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**Al-Qaeda versus the War on Terror :A Study on
Psychological and Economic Causal Factors**

BY: ASHENAFI FISSEHA ZELEKE

ADDIS ABABA

JUNE, 2014

**AL-QAEDA VERSUS THE WAR ON TERROR :A STUDY ON
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC CAUSAL FACTORS**

**BY:
ASHENAFI FISSEHA ZELEKE**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES OF ADDIS
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Dedication

In memory of my late sister Sintayehu Fisseha

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List of Abbreviations

- AIAI- Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya
- IGAD- Inter governmental Authority on Development
- LRA- Lord's Resistance Army
- UIC- Islamic Courts, Union
- US or USA- The United States of America
- VLCC- Very Large Crude Carrier
- WMDs- Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Abstract

Enquiring why terrorism occurs is an endeavour to identify the causes and a 'root cause' or at least 'root causes' of the phenomenon. More importantly, it is also about identifying the causation or causal analysis, the way in which the cause-events or cause-state of affairs are linked with one another and with the effect-event or effect-state of affair, i.e. terrorism.

This research thesis, "Al Qaeda versus the War on Terror: A Study on Psychological and Economic Causal Factors", is a qualitative and descriptive analysis of the psychological and economic causation of terrorism. The research aims at scrutinizing whether psychological or economic causes can avoid the other from causing terrorism and become the sole causes of terrorism by themselves, as it is claimed by primarily¹ economic or primarily psychological cause-causation. Plus, it aims at scrutinizing whether temporal precedence or causal power matters more in the causation of terrorism and whether economic and psychological factors apply their causal power to yield terrorism on the geographic space or on the 'mind' entity.

The research disagrees with primary-cause and chain of causes-causation. To assert that psychological or economic factors are the sole causes of terrorism or that they first cause one another and then cause terrorism based on temporal precedence is unnatural for two reasons. Firstly, this delinks the emotionality and rationality, the purposiveness and motivation as well as the need for material and non-material gains within a single cause-agent of terrorism (the individual terrorist or the group terrorist as unified by group think and sense of belongingness to the group). Secondly, this disregards the fact that psychological and economic factors can cause terrorism without being correlated or related on the basis of temporal precedence, but on the basis of causal power. Therefore, the central argument of this thesis is for simultaneous causation of terrorism by psychological and economic factors applying their causal power on the single entity ('space') of the mind within a point of time.

¹ Key words: *Causation,*
primarily economic causation,
causation, simultaneous Causation,

Chain of causes causation,
primarily psychological
Terrorism

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

Intuitivism or perceptual knowledge is greater in quality in human beings than in other living organisms. Humans do not merely instinctively react to the phenomena (environmental stimuli or event) happening around them like other animals do, rather, they question what is happening, when it is happening, where, how, by whom and why.

With regards to terrorism, the “what” question deals with defining and characterizing the phenomenon and classifying its sub variants. Meanwhile, the ‘when’ question deals with the time of origin of terrorism or the situations fertile for the happening of terrorism; for instance democratization, authoritarianism, development, underdevelopment, frustration, or collective trauma. It may also infer the inclusion of different particular episodes of violence into the chronology of terrorism, which is or has to be different from that of other forms of violent actions if terrorism is to stand as a unique violence in its own merit.

Another intuitive enquiry any observer could raise about terrorism is the question of “where terrorism occurs”, which deals with the place of origin and the place of frequent incidence of terrorism. Moreover, the question of how terrorism occurs entails the continuous “means versus end” debate in the explanations of the phenomenon.

The question “who” or by “whom” covers the issue of doers or perpetrators of the act of terrorism. These are debated over as being an individual, a criminal gangs’ group, a group specializing in the perpetration of the act of terrorism and sometimes making an open self-proclamation and claims of responsibility for launching ‘terrorist’ attacks, or being a state or government institution. The question also entails the issue of identity of the perpetrators; for instance, their socio-economic status and, in some literature, their mental condition.

As it is reflected in the third chapter of this thesis, enquiries about terrorism based on the questions when, where and by whom all contribute to the analysis of terrorism based on the 'why' question, which is the particular focus of the thesis. The 'why' question, entails the factors behind committing acts of terrorism and the way these factors are related with one another and with terrorism. In short, it entails the causes of terrorism and the causation of terrorism. Like the preceding questions of enquiry about terrorism, the why question is not well studied and vulnerable for subjectivity. It is true that researches on terrorism, particularly those that have a cause, impact and solution framework have proliferated especially since the September 11/2001 incident. But, the fact that they are numerous does not mean that the question is satisfactorily answered. The drawbacks in the study of the causes and the causation of terrorism among others include the followings:

Firstly, it suffers from the methodological problem of dealing with human behaviour and socially constructed knowledge. Secondly, there is the "research after conclusion" tendency in most research on terrorism. Thirdly, either the "multiple-cause" or "the single-cause" approach has often been applied to study the why question about terrorism. The former deals with a combination of political, psychological, ideological, social or economic factors as causes for terrorism, whereas the latter deals with solely one factor; for example, solely economic or solely psychological factor, as a cause for terrorism (Hudson, 1999). The multiple-cause approach could lead to the presumption that all types of violence that creates fear can be a form of terrorism and therefore makes the task of data gathering and processing very complex, whilst the single-cause approach, which may be easier for the gathering of research data could an unfulfilled and untrue picture of the phenomenon of terrorism.

Surprisingly, as this thesis takes it to be one of its basic assumptions, not only the terrorists but also the parties of the "war on terror" want not the demise of terrorism through peaceful conflict resolution, but rather the sustainability and expansion or globalization of terrorism. Therefore, this thesis will deal with the following and other issues in a psycho-economic framework (see sub section 1.5).

1. If being 'psychic' is not synonymous with being 'psychologically motivated, Hudson (1999), what is there behind the motive of these two combatants to work to sustain the conflict?
2. Do terrorists not seem to be calculative of certain economic or tangible gains, while 'intangible objectives' are often made when defining the theme of terrorism?
3. If their objectives were purely economic gains, why are the terrorists, such as the tribal warlords in Somalia, organized terrorists like Al Qaeda, the remnants of the Taliban or Sadam Husain supporters, not taking themselves out of the conflict circuit once they are fatally defeated?
4. Similarly, because the economic cost of countering terrorism is greater than that of terrorism itself for developed states(Keefer& Loayza,2008), why do these developed states not seek other non-violent means of countering terrorism if their objectives were purely for economic gains?
5. More paradoxically, if developing states' cooperation and the 'evil aid' they receive is making them primary targets of the global terrorist network, increasing the cost of both terrorism and counter terrorism for them and furthering their decline in the global power structure, (Keefer& Loayza,2008), why are these developing states still allied to the "global war on terrorism"?
6. Is there a kind of "war mongering" psychological pathogen in the leaders of terrorist organizations and those of developed and developing states which is not a mental illness but a condition moulded and remoulded by their tangible economic motives of staying in power and/or personalizing part of the resource mobilized for terrorism or counter terrorism?

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Psychological and economic causative factors of terrorism have often been studied separately except in the multi-causal approach that deals with a pool of other factors too. Nevertheless, economic centrality and psychological centrality perspectives have many drawbacks in explaining terrorism, which among others include the followings:

The first problem many have observed in separately analyzing the psychology and economics of terrorism is methodological. This involves the question of whose economy

or psychology to study: the individual perpetrators', the group leaders', or that of the leaders of harbouring or targeted states. The confusion of studying the psychology and economy of leaders of states infers another problem. This is the question that: 'which creation of an atmosphere of fear is terrorism; the one by non-state actors or by state actors. With the economic perspective in particular, it is also questionable as to whose development and/or underdevelopment matters in relation to terrorism. There are two competing assertions in this regard: one, advocated by authoritative persons such as Andrew Tobias² says that the locus of the developed world's security threat is shifting to the developing world and another, advocated by writers such as Laqueur (2004) says that that terrorism does not originate from the poorest and most neglected districts, but hails from other places, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and North African countries, where the backwardness, if any, was intellectual and cultural, but not economic and social.

The second problem concerns the relevance of the 'economic centrality' and the 'psychological centrality' perspectives themselves. For example, not all the poor are necessarily criminals or even terrorists. The criticism holds water especially when considering the economy of the terrorist organizations' leaders, and/or that of the oil producing and exporting countries, which are believed, at least for most of western literature on terrorism, to be the incubators hatching the eggs of terrorism. The reason is that these people are economically well to do, academically well-educated and most of these countries are middle income countries.

If the externalization (pushing) of the origin of terrorism reaches the frontiers of poor nations of the world, such as those of Africa where there is both national and individual underdevelopment, then the 'developing' or 'underdeveloped' world's being the origin of terrorism, as the researcher argues citing Gebru, might work for domestic, but not international terrorism.

According to Gebru (1991), increasing state violence, or rightly termed, 'state terrorism' or 'legal terrorism', sows the seed for greater political violence amongst the people. In

²See: Andrew Tobias, US AID administrator, as quoted in Keefer and Loayza (2008).

this case, terrorism can be considered as being one of the strategies. However, when the state's violence reaches its peak, the people's violence decreases or hibernates as the state legally monopolizes coercive power.

Therefore, local violent conflicts (rightly or wrongly labelled terrorism) in these countries are local and originate from a source within the country. Thus, they can hardly have an international scope. Moreover, in terms of incidence, such local violence are greater in the developed world than the developing world, (Daniel, 2004), but their impacts are felt more strongly in the latter because it is bottle necked due to the underdevelopment. That is maybe why counter terrorism efforts in Africa, as described by Pham (2007), both in practice and in terms of legal criminalization³ focus on domestic terrorism. Thus terrorism is not necessarily poverty driven.

Likewise, the opponents of the psychological perspective go to the extent of asserting that there is no terrorist psychology as such which is different from that of other violent people. If this was not the case, the threat of terrorism could be avoided simply by the removal of terrorists. The assertion here is that terrorism is not derived out of psychological pathogens and the being psychotic.

The third limitation of psychological or economic factors' primacy in the causation of terrorism is that they give a distorted image of the phenomenon by dissociating terrorists from their human nature. For instance, the economic approach draws man in the paint of economic materialism and 'money mongerism', dissociating him from the emotional elements in his behavior. The psychological approach dissociates man from cost-benefit analysis rationalism and a certain degree of egoism, which are again there in his nature. So, both are unnatural on their own.

Nevertheless, the researcher does not agree with such complete neglecting of both economic and psychological causative factors of terrorism and, for that matter, the "war on terror", which is condemned by some to be the other face of the coin. Rather, they

³ O A U's Convention on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism defines "terrorism" as: Any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party, (See: Pham, (2007)).

have to be dealt with in combination as simultaneously causing terrorism. The reasons the researcher has are as follows.

Firstly, simultaneous causation of terrorism by the two sets of factors reduces the problems of gathering and analyzing data and hasty generalization of all violence as terrorism from which the “multi causal” approach of studying terrorism suffers. Secondly, terrorism, particularly organized terrorism, is a crime economy in which there are producers (state and non-state terrorists), distributors (mass media and politicians) and consumers (states, terrorists and the mass media). The producers do not seem to be beneficiaries from the economy in terms of material, but they, particularly the terrorist leaders (state or non-state), highly benefit from the resources mobilized to conduct the terrorism. Even suicide bombers most of the time first ensure that remittance is transferred to their relatives before their death.

The distributors and consumers of the economy use the production of fear for widening their base of legitimacy, diverting the attention of citizens by building artificially constructed nationalism or blackening the image of their adversaries internally and externally, and for attracting audience.

Expressed in terms of world economic zones, the core wants the sustainability of this violent conflict, or terrorism, as it ensures sustainable demand for the core’s surplus armament products on the side of the periphery, which has little of the manufacturing and excess of the product.

Meanwhile, the periphery wants the conflict’s sustainability since it opens a new channel for the flow of aid, or ‘evil aid’. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, both individual and state terrorists may be doing well economically, but they engage in terrorism due to the fact that their own personal human needs are psychologically ever increasing and unlimited and the crime economy for them is the most lucrative and the shortest way of meeting such ever increasing and unlimited needs.

Thirdly, the terrorist psychology, if he/she is not psychotic, is not delineated from the rational cost benefit analysis. However, the crime economy continues to endlessly operate even when the business cycle is in recession with no ears for close down

decisions. This is mainly because of machinations on the participants of the economy by their respective ideologies. In short, the economy of terrorism cannot be isolated from the psychology of terrorism and vice versa.

1.3. Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 General Objectives

Having the assumption that separating human psychology from human economic rationalism is unnatural, this research mainly aims to:

- ➡ Realistically understand the interplay of psychological and economic factors which cause terrorism and influence counter-terrorism.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The research also aims to achieve objectives, which are supportive to its central theme.

Accordingly, the research aims:

- ➡ To draw links between definitional problems, the cleavages between politics and terrorism, the cleavages between terrorism and other types of violence, and the challenge to legally ban terrorism and make it punishable under the law.
- ➡ To critically compare and contrast the existing theories of terrorism, particularly psychological and economic theories of terrorism.
- ➡ To show the place of “psycho-economic” factors in determining individual and group terrorist decisions and actions as well as those of counter- terrorism by using al Qaeda and the ‘war on terror’ as lens.
- ➡ To critically examine the link between psychological and economic causation of terrorism, and the dominant presumption in the main stream that terrorism originates in the developing world.

1.4. Research Questions

The following questions are thought to guide this thesis research.

- ➡ What makes a violent act such as terrorism a crime? Is it the existence of a law banning it or the nature of the act?
- ➡ Can either economic or psychological causes avoid the other from causing terrorism, as it is assumed by terrorism theories advocating ‘primarily economic or ‘primarily psychological’ causation?
- ➡ Do economic or psychological causes happen in a way one causing the other and the latter causing terrorism as assumed by terrorism theories advocating the chain of causes approach?
- ➡ Do psychological and economic causation of terrorism have relation to the place of origin of the phenomenon whether it originates from the developing world or the developed world?
- ➡ Is counter terrorism without any psychological or economic motives and has only consequences?

1.5 Methodology and Method of Data Collection

1.5.1 Methodology

This research thesis takes into account: the multiplicity of the causes of terrorism, and the economic rationalism and the relative egoism of human beings. Besides, it assumes that it is the lack of readiness to windup terrorism, not only on the part of the terrorists but also the ‘counter-terrorist’ which prevented the possibility of this violent conflict from ceasing or even becoming reduced. The general consensus is for terrorism to have causes and consequences, and counter terrorism to have only consequences, but no causes except terrorism itself. In contrast to this, the thesis assumes that both terrorism and counter terrorism have psychological and economic causes and consequences.

With the above assumptions in mind, this research thesis applies an analytical qualitative methodology. While looking into the possible causes of terrorism, this research thesis is

informed by the existing multifaceted perspectives on terrorism, which it reflects in a bird's eye view in the first sub sections of the third chapter. Then, the thesis goes beyond the centrality of either economic or psychological factors in causing terrorism to assert that no terrorist psychology is free from economic rationalism in the next sub section of that chapter. In short, the thesis squeezes the various factors under the economic domain and psychological domain into one, "psycho-economic" domain. That is why the researcher says it brings factors from two different domains into one, but it adheres not to the "single-causal" approach, rather, to the "multi causal" approach.

Incidentally, according to Hudson (1999), the psychological approach is concerned with the study of terrorists perse, their recruitment and induction into terrorist groups, their personalities, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and careers as terrorists. On the other hand, the economic approach, or more broadly the developmental approach is concerned with the economic motivation and the economic socialization or economic education of terrorism. This, according to Keefer, & Loayza, (2008), includes terrorism's economic and physical costs and the economy as an instrument for deterrence of terrorism, as well as how development affects terrorism.

The "psycho-economic" approach, which is going to be applied in this thesis, is concerned with the psychological and economic machinations that simultaneously happen to an individual rational, non psychotic terrorist pushing him/her to do the act, and such motivations behind counter terrorism. The approach examines how counter terrorism utilizes psychology and economy to deter terrorism in its presence and for securitization in its absence. It also deals with the psychological and economic impacts of both terrorism and counter terrorism, which will not be covered in this thesis.

The analytical approach is selected because of the nature of the research. As the title clearly indicates, "Al Qaeda versus the War on Terror: A Study on Psychological and Economic Causal Factors", is an endeavour to investigate causes and causation of terrorism in terms of simultaneous occurrence of psychological and economic causal-events to result in the effect-event of terrorism. This, therefore, requires adequate description and explanation. Analytical approach of analysis has to be employed to show how these variables are properly analyzed.

1.5.2 Method of Data Collection

This research is a qualitative, thus, it uses a qualitative method of data collection. It primarily depends on secondary data obtained from consulting books, magazines, newspapers and electronic media: the internet, television and radio. Moreover, to fill gaps of information, unstructured interviews to be administered by the researcher will be conducted with concerned experts from the Ethiopian Federal Police Forensic and Organized Crimes Department and IGAD's Security Services Program Ethiopia Office. The preference for the information obtained from experts is because of the inaccessibility of perpetrators of terrorism and the possibility for them to provide wrong information even if found under arrest or in prison and because the experts spend a lot of their time and mental effort on the issue and with the actors.

1.6 Significance of the Study

Thus, the “psycho-economic” perspective is manageable for data gathering and analysis and gives a realistic picture of the phenomenon that can be comprehended. This thesis also will divert from the trend of prejudgment of terrorism and counter terrorism as always being “tit for tat”. Rather, it takes the two to be motivated by their own respective psychological and economic motivation. And, in some episodes, actions in the latter may happen in the absence or without the prior happening of actions in the former.

1.7 Scope and Limitation of the Study

This study can be categorized under the “multi causal” orientation of studying the causes, impacts and solutions of terrorism since it merges together ample of psychological and economic causes of terrorism. Even though it recognises the existence of factors of terrorism other than those in the psychological and economic domain, it is not going to give a detailed account of these factors. Even with regard to the psychological and economic factors, it does not focus on identifying the causes or the factors, rather on the causation or causal analysis of terrorism as caused by these factors.

It is well known that there are researches of the psychological and economic impacts of terrorism. Though the question ‘why terrorism?’ has an implication to this too, the focus

in this thesis is not on the impacts of terrorism, but the causation of terrorism. Still further, the intention of this thesis is not to deal in detail with psychological terrorism and economic terrorism which are sub variants of terrorism as identified by the taxonomy of the phenomenon.

1.8 Organization of the Thesis

The second chapter of this thesis focuses “on the concepts terrorism and counter-terrorism”. In the subsequent sub sections the problematic nature of defining and characterizing terrorism, and the implications of this for legalization and practical countering of the act are reflected upon. Classifying the types of terrorism based on different criteria, the chapter then proceeds to reflect on both the historical overlap of politics and terrorism and counter terrorism as well as on the existing debate on the “war on terror.”

The third chapter of this thesis, “theorizing terrorism”, makes a review of the existing causal analysis of terrorism from different angles. It begins by reflecting the possible two side arguments on the causality and non-causality of terrorism based on various parameters. Then, it proceeds by identifying the drawbacks of chain of causes approach and primarily psychological and primarily economic causation approaches in the causation of terrorism. This would serve as a stepping stone to come up with the thesis’s arguments for simultaneous causation of terrorism by economic and psychological factors.

By using Al Qaeda and the war on terror as cases, the fourth chapter tries to give a practical illustration of the limitations of primary-cause and chain of causes approaches in the causation of terrorism by economic and psychological factors based on the parameters identified in the preceding chapter. Besides, this chapter uses Alqaeda and the war on terror as lenses.

The fifth chapter outlines the major findings of the research and gives directions for further research on the causation of terrorism.

Chapter Two: On the Concepts Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism

Etymologically the term terrorism can be traced back to the cold war period. But, an act of violence creating an atmosphere of fear can be rightly traced back to antiquity even though there can be mismatches and cleavages with other forms of violence. Regardless of the dynamism in political ideology, philosophy, desired goals and social contexts of terrorists, and techniques of terrorism, across time and between terrorists, however, according to Garrison (2004), the thought or ideology about the rationalization for the use of terror and the belief in its utility is persistent across time and between terrorists.

In contrast, the definition and characterization, the tactical continuums and contextual frameworks, the legalization (criminalization) and periodization as well as, the typologization and the spectacularization, (Boyns and Ballard, 2004),⁴ of the phenomenon are bottlenecked by the disagreements among the various concerned parties. Similarly, the response to terrorism, which hitherto has acquired no new approaches, but a new magnitude, nomenclature, and politicization and securitization under the post September 11 “war on terrorism,” is equally debated over among others with regard to its definition, legality, morality and uniqueness. Therefore the upcoming sub sections of this chapter are devoted to critically identify some of the existing disagreements and confusions involving the definition and characterization, and typologization and periodization of the two phenomena. The subsections also look for the reasons for such contestations, and the implications of these contestations for studying as well as legally and practically countering the phenomenon.

2.1. Terrorism: Many, While One and One, while Many

2.1.1. Terrorism Defined

Commonsense knowledge exists about terrorism and its routines in everyday life. Nonetheless, the unique characters of the phenomenon, its causative factors, the type of its perpetrators, the nature of its objects or targets, and the modus operandi are endlessly

⁴ The aforementioned are trends of analysis of terrorism (see: Boyns and Ballard (2004)).

open avenues of contention. For instance, Burgoon (2006) has noted that scholars, governments, the legal system, security forces, the media and institutions have created more than a hundred definitions for terrorism. Garrison (2004) reaffirms this asserting that particularly, terrorologists have sought to define every possible aspect of terrorism: defining it from the terrorist's point of view, from the view of the victim, from its utility, to viewing terrorism as another side of war. However, all the definitions of terrorism are insufficient and controversial

2.1.1.1 Confusions in Defining Terrorism

The first confusion is concerning the way of devising definitions: whether to devise precise or simplistic definitions as opposed to 'verbose' definitions (Zumve, 2013 & Garrison, 2004) of terrorism. The former is advocated more by government agencies and less by academics. Though it is widely used approach of defining, it is atheoretical and makes no distinction between terrorism and other variants of violence, and between terrorism on one hand, and political resistance and mass violence on the other hand. The latter is a less widely used approach and is advocated more by the academics than by government agencies. Though it criticizes the former one for being loaded by politics, power dynamics and the motive to delegitimize adversaries, it is not free from embodying such interests of the definers: political choices about what are constituted as being relevant issues and what are acceptable questions for study. That is may be why as Feldman and Perala (2004) and Boyns and Ballard (2004) have criticised, definitions in this approach tend to have singular focus; for example state terrorism. Though it is a trial to grasp every possible aspect of terrorism, like its predecessor it is not free from subjective themes of definition. Therefore, given these limitations in both approaches, Carney (2005) and Ratner (ND) comment that terrorism, both domestic and international terrorism have been loosely defined.

The second more general confusion in defining terrorism is the overlap between terrorism and other variants of social and political violence. One of the reasons for this is the widely accepted conception of terrorism as a means to an end, which is also true for other forms of violence. The other reason is that perpetrators of other forms of violence apply terrorism as one of their available strategic alternatives. Ted Robert Gurr (1993) noted

that out of 114 communal groups which were engaged in certain forms of armed rebellion between 1945- 1989, 35 used terrorism as their main tactic of rebellion. This is in order to tactically balance the supremacy of their adversary, which is often an incumbent government monopolizing as a coercive power.

The above mentioned confusion also bears an additional third confusion, the confusion conveyed by the cliché, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”(Ganor,2009).

Fourthly, it can also easily be inferred from the second and the third confusions discussed above that there is ‘Means Versus End’ confusion in conceptualizing terrorism. However, the ‘means’ conception of terrorism: its conception as tactic, method, modus operandium or a political strategy, which is selected from among a wide variety of alternatives overweighs in the definitions of the phenomenon than the end conception. Coady(1985) reemphasizes this ‘means’ conception’ of terrorism asserting that terror is a form of violence and violence is primarily a means. As such, terrorism should be morally judged in the light of being a means or technique for the pursuit of political ends. Nonetheless, this notion, as Ahmad (2009) rightly argues, is erroneous since it confuses freedom, which is the goal of the bearer with terrorism that could be a means to achieve a goal.

A fifth confusion is whether to conceive a single episode of terrorism as a process or as an independent phenomenon on its own merit. This can be illustrated by the question about whether or not non state terrorism is a reaction to a previous act done by its adversary, the state, either under the guise of countering terrorism or that of maintaining security, order and the “rule of law.” Similarly, the question whether or not anti-terrorism or counter-terrorism is initiated by the non state terrorism illustrates this confusion. Additionally, the ‘process conception of terrorism’ means the sustainability of the phenomenon in a given geographic area across time that could be understood in terms of the tit for tat between its state and non state perpetrators, the psychological condition and rational consideration of both parties as well as the level of development of the area.

