

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**  
**COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE**  
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**Challenges to Regional Integration: The Case of  
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**

**By**

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# **Challenges to Regional Integration: The Case of Intergovernmental Authority on Development**

**By**

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This is to certify that the thesis prepared by Gebregiorgis Abraha: Challenges on Regional Integration: The Case of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Degree of Master of Arts (citizen ship and State in Africa) complies with the regulations of the University and Meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

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## Acronyms

|         |   |
|---------|---|
| ARIA    | Assessing Regional Integration in Africa                |
| ARPCT   | Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism |
| ARS     | Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia               |
| ASEAN   | Association of South East Asian Nations                 |
| ASF     | Africa Stand by Force                                   |
| CEC     | Commission of the European Community                    |
| CEN-SAD | Community Sahl-Sahalian States                          |
| CEWARN  | Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms          |
| COMECON | Council for Mutual Economic Assistance                  |
| COMESA  | Common Market for Easter and Southern Africa            |
| CPA     | Comprehensive Peace Agreement                           |
| CPMR    | Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution           |
| DOP     | Declaration of Principles                               |
| EAC     | East African Community                                  |
| EASBRIG | East Africa Stand by Brigade                            |
| EBA     | Everything but Arms                                     |
| ECA     | Economic Commission for Africa                          |
| ECOBRIX | ECOWAS Stand by Brigade                                 |
| ECOWAS  | Economic Community of West African States               |
| ECSC    | European Coal and Still Community                       |
| EEC     | European Economic Community                             |
| ELF     | Eritrean Liberation Front                               |
| EPLF    | Eritrean People's Liberation Front                      |
| EPRDF   | Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front       |
| EPRP    | Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party                  |

|          |  |
|----------|--|
| EU       | European Union   |
| EURATOM  | European Atomic Energy Community   |
| FAL      | Full ct of Lagos   |
| FOMAC    | Central Africa Force Multinational del' Afrique Central Forces for Somalia |
| FTA      | Free Trade Area  |
| GoS      | Government of Sudan  |
| GoSS     | Government of South Sudan  |
| GTZ      | German Agency for Technical Cooperation                                    |
| HDI      | Human Development Index  |
| HOAI     | Horn of Africa Initiatives   |
| ICC      | International Criminal Court   |
| ICPAT    | IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism                           |
| IDP      | International Displacement of People                                       |
| IGAD     | Inter Governmental Authority on Development                                |
| IGADD    | Inter Governmental Authority on Drought and Development                    |
| IPE      | International Political Economy  |
| IPF      | IGAD Partner Forum   |
| IPSS     | IGAD Peace and Security Study  |
| IR       | International Relations  |
| LPA      | Lagos Plan of Action   |
| MIP      | Minimum Integration Plan   |
| MORCOSUR | Southern Common Market/Mercados Comun del Sur                              |
| MOU-     | Memorandum of Understanding  |
| NAFTA    | North America Free Trade Area  |
| NASBRIG  | North Africa Regional Stand by Brigade                                     |

|          |   |
|----------|---|
| NATO     | North Atlantic Treaty Organization                    |
| NCP      | National Congress Party                               |
| NIF      | National Islamic Front                                |
| NRIS     | National Research Institution                         |
| OAU      | Organization of African Union                         |
| OLF      | Oromo Liberation Front                                |
| ONLF     | Ogaden National Liberation Front                      |
| PTA      | Preferential Trade Area                               |
| QDF      | Quota Free and Duty Free                              |
| REC      | Regional Economic Community                           |
| RECSA    | Regional Centre on Small Arms                         |
| RSADO    | Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization                  |
| RTB      | Regional Trade Blocking                               |
| SACU     | South Africa Custom Union                             |
| SADC     | Southern African Development Community                |
| SADCBRIG | Southern Africa Stand by Brigade                      |
| SADCC    | Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference |
| SPLM/A   | South Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army         |
| SRRC     | Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council        |
| SSDF     | Somali Salvation Democratic Front                     |
| TFC      | Transitional Federal Charter of Somalia               |
| TFGs     | Transitional Federal Government of Somalia            |
| TFI      | Transitional Federal Institution of Somalia           |
| TFP      | Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia            |
| TNGs     | Transitional National Government of Somalia           |
| TPLF     | Tigray People's Liberation Front                      |

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| UIC/ICU | Islamic Courts Union/ Union of Islamic Courts      |
| UN      | United Nation                                      |
| UNDP    | United Nation Development Program                  |
| UNECA   | United Nation Economic Commission for Africa       |
| UNGA    | United Nation General Assembly                     |
| UNMIS   | United Nation Mission in Sudan                     |
| US      | United State                                       |
| USAID   | United States Agency for International Development |
| USSR    | Union of Soviet Socialist Republic                 |
| WSIF    | Western Somali Liberation Front                    |
| WTO     | World Trade Organization                           |

## ***Abstract***

*This study explores and examines the challenges of regional integration in the sub region of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Political and Economic integration has been part of African strategy to overcome fragmentation and improve the continent's position in the global political economy. Regional Economic Communities have been part of this and there are more such efforts in Africa than other continents. One of these, Intergovernmental Authority on Development was initiated in 1986 to coordinate efforts at combating drought and desertification and Reorganized in 1996, it has since been more active in managing regional conflicts.*

*The paper uses the IGAD region as a case study to argue that there are more political and economic integration. In continental and regional perspectives there seem to be strong evidence that political and economic integration are close related, these include Neo-functionalism, Intergovernmentalism, Custom Union theory, Optimal Currency theory, Fiscal federalism and International Political Economy respectively.*

*The study also discusses pre-conditions that are necessary to regional integration such as diversity in production, adequate infrastructure, political will, domestic peace, robust and strong private sector, strong market pressure and mutual trust among member countries and challenges for regional integration, including lack of supra nationalism and political will, overlapping membership, distrust among membership, lack of complementarities and poor infrastructure.*

*The appraisal of this study reveals the challenges of IGAD region. The major challenges are political and security (lack of supra nationalism, lack of political will, security), structural challenges (weak institution, over lapping membership, lack of a proper managing of relations among member states) economic and social challenges (poverty, lack of complementarities, inadequate infrastructure, fast growth of population, endemic diseases and HIV/AIDS), problems on human and resources (lack of enough man power and finance). In conclusion the regional integration process in the IGAD region is still at lower level. Thus, this study stresses that if actual and sustainable regional integration is to advance, IGAD needs further agreements to implement and achieve their goal, and it needs synchronization of national efforts to improve agricultural production, bring the region's conflicts under control and need to reduce it.*

# Chapter One

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Background of the study

Regional integration in Africa is not a new phenomenon (ARIA V: 11). Initiatives on the continent dates back to the early part of twentieth century's. The region indeed boasts two of the oldest regional integration schemes: The South African Custom Union (SACU) was set up in 1910 and the origin of the former East African Community (EAC) can be traced to 1919, when free trade was established between Kenya and Uganda, even the former federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, formed in 1953. However, almost all the current regional integration schemes in the region, except SACU were established after 1970 (Sarbo, 2010:22, Kasekende and Ngeno, 1993:148). From the dawn of the independent era, virtually all African countries have embraced regionalism. Today, there are more regional organizations in Africa than in any other continent and most African countries are members of more than one regional integration initiative. At the same time, it is widely recognized that many initiatives did not live up to expectation (Kasekende and Ngeno, 1993:148).

Regional and sub regional integration is not a new concept (Tesfaye, 2002:1). It has been an important part of international trade relations and policy worldwide since the Second World War. However, in the 1980's and 1990's the new wave of regional integration is once again at the top of the policy agenda in both developed and developing countries. All over the world, the pace of regionalism has accelerated and the division of the world in to three trading blocs based on Europe, the America and East Asia has become a serious possibility (Ibid).

The emergence of the European common market under the Rome treaty of 1957 signaled a new push for this new form of organization. In the case of this treaty, the objective was to deal with the effect of WWII mainly by the two wider economic interests that world create conditions for peace. It was argued that a wider regional market in key industries such as steel, iron and coal would create a common interest it would prevent a member country embarking on war against the other (Nabudere, 2006:67).

Voluntary political and economic integration have been a high priority on the African agenda ever since the demise of colonialism more than half a century ago (Garrit Olivier, 1999:1).

Despite the fact that, the original pan African project was a political one in which Nkrumah called for the formation of united state of Africa, the main activity in this direction has been the push for the formation of regional economic arrangements it was seen as the gradual building blocks aimed at the eventual creation of an African market and a political union of the continent. Most scholars agreed that regional integration and cooperation is a vehicle to economic growth. Currently African leaders seem to recognize it. At the early stage of African independence without planning and preparation there was an attempt of institution for regional integration and cooperation. After the end of the cold war the international arena of economic led integration approach has been displaced by political rational in African continent (Elizabet: 2007:71).

African integration, broadly defined, represents a mixture of sequential, chronological, not necessarily cumulative episodes of regionalization, moving along slowly, still lacking the ingredients that would render it a success recipe in terms of problem solving propensities. The first episode of African regional integration was dominated by political forces spawned and unleashed by anti-colonialist by notion of ‘African-unity’, ‘African fraternity’ or ‘Pan-Africanism. ‘Those notion implied African political unification, the creation of a ‘United State of Africa’, a single united state of African political entity (Gerrit Oliver). Despite there was a rift between Casablanca and Monrovia group African leaders’ quest for unity clearly demonstrates their commitment, which gave impetus to the formation of Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 in Addis Ababa (ARIA IV: 7).

The second episode of African regional integration is highlighted by shift from the continental geo-political approach to the sub-regional economic domain of market-driven intra-state or extra-territorial cooperation. A sensible start was made when the UN General Assembly and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) mooted functional co-operation for five ‘economically viable’ sub regions: North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, and Southern Africa, building to an important extent on pre-independence institutions and practices (Gerrit Oliver).

The third episode of African regional integration was heralded by the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and Full Act of Lagos (FAL) in 1980 authored and actively promoted by the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). This new effort to revitalize the African economy was

in response to the failure of the post-colonial economic strategies and the diagnosis that development strategies should be revised and redirected to a more inward looking mode of action. The LPA was the first effort to deal with economic problem in a unified, pan-African fashion. From a pure integrationist point of view the LPA was a step forward. It reintroduced pan-African themes, emphasizing continental co-operation for the purpose of greater, faster and sustainable development. In particular it laid stress on the concept of African solidarity, collective self reliance and self-sufficiency, economic progress on self sustaining socioeconomic development, reducing its dependence vulnerability Vis-a –vis ‘external nations.’ According to the African Development Bank, the LPA was articulated around the concepts of solidarity and collective self reliance: a self sustaining and endogenous development strategy and a policy of self sufficiency in basic need (Ibid).

The earlier reaction of regional blocks and regional economic integration schemes did not achieve their objective of integrating the regional economic. The African Head of States and government signed the Abuja Treaty (the fourth episode of African regional integration) on the establishment of a pan African economic community by the year 2025 as a response to the changing in international economic relations. This could be regarded as the new wave of regionalism in Africa in the 1990’s (McCarthy 1995: 213, cited in Tsesfaye, 2002:1).

According to article 8(3) of the treaty, the Assembly of Head of State and Government, the supreme organ of the Treaty, was empowered to ‘give directives coordinate and harmonize the economic, scientific, technical, cultural and social policies of member states’. This rule was also adopted by the African Regional Economic Community’s (REC’S). The ultimate episode of African integration was introduced with the launching of the African Union (AU) in the 2002 in Durban South Africa, to succeed the largely dysfunctional OAU and the African Economic Community (AEC).

This has led to a renewed interest with in African in revitalization and resuscitation regional grouping along with favorable internal political changes within the continent. For example the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) was transformed in to the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 1994 with a view of attaining among other things sustainable growth and development of its production and marketing structures. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was similarly transformed in 1992 in to the

Southern African Development Community (SADC) to attain a higher level of cooperation that would be enable the countries of the sub region to address problems national development and cope with the challenges posed by a changing and increasingly complex regional and global environment more effectively.

In the Horn of Africa renewed interest in revitalizing and resuscitating come also in to existence that resulted in the transformation of intergovernmental authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in 1996 in to Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) with a view of attaining among other things, the promotion of food security, sustainable environmental management, peace and security, inter–regional trade and development of improved communication infrastructure in order to enable the sub region to interact and complete in the global economy eventually, leading to regional integration (IGAD, 1996 b:3). However, member state of IGAD face common problems like economic dependence, debt burden, poor economic performance, lack of political commitment, poor communication and transaction, instability that limit the implementation of the sub regional organizations objective.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

**IGAD** from its inceptives, set clear, wide-ranging and goal oriented objectives based on the assessment of the needs of the region. Its aspirations to weight the progress of the region efforts, to ensure food security, mitigation of conflicts, and implement its objectives are undermined by certain factors, which leaves a clear gap between the objectives and the achievement. To alleviate these perceived common challenges to the sub-region. Expectations that the new world order would resolve certain crisis of the cold war period have been shown little effects in promoting peace and consequently enhance progress. On the contrary members have experienced increased interstate conflicts. Furthermore, manmade and natural disasters persisted.

