

THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY IN G.F.W.HEGEL

By

Markos Haile

Tel: 0911 12 30 71

E-mail: markoshaile@yahoo.com

Submitted to:

Addis Ababa University

College of Social Science and Humanities

Department of philosophy

Supervisor:

Bekele Gutema (PhD)

**JUNE 2011
ADDIS ABABA
ETHIOPIA**

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank my advisor Bekele Gutema for his willingness to be my advisor, Ulrich Scholl Muller for inspiring me to make an effort to understand Hegel, Richard Dien Winfield for his lectures on the science of logic (without those lectures this thesis was not possibly written within this short time) and finally to my girl friend Samrawit for her accurate typing of the thesis.

ABSTRACT

The system of philosophy in G.F.W.Hegel is peculiar in its objective and realization. The objective of system of philosophy is the knowing of truth which is no less than self-realization through self-determination. Since truth is a self-thinking idea that is an intrinsically concrete totality, it is not possible to know truth through the logic of being as a negation of its other or through reflections of essence (logic of essence). Those logics are lower forms of knowing truth as they are relative or dependent on some other element for their determination. But truth must have absolute form since genuine truth is self-supporting. Truth is a process that comes to self-knowing through development based on self-realization (logic of concept). This is possible as truth is idea or adequate concept in its structure having subjective and objective aspects at the same time that allows it to be self-knowing. Hence the construction of system doesn't allow any formalism or intrusion of external element rather it is a process of self-determining and self-realization. The implementation of system in the philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit is also a free self-realization of idea in its otherness as truth becomes totality only through overcoming one-sidedness or, in other words, through self-concretization. Thus this thesis will reconstruct the system of philosophy in Hegel using three chapters emphasizing the anti-foundationalism of philosophy (chapter one), pure construction of system (chapter two) and implementation and totality of the system (chapter three).

List Of Abbreviations

In the notes and quotations the following abbreviations of Hegel's works are used as follows:

- a) SL.....Science of logic, translated by
A. V. Miller, Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, 1989
- b) ENC I.....Encyclopedia of philosophical
sciences, part one, translated by William Wallace, Marxist internet archive, 2009
- c) ENC III.....Philosophy of mind, translated by
William Wallace, Blackmask online, 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	5
CHAPTER I - ON THE PRESUPPOSITIONLESS BEGINING OF SYSTEM	
PHILOSOPHY	13
1.1. An Overview on the Systemic view of Philosophy	13
1.2. On the presuppositionless beginning	17
NOTES	27
CHAPTER II. HEGEL'S LOGICAL TRUTH	28
2.1. Subjectivity	29
2.1.1. Concept	29
2.1.2. Judgment	31
2.1.3. Syllogism	33
2.2. Objectivity	35
2.2.1. Mechanism	36
2.2.2. Chemism	38
2.2.3. Teleology	39
2.3. Idea	41
2.3.1. Idea as life	42
2.3.2. Idea as Cognition	43
2.3.3. Absolute idea	53
NOTES	58
CHAPTER III. THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY	59
3.1. The First Syllogism (logic-nature-spirit)	62
3.2. The second syllogism (nature-spirit-logic)	65
3.3. The third Syllogism (spirit-logic-nature)	67
NOTES	71
CONCLUSION	72
REFERENCE	79

INTRODUCTION

G.F.W. Hegel is one of the most famous and controversial philosophers in his significance, contribution and ways of interpreting his works ranging from those who argue about his uselessness to philosophy to those who say an enormous philosopher with multiple solutions and insights for the problems of doing philosophy. Without taking sides we can try to examine Hegel's claim to be builder of system philosophy and what does he mean by system philosophy. I think this aspect of the research is significant to understand how philosophy is understood and in which respects we are now having a different conception of philosophy. In addition we may be able to sympathize with Hegel's positions rather than marginalize him through making charges like racist, obscure and useless philosopher. This is important, especially, to unveil the darkness those charges create covering one's resolution to study the philosophers' work which actually has to be the only way to make proper arguments either in favour of or against them.

G.F.W. Hegel is one of the philosophers who tried to develop the system of philosophy as a self-developing system on its own account that comes to self-knowing in his age that is the modern period. In construing the system of philosophy as self-knowing Hegel is also announcing the completed determination of system at the same time. As it is the logical fact that knowing comes at the completion of self-determination. In this thesis I would like to reconstruct the exposition of the system of philosophy in Hegel in its historical embeddedness and peculiarity of its objective and realization. Accordingly, the first chapter introduces system from the perspective of historical forces that make possible the opening up of system philosophy and the building of such system through philosophers.

In addition, there will be few remarks on Hegel's claim, how should philosophy (a systemic one) make undeduced or presuppositionless beginning.

The second chapter examines the peculiarity of Hegel's system in its logical knowing (universality) as absolute idea (the term absolute is the most misinterpreted term in Hegel referred to ultimate reality beyond everything else, however, it means the negation of relation, abstraction or formalism; it consists Latin of *ab*-away and *salute*-separate that is away from separate, not abstracted, not formal or independent), or, in other words, the becoming of the activity of freedom from its subjectivity to objectivity and to truth (idea) which is finally known as science or method. Freedom in the realm of logic is abstract at the beginning and, hence the goal should be to fully realize freedom from its process as the outcome of the subject or concept that is self-determining and self-realizing. Truth (idea) is this logical knowing through absolute idea that is no more than a concretization freedom. And system of categories in the domain of logic makes this philosophy science. Absolute idea is universal valid method (form) of the truth (system) in unfolding itself in its totality through various shapes. But the method is found intertwined with all content that is the content of self-determination. The method (absolute idea) is the subject matter and vice versa. The method is the truth in so far as method involves knowing, hence, both come at the end. For Hegel truth is not correctness as we know commonly where empirical reality corresponds to our representation rather truth is the whole or totality. As such truth is more than descriptive correspondence rather a normative correspondence that comes only when there is a correspondence between concept and its objectivity as its own objectivity (completed self-determination). That is why Hegel's absolute idea is free from the criticism of pantheism or alternatively of finite God. We know that pantheism

held that everything is God without giving an account for the particularity of the other but for Hegel God (synonym to absolute idea) is God through mediation that constitute it. In Hegel the other is both determining and determined which is also true to absolute idea too. To put it in simple terms the absolute idea realize itself through particularization, however the particularization is itself universalized in so far as there is no other in the realm of freedom. Previous categories in the logic are objective and universal as logic is objective thinking and also as they are particularizations of the absolute idea that is an individuality that returns back to its beginning and encompass them all through knowing as its particularized universal or concrete universal.

The objective of system philosophy is nothing but the knowing of the absolute (truth) in its logical form and in its otherness (substantiality) as *realphilosophie* (philosophy of nature and finite spirit). Hegel's logic of concept gives us a primary conception of the logic of truth. The nature of concept is to be self-differentiating and still remains to be the same. Logic and its otherness presuppose each other. As such logic exhibits this nature of the concept. Thus, the system of philosophy is the knowing of truth both in pure form and in the otherness of this pure form (as substance). However the two spheres are completely distinct and develop on their own. This distinctness of the spheres of knowing tells us the freedom the spheres (disciplines) as totality or as completely self-determining. When we reach at the end (philosophy), we realize that logicity (self knowing) is manifested in the development of *realphilosophie* since the form of absolute idea is a universal form or concrete universal that is coextensive with its particularization. Truth is idea as such (self knowing concept); it is the foundation of system though we only know that through philosophy in absolute mind/spirit in the completion of system with its return to the

beginning or the return of the beginning in the end. Philosophy realized that the absolute idea is a universal valid method (self-knowing pure concept) which is the structure of truth per se as a negative unity (the unity of subjectivity and objectivity or theory and practice or life and cognition) resulted from logical investigation of philosophy or science of logic in a pure way. Then absolute idea is the method (form) of philosophy as self determining and self realizing subject matter in knowing. The knowing of the truth means the knowing of something independent, totality, infinite that is not relative or dependent on anything else as it has nothing beyond it. That would be possible only through idea (self-knowing reason) or we can say through idealism in Hegel's sense – a free adequate concept (subject) that encompasses everything in knowing. Hegel's logic of truth or conceptual construction of system has three aspects in its structure: subjective, objective and absolute form. The absolute form is the unity of those onesided (subjective or objective) aspects. Hegel's system can be said to be essentially the system of absolute idea which is the truth of being in general realized through the science of logic as method. Absolute idea is the outcome of this science that ends up knowing itself as the form of all determinacy of any sort seen in the whole development of the logic. Absolute idea is the method or form of all philosophical knowing as such it is a universally valid method. Absolute idea has such universal form determinacy as its content, thereby, form and content coincide. In this way, Logic through absolute idea coincides with metaphysics in so far as it comprises the essential structure of being in general. In other words, absolute idea as form is the form of all content that shows up till this point. Logic as logic of content (ontological) transform itself to form determination to completely determine itself as totality. In such a result form and content coincide which result in the similarity of logic with metaphysics (the study of inner unity of being). Logic can be said

to be a conceptual foundation or construction of the system. This is not, however, the whole story, absolute idea is not the system (if it is system only as system's universality) rather it is system of the logic. To put it in other words, it is the subject side of the truth that needs to be mediated (substantiated) to finally become a particularized universal, thus we need a third chapter to highlight the object aspect of the system. The situation appears like this because of the nature of the fact- the concept (freedom) of the subject matter to be universal, particular and individual. In other words, the situation has to be like this because of the nature of the fact (*das sache*) that is the concept which is always in dialectical movement which in turn brings development. Universality should become particularity to realize itself or to be what it is. Immediacy should become mediation and vice-versa. As a unity of all these dichotomies we find absolute idea which itself is organic unity but in its immediacy brings in nature that allows us to see system from a different perspective-in its object aspect (substantiality).

The third chapter is the final chapter that exposes Hegel's system proper in an intelligible way possible relying on the universally valid method that Hegel realized through his logic that is conceptuality and also truth is truth only when it involves a reality that knows the whole. This method is conceptual in nature except that it also involves knowing as part of its conceptual truth. Truth cannot come without having access to the knowing of everything. Absolute idea as the conceptual foundation of system remains to be a conceptual knowing of truth that is no more than the self knowing of absolute idea purely as subject. However, Absolute idea in its immediacy as totality is just the knowing of truth purely without further mediation but that is not enough, immediacy should become mediation (dialectically speaking), hence it allows other spheres to develop

freely in their own realm like nature and finite spirit that would finally turn out to be manifestations of its existence in other spheres of philosophical disciplines. Hence absolute idea is not the whole truth; it may be the self knowing of the whole truth without further qualification or specification as a concrete universal. Thus, we see in this chapter absolute idea in its further qualifications or specifications becoming an inner unity of being in general both as subject and substance. By way of contrast the previous chapter can be said to be the construction of system conceptually that is also called method as it is a conceptual knowing of conceptual knowing (logic), that is, as the form of all knowing that returns back to all its previous determinacies and take them in as its own content (as their inner unity) at the end of the science. Thus this chapter considers the free implementation (mediation) of system in nature and finite spirit. This fact is figured out by philosophy itself where the immediate closure of logic brings in nature which in turn similarly then brings in mind/spirit. Here in the finite spirit we can remind ourselves the memories of the phenomenology of the spirit in which consciousness 'distinguishes itself from itself and relates itself to it'. This is the typical character of consciousness that arises in the system to be overcome when we reach at absolute mind/spirit. Thus, the opposition between finite spirit (consciousness) and nature as its object in the phenomenology of spirit can be seen from the point of view of subjective standpoint of the system. The system proper is the system of absolute mind (spirit) or subject which is the unity of both logic and *realphilosophie* and the sublated unity of art and religion. This is philosophy: a concrete cultural or spiritual reality that takes self-knowing reason as its spiritual principle of knowing, that is, a concrete form of absolute idea that returns back through exhibiting logical form (method) or real knowing in its manifestation in nature and finite spirit. Philosophy is the highest form of knowing truth that comes after art and

religion. In addition, it is the knowing of everything either conceptual or real (substantial) in its nature. Philosophy can be said to be a free science of knowing not only as subject but also as substance. The movement of logic to nature is not a conceptual movement since logic in absolute idea already reaches at its absolute truth. Nor, we do have a transition from logic to nature rather what we have is a contraction of absolute idea into itself as totality as a return to 'immediacy of being' that is nature which is independent of thought or thought is implicit in it. This is like labeling a picture of Monalisa as a piece of canvass so to speak. Logic is an organic unity but it is also an abstraction in a sense in so far as it treats only thought or the purest staff of truth. Thus the immediacy of this purest staff in its totality gives us nature. This is a red light that tells us not to identify philosophy with logic as if it is the whole philosophy. Hegel claims at some point logical system is the concept of philosophy (its universality) but the concept realizes itself through further particularization. Then nature develops in its realm so as thought (idea) finally returns back to itself out of that otherness as the outcome of its own development as mind to nature in finite spirit. In short, Hegel would say nature is for mind. This return is not just the negation of nature but also sublation of the previous moments such as logic and nature; hence it is also a return to logic in a more concrete manner as spirit. The finite spirit develops and becomes absolute spirit. In absolute spirit (mind), philosophy is not just the highest form that will express the whole system of philosophy. It will also be the method (subject) or the knowing of forms of the determinacies of all determinations as logic, nature and finite spirit as their immanent truth. As such, it is a self knowing reason that particularizes itself in nature and spirit and remains to be the same in its differentiations. That is a reason to say logic becomes identical to philosophy whose

nature is self-knowing not merely logically but now also spiritually (real knowing in nature and human mind).

