

Addis Ababa University
School of Graduate Studies
Institute of Regional and Local Development Studies

DISTRICT LEVEL DECENTRALIZATION PROGRAM IN THE SOMALI
REGION: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO JIG-JIGA AND BABILE WOREDAS

By:
Mahat Daud Hassan

March, 2007
ADDIS ABABA

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A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an MA Degree in Regional and Local Development Studies

By:

Mahat Daud Hassan

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY




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**DISTRICT LEVEL DECENTRALIZATION PROGRAM IN THE
SOMALI REGION: PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENTS WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO JIG-JIGA AND BABILE WOREDAS**

By: Mahat Daud Hassan

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ACRONYMS

ABE: Alternative Basic Education
BoFED: Bureau of Finance and Economic Development
CBB: Capacity Building Bureau
CBCO: Capacity Building Coordinating Office
CBOs: Community-Based Organizations
CMPCO: Community Mobilization and Participation Office
CSB: Civil Service Bureau
DLDP: District Level Decentralization Program
DPPB: Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau
DPPO: Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Office
EC: Ethiopian Calendar
EPRDF: Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization
FDRE: Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FEDCO: Finance and Economic Development Coordinating Office
GC: Gregorian Calendar
IMF: International Monetary Fund
MCB: Ministry of Capacity Building
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals
NEBE: National Electorate Board of Ethiopia
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organization
OFED: Office of Finance and Economic Development
PCDP: Pastoral Community Development Project
PDCO: Pastoral Development Coordinating Office
PSCAP: Public Service Capacity Building Program
SCF-UK: Save the Children Fund -United Kingdom
SDPRP: Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
SJACO: Security and Justice Administration Coordinating Office
SNNPR: Southern Nations and Nationalities and Peoples Region
SPDP: Somali People Democratic Party
SRS: Somali Regional State
TGE: Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPCE: Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia
UNDP: United Nation Development Program
WB: World Bank
WSDP: Western Somali Democratic Party

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Abstract

After decades of highly centralized and unitary political system and administrative setup, Ethiopia has been following federal system of government and decentralization policy of regional and local governance and democratization process immediately after the downfall of the military regime in 1991. The process of decentralization in Ethiopia has taken place in two major phases. The first phase was decentralization from the central government to autonomous regions which was done at ones and referred to as the first wave of decentralization in Ethiopia, while the second phase was from regions to woredas and has not taken place at the same time unlike the devolution from the central government to regions. But rather DLDP (or the second wave of decentralization in Ethiopia) from regions to woredas took place in two major phases based probably on regions' level of development and political maturity; that is, relatively developed four regions embarked the program first and then followed by the so called emerging regions. DLDP in the Somali region has been probably the last of all regions and had it not the pressure from the central government it would have not been implemented even to its current low level status.

In view of this, the study attempted to explore the objectives, driving force(s), design, processes, scope, legal and institutional frameworks and implementation status of the recently embarked DLDP in the Somali region. Secondly, the study provided a modest preliminary investigation of some performance indicators of the program in terms of local governance processes, community participation and empowerment and basic service delivery with particular reference to two woredas. Finally, the paper tried to unveil some of the major inherent and encountered problems, and the possible prospects of the program as well as contradictions of the basic requirements of the program and the way of life of the most inhabitants of the region. To this regard the study concluded that DLDP in the Somali has been embarked and implemented hastily in a big-bang, one-time event, project-like, top-down and uniform approaches without adequate policy, legal and institutional frameworks as well as with very limited participation and preparedness of the stakeholders (woreda governments and the community) at local level. As a result of these, the program current implementation status is not doing well both in terms of governance and basic service delivery, and faces a bleak prospect of sustainability due to absence of broad societal consensus and participation during its inception and poor grassroots support during its implementation.

Key words: *Decentralization, Devolution, Local governance, Good governance, Local Development, Empowerment, Participation.*

Chapter One

1. Introduction

1.1. Background of the Study

Decentralization in its various forms has been advocated for as a fundamental political agenda for democratic self governance, administrative and fiscal instrument and socio-economic development for over three decades (Meheret.1998).

It is a concept which is surrounded by a variety of complexities, dynamism and confusion which should be cautiously analyzed in any particular situation, setting, context and country/region before using it as a development policy for reorganization of political, fiscal, administrative and service delivery responsibilities to lower levels.

In its general understanding, decentralization is *a process through which authority/power, responsibility for some functions, resources and accountability are transferred from the central levels of government to subnational levels of governments, communities and (maybe) the private sectors*(Altmann, et al, 2001). It has been considered by many as one of the most important strategies in public sector reform.

Decentralization may take various forms depending on the objectives and the country implementing it. It exists in a continuum that starts from *administrative* (deconcentration and delegation), through *fiscal*, political (devolution) and *market* (privatization and deregulation) forms. The difference among these forms of decentralization depends on what is decentralized or rather the degree of power and accountability, responsibility and resources relinquished by the center to the periphery. On the other hand, Basta(1998) perceive decentralization from two separate but closely related perspectives;(a)*intergovernmental processes*-that is, decentralization of governance between levels of government from federal/central to state/local; (b) *deregulation*-that is decentralization from government to market, quasi-market and non-governmental organizations. Any country may adopt one or a combination of two or more based the objectives of the decentralization adopted by the country.

Most countries especially the developing ones around the world faced external as well as internal pressures to devolve power to regional and local levels which is in fact becoming part of the trend which if not universal is nevertheless the dominant trend. General causes include systemic forces like democratization and economic development; specific causes (see box1.1 for the examples in Africa) however, are different for different countries. In some countries the policies of opening up of economy and policies devised to deal with the challenges posed by new globalized world are interacting with domestic political and economic institutions in such a way so as to create incentives for decentralization. Further more, there is external pressure coming from IMF and WB who implicitly and explicitly have declared '*decentralization*' as their most favoured policy prescription especially for the developing world (Sharma, 2004).

Box1.1 Driving forces for Decentralization in Africa

1. The overt failure of *centralised* public sector management which gave way to economic, fiscal and political crises on the 1970s and 1980s.
2. The resulting decline in *state* resources increased pressure for economic, institutional and political reforms as part of the search for new paradigms of governance.
3. Pressure from increasingly sophisticated non-state actors – the civil society and private sector who pressed for space to influence decision-making process and to get more involved in public affairs, especially in service delivery and local development.
4. Pressure from external donors to establish leaner and efficient bureaucracies as a pathway to improving governance and service delivery; an important consideration given the fact many African states are heavily dependent on donor funds for development expenditures.
5. Pressure of the urbanisation and *metropolitanisation* phenomenon in most countries.
6. The use of decentralisation by ruling groups to neutralize or seek compromises with local elites with secessionist mentality
7. The pressure from the globalisation phenomenon which compelled many national governments to focus their attention on strategic issues of national economic and political management

Source: Sharma, 2004


Decentralization whether it's a political choice or a development policy, is not a universal remedy to all problems of a country, neither can it stand alone. It is complex and constantly evolving and changing phenomenon and difficult to assess its outcomes and should be accompanied by other compatible reforms. Decentralization is not an end in itself; it is one of several means being used to achieve priority development goals. It is a means to allow the participation of the people and local governments. Promoting good governance through decentralized local governance is a precondition necessary to achieve development goals (Conyers, 1986 and Jacob, 2005).

The fundamental developmental logic of decentralization is that local institutions are more likely to respond to local needs and aspirations. Theorists believe this ability emanates from local authorities having better access to information and being more easily held accountable to local populations. Downward accountability of local authorities is central to this principle. When downwardly accountable, local authorities also have discretionary powers (i.e., local autonomy) over significant local matters and there is good reason to believe that greater equity and efficiency will follow (Ribot, 1995).

However, every thing that glitters is not gold, decentralization is not most of the time successful as expected due to among other things, poor understanding, planning and implementation regimes. Decentralization as Turner and Hulme(1997) termed it, is a "*good theory but poorly practiced*". It is plagued with failures due to over expectation placed on it and poor participation of stakeholders from its initiation at policy level to its implementation at grass-root level.

Figure1.1 illustrates the extent and performance of decentralization reforms in various African countries using various indicators to reflect the three dimensions of decentralisation namely: political, administrative, and fiscal. The political decentralisation index included (i) the number of elected subnational tiers, (ii) the existence of direct elections for local governments, and (iii) the turnout and fairness of such elections. The administrative decentralisation index consisted of (i) clarity of roles of national and local governments provided by the law, (ii) the indicative of where the actual responsibility for service delivery resided, and (iii) the indicative of where the responsibility for (hiring and firing) civil servants resided. The fiscal decentralisation was measured by: (i) the arrangement for fiscal transfers from central government to local authorities, and (ii) the proportion of public expenditure controlled by the local authorities. South Africa leads the overall performances while Chad tails. The extent of decentralization in Ethiopia shows a modest score in the degree of decentralization with little more above average.

Figure 1.1. The Extent of Decentralization in Africa



Source: Matovu(2004)Decentralization in Africa: A Review of Patterns, Trends and Challenges

1. 2. Statement of the Problem

After decades of highly centralized and unitary political system and administrative setup, Ethiopia has been following federal system of government and decentralization policy of regional and local governance and democratization process immediately after the downfall of the military regime (the Dergue) in 1991. Since then (1992), Ethiopia has been implementing one of the most ambitious decentralization programs in Africa, in fact of any developing country, by devolving authority to autonomous regions and then sub-regional governments. The Government of Ethiopia initiated a civil service reform in 1996 to build the capacity to implement the decentralization program (Peterson, 2001).

The process of decentralization from regions to sub-regional (*woredas*/local) levels has not taken place at the same time unlike the devolution from central government to the regions. But rather *woreda* level decentralization from regions to *woredas* took place in two major phases based on regions' level of development and political maturity (i.e., relatively developed four regions embarked the program first and then followed by the so called *emerging* regions). DLDP in the Somali region has been probably the last of all regions and had it not been for the pressure from the central government, it would have not been implemented even to its current low level status.

Decentralization is a complex, multi-actor, multi-dimensional, multi-sector and multi-subject process, which may not necessarily follow a clear and precise sequencing with distinct timelines of the individual phases. However, the process can be generally divided into different phases ranging from *policy formulation and enactment; to organizational and human resources adjustments; to transfer of responsibilities and resources; to improving capacities for service delivery, and finally reviewing and fine-tuning policies* (Jacob, 2005).

This being the case, it appears that DLDP in the Somali region has been embarked and executed in *semi spontaneous manner without any prior preparations, planning and comprehensive (even to lesser extent) policy, legal, administrative and institutional frameworks*. The initiation of the DLDP process at the region level started at the beginning of 1996/97 EC (May 2004) Ethiopian fiscal year. The preparation, planning and execution of the whole program from conception to conclusion took place just within a period of five months (i.e. May 2004/Ginbot 1996-September 2004/Meskrem, 96) in a one time event manner without prior studies, pilot-testing or incremental and gradual devolution of power and resources. This could imply that the region was prepared in all aspects before it implemented the DLDP.

However, this was not the case and the study is of the argument that DLDP in the Somali was not adequately planned, designed and implemented well at regional level, and its prospects are bleak unless corrective actions are taken before it is too late. Hence, the main theme of the study is to find out how the program (DLDP) was planned designed and implemented? What change or indicators of change does the program brought so far? What are major constraints faced in the implementation of the program? What are the prospects of its success?

Thus, the thrust of this study is to explore and analyze the following:

- ◆ The objectives, driving force(s), design, processes, scope, legal and institutional frameworks and implementation status of the recently (1997, EC) embarked DLDP in the Somali region;
- ◆ A modest investigation of preliminary performance indicators of the DLDP in terms of local governance process, capacity issues, community empowerment and

- participation and basic service delivery trends over the last three(1997,1998, 1999 EC) years of DLDP implementation of the predominantly pastoralist community; and
- ◆ Try to unveil some of the inherent and encountered problems, and the possible prospects of the program.

1.2.1. Working Hypothesis

DLDP in the Somali region has been embarked and implemented hastily without comprehensive policy, legal, institutional and working system frameworks in a big-bang, top-down and uniform approaches as well as without adequate involvement of stakeholders which are negatively affecting the effective and efficient implementation of the program, and unless corrective actions are taken before it is too late, the program may transform itself into harm in the place of the presumed benefits.

1.3. The Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 General objectives

The general objective of the study is to explore how *DLDP* was designed and implemented in the Somali region. That is, to highlight the general picture and profile of the DLDP in the region.

1.3.2 Specific objectives

The study being the first of its kind so far conducted in the region has the following specific objectives:

- ◆ To outline and analyze the rationale, structure, processes, legal and institution and frameworks of the program in the region.
- ◆ To show the implementation trends regarding the DLDP during its tenure;
- ◆ To give preliminary assessment of some performance indications of the DLDP in the region, and
- ◆ To state and analyze the major inherent and encountered problems, and prospects of the DLDP process in the region from its inception to implementation and the possible consequences.

1.4. Research Questions

The study endeavors to answer the following questions which encompass the framework of the study:

1. What are the objectives and driving force(s) of the program?
2. What is the structure (functions, powers, resources, etc, decentralized), design, institutional and legal frameworks of the DLDP in the Somali region?
3. what are the major performance indications and their level of contributions in terms of the following indicators:
 - ◆ allocative efficiency(resource allocation, closeness, responsiveness);
 - ◆ productive efficiency(fostering accountability, reducing corruption, increasing cost effectiveness , increasing legitimacy , etc);
 - ◆ community empowerment and participation;
 - ◆ planning, management and operations capacity,
 - ◆ Better basic service delivery (is the program improving public services delivery?);
4. What are the inherent and encountered problems of the program?, and
5. What are the possible prospects of the success and/or failures of the program?

1.5. Research Design and Methodology

1.5.1. Type of the Research.

The study is an exploratory study. Exploratory research means that hardly anything is known about the subject matter of the study at the outset of the project which renders hard to define the problem clearly. Accordingly, the author opted for this type of study because there is no any other previous study conducted in the region on the subject matter, and the DLDP in the region is in its early stages of implementation to undertake conclusive study. The theme of the study is to portray and disclose what, when, where, why and how DLDP was planned and administered as well as the currently existing status and trends of the program implementation in the Somali region. Therefore, the study reveals the status of what has happened and are happening currently in the region as far as DLDP is concerned. The study uses the facts available and information derived to analyze and make an evaluation on the process and trends of DLDP in the region.

1.5.2. Sampling Design

There are 52 *woredas* in the region. Out of this population, 2 *woredas* are being selected purposively as the sample of the study. One of the two *woredas* (Jig-jiga the capital of the region) selected represents relatively urban *woredas* in the region, while the other one (Babile) *woreda* represents predominantly rural *woredas*.

The respondents of the study are categorized into four main categories. These are planners and analysts of the program at regional level, elected and assigned officials at *woreda/woreda* levels, the manpower devolved from the regional level (center) to the *woreda* and a sample of community members at *woreda* level. From each group, 10 respondents were selected. The type of sampling technique applied in this study is non-probability sampling, in which purposive sampling was applied to select respondents, the concerned offices and officials at national, regional and *woreda* levels.

1.5.3. Data Sources and Gathering Tools

The study uses both secondary and primary data sources. What is more, various data gathering tools have been applied. Of the primary data collection tools, a *triangulation* semi-structured questions (for the sample respondents), in-depth interview (for key informants-like top executives), focus group discussion (for planners, policy analysts, and community members), and direct observation of the author are employed so that the benefit of one method offsets the limitation of the other. In addition to these, concerned officials (planners, monitors, etc) both at regional and national levels were interviewed about the plans and implementation regimes (if any) of the DLDP in the region.

And of the secondary data sources, various documents, annual plans, performance reports, database of the concerning offices (Capacity Building, BoFED Civil Service bureaus, MCB, MoFA, etc, at national, regional and local levels) and research papers prepared and presented for policy discussions and conferences both at national and international levels are retrieved and reviewed to the extent possible.

1.5.4. Method of data analysis

Since the data collected are more of qualitative in nature, mainly non-parametric descriptive (tables, charts, graphs, measures of central tendency and dispersion-where applicable) data analysis that combines both quantitative and qualitative data is applied to organize, analyze and interpret the study.

Procedurally, the study first endeavors to forward (where applicable) the basic principles of the subject matter at hand based from the already established literatures and logic as an exploration and groundwork for the subsequent specific issue(s) to be analyzed. The study then presents the facts, clues and evidences of subject matter of the study and compares or contrasts between the established principles of the subject matter of the study with the reality at hand in a negation or confirmatory assessment. That is, the study employs deductive analysis from general perspective to specific issues.

1.6. The Significance of the Study

Since the study is the first of its kind so far conducted in the region, it would have an immense importance and impact in the region in general and the subject matter in particular. It will be a stepping stone and springboard for future research studies and researchers in this particular subject in the region. The study will act as a foundation and guidelines to the reformulation and redirections towards the implementation strategies of the DLDP where and when the need arises. This is because the study will shed light over the whole process of decentralization from across disciplines of related literature and experiences of some developing countries. Thus, the study will be a base for system analysis and redesign.

1.7. The Scope of the Study

The study is a region and locality specific. Its main thrust and focus is on how *DLDP* was prepared, designed and implemented in the Somali region. It also highlights the preliminary indicators of the program in terms of local governance process, service delivery as well as overall linkages to local development. The study also explores the leakages of the *DLDP* process in the Somali region in comparison with the established pre-and-post conditions for successful decentralization programs forwarded by various researches of the subject matter.

1.8. The Limitation of the Study

The study is of preliminary in nature and thus not exhaustive. It may lack some features that are characterized by a comprehensive and full-fledged research study. This is due to time, resources, and the knowledge (of the researcher) constraints. The main limitation of this lies on the availability of organized secondary data due to the absence of documentation and organized database system in the region in general, and the subject matter in particular. What is more, the willingness of respondents to give first hand (primary data) information is another test for the researcher. Therefore, the study relies on a combination of different primary data collection mechanisms with special emphasis to questionnaire, interviews, focus group discussions, observation, etc, and of course with their limitation conceded.

1.9. Organization of the Paper

The paper comprises of six chapters, which are related subsequently. The first chapter is the introduction of the study which sets the base for other chapters and the study as a whole. It contains the background, problem statement, objectives, research design and methodology of the study, significance, scope and limitation. The second chapter is the review of the related literature which describes the theoretical and empirical frameworks from which the problem of the study arises. It comprehensively deals with concepts, processes, principles, objectives and dimensions of the subject matter of the study via exploring various previous scriptures, books, journals, magazines, abstracts, research papers, policy discussions and reports concerning the subject matter of the study. The third chapter explores the process objectives, driving force, design, scope, legal and institutional frameworks and implementation regimes of the DLDP in the Somali region. The fourth chapter investigates the preliminary performance indications and contributions of the DLDP in terms of local governance (allocative efficiency, productive efficiency, good governance, etc), capacity issues, community empowerment and participation, and better service delivery. The fifth chapter tries to unveil some of the major inherent and encountered problems, and the prospects of the program. The sixth chapter, which is the closing chapter of the study, deals with the conclusion, findings, and recommendation of the study. It gives the concluding summary of the study in a nutshell form and then forwards condensed findings of the study. Eventually, the study put forward the author's recommendations and possible remedies to problems identified. The reference and appendices will be next to the closing chapter.

Chapter two

2. Review of the Related Literature

2.1. Introduction

Decentralization as political reform and local development policy had been on the agenda for quite some time both in developing and developed countries. It has been recently on the increase as a resorted means to accomplish effective public service delivery and local self-rule with the driving force of the basic tenets of *good governance* such as legitimacy, representation, accountability, transparency and rule of law (Tegegne and Kassahun, 2004)

Decentralization is universally regarded as the necessary end result of democratization which is offered as a possible response to the lack of efficiency of the central apparatus of the state. It has its place in the general context of a review of the role of the state, the involvement of society's players and raising of their awareness, and consolidation of the role of the private sector (M'Bassi ,1995),

Since early 1980s, there seems to be a consensus that too much centralization or absolute local autonomy are both harmful and that it is necessary to put in place a better system of collaboration between the national, regional and local centers of decision-making(FAO, 1997). Since that time most sub Saharan African countries (including Ethiopia) have been in one way or another been engaged in the process of distribution of powers between the central, state and the lower administrative and management echelons.

According to FAO (1997) three major trends relating to decentralization can be identified:

- the gradual appearing of a new distribution of responsibilities among the national, regional and local levels of governments through the process of deconcentration (an initial and limited form of decentralization);
- the disengagement of the state and economic liberalization which favored a new wave of decentralization through devolution, and
- increased involvement of local jurisdictions and civil society in the management of their affairs with new forms of participation, consultation, and partnerships.

To this effect therefore, various political systems have been executing a series of decentralization policies designed in different ways and with different degrees of powers, responsibilities and duties ranging from mere deconcentration to full devolution. Ethiopia, as one of the countries implementing decentralization reform, has been undertaking one of the most full fledged and contentious decentralization program in Africa and even in developing countries (as some observers have commented it) since 1992, first from the center to autonomous regions and then from regions to *woredas* and *kebeles*; the lowest administrative units of the government. The later portion (DLDP) of the decentralization program is the theme of this study.

In this chapter therefore, the author tries to review modestly, the conceptual framework of the subject of decentralization, looking and surveying at the various definitions of decentralization and related terms. Then the forms, rationale and the major conditions and prerequisite for successful decentralization program have been dealt. Finally, a brief overview of decentralization process in Ethiopia is given especially after 1991 to lay the platform for later chapters.

2.2. The Conceptual Framework of Decentralization

What is Decentralization?

The term '*decentralization*' is a dynamic and ever changing concept both in terms of meaning and content as well as the degree of its application. It may mean different thing to different people and countries at different times.

To this regard therefore, the following are some of major definitions of decentralization which some times the difference between two definitions is a mere choice of words by different writers with no much conceptual difference.

Rondinelli (1981), one of the proficient writers in this field defined decentralization as '*the transfer of authority to plan, make decisions, and manage public functions from a higher level of government to any individual, organization, or agency at a lower level*'. Furthermore, in one of their series of publications in policy implementation in developing countries Cheema and Rondinelli(1983:18) defined decentralization broadly as:

... transfer of planning, decision making, or administrative authority from central government to its field organizations, local administrative units, semi autonomous and parastatal organizations, local governments or non governmental organizations.

The definitions above though broad and missing of some details but then clearly shows some of the powers/authority decentralized (e.g., planning, decision making, etc) as well as the various ways in which decentralization can implemented which will be discussed in the next section. The definition also indicates the flow of decentralization from central level to local level. However, it can also be from provincial/regional level to local level as the case is in Ethiopia and its regional governments.

Decentralization to non-governmental organizations through divestment and privatization are not level specific, i.e., transfers are not from one level to another, but usually occur at the same level and may not be treated as form of decentralisation, but of divestiture(Mugabi, 2004).

Rondinelli, and Cheema (1984: 9) cited in Vengroff (2000:4-5), Yigremew et.al(2005:5) and Tegegne(1997)defined decentralization in a more comprehensive manner as :

transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and resource raising and allocation from central governments and its agencies to (a) to field unities of the central government ministries or agencies, (b)subordinate units or levels of governments, (c) semi autonomous public authority or corporation, (d) area-wide regional or functional authorities, (e)non-governmental private or voluntary organizations.

The definition is more or less the same as the above definitions but with little bit more details and clarifications of the powers and responsibilities decentralized.

Still Jacob(2005:1) defines *decentralization* as"*... a process through which authority and responsibility for some functions are transferred from the central government to local governments, communities and the private sector*". The definition provides an additional point to the above definitions given by Rondinelli and his colleagues in that what is decentralized are '*some*' and not '*all*' the functions of the central government.

Altmann, et al (2000) a team commissioned by joint UNDP and government Germany to evaluate the UNDP's role in decentralization and local governance believe that the definition of decentralization and local governance depend 'primarily on the context of: *the country involved, culture and societal traditions, reasons and objectives, forms and scope of decentralization, level of geographic application, linkages to other reform agenda items, among other considerations*'.

To some extent I do agree with the team that decentralization is more of art than science which depends on real context in place whether defining it as term or implementing it as policy. Accordingly Box2.1 and box2.2 show what decentralization is and what it is not as per the preference of UNDP.

Box 2.1. What Decentralization IS

"... Decentralisation is considered by UNDP as part of the overall governance system of any society. It is the process by which authority, responsibility, power, resources and accountability are transferred from the central levels of government to subnational levels ... Conceptually, decentralisation relates to the role of, and the relationship between, central and subnational institutions, whether they are public, private or civic. Improved governance will require not only strengthened central and local governments but also the involvement of other actors from civil society organisations and the private sector in partnerships with government at all levels."