The sixth confusion in conceptualizing terrorism is the amalgamation between terrorism on the one hand and religion and ideology on the other hand. As it will be discussed in

the third chapter, this confusion clearly portrays the secondary importance of ideology in causing terrorism and the weakness of chain of causes causal analysis. The reason is that all bearers of an ideology are not terrorists. Pham (2007) points the place of ideology in the causation of terrorism asserting that terrorism does not arise out of political failure or out of underdevelopment in general without some sort of ideological “accelerant.”

The amalgamation of terrorism and religion is wrong in that it leads to the blind categorization, by a forced ‘collective think’, of a certain faith as a religion of violence serving as a source for an unrelenting impulse of violence (Khan, 2006 and Springer, 2009). This amalgamation is also wrong in that it diverts the attention of research and practical countering efforts away from the root causes of terrorism: occupations, territorial appropriations, or human rights abuses. Moreover, the amalgamation of terrorism and ideology is erroneously conceived merely because the two words have the ‘ism’ suffix (Coady, 1985). If this was not the case, terrorism is not an ideology by itself, but it may have its own ideology that it uses for creating unity among the terrorists and for expanding the base of membership.

The seventh confusion is the conceptual inflation and inconsistency of terrorism across different disciplines. In geography, terrorism is a tactic for attempting to gain control over a geographical area or territory. For the forensic and criminology disciplines, it is a criminal plan to violate rights and freedoms of people. Additionally, terrorism can be considered to endanger a national resource or international facilities, or to threaten the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent states. While political scientists treat terrorism as a politically motivated violence, psychologists*⁵ see it as violence committed by those with psychological pathogens and/or damned behavior (Borum 2004 and Andargachew, 1988).

⁵ Note that the definitions of terrorism from psychological perspective emphasize more on psychological impacts of terrorism on direct and indirect victims, than on the motives for its perpetration. See for example, Springer (2008)).

2.1.1.2 Reasons behind the Confusions in Defining Terrorism

Some of the reasons for the prevalence of contestation and insufficiency in defining and characterizing terrorism are its complexity, the cleavage with other forms of political violence and the relativity of the defining themes common in most definitions, and the underlining motives of the defining parties.

2.1.1.2.1. The Underlying Motives of the Definers

The underlining motive of the parties fabricating the diversified definitions of the phenomenon is the most crucial reason behind the controversy on the essence of terrorism, because the definitions of the concept are often devised in a political and ideological approach.

As Gibbs (1989) notes, the definitions of terrorism are controversial for reasons other than conceptual issues and problems, because labelling actions as "terrorism" promotes condemnation of the actors. That is maybe why as Duffy(2008) observes, the various terrorism 'lists' at national, regional and international level lack transparent reasons for inclusion and exclusion in them and those listed lack meaningful opportunity to challenge inclusion. For example, a "terrorist regime", which involves those, engaged in state conducted terrorism, state sponsored or legal terrorism, may frame their own definition of terrorism so as to persecute their opponents under the guise of the law of anti-terrorism (Asafa, 2004). Or, they may do so in order to divert the attentions of their own nationals away from their mal politics towards their "self-constructed" common enemy which may be a foreign state or a group. In addition to this, since the nationals of these terrorist regimes are a divided up entity who are less likely to identify themselves by the name of the state, it is not bad to guess that the regimes may frame certain definitions of terrorism which fit the actual terrorist threats that may occur or potential terrorist threats that the regimes may 'fictionate' and show to the people. This builds artificial and malevolent nationalism, which inturn results in obedience and loyalty to the regimes.

On the other hand, “democracies” ⁶ may frame their own definition of terrorism. Their intention here may be to exclude state terrorism from the category of terrorism. Nevertheless, state terrorism can be considered to be equally victimising primary targets and as terrifying or ‘lesson giving’ to secondary targets as the acts of terrorism. The U.S. Department of State’s (1998) basic definition of terrorism could clearly show this effort of excluding state terrorism, that is state sponsored or state conducted terrorism, and legal terrorism from the category of terrorism. This definition says that terrorism is “a premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”(Whittaker, 2002& Oruka, 1976),

However, such an externalizing definition of terrorism devised by the state bears two problems. First, an act of violence that is generally regarded in one country as an act of terrorism may not be viewed so in another country (Hudson, 1999). This in turn would have made ‘international cooperation on counter-terrorism’ unlikely to happen if there was no machination by the “politics of evil aid” by the first world on the third world. Second, though it is asserted in the definition that terrorism is enacted solely by external groups, these so called “clandestine groups” have their own ideology, such as “Alqaedaism” , which they could use as a binding force gearing unity amongst themselves, the “we” group, and to create a sense of enmity and inferiority complex towards others, the “they” group. The existence of an ideology on the side of the state too, for example, liberalism, therefore makes it difficult for the state to apply the term. So, states try to control the definition of terrorism by making the definitions flexible and malleable (Campos II, 2007).

What could be a common intention of both ‘terrorist regimes’ and ‘democracies’ while framing multiple definitions of terrorism is the intention to make their respective adversaries lose moral and ethical values, and become rogue players outside the rules of

⁶ **Democracies are regimes, which, according to the democratic peace theory, never fight each other, but against the “non- democracies.” But, the theory’s workability is questionable in the face of the NATO led counterterrorism campaigns, for example.

normal political games. This, according to Cooley (2000) is by labelling the adversary a 'terrorist' and sticking the label to it. Khan (2006) notes that 'nothing justifies terrorism' has been the new paradigm of suppressive entities. This includes both 'democracies' and 'terrorist regimes', which claim that their acts are counter terrorism rather than terrorism.

Another intention that democracies might have while framing multiple definitions of terrorism is to expand the scope of conflict.⁷This, however, may not be only the intention of democracies; non-state terrorists may also work toward the expansion of the scope of terrorism conflict. To expand the scope of terrorism may imply two things: temporally, to work to prolong the conflict and increase the magnitude and frequency of incidents in the conflict, and spatially, to widen the geographic coverage of the conflict. This intention can be clearly observed from the effort to trans-nationalize terrorist attacks by the 'terrorists', and the one to launch global response by the 'counter terrorists'.

From the point of view of terrorists themselves, they frame their own conception of the phenomenon, which is that 'one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter', in order to counter the dictum of the counter terrorists; i.e. 'nothing justifies terrorism'. This assertion of the terrorists is to mean that lawful violence, for example, violence associated with liberation movements, is different from unlawful violence or terrorism (Chomsky, 2002). In short, terrorists adhere to the 'process conception' of terrorism arguing that they are militants forming terror cells to avenge state terrorism (Shultz & Dew, 2006). So, from their angle, terrorism is not merely an emotional act of those with psychological pathologies. Rather, it is rationally and psychologically motivated act that aims at resource and power redistribution, avoidance of suppression and also the revenge of former violence.

Finally, according to Feldman and Perälä (2004) and Boyns and Ballard(2004), academics have their own motives while framing multiple definitions of terrorism. That is, they seek for relevant issues and acceptable questions for study. Given that knowledge

⁷ According to Schattschneider's (1960) model of power resolution, "the outcome of any conflict will not depend on the relative power of the competing interests but will be determined by the eventual scope of the conflict", (see: Taylor and Flint (2000), PP 26)).

and identity are socially constructed and that the researchers have their own identity, they may also tend to frame the essence of terrorism in a way that protects or favours the researched group to which they belong in one or the other way.

2.1.1.2.2. Relativity or Subjectivity of the Definitional Elements of Terrorism

The relativity or subjectivity of the definitional elements of the concept is also an equally important reason behind the contending and misleading conceptualizations of terrorism. It is known to the laity that terrorism is a violent method to achieve certain objectives. But, the subjectivity concerns the definitional elements: who or what type of entity utilizes, what form of violence, to attain what type of objectives, by targeting whom, with what effects on the targets, and what societal and legal implications for the perpetrators.

The literature on terrorism is subjective or relative and emotionally loaded when seen in the aforementioned common definitional elements. The subjectivity starts with the emphasis different literature place on the definitional terms; some emphasize the actors, others emphasize the actions, yet others emphasize the victims or the effects.

The other subjectivity is in terms of the meaning and scope of the definitional elements. To begin with, some replace 'violence', with propaganda. For those who assert that terrorism is more about propaganda than violence, the act of terrorism is essentially about publicity. These people seem to share the same view with those who say terrorism is a form of undeclared war without any formal engagement in battles. They also seem to share similar views with those who say that terrorism is a surprise attack, unexpected at a particular point in time and space (Held, 1984 & Morris 2009). All the above assertions imply that terrorism is a psychological warfare, which primarily operates on the mind of victims. The assertions also could imply that terrorism as "third-party" or "general" intimidation influences some audiences that differ from the immediate target of the violence (Chomsky, 1988 & Post, 2007). This means that terrorism is harmful for two entities: direct violence on a small number of people is used as a symbol to indirectly leave a larger number of people in anxiety.

Treating terrorism as merely propaganda denounces the place of violence in the phenomenon. What terrifies in terrorism is not only the surprise or unexpectedness of the act, but also the magnitude of violence. Explaining terrorism as a surprise attack also leaves the phenomenon as being no different from special operation warfare; since surprise is a key operational enabler in both so as to overcome the enemy's superiority of force (Morris 2009).

Writers, such as Feldman and Perälä (2004), conceive terrorism as the deliberate or calculated use of violence; others see it as an outgrowth of mental illness or a psychological pathogen. Ultimately, there are some who try to differentiate terrorism from other similar kinds of violence in terms of unlawfulness (Khan, 2006).

If terrorism is such a 'violent act', who is or are the actor/s of such an act? Most literature of terrorism tends to exclude state actors from the responsibility for committing a terrorist attack. According to them, there is no such a thing called 'state terrorism', or if it exists at all, it is either a misnomer or at least something that needs to be distinguished from terrorism proper and presumably analyzed in its own right. In other words, terrorism is often perpetrated by small groups operating from within a society rather than as an external, invading force, i.e. any individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority (Goodwin, 2006, Pine & Masten, 2005 & Plümper & Neumayer, 2009). States may actually support the conduct of terrorism by non-state and clandestine actors, but they do not engage themselves directly in the perpetration of the act. One of the rationales to back the above assertion is that political violence committed by states against civilians, both in times of war and in times of peace, is already governed by existing international laws and conventions.

In contrast, there are some definitions of terrorism that connote the possibilities for states to carry out terrorist acts. Some even go to the extent of asserting that terrorism is a response to state terrorism, (Goodwin, 2006 & Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006). In addition to this, others such as Khan (2006) even claim to have found a kind of mutualism between terrorism and state terrorism saying that the two are co-dependent forms of violence.

Regarding the objectives of terrorism, the descriptions ‘for political purposes’, or ‘politically motivated’ are the most common in the literature of terrorism (Carney, 2005, U.S. Marine Corps, 2001, Coady, 1985, Post, 2007 & Burgoon, 2006). Within the same spectrum of intangible objectives, some others widen the objectives of terrorism to goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. This description of the objectives of terrorism goes in line with the assertion which says that publicity is an essential part of terrorism. By implication, terrorism aims at generating fear and influencing some audiences (Goodwin, 2006, Boyns & Ballard, 2004 & Post, 2007).

Nevertheless, the concept of the objectives of terrorism is also not free from contestation and relativity. The subjectivity of the concept of this theme starts with inclusion and exclusion of this definitional element from the definitions of terrorism. Accordingly, most literature from Western countries tend to detach this end from the means, while those from the third World and Muslim countries tend to be cautious of this for, it would lead to the merging of liberation, resistance, and guerrilla movements with terrorism.

Though ‘politically motivated’ is the common concept, some see such ‘public recognition of a problem or claim’ as a tactical aim of terrorism and contend that its strategic aim is a broader absolute change caused by fear. Within a similar wider spectrum, others stretch the objectives of terrorism to the furtherance of political or social objectives, and more broadly to the achievement of economic, political, socio psychological or ideological objectives,(Boyns & Ballard, 2004 & Garrison, 2004).Some unclearly state the objectives of terrorism as a kind of social control (Frisby,1998),while others confuse the ends of terrorism with the effects or impacts on the victims saying that terrorism aims at terrifying and compliant behaviour (Feldmann & Perälä, 2004).

In short, what is meant by ‘politically motivated’ and whether creation of fear can be an objective are questions still not unanimously agreed upon.

Given this disparity in framing the ‘objective’ as a defining element what could be the acceptance of the actors in the society or by the law in the furtherance of their objectives? ‘Illegal’, ‘merciless killing’ or ‘unjustified’ describe the terrorist act and seem to connote the immorality of terrorism. The subjectivity regarding the morality of terrorism and for

that matter counter terrorism, ranges from those that justify it as moral, to those that are neutral with respect to the morality and immorality. Those, who justify its morality reason out that terrorism is a response to state violence and linked to armed struggle and the liberation movement. To the contrary, human rights activists condemn both terrorism and counter terrorism as immoral for them, non-state terrorism is not always a response for state terrorism, and rather it is often initiated by the terrorist organizations themselves. Linking terrorism with the liberation movement is criticized for confusing (Chomsky, 2002) an end (liberation) with a means (terrorism). Besides, a great debate is under way over the continuing validity of the right to armed struggle (Khan, 2006). Meanwhile, at the mid of the spectrum there are neutral concepts of both terrorism and counter terrorism that say nothing about the goodness or badness of the cause and mission for which both acts are conducted.

The typology of targets of terrorism is also bottlenecked by the problem of subjectivity. Some devise a dual typology of the targets or victims of terrorism, while others devise that of a threefold typology. The dual typology of the victims or targets of terrorism includes primary targets and secondary targets. The 'primary targets' refer to the immediate victim of terrorist attacks, which are relatively smaller than the secondary targets and are used by the terrorists as symbols or signals to convey a message (Lowther & Lindsay, 2009) to the wider secondary target. The 'secondary target' stands for the general public or the state or government.

On the other hand, the threefold typology is divided into the target of terror, the target of demand, and the target of influence. The 'target of terror' in this typology refers to the members of the victims of violence, whereas the target of influence refers to the establishment calling attention to the terrorists' cause. In the same typology the target of demand refers to the hostage kidnapped by the terrorists and a threat to whose life is communicated to the target of influence, compelling it to fulfil certain demand of the terrorists. The subjectivity, therefore emanates from here; those in support of the terrorists make their inference from the dichotomy and 'trichotomy' to assert that the 'innocent' are not the 'ultimate targets' or 'intent' of the terrorists (Smelser, 2007).

However, subjective adjectives such as ‘innocent’, ‘civilian’, ‘non-combatant’ or ‘unarmed’ are commonly used to describe the targets of terrorism. What is meant by these descriptions creates more problems when considering that terrorism may target civilians and/or instead of, the military. Military personnel may be off-duty and unarmed and therefore non-combatant at the time of the terrorist act. Additionally, it can be said that it is not only civilians, but also their properties that are targets of terrorism. This means that the description of targets as definitional elements of terrorism includes human and non-human targets.

While some say that terrorism as undeclared and low-intensity warfare must make targets of everyone except for active supporters, others say that it has to be selective in order not to frighten away the support for its cause from among the common people (Smelser, 2007). The indiscriminateness of terrorism is not only a proposition for its strategy, but also a criticism for its immorality.

‘Being indiscriminate’, in the proper sense of the dictionary, means being non selective. According to (Crenshaw, 1973 & Watson, C 1976), terrorists have to be selective of their targets; i.e. choosing news worthy targets, which cause violence to a few, but influences many. According to others, terrorists have to be ‘indiscriminate’, i.e. have to attack friends or innocents in the target area together with the enemy so as to enable a safe escape from the enemy’s boundary.

Whether there are direct or indirect targets of terrorism, it is obvious that their being targeted has certain impacts. Nevertheless, the impact of terrorism is also not an agreed upon element. While the generation of fear in any section of the public or in the government, or the initiation of change due to fear is the most pronounced impact of terrorism in the literature, some argue that terrorism may not always terrorize and hence may in fact influence audiences by other means (Smith & Thomas, 2001). Others add by saying that people are terrified by terrorists not necessarily because of being terrified of the act, but because of the socially constructed reality of normalcy, which is built in them and bounds their perception of reality (Quarantelli, 2002).

Furthermore, there are legal and practical implications of the problematic definitions of terrorism. In the first place the routine occurrence of the phenomenon and the term becoming cliché develops the perception that terrorism is something which exists and is known to the laity, and hence does not need any scholastic inquiry. Secondly, the interdisciplinary inconsistency of definitions of the phenomenon and the arbitrary utilization of the term leads to both a broader scope of the term or greater confusion of the meaning (Campos II, 2007&Chomsky, 2002).

Thirdly, since terrorism is conceptualized and theorized as unstructured violence or deviance, to borrow the term of sociologists, this leads to the prejudgment in the academics that every terrorist act is a 'problem and bad', while every counter terrorist act is a solution and good. Fourthly, different from other violent conflicts, one party in terrorism is taken for granted to be illegitimate, while the other to be legitimate. This blocks the chance for peaceful conflict resolution by making disputants not admit their mistakes and to continue resorting to force. Fifthly, the legalization or legal banning of a certain act needs its clear definition and delimitation of scope, but this is not the case in terrorism. Sixthly, the linkage of terrorism with ideology, both state and terrorist, results in the problem not being addressed independently, but as part of another issue such as securitization or globalization.

In general, the intuitivist orientation of the phenomenon of terrorism leaves it very much vulnerable to subjectivity, because the definition or characterization of the phenomenon is relative to the perceptions of the perpetrators of the act, and that of the direct and indirect targets of the act. Researchers therefore can also be influenced in their perception of the phenomenon of terrorism according to their affiliation with the above mentioned groups.

2.1.1.3. Definitional Problems Viewed from the Perspective of Causative Factors

There are definitions of terrorism which specify the motives and objectives of the terrorists, thereby giving an indication of the causative factors involved. Such definitions indicate the deliberateness of the targeting of 'civilians or non combatants in terrorism. In other words, they state that terrorist actions are not emotional, but intentional, and aim

at the attainment of clearly defined calculated objectives. It is arguably said that the terrorists are not doing their actions emotionally, but they seek to engender an emotional response among a target group.

Most definitions of terrorism conceive all terrorism to be politically motivated; for example, the definitions in the works of Kagwanja(2006) and Wintrobe(2006), have made ‘political purpose or goal’, ‘extreme and violent methods of political competition’, ‘a political agenda: a specific set of grievances or demands’, essential definitional elements of their respective definitions. On the contrary, others Morris (2009), assert that the goals of terrorists are not necessarily political except in the case of "political terrorism" as being one of the types of terrorism. From this ‘non political motive’ perspective it could be said that it is often tainted by self-serving motivations; in particular, groups in conflict tend to justify the use of violence for highly regarded political ends.

To continue with other motives of terrorism, the definitions of terrorism range from those that say the aspirations of the terrorist is to make sense of life and death by linking himself or herself to some form of immortality to those that say the motives of the terrorist are ideological, religious, ethnic and racial (particularly in multi-cultural societies) or criminal, which includes war crimes of undeclared war in time of peace (Rinehart, 2006).

The definition of terrorism with which this thesis is most closely aligned is the one that does not conceive the phenomenon to be either politically motivated or psychologically directed, rather that terrorism is both politically and psychologically motivated. The following definition of terrorism demonstrates the position of this thesis: terrorism is a “psychological response to oppression and an illegitimate use of power and violence to make political, social and/or religious change”.

The agreement of the thesis with this definition is conditional; firstly, as long as psychology is given motivational status. Secondly, as long as ‘political motive’ is taken not in ‘intangible’, but ‘tangible’ terms. Thirdly, as long as social change encompasses economic gains for the terrorist and economic change for those whom it represents, if

there are any. Finally, as long as religion is taken as a secondary purpose, used as a pretext of the primary objectives for membership recruitment and for ‘widening the scope of conflict’.

2.1.2. Terrorism versus other Forms of Political Violence

Terrorism has certain similarities with other forms of political violence. However, it is not one and the same with them. That is why simplistic definitions of terrorism are criticized, as we have raised earlier, for not clarifying the distinction that prevails between terrorism and other forms of violence.

I. Similarities between Terrorism and other Forms of Political Violence

The similarity between terrorism and other forms of traumatic political violence lies primarily in the potential psychological impact on the victims. In terms of impact, these forms of violence result in various degrees of social disorganization, where social order collapses into chaos and emergency systems. In terms of tactics and strategy both terrorism and other forms of political violence can be taken as or have an element of special military operation, or surprise attack, that avoids direct battle confrontation between the disputants. This is particularly when the parties launching the violence are nongovernmental entities or even states which have lesser capabilities than their adversaries (Pine, Costello & Masten, 2005, Morris, 2009&Williamson, 2009).

The third similarity between terrorism and other political violence is that in all cases the actors seek to attain their objectives through violence, no matter how the objectives are blurredly distinguished as political or non political, tangible or intangible, or otherwise. Fourthly, the distinction between combatant and non combatant targets is debatable and difficult to distinguish, both for terrorism and other forms of political violence. Fifthly, both the causes of terrorism and the causes of the aforementioned forms of violence are multifaceted (Sangiovanni & Jones, 2008). Sixthly and most importantly, besides being a method to groups who are specialized in it, terrorism can be a part of the style, tactics and strategies of all other forms of political violence. In comparison to other forms of violence, the capacity to kill or injure is not unique or of any special importance to terrorism as noted by Fitzpatrick(2003). However, saying so, Fitzpatrick contradicts the

supposition that the fear of terrorism arises due not only to the suddenness of the attacks but also to their magnitude.

II. Differences between Terrorism and other Forms of Political Violence.

Terrorism differs from structural violence in that it is not incorporated in the everyday workings or organization of social life that is it is a deviance. Arguably, being “deviance” of the ‘unstructured’ or ‘civil violence’ is socially constructed as decided by the dominant group in the society, which may not be the majority group (Jonson, 2000).

This definer dominant group, while defining a certain act as a ‘deviance’, utilizes its capability and audibility to frame a certain profile of the actors of that act. The common dichotomizations in political discourse that devalue the place of neutrality in the personal philosophy of an individual or a group such as “if you are not with us you are with them”, can illustrate this effort of the definer dominant group to frame a profile or personality of the ‘self labelled’ doers of a certain act, which it had defined as a deviance or being deviant. Similar dichotomizations, such as “good Muslims and bad Muslims” or the framing of the terrorists as ‘possessions of devil’, are good examples of such constructions of deviance and deviants as defined by the definer dominant group(Stephens & Williams,2009).

The above paragraph helps to clarify how terrorism can be seen as being different from the specific forms of political violence which are outlined hereunder; namely war, torture and genocide, nuclear terror and criminal acts.

i. Terrorism versus War

Wars, on one hand, and rebellion and social revolutions, on the other hand, are forms of political violence by downtrodden masses with varying levels of organization and varying scope of objectives. But, terrorism is a political violence by a small group of people, who nowadays can be networked with similar groups across national jurisdictions.

In their counter framing to the framings of being a ‘deviance’ by the definer dominant group, those labelled terrorists framed terrorism as resembling a small war. Their intention seems to imply that though all war should be avoided, some war is more

morally justifiable than other war and terrorism is as such a morally justifiable war. Nonetheless, defining terrorism as a ‘small war’ blurs the aforesaid distinction, which is made between terrorism, and war and its variants. Although there are many different classifications of wars, such as world wars, civil wars, wars of liberation movement, guerrilla war, rebellions and social revolutions(Held,2004), for the purpose of demonstrating a variety of differences between war and terrorism, this thesis will focus on just a few classifications of war.

To begin with, the ‘surprise attack’ tactic can be found both in terrorism and in small wars or guerrilla wars. In the latter, surprise is merely a tactic that enables increased numbers of prey for the weapons utilized, but in the former surprise and shock itself is a weapon, and armaments are delivery systems of that weapon. When Guerrillas take relatively permanent control of a portion of land, they become insurgents enjoying certain rights and fulfilling certain responsibilities under international law with regard to the population under their control. In contrast, terrorists do not have such areas under their control which they can use to mount attacks against the opposing state. Paradoxically, America’s official list of international terrorist organizations included Hamas and Hezbollah, which claim to work toward Palestinian liberation from Israel (Morris, 2009, Fitzpatrick, 2003& Henry, 2004).

Secondly, civil war is one of the forms of war that have the nature of internecine conflict. In terms of defining the difference between civil war and terrorism, civil war is significantly more likely in poorer and less open countries, whereas in the case of terrorism, as to Sambanis,(2008), lack of openness matters only for domestic terrorism.

Thirdly, though social revolutions are most often followed by post-revolutionary terror, this terror is different from terrorism in that the former, which is a systematic and consistent terror, is for the very objective of the revolution itself. Nonetheless, if it is measured by the parameter of indiscriminateness, revolutionary terror can be one sub variant of terrorism, political terrorism (World Book Inc, 2003).

ii. Terrorism versus Torture and Genocide

The terrorization and targeting of a relatively large number of people would make genocide similar to terrorism, but while the former is selective on the basis of religion, nationality, race, or ethnicity, the latter is indiscriminate. Some, Kalyvas (2004), suggest that discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, or ethnicity does not make genocide different from terrorism as long as the former is not making discrimination of targets based on personalized information about the target's actions. The other clearly observable difference is that terrorists are generally taken to be illegitimate, but the perpetrators of genocide, usually state agents or those affiliated to the state, try their best to conceal their activities and/or their identity through the use of propaganda and thus their actions are, at least temporally, considered to be legitimate.

