



# **Addis Ababa University**

**The Effect of Ethnic Federalism on Employment and Promotion in the  
Federal Institutions of Ethiopia**

**A Thesis Submitted to Department of Political Science and International  
Relations of AAU in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Art in Political Science and Diplomacy**

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**The Impact of Ethnic Federalism on Employment and Promotion Opportunity in the  
Federal Institutions of Ethiopia**

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## **STATEMENT OF DECLARATION**

I declare that this study “The Impact of Ethnic Federalism on Employment and Promotion Opportunity in the Federal Institutions of Ethiopia” is my own work. It has not been submitted for any award in this or any other institution. And that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Selamawit Kuma

Signature.....

**STATEMENT OF CERTIFICATION**

This is to certify that Selamawit Kuma has carried out this research work on the topic entitled "The Impact of Ethnic Federalism on Employment and Promotion Opportunity in the Federal Institutions of Ethiopia" under my supervision. This work is original in nature and it is sufficient for submission for the partial fulfillment for the award of Degree of Masters of Art in political Science and Diplomacy.

Professor, Merera Gudina

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Date.....

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## **ACRONYMS AND ABBRIVIATIONS**

ADP	Amhara Democratic Party
ANDM	Amhara National Democratic Movement
CBVT	Competing Bureaucratic Values Theory
EPP	Ethiopian Prosperity Party
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
HOF	House of Federation
HPR	House of People's Representative
NEPSE	National Employment Policy and Strategy of Ethiopia
ODF/P	Oromo Democratic Front/Party
SEPDM	Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Movement
SNNPR	Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region
TPLF	Tigrayan People's Liberation Front

## **Abstract**

*Despite the advantages, one of the disadvantages of ethnic federalism is the competition between ethnic groups for resources. This competition will lead to ethnic bias when the leader is from ethnic-based party. Three decades have passed since the introduction of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. This study assesses the effect of ethnic federalism on recruitment and promotion of employees of federal institutes. It assesses the check and balance mechanism to control ethnic domination, the employment and promotion procedures and their applicability, the existence of ethnic favoritism and its effect on the private sector. Both primary and secondary data are employed. Survey questionnaire, semi structured interview and review of related literatures have been used to write this thesis. The research questions are addressed using descriptive research design. The findings of the study confirm the literatures that ethnic favoritism is prevalent in Ethiopian ethnic federalism while recruiting, promoting and transferring of public employees. There is no strong check and balance mechanism to control ethnic domination. Even though the positioning and employment policy and procedure is in place, it is less applicable and employees are favored based on their ethnic background. The ethnic favoritism brought an impact on the performance of the private sector, one of the pillars for economic development, making the federal institutions less effective in implementing policies and delivering quality service.*

*Key Words: Ethnic, Favoritism, Federalism, Recruitment, Positioning*

# Chapter One

## 1. Background

Because a major objective of a federal political system is the maintenance and protection of territorially based constituent communities, there is usually a clash between the pressures for regional equality and citizens' equality in the arrangements for representation in the shared institutions (Watt, 1998). As King (1993) has noted, most federations have sought to balance these two types of equality in representation within their shared institutions. A crucial variable affecting the achievement of such a balance and the internal political dynamics of federations have been the executive-legislature relationship within the shared institutions (Watt, 1998).

Since the introduction of ethnic politics in 1991, Ethiopia has been ruled by the founder party the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) for more than a quarter of a century and its successor, the Prosperity Party. EPRDF was composed of four main ethnic-based parties: The Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the Oromo Democratic Party (ODF), the Amhara Democratic Party (ADP) and the Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Movement (SEPDM). In practice the Prime Minister is selected from members of the House of Peoples Representatives in a majority vote and approved by same. The selected Prime Minister heads the central government and controls the regional government at the same time. The Prime Minister is responsible for realizing the regional ambition of the ethnic-based parties and the ambition of the central government which contains the federal government offices and multiethnic cities.

The Prime Minister has extensive powers in the central government, and the other ministers are accountable to him (Aalen, 2002). The Ethiopian system of non-judicial constitutional review does not serve to protect the human rights of its citizens because it leaves the federal and state governments with virtually unlimited power. The executive branch has the power to do as it wishes with no judicial check on its activities. In the absence of a legitimate mechanism to review the constitutionality of the executive branch's acts and decrees, the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers possess unbridled political power (Chi, Melisa *et al*, 2008).

Unrestricted power with dual interests of regional and federal governments challenges the Prime Minister to control the balance where the ethnic-based party is well satisfied while the federal interest not compromised. Ethnic-based executives are prone to ethnic favoritism in different ways including targeted employment in public institutions. Federal institutions employ significant number of people in addition to city administrations and the private sector. Employment opportunity in shared institutions has to be neutral from ethnic bias, examining the employment practice of federal institutions through the government of the Prime Minister from different ethnic-based parties is important to understand the effect of ethnic politics on employment and promotion.

## **2. Statement of the Problem**

The public sector is a major formal sector employer in urban areas. It accounts for almost two-thirds of formal sector employment and 68% of employment among those with higher education (National Employment Policy and Strategy of Ethiopia, 2009) implying its significant contribution in the reduction of unemployment. However, due to ethnic/linguistic federalism, the employment opportunities of the public sector are diminished if not closed for urban inhabitants that are multiethnic and speakers of Amharic language in regional governments. These people have lost opportunities for regional and local employment because of the policy of local language use in administration and education (Aklilu, 2000: 26). Consequently, this group of society is forced to look for an employment opportunity in federal institutes and city administrations intended not to ask polyglot.

A federal system based on ethnic identities, particularly one with an overwhelming presence of a single party, influences the development of a bureaucracy that identifies ethnically and politically with the executive leadership of the dominant party (Vogel, 2005). This development further reinforces the predominance of executive leadership to the detriment of neutral competence (Paul, 2000; Rohr, 2002) thus overriding the selection, promotion and transfer of civil servants on the basis of competence and merit (Ingraham, 1995). The extent to which the civil service is representative of the polity comes into question in a single-party state, especially when that party is representative of a single minority ethnic group (Vogal, 2016).

Ethnic favoritism is a global phenomenon not restricted to Africa, poor countries, or autocracies (Giacomo et.al, 2018). Ethnically organized government is prone to discrimination in distribution of public goods. Public employment and transfer is one of the mechanisms to shift public expenditure to a specific group. Governors use targeted employment and transfer to increase the flow of public expenditure to specific group (Easterly & Alesina, 1999). In Africa, ethnic identities have comprised the key basis on which clientelistic coalitions have been built. Political leaders have allocated public resources and amenities to key intermediaries and their ethnic clienteles in ways designed to fashion a following and ensure political support (Ayee, 2008).

An inequitable distribution of power among the ethnic and linguistic groups at the federal level is a prominent problem and source of conflicts in Ethiopia (Legesse, 2016). The practice demonstrates that bases for recruitment into the Ethiopian public sector has largely shifted from the principles of meritocracy (educational qualification and experience) towards factors such as nepotism, political patronage (godfatherism), and ethnicity (Henok, 2018) which affect equal employment opportunity.

Equal employment opportunity can be influenced by multiple factors. The concept of equal employment opportunities refers to: sex, race, color, gender, belonging to a marginalized group, ethnicity, language, nationality, social background, religion or belief, other beliefs, education, political affiliation, personal or social status, mental or physical disability, age, family or marital status, property status, health status or any other basis which is envisaged by the law or by a signed international treaty (Stoilkovska et.al, 2015). Transparency Ethiopia (2011) indicated that despite the fact that the context and the purposes have completely changed, seeking political patronage still perpetuates in post-1991 Ethiopia. Political patronage is considered as an important mechanism to have access to employment and resources such as land, credit services and the like. The civil service structures and other benefits generated by state – led development were frequently manipulated by the government apparatus and ruling elites as a source of patronage (Tesfaye, 2011).

As ethnicity is one factor affecting equal employment opportunity, the ethnic-based federalism of Ethiopia, its effect on assuring equal employment opportunity in shared federal institutions

and its long run effect in the private sector has to be examined. In addition, the effect of ethnic federalism on transfers and positioning in public institution as well has to be assessed.

### **3. Objective of the Study**

The study aims to assess ethnic federalism and its effects mainly on employment, promotion and transfer in federal institutions.

#### **3.1 General Objective**

The study intends to assess the effects of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia and its influence in insuring equal employment opportunity and maintain bureaucratic values in promotion and transfer of employees of shared institutes. The related impact in the private sector will also be assessed.

#### **3.2 Specific Objectives**

- To assess the existence of framework to check and balance ethnic dominance in federal institutions
- To assess the positioning and employment practice of federal institutions
- To assess the ethnic favoritism in employment and promotion of federal institutions under the two different Prime Ministers from different ethnic groups
- To assess the effect of the ethnic favoritism on the activities of the private sector

### **4. Research Questions**

Upon completion the research it is aimed to answer the following general and specific questions.

#### **4.1 General Research Question**

Has the ethnic federalism in Ethiopia an effect on employment opportunity in federal institutes?  
Does ethnic dominance in shared institutions affect the private sector?

#### **4.2 Specific Research Question**

- Do the federal institutions have a framework to check and balance ethnic dominance?

- What is the positioning and employment practice of federal institutions?
- Are the shared institutions practice ethnic favoritism in employment/promotion under the two different Prime Ministers from different ethnic groups?
- Does ethnic favoritism affect the activities of the private sector?

## **5. Scope**

The purpose of the study is to examine the effect of ethnic federalism on the employment and recruitment of federal institutions. Since regional governments are required language proficiency as per their respective region, ethnicity as an employment factor raised as an issue only in federal and chartered cities. Thus, the study focuses on federal institutions. Employment opportunity on federal institutes can be negatively affected by different political and sociological factors however this research focuses on the effect of Ethic based federalism.

Since the focus of the study is Ethnic federalism, the study covers the period under which the county introduced federalism. Federal institution can be Federal legislative organs, federal independent constitutional agencies, judiciary, Federal government ministries or federal (Executive) administrative agencies. However this research focuses on Federal government ministries or federal (Executive) administrative agencies which are institutes under the executive body.

## **6. Limitation of the Study**

The study is intended to assess ethnicity and its effects on equal employment opportunity on federal institutions. In developed countries ethnically organized employment data is easily available or reported by a government organ. European Union member states such as Finland, Ireland and United Kingdom have laws obliging or promoting the collection of data relating to race and ethnic origin (Farkas, 2017). On the contrary in Ethiopia such reporting and transparency is not found and even difficult to organize due to the confidential nature of the issue. Therefore, the study is constrained by lack of governmental reports on the area that prohibited the researcher from using more rigorous research methodology.

The study focuses on share/federal institutions which reside in the Capital City. Among the federal institution it focuses on only Ministry Offices due to time and financial constraints.

## **7. Significance**

Even though most of us observe the ethnic dynamics of the bulk employer; federal institutions in accordance with the change of the ruling ethnic group, ethnicity has been given less emphasis as roadblock in insuring equal employment opportunity and improving bureaucratic values. Accordingly, this study aims in bringing the issue as a determinant factor of employment in federal institutes so as to consider in the process of insuring equal employment opportunity and improving the effectiveness of the institutions.

The output of the research can be used in the process of crafting policy concerning employment in public institutions as well as monitoring implementation of same. It can also be taken as an input and as an additional dimension in the study of Ethiopian ethnic federalism.

## **8. Organization of the study**

The study contains five chapters. The first chapter constitutes the back ground and introductory part of the thesis. Review of related theoretical and empirical literatures are presented in the second chapter. Chapter three describes the methodologies used to answer the research question.. Data analysis and presentation has been presented in the fourth chapter followed by the conclusion and recommendations based on the analysis in the fifth chapter.

## Chapter Two

### 2. Literature review

#### 2.1 Defining Concepts

##### 2.1.1. *What is Federalism?*

Michael (2006) argues that while such a thing as federal theory does exist, there is, as yet, no full-fledged theory of federalism. However, the widely used definition of Federalism is a system in which two (or more) levels of government combine elements of *shared-rule* through common institutions and *regional self-rule* for the governments of the constituent units” (Watts, 1996).

The national government exercises authority over the whole nation, whereas the government of the constituent units exercises independent authority within their own territories. The system insures self-rule parallel with shared rule to accommodate unity with diversity. The revival of federalism may have traced back from the beginning of the 1990s. The origin of the revival is usually linked with the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet System (Lepine, 2012). According to the Forum of Federation currently, there are roughly 25 federal countries in the world which together represent 40 per cent of the most complex democracies like India, the United States, Brazil, Germany and México. Of the eight largest countries in the world by area, seven are organized on a federal basis. These are Russia, Canada, the United States, Brazil, Australia, India and Argentina while China, the third largest is a unitary state.

Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa are countries commonly referred in studies concerning the African experience of Federalism. African states are either less interested or have a general distaste for federalism (Gebeye, 2020). Although government power is decentralized to different levels in many states, the overwhelming majority of African countries have rejected a constitutionally sanctioned federal structure of government (Adem , 2013). Out of the 54 states, only a handful of them adopt federalism. While Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa are established African federal states, the Union of Comoros, Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Somalia can be considered as federalist states (Berihun, 2020).

The major intent of federalism is to peacefully reconcile unity and diversity within a single political system. Federalism deals simultaneously with fundamental moral questions (respect, tolerance, dignity and mutual recognition) as well as with amoral matter-of-fact (territorial expansion or economic benefits and security) (Michel, 2006) this and other complex problems make it difficult for scholars in the area as well as the political society while practicing. However, despite its theoretical and practical drawbacks it is believed that it is a political system suitable for the contemporary needs and quests arising. Watt, (2007) depicts the idea as "Given the dual pressures throughout the world, for larger political units capable of fostering economic development and improved security on the one hand, and for smaller political units more sensitive to their electorates and capable of expressing local distinctiveness on the other, federal solutions have had an increasing appeal throughout the world". Yet, there are questions concerning the practicability of the federal political system.

