory like symbolic performance, monuments and museums. Sometimes there are cases in which the survivors refuse to accept

reparations in the form of money like in the case of the Moroccan reparation process (Wilson, 2017). Gillard explained that violation of the principle of international law by any state may leads to make reparation. The acceptance of duty to make reparation can also appear in treaties that the parties signed after they end their hostilities based on the accord.

## **2.2. Literature Review**

### **2.2.1. The Field of Conflict Resolution**

After the Westphalia Treaty of 1648 the ideology of liberal democracy was considered as it would satisfy the long hope and interests of the newly emerged nation-states. Conflict resolution as a field of study emerged in 1950s and 1960s during the cold war periods, when nuclear weapons development observed and the conflict among the European powers seemed threatened human survival (Wani, 2011). Some people who had a capacity established research groups in American land, particularly North America and Europe. From this group of researchers, some of them had experiences with conflict management, attempted to develop new ideas which later had got attention of others. Many scholars turned their faces towards the issues of conflict and conflict resolution. As a result, scholarly journals in conflict resolution began to emerge (Wani, 2011).

After the end of the cold war however, relations among the superpowers were improved. On the other hand, ethnic based and other type of conflicts increased rapidly. These developments contributed to the acceptance of scholars of International Relations (IR) and comparative politics for their ideas of conflict resolution. In 1957 the journal of conflict resolution was established by Kenneth, Boulding and some other influential in the field of conflict resolution (Senehi et al, 2010). In 1959 the centre for research on conflict resolution was set up by Kenneth Boulding in collaboration with Antol Rapoport and Herbert Kelman. Boulding understands the idea of power in two aspects; hard power and soft power. Hard power for him is to command, to order and enforce whereas soft power to induce cooperation, to legitimate, and to inspire. Hard power is used in violent conflict and soft power in conflict management (Wani, 2011). The Journal of Peace by Johan Galtung in 1963, the International Peace Research Association in 1965, the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security in 1985 were some major events that contributed to the knowledge of field of conflict resolution (Senehi et al, 2010).

The approach of conflict resolution argues and emphasizes on the root causes of the conflict and premises, prospects of the future relationship (Richmond, 2001). The development of ideas on functional integration among states as to come up with a common interest, by David Mitrany in the issues of peace, and Ernst Haas's empirical analysis are some among others from which the field of conflict resolution acquired its development (Richmond, 2001).

Conflict resolution is mainly about the balance of power, for others, which put attention for altering the relationship between the conflicted parties strategically rather than providing immediate solution for the conflict. The central focus of conflict resolution is promoting stable peace and cooperation at different levels of leadership (kelman, 2010).

Kelman pointed out that "conflict resolution represents a transformation of the relationship between the parties". The process of peace making on the other hand necessitates new relationship development that comes with new attitude which may not be the same with the previous ones or changing the ways of thinking (Lederach, 2014). Where there exists such a new attitude there is a possibility of not to give same meanings and be understood similarly by the parties, particularly when the nature of the conflict is ethnic based.

Kelman (2010) in his work of identifying conflict resolution, settlement and reconciliation approaches concluded that they do have the same goal but attempts to achieve it in different ways. Conflict resolution is not only the duty of the conflicting parties but also that of other stakeholders who possess legal authority and recognitions. Among others, Regional intergovernmental organizations usually involve in conflict resolution process. The current peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea also requires the involvement of concerned stakeholders.

### **2.2.2. Interstate Conflict Resolution**

Though the nature of conflicts after the end of the Cold War is characterized by intra-state than interstate, the Horn of Africa has fought some major inter-state wars and violent conflicts after their independence from colonial rule (Fortna, 2004; Kidane, 2011). Inter-state conflicts have been decreased in the past three decades while intra-state conflicts are prevailing in the contemporary world (McMahon, 2017; Cox, 2017). To understand causes of war and state behaviour it is crucial to overview level of analysis frame work coined by Waltz. According to

the level of analysis framework of Waltz causes of conflicts may be laid at individual level, state level or international system level. The individual level analysis is mainly emphasis on the human nature and aggressiveness behaviour which can affect leaders on power. For conflicts to happen according to Jahn Gultang's model understood as a triangular with *Attitude*-cognitive and emotional towards the adversary, *behaviour*-gestures displaying either cooperation or force and *contradictions*-incompatibility of goals between the conflicting parties (Seyum, 2012).

The causes of interstate conflicts can be incompatibilities in *goepolitik*, *real politik*, *ideal politik* and *capital politik*. When a territory has strategic importance, the states claim this area and they may go into conflict, when they fail to achieve their interests through peaceful means, in order to maintain their position of the claim. Territorial conflict can be caused over control of resources around borders like in the case of Nigeria and Cameroon in which they fought on the oil rich and with abundant fishing potential region called Bakassi Peninsula (Edwin, 2010).

Real politics is another in which states want to have power capability that enables them to display the need of dominance over the others whereas *ideal politik*s refers to differences in ideology and the attempt to legitimize one's own ideology over the others. This was observed during Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Iran accused Iraq for that Islamic government in Theran was undermined by the Iraq. On the other hand, as in the US involvement in Iraq with the purpose of establishing democracy, ideal purpose of democracy may cause interstate conflict in dictatorial governments.

Capital *politik* is basically about economic significances in which states claim to control by any means. The divergent economic goals and interests of states may lead to capital conflict. These different natures and causes of conflicts, therefore, require different conflict resolution strategies. A strategy advised to resolve a conflict caused by territorial or border issues cannot necessarily work for *real politik*. Kelewongel identified that a conflict caused by governmental power or regional dominance, is better resolved through negotiation and compromise conflict resolution strategies (Kalewongel, 2008). More over according to Kalewongel (2008), cited Wallenstein, there are seven mechanisms of resolving interstate conflicts; i) shifting priorities, ii) value division iii) the principle of horse trading, iv) shared or common rule v) neutralization vi) resort and vii) let the issue un resolved for sometimes.

Shifting priorities refers to when the parties are in a position to change their priorities from the original ones. Despite the parties could not alter their fundamental stands in the conflict, they can shift the order of importance for the issue on which they are focusing in the dialogue process. The case of the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement and the peace talk process also has emphasized on people to people relations where both countries shifted their former stand which was focused on boundary issues. Usually this change of priorities is accessed through change of leadership or change in balance of powers at different levels, regional or international (Kalewongel, 2008). Sharing the values on which the parties came into conflict is the second mechanism that helps resolve conflict between states. What is considered as value can be vary depending on the nature of the conflict. For instance, when the war is geopolitical the possible value can be natural resource, territory. Thus, value sharing in this case, is dividing a territory up on which the two parties are conflicting.

The third mechanism of conflict resolution between states is 'horse-trading' principle. This principle is about give and take method in which the parties are obliged to lose something for the other in order to get something from the opposite party as to achieve their basic interests. The fourth mechanism of interstate conflict resolution is shared rule (common rule). This involves dual rule by the conflicting parties over a given territory or resources. The fifth mechanism of conflict resolution for Kalewongel, is neutralization. Neutralization is used when the conflicting parties have divergent ideas on the issue and unable to reach on an agreement. During such condition the parties leave the issue for another third party like the UN and AU. For instance, in East Timor the resource administration mandate was left for the UN from 1999-2002 (Kalewongel 2008).

Resort is the sixth mechanism of conflict resolution. This mechanism involves the shift from political ways of conflict resolution to legal procedure of conflict resolution. In this regard the issue and responsibilities to resolve the conflict cannot be limited to head of states or governmental officials. The people are concerned and take part in the process of resolution through election or referendum. Arbitration is considered as the most comfortable way of resolving interstate conflict when the war is derived by geopolitical cause (Kalewongel, 2008). Historically the Iraqi-Kuwait border conflict, the Peru-Ecuador conflict, Botswana-Namibiya

conflict, Nigeria- Cameroon conflict, and Benin and Niger conflicts were resolved through arbitration conflict resolution (Kalewongel, 2008).

Conflict resolution passes through two major stages (Kieh,Jr., 2010); the first stage is to cease fire or hostilities between the conflicting parties through agreements. This paves the way to come to discussion on their differences. Peace agreement by itself is not an end. It is an essential integral part of conflict resolution. Peace agreement can be signed on paper and it cannot represent action. Thus, it can be easily broken as evidenced in the case of peace agreement between India and Pakistan (Wallensteen, 2002). The second stage is peace building which is about addressing the root causes of the conflict. Peace building is impossible where there exists violent conflict. Thus, avoiding violent conflict complements peace building process.

Countries can make diplomatic ties after conflict considering their mutual benefits and prosperity in future as in the case of Franco-German rapprochement after the end of the WWII, having the vision of peaceful and prosperous continent, Europe (Jeong, 2010). France and Germany hostilities began since the Franco-Prussia war in the course of the German Unification in 1870s. The hostilities between the two countries had continued up to the end of the WWII. After the two world wars in which they suffered from they had got lessons and started rapprochements. In 1963 the leaders of German and France, Chancellor Adenauer and President Charles De Gaulle respectively signed the Elysee Treaty that concluded the century lasted hostilities between the two powerful European countries (Shamim, 2018). The leaders also assured that the treaty must be continued and the future leaders should strengthen cooperation between the two countries as stated by the then foreign minister of France Couve De Murville. The treaty, said the Minister;

This treaty solemnly sealed Franco-German Reconciliation forever. From then on, what had previously seemed an insurmountable enmity between two people, which took shape in nineteenth century and culminated in the twentieth century with two ruinous and bloody wars, belonged to the past (Shamim, 2018).

Finally letting the issue unresolved for certain times is another mechanism of interstate conflict resolution. This is the method through which the conflicting parties find the best ways for

resolution by taking times. Such prolonging acts helps them study the issue deeply for instance by appointing commissions.

Conflict resolution is comprehensive ideas applicable to all conflicts disregarding of its levels; whether it happens between families, organizations, or countries (Kriesberg, 2009). Conflict resolution is viewed differently by conflict resolvers. Some conflict resolvers understand the concept of conflict resolution as methods of settling and ending disputes between the conflicting parties and reaching on mutual agreements (Kriesberg, 2009). As Sousa describes conflict resolution can transform a society from a state of war to a state of peace (Sousa, 2018). This is to mean that from situations of war into negative peace where there is no violence, and from negative peace to positive peace which is characterized by social justice.

There are a number of conflict resolutions and theories; specifically, that comes from the Westerns. However, it is difficult to distinguish a theory which serves better in settling dispute. Even though there are different peace theories, each of them falls under criticisms in putting them into practice (Al-Abedine, 2017). According to Kalewongel (2008), conflict resolution between states is relatively easier than conflict resolution of intra-state.

As an approach, the conflict resolution school focuses on solving the causes of conflict and restabilising or healing of the deteriorated relationship of the conflicting parties (Paffenholz, 2009). In the early stage of the school, role players in building peace were the Westerns. Their engagements were in different ways. Among other ways the Westerns have been played through their academic institutions facilitating various workshops on issues of conflict resolution. The scope of actors that had limited to official civil society now extended to non-official civil society resulting in the emergence of this school. Civil societies play significant role in resolving conflicts. The range of civil society extended from individuals to communities and organized civil society groups.

The assumption that communication improvement and enhancing relations between the disputed parties could resolve a conflict is not fully accepted by the conflict management school. For the school of conflict management communication improvement and enhancing relations between the disputed parties could not necessarily bring an agreement (Paffenholz, 2009).

Throughout history a number of African countries fought border conflicts. However, none of the interstate conflicts in Africa was equated with Ethio-Eritrea conflict that lasted for about two decades. That means the Ethio-Eritrea war was the most protracted interstate war in Africa after the cold war (Edwin, 2010; Freweini, 2016). To stop the large-scale war, that was caused by a combination of factors, geopolitik, capital politik and others, the Algiers Agreement was remarkable. Until the recent time, however, the two countries had been hostile to each other. The recent rapprochement has paved the way to resolve the past hostile based on either of conflict resolution approaches.

### **2.2.2.1. Conflict Transformation**

The idea of conflict transformation approach was developed by John Paul Lederach (Paffenholz, 2009). John Paul Lederach posits Conflict transformation as follows:

Conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships (Lederach, 2014).

According to this definition, conflict transformation focuses on constructive changes, enhances justice and interactions in identifying the real cause of the problem that determines the future relations of the conflicted parties. Conflict transformation framework requires considering the present situations, the horizon of desired future and the development of change processes that could link the two (Lederach and Maiese, 2009).

The term conflict transformation was not well known by scholars as conflict resolution and in academic arena. As a result, the term transformation was understood by some as too idealistic that could not be attained in practice, too unworldly and new age (Lederach, 2014). Lederach believes that the term is accurate that it scientifically considers conflict as normal human relations on one hand and conflict as a motor for change on the other hand. The central theme of conflict transformation, therefore, is creating health relationships among societies in particular and globally at large (Lederach, 2014).

Conflict transformation refers to process, outcome and structure oriented in the courses of peace building efforts through long-term plans that has objectives to overcome an identified form of conflict or violence. The positive aspect of Conflict transformation is that it focuses on structural change that contributes for recognition of justice and human dignity (Jeong, 2010). Among the features of conflict transformation, it opens itself for involvement of different actors. According to Wani (2013) actors in conflict transformation can be classified into four main categories; state and intergovernmental organization, development and humanitarian organizations, international NGOs concerned with conflict preservation and transformation, and parties to the conflict and other relevant groups. Conflict transformation is characterized by its comprehensiveness since it goes from micro to macro levels of involvement of different entities.

The aim of conflict transformation is to build capacity and encourage structural change in settling disputes; the range of involvements goes from the grass root level to elite actors or from local to global (Wani, 2013 & Jeong, 2010). Conflict transformation as a field of study relates societal non-negotiable needs to access, acceptance and security (BMZ, 2010). Needs to accessibility refers to the opportunity of political and economic participation that could benefit the people whereas acceptance is a matter of getting recognition of one's identity and culture. Security is about accessibility to nutrition, housing and assuring physical integrity of an individual. The goal of conflict transformation is creating constructive change using the energy created for the purpose of conflict. Conflict transformation is not about immediate problem solving but building change of social structures and relationships. It answers to societal needs and existing realities and also constrains of lives (Wani, 2013).

### **2.2.3. Understanding of Peace Building**

Boutros Boutros Ghali was the General Secretary of the UN who defined peace building as “*action to identify support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse in to conflict*”. It was after this definition that the term peace building has got international attention. As depicted in Boutros Boutros Ghali's *Agenda for peace* of 1992, peace building involves post conflict social and political reconstruction activities in order to avoid getting back to conflict (Call & Cook, 2003). Tschirgi (2004) also defined peace building with the concept that “examines non-military interventions by external actors to help war-torn

societies not only to avoid a relapse into conflict, but more importantly, to establish the conditions for sustainable peace”. Peace building is not about short term peace of post conflict. It goes beyond short term early peace construction after a conflict but full range of international community involvement through non-military activities (Tschirgi, 2004).

Peace building is viewed as a long-term development of social, governmental and non-governmental mechanisms through which violence can be minimized and means of resolving disagreements of the conflicting parties can be created (Waldman, 2009). It emphasizes on post conflict peace settings. Community based approaches to peace building recognizes the local community groups and institution by empowering the local people. The people have an access to planning, making decision and execution as well as in monitoring process. The local community therefore identify their shared needs and demanded measures to be taken in order to meet the needs (Haider, 2009).

The involvement of different stake holders is crucial in peace making and peace building process. Conflicts could be resolved without force in the modern democratic world today. However, this can be achieved only when different role players take part through peaceful methods and techniques, including the local communities. To resolve the conflict and to make sustainable peace building the conflicted parties can proceed to reconciliation, diplomacy and cooperation at different levels either to resolve or transform the conflict (Wani, 2011). Post-conflict peace building is about actions of identifying and encouraging structures that are supposed to create and consolidate peace in the post-conflict circumstances in order to avoid the possible reoccurrence of conflict between the parties that had been in conflict (Peek, 2016).

#### **2.2.4. Challenges to Post-Conflict Peace Building**

Peacemaking and peace building require rapprochement of the conflicting parties. Various approaches can be used in making and building peace. Regardless of the selected approach peace building process cannot be scaped from challenges. Conflicts and wars can usually be affected by politics; they are mainly driven by the nature of the politics. Wils et, al. (2006) identified core challenges in peace building process. The complex political dynamism of conflict challenges peace building since actors involving in resolution of the conflict may not clearly understand this complexity (Wils et al, 2006). An *ad hoc*, fragmented, and too late response to

conflicts can also challenges peace building process. The International community in resolving conflict system responds based on agreements made in sensitive political spheres.

#### **2.2.4.1. Systemic and Structural Challenges**

Systemic and structural issues can affect post conflict peace building. Even though international peace building has inspirational sense it cannot be free from the will and commitments of the national governments. The first challenge can be the political nature of national governments that affects implementation of peace building. The level and nature of the member states' contributions in international peace building is the decisive factor (Tschirgi, 2004). The way through which the actors involve in peace building can be determined by their respective national government.

The second challenge is the difficulty in “de-linking” of post-conflict reconstruction in a state from its original environment. Country level peace building is a narrow focus in peace building process. Thus, international approach of peace building can be judged as exclusive at state level (Tschirgi, 2004). Financial resource can also be the third systemic issue that affects peace building. In post conflict peace building and peace reconstruction funding is a crucial and decisive.

Fourthly, systemic issue is about workable country-based peace building strategies which don't affect the globalized world economy. Finally, lack of institutions in peace building is one of the systemic issues that can affect post conflict peace building. It is fact that different actors, agencies and organizations including the UN could involve in peace making and peace building with poor mechanism. However, where there is no mechanism through which the actors formally involved in peace building may not result good fruits. For instance, the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea will face challenge because of the fact the two states were in hostilities for not less than two decades and the issue of institutions were undermined by both.

Another challenge pointed out by Lederach, is the kind of changes and solutions wanted, its levels and concerned issues under discussion and embedded in which relationship. Identifying what is specifically not wanted and to be changed and the desired changes challenges the actors in transforming the conflict (Lederach, 2014). The Ethio-Eritrea peace deals, therefore, could not

be scaped from the above mentioned challenges either directly or indirectly. Lack of institution, financial problems and the nature of both governments are factors that could challenge the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

### **2.3.Theoretical Framework**

The theories of realism, idealism, structuralism and post structuralism, for example, focus on regulating peace, security and order of international system in one or another way (Paffenholz, 2009). For the realists the international system is anarchic thus balance of power is important as to maintain relation between states.