To add one more feature to this debatable discriminate targeting in terrorism and genocide, terrorism intimidates a larger audience by harming or killing relatively a few, indiscriminately targeted direct targets. However, genocide is the elimination of entire communities selectively targeted on the basis of religion, nationality, race, or ethnicity.

The same terrorization of a group of people also blurs the distinction between terrorism and torture. Torture, as well as genocide, incites public feeling against the perpetrators of the violence. But, in terrorism the public discontent, at least in the long run, turns against the victims. Likewise, while torture is a form of brain washing on individual basis, terrorism is a form of brain washing on a mass basis (World Book Inc, 2003). Nevertheless, this distinction should not cover the possibility for terrorists to use torture as one of their tactics, particularly against their 'target of demand'.

iii. Terrorism versus Nuclear Terror

The 'terror' suffix is there not only with revolutionary terror, but also with 'nuclear terror.' In addition, as a foreign policy instrument, nuclear terror of the cold war era could be considered similar to terrorism nowadays, since state sponsored or state conducted terrorism is also serving likewise. Nevertheless, 'nuclear terror' is not similar with terrorism as the former is deterrence while the latter is the propaganda of the deed (Borum, 2004 & Lowther & Lindsay, 2009).

iv. Terrorism versus Criminal Acts

Terrorism has also a blurred distinction with ordinary crimes such as kidnapping, robbery, assassination. However, an assassination in terrorism is different from the 'political murder' kind of assassination that targets a single or a few prominent personalities, because a terrorist assassination targets a relatively large number of less prominent personalities. Some (Jonson, 2000 and Morris, 2009) argue that ordinary crimes such as robbery and kidnapping qualify as terrorism if they are not robbery and kidnap for profit, but rather as a propaganda message. They also add by saying that these ordinary crimes do not threaten violence to maintain or alter a putative norm; instead, they are concerned only with behavioural control in a particular situation.

Terrorism commands attention, captures imaginations, and alters perceptions on a scale that few other criminal activities could. This is because terrorism is both politically motivated and psychologically directed.⁸

2.1.3. Types of Terrorism

In this section the classification of the various types of terrorism is presented within the basis of the following parameters: what type of actors do it, what methods and weapons are used within this broader strategy of terrorism, what secondary purposes are used to cover its primary objective, the place of origin and its reach.

Exploring the typology of terrorism helps to organize terrorist incidents into categories and serves as a bridge towards the examination of the emerging trends in terrorology. It can also be used to replace simplistic definitions and as predictive tools for threat assessments. However, it is not scientific in any theoretical or methodological sense; rather, it may symbolize outdated ideas or represent uncomplicated and ideologically driven motives. For example, the Coalition against terrorism is echoing the voice of USA that to treat terrorism as different types is to undermine the "moral clarity" needed to pursue the war on terrorism. The fact is that terrorism is of different types(Boyns& Ballard, 2004& Wallace,2008).

⁸ In this thesis, the phrase 'psychologically motivated' is more preferred to the term 'psychologically directed' (see: Morris,2009)

To begin with, based on the perpetrators, terrorism is classified into individual terrorism, organized terrorism, and state sponsored or state conducted terrorism. The former two are counter hegemonic, 'retail' or bottom-up forms of terrorism; while the latter are top-down forms of terrorism. Although some consider 'retail' terrorism to be self initiated terrorism and top down terrorism to be a response to that. In this respect it could be argued that top-down terrorism is conducted self initiatively under the guise of counter terrorism. The reasons for this argument are that firstly, terrorism is one of the available malevolent instruments of foreign policy for states. Secondly, the states may use it to maintain their hegemony regionally or globally, and their incumbents may use it to drive some material gains out of the sustainability of this 'conflict economy' (Chomsky, 2002, Khan, 2006).

Individual terrorism is conducted by individuals with little or no coordination with others. Such individuals may be suicide bombers, 'criminals' for personal gain or for reasons of their own that do not make sense to anybody else. Perhaps the most famous individual terrorist in history is Carlos the 'jackal' who always fought for Marxist reasons. The second sub type under this category is organized terrorism committed by organized groups, which have networks among themselves across national jurisdictions. These organised groups tend to be mainly religious or extremist groups.

The third sub divisions under the 'perpetrators of terrorism' category are state conducted terrorism and state sponsored terrorism. When terrorism is conducted by state agents its own citizens, this is called internal suppression. Internal suppression often involves terrorism by authoritarian or totalitarian regimes to terrorize their population and propagate anxiety among citizens in order to curb political opposition. A state may also conduct terrorism directly by its agents or may order and sponsor such an act by an outsider agent against another state or a non-state actor. Though the very origin of the term 'terrorism' was primarily to refer to violent acts of governments designed to ensure popular submission, these days it is being used mainly with individual and group terrorism.

While internal suppression is over emphasized, state conducted or state sponsored terrorism against other fellow states is deemphasized. It is true that there are various

aspects of law enforcement and all violence by state agents is not necessarily terrorism. But, 'democracies' exploit this fact in order to make terrorism by government agents to be unseemingly married with war; such as the 'war on terror', which paradoxically claims for international legal regimes on armed conflicts not to be applicable on it (Lawless, 2007).

In addition to the type of perpetrators, terrorism is also classified based on tactical and operational choices and actions. These methods and weapons are sub divided into traditional and new methods. The traditional method or modes of expression of terrorism include bombings, car bombs and suicide bombings, assassinations, hostage taking, sabotage, hijacking, as well as mass murders and air and missile strikes against sovereign states (Berkouk, 2008).

It is in these types terrorism that the 'on demand' targets of terrorism come to the picture most. For example, the issue of suicide terrorists addresses the emotionality and rationality debate of the literature on terrorism. Suicide terrorists' readiness to die seems to overemphasize the emotionality of terrorists and to support the 'centrality of psychological motive' in the hypothesis of terrorologists. Nevertheless, the readiness to die signifies neither emotionality, nor cultural tolerance for 'self sacrifice'; rather it may signify a realization of necessitating a strategy of last resort (Mokhtari, 2006).

The other variant of terrorism based on weapons and methods criterion is the new methods, which in turn includes weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and cyber terrorism. WMD terrorism refers to the use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive weapons by terrorists. Meanwhile, cyber terrorism refers to the use of computers, electronic networks and modern information technologies for the purpose of terrorism.

WMDs have been rarely used in terrorism, because of the extremely high number of casualties they cause and their inaccessibility for terrorists. But, a potential possession and utilization of WMDs by terrorists is being predicted. This may be due to unstable states' failure to safeguard their stockpiles of WMD from accidental losses, illicit sales or outright theft or seizure. On the other hand, it may be due to the terrorist organizations'

gradual capability for covert independent research efforts or hiring technically skilled professionals to construct WMDs or, even due to the possible supply of WMDs by terrorist regimes to terrorist groups. Thus, although an explosive nuclear device is believed beyond the scope of most terrorist groups, chemical, biological or radiological dispersion weapons that use nuclear contaminants are not. The first large-scale use of a lethal chemical by terrorists was the AumShinrikyo incident in Japan in 1995, when a terrorist attack using the nerve agent, Sarin, resulted in 12 deaths and 5,500 hospitalizations(U.S. Marine Corps, 2001).Another example of the potential threat of WMD terrorism is the release of anthrax spoiled mail in 2000 in the USA.

Although cyber terrorism lacks a high profile compared to other types of terrorist attacks, its impact can be just as destructive from an economic perspective rather than a human casualty perspective(Guelke 2006).The most frequent threat in this type of terrorism is the infection of computers and networks by unwanted computer programs; computer viruses internet worms ,logic bombs or trojan programs. Some examples of these include: “I love you” virus (May 2000), “Klez” (April 2000), “Code Red”(2001) and “Melissa”(March 1999).

Moving on from the weapons and methods criterion, the taxonomy of terrorism based on geographic origin and scope can be categorized into domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism. The former refers to home grown terrorism, whose activities are confined within national territorial jurisdiction of states. This type of terrorism may be conducted by terrorist groups composed of nationals of a country targeting citizens of the same country. It may also be conducted by the state under consideration either as legal terrorism to persecute opposition against the incumbent regime in the guise of maintaining law and order or, through a third force affiliated to the state targeting civilians of the same state so as, to justify the state’s harsher reaction against political opponents(Oruka,1976).

In contrast, seeking to maximize their coercive leverage and increase the target country’s vulnerability, insecurity and costs, as well as to create an international forum for propagating their cause, domestic terrorists may internationalize or transnationalize their

activities. For instance, to achieve these aims terrorists may attack the target regime's embassies, diplomats, soldiers or even citizens located in other countries.

In addition to the transnationalization of domestic terrorism, there is also a terrorism which is purely international. In this case, the terrorists cross national borders to strike foreign targets or select victims or targets because of their connections to a foreign country with the intention to exploit the clearly international consequences of their acts (World Book Inc., 2003).

Though the actions of terrorists, as often expressed, are primarily “politically motivated and psychologically directed”, these primary objectives of terrorists are always covered by other secondary objectives. Terrorists openly claim secondary objectives that they use as frames of legitimization or to cover their primary objectives. Based on the secondary purposes, terrorism can be classified into the following types: political terrorism, religious terrorism, war terrorism, nationalist and racist terrorism, psychotic terrorism, etc (Berkouk, 2008).

Though political terrorism often takes place in post-revolutionary periods and is known as ‘revolutionary terrorism’, there is a vast array of terrorist incidents that fall under this major category as sub types (Berkouk, 2008). Accordingly, ideological extremism, such as radical or leftist extremist) and reactionary or rightist extremist, anarchist terrorism, nationalist terrorism or ethno-political separatism, hegemonic tendencies all fall under the category of political terrorism.

As it is noted earlier in this chapter, the typology of terrorism is also not free from problems of subjectivity as other ways of comprehending terrorism.

Some pronounce political terrorism as the “most difficult problem of our time due to its complexity, others treat religious terrorists as the most dangerous terrorists of the era, since the latter have not only intangible objectives, but also undefined missions. Those who assert that religious terrorism is more dangerous believe that, unlike political terrorists, religious terrorists are not subject to rational constraints on the scope of their violent acts, nor are they easily deterred by credible threats.(Hudson, 1999 & Rinehart, 2006.)

Examples of religious terrorist organizations include: Al Qaeda, AL Itihad, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Religious terrorists are said to aspire sweeping changes in pursuit of divine commands, which is intangible and undefined. The triangular symbiosis they create between themselves, state terrorism and supportive entities, which provide moral, material, financial, and military assistance to aggrieved populations, proves otherwise (Khan, 2006).

In the current wave of international terrorism, religion is largely acting as a means rather than an end. So, to portray religion as a goal by terrorists, if it exists, is an exception, and to treat it to be generally the case is an illogical simplification that undermines the essentially political nature of current terrorism ; consequently preventing the adoption of counter-terrorism policies to tackle terrorism politically.

2.1.4. The Link between Politics and Terrorism in History

Under the typologies of terrorism, it is reflected that one of the types of terrorism is political terrorism. The term 'terror' itself was associated with the Jacobin 'Reign of Terror' in the aftermath of the French Revolution (Rehman, 2005). The form terrorism has taken in history, even that of counter terrorism has been wrongly or rightly married with politics.

The marriage between terrorism and politics has enabled 'political terrorism' of the Cold War era in Latin America be sustained until present, but with a different motive than ideological ones(Oslender, 2008). Regardless of the concern of the 'democratic peace theory', which maintains that democracies never fight one another they fight only against non-democracies, state terrorism has also occurred in some democracies, most prominently in Colombia.⁹ To add another factor for the historical continuity of terrorism is the politics of globalization, particularly western globalization having economic, social and cultural impacts on the rest of the world(Muhula, 2007).

⁹ The idea that democracies rarely make war on one another and its corollary that democracies rarely produce

international terrorism and international violence are a truisms.(see, for example, El-Affendi, 2005)

As an instrument of the weak deployed against the weak and the inarticulate, terrorism's expansion of scope both spatially and temporally again is related with being sandwiched between the tangible motives of the terrorists or counter terrorists within ideological rationalizations and the willingness of states to sponsor terrorist activities. In a similar vein, the American war against terrorism has focused attention on political influence followed by those of economic assistance, the 'evil aid'.

With regards to counter terrorism, which has taken similar strategies and content, but different magnitudes and brands over time, there is the same nexus of the phenomenon with politics. Good indicators of such a marriage between politics and the response to terrorism can be firstly, that the discourses on the securitization of terrorism by leaders of states, of both democracies and terrorist regimes, are geared by divisive ideologies of the 'we' and the 'they'. Even in democracies, this is sometimes accompanied by the implicit dichotomization of their own societies on the basis of religion, which is contradictory to their 'secularism' principle. Moreover, these securitization discourses link the problem and solution of terrorism to democratization.

Secondly, from the economic domain, the imposition of economic sanctions and the donation of 'evil aid' have been often in nexus with the politics of counter terrorism. Accordingly, counteracting terrorism has been one of the aims of US economic sanctions on other states(Kraxberger, 2005).

The arbitrary inclusion of organizations and groups into the 'terrorist black list' of states, the exemption of the 'war on terror' from the international law of armed conflicts, and the un questionability of some states (Brooks,2004, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,(ND)& Bigo, & Tsoukala, 2008) under international law, which are condemned for human rights violations under the guise of combating terrorism, can also be good indicators of the nexus between politics and counter terrorism.

2.2. Counter-Terrorism: Is the ‘War on Terror’ Morally Justifiable not to be a Deviance?

2.2.1. On the Essence of War and Counter-Terrorism

There is inconsistency and dispute not only over the definition of terrorism, but also in the labelling and definition of the response to it. Accordingly, the response to terrorism has been variously labelled as ‘anti terrorism’, ‘combating terrorism’, ‘war on or against terrorism’. Common ground for the definition of both terrorism and counter terrorism is to define them as an “undeclared war” (Williamson, 2009). The only distinction we can make between the two in this regard may be that the former is treated as a small war, while the latter as a ‘global war’, which is unconfined both spatially and temporally. Meanwhile, it is paradoxical to notice that while both are conceived as ‘undeclared war’, the terrorist parties are treated not as ‘warriors’, but as ‘criminals’, and their acts as ‘immoral’. In contrast, the counter-terrorist parties are treated as ‘warriors’ and their acts as ‘moral.’

Some of the definitions for international counter terrorism or the ‘global war on terrorism’ are as follows:

1. An international armed conflict in Afghanistan between its domestic rivals internationalized by the intervention in October 2001 by the United States and allied states.
2. An undeclared international armed conflict by the United States and allied states against Afghanistan, against the former Taliban regime in Afghanistan, against the non-state entity Al Qaeda , and against a range of non-state entities and individuals alleged from time to time to be international terrorists.
3. A continuation of crime control activities against international terrorists with a metaphorical use of ‘war’ rhetoric.
4. The practices, tactics, techniques and strategies those governments, military, police and other organizations adopt to prevent or respond to terrorist threats and/or acts (Fitzpatrick, 2003).

The prefix ‘global’ in the term ‘global war on terrorism’ conveys the historically unprecedented conception of counter terrorism(Vorkink & Scheick , (ND). This means

that the war on terrorism is spatially and temporally unconfined as well as legally unconstrained under international law. In this regard, the first two definitions are contradictory with the historically unprecedented conception of the phenomenon, since they confine the 'war on terror' spatially to Afghanistan and temporally to the incident of the collapse of the Taliban regime.

Through time, however, the aforementioned two definitions were disregarded in the practical counter terrorism in that in line with its historically unprecedented conception, practical counter terrorism sooner expanded spatially to the 'axis of evil' and temporally to 'early intervention, including regime termination. Here, the 'axis of evil' are states which are believed by the coalition for counter terrorism to be sponsoring terrorism and developing WMDs (Collins, 2007). Incidentally, the historically unprecedented conception of the war on terror itself is criticized for being value laden.

The following are limitations in the conceptualization of counter terrorism or the global war on terrorism:

Firstly, this conception of the war on terror, helped by the process of globalization, has blurred the conceptual and legal distinction between: "war" and "non-war," "national security" and "domestic issues", state and non-state actors; combatants and non-combatants; criminal and non-criminal, conflict zones and non-conflict zones, conflict times and non-conflict times. In a similar vein, the global war on terrorism is at odds with democracy, and state terrorism (Brooks, 2004).

The aforementioned rifts between the global war on terror and other conceptual and legal categories have arisen mainly because of the underlining motives of the parties framing the definition of the global war on terror. Accordingly, the link between democracy and the war on terrorism is intended to eliminate the suspected direct factors that generate terrorism by "increasing the expected return of legal activity and offering multiple channels of non-violent expression without the threat of government retaliation. Democracy and the war on terror are linked means that the former is framed as a cure for all the myriad social, political, and economic factors that can precipitate terrorist activities. On the other hand, the deliberately open-ended securitization of terrorism (not as an act of influencing change based on injustice or maltreatment, but as that of

threatening national security) frames terrorism as a crime against the ideals of law and process; that is: civilization, morality, and democracy (Vorkink, & Scheick (ND), Drakos, & Gofas, (2006), Chomsky, 1988).

Secondly, the link between the war on terror and state terrorism is that states, both authoritarian and democracies, exercise and orchestrate international terrorism often in the guise of counter terrorism. For example, both authoritarian and democratic states in Latin America have been exercising international terrorism under the guise of countering terrorism. (Chomsky, 1988 & Boyns, & Ballard,2004) Though such an act of terrorism would create problems among allies, state leaders exploit their own identity and the image they present abroad for the furtherance of their terrorist operations.

Thirdly, the war on terror is paradoxically linked with international armed conflicts and with criminalization. Though the war on terror is labelled 'war', it differs from war since it is an undeclared war relying on a small number of fighters, whereas conventional warfare relies on large numbers of combatants who operate openly. Furthermore, the enemy combatants in counter terrorism are less well defined than those of conventional warfare. However, the fact that they are less well defined does not necessarily mean that the enemy combatants are targeted without being predicted and identified. Rather, it would refer to the unpredictability of the spatio-temporal medium of targeting the enemy combatants (Piazza, 2006 ,Held, 2004& Paulus, & Vashakmadze, 2009).

Additionally, the war on terror seems to adopt such a tactic of linking 'targets' and 'opportunity' from terrorism itself. Those on the side of war on terror are reluctant to provide a stable definition of the enemy with the intention of avoiding legal constraints and of shifting policy objectives with minimal accountability through ambiguity. Nonetheless, the threat of an international armed conflict against Iraq by the US, for example, is a good indicator of the conventionality of the war on terror. To conclude, the war on terror has been as much political as tactical(Weber, 2005 , Paulus, & Vashakmadze, 2009& Barber; 2002).

2.2.2. Debates Regarding Morality of Terrorism and the War on Terror

Debates regarding the morality and legality of terrorism and counter terrorism are intertwined with one another and can be argued from the point of view of the terrorists and the counter terrorists.

A third party in the debate are human rights activists who argue that all targeting of civilians by means of incapacitation, deterrence or retribution is immoral for it constitutes the arbitrary denial of liberties, dignities and rights of human beings under the shade of legitimacy and justification that do not hold water vis-à-vis violations (Stephens & Williams, 2009).

Terrorists often justify their acts by invoking political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, or religious considerations. These considerations help terrorists to frame themselves not as violent people, but people who use violence as a last resort to attain certain objectives in the aforesaid domains. In their opinion, terrorism is the inevitable outcome of the compulsive territorialization of human communities. For instance, it is repeatedly argued that far from being the terrorists of the world, the Islamic peoples have been victims of the other face of terrorism, America's hegemonic fundamentalism (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, (ND), Islamic World Peace Forum, (ND) & Gibbs, 1989).

It can be inferred from this that an argument, such as the above, masks the immorality of the targeting of civilians by claiming that there is a blockade of other non violent means of competition by the 'hegemon', its 'legitimate' monopoly of means of coercion to prevent desired change (Helfand & Tiwari, 2002). Another reason terrorist mask the targeting of civilians is due to their inferiority in number and logistics (which they claim makes their attack strategically indiscriminate and sudden).

The terrorists' externalization of the moral responsibility for their acts on both direct and indirect victims proceeds along the line of the causative factors for such indiscriminate violence or terrorism. Accordingly, humiliation and difficult living circumstances are inflicted on the terrorists by the hegemon or the incumbents of state power. According to them their conditions should be humanistically and rationally felt (Held, 2004). The

civilian electorate are responsible for bringing the hegemon to power and continuing support for it, which means that the selective, though not discriminate targeting of the electorate civilians by the terrorist is right. The states determined to maintain the status quo should shoulder the moral responsibility for the act.

Those suppressing terrorism do not hold back from making counter arguments against the aforementioned moral claims of the terrorists. The common counter argument of the suppressing parties has been that 'nothing justifies' terrorism since the inherent dignity of the human person should not be used as an instrument of another's ideology(Khan,2006, Weiss, Crahan & Goering, 2004). An exception to this could be President Reagan's claimed readiness to recognize and tackle larger underlying problems which terrorism represents.

One of the ways the 'war on terror' justifies itself is by amalgamating various acts of political violence under the umbrella of terrorism. A second way in which the 'war on terror' justifies itself is by framing terrorism as a massive and an immediate threat; for example, though the usage of WMDs by terrorists. This is very rare in terrorism. The 'war on terror' deviates from this reality by linking the terrorist threat to the mediated reality of WMDs so as to justify forceful measures (Held, 2004, Vorkink & Scheick , (ND)& Gibbs,1989).

The launching of a terrorist attack by states against their own citizens through their 'third party' agents also serves to over massify the terrorist threat. The third way in which counter terrorism justifies itself is through the criminalization of terrorism. Nonetheless, according to the suppressing parties, this has to be treated under 'specialty law', which is out of the existing international and national legal regimes and judicial systems. Their reason is that all the laws in the world are not enough and hence, all judicial institutions are unable to protect people in the face of the newly emerging 'massive' terrorist threat (Ratner, (ND)& Paulus, & Vashakmadze, 2009).

Such a 'specialty law' which criminalizes terrorism is intended to dehumanize the terrorists and deny them procedural justice if they are considered criminals, or to give terrorists the chance to negotiate, if they are considered as warring parties. The specialty

law also allows the suppressing parties to launch pre-emptive self-defense attacks and military obliteration. Excessive pre-emptive self-defense attacks and military obliteration without authorization of the Security Council, for example, is a 'specialty' legal claim since it contradicts structural and substantive limits on the use of force by the UN charter. The third justification for the war on terror is the 'clash of civilizations', the framing of the fight between terrorism and counter-terrorism as a conflict between 'democracy' and 'extremism' or between right and wrong (Paulus, & Vashakmadze, 2009, Held, 2004, Yacob, 2010 & Shor, 2008).

There are also counter arguments against the war on terror's claims for the peculiar immensity of the terrorist threat, the homogeneity of the terrorist threat and 'specialty law' criminalization of terrorism. First, these counter arguments start with the effort to indefinitely postpone the debate concerning the immorality of terrorism by claiming the need for a background moral theory. Secondly, it is counter argued that the war on terror's claim for the right to national security and/or pre-emptive self-defense attacks is criticized for justifying state violence. Here, some even go to the extent of asserting that, judged by their actions, most Western governments would themselves fall within the definition of terrorist. Thirdly, there is a criticism that, it is state terrorism which is taking the label of 'war' for itself in order to be able to claim a 'moral right to killing' or an excuse to repress the opposition that is ignored, accepted, or even justified by the hegemon. (Khan, 2006, Shor, 2008, Coady, 2004).

The fourth and the most widely aired counter argument is waged against both terrorism and the 'war on terror' by human rights activists and other neutral parties. According to them, terrorism is immoral since it targets people indiscriminately and independently of what they both did or could have done, however, war on terror is equally immoral by replacing the inalienability of moral value of human rights with the 'suppression of terrorism', and by making people more risk-seeking in vengeance for a previously unacceptable risk. The reference this bi-faced criticism is making is to the human rights violation involved both in terrorism and the 'war on terror'. Accordingly, terrorism endangers human rights directly by impacting on the right to life, liberties and dignities of human persons and indirectly by destabilizing governments, undermining civil society,

jeopardizing peace and security, and threatening social and economic development. Meanwhile, war on terror seriously challenges human rights and the rule of law by targeting those suspected of terrorism; for example, Israeli actions severely deteriorated human rights in the 'occupied territories' (Vorkink & Scheick, (ND), Farer, 2008, Shor, 2008 & Kalyvas, 2004).