In spite of the American model, which referred as one of the best known types of federal political system and which believed that it corresponds theory and practice, many of the newly-established federations in formerly colonized areas in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean failed, as did the longer-lived and in some quarters much admired federations of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Even the oldest and most stable federations, like Canada, have experienced significant pressures of disintegration (Smith, 2007).According to Weingast, (2014) looking around the world, it is clear that most countries have difficulty adhering to constitutional and political rules supporting critical national institutions, such as federalism, democracy, and the market. The political reality in most developing countries implies, according to Weingast, (2005) unstable regimes that typically use various forms of rents, subsidies, and market intervention to make political deals necessary to survive. These political forces work against implementing the type of federal system just outlined, in part because it forces political officials to break the deals used to maintain power.

Watt (2006) argued that this is not because of the formal federal arrangements and techniques in any one political system rather it differs in accordance with the context within which they are

given effect by those who administer the state. The stability of federalism also rose as a more general problem.

### ***2.1.2 What is Ethnicity?***

The terms “ethnic group” or “ethnicity” have been studied by a range of disciplines including statistics, demography, political science, sociology, history, ethnology, and anthropology, as well as geography and psychology but without agreement on their definitions across or even within disciplines, as researchers differ in perceiving their content and scope. (Hamer, McFarland, et.al 2020) Ethnicity has been a debated topic and there is no single definition or theory of how ethnic groups are formed. (Baumann, 2004)

According to John Hutchinson and Anthony Smith (1996), the term “ethnicity” is relatively new, first appearing in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1953, but its English origins are connected to the term “ethnic,” which has been in use since the middle Ages. The true origins of “ethnic” have been traced back to Greece and the term *ethnos*, which was used in reference to band, tribe, race, a people, or a swarm.

There are also attempts to summarize the common elements to give a general definition for the term. In this regard Smith (1986), tried to define ethnicity by listing six essential attributes. These are collective name, common myth of descent, shared history, distinctive shared culture (comprising language, religion), institutions and/or other cultural characteristics with a specific territory, and lastly a sense of ethnic solidarity which is recognition of each other as members of the same ethnic group.

### ***2.1.3. Federal Institutions***

Federalism requires power-sharing between federal institutions and those at the subnational level, such that neither level of government has absolute power (Bulmer, 2015). The Constitution confers enumerated powers and responsibilities upon the Federal Government of Ethiopia. It has the power, to formulate and implement national policies, plans and strategies concerning the overall economic and social developments. It is empowered by the Constitution to formulate and execute national policies and strategies in the financial and monetary areas, as well as for the

utilization and conservation of natural resources. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government to set country wide standards in concerning public health, education, science and technology, as well as for the preservation of cultural and historical sites. In addition to the more customary functions of the Federal Government in the spheres of defense, foreign relations inter-state and international trade and commerce there are also various responsibilities. To name few, power to enact laws concerning the utilization of land and other natural resources, enforcement of political rights enshrined by the Constitution, electoral laws and procedures, the penal, commercial and labor codes of the country.

The government is not only responsible for crafting appropriate policy but also build capable public institutions to implement same. Inadequate public sector capacity undermines policy effectiveness (Loayza and Woolcock, 2020). A policy does not become a public policy until it is adopted, implemented, and enforced by some government institution. The public sector consists of governments and all publicly controlled publicly funded agencies, enterprises, and other entities that deliver public programs, goods, or services. Core governments include all departments, ministries, or branches of the government that are integral parts of the structure, and are accountable to and report directly to the central authority the legislature, council, cabinet, or executive head. (Dube and Danescu, 2021). The prevailing government of Ethiopia, under the executive organ announced 22 minister offices and 20 institutions which are directly accountable to the Prime Minister's office.

#### ***2.1.4. Public Service/Civil Service***

Public service, particularly, refers to those activities of government institutions aimed at satisfying the needs and ensuring the well-being of society as well as enforcing laws, regulations and directives of the government. Service is generally any activity undertaken to meet social needs (Midaksa, 2018). Duguit (1923) define Public Service as every activity of general interest which is of such an importance to the entire collectivity that those in authority are under a duty to insure its accomplishment in an absolutely continuous manner, even by the use of force. Those in authority are thus under a duty to insure without interruption the operation of the public services, because they are, as members of the society like all the rest, subject to the social

discipline which obliges them to act in conformity to their condition and means of action (Duguit, 1923).

It is difficult to put a clear boundary as to what services to be included or excluded in public service. There are writers attached public services to the core government services and others define civil service including services given by the private sector and nonprofit organizations. According to Spicker (2009), Public services have been misunderstood. They are not simply services in the public sector, they are not necessarily there because of “market failure”, and they cannot be analyzed by the same criteria as market-based provision. They have four defining characteristics. They exist for reasons of policy; they provide services to the public; they are redistributive; and they act as a trust. They consequently operate differently from production for profit, in their priorities, costs, capacity and outputs. (Spicker, 2009)

On the other hand Civil services are those in which the preponderance of non-elected public sector jobs are filled through a process of credentialing based on education, examination, or some other test of merit; in which a career ladder exists and is accessed through regularized demonstration of credentials of education, examination, tenure in office, or other form of assessing merit; in which tenure is secure barring malfeasance in office; and in which movement in and out (through retirement, for example) is regulated and compensated (Hilderbrand and Grindle, 1995). It is a vehicle through which public policies get implemented for the development of the society as a whole (Legesse and Ahmed, 2019).

According to FDRE Proclamation No 61 released on July 2015 Public Servant is monthly salaried person employed permanently or for definite period or piece of work in a public office, public enterprise or project or program carried out by government, and includes government appointees, members of parliament, members of the defense force and the police. Whereas Civil Servant means a person employed by a Federal government institution; provided, however, that it may not include the following:

a) Government officials with rank of state minister, deputy director general and their equivalent and above;

b) Members of the House of People’s Representatives and the House of the Federation;

c) Federal judges and prosecutors;

d) Members of the Armed Forces and the Federal Police including other employees governed by the regulations of the Armed Forces and the Federal Police;

## **2.2 Theories on Federalism**

### ***2.2.1 Characteristics of Federalism***

Federalism as a system of government has the following common characteristics as summarized by (Sawer, 1976):

1. An independent country with a central government that has the institutionalized power to govern the whole of the country;
2. The country is divided into separate geographical regions which have their own institutions of government to govern in their particular regions;
3. The power to govern is distributed between central and regional governments;
4. The distribution of power between the central and regional governments is set out in a constitution and is rigidly entrenched by the constitution so that it cannot be amended by the central government or any region or regions;
5. The constitution contains rules to determine any conflict of authority between the center and the regions. In most constitutions, the general rule is that the law of the central government will prevail; and
06. The distribution of powers between the central and regional governments is interpreted and policed by a judicial authority. The judicial authority has the constitutional power to make binding decisions about the validity of legislation and government action, or where there is a conflict of the laws of the central and regional governments (cited in Evans, 2010, p.19).

Despite these common characteristics, federalism can be formed as

### **1. Holding together, coming together and putting together**

Federations are seen as democracies that are created either through the integration of independent states or the devolution of power to sub-national units (Muluye, 2020). Watt, (2008) identifies three ways of federalism formation; the first is through the aggregation of former separate subunits, the second is through devolution from a former unitary state, and the third is through a combination of aggregation and devolution. On the other hand, Stepan, (2001) summarized the formation of federation in to three types, coming together, holding together and putting together federations. Coming-together federalism refers to the formation of a federal state from prior sovereign states. It is formed by the voluntary agreement of formerly individual polities characterized by a sense of sovereignty and identity (Muluye, 2020). Holding-together federalism refers to the formation of a federal state from the preexisting subunits in a former unitary state. These federations are established through democratic dialogue to curtail separatist tendencies in a unitary state (Ibid) and Putting together federations are formed through “devolution of power” like holding together federations. However, these federations are established through coercive procedures without democratic bargaining among the concerned actors. The direction of empowerment in a coming-together federalism is towards the Union or central government, while in a holding-together federalism it is towards the constituent units (Maru, 2008).

The classic examples for Coming-together federalism consist of the United States, Switzerland, and Australia, while many post-Second World War federal states such as Nigeria and Belgium are Holding-together federalism, whereas Canada and India combine the features of both Coming-together and Holding together federalism (Watt,n.d). Regarding the African Experience, in 1954 British colonial authorities had brought together peoples of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and thereafter became a ‘holding together’ federation in Nigeria (Babalola, 2015). South Africa is used as a useful example to show the devolution of power and the daring nature of regional states (Maru, 2008).

Despite the lack of consciences whether the Ethiopian federation is formed by coming together (Eshete, 2003), putting together (Muluye, 2020, Aroney, 2016) or holding together (Fiseha, 2006) a number of literatures agreed that it has a feature of holding together federalism formation.

According to Eshete (2003) the ‘bargain’ that led to the formation of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia was offered by a ‘revolutionary overthrow of a unitary state.’ Thus, the Ethiopian federation is a result of the coming together of the country’s ethnic groups who freely decided to reconstruct their shared political community on a new basis.

The need to reduce group conflict, demonstrate respect for diversity, and the commitment to protect the integrity of the culture of different groups is one of the utmost justifications given for entering into a federal arrangement (Mandebo, 2009). Then the federalism Ethiopian can be considered as holding together federalism.

Noting to the supremacy of the dominant party EPRDF during the negotiation of restructuring the country in to federal states, Muluye (2020) argue that the federal arrangement was imposed by the dominant power (TPLF/EPRDF) rather than being resulted from a democratic, inclusive, and impartial federal bargaining. The absence of an organization that could represent Amhara during the Peace Conference, exclusion of the major political organizations from the conference and the aftermath processes as well as the inhuman and extrajudicial treatments against those who were explaining their discontent in the restructuring processes are some of the justification provided by the author to level Ethiopia’s federation as putting together.

Similarly, Madebo (2009), notes that “what appeared to be a holding together” federation in 1991, ended up evolving into ‘putting together” federation in 1994 when the TPLF controlled ethnic parties created federal states where administrative power was devolved to the states while political power was monopolized by the center; and the center was TPLF.

## **2. Symmetrical or Asymmetrical**

Symmetry and asymmetry federation is about the degree of autonomy the constituent units assumed. Symmetrical model is one which comprises political units constituting equality in terms of territorial area and inhabitants, semblance in economic condition, social assemblage, and various institutions of the state concerning politics (Tariq, 2020). All subnational units have equal juridical status and powers (Bulmer, 2015). All the federating units have equal representation in the central legislature by showing their support for the activities of the federal government so as to distribute their resources among the units in a just and harmonious way (Tillin, 2007). The federalism of United States is commonly mentioned as an example of symmetrical federalism.

In contrast to the symmetrical federalism, asymmetrical federalism is a form of federalism in which different parts of a country's territory have different degrees of autonomy (Bulmer, 2015). In asymmetrical federalism the diversities in the larger society express their political representation through the system of local government having varying degrees of autonomy and power (Tariq, 2020). Asymmetry is usually although not necessarily a product of 'holding together' federalism (Bulmer, 2015). Aroney, (2016) as well indicated the relationship between holding together and asymmetric federalism. There seems to be a relationship between formally devolutionary elements in the construction of a federation and asymmetries in the treatment of the constituent political units, and vice versa in the case of aggregative federations. This is because, as Bulmer, (2015) when independent states are coming together to form a federation, they usually do so on equal terms, but when an existing country is dividing itself into federalized components in order to accommodate desires for autonomy, it often has to accommodate different parts of the country to different extents, depending on the different intensities of separate identity or interest, rooted in cultural, historical or geographic particularities.

The dimension of the relationship between the central government and the constituent units could be vertical, horizontal or sectorial. Vertical dimension implies the relationship between the political center and the regions (bottom-top/top-bottom model), while horizontal dimension refers to the variations that exist among the federating units in terms of political and economic power.

The sole aim of asymmetry federalism is to bring unity among the units and between the center and the federating units without ignoring the diversities of different types among units for acquiring political stability (Tariq, 2020). Canada, Spain, India, Germany, Malaysia, Russia, United Kingdom etc. are examples of countries having asymmetrical distribution of powers among the federation and the constituent units.

The Ethiopian ethnic-based federalism is horizontally asymmetric in the rights provided to the ethnic groups. Only five ethnic groups from about 80 are granted their own ethnic regions in contrast to the right given for all ethnic groups for self-determination. SNNPR confined more than one ethnic group in a single ethnic region. There are also inequalities among the regions in terms of population and territorial size. Some of the regions such as Oromia, Amhara and Somali are territorially too big with the resultant administrative and logistic difficulties, while such regions as Harari, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella are too small with the difficulty of ensuring their economic viability (Asymmetries).

Vertical asymmetry refers to the dominance of the federal government and the ruling party over the regions or vice versa. The Ethiopian constitution gives authority to the federal government to formulate and implement overall economic, social and development policies. The constituent units similarly granted authority on same issues within their regional boundary. While differ in practice; Ethiopia established a centralized federation where policy decisions come from the center and the sub-units are responsible for implementation (Andreas, 2003). The financial dependency of regional states on the federal government is another factor of vertical asymmetry in Ethiopian federalism.