Source: UNDP, MDGD, Decentralized Governance Programme: Strengthening Capacity for People-Centred Development, September 1997, p. 4. in Altmann, et al 2000

Box2. 2. What Decentralization is NOT

"... An alternative to centralization: Decentralization is not an alternative to centralization. Both are needed. The complementary roles of national and subnational actors should be determined by analyzing the most effective ways and means of achieving a desired objective. For example, a national road system should be designed with both local input and national coordination. Foreign policy should be a national function based on the views of the citizenry ... In designing a decentralization strategy it is imperative that such an analysis be done."

"... Exclusively public sector reform: Decentralization is much more than public sector, civil service or administrative reform. It involves the roles and relationships of all of the societal actors, whether governmental, private sector or civil society. The design of decentralization programmes must take this into account. This is why UNDP prefers the use of the term 'decentralized governance' rather than the term 'decentralization'."

Source: UNDP, MDGD, Factors to Consider in Designing Decentralized Governance Policies and Programmes to Achieve Sustainable People- Centred Development, February 1998, p. 1. in Altmann, et al 2000

To put all together and sum up, *decentralization* is any act in which the central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political, administrative and territorial hierarchy (Mawhood 1983 and Smith, 1985 cited in Agrawal and Ribot, 2000). It is a gradual process of transferring power and resources from central government to the lower levels of government, such as the regions, provinces/zones, *woredas* and municipalities.

Decentralization program is usually about strengthening both central and local governance in ways that support the objectives of national unification, democratization, and greater efficiency and equity in the use of public resources and service delivery. A primary objective of *decentralization* program is to have governments that are able to perform or support all of these functions with appropriate roles at multiple levels (Ribot, 1995).

2.3. Forms of Decentralization

Decentralization takes a number of different forms, or combinations of forms, depending on the country, the objectives and what is decentralized (Altmann, et al 2000). Forms of decentralization include political/democratic, administrative, fiscal, and market/economic decentralization. Drawing distinctions among these various concepts is useful for highlighting the many dimensions to successful decentralization and the need for coordination among them. Nevertheless, there is clearly overlap in defining any of these terms and the precise definitions are not as important as the need for a comprehensive approach. Political, administrative, fiscal and market decentralization can also appear in different forms and combinations across countries, within countries and even within sectors (*World Bank, 2001*)

Moreover, each form/type of decentralization has its own subdivisions which are not agreed upon by scholars/writers of the field that which subdivision comes under which form. Some literatures take the sub-forms such as devolution, deconcentration, and delegation as major forms of decentralization instead of political, administrative, fiscal and economic/market. Others put devolution under administrative form of decentralization. To this end therefore, Box 2.3 gives a precise description of various forms of decentralization and their subdivisions summarized from various literatures of the subject matter. According to recent studies on

decentralization in developing countries (e.g. UNDP-2000), devolution is practiced by few countries. Most forms of decentralization practiced by developing countries are deconcentration and delegation with few cases of *contracting-out* some functions to the private sector.

Box 2. 3. Forms of Decentralization

Political Decentralization: This normally refers to situations where political power and authority have been decentralized to subnational levels. The most obvious manifestations of this type of decentralization are elected and empowered subnational forms of government ranging from village councils to state level bodies. . . Devolution is considered a form of political decentralization.

- ◆ **Devolution:** Devolution refers to a full transfer of responsibility, decision making, resources and revenue generation to a local level of public authority that is autonomous and fully independent from the devolving authority. Units that are devolved are usually recognized as independent legal entities (such as municipal corporations) and are ideally elected (although not necessarily).

Administrative Decentralization: . . . aims at transferring decision making authority, resources and responsibilities for the delivery of a select number of public services from the central government to other lower levels of government, agencies, field offices of central government line agencies. . . It is the accountability factor that differentiates the major types of administrative decentralization.

- ◆ **Deconcentration:** transfers authority and responsibility from one level of the central government to another while maintaining the same hierarchical level of accountability from the local units to the central government ministry or agency which has been decentralised. Deconcentration can be seen as a first step in newly decentralising governments to improve service delivery. . .
- ◆ **Delegation:** redistributes authority and responsibility to local units of government or agencies that are not always necessarily branches or local offices of the delegating authority. While some transfer of accountability to the subnational units to which power is being delegated takes place, the bulk of accountability is still vertical and to the delegating central unit.


Fiscal Decentralization: Cutting across all forms of decentralization, some level of resource reallocation is made to allow local government to function properly. . . . Arrangements for resource allocation are usually negotiated between local and central authorities and they are dependent on several factors including concerns for interregional equity, availability of central and local resources and local fiscal management capacity.

Divestment or Market Decentralization: This form . . . is done in favor of non-public entities where planning and administrative responsibility or other public functions are transferred from government to voluntary, private, or non-governmental institutions with clear benefits to and involvement of the public. This often involves contracting out partial service provision or administration functions, deregulation or full privatization.”

Source: UNDP, MDGD, The Impact of Participation in Local Governance: A Synthesis of Nine Case Studies, draft report, Decentralized Governance Programme, 14 January 2000, pp. 5-7. in Altmann, 2000

In addition to box2.3 which depicts the definition of decentralization and its various divisions and subdivisions, figure2.1 below shows a summary conceptual framework of major forms (political, administrative and fiscal) of decentralization and their respective activities and/or characteristics.

Figure2.1: Conceptual Framework of forms of decentralization



Source: AQIM, a quarterly bilingual magazine published by Ministry of Capacity Building, p38 Nov. 2005

Furthermore, table2.1 provides a framework that outlines the essential features and difference between political and administrative decentralization.

Table2.1: Framework for understanding political and administrative decentralization

Parameter	Political decentralization	Administrative decentralization
Operational definition	-Devolution of power and authority -Emphasis on institutional and fiscal autonomy	-Deconcentration of authority and responsibility -Central allocation of resource
Organization character	-Decision-making authority spatially dispersed -Territory/spatial link or authority/administration relationships	-Administrative delegation of responsibility and functions to branch offices -organizational/administrative authority relationships
Objectives/Goals	-Equity -Empowerment -representation -Autonomy -Self-government -Accountability and responsiveness	-Efficiency -Uniformity and consistency -Hierarchical control
Limitations/problems	-Danger of political exclusion -Constant central intrusion -Upward accountability -Conflicting claims federal government Vs regional/state rights -inadequate financial base	-Bureaucratic rigidity -limited institutional and administrative capacity -limited discretion -Top-down leadership

Source: Meheret Ayenew(1998): Some Preliminary Observations on Institutional and Administrative Gaps in Ethiopia's decentralization process, Working paper No.1, pp3, RLDS_AAU

Though box 2.3, figure 2.1 and table 2.1 give a precise and clear picture of various forms of decentralization, some forms such as fiscal decentralization demands more elaborate description.

2.3.1. Fiscal Decentralization

Financial responsibility is a core component of decentralization. If local governments are to carry out decentralized functions effectively, they must have an adequate level of revenues (either raised locally or transferred from the central government) as well as the authority to make decisions about expenditures.

According to World Bank group publications (2001) by a thematic team, *fiscal decentralization* can take many forms, including: (a) self-financing or cost recovery through user charges, (b) co-financing or co-production arrangements through which the users participate in providing services and infrastructure through monetary or labor contributions, (c) expansion of local revenues through property or sales taxes, or indirect charges, (d) intergovernmental transfers that shift general revenues from taxes collected by the central government to local governments for general or specific uses, and (e) authorization of municipal borrowing and the mobilization of either national or local government resources through loan guarantees

Fiscal decentralization consists of four major components which some writers in the field termed it as 'pillars' of intergovernmental fiscal relations (fiscal decentralization) which may flow in consecutive sequence. These are (1) expenditure assignment (2) revenue assignment (3) intergovernmental transfers and (4) Local government borrowing and debts.

1. Expenditure Assignment

Fiscal decentralization involves shifting some responsibilities for expenditures and/or revenues to lower levels of government. One important factor in determining the type of fiscal decentralization is the extent to which subnational entities are given autonomy to determine the allocation of their expenditures. The other important factor is their ability to raise revenue (World Bank, 2001).

Assignment of functional responsibilities among different levels of government is the first essential step in the design of a system of fiscal decentralization or intergovernmental fiscal relations. Designing and implementing the other important components of fiscal decentralization such as revenue assignment and transfers in the absence of clear expenditure assignment would be putting the cart before the horse (Vazquez, 1999). Moreover, Vazquez further points out that instabilities and controversies in the practice of decentralized systems mainly surfaces when laws relating to decentralization are silent or unclear about the competencies and expenditure obligations of different levels of government.

The problems with the expenditure assignment of fiscal decentralization according to Smoke (2001) appear to be related more to a lack of attention to implementation than to decentralizing inappropriate services. To this effect therefore, according to Smoke two major aspects are worth noting. First, no matter what a constitution or enabling law says, central government agencies rarely have a desire to decentralize services they have been providing, particularly if decentralization involves a loss of prestige and resources to these agencies and they perceive each other as competitors. Under this circumstance, they should be expected to try to slow the process down. Second, if too many sectors are decentralized too rapidly and subnational governments do not have the capacity to handle these new responsibilities, they are likely to perform poorly, allowing central/regional agencies to be hostile to decentralization and can use poor local performance as an excuse for keeping the services centralized. Actually both the two points forwarded by Smoke clearly describe the DLDP in the Somali region as if Smoke was aware of the decentralization in the Somali region.

2. Revenue Assignment

Governments rely on a wide variety of tax instruments available for their revenue needs, such as direct, indirect, general, specific, business and individual taxes.

If fiscal decentralization is to be a reality, subnational governments must control their 'own' source of revenue which is the essence of decentralization (Yilmaz, 2001, Boex and Heredia, 2005). Subnational governments that lack independent sources of revenue can never truly enjoy fiscal autonomy. They may be (and probably are) financial thumb of central

government. The question is which revenue sources can and should be assigned to subnational level governments and how these assignments are to be effected? What are the features of good local tax? What constitutes a sound assignment of revenue sources to local government level? These questions and other related ones are called '*the tax assignment problems*' (Boex and Heredia, 2005).

Complete fiscal autonomy over revenues requires that, in principle local governments can change tax rates and set tax bases. The general principles of revenue assignment to different levels of government outlined in fiscal federalism and local government finance literature such as Oates (1972), and Bird (2000) cited in Yilmaz (2001:31) as shown box 2.4

Box2.4. Principles of revenue assignment

- 1. The tax base assigned to subnational governments should be immobile in order to allow local authorities some freedom to vary rates without the base vanishing. Inter-jurisdictional mobility of tax base makes taxation of mobile factors difficult to subnational governments.*
- 2. Redistributive taxes should be assigned to the central government. Taxes imposed on mobile factors for redistribution purposes might result in inefficient jurisdictional allocation of the factors of production. Uniform redistributive taxes minimize locational distortions of economic activities.*
- 3. Services provided by subnational governments should to the extent possible be financed through user charges and other local fees and taxes that are related to benefits. Efficient allocation of resources requires subnational governments recover their expenses from the beneficiaries of their services. Examples of benefit related revenues include taxes levied on motor vehicles and fuels and construction fees.*
- 4. Taxes that are subject to important economies of scale in collection efforts should be centralized.*
- 5. Taxes subject to cyclical fluctuations need to be protected by a system of counter-cyclical rate adjustments in order to avoid subnational governments' exploitation of fiscal power.*
- 6. Taxes levied on tax bases that are unevenly distributed should be centralized. Uneven distribution of tax bases among subnational governments forces the residents of one subnational area bear the economic burden of taxes imposed by another jurisdiction. Taxation of natural resource is the best example of this type of taxation practice.*
- 7. The revenue yield should be stable and predictable over time.*
- 8. The revenue system should be easy to administer efficiently and effectively.*
- 9. Subnational taxes should be visible to encourage subnational government liability.*

Smoke (2001) has summarized from Bahl and Linn (1992); Shah (1994); Litvack, Ahmad and Bird (1998) four major problems of revenue assignment. First, assigned revenues are almost never adequate to meet the expenditure requirements, thus necessitating intergovernmental transfers. Second, subnational governments often use too many unproductive revenue sources that barely cover the collection costs. Third, individual local revenue sources suffer from serious design problems, such as stagnant bases, overly complex structures, and ineffective administration. Fourth, care must be taken to approach reform strategically, as attempts to implement many reforms at once can overwhelm the tolerance of local residents and the capacity of local governments.

3. Intergovernmental transfers

Intergovernmental grants and transfers form the cornerstone of subnational government financing in most developing and transitional countries (Boex and Heredia 2005).

The revenue and expenditure assignments give rise to vertical and horizontal imbalances within a country's intergovernmental finances. In fact, every intergovernmental transfer system has two dimensions: (i) *the vertical dimension*, concerned with the distribution of revenues between central and local governments, and (ii) *the horizontal dimension*, concerned with the allocation of financial resources among the recipient units. A *vertical imbalance* occurs when the expenditure responsibilities of subnational governments do not match with their revenue raising power. The issue of vertical imbalance is widespread almost in all countries practising decentralization. A *horizontal imbalance* takes place when own fiscal capacities to carry out the same functions differ across subnational governments. These imbalances are usually handled through a variety of transfer mechanism in order to allow subnational governments to perform their assigned functions (Yilmaz, 2001).

Intergovernmental transfers take different forms of transfer mechanism such as: (a) sharing revenues and tax bases, and (b) establishing conditional or unconditional grant systems. Central government and subnational governments can share revenues based on a formula or share a tax base by one of them applying a supplement on other's tax. In the case of establishing grant system, conditional grants require matching elements by recipient government but unconditional grants are given to recipient government with full discretion to spend. The choice of transfer mechanism depends on the objectives of the intergovernmental policies. If the concern of the intergovernmental system is only to address

vertical fiscal gap, this could be achieved either by revenue sharing or by “gap-filling” unconditional grants. The horizontal imbalances can be alleviated with equalization transfers from the central government to subnational governments. However, in practice, measuring the horizontal imbalance and relative fiscal capacities of subnational governments is very difficult task and only very few countries review them such as Australia, Canada, and Germany (Ahmad and Craig, 1997, Yilmaz 2001).

The intergovernmental transfer system of a country usually has different objectives to meet and in most cases these objectives may need to be met through a combination of policy tools. According to Ahmad and Craig (1997), there are three different policy responses to establishing the link between vertical and horizontal balances:

- ◆ Correct each imbalance by separate policy measures: The vertical imbalance at each level is resolved by tax-sharing or grant arrangements. Horizontal imbalances are then resolved by payments from regions with higher fiscal capacity to poorer regions. This is the approach used in Germany.
- ◆ Implement an integrated system of equalization grants: The vertical and horizontal imbalances are dealt with simultaneously through a system of grants, including equalization payments and special purpose grants. This is the Australian and Canadian approach.
- ◆ Correct only the vertical imbalance and ignore horizontal imbalance: As under the first option, vertical imbalances are resolved by tax sharing and grants, but no action is taken to correct horizontal imbalances. There may be, however, special purpose grants servicing central government objectives, which may also reduce horizontal imbalances at least in some functional areas. This is broadly the approach in the United States.

As a summary of this section, intergovernmental transfer system design according to Shah (1994) should be meet at least seven basic criteria as shown in table2.2.

Table2.2: Criteria for designing intergovernmental transfer system

Criteria	Definition
Autonomy	Local government should have adequate revenues, including the incentive and capacity to generate own source revenues in order to finance service provision.
Equity	Transfers should vary directly with fiscal needs and inversely with taxation capacity of each municipality
Predictability	Transfers should be predictable in the medium term, 3-5 years
Simplicity	Transfers should be formula driven and the formula must be simple, easily understood and public.
Incentives	The transfers should provide incentives for sound fiscal management and discourage /prevent inefficient and corrupt practices.
Meet objectives	Grant design should permit meeting basic objectives of the grantor
Source: Shah, 1994	

4. Subnational Borrowing/Debt

Why subnational borrowing? Three primary reasons may be cited as to why subnational borrowing can be considered as an appropriate tool for subnational public finance as forwarded by Yilmaz (2001:36):

- ◆ **Intergenerational equity:-** the benefits of certain investment projects, such as infrastructure and education, are spread over time, which means that not only present generations of a locality, but also future generations will consume the services provided by the projects. Therefore, the benefit principle of taxation suggests that future generations should also contribute the cost of investment. For this purpose borrowing is an appropriate tool that offers a means through which payments for capital projects can be spread over the life of the project so as to coincide more closely with the stream of future benefits (Oates, 1972 in Yilmaz 2001).
- ◆ **Economic Development:** - delaying infrastructure investments might have a negative impact on subnational economic performance. Such a negative impact will have a direct effect on residents' life in terms of less employment opportunities and decline of earning levels. Therefore, borrowing is an appropriate tool for subnational governments in investing infrastructure projects to stimulate regional economy.
- ◆ **Synchronization of Expenditure and Revenue Flows:-**access to financial tools offers an opportunity to subnational governments to synchronize expenditures incurred and revenue collection. For a variety of reasons expenditure incurred and tax

intake may not be fully synchronized for a particular year. In such a situation, borrowing provides subnational governments to smooth out the mismatch and provide services without disruption.

There are at least two different channels through which subnational governments can borrow: through a public intermediary such as infrastructure bank or direct borrowing from private capital markets. The international experience suggests that lending through a public entity either central government lending or public financial intermediary suffers from political favouritism (World Bank, 1990).

Subnational borrowing is an important component of the devolution of fiscal powers to local authorities. However, a well-designed regulatory framework for subnational borrowing is necessary to ensure that subnational borrowing does not provide perverse incentives to lending institutions and subnational governments for excessive lending and borrowing. Such a framework includes standardized accounting procedures for subnational governments, disclosure of subnational governments' liabilities and repayment capacity. However, these measures by themselves will not be sufficient to curb *moral hazard problem*. The macro concern of moral hazard occurs when subnational governments are backed by the central government by providing guarantees to their borrowing. In these circumstances, the incentive structure is set for excessive borrowing of subnational governments, which would ultimately lead subnational governments to default on loans (Yilmaz, 2001).

A common proposal to deal with subnational governments' default on loans (if any) is to set up limits on the borrowing ability of subnational governments (Craig, 1997). There are two reasons limiting subnational governments' borrowing ability (Bird, 2000). First, if there is no constraint on subnational governments borrowing, the propensity to behave fiscally irresponsible is very high. In the absence of the checks and balances of the subnational debt issuance mechanism, subnational governments may increase their current expenditures well above their capacity to finance them and close the gap through borrowing, especially in countries where general inability of central governments to impose hard-budget constraints exist. The second reason for imposing restrictions on subnational borrowing is macroeconomic stabilization. Since central government has the responsibility for stabilization policies, it is important that it has full control over public debt.

2.4. The Rationale of Decentralization

Too much have been said about decentralization. But why decentralization is preferred to centralization? To answer this question and other related ones, the literature and scholars in this particular area forwards various reasons some of which are more commonsensical and theoretical than practical.

To start with, in the viewpoint of ordinary citizens, the central government is often too far away from the experiences of their life to meet the needs and problems the citizen faces every day (Kali, 1998). Much of the justifications of decentralization are built around the assumption that greater *participation* in public decision making which leads to improve efficiency, equity, development and resource management. This in turn enhances public-sector accountability and therefore effectiveness because the local government's operations and undertakings are closer to citizens. At its most basic, decentralization aims to achieve one of the central aspirations of political governance/democratization, or the desire that people should have a say in their own affairs (Agrawal and Ribot, 2000).

What is more, Mohabbat Khan (1986:1) has given clear description of the rationale of decentralization.

... the increasing concerns with the adverse effects of centralized bureaucratic control on development planning, resource mobilization and popular participation in administration at local level in developing countries has paved the way for resurgence of the interest in decentralization. The use of highly centralized planning and control mechanism, the increasing realization of new and humane ways of approaching development policies and programmes and the tremendous expansion of government activities and the attendant complexities have pushed many developing countries to adopt decentralization as kind of creed encompassing social, political and economic sphere.

The advocates of decentralization argue that decentralization of the delivery of local public goods improves the efficiency and responsiveness of the public sector in at least three ways: *by promoting allocative efficiency, by fostering productive efficiency and accountability, and by facilitating cost recovery* (Azfar, et al, 2001). Therefore the following are some of underlying principles of rationale of decentralization as forwarded by scholars as well as the three major rationales of decentralization forwarded by Azfar and his colleagues repeated again:

- ◆ **Promoting allocative efficiency**-The most common theoretical argument for decentralization is that it improves the efficiency of resource allocation. It is said to promote allocative efficiency by allowing greater differentiation of resource allocations across jurisdictions according to the demand in each locality. Subnational governments are believed to be in a better position than the central government to ensure that services delivered match the preferences and circumstances in the jurisdiction.
- ◆ **Increasing productive efficiency and accountability**-decentralization is also believed to improve efficiency by fostering accountability, reducing corruption, and increasing cost-effectiveness in the government
- ◆ **Facilitating cost recovery**- in terms of willingness to pay for services by the public which in turn helps increase willingness to pay both taxes and fees.
- ◆ **Better local development**- local government may make development activities more sustainable by involving the people affected more directly in the implementation of projects. Beneficiaries who "own" a project will be more likely to assume the responsibility for the project's maintenance. Local resources for social and economic development can be more easily mobilized and projects are decided by and implemented on the local level. Furthermore, decentralization if done right, removes institutional and legal obstacles to self-help and it encourages innovative forms of solutions for local problems (Kalin, 1998).
- ◆ **Democracy and protection of liberty**- decentralization builds a sense of community and permits more meaningful participation in self-government. In many countries, the autonomy granted to local units is designed to assure self-determination and the rights of minorities and their members against abuse by national majorities. Moreover, decentralization allows (to a certain extent) specific kind of political power-sharing which in turn contributes to political stability (Kalin, 1998).
- ◆ **The subsidiary principle**- which states that public service responsibilities must be exercised by the lowest level of government unless a convincing case can be made for higher level assignment (Shah and Thompson 2004).

As to the driving forces behind of decentralization, WB (2001) publications on decentralization demonstrates that political motives as the major driving force of

decentralization as clearly described by the following excerpt with examples from different countries and regions.

*...Much of the decentralization which has taken place in the past decade has been motivated by political concerns. For example, in **Latin America**, decentralization has been an essential part of the democratization process as discredited autocratic central regimes are replaced by elected governments operating under new constitutions. In **Africa**, the spread of multi-party political systems is creating demand for more local voice in decision making. In some countries, such as **Ethiopia**, decentralization has been a response to pressures from regional or ethnic groups for more control or participation in the political process. In the extreme, decentralization represents a desperate attempt to keep the country together in the face of these pressures by granting more autonomy to all localities or by forging 'asymmetrical federations'. A variation on this theme has been decentralization as an outcome of long civil wars, such as in **Mozambique** and **Uganda**, where opening political opportunities at the local levels has allowed for greater participation by all former warring factions in the governance of the country. The **transition economies** of the former socialist states have also massively decentralized as the old central apparatus crumbled. In many countries, decentralization simply has been happened in the absence of any meaningful alternative governance structure to provide local government services. In some cases (particularly in **East Asia**) decentralization appears to be motivated by the need to improve service delivery to large populations and the recognition of the limitations of central administration (World Bank, 2001)*

Although politics are the driving force behind decentralization in most countries, fortunately, decentralization if implemented accordingly may serve all justifications mentioned in the section whether political, social, or economical development; which are the pillars of decentralization. The political objectives to increase political responsiveness and participation at the local level can coincide with the economic objectives of better decisions about the use of public resources and increased willingness to pay for local services.

2.5. Conditions for Effective Decentralized Local Governance/Decentralization

When does decentralization program produce benefits and under what conditions? To answer this question, first of all, decentralization per se is not a *panacea* to all ills of political, social and economical problems of a particular country neither does it stands alone. For it to be successful or meaningful, it should be preceded and /or accompanied by various reforms and conditions as a springboards and platform for its implementation and hence provision of desired end-results.


Azfar and his colleagues (2001) believe that successful decentralization program depends on formal institutional arrangements as well as their interaction with social practices influencing the implementation of decentralized governance. These, according to Azfar and his friends include the distribution of powers among levels of government, the disciplines operating from within and outside government (e.g., hierarchical oversight and voting), as well as principal-agent information flows (e.g., sources of citizen perceptions of corruption).

Experience with decentralization is mixed. Both rigorous empirical studies (though small) in this area as well as the public record of decentralization efforts, show limited success within a generally disappointing array of experiences (Azfar, et al, 2001).