2.2.3. The Problem of Legally Countering Terrorism

At the international level, the effort to develop legal instruments to counterterrorism take place in the form of multilateral treaties and supplemental agreements at the global and regional level, and a series of Security Council resolutions. The first of the modern counter-terrorism conventions, multilateral treaties and supplemental agreements, is the 1963 Tokyo convention on behaviour on board aircraft that affect in-flight safety, following which about sixteen such agreements have been reached at on the same issue. The trend of formulating international conventions and protocols as well as Security Council resolutions has shown a tremendous increase particularly since the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Not only in the sphere of facilitating counter terrorism, there are also efforts of legislation restricting it since some states have engaged in torture and others in ill-treatment to counter terrorism; for instance, the Berlin Declaration on Upholding Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Combating Terrorism illustrates such efforts (Lawless, 2007, Hassan, 2007, Vorkink & Scheick, (ND) Kagwanja, 2006 & Pham, 2007).

Therefore, terrorism under the international and domestic law is recognized as a crime which engenders serious violations of individual and collective group rights, but which is not clearly defined. The legalization of terrorism is bottlenecked by problems related to the difficulty of defining the two problems, terrorism and counter terrorism, as legal problems and the claims of legality by terrorists and counter terrorists.

To begin with definitional drawbacks, firstly, there is no legal notion of a general or global 'war on terror' and the struggle against terrorist groups does not constitute a new kind of war. Secondly, defining terrorism as an illegal activity for "intending to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part

in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict” does not refrain from indirectly criminalizing counter-terrorism, which has the aforesaid features but claims to be legitimately remedying the problem of terrorism in a retributive justice. Here, though the ‘war on terror’ can be considered to be like ‘armed conflict’, differed from the latter, the former has the feature of indiscriminate violence (targeting based on identity than actual deed). ‘War on terror’, therefore is closer in meaning to terrorism rather than to armed conflict. Morris reinforces this argument by stating that some aspects of criminal justice would qualify as terrorism; for instance state terrorism. Nonetheless, the ‘war on terror’ labels indiscriminate violence in terrorism as a ‘reprisal’ while labelling the same violence by itself as ‘targeting the suspected’. This is in order to legitimize itself and delegitimize terrorism. Contrary to this effort, even those terrorist acts committed during an armed conflict do not alter either the legal status of the hostilities or of the parties involved or the duty of the parties to observe humanitarian law(Kalyvas 2004 , Duffy, 2008 & Morris, 2009).

There is disagreement as to whether terrorism, or even counter terrorism for that matter, is part of international law or the law within a society. Accordingly, some argue that though it has no established definition, terrorism is recognized as a crime and inherently illegal under international and domestic law. Others argue that the declaration of a moral and legal right to terrorism and counter terrorism is an action in and part of the ‘terrorism versus counterterrorism’ conflict. Thus, terrorism may be claimed not as a crime, but rather as self-defense, resistance to ethnic cleansing, the struggle of people for their very survival as a people. Therefore, being violent is not by definition wrong or a crime. Besides, while some argue that the ‘war on terror’ is illegal, others assert that conceptualizing the ‘war on terrorism’ as an international armed conflict risks undermining the integrity of international humanitarian law(Byers, 2002 , Held, 2004, Hassan, 2007, Chossudvsky, 2005 & Lawless, 2007).

These definitional controversies in the legal arena have implications for both terrorism and counter-terrorism and for the practical combating of terrorism, which are discussed as follows:

In the first place, lack of a universal definition makes it difficult for terrorist offenses to come under universal jurisdiction. The other implication of the lack of a universal definition of terrorism is that it causes the conception and practical countering of terrorism to be dominated by politics. Some of the manifestations of the dominance of politics over law in counterterrorism include: the confusion in international legal responses to terrorism because of some resolution that confine terrorist threats only to private terrorism, and the lack of a common approach to the treatment of terrorism as an international crime. Besides, the prerequisite of political willingness rather than law in counterterrorism and the arbitrary list of 'terrorists' can demonstrate the political aspect of counterterrorism more than the legal aspect. Still further, the ambiguity in definition has led some states to claim supremacy over international law and not to respect the exclusive law enforcement authority of states in the face of the terrorist threat, and some others to deny their peoples legitimate rights (Antonio,2001, Khan,2006, Henry, 2004, Hassan, 2007, Paulus & Vashakmadze 2009, Morris, 2009).

Given the challenge it poses to the protection of human rights there is a call on the "war on terrorism" to adhere to rather than to recognize established principles of international law, and to prevent terrorism rather than to define it as illegal (Hassan, 2007). From this, it can be inferred that the debate in terrorism currently is overwhelmingly about legality than legal definition. The first argument regarding legality is that it is not necessarily a precise definition but the identification of an action, based on spatial considerations of the place of planning, and continuation of the act, as 'terrorist crime' by the law or by the reaction of politicians which make it a crime since classes of events or things exist independently of definitions.

Accordingly, such identification helps the exercise of control and/or the realization of a goal, which is realizable through legal means, by super ordinate state officials. Secondly; there is an argument in favour of ethical ways of combating terrorism rather than the legal ways. This goes in line with the assertion that proper behaviour depends on character rather than laws and regulations. The third argument about the legality of phenomena involving terrorism can be seen from the angle of counterterrorism. Here, in addition to the criticism that counterterrorism commits forcible

marriage between itself and 'armed conflicts', its legality is questionable in the face of the double standard of construing the law of armed conflicts both narrowly, (for the actions of counterterrorism) and flexibly , for holding non state actors accountable(Brooks, 2004& Mokhtari, 2006).

Chapter Three: Theorizing Terrorism

3.1. Introduction

Theories and theorizations in terrorism will be considered in this chapter from the angle of the causation of terrorism or the analysis on the question ‘why does terrorism occur?’ The researcher is attracted to this task because of the contestation between the explanations which depict Islam as a terrorist religion, Muslims as terrorists, and those which depict terrorists as evil-mongers and mentally deranged people, as well as those which claim that terrorists are rational actors motivated by short-term goals,(Ahmad,2009).

The commonsense meaning of the term “why” can mean ‘how come?’ or ‘what for?’, Lerner (1965). The factors for terrorism and causes of terrorism’ imply the ‘how come’ sense of the term “why”, where as the purposes, objectives, agenda or motives of terrorists imply the ‘what for’ sense of the term “why. If it is taken from the perspective of legality, the term “why” implies accountability in that it denotes actions accountable for wrongs for which there were legal remedies.

Though the above linguistic representation is not a focus here, understanding the issue of why terrorism occurs in terms of the ‘how come’ sense could lead us to infer the regularity of the general form: if A happens, then B will or probably will occur. In other words, if certain pushing or pulling forces - such as poverty or underdevelopment, aggressive or excessive countering measures of states- are present, then there is terrorism. Meanwhile, understanding the issue of why terrorism occurs in terms of the ‘what for’ sense, could lead us to infer the regularity of the general form: I do A in order to achieve B. In other words, the terrorist launches terrorist attacks in order to obtain a certain goal; for instance economic equality, global justice, or religious universalism. These are just some of the purposes often claimed by terrorists. Leaving aside the pretext versus the ulterior motive and/or root cause debate that could be raised regarding the purposes of terrorists, it is attractive to examine the relationship between the purposive (‘what for’) explanation and the non-purposive(‘how come’) explanation of the causation in terrorism.

From the discussion in the above paragraph the following issues demand further scrutiny. Firstly, can any regular pattern of causation of terrorism be drawn as such in the forms of: ‘if A happens, then B will or probably will occur’ or, ‘I do A in order to achieve B’. Seen from the angle of the ‘what for’ sense of the term, causes are basically not only synonymous, but also fully compatible with motives. Nonetheless, in analyzing goal oriented behaviour we face some purposes which are non-human and cannot be analyzed in terms of mental causation. Bearing these in mind, we can by inference raise the following inter related questions: can the causes of terrorism be discernible more from terrorism itself than from the motive of the perpetrators, as Lerner (1965) claims any cause to be so, or is there any direct cause and effect relation that can be drawn from discussions about terrorism? Moreover, can the purposes of a terrorist organization be understood as the sum total of the purposes of its individual members? Or in reverse, how far is the knowledge of the purpose of a terrorist organization helpful to understand the purposes of its individual members?

If we accept Lerner’s conclusion that causes are more discernible in their effects than in terms of motives to be workable for terrorism too, then it goes in line with what Carroll(1988) criticizes as the intuitive appeal of the traditional model of general causation; that is: ‘causes, and only causes, raise the probability of the effect’. Similarly, Collins’s (2007) observation that the aftermath of acts of violence, such as terrorism, produces patterned waves of ritual that in turn produces solidarity among those who are victimized. However, Collins’ observation creates a blurred distinction between the causes of terrorism, the effects and the impacts of terrorism.

Additionally, cause or effect, according to Ducasse, (1968) only happens where there is an event or state of affairs which is either a qualitative or relational change or an absence of such a change of an object¹⁰. Nonetheless, no event can be spoken of as the cause of

¹⁰ According to Meixner, events either are states of affairs, or, if not, are at least one-to-one representable by states of affairs. Thus, there is no philosophically significant distinction between event and states-of-affairs causation (see: Meixner (2004))

anything, except relatively to certain conditions or environment and vice versa, Bontly (2006).

The issue of causation in terrorism, or that of any other event or state of affairs related in causal relation, revolves around the following concerns: the nature of the relationship between the cause and effect contextuality or regularity and time and space in which the causal relation is held.

3.2. The Causality versus non-causality of Terrorism

Under this section of this research thesis, various parameters that would make a certain terrorism analysis either causal or non-causal are briefly discussed from different Perspectives. By the use of the parameters of causality and non-causality identified here, the next section moves on to evaluating the causality and non-causality claims of the various theories of terrorism.

The criteria to measure the causality or non-causality of a given analysis as they are used in different literature include the following. The first of these is the regularity of the causal relation being analyzed. This measures whether or not there can be a direct causal relation between some identified event that causes terrorism, and its effect, which is terrorism. In the reverse, it could also assess whether or not there is a possibility in which the effect, terrorism, would also cause other events that caused it.

The second criterion to assess the causality or non-causality of a given analysis is the place of actors and their purposes. Are terrorists the cause of terrorism or facilitators for its occurrence? If the terrorists are considered in either of the cases as causes or conditions, then this leads to an additional query: whether terrorism occurs due to human purposes or non-human purposes.

The issue of environment is a third criterion which is concerned with the contextuality of terrorism. Environment entails the geographic space where the cause and effect relationship is held. Within one particular environment there can be many causes and trigger factors which create an event. Moreover a single cause may result in the

occurrence of many events. There is therefore a need to differentiate between trigger factors and causes of terrorism within the environment it occurs.

The place of time in the causal relation is the fourth criterion. If terrorism occurs due to a chain of causes and conditions, the question is: which of the chain of causal factors happens first and in what type of causal linkage is it related with its successors in the chain?.

This then leads us to the fifth criterion; the search for a root cause of terrorism. The concern here is the one that questions whether priority or necessity matters more in the causation of terrorism, while emphasizing the latter one.

Arguing about the causality of terrorism, this thesis asserts that some of the above criteria, such as regularity and time (the emphasis on priority and succession), shadow particularly the economic and psychological causality of terrorism. Thus, it adheres to a sixth criterion, namely simultaneous causation as an anti thesis to them. More detailed description of this criterion is made in conclusion to the following two subsections concerning non-causality and causality of terrorism.

3.2.1. The non-causality of Terrorism

There are various approaches of analyzing causation of terrorism and of studying terrorism in general. Among others, these frameworks include the single-causal and multi-causal approach, the internal factors and external factors approach, the top to bottom and bottom to top approach.

One of the arguments for the non-causality of terrorism is a simple ignorance of causation of terrorism: the assertion that the question ‘why’ does not necessarily need an answer in causal terms, but in terms of justification. Or, in the extreme sense, the existence of a question does not necessarily require the existence of an answer, Lerner (1965). Next, let us see the arguments for the non-causality of terrorism forwarded by some of the above theories and adopted theories of terrorism by taking into consideration the five criteria, which are mentioned earlier.

I. Regularity or Pattern of the Causal Relationship in the Causal Analysis of Terrorism

The essence of regularity or patternedness of causation entails that there is a certain structure that the chain of causes of an event have to be arranged in. This essentially dictates two things: the determinism and observability of the causal relation. If these do not happen, then the causal relation is not causation, but a simple correlation between factors. The determinism of the causal relation is that when 'A' type of events observably occurs, 'B' type of events can be assumed logically to follow. Such a deterministic causal relation is observable means that it involves relations of observable objects or relations of statements pertaining to observable 'events'. For the perspective of deterministic and observable causation, terrorism and other events in the social world, therefore, are not causal or cannot be explained through regularities of behaviour. Rather, they have to be understood through interdisciplinary and interpretive or explanatory understanding of concept-dependent and non-observable meanings of social reality, Kurki (2008).

Seen from the angle of the nature of cause and effect, causation of terrorism can be explanation and determination, but not in the real sense of causation; that is 'bringing about', (Hulswit(2005). This is because of the tendency of the causal analysis of terrorism to focus on the systematicity of its causation. Meaning, the hitherto theories and adapted theories of terrorism have been analyzing causation of terrorism by way of explaining how higher level events or 'factors', such as structural variables, psychological or rational choice factors, contribute to the happening of the lower level event, terrorism,(Hulswit,2005).

The system or the higher level cannot be frankly said to have caused the lower level event as long as the difference between what 'causes', for example, psychological factors and 'what is caused' that is terrorism, is not clearly set. Again, this cannot be asserted as long as the two are not in a clear causal relationship. For example, psychology that works for humanity at large, cannot be said determinant over the occurrence of terrorism. Therefore, terrorism is not causal as it is often explained merely in terms of the system being determinant over the event.

In looking for a regular pattern of causation, as mentioned earlier, the thing is the causal linkage that if 'A' occurs, then 'B' will or probably will occur. This entails that a cause raises the probability of its effect, (Sapire, 1991). This is unlikely. For example, economic factors, development or underdevelopment, or psychological factors do not necessarily increase the probability of becoming terrorists. That is why all the poor, and all those with psycho pathogens do not grow into being terrorists, as it is proposed by the 'rooted in poverty' thesis and the psychological perspective respectively.

The other argument for the non-causality of terrorism is raised from the angle of the amalgamation of multiple causal variables under the multi causal approach in the study of terrorism. Accordingly, the multi causality in the analysis of the causation of terrorism leads to the adoption of a relativist stance; (Kurki, 2008), which is the attitude to accept whatever is thought to be the causes of terrorism instead of what its causes really are. A related argument for the non-causality of terrorism is the debate regarding whether the causes of terrorism are the same as those of other forms of political violence or that are peculiar to it. For example, while some see terrorism as a subspecies of guerrilla warfare or as one of many tactics used by guerrillas and its causes as being similar or the same as those of guerrillas, others see it as a unique phenomenon having causes peculiar to it, (Ross, 1993). According to these criticisms, therefore, multi causality confines causes of terrorism to exist only in the research accounts, but not in the world outside research narratives and accounts.

II. The Place of Actors and their Purposes in the Causation of Terrorism

With regards to actors, there are human and non-human actors in terrorism. While the human actors refer to individuals and group terrorists, the non-human actors refer to domestic and international terrorist organizations and states. The two concerns about causation of terrorism in the light of the 'actors' criteria are whether the aforementioned entities can be causes of terrorism by themselves and the concern about their strictly human and cosmic purposes.

The questions "Who are the terrorists?" and "What prompts their behaviour?", implicitly hold the assertions that the causes for terrorism are found in the identifiable properties or

personality traits of terrorists and by extension in the distinct organizational structure and evolutionary trajectory of a generic "terrorist group" or organization., (Kruglanski,2006). Those holding the view that terrorists and terrorist organizations are not causes of terrorism come up with the following arguments.

We have noted on the 'what for sense' of the term 'why' in the introduction of this chapter. There is also rejection to such purposive explanation of causation of terrorism. One of the reasons for this is the simple allegation that terrorists are irrational or mentally ill and cannot be purposive in their actions, (Gibbs, 1989).

Secondly, inferred from Lerner's assertion, the purpose which the terrorists claim to have, can usually result in a great variety of political acts, and not only terrorism. The third reason for the rejection of purposive explanation of causation in terrorism is that terrorism can result from a great variety of purposes ¹¹ such as economic, social identity, but not only from political purpose as most of terrorism's definitions claim it to be.

Fourthly, if we accept the stand points that nothing other than an event or state of affairs can be spoken of as a cause or an effect, and that things and actors are only conditions, then we by default accept the cosmic or non human nature of the purpose we are speaking about. Therefore, a future event or state of affair, which is the purpose, causes the present event or state of affair, which is thought to cause or bring about it. In short, if political acts like terrorism are taken to be purposive actions, then the 'cause', terrorism, is supposed to cause its effects such as religious universalism, liberation, justice. But, this does not happen due to the futurity of the goal to be achieved by a purposive action, (Lerner, 1965).

Instead, the events or state of affairs such as religious universalism, liberation, justice, which the terrorists claim as their future purposes, cause the present event, terrorism. In other words, the effect causes its cause. Therefore purposiveness does not explain the

¹¹ According to Lerner, political purposes are peculiar: any single purpose can usually result in a great variety of political acts and in the reverse, any single political act can result from a great variety of purposes. (see: Lerner(1965))

causality of terrorism since it yields a cause that does not cause as its nature commands, but rather is caused by.

Fifthly, there is disagreement in the field of sociology over the purposive quality of terrorism. A few sociologists argue that terrorism should not be studied in terms of deviance, but in terms of social control, which emphasizes purposive quality of human behaviour. Meanwhile, many sociologists de-emphasize the purposiveness of the terrorism, because they view the emphasis on purposive human behaviour as reductionism, (Gibbs, 1989). Therefore, for the majority of sociologists, terrorism is non-causal when it is viewed purpose-wise.

III. Environment and Causation of Terrorism

The essence of environment in the analysis of the causation of terrorism implies two things. One of these is the space across which the cause and effect are related in a certain manner. The other one refers to what are called situations, or trigger factors that facilitate the cause and effect relationship.

Arguments about the non-causality of terrorism with regard to the space issue could arise from the preference of the 'case study' approach, which is dominant in the literature about terrorism and causation of terrorism. One of the problems that case studies have is that they come up with a list of factors thought to be causes of terrorism, but they do not establish relationship between the identified factors. This makes them not to be causal analysis, because to be causal analysis they need to have certain relationship between the causes and the trigger factors for terrorism, and between the two and the effect, which is terrorism.

Secondly, besides there being a non-generalizable hypothesis, the factors identified and categorized as causes of terrorism may be unfit to the specific case under investigation. For instance, it is true that religious extremism is characterized by the hardening of contradictions based on religious convictions. With increasing polarization and differing visions of religion, in the long run, one cannot also exclude the possibility for religious extremism to be at least a catalytic, if not a cause, for terrorism. Nevertheless, the adaptation of the theory of the clash of civilizations and/or failed civilization theory is not

applicable to the study of the case of Islamic terrorism of Al-Qaida or terrorism from the Middle East. There are two reasons for this. One is the presumption that the places so far unaffected by religion based conflicts will no longer stand the global tide. The second reason is that there is no simple linear pattern of ideology. Particularly, the pattern for Islamist terror is more complex.

With regard to the 'trigger factors' sense of environment, (Muhula, 2007), for example, criticizes that the majority of the factors identified as causes of terrorism merely play a catalytic role and are not necessarily causal factors. Therefore, the analysis of terrorism is by and large a correlation of such catalytic factors rather than a causal relation. Therefore, the causal analysis of terrorism tends to be non-causal viewed in the criterion of environment both in terms of space and trigger factors.

IV. Time: What Matters in the Causation of Terrorism, Priority or Necessity?

Time and space are the two sides of a single coin that cannot be avoided from any causal analysis, whether in the physical or social world. Time in causation refers to both a sequence of events, which are either causes or effects, as well as that of agents and conditions. When identifying this sequence it is important to know the first great cause and to establish a chain of causal relationship. Since time counts only forward, identifying such a sequence is also important to evaluate the possibility of backward causation. Questions that can be asked are: Is it necessarily that a cause always happens before the effect? Is it not possible for the effect to cause its cause?

The other meaning that time would have in causation is recurrence. This entails a degree of repetition at regular intervals of the factor, event or state of affairs, which is either a cause or a condition. Additionally, a third meaning that time would have in causation is the degree to which simultaneous occurrence is possible for two or more events or state of affairs that can be causes, conditions or effects. Here it can be asked whether or not two or more causes and /or trigger factors can occur simultaneously together in order to cause terrorism.

By inferring from the above mentioned meanings of time in causation, the following arguments can be made about the non-causality of terrorism. The first argument is the

presupposition that since time appears prior to causation and can exist if there were no causation at all, (Meixner, 2004), it should not be used as a criterion to evaluate the causality of terrorism or any other phenomena. Secondly, for a cause to be said that it has caused its effect, the cause has always to occur before its effect. But, this cannot be certainly asserted in the case of terrorism. Thus, terrorism is not causal. Thirdly, backward causation, where the effect causes its cause, or an already passed event causes a present event, is conceptually impossible. Seen from this angle, terrorism is often said to have occurred because of the terrorists' aims, which they intend to attain in the future. This means that the effect causes its cause backwards, which is conceptually impossible. In other words, no cause-event can be an effect-event at all. But, Meixner, (2004) partially opposes, this view asserting that a causation of such a nature is possible, but it will not be efficient causation. Fourthly, simultaneous causation is conceptually impossible.

As indicated above, the recurrence sense of time in causation measures the repetitiveness of an event's occurrence. Inferring from this, some, for example, (Englehart, 2006 and Hanson, 2006), came to the conclusion that the study of the causation of terrorism should be ignored, because it is a relatively rare event killing relatively few people as compared to civil wars, homicides or traffic accidents.

V. The Search for a Root Cause of Terrorism

The 'root-cause' concept implies a factor that constitutes both a necessary and a sufficient condition for some effect. This term, in relation to terrorism, is defined by Martha Crenshaw (1981) as the preconditions or those factors that set the stage for terrorism over the long run. The only valid explanations of causation in the modern conception are explanations by efficient causation. The efficient cause, according to Aristotle, is that individuating external cause from which the change or the ending of the change first starts. So that it is the primary sources of change, which entails an act of doing something, (Hawkins, 2007, Kruglanski, 2006, Hulswit, 2005 and Meixner, 2004). It is the first cause upon which every secondary cause is dependent. Thus, it is a process in time. Precisely, such an efficient causation must have specific qualities: the cause is sufficient for the effect, the effect is connected to the cause by a form of necessity, and

the cause precedes the effect in time. Besides, such an efficient causation is sufficient for the effect, i.e. the occurrence of the cause necessarily leads to the occurrence of the effect, (Robins and Greenland, 1989). If a root cause is conceived to be both efficient and sufficient cause, then the following are arguments for the non-causality of terrorism when seen in the light of the root cause criterion.

Firstly, the focus on the root cause in the analysis of causation in general and that of the causation of terrorism in particular has unhelpfully narrowed down the meaning of the term cause to 'pushing and pulling' forces or to 'efficient' or 'moving' causes. Secondly, there is no empirical evidence for a relation between poverty, education or political repression and terrorism. Hence, there is no situational "root cause" of terrorism. Thirdly, some argue that the social world is made up of complex interactions between various types of causes, thus, there is 'no reason to collapse the concept of causality into that of efficient cause'. Even in previous studies of the causation of terrorism, no agreement is reached in any one precise cause. There exists no single root cause of terrorism, or even a common set of causes. Fourthly, what should be rightly referred to as 'causation' is the one which is the best possible analog of efficient causation, and the cause in efficient causation is always sufficient for the effect, (Mercer, 2005, Kurki, 2008, Kruglanski and Fishman, 2006, Meixner, 2004 and Krueger and Maleckova, 2002). Therefore, causal analysis of terrorism is not causal; i.e. it is not a cause that combines the qualities of being efficient and sufficient for the effect. Rather, it is a description of a causal factor.

Fifthly, a root cause requires for the cause to be efficient and sufficient. Efficiency of causation in turn requires for the cause to be prior to the effect. The priority of the cause over the effect is less likely in the causal analysis of terrorism particularly when viewed from the perspective of purposiveness of terrorism. In addition to this, the search for a root cause tends to focus on individual facts or individual terrorist incidences than on the recurrence of the phenomenon. The reason is that the former is truly causal, but the latter is more general or law like. Observing this tendency, Newman as cited in Muhula (2007), suggests that a focus on "root causes" of terrorism is not useful in explaining terrorism as a general phenomenon.

Lastly, the notion of ‘root causes of terrorism’ is taken more from the realm of political discourse than from terrorism research and social theory. Moreover, there are a number of root causes or ‘preconditions’ of terrorism that cannot be removed because they are beyond our capacity to change, (Bjorgo, 2005 and Meixner, 2004). Therefore, to study root causes or even the causes of terrorism is useless.

