

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**

**SECURITY FACTORS AFFECTING ETHIO-KENYA  
RELATIONS :( POST 1991) CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS**

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RELATIONS: (POST 1991) CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS**

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## List of Acronyms

ADB	African Development Bank
AU	African Union
CEWRUS	Conflict Early Warning and Response Units
CFA	Cooperative Frame work of Agreement
COMESA	Common Market for East and South Africa
EAC	East African Community
EAPP	East African Power Pool
ECA	Economic Commission of Africa
EEPCO	Ethiopian Electric Power corporation
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF	Eritrean People Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP	Ethiopian People Revolutionary Party
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
IGAD	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOI	Ministry of Information
MW	Mega Watt
NBE	National Board of Ethiopia
NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
PD	Prisoners Dilemma Game
SADC	Southern African Development African Cooperation
SALW	Small and Light Weapons
SPLM/A	South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TPLF	Tigray People Liberation Front
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USSR	Union of Socialist States of Russia
WPE	Workers Party of Ethiopia
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front

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## ***Abstract***

*Security is a primary agenda of any state. The same is very true of Ethiopia and Kenya both of which have under gone several security related factors affecting their bilateral relations. Apart from pastoral communities located in and around their common border area competing over natural resources, there are several other factors that affect their relations. The objective of this research is to unravel the security factors affecting Ethio-Kenyan relations. Methods used for this research include consultation of available secondary materials on the issue and interview with resource persons in relevant institutions. Hence, to compile this research I used both primary and secondary data. In the border areas of Ethiopia and Kenya, conflict between and among pastoralist communities, competition over water and pasture lands around the border, cattle rustling, contraband trade, the movement of OLF around the border in both countries, the influx of Ethiopian refugees in to Kenya are the major sources of insecurity in the two countries bilateral relations. Relations of the two countries on the other hand are smooth and based on non-interference in the internal matters of the other. The research concludes that Ethiopia and Kenya, having palpable security threat from the failed state of Somalia, used dual strategy for their common security issue from neighbor Somalia. They hold common position in the peace process of Somalia and Sudan, and protecting their border from infiltration by various armed groups. Despite the common efforts of the two countries, to solve conflict between and among their pastoralist communities, analysis of the research findings show that serious confrontation continue to exist in the border areas.*

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background of the Study**

There are various themes on which states establish bilateral and multilateral relations. Ensuring common security is among these themes. This is particularly true when states are neighbors and share common borders. In achieving such goals states use both bilateral and multilateral forums. States involve in these forums to address their security concerns. African states since the time of decolonization have been working to mitigate the impact of colonial legacies on their security relations.

Up on its establishment, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has emphasized on decolonization and territorial integrity of African states. It was also asserted that the inherited boundaries would remain intact. This is mainly because of the fact that African boundaries are artificial colonial formations. If an attempt is made to revise one country's boundary, it will be difficult to address the claims of other African states. Even though most African states accept the intactness of the colonial boundaries, there are some that attempted to alter the nature of the boundaries. Ethiopia and Kenya are both supporters of the statues-quo. These states, however, have a common neighbor i.e. Somalia that demands the rearrangement of the boundaries. Somalia is a state born with the agenda of 'Greater Somalia' which aimed at uniting all Somali speakers in the Horn of Africa. This became a security concern for Ethiopia and Kenya and brought the two states more close to each other.

Following the independence of Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya were exposed to irredentist movements in Ogaden Region and Northern Frontier District, respectively. Subsequently, they have established a Military Pact in 1964 that focused against the then Somalian government. Even though the main cooperation of the two countries has been over security matters, there are also agreements on other aspects.

Ethio-Kenyan relations can be traced back to decades. The formal relations of the two countries commenced after Ethiopia opened its consulate office in Kenya in 1945. Even though Ethiopia enjoyed good relations with the colonial British administration, it supported

the Mau Mau Movement that was fighting for Kenyan independence from the British colonial rule. After Kenya got independence in 1963, the relations of the two countries further strengthened. Kenya opened its consulate in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) and Emperor Haile Sellassie paid a state visit to Kenya in 1963. Significant achievements were made: they demarcated their common boundary, abolished visa system and established a military pact in 1964. They also formed boundary administration committee and held frequent meetings and reached common understanding on the use of Tran's boundary resources. During the Imperial regime, Ethiopia allowed Kenyans to use the Omo River. The relations of Ethiopia and Kenya in the Haile Sellassie era were cooperative (Belete, 2005).

The Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 has changed the political, economic and societal structure of the Ethiopian state. The monarchical system was abolished by a military junta known as Derg. This radical, middle and lower rank military group established close relations with the socialist camp that included USSR, East Germany and Cuba. The internal political dynamics of Ethiopia in this particular time was fragile; the Derg regime was in constant power struggle with armed opposition groups in urban and rural areas. This incident was important because the inclination of the military government in Ethiopia for proletarian internationalism was perceived to be dangerous for Kenya in view of its pro-West stand. Surprisingly, the Derg continued Ethiopia's smooth relations with Kenya. According to the 1964 Military Pact, Ethiopia earned Kenyan support during Somali invasion of Ethiopia in the year 1977/78 (Nigussay, 1977:65; Okumo, 1977:142-145). Until the fall of the Derg Regime, Ethiopia and Kenya continued their amicable relations. In 1980 and 1987 they reviewed the military pact of 1964. Besides, the Derg leader Col. Mengistu went to Kenya before he fled to Zimbabwe in May 1991. This incident indicates the extent of the relations of the two countries even in difficult situations.

The coming of the EPRDF government in Ethiopia in May 1991 opened an opportunity for cooperation in the Horn of Africa. The new government emphasized on peaceful co-existence with neighboring states. This period shows the continuation of the friendly relations of Ethiopia and Kenya. In 1991 a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was signed between the two states. Article7 of this treaty emphasized on cooperation in the areas of

irrigation, water resources and energy. Moreover, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 1997 on political, social and economic cooperation. It identified 18 fields of cooperation on different spheres: border security, immigration, refugee matters etc (Abebe, 2010:50-58; Moi, 2002).

The threat from terrorists is a major factor that pushed the two states for enhanced cooperation in security areas. Both countries suffered from terrorist attacks at different times. For example, the 1998 attack on Mombassa and the attack on American Embassy in Nairobi are the major ones for Kenya. The 1995 assassination attempt on the former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek in Addis Ababa, the 2006 mass killings of Chinese Oil workers and Ethiopians in the Somali Region of Ethiopia are the major blow by terrorist and armed opposition groups that are accused of having a link with Somali extremist groups. In response to this, Ethiopia and Kenya tightened their security cooperation. Ethiopia intervened in Somalia in 2006 to weaken the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Kenya also provided support for Ethiopia by closing its border with Somalia to deny hiding place for defeated UIC forces (Ploch, 2010:5-14). There are also annual border commission meetings between the two countries in which they discussed their security problems in and around their common border areas. In these meetings officials from the two countries, local community leaders and IGAD officials participated in order to identify common problems and seek solutions from both sides (IGAD, 2009).

Ethiopia and Kenya share Omo River, but they have not formulated binding legal framework on the utilization of the river. However, Ethiopia is building hydro electric power project on this river. Some Kenyan members of parliament and NGOs have opposed the building of projects on the Omo River. The Ethiopian and Kenyan officials discussed the issue, Kenyan government delegation visited the construction sight and they are convinced that the project will not affect the flow of the Omo River (Ethiopian Embassy in London, 2010; IGAD, 2009).

Ethio-Kenyan relations have peculiar characteristics: all Ethiopia' neighboring states are Arab League members except Kenya, Ethiopia and Kenya remain pro-West for most of their

patterns of alliance, Ethiopian national security threat has always been from the north, not from south, no issue of irredentism from the Kenyan side, the Oromos of Kenya seem to have been contented with the system, integrated in to the country's politics and economy. In addition to this the current situations of the two countries: the building of Gilgel Gibe I,II,III and the intended IV&V are affecting the relations of the two countries. The pastoralist conflict in the common border areas of the two countries, the ever increasing threat from stateless Somalia makes this study topical.

### **1.2 Statement of the problem**

Ethiopia and Kenya have security cooperation for many years. As mentioned earlier they have military pact since 1964 and that was reviewed in 1980 and 1987. Despite this, their security concerns are still in place in view of three factors viz: First, after Somalia became a failed state, several armed groups have begun operation and challenged the two countries. Second, pastoral communities of the two countries crossed their common boundary and competed for resources such as pasture land and water, and raiding the cattle's of one another. Third, Ethiopian armed opposition group OLF have also operated in their common border area (IGAD, 2009).

Both Ethiopia and Kenya have security concerns in relation to Somalis in their own territories and along their common boundaries. The Ogaden Region of Ethiopia is inhabited by large size of Somali population. This region is a place of confrontation between the Ethiopian government and the ONLF. The region shares border with Somalia, and therefore, ONLF easily get access to training and military aid from its ethnic groups in Somalia. The instability in Somalia for example, provided hundred thousands of refugees in both Kenya and Ethiopia. Besides, terrorist groups cross the boundaries of the two states and caused appreciable harm to the peace and stability of Ethiopia and Kenya. Further more, the NIF (National Islamic Front) that governed Sudan under the influence of Islamic radical leaders was exporting Islamic ideologies to neighboring states (Ploch, 2010).

In short, Somali irredentism, terrorism, insurgent movements, pastoral conflicts and influx of refugees are among the common security related factors that affect the close relation of the

two states. This study looks into the relation between Ethiopia and Kenya with particular focus on the security issues which these states have been encountering for some time and which have the potential to affect their bilateral relations.

### **1.3 General objective**

The general objective of this study is to look into Ethio-Kenyan political and security relations in tackling both their domestic and external security threats.

The specific objectives are to: -

- Explore the security concerns of the two countries that demand the common actions of the two countries.
- Evaluate the major challenges in safe-guarding the peace and stability of Ethiopia and Kenya.
- Access the major prospects for co-operation between Ethiopia and Kenya in maintaining the security of their border area.
- Examine the result gained from the involvement of the two countries in the peace process of Somalia and Sudan.

### **1.4 Methodology and Methods of Analysis**

The study attempts to look in to joint security actions of the two countries. To this end the regional and domestic security issues are discussed taking both the pastoralist communities in Ethiopia and Kenyan side into consideration. The Northern Frontier District of Kenya and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia are important in the discussion since they have clashed with Al-Shabbab in Somalia that has implicated terrorist acts in Kenya, Somalia and Uganda.

#### **1.4.1 Methods of Data Collection**

The study has used both primary and secondary data. These are books, Journal articles, newspapers, and government publications. In addition, unstructured in-depth interviews were conducted with officials at Kenya Embassy, Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and with academics who has multiple advantage for this study as a source of primary data. The tool that I have used to select my informants is purposive sampling, where respondents are

selected on the basis of certain predefined purpose. I have chosen institutions that are working on the area of diplomacy of the two countries under study.

#### **1.4.2 Methodological Approach**

Qualitative approach of research method is applied in assessing information gathered from the above different sources. This is basically because of the very nature of the study that tries to understand the complex security relationship from within. Data for the study were collected in-depth and have been analyzed descriptively.

#### **1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Study**

The study takes into account mainly the security issues at the expense of economic and cultural relations of these two neighboring countries. Primary data obtained for the study from both sides are not balanced due to financial and time constraints. Financial and time constraints have impinged greatly to access materials from Kenya. However, with limited availability of data, analyses have been made without much affecting my efforts to realize the overall objectives of the study.

#### **1.6 Significance of the Study**

Ethiopia and Kenya are found in the area that is devastated by natural and man-made disasters. The two countries have been vulnerable for irredentist movements and terrorist groups that have link with neighboring countries. This situation has escalated following the fall of Said Barre Regime in Somalia in the year 1991. When Somalia became a failed state, different Islamic extremist groups hidden in Somalia challenged the peace and stability of the region in general and Ethiopia and Kenya in particular. There are frequent conflicts between and among pastoral communities in the common border areas of Ethiopia and Kenya. Cattle rustling, contraband trade, and the movement of armed Ethiopian opposition groups are major security problems of the two countries. The involvement of local communities in government efforts of stopping conflict in the border areas among pastoralist groups is significant. Besides, the local authorities of both countries frequent meet to address the conflict issues at their common border. Hence, this study is important for the analysis of

the above-mentioned security problems. Its findings will help for researchers and policy makers.

### **1.7 Organization of the Study**

The study is organized in five chapters and a conclusion. Chapter one presents the background of the study and methodological issues. Chapter two explains relevant theories of international relations which are vital to analyze bilateral relations as well as conceptual frameworks of interstate relations. Chapter three discusses the historical background and the geopolitics of the area. Chapter four assesses challenges in Ethio-Kenyan security cooperation in relation to combining their efforts on safe-guarding their national interest. Analyzing the prospects of the two countries in addressing their common security threats is the concern of Chapter five. The study comes to an end by giving summary and conclusion.

## CHAPTER TWO

### *THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK*

#### **Introduction**

This chapter consists of two major sections. The first section is the theoretical framework that provides some important theories relevant to the security concerns of Ethiopia and Kenya. International relations theories are used to analyse inter- state relations. The second part is the conceptual frame- work which has the purpose of clarifying and defining concepts that are being used in the remaining parts of the study.

#### **2.1 *Theoretical Framework***

The development of states is uneven. Because of this they differ in their economic, military and political powers. States interact in the international system to achieve certain goals that are not necessarily compatible. The national interest of states is the prime mover in their interaction in the international arena. All governments of the world have definite national interest. The sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of states are for example, primary national interest of states. Certain economic interests are considered as secondary, based on their importance for that particular state. Even though states possess legal equality the international system does not see them in equal footing. This difference between and among states are created because of their economic, military and political strength. The rich states have various instruments of violence, and economic muscle that can punish those countries that are against their national interest. Weak and poor states do not have any one of these elements of national power.

The role of power is important in the relations of states because the inequality in their relations emanates from their power difference. According to Olson and Fred (1968:79), "Power is the ability of an actor to influence and impose its will on the other". This shows that the relations of states operate in orderly manner due to the maintenance of power. Universal moral principles do not serve as reliable tool to lead state actions. "International politics is a struggle for power between states: the pursuit of national interest was a normal, un avoidable and desirable activity" (Morgenthau, 1948).

Morgenthau further went on his discussion:

*Politics is governed by objective laws which have their roots in human nature and human nature has not changed since classical times, states advanced their national interest by relying on power, Environment plays a vital role in shaping interests that determine political Action (Morgenthau, 1948 cited in Burchil and Linklater, 1996:76).*

International politics can be explained as different ways of international system among sovereign states and it could be conflicting or cooperation. Conflict could be controlled in order to realize cooperation. Within this international system, states strive to preserve their primary interest: sovereignty of state and its territorial integrity. States will sacrifice whatever they have to this end (Chandra, 1995:5; Holsti, 1987:124). Conflict between states is inevitable in an international system without global authority which can enforce international obligations. Unlike domestic politics there is no compulsory jurisdiction in international politics. Besides, there is unbridgeable gap between states in realizing their national interest (Burchill and Linklater, 1996:72).

Following the end of Cold -War politics, the geo-political significance of the Horn of Africa region declined. The super powers of that time, USSR and the US, withdrew their support from their allies Ethiopia and Somalia, respectively. This situation attracted the attention of regional powers namely Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran. The coming of these predominantly Muslim states in the region has threatened the security of Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia has a sizable Muslim population and historical clash, with Arab states because of their stereotype naming Ethiopia as “An Island of Christianity”. The Kenyan Muslims, small in size, do not guarantee Kenya from risk of repeated terrorist attack (Alxander, 2003: 630). The study believes that some element of Ethio- Kenyan relations could be taken as the attribute of realism. The emphasis of realism is that states are trapped with conflicting interest this is seen in some of Ethiopia and Kenya relations. The strategy of Emperor Haile sellassie was providing appreciable amount of military aid for African nationalist fighters without affecting its relations with the colonial power in that country. For example, Ethiopian government was supporting the Mau Mau movement in Kenya while having good relations with Britain, the colonial power in Kenya. The closure of the Kenyan border against Somali refugees in 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia challenged the interests of the Kenyan

Government. Even though Kenya's denying access to vulnerable Somali citizens who fled from the war between the Ethiopian forces and UIC in Somalia was against international law, allowing the refugees to Kenya had the risk of inviting terrorist groups that were hidden in side refugees (Belete, 2005:2-7; Redres and Reprive, 2009).

Acharya(1996:3) argues that international relations could be observed in terms of "structural properties of the international system, specially of the distribution of power." In his explanation of international system, he states that:

*In anarchy states seek security through self-help, either by increasing their own military and economic capabilities and/or through alliance with stronger powers. But security can only be achieved in a limited way, because of the operation of the "security dilemma", where by attempts by any state to improve its security by acquiring the means of power provokes other states to follow suit, there by rendering the initiating state as insecure as before (Acharya, 1996:3).*

According to Acharya (1996:3), neo-realists disagree with the idea that international institutions are important in shaping state behavior and encouraging peace, they rather argue that international institutions are mere servants of power holders. Hence, the neo- realist advice is all self-help system to be ruled by a balance of power dynamic preserved by super powers. If we see Ethiopia in 1990 it was vulnerable for series of attacks by Al-ithad Al - Islamiya in Ethiopian cities. International institutions did not help Ethiopia to protect its sovereignty from this islamist group. Only after 9/11 US and other powers extended their support for fighting terrorism. Another situation which might suggest the neo-realist position is the Ethio-Eritrean War in 1998. Here again the two countries fought bloody battles in order to protect their interests. The role of the international institutions in protecting the peace and security of the world states is weak. Eritrea for example is accused of violating international law by its neighbors many times, but no international institutions have stoped this confrontation between Eritrea and its neighbors. That is why Ethiopia repeatedly complained as it is directly affected by Eritrea's move in arming, training and deploying several anti-regime Ethiopian opposition groups. Kenya also accused of Eritrea's disturbing role in the region by helping Somali terrorist groups including Al-Shabbab; these groups attacked Kenyan cities and hotels (Moller, 2009:31-34).The relations of Ethiopia and Kenya, their actual and potential security problems and the way they react to it has neo-realist element.

Above all the neo –realist perception of the anarchic international system and the way countries followed in addressing their threat either by themselves or forging alliance is visible in policies and actions of the two countries under study.

