



ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

**POLITICAL TRANSITION IN ETHIOPIA SINCE 2018: DRIVERS,
CHALLENGES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**

BY
SENASSA DAMISSIE LICHIE

ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

JANUARY, 2021

**POLITICAL TRANSITION IN ETHIOPIA SINCE 2018: DRIVERS,
CHALLENGES AND ITS IMPLICATIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**

BY

SENASSA DAMISSIE LICHIE

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES OF ADDIS
ABABA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF THE MASTER OF ARTS (M.A.) IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY**

ADVISOR

ASNAKE KEFALE (PhD)

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

M.A. PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
M.A. PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY

**POLITICAL TRANSITION IN ETHIOPIA SINCE: DRIVERS, CHALLENGES AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**

BY
SENASSA DAMISSIE LICHIE

APPROVED BY BOARD OF EXAMINERS

_____	_____	_____
Advisor	Signature	Date
_____	_____	_____
External Examiner	Signature	Date
_____	_____	_____
Internal Examiner	Signature	Date

DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis entitled, Political Transition in Ethiopia Since 218: Drivers, Challenges and Its Implications in the Horn of Africa, is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Senassa Damissie

January, 2021

Acknowledgement

First and foremost, praises and thanks to God, the Almighty, for His help throughout my work to complete this study successfully. Secondly, I am extremely grateful and I would like to express my deep and sincere gratitude to my research advisor, Dr. Asnake Kefale, an associate professor at Addis Ababa University, School of graduate studies, college of social sciences, department of political science, and international relations, for being a true mentor and his amazing guidance, encouragement, constructive advice, motivation, enthusiasm, immense knowledge and sharing his pearls wisdom with me throughout this work. Thirdly, I extend my thanks to Ambo University which sponsored my MA study, and my mentors at the Department of Political Science and International Relations of the Addis Ababa University. Last but not the least, my deepest gratitude to my caring, loving, and supportive wife Genet, your encouragement when the times got rough are much appreciated and duly noted; I extend my heartfelt thanks. And my thanks also go to my family and to all the people who have supported me to complete my graduate study.

Table of Contents

	Page
Acknowledgement	i
Table of Contents	ii
Lists of Acronyms	v
Abstract	vii
CHAPTER ONE	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Background of the Study	1
1.2. Statement of the Problem	2
1.3. Core argument of the Study	6
1.4. Objectives of the Study	7
1.4.1. General Objective	7
1.4.2. Specific Objectives	7
1.5. Research Questions	7
1.5.1. Core Research Question	7
1.5.2. Specific Research Questions	7
1.6. Methodology and Methods of Data Collection	8
1.6.1. Approach of the Study	8
1.6.2. Methods of Data Collection	8
1.6.3. Data Analysis and Interpretation	8
1.7. Ethical Consideration	9
1.8. Significance of the Study	9
1.9. Scope of the Study	9
1.10. Organization of the Study	10
CHAPTER TWO	11
2. POLITICAL TRANSITION: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES	11
2.1. Introduction	11
2.2. Political Transition: Liberalization and Democratization	12
2.3. Phases of Political Transition	14
2.4. Transition: Patterns and Methods	17
2.5. Political Transition and Waves of Democratization	19
2.5.1. The First Wave of Democratization, 1828-1926	20
2.5.2. The first reverse wave, 1922-1942	21
2.5.3. The Second Wave of Democratization, 1943-1962	22
2.5.4. The second reverse wave, 1958-1975	22
2.5.5. The Third Wave of Democratization, 1974 to around 1990	23
2.6. Theoretical Framework to Political Transition	25
2.6.1. Structural Approach	25

2.6.2. Strategic Choice Approach	26
2.6.3. Institutional Approach	27
2.6.4. Political Economy Approach	29
2.7. Conclusion.....	31
CHAPTER THREE	33
3. HISTORY OF POLITICAL TRANSITION IN ETHIOPIA FROM MODERN TO CONTEMPORARY PERIOD (1885-2018).....	33
3.1. Introduction	33
3.2. The Pre-1991 Imperial Transitions	35
3.2.1. Reforms during Emperor Menelik-II (1889-1913).....	35
3.2.2. The brief reign of Lij Iyasu (1910/11/13-1916)	37
3.2.3. Reforms during Emperor Hayle Selassie-I (1930-1974).....	39
3.2.3.1. Ethiopian politics on the Eve and Aftermath of the 1960 Coup d'état	43
3.3. The 1974 Political Transition of the Derg.....	45
3.3.1. The 1974 Ethiopian Revolution and Its Causes.....	45
3.3.2. The Political Actors behind the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974.....	47
3.3.4. The Derg's Democratic Political Opening up of its Earlier Period and Reforms	48
3.3.5. The Closure of the Transition and the Emergence of the Derg as Authoritarian/ Totalitarian System.....	52
3.4. The Anatomy of Post-1991 Political Transition: Democratic Opening and Closure (1991- 2018).....	56
3.4.1. The Essence of the Post-1991 Transition	56
3.4.2. The July Conference and Formation of Transitional Government of Ethiopia.....	57
3.4.3. Democratic Opening and Transitional Period Charter	59
3.4.4. Democratic Opening and the FDRE Constitution	60
3.4.5. Lost opportunity, Closure of Democratic Process and Dashed Hope for Consolidation	62
3.4.5.1. Structural/Fundamental Causes	62
3.4.5.2. Undemocratic Political Culture.....	64
3.4.5.3. Ideological Principles of EPRDF and Revolutionary Democracy.....	64
3.4.5.4. Repressive Laws and the Closure of Democratic Opening	66
3.4.5.5. The rise of Oligarchy and Privatization of the State.....	67
3.4.5.6. Internal Schism within the TPLF and Contested Parliamentary Elections.....	67
3.5. Conclusion.....	69
CHAPTER FOUR.....	71
4. THE NEW POLITICAL TRANSITION IN ETHIOPIA SINCE 2018: DRIVERS, AND CHALLENGES	71
4.1. Introduction	71
4.2. The Drivers of New Political Transition in Ethiopia	71
4.2.1. The mass People's Protest Movements in Different Parts of Ethiopia Since 2014.....	71

4.2.1.1. The Oromo People’s Protest	72
4.2.1.2. The Amhara People’s Protest.....	73
4.2.1.3. Solidarity Movements of Other Ethnic Group.....	74
4.2.2. Political Cleavage within EPRDF Coalition	75
4.3. Causes of People’s Movement and Its Consequences	76
4.4. Actors in the New Political Transition as a Driving Force	79
4.5. The New Political Transition and its Changes	81
4.5.1. Some Changes with the Transition.....	81
4.5.2. Different Positions on Ongoing Transition and Changes	84
4.5.3. A Transition from Democratic Centralism to ‘Medemer’ or Synergy	86
4.5.4. A Transition from EPRDF-1 to Prosperity Party	88
4.6. The Challenges of the Current Political Transition in Ethiopia.....	90
4.6.1. Problem with State Building and Historical Contradictions	90
4.6.2. Political Polarization and Ethnic Division.....	91
4.6.3. Weak Institutions and Lack of the Rule of Law	92
4.6.4. Ethnic Conflict and Internal Peoples Displacement	93
4.6.5. High Expectations/Youth Population Growth and Limitation of Economic Resources	94
4.6.6. Propaganda/Political Culture and Ultra-nationalism.....	95
4.6.7. Structural Problem and the Past Stand Patters.....	97
4.6.8. Lack of Negotiated transition Road Map	98
4.6.9. High Living Cost and Money Laundering.....	99
4.6.10. GERD, Covid-19, Flood, Drought and Locust Invasion	99
4.8. Conclusion.....	100
CHAPTER SIX.....	102
5. THE 2018 NEW POLITICAL TRANSITION IN ETHIOPIA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA	102
5.1. Introduction	102
5.2. The New Political Transition in Ethiopia and Its Impact on the Neighboring countries .	102
5.2.1. Sudan	103
5.2.2. South Sudan.....	103
5.2.3. Somalia and Somaliland	104
5.2.4. Kenya.....	105
5.2.5. Djibouti.....	105
5.3. Change in Ethiopia and GERD	106
5.4. Change in Ethiopia and Its Implication on IGAD as Regional Organ	109
5.5. Conclusion.....	111
GENERAL CONCLUSION	113
References.....	118

Lists of Acronyms

AD	Anno Domini
ADP	Amhara Democratic Party
AESM/MEISON	All Ethiopian Socialist Movement
ANDM	Amhara National Democratic Movement
ANDP	Afar National Democratic Party
AU	African Union
BC	Before Christ
BDP	Benshangul-Gumuz Democratic Party
COWPE	Commission for the Organization of the Ethiopian Workers' Party
CSO	Civil Society Organization
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
EFFORT	Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPPF	Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
ESAT	Ethiopian Satellite Television
EZEMA	Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice Party
EU	European Union
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
GPDM	Gambella People's Democratic Movement
HNL	Harari National league
HoA	Horn of Africa
ICU	Islamic Court Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
METEC	Metals and Engineering Corporation
MIDROC	Mohammed International Development Research and Organization Companies
ML	Marxist Leninist

MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NaMA	National Movement of Amara
NDR	National Democratic Revolution
NDRPE	National Democratic Revolutionary Programme of Ethiopia
NEBE	National Electoral Board of Ethiopia
NPRC	National Peace and Reconciliation Commission
ODP	Oromo Democratic Party
OFC	Oromo Federalist Congress
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
OMN	Oromo Media Network
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPDO	Oromo People's Democratic Organization
PDOs	People's Democratic Organizations
PDRE	People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
PMAC	Provisional Military Administrative Council
PNDR	Program for the National Democratic Revolution
POMOA	Provisional Office for Mass Organizational Affairs
PP	Prosperity Party
SDP	Somalia Democratic Party
SEPDM	Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement
SNNPR	Southern Nation Nationalities and People's Region
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UEDF	United Ethiopian Democratic Forces
UNUDHR	United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
USA	United States of America
WPE	Workers Party of Ethiopia

Abstract

This study aims to examine drivers, challenges and implication of the new political transition in Ethiopia which has opened since 2018. The thesis particularly scrutinizes the causes, drivers of Ethiopia's new political transition, changes, challenges, and implications on the Horn of Africa region and IGAD. To achieve this objective, a qualitative research approach was employed. In this study, both primary and secondary sources of data were used. Thus, field data was collected through interview and focus group discussion which was supplemented by the literature. Based on this, the study argued different political transitions in Ethiopia were promised many positive changes at their opening phase, and reverted without achieving their initial promises and consolidated. Therefore, this thesis identified the drivers of the new ongoing political transition of 2018. People's movements resulted from a lack of equality, freedom, democracy, and the Addis Ababa Integrated Master plan, especially, for the Oromo's were among the driving factors. The youth, notably, students at a different level, educated part of society, academicians, intellectuals, activists, elites, political parties, and media; those were the main drivers of this new transition opened in 2018. Ideological principles against the democratic values and internal party fissure were also identified as another driving factor. Further, the research identified incomplete state formation, ethnic division, and communal conflict, internal people's displacement, youth population growth, etc...as a challenge. It has also peace, security, and economic implications on IGAD member states and the whole region. Based on the empirical discussions, this study concludes with the suggestion of real political dialogue, broader national consensus, and inclusive nation-building and state formation project, build strong democratic institutions and implement genuine federalism with real democracy, etc... for the success and consolidation of this democratic political transition.

Key Words: *Ethiopia, Horn of Africa, IGAD, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Political Transition*



RICH CLABAUGH/STAFF

MAP 1: Map of Ethiopia, Neighboring States and IGAD

Source: www.worldpoliticalmap.com

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

To begin with, the concept of transitions has been central to discussions of democratization for more than four decades now. Before 1970 the use of the word “transition” to refer to a change in political regime is relatively limited because most political scientists of the day focused on how democracy can be preserved and strengthened where it already exists, mainly in North America and Western Europe (Rustow, 1970:337). However, another scholar of government science and international politics Samuel P. Huntington delineated that “transition” is the primary term used to describe the political changes from authoritarianism to democracy that typified what he labeled as the “third wave” of democratization. The other is a transition from democracy to authoritarianism what he calls “reverse wave” which signifies the event where many states reversed from democracy to semi-authoritarian or authoritarianism; in which Africa is not exceptional (Huntington, 1991:17).

According to Marina Ottaway (2003), Rene Lenarchard (1994), O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), political transition is an interval between one political regime and another or it is a political transformation from one form of government to another form of government which typically arises from warfare and internal social conflict. Given the fact that, “political transition can occur through any of three methods of change: reform, compromise, and overthrow” (Shain and Linz, 1995: 53-55). Furthermore, the transition model points to three sequential phases on which, more often than not, democratization appears to build: opening, breakthrough, and consolidation (Lenarchard, 1994) in which political transition takes place in Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular, couldn’t out of it.

However, the momentum of transformation through determination in upholding democratic values became increasingly difficult in many African countries owing to the persistence of previously entrenched authoritarian legacies. This notwithstanding, however, political and socio-economic reforms that became the order of the day neutralized the uncontrolled privileges of the African power elite, which in the past reduced citizens to “extended households of incumbents”

(Gros, 1998:3). Consequently, all regimes in Africa “have embraced at least one phase of democratization” at varying times (*ibid*: 4).

Thus, Ethiopia experienced different regime changes and political transitions. Especially, the two successive regime changes since the mid-1970s are the important ones. These are, the *ancient regime*, alias imperial rule, was toppled by the revolution of 1974 that brought about the reigning of a military dictatorship that ruled until 1991 (Gebru, 2009). This was followed by the ousting of military rule in May 1991 by a coalition of ethno-nationalist insurgent groups spearheaded by the incumbent Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) through [replacement/overthrow] mode of transition (Merera, 2011).

However, all were not achieved the desired objective of democratization and democratic consolidation. Notably, the 1974 transition from ancient to *Derg* military regime and the 1991 transition from *Derg* to EPRDF regime were the best example of a failed transition in the country. To this end, the 2018 ongoing transition, which is resulted from a centrifugal and centripetal force within and outside of the existing EPRDF, is opened with significant reform measures. Even if there are important measures and hope with this new political transition, there are also different challenges that needs investigation to identify. It has also its implications for the Horn of African region and IGAD member states in different dimensions. These are among the many issues that are encouraged and initiate me to conduct this study in this area.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Ethiopia is one of the major countries in the Horn of Africa. As a result, developments associated with the Ethiopian transition can affect the region (Vaughan, 2006 and Teferi, 2018). As I have showed above, Ethiopia is not new for political transition with different modes of transition.

Shain and Linz, 1995, confirmed that political transitions can occur through any of the three modalities of change, reform, compromise, and overthrow. Reform /transaction/ transformation assumes a transition triggered by the existing regime, which introduces reforms that brings to an end of authoritarian rule and paves the way for democracy to emerge (Mainwaring and Share, 1986; Schmitter, 1991; Huntington, 1991; Shain and Linz, 1995). In this model, the incumbent is in charge of the transition with tremendous capacity to shape the nature of the new democracy without consultation or negotiations with opposition forces. In the compromise context,

transition emerges from a stalemate between the incumbent and opposition forces. Realizing that each side cannot triumph over the other, the opposing forces reach a compromise and decide jointly to usher in political transition. The success of democracy is heavily conditioned by the nature of the political bargain both sides make during the transition. The last modality which overthrow occurs when the authoritarian regime resists reforms and is toppled by the opposition. In this situation, the new government directs the transition process and shapes the ensuing democracy (Shain and Linz, 1995).

In my view, the Ethiopian transitions are characterized by overthrow and reform models. For instance, in the wake of the overthrow of the Haile Selassie government, the *Derg* came to power in 1974. This change fits with the model of “overthrow” with somewhat good opening phase by introducing different reforms like: land reform, nationalization of different sectors, allow the right to association and some other democratic principles but finally reversed to authoritarian form of government and the transition itself failed to complete (Alemante, 1992). After seventeen years, in May, 1991, the much hated and brutal military-Marxist dictatorship replaced in the course of “overthrow” transition model which was still a non-peaceful kind of transition. Since 1991, the coalition of ethno-nationalist insurgent groups Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) control the power with the good opening phase of transition and with very limited windows of breakthrough with declaring transitional arrangement with a number of reform measures such as introducing a transitional charter as an interim constitution that guaranteed freedom of speech, assembly, association, etc. Other major political developments that transpired during the period in question included the adoption of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNUDHR), and conducting elections for political consumption which called “electoral fallacy” rather than for democratization (Drake and Silva, 1986:10). Sadly, the transition couldn’t develop to the consolidation phase of political transition; as a result of human right abuses, restrictive laws, electoral fraud, and other deterioration of democratic principles.

Generally, the failure to democratize from above resulted in a revolution from below which leads to the youth-led mass protest in different parts of the country (specially the mass protest in Oromia National Regional State and Amhara National States) and reform from above per se. Recently, after years of unrest, Ethiopia is in the midst of another new political transition. The

indications of this is different action are on the way. The unexpected rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea over long-lasting territorial disputes is welcome news for the region and brings optimism to all of Africa (Addis Standard, 2018). Other measures included, release of thousands of political prisoners, outlawing of human rights abuses, decreased censorship and the return of independent media to the country have pushed Ethiopia forward(*ibid*), and this imply the transition begins with a very good opening phase and on its way to breakthrough.

Furthermore, strengthening cooperation with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, ending the state of emergency in Ethiopia declared by the then leaders of government, amendment and review of repressive laws, replacing senior military commanders, demonstrating willingness to re-establish the currently defunct Ethiopian navy, the promise to privatize of the telecommunications sector in 2018 and more are another indications that Ethiopia is in a new transition (Gottlie, 2018). However, as a result of competition on the use of river Nile and GERD development, the Ethio-Egypt cooperation has deteriorated and the relation with the Gulf States like, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is also not on its first position; because, there is an inclination of supporting Egypt in favor of Ethiopia (Mosley,2020).

In fact, the current new political transition in Ethiopia is a reform at the opening phase with the coming to power of the reformist group within the existing government and their commitment to different reforms. A breakthrough phase can be achieved if the government creates a political bargain with opposition forces and produces a roadmap and timeline leading to a national election and ultimately a democratically elected new government. Until this is achieved, it is not possible to proceed to the consolidation phase where democratic norms, institutions, attitudes emerge, and new democratic rules of the game become firmly established. And then, if the transition is successful and consolidate, what will be its implications for the Horn of African region?

Since, Ethiopia is a major country in the sub-region in terms of a number of indicators such as population size, land area, potential resource endowment, military capacity, its role in different regional organization like IGAD and a long history of statehood marked by its prominent role in the liberation of African colonized entities, which is further reinforced by the enduring foreign relations the country has established with state-actors in the Horn and the rest of the continent

and transition in Ethiopia has regional impact which affects the International Relations of Africa in area of peace and stability, democracy, influence in regional institutions like IGAD, port politics will be good, regional economic integration will be established, Etho-Eritrea rapprochement will be sustained (Badwaza,2018 and the Guardian, 8 July,2018).

Nevertheless, if the transition become unsuccessful or collapse, what will be going to happen? That is obvious; as Marina Ottaway, (2003), states “it will be reversed to semi-authoritarian or complete authoritarianism” and this leads to different political and economic dangers like: political tension both in the country and region, economic decline, displacement and forced migration. It was the current event that, the conflicts and mass protests that unfolded in several parts of Ethiopia especially Oromia and Amhara National States ethnic prompted by a range of issues including sharing of political power, grievances over distribution of resources, different suppression, Human right violations, intra-party confrontation were among the driving forces which bring this ongoing change to the fore and it also could be entailed as spillover effects to neighboring countries like Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Eritrea and Even Djibouti where identical ethno-linguistic groups and socio-cultural formations inhabit the border areas of the countries at per se(Alemo, 2010; Addis Standard,2018).

What are challenges and threats of this new ongoing political Transition in Ethiopia? Internal power struggle between [hardliners/stand patters and soft-liners/liberal reformers], re-integration of armed militia, lack of public trust in security services, ethnic conflict and internal displacements in different parts of the country are among the challenges which highly threaten the new transition, therefore if these and others are not managed it may lead to civil war or state collapse (Badwaza, 2018). Therefore, this work is going to shade light on such issues within this transition.

In nutshell, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti start to work on solving disputes among themselves which opened new era and the end of long-lasting tension in the region. Therefore, ending war and expanding economic ties with neighboring Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya is critical for stability and developments in the impoverished IGAD member states which constitutes an aspect of the regional implication of the current new Ethiopian transition and affect the geopolitical climate of the Horn of Africa (Zekareas, 2018). In addition, there also favorable conditions for the transition like: availing political space which give opportunity for

the opposition parties and leadership skill with consensus on fundamental political issues, however, if there is unwillingness to negotiate between the government and opposition groups, misreading the national situation, may lead to violence and chaos which may derail the transition. Therefore, the transition highly needs management to make the long-awaited transition to a democracy (Addis Standard, October, 17/ 2018).

From then on, as many believe that there is a new kind of transition in Ethiopia since recent times. Still, there is knowledge gap with the existing literature; because it is too much scanty, unpublished and did not cover areas of the drivers, Challenges and even its implications for the Horn of African region. In addition, there is also a controversy among some scholars and politicians on the very existence of this transition. Therefore, this study will contribute in identifying and highlighting the problems with this new transition, drivers, challenges and its regional implications for the Horn of Africa and tries to fill gaps apparent in some of the previous knowledge and going to critically analyze the transition in light of opening, breakthrough and consolidation phase of transition.

1.3. Core argument of the Study

The central argument of this study is that, the 2018 new political transition in Ethiopia is driven by different factors and facing different complex challenges per se. Furthermore, this political transition has also a regional implication for the Horn of Africa and IGAD member states. According to different literatures, people's protest movements that emanate from socio-economic and political problems brought political transitions and changes across the world. These political transitions phase different challenges; some of it overcome those problems and consolidated and some of it failed to reversion. Ethiopia is also not out of this reality; it faces challenges and passed through history of failures. For instance, the 1974 political transition from Imperial regime to *derg* and 1991 political transition from *derg* to EPRDF were failed to reversion without achieving its initial promises of democratization and democracy. This is because of the method of the transition, political culture, and other socio-economic problems.

Thus, the 2018 ongoing political transition is facing challenges of uncivilized political culture within the political elite and severe socio-economic problems. However, as an opportunity, it has started by the reform over revolutionary/overthrow method of political transition which makes it unique from the past political transitions took place in Ethiopia. Therefore, even if it is at its

opening phase, the 2018 political transition in Ethiopia can achieve its desired objective of consolidation, if care is given for the problems touched above. This in turn has both positive and negative implications for the Horn of Africa region and IGAD member states.

1.4. Objectives of the Study

1.4.1. General Objective

The general objective of this study is to examine political transition in Ethiopia since 2018 its drivers, challenges and its regional implications for the Horn of Africa and IGAD as regional organ.

1.4.2. Specific Objectives

In the light of the above-mentioned general objective, this study seeks to deal with the following specific objectives.

- Examine the historical evolution and concept of political transition in Ethiopia;
- Analyze the major causes, drivers and changes of the new political transition of 2018 in Ethiopia;
- Point out the most important challenges which negatively affect the ongoing reforms not to consolidate;
- Assess the regional perspective of the new transition and reflect on its implications toward the Horn of African region and IGAD

1.5. Research Questions

Based on the research problem and the aforementioned general and specific objectives, the central question of the study is being the following

1.5.1. Core Research Question

Is there a new political transition in Ethiopia, and what are its drivers, challenges and its implications for the Horn of African region and IGAD?

1.5.2. Specific Research Questions

- What are concepts and historical evolution of political transition in Ethiopia?
- What are the causes and drivers that brought the new political transition in Ethiopia?

- What are challenges that threaten its consolidation phase?
- What are the implications of the new transition for IGAD and the Horn of African region?

1.6. Methodology and Methods of Data Collection

1.6.1. Approach of the Study

This study examines and gives reflection on “The 2018 Political Transition in Ethiopia” its causes, drivers, changes, challenges and its implications for the Horn Africa and IGAD as regional organ. To appropriately address the research problem and achieve its core objective, the study employed qualitative research approach. For the reason that, qualitative research approach is more vital to gather a wide range of data from multiple sources, and deliver an explanatory and all-inclusive understanding of the subject under investigation (Creswell, 2007).

1.6.2. Methods of Data Collection

The study used both primary and secondary source of data which was depended on three different kinds of sources; these are: interviews/discussions, documents and academic works. Accordingly, for the collection of primary data, the study employed method of key informant interviewing through semi-structured interview with open-ended questions. My key informants were from among federal officials in Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), leaders of governing and opposition political parties, youths, civil society organizations, African Union (AU) political experts, scholars, Diaspora, bloggers, well known activists and community elders and elites. This thesis also utilized secondary source of data to substantiate the primary data. The secondary data gathered from different public records such as official documents like reports, plans, and minutes, books, journal articles, and periodicals, through qualitative documentary analysis in order to achieve its core and specific objectives.

1.6.3. Data Analysis and Interpretation

The data collected through key-informant interviews, focus group discussion and document analysis is largely qualitative. Accordingly, the study employed qualitative method of data analysis. In analyzing the data, an inductive, recursive and interactive analysis is used to “build [...] patterns, categories, and themes from the “bottom-up,” by organizing the data into increasingly more abstract units of information” (Creswell, 2007: 38).

1.7. Ethical Consideration

Research ethics is one of the very important part in establishing trustworthiness and credibility of the study (Creswell, 2003). Thus, the researcher will embrace and respect necessary research ethics such as confidentiality, impartiality and/or personal judgment which guarantee the credibility and reliability of any study.

1.8. Significance of the Study

Political transition is important for all-rounded human development which needs high management. For proper management of political transition, it is very much important to know what transition is, its causes, drivers, challenges and even its implications. Accordingly, this study will have academic significance in the study of “New Political Transition in Ethiopia?” specifically its driving forces, challenges, and its implications for the Horn of African region. It will also suggest some scientific way out for concerned policy issues and serve as basis for further research.

1.9. Scope of the Study

As the general objective of the study is to examine the new transition in Ethiopia, its drivers, challenges and its regional implications for the Horn of Africa, the study is delimited to issues of political transition, its process and concepts to understand the new political transition in Ethiopia. Furthermore, the study will also specifically focus on the drivers, challenges and its implication for the Horn of Africa region.

While conducting this thesis, some challenges were faced during data collection. The significant challenges were Covid-19 which limits contacts with key informants to make an interview and focus group discussion during data collection phase. Due to this reason, the researcher has put it into a time management problem. Another challenge was the refusal and lack of permission for interview from concerned individuals, and institutions. Finally, requests to record voice or permissions for documents were refused at some offices and embassies. However, the researcher has overcome the aforementioned problems by using the available opportunity, techniques, and programs that help to acquire the necessary data for this study. Henceforth, the overall constraints were managed by the researcher's own, and some of the others also solved by the cooperation of individuals who positively responded to the quest by the investigator.

1.10. Organization of the Study

This study is organized into 5 chapters. To begin with, the first chapter is an introductory section. Thus, the introductory section offers and describes a general background to the problem that this research examines. Notably, it puts a statement of the problem the research objectives, research questions and the core argument that guides this study. Further, it gave an outline of the research method in terms of methods and procedures of data collection and analysis technique employed in this research, scope, significance, limitations, and ethical considerations of the study. The second chapter provides a conceptual and analytical framework for the study of the research problem. The third chapter provides a brief historical background to political transition in Ethiopia from modern to contemporary period with the emphasis on political dynamics from one regime to another. The fourth and fifth chapters respectively present an analysis on the new political transition in Ethiopia: drivers, challenges and its Implications on the Horn of Africa and IGAD as regional organ with general conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

2. POLITICAL TRANSITION: CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

2.1. Introduction

To start with, the central issues that this thesis examines are twofold. First, the thesis will analyze, the drivers of Ethiopia's new political transition. Second, it carefully examines the impacts of Ethiopia's transition on the peace and security of the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter is to develop conceptual and theoretical framework aimed at investigating political transition.

The term 'transition' or regime transition refers to "the interval between one political regime and another; which could be the interval between an authoritarian polity and a democratic one, or an authoritarian polity and another authoritarian polity" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986:6). According to different scholars, the transfer of power is a key element in defining the process of democratic transition; in addition to political authority being derived from the free decision of an electorate (Linz 1990; Przeworski 1986; Welsh, 1994). Transition also denotes to "the intermediate phase that begins with the disbanding of an old regime and ends with the establishment of a new one" (Linz, 1990:148). Democratic transitions consist of two simultaneous but to some extent autonomous processes: a process of dissolution of the authoritarian regime and a process that leads to the emergence of democratic institutions (Przeworski 1986; Welsh 1994). Therefore, a political transition is defined as the interlude amid the demise of one political system and the installment of a new one; that ultimately entails regime change, which in turn bring about a procedural, ideological and/or behavioral change (Shain and Linz, 1995; Munck, 1996).

According to Guillermo O'Donnell (1988:59), "after the demise of authoritarian regime, there are two types of transition; one is a transition to democracy, and then a transition to a consolidated democracy." In relation to this, other scholars like Hagopian and Mainwaring (1987:485) argued that, "another possibility is to distinguish between a democratic government and a democratic regime". To illustrate these scholars continued, regime of course, "is a broader concept than government and refers to the rules that govern the interactions of the major actors in the political system". Indeed, the notion of regime involves institutionalization, i.e., the idea that such rules

are widely understood and accepted, and that actors pattern their behavior accordingly. According to these scholars, therefore, transition to consolidated democracy is different from; transition to democracy in its criteria of institutionalization of democratic principles; competitive elections must be the principal route to political office, citizenship, civil liberty for all, and a relatively uncensored press which resulted in building democratic regime[which signifies democratic wave](Karl, 1986 and Seligson,1987). Thus, the use of the word “transition” to refer “to a change in political regime is relatively new because most political scientists were focused on how democracy can be preserved and strengthened where it already exists, mainly in North America and Western Europe” (Rustow, 1970:337). This was, however, “changed after processes of democratization were unleashed in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Southern and East Central Europe” (Casper and Tylor, 1996:1).

2.2. Political Transition: Liberalization and Democratization

In understanding democratic political transition, it is essential to make an analytic distinction between liberalization and democratization. Liberalization is a controlled partial opening of the political space on political and civil rights from above; such as releasing political prisoners, opening up some issues for public debate, loosing censorship, freedom of press, speech, association and the like, but short of choosing a government through freely competitive elections (Winckler, 1984;O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Chou and Nathan, 1987). On the other hand, Sujana (1995) defines that:

Democratization is release from the non- democratic regime and constitution, which is a process that subjects different groups to competition, regularizes transfer of power, and institutionalizes the pluralist political structures and the procedures by which different groups compete to win or withdraw from the power. To point out, liberalization may precede democratization and become a feature of transition; but it does not involve a process essential to the transition to democracy, namely a transfer of power, the abdication of power, or the take-over of power by some groups willing to open the doors to democratic political process or ready to over power to those would do so (Sujana, 1995:72).

Arguing on political liberalization, most authors have focused on elite processes, especially those within the authoritarian regime. Thus, many scholars contend that “liberalization begins with

divisions within the authoritarian coalition and its military” (Przeworski, 1986; Stepan, 1988; Kaufman, 1986). In addition, other scholars state that, “the elite groups find a liberal regime to be the most appropriate and useful manner of organizing political life under the present circumstances” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). In some cases, “the schisms that precede liberalization begin because of the failures of authoritarian regimes”. In others, “they begin because of a paradox of success; major successes convince authoritarian elites that they have little to lose by opening the political system, and a good deal to gain: international and domestic legitimacy” (Chalmers and Robinson, 1982: 5). Moreover, with the current emphasis on splits within authoritarian coalitions as a starting point in processes of political liberalization, exclusive attention to internal tensions can lead to neglecting the impact of opposition actors in general, including mass mobilization. And, most transitions involve complex interactions between regime and opposition forces from a relatively early stage (Smith, 1987).

Another important point about liberalization and democratization is that, in a nondemocratic setting, liberalization may entail a mix of policy and social changes, such as less censorship of the media, somewhat greater space for the organization of autonomous working-class activities, the introduction of some legal safeguards for individuals such as *habeas corpus*, the releasing of most political prisoners, the return of exiles, perhaps measures for improving the distribution of income, and most important, the toleration of oppositions (Stepan, 1998). On the other hand, democratization entails liberalization but is a wider and more specifically political concept. To make clear, “democratization requires open contestation over the right to win control of the government, and in-turn requires free competitive elections, the results of which determine who governs”. Using these definitions, it is obvious that there can be liberalization without democratization (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:7-11).

Indeed, understanding the concept of liberalization and democratization enables to understand what constitutes a completed democratic transition. Consequently, first, transitions may begin that are never completed, even though a new authoritarian regime does not assume power. Our definition helps guard against the “electoral fallacy,” that is, “that a necessary condition of democracy, free elections, is seen as a sufficient condition of democracy” (Drake and Silva, 1986:10-20).

Second, there is also the need to reach an agreement on the specific institutional arrangement for the production of democratic government. Disagreements among democrats over such issues as a unitary versus a federal state, a monarchical or republican form of government, or the type of electoral system may create questions about the legitimacy of the emerging democratic government, the decision making process, and indeed the future of the political system. Such institutional indeterminacy about core procedures necessary for producing democracy may not only leave the transition incomplete, but also postpone any consolidation of democracy. It does not mean that there cannot be disagreement about the most desirable democratic institutions early in the transition and in the constitution making process. Such disagreement is normal; but a deep and continuous confrontation and ambivalence about democratic institutions among the political elites and the majority of the population, with no sign of accommodation to the enacted institutions, is certainly not conducive to consolidation. It is, therefore, disagreement not only about the value of democracy but also about the specific institutions of a democracy that might make consolidation difficult (Linz and Stepan, 1996).