Some of the chief challenges of IGAD encounters are realizing its declared objectives and programs, particularly in the areas of conflict resolution, peace, stability and regional integration. In this sense IGAD suffers from a capacity deficiency with regard to enforcement and implementation. The obvious constriction IGAD encounters is developing mechanisms and institutions that enable the mobilization and participation of grassroots communities. This would mean moving the theatre of action from an exclusive space for the privileged club member states to the larger public. Another problem is an overlap of membership where loyalty and priorities

are shared and divided. This may have the effect of undermining the cohesion and integration of the people.

Although the IGAD charter (Article 3 of 1996) emphasizes promotion of regional trade and gradual harmonization of policies and removal of tariff and nontariff barriers to interstate trade, transport and communication, there are barrier to the intra regional trade. These are: major differences in tariff rates among member states, cumbersome administrative procedures, discriminative procedures at points of entry and exist and the imposition of unilateral bans.

In addition to this the political conditions in the IGAD region is also not favorable to the creation of possible cooperation for the use of resources for mutual interest. Relations among states are marked by mistrust, suspicion and uncertainty and there is no a single country in the Horn of African that has not been affected by conflict (Tafsse, 1998: 25-26). Despite the fact that Uganda and Sudan recently agreed to make efforts to improve relations, there are accusations and threats from both sides. The same holds true with regard to relation between Eritrea and Ethiopian. Eretria and Sudan are not good terms. Up to the recent time Somalia is without central government. This shows lack of political commitment among the leaders of the member countries and poor communication and transaction.

Therefore, this thesis tries to assess the challenges to the effort of attaining integration in the sub region of IGAD.

### **1.3 Research questions**

The main research question which guides this study is what are the challenges on regional integration the case of IGAD? The study has also the following specific questions:-

1. What is the rationale for the regional integration in the case of IGAD?
2. How was the historical development of IGAD?
3. What was the main objective of IGAD designed in its very beginning?
4. What are the major economic factors that are Challenging IGAD?
5. What is the status of IGAD in its financial and human resources? Is it self-reliant?
6. What is the main cause of political instability in the IGAD member countries?

## **1.4. Objective of the study**

The study is going to be conducted hoping at achieving some general and specific objectives

### **1.4.1 General Objectives**

- Explore the main factors that are responsible for the challenges to regional integration in the IGAD region

### **1.4.2 Specific Objectives**

- To assess the theoretical perspectives of regional integration that relevant to the IGAD sub region
- To investigate the socio - economic and political settings of member state of IGAD
- Analyze the peace and security process of the IGAD
- To add some general information on the subject

## **1.5. Methodology**

The study seeks to explore the factors that are responsible for the challenges of the regional integration on the IGAD region and to consider the foundation of historical development of IGAD and the issue of peace and security. To explore and broaden it, the researcher study it within the particular given period of time .Thus, the researcher has selected an exploratory, descriptive and analytical method.

### **1.5.1 Method of Data Collection**

Regarding the method of data collection, the study collects data using two methods. The primary data were collected through personal interviews with the concerned authorities of institutions and scholars in academic and research institutions. Moreover, archives and reports are also used in the study. Secondary data were also collected from various sources. Peer reviewed journals, books, articles, news (both printed and broadcast) are secondary sources the study utilizes.

## **1.6 Significance of the study**

This thesis tries to address the issue of the IGAD sub regional economic dependency status of the countries of the sub region, lack of political will, instability and the poor communication and transaction within the sub region as the principal challenge to regional integration in the IGAD region .

The study may provide IGAD officials with the picture of the major challenges with some suggestions to overcome them in order to contribute towards the revisiting of some of their policies that might help for successful integration scheme.

The findings of this study may also be used as sources of information for those who are interested in conducting research on integration schemes, in the sub region of IGAD and other integration schemes in developing countries. It is also hoped that such a study will help contribute to the gap of knowledge on the subject under discussion.

### **1.7 Scope of the study**

The study is specifically restricted to investigate the challenges of the sub regional integration of IGAD. The region has different challenges, but the scope of this study is limited only to the political and economic challenges.

### **1.8 Limitation of the study**

This paper deals with the problems and challenges of regional integration in the case of IGAD. From its objectives and principles it is difficult to see each of them problem had encountered over the period of two decades within the scope of this papers. The researcher faced a problem of Due financial constraints, to find and secures a relevant data from resource persons in the IGAD secretariat. to this problem the researcher is going to use or limited to secondary sources including IGAD Archives. Incidentally interview has made with some concerned body.

### **1.9 Organization of the study**

The researcher divided the study in to five chapters. The second chapter deals with the conceptual framework, theoretical perspectives of regional integration and rationale for regional integration. The third chapter focuses on the foundation, historical development of IGAD, and its objectives, structures, the issue of peace and security. Chapter four is focused on the main challenges of regional integration in the IGAD sub region and the last chapter is conclusion and recommendations.

## **Chapter Two**

### **Literature Review**

#### **2. Conceptual framework and theoretical perspective of regional integration**

##### **2.1 Conceptual Frame Work of regional integration**

The term “regional integration” simply means combining parts in to a whole, according to the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary (Dosenrode, 2010:4). The concept of integration is elusive to define. In a simple sense it means bringing parts or units together to form a whole or creating interdependence. It could also represent a situation in which state becomes interdependent in whatever aspects of their relations they desired (Adetulu, 2004).

From a theoretical point of view then regional integration could be said to require a de-territorialization identity and citizenship. De-territorialization in turn would mean designing other forms of identity and citizen foundations. The rationale and logic of this argument is that any functional and suitable regional integration presupposes a prevalence of some kinds of common regional identity that transcends the ideology that confers up on territoriality a socio - politically defining power (Curry, 2012).

Another level of classification is possible; the one which considers the specific meanings of ‘integration’ from the perspectives of different disciplines. Thus there can be political integration, social integration, and economic integration (Adetula, 2004).

As many social science definitions, the term, however, is less clear cut when used to more specifically; it is used both to describe a process and a state affairs, and additionally there have been quite a number of attempts, more or less constructive, to define regional integration (e.g. Mattli 1999), so that no common understanding emerges. If we look at Ernest Haas, the founder of neo-functionalism he defined political integration as: “Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre- existing national states. The end result is of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre- existing once” (Dosebrode, 2010:4).

Accordingly regional integration is a process transferring loyalty, expectations and political decision making power, or (with an outdated but still popular concept), ‘Sovereignty’ to a new centre (Ibid). On the other hand regional integration defined as: “a relationship among units in which they are mutually interdependent and jointly produce system properties which they would separately lack” (Deutsch, 1968:192). To him regional integration does not necessarily include a new state like entity. But if the aim is to construct a supra-national unit, the strategies must consist of four elements or the general goal of regional integration includes: 1, maintaining peace 2, attaining greatest purpose capabilities 3, accomplishing some specific tasks, and 4, gaining a new self image and role identity (Curry, 2012:4).

In the economic Literature the term “economic integration” does not have such a clear cut meaning. Some authors include social integration in the concept, others subsume different forms of international cooperation under this heading, and the argument has also been advanced that the mere existence of trade relations between independent national economies is a sign of integration. We propose to define economic integration as a process and as a state of affairs (Balassa, 1967:174). According to Adetulu (2004), also the concept of economic integration as the progressive elimination of trade and tariff discrimination between national borders shows it as a state of affairs and process (Adetulu, 2004). Regarded as a process it encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to different nation states; viewed as state of affairs, it can be represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies (Balassa, 1967:174).

Up on this restrictive notion of regional integration , many self styled common markets, federations, unions and communities have emerged without promoting regional integration among members or even showing the potential to do so. In all these, there is harmony among scholars of economic integration on one question: that integration can be regarded as processes or as a state of affairs reached by the process (Adetulu, 2004).

## **2.2 Theories of regional integration**

The theoretical foundation of regional integration is traditionally found in the disciplines of economic and political theory. With regard to the former, trade theory is an important source of inspiration; with regard to the later the roots are more mixed (Cornett, 1999:2).

In a global perspective functional thinking and focus on transaction analysis has been important. In true regional perspectives federalism and in particular neo-functionalism have been two important approaches, with strong links to real world integration initiatives. In a continental and regional perspectives there seems to be strong evidence that economic and political integration are close related (Ibid).

### **2.2.1 Political integration theory**

Regarding to the political science theories of integration, four approaches are often considered to be the classical schools in the field. They are often labeled as: the federalism, the transaction or pluralistic approach, functionalism and the neo-functionalism. In the seventies new variants have been added namely the so called inter-governmentalism and trans-governmentalism, mainly taking in to account the obvious changes real political integration has taken in the period. The schools indicate that no common consensus with regard to a definition of integration exists. Some focus on the process of forming a regional body; others emphasize the stage of integration (Cornett, 1999:4). With in *the political sciences and International Relations (IR) domain the attention that has been devoted to regional integration has not been with out- disagreements and theoretical disputes. The theories between that have been developed to explain regional integration have in fact created long debates than various schools of thoughts. The main contention had been neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism (Fanta, 2008).*

#### **2.2.1.1 Neo- Functionalism theory**

The neo-functionalism was devised as an attempt to account for the political regional integration process that emerged in its unique form in western Europe in the 1950's and simultaneously to challenge the dominant IR and realist accounts of inter- state cooperation (McGowan 2007: 16). Regional integration in Western Europe was identified as a process where states ceased to be wholly sovereign, and where they entered voluntarily in to arrangements with their neighbors to establish new forms of engagement and new techniques for resolving conflict between one another. For neo- functionalists the available evidence as manifest in the European coal and steel community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) treaties seemed to suggest that the nation state was becoming redundant as an authorities source of governance. In this European laboratory powers and sovereignty were being transferred from the nation states to a set of supra-national institutions.

Supra-nationality appeared to offer new and definitive answers to resolving conflict and the beginning of a new Europe (Ibid).

Drawing in from federalism, transactionalism but above all from functionalism, the neo-functionalists have tried explaining integration process. According to this school of thought, when ever two states or more decide to collaborate on a given issue, a certain number of supra-national institutions will be created which will in turn result in a change in the sovereignty of the participating state (Fanta, 2008).

Ernest Haas(1961:366-367), one of the founding fathers of neo-functionalism thus considers that regional integration corresponds to a process “where by political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new larger center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing states.”

In the first period of European integration, neo-functionalism appeared to be winning the theoretical debate. Neo- functionalism sought to explain how and why states voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between them (Haas 1970: 610).

There are four key parts to the neo-functionalists, as follows; 1, the concept of the ‘state’ is more complex than realists suggested; 2. The activities of interest groups and bureaucratic actors are not confined to the domestic political arena; 3. Non-state actors are important in international politics; 4. European integration is advanced through spillover pressures. In contrast to realists, neo-functionalists argued that the international activities of states were the outcome of a pluralistic political process in which government decisions were influenced by pressures from various interest groups and bureaucratic actors [http:// fds. oup. com/ www. oup. com/ pdf/ 9780199544813 chapter -1.pdf](http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.com/pdf/9780199544813_chapter-1.pdf)).

Neo-functionalists pointed to the activities of Multi-national Corporation to illustrate their argument that non-state-actors are important in international politics. However, for neo-functionalists, the European commission was the most important non-state international actors (Ibid).

According to Lindberg (1963:10), Neo functionalists used the concept of spillover. In its most general formulation, spillover' refers to specific goal, creates a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, so forth. Two types of spillover were important to early neo-functionalists: functionalist and political (Fanta, 2008).

Functionalist spillover corresponds to the idea to reach its original goal an organization cannot work solely in one sector of the modern industrial economy but also needs to get involved in other sectors. Therefore, so as achieve its and the international original organization needs to empower itself so as to be able to act in the different sectors linked to this (Ibid).

Function spillover argued that modern industrial economics were made up of inters connected parts. As such, it was not possible to isolate one sector from others. Following this understanding, neo-functionalists argued that if member state integrated one functional sector of their economies, the inter connectedness between this sector and others would lead to a "spillover" on to other sectors (Ibid).

Political spillover involved the buildup of political pressures in favor of further integration with in the states involved. Once one sector of the economy was integrated, the interest groups operating in that sector would have to exert pressure at the supra-national level, on the organization charged with running their sector, so the creation of the ECSC would lead to the representatives of the coal and steel industries in all of the member states switching at least a part of their politics lobbying from national governments to the new supra national agency of common interests points to the effort that are made to overcome institutional dead lock situation usually by finding a consensus between the different involved actors(Ibid).

### **2.2.1.2 Intergovernmentalism**

Intergovernmentalism was constructed in the 1960s and 1970's as a response to neo-functionalism which was perceived to be insufficient to explain some of the trends pertaining to regional integration with a theoretical background more rooted in the realist school of thought, the opponents of neo-functionalism have denounced its emphasis on the regional and supranational levels at the demise of the nation state (Fanta, 2008).