Accordingly, hegemonic power maintains stability and interests of states for realists. Idealists on the other hand argue that international norms, international organizations and standards regulate the world. For idealists Peace building among nations is achievable on the basis on creating international norms and standards that could be run through international organizations such as the United Nations (UN). Peace building for the structuralist is about achieving radical change through mass revolutions in international system where as post-structuralist peace building is not about common meta-narrative; rather it needs consideration and understanding of diversities that comprise every day peace to the level of ordinary people (Paffenholz, 2009).

Kant attempted in his work to identify major issues that sovereign states need to hold and maintain. These include the issues of intervention in other country's internal affairs and peaceful coexistence. There are fundamental points in which the idea of sustainable peace lays down. For Kant, treaties of peace, activation of social contracts of the government and the governed, disarmament, self-reliance of states economically, confirmation of states' independence and abstain from intervention and finally ethical consideration during war are important elements that states require to maintain (Al-Abedine, 2017).

However, the above-mentioned points faced criticisms from other scholars. They criticize that points stated by Kant could only be considerable in a democratic republic governance system. This on the other hand implies that for sustainable peace, nations need to be republicans which are not as such simple to achieve it. Kant's peace theory also criticized for its idea of social contract. Social contract conception of Kant may enforce governments to establish federation

system with the people and with other governments just for the sake of peace. Generally, the theory is criticized for its vulnerability in terms of structure and unclear procedures (Al-Abedine, 2017).

According to Paffenholz, there are five fundamental approaches to peace building. These are the conflict resolution school, the conflict transformation school, the conflict management school, the complementary school and the Alternative Discourse of Peace building school (Paffenholz, 2009). But this thesis tries to analyse only the conflict transformation school, and Interstate Relations and Economic Interdependence for the study purpose

### **2.3.1. The Conflict Transformation School**

Conflict transformation theory differs from that of conflict resolution and conflict management in that it focuses on the change in social structures of the conflicting parties (Miall, 2007). It goes beyond searching an immediate solution for the conflict. Conflict transformation is characterized by its focus and attention on background causes of conflict rather than working for immediate solution of the happening disputes and it is about to put into consideration peoples' attitude, perception and the context in which the people are living (Dijk, 2009). According to Podusova (2017), among other conflict resolution strategies conflict transformation emphasises on facilitation of reconciliation based on promoting mutual interests of the conflicted states.

The main focus of the conflict transformation school is transforming conflict relation to peace relations. John Paul Lederach is the pioneer who developed comprehensive and transformation oriented approach. He supports the potential of society for reconciliation in order to build "long-term infrastructure" in peace building. He believes that deteriorated relationship of two conflicting parties need to be rebuild through increasing capacities and potential of society in peace building courses. This issue also requires giving recognition for reconciliation. A third party that is supposed to be involved between the disputing parties needs to encourage both internal and external actors' effort in peace making processes. In this regard Lederach distinguished society into three fundamental categories; Track 1, Track 2 and Track 3.

These tracks for Lederach is to mean different levels at which conflicts could be transformed into peace. Track 1 refers to the accessibility of top leadership through mediation at level of state. At

the top level leadership prominent figures like top military positions, politicians and religious leaders having legitimacy of representing of the conflicting parties. The leaders of the disputed parties are primarily responsible in ending the conflict which the society at local could accept (Mirjana et.al, 2017). Figurative leaders could influence their society in making decision of the first stage of conflicts. Leaders like Nelson Mandela and the Dalai Lama contributed to peace building through their discourses and behaviours in transforming peoples' attitude and behaviours (Brounéus, 2003). Track 2 refers to the accessibility of middle level leadership by resolution-oriented approaches like exemplary personalities in a society, and peace commissions. Track 3 refers to the grass root level at which the majority of the people could be accessed through community based peace building approaches such as local peace commission and community dialogue projects.

The approach cooperates the local peace building with international peace building advocacy. Thus, it has shifted that the focus from international to local actors. Civil societies and ordinary people are given attention within this approach. The conflict transformation school has become the leading for those who take part in peace building such as scholars and international NGOs. Despite some of its deficiencies, which Paffenholz identified in his analysis of peace building process in Mozambican and Somalia, the school seems that it has not yet faced fundamental criticism.

Conflict transformation as expressed by Miall (2007), could involve four fundamental changes. These are i) actor transformation or change, ii) issue change, iii) rule change, and iv) structural changes. Actors are established and fixed institutions or entities having material interest and mental formation. The interests of the institutions are shaped by the situation in which they exist. That is to mean actors are influenced by their environment. On the other hand, the environment can also shape the actors (Richmond, 2001). More importantly actors share common purpose, interests or shared attributes in their groups. Actors are dynamic in their nature because of external and internal factors which could lead them to develop new goals and interests. Thus, the change in leadership could bring a change in interests and goals which in turn influence the process of conflict transformation (Galtung, 2004).

Another crucial element in conflict transformation is the change of issues or goals. Actors need to reset new goals and interests to transform the conflict into peace based on existing situations with care since changing of previous goal could not be escaped from challenges (Miall, 2007). According to Miall, the context in which the conflict exists is also a point to be focused in conflict transformation. Rules and norms can influence the behaviours and ways of engagement of actors in conflict transformation. It needs to change the meaning of the stakes in conflict and actor's perceptions based on the apparent situation (Richmond, 2001). For instance, as in the case of Northern Ireland conflict in which the border issues discarded and the focus was given to the people. This was as a result of the development of the EU that declined the border issues (Miall, 2007).

Changing structures through which actors interact could also help in conflict transformation. The prevailing political forms, institutions and social patterns can either directly or indirectly affect methods and techniques through which actors could interact. Transformation of social structure is important where there exists asymmetric relationship of different groups (Mitchell, 2006). In the case of Northern Ireland, the relations between the protestant and the catholic were characterized by dominance by majority over the minority. This was gradually balanced by strengthening the Republic of Ireland and pan-nationalist coalition (Miall, 2007)

The longstanding hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea had the effect on deteriorating the economic, political and socio-cultural reality of the two people and also highly destabilized the Horn of Africa (Kalewongel, 2008). Despite the fact a number of attempts had been made by different regional, international organizations and international community none of them able to transform the animosity between the two states into peace until the recent rapprochement of 2018.

## **2.4 Interstate Relations and Economic Interdependence**

### **2.4.1. Liberal Peace theory**

According to Liberal Peace theory, democracy guarantees domestic political systems of states (Tanabe, 2017). This implies that democratic states do not go to war. They use their economic interdependence based on free trade, and international laws and norms in resolving conflicts. For liberalists states can use economic interdependence as an apparatus in stabilizing domestic issues

and international orders. Liberal peace building as an approach is mainly emphasis on promotion of democracy with free trade and economic reforms and the issue of institutionalization for the realization of durable peace (Tanabe, 2017). This could help states to resolve any possible disputes through peaceful means without physical forces. Liberal peace building can be described as a means through which ‘liberal values’ are disseminated in post conflict situations (Peek, 2016).

The two main schools of thought of liberal peace building debate theory are the approach of ‘problem solving ‘manner and the ‘critical approach’ (Newman et al. 2009). The problem solving manner approach considers the apparent social relationship and the existing structures/ institutions in which they are supposed to perform. Accordingly, the approach attempts to look for ways through which performances of certain actors are improved in different sectors like to improve coordination among the actors and how to promote donors and other stakeholders to be engaged in enhancing peace building projects.

The critical approach debate on the other hand is about whether peace building is liberal by itself, should be liberal and whether liberal peace building is a concept (Newman et al. 2009). The approach questions on the prevailing institutions and also policy assumption as well as the interests they hand out. Who do the institutions and its policy serve is a core inquiry of critical approach of liberal peace building?

For Kant Liberal peace depends on the premises of the reasonable of human nature and all natural capacities given to a creature (Newman et.al, 2009). By human reasoning Kant means nature categorized human being within faculty of reason. In the faculty human can do his free will, establish his own life style, reshape his behaviour, can create rules and moral judgments to become morally accountable through which conflicts can be resolved (Fischer, 2000).

#### **2.4.1.1. Economic Interdependence and Peace**

In the globalizing world states interaction has been increasing as to compete in enhancing their national interests or not to be dominated by other. States relations can be varying depending on their foreign policy direction. Economic based relations are becoming common throughout the contemporary world states. Trade relation among states is not a recent phenomenon. Trade has

been practiced among human societies since ancient times. Today trade is a mechanism through which states could achieve their economic interests. Liberal peace building gives emphasis on building of institutions under a consideration of market economy and democratic principles. The contemporary international political economy is characterized by economic interdependence (Robera, 2016; Newman et.al, 2009).

For liberalists states are open to one another as to enhance their trade transaction and opportunities beyond their jurisdictions which in return assure their economic progress and strengthen policy choice connectedness. In economic cooperation, states establish principles and rules to be obeyed by the member countries. Economic interdependence of states can contribute in resolving disputes between them peacefully. Various evidences show that trade interdependence minimizes interstate conflict (Gartzke et. al, 2001). Reforms to liberal market economy can help states in peace building operations (Peek, 2016). According to Peek (2016) many peace building operations from 1992 to 1999 were practically conducted using liberal market economy within countries that had experienced post conflict peace building. Many agree to the Kant's argument that interdependence leads to peace supporting. But what kind of conflicts fit this assumption is not identified in theory.

According to Gartzke et.al (2001), the liberals have non militarized conflicts and others like Gosiorowski and Mary Tetreault argue that it is interconnectedness of states not trade interdependence that can minimize conflicts between states (Hegre, 2004). It is when economic process avoids incentives for states that may encourage them into conflict and minimizing uncertainty during bargaining process that enables interdependence to support peace. Gartzke et.al (2001) argues that interdependence can shift militarized conflicts to non-violent conflict resolution. Interdependence and interconnectedness, therefore, widens the options of states in resolving disputes among sovereign states. The failure to create linkage with other states on the other hand limits the options of states to war. Generally, derived by the expensive nature of conflict than the expected values of the war, and the reality that interdependence is much more benefits than war/conflict, economic interdependence can promote peace (Gartzke et. al, 2001).

The recently started Ethio-Eritrea relations requires to be built through establishing institutions guided by democratic principles and promotion of market economy system. Encouraging economic interdependence between the two countries maximize the possibility of building peace.

## Chapter Three

### Post 1991 Historical Overview of Ethio-Eritrea Relations

#### Introduction

Before directly dealing with the post 1991 Ethio-Eritrea historical relations it is important to describe the colonial legacy of Italy which had put a far-reaching consequence up on Eritreans. This is because the emergence of Eritrean identity by itself was triggered by colonial legacy of Italy (Gebru, 2006:58; Lencho, 2006:76)). Ethiopians and Eritreans have a long history of relations as people of the same country some times and as neighbouring countries at another time. Evidences show that prior to 1880s Eritrea had been part and parcel of Ethiopia starting from the Axum Civilization (Wubzgher and Mensah, 2014: 47). As mentioned earlier, the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea share similar ethnicity, culture, history and mythology. The people of the two countries are also bounded through blood and ancestors (Kidanu and Endalkachew, 2015). However, through times the relations between the two people had deteriorated by colonial legacies of Italy since 1880s. The colonial legacy of Italy also led to the creation of Eritrean identity through times (Kidanu and Endalkachew, 2015).

The death of Emperor Yohannis IV in 1889 at the battle of Mettema created a power vacuum and facilitated the southward expansion of Italians. The centre of power which had been at north, centred in Mekelle, now shifted to Showa. During this shift the Italian forces had got a chance of penetrating into the interior land of Ethiopia (Tekiste, 1997). However, this does not mean that Italians easily controlled and put Ethiopians under their rule. Emperor Minilik II who had formerly negotiated with the Italians against Yohannis, now obliged to sign a treaty with Italians not to let their simple penetration into Ethiopia. Accordingly, the Wuchale Treaty was signed in May 1889. The treaty recognized Eritrea as an Italian colony (Tekiste, 1997). Moreover, Emperor Minilik made boundary delimitation with Italians in 1890 that assured the Italian colonial rule over Eritrea. After the victory of Adwa, the Italian government appointed Ferdinando Martini to govern Eritrea. Martini ruled Eritrea from 1897 to 1907 and assured the colonial government (Tekiste, 1997). Martini during his rule understood Eritrea's potential in serving Ethiopia by its outlet. Finally, when Martini left Eritrea in 1907, the policy of good neighbourliness and non-interference was used in the areas adjacent to Eritrea under the

jurisdiction of Ethiopian state. After many years, the Italian colonial interest was revived in 1930s. During this time around 25% of Ethiopia's export-import was through the Eritrean ports.

Another potential of Eritrea that Martini observed was the man power from Eritrea. Soldiers were recruited from Eritrea to be sent to other Italian colonies, particularly Libya in which about 4000 soldiers were stationed from Eritrea. These potentials therefore, created good relationship between the colonial government of Italy and the Eritrean people (Tekiste, 1997).

As a result of the racist ideology, the economic boom of Eritrea and the Ethio-Italian war were emerged as the major factors contributed to the creation of Eritrean identity and developed sense of separation. Generally, the rule of Italians lasted for about half a century contributed to the expansion of industries, schools, infrastructures commercial agricultures had played crucial roles in creating Eritrean identity (Kidist, 2011).

Eritrean independence from the Italian rule became true in 1941 when the joint forces of Ethiopia and Britain chased the Italian forces out of both Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, Eritrea was put under the control of the British military administration until 1952 when the UN facilitated the federation with Ethiopia (Eri-Platform, 2018).

In 1952 Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia by the UN resolution. After the evacuation of Italy from Eritrean land, unfortunately, Eritrea was put under the rule of British for about a decade. At the time two options, federation or union, were provided for the Eritrean people. By the facilitation of the UN however federating to Ethiopia won. Some argue that there existed the interests of the western powers particularly, Britain, and USA (Tekste, 1997). The interest of British government in this regard was protecting its interest in the adjacent colonies whereas the US interest was to enhance its relation with Ethiopia.

The Federal Act comprises of basic human rights principles and fundamental freedoms like the right to life, liberty and security of person, the rights to own property, the right to freedom of opinion and expressions. The UN Commissioner for Eritrea, Anze Matienzo and the British Administration planned and worked on the issues of the election of constitutional assembly, drafting of the constitution, creation of government and power division between the local government and the Imperial Government (Tekste, 1997).

On 25 and 26 March 1952 elections held in Asmara and Massawa, for General Assembly were contested by the Unionist Party (UP), the Moselem League (ML), the Eritrean Democratic Front (EDF) and the Liberal Progressive Party in Eritrea (LPPE) (Tekste, 1997). For the Unionists, the resolution of the UN was considered as equivalent with union with Ethiopia whereas the ML understood the UN resolution as it assured political and cultural autonomy of Eritrea. On the other hand, the Eritrean Democratic Front had unclear position about the resolution i.e in between cooperation and hesitation. However, on 15 July 1952 the constitution was approved by the Eritrean Constitutional Assembly. The Ethiopian government also approved the Federal Act on August 11 of the same year. The federation system paved the way for easy incorporation of Eritrea to Ethiopia in 1962 and to be considered as one of the Ethiopian provinces until 1991(Riley and Emigh, 2002).

### **3.1. Formation of Secessionist Movements**

The United Nations sponsored federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952 came to an end in 1962 when Emperor Haile Sillase I changed it into union by influencing the Eritrean parliament to vote for union (Tesfa News, April 23, 2018). The UN in the facilitation of the federation provided Eritrea liberal constitution which in fact contradicts with the monarchical constitution of Emperor Haile Sillase I of Ethiopia. Fundamental principles of human rights, the concept of separation of power and the system of check and balance were some major provisions of the liberal constitution provided to Eritrea (Edwin, 2010). However, the ‘federation status’ of Eritrea had brought ideal divergence among the ministers of the Ethiopian government of the then period. The progressive and the centralist categories came into exist. Accordingly, the progressive category argues that the model of Eritrea’s federation could be a potential defused to Ethiopian provinces and the claim of federation status might rise in Ethiopia.

On the other side, the centralists argue that such model endangers the emperor’s absolute power (Edwin, 2010). Finally, the government of Ethiopia had put pressure on Eritreans to vote for union and Eritrea became one of the Ethiopian provinces in 1962. The shift from federation to union had triggered to the creation of guerrilla movements. The repression on Eritreans by the government of Ethiopia of the then period, had created grievances and led to the emergence of the ELF in 1961 before the union (Paulos, 2015). It was later, when some came apart from ELF

that the EPLF was also formed in 1970s, which the EPLF began to challenge the government of Ethiopia (Kidanu and Endalkachew, 2015; Yoel, 2018).

### **3.1.1. Historical Relations Between the TPLF and the EPLF**

The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) movements had both cooperation and conflict historical relations. Their relations had started in 1975 when the TPLF was emerged. In this early formation the TPLF the two movements had been working together. For instance, among the founding members of the fighters of the TPLF, 20 of them were trained by the EPLF at Sahel rear station and when returned to Tigray where they were given weapons (Redie, 2009).

The relations between the EPLF and the TPLF began to decline when the idea of a great Tigray republic was raised by TPLF. The Greater Tigray Republic in line with the notion of 'Tigrayan' would not be realized without touching the Eritrean territories. Some areas of Eritrea and some populations from Eritrea were to be included in the proposed project of the TPLF. The proposal was on the territorial boundary during Emperor Yohannies IV which included the High lands of Eritrea. The interest and proposal of the TPLF was not welcomed by the EPLF (Redie, 2009). The expansionist ideas of the TPLF deteriorated the relation between the two movements. However, in 1980s rapprochement between the two fronts was revived (Redie, 2009). According to Redie the rapprochement was not as to find solution for the differences rather pragmatic relations. During the revived relations the TPLF sent its fighters for the EPLF against the Ethiopian 'Red Star Campaign' in 1982. But still the ownership of the town of Badime was continued contesting.

## **3.2. Post 1991 Ethio- Eritrea Relations**

### **3.2.1. Ethio-Eritrea Diplomatic Relations from 1991-1997**

Eritreans fought 30 years war against Ethiopian governments to achieve their independence. The ELF and later the EPLF fought against the autocratic government of Emperor Hailesilasse I and the authoritarian government of the Dergue (Meala, 2011). During the struggles the insurgent groups, the TPLF and the EPLF, from both Ethiopia and Eritrea had collaborated against the

authoritarian government of Ethiopia, the Dergue. Once the Dergue regime was collapsed, the two parties dominated political power of their respective countries.