Consequently, based on the above scholarly established facts, the current political transition in Ethiopia that started since 2018 is at the stage of political liberalization with some progress towards democratization. Due to people protest movement since 2014-2018, liberalization begins with divisions within the authoritarian EPRDF coalition, which led to the emergence of liberal reformers. These liberal reformers called “team lemma” came from OPDO and ANDM, have released different political prisoners, closed a notorious prison camp known as ‘*Maekelawi prison*’, pardoned exiled armed opposition movements, legalized opposition groups long classified as terrorists and encouraged the return of exiles, revised repressive laws, and opened political space; which signifies political liberalization with short of choosing a government through freely competitive elections (Paulos, 2019).

2.3. Phases of Political Transition

According to Samuel Huntington’s “transition paradigm”, political transition can occur through any of three methods of change. These are: “reform/transaction/transformation, compromise/trans-placement/extrication and overthrow/regime defeat/replacement/sometimes called revolution” (Huntington, 1991:114; Mainwaring, 1989:26; Mainwaring and Share, 1986:175; Schmitter, 1991: 275; Shain and Linz, 1995: 53-55). To illustrate, the first modality

transformation/reform assumes a transition triggered by the existing regime, which introduces changes that end authoritarian rule and pave the way for democracy to emerge. In this model, the authoritarian elite retain a significant hold of political power and determine the choices of the new democracy will have to make (Schmitter, 1991).

The second modality compromise/ trans placement arises from a special condition affecting both the old regime and the opposition groups. That is to say that the two actors are equally matched and come to the realization that they need each other to lead the political transition. Therefore, they reach a compromise, which may take the form of a Peace Agreement, if the country is facing a civil war, and together initiate the transition. As pointed out, the level of power still retained by the old regime will be a critical factor in the political transition and will heavily condition it which is featured by negotiation between government and opposition (Shain and Linz, 1995).

The last modality, overthrow/ replacement, ends to occur in cases of authoritarian regimes that have opposed reforms, where the opposition groups have grown so strong as to bring down the authoritarian regime. The most important implication of transition by overthrow is that the new ruling forces will have the widest choice in directing it and occur through military defeat of the incumbent (Shain and Linz, 1995).

Therefore, to make clear, Huntington finds that in the third wave, whatever the type of the authoritarian regime and he proposes a four-category typology (viz. one party states, military regimes, personal dictatorships, racial oligarchy) only a small minority democratized by way of “replacement”. The overwhelming majority of transitions were elite driven by various combinations of government/opposition action or negotiation (Huntington, 1991). Huntington's description of the typical trans-placement process remains particularly accurate and remarkable. First, “government and opposition leaders perceived a stand-off and began to explore the possibilities of a negotiated transition”; then always the process was “marked by a go up and down, back and forth of strikes, protests and demonstrations on the one hand and repression, jailing's, police violence, state of siege and martial law on the other" (*ibid*: 153) before the trans-placement actually occurs.

Moreover, the “transition paradigm” points to three phases on which, more often than not, democratization appears to build: opening/liberalization, breakthrough/democratization and consolidation. Being that, the opening phase is the stage through which the political transition itself begins and coincides, according to the above categorization, with a reformist move usually promoted by the governmental authority. The opening phase in the process of democratic political transition is also, a period of democratic ferment and political liberalization in which cracks appear in the ruling dictatorial regime, with the most prominent fault line being that between hard-liners and soft-liners (Carothers, 2002:7).

The second phase in the process of political transition is the phase coincides with the collapse of the old regime and the establishment of a new democratic government that acquires power following a precise political path. That is, the conduct of national elections, the enactment of a new constitution, the establishment of a new democratic institutional structure (*ibid*). Subsequent to political transition comes consolidation, a slow but purposeful process in which democratic forms are transformed into democratic substance through the reform of state institutions, the regularization of elections, the strengthening of civil society, and the overall habituation of the society to the new democratic “rules of the game”(O’Donnell, and Schmitter, 1986:48-56). Thus, different Ethiopian political transitions, specially, the new one is not out of this process.

Therefore, both past political transitions in Ethiopia, from imperial regime to military dictatorship of 1974 and from military regime to EPRDF in 1991 took place through replacement or overthrow method of political transition. However, the new ongoing political transition which opened in 2018 is different from both of them; because it is taking place through reform/transformation methods of political transition.

The Traditional Doctrine of political transition constitutes a foremost analytical endeavor conceived to systematize in rigorous and well-defined conceptual framework of democratic political transition; the intense political developments occurred in the last quarter of the twentieth century, efficaciously portrayed by Huntington as the “Third Wave” of democracy. Therefore, in this thesis I scrutinize the “new political transition in Ethiopia” in the context of a “transitology” model also known as the “transition paradigm,” popularized in the 1990s as a universal paradigm for understanding democratization (Huntington, 1991-1992:582; Rustow, 1970: 357; Carothers, 2002:8; Gans-Morse, 2004:322). Hence, by drawing on the works of

Dankwart Rustow and Samuel P. Huntington's scholarship, I attempt to develop 'political transition' as a guiding framework.

In fact, my goal here is not to test a model but to stress the need for a programmatic approach toward understanding the "new political transition in Ethiopia" through descriptive and explanatory manner. That is, the 'what, why and how' of the drivers, challenges and its implications for the Horn of Africa can be answered by this context. Therefore, in the following sections, a brief discussion on the relevance terms of transition will be made. From there, I develop the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study.

2.4. Transition: Patterns and Methods

Political transition is habituated by its own nature; although the nature and circumstances vary from one country to another as to the direction of the change; two basic patterns in the modes of transition to democracy were identified (Share and Mainwaring, 1986; Alves, 1988; Huntington, 1991; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Munck and Leff, 1997). According to these Scholars, "transition from above or elite driven transition occurs when functioning rulers respond to an impending or actual crisis by initiating democratic reform"(Diamond, 1989:24). And, "transitions from below or mass driven transition occur when there are mounting popular pressures from the people resulting in national conferences, popular revolutions, coups d'état, or pact formations, all with the goal of moving toward a more democratic society" (Alves and Moreira, 1988:47).

In addition, "transitions from above are more promising in terms of their ability to deliver democracy, because they tend to be more specific about their time frame, procedural steps and overall strategy" (Karl, 1990:122). And "transitions from below are said to be plagued with a great deal of uncertainty" (Alves, 1988). There is also another idea that contends that every historical case of regime change has involved some negotiation explicit or implicit, overt or covert between government and opposition groups. Transitions may also begin as one type and become another, particularly if the government is uncertain of how far it wants to go in opening up the country. In many cases, however, "they combine elements of the two transition processes" (Diamond, 1989:26).

Therefore, the above transition concept is important to understand the method and nature of different political transitions Ethiopia, including the current one. For instance, the transition from

imperial regime of Haile Selassie to *Derg* military regime of 1974 and the transition from *Derg* military regime to Federal EPRDF regime of 1991 were the sum of both transition from above and transition from below. To illustrate, during the regime of Haile Selassie there was people's revolution from below and this resulted in the cleavage in the military those support the revolution. This military officers, organize themselves and overthrew the Haile Selassie regime with the people's pressure from outside (Bahru, 1991; Andargachew, 1993; Gebru, 2009; Merera, 2011). The same is true, for the new ongoing political transition which is at its opening phase is also the result of protest movement for equality and justice erupted in different regions in Ethiopia against the TPLF-led EPRDF regime from below. And this in turn has created internal party fissure and paved the way for the emergence of liberal reformer/soft-liners from above those support the people's movements (Mululem, 2018).

Thereafter, according to one scholar, there are two different methods of transition in which the transition process took place in different countries of the world including Ethiopia; these are "negotiated transition method and non-peaceful transition method" The term 'negotiated transition' signifies a peaceful transition and is non-violent that negotiated in the sense that the existing government agrees to meet with the opposition elements to discuss and implement the goals of the transition; whereas, non-peaceful transition method refers to the vice-versa (Alemante, 1992:209).

In view of that, different political actors and parties are involved in the process to ensure that the new system represents the will of all the people. While the purpose of the negotiation is to arrange a new political order, the parties agree that the institutions of the existing government will remain in place and be refashioned only to the extent necessary to carry out the country's new objectives. "This approach avoids the necessity of building a new government from the ground up and is especially useful when the existing institutions are readily adaptable to the form of the new government" (*ibid*:211).

After the parties negotiate and agree that the existing institutions can be manipulated to accommodate the transitional government, the next step is to create the rule of the game that is the new constitution. The decision to amend a pre-existing constitution or adopt a new one could profoundly affect the dynamics of the new state. It is a choice that implicates the relationship between the old ruling party and the new government, the allocation of power within the new

government itself, or between the center and the component units of the state. This decision was faced different countries of our earth; best example for this is decision faced by the Czech and Slovak republics in December 1990 (Eric, 1992).

In addition, another important subject the new government must address is the extent to which it will allow the existing institutions to dictate the character of the new system. “When the old regime's constitution is merely amended to reflect the changes of the new political system, the tendency is for institutions to change only in ways which those institutions themselves permitted” (Ulrich, 199:112).

The second method is the non-peaceful method of transition. A non-peaceful or forced transition is an expression of revolutionary forces unfamiliar to democratic ideology. The usurpers of state power deny the existing government of its authority and embody their political agenda in a constitution that perpetuates their power. The resulting relationship is one in which the rulers proclaim their right to govern, disregarding that the ruled have neither consented nor recognized a duty to obey. This kind of transition took place, most of the time in regime defeat through revolutionary way [as occurred in Ethiopia during the overthrow of *derg* regime by EPRDF in 1974] (Harold, 1991).

On the whole, in Ethiopia since its formation as a modern state, there is no complete and consolidated democratic political transition. For example, *derg* and EPRDF transitions had this history of reversion; because, they failed to achieve their initial promises of democracy and democratization (Bahru, 1991; Alemante, 1992; Young, 1996; Henze, 2000; Merera, 2011). Both transitions took place through what Huntington called “replacement/overthrow” or non-peaceful method of transition (Huntington, 1991). However, if it succeeds, the new ongoing political transition in Ethiopia is relatively a negotiated/peaceful transition which taking place through ‘reform/transformation’ method of political transition (ibid).

2.5. Political Transition and Waves of Democratization

To start with, Huntington (1991:15) coined the term a wave of democratization to refer “the political transitions of a group of countries from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time.” A wave also usually involves liberalization or partial democratization in political systems that do not become fully democratic. Thus, “three waves of

democratization have occurred in the modern world; each wave affected a relatively small number of countries and during each wave some regime transitions occurred in a nondemocratic direction” (Gurr, et al, 1990:88). To be clear, in waves of democratization, transition toward democratic political system which is termed as “wave of democratization” and transition toward non-democratic regime [reverse wave of democratization] occurred in different regions of the political realm (Huntington, 1991). In what follows, the three waves are going to be discussed briefly to understand why, how and what explains them.

2.5.1. The First Wave of Democratization, 1828-1926

The theory and principle of wave is interlinked with political transition. This connection helps to understand what, why, and how political transition happened through waves of democratization. The First wave of democracy began in the early 19th century when democracy triumphed over non-democratic regime in different parts of the world. This wave of democracy resulted from people’s revolution, student protest, and mass movement toward democracy; due to lack of freedom, democracy, and equality. The major geopolitical disorders of the twentieth Centurythe two World Wars and the Soviet Collapse each produced powerful, globe-spanning waves of democratic reform (Gunitsky, 2017).

Thus, the primary factors responsible for the first wave of democratization appear to be was motivated by the territorial claims, economic and social development, the economic and social environment of Europe, and the victory of the Western Allies in World War I and the resulting breakup of the principal continental empire (Huntington, 1991). Moreover, this wave is termed as “vertical wave which resulted from major wars or imperial collapses trigger dramatic cascades of institutional reforms by changing the material or ideological opportunities for reform and rebellion” (Gunitsky, 2018:637).

As a result of revolution and rebellion against domination and injustice, reforms and political transition took place in different western countries, this was created democratic waves through snowballing or demonstration effects (Huntington, 1991). In this wave, election/ universal suffrage through plural voting and secret ballot which was granted expanded voting rights to previously excluded groups like women and working-class men with the development of democratic institutions like elected independent parliaments, civil liberties in the western region of the world (Sunshine, 1972; Huntington, 1991; Gunitsky, 2018). Furthermore, the defeat of

autocratic monarchs by democratic states created both material and ideological opportunities for the spread of democratic institution which marked democratic transitions in many countries especially in the west (ibid). This, wave continued until “the great depression and the rise of fascism in Europe” (Gates, et al, 2003:6), this followed by the first reverse wave.

2.5.2. The first reverse wave, 1922-1942

The word ‘reverse wave’ refers to the antithesis of the democratic wave which is going in opposite direction of democratization. In support of this, “the leading political change of the 1920s and the 1930s was the shift away from democracy and either the return to traditional forms of authoritarian rule or the introduction of new mass-based, more brutal and pervasive forms of totalitarianism” (Huntington, 1991:17). As a result of military coups, military takeovers and military intervention in politics democratic institutions were eroded and democracy was ended in different countries in Europe (ibid). Thus, the reverse wave of democratization refers to the transition from democracy to non-democratic regime. This transition from democracy to non-democratic regime has tripartite distinction among democratic regime breakdown, hybridization, and loss of democratic quality (Erdmann, 2011).

The rise of fascism, communism, and militaristic ideology that paved the way for the antidemocratic movements which highly affected the democratic institutions those built in the first wave of democratization; this in turn led to democratic regime breakdown or reverse wave of democratization and political transition from democracy to autocracy (Huntington, 1991; Gates, et al, 2003; Erdmann, 2011). Therefore, the reverse wave is characterized by democratic breakdown,

In Ethiopian case, as a result of the spread of socialism, the *derg* regime came to power in 1974, by the revolution and military coup against the imperial regime with some good promises at the initial phase. However, the initial promises of the *derg* were failed and after the cold war as a result of the triumph of capitalism and ideological shift in the Soviet Union, the EPRDF came to power in 1991 (Merera, 2011; Semahagn, 2014). And again, the EPRDF also after 2001 to 2018, democratic institutions became eroded and broke down which resulted in democratic reversion to authoritarian regime which implies political transition is not a one direction process; and it is “a transition from free to partly free, from partly free to no-free or it is a process from no free to free or partly free” (Cassani, et al, 2016:8).

2.5.3. The Second Wave of Democratization, 1943-1962

This second wave of democracy was relatively brief and resulted from World War II. Most of the countries that transitioned to democracy in this wave fall into one of three categories. First, the victorious democratic Western Allies imposed democracy on a number of countries, second, many other countries moved in a democratic direction because the Western Allies had won the war, and third, the weakening of the Western states by the war and the rising nationalism in their overseas colonies led them to initiate the process of decolonization (Huntington, 1991; Gates, et al, 2003). Therefore, this wave was stemmed from major disruptions to the international system/ international systemic shock which is called ‘vertical wave’ (Gunitsky, 2018).

Indeed, political and military factors were clearly predominant in the second wave of democratization, because, the victory of the established Western democracies in World War II and decolonization by those democracies after the war were thus largely responsible for the second wave (Huntington, 1991; Gates, et al, 2003). This wave of democratization characterized by the end of military dictatorships, inauguration of democratic institutions, the transition from authoritarian regime to democracy, and popularly chosen governments. As a result, many post socialist states from Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa began life as a democracy (Huntington, 1991); however, some of the states in this wave were not stayed with democracy and their democratic process was eroded. This followed by the second reverse wave.

2.5.4. The second reverse wave, 1958-1975

As any reverse wave, the second reverse wave was also caused by the fragile nature of the political institutions created in the wake of international systemic shocks. Due to this, “in the late 1950s, political development and regime transitions were taking on a heavily authoritarian cast” (Emerson, 1960:18). The military intervened to alter the results of an election and overthrew civilian governments by military coup especially in Latin America which was led to of a new type of political system known as “bureaucratic authoritarianism” (O'Donnell, 1973).

Martial laws, military coup, the legitimation of semi-authoritarian regime by election, and emergency rule were among the causes of the second reverse wave notably in Asia. In this continent there were many autocratic states, this in turn has neighborhood affects as surrounded by autocracies. These repressive acts of those authoritarian regimes were weaken democratic institutions and silenced any kind of democratic political discourse (Cheng, 1989; Gates, et al,

2003). Further, military coup and military overthrow of the civilian government was also significant feature of the second reverse wave in the Mediterranean area and Africa after independence. After independence, multiple authoritarian new states were emerged because of their weak democratic institutions. Due to these, the second reverse wave of democratization was termed as “the global swing away from democracy” or “negative transitions” (Finer, 1976:223; Verba, 1976:6; Gates, et al, 2003:13).

This implies the weak democratic institutions vulnerable for undemocratic way of taking political power which hampered democratic consolidation. In line with this reality, Ethiopia had not built strong genuine democratic institutions for almost centuries. This is why it always fails to make consolidated democratic political transition. Therefore, for the success and consolidation of the new political transition in Ethiopia, due attention should be given for building strong impartial democratic institutions.

2.5.5. The Third Wave of Democratization, 1974 to around 1990

According Huntington, (1991:41), as defined above, democratic wave is the transition of countries from authoritarian to democratic regimes. Thus, in different parts of the world, different types of non-democratic regimes like: “one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships, and the racial oligarchy was transited from authoritarianism to democracy”. The causes of third wave of democratization and the transition from the above listed type of authoritarian regimes were: decrease of legitimacy of authoritarian regimes due to increased popular expectation of periodic and competitive election, poor economic performance or military failure, economic modernization, urbanization, education, demonstration effects and a rising middle class unleashes a constellation of social forces with the organizational capacity and education to press for democratic governance (Huntington, 1991; Gates, et al, 2003).

As a result of substantial liberalization occurred in authoritarian regimes, movement toward democracy, military withdrawals from politics, the collapse of military governments in different countries and regions, return from emergency rule to democratic path endorsement of new liberal constitutions, elections which produced a civilian government were the main features of the third democratization wave. This wave had covered different continents of the world like: Europe, Latin America, Asia, communist world (Soviet Union, East Germany, etc.), Middle East, and Africa in different degrees (Huntington, 1991). In the third wave of democratization, democratic

political transition from military to civilian government took place through liberalizing the politics, negotiations, expanding political participation, and competitive elections(*ibid*).

According to established literature, the waves of democratization and movements toward democracy were global one (Huntington, 1991; Gates, et al, 2003; Cassani, 2016; Gunitsky, 2018). However, “what unites the vast majority of waves is the presence of failure the tendency for democratic cascades to crest, collapse, and roll back [as a result of consolidation problems]” (Gunitsky, 2018:643). Thus, the third wave was also challenged by consolidation problem as a result of “systemic failures of democratic regimes to operate effectively for instance, inability to provide welfare, prosperity, equity, justice, domestic order, or external security could over time undermine the legitimacy of democratic government” (Huntington, 1991: 294). What’s more, “economic collapse, snowballing actions in other country, religious fundamentalism, and authoritarian nationalism are among many factors which lead to the third reverse wave” (*ibid*). And countries with strained class relations, ethnic tensions, low levels of economic development, and no history of democracy suddenly find themselves in the consolidation problem (Gunitsky, 2018: 643). Whatever the case, “shocks to the international system (such as global war), the birth of new states with weak institutions (often born out of such systemic shocks), and political neighborhood effects brought both democratic waves and reverse waves” (Gates, et al, 2003:10).

In sum, Huntington concludes that, “the democratization waves and the reverse waves suggest a two-step-forward, one-step-backward pattern; [because] each reverse wave has eliminated some, but not all of the transitions to democracy of the previous democratization wave” (1991: 294). Therefore, Ethiopia is one of the third wave countries between, 1974-1990; which Marxist-Leninist regimes produced by revolutions seemed determined to remain Marxist-Leninist regimes for long (*ibid*: 296). Further, Ethiopia also characterized with political transition some steps forward and some steps backward, due to lack of strong democratic institutions, geopolitical tensions of the horn region and GERD development, ethnic tensions, and low levels of economic development, authoritarian political culture, and systemic failures to provide welfare, prosperity, equity, and justice. Even if its future is uncertain, the new ongoing political transition in Ethiopia since 2018 is a result of these problems and it is facing the same challenges which the countries of both democratic waves and reverse waves were faced.

2.6. Theoretical Framework to Political Transition

Political transition theories, as theoretical models, have been influenced theoretical frameworks drawn from social science disciplines such as system theory, political culture theory, decision theory, modernization theory, structural-functionalism and institutionalism. Different theoretical approaches to transition theory have provided various analytical frameworks for comparative analysis of regime transition across region, and identified factors or variables to explain outcomes of particular transformations that have occurred in different countries under different circumstances (Pinkney, 2007). However, “theoretical approaches to democratic political transition have not presented any coherent or elaborate body of work” (Pridham and Vanhanen, 1994:2). In fact, transition theory, tended to “diverge” between different schools of thought. Thus, Helga A. Welsh notes that:

Some scholarly attention initially focused on the various causes of regime change, while other placed major emphasis on such prerequisites for democratization as socio-economic development, political culture, and the role of civil-society. More recently, the comparability of regime transitions in the former soviet bloc to those in other regions of the world has been given greater attention (Welsh, 1994:379).

Another scholar, Adam Przeworski points out that, “studies in democratic political transition can be loosely grouped in to two categories: studies that focus on the objective conditions of regime transformation and studies that concentrate on political strategies and choices” (Przeworski, 1991:95-99). However, this thesis attempts to categorize major studies in the rich literature on democratic political transition in to four (4) theoretical approaches: “structure-oriented approach, process oriented approach, institutional context oriented approach and political economy approach” (Sujian, 1999:134), to understand the why and how of the new ongoing political transition in Ethiopia that opened since 2018.

2.6.1. Structural Approach

To begin with, the structural approach is pioneered by Lipset, Almond, Moore, and others, dominated much of the political science scholarship on Latin America and Southern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. Structural approaches assume economic development, political culture, class conflict, social structures, and other social conditions can explain particular outcome of transition. These scholars were preoccupied with the level social conditions or socio-economic

and cultural pre-requisites of democracy and sought to explain the causes and effects of democracy and clarify the nature of their relationships. Their quantitative studies of large number of countries found a positive correlation between democracy and economic development or various facets of social development (Moore, 1966; Almond, 1963; Rueschemeyer, et al, 1992).

While Lipset, focused on:

The long run causal influence of the level of wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education on democratization, other writers emphasized the role of civic culture, class conflicts, interest groups and religions. There empirical studies generated debates over not only the prerequisites for, but also the level and stability of democracy (Lipset, 1959:69).

O'Donnell and Schmitter's earlier work, another structural approach sought to explain "the collapse of democracy by assuming an important connection between socio-economic and political structure and, accordingly, focusing on economic development and class conflict as principal explanatory variables" (O'Donnell, 1973:85). The common features of this studies by this group of scholars was the assumption that certain social and political structures must be in place before democracy can be inaugurated (Dahl,1961; Lijphart,1968; Rustow,1970).

Thus, structural approach enables to understand the causes and challenges of the current ongoing political transition in Ethiopia. This theory argued that, lack of democratic political culture, lack of economic development which leads to poverty and unemployment, and education on democratization challenges democratic political transition and democratization. At the same time these are also the causes of political transition which is a reality in the ongoing political transition in Ethiopia.

2.6.2. Strategic Choice Approach

The strategic choice approach constituted a great challenge to the structural perspectives. This approach concentrated on the interaction of elite strategic choices as possible explanations for the success or failure of democratic transition. The proponents of this approach focused on the micro level, the critical role of elites and their strategic choices, the splits within the authoritarian regime, and the compromise between "the soft liners" and "hard liners" (Linz, 1978). Their studies emphasized on the autonomy of political processes rather than the economic determinants

of political change. Elite calculations, strategic choices, and the interaction between choices were viewed as decisive in determining political outcomes and whether or not democratic transition would occur at all, although they did not deny the importance of economic factors (ibid).

This approach was later joined by O'Donnell and Schmitter's often cited four volumes of transition from authoritarian rule, in which they shifted their positions away from the structural perspective. Their studies emphasized the critical role of elite and their strategic choice and the compromise between the "soft-liners" and "hard-liners", and argued that "elite character, calculations, and pacts" "largely determine whether or not an opening [to democracy] will occur at all" (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:19).

The central concern of this group of scholars was the process of transition rather than structural conditions. Guiseppe di Palma, Juan Linz and Alfred Stephan gave special attention to the process of "democratic crafting" involving "negotiated agreements" between ruling elites and opposition elites that moved common perceptions of "self-interest" toward accepting democracy as the best possible regime form under given conditions (Linz and Stephan, 1986; Guiseppe di Palma, 1990). He also argued that the game between ruling elites and opposition elites could be converted in to a positive sum game, if the right steps in the process of regime transition were undertaken. Therefore, skillful crafting and tactical devices of transition were important in facilitating the transition process (Kitschelt, 1992).

Strategic choice approach argues that, the interaction of elite strategic choices, critical role of elites, the splits within the authoritarian regime, and the compromise between "the soft liners" and "hard liners for the success or failure of democratic transition. Therefore, even if there is people's pressure from below, the current political transition in Ethiopia fits this theory; because, it is a result of the strategic interaction among and between OPDO and ANDM political elites from above as a result of the splits within the authoritarian EPRDF regime. Initially, there was also a kind of compromise between hard-liner/ stand patter TPLF and soft-liners/ liberal reformers called 'Team Lemma' which is the sum of OPDO and ANDM political elites.

2.6.3. Institutional Approach

The institutional approach emphasized on the impact of institutions on the formation of policies and patterns of political actions and stressed the role of institutions in shaping and constraining

the objectives and preferences of political actors. How the regime was institutionalized was seen as the explanatory variable for the variations in regime transition (March and Olsen, 1984; Krasner, 1988; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; O'Neil, 1996). Within this camp, some institutionalists concentrated on the changes in state-society relations that played a crucial role in democratic political transition. Civil society was the key factor for the collapse of the formerly communist country in Eastern Europe. Ali R. Abootalebi argued that, "so long as the state lingers as the ultimate center of power; the prospects for inauguration of democracy will remain minimal" (Abootalebi, 1995:508).

Other scholars focused on the links between the elite strategic choices and the "confined contexts" that determined the very parameters of political action and attempted to bridge the links between structures, institutions, and elite contingent choice by pointing out the limits of the two approaches. They argued that "the historically created, preexisting structures and institutions were the 'confining conditions' that determined the very parameters of political action" (Karl, 1990:6).

Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter argued that:

Elite strategic choice was contingent upon the confined contexts or conditions, which might or might not break with the past and lead to democracy. If the focus was placed solely upon strategic choice and interaction, the pattern would appear to be simply the result of skillful leadership, leading to excessively deterministic conclusions about democratic political transition. Instead, if the links between strategic choice and the confined contexts were underscored, one would be aware of how different contexts made such "state craft" of the transition more or less possible, and how the different arrangement "crafted" by key political actors during a regime transition produced different types of democratic regimes. This is because preexisting structures constituted "restricting conditions" that restricted or enhanced the choices available or determined the range of options available to political actors and even prepared them to choose a specific option. Therefore, political actors and their strategies, which were constrained by preexisting social, economic, and political structures, defined the basic property space within which political transitions could occur and the specific combination of the two defined which type of transition occur (Karl and Schmitter, 1991:272-74).

Still others tried to bridge the gap between the structural and strategic choice approach and demonstrated how the regime was institutionalized was the explanatory variable for the variations in transition. In his most recent study of Hungary, Patrick H. O'Neil employed institutional analysis to examine the transition from within the communist authoritarian regime and found strong correlation between institutional forms and the collapse of regime (O'Neil, 1996).

An institutional approach is used to understand the role of democratic institutions and shaping the actors in the transition process. As the strong impartial democratic institutions facilitate a good relation between state and society which have a great impact on the success of democratic political transition, weak democratic institutions are also negatively affect and challenge democratic political transition. This argument helps to understand how lack of strong democratic institutions, judiciary, and lack of strong civil society, skillful leadership and strong opposition political parties are challenging the new political transition in Ethiopia.

2.6.4. Political Economy Approach

The political economy approach emphasized the sequencing of political and economic reforms and the interplay between politics and economy as the explanatory variables determining variations in transition outcome with a particular attention to “dual transitions” from authoritarian rule to consolidated democracy (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997: 263). The central concern to this group of scholars is the effect of short-term economic conditions or the impact of economic crises on the terms of transition and nature of new political alignments (ibid). During the transition process, economic conditions affected the capacity of the ruling elites to determine the timing and nature of their withdrawal from authoritarianism, the economic and institutional legacies of the transition affected economic policy making in the new democratic regimes, and market oriented reforms and democracy could be reconciled and consolidated. One of the underlying assumptions was the correlation between the economic crises and regime change. Failure to overcome economic crises and manage the resulting distributive conflicts would increase the probability of the old regime being transformed; similarly, successful adjustment to economic crises and improvements of economic performance would increase the prospects for democratic consolidation (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995).

Moreover, political economy approach brought attention to the sequencing of economic and political reforms. Of central concern to students of dual transitions was how the sequencing of political and economic reforms influenced the prospects for democracy and economic restructuring, how the arrangements linking state and civil society could facilitate a favorable environment for social interaction, and how socioeconomic structure shaped policy preferences and social conflicts. Studies on these questions have provided insight in to the lessons about democratic transition and consolidation (Encarnacion, 1996; Bermeo, 1994; Haggard and Webb, 1994).

The political economy approach argues that, economic liberalization was pursued first as the expense of political liberalization, suggested that, after the economic reform strategy was put in to place, there was no guarantee that authoritarian elites would choose to carry through with political democratization. Instead, successful economic reforms might provide the excuse the regime to continue dictatorship. Many others formerly communist countries in the soviet bloc, cases in which economic and political reforms took place simultaneously suggested this explanation: despite the undeniable success of democratic transition, economic reforms in the fledgling democracies usually run into serious political difficulties not because of democracy but rather because of the absence of firm institutional structures of political representation that could bring strong party coalition to support economic reforms(Encarnacion, 1996). Once the costs of structural adjustment began to be felt by the public, a backlash against economic reforms set in. Most political parties distanced themselves from the reform programs and the new communist pledged to slow down privatization and restructuring. The Spanish model in which economic reforms took place after democracy was consolidated provides a more attractive path of political and economic change. The consolidation of democracy reduced the political risks of structural adjustment because, by the time economic reforms were implemented, the basic infrastructure of democracy was in place and democracy had been institutionalized and, with a parliamentary majority, political leadership was able to obtain party coalition support and focused their energies on economic reforms (Bermeo, 1994).

According to the political economy approach the interplay between politics and economy have a great impact on democratic political transition and consolidation. Accordingly, the domination and monopoly of political and socio-economic infrastructure by TPLF with its ideology of

revolutionary democracy was the cause of the current transition in Ethiopia. Heavy hand of TPLF led EPRDF in the economy, lack of economic reform/liberalization, the economic crises and failure to overcome economic crises aggravated people's protest movement which caused political transition. Still, these are the challenges against the new ongoing political transition which is at opening phase. Thus, solving the above listed problems help the successful and consolidation of democratic political transition in Ethiopia.

2.7. Conclusion

On the whole, this chapter examined the definitions of relevant concepts with political transition. Accordingly, it discussed the notion of transition as the interval between two types of government which could be authoritarian and democratic regime. Any transition started with some phenomenon and passed through different process to reach its consolidation phase. To point out, liberalization and democratization are very important concepts to understand political transition and its process. Thus, liberalization always explains the opening phase of democratic political transition; because, liberalization signifies opening political space and reforming the existing restricted rules and regulations with the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime; Whereas, democratization signifies the consolidation phase of political transition because it advocates fair, free and competitive election with full democratic values.

The chapter also discussed patterns and methods of transition to understand how political transition took place in different countries, including Ethiopia. Hence, there are two transition patterns which are transition from above and transition from below. Transitions from above took place by the rulers in power through initiating democratic reforms; whereas, transitions from below occur as a result of popular pressures from the people resulting in national conferences, popular revolutions, *coups d'état*, protests and pact formations. In addition, there also two methods of transition these are negotiated transition method and non-peaceful transition method which enables to understand the way political transition occur in a given country.

Another important point covered under this chapter is, the “transitology” model known as the “transition paradigm,” popularized in the 1990s as a universal paradigm for understanding democratization since the third wave of democratization. This model also envisages the modes of a political transition and submits that they are the following: reform/transformation, compromise/trans-placement and overthrow/replacement. Transformation or reform refers to a

top-down (elite-controlled) change from within government; whereas, transplacement/compromise signifies the negotiated reform of regime and government. And, replacement/overthrow is the regime breakdown (rupture) and the collapse of authoritarianism.

Moreover, the chapter also discussed three phases of political transition; these are opening phase, break through, and consolidation phase to conceptualize the process of political transition from its starts to its completion. Finally, this chapter was conversed the theoretical methods of political transition by denoting different approaches; structural approach, strategic choice approach, Institutional approach and political economy approach to get conceptual understanding of political transition. Therefore, this conceptual and theoretical framework will inform the empirical discussions in the coming chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

3. HISTORY OF POLITICAL TRANSITION IN ETHIOPIA FROM MODERN TO CONTEMPORARY PERIOD (1885-2018)

3.1. Introduction

To begin with, this chapter is going to give a brief back ground concerning history of political transition and changes in Ethiopia prior to 1991. Ethiopia has a strong claim to being one of the oldest countries in the world and known as Abyssinia (Henze, 2000; Prunier & Ficquet, 2015). This oldest independent country in Africa “is located in the Horn of Africa” (Bahru, 1991:1) Starting from the Da’amat State (ca. 500 BC-100 AD), followed by the advanced civilization of the Axumite Empire and finally the Era of the Princes, Ethiopia has existed within different patrimonial empires(Lappiso, 1989).