In general terms we can say that the system of philosophy aims at self-knowing not only logically in pure way (in its subject aspect) but also in the world of things (in its object-aspect) in the real way. This aim is realized as the aim of freedom (philosophy) only at the end of the process where system comes to know itself as what it is from the very beginning through the realization of the self knowing of the identity of the end with the beginning. This identity shows that there is a oneness of ontology and epistemology. This is philosophy as such that is self-knowing reason in its essence so to speak. Since in this case the 'essence' takes in its manifestations as a necessary mediation or constitution to be what it is, it is contrary to essentialists who take manifestations as reflections. To put it in other words, this is what it means to be both determining and determined in Hegel's logic of concept. The system knows itself through philosophy as logical element (self-knowing reason) is a universal form that is part and parcel of itself. Hence, the system is a unity of all its various aspects and it can only be known through philosophy that is speculative (retrospective or comes at the end) in its nature. The unity of the system is nothing but the nature of the concept or freedom (universal, particular and individual) which has to be corresponding with itself and become concrete through such correspondence both in its subject aspect and object aspect. In the coming chapters we examine how this correspondence unfolds itself.

CHAPTER I - ON THE PRESUPPOSITIONLESS BEGINNING OF SYSTEM PHILOSOPHY

1.1. An Overview on the Systemic view of Philosophy

System comes from the Greek *Synistemi*, I put together, signifying the way things get ordered or connected. System building may involve the ordering of things based on some fixed model that already existed. In addition, however, system may also involve the ordering of things 'in such a way that the order itself is thereby first projected' as self-ordering.¹ In this sense, system exhibits an inner necessity for everything in it including the system itself.

System of philosophy is the inner ordering of cognition in its necessary development. The possibility of system philosophy opened up in the modern period in accord with the feature of the epoch possessed as having a scientific world view in which self-certainty gets the front position in any conception of truth. System philosophy can be taken as the essential characteristic of modern period as the formation of system came under definite historical conditions. To put it differently, if we take the concept of system in its genuine sense, it can only come at specific time in an actual form.²

In the modern period, science (*Wissenschaft*) has a meaning similar with philosophy: Heidegger expressed philosophy of that time as 'knowledge that knows the last and first grounds and in accordance with this fundamental knowledge present what is essential in everything knowable in a reasoned-out essential connection'.³ Accordingly, all

knowledge (sciences) should be encompassed in philosophy in so far as philosophy is an inquiry that tries to reach at the essential knowledge in everything. Behind this scientific view of philosophy, we get 'a hidden task of philosophy'. This task is the system and for philosophers, the task is the building of such a system as it is. Before we come to the concept of system, let's see factors that are alleged to force philosophers to engage in the task of building system philosophy.

Heidegger⁴ listed six main conditions for the first formation of system in the modern era.

These are:

1. ***The predominance of the mathematical as the criteria of knowledge*** - This is a new orientation of knowledge in which there is no foundation of knowledge in the true sense of the term. Mathematical knowledge is characterized by self-origination and everything in it is within first principles and in terms of those principles.
2. ***The precedence of certainty over truth*** - This is related to the previous one in which knowledge of the mathematical requires certainty. This involves finding something knowable which at the same time makes itself a foundation. That is to say a search for knowledge that becomes founded through knowledge. This cannot be anything other than absolute knowledge which is not relative or dependent on anything. Absolute knowledge is knowledge that is completely in and through itself. Consequently, when knowledge is certain of itself, then that knowledge considers itself founded. This certainty, then, is the foundation of all knowledge. Thereby, reaching at certainty becomes of a primary importance

while the content is of secondary importance. Through this precedence of certainty over truth, we get an idea that certainty becomes part of truth and precedence is given to method over content.

3. ***The founding of certainty as the certainty of the "I think"!*** - This is a historical condition we get in Descartes, that is Ego - cogito as the ground and foundation to place knowledge in self certainty principle.
4. ***Thinking as the court of judgment for the essential determination of being*** - This makes 'being known' to be an essential part of truth or truly existent. Thinking judges what is real and unreal.
5. ***The shattering of the exclusive dominance of church faith in shaping knowledge*** - This is a turn to evaluate order and form truth in terms of pure thinking that knows its correctness based on self-certainty.
6. ***The setting free of man from the creative conquest and rules and new formation of being in all areas of human existence*** - In the context of the decline of the role of church in shaping truth, comes the view that sees it as a liberation of man to himself. But the liberation is situated in the definitely oriented history of this liberation. Human thinking as the power that forms man is part of what is real - law of things themselves. This begins the idea of conquering the world in knowledge and action.

Though it is not possible to determine the exact conditions that lead to the formation of system, we can see that those factors mentioned have influenced the proliferation of various systems of philosophy and as such characterize the modern period beginning with this task of building system as the quest of the period. Here we can mention Kant among others who tried to build a system philosophy based on a mathematical model.

G.F.W. Hegel is one of the great philosophers who tried to build the system of philosophy of his time. The Encyclopedia of philosophical sciences is his work that is written in the early 19th (1817, with new editions in 1827 and 1830) for this purpose. The Encyclopedia has three parts: Logic, Nature and Finite spirit. However, it is wrong to identify Hegel's system with this mere appearance of the specific order of the parts of the system.⁵ Philosophy, according to Hegel, can only be true when it is a system as a totality. The system, thereby, must exhibit the science of the sciences or the connection between the distinct parts of the philosophical science.

Hegel's systemic view of philosophy is clearly stated as:

"The thought, which is genuine and self-supporting, must be intrinsically concrete; it must be an idea, and when it is viewed in the whole of its universality, it is the idea, or the absolute. The science of this idea must form a system. For the truth is concrete; that is, while it gives a bond and principle of unity, it also possesses an internal source of development." (ENC I 14)

Any thought that claims to be true must be absolute or independent. If truth is dependent or relative to something other than itself, then that truth is not genuine and self-supporting. Truth is idea - an adequate concept. Concept is a category of freedom-a universal that remains to be the same in its particularization or differentiation. Concept must pass through stages like subjectivity and objectivity before it becomes idea. Idea is

an adequate concept (concrete) that possesses the whole development of the concept both as subjectivity and objectivity at once. To expose the true (idea as such), we need a system –as idea is unity of subjectivity and objectivity or intrinsically concrete. Hence, system is a totality in which idea remains self-identical and self-developing in its self-unfolding in so far as it is a free concept that overcomes mere subjectivity and mere objectivity.

In addition, this system becomes circular:

"Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle rounded and complete in itself. The whole philosophy in this way resembles a circle of circles."
(ENC I 15)

All parts of the system are circles as they are self-enclosed. The totality is a circle of those particular circles. Hence, Philosophy becomes science when it is circular - when there is a return to itself as a knowing of itself as a self-contained whole. Philosophy as science provides the ground for both its beginning and end without any presupposition from outside. This presuppositionlessness is the most peculiar character of Hegel's system that Hegel attempted to maintain through out the system of philosophy.

1.2. On the presuppositionless beginning

Logic is the first part of the system but we do not know that at first. If we do then it will be a presupposition of the system. This section examines how logic begins without any presupposition in its beginning. We know that the problem of foundation is a long-standing problem in philosophy. Finding a beginning in philosophy is a difficulty for thinkers and philosophy itself as a discipline. All other sciences begin with assumptions

about the subject matter and the method by which they address their subject matter. It is necessary to make a boundary in order to be a specific discipline. This boundary is not something to be questioned or examined for the sake of legitimizing its sphere of study. Rather, it is accepted as familiar truth. Due to this unquestioned assumption the knowledge they arrive at is relative to this assumption.⁶

Philosophy, in contrast, does not begin with any assumption about the subject matter and method of its study. This boundary is part of its investigation that has to be established in philosophical activity. Everything will emerge in the final result as the conclusion of the investigation. Thus, we cannot make any premise outside of the science - Logic makes an absolute beginning.⁷ Absolute beginning is different from relative beginning since it doesn't rely on any assumption whatsoever. Hegel criticizes traditional logic as it exhibits formal character. Formal logic presumes that the science of thinking (logic) is concerned with forwarding rules that are abstracted from any content. As the content is outside of the science of thinking (logic), this logic is not real since the content which is essential to the truth external to the logic. In addition, formal logicians are not aware of the fact that the rules themselves are the contents that constitute the logic. Moreover, this conception of logic relied on the opposition of consciousness that separates knowledge and the object or method and subject matter (content) has to be overcome before even we enter into philosophy. The opposition of consciousness takes in objects as given as if the truth is not the whole resulting in separation of truth and certainty while certainty itself should be part of truth.⁸

Hegel said 'what is first for thought ought also to be the first in the process of thinking.'⁹ This critic of Hegel is forwarded to those who make immediate or mediated beginning in philosophy. If one is beginning with an immediate principle, Hegel refutes their idea by asking why this immediate rather than something else. This goes to all beginnings in philosophy that make a particular determinate content like water, the one, nous, idea, substance, monad, and others their principle. Those philosophers should be able to justify or legitimize their immediate beginning. But if they do so then it will no more be an absolute and immediate beginning. If on the other hand one begins with a mediated principle, it will not fulfill the above prerequisite of being 'first for thought ought also to be first in the process of thinking'. Mediation implies relation to some other term or reference to something else as such the mediated beginning is not real beginning. It is a conditional or grounded beginning on some other term. This is begging the question- what is the ground of the grounding or the condition of the conditioning. In other words, the problem is the problem of abstraction or making thought outside of the science. Any kind of thought that is outside of science implies the science is not scientifically developed. Nonetheless, we should begin somewhere and the choices seem to be either an immediate or a mediated beginning which are already shown to be refutable. How does Hegel come out of this situation and able to begin his philosophy (logic)?

Hegel deduced the concept of pure science (philosophy) - the science of logic from phenomenology of spirit (PGS). PGS is the science of experience consciousness whose final outcome is absolute knowing. Absolute knowing is the truth of all modes of finite consciousness. This truth (Absolute knowing) resulted from the overcoming of the inherent problems of consciousness that functions in the separation (opposition) of the

object and the knowledge of the object. The science of consciousness (PGS) shows that consciousness take in object as given and distinguishes itself from the object to examine the equivalence of the certainty of itself and the truth (object). The gap between the two is eliminated only at the end of the science of consciousness (PGS) in absolute knowledge in which consciousness no more differentiates the subject and the object of its knowledge. Thus, the phenomenology of the spirit sets up a stage for the possibility of the beginning of philosophy.¹⁰ In philosophy, we get the opposition of consciousness overcome and changed into 'what it thinks' is itself as a thinking of thinking. At the end of the science of logic, we see that this thinking of thinking is a conceptual knowing of conceptual knowing. We get it as absolute idea or method (composed of Greek *meta*:after and *hodos*:way) as a way of attaining truth and become one with truth or totality and found immanent in all content. Here, we should remind ourselves that if method comes either at the outset or before the end, then it will be a presupposition or fails to encompass the whole truth respectively. Philosophy is a free and autonomous science independent of anything else. One of the central intriguing points in Hegel's system is that philosophy cannot be anything at the beginning of its determination or self-developing. Since philosophy is free and self-determining science, it will be what it is through establishing itself by a process of determinations that constitute what it is after full exposition as a final outcome. This point is universal (method) in philosophy as we realize it in other spheres of philosophical disciplines too. In other words, this is what it means for philosophy to be 'free and for itself' or the process of realization of freedom.