The previous discussion on neo-realist theory suggests why Ethio-Kenyan relations should be strengthened in the current regional and domestic situation of both countries. There are also other schools of thought that believe in the role of international institutions in reducing conflict in the international system. Their central idea is that “long term mutual gains is often more rational than maximizing individual short-term gains”. This theory argues that states are capable of forging co-operation mainly because of their mutual interest. For them, states have not only conflicting interest but they have also mutual interests that force them to come together (Goldstein, 2001:112-11). The continuing Ethiopia’s involvement in the peacekeeping activities in Darfur, Sudan and the hosting of Somali peace process in Sodere, seem that its foreign policy is shaped towards peaceful co-existence and co-operation. War and instability in any of her neighboring country is perceived by Ethiopia as a danger to it, too. In the same vein, economic growth and peace in other countries will help Ethiopia to have larger market for its products (Moi, 2009). Ethiopian government’s Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) which envisages Ethiopia’s energy to be five fold in five years time and its agriculture output to be doubled in the same year. Kenya also planned in 1997”industrial transformation to the year 2020”.Recently Kenya launched another plan that envisaged Kenya to be a middle income country in 2030(ADB,2009). These plans can only be met if and only if the security concerns of Ethiopia and Kenya are addressed.

It is worth mentioning Prisoners Dilemma (PD) Game as it rises important issues concerning the possibility of co-operation in the international system as a plausible task. The Prisoners Dilemma Game is a condition in which “rational players will choose moves that produce an outcome in which all players are worse off than under a different set of moves. They all could do better, but as individual rational actors they are unable to achieve these outcomes.”(Goldstein, 2001:112-114)

Another important term for discussions of co-operation between states is reciprocity, which is a principle that shows co-operation between and among nations in the absence of central authority. For Goldstein (2001:112-114), “reciprocity is a response in kind to the others actions. A strategy of reciprocity uses positive forms of leverage as promises of rewards (if the actor does what one wants)”; simultaneously it uses negative forms of leverage as threats of punishment (if the actor does not refrain from doing what one does not want).

The present Ethiopia’s government foreign policy emphasized on good relations with neighboring countries. Conversely, it has helped SPLM /A following the implications of the Sudan government in assisting extremist religious groups against the Ethiopian government in the 1990s. The position of the Ethiopian government on the Somali factions that have shown anti-Ethiopian tendencies also reciprocated by helping another group that is not inimical to Ethiopia. This policy shows the concept of reciprocity is important when we discuss Ethiopia’s relations with neighboring countries (Moi, 2002).

The relationships between Ethiopia and Kenya, and the protection of their security have been taking place on the basis of the prevailing domestic, regional and international balance of power system. As their security concerns have different causes and effects, the remedies are also different. Therefore, no single theory can be applied for the security concerns of the countries under study. Nonetheless, the research tries to show some of the theories that are most relevant in studying the security concerns of the two countries.

## ***2.2 Conceptual Framework***

### ***2.2.1. Inter- State Relations***

Independent states interact with each other in search of certain advantages. In the words of Chandra (1979:5), “three important things relevant to international politics are national interest, conflict and power.” For him, national interest is the objective, conflict is the condition and power is the means. Deutsch also pointed out the inter-dependences of any two states what so ever quarrel they are facing, the cooperation of another is needed in one form or another. He further went on his argument that “the government of neither state can get every thing it wants without some cooperation whether voluntary or involuntary on the part

of the other.” This means that, one state can not go against the interest of another unless the other allows the negative consequences. In such case, the leader of the two states will strive to win from the situation by what ever means which is less costly and better (Deutsch, 1978:165). Another author Kopstein and Lichbach believes that the world is partitioned in different states and these states are often in tension with one another. States are sovereign, they possess strong defense institution to safe- guard their external securities; they exchange ambassadors with other states and belong to the “global club of states”, the UN. His explanation is important in understanding the unavoidable relations between states in their day- to- day activity. Kopstein and Lichbach perceived the current world situation as follows:

*Inequality and poverty, the gap between North and South, is a global problem. Disease and epidemics are global problems. Bubonic plague, influenza, and smallpox were problems of human kind and AIDS is now every one’s problem environmental problems are also now global. We are part of a single ecosystem, and, hence, environmental degradation global warming, energy conservation, and water pollution are global problems. In sum, it is not possible for a country to isolate itself from global economic trends, cycles, and shocks* (Kopstein and Lichbach 2005: 18).

States have certain interactions namely; diplomacy, war, trade relations, alliances, cultural exchange, and participation in international organizations and in those cross-cutting issue areas. Politicians of one state can behave in a cooperative or conflictual manner, extending either friendly or hostile behavior toward the other nation (Goldstein, 1992:5).

In the same vein Ethiopia and Kenya established interstate relations immediately after Kenya got its independence in 1963. These relations have gone through different regimes, ideologies and political atmosphere. Ethiopia is non- colonized state in Africa while Kenya was ruled by British colonial administration. During that time, Ethiopia had diplomatic relations with the British government and there was an attempt to demarcate Ethio-Kenyan boundary. Additionally, Ethiopia established consular office in Nairobi and she used to support the Mau Mau movement (Belete, 2005).

After Kenya got independence Jomo Kenyatta became the first president of Kenya. Kenyatta had close relationship with Ethiopian Emperor Haile Sellassie. This friendship translated to peaceful relations between the two states. Ethiopia is the first country to open its embassy in

Kenya and Kenya also opened its embassy in Ethiopia. They have peacefully demarcated their boundaries and established boundary administration commission (Negussay, 1977: 50; Moi, 2002: 99-105).

The change of government in Ethiopia in 1974 has not hurt the cooperation between the two countries. Kenya extended its support when Ethiopia was invaded by Somali Army in 1977/78. The presence of USSR in Ethiopia and the adoption of Marxism/ Leninism by the Ethiopian military regime had not broken the smooth relations of the two states (Chazan, et al, 1999: 393). The current Ethiopian government also perceives Kenya as a country which has central role in Ethiopia's development and security. It strives to establish strong trade relations with Kenya and to use Kenya as a bridge to connect with Eastern and Southern Africa region. Kenyan government also views Ethiopia as a dependable ally; they usually hold the same position in continental and regional affairs (Moi, 2002).

From the above points we can see their common position that the current global conditions prescribe, the importance of inter- state relations whether the country is poor or rich strong or weak they all are interconnected via various issues. No single actor can ever address global problems. States cooperate at regional and global levels in order to conduct their business without taking into consideration their differences in ideology level of development and the political system they follow. Climate change, terrorism, world economic crisis among others has attracted the attentions of world states.

### ***2.2.2. Bilateral Cooperation***

Many scholars agree that modern state system is a recent phenomenon despite the presence of earlier state system. However, these state systems were unstable and limited to certain well defined areas like Greece, Italy, China, and India; and there were no considerable contacts between any two areas. From the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia onwards modern state system was established, followed by the Treaty of Utrecht 1713 and the Congress of Vienna in 1815 establishing fundamental tenets of international politics; namely alliances, balance of power and diplomacy. The establishment of the League of Nations in 1920 and its successor

the UN in 1945 has contributed to a more comprehensive state- to- state cooperation (Chandra, 1979: 42-46).

In the contemporary world a significant part of interactions between states system is the cross-cutting and numerous national, regional and global problems arise and require the attention of more than one state. Governments continuously interact to deal with those common issues. They sign treaties which are satisfactory to both sides. This process is named as collaboration or cooperation (Holsti, 1976: 504-505). According to Holsti, cooperation can happen in different situations and most of collaborative interactions occur between two governments with a matter of common cause. Brazil and Japan for instance annually negotiate a trade deal; Pakistan and China arrange air line communications between Rawal pindi and Peking or two African countries agree to demarcate their common boundary. There are also extensive non- institutionalized collaborations between and among states that is called as “pluralistic security community” in which:

*Two or more states have many transactions and almost constant interaction, but not necessarily created formal organization for cooperation. However, the distinguishing features of the pluralistic security community is that all the relationship between the units are predictably peaceful and, when conflicts arise, they are normally resolved by compromise, avoidance and awards rather than by threats, deterrence, force etc (Deutsch, 1959: 5 quoted in Holsti, 1976: 505-506).*

Deutsch's believe is that Canada and the United States are amalgamated security communities. For him, the litmus test for the existence of security community are; when the politicians of two or more countries and their citizens do not consider the possibility of mutual warfare and when the two or more states render from allocating resources for military buildup against each other (Deutsch, 1959: 5 quoted in Holsti). Ethiopia and Kenya have fertile ground to be a pluralistic security community because they full- fill the distinguishing features of pluralistic security community i.e. now almost five decades passed since Kenyan independence, the records of relations between the two countries is predictably peaceful and when occasional conflicts arise around their border, they peacefully resolve them. Besides, these countries do not consider the possibility of war between them and they have not built up military power targeting each other. Rather Ethiopia has planned to export electricity to Kenya and Kenya offers her Mombasa port to be used for import/export trade. Moreover,

Ethiopia and Kenya work hard by forming CEWERUs (Conflict Early Warning and Response Units). The building of Lamo port for Ethiopian international trade, and the building of infrastructure which is aimed at connecting Ethiopia and Kenya is evidence of the level of cooperation between the two countries (IGAD, 2009).

Like wise, Ethiopia was a member of the League of Nations and has used this as a seed of the current African block in the UN mainly because except Liberia and Ethiopia, many African countries were under European colonial administration. Hence, Ethiopia raised the issue of apartheid government in South Africa that was violating the rights of indigenous South Africans in the UN general meetings. The issue of Rodesia that was ruled by white minorities was taken by Ethiopia to the UN. Further more, Ethiopia was as a member of decolonization committee in the UN. Ethiopia becomes a seat of United Nation Economic Commission for Africa and a head-quarter of the OAU (Organization of African Unity now the African Union, AU). Today Ethiopia hosts more than hundred embassies of states of the world and it is a seat of many international organizations. The presence of embassies in Addis Ababa facilitates Ethiopian bilateral relations with the rest of the world (Taye, 2010: 54-65).

To sum up bilateral cooperation is a profitable project in which the parties cease to allocate human and other resources for military purpose and engaged in development endeavors. When we look at the Ethiopia and Kenyan cooperation, the two countries benefited much, and their interaction in many forms is exemplary example for the rest of the African continent.

### ***2.2.3. Security***

One of the responsibilities of states since earlier times is protecting the territorial integrity of the state and the well being of their citizens. One can also argue security is one of the broadest and most common objectives of governments. Security is not merely the security of life and limb of peoples; rather, it means maintenance of peace. To preserve the peace one must overcome or challenge force. Hence, peace is not always maintained and the world is exposed to security problem at various point of time (Deutsch, 1978: 211).

The establishment of international institutions is to protect the security of world states. When the League of Nations was founded in 1920 for example, its preoccupation was the security of world states. Similarly, the UN emphasizes on the security of world states. If we look at article 2 (4) “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.” Hence, the UN charter is in favor of the security of member states. Similarly, it has granted a right of states when they are invaded. Article 51 says:

*Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken measure necessary to maintain international peace and security ( UN Charter 1945, cited in Lowe, 2007: 71-75).*

As ancient state, Ethiopia encountered a number of foreign military forces; Ottomans of Egypt, Dervishes of the Sudan, Italians, Somalia, and Eritrea. The 1896 Battle of Adwa signifying Ethiopia’s victory against Italian colonial power has multidimensional implication. During the World War II, Ethiopia was occupied by Italy, initially, both France and British and other colonial powers in the area were in favor of Italy, when Italy joined the axis powers, British forces combined their armies with Ethiopian patriots and they helped achieve the independence of Ethiopian State in 1941 (Markakis, 1998: 17; Nigussay, 1979: 47-71).

Security could be both internal and external. The two states under study (Ethiopia and Kenya) have witnessed security problem from with- in and with -out. Indeed, many scholars agree that the internal security problem of states in the Horn of Africa has a link with the external. The involvement of Egypt and other regional states that wanted to export the ideology of radical Islam in the region and the presence of trans- boundary settlement of pastoralist groups extend conflict in one country to the other.

Currently, the ‘failed state’ of Somalia is the, ‘seed bed of terrorism’ and many more, global terrorist groups like Al- Qaeda that use Somalia as a recruitment, training and deployment of their forces to the neighboring countries of Ethiopia and Kenya. The repeated bombings of

Al- Itihad Al- Islamia in Ethiopian capital and its incursion to Somali Region of Ethiopia in 1990s forced Ethiopia to launch successive military campaign deep inside Somalia. Domestic armed opposition groups who have a link with Somali factions like ONLF were operating in Ogaden. After the UIC waged Jihad on Ethiopia, it backed the TFG and heavily involved in Somali politics. Kenya in its part witnessed terrorist bombings in Mombasa in 1998 attacks at US embassy in Nairobi and at Israeli Hotel (Ploch, 2010: 5-14). Kenya and Ethiopia have faced security problem since they started diplomatic relations.

The study conceives security as a common concern of all states regardless of their political structure, economic power, and ideological orientation. When states share boundary, their security issues will be even greater. The movement of pastoralist communities along their cattle in search of pasture land and water, the infiltration of armed opposition groups towards their military targets, the threat from terrorist groups that settled in and around porous borders of weak states, the exodus of refugees from war- thorn states are major security concerns of Ethiopia and Kenya.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

#### **3.1 Historical Factors Affecting Ethio-Kenyan Relations.**

Ethiopia is an ancient state in the Horn of Africa. It has been forging relations with the European colonial powers that were engaged in scrambling the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia's development is linked with the formation of the isolated Christian kingdom in the northern part of the country during the fourth century A.D (Markakis, 1974:13). As a gradual and incremental process, the territory expanded to the south and incorporated the present southern parts of the country. On the other hand, Kenya got its present statehood after the coming of colonial powers to the area. Nonetheless, different African groups settled in today Kenya, before the coming of colonialism. The two important groups the Mausai and Kikuyu experienced nomadic life and sedentary agriculture, respectively (Joseph, 1993:502). Initially, Kenya was given to the Imperial British East African Company by the British government in 1888. After seven years the British government held formal administration. Among the outcomes of the colonial administration, the building of the Rail Road between Mombassa and Lake Victoria and the distribution of large amounts of land to white settlers are important (Joseph, 1993:502).

In the last quarter of the 19th century, the present map of the Ethiopian state was drawn. Emperor Menelik was in a constant competition with European colonial powers in the border areas of Ethiopia with its neighbors. As a result of this competition, Menelik expanded his domain towards south, whereas, the predominant European colonial powers ruled the rest of Horn of African region. Therefore, instead of Africans Ethiopian neighbors became European colonial powers: Britain, France and Italy. These powers competed among themselves in the scramble for Africa. Especially Britain and France fiercely fought to control Blue Nile in the Fashoda area. The strategy of the Ethiopian Emperor at that particular time was displaying Britain over France, France over Italy. This approach of the king helped in the independence of the Ethiopian state. The turning point for the relationships of the Ethiopian state with colonial European powers in the region was the Battle of Adowa.

This war signified the freedom of peoples of Ethiopia from colonial rule because, Ethiopia won the modern Italian army in 1896. The major outcomes of Ethiopia's victory over Italy was that for the first time in history black people won modern European army and all colonial powers in the region including Italy recognized the independence of the Ethiopian state (Joseph, 1993:502; Woodward, 1996:14-32).

After ten years of the Adowa victory, a Tripartite Treaty was concluded by Britain, France and Italy on December 13, 1906. This provided for the delineation of zones of economic interest in Ethiopia while they were prepared to take under their protection in cases of turmoil and internal disorder (Scholler, 1985:29). These colonial powers which had been encircling Ethiopia by controlling its neighbors utilized the policy of divide and rule within and amongst African societies. Furthermore, they concluded many treaties on behalf of the interests of these African states on issues which are now potential sources of conflict. Among others major issues were Ethnic relations, boundary demarcations, and on the utilization of Transboundary water resources. The colonial powers that had ruled the neighboring countries created conditions which later proved to be causes of future internal instabilities between and among neighboring countries. Ethiopia negotiated with European powers that ruled the neighboring countries. In view of Ethiopia's peaceful relations with Britain and France, its boundaries with Djibouti and Kenya did not result in serious problem. Whereas, Ethiopia's border with Somalia and the Sudan produced conflict (Markakis, 1998).

The brief occupation of Ethiopia by Italian colonial power in the year 1936-1941, was the change in the external and internal political dynamics of the Ethiopian state. The Emperor went to exile to Britain and intensified his diplomatic campaign against the invading Italian forces. Haile Selassie met Jomo Kenyatta and other Africans in London and in the process, the personal friendships between Haile Selassie and Jomo Kenyatta grew. During Italian invasion of Ethiopia, Kenya was used for the movement of Ethiopian independence fighters. As the Second World War started, Italy benefited from the presence of two powerful groups that did not want to denounce the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. When Italy decided to join the Axis powers, Britain combined its forces with Ethiopian patriots and restored the Ethiopian independence in 1941. The invasion of Ethiopia challenged the legitimacy of the League of

Nations because, it failed to protect the sovereignty of member state (Belete, 2005:2-7; Joseph, 1993:502). The restoration of power by Emperor Haile Sellassie, in 1941, was accompanied by a policy of incorporation of Eritrea and Ogaden. The Emperor approached the US, and he full filled both of his objectives. In return for this, Ethiopia granted Kagne Station in Asmara, for the US communication base.

The Ethiopian government opened its consulate in Nairobi; Kenya in 1945. This condition benefited the relations of the two countries. It extended its support for the Kenyan independence Movement (Mau Mau) and helped the families of Jomo Kenyatta when he was detained by the British colonial rule. Ethiopia along with other African states established OAU (Organization of African Union) in 1963. The charter of the OAU required African states to respect the colonial boundaries. This is because; African boundaries are artificial colonial creatures. If one state claimed a change of the statues-quo it would be difficult to stop the claims of others. Nevertheless, the Somali state was born with revisionist approach; it wanted to join all Somali speaking people in the region under a single political unit, called as 'greater Somalia', 'the five stars'. Both Ethiopia and Kenya were confronted by irredentist movements. Thereafter The Northern Frontier District of Kenya and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia became instable. Northern Frontier District of Kenya saw 'shifta war', 'bandits' from 1964-1968. The Ogaden region of Ethiopia went to instability for long time. Ethiopian army fought with the Somalia force (Global Security.org; Woodward, 1996:90-95). The relations of Ethiopia and Kenya grew following the independence of Kenya in 1963. Kenya opened its consulate in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The leaders of the two countries paid a state visit to each other. Among the results gained in this particular period, the 1963 boundary agreement, the 1966 Visa abolition are important.

The deposition of the Ethiopian Emperor in 1974 did not alter the relations of the two countries. The military government continued Ethiopia's smooth relations with Kenya despite its Socialist oriented ideology. Kenya assisted Ethiopia in the 1977/78 Somali invasion of Ethiopia. The Kenyan government was allowed Ethiopian access to the port of Mombassa when the Eritrean rebels blocked the Ethiopian ports. The Derg regime reviewed its military pact against Somalia in 1980 and 1987 (Both, 2004).