Present day Ethiopia is a land-locked state, “lies between the Equator and Tropic of Cancer, between the 30 N (Moyale) and 150N (Bademe) Latitude or 330 E (Akobo) and 480 E (Ogaden) Longitude” (Teferi Mekonnen et al, 2019:4). Further, having a total population of 112,078.73 people, Ethiopia is the second populous (next to Nigeria), and is the tenth largest (occupies an area of approximately 1,127,127 square km) African country; and is bordered by Sudan in the west, Eritrea in the north and north-east, Kenya in the south, Somalia in the south-east, and Djibouti in the east (WB, 2019; Bahru, 1991; Teferi Mekonnen et al, 2019). John Markakis (2003) portrays that, “the modern state of Ethiopia was created by the Abyssinian or Christian highland rulers largely through the twin process of political subjugation and economic exploitation in the 19th and early 20th C”(Markakis, 2003:1).

According to several scholars, ‘conventionally, the historical foundation of the ancient Ethiopian state goes back at least three thousand years (Teshale, 1995; Bahru, 1991; Tadesse, 1972). Mythology traces the origin of Ethiopia to the days of the Old Testament, and that of its kings of King Solomon of Israel and Queen Sheba of Ethiopia (10thC BC). This legend has been propagated by the church and state since long and helped as an influential source of legitimization by the Ethiopian royal family (Teshale, 1995, Solomon, 1993; Tadesse, 1972). In fact, the myth conferred upon the Ethiopian kings and emperors the traditional authority of a ‘mandate from heaven’ and so strengthened and sustained the symbolic relationship between

church and state; the two pillars of state-led nationalism in Ethiopia until the 1974 revolution that ended the imperial regime (Merera, 2003; Marcus, 2002).

In the past, “between, 1769-1855, the Abyssinian Empire becomes on its last legs and eventually ended to exist in all, but its name” (Keller, 1998:89). This was a period that comes to be known as the “Era of the princess” (*Zemene Mesafint*) provincialism among regional nobles reached crises proportions (Abir, 1968). Abyssinia was then only nominally a state, being ruled by different figurehead emperors during the period. After almost ninety years of political instability and lack of state cohesion, the end of *Zemene Mesafint* began with the rise of a regional war lord around 1853(Keller, 1998). Thus, the war started between the regional nobles and warlords in whom the war lords won the battle to reconstruct the Abyssinian state to its former unity and greatness. This marked the beginning of the modern Ethiopian Empire or the transition from fragmented traditional provinces to modern imperial state (Abir, 1968).

Typically, before 1974, political changes/transitions took place in the history of Ethiopian state. Consequently, three emperors Tewodros, Yohannis, and Menilik laid the foundation for the modern empire state of Ethiopia. To point out, Lij Kasa crowned Emperor Tewodros in 1885 and brought the era of princes to an end and brings one rule to divided territory of the north. He also attempted to bring the church under his control and reduce the power of regional leaders by establishing regional administration responsible to him (Bahru, 1991). Moreover, Tewodros also divided the greatly enlarged kingdom in to four major provinces and thirty-nine districts through reducing the power of regional leaders by establishing local administrations responsible to him. What is more, Tewodros made public that “his attention once and for all to break every threat to his mission, suppress Islam, abolish slavery, end the autonomy of provincial rulers of the era of princes, establish strong central government with standing army, and above all, reunite Ethiopia as a Christian empire” (Abir, 1980:142). Another key thing to add is, even if it lacks consistency and method, Tewodros’s reforms embrace social, cultural, administrative, and military reforms which enables him to secure his financial problems and absolute power over the regional lords of *zemene mesafint*. Most importantly, he also strongly argued that church would refrain from interfering in politics and the state would also leave spiritual matters to the church. In addition, he confiscated the property of most churches and distribute to the farmers which marked the

transition from old fragmented system of government or *zemenā mesafint* to the modern one (Adejumobi, 2007).

However, to the contrary, “church and most of the provincial nobles did not recognize his ambition for reforms and finally his reforms were reverted; Thus, Tewodros plans for the reunification and modernization of Ethiopia on unequal bases were not realized in his time and finally died in 1868” (Young, 1997:44). In conclusion, one may consider it as the transition between the traditional Abyssinia, and the modern Ethiopian state of today. Thereafter, the struggle for power of the time was won by Dejazmach Kasa Mercha from Tigray who took the name Emperor Yohannis IV in 1871 (Marcus, 1994).

Emperor Yohannes pursued the goal of unity initiated by Tewodros; however, his approach was decidedly different. “Unity was not to be achieved by overthrowing regional opponents, taming the Church, but instead by accepting a measure of cultural diversity and the existence of other centers of power, something which has been called ‘controlled regionalism’” with semi-autonomy; but still, did not end the cultural dominance of the Amhara and Amharigna remained the language of his court (Clapham, 1988: 229; Brass, 1991:8).

3.2. The Pre-1991 Imperial Transitions

This section of the chapter attempted to discuss and briefly describes the imperial transitions of Emperor Menelik-II, Lij Iyasu, and Emperor Haile Selassie-I by giving due emphasis to reforms taken place during their respective government.

3.2.1. Reforms during Emperor Menelik-II (1889-1913)

Following the death of emperor Yohannes II, Menelik, King of Shawa (1865-1889) and Emperor of Ethiopia (1889-1913), came to power (Adejumobi, 2007; Last, *etal*, 2013). Menelik succeeded in stretching the boundary of Ethiopia to its present configuration and over one-half of present-day Ethiopia was added under his reign (Markakis & Nega, 1978). In spite of his subjugation and exploitation of the south, Emperor Menelik-II took different measures and reforms throughout his reign; especially, in his modernization process. To point out, in political aspects, Menelik-II, administrative reforms took place by establishing permanent administrative structure and introduction of the ministerial system; which marked the transition from traditional to modern and European style political administration (Tekle Tsadik, 1983; Bahru, 1991). For

instance, “he appointed his most trusted generals as governor’s general of the provinces, which constituted the largest administrative division in the empire and below the governor of a province were the district governors” (Adejumobi, 2007:33). The district governors in turn appointed the heads of the lowest administrative divisions called *chika shum*, which consisted of either one large village or a cluster of small villages in the same general area. In addition, Garrisons, or *Ketema*, also became important administrative centers in the acquisition of new territories, especially in the Oromo and Somali areas (Bahru, 1991). Moreover, appointment of different ministers, establishment of modern state bureaucracy, the diplomatic corps, the nascent secularization of administrative institutions and re-structuring of Ethiopian Empire state to six administrative zones with two seats of judges for each zone (Tekle Tsadik, 1983; Adejumobi, 2007).

In social aspects, different modern public infrastructures were introduced. To give an illustration, health sector reform by introducing modern Hospital, introduction of modern education that open the door for European civilization, pipe water, electricity, hotel service and restaurants (Bahiru, 1991). According to some scholars, in terms of transportation and communication services he also introduced “modern road from Addis Ababa to Addis Alem, railway from Djibouti to Addis Ababa, modern bridges were erected in Addis Ababa, Awash, and Gojjam, the first motor car, postal service, telephone and telegraph machine”(Pankhurst, etal, 2013:55). Above all, “Menelik was able to change the negative perception of society toward hand craftsmen and allowed that citizens after six years of age should have to join the school” (Tekle Tsadik, 1983: 588). These marked the transition of social service and infrastructure from traditional to modern one.

In economic facet, in 1905, the first national bank, called the Bank of Abyssinia was established; the country’s first national currency was introduced; substantial expansion of the import-export trade and introduce the practice of paying taxes. These were greatly changed the pattern of traditional Ethiopian society which had laid the foundations for further development and modernization reforms (Tekle Tsadek 1983; Adejumobi, 2007; Robson, 2013). All in all, after the victory of Adwa during the era of Emperor Menelik-II Addis Ababa (Shewa) became the political and commercial center of the Empire state; international boundary of Ethiopia was delimited; trade, investment and diplomatic relations started with Europeans which opened the way for different modernization reforms (Merera, 2011).

Well known political scientist Samuel P. Huntington argued that, “human mortality is likely to ensure [regime] changes in some undemocratic regime...therefore, the death or departure from office of undemocratic leaders” pave the way for regime transition (Huntington, 1991:296). Accordingly, after suffering from illness and stroke, Menelik-II died in 1913; the death of both Menelik and the regent, Ras Bitwaddad Tasamma Nadaw, had created conducive environment for the reign of Lij Iyyasu, the son of Ras Mikael of Wollo as reformer (Bahru, 1991; Harold G., 1994).

3.2.2. The brief reign of Lij Iyasu (1910/11/13-1916)

In fact, “the end of the reign of Emperor Menelik-II and the reign of Iyasu were marked by great political, geopolitical, and cultural shifts in Ethiopian empire state which illustrate the adoption efforts of the monarchy to the unprecedented changes experienced by the kingdom”(Merera, 2011:64). Therefore, even if the reign of Lij Iyasu (1910-1916) was short, nonetheless, it was eventful which characterized, for a careful observer, by chains of incidents such as elements of social progress, factual disinformation, political treasury, and leadership inconsistencies to handle the affair of the country with maturity. This can be safely argued based on the major issues he raised some of which were not dreamt neither by his predecessor and nor by his successor as well. Among such major issues that of his reform were recognition of multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-cultural Ethiopia (Merera, 2011).

Accordingly, Lij Iyasu the reformist prince attempted different political and socio-cultural reforms. To demonstrate, progressive reforms undertaken by Lij Iyasu in political aspect were his attempt to bring political equality through integrating the periphery nationalities to the center of Ethiopian-empire state (Bahru, 1991; Teshale, 1995). Expressly, “Iyasu’s policy towards the Oromos, Somalis, Affars and Muslims was in the direction of charting a new path for the evolution of Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic, multi religious and multi-cultural polity” (Merera, 2011:16). This highly challenge the political supremacy of the stand patters shewan nobility those dominate the political center of Ethiopian empire state.

Socially, “Lij Iyasu had tried a reform to bring social equality by contacting all constituent and introduced religious equality, especially, between Muslim and Christian which challenged the religious supremacy of Orthodox Church as state religion over Muslim”(Ficquet, etal, 2014:42). And, to ensure, social security he introduced the institution of the municipal police force. Most

importantly, in cultural aspect “Iyasu was officially expressing the acknowledgement by the Ethiopian state of other cultures, which was a necessary step for the foundation of real political, military and economic partnership” (Sohier, 2012:61). And he attempted to correct ideological lapse of his predecessors through center-periphery [north-south] integration on balanced and equal bases (Soher, 2012).

As noted above, different political and socio-cultural reform policies of Lij Iyasu can be regarded as the tangible reaction to former injustice committed by his predecessors. For instance, question of national integration that of religious equity through official political acknowledgement of the country’s religious and cultural pluralism which were the necessary steps for the foundation of real political, military and economic partnership that focus on correcting political and socio-economic injustice of the past (Teshale,1995; Gobaze, 1996; Hazen, 2004).

Given these points, Lij Iyasu as a reformer followed a domestic policy that enables him to “integrate the peoples of Ethiopia on equal bases, regardless of religion, ethnicity, and region [with the vision of an empire where Muslim and Christian were equal] and his foreign policy was also to expand the Ethiopian territory/borders up to the sea” (Merera, 2011:45; Gebre-Igziabiher & Molvaer, 1994:335).

Most importantly, to conceptually highlight the transition period of Lij Iyasu, it is important to see the argument of different scholars like Samuel P. Huntington. According to Huntington (1991:121), different democratic transitions, especially

[...] the third wave transitions were complex political processes involving a variety of groups struggling for power and for and against democracy and other goals. In terms of their attitudes toward democratization, the crucial participants in the processes were the standpatters, liberal reformers, and democratic reformers in the governing coalition, and democratic moderates and revolutionary extremists in the opposition.

Therefore, the same is true for Iyasu’s reform which followed by power struggle among the regional elites competing for political position which was highly challenged his reform vision. Correspondingly, the three forces the Orthodox Church, the shewan elite and the three colonial powers allied against Lij Iyasu the reformer prince. The former two were challenged his changes and reform as internal standpatters and the colonial powers as external international forces.

In the end it can be concluded that, “the shewan nobility, Orthodox Church [as standpatters] and the colonial powers [France, Britain and Italy] joined against Iyasu and removed him from power in September, 1916, perhaps in what might go down in history as Africa’s first military coup in the modern sense of the world” (Merera, 2011:16). Sadly, as a result Lij Iyasu’s plan and vision for reform was aborted and reverted. Thus, after the power struggle between different forces, Lij Iyasu detached from power through replacement or revolutionary means and ended with the reign of Menelik’s daughter Empress Zewditu; Ras Tefari Mekonnen as regent [*de facto* ruler] of the empire who later became Emperor Haile Selassie I, in 1930 and ended Iyasu’s abortive but interesting reign in the history of Ethiopian politics and government.

3.2.3. Reforms during Emperor Haile Selassie-I (1930-1974)

To begin with, the mid-twentieth century in Ethiopia, from 1916 through to the revolution in 1974, was dominated by a single man called; Emperor Haile Selassie who had a critical impact on the formation of modern Ethiopia (Henze, 2000). After the power competition among the Shewan nobility and coup d’état against Lij Iyasu, Teferi’s role in Ethiopian politics became significant. His role in the coup d’état that overthrew Iyasu in September, 1916 was exaggerated and insignificant (Beharu, 1991). Typically, “he remained behind the scenes while others made the running, but he emerged from the coup, which elevated Menelik’s daughter Zawditu to the throne, with the title of *ras* and the status of heir to the throne”(Prunier, etal, 2015:185). As a result, he played a prominent role during the short reign of Empress Zewuditu, he was also made regent to the Empress (Bahru, 1991). Upon the death of empress in 1930 Teferi was “proclaimed king of [kings] of Ethiopia and had established strong support from intellectuals and progressive section of the society, even if internal and external opposition dominated through his entire reign” (Walelign, 2008:163).

Being that, in spite of its lack of practicality, “starting from his regency period, Emperor Haile Selassie-I introduced different reforms in the history of Imperial Ethiopia [...]” (Last, *etal*, 2013:56). Thus, he introduced reforms in political and socio-economic aspects; especially, his pre-war initiatives and reforms began while he was still heir to the throne. To illustrate politically, Teferi played a critical role in organizing “the abolition of the Council of Ministers inherited from the Menelik era [...] which was taken in the name of the Empress and represented an initial success in Tafari's plan to modernize the central administration” (Marcus, 1994:36).

Moreover, the central and provincial administration were modernized and made to grow in size. New ministry were created and the existing ones were expanded; some of them with the branches in the provinces (Clapham, 1969; Bahru, 1991).

Thereafter, with respect to foreign relations, he had opened Ethiopian politics to the outside world by taking the country to the League of Nations. After his coronation in 1930, he introduced the first written constitution with at least some rights and a facade of a modern parliament in 1931 which was an important part of the newly crowned Emperor's plan for the future (Pankhurst, *etal*, 2013; Merera, 2011). Moreover, in the same year of 1931, he also issued a second decree for the abolition of slavery which was officially brought to an end in the 1920s (Merera, 2011). Certainly, even if it was restrictive, the 1931 constitution paved the way for the establishment of government institutions. To point out as stated above, “it provided for the establishment of a bicameral parliament, a senate appointed from the nobility by the emperor and a chamber of deputies to be elected indirectly, which led to the establishment of parliamentary [system with titular powers]” (Henze, 2000:207). These reforms and initiatives suggest that his ambition to replace the traditional, decentralized governance structure with modern centralized state machinery which was interrupted by the invasion of Italy in 1935.

After being restored to power in 1941 of the post war period, Emperor Haile Selassie pursued a policy of reconciliation with the elite, who helped the Italian in their war of occupation which was pragmatic rather than altruistic (Bahru, 1991; Teshale, 1995). Thus, “after restoration of power Emperor Haile Selassie built a modern civil and military bureaucracy by the support of outside forces like Great Britain and later United States of America” (Merera, 2011:21). Most importantly, “[the year] 1940s was the consolidation of the modern Absolutist empire state of Ethiopia which strengthened the hegemony of the landed aristocracy with the domination over the state power and state apparatus” (Addis Hiwet, 1975:32). In the 1960s, however, the landed aristocracies lose both state apparatus and the state power (*ibid*).

In this regard, Merera, (2011) and Addis Hiwet, (1975), underscore that, the power restoration of the monarchy that covers the years 1941-1960, refers to the consolidation of repressive organs through the support of Britain and USA in the year from 1940s to 1950s, especially, as discussed above, the army and police of the absolutist state; provincial administrative and bureaucratic apparatus of the empire state of Ethiopia were restructured and centralized. In political aspects to

add, what Addis Hiwet also points out that “the most important measures were the imperial decrees of the 1942 and 1943 related to provincial administration and the creation of ministers, respectively, and, of the decade of the 50s, by far the most important is the so called revised constitution of 1955” (Addis Hiwet, 1975:34).

Indeed, in 1955, Haile Selassie promulgated a revised constitution, under which for the first time the Chamber of Deputies would be elected by popular suffrage (for men and women); the Senate continued to be appointed by the emperor (Beharu, 1991; Vander Beken, 2007). Chapter three of the constitution provided “Rights and Duties of the People, granted all citizens freedom of religion, speech and assembly, and direct petition of the Emperor; it specified that “no one ... may be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law”, but conditioned these rights on “respect for the rights and freedoms of others and the requirements of public order and the general welfare” which were to be elaborated in legislation (Henze, 2000:253). By comparison, “the constitution reaffirmed the Emperor's descent from Solomon and Sheba and confirmed his primacy in all important respects [which still signifies to the executive authority of the Emperor]: appointment of officials, control of the armed forces and of foreign relations, and oversight of the judicial system” (*ibid*, 2000:252). Thus, it can be concluded that, “the so-called revised constitution [of 1955] was promulgated the re-strengthening and consolidation of autocracy” (Addis Hiwet, 1975:36).

In terms of social services, Emperor Haile Selassie’s pre-war changes were significant. Hence, in 1923 he founded a printing press which was soon to produce the new paper the *Berhanena selam* which means light and peace, the Beta Saida Hospital of 1924 which was later on renamed the Haile Selassie Hospital, modern schools were built between 1916 and 1935, and steps were also taken to improve communications and transportations facilities (Merara, 2011; Robson, et al, 2013).

Likewise, in terms of economy, Emperor Haile Selassie undertook different reforms both in pre-war and post war time. Typically, in 1931, “a national currency was instituted, with the conversion of the Egyptian-owned Bank of Abyssinia into the new and government-owned Bank of Ethiopia” (Henze, 2000:209). Consequently, this measure “freeing Ethiopia from the dependence on a fluctuating international silver market imposed by the use of the superb Maria Theresa dollar” (Prunier, et al, 2015:188). However, both Ethiopia's financial system and its

economy were still in an underdeveloped state when Italy invaded (Henze, 2000). Moreover, “the establishment of national bank, few commercial agricultural undertakings had been established; Tendaho cotton picking, stock ponds in Borena, Aseb port and oil refinery” are among the economic development during Emperor Haile Selassie regime (Pankhurst, et al, 2013:62).

Most importantly, Paul B. Henze underscores that “land tenure systems varied from one region to another, with communal systems of redistribution prevalent in the north and tenancy amounting to serfdom in the south” (Henze, 2000:210). Even if the ministry of land reform was established, but was in no position to make any changes that might challenge established interests and announced number of token changes were not as expected (Prunier, et al, 2015). Furthermore, “as many as 300,000 Ethiopians are thought to have still lived in some form of slavery in 1935, though trade in slaves had for the most part been stopped” (ibid). By and large, the economy of the country during this time was open to outside world and especially, the period 1960s-1970s constitutes the most decisive moment in the process of integration of the country in to the world capitalist system which signifies the transition from feudalism to capitalist economic system (Addis Hewot, 1975).

The post war Ethiopia had become a much-transformed modern polity compared to the situation just two decades earlier (Gilkes, 1975; Lefort, 1983). Different development endeavors took place; in sectors such as: education, health, agriculture, transport and communication, etc. (Pankhurst, et al, 2013). Furthermore, “labor unions was formed, press, new industry were established, independent institutions and associations of many kinds came into being” (Henze, 2000:241).

Besides that, by 1960s the Ethiopian polity, was relatively transformed one and the modern elite, which had become a relatively both in terms of quantity and quality, begun to show signs of frustration with the social system that produced it and these led to the growing conflict between the traditional elite and the rising modern elite (Greenfield, 1965; Andergachew T.1993). To make detail, by the 1960s and 1970s, Emperor Haile Selassie’s regime was encircled with severe and recurrent disruptions from the university and high school students, military forces, and the rest of Ethiopia who demanded the political and socio-economic reforms and changes(Yohannes, 1983). Thus, due to such kind of demands the Ethiopian state of affairs had

tested by various persistent events; among these events the aborted coup of 1960 was the important one.

3.2.3.1. Ethiopian politics on the Eve and Aftermath of the 1960 Coup d'état

On Tuesday, 13 December 1960, the two brothers, Brigadier General Mangestu Neway and his younger brother Germame Neway with some of the military component and a few educated radicals were attempted a coup d'état against the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie (Clapham,1968; Bahru, 1991). The motive behind this attempted coup was not only political, rather; it holds the questions of social injustice, backwardness of the regime, economic deterioration, and corruption by the central government (Marcus, 1999). This coup d'état was not only a coup, it has had a considerable effect on the later growth of political consciousness in Ethiopia, both in the armed forces and among the intelligentsia of Addis Ababa; in this respect it may cast a shadow on future events(Clapham,1968).

Indeed, there have been coups, revolutions and political assassinations throughout Ethiopia's long history but the abortive revolution of 1960 was different in one vital respect. Its leaders sought not merely to displace the then national leaders, but to reform and remold the whole system of government. It may be said that "in December 1960 Africa's 'wind of change' reached even the remoteness of the Ethiopian High Plateau" (Greenfield, 1965:2), which marks a major turning point in modern Ethiopian history. The rebels also asked the question of economic development, education, unemployment, nationalization of land and living standards as a result stubbornness of the Emperor for radical reform (Clapham, 1968).

After the liberation, Emperor Haile Selassie gave emphasis for the reinstatement of ministerial government. Thus, in 1943, two imperial orders set up eleven ministries and the office of the prime minister with the responsibility of empowered to draft their own laws and to appoint junior officials, but with corporate manner(Bahru, 1991). However, an order of 1966 changed little as far as the power equation is concerned: although the prime minister was empowered to select his team, and the council of ministers came slightly nearer towards a cabinet, final decision on policy matters, as well as the appointment of all ministers(including the prime minster) vice ministers, and assistance ministers remained the emperors preserve(ibid).

Despite minor good attempts, still Haile Sellassie was failed to make radical reform his government; instead, he focused on consolidation of his power and monopolized all state affairs (Vestal, 2013). Thus, the failure to reform the feudal land-tenure system, the slow rate of economic development, and the absence of civil and political rights, caused increasing discontent in the country and resulted in different revolts, rebels and coup (Clapham, 1968). Further, after the failed coup of 1960 different movements started to emerge in organized form (Addis Hiwet, 1975; Merera, 2011). For stance, Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) and different ethnic based movements are among others (*ibid*).

However, according to some literature and “as historians judged later [different changes took place during the Haile Selassie regime], especially, the 1955 constitutional changes was more cosmetic than real and in fact; a legal charter for the consolidation of absolutism” (Bahru, 1991:206). Accordingly, during the post-war period “the consolidation of the modern absolutist state of Ethiopia strengthened the hegemony of the landed aristocracy with the domination over the state power and state apparatus” (Addis Hiwet, 1975:32). However, after the coup “in the post 1960s the landed aristocracies lose both state apparatus and state power because of the consolidation of the repressive organs; the army and the police of the absolutist state, in which the latter was assured a firm domination over the whole social formation” (*ibid*:34).

Therefore, despite some changes within the regime, oppression and exploitation, lack of concrete social reform and change which embrace the periphery and mass society that led to a spontaneous popular uprising which was the way to the start of the revolution. Traditionally, it has been argued that and what is observed practically, there are factors and causes contribute to the regime change. Among them, “shocks to the international system (such as global war), the birth of new states with weak institutions (often born out of such systemic shocks), and political neighborhood” (Gates et al, 2007:10). Equally important, “unsatisfactory economic performance which leads to depression, unemployment, food shortages, and famine similarly played a key role in producing the crisis of autocratic regimes” (Huntington, 1991:51). Furthermore, “the oil price hike of 1973-74 triggered a global economic recession which undermined the legitimacy of undemocratic regime in different parts of the world” (*ibid*).

In a similar manner, international systemic shock as a result of “Arab-Israeli war which led to dramatic petrol price increases highly affects the economy of the Haile Selassie regime; because,

Ethiopia had import petroleum from abroad and buys the commodity on the international market” (Andargachew T.,1993:38). Most importantly, unsatisfactory economic performance which resulted in urban unemployment, the 1972-3 food shortage and severe famine led to the regime crises that highly challenged the Haile Selassie government (Henze, 2000; Prunier, 2015). In addition, “educational reform program which aimed at limiting the number of the students allowed to enroll, weak government institutions such as “the Parliament” or “the Constitution” were hollow structures which had created expectations they could not satisfy” (Prunier, 2015:213). These and “the triumph of socialism as an ideology, are the main challenges against the imperial regime which to led [revolution] and systemic change” (Merera, 2011:28). All in all, as a result of these problems the Haile Selassie regime face resistance from three centers of opposition; the rebellion in the Ogaden and Bale, the rebellion in Eritrea and the emergence of opposition at the center in which the emperor lost ‘the heavenly mandate’ in 1974 (Andargachew T., 1993; Henze, 2000;Gebru, 2009;Merera, 2011).

3.3. The 1974 Political Transition of the *Derg*

In 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie's government had lost public confidence within Ethiopia following the structural crises of his regime, leading to the Ethiopian revolution which had brought the Solomonic Dynasty to an end (Gebru, 2009).Thereafter, power came into the hands of the *Derg* and it suspended the existing constitution, deposed [Emperor] Haile Selassie I, and dissolved the parliament (Andargachew T., 1993; Gebru, 2009). *Derg’s* political transition is resulted from the 1974 revolution that took place in different parts of the country. This revolution was highly challenged the imperial autocracy as a result of structural crises or the incapacity of the regime which led to the question from different section of society (Andargachew T., 1993; Prunier, 2015). Thus, this revolution was resulted from different major and immediate causes (Harold, 1994).

3.3.1. The 1974 Ethiopian Revolution and Its Causes

Ethiopia is one of the very few countries that have experienced a revolution in modern times. For nearly two decades, it was a land of war, death, destruction, despair, and misery, but also one of hope, reform, and reconstruction; of struggles for national cohesion and identity but also for autonomy, freedom, dignity, and an unfettered future (Gebru, 2009). To see in detail, the major causes of the revolution and the collapse of the old regime were “the incapacity of a post feudal

socio-political system to modernize itself when faced with the challenges of the transformations of the second half of the twentieth century” (Prunier, 2015:211). Most importantly, the very root cause of the revolution goes back to the post War Ethiopia. This is because of the political resentment from the component of Ethiopian patriots, military and intellectuals against the Emperor as a result of his spending five years in the safety of exile, while the patriots led a precarious existence fighting for liberty (Bahru, 1991). Added taxation on the peasant masses, poverty, insecurity, the ecological disaster, severe famine, high income disparity between the bourgeoisie and the mass, demographic growth and waves of population towards the cities which created the urban unemployment led to popular uprising in different parts of the country, caused the collapse of the ancient regime (Harold, 1994; Henze, 2000; Prunier, 2015).

In addition to the major causes of the revolution, there were also immediate causes which severely challenged the imperial regime. These were the two related economic crises which first, “stemmed from the sharp increase in the cost of petroleum products caused by the closed Suez Canal[in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war] and the second from related inflation in the prices of finished goods and food, which rose 20 percent and 80 percent, respectively”(Harold, 1994:182-83). In fact, the 1973 oil shock which led to a massive rise in petrol prices resulted in increase in taxi and bus charges that led to strike to reverse the price rise in Addis Ababa (Harold, 1994; Prunier, 2015). Furthermore, the teachers' strike for greater pay and more job security and against a government plan known as ‘Educational Sector Review’ of 1971-1972, requiring many of them to teach in provincial posts is also one of the immediate causes of the revolution of 1974(Andargachew T., 1993; Harold, 1994; Henze, 2000). Afterwards, “military unrest from [the] non-commissioned military officers as a result of their dreadful living conditions with the question of improved working conditions, greater pay, better food, and more freedom to proffer their criticisms through the chain of command”(Harold, 1994:183).

Finally, the questions of Ethiopian society, especially the students were widened to “for radical change like: the question of land reform, the disestablishment of the Orthodox church, the end of the monarchy and free speech and other civil rights”(ibid:184). In nutshell, economic exploitation, question of land, the question of nationalities, administrative inefficiency and corruption, government repression and response to the opposition, student’s struggle for free press and free union, political and socio-economic inequality, agricultural income tax on the

peasants and land alienation for mechanized farms which led to uprisings in Bale, Gojjam, Yajju and Gedeo were the major causes of the 1974 revolution which ended the ancient imperial regime (Bahru, 1991; Harold, 1994; Henze, 2000), and paved the way for the transition from Emperor Haile Selassie to *derg* Mengistu regime.

3.3.2. The Political Actors behind the Ethiopian Revolution of 1974

Different actors were engaged in the revolution from different sections of Ethiopian society. Thus, “the main actors of the popular uprising against Haile Selassie's government, were the peasant, the armed forces, the teachers, the students, taxi drivers, the Orthodox clergy, Muslim community, Confederation Ethiopian Labor Union (CELU), the trade unions and the civil servants” (Andargachew, 1993:37). From the imperial government, the armed forces or the soldiers of different divisions were engaged in the revolution for both economic and political purposes (Bahru, 1991; Andargachew, 1993; Harold, 1994). For instance, the cause of the Nagelle Soldiers' mutiny was economic rather than political; because their question was centered on the shortage of water and food, frequent delay in the payment of salary, pay increase and improved conditions, the provision of hardship and pension allowance, better uniform and opening of secondary school in the town (Bahru, 1991), whereas, the second division based in Asmara, the Eritrean capital called for regime change (ibid). Furthermore, concerning the military as an actor in the revolution, Andargachew Tiruneh (1993), maintains that:

Representatives of the various military units in and around Addis Ababa went to the King and submitted their demands including, it appears, freedom of political parties, the democratic election of administrators, land reform, the improvement of employee employer regulations, freeing of all political prisoners, free education for everyone, enforcement of necessary price controls, the appearance in court of the government officials who directly and indirectly embezzled public funds and belongings, salary raises for members of the army and other workers in accordance with prevailing market prices and the formation of a committee including members of the army and the civilian public to follow up the enforcement of the above points (1993:40-41).

As noted above, the civilians like teachers were also engaged in the revolution as an actor through making general strike against an educational reform program known as ‘educational sector review’, pay increases and salary scales (Andargachew, 1993; Harold, 1994; Henze, 2000;

Gebru,2009). Indeed, “the teachers, supported by many secondary school students and some parents, perceived the review as detrimental to the interests of the poor and protests against its imminent implementation” (Bahru, 1991:230-31).). Equally important, students at different levels with the question of national equality, social justice, and land to the tiller, unemployed youth with the question of job opportunities, taxi drivers with the question of oil price decrease, peasants as a result of land tax increment and land alienation, Confederation of Ethiopian Labour Unions (CELU) with the question of the right to form a trade union, free medical services, the right to have their insurance paid for by the government, and free education which would enable them to improve their professional skills were involved in the revolution as an important actors of the revolution(Bahru, 1991; Harold, 1994; Andargachew, 1993).

All in all, workers with demands of wage increases, the passing of new labor legislation, and freedom of association, students, teachers, soldiers, government officials, Moslems, and Orthodox priests with the question of religious equality, separation of church and state and the national observance of the Muslim holydays; each of them were demanded reforms with the government(Bahru, 1991; Harold, 1994). In addition, different fronts especially with the question of Eritrea like: Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) which was supported by the Arab world specially, Syria and Iraq, Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) were also played their parts in the revolution as actors (Bahru, 1991).

3.3.4. The *Derg*’s Democratic Political Opening up of its Earlier Period and Reforms

Following the revolution, in the 1970s, Mengistu embraced the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, which was increasingly popular among many nationalists and revolutionaries throughout Africa and much of the Third World at the time (Keller, 1998; Henze, 2000). In the summer of 1974, the new 126-member Provisional Military Advisory Council (PMAC), or *Derg*, had declared a policy of Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia First) which was taken as a vague motto rather than political program (Henze, 2000; Merera, 2011). However, as Andargachew Tiruneh (1993:66), noted that:

The Derg as its motto, slogan, philosophy, principle, ideology etc..., ‘Ethiopia First’ had different sections, most of which related to the issues of the time. Examples of this are: cabinet reform, the trial of the corrupt and inept officials, speedy implementation of the draft constitution, close collaboration with the cabinet, the continuation of humanitarian

aid to the drought-affected people. The other points reflect the Derg's long term strategy: protection of rights for the entire people, quick development of the people, modern legislation on employer employee relations, modernization of the traditional beliefs that obstruct the development and unity of the country, increased participation by the people in the development process, betterment and modern civilization on the basis of nationalism and equality rather than on the basis of the age-old discrimination along national and religious lines, and the conviction that the movement of the armed forces and police would result in change without bloodshed which would be possible because of the uniqueness of the country's history and culture.

Therefore, at the opening phase of the transition from feudal autocracy to Ethiopian first republic, the *derg* “declared ‘Ethiopian socialism’ on 20 December 1974, six months after it had constituted itself around the philosophy of ‘EthiopiaTikdem’ (Ethiopia first) and just over three months after it deposed the Emperor” (Merara, 2011:31). On top of that, ‘Ethiopian socialism’ was issued as *Derg's* first fundamental political and economic programme which was translated into practice by adopting a series of nationalization measures in the course of 1975 based on the Government ownership of the means of production with proclamation 26, 1975 (Henze, 2000). To be clear, “the cardinal elements of political philosophy of Ethiopian Socialism were, equality; self-reliance; the dignity of labor; the supremacy of the common good; and the indivisibility of Ethiopian Unity” (Gebru, 2009:39).