3.2.2. The Causality of Terrorism

In the preceding sub section the various arguments made for the non-causality of terrorism were reflected upon by using the five criteria of causation that are common in the literature of causation. Here, we use those same five criteria in order to portray the counter arguments for the causality of terrorism.

I. Regularity or Pattern of the causal Relationship in the Causal Analysis of Terrorism

The first argument for the non-causality of terrorism under the regular pattern criterion has been that terrorism is not causal since it is not deterministic and not observable. The counter argument for the causality of terrorism as measured by the same parameter is as follows:

Firstly, the causation of phenomena in the social world such as terrorism should not emphasize on logical necessitation, but on efficient or actual causation, which deals with moving causes that ‘push and pull’. Moreover, the causation of phenomena like terrorism should emphasize not only on concrete processes, and normative projects, which are observable, but also on implicit more commonsensical causal statements. That is why implicit mental processes such as ideas and reasons are causal, (Kurki, 2008), in the analysis of phenomena like terrorism.

Secondly, though all the poor and all those with psycho pathogens do not grow into being terrorists, postulating poverty and psychological pathogens as causes that increase the probability of the occurrence of terrorism is explanatorily relevant. The point being made is that if poverty and psychological pathogens are not the causes upon which the occurrence of terrorism necessarily depends, they have connections to it. Moreover,

together with an array of other factors, these factors influence one another, they also influence terrorism's occurrence and are influenced by it. Therefore, terrorism is causal if not as the effect's dependence on the cause or causes, at least as a 'pattern of dependencies between the cause and effect events, (Rueger, 2006).

The view that there is no clear cut relationship between terrorism and its causes seems to be looking for an 'objectively observable' connection between the two. Nevertheless, conceiving the causal connection between the two in terms of a tangible and observable sense impression is wrong. The reason is that as events can be tangible and observable, the causal connection explaining the regularity of the succession between them is not a sensation at all, but a relation, (Kurki, 2008). Armstrong, as cited in Bontly (2006), reaffirms this argument and says that causation is to be identified not with any particular physical relation, but rather with the instantiation (by a sequence of events) of a strong law; i.e., a relation of realnomic necessitation. Therefore, terrorism is causal even when treated as a causal connection.

Here, a functional explanation of causation is systemic. Such a functional explanation is often analyzed either as bottom-up causation, as top-down causation, or as downward causation, (Hulswit, 2005). Various scholars have argued for the causality of functional, systemic or mechanistic explanation of terrorism as one of the political events. To begin with, Lerner(1965), asserts that a functional explanation in political analysis can always be restated either as a strictly causal explanation or as a correlation. More specifically, Turk, (1982), argues for the causality of such a functional or systemic explanation of terrorism and says that terrorism has to be explained as the product not of discrete causes but rather of systemic processes generated in functional and interactive relationships of inequality. Englehart and Kurzman, (2006), reaffirm the argument for the causality of terrorism saying that although the change in the ideological spectrum for Islamist terror is not in a simple linear pattern, other macro-level factors, including changes in the geopolitical environment, may be at work in the systemic or functional analysis of the causality of terrorism. Similarly, Crenshaw (1981), identifies geographical location, type of political system, and level of modernization as the permissive structural or systemic causes of terrorism. She also identifies social, cultural and historical facilitation,

organizational splits and development, the presence of other forms of unrest, counterterrorist organization failure, the availability of weapons and explosives, and grievances as the precipitant structural or systemic causes of terrorism.

Thirdly, the multi causal approach to the causal analysis of terrorism has been criticized, under subsection 3.2.1. in this thesis, to have produced a relativist stance and in effect to make terrorism non-causal. On the contrary, Walter Laqueur, as cited in Lowther and Lindsay (2009), implies the multi-causal nature of the phenomenon when he notes that writing a comprehensive history or a general theory of terrorism is all but impossible. For example, it is convincingly argued that an approach which integrates multi-faceted factors in micro, macro and meso-levels of analysis, (Englehart and Kurzman, 2006), is a fruitful approach for the study of terrorism and causation of terrorism. The reason is that terrorism, and non-state violence in general, is intrinsically more difficult to study than state violence or civil war between well-defined sides. Ranstorp and Herd (2007) also view the multi causal analysis of terrorism to be causal. According to them, it is a kaleidoscope (a complex pattern) of internal and external factors, much like vectors, that push individuals towards radicalization and enable their recruitment. The reason is that internal and external factors causing terrorism are interchangeable and intertwined. For instance, personal grievances are transformed into global ones and vice versa.

II. The Place of Actors and their Purposes in the Causation of Terrorism

The first argument for the non-causality of terrorism under this criterion, which is seen in the preceding sub section, denounces states, terrorist organizations, or individual terrorists not to be causes of terrorism, but only ‘agents’ for the causation of terrorism. That argument recognizes such an agent-causation as just one form of event-causation rather than as a type of causation on its own merit, (Meixner, 2004). The counter argument is that a causation linking some cause events of terrorism with their effect event, a terrorist act, is not an efficient and sufficient causation. The reason is that such a causation cannot make terrorism actual. Instead, an actual, or efficient and sufficient causation of terrorism is a causal linkage between actors of terrorism and terrorism itself. Therefore, causal analysis of terrorism in terms of event-causation is not in the proper

sense efficient causation, at least analogically, until it adapts the features of agent causation.

This thesis does not intend to assert that the purposive explanation of causation of terrorism is free of controversy. For instance, while Gibbs(1989), recognizes that a human action that is not goal oriented is hardly possible, he admits that the issue in the case of terrorism is controversial. To the contrary, Crenshaw (1995) comfortably concludes that terrorism is a well-organized, rational, purposeful process carried out by structured groups. What could be supportive to Crenshaw's argument is the crime perspective on terrorism. If terrorism is treated as a crime, then a criminal intent is at the core of a person's motivation in any criminal act, and creativity is deliberately and consciously employed as an instrument for achieving illegal ends. Similarly, Wintrobe (2006) argues that one of the best ways to counter the suicide terror of extremist groups is by looking at the goals of these groups in order to understand their actions. This, according to him, enables the presentation of these goals in a way which satisfies some of the potential supporters of the group and thus dries up support for the grander ambitions of the leaders of extremist groups.

Even agreeing on the causal purposive explanation of causation of terrorism, these scholars in the latter group may fall into disagreement over the issue of which purpose matters; the purpose of the system, which is the terrorist organization in our case, or that of its parts: individual terrorist members. There is the assertion that we can somehow infer the purposes and actions of the individuals in a system based on the knowledge of the purposes of the whole system. On the contrary, there is the assertion that the purpose of a system cannot always be explained as a resultant of the purposes of the individual elements, because it is thought to have a purpose of its own apart from the aggregate of those of its parts, (Lerner, 1965).

III. Environment and Causation of Terrorism

To begin with, the conclusion that terrorism is not causal, but a correlation or an interaction, (Lerner, 1965), when measured by this parameter, is with the presumption that there is no any continuity in time and space between the causes of terrorism and their

effect, terrorism itself. The counter argument in this regard is that terrorism would have been causal if time had been conceived not as a point of time, but as a span of time and in terms of situations or contexts. Besides, terrorism would have been causal if the concept of the space had been conceived not as a specific geographic area, but in terms of the conflictual and cooperative relations of the inhabitants of that specific geographic area with those in the micro and macro environment around it and in terms of the entity of the mind.

Taking the space dimension of environment into account, Barros and Proenca, (2005), conclude that there is spatial heterogeneity in Islamic terrorist attacks among the countries in their analysis. Accordingly, terrorist attacks are more prevalent in Switzerland, France, and Italy and less prevalent in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is not only the spatial heterogeneity of international Islamic terrorist attacks across countries that make case study method of studying terrorism attractive. Rather, it is due to the fact that, despite the world's attention being focused on transnational acts of terrorism with their dramatic and devastating consequences, the underlying causes can always be traced to domestic grievances or circumstances, (Botha, 2008). The idea that the underlying causes of terrorism can be found in domestic grievances or circumstances would mean two things. One, which seems less likely, is that there is no cause of terrorism that is international or systemic, and the causes for all types of terrorism are domestic, however, transnationalization is just a shift in strategy. The other is that if both domestic and international terrorism are sourced from domestic grievances or circumstances, these circumstances vary across countries in effect verifying the causes of terrorism across places. Thus, this makes the case study method of the study of causation of terrorism a better choice at hand.

Taking into account the time dimension of the criterion of environment, Raza (2007) notes how the nature of terrorism changes across time. According to him, 'conspiratorial terrorism' in the 1960s was a tactical action used to achieve a political objective, but today's global terrorism seeks to define the political environment.

In line with this, Kamal (2008) notes that the phenomenon of terrorism and our notion of it rely greatly on historical context: political, social, and economic conditions of the time

as major variables. Similarly, for organizational theorists, terrorism tends to emerge in the presence of a unique convergence of ideology, resources, and thoughtful, appropriate tactics or other very specific conditions and contexts that exist within a society. Though the impact or consequence aspect of causation of terrorism is not the focus of this thesis, it is not only the nature of terrorism that changes with the change in the environment, but its impact and power also increases with the advent of new means and technology such as WMDs.

According to the case study work package on transnational terrorism (2008), of the many environmental factors that are the causes of terrorism at the national, international or sub-national arenas, discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origin is the chief root cause of ethno-nationalist terrorism. Meanwhile, social injustice is a main motivating cause behind social revolutionary terrorism.

The above view adheres to the multi causality of terrorism. The reason is that societies and terrorist organizations vary in their respective societal and organizational culture and contexts. Such varying group and organizational contexts maintain involvement and sustain behaviour and eventually contribute to the commission of acts of terrorism. Thus, why people may wish to initially become involved in terrorism may have little bearing on what they do (or are permitted to do) as terrorists or how they actually become engaged in specific terrorist operations, (Horgan, 2008 and Morris, 2009). This contextual nature of the phenomenon, therefore, calls for a case study method to be applied in the study of terrorism and causation of terrorism.

IV. Time: What Matters in the Causation of Terrorism, Priority or Necessity?

Under the 'environment' criterion above we have slightly touched on the issue of time since time and space are inseparable. Next, a more detailed argument for the causality of terrorism is presented from the angle of the 'sequence', 'recurrence' and 'simultaneous occurrence' senses of the criterion of time.

Firstly, it is true that time exists prior and independent of causation. But, this cannot make the causal theory of time out of the question, (Meixner, 2004). The reason is that there is no event that occurs or exists out of time limits. Secondly, given the temporal

relationship of the cause and effect events, causes may happen before, after or at the same point of time of the occurrence of their effect. So, the argument that an event needs to occur before another event, if it is to be called the cause of that second event, is valid only in the case of efficient causation. This means, there may not be an efficient causation where the cause happens after or simultaneously with its effect, but it is certain that there is a causation of such a sequence of temporal relationship between the cause and the effect.

The point being made is that the real causal power that exists in the very nature of the factors identified to be causes of terrorism matters even more than the priority of the cause-events vis-à-vis the effect event, terrorism. The causal power of causation entails the underlying causal structures and relations that are involved in bringing about concrete processes or patterns of events, (Kurki, 2008).

Secondly, inferred from the above argument, backwards causation is not a conceptual impossibility, (Meixner, 2004), but there can be no efficient causation that is directed backwards in time. For example, from their empirical analysis of the media coverage of terrorism, terror incidents and fatalities in the New York Times and in the NeueZurcher Zeitung, Rohner and Frey (2007) concluded that terrorism and media coverage of terrorism cause each other in the Granger¹² sense of the word. In a similar manner, the work of Dreher and Siemers (2010) implicitly indicates that causation is not only forward, but also backward. They assert that in countries of with a poor human rights situation, low levels of human rights might not be the consequence of terrorism but might instead be its cause. Fourthly, inferred from the second argument above, simultaneous causation is not a conceptual impossibility, (Meixner, 2004), but there can be no contemporaneous efficient causation.

To sum up, in looking for the root causes of terrorism, such causes are those where the effect, or terrorism, begins at an instant time and space, which are points of termination

¹² Granger causality is a statistical concept of causality that is based on prediction. According to Granger causality, if a signal X_1 "Granger-causes" (or "G-causes") a signal X_2 , then past values of X_1 should contain information that helps predict X_2 above and beyond the information contained in past values of X_2 alone (see: Rohner and Frey (2007)).

for its causes. In short, the point of argument raised above recognizes that the cause in the case of efficient and sufficient causation of terrorism has to precede its effect. Given the multi causality of terrorism, this argument also poses a question with regards to the impossibility for some other event to creep in between (Turk, 1982) the cause and the effect. But, it disagrees with Ducasse's, (1968), proposition that no change other than the cause occurs during the time and space of the cause, and no change other than the effect occurs during the time space of the effect. The reason for this is that such a proposition overall denies the possibility for backwards causation and simultaneous causation.

To move onto the arguments for the causality of terrorism from the angle of the 'recurrence' sense of time criterion, focuses on the fact that to disregard the causality of terrorism due to its rare occurrence is erroneous for the following reasons: The supposition of no recurrence, that is, of a single occurrence, is wholly relevant to the meaning of cause. Nonetheless, any recurrence becomes related to causation only when a law, (that happens to be a generalization of a class of resembling terrorist acts; which themselves are individually causal to begin with), is considered. The causality of each single terrorist incidence in such a general proposition is in its own right rather than due to its co-membership with others in the class of successive events (Turk, 1982). Therefore, in the analysis of the causation of terrorism, a single occurrence of terrorist incidences should be emphasized for the following reasons.

In the first place; the cause and effect analysis of a single terrorist incidence is the one which is in the true sense causal. Secondly, being less repetitive of the incidence did not reduce the magnitude of the harm of terrorism both nationally and internationally. Thirdly, recurrence is misleading in that it makes the causal relationship between the causes of terrorism and the effect to be dependent on the relative frequencies of the phenomenon at the local or global level. The problem is that if one focuses on the intuition of the recurrence of terrorism on the global level, then one's causal analysis collapses into the causal theories or at least factors of terrorism at the local level and the vice versa. Fourthly, the more general a cause of terrorism becomes, the less directly it is related to terrorism and the more likely it acts to produce all kinds of violent social outcomes, of which terrorism is just one. Fifthly, the emphasis on the causation of

terrorism as a whole indicates the search for a single cause that is there behind all forms of terrorism at all places and at all times. Nevertheless, such an effort is too simplistic and erroneous as well as controversial. For instance, as there is the assertion that terrorism is rooted in poverty or underdevelopment, there is also the assertion that political, economic and religious grievances are not in and of themselves factors which lead to terrorism. Sixthly, the causal analysis of terrorism is important even if the phenomenon is less recurrent. Because, since there is a decline in the rate of inter-state war in the current era, the academic study of violent acts by non-state actors, with terrorism being the most opted for operandium, terrorism has important ramifications for electoral competition and public policy(Lindner 2000 , Looney, 2004 Regan & Norton, 2005& Crenshaw, 1981).

With all these predicaments, however, recurrence or repetitive occurrence of the phenomenon should not be ignored in the analysis of its causation. The reasons for this are that firstly, ignorance of the recurrence of terrorist incidences in the guise of ‘being given over attention’, confines our knowledge of terrorism to the cause and/or causality of individual terrorist incidences than the causation of the phenomenon as a whole. Secondly, the consideration of only a ‘single occurrence’ is also equally erroneous or misleading. For instance, the construction of the Muslim subject as the ‘potentially radicalized other’, which has implicitly dominated the securitization of terrorism, is based on such generalization of singular acts¹³so that particular transgressions of law come to be culturally defined as common to the community as a whole.

V. The Search for a Root Cause of Terrorism

Under the same criterion in the preceding sub section, it has been debated that terrorism is not causal for the reasons that there is no situational root cause, that there is no combination of the qualities of efficiency and sufficiency in the causation of terrorism,

¹³ . For example, Kagwanja links the exposure of the countries in the Horn of Africa to sectarian conflicts and international terrorism with their either being predominantly Muslim or having significant Muslim minorities.(see: Kagwanja, 2006).

that there is no common set of causes of terrorism and that there are multiple and complex causes of terrorism.

As it can be inferred from the discussion under this criterion in the preceding sub section, root causes or preconditions of terrorism are those factors or issues that are distant and general, and far removed from the actual acts of terrorism and extremely difficult to change. Meanwhile, 'trigger-causes' or precipitants are those immediate circumstances and events that take place immediately preceding the occurrence of terrorism, and motivate or facilitate specific campaigns and acts of terrorism by provoking people to have recourse to terrorist action. Keeping these concepts of root cause and trigger causes in mind, the counter arguments for the causality of terrorism in this respect are as follows:

Firstly, the issue of necessity would matter in the causal analysis of terrorism only if we analyze it in terms of event-causation or state of affairs causation. But, if the causation of terrorism is analyzed in terms of agent causation, necessity would not matter that much. Agent-causation is the analysis of causation of terrorism as caused by the agents or actors; i.e. states, terrorist organizations or individual terrorists. Necessity does not matter in such a causal analysis, because the agents or actors are the entities that actualize terrorism. And, the transfer of actuality from the agent-cause to the effect-event, or terrorism, need not involve necessity. To the contrary, in the usual 'event' or 'state of affair' causation of terrorism, the "necessary connection" is mandatory between the cause-event, such as suppression of human rights and poverty, and effect-event, i.e., terrorism.

Secondly, causal analysis of terrorism tends to conclude that there is as such no root cause of terrorism. This tendency, however, is due to the focus of causal analysis of terrorism on logical necessity, which is 'deterministic' in the sense that a cause strictly necessitates an effect (when A, then B). A root cause of terrorism would not have been non existential if causal analysis of terrorism focuses on natural necessity, which is always contextual and which is never the only 'determining' cause. Bjorgo (2005) notes this contextuality of root factors of terrorism and says that some root factors, such as the level of modernization, may impact differently on various types of terrorist groups, and on individuals with different positions within a group.

Thirdly, it is true that, one specific root cause for all forms of terrorism, or even one set of root causes of terrorism, is hardly possible to identify. Nonetheless, the push for identifying the root causes of terrorism so as to avoid them to alleviate terrorism is not a political discourse, but rather a logical one. The reason is that the war on terror, at least in principle, ends terrorism if it exerts its capacity to this ideal task of identifying and totally removing the root causes of terrorism. Otherwise, the war on terrorism will only produce more terrorism (Meixner, 2004).

Fourthly, temporal logic, which is the strong temporal priority of the cause-event to the effect-event is over emphasized in the causation of terrorism. This is due to the dominance of the event-causation perspective rather than the agent-causation perspective in the causal analysis of terrorism. However, in the causation of terrorism, agent-causation, which actualizes the causation and the causal necessity, particularly the natural causal necessity, needs special attention (Meixner, 2004&. Bjorgo, 2005). If this is the case, then necessity or the sufficiency of the cause for the effect matters more than the temporal priority of the cause over the effect. There are two reasons for this. One is that when causation of terrorism is viewed from the angle of purposive explanation or the 'why for' sense of the term 'why', the occurrence of the effect, or terrorism, temporally precedes that of its cause, which is the purpose of the terrorists. This is because; purposes in their very nature are future state of affairs. The other reason is that when causation of terrorism is viewed from the angle of 'how come' sense of the term 'why', there are many cause-events, but not a single cause-event of terrorism and these cause-events create other violent phenomenon, not only terrorism. Thus, there is no clear-cut temporal distinction between the cause- event/s and the effect-event. This observation in turn leads to the wrong conclusion that there is no root cause of terrorism. But, if natural necessity and agent causation are emphasized over event causation there are multiple root causes, if not a single root cause of terrorism. Nonetheless, the argument here is not to undermine the place of logical causation and reasoning in causal analysis in general and in the causation of terrorism in particular. Therefore, this research thesis recognizes the existence of multiple root causes rather than a single cause of terrorism. It also shares the view point of Ehrlich and Liu, (2002) against the presupposition that there is no root cause of terrorism. According to them, there are root causes of terrorism, but they are

related to terrorism in a complex and unclear causal linkage. So until more is known about the causal linkage, developed nations have to work to improve such complex socioeconomic and demographic factors.

3.2.3. Simultaneous Causation in the Causal Analysis of Terrorism

Under the fourth criterion in the two preceding subsections, arguments for and against the causality of terrorism have been made from the perspective that causation is sequential. From the discussion that has been held until now in this thesis, the idea that causation are sequential means three things. One of these implications of sequential causation is that the cause of terrorism has to be always prior in time from the occurrence of terrorism, which is the effect, if it is to be said has caused terrorism. The second implication is that when the causes of terrorism that occur before the effect are more than one, they are in a chain of causal relationships in which the stronger causes temporally proceed the weaker ones. The dichotomy of the causes of terrorism into preconditions and precipitants, and the trichotomy of its causes into structural causes, psychological causes and alternatives for 'rational choice' by Crenshaw (1981) and Ross(1993) respectively, implicitly hold such a conception. Thirdly, the same conception of causation of terrorism, when pronounced in terms of consequence, implies that the cause or causes of terrorism result in many violent social and political consequences of which terrorism is one(McDermott ,1995 & Kruglanski& Fishman, 2006).

This thesis research poses two questions to the aforementioned sequential conception of the causation of terrorism, which seems to be dominant in terrorism research. One question is concerning whether neither economic nor psychological factors are stronger than the other, but have an equal¹⁴ claim to be regarded as causes of terrorism. More importantly, what if both poverty (economic motive) and psychological pathogens (psychological motives) jointly occur so as to convert an individual or a group into being

¹⁴ According to the perspective of redundant causation, for two causes c1 and c2, intuitively to have an equal claim to be regarded as causes of an effect e, is over-determination. Again intuitively, for one of them to be a cause and the other merely to wait in reserve is pre-emption. Therefore, either c1 or c2 cause e although e would have occurred without either of them (see: Meixner, 2004).

terrorists? These questions lead us to argue for the simultaneous causation of terrorism. From the discussion that has been held until now in this thesis, simultaneous causation would imply two things.

One of these implications is the occurrence of the cause-event or the cause-state of affair of terrorism and the effect-event or the effect-state of affair, which is terrorism, at the same extent of time and the same extent of space. (Lerner,1965& Hulswit, 2005).The other implication is the joint occurrence of more than one cause-event to cause terrorism. For example, we can infer this essence of simultaneous causation from Craik's (1952) observation that a number of causes acting together will account for the slight variations in the occurrence of a phenomenon in general. More particularly, Hassan's (2007) observation that terrorism occurs when opportunity, motivation and capability meet goes in line with the issue at hand.

Before the researcher proceeds to the arguments for simultaneous causation of terrorism, it is good to ask what limitations are there with the aforesaid sequential conception of the causation of terrorism. The first and the third implications of sequential causation of terrorism shown above are problematic.

The first problem, as discussed earlier, is that the knowledge that one grasps from an analysis of causation of terrorism in terms of a single cause temporally prior to its effect is incomprehensive. For instance, psychological pathogens as causes of terrorism ignore the place of structural factors such as political, economic, or social setting as well as the absence or presence of a normative basis for social control in the causation of terrorism. Meanwhile, a solely structural causation ignores the place of individual behaviour, perception, ideology, motivation and identity in the causation of terrorism. The second problem is that the 'single cause' antecedence to the effect, terrorism, contradicts with the nature of causation. Aristotle, as cited in Kurki, (2008), describes this nature of causation saying that many different things can all be causes; however, they cannot be causes in the same way. According to Lerner(1965), causes are neither single, nor final. Craik (1952) similarly notes that a number of causes acting together will account for the slight variations in the position of the shots on a target. Here, even some writers like Laqueur,

as cited in Gibbs (1989), discard such multiple, sequential, or reciprocal causation in favour of direct causation.

The third problem emanating from the sequential sense of the causation of terrorism is that the causes of terrorism are taken not to be causing only terrorism, but also other similar phenomena. This diverts the focus of causal analysis from 'what causes terrorism' to the less important concern: in what ways are the causes of terrorism similar with those of other phenomena that take place in a similar environment?

The fourth problem is that the sequential sense of the causation of terrorism tends to be applicable only for observable causes and observable causal relationships. Nevertheless, causal relationships and some events causing terrorism are not observable. For example, causal claims of terrorism can be made by using if not the constraining and enabling causal power, at least the conditioning causal powers that ideas, discourses, awareness, rules, norms, control and judgment have on the agents or actors of terrorism. Nonetheless, the causal chain linking these causes and their effect, and even the causes themselves are non observable. Last, but not least, since there is obviously no categorical difference between cause-event and effect-event, and no activity-passivity-contrast between them, the multiple causes of terrorism are not discernible in a chain of sequence in which the stronger causes or root causes precede and cause the succeeding weaker causes or immediate causes. Therefore, the tenability of mutual and reciprocal interdependence of the causal variables in the chain of causes is questionable (Lerner, 1965, Kroedel, 2008, Otte, 1987 & Hassan, 2007).