Post 1991 Ethio-Kenya relations following the same path as earlier times. In 1991 a Treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between the two states. In 1997 Memorandum of Understanding on the political, social and economic co-operations was a comprehensive “it identified 18 fields of co-operation on different spheres; border security, immigration, refugee matters, legal matters, information and broadcasting.” The relations of the two countries have been tested by the movement of Ethiopian opposition group, OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) the officials of the two countries along with local communities in their common border area usually consulted about the movement of this armed opposition group and the security concerns created due to the OLF. Besides, conflict issues in the common border area such as, cattle rustling, Contraband trade, the issue of refugees is identified and the solutions were forwarded by the local communities. Furthermore, Ethiopia and Kenya are sharing trans-boundary resources; there is no binding legal framework in the use of these common resources. Hence, when Ethiopia started using The Gibe River, a trans-boundary River shared by the two countries, a lot of concerns were raised by members of Kenyan parliaments and NGOS. The Ethiopian and Kenyan higher officials held discussions on the issue. Ethiopia agreed to sell 1/3 of electric power generated from Gilgel Gibe III to Kenya (Abebe, 2010; IGAD, 2009; Schlee, 2003).

### **3. 2 Geo –political Settings**

Ethiopia and Kenya are found in extremely strategic position that their international relations always subjected to inquiry by different global and regional actors. The two countries are situated along the Red sea, Suez Canal and Indian Ocean. The Red Sea is a vital line for international trade among the Far East, Europe and the Muslim Empires of the Middle East. The area is also characterized by strategic resources. The Nile basin has played a pivotal in providing a line of communication and gave rise to civilizations like that of Ancient Egypt (Mordehai, 1980: xv).

The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden have linked north East Africa to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East and Far East. The Indian Ocean is used, as line of communication, between East Africa, the Middle East, India and the Far East (Bahru,

1998:7). Historically the greater Horn of Africa was a strong hold of the Axumite kingdom which had strong relations with the Greco-Roman world. This kingdom later adopted Christianity and extensively engaged in trade relations with European powers. The expansion of Islam in the Red Sea coast posed great danger for the Axumite kingdom and it is believed to be one of the causes for the collapse of this great power. Again after the rise of Solomonic kings, the area witnessed numerous competitions by global powers like Ottoman Turks and Portugal and regional powers such as Ethiopia and Egypt. These forces mobilized vast resources to control the area and exploited domestic political turmoil in Egypt and Ethiopia (they fought proxy wars).

For instance, when Ottoman Turks backed Gragn Ahmed who was fighting the Christian Ethiopia, Portuguese came to save Ethiopian state in 1541 (Mordechai, 1980:98). Similarly, during Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in 2006 US, Kenya and Uganda supported Ethiopia while Egypt, Iran, Yemen, Djibouti and, Syria were in favor of UIC. It appears that religion is still important in the politics of the region (Moller, 2009:33).

In the period of scramble for Africa, Britain, France and Italy intensified their competition on this strategic area. Britain took Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland; France gained French Somaliland (Djibouti) and Italy owned Italian Somaliland and Eritrea. For some writers, Ethiopia is also considered as black colonizer that competed for more land with Europeans others believe Ethiopia has incorporated the lost territory during previous time (Woodward, 1996: 14-32).

If we look at the- Cold War period, the bipolar system used the area. The US established strong relation with Ethiopia and Kenya while, the USSR went to Somalia. These super powers made the region highly militarized following the Ethio-Somali war of 1977/78. Before the overt-throw of the emperor, Ethiopia was a close ally of US and Somalia inclined to USSR. When the Derg came to power in September 1974, the US became increasingly critiques of Dergs human right violations and abandoned military aid for Ethiopia. This situation led the Derg to embrace USSR while, Somalia turns to US. Middle East Arab

countries also wanted to extend their Arab-Israel conflict to the Horn of Africa (Lefebvre, 1998:611-643).

After the collapse of communism, the area abandoned by super powers and the regional Islam states wanted the Red Sea to make an Arab sea in due process, Ethiopia lost Eritrea and consequently sea access and Somalia became stateless. Besides, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Iran highly involved in the Horn politics. Sudan started exporting Islam to the neighboring countries. Hence, currently the Horn of Africa is experiencing various odd things including war, anger, and poverty. It is the source of radical Islamic groups that are harvesting thousands of casualties in the failed state of Somalia (Attilio, 2003: 629-631; Dagne, 2002: 12-17).

The survival of Ethiopian state could be seen as a miracle mainly because the burning desire of Ottoman Turks, Portugal, Egypt, Britain, France and Italy to control the area. And Ethiopia fought all of them. While Ottoman Turks and Egypt remain at coastal areas of the Red Sea, Italy was highly ambiguous to colonize Ethiopia. The 1896 Adowa victory made Ethiopia as equal state with European powers; they came to Addis Ababa and signed treaties. Italy came in 1935 and able to occupy Ethiopia for five years. Otherwise Ethiopia remains independent (Joseph, 1993: 502).

Before the coming of colonialism, there was no state in today Kenya but different African groups placed to the area. The two important groups the Mousai and Kikuyu experienced nomadic life and sedentary agriculture respectively (Joseph, 1993: 502). Initially, Kenya was given to the Imperial British East African Company in 1888, while it was after seven years that the British government came to hold formal administration. Among the outcomes of the colonial administration, the building of a railroad between Mombasa and Lake Victoria and the distribution of large amounts of land to white settlers are important (Joseph, 1993: 502).

The geopolitical setting of present-day Ethiopia and Kenya is highly affected by the legacy of colonialism. Different pastoral groups were separated from their pasture land, water and so on. However, Britain as the colonial master of Kenya had relatively good relation with

Ethiopia and, at least, Ethiopia had opened her consular office in Nairobi in 1945 (Belete, 2005:7). When Haile Sellassie was in exile, he made frequent contacts with Jomo Kenyatta. After Ethiopia got independence the Emperor used to support the Mau Mau Movement and help the families of Jomo Kenyatta when he was imprisoned by the British colonial administration (Belete, 2005: 2-7).

Ethiopia and Egypt have always been in disagreement concerning the use of the Nile waters, but these days Ethiopia is not alone. All Nile Basin countries with the exception of Egypt and Sudan hold common position and they have signed an agreement which denounced the 1959 Egypt and Sudan agreement on the exclusive use of the Nile by them. Kenya and Ethiopia played a central role in convincing Uganda and other up- stream states to hold similar position.

The new emerging global powers China and India clearly understand the geo- political significance of the region and they are extensively engaged in Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia hosted Chino-Africa Forum and the Chinese officials promised to increase investment in Africa. They have also agreed to give large sum of money for Ethiopian Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP).The plan aims to register significant improvement in energy sector, infrastructure development including railways; the countries export revenue also planned to increase by five fold. Indians are investing in agricultural sector; they have extended their support by providing debt for the Ethiopian government for infrastructure development. Turks, Saudi Arabians investment increased from time to time. The finding of large volume of oil in Sudan, the military presence of US and France in Djibouti territory is a plus for the ever increasing importance of the area (Kirubel, 2010:6).

Kenya is found in a strategic position that it uses to link the Horn of African countries to eastern, southern and central African countries. Its possession of the coast of Indian Ocean is also important for the landlocked countries like Ethiopia. When we look at Ethiopia, it is center for all the Horn of African countries, it shares border with all of them, and is a water tower of Horn of Africa (Woodward, 1996:1). In nutshell, Kenya and Ethiopia are found in

highly strategic area and that they are always vulnerable to super power intervention and global issues including terrorism.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **CHALLENGES IN ETHIO-KENYAN SECURITY COOPERATION**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter deals with three sub sections that are devoted for assessing threat from stateless Somalia, Kenyan domestic security challenges and Ethiopian domestic security challenges. Under threat from stateless Somalia the study will see those core issues that are affecting the security of Ethiopia and Kenya; terrorist threat in Ethiopia, terrorist threat in Kenya and refugee influx from Somalia to Kenya. Kenyan domestic security factors will see those factors intimately related to Ethio- Kenyan relations especially those related with border areas namely, the issue of the influx of refugees from Ethiopia and the presence of Ethiopian insurgent groups in Northern Kenya. The Ethiopian domestic security factors will see those issues that are responsible for insecurity in Ethiopian territory and that have claimed the support of Kenyan government. In this connection: The issue of Ogaden, contraband trade and cattle rustling will be cited as challenges.

#### **4.1. Threat from Stateless Somalia**

Many authors consider the Horn of Africa sub region as sensitive area in which terrorism and counter terrorism interactions are taking place. It is also a breeding ground and hiding place for terrorists especially of Jihadist type. Among the countries that are located in the Horn of Africa, Somalia is considered as terrorist prone country. Its long coastal area, the absence of central government for 20 years, its complete Muslim population have contributed for Somalia's number one position in hosting global terrorist group, Al- Qaeda and the more radical regional group Al -Shaabab, which is now conducting terrorist activities in Somalia and its neighbor, Kenya, even going further to Kampala, Uganda, Besides, Al-Itihad is known for its numerous terrorist activities in Ethiopian territory made Somali save haven for its destructive objectives(MQller, 2004: 20-22).

The independence of Somali state in 1960 has not brought good news for Ethiopia and Kenya, which have sizable Somali population; the two neighboring countries suffer a lot, Shifta war in Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya and the Western Somali Liberation Front in the Ogden region of Ethiopia has been testing the governments of the two countries.

As Somalia got independence its pre- occupation was to unite all Somalis in the region under a single political unit ,this agenda known as "greater Somalia", "the five stars" the rationale behind this motto was that Somalis were severely dissected by colonial powers into different countries and after de colonization they must re-unite. Threatened by the over growing danger from the Somali state Ethiopia and Kenya established military pact in 1964. Ethiopia was invaded by Somalia in 1977/78 and a full scale war was going on. The coming of USSR and Cuban forces helped Ethiopian military forces in chasing Somalia army out of the Ogden (Woodward, P, 1996: 90-95; Global Security.org).

After the collapse of the Saide Barre regime, Somali experienced state collapse, hundred thousand of refugees fled to Ethiopia and Kenya. Furthermore, the growing of radical Islamic forces in Somalia repeatedly undermined the peace and stability of Ethiopia and Kenya. Therefore, in the next section of this study we will see terrorist activities in Ethiopian soil and Kenyan territory independently.

#### **4.1.1. Terrorist threat in Ethiopia**

Ethiopia is one of the Horn of African countries that have been attacked by terrorist groups. Ethiopia had been fighting terrorism alone. The assassination attempt on the former Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarek in 1995, when he was coming for OAU summit in Addis Ababa, was one of the dangerous acts by these fundamentalists who wanted to disturb the whole Horn of Africa region by exporting the ideology of radical political islam to the neighboring states. The assassination attempt was a turning point for diplomatic relations of the neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Sudan because of the implication of the Sudan government in helping islamist forces in the region. The neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda responded for Sudan's anti- peace action by forming Addis-Asmara-Kampala axis. They helped SPLA in order to launch a series of campaign and it was successful in controlling several towns in the South Sudan (Ploch, 2010: 5; Shinn, 2004). Before the eruption of Ethio-Eritrean war, the sources of terrorism in Ethiopia were Sudan and the stateless Somalia. The assassination attempt on the late Ethiopian Minister of Transport and Communication Abdulmajid Hussen, an Ethiopian Somali, in the heart of Addis Ababa, when he came to his office was masterminded by ONLF (Ogden National

Liberation Front). Besides, series of bombing, shooting, attacking hotels committed by AIAI (Al- Ithad Al- Islamia) a terrorist group. ONLF and AIAI have comparative advantage for their evil project. Among others they use the stateless Somalia where they recruit and train their members with out problem; they also collect finance to build their military power in Somalia. They were also easily communicated international terrorist groups from Yemen, Saudi Arabia etc. Finally, after they had committed their terrorist act, they easily fled to Somalia that is theoretically believed to have sovereignty. Additionally, the Somali region of Ethiopia is a huge territory and safeguarding the peace and stability of this region is a very expensive duty (Ploch, 2010:5).

Having repeated attacks by these groups, the Ethiopian government embarked on series of offensives both in Ogaden and even crossing the Ethio-Somali border chasing AIAI, destroying its camp inside Somalia. The counterattack waged by the Ethiopian government was so destructive that AIAI never came to the border area; rather, it had formed an alliance with other groups in Somalia and tried to survive by combining its forces around central Somalia (Vermass, et al :2010). In spite of the fact that the Ethiopian government works hard to protect terrorist acts, it has not yet achieved its goals. Rather, terrorism continued to be a great danger for the peace and stability of Ethiopia. Leave alone the terrorist groups inside Somalia; Ethiopia has not yet eliminated the ONLF in its own territory. So bombing, fighting, attacks on hotels, and other tactics of terrorist groups undermined the internal sovereignty of the Ethiopian state (Dagne, 2002).

It was after all these attacks, counter attacks and offensive that, the 9/11 accident was happened. Hence, the USA president George W. Bush waged 'War on terrorism' and his ever confusing words heard "you are either with us or with terrorist groups" and these words responded by Iran "we are not neither with you nor with terrorist groups". The Ethiopian prime minister exploited the opportunity and he said "we were fighting terrorism alone, if any one joins this endeavor we would like to say welcome". Moreover, US diminished its conditionality's like, human right, democracy and so on. It simply pleased the one who was joined the fight on terrorism as substantial criteria.

The Addis –Asmara- Kampala axis had shortest life span because the Asmara regime invaded Ethiopia in 1998. It was a great blow for the US and Uganda who firmly believed that the strong Ethiopia and Eritrea can contain the influence of Sudan in the region. US and Uganda tried to settle the conflict peacefully. However, the former friends EPLF and TPLF were not narrow down their gap and this became cause for the death of 70, 000 young and productive forces from both sides. This time is important in changing both the internal and external political dynamics of Ethiopia. One of the clear incidents was the rise of Ethiopian nationalism that cooled down after the TPLF come to power. According to some spectators, Ethiopians all over the country jointly fought and defeated the Eritrean belligerent forces and forced Eritrea to withdraw from Bademe. Nonetheless, Ethiopian was able to control the Bademe area and forced the Eritrean government to accept peace deal mediated by international community. The outcome of the war was that Ethiopia and Eritrea deported the citizens of each other. However, the most dangerous of all incidents was the rift between the executive committee of the TPLF. During this time, the attention of the Ethiopian government was highly devoted to the war with Eritrea and its internal matters rather than fighting terrorist groups (Tronvoll, 2009: 208-212). Additionally, Eritrea becomes another source of terrorism it is always accused of training, arming the UIC (Union of Islamic Court) that controlled Mogadishu and known for its Islamic extremism. Eritrea does not share any border with Somalia but its intervention is to create another front to weaken Ethiopian government by providing military assistance to the UIC (Medhane, 2001: 77-87).

When the May 2005 election was held the TPLF had not recovered fully from the war with Eritrea, and the rift in its inner core, and the dissatisfaction of large size of Ethiopian population feeling that the government sold the military victory for the rhetoric of ‘peace deal’. EPRDF lost all seats in Addis Ababa, but one; the government declared state of emergency even before voting was finalized. The two main opposition parties CUD and UEDF opposed what the government has done. And when their supporters went to streets, security forces opened fire and killed mainly demonstrators. When the new government established in September 2005, the situation was not solved, rather the CUD leaders were jailed (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010; Balsvic, 2007:168-184).

The year 2006 witnessed the intervention of Ethiopian soldiers in Somalia in the pretext of the UIC waged Jihad on Ethiopia and the TFG(Transnational Federal Government of Somalia) invited Ethiopian forces to intervene, Ethiopian armed opposition groups ONLF and OLF used Somalia as their springboard for their military incursions. Ethiopian soldiers took little time to control Mogadishu. However, international terrorist groups came to Somalia to assist the UIC. The TFG was not strengthened despite the help of the Ethiopian government, terrorist groups engaged in guerrilla fighting and caused massive cost on the side of Ethiopian soldiers. In turn, Ethiopian soldiers killed civilians, even women's; this led the human right institutions to condemn the act of the Ethiopian government (Ploch, 2010). The ever hostile Somali attitude towards Ethiopian harvested various militant groups. The international community including USA wanted the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world and was not able to carryout such a protracted war in political and economic terms; Ethiopian forces withdrew from Somalia in 2009. For those who calculated the cost/benefit analysis of Ethiopian intervention in Somalia it was too costly, the operation stops neither terrorist forces in Somalia nor in the Ogden region of the Ethiopian state. Hence, Ethiopia is still preoccupied with the issue of terrorism (Ploch, 2010:8-15).

Recently, Al –Shabaab, a militant terrorist group in Somalia, committed terrorist attack in the Capital of Uganda on civilians who were assembled to see the final world cup game inside a restaurant owned by an Ethiopian. This event suggested that Ethiopian is at clear and present danger from terrorist groups which reside in Somalia and assisted by the Eritrean government. The Ethiopian government commitment in ‘fighting terrorism’ has not been fruitful, the capacity of Al-Shabaab increased from time to time even, to the extent that planning, organizing and committing its destructive activities out- side Somalia territory.

It was after Ethiopian intervention in Somalia that ONLF killed Chinese and Ethiopian who were doing their business in Ogaden. Later on the Ethiopian government waged campaign to uproot the ONLF, series of human right violations by the Ethiopian soldiers including killing civilians, burning houses and rape. These situations produced fertile ground for recruitment of many Ogadeny youth to the ONLF. Besides, the human right institutions condemned the

act of the Ethiopian soldiers in Ogaden (Ploch, 2010:12). The terrorist act also seen in the Afar regional state after European tourists and other Ethiopians were kidnapped. The Ethiopian government tried to make the people freed by approaching elders of Afar region, and finally at least the Europeans got free. Such involvement of terrorist groups invited the coming of USA and establish the combined joint task force (CJTF-HOA's), East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI), and the US is helping Ethiopia to counter terrorist attack through helping Ethiopian military force (Ploch, 2010: 47-49).

The main Ethiopians ally in the region Kenya is cooperating in various ways. Kenya is also actively participated in US various initiatives that are devoted in fighting terrorism in the Horn of Africa region. Moreover, Ethiopia and Kenya used their long standing peaceful relations in jointly fighting terrorism. Kenya followed the same policy in the 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, it has extended support for TFG. When Ethiopia fought in Somalia the defeated terrorist groups fled to Kenya during this time; Kenya closed its border which connected to the Somalia and those terrorists were able to cross the boundary held by Kenya security forces, they are detained and transferred to the Ethiopian authorities (Redres and Reprive, February 2009). According to Bjørn Møller(2009:9), from 1998-2005 Ethiopian was a victim of 15 incidents that resulted in 43 deaths and 191 injuries. Numerically, Ethiopia witnessed the highest terrorist attack in the region.