### **3. Bicameral or Unicameral**

In federal government system commonly there are three branches of government, the executive, judiciary and legislative. Bicameralism is having the legislative divided in two separate bodies. It is an essential feature of federalism. It is indispensable for a federation to safeguard the rights of smaller units and to accommodate the diversity in the legislature (Khan, 2017). Unicameral is when the legislative is not divided which is typical in small countries with unitary system of

government like Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Israel and New Zealand (Britannica) however, unitary system of government does not necessarily imply unilateralism.

The classic example of bicameral system is the congress of the United States, which consists of a House of Representatives, with 435 members elected for two-year terms from single member districts of approximately equal population and a Senate, consisting of two persons from each state elected by the voters of that state. Theoretically the dualism in the bicameral system is justified as an application of the principle of check and balances (Ibid).

The Ethiopian federal system as well has three branches of government the executive, the judiciary and the legislative. Like most countries the Federal Legislature is made up of two Chambers the House of Peoples' Representatives and the House of Federation (Article 53).

The House of Peoples' Representatives, known as the lower chamber, is the highest authority of the Federal Government (Article 50, 3). Members of the House of Peoples' Representatives shall be elected by the People for a term of five years (Article 54, 1). Members of the House, on the basis of population and special representation of minority Nationalities and Peoples, shall not exceed 550; of these, minority Nationalities and Peoples shall have at least 20 seats (Article, 3).

The House has granted with a number of Powers and Functions listed under Article 55 of the constitution including power of legislation in all matters assigned by the Constitution to Federal jurisdiction and the power to call and to question the Prime Minister and other Federal officials and to investigate the Executive's conduct and discharge of its responsibilities.

The House of the Federation, known as the upper chamber, is composed of representatives of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. Each Nation, Nationality and People shall be represented in the House of the Federation by at least one member. Each Nation or Nationality shall be represented by one additional representative for each one million of its population (Article 61,62). Members of the House of the Federation shall be elected by the State Councils or they may hold elections to have the representatives elected by the people directly.

The House has the power to interpret the Constitution, organize the Council of Constitutional Inquiry and in accordance with the Constitution, decide on issues relating to the rights of

Nations, Nationalities and Peoples to self-determination, including the right to secession. Moreover, there are a number of Powers and Functions of the House of the Federation listed under Article 62.

#### **4. Parliamentary or Presidential**

There are two common forms of democratic government system; Presidential and parliamentary form of government which based their differences on the relationship between the executive and the legislative body of government. Among the most important variables of difference between the presidential and parliamentary government system are the methods of selecting and removing the head of government. There are a number of advantages and disadvantages accompanied in each of the systems.

Parliamentary system, originated from Great Britain, is a democratic form of government in which the party (or a coalition of parties) with greatest representation in the parliament (legislature) forms the government, its leader becoming the Prime Minister or chancellor. Executive functions are exercised by members of the parliament appointed by the Prime Minister to the cabinet. Parliamentary form of government is the form of Constitutional democracy in which executive authority emerged from, and is responsible to the legislative authority (Griffith, Booth & Ryle, 1989). In the parliamentary form of government, there is a tight legislative-executive relation. The later depends on the former for its legitimacy of its power and authority (Ahmed, 2011). Parliamentary government system is mainly characterized by

- Close relation between the legislature and executive and share power with each other
- Cabinet formed by the parliament and parliament is the superior organ
- There are two executives i.e. the elected president or king and the Prime Minister. The president represents state while the Prime Minister represents government.
- Cabinet is responsible before the legislature

In a parliamentary system of government, the executive and the legislative body of government has closer relationship. Parliamentary system of government creates a friendly relationship between the executive and legislative body of government since they are not separated. When the

legislative and executive arms of the government in a parliamentary system of government are join together, it is usually faster and quicker for decisions to be made. Due to the fusion of the legislative and the executive organ of government less personnel and cost are required to run cabinet system of government.

On the other hand, parliamentary system of government makes members of the parliament to become too powerful that might also lead to abuse of political power. Because the Prime Minister is directly elected by virtue of being the leader of his party he/she becomes loyal to the party rather than the people. Unlike the presidential system of government that assure the stability of the government and the continuity of policies, the parliamentary system of government is prone to uncertainty of the tenure of office of the Prime Minister as the parliament can give a vote of confidence to dismiss the Prime Minister an any time. The fusion of the legislative and the executive functions in the members of the cabinet may overburden the members of the cabinet with double functions and some ministers may not cope well. There may also lack specialization of the art of governance from the ministers to handle one or the other organ of the government.

The presidential system is a government system in which the head of government, the president, is popularly elected, either directly by the people or by means of an Electoral College system such as in the United States (Sargentich, 1993). The system mainly is characterized by

- The head of the government is the president. She/he is elected by popular vote for a fixed term. The president is not a member of the legislature.
- The president can assign any person whom she/he considers fit to head any government department.
- At a time, no person may hold office in more than one of the three branches of government

In presidential system of government, the president makes decision on his/her own without the need to call for the executive unless receiving mere advice if needed. The system allows prompt decision making unlike the parliamentary system of government where the Prime Minister is

always at pains to secure the support of the cabinet, and unanimity of opinions among its members.

The other advantage of the presidential system of government is that the President has a free hand in appointing his/her ministers and other government appointees. Ministers could be chosen from outside the president's party. Since the bulk stops at his desk, the president can easily replace or fire any of his appointees because they are directly responsible to him. The fact that the electorate popularly elects the president makes the whole country a single constituency for him/her, and as such, the party does not have an overbearing control over him/her, beyond offering him/her advice at party caucuses. This constitutes a consistent source of pressure on him to perform since he cannot shift blame to any other person. The mechanism of separation of power in presidential system of government enhances the effective performance of each arm of government in its functions while checks and balances also ensures that a president who by nature is dictatorial can be brought under constitutional checks.

Apart from the number of advantages presidential system of government has there are issues raised as a downside. As a result of enormous power is concentrated in the office of the president, the presidential system is prone to dictatorship or abuse of office, which is dangerous to the democratic process. Delay of execution of government programs is also another disadvantage of the system. Separation of powers can cause delays in the execution of government programs, especially in situations where executive-legislative relations are not properly managed. A water tight separation of power often inhibits the smooth running of government, especially if attempt by one organ to moderate the activities of the other through the mechanism of checks and balances is being resisted. The operation of the presidential system has been criticized for being too rigid and not amenable to changing circumstances. Another disadvantage of the Presidential system is that it is very expensive to run. The parliamentary system is considered to be more cost effective since it is from the elected members of the parliament that the Prime Minister and other ministers, who constitute the nation's cabinet, are appointed.

Ethiopia followed parliamentary system of Government where the head of the state is the president and the Prime Minister heads the government. The Prime Minister and his/her cabinet are accountable for the legislative.

### ***2.2.2 Ethnic Federalism***

Federalism is a system of government that constitutes two or more levels of government aimed to insure self-rule and shared rule (Watt, 2008). The central government exercise shared rule and the constituent units exercise self-rule with their respective power of autonomy. The way the federalism is organized defines the nature of the constituent units. In coming together federalism the constituent units have their own territorial boundary and sovereignty which most of the time keep their identity as a constituent unit. When independent states are coming together to form a federation, they usually do so on equal terms, but when an existing country is dividing itself into federalized components in order to accommodate desires for autonomy, it often has to accommodate different parts of the country to different extents, depending on the different intensities of separate identity or interest, rooted in cultural, historical or geographic particularities (Bulmer, 2015).

In the case of holding together federalism the constituent units are formed based on the consent of negotiating parties. The different political forces will actively engage and reach at a consensus on the main foundations of the federation. This type of federation is established to “maintain a unity of states by establishing a multi-ethnic federal system largely to avoid or settle ethnic, regional and other type of group conflict (Wondewosen & Zahorik, 2008).”Federations are essentially a territorial form of political organization (Watt, 2008). As independence approached, regionalism, ethnicity, religion, and economics took center stage in the political negotiations for self-determination (Gebeye, 2020).

As a means of safeguarding distinct groups or minorities, federalism do this best when those groups and minorities are geographically concentrated in such a way that they may achieve self-governance as a majority within a regional unit of government (Watts, n.d.).If ethnic, religious or linguistic communities are not concentrated in particular geographical areas, other ways of combining self-rule with shared rule might be preferable (Bulmer, 2015).Ethnic federalism is one

of the means to grant ethnic groups autonomous self-rule under a shared central government. The constituent units are organized based on ethnicity.

Ethnicity is more than skin color or physical characteristics, more than language, song, and dance. It is the embodiment of values, institutions, and patterns of behavior, a composite whole representing a people's historical experience, aspirations, and world view. Deprive a people of their ethnicity, their culture, and you deprive them of their sense of direction and purpose (Deng, 1997). Since ethnic passion has become the main reason of a vast number of wars, revolts and conflicts which are the major concern of government ethnicity does matter for politics (Saeed & Majeed, 2015). Ethnic groups try to develop their ethnic organization in the form of ethnic political party. The party mobilizes the in group and excludes the ethnic outsiders (Ibid).

A principal justification for ethnic federalism derives from the idea of ethno nationalism. Ethno nationalism is the belief that "proclaims the distinctiveness of a particular people and their right to self-rule in their homeland" (Gebreselassie, 2003). Federalism is a means of ensuring peace, stability and mutual accommodation in countries that have territorially concentrated differences of identity, ethnicity, religion or language (Bulmer, 2015). However, countries experience also indicates that in some cases it rather exacerbates ethnic conflict. While federalism has helped some countries settle conflicts or improve governance, it can also exacerbate existing differences, sometimes leading to deeper conflicts or state failure (Ibid). Multi-ethnic federations have been among the most difficult to sustain, as Nigeria, Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Canada, Belgium, and Spain, as well as the effort to federalize Europe, have illustrated. There is no doubt that fundamentally mono-cultural federations, such as the United States, Australia, and Germany have faced fewer difficulties (Watts, 1998).

A number of federations or semi-federations in Africa were designed to respond to the multi-ethnic reality that characterizes many of these post-colonial states. Yonatan (2012) as Wondwesen & Zahoric (2008) summarized, a number of writers conclude that ethnic federalism reduces ethnic groups' disparity and secession of regions, gives self-rule to ethnic groups and thus brings ethnic harmony. On the other hand, a group of writers argue ethnic federalism accentuates ethnic conflicts, increases secession, suppresses individual citizen's rights and eventually leads to the disintegration of countries (Wondwesen & Zahoric, 2008).

Watt (2007) responds to such comments as federations composed of different ethnic groups or nations may be unworkable or run the risk of suffering civil war. According to Watt, while these are certainly possibilities, the persistence of federal systems, despite evident difficulties, in such multi-ethnic or multi-national countries as Switzerland, Canada, India and Malaysia indicates that, with appropriately designed institutions, federal systems can be sustained and prosper in such countries (Watts, 2007).

Experience does indicate that countries with a federal form of government have often been difficult to govern; but then it has usually been because they were difficult countries to govern in the first place that they have adopted federal political institutions (Ibid).

In Africa, countries like Cameroon, Comoros, Congo DR, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda either follow federalism or have constitutions with strong federal flavor. (Wondwesen & Zahoric, 2008)

### ***2.2.3 Federalism in Ethiopia***

Ethiopia is one of the countries commonly appeared while searching for Ethnic Federalism. In 1991 the country introduced ethnic-based federalism and officially sanctioned in the 1994 constitution. The EPRDF taking power from the Military government transformed the centralized state into the Federal Democratic Republic and also redefined citizenship, politics and identity on ethnic grounds (Crisis Group, 2009).EPRDF dominantly ruled the country until it is replaced by Prosperity Party in December 2019.Following the political crisis and unrest in the country the last Prime Minister of EPRDF, who is from ODP, replaced the resigned Prime Minister from SEPDM.

The new Prime Minister dissolved the coalition of the four regional parties, EPRDF, to be replaced by PP which allowed other ethnic groups which were not part of the EPRDF to join the new party. Other than the three regional parties dominantly vote to dissolve and merge with PP, it also includes the ruling parties from Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Harari, Somalia and Gambella regions. ODP, ADP, SEPDM that makeup Ethiopia's ruling coalition and the other satellite parties except TPLF voted to merge into a single national party, called Ethiopia Prosperity Party (EPP) (Dessalegn, 2020).

Other than the efforts made to include parties from more regional states, the new party is intended not to be the direct representative of any particular ethnic group. Instead, it will try to be an all-encompassing national party that speaks for the entire Ethiopian People (Allo, 2019).

Currently including the newly established regional state ‘Sidama’, there are 11 regional states or *Kilils* and two city administrations. The constitutional distribution of legislative and executive jurisdiction and of financial resources is a key characteristic of federations, but the form and scope of the distribution of powers may vary enormously. The Ethiopian Federal Government is parliamentary that allows the legislature to exercise oversight and control over the executive (Habib, 2010). The 1994 constitution assured that both the federal and the regional governments have their own legislative, judicial and executive power and the right to levy taxes and allocate budgets. (Aalen, 2002)

In Ethiopia in addition to the ordinary functions of the Federal Government that is defense, foreign relation, inter-state and international trade and commerce, the federal government has more power and responsibilities. It has a power to formulate and implement national policies, plans and strategies concerning the overall economic and social developments, formulate and execute national policies and strategies in the financial and monetary areas, as well as for the utilization and conservation of natural resources. It is within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government to set country wide standards concerning public health, education, science and technology, as well as for the preservation of cultural and historical sites (Habib, 2010).

Regional governments, on the other hand, governed by the state president/chief executive and the state council and the *woreda* (district) councils, empowered to establish its own administration and formulate and execute economic, social and political strategies and plans. It has also given the powers to adopt their own constitution, and if certain conditions were fulfilled, to secede from the federation (Aalen, 2002).