Inter governmentalism also rejects the idea that a continuum exists between the economic sector and the political sector as they also differentiate 'high' and 'low' politics. According to this approach nation-states are wary of losing their national sovereignty and as a result may only agree to integrate issues that are not considered to be a threat to their sovereignty. Regional integration in this approach corresponds to the outcome of interstate bargaining. Thus contrarily to the neo-functionalists its primary actors are no longer at the supra-national level but are in fact the different governments involved in the talks to establish a regional cooperation framework (Ibid).

One of the most important criticisms that have been made to the proponent of intergovernmentalism is that they tend to overlook the process of actual implementation of the regional agreements and decisions or that this implementation is not perceived to be problematic. The intergovernmental approach mainly views the process of regional integration as happening through defining historical moments such as the signing of an act or an agreement (Fanta, 2008). Haffman rejected the neo-functionalist view that governments would ultimately be overwhelmed by pressures from élites interest groups to integrate. His intergovernmentalist position was more sophisticated than that of realists in this respect, and his political awareness was also greater than that of the neo-functionalist writers, who tended to adopt a rather simplified pluralist view of political processes (cited at [http:// fds.oup.com/www.oup.com/pdf/9780199544813](http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.com/pdf/9780199544813) chapter - 1.pdf).

### **2.2.2 Economic integration theory**

The economic concepts of regional integration were originally introduced by Jacob viner (1950) in his analysis of custom unions, but the concept have been expanded in scope to cover most aspects of regional economic cooperation (Cornett,1999:3).

The most conscious concept of economic integration can be found in the pure model of trade theory that defined economic integration to be the inverse of transportation costs. In this model, integration is assumed to reach from autarky (non-integration at all) to unrestricted freedom of trade (complete-intergradations) moreover goods and services only (chirstiance-krieger-Boden, Budigersol, twodel, 2010: 2).

Economists have focused primarily on market relationships among goods and factors of production within a region and have assumed away the relevance of institutional and political forces. Economic explanations are positive theories of welfare gains and losses associated with regional integration, not explanations of political choices that produce integrated areas. Most of these explanations are static: They do not address the questions of pertaining to the dynamics of integration such as in the rules and policies governing economic regions (Mattli, 1999a:19). Mattli, in his review of regional integration theories distinguished three different theories: custom union theory, optimal currency Area theory and-fiscal federalism. Economic integration theory is represented by the interests International Political economy (IPE) has devoted to regional integration (Fanta, 2008).

### **2.2.2.1 Custom Union Theory**

The theory of custom unions mainly concerned by the elimination of interstate barriers and on the establishment of common import tariffs will allow states within a region to benefit from cheaper imports from more efficient industries located in another member states (Fanta,2008). Bela Ballasa has also contributed to custom union theory by looking at the six different categories through which economic integration happens: these regional integration arrangements are, Preferential Trade Areas (PTA), Free Trade Area, custom union, Common Market, Economic and Monetary Area and eventually complete economic integration (1967:174).

#### **2.2.2.1.1 Preferential Trade Area**

Preferential Trade Area is an arrangement in which members apply lower tariffs to imports produced by non members. Members can determine tariffs on imports from non members (ECA, 2007:10). It is an arrangement in which members apply lower tariffs to imports produced by other members than to imports produced by non-members. Member states of a given sub-organization can determine tariffs on imports from non-members.

#### **2.2.2.1.2 Free Trade Area**

A free trade area (FTA) is a preferential free-trade area with no tariffs imports from other members but each country decides its own tariffs against non-members (Lee, 2002: 3; ECA, 2007:10). It is important step of market integration that removes tariffs, import quotas, and partiality on most goods and services traded between member states of regional integration. It

opens border for products originating within the region. As preferential trade areas, in free trade area members can determine tariffs of imports on non-members.

Free trade area enables member states of the regional integration to increase their production in the region and this, in turn, reducing the costs of import from the rest of the world. It also makes a region in a stronger position to respond effectively to global economic competition and influences. The full- fledged of FTA in regional community of developing countries will be questionable because tariffs are the source of revenue

generation for most of states. This fact makes countries reluctant to reduce tariffs quickly and as that may lead to revenue loss of states (ibid).

### **2.2.2.1.3 Customs Union**

Customs union is a free trade area in which members impose common tariffs on non-members and members may also give up sovereignty to a single customs administration in the region (Lee, 2002:3; ECA, 2007: 10). It is where the member states determine a common trade policy and tariff towards third party or non-member states as region. This means that the member states of a customs union promise to liberalize trade, and eliminate trade obstacle placed against members, as well as, agreeing to impose a common tariff against non-member states.

Customs Union enhances economic development and poverty reduction through promote cross-border investment and attract tourists into the region. This improved investment, which facilitates jobs to the majority of the jobless population. If taxes are low, in the same way, prices of goods and services are also low so that there is a greater demand as a result of lower prices, which increase availability of goods and services (Ibid).

### **2.2.2.1.4 Common Market**

Common market is still another stage of market integration that allows free movement of capital and labor across national borders within the integration area (Lee, 2002: 3 ECA, and 2007: 10). The main aims of common market are eliminating restrictions on technology, capital and labor among member states of a given region and this in turn; member states would develop a common visa policy and a common agreement on the right of residency (Adepoju, 2001: 43).

### 2.2.2.1.5 Economic Union

Economic union consists of a common market that promotes unified monetary and fiscal policies, including a common currency in a given sub-organization (ECA, 2007: 10). Fiscal policy refers to the taxation and expenditure policies, which are normally implemented by regions finance authority (Filho, 2005:2). The main benefit of a single currency has been to facilitate goods and services, and investment among member states of the union.

### 2.2.2.1.6 Political Union

Political union is the ultimate stage of integration, in which members states of any regional integration become one and strong community through when each states surrender their sovereignty to region so as to achieve economic and social cooperation in a given sub-organization (ECA, 2007 : 10). It achieves full economic and political unification to member states of regional integration.

Nevertheless, Critics of Custom union theory has been quick to point out that regional custom union only partly maximized national income and that in fact there should have been a greater incentive for a global union which can avoid all trade diversion (Fanta, 2008).

**Table.1** Feature of regional integration arrangements

| Types of arrangement    | Free Trade among members | Common commercial policy | Free factor liability | Common monetary and fiscal policy | One government |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|
| Preferential trade area | No                       | No                       | No                    | No                                | No             |
| Free Trade area         | Yes                      | No                       | No                    | No                                | No             |
| Custom union            | Yes                      | Yes                      | No                    | No                                | No             |
| Common market           | Yes                      | Yes                      | Yes                   | No                                | No             |
| Economic union          | Yes                      | Yes                      | Yes                   | Yes                               | No             |
| Political union         | Yes                      | Yes                      | Yes                   | Yes                               | Yes            |

Source: ECA.(2004) “Assessing regional integration in Africa” ECA, policy report research paper (Page,10)

### 2.2.2.2 Optimal Currency Area

Another economic theory of regional integration is the optimal currency area theory that focuses more on the attempts to establish currency union rather than liberalize the movement of goods

and people. A currency union in this view is considered to be the conditions that allow fixed exchange rates are believed to enable the member states to better manage internal and external balance in their exchanges with other states in the region. To be truly efficient, the optimal currency area therefore needs to already have a high mobility of the different factors of population (Fanta, 2008). Currency area theory, just as a custom Union theory, still suffers from a major flaw as the only take in to consideration the rules and policies governing the explaining how regional integration can surpass the domain of trade and can be deepened by incorporating new non-economic areas of cooperation. This unique focus on trade and market integration is clearly insufficient to explore the many spheres that states made decide to address regionally. Moreover, those two theories do not address either the framework under which the regional agreements can be signed as they are considered as already given and somewhat immutable (Ibid).

### **2.2.2.3 Fiscal Federalism Theory**

Fiscal federalism theory contrarily to the theory of custom union and optimal currency are allows to a better explanation of the role institution can play in regard to regional integration. Alessandra Casella in particular has attempted to demonstrate that trade could be a factor of regional integration also because it would bring about a virility of political changes of both the national and regional levels (1994). The main leading idea of fiscal federalism theory is that regional differences in terms of taxation and the supply of public goods will need to be leveled so as to better accommodate the process of market integration. States within a given region will attempts to improve the coordination, or centralize their fiscal policies in order to facilitate the mobility of capital labor and goods (Fanta, 2008).

### **2.2.2.4 International Political Economy (IPE)**

Another set of economic theories of regional integration pertains to the international political economy (IPE) school of thought. The IPE already represents an attempt to better incorporate element of International relation (IR) with the fields of political economy. The fact that the IPE does not solely uses nation states as the actors involved in the regional integration powers, also allows it to consider the domestic and international dynamics in both the economic and political spheres (Fanta, 2008).

Regional integration is understood as an institutional framework that allows state and non-state actors to participate to the world economy while at the same time being protected from excesses of the globalization processes. Nevertheless, the IPE approach also suffers from the syndrome of being constructed up on the study of advanced industrial economies and is still lacking to fully explain the dynamics that can be found in developing economies (Ibid).

### **2.2.3 Economic VS political integration**

Among the debate of around regional integration is whether the economic or the political should come first. Two models or school of thought, for lack of labels we can call them the economist and political, inform the debate on regional integration (Fanta, 2008:14).

The economic school of thought's approach is that identifying common economic interests and binding integration on those interests may not only be easily achievable but also can be sustainable. Therefore, some of the economic mechanisms and instruments that are thoughts to contribute to regional integration may include building roads, railways and creating sea and air links i.e., communications, intra structures that bring economic integration thoughts linking different regions and peoples who formerly lived in isolation, etc, kymlika and patten cited in (Curry,2012).

Further, the possibility of economic complementarily where there is differentially in resource endowment constitutes reason enough for nations to aim at integration. In addition economic integration is rationally and functionally presumed to be effectively induced, it predicated on selective high value items like coal and steel in the European case. For the region Horn of Africa it could mentioned that there could be agricultural products ,livestock, oil, water, port service, etc; that can serve as economic complementariness. The theory of complementariness is predicated on theories of endowment differentiability. Neighboring societies endowed with diverging resources may enter in to cooperation in order to mutually compensate for some of resource they lack. Since the cooperation, is based on material that is produced externally, cooperation would be the preferable option, rather than competition is context contingent. Dictated by the specificity of the relation of the involved states, priorities could shift. States characterized by chronic inter-states conflict may need to prioritized security issues (mills, 1995:9).

The political school of thought of integration, on the other hand, focuses on super structure where political integration through the creation of political institutions is presumed viable. The presumed political institutions that are needed to speed up regional political integration will include a regional parliament, regional commission or authority, common regional security forces, common regional president, common foreign policy etc... a process on which the African union (AU) seems to have embarked since February 2009 (cf. AU Strategic ,2009-12). These arrangement have natural of supra national states hood, because they over ride national political institutions. In a supra-national arrangement states agree to exercise some of their sovereignty together (Mathew, 2003). In this sense of political integration may be perceived as more advanced.

Another different featuring the two strategies while economic integration may be associated with the bottom up integration strategy, the political integration could be said to have close association with the top down strategy.

Economic strategy may involve private and sectoral actors and cross border community, transactions as well. The role of decision makers in this respect will be restricted to facilitating the integration through the provision of a conducive, legal and political environment (Redaie, 2012).

Perhaps a third model could also be suggested. The third model is neither economic nor political but instead proposed a combination of both, that is the carrying out of a simultaneous process of economic and political integration. This synthetic model may offer a superior approach. Similarly a simultaneous process of top down and bottom up strategies of regional integration could also be considered as highly possible and even appropriate (Ibid).

The two strategies (bottom up and top down) could complement each other. The complementarities could operate in a manner such that the communities across the geopolitical boundaries, from a bottom up perspective, enhance regional integration, while decision makers, from a top down perspectives, facilitate regional integration through creating a conducive, environment. In the end the convergence of both strategies will lead to functioning and lasting a regional integration (Ibid).

#### **2.2.4 Preconditions for Successful Regional Integration**

An excellent means to ensure economic development within the regional bloc is a robust and strong private sector. An active involvement of the general public entrenched with skills, education, and a tax base are crucial. This aspect of the regional integration process in Africa for example has been singled out as one of the major weakness of the ineptitudes of regional blocs on the continent. Well matched historic, cultural and political relations among member states of a region are needed.

Diversity in production is also the pre-condition of regional integration. When the member countries had diversified production patterns in which industrial goods prevailed, so that competition and specialization efforts would become stronger (Inotai, 1991:4).

A strong pre-condition for regional economic integration is adequate infrastructure. The dynamics of a robust economy that effectively and efficiently utilize its resources is dependent up on its infrastructure. Economic gains prompted from regional integration are highly dependent up on the ability of the system to move resources, people, capital, and information seamlessly from the sourcing areas to production hubs and finally to distribute its products efficiently(Ibid).