After independence of Eritrea in 1993 Ethio-Eritrea diplomatic relations were smoothly carried out with a number of agreements signed between the two countries. The formal state to state diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea started after 24 May 1993 official independence (Kalewongel, 2008). In June of the same year Ethiopia and Eritrea signed the Friendship and Cooperation Agreement (FCA). The Agreement allowed Ethiopia the free use of the Assab port and facilitated the free import and export of commodities for the two countries which saved them from foreign exchange since they used the Ethiopian Birr as a common medium of exchange (Worku, 2016). Ethiopia had been exported agricultural products mainly food which accounted 30% from 1992-1997. On the Eritrean sides, industrial products were exported to Ethiopia. The two countries also signed another agreement in September 1993 concerning economic policies (Kalewongel, 2008).

These economic policies mainly focused on interest rate, methods of overcoming inflations, free movement of goods and services, and to use a common currency, the Ethiopian Birr. The agreement also included that the goods or commodities imported from either of the two countries must not be exported to the third country (Kalewongel, 2008). Even though the rapprochement was perceived positively by both countries and international community, as a result of lack of institutions, inability and lack of political willingness, the two countries failed to obtain the desired advantages from the cooperation (Kidanu and Endalkachew, 2015). Finally, when Eritrea introduced its new currency (Nkfa) in 1997, the economic cooperation between the two had begun to decline and the 1998 war totally interrupted the economic cooperation of the two independent states of Ethiopia and Eritrea (Meala, 2011).

### **3.2.2. Causes of the Ethio-Eritrea War (1998-2000)**

There is no consensus among scholars and politicians on the cause of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrea war. Scholars, politicians and diplomats still debate on the real causes of Ethio-Eritrea war (Dima, 2006). The Ethio-Eritrea conflict cannot be attributed to a single factor. According to Gebru (2006), the courses of state formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea, different political approaches of the two states, contending economic interests and border issues could be major causes.

However, it can be said that the two years lasted war was caused by complex and interrelated factors. These are political tension, economic factors, psycho-social issues, and also border issues, as the conflicted parties claimed, are considered to be causes (Kidanu and Endalkachew, 2015). Others also attribute the causes of the war to lack of accountability and public discussion of the leaderships of the two states (Dima, 2007). Peoples of Ethiopia and Eritrea were excluded from the debate of the early 1990s.

### **3.2.2.1.Economic Causes**

The independence of Eritrea in 1991 made Ethiopia the only landlocked state in the Horn of Africa. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) welcomed and recognized the independence of Eritrea. At the time Ethiopia was promised for free access to the port of Assab by the Eritrean government. It seems that the recognition of the independence in exchange with the free access to the port, and also they agreed on free movement of people of the two countries, using common currency, Ethiopian Birr (Dias, 2008). According to Dias the post 1991 Ethio-Eritrea relations can be understood under major aspects; the access to the Assab port, the introduction of new currency of Eritrea, Nkfa and social implication of economic changes.

Following its independence Eritrea had took the model of Singapore for economic development to be achieved in 2015. It was targeted to reach the level Germany in infrastructure of road transport, at the level of Sweden by telecommunications. This proposal was by calculating huge and free market system and opportunity in Ethiopia and cheap labour from Ethiopia for Eritrean industries (Gebru, 2006). Prior to the war more than 300,000 Eritreans had got employment opportunities either directly or indirectly in Ethiopia and Eritrea's 80% of export was to Ethiopia (Seyoum, 2012).

After 1997 Ethiopia's access to the port of Assab was declined and later Ethiopia lost the accessibility to it. Thus, Ethiopia shifted its outlet to the Djibouti port. In fact, Ethiopia had been using the Djibouti port during the reign of Emperor Haile Sillasie which held 60% of total import-export volume. However, the Ethio-Somalia war of 1977-1978 unsecured the region and deteriorated accessibility to the port and minimized the percentage of transit to only 10%, the

Dergue changed the route to the port of Assab which almost controlled the import and export trade of Ethiopia. About 90% of import and export shifted to the port of Assab (Dias, 2008).

Geographically the port of Assab has comparative advantage for Ethiopia. Even though there are other optional ports like the port of Djibouti the port of Assab is found at 882 km from the capital city of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa whereas the ports of Djibouti, the Berbera port, the port of Sudan and the port of Mombasa are located at 910km, 964km, 1881km and 2077km from Addis Ababa respectively. In this regard Ethiopia also changed the cross-border trade with Eritrea.

The introduction of new currency, Nkfa was another economic dimension that had affected the trade relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Kidanu and Endalkachew, 2015). The introduction of Nkfa in 1997 was also considered as one of the immediate causes of the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998 because it worried the previous economic relations of the two countries (Reid, 2018; Lasely, 2015). When Ethiopia started building up of militias around the borders, specifically Badime, Eritreans protested against it. This impacted the economic benefits and relations of the two countries in general and the communities around the borders in particular.

### **3.2.2.2. Political and Security Causes**

The EPLF and the TPLF relation which was started during the early establishment of the TPLF, in 1975, faced problems in 1976 when the TPLF's intention was discovered. The intention of the TPLF was to establish a Great Tigray Republic through taking over some peripheral territories of Eritrea and some ethnic minorities, which was strongly resisted by the EPLF (Redie, 2009; Lencho, 2003).

The main emphasis of the two governments after the down fall of the Dergue regime was state building (Gebru, 2006). The leadership of both countries began to consolidate their respective powers against each other. The dynamic nature of relations between the two forces, TPLF and EPLF, was remarkably changed after they came to power. The nature of state creation in Eritrea and Ethiopia became different. As a result Ethiopia developed Federal Democratic Republic state structure whereas Eritrea becomes authoritarian. The two countries have followed different political approaches which paved the way for their disagreement that later led them to war in 1998. Eritreans struggled for 30 years to achieve independence from Ethiopia. From this

background the Eritrean elites considered Eritreans as they were homogenous strong and united. They Developed a sense of chauvinism and claimed the total credit of the victory over the Dergue regime in 1991 (Gebru, 2006).

### **3.2.2.3.Territory**

As mentioned earlier, the border disputes of Ethiopia and Eritrea traced back to the colonial legacy of Italy on Eritrea. Emperor Haile Silase I abrogated the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1962. Since then Eritrea was part of Ethiopia until its independence of 1991. The boundary issues were not as such major contending point until 1997. However, it was seen as pretext to start war in 1998 which consumed the lives of thousands of people from both sides within two years (Gebru, 2006). The town of Badime became the flashpoint that later decided by the EEBC though Ethiopia rejected the decision in 2003.

### **3.3. Courses and Consequences of the Ethio-Eritrean War (1998-2000)**

On May 6 1998 Eritrean troops crossed to Ethiopian territory and confronted with the local militias. The local inhabitants of Badime and the surroundings were considering themselves as Ethiopians (Tigrayans) who had always been paid taxes to Ethiopian governments (Abbkin, 1998). The war was intensified to other localities like Altena, Zalambessa, and Bure for the following weeks. The Eritrean soldiers were unable to penetrate deep into Tigray regions because there were around 28,000 demobilized fighters and estimated 50,000 militias stationed in the region (Dias, 2005). The first round of the war was fought from May-June 1998. In this round Eritrea had strategic position and military advantages. The Eritrean troops were not demobilized unlike Ethiopia. In this round of war Eritrea had a position of offensive whereas Ethiopia's position was defensive (Dias, 2005). After this confrontation the two states seemed to build their military power. Until November 1998 the two parties ceased clash and began competing each other in armament.

The second round of the fighting had openly started in February 1999. At this time Ethiopia had mobilized counter offensive force called "*Operation Sun Set*" which restored the occupied territory of Ethiopia, Badime on 26 February of the same year which was after serious fighting against the Eritrean forces. During this round of confrontation Ethiopia had airpower advantage

over the Eritrean army. The Ethiopian forces had gone beyond Badime and with capacity of penetrating deep into Eritrean lands. Though it is not clearly identified why the Ethiopian army retreated, according to Dias (2005) the possible costs and risks obliged the forces to abstain from invading Eritrea. The withdrawal of Ethiopian army from the western Eritrean territories, according to some, was because of the fact that they achieved the objective of regaining the occupied Ethiopian territories (Kalewongel, 2008; Roba, 2011).

The Ethio-Eritrea war which lasted for two years was resulted in a number of deaths and civilian displacements. The number of deaths estimated to be from 70,000 to 100,000 on both sides (Dias, 2005: 10; Reid, 2018). A number of people were displaced at least from the TSZ made by the UN as a buffer zone along the borders. Additionally, the two decades hostilities and clashes between Eritrea and Ethiopia highly contributed in destabilizing the horn of Africa. The war highly declined the economies of the two countries. Uncertain economic situations were created. Trade, tourism and investments were rapidly declined since there is no comfortable environment to be conducted smoothly like the previous one (Wuhibegezer, 2014). On the other hand, by its nature, war at least endangers economy of the conflicting parties. This is because building military, buying firearms requires huge capital. During war times, governments shift their expenditure to war rather than on investment. Ethiopia and Eritrea, the two poor countries of Africa, diverted not only their hundred million of Dollar but the active productive forces also went to war. The war devastated the Economy of both countries. For instance, Eritrea's Defense budget in 1997 was 13.6% of the country's GDP, 38.5% of the GDP during the war, and reached 25.7% in 2002 (Country Profile, September, 2005). As a result, Eritreans suffered from shortage of food. Farmers had no comfortable situation because of intensive bombings and huge military vehicles overrunning the farmlands of the farmers during the war and food production was declined by 62% (Wuhibegezer, 2014).

### **3.4. Attempts Made to Resolve the Conflict**

A number of attempts were conducted by different regional and international entities to find solutions for the devastating Ethio-Eritrea conflicts that lasted for about two decades. The AU, the UN, the US-Rwanda attempted and have worked to resolve the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea that unsecured the entire Horn of Africa.

### 3.4.1. The Algiers Agreement

Though animosity and suspecting each other was continued between the two countries, the Algiers Agreement of December 2000 concluded the Ethio-Eritrea intense and large-scale war (Abbink, 2003). The Agreement had brought the conventional war to an end but unable to resolve the conflict and demarcate the boundaries between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Kidanu and Endalkachew, 2015). Cease fire and settling border issue was the main focus of the Agreement, but the issues of the conflict seem went beyond the borders. Though the Agreement able to sop the large scales conventional war, it narrowed the issue of the discussion between the two countries to boundary. Other important issues, like the conflict-induced displaced people, highly militarized borders, absence of formal communications between Ethiopia and Eritrea were unconsidered evidenced the narrow focus of the Algiers Agreement.

The Algiers Agreement was signed to cease fire and also created a demilitarized Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) under the supervision of the UNMEE (Caprile, 2008). On the other hand this Agreement paved the way to the established Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) in 2002 in order to demarcate the disputing borders between the two countries. However, the attempts were not put into practice because Ethiopia rejected the EEBC in 2003 (Caprile, 2008).

After the Agreement the two countries went to a situation of no war no peace for about two decades. The period of ‘no war, no peace’ was characterized by frequent attacks and incidents against each other violating the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). The TSZ was established to keep apart the forces of Ethiopia and Eritrea at twenty-five kilometres from *defacto* border of Eritrea. However, Eritreans violated the Zone and began to construct their defences approaching Badime. The deployment of UN peacekeeping operation was a term of the Algiers Agreement along the TSZ that estimated to be 1000km disputing borders (Dias, 2005). Some low level of incidents includes skirmishes, border patrols, stealing of live stocks and exchange of fires. But in recent years serious clashes were observed. In 2012 the Ethiopian force made an attack penetrating into Eritrean territory and another clash was taking place at Tsorena in 2016 between the two forces (Reid, 2018).

### **3.4.1.1. The Ethiopia and Eritrea Border Commission (EEBC)**

The Algiers Agreement of 12 December 2000 recommended for the setup of neutral Boundary Commission and Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) (Redie, 2009). Accordingly, the Ethiopia and Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) was established in 2001 containing five neutral member countries for delimitation and demarcation of the disputed borders between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The commission was obliged to base on the previous boundary treaties signed between Ethiopia and the colonial master of Eritrea, Italian government of the then period (Redie, 2009). There were three major treaties signed between the two at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that the Algiers Peace Agreement charged the EEBC. The Article 4 (2) of the Algiers Agreement states that;

*“The parties agree that a neutral Boundary Commission composed of five members shall be established with a mandate to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902, and 1908) and applicable international law”.*

The aforementioned treaties were considered as historical and legal base in order to resolve the border conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Accordingly, the EEBC's decision was based on the three treaties. Before the decision however, the commission facilitated for arguments between the two parties (Ethiopia and Eritrea) and also heard their responses for questions posed to them by the commission (Robera, 2011). The commission passed decision about the delimitation of the contested boundaries between Ethiopia and Eritrea on 13 April 2002 (Robera, 2011). The delimitation decision was undergone by clustering the borders into the West, the central and the East. According to the decision, Zalambessa and the Irob territories were given to Ethiopia whereas the Badime was given to Eritrea (Redie, 2009).

The Boundary Commission's decision of April 2002 belonged Badime to Eritrea which enhanced the tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Reid, 2018). The decision has two major short comings (Kidanu and Endalkachew, 2015). The first shortcoming is it depended on the pertinent colonial border treaties of 1900, 1902 and 1908. Second, the local people were not consulted in the process of the decision. In 2003 Ethiopia responded to the decision criticizing that the verdict was illegal, unjust and irresponsible.

### **3.5. The Five Point Peace Proposal of Ethiopia**

Although the Ethiopia and Eritrea Boundary Commission decision was expected to delimit the borders between the two countries as a final binding, Ethiopia refused to accept the decision of April 2002. Ethiopia and Eritrea had developed disagreement on the commission's decision. Eritrea accepted the decision and only if Ethiopia accepted the decision. Eritrea was ready to start dialogue for normalization of the relations between the two states. Ethiopia on the other hand refused to accept and came up with reservation (Robera, 2011). The five-point peace proposal was approved by the House of people's Representatives of Ethiopia with direct relation with national interest, demanding dialogue and negotiation in order to resolve the conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Abebe, 2016).

Later on, in 2004 Ethiopia had denounced the legality of the decision and emanated a new initiative called Five Point Peace proposals, with the aim of repairing the image of the country (Kalewongel, 2008). Through the initiative Ethiopia wanted a dialogue before demarcation of the borders which on the other side dissatisfied Eritrea. Following this disagreement Ethiopia and Eritrea began to deploy their arms around the borders which invited the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), and aggravated 'no war no peace' situations until the recent rapprochement of 2018.

### **3.6. The Role of International Community**

At the early beginning of the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea some international mediators attempted to resolve the conflicts. Major brokers were US, Rwanda, the UN and AU that mediated the two countries to resolve the conflict. Susan Rice, the US Assistance Secretary for State of Africa cooperated with Rwanda's Paul Kagame went to the region for finding solution to the conflict. From 17 to 29, May 1998 the delegates shuttled between Addis Ababa and Asmara in order to facilitate the situation for peace settlement between the two states (Lencho, 2003). It was aimed to find solution through peaceful methods and the two countries were requested to demilitarize the borders. But on the side of Eritrea the request was not accepted because Eritrea understood the peace talk as blaming only against her country (Meala, 2011). Even though the attempt didn't bring solution it led the two conflicting parties to sign the Algiers Agreement in 2000 which obliged them to cease fire (Gebbru, 2006).

Some argue that the international approach to the Horn of Africa is unbalanced. Concerning the stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea there is an argument that Eritrea's foreign policy is not isolationist as others say (Redie, 2009). It is not Eritrea that isolated itself but the international community by itself excluded Eritrea. Historical evidences consolidate this idea. For instance, in 1962 when Ethiopia abrogated the federation which had facilitated by the UN, either the international community or the western powers kept silent. Again when Ethiopia refused and rejected the decision of the EEBC which was considered as a final binding, the international community did say nothing.

The so called 'new powers'; Turkey, Qatar and South Africa and also the EU have showed concerns in the Horn of Africa's security issues. The European Union Special Representatives (EUSR) was set up in 2012 for new engagement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In engagement with Eritrea the EU was in a weak position concerning two major areas (Mosley, 2014). First the EU was perceived as it failed to enforce compliance by Ethiopia. Secondly its diplomatic stance was based on human rights focus approach (Mosley, 2014).

However, the EU has sustained its relations with Eritrea basically on common interests like migration. This was because of the fact that the African migrants have increased in the member states of the EU most probably many of them from Eritrea.

### **3.7. Understanding the Period of 'no war, no peace'**

The 'no peace no war' situation in the context of the study refers to a circumstance in which people living on border sides of Ethio-Eritrea became in unstable state of mind and not certain about their security issues (Berhe, 2003). No peace no war situation was the circumstance in which there were no formal or informal relationship between the two people, militarization of the borders by the government of Ethiopia and Eritrea, which had unsecured the region (Berhe, 2003).

The no war no peace stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea clearly revealed that the causes of the conflict goes beyond the border issue. After the major conventional war of 1998-2000, the emphasis was shifted to the consequences of the war rather than its cause roots. Such a focus therefore, undermined issues of normalization of relations between the two, reduced the actors'

willingness to contribute and also blocked the implementation of the decision of the border commission (Abebe, 2016).

The approaches that the two countries followed were divergent and complicated resolution of the conflict. The Ethiopian government of the then period believed that negotiation should come before the boundary demarcation which in fact implies refusing the Boundary Commission's decision that gave Badime to Eritrea. On the other hand, Eritrea was not in a position to sequencing the issue. Rather Eritrea highly interested in demarcation of the border before any negotiation. The divergent approaches followed by the two states in sequencing the issues therefore, contributed to the situation of 'no war, no peace'. On the side of the Eritrean government it seems that the approach was used to stay in power and for regime continuity (Abebe, 2016).

The 'no war, no peace' stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea was experienced with supporting of the opposition movements in the region that contributed for destabilizing the region, and in return political, social and economic aspects of the two states were declined. According to Berhe (2003), the no peace no war situations affected negatively both states in political, economic and social aspects. Economic relations that had been flourished before the war was completely closed during the 'no war no peace' situation. Economically, peoples of the two countries have suffered from the situation which lasted for more than a decade and a half. Local trade between the people living along the border came to an end. The youths were suffered from unemployment. Socially families were broken and prohibited to visit each other (Berhe, 2003). On the other hand, youth migration to the neighbour countries particularly, Ethiopia has increased. The 'no war, no peace' stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea was highly affecting not only the people of the two countries, but also destabilized the horn of Africa (Frewieni, 2016). The impact of the no war no peace situation can be seen in terms of political, economic and social aspects.