More specifically, Azfar and his colleagues have pointed out that whether presumed advantages or disadvantages of decentralization materialize depends on the existence of what they termed as ' *institutional disciplines*' which includes the following and as summarised in the figure in the next page:

- ◆ *Civic disciplines* are those associated with the capacity of individual citizens, media, and non-governmental organizations to make their views known to the relevant government officials and bodies—a capacity sometimes referred to as “voice”—and with mechanisms, such as voting, that induce officials to take these views into account in their decision making. Another civic discipline is that of “exit”—for example, switching to privately supplied services, or moving away from jurisdictions with poor public services.
- ◆ *Intergovernmental disciplines* are those exerted between different levels of government: for example, central government oversight of local government operations, or budgetary constraints (or limits to taxing authority) imposed by the central government on lower levels of government. One manifestation of such disciplines is “adjustability”—i.e., the discretion a local jurisdiction has to take decisions in response to local needs.
- ◆ *Disciplines related to public sector management* are the ways in which each government body regulates and constrains the behavior of its own officials: for instance, anti-corruption provisions, performance-based recruitment and promotion, and provision for periodic audits. Key to the effectiveness of these disciplines is the

capacity of a governmental unit to manage its affairs—that is, the competence of its officials.(Azfar, et al 2001:9).



Source: Azfar, et al, 2001

The failure of these disciplines to operate as the case is in many countries (including Ethiopia) might lead to an adverse experience with decentralization.

On the other hand, according to Cheema and Rondinelli(1983) the degree of implementation and the degree of accomplishment of intended goals of decentralization policy depends on a range of political, social, behavioural, economical and organizational factors. These factors and sub-factors are summarized in table 2.3 in the next page.

Table 2.3: factors affecting the level of the performance of a decentralization program

Main Factors	Sub factors
Environmental Conditions	Political structure
	Policy making process
	Socio-cultural factors
	Organization of program beneficiaries
intergovernmental relations	Clarity and consistency of the program objectives
	Appropriate allocation of functions
	Effective planning, budgeting and implementation procedures
	Quality of intergovernmental communications
	Effective linkages among organizations
Resources for policy implementation	Control over fund
	Adequacy of budget and availability of budgetary resources
	Support of national, (regional) and local political leaders
	Support of the national and (regional) bureaucracy
Characteristics of implementing agency	Technical, managerial and political skill of staff
	Capacity to coordinate, control and integrate subunit decisions
	Effective internal communication
	Agency political resources and support
	Commitment of staff to agency program

Source: Cheema and Rondinelli(1983) ; table created by the author

These all put together will lead to performance and achievement of policy goals, local capacity improvement, productivity, participation and better service delivery. Since these factors are interrelated, it implies that, if some these conditions (as the case is in most circumstances) are missing which in turn implies that, the program is limping and may not produce desired outcomes.

In addition to the above mentioned issues influencing decentralization policy, practical experience as well as scholarly studies (e.g. WB publications and Kalin, 1998) point out various conditions which are indispensable for successful decentralization which among other things include: (a) secure existence of local government, (b) availability of adequate resources (financial, human, material, etc) and autonomy to use and manage it, (c) accountability and transparency, (d) political will and partnership, and (e) strong legal framework- setting out the powers, rights and duties of local governments clearly.

Moreover, Altmann et al (2000) in their report on the role of UNDP in decentralization and local governance concluded a ten point in which they termed it as key success factors for decentralization as shown in box 2.5 in the next page.

Box-2.5 Some Key Success Factors for Decentralization

- (1) Decentralization is long term and high risk, demanding strategic management.
- (2) Understand the problem before designing and implementing solutions.
- (3) Decentralization requires top executive commitment and coordination.
- (4) Expectations must be carefully managed.
- (5) Participation requires flexible approaches adapted to the local situation.
- (6) Decentralization is a learning process; it requires risk-taking and innovation.
- (7) Decentralization is cross-sectoral and requires substantial multidimensional capacities.
- (8) Decentralization depends on an enabling environment.
- (9) Decentralization implementation should be paced and linked to other reforms.
- (10) Sustainable decentralized governance depends on local fiscal capacity.

Source: Altmann, et al, 2000

Lastly but not the least, a decentralization programs to be successful highly depends on an effective and efficient design before it is implemented showing the sequence and steps of implementation, what is required at every step, the legal framework governing the process at every step, the institutional framework and continuous fine tuning during its implementation. In designing decentralization program, the fiscal (functional assignment, revenue assignment, transfers system, etc) design is a key condition for successful decentralization program. To this regard, Vergara(1999) argues that:

... In order to hold local government accountable it is necessary for national legislatures, central government and regional governments to design and implement effective and technically sound decentralization policies. These policies include well sequenced initiatives in political, fiscal and functional decentralization. While historical and political context make it impossible to define a recipe (formula) for any given country there is considerable accumulated experience defining fundamental premises”.

2.6. Decentralization in Ethiopia

Ethiopia has a long history of central control. Although there were some deconcentration (rather than decentralization) programs in a form of establishing provincial administration during the times of the Emperor and the Dergue governments, there was no genuine decentralization to talk about. However, since the overthrow of Dergue regime, Ethiopia has developed a decentralization program that is among the most significant and ambitious in the developing world, certainly one of the most substantial in Africa (Smoke, 2001 and Peterson, 2001). Immediately after the EPRDF come into being, the transitional (federal)

government of Ethiopia was established with a transitional period charter in which the rights of nations, nationalities and peoples are confirmed. Among the rights guaranteed to nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia by the new TGE and its charter included that every nation or nationality has the right to:

- a) preserve its identity and have it respected, promote its culture and history, use and develop its language;
- b) administer its own affairs within its defined territory and effectively participate in the central government on the basis of freedom, fair and proper representation;
- c) exercise its right to self determination of independence, when the concerned nation/nationality and people is convinced that the above rights are denied, abridged or abrogated (TPCE, 1991 in Tegegne and Kassahun, 2004)

Subsequently afterwards proclamation No.7/92 has provided the legal basis for the establishment of regional governments which can also be considered as the beginning of the real implementation of the decentralization. Then come proclamation No.33/92 which stipulated the sharing of revenue between the national and regional government; and proclamation No.41/93 which defined the powers, duties and responsibilities of the national and regional executive organs. Up until 1995 when FDRE constitution comes into being in a full-fledged manner, regional governments/states (14 by then) were operating on provisional basis (Tegegne and Kassahun, 2004, Yigremew, et al, 2005).

The 1995 FDRE constitution clearly laid down the foundation for decentralized system of governance by giving various and substantial powers (political, administrative, financial and, etc) to regions (now nine regions and two city administrations) to make decisions concerning them as well as reporting and accountability relationship. The constitution has also provided a suggestion and justifications to *woreda* decentralization to confer adequate power to the lowest unit of government to allow the community at local level to equally participate directly and indirectly in the administration of their own affairs. However, the intermediate level of administration known as *zone* were established by regions to coordinate and monitor administrative and development issue of *woredas* under their jurisdiction without clear reference to this by the constitution (Tegegne and Kassahun, 2004, Yigremew, et al 2005).

Although the FDRE constitution clearly indicated that powers and authority should be devolved to local (*woreda*) level, it did not materialized (except for some deconcentration) but instead decentralization was confined to regional level up until 2001/2002 in which it was

implemented in two phase as broader part of the famous PSCAP. The first phase was started with the four bigger or relatively advanced (Oromia, Amhara, SNNP and Tigray) regions in 2001/2002 followed by the remaining (Somali, Afar, Benshangul-Gumuz and Gambella) regions usually known as the emerging regions. The implementation of the DLDP is in its early stages and its outcome towards achieving its objective is yet to be seen.

Analysts in Ethiopia's decentralization like Smoke (2001) outlined a number of positive features of the Ethiopian decentralization of which the following worth noting.

- ◆ Unlike donor-driven decentralization policies in many developing countries, decentralization in Ethiopia has clear internally determined priority. Donor agencies have been invited to assist in various ways only after the federal government defined the basic parameters of the decentralized system.
- ◆ In contrast to many African countries, Ethiopia has developed a fairly robust and extensive legal framework for decentralization. The 1995 Ethiopian Constitution explicitly provides for a federal system, with different service provision and revenue responsibilities for the federal and regional (state) governments. This builds on Proclamation 41 of 1993, which provides more detail regional government functions. Revenue bases and provisions for their administration are defined in detail in Proclamation 33 of 1992.
- ◆ Ethiopia has pursued decentralization from a genuine desire to give more powers and resources to decentralized levels rather than to effect central budgetary relief, which is common in other African countries. Consistent with this view, Ethiopia has developed a very significant intergovernmental transfer program that consumes a substantial proportion of central revenues. Clear rules govern the intergovernmental transfer program, making it easier for all parties concerned to understand the basis for resource allocation.
- ◆ The federal government has clearly recognized the importance of capacity building at the subnational level, particularly in the form of training, to ensure that decentralization will be successful. Some efforts have already been undertaken in this regard, and plans are underway to further develop training programs.

Despite these positive features of Ethiopia's decentralization, some critical weaknesses remain (Smoke 2001).

- ◆ Although the basic enabling environment is in place, many key systems and procedures-planning and budgeting, financial management, service delivery mechanisms (including roles for the private sector/civil society), etc. are not fully developed. Without them, sub-national governments cannot be expected to behave in a fiscally responsible way and meet the service delivery responsibilities that are so critical for local economic development and poverty alleviation.
- ◆ Even with an enabling environment and well-developed procedures, there are serious capacity constraints. Some functions are officially the responsibility of state governments that have limited capacity to perform them effectively.
- ◆ There is no much specificity in the constitution and relevant other legislations about the functions of tiers of government below the states (the zones and *woredas*).
- ◆ There is no clearly articulated process for implementing and coordinating decentralization. Given the severe capacity constraints and lack of local governance in Ethiopia, there is a need for a strategic and gradual process of decentralization consistent with existing capacity at all levels.
- ◆ More emphasis has been given to the development of intergovernmental transfer programs than to improving sub-nationals' own sources of revenue.

Chapter Three

3. The Process of DLDP in the Somali Region: An overview

3.1. Background of the Somali Region

Somali National Regional State (SNRS) is one of the member states of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The state incorporates 52 *woredas* which are in turn categorized into nine (9) administrative zones. The regional parliament with its 169 members is the highest legislative body in the region. The administrative executive council is the other branch of the regional government with 20 cabinet members and 20 other line bureaus, offices, commissions and institutes headed by the regional president and his/her deputy.

The state (region) is located in the eastern and southeastern parts of Ethiopia. It lies between 3 and 15 degrees north latitude and 41 and 48 degrees east longitude. The region has common borders with Oromia national regional state in the west, with Afar national regional state and with the republic of Djibouti in the north, with the republic of Somalia in the east and south, and republic of Kenya in the south. Somali region covers the second largest territorial size (next to Oromia) and is estimated to be 250,000 square kilometers. According to the last housing census, the population of the Somali region is estimated to be 3.5 million with 2.3% growth rate. Of the total population, 46% and 54% are females and males respectively with an average household size of 6.6 persons. The total urban population of the region is estimated to be only 16%, while the overwhelming majority (about 84%) of the total population are pastoralist and agro-pastoralist.

Being pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, the main occupation of the inhabitants of the region is livestock breeding, commerce and sedentary agriculture in the 'woina dega' (warm temperature) areas of Jig-jiga (the regional capital) and around main river basins (Wabishabelle, Gannale, Wayb and Dawa). 80% of the region is flat land, classified as hot arid and hot semiarid climate, while 15% and 5% possess warm temperate and temperate climate characters respectively. The highest average temperature registered is between 32-40⁰c, while the lowest is between 20-28⁰c (MEREWA, 1998)

Jig-jiga is the capital city of the region as well as the head quarter of Jig-jiga zone. The other zonal headquarters are: Gode, Qabridahar, Dagahbur, Warder, Shinile, Fiq, Hargelle, Filtu.

3.2. Introduction and Background of the chapter

DLDP as a sub-component of the PSCAP was first launched in 2001/2002 and is referred to as the *second wave* of decentralization in Ethiopia, the first wave being the decentralization from the central government to region governments since 1992. It (DLDP) was in a response to article 50(4) of the FDRE constitution which declares that “adequate powers shall be granted to the lowest units of the government to enable the people to participate directly in the administration of such units”. The DLDP encompasses all the three major aspects of decentralization namely: political, administrative and fiscal (MCB, 2005).

The objective of the DLDP as enshrined in the program document, is(a) to deepen the devolution of power to the lower tiers of regional governments, (b)to institutionalize decision-making processes at the grassroots level with a view to enhance local participation,(c) to promote good governance, and(d) to improve decentralized service delivery.

To this regard therefore, Somali regional state, as one of the members of the FDRE embarked and has been implementing DLDP program since 1997 EC or 2005GC. The implementation of the program by the Somali region came in the second phase of the second wave of decentralization in Ethiopia. Implementation of DLDP started with the four (Oromia, Amhara, Tigray and SNNPR) relatively advanced regions in 2001/2002 and then followed by the four (Somali, Afar, Benshangul-Gumuz and Gambella) so called emerging regions.

Besides the above stated objectives mentioned in the PSCAP document and common assumptions that local governments are more closer and responsive to the people than national and regional governments, the driving force behind the implementation of DLDP in the Somali region according to the concerned officials (of BoFED, CBB, others)interviewed for this purpose forwarded the following:(a)implementation and fostering of the constitutional rights and obligations enshrined both in the national and regional constitutions,(b)implementation of MDGs and SDPRP goals on time,(c) because other regions of Ethiopia have already embarked on the program, and (d)Donors pressures to the federal government and subsequent federal government pressure to regions (especially the Somali region) which by the time the program was supposed be implemented were busy in political pull and push.

As to the timing of the program, the concerned officials contacted for this purpose replied infrastructure, human resource and political issues were the major impediments why the program was not implemented before. However, these same issues are still pending. The other observation is that the region was not aware of the (DLDP) program and its preparations at national level up until they were told to implement without prior knowledge and preparation.

As a groundwork for the implementation of the DLDP or more precisely as first step of the program implementation, the region has conducted local elections few months before the devolution of functions, power and resources, with the help of NEBE in which every kebele has 'elected' its representative in the *woreda* council. The election process started on Hidar28 and was finalized Yekatit 12 with Tir 16 1996 as the exact election day. Besides the ruling party (SPDP), WSDP and independent candidates have participated in the election. SPDP, the ruling party won the election with an absolute majority of 96.2 percent as shown in table 3.1. Opposition parties and opponents labelled the election as sham basing their arguments that the election was not well informed and prepared in time. Moreover, security problems prevailing at the time of the election prevented the opposition parties and independent candidates to campaign and move freely in order to sell their ideas to the electorate. The security issue and poor understanding of the rationale of the election and its process has led to poor participation and/or choice of candidates by the electorate. In addition to this, there were no independent observers of the election to qualify its validity.

Table3.1: Woreda level election results

Political Parties	No. of candidates won by party			Percentage (%) by party
	Male	Female	Total	
SPDP	2829	353	3182	96.2
WSDP	20	1	21	0.6
Independent candidates	104	2	106	3.2
Total	2953	356	3309	100

Source: NEBE, 1996 EC.

Then *woreda* government consisting of 9 members headed by the *woreda* chief/chairperson and the council speakers was selected and/or elected by the *woreda* parliament under the auspices of (party and administration) officials from the region. Finally, resources in a form of 3Ms (manpower, money and material) and power/authority has been devolved to *woredas*.

Based on this background, in this chapter, the author attempts to describe and analyze an overview of the overall status of DLDP in the region looking at the design and modalities of the program; the legal and institutional frameworks of the program at regional level; the functions and powers decentralized; intergovernmental fiscal relations, and planning and budgeting processes and system of the DLDP program of all *woredas* in the Somali region.

3.3. The design of the DLDP in the in the Somali Region

Designing a reform program (such as DLDP) comprehensively and before its implementation is a prerequisite for its success as well as benchmark for its implementation. Moreover, sequencing (see box 3.1) the process and activities of decentralization logically might lead to its effective and efficient implementation. To this regard, Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006) forwarded a normative approach in sequencing (fiscal) decentralization. The approach consists of six consecutive steps as shown in box 3.1.

Box 3.1: Sequencing Decentralization: A Normative Approach

The Platform: Deconcentration, rule of law, etc.

Step 1: Carry out a national debate on the issues related to decentralization policy;

Step 2: Do the policy design and develop a white paper;

Step 3: Pass the decentralization law;

Step 4: Develop the implementing regulations;

Step 5: Implement the decentralization program, and

Step 6: Monitor, evaluate and retrofit.

Source: Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2006

DLDP in the Somali region with its all dimensions (political, administrative and fiscal) has not been designed well and sequenced at regional level, but rather the devolution of responsibilities and resources have been undertaken hastily and as a *one-time* project. Every aspects of the program (DLDP) have been adopted from the federal government's *blue print* and other (mainly Tigray) regions.

However, a broad and cautious observation of the modality of the DLDP implementation in the region can be viewed from its implementation trends and its current status quo. It was implemented in a *big-bang, top-down and uniform* approaches. *Big-bang* approach entails the devolution of major dimensions and components (political, administrative and fiscal) of

a decentralization program at once in an integrated, all inclusive single package within a short period of time without step by step (or gradualism) devolution and/or pilot testing, which is the case of DLDP in the Somali region. This may imply that, the implementing bodies at local (*woreda*) and community levels were well prepared and capacitated prior to embarking of the program. However, that was not the case in the Somali region and the reality at ground was very different from the minimum requirements (capacity, readiness, awareness, etc) of the program. Institutions and people who were supposed to implement the program were pastoralist and agro-pastoralists who hardly heard or knew about what they are supposedly to implement. That is, the would-be change agents and stakeholders at local level were not mobilised, prepared and capacitated prior to the program implementation.

On the other hand, the program is also characterised by *top-down* approach from its initiation to implementation in that there were no participation and involvement of stakeholders at all (national, regional, local) levels. At national level there was no consultation with the regional officials as to the essence and the modalities of the program and its implementation regimes. According to some top officials in the regional government, the program was more or less an imposition from the central government to the region. Likewise, at regional level, according to sample community members in a focus group discussion and local officials interviewed, there were no consultation and involvement of the local (*woredas*) authorities and general community about the importance of the devolution of local development responsibilities to local level other than the election of *woreda* councils/parliament. The same tendency continued at *woreda* (local) level between *woredas* and *kebeles* that, there is no strangeness if some community members pronounce their unawareness about the whole DLDP program in their localities.

Moreover, another salient feature of the DLDP in the Somali region is that, the program has also been implemented in a *uniform* manner. There was no differentiation in assignment of responsibilities among various categories of localities (*woredas* and *kebeles*). Uniform approach is used when various jurisdictions are relatively homogeneous with regard to their fiscal capacities and with no political or ethnic grouping that demand a special consideration. Though there is no ethnicity difference in the region, various *woredas* in the region are

different in many aspects such as, revenue base and capacity, level of development, political stands of inhabitants and the notorious clan based identity.

Despite the fact that, *big-bang*, *top-down*, and *uniform* approaches is evident from the implementation regimes of the DLDP in the Somali region, it is my observation that it happened by default and not by design. This is because planners of the program at regional level were just trying to meet deadlines set by federal government and were not conscious about which approach and/or design is appropriate for the DLDP in the region.

3.4. Legal and Institutional Frameworks of DLDP in the Somali Region

3.4.1. Legal framework

Any decentralization program to be successful requires a *strong legal framework* setting out the powers, rights and duties of local governments clearly. In the absence of such a framework, it is often impossible to know who is responsible for what. This allows central authorities to interfere easily with local affairs and leaves the local authorities with no possibility of stopping such interference. Legal norms should be adapted to local needs and to the circumstances of the local area. Imposed norms that are from somewhere else (e.g. from top) may not be used in practice or may be unsuitable and, therefore, may lose much of their impact (Kalin, 1998).


The legal framework should be established before embarking a decentralization program and should be fine-tuned during the implementation process. Apart from the FDRE and adjusted 2002 SRS constitutions which set the general legal foundation for the DLDP, there are no other legal or specific policy frameworks (such as local government acts, harmonization of sector legislations, etc) or even manual to direct the implementation of the DLDP in the Somali region. That is, the program has been implemented without detailed legal base indicating the mandates, responsibilities and authority of the local governments, the relationship (supervision, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, etc) between local and regional governments, and relationship among local governments. Moreover, the region is not even in the process of preparing the legal frameworks required for the implementation of the program. However, an official in the CBB (which is the presumed to be the father of the program) told me they are planning to adopt the legal and institutional frameworks of the

other (Oromia, Amhara, Tigray, SNNPR) regions or from the federally prepared frameworks. To this effect, therefore, the local governments in the region are so confused about their rights and responsibilities, which is hindering the implementation of the program and making them susceptible to unnecessary interference of the regional officials and organs; which is actually the case.

3.4.2. The Institutional Framework

When a policy or reform program such as decentralization is implemented, it creates, modifies and /or assigns institutions/organizations at different levels which have the mandate to plan, coordinate and monitor the implementation of the program. The establishment or assignment of such institutions and their mandates should be clearly stated by law. This being the case, the institutions implementing DLDP in the Somali region at regional and local levels are not clearly defined and their legal bases are almost nonexistent and the author did not come across any official document let alone law describing the institutional settings of the DLDP in the region. Nevertheless, from observations of how things are being done in the region with regard to DLDP, one may deduce that, the institutional framework (see figure 3.1) of the program follow from regional to zonal and to local (*woreda*) levels. At regional level, there is the president office which is concerned with the political and administrative aspects and overall coordination of the program. Then come the BoFED, which is responsible for the planning and budgeting processes, financial issues, and overall coordination and monitoring of developmental issues of the DLDP. CBB which is the presumed father of the program is concerned with the policy and capacity issues of the implementing organs at local level. The CSB, on the other hand, is concerned with manpower and staffing issues. These are the four major institutions with mandates and influences (though not clear) of the DLDP at local level in the Somali region. However, other sectoral and line bureaus may have indirect relations and support packages with their respective offices at local level.

Figure 3.1: The Institutional framework of the DLDP in the Somali region



Source: author

While the revised 2002 regional constitution confers the state, the power to establish any administrative hierarchy when it finds necessary, but then, the revised SRS 2002 constitution has completely omitted zones from the structure and administrative hierarchies of the state. Nonetheless, at zonal level, the zones in principle should have minimum influence in all aspects except the security issues of the zone at local level, but in reality they have immense influence to the extent of ousting local officials through improper means if and when local officials defy them.

Finally, at local level, different institutions which was created or modified/ decentralised by the DLDP program play the actual role of implementing the program. These consist (see table 3.2) of the *woreda* council headed by the speaker and his /her deputy; the executive cabinet consisting of the *woreda* chairperson, his/her deputy and five (FEDCO, CBCO, PDCO, SJACO, and CMPCO) coordinating offices, and the various line offices which come under the coordinating offices. That is, the agriculture, cooperative, basic rural infrastructure development and DPPO offices come under the pastoral development coordinating office; while education, health, women affairs and civil service and training offices are accountable to the capacity building coordinating office; the justice, police and militia offices come under the purview of justice and security administration coordinating office; the expenditure and revenue office comes under the supervision of the finance and economic development coordinating office. Finally, there is the judiciary system which is in principle independent from the administrative operations and influences of *woreda* councils and executive cabinet. The working relationship between the *woreda* administration and courts is not clear. That is, the judiciary system of *woreda* is accountable to the regional of judiciary administration and not to *woreda* organs, and thus judiciary system is more of deconcentration/delegation than devolution.

Table 3.2: the institutional framework of the DLDP at local level

Institutions created by the DLDP		Institutions Decentralized
1. Woreda Council	1	Expenditure and Revenue(Finance) Office
Office of the Speaker	2	Education Office
Office of the Deputy Speaker	3	Health Office
2. Woreda Executive Cabinet	4	Agriculture Office
Office of the <i>woreda</i> Chairperson	5	Basic infrastructure development Office
Office of the <i>woreda</i> deputy chairperson	6	Cooperative Office
Finance and Economic Development Coordinating Office	7	Justice office
Pastoral Development Coordinating Office	8	DPPO
Justice and Security Administration coordinating Office	9	Civil Service and Training Office
Capacity Building Coordinating Office	10	Women Affairs Office
Community Mobilization and Participation Coordinating Office	11	AIDS Secretariat
	12	Militia Office
	13	Police Office
	14	Sharia Court
	15	Constitutional Court

Source: author

Though the SRS constitution recognise kebele as the lowest tier of the regional government with all organs (Kebele council, cabinet, and the social court) as other levels (regional and *woreda*) of the region, but in real sense *kebeles* cannot be considered as administrative units at least currently because they do not have elected council, they don't have their budget, they don't have any semblance of modern governance system other than two officials who are *woreda* council members assigned from *woreda* cabinet to deal and report to the *woreda*, the peace and security issues of the kebele. The two officials have no salary but they take a lion share (if not all, as the case is in most the time) of kebele food sent by the DPPB during the drought time.