In one of the few comparative analysis of regional integration that draws on a large sample of cases, Mattli has identified two critical pre-conditions of successful integration. The first of these is ‘strong market pressure for integration,’ which will arise where there is ‘significant’ potential for economic gains from market exchange in the region that is to be integrated. According to Mattli, if there is little potential for gain, perhaps because regional economies lack complementarities or because the small size of the regional market does not offer important economies of scale, the process of integration will quickly peter out’(Mattli,1999a:42). The second supply condition of successful integration, for Mattli, is undisputed leadership. There must to be a ‘benevolent leading country’ in the region, that serves as a ‘focal point in the coordination of rules, regulations, and policies and may also help to ease tensions that arise from the inequitable distribution of gains from integrations (Ibid: 43).’

Domestic peaces in countries and political and civic commitment, as well as, mutual trust among countries are other precondition for successful regional integration. Integration calls for a strong

political commitment that implies the willingness to share certain aspects of sovereignty (CEC, 1995: 10). The advancement of regional integration and peace, security and stability within and among members of any development communities should be closely interlinked. Countries, which suffered by civil conflicts and political crisis cannot participate effectively in regional integration process.

Political will to integration is a key ingredient for the long term stability of regional trading block. The national interests of each member country in the Regional Trading Block (RTB) must to be adequately taken in to consideration. Thus, supra- national institutional arrangements are essential to ensure that long term commitments to integration are kept and that the integration agenda is not delayed unnecessarily by changes political leadership of the member countries or variations in public support for integration (Simms, 2006:20).

### **2.2.5. Challenges to Regional Integration**

The global trend toward regional integration has benefited from intra-regional trade, investment and capital flows in the EU, ASEAN, and North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) (USAID, 2009: 3). In addition to this, they have been successful, at least partially, because they were not eager to achieving free trade or economic union objectives at the beginning rather than regional political issues. This in the sense that EU, ASEAN, NAFTA prioritized political union and cooperation. In addition to this, they are solving intra-regional conflicts through peaceful means (Ibid: 19).

A range of technical, economic, institutional, and political issues have slowed or curtailed progress towards regional economic integration in Africa. One problem is countries overlapping membership in regional economic communities. A significant problem for all the RECs is lack of implementation of commitments, attributable to, in various instances, lack of political will, and lack of technical capacity. The largest market in each of the three major, REC's Kenya in COMESA, Nigeria in ECOWAS, and South Africa in SADC-has dominated formation of the REC's respective FTAs and has protected local industries. In addition, a plethora of non-tariff barriers remain, and a number of smaller countries have been unwilling to eliminate customs duties, arguing a need to service revenue requirements. Unfortunately, this trend has been reinforced by the global economic downturn (Ibid: 3-4).

The predominance of one country upon others leads member states of a region to mutual distrust and undermines the role and involvement of other members in the region.

Source of revenue generation for most of states are custom duties so that states do not willing to enter the products of other countries into their countries without custom duties.

Political instability and conflicts within and among member states of the region are also undermining the objectives of regional development communities. Thus, sustaining peace and security, as well as, enhancing the democratic process are decisive factors for the regional block to be able to attract tourists. In addition to this, overlapping and multi-memberships are also perceived as wasting efforts and resources and in turn, leads to a loss of efficiency and adds burdens to member states (ECA,2007:32). Overlapping of regional development community is not solely faces multiple financial obligations, but also obliges to follow different conference, strategy, decisions, procedures and schedules (ibid: 41). Sometimes these decisions, procedures and schedules are conflict and contradict each other and this, in turn, affects the effectiveness and efficiency of regional sub-organization.

Paulo Borba Casella cited in Simms (2006:20) identified that the “political will” to support deepening of economic ties between countries; where “political will” is lacking, integration is unlikely to be successful. Casella acknowledges the role played by successful models of integration, such as MORCOSUR. He also notes that blindly following a model will not bring success, especially if the political will to support deepening of economic ties is absent. Commenting this issue Casella stated that:

*“On the one hand, it is not possible to solve every problem before starting implementation, yet on the other hand, integration cannot be implemented without first having defined parameters. The evident variation in models and paths illustrates the vital relevance to the success of integration of factors that go beyond strictly economic and legal ones, notably the key role of political will, its stability and capacity to reflect national inter”*Simms,2006:20).

Political will, must be coupled with the potential for economic gain, in order to provide the impetus for deeper regional integration; one cannot exist without the other (Simms, 2006:20).

Lack of complementarities in trade flows is the challenges of regional integration. The potential for economic gain will also be very limited if the countries involved in regional integration agreement have overlapping production and trade flows. Overlapping trade flows refers to the scenario where the Regional Trade Blocking (RTB) members produce similar goods and export these goods to same or similar markets (Simms, 2006:10). This overlapping in the kinds of goods produced and/or the markets for the goods may affect the potential for economic gain for each country in the RTB in two ways : (a) Firstly, the prospect for intra-regional trade will be reduced if all members are producing the same goods; (b) Secondly, a RTB may result in some members capturing a greater share of the external market at the expense of other smaller/weaker members (Ibid).

Developing countries have similar resources. Thus, they do not complement each other sufficiently and as a result, they compete in the same products in the same markets. This circumstance has impacts on the capacity of the countries to trade internally within the region and with other regions (Keita and Kone, 2010: 14).

Inadequate and poor regional infrastructure network is also the other challenges to deepen regional integration, which limits economic growth and trade expansion (Keita and Kone, 2010: 12). It is a fundamental service, which reducing the costs of doing business among member states of the region. In developing countries, for internal and external investments and tourist attraction, the provision of efficient infrastructure services is very important. However, the potential contribution of infrastructure to economic growth and poverty reduction has not been fully realized in Africa due to even the existing infrastructure services need of a great repair (Kirkpatrick, et al. 2006: 144).

### **2.2.6 Rationale to Regional Integration**

The merit of regional integration is obvious. Regional integration is progressively being recognized as an important factor and a complement to a more effective and fair global development process. The major rationale for regional integration is the belief that there is strength in numbers and in unity and that strength can speed up the pace of development as well as enhance security. Cooperation and integration are a strategy for overcoming perceived weakness and development obstacles (Mark Chingono and Steve Nakana, 2008).

There are several reasons for integration. First, it is believed that regional groupings will enable economies of scale resulting from enlarged market and thus lower the costs of production and raise economic efficiency (Balassa, 1961:6). Second, it would increase the demand for raw materials and food stuffs, and with time, exports of manufactured goods among developing countries which reduce economic and technological dependence on developed countries (Hans Singer et al cited in Tesfaye, 2002:27). Thirdly, it can increase the bargaining power of member countries, Vis-à-vis developed countries. It is argued that “the larger the trade area as a single bloc, more likely it is to get” better commercial treatment” in its negotiations with others, particularly developed countries (Bhala and Bhalla,1997:1,cited at Tesfaye 2002:27). Fourthly, most developing countries are exports of primary commodities the price of which are subject to general fluctuation.

From a global perspective, African states are not strong enough to survive in the world market on their own. The rationale behind African integration is quite obvious: acting on their own. Most African states are destined to remain vulnerable marginalized and beggar nations. Today more than six decades since decolonization, Africa remains the most backward continent on the globe as attested by the alarming levels of economic underdevelopment, poverty, political instability, as well as the perennial armed conflicts in and among various states. “Between the 1960s and 2000 sub-Saharan Africa registered absolute declines on virtually all indices of socioeconomic development (Gerrit Oliver).” What needs to be overcome is the incapacity, particularly of sub-Saharan African states, to escape from their own backwardness and marginalization and to become integrated in the main stream of globalization (Ibid).

African countries in particular are too small and too weak to compete independently in the global economy; and thus, the only hope for those countries lies in coming together to form regional and sub regional economic groups. In addition to the small size of nations, the fact that many African economies are dependent on a narrow set of similar primary products generally affects their participation in world trade. Africa’s participation in world trade, which has never been significant, has fallen in the last decade and intra-regional trade is itself very low. To offset the unfavorable trends of external markets, it is often suggested that increased trade among African nations could bring greater advantages to the nations involved and help them to mobilize their resources by finding markets for their goods (Mwasha).

## **Chapter Three**

### **3. Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**

#### **3.1 Historical Image of the IGAD Region**

The political geography of the Horn of Africa primarily comprised Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda. The Horn is a geographical description of the region of the North East Africa on the map. The regional formation and 'regions' of the Horn has been constructed by a variety of natural, internal and external factors and forces. The multiplicity of internal and external problems, and the challenge faced by the sub region, i.e. civil wars, violent power struggles, warlords and state collapse, natural disasters and the cold war conflict and super power rivalries played out in the Horn, have led to further reconstruction and expansion of the region (Higgins, 2003).

The IGAD region structures over an area of five point two (5.2) million kilometer square comprising the countries of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and recently the new state of south Sudan (IGAD, MIP 2010:6)

The IGAD region has a population of approximately two hundred million people, characterized by high growth rates. The average population density is about thirty percent per kilometer square in 1999, the IGAD region achieved a total gross domestic product valued thirty five point nine U.S.A billion Dollars. This corresponds to an average income (Gross National Product) of USA Dollar two hundred thirty three per capita, which has been stagnant in most of the IGAD countries for the last two decades (Ibid).

The Horn of Africa is one of the most fragile crisis regions in the world, and close observers have not hesitated to proliferate ideas of what the major resources of conflict identity fault-lines, resource, poverty, super power rivalry, porous borders, among others (Medhane, 2003:I).

The Horn of Africa has distinguished itself as the 'epitome of the hopeless Region' or a Region at war with itself because according to the international media coverage of issues and developments in the sup region. It is an area of famine, droughts, poverty and starvation, civil conflicts and inter- state wars, and political stability. The region described by the majority of the media commentators and political analysts as a region of 'permanent emergency' and hence is

dependent on international humanitarian agencies, relief organization and UN agencies for crisis and development intervention (Francis, 2006).

According to agro- ecological considerations the region can be classified as arid, and semi arid accounting for 80%. The rest are sub humid and humid totally 20% out of this agriculture, crop farming and cash crops cover only 7% of the region (Mesfin, 1999:76). The major of the population depends on subsistence agriculture and pastoralist. Pastoralist is an important production system in the region. The world's largest concentration of pastoralist population is found in the Horn, with Sudan as the world's largest, and Somalia and Eritrea 3<sup>rd</sup> and fourth (4<sup>th</sup>) respectively (Higgins, 2003).

The primarily reason is that 70% of the land is arid and semi arid. The environmental system of the region is one of diversity, with rich agricultural areas as well as arid land and diverse coastal areas. There is also high degree of dependence on scarce natural resources and both the population and national economies depend on the management and utilization of these resources. The region is affected by famine, droughts and floods. Furthermore, many of the ecosystems and livelihood systems straddle international borders such as the Juba/Shebelle basin shared by Somalia and Kenya, the massai pastoral communities straddling the Kenyan- Tanzanian borders and the Nuer of Sudan- Ethiopian borders (Higgins, 2003).

These complex livelihoods and eco-systems have led situations where by armed pastoralist groups clash over the use of access to water resources. The region is also affected by environmental degradation, including desertification, deforestation, water scarcity and watershed degradation. The pervasiveness of conflict in the reign has also led to serious problems of land mines and their devastating effects on agricultural, economic and commercial activities. The environmental problem is compounded by oil extraction and oil exploration activities in Southern Sudan (Ibid).

There is a major trend for urbanization in the IGAD region with large number of people from the rural areas migrating to the big urban centers in search for employment and income. The region is endowed with substantial natural resources which if properly managed; these resources shall significantly contribute to the economic development of the region (IGAD, 2010:6).

During the cold war, the Horn of Africa was the scenes of super power rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States particularly in the 1970's conflict in the Horn were overshadowed by the rivalry between the super powers. As a result there is a tendency to see various disputes and wars in the region as being caused by outside powers or at the very least exacerbated by those powers (Medhane, 2003:1).

The Horn of Africa never acquired a strategic importance for its raw materials or for any other continental advantage. However, the region has always been allotted a relatively important strategic value owing to its proximity to the Red Sea, which is an important and expeditious routs of international trade and communications between Europe, the Middle East and the East, as well as the navigation brought through which oil is transported from the Persian Gulf (in which the largest oil deposits of the world are located) to consumers in North America were forced in to economic, political and military dependence on either one of the two super powers of the cold war, the U.S.A and U.S.S.R (Brouk, 2011:19).

Competing to establish positions of influence, and military advantage in the strategically significant regions of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, the two super powers supported client states in the adjacent Horn of Africa- primarily by injecting military aid and under mined inimical states by supporting rebel movements and weaving unfriendly alliances and center alliance (Ibid).

At the end of the cold war ushered in a new, cooperative mood for the management and resolution of conflicts. There was progress towards a peaceful transition to democratic governance in many African countries such as Mozambique and Ethiopia. However, in the final months of 1989 and in to 1990 the wars in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia intensified and peace initiatives faltered. In short, conflict remained as serious problem for the Horn of Africa as the 1990s began, despite the favorable developments in the regional and international systems, in the final years of the previous decades. It becomes increasingly evident that the end of the cold war or bipolarity has not contributed to the creation of a regional context for peace. Indeed it created a power vacuum. This coincided with major political upheavals: the deconstruction of the state of Somalia the fall of the "Dergue regime" in Ethiopia and the independent of Eritrea (Medhane, 2003:2).