According to Paul B. Henze (2000), the above proclamation or law distinguishes between three kinds of mining, industrial and commercial activities. The first were to be owned and operated by the government exclusively, the second to be owned and operated by government and private investors jointly, and the third to be owned and operated by private investors exclusively. Considerably, the basis for the distinction between the three categories was Ethiopian Socialism. And then, after it adopted socialism as the official ideology on 20 December, 1974, to improve its socialist credentials, the *Derg* military committee was undertaken different reforms which paved the way for the transition from feudal autocracy to communist “people’s republic with guarantees of national self-determination or from quasi-feudalism to garrison socialism” (*ibid*). Accordingly, “in February 1975 the *Derg*, took the socialist measure of nationalizing 101 leading companies and in April, it decreed the abolition of land rents and nationalized all rural land,

declaring this to be the collective property of the Ethiopian people” (Chege, 1979:13). Thus, “individual family was granted ‘possessory right over rural land not exceeding 25 acres and one urban house” (*ibid*). This land reform of 1975 ended the *gabbar* system which was imposed on the southern peasantry through Ethiopian successive regimes. To illustrate, concerning nationalization measures, Patman, (1990:155) noted that in the following way:

On 1 January 1975, all banks and the largest insurance companies were nationalized. On 3 February, seventy two industrial and commercial enterprises were fully nationalized, and the Ethiopian state took over all control in twenty nine others. Then, on 4 March, the most significant reform, a land reform, was promulgated: all rural land was nationalized, tenancy was abolished and the peasantry was given the right to till land up to a maximum of 10 hectares.

In line with this, “the 'Ethiopian Socialism' stated that land would be owned by the people; therefore, this move was in fact more than a reform; it was a radical transformation which was to change the social, economic and political scene of the country substantially” (Henze, 2000:97). Finally, “in July 1975, all urban land was likewise nationalized, along with extra houses, allowing house owners to retain only with single residence for their own use. This destroyed the renter class in the towns, just as rural land reform had destroyed the land lord class in the country side” (Clapham, 1987: 151). What’s more, *derg* also “confiscate the assets of the royal family including those of the King and the aristocracy [which means] the possessions of the ancient regimes officials to ensure equal share of the wealth of the country for all” (Henze, 2000: 86). Therefore, “the land reform of 4 March 1975, did not only fit the ideological framework of Ethiopian socialism, but was also aimed at acquiring support among the people” (Marcus, 2002:316).

Another important point to be discussed concerning the communist regime was, the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) the country’s ruling military group, set out to obtain the material basis for socialism and to establish new political institutions to support the new political order. In addition to nationalization of the main means of production, including the land, it began to create new institutions through decrees and tried to implement them with partial or full use of force (Ottaway, 1977; Dawit, 1989; Dessalegn, 1992). On account of this, “the law and decree provided for the establishment of Peasant Associations with legal personality, local

governments which were charged with the execution of the land reform which was especially welcomed in the southern regions” (Vander Beken, 2007:28). Moreover, “as a new social and political organization the peasant associations, in the countryside, were helped to defeat the landlords and allow the peasants to control their land and their affairs” (Ottaway, 1977:80). In support of this, Marina Ottaway, (1977), continued her discussion as follows:

The role of the peasant associations was further broadened with the proclamation No 71:108, to enable peasants to secure and safeguard their political, socio-economic rights; enable the peasantry to administer itself by building consciousness in line with Ethiopian socialism; establish cooperative society, women’s associations,[youth associations] and any other associations that may be necessary for the fulfillment of its goals and aims and to enable the peasantry to work collectively and to speedup political and socio-economic development by improving the quality of the instruments of production and the level of productivity that in turn secure the objective of hibretebawinet(Ethiopian socialism).

Another important point to be discussed here is the role of Ethiopian student in the process of institutionalizing Ethiopian socialism under the idea of development through cooperation development campaign called ‘*zemecha*’ (Henze, 2000). To demonstrate, students from different collages and secondary schools were made demonstrations on 11 October 1974, to express their demand for the law about land redistribution as a pre requisite for any participation in the development campaign; and this in turn led to the promulgation of very radical land redistribution laws which took place in March 1975. Indeed, this law has characterized as one of the most radical land reform proclamations that any past regime has ever issued (Bahru, 1991; Andargachew, 1993; Basvik, 1998; Clapham, 1998). Consequently, “the students were also to organize peasant associations and handle the redistribution of land, and in addition they were to aid the formation of women’s and youth associations” (Basvik, 1998: 261).

Equally important, resettlement and literacy campaign were also among the socio-economic measures were taken by the communist military regime after the revolution. In fact, “the literacy campaigns have been judged to be “one of the regime’s most impressive achievements” (Clapham, 1998:97). The state also wanted to use the resettlement projects to further its socialist policy of creating producers’ co-operatives, which had otherwise met with stubborn resistance

among rural laborers (Dawit, 1989; Svein Ege, et al, 2009). Furthermore, “the Revolutionary Government has also embarked upon villagization program in rural Ethiopia where by the rural population will be disposed to produce better and to receive better social services through collective equipment” (PDRE, 1987:31); which was never materialized.

3.3.5. The Closure of the Transition and the Emergence of the *Derg* as Authoritarian/ Totalitarian System

Apparently and sadly, the above noted socio-economic restructurings of the *Derg* were not last long with their initial promises. Even if, in the first few years after the land reform, the economic position of the peasants visibly improved. On the contrary, after a few years peasant control of the Peasant Associations was replaced by a tight control of the central government; which means from bodies of local self-administration, the Peasant Associations were transformed into instruments of central control (Chege, 1979; Vander Beken, 2007).

Correspondingly, “villagization and the resettlement schemes were failures[also] in revolutionary social engineering terms, since people tended to move back to where they considered they belonged, in spite of state efforts to prevent this”(Ege, et al, 2009: 269). As a result of this, the initially very high death rates in the new areas, the repressive co-operative system (in spite of considerable government aid to help establish this) and the enmity of the indigenous people whose resources were diminished because of the new comers all contributed to a high percentage of deserters(Pankhurst,1997;Merera, 2011; Prunier, 2015). According to Dawit Walde Georgis(1989), the resettlement programme has been labeled perhaps the most cruel chapter of the entire famine during the *Derg* communist military regime(Dawit, 1989; Henze, 2000).

It can be concluded that, the socio-economic transformation of the military regime, especially, settlement and villagization programs were the most dreadful of all. Implementation of both was based on the use of force, involved the lives of millions of peasants and the end result was dismissal failure of the reform (Merera, 2011). Numerous studies argued that, they were ill planned; ill executed and held little or no benefit for the peasants whose lives they were supposed to improve (Dawit, 1989; Merera, 1992; Dessalegn, 1992). In nutshell, concerning the socio-economic changes of military regime, Merera Gudina (2011), underscores that “except for the land reform of 1975, which was useful move across the south as it ended the *gabbar* system (feudal serfdom) imposed on the southern peasantry through Ethiopian successive

regime, almost all the development policy initiatives of the military regime utterly failed” (Merera, 2011:32).

In all honesty, in terms of change in political institutions, the *Derg* established, the Mass Political Education and Co-coordinating Committee with the individuals those who have better verses on the subject matter to work on the reorganization of political institutions. Accordingly, after some studies and discussions by this committee, “the ‘National Democratic Revolutionary Programme of Ethiopia’ (NDRPE) was introduced on 20 April 1976” (Andargachew, 1993:159). Notably, Andargachew (1993) continued that, the NDRPE constituted a massive ideological shift on the part of the *Derg*, not for the first time either. ‘Ethiopia First’ of July 1974 could be described as the programme of a coup d'etat, Ethiopian Socialism 1 of December 1974 as a programme of African socialism; and the NDRPE of April 1976 as a programme of scientific socialism.

Nonetheless, the military regime’s political institutions were not succeeded for better. As noted above initially, “the *Derg* aimed at more durable political programmes when it declared the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) and the Provisional Office for Mass Organizational Affairs (POMOA) in April of 1976” (Merera, 2011:32). By 1979, much of the content of the NDR was lost-by which time the Original authors of the programme were liquidated and a new façade institution was needed to serve the military élite interests better (*ibid*). On the whole, a military-dominated Commission for Organizing the Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (COWPE) was introduced in 1979 whose sole purpose was to create a workers’ party of soldiers around the person of dictator Mengistu (Dawit, 1989). This commission officially proclaimed, with unprecedented ceremony and circumstance, the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) in 1984-in the midst of the worst famine in Ethiopian history to that date. Concerning the establishment of Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), as directly quoted in Merera (2011), John Markakis (1986), maintains that:

The proletarian party came after the battle for popular democratic rule has been lost. The civilian opposition was destroyed...obliterated, leaving the field clear for the regime to fashion its own political support structures. Achieved with great violence, the victory was not without price for Ethiopia. A generation of militants was neutralized; its member’s dead, self-exiled or cowed into passivity...it was in stagnant political waters that the Workers Party of Ethiopia was founded in 1984 (Markakis & Nega, 1986:9-10).

As it happens, Mengistu has started to show the inclination to change, the political order to military regime. In support of this, Gebru Tereke (2009), points out that:

The shift to military dictatorship that began on February 11, 1977, was completed in December 1979 with the formation of the Commission to Organize the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE), which five years later made Ethiopia a rigid one-party state. COPWE was transformed into the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) in 1984, and three years later the empire was replaced with a republic. Single mindedly and ruthlessly, Mengistu had put in place the organizational apparatus with which he could rule the country, crushing everyone who dared defy his authority (Gebru, 2009:43).

Overall, in principle the National Democratic Revolution Programme(NDRP) was a fundamental kind of proposal and it called for the creation of a 'people's democratic republic' and the building of a firm foundation for the transition to socialism(Patman, 1990). As noted above, in the "Programme of the National Democratic Revolution" (PNDR), a political programme that was adopted by the *Derg* on 20 April 1976, and that replaced the ten point programme of 20 December 1974; a much more positive attitude towards ethnic diversity came to the fore(Abate,1983;Merara, 2002). Yet again, Merera (2011) reviewed the regional autonomy formula in NDR programme on his part in the following manner:

The right to self-determination of all nationalities will be recognized and fully respected. No nationality will dominate another one since the history, culture, language and religion of each nationality will have equal recognition in accordance with the spirit of socialism. ... [Thus], given Ethiopia's existing situation, the problem of nationalities can be resolved if each nationality is accorded full right to self-government. This means, that each nationality will have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political, economic and social life use its own language and elect its own leaders and administration to head its organs. This right of self-government of nationalities will be implemented in accordance with all democratic procedures and principles (Merera, 2011:34-35).

After the establishment of “Workers’ Party of Ethiopia (WPE) in 1984, Ethiopia’s first republic was founded and the new constitution was promulgated; as ‘the Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’ in 1987” (PDRE, 1987:69). For the most part, in early 1987, this new constitution, a hybrid that resembled the Soviet and Romanian Marxist-Leninist constitutions, was submitted to the populace for their consideration. After it got approval, as noted above, the constitution established the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE), with an 835-member national assembly (Keller, 1998).

The new PDRE constitution of 1987 which drawn in accordance with Marxist-Leninist ideology, was democratic in principle than that of the imperial regime and guaranteed some democratic rights as a response for the past injustice and inequality. For instance, religious freedom and equality (Articles 35 and 45), separation of state and religion (Article 47), give power and sovereignty to the working people through national *shengo* (Article 63), regional autonomy (Article 9), equal development and respectability of all languages of nationalities (Article 2) (PDRE, 1987:69-71). In fact, the decree on religious and separation of church and state in Ethiopia was also part of the new regime’s response to the ethnic/religious inequality perpetuated under the imperial regime (Kiflu, 1993). In the same way, minimum on paper, the socialist states with diverse nationalities have tended to recognize a significant degree of autonomy from central control for their administrative components and, even rendered to its constituent republics the right to secede. In spite of this, Ethiopia's constitution postulated that PDRE is a ‘unitary state’ composed of administrative areas and self-governing regions which is still guilty of failing to recognize practically that Ethiopia is a multi-linguistic society (Andargachew, 1993) To sum up, the regional autonomy programme was resurrected in the constitution of 1987, which provide a regional autonomy status only on paper for some regions; and based on this constitution the country continued to a unitary state, and the workers’ party was the only legally recognized political party in Ethiopia (Merera, 2011), that gave strong powers to the president of Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam which in return resulted in the failure of promised reforms(Gebru, 2009; Prunier, 2015).

As a matter fact, “the communist military regime was not only failed to solve the above mentioned basic issues, but also miserably failed to follow the proper method to solve conflict with its opponents”(Merera, 2011:36). Particularly, its military response to the demands of the

marginalized ethnic groups and elimination of its civilian opponent through ‘Red Terror’ aggravated the already acute ethnic problems in the country and the alienation of the civilian left had isolated the regime from the real forces of change (Bereket, 1980; Merkakis, 1987) which provoked different resistance from different parts of the country. Another, pitfall in the military regime was its mistreatment of workers, peasants, and low-paid government employees, which provoked another resistance against the regime. Further, the most serious mistake of the communist military regime was its rural policy. As discussed above, in spite of its initial achievement, the settlement and every association changed to governments’ instrument of central control and its attempt to solve by use of force the problems posed by various marginalized ethnic/regional movements (Dessalagn, 1992; Pausewang, 1994; Merera, 2011).

According to Samuel P. Huntington (1991), and Juan J. Linz (1978), political regime change is always the outcome of war fare or internal social conflict and takes place through different patterns of change like: transformation/ reform, trans-placement/ compromise and replacement/ overthrow (Huntington, 1991; Linz, 1978). Accordingly, the Ethiopian communist military regime (*Derg* in Amaharic) has overthrown by different rebel forces like: EPLF, TPLF, ONLF, OLF and many others, through pattern of replacement after many years of war, replaced by TPLF-Led EPRDF in 1991, as a result of some of the following reasons.

As a consequence of great famine, rigid socio-economic policy toward peasants, exclusive political approach in dealing with the civilian left which led to one man rule, follow military solution for every resistance, the end of the cold war, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the decline of the Soviet Union, and in 1985 Gorbachev launched a new course in Soviet policies, both at home and abroad were among the causes those led to the end of the communist military regime. To be brief and in summation, ethno-nationalist insurgency, structural economic crises and global political change finally led to the demise of the military regime in May, 1991.

3.4. The Anatomy of Post-1991 Political Transition: Democratic Opening and Closure (1991-2018)

3.4.1. The Essence of the Post-1991 Transition

After the collapse of *derg*, on 28 May 1991, the EPRDF, EPLF and OLF announced in a joint declaration that on 1st July 1991 a large-scale national conference would be organized (Lyons, 1991). And then, an interim legislative assembly known as the Council of Representatives

(COR) was established at the July 1991 Conference, which approved the formation of a Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) affirming the coming on the scene of federalism, liberal political economy, and the right of the country's ethnic groups to self-determination as the major drives (Merera, 2011; Semir, 2018). Therefore, in case, opposition lead transition or transition from below characterized the nature of Ethiopian political transition from *Derg's* regime to the government of EPRDF. For instance, Huntington's replacement, (1991), or Linz's rapture, (1978), justifications of democratic transition can describe the political transition that Ethiopia has experienced since post-1991.

In addition from the onset, the post-1991 political transition in Ethiopia was dominated by the TPLF and excluded all the opposition from the July transitional national conference of Addis Ababa, the national transitional charter, and the transitional government (Lyons, 1996; Micheaw, 1996). Therefore, exclusion, domination, lack of genuine democratic participation, weak and fragmented opposition political parties, flawed election, absence of visible practical democratic institutions, elite conflict and competition for political power within TGE, monopolization of political power and representation, and state or one party led democratization were the essence/nature of this transition (Vanghan, 2003; Assefa, 2007; Merera, 2007; Erk, 2016). Furthermore, "the contradiction between its de facto one-party state and its promises to deliver practical multi-party elections, human rights and self-determination has been the defining feature of politics [or political transition] since 1991" (International Crises Group, 2009:5).

Finally, the post-1991 transition in Ethiopia was also characterized with both hope and despair; because, on the one hand it promised the transition from the barrel of the gun to the ballot box or democracy and democratization, on the other hand it was full of war and mixture of democracy and State of terror in all its essentials (Merera, 1994), thus it was not negotiated and inclusive political transition.

3.4.2. The July Conference and Formation of Transitional Government of Ethiopia

As political scientist Samuel P. Huntington (1991) notes that, during the beginning of the third wave of democratization, national conference which recognized and laid the foundation for the rule of law, democracy, political pluralism, the right to form political parties, free and fair elections, and generally, human rights and freedoms and to the international monitoring of these rights in individual countries took place (Huntington, 1991). Accordingly, on 1st July 1991

national conference called ‘Addis Ababa conference’ was opened by the provisional EPRDF administration (Vander Beken, 2007:35). Thereafter, on 22 July 1991 the national conference adopted the Transition Period Charter which was embraced different democratic sentiments (Vestal, 1999; Tewfik, 2010; Prunier, 2015). As noted above, the conference was also put the foundation for the formation of transitional government of Ethiopia (TGE) with different promises (Vaughan, 2003; Merera, 2011; Semir, 2018).

After its formation at the opening phase of the transition, “the new Transitional Government (TGE), publicly pledged its commitment to three radical reform objectives: namely, the decentralization of the state, the democratization of politics, and liberalization of the economy” (Tronvoll & Vaughan, 2003:26). Even if it organized as the foundation for a transitional period charter and the TGE after the regime change, however, the July conference had excluded many of the political groups from participation, especially, the pan-Ethiopian opposition like: EPRP and MEISON/AESM, (Alemante 1992; Young, 1996; Merera, 2011). Concerning the recognition of democratic rights by the TGE, John M. Cohen (1995) maintains that:

[In spite of its exclusion of the opposition, at the opening phase of the transition], the TGE began to take steps [which] aimed at effectively reaching a large and formidable number of transition objectives. These were to draft a constitution, hold regional elections, rebuild physical infrastructure, implement macroeconomic and land tenure reforms aimed at stimulating the economy, rehabilitate public service infrastructures, reform the judiciary, promote human rights, support the emergence of an independent media, decentralize power to regions and districts, and encourage the emergence of a free press and democratically oriented civic organizations(1995:158).

Moreover, the TGE addressed the decentralization of administrative authority to regions and the local-level units. The march toward administrative decentralization began in early 1992 when the TGE issued Proclamation number seven (7), which aimed at establishing a provisional federal system of twelve (12) regions based on ethnic identities, two (2) urban regions that were too diverse to be subdivided by ethnic identity and divided the regions into zones and *weredas* (Cohen, 1995; Tewfik, 2010; Merera, 2011).

3.4.3. Democratic Opening and Transitional Period Charter

After the demise of the *derg* through an overthrow kind of transition, the TPLF/ EPRDF came to power in May 1991. After the coming to power of TPLF led EPRDF at its democratic opening Ethiopia has experienced two processes of transition from a unitary to a federal system of government. These are the devolution of power which occurred from 1991-1995 and the adoption of the federal constitution in 1995 (Tewfik, 2010). To make clear, at the devolution phase of the transition from 1990s to 1995, after the convening of national conference, “the most significant development in the initial transition was the adoption of the Transitional period charter” (Tewfik, 2010:6), which designated as the supreme law of the land during a transitional period (Vaughan, 1994; Vestal, 1999; Prunier & Ficquet, 2015).

At least on paper, the aspirations and recognition stipulated in the charter were, “[freedom[s], equal rights and self-determination of all peoples shall be the governing principle of political, economic and social life” (Transitional Period Charter, 199: preamble para.2). And it proclaimed fundamental individual human rights and freedoms; it guaranteed the right of each nation, nationality and people of Ethiopia to self-determination (Cohen, 1995; Abate, 2004; Tewfik, 2010). The charter also puts a high premium on human rights which manifested in its direct reference to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in its Article 1, which states that individual human rights like: freedom of conscience, freedom of speech/expression, freedom of assembly and association, right to engage in unrestricted political activity, forming political parties are confirmed and it give recognition to the right of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples to self-determination (Transitional Period Charter, 1991; Merera, 2011).

Even if tension between promises on paper and the reality on the ground, at the opening phase of political transition from *derg* to TPLF/EPRDF in the transitional charter, the political space was opened, democratic institutions were arranged, within its lack of competitiveness multi-party democracy and election were allowed, and liberal democracy was adopted (Transitional Carter, 1991;Tewfik, 2010; Merera, 2011), political pluralism was allowed, decentralization of administrative structure was officially safeguarded, self-rule and shared rule through federalization of the state was confirmed(FDRE Constitution, 1995; Vestal, 1999; Prunier, 2015), and laid a base for the FDRE constitution of 1995.

3.4.4. Democratic Opening and the FDRE Constitution

As noted in the above section of this chapter, even though it failed to achieve its initial promises for democratization, the first opening phase of the post-1991 transition from *derg* first republic to EPRDF second republic was started through the adoption of the Transitional period charter and the establishment of TGE (Cohen, 1995; Tewfik, 2010). Following that, another important move of the TPLF/EPRDF and the second phase of the transition process was the promulgation of liberal constitution in 1995 (Vaunhan & Tronvoll, 2002). As a new social contract, this Constitution as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) came into force in August 1995 after passing through drafting and series of deliberations by bodies set up by the Transitional Government (Transitional Charter, 1991, Art. 10; Abate, 2004).

As briefly noted above, the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), was reconstituted the country into an ethnic federation [or ethno-regional line]" (Asnake, 2009:1), "based on the federal constitution [which] was introduced in Ethiopia, in August, 1995" (Assefa, 2006:131; Smith, 2007:3). Moreover, "democratic principles were eventually enshrined in a well-crafted national constitution (Keller, 2002:22). Thus, "most notable among the political changes of this period were the establishment of a federal arrangement centered on ethno-linguistic identities for the decentralization of power from the center to regions, [...] and the scheduling of multiparty elections" (Mengisteab, 1997:111). Further, the constitution also formalized the division of the country into nine federated states (kilils or NRSSs)'delimited on the basis of settlement patterns, identity, language and the consent of the people concerned' (FDRE Constitution 1995: Art.46, 47; Habib,2010). Accordingly, the FDRE is comprised of the federal government and nine member states (also referred to as "regional states") and two federally chartered cities, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (FDRE Constitution 1995:Art. 50; Milkessa, 2017).

Formally, the constitution heralds the dawning of a new chapter in Ethiopian political history in which freedom, equal rights and self-determination of all the peoples shall be the governing principles of political and socio-economic life (Vaughan, 2003; Assefa, 2006; Yonatan, 2010). With this constitution, different ethnic groups and identities were recognized under the banner of "Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia" and established a federal state by dividing and

sharing power between the federal and state governments (Constitution, 1995:Arts.46, 47, 56& 57).

In spite of the problem within its making process and implementation, “[...] the principles incorporated in the constitution are, in many ways, [liberal and] a break with the past” (Semahagn, 2014:80). Furthermore, vis-à-vis the new social contract or the constitution of 1995, Semahagn Gashu, (2014:80), goes on to write:

The most striking feature of the FDRE Constitution is its complete departure from the past, by making the transformation from a strong centralized monarchical (later socialist) state, to a highly decentralized federal state. This approach rejects the patriotic narrative, based on historic Ethiopian nationhood and replaces it with an idea of Ethiopia as a multi-ethnic state. The other important feature of the constitution is its unprecedented emphasis on ethnic identity. The preamble of the constitution begins with ‘we the nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia’ as opposed to the common phrase ‘we the people’.

In light with this, the 1995 EPRDF constitution as stated in article 39 (2) recognizes the cultural rights of all ethnic groups “[...] the right to speak, to write and to develop its own language; to express, to develop and to promote its culture; and to preserve its history. Despite some of its problem “the constitution meets all the criteria by which modern, democratic constitutions can be judged [and] lays the foundations of a state ruled by law” (Henze, 2000:335,341). At least on paper, the FDRE constitution also deals with the structure and division of powers between the federal government and regional states and formed three independent organs of government: executive, legislative and judiciary, with their respective share of power and function (FDRE Constitution 1995:Art. 51, 52, Art. 55, 72, 79; Habib, 2010). Moreover, the FDRE constitution as its fundamental principles, has also recognized and guaranteed both human and democratic rights; and, it has officially advocated secularism through the separation of state and religion (FDRE 1995:Art., 10, 11, 14-44; Habib, 2010). Thus, the decentralization or remaking of Ethiopia politics through federalization was led to transition from an autocratic unitary system to Ethiopian second peoples Republic or a federal system of government in Ethiopia (Young, 1996; Tronvoll, 2008).

On the whole, the post-1991 remaking of Ethiopian politics was embraced recognition of cultural diversity, linguistic and political pluralism, decentralization of government structure through self-rule and shared rule principles, genuine holding together multi-cultural federation, separation of powers and checks and balances, regional autonomy, fair free and competitive election, multi-party democracy or in general terms democracy and democratization of Ethiopian polity (Cohen, 1995; Keller, 2002; Merera,2003; Assefa, 2006; Alem, 2004; Asnake, 2009; Yonatan, 2010; Semahagn, 2014). And it was also guaranteed self-administration/self-rule, and organized parliamentary form of government with two federal houses: the house of Peoples' Representatives and the House of the Federation with their respective function and responsibilities (FDRE 1995:Art., 53, 54). However, despite its initial positive measures at the opening phase of the transition, the TPLF/EPRDF failed to fulfill its promises which stated in the constitution and remain the same with its predecessors in practical terms.

3.4.5. Lost opportunity, Closure of Democratic Process and Dashed Hope for Consolidation

Soon after 1991 when the oppositions were excluded from the conference of transitional process, formation of Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), the adoption of transitional charter, exclusion of opposition from 1992 elections and the TPLF/EPRDF became the sole sponsor of political infrastructure, democratic promises at the opening phase of the transition was started to erode (Merera, 1994; Vestal, 1999; Harbeson, 2005). And, this democratic recession had got its critical stage since 2001 as a result of “internal dissent in 2001 and popular opposition in 2005, [when] TPLF leaders reverted to an authoritarian populism that echoed the party's Leninist origins” (Crises Group, 2009:6). Thus, the causes of this democratic reversion and closure could be identified as structural/fundamental, cultural, TPLF's difficulty of transforming itself from armed movement into a democratic government,2001 TPLF split, disputed elections of 2005and its impacts, rigged elections of 2010 and 2015 and youth opposition and regime response.

3.4.5.1. Structural/Fundamental Causes

Sadly, the recognized and promised democratic rights and political power decentralization remained paper value and lacked implementation on the ground because of the hegemonic aspiration of the TPLF through its philosophy of 'national struggle first' (Merera, 2011). To achieve this, the TPLF/EPRDF excluded multi-ethnic opposition political parties from democratization process (Leenco, 1999). As a result of these politics of exclusion and

domination on all promised democratic political processes were started to erode the started democracy and democratization; this in turn was created the question of legitimacy against TPLF/EPRDF (Sorenson, 1995; Aron, 2002; Mohammed, 2002; Ketemaw, 2020).

Another important point should be raised here is, “the regional and local elections of 1992 which became the acid test for the new regime’s decentralization initiative along democratic lines” (ibid: 74). Thus, the June 1992 elections did not serve its objectives of democratic political transition and democratization; rather it helped the incumbent government to consolidate its power through a semblance of democratic elections and the exclusion of its opponents like: OLF, AAPO, EPRP and MEISON from the election (Ottaway, 1995; Leenco, 1999; Aron, 2002). In short, “the 1992 elections were neither ‘free nor fair’, nor did they help the institutionalization of multi-party democracy in the country” (Merera, 2011:74), instead, it closed the opened democratization process through what Schmitter & Karl (1991:78) called the “fallacy of electoralism” and created a new style of authoritarianism through the monopoly of power by the TPLF/ EPRDF (Pausewang, 1992; Vestal, 1994).

Moreover, “the most serious pitfall in the Ethiopian democratization and decentralization process is the absence of ‘democratic politics’ in the ongoing federal experiment (Merera, 2007:84). And ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is also used by TPLF-led EPRDF for the purpose of ‘divide and rule’ through its top-down policy directions to control lower level activities and challenge regional autonomy and secure its political position/centralization(Abbink, 1997; Mohammed, 1999;Vestal, 1999; Aalen, 2002; Siraw, 2015). Another important point why Ethiopian ethnic federalism is not achieved its objective of democratization of the country, national integration and reducing conflicts is, “Ethiopia began as what appeared to be ‘holding together’ federation in 1991, but within a year ended up as a ‘putting together’ federation” (Keller, 2002: 24), and it couldn’t bring the desired national integration on equal terms (Siraw, 2015).

The hegemonic aspiration of the post-1991 dominant Tigrayan elite to dominate all socio-economic and political infrastructures and other coalition members were also another structural challenge for democratic political transition (Merera, 2011). Lack of strong democratic institutions, party-state fusion, weak and fragmented opposition political parties those couldn’t challenge the incumbent TPLF led EPRDF government were contributed much for the closure of democratization in Ethiopia (Merera, 2011; Samir, 2018).

For over a decade, the United States has considered the Horn of Africa a major source of global terrorism. Thus, following the 9-11 attacks against the United States, the Horn Africa came under intense scrutiny by counter-terrorism specialists and it remains a strategic focal point in the American war against terrorism (USIP, 2004). Ethiopia has geopolitical significance for the United States of America and strategic military partnership to combat terrorism (ibid). Therefore, Ethiopian government uses Western concerns about security, especially US anti-terrorism policies, as a domestic policy instrument. The regime has managed to delegitimize internal opposition under the pretense of fighting terrorism and violates human and democratic rights of the citizen internally (Yonas, 2016). Because “the international community and donor countries perception of the regime has shifted from democratization to economic and security imperatives” (ibid: 132), this had contributed much for the closure of democratization in Ethiopia.

3.4.5.2. Undemocratic Political Culture

Lack of consensus between the TPLF/EPRDF and other opposition political forces on the remaking of the state structure and policy directions became the problem of democratic political transition and democratization in Ethiopia (Merera, 2011). Authoritarian legacy of the past, patrimonial politics based on political loyalty, conspiracy politics among political parties and elites within governing coalition and opposition, limited culture of compromise or give and take politics (Merera, 2011; Samir, 2018).

Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) s difficulty of transforming itself from armed movement into a democratic government was also one of the causes that eroded democratic political transition of post-1991. Thus, following its impressive military victory achieved in comradeship with the EPLF in 1991, the EPRDF quickly moved its military victory to a political success (Merera, 2011), however, “the hegemonic aspiration of the militarily victorious elite was stifled [democratic] political, opening up” (ibid: 65).

3.4.5.3. Ideological Principles of EPRDF and Revolutionary Democracy

The authoritarian politics of the former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi like TPLF-EPRDF highly controlled every aspects of the society by using its draconian ideological principles which opposed to the formal constitutional principles of its own (Merera, 2011; Semahagn, 2014). These ideological principles were, “revolutionary democracy, developmental state doctrine, *gimgemma* (criticism and self-criticism), democratic centralism, and neopatrimonialist

mobilization of party membership and support” (Larbi, 2001; Vaughan, 2011; Semahagn, 2014; Prunier, 2015; Abbink, 2017); from then on, Ethiopia’s democratic consolidation lost hope. Concerning these repressive ideological principles of TPLF dominated EPRDF, Takele Bekele (2019:1), maintains that,

To maintain the dominant position within the coalition the TPLF has transferred its rebel time internal governance network that focuses on traditional Marxist Leninist organizational lines, with an emphasis on revolutionary democracy or “democratic centralism”; and a tradition of hierarchically organizational structure to the newly established political organization i.e. EPRDF. Consequently, the EPRDF intraparty network and governance system is dominated by the use of ML (Marxist-Leninist) authoritarian methods and hegemonic control, rigid hierarchical leadership; democratic centralism, the dominance of the party apparatus behind the façade of regional and local autonomy, an extensive patron-client mechanisms; the use of force to silence opposition within and outside the party; intertwined state institutions and the party system and excessive reliance on party entity instead of state administration units; and gimgema (self-evaluation) are worth mentioning.

In line with this, “the EPRDF controls all the regional state governments in the Ethiopian federation, either directly through its member parties or indirectly through affiliate parties [or through attaching the big men from TPLF]” (Paulos, 2007:355). When faced with internal dissent in 2001 and popular opposition in 2005, TPLF leaders reverted to an authoritarian populism, and started to organized under the principle of democratic centralism and it exercises strict control over the regional and local governments through party structure(Young, 1997;Aalen, 2002). Further, “in the principle of democratic centralism, the top leadership of the EPRDF uncontested authority to decide both the ideological and organizational affairs of the organization” (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003:15), which is the anti-thesis of democratic political decentralization.

Therefore, because of the contradictory behavior of these ideological principles with democratic values, democratization process in Ethiopia couldn’t reach its consolidation phase; and aborted at its break through phase. In support of this, “the EPRDF sponsored experiment at multi-party democracy is informed by ‘revolutionary democracy’, which overtly sub-scribes the principles of

liberal democracy but secretly, adheres to the fundamentals of democratic centralism” (Merera, 2011:68). By and large, “the Leninist political heritage of “democratic centralism’ ’could be taken as important continuities of the past *Derg* military regime” (Hagmann & Abbink, 2012:584), and this implies the deterioration of democratization process in Ethiopia.

In nutshell, even though, at the opening phase of the democratization process and the radical restructuring of the Ethiopian polity, included the introduction of formal multi-party politics, recognizing ethnicity as the political idiom of public life, holding elections, redrawing administrative boundaries, decentralizing bureaucracy, and liberalizing different sectors of the economy, as a result of these repressive ideological principles of the TPLF/EPRDF, the started democratic political transition became reversed to totalitarian form of government which makes it similar with that of the *derg* authoritarian regime.

3.4.5.4. Repressive Laws and the Closure of Democratic Opening

Following the 2005 national election crisis, different unconstitutional and politically motivated proclamations or repressive laws were enacted by TPLF/EPRDF government which violates democratic principles and the FDRE constitution of 1995. For instance, Media and Press law, Anti-Terrorism Law, Charities and Societies Law are among the most debatable legislation in the aftermath of the controversial election of 2005; which was highly affected the democratization process in Ethiopia (Arriola, 2011; Merera, 2010; Abbink, 2017).