3.5. Functions and Powers Decentralized

3.5.1. Functions decentralized

The question of which functional activities are to be decentralized from higher level to lower level of government entirely depend on the situation and purpose of decentralization(Conyers,1986). The structures and powers of various organs (council, cabinet and courts) at regional, *woreda* and kebele levels are clearly stated in the revised

2002 constitution of the SRS. But the constitution has not mentioned clearly the functional responsibilities between the regional and *woreda* levels, and between the *woreda* and kebele levels. Moreover, there is no any other official document stating the functional assignment among levels of the regional governments. This implies that there is no clear demarcation of responsibilities among the tiers of the regional administrative units. However, according to response given by a number of concerned top officials interviewed about this issue, it appears that the region has just followed the models of other (Oromia, Amhara, Tigray and SNNPR) regions in assigning functional activities to *woredas*. Thus, table 3.3 below shows the functional activities assigned to *woredas* in the Somali region.

Table 3.3: Functional activities decentralized	
Functional activities decentralized	<i>Woreda</i> level
Planning and financial control	- <i>Woreda</i> budget, Monitoring & Evaluation, Reporting
Education	-1 st and 2 nd cycles of primary education, Primary school management and cost sharing, Allocation of <i>woreda</i> fund.
Healthy	-Health centers, health posts, health extension package, allocation of <i>woreda</i> fund.
Water supply	-Hand dug well, springs and pond development
Agriculture	-Planning and implementation of <i>woreda</i> based extensions programs, small scale irrigation, and adaptive research.
Natural resource	-Land use administration, natural resource protection and development
Roads	Rural travel and transport integrated development(rural road, pavement, etc)

Source: Worku Yehualashet 2005 with adjustments by author

The functional activities stated in the table are not even clear to *woreda* governments and concerned officials at regional level and thus *woreda* governments operate with no clear direction and mandates. This is because both regional and local officials replied differently when asked about this issue which indicates the absence of clarity of mandates and responsibilities between the regional and local levels of the region. Furthermore, local governments have been so far attempting to do something about education, health, water and agriculture as a priority of local development but have done little about rural roads, natural resources and other related developmental issue due to capacity and financial constraints.

3.5.2. The Powers and Resources Decentralized

Devolution of power follows the functional assignment. It is an important and politically sensitive issue, and determines the control which the local government have over various functional activities decentralized. Moreover, it is also an intricate issue because it involves different powers for different functional activities decentralized. These powers may be broadly categorised into: *policy making* powers (law making, executive powers), *financial* (revenue and expenditure powers) powers and powers over *personnel* (hiring, appointment, transfers, discipline, etc) matters (Conyers, 1986).

1. Executive Powers

Generally speaking, powers in a form of political, administrative fiscal as well as material have been devolved to *woredas* as a starting point. To start with, *woreda* election has been conducted few (Tir, 1996 EC) months before the actual implementation of the DLDP in which community have elected their representatives at *woreda* level. The powers and functions of the *woreda* council/parliament and other organs of the *woreda* government and their interrelationship are extensively affirmed in the revised SRS 2002 constitution.

The *woreda* council and cabinet have constitutionally some powers/authority to make political, administrative and fiscal decisions concerning their specific *woreda* and within the frameworks of the regional and federal constitutions, laws and policies. However, these powers are mainly implementation in nature than initiation; that is, *woreda* governments have the power to execute some policies, laws, directives, plans and programs of the state and federal governments at *woreda* level, but there is no clear mention in the SRS constitution (and no other legal document) that *woreda* governments (*woreda* council and cabinet) can initiate and implement policies, programs, laws and directives, specific to their particular *woredas* other than the preparation and approval of annual plans and budgets.

Yet, according to officials at regional and *woreda* levels contacted in in-depth interview, most of the powers enshrined in the regional constitution are good only in the constitution document in the shelf because of two major reasons. First, most of *woreda* council and cabinet members including council speakers and *woreda* chairpersons have no knowledge of their rights and responsibilities enshrined in the constitution due to ignorance and/or lack of orientation. Secondly, the constitutional rights of *woreda* governments and the reality in

the ground are different in that the constitutional rights are continuously abused by regional officials who are elected from particular *woreda* in the state council, and officials and organs who have influence and stakes in one way or the other such as the officials from the party, president office, BoFED, etc. This is because these officials and organs can influence the existence or the absence of the *woreda* officials and employees through legal as well as illegal means. Hence, generally speaking, *woreda* governments have no adequate practical powers to make political, social, economical and administrative decisions to implement the DLDP. They are virtually powerless both by default and design.

2. Manpower and Material Devolved

After the election and appointment of the of the *woreda* government officials (council speakers and cabinets), human, financial (see section 3.5), and material resources have been decentralised at ones to all *woredas*. As to the manpower devolved, the regions has devolved a substantial number (≈ 860) of professionals with degrees and diplomas selected from various line bureaux and sector coordinating offices at regional level as a first round to help the commencement of the program and its subsequent implementation at *woreda* level. Then later on, a second round of mid level experts mainly with diplomas as well as support staff mainly with certificates have been assigned to *woredas* by the CSB. The devolution of the first round professionals was more organised than the assignment of second round .This is because, the second round was assigned only by the CSB randomly through normal employment process, while the first round devolution was done by a special decentralization committee mandated by the regional cabinet in which the assignment (devolution) of experts to *woredas* was based on the manpower needs of the various *woredas*. Though the manpower decentralised was not enough, it can safely be concluded that it was a modest number for the program to commence. However, sadly most of ($\approx 85\%$ expert guess) the professional manpower devolved returned back from *woredas* to the region due to various reasons ranging from poor reception by *woreda* governments, to remoteness and security issues, to unbearable working conditions as well as deliberate unlawful dismissals of the qualified manpower and their replacement with illiterate and semi-illiterate ones by officials both at regional and local levels.

As to the powers over manpower, *woreda* governments have so far no clear power confirmed by law, to hire, appoint, transfer, discipline, etc employees at *woreda* level. Currently they (*woreda* governments) receive their manpower needs from the region in terms of hiring, appointing and transferring. It is mainly when an official or delegate came from the region to *woredas* that major adjustments with regard to appointments and firings of cabinet members and sectoral offices heads are done mostly in irregular manner. Appointments of major line offices heads is done by the president office, while hiring and transfer of employees is done by CSB at regional level. This is with the fact that, *woredas* have *civil service and training office* earning salary and maybe with operational cost. However, recently there is circular from the regional cabinet that *woreda* governments can administer the employment of positions with monthly salary of less than 500 birr. With regard to this(manpower administration) issue, there is a bit different scenario in other regions. For instance, in Amhara region, though it is not clearly mentioned in the constitution or any other law about *woredas'* powers over personnel (recruiting, hiring, firing, etc) matters but in practice *woredas* undertake recruitment and hiring decision of personnel at their disposal locally, while the region sometimes appoint and transfer *hard-to-find* personnel at local level. But the administrative responsibility of managing the local personnel rests with *woredas* (Don and Mohamed, 2006).

On the other hand, physical material resources have been devolved to *woredas* to help *woredas* basic material needs to start operating up until they are able to purchase their own offices materials and other facilities. The composition and details of the physical materials decentralised is shown in table 3.4.

Table3.4: Physical Materials Decentralized to *Woredas*

S/N	Items	Material Physical Count at Regional Level	Required Number for <i>Woredas</i>	Delivered Number	Difference	Remarks (Missing Gap) %
1	Vehicles	146	32	7	25	78.12
2	Motors-cycles	56	56	5	51	91.07
3	Generators	45	11	4	7	63.63
4	Photocopies	71	22	10	12	54.54
5	Duplicators	37	37	4	33	89.18
6	Type writers	198	198	26	172	86.86
7	Tables	2014	802	256	546	68.07
8	Chairs	5267	2106	664	1442	68.47
9	File-cabinets	464	179	55	124	69.27
10	Shelves	830	331	53	278	83.98
11	Cupboards	198	72	35	37	51.38

Source: Audit Office

The table clearly illustrates the absence of commitment of the region towards the implementation of the program in that, the gap between materials planned to be decentralized and materials got/delivered by regional line bureaux is high and ranges from 51.38percent to 91.07 percent. Moreover, most of the materials presented by line bureaux were more of liability than asset to be of help to *woredas* because most of the materials were old and were in the stores of various line bureaux after bureaux replaced it with new ones awaiting disposal and thus a good number disintegrated at the collection point before distribution. Another observation from the table is that, most of the materials presented are not divisible for around fifty *woredas* except typewriters, tables, chairs, file cabinets and shelves.

3.6. Fiscal Decentralization (Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations)

Fiscal decentralization is the life blood of decentralization without which other forms (political and administrative) of decentralization will be an empty rhetoric. It may seem, on the face value, the “easiest” dimension of decentralization because it involves assigning revenue capacities to subnational governments. The reality, however, is more complex because even when an official decision is made to decentralize financial capacities to local authorities, reluctant central/regional agencies may be able to slow the process down. Moreover, giving resources to subnational governments who are not politically, managerially and technically prepared to use them responsibly may create enormous problems. Finally and perhaps most important, the degree to which fiscal decentralization should be pursued is most of the time not clearly defined (which suits the case of DLDP in the Somali region at hand). If fiscal decentralization is not defined and managed/done well, it may not produce desired goals and may lead to undesirable macroeconomic outcomes (Smoke 2000).

Thus, scholars and researchers of the subject presented various approaches for implementing fiscal decentralization which the author see as appropriate to present one example as a preface for this section. Bahl (1999) for instance, has proposed twelve (12) rules for implement fiscal decentralization as depicted in box 3.1

Box3.2: Implementing f rules for fiscal decentralization

- Rule1:** Fiscal decentralization should be viewed as a comprehensive system;
- Rule2:** Finance follows functions;
- Rule3:** There must be a strong central ability to monitor and evaluate decentralization;
- Rule4:** One intergovernmental system does not fit the urban and rural sector;
- Rule5:** Fiscal decentralization requires significant local government taxing powers;
- Rule6:** Central government must keep the fiscal decentralization that they make;
- Rule7:** keep it simple;
- Rule8:** The design of intergovernmental transfer system should match the objectives of decentralization reform;
- Rule9:** Fiscal decentralization should consider all three levels of the government
- Rule10:** Impose a hard budget constraints;
- Rule11:** Recognize that intergovernmental system are always in transitions and plan for this, and
- Rule12:** There must be a champion for fiscal decentralization.

Source: Bahl, 1999

Barely, there is no one rule which is fulfilled in the fiscal decentralization of the DLDP in the Somali region. There is no established and comprehensive system in place; finance and functions have been devolved simultaneously in big-bang approach; no strong monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to account the progress of the program; fiscal decentralization of rural and urban *woredas* are dealt on the same footings and uniformly without variation ; local government do not have clear taxing powers let alone significant, and hard budget is normal phenomenon by default due to limited transfers ,shortages of revenue sources and capacity of *woreda* governments to effectively mobilise it but not due to conscious imposition from the regional government.

3.6.1. Expenditure Assignment

As described in section 3.4.1 above, expenditure assignment for the DLDP of the Somali region lacks clarity and formality. When asked regional and *woreda* officials about expenditure assignment between the local and regional governments, they responded differently. For instance, each one claimed the responsibility of secondary schools. However, *woreda* governments have the power/authority of allocating budget to *woreda* priorities such as, education, water, healthy, agriculture, etc. within the framework of priority areas indicated by BoFED. But capacity (technical, managerial) limitations of most *woredas* render them to be under the manipulations (through experts) of region for making decisions such as budget allocation to major priority areas.

3.6.2. Revenue assignment

Revenue assignment shares the same fate with expenditure assignment with regard to clarity and legal base. Though the regional constitution indicates that *woredas* have the power to collect revenue, there is no proclamation, regulation, decree or even semi-legal (manual) guiding the revenue sharing responsibilities and rights between regional and *woreda* levels. In some *woredas* (like Jig-jiga) revenue collection is a battle ground between regional and *woreda* agencies. Moreover, *woredas* don't know the sources, base and rate of the revenue they are suppose to collect. The major revenue collection sources for *woredas* are *payroll tax* from the employees and Lorries carrying retail products commonly known as '*Bagaash*' or *sheqada-sheqed* passing or coming to the *woreda* by small businessmen.. These Lories are arbitrarily levied a lump-sum amount by every check point or *woreda* they pass regardless of whether they have receipts or not. This is discouraging the small businesses development and growth because they cannot bear and afford the heavy and arbitrary taxation of the *woreda* governments. Revenue from Kat (e.g. Jig-jiga *woreda*) is administered at national (via letter credit) and regional levels. Moreover, *woreda* governments don't collect land use revenue from farmers as well as from other pastoralist and their livestock except when livestock are brought to market which is levied to the buyer as sale tax rather than the seller.

When it comes to revenue collection responsibilities between *woreda* and regional levels, BoR assigns arbitrary percentage between *woreda* and regional levels and then among *woredas* without any base such as study of the potentiality of *woredas* base of revenue. The only base of BoR revenue collection assignment (as remarked by revenue collection department head with BoR) is whether a main road passes a particular *woreda*. Table 3.3 shows revenue collection responsibility between regional and local levels for the last three years of DLDP implementation.

Table 3.5: Revenue Collection responsibility between regional and *woreda* levels

Planned Revenue Collection.	1997 EC		1998 EC		1999 EC	
	Amount	%share	Amount	% share	Amount	% share
Regional level	24,500,000	45.14	27,744,282.92	46.24	27,588,451.97	46
Local(<i>woreda</i>) level	29,770,957.48	54.86	32,255,717.08	53.76	32,411,548.03	54
Total	54,270,957.48	100	60,000,000	100	60,000,000	100

Source: BoR

The table clearly illustrates the responsibilities of revenue collection between the two levels of the region for the last three years of DLDP implementation. The share of the *woredas* is 29,770,957.48(54.86 percent), 32,255,717.08(53.76 percent) and 32,411,548.03(54 percent) in 1997, 1998 and 1999 Ethiopian fiscal years respectively of which all are more than the share of the region. The major problem is not in the assignment of revenue collection responsibilities between the two levels and which level collects what, but the problem stems from fact that the amount of revenue collection responsibility assigned to *woredas* is deducted from budget of *woredas* as revenue to be collected from *woredas*. The amount deducted from the *woreda* as revenue is most of time more than the operating (petty cash) cost of most *woredas*. Then what happens is that, the capital budget and sometimes the salary of the employees are occasionally used as an operating cost. This is disastrous for development initiatives/activities of *woredas* as well as revenue mobilization at *woreda* level because *woreda* government will not endeavor much to collect revenue since they know their revenue collection obligation has been recovered in advance from their budgets and there will be no pressure from the region to collect revenue. Moreover, this is against established principles of intergovernmental fiscal relations. The relationship between local revenue and expenditure needs is shown in table 3.7 in the next section.

3.6.3. Intergovernmental transfer

Intergovernmental transfers are the major source of revenue for local governments in the Somali region. That is, the region highly depends (see table 3.7) on transfer (subsidy) from federal government and *woredas* in turn get most (see appendix 3) of their budget from regional transfers. Table 3.6 shows the total budget, budget sources, budget growth and federal subsidy dependency rates of the Somali region for the last three years in which the DLDP was implemented. From the table, it is clear that the region cannot do any thing without the transfer (subsidy) from the federal government and the dependency rate ranges from 88.26 percent to 89.30 percent to 91.57 percent in 1997, 1998 and 1999 EC fiscal years respectively. Table (3.7) also shows that, as the growth of the budget increases, the independency rate also increases with decreasing proportion of own revenue. This implies that the region is virtually handicapped without the federal subsidy and hence the autonomy (in its all dimensions) and self-reliance of the region which are the essence of the decentralization policy is basically non existent.

Sources	1997EC	1998 EC	1999 EC	%tage share		
	Amount	Amount	Amount	1997	1998	1999
Federal subsidy:						
♦ Central treasury	345,880,000	475,150,000	584,530,000	75	85	82
♦ External aid	32,580,000	23,310,000	23,440,000	7	4	3
♦ External loan	28,660,000	2,600,000	44,110,000	6	0.5	6
Total Federal Subsidy	407,120,000	501,060,000	652,080,000	88	89	91
Regional revenue	54,120,000	60,000,000	60,000,000	12	11	9
Total budget	461,240,000	561,060,000	712,080,000	100	100	100
Source: BoFED- 1997-98-99 Budget						
Federal subsidy dependency (%)	88.26	89.30	91.57			
Annual budget growth (%)	-	21.64	26.91			

Source: BoFED

On the other hand, the dependency of *woredas* on regional transfer/subsidy is more or less the same as that of the region to the federal as shown in table 3.7.

Table 3.7: Regional transfers (subsidy) to *woredas* Vs own revenue expected of them

Local budget dependency	1997EC		1998 EC		1999 EC	
	Amount	%share	Amount	% share	Amount	% share
Regional transfer	171,629,043	85.22	217,158,448	87	261,429,679	88.97
Planned revenue from <i>woredas</i>	29,770,957.48	14.78	32,255,717.08	13	32,411,548.03	11.03
Total local budget	201,400,000	100	249,414,165	100	293,841,227	100

Source: BoFED

The dependency (see also appendix 3 for specific *woredas*) of *woreda* governments on the regional transfer is high and ranges from 85.22 percent, 87 percent and 88.97 percent for the last three (1997, 1998, 1999 EC) years of DLDP implementation respectively. This implies that local governments cannot exist without the regional subsidy which in turn cannot exist without the federal subsidy. This leads us to the difficult question of how long can the federal government continue to provide subsidy to the regional and *woreda* governments to exist. The table also clearly shows the relationship between the local expenditure needs and revenue at their disposal. Thus, of the total budget planned for *woredas*, only 14.78 percent, 13 percent and 11.03 percent in 1997, 1998 and 1999 respectively is from local source or own revenue of local governments. This indicates the vulnerability of local governments to the manipulations of regional officials and organs.

The intergovernmental transfer from region to local (*woreda*) governments should in principle increase year after year if the objective of decentralization to capacitate the local

governments based on yearly progress and experience. However, these is not the case in the Somali region so far even after the total budget of region had been adjusted by reducing loan and aid as well other deductions(contingency, debt etc) from the total budget of the region. The *woreda* (percentage) share of the budget has been declining year after year instead of gradually increasing. Table 3.8 demonstrates the division of the budget among the regional, local and some urban areas after some adjustments. It shows the percentage shares of *woredas* of the distributed budget after deductions are 53%, 49% and 47% for the last three years respectively.

Table3.8: The Distribution of the Distributable Budget between Local (*woredas*) and Regional Levels

Fiscal year	1997 EC		1998 EC		1999EC	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
Distributed budget	380,000,000	100	509,008,500	100	625,194,100	100
Regional level share	171,000,000	45	249,414,165	49	306,345,109	49
Local level share	201,400,000	53	249,414,165	49	293,841,227	47
Urban areas	7,600,000	2	10,180,170	2	25,007,764	4

Source: BoFED

This is with the fact that, the regional government boasts that it has devolved significant financial resources to *woredas*. Moreover, the regional government argues that retained budget at regional level is also for *woredas* and just because the *woreda* governments does not have the required capacity that it is retained at regional level; otherwise they (regional government) would have devolved to *woredas*. This may imply that the total budget of the region goes to *woredas* at the end of the day which is logically right; however, critics within the government hierarchy who are not satisfied with the division of budget between regional and local levels see the other way round, as reluctance to relinquish power and resource to *woredas*. These opponents argue that since urban areas are also *woredas*, the urban budget would have been added to urban *woredas*' budget instead of keeping it as a separate item at regional level. The other, issue forwarded by the opponents is that instead of keeping a lump sum amount as contingency at regional levels, *woredas* would have been told to have their contingency when allocating their budget. As to the non-divisibility of loan and aid, proponents argue that since donors have conditioned(earmarked) the loan and aid for specific project at specific localities, then this should be administered at regional level but in the end goes to a *woreda* and cannot be put in the grant formula. Still opponents argue that, this should have been added directly to that particular *woreda* budget where the projects are to be implemented. Argument and counter argument, there is sense of what both are saying, but lack of transparency exist in what proponents are saying in that, there

may be inequality(which is the concern of the opponents) of allocation of projects implemented at region level among *woredas* whether the budget is from loan, aid or from internal sources.

To this regard therefore, the real share of *woredas* in the grand budget of the region over the last three years without any deduction shows even a lesser share for *woredas*. Instead of 53, 49 and 47percents of the adjusted budget (see table3.8), it shows an average of approximately 43 percent for *woreda* while the remainder (57 percent) is for regional level as depicted in table 3.9.

Table3.9: The actual (real) share of *woredas* in the budget of region

Budget Year	Total Regional budget	Local(<i>woreda</i>) Budget	Actual share of local budget over the total yearly budget (%)
1997 EC	461,240,000	201,400,000	43.66
1998 EC	561,060,000	249,414,165	44.45
1999 EC	712,080,000	293,841,227	41.26
Total	1,734,380,000	744,655,392	42.93

Source: BoFED

Moreover, the transfers from the regional treasury to *woreda* bank accounts are administered on quarterly basis of equal proportions. But there is heavy bureaucracy, interest attachments and manipulations by the concerned regional officials in releasing the grant transfer to *woredas*. Thus, the last quarter proportion of 1997 was not transferred to most *woredas* but utilized at regional level due to delay of the transfer in the right time. In addition, a lump sum amount of birr 8 million have been deducted from the 1998 budget allotted for *woredas* by a decision from the regional cabinet to be used for other pressing issues without the knowledge of *woredas*. This clearly highlights the unpredictability of intergovernmental fiscal system in the region.

3.6.3.1. The Grant formula

Inline with the federal policy of more autonomy to *woredas*, the core fiscal framework of the region is unconditional block grant to *woredas*. But the region has so far been dividing the *woreda* budget into major three parts of salary, petty cash and capital budgets on the pretext of lack capacity of the *woreda* governments to do so by themselves. Opponents again have remarked this as 'de-capacitating' *woredas*.

The division of the budget between regional and local level is more of random percentage, but the division of budget among *woredas* is based on a programmed grant formula on three parameters/variables namely; population, level of development and revenue raising capacity. The percentage share of each parameter is usually given by the cabinet of the region on yearly basis. Table 3.10 shows the grant formula used for last three years.

Table 3.10: The Grant Formula

Budget Year	Population	Level of Development	Revenue raising capacity	Total
1997 EC	65%	25%	10%	100%
1998 EC	50%	35%	15%	100%
1999 EC	50%	40%	10%	100%

Source: BoFED

The table illustrates that the grant formula is *equity* oriented in that, it gives a high share to population (65%, 50%, 50%) and level Development (25%, 35%, 40%) than to *efficiency* as shown in the revenue raising (10%, 15%, 10%) capacity parameter proportion. The other observation from the grant formula in the table is that the level of development variable has been increasing year after year. The reason for this (increase) is because MPs from less populated *woredas* have campaigned and lobbied hard that the level of *development* parameter share be increased. This campaign for *woredas* by MPs has led to unconstitutional division of budget among *woredas* in 1998 in which after a bitter quarrel among MPs, every *woreda* has been allotted birr 1,000,000 before the application of the grant formula. The federal government refuted this in 1999 budget division and branded the act of 1998 budget year as unconstitutional.

3.6.4. Borrowing privileges

There is no opportunity for borrowing or access to debt for local governments from any where; internally or externally, which implies that local governments in the region does not have access to various financial tools such as borrowing privileges to give them the opportunity to harmonize expenditures requirements and revenue collection. This is because, for different reasons expenditure required or incurred and sources of income (transfer and tax intake) may not fully match for a particular year. In such a situation, borrowing provides local governments to smooth out the mismatch and provide services without disruption. Hence, one important principle of fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental relations is missing from the DLDP process in the region and which also minus the autonomy of local government. However, this is not peculiar to local governments

in the Somali region; it is more less, the same in all regions of Ethiopia (regionally or locally) even though the FDRE constitution does not disprove clearly borrowing /debt privileges for subnational governments.

3.7. Planning and budgeting process

These are the major functional and fiscal powers that characterize any decentralized local governance and show the extent of devolution. Though, in principle, this is recognized, in practice, there are few *woredas* which have the capacity to do their own planning and budgeting process. To this end therefore, the planning and budgeting process of most *woredas* has so far been done in a semi top-down approach in three rounds: first, in a form of indicative plans from the region setting out priority areas to be dealt with by *woredas*; secondly, the block grant transferred to *woredas* are divided (earmarked) in three major parts of salary, petty cash and capital at regional level; finally planning and budgeting experts are sent from the region to help the *woredas* in the technicalities of planning and budgeting process within the priority area. In principle, the experts should play mainly advisory role rather than dictating what to do and influencing the direction of the planning and budgeting process. However, since most *woredas*' don't have the basic capacity and skills to plan and budget, the experts over do it and their wishes rein the planning and budgeting process of *woredas*.

The institutions involved in the local planning and budgeting process of the DLDP are BoFED at regional level and OFED and sector offices at *woreda* level. The *woreda* executive (cabinet) committee and *woreda* (parliament) council play the approving role after a series of meeting and discussions of priority and pressing issues.