Evidently the decline of bipolarity has not reduced the intensity of the civil wars in Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia. Most of the conflicts have in fact taken on new magnitudes and dimensions. The coming of Omer El-Basher in Sudan through coup de'etat in May 1989, the silent civil war in the port state of Djibouti between the Issa and the Afar opposition continued, and the republic of Somalia ceased to exist amid a brutal civil war between the warring factions. The civil war in the Sudan not only continued but was further complicated by political Islam, oil, and the split of SPLA in the early 1990's. Three years after independence Eritrea was at loggerheads with its neighbor (Ibid).

As Lionel Clief observed, the Horn has been faced with the same arbitrariness of borders inherited from European colonial rule and with the inability resulting problems of state making a nation building among disparate peoples and in contested territory where there were cultural links with people across these borders. These features found throughout Africa and other ex-colonial territories, were intensified by factors specific to the Horn, each of which further enhanced the livelihood of internal and inter-state conflict. On ethnically homogeneous state of Somalia, whose nationalism embraced but also room becoming empire; Sudan straddling the cultural divide between Africa South of the Sahara and the North (Ciru Mlnaura , Guter Baechler, and Bethuel Kiplagat 2002).

The revision of boundaries (as evidenced the appearance of Eritrea and the still unrecognized Somaliland and Puntland), the collapsed state (Somalia), and secessionist groups (continued agitations for separate Oromo state outside Ethiopia's Ethnic federalism) are thus a key part the Horns reality (Ibid).

IGAD region is part of the African continent, which may be cited as an area engulfed by struggles over economic and political power, often taken the forms of ethnic conflict. Furthermore, the situation of the IGAD region is undermined by overlapping problems of fragile ecological inheritances of cyclical drought compounded armed a conflict. Pastoralists and other hinter land populations have been among the primary victims. These multi dimensional challenges forced the people to be displaced, subjecting them to migrate as an environment refugee (Tesfaye, 2007:24).

The conflict in the Horn has been intra-state but with spillover effects in such situation, the option of developing regional cooperation mechanism becomes more of necessity than a choice. It is visualized that state could more easily cope with the challenges if they cooperate with each other (Elizabet, 2007:3).

The formation of regional structure is therefore seen as a way of bringing about coordination of efforts to overcome the challenging situation. The inter-state cooperation as well as regional peace and security is an ongoing process with different phases which need supportive condition. Taking such an issue in to account, seven countries namely, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan established a sub regional organization, initially to combat drought and desertification, and later on to promote cooperation peace and security in this sensitive area (Ibid). The following are a short profile of the member countries:-

**Ethiopia:** - is the country that we generally assume to be the Horn of Africa. The only country which has physical contact or shares land boundary with all the countries of the Horn is Ethiopia. We shall call this country, Ethiopia the core country of the Horn. All the countries that have land boundary with Ethiopia will constitute the Horn of Africa. These are Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, South Sudan and Sudan makes Ethiopia the core country of the region. Practically all countries receive Ethiopia water in varying degree. Ethiopia is the variable water toward of the Horn of Africa (Mesfin 1999:68).

The population of Ethiopia is made up by the Oromo (40%), the Amharic of central Ethiopia and the Tigreans in North western Ethiopia (about 32%) and other ethnic groups. Agriculture accounts for almost half the Gross National Product and employs about three quarters of the active work force. About 13% of the land is Arable. The main crops are barley, maize, sorghum, teff, and sugar cane. Cattle, sheep, and goats are also raised and major exports are coffee and animal hides (WHYCOS, 2004:12).

**Eritrea:** - is located in the Horn of Africa, to the North of Ethiopia and bordered the Red sea in the North East, Sudan in west, Ethiopia in South, Djibouti in South East. Sudan and Eritrea shares also maritime borders with Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Compare its area of 117,000km<sup>2</sup> is almost four times the size of Belgium or slightly larger than the US states of Pennsylvania. Its population of 6 million people is made up of Tigriana 55%, Tigre 30% and some smaller ethnic

groups. Spoken language is Tigrinya, Arabic and English (<http://www.nationsonline.org/one-world/eritria/htm>).

Eritrea was one of the provinces of Ethiopia from 1961-1991. But ELF and EPLF waged protracted struggles for independence which Eritrea obtained in May 1993. (Kifle, 2006:234). On the positive side, the key development of the early 1990's was Ethiopia's endorsement of the principle of self determination which was pertinent to Eritrean independence. This led to the creation of Eritrea state in May 1993, and it becomes the member of IGAD in this year (Ibid). Although Eritrea is small, weak and poor, it is the major threat to its neighbors (Medhane, 2003:70).

**Djibouti:** - is one of the smallest countries in Africa located on the strait between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea between Eritrea, Somaliland and Ethiopia. Its smallness is both in terms of area and population.

It has two main ethnic groups: the Afar of Ethiopian origin, and the Issa, closely related to the people of Somalia. More than half of the inhabitants are nomads and herders, although less than one tenth of Djibouti is suitable for grazing. Sheep, Goat and smaller number of cattle are raised. Agriculture is limited to a few oases, where dates fruit and vegetables are grown. The national economy depends on the Port of Djibouti, which is linked by rail to Addis, Ababa, Ethiopia, and serves as a major sea port for Ethiopia (WHYCOS, 2004:6).

**Kenya:** - is bounded on the North by Sudan and Ethiopia, on the East by Somalia and the Indian Ocean, on the South by Tanzania and on west by lake Victoria and Uganda. Kenya is a republic in East Africa a member of a common wealth of nations. Kenya had a varied landscape of plateaus and high mountains and is home to many different ethnic groups belonging to three linguistic families, the Bantu, the Cushitic and the Nilotic. Language traditionally has been the primary characteristic of ethnic identity in Kenya (Maxon, 2004: np).

Coffee and tea are the main cash crops in Kenya. Livestock, maize, wheat, rice, cassava and sugar cane are also important agricultural product. The vital tourist industry is well developed, and also Kenya has one of Africa's best telecommunication system (WHYCOS, 2004:28).

**Somalia:** - is the Eastern most extension of the African continent and is bordered by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.

The former British and Italian colonies formed the first state of Somalia and became independent in 1960. The Somalis, perhaps are the most arbitrarily spread across borders that are found in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. As they were under different colonial administration, the northern and southern were experiencing some splits. At the same time with an intention of unifying all Somalis, spread across Ethiopia and Kenya borders, there was also substantial conflict between different groups' pro-Arabs, pan-Somali militants on one hand the Somali in habited territories in Ethiopia and Kenya on the other (Tesfaye, 2007:29).

With the collapse of the state in January 1991, Somalia becomes the first country in modern history to become stateless. As a result, the country was left without rule and regulation. Thereafter, violent struggle began to get deep rooted among the factions in the country. This condition led the people to become idle and famine took place (Ibid).

**Sudan:-** the most burning issue in Sudan which remains for about four decades is the prevalence of uninterrupted civil war, Sudan is believed to have been in internal civil strife since its independence in 1956 which increased its intensity in the year 1983 between the largely Christian South and the largely Muslim north. It was Nimerie's declaration of sharia or Islamic fundamental law which added fuel to the existing conflict. The Sudan's government encountered heavy resistance from the southern people's liberation movement (SPLN) and its military wing, the Sudan's people's liberation army (SPLA) ([Kttp://www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org)).

**Uganda:** - contains a varied landscape of savanna, dense forests, and high mountains, as well as almost half of lake Victoria, the largest lake in Africa and the sources of the White Nile River. It is a landlocked country on the equator in East Africa. Uganda is an ethnically diverse nation with a deeply ingrained intellectual. Uganda becomes a British protectorate in 1884, and its present borders were established in 1926. It gained independence from British rule in 1962. Many of the languages presently used are not mutually intelligible. About two thirds speak Bantu language and live in the South, including the largest and wealthiest ethnic groups. English is the official language of Uganda. Though Swahili is more widely spoken and used as a lingua franca (Kasfir 2004, cited in Elzabiet 2007:8).

Farming and the raising of cattle, goat, sheep and poultry are important occupation in Uganda. Coffee is the main commercial crop, followed by cotton and tea.

**South Sudan:-**The republic of south Sudan becomes the world’s newest nation and Africa’s 55<sup>th</sup> country on July 9, 2011, following a peaceful referendum in January 2011. The referendum was seen as parts of the 2005 comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) signed by the government of the republic of the Sudan and the then southern based rebel group, the SPLA after decades of conflict. As a new nation without a history of formal institutions rules or administrations accepted as legitimate by its society, south Sudan must build its institutions from scratch. Core administrative structures and mechanisms of political representation are only beginning to emerge, and the government still struggles to provide basic services to the population. Outside a few oil enclaves south Sudan remains a relatively under developed, subsistence economy ([www.worldbank.org/en/country/south Sudan/overview](http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/south-sudan/overview)).

South Sudan, with an estimated population 8.3m is bordered by Ethiopia to the East, Kenya, Uganda and the democratic republic of Congo to the south and the central Africa republic to the west. At 644,329sq.km, it is roughly the size of France with it had virtually no road or water infrastructure, and then no paved roads in and outside of its capital of Juba. Structures for service delivery were practically nonexistent (Ibid).

**Table.2 Demographic and Human Development Index**

| Country  | Area (Thousands sq km) | Population (million) | Population growth(% Per annum) | Rural population (%) | Life expectancy (years) | GDP (US\$ billions) | Annual Economic growth (%) | HDI(2008)ranking |
|----------|------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|------------------|
| Djibouti | 23.2                   | 0.8                  | 1.8                            | 12                   | 57                      | 1                   | 5                          | 155              |
| Eritrea  | 117.6                  | 5.3                  | 3.8                            | 78                   | 61                      | 2                   | 2.2                        | 165              |
| Ethiopia | 1,104.30               | 83                   | 2.4                            | 82                   | 58                      | 29.7                | 10.1                       | 171              |
| Somalia  | 637.7                  | 9.9                  | 2.3                            | 63                   | 51                      | 5.9                 | No data                    | No data          |
| Sudan    | 1,862                  | 36                   | 2.4                            | 55                   | 61                      | 62+                 | 4.5                        | 150              |
| S. Sudan | 644.3                  | 8.3                  | No data                        | 79                   | No data                 | No data             | No data                    | No data          |

Source: World Development Indicators 2011 (World Bank).United Nations Development program (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), (2008). This ranking was out of 182 countries; more recent reports before South Sudan’s Independence.

### **3.2 Foundation and development of IGAD**

The environmental and development problems and challenges faced by the Horn countries, in particular the impact on human security, forced up on them the imperative to create a regional system to address these regional problems. Some of the immediate challenge facing the countries in the Horn of Africa and IGAD as well as national and international non state actors operating in the region have been drought, famine, refugees as well as victims of land mines and war. Conflict remains the major contributing factor with far reaching ramification to disasters because of instability in the region (Adar: 44). This led to the creation of the Inter governmental authority on Drought and development (IGADD) in 1986 with a narrow mandate focusing on issues of drought, famine and desertification in the region. IGADD also provided a regional plat form for dialogue on regional peace and security (Francis, 2006:222) and IGADD comprising Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda. The circumstances giving rise to the formation of IGADD were the rampant drought and desertification that was ravaging the region (IGADD, 1996).

Since the early 1970's the region has been experiencing pervasive and severe droughts such as those of 1974 and 1984. These droughts inevitability generated extreme environmental degradation, desertification and famine, making livelihoods in the region extremely precarious. The famine of 1984/85 which was of a cataclysmic magnitude brought an un imaginable destruction of life in the forms of death of animals and humans, large internal displacement of people (IDPs), migration of others to neighboring countries and immense human suffering (Fracis, 2006: 223).

The devastating famine visited the region again in the summer of 2011, afflicting Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia, the foundation of regional integration was motivated by the ideas of resolving common problems through collective efforts, and was launched at a summit in Djibouti in January 1986. Driven by the immense hardships, the state of the six countries with the help of the UN and the international donor groups, initiated the creation of an institutionalized action to control desertification and minimize the effects of droughts on life and induce development. Indeed the states of the region were urged to form an intergovernmental authority to coordinate the fight against drought and famine (Radaie, 2012).

The six founding member of IGADD were joined by Eritrea following its formal independence in 1993. The agreement they signed stated their intension to coordinate and supplement the effort of member states to combat the effect of drought and other related natural disasters (Art 7(a)). The supra national organizations responsibility was declared to be complementary to national efforts and thus aid national states in their endeavors to achieve national programs. Apparently the first step in establishing the regional organization was taken by the United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 38/216 of 20 December 1983 (Ameyo, 2010:5). The assembly of head of states and government in Djibouti in January 1986 and signed an agreement which formally launched IGADD. It is symptomatic of instability in the Horn that five years after its creation, half of IGADD's founding head of states had been driven from office, all by unconstitutional means. In Sudan, Omar El-Basher sized power in 1989 and established an Islamic government. In Ethiopia Mengistu was over thrown in 1991 by a dual rebel's alliance. In Somalia, Said Barre was removed from power by rebel forces in 1991, ushering in a protracted period of state collapse and the emergence of a separatist administration in Somalia (Healy, 2009:3).