Underlining this theoretical background about structure of Ethiopian federalism, there are differing views on the practical applicability and supremacy of the federal system. Absence of democratic institutions and organizations, (Begashaw, 2019 Getahun, 2007) and lack of basic features of checks and balances (Adem, n.d.) are among the reasons for the drawbacks.

#### ***2.2.4 Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism***

Ethiopian ethnic-based federalism is established as a panacea for ethnic quests rose in 1960's student movement driven by Marxist-Leninist idea and the Bale and Eritrean nationalist movement (Beken, *Federalism and the Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity: The Case of Ethiopia*, n.d.). Ethnic federalism was preferred to address the perceived grievances of different ethnic groups who were rallying behind the nationalities question (Kefale, 2009). The study of the case of Ethiopia shows that the political context at the time of adoption of ethnic federalism was such that a state building strategy based on the recognition and administrative/institutional accommodation of ethnic diversity was the only mechanism that could guarantee societal stability and the continued existence of the Ethiopian state (Beken, *Federalism and the Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity: The Case of Ethiopia*, n.d.).

The Ethnic federalism of Ethiopia is introduced in 1991 while in 1994 it is officially approved in the country. Currently it constitutes eleven ethnic-based regional states including the SSNN and South West Ethiopia together containing more than 56 ethnic groups. It seems that factors like the nature of the federation, its evolvement and the role of political elites and the basic principles used to organize the system matters a lot (Zerihun & Samuel, 2018). There are a number of studies supporting and contesting the ethnic-based federalism of Ethiopia. Some argue that, ethnic federalism of Ethiopia, that allow the right to secede, discourage ethnic tensions in the country and encourage the various ethnic groups to live together peacefully. Others claim that, it can go out of hand and may lead the country into never-ending ethnic wars and eventually to disintegration. In spite of assuring the right of self-rule for regional states, there are critiques on the prevailing federal arrangement.

As stated by Biniyam, (2014), economic rationalities, administrative convenience and other important factors other than linguistic/national identity were left unconsidered or not seriously considered in the designing of the member states of the Ethiopian federation. Common citizenship is still underdeveloped, because it is not the basis of constitutional sovereignty and rights as ethnicity is the prime basis of people's identity: for voting in elections, for party membership, and for identifying yourself when you come to a police station to report a stolen object (Abbink, 1995). Territorial federalism i.e., splitting national territory in geographical zones

and regions (like Germany, USA, Spain, UK) suggested as an alternative by (Wondwosen & Zahorik, 2008). Most notably, the strong emphasis on separateness (e.g. through the right to territorial autonomy at different levels) should be reduced and countered by the development of mechanisms that focus on integration (e.g. political participation, non-territorial autonomy) (Beken, *Federalism and the Accommodation of Ethnic Diversity: The Case of Ethiopia*, n.d.).

The existence of political, population size and geographical asymmetry between regional states makes the center of the Ethiopian federal system susceptible to be under the domination of few larger regional states or nationalities so that these states can overrule the other states and bend the will of the federal government to their own advantage. The legislative and the executive branch of the federal government can easily be controlled by alliances of few regional states (Negash, 2014).

Empirical studies on the ethnic federation of Ethiopia show that the experience of the system of government mostly diverges from the theoretical basis. While federalism in Africa shares the forms, structures, and discursive practices from classic federal theory, its normative articulations and institutional frameworks are animated by syncretic configurations. These, in turn, transform the purpose, fundamental elements, and operation of federalism in Africa (Gebeye, 2020). The writer argues that even though these countries adopt federalism primarily for the accommodation of ethno national diversity and territorial integrity, rather than the institution of constitutionalism and liberal democracy they can suit with the undemocratic including military, government as far as the government holds the federal logic.

### ***2.2.5 The check and balance mechanism in Ethiopian Federal System***

The constitution provides roles and responsibilities for the judiciary, executive and legislative organs of government. Governmental activities must be within the constitutional boundary. To affirm this there is a mechanism that constrains the power of government. The ability of each branch (legislative, judiciary and executive) to respond to the actions of the other branches is called the system of checks and balances which means each branch of government can change acts of the other branches. In a constitutional design, each government organ should be

empowered to oversee the functions of the other organs in terms of constitutional requirements (Adem, n.d.).

Encyclopedia Britannica defined checks and balances as a principle of government under which separate branches are empowered to prevent actions by other branches and are induced to share power. A system of checks and balances within government is necessary for enforcing constitutional constraints because it divides power among elites with competing interests and enables one group of elites to check the power of others. Checks and balances within governmental institutions are necessary to constrain the government from abusing its power (Holcombe, 2018).

The most important horizontal accountability mechanisms include bicameralism, where each legislative organ is armed with the power to veto the initiatives of the other legislative chamber, presidential (executive) veto, judicial review and federalism (Adem, n.d.). The Ethiopian constitution establishes bicameral parliamentary system. The separation of powers is formally enshrined in the 1995 constitution, but is weak in practice. One branch, the executive, has largely undermined any opportunity for effective exercise of checks and balances (Begashaw, 2019). The Ethiopian parliament is solely controlled by the ruling party which therefore is unrealistic to expect that elected parliamentarians can freely and fairly participate in lawmaking.

A crucial variation among federations has been the legislature executive relationship within the commonly shared institutions. These different forms of relationship exemplified the separation of powers. They have also affected the nature of intergovernmental relations. Within parliamentary federations, for example, the general tendency to cabinet dominance has usually given rise to "executive federalism" where most negotiations are carried out between the executives of the governments within the federation (Watts, n.d.).

The Ethiopian system is formally parliamentary, but has also elements of presidential systems. The highest authority of the federal state is the House of Peoples' Representatives and the executive is regulated by parliamentary principles, and this altogether minimizes the separation of powers and the checks and balances as seen for example in the U.S. Constitution. The Prime Minister has more power than what is common in parliamentary systems, due to the facts that he

controls the army and that the council of ministers are accountable to him and not to the HPR. Taken together, this implies that the central executive's powers are largely unrestrained by the control of other institutions (Aalen, 2006).

The Ethiopian system of non-judicial constitutional review does not serve to protect the human rights of its citizens because it leaves the federal and state governments with virtually unlimited power. The executive branch has the power to do as it wishes with no judicial check on its activities. The EPRDF, which was dominated the executive, also represented the majority party in the HPR same to its successor PP since it continues holding the existing ruling collusion. Therefore; it is unlikely that the HPR would be able to curtail the excessive power of the executive branch. In the absence of a legitimate mechanism to review the constitutionality of the executive branch's acts and decrees, the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers possess unbridled political power (Chi, Melisa *et al*, 2008).

In federal systems like that of the United States, the second chamber of the legislature has the role of checking the power of the other federal institutions and plays an essential part in the separation of powers. Same to the Australian or the Canadian, federal systems the second chamber ensure that all legal actions of the national government are consulted by the regional units (Sharman, 1987)The second chamber in the Ethiopian federal system, the House of the Federation, fills neither of these roles completely. The Prime Minister has more power than what is common in parliamentary systems, due to the facts that he controls the army and that the council of ministers are accountable to him. Furthermore, the House of the Federation does not have any role in checking the ordinary legislating process in the HPR, and this contradicts with the practice of other federal, bicameral parliamentarian systems (Aalen, 2002). Ethiopia's system of non-judicial constitutional review weakens the judiciary's power to check the constitutional excesses of the other branches of government; may fail to protect the rights of minority groups in constitutional disputes due to the majoritarian make-up of the House of Federation; and perpetuates an inefficient system that precludes access to justice (Chi, Melisa *et al*, 2008).

The Ethiopian federal system, characterized by bicameral parliamentary, has lacked appropriate check and balance to control the power of the executive branch. In addition to the weak check and balance between the three branches of the government the dominant party rule also plays

significant role in controlling the decisions by the ruling party. Aalen (2002) describes the problem with dominant party rule as; a general problem in Ethiopian political life is the difficulty of distinguishing the party organs from the administrative organs of the state. On top level, it is hard to distinguish between the leadership of the central committee and the party executive and the top executives of the government, because they essentially consist of the same groups of people. The Ethiopian constitution gives room for a strong executive, and the other branches of the government, the judiciary and the legislative have relatively little power to impose checks on the Prime Minister.

The check and balance systems among the three wings of the government and accountability and transparency principles have been enshrined under different provisions of FDRE Constitution. Any public official or an elected representative is accountable for any failure in official duties. In case of loss of confidence, the people may recall an elected representative. This is the general accountability clause applied to executive branch of the government (FDRE Constitution, 1995, Article 12). Accordingly, the house of people's representatives has extensive powers with regard to accounting the executive(Art.55 (7)).The current reality within the parliamentary practice in Ethiopia unless rectified through series of reforms, subordinates the legislature to the executive (Fiseha, 2006).

One branch, the executive, has largely undermined any opportunity for effective exercise of checks and balances. The national parliament (most majorities, 95% or more, controlled by a single party) is regarded as a rubberstamp (access the chance to easy approval ) institution, without any influence on decision-making processes. It is therefore unrealistic to expect that elected parliamentarians can freely and fairly participate in lawmaking (Begashaw, 2019).

Ahmed (2011) identified factors affecting effective implementation of check and balance between the legislative and the executive as, Lack of understanding of the members of HPR, Lack of freedom of expression, lack of sufficient budget, neutrality of state media and absence of freedom of press, lack of commitment from the side of the member of committees and the control of the ruling party the whole standing committees as the main obstacles. However, the core problem to contributing to ineffective parliamentary oversight is single party domination of the legislature and the government institutions. Because of these reasons, the writer concluded

that, the existing Ethiopian parliament is not conducting effective parliamentary oversight on the executive organs and quality and process of the parliamentary oversight at the House level is very poor.

For shared federal institutions to be legitimate and effective, they have to accommodate diverse groups. One of the schemes that can accommodate regional or diverse interests through shared federal institutions is the establishment of a representative upper house. (Mengie, 2016)

The Ethiopian upper chamber, which is traditionally expected to play the role of moderating the corrosive impacts of political asymmetry that arises from the relative population and territorial size of member states by counter balancing the relative dominance of larger units in lower chamber, has no significant actual and potential role in moderating the political asymmetry within the Ethiopian federal system. The powers and functions given to the HOF and the mode of representation and the nature of entities represented within it significantly impede the possible capacity of the House of Federation to play such a moderation role. (Negash, 2014).

The Ethiopian legal regime does not enable the upper house which represents diversity, i.e., House of Federation, to have any involvement in the law making process. Thus, the constitutional protection of diverse groups in Ethiopia can easily be paralyzed through the lawmaking role of the lower house which is dominated by a few ethnic groups (Mengie, 2016).

Judicial independence is an essential constitutional principle to the impartiality of justice and it is related with rule of law (Muluken, n.d.). After the coming of EPRDF to office efforts were made to improve the justice system and try to limit the act of government by introducing the constitutional principle of separation of power and independent judiciary. However, there is no real independent organ which is entrusted with rule adjudication (Ibid).

Those who are entrusted with the power of administrative tasks, and engaged in day to day activities which in one way or another affects the life of the people are required to be held accountable to the legislatures. A condition of exercising this power in constitutional democracy is checked by being held accountable to an organ of government distinct from it, (legislature). The parliamentary oversight among other things, have the function of detecting and preventing

abuse on the part of the executive, detecting wastage of resources (financial scrutiny) and enhancing constitutionalism and accountability (Ahmed, 2011).

Generally looking at the Ethiopian Ethnic federalism it fairly constitutes principles of democratic government that help in insuring the benefit of the people through electoral government, parliamentary structure and bicameral system of parliament which all help to assure democracy. However, as it has been discussed due to a number of drawbacks including dominant party system, the check and balance system of Ethiopian parliament is weak to control the day to day activity of the executive. The absence of strong check and balance coupled with ethnic federalism that appoint the head of executive from ethnically organized political party, create a fertile ground for ethnic favoritism.

#### ***2.2.6. Representativeness of federal institutions***

Genuine regional autonomy and an effective political participation of the regions at the federal level are necessary conditions for the accommodative effects of ethnic federalism to come into play (Beken,n.d.).An important instrument to achieve unity in diversity is the political participation of the diverse regional states/ethnic groups (or federated entities) at the federal level (Watts, 2003). Federated entities are only interested in the unity of the federation when they can exert sufficient influence in the federal institutions (McGarry, 2002).However, in many African states a particular ethnic group so dominates or is perceived to dominate the state that the desired official impartiality of public institutions is often belied by the reality or appearance of ethnic domination (Gebreselassie, 2003).

Since a major aspect of politics deals with the allocation of access to resources, including political power, various identities in the pursuit of maximizing their access to power, resources, and other opportunities, engage in competition (Mengisteab,n.d.).If a state lacks (Aalen, 2002) the necessary level of neutrality for the fair management of identity relations and moderation of inter-identity inequalities, then identities are likely to engage in violent conflicts often against the state but sometimes directly against each other(Ibid)

The Ethiopian constitution says nothing about the ethnic identity of members of the executive. Given the loose check and balance mechanism and the excessive power granted to the executive body, as discussed above, ethnic domination is likely to occur.

In practice, the executive used to be dominated by the four EPRDF-led regional states which contribute not less than 19 of the 21 ministers (excluding the Prime Minister, who has been from one of these regions) (Beken, n.d.). According to Henze (1998) the dominant role the Amhara elite played in Ethiopian politics, at least since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, has been displaced by new Tigrean elite in the top echelons.

Ethnic domination also observed within the four ethnic-based parties, which create collusion to form the EPRDF. The TPLF had been a senior partner in the ruling coalition at federal level and dominated the central government. Since the ruling party at the federal level was Tigray dominated, Tigrayan interests were pursued and Tigray regional state maintained an exceptional position in the federation, while the governments of other federal units, remained weak and practically ineffective (Aalen, 2002). Similarly, the successor PP, formed without the consent and membership of TPLF, condemn for Oromo domination by opposition parties and activists.