Procedurally, various sector offices of the *woreda* plan and present their activities to OFED which compile it and in turn present it to the *woreda* cabinet. After discussions and adjustments, the *woreda* cabinet presents the budget to the *woreda* council which approves it after discussion and may be adjustments. This is theoretically how planning and budgeting should be done, but in reality, there is no planning budgeting process undertaken in most *woredas*. Only the *woreda* chairpersons and OFED heads decide over the capital and petty cash portions of the budget by assigning random proportions (e.g. 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%...etc)

to various sector offices in a lump sum approach without identifying projects or project sites. Then, when the expenditure time came, the same two officials award a local contractor who is member of the clan of the site of where the project is supposed to be implemented to undertake the construction of the project mostly without consulting the concerned sector office head who is supposed to have managed and monitored the project implementation.

As to the selection of project site, it is as a result of stiff lobbying among cabinet members each one campaigning for his/her *kebele* and not based on need though need exist almost in every *kebele*. This is the trend of planning and budgeting process in most (rural) *woredas*, but there are few *woredas* (e.g. Jig-jiga) with sensible planning and budgeting process and of course with acceptable gaps.

On the other hand, civil society organization (NGOs, CBOs, etc) and general public are not part and parcel of the planning and budgeting process of *woredas*. The reason is that community is not aware (due to lack of orientation and mobilization) of the planning and budgeting process of *woredas*, while civil society organizations does not exist in most *woredas*. Moreover, there is no any mechanism or modality in place or in process for civil organization and the community involvement in the planning and budgeting process of local governments in the region. However, PCDP, a semi-government organization funded by the World Bank implement projects in some *woredas* with consultation of *woreda* administrations and W/KDC which is mostly used as rubber stamp.

The *woreda* budget composition shows a higher propensity to recurrent costs such as salary and petty cash than to development. Table 3.11 illustrates the development (capital) budget of the last three years of DLDP implementation is declining while the recurrent budget is increasing. To make the matter worse, sometimes even the little capital budget is used for other issues other than development such as security operations because a large portion (if not all) of the *woredas'* petty cash is deducted in advance at regional level for the revenue collection obligation from *woredas*.

Table3.11: Woreda Budget Composition

Components of Woreda Budget	1997 EC		1998 EC		1999 EC	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
Salary	-		130,523,688.58	52.33	188,432,369.26	64.13
Petty cash	-		52,356,190.80	20.99	42,493,543.40	14.46
Capital	58,675,102.83	29.13	66,534,286.20	26.68	62,915,315.34	21.41
Total	201,400,000		249,414,165.58	100	293,841,227.00	100

Source: BoFED

The reason for this dramatic scaling up of the recurrent portion of the *woreda* budget is because, the vacant posts within *woreda* structure which were intended for the coming five-ten years has been filled-up unnecessarily by the regional CSB in the first three years without considering manpower needs of *woredas*. Moreover, most of the manpower assigned to *woredas* is not skilled let alone qualified. Thus, *woredas* governments are complaining that the salary taken by employees at *woredas* and service provided by employees do not commensurate. That is, employees receive salary that would have been used for development projects and *woreda* don't have the power to downsize the idle manpower assigned to them without their knowledge and consent. Because of this, the 1999 budget has been put into the grant formula after the deduction of the salary from *woredas'* budget fearing that some (indeed most of them) *woredas* may not get budget other than the salary.

The reporting back of budget expenditure by *woredas* is weak and not established fully. So far, no *woreda* has reported back its financial (income and expenditure) undertakings for the last three years of DLDP implementation except three (Jig-jiga, Awbarre, Qabribayah) *woredas* which are supported by the World Bank. Though, there are standard forms for accounting back financial transactions, there is no established monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and system (other than unorganized periodic inspection) in place between *woredas* and regional levels. This is with fact that, a couple of financial management training programs funded by DSA project of USAID are given to *woredas* OFED employees. The trainings were however, not successful because; first, it was not organized and conducted well by BoFED trainers sent; secondly most of trained officials and employees were repeatedly fired one after the other by officials from the region or by other invisible hands who have stakes in particular *woredas*.

3.8. Chapter Summary

To summarize the chapter, table 3.12 shows the extent of political, administrative and fiscal (DLDP) decentralization in the Somali region based on the responses received (in a form of interview, focus group discussions, etc) and observations of the author. The table clearly demonstrates the low level implementation of the DLDP in the region. All the parameters are either non-existent or very low level with overall low performance of major (political, administrative and fiscal) parameters.

Table3.12: The extent of Political, Administrative and Fiscal decentralization in the Somali region

Political Decentralization	
Constitutional safe-guard against arbitrary dismissal of local government	Response frame No clear mention
Popular election of local council members	Yes
Popular election of heads of local councils	No
Degree of popular participation in local elections	Low
Provisions for popular recall of local officials	No
Contestability in local elections	low
Security of existence for local government	No
Overall political decentralization	Low
Administrative Decentralization	
Freedom to hire/fire/set terms of employment of local government employees	No
Freedom to contract out own responsibilities	Yes (but wasteful)
Administrative regulatory authority(by-laws)	No
Overall administrative decentralization	Low
Fiscal Decentralization	
Rate and base setting for local revenues	No
Majority of transfers are formula-based and unconditional	Yes
Revenues more or less match responsibility	No
Own revenues finance majority of expenditures	No
Responsibility and control over health, education, welfare	Yes(but not clear)
Autonomy for planning	Yes(but capacity problem)
Autonomy for procurement	Yes
Ability to borrow from domestic banks/higher levels of government	No
Ability to issues domestic bonds	No
Ability to borrow from foreign banks	No
Ability to issue foreign bonds	No
Overall fiscal decentralization	Low

Chapter Four

4. Preliminary Performance Indications of DLDP Implementation in the Somali Region with particular Reference to Jig-jiga and Babile *Woredas*


Although it is not easy to talk about the performance and impact of the DLDP at this early stage of its implementation, nonetheless, the author attempts to give in this chapter a general qualitative description of trends of DLDP implementation in the region in general and two sample (Jig-jiga and Babile) *woredas* in particular. Jig-jiga represents the (few) urban *woredas* of the region while Babile represents rural *woredas* for some kind of comparison of the DLDP implementation regimes between predominantly rural *woredas* and relatively urban *woredas*. Thus, in this chapter, the author endeavors to furnish a modest description and analysis of some basic preliminary performance indications of the DLDP in the region such as, local governance process (good governance, relationship between local and regional governments, functioning of local/*woreda* governments, local capacity), community participation and empowerment, planning and budgeting process and trends, and basic service delivery trends.

The data and analysis of this chapter is based on the response to interviews, focuses group discussions and questionnaires by planners and analysts of the program at regional level, elected and assigned officials at *woreda* levels, a sample of the manpower devolved from the regional level (center) to the *woreda* and a sample of community members at *woreda* level. Besides, some hard data on basic service delivery trends retrieved from planning and budgeting documents and performance reports of sample *woredas* as well as the observation of the author plays a significant portion of the chapter. Much of the analysis depends on qualitative description some times with quantitative data of the prevailing general situation in the implementation of the program.

4.1. Background of the Sample *Woredas*

Jig-jiga, the capital city of the Somali region and headquarter of jig-jiga zone is located at northwest of the Somali region and centre of the jig-jiga zone and is 638 km east of Addis Ababa. Jig-jiga *woreda* has common border with Aw-bare *woreda* in the north, with Qabribayah *woreda* in east and south, with Gursum and Dambal *woreda* (of Shinile zone) in

the west. Jig-jiga *woreda* covers a territorial area of 110727 hectares, most of which is flat land and suitable for agriculture and thus around 85% of its inhabitants are semi sedentary agro-pastoralists, while the remaining 15% are pastoralists. The climate of the Jig-jiga *woreda* is temperate semiarid with average annual temperature ranging from 18-32°C and average yearly rainfall of 525mm. The population of Jig-jiga *woreda* is estimated to be 346,325 persons of whom 54% are male and 46% are female, and 85% of the population of *woreda* is living in the rural areas and the rest (15%) in urban areas. The economy of the *woreda* depends on rain-fed agriculture and livestock as well as various (Chat, cloth, agricultural products, livestock products, etc) small business activities (OFED, 1998-99 EC Planning documents).



On the other hand, Babile *woreda* one of the six *woredas* of jig-jiga zone is 72 km west Jig-jiga town and consist of 43 rural *kebeles*. Babile *woreda* was one of the disputed *woredas* between the Somali and Oromia regions and the after the referendum, the *woreda* has been divided (30 *kebeles* to Somali and 13 *kebeles* to Oromia) between the two regions with

major urban *kebeles* (including the town) going to Oromia region. It has common border with Ajarsogoro *woreda* in the north and north west, Gursum *woreda* in the in the north east, Harar Kilil in the west and Fiq *woreda* in the south. Babile *woreda* has an area of 3000 square km of which 90% is flat land, 6% (rocky) mountainous and the remaining 4% valleys. The population of Babile *woreda* is estimated to be 116,432 of which 80% of the inhabitants of the *woreda* are agro-pastoralists, 15% pure farmers, and 5% depend on various business activities and government employments. The climate of Babile *woreda* is temperate with annual average rainfall ranges from 400-700mm with rainy seasons in Megabit-Miyasiya and Hamle-Meskerem(Babile OFED, 1997-1999 EC planning documents). The study is confined to the Somali part of the Babile *woreda*.

4.2. Local Governance Process

In this section the author tries to look at the local governance process with particular emphasis to Jig-jiga and Babile *woredas* in terms of basics of good governance (allocative and productive efficiencies, transparency, accountability, less corruption, etc), capacity issues, the relationship between the *woreda* and regional governments and the functioning of the *woreda* governments.

1. Good governance

The terms *governance* and *good governance* are being increasingly used in development literature. Governance describes the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented or not implemented. Public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources, and guarantee the realization of human rights. Good governance accomplishes this in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption and with due regard for the rule of law (Wikipedia free encyclopedia).

One of the major reasons of decentralization programs such as DLDP is to enhance and promote good governance and local self rule. To this end therefore, there is widespread consensus that local development is hardly realizable without establishment of basic principles of good governance. These, among other things include the elements shown in box 4.1 in the next page.

Box4.1: Basic Elements of Good Governance

- Closeness to the community with better information
- Responsiveness to the demands and preferences of the public
- Effectiveness and efficiency
- Accountability
- Reduced corruption
- Rule of law
- Transparency
- Legitimacy and Consensus
- Equity
- Predictability
- Participation*

Source: different sources

◆—————◆
*participation will be dealt alone in the next section

Measuring these basic principles of good governance is important and yet difficult, hence the author tries to describe them qualitatively to give the overall picture of good governance processes and status in the region in general and sample (Jig-jiga and Babile) *woredas* in particular, in a comparative and contrasting manner.

It is argued that local governments are in better position in terms of having better information of the community problems and needs than higher(regional and central) levels of the government and that the service delivered at local level by local government match the preferences and circumstances of the local community. However, this is not always true, because usually local governments are closer to the community in terms of proximity but not always in terms having full information of the community needs and subsequent responsiveness to their demands and preferences due to reasons sometimes beyond the capacity of local governments.

Nevertheless, generally speaking, according to officials in the sample *woredas* as well as officials at regional level interviewed for this purpose, local governments in both (Jig-jiga and Babile) *woredas* are closer (see also table 4.1) to the community and with better information than before the decentralization program. Likewise, resource allocation/distribution(in terms of prioritization of needs and demands of the community) is now much better than before in both *woredas*, but Jig-jiga *woreda* enjoys a better capacity than Babile *woreda* almost in all

aspects. This is because local governments have now some authority, resources and responsibilities to make decisions over a host of issues concerning their localities than prior to the DLDP. When it comes to responsiveness to the demands and choices of the community needs, according to comments of the community elders in focus group discussion, both *woredas* are far from community satisfaction in terms of consulting and involving the community in the process of development from planning through implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Among other things, this could be attributed to two major reasons. First, poor accountability to the community; that is, community have less influence in the operations of *woreda* governments but instead *woreda* governments are by *defacto* accountable to higher level officials and organs than to the community they represent and have elected them. The second reason for poor responsiveness to community needs is that *woreda* governments don't have adequate means (human, financial and material resources) to respond to all the needs and preferences of the community.

On the other hand, rule of law, another basic principle of good governance is more or less missing in the implementation of DLDP in the Somali region. Good governance requires (a) fair legal frameworks that are enforced impartially; (b) full protection of human rights, particularly those of minorities, and (c) independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force. According to concerned top officials and observers at regional as well as devolved manpower at local level in an in-depth interview and focus group discussion, all these are almost non-existent. That is, there is no comprehensive and clear legal framework in place; protection of human right and minorities though clearly defined in the regional constitution has not yet taken root and is not observed so far; the judiciary and police are not independent (due to invisible and visible hands of the regional and national officials and agencies) and not impartial (due to clan and interest inclination), but rather tools of the regional officials to manipulate local governments and hence are corrupted (see also chapter five). These have brought a continuous breach of the above principles of rule of law at local level both by local and regional governments and officials. Moreover, due to the absence of rule of law, corrupt activities and elements have increased at local level in the last three years of the DLDP implementation. This is because corruption equals *monopoly* plus *discretion* minus *accountability*, or $C = M + D - A$, which is the reality of most local governments in the Somali region. What is more, the absence of strong community and civil society organizations to act as *whistle blowers* as well as the absence of system that

facilitates the community to participate in the local governance and development process has exacerbated the local governance situation. Likewise, the absence of established check and balance system through reporting and accounting, monitoring and evaluation, etc from the region is another contributing factor to the monopoly and lack of accountability of local governments.

In addition to the absence of rule law, accountability, increased corruption can be attributed indirectly to the **pooling system** adopted by the region as a policy to decrease unnecessary costs and increase efficiency. That is, instead of every office having its own support staff, all line offices at *woreda* level are served by a pooled support staff which performs all financial transactions for every office in the *woreda*. In this way, there is one bank account, one cashier, one accounting unit, one purchasing unit and one planning unit for all *woreda* line offices and the administration. Moreover, the financial expenditure of all line offices are signed by three (OFED head, the cashier and *woreda* chairperson) officials. Consequently, this has concentrated power in the hands of few individuals and led to misappropriation of financial expenditures some times without the knowledge of concerned line offices. This has been the first comment or complaint of almost every respondent (except the community representative) I asked about the problems of the DLDP in the region. However, with regard to this issue, the two sample *woredas* (especially Jig-jiga) are in better position than other *woredas* of the region as far as prevalence of corruption is concerned. This because Jig-jiga is in the eyes of region and has qualified manpower than other *woredas* including Babile which in turn has less prevalence of corruption when compared to the majority of other *woredas*.

Accountability, another basic principle of good governance and rationale of decentralization is also at stake in the implementation of DLDP in the Somali region. While in principle article 76(2) of the SRS 2002 revised constitution clearly states that *woreda* governments are accountable to *woreda* councils which are in turn accountable to people that elect them, but then in practice, there is a hardly accountability improvement of the *woreda* governments to the public, but rather there is an upward accountability of the *woreda* governments to regional level organs and officials. The absence of accountability of *woreda* government is mainly due to the lack of awareness/orientation and indifference of the community over the operations of *woreda* governments. In other words, the community has not yet assumed the

program as their own which undermines the sustainability of the program. The other reason for less accountability or rather upward accountability of *woreda* government is because of strong influence and interference from regional organs and officials to the extent of ousting the *woreda* governments or officials who resist against the will and command of the regional officials even if their will is against the established legal norms such as, autonomy of the local governments to operate in their own ways and discretion, and not to the dictations of the of regional officials. Therefore, this is why there is an upward accountability instead of downward accountability. This applies to all *woredas* of the region implementing the DLDP with special reference to Jig-jiga *woreda* since there are no elected council/representatives but rather selected and appointed cabinet by the region.

In conclusion, good governance status as a result of DLDP intervention is generally weak and unpredictable with no end in sight for its improvement. However, the sample *woredas* conditions of good governance are better when compared to overall general picture. Table 4.1 gives the response of sample respondents over some elements of good governance.

Table 4.1: The state of good governance in the region according to respondents		
Question	N=80	
	Response rate	
Is the implementation of DLDP at <i>woreda</i> level promoting good governance in terms of:	Yes (%)	No (%)
• Closeness to people with better information	63.75	36.25
• Responsiveness to demand and preference of the people	22.50	77.50
• Improved resource allocation/distribution	47.50	52.50
• Fostering accountability	13.75	86.25
• Reduced corruption	11.25	88.75
• Community participation and involvement	28.75	71.25
• Transparency	27.50	72.50

Source: Own computation from field Data

It is clear from the table that almost all elements of good governance which are the rationale of the DLDP in the region are yet to materialize. That is, the negation of respondents is higher than their affirmation of the improvement of basic elements of good governance. However, the table also shows that, there are some positive trends towards good governance process at local level. For instance, the yes response with regard to local government closeness to people with better information shows a good score of 63.75 percent, while 47.50 percent of the respondents see that resource allocation and distribution

have been improved as a result of DLDP intervention. But, some critics again argue that, even though local governments have physical proximity to the local community, they don't have better information nor do they respond to their needs and preferences.

2. The Relationship between the Local and Regional Governments

The relationship and roles between the region and local (sample *woredas*) governments is not clear neither smooth according to most local officials of the sample (Jig-jiga and Babile) *woredas* in focus group discussion. So far, the existing relationship between local and regional governments includes periodic transfer of block grants (fiscal relations) to *woredas*, budget preparations support, training programs, and periodic and *ad-hoc* supervisory inspections.

The transfer of grant to *woredas* is not smooth and predictable. For instance, the (semi)block grant disbursements to Babile *woreda* come too late to the extent that, employees in Babile (which is just 72km from Jig-jiga) *woreda* get their salary after two-three months most probably due to bureaucratic red-tape and various virtual roadblocks. However, in Jig-jiga unlike Babile *woreda*, the grant transfer is on time according to OFED officials interviewed because of close location proximity and better qualified manpower enjoyed by Jig-jiga *woreda* than other *woredas*. Moreover, the grant transfer to remote *woredas* are accumulated and released periodically which creates unnecessary delay.

Likewise, the regional government offers various training programs to *woreda* officials and employees. However, the training programs offered by the region are not based on the request of *woreda* governments or need assessment conducted by the region. Moreover, the training programs offered by the region are not organized and integrated. It is given by different regional bureaus to different *woreda* line offices some time even without the knowledge of the *woreda* administration. That is, regional line bureaus at regional level directly contact with their respective line offices at *woreda* level without informing *woreda* administrations.

Similarly, BoFED has been sending technical experts to help *woredas* to prepare their budgets and action plans for last three years of the implementation of the program. Despite the fact that, the role of the experts are mainly advisory in principle, in practice however, they are the real decision makers on what to do and what not to do due to limited

capacity (and inferiority complex) of most local staff concerned with the budgeting task as per the comments of the BoFED deputy head . In addition to this, BoFED conducts a periodic and ad-hoc monitoring and inspection programs.

On the other hand, the *woreda* council (parliament) has no significant relationship with regional council even to extent the *woreda* administration has with the regional government except one training program given to speakers of *woreda* councils before the devolution.

In short, the *woreda* -regional relationship in general and sample *woreda* in particular (in terms of administration, political, technical and fiscal dimensions) is not smooth and most of the time hardly exists with no end in sight for its improvement in the near future if the currently existing *woreda*-region relationship trend remains this way.

3. *Woreda* (Jig-jiga and Babile) functioning

Jig-jiga (the capital of the region) is largest *woreda* in the region and has 187 *kebeles* of which 6 are urban and 181 are rural. Local elections has not taken place in Jig-jiga *woreda* due dispute among clans (as well as hidden political agenda as commented by one official in the *woreda*) of the *woreda* in sharing the *woreda* council members. Hence, Jig-jiga has no parliament but executive cabinet selected and appointed by the regional government.

Conversely, Babile *woreda* has 30 *kebeles* of which all are rural. Unlike Jig-jiga, Babile has council (parliament) consisting of 60 members of whom only three (5%) are women and the rest (95%) are men. The council members of *woreda* don't earn salary except the two speakers and five *woreda* cabinet members who are supposed to come from the council members. According to article 80(1) of the SRS revised 2002 constitution, the Babile *woreda* council as other *woredas* has to meet normally on quarterly basis plus extraordinary sessions and perform duties and responsibilities shown in box 4.2. However, according to Babile council chairperson, the council rarely meet except when approving budget and when there are extraordinary issues, e.g. when a delegate come from the region with an agenda of changing *woreda* top officials. Thus, so far Babile *woreda* council had met only five times, three of which was a budget approval, and one was the first meeting when the *woreda* government was established, while the other one was an extraordinary session to oust the *woreda* cabinet. Both times there were invisible hands involved in the process from regional

government and the party because they just approved the proposals of the regional delegate. This indicates the poor status of local *autonomy* as well as security of local government from the regional and national organs and officials. According to the speaker (December 19, 2006) of the Babile *woreda* council, the council doesn't have *standing committees* due to order from the regional parliament. Though, the reason was not clear in the circular of the regional parliament, but the speaker of Babile *woreda* council contemplated the reason for not allowing the establishment of *woreda* parliament *standing committees* as to financial constraints because the *woreda* council does not have budget other than the salary of the two speakers. This is with fact that, article 75(3) of the revised SRS 2002 constitution permits the establishment of standing and temporary committees when and if need arises. Moreover, the *woreda* council is not actually involved directly in the administrative and development activities of the *woreda* other than those who are in the cabinet and *kebeles'* chairpersons.

Box4.2: Functions and Powers of the Woreda (Parliament) Council

- Deliberate upon and approve draft economic development, social services, and administrative plans and programs.
- Follow-up timely understandings of the basic livestock and grazing resources development activities in the *woreda* and ensure that due attention is given to the development, protection and preservation of natural resource.
- Create conducive condition for the purpose of initiating and mobilizing the people for development activities in a comprehensive manner. In particular, devise the means by which the pastoralist achieve a sustained livelihood and be a beneficiary of water and grazing services in their nearby.
- Participate, directly or indirectly, the people the process of formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans with a view of ensuring the sovereignty of the people.
- Elect the speaker and deputy speaker from among it members. Nominates the chairman.
- Approve the appointment of the deputy chairman and other officials upon the recommendation of the chairman;
- Issue it own internal rules of procedure that determines its work;
- Ensure the collection of land use tax, agricultural activities income tax and other fees that determined by law.
- Utilize properly sources of income, other than the budget allocated by the state to the *woreda*; deliberate upon and approve its budget; prioritize the needs of the *woreda* and allocate accordingly, the budget provided to it by the state council; follow-up and supervise the utilization of the budget.
- Appoint, in consultation with concerned state organs, other officials outside the administration of the *woreda*.
- Implement directives the guarantees peace and security in the *woreda*.

Source: SRS revised 2002 Constitution

On the other hand, the *woreda* cabinet of both Jig-jiga and Babile *woredas* undertake the day today operations of the *woreda* whether it is administrative, developmental, security and socio-political issues. In principle, the cabinet members have clear-cut collective roles and responsibilities (see box 4.3) at *woreda* level. Each cabinet member other than the chairperson and his/her deputy coordinates a number of line offices organized structurally under him/her. Then the *woreda* chairperson and his/her deputy oversee the overall activities of the cabinet and line offices.

Box4.3: Functions and Powers of the Woreda Cabinet

- Implement the policies, laws, directives, plans and programs of the state and the federal governments in the *woreda*.
- Coordinate, follow-up, and direct the activities of the executive organs in the *woreda*.
- Draw up and draft annual of the *woreda*; submit it to the *woreda* council, and upon approval implement it.
- Collect, in accordance with the law, rural land use tax, taxes on income from agricultural activities and other revenues. Study other mechanisms of generating revenues and submit for the *woreda* council for the purpose of decision;
- Maintain peace and security of the *woreda*; direct and coordinate security and police organs.
- Mobilize the people for development activities in a comprehensive manner; promote rural development, protect, develop and preserve the natural resource.
- Prepare and submit social, economic and administrative plans to the *woreda* council, and upon approval, implement them.
- Undertake, on timely basis, the basic livestock and grazing resources development, and general agriculture activities; by paying due attention, undertake the development, protection and preservation of natural resource.
- Follow-up closely that any antiquities in the *woreda* get proper protection and care.
- Discharge other duties that are assigned to it by the *woreda* council and state cabinet council.

Source: SRS Revised 2002 Constitution

However, in practice, the cabinet and two representatives of the ruling party do the coordination job collectively in team approach with no clear procedure and timing of activities. The line offices heads are assigned from the region and earn salary higher than that of the cabinet members including the chairperson which created tensions between the cabinet and line offices heads. The cabinet meets irregularly as per the needs of the day, i.e., they perform their duties in a *fire-brigade* manner; no schedules of activities and even if there are schedules of activities it is good in the paper. The same applies to line offices; though they prepare their activities at beginning of the year, but then, they don't specify the timing and the location of their activities. Moreover, due to the absence comprehensive legal and institutional (e.g. job description) frameworks, there is no a clear demarcation of duties

between the coordinating offices in the cabinet and various line offices which has created duplication of efforts and dysfunctional conflicts among them.