The two neighboring states, Ethiopia and Kenya are working together for better life of their citizens and the peace and stability of the region. Nonetheless, Ethiopia is still vulnerable for terrorist attacks and of course, many other groups are behind the scene, giving financial, moral and military support to anti-peace forces. As we have seen in the above section of this study Ethiopia is in continuous struggle with terrorist groups these groups use various techniques in disturbing peace and stability of Ethiopian state. Hence, Ethio-Kenyan relations should take into consideration this security issues and its negative role in diverting resources from development programs to military and intelligence units.

#### **4.1.2. Terrorist threat in Kenya**

Kenya is one of African countries that are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Its porous borders and weak security structure among others contributed to Kenya's exposition for terrorist attacks at different point of time and place. Despite its limited Muslim population, Kenya is a focal point of terrorist destination (Bruk, 2010:1). According to Ayittey, the first terrorist accident in Kenya was in 1979 on the Norfolk hotel by Islamic Fundamentalist groups, that opposed the act of Kenya government in allowing the Israelis Special Forces to use Kenyan territory as a staging area to rescue hostages in Entebbe, Uganda, and the second was the terrorist attack on US embassy in Kenya on August 1998. The third was car bombing of an Israel owned hotel and an aborted missile attack on an airliner which is owned by an Israeli (Ayittey, 2002; Ploch, 2010: 6). The terrorists used surface to air missile that was bought in Mogadishu arms market and smuggled to Kenya by Fazul who is now considered, top Al-Qaeda leader in Somalia. Recently, the terrorist groups committed suicide bombing in Uganda, Kampala and 10 Kenyans arrested and the two suicide bombers were believed to be Kenyan's and Somalis. This incident approved that Kenya is one of the recruitment site of terrorist groups who are conducted their projects not only inside Kenya but also in the territory of neighboring countries (Ploch, 2010: 1-10).

For Ploch, the "victimization narrative" of Al -Qaeda and Al -Shabaab is responsible for radicalization of Muslim communities in Kenya, where "Muslim population is concentrated largely in coastal and Northeastern provinces, and in certain Nairobi neighborhoods. Social service delivery and infrastructure investments have been historically poor in these areas." Moreover, Kenyan Muslims misconception that their religion is mistreated by the west is a drive for extremism. Additionally, the Al-Qaeda and Al-Shaabab's accusation of the Christian crusaders of west powers intervention in Muslim countries like Iraq and Somalia helped them to buy the heart and minds of Muslims in the region (Ploch, 2010:16). The ever-growing terrorist activity in Kenya is clearly observed by the US government. Hence, US have established various co-operations, aid programs, training Kenyans to win their war on terrorism. One of US effort in fighting terrorism in East Africa is drying terrorist financial source in this endeavor US helped the establishment of Financial Intelligence Unites (FIUS) in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Besides, US support on

Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), Personal Identification secure comparison and evaluation system (PISCES), Makes Kenya a high priority partner along with Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen (Ploch, 2010: 16-22). Another program launched by US the counter terrorism in East Africa is (EARSI), under which:

*Fostering regional counter terrorism efforts, build partner capacity, and diminish support for violent extremism. In 2003, the Bush administration announced the creation of the east African counter terrorism capabilities in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia Kenya (Ploch, 2010:16-30).*

The most famous force which is fighting terrorism in East Africa is (The combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) and its mission is “detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating trans- national terrorist groups operating in the region” and for US officials “identifying and destroying the terrorist threat before it reaches our borders” is a proactive action. CJTF-HOA’s headquarter is Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, and has temporary operating locations in Kenya and Uganda. (Ploch, 2010: 26-29). However, the US aim of fighting terrorism in east Africa (Kenya) abused by Kenyan forces for example “Some rights activists have accused Kenya’s Anti Terror Police Unit (ATPU) of arbitrary arrest and disappearances.” Muslim groups in predominantly Christian Kenya have repeatedly accused the Kenyan government of using anti-terrorism measures to persecute Muslim communities (Ploch, 2000: 37). Despite Kenyan government effort in fighting terrorism and US support of anti terrorism war, Kenya still, witnessed terrorist attacks. Its porous boarder, with Somalia and along its coast line and being a home to 350,000 Somali refugees are among others the causes of its vulnerability. Likewise, the presence of Al -Shabaab in Kenyan territory, there are some information that Kenyan security forces clashed with Al- Shabaab forces inside Kenya. The ever growing awash of small arms in the region and the existence of piracy in the region threatened the Mombasa port. Besides, the accusations of Kenyan Muslim community, on the Kenyan government, as its counter terrorism effort are discriminatory (Ploch, 2010: 50-54).

Bjørn Møller in his part argued that Islamic fundamentalists have strong hold in Sudan and they are now changing their site to Somalia and Kenya, and this is probably harvested additional force for their terrorist agenda. For him, 1998 is the first year which has data for international as well as internal terrorism. The 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Kenya

and Tanzania is the worst case in which 1/3 of death and 90% total recorded injuries in that particular region (Møller, 2009: 7-8). From the year 1998-2005, Kenya witnessed 6 terrorist attacks and 304 peoples died and 5, 080 injured, among these attacks Al-Qaeda committed three of them and the rest are not identified (Møller, 2009: 8-15).

As we have seen in the above part of this study, Ethiopia and Kenya both are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. They are also cooperating with the US in fighting terrorism. Nonetheless, in addition to the past activities of the terrorist groups, the temporary political atmosphere of the two countries tells us, still there are clear and present terrorist attacks that are urging Ethio-Kenya strong joint action. The presence of radical Muslim groups in Kenyan coast also a burning issue for the Ethiopian government because; it wants to use the Mombasa and the Lamu port of Kenya. According to one Kenyan official, Ethiopia is no more depend on the Djibouti port entirely since great risk hovered around that area and the newly establishing Lamu port has relative security. <sup>1</sup>

We can take that the prevalence of terrorist attack in Kenya has negative effect in Ethio-Kenyan relations. Since the two countries engaged in cooperation in many fields, the repeated terrorist attack forced the Kenyan government to divert resources from development endeavor to building its military force, this move thwarted the economic cooperation of the two countries. Besides, railway project that is under construction in Kenya and believed to accelerate movements of goods from Kenya to border town of Ethiopia (Moyale) might be destructed by anti- peace forces. If terrorist forces build strong hold in Ethio-Kenyan border, they can easily recruit Ethiopian refugees who want to migrate to South Africa in search of better life. This trans-boundary issue needs concerted effort of many stakeholders, the Ethiopian government, the Kenyan government and the international financial institutions. If the Ethiopian government create jobs for Ethiopian youth at least the problem of refugee can be solved, the Kenyan government in its part should take into consideration the problem of its citizens in the arid and semi arid areas in general and its coastal Muslim population in particular this effort can dry the source of terrorism. Finally, the international financial

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<sup>1</sup> Interview with Machani Nathan, first Secretary of Kenyan Mission in Ethiopia on Thursday 15/11/2010.

institutions should lend money for both countries in order to address the above-discussed issues.

#### **4.1.3. The Influx of Refugees from Somalia to Kenya**

Somalia is one of the largest numbers of refugee producing countries in the world. Its citizens flee to the neighboring countries mainly because of violence and humanitarian abuses by various armed groups. Moreover, Somalis currently become vulnerable between fighting in different groups; they are forced to recruitment. Hence, an estimated 600,000 Somali refugees found in the region, some 323,000 in Kenya, 164,000 in Yemen and 72,000 in Ethiopia. This data makes Somalia a source of largest amount of refugees in the world next to Afghanistan and Iraq (UNHCR, 2010; Mwagirw, 2008:134). Somali refugees escaped from southern and central Somalia in order to have protection from their countries situation which is full of risk “In the three weeks of July 2010, 18,000 people have been displaced, 112 killed and around 250 wounded according to field reports from partners and agencies of the ground” (Amnesty International, 2010). The intensification of war in Somalia since the end of 2006 has resulted in the increase flow of refugees to Kenya. However, the Kenyan government had limited capacity to support the refugees. Human right institutions admitted that Kenya forced to host a very huge number of refugees to its territory. Hence, the international community should support the Kenyan government. Nonetheless, Kenyan authorities restricted the rights of Somali refugees and in 2007, the Kenyan authorities blocked the countries 682km border with Somalia and the main transit center in Liboi, which run by UNHCR to protect those fleeing the war in Somalia between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) backed by Ethiopian army and the union of Islamic court (UIC). The Kenyan government argued that the UIC fighters whom it believed to have links with Al- Qaeda, might enter in to Kenya and destabilize national security (Amnesty international, 2010).

After the closure of Kenyan boarder, security forces have taken bribes from Somali asylum-seekers, otherwise forced them to return to Somalia. Moreover, the increasing over crowding in the Dadaab refugee center and its consequence of the health of the refugees is not well considered by the Kenyan authorities. In the words of Amnesty International:

*Some 280,000 registered Somali refugees are confined to the three refugee camps in Dadaab in North Eastern Kenya, Some 80 km from the Kenyan boarder with Somalia where their access to shelter water sanitation and other essential services are impeded by severe over crowding. As one refugee said to Amnesty International “In Moqadishu, there was life, but there was no peace. Here we have peace but we have no life.” (Amnesty International, 2010)*

Many refugees reported that the Dadaab camps are comparable to an open prison. Besides, refugees are in-secured with other refugees and even the presence of members of Al-Shabaab, there are limited security forces that are controlling security incidents, additionally some security forces misuse their authority on the refugees around the camps. Moreover, “urban Somali refugees are always harassed, arrested, arbitrarily detained, and at risk of ill treatment by the Kenyan forces” (Mwagiru, 2010; Amnesty International, 2010). In the eyes of Ethiopian and Kenyan officials, the coming of huge refugee from Somalia to Kenya has profound effect. Firstly, Kenya has sizable Somali population that used to claim to unite with greater Somalia, secondly radical Muslim groups from Somalia are used refugee as a means to hide them selves and pass to Kenya then continued their operation in it. Ethiopia and Kenya have close relation in security issues, for instance Kenya closed its border when Ethiopia intervene in Somalia in 2006, some UIC members were fled to Kenya even some of them transferred to Ethiopia by Kenyan security forces.

As we have seen in the above discussion, Kenya is trapped in to two dangerous choices: one is allowing Somali refugees to enter Kenya territory with out restrictions that entails the clear danger of terrorist attack, meaning inside refugees there are reports that indicated the presence of Al -Shaabab members and supporters. The second is blocking its border for refugees who are fleeing from Somalia, which is full of risk, including death, and in search of protection from such danger. These situations could not solved by the Kenyan government alone rather the support of Ethiopia is badly needed. Therefore, Ethio-Kenya relations should tackle the refugee problem that has counter-productive problem for the relationships of the two countries.

## **4.2. Kenyan Domestic Security Factors**

### **4.2.1. The Influx of Refugees from Ethiopia to Kenya**

The relative peace in Kenya has been attracting large number of refugees from neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan. The Ethiopian refugees have long history of refugee life in Kenya. During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia from 1935-1941, Ethiopians went to Kenya in order to escape from fascists Italy racist policies. The Ethiopian patriots were using Kenyan territory such as to organize their freedom fighting (Both, 2004:140-1).

After the restoration of Ethiopian independence, Britain was trying to hold Ethiopia as “occupied enemy territory” and this situation made Ethiopia and Kenya under the same authority (British administration). Shortly, Haile sellassie approached Americans and reasserted his authority. In all these times the relations of the two countries remained peace full for the following main reasons. The friendly relationship between Emperor Haile Sellassie and Jomo Kenyatta, the foreign policy of the two countries, stress on non-interference in the internal matters of another state, both countries was pro-West, unlike the other Ethiopia’s neighbors’ Kenya is not member of Arab League. These things made Kenya the safest place for Ethiopian refugees (Belete, 2005:6-8).

The coming of military Junta in Ethiopia in the year 1974 did not shifted the relations of the two countries in wrong direction. Rather Kenya continued its cooperation with the Derg regime. From its out set, the record of human right violation of this government was worst and many peoples fled to Kenya to save their lives initially from the “Red terror”, a non selective gross killing by Derg regime in the year 1977-78 and later from forced conscription to the military(National Military service) ( Assefaw, 1997:26-42). When the Derg regime overthrown many Derg officials and military personnel’s were fled to Kenya, to escape a possible revenge by the EPRDF forces. Members of WPE (Workers Party of Ethiopia) the ruling party during the Derg time believed to be involved in killings of individuals, detained peoples uncharged. Knowing their facing court was inevitable they fled to Kenya.

After EPRDF Consolidated power, the flow of refugees decreased dramatically, Ethiopian refugees in neighboring countries return home. The present Ethiopian refugees in Kenya flee

from their towns mainly have a motive of economic interest meaning, they want to go to third country through Kenya. For many Ethiopians departing to South Africa through the Kenya-Tanzania-Mozambique - South African route is a better alternative than the Somali-Yemen -Saudi Arabia or Sudan – Libya – Italy route. It is a very surprising and strong question igniting that how Ethiopians go to Somalia to cross to Yemen, having great risk in Somalia for the people of Somali them self.

South Africa the top economic giant in the continent is a destination place for many Ethiopians. Hence, many Ethiopians are fleeing to Kenya for their illegal migration to South Africa. The Kenyan government established controlling centers and tried to reduce the movement of illegal refugees from Ethiopia to Kenya. Some human right organizations accused the Kenyan authorities that they are violating the human rights of Ethiopian refugees. The Kenyan Authorities arrested these refugees because they are illegal and exposed to danger while they are crossing Kenya, Tanzanian border.<sup>2</sup> Generally the issue of Ethiopian refugees is one aspect of Ethiopia- Kenya relations. It needs the concerted effort of both countries. Ethiopia should create jobs for its citizens and the distribution of wealth should also be fair. Kenya needs to hold Ethiopian refugees according to international standard.

#### **4.2.2. The presence of Ethiopian opposition in Northern Kenya**

Even if Ethiopia and Kenya have maintained their strong relations since Kenya independence in 1964, armed Ethiopian opposition group namely OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) made Kenya safe haven for its military confrontation with the Ethiopian government. There were occasions that forced the Ethiopian military to cross the Kenyan border so as to eliminate the OLF (Schlee, 2003:358-361; IGAD, 2009: 11-14; MOI, 2002, 102-103). Oromo's are large size ethnic group in Ethiopia both in terms of population and territorial size. This people are endowed with appreciable amount of natural resources including Gold, Coffee and the like. These resources are at the top in Ethiopia's revenue generating items. Nonetheless, the Oromo people are not beneficiary of these resources. The Oromo's have their own interpretation of the Ethiopian state. For some it is expansionist and others believe that

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<sup>2</sup> Interview with Teshome Shumbe an officer in MoFA, Neighboring Countries Department on December, 2010.

Ethiopia is a black colonizer. Moreover, the Oromos argued that Menelik conquest of their area in 1880<sup>th</sup> was brutal and it confiscated land from the indigenous people and made them tenants for Menelik soldiers (Merera, 2003: 4-8).

The combined effect of the above events led to armed struggle by Oromo's in different parts of their regions. The Bale peasant revolt was one of Oromo's resistances against the Emperor regime. The Mach- Tuuluma Association was another threat for the Haile Sellasie regime and both efforts were controlled by the government. The Temporary form of Oromo resistance is the OLF; it was fighting the Derg regime along with EPLF and TPLF. In 1991 OLF was one of active participant in the adoption of the Transitional Charter of Ethiopia. The charter was generous enough for ethnic movements and the emphasis on Ethnic federalism that theoretically granted freedom of association, self rule, cultural autonomy, as well as secession but practically the charter proved unimplemented. Therefore, opposition political fronts like OLF immediately withdrew from the Transitional government and started fighting in various Oromia regions. The engagement of OLF in armed struggle against the EPRDF was not sustained. The OLF fled to the neighboring countries of Kenya and Somalia (Kidane, 2001:20-25; Wondwosen, 2009: 62)

The Oromos have ethnic link with the Kenyans in Northern part of the country, this helped them to hide in Kenyan territory and launch their attack on Ethiopian military inside the Ethiopian soil. The infiltration of OLF into the Ethiopian border is some times hot some times cold issue (MOI, 2002:100). The Ethiopian and Kenyan officials discussed on the issue of OLF, they agreed to stop OLF operation in the border area but the result obtained from their agreement is not implemented. The security situation in the common border area some times deteriorated because of the OLF. (IGAD, 2009: 11-14) The Ethiopian and Kenyan officials are trying to fight the OLF by approaching the local communities in both sides; extensive discussion was taken place under CEWARUs (Conflict Early Warning and Response Units).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Interview with Machani Nathan, First Secretary of Kenyan Mission in Ethiopia on Thursday 15/11/2010.

The involvement of IGAD in enhancing peace in the borders of Ethiopia and Kenya is important. The participation of higher officials of Ethiopia and Kenya, IGAD, regional authorities from both countries in the border area, Community leaders was important for discussing their security problems and they have also provided the possible alternatives to protect the stability of the area from OLF armed activities (IGAD, 2009: 14-16).

The study argues that the issue of OLF should be solved by political means instead of military muscle. The previous regimes resorted to war and the country suffered from civil wars for more than three decades in the Northern parts of the country. This had destructed the weak economy that was depending on exporting primary agricultural products. The present government should open the political space for opposition political parties. The last four elections have shown the dominance of EPRDF; election fraud, pro-ruling party NBE(National Board of Election) has been accused by opposition parties for its partiality, elections were boy coated by opposition groups, international election observers clearly showed that the elections were “below the standard ”. Therefore, Until the Ethiopian government believes in true election, peoples right to nominate their representatives, opposition groups will have no chance other than armed struggle (Economist Intelligence unit, July 2010:11).

To summarize the movement of OLF in Kenyan territory is a burning issue for both countries. Northern Kenya is far away from the capital Nairobi and Southern Ethiopia is remote from capital Addis Ababa. Hence, the two countries have security gaps. OLF is using this space for its operation in both countries. Kenya needs to protect its border from movement of OLF; Ethiopia should promote free and fair election and independent NBE.

### **4.3 Ethiopian Domestic Political factors**

The Ethiopian state has long history in the region of the Horn of Africa. The ancient civilization of Axum, Lalibela, Gonder have left their print for the present Ethiopian political structures. The modern Ethiopian state holds the present shape during emperor Menelik reign. He has expanded to the southern parts of the country. Menelik defeated Italian colonial power in the region and forced Britain, France and Italy to sign agreement with him in Addis

Ababa, in the last quarter of 19<sup>th</sup> century. The contemporary Ethiopians inherited the merits and demerits of their predecessors, the actions of European colonial power that were ruled the neighboring countries of Djibouti, Kenya Somalia and Sudan. This subsection of the research will see the current Ethiopian domestic issues that are linked with Kenya.