The most controversial and debatable legislations that is believed to be a challenge to democratic consolidation particularly of politically active individuals, opposition groups, political activists, Media, international human rights organizations and human rights activists were targeted (Gunther & Mughan, 2000; Amnesty International, 2012; Abebe, 2012). Thus, by using these proclamations, the government was violated and repressed internationally protected freedoms and to crack down on political dissent, including peaceful political demonstrations and public criticisms of government policy (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Moreover, it has been violated freedom of expression, freedom associations which are pillars of democracy and used to put down the opposition and intimidate citizens (Asare & Sekyere, 2016). These laws permit long-term imprisonment and even the death penalty for “crimes” that bear no resemblance, under any credible definition (Human Rights Watch, 2009; Abebe, 2012; Seble, 2012). Therefore, these laws and proclamations have been placed excessive restrictions on the work of democratic

organizations and jeopardizes the observance and protection of human and democratic rights of every person in Ethiopia. In turn, these have hindered democratization and the consolidation democratic political transition in the country (Ross, 2010; Menychle, 2019).

3.4.5.5. The rise of Oligarchy and Privatization of the State

Corruption and control of the economy by the party in ruling position is the anti-thesis of democratization and democracy which hinders the consolidation of democratic political transition. This is the reality in Ethiopia after the split within the TPLF in 2001 and augmented 2005 election developmental state rhetoric began to appear in the Ethiopian political landscape (Paulos, 2003). To be sure, “Ethiopian oligarchy which is a party led oligarchy was emerged under the EPRDF regime, as manifested in the political economy of growth, the creation of major conglomerates and the holding onto state power by ruling party elites” (Tefera 2019: iii).

These oligarchies (party nomenklatura/EFFORT, military/ METEC, Ethio-Saudi businessman/ MIDROC)in were engaged monopoly through privatization, land deals, deceptive shareholdings, and corruption (Demissie, 2008; Cherry 2009; winters, 2011; Berhanu, 2011; Tefera, 2019). In the end, these all are against the promised free market economy, multi-party system, and democratization; which in turn led to the monopoly of democratic political space, monopoly of the economy which widened inequality in resource sharing and led to poverty. Therefore, privatization of democratic political infrastructure and the state severely hampered democratization process and consolidated democratic political transition in Ethiopia (Berhanu, 2011; Tefera, 2019), these were a critical challenge for democratic political transition in Ethiopia of the post 1991.

3.4.5.6. Internal Schism within the TPLF and Contested Parliamentary Elections

The internal rift of TPLF was negatively affected the political transition of post 1991. In 2001 different undemocratic measures were taken by Meles-Sebhat group against Tewelde-Siye group (as Meles mention them “Rotten Bonapartists”) by the name of fighting against corruption and undemocratic comportment in the TPLF through ‘self-assessment’ or in Amharic called ‘*gimgema*’ which against the democratic principles (Paulos,2003). From that time onwards, different political assassinations were took place, labeling one another as corrupt, anti-democracy, anti-development, and anti-Leninist principle of democratic centralism was started

(*ibid*), and Meles accused them of “Bonapartism”, a Marxist term for a counter-revolutionary attitude” (Crises Group, 2009:6).

Therefore, the crisis of 2001 is a watershed in the history and changed nature of the TPLF. As a result of “[this] crises and dog eat dog approach within the TPLF, the political transition at its initial stage with some kind of political space has started to erode and made a U turn from its opening phase toward authoritarianism”(Pruiner, 2015). Thus, “human rights were not [the] main concern that is an understatement and repressive legislation and practice (on the press, on personal rights, on political activity) were common” (*ibid*: 427). And then, the promised democracy at the opening phase of democratic transition of 1991, especially, electoral and multi-party politics have severely threatened by political domination of TPLF after, May 2005 parliamentary election (Abbink, 2006; Merara, 2011, Vaughan, 2015).

Before 2005, the elections held in the country were not competitive elections and were dominated by ruling party EPRDF through the intimidation of opposition candidates, violence and electoral fraud (Pausewang, 1994; Tronvoll & Aadland, 1995; Crises Group, 2009). Nonetheless, Patric Gilkes (2015), in Gérard Prunier(2015), writes:

The May 2005 elections marked a significant change in Ethiopia’s political history, being the country’s first genuinely contested elections. Several opposition parties, despite expressing mistrust of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) and doubts about government intentions, decided, under considerable international pressure, to participate rather than boycott as in 1995 and 2000. In all, a total of 35 parties contested the election, for both federal and regional assemblies (2015: 313).

In support of this again, “beginning on 15 May 2005, Ethiopia conducted the first genuinely competitive multiparty elections in its long history” (Harbeson, 2005:144). In this election “the EPRDF was challenged by the opposition groups; especially, from the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF)” (Gilkes, 2015: 428). Indeed, “the elections were a step forward but did not signify a decisive, non-reversible move towards democracy because of the uncertainty about the counting procedures, the real results, and the controversial government response” (Abbink, 2006:174).

Even though, “the 2005 elections witnessed an unprecedented breakthrough to political mobilization [...] soon after the elections, the artificiality of the opening was revealed when the government cracked down on the opposition [following the contested election result]” (Semahagn, 2014:245). John Abbink (2006) again notes this election contest and its aftermath as follows:

The Ethiopian parliamentary elections of May 2005 were the most contested ever. Preceded by a relatively free and open public debate between the dominant party and opposition parties, as well as by more wide spread campaigning in the countryside than hitherto, they generated an atmosphere of hope and dynamism. But they ended in sharp disagreement, controversy, and massive repression of popular protest in the post-election phase. Opposition parties claimed to have won, but to have been denied victory because of rigging, and when their demand for new elections in contested constituencies were rejected, they called for demonstrations. A period of instability and violence began, leading to the killing of dozens of people and the arrest of tens of thousands of alleged opponents and protestors and suppression of civil society groups (2006:176).

In summation, “when faced with internal dissent in 2001 and popular opposition in 2005, TPLF leaders reverted to an authoritarian populism that echoed the party’s Leninist origins” (Crises Group, 2009:6). Thus, following the post-election crises of May 2005, the democratic breakthrough phase of democratization process was reverted back and the hope for democracy was faded away. Following that, the TPLF dominated EPRDF, begin to erode democracy through the introduction of tyrannical rules and regulations as well as repressive ideological principles (Merara, 2011; Semahagn, 2014).

3.5. Conclusion

To conclude, in the Ethiopia’s political history of pre-2018, despite some political and socio-economic developments, there were only attempts of reforms which were not existed on the ground and have not yet got down to essentials as desired by the mass society in all successive regimes of the time. For instance, Emperor Tewdros-II came up with his policy re-unification, centralization and modernization by ending the era of princes. The approaches that he used to achieve his above listed objectives pitted him with different internal and external forces. As a result of this, his reform objectives were aborted and Emperor Yohannes-IV followed him.

Except his approach of controlled regionalism, he followed the foot step of his predecessor and succeeded by Menelik-II of Shewa. The time of Menelik-II was marked with the full restoration of imperial authority with vast territorial expansion and transformation to a vast empire.

Both *derg* and EPRDF at their initial phase were attempted different radical reforms which make them different from their predecessors. However, except its radical land reform, the socialist *derg* initial promises were not implemented on the ground and finally failed. At the opening phase of EPRDF transition, federal state structure, liberal constitution, free market economy, multiparty system were introduced; sadly, all initial promises were failed without democratizing the state and finally reversed to semi-authoritarian system (Merara, 2011), both were characterized by politics of exclusion.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. THE NEW POLITICAL TRANSITION IN ETHIOPIA SINCE 2018: DRIVERS, AND CHALLENGES

4.1. Introduction

The preceding chapter analyzed the why and how of the history of political transition in Ethiopia from modern to contemporary period -2018, its initial promises, its achievements and its failure. This chapter aims at examining the what, why and how/ drivers, changes, challenges of new political transition in Ethiopia since 2018, based on the collected data through interviews, FGDs and various documents found to be pertinent for the study.

4.2. The Drivers of New Political Transition in Ethiopia

There were different drivers of 2018 political transition in the country. The mass People's protest movements from below in different parts of the country and political division within the ruling party from above were the major ones. Thus, this sub-section of the chapter aimed at analyzing important drivers of 2018 Ethiopia's Transition.

4.2.1. The mass People's Protest Movements in Different Parts of Ethiopia Since 2014

Protest is an organized public action objecting to an official policy or course of action; and, political protest manifested by demonstrations, boycotts, or strikes in which participants or actors demanded political rights and freedom or new rulers are common in the African continent (Batton, 1997). In Ethiopia, anti-government protest and public resistances were voiced in different parts of the country since EPRDF's ascent to state power in 1991. But the protests became more protracted and organized after the 2015 elections in which TPLF-led EPRDF claimed to have won one hundred percent of the parliamentary seats (Arriola, 2013; Menychile, 2016; Abbink, 2017). To make clear, lack of political and socio-economic justice, lack of equitable sharing of political power and resources, lack of good governance, democracy, specially, the issues of land led to mass protest in Ethiopia since 2014(Allo, 2016; Gaffey, 2016; Schemm, 2016).

4.2.1.1. The Oromo People's Protest

According to scholars, “the Oromo people are one of the most numerous people in Africa and the largest ethno-nation in the Horn of Africa” (Baxter, et al, 1996: 7; Jeylan, 2006:256). In Ethiopia, they constitute more than 40% of the country's total population and occupy the largest regional state of the federal state. Moreover, the Oromo live largely in the Regional State of Oromia, the largest and the most populous of the nine regional states formed following the downfall of the *Derg* regime in May 1991(Jeylan, 2006).

In its history, Ethiopia experienced several consequential protests and uprisings. For example, the 1960 student movement played a crucial role in ending the regime of Haile Selassie in 1974. The civil war in northern Ethiopia that lasted for decades led to the overthrow of the Marxist-Leninist regime of Mengistu Hailemariam in 1991 and secession of Eritrea in 1993(Beharu, 1991; Andargachew,1993; Henze, 2000; Merera, 2011). The Oromo protests that started in April and May 2014/2015 and continued until 2018 was forced Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn to resign on February 15, 2018(Amnesty International, 2014).

Accordingly, the Oromo protest movement had taken an astonishing and exceptional turn in pushing the TPLF led EPRDF regime to an endless crisis from 2014/2015 onwards. Even if there were other factors, the initial cause of the protest was against the ‘Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan’ a plan which was taken as one of the infrastructure development program by some of the government officials (ACLEDA, 2017). However, the plan would have expanded the territory of Addis Ababa, the capital city, into surrounding areas of the region (Amnesty International, 2015), and some of the government officials share this idea; especially from OPDO. This master plan viewed by Oromo activists as a scheme by government officials to displace farmers from their lands. Other factors such as constitutional right violation, political marginalization, corruption, unemployment, issues of border, and a violent response by security forces have exacerbated protest politics in the region. Moreover, the three decades of an authoritarian rule and domination by TPLF/EPRDF regime led to widespread discontent that sparked a series of protests in the region by 2014/2015(Allo, 2016; ACLEDA, 2017; Faleg, 2019; Mebratu, 2019).

Most importantly, the year 2016 provided more attributes for the Oromo struggle against the TPLF/EPRDF regime. For instance, the Ethiopian national examination was seeped by the

Oromo activist Jawar Siraj Mohammed before the exam date. Further, on August 21, 2016, the marathon runner Feyisa Lesisa crossed the finish line in Rio de Janeiro crossing his hands over his head, showing his solidarity with the protest movement in Ethiopia (Allison ,2016; Mebratu, 2019). Another important impetus of the Oromo protest was the *Irreechaa* festivity of October 2016 that caused the death of numerous peoples which had escalated the tension in the region (ACLEDA, 2017). As a result of this anger, some protests in the region became violent as protesters destroyed foreign and local businesses, farms, vehicles, particularly those nearby Addis Ababa. Accordingly, the repressive responses by the TPLF-led EPRDF government on the protest made the Oromo youths irritant highly against the government. To make clear, the *derg* military regime also use military solution to suppress the dissidents, this approach in turn led Mengistu's government to total collapse in 1991(Merera, 2011).

The same is true for the TPLF led EPRDF; its repressive response against people's protest movements and turning the deaf ear to the people's questions. Due to this, the Oromo protest supported by a well-organized movement of the Oromo's youth commonly labeled "*Qeerroo*", is the corner of struggle to overthrow the TPLF which have absolute power over the three sister parties of the EPRDF, namely, the OPDO, ANDM, and SEPDM. Finally the People's pressures widen the internal party division of EPRDF coalition. The pressure from the Oromo protest which is facilitated largely by a youth-led movement has prompted the EPRDF regime to introduce several internal reforms and then initiated a political transition in the country. Therefore, Oromo's protest was the one stream for the coming of politics by transition since 2018. Thus, the *Qeerroos*, an Oromo "National Youth Movement for Freedom and Democracy" became the big player contributing to the birth of the in-progress Ethiopia's political transition (Paulos, 2029).

4.2.1.2. The Amhara People's Protest

The Oromo protest visibly had the spillover effect on the Amhara. The Amhara people's protest had a similar character with that of the Oromo's which was instigated by political marginalization, economic inequality, and more particularly the issue of land. Accordingly, in August 2016 public protests and demonstration took place in different parts the Amhara National Regional State, particularly in Gondar and Bahir Dar as opposition against arbitrary detention of

members of Wolqait identity and self-determination committee members which aimed at the return of Wolqait to the Amhara region from Tigray (Abbink, 2017).

Consequently, the peoples of the Amhara regional state intensified the protest against the TPLF-led EPRDF regime. The public protest that erupted in the Amhara region opposed the government's ill-treatment of the protestors of the Oromia region in 2016. Thus, many expressions of solidarity were made at rallies, in one of the Amhara region's demonstrations in "Gondar" it was stated that, "the blood flowing in Oromia is also our blood" (Getnet, 2018:12). The domineering nature of the TPLF/EPRDF and the expansion and annexation in the northern part of the region highly fueled the Amara protest.

4.2.1.3. Solidarity Movements of Other Ethnic Group

The government's violent response to the Oromo protests has prompted populations in other regions to demonstrate their solidarity with the Oromo and Amhara demonstrators. In addition to the Oromo *Qeerroo* and the Amhara *Fano*, the Gurage *Zerma*, the Sidama *Ejetto*, the Somali *Berberta*, the Dawro *Lakayto* and Diasporas also played a significant role in bring the ongoing political transition in Ethiopia. Students in regions outside Oromia held various protests and sit-ins in solidarity. Key flashpoints were the universities of Dila and Hawasa (SNNPR region) and the various schools in Dire Dawa, where many Oromo students resided. The inhabitants of Jijiga, in the Somali region, as well as members of the Muslim community in Addis Ababa, also demonstrated in support of the Oromo protests (ACLED, 2017).

Lastly, hundreds of people in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa responded to the Oromos' Grand Protest call on 6 August, 2016, organizing large demonstrations in their respective areas. Moreover, members of the Konso community protested in the SNNPR in March 2016 to demand autonomous administration and the right to self-determination. The demonstration resulted in a violent government response that triggered further protests (Amnesty, 2016). Residents of several districts in Addis Ababa and in Dire Dawa also marched, in June 2016 and July 2016 respectively, to protest the future eviction from their homes planned by the government. Other expressions of group grievances were more violent: the Qimant farmers (of the Agaw ethnic group) clashed with security forces in November 2015. Members of the *Surma* ethnic group also clashed with government forces in the Omo valley in March and in Mizan Teferi in SNNPR in July 2016 over dispossession of their lands without compensation.

Surma militants also attacked a group of European tourists in November 2016. Finally, farmers of Addis Ababa clashed with state forces in May 2016 as they were being evicted from their properties by security forces (ACLED, 2017), these in sum challenged the TPLF/EPRDF regime and forced to resign since 2018.

4.2.2. Political Cleavage within EPRDF Coalition

Political transition is a complex process and it may be characterized by instabilities and crises. It is also not static or a one direction process, it might be one step forward and one step back ward (Huntington, 1991). And political transition is also a result of the interaction of external and internal change seeker forces within a given country. Furthermore, political transition takes place through different methods and pathways. These could be reform, compromise, and overthrow or the transition from below, transition from above and transition through negotiation are most common in different countries (ibid).

Therefore, based on the evidence from both my primary and secondary data, the new political transition in Ethiopia which has begun since 2018 is a transition resulted from people's protest and the emergence of liberal reformer within the EPRDF. This transition is the sum of transition from above by the liberal reformer called "Team Lemma" and transition from below by people's movement (Oromo protest, Amhara protest, activists, diaspora, etc.) took place for four consecutive years from 2014-2018. Additionally, this transition is different from that of the two successive regime changes Ethiopia experienced since the mid-1970s; because, it is transition by transformation from above through the leading of liberal reformer.

Another important point to understand the current political transition in Ethiopia is also what Samuel P. Huntington (1991) in his famous work, *The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, admitted that political transition processes involving a variety of groups struggling for power and for and against democracy and other goals. There are standpatters, liberal reformers/ and democratic reformers in the governing coalition, and democratic moderates and revolutionary extremists in the opposition (1991:121). In doing so, in the case of Ethiopia, after the political cleavage within the EPRDF coalition due to people's pressure from below, the political elites within the two sister parties of OPDO, and ANDM became the advocator of the reform, and the TPLF needed to remain with the status quo of the authoritarian political culture. On the whole, one can conclude that the new Ethiopia's political

transition was the drive of change that came from some of the reformist elites within the ruling EPRDF government; which is “political transition by transformation”

4.3. Causes of People’s Movement and Its Consequences

The people’s protest movement voiced a broad range of political and economic demands. As discussed above the causes of the people’s protest, can be seen as the immediate trigger of the protests and the long-standing issues. For instance, the immediate triggering factor for the Oromo protest was what described as the Addis Ababa-Oromia Special Zones Integrated Master plan, also known as the Master plan. Further, there are also long-standing socio-economic, political, and cultural grievances.

Evidently, at the heart of the economic and political grievances and the mother of all conflicts was the land issue. Different successive regimes couldn’t solve land related problems in Ethiopia. Border related conflicts in different parts of the country were the claim of land. For example, between Amhara national regional state and Tigray national regional state, between Oromia national regional state and Somali national regional state, and between Oromia regional state and Southern Nation Nationalities and Peoples national regional states. In addition, the Addis Ababa master plan which was the immediate factor for the Oromo protest was also related to the issue of land. According to Oromo activists the master plan was taken as the government project that would expand the territory of Addis Ababa into the surrounding areas of the Oromia region for the land grab (Allo, 2016).

Lack of practical implementation with its promises of post-1991 like: genuine multinational federalism, liberal economy, and multi-party democracy were led to structural problems in the country and created long standing causes for people’s protest movement. The long standing causes of the people’s movement which led to transition were economic inequality, unemployment, lack of fair share of resources and political power, lack of inclusive politics, authoritarianism, repression, neo-patrimonial politics, internal divisions within the (EPRDF) and both political and economic domination of TPLF were among the causes of people’s movement, especially which became strong since 2015. Moreover, the problem with center-periphery relation starting from Ethiopian state formation to present, that led to marginalization and discrimination of the periphery in socio-economic and political arena, minority rule over

majority, lack of representative government and democracy were also another factor which were caused the people's protest.

Ethiopia has re-structured in line with ethnic federalism since 1991 and has got new liberal constitution in 1995 with promises of multi-party democracy (Asnake, 2009; Merara, 2011). In spite of its promises, there was no proper implementation of federalism in line with constitutional provisions. Instead, the TPLF/EPRDF has used different proclamations and principles which contradict with its own constitutional provisions and abuse both human and democratic rights. This in turn also led to another political gripe in the country since 2001 to 2018. To point out, after 2001 internal crises of TPLF, the democratization process in Ethiopia has started to revert; because of the dominance of one person Meles Zenawi.

PM Meles Zenawi put the TPLF and the entire EPRDF under his personal monopoly through adopting democratic centralism (Semahegn, 2014). And after years, Meles died in 2012 and leadership transitions in took place peacefully without an incident. Haile Mariam Dessalegn who was Deputy Prime Minister assumed power. From that time onward, internal power struggle started within the EPRDF coalition. The sum of this internal power struggle within TPLF led EPRDF and people's protests from the outside greatly challenge the existence of EPRDF as strong vanguard party. But still the TPLF dominated EPRDF turned deaf ear to these situation. In addition, the government responses to the people's protests through arresting and killing some protesters were also escalating the situation which came up with the new demands of the release of political prisoners and demand for justice for those who were killed by security forces.

As a consequence of these and especially, the domination of TPLF over the other members of the EPRDF which was resulted in the opening up of power competition and clashed within the coalition members of the ruling party for a leadership position in the federal authorities (Cok, 2019). Even though no successor was named then, the appointment of Hailemariam, as deputy prime minister gave hints about Ethiopia's political direction after Meles. Therefore, Hailemariam's reign as the PM and representing the SEPDM was characterized by the appointment of three deputy prime ministers each of them represented remaining parties in the coalition from the ANDM, TPLF, and APDO (Aalen, 2014). Nevertheless, taking political measures did not terminate the TPLF's domination, power imbalance, and hostility between political elites within the coalition of EPRDF. Therefore, as people's protest and pressure

continued, this political power competition within the EPRDF became tough and resulted in the birth for the teamwork effort of ANDM and OPDO (Team Lemma) in late 2017 and early 2018.

This in turn, was created different actors and participants in the process based on their attitudes toward the democratization processes, what Samuel P. Huntington called “the standpatters, liberal reformers/democratic reformers in the governing coalition, and democratic moderates and revolutionary extremists in the opposition” (Huntington, 1991:121). This is what was happening in EPRDF coalition since 2018 as a result of centripetal force of people’s pressure and centrifugal force of the liberal reformer or what called itself “team lemma” until recently. Still the protest continued.

Following that, PM Haile Mariam Desalegn and his cabinet declared a state of emergency and then the Premier has ordered the security forces to shoot at the demonstrators (Amnesty international, 2017). However, the government forceful measures did not stop the protest and the government’s approach toward the protestors couldn’t be the solution rather it became the part of the problem; and protestors in the Amhara region condemned the response taken by security forces and had continued their struggle in an organized manner. In addition to the protest, the commitment and wise strategies used by the Amhara and Oromo leaders within the EPRDF regime were the major reason that accelerated the effort to bring about a transition to democracy in Ethiopia. The affirmations by Amhara and Oromo’s political elites were framed as a reformist and have shown their effort to end the TPLF authoritarian domination in Ethiopian politics (Paulos, 2019). Therefore, continuous protest erupted in the region for more than three years severely challenged the EPRDF government until resignation of the former PM Haile Mariam Desalegn which finally led to the opening phase of Ethiopian transition of 2018. Therefore, the new political transition of 2018 in Ethiopia was the result of people’s protest from outside of the party and reformer team within the party

Given these points, Ethiopia’s transition which has started in 2018, is the outcome of two severe crises that shook the regime to the core over four years of relentless mass protests in Oromiya and Amhara regional states and a sharp economic downturn. Furthermore, people’s protest and the split within the coalition of EPRDF show the revolutionary democracy has had an expiry date. Later on, the strategic coordination effort by above two sister party and fractious

internal reshuffle brought Abiy to the Premiership of Ethiopia and Hailemariam Desalegn resigned from power (Aalen,2019; Paulos, 2019).

4.4. Actors in the New Political Transition as a Driving Force

The preceding section of this chapter discussed the causes and consequences of people's movement in bringing political transition in the country. This sub-section is going to give a brief discussion on actors that participates in bringing the current political change and transition in Ethiopia. Indeed, starting from 1960s youth have played a critical role in different political movement in the country specially, the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM). Most of these were students of different levels of education like High school, collaged and university. The same is true in the people's movement from 2014 to 2018, the youth specifically, the student were played a leading role.

As a result of the above discussed problems youth (students) from different Ethnic groups organized themselves and started to fight against the injustice and repression of the TPLF/EPRDF since 2014. For example, *Qeerroo* from the Oromos, *Fano* from the Amara, *Ejeto* from the Sidama, *Zurma* from Gurage, etc. are the well-known actors in the people's protest which has the prominent role in bringing down the TPLF. According to both primary and secondary data, most of these youth were secondary school and university students; because these students are educated and aware about the problems of their people. Moreover, these youth students have also an exposure to different digital device like computer and mobile phone which give them different information from around the world. This access of technology also enables these youths to coordinate and organize themselves in a very clandestine way and exchange information among themselves and the diaspora activists. Another point why the youth always take the pole position in the people's movement is their natural nature of change seeker. The age of youth, their energetic nature, risk taker, dynamic force and their change-oriented mind make them at the forefront of the people's questions and movements. Furthermore, because of unemployment many graduate students couldn't get job opportunities, this has also taken the university students to protest against the TPLF/EPRDD regime.

Diaspora and activists also have played important role in supporting and organizing the people's protest at home. The Ethiopian diaspora is estimated at two million, a significant number of whom remain actively engaged in domestic politics and critical of the ruling government. On the

whole, youth, diaspora activists, writers, opposition parties, main stream and social media, activists, bloggers, athletes and journalists play a key role in providing coverage of the recent protests, particularly on social media websites like Facebook and Twitter. This was particularly important considering the limited press freedom and the increasingly severe government restrictions on communication and information-sharing platforms inside the country. For example, criticism on social media following violence at the *Irreechaa* festival in Bishoftu on 2 October 2016, was possible by activists based outside Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, the entire Internet was shut down in most parts of the country after the events. The diaspora's ability to coordinate and lead the protest movement in Ethiopia, however, is blocked by the lack of internet access in rural areas of the country, and by the government's increasing restrictions. Beyond social media, international sporting events have also been used to raise awareness and support for the issues faced by Ethiopian ethnic groups in their country. For instance, crossing wrists above one's head became a gesture of solidarity with protesters in Ethiopia after silver medalist Feyisa Lilesa made the sign while crossing the finish line at the 2016 Rio Olympics.

The Medias were also contributing much in bringing the current political transition in Ethiopia which has started since 2018 through mobilizing people. To point out, both mainstream and social media played a significant role in coordinating and exchanging information among and between forces in the country and Diasporas. Social Medias like: Facebook, twitter, what Sapp, Telegram, YouTube, personal blogs, and Instagram and the mainstream media like: the Oromo Media Network (OMN) and Ethiopian Satellite Radio and Television (ESAT) played a prominent role as an actor of change in the country starting from 2014 to 2018. The former is directed by Jawar Mohammed, who was a leading advocate of the Oromo protests, while the latter is founded by Amhara intellectual circles.

The international community were put different pressure against the authoritarian TPLF controlled Ethiopian government during the people's protest. The European Parliament and the United States (US) Senate have produced the strongest statements, condemning the Ethiopian government's violent crackdown, and calling for their own governments to take a stronger stance against the EPRDF regime. Various international and regional bodies, as well as a number of human rights organizations, called for an independent, credible investigation into the crisis.

Other driving forces of the 2018 ongoing political transition in Ethiopia were intelligentsia, activists, civil society elite, opposition political parties, bloggers in the diaspora, and rebel groups from in and outside the country. For example, Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in some parts of Oromia, Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in the Somali Ogaden region, and Eritrea-based Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF) and Ginbot-7 in Tigray-Amara regions were contributed some in challenging the EPRDF regime. Moreover, activists like Jawar Siraj Mohammed played a very important role in coordinating and leading the Oromo protest and influencing the regime in different international Medias like Aljazeera. To add, intelligentsia, political and civil society elite and religious leaders were also played their part.

Lastly, the liberal reformers and their supporters those came out from the ruling EPRDF coalition, what has come to be known as "Team Lemma" with the personality of its leader, the new Prime Minister Abiy Ahimed Ali also played a profound role to end the old age socio-economic and political inequality, exclusive governance, patronage politics, severe human rights abuses and TPLF hegemony which could be taken as a significant departure from the past almost 27 plus years. These are among the driving factors that led to the new political transition that was begun since 2018.

4.5. The New Political Transition and its Changes

The above sub-chapter made a brief discussion on actors that participates in bringing the current political changes and political transition in Ethiopia. This part of the chapter seeks to discuss the new ongoing political transition in country and some changes resulted from it. The conceptual chapter of this thesis discussed the concepts of what a transition is, how it happen, its phases and processes, when and why of it. According to these concepts there is a new ongoing political transition in Ethiopia since 2018. This political transition is now at its opening/liberalization phase which has not yet reached at both breakthrough and consolidation phases. And it was also started through reform method of political transition over both, trans-placement and replacement or overthrow like that of both 1974 and 1991 transitions.

4.5.1. Some Changes with the Transition

For decades Ethiopians suffers from a lack of inclusive governance, human rights abuses, patronage politics, youth unemployment, and TPLF monopoly of every aspects of society. Moreover, under TPLF/EPRDF all initial promises and democratization process were eroded

severely. Dominant party politics, sham elections, divide and rule instead of genuine federalism, and controlled economy became the good features of TPLF led EPRDF government. Due to these and others, popular mobilizations demanding democratic change with long-standing autocratic leaders have been seen in country since 2014 to 2018 with strong aspiration of democracy. To make clear, Ethiopia faced considerable democratic challenges following mass anti-government protests between 2014 and 2018 which centered on demands for enhanced political and socio-economic reforms. This was resulted in incipient democratic reforms and democratic political transition in the country. The new ongoing political transition in Ethiopia therefore, has started by opening the political space, releasing thousands of political prisoners, signing peace agreement with neighboring Eritrea, solve the problem within the Ethiopian Orthodox church, allowing return of peaceful and non-peaceful opposition from exile, lifting a draconian state of emergency, announcing plans to revise repressive laws, the notorious federal crimes investigations unit in Addis Ababa, commonly known as *Maekelawi* was closed, removing past Army Chief of Staff and National Intelligence Security Service Director to reform the security sector, starting to fight corruption by taking corrupts to court, appointing new cabinets representing various ethnic groups, involving women in the highest leadership positions (including the presidency and key ministerial positions); engaging opposition parties and other marginalized sections of society in the political and reform of the security services (Badwaza, 2018; Weber, 2018; Tokuori, 2019; Yonas, 2019; Crisis Group, 2019).

In addition to the rapprochement with rival Eritrea, the peace deal between Eritrea and Djibouti, initiated an agreement with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), signed a peace agreement in August 2018 with most of the rebel Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and in October with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and the easing of restrictions on civil liberties, were another unexpected reforms that took place at the opening phase of the transition started since 2018.

In legal terms, to revise and repeal different repressive laws, Legal and Justice Affairs Advisory Council was established. A 13-members Law and Justice Advisory Council was appointed with the task of reviewing the CSO [civil society organizations] Law, the Anti-terrorism Law (Proclamation No. 652/2009, 28 August 2009) and the Media Law which was highly hampered both human and democratic rights for many years in Ethiopia. These important move of revising

and repealing of the Proclamation on Charities and Societies and its replacement with the new Proclamation on Civil Society provides robust protection for freedom of association while putting in place a reasonable regulatory and accountability mechanism.

Indeed, the draconian laws like: anti-terrorism law, media law, electoral law, and civil societies proclamation were reformed. Following the reform of these laws, the new administration also decided to unblock a number of websites, blogs and radio and TV stations including two diaspora TV stations [OMN and ESAT), lifting state of emergency, announced plans partial liberalization of the economy, admitting the past injustice and former opposition leader lawyer and judge Birtukan Midekssa was named head of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE).

Institutions have also been revamped (the Ministry of Peace) and the Ethiopian government has issued draft legislation to create new institutions such as the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC) to bridge political divides. Therefore, since Abiy Ahmed Ali became the youngest prime minister in Africa, the pace of change in Ethiopia has been lightning fast (Moti, 2018; Badwaza, 2018). Thus, there is new political transition in Ethiopia since 2018 which resulted from people protest from below and the political split within the EPRDF which paved the way for the emergence of liberal reformer from the two sisters' party of OPDO and ANDM (team Lemma).

On the whole, these reforms and ongoing transition had widened the political space in Ethiopia and could lead to an improvement in the human rights situation, including for members of the opposition. This development had inspired a cautious optimism among observers of the political situation in Ethiopia as the new administration had announced that it will take human rights more seriously. Despite, some emerging security problems, the overall and relative changes in Ethiopia is undeniable which could be taken as an opening phase of a transition from authoritarian [revolutionary democratic regime/'the developmental state'] regime to open democracy. Therefore, the opening of political space by new administration is a clear departure from the policies of the past decades by many of its predecessors with this new political transition that has taken place since 2018.

4.5.2. Different Positions on Ongoing Transition and Changes

There are different positions on the ongoing transition from different stake holders. For instance, the opposition political party officials from Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice (EZEMA) argue that there is a transition with some changes but still there are different challenges and problems. Even if it started with a good opening at its initial phase, it didn't achieve its desired objectives within expected speed; because there is no agreement and national consensus among the concerned stake holders concerning the transition process. Moreover, most of the interviewee from ruling political party, opposition, youth, elders, activists, and intellectuals shared together that, there were changes; but currently, there are challenges and signs of rolling back of those changes. This is because of the EPRDF-1 government structure at zonal, *wereda*, and *kebele* levels and extremist standpatters' politicians, rebel army forces both with the government and opposition.

Some of the opposition political party officials commented that “in spite of few changes at some first months of the coming to power of Abiyi Ahmed as a Prime Minister, the transition is aborted and hijacked by the group solely dominated the government position”. And, it lacks inclusiveness of all concerned bodies in the transitional process and dominated by the ruling party alone. Furthermore, Lemi Begna the OLF youth league chair argued that, “the group dominated the government position since 2018 is not responded a single Oromo people's question and not fulfilled its initial promises; this is why I say the transition is hijacked”. Melkamu NaMA office head add his argument “during TPLF many Amhara people were killed, jailed, displaced; at the same time since 2018 also many Amahara people killed and displaced in different parts of the country. This is why I call the transition replaced TPLF with ODP and reverted from its initial good start”

In addition, the governing political party officials uphold that there is a new and historic political transition in Ethiopia since 2018 after the inauguration of Dr. Abiyi Ahmed as a primer of the country. Notably, the resilience of protests that began in 2014 and the reformer group's commitment from the EPRDF coalition was the turning point for this ongoing transition. These two forces have opened the transition from military junta or from no democracy to wider democracy. Further, for the last 27 years, especially, after 2001 division within the TPLF and 2005 queried election, the very narrow democratic space in the country was totally closed not

only at country level, even within the TPLF led EPRDF political party. On the contrary, since 2018 there are numerable changes in the country. For instance, the above discussed changes were resulted from this ongoing democratic political transition.