The year 1991 constituted a watershed in the history of IGADD when regime change took place in both Ethiopia and Somalia, opening new opportunities to breathe new life in to the activity of the regional organization. The emergent regimes of the Ethiopian people's revolutionary democratic front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean people's liberation front played a crucial role in revitalizing IGADD (El-Affendi, 2001:582).

Djibouti become the permanent head quarters of the regional organization, nevertheless IGADD found itself, beyond fighting drought and desertification, involved in efforts to resolve regional socio-economic and political problems (IGADD, 1996).

The expanded mandate of IGAD, in addition to combating drought and desertification, included economic cooperation and integration. Eventually IGADD also moved from environmental agricultural and economic cooperation and integration to political, security and peace concerns. IGADD therefore, pursued a gradual and progressive expansion and elaboration of its mandates and programs (Ibid).

The resurgence of regionalism in world politics in the 1990's caused the political leadership of IGADD to consider the political benefits from regional economic integration and cooperation, on peace and security issues in the Horn (Francis, 2006). The strongest motivation for the revitalization of IGAD was the need to find regional strategies for the resolution of the numerous inter and intra-state conflict (Terlinden, 2004:2).

The consensus amongst the IGAD leadership was that it was imperative to revitalize the regional institution as a serious mechanism to respond to the problems and challenges faced by the region. Therefore, at the 1995 IGADD extra ordinary summit in Addis Ababa, the decision was taken to expand regional cooperation in the Horn, and at the 1996 summit in Nairobi, IGADD adopted the agreement establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Francis 2006). The four primary areas of focus of IGAD were food security and environmental protection; infrastructure development (transport and communications) and regional conflict prevention, management and resolution and humanitarian affairs (IGAD, MIP, 2010).

The aim of IGAD is to promote regional peace and stability as the foundation for attaining the goal of good security. Environmental protection and sustainable regional development with in this context, regional integration and cooperation in the Horn was to serve as the driving force in achieving the goals of regional peace and security. Art7 (g) states that the aim of IGAD is to promote peace and stability in the sub region for prevention, management and resolution of intra state and interstate conflicts through dialogue.

### **3.3 Areas of cooperation**

In April 1996 on the recommendation of the summit of the head of state and governments, the IGAD council of ministers identified areas, of cooperation.

- Promoting conflict prevention, management and resolution and humanitarian affairs
- Harmonization in policies of infrastructural development (transport and communication);
- Initiate and promote programs and projects to achieve regional food security and sustainable development of natural resources and environmental protection, and encourage and assist efforts of member states to collectively combat drought and other natural and manmade disasters and their consequences;

- Conserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment;
- Advancing trade and harmonization of trade policies.
- Respect for the fundamental and basic rights of the people of the region.
- Mobilize resources for the implementation of emergency, short term, medium term and long term programs within the frame works of sub regional cooperation's;
- Facilitate, promote and strengthen cooperation in science and technology. Among these, the head of state and government and the IGAD council of ministers identified three priority areas of cooperation.
- Conflict prevention, management and resolution and humanitarian affairs;
- Infrastructure development (Transport and communication)
- Food security and environment protection.

To tackle the socio-economic and the political problems IGAD member states enhancing cooperation by reaffirm their commitment to the principle of declared:-

- Retrain from interfering in the internal affairs of member states
- The sovereign equality of all member states
- The peaceful settlement of inter and intra state conflicts through dialogue and negotiation
- Maintenance of regional peace and security
- Mutual and equitable sharing and enforcement operations.

### **3.4 Objectives**

IGAD aims to expand the areas of regional cooperation, increase the members, dependency on one another and promote policies of peace and stability in the region in order to attain food security, sustainable environment management and sustainable development. The IGAD strategy is to attain sustainable economic development for its member countries.

Regional economic cooperation and integration are given special impetus and high priority to promote long term collective self sustaining and integrated socio-economic development. The leading principles of the IGAD strategy are stipulated in the agreement establishing IGAD, but are also mindful of the UN charter and AU constitutes act [www.igad.org](http://www.igad.org).

IGAD's aim and objectives are:-

- Promote joint development strategies and gradually harmonize macroeconomic policies and programs in the social, technological and scientific fields;
- Harmonize policies with regard to trade, customs, transport communications, agriculture, and natural resources, and promote free movement of goods, services, and people and the establishment of residence;
- Create an enabling environment for foreign, cross border and domestic trade and investment;
- Achieve regional food security and encourage and assist efforts of member states to collectively combat drought and other natural and manmade disasters and their consequences;
- Initiate and promote programs and projects for sustainable development of natural resource and environmental protection;
- Develop and improve a coordinate and complementary infrastructure, particularly in the areas of transport and energy;
- Promote peace and stability in the sub region and create mechanisms within the sub region for the prevention for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intrastate conflicts through dialogue;
- Mobilize resources for implementation of emergency, short term, medium term and long term programs within the framework of sub regional cooperation;
- Promote and realize the objectives of the common market for eastern and southern Africa (COMESA) and the African Economic community (AEC).
- Facilitate, promote and strengthen cooperation in research, development and application in the field of science and technology.
- Develop such other activities as the member states may decide in furtherance of the objectives of this agreement (Ibid).

### **3.5 Structure and operation of IGAD**

The organs of the IGAD comprise the assembly of heads of state and government (the summit); the council of ministers; the committee of ambassadors; and the secretariat.

### **3.5.1 The assembly of heads of state and government**

The summit ordinarily meets once a year and reaches its decisions by consensus, it has inter alia, the following functions: policy making, directing and controlling the function of the organization determining the main guidelines and programs of cooperation; and giving guidelines and mentoring political issues, especially on conflict preventions, management and resolution (Appuli, 2011:349).

### **3.5.2 The council of ministers**

The council of ministers, composed of ministers of foreign affairs and one another focal minister designated by each members state, is tasks with inter alia, following up political and security affairs, which include conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as post conflict building; monitoring and enhancing humanitarian activities; promoting peace and security in the sub region; and making recommendations to the assembly. The council ordinarily meets twice a year and normally reaches its decisions by consensus (Ibid).

### **3.5.3 The committee of ambassadors**

The committee of Ambassadors, which reports to the council of ministers, comprises member states ambassadors or plenipotentiaries accredited to the country of the headquarters of the organization. It functions are to advise the executive secretary on the interpretation of policies and guidelines that may require further elaboration. The committee holds meetings when necessary and normally reaches its decision by consensus (Ibid).

### **3.5.4 The secretariat**

The secretariat, which is headed by an executive secretary, is the executive body of the authority. It is tasked with, inter alia, implementing the decisions of the assembly and the council; preparing draft proposals and agreements on matters arising from the decisions and recommendations of the assembly and the council; and assisting the policy organs in their work relating to political and humanitarian affairs (Ibid, 350).

From the forgoing, it can be observed that decision-making in IGAD is in pyramid form, with final decisions being made by the summit. The IPSS plan process began in 2004 when the IGAD

head of state and government tasked the secretariat with developing a comprehensive peace and security strategy. This was against the background of IGAD's success in mediating the Somalia and Sudan peace process. In March 2005, the IGAD secretariat convened a launching conference of the process in Khartoum, Sudan. A follow up workshop was convened in Mombasa, Kenya, in July 2007, which was attended by representatives of civil society, government representatives and eminent personalities. At this workshop thematic areas were identified to constitute the issues to be covered by the IPSS plan. The identified themes included border demarcations of IGAD member countries/states/ and their implications; access to the sea for land locked countries in the region; trans-boundary water resources management; and cross border cooperation and counter terrorism.

### **3.6 IGAD: the Issue of peace and Security**

Since the establishment the IGAD, creating an effective security policy among the member states has been its primary aim. The IGAD; main objectives are to retain peace security and stability and to accomplish prosperity and regional integration among the member states (Abdurahman, 2012). In the agreement establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development or the IGAD; security policy towards East Africa is stated in articles 18a of the IGAD charter, member states agreed "... to act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability, which are essential prerequisites for economic development and social progress". They committed themselves to take collective and effective measures to cooperate for peace building and security; to establish an effective consultative mechanism; and to deal with interstates disputes and conflicts with in this mechanism (Abdurahman 2012, and MIP, 2010:14).

In its broader sense the peace and security program consist of three sub programs (Radie, 2012:179) and Siebert, 2010:96).

- i. The conflict prevention, management and resolution:** Sudan peace process; Somalia peace process; development of the IGAD peace and security strategy; conflict early warning response mechanism (CEWARN); IGAD capacity building program against terrorism (ICPACT); coordination of the East African Stand by Brigade (EASBRRIG).
- ii. Humanitarian affairs:** Enhancing DRM capacity through training; resource mobilization for the implementation of DRM program; establishment of disaster facility in the IGAD region;

DRM as component of the regional food security and risk management program (REFORM); the risk management of bird fule /avian influenza, refugees, returnees and IDGPs.

**iii. Political affairs:** Inter parliamentary union of IGAD; IGAD/civil society forum. Conflict resolution and management remains the major field where IGAD has established demonstrated effectiveness notably in the resolution of the conflicts particularly in South Sudan and Somalia. In addition to, the implementation of the CEWARN programs and current strategic plan (2008-2012) contributed to enhancing the capacity of IGAD member states through providing fundamental data for conflict management and training of the national experts (IGAD: minimum integration plan 2010:14). The IGAD peace and security sub program deals with one of the crucial dimensions that have increasingly come to define the region, notably conflict. It is concerned with conflict prevention, conflict management and conflict resolution (IGAD, 2007:45). Indeed IGAD's principles declare its intentions in "the peaceful settlement of inter and intrastate conflicts through dialogue and the" maintenance of regional peace, stability and security (IGAD, 1996:7). Due to the complex historical, socio-economic, and political background, the demand for innovative regional peace and security structures is urgent (Ciru Mwaura, Gunther Bacehler, and Bethuel Kiplagat, 2002:37).

IGAD had been quite successful in developing the regional Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism CEWARN and the Anti Terror Capacity Building Program ICPAT (Borchgrevink axel and lie Harald sande 2009:32).

### **3.7.1 Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism**

With its revitalization in 1996, IGAD began to focus on issues of CPMR. Thus the establishment of a conflict early warning and response system was identified as a key area within IGAD's peace and security agenda. In a meeting of the council of ministers held in Khartoum in 2000 a decision was taken to establish CEWARN for the IGAD region. After focused research, consultations and assessments in all IGAD members, the council of ministers of IGAD endorsed the protocol agreement in 2002, providing CEWARN with a legal entity and operational frame work the protocol entered in to force in July 2003 having received the necessary instruments of ratification from the state of Eritrea, republic of Kenya, the federal democratic of Ethiopia and the republic of the Sudan (CEWARN, 2006:13).

As Appuli (2004:176 and CEWARN,2006:13) try to explain under the CEWARN there is established a CEWARU-Unit, central to the CEWARN is that all stake holders- civil- society, grass root organizations and governmental institutions in the IGAD region will be utilized for the collection of information related to the conflict.

An effective early warning system requires cooperation among a host of relevant sources including academics, media, nongovernmental organizations, national governments, regional organizations and the United Nations, to collect the necessary information and to offer a reliable meaning of its interpretation. The need to monitor a growing number of internal conflicts and develop policies that are more consistent as a reliable early warning system that can handle with the growing number of conflicts around the world (Appuli, 2004:176).The function is carried out by collecting and discussing information regarding the outburst and elevation of probable violating conflict in the region occupied by the IGAD countries, analyzing and processing the data, and coming up with alternative route of response. The ultimate goal of CEWARN is to establish itself as a self-sufficient, functional and long standing conflict warning and response system in the IGAD region; promoting an environment of positive cooperation among the stakeholders, in response to possible and real violent conflict between these countries, and set the grounds for peacefully setting disputes in the area (CEWARN/<http://www.igad region.org/cewarn/>).


By establishing national collaboration between several government and nongovernmental stakeholders such as conflict early warning and response units (CEWRUS), national research institutes (NRIS) and field monitors (FMS), the CEWARN target of early warning and response has been under taken in three main geographical clusters, namely, the karamoja cluster (include cross border regions of Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda, the Somali cluster (encompassing cross border regions of Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia), and the Dikhil cluster (cross border regions of Djibouti and Ethiopia).

The CEWARN protocol lays down a wide range of areas on which CEWARN can collect information. The mandate of CEWARN is to receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region. Those include livestock rustling, conflicts over grazing and water points, nomadic movements, smuggling and illegal trade, refugees, land mines and banditry. However, CENARN was

mandated by the member states to commence with the monitoring of cross border pastoral conflicts. The focus on cross border postural conflicts was chosen as an entry point for CEWARN because such a pilot project was of mutual interest to all IGAD member states which held common interests in addressing the problem and as a means of gaining and to encourage cooperation among countries in the Horn (CEWARN, 2006).