Despite the Algiers Agreement's provision of EEBC, that was considered as the final binding, and the TSZ the period of no war no peace has been characterized by frequent incursions and incidents around the borders (Reid, 2018). United Nations Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) was established to patrol the TSZ. Accordingly, the UNSC Resolution 1320(2000)

established the number of troops to 4200 with 220 military observers to observe the TSZ. Eritreans were fighting for independence against Ethiopian governments for about thirty years. However, they had been trading and people to people relations were continued in such long lasted struggles for independence. But the no war no peace situations deteriorated and brought to an end the trade relations between the countries including the border areas and people to people relations (Frewieni, 2016). The no war no peace situation ended the “fraternal” relations between the people of Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Politically diplomatic relations between the two countries was stopped. Even though Ethiopia and Eritrea wanted to make good relations with US, Ethiopia won the ally. The US became against the move of Eritrea because of the fact that Eritrea supported the Somali Islamic group (Frewieni, 2016).

These two poor countries of the Horn, Ethiopia and Eritrea, had increased their military expenditure in building the army and arms race which highly endangered security of the region (Frewieni, 2016). Huge amount of soldiers was stationed around the borders close to each other not more than 70 to 80 meters far away from the respective borders until the recent rapprochement of 2018. Rather than enhancing their economic advantages the two countries invested on militarization of the border while millions of their people are starving and leading meagre lives

## **Chapter Four**

### **Challenges and Prospects of the Ethio-Eritrea Rapprochement**

#### **Introduction**

The domestic political dynamics in Ethiopia have resulted in major developments in the country and as well the region. The change of leadership within the EPRDF ruling Party and foreign relations, particularly with Eritrea by the new leadership, are among the new developments. The continuous popular struggles in Ethiopia, at least in the last three years, has led to the shift of power relationship within the four-member ruling coalition party, the EPRDF, composed of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the Oromo People's Democratic Front (OPDO/OPD), Ahmara National Democratic Movement (ANDM/ADP), and the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM). The TPLF has lost the dominance within the party after the tactical defeat by the alliance of the ODP and ADP which resulted in the election of the new leadership Abiy Ahmed as the chairman of the party, on 27 March and on 2 April as Prime Minister. The new Prime Minister immediately began undertaking reforms on domestic issues and in foreign relations. Among others, the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement is the major issues that attracted and astonished not only the peoples of the two countries but also the Horn courtiers, and has got international attentions.

This chapter is intended to analyse and explain the obtained data through in-depth interview from different sources. This context-based discussion, therefore, will overview the process of the rapprochement, the driving factors, major challenges and finally prospects of the rapprochement.

#### **4.1. The Ethio-Eritrea Rapprochement**

The Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement has at least ended the stalemate between the two countries in particular and paved the way for regional cooperation of the Horn of Africa at large. The rapprochement between the two countries has revived by the new Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed. Though the rapprochement was derived by a combination of factors the new Prime Minister dared to end the stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The change of leadership and political transition in Ethiopia led by the Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed has changed the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea since July 2018. The Executive Committee of the ruling

party, the EPRDF decided to accept unconditionally the Algiers Peace Agreement and the EEBC's decision on 5 June 2018 (Redie, 2019). Series and remarkable deeds were carried out within weeks. Some express the pace of events as the decades where nothing has happened and weeks when decades happened.<sup>1</sup>

The unconditional acceptance of the Algiers Peace Agreement by the EPRDF government, the Eritrea's positive response on June 20, and on 26-28 June 2018 Eritrea's delegation landed in Ethiopia, the Prime Minister had landed in Asmara and the Eritrean government and the people welcomed him hotly. Dr Abiy visited Asmara with his delegates and signed the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship on 9 July 2018, and on 14 July 2018 Isayas Afeworki, the president of Eritrea visited Ethiopia and the reopening of Eritrean Embassy and the opening of border on 11 September 2018 were the major events with high pace (Eri-platform, 2018). These series of events within the rapprochement of the two countries shifted the situation of 'no war, no peace' to '*yes peace no war*' (Eritrea Profile, 11 July 2018).

The Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement and the sudden conflict transformation and U-turn unexpected happenings, by the Government of Ethiopia under the leadership of Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed and the Eritrean Government under President Isayas Afeworki, was positively understood by many people (Mohammed &Hirt, 2018). Despite the fact that the acceptance of the Algiers Agreement was welcomed by many Ethiopians and Eritreans who have been waiting for the reconciliation, some criticized the decision as a flaw of the government of Abiy Ahmed. The TPLF called for reconsideration of the decision and demonstrations were observed in some parts of the Tigray Regional State at the initial stage of the rapprochement. However, the issue of accepting the Algiers Agreement by the new Prime Minister could not be criticized from the perspectives of international law. Whether the Algiers Agreement is rightly or wrongly signed from the beginning, accepting it unconditionally by the new leadership seems opening the door for the rapprochement between the two countries. The stand of the TPLF, therefore, seems expressing of their grievances for the dominant position that they lost in the EPRDF ruling party.

---

1. See [www.eri-platform.org](http://www.eri-platform.org)

But this does not mean that the implementation of the Algiers Agreement will be easy and could escape from challenges.

The current change within the EPRDF government under the leadership of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has made an intelligent decision in relation with the rapprochement with Eritrea without going deep to the border issues unlike before. The talk with Asmara was immediately accompanied by the primer's visit of Asmara and the People to people relations have got precedence than other issues. The new Prime Minister has frequently expressed at different places that priority has to be given for the two peoples advantages in the rapprochement.<sup>2</sup>

In his speech of US Dr. Abiy said, "It is not about the governments, it is all about the people of the two countries. Our investment in the people will ultimately bring about the peace and prosperity we sought to win". The speech may imply that diverting the investment from cost military expenditure around the border, in which the two countries have been exhausted, to the efforts of poverty reduction and to improve basic services for the peoples.

Prime Minister Abiy and President Isayas met each other and made public speeches at both capitals; Addis Ababa and Asmara, "*We have agreed to open up embassies in our respective countries, allow our people to visit each other's cities and allow our airlines and ports to operate freely,*" said Abiy (Associated Press, on 8 July 2018). President of Eritrea Isayas Afeworki also said;

*"The Eritrean people have today got the chance to express their true love and emotion for Ethiopians," "We can imagine that the decisions the Prime Minister of Ethiopia took was not a simple one. But we can assure you we will face the future together. We will work as one."*(As. Press, July 2018).

It is understandable, from the speeches of the two leaders, that the deadlock between the two countries had endangered their respective national interests in the last decades. The peoples

---

2. Interview with Prof. Tesema Ta'a, Addis Ababa University, History Department on May 06 2019/Office.

of these two economically backward states had been suffering from poverty and low level of living standards. Thus, investing huge resources on hundreds of thousands of military stationed around the border lacks rationality. The two countries have re-established diplomatic relations since July 2018 almost after two decades.

In the above statements the two leaders in their speech to the public declared that they have agreed to endeavor for the interests of their people in socio-economic and political aspects. Different Medias, activists, scholars and politicians crowdedly began to air the rapprochement (Redie, 2019).

The rapprochement has changed the approaches that had been used towards Eritrea. Until the rapprochement, Ethiopia was using the approach of pressuring sustainability of the sanction on Eritrea in different ways. Ethiopia had also working on separating the Eritrean people from the Government of Eritrea and was helping in providing educational opportunities for Eritrean refugees either in Ethiopia or abroad and even encouraged armed struggle against the Eritrean Government. An informant from the HPR explained the issue as follows;

... In Ethiopian Parliamentary Diplomacy, the approach of exposing Eritreans faults was considered as one mission. This approach was used by Ethiopia as to expose Eritrean wrong doings up on regional and international stages. For instance, on African Caribbean Pacific and European Union (ACPEU) Joint Parliamentary Assembly was the major international stages through which Ethiopia was exposing Eritrea's deed against its neighbours like sudden invasion on Djibouti in 2008 and helping Alshabab in the region<sup>3</sup>.

One can understand from the above sayings that the stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea was characterized by working against each other's interests and advantages in every aspect. Though the agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea cannot be a treaty, since not approved by the Parliament, but general road map or major areas of the agreements, has shifted the approaches between the two states. The previous stalemate relation of Ethiopia and Eritrea had ignored peoples' interests. But the recent rapprochement reversed the previous ones<sup>4</sup>

---

3. Interview with Mr. Tesfaye Daba: HPR, Head of Foreign Affairs Permanent Committee, on 02 May 2019/Office.

4. Interview with Prof. Tesema Ta'a, Addis Ababa University, History Department on May 06 2019/Office.

Based on the fact that the people of the two countries have historical and ethnological similarities, people to people relations have got focus. The former position of Ethiopia in imposing the sanction on Eritrea through the UN is currently reversed and the new Government of Abiy has contributed in lifting up of the sanctions that had put on Eritrea and also working for the regional stability in bringing the Leaders of the Horn countries for reconciliation (Stauffer, 2018).

Unlike the former position, Ethiopia has stopped to work against Eritrea and is revising its foreign policy direction with Eritrea. The discussion has continued since the agreements of Asmara and Dubai. The stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea came to an end when the Prime Minister and the President displayed commitments to cooperate and signed a Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship at Asmara on 9 July 2018. The Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship states the following five points:

*1) The state of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has come to an end. A new era of peace and friendship has been opened. 2) The two governments will endeavour to forge intimate political, economic, social, cultural and security cooperation that serves and advances the vital interests of their peoples; 3) Transport, trade and communications links between the two countries will resume; diplomatic ties and activities will restart; 4) The decision on the boundary between the two countries will be implemented. 5) Both countries will jointly endeavour to ensure regional peace, development and cooperation. (Eritrea Profile, July 11, 2018).*

The difference between the Algiers Agreement and the recent Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship of the two countries, the former lacks to assess and address the root causes of the conflict. The Algiers Agreement has given emphasis to boundary issues whereas; the recent Agreement goes beyond territory issues. Some argue that the difference between the Algiers Agreement and the current is commitment. At the time the Leaders of the two countries were not committed to resolve the conflict heart fully. However, as a result of internal political transformation in Ethiopia the new government under the new Prime Minister Dr Abiy Ahmed genuinely observed the problem and able to transform the conflicts into peace prospective. The current situation between the two countries is relatively understandable and capable of being

heard and drew the attention of many. The researcher on the other argues that not only the commitment of the two leaders but also the experiences from the long animosity that they had been suffering from, ripen the issue to seek peace and stability.

According to one of the key informants the rapprochement goes beyond avoiding hostilities between the two states. It focuses on people to people relations as far as the war of 1998-2000 concerned in which people were displaced from both sides forcefully; the re-joining of separated families should meet each other. Moreover, the same people living in two different countries obliged the people to people relations approach to come first. On the other hand, the current Agreements between Ethiopia and Eritrea seen as a kind of road map. The detail of the procedures and implementation on the ground needs farther elaboration by the two governments. Immediately after the joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship between Ethiopia and Eritrea phone lines, transportation, opening the borders (which in fact closed later in December 2018), and embassies were open, flights resumed.

#### **4.2. Driving Factors for the Ethio-Eritrea Rapprochement**

One can ask why the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement at this time? The recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement cannot be attributed to a single factor but a combination of factors. The major factors that contributed to the peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea include; the change of leadership in Ethiopia, the economic interests of the two countries that they had lost the opportunity in the last two decades, and political and also security importance of the Horn of Africa by regional and international powers (Yoel, 2018).

An interview conducted with two informants from IPSS and the OLF on 15 March 2019 and on 9 May 2019 respectively expressed similar ideas as follows:

Both Ethiopia and Eritrea through times came into a deadlock which obliged them to regret and reconcile. This was because neither of the two countries was benefited from the hostile relations in the past two decades. Internally, the political transformation /reforms/ under the new leadership of the EPRDF government and economic interests of

the two countries that they had lost in the past two decades became a driving factor for the rapprochement.<sup>5</sup>

The above argument clearly identified two major driving factors for the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement. First the domestic political dynamics particularly in the past three years accelerated the emergence of new leadership that in turn led to peace deals with Eritrea. Second the two countries have suffered from the deadlock and realized that they had lost opportunity of using the existing potentials for their respective country's advantages.

For instance, Ethiopia's highly dependence on Djibouti's port for its import and export trade items since it became land locked country and the flourishing of regional and international economic and security competition on the Horn obliged Ethiopia and Eritrea to reconcile. These internal and external deriving factors for the rapprochement are elaborated in the following sessions.

#### **4.2.1. Internal Driving Factors**

Ripeness of time is one of the driving factors for the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. According to Zartman (2001) for a conflict to be mediated and to have final resolution, it requires to ripe (Zartman, 2001). However, for a conflict to reach at ripe moment determined by perceptions of the conflicting parties. When two parties stay in conflict situation for long period of time they can realize that the conflict is not benefiting them. Thus, they want options to be out of the situation. Redie (2019) this maturity of time as objective and subjective maturity condition that led to reform in Ethiopia in return reconciliation with Eritrea become mandatory (Redie, 2019). The Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement therefore, more derived by the hardship of deadlock which lasted for about two decades without political, economic and social benefits. Thus, the peace in which the rapprochement is going on seems that the two governments had regretted for the past and running to compensate it. The internal political dynamics of Ethiopia in the last three years have led to the emergence of new leadership with new approaches within the EPRDF government.

---

5. Interview with Yonas Adaye (PhD): IPSS/ Ass. Professor and Associate Academic Director, on15 March 2019/Office.

Continuous popular protests and resistance against the EPRDF government dominated by the TPLF, enforced the government for political ‘transition’. Up on the seventeen days of meeting of the EPRDF government in March 2018, the issue of Ethio-Eritrea was a debating issue among the member party of the government.

The accumulated grievances of Ethiopian people led to major popular protests intensively throughout the country which later led to the resignation of the former premier Hailemariam Dessalegn without bloodshed in February 2018 (Reuters, 14 July 2018). The period in office of the former prime Minister Hailemariam was characterized by intensive protests and stiff resistances particularly from two major Ethnic groups, the Oromo and the Amhara (Yoel, 2018). Popular protests erupted in Oromia Regional State in 2014, that was caused by the Federal Government’s Addis Ababa Integrated Regional Development Plan-commonly called the Master plan, and the displacement of farmers from their farm lands around Addis Ababa (HRW, 2019).

As said by one of the key informants on 6 May 2019;

The Master Plan was perceived by the Oromo nationalists as a strategy of expanding the capital city towards the surrounding Oromia towns. Strong and massive youth resistances against the EPRDF government, dominated by the TPLF, intensified throughout Region since 2015. Through times the question went beyond the master plan. The Oromo youth called ‘*Qeerroo*’ and ‘*Qarree*’ continued stiff resistance against the government which was accompanied by blocking of main roads throughout the region. These factors pushed the EPRDF government towards the reform...<sup>6</sup>.

From the above argument one can understand that popular resistances against the dominance of the TPLF in the federal government finally twisted the government to respond in peaceful ways unlike the previous military actions. The youth accused OPDO because the party was unable to give fair responses and failed to safeguard the Oromo resources, particularly land (ICG, 2019).

---

6. Interview with Prof. Tesema Ta’a, Addis Ababa University, History Department on May 06 2019/Office.

These youth resistances throughout Oromia region twisted the government of the region to elect an acceptable man, Lema Megersa as the president as to calm down the uprisings. However, once Lema came to power, he began to echo the sounds of the *Qeerroos* and *Qarrees* and became the backbone of the reformists in the EPRDF government.

In the mid 2016 similar protests erupted in Amhara Regional State. The main cause there was confiscation of the territories that had been inhabited by the Amahara population by the TPLF government (Redie, 2019). The TPLF using the military forces as an apparatus for the dominance of the governance in the EPRDF led the country for more than two decades (Tesfa News, 2018). The absence of accountability, justice, good governance and intensified corruption aggravated the protests against the EPRDF government during the following three years which later led to the disagreements among the coalition parties of the EPRDF and reformist groups came out of it.<sup>7</sup> Finally the popular protests tuned to blocking main roads throughout Oromia, Amhara and to Addis Ababa and other major cities by the youths throughout the country.

Though the government had attempted to calm down the protests using military and police forces, the protest finally triggered the resign of the former Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn (Yoel, 2018). Hailemariam Desalegn in his term of office from 2012 to 2018 was unable to make remarkable efforts in resolving the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Strong influences from the political elites, the old TPLF leaders and the position of Eritrea that the President was waiting for leadership change in Ethiopia could be the factors for the failure (The conversation, 2018). These domestic popular upheavals in Ethiopia led to the change of political landscape in the country that finally came with new Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, who dared the reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The resign of the former Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn in February 2018 and led the EPRDF to elect Dr Abiy Ahmed with 108 of 169 votes as chairman of the coalition party and on 2 April 2018 the parliament approved as Prime Minister which marked the beginning of ‘political transition’ in Ethiopia (ICG, 2019). Once came to power, he took series of measures and reforms with unexpected pace to calm down

---

7. Interview with Prof. Tesema Ta’a, Addis Ababa University, History Department on May 06 2019/Office.

the situations internally and focused on consolidating foreign relations particularly with neighbouring countries in which the reconciliation with Eritrea is part of it. Throughout the past two decades a number of efforts were failed to resolve the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Eri-platform, 2018). As depicted in the chapter three above in the historical overview, the Algiers Peace Agreement of December 2000, the US-Rwanda engagement, the EEBC and the establishment of the TSZ were some major efforts made to conclude the hostilities between the two countries. However, none of them was able to end the hostile relations between the two states. As a saying ‘making peace is not as easy as making war’ the Ethio-Eritrea conflict stayed unresolved until the recent time in July 2018.

#### **4.2.2. External Driving Factors**

The IGAD region has been characterized by insecurities caused by either intra-state or inter-state conflicts. On the other hand, the Horn of Africa is situated on strategic geographical landscape. The strategic position of the Horn of Africa attracted the regional and international powers to the region mainly for economic purpose and security developments (Berg and Meester, 2018).

One of the key informants from Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation responded as:

The Horn of Africa is one of the major marine transportation hubs in the world. This made the region to be the focal point of many regional and international actors. Economic and security importance of the region has increased. Non-African military bases have increased particularly in Djibouti. In Djibouti French established and maintained its historical military base, the US military base after 9/11 as to fight against terrorists and the Chinese military bases are the major ones. The Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement, therefore, could not be escaped from this influence.<sup>8</sup>

The above argument can enable us to understand the competition among regional and international actors involvements in the Horn of Africa for economic and security purpose. For instance, the Turkish first foothold in Somalia was after Somalia hit by famine. The presence of Turkey in Somalia in 2011 was to provide humanitarian aid.

---

8. Interview with Belete Belachew (PhD): Centre For Dialogue, Research and Cooperation, Senior Researcher, on 04 April 2019/Office

President Erdogan's visit in Somalia remarked the interests of Turkey and its foreign policy rooted in humanitarian aid and increasing of its soft power at international stage (Karim, 2017).