Some of the civil society organization leaders also believe that, there is a transition in form of transformation/reform in Ethiopia since 2018. There are some political changes and further promises by the current government to change socio-economic policies of the country and there are some good starts. However, still there is no inclusive national dialogue to bring the better future and take the transition to its consolidation phase. The government give due emphasis to politics and political activities over socio-economic issues of the society. This in turn led to inflation and price increase in food related commodities, especially, in urban areas of the country. Moreover, lack of commitment on behalf of both ruling and opposition elites to agree on the transition and democratization process is also challenging these changes. As a result of these and others, some of the promised elements of this transition haven't devised as desired and expected by Ethiopian society.

Finally, youth activists, bloggers, and scholars also agreed that, there is a good opening of political space and good start for democratization. However, the future is still uncertain; because some of the past political regimes in Ethiopia were tried to make their government open and free at their initial time. But they didn't bring the desired democracy and reverted back to consolidate their power over consolidating democracy. For instance, *derg* and EPRDF did the same thing. Therefore, it needs the effort of all stake holders to make this good start fruitful in democratizing the Ethiopian state. Besides, the youth also maintain that, there was a good start at opening the political space, releasing political prisoners and journalists, but currently all are reverted back and the promised objectives of the transition are not on the ground.

To put in nutshell, the results acquired from the focus group discussion and interview with different section of society show that, even if it is full of complex problems, there is a new political transition which is at its opening phase in form of transformation which is different from the past two transitions of the *derg* regime and EPRDF regime.

4.5.3. A Transition from Democratic Centralism to ‘Medemer’ or Synergy

For the past 27 years Ethiopia the EPRDF followed what it called a revolutionary democracy with democratic centralism as philosophy, which had paved the way for socio-economic and political monopoly of TPLF/EPRDF. After coming to power of PM Abiy Ahmad Ali dropped the revolutionary democracy ideology and introduced his thinking. In his speech at the World Economic Forum (2019), he said, his ideas of governance and development are deeply rooted in the concept of ‘Medemer’ in Amharic meaning synergy or coming together, convergence, and collaboration for a shared purpose (Mokaddem, 2019). Accordingly, the idea of ‘medemer’ is centered on three interdependent pillars. These are building a vibrant democracy, economic vitality, and enhancing regional integration and openness to the world. Furthermore, the philosophy of ‘Medemer’ advocates and based on values of love, forgiveness, compassion, solidarity, and prosperity which can restore national unity and brotherhood among nation nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. It is also homegrown grand vision which is advanced by the PM which reflected in our political, social, and economic life of Ethiopian.

In light with this, the PM’s projected ‘Medemer’ as a social compact, for Ethiopians to form an unbiased democratic and humane society by pulling together our resources for our collective survival and prosperity. Moreover, at its central ‘Medemer’ is a contract of peace that pursues unity in our common humanity, it follows peace by practicing forgiveness, the value of love, reconciliation, and inclusion. Beyond the broader Ethiopia’s ‘Medemer’ inspired foreign policy, pursues peace through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and a good neighborhood. In his work titled ‘Medemer’ or ‘Ida’ amuu’ Abiyi Ahmed (2018), noted the idea of *medemer* as follows:

Yaadni ida’amuu dhimmoota hawaasummaa, siyaasaa, fi diinagdee dabalatee, jiruufi jireenya dhuunfaafi hawaasummaa kan xuquudha. Maalummaafi[kaayyoon] ida’amtummaas biyyi keenya Itoophiyaan daandii isheen irra adeemuu qabduufi galma isheef tolu kan akeekuudha. Gabbachuu yaada ida’amuu kanaaf kaka’uumsa guddaa kan ta’e yeroo dhihoo asitti rakkoolee siyaasaafi jijjiirama biyya keenya keessatti raawwachaa dhufaniif waaraa barbaaduu keenya irraa madda(2018:45).

In Amharic, the ideas of *medemer* could be presented:

መደመር ማህበራዊ፣ ፖለቲካዊና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ዘርፎችን ጨምሮ ሁሉንም ግላዊና ማህበራዊ የህይወት ዘይቤን የሚነካ ዕሳቤ ነዉ። አላባዎቹም ሀገራችን ኢትዮጵያ ልትሂድበትና ልትደርስበት የሚገቡ መንገዶችና መዳረሻዎች ናቸው። ለዕሳቤዉ መዳበር ገፊ ምክንያቱ በሀገራችን ባለፉት አራት አመታት የተቀጣጠለው ሀገራዊ ለዉጥ ፍንትዉ አድርጎ ያሳየን ዘላቂና አፋጣኝ መፍትሄ የሚፈልጉ ሀገራዊተ ግዳሮቶች ናቸው (ፀቢይ። 2012።35)።

Which means *medemer* is an idea which touches all aspects of society which could be individual, social, economic and political with the objective of identifying and show the proper road to achieve the final goal that is prosperity. The reason and initiation for the development of *medemer* is to find the way out to the problems, and challenges that our country phases since recent time and to manage the current change in the country (Abiy, 2018).

Even if many, especially the Pan-Ethiopianists support the ideas of ‘*medemer*’, there are also many who fiercely oppose it for the purpose of propaganda and fear of assimilation. The opponent of the idea of ‘*medemer*’ often times the ethno-nationalist argued that, ‘*medemer*’ aimed at building one Ethiopia without considering the diversity of Ethiopian society. Further, it is perceived as Unitarianism which seeks to restore the past imperial regime and undermine the current Ethiopian Federalism. It rejects multi-ethnic federalism, regional autonomy, shared rule, and wants to one Ethiopia, one language, one culture, one religion and it is anti-Oromo identity.

However, the proponents of ‘*medemer*’ argue that it is no different than Mandela’s Ubuntu. “*Medemer*” is all about, cooperation, collaboration, consultation, common cause, give and take partnership, alliance-building, teamwork, creating synergy for the common good (Alemayehu, 2018). *Medemer* is a socio-economic and political idea that gave birth to the Prosperity Party and it provides a platform to inclusive political participation for every Ethiopian. The idea of *medemer* also focus on avoiding enemy-friend or black-white dichotomy and advocate taking the past good and correct the past bad and work in harmony for common good. Above all, *medemer* didn’t deny ethnic politics which is a reality of the day, but it works to balance both national

unity and ethnic nationalism and implement genuine multi-ethnic federalism. Thus, if it is practically implemented and acknowledged by the Ethiopian people as a positive idea, it can solve the Ethiopian problem at its last long demand.

4.5.4. A Transition from EPRDF-1 to Prosperity Party

Party institutionalization is the process by which the party becomes established in terms of both integrated patterns of behavior and attitudes or culture (Randall, 2006). Political parties and party systems are the essential themes that help to examine the worth of political transition, progress, success, and consolidation of democracy and democratization. The existence of a workable political party and effective party system is vital to the long term political development and it is central to building democracy (Burnell, 2014). For over 27 years, the TPLF dominated EPRDF regime tends to engender weak institutionalization of opposition political parties through direct repression and indirect pressure such as, control encouraging internal rivalry by monopoly over state institutions. This made Ethiopia home to extremely fragmented, unstable, and weak political parties and party system has marked by lack of party cohesion, high regional fragmentation, very weak financial resources, and also clientelism (Girmachew, 2019).

In political transition one of the important procedures are the disbanding of the past authoritarian political institutions and installment of the new ones. Accordingly, the Prosperity Party was formed at the end of 2019 with the objective of correcting the past socio-economic and political problems, recognizing the past achievements and built the common future of peace, democracy, national unity, respect of citizens, and prosperity (PP Program, 2020:2). The EPRDF which was emerged in 1991, the rest members of the coalition were dominated by TPLF and other parties from the periphery were excluded from the government. The formation of prosperity party brought together three of the parties from the former EPRDF coalition and five affiliated parties those were excluded under the domination of TPLF. After the merger of eight political parties and form Prosperity Party, in December 2019 the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) registered the Prosperity Party. The parties that dissolved and merged to form the new party were: Harari National League (HNL), Gambela Peoples Democratic Movement (GPDM), Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), Somali Democratic Party (SDP), Benishangul-Gumuz Democratic Party (BDP), Southern Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement (SEPDM), Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) and The TPLF, the dominant member

of the EPRDF coalition, did not join the Prosperity Party because they have believed that the formation of the Prosperity Party is against FDRE constitution and the existing federal structure.

In modern Ethiopian political history, there were problems in center-periphery relation. To make clear, the south periphery always excluded from the center in socially, economically, and politically. The periphery affiliate political parties didn't have a say in any decision making; the only thing they do was implementing what has decided at center by TPLF without any question. In fact, even the three members of the coalition like: Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), Amara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), and Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM)s role were also nominal when compared to the dominant TPLF. Moreover, the role of the affiliate parties in the federal government and EPRDF coalition were insignificant. Therefore, the formation of Prosperity Party aims at solving these problems from the root through integrating those affiliate parties to the center ensures genuine federalism, fair share of resources and political power, self-rule and shared rule, implement the provisions of the constitution, and ensure true democracy. Moreover, the formation of PP is a notable development for Ethiopia's new political transition which has started in 2018; it is a national based party that represented all the entire Ethiopian people. It made all the Ethiopian people less than one roof party system and institution; it works not for one ethnic group rather for all nations of Ethiopia.

But to the contrary, most of the Oromo nationalists and TPLF standpatters criticize the formation of the prosperity party. Both argue that, the establishment of this party targeted at destroying the current multinational Federation, constitution, established regions, against the sovereignty of nations, nationalities and peoples, ethnic identity, and described the Prosperity Party's formation as a shift away from multinational federalism to a centralized state, alleging that Abiy was steering the country back toward authoritarian rule. The former president of Oromia and member of former OPDO and later ODP Lemma Magarsa also refused to accept the formation of this party. His argument is different from that of Oromo activists and TPLF officials and believes in the importance of its formation; however, he argued that, it is not the right time to focus on merging the coalition and form the party, because there are many complex problems and unanswered questions. First we should have solve the problems and answer the peoples questions.

Whatever the case, as far as my reading and collected data is concerned, there is no in the official documents and party program of the prosperity party what TPLF and some of the Oromo nationalists claim, an statement which refers to their aim of restoring the past imperial regime and establishing monarchial state with the superiority of one culture, one language, and one identity (PP political program, 2020).

4.6. The Challenges of the Current Political Transition in Ethiopia

The above sub-section of this chapter gave a brief highlight on the process of the new political transition in Ethiopia which started since 2018. This part of the chapter aims at discussing the different challenges this ongoing transition is facing. In line with this, as discussed in the conceptual chapters, any political transition is not static or leaner it passed through different ups and downs. The same is true for the Ethiopian new transition of 2018. In mid-2018, a peaceful change of leadership and a transfer of power took place, which bring the then vice-president of Oromia and OPDO secretary, Abiy Ahmed Ali, was elected EPRDF chairman on 27 March 2018 and was appointed prime minister on 2 April. This in turn opened the transition processes in way of reform. Even if the peaceful transfer of power took place, after sometimes it has faced different challenges.

4.6.1. Problem with State Building and Historical Contradictions

Despite the many positive developments, enormous challenges persist against the undergoing political transition in Ethiopia. Accordingly, incomplete state building and lack of agreement among different political class of the country on the common national history, have challenging different political development in Ethiopia. The same is true for the current political transition which has started in mid-2018. Different regime in Ethiopia couldn't form a common state which involves the cultures, identities, and languages of all Ethiopian people. For instance, the Ethiopian emperors build the empire which favors the superiority of one group over the rest of the country's people like the Oromos, under the banner of nation building. Because of this they couldn't build nation and common state for different ethnic groups in Ethiopia. This lead to historical grievances and has created conflict among different nation nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia.

To make detail, the past imperial regime built an empire with the bureaucracy of almost one political class and group, educational system, the domination of one religion, one language, and

culture that dominate Ethiopian national identity. This process had assimilated and excluded the other ethnic groups from socio-economic and political infrastructure of the country for centuries. This in turn had created controversies and disagreement toward the question of, who is an Ethiopian? What represents Ethiopia's national identity? Who is perceived as Ethiopian citizen? Indeed, still today there is a group which believes that Ethiopia had colonized us and benefited only one group, our resource had exploited, our culture is assimilated, and our identity was not recognized at national level. As a result of this, different successive regime of this country couldn't create a common state called "Ethiopia" which serves all ethnic groups equally. This strictly affects the center-periphery and even state society relations; this in turn hampered the completion of both state and nation building. Therefore, this had created lack of consensus and trust among different ethnic groups as an Ethiopians and challenging the current transition too.

4.6.2. Political Polarization and Ethnic Division

The above discussed, incomplete state building and historical grievances has also an impact on polarizing and dividing the Ethiopian society. Due to lack of consensus and trust among different ethnic groups of the country, it is difficult to build strong united nation for a common objectives. The past injustice and political culture had created suspicion among different social and political groups which is a great challenge to work together for the common country. All successive Ethiopian regimes including *Derg* and the EPRDF regimes failed to solve these problems; instead, they use for the strategy of divide and rule to consolidate their political power.

Most importantly, starting from 1960s and 1970s there were no political unity and the spirit of working together within and among different opposition political parties for the good benefit of the country; the same is true for the governing coalition of EPRDF. This highly polarized political culture is still affecting the political development of the country. After, 2001 political crises in the TPLF and the death of former PM Meles Zenawi in 2012 have escalated the power struggle within the EPRDF and have created political polarization among the members of the coalition. This internal power struggle continued in EPRDF after Haile Mariam Desalegn come to power which is not resolved even after PM Abiy came to power. To make clear, while popular support for Abiy and the reformist elements within the ruling party appears to be strong, internal power struggles within and between the four constituent parties of EPRDF have not yet been

resolved definitively. Powerful members of the establishment are not completely convinced of the reform measures that the new leadership is taking (Badwaza, 2018).

According to Yoseph Badwaza (2018), Senior Program Officer at U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, again his discussion:

These elements continue to lament that EPRDF is abandoning its ideological foundations of revolutionary democracy and a developmental state in favor of neoliberal and populist tendencies. One reason the party keeps postponing the planned party Congress seems to be this disunity among the leadership on the breadth of the reform measures and the future direction of the party. As the supreme organ of the party, the Congress is being considered as a referendum on Abiy's reform agenda and decisive indicator of the party's direction as a coalition (ibid). As there is minimal distinction between the state and the ruling party, the crisis within the ruling party has a direct bearing on the way the business of government is conducted. Party and government officials who are not on board with Abiy's reform agenda are in a position to derail the momentum of change and cause frustration among the public. The new government has accused these establishment elements of conspiracy to sabotage the wave of change in the party and in the country. For instance, the government blamed disgruntled elements in the security services for many acts of subversion, including the grenade attack at the pro-Abiy rally in Addis Ababa in June (2018:3).

This political cleavage more intensified among the liberal reformer of Abiyi Ahimed group and TPLF which dominate the entire coalition for 27 and above years, when the former merge the coalition to one national party called 'Prosperity Party' and the later make regional election without the recognition of the former. This widened the political division between the federal government and TPLF which extremely challenge the current political transition in the country. If this problem is not solved in whatever means within a proper time, it will erode the ongoing democratic process in the country.

4.6.3. Weak Institutions and Lack of the Rule of Law

Weak institutions and lack of the rule of law led to breakdown of law and Order in the country. Institutions such as the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE), the Human Rights

Commission, and the judicial system that is supposed to be accountable to the parliament were ineffective and perceived by the public as highly partisan. The unwarranted influence of the government on the work of such institutions has undermined the institutions' credibility and rendered them weak and incapable of ensuring check and balance in the country.

The emergence of informal forces and youth groups, particularly in the Oromia and Amhara regions, and their competition for power and space and replacement of formal institutions is also another challenge for the ongoing transition. The existence of these forces and the inability of the federal government to ensure law and order trammled the initiated reform from reaching grassroots structures; and also put the capacity and legitimacy of the security institutions in question and this highly challenge democratic political transition in Ethiopia.

4.6.4. Ethnic Conflict and Internal Peoples Displacement

Another major gravest challenge is insecurity driven problems manipulated by different political activists, extremist political elites, ethnic militias and insurgent groups, political standpatters at both regional and federal levels which emanated from their personal interest or group interest. This in turn created conflict among Ethiopia's ethnic groups in different parts of the country. These longstanding political elite driven contradictions and conflicts among Ethiopia's ethnic groups are becoming more acute. Thus, the forces that kept them at least partly in check are loosening, and all around the country groups that see each other as competitors are jostling for political power(International Crises Group, 2019). Though anti-government protests have largely subsided since Abiy became prime minister, communal violence that rose in parallel with them over the past few years has spread and worsened and ethnic militias are growing in size and reach. According to International Crises Group, the number of persons displaced due to conflict in Ethiopia has reached 2.2 million; more than half of them have been displaced since January 2018 (Crises Group, 2019), and according to the updated data estimated approximately three million individuals were displaced across Ethiopia (IOM, 2020).

At the same time, ethno-nationalist sentiment around the country is on the rise, with ethnic movements using increasingly incendiary rhetoric about other groups and pressuring parties within the ruling coalition toward more confrontational policies. In addition, ethnic and identity based clashes that flared in Oromia, SNNPR, Amhara, Benishangul Gumuz and Somali regions caused the death of hundreds of civilians and the displacement of more than one

million people. Especially, this Ethnic instability and disarray have been particularly widespread in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region (SNNPR). Home to a large variety of ethnic groups, and one of the four Ethiopian regions that is multi-ethnic (without a de jure dominant ethnic group in the region); the region has recently seen a large drive for increased autonomy. This has been the case in particular in Walayita and some others in the region, which is seeking to be recognized as a fully-fledged independent region, but others have pursued similar objectives, spurred on by the centrifugal forces unleashed in the new climate of political reform. Accordingly, the question of autonomous status by most zones of the region is the most challenging phenomenon for the new leadership. Each zone wants to be independent and an autonomous region

The [stand patter] TPLF which want to gate back its past privilege of domination works to exacerbate this ethnic conflict to use as an opportunity by using its agents and providing financial support in different regions. And, the government's efforts to address these incidents are largely reactive and have so far not done much to bring lasting solutions. There have not been coordinated efforts to bring to justice local government officials who in many cases are instigators and perpetrators of these crimes in join with TPLF. Liberalization in the political environment and tolerance for free speech brought longstanding grievances between different ethnic groups into public political discourse. The past few months also witnessed heightened nationalistic and identity-based rhetoric targeting minority communities in different parts of the country. These sentiments are putting enormous strain on the long tradition of co-existence among the various communities.

4.6.5. High Expectations/Youth Population Growth and Limitation of Economic Resources

Reform measures and opened political space are generating high expectations among the youth and could lead to resentment and unrest because it couldn't be met with this short period of time. Ethiopia's population is growing rapidly and resource scarce. Each year, colleges and universities in country produce an army of youth that joins the job market, many with unreasonable expectations of future employment and earnings. As yet, the number of opportunities available is not commensurate with the number of young people entering the job market. Youth who do not have the opportunity to join higher education institutions or training centers or even unable to complete high school education, are even greater in number and Farm

land is limited. Border disputes among different regional states in claiming land was also a critical problem that challenging the transition. For instance, as a result of land resource limitation, there are border clashes between SNNPR and Oromia, Somali region and Oromia, Oromia and Affar, and the most critical one is between Tigray and Amara region on the issues of Raya, Welqait, and Tegade.

Sadly, small number of “former corrupt leaders”, “human rights abusers”, and “free-riders” of TPLF and others, who have amassed wealth inside and outside the country and have established possible channels of communication with some of these youth groups. These combined with the structural ethnic competition that is embedded in Ethiopia’s political system, the fracturing of the EPRDF, and the high levels of internal displacement, high expectations of the society which didn’t consider the existing economy and resource, in many cases as a result of deliberately planned instability are highly challenging the ongoing political transition.

4.6.6. Propaganda/Political Culture and Ultra-nationalism

According to respondents from different walks of life, the problem with the past Ethiopia’s political culture full of conspiracy, patron-client network, people’s perception of government as super-natural force, leaders perception for themselves as boss rather than servant, bad state-society relation, empty promises without implementation, use of force as a solution for every problem, and lack of dialogue political culture among all political forces are among cultural challenges of Ethiopian politics.

Baseless propaganda among different political groups is also another challenge of democratization and political change in Ethiopia. Criticizing one another without reason and true information for only the purpose of political mobilization, create political cleavage among political elite, which in turn widened ethnic division among the Ethiopian society. These political forces use both mainstream and social media like: Facebook, YouTube, internet bloggers and websites to disseminate false propaganda which create suspicion and conflict among ethnic and religious groups. This propaganda hamper the journey of the political transition through extremist media group who disseminate their pseudo propaganda to escalate the difference than preaching peaceful existence via electronic and non-electronic media. For example, the hate speech repeatedly written via social media initiated one ethnic group against the other.

Hence, enacting media law regarding hate speech and make the extremists calm down and refrain from hate speech is a challenge for this political transition. Another important point concerning propaganda, the lack of public outreach by the government and the failure to implement concepts such as '*medemer*', love, peace and national unity may confuse young people, who hear about political reform but discern no visible change in their material needs. These may make them vulnerable to propaganda questioning identity, promoting respect for the constitution, or pursuing regional autonomy. For example, some of the propaganda used to rally youth against this political transition includes: the new leadership stands for the Oromo only; it excludes other nationalities; it is anti-Tigrigna (TPLF); it securitizes the TPLF and the Tigrayan people; it does not respect the constitution and ethnic federal system; it is a neoliberal and western satellite government; Ethiopia is a failed state; it cannot provide basic security to its citizens; there is no rule of law in the country[...] therefore, the previous leaders and system should be back in power. In line with this, this false propaganda divides the Ethiopian society in line with ethnic groups and severely challenges the ongoing political transition.

In Ethiopia's political history, lack of culture of dialogue, political bargaining, discussion, give and take politics, lack of compromise, and negotiation, affect both the ruling party and opposition political forces. Despite the good starts, these are also what we are observing in the current political development as usual. For instance, still there is no inclusive political platform which brings all stake holders to the transition process. And all activities concerning the current political transition have dominated by the prosperity party (PP). The reformer group those lead the prosperity party have refused to consult and entertain the ideas of opposition political parties and other stake holders. At the same time, the opposition political parties are also lacks commitment to give and take politics, compromise, and failed to make a reasonable democratic political bargain with the ruling party.

Ultra nationalism which is highly manipulated by the objective of creating a superior nation over the other in terms of culture, language, economy, and political power became the challenge for this change. Because this idea doesn't recognize the right of other ethnic groups and always create antagonistic political forces those compete for socio-economic and political power. This idea negatively affects the relation among and within different ethnic groups in the country. In

fact, one of the sources of political polarization and ethnic division in Ethiopia is this bad/ ultra-nationalism which directly or indirectly challenging democratic development, national unity and the current political transition in Ethiopia.

4.6.7. Structural Problem and the Past Stand Patters

According to one of my respondents from the focus group discussion “after this change come we hope many, however, the change is only from the top officials at the ministerial level; still there is no change at zonal, *wereda* and *kebele* structure” and he continued “we are suffering from the corrupt cadres and remnant of the past TPLF led PDOs those who are working still as an agent and puppet of TPLF to restore their past privilege”. In different government sector like administrative and security sectors there are individuals those are against this political change and they create conflict through giving support and information for the insurgents.

Equally important, there are/were also regional states which challenged the authority of the federal government. For example, Somali leaders of the group of Abdi Illey refused to accept the rule of law and every order from the federal government. He organized his special force using the support of the TPLF. As a result of this, when the federal government took measure of keeping the rule of law, conflict took place between the special force of Abdi Illey and the federal government security forces. Following that, many non- Somali people displaced from the region. Moreover, especially after the formation of Prosperity Party the disagreement between the new prosperity party and TPLF has been escalating. The TPLF which is governing the Tigray regional state refused to recognize the power given to the federal government in the constitution and conduct regional election. This move was labeled as ‘illegal election’ by the federal government.

Unprofessional government bureaucracy which is highly affected by corruption, revolutionary democracy, and democratic centralism of TPLF is a challenge for this transition. Most part of this bureaucracy was built on political loyalty to TPLF led EPRDF, rather than for Ethiopian people. As discussed above, there are individuals and political cadres sponsored by TPLF and other [standpatters] from the former EPRDF; those make conspiracy against the current government to break the state-society relations. Lack of strong democratic political institutions and state-party fission for more than 27 years are also the challenge for the current leadership.

Almost all democratic institutions were dominated and destroyed strategically by the TPLF ideological principles and repressive laws.

In addition, the politicized security force at different levels of government is also a threat and challenge to the ongoing political transition in Ethiopia. To illustrate, the country's security arrangements has been a durable affection to the political leadership in power both in ideology and individual networking. The informants further argued, to promote for and defends partisan political fortunes, politicized security force maneuvers its allegiance to a single political agent regularly. In Ethiopia both the state of the federation and the national security forces have been highly politicized. As a result of this, high profile political assassinations took place in the country which highly challenges the transition in aggravating conflicts in the country. Moreover, the prevalence of armed insurgent groups in different parts of Oromia and disagreement between the government and this group, threatens the rule of law, peace and stability in the country; this also affects the started democratic process in the country. This is the great challenge against the ongoing political transition which started since 2018.

4.6.8. Lack of Negotiated transition Road Map

The absence of a negotiated transition road map has created dis-agreement on the future socio-economic and political direction among and between different political forces in the country. Thus, despite many changes in Ethiopia since the transition, there have been also many troublesome realities in the Ethiopian state of affairs; because of lack of common consensus and negotiation between government and opposition political parties. For instance, some of the opposition accused the government that, every state of affairs dominated by the party in the ruling position and we are excluded from the transitional processes. Therefore, the ongoing transition does not afford a proper legal framework and not institutionalized.

On behalf of the government, they argue that, all the oppositions are weak and fragmented, most of them haven't any political program and their accusation is baseless. In addition, when they are invited they couldn't provide alternative ideas as impute and they always focus on accusing the government for their own political consumption through their propaganda. This is why the government committed to lead the transition process. Therefore, whatever the case, this study reveals that the absence of agreement among ruling and opposition political parties to

recommend a common negotiated transition roadmap is a challenge for the new ongoing political transition in Ethiopia.

4.6.9. High Living Cost and Money Laundering

Fostering economic benefit of the people is also an acute challenge that this government will need to prioritize. The reformist leadership inherited an economy that was already in a perilous state. The country's economic growth over the last decade was fueled by massive borrowing that has created a debt burden of more than \$24 billion, which Addis struggles to service. Moreover, in recent years, prices have sky-rocketed even as unemployment has increased. Compounding the problem are the public's rising expectations, notably in the urban population that is more aware of the economy's weaknesses.

Disappointment and frustration are especially acute among job-seeking youths joining the country's expanding labor pool only to find that there are few meaningful prospects. Even if many Ethiopian seen the change can brought economic benefit, the living condition become high and high. Hence, money youngsters are involved in various criminal activates like becoming illegal brokers of goods and services, robbers and so on. Furthermore, an extensive engagement of the old system in money laundering outside of the country that has potential to cover all loan of Ethiopia need much bargaining from depositor countries to return the money. This is also among the challenges of the ongoing political transition in Ethiopia.

4.6.10. GERD, Covid-19, Flood, Drought and Locust Invasion

There are different interests on the Nile. Countries like Sudan and Egypt which to a large measure depend on the waters of the Nile try seek to influence Ethiopia through diplomacy and sponsoring different political dissidents in the country. According to government officials interviewed for this work, the standpatters like TPLF and insurgent groups like OLF were approached by Egypt to create security crises through attempting political coup and committing high profile political assassinations.

The Ethiopian state has confronted by both manmade and natural crises such as the above listed ethnic based violence, humanitarian crisis, political disputes between the incumbent and the opposition parties, narrowed nationalist and many others. Covid-19, flood and drought locust are also another natural crisis which severely challenges the global citizens and some HoA countries.

Covid-19 is the international calamities which affect socio-economic and political activities of global citizens. The constitutional review and postponement of election were resulted from this international crisis which aggravate disagreement among some political forces in the country and threatened the legitimacy of the government.

The drought locust, heavy flood and land slide affect some countries in the Horn of African region. Ethiopia is also one of the affected countries of these flood and locust. Somali, Oromia, Afar, Dire Dawa and Southern Nations, Nationalities and People's (SNNP) regions were affected by the disaster in first half of 2020. This in turn implicitly or explicitly affects the country's economy and the current political change in Ethiopia.

4.8. Conclusion

This chapter examined the ongoing political transition in Ethiopia which has opened since 2018, its causes, drivers, changes and its challenges. Therefore, based on the data gathered through interview, FGDs and literature review, causes, drivers, actors, changes and challenges were identified in this chapter. Thus, the immediate triggering factor of the transition was the issue of land, that related to controversial 'Addis Ababa Integrated Master plan' which pave the way for the breakout of the Oromo protest. And there are also long-standing socio-economic, political, and cultural grievances. For example, land related problems, lack of practical implementation with its promises of post-1991, economic inequality, unemployment, lack of fair share of resources and political power, lack of inclusive politics, authoritarianism, repressive government response of the government to people's questions, neo-patrimonial politics, internal divisions within the (EPRDF) and both political and economic domination of TPLF. Moreover, the problem with center-periphery relation, minority rule over majority, lack of representative government and democracy, were also another causes of the ongoing transition in Ethiopia.

There were also different drivers of this transition. The mass people's protest movements externally from below and political cleavage within EPRDF coalition internally from above were the major drivers of this transition. There were different actors those engage in bringing the ongoing change in Ethiopia. The youth specially the students, activists and Diaspora, public intellectuals, political elites, writers, intelligentsia, opposition parties, bloggers and journalists, international community, liberal reformers what is known as 'Team Lemma' and the mass had contributed much in bringing change in Ethiopia since 2018.

The opening of political space, releasing thousands of political prisoners, signing peace agreement with neighboring Eritrea, solve the problem within the Ethiopian Orthodox church, allowing return of peaceful and non-peaceful opposition from exile, lifting a draconian state of emergency, announcing plans to revise repressive laws, the notorious federal crimes investigations unit in Addis Ababa, commonly known as *Maekelawi* was closed, removing past Army Chief of Staff and National Intelligence Security Service Director to reform the security sector, starting to fight corruption by taking corrupts to court, appointing new cabinets representing various ethnic groups, involving women in the highest leadership positions (including the presidency and key ministerial positions); engaging opposition parties and other marginalized sections of society in the political and reform of the security services (Badwaza, 2018; Weber, 2018; Tokuori, 2019; Yonas, 2019; Crisis Group, 2019), were changes resulted from the ongoing political transition in the country.

As any other countries in transition the current political transition in Ethiopia is facing different challenges. Thus, historical contradictions with state building, political polarization and ethnic division, weak institutions and lack of the rule of law, ethnic conflict and internal people's displacement, youth population growth, unemployment, high expectations and limitation of economic resources, propaganda/political culture and ultra-nationalism, structural problem and the Past stand patters, lack of negotiated transition road map, high living cost and money laundering, competition on GERD, natural disaster like: COVID-19, flood, Drought and Locust Invasion were identified as the challenges of this ongoing transition in Ethiopia.

CHAPTER SIX

5. THE 2018 NEW POLITICAL TRANSITION IN ETHIOPIA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA

5.1. Introduction

The preceding chapter discussed drivers, causes, changes, and challenges of the new political transition in Ethiopia. This chapter is going to discuss the implication and impacts of this political transition on the neighboring states, IGAD as an organization and the Horn of Africa region briefly. As discussed in the previous chapter, Ethiopia is undergoing a political transition since 2018. This political transition has affected the government's approach to managing its relations in the Horn of Africa. In turn, this has affected its neighbors as they react to Ethiopia's shifting stance. There are also implications for the future of regional integration in the Horn of Africa (Mosley, 2020). Accordingly, with Ethiopia left landlocked by Eritrea's independence, physical integration has been at the core of Ethiopia's regional policy and remains so. Ethiopia's priorities are reflected in the integration agenda of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the main regional body for the Horn of Africa (ibid).

To illustrate how the significant political development in Ethiopia since-2018 has impacted the political dynamics in the Horn of Africa, this chapter examines such major events as developments are: Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement, the Sudanese political transition, and the political dynamics in Somalia between the Federal Government of Somalia and the regional administrations (Tokuori, 2019; Mosley, 2020). Ethiopia is geographically important, demographically strong, and relatively stable and it hosts many international institutions like AU, Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), share ethnic groups with neighboring countries, and its role in peacekeeping in the Horn of Africa; therefore, any changes that takes place in Ethiopia directly or indirectly affect the neighboring state and the whole region.

5.2. The New Political Transition in Ethiopia and Its Impact on the Neighboring countries

Ethiopia is a key political and economic state in the Horn of Africa, which is also home to Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, and Somaliland. Therefore, in addition to the domestic political objective of promoting reconciliation among the people, and the economic

objective of becoming a lower-middle-income country and a manufacturing hub, Prime Minister Abiy's third key objective is to achieve stability in neighboring countries through diplomacy (Faleg, 2019; Mosley, 2020). In particular, it would be difficult for Ethiopia to achieve sustainable economic growth without long-term stability in the Horn of Africa region because it is a landlocked country (ibid).