The Science of logic (philosophy) presupposes the overcoming of the separation between truth and certainty or object and knowledge of the object or method and content. The

science of logic starts when the object of thought is itself objective. Philosophy begins when we overcome the problem of the givenness of truth (the standpoint of *Gegenstand*) which externalizes the knowing subject from the truth as such makes its freedom limited. The immediacy of absolute knowing from the completion of the science of consciousness is the true beginning of philosophy in so far as truth is the same as certainty where we have no opposition between the object of thought and the knowledge of thought. This is objective thinking where the object of thought is thought itself. In the beginning of pure science we should refrain from assuming the separation of the subject and object of study since thought is both the subject and the object of the subject matter. It is this objective thinking in which the object of thought is thought itself that constitutes pure science.

In this manner, Hegel claims the beginning of philosophy or his system to be logical pure knowing that is 'free and for itself'¹¹. Pure knowing is only simple immediacy that has sublated all oppositions of consciousness. Hegel is not comfortable with using the term simple immediacy to absolute knowing since immediacy involves reference to what is not the mediated. Thus, Hegel should find the true object or expression of this simple immediacy. The true expression of this simple immediacy is pure being since it signifies the distinctionlessness of pure knowing. Pure being is being in general, without any further specification and filling.¹² Thus, pure being is the beginning of logic taken in immediately. This (pure being) is immediacy itself without any determination. It is completely indeterminate and it is supposed to prove itself to be the beginning in virtue of its final result as the beginning of what the beginning is. The beginning of logic is pure being. Pure being is completely indeterminate. However, things get qualified fairly soon, this indeterminacy of the beginning becomes determinacy if we at least draw a distinction

between the two. In this way thought starts to move in thought. We should not bring in conceptions of time and space as we are in the sphere of pure science in itself. Let's see just one triad of the logic of being at the beginning¹³ (being, nothing and becoming).

Pure being, without any further determination. It is indeterminate immediacy. It is equal only to itself and also not unequal relative to another. We cannot use any other term that is employed to plurality of entities since it is equal only to itself. We cannot refer to it the other since it has no relation or difference to be what it is.

It is not unequal relative to another. Pure being has no diversity with itself or outside of itself. Otherwise it would be determinate and lacks its purity. The purity of being is its indeterminacy with respect to something else or internally. In pure being there is pure intuiting or it intuits nothing. There is nothing determinate to be thought in it. It is empty thinking. In fact, being is nothing.

Nothing is a second category next to pure being. We do not have any procedure to transform being to nothing. Being is immediately nothing. Pure nothing is equal to itself like pure being. With respect to intuiting it is empty intuition. Like pure being we have complete indeterminacy in pure nothing.

Pure being and pure nothing are the same. Pure nothing depends on pure being for it to be. The unity of pure being and pure nothing is becoming.

In this logic we saw that we have being that is immediately nothing and nothing that is immediately being. Thus we have becoming. Pure being and pure nothing are the same but now one has passed over to the other without any mediation or middle term. This is because both of them are indeterminacy without content.

But they are absolutely distinct in contrast to being relatively distinct in which we need some factor to differentiate between them. Here we have them as distinguishable but inseparable at the same time.

The moments of becoming are coming to be and ceasing to be. Becoming contains both moments as distinct elements and at the same time inseparable. Becoming as unity of the two moments is more than just being and just nothing. This unity is a determinate unity that is also a sublation. This is because both being and nothing immediately vanishes or gives way to one another.

The two sides of becoming are one that starts from being and the other that starts from nothing cancels them from within to be their opposite. It is the immediacy of this process that we call becoming composed of coming to be and ceasing to be.

The two moments of becoming compose becoming itself that is the conjunction of being and nothing with one another. We have being and nothing in becoming as a stable unity. In this unity being and nothing are vanishing moment. Yet as a double side vanishing rests on their distinguishedness.

However, their vanishing means the vanishing of becoming. There is something self – contradictory about becoming. The unity in becoming is a unity of opposites. But the unity in becoming is a union that vanishes - itself. The result is the collapse of becoming. But, is it nothing? No, it is not. Because, this would bring us back to an already sublated determination (sublation is the most popular term in Hegelianism that refers to German *aufheben* meaning to cancel, preserve and lift up at the same time which is very important to understand how dialectic in philosophy functions). Rather the result is a stable oneness- determination of the whole that consists both being and nothing. It is being as a determination of the whole.

Thus becoming a unity which is in the form of being is determinate being- determinacy as such that can be explained by not any other resources than just being and nothing in the form of one-sided immediate unity. The movement continues through overcoming the immediacy the unity we saw at the end that is a unity as a determinate being.

In this determination of the beginning we see nothing more than the self movement of thought. Even the self in question can only be spoken of in this minimal sense of determinacy as such. Thus at the beginning of Hegel's system we see no relation between the terms, no concept of the terms and also no method or knowing of the terms involved. All these things come on their own and justify what the beginning is the beginning of at the end of the science.

Hegel's logic is divided into two major volumes: the objective logic and the subjective logic. The objective logic has two major books: the logic of being and the logic of

essence. The objective logic is taken by Hegel as the logic of his predecessors that is unable to make an adequate exposition of truth. The subjective logic constitutes his logic of truth that is the logic of the concept. Hegel's science of logic consists of three major different types of logics of being, essence and concept. These logics have their own peculiar characteristics and connectedness from one part to the other part as logic doesn't allow inserting in anything new outside of the science.

Before we see the logic of Hegel's system that is the logic of concept (the logic of truth), I would like to compare and contrast the three logics of Hegel. We will see in the next chapter the logic of concept which is Hegel's logic of truth that unites the preceding logics of being and essence.

In the logic of being, terms are introduced immediately one after the other as we saw it in the initial movement of being, nothing and becoming. The logic of being is the logic of immediacy. The term being immediately gives rise to what is not-being. The term something immediately gives rise to the other or not something. The term finite gives rise to infinite (not finite). The term one gives rise to the many, repulsion to attraction, quality as a whole to quantity. And finally the unity of quality and quantity goes to measure - a qualitative quantity. We come out of the logic being, when measure gives rise to the measureless, to essence. As the saying goes the logic of being is 'one damn thing coming after another'.

In the logic of essence, terms are mediated (reflected). The logic of essence is the logic of meditation (reflection). This is a higher logic of knowing in contrast to logic of being. We

have a two- tiered relation. There is a determiner and the determined, the ground and the grounded, cause and effect and other similar relation. We come out of the sphere of logic of essence, when logic overcomes or removes the difference between the two tiered relations in which the determiner has a primacy over the determined or the positing has a primacy over the posited. This two tiered relation is eliminated when we come to the logic of concept that unifies positedness and being-in-and-for itself. In other words, concept holds in unity being determined as determining. In the logic of being, what unfolds is determinacy and there is no determiner. All terms are coeval. In the logic of essence, there is a primacy of the determiner over what it determines.

In the logic of concept, the difference between the determining and the determiner is removed and active determining is equally being determined. This sphere of logic is a sphere of freedom since we are dealing with self - determination whereby we have an identity of the determiner and the determined. Thus, we can say that the logic of concepts is the logic of truth as it sets out to be the whole in and through itself. And for Hegel, truth is the whole. The concept seems to be both immediacy and mediation simultaneously. The concept is immediacy in so far as it doesn't depend upon something outside or external to it for its determination and also mediation in so far as it has a self-meditated character. The logic of concept can be said to be a unity of the preceding logic of being and logic essence and also a sublation of them. It embraces their one-sided character that makes them to be abstract determination in unity and make them more concrete. As an immediate-meditation, the concept has development as its typical character different from the logic of being and the logic of essence. It can be considered as a self (subject) that is what it is through its own activity of determining (choices so to

say) itself. In the next chapter we will deal with the logic of concept as the logic of truth or system in more detail. Finally in the third chapter we will see the significance of the three logics in the determination of the system of philosophy adequately.¹⁴

NOTES

1. Heidegger (1985), 22
2. Heidegger said that it will be a misunderstanding of the concept of system in external sense if we expect to find system in Greek or Medieval philosophy. (ibid, 22-28)
3. ibid, 16
4. ibid, 29-31
5. See at Chapter III for the explanation of the syllogism based on the logic of concept under the title the third syllogism (section 3.3)
6. Hegel (1989), 42
7. ibid
8. ibid, 42-3
9. ibid, 67-68
10. ibid, 48-49
11. ibid, 68
12. ibid, 81
13. ibid, 82-108
14. Look at the whole third chapter to get the details.

CHAPTER II. HEGEL'S LOGICAL TRUTH

Hegel's logical truth can only be shown through the correspondence between concept and its objectivity. This is a classic correspondence theory of truth. In Hegel such a correspondence turns out to be idea. Idea is the true or the truth per se.

Hegel's logical truth is explicated through the logic of concept or freedom. Truth (idea) is the adequacy of freedom (concept) to itself. At first, the concept is only something subjective or inner as such it is formal concept that has not yet come to be its own subject matter. Understanding determines concept in fixed form, as such the concept is "external form which cannot count as a being-in-and-for-self" (SL 597). Immediacy (givenness) of the concept, through the collapse of logic of essence specifically through reciprocity of cause and effect, in fixed form puts it in dialectical motion to overcome this formal aspect as we are in the realm of freedom and self-determination that puts it in such activity. The movement consists in avoiding the 'separatedness between moments' as false externality so to say. The movement of the concept as subjectivity consists in three moments (concept per se, judgment and syllogism) which are the processes of overcoming its mere subjective aspect and come to objectivity.

Objectivity is the objective concept. It is 'the subject matter in and for self'. As such, the concept bears 'a free determinate being of its own'. But as objectivity comes to the front through the collapse of subjectivity particularly from disjunctive syllogism, it has an immediate character of mere objectivity without its own subjectivity. Thus its dialectical moments (mechanism, chemism and teleology) result in giving it the form of subjectivity.

At this point concept becomes free concept that is now adequate through removing its formal aspect and indifferent objectivity. Here the concept is idea that is the correspondence between concept and its objectivity.

In this chapter we go through the logic of concept in its subjectivity, objectivity and as idea from the point of view of deciphering in which respect the one-sided aspect of moments of subjectivity and objectivity should be overcome in order to fully realize the free concept.

2.1. Subjectivity

2.1.1. Concept

The genesis of concept comes through the closure of logic of essence which also comes through the closure of logic of being. The concept thus embraces being and essence in some way. The logic of being is immediacy or 'determinacy as such' in which one damn thing comes after another. The logic of essence is mediation or relation in which we have a determining and determined. Now the logic concept as their unity is self determining in which we have a determination but as self determination. It is immediacy but also self mediating. Here, being determined will be the same as to determine. It is being-in-and-for-itself which is as much positedness.

Hence, conceptual determinations are self-differentiations. Any determination now becomes the whole concept, a determinate concept and a determination of the concept¹. Thereby, concept is universal, particular and individual.

Universal Concept

The concept is original and positing as it posits itself and not posited by anything from the outside. The logic of concept is self-determination that is ‘pure self-relation of concept to itself’ (SL 601). This is universality, hence concept should engage in the process to be what it is. When it exhibits such character it will only be self-differentiation as there is nothing other than itself.

Particular Concept

The universal concept in its differentiation is particular concept. Particularity is not otherness (logic of being) or difference (logic of essence), it is concept as particularity. Hence, particular concept is universal concept. We have now two species: the universal itself and the particular.

“The universal as concept is itself and its opposite, and this again is the universal itself as its posited determinateness, it embraces its opposite and in it is in union with itself.” (SL 606)

Individual concept

Individuality is the particularized universal that is the unity of itself and other. At first, thereby, individuality is ‘the reflection of the concept out of its determinateness into itself’ (SL 618). This aspect of individuality is ‘self-mediation’ that is a self-related moment of the concept. Thus, individuality is one determination of the concept along side others. As such the individual concept is the particular concept; the particular concept is also universal since all moments share it. Hence, all determination is totality and

individuality. This makes the moments of the concept an actuality that is self subsistent in and through themselves. This return of individuality resulted in original partition of the concept in so far as that mediation is not outside of the concept.

“Individuality is not only the return of the concept into itself, but immediately its loss. Through individuality, where the concept is internal to itself, it becomes external to itself and enters to actuality.” (SL 621)

The concept now posited as judgment (the German *Urteil*, its root word, signifies partition) which is the determining of concept by determinate concept.

2.1.2. Judgment

Judgment is ‘the determining of the concept by itself’ (SL 622) or ‘the positing of the determinate concept by the concept itself’ (SL 622). Individuality brings forth the moments of the concept in which each is totality and individuality. As such we see partition of the concept that we call now judgment. Judgment is a necessary consequence of self-determining concept.