Finally, in very kebele there are two persons (among the elected representatives in the case Babile *woreda* and ordinary representatives in the case of Jig-jiga *woreda*) assigned by the cabinet to coordinate and report the peace and security of the kebele. These two representatives (chairperson and deputy) of the kebele have no formal salary but they manage all social and development activities of the kebele in which they help themselves. Moreover, Jig-jiga municipality and *woreda* administration relationship is not clear in that, the municipality work is related to the *woreda* but accountable to the region.

In conclusion, the functioning and the operations of local governments in the Somali region in general are not systematic and clear even with the legal frameworks in boxes 4.2 and 4.3. The current *woreda* functioning are inclined more to *traditionalism* (e.g. clan orientation and impact) than progressing to modern ways of governance. Though, the sample *woredas* are in better (especially Jig-jiga) position than other *woredas*, the difference in the *woreda* governments' functioning is a matter of degree rather than dichotomy.

4. Capacity issues

Local capacity is not an end in itself; it is rather a means and a tool that allows the pursuit and accomplishment of a goal such as good governance and better service delivery to the local community (Fiszbein, 1997). Local capacity is one of the major challenges and impediment in the implementation of the DLDP in the Somali region.

Local governments in the Somali region suffer from capacity problems in all dimensions ranging *resources* (human, financial, material), administrative, technical, political and legal aspects. Shortage of skilled manpower is one of the most pronounced and frequently mentioned by regional as well as local governments' officials in the Somali region. Thus, for instance, because of deficiency of skilled manpower, some of the schools and health posts built by *woredas* are not functioning and giving the direly needed service to the local community. This has been exacerbated by the fact that most of the devolved manpower returned back from *woredas*(due to reasons ranging from remoteness of the *woreda*, to hostile reception, to absence of work to do), and were reemployed by the regional bureaus

at regional level while others joined NGOs and UN agencies working in the region. Yet others have been dismissed wrongly by *woreda* governments because of two major reasons; first, the devolved employee does not belong to the clan(s) inhabiting in the *woreda*, and secondly, the devolved employee may be seen as an obstacle to the interests of the elected *woreda* cabinet and /or stakeholders at regional level.

Material and facilities such as vehicles and equipments are also far from adequate to cover the vast needs of the *woredas* which has hindered the day-to-day undertakings of *woreda* governments. For instance, both Jig-jiga and Babile *woredas* officials complained shortage of vehicles to undertake field work to remote *kebeles*; the actual sites of the actual job of the *woreda*. This is with the fact that Jig-jiga and Babile *woredas* are among the lucky *woredas* when compared to other *woredas* because each of them has a car and an ambulance while most other *woredas* have none. This is again with the fact that, at regional level, there many vehicles which are not giving productive service but used for leisure by the regional officials to shuttle between Jig-jiga and Addis Ababa. The same is true for deficiency of equipments, for example, wells are dug or maintained (e.g. in Babile *woreda*) and yet not giving service to the community due to lack of water pumps/engines. The *woredas* cannot afford to purchase all of the materials and facilities (particularly vehicles) needed at once, among other things, due to budget inadequacy.

Financial incapacity is yet another pressing problem in the implementation of the DLDP in the Somali region. This is because (a) the grant/subsidy from the region to *woredas* is not enough and used properly, and (b) poor own revenue base and sources at *woreda* level, with no observable development of *woreda* revenue potentialities in the near future if DLDP implementation trend continues this way. Moreover, Jig-jiga, the only *woreda* with significant potential revenue base is not allowed to collect its revenue because there will be no revenue collected at regional level if Jig-jiga revenue sources(e.g. Kat) is transferred to Jig-jiga *woreda* government.

Local governments suffer from administrative and technical capacity constraints due to the fact that, most(if not all in some *woredas*)of the *woreda* cabinet officials including the chairpersons are *semi-illiterate* who cannot understand the basics of their job let alone plan and implement the huge development needs of the local community. For instance, the

author had a chance to participate as a trainer in a training program designed for the *woreda* officials and observed that, of the 50 *woreda* chairpersons participating in the training, only five(10%) were having formal schooling background, the highest with grade eight certificate. Thus, most of them don't know their political and legal rights and responsibilities which made them vulnerable to the interference and manipulation of the regional organs and officials.

While this is the overall picture of local governments in the region as far as capacity is concerned, the sample *woredas* (particularly Jig-jiga) are relatively in better shape when compared to the majority of other *woredas* in the region. For instance, unlike other *woredas*, there is no turnover of manpower from Jig-jiga *woreda* but rather employees from other *woredas* are willing to join Jig-jiga *woreda* if they get the opportunity. Besides, a significant number of Jig-jiga *woreda* top posts incumbents are degree and diploma holders. Likewise, since it is relatively near (72 km) to Jig-jiga, there is low turnover of manpower from Babile *woreda*. However, both Jig-jiga and Babile *woredas* more-or-less share the same fate with other *woredas* with regard to other capacity issues.

Put together, except few *woredas* with little improvements, the capacity status of local governments in all dimensions (resources, administrative, technical,) is not promising in most *woredas*. Thus, though it is too early to make meaningful judgments and projections, the preliminary performance indications of the DLDP implementation in the Somali region is not doing well nor encouraging with regard to capacity improvements.

4.3 Community Participation and Empowerment

Participation according to Jacob (2005) may be defined as: *the capacity and the ability of the community to contribute to, share in and benefit from diverse, social, economic, political or other processes of the society*. Participation in development is an indicator of decentralization and involves in the first place the local community. Participation is therefore a continuum, a permanent state which can only be achieved through providing the means for effective involvement of people in all facets of the society and actively promoting this as a matter of policy and practice (Cistulli, 2002).

Participation, according to Cistulli (2002), has to be planned and supported by policy and other measures such as: commitment by governments and civil society to the principle;

search for methodologies of effective participation for development; commitment to fund and support target sectors and programs.

On the other hand, the term empowerment has different meanings in different socio-cultural and political contexts, and does not translate easily into all languages. Whatever the definition of empowerment is, it has the following closely intertwined elements which are synergic to one another (Narayan, 2002);

- Access to information;
- Inclusion and participation;
- Accountability, and
- Local organizational capacity.

From the above elements, it appears that participation is subset of empowerment; however, in this study the two terms are used interchangeably and together as other terms such as community involvement, community consultation and community action.

Community participation and empowerment in the development from planning to implementation to monitoring and evaluation is one of the essences of decentralization program without which the success of decentralization is unthinkable. However, in most scenarios of where and when a decentralization program is implemented particularly in developing countries, the participation of all stakeholders are either not adequate or completely absent. Grassroots community participation or what development administrators call the *people-centred* development such as DLDP has many theoretical advantages as shown in box 4.4 below.

Box4.4. Advantages of community participation

- Community participation provides planners with information which is otherwise hard to come by.
- Community participation in the selection, design and implementation of local development programs leads to the acceptance of change and ownership of the program by the community.
- Community participation reduces costs by mobilizing unused labor and local resources.
- Community participation leads to timely completion of development projects.
- Community participation leads to efficient operation and effective service delivery
- Community participation leads to effective monitoring and evaluation.
- Community learns how to promote their development by actually participating in the process of planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. That is participation is an educative process.

Source: Kent, 1981

Moreover, the modalities of community participation have not been agreed upon by scholars of the subject. However, a study conducted in Philippine identifies six modes of community participation as shown in box 4.5.

Box 4.5: Modes of Community Participation

Mode 1: Only the educated and moneyed people are involved without the participation of grassroots or beneficiaries.

Mode 2: People or beneficiaries are asked to legitimize or ratify projects identified and formulated by the government.

Mode3: People are consulted about the project but they do not actually participate in the planning and management of the project.

Mode 4: People are consulted from the very start and they actively participate in the planning and management of the project.

Mode 5: People or beneficiaries are represented in the highest policy making body of the agency.

Mode 6: The representative of the people controls the highest policy making body of the agency.

Source: Hollnsteiner, 1976

Despite the fact that, community participation and empowerment is recognised both in the DLDP document as well as the revised SRS 2002 constitution, it seems that it is not understood well by the local governments as well as the community as per the responses given by local officials and community members. Local officials understanding of community participation is that of community contribution in terms of free labor and local materials, while on the other hand, community understanding of participation is that of interest attachment. Hence participation in its all dimensions is not established well so far in the region in general and sample *woredas* in particular.

Officials in the *woreda* recognise the importance of community participation in the local development process. However, so far, there are no clear and established modalities of involving the community in the process of local development. This is with knowledge that there is a coordinating office for community mobilization and participation in the structure of all *woredas*. But, according to the heads of the office in both Babile and Jig-jiga *woredas*, the office does not have the slightest idea of how to involve the community in the planning and implementing development projects among other things, due to financial, human and capacity constraints as well as lack of commitment to the principles of community participation by local officials. Moreover, the major job done so far by the community

mobilization and participation office is that of peace and security monitoring of *kebeles* as other cabinet members. Thus, community participation in the planning, budgeting and operations of the *woreda* government is weak and community members do not have access to the operations and undertakings (see also table 4.1) of the *woreda* governments. However, sometimes, mode two (people or beneficiaries are asked to legitimize or ratify projects identified and formulated by the government) in box 4.5 is used whereby projects formulated and planned by *woreda* cabinet are ratified (sometimes with adjustments) by the community at implementation stage and they are told to contribute certain proportion of the cost of the project through free labor and local materials. There are no any other modalities of community involvement in place in both *woredas*. Moreover, there is misunderstanding and misconception between the *woreda* officials and community in that each of them is complaining separately. *Woreda* officials complain saying that, community members are not committed in that they want money in every activity and every action they take. That is, majority (if not all) of community elders may place a small personal interest before a development project for the whole community. On the other hand, community members argued that *woreda* officials are exploiting their money in their names. Community members sometimes proclaim to the *woreda* officials when *woreda* officials visit their localities, "have you taken money on us" and " we will not do your job". When asked some community members whether they are involved in the development process, from answers they appear to have little understanding of what participation is; one time they say 'yes' and immediately again they will say 'no' but after detailed discussion the end result was that there is no mentionable community participation in both sample *woredas*.

To sum-up, community participation is a challenge facing the local development in general and DLDP in particular in the Somali region. Whether this challenge can be met depends on how the government affects the policy environment so that efforts establish the specific political and legal framework within which all the planning institutions (governmental and non-governmental), communities and individuals operate and thus affect their potential contribution to the local development agenda. Community participation if done right brings about development that is responsive, accountable, equitable, and sustainable and meets the needs, demands and aspirations of the local community and fulfils the national development goals and objectives.

Therefore, the scope of local community participation in the region in general and local level in particular is limited and sometimes missing. The absence of comprehensive legal and political frameworks and the weak organizational capacity at the grassroots level are affecting negatively the community participation in the process of local planning and decisions making in the region.

4.4. Planning Process and Budget trends of Jig-jiga and Babile woredas

1. Planning process

The overall planning process of all *woredas* is more or less the same in principle as discussed in section 3.6 of chapter three. That is, all line offices plan their activities and submit it to *woreda* OFED which consolidate the plan of all offices and in turn submit it to the *woreda* cabinet which discuss the draft plan and after adjustments in both physical and financial plans submit it to the *woreda* council. Then *woreda* council approves the plan and budget after adjustments.

The planning process in Jig-jiga *woreda* flow almost the above process but since there is no *woreda* council, the *woreda* cabinet play the role of the *woreda* council. However, the planning process of the Babile *woreda* is little bit different, in that, every office prepare its activities and submit it to the capacity building coordinating office which consolidate it and in turn submit to a development projects' committee headed by finance and economic development coordinating office. The other members of the committee include the other major coordinating and line offices such as education, health basic rural development and agriculture. Then after discussion and adjustments of the plan by the committee, the plan is submitted to the *woreda* cabinet which assign financial figures (in percentages) to activities proposed by line offices and refined by the development projects committee, with some adjustments and finally submit to the *woreda* council. After discussion and adjustments the *woreda* council approves the plan and the budget which then in principle goes into implementation phase as per the action plan but in practice based on when the budget is released and transferred from the regional treasury to the *woreda* bank account. This is usually too late for Babile (and other *woredas*) *woreda* to implement planned projects on time, but relatively punctual for Jig-jiga *woreda*.

Unlike other (Tigray and Amhara) regions, the planning process of the sample *woredas* as other *woredas* in the region does not involve the kebele administration, the community and the civil society organisations. That is, according to Dom and Mohamed (2006) community participation in the planning process is taking a modest momentum in Tigray and Amhara regions whereby the community (represented by committees) at *Tabia* (location or *kebele*) level in Tigray prepare the annual plan based on multi-sectoral strategic plan and submit it to the *woreda* administration and then defend it, while in Amhara region there are different mechanisms (though fragmented and unsystematic) for community participation in the planning of local development. In the Somali region, sometimes, there may be consultation with the community as to which service is more needed than other services in a particular *kebele* during need assessment trip by the *woreda* officials, but there is no actual participation of the community in the planning, monitoring and evaluation processes of local development.

2. The Budget trends

In this section an attempt is made to see the budget of the two *woredas* from two perspectives. First, the composition of the budget in terms salary, petty cash and capital or more precisely in terms of recurrent and capital; and secondly the author endeavors to look at the development budget prioritization and allocation to major service giving offices such education, health, water (or basic rural infrastructure development) and agriculture.

<i>Woreda</i>	1997EC		1998EC		1999EC	
Jig-jiga	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
Salary	4,176,936.33	33.64	10,230,403.52	67.98	12,333,096.09	73.60
Petty cash	2,995,555.00	24.13	1,927,984.73	12.81	1,769,432.58	10.56
Capital	5,243,332.27	42.23	2,891,977.09	19.21	2,654,148.86	15.84
Total	12,415,828.60	100	15,050,365.34	100	16,756,677.52	100
<i>Woreda</i>	1997EC		1998EC		1999EC	
Babile	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
Salary	968,352.81	32.62	1,820,951.94	40.18	3,082,699.36	53.78
Petty cash	315,395.88	10.63	1,084,399.60	23.93	1,059,889.96	18.49
Capital	1,684,604.00	56.75	1,626,599.44	35.89	1,589,834.94	27.73
Total	2,968,352.69	100	4,531,950.98	100	5,732,424.26	100

Source: BoFED

The budget trend of the two *woredas* as shown in table 4.2 is highly inclined to recurrent budget than to the capital budget. Moreover, the table clearly demonstrates that, the proportion of the capital budget is reducing year after year in both *woredas* while on the

other hand, the recurrent budget, particularly the salary portion is increasing dramatically. That is, while the proportion of the capital budget decreases/dwindles from 43.69 percent to 19.21 percent, to 15.84 percent in Jig-jiga, and from 56.75 percent to 35.89 percent to 27.73 percents in Babile *woreda*, the recurrent budget (specifically the salary portion), increases from 57.77 percent to 80.79 percent to 84.16 percent in Jig-jiga, and from 43.25 percent to 64.11 percent to 72.27 percent in Babile *woreda*. In other words, while the overall budget is increasing year after year, the proportion of the development (capital) budget is decreasing.

The reason attributable to the dramatic increase in the recurrent budget in general and the salary portion in particular of the overall budget, and continuous declining of the capital budget is mainly due to unnecessary and untimely staffing and filling of *woreda* structure by the regional civil service bureau without the consultation of the concerned *woreda* officials. This has created redundancy of support staffs that consume a significant amount of the budget in a form of salary but give little or no service to *woredas*. To this regard, therefore, officials in both Jig-jiga and Babile *woredas* complained that the money received by employees in a form of salary and the service they provide do not commensurate.

Another perspective of the *woreda* budget which is worthy examining is the revenue collection responsibilities between the regional and *woreda* levels. For instance, table 4.2 demonstrates the revenue collection responsibilities of the sample *woredas* for the last three years of DLDP implementation. The allocation of revenue collection responsibilities is done by the regional BoR without prior study of revenue potentials of *woredas* or even without consultation with the concerned *woreda* officials. The assignment of revenue collection responsibilities to *woreda* is based on arbitrary guess and is more or less transfer of revenue collection burden to *woredas* which is not based on whether the *woreda* has the potential and capacity to collect the assigned revenue.

<i>Woreda</i>	Budget year		
	1997 EC	1998EC	1999EC
Jig-jiga	1,000,000	1,160,000	1,322,383.70
Babile	807,673.65	657,673.65	647,673.15

Source: BoR

This is because the assigned revenue will be deducted in advance from the *woreda* budget and it is up to the *woreda* to collect the revenue to fill the vacuum of the deducted budget. For example, birr 1,000,000; 1,160,000 and 1,322,383.70 are deducted from the budget of Jig-Jiga *woreda* in 1997EC, 1998 EC and 1999EC respectively; while birr 807,673.65, 657,673.65 and 647,673.15 are deducted from Babile *woreda* in 1997EC, 1998EC and 1999EC respectively. By referring to table 4.2 you can imagine what remains of the petty cash of the sample *woredas* after deductions. The impact is that, a substantial amount of the already inadequate capital budget is used as a petty cash (especially in Babile *woreda*) directly or indirectly. But the regional BoR and BoFED (which performs the actual deduction on behalf of BoR) appear to be less concerned about the impact of advanced deductions from the *woreda* budget. Their concern is mainly whether they have attained the planned regional revenue at the end of the year for reporting purposes. Moreover, this is with the knowledge that, the revenue sources and bases of Jig-jiga are controlled by regional BoR and the only major revenue source for Jig-jiga *woreda* is the monthly payroll tax from employees.

As for the capital budget prioritization of the sample *woredas*, it shows as expected a significant inclination to four major areas; namely, education, health, basic rural infrastructure (rural water, rural roads, communication, etc) and agriculture which can also be categorized into economic development and social service development. Table 4.4 gives glimpse of how prioritization trends of these major areas of development are done in the two sample *woredas*.

To start with, the table clearly indicates that both *woredas* have allotted the whole (100%) capital budget to education, health, basic rural infrastructure and agriculture (of course with internal prioritization among them) in 1997 Ethiopian fiscal year which was the starting year of DLDP implementation. Then, this declined to 69.24 percent of the total capital budget in Jig-jiga *woreda* and 47.78 percent in Babile *woreda* in 1998 EC. However, the share again rose up in the 1999 fiscal year to 85.40 percent of the capital budget in Jig-jiga *woreda*, and 78.24 percent in Babile *woreda*.

Table4.4: Capital Budget prioritization of the sample woredas						
Jig-jiga	1997EC		1998 EC		1999EC	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
Capital budget	5,243,332.27	100	2,891,977.09	69.24	2,654,148.86	85.40
Education	926,500.00	17.67	515,408.00	17.82	485,000.00	18.27
Health	1,033,856.86	19.72	224,000.00	7.75	615,000.00	23.17
Basic Infrastructure	2,306,689.41	43.99	586999.75	20.30	928,500.00	34.98
Agriculture	976,286.00	18.62	386769.40	13.37	503,680.00	18.98
Babile						
	1997EC		1998EC		1999EC	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
Capital Budget	1,684,604.00	100	1,626,599.44	47.78	1,589,834.94	78.24
Education	575,000.00	34.13	347,000	21.33	524,834.94	33.01
Health	464,054.00	27.55	151,200	9.30	261,000	16.42
Basic Infrastructure	391,300.00	23.22	173,260	10.65	280,000	17.61
Agriculture	254,250.00	15.09	106,000	6.52	178,000	11.20

Source: BoFED

The other observation from table is that, while Jig-jiga *woreda* gives the first priority (though not very substantial) to basic rural infrastructure, Babile *woreda* is inclined to education in all three years. This is because Jig-jiga was in better position in education service than Babile *woreda* before the embarking the DLDP. That is, while Jig-jiga was having around 20 primary schools before the DLDP, there was only one rented school in Babile *woreda*. Another close reading from the table is that, the education budget fluctuation is less than other development areas in both *woredas*. That is, the rise and fall of budget allocation to education is less when compared to other major development areas such as health and agriculture in the last three years of the program implementation.

In general, the prioritization of education, health, basic infrastructure agriculture is evident from the budget allocations of both *woredas* and shows the extent of basic service requirements of different *woredas* in the region. Some *woredas* (e.g. Jig-jiga) have started the DLDP with certain level of basic service, while others (like Babile) have started from scratch.

4. 5. Service Delivery Trends

One of the potential impacts of decentralization is improved basic service delivery. Because theoretically, it is assumed that, (a) local governments know better about their citizens' needs and preferences (b) local governments are better prepared to meet their needs (c) local people might be more willing to pay taxes for services provided in accordance with their needs by their local authorities.

However, local governments can only be efficient to provide required basic services if (a) responsibilities are assigned with clarity (b) revenues are sufficiently available to them to fulfill their mandates (c) there are appropriate incentives to improve accountability in service provision (d) local government have the administrative, technical and legal local capacity and means to do so. These are conditions which are more or less absent in most of time in the implementation of decentralization programs of developing countries in general and DLDP in Somali region in particular.

Therefore, in this section, the author attempts (to the extent possible) to portray the trend of basic service (education, health, agriculture, water, etc) delivery of the sample *woredas*. Despite considerable effort exerted to obtain concrete (hard) data to substantiate the analysis, it was not easy because of absence of data base system in the region in general and subject matter in particular. Moreover, by their nature, the Somali community are oral society and keeping records is a new phenomenon to them which needs sometime to adapt to. Likewise, since the program implementation is in its early stages, it is not easy to get data organized and this study is the first of its kind so far conducted in the region in this particular subject.

To start with, despite capacity (administrative and technical) and resource limitations, the overall basic service delivery is increasing in terms of quantity and coverage in all *woredas* of the region and especially in the sample (Jig-jiga and Babile) *woredas*. In this regard therefore, table 4.5 shows the trend of service delivery in Babile *woreda* for the last three years of DLDP execution. The table depicts the basic service status before the implementation of DLDP and the changes after the embarking of the program. The face

value changes are encouraging in that, although far from adequate but almost all basic services are showing improvements in term of number.

Table4.5: Trends of Service Delivery in Babile Woreda (1997-1999) EC		
Changes in service delivery	Up to 1996 EC	1997-1999 EC
Primary education		
Number of primary schools	1	26
▪ Formal government schools	3	10
▪ Informal ABE and mobile schools	-	16
▪ Formal private schools	0	0
Numbers of teachers paid by the <i>woreda</i>	0	76
Numbers of teachers paid by the community/NGO...	----	---
Number of school age children(7-18) (estimate)	22,200	22,800
Number of Pupils enrolled	250	5,764
Education coverage in terms of enrollment (%)	----	25.28
Health		
Number of Health posts	2	8
Number of Health stations/Clinics	-	-
Number of Health centers	-	-
Number of Health workers	-	3
volume of medicine purchased /received	-	2 Health emergency kits
volume of medicine utilized		utilized all
Health Coverage in terms of construction and equipment (%)	12.88	38.65
Agriculture		
Number of development agents and vets	7	13
Volume of fertilizers distributed to farmers(quintals)	-	75
Volume of seeds distributed to farmers(quintals)	-	60
Number of farming households	16,587	18,180
Number of farming HH supported by extension services	-	150
Animal health post/clinics constructed	-	3
Animal crush/dip constructed	-	3
Agriculture coverage	-	-
Water , Rural Roads, Telecommunication		
Number of deep wells	3	3
Number of Hand-dug(shallow) wells	-	6
Number of Water Reservoir	-	17
Number of HH with access to safe water	606	2424
Interconnecting rural roads constructed in km	-	447
Telecommunication service connection by <i>Kebeles</i>	-	28
Number of community members trained in water supply Mgt	-	-
Water coverage	3.33	13.33

Source: Babile Woreda Administration

For instance, the number of primary schools in Babile *woreda* have gone up from only one in pre-decentralization to 26(16 are ABE schools) schools after the decentralization, while the gross enrollment of school age children increased from mere 250 to around 6000 children which makes the education coverage in terms of enrollment to 25 percent from mere 1 percent before the program.

There are also some improvements in the health service delivery in that, the number of health posts which were only two before the DLDP have been increased to 8 health post in the last three years. This, according to the report of the *woreda* makes the health coverage of the *woreda* in terms of construction of health facilities to nearly 38 percent from around 13 percent before the DLDP. Moreover, there also some value additions in agriculture both in livestock and crop development main branches. This is in terms of construction of facilities (e.g. vet clinics and crushes) and distribution of seeds and fertilizers to farmers. Still the rural infrastructure (water, rural roads and telecommunication) basic service is in better shape than before the decentralization in that, 6 hand-dug wells and 17 water reservoirs have been constructed. In addition to this, 447km interconnecting rural road has been constructed which has helped the easy traveling between *kebeles*. The most outstanding job done by the Babile *woreda* is in the area of telecommunication service to *kebeles*. With the help of ETC, 28 out 30 *kebeles* in Babile *woreda* have been connected to modern telecommunication services which have facilitated the easy access of information from far and remote rural *kebeles*. The *woreda* chairman told me that he contacts every kebele before he goes to sleep and after break fast before going to work.