Federal institutions in Ethiopia experienced a number of structural adjustments due to ideological changes, responding to quality service claims as well as following changes of the Prime Ministers and their cabinet. To enhance the capacity of public institutions in Ethiopia and to create an ideal environment for investment and economic growth, the public sector has gone through a series of reform processes including the civil service (Getachew & Rechar, 2006).

Since 1991, Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) led government embarked on reform programs hinged on the ideological shift happened in the country from centralized command economy to free market economy. In the early 1990s, the government launched Structural Adjustment Program consisting Civil Service Reform Program (CSR) as one of the components (Fekadu, 2013).

However, structural adjustment may contain hidden agendas particularly when it comes with the change in ruling party in the country. As cited by Getachew & Rechar (2006) from the three structural adjustments made by EPRDF in the civil servant that is in 1992, 1996-2000 and 2001

onwards, the first reform phase in the early days of EPRDF rule was politically motivated by aiming to root out an entrenched but ‘articulate section of the national elite’ that remained from the Dergue regime (Clapham 1995: 131). The reform and the structural adjustment still continue till the last made in 2018 by the new Prime Minister. Despite the reforms and the structural adjustments, there is always lack of transparency and deep-rooted corruption in the country. In this regard, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has stated that Ethiopia is facing an existential threat from the proliferation of corrupt activities blaming lack of proactive media role in uncovering corrupt practices and ineffectiveness of government institutions to root out corrupt practices is endangering the country's political structure.

In the last two or three years, the ruling ethnic-based party has changed, and the ethnic dynamics as well seems changing, EPRDF with its last chairman from ODP/OPDO was dissolved and succeeded by EPP. The new Prime Minister expressed his stand that he wants people to be appointed to office on the basis of merit rather than using the criteria of balancing ethnic groups (BBC NEWS Nov 22, 2019).

### ***2.2.7. Ethnicity and Employment in federal institutions***

The ethnic federalism with a dominant party rule in Ethiopia allowed an ethnic group to control federal institutions which assumed to be neutral from ethnic bias or institutions that have to address the interest of different ethnic groups. A federal system based on ethnic identities, particularly one with an overwhelming presence of a single party, influences the development of a bureaucracy that identifies ethnically and politically with the executive leadership of the dominant party (Vogal, 2016). As discussed above, during the ruling of EPRDF most of the ministers were from the party which the four EPRDF-led regional states contributed not less than 19 of the 21 ministers (Beken, n.d.) and from EPRDF most of them were from one of the representatives of the Tigrayan ethnic group TPLF. As Aalen (2002) discussed the ruling party at the federal level used to be Tigray dominated, Tigrayan interests were pursued and Tigray regional state maintained an exceptional position in the federation. According to Crisis Group report, higher officials promote lower ones to government posts that offer regular income and privileges. Employment in the public sector or selection for state-sponsored education requires being a member or close to the party (International Crisis Group, 2009).

Studies of federal systems illustrate how important the organization of the political party is for the operation of a federation. Smith (1995) shows how the communist party employed totalitarian techniques in order to ensure the continuing imposition of centralized communist party rule over the nationality-based union republics. This was done through retaining the control of appointments, promotions and dismissals of local party cadres and state officials in the ethno-regions, and appointing Russians to certain regional key positions. This made them able to ensure the loyalty of the local party leadership and further reinforce the centralized control and the expedition of the center's policies.

In the case of Ethiopia during the decades after the introduction of Ethnic federalism as Aalen (2002) discussed the formal positions of TPLF members; TPLF party ideologists was played a crucial, but informal role in developing the EPRDF's policies and plans and as advisors to the government. The TPLF was also a major actor in the economic sphere of Ethiopia. Regionally based TPLF-owned enterprises have had business interests and networks in many parts of the country (Vestal, 1999). In addition to this, many observers describe what they call the "Tigrayanisation" of the general power structures in Ethiopia. This implies that people with a Tigrayan background were consistently employed in important positions in the state machinery, in the economy and in public services (Abbink, 1995). It is widely believed that the leaders of the OPDO, the ANDM, and the SEPDM were directed by TPLF politicians and generals that controlled and commanded the heights of Ethiopia's powerful institutions, including the security establishments and key economic institutions (Mergo, Nimubona & Rus ,2019).

The dominance of Tigrayan is over when the new Prime Minister come to power and displaced officials at key positions various times. Some of the officials retired while others replaced. However, the follower PP as well accused for substituting officials with Tigrayan background by officials with Oromo background.

Henok (2018) expressed the situation that managerial positions, especially middle and higher ones, are reported to be exclusively reserved for politically loyal personnel with ethnic background supplement.

### ***2.2.8. The concept of Bureaucracy***

Bureaucracy is marked by predictability, rationality, expertise, structure, equal treatment, documentation, and record-keeping (Hubert, 2021). The characteristics of bureaucracy were discovered by Kautilya and Hegel, but Max Weber became the first person to legitimize the concept (Nwizu, 2010). According to him, the ideal type of bureaucracy leads to efficiency, rationality and development. In this sense, he opines that the most efficient and rational organization is that in which there is clearly defined hierarchy of offices, each office with a clearly defined area of jurisdiction, each department filled with individuals tested to have gotten the highest technical qualifications and the entire set of offices bound together by a system of rules, regulations and procedures and impersonal relationships.

According to Max Weber a characteristic principle of bureaucracy is that it is an expression of a regularized governance with abstract rules and regularized governance springs from a desire for 'equality before the law,' and looks at privileges as abominations (Waters and Waters, 2015). Bureaucracy promotes the rule of law. The rule of law refers to the related ideas that no one is above the law that all of us are equally subject to the laws that we collectively make together, and that decisions are reached by following pre-established procedures. Bureaucrats don't do arbitrary and they don't play favorites at least, they're not supposed to treat people unequally (Hubert, 2021).

One of the principles of the bureaucratic theory is that formal selection process. Weber believed that the workers should be recruited through their technical skills and expertise instead of 'first come first selected' basis. Even the promotion should be based on performance and merit (Prachi, 2019). A merit system in government bureaucracies means that people are hired and promoted to ever greater responsibilities due to their qualifications and their capabilities. A merit system contrasts with what is known as a spoils system, which is one where the winning political party stocks the bureaucracy with their own people (Hubert, 2021) which is a related concept with Patronage Client Relationship.

### ***2.2.9. Patronage Client Relationship***

A patron-client relationship is a vertical dyadic alliance i.e. an alliance between two persons of unequal status, power or resources each of whom finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior to himself (Landé, 1977). Patron-client relations or Clientelism is a form of politics in which ties between leaders and followers are personal. The patron grants favors in return for political support, material goods, and/or other services (Hall, 1977). According to Kopecky, (2011) patronage means a bias in regard with the distribution of public jobs and other state-based transfers to a certain social class, local or ethnic group, but does not necessarily involve the bending of public-decision making in order to favor selected individuals.

In democracies, since politicians must worry about re-election, they often lack incentives to create good bureaucracy rather they may prefer patronage-based system. If politicians choose to emphasize patronage, they undermine professionalism in the civil service and make it more difficult to achieve good governance ( Huber & Ting, 2021). Policy outcomes in poor-performing democracies are often identified with the influence of clientelism and, specifically, of patrons (Keefer & Vlaicu, 2005). A federal arrangement of states defined on the basis of ethnicity may do little to curtail practices within the civil service of bias and patronage that are based on the ethnic identity of political elites (Vogel, 2005).

According to Huber & Ting (2021) most bureaucracies in advanced countries, are a mix of civil servants and patronage. African leaders also extend their tenure in office by expanding their patronage coalition through cabinet appointments. The appointment of one additional minister to the cabinet lowers a leader's coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage-point increase in economic growth (Arriola, 2009). Bureaucracies with professional civil servants can produce public goods; conversely, bureaucracies with patronage-based structures produce private goods that specifically benefit the party in power. Patronage-based bureaucrats typically lack the skills, experience and especially the incentives to produce public goods (Huber and Ting,2021).

Gedamu,(2017) identified the patron-client relations and the mechanisms of elite co-optation at the regional state levels of Ethiopian ethnic federalism that aid the survivalist ambitions of those controlling political power. He argue that the patronage system eventually became the main

feature of the Ethiopian bureaucracy across the federal setting in post-1991 Ethiopia, as it is before, the country's bureaucracy is never made to enjoy the level of independence. Seyoum H., (2017) finds out that the bases for recruitment into the Ethiopian public sector has largely shifted from the principles of meritocracy (educational qualification and experience) towards factors such as nepotism, political patronage (godfatherism), and ethnicity.

#### ***2.2.10. Public Service in Ethiopia***

In Ethiopia, the commencement of modern civil service goes back to the early periods of the twentieth century (Chanie, 2001). Since then it has been transformed several times. Over these periods, the country was governed as a unitary feudal state during the imperial regime (-1974); as a unitary socialist state during the Dergue government (1974-1991); and currently, as a federal parliamentary republic by the EPRDF government (1991) (Assefa and Hondeghem, 2020).

Assefa and Hondeghem, (2020), classified the progress of the civil service in to five in line with the ruling regimes. The first is the Era of Menelik II known for state formation and establishment of a modern public administration. During this era individuals' political loyalty and their ability to mobilize an army were the basis for them to assume a ministerial position. The second is the period between Menelik II and Emperor Haile Selassie which according to the authors characterized as a period marked by confusion and significantly eroded central government authority. The period is followed by the Era of Emperor Haile Selassie; he adopted Ethiopia's first Japanese-style constitution in 1931 and embarked on many reform initiatives emulated from foreign development models. The forth is the Derg government, with no significant change on the legal framework of the nation's civil service, it is known for expanding the state apparatus, restructuring the cabinet and amending the salary scale of the civil service. It is also characterized by replacement of the civil servant, at almost all levels, by political patrons, thereby downplaying professionalism in personnel management. The last is the Ethiopian people's democratic front, which characterized by multiple reform interventions. Even though the reforms are criticized as a tool to replace civil servants associated with the previous government, there are a number of improvements on the public service delivery particularly after the implementation of PSCAP.

### ***2.2.11. Employment/Promotion in Ethiopian Civil service***

Civil service encompasses all other values that guide the public service such as loyalty, neutrality, transparency, diligence, punctuality, effectiveness, impartiality, and other values that may be specific to a given country (United Nations, 2000). It has embraced also the merit principle in setting up career structures from recruitment to promotions. Complementary to this process is a need to set up management structures to ensure that a public service ethos and competence is achieved (Seyoum H ,2017).

Meritocratic recruitment and career progression is one of the key features of Weber's ideal type bureaucracy. Meritocratic civil service emphasizes talent and education. It is a system of governance based on ability rather than on wealth, race, or other determinants of induction (Seyoum H. ,2020).

Federal Civil Servants Proclamation NO.1064/2017 dictates that government institutions shall study their organizational structure and manning plans that enable them to achieve their goals, and get approval from the respective Ministry. Vacant positions shall be filled through promotion or recruitment or transfer or redeployment in accordance with human resource plans. Any type of recruitment of a civil servant shall be affected only on the result of examination conducted on the basis of nationally set criteria or on the basis of any other type of objective certification of professional and occupational competence. There shall be no discrimination among job seekers or civil servants in filling vacancies because of their ethnic origin, sex, religion, political outlook, disability, HIV/AIDS or any other ground.

Given this legal background Seyoum H.,(2020) indicated that there indeed exists a system that guides the process of recruitment and selection in Ethiopian civil service institutions, but there is a gap in terms of its proper implementation. A number of reasons account for the non-meritocratic recruitment into the Ethiopian public services have been raised by the author including political interference, personal connections and by implication nepotism are prevalent in recruitment processes.

## 2.3. Empirical Studies

### *Ethnic Federalism and Employment Opportunity in Shared institutions*

Amodio, (2019) assess the employment effect of ethnic politics in 15 different African countries (Ethiopia is not included). The paper studied the labor market effects of ethnic politics and its impact on the allocation of resources, namely labor, between and within ethnic groups and sectors. Combining georeferenced data across 15 countries on elections, ethnicities, and individual outcomes, showed that individuals from ethnicities connected to parties that elect a local representative in the national parliament enjoy a competitive advantage in the local labor market and in the agricultural sector in particular.

Mergo, *et.al*, (2019) studied the resource allocation or provision of public goods in ethnically asymmetrical political representation for the case of Ethiopia. They concluded that under certain regular conditions, regional states with a higher degree of political representation enjoy improved access to public goods, mainly because regions with better political representation receive more transfers from the center. On the other hand, regions with worse political representation receive fewer transfers, despite the effectiveness of transfers to reduce the cost of political unrest.

Franck & Rainer, (2012) collected data from 18 Sub Saharan African countries to assess the impact of leader's ethnicity on education and health in the last fifty years. They found that ethnic favoritism is an important determinant of education and infant mortality in Sub Saharan Africa.

Vogal (2005) attempted to address the influence of single-party-based executive leadership on the development of bureaucratic values in a country transitioning to liberal democracy. These values were examined in the context of an ethnic federalism, namely, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. However, due to the modest accuracy of the bureaucratic values models used, the results of the analysis of relative positiveness among the three bureaucratic values models were unable to determine the influence of one-party executive leadership on the bureaucratic values of the civil service in Ethiopian ethnic federalism.


## 2.4. Gap Identified

A vast number of studies have been conducted on Ethiopian ethnic federalism from multiple aspects. The dominant party rule has multidimensional economic, social and political implications. Weak check and balance with excessive power of the executive organ, dominant party rule, central government ruled by ethnic-based party and asymmetrical political representation lead to questioning of the neutrality of central government. A research has been made on the regional allocation of public goods to affirm that there is ethnic favoritism in the allocation of resources for ethnic group dominating the central government.