#### **4.3.1. The Issue of Ogaden**

The area which is found in present day Somali Regional State of Ethiopia, the Ogaden is a bone of contention between the Ethiopian government and Somalia. As all the Horn of Africa region save Ethiopia was under the rule of colonial administration, the European powers and Ethiopian rulers of the time were in a constant competition over the land. Following the outbreak of Second World War, Italy occupied Ethiopia for five years, 1936-1941 and Ogaden was ruled by Italy. When Italy defeated by the combined forces of Britain and Ethiopian forces in the year 1941, Britain hold the Ogaden territory and there was a plan to unite all Somali speaking peoples under one flag. (Bovine plan) that was forwarded by the British colonial administration (Woodward, Peter, 1995: 26-27).

After the complete liberation of Ethiopia, the emperor established strong relations with the US and he has reunited Eritrea and Ogaden. The emperor also claimed Somalia and Djibouti (Clapham, 1984:221). When Somalia got independence in 1960, it was followed a policy of the 'five stars' 'great Somalia' a strategy that opted for uniting all Somali speakers in Djibouti, Kenya and Ogaden region of Ethiopia, while the main Somalia it self were not fully integrated. The Northern Somalia, ruled by Britain was less developed, but the southern Somalia had better irrigation and infrastructure development by the Italian colonial powers. The Ogaden area went to war as the WSLF (Western Somalia Liberation Front) operates in the area; it was supported by the Somalia government. The Ethiopian government repulsed the provocative forces of Somalis in the year 1964 (Markakis, 1998: 126-130).

Another bitter conflict was between the Derg and the Somali government in 1977/78, these days ushered the complete control of the Ogaden by the Said Bare forces. Somalia was heavily armed by USSR, its ally during 1964-1976. While Ethiopia's ally US was repeatedly rejected Haile Sellassie's demand for more military aid. Derg purged 60 Haile Sellassie's

officials, it was fighting with EPRP (Ethiopian people Revolutionary party), and the EPLF and ELF were in advance to control Asmara.

Having this opportunity, Somalia invaded Ethiopia and won temporarily. The Derg embraced socialism as an ideology and convinced the USSR and Cuba that the revolution was going as they wanted. Therefore, USSR provided very generous military support and Cubans send their military to fight for Ethiopian 'infant socialist revolution'. The Ethiopian government chased out the Somali army from its territory. However, the Ogaden region remained a conflict ridden zone during Derg time, because Said Barre was arming insurgent groups in the area and Derg also retaliated by arming Bare's oppositions <sup>4</sup>(Clapham, 1984: 228).

The coming of EPRDF in Ethiopian political landscape in the year 1991 appeared a best chance for Ogaden because EPRDF adopted the Transitional Charter that granted freedom of Nation, Nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia and their right of self rule. In the early periods of the Transitional periods, ONLF was satisfied with the new government's position on the autonomy of ethnic communities, later on the ONLF insisted on the agenda of secession according to article 39 of the constitution.<sup>5</sup> This claim was sour relation between EPRDF and ONLF. The capital city of SRS changed to Gigiga, from Gode, self administration is not allowed.<sup>6</sup> There are also other factors, for the continuity of conflict in the Ogaden area. According to Abdiwasa, " the long term structural factors or causal variables that give rise to certain effects, which then create conditions, conducive for, actors and or communities, to engage in conflicts might covered for a while or it could be long standing", when favorable atmosphere created ,it can be erupted. That is why instability, civil unrest has been the defining features of the Somali Region:

*Political violence involving the federal government army, regional security forces, ONLF rebels and clan militias has long history in the Ethiopian Somali Region. Recurrent humanitarian crises triggered by droughts foods, conflict and population displacement have haunted the eastern part of the country for several decades. The situation received much greater international attention with the recent, ONLF attack on the Chinese oil field in Degehabur in April 2007(Abdiwasa, 2008).*

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<sup>4</sup> See Appendix six for more information.

<sup>5</sup> Interview with Abdilwasa Abdilhi, Instructor at AAU in PSIR Department on December, 2010.

<sup>6</sup> Interview with Abdilwasa Abdilhi, Instructor at AAU in PSIR Department on December, 2010.

As the writer commented the region is volatile and the involvement of the federal and regional government in the area was not careful that instead of alleviating the natural and man made crisis in the region, they were exacerbating by following a policy of force rather than reconciliation. It is the position of the research that the Ogaden issue has been the concern of all leaders of modern Ethiopian state. They all have confronted with the Somalis in the Ogaden and their ethnic links in Somalia. The regimes also paid a lot in terms of human life and resources to maintain Ogaden.

The present Ethiopian government showed a paradigm shift that it has theoretically given autonomy for regions and the right of self administration including secession. However, the implementation of most of the above mentioned rights has been rhetoric than reality. Hence, the Ogaden region is remained volatile zone its existence heavily depend on the presence of the Ethiopian army rather than the will of the Ogaden people, when the army is absent the ONLF is engaged in massive offensive. The Ethiopian government signed a peace deal with one of ONLF faction led by Selahadin Mao in October 2010, he says representing majority of ONLF fighters. The other group led by Mohamed Omar Osman a former Somali navy chief Admiral. He declared that “During the months of October and the beginning of November it has conducted 34 tactical and strategic military operations, killing 267 Ethiopian army soldiers and wounding 157” This group was responsible for a 2007 attack on an oil exploration field on Ethiopians and Chinese it has killed 65 Ethiopian soldiers and Chinese oil workers. (The Daily Monitor 2010: 1) Another Amharic News paper Addis Admas wrote that the US has hand over manual that can assist Ethiopian army in its fighting with the ONLF. The News Paper elaborated that the US officials understand that the government waged fierce campaign on Ogaden because the ONLF attack on the Oil exploration field has political and economic implications. The Ethiopian government accused of ONLF as it has a link with Al- Qaeda and wanted the US support. The US is skeptical about the link of ONLF with Al -Qaeda. But it provides the manual that can assist the Ethiopian army to fight ONLF with out hurting Civilians (Addis Admas, February 14, 2011)

The information gathered from different sources shows that, the Ogaden region is in state of conflict and the Ethiopian government chooses to dialogue with one faction of the ONLF, while fighting with the other. This Political strategy is not helpful since war in the region continued by another faction. The past histories show that no people can be ruled by force. Therefore, the Ethiopian government should be abided by law. It has to implement the right granted by the constitution to all Ethiopian peoples in general and the Ogaden in particular. As the main security threat for Ethiopia and Kenya emanated from Somalia, the two countries need to work their assignment inside their territory. Lack of good governance, corruption, nepotism are prominent factors in grievances of the citizens and finally it could lead to collapse of regimes.

#### **4.3.2. Contraband Trade**

The economic relations between Ethiopia and Kenya is weak, a lot of work remains to facilitate the trade relations of the two countries. One of the reasons for such a weak economic relation is lack of infrastructure. Another pertinent reason is different economic policies of the two states and Kenya's membership to the WTO while Ethiopia is still in process.<sup>7</sup> Finally the movement of anti peace forces in Ethio-Kenya border and Occasional conflict between pastoral societies around their common border has negative effect for accentuating better economic relations of the two countries. Even though the political relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya has been healthy, the economic relationship has lagged behind. According to MOI (2002:29-101):

*Kenya has faced a series of economic difficulties in the last ten years that weakened its economy. But it certainly enjoyed better development than others in our region and still does. Even though, it faced various political problems aggravated by its troubled economy, Kenya is basically a peace full country. Kenya follows Ethiopia and the Sudan in terms of population but has a comparatively larger market. However, the economic ties between Ethiopia and Kenya are weak and hobbled by contraband.*

The absence of strong trade relations between the two countries, result in contraband trade as an alternative to fill the gap created by loss of market for the communities around the border area. Contraband trade has many demerits among others: the government loss tax revenue

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<sup>7</sup> Interview with Masimba Laban, a Kenyan origin, working in AU on 3/1/2011.

since contrabandists are illegal and they do not pay tax, contraband reduce the income of export revenue of the government, mainly because of goods transferred through border by illegal traders, expired medicine and foods have access to pass through border unseen. Drugs and toxic chemicals will enter in to the territory of a state and inflict severe damage, illegal arms trade will be intensified and the peace and stability of the country will be at stake, e.g. the missile which was used by the Somali- terrorist groups against Israeli air liner was smuggled from Mogadishu arms market to Mombasa. The long lasting animosity or rivalry between pastoralist groups in Ethiopia and Kenya is exacerbated by this access to smuggled arms from Somalia (Ploch, 2010).

The cross border meeting for Ethiopia Kenya raised the issue of contraband trade. The Kenyan country peace structure presented in 2-4 November 2009 identified illegal cross-border trade involving contraband and smuggling as one of the conflict issue in Ethio-Kenya border. The recommendations provided by participants were “establish custom offices at border points and regions: strength cross-border trade.” The Border areas of Ethiopia with Kenya are devoid of custom office and the absence of legal cross-border trade resulted in the expansion of contraband trade. The pastoralist communities of the two countries compete for resources and clash at certain points. Thus illegal trade is oiling the problems in the border areas of the two countries. Identifying the problem is the first step in discerning alternatives that are remedy for it. Therefore, the cross- border committees of Ethiopia and Kenya that comprised of many stake holders: The Ethiopian government higher officials, Kenyan government higher officials, IGAD officials, regional authorities in Kenyan side, regional authorities of Ethiopia, local community representatives arriving at solutions for the problem of illegal cross-border trade what remains is the implementation part (IGAD, 2009:11-13).

The issue of contraband trade is one of challenging issue in Northern Kenya and southern part of Ethiopia. The two countries are committed to redress this issue by promoting the participation of the local communities in both sides. Frequent visits and meetings by high profile politicians of Ethiopia and Kenya to the border areas helped them to establish smooth relations with the local communities and they are closely working to reduce the illegal trade

by encouraging cross-border trade, and establishment of custom offices at the border areas.<sup>8</sup> The study has tried to show the impact of contraband trade in undermining the economic interest of Ethiopia and Kenya. This illegal trade has various negative roles in the security relations of the two countries. Aware of the severity of the problem the two countries are working together to eliminate this parasitic institution.

### 4.3.3. Cattle Rustling

Another common issue of conflict in the border areas of Ethiopia and Kenya is cattle rustling. This practice is known in many areas that are occupied by pastoralist societies. Wasara, Samson has identified pastoralist groups that are involved in cattle rustling in the Horn of Africa his data is relevant for our discussion.

Armed cattle rustling in and around the Horn of Africa:

<b>State</b>	<b>Clusters</b>	<b>Targeted Areas of Raids</b>
Ethiopia	Korom Nyangatom	North-Eastern Kenya South-Eastern Sudan
Kenya	Marakwet Turkana Sabiny	North-Eastern Uganda Southern Ethiopia South-Eastern Sudan
Sudan	Boya Didinga Toposa Morle	Northern Kenya North-Eastern Kenya North-Eastern Uganda Southern Ethiopia
Uganda	Karamajong Dodoth Jie	Northern Kenya South-Eastern Sudan North-Eastern Kenya Kenyan Rift valley

(Source: Wasara, 2002 cited in Bruk (2010:10))

<sup>8</sup> Interview with Machani Nathan, First Secretary of Kenyan Mission in Ethiopia on Thursday 15/11/2010.

As wasara shows, Koromas from Ethiopian side engaged in cattle rustling in north eastern Kenya while Turkana of Kenya engaged in cattle rustling in southern Ethiopia. The CEWARN Report of July 2003 to January 2009, recorded those violent incidents, that occurred, in the Karomoja cluster, the border region, between Kenya and the south Omo zone ” with 18945 live stock raided and 267 human fatalities...Most conflicts are between groups based in Ethiopia, but cross border incidents also occur as was the case with the May, 2005 Kenyan Turkana live stock raid, on Dassanach land in Toltale Kebele, of the Kuran(Dassanch)woreda, Ethiopia ”(CEWARN report in Zerihun quoted in Abebe 2010:29-30). The above data shows how the cattle rustling incidents are frequent and dangerous. The pastoral societies inside Ethiopia and Kenyan groups by crossing the border of the two countries they are embarked on cattle raids. 109 incidents of this kind in six years time mean a serious security threat that commands the intervention of governments of the two countries.

The delegation of Ethiopia and Kenya in November 2-4 2009 discussed the conflict issues and the country report of both countries stress the problem of cattle rustling is one of the major factors that causes conflict between pastoral societies in Ethiopia and Kenya and they recommended:

*Joint peace meetings for enhanced peace full co-existence and discourage rustling among the communities in the two countries. Viable and vibrant youth initiatives that will up lift their living standards. Construction of an abattoir for live stock farmer's in the region in order for them to access direct marketing for their live stock issues loans to Pastoralists as a way of enabling them to venture in to other commercial sectors rather than nomadic life. Address the problem of illicit proliferation of SALW (IGAD, 2009:14).*

The discussions and recommendations of the delegation of the two countries appear as they have identified the problem of cattle rustling and its solution. However, the solutions demand strong financial support of the government of the two countries in the one hand and strong effort by the leaders of the two communities in convincing the above mentioned solutions for their people. The issue of live stock raids and counter raids is a prominent problem in Ethiopia and Kenya border areas; there are two clusters around the border: 1. The Caramojan cluster 2. The Somali cluster the former includes Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia while the latter cover cross border area of Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. In 2009, 13,316 cattle were taken from Yangatom and in 2010, 3423 goats stolen from Asyle Kebele. Despite the effort of the

two governments to reduce cattle rustling it is still a major problem around the borders of the two countries. Cattle raids, grazing field shortage among others around their common border in both countries at micro level joint smuggling, general insecurity. When we look at all sources used in this section, they have all agreed that cattle rustling are one of the major conflict issues between and among pastoral societies of Ethiopia and Kenya.<sup>9</sup> The two countries have collected local communities and they share ideas but the problem is not solved. For pastoralist societies, their cattle's are their mere survival. Thus, Ethiopia and Kenya should solve the cattle rustling in both countries other wise it might lead to more intensified conflict.

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with Teshome Shumbe an officer in MoFA, Neighboring Countries Department on December 2010.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **PROSPECTS IN ETHIO-KENYAN SECURITY COOPERATION**

#### **Introduction**

This chapter deals with the security cooperation of Ethiopia and Kenya, in promoting peace in their border areas, alleviating conflict of various sources and helping peace initiatives in the neighboring countries, that are suffering from devastated war. Somalia is a failed state that is experiencing all sort of illegal activities and a battle field for different radical Islamists, clan militias and so on. Sudan, the largest country in the continent, has also long experienced civil war in its southern part. The Darfur Crisis in western Sudan has also inflicted sever damage both in human and material terms and resulted in sour relations of the Sudanese government with the international community. Ethiopia and Kenya together have played a role in assisting the Sudanese government and the SPLA to reach out an agreement signed in 2006, CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) and finally to be held a referendum in Southern Sudan in 2011. The referendum held recently in 2011 to decide the fate of the Southern Sudanese heralded their secession from the North. Such process witnessed a great role played by Ethiopian and Kenyan governments. Besides, Ethiopia and Kenya have also played a pivotal role in an effort of restoring peace in Somalia. This section deals with Ethio-Kenya roles played in the Somalia's and Sudanese peace processes. It also elucidates the prospects of Ethio-Kenya cooperation in such fields like in border administration, port use, and the use of trans-boundary resources.

#### **5.1. Issue of Somalia Peace Process**

Somalia is neighboring country for Ethiopia and Kenya. It shares long boundary with them. Ethiopia and Kenya have played a role by sponsoring various peace agreements for Somalia. Nevertheless, the complexity of the problem in Somalia rendered their efforts therefore; they are unable to completely solve the lingering problem in that country. However, Ethiopia and Kenya along with IGAD, AU and other regional and global institutions exhibited strong support for Somalia peace processes. They have hosted Somali peace processes in Sodere, Ethiopia, and Eldoret, Kenya. They have also provided diplomatic and military support for the formation of Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (Berhanu, 2008:8). The question here is that why Ethiopia and Kenya have revealed strong interest in the Somalia's peace

process? This is simply due to the fact that they are front line states sharing problems of Somalia, that is, exodus of refugees, repeated terrorist attacks and most importantly Ethiopian armed opposition groups gained fertile ground in Somalia for their military and political objectives.<sup>10</sup>

The foreign policies of the two countries, Ethiopia and Kenya, emphasize on the peaceful coexistence and non-interference in the internal matters of another state. Accordingly, they have initiated and work hard to bring about peace and stability in Somalia and restrain it from being a threat to their security and the region at large. For instance, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia was mandated to coordinate peace dialogue and mediation process of Somalia by OAU and IGAD. Consequently, IGAD member states and their partners had a two day conference in Rome on 19-20 January 1998. They have agreed to form a committee to help the peace efforts of the Ethiopian government for Somalia. Moreover, in October 1998, Ethiopia hosted an international conference on Somalia under the auspices of IGAD. “The conference decided to establish a 15 member committee to spearhead anew peace and reconciliation effort in Somalia. The committee will be composed of delegates from the seven IGAD member states, the OAU and the Arab League” ([www.igadregion.org](http://www.igadregion.org)).

Similarly, Kenya has played part for stable Somalia by dispatching its special envoy to Somalia in the IGAD; Kenya’s special envoy on Somalia Mr.Mwangale was chairing the Somalia front line states technical committee. The committee convened a Somalia National Reconciliation Conference which commenced on October 2002 at Eldoret, Kenya “on 27 October, almost 800 delegates witnessed the signature of a declaration on cessation of hostilities, structures and principles of the Somalia national reconciliation process. It agreed, inter alia, to the cessation of all hostilities and to create, federal governance structures for Somalia” ([www.igad region.org](http://www.igadregion.org))

Kenya’s strong effort in restoring peace and stability in Somalia is also affirmed by the first Secretary of Kenya embassy in Ethiopia as follows: “Kenya has been in the front line in hosting peace process for Somalia, the formation of TNG (Transitional National

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<sup>10</sup> Interview with Teshome Shumbe an officer in MoFA, Neighboring Countries Department on December,

Government) and the establishment of TFG highly supported by Kenya”. He further went on explaining that Kenya trained armed forces of the current government in Mogadishu. Moreover, Kenya helped the involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia stopping the ICU.<sup>11</sup>

According to Teshome, the Ethiopian government has shown extensive move for the Somali peace process to the extent that sending its army to Somalia to protect the legitimate TFG (Transitional Federal Government of Somalia). He also added that Ethiopia and Kenya closely work hard to win the support of international community in order to extend their financial and diplomatic supports for the TFG.<sup>12</sup> However, there are regional and global actors concerns that Somalia is still in a state of chaos. Therefore, Somalis’ went to Djibouti to sign peace deal once again in June, 2008. The participated Somali groups were the TFG and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). The two groups had incompatible interests. The former highly supports the presence of Ethiopian forces in Somalia for its survival, whereas the latter, in contrast, strongly oppose it. In line with this, one writer put his opinion as follows “Meles Zenawi did not decide to occupy Somalia for altruistic reasons out of neighborly dutifulness. So it is virtually naïve to assume that he no longer has plans to micro manage the rest of the commenced peace process, and keep on violating the arms embargo” ([www.atlantic.community.org](http://www.atlantic.community.org)) Despite resentment, sharp critiques and covert involvement of other powers against Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, there are many intimately related issues between the two countries. Firstly, Ethiopia has more than 4.3 million Somali population in its own territory and it fought with Somalia in two occasions: 1964 and 1977. Secondly, Ethiopian armed opposition groups such as OLF & ONLF made stateless Somalia as a safe haven for their armed struggle of the EPRDF regime. Moreover, radical Islamist groups such as Al-ithad repeatedly crossed Ethiopian border and launched series of attacks on Ethiopian hotels and other targets. The formation of the UIC in Mogadishu was also highly frightened the Ethiopian government since AIAI (Al-Itihad Al-Islamya) that confronted the Ethiopia government known to have a lion portion in the UIC (Yoh, 2003; Dagne, 2002:14-18).