We started with the concept per se as fixed determination of universality, particularity and individuality. Now we come to the determination of the concept as individuals which are themselves universals. Thus, if we say at the beginning, for instance, the universal is individual. Now we say the individual is universal as a particularized universal. At first, judgment is the determination of concept (subject) as ‘individuality is universality’ while earlier the case was concept as fixed moments of universality, particularity and individuality. In judgment we have relation between moments as subject and predicate coupled with the copula (is). The function of this copula is important in determining the

process in judgment as the copula tries to unite the moments as one equivalent moments of the concept without separatedness.

Judgment collapses when its unifying element is excluded as an external or merely subjective element from the subject matter. The copula (is) is mere subjective aspect of judgment as the unifying element is not part and parcel of the subject matter. We are in the sphere of the logic of concept which is free and universal and expected to determine itself fully out of its own resources. Hence judgment engages in dialectical movement so as to erase the external element and become syllogism:

Types of judgment	Types of universal	The status of individuality	Examples
Judgment of Quality	Abstract	Abstract	Rose is red
Judgment of Reflection	Class	Individuality through membership	All plants are medicinal
Judgment of Necessity	concrete	Individuality through necessity	Gold is metal
Judgment of the concept	concrete	Individuality through particularization	The house constituted so and so is good

Table 2.1

It is through the judgment of the concept that we come out of judgment as such. In the judgment of the concept, terms no more merely get connect by the copula (is) rather terms get connected through right particularization that demonstrates such character of unifying the subject and predicate. For example if we say ‘the house constituted so and so

is good' then both the subject and predicate particularized as such we are not in judgment but in syllogism which is a kind of inference based on concept or particularity as it is one element of the concept.

2.1.3. Syllogism

Syllogism is 'the restoration of the concept in the judgment' (SL 664). This restoration is the restoration of the element of the concept that is particularity in order to justify or demonstrate the truth of the judgment. Hence, we have now a fulfilled copula that is the particular taking the place of it. Accordingly, the individual and the universal are now connected by the element of the concept (the particular).

Syllogism collapses when the particular is no more distinct from the extremes. At that point concept becomes objective concept that is self- subsistent subject matter in which the middle term and the extremes are similar content. In order to accomplish this syllogism passes through three moments:

A) Syllogism of determinate being

B) Syllogism of Reflection

C) Syllogism of Necessity

N.B. We may refer to table 2.1 to get additional analysis on the type universals involved, the status of individuality and examples. We can do this through comparing the corresponding judgments to their syllogisms. This is possible as syllogism is nothing but a series of judgments.

It is through syllogism of necessity particularly disjunctive syllogism that syllogism is no more syllogism (middle term distinct from the extremes). Disjunctive syllogism takes the shape of:

A is B, C or D

A is neither C nor D.

Therefore, A is B

The three premises in disjunctive syllogism exhibit the same content. As a result of this the form of syllogism is no more there as we have no distinction between middle term and extremes. Extremes are no longer dependent on something outside them for their determination. Each is the same totality at each juncture of the form of syllogism. Here we see that the universal necessarily differentiates itself as a concrete universal.

The middle term in disjunctive syllogism is ‘pregnant with form’ that take the schema of universality, particularity and individuality. Hence the middle term is:

“As universality it is first the substantial identity of the genus, but secondly an identity that embraces with itself particularity, but a particularity co-extensive with the identity of the genus.” (SL 701)

In disjunctive syllogism, the middle term contains the extremes as totality of the concept. Thus, through disjunctive syllogism we can deduce the objects by removing the last remnant of subjectivity or externality of subject matter. The mere subjective aspect of syllogism (distinctness of the middle term) is now removed as the concept accounts for all its content by itself.

“The formal side of syllogism consists in the fact that the mediating factor of extremes is the concept as an abstract determination, and this latter is distinct from the extremes whose unity it is” (SL 703)

In disjunctive syllogism, we do not have such distinction between the middle term and what is mediated. All the three terms have the same content. That is why we are able now to go to objectivity.

“In the consummation of syllogism, on the other hand, where objective universality is no less posited as totality is the form determinations, the distinction of mediating and mediated has disappeared. That which is mediated is itself an essential moment of what mediates it, and each moment of what mediates it, and each moment appears as the totality of what is mediated.” (SL 703)

This is what has been all along the way from concept to objectivity that is what mediates and what gets mediated are the same as the nature of the concept is to remain the same in its self-differentiations. Hence Hegel continued to say “the concept ... has obtained a reality that is objectivity”. (SL 703) If we think of what reality is this reality, it is the correspondence between concept and its objectivity. That is what it means for the concept to be real. Reality comes from the Latin *realitus* that means ‘that which constitutes the thing (*res*) in what it is. The reality (that which constitute) of concept is objectivity in the true sense of the term.

2.2. Objectivity

A transition to objectivity is made possible by the self-knowing transformation of subjectivity specifically through disjunctive syllogism². In disjunctive syllogism we have removed of the last element of subjectivity. Now we move to objectivity that possesses objective universality in which form and content are similar entities. Contrary to subjectivity, we have concrete content in objectivity. Subjectivity, as we have seen, exhibits formal content in which the form of universality doesn’t directly entail its content without conditionedness or reliance on something external for its determination.

Both the mediating factor and what gets mediated are in immediate identity in objectivity. As such we can say in objectivity the concept is realized concept as that which is self-determining and totality. As the object in objectivity is totality that is comprised of the universal that has particularized itself and gives itself individuality, now the object stands in completely external relation with entities of such sort. It is a peculiar characteristic of objectivity to be completely indifferent to relations between objects. Objectivity is immediacy from the collapse of subjectivity thereby subjectivity is implicit in it at first. Immediacy should always be overcome as it is externality or givenness which doesn't fit in the domain of self-determination; hence objectivity gives itself the moment of subjectivity through moments that includes mechanism, chemism and teleology.

2.2.1. Mechanism

In objectivity, we do no more have that disparity between what mediates and what is mediated. Rather we are dealing with what is in and through itself in which the relation between objects has no bearing on what they are. As objects are now totalities on their own, relations are external to them. This moment of objects is called mechanism in which objects exhibit indifference.

Those objects that arise from disjunctive syllogism are called mechanical objects. Mechanical objects are similar with Leibniz's Monads. Monads in Leibniz is totality that is necessarily entailed by its concept since it is possible to completely exhaust monads through their concept in a similar manner we see in disjunctive syllogism in which objectivity resulted from the equivalence between the mediation of middle term and the

mediated extremes. Everything about monads is found in the monad just as everything about the extremes in the disjunctive syllogism is found in the middle as they have similar content. Monad could not be determined from anything outside it. It is completely mediated that cannot be penetrable by outside factor. It is concrete unity. Similarly, mechanical objects are the unity of form and matter in which 'particularity is absolutely reflected in the totality'. (SL 712)

Mechanical objects, at first, are indeterminate except that they are just objects. As mechanical objects arise from concepts, they are, in a sense, concepts with parts. However, as the outcome of disjunctive syllogism shows each part is now as much totality as totality is. To put it differently, each premises are universal, particular and individual. Hence, we have a plurality of objects in aggregate manner. Mechanical objects engage in mechanical process which is a double side determinateness of objectivity as indifference of objects for relation and also however indifference becoming determinateness peculiar to objects. Mechanical process passes through stages:

A) Formal Mechanical Process

B) Real Mechanical Process

C) Absolute Mechanical Process, that allows for transition to chemism that overcomes some level of lack of self-determination on the part of objects due to their indifference to mechanical relations they engage in.

2.2.2. Chemism

Through various forms of syllogistic stages, mechanism ends up in chemism. While in mechanism objects are almost indeterminate with respect to relations they engage in, chemism arises to the extent that this external relation to objects is just as much is determined or posited by these objects. In chemism, relations are taken to be dependent on objects own nature (impossible if it were not for objects themselves). Objects in chemism do not lose their character of being self-subsistent objects. But those external relations between them have a link to their nature. In chemical process, we have objects drawn to one another. However, they do not make themselves coalesce. Rather something else does the job of creating unity. Thus, in chemism, objects are tensed to react one another while still the relations made possible depend on objects (that is to what they are). Hence, in contrast to mechanism, in chemism relations are dependent on objects.

In chemism, there is a product that is different from objects in relation. We also have a third factor engaged in the relation. The product or neutralization involves third factor. This makes chemism not fully self-determinate in so far as external factor facilitate the neutralization process.

Neutralization in chemism as unity is not equivalent to the process that is with respect to a reference to the third factor involved in the process. It would be equivalent if the product comes from the objects themselves. In chemical process, we see the self-realizing unity in contrast to external objectivity that serves as means for its own realization. This sets up a situation for teleology (an end). This end is subjective end, at first, in so far as it stands in relation to given or external objectivity poised to be realized.

2.2.3. Teleology

Teleology is the implicit truth of mechanism and chemism. Teleology has final causality in contrast to an efficient casualty we see in chemism and mechanism.

Teleology has three moments; **subjective end, means, and realized end**. At first teleology is external teleology that arises from chemical process exhibiting the determinability of the objects by an end external to it. This determinability is subjective end as it has its ideal external to the objective world. Subjectivity in Hegel has double sense, it refers to subject that is self-determining and it also refers to inner, formal, abstract hidden, not fully realized objectivity. Subjective end is

“An internality... confronted by objective, mechanical and chemical world to which its objectivity relates itself as to something already there” (SL 742).

Thus, Subjective end is finite for two reasons. First, it is a determinate content. As such, subjective ends are individualized, multiple, dependent, arbitrary and contingent, hence lack intrinsic necessity of the objects. As the subjective end is confronted by an external objectivity, it is not itself an objective reality. As such this is called a finite end since the subjective end stands over and against another that limits it. Secondly, teleology has a means by which a subjective end is realized. Hegel used syllogism to explain this, the syllogism between the subjective end, the goal to be achieved and a means. The minor term is a subjective end. The major term is the goal. The middle term is the means. Thus, it is not fully self-determining.

The means is the object itself that functions itself as a tool for realization of the end. The means is not the end by itself. Yet, it seems that the end needs some means to be able to

realize end as it will not realize itself immediately in the product. The subjective end should immediately become means to realize end. Otherwise we will fall in infinite regress if means requires means to be means. Means should immediately happen from the subjective end. Means facilitates the realization of end. It is not objectifying itself. The subjective end has to go outside of itself to realize itself that is why we said it is finite. It confronts its object over and against itself. The nature of means is to subordinate itself to the realization of the end.

“Universality is the relation of the activity of the end and the means...To the end (intention), therefore, which is the posited concept, it (means) is absolutely penetrable, and reception of the communication, because it is in itself identical with the end...consequently the object has the character of being powerless against the end and of serving it; the end is the object’s subjectivity or soul, that has in the object its external side”. (SL 745)

Thirdly, teleology is realized end,

“The conclusion or the product of the purposive act is nothing but an object determined by an end external to it: consequently it is the same thing as the means. In such a product, therefore, only a means, not a realized end, has resulted, or the end, has not truly attained an objectivity in it” (SL 749-750)

In the realized end, we see that objectivity itself was the means of subjective ends own self-realization. The fully realized end is the entire system of lower ends, means and objects. To construct the whole, we must recognize the priority of the whole and see the subsidiary subsequent of determinacies distilled out of the whole.

“The movement of the end has now reached the stage where the moment of externality is not merely posited in the concept, where the end is not merely an ought-to-be and striving to realize itself, but as a concrete totality is identical with the immediate objectivity”. (SL 753)

Hegel’s grandest claim is that the totality necessarily has a certain essential structure.

And uncovering the nature of totality is the major object of Hegel’s system.³

“The consummation of the infinite End, therefore, consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. The Good, the absolutely Good, is eternally accomplishing itself in the world: and the result is that it need not wait upon us, but is already by implication, as well as in full actuality, accomplished. This is the illusion under which we live”. (ENC I. 212, Zustaz)

2.3. Idea

Idea arises from the collapse of external teleology in the realized end which is the unity of both end and external objectivity. Idea is internally purposive in so far as it is a unity of subjective concept and its objectivity. Idea is not concept per se rather an adequate concept or the true as such. Idea overcomes all the limitations associated with the moments of either one-sided subjectivity or objectivity. Thus, idea is a self-related negative unity that can distinguish itself into two components of subjectivity and objectivity to further realization based on what it realizes. Objectivity of idea is nothing more than the realization of end posited by itself. We have stages idea passes through starting from immediacy as life to mediation as cognition, till it gets its Absolute form. In its immediacy the idea is only in its concept that is to say it's objectivity is 'not liberated again into its concept'. It did not determine what itself is theoretically. And on the other hand, the concept 'doesn't exist for itself as concept'. (SL 759) It did not determine what itself ought to be practically. Thus at this stage, there is not self-manifestation of idea in its essential relations that come out of its constitutive elements including subjectivity and objectivity.⁴ In the second form that is in cognition, we can expect the overcoming of this problem of immediacy through mediation. Here the idea will be in its judgment (*urteil*) from either of the two sides: for itself as concept or objective reality taking the shape of the concept. Absolute idea will be the unity this two aspects of the idea in its judgment.