However, there are also indications that ethnic favoritism is not limited to provision of public goods. The ethnic federalism has as well deemed to impact the equal employment opportunities on shared institutions. Thus, this research intends to identify and measure the effect of ethnic control of the central government on employment opportunity in shared institutions.


## 2.5 Conceptual Framework

So far the Prime Ministers of Ethiopia have been from an ethnic-based party – the EPRDF which had been a coalition of four ethnic-based parties. The first Prime Minister was from the TPLF, an ethnic-based party from the Tigrayan ethnic group – who led the country as a Prime Minister from 1995 to his death 2012. The other Prime Minister was from SEPDM which ethnic-based party was holding together heterogeneous ethnic groups. He was a Prime Minister from the death of the previous Prime Minister in 2012 to his resignation in 2018. From 2018 to date the country has been under the leadership of the Prime Minister from ODP/OPDO from Oromo ethnic group. The last Prime Minister has reformed the party and changed its name to Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP). The reform allows additional ethnic-based parties to join the new party while losing representative from Tigrayan ethnic group.



The cabinet of ministers is formed by the Prime Minister, who is from an ethnic-based party. Noting to the weak check and balance the ministers are inclined to ethnic bias or compromise bureaucratic values. A federal system based on ethnic identities, particularly one with an overwhelming presence with the executive leadership of the dominant party(Vogal 2005).The bureaucratic values as Kaufman (1956)identified are non-partisan technical competence, representativeness, and executive leadership and it is within the arena of civil service bureaucracy that the competition among these values is played out.

The prevalence of these bureaucratic values will be measured during the ruling of two Prime Ministers from a single ethnic-based party. The Prime Minister from SEPDM is not considered since it is from a party holding multiple ethnic backgrounds. The bureaucratic values are measured using non-partisan technical competence, representativeness, and executive leadership in the ruling of the two Prime Ministers.



The factors affecting bureaucratic values are taken from same research conducted to test the CBVT model in Ethiopian context by Vogal (2005).

## **Chapter Three**

### **3. Research Methodology**

#### **3.1 Research Design**

The research design for this study is descriptive. Descriptive research is defined as a research method that describes the characteristics of the population or phenomenon studied. One of the purposes of descriptive research is to portray the characteristics of persons, situations, or groups and the frequency with which certain phenomenon occur; these studies observe, describe, and document aspects of a situation as it naturally occurs (Dulock, 1993). It focuses on the ‘what’ of the research subject than the ‘why’ of the research subject primarily emphasizing on describing, explaining, and validating findings. Descriptive research methodology best fits the intent of the research in describing the effects of ethnic politics focusing on the employment practice of public institutions.

The researcher argues that the Ethnic-based Federalism in Ethiopia exacerbates the ethnic favoritism in employment and promotion of individuals in federal institutes. Ontology as a branch of philosophy is the science of what is, of the kinds and structures of the objects, properties and relations in every area of reality (Ahmad & Adamu, 2017). This research intends to assesses the relation between the Ethnic-based administration and the employment and promotion opportunity on federal institutes. The research wants to show the patron client relationship that can be fueled by the ethnic politics in the Country since the Ethnic federalism is adopted.

Mixed method of data collection has been chosen for the study. Both quantitative and qualitative data are employed in undertaking the research. Quantitative data is defined as the value of data in the form of counts or numbers where each data set a unique numerical value associated with it (Surendran, 2021). Quantitative data is usually collected for statistical analysis using surveys, polls or questionnaires sent across to a specific section of a population (Ibid).

The finding of the quantitative data has been supported by qualitative findings. Qualitative data describes qualities or characteristics. Qualitative data can be used to describe how an individual subjectively perceives and gives meaning to their social reality (McLeod, 2019).

The study uses primary as well as secondary data. Primary data has been collected using questionnaires having close and open-ended questions as well as using semi-structured interview. Related documents and literatures have been reviewed as a source of secondary data.

### **3.2 Data Collection**

The survey data collection instrument has been adapted from a research conducted on bureaucratic values by Vogel, (2005). The questionnaire has modified in a way that can address the research question of the study. The survey instrument has been translated to Amharic in order to reach respondents at different level of education. In addition to the questionnaire semi-structured interview has been employed to collect qualitative information so as to cross check the data obtained through the questionnaires. Literatures related to the research questions as well as reports from governmental and non-governmental institutions have been used from website and documentations.

### **3.3 Sampling**

Taking in to account the time and financial constraints, purposive sampling has been employed. In the prevailing government structure, there are 22 minister offices and commissions, of which the study addresses five of them namely Ministry of Health, Ministry of Urban Development and Construction, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education and Ministry of Trade and Industry. A total of 200 questionnaires have been distributed which is 40 questionnaires for each minister offices. Of which 83% or 166 questionnaire have been filled and returned. To include diverse ideas, the opinion of one human resource personnel in one of the minister offices and a managing staff from opposition party has been collected using interview. The number of interviewees has been limited due to the confidentiality nature of ethnicity. Even though the confidentiality is clearly described to them, most of the selected potential candidates are not willing to give their view due to fear of negative consequence.

Collecting sample frame i.e. list of employees from the respective ministry offices, taking into account the confidentiality/sensitivity nature of the topic, may bias respondents or prohibit them from filling the questionnaire. Therefore, the questionnaire is distributed for employees working on different departments as they are engaged at office based on their consent.

### **3.4 Data Analysis**

The collected data has been analyzed using mixed methods both quantitative and qualitative. The responses from the questionnaire also analyzed using percentage. Based on the findings from the qualitative analysis, under each research question, there is qualitative demonstration using the data obtained from interview and document/literature review.

### **3.5 Reliability and Validity of Data**

Reliability referred to the stability of findings, whereas validity represented the truthfulness of findings (Altheide & Johnson, 1994). Reliability is the extent to which results are consistent over time if reproduced under [using] a similar method (Cook and Campbell, 1979). It measures consistency, precision, repeatability, and trustworthiness of a research (Chakrabarty, 2013). Whereas validity explains how well the collected data covers the actual area of investigation (Ghuri and Gronhaug, 2005).

The instrument of the research (the questionnaire) has been tested for reliability using Cronbach's alpha (reliability coefficient) using SPSS 20. Measured independently for each variable it is equal to 0.71 the minimum to 0.95 the highest which is within the acceptable range of 0.7 to 1. The researcher uses data triangulation to enhance the data validity in addition to revising the questionnaire based on the feedbacks from experts.

### **3.6 Ethical Consideration**

The study took in to account ethical considerations during approaching interview and questionnaire respondents. The respondents were well informed about the purpose and scope of the study and assured about the confidentiality of the information provided. Making sure that the respondent faces no harm due to responding to the questions was also not overlooked. As the study is centered on ethnicity; it particularly needs attention in ethical consideration. The

respondents may be sensitive in responding to ethnic related questions due to fear of discrimination and malpractices from his/her supervisors. These points have been considered during the data collection process.

## Chapter Four

### 4. Result and Discussion


This section presented the analysis and discussion of the data collected in a way that can answer the research questions. The effect of ethnic federalism on employment opportunity in shared institution is assessed from the existence of check and balance mechanism to protect ethnic favoritism in Ethiopian federal institutions, the positioning and employment practice of federal institutions, the ethnic dominance of the federal institutions under the two different Prime Ministers from different ethnic groups and from the impacts of ethnically dominated federal institutions on the activities of the private sector. It presents the respondents profile in the first sub section followed by four sub sections. Data collected using questionnaire is presented in tabulation with elaboration supported by information collected through interview and document review.

#### 4.1 Respondents Profile

##### 4.1.1 Age

From the total respondents 46 % (77) are between the age of 30-39 which represent the majority of respondents. Age group 40-49 is the second largest respondents' constituting 24% of the respondents followed by age group 20-29 and 50 & above representing 20% and 10% of the respondents respectively.

*Figure 4.1 Age Composition of Respondents*



Source: survey data, 2021

#### ***4.1.2 Work Experience in Federal institutions***

Most of the respondents, representing 43.4% (72) are served for 6-10 years in federal institutions and respondents served for 11-20 years constitute 40% of the respondents. Candidates having 1-5 years of experience in federal institutions are 6.6 % of the respondents while 10% (17) are senior staffs worked for 20 years and above in federal institutions.

***Table 4.1 Work Experience of Respondents in Federal Institution***

<b>Work Experience in Federal Institution</b>	<b>Respondents in Number</b>	<b>Respondents in Percentage</b>
1-5	11	6.6
6-10	72	43.4
11-16	33	20
16-20	33	20
21 & Above	17	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: survey data, 2021

#### ***4.1.3 Number of Federal Institution/s served***

Serving for more than one federal institutions helps to understand the practical experience, difference and communalities exist between federal institutions. As observed from the collected data 70% of the respondents served two different federal institutions, 6.6% served three federal institutions and 23.5% of the respondents served a single federal institution.

***Table 4.2 Number of Federal Institution/s Served***


<b>Number of Federal Institution/s served</b>	<b>Respondents in Number</b>	<b>Respondents in Percentage</b>
One Minister Office	39	23.50%
Two Minister Offices	116	70%
Three Minister Offices	11	6.50%
More than 3	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: survey data, 2021

#### 4.1.4 Position held in Federal institution

Since the number of officers is larger in any organizational structure, 73% (121) of the respondents are officers. The remaining are 3% (5) senior managers, 17 % (28) middle managers and 3.6 % (6) supervisors.

**Figure 4.2 Position Held**




Source: survey data, 2021

#### 4.1.5 Educational Background

The total respondents constitute 23% Master's Degree holders, 56% BA Degree holders and 12% Diploma holders and the remaining 9% have other credentials like Certificate, High school and Elementary school completion.

**Figure 4.3 Educational Background**



Source: survey data, 2021

## **4.2 The check and balance to protect ethnic favoritism in Ethiopian federal institutions**

The specific objective of the analysis of this sub section is to assess the existence of check and balance system to control the ethnic favoritism in employment, promotion and transfer of employees of federal institutions after the introduction of ethnic politics, which is when the government is under ethnically oriented regional parties.

### **4.2.1 Ethnic politics and distribution of Public Expenditure**

Constitutional and institutional guarantees are meant to prevent political leaders at the central level of the federation from breaking the rules or changing the federal bargain unilaterally (Aalen, 2002). In this regard, Riker, (1964) argues that these guarantees were ineffectual when the political leaders at the center also control the party at the constituent levels.

Literatures indicate that the governments of ethnically diverse countries tend to favor the ethnic group they belong to. According to Easter & Levine (1997), ethnic diversity directs to costly

rent-seeking by different ethnic groups. Politically dominant ethnic groups will use their power to provide economic benefits to their own members (Franck & Rainer, 2012). Ethnic favoritism as well is a prominent theme in formal theories of ethnic politics. As referred by Franck and Rainer (2012) the models of Fearon (1999) and Caselli and Coleman (2006) indicated that ethnicity is used as an exclusion device, and the winning ethnic groups redistribute resources toward their own members.

One of the mechanisms to redirect public expenditure to their ethnic group is public employment. Governors use targeted employment and transfer to increase the flow of public expenditure to specific group (Easterly & Alesina, 1999).

Generally, literatures and theoretical models show that ethnic politics is prone to bias in distributing public goods, and public employment is the one. Nevertheless, despite the existence of ethnic favoritism, according to Easterly & Levine, (1997), ethnically diverse societies are empirically less likely to have political institutions that create effective checks and balances, i.e. Democratic institutions and rule of law.

#### **4.2.2 The case of Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism**

Since the introduction of Ethnic federalism, Ethiopia has been ruled by three Prime Ministers from different Ethnic background. These Prime Ministers are the rulers of their regional based party parallel with the ruling of the federation. This study focuses on the two Prime Ministers elected from the Tigrayan ethnic group and the Oromo ethnic group. The Prime Minister from the SEPDM is not considered due to the party constitutes diverse ethnic background.

The survey tries to capture if there is a transparent way of addressing employee compliant concerning discrimination as a whole and ethnic discrimination in particular in the process of employment and transfer. Due to the sensitivity nature of ethnicity, the questionnaire mostly focuses on general questions that can be deducted to address the question at hand.

**Table 4.3 Survey result concerning procedure and application**

	Strongly Agree	Percent age	Agree	Percentage	Disagree	Percentage	Strongly Disagree	Percentage	Does Not Know
There is a formal procedure that can be followed if an employee need to talk to someone within the institution	22	13%	139	84%					5
An employee can report any kind of discrimination to someone outside of the institution without worrying that it would have a negative impact on her/his employment or professional development	-	-	61	37%	100	60%	5	3%	-
The institution would support an employee whether she/he reported discrimination to someone inside /outside of the institution	-	-	50	30%	88	53%	28	17%	-

Source: survey data, 2021

The survey participants were asked if there is a formal procedure that can be followed if they need to talk to someone inside or outside the institution concerning discrimination on any bases. More than 97% of the respondents agreed that the procedure exists but 60% of the respondents indicated that they are worried to report the situation outside the organization because they may afraid that it would have a negative impact on their employment and professional development. This implies that apart from the existence, the practical applicability of the procedure is minimal. 70% of the respondents think that the institution wouldn't support them whether they reported the situation outside or inside their institution.

The survey participants were asked if there is an independent government institution to address complaints of discrimination. Of which 93% are not aware of such an institution while 7% mentioned the institute of the Ombudsman noting its less effectiveness.