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2010.

<sup>11</sup> Interview with Machani Nathan, First Secretary of Kenyan Mission in Ethiopia on Thursday 15/11/2010.

<sup>12</sup> Interview with Teshome Shumbe an officer in MoFA, Neighbouring Countries Department on December, 2010.

To sum up, Ethiopia and Kenya have vested interest in the establishment of central government in Somalia that can assert control and assume the functions of major government services for the Somali's people. The presence of central government in Somalia will help reducing cross border incursions including terrorist attacks, exodus of refugees and the instability of Somali inhabited areas in both Ethiopian and Kenyan provinces. In order to realize these objectives the two countries under study have been working with IGAD, AU, UN, US, EU, and with Somali groups for two decades, sometimes with good outcomes but without bringing lasting peace and stability and restoring statehood in Somalia. However, their effort is continuing on a different style.

## **5.2. Issue of Sudan Peace Process**

The two neighboring countries under study have been involving in Sudan peace process. At the time of writing this paper, the south Sudan referendum completed and southern Sudan people voted for secession according to the temporary result. The Sudan civil war, the longest one in the continent, was a manifestation of several security complexes in the Horn sub-region. As many conflicts in the continent has colonial legacy, the Cold War rivalry between the US and USSR and the Christian versus Islam rivalry are another catalysts for the Sudanese civil war (Berouk, 2010:2-8). During Emperor Haile Sellasie regime the Sudanese government provided support for Ethiopian armed oppositions groups in Eritrea, EPLF and ELF. In reaction, the Emperor also supported Ananya movement in Sudan. Despite this, the Emperor had played an important role in mediating the Sudanese government with its southern rival, Ananya, in 1972 in Addis Ababa. This event enabled the two countries having better relations onwards.

After the down fall of the Emperor's regime in 1974, the new Ethiopian military regime (Derg) pursued a policy of assisting the SPLM/A in retaliation to the Sudanese government support for Ethiopian insurgents, the EPLF and TPLF. The Derg and the Sudanese regimes' efforts of undermining each other security providing military supports for one another dissidents groups helped the SPLM/A to capture many of the towns in southern Sudan and the same issue also facilitated ultimately the collapse of the Derg regime. Despite this, the

Derg tried to broker a peace deal between the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A in Ethiopia (Koka dam) in 1986. Even before the fall of the Derg, SPLM/A was started talks with the new Sudan government in August 1989 in Addis Ababa and in December of the same year in Nairobi (Young, 2007:8). However, all the previous attempts made to end Sudanese civil war were not working.

The new chapter opened in the history of the region when the Derg regime overthrown by the EPLF and EPRDF forces, which were managed to control Eritrea and Addis Ababa respectively in 1991. The SPLM/A lost its main ally as a result of change in regime in Addis Ababa, the Derg. Therefore, relative peace resurfaced in the region and opportunity created for calling peace deal between the Sudan government and the SPLM/A. The regional authority (IGAD) then started a new effort to conclude the conflict in Sudan:

*IGADD launched a peace initiative at its Addis Ababa summit of September 1993 and a peace committee made up of the heads of state of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Kenya was established with president Daniel Arap Moi serving as a chairman. The mediation process was handled by a standing committee made up of the foreign ministers from the same countries and chaired by Kenya. In addition, the friends of IGADD was formed by leading western countries and it promised support for IGADD's peace keeping role (Young, 2007: 9).*

In the eyes of the Sudan government, the ownership of the Sudan peace process fall in the hands of IGADD is beneficial because Ethiopia expelled SPLM/A from its territory due to its principle of good neighborly relations. Djibouti is member of the Arab League. Kenya has less record in helping the SPLM/A, but “its officials had less knowledge of the conflict in Sudan than their counterparts in Ethiopia and Eritrea.” Therefore, a standing committee on peace in Sudan was formed by representing Kalonzo Muiyoka, a Kenyan foreign minister, as its chairman. It was during this time that IGADD proposed a declaration of principles (Dops) that brought about one important element, the right of southern Sudanese to self-determination unless and otherwise the Sudan government work for democracy and secularism (Young, 2007: 9).

Ethiopia and Kenya are active members of the IGADD member countries, their strongly believe in avoiding obstacles for cooperation in the region, which made them forefront in

accelerating the Sudanese peace process. Following the revitalization of IGADD to IGAD in 1996, the original ministerial sub-committee replaced by a permanent secretariat on the Sudan peace process. President Moi appointed Lieutenant General Lazarus Sumbeiywu as special envoy to Sudan, and then:

*The first rounds of talks held under this arrangement began in February, 2000. In July 2002, talks in Machakos, Kenya, resulted in the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) signing the Machakos protocol. The protocol provides for a six-month "pre-interim period" during which hostilities should cease and a formal cease fire should be established as soon as possible. During a subsequent six year "interim period", the cease fire should be maintained and Sharia law should not be applied in the south during that period. After six years a referendum on the southern self-determination should be held ([www.igad region.org](http://www.igadregion.org)).*

For those who follow attentively the Horn sub-regional political dynamics, the achievement of ending civil war in southern Sudan is a tremendous outcome for the IGAD member states in general and Ethiopia and Kenya who have facilitated the realization of the peace process in particular. Ethiopia shares thousands of kms borderlines with Sudan. It was also sponsoring SPLM/A during the Derg regime against the Sudanese government. Kenya was pro-west in the Cold War era and its relations with Sudan were not hostile. The only bone of contention between Kenya and Sudan is the Elmi Triangle which is believed to be oil rich area and claimed by the Sudan government. Another worst periods in the relations between Sudan and IGAD member countries in general and Sudan and Ethiopia in particular was the exporting of Islam to the neighboring countries by the National Islamic Front (NIF) that was influential in Sudan Politics ultimately leads to strong response by Ethiopia, Ugandan and Eritrea (Young, 2007: 10).

According to the Ethiopian government, Sudan is a better market for Ethiopia and thus widening cooperation in many fields could benefit the people of the two countries. Helping opposition groups against one another's security leads them to self destructive end. Hence, the Ethiopian policy towards Sudan remains mainly peaceful, when problem arises they will

solve it around the table.<sup>13</sup> This pragmatic move enabled the Ethiopian government along with its Kenyan side to help the Sudanese government sign peace deal with SPLM/A despite obstacles. The Kenyan special envoy struggled for the realization of peace agreement between the two contending parties (Sudan government and SPLM/A.) Now southern Sudanese voted for separation from the north and the Sudan government exhibited matured political commitment that President el-Bashir pledged support for the upcoming new state of Southern Sudan. Furthermore, el-Bashir promised to work hand in hand with southerners (MOI, 2002:88-90; The Daily Monitor, 2011). The above discussion concerning the Ethio-Kenyan governments' role in advancing Sudanese peace process entails the bright future for the region that the prospect of solving conflict by endemic means is higher.

### **5.3. Bilateral Action on Terrorism**

Terrorism has become one of the major global concerns especially since 9/11. Many countries around the world have seen the outcomes of terrorists' acts. Terrorist organizations followed different tactics to execute their agenda. Ethiopia and Kenya also witnessed terrorist attacks at different times. Their neighbor, Somalia, is now a seed bed of terrorist acts. Terrorist groups as a result crossed easily the boundaries of the two countries and committed number of bombings. Additionally, the two countries have large size of Somali population in the Somali regional state of Ethiopia and in the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. Therefore, terrorist groups easily convince these similar ethnic groups for their radical Islamist objectives.

The provocation of terrorist groups in Somalia forced Ethiopia and Kenya to counter terrorism inside their territories, in the Horn sub-region and globally by cooperating with those countries determined to fight terrorism. Kenya already has close relations with its former colonial master, Britain, and is a close ally of US. It has joint military exercise with Britain Navy and allowed US forces to use her Mombassa port to safeguard the Indian Ocean security. When the Mombassa hotel, and the US embassy attacked in Nairobi and other brutal

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<sup>13</sup> Interview with Teshome Shumbe an officer in MoFA, Neighboring Countries Department on December, 2010.

incidents occurred by the terrorists, Kenya tightened its cooperation with the US forces (Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 2007).

Similarly, Ethiopia argues as it has been affected by various terrorist acts. Many of its cities were affected by terrorist bombings including the capital city, Addis Ababa. Such terrorist acts lead Ethiopia strongly fighting with them within its territory and formulate counter terrorism agreement with those countries that are fighting terrorism in general and Kenyan government in particular, which shares a number of similarities of the attack by terrorist groups and the response of the respective governments.<sup>14</sup>

According to USDS (United States Department of State), the trans-boundary activity of terrorist groups forced the Ethiopian government to cross the Somali's borderlines engaging in counter offensive in 2006, supporting Somali's Transitional Federal government, providing facilities for AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia). Moreover, "on October 6, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) and the United States Department of Treasury signed the terms of reference and work plan for technical assistance package to strengthen Ethiopians anti-money laundering counter terrorist financing regimes" (USDS, 2008: 18). This shows that Ethiopia jointly with regional and global powers is fighting terrorism. Besides, Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) is working on counter-terrorism management and its central and regional police counter terrorism capabilities were targeted on responding to terrorist incidents. Moreover, Ethiopia participated in AU counter terrorism efforts and it is focal point for the AU's Center for Study and Research on Terrorism (USDS, 2008:16-19).

The Kenyan government also helped Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in 2006. Kenyan military forces prevented the retreat of terrorist forces across Somalia-Kenyan border. Kenyan security forces also detained several extremist leaders during the same operation.<sup>15</sup> Besides, the Kenyan government suspended all flights from and to Somalia except those aimed at helping the TFG and humanitarian aids. Moreover, the Kenyan government comes

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<sup>14</sup> Interview with Teshome Shumbe an officer in MoFA Neighbouring Countries Department on December, 2010.

<sup>15</sup> Interview with Machani Nathan, First Secretary of Kenyan Mission in Ethiopia on Thursday 15/11/2010.

up with a revised draft of the “Suppression of Terrorism Bill” in 2006. However, it was criticized by the legislation regarding combating money laundering and terrorist financing are not being materialized. According to senior Kenyan officials, “US public announcement regarding the possibility of terrorist threat to the cross-country world champion ships in Mombassa in March, seeing this as an unfriendly act and a threat to the country’s tourism industry (USDS, 2008:18-19). As the official revealed terrorism and counter terrorism measures have their own limitation on the tourist industries of terrorist prone countries. Therefore, countries should consider this aspect whenever they exchange information and should agree how to publicize this information.

In 2007, Ethiopia, Kenya, the US and TFG jointly establish a secret detention for people who cross the Somalia-Kenyan boundary and 150 people arrested and transferred them to security forces in Ethiopia because it is the major power fighting terrorism in the region, it has legitimate security concerns. The AIAI (Al-Ithihad Al-Islamia), radical Islamist group inflicted on Ethiopia’s major cities several terrorist attacks /bombings gained appreciable influence in Somalia and with its spillover effects of spreading Islamism in Ethiopian soil, creating friendly relations between UIC (Union of Islamic Courts) and the ONLF and OLF, and increasing the role of the Eritrean government in the Somali’s crisis, which forced Ethiopian government to fully engaged in military campaign in Somalia (Møller, 2009:33-35). Besides, the Ethiopian government adopted anti-terrorism bill in 2009 so as to cement its war efforts on terrorism. “Of the 378 law makers present during Tuesday’s session, 286 voted in favor of the legislation championed by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, 91 against and one abstained” (AFP, July 7, 2009). Kenya actively cooperates with the US in its efforts of combating terrorism “it received training and equipment for its multi-agency coast guard-type unit to patrol the waters near Somalia and efforts to improve security at the port of Mombassa” (Ploch, 2010: 51).

Ethiopia and Kenya are fighting terrorism in their domestic system and in neighboring Somalia. Consequently, terrorist incidents could be declined gradually but not completely eradicated. The two countries have worked closely with the US and they have received military training from the US that could help them fighting money laundry activities by

terrorist groups. As we have seen in previous sub section of this study, the two countries remained vulnerable for terrorist attacks and they could not fight this danger unilaterally. Hence, they are jointly fighting terrorism and prevent Somalia from being a state ruled by terrorists.

#### **5.4. The Outcome of the Border Commission Meeting**

Ethio-Kenyan border extends from Lake Turkana to Dollo, which is 830 km in length and also demarcated.<sup>16</sup> To strengthen their economic, politico-military and socio-cultural ties, Ethiopia and Kenya have signed various (about 50) bilateral agreements. Consequently, they have managed to establish various common commissions such as border development commission which meets annually, and ministerial commission consisting of three committees: political and security committee, economic committee, and cultural and social committee.<sup>17</sup> They have also consultation forums, report system, information exchange, radio communication agreement, cattle checking, and common security project. Kenya is also started disarming of its pastoral groups and the local communities in both countries cross their border freely Ethiopia and Kenya have boundary agreement in 1963 and visa abolition in 1966. Unlike the rest countries in the region, the two countries registered early success in forging such great interactions during the emperor regime. Many of African countries inherit colonial boundary which is a will of the colonial powers rather than the local community. Hence, number of countries went to war immediately after independence due to border problems. But Kenya and Ethiopia won this problem.<sup>18</sup>

Even if Ethiopian and Kenyan officials attended border commission meetings and try to reduce security problems around their common border, there were incidents that caused loss of life and destruction of assets in their common borders. The security problems in such borders emanated from two key factors: political and economic. The political factor is instigated by OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) that was reside in Northern Kenya where it has ethnic affinity with the Kenyan especially at Moyale. Due to this fact, it was believed that

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<sup>16</sup> Interview with Machani Nathan, First Secretary of Kenyan Mission in Ethiopia on Thursday 15/11/2010.

<sup>17</sup> Interview with Teshome Shumbe an officer in MoFA, Neighbouring Countries Department on December, 2010.

<sup>18</sup> Interview with Machani Nathan, First Secretary of Kenyan Mission in Ethiopia on Thursday 15/11/2010.

some Kenyans extended their support for the OLF. The OLF was participated in the Transitional Government of Ethiopia along with the EPRDF. However, when confrontation was inevitable with TPLF dominated group led by Meles Zenawi, the OLF went out of the Transitional Government and started fighting with the EPRDF regime. Despite defeated several times by the EPRDF, it did not abandon its struggle completely of the incumbent regime. The economic factor is mainly seen when the pastoral communities of the two countries along their common borders crossing in search of f the boundary fresh water, pasture land and some times fishing in the waters of another tribal communities across the border. Besides, traditional rivalries between pastoralist groups across the border are occasionally responsible for sporadic conflicts between pastoralist groups of the two countries (Moi, 2002:100; Schlee, 2003:361-364; Wondwosen, 2009:62).

Whenever security problem arises in the common borders of the two countries usually solved in a peaceful manner, the conflict between pastoral communities settled by discussion with local communities. Since the authors of African boundaries gave little attention for Ethno-linguistic makeup of the African people and also left most of the boundaries un-demarcated, in the post-colonial era un- demarcated borders have become the bone of contentions between and among states especially between those who have pastoral communities. For example, the Ilemi Triangle: an area which joins South Eastern Sudan, North Western Kenya and South West Ethiopia, is a contested area among Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. Ilemi is a triangular shape area that has got its name from Anuak chief Ilemi Akwon. Its size is 4000 square miles. Various pastoral communities from Ethiopia Kenya and Sudan are sharing pastures of the land in the area. The main pastoralist groups are; Turkana who oscillated between Sudan and Kenya, Didinga and Toposa from the Sudan who usually come to the western part of Ilemi, the Nyangatom from Sudan and Ethiopia are also used the pastures of the Ilemi triangle (Abebe, 2010:37).

The 1999 OLF attack on an Ethiopian military inside Ethiopian border resulted in counter attack by the Ethiopian forces defeating the OLF forces but they fled to the Kenyan territory, which leads Ethiopian officials' complaints on the fact that they were attacked by Kenyans. While Kenyan authorities complained on the fact that their borders were violated by

Ethiopian forces. However, the Ethiopian delegation led by Brig. General Abba Duula and Ato Gabre approached the local communities and exposed the OLF for its destructive activities and compensate the local civilians who were injured during the fight between the OLF and Ethiopian military forces, the traditional leaders on their part promise to fight OLF (Schlee, 2003: 361-364).

The Ethiopian and Kenyan governments along with IGAD and local pastoral communities of both countries have been working in building peace in their common border areas. For instance, in November 2009, the delegates of the two countries assembled in Oromia *woreda* conference Hall and each country provided its own reports. The Kenyan side identified conflict issues as follows:

*Resource based conflicts along water points and competition for pastures during the draught/famine seasons; that is, illegal & excess flow of pastoral migrations; proliferation of illicit SALW; negative ethnicity/clanism and polarization of local politics; poaching within the Kenyan borders; illegal cross-border trade involving contraband and smuggling; limited central and federal government institutions presence and representation; break down of community social fabric such as drugs abuse and immorality(IGAD,2009:11-14).*

The participants believed that in order to solve the above-mentioned issues, the role of local communities and government agencies in cross-border areas is significant. and they came up with their own proposal to challenge those issues, "facilitate on going communal sharing process especially water and pasture; sinking bore- holes and water-pans in strategic places and conflict hot-spot areas along the borders ;establish and strengthen cross-border peace committees with more government representation ;quarterly cross-border meetings and follow-up consult actions(IGAD,2009:11-14). The Ethiopian side also listed what it believed as major conflict issues, which include "access to resource, watering points and grazing areas; movement of anti-peace forces (OLF); frequent livestock theft; impact of draught and famine." And the proposed solutions by Ethiopian side include "address logistic gaps such as budget; create linkages across the border; accommodate relevant regional and zonal structures into the system; expand FMS role to include teaching peace values to the communities" (IGAD, 2009:18-21).