5.2.1. Sudan

The ongoing change and political transition in Ethiopia has a positive spillover effect on Sudan's politics. For instance, the people's protest movement that took place in Ethiopia for about four years starting from 2014 to 2018 impacted the political movement for equality and justice in Sudan. Similarly, Sudan's people also say no to a dictator. Following that, Ethiopia's PM Abiy Ahmed played a key role in negotiating a truce between protestors and the provisional military council which currently rules Sudan since coming to power in 2018. Ethiopia has also started to negotiate to use the port of Sudan based on mutual benefits which could strengthen the economic relations of the two countries.

At first, things looked positive: on 1 May 2018 Ethiopia and Sudan agreed to set up joint forces to protect the Renaissance Dam, which is only 20 km from the Sudanese border with Ethiopia (Middle East Monitor, 2018), and two days later Abiy made a two-day visit to Khartoum (Borkena.com, 2018); however, according to sources in Addis Ababa and Khartoum, Abiy warned al-Bashir and his government not to meet with the TPLF, which was now held to be politically defunct and told them that failure to act accordingly would be viewed unfavorably. Thus, after Abiy came to power, the Ethio-Sudan relation was somewhat good under the leadership of Al-Bashir, however, it started to erode after the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement and continued under the new leadership in Sudan; as a result of disputes over Nile and border and Alfashaga border disputes.

5.2.2. South Sudan

South Sudan broke away from Sudan in 2011 after a long and bloody independence struggle, but just two years later, war broke out again when Kiir accused his former deputy Riek Machar of plotting a coup. After coming to power PM Abiy Ahmed played a significant role in mediating a peace deal between the two forces and bring them together in Ethiopia to solve their problem peacefully. Accordingly, South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and rebel leader Riek Machar met

in Addis Ababa and made their first face-to-face meeting in two years this in turn resulted in the formation of unity government which included Riek Machar. Commitment to bring peace among the South Sudan government and opposition was part of Abiy's attempt to bring regional security and integration in the Horn of Africa. Thereafter, relative peace was established in South Sudan following the cessation of hostilities agreement between the warring parties after five-year civil war on Sept. 12, 2018 by the facilitation of Ethiopia's PM Abiyi Ahmad. Ahmed, were able to persuade President Salva Kiir and most of the opposition to sign the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan in September 2018 (IGAD, 2018). Following this development in South Sudan, oil fields in the area were resuming operations after years of disruption due to civil war. However, the final outcome is unclear and didn't achieve its desired objective.

5.2.3. Somalia and Somaliland

After coming to power of Abiy and bring changes in Ethiopia, he has attempted and decided to strengthen Ethio-Somalia brotherly bilateral relations and to collaborate with the African Union in seeking solutions to problems on the continent. The two leaders agreed to enhance diplomatic and trade activities, including opening diplomatic and consular offices and removing of all trade and economic barriers. Thereafter, the Somali leader Mohammed Abdullahi Farmaajo arrived in Addis Ababa for bilateral talks. The discussions focused on four key issues including strengthening of regional peace & security per the agreements signed previously; mechanisms to ensure Kenya-Somali relations are strengthened; continuation of joint port development; and ensuring that relations between the administration of Somaliland & Somalia are in support of regional peace, which all have resulted from the political transition in Ethiopia.

However, Abiy's positive relations with Farmajo and the FGS have complicated Ethiopia's links to Somaliland over the Berbera port investment and corridor plans. The Farmajo administration has also been able to leverage Ethiopian support in strengthening its position domestically and Ethiopia supports Somalia against Somaliland (Mosley, 2020). Therefore, the political transition in Ethiopia harmed neighboring Somaliland because it sidelined the tripartite agreement between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea which was a strategic mistake for Ethiopia (ibid).

5.2.4. Kenya

Although Ethiopia and Kenya have generally enjoyed stable and positive relations since Kenya's independence, the situation in Jubaland has also put Ethiopia and Kenya at odds. The two countries have long cooperated on security, with a defense pact dating back to 1965 and visa-free travel between the two countries. However, Kenya's 2011 military intervention in Somalia marked its first foreign security intervention; this foray also marked Kenya's shift into an area that had, especially since the 1990s, been dominated by Ethiopian military influence. Shortly after its intervention, Kenya backed President Madobe in asserting Jubaland's interests as an emerging federal member state over the influence of the federal government. This stance brought Kenya into competition with Ethiopia (Mosley, 2015). Moreover; Ethiopia's recent support under Abiy leadership for the FGS in its attempt to influence events in Jubaland again continued in unsettling the Kenyan Government.

Despite the apparent tensions between Ethiopia and Kenya over Somalia, Kenya is Ethiopia's only neighbor in which economic considerations are likely to significantly counterbalance purely political or security concerns resulting from Abiy's shifting of Ethiopia's established positions. Furthermore, planned economic liberalization under Abiy government also attracted the Kenyan private sector to invest in Ethiopia in the telecom and banking sector. This in turn has a role in solidifying the relation of the country in terms of the socio-economic and political sphere.

5.2.5. Djibouti

Political transition in Ethiopia under the leadership of Abiyi Ahmad has also an impact on neighboring Djibouti. Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed arrived in neighboring Djibouti in what was his first foreign trip since taking office in early April 2018 to discuss mutual interest to their countries and the Horn of Africa region at large. The PM making his first foreign visit to Djibouti is a great move. There has been a misguided belief both by the ruling party and the opposition for long time that prioritizes diplomatic relation with Western and superpowers over immediate neighbors.

As a result of the political transition in Ethiopia, full diplomatic relations has been restored between Eritrea and Somalia; and the leaders of Eritrea and Djibouti have met in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia through the mediation effort of Prime Minister Abiyi Ahmad. However, the change in Ethiopia might also affect Djibouti negatively in economic terms; because Ethiopia has started to

facilitate port alternatives with another neighboring state like Kenya, Somaliland, Eritrea, and Sudan. This may reduce Djibouti's income that she gets from port.

5.3. Change in Ethiopia and GERD

Accordingly, the most significant shift in regional relations under Abiy has been the rapprochement with Eritrea which is a direct result of regime change in Ethiopia and this has its implications on IGAD as an organization in particular and regional politics of the Horn of Africa in general (Faleg, 2019; Mosley, 2020).

The Secretary-General of the UN, Antonio Guterres, described the new development in the region thus: 'There is a powerful wind of hope blowing across the Horn of Africa' (UN News 2018), and he continued when he describes the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement which is as a major world event, "We have seen a conflict, that has lasted for decades, ending, and that has a very important meaning in a world where we see, unfortunately, so many conflicts multiplying, and lasting forever" (Quoted in Rediet,2019:13). And next, what followed was a reciprocal visit to Eritrea by the Ethiopian prime minister on 8-9 July, amid huge popular rejoicing. On this visit, the two leaders signed a Peace and Friendship Agreement which consisted of five points. These are an end to the state of war, cooperation on political, economic, social, cultural, and security issues and the opening of embassies in the respective capitals, links in trade, communication, and transport, implementation of the border decision, and joint work toward peace and security in the region.

To make clear, following the two countries' rapprochement, as touched in the above paragraph, the state of war between the two countries has ended and a new era of peace, friendship, and comprehensive cooperation has started. And then, the two countries will promote comprehensive cooperation in the political, security, defense, economic, trade, investment, cultural, and social fields based on complementarity and synergy. They were also agreed to develop Joint Investment Projects, including the establishment of Joint Special Economic Zones, promote regional and global peace, security and cooperation, and implement the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission decision. Thereafter, the two countries have also agreed to combat terrorism as well as trafficking in people, arms, and drugs by international covenants and conventions.

Because of that, the ongoing political transition in Ethiopia since 2018, which has brought the shift within the EPRDF to marginalize the TPLF, combined with Abiy's tendency to govern from the prime minister's office, meant that he was in a position to make some significant departures from the previous policy for the rapprochement of the two countries. This rapprochement was overwhelmingly driven by domestic political considerations and leadership commitments of the reformer group in Ethiopia. This measure normalizes the no peace no war relation between the two countries; the reopening of border crossings even if the latter closed for security and economic purpose (illegal trade and anti-government forces), the Ethiopian Airlines flights between Addis Ababa and Asmara that were quickly restored (Tokuori, 2019). Besides, following the restoration of the two country's relation, the armed groups in Eritrea those controlled tens of thousands of combatants, which constituted a real political and security threat to the government of Ethiopia were also negotiated and returned home. This in turn contributes explicitly or implicitly to the region's peace and stability.

However, efforts to build peace and strengthen logistics infrastructure for economic integration are being made simultaneously, but the peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea has currently stalled. After the peace agreement was reached, the border was reopened, but around five months later in December, it was suddenly reclosed by Eritrea. The Eritrean government has not made its reasons clear, but media reports widely think that it aims to prevent an influx of illegal trade and anti-government forces (Tokuori, 2019). Flights are currently still operating, but the border has yet to be reopened. The TPLF group has also refused to accept the implementation of the peace agreement because they are in tension with the reformer group and this also contributes to the closure of the border. Whatever the case, the two countries have been at war for around 20 years, and eliminating all barriers at once is impossible. For the time being, it seems likely that political dialogue will be continued to repair the trust relationship between the two countries.

What's more, there were the involvements of the global and regional actors like IGAD, AU, EU, and the USA in the Ethio-Eritrea issue for decades. However, they couldn't solve the problem. In this regard, the change in Ethiopia has restored the relation between the two countries. Geopolitically, change in Ethiopia and Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement contributes much to the economy, peace, and stability of the two countries in particular and the Horn of Africa region in general. The Ethio-Eritrea war 1998-2000 was affected by both countries in taking the lives of

thousands from militaries and many civilians and divided the region politically. Because Ethiopia took the issue to IGAD member states and IGAD took it to the AU and again the AU took the issue to the UN Security Council, and all-rounded sanctions were imposed on Eritrea. This is why it created division among the Horn of Africa region states. This also created the proxy war between and among the Horn of African states, especially, between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In light with this, when Ethiopia engages in Somalia for a peacekeeping mission, to fight Al-Shabab, Islamic Court Union (ICU), and other Terrorist groups, Eritrea on its part interfere there in supporting these groups. These groups, in turn, tried to attack Kenya, Uganda, and Djibouti. Behind this attack, there was the hand and support of Eritrea. This is what divides among and between the IGAD member states and the region. Even the tension between Eritrea and Ethiopia, affect the diplomatic relation between the Horn of Africa and the Gulf region; because they face complexity in preferring Eritrea or Ethiopia to make diplomatic relation. But now after the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement, this is solved and the relation between the Gulf States and the Horn region is improved as a result of the current political transition in Ethiopia.

Therefore, after the rapprochement between the two countries, there is no proxy war, the division is avoided among the states in the horn, the relation of Eritrea between the Horn states and International forces has restored, diplomatic relation with other region has improved; the threat of insurgents and terrorist groups is solved to the extent. This has a good peace and security implication for the Horn of African Region which has the potential to create peace, stability, and cooperation among the countries in the region. However, the restored relation has its negative implication for Ethiopia's internal issues. For instance, the opposition and insurgent groups came home from Asmera are not playing a positive role in the ongoing political transition in Ethiopia. And the TPLF was also not happy with the peace that Ethiopia made with Eritrea. These forces allied with each other and with other external actors are now threatening the current democratization process in Ethiopia. To make clear, Egypt shifted its support from Asmera to approaching TPLF, OLF, some activists in Ethiopia who are challenging the transition process in the country. Egypt did this to advance its national interest in relation to water politics. It uses what every power it has to derail the development of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). What Egypt has tried to do in different neighboring countries of Ethiopia and its policy's in the region is to ensure its interest over the Nile. To achieve this objective, it always stands against Ethiopia's interest by attempting to use neighboring countries and Ethiopia's

internal opposition forces. To some extent, the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement has reduced this problem.

In terms of Nile dynamics and GERD development, Eritrea was opposing the development of the GERD for many years by arguing that, it is a political project which is not feasible and doesn't have economic value for the country and the whole region. But now after the change in Ethiopia and restoration of the relation between the two countries the stand of Eritrea against the GERD has changed and supported the development of the dam along with other riparian countries. Moreover, it has also informed Egypt that, the GERD project doesn't have such an impact on downstream countries and it is better to solve the problem peacefully.

In terms of democratization and political development, the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement negatively affects the democratization process and political development in Ethiopia. The coming home of different insurgent armed and opposition groups with diverse interests became a threat to peace, stability, and security in the country. For example, the OLF refused to disarm its army and confront the government security forces. This has led to conflicts in different regions of the country, especially, West and Southern Oromia which displaced many people from their residents. Besides, it also widens political cleavage among and between political forces and ethnic division in the country which still has challenges to the democratization process in the country. But in the region and even the whole of Africa, the political transition in Ethiopia and Ethio-Eritrea reconciliation has a positive spillover effect on peace and stability. Indeed, the change in Ethiopia contributes much to the political transition in Sudan to negotiate and gave experience of the possibility of peaceful transfer of power between the two opposing forces in the country.

5.4. Change in Ethiopia and Its Implication on IGAD as Regional Organ

Indeed, political change in Ethiopia and the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement were interlinked and a part of political development in the Horn of African region. Therefore, these developments in the region's political landscape have snowballed to Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states. In light of this, the IGAD member states those have some tensions before, have made different socio-economic and peace agreements among themselves (Rediet, 2019).

After the coming to power of Abiy Ahmed Ali in 2018, many peace-building objectives among IGAD member countries were achieved through the initiatives of the liberal reformer group. To illustrate, after carrying out negotiations since July 2018, a peace agreement was signed between Eritrea and Ethiopia in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on September 16, 2018. The opening of the Ethiopian embassy in Eritrea, the opening of the Eritrean Embassy in Ethiopia, Eritrean Airlines flights to Ethiopia, the use of Massawa Port in Eritrea, and the opening of telecommunication were the unthinkable achievements of the current government. On September 5, 2018, a trilateral cooperation agreement was signed in Eritrea by Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia. The agreement included the promotion of peace and security in the region, and the establishment of high-level meetings to monitor progress on peace and stability of the Horn of Africa region. Moreover, political transition in Ethiopia facilitate the normalization of Djibouti-Eritrea relations in respect to the border issue, and mediate negotiation between the Transitional Military Council of Sudan and the Forces of Freedom and Change alliance with AU to form the transitional government peacefully. Furthermore, if this ongoing political transition in Ethiopia achieved its objective and consolidated, it has spillover effects on the other Horn of African states that, the possibility of peaceful political transition through reform without violence.

What's more, another impact on IGAD as a regional organization, Eritrea is not willing to join; rather it wants to improve its relation with Addis Ababa and Mogadishu only or in separate and bilateral with Sudan. Sudan was not in good relation with Eritrea before the change in Ethiopia and Sudan itself. But after, the change in Ethiopia and Sudan, the relation between Khartoum and Asmara became good and restored and there is no confrontation at the border. With Djibouti even if it is not resolved, there is no danger of physical conflict and war; both countries expressing their wish to improve their relationship soon and Ethiopia is still working on that. Therefore, Eritrea is still not returned to the membership of IGAD because of the past measures taken by this organization on Eritrea in facilitating and imposing sanctions on Eritrea in favoring Ethiopia. Furthermore, Eritrea picked out Ethiopia with its side only and sees other IGAD member states as its enemy, because they stand with Ethiopia during the process of imposing sanctions on it and refused to join this organization. This resulted in weakening the IGAD to some extent. However, Ethiopia is working to improve these dynamics in IGAD and relation among the Horn of African states.

The current political transition in Ethiopia since 2018 has not only peace and security implications; but also economic implications. Accordingly, “in stark contrast with his predecessors, Abiy is pursuing a policy of regional economic integration, free trade, and open borders” (Faleg, 2019:5). Thus, to become a manufacturing hub in the African region and in the world, it is necessary to increase Ethiopia’s port options to secure distribution routes and integrate the Horn of Africa region economically. Different efforts were started to build strong economic integration, robust regional infrastructure development which connects the countries in the region with the philosophy of ‘*medemer*’ or synergy. In terms of socio-economic integration, it has also important positive impacts on the Horn of Africa region. Ethiopia under the current government, working tirelessly to create socio-economic integration with Djibouti, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, and Eritrea which is still challenging with the issue at Mekele. For instance, the Ethiopian government has mediated and reduced the difficulties between Somalia and Kenya because of the maritime boundary on the Juba land around Kismayou. Moreover, the relation between Asmara and Djibouti improved by the efforts Ethiopia’s government has made. Thus, the ongoing political transition in Ethiopia since 2018 has positive impact in integrating the neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa region which also changed the region's relation with the Arab States of the Gulf Region. In nutshell, the evolution of relations between Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan since Abiy took power in Ethiopia has established some indication of the potential for regional cooperation of the IGAD members states, a major shift after a long history of mutual distrust and destabilization.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter examined the new political transition in Ethiopia and its implications for the Horn of Africa. Notably, it focuses on its impacts on neighboring countries and IGAD as an organization. The issues of Ethio-Eritrea conflict resolution and GERD development is also briefly examined. Accordingly, political transition and change in Ethiopia have both negative and positive implications on some of the neighboring countries. For instance, the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement and tripartite agreement among Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia sidelined Somaliland and seen as a strategic mistake to Ethiopia’s regional interest. Egypt is now warming relations with Somaliland. Furthermore, even if it is positive for Ethiopia, its port deals with other neighboring states like Kenya, Sudan...etc., also negatively affect Djibouti’s income.

People's protest and political transition in Ethiopia have a spillover effect on Sudan's politics. Protestors in Sudan have got more lessons from Ethiopia's protest and fight against the dictator Albashir. Following that, PM Abiyi Ahmad has also mediated with the protestors and the military to form the transitional government. Further, after the change in Ethiopia, Sudan-Eritrea's relation became good. However, recently the relation between the two countries became tense as a result of border disputes. With efforts made by PM Abiy, the conflict between the South Sudan government and opposition was also reduced; during the writing of this paper, Somalia-Kenyan relation was calmed; and even if some negative impacts on Ethiopia in security terms, the Ethio-Eritrea conflict was resolved. The restored toward Ethio-Eritrea relation has also implication the Gulf-states diplomatic relation within the two states and Ethiopia got additional support from riparian countries; that is Eritrea on the GERD development.

Change in Ethiopia has also impacts on Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). To the extent, some of the IGAD member states tried to reduce their tension, and have started to create regional economic integration and different bilateral and trilateral agreements were made among and between the IGAD member states. For instance, between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Eritrea and Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia different socio-economic and political agreements were made to work together. But still, Eritrea refused to return to IGAD, rather prefer to make bilateral relations with its member states; this negatively affects IGAD as an organization. Therefore, the progress of relations between Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan since Abiy took power in Ethiopia has established some indication of the potential for regional socio-economic and political cooperation, a major shift after a long history of mutual distrust and destabilization.

In nutshell, the new political transition in Ethiopia has important security and economic implications. After changes have come in Ethiopia since 2018, the peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea were restored, cooperation on political, economic, social, cultural and security issues and the opening of embassies in the respective capitals took place, agreement on peace and comprehensive cooperation were signed among and between the Horn of Africa region states through the initiation of the new government in Ethiopia.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

In general conclusion, this study examined the 2018 political transition in Ethiopia by a focusing on its drivers, challenges and its implications on neighboring states of Ethiopia, IGAD as regional organ in particular and the HoA region in general. Beginning from 2018 there is ongoing political transition in Ethiopia which has got both domestic and international attention; because was relatively peaceful and has started through reform or transformation method. . However, its future of democratic consolidation is still uncertain. Thus, as it was discussed in the chapter one of this thesis, the core research question of this work was, is really the new transition in Ethiopia currently, and what are drivers, challenges and its implications for the Horn of African region and IGAD?

Therefore, to properly examine and reflect on the, drivers, challenges, and impacts of the new political transition in Ethiopia on the peace and security of the Horn of Africa region, this study employed a qualitative methodology. The study argues that, there is an ongoing new political transition in Ethiopia, which is different from the past political transitions, took place in the country's history. Indeed, this political transition is at an opening phase and taking place through reform method. In order to ascertain the reality and differences of this new transition in the study area, data was collected through interviews.

The study employed the conceptual framework of political transition, which helps to clarify the definition, nature, phases and methods, drivers, actors, changes and challenges of the new political transition opened in Ethiopia since 2018. The framework is grounded on the assumption that, political transition has different phases, patterns, and methods to take place. Therefore, political transition in the current context of Ethiopia can best be described and explained by this approach, as it was discussed in the conceptual chapter of this work.

The study considered 2018 as a point of departure and watershed; it was in mid-2018 that the Former PM Haile Mariam Dessalegn resigned premiership position, as a result of people's pressure from outside his party and political division within EPRDF. Following that, the current PM Abiyi Ahimed Ali came to power with support of soft-liners with the regime. Thus, as discussed in introductory and conceptual chapters of this study, the new political transition in Ethiopia that which has started since 2018, could rightly be described as a transition taking place through reform method with at its opening phase.

To make clear, different transition theories/approaches forward different thesis on why democratic transition failed? For instance, the structural approach among its propositions, the exclusion of concerned stakeholders from state institutions and the process of transition negatively affects the transition outcome; which could be democratic closure and autocratization and the inclusion of previously excluded groups in large scale institutions enables the success of democratic transition (Bratton & Walle, 1997). Thus, this transition needs to avoid the top down transition process and politics of exclusion to achieve its objective of democratization; unless it will be difficult to make stable democratic transition without avoiding reality in Ethiopia's failed transitions of the past.

The rational/strategic choice approach argues that, actors in the transition process and their choice determine the outcome of democratic political transition. The split with the ruling party, compromise between liberal reformer/soft-liner and standpatter/hardliner and their leadership commitment have direct impact on the success of democratic political transition (Hyden, 1992; Chazan, 1992). Accordingly, lack of elite bargain/ culture of give and take in every political transitions of the country kept in vicious circle of democratization failure in Ethiopia (Merera, 2003). Therefore, this thesis came to the conclusion that, the ongoing political transition which opened since 2018 is not revolutionary in nature and taking place through reform method. Furthermore, it is also the mix of transition from below and transition from above because it is the result of people's protest from below and the emergence of liberal reformer from above within the EPRDF coalition as a result of internal party fissure. Moreover, despite their current conflict, at its initial opening phase, there was also a kind of elite bargain or what Linz called "compromise between "the soft liners" and "hard liners (Linz, 1978). These make this political transition unique from the past political changes in Ethiopia.

Another point to be discussed, from blow this transition is derived by all actors engaged in the people's movement as centripetal driving factor from outside directly or indirectly. People's movements that had taken place from 2014 to 2018 were caused by lack of equality, justice and freedom in the country for almost 27 plus years. These actors were youth specially students at different level, educated part of society, academicians, intellectuals, activists, elites, political parties, and medias; those were the main drivers of this new transition opened in 2018. Moreover, from above as a result of revolutionary democracy, democratic centralism, and

developmental state doctrine which were paved the way for the domination and monopoly of TPLF over the other members of the coalition, intra-party fissure was created. This was also the centrifugal driving force of this transition from inside.

As clearly discussed, different challenges were identified. These challenges are: problem with state building, lack of center-periphery integration, historical grievances, structural problem built by the past stand patters (TPLF, PDO remnants, etc.) at different levels of government, political polarization within the political parties and society, ethnic division and communal conflict, internal people's displacement, youth population growth, high expectation and limitation of resources, inflation and high living conditions uncivilized political culture and ultra-nationalism, false propaganda, border disputes between regions, question of being region, disagreement on GERD development, Covid-19, desert Locust, and flood were strictly challenges the ongoing political transition in the country.

Moreover, even if its future end is uncertain, this new political transition in Ethiopia has also its own implication for the neighboring countries of Ethiopia, IGAD as regional organ and the Horn of Africa in general. Thus, this transition has both security and economic implication for the region. As discussed, after changes has come in Ethiopia since 2018, the peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea were restored, cooperation on political, economic, social, cultural, agreement on peace, security, and comprehensive cooperation were signed among and between the Horn of Africa region states through the initiation of the new government in Ethiopia. This is a good start and has an impact on future socio-economic integration, security, peace and stability of the whole region. In light of the existing literature, this is an important addition of this thesis. Therefore, based on the existing literature and data gathered, the study discovered and substantiate that, there is a new political transition in Ethiopia since-2018, which is different from the past transitions. In fact, the final stage of this transition is unknown; it might be democratic consolidation or a reversion to non-democratic authoritarian system of government.

Thus, based on the findings of this study the researcher has forward the following as possible proposition and suggestion that can be enabling the success of this new political transition which is at the opening phase, on its way from authoritarian form of government to consolidated democracy. The ongoing political transition in Ethiopia since recent time is remains one of the most promising in recent years; it still needs commendable of strong care and commitment from

all stake holders. These concerned bodies are: the liberal reformer or the government, opposition political parties, international community, civic societies, media, public intellectuals, opinion leaders, diaspora, political elite, political scientists, academicians, women, youth, students, and all Ethiopian people those who understand the complexity and problems with Ethiopian politics. To address the main political challenges, of the Ethiopian political transition it requires a broader national consensus on an inclusive nation-building and state building project, real political dialogue among all concerned body, implement genuine federalism which has a room for both minority and majority and balance the relation between unity and diversity, develop democratic political culture of contestation over politics of conspiracy and false propaganda, culture of give and take with compromise, hard work on building political community, build rational bureaucracy, learn from past mistakes, working on politics of elite bargain and compromise, ensure fair distribution of power and resources between the central government and regional states, develop democratic institutions that provide a visible solution for political questions, integrate the periphery to the center in decision making process, ensure decentralization of power based on equity, and provide common national political agenda agreed by all nation nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia to solve the country's overall long aged evils.

Moreover, to ensure and achieve the quest of democracy, equality, justice and consolidated democratic political transition in the Ethiopian state, the political elites and peoples of Ethiopia should change their attention towards creating common ground on the issues of national interest. Indeed, no transition can succeed without effective leadership, a practical and reasonable degree of unity, create people to people relations, public support, and thus government should begin its commitment and responsibility to maintain the rule of law, calm the mounting ethnic tensions between different Ethnic groups.

In summation and most importantly, the current government/liberal reformers should have to learn from the past fatal mistakes and failures of the past attempted political transitions to make the ongoing democratic political transition successful and historic. To add, the government or the liberal reformer and the moderate democrats should have to stand together to weaken the stand patters and the radical extremists those threatens this transition to restore the past status quo. Thus, if the government or the liberal reformers, democratic moderate, and the Ethiopian people's stand together and take into consideration the above propositions, the new political

transition in Ethiopia which is at its opening phase can pass the breakthrough phase and can succeed through arriving its consolidation phase. Most importantly, the master key to achieve this is, learn from the past failure, mediating the past and negotiating the future, and building consensus about the present to go out from the vicious problems of democratic reversals. However, if all stakeholders missed this points and the above suggestions, they might missed another opportunity for the transition from authoritarian to democratic form of government and history is going to repeat itself.

References

- Abate Nikodimos Alemayehu, (2004). “*Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: Challenges and Openings*” Master thesis: Faculty of Law University of Lund.
- Abbink, J. (2006) ‘*Discomfiture of Democracy? The 2005 Elections in Ethiopia and its Aftermath*’, African Affairs 105 (419): 173-99.
- Abebe Adem, (2012), “*Rule by Law in Ethiopia: Rendering Constitutional Limits on Government Power Nonsensical*”, CGHR working Paper 1, Cambridge: University of Cambridge Centre for Governance and Human Rights.
- Abiyi Ahimad, (2018). “*Ida’amuu*”, Finfinnee.
- Adam Przeworski, (1991). “*Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*” New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Addis Hiwet, (1975). “*Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution*”, Occasional Publication, No .1 of Review of African Political Economy, London.
- Addis Standard October 17, 2018, In-depth Analysis: Managing Political Transition in Ethiopia: The choice Factor
- Aklilu Abraham, (2006). “*Ethnicity and Dilemmas of State Making: Ethnic Federalism and Institutional Reforms in Ethiopia*” International Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1/2: Tsehai Publishers.
- Alem Habtu, (2004). “*Ethnic Pluralism as an Organizing Principle of the Ethiopian Federation*”, Dialectical Anthropology, Vol. 28, No. 2: Springer.
- _____, (2010). ‘Introduction’, In Alem Habtu (ed.). “*Ethiopian Federalism Principles, Processes and Practice*”. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University press.
- Alemante G. Selassie, (1992). “*Ethiopia: Problems and Prospects for Democracy*, William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal. Vol.1, Issue.2.
- Alfred Stepan, (1988). “*Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*”, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- _____, (1999). “*Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model*,” Journal of
- Ali R. Abootalebi, (1995). “*Democratization in Developing Countries: 1980-1989*”, Journal of Developing Areas, 29.
- Almayehu G. Mariam. (2018). “*Medemer or not Medemer, That is the Question for All Ethiopians!*” Al Mariam commentaries. <http://www.almariam.com/2018/08/26/medemer-or-not-medemerthat-is-the-question-for-all-ethiopians>.
- Alula Pankhurst, (1997). “*When the Centre Relocates the Periphery: Resettlement during the Derg*”, Ethiopia in Broader Perspective Papers of the XIII the International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Volume II Kyoto.
- Alves, María Helena Moreira, (1988). “*Dilemmas of the Consolidation of Democracy from the Top in Brazil*.” Latin American Perspectives.
- Amnesty International ,(2012). “*Ethiopia: The 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation as a serious obstacle to the promotion and protection of human rights in Ethiopia*”, Amnesty International’s written statement to the 20th Session of the UN Human Rights Council (18 June - 6 July 2012), Index: AFR 25/007/2012.
- _____, (2014). “*Because I Am Oromo’ Sweeping Repression in the Oromia Region of Ethiopia*”, by Amnesty International Ltd. Peter Benenson House 1 Easton Street. London WC1X 0DW United Kingdom.

- Andargachew Tiruneh, (1993). *“The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1987: A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy”*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Andrea Cassani and Alessandro Pellegata, (2016). *“Investigating the ‘reverse wave’ of de-democratization hypothesis”* International Political Science Association (IPSA), Poznan, July 2016.
- Annette Weber, (2018). *“Abiy Superstar– Reformer or Revolutionary?: Hope for Transformation in Ethiopia”* Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
- Antonie K. Nord, (1999). *“Politische Partizipation in einer blockierten Demokratie: das Beispiel Äthiopiens”*, Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde.
- Aregawi Berhe, (2008). *“A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (1975-1991): Revolt, Ideology and Mobilization in Ethiopia”*, Amsterdam: VU University, PhD dissertation; Hollywood, USA: Tsehai Publishers.
- Arend Lijphart, (1968). *“The Politics Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands”* Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Set (ACLED), (2017). *“Country Report: Popular Mobilisation In Ethiopia: An Investigation of Activity from November 2015 to May 2017”*.
- Aron Tesfaye, (2002). *“Political Power and Ethnic Federalism: The Struggle for Democracy in Ethiopia”*, University Press of America.
- Arriola.R.Leonardo, (2011). *“Countries at the Crossroads: Ethiopia”*, Freedom House.
- Asnake Kefale, (2009). *“Federalism and ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: a comparative study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz regions”* Doctoral Thesis: Leiden University.
- _____, (2014). *“Ethnic Decentralization and the Challenges of Inclusive governance in multiethnic cities: The case of Dire Dawa, Ethiopia.”* Regional & Federal Studies, Vol.24, No.5
- Assefa Fesseha, (2006). *“Theory Versus Practice in the Implementation of Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism”*, in David Turton, (2006), (eds). *“Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective”*, Eastern African Studies: Oxford, James Curry/Athens: Ohio University Press/Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press.
- _____, (2018). *“Federalism and Development: The Ethiopian Dilemma”*, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 25, No. 3.
- _____, (2012). *“Ethiopia’s Experiment in Accommodating Diversity: 20 Years’ Balance Sheet.”* Regional & Federal Studies, Vol. 22, No.4.
- Bahru Zewde, (1991). *“A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974”*, London: James Currey.
- Barrington Moore, Jr., (1966). *“Social Origin of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of Modern World”*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Berhanu Abegaz, (2011). *“Political Parties in Business”* College of William and Mary Department of Economics Working Paper Number 113.
- Bosman Asare and Peter Sekyere, (2016). *“An Examination of Ethiopia’s Anti -Terrorism Proclamation on Fundamental Human Rights”*, European Scientific Journal, vol.12, No.1.
- C. Clapham, (1988). *“Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia”*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Center for International Human Rights, (2009). *“Sounding the Horn: Ethiopia’s Civil Society Law Threatens Human Rights Defenders”*, Northwestern University School of Law.
- Chabal P, Daloz JP, (1999). *“Africa works: Disorder as a political instrument”*. Oxford: James Curry.