Simultaneous causation of terrorism is preferable to its sequential causation in that the former has many advantages over the latter. Among others, simultaneous causation results in over-determination not being carried over to multiple-causation of terrorism by virtue of counterfactual dependence. Incidentally, over determination is the problem of 'equal claim' of several causes to be causes for an effect, (i.e. terrorism). This thesis argues that mental causation is most fit to such multiple causation of terrorism without over determination. Nonetheless, the essence of mental causation of terrorism is bottlenecked by the widely accepted presumption that terrorism is an act for no purpose. This presumption emanates from the conclusion concerning "the irreality of the mental".

However, the irreality of the mental is unlikely, because some mental processes are constituted by a combination of neural, bodily and environmental component processes. Thus, they have their own causal properties and are not pre-empted by other non-psychological first-order properties (Keijzer & Schouten, 2007 & Burgoon, 2006).

The issues of motivation, terrorists' perception of their enemies, identitarian consolidations, awareness, control, and judgment (Azizian, 2007, Khan, 2006 & Bernholz, 2006) are issues related to mental properties. Motivation, whether it is psychological, political, ideological, and economic or else, for example, is not pre-empted by other non- psychological first order properties such as ideology or socio-economic discrimination and conflict. The point being made is that the sequential conception of ideology as the preceding stronger cause or the driving cause for motivation is wrong, because motivation as a mental property has its own causal property. In addition to this, it is unlikely to clearly demarcate the time and space segments for the aforementioned types of motivation, but also to have a causal sequence of them in the causation of terrorism.

3.3. The Limitations of 'Primary Cause' and 'Chain of Causes' Approaches in the Psychological and Economic Causation of Terrorism

- The preceding three sub-sections of this thesis have had a glance at the possible arguments for the causality and non-casualty of terrorism. This subsection is devoted to identifying the demerits of primary- cause causation and chain of causes- causation, which seem dominant in the causal analysis of economic and psychological causality of terrorism. Primary cause- causation of terrorism asserts that terrorism is caused by a single factor or by a set of factors from a single domain, such as economy or psychology, which at the same time is the cause and the root-cause of the phenomenon (Held, 1997, Piazza, 2006 & Smelser, 2007). Meanwhile, the 'chain of causes' approach of causation says that temporally and spatially prior, and causally stronger factors cause their weaker successors so as to cumulatively cause terrorism. The first limitation of the primarily economic and/or the primarily psychological causation of terrorism and that of the chain of causes approach is lack of consensus among scholars. The disagreement is

regarding whether the two sets of factors are causes of terrorism independently or in a chain of relationships, and how they become so. The disagreement in both approaches of causation of terrorism is shown by picking one illustration for each as follows:

With regard to the 'chain of causes' approach of the causation of terrorism; for example, many analysts such as, Edward, Crenshaw and Jenkins as cited in Englehart and Kurzman (2006) and Kruglanski and Fishman (2006), assert that the psychological motivation for terrorism is essentially driven by religious or non religious ideology. The reasons they provide for this are that firstly, motivation significantly affects individuals' tendency to embrace beliefs on the efficacy and justifiability of terrorism. Thus, individuals with appropriate motivations (deriving from their stable personality traits or situational pressures) may well be more prone to endorse terrorism under the appropriate circumstances than individuals with different motivations may be. Secondly, ideology is the social and individual schemata or device through which complex set of large-scale socio-economic causation gets filtered. That means, it brings people some distance from generalized dissatisfaction towards accepting specific cognitive beliefs about the reasons for their dissatisfaction. Thirdly, ideology is composed of a supreme value, an absolutely true and highest aim or a bundle of such aims preferred to all other aims, which are the ultimate source of terror. (Smelser, 2007, Englehart, & Kurzman, 2006, Horgan, 2008, Wallace, 2008 & Bernholz, 2006)

To the contrary, many also argue that religious and non religious ideologies are not the driving forces for the psychological motivation of terrorism. (Ramakrishna, (2007) Jackson & Reiter, 2007, & Munger, 2006). According to them, ideology does not motivate psychologically, in the sense the term connotes irrationality, emotionality or non-conscious reasoning. Rather, ideology guides rational action or at least semi-conscious reasoning or justification. Why the motivation by ideology seems psychological, emotional or irrational is, therefore, because of the motive of anger, sadness and retaliation or revenge, which the ideological thought includes and which affect its systematicity and content.

For example, even though religious differences between the beholder of religious ideology and the adversary or the 'occupier' increases the likelihood of suicide terrorism, suicide terrorism is not caused by religious ideology. Rather, it is a result of protracted conflicts, self-interest and political bargaining and/or a strategic response to perceived occupation. Why religious ideology appears to have essentially caused suicide terrorism is because of the more apparent motives of anger, sadness and retaliation or revenge that disguise the real motives of the suicide terrorists. If this was not the case, the real intent of suicide terrorism would not have been bypassed. This refers to the Nash equilibrium¹⁵ or zero-sum conflictual relationship between the beholder of the ideology and its adversary. The willingness to 'kill and then die' is not a psychological motive; rather, it is a strategic willingness opted in the face of the military weakness of the attackers vis-à-vis the states they target, and the need to escape capture, which leads to exposure of future operation plans of the terrorist organization (Ashworth, Clinton, Meirowitz & Ramsay, 2008). Therefore, the aforementioned apparent motives should be interpreted as strategic motives for the Nash equilibrium.

Suicide terrorism is not an emotional, but a rational act. Moreover, the argument for this holds that the exclusion of economic motives from the scene of causation of suicide terrorism is unreasonably favouring that of being primarily psychologically. This unreasonable favouring in the guise of 'no amount of money in the world persuades somebody to die' is wrong, because suicide terrorism gradually becomes dependent on the subsequent reality of what being involved actually delivers; i.e. striving to sustain, as it grows into being more focused, narrow, and unambiguously terrorism related. Thus, suicide terrorism, generally, is not a fundamental shift in the terrorists' ideology, and nature of terrorism, but it is the end point of a continuum of the processes in terrorism (Herriot, 2009, LaFree, & Dugan, 2009 & Smelser, 2007).

With regard to primarily economic or primarily psychological causation of terrorism, for example, there is an endless debate about the rationality, emotionality and bounded rationality of terrorists (Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen & Klemmensen, 2006). Similarly,

¹⁵ .Nash equilibrium is a notion of game theory, which refers to a stable state of a system that involves several interacting participants in which no participant can gain by a change of strategy as long as all the other participants remain unchanged (see: Word Web(see: reference)).

there is a contestation about terrorists being either altruistic or selfish, which is dominant in the literature. This is supported by the rational choice theory and its variants, and utilitarianism.

The second limitation in the two approaches of causation, as shown above, is that both tend to exclude either economic or psychological, or even other large scale (Traugott, 1978) structural factors from the causal analysis. This tendency can be easily understood from the words of my respondent from the Ethiopian Federal Police Crime Investigation Department:

“.....To think of terrorists as economically motivated or have economic purpose is unlikely, because of most terrorist organizations and their members have good economic profile Oh yes! Seen from the angle of the man [a member of the terrorist organization] who engages in an actual terrorist attack mission, economic factors may be seen as causes for terrorism. But, this again hardly works in the case of suicide bombers” (Anonymous¹⁶).

Nonetheless, these factors forgone in the causal analysis, as Ross (1993) claims, are most abundant, and much easier to operationalize and measure than psychological or rational choice factors. Not only this, as it is argued in the fourth coming subsection of this thesis, the exclusion of either psychological or economic factors, in favour of the other, from the causal analysis of terrorism contradicts the nature of man.

A related problem is the tendency of causal amalgamation, which is the tendency to presume the sameness of the causes of terrorism and those of unconventional political behaviour (hate crimes or protest) and retail terrorism, domestic terrorism and international terrorism. (Ross, 1993). This, as it has been raised earlier, diverts attention from ‘what causes terrorism’ to ‘ what makes it similar with other phenomena’. Even, the approach proposed in this thesis, simultaneous causation of terrorism by psychological

¹⁶ My Interview with Anonymous, my Respondent, in his Office at the Ethiopian Federal Police Crime Investigation Department, Addis Ababa, on June 21, 2013 @ 10:00 AM.

and economic causes, does not proclaim to have totally avoided the aforesaid problem, but reduced it. The reason is that even though the causes for all the above phenomena are not the same they are somehow related.

Both the aforesaid limitations emanate from a third limitation of the ‘primary cause’ and ‘chain of causes’ causation of terrorism. The third limitation is that there is no empirical or sustainable, but indirect, weak and complicated relationship between economic or psychological factors and terrorism in the primary cause causation. The ‘chain of causes’ causation of terrorism also faces the same fate in its correlation or relation of complex set of factors from both domains and other domains, amongst themselves and with terrorism (Cornell, 2005, Feldman, & Perala, 2004, Krueger & Laitin, 2008 & Khan, 2006). This limitation has many implications to the study of the causation of terrorism. The researcher would like to see those implications of the problematic of ‘primary cause’ and ‘chain of causes’ causation of terrorism in the light of the viewpoints of the respondents.

The first implication is that there is no clear cut spatial and temporal distinction in the relation, which primary cause causation establishes between the cause (economic or psychological factor) and the effect (terrorism). This lack of clear cut spatial and temporal distinction is aggravated in the case of the ‘chain of causes’ causation. The second implication is that the causes and trigger factors cannot be clearly distinguished in the primary cause and chain of causes causation of terrorism. This is because the factors are arranged in a certain sequence not based on their causal power to result in the effect, but based on their unlikely precedence over one another in time and space. Such confusion can be grasped from what the researcher’s anonymous respondent says:

“... Therefore, it is the psychological motive of the perpetrators, which is driven by religious thought, that can be spoken of not only as the cause, but also as the trigger factor of both domestic and international terrorism¹⁷”

(Anonymous).

¹⁷ My Interview with Anonymous. my Respondent, in his Office at the Ethiopian Federal Police Crime Investigation Department, Addis Ababa, on June 21, 2013 @ 10:00 AM.

In his Gurrian, (Ted Robert Gurr), glance of the causation of terrorism, the researcher's respondent Abebe Muluneh from IGAD's Security Services Program Ethiopia Office denounces the above suggestion. According to Abebe:

“[the] need for identity, and religion [ideology, in the broader sense] could be a force multiplier used by the terrorist group or organization in order to evoke reaction in the ordinary people in support of their cause and to broaden their membership base, but not a source for terrorism. Rather, since the psychology of the individual terrorist arises from his or her dissatisfaction with individual life, it is injustice, particularly international injustice that could be a source for terrorism. Such an actual or perceived injustice develops dissatisfaction, which in turn leads to the creation of the ‘we’ versus the ‘they’, [the latter perceived by the former as ‘evil’] divisive psychology”¹⁸ (Abebe Muluneh).

Before scrutinizing the aforementioned responses of the researcher's respondents let us go on listing the implications of the problematic of the two approaches of causation. The third implication of the problematic of primary cause and chain of causes causation of terrorism is self evident. Approaches of causation, which are unable to distinguish the cause from the trigger factor of terrorism, could not be expected to identify its root cause. Primary cause causation may claim to have identified the root cause of terrorism on the basis of its self-proclaimed presumption of the dichotomized primacy; i.e. either poverty or psychological motive as primary causes. Chain of causes causation may claim to have identified the root cause or at least root causes of terrorism in that it has arranged the multiple causal factors in a self-proclaimed ‘correct order’ based on their temporal and spatial precedence of occurrence over one another. None of the reviewed literature on the causation of terrorism has identified the factors in a precise chain of relationship. Nonetheless, from the spirit of the above claim, the order of such a chain of causal relationship could be: socio-economic structure, socio-economic situation or status (deprivation), the psychological motive to avenge the deprivation, the rational cost-

¹⁸ According to frustration aggression theory (the theory of Ted Robert Gurr), the larger the gap between what one gets and what one expects to get from a system, the more likely one is to turn to violence. Meaning, deprivation leads to frustration and then to aggression.

benefit calculus, and then, terrorism. Nevertheless, since the causation of terrorism solely by a single factor or by combination of factors from a single domain, such as economy or psychology, is not empirically proved, the claim of primarily economic or primarily psychological causation of terrorism to have identified the root cause of the phenomenon is naïve. Similarly, the claim by the ‘chain of causes’ causation of terrorism is also not convincing. The reason is that it is unable to specify a clear temporal and spatial gap and the respective causal power among the causes of terrorism, and between the causes and the effect.

From the above responses of my respondents one can easily comprehend that both seem to explicitly to support the primarily psychological causation of terrorism. But, their speeches also hold some implicit indications about the chain of causes causation of terrorism. The Gurr view of the causation of terrorism held by my respondent, Abebe Muluneh, can be criticized as follows:

Firstly, rational choice theory and analytical or structural theory criticize the frustration aggression view of Ted Robert Gurr. According to these theories, terrorism is associated with relative internal affluence such as monetary gain and external advantages, such as social and political recognition, rather than poverty or other indicators of deprivation. The fact that one is frustrated due to poverty or oppression does not necessarily mean one will become a terrorist; instead, one could escape, withdraw, or aggress against oneself rather than against others. Psychologists also pull the argument to their own sphere saying that neither situational phenomena like deprivation, nor ideology, learning or socialization to violence can create aggression in terrorists. What these can do is to modify the instinctual or naturally existing tendency to attack the frustrating agent (Gurr, 1968, Schweitzer & Shay, 2003, Herriot, 2009 & Kruglanski, & Fishman, 2006).

Secondly, the researcher sees the over emphasis that my anonymous respondent has given to the ‘religiously motivated’ stance on terrorism as a mere airing out of what most terrorists claim has motivated them or what the state-mediated security discourse conveys has motivated terrorists. Instead, the solution to this global threat should be to search for what really motivates the perpetrators.

Thirdly, other limitations of primarily psychological and primarily economic causation of terrorism are identified from the contending literature that primary cause causation in both aspects suffers from: uncertain predictions about terrorist and anti-terrorist interaction, as well as implausible conclusions due to the immeasurability of some elements such as the terrorists' preferences and values (Herriot, 2009 & Mercer, 2005).

3.4. Simultaneous Causation of Terrorism by Psychological and Economic Factors

As it has been reflected in the discussion of the environment criterion and the root cause criterion of the causation of terrorism under sub-section 3.2.2., this thesis agrees with the causation of terrorism by many factors, rather than by a single or primary factor. The reason for this, as it has been raised in one way or the other, is that many causes operate at different levels of generality and causal significance in the causation of terrorism. While some are permissive and encouraging, others are preventive and/or inhibiting. Furthermore, others are precipitating (Shrivastava, 2005). Even though the thesis agrees with the causation of terrorism by multiple factors, its disagreements with the chain of causes approach, particularly when it comes to such a causation of terrorism by psychological and economic factors have been outlined under sub-section 3.3. This sub-section of the thesis, therefore, is devoted to make arguments in favour of simultaneous causation of terrorism by economic and psychological factors.

As it is well known, behaviour is not only instinctive, but also learned. In both ways of its development behaviour is dynamic to a varying degree. This thesis argues that learned behaviour, particularly in the development of malevolent behaviour like terrorism, needs a combination of two complimentary processes: continuously occurring, actual or perceived situations/conditions, and the process of teaching and learning or socialization into the malevolent behaviour. These two processes either make the situations penetrate into the minds of people or make people internalize those situations. In order for the situations to have penetrated into the mind or to be internalized means that they appear in the minds of people in the form of motivation and purpose or in the form of their respective opposites. It is after such internalization into the mind of the violent person that we refer to the conditions or the situations as psychological, economic and/or

structural factors. Or, in the term being applied in this thesis, we refer to them as cause-events and/or cause-state affairs.

Inferred from the above paragraph, whether we call them psychological, economic or structural, all the hitherto identified cause events and/ or cause state of affairs of terrorism need to be converted into motives, purposes, grievances or else in the mind of the terrorists before they are called causes.

Even though it seems to be debatable, this internalization or conversion of situations into purpose, motive, grievance and the likes, in the minds of the 'to be terrorists' is not and should not be debatable particularly in economic and psychological factors. The issue is even clearer in the case of psychological factors in that, according to Bakker (2004), the processes in terrorism such as involvement, disengagement, radicalization, de-radicalization, situational conditions and the trait of novelty seeking are basically psychological processes and part of human disposition. Moreover, psychological factors apply their causal power on the single space or entity of the mind all at once and within a single point of time to cause any effect-event, such as terrorism. They need not apply their causal power one after the other in that psychological explanation can be causal without being mechanistic (Craik, 1952). If this fact of converting factors into purposes, motives, grievances and the likes in the mind of the 'to be terrorists' had not been there for economic factors too, the application of the causal power of economic factors on the single space or entity of the mind within a single point of time would have been unlikely. But, it is there and we can grasp this from Ranstorp's statements.

According to Ranstorp (2007), regardless of inexhaustible lists of precipitating factors, what is central in both internal and external factors of terrorism are grievances and discontent, which are some of the negative manifestations of motive and purpose. Here, such grievances are interchangeable and intertwined: the personal with the global and the public with the private.

If such simultaneous operation of the causal power of internal or psychological cause-events and cause-state of affairs of terrorism, such as personality trait, is not debatable

since they are by nature mental events or state of affairs, then let us illustrate how economic factors simultaneously apply their causal power on the mind .

Economic factors of terrorism, both in the narrow and broader definition of the term among others, include: poverty, illiteracy, human rights abuses, repressive or undemocratic governance, lack of political freedom, injustice, disempowerment, and religious or socio-political alienation. These economic and development related cause-events or state of affairs do not merely result in terrorism unless their existence is either internalized into the minds of the 'to be terrorists' in terms of deprivation, grievance, or frustration, or until the reaction to them is internalized in terms of purposes or motives, such as the need for change or empowerment and self-actualization, or aggression (Turk, 2004 & Bjorgo, 2005). Moreover, it could also be said that the same results would not occur unless terrorism is opted as a strategy for the attainment of the aforesaid purposes, motives, aggression or else with a certain degree of rational cost-benefit calculus. Both the aforesaid internalization of the cause-events and state of affairs of terrorism and the option of terrorism as a strategy take place in the mind as a single space or entity.

For these reasons, all aggrieved and/or deprived persons are not necessarily frustrated. Additionally, all who is frustrated is not necessarily violent in general and terrorist in particular. By extension, that is why all the poor or all the under-developed, or all people with psychological pathogens are not terrorists or not 'to be' terrorists. In other words, the hitherto psychological and economic causation of terrorism both in its chain of causes and primary-cause approaches, the researcher believes, still fails to indicate a direct link between terrorism and its economic and psychological causes. The reason for this is that these approaches, in their spatial and temporal correlation of the causes and the effect, focus on geographic space instead of the space or the entity of the mind, where the correlation actually starts. It is such a correlation between psychological and economic cause-events or state of affairs and terrorism in the single space or entity of the mind within a single point of time that defines the 'to be terrorist'.

The identification of the 'to be terrorist' is one thing in the face of the current international threat of terrorism. However, the perpetration of terrorist operations demands the fulfilment of more preconditions other than the shaping of the 'to be

terrorist'. In this regard, Oberschall (2004) and Cohen and Felson (1979), for example, note that the launching of a terrorist attack requires the convergence or coordination in time and space of: discontented or motivated offenders, ideology that feeds grievances, organizational capacity, thoughtful, appropriate tactics, and suitable targets; i.e. political opportunity and absence of capable guardians (Berkouk, 2008, Turk, 2004 & Bjorgo, 2005). These factors, other than the motivated terrorist, in one or the other way imply what research on terrorism often refers to as the structural causes of terrorism.

Structural causes of terrorism are factors related with the world order. They include: the hegemonic decline of powerful nations, failure of international institutions to resolve conflicts involving aggrieved populations, globalization, empire and colonial competition, ethno-religious and political diversity, the unexamined cultural clash between the Western and Islamic worlds, poorly understood religious or anti-religious ideologies, social disorganization, the structure of party politics, the international network of terrorist organization (Bergen, 2010).

Nevertheless, this thesis does not agree with the usual downward or systemic causation of terrorism as caused by the above mentioned and other structural causes. Its disagreement with systemic or downward causation of terrorism by structural factors is because of the following reasons:

1. Most of these factors are either economic or psychological in nature, or need to be internalized into the mind of the 'to be terrorist' in terms of psychological and/or economic purposes and motives or their opposites so as to be causes. To look for their causal linkage on the geographic space rather than on the space or entity of the mind does not lead us to the root cause or causes of the phenomenon.
2. This, however, is not to mean that the dichotomized study of the domestic and global causes of terrorism is unimportant. The reason is that the way domestic and international cause-events and/or state of affairs are internalized into the mind of an individual 'to be terrorist' and the significance he/she places on either of them may vary. Moreover, if not in the cause analysis, structural factors can help a lot in the impact analysis of terrorism and entail the globality of the phenomenon.

As it is repeatedly raised, there is no direct linkage between these factors and terrorism. They have a second degree importance in the occurrence of the phenomenon. For example, even in the absence of suitable targets (Caplan, 2006) a terrorist organization may strategically plan for a suicide terrorist attack, which is the Nash equilibrium, only when viewed from the angle of the individual member or members involved in that attack, but not for their organization. Therefore, most of these factors can be seen as trigger factors rather than causes or the root cause of terrorism.

Viewed from the angle of spatial linkage, for example, lack of democracy, participatory politics civil liberties, the rule of law and economic base for functioning liberal democratic institutions are taken to be causes of terrorism. Furthermore, the west believes that terrorists from the developing world are target it because of their hatred of democracy, freedom, values, and way of life. Thus, the west proclaims to have the responsibility to expand democracy and freedom around the world (Vorkink , & Scheick, (ND) Abrahms, 2006 &Dunn, 2005).

In spite of this, the claim for the spatial origin of terrorism in the developing world is counter argued as follows:

In the first place, terrorism rarely occurs against repressive regimes, and when it does, it is quickly and effectively eradicated. Next, the assertion that terrorists target democracies because they hate the values and institutions of democracy is not convincing. For example, terrorists should like economic globalization or openness since it facilitates easy movement of their resources and themselves. The being trigger factor for terrorism of globalization is within itself than in its being liked or disliked. That means, in addition to facilitating easy movement, globalization decreases the cost of illegal activity vis-à-vis that of legal activity. Thirdly, terrorism is a phenomenon that is exclusive to democracies. The reason is that sectarian violence on behalf of ethnic identity or sub-national aspirations to independence may nurture violence within democracies (Grandin, 2006 ,. Li, &Schaub, 2004, Kruglanski, & Fishman, 2006 & El-Affendi, 2005).

The boosting of the economies of democracies from the armament trade is not democratization, but the democratization of violence'. Plus, the patron-client relationship between democracies and non-democracies is not based on the self proclaimed exchange of democratic values. Instead, it has been an exchange where democracies export insecurity and non-democracies export non-renewable natural resource. Depicting the exportation of insecurity from democracies to non-democracies assert that the regional concentration of terrorism has moved from Western Europe in the 1970s, to Latin America in the 1980s, to the Middle East and Persian Gulf in the twenty-first century. In its intervention in the non-democracies, particularly in the attempt to control oil resources democracies support their client-suppressive regimes there. This in turn instigates retaliation attacks against democracies from suppressed groups or groups which perceive suppression in non-democracies. Nevertheless, these attacks are not good enough to justify the non-democracies' being the origin of terrorism in that the very genesis of the spatial origin (if it is seen in terms of geographic space) of the phenomenon is in the relationship between democracies and non-democracies described above (LaFree, 2009, Oberschall, 2004, Dunn, 2005, Ehrlich & Liu, 2002, Deshpande, 2003, Schweitzer & Shay, 2003 & Englehart & Kurzman, 2006).

Stepping from the arguments made until now, one may question as to how the internalization of the cause-events or state of affairs into the terrorists' minds takes place. If such structural factors like the culture of society, ideology or socialization into terrorism (Horgan, 2008) enable the internalization of the cause-events or state of affairs into the mind of the 'to be terrorists', why are these factors of secondary importance or trigger factors?

The modality of the internalization of psychological and economic situations into the mind may be either through direct observation of disparities by the 'to be terrorists' themselves or through their observation and imitation of others or through induction or socialization into terrorism, ideology, media and culture being agents for this. Precisely the internalization is either through innate psychological imperative or through cognitive "re-construal" (Herriot, 2009) of moral imperatives. The answer for the above question, therefore, is that the degree of innate tendency to violence and the option of terrorism as a

strategy matter more than the modal of internalization of situations into the mind. The ‘to be terrorists’ are similar to people committing other types of violence in terms of their higher degree of innate tendency towards violence. But, they are different from people committing other forms of violence for choosing terrorism as a strategy.

If the mind as the single space or entity for the application of the causal power of both psychological and economic cause-events and/or state of affairs is accepted, then the thesis argues for the temporal inseparability of economic and psychological purposes and the emotionality and rationality of terrorists as follows.