Likewise, Jig-jiga *woreda* statistics of basic service delivery trends show a better improvement than Babile *woreda* or even any other *woreda* in the region. This is because Jig-jiga was in a better position than all other *woredas* before the DLDP implementation. Since it is the capital of the region, most of basic service constructed before the DLDP concentrated in and around Jig-jiga *woreda* more than other *woredas* as well as other zonal headquarters. Table 4.6 illustrates the trend of basic service delivery in the *woreda*.

The number of primary schools (see the table) has significantly increased from 34 to 119 schools in the last three years of DLDP implementation. The increase accrues more to ABE and mobile (46) schools which are designed for the pastoralists community of the region, which according to an expert with the education office are performing well beyond expectations. The number of teachers and gross enrollments has also increased (see table 4.6) modestly.

Table4.6 :Trends of Service Delivery in Jig-jiga woreda (1997-1999) EC		
Changes in service delivery	Up to 1996 EC	1997-1999 EC
Primary education		
Number of primary schools	34	119
▪ Formal government primary schools	20	27
▪ Informal ABE schools	4	69
▪ Privately owned formal primary schools	10	23
Numbers of teachers paid by the <i>woreda</i>	556	757
Numbers of teachers paid by the community/NGO...	----	---
Proportion of qualified teachers in grade (1-8)	----	---
Number of school age children(7-18) (estimate)	65,772	72,465
Number of Pupils enrolled	18,846	23,685
Education coverage in terms of enrollment (%)	28.65	32.65
Health		
Number of Health posts	2	29
Number of Health stations/Clinics	10	10
Number of Health centers	1	1
Number of Health workers	24	60
volume of medicine purchased /received	-	
volume of medicine utilized	-	
Health Coverage in terms of construction and equipment (%)	10.37	55
Agriculture		
Number of development agents and vets	58	48
Volume of fertilizers distributed to farmers(quintals)	-	546
Volume of seeds distributed to farmers(quintals)	-	177.5
Number of farming households	-	-
Number of farming HH supported by extension services	-	
Animal health /post clinics constructed	2	10
Animal crush /dip constructed	-	2
DA house	-	7
Agriculture coverage (%)	7.00	-
Water , Rural Roads, Telecommunication		
Number of deep wells	17	41
Number of Hand-dug(shallow) wells	24	55
Number of Water Reservoir	16	44
Number of HH with access to safe water	-	-
Interconnecting rural roads constructed in km	270	325
Telecommunication service connection by <i>Kebeles</i>	6	60
Number of community members trained in water supply Mgt	-	-
Water coverage (%)	12	45

Source: Jig-jiga Woreda Administration

Moreover, the health service in Jig-jiga *woreda* is doing relatively well in terms of construction and also service giving. Health posts have increased from two in the base year to 29 in 1999 EC, and health workers from 24 in the base year to 60 in 1999; while the coverage according to *woreda* health office have increased from 10.37 percent in 1996 EC to 55 percent currently. There are also modest improvements in agriculture's crop development section in terms of fertilizers and seeds distributed to farmers as well as in

livestock development in terms of construction of animal clinics, dips and crushes (see table 4.6).and DA /Vet houses.

In the area of basic rural infrastructure development, Jig-jiga was having a good base than Babile and other *woredas*. Thus, the number of hand dug wells has increase from 24 in the base year to 55 wells in 1999; while the number of water reservoirs increased from 16 in 1996 to 44 water reservoirs currently. These put together have increased the water coverage of Jig-jiga from 12 percent in the base year to 45 percents presently. On the other hand, there is no much done in the subsection of rural roads of the basic rural infrastructure development and according to concerned officer, only 55km rural road has been constructed. This is probably because there were some basic rural roads in place before the decentralization inherited from region to start with and hence the *woreda* has focused on other basic rural infrastructure for the time been. Moreover, there are substantial improvements in the area of connecting modern digital telecommunication services to the rural *kebeles*. That is, before the DLDP, only the six urban *kebeles* of Jig-jiga *woreda* were connected to telecommunication services, but now 60 *kebeles* of which 54 are rural have modern telecommunication services.

By and by, it can be concluded that there are some improvements in the basic service delivery of both two sample *woredas* from the perspective of quantity, coverage and beneficiary access at construction level. However, there are many problems in term of service giving and quality of the basic services constructed. That is approximately 85 percent of schools (except ABE schools), health posts, animal clinic and crushes, shallow wells and reservoirs constructed in both *woredas* are not giving the critically needed service to the community because of two major reasons. First, due to poor quality of construction that has led to the collapse or dilapidation of the building shortly after its completion because of the *low cost policy* adopted by the region as well as problems attributable to contractors. That is, in order to provide basic service to various *kebeles* of *woredas*, the region has adopted a low cost policy in which free local materials and labor (30 percent of the project cost) are expected to be available .Thus, the money allotted for project is very small with the hope that community contribution and free local materials accounts 30 percent of the project cost. But the community is not mobilized and involved in the project planning and hence they don't feel of a sense of belongings and ownership to development projects. In addition to

this, even the available small amount of the project budget is not managed well in that the contractor is an ordinary person who comes from that particular kebele where the project is to be constructed with no knowledge of construction and legal documents. Furthermore, there is no monitoring and evaluation of contractors by the *woreda* officials probably because of their invisible personal involvements in the project money which render them unable to monitor and evaluate the contractor.

The second reason of why projects are not giving service to the community is the absence of material and manpower required for the operation and functioning of the projects. There are no teachers and health workers (especially in Babile *woreda*) for the schools and health posts constructed respectively, and the very few available are not willing to go to remote *kebeles*. On the other hand, there are no facilities and equipments for the finished projects to operate. For instance, many wells and health posts are not functioning barely because of lack of water pumps/engines and health equipments/facilities respectively.

In nut shell, generally the basic service delivery has relatively increased nominally after the DLDP implementation in the region. However, in real terms the real contribution to the community is not *celebrate-able*. What is more, most of the basic service facilities constructed such as health posts, shallow wells and ABE schools in Jig-jiga *woreda* are built by PCDP, a semi-governmental organization funded by the World Bank, while ABE teachers are trained by SCF-UK. On the other hand, table 4.7 depicts the responses of sample respondents to the trends and regimes of basic service delivery in the region in general and sample *woredas* in particular.

Table 4.7: the level of basic service delivery according to respondents

Variables	Response frame: N=80		
	Better (%)	Worse (%)	No difference (%)
number	86.25	-	13.75
quality	17.50	73.75	8.75
accessibility	48.75	-	51.25
number of beneficiaries	40	-	60

Source: own computation from response of the sample respondents

The table clearly demonstrates that, though, the basic service delivery to the community has increased in terms of quantity over the last three years, the quality and accessibility of the service is not in good posture and is far from the satisfaction of the community.

Chapter Five

5. Problems and prospects of DLDP in the Somali region

In this chapter, an attempt is made to shed-light over the major inherent and encountered problems /challenges (which may overlap with previous discussions) facing the DLDP implementation in the Somali region. The analysis presented in this chapter stems from interviews (in-depth interview) with top officials, focus group discussion with program planners and analysts and community members and questionnaires to sample respondents as well as the observation of the author. Moreover, the problems discussed in this chapter are applicable to all *woredas* in the region including the sample *woredas* and may overlap among themselves.

5.1. Problems

1. Centralized Decentralization

DDLDP in the Somali region may be cautiously termed as "*centralized decentralization*" on the basis of its implementation regimes. It is true that, a considerable responsibilities, power and resources have been devolved to local level(*woredas*)l of the region but the process took place from one center (region center) to another center (*woreda* center) and hence there is no actual transfer of power and resources to the actual local community. First and foremost, the DLDP has been executed without the consultation and involvement of the various stakeholders (community, civil society organizations, private sector and even the would-be *woreda* governments) at local level. According to one top official in the president office, it was just an imposition (without prior consultation) from the federal government to regional government and then to the *woreda* governments. That is, from its inception at policy level, the DLDP has never been inclusive and participatory.

Secondly, then after the devolution of resources, responsibilities and authority to the *woreda* it remained there without further devolution to kebele level and/or involvement of the community in the planning and implementation process of the local development. Hence, according to responses of sample community members in focus group discussion, the community has not yet owned the program but in contrast they (those who are aware of the existence of the program) see as an exploitation of resources in the name of the local community.

Thirdly, the *pooling policy* of the staff employees of the *woreda* administration, has concentrated power and resource in the hands of few individuals. These are *woreda* chairperson, OFED head, and the main cashier who are signatories of *woreda* bank account and subsequent financial transaction of all line offices. The purpose of the pooling system was to reduce cost and corruption and enhance efficiency, in that instead of every office having its own support staff, a pooled support staffs that come under the OFED serve all line offices in their financial operations and transactions. However, the pooling system was misunderstood and misused in that instead of pooling support staff, the finance office was put wrongly under pooling system which has facilitated the misuse of the pooling system by the three officials mentioned above. This has created collusion among the three officials and left the other members of the cabinet and line offices as spectators and under the mercy of the *woreda* chairman and OFED head. The pooling system has also led to lack of transparency in the operations of the *woreda* government which in turn has led to rampant corruption as the result of collusion among three officials at *woreda* level and some other officials at regional level. Moreover, there is no check and balance system in a form of financial and/or performance audit or inspection and evaluation system from the region in place. The internal control employee within the *woreda* structure is not in a position to do any thing because he/she loses his/her salary /job if he/she tries to say anything against the three officials and hence he/she has to join the collusion. Therefore, there is no participation even within the cabinet members let alone the other organs of the *woreda* government and community at large. Moreover, the community has no *exit or* alternative means if the local government is not providing (whether by design and default) the basic service to the community.

Therefore, since, there is no devolution of resources and power from *woreda* to kebele level, no participation and empowerment of local community and civil society organization in the development and decision making processes at *woreda* level, and no involvement and consultation even within the local government organs (e.g., within the cabinet), it is safe to label the DLDP in the Somali region as "*centralized decentralization and/or local dictatorship*". That is, devolution from one center to another center in which the later is by de facto (indirectly) accountable to the former and not to the community they are supposedly representing.

2. Weak Institutional (Structure) and Legal Framework

The structure, interrelationship and specific roles of institutions concerned with the implementation of DLDP both at regional and local levels lack clarity and formality. To start with, at *woreda* level, the relationship and job description between the cabinet coordinating office heads and line office heads is not clear and there is considerable confusion among them on what should constitute their working and reporting relationship and who come under who because the line offices heads are nominated from the region and earn more salary (2000) than *woreda* cabinet and council officials. This has created tension and conflict between them as who is subordinate and who is super-ordinate as well as who is responsible for what and who should manage the budget. Besides, there is also duplication of efforts between the two levels of the *woreda* government. In addition, according to the head of police in Babile *woreda* (December 19, 2007), there is tense relationship between the police office and *woreda* administration because the police is still administered at regional level in all aspects.

The same pertains as to the relationship between *woreda* and regional governments on one side, and *woreda* governments and zonal administrations on the other side as well as horizontal relationship among *woreda* governments. There is no legal or semi legal document guiding the relationship between the regional and local governments, and *woreda* and zonal administrations as well as among *woreda* governments. The zones are constitutionally not existing but administratively there. In principle, they should not interfere with the operations of *woreda* governments, but in practice they do every thing to the *woreda* government. The absence of zone administration from constitution have been criticized by some officials in the regional government saying that, since the capacity of *woreda* governments are low, the zonal administration would have done the capacity enhancement of *woreda* governments on behalf of the regional government. The communication between the regional bureaus and *woreda* governments is also limited, in that there is sometimes duplication of efforts in the implementation of development projects.

On the other hand, there is no specific office (e.g. Bureau of local government) or a body (DLDP secretariat) at regional level to oversee and coordinate the implementation of DLDP at *woreda* level. Thus, the program is more or less fatherless and *woreda* governments don't have specific office to report and complain to.

Finally, there is no comprehensive legal framework such as local government act, proclamations and regulations to direct the operations and undertakings of the *woreda* governments. There are no even manuals and guidelines to support the fiscal, administrative and political processes of the program.

3. Capacity Constraints

Local governments in the Somali region face serious capacity problems in terms of administrative, technical, experience, as well as resources (financial and manpower, material) to plan and implement their responsibilities to the satisfaction of the community. Most of *woreda* cabinet and council members are semi-illiterate to understand technicalities of local development process. This has been exacerbated by fact that the, little manpower devolved from the region have returned or dismissed from *woredas*. Moreover, the grant transfer from the region is not enough to cover the vast needs of the local community and the revenue base and potentiality of *woredas* is either low or under utilized due to knowledge and capacity gaps. The acuteness of these capacity constraints vary from *woreda* to other and from rural *woredas* to urban *woredas*. The capacity of *woreda* government is still hampered by shortage/lack of facilities such vehicles to reach the rural and remote *kebeles* of the *woreda*.

4. Design Problems

As discussed else where in this paper, DLDP in the Somali region has not been designed in a way that leads to its successful implementation. The program has been embarked hastily at regional level and then devolved to *woreda* level hastily without establishment of necessary prerequisites such as organizations or institutional and legal frameworks.

Thus, the programs has been implemented in big-bang, uniform and top-down manners as well as one-time project instead of may be gradual and asymmetric implementation with continuous fine-tuning as time goes. Every thing was done at the same time such that there is no even established monitoring and evaluation system in place to assess the progress of the program. If the starting is this way what do you thing the end result would be? Somalis say "*Gudcur kowaad nin geed dardarey, kdarankiisna laaban*". That is, "*if someone fails to see in the first night of darkness, what do you thing of the last nights of darkness?*"

In general, DLDP has not been designed in a manner that ensures its success to deliver the long awaited basic services to the expectation of the community it is meant to serve.

5. Absence of Local Government Security and Autonomy

A primary essential condition for strong local government is security of existence. Obviously, local governments cannot carry out their responsibilities properly if their existence is in danger by the ability of authorities on higher levels of government to dissolve them easily. Secure existence requires that members of local governments only be dismissed for specific, predetermined reasons and under formal procedures that require the dismissing authority to show that the dismissed person has violated the law with clear criteria and procedures (Kalin, 1998).

This is one of the most problematic realities of local governments in the Somali region. *Woreda* governments in the region expect dismal (whether the dismal is legal or illegal) whenever a delegation comes from the region. They are dismissed based on the interest of the delegation. For instance, if an official in the *woreda* does not have a good personal relation with the delegation, he/she will be dismissed automatically by creating false allegation for him/her. Thus, within last three years, most *woredas* have undergone changes of *woreda* government four to five times under the auspices of delegation from the region and invisible hands of officials of the national defence forces who are really the *de facto* administrators of *woredas* in the region. Due to this reality, *woreda* governments are *upwardly* accountable to some regional officials and invisible hands at *woreda* level rather than being accountable to the people they represent. This has instigated corruption and absence of transparency in the operations of the local governments in that, since *woreda* officials will not stay long, they try to misappropriate public resources (money) during their short stay.

On the other hand, Kalin (1998) further underscores that, the success of decentralization efforts depends to a very large extent on the availability of sufficient resources and the possibility of using these resources autonomously. However, local governments in the Somali region don't have adequate autonomy to make political, administrative, fiscal, legal and developmental decisions that affect them. For instance, they don't have the autonomy

(right), to appoint, employ, transfer, promote or dismiss local employees. Moreover, they have limited autonomy to collect revenues and use it. The local planning and budgeting is still under the auspices of regional BoFED experts.

6. Absence of Political Will and Partnership

The existent of political will at all levels (national, regional and local) of the government is one of the conditions for successful decentralization. Absence of political will is one of the first pronounced DLDP problems during my field work especially with top officials, and is one of the conditions which the fate of the program depends on. There were no political will for the program from its inception to its implementation. At the time of its inception, the regional government was not ready to embark and implement the program because there were a lot of political push and pool within the region. However, the federal government pressured the region to quickly implement the program with a series of deadlines to the extent that if the regional government failed to implement the program based on the deadline, then the federal government will take over the region. After this haste devolution has taken place, the regional government sighed and never attempted to do any improvement afterwards, because they have transferred the burden to *woreda* governments and it is up to the *woreda* governments to make and bring changes. Thus, they (regional government) escaped the takeover and subsequent dissolution of their jobs. What is more, the program also lacks partnership among various stakeholders of government agencies, civil society organisations and local community

Therefore, in short, there is no political will, commitment and partnership at regional or local level, and accordingly, the destiny of the program is at stake as remarked by many top officials and observers interviewed, if the present political will and commitment towards the program didn't change. Some observers even further commented that, it is the top government officials of the region who are deliberately weakening the program instead of doing otherwise.

7. Limited Monitoring and Evaluation System

Another pressing problem facing the DLDP implementation in the region is the limited (if not absent) monitoring and evaluation system to the progress, status and problems of the program at *woreda* level. So far, only one inspection program has been conducted by

BoFED in 1997 EC, the first year of the program implementation. Moreover, no checking has been undertaken of how budgets are utilized at *woreda* level. This has led the *woreda* governments to be *ultravires* in their financial operations in that, in many circumstances the *woreda* government use the little capital budget as a petty cash (operating cost) for security issues.

8. Infrastructural problems

Infrastructure is the backbone and determining factor of development in general and local development in particular. Infrastructural development is a cornerstone and spring-board for other development processes at any level. Infrastructure consist of *economic* (roads, telecommunication, power, etc), *Social* (education, health, banks, etc), and *administrative* (legal system, etc) dimensions. It is only after these factors are satisfied to some extent that other development issue can be undertaken.

Weak infrastructural base is one of the major problems facing the DLDP implementation in the region. Most of the transport roads in the region are dry weather roads which are not passable during the rainy seasons, while there are no telecommunication and electricity services in most rural *woredas* and *kebeles*. Moreover, out of the 52 *woredas* in the region, only five *woredas* have banking service, and all other *woredas* have their bank account in the nearest *woreda* with a bank. Some of the *woredas* have bank account in Oromia region with distance of 200-300kms from the *woreda*. You can imagine the extent of the risk they face and the cost they incur when they want to withdraw money from such far bank accounts. For instance, usually the three signatories of the bank account and a handful of police officers travel to where the bank is to collect the grant transferred from the region. When they arrive, they may not find money in the account which means that, the quarterly transfer was not yet sent by the region. Then they have to wait, sometimes for a month or so and at the end the petty cash of the *woreda* will be more or less equal to the cost incurred by three officials and their security staff during their stay at the bank location waiting for the budget to arrive. This implies using the capital budget as operational cost when they come back to the *woreda*. This is just but to name one scenario facing the implementation of DLDP with regard to problems related to infrastructural facilities.

9. Inter-clan Conflicts and Animosity

Probably a peculiar problem to the Somali region brought by DLDP is the conflicts and animosity among clans living in the *woreda* over the ownership of the *woreda* and sharing of the positions (nomination as well as normal employments) of the *woreda*. Beside the overall insecurity problems perpetrated by the *nabadiid/ant-peace* elements operating in the region, inter-clan conflicts and animosity are other challenges hindering the implementation of DLDP in the region. The inter-clan conflicts and animosity has led to marginalization of some clans who are either minority in the *woreda* or clans who don't have political weight in the regional politics. Moreover, there are some clans who are trying to expand their territories to get more *woredas* or *kebeles* by removing/getting rid of other previously inhabiting clans either by force or political maneuvering/means. While on the other hand, there are other clans who previously didn't have their own separate *woreda* and are now trying their best to get new *woredas* through *hook* and *crook* means to the extent of using force to drive out other clans from their *woredas*.

Moreover, because of this inter-clan conflicts and animosity, the budget of some *woredas* are sometimes distributed (in cash) among clans living in the *woreda*, while on other times it is the projects which are distributed among clans to avert conflicts. All these put together are impeding the DLDP implementation in the region.

10. Contradiction between of the Pastoralist way of life and the nature of the program.

Another challenge of the program is the contradiction between the way of life of considerable number of the Somali people and nature of the program. Most Somali people are pastoralist (Transhumant, nomadic, agro-pastoralists) people who move from one place to another in search of water and pasture for their livestock and themselves with no permanent settlement, while on the other hand, the program by its nature benefits mainly sedentary communities with permanent settlements.

Though, there are some attempts in a form of mobile and ABE schools to provide education service to the pastoralist community, it is not easy and face many problems such as poor attendance and continuity of students; shortage, quality and willing of mobile teachers. The other attempt to address this problem was to build some basics services at some major junctions for the transhumant pastoralists to get basic service after returning back from one

trip among regular round trips. However, both attempts are difficult and costly with no much constructive outcome so far. Thus, you may see schools built in remote areas with no people around it and not giving service because the pastoralists have left the place.

Therefore, incompatibility of the program with the way of live of the pastoral community is another problem undermining the effective implementation of the DLDP in the Somali with no end insight for its solution in the near future. This is because, the program has not been designed in a way that is harmonious to the way of live of the pastoral community of the region but rather adopted blueprints from other regions and federally prepared documents without adjustments.

5.2. Prospects of DLDP in the Somali region

It is not easy to judge and project at this early stage, the prospects of success and/ or failure of the DLDP in the region. However, based on its current status and implementation trends, the program is **NOT** in the right direction neither is it contributing *much* to the predetermined goals of the program. To this regard, some key top officials in the regional government, some of whom are the presumed coordinators of the program, commented that "if the program continues in its current status, then it will be *disastrous*". This is because of the absences of political will at regional and local levels, limited legal and institutional frameworks, local capacity deficiency to implement the program, inadequate resources, and attitudinal problems and misconception towards the program both by the local government and the community.

In short, though, the program has brought some positive contributions in terms of basic service delivery and understanding of governance issues, but then, according to most respondents (including some key observers) asked about this issue as well as my own observations, the program implementation in the Somali region is not in a good shape and if it is not corrected before it is too late, its harm will overdo its benefits. Thus, the sustainability of the program is at stake with more inclination to failure than to success.

Chapter Six

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1. Concluding Summary

Decentralization as a political reform and local development policy had been on the agenda for quite some time both in developing and developed countries. It has been recently on the increase as a resorted means to accomplish effective public service delivery and local self-rule with the driving force of the basic tenets of *good governance* such as legitimacy, representation, accountability, transparency and rule of law. It is universally regarded as the necessary end result of democratization which is offered as a possible response to the lack of efficiency of the central apparatus of the state.

After decades of highly centralized and unitary political system and administrative setup, Ethiopia has been following federal system of government and decentralization policy of regional and local governance and democratization process immediately after the downfall of the military regime (the Dergue) in 1991. Since then (1992), Ethiopia has been implementing one of the most ambitious decentralization programs in Africa, indeed of any developing country, by devolving authority to autonomous regions and then sub-regional governments. The Government of Ethiopia initiated a civil service reform in 1996 to build the capacity to implement the decentralization program.

Decentralization in Ethiopia has taken place in two major phases. The first phase was decentralization from the central government (FDRE) to autonomous regions which was done at ones. However, the process of decentralization from regions to sub-regional levels (the second phase of decentralization) has not taken place at the same time unlike from central government to regions. But rather DLDP (or second wave of decentralization in Ethiopia) from regions to *woredas* took place in two major phases based probably on regions' level of development and political maturity. Thus, relatively developed four regions embarked the program first and then followed by the so called emerging regions. DLDP in the Somali region has been probably the last of all regions and had it not the pressure from the central government it would have not been implemented even to its current low level status.

Accordingly, the study attempted (refer chapter three) to explore the objectives, driving force(s), design, processes, scope, legal and institutional frameworks and implementation status of the recently embarked DLDP in the Somali region. Secondly, the study provided a modest preliminary investigation of some performance indicators (refer chapter four) of the program in terms of local governance processes, community participation and empowerment, and basic service delivery with particular reference to two (Jig-jiga and Babile) sample *woredas*. Finally, the paper tried to unveil (refer chapter five) some of the major inherent and encountered problems, and the possible prospects of the program as well as contradictions of the basic requirements of the program and the way of life of the most inhabitants of the region.

Consequently, based on the outcome of the research questions (refer to page 7) of the study, DLDP in the Somali has been embarked and implemented hastily in a *big-bang, one-time event, project-like, top-down and uniform* approaches (by default) without adequate policy, legal and institutional frameworks as well as, with very limited participation and preparedness of the stakeholders (*woreda* governments and community) at local level. As a result of this, the program implementation status currently is not doing well both in terms of *governance* and *basic service delivery* (the two pillars of the program), and faces a bleak prospect of sustainability due to absence of broad societal consensus and participation during its inception and poor grassroots support during its implementation. Thus, the working hypothesis (refer page six) of the study is verified to the anticipation of the author and hence the program is deemed to failure, unless its current trends of implementation are adjusted and improved.