- Chalmers, Douglas, and Craig Robinson, (1982). "Why Power Contenders Choose Liberalization." International Studies Quarterly.
- Christopher Clapham, (1969). "Haile Selassie's Government", New York: Praeger.
- _____, (1987). "Revolutionary Socialist Development in Ethiopia", African Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 343, Oxford University Press.
- _____, (1988). "Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, Cambridge", Cambridge University Press.
- _____, (2017). "The Ethiopian Developmental State", third World Quarterly, Vol. 39, Issue, 6.
- Christophe Vander Beken, (2007). "Ethiopia: From A Centralized Monarchy to A Federal Republic", Belgium: Ghent University, Afrika Focus, Vol.20, No.1-2.
- Cok, C. (2019). "Ethiopian critical junctures: Ethnic tensions and liberal transition". Retrieved from <https://globalriskinsights.com/2019/08/ethiopia-critical-juncture/>.
- Committee for the Founding of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1987). "Ethiopia from Feudal Autocracy to People's Democracy", Birhanena selam printing press, Addis Ababa.
- Crises Group, (2019). "A Timeline from the Fall of Ethiopia's Junta in 1991 to the Rise of Abiy Ahmed". Nairobi/Brussels.
- D. Mawere Mutumwa, (2008). "Africa: Republicanism or Dictatorship?" online : <<http://www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/mawere53.15099.html>>, accessed 20.08.2019.
- Dan Gottlieb, (2018). "Ethiopia 2018: The Transition of Power and its Implications." African Research Program, Volume 4, Number 3.
- Daniel J. Elazar, (1984). "American Federalism: A View from the States". New York: Harper and Row. Democracy, Vol. 10, No.4.
- Dankwart Rustow, (1970) "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model", City University of New York.
- Dawit Walde Georgis (1989). Red Tears: Class and Revolution in Ethiopia. Trenton and New Jersey: The Red Sea Press.
- Dessalegn Rahmato, (1994). "The Hnquiet Countryside: The collapse of 'Socialism and Rural Agitation, 1990 and 1991", in Abebe Zegaye and S. Pausasang (eds) (1994) *Ethiopia in Chane Peasantry, Nationalism and Democracy*.
- Diamond, L. (1989). "Beyond autocracy: Prospects for democracy in Africa." Beyond Autocracy in Africa. Atlanta, The Carter Center of Emory University.
- Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Eveyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephan, (1992). "Capitalist Development and Democracy". Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Edmond J. Keller & Lahra Smith, (2005). "Obstacles to Implementing Territorial Decentralization." In *Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars*, edited by Philip G. Roeder and Donald Roth child. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Edmond J. Keller, (1981). "Revolution, Class and the National Question: The Case of Ethiopia", Northeast African Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3: Michigan State University Press.
- _____, (2002). "Ethnic Federalism, Fiscal Reform, Development and Democracy in Ethiopia" Africa Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, No.1
- _____, (1988). "Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic" Bloomington: Indiana University Press

- Éloi Ficquet & Wolbert G.C Smith, (2014). *“The Life and Times of Lij Iyasu of Ethiopia: New Insights”* French Centre for Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa: Ethiopia
- Endalachew Bayeh, (2018). *“Developmental State of Ethiopia: Reflections on the Benefits Obtained and the Costs Incurred”*, Ethiopian Journal of Social Science and Humanities, Vol.14, No. 2
- Eric Stein, (1992). *“Devolution or Deconstruction Czecho-Slovak Style,”* 13 Michigan J. International Law 786.
- Estelle Sohler, (2012). *“Between Ethnic and Religious Pluralism, Reform and Continuity, Portraits of an Ethiopian Prince”*
- Faleg, G., (2019). *“Resetting Ethiopia: Will the state heal or fail?”* European Union Institute for Security Studies. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/resetting-ethiopia>.
- Fasil Nahum, (1997). *“Constitution for a Nation of Nations: The Ethiopian Prospect”*, Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press.
- G.P. Gooch, (1959). *“English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century,”* 2nd ed. New York: Harper.
- Garbel Almond and Sidney Verba, (1963). *“The Civic Culture”* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Garon Hyden, (1992). *“Governance and Study of Politics”*, in *Governance and Politics in Africa*, (ed.) Garon Hyden and Michael Bratton (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rinner.
- Gebru Tareke, (2009). *“The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa”* New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
- Gedion T. Hessebon, (2013). *“The Precarious Future of the Ethiopian Constitution”* Journal of African Law, Vol. 57, No. 2, School of Oriental and African Studies.
- Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen, (1994). *“Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International Perspectives”*. New Yor: Routlage.
- Georg Sorensen, (1998). *“Democratization in the Third World: The role of Western Politics and Research”* Aarhus C, Denmark: Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus.
- Gérard Prunier & Éloi Ficquet, (2015). *“Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia”*, London: Hurst & Co. Publishers.
- Ghelawdewos Araia, (1995). *“Ethiopia: The Political Economy of Transition, New York, University Press of America.*
- Gilkes, Patrick ,(1975). *“The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia”*, New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Giovanni Faleg, (2019). *“Resetting Ethiopia: Will the State Heal or Fail?”*, Conflict series prevention, Brief / 11, European Union for Security Studies.
- Greenfield, R. (1965). *“Ethiopia: A New Political History”*. New York: Praeger.
- Gretchen Casper, Michelle M. Taylor, (1996). *“Negotiating Democracy: Transitions From Authoritarian Rule”* Pitt Series in Policy and Institutional Studies, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,
- Gros, J-Germain (1998), “Introduction” in Gros, J-Germain (ed.), *Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa: Coping with Uncertainty*, Greenwood Press, Westport and London.
- Guillermo A. O'Donnell, (1973). *“Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics”* Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies.
- Guillermo O'Donell and Philippe C. Schmitter, (1986). *“Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies.”* Baltimore and London, the John Hopkins University Press.
- Guiseppe di Palma, (1990). *“To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions”*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Gunther, R. & Mughan, A., (2000). *“Democracy and the Media”*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- H.G. Marcus, (2002). *“A History of Ethiopia”*. Berkeley/Los Angeles, University of California Press.
- Hagopian, Frances, and Scott Mainwaring, (1987). *“Democracy in Brazil: Prospects and Problems.”* World Policy Journal IV.
- Harold G. Marcus, (1994). *“A History of Ethiopia”*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Harold J. Berman, (1991). *“The Rule of Law and the Law-Based State”*, 4 the Harriman Institution. F. 1, 5.
- Hashim Tewfik, (2010). *“Transition to Federalism: The Ethiopian experience”*, Forum of Federations: Canada Ottawa, Ontario.
- Helga A. Welsh, (1994). *“Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe,”* Comparative Politics.
- Herbert Kitschelt, (1992). *“Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations?”* American Political Science Review, Vo. 86, No. 4.
- Horn of Africa Bulletin, (2018). *“Transitions in the Horn: Between Optimism and Caution”*, Peace & Life Institute, Vol. 30, Issue, 4: Uppsala, Sweden.
- Human Rights Watch, (2009) *“An analysis of Ethiopia’s draft anti-terrorism law,”* Ethiopia.
- International Crisis Group, (2019). *“Managing Ethiopia’s Unsettled Transition”* Africa Report N°269 | 21 February 2019: Brussels, Belgium.
- International Organization for Migration, (2019). *“Ethiopia National Displacement Report”* Round 18: July — August 2020: Ethiopia.
- Jalal Abdel-Latif and Sara Mokaddem, (2016). *“Ethiopia: Emergence and Positive Change in a Turbulent Geopolitical Context”*, Research Paper: OCP Policy Center, Rabat Morocco.
- James Bryce, (1921). *“Modern Democracies,”* vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, , p. 24.
- James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, (1984).*“The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,”* American Political Science Review, 78, No. 3.
- Jeylan Wolylie Hussein, (2006). *“A Critical Review of the Political and Stereotypical Portrayals of the Oromo in the Ethiopian Historiography”*, Nordic Journal of African Studies Vol. 15, No. 3.
- John Abbink, (1997).*“Ethnicity and constitutionalism in contemporary Ethiopia”*, Journal of African Law, 4th Quarter.
- _____, (2006). *“Discomfiture of Democracy? :The 2005 Election Crisis in Ethiopia and Its Aftermath”*, African Affairs, Vol. 105, No. 419: Oxford University Press.
- John Creswell, (2003). *“Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches”* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- _____, (2007). *“Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five.”*
- John M. Cohen, (1995). *“Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia”*, Northeast African Studies, New Series, Vol. 2, No. 2: Michigan State University Press.
- John Markakis and Nega Ayele, (1978). *“Class and Revolution in Ethiopia”*, Nottingham.
- John Markakis, (2003) *‘Ethnic Conflict in Pre-Federal Ethiopia’*, in Proceedings of the First National Conference on Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building, Addis Ababa: Ministry of Federal Affairs.
- _____,(1974). *“Ethiopia: An Anatomy of Traditional Polity”*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- _____, (2011). *“Ethiopia: The Last Two Frontiers”*, James Currey, USA.

- John Sorenson, (1995). *“Disaster and Development in the Horn of Africa”* Macmillan Press Ltd.
- John W. Harbeson, (2005). *“Ethiopia's Extended Transition”*, Journal of Democracy, Vol.16, No. 4: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- John Young, (1996). *“Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia”*, Review of African Political Economy, vol. 23, No. 70.
- John Young, (1997). *“Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 1975- 199”*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- _____, (1997). *“Revolution in Ethiopia the Tigray People's Liberation Front, 1975-1991”* New York: Cambridge University press.
- Jon Abbink, (2009), *“The Ethiopian Second Republic and the Fragile Social Contract”*, in: Africa Spectrum, 44, 2, 3-28. , GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of African Affairs Uppsala and Hamburg University Press.
- _____, (2011). *“Ethnic-based federalism and ethnicity in Ethiopia: reassessing the experiment after 20 years”* Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, Leiden, the Netherlands: Routledge.
- Jonathan H. Sunshine, (1972). *“Economic Causes and Consequences of Democracy: A Study in Historical Statistics of the European and European-Populated, English-Speaking Countries”* Columbia University.
- Jordan Gans-Morse, (2004). *“Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post-Communist Transitions and the Myth of a Dominant Paradigm,”* Post-Soviet Affairs, 2.
- Joseph Badwaza and Jon Temin, (2018). *“Reform in Ethiopia: Turning Promise into Progress”* Freedom House policy briefs.
- Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan (1978). *“Crisis, Breakdown, and Re-equilibration, in the Breakdown of Democratic Regimes”*, (ed). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- _____,(1996). *“Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe”* Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Presss.
- _____, (1986). *“Political Crafting of Democratic Consolidation or Distruction: European and South American Comparisons”*, Carter Center, Atlanta, Georgea.
- Juan Linz,(1990). *“Transition to Democracy”* The Washington Quarterly 13, No:13.
- Kaleab Kassaye, (2001). *“The Nonfederal Features of the Ethiopian Ethnic-Based Federal Experiment”* University of Fribourg, Switzerland.
- Karl, Terry Lynn, (1986). *“Imposing Consent?Electoralism Vs Democratization in El Salvador.”*In Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva, eds., Elections and Democratization in Latin America. San Diego: University of California.
- _____, (1990). *“Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America.”*Comparative Politics.
- Kassahun Alemo(2010). *“The Ethiopian Transition in Regional Perspective:Election processes, Liberation movements and Democratic change in Africa”*. Maputo,CMI and IESE.
- Kaufman, Robert. 1986. *“Liberalization and Democratization in South America: Perspectives from the 1970s.”* In O’Donnell et al., eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, part 3.
- Kesselman Krieger and Joseph Nye, (2003). *“Introduction to Comparative Politics: Political Challenges and Changing Agendas”*,Houghton Mifflin: New York.
- Ketemaw Muluye, (2020). *“The Formation of Ethiopia’s Federation and Its Implications for The Amharas’ Quest for Recognition and Boundary Demarcations”* Modern Africa: Politics, History and Society, Vol.8, Issue 1.

- Kidane Mengisteab, (1997). “*New Approaches to State-building in Africa: The Case of Ethiopia’s Ethnic-based Federalism*,” *African Studies Review*, Vol. 40, No. 3.
- _____,(2007). “*Identity Politics, Democratization and State Building in Ethiopia’s Federal Arrangement*.” *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, Vol.7, No. 2.
- Kiflu Tadesse, (1993). “*The Generation: The History of Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party*”. (Part), Silvers spring.
- Kjetil Tronvoll and Øyvind Aadland, (1995) “*The Process of Democratisation in Ethiopia – An Expression of Popular Participation or Political Resistance?*”, Norwegian Institute of Human
- Kjetil Tronvoll, (2000). “*Ethiopia: A New Start?*” London.
- _____, (2008).“*Human Rights Violations in Federal Ethiopia: When Ethnic Identity is a Political Stigma*”, *International Journal on Minority and Croup Rights*, Vol. 15, No. 1.
- Koehn P., (1975). “*Ethiopian Politics: Military Intervention and Prospects for Further Change*”. *Africa Today*, Vol. 22, No. 2.
- Lahra Smith, (2007). “*Political Violence and Democratic Uncertainty in Ethiopia*”, Special Report, United States Institute of Peace: Washington, DC 20036.
- Lappiso G. Dilebo, (1989). “*Long History of the Ethiopian State and People (Amharic)*”. Addis Ababa: Commercial Printing Press.
- Leenco Lata, (1998). “*The Making and Unmaking of Ethiopia’s Transitional Charter*,” in Asafa Jalata *Oromo Nationalism and the Ethiopia Discourse*, (ed.), Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press.
- _____, (1999). “*The Ethiopian State at the Crossroads*”, Asmara: the Red Sea Press.
- Lefort, Ronan, (1983). “*Ethiopia: A Heretical Revolution?*” London, Zed Press.
- Lewitsky Steven and Way Lucan, (2010).“*Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*,” Cambridge University Press.
- Lisa Anderson, (1999). “*Transitions to Democracy*” New York: Columbia university press
- Lovise Aalen, (2002). “*Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000*”, Bergen: Michelsen Institute. Development Studies and Human Rights, Bergen
- _____, (2002).“*Institutionalizing the Politics of Ethnicity: Actors, Power and Mobilization in Southern Ethiopia under Ethnic Federalism*”, University of Oslo, Department of Political Science, Unpub.
- _____, (2014). “*Ethiopia After Meles: Stability for How Long?*” in *Current History* Vol. 113, No. 763, Retrieved from <https://www.cmi.no/publications/5144-ethiopia-after-meles> stability-for-how-long.
- _____, (2019). “*The Revolutionary Democracy of Ethiopia: A Wartime Ideology both Shaping and Shaped by Peacetime Policy Needs*”, Government and Opposition: Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway.
- Lyons, T., (1996). “*Closing the Transition: The May 1995 Election in Ethiopia*”.*The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1
- M. Abir, (1968). “*Ethiopia: The Era of Princes*,” London: Longman.
- _____, (1980), “*Ethiopia and the Red Sea: The Rise and Decline of the Solomonic Dynasty and Muslim-European Rivalry in the Region*”, Frank Cass Inc.,London,
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Eduardo Viola, (1985). “*Transitions to Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s*.”*Journal of International Affairs* No.38.
- Marcus, H. G., (1983). “*Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States, 1941-1974: The Politics of Empire*,” Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

- _____, (1994). *"A History of Ethiopia"* Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press.
- Marina Ottaway, (1977). *"Peasants in Africa: Land Reform in Ethiopia 1974-1977"*. African Studies Review, Vol. 20, No. 3, published by African Studies Association.
- Marina Rafti, (2007). *"A Perilous Path to Democracy Political Transition and Authoritarian Consolidation in Rwanda"* Institute of Development Policy and Management, Belgium: University of Antwerp.
- Medhane Tadesse and John Young, (2003). *"TPLF: Reform or Decline?"* Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 30, No. 97, the Horn of Conflict: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
- Menychle Meseret Abebe,(2019). *"The Relations between the Media and Political System in Ethiopia's Revolutionary Democracy from May 1991-April 2018"*, ERJSSH Vol.6, No. 2.
- Merera Gudina,(2010)*"Twenty Years of Experimenting with 'Revolutionary Democracy': Elections and Democratization in Ethiopia, 1991-2010. "* [http:// www.oromopress.org](http://www.oromopress.org) (accessed 4/25/ 2019)
- International Crises Group, (2009). *"Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents"* Crisis Group Africa Report N°153.
- _____, (2003). *"Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Quest for Democracy, 1960-2000"*, Addis Ababa: Chamber Printing House.
- _____, (2011). *"Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolutionary Democracy, 1960-2011"*, Addis Ababa: Chaber Printing House.
- _____,(2002). *"Ethiopia: Competing ethnic nationalisms and the quest for democracy, 1960 – 2000,"* PhD thesis, ISS, The Hague, The Netherlands.
- _____,(1994). *"The Ethiopian Transition from Military Autocracy to Popular Democracy?: Some Major Issues for Consideration in Crossing the Crossroads"* Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies, 22(1-2).
- _____, (1994). *"Authoritarian Populism and Ethiopia's Passage to Democracy"*, a paper presented to SSRC, New York.
- _____, (2003). *"The Elite and the Quest for Peace, Democracy, and Development in Ethiopia: Lessons to be Learnt"*, Northeast African Studies, New Series, Vol. 10, No. 2, Special Issue: Challenges of Building Democratic Institutions for Governance and Development in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa: Michigan State University Press.
- _____, (2007). *"Ethnicity, Democratization and Decentralization in Ethiopia: e Case of Oromia"*, Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review, Vol. 23, No.1
- _____, (2002). *"Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Quest for Democracy"*, Maastricht, Shaker Publishing.
- _____, (2003). *"Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarian Regimes"*, Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- _____(1994), *"Transition towards Democracy and Governance in Post-Mengistu Ethiopia"*,*Development Discussion Paper No. 493*,Harvard Institute for International Development, Harvard University.
- Meseret,(2016).*"Protests in Ethiopia: Why are Ethiopians protesting?"* A Report for the Center on Conflict and Development at Texas A & M University.
- Michael Chege,(1979). *"The Revolution Betrayed: Ethiopia, 1974-91"*, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 17, No. 3. Cambridge University Press

- Milkessa, M. (2017). “*Ethiopian federalism and the ethnic politics of divided cities: Consociationalism without competitive multiparty politics in Dire Dawa*”. Ethno politics,
- Mohamed Hassen, (1999). “*Ethiopia: Missed Opportunities for peaceful Democratic Process*.” In: *State-building and Democratization in Africa*. Kidane Mengistiab and Cyril Daddeh (Eds.). Westport, CN: Praeger. Hechter, Michael..Containing Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- _____, (2002). “*Conquest, Tyranny, and Ethnocide against the Oromo: A Historical Assessment of Human Rights Conditions in Ethiopia, ca. 1880s–2002*”, Northeast African Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3, Michigan State University Press.
- Mosley, J., (2015). “*Somalia’s Federal Future: Layered Agendas, Risks and Opportunities*”, Research Paper, Chatham House, Sep., pp. 9–12.
- Moti Daba, (2018). “*Faith-based Institutions and Peace-building in Ethiopia’s New Context*”, in Horn of Africa Bulletin, Vol. 30, Issue, 4, Peace & Life institute: Uppsala, Sweden
- Muhammad Habib, (2010). “*The Ethiopian Federal System: The Formative Stage*”, Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung, Addis Ababa.
- Munck, G. L. (August 1996) “*Disaggregating Political Regime: Conceptual Issues in the Study of Democratization*,” University of Illinois Working Paper 228.
- Murcus, H.G., (1994b). “*New Trends in Ethiopian Studies*”, Papers of the 12th International Ethiopian Studies. Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press.
- Nahomi Chazan, (1992). “*Liberalization, Governance and Political Space in Gana,*” in *Governance and Politics in Africa*,(ed.) Garon Hyden and Michael Bratton(Boulder, Colo.:Lynne Rinner
- Nancy Bermeo, (1994). “*Sacrifice, Sequence and Strength in Successful Dual Transitions: Lesson from Spain,*” Journal of Politics 56
- National Research Council, (1992).“*Transitions to Democracy in Africa.*” Democratization in Africa: African Views, African Voices. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.
- O’Donnell, Guillermo, (1988). “*Democracy as a Contingent Outcome of Conflicts.*” In Jon Elster, ed., Constitutionalism and Democracy ,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Omar G. Encarnacion, (1996). “*The Politics of Dual Transitions,*” Comparative Politics 28
- P.Brass, (1991).“*Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*”, Sage Publications.
- P.T.W Baxter, Jan Hultin, and Alesandiro,(1996). “*Being and Becoming Oromo*” Historical and Anthropological Inquiry (eds), Nordiska Afrika Instituteten: the Red Sea Press.
- Patric Gilkes, (2015). “*Elections and Politics in Ethiopia, 2005-2010*”, in Gérard Prunier &Éloi Ficquet,(2015). “*Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia*”, London: Hurst & Co. Publishers.
- Patric H. O’Neil, (1996). “*Revolution From Within: Institutional Analysis, Transition from Authoritarianism, and The Case of Hungary,*” World Politics 48
- Paul B. Henze, (2000). “*Layers of Time*”, New York: Palgrave.
- Paul R. Brass, (1991). “*Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*”, New Delhi: Sage Publishers.
- Paul W. Drake and Eduardo Silva, (1986). “*Elections and Democratization in Latin America*” eds., San Diego: Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies, University of California.
- Paulos Chanie, (2007). “*Clientelism and Ethiopia's Post-1991 Decentralization*”, the Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3
- Paulos Milkias, (2003). “*Ethiopia, the TPLF, and the Roots of the 2001 Political Tremor*”, Northeast African Studies, New Series, Vol. 10, No. 2, Special Issue: Challenges of Building Democratic

- Institutions for Governance and Development in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa: Michigan State University Press.
- _____, (2019). *Political Junctures and Transition from Authoritarian to Democracy and Tasks or Constructing Integrative Federalism in Contemporary Ethiopia*, paper presented at Ethiopian forum: challenges and prospects for constitutional democracy in Ethiopia. Retrieved from <https://globalafrica.isp.msu.edu/files/8415/5991/6509/PaulosMilkias.pdf>
- Pausewang, S. (1994). "Local Democracy and Central Control", in Abebe Zegeye & Pausewang, S. (eds)(1994) *Ethiopia in Change: Peasantry, Nationalism, and Democracy*.
- People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, (1989). "Ethiopia from Feudal Autocracy to People's Democracy" September, 1987, Addis Ababa Ethiopia: Berhanina Selam Printing Press.
- Peter B. Evans, Dietric Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, (1985). "Bringing the State Back In" Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, (1991). "What Democracy Is...and Is Not," *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 2, No. 3
- Przeworski, Adam, (1986). "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy." In *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Comparative Perspectives*, vol. 3, ed.
- Randi Rønning Balsvik, (1998). "Student Protest-University and State in Africa 1960 -1995." *Forum for Development Studies* No.2, NUPI,Oslo.
- Redie Bereketeab, (2019). "The Ethiopia-Eritrea Rapprochement: Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa" The Nordic Africa Institute: Uppsala.
- Rene Lemarchand,(1994). "Managing Transition Anarchies: Rwanda, Burundi and South Africa in Comparative Perspective", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.32, No.4
- Richard Greenfield, (1965). "Ethiopia: A New political history" London and New York.
- Richard Pankhurst, Geoffe Last, Eric Robson,(2013). "A History of Ethiopia in Pictures from Ancient to Modern Times", Arada Books: Ethiopia.
- Robert A. Dahl, (1961). "Who Governs: Democracy and Power in American City", New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press.
- Robert G.Patman, (1990). "The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention and Disengagement". New York, Cambridge University Press
- Robert Mattes and Mulu Teka, (2016). "Ethiopians' views of democratic government: Fear, ignorance, or unique understanding of democracy", Afro barometer working paper, No. 164
- Robert Pinkney, (2007). "Democracy in the Third World," Lynne Rienner Publishers:India.
- S.E. Finer,(1976). "The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics" 2d ed. Harmonds worth: Penguin Books.
- Sable Teweldebiran (2012), "Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Law and Human Rights", Addis Ababa, last updated Tuesday 10 May 2012.
- Sagantaa Paartii Badhaadhinaa, Fulbaana 2012, Finfinnee.
- Saheed A. Adejumobi, (2007). "The History of Ethiopia", London: Greenwood Press.
- Samuel P. Huntington, (1987). "The Goals of Development," in *Understanding Political Development*, ed. Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, Boston: Little, Brown.
- _____, (1991). "The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century" Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
- Samuel P. Huntington, (1991-1992). "How Countries Democratize," *Political Sciences Quarterly*, 106 (4): 579-616.

- _____, (1991). “*Democracy’s Third Wave*” *The Journal of Democracy*, Vol.2, No.2
- Sara Mokaddem,(2019). “*Abiy Ahmed’s ‘Medemer’ reforms: Can it ensure sustainable growth for Ethiopia and what are the challenges facing the new government?*” Policy Brief, PB-19/08, Policy Center for the New South.
- Sarah Vaughan & Kjetil Tronvoll, (2003). “*The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life*”, Stockholm:Sida, Edita Sverige, SIDA (SIDA Studies, 10).
- Sarah Vaughan, (1994) “*The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991: its origins, History and significance*”, Centre of African Studies, Edinburgh University.
- _____, (2003). “*Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia*”, PhD dissertation: the University of Edinburgh.
- _____, (2011). “*Revolutionary democratic state-building: party, state and people in the EPRDF’s Ethiopia*”, *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, Vol.5, No. 4
- _____, (2015). “*Federalism, Revolutionary Democracy, and the Developmental State, 1991-2012*”, in Gérard Prunier &Éloi Ficquet,(2015). “*Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia*”, London: Hurst & Co. Publishers.
- Scott Gates, (2007). “*Democratic Waves? Global P Atterns Of Democratization, 1800–2000*”, Paper prepared for delivery at the National Political Science Conference, 3–5 january 2007, Trondheim, Norway.
- Scott Gates, Håvard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, Håvard Strand (2007). “*Democratic Waves: Global patterns of Democratization, 1800–2000*” Paper prepared for delivery at the National Political Science Conference, 3–5 january,2007, Trondheim, Norway.
- Scott Mainwaring and Donald Share,(1986). “*Transitions through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain.*” In Wayne Selcher, ed., *Political Liberalization in Brazil*, Boulder: Westview.
- Scott Mainwaring, (1989). “*Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and Comparative Issues*” Working Paper No.130
- Selassie Alemante (1992). ‘*Ethiopia: Problems and Prospects for Democracy*’, William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, Vol. 1, No. 2
- Seligson, Mitchell, (1987a.) “*Democratization in Latin America: The Current Cycle.*”In Malloy and Seligson, eds., *Authoritarians and Democrats*.
- Semahagn Abebe, (2018). “*The Developmental State Model in Ethiopia: A Path to Economic Prosperity or Political Repression?*” *Social Evolution & History*, Vol. 17 No. 1: Uchitel’ Publishing House.
- Semahagn Gashu, (2014). “*The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation: Ethnicity, Ideology and Democracy in Ethiopia*” University of Connecticut, USA: Ashgate Publishing.
- Semir Yusuf, (2019). “*Drivers of ethnic conflict in contemporary Ethiopia*”, Institute for Security Studies: Monograph, No. 202.
- Seva Gunitsky, (2017). “*Aftershocks: Great Powers and Domestic Reforms in the Twentieth Century*”. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- _____, (2018). “*Democratic Waves in Historical Perspective*”, *Perspectives on Politics*: Vol. 16, No. 3, American Political Science Association
- Seymour Martin Lipset, (1959). “*Some Social Requisites of Democracy*” *American Political Science Review*: 53
- Shain, Y. and Linz, J. J. (1995) “*Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions*,”Cambridge University Press.

- Sidney Verba, (1976). "*Problems of Democracy in the Developing Countries*," Remarks, Harvard-MIT Joint Seminar on Political Development
- Siegfried Pausewang, (1994) "*The 1994 Election and Democracy in Ethiopia*", Norwegian Institute of Human Rights.
- _____, (2014). "*Local democracy and human security in Ethiopia: Structural reasons for the failure of democratization*". The South African Institute of International Affairs, report paper 45. Retrieved from <https://www.africaportal.org/publications/local-democracy-and-human-security-in-ethiopia-structural-reasons-for-the-failure-of-democratisation/>
- Siraw Megibaru Temesgen, (2015). "*Weaknesses of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia*", International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention, Vol. 4 Issue. 11
- Smith, William. 1987. "*The Political Transition in Brazil: From Authoritarian Liberalization and Elite Conciliation to Democratization*." In Baloyra, *Comparing New Democracies*.
- Solomon, Gashaw, (1993). '*Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia*', in C.Young (ed.), *The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-state at Bay*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Stepan, Alfred,(1988). "*Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*". Princeton: Princeton University Press
- Stephan D. Krasner, (1988). "*Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspectives*," Comparative Political Studies 21
- Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, (1995). "*The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*", Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- _____, (1997). "*The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*", Comparative Politics, 29
- Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb,(1994). eds "*Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment*," New York: Oxford University Press.
- Sujian Guo,(1999). "*Democratic Transition: A Critical Overview*" Issues & Studies Vol. 35, No. 4
- _____,(1995). "*Totalitarianism: An out dated Paradigm for post-Mao China?*" Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol: 14, No: 2
- Svein Ege, Harald Aspen, Birhanu Teferra and Shiferaw Bekele, (2009). "Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies" (eds), Vol. 1, Printed in Norway by NTNU-trykk, Trondheim
- Taddesed Tamrat, (1972). "*Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270-1527*,"Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Takele Bekele Bayu, (2019). "*Fault Lines within the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF): Intraparty Network and Governance system*", International Journal of Contemporary Research and Review, Vol. 10, Issue 02
- Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jagers, Will H. Moore, (1990)"*The Transformation of the Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power since 1800*," Studies in Comparative Development.
- Tefera Negash Gebregziabher, (2019). "*The Party That Consumes the State: The Rise of Oligarchy in Post-1991 Ethiopia*", PhD dissertation: Legatron Electronic Publishing, Rotterdam.
- Teferi Mekonnen,Nigatu Gebremedhin,Alem-meta Assefa,Binyam Moreda, (2019). "*Geography of Ethiopia and the Horn*" Teaching Module: MoSHE
- Teferi Mergo,(2018). OSA statement: "*The unfolding political transition in Ethiopia*"Minneapolis, MN 55406-0541

- Teferra Haile-Selassie, (1997) *“The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1991: From a Monarchical Autocracy to a Military Oligarchy”*, London/New York, Kegan Paul International
- Tekle Tsadik Makuria, (1983). *“Atse Menelik and Ethiopian Unity (Amharic)”*, Addis Ababa Ethiopia: Bole Printing Press.
- Terrence Lyons, (1991). *“The Transition in Ethiopia,”* CSIS Africa Notes.
- _____, (1996). *“Closing the Transition: the May 1995 Elections in Ethiopia”*, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1.
- Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter, (1991). *“Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe,”* International Social Science Journal, Vol. 48, and No.2
- Terry Lynn Karl, (1990) *“Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,”* Comparative Politics, 23
- Teshale Tibebe, (1986). *“The Making of Modern Ethiopia, 1896-1974”*, Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press.
- The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, August, 1995.
- The Guardian, 8 July, 2018, These changes are unprecedented: how Abiy is upending Ethiopian politics
- The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI), (2017). *“Country Policy and Guidance Note Ethiopia: Oromos including the ‘Oromo Protests’* Globe House, 89 Eccleston Square, London.
- The Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, charter no.1 of 1991, Negarit Gazetta, 50th Year, preamble, para.2
- Thegaye Regassa, (2004). *“State constitutions in Federal Ethiopia: A preliminary observation”*. Paper presented in the Bellagio conference March, 22-27, 2004.
- Theodore M. Vestal, (1996). *“An Analysis of the New Constitution of Ethiopia and the Process of Its Adoption”* Northeast African Studies, New Series, Vol. 3, No. 2.
- _____, (1999). *“Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War State.”* Westport: Praeger Publishers.
- _____, (2013). *“The Lost Opportunity for Ethiopia: The Failure to Move toward Democratic Governance”* International Journal of African Development, Volume 1, Issue 1: Oklahoma State University.
- Thomas Carothers, (2002). *“The End of the Transition Paradigm Journal of Democracy”* Volume 13, Number 1, Project MUSE.
- Thomson, Alex (2004). *“An Introduction to African Politics”* 2nd Edition, London: Routledge
- Tobias Hagmann & Jon Abbink, (2012). *“Twenty years of revolutionary democratic Ethiopia, 1991 to 2011”* Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol.5, No.4
- Tomomi Tokuori, (2019). *“How Prime Minister Abiy Envisions “New Ethiopia”: Moving Towards People’s Reconciliation And Sustainable Economic Development”* EMEA & Russia Dept., Global Economic & Political Studies Div. Mitsui & Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute
- Tracy J. Ross, (2010). *“A Test of Democracy: Ethiopia’s Mass Media and Freedom of Information Proclamation”*, Penn State Law Review, Vol. 114, No.3
- Transitional Government of Ethiopia TGE, (1991). *“The Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia”*, Addis Ababa
- Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, (1991). Negarit Gazeta. Proc. No.1/1991.
- Ulrich K. Preuss, (1991). *“The Politics of Constitution Making: Transforming Politics into Constitutions,”* 13 LAW & POL’Y 107. 23
- United States Institute of Peace USIP (2019): A Year of Change in Ethiopia, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/04/year-change-ethiopia>

- Vaughan, S (2006). "*Responses to Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia's Southern Region*", in Turton, D. (ed.), Vestal, T. M., (1994). "*Democratic Electoral Process: Fairness for Whom: Representation of What?*" in 'Inter African Group, Proceedings of the Symposium on 'The making of the New Ethiopian Constitution':15-18.
- Walegn Emiru, (2008). "*Ethiopia Through the Second Millennium: Critical Assessment*", Addis Ababa Ethiopia:Bole Printing Press.
- Walter W. Powell and Paul J.DiMaggio, (1991), eds"*The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*" Chicago: Univesrity of Chicago Press.
- Welsh, Helga A., (1994). "*Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe.*"Comparative Politics
- Whitehead, L. (2002). "*Democratization: Theory and Practice.*" Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- William H. Riker, (1964). "*Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*". Boston: Little Brown
- Willy Kymlicka, (2006). "*Emerging Western Models of Multinational Federalism: Are they Relevant for Africa?*
- Wondwosen Teshome,(2008). "*Federalism in Africa: The Case of Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia*", International Journal of Human Science, Volume: 5 Issue: 2, University of Vienna.
- World Bank,(2019). "*World Population Report*" World Bank Group: IBRD. IDA
- Yohannis Abate, (1983). "*The Legacy of Imperial Rule: Military Intervention and the Struggle for Leadership in Ethiopia 1974-1978*" Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 19, No.1, Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
- Yonas Adaye,(2019). "*Preventing violent extremism in the Horn: The case of ethnic extremism in Ethiopia*", Policy paper, European Institute of Peace
- Yonatan Tesfaye, (2010). "*Institutional Recognition and Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity: Federalism in South Africa and Ethiopia*" PhD dissertation, Pretoria, University of The Western Cape, South Africa: Ashgate Publishing.
- Yoseph Badwaza, Yoseph and Jon Temin (2018). "*Reform in Ethiopia: Turning Promise into Progress*", Reviewing Current Developments in Ethiopia: Freedom House, 75 years Championing Democracy.
- Zekareas B. Abebe,(2018). "*From Rhetoric to Concrete Steps: Will Reforms in Ethiopia Last?*"on IPE Global Observatory, Daily analysis.