The structure of CEWARN consists of the assembly, council and committee being its policy arm; the secretariat of IGAD being the administrative arm; the CEWARN Unite and CEWARN as the technical arm; optional interested structures and optional regional councils the cooperating arm; and the committee of permanent secretaries and the technical committee on early warning the coordinating arm.

### Organizational Structure of the CEWARN Mechanism



Sources- at IGAD Livestock policy initiative

In spite of its ambitious CEWARN program IGAD has had only modest achievement at micro levels, such as tackling pastoral conflicts in the karamoja and Somali clusters at the macro level such as dealing with the ‘no war no peace’ relations of Eritrea and Ethiopia conflict, Djibouti-Eritrea conflict in 2008, conflict in Darfur, Northern Uganda and Eastern Ethiopia it has not successful (Radaie, 2012:180).

### 3.7.2 East African Stand by Brigade (EASBRIG)

It is the key component of the IGAD’s peace and security division. As parts of its CEWARN strategy IGAD also become involved in the creation of the East African Stand by Brigade, which

is part of the African stand by force (ASF) (IGAD, 2007:49). The EASBRIG includes IGAD member states plus, Tanzania, Mauritius, Seychelles, Burundi and Rwanda (IGAD, 2004:7)2.

The AU ASF is divided into five groups to coordinate its peace and security activities effectively in Africa: Namely the North Africa regional stand by Brigade (NASBRIG), East African stand by Brigade (ESBRIG), Central Africa force Multinational del' Afrique central (FOMAC), Southern Africa stand by Brigade (SADCBRIG) and ECOWAS stand by Brigade (ECOBRIG).

IGAD coordinates the program of EASBRIG and works closely with the African Union in the areas of peace and security, as well as with the Regional Center on Small Arms (RECSA), 15<sup>th</sup> of March 2000. RECSA's main function is to combat proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the Great Lakes Region and East Africa (Abdurahman, 2012).

Since the environment of Sudan and the SPLM/A signed the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in January 2005; IGAD has been playing a key role in facilitating and observing the Sudan peace process. Furthermore, it contributed to the United Nations mission in Sudan (UNMIS) with two peace keeping battalions from Uganda and Kenya. In Somalia, it has played vital roles in reinforcing the TFG and assisted the TFG to prepare vital roles in reinforcing the TFG and assisted the TFG to prepare the national security stabilization plan (NSSP). In addition, it had made efforts to lift the UN arms embargo against the TFG, to make it a more active and more effective political instrument in the country. In January, IGAD was authorized by the African Union Peace and Security Council to deploy a peace keeping mission in Somalia, named IGASOM. However, it could not implement it in 2006, but rather than the AU Peace and Security Council authorized a peace keeping mission, AMISON, in April 2007 (Ibid).

### **3.7.3 IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism**

Since 1990 the concern with terrorism has grown in the IGAD region. With the hosting of Osama Bin Laden by the Islamic government in Khartoum and the emergence of the radical Islamic movement of Al-Ithihad in Ethiopia (Woodward, 2004: 472; Muller, 2008: 110 cited in Redaie 2012:186), the issue of terrorism has constituted a serious concern for IGAD.

The bombing of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dares-Salam in 1998 further sharpened the worry over terrorism in the IGAD region (Ibid).

IGAD responded to the terror threat through the establishment of the IGAD Capacity building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT) set up by the help of Dutch and Danish governments in 2006, located in Addis Ababa. Staffed with experts from the sub region and supported by an NGO (Redie: 2012:187..., Peter, 2010:117, Appuli, 2011: 364; and Axel Borchgrevink and Jon HaraldSande Lie, 2009:103).

In a region that is characterized by high vulnerability to terrorism, low state capacity, and (in the past) relative inattention from the UN's counterterrorism bodies, ICPAT has proven to be a valuable vehicle for counter terrorism assistance with a wide range of partners and donor including a stronger engagement with UN organs (peter 2010:117).

*ICPAT's focus includes establishing a regional approach to counter terrorism with a broader international strategy; acting against financing of terrorism, developing operational capacity to counter illegal cross border movements; expanding the capacity to record and share information; ensuring that human rights are protected in counter terrorism operations and promoting educational programs to enhance public support (Redie,2012:187).*

What must be observed, however, is the fact that the work of ICAPT has not been visible in member states. Other than the low level-training given to state security and Judicial officials from member states, the program has had minimal impact, for example, in combating piracy off the coast of Somalia and Gulf of Aden in which ships and fishing boats were attacked in 2003. Besides, ICPAT has been poorly funded by donations from friendly countries and donors, and as a result a decision was taken by the IGAD secretariats to suspend its operations in 2010 pending its transformation in to a security sector program under the IPSS plan (Appuli, 2011:364, Radie 2012:187) .

The focuses of IPSS were to be on Terrorism, human trafficking and other cross border organized crimes. This program was considered as parts of the broader security strategy of CEWARN (Ibid).

ICPAT has received financial support from Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden, as well as technical support to activities from UK. Among its activities IGAD had also sought to map the over al received by its individual member states for the security sector (Axel Borchgrevink and Jon HaraldSande Lie, 2009:104, Solomon, 2010:27).

To some extent, ICPAT could be seen in contrast to CEWARN, as a more top down mechanism, working on strengthening the main security institutions of the states. Its focus on borders is also much more on establishing effective control over the border lines. More are the general works of the IGAD secretariat on issues of migration border control. The fact that the international organization for migration is involved as a partner in both processes would seem to be of potential assistance for this. In practice, however, there has been little cooperation. In the IGAD secretariat, it was expressed that ICPAT dealt more with border issues from a security perspective, as if this were something totally delinked from the secretariat's work in formalizing cross border migration within the region (Ibid:105).

### **3.7 Peace process in the Region**

With in the field of peace and security, IGAD has been achieved certain successes in mediating the peace processes of southern Sudan and Somalia, but has been notably absent with respect to other conflicts (as in Darfur, Ethiopia- Eritrea, Northern Uganda). There is thus a certain ad-hoc character to IGAD's engagement in peace process.

#### **3.7.1 IGAD and the Sudan peace process**

Prior to the IGADD process peace negotiations had taken place in Nairobi (1989) and Abuja in 1992 and 1993 (Ylonen 2011:149) and El-Affendi 2001:585). After several unsuccessful attempts by the international community to end Sudan's second civil war, the IGADD initiated a peace process in 1993 between the NIF the predecessors to NCP and the SPLM/A (Warner 2011:190).

IGAD's intervention in Sudan took place over a twelve year period after Nigeria failed to broker peace in the country. In 1993, the president of Sudan, Omar El-Basher, invited IGAD (at that time still being referred to as IGADD) to intervene and assist in resolving the North-South conflict (Murithi 2009:141). Basher calculated that IGAD's intervention would appeal to the SPLM/A since the regional organization included states that had at one time or another supported SPLM/A against Khartoum. Basher was also motivated to avoid a pretext for foreign intervention on Sudan's oil. The Sudan's government also felt that IGAD's proximity would enable it to approach the crisis in a more sensitive manner. However, this was diplomatic short hand for stating that IGAD would consider the interests of the Sudan's above those of the

SPLM/A. The SPLM/A felt biased toward the interests of its member state than those of a sub national non state grouping, placing state security over human security (Ibid). At this time, various faction of SPLM/A, and their armed forces were divided and often indirect confrontation with one another. U.S.A led initiative succeeded in bringing the competing groups together in October 1993 to adopt a declaration on south Unity (Ibid).

IGAD launched its peace initiative for Sudan at its Addis Ababa summit on seven September 1993 by constituting a peace committee made up of the head of state and government of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Uganda, with the late President Daniel arap Moi as the chair man (Appuli, 2011:352). In March 1994, the meeting of the IGADD subcommittee was convened in Nairobi, at which it proposed a declaration of principles (DOP) to form the framework of the negotiations. The DOP acknowledged the right of the south to self determination, but made this contingent up on the failure of the GoS to introduce democracy and secularism (Ibid).

Between March and May 1994, IGAD succeeded in mediating ceasefire to open access to humanitarian relief. However, when it sought to encourage both parties to adopt a declaration of principles (DOP) in July 1994 the Sudan government rejected it, arguing that the issue of self determination and religious orientation of post conflict Sudan toward Sharia law were not subject to negotiation (Murithi, 2009:142).

In October 1997, the government of Sudan returned to the negotiation table and there after in may 1998, accepted the DOP as the basis for negotiations, because of the progress of SPLM/A towards the North Sudan. However, the outbreak of Ethiopia-Eritrea war in May 1998 reduced the government's enthusiasm for the IGAD initiatives (Appuli, 2011:353).

Mean while, with IGAD process faltering, other mediators jumped in the fray these includes the Joint Libyan and Egyptian initiatives (JLEI) , the Eritrean initiative to negotiate between the nation democratic alliance (NDA)and the government of Sudan; and the Nigerian led initiatives. Although these initiatives attracted the support of the parties to the Sudan conflict, they did not achieve much (Murthi 2009:143, Appuli, 2011:353).

The IGAD initiatives gained prominence over other simultaneous peace efforts by neighboring powers as an inherently regional effort for peace endorsed increasingly by a number of African

states and prominent international actors them supported it as an African solution to an African problem (Ylonen: 2011:150). IGAD responded an innovative mechanism to widen its sphere of responsibility, called the IGAD partners forum (IPF). The IPF sustained the negotiations and provided timely support to ensure that progress was achieved behind the scene (Muirthi, 2009:143).

The second phase of IGAD mediation kicked off in June 2001 with the convening of an extraordinary IGAD summit in Nairobi. The summit recognized, the outstanding issues that constituted a stumbling block to the negotiations, and recommended serious dialogue between the parties subsequently, in November 2001, lieutenant general lazaro submeiywo was appointed special envoy to the IGAD peace process in Sudan (Appuli 2011:353). This process eventually led to the signing of the machakos protocol in July 2002, which provided the framework for future negotiations including setting four principles of governance, the transition process and the structure of government (Warner, 2011:190).

In addition, the mechakos protocol granted the south the right to hold a referendum on self determination, after a six year interim year. In subsequent years five more protocols were signed (Ibid): the agreement on security arrangements (Sep 2003); the agreement on wealth sharing (January 2004); the protocol on power sharing (May 2004); the protocol on the resolution of conflict in the southern Kordofa/Nuba mountains and Blue Nile states (2004).

On the question of the three areas of Nuba Mountain, Abeyi; and Funj the SPLM/A accepted the proposal of the mediators that status of these areas is dealt with under IGAD mediation as parts of an overall solution to the Sudan conflict. However, the GoS had demanded that IGAD limit the peace process to Southern Sudan in accordance with the border of 1, January 1956 (Appuli 2011:354).

The negotiations recommenced in October 2002 when the parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on cessation of hostilities so as to create and maintain a conducive atmosphere throughout the negotiations until all the understanding issues were resolved (Ibid).

From Machakos in 2002, the negotiations were shifted to Nakura in July 2003, then Nayuki in August 2003 and finally led to the conclusion and signing of the CPA on 9 January 2005.

Colonel John Garang, the leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and Ali Osman Mohammed Taha, vice president of the Sudan's government, have signed in Nairobi on January 9, 2005, a historic agreement which put on end to the more than twenty years of civil war between the North and the South of the Sudan (Prunier, 2005:131).

Three factors could be mentioned as contributing to the success of the engagement of IGAD in the Sudan. These are: the willingness of the two parties to the conflict, the commitment and determination of the international community, particularly U.S.A, in putting pressure on the parties; and the unity of purpose of IGAD member states. The most outstanding factor is the political will shown by the NCP and SPLA, particularly the former.

### **3.7.2 IGAD: the peace process in Somalia**

Between 1991-1997, 13 attempts were made to institute a functioning governing for Somalia and reestablish the state. None of these attempts achieved much (Appuli: 2011:356). The Somalia peace was driven by IGAD. In 2000, Djibouti hosted a conference on behalf of IGAD that lasted four months, known as the Arta conference it produced the TNG (Radie: 2012:187). The IGAD initiative became the 14<sup>th</sup> attempt at trying to reestablish the Somali state and government. Ethiopia hosted another conference on Somalia, Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), which was headed by Abdulahi Yusuf.

The SRRC effectively undermined the TNG (Ibid). The Ethiopian action creates a friction among Ethiopia and Djibouti. The TNG did not get sufficient support internally. It lacked legitimacy from the main clan. It was regarded as representative of Hawyee /Habargidr/ Ayrsubclans, which led to fierce rivalry especially with the darood clan, represented by SRRC and backed by Ethiopia (Kidist,2009:27) subsequently, the TNG failed to establish its authority beyond Mogadishu and its three years life span terminated without operating as a national government (Kinfe: 2006:215).