2.3.1. Idea as life

Life is for its own sake in so far as it is means and end to itself. Life is means to its own perpetuation. The end is realized and functions in this realization of what it realizes as such it is internally purposive. Life is not static as it is a negative unity. Rather, life is an active positing, renewing and sustaining of itself as a product of its own existence in so far as it has itself as given unlike external teleology.

The processes life engages in are as **living individual, life process** and **genus**. Life as **living individual** is its own internal process like an organic unity that stands in its own right. As such corporeality is external to it. This is the first opposition life engages in. This process involves **sensibility, irritability** and **reproduction**. As **sensibility**, it is immediate form with omnipresence in its body as soul to body.⁵As **irritability**, it is reciprocal relation or affinity between the organism and its external world. But as **reproduction**, it is perpetually resorting itself from inner distinction of its members or organs. The relation between organs and organism is peculiar as organs serve as means and end one another for the sake of their sustenance. The organism as a whole is concrete and determines its components. Life as life process is not merely inwardly but sustains itself in relation to what is outside. This involves **metabolism** or **assimilation** which is the peculiarity of living being in embracing the inorganic elements in it. In this process, the external objectivity gets integrated to life and exhibits a higher level of existence. The result of life process gives us **genus** or **kind**. The genus is a combination of specific order of the living being. Genus is a generic name for living individuals.

As a genus life reproduces itself in a number of individuals through the connecting of them as its species. This sets up a situation for cognition in which life sustains itself as a genus that separates itself out of immediate living individuals. The limits of life consist in its lack of corresponding between its concept and objective reality. Hence, in life soul is not yet freely self-conscious. The process of life consists in overcoming this preliminary stage of being. Passing through various stages, life becomes a genus in which the process of self-consciousness as subjectivity and objectivity is explicit. This is cognition. Cognition involves a rationalizing activity of the objective world and also an assertion of subjective ideals in the midst of objective phenomena of being, modifying and adopting them to its needs and standards. The first process is theoretical activity and the second process is practical activity.⁶

2.3.2. Idea as Cognition

Idea in its judgment is cognition. Contrary to life, cognition involves the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity within idea. Life like concept per se is a process within while cognition like judgment per se is a relation between elements within. The opposition between subjectivity and objectivity brings in knowing -a driving force that brings forth further development till idea overcomes such separatedness or opposition.

“ The concept, having truly attained its reality, is this absolute judgment whose subject, as self-related negative unity, distinguishes itself from its objectivity and is the latter’s being-in-and-for-itself, but essentially relates itself to it through itself, it is therefore its own end and the urge to realize it” (SL 758)

Idea as adequate concept is concerned with truth. It involves a process or an urge to accomplish self-realization. Thus, at some point, logic should treat cognition as part of its

truth that as it is the case that without knowing, how can we know we know the truth. We already have seen, in the first chapter, logic does not allow anything from outside, knowing should be part and parcel of truth. However, cognition is not philosophical knowing as it is not absolute knowing if it were so, it would also be at the same time the method of the subject matter. A philosophical knowing cannot separate the subject matter and method of the investigation of the subject matter. In absolute knowing, the subject matter and method will be one. If cognition were philosophical knowing, we would have method before we reach at the end; an impossible event in science. The issue here is that truth should contain or involve the knowing of truth and it should only occur at the end or the conclusion of the science. When we talk about truth, it couldn't be truth if knowing is outside of such truth. Knowing should be found in the truth. As a matter of fact such knowing can only come at the end since there cannot be other truth which is yet to be known after we reach at the knowing of truth.

Cognition is not a philosophical knowing as it is only a search for truth that sets as its goal the searching of such truth. The goal of cognition is either the true or the good whose realization remains to be one-sided as its modification fall on the one side of the twofold unity of idea as subjectivity and objectivity. When transformation occurs on the side of subjectivity, then we have a theoretical activity of idea. When transformation occurs on the side of objectivity, then we have a practical activity of idea.

Unlike teleology (external), in the idea objectivity is conformable to the concept as the concept is adequate in the idea overcoming mere subjectivity and objectivity. But in external teleology we saw that subjective end is contrasted with the objectivity that is

external to it. As such the realized end requires a mediation of the means for its realization. But in cognition the end is objective as it is either the true or the good. The theoretical activity of the idea has its goal as the true in which the process involves a conceptualization that inherently is at one with objectivity. The practical activity of idea has the good as its goal in which the process involves transformation of objectivity in accord with the conceptual determination of subjectivity. Both these complimentary processes are finite to the extent that theorizing is theorizing and practical activity is practical. With respect to the finitude of cognition, Hegel said

“While idea is indeed the free concept has itself for object, yet it is immediate... what it seeks is the true... in its first stage still subjective.” (SL 782)

“ Since therefore in this cognition the concept posits the object as its own, the idea in the first instance only gives itself a content whose basis is given, and in which only the form of externality has been sublated. Accordingly, this cognition still retains its finitude in its realized end, in its realized end it has at the same time not attained its end, and in its truth has not yet arrived at truth. For in so far as in the result the content still has the character of a datum, the presupposition implicit being confronting the concept is not sublated; equally therefore the unity of the concept and reality, truth, is also not contained in it.” (SL 784-785)

Hence, subjectivity in theoretical cognition is going to determine itself in accord with objectivity and rely on its own conceptual determination, and still retain difference from objectivity. It arrives at truth only in theory. Cognition, in general, is classified in two: theoretical and practical cognition. Theoretical cognition further divided into two: analytic and synthetic cognition.

The process of cognition can be exemplified by the opposition of consciousness we have in the phenomenology of the spirit (PGS). This opposition in cognition is between subjectivity and objectivity in which the concept (subject) distinguishes itself from the

objectivity and relates itself to it. In the PGS, Hegel made an opposition between consciousness and its object. In **sense certainty**, for instance, we see consciousness describing what it immediately senses as it is, we just have a mental representation of what is given independently. This is not the same as cognition though we do have a similar kind of opposition between subjectivity and objectivity and their unity as a goal. In analytic cognition (first kind of theoretical cognition), for instance, we see an immediate theorizing about the given but it is not mere description. Theorizing like induction tries to hold on to the universal aspect of cognition on the basis of what is given. In analytic cognition, we have two elements that separate it from mere descriptive consciousness: positing and presupposing. Positing is positing what is given in the form of the concept. The presupposing is about the positing or conforming that is taken for granted. This means theorizing leaves out what gives the basic individuality of the given.

“Analytic cognition, the transformation of the given material into logical determination, has shown itself to be two things in one; a positing that itself no less immediately determines itself as a presupposing.” (SL 788)

In analytic cognition, idea takes in objectivity as given. There is a passive element (subjectivity) in this process of getting what truly is. The immediate apprehension of the given has shown us the lack of synthetic cognition or passivity in cognition. Here, idea is basically conceiving what is given- datum. In this conceding to what is given, the given has the character of individuality. Individuality, however, is a manifold with multiplicity of character. Hence, any attempt to put the given individuality in the form of the concept wouldn't bring us to concrete universality rather we get an abstract or class universals. Analytic cognition is mainly characterized by Hegel as a cognition we get in problem and proof that we see, for instance, in arithmetic problems.

“But if analytic proposition is not to mean the completely abstract identity and tautology $12=12$ and is to contain any advance at all, it must present a difference of some kind, though a difference not based on any quality, on any determinateness of reflection, and still less of the concept. $5+7$ and 12 are out and out the same content; the first side also express as the demand that 5 and 7 shall be combined in one expression; that is to say’ that just as 5 is the result of a counting up in which the counting was quite arbitrary broken off and could just as well have been contained, so now, in the same way, the counting is to be continued with the condition that the ones to be added shall be seven. The 12 is therefore a result of 5 and 7 and of an operation which is already posited and in its nature is an act completely external and devoid of any thought.” (SL 791)

In synthetic cognition, there is a transition from abstract identity that exhibits abstract universal and particular content to difference or mediation. Analytic cognition should inherently become synthetic cognition in so far we are concerned with the search for truth. Unlike analytic cognition, we have theorem and proof in synthetic cognition. The proof plays the role of mediation to capture the individual. In proof the solution we get is not immediately at hand like analytic cognition. Synthetic cognition involves mediation through conceptual mediation to arrive at truth. Truth, in its nature, requires mediation as it doesn't immediately relate to the given that is a manifold individual. Synthetic cognition has three methods to grasp the individual in their progressive form: definition, division and theorem.

In definition, cognition tries to identify genus that allows for the differentiation of universality and particularity. Definition has its limits in that we already saw in the types of the judgments that use genus and species in which we see a necessary relation with the two (genus and species) but still leaves the individuality of the species without any account or treatment.

In division, the limitation of the definition brings us to division; still, the move from universal to its particularization is not analytic or deducible. It confronts objectivity. Still we are in the problem of cognition that tries to conceptualize 'what is'. We do not have any principle to make division. As such theorizing through division has its own problem: individuality never laid hold of through division. There is something that has not yet ever been laid hold of through division. To put it in other words, there is something that is not yet fully self-determining and determined which makes it incompatible to the domain of freedom. The problem of taxonomization will be better solved through theorem.

In theorem, we get various degrees of exhaustive determination in a similar way we get in Euclidean Geometry. Theorems are by definition proven. Theorem has a proof that allows accounting for individuality as a unification of universality, and its particularization. That unification rests upon proof in theorem. Proof plays a connective role between conceptualization and objectivity. Hence, the particularization still exhibits a character of a datum or as found through given. Theorem has principle of particularization (axiom) that is taken as given at first but be proved. Truth is constructed in this synthetic cognition by the demonstration. Demonstration brings with it necessity. The product that comes with necessity has some externality as there is a presupposition of working on necessity that is imposed on terms. Truth should remove externality in this case necessity and should exhibit immanent kind of determination if it is truth, what is. This takes us to the next part of cognition that is volition (idea of good).

This very end of synthetic cognition sets up a stage for practical cognition and closure of theoretical cognition. Practical cognition still involves the opposition of subjectivity and

objectivity like theoretical cognition. Thereby, it involves the process or the urge for further realization. We have already seen at first, this urge takes the form concerned with theoretical cognition that involves conceptual determination to take on the character of the given determinacy of what objectively is. That leaves the theoretical cognition be subjective or a one-sided correspondence in a sense. Now the opposition becomes practical in which the process is concerned with producing something that will alter objectivity to make it true or what it ought to be. The modification, now takes place at the side of objective reality in accord with what is achieved in the true domain of subjectivity or conceptualization. Here, objectivity is still given but taken as untrue that has not been thoroughly conceptually determinable but still determinable. In practical cognition, subjectivity already has a content that is worthy of being true. But the objectivity it confronts doesn't conform to it. The discrepancy in the theoretical cognition is empty conceptualizability of the objective that is given and achieves correspondence in the domain of theory. In practical cognition, what counts as objective is already mistaken to be truthful. Hence, the opposite situation happens that is the subjective side is a determination that is true as it has individuality – universality that has particularized itself. Thus, the transformation follows the logic of external teleology in which subjective end becomes realized end.

“The syllogism of immediate realization itself requires no detailed exposition here, it is altogether the same as the syllogism of external purposiveness considered above, it is only the content that constitutes the difference.” (SL 819)

If we remind ourselves what has happened in external teleology, we have two premises or two stages to get at the product. The first premise is the immediate communication of the subjective end with the means. The second premise is the relation between the means and the realized end in which the means is employed as a mediation for the realization of the

end. That is the **cunning of reason** Hegel talks about, sometimes also called the **cunning of history** to give similar account in historical process of development of consciousness. The cunning of reason involves the action of one object over another object by means of which the end is realized irrespective of individual whims or in some cases through individuals who grasped the spirit of the age.