The Institution of Ombudsman was established in 2000 by Proclamation No. 211/2000 in pursuance of Article 55 of the FDRE constitution later the Establishment Proclamation is amended and repealed by the new amendment Proclamation No. 1142/2019. However, our survey result showed that most of the public employees are not aware of the existence of the

institution and very few knew it but perceived that it is ineffective. Dessie (2018) as well confirmed the survey result. Although the importance of ombudsman as mechanism of promoting good governance is accepted as indispensable part of democratization process, the office, however, has not yet been reach grass root level and the provisions of the act have remained as dead letters. As a result, the local area people do not aware of the importance of this institution and have no good perception of it (Dessie, 2018).

The interviewee, member of an opposition party, as well depicted that the ombudsman in Ethiopia is established not because the government is committed to Human Right protection but it was mandatory. According to the interviewee, looking at the implementation of the act, ethnic-based violations and favoritism by government officials, it can be understood that it is not on the right track to promote good governance and transparency. Even though ombudsman is expected to be independent, neutral, and trustworthy, the interviewee candidate reflects that its independence is compromised.

Overall the opinion of the employees of the federal institution indicated that the procedure to report discrimination inside the organization is available but majority of them are against the idea that it can solve a kind of problem, rather the reporting may bring adverse impact on their employment and professional development. Regarding the independent organ Ombudsman, it is not known by most employees of federal institutions as independent organ that can handle such types of claims. Few know about the institution but they think it is not effective. This implies that the victim of ethnic favoritism has no choice but accept. The finding of the survey supports the finding of literatures about the weak check and balance system and weak institutional capacity in ethnic politics. In the third world there are fewer checks based in institutions and civil society (Fearon, 1999).Ethnically diverse societies are empirically less likely to have political institutions that create effective checks and balances, i.e. democratic institutions and rule of law. Ethnic-based government create ties that lead the public sector to a patrimonial system characterized by favoritism and payoffs that undermine the transparency and effectiveness of formal institutions (Rose, 1999). Hodler & Raschky, (2014), indicated that birthplace favoritism is a phenomenon that mainly occurs in countries with weak political institutions.

### **4.3 The assignment and employment practice of federal institutions**

The positioning and employment practice of federal institutions of Ethiopian ethnic-based federalism in respect of the ethnic bias and domination in federal institutes is assessed in the following section. Apart the existence of policies and procedures the applicability of same is surveyed.

#### **4.3.1 Ethnic Politics, positioning and employment practice**

Merit system principle demands that Federal employees be recruited from all segments of society and selected and advanced solely on the basis of relative ability, knowledge, and skills, after fair and open competition. The civil service proclamation of Ethiopia as well dictates that candidate's for vacant positions shall be recruited and promoted on the basis of competition. There shall be no discrimination among job seekers or civil servant in filling vacancies because of their ethnic origin, sex, religion, political outlook, disability, or any other ground.

However, in the multi ethnic country like Ethiopia the merit based employment is highly distorted by factors such as patronage against merit, the comparative importance of racial, religious based, provincial and gender based preferences besides factors like nepotism and friendship (Merga & Freweini, 2015). The leadership in many African countries, with their ethnic diversities, is characterized by ethnic bias and favoritism, and citizens are thus treated unequally in many respects, particularly when it comes to national resource allocation and political representation (Ilorah, 2009).

As it has described in the previous section one of the mechanism that the ethnic-based government distributes public expenditure among its own ethnic group is public employment. The Ethiopian case of ethnic federalism also assessed from the policy, procedure and applicability in positioning and employment in federal institutions.

#### **4.3.2 The case of Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism**

Given the weak check and balance, diminished institutional capacity coupled with ethnic-based leadership, the implementation of policies and procedures that guide employment, promotion and

transfer are in tight. Survey questions were distributed to capture the opinion of employees on the applicability of policies and procedures in a way that can minimize ethnic favoritism. According to the civil service proclamation, employment and promotion shall be merit based. However, 70% of the respondents disagree that the promotion and advancements are based on individual merit while 57% believe that horizontal transfers are also not merit based.

**Table 4.4 Survey result concerning recruitment**


The application of the following are merit based	Strongly Agree	Percentage	Agree	Percentage	Disagree	Percentage	Strongly Disagree	Percentage	Does Not Know	Percentage
Promotion and advancement from within the organization	-	-	50	30%	88	53%	28	17%	-	-
Horizontal transfers (e.g. from department to department or from ministry to ministry)	-	-	66	40%	83	50%	11	7%	6	3%
Recruitment of candidates from outside of the organization who are equally or more qualified	-	-	50	30%	88	53%	28	17%	-	-
The way people are recruited into the institution is transparent and following the appropriate procedure	-	-	33	20%	121	74%	6	3%	6	3%
The way people are recruited in the institution is fair and based on individual merit	-	-	50	30%	111	67%	5	3%	-	-
The way people are transferred from one ministry to another is fair and based on individual merit	-	-	33	20%	50	30%	83	50%	-	-
The way people are recruited in the institution has no room for ethnic favoritism	-	-	11	6.50%	78	47%	66	40%	11	6.50%

Source: survey data, 2021

As an indicator of the recruitment process the survey respondents were asked if new recruited candidates are more or equally qualified than internal candidates, more than 76% of the respondents not agreed that the newly recruited candidates have better qualification. While 70% believe that the way people recruited is not transparent and not following the appropriate procedure.

Half of the respondents strongly disagreed and 30% disagreed that transfers from one ministry to the other are fair and based on individual merit. Finally, the respondents were asked whether they believe that the recruitment process has no room for ethnic favoritism. About 47% of the respondents strongly disagreed while 40% disagreed implying that 87% of the respondents believe that the recruitment practice is exposed to ethnic favoritism.

**Figure 4.4 Survey results concerning Ethnic favoritism in the recruitment practice of public institutions**



Source: survey data, 2021

Ethnic bias is a product of personalized ties between the leadership as public officials and certain interest groups within the same country, both usually from the same ethnic group expressed by corruption and favoritism (Ilorah, 2009). Seyoum, (2018), pointed out that managerial positions, especially middle and higher ones, are reported to be exclusively reserved for politically loyal personnel with ethnic background supplement. Other studies Merga & Mekuria, (2015), Gebre Miruts (2014), Workagegnehu (2019) focused on the civil service as well confirmed the result of the survey that the recruitment and promotion procedures are not free from bias.

The survey result indicated that the recruitment and promotion procedure in federal institutions not strictly flow the policy and procedure set for and lacks transparency which is a fertile ground for nepotism and favoritism particularly as indicated by 86% of the respondents the practice is open to ethnic favoritism.

#### **4.4 The ethnic dominance of the federal institutions**

As it has been discussed in the literature review section and in the previous sections of the analysis ethnic-based politics is susceptible to favoritism in distributing public good and expenditure. The focus of the study is employment in federal institutions which is used by ethnic-based governments as a tool for distribution of public expenditure to targeted ethnic group. La Porta et al. (1999) indicated the character of ethnic-based government regarding ethnic favoritism: “In ethnically heterogeneous societies, it has been common for the groups that come to power to fashion government policies that expropriate...the ethnic losers..., and limit the production of public goods to prevent those outside the ruling group from also benefiting and getting stronger”.

Gebreselassie (2003) also described the case of public institution that in Africa a particular ethnic group so dominates or is perceived to dominate the state that the desired official impartiality of public institutions is often belied by the reality or appearance of ethnic domination. The Ethiopian ethnic federalism as well seems followed similar pattern.

##### **4.4.1 The Case of Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism**

Before the introduction of Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, the civil service is said to be dominated by Amhara elite. Later the first Prime Minister from ethnic-based party TPLF come to power and the ethnic configuration changed as well. According to Henze (1998) the dominant role the Amhara elite played in Ethiopian politics, at least since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, has been displaced by new Tigrean elite in the top echelons. Following the death of the Prime Minister from the Tigrean ethnic group, a Prime Minister from SEPDM, ethnically diverse party, took the seat until his resignation to transfer the position for the Prime Minister from ODP, from Oromo ethnic group. The last Prime Minister dissolved EPRDF and form PP constituting three of the previous ethnic-based party in addition to new other regional states previously denied to join EPRDF.

Even though the new Prime Minister Dr Abiy Ahmed expressed his stand that he wants people to be appointed to office on the basis of merit rather than using the criteria of balancing ethnic groups (BBC NEWS Nov 22, 2019), the survey result showed that the ethnic domination and displacement is still there.

Among the list of discrimination factors like Gender, Disability, Ethnicity, Age, Religion, Family responsibility, Health Problem, Educational Background and job classification the respondents were asked to choose the bases they face discrimination.


**Table 4.5 Opinion of Respondents on Discriminating Factors**

<b>Discriminating Factors</b>	<b>Discriminated</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Not Discriminated</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Does Not Apply</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
sex	66	39.50%	100	60.25%	-	-
Disability	-	-	5	3%	161	97%
Ethnicity	133	80.12%	33	19.88%	-	-
Age	9	5.42%	157	94.58%	-	-
Religion	22	13.25%	144	86.75%	-	-
Family responsibility	-	-	100	60.25%	66	39.50%
Health Problem	-	-	32	19.28%	134	80.72%
Educational Background	-	-	166	100%	-	-
Grade/Job classification	33	19.88%	133	80.12%	-	-

Source: survey data, 2021

As it can be observed from the above table and the graph below, ethnicity is the most discriminating factor in federal institutions. More than 80% of the respondents feel that they have been treated unfairly due to their ethnic background by the immediate supervisor, manager, colleagues or in other way in the organization.

**Figure 4.5 Survey result on discriminating factors**



Source: survey data, 2021

The respondents were asked about the availability of opportunities to advance in their carrier and whether these opportunities are equally available for all. 73% of the respondents do not believe that these opportunities are available rather 56% of them think that the opportunities are not equally available for all. Among the respondents 43% strongly agreed and 46% agreed that there are employees favored due to their ethnic identity.

**Table 4.6 Survey result concerning opportunity**

	Strongly Agree	Percentage	Agree	Percentage	Disagree	Percentage	Strongly Disagree	Percentage	Does Not Know	Percentage
Employees are satisfied with the availability of opportunities to advance in their career and improve thier skill			33	20%	111	66%	11	7%	11	7%
Employees are satisfied that, these opportunities are equally available and accessible to all employees			28	17%	72	43%	22	13%	44	27%
There are employees favored due to their ethnic identity	72	43%	77	46%	11	7%	-	-	6	4%
Belonging to the Ethic group of the prime minister/the ruling ethnic based party is an added advantage	99	60%	33	20%	22	13%	6	3.50%	6	3.50%

Source: survey data, 2021

The survey participants were asked if they think that belonging to the ethnic group of the Prime Minister/ the ruling ethnic-based party is an added advantage to advance in their carrier, 60% of them strongly agreed and 20% agreed that it is an added advantage.

Finally, the respondent working in federal institutions during the ruling of the Prime Minister from TPLF through the ruling of the Prime Minister from ODP (Prosperity Party after reform) asked if they believe that there is ethnic favoritism in the ruling of the former Prime Minister and the way it is during the later. 80% of the respondents think that there was ethnic favoritism during the ruling of the former i.e. Prime Minister from TPLF while 67% think that the ethnic favoritism is the same during the ruling of the Prime Minister from ODP (Prosperity Party after reform).

The interview candidates also emphasized the ethnic favoritism in public employment and promotion. According to the candidate from one of the opposition parties the ethnic favoritism is making public institutions weak due to lack of competent manpower. This is not a problem of these days but since the country is under ethnic federalism. The other candidate working in one of the institutions believed that the employees of the institution are hopeless in advancing in their carrier based on their individual merit.

Overall the survey result, the interview and related literatures indicated that ethnicity is becoming the major factor of employment and promotion in Ethiopian federal institutions. Great majority of the respondent believe that they are unfairly treated because of their ethnic background and others are getting inappropriate benefits due to their ethnic background. The ethnic favoritism is the same during the ruling of the Prime Ministers that are from a party representing a single ethnic group according to the majority of the respondents.

#### **4.5 Ethnic domination of federal institutions and the private sector**

Favoritism is generally considered to be unethical because of its association with a range of negative side effects such as discrimination, corruption, the loss of productivity, reduced job satisfaction, increased inertia, and stress (Khatri & Tsang 2003; Pearce 2015; Pearce et al. (2000) as cited by Hotho et.al, (2020). Ethnic favoritism in this case relies on ethnic-based ties in employment and promotion in public institutions rather than merit-based

employment/promotion. Such ties in the public sector lead to a patrimonial system characterized by favoritism and payoffs that undermine the transparency and effectiveness of formal institutions (Rose, 1999). Federal institutions are the means to implement country wide policies of the government. The implementation of government policies and strategies is highly dependent on the effectiveness, courage and passion of a respective civil service (Henok., 2017). On the other hand, lack of competent and skilled manpower creates weak federal institutions.

Weak and ethnically dominated institutions bring adverse impacts on the performance of the private sector. According to Ackerman (1999), the trust, reputation and reciprocal obligations created by personal ties can facilitate corruption, distorting the operation of the state.

The survey result conforms to literatures on the area, that 67% of the respondents believe that the management/officer is inclined to favor customer from his/her ethnic group. 70% of them do not agree that there is a strong check and balance system not to favor targeted customers. This implies that employees of ethnically dominated federal institutes are more exposed to ethnic-based biases which in turn affect the private sector. The ethnic-based preferential treatments narrow the ground of competition and raise corrupt practices that discourage private investors from other ethnic groups. Anteneh (2014), in his study of the impact of ethnicity on economic development indicated that ethnicity occupies a great space in hampering economic development through influencing investment, intensifying brain drain, amplifying corruption, leading unfair competition, eroding trust and exacerbating economic marginalization and degrading state legitimacy.