To begin with, as Descartes (1596-1650) notes in his notion of the ‘integrity of the person’, which seems to be borrowed with modification from Plato’s (427- 3347 B.C) notion of ‘harmonious or just individual soul’, man is an integrated whole of the mind self and the body self. In the causal interaction between the two, for example, the mental decision to raise an arm causes the bodily ‘arm’ to go up, and injury to the body causes a mental perception of pain¹⁹. Extending the corollary of this assertion to the notions of motive and purpose may connote that it is the mind itself that needs and wants, what is basic or luxurious, and it is the mind that orders responses to the needs and wants to be given by the physical system. Of course, the Platonic conception may counter this in that it holds the fixation of the ‘mind as hungry for reason’²⁰, but not for material needs and wants.’ If we accept the position that needs and wants arise and are responded to by the physical system itself, this places the causal linkage (the ‘integrity’) between the mind and the physical system onto an unconceivable track. The part that encourages the needs and wants is the one expected to order or request for them to be supplied. If needs and wants arise and are responded to by the physical system itself, then it is the physical system that takes over the task of ordering, guiding and judging. This, therefore, is like the ‘toe itches the head’. However, the truth is that, the physical system would not have sensed environmental situations or stimuli, such as coldness, hotness, etc, if it was

¹⁹ See: The Philosophical views of Descartes (1596-1650) as quoted in Callicott & Frodeman, 2009 & Thompson & Hirschman, 1995), (see: reference)

²⁰ See: The Philosophical views of Plato (427- 3347 B.C) as quoted in William, 2000 (see: reference)

dissociated from the mind. Even after sensing the stimuli the physical system waits order from the mind to react. This is so even in metabolic processes with no exception for reflexive actions. The mind gives such orders to the physical system after perceiving and valuing both the stimuli and the reactions to them, such as the merits and demerits of hot and cold climate, and the protective and aesthetic value of cloths.

Under sub-section 3.2.2(VI.), we have raised the debate regarding the ‘reality and unreality’ of the mental state or mind. This thesis agrees with the arguments for the reality of the mind. But, still there are two problems regarding the internalization of situations into the mind. One is that two or more persons cannot think and/or internalize a situation or situations alike. The other is the ethno-centric view; that people of different regions have different intelligence quotients, thus, they cannot think and/or internalize a situation or situations alike. The reasons for the inseparability of the rationality and emotionality of terrorists like that of other human beings are that:

1. Even though previous psychological research, have failed to profile terrorists’ psychological makeup and that of those vulnerable to radicalization. There is one outstanding common characteristic of terrorists, according to Crenshaw, which is their normality (Crenshaw, 2000).
2. This can be implied from the terrorists’ defence of their own attitudes and behaviours via excuses and justifications, which are aimed at minimizing their responsibility for the deviance and normalizing that behaviour.
3. Isolating feelings of reputations such as the ‘feelings of humiliation’ from psychology makes the cost-benefit calculus, which terrorists are said to make, to be a "mindless" cost-benefit calculus. The reason is that reputation is basically a psychological process or a function of mental properties (Mercer, 2005).

This thesis compliments with the argument that a ‘groupthink’,(unanimous consent on an agendum in a group where individual members are forced to compliment by surrendering their views and interests to those of the group), is hard to achieve, but not an impossibility. According to cognitive dissonance theory, therefore, a person with less rationale for attending a group meeting has more need to justify his behaviour and will change more. On the other hand, a group’s influence on an individual’s disposition to

violence can be increased by the group providing normative support, by providing apparent protection from retribution, and by providing cues for violent behavior. Equally, since object relationships with others are controlled by unconscious forces such as projection-the theory that one irrationally attributes one's own attitude to others, there is the argument that such collective action problems can be overcome through the trust created by the emotion in the members because of their identification by the group (Barros & Proenca, 2005 & Lerner, 1965).

In short, it is true that psycho-pathology, socio pathology or rational choice influence an individual's decision to become involved in terrorism. But, neither of them can fully account for the genesis of terrorist behaviours independently (Victoroff, 2005). In other words, just as we cannot dissociate the body self and the mind self, we cannot delink psychological and economic motives, purposes or their opposites. Moreover, just as we cannot allocate the space of the entity of the mind for psychological and economic purposes, motives or their opposites by cutting it into pieces, we cannot do so for rationality and emotionality. By the same token, we cannot fixate the mind to be economically, psychologically, strategically or else wise motivated, and to be emotional or rational at this or at that point of time.

Chapter Four: Simultaneous Causation of Terrorism by Psychological and Economic Factors: Al Qaeda versus the War on Terror

4.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter of this thesis, reflection of the debate on the casualty and non-casualty of terrorism is made. Additionally, arguments against the problematic primary cause and chain of causes approaches, and arguments for an alternative, i.e., simultaneous causation of terrorism by psychological and economic factors is also made. The following subsection of this chapter is used as a demonstration of the asserted problematic of primary cause and chain of causes approach, and the claimed merits of simultaneous causation of terrorism by using the organizational terrorism of Al Qaeda as a case in point. The implication of primary-cause, chain of causes and simultaneous causation approaches in international counter terrorism and the relationship between the developing and developed world will also be drawn in conclusion.

Al-Qaeda, the terrorist organization, was 'zygoted' in Saudi Arabia in the year 1988. It was co-founded by Osama bin Laden, who was born in 1957 to a wealthy family in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and by his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. Osama bin Laden named his organization Al-Qaeda, meaning the Base, a name derived from the name of the computer file or data base, which he made for the purpose of 'managing the needs' of Mujahideen in Afghanistan. For about seven years since its establishment, Al Qaeda was not recognized even by the CIA and FBI, while it was believed to be involved in the attacks against Americans in Yemen in 1992 and against US and other peacekeepers in Somalia in 1993 (Ali, 2004, Bergen & Footer, 2008, Robertson, 2007).

It has been debated that the organization has gone through organizational regeneration, degeneration or hibernation since its 9/11 devastating attack against the US. Those holding the stance of Al Qaeda's regeneration point to its network, which is said to have covered from 26 up to 60 countries that allowed the organization to be the only one of its kind to have a full global reach. They also point to Al Qaeda's possession of about 300 up to 17,000 actual trained militants with expertise (according to different sources) who can be mobilized in between 50 and 60 countries. Plus, the organization's being the first of its kind to have targets across physical and cyber space is mentioned as an indicator

for its continuation as the most potent threat to US interests and the most deadly of the over 300 militant groups in the world. Having these and others as indicators, the 'organizational regeneration' view holders compliment with Al-Qaida with its vision of restoring Islamic caliphates (a 'totalitarian government') and predict that Al Qaeda or its spinoffs may soon become the government in any of a dozen countries and may acquire WMDs (Cetron & Davies, 2008, Kivimäki, 2002, Suder, 2006, Bigo, & Tsoukala, 2008, Ali, 2004 & Pham, 2007).

In contrast, there are those who hold the view that Al Qaeda has gone through organizational degeneration since its 9/11 attack and present the following reasons: firstly, as an organization Al Qaeda has no coherent vision or plan for the future be it ideological, revolutionary, liberation or self-determination-except for bankrupting the US and replacing, in their view, false Islamic governments by true Islam, an Islamic Caliphate. Secondly, the widening international network paradoxically indicates Al Qaeda's organizational degeneration. This means that today's Al Qaeda represents not a specific organization, but a conglomerate of self-replicating, loosely interconnected independent or quasi independent terrorist cells with amorphous and non-discernible command control apparatuses, which are presumed to be operational all over the world (Matthew, Shambaugh, 2005, Clauss, 2006, Drakos, and Gofas, 2006, Gasper, 2001, Nagl, 2009 & Klein, 2010).

Thirdly, close operational direction by al Qaeda personnel and financial dependence on al Qaeda has been diminishing since 2001. Fourthly, its top leaders including Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed have for years remained fugitives or captives, denied support and/or have been distanced by people and lastly killed. Thus, they claim its degeneration into "home- grown" terrorism and an ideological popular movement, what is being referred to as [an attempted] "global Islamist insurgency or Al Qaeda 2.0 " (Vorkink & Scheick, (ND), Schweitzer and Shay, 2003 Alexander, 2009, Sageman, 2004).

Besides the organizational regeneration and degeneration view-holders regarding Al Qaeda, there are others who are of the opinion that Al Qaeda is hibernating. According to these view-holders, the presumption that the central al Qaeda organization is no longer a

threat underestimates the resiliency of al Qaeda as a criminal organization, animated by strong ideological/religious beliefs and drawing strength from local insurgencies. For them, it is this hibernation that helped to keep the location, or at least the official links, of the central Al Qaeda unidentified by the CIA and FBI for so long a time; except for suspicions of it being in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, or elsewhere. Again, it is this hibernation that enabled Al Qaeda to retain the coordination of terrorist attacks on Western interests on an ad hoc basis even after it appeared damaged (Matthew, and Shambaugh, 2005, Held, 2004 & Buzan, 2006). Therefore, Bergen, as cited in Egerton (2006), concludes that Al-Qaeda is both a movement and an organization.

Whatever form it has evolved into, Al-Qaeda's terrorism is indeed an organized, networked and international terrorism. In addition to the above contestation, the difficulty in describing and characterizing a terrorist organization such as Al Qaeda emanates from the fact that terrorism is not essentially the result of organizing and unifying groups, rather the 'result of a split between the moderate and the more extreme wings of an already-existing organization' such as a political party or a movement. Besides, it emanates from the vagueness of the network as an organizational structure (Ross, 1993).

With all these drawbacks, however, it is more useful to analyze the psychological and economic causation of terrorism in a group (organizational or network) based analysis than individual based analysis. Given that many stage sequences of causes determine a particular outcome only in combination (Traugott, 1978) such an analysis reduces the problems of lack of theoretical specificity, vague conclusions, and the inability to make backward and forward predictions that likely emanate from multiple causation.

4.2. Primary Cause, Chain of Causes and Simultaneous Causation Approaches in

Economic and Psychological Causation of Organized Terrorism: Al Qaeda as a Lens

What is the cause of Al Qaeda's organized, networked and international terrorism? Is it primarily caused by psychological or economic factors or by a chain of factors from both domains?

In the analysis of the causation of Al Qaeda's terrorism as primarily caused by psychological or economic cause events or state of affairs there are many apparent problems. Firstly, members of Al Qaeda either do not have a specific psychological or socio-economic profile of their own, which makes them alike or different from terrorists of other organizations, or from those engaged in violence other than terrorism or at least from non-violent people. Here, those holding the stance of the primarily economic causation of terrorism may claim that socio-economic profiles of Al Qaeda are easier to identify than its psychological profile. For them, the socio-economic profile of Al Qaeda can be easily distinguished from non-terrorists and non-violent people, but also from terrorists of other organizations, such as the groups in Israel. 'Individuals without much hope of socio-economic improvement' is, for example, the socio-economic profile, which they identify as being common among all Al Qaeda members. But, this contradicts with the fact that most of the 'up to death' determined perpetrators of the organization's operations are drawn not from the most impoverished and ignorant segments of the population, but from the middle and upper income classes (Bjorgo, 2005).

On the other hand, those holding the view of primarily psychological causation of Al Qaeda's terrorism point to its recruitment of teenagers, who have the trait of novelty seeking or the "romance of risk taking", for its operations. The demerit of this assertion is that it diverts the analysis of psychological causation of terrorism from group or organizational unit of analysis to individual unit of analysis. The underlying assumption of such an assertion seems to be that emotions or cognitions such as the above are essentially individual psychological processes.²¹ This then is ultimately naïve in that comprehensions cannot be made from the huge data gathered and generalizations cannot be made about the phenomenon. The thing is that to assume novelty seeking as innate behaviour of the individual suffers from the problem of being non-generalizable. And what looks convincing is to assume it not as innate, but as a result of other psychological

²¹ Novelty seeking is a high-level stimulation or developmental attraction or need for risk taking and catharsis, which may be genetically determined and innate. (see: Haberfeld, King & Lieberman, 2009)

processes within the individual that shape him or her as novelty seeking; such as conformity, social identity, prejudice and individual member's personalization of organizational goals. Even though these too are individual internal psychological processes, they nevertheless had their origins and outcomes in interactions with others. More importantly, a violent group in particular brings the individual member under conditions which allow him or her to throw off the repression of his unconscious instinctual impulses (Herriot, 2009, Haberfeld, King & Lieberman, 2009, Post, 2005 & Traugott, 1978)

This is where the need for an organizational unit of analysis comes into the scene. Since all Al Qaeda terrorists are not teenagers and not all teenagers necessarily have the motivation of novelty seeking, as well as the fact that novelty seeking is not the only psychological factor behind the causation of terrorism, it cannot be taken as the common psychological profile of Al Qaeda terrorists.

Indeed, there is no specific psychological and/or socio-economic profile of Al Qaeda terrorists. That is why, from all the detainees under US custody with the suspicion of being Al Qaeda fighters, only 8% were characterized so according to the combatant status review done by Seton Hall Law School. Being unable to identify a specific psychological and socio-economic profile of Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization, psychologists and economists in their respective domains follow the strategy of lobbying their readers to believe that a profile exists, but has not been found yet. This then, pushes readers to the second problem: to accept what Al Qaeda terrorists and the coalition of counter-terrorism claim about themselves and their adversaries' psychological and economic being than what they actually are. For example, it may push readers to accept what counter-terrorists paint as the psychological cause of Al-Qaeda terrorism; being a psychological pathogen or paranoiac elements, such as fanaticism, radicalism, and perhaps irrationality. To put it in their own words, 'diabolical evil-genius'. It may also lead readers and analysts to accept the psychological motive of Al Qaeda terrorists as being a 'divine command', or in the words of Osama bin Laden, a creed based defensive jihad against infidels or "Crusader- Zionist alliance (Horgan, 2008, Moghadam, 2008, Gregory, 2006, Ganor, 2009, Crenshaw, 2000, Krueger, 2008 & Post, 2005).

Such an airing out of the claims of Al Qaeda or those of the coalition for counter-terrorism misleads the research on the causation of terrorism for the following reasons:

Factually, Al Qaedaism (Al Qaeda's 'Islamic' ideology) and the counter-terrorists' ideology, which is often conveyed in a mix of secularism and religiosity, are one another's ideological tit for tat in the battle for legitimacy. However, unexamined inclusion of the claims of both sides into the causation of terrorism makes what would have been in reality an excuse or force multiplier to be concluded as a cause of terrorism and a definer of terrorists' characteristics, activities and recruitment methods (Ganor, 2009 & Hoffman , 2006).

Regarding the casualty of terrorism by ideology, writers like Yahya (2002) hold an indifferent view by asserting that the cause of terrorism, cruelty, violence, bloodshed and murder is not in religious, but in anti-religious ideologies. In spite of this, being an excuse and force multiplier rather than cause of both religious and non religious ideologies can be grasped from the stance held by my respondent Abebe Muluneh and from what Ahrari (2007) notes. Abebe says:

“The need for identity, religion and ideology are used by the terrorist groups or organizations in order to evoke reaction in the ordinary people in support of their cause and to broaden their membership base. For instance, the Palestine case has been a breeding point for Al-Qaeda since its establishment. Similarly, it also inspired the Al- Aqsa brigade ladies. Identity is a bound, which ties people like an ideology does on the people it bounds.” (Abebe Muluneh)²²

Ahrari on his part asserts that by successfully conflating their agenda with the interests of a broader ethnic group, such as the Taliban-Pashtun linkage in Afghanistan or the jihadist–Sunni Arab linkage in Iraq extremists such as Al Qaeda exploit a force multiplier.

²² My interview with Abebe Muluneh head of IGAD's Security Services Program Ethiopia Office at his office found at Kiaab building Pushkin street, Addis Ababa. On 24 June, 2013 @ 2:00 AM.

While there have been Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Buddhist terrorists in history, considering Al Qaeda terrorists as religious sect, cult or a political religion is erroneous and takes counter-terrorism away from focus. It is erroneous in that it is a conclusion before researching what governs Al Qaeda militants behind their Al Qaedism. Presumptions such as the one asserting that the probability of terrorist attacks being Islamic as a function of the target country and the type of attack also divert the focus of counter-terrorism(Hassan,2007, Gunaratna,2007 & Barros & Proenca, 2005). They do so, because the identification of a given segment of a population to which the terrorist group belongs or claims to belong, gives that group a support base instead of dissociating it from the social base. Moreover, this widens the temporal, special and structural scope of the counter-terrorism process and makes the process costly and non amicable.

We can identify the other problem in the analysis of the psychological and economic causation of Al Qaeda's terrorism from what seems a multi causal approach: religious ideology results in the psychological motivation of terrorists and the financing of terrorism by Islamic states and followers of Islam(since charity is one of the main Islamic duty), and this inturn results in the occurrence of terrorism. The third problem can be easily inferred from the above description: the denial of the possibility for Al Qaeda and its affiliates and cells to have idiosyncrasies of either cognitive capacity or cognitive style and for economic factors to be causes of Al Qaeda's terrorism (Springer, Regens &Edger, 2009).

It may be adhering to such a stance that my respondents Abebe and Anonymous excluded economic cause events and state of affairs from the causation of terrorism.

Funds skimmed from hawalas, Islamic charities, the Al Qaeda's front companies and legitimate enterprises, contributions (zakat and infaq) from members and outsiders and, petty crime, like kidnapping are some of the many financial sources of the organization. Funds may be taken as pull factors, while other economic factors such as poverty, lack of education and alienation may be taken as push factors of terrorism. This thesis argues that if economic pull and push factors are seen from the primary cause and chain of causes perspectives, they do not have significant causal power, but have explanatory power of Al Qaeda's terrorism. This means that such factors cannot explain what causes Al

Qaeda's terrorism, but its sustainability and globality. In light of this, for example, the frequent consideration of state sponsorship, mainly Middle East states' sponsorship, as a root cause of terrorism is wrong. The financial support that Al Qaeda receives from state and non-state sources, the support it offers to local Islamic terrorist groups and its cells (which ranges from seed money to multifaceted support cannot prove the economic causation of Al Qaeda's terrorism for two reasons. One is that the local terrorists' and the cells' network with Al Qaeda does not directly address the issue of the special potency of contemporary terrorism. The other is that it is not necessarily an impossibility for them to operate out of Al Qaeda's network (Abuza, 2003, Smelser, 2007, Menkhaus, 2005, Matthew & Shambaugh, 2005, Prendergast & Thomas-Jensen, 2007, Löwenheim, 2002 &Blomberg, 2008).

Not only is the exclusion of economic factors from the causation of Al Qaeda's terrorism problematic, but also the primary-cause and chain-of causes causation of Al Qaeda's terrorism by them is problematic. To identify a fourth problem, even though some top leaders of al Qaeda were the products of repression, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda also appeals to alienated youth. These youth often feel blocked in societies where there is no real possibility of advancement, their 'up-to-death' determined perpetrators(suicide bombers) are respected individuals from advantaged classes with stable family and community ties(Ali, 2004,Bjorgo, 2005, Bakker, 2004 and Turk, 2004). This fact, however, needs to be reconciled with the gradual shift in the motivation of terrorists from a sense of martyrdom and accompanying rewards which are represented by "being involved in terrorism" to actual economic gains. Such a reconciliation of the two facts would have been possible if the two were analyzed not by primary-cause or chain of causes approach, rather by simultaneous causation.

Simultaneous causation, in this thesis, involves the internalization of situations into the mind of the 'to be terrorist' in the form of motives, purposes wants and the likes. And, since human needs and wants are unlimited, the aforementioned economically well doing Al Qaeda terrorists can be characterized as psychologically and economically motivated if they are conceived as not the 'have-nots', but the 'want more.'

Next let us see the workability of primary-cause and chain of causes-causation on Al Qaeda's terrorism from space time and environment perspectives. From these dimensions again, it is difficult to find an empirical direct and clear cut causal linkage between psychological and economic factors and Al Qaeda's organizational terrorism. As it is reasoned below, the following descriptions, for example, seem repetitions of the ideological discourses for legitimacy between Al Qaeda and the coalition for global counter-terrorism than causal analysis.

1. Somalia and much of Africa are claimed to be safe havens for Al Qaeda due to their long coastal area, failed or failing states and poor, young, disaffected, unhealthy, under educated Muslim populations (Carson, 2005). But, this is unlikely for the following reasons:

It is true that the international efforts to combat terrorism financing may further push terrorist organizations and groups toward organized criminal financing helped by the processes of globalization; as happened in the drug trafficking in Latin America (most importantly in Colombia), in Asia and the Middle East (Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Afghanistan, India, the Philippines, Pakistan), and even in Western countries such as Italy, Spain, Ireland, and the United States (Ganor, 2009). But, this is unlikely for Al Qaeda in much of Africa and particularly in Somalia. For instance, of the few maritime terrorism incidences worldwide, only three have been attributed to Al Qaeda: an attempted one on Sullivan USS (1999), a successful one on the American destroyer USS (2000) and an insignificant one against the French Very large Crude Carrier (VLCC) (2002).²³ Moreover, al-Shabaab, the suspected affiliate of Al Qaeda, has sought to impose bans on the use of and trade of Khat as it has taken towns in central and southern Somalia (Lunn, 2008). That is maybe why President Bush made a distinction (Campos II, 2007) between Al Qaeda and mafia: [Al Qaeda is a mafia; not for making money, but for remaking the world].

²³ Existence of terrorism alongside piracy in Somalia and their shared method of operation are generally identified(see: (Teshome, 2012)

2. The relationship among regional terrorist groups in Somalia, such as Al Islah, AIAI, Al Shabab and UIC, between them and Somali pirates, and between them and Al Qaeda is minor and full of dispute than cooperation. Even Al Qaeda listed going after Somali clan leaders as the second priority for jihad after expelling Western forces. In addition to this, due to the chronic insecurity and risk of betrayal, extortion, clan conflicts, xenophobia, a security vacuum and logistical constraints that foreign terrorists encounter in Somalia, Somalia's principal role in the terrorist portfolio has been as a transshipment point rather than as a safe haven (Henok, 2011, Lunn, 2008 & Menkhaus, 2005).

Putting this in a broader perspective, some go on to argue that it is the global war on terrorism which gave terrorism the unlikely global scope. But, for the fact on the ground, fewer and fewer national governments have come to support politically motivated violence against the people or the infrastructure of other states after the 1990s (Berrebi, & Klor, 2008 & Levitt, 2002).

3. From another dimension, the explanations of Al Qaeda's terrorism as non-rational and non-purposive violence or spoiler violence, which aims at an attempted social control, the acquisition of "perceived legitimate authority" and the coercion of governments to grant policy concessions,²⁴ have reduced the possibility of economic casualty of its terrorism.

Regarding the facts presented on number one and two above, Al Qaeda's presence in Africa, in the Horn of Africa in particular, and its violent recruitment of a terrorist task force is undeniable (Clement M, 2004). If this is so, the facts are not powerful enough to

²⁴ Spoiler violence is violence by leaders and parties to undermine attempts to achieve not all peace, but the one emerging from negotiations, which they believe threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence. It also encompasses failure to act as required under the terms of an agreement. In the case of Spoiler violence, the distinction between means and ends is far from clear. (see: Guelke, 2006).

exclude economic factors from the causation of Al Qaeda's terrorism all in all, but depict the difficulties of primary and/or chain of causes-causation of the organization's terrorism by economic factors. When the political economy of the power relationship among the local violent entities in Somalia and between them and Al Qaeda is scrutinized, the role economic factors play in Al Qaeda's terrorism comes into picture. In short, the point of contestation and conflict among the said parties is the distribution of resources obtained from the black market transaction in the Somali ports, the piracy and maritime terrorism along the sea coast and the actual and potential oil resources of the area.

Regarding the points on number three above, the non- purposiveness and non-rationality of Al-Qaida's terrorism seem to be based on three sets of assumptions. One is to regard the attack on America as spoiler violence, which in this case means a calculated effort to provoke an aggressive response from the United States so as to revive the fortunes of the jihadist cause (Guelke, 2006). The other is to assume the Al Qaeda's rage against the United States as being caused by the relative failure of Islamic nations to achieve economic success(Guelke, 2006). In a similar vein, the third assumption is to regard the main target of 9/11 as being not the US ,but the 'hypocrite regimes' of the Middle East (Ehrlich, & Liu, 2002& Dunn, 2005).

Nevertheless, the non- purposiveness and non-rationality of Al-Qaida's terrorism on one hand and its isolation from emotions (psychology) on the other hand are untrue for the following reasons:

Firstly, to regard al Qaeda's terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi (1998), on the New York trade centre (9/11) or others as spoiler violence is more plausible. Because, whether or not the American electorate shows a highly sensitive reaction to terrorism, it is yet to be clearly established and quantified (Guelke, 2006). Rather, it is the impact of the US lead war on terrorism, more particularly on its own domestic policies, that has been precisely measured and known.