“Reason is as cunning as it is powerful. Cunning may be said to lie in the intermediative action which, while it permits the objects to follow their own bent and act upon one another till they waste away, and does not itself directly interfere in the process, is nevertheless only working out its own aims. With this explanation, Divine Providence may be said to stand to the world and its process in the capacity of absolute cunning. God lets men do as they please with their particular passions and interests; but the result is the accomplishment of-not their plans, but his, and these differ decidedly from the ends primarily sought by those whom he employs.” (ENC I. 209, Zustaz)

“That the end posits itself in a mediate relation with the object and interposes another object between itself and it may be regarded as the cunning of reason... It puts forward an object as a means, allows it to wear itself out in its stead, exposes it to attrition and shields itself behind it from mechanical violence”. (SL 746–747)

With respect to the product of external teleology, we see that the means is the same as the end. This sets up the situation for the emergence of life.

Hegel characterized the good as follows:

“The good comes upon the scene with the worth of being absolute, because it is within itself the totality of the concept, the objective that is at the same time in the form of free unity and subjectivity.” (SL 818)

The end in practical cognition is the good. Hence, it is different from the end we have in external teleology both in its content and in its conclusion. With respect to the difference in content Hegel said:

“In external (teleology) as in formal purposiveness, it was an indeterminate finite content in general: here, though it is finite too, it is as such at the same time an absolutely valid content.” (SL 819-820)

The content of practical cognition is finite as it is not realized or as it is in the stage of pursuit. This end has such a subjective character as we saw in external teleology. The content of practical cognition would not be finite if it works on the basis of its prior realization. Hegel’s philosophy of right is the best place to look for this type of content. Hegel’s theory of ethics in the philosophy of right operates on actual freedom in which its ethical community aims for already realized freedom only in the activity of realization. This is somewhat similar with logical life that works on the realization of self. Unless actual freedom or logical life operates on its prior realization, it will collapse as its life consists in its activity.

The whole practical urge to do what is good involves the good that is yet to be realized. It is only after objectivity completely altered that there will be no room for doing good. In the practical cognition, though the good is finite, it is also ‘absolutely valid content’ that has only immediate (inessential) givenness of objectivity. As such, the objectivity it is facing is not genuinely true which ought to be transformable. With respect to the difference in conclusion from external teleology Hegel said:

“The finite end in its realization, all the same, get no further than a means; since in its beginning it is not an end already determined in and for itself, it remains even when realized an end that is not in and for itself.” (SL 820)

Similarly Hegel also said about external teleology:

“The conclusion or the product of the purposive act is nothing but an object determined by an end external to it, consequently it is the same thing as the means. In such a product, therefore, only a means, not a realized end, has resulted, or the end has not truly attained an objectivity in it. It is therefore a

matter of completed indifference whether we regard an object determined by an external end as a realized end or only as a means: the determination here is relative, external to the object itself not objective.” (SL 749-750)

Thus what is the specific conclusion or realization of the good different from external teleology?

“ Hence it is only the will itself that stand in the way of the attainment of its goal, for it separates itself from cognition, and external reality for the will does not receive the form of true being; the idea of the good can therefore find its integration only in the idea of the true.” (SL 821)

In theoretical cognition, subjectivity treated objectivity as true and given to make it conceptually determinable and have a subjective possession of truth. Now in the practical cognition, objectivity should treat subjectivity in similar manner subjectivity treated objectivity for the realization of the good. The syllogism of this transition involves two premises. The first premise is the ‘immediate relation of the good end to actuality’ which it immediately took over. In the second premise, we have an external means against external actuality. The second premise has the same logic we see between means to realized end in external teleology. After all, means is a means in so far as it realized end. The conclusion of the two premise is ‘to bring together the thoughts of the two premises’.

“Now just as in the end relation in general, the realized end is also again merely a means, while conversely the means is also the realized end, so similarly in the syllogism of the good, the second premise is immediately already present implicitly in the first; but this immediacy is not sufficient, and the second premise is already postulated for the first-the realization of the good in the face of another actually confronting it is the mediation which is essentially necessary for the immediate relation and the accomplished actualization of the good.” (SL 822)

2.3.3. Absolute idea

Absolute idea is the final category in which the investigation of logic comes to closure. As such it is not just one category among others, rather absolute idea is what logic is all about. Absolute idea is not just one category with a specific content like other categories. Absolute idea is a category under which all the previous categories are somehow encompassed within it as their truth. The content of absolute idea (if there is any) is the form determination that we find in all content. As such content coincide with form, which is in line with the task of traditional metaphysics (determining the absolutely universal). Absolute idea is the point at which the knowing of truth falls in the science. In the determination of truth, knowing of truth can only come in the completed determination of truth, if not; it would make the knowing of truth without having access to all truth. Absolute idea should also embrace previous categories as logic does not allow the separation between knowing and its object or the method and its content. According to Hegel absolute idea is

“...the sole subject matter and content of philosophy. Since it contains all determinateness within it, and its essential nature is to return to itself through its self-determination or particularization, it has various shapes, and the business of philosophy is to cognize it in these.” (SL 824)

The opposition of consciousness could not be the final result of the science of logic rather it is the point at which science of logic starts through eliminating such opposition. In German, Hegel calls such stand point *Gegenstandlichkeit* in which philosophy is not free as its object is given from outside of the science. This is the reason why absolute idea as the knowing of truth is not separate from objects (categories) of truth that arise in the process of determination.

Philosophy is science when it is a system. System is the return of the end to the beginning so as to justify the beginning as its own presuppositionless beginning, hence due to the return now gets its new meaning as the beginning of the outcome of the science. The beginning of logic has now found its truth that is absolute idea. Absolute idea is the beginning of science of logic as the end result of the science shows us to be. In the first chapter we saw that science does not begin with any presupposition with respect to its subject matter, its method, concept, relation or anything. Science starts out of nothing (ex nihilo) and sees what it realizes when there is an identity between starting point and the outcome. In other words, when there is an identity between form and content. Logic is scientific as it exhibits a systemic character at the end of its investigation through absolute idea.

Absolute idea is the life of logic from its beginning to the end. This is mainly due to the nature of absolute idea as a negative unity of oppositions of subjectivity and objectivity or theory and practice or life and cognition. As such knowing falls inside it. Hence logic realizes or knows the whole development of logic as the development of absolute idea at the end of the science. Hegel calls this absolute idea or the method.

“More exactly, the absolute idea itself has for its content merely this, that the form determination is its own completed totality, the pure concept. Now the determinateness of the idea and the entire course followed by this determinateness has constituted the subject matter of the science of logic, from which course the absolute idea itself has issued into an existence of its own; but the nature of this its existence has shown itself to be this, that determinateness does not have the shape of a content, but exists wholly as form, and that accordingly the idea is the absolutely universal idea. Therefore what remains to be considered here is not content as such, but the universal aspect of its form- that is, method.” (SL 825)

As a negative unity absolute idea exhibits opposition between subjective idea and objective idea but as both aspect exist simultaneously. As subjective idea, absolute idea is a corresponding conceptual determining of objective reality. As objective idea, it is also the realization of good that is objectively determined in and through itself. Moreover, the process by which conceptualization determines what is other than itself is now inherent in the process of what is in and through itself independently. This resembles life in some sense that the realization process operates on the process of what it realizes as self realization. Though absolute idea involves opposition of conceptual determination and objectivity, the cognition we find is self knowing. This is the form determination that is the content of the absolute idea but the one that comprises all determinacy of any sort and as such having a universal aspect that is method.

Method is the whole science as it comprises the form of all determinacy that come up to this point. Method emerges through knowing of itself that is a knowing of its objectivity (self-constituting) as conceptually determinate. This method is an absolute form we find immanent in all content. The important issue is Hegel claims that content will have to constitute knowing of itself at the end as a result of the science. When this happens, we have a closure of the science.

Now we need to examine this form that is identical to the development of the entire content. This form is the logic of truth without truth having further qualification or purely. The method is universal in so far as it is a conceptual determination of all as cognition of the whole providing their truth. It is particular in that it involves knowing as such it is identical with the object (content). It is knowing of knowing as conceptual

knowing of conceptual knowing. When logic was starting, there is no knowing, no concept and no method. Logic was defined as just thinking of thinking. But when we come to the conclusion of the science, we find the foundation of all determinacy (absolute idea) that allows us to see all forms of determinacy as conceptual determinations. For instance we may take the first triad (Pure being, nothing and becoming) in which pure being was nothing but indeterminacy, now we realize that pure being a conceptual determination that gets its higher truth through going to its opposite (nothing) then returns back to becoming as a sublated truth. This makes pure being a concept. Thus, when logic is seen from the final outcome (absolute idea which has for its content the form of all determinacy), it turn out to be the conceptual knowing of conceptual knowing. As the final form determination, it encompasses every determination up to this point as itself or as its development. As such it returns back to the beginning and give the beginning a new meaning. I think this is the main reason we say logic coincide with metaphysics or form coincide with content. Now, the beginning is the beginning of absolute idea or logic. The beginning is now filled with the fact that it is the starting point of the whole that develops itself not only as a self-determination but a complete self determination as a totality. The totality is individuality as it involves the knowing of itself not separate from what it knows. It is the individual that unites the subject that knows with content.

The method expands to take in all content and become all the system of determination immanent to itself and become part and parcel of itself. We are at the closure and also at the starting point of a new beginning. Through method, we now see logic in new light as the totality of determinacy that knows itself without any distinction between it and its

object (content). This takes the shape of immediacy of totality of logic in the form of being automatically. Hegel calls this nature-immediacy of totality of logic in the form of being. This allows us to make a contrast between logic and other spheres. Logic is self-knowing of truth without qualification, without the emergence of specific domains of truth or philosophic discipline. Hence logic in its closure provides a point of departure for specific domains of truth like philosophy of nature and philosophy of mind or spirit. Philosophy of spirit comes as a return to logic but as mind to nature. The whole phenomenology of the spirit is a proof of this as idealization of nature. Logic can be contrasted to *realphilosophie* so as logic is a pure form that will take on other forms to which other determinacies are added and thereby considered as nature and spirit or mind.

In the whole development of the system of philosophy in its totality, something similar with the culmination of the logic will happen wherein the totality of the forms of truth will have to involve a reality that knows the whole as well. This is what we see in philosophy in absolute mind in contrast to art and religion as a self knowing reason in nature and finite spirit. It comes at the end in so far as it operates with respect to everything else or totality. In absolute mind/spirit, philosophy is a kind of being that will be in non-logical reality which will itself involve logical determinacy. Philosophy in this sense is a cultural reality or real reality that is part of what is. As such it allows 'what is' to know itself in real way not just as in a pure way we see in logical determination (logical truth). This involves a return in such a way that philosophy will include logic as part of itself in which philosophy as real cultural phenomena (mind) or subject that includes logical investigation, philosophy of nature and philosophy of mind or spirit. Philosophy operates on what logic provided as the presuppositionless science of

development that end up cognition of itself but with added features of determination of nature and spirit.

NOTES

1. Hegel (1989), 600-601
2. We do not yet come to see the category of knowing (cognition) as that requires a stage at which we see opposition of subjectivity and objectivity. But the subject is in dialectical movement to become adequate concept, thus self-knowing in this minimal sense.
3. Devries, W.A. (1991), 68
4. Hibben, J.G.(1902),139
5. I think this is different from Christian soul which is taken to be eternal while in this case the soul perishes through death.
6. Hibben. J.G. (1902), 140

CHAPTER III. THE SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY

The system of Hegel's philosophy can be exposed as a syllogism of a triad of logic, nature and spirit as it is found at the very end of the Encyclopedia III. (575-577). I think this syllogism is similar if one just exposes Hegel's system as the system of philosophy which is the highest sublated form of absolute mind of art and religion and also specific philosophical disciplines like logic, nature and finite spirit. Mind (spirit) is the truth of logic and nature. It is a concrete unity as mind to nature or return of logic from nature (we only know this at the end as the realization of philosophy) but not merely conceptually rather in higher form as a spiritual knowing of the two that is a sublation of the mere logical and mere externality of nature as form of determinacy that has become absolute in art, religion and philosophy. Art and religion have the same content like philosophy but philosophy has the highest form of grasping the truth that is a conceptual form of universality, particularity and individuality. In this context, the system of philosophy is nothing more than the self-knowing of absolute mind in nature and finite spirit as its particularity that is not just a conceptual system we saw in the logic but as a real knowing in its otherness or alterity. To put differently, system is the identity of method and subject matter. Now the subject matter is philosophy or the more concrete form of absolute idea (individuality through being fully particularized) or what has been all along the entire course of development. As absolute idea is a free adequate concept that is a unity of theoretical idea and practical idea becomes method and expands to system of categories, in the same manner absolute mind as the unity of mind subjective and mind objective becomes method or self-knowing reason that expands to system of philosophy. Method is nothing but the form of conceptual knowing of conceptual

knowing in the sphere of logic. Now method is real knowing of everything or truth not merely conceptually but also in nature and finite spirit in their unity at the same time and this is Hegel's philosophy of spirit as system philosophy.