To sum up, Ethiopia and Kenya established common border development commission and they met regularly whenever urgent issues arise. Trans-boundary conflicts are seen occasionally in the common borders of the two countries. They are working hand-in-hand with the local communities in collaboration with IGAD to solve sporadic conflicts in their common borders in particular and the region at large.

### **5.5. Issue of Trans-boundary Resources**

Ethiopia shares cross border resources with its neighboring countries. One of which is water resource. Ethiopia has many cross border rivers flowing in many directions to its neighboring states such as River Nile, which is the longest river in the world flowing to Sudan and Egypt; River Tekeze flows to Sudan and Omo to Turkana. Ethiopian history has showed us that it has passed through several wars. Accordingly, it devoted resources to execute wars maintaining its sovereignty. The country was not able to utilize its untapped large water resources for many years. As Ethiopia recovered from lingering civil wars, it turns its face to development in many sectors. It is currently hoped that its rivers will play a pivotal role in its endeavors of bringing sustainable development in the country. One of the Rivers that Ethiopia is using for Hydro electric power generation is the OMO/Gibe River on which Ethiopia has already built Gilgel Gibe I, II and Gilgel Gibe III is under construction. Gilgel Gibe I and II are generating power and reducing the shortage of electric power in the country. The Ethiopian government also envisaged six sugar factories in the south Omo area by using the Omo River (Mutia, 2009:27-28).<sup>19</sup>

Ethiopia and Kenya have not endorsed binding legal framework concerning their trans-boundary resources, River Omo. However, the 1970 treaty between the imperial government of Ethiopia and Kenyan government in the Namornputh area allowed Ethiopia to use the Omo River in its territory, though Kenyans deserved a right to use the same river in a condition that they respect the rules of the land (Abebe, 2010: 53-54). The military regime, Derg, also signed a memorandum of understanding with Kenya government in 1979, which stated that the two countries jointly study the development of their cross-border water

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<sup>19</sup> Interview with Teshome Shumbe an officer in MoFA, Neighbouring countries Department on December, 2010.

resources. They have also agreed to establish joint technical committee that can accelerate the efforts of the two countries (Abebe, 2010:53-56).

After the EPRDF regime came into power in 1991, Ethiopia and Kenya have signed Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty emphasizes cooperation in specific areas, that is, in irrigation, water resources and energy. In 1997 a memorandum of understanding on political, social and economic cooperation, which is wider than the previous one, was also signed. In 2004, they continued the previous discussions on the shared water resources of the two countries, and they have agreed to utilize the trans-boundary water resources of Lake Turkana, Dawa River and underground water (Abebe, 2010:50-58)

Kenya and Ethiopia have their own visions in their countries: GTP (Growth and Transformation Plan) in Ethiopia and vision 2030 in Kenya. According to GTP “the country will shift from a strategy dependent on foreign investment to a locally driven economy and targeted an economic growth of 14.9 %”. Moreover, the plan envisaged huge expansion of infrastructure such as the construction of power plants aimed at increasing the existing capacity which is 2,000 MW to 10,000 MW (Ethiopian Embassy in London, 2010). This obviously demands the exploitation of its rivers like the Nile, OMO and Tekeze. Similarly, Kenya’s 2030 vision generally aims at making Kenya “a middle income country. The country allocated for 2008/9 budget Ksh 65 billion for road works, rural electrification, port dredging and the submarine fiber optics.” Hence, the two countries need to exploit their rivers extensively to realize their visions. Despite this, Ethiopia and Kenya have not yet signed binding legal framework regulating their utilization of cross-border resources, rivers (ADB, 2009: 28).

Another trans-boundary resource is the Nile Basin to which both Kenya and Ethiopia are upper riparian states and they are actively participating in NBI (Nile Basin Initiative). This trans-boundary river initiative composed of ten countries and it established in 1999. The member states of NBI are Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. As Egypt and Sudan have bilateral agreements on the full utilization of the Nile waters, the rest of countries were suffering due to frequent

draught and famine. <sup>20</sup>Under the banner of NBI, the upper riparian states now exerted significant pressure on Egypt and Sudan to force them signing a new agreement that could benefit all NBI member states. For example, in the 17<sup>th</sup> annual meeting of the Nile council of ministers held in Alexandria, Egypt, from July 27-28, 2009, all the member states agreed to approve the draft Cooperative Framework Agreement of the NBI, while Egypt and Sudan claimed a six-month extension. During this time the water resources minister of Ethiopia reportedly said “he was dismayed at the continued refusal of Sudan and Egypt to sign the water sharing agreement. The on going dispute was holding Ethiopia back from harnessing the economic potential of the Nile River” (Debay, 2009:11-12).

The refusal of Egypt and Sudan to sign agreement on the use of the Nile waters forced member countries to take a unilateral action on the Nile waters. For instance, “In 2004, Tanzania Unilaterally announced the establishment of a 170 kilometers water pipeline from Lake Victoria (where 14 % of the Nile waters originates) to supply water to some dry areas in the country.” Kenya in its part declared that it would not reserve itself from using Lake Victoria and River Nile (Debay, 2009: 7-9). The upper riparian states also gave chance to Egypt and Sudan to come into terms with them on the allocation of the Nile waters. Having no positive response from Egypt and Sudan, the rest seven countries decided to sign the agreement beginning May 14, 2010 and the duration of signing the agreement will be more than a year then after the ratification process will be started (Solomon, 2010).

The ever-increasing population size of Ethiopia and Kenya, the repeated famine, draught, climate change and other factors are pushing Ethiopia and Kenya to use their trans-boundary resources. They have embarked on large projects that consume large volume of water. In order to sustain the supply of water and to scale up their efforts, the two countries need to approach donor institutions, have to abide by international laws, and cooperate with other states that share these cross-border resources.

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<sup>20</sup> Interview with Masimba Laban, a Kenyan origin working in AU, on 3/1/2011.

## **5.6. The Use of Port**

Ethiopian rulers were in disagreement with their rival colonial powers of Ottoman Turks, Italy and regional expansionist power of Egypt regarding the issue of port. According to Woodward (1995), Adulis port used as a channel to link the Axumite civilization of Ethiopia with the rest of the world, the coming in the scene of colonial powers in the Red Sea coastal area denied Ethiopia open access to the sea. This had implications for its isolation from the rest of the world and underdevelopment for centuries. Italy controlled Masawa in the 1880's and invaded Ethiopia in 1896 and 1935. The former was concluded by the total defeat of Italy by Ethiopia, while the latter witnessed the occupation of Ethiopia by Mussolini for about five years. When the Emperor Haile sellassie restored his power in 1941, his primary agenda was uniting Eritrea and safe guarding Ethiopia's access to the sea. Haile sellassie forged good relations with the US and UK for this end. His effort was fruitful when Eritrea confederated with Ethiopia in 1961. The abolition of federation by Ethiopia severely criticized by many and Eritreans started guerrillas fighting. But the emperor was following a smart move not to escalate the civil war in Eritrea (Joseph, 1993:502; Woodward, 1995:14-17).

The coming of military regime in 1974 accelerated the Eritrean civil war, highly excited by victory on Somalia Derg determined to solve the Eritrean question by force. Therefore, the former military regime allocated large budget for its army. However, the combined forces of EPLF (Eritrean People Liberation Front) and TPLF (Tigrean People Liberation Front) heavily defeated it (Woodward, 1995:98-100). Initially there was a hope for Ethiopian access to Assab port in Eritrea, but finally the former comrades went to war in 1998 and Ethiopia once again lost access to the sea (Ewing, 2008:1-7).

The current EPRDF regime is forced to allocate large sum of hard currency for port service. The Djibouti port is now serving Ethiopia's import/export trade. And the government is looking for alternative port from the rest of neighboring countries of Kenya, Sudan, and Somalia. Mombasa port, of Kenya, the newly constructing Lamo Port, Port Sudan, Berbera port and Hargesa port in Somalia are considered by the Ethiopian government.

The Ethio-Kenya relations have viewed the Kenyan ports for the use of southern part of Ethiopia. The two countries coordinating their cooperation along with donors, the Mombasa – Nairobi – Addis Ababa Road corridor that aims at economic integration between Ethiopia and Kenya by improving transport and communications between the two countries is financed by African Development Bank, Ethiopian Government, and Kenyan Government.<sup>21</sup> For the ADB” the road is one of the missing links on the Trans-African-High way Cairo-Cape town and is one of the key priorities of the New partnership for Africa’s Development(NEPAD) and part of its short-term action plan for infrastructure”(ADB,2009:18). Since Ethiopia and Kenya are active members of regional and continental institutions, they are formulating their economic and political policies in consistence with the strategies of these institutions. The Horn of African countries are less involved in ‘intra - COMESA trade boom’ this is attributed to lack of road transport. So the Mombasa – Nairobi-Addis Ababa Road is the effort of the two countries in accelerating regional integration and regarding the benefit of the road for Ethiopian access to the sea the bank explain:

*Ethiopia as a landlocked country relies on the neighboring transit countries for its sea freight, In order to reduce transport cost and improves the competitiveness of the Ethiopian economy. The government is striving to diversify its access to sea ports as much as possible. About 20% of the Ethiopian sea freight traffic originating or destined to southern and south – Western Ethiopia would normally be attracted to the Mombasa port.*

The Djibouti port dominated Ethiopian port use for the past 100 years. Currently 98% of Ethiopian import/Export trade used port of Djibouti. This monopoly of port service by a single country needs to be diversified in order to provide different corners of the country to be linked with nearest, economically profitable and safe port from other neighboring countries (ADB, 2009:15-30).

Kenya is known for its cooperative manner with Ethiopia not only in peace times, but also, in difficult times. When Ethiopian ports were blocked by EPLF, Kenya provided its Mombasa port. Therefore, using Kenyan ports has different rewards, it can strength Ethio – Kenyan economic relations, Ethiopia could get access to the rest of East African countries. “The

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<sup>21</sup> Interview with Machani Nathan,First Secretary of Kenyan Mission in Ethiopia on Thursday15/11/2010.

Lamo port is constructed by the Kenyan government for Ethiopian access to the sea. Kenya is also building railway line from Lamo – Esole – Moyale”. Fiber optics cable is done from Lamo – Moyale. There are also plan to establish similar infrastructure from Lamo to AA. This sub- section tries to see how port service is crucial to the land- locked state of Ethiopia. And Kenya’s infrastructure building to connect Ethiopia to Kenyan ports is going on. When these projects completed the economic cooperation and trade between the two countries will be increased dramatically.<sup>22</sup>

### **5.7. Position in the Use of the Nile Waters**

Ethiopia and Kenya are the upper riparian states, their rivers crossed Sudan and have been watering the arid areas of Sudan and Egypt. These countries have repeatedly attacked by famine and they want to use their rivers, in order to reverse their peoples suffer due to famine. Nonetheless, the lower riparian states of Sudan and Egypt have been sticking to their bilateral agreement that excludes the upper riparian states that contribute the whole volume of water. Especially, Ethiopia contributes 85% of the Nile waters. Nonetheless, the 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan did not consider the right of Ethiopia, Kenya and other upper riparian states in using their natural resources (Kindiki, 2009: 29-35).

Ethiopia has been denouncing the agreement between Sudan and Egypt as it is exclusive and illegal. It makes crystal solid that it will develop projects on the Nile waters as soon as it is be able to get financial and technical support. However, Egypt lobby to major donors not to allow debt to Ethiopia for building projects on the Nile waters.<sup>23</sup> Besides, Egyptians always support hostile neighboring countries and armed opposition groups in Ethiopia to put an obstacle on Ethiopian development endeavor.

The emperor regime, the Derg regime, and the current government hold the same position in Ethiopian full right in using its natural resources. Egyptians in their part are always building their military power to deter Ethiopian unilateral move on starting any project that claims the use of the Nile waters. The current Ethiopian regime has shown a great leap in cooperating

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<sup>22</sup> Interview with Machani Nathan, First Secretary of Kenyan Mission in Ethiopia on 15/11/2010.

<sup>23</sup> Interview with Teshome Shumbe an officer in MoFA, Neighbouring Countries Department on December, 2010.

with other upper riparian states of the Nile namely Burundi, Congo democratic republic, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda by participating in Nile Basin Initiative. However, the hydro political tension in the Nile Basin has tremendous sources “1. Down stream insecurity versus up stream actions, 2. Lack of legal institutional framework, 3. Unilateral development of water resources, 4. Latent military threats and 5. The Afro-Arab divide.” Standing among such complicated issues, Ethiopia is trying to be part of legal institutional framework that can provide a win- win solution for all stakeholders (Yacob, 2007: 69-220). Ethiopia’s active role in Nile Basin initiative seems to bring beneficial outcomes; its patience for a decade gathered the other up stream states around its objective in establishing legal framework on equitable use of the Nile waters. The Cooperatives Framework of Agreement (CFA) of May 14<sup>th</sup> 2010 is great achievement for the entire up stream states that and they could use the badly needed fresh water for reversing poverty in their respective countries (Solomon, 2010).

The CFA which is signed by Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda is opened to a signature for year duration seems to bring the like minded states of the East and Horn of Africa to the same position. Here the contribution of the Kenya government is crucial. Kenya is member of EAC (East African Community) and its influence on the East African states is considerable. Further more, the Ethio-Kenyan smooth relations have used as an input for holding the same position on the issue. Kenya is also playing a constructive role to convince Egypt and Sudan to sign the CFA. After the signing of CFA by majority of the up stream countries, Egypt and Sudan call for another alternative. However, the rest of member states hold firm position (reject the demand of down stream states). So Kenyan government officials went to Egypt and Sudan and pushing the Egyptian and Sudanese political elites, to sign the agreement and cooperate with the rest of the countries in jointly developing, protecting the Nile Basin (Solomon, 2010).

In the eyes of many Ethiopians, the Nile waters have been source of enemies like Egypt and Sudan and the proxy wars of Somalia and Eritrea is in one way or another intimately interconnected, reaching agreement in the use of the Nile waters is a dual benefit for Ethiopia. Firstly, Ethiopia contributes 85% of the Nile; hence, whatever sort of logical

distribution of this natural resource will benefit Ethiopia.<sup>24</sup> Secondly, Egypt will stop hostility and its destructive covert and overt support for hostile neighboring countries will be reduced once the Nile issue resolved. Therefore, Ethiopia and Kenya have worked hard to come up with a new agreement on the use of the Nile waters. Under the NBI, the two countries negotiated with the relevant stakeholders and the result gained from this win- win deal is appreciable, the two countries are supported by other up stream states and seeing the Nile in curving famine in the two countries appears a plausible assumption.

### ***5.8. Energy Trade***

Every country in the world has energy demand, this demand could not be fulfill only by domestic sources. The scarcity of energy in day-to-day activity forced countries to buy energy from other countries that have abundant natural resources. This buying and selling activity is called as Energy trade. Africa is endowed with abundant energy resources. However, these resources are remote from demand areas; they are underdeveloped and accompanied with poor infrastructure. Ethiopia and Kenya both have shortage of energy but they have planned different ways to mitigate this problem. Ethiopia has abundant water and suitable topography for generation of hydroelectric power. Kenya is inter-connected with Tanzania in order to narrow dawn energy demand and supply gap in its territory. Moreover, Ethiopia agreed to sell 1/3 of Gilgel Gibe III hydroelectric power to Kenya at cheap price when compared with the current price in Kenya ([www.kenyamission-un](http://www.kenyamission-un)).

Ethiopia has numerous rivers which have a potential of generating hydroelectric power that can satisfy the domestic demand and could be exported to neighboring countries. Ethiopian officials argue that the building of Gilgel Gibe III hydroelectric project and the intended Gilgel Gibe IV, and Gillgel Gibe V enable the country to sell the excess hydro power from these projects to Kenya and agreement has been reached between the two governments. Kenya's electricity supply comes from both internal and external sources; it has hydro electric station at dams along the upper Tana river, Turk well George Dam the West and a petroleum fired plant on the cost, geothermal facilities at olkanria (near Nairobi). Kenya buys

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<sup>24</sup> Interview with Teshome Shumbe an officer in MoFA, Neighboring Countries Department on December,2010.

electricity from Uganda. In spite of such diverse energy sources Kenya has a problem of short falls of electricity transmission and distribution. In this connection the building of hydroelectric power on Gilgel Gibe River will benefit Kenya to get its badly needed energy demand (Ethiopian Embassy in London, 2010; Fortune, 2009:2).

The abject poverty in Africa, particularly in black Africa makes the use of commercial energy a difficult option. Hence, the strong dependence on biomass, fire wood, charcoal, animal waste is seen. Regional economic communities in Africa have developed hydropower resources these are: “The 666 Mega Watts, Kariba South, Power Station, in SADC, between Zambia and Zimbabwe, the 40 Mega Watt Ruzizi hydroelectric stations in the Great Lakes region, among Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda” are exemplary for regional power pools (ECA, 2004:156).

When we look at the Horn of Africa, the lack of cheap energy supply hindered the development endeavor of the region; the possible way out from this problem is promoting hydroelectric production which is cheap and environment friendly than other energy sources. For example, Ethiopia has 45,000 Mega Watt hydropower potential. Nonetheless, it has developed only 2,000 MW and it is doing additional hydropower project which will be exported to Kenya, Sudan and Djibouti only after the satisfaction of domestic demand. The cost of oil fired electricity generation in Djibouti four fold higher than that of Ethiopia’s hydropower production cost. (Seifulaziz, and Jalal, 2007: 14-18). Regional integration process in Africa commands the importance of power trade, the attempt of Ethiopia and Kenya to be connected under East African Power Pool (EAPP) is appreciable as it will expand the cooperation of the two countries in additional sectors.