Secondly, given the organization's suicide terrorists and the importance of religion for the organization particularly in the context of national resistance to foreign occupation",

(Moghadam, 2008) psychology matters in the causation of Al Qaeda's terrorism. Similarly, for example, given Al Qaeda's preference of the media for propaganda purposes more than traditional terrorist-groups and the strong causal linkage between media coverage and the number of its attacks in Western Europe and the United States, one can explain that economic factors matter in the causation of Al Qaeda's terrorism, (Drakos & Gofas, 2006 & Rohner & Frey, 2007). This holds true when one steps from the fact that some particular media, like Aljazeera, are often preferred by Al Qaeda leaders to be first in the race of transmitting their video message, that Al Qaeda attacks look carefully choreographed to be eye catching news items and that Al Qaeda and the media possibly have established economic mutualism.

Thus, for psychological and economic factors to apply their true causal power in the causation of terrorism, the causal analysis should focus on simultaneous causation rather than primarily psychological cause, economic cause or chain of causes approaches. The reason for this is that:

Mental life, both privately and in the group think, (what Al Qaeda is supposed to have), is composed of unconscious, subconscious and conscious response mechanisms. Explicit or self-attributed motives, which are related to immediate responses to specific situations, are aspects of a conscious response mechanism. Implicit motives, which are related to spontaneous behavioural trends over time, are aspects of sub conscious response mechanism, (Smith, 2008 and Herriot, 2009). Then, Al Qaeda's preference of Nash equilibrium suicide terrorism and of a decentralized organizational structure (represented by organizational degeneration), as opposed to a centralized one (represented by organizational regeneration), could not be irrational, (Matthew and Shambaugh, 2005 and Nagl, 2009).

This is because they are decisions out of cost-benefit calculations made vis-à-vis the power of its adversaries and the vulnerabilities associated with the quest for legitimization and political participation. How could Al Qaeda's self proclamations of being motivated by the sense of divine command and martyrdom be explicit motives related to immediate responses to specific situations merely for they are self-attributed motives? Can anyone determine the specific point in time when Al Qaeda terrorists

individually and/or collectively had such an implicit or explicit motive or were rational or emotional? That is why simultaneous economic and psychological causal analysis is needed to understand Al Qaeda or any other terrorist per se.

4.3.Implications of Primary Cause, Chain of Causes and Simultaneous Causation

Approaches of Terrorism’s Psychological and Economic Causation on its Countering

The US led global war on terrorism is composed of military and non-military strategies. Military strategies consist of two non-sequential, but complimentary processes, 'Counter-terrorism', and 'pre-emption and pre-eminence'.

Counter-terrorism means directly targeting the terrorists; the state harbouring them in a traditional countering technique, which involves detention, denial of human rights, extradition and surgical strikes against al-Qaeda members. Under the military strategy, there is also 'pre-emption and pre-eminence', which has been manifested by the invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Meanwhile, non-military strategies include: ‘democratization of the Middle East’(re-education and rehabilitation programs, good governance open and free media and a healthy civil society), human rights and human security, economic cooperation and interdependence, ideological battle(dehumanization terrorists or dividing them from their audiences and presenting a more positive vision of American values), diplomacy, international cooperation, pushing for the endorsement of new anti-terror legislations in other states(for example, in African countries), state building, economic inducements, rewards for information program, constructive engagement, economic sanctions, (Anonymous, 2004 , Nassar, 2010, Kagwanja, 2006, Kraxberger, 2005, Davis, 2007, Ahmad, 2009).This sub-section draws the linkage between the strategies of the war on terror and the primary-cause causation, chain of cause causation and simultaneous causation of terrorism by psychological and/or economic factors.

The primarily psychological and primarily economic causation of terrorism seem to be the very rational behind the wide spectrum of the strategies of the global war on terrorism that range from law enforcement to 'pre-emption and pre-eminence. 'They include

counter terrorism strategies such as: deterrence, (marginalization, surveillance, “snatch-and-grab” operations, arbitrary, indefinite and potentially permanent administrative detention), incapacitation (freezing terrorist financing, eliminating physical ability, and increasing the distance between terrorists and potential victims)and retribution or criminal prosecution (containment, and surgical strikes against target radicals and killing them).They also include military interventions of the US in other countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan in the form of pre-empted self defense. Nonetheless, the exclusionist stance of these approaches against one another and against other approaches of the causation of terrorism makes the corresponding counter terrorism strategies to be circumscribed among others by the following problems:

Firstly, taking psychology as the primary or the sole cause of terrorism and by it being driven by identity factors like religious or non-religious ideology and the identity by a geo-political space contradict one another. By conflating terrorism with a particular religion such as Islam, as well as with a particular geopolitical space, such as the Middle East, the line between prevention and provocation has become blurred. As a result of such a conflation, this approach runs the risk of creating a far more hostile environment and serves as a significant trigger of oppositional terrorism. Like the occupation of Palestine by Israel helped the origin and growth of al Qaeda. This is because of overreacting to terrorist threats; under preparing and over preparing populations for danger. This again means that counter-terrorism strategies orchestrated by this approach of the causation of terrorism will go a long way toward defusing the threat of Islamist extremism, (Fierke, 2005, Abrahms, 2006, Schweitzer & Shay,2003, Menkhaus, 2005 & Ali, 2004).

Incidentally, psychology has relatively failed to assert explicit relevance for counterterrorism initiatives. It prescribes counter-terrorism strategies up to the extent of restricting civil liberties. But, for the fact on the ground, terrorism (terrorist crisis) and counterterrorism(government response, government crisis or the restriction of civil liberties) are caught in a perpetual cycle. Even though these restrictions of civil liberties are undertaken in the guise of terror-management, psychologically viewed they are responses not to terrorism, but to the terror felt by the counter-terrorists due to a "siege

mentality” (aggressive and exclusionary attitudes, not just toward the direct source of the threat, but also toward other minorities).

Ideology is thought to be the driving force behind the psychological causation of terrorism. However, the US-led approach lacks commitment to ‘counter terrorism ideology’ or national security discourse. Thus, there is no common opinion regarding the goodness or legitimacy of the framing of each of the following: American interests as universal principles, Al- Qaeda as a cult and a threat to western civilization and 9/11 terrorists as victims of cult brain washing. Moreover, the ‘good guys against bad guys’ dichotomy of the counter terrorism ideology or national security discourse does not address the grievances and issues that are at the roots of terrorism, (Nils, 2002, Wright, 2009, Stephens & Williams, 2009).

Secondly, the option to use military force against terrorism as dictated by these approaches of causation clearly portrays the connection between terrorism and national security. Nevertheless, this has diverted the focus of the global war on terrorism from a strategy of human security and the prevention of socio-economic conditions which engender terrorism to actual terrorist acts. That is maybe why leaders of the periphery states, even those of “rogue states”, allied themselves with the global coalition against terrorism, in order to take advantage of the global dichotomy created by the ‘War on Terror’ in pursuit of their domestic agendas (poverty and labelling their political opponents as terrorists). However, the political and economic conditionality of bilateral aid programs remained at odds. For example, Africa has helped in the mobilization of support for the ‘War on Terror’, but that has very little to offer in terms of solving the continent's development problems, (Abrahamsen, 2005, Cooley, 2000, Watson, 2003, Collins, 2007 and Springer 2009).

Rather, what is happening in the relationship between the patrons and the clients is the selling of insecurity to the latter. For instance, though the global war on terrorism has catalyzed peace deals in a few African countries like Somalia and Sudan, it has by and large fostered restrictive security paradigms which have perpetuated conflicts and stoked civil wars in the region by enabling regimes to instrumentally utilize terrorism for political ends. Moreover, pressure from the US for the endorsement of new anti-terror

legislation in African countries diverts the focus of these states from the actual challenge of domestic terrorism to international terrorism; thereby African countries carrying the "white man's burden" (Kagwanja, 2006).

Thirdly, the implications of the stance of rational choice perspectives on counter terrorism can be good indicators of the negative implications of primarily economic causation of terrorism on counter terrorism. According to rational choice perspectives, increased punishment aimed at terrorists will reduce violence. This is erroneous in that it excludes the possibility for the reduction of violence through rewards for non-terrorist behaviour. Besides, reduction of terrorism by increasing punishment would only make sense if the severity of punishment is perceived by potential and actual offenders than by the society in general. In a similar vein, the black listing of terrorists, their sponsors and sympathizers is the result of policy decisions regarding the potential costs and benefits of inclusion or exclusion. However, the US contradicted its own calculated policy decision by providing aid to the states it had listed as 'rogue states': Lebanon, to contain Hezbollah, the Palestinian Authority to counter Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad, and Central Asian states to counter al-Qaeda activities along their borders. The US's support for these states and other states in the coalition for counter-terrorism on a global scale is therefore fighting a tactic rather than a specific enemy, (Paz, 2000, Dunn, 2005, LaFree, and Dugan, 2009). Thirdly, not only the terrorists, but also the counter-terrorists want and work for the sustainability of the terrorism versus counter-terrorism conflict. Particularly because those counter-terrorists, which are in a hegemonic or patron position in the politico economic structure of the terrorism conflict, exploit the phenomenon for strategic competition over resources and spheres of influence with their near-peer competitors on the global stage, (Kraxberger, 2005 and Pham, 2007). For example, terrorists use spoiler violence (though not largely the case with Al-Qaeda's terrorism) in order to disturb peace negotiation processes which they think are not in their interest. Likewise, counter-terrorists work towards the sustainability of the terrorism conflict by holding the policy position that their adversary's 'fanatic demands' are beyond accommodation and by framing the conceptualization of "an open ended war against terrorism", (Klein, 2010, Buzan, 2006 Dunn, 2005). That is why the global war on terrorism up to date lacks political and negotiated solution to the problem.

Fourthly, the anti-terror legislations, mentioned in the second point above, are problematic in themselves. The defensive measures, which are dictated by these laws and informed by the primarily psychological causation of terrorism, suffer from derogability of fair trial norms and just war standards. Detainees are tried before a military tribunal where they admit to evidence obtained through 'coercive interrogation means' that the anti-terror legislations lack according to the second line of defense for human rights norms. This implies that the balance between a liberal states' obligation of retributive justice and the obligation of security from crime is not kept, (Tadros, 2007, Fitzpatrick, 2003, Gregory, 2006).

Fifthly, 'pre-emption and pre-eminence' (i.e. acting against emerging threats before they are fully formed) is a counter-terrorism strategy that has replaced deterrence. The replacement is due to the belief that deterrence will not work against leaders of rogue states which are willing to take risks with the lives of their own people, or against suicidal terrorists. This counter-terrorism strategy again seems to be orchestrated in the rhythm of primarily psychological and /or primarily economic causation of terrorism. The drawbacks of this strategy are numerated as follows:

1. It was based on propositions of the benefit of the doubt concerning the following: al-Qaida's being an active enemy, the existence of working collaborative contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda regarding the supply of WMDs or Al Qaeda being the acting government in Afghanistan under the shield of Taliban, the immediate and credible threat of their relationship to the USA. In an ambition to delink such presumed relationships, which actually did not exist before, the military pre-emptive strike brought about Iraq and Al Qaeda linkage in its aftermath. Thus, by that strike the US did not find its potential enemy as expected.
2. The pre-empted invasions were replies to Al Qaeda's or other terrorist organizations' violent communications through the same violence. Thus, they marked USA's bankruptcy, its being off track from its tactics and strategy of the global war on terrorism and its being trapped by the terrorists; providing them with a cause around which they rally their existing forces and recruit new ones.

3. The pre-empted invasions were over ambitious in that it is never possible to kill or capture every fighter of non-traditional terrorist foes like Al Qaeda, (Riedel, 2007, Amoores, and de Goede,2000, Miller 2005, Fierke, 2005, Ali, 2004 and Cetron and Davies, 2008).

Sixthly, the practical application of non-military strategies is somehow observed with the evolving of Al Qaeda's terrorism into an 'attempted global Islamic insurgency' or Al Qaeda2.0 and that of the global war on terrorism into global counter insurgency. The reason for this is that 75 to 80 percent (according to different sources) of the success of counter insurgency strategies, or defeating al-Qaeda, lies on non-military and political victory, (Wadley, 2008, Bergen and Footer, 2008, Klein, 2010, Rogers, 2007 and Malinowski, 2008).

Both chain of causes causation and simultaneous causation of terrorism inform non-military strategies of the war on terrorism. But, simultaneous causation of terrorism, the approach in this thesis, is different for informing multi faceted counter terrorism response with an emphasis on peace building. In other words, even though chain of causes causation informs non-military counter-terrorism responses, these responses are not amicable. For instance, freezing terrorist finance is a negative socialization though it is not as violent as the use of military force. There has been some success with regard to the freezing or combating of terrorist financing. Nonetheless, on one hand, none of these funding mechanisms has been effectively shut down due to the near impossibility of shutting down and bureaucratic inertia: a lack of political will, and diplomatic pressure. On the other hand, the combating terrorist financing is further pushing non-state violent actors toward organized criminal financing helped by globalization and to turn to logistically simple, but deadly bombings, (Enders, 2005, Cornell, 2005, Dunn, 2005, , Abuza, 2003 and Garoupa, Klick and Parisi,2006)

The multi pronged non-military counter terrorism strategy, as informed by the chain of causes causation of terrorism, is still loaded with the 'zero-sum' mentality of militarism. For example, the deportation of the Somali deportees from the US in relation with a wrongful accusation of being sympathizers of terrorism was based on the suspicion of Muslims as terrorists, (Peutz, 2006 and Sageman, 2004).

On the contrary, the same counter- terrorism strategy, as informed by simultaneous causation, would focus on a reconciliation process up to the level of peace building. This requires using those strategies crafted as informed by chain of causes causation in a ‘carrot and stick’ combination. But, it requires more than that. In the first place, it requires the identification of the real grievances rather than the ‘cover claims’ of the terrorists, or the ‘to be’ terrorists, and responding to them. Secondly, it requires the replacement of transplanted democratization by democratization from within the society where the terrorists or the ‘to be’ terrorists are found. Thirdly, it requires forgoing the profit from war or conflict economy, such as the armament trade, in favour of peace. Fourthly, it requires the replacement of a malevolent ideology by a benevolent ideology. Benevolent national security discourse or counter- terrorist ideology is one which does not create an adversarial dichotomy between the terrorists and the target societies. Rather, it evokes the terrorists to reconsider their cause. If such an ideology has a dividing effect, it is not on all terrorists, but on those who insist up on violence. The ideology also does not dissociate the insisting terrorists from humanity at large, but from their support base. Here, in disseminating the benevolent counter-terrorism ideology, the target audience should be clearly identified. To do this, again, requires knowledge of the diffused nature of networks that allow new terrorists to proliferate and what makes terrorists stick, (Ibrahim, 2004, Tsoukala, 2008, Nagl, 2009 and Wintrobe, 2006).

Chapter Five: Findings of the Research and Directions for Further Research

Starting with the description of the focus areas of any intuitive interaction with terrorism as a phenomenon, the preceding chapters of this thesis have come across the drawbacks of the study of terrorism: its definition, characterization, typology and theorization. Particularly, the thesis portrayed the two sided argument about the casualty and non-causality of terrorism. Then,—arguments were made against primarily psychological and/or primarily economic causation and chain of causes causation of terrorism. There were also arguments for simultaneous causation of terrorism by psychological and economic causes. Lastly, facts related with Al Qaeda and the global war on terrorism was used as lenses to put the theoretical arguments and counter-arguments on the ground. What findings can be drawn from the research undertaken is presented as follows.

In the study of terrorism until today, the seemingly wide acceptance of a given definition, characterization, typologization or theorization of the phenomenon often has not been the acceptance of these themes, rather the acceptance of the definer dominant group or the main stream. Thus, the study of terrorism has been highly political. Nevertheless, this thesis agrees with the view that a study of terrorism without a definition, characterization, typology and theorization of the phenomenon is manifestly absurd. Therefore, the contributions of original theories on terrorism should be acknowledged: namely; identification of processes which are contributing and sufficient (Gross); identification of important causal variables which are important in the stages of terrorism (Crenshaw, Johnson); development of a typology of causes (Crenshaw, John-son); deduction of factors from more general theories of conflict (Hamilton); specification and empirical testing of relationships among some of the variables (Hamilton); and, the description of individual factors in a historical context.²⁵

The focus in this thesis research has not been on the causes of terrorism, but on the psychological and economic causation of the phenomenon. In line with this, terrorism is

²⁵ See: the works of these writers as quoted in Ross (1993)

one of the fields which is-descriptively rich but analytically barren. Thus, the search for a causal model, particularly the first generation causal model of terrorism, will provide the foundation for more complex models in the future. Though this thesis's causal model, i.e. 'simultaneous causation of terrorism by psychological and economic factors' is one of first generation causal models (Ross, 1993), it advocates for causal interaction which is different from that of other first generation causal models. Most first generation causal models come up with a causal interaction that links one dependent variable, i.e. transnational terrorism, with two independent variables, internal (intra societal) and external (interstate and systemic). Whereas, the causal interaction here is between a dependent variable, i.e. terrorism (domestic or transnational), and two independent variables, internal (within the 'to be terrorist' individual or group) and external (intrastate and systemic). It is understood that any causal relation and correlation is made through time and space. Here, most first generation causal models consider the causal interaction to happen only in a segment of geographic space. This can be inferred from their identification of independent variables, as internal (intra societal) and external (interstate and systemic). The confinement of causal interaction only on geographic space has problematic implications for most first generation causal models, which is their specific applicability. For example, it makes the causal models specifically applicable for transnational terrorism rather than for domestic terrorism, or applicable for organizational terrorism rather than for state terrorism. This thesis has argued that if the space of the causal interaction is taken to be the geographic space, then the developing or 'underdeveloped' world being the spatial origin of terrorism might work for domestic, but not international terrorism.

The confinement of causal interaction on geographic space together with the presumption of terrorists as non-purposive also causes most first generation causal models to suffer from an exclusionist stance in the face of agent causation. But, if the 'agents' or terrorists, either as individual, group, organizational or state entities, are excluded from the causation of terrorism, then does terrorism merely occur out of the psychological, economic, structural causal factors in its own merit ?

On the contrary, 'simultaneous causation of terrorism by psychological and economic factors' takes the entity of the mind as the space through which terrorism's cause-events or cause-state of affairs are related or correlated with one another, with the effect i.e., terrorism, at a point of time.

By bringing the causal interaction from the geographic space to the entity of the mind, this model tries to resolve long standing causal dilemmas in terrorism. One such dilemma is psychology being the cause of terrorism vis-à-vis the fact that all psychologically pathogenic or all psychologically motivated people are not terrorists. Another dilemma is conceiving poverty as a cause of terrorism vis-à-vis the fact that all poor or all the 'want mores' are not terrorists. The thing is that unless the psychological, economic, structural conditions are internalized into the minds of the to be terrorist individuals, group or officialdom of a state in a way that leads them to resort peculiarly to terrorism, they cannot be spoken of as cause-events or cause- state of affairs of terrorism. The reason for this is that unless these conditions are internalized into the minds, their causal interaction remains in the geographic space. They are causes of any phenomenon, but not peculiarly of terrorism, and terrorists do not have any behavioral or psychological and economic relation to the act they are perpetrating. This contradicts with the fact that the use of extremist means (e.g., terrorism, violence) follows from the goals and the self initiatives of the perpetrators, (Jackson, Murphy and Poynting,2010). As argued in this thesis, this also denies the possibility that top-down terrorism (state sponsored or state conducted terrorism) may at times be conducted self initiatively at least under the guise of counter terrorism. Given that terrorism is one of the available malevolent instruments of foreign policy which the states may use to maintain their regional or global hegemony and their incumbents may use it to drive some material gains out of the sustainability of this 'conflict economy'. It is true that this economic rationality may sometimes fail under the emotionality of the officialdom and the ideological machinations of the state.

Therefore a person who becomes a terrorist is the one who internalizes actual or perceived psychological and economic conditions and opts for terrorism by calculating the possible gains and losses. But, the determination of terrorists is beyond this rational cost benefit calculus. Thus, the psychological and emotional factors are also at the same time in play in their minds.

If the internalization into the minds of the factors before they are called cause-events or cause-state of affairs of terrorism is agreed upon, the simultaneous occurrence of psychological and economic cause-events or state of affairs to cause terrorism is not debatable. The reason for this is that the entity of the mind is not and cannot be divided up for psychological motives or for economic purposes, and for emotionality and rationality. Besides, it cannot be temporally fixated by when to be what.

Even though 'simultaneous causation of terrorism by psychological and economic factors' is believed to address the roots of terrorism, why terrorists remain as 'terrorists' causes a certain problem. The problem, as it is argued in this thesis, is not the irreality of the mind, where the causal interaction takes place, but it is a problem related with measurability and empiricism. Because, though the mind is real, it is not easily comprehensible. Therefore, the writer of this thesis leaves the operationalization and measurability of the simultaneous occurrence of psychological and economic cause events or cause state of affairs to yield terrorism for further empirical research.

However, to forgo simultaneous causation of terrorism by psychological and economic factors due to the above limitation is to let primarily economic or primarily psychological causes dominate the causation of terrorism. But, these approaches are more convincing and more useful in the impact analysis of terrorism than in its causation. For instance, they are more useful in the analyzing the level of individual and state insecurity in the face of terrorism vis-à-vis the costs involved in increasing the levels of security, (Tadros, 2007).

Last, but not least, countering Al Qaeda's or any other international terrorist organization's terrorism does not require the hunting of each and every terrorist. This would be a tiresome task, which terrorists can endure for a long time by applying their tactics of hibernation and re eruption, just as Al Qaeda is doing in the aftermath of the capture and death of its top leaders. Rather, counter-terrorism strategies as informed by 'simultaneous causation of terrorism by economic and psychological factors' can be listed as follows: In the first place, it requires addressing the grievances of the terrorists or that of their safe havens in reconciliation, adjudication and social policy mechanisms by working to bring the temporal end of both wars, terrorism and counter-terrorism, with

determination. Secondly, it requires the utilization of a benevolent counter-terrorism ideology or state security discourse that minimally brings the terrorists towards the counter-terrorists or optimally dissociates the terrorists from their support base. Thirdly, with regard to the terrorist network, it requires more than blocking the strategies of the terrorist network, such as killing their top leaders, freezing their finances, or combating them by anti maritime terrorism or by an anti-drug trafficking fight. It requires braking into the networks and destabilizing them, which inturn requires understanding the nature and dynamics of the networks. If the networks are not destabilized, it is hardly possible to bring in the terrorists to win them over with reconciliation, adjudication and social policy mechanisms. Fourthly, it requires the process of peace building, not the kind of military settlement in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the inclusion of societies in which the terrorists are believed to be found and bringing an end to the democratization of violence and the lucrative trade in arms.

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Appendix

Sample of Open-ended Interview Questions

Profile of Informants

Name of informant	Position	Place of interview	Time of interview
Anonymous	Anonymous	His Office at the Ethiopian Federal Police Crime Investigation Department.	On June 21, 2013 @ 10:00 AM.
Abebe Muluneh	head of IGAD's Security Services Program Ethiopia Office	at his office found at Kiaab building Pushkin street	On 24 June,2013 @ 2:00 PM.

1. To what extent is terrorist motivation independent from their economic rationalism?
2. If the motive for terrorism is “killing for nothing, but for the sake of dramatic news”, why is counter-terrorism, the ‘Global War on Terror’, not frustrating the terrorists?
3. If terrorists are merely motivated by the psychological motive of committing terrifying acts of violence, why do they select newsworthy targets and tactics of escaping capture?
4. If terrorists have economic rationalism, then why do they become indiscriminate of combatant or non combatant targets to the extent that dissociate themselves(i.e. the terrorists) from their civilian social base and make them incur cost?

5. It is often said that higher income would significantly reduce the threat of terrorism in poor countries. Here, it could be argued that the evenness of the distribution matters more than the amount of the income. So, why is higher and relatively evenly distributed income serving terrorism in rich countries?
6. What amicable counter-terrorism strategy could replace the existing conflictual, non-lucrative security and military intervention based strategy?
7. If increasing suppression in non-democracies would make people frustrated toward themselves instead of becoming frustrated toward the frustrating agent, how could this be reconciled with the dominant presumption that the developing world is the source of terrorism?
8. Can the mind of an individual be divided into portions and or precise span of time for his or her rationality?
9. In which sense shall economic factors causing terrorism be considered, in the holistic sense of development or in the narrow sense of economic growth?
10. Which aspect of economic factors matters in the causation of terrorism, individual development or national development?
11. Which aspect of psychological factors matters in the causation of terrorism, the psychology of individual members or that of the organization as a whole?

NB. This list does not include questions raised for elaboration on the spot of discussion with the informants.

DECLARATION STATEMENT

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged

Ashenafi Fisseha Zeleke.

April 2014

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate.

Tarekegn Adebo (Dr).

Date of approval: _____