Through providing aids for failed states, Turkey wanted to enhance its international prestige on one hand and seeking the economic and trade opportunities of the region on the other hand. Turkey's business firm won the contracts on Somalia's Air Port (Mogadishu Air Port) and the Mogadishu port against the Dubai's DP world and other firms. The Turkish interest was not only limited to building of infrastructure but also military basement in Somalia. Somali wanted a convivial approach with the two (Qatar and Turkey) which was against the UAE and Saudi. This was openly known when the UAE called back its ambassador from Somalia. The success of Turkey in Somalia obliged the UAE to search for another option.

In 2016 the UAE engaged in Somaliland and began to construct and develop the port of Berbera (Berg and Meester, 2018). The Emiratis supported Minister Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke who has non-Islamist political personality while Turkey and Qatari backed the political Islamist groups (Karim, 2017).

The same informant also added the influence of the Gulf crisis on state to state relations of the Horn countries that in turn implicated the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement as follows:

Following the split of Qatar from the majority members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) many countries of the Horn cemented their relations with the GCC led by Saudi. Qatar has military base and installations in Eritrea, a country which had long conflict relations with both Djibouti and Ethiopia. Qatar attempted to broker Eritrea and Djibouti and deployed its troops to borders of the two states. Later when Qatar withdrew its forces from the Djiboutian-Eritrea border, conflict relapsed between the two. The extended Gulf crisis obliged Eritrea and Djibouti to cease their relations with Qatar. Then the GCC strategically extended its military bases to Djibouti. These approaching to the Horn on one hand pushed Ethiopia and Eritrea to reconcile.<sup>9</sup>

---

9. Interview with Belete Belachew (PhD): Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation, Senior Researcher, on 04 April 2019/Office.

One can understand from the above saying that the expansion of the GCC military in Djibouti therefore, created concern on Ethiopian perspective that the prospect of the GCC states pressure on Djiboutian government may be against Ethiopia's interest as far as Egypt was concerned. In fact, presently Ethiopia and Djibouti have concluded agreements concerning economic cooperation and joint infrastructure for mutual benefits. Zelalem (2018) expressed the highly dependence of Ethiopian export and import trade on Djibouti's port as "when Djibouti sneezes Ethiopia gets a cold". Thus, this may tell us that the relations between the two require careful management and Ethiopia needs to watch the geopolitical atmosphere and follow strategic approaches in its foreign policy regarding Djibouti in particular and with the Horn Countries at large (Zelalem, 2018). The expansion of the GCC's military to Djibouti, therefore, could have negative prospects for Ethiopia in pressurising the Djiboutian government against Ethiopian interests and made Ethiopia conscious to look for another means of escaping, probably to reconcile with Eritrea.

Considering ports and trade facilities that will connect the Horn with markets of Asia passing through Dubai, Abu Dhabi and other Gulf States will make the UAE and Saudi allies prominent actors in the region (Khan, 2018). The military bases development of the Emiratis in Somaliland and Eritrea, the smooth relations between the UAE and Egypt, the footing of Egypt in Eritrea have a message of 'strategic encirclement' for Ethiopia as far as Egypt is concerned. The development of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on Blue Nile has continued tension between Ethiopia and Egypt. Egypt strategically allied with Eritrea, former enemy of Ethiopia to influence Ethiopia. However, the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement has ended Egyptian's source of potential leverage (Mosely, 2018).

Generally speaking, the military base competition of international powers in Djibouti including French, China, Germany and the regional coalition competition has understood as threatening or endangering of Ethiopia's access to the port of Djibouti. This security-based concerns of the regional and international powers in the neighbouring countries of Ethiopia, mainly in Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti seems one of external driving forces of the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement in July 2018 as a means of looking for another options in terms of port usage and to balance hegemonic claim of Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa.

Externally, pressures towards Isayas Afeworki's government particularly from the Gulf States and the powerful European countries have increased. Exhausted by continuously increasing Eritrean refugees EU interested in the reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Eritrean youth fleeing per month is estimated to 5,000 mainly to European countries and others (Woldemichael, 2018). The Gulf States also provided incentives and closed-door negotiation to the regime of Isayas Afeworki.

Internally, the people of Eritrea are suffering from like shortage of electric supply, low wages, and limited choice of goods are also contributed to change his mind for Isayas and obliged him to accept the reconciliation with Ethiopia. For the government of Isayas, the US was unable to enforce Ethiopia for implementation of the EEBC which was perceived as a means of supporting Ethiopian government. However, the presence of the Chinese in Djibouti obliged the US to search for another state near to Djibouti. Thus, Eritrea has become under focus of the US. The US therefore showed some interests in normalizing the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Africa News, 13 April 2019). The US may expect the Ethio-Eritrea reconciliation could result in increasing Ethiopia's military participation against terrorism particularly in the East. In his major Diaspora tour in the United States of America, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed talked with the US Vice president, Mike Pence at White House on 27 July 2018. During this deal, the Prime Minister and the Vice president discussed, on how to build and sustain their bilateral relations. The Vice also congratulated the Prime Minister for his reform and liberalization, and reconciliation with Eritrea that reinforced the US government to support Ethiopia's development (Ethio News, 2018).

How these external developments contributed to the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement? The above developments have greatly contributed either directly or indirectly to the peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea. For instance, in responding to the interests of competing strategic coalition for the access to the Red Sea, the UAE interest to exploit the Assab port and mining initiatives in Eritrea. This could only be accessed when stability assured. The presence of the Emirati Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed in Ethiopia and the grant of 1 billion Dollar deposit in the National Bank of Ethiopia and as well letting 2 billion Dollars for investment in tourism sector in Ethiopia may indicate the interest of the UAE to the Red

Sea and the Horn of Africa (Mosely, 2018). To this end the UAE and other actors have interested to end the sanction against Eritrea on one hand and to end of stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea. On the other side, the instability of the Horn of Africa in the last decade had aggravated human trafficking by individuals and group actors of the Horn, North Africa and the Gulf States. This may also hinder the interests of the regional competitors for the strategic Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Thus, normalization of Ethio-Eritrea relations was seen as contributing to the national, regional and international efforts to minimize the human trafficking. A key informant for the purpose of this study has said about the interests and ambition of Eritrean elites and people differently as follows;

Eritrean elites have different mindset that they inherited. That is their long-lasting ambition to be the 'African Singapore'. At the eve of the rapprochement the Eritreans assumed that Ethiopia's internal vulnerability throughout the past three years paves the way for the accomplishment their long ambitions. On the other side, the ordinary people in Eritrea need peace with Ethiopia based on economic, political and social interests. They need to be benefited from the cooperation. The people of Eritrea have been suffered from lack of rule of law, isolation from other worlds and economic problems...<sup>10</sup>

On the contrary way another informant from the Embassy of Eritrea responded that for the question why the rapprochement at this time? As follows:

Why the international powers like Turkey flourishing to the Horn? The question is how to defend our Sea in such situations? Why not East Africans do not group themselves like in the case of South and Western Africans? There is a plan to be grouped for free trade and integrations. When we cooperate, it will be easy to enhance our national interests. Moreover, it becomes very easy for particularly northern parts of Ethiopia to trade with Eritreans through the Eritrean ports. Eritrea has allowed Ethiopia to use the port of Assab freely as before. The case of Djibouti is not about its distant but overloaded than Assab and Massawa. The Ethiopian commodities stay on the port for long period of times.<sup>11</sup>

---

10. Interview with Mr. Gebru Aserat: the former Tigray President, on 03 May 2019

11. Interview with the Ambassador Araya Desta: Permanent Mission of the State of Eritrea to the African Union and UNECA on / Eritrean Embassy /Office.

As it can be understood from the above two arguments, in fact they are contradicting, the former gives focus on Eritrean elite's old ambition to extend their dominance over the Horn and the Red Sea. For the researcher this assumption might not be workable probably for two reasons. First the Horn countries have proposed to realize their cooperation and economic integration. Second, the strategic Horn could not be dominated by a single state of the region as far as interests of others are concerned and also Ethiopia with huge demography cannot let such domination. The second argument consolidates the contemporary situations about cooperation and economic integration of the Horn countries. From the second argument it might be concluded that the rationale behind of making reconciliation with Ethiopia was as to defend the flourishing competition over the Horn of Africa.

### **4.3. Major Challenges for the Rapprochement**

Despite its positive aspects the rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia could not be free of challenges. A number of challenges could tempt the diplomatic thaw between the two countries. One can say that the Ethio-Eritrea relations are at a crossroads and encounter a number of challenges (Tekeda, 2019). These challenges can be seen under two categories. The first category is internal challenges emerging from domestic conditions of vulnerability and structural problems whereas the second is external challenges which could come from the regional dynamics or geopolitics of the Horn of Africa.

#### **4.3.1. Internal Challenges**

##### **4.3.1.1. Absence of Institutions**

The Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement has ended the long stalemate between the two countries and positively observed by different entities. The people of the two countries welcomed the peace surprisingly hoping that they will have re-established their historical Brotherhood spirit. However, this does not mean the relations between the two will smoothly be cemented without challenges. There are a number of challenges in the process of the reconciliation. When this study was conducted there was no any institution established for this purpose. Thus, many have started criticizing the rapprochement for that is not yet guaranteed by institutions/mechanism and with clear term of agreements. One among other informants put criticism to the rapprochement saying that:

The Asmara and Dubai Agreements were not clear and public. It lacks transparency. The detail of the accords has not been known even by the higher officials of both governments. Only the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and President Isayas Afeworki know the detail of the agreements within the rapprochement. The two leaders have dominated the peace deal. Moreover, the two leaders have not yet institutionalized the revived relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea.<sup>12</sup>

As reviewed in the literature Tschirgi (2004), asserts that lack of institution challenges peace building process between the conflicting parties. The Ethio-Eritrea peace deal is exposed to the similar challenges. Even though it is too early to criticize within not more one year of duration since the rapprochement has started, some dared to criticize the rapprochement for it is not yet guided by institutions and the Agreements within the rapprochement lacks transparency. In similar way another informant from the Institute of Peace and Security Studies also support that the absence of clear terms of the agreement and lack of institutionalization could complicate the practical implementation of the peace building process on the ground.<sup>13</sup> The Ethiopian government unconditionally accepted the Algiers Agreement and the decision of the EEBC. How will the agreements be implemented without clearly identified terms? How sustainably Ethiopia and Eritrea could build peace is not clearly indicated. Clear term of agreement and structured mechanism could facilitate the relations between sovereign states.

In this regard terms of the Agreements and in what type of politics is not publicly addressed. Is the term of agreement bases on inter-state relation, federation or confederation? This has not yet clearly identified in the process of peace deals. On the other hand, the Abiy government announced that the usage of the Eritrean ports in near future. But still the detail of the agreement lacks transparency. In such situations, it becomes difficult to assure sustainable peace between the two countries.

---

12. Interview with Abebe Aynete (PhD student, IPSS, AAU), Peace and Security Analyst on the Horn of Africa, on 05 April 2019/Office.

13. Interview with Yonas Adaye (PhD): IPSS/Ass. Professor and Associate Academic Director, on 15 March 2019/Office

In consolidating the above argument an informant from the IGAD Security Sector Program responded during the interview on 22 March 2019 equivalently forwarded his belief by saying;

The Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement which in fact ended the stalemate lacks institutionalization. Both the Agreements at Asmara and Dubai were not guided by institutions. Without institution it could not guarantee sustainability of peace between the two countries. Any peace process requires institutions that could guarantee sustainability of peace between the two countries. Thus, the absence of institutions through which the detail of peace agreements and peace building process should be guided could be one of the major challenges of the rapprochement in the practical application of border demarcation on the ground.<sup>14</sup>

However, another in-depth interview data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia indicates that the Ethiopian Government currently working on it on one hand and on the other hand there is expectation that the situations in Eritrea will be changed<sup>15</sup>. Accordingly concerning the detail of trade agreements between the two countries, for example, on Ethiopian side draft was sent to the Eritrean government. However, there is no response on Eritrean side when this research was conducted.

For the researcher the importance of institution for durable peace building between Ethiopia and Eritrea is strongly agreeable. This is because institution could guarantee the sustainability of the proposed peace rather than only relying on leaders who are not permanent relatively. Though the historical and cultural affinity of the two people is undeniable; it cannot guarantee the diplomatic relation of the sovereign two states. The call for peace cooperation between the two countries requires clarity and must be consistent with principles of inter-state relations (Tekeda, 2019). Many of the informants argue that the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement lacks formality of interstate relations. It requires institutions that guide and guarantee the relations of the two countries.

---

14. Interview with Commander Abebe Muluneh, Director of IGAD, SSP, on 22 March 2019/Office

15. Interview with Mr. Ojige Osso: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Eritrean Affairs Minister Councillor II, on 21 March 2019/Office

On the other hand, Kjetil Tronvoll consolidated the above idea of institutionalization of the rapprochement stating that;

*“Local trade is re-flourishing as Eritreans and Ethiopians trade with no currency exchange issues. Birr-nakfa [their respective currencies] exchanged on parity on the ground. Very positive development—but needs institutionalisation!”* (Africa Renewal, December 2018).

Finally, the researcher argues that, believing in existences of institutions and clear terms of the agreements that may guarantee the durability of peaceful relationship of the two countries, establishing of institutions may take time. This is because in a country where political elites have been doing their will, like Ethiopia, reforming and creating institutions, by the new leadership, is not something accomplished overnight. On the other hand, the internal situations and political vulnerability by itself may elongate the possible establishment structured institutions.

#### **4.3.1.2. Absence of Inclusiveness of the Peace Process**

The peace deals between Ethiopia and Eritrea lacks involvement of other stakeholders in the reconciliation process. The rapprochement excluded the AU, IGAD, non-state actors like civil societies and also border land communities from both sides. Though the involvement of border land communities in the peace process could help to strengthen of the peace talks, the rapprochement was unable to do so and has state centric character (Demisie, 2018).

During the stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea the members of Inter-Governmental Authority Development (IGAD) had involved either to mediate or to support Ethiopia against Eritrea in pushing the United Nations (UN) to put sanction on Eritrea. However, none of the two leaders invited the IGAD member countries in the peacemaking process of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The excluded stakeholders therefore, may lose interest and trust to cooperate with Ethiopia and Eritrea. One of the key informants said;

The Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement didn't embrace other stakeholders who want to be involved in. Such exclusion may lead to disintegration of the horn countries rather than cooperation. This is because the peace deals totally ignored the IGAD member countries

and other stakeholders including the border land communities. The rapprochement should start even from Tigray people but totally ignored...<sup>16</sup>

As some say Peace is always plus (Belete, 2018), promoting different stakeholders to be involved in any peace process may contribute to peace values. The exclusive peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea, according to the informant creates distrust and endangers even collective security among the countries. The informant argues that the rapprochement should start from Tigray Regional State where the battles were fought. This is because the region geographically exposed to any problem and opportunities that could come from Eritrea. The future practical demarcation of the borders on ground between Ethiopia and Eritrea will not be without the consultation of the Tigray peoples. Accordingly, in whatever the case the boundary demarcation between Ethiopia and Eritrea requires the involvement of local people. Thus, the absence of involvement of other stakeholders in the peace deals, when this research was conducted, could also challenge the future implementation of the agreements on the ground.

Though it is agreeable to make peace building inclusive, as said above, the concept that the consequence will disintegrate the Horn Countries doesn't hold water. This is because, the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement has witnessed in reconciling animosities of some Horn States and the peace deal has put positive effect to resolve the Horn countries instability. It is after the rapprochement that the leaders of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia signed a joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation was signed on 6 September 2018. For instance, the letter sent from the UN Secretary General António Guterres, to the Security Council indicated that the rapprochement created positive impact on peacemaking in the Horn of Africa.

The letter reads as; *“We are witnessing a historic moment in the Horn of Africa. The rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, begun in July 2018, has created a positive momentum for peace and security in the region and beyond”* (UNSC Report, 2019). It was the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea that triggered the lift up of the sanction by the UN and readmission of Eritrea to IGAD.

---

16. Interview with Abebe Aynete (PhD student, IPSS,AAU), Peace and Security Analyst on the Horn of Africa, on 05 April 2019..

This has ended the isolation policy of Eritrea and contributed to the regional stability (ISS, 2018). The re-emerging of peace agreements among Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia are also evidences that show the positive effects of Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement.

On the contrary of the above idea that claims local people participation in the Ethio-Eritrea peace process, some key informants argue that the relation between Ethiopia and Eritrea should be based on sovereign state relations principles. In the peace deals therefore, regional/provinces could not make any independent relation with other sovereign states. In this regard the peace dealing process between the two independent states could run through their respective national governments. However, consolidation of the peace between the two will be determined by the people. Consultation with the border land communities by the two governments before any decision, however, contributes for sustainability of the peace.

Another informant from the Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation, consolidates that Ethiopia's failure to consult other stakeholders in the rapprochement with Eritrea could challenge the implementation of the agreements on the ground. Excluding others who want to be involved in the process of peace deals, may create grievances and distrust on them. In the rapprochement some are excited, like Somalia while others are not. For instance, Djibouti fears the possible decline of Ethiopian trade volume through Djibouti port because of optional ports, Assab and Massawa even though port facilities and bargaining power matters. Sudan on the other hand feared the reconciliation that it may destroy the trust built with Ethiopia in the past twenty years<sup>17</sup>. The peace process between the two countries still limited between the two leaders in which experts and others who closely observe sought explanations about unexpected pace of events. The move by the two leaders in the peace making process seems without engagement of usual international diplomatic actors. Thus, some fear the possible relapse of conflict, tracing back to the experience of the previous rapprochement between the two from 1993 up to the outbreak of the war of 1998. Disregarding the usual and formal state to state relations principles may put the success of the peace building under question (Tesfa News, 27 October 2018).

---

17. Interview with Belete Belachew (PhD): Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation, Senior Researcher, on 04 April 2019/Office.

#### 4.3.1.3. Internal Political Discontents

Internal political situation in Ethiopia could be another challenge of the rapprochement. Following the shift of leadership within the EPRDF unrests have been challenging the country. The political reforms by the new leadership in Ethiopia, immediately accompanied by political instabilities among the EPRDF and dissatisfied opposition parties. The change in leadership of the EPRDF has caused winds of hope on one hand, and unrests, on the other hand, which seems undermining the legitimacy of the government of Abiy Ahmed.