### **5.9. The Use of Gibe River**

Gibe River also called, as (Omo River) is one of Ethiopian rivers that have huge potential for hydroelectric power and it has a potential of irrigation for hundred thousands hectare of land. The Ethiopian government has already completed Gilgel Gibe I, a hydropower project that is generating 187 MW, Gilgel Gibe II, 420 MW and the giant Gilgel Gibe III is currently under construction and expected to generate 1,870 MW. Ethiopian government and its Kenyan

counterpart have common understanding of the benefit of the Gilgel Gibe III and they are jointly seeking debt for this project.<sup>25</sup> The Environmental friendly nature of the project and the agreement of the Ethiopian government to sell 500 MW out of 1,870 MW from Gilgel Gibe III to the Kenyan government have helps the two countries to hold the same position on the Gibe III Project. However, there are groups, environmentalist and parliamentarians heavily opposed the building of Gilgel Gibe III. Thus the Kenyan National Assembly discussed the issue of Gilgel Gibe III on Thursday, 11<sup>th</sup> December 2008. Mr David Ethuro asked the minister of water and irrigation about the extensive damming of Omo River, the major Source of water for Lake Turkana that imposed danger of drying of the lake. The parliamentarian also asked what the Kenyan government was doing to protect the country's national interest. Mr Ethuro argued that:

*Due to the damming of River Omo in Ethiopia, the level of the lake has dropped by 10 meters: the lake has three sites that have been declared world heritage sites. The decrease of water levels will affect both the flora and fauna, and the economic life style of about 500,000 people. It will not only affect the people around Lake Turkana, but also on the other side of Marsabit and Chalbi districts. (National Assembly official report, 2008 quoted in Abebe mulu).*

Other oppositions of Gibe III were friends of Lake Turkana and international Rivers that held extensive campaign against Gilgel Gibe III. These NGOs urged international financial institutions to deprive debt for the Ethiopian government. The Ethiopian government had a pressing energy shortage in the year 2003 and “it was forced to buy diesel generator and installed in Dire dawa (40Mw) Awash Sebat (30 MW) and Kaliti (10 MW) such huge energy short falls has harmed the productivity of the country. As fortune News paper described: “There was no officially announced power shedding program as in past although EEPCO switches of its button during morning peak hours (between 9:00 am and noon) and late in the afternoon” (between 6 pm and 8 pm) (Fortune, Feb 1, 2009). Having such short falls of electricity the Ethiopian government convinced to accelerate Gilgel Gibe III despite the oppositions of some Kenyan parliamentarians and NGOs. Regarding the position of the Kenyan government Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said in his interview with the Embassy of FDRE in Britain:

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<sup>25</sup> Interview with Teshome Shumbe an officer in MoFA, Neighbouring Countries Department on December, 2010.

*We have no dispute with Kenya on the hydro electric power project, on the contrary the Kenyan government would expect us to sell some of the electricity generated from Gilgel Gibe III to Kenya; Indeed together with Kenya, we are approaching funding agencies to help us build an electricity grid network that would connect Ethiopia to Kenya (Embassy of the FDRE in Britain, 2010).*

The explanation of the Ethiopian government concerning Gilgel Gibe III project appears convincing that it raises the nature of the project that is environment friendly and it does not incur major rescue on the Lake Turkana. It is recent memory that River Omo flooded the Dassanech and Yangatom area and inflicted loss of human life and destruction of properties of the pastoralist societies in the area. The Ethiopian government and Kenyan government have signed memorandum of understanding that made Kenya beneficiary from the Gilgel Gibe III, 500 WM of this project will be exported to Kenya. Since the two countries have not pull out their people from poverty, famine, they have to work together in developing trans-boundary resources. When they exploit their natural resources and jointly develop, maintain protect their common resources it can lead to integration of the two countries gradually. The commenced infrastructure development that joins the border town of Moyale to Mombasa port and other infrastructure development gird the successful political and security relations of the two countries to be translated into a wider economic cooperation.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

The study has attempted to describe Ethio-Kenyan security issues: the common denominators that commanded the actions of the two countries, regional security problems and their impact in the two countries, what remedy has been prescribed by the two countries till now, and major challenges and prospects for bolstering Ethio-Kenyan security cooperation. The major assumption of the study is: Ethio Kenyan security relations are exemplary for the rest of Horn of African region. These relationships grow up from strong base laid by the Emperor Haile Sellassie of Ethiopia and President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya. Despite change of government and ideology, the two countries have maintained their good state-to-state relations. However, Ethiopia and Kenya share trans-boundary resources, but they have not endorsed binding legal framework on the use of their common resources. As far as security threats are concerned, they have strong cooperation.

The security problems of Ethiopia and Kenya are intimately related with their neighboring countries. As the problems are very complicated, their solutions need strong and continuous effort by the two countries. One of the major security problems of the two countries is the issue of Somalia. The two countries have sizable Somali population and they were ones claimed to join with their ethnic lines in Somalia. When Somalia became a failed state and war- torn, Somali refugees flooded to Ethiopia and Kenya. Furthermore, radical Islamic Al-Shabaab group in Somalia has created a link with international terrorist group Al-Qaeda. Another common security concern of Ethiopia and Kenya is the conflict between and among the pastoralist communities in and around their common border area. These communities do not consider crossing the boundary of the other as illegal act. They move along with their cattle in search of pastureland and water. When they incidentally met with the other side, they usually fight and cattle raids and many illegal activities result.

The issue of Ogaden has been a security concern of the Ethiopian governments since Emperor Menelik II incorporated the area to his domain. The present Ethiopian government is in confrontation with ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front.) As chapter four of this study shows, the issue of Ogaden has many dimensions: the influence of islamist forces in

the failed state of Somalia, the mis- use of force by the Ethiopian government army, the inability of the Federal Government to respond to the development questions of the Ogadeni people, the governments failure to implement those rights granted by the Constitution including self rule, among others, are factors for the current instability in the region. Ogaden is a large territory. Hence, the prevalence of instability in Ogaden means, instability of eastern part of Ethiopia. Besides, islamist forces in Somalia cross the Ethiopian boundary and involve in the Ogaden conflict. The recent agreement between the Ethiopian government with one ONLF faction led by Salahdin Mao is appreciable. However, the other faction is still fighting with the Ethiopian army.

The movement of OLF in Ethio-Kenyan border has an impact in the security cooperation of Ethiopia and Kenya. The researcher believes that because of the ethnic link in the Kenyan side of the border and the porous nature of the Ethio- Kenyan border, OLF occasionally cross the Kenyan border and launch its attacks on the Ethiopian government army. This security challenge is even higher given the Oromo's are large ethnic group both in terms of territorial and population size. Most revenue generating items of Ethiopia are generated from the Oromia Region. If the power of OLF strengthens the Ethiopian economy could be in trouble. Moreover, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya and the south and western part of Ethiopia could be exposed for instability. One plausible scenario is the opening of political space for all opposition groups; this might attract the attention of the OLF leaders to peaceful involvement in the Ethiopian politics.

There is an increasing trend of the influx of refugees from Ethiopia to Kenya. It seems that most of the refugees have economic motive for departure to Kenya rather than political motive. The information gathered from the Ethiopian and the Kenyan side shows that the Ethiopian refugees have a desire to reach to South Africa by crossing Kenyan, Tanzanian and Mozambique borders. This illegal migration produced several dangers on the refugees that are using risk-ful roads such as to hide from Kenyan security forces. The Kenyan government established controlling centers and detained Ethiopian refugees who were trying to cross the common boundary. This also put the Ethiopian government under pressure. Refugees are not only going to Kenya but they are crossing other dangerous areas including Bossaso in

Somalia. This entails the frustration of the youth (young productive force).The Ethiopian government needs to create additional job opportunity to curve the problem of refugees.

The terrorist threat in the two countries is addressed by different measures. Each country is doing its own homework. Drafting anti-Terrorism Law, training security forces to combat terrorism and approaching the Muslim communities are some of the strategies in fighting terrorism. Besides, Ethiopia and Kenya have communications on terrorist incidents. They have cooperation with the US in combating terrorism in the region. CJTFHOA (Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa) is one of such forces that are working with Ethiopia and Kenya. The US have given training for Ethiopian and Kenyan security forces, and for Ethiopian NBE anti-money laundering measures. This multilateral effort also considered the backward areas in the coastal areas of Kenya. Muslim communities in the coastal areas of Kenya viewed as they are victims by Christian crusaders; the victimization narratives of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabbab radicalized Muslim communities in Kenya. Moreover, the Anti-Terror-Police-Units (ATPUs) in Kenya are accused of harassing Kenyan Muslims. Hence, the rights of Muslim communities should be protected. They have to get access to education, health service and other basic necessities. This can dry the source of terrorism in the Ethiopian and Kenyan Muslim communities.

There are factors that assist the Ethio-Kenyan security cooperation. The involvement of the two countries in the peace process of Somalia and Sudan has tremendous outcomes. Even though the complicated nature of the Somali politics rendered the establishment of central government, there are prospects for the coming of days that will declare a better Somalia. The African Union Mission in Somalia has controlled certain areas in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. The TFG has discussed with moderate sections of the UIC. The Ethiopian and Kenyan governments together with IGAD played a role in strengthening the capacity of the TFG. They have trained Somali soldiers that can assist in protecting the peace and stability of Somalia. If Somalia established a central power that can provide basic government functions, Ethiopia and Kenya would have a relief from terrorist threat from Somalia and the infiltration of ONLF into the Ogaden. This task is not the sole responsibility of Ethiopia and Kenya; much is needed from IGAD, AU and UN. Similarly, the peace process in Sudan has brought

a cease-fire between the Sudan government and the SPLM/A. South Sudan held referendum and decided to establish a new state. This achievement is partly the role of Ethiopian and Kenyan government as well as IGAD. Sudan is the largest country in the continent, and whatever happen in Sudan, it will affect the neighboring countries of Ethiopia and Kenya. After the 1995 Sudanese government involvement in exporting Islamic ideology to the region, the relations of neighboring countries with Khartoum strained. When Eritrea and Ethiopia fought in 1998, the Sudanese government approached Ethiopia and this re-established peaceful relation of the two countries. Subsequently, Ethiopia played a role in the Sudanese peace process.

The other opportunity in the security relations of the two countries is their position in the use of trans- boundary resources. Ethiopia and Kenya share trans-boundary resources and have agreements on the use of these resources. The River Omo is the largest River that flows to Lake Turkana. Ethiopia has built Gilgel Gibe I and II and is building Gilgel Gibe III. Despite oppositions from some Kenyan parliamentarians and NGOS, Ethiopia and Kenya agreed the building of Gigel Gibe III. When this project is finalized, Ethiopia will export 500MW electric power to Kenya. This has economic benefit for the peoples of the two countries. The position of Ethiopia and Kenya in the use of the Nile Waters is the same. They have denounced the 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan. This position is supported by other NBI (Nile Basin Initiative) member states. These countries signed CFA (Cooperative Framework Agreement) in May 14, 2010. They have opened the signature for a year time. Recently, Ethiopia has started the Grand Millenium Dam that is believed to generate 5,250MW, and the cost of the project is estimated at 80Billion Birr. The Ethiopian government vowed to finance this project solely by local sources. This success is the result of the cooperation of Kenya and other NBI member states.

Ethiopia is a landlocked country whose international trade relies on the ports of neighboring countries. The Djibouti port is the main access for Ethiopia to the international seas. The dependence of Ethiopia on a single country for its port service has been challenged the Ethiopian government. Hence, Ethiopia is looking for alternative ports in the rest of neighboring countries. Port Sudan, Berbera, Moyale ports are considered by the Ethiopian

government. Access to sea ports is important for the country's security. If it needs to import heavy weapons, the permission of the port owner country is necessary. If the country refuses, to allow the transfer of such equipments in war time, the countries sovereignty might be at stake. Therefore, Ethiopia's security cooperation with Kenya should be strengthen for this end. The Kenyan port of Mombassa is preferable for south and south west parts of Ethiopia that contributed Ethiopia's 20% of export. Besides, Kenya has no record of hostility with the Ethiopian government. Kenya offered its Mombassa Port when Eritrean insurgents blocked Ethiopia's ports in Derg time.

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**Appendix (1): list of key informants**

KEY INFORMANT	DATE AND PLACE OF INTERVIEW	POSITION&ORGANIZATION
Abdilwasa Abdilhi	10/10/2010.AAU at 4pm	Instructor at AAU,PSIR Department
Machani Natan	15/11/2010.Kenya Embassy. at 11pm	First Secretary of Kenya Embassy in Ethiopia
Masimba Laban	3/1/20011.Megenaga area at 2pm.	AU
Teshome Shumbe	10/10/2010.in MoFA Office. at 9am	Officer in MoFA, Neighboring countries Affairs

## **Appendix (2)** Interview Guideline Questions for MoFA

### Introduction

I am, Henok Merhatsidk a post graduate student in international Relations, AAU. I am doing my MA thesis on Security Factors affecting Ethio-Kenya Relations (post 1991) Challenges and Prospects. The main objective of the study is to look into Ethio-Kenya political and security relations in tackling both their domestic and external security threats.

Therefore your genuine information is highly appreciated and valuable for the study. I would like to assure you that confidentiality for your comments will be respected and will be used only for research purpose. I greatly appreciate and acknowledge your taking time to speak with me.

1. What are the main factors which calls for both Ethiopia and Kenya coordinated actions? How do you evaluate the role of external actors in mitigating these cross-cutting issues?
2. What are the major challenges for cooperation in Ethio-Kenya relations for integrated and sustainable trans boundary resource management, development and utilization? How do you evaluate the policy and political positions of the politicians and policy makers of the two states?
3. What are the major opportunities for Ethio-Kenya cooperation for integrated action in safeguarding peace and stability of their border area? Development of infrastructure, port use and energy trade endeavors.
4. How do you evaluate the role of the Ethiopian government in further expanding the Ethio-Kenya relations for better benefit of the people of the two countries?

## **Appendix (3)** Interview Guideline Questions for Kenyan Mission in Ethiopia

### Introduction

I am, Henok Merhatsidk a post graduate student in international Relations, AAU. I am doing my MA thesis on Security Factors affecting Ethio-Kenya Relations (post 1991) Challenges and Prospects. The main objective of the study is to look into Ethio-Kenya political and security relations in tackling both their domestic and external security threats.

Therefore your genuine information is highly appreciated and valuable for the study. I would like to assure you that confidentiality for your comments will be respected and will be used only for research purpose. I greatly appreciate and acknowledge your taking time to speak with me.

1. What are the main factors which calls for both Ethiopia and Kenya coordinated actions? How do you evaluate the role of external actors in mitigating these cross-cutting issues?
2. What are the major challenges for cooperation in Ethio-Kenya relations for integrated and sustainable Tran's boundary resource management, development and utilization? How do you evaluate the policy and political positions of the politicians and policy makers of the two states?
3. What are the major opportunities for Ethio-Kenya cooperation for integrated action in safeguarding peace and stability of the border area? Controlling the movement of armed Ethiopian opposition groups and threats that are coming from the failed state of Somalia?
4. How do you evaluate the role of the Kenyan government in further expanding the Ethio-Kenyan Relation for better benefit of the people of the two countries?

## **Appendix (4)** Interview Guideline Questions for Abdiwasa Abdilhi

### Introduction

I am, Henok Merhatsidk a post graduate student in international Relations, AAU. I am doing my MA thesis on Security Factors affecting Ethio-Kenya Relations (post 1991) Challenges and Prospects. The main objective of the study is to look into Ethio-Kenya political and security relations in tackling both their domestic and external security threats.

Therefore your genuine information is highly appreciated and valuable for the study. I would like to assure you that confidentiality for your comments will be respected and will be used only for research purpose. I greatly appreciate and acknowledge your taking time to speak with me.

1. How do you evaluate the Ethio-Kenya relations in safeguarding the peace and stability of their common border? What are the major threats for Ethio-Kenya security?
2. How do you evaluate the involvement of Ethiopia and Kenya in the peace process of Sudan and Somalia? What are the spillover effects of conflict in Somalia and Sudan for Ethiopia and Kenya?
3. How do you evaluate the security situation in the Ogaden Region of Ethiopia? What are the main causes for the lingering problem in that particular part of Ethiopia?
4. How do you see the impact of Ethiopian government policies and actions in solving security issues in Ogaden?

## **Appendix (5)** Interview Guideline Questions for Masimba Laban

### Introduction

I am, Henok Merhatsidk a post graduate student in international Relations, AAU. I am doing my MA thesis on Security Factors affecting Ethio-Kenya Relations (post 1991) Challenges and Prospects. The main objective of the study is to look into Ethio-Kenya political and security relations in tackling both their domestic and external security threats.

Therefore your genuine information is highly appreciated and valuable for the study. I would like to assure you that confidentiality for your comments will be respected and will be used only for research purpose. I greatly appreciate and acknowledge your taking time to speak with me.

1. What are the main factors that commanded the common actions of Ethiopia and Kenya? How do you evaluate the inter-state relations of the two countries?
2. How do you evaluate the participation of civil societies of Ethiopia and Kenya for strong relations of the peoples of the two countries?
3. How do you evaluate the level of infrastructure development that could link Ethiopia and Kenya? What are the main factors for the present level of infrastructure between the two countries?
4. How do you evaluate the positions of Ethiopia and Kenya in the peace process of Somalia and Sudan?

## Appendix (6)

Declaration page

Table 2: Intra –State Conflicts in and around the Horn of Africa

State	Selected Rebel Movements	Years of Origin	Motivation	Active Regional Backing
<b>Djibouti</b>	Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy	1991	Change of regime	Eritrea
<b>Eritrea</b>	Eritrea Islamic Jihad	1989	Change of regime	Sudan
	Eritrean Democratic Alliance	-	Change of regime	Ethiopia
	Afar Red Sea Democratic Front	1998	Autonomy	Ethiopia
<b>Ethiopia</b>	Eritrean Liberation Front	1961	Secession	Sudan, Somali, Egypt
	Eritrean People's Liberation Front	1972	Secession	Sudan, Saudi Arabia
	Tigray People's Liberation Front	1975	Autonomy and change of regime	Sudan
	Oromo Liberation Front	1976	Secession	Sudan, Somali, Eritrea
	Western Somali Liberation Front	1961/1976	Secession	Somali
	Ogaden National Liberation Front	1986	Secession	Eritrea
	Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front	1998	Change of regime	Eritrea
<b>Kenya</b>	Shifita war	1963	Secession	Somali
<b>Libya</b>	National Front for the Salvation of Libya	1981	Change of regime	Sudan
<b>Somali</b>	Somali Salvation Democratic Front	1979	Change of regime	Ethiopia
	Somali National Movement	1981	Secession	Ethiopia
	Al Itihad al Islamiya	1983	Islamization	Sudan, Ethiopia
	Somali Patriotic Movement	1989	Change of regime	-
	United Somali Congress	1989	Change of regime	Ethiopia
	Al Shabab Al Mujahedeen	2006	Change of regime	Eritrea
<b>Sudan</b>	Beja Congress	1958	Autonomy	Eritrea
	Anyanya	1960	Secession	Ethiopia
	Sudan People's Liberation Army	1983	Secession	Ethiopia, Libya, Uganda, Eritrea, Kenya
	National Democratic alliance	1995	Change of regime	Eritrea , Ethiopia
	Justice and Equality Movement	2003	Darfur	Eritrea , Chad
	Sudan Liberation Movement	2003	Darfur	Eritrea
<b>Uganda</b>	National Resistance Army	1981	Change of regime	-
	Lord's Resistance Army	1987	Autonomy	Sudan

Source: Compiled by