But we may also see the possible syllogisms of the triads of logic, nature and spirit to find out an adequate way of comprehending system. These three spheres of philosophy are totalities on their own. Each one of them is circle or a specific philosophical discipline. The system proper is a circle of circles. This means each parts of the system get out of its specific realm and take the shape of the bigger truth that is the system¹.

Hegel showed the system of philosophy through the three possible ways of exposing the idea of philosophy. These are the three-fold syllogisms of the idea of philosophy. Through this exposition Hegel is also at the same time tried to expose the possible ways of accessing the system and the most adequate way of exposing system based on his method. One of the peculiar conceptions of truth in Hegel is that truth is not something ultimate that is found beyond everything else rather truth is totality or the whole that unites every partiality (one-sidedness) as either a lower form of truth that takes the shape of higher truth or by showing the immanence of truth in every manifestations or appearances of truth. Hegel can be taken to be an atheist philosopher in so far as he takes the ultimate truth as not transcendent, in other words, Hegel does not agree with the conception of God beyond his manifestation as we find in Jewish, Christian and Islamic religions. A true infinite should encompass everything in it.

One of the main challenges of understanding Hegel's system goes to figuring out the place of logic in the final system. It appears from encyclopedia that logic is the starting point of the system. However, system does not allow such externality of the subject matter (truth) as system should make a presuppositionless beginning. It turns out, however, at the end of the whole science of logic proved itself to be identical with absolute mind (spirit) as absolute mind is a self-knowing reason (subject) in nature and finite spirit in their specific realm that leads philosophy to encompass the whole science as its determination as such logic is the starting point of absolute mind before it manifests itself in other spheres. Logic is the pure form (concept) of absolute spirit that is also found animating nature and finite spirit. This is the realization of (speculative) philosophy at the end of the science. The idea of philosophy turns out to be self-knowing reason in nature and spirit. As such philosophy knows totality (logic, nature and finite spirit as parts) as knowing of itself. This is method, hence is the place of logic in the final system. As such philosophy returns back to logic and becomes identical to it with the added features of philosophy as nature and finite spirit. This is clear 'for us' (philosophers) who resolved to follow thought in its self-development.

The relation between logic and phenomenology of spirit (mind) is also very important to understand Hegel's philosophy. Phenomenology as the science of consciousness brings us to the starting point of philosophy through its end result. Phenomenology passes through lower forms of ordinary thinking before it brings us to the beginning of philosophy as a thinking of thinking. But Hegel also argues that if one just be resolved to engage in pure thinking that will be enough to access system of philosophy. In either case we see phenomenology to be part of the system in third part of the system (Encyclopedia)

as mind subjective. Hegel's philosophy of spirit consists of three parts: mind subjective, mind objective and Absolute mind. We find phenomenology in mind subjective.

3.1. The First Syllogism (logic-nature-spirit)

As we have seen in the second chapter syllogism arises from the return of concept in the judgment. Judgment consists in the connection between subject and predicate with the copula (is) which has externality from the subject matter. The copula (is) doesn't really express the equivalence between the subject and predicate though it is expected to perform that function. This leaves the determination of truth of judgment to be merely subjective or external from the subject matter (truth). However, the judgment of the concept takes us to syllogism by removing the basic form of judgment. Syllogism consists of the relation between two extremes through a middle term as a unifying principle of the extremes. Hegel said in the science of logic that everything rational is syllogism to express the nature of the concept as universal, particular and individual. We can see the truth of any determination when it takes the shape of syllogism. The shape of syllogism is better equipped in exposing the truth in concrete manner. This is not the whole story as we remember the distinctness the particular as a unifying agent from the extremes that are mediated still exhibits some level of externality from the subject matter (truth) as the unifying agent is also the essential moment of what is mediated. As truth is the whole if it is truth, all moments of truth should be universal, particular and individual. This is the case in the third syllogism in which the middle term is the true unifying agent in so far as it is a concrete universal. Here I am talking about the absolute idea or self knowing reason. When logic is a middle term, then system stands as a system.

With this perspective let's see the first syllogism through which the idea of philosophy is exposed. The first syllogism takes nature as a middle term for logic and spirit. We should note that system of philosophy tries to comprehend the parts of philosophy as an organic unity since its concept is absolute idea (concrete universal) as such there is a return to the beginning. This return is the return of philosophy to its logical element as one of its investigations but also identical to it. In a similar way the beginning of logic (pure being) becomes identical to absolute idea as pure concept, here logic becomes identical to philosophy as universal conceptual system that has become particularized through processes in nature and finite spirit. This is possible if we have the point of view of the system as the science of sciences.

In reference to three syllogisms Hegel said they refer to the idea of philosophy as such:

“This concept of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea, the truth aware of itself (α 236) – the logical system, but with the signification that it is universality approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. In this way the science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but as a spiritual principle”. (ENC III 574)

This means that philosophy has now returned back to logic taking it in as its universal form. The point here is that how did Hegel make such a return after passing through concrete contents: nature and finite spirit. The most famous Hegel's *Doppelsatz* (All that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real) can easily be understood if logical system is taken to be exhibited in its particularity as nature and finite mind justifying the logical system as absolutely concrete universal (Particularity is itself universality as we see in the logic of concept) rather than making essentialist interpretations (logic of essence that takes manifestations as not real universals rather reflections of the essence).

Hegel stated the first syllogism as first appearance as follows:

“The first appearance is formed by the syllogism, which is based on the Logical system as starting–point, with Nature for the middle term which couples the Mind with it. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. Nature, standing between the Mind and its essence, sunders itself, not indeed to extremes of finite abstraction, nor itself to something away from them and independent – which, as other than they, only serves as a link between them: for the syllogism is in the Idea and Nature is essentially defined as a transition–point and negative factor, and as implicitly the Idea. Still the mediation of the concept has the external form of transition, and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity, so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the concept is explicit as a self–amalgamation.” (ENC III 575)

In the first syllogism, the figure can be put like **logic-nature-spirit** in which the middle term is nature. Nature as a middle term should be no different from the extremes as it is their unity. But in this first syllogism the middle term (nature) plays no role other than be a link to the extremes. It has no independent existence. Nor, it has the extremes as its manifestation. The transition of logic to nature is the logic of being (logic of determination through negation) that is no more there as we are in the sphere of concept which takes all determinations as its particularizations.

This syllogism is the syllogism of determinate being in so far as nature is external to the extremes and we did not see it in the conclusion. As the major premise ‘logic is nature’ is a transition to what the subject is not, it is not reflection or particularization. Thus the type of universal we have is abstract universal. Truth is the whole as such what mediates should be the essential moment of what is mediated. The transition of logic to nature is abstraction as logical system (absolute idea) is an individual that is completely determined in and through itself. Logical system (absolute idea) as an individual is necessarily a manifold that exhibits multiplicity of features. The middle term nature is, hence, abstract universal. ‘Logical system is nature’ is an abstraction like ‘Rose is red’.

Rose can be other things like height, smell and others. Absolute idea also has other form determinations as its manifestations. In addition nature can also inhere in another thing like mind. As we already saw there is no logical development from absolute idea to nature as it is a true individual or a universal that has completely particularized itself. The universal involved in this syllogism is abstract universal as nature is not a concrete universal. It is just mere transition that only expresses an aspect of the individual as the judgment 'logic is nature' is not a particularization of the universal in which the particular enjoys the same status of the universal.

Ancient Greek philosophy relied on formal logic for the possession of truth. Truth is the correspondence between the object and rules of thought. The object of truth (content) is found outside the rules of thought. We see an initial problem of the opposition of consciousness that has to be overcome before we even enter into philosophy. In a similar manner with this first syllogism, logic is presupposed as immediate truth or starting point in separation from the content which has to also be the essential part of truth. Above all, if truth is the whole we cannot separate rules of thought from the truth. This makes this idea of philosophy dogmatic or foundational in its nature.

3.2. The second syllogism (nature-spirit-logic)

Hegel stated the second syllogism as follows:

“In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded, that that syllogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself, which – as the mediating agent in the process – presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition, of which liberty is the aim, and which is itself the way to produce it.”
(ENC III 576)

The second syllogism as second figure can be expressed as **nature-mind (spirit)-logic** in which the middle term is mind. This syllogism is familiar for those of us who studied the philosophy of subjectivity starting from Descartes to Kant. In this syllogism, the major premise 'nature is mind' is as a reflection that is not a transition or particularization. Nature is a reflection of mind and the point is to know it in this through necessary connection with logical principles. This is syllogism of reflection in which the type of universal is class universal. Hegel characterizes those philosophers who rely on this syllogism in their claim to truth as subjective idealist in so far as they make epistemology foundation in contrast to ancient Greek philosophy of ontology, though both philosophies can be rooted in the same line as the necessary developments to Hegel's philosophy. Both made a similar mistake of foundationalism in different respects. Kant claims knowledge is possible is so far as we have objects of experience. Knowledge is restricted to the realm of phenomena as such we cannot know things in themselves or objectivity to put in Hegelian terms. Rather than overcoming the opposition of consciousness, the subject-object dichotomy is taken for granted and used as a principle to reach at truth in the realm of experience. Kant's knowing has no access to objects but to its representations. The objective reference of representation lies in their relation to one another. This relation becomes non-subjective by being necessary in character. The relations owe their necessity by being given independently of what they are, laying hold of features like spatio-temporal ordering that are indifferent to their form. This necessity must be rooted in subjectivity since there is no access to things in themselves. However Kant's strategy still remains in the problem of foundationalism. This is because Kant's objectivity is

relative to the structure of cognition. This makes Kant foundationalist. In addition the transcendental element in Kant is not part of knowledge or just dogmatically asserted.

The syllogism Hegel forwarded is similar with the above analysis in that the syllogism between the totalities exhibits the logic of essence or reflection in which mind is the middle term that unites nature to logical system. Nature is presupposed to be conformable to mind and mind reflects itself in the idea based on necessity. This makes the idea of philosophy a human construct or a subjective idealism. The kind of universal is class universal that leaves out individuality without account or as unknowable though it is able to give determination of the universal for its members.

3.3. The third Syllogism (spirit-logic-nature)

Hegel stated the third syllogism as follows:

“The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy, which has self– knowing reason, the absolutely universal, for its middle term: a middle, which divides itself into Mind and Nature, making the former its presupposition, as process of the Idea's subjective activity, and the latter its universal extreme, as process of the objectively and implicitly existing Idea. The self–judging of the Idea into its two appearances (ϣϣ575,576) characterizes both as its (the self–knowing reason's) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects: – it is the nature of the fact, the concept, which causes the movement and development, yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition. The eternal Idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind”. (ENC III 577)

The third syllogism is an adequate expression of the idea of philosophy as the third figure (**spirit-logic-nature**) in which the middle term is self-knowing idea or reason (absolute idea). This syllogism allows for realization of true objectivity in which the middle term is no more external to what it mediates. Logical system as a middle term is the essential

moment of what is mediated that is finite spirit and nature. All the premises speak for the same truth. The middle term is found in all premises and the conclusion. 'Spirit is logic' is as its universal spiritual principle of knowing everything. The movement from logical system to nature is a particularization in contrast to the previous syllogisms of transition and reflection. The system is the system of one object (subject) that is spirit (mind) that remains the same in its differentiation as both subject and substance.

Hegel's system proper can only be determined from the point of view of the science of the sciences or as a circle of circles. As each parts of the system are distinct and complete sciences (logic, nature, and spirit), we cannot make transitions from one part to the other. However, Hegel makes a connection between them using the same method (self knowing of pure concept or subject) he used while developing each science but now from the point of view of the absolute system or the entire system of philosophical sciences since one science is not a continuation of another. Though the sciences presuppose one another, we cannot make linear connections as the encyclopedia appears to be so. The question now is how can we make connections between those moments that are distinct through the same method employed in each science from the point of view of philosophy in the absolute mind?. Here we should be cautious that the connection cannot be made between the concept of, for instance, absolute idea and the beginning of nature. The connection should be made between logic as a totality and nature as totality and finite spirit as totality. Each part of the system is a self-sufficient enclosure but from the point of view of the system proper they can be seen differently in a speculative manner. Hence the connection of the parts can originate only from the final result of the system proper (philosophy in the absolute mind/spirit) which can be separated out from all of them as the truth of the

whole and at the same time encompasses them all as self knowing: the spiritual knowing of everything that arise till this point. This is philosophy as system: a self realization in the process of self-determination. The system of philosophy is the system of the life of cognition in those parts of the science. Hegel claims that the method (self-knowing pure concept) we find in the logic is an absolutely universally valid method of explanation of philosophical science as the outcome of logical investigation is pure knowing of truth that should also be method as truth is the whole. The point of view of the final system is also expressed using this same method. This point of view is the point of view of philosophy in the absolute mind in which philosophy is their underlying ground. The parts of the system should include a reality that knows them through taking them in as philosophy's (absolute mind's) knowing of the parts as its own determinations.