The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) once lost its dominance within the EPRDF government openly started challenging the government of the new leadership under Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed. Most of the dissatisfied TPLF executives hosted at Mekelle, the capital of Tigray Regional State, and have challenged the federal government from distant even if they resemble supporting the government officially. The challenge emerged from the TPLF who lost role playing positions in the EPRDF government. The TPLF began to see every move and reforms led by the Prime Minister as violation of the constitution, which in fact they had never claimed for the constitutional principles violation during their dominance.

The TPLF has openly challenged the new reforms and began campaigning of save guarding the constitution as an apparatus. The speech by the Deputy President Dr Debretsion G/Micael at Mekelle on 28 July 2018 to the people has indirectly a threat against the reform. He said '*we either respect each other or disintegrate*' that may have indicated the option for a claim of Article 39 of the EPRDF constitution, the right to self-determination up to cessation. As Maru (2018) asserts, the TPLF continued criticizing the current situation of political reforms as lawlessness, violation of constitution and dislocation of national institutions. For instance, the federal government involvement in the Somali Regional State was criticized by the TPLF as an indication of violation of the constitution (Maru, 2018).

Concerning the foreign relations, particularly the rapprochement with Eritrea, the TPLF is in its old position. Still the TPLF magnifies the issue of borders which is not under the focus of the new rapprochement of the two countries. The current peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea, however, seems that it has put the people to people relations in the first order of importance in the process of peace buildings. Though the border issues of two sovereign states usually resolved

by the federal (central) government or at the level of head of states, the TPLF has the stand that the border issues should be resolved by the local people negotiations, meaning the people of Tigray. Few of the key informants also substantiate the above idea of local people engagement in the peace process of Ethio-Eritrea.

Officially the TPLF supports the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement, but popular oppositions and demonstrations have been observed throughout the Tigray regional state as soon as the federal government unconditionally accepted the Algiers Agreement and the Ethiopia and Eritrea Boundary Commission's decision. The rush for peace by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Eritrean President Isayas Afewerki is considered by some as to their common foes, the TPLF. The Isayas Afewerki's word 'Game over' may also reflect the alliance with the new leadership as to weaken the TPLF. Assuming that the TPLF may resume power, the new Prime Minister fired higher military ranks and intelligence officials, which was highly dominated by the Tigrayans, and replaced by others. The new Premier fired the higher officials of the TPLF, Abay Tsehaye, Getachew Asefa, Tewdros Hagos, Getachew Ambaye, Mej.Gen. Teklebrhan Woldearegay, (Zelalem, 2018; Bruton, 2018). One of the key informants, argues that the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a strategy to weaken the TPLF used by the prime minister and Isayas Afewerki.<sup>18</sup>

Not only the hard-liners, but the Arena party also undermines the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement claiming that the Algiers Agreement by itself was against Ethiopia's interest.

---

18. Interview with Mr. Gebru Aserat, the former Tigray President, on 03 May 2019

One of the key informants from the party responded as;

Eritreans has been claimed the border demarcation based on applicable international law and the colonial boundary treaty principles. But the colonial boundary cannot be a legal base in this case. This is because the UN by itself disregarded the colonial boundary principle when facilitated the Federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952. On the other side in 1993 Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had immediately recognized the independence of Eritrea. Since the current rapprochement is based on this historical mistaken Agreement of Algiers, we called a demonstration against the acceptance of the Algiers Agreement by the new leadership of Ethiopian government.<sup>19</sup>

The above observation shows that the Algiers Agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has an impact on the recent Agreements between the two. The later relies on the former which, on the other hand, has historical mistake. But one thing that is understandable in this regard, Ethiopia had accepted the Agreement and gone to the Hague, even though it didn't give consent for resolution. It is obvious that the UN didn't take into account the pertinent colonial treaties when facilitated the Federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952. This may imply that the UN had divorced the colonial based boundary in this case. On the other side, Eritrea was one of the provinces of Ethiopia after the liberation from the Italian colonial rule and British occupation. It is clear that the party opposed the current Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement based on these backgrounds.

On a symposium held on 01 June 2019 at Addis Ababa, that the researcher attended, on Revisiting the Ethio-Eritrea Relations which was initiated by Addis Ababa University Law School Dr Dereje Zeleke asserted that the Cairo Declaration of 1964 has nothing to do with the boundary issues between Ethiopia and Eritrea. However, once it was signed at the time there is no way to escape from accepting the agreement from perspectives of international law. Thus, resisting such initiatives of peace may not have advantage for both peoples and governments in future rather than relapsing the past hostilities that the two countries had suffered from for about two decades.

---

19. Interview with Mr. Gebru Aserat, the former Tigray President, on 03 May 2019

Ethnic based conflicts in different parts of Ethiopia have aggravated internal displacements that made huge number of people homeless. The case of the Oromo and the Ethiopia Somali ethnic groups inter-communal conflict in the eastern part of the country was through the hands of the former president of Somali Regional State, Abdi Ille, was the short memory event (Woldie, 2018). The unrest in the western part of the country between the Oromo and Benishangul-Gumuz regions and unrest in Amhara regions were also another tensions backed by those who lost power in the reform (Woldie, 2018).

Another challenge was the issue of security and defence force. According to the current FDRE constitution the Prime Minister is the Commander In Chief (C-in-C) of the army. On the other hand, in reality this institution had been dominated and controlled by the TPLF. Under such situation it was not easy to bring the military force under the control of the new Prime Minister (Redie, 2019). However, the situation was unable to stop the premier from removing the higher senior military officers from their position and offices including Gen. Samora Yenus, the Chief of the Staff of the Army and the right hand of the TPLF.

The dissatisfied forces seem moving against the Prime Minister and the reforms. The attempt of June 23 at Addis Ababa *Meskel Squar* on the life of the prime minister could be related with unsatisfied forces. The prime minister has taken serious measures of transforming the defence forces. However, still controlling the army could also be challenging because most of higher ranked military officers are from Tigray. A number of senior military officers and generals were arrested as suspects for violation of basic human rights and corruption. This was perceived by some as the move against the Tigray people.

#### **4.4. Divergent Political Approaches of Ethiopia and Eritrea**

The lack of parallel political transformation within the two countries can also challenge the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Belete, 2018). The ongoing political transformation in Ethiopia has come with peace initiatives. Parallel political transformations facilitate grounds for the success of peace building process. Relatively two democratic states do not go to war.

Some of the Key informants argue that the difference in political approaches of the two countries doesn't affect their cooperation. "The difference in political approach for me could not affect peace making process and economic integration of the two states. Peace is holistic by its nature; peace is before ideology."<sup>20</sup> The authoritarian government of Eritrea under Isayas Afeworki and 'democratic Ethiopia' requires commitments than political ideologies they pursue to assure peace and stability.

In similar ways interview data from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs substantiate that ideological differences between Ethiopia and Eritrea could not directly challenge the rapprochement.<sup>21</sup> On the Eritrean side, some government opponents are not in a position to accept the friendship between the two countries. They were reluctant towards the end of the stalemate which lasted for two decades (Mohammed & Hirt, 2018).

The opposition leaders and government opponents on Eritrean side undermine the new development between Ethiopia and Eritrea arguing that: the current authoritarian Isayas's government in Eritrea cannot represent the people of Eritrea, People around the border, Eritrean Diasporas were not involved in the peace process. These opponents also argue that making peace with Ethiopia without domestic change in Eritrea consolidates the regime of Isayas politically, economically and diplomatically (Eritrea Profile, July 11, 2018). For some Diasporas the rapprochement was a short term of political strategy against their common foe, the TPLF. On the other hand, in the early morning of the July 8, 2018 hundreds of thousands of people went out from their home and standing at both sides of the avenue expressing their happiness for the reconciliation. The hot welcome for The Prime Minister and his delegates seemed as if no one left at home and even the churches must have been closed their doors and went to welcome (Eritrea Profile, July 11, 2018).

The above ideas of the opposition and Eritrean Diasporas may imply that they wanted equivalent political transformation in their country. It does not seem that these sections of the Eritrean people resisted the rapprochement between the two countries.

---

20. Interview with Yonas Adaye (PhD): IPSS/ Ass. Professor and Associate Academic Director, on 15 March 2019.

21. Interview with Mr. Ojige Osso: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Eritrean Affairs Minister Councillor II, on 21 March 2019/Office

This because there claim was about the representation, involvement of local people and the diasporas in the peace process. In return the divergence in political approaches of the two states, to some extent, can have its own impacts on the peace building process.

Though there are several internal problems of peace in both Ethiopia and Eritrea, the restored peace requires to be converted into durable. Regarding Ethiopia, ethnic conflicts, internal displacements, and hate speech need to be resolved and on the sides of Eritrea, brutal repression, indefinite detention and endless national service must be ceased.<sup>22</sup> Assuring durable peace on the other hand requires the engagement of other actors and stakeholders in both states. Marginalizing at least political actors is not advisable because it enhances the possibility of relapsing hostilities between the two (Eri-platform, 2018).

Despite the people of the two nations, Ethiopia and Eritrea, are happy about the reconciliation the real boundary demarcation on the ground will be the major challenge for the two leaders. The disaster war in which thousands of people lost their life in both sides may complicate the border demarcation if it has to be implemented rather than the importance of the Badime and the surroundings. Many agree that Badime was not the cause of the war but used as a pretext by the two governments. Though Badime was decided for Eritrea by the Ethiopia and Eritrea Boundary Commission's decision of 2002, the then period Ethiopian government refused the decision openly in 2003. However, the cost paid since the outbreak of the war could challenge both governments on the practical demarcation of borders. Thousands of lives were lost because of the war and many were displaced from around the borders. Strengthening economic development of the two countries could also face challenges. The disparity of economic development and infrastructure between Ethiopia and Eritrea may challenge the pace of their cooperation. Relatively there are poor infrastructures in Eritrea<sup>23</sup>.

---

22. Interview with Mr. Ojige Osso: MoFA, Eritrean Affairs Minister Councillor II, on 21 March 2019/Office

23. Interview with Getachew Nigatu, MoFA/ Director General, FR-SIRC on 05 May 2019/Office

#### **4.5. External Challenges: Regional Dynamics of the Horn of Africa**

The dynamics of geopolitics of the Horn of Africa could also be a challenge to the new rapprochement of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The flourishing of regional powers like Saudis, Emiratis, Turkish and Qatari with different interests to the strategic region of the Horn could challenge the peace process started between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In this regard the asymmetric interests of different powers and its overall national interests could have impact on Ethiopia's interest in relation with Djibouti (Belete, 2018).

The USA, China, Japan, French, Germany and UAE have established military bases in Djibouti. The presences of non-African military and naval in Djibouti, which could affect the regional hegemonic power of Ethiopia and could also, shift the current relations of the two states in using the Port of Djibouti (Zelalem, 2018).

Around 40% of the world trade passes through the Red Sea region<sup>24</sup>. Some international and regional powers began to influence the region for their interest of security and economic benefits. The French historic military base, the Chinese military bases are among the presences of international powers in Djibouti. On the other side, the Emiratis military base establishment and port development in Djibouti, Somali land and at Assab from regional powers indicates the competition over the region.

A key informant from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, on 25 March 2019, said that;

The presence of Chinese companies which initially came to Djibouti as to invest on and develop the Doraleh Multi-purpose port, had established its first over sea military base in the country. The investment on the port of Djibouti may increase the quality the port that could become unaffordable for Ethiopia to use it as before<sup>25</sup>.

The above argument may depict that the external pressure and competition for economic and

---

24. Interview with Belete Belachew (PhD): Centre For Dialogue, Research and Cooperation, Senior Researcher, on 04 April 2019/Office

25. Interview with Mr.G/Tsadik Tasew: Ministry of Trade and Industry, Expert, on 25 March 2019/Office

security purpose has implications on Ethiopian national interests in the region. It seems that thus why Ethiopia has been searching for other optional outlets. Therefore, the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement and the peace deal could stabilize this challenge from abroad.

#### **4.6. Prospects for the Rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea**

What does the future hold for the ties between Ethiopia and Eritrea? Many believe that a proper handling and management of the rapprochement could determine the future relations of the two countries. The aforementioned challenges should critically be observed and minimized or avoided in order to achieve sustainable peace between the two countries. Based on the past experiences of the relations between the two countries, the current rapprochement can be seen under optimist and pessimist views.

##### **4.6.1. Optimistic Perspectives**

The rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea could have positive contributions for both peoples of the two states in particular and the region at large. The peace making process between the two sovereign states of the Horn, Ethiopia and Eritrea determines their future relations. In the globalizing world competing alone is difficult. Ethiopia needs economic benefits in the region and the vice versa for Eritrea. The region has high economic potential that the two countries didn't operate effectively in the past two decades. Thus, properly managing of the recent rapprochement of the two countries could help them in efficient manipulation of the existing potentials and resources including the Eritrean ports and Ethiopian demography as potentials of markets.

Since the independence of the Eritreans 1991, Ethiopia is a landlocked country. Thus, port is the long desire of Ethiopia that could be used freely as a result of successful rapprochement of the two states. Looking for jobs in other countries is one of internal pushing force to seek peace with others for Ethiopia. The settling of peace between the two will provide Ethiopia the access to the outlets, Massawa and Assab that had lost since the Ethio-Eritrea war of 1998-2000.

An informant interviewed on 04 May 2019 responded that;

Ethiopia had been using the Eritrean ports freely. This recent rapprochement of the two countries will also enable Ethiopia to use the ports of Assab and Massawa freely. This means Ethiopia could pay only for the service they will get not tariff for the usage of the ports<sup>26</sup>.

Another key informant in expressing the prospects of the rapprochement said;

*'I see green light at the end of the tunnel'*. The rapprochement has far reaching positive prospects for both countries in particular and the region at large. There is a very good start by both states but not the end. The proper management of the peace deal between the two countries will determine. Economically they will be benefited in exchange of trade items with each other. Eritreans are highly in need *teff* from Ethiopia and Ethiopia also wants finished products of Eritrea. It helps both countries in widening their market opportunities. For instance, Eritrean industries could get market in Ethiopia. The large demography of Ethiopia is important for Eritreans as to export their products at a nearby distant.<sup>27</sup>

Moreover, the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement could stabilize the Horn region which has been considered as the most destabilized region of the world. Assuring security in return enables the two people to enhance their mutual benefits in particular and contributes in realizing the Horn countries cooperation and economic integration. On the other hand, the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea on the other hand will minimize the emigration of Eritrean youth, which accounts 5000 per month, to European countries (Dahir, 2018).

The success for the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement, however, requires careful handling and management. The rapprochement requires agreement on durable adjustment of border dispute resolution.

---

26. Interview with Ambassador Araya Desta: Eritrean Embassy, Permanent Mission of the State of Eritrea to the AU and UNCA, on 04 May 2019/Office

27. Interview with Prof. Tesema Ta'a Addis Ababa University, History Department on 06 May 2019/Office

The current scenario seems that the both governments are not working with the pace they started the rapprochement. Currently when this research is conducted borders are closed even though it is justified as to establish more legal ways for people to people relations. Comprehensive cooperation, good faith or trust to each other, and diplomacy facilitate ways for durable peace. This means on one hand it requires relying on principles guiding inter-state relations and institutions. In this regard principles maintain and legitimize their mutual benefits and enhance regional peace and security. Institutions could help to guarantee smooth relations between the two states based on international laws. According to Belete (2018) there are major and sensitive issues which need urgent measures and solutions.

But these measures require institutions and mechanism to put into practice. Demilitarization of common borders, demarcation of the border, port utilization agreements, immigration and dual citizenship, residence permit, consular affairs, currency, taxation, money transfer are some major issues that should come first to be resolved in the peace building process between Ethiopia and Eritrea <sup>28</sup>. Ethiopia needs to envision and focus on the country's overall interests in the long-term. In order to realize the future benefits through long-term plan therefore Ethiopia should carefully to observe and assess how the recent rapprochement enhances or endangers political, economic, social and security situations internally in particular and externally at large. However, to put in to practice the above-mentioned issues is not as such easier for both governments. A comprehensive involvement of different stakeholders in the peace talks could help the success of the rapprochement. Interdependence in economic and political engagement, improving infrastructures, and public diplomacy could facilitate the relation between the two countries and enable them to manipulate their high potential on the Red Sea region and on regional security.<sup>29</sup>

An interview from the IGAD security sector on the other hand clearly indicated that the proper handling and management of the rapprochement could provide a number of advantages for the two people and also the region.

---

28. Interview with Belete Belachew (PhD): Centre For Dialogue, Research and Cooperation, Senior Researcher, on 04 April 2019/Office

29. Interview with Shigut Geleta (PhD), OLF/ International and Public Relations Department Head, 10 May 2019.

It could help in realizing the economic interests of the two states in this strategic region and for common security of the two.<sup>30</sup>

As explained in the literature liberal peace building gives focus on establishing institutions considering market economy and democratic principles (Newman et.al, 2009). Interdependence widens option of states in resolving disputes. The possible stability of the Horn as a result of the rapprochement, enable Ethiopia to realize its regional power in the economic and military. The government of Ethiopia has already commenced initiatives of the regional economic integration. The Prime Minister has made agreements with some of the Horn countries for economic interests of Ethiopia and mutual benefits with others. The economic agreements include port development projects with Kenya, Somaliland, Somalia and with Djibouti. Another prospect of the rapprochement is that it creates united Horn of Africa for searching better ways of resolving their own problems without others involvement and enable them to defend other regional and international powers flourishing towards the Horn of Africa with diversified interests.

On the other hand, the rapprochement could facilitate fertile ground for the proposed projects of the 2050 African Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy. After the Millennium the Horn of Africa became under the focus of international powers. This was because of increments of robbery and piracy on the sea and around.

Among other attempts the UNSC deployed naval patrols. The Djibouti Code of Conduct of 2009 was also another attempt to tackle the problem on the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. It was in 2014 that the AU adopted the AIM with not only engaging in maritime security, but also against any unlawful activity on and around the seas, and involving in sustainable development of the African Blue economy and maritime safety (Egede, 2018). On the side of Eritrea there is hope situations will be improved or changed as a result of the rapprochement<sup>31</sup>.

---

30. Interview with Commander Abebe Muluneh, Director of IGAD SSP, on 22 March 2019/Office

31. Interview with Mr. Desta Dinka: OFC, Youth sector Chair person of the party on 15 March 2019/Office

A successful peace relation between the two countries could minimize the national military service system in Eritrea and divert the investment from military building to economic aspects.