Employment and transfer based on ethnic ties has also indirect effect on the private sector challenging public reforms aimed at improving performance of public institutions. Efforts to change or introduce reforms are restrained by the extent to which patronage networks are coherent and the capacity of benefactors to have control of the state system (Grindle, 2012).

**Table 4.7 Survey result concerning customer service**

	Strongly Agree	Percentage	Agree	Percentage	Disagree	Percentage	Strongly Disagree	Percentage	Does Not Know	Percentage
The management/officer is inclined to favor customers from his/her ethnic group	11	7%	100	60%	22	13%	11	7%	22	13%
The management/officer is under strong check and balance system not to favor targeted customers			22	13%	94	57%	22	13%	28	17%

Source: survey data, 2021

Private investment is a major determinant of economic growth, and the ability of a country to reduce or alleviate poverty and improve the lives of its citizens. A global survey of private businesses, which focused on obstacles to doing business, indicated that corruption was the leading constraint on business activity in developing countries (Emery, 2003). Federal institutes recruit employees not based on merit but ethnic ties are exposed to, corrupt practices, lack transparency and face difficulty to offer prompted and quality service, which are the major factors to flourish the private sector.

## **Chapter Five**

### **5. Conclusion and Recommendation**

#### **5.1 Conclusion**

Ethnic-based politics has positive sides such as promoting competition between ethnic entities which increases effectiveness, promote bargaining which is a pillar to form a stable, non-coercive, development-oriented state, protect civil war, an ethnic mix also brings about variety in abilities, experiences, cultures which may be productive and may lead to innovation and creativity (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000, La Ferrara and Alesina, 2004). On the other hand ethnic politics criticized for a means for civil war, high competition for resource, ethnic domination, weak institution and governance (Collier, 2001, Ilorah, 2009).

Ethnic-based politics mostly suffer the risk of ethnic favoritism. Unequal treatment of citizens on the basis of ethnicity is a common characteristic of the political leadership in many African countries (Ilorah, 2009). One of the mechanism ethnic leaders use to distribute public expenditure to his/her ethnic group is public employment.

The Ethiopian ethnic federalism may not be an exception since its base is ethnic identity. It allows a ruling party based on ethnic identity to control the federal government. The Prime Minister who has the executive power is also selected from the ethnic-based party, holding dual regional and national responsibility. In our daily routine and conversations with someone in any case, we can hear that ethnic favoritism is prevalent. Theories and practical experiences signify that ethnic-based politics most of the time is exposed to ethnic bias.

The public sector is a major formal sector employer in urban areas. In Ethiopia it accounts for almost two-thirds of formal sector employment and 68% of employment among those with higher education (NEPSE 2009) implying its significant contribution in the reduction of unemployment. Federal institutions not only are the major employers but also have a pivotal impact in the implementation of government policies. Therefore, the recruitment and promotion of employees in federal institutions has to be carefully evaluated. Accordingly, the effect of the Ethiopian ethnic-based federalism on employment and promotion of federal institutes has been

assessed from the check and balance controlling mechanism, the implementation of policies and procedures guide the recruitment of employee of federal institutions, the ethnic favoritism in employment and promotion and its impact on the private sector and on the economy. Supporting literatures coupled with opinion survey and interview are used to show the ethnic favoritism prevail in Ethiopian shared institutions.

The research finds out that the Ethiopian federal institutions are ethnically dominated during the previous Prime Minister from TPLF as well as the current Prime Minister from Oromo ethnic-based party (PP Oromo wing). The opinion survey, the interview, the related literatures and document reviews conformed that there is ethnic favoritism in employment, promotion and transfer of employees in federal institutions. Even though there are policies and procedures to protect discrimination on any base, the implementation is minimal. Employees are not confident to report such discriminations since they are afraid of negative consequences on their career. There is no check and balance to watch ethnic domination in federal level or in institutional level. The Institution of Ombudsman is an independent organ to handle such claims but only few respondents knew about the existence and they believe that it is not effective and the independence is in question.

The ethnic-based recruitment allowed less competent and less skilled manpower to join such institution other than diminishing employment opportunity for competent candidates from other ethnic background. When ethnic and personal attachments are the governing principle rather than the rule of law, public institutions capacity will likely deteriorate (Anteneh, 2014). It is also tantamount to corruption since it often involves explicit and implicit reciprocal obligations among the favored groups, depending on whether the beneficiaries are business associates and acquaintances or friends and loved ones. (Ilorah, 2009). Weak institutional capacity is a major obstacle to economic development. (Graham, 2002) Weak, corrupt and ethnically dominated institutions discourage the private sector due to lack of capacity, poor quality service and preferential treatment.

Generally, there is a wide spread ethnic favoritism in employment, promotion and transfer in federal institutions following the introduction of ethnic-based federalism. Belong to the ethnic group of the Prime Minister is becoming an added advantage to join federal institutions. The

Ethnic-based employment and domination creates corrupt and weak institutions to implement government policy which adversely affects the performance of the private sector as well as the development of the country as a whole.

## **5.2. Recommendation**

Apart from hampering employment opportunity for capable individuals, poorly functioning public sector institutions and weak governance are major constraints to growth and equitable development in many developing countries (A World Bank Strategy, 2020). Therefore, based on the findings the following remedial points are suggested

- Considering the nature of the system of government and the contribution of public employment to the total national employment, the recruitment and promotion practice in public institutions should be given greater emphasis in crafting appropriate policies and following implementation.
- The government should urge the establishment of independent controlling agencies and assure that they are performing accordingly in the reduction of Ethnic favoritism. The existing agencies also should be examined for their functionality and accessibility by the employee of federal institutions.
- To reduce the consequence of ethically dominated public institutions on the private sector as well as on the economic development of the county, the institutions have to be reformed in a way that can accommodate potential candidates based on meritocracy.

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## Annex

### Cronbach's Alpha Result

	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Q1	5.6386	1.408	.430	.860
Q2	4.8675	1.219	.693	.584
Q3	4.6867	1.041	.696	.561
Cronbach's Alpha for Procedure and Application				<b>0.764</b>
QQ1	18.5663	9.993	.805	.852
QQ2	18.7530	9.654	.756	.859
QQ3	18.4639	10.614	.595	.880
QQ4	18.4036	11.551	.487	.890
QQ5	18.7229	11.086	.757	.864
QQ6	18.0904	10.252	.683	.868
QQ7	17.9277	10.334	.699	.866
Cronbach's Alpha for Recruitment and Promotion				<b>0.886</b>
QQQ1	16.9880	3.103	.702	.806
QQQ2	15.6205	4.249	.396	.840
QQQ3	17.3916	3.755	.415	.840
QQQ4	16.6446	4.049	.501	.831
QQQ5	16.7229	3.547	.699	.808
QQQ6	16.1928	3.272	.589	.823
QQQ7	15.7831	3.274	.788	.794
QQQ8	16.5904	4.558	.000	.853
QQQ99	16.7892	3.258	.789	.794
Cronbach's Alpha for Ethnic Dominance				<b>0.840</b>
QQQQ1	7.6446	6.703	.628	.621
QQQQ2	7.1627	6.028	.483	.663
QQQQ3	8.3434	6.397	.287	.796
QQQQ4	8.7831	4.559	.738	.482
Cronbach's Alpha for Equal Opportunity				<b>0.714</b>
QQQQQ1	3.3373	.831	.933	.
QQQQQ2	2.5964	1.309	.933	.
Cronbach's Alpha for Customer Service				<b>0.953</b>

## Questionnaire

Addis Ababa  
University  
(Since 1950)



**Addis Ababa University**

**Dear Madam/Sir:**

My name is Selamawit and I am a graduate student at Addis Ababa University. For my final project, I am examining the impact of Ethiopian Ethnic Federalism on employment opportunity in shared institutions. Because you are employee of one of the federal institutions, I am inviting you to participate in this research study by completing the attached surveys.

The questionnaire will require approximately 15-20 minutes completing. In order to ensure that all information will remain confidential, please do not include your name. If you choose to participate in this project, please answer all questions as honestly as possible.

Thank you for taking the time to assist me in my educational endeavors. All surveys are absolutely confidential and will be used exclusively for the purpose to assess the existing practice in federal institutions.

Sincerely

Selamawit

e-mail address- [selamawitkuma2008@gmail.com](mailto:selamawitkuma2008@gmail.com)

**1. Personal Information**

1. How old are you?  
 Under 20  20-29  30-39  40-49  50 & over
2. Work experience in federal institution/s(years)  
 1-5  6-10  11-15  16-20  21& over
3. Number of federal institution/s you worked for?  
 One  Two  Three  More than three
4. Please specify your current position  
 Director  Senior Manager  Middle Manager  Supervisor   
 Officer   
 Other (*please specify*) \_\_\_\_\_
5. Educational Background  
 Master's Degree  Bachelor Degree  Diploma  Certificate   
 Other \_\_\_\_\_  
 Other (*please specify*) \_\_\_\_\_

**2. To assess the existence of framework to check and balance ethnic dominance in federal institutions**

If you have been, or were to be, harassed or discriminated against, to what extent do you think you would agree or disagree with the following statements:

	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Don't know</b>
1. There is a formal procedure I can follow if I need to talk to someone within my organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. There is a formal procedure I can follow if I need to talk to someone outside of my organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. I am able to report the situation to someone outside of my organization without worrying that this would have a negative impact on my employment or professional development	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

4. My organization would support me whether I reported the situation to someone in my organization or to someone outside of my organization

5. There is a policy and procedure in my organization to protect discrimination in employment And promotion

6. Do you know if there is a department in your organization or an institution outside of your organization that is responsible for handling questions or concerns about discrimination on any basis?

Yes  No

7. If your answer is yes to question 6, please mention the name of the department or institution:

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8. Do you know if there is an independent government organization to respond to such complaints?

Yes  No

9. If your answer is yes to question 8, please mention the name of the organization:

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**3. Examine the positioning and employment practice of federal institutions**

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about policies, procedures and promotions and their application on the basis of individual merit.

	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Don't know</b>
10. Promotion and advancement from within the organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. Horizontal transfers (e.g. from department to department or from ministry to ministry)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. Appraisal (e.g. annual formal evaluation)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13. Training and development	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14. Recruitment of candidates from outside of the organization who are equally or more qualified than internal candidates	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. Overall I think the way people are recruited into my organization is transparent and following the appropriate procedure	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16. Overall I think the way people are recruited into my organization is fair and based on individual merit	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17. Overall I think the way people are transferred from one ministry to another is fair and based on individual merit	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. Overall I think the way people are recruited into my organization has no room for ethnic favoritism	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

***4. To examine the ethnic dominance of the federal institutions under the two different Prime Ministers from different ethnic groups***

19. Do you feel that you have been treated unfairly by your immediate supervisor, manager, colleagues or others in your organization as a result of any of the following?

	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Does not apply</b>
a. Gender	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Disability	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Ethnicity	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Age	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
e. Religion	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Family responsibilities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
g- Health problems	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
h. Educational background	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
i. Grade/Job classification	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
j- Other ( <i>please specify</i> ) _____			

When answering the following questions, please think about the *opportunities that you believe you have* to develop yourself and your career within your Ministry or Department as well as within the federal institutions as a whole.

	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Don't know</b>
20. I am satisfied with the availability of opportunities to advance my career and improve my skill	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21. I am satisfied that these					

opportunities are equally available and accessible to all employees

22. I think there are employees favored due to their ethnic identity?

23. I think there are employees favored due to their party affiliation or political attitude?

Answer the following question if you have worked in federal institutions since the ruling of the Prime Minister from TPLF to the Prime Minister from ODP (PP After reform)

24. Do you think employees belonging to the ethnic group of the Prime Minister favored in employment, promotion and transfer during the ruling of TPLF? Yes  Do not know  Does not apply  Don't know

25. If your answer for question number 24 is yes, which way these practices are changed in the ruling of the current party? Improved  Worsen  The same  Don't know

26. If your answer for question number 24 is no what about during the ruling of ODP (PP After reform) Yes  No  Does not apply  Don't know

27. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: To advance in my organization it is important to conform to:

	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Don't know</b>
a. Prevailing ideology	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Social, political or other connections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Belonging to the Ethnic group of the Prime Minister/the ruling ethnic-based					

party is an added advantage

**6. Assess the effect of ethnically dominated federal institutions on the activities of the private sector**

	<b>Strongly Agree</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Strongly disagree</b>	<b>Don't know</b>
28. The service delivery of my organization is free from malpractice	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
29. There is an internal mechanism to check the quality of the service delivery of my organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
30. There is a department in my organization to handle customer complaints	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
31. Feedbacks from customers collected and resolved on time	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
32. If a customer is not satisfied by the service delivery of your organization he/she can report to an independent government organ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
33. The management/officer is Under strong check and balance System not to favor targeted customers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
34. The management/officer is Inclined to favor customers from his/her ethnic group	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

If you would like to add points on the Ethnic federalism and its impact on federal institutions concerning employment, please use the following space

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**Guiding Questions for interview**

1. Did you observe the ethnic dynamics in federal institutions following the change in Prime Minister/ ethnic-based party?
2. Do you think the Ethnic Federalism impacted equal employment opportunity of citizens in federal institutions?
3. If you agree that there is ethnic domination in federal institution does it affect the performance of the private sector? If yes in what way?
4. If you believe otherwise do you mean that these institutions are free from political intervention?
5. Do you think the Ethnic federalism compromised competency in employment, promotion and transfer practices in federal institutions?
6. Do you know any independents institution to oversee the employment, promotion and transfer practice of federal institution's?
7. Do you have other comments that you would like to make?