Moreover, It should be noted here that generalizing the status of DLDP of the whole region from the preliminary findings of small sample exploratory study might be contentious. However, the two sample *woredas* are relatively good representative in the sense that, one *woreda* represents relatively urban *woredas* while the other represents rural *woredas* and that many issue raised in the paper are analogous to most *woredas*. Accordingly, many of the findings of the study could be taken as indicative and insight of what is going on in the whole region rather than specific to sample *woredas*. Based on this background, DLDP in the Somali region lacks almost all the theoretical principles and conditions that are

characterized by successful decentralization program to make the desired changes. To this regard, box 6.1 underscores a highlight of the major findings of the study condensed into points.

Box 6.1: Summary of Findings

1. Hastily embarked and implemented at regional level in *one-time event, project-like, big-bang, top-down and uniform* approach;
2. Absence of political and bureaucratic will and partnership both at regional and local levels;
3. Limited administrative, institutional, technical local capacity to implement the program;
4. Limited policy, institutional and legal frameworks which have created confusions of who does what and unnecessary interference from regional officials and organs to the affairs of the woreda government;
5. Unclear regional-woreda, zonal-woreda, and woreda-woreda relationship which has led to duplication of efforts
6. Absence of specific coordinating office or body of the implementation of the DLDP;
7. Inadequate resources (financial, human, material) to effectively implement the program;
8. *Centralized decentralization* in terms of the absence of participation of stakeholders at regional and local levels as well as within the woreda administration from the inception of the program to its implementation which is paving the way for *local dictatorship*;
9. Upward accountability and absence of transparency in the operation of local governments is leading to local dictatorship at the cost of the program and the local community it supposedly serve;
10. The *pooling system* meant for efficiency is proving otherwise and is leading to corruption and hindering the implementation of action plans on time;
11. Low level and poor quality of basic service delivery;
12. Absence of established monitoring and evaluation system both at regional and local levels;
13. Inter-clan conflicts and animosity as result of local elite capture;
14. Absence of clear and predictable fiscal decentralization, and
15. Absence of civic, intergovernmental and public sector management disciplines.

6.2. Recommendations

Based on the foregoing discussion and findings, the following recommendations are proposed.

1. *Prepare the people (change agents) and the system before embarking policy or reform-* change agents (key actors) at various levels should be identified, their capacity assessed and mandates clear clarified. These key actors include; government agents at regional and local levels, private sector, civil society organizations and local community

at large. The role and responsibility of each actor should be clear before hand. On other hand, systems, procedures, guidelines and working and reporting relationships should be prepared before the commencement of the program. Since this was not done in the Somali region before, the regional government should prepare with the consultation and involvement of all stakeholders at various levels and then send it to local governments.

2. Creation of sectoral coherent and consistent legal framework: a package of various structural laws, implementing legislations and regulations which are consistent and a coherent with one another should be established for local governments. The local government legal framework may consists of various laws that function together and covers areas like(a)framework of local government organizations(b)framework for regional-local government fiscal relations(c) framework for operation of local public property and enterprises(d) legislations that elaborate specific powers of local governments, etc.

3. Creation of conducive and comprehensive institutional frameworks for decentralized governance: establishment of strong specific office (e.g. *bureau of local government* or autonomous multi-sectoral secretariat/body) mandated to oversee and coordinate the implementation of DLDP in the region. The bureau or the secretariat tasks, among other things, should include: (a) local capacity enhancement, (b) representing responsibly all aspects of local governments at regional level, (c) establishment of comprehensive policy, legal and institutional frameworks, (d) coordination of the activities and undertakings of the local government, (e) monitoring and evaluation, and (f) fine tuning and adjustment of the implementation strategies if and when need arises, etc.

4. Community participation and empowerment: the program must empower the people; establish arrangements where local communities work in partnership with the local government, private sector and civil society; mobilise and allocate sufficient resources to participating institutions as well as establish reliable mechanisms for resource utilisation, transparency and accountability. Creating conducive environment of involving the local community in all aspects of local governance from planning to implementation to monitoring and evaluation of local development is of paramount importance in order to accomplish desirable changes that satisfy community and justify the program.

5. The *pooling system* should be revised in a way that mitigates corruption and collusion and enhances efficiency and effectiveness of the operations of various line offices through implementing their activities on time. That is, a strong system of check and balance should be established both internally and externally. In addition to this, the quantity and quality of the pooled staff should be increased to avoid overload and delay of service giving to the line offices.

6. Establishment of transparent, predictable, incentive, simple and adequate fiscal system. Moreover, the grant transfers to *woreda* bank accounts should be administered in time to enable local governments to execute their plans on time.

7. The regional government should undertake capacity assessment of local governments and then act upon accordingly in providing various packages of capacity enhancement through various skill training programs, policy direction and sensitization workshops.

8. *Local autonomy enhancement:* The local government should be given full autonomy in the planning and budgeting of their activities, especially in apportioning the budget into recurrent and capital portions according to their needs. Moreover, the local government should have the authority and autonomy to recruit, hire, appoint, transfer or dismiss local manpower which should be governed by local laws. Both the above issues are currently done at regional level at the disadvantage of local governments.

9. *Political will and partnership:* this is the most challenging and difficult issue to attain in the implementation of DLDP in the Somali region. If political will and partnership is attained then the program has a prospect to continue. To this regard therefore, experience has shown that the success of decentralization efforts depends, to a large extent, on a clear vision regarding the position and function of local governments and on a strong political will to implement that vision. It also depends on the willingness of both the regional and the local levels to see each other as partners in an ongoing process. Such a partnership implies a willingness by the regional government and its zonal representatives to exercise self-restraint in supervising local governments.

- 10.** Monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems should be an integral part from the start and should cover all aspects including formulation, implementation and results. Standardized procedures for quantitative and qualitative evaluation of decentralization programs need to be established, especially at the *woreda* level where they are usually implemented.
- 11.** The program should be redesigned in a manner that is harmonious and suits the way of life of the predominantly pastoralist community of the region instead of blindly importing models and frameworks of other regions which are different in many aspects (political, social, economical, level of development, etc) from the Somali region. This is because although, across-regional experiences may offer a good starting points that could be modified to suit local circumstances, it is not desirable to duplicate the practices of one region, or even one *woreda*, in another because differences in history and circumstances are bound to generate unique dynamics in the decentralization process of every region and/or *woreda*.
- 12.** The author recommends further complementary studies be conducted in the region on the subject matter in order to provide more conclusive findings over the direction and impact of the program in the region using the preliminary findings of this study as a springboard and stepping stone.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Definitions of Terms

1. Decentralization- ...(The) process by which authority, responsibility, power, resources and accountability are transferred from the central levels of government to sub-national levels. Conceptually...decentralisation relates to the role of, and the relationship between, central and sub-national institutions, whether they are public, private or civic (Altmann, et.al 2000).

2. Devolution- Devolution refers to a full transfer of responsibility, decision making, resources and revenue generation to a local level of public authority that is autonomous and fully independent from the devolving authority. Units that are devolved are usually recognized as independent legal entities and are ideally elected (Altmann, et.al 2000-UNDP)

3. Deconcentration- transfer of authority and responsibility from one level of the central government to another while maintaining the same hierarchical level of accountability from the local units to the central government ministry or agency which has been decentralised (Altmann, et.al, 2000).

4. Empowerment- Access to information, inclusion and participation, accountability, local organizational capacity (World Bank, 2002).

5. Participation- the capacity and the ability of the community to contribute to, share in and benefit from, diverse social, economic, political or other processes of the society(Jacob,2005).

6. Good governance- Rule of law, participation by governed, equity, effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and accountability (Omiya, 2000)

7. Local Development- Empowerment, local governance, local service provision, and local development impacts -improvements in the social and economic welfare of people-(International Conference on Local Development in Washington, DC on 16-18 June 2004.)

8. Local governance- is the way authority is organized, legitimated, and employed by and on behalf of local people through planning, decision-making, and accountability processes (International Conference on Local Development in Washington, DC on 16-18 June 2004).

Appendix 2: Checklist for the field work of the study

This checklist summarizes the topics that will be covered in the interviews-in-depth interview), focus group discussions for concerned individuals, officials and groups of DLDP in the Somali region at regional, woreda, kebele and community levels. Different questions are designed for different groups (planners, top officials and monitors, woreda administration, woreda council, decentralized manpower, and community group) but sometimes may overlap so that different viewpoints of different groups may be obtained.

Each topic will be introduced through general questions on actors, processes, systems, mechanisms, etc as they are today. Then more specific questions will follow. This checklist represents a framework of this research study and some additional points may be included in the discussion of the main body of the study.

A). Points addressed with the top officials planners and monitors at regional level for “hard facts”

1. The objectives and driving force(s) of the DLDP in the Somali region

- ◆ Why now?

2. How was the program designed?

- System analysis undertaken?
- Stated and un-stated goals driving the reform understood?
- Common vision of reform among potentially competing centers of power developed?
- Simple, clear and realistic plan developed?
- Organizational and management analysis conducted early in the process?
- Authority transfer mechanism; incrementally, or at once (Big bang); why and why not?
- The long-term vision of the program understood.
- Implementation modalities and phases
 - ✓ Policy formulation and enactment
 - ✓ Transfer of responsibility and resources
 - ✓ Organization and HR adjustments
 - ✓ Improving capacity and resources for services delivery
 - ✓ Reviewing and fine tuning policies

3. The institutional and legal frameworks of the DLDP setting out the following:

- Structure;
- Powers and duties
- Rights and responsibilities,
- Vertical and horizontal Interrelationships (fiscal, working, etc)

4. The functional activities decentralized?

- Education(up to what level)
- Health(up to what level)
- Agriculture(to what extent)
- Water (to what extent)
- Roads(to what extent)
- Peace and security
- Others-----

5. The authority /powers decentralized?

- Policy making(law making and executive powers)
- Financial powers(revenue, and expenditure assignment)
- Powers over personnel matters(recruitment, appointment, transfers, supervision and discipline, etc).
- Material resources.

6. The level and to whom which powers/authority is decentralized to

- To woreda level only
- To woreda up to kebeles
- Specialized functional agency
- Multi-purpose territorial based one

7. Planning and budgeting processes, systems and relationships

8. Fiscal decentralization

- Expenditure assignment
- Revenue sharing
- Intergovernmental transfers
- Borrowing
- Formula

9. The key actors, their capacity and mandates at, national, regional zonal, woreda and Community levels.

B) Points addressed with the top officials, analysts and observers (through focus group discussions and in-depth interview) at regional and woreda levels for stimulation of different viewpoints.

1. How do you see the preparation, planning and implementation of program?
 - ◆ Was the program (DLDP) planned prior to its implementation at region level? How/Why not
 - ◆ Were the region and woreda ready in major aspects (politically, technically, resource wise, etc) when the program was implemented?
 - ◆ Why now and not before (1997) or after?
 - ◆ Why was the embarking of the program late than other regions?
 - ◆ Why not pilot testing the reform (DLDP) before full-fledged implementation? Is that because that the region has the capacity to do it at once?
 - ◆ How was/is the political will and partnership at all levels since the inception the program?
2. Are all of all stakeholders involved and empowered from the inception to the implementation of the program(DLDP); if yes, how; and if no why not?
3. What are major inherent and encountered problems/challenges of the program?
4. What are prospects of success or/and failure of the program?
 - ◆ Is the program in the right direction/track so far?
 - ◆ Is it contributing to the predetermined goals(Local development)
 - ◆ Will the program be sustainable politically, socially, economically, etc?
5. Recommendations and suggestions towards the implementation of the program.

C). Points addressed with the woreda officials (administration)

1. General situation of the woreda in term of socio-economic background and development and major positive indication of changes over the last two and half years as a result of the DLDP.
2. Regional –woreda relationships in terms of administration, technical, political fiscal dimensions of decentralizations (including issues related to revenue mobilization capacity, block grant allocation, support for capacity development from the region.
3. Woreda level functioning –e.g., a) interrelationship among:
 - ◆ various sector offices;
 - ◆ sectors offices and cabinet

- ◆ sector offices and woreda council
- ◆ woreda cabinet and the woreda council
- ◆ woreda and other woredas

b) Human resource conditions.

c) Capacity issues (managerial, technical etc) of the woreda government.

d) Development actors within the woreda; their compositions, roles, activities effectiveness and relationships among them and government

4. Promotion of allocative and productive efficiencies and good governance in terms of:

- Improved resource allocation/distribution?
- Closeness to people with better information?
- Responsiveness to the demand and choice of the public?
- Fostering accountability and transparency
- Reduced corruption
- Increased cost effectiveness

5. Woreda planning and budgeting process

- ◆ how and when
- ◆ institutions and individuals involved
- ◆ reporting on budget at woreda and regional levels

6. Community participation and empowerment:

- ◆ Recognition of the importance of community participation by woreda officials
- ◆ Modalities of community participation and empowerment currently (if any) in place.
- ◆ Gaps
- ◆ Future plans for community participation and empowerment

7. Service delivery in terms of *number, quality, accessibility and number of beneficiary*

8. Problems.

D). Points addressed with community members, and others non governmental actors (if any)

1. General situation of the woreda in term of socio-economic background and development and major positive indication of changes over the last two and half years as a result of the DLDP.

- ◆ Are you aware of the DLDP?
- ◆ How you see the DLDP? Are satisfied with the operation of the woreda administration.

2. Assessment of relationship between the woreda governments and the community

- ◆ Community access to information such as budgets, reports, audit report(if any), strategic and operational plans, resource(Tax)mobilization and assessment, services delivery by woreda government; and agendas and decisions of the woreda council;
- ◆ Consultation of the woreda government to local community when preparing documents such as: strategic plan, budget preparation, service delivery mechanisms;
- ◆ Match or mismatch of community needs and priority and woreda government initiatives and operations;
- ◆ Community expectation from the local government;
- ◆ Mechanisms for Community participation in planning, budgeting , reviewing performance and effectiveness;
- ◆ Were you involved in planning, designing and implementation processes of the program (DLDP)?
- ◆ Woreda government accountability and transparency to the community
- ◆ Is the implementation of the program (DLDP) benefiting the community in your woreda, and kebele so far? How? Why if it is not contributing?
- ◆ The problems that you wish the woreda and regional government to solve and how?
- ◆ Any other suggestions.

E). Points addressed with the woreda Council

1. General situation of the woreda in term of socio-economic background and development and major positive indication of changes over the last two and half years as a result of DLDP.
2. Regional –woreda relationships in terms of administration, technical, political fiscal dimensions of decentralizations, support for capacity development from the region.
3. Woreda government functioning –e.g., a) interrelationship between:
 - Woreda council and other woreda and sub woreda sub woreda structures, e.g., kebele council (if any);
 - Functioning of the council and its standing committees(if any)
 - The role of council and standing committees in the process and supervision of budget and plan implementation.
4. Community participation and empowerment: modalities; gaps and future plans for community involvement (if any);
5. Other development actors (if any) and their interrelationship among themselves and with woreda government.
6. Problems

Appendix 3: Local/woreda government budget and level of dependence in 1998 and 1999 EC fiscal years							
S/n	Woreda	1998			1999		
		Total budget	Own Revenue	Dependence (%)	Total budget	Own Revenue	Dependence %
1	Jigjiga	15,354,163.91	1,160,000.00	92.45	16,756,677.04	1,322,383.70	92.11
2	Awbare	8,204,430.73	1,062,383.00	87.05	9,555,380.07	900,000.00	90.58
3	Harshln	4,460,785.63	590,000.00	86.77	5,200,650.52	590,000.00	88.66
4	Qabribayah	3,431,064.70	1,050,000.00	69.40	8,025,623.78	1,050,000.00	86.92
5	Gursum	3,330,686.26	240,000.00	92.79	4,202,653.88	400,000.00	90.48
6	Baabble	4,790,906.82	807,673.00	83.14	5,732,424.24	647,673.15	88.70
7	Shinile	5,795,637.91	3,000,000.00	48.24	7,211,694.00	3,044,170.00	57.79
8	Aysha'a	3,694,172.34	300,000.00	91.88	4,614,776.23	525,830.00	88.61
9	Erer	4,605,953.92	740,000.00	83.93	5,573,791.53	740,000.00	86.72
10	Danbal	4,941,251.32	680,000.00	86.24	5,869,542.96	660,000.00	88.76
11	Afdem	2,992,545.87	210,000.00	92.98	3,772,700.07	310,000.00	91.78
12	Ma'iso	3,138,646.61	400,000.00	87.26	4,434,547.25	350,000.00	92.11
13	Filq	5,796,961.49	920,000.00	84.13	6,920,651.36	740,000.00	89.31
14	Hamaro	3,338,329.18	300,000.00	91.01	4,068,480.37	300,000.00	92.63
15	Sagag	2,738,021.86	180,000.00	93.43	3,522,901.87	220,000.00	93.76
16	Garbo	3,200,827.74	320,000.00	90.00	4,052,496.81	370,000.00	90.87
17	Dhuhun	3,021,446.31	200,000.00	93.38	4,275,245.81	200,000.00	95.32
18	Sallhad	2,601,691.08	150,000.00	94.23	3,549,356.51	200,000.00	94.37
19	Mayamuluqo	1,668,118.24	90,000.00	94.60	3,605,814.83	90,000.00	97.50
20	Lag- hida	2,788,999.02	127,055.00	95.44	3,796,198.19	222,054.72	94.15
21	Dhagah-buur	8,670,043.78	830,000.00	90.43	10,053,961.05	800,000.00	92.04
22	Aware	5,852,426.25	728,972.00	87.54	6,788,522.57	618,971.40	90.88
23	Gashamo	4,741,459.53	640,000.00	86.50	5,694,415.83	600,000.00	89.46
24	Gunagado	1,000,000.00	0.00	100.00	1,500,000.00	50,000.00	96.67
25	Dhagah-madow	4,049,461.52	254,632.00	93.71	4,903,073.70	294,631.90	93.99
26	Warder	6,613,100.96	1,150,000.00	82.61	7,978,598.61	1,100,000.00	86.21
27	Danod	3,537,732.17	300,000.00	91.52	4,419,941.66	350,000.00	92.08
28	Geladi	5,140,216.51	972,320.00	81.08	6,029,861.60	952,320.20	84.21
29	Bokh	4,233,473.64	760,000.00	82.05	5,179,675.08	760,000.00	85.33
30	Qabri-dahar	8,475,834.97	1,000,000.00	88.20	10,215,734.22	700,000.00	93.15
31	Shilaabo	4,166,714.57	447,308.00	89.26	5,142,234.46	447,308.00	91.30
32	Dhoobo-weyn	4,781,740.78	376,679.00	92.12	5,329,034.02	376,679.40	92.93
33	Shaygosh	3,954,402.90	180,000.00	95.45	4,702,506.77	480,000.00	89.79
34	Godey	8,582,888.04	1,500,000.00	82.52	10,328,153.62	2,000,000.00	80.64
35	Qallafo	4,497,646.92	700,000.00	84.44	5,506,191.62	670,000.00	87.83
36	Adadle	3,677,948.35	120,000.00	96.74	5,031,956.18	320,000.00	93.64
37	Ferfer	4,523,706.99	311,000.00	93.13	4,947,311.79	311,000.00	93.71
38	Dhanan	3,447,912.33	335,650.00	90.27	4,187,031.33	335,650.00	91.98
39	Mustahil	3,896,233.50	452,876.00	88.38	4,406,310.96	452,875.56	89.72
40	Imey-barl	2,977,909.45	340,000.00	88.58	3,827,173.91	340,000.00	91.12
41	Hargelle	4,355,978.97	750,000.00	82.78	5,316,693.98	575,000.00	89.19

42	Elkarri	2,996,099.10	220,000.00	92.66	3,708,282.58	300,000.00	91.91
43	Jaratl	4,431,310.98	780,000.00	82.40	5,168,104.77	780,000.00	84.91
44	Barey	4,446,746.78	760,000.00	82.91	5,582,268.48	695,000.00	87.55
45	Dolobay	4,256,803.07	481,301.00	88.69	5,996,624.93	500,000.00	91.66
46	Guradhamole	2,318,451.95	552,868.00	76.15	3,604,862.02	280,000.00	92.23
47	Goro-bakhaksa	2,846,759.54	600,000.00	78.92	3,837,254.78	250,000.00	93.48
48	Imey-galbed	3,666,626.43	425,000.00	88.41	4,023,455.68	450,000.00	88.82
49	Filtu	5,892,716.52	900,000.00	84.73	7,164,103.15	850,000.00	88.14
50	Moyale	7,008,693.68	1,700,000.00	75.74	8,033,480.20	1,350,000.00	83.20
51	Dolo-ado	6,618,233.13	1,150,000.00	82.62	8,992,900.09	1,150,000.00	87.21
52	Huded	1,640,782.24	200,000.00	87.81	1,500,000.00	250,000.00	83.33
	Average	4,561,436.47	623,956.10	87.05	5,650,794.75	620,606.69	89.60

Source: BoFED

Appendix4: Some of the persons consulted and their respective institutions

A) Some of the top officials consulted at regional level in an in-depth interview and focus group discussion

S/N	Name	Title and Institution
1	Bashir Sheikh Saeed	CBB head (then)
2	Ismail Mohamed Khalif	BoFED deputy
3	Jama Ahmed Jama	CBB deputy
4	Ahmed Arab	Rural Roads Authority head
5	Abdi Garad	BoR head
6	Hussein Hashi	President Advisor
7	Nur Garane	President office Bureau head
8	Olad Abdi	Civil Service Reform Office head
9	Abdirahid Haro	DLDP Coordinator with CBB
10	Mohamed Agjar	UNDP supported decentralization and governance pilot project
11	Abdirahman Harari	Planning department head, Health bureau
12	Abdirahman Roble	Team leader, BoFED
13	Abdirizak Qawrah	Department head, Justice bureau
14	Mohamed Dheeg	Former BoFED Production Dep't head
15	Abdikadir Mohamed Farah	Former Water Bureau Planning Dep't head
16	Faisal Farah	Revenue Collection Dep't head, BoR
17	Muktar Mohamed	Expert, BoFED
18	Adan Hassan	Expert, Food Security Office

B) Some of the Returned Devolved Manpower Consulted

1. Mohamed Mumin Awbarre woreda
2. Adam Bulle D/Buur woreda
3. Ahmed Mahmud Dollo-Ado woreda
4. Ahmed Shukri G/Dhamole woreda
5. Hasan Isse Dollo-Bay woreda
6. Abdirahman Qasse Jig-jiga woreda
7. Abdullahi Mahdi Hargelle woreda
8. Ahmed Wadi Adan Imey woreda
9. Ahmed Mohamed Asnaje Hamaro woreda
10. Deeq Askar Gashamo woreda

C) Some of the Consulted Officials and Employees in Jig-jiga Woreda

S/N	Name	Title and Institution
1	Muhumed Olad	JJ woreda Chairman
2	Ahmed Aideed	JJ Woreda deputy Chairman
3	Abdirahman Qasse	Revenue Desk head, OFED
4	Mohamed Sh. Abdirahman(Badri)	Head of Basic Rural infrastructure Devt
5	Mohamed Ahmed Arab	Head of Agriculture Office
6	Abdullah Mohamed Mawlid	Head of Education Office
7	Mukhtar Ali	Capacity Coordinating Office head
8	Mohamed Abdi Kare	Party Head
9	Ahmed Ibrahim	Security and justice Admin. Coordinating Office
10	Wali Sheikh Omar	Cooperative Office head
11	10 community members	from different kebeles

D) Some of the Consulted Officials and Employees in Babile Woreda

S/N	Name	Title and Institution
1	Musbah sheikh	BB woreda Chairman
2	Mohamed Sheikh	BB woreda Council Speaker
2	Hassan Farah	Head of Education Office
3	Isse Bana	Head of Agriculture Office
4	Hirane	Head of Basic Rural infrastructure Devt
5	Abdisahid Gedi	CMPCO head
6	Abdulahi Sheikh	OFED coordinating head
7	Mohamed Fadli	Capacity Coordinating Office head
8	Mohamed Abdulahli	Health Office head
9	Hussein Daheeye	Desk head, health office
10	Sulayman Sheikh Rashid	Justice office head
11	Mubarak Sheikh Abdiqani	woreda Police Office head
12	Hodan	Women Affairs Office head
13	Nimo	Expert, Women Affairs Office
14	Abdishukri	Expert, Agriculture Office
15	Abdullahi	Expert, Education office
16	Dr. Asnaqash	Animal health Desk head, Agriculture Office
17	10 community members	from different kebeles

Declaration

This thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university, and that all sources of material used for the thesis has been duly acknowledged.

Declared by:

Name: **Mahat Daud Hassn**

Signature.....

Date.....26-03-07

Approved by the Advisor:

Name: **Dr. Tegegne G/Egziabher**

Signature.....

Date.....26-03-07