The situations in Ethiopia may have a spill-over effect on Eritrea. The people of Eritrea need two things simultaneously; on one hand they respect the president and don't want to discredit him. They consider him as the father of Eritrean independence. On the other hand, they want as well political transition which could not be easy in the authoritarian system. However, the internal security system is very tight in Eritrea. It is difficult to expect popular pressure that could lead to political transition in Eritrea. According to some probably resistances could come from the army which comprise 10% of the population.<sup>32</sup>

#### **4.6.2. Towards Pessimist Perspectives**

Despite the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement is welcomed by various entities and individuals there are also some who fear the fate of the rapprochement. The fear emanated from some defects observed in the process of peace deals with Eritrea and the past experiences. Citing the previous rapprochement of the two states in the early 1990's which also lacked

transparency and institutionalization, and similarly depended on top level leaders of the two countries. One of the key informants expresses his fear of a possible relapse of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea as:

The recent rapprochement is similar with that of 1993, which was criticized for it lacked transparency and not guided by sovereign states relation principles. As a result, war broke out in 1998 unexpectedly. Thus, in this current rapprochement, similar problems may appear unless guided by comprehensive agreements and institution.<sup>33</sup>

One can understand from the above observation that the two countries require to make their

---

32. Interview with Mr. Gebru Aserat: the former Tigray President, on 03 May 2019

33. Interview with Abebe Aynete (PhD student, IPSS, AAU), Peace and Security Analyst on the Horn of Africa, on 05 April 2019.

relations principle based and should not repeat the past mistakes. For instance, the possible border demarcation on ground between Ethiopia and Eritrea may lead to conflict and hostility. In the recent rapprochement Either Ethiopia or Eritrea needs to institutionalize the peace process to assure durable peace between the two countries. Some may hope that the recent rapprochement might lead to similar political transition in Eritrea. However, there is no such a remarkable sign that indicates the move towards democratization in Eritrea. This is because as some say it will split apart a village around Alitena and Tsorena. On the other hand, some the international community who welcomed the peace deal has kept silent in giving suggestions to help Eritrea to democratize.

Even though the current situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea seems that smooth relation in which people to people relation has continued, only air plane transportations are allowed for the two people. This might be difficult for both people to contact each other. Therefore, the border between the two states needs to be reopened based on legal principles. Thus, it can be generalized that the fate of Ethio-Eritrea relations depends on the peace process management of both countries on one hand, and involvement of other stakeholders. Transparency and institutionalization of the peace deals are the major instruments of managing the rapprochement through which the two countries will be benefited.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Conclusion**

In the previous chapters an attempt has been made to explain the major challenges and prospects of the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement. The main challenges from internal and external perspectives have been discussed in different chapters under different headings. On the other hand, the prospect of the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea based on historical and cultural ties, have also been described. Both major challenges and prospects for the rapprochement have been discussed in line with conceptual and theoretical frame work of the study. This conclusion displays the picture of the issues, facts and major ideas observed under the study.

The long historical ties between Ethiopia and Eritreans have been deteriorated when major war erupted between them in 1998. The two countries have started state to state relation since the independence of Eritrea in 1993. Despite Eritreans and Ethiopians share historical, ethnic and mythology since the ancient times of the Axumite civilization, Eritreans had been struggling for independence against regimes in Ethiopia for about three decades. In 1952 Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia by the facilitation of the United Nations. However, the federation was abrogated in 1962 influenced by Emperor Haile Sillasié I and Eritrea became one of the provinces of Ethiopia under the centralized state of Ethiopia. The struggles of different movements like the TPLF, OLF and the EPLF had ended the Dergue regime in 1991. As a result, Eritrea achieved its independence through referendum in 1993. It was this time that remarked the Ethio-Eritrea state to state relations. The two countries had started peaceful relations and signed some agreements of peace and economic cooperation which was not institutionalized.

However, the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea gradually deteriorated and finally led the two countries into a devastating war in 1998. The historical, cultural and ancestral similarities between Ethiopians and Eritreans didn't save them from large scale war which had far reaching effects even beyond the borders of the two countries and destabilized the region. The war was fought for the two years (1998-2000) which consumed the lives of thousands of people, caused displacement in the region from both sides and deteriorated the economy of both countries.

The two countries entered into the situation of ‘no war, no peace’ and began to work against each other’s interests. Even though conventional war was ceased since the Algiers Peace Agreement of 2000, sudden attacks and skirmishes were usually common during the periods of no war, no peace. They had been working in supporting each other’s insurgent groups in their respective country and also came into proxy war particularly in Somalia.

A number of attempts were carried out by the international community including the AU, UN, EU and the US-Rwanda at different times to resolve the problems of borders between the two countries. The defect of the Algiers Agreement was it focused on border issues rather than finding the root causes of the war. The Algiers Agreement of 2000 was among other engagements that had brought to an end the conventional large-scale wars between the two. After the Algiers Agreement the two countries have been in ‘no war, no peace’ situation. The EEBC’s decision of 2002 was rejected by Ethiopia. It was after this time that Ethiopia and Eritrea had been working against each other’s interests. They had supported each other’s opposition movements in their respective countries and even they were engaged in proxy war in Somalia. Until the recent time rapprochement of July 2018, Ethiopia had been accusing the Eritrean government and the vice versa.

The recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement has ended the period of ‘no war, no peace’ between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The stalemate came to an end by the new Prime Minister of Ethiopia Dr. Abiy Ahmed who came to power in April 2018. The premier declared that his government’s unconditional acceptance of the Algiers Agreement. The Eritrean response was positive and unexpectedly the prime minister visited Asmara on 8 July 2018. The people of Asmara and the surroundings hotly welcomed the premier, some of them, with the tears of joy stream down on their faces. Immediately after the rapprochement, the broken families were rejoined, people to people relations was also restored.

There have been internal and external factors that pushed the two countries for the rapprochement. Internally the leadership change in Ethiopia with new approach under the leadership of Prime Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed committed to resolve the Ethio-Eritrea hostile relations. The economic interests of Ethiopia and Eritrea can also be another pushing factor to seek for reconciliation. Peace relations between the two countries have started since July 2018.

People to people relations are given great attention in the rapprochement. Diplomatic relations have been conducting for durability of the started peace and on the other side, the rapprochement has encountered a number of challenges from internal and external.

This study is designed to investigate the challenges and prospects of the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement. After two decades of hostilities Ethiopia and Eritrea have revived diplomatic relations. The finding of this study indicates that internal vulnerability, political discontents, flourishing external regional and international powers with diversified interests to the strategic Horn of Africa as major challenges to the recent Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement. Properly managing of the rapprochement will enable the two countries to improve their political, social and economic aspects. Ethiopia could get free use the Eritrean ports, which was interrupted since the war. At this time, when the research was conducted, the two countries have begun to trade with each other, and people to people relations are positive developments. Moreover, the rapprochement could stabilize the region at large and facilitates the ground for economic cooperation and integration of the Horn countries. However, the rapprochement needs to be institutionalized, and invite others stake holders to be engaged in the peace process.

Finally, the researcher argues that Ethiopia and Eritrea need to manage the rapprochement in order to enhance at least their economic benefit from the strategic Horn of Africa. Economic interdependence has to be focused by the two countries rather than boundary issues. Even though many argue that border demarcation should be resolved first, the researcher argues that priority should be given for economic benefits of the people of the border lands. This requires facilitating infrastructures and border trade agreements between the two. Enabling the border communities from both sides to run their economic activities and trade with each other may relax the tension. Focusing on mutual economic progress may enable them to have a long lasting peace rather than focusing of the territory, specifically Badime.

## References

### Books

- Adamović, Mirjana et.al, (2017). *Process of Reconciliation in the Western Balkans and Turkey: A Qualitative Study*. Zagreb, Croatia.
- Bar-Tal, Daniel. (2008). *Handbook on Building Cultures of Peace: Reconciliation as a Foundation of Culture of Peace*.
- Bergh of Foundation (ed.) (2012). *Bergh of Glossary on Conflict Transformation: 20 notions for theory and practice*. Germany, Berlin.
- Brounéus, Karen. (2003). *Reconciliation—Theory and Practice for Development Cooperation*.
- Cox, Fletcher D. (2017). *Democracy and Peace building. A Resource Guide*, International IDEA. Stockholm, Sweden.
- Galtung, Johan (2004). *Transcend and Transform: An Introduction to Conflict Work*. London.
- Gillard, Emanuela-Chiara (2003). *Reparation for violations of international humanitarian law*. *IRRC*, Vol. 85 No. 851.
- Jeong, Ho- Won (2010). *Conflict Management and Resolution: An introduction*, Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN. Pp. 194-1996.
- Kieh, Jr George Klay.(2010). *An Anatomy of Conflict Resolution in Africa's Civil Conflicts*. *Peace and Conflict Studies*.Vol.17, No. 2.
- Kumar Ranjit (2011). *Research Methodology: a step-by-step guide for beginners*.3<sup>rd</sup>ed. India.
- Lederach, John Paul. (2014). *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*. United States of America.
- McMahon, Patrice C. (2017). *Cooperation Rules: Insights on Water and Conflict from International Relations*. in *Water Security in the Middle East*, Anthem Press.
- Miall, Hugh (2007). *Conflict Transformation Theory and European Practice*. University of Kent, Canterbury CT2 7NX, UK.
- Newman, Paris and Richmond (eds) (2009). *New perspectives on liberal Peace building*. United Nations University Press, ISBN 978-92-808-1174-2.
- Richmond, Oliver P. (2001). *Rethinking Conflict Resolution: The Linkage Problematic Between "Track I" and "Track II"*. Vol. XXI, No.2.

- Riley, D. and Emigh, R. A. Jean (2002). *Post-Colonial Journeys: Historical Roots of Immigration and Integration*. Vol. 1, issue 2. Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden.
- Tanabe, Juichiro (2017). *Beyond Liberal Peacebuilding: A Critique of Liberal Peacebuilding and Exploring a Postmodern Post-liberal Hybrid Model of Peace building*. Vol. 5, No. 8, pp. 459. Kumamoto University, Kumamoto, Japan.
- Tekeste, Negash (1997). *Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience*. Sweden.
- Wallensteen, Peter. (2002). *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and Global System*, London: SAGE Publications Ltd. pp. 12.
- Walliman, N. (2011). *Research Methods: The Basics*. USA and Canada, Avenue, New York.

### **Journal Articles**

- Abbink, John (2003), "Ethiopia-Eritrea: Proxy Wars and Prospects of Peace in the Horn of Africa". *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 21, No, 03 pp.12-20
- Abebe Aynete (2016). "Who will "Tear Down" the wall of hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea"? *EFRSSI Occasional paper*. Vol.1.No. 1. Pp.1-7
- Al-Abedine, Yasmine Zein (2017). "Western Theories on Conflict Resolution And Peace Building: A Critique". *Proceedings of 132<sup>nd</sup> the IIER International Conference*, Rome, Italy, 20<sup>th</sup> -21<sup>st</sup> October.
- Belete Belachew. (2018). "The Recent Ethio-Eritrea Diplomatic thaw: Challenges and Prospects", in Demisse Fantaye (ed.), *Imagining Peace: Ethiopia-Eritrea Rapprochement*, Horn of African Bulletin, July-August 2018 Vol. 30 Issue 3.
- Call, Charles T & Susan E. Cook (2003). "On Democratization and Peacebuilding". *Global Governance*. PP. 233-246.
- Daley, Patricia (2006). *Challenges to peace: conflict resolution in the great lakes region of Africa*. Third World Quarterly, Vol.27 no.2, pp.303-319.
- Daniel, Mekonnen and Paulos Tesfagiorgis (2011), "The Causes and Consequences of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Conflict: The Need for a Holistic Approach Towards Transitional Justice" in *Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa*, ed. Roba Sharamo and Berouk Mesfin, Relief Web report, Institute for Security Studies.
- Dias, Alexandra Magnolia. (2008). "An Inter-state War in the Post-Cold War Era: Eritrea-Ethiopia (1998-2000)". *published thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations*. London School of Economics and Political Science.

- Dijk, Paula (2009). "Together in conflict transformation: Development co-operation, mission and *diacony*". *A journal of peace research and action*. New Routes.Vol. 14.
- Dimma Nogo Sarbo (2006) "Ethiopia and Eritrea: Short sighted Solutions, Long Term Problems" in *The Search for Peace: The Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea*. Proceedings of the scholarly conference on Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict, edited by Lencho Lata, Oslo, Norway 6-7 July 2006.pp, 41-57.
- Fischer,Markus (2000). "The Liberal Peace: Ethical, Historical, and Philosophical Aspects", *BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-07, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University*.
- Fortna, V. Page (2004). "Interstate Peacekeeping: Causal Mechanisms and Empirical Effects". *World politics*, vol.56, pp. 484.
- Galtung, Johan (1969). "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research". *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 166-191.
- Gartzke, Erik, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer (2001). "Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict". *International Organization*. Vol.55, no2, pp.391- 400
- Gridneff S M. (2018). "Ethiopia and Eritrea Move to End 20-Year Conflict in Historic Breakthrough". *The Wall Street Journal*.
- Haider, Huma (2009). "Community-based Approaches to Peacebuilding in Conflict-affected and Fragile Contexts".*Issues Paper*.
- Hamber, Brandon (2007) "Forgiveness and Reconciliation: Paradise Lost or Pragmatism? Peace and Reparation for violations of international humanitarian law Conflict", Vol.13: no1, pp,116-120.
- Healy S. (2011). *Hostage to Conflict Prospects for Building Regional Economic Cooperation in the Horn of Africa*. A Chatham House Report.
- International Crisis Group (ICG). (2008, June 17). *Beyond the Fragile Peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting New War*. Report No. 147. p. 1-2.
- Kelman, Herbert C. (2010) "Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation: A Social-Psychological Perspective on Ending Violent Conflict between Identity Groups," *Landscapes of Violence*. Vol. 1, no. 1.

- Kidanu Atinafu, & Endalkachew Bayeh. (2015). “The Ethio-Eritrean Post-war Stalemate: An Assessment on the Causes and Prospects”. *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs*. Vol. 3, No. 2, 2015, pp. 96-101.
- Kidist Mulugeta (2011), “The Ethiopian-Eritrean War of 1998–2000: An analysis of its causes, course, impacts and prospects” in *Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa*, ed. Roba Sharamo and Berouk Mesfin, Relief Web report, Institute for Security Studies. Pp.31-37.
- Kupchan, Charles A. (2011). “Enmity into Amity: How Peace Breaks out”. *International Policy Analysis*.
- Lasley, Trace C. (2006). “We Saw Not Clearly Nor Understood: The Economic Background of the Ethiopian-Eritrean War,” *Kaleidoscope*: Vol. 5, No. 14.
- Lederach, John Paul and Michelle Maiese. (2009). *Conflict transformation: A circular journey with a purpose*
- Lencho Leta. (2003). “The Ethiopia–Eritrea War”, *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol.30 No.97, pp.369–378.
- Lie, Sande J. Harald, & Berouk Mesfin. (2018). “Ethiopia: A Political Economy Analysis”. *Norwegian Institute of International Affairs*.
- Mohammed, Abdulkader Saleh, and Hirt Nicole (2018). “Peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia: Voices from the Eritrean Diaspora”, in Demisse Fantaye (ed.), *Imagining Peace: Ethiopia-Eritrea Rapprochement*, Horn of African Bulletin, July-August 2018 Vol. 30 Issue 3.
- Mohamood, O. and Meresa K Dessu (2018). *Can Improved Ethiopia-Eritrea relations stabilize the region? The Horn of Africa could see an end to the ongoing cycles of direct and proxy conflicts*. Institute for Security Studies (ISS).
- Mosely, Jason (2018). “Eritrea-Ethiopia rapprochement and wider dynamics of regional trade, politics and security” in Demisse Fantaye (ed.), *Imagining Peace: Ethiopia-Eritrea Rapprochement*, Horn of African Bulletin, July-August 2018 Vol.30 no. 3.
- Müller Tanja R. (2016). “Assertive foreign policy in a ‘bad neighbourhood’: Eritrean foreign policy making”. *Conference Paper*.
- OCHA (2011). “Peacebuilding and Linkages with Humanitarian Action: Key Emerging Trends and Challenges”. *Occasional Policy Briefing Series*, Brief No. 7.

- Paffenholz, Thania (2009). "Understanding peace building theory: Management, resolution and transformation" *A journal of peace research and action*. New Routes, vol. 14.
- Redie Bereketeab (2009). "The Ethio-Eritrea Conflict and the Algiers Agreement: Eritrea's March Down the Road to Isolation" The Nordic Afric Institute, Uppsala, Sweden.
- Redie Bereketeab (2019). "The Ethiopia-Eritrea Rapprochement: African Solutions to African Problems?" *The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden*.
- Reid R. (2018). "Elite Bargains and Political Deals Project: Ethiopia-Eritrea Case Study". *Stabilisation Unit report*.
- Senehi, J. essica; Ryan, Stephen; and Byrne, Sean (2010) "Introduction: Peace building, Reconciliation, and Transformation," *Peace and Conflict Studies*: Vol. 17, N o. 1.
- Seyoum, Yohannes . (2012). "Eritrea-Ethiopia Arbitration: A 'Cure' Based on Neither Diagnosis Nor Prognosis". *Mizan Law Review*. Vol. 6 No.2.
- Shamim, S. Jazib (2018). "Franco German Reconciliation: Lessons for India and Pakistan". *SSRN Electronic Journal*. University of Karachi.
- Solomon, A.Deresso. (2004). "Ethiopian-Eritrean Relations: Reading the balance sheet". *Institute for Security Studies, Situation Report*.
- Sousa, Ricardo Real P. (2018). *The Context of Conflict Resolution - International Relations And The Study Of Peace And Conflict*. Working Paper, CESA CSG 164.
- Terlinden U. and Tobias Debiel (2004), *Deceptive Hope for Peace? The Horn of Africa Between Crisis Diplomacy and Obstacles to Development*. Peace, Conflict and Development – Issue Four, ISSN: 1742-0601.
- Terrence, Lyons (2009) 'The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict and the Search for Peace in the Horn of Africa', *Article in Review of African Political Economy*, Vol.36: no120, pp.167-175.
- Trivelli, Richard M. (1998). "Divided Histories, Opportunistic Alliances: Background Notes on the Ethiopian-Eritrean War". *Africa Spectrum*, Vol. 33, No. 3 pp. 257-285.
- Tschirgi, Neclâ (2004). "Post-Conflict Peace Building Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges". *International Peace Academy Prepared for the WSP International/IPA Peace building Forum Conference*. New York.
- Wani, Hilal Ahmad. (2011). "Understanding Conflict Resolution". *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Vol. 1 No. 2*. Aligarh, INDIA

Wils et.al (2006). “The Systemic Approach to Conflict Transformation: Concept and Fields of Application”. *Bergh of Foundation*, Berlin,Germany.