Thus, in the third syllogism, the idea of philosophy becomes concrete as the middle term (absolute idea) is a concrete universal. Here the idea of philosophy is exposed adequately as truth is the whole both in subjectivity and objectivity (from the study of logic). In absolute mind, philosophy (spirit) as self knowing reason is both the subject and object that knows itself without taking in anything from outside of the science. Absolute mind passes through the stages of the method as universal, particular and individual that is also self knowing in all this. As a universal, absolute mind is absolute idea, and in its particularization it is nature and finite spirit and as individual it is the unity of the previous two aspects. The individual, in general, is philosophy or a self knowing reason or subject that is particularized universal. As the final results of the science of logic shows, it also involves self-cognition in all this. The outcome of logical investigation gives us the concept of philosophy as a self-knowing idea or reason. In this syllogism we

see reason differentiates itself as self-differentiation; the end of the process is reason knowing itself in these differentiations as nature and finite spirit. The logic is neither ‘a starting point nor an instrument’, but rather identical with spirit itself as the result of science. Only in this syllogism logic and spirit are entirely identical – as we realize it at the end of the Encyclopedia they must be.² This return is easily grasped if we see the similarity between the return of the pure being to absolute idea with the return of logic to spirit after complete particularization.

Now, we are at the closure of the system which is at the same time at the beginning of pure being or the beginning of logic. The system is just the system of philosophy that has come to be known till this point both in its subjectivity (theoretically) and objectivity (practically) in which it is aware of itself as self-knowing; in short the system is philosophy. Hegel’s system of philosophy is not ‘the night in which all cows are black’ because philosophy is identity of identity and non-identity. The absolute idea is self-differentiating in its subjectivity and objectivity and remains to be the same. Philosophy as such is the identity of identity and non identity as it is the unity of logic, nature and finite spirit. The system is true in so far as philosophy (as the owl of Minerva) comes at last as the knowing of everything preceded it as its own determination. As such philosophy is science. Philosophy is totality that includes all content in it. And philosophy is circular as it returns to the beginning as its particularization or mediation. That is why all dichotomies like method and subject matter, form and content, epistemology and ontology, immediacy and mediation disappear in the system exhibiting an identity. Philosophy is also a concrete cultural or spiritual reality as it’s a knowing of non-logical things that exhibit logicity (knowing) on their own.

NOTES

1. “The single circle, because it is a real totality, bursts through the limits imposed by its special medium, and gives rise to a wider circle”. ENC I. 15
2. Baillie, J.B(1901),214-215
3. Ferrarin, A.(2004),57

CONCLUSION

I would like to begin the conclusion with mentioning some criticisms forwarded towards the two crucial points in the system that is the beginning and the end of the system which allowed Hegel to claim about his building a scientific philosophy. Most researches in Hegel's philosophy revolve around these important nodes in the system. Thus I will introduce my readers of the thesis with criticisms that are directed towards the presuppositionless beginning of the system and the end point of the system that is construed as coming to closure through self knowing.

The presuppositionless beginning in the system is, for instance, criticized by one of the remarkable critical social theorist and reconstructionist Jurgen Habermas to be not a genuine one since the absolute end in the system is presupposed at the beginning. The absolute is the end point presupposed in Hegel's philosophy in the sense of being a point of destination. Similarly, we have lots of debate going on in the academic sphere especially on the first triad that is pure being, nothing and becoming that uniquely expressed Hegelian presuppositionless beginning. This is, for one thing, different from most philosophical beginnings that raise the question 'why is there something rather than nothing?' and for another thing the reasoning about the beginning is that there is nothing that has began at the beginning. Everything comes through a systematic argument and gives us a justification of what the beginning is the beginning of. This argument makes the beginning of philosophy without presupposition to be a huge area of interest in academic research and we see positive and negative responses to the very possibility of beginning philosophy without presupposition and at some places you also see it being a

source of other approaches in philosophy like Hermeneutics in Gadamer. Nonetheless, it seems to be a little bit difficult to address such extensive research without necessarily depriving oneself to give full accounts of such criticisms and developed insights particularly in this thesis that specifically attempts to address the system as a whole from the point of view of its totality.

When we come to criticisms forwarded to the end point that is absolute idea, we see it as a major area of controversy in Hegel's philosophy especially its very idea of being an end point and self knowing closure with encompassing previous contents are some among many topics of criticisms. Hegel claims the completion of history, philosophy and truth in his age but it seems that this claims are dependent on a specific cultural and narrow conception history that forced Hegel and other system philosophers to be influenced and make remarks that marginalize other parts of the society that has its own ways of doing philosophy and conception of history because of that being alienated from inclusion in the system. In Hegel's philosophy, we clearly see a uni-linear conception of history that depends on the development of consciousness and a systematic argument that is logocentric. However, philosophy can be construed by other conceptions of history and philosophizing related with oral tradition and feeling, emotion and passion. In relation to this, the idea of self knowing as ultimate and justified end point is also seen as not enough in so far as the enlightened self in knowing is in a sort of imprisonment in one's self while philosophy has to always be waiting for some content thereby keeping the subject-object dichotomy in a sense.

I think the above points show us the limits visible in system philosophy and the alternative path philosophy should take, in the sense that philosophy should be broad enough to acknowledge various philosophies and should entertain different contents and methods or approaches of philosophy. Thus what we need is not a specific method or content of philosophy which can either be converged with other approaches or seen independently on its own merits. In other words, there are a lot of critics of Hegel's claims who say what we need is not ultimate identity rather what we need is ultimate non-identity which also celebrates unity and diversity at the same time.

Though Hegel's system philosophy doesn't allow external critique as a concrete totality in so far as it is impenetrable from outside and everything about the system is exhaustively determined from its concept, we see that there is a possibility of doing criticisms from the perspective of other ways of life specially from non-western countries who exist in history with their own wisdom and ways of life. We can also make internal critique that is the only way to make valid criticism through one's evaluation of the phenomenology of the spirit that allows Hegel or philosophy to get the concept of science or absolute knowing. But this task would go beyond the scope of this thesis in the sense that phenomenology of the spirit is a huge work that requires a lot of research and we also need to face the challenge of addressing misinterpretations by many thinkers including Carl Marx's that takes the phenomenology as a philosophical doctrine in its own rather than as introduction to the system in a peculiar way. Hence I will just raise some concrete issues that are visible in the thesis and important for anyone interested in Hegelian scholarship.

The system of philosophy in Hegel showed itself to be presuppositionless or anti-foundational, logical in so far as we can show this truth with adequate logic (subject) of truth (logic of concept or freedom) and also the world of things and human mind also exhibit this truth to finally justify the identity of logical system with the system of the life of philosophy as a cultural or spiritual reality both as subject and substance coming to self-knowing in the modern period. Philosophy as a system is nothing but a depiction of the life of cognition in the world wherever this truth is freely manifested.

Once again in the conclusion as I tried earlier in the introduction, would like to examine the objective of system. Hegel followed the traditional task of philosophy as a metaphysical study. As such philosophy is the knowing of the structure of being. Though structure tends to imply fixedness of being in its nature, here in Hegel it is a dynamic dialectical system. The dynamism takes the shape of self-determining as universality, particularity and individuality in which philosophy as a self is indeterminate at first but it has the freedom to determine itself to what it is not at the outset. Hence the objective of system is this self knowing of dynamic self-determining movement of being. This is what happens in philosophy of logic, nature and spirit specifically and also from the point of view of the whole science. Absolute idea or a self knowing reason, as we have seen, is the outcome of logical (thought) investigation that turn out to be an overarching reason that exhibits an urge for self-realization both theoretically and practically through self-determination that means without an external influence or in a completely free activity of cognition. This point of view of philosophy is absolute that is not subjective as it does not take truth to be any subjective or one-sided knowing (doesn't entertain external element).

As such it removes the problem of relativism or dependence in any account for truth. That is why philosophy is an autonomous free science.

One may ask, why does philosophy comes at the end? This has the same justification we get in absolute idea which is the pure knowing of truth in the science of logic. Philosophy should come at the end since it is that part of truth that accounts for knowing. Philosophy, though it comes at highest level of knowing after art and religion, is not greater than what preceded it. Rather the preceding features would be constituting elements of it. But as it is related with the knowing of truth it should come at the end so as to encompass everything that preceded it as its own moments as the syllogistic formulation somehow depicted in chapter III.

Philosophy is all about the realization of freedom of thought or knowing whether in logical realms and spiritual realms. Philosophy or logic is all about the freedom of thought thinking itself as a science. Philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit are also about the freedom of nature and mind in exhibiting logicity (an attempt to correspond to the truth) on their own. The system of philosophy is the knowing of this dynamic freedom through speculative science (philosophy), in fact, there is no such separation between the world of thought and the world of appearance as the opposition of consciousness takes it for granted.

It is known that philosophers no more think that it is possible to develop a universal philosophy like the system philosophy Hegel tried to build. The reason behind is Kantian philosophy which says we cannot know things in themselves or we cannot know

objectivity. Kant's solution is to rely on the structure of consciousness to grasp the truth in so far as there is the object of experience. But this is problematic for one thing it makes epistemology foundation as such philosophy is not free science rather relative to the structure of consciousness alleged to grasp truth and in relation to that for another thing the objectivity in Kant is not genuine objectivity as it is not self-subsistent. In addition truth is the whole but against this Kant limited the knowing of truth to the phenomenal world. In line with Kant a number of philosophers replace Kant's 'structure of consciousness' to know the truth with language, will to power, and other principles at the heart of their philosophy without really considering the significant contribution of Hegel's claim that philosophy should be a free and presuppositionless science that is not relative to anything else. Most importantly, Hegel come to such a stand point through the science of experience of consciousness that turns out to show us that subject-object dichotomy is false dichotomy rather than the truth of knowing as Kant takes it to be for granted. In Hegel the truth of the opposition of consciousness is absolute knowing that allows for the opening up of philosophy. Hence, understanding Hegel requires more than such Kantian conclusions. In addition, Hegel examined the logic of previous philosopher's claims for truth and find room in his philosophy to embrace their logic in a critical and more unifying principle (system) rather than creating a new philosophy. Thus we need a critical internal examination of the system of philosophy to show in which respects such a system failed to be a universal philosophy or failed to embrace the intellectual experience of most non-western countries. This task can be taken as the limit of this thesis but a viable area of research that has to be further carried out in order to make up one's mind with respect to the relevance of Hegel for Africans and Africa philosophy in particular.

It is my belief to say at the end that studying Hegel by Hegel's works gives us much proximity to clear understanding of philosophy in Hegel. Since the scholarship we get in Hegel is so extensive and broad that we might be lost in commentaries, critiques and other approaches that arise from Hegel's philosophy before we come to see what exactly Hegel has said about his philosophy. Hence, it is the conviction of many great thinkers who made a lot of research in Hegel's philosophy to say the best commentary in Hegel's philosophy is Hegel himself.

REFERENCE

- Baillie, J. B.(1901): *The Origin and significance of Hegel's logic: A General Introduction to Hegel's System*, NewYork and London (Macmillan Batoche Books Kitchener)
- DeVeris, W .A.(1991): *The Dialectic of Teleology*, philosophical topics, Vol.19,No.2 (University of New Hampshire)
- Ferrarin, Alferdo(2004): *Hegel and Aristotle*, the Edinburgh Building, UK (Cambridge University Press)
- Hegel, G.W.F. (1989): *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A.V. Miller, Atlantic Highlands (Humanities Press)
- Hegel, G.W.F. (2001): *Philosophy of Mind*, trans. By William Wallace, Blackmask online
- Hegel, G.W.F. (2009): *Hegel's Logic Being Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Science*, trans. By William Wallace, Ohio (Bookmasters)
- Heidegger, Martin (1985): *Schelling's Treaties on the Essence of Human Freedom*, trans. By Joan Stambaugh, London (Ohio University Press)
- Hibben, J.G.(1902): *Hegel's logic: an essay in interpretation*, Newyork (Batoche Books limited)