Worku Aberra (2016). “Asymmetric Benefits: The Ethio-Eritrea Common Market (1991-1998)”. *International Journal of African Development*. Vol.4 no.1.

Wuhibegezer, Ferede and Emmanuel Ababio Ofosu-Mensah (2014) “The trajectories of the Ethio-Eritrean distinct identity construction and the invention of nationalist historiography.”

Zartman, William (2001). “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*. Vol. 1, no. 1, pp 8-11.

### **MA Thesis and PhD Dissertations**

Berhe Yonas. (2003) “‘No peace No war’ situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Perspectives of Eritrean and Ethiopian students and local people, Adigrat Town, Ethiopia”. The Netherlands. *Un published MA Thesis, Submitted In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Development Studies, ISS, the Netherland.*

Edwin M. Teka (2010). “Instability in The Horn Of Africa: An Assessment Of The Ethiopia-Eritrean Conflict”. *Unpublished Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School.*

Fireweini Habtom (2016). “Ethio-Eritrea Conflict and The Role Of Scholars And Intellectuals In The ‘Stalled’ Peace Process and Reconciliation” *Unpublished MA Thesis, Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Peace And Security Studies, IPSS.*

Hegre, Håvard (2004).“The Limits of the Liberal Peace”. *Unpublished A dissertation for the degree of Dr. Philos.University of Oslo.*

Kalewongel Minale (2008). “Ethiopia and Eritrea: The Quest for Peace and Normalizations”. *Unpublished MA Thesis, University of Tromsø, Norway. pp.31-67.*

Meala Tesfamichael, (2011). “The Causes of Return to Conflict and The Geopolitical Dynamics in The Horn of Africa: The Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Conflict”. *Unpublished MA Dissertation in Politics, University of London.*

Peek, Laurens (2016). “Development of Peace Building Theory and Practice”. *Un published BA Thesis – Taal- en Cultuurstudies.*

Podusova, Antonina (2017). "Conflict Management in the International Context: Analysing the Role of the United Nations in the Western Sahara conflict". *Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Jyväskylä*.

### **Internet sources**

Dahir, H.A. (2018). "Ethiopia-Eritrea border rapprochement: Rewards and responsibilities." Available at: [/www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2018/06/25](http://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2018/06/25).

Dawit Endeshaw (Dec.29,2018). "Confusion at the border". The Reporter. Available at: <https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/confusion-border>.

Eritrea Profile (July 18, 2018). *Eritrean Embassy in Addis Ababa Reopens*. Vol. 25 No. 40, available at: [http://www.afrikakomitee.ch/eritrea/2018\\_08\\_Eritrea-Ethiopia](http://www.afrikakomitee.ch/eritrea/2018_08_Eritrea-Ethiopia).

Fikrejesus Amahazion (2018). "Yes Peace, No War." Eritrea Profile, Wednesday, July 11, 2018. Vol. 25 No.38 . See: [http://www.afrikakomitee.ch/eritrea/2018\\_08\\_Eritrea-Ethiopia.pdf](http://www.afrikakomitee.ch/eritrea/2018_08_Eritrea-Ethiopia.pdf).

Fikrejesus, Amhazonian (July 10, 2018). "Eritrea and Ethiopia: Recap and Brief Commentary on Recent Developments". Tesfa News, Available at: <https://www.tesfanews.net/eritrea-ethiopia-peace-friendship-agreement-recap/>

Fikrejesus Amahazion (2018). "A Look Back on Eritrea's Holistic 1993 Referendum. 23 April 2018." Available at: <http://www.shabait.com/categoryblog/26173-a-look-back-on-eritreas-historic-1993-referendum>.

Fischer, Martina (2011). *Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice*. Available at: [http://www.operationspaix.net/data/document/4036~v~Transitional\\_Justice\\_and\\_Reconciliation\\_\\_Theory\\_and\\_Practice.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/data/document/4036~v~Transitional_Justice_and_Reconciliation__Theory_and_Practice.pdf)

Coser Lewis, et al. (2006). *Conflict and Critical Theories: Conflict Theory*:

Dias, Alexandra Magnólia (2013). *Introduction: Understanding Conflict and Processes of State Formation, Reconfiguration and Disintegration in the Horn of Africa*.

Moolakkattu, S. John (2016). "Forgiveness and Conflict Resolution". See at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265482671>.

Mitchell, Christopher R. (2006). *Conflict, Social Change and Conflict Resolution: An Enquiry in Social Change and Conflict Transformation*.

Reuters (28 Dec 2018). "Eritrea closes border crossing to Ethiopians, official and residents say".

The conversation (2018). What peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia will mean for the Horn of Africa. Available at:<https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/what-peace-between-eritrea-and-ethiopia-will-mean-horn-africa>

Waldman, Thomas (2009). *Conflict Resolution, Peacebuilding, and Youth. SPW Primer.*

Wilson, Richard A. (2017). *Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Anthropological Perspectives*

Yemane Beyene (27 October 2018). “Putting the Eritrean-Ethiopian rapprochement into Proper Prospective.” Tesfa News, ECIS. Available at: <http://www.shabait.com/categoryblog/273>.

## **Documentations**

BMZ (2010). “Connecting Human Rights and Conflict Transformation”. *Guidance for Development Practitioners.*

Caprile A. (2008). “The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict”. *Directorate General for External Policies of the Union Directorate B, Policy Department. European Parliament, Brussels.*

Security Council Report (9 November, 2005) Security Council Report One Dag Hammarskjöld Plaza, 885 Second Avenue at 48<sup>th</sup> Street, 31<sup>st</sup> Floor, New York NY10017. Available at: [www.securitycouncilreport.org](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org)

Stauffer HU. (2018). “A new Era: Eritrea – Ethiopia in Peace Documentation”. Basel, Switzerland.

Tekeda Alemu (January 2019). “The conundrum of present Ethiopian foreign policy-in search of a road map for Ethiopia’s Foreign and National Security Policy and Strategy”. CDRC DIGEST, vol.4, no1.

## Appendix-I

### List of Key Informants

No	Name	Organization	Position	Date
1	Prof. Tesema Ta'a	AAU	History Department	6 May 2019
2	Shigut Gelata (PhD)	OLF	International and Public Relations Department Head	10 May 2019
3	Yonas Adaye (PhD)	Institute of Peace and Security Studies (IPSS)	Assistant professor and associate Academic Director	15 March 2019
4	Belete Belachew (PhD)	Centre for Dialogue, Research and Cooperation	Senior Researcher	04 April 2019
5	Ambasadar Araya Desta	Eritrean Embassy	Permanent Mission of the State of Eritrea to the AU and UNECA	5 May 2019
6	Mr Abebe Aynete (PhD candidate)	EPIID	Peace and Security Analyst on the Horn of Africa	05 April 2019
7	Mr. Getachew Nigatu	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Director General Foreign Relation Strategic Information Resource Centre (FR-SIRC)	20 March 2019
8	Mr Ojige Osso	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Eritrean Affairs Minister Councillor II	21 March 2019

9	Mr.G/Tsadik Tasew	Ministry of Trade and Industry	Expert	25 March 2019
10	Comonder Abebe Muluneh	IGAD	Director of IGAD Security Sector Program	22 March 2019
11	Mr. Tesfaye Daba	HPR	Head of Foreign Affairs Permanent Committee in the HPR	02 May 2019
12	Mr. Gebru Asrat	Arena Party	Chair Person of the Party	03 May 2019
13	Dasta Dinka	OFC	Youth sector Chairperson of the party	15 March 2019

## **Appendix-II: In-depth Interview Guide Line for Key Informants**

The purpose of this interview guide is to gather information to conduct research for the partial Fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations and Diplomacy. Thus, this instrument is designed for the purpose of gathering information concerning the Recent Ethio-Eritrea Rapprochement: Challenges and Prospects. Information that you have provided is intended to serve for identification of determinant challenges that the rapprochement could faces and its prospects expected from the new diplomatic relations of the two countries. Therefore, you are kindly requested to provide accurate information as much as possible. I confirm you that all data given by you will be treated confidentially.

1. Could we start our discussion by introducing each other? (By telling name, age and current position and work place).

1. Name: -----

2. Age: -----

3. Position and work place: -----

### **Interview Guide Questions**

1. Why do you think the Algiers Agreement was unable to resolve the Ethio-Eritrea conflicts?
2. How do you see the situation of ‘no war, no peace’ between Ethiopia and Eritrea?
3. Why the rapprochement at this time? What factors contributed?
4. How do you evaluate Ethiop’s acceptance of the Algiers Agreement and the Boundary Commission’s decision after sixteen years?
5. What are major challenges to the efforts towards the transition to peace, in re-establishing sense of understanding among the populations and in sustaining the peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea?
6. Do you think that the differences in political ideology or political divergence of the two countries can have impact on the diplomatic thaw?
7. What do you think the role of Intergovernmental organizations and international community in Ethio-Eritrea’s peace building process? How?
8. What are the possible prospects of the new diplomatic relations of Ethiopia and Eritrea?
9. How could the two countries make and ensure sustainable peace and stability?
10. Does the new rapprochement of Ethio-Eritrea affect the current Ethiopian foreign policy?
11. Any additional comment is appreciable.

## **Appendix III: The Algiers Agreement**

### **AGREEMENT BETWEEN**

### **THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ERITREA**

The Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea (the “parties”),

REAFFIRMING their acceptance of the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) Framework Agreement and the Modalities for its Implementation, which have been endorsed by the 35th ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, held in Algiers, Algeria, from 12 to 14 July 1999,

RECOMMITTING themselves to the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, signed in Algiers on 18 June 2000,

WELCOMING the commitment of the OAU and United Nations, through their endorsement of the Framework Agreement and Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, to work closely with the international community to mobilize resources for the resettlement of displaced persons, as well as rehabilitation and peace building in both countries,

Have agreed as follows:

#### **Article 1**

1. The parties shall permanently terminate military hostilities between themselves. Each party shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the other.
2. The parties shall respect and fully implement the provisions of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities.

#### **Article 2**

1. In fulfilling their obligations under international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions relative to the protection of victims of armed conflict (“1949 Geneva Conventions”), and in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the parties shall without delay release and repatriate all prisoners of war.

2. In fulfilling their obligations under international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the parties shall without delay, release and repatriate or return to their lastplace of residence all other persons detained as a result of the armed conflict.

3. The parties shall afford humane treatment to each other's nationals and persons ofeach other's national origin within their respective territories.

### **Article 3**

1. In order to determine the origins of the conflict, an investigation will be carried out on the incidents of 6 May 1998 and on any other incident prior to that date which could have contributed to a misunderstanding between the parties regarding their common border, including the incidents of July and August 1997.

2. The investigation will be carried out by an independent, impartial body appointed by the Secretary General of the OAU, in consultation with the Secretary General of the United Nations and the two parties.

3. The independent body will endeavour to submit its report to the Secretary General of the OAU in a timely fashion.

4. The parties shall cooperate fully with the independent body.

5. The Secretary General of the OAU will communicate a copy of the report to each of the two parties, which shall consider it in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Framework Agreement and the Modalities.

### **Article 4**

1. Consistent with the provisions of the Framework Agreement and the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, the parties reaffirm the principle of respect for the borders existing at independence as stated in resolution AHG/Res. 16(1) adopted by the OAU Summit in Cairo in 1964, and, in this regard, that they shall be determined on the basis of pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law.

2. The parties agree that a neutral Boundary Commission composed of five members shall be established with a mandate to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable international law. The Commission shall not have the power to make decisions *ex aequo et bono*.

3. The Commission shall be located in The Hague.

4. Each party shall, by written notice to the United Nations Secretary General, appoint two commissioners within 45 days from the effective date of this Agreement, neither of whom shall be nationals or permanent residents of the party making the appointment. In the event that a party fails to name one or both of its party-appointed commissioners within the specified time, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall make the appointment.

5. The president of the Commission shall be selected by the party-appointed commissioners or, failing their agreement within 30 days of the date of appointment of the latest party-appointed commissioner, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations after consultation with the parties. The president shall be neither a national nor permanent resident of either party.

6. In the event of the death or resignation of a commissioner in the course of the proceedings, a substitute commissioner shall be appointed or chosen pursuant to the procedure set forth in this paragraph that was applicable to the appointment or choice of the commissioner being replaced.

7. The UN Cartographer shall serve as Secretary to the Commission and undertake such tasks as assigned to him by the Commission, making use of the technical expertise of the UN Cartographic Unit. The Commission may also engage the services of additional experts as it deems necessary.

8. Within 45 days after the effective date of this Agreement, each party shall provide to the Secretary its claims and evidence relevant to the mandate of the Commission. These shall be provided to the other party by the Secretary.

9. After reviewing such evidence and within 45 days of its receipt, but not earlier than 15 days after the Commission is constituted, the Secretary shall transmit to the Commission and the parties any materials relevant to the mandate of the Commission as well as his findings identifying those portions of the border as to which there appears to be no dispute between the parties. The Secretary shall also transmit to the Commission all the claims and evidence presented by the parties.

10. With regard to those portions of the border about which there appears to be controversy, as well as any portions of the border identified pursuant to paragraph 9 with respect to which either party believes there to be controversy, the parties shall present their written and oral submissions and any additional evidence directly to the Commission, in accordance with its procedures.

11. The Commission shall adopt its own rules of procedure based upon the 1992 Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two

States. Filing deadlines for the parties' written submissions shall be simultaneous rather than consecutive. All decisions of the Commission shall be made by a majority of the commissioners.

12. The Commission shall commence its work not more than 15 days after it is constituted and shall endeavor to make its decision concerning delimitation of the border within six months of its first meeting. The Commission shall take this objective into consideration when establishing its schedule. At its discretion, the Commission may extend this deadline.

13. Upon reaching a final decision regarding delimitation of the borders, the Commission shall transmit its decision to the parties and Secretaries General of the OAU and the United Nations for publication, and the Commission shall arrange for expeditious demarcation.

14. The parties agree to cooperate with the Commission, its experts and other staff in all respects during the process of delimitation and demarcation, including the facilitation of access to territory they control. Each party shall accord to the Commission and its employees the same privileges and immunities as are accorded to diplomatic agents under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

15. The parties agree that the delimitation and demarcation determinations of the Commission shall be final and binding. Each party shall respect the border so determined, as well as territorial integrity and sovereignty of the other party.

16. Recognizing that the results of the delimitation and demarcation process are not yet known, the parties request the United Nations to facilitate resolution of problems which may arise due to the transfer of territorial control, including the consequences for individuals residing in previously disputed territory.

17. The expenses of the Commission shall be borne equally by the two parties. To defray its expenses, the Commission may accept donations from the United Nations Trust Fund established under paragraph 8 of Security Council Resolution 1177 of 26 June 1998.

## **Article 5**

1. Consistent with the Framework Agreement, in which the parties commit themselves to addressing the negative socio-economic impact of the crisis on the civilian

population, including the impact on those persons who have been deported, a neutral

Claims Commission shall be established. The mandate of the Commission is to decide through binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one Government against the other, and by nationals (including both natural and juridical persons) of one

party against the Government of the other party or entities owned or controlled by the other party that are (a) related to the conflict that was the subject of the Framework Agreement, the Modalities for its Implementation and the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, and (b) result from violations of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, or other violations of international law. The Commission shall not hear claims arising from the cost of military operations, preparing for military operations, or the use of force, except to the extent that such claims involve violations of international humanitarian law.

2. The Commission shall consist of five arbitrators. Each party shall, by written notice to the United Nations Secretary General, appoint two members within 45 days from the effective date of this agreement, neither of whom shall be nationals or permanent residents of the party making the appointment. In the event that a party fails to name one or both of its party-appointed arbitrators within the specified time, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall make the appointment.

3. The president of the Commission shall be selected by the party-appointed arbitrators or failing their agreement within 30 days of the date of appointment of the latest party-appointed arbitrator, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations after consultation with the parties. The president shall be neither a national nor permanent resident of either party.

4. In the event of the death or resignation of a member of the Commission in the course of the proceedings, a substitute member shall be appointed or chosen pursuant to the procedure set forth in this paragraph that was applicable to the appointment or choice of the arbitrator being replaced.

5. The Commission shall be located in The Hague. At its discretion it may hold hearings and conduct investigations in the territory of either party, or at such other location as it deems expedient.

6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ such professional, administrative and clerical staff as it deems necessary to accomplish its work, including establishment of a Registry. The Commission may also retain consultants and experts to facilitate the expeditious completion of its work.

7. The Commission shall adopt its own rules of procedure based upon the 1992 Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States. All decisions of the Commission shall be made by a majority of the commissioners.

8. Claims shall be submitted to the Commission by each of the parties on its own behalf and on behalf of its nationals, including both natural and juridical persons. All claims submitted to the Commission shall be filed no later than one year from the effective date of this agreement. Except for claims submitted to another mutually agreed settlement mechanism in accordance with paragraph 16 or filed in another forum prior to the effective date of this agreement, the Commission shall be the sole forum for adjudicating claims described in paragraph 1 or filed under paragraph 9 of this Article, and any such claims which could have been and were not submitted by that deadline shall be extinguished, in accordance with international law.

9. In appropriate cases, each party may file claims on behalf of persons of Ethiopian or Eritrean origin who may not be its nationals. Such claims shall be considered by the Commission on the same basis as claims submitted on behalf of that party's nationals.

10. In order to facilitate the expeditious resolution of these disputes, the Commission shall be authorized to adopt such methods of efficient case management and mass claims processing as it deems appropriate, such as expedited procedures for processing claims and checking claims on a sample basis for further verification only if circumstances warrant.

11. Upon application of either of the parties, the Commission may decide to consider specific claims, or categories of claims, on a priority basis.

12. The Commission shall commence its work not more than 15 days after it is constituted and shall endeavour to complete its work within three years of the date when the period for filing claims closes pursuant to paragraph 8.

13. In considering claims, the Commission shall apply relevant rules of international law. The Commission shall not have the power to make decisions *ex aequo et bono*.

14. Interest, costs and fees may be awarded.

15. The expenses of the Commission shall be borne equally by the parties. Each party shall pay any invoice from the Commission within 30 days of its receipt.

16. The parties may agree at any time to settle outstanding claims, individually or by categories, through direct negotiation or by reference to another mutually agreed settlement mechanism.

17. Decisions and awards of the commission shall be final and binding. The parties agree to honour all decisions and to pay any monetary awards rendered against them promptly.

18. Each party shall accord to members of the Commission and its employees the privileges and immunities that are accorded to diplomatic agents under the Vienna