The Arta peace process was not, therefore, successful in stemming the continued fighting. Violent conflicts (Clan wars) continued to plague Somalia (IGAD 2002, 59).

In general, IGAD was involved in restoring peace and stability in Somalia between 1991 and 2002, by endorsing the initiatives taken by member states to lead initiatives on Somalia.

Although IGAD gave its backing to the Sodere and Arta peace conferences, the hosting and mediation was provided by Ethiopia and Djibouti government respectively (Kidist, 2009: 27). Until 2002 IGAD played no institutional role in Somalia reconciliation beyond endorsing Ethiopia and Djiboutian initiatives (Heally, 2009:10).

The IGAD summit had in Khartoum in January 2002 agreed to convene a new peace processes under the auspices of IGAD. The IGAD leaders assigned the responsibility of undertaking the peace process to what they called the IGAD technical committee, which was composed of the frontline states, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Due to the intensified rivalry among Ethiopia and Djibouti over the TNG, Kenya was considered neutral as chair man of the IGAD technical committee (Kidist, 2009:28).

IGAD, however, persisted with attempts to reestablish a peace process inter alia by convening a meeting in Eldoret, Kenya, on October 27, 2002. The meeting sought to address the obstacles to forging peace, even as it confronted a series of problems, including, a combination of mismanagement, regional rivalry, and insufficient out is political support and a financial constraints (Murithi, 2009:147).

IGAD subsequently convened a meeting in Nairobi that forged an agreement, leading to the establishment of the Somalia Transitional Government Institution of Somalia (TGIs), and Transitional of Federal Government of Somalia (TFGs). The TFG drafted the transitional federal charter (TFC) which was adopted in February 2004. On October 14, 2004, the IGAD led initiative led to the election, by member of the Somali Transitional Federal Parliament of Somalia (TFP), of the late President Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed as head of the TFG. While a number of western governments recognized the TFG which governed from Baidoa, as legitimate, it did not receive universal support in Somalia. One of the main reasons why the TFIs have not been considered legitimate by the wider Somali population is the tacit support that Yusuf received from Ethiopia (Ibid).

Eldoret peace process was more inclusive bringing together as many Somali political forces, armed factions and civil society groups as possible. Besides it is the only peace initiative supported by the majority of the IGAD member states under close scrutiny of the international community. The process was also structurally well designed. Unlike many of the previous

peacemaking efforts, it try to deal first with substantive issues and address power sharing at the last phase (Medhane, 2004; 65).

The SRRC was divided in to three phases. Phase one was concerned with the agenda setting to establish the ownership of the process; phase two tackled the issue of reconciliation including the core issue of drawing up the transitional federal charter; phase three was concerned with the issue of power sharing including the core issues of the formation of (TFI) (Kidist ,2009: 28 and Appuli, 2011:356).

Yet the TFG president unable to relocate itself to the capital of the country Mogadishu, so the TFG president Abdulahi Yusuf, unable to assert its authority, asked IGAD to authorize peace keeping force (Radie 2012:183).

IGAD agreed to establish an IGAD peace support mission in January 2005, based on its acceptance of in principles of the deployment of an AU peace support mission. In February 2005, AU authorized IGAD to send a peace mission to Somalia and in March 2005, the IGAD Agreed to deploy 10,000 peace keepers that April (Murithi, 2009:147).

After nine month IGASOM deployment, replaced by the AU forces and the peace support mission was not realized. Internal divisions at that time undermined the TFG, and in June 2006, the union of Islamic courts (UIC) captured Mogadishu casting doubt on the potential for a brokered peace, after defeating the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT) in June 2006, the UIC captured Mogadishu. The ARPCT more or less ceased to exist. On December 28, 2006, Ethiopia, with U.S.A backing, intervened in Somalia, and expelled the UIC from Mogadishu (Ibid).

The IGAD mediation model of drawing on the good will of the political elites in Somalia seems to have singularly failed. Two decades factionalism has created entrenched divisions that might be difficult to overcome in the short term. The main reason for the failure of IGAD mediation process in Somalia is, its complete disconnect from the realities on the ground (Ibid, 151).

### **3.7.3 Ethiopia- Eritrean conflict**

The most glaring of IGAD regarding to peace and security concerns in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict (Healy 2009:12). In spite of the fact that Article 18a on conflict resolution states that states shall accept to deal with disputes between member states with in this sub regional mechanisms before they are referred to other regional or international organizations. IGAD has not been able objectively and naturally discuss the issue in spite of the fact that conflict has been described as the epicenter of most of the conflict in the region (Healy 2009).

Strongly, the IGAD conflict resolution mechanism was not even involved (El-Affendi, 2009:10). This is because IGAD lacks mechanism that deals with either intra or interstate conflict in its CEWARN protocol (Appuli 2004:183). Moreover, the most noticeable factor of this negligence can be found in the fact that Ethiopia occupies a dominant position in the regional organization.

Therefore, any discussion, let alone, decision that would offend Ethiopia could not be entertained with in IGAD. IGAD was caught between enforcing an international court of Arbitration resolution and appeasing its dominant member state. In the way Ethiopia cleverly manipulated U.S fears about terrorism in the Horn and enabled it to elicit support to invade Somalia in 2006, Ethiopia persuaded IGAD to initiate a U.N sanction process against Eritrea. The initiative taken by IGAD to impose sanctions on Eritrea was for its alleged supply of arms to Al-shabab and its border dispute with Djibouti.

IGAD as an institution has been unable to act in a neutral or mediatory capacity. It played no role in trying to resolve the Ethiopia-Eritrea war of 1998-2000 or its aftermath (Healy, 2011:4).

### **3.8 Ethiopia's Involvement in Somalia**

Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia has its roots in several territorial and political disputes that bred animosity between the two countries in the past. These includes the 1960-1964 border dispute, the 1977-78 Ogaden war, the August 1988 border clash and the 1998-2000 cross border war fare during the chaotic war lord led era (Sabala, 2011: 102). Since the overthrow of said Barre and the subsequent fall of the central Somali government, the Ethiopian military have entered Somalia several times. The first incursion took place in August 1996, and in March 1999 Ethiopian troops reportedly raided the Somalia border town of Blamable in pursuit of members

of the al-Ittihad al-Islamiya group which has been fighting to unite Ethiopia's Eastern Ogaden region with Somalia (Ibid).

The Ethiopian government with the backing of US declared war on UIC in late 2006 by categorizing it as a terrorist organization. The Ethiopian military intervention (Kidist, 2009:32, Tariku, 2009:30 and Sabela, 2011: 103) in Somalia was motivated by UIC's alleged link to terrorists, irredentist rhetoric, support to Ethiopian rebel group (OLF and ONLF), and dependence on Eritrea. Surprisingly, the UIC forces were quickly defeated and left most of their controlled areas, which enabled the TFG to move to Mogadishu. Moller (2009) try to point out that Ethiopia took as one reason to fight the UIC not only because it was alarmed by the rhetorical support of the later for its secessionist movements (mainly ONLF and OLF), also by the rise to prominence of sheik Aways, a former leader of AIAI, which Ethiopia viewed as a potential threat.

As Muthuma (cited in Tariku, 2009:30) believes that the main reason for the intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia's conflict is the priority it gives to its national interest. Ethiopia never opts to see a strong government in Somalia which might never demands for the return of Ogaden province from itself, as the Islamists had started to do. So, albeit the unpopularity of the Ethiopian troops, president Yusuf dared not have the Ethiopians withdraw, since that would mean the collapse of his government. The TFG under the leadership of Abdulahi Yusuf enjoyed great support from the Ethiopian government, President Yusuf had the support of Ethiopia because, firstly, Ethiopia had helped in the creation of Somali salvation Democratic front (SSDF), secondly, Yusuf had been released from Mengistu prison by the Zenawi government and, thirdly, Ethiopia had been partly responsible for the collapse of president Salat's, the controversial decision which was later endorsed by IGAD, partly on 22 April 2007 following a rift with Ethiopia at an IGAD meeting (Ibid).

Many people argued that "Ethiopia seeks a weak and disunited Somalia so that it does not pose a security threat" (Shinn, cited in Abay, 2009). The Ethiopian intervention in Somalia has resulted in "a relative strengthening of the extremist forces in the Islamist movement, both by allowing militant militias such as the al-shebab to gain ground and by promoting more salafists versions of the Sharia" (Moller 2009:25), Because Ethiopia was unable to eliminate the radicalist elements. Finally, Ethiopia left Somalia without creating a central authority and a country in much worse

shape than before its intervention (Ibid). Therefore, the role of Ethiopian government continues to be negative in Somalia. And there by remains a serious challenge to the revival of the state of Somalia (Mohammed, 2007).

## Chapter Four

### **Assessment on challenges facing Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**

This chapter mainly explains challenges to IGAD. These include political and security challenges, structural challenges, economic and financial challenges, social and human development challenges.

#### **4.1 Political and security challenges**

##### **4.1.1 Lack of supra nationalism**

Economic integration can be pursued either through an intergovernmental or supra-national approach. Supra-nationalism implies, member states agree to exercise some of their sovereignty jointly. And it can be seen as a stepping stone to a federal political structure or confederation but more recent thinking, based on the European Union experience, envisages a more diversified political outcome in which power is shared at various levels and interacts in complex ways. A key issue with supra national arrangement is ensuring the democratic participation of stakeholders, the transparency of supra national decision making and the accountability of supra national decision making and the accountability of regional institutions. In their absence, the shift of sovereignty to supra national bodies may weaken democratic control and strengthen the political influence of groups able to organize effectively at the regional level, with possible negative consequences for poverty and food security (Mathew, 2003).

With inter-governmentalism, there is no sharing of sovereignty, and each member state effectively retains a veto on the application of regional agreements. Inter-governmentalism requires close coordination of national policies, and intergovernmental bodies typically have a secretariat that has no independent power. Most integration bodies in developing countries are intergovernmental (Ibid).

A weakness of intergovernmental bodies is the lack of enforcement mechanisms to ensure that states abide by the common rules.

One of the challenges that stand out and cut across all regions are the challenge of ceding sovereignty. Regionalization challenges the narrow concepts of national sovereignty since the organization is meant to take over certain state functions- in some cases more, in others less. At the same time the member states anxiously guard their sovereignty and continue to create more and more elaborate regional organizations and expand their responsibilities (Wuluf and Dabiel, 2009).

Clements and foley, 2008 (cited at Wuluf and Dabiel, 2009), conclude; “to be successful each regional member requires a degree of de-territorialization and de-borderization and some ceding of hard notions of national sovereignty.”

The concept of regionalism has considerable resonance in the African continent, both in the rhetoric of African unity and as a preferred vehicle for economic development. But the environment attaining regional integration is challenging. Because state structures are weak and Africa’s political leaders cling to the most conservative principles of statehood and sovereignty (Heally, 2011:9) and the same holds true in the IGAD region. Implicitly or explicitly regional integration arrangements imply the surrender of some degree of sovereignty. In a new state emerging from a costly war, (such as Eritrea as well as recently South Sudan) sovereignty remains highly prized and jealously guarded. In the short term a combination of military priorities and economic nationalism is likely to prove a stronger driving force than regionalism (Ibid: 17).

Nomve (1997) cited at Tesfaye (2002:81) contends that the follow up of decision taken at sub regional meetings is left to head of state or few ministers and to civil servants in the ministers dealing with cooperation matters without the involvement of the rest of the population. He further argues that people even do not know that there is a treaty establishing the cooperation arrangements. As the case in most of regional groupings in Africa, this is an inhibiting factor to an attempt to integration in the IGAD sub region. In other words, integration in the sub region lacks a strong supra-national authority.

The supreme policy making organ of IGAD is the assembly consists of head of state and government and a decision is reached by consensus (IGAD, 1996a: Art 9). This allows governments to avoid a loss of sovereignty through unilateral decisions on the applications of

regional agreements. Consequently, IGAD lacks the power and hence the leverage on governments. And this remains a road block to integration process in the sub region of IGAD.

Lack of political commitment on the parts of the participating governments is also reflected on their reluctance to give executive independence to secretariat in the running and management of the institution. Moreover the secretariat of the regional groupings, composed of international civil servants that have sworn to be faithful to the treaty but who are answerable to the council of ministries and member states are too weak to enforce the organization's view point (Adedeji, cited at Tesfaye 2002:83).

The argument is relevant to the IGAD region. Most officers are loyal to their governments than to the institution. As commander Abebe head of ISSP explained that inclined towards their government and their mother land is human nature and inevitable, but it does not mean they could not fulfill their responsibilities which they have and similar explanations by Ato Brouk Mesfin a senior researcher of ISS (interviewed 10,4, 2011). This has become one of the challenges that hampered integration in the regions.

#### **4.1.2 Lack of political will**

Simms pointed out that “political will to integration is a key ingredient for the long term stability of a regional trading block. He also agreed that for political will to be present the national interests of each member country in the RTB must be adequately taken in to consideration (Simms, 2006:20). Even if political motives are not upper most, political will is a crucial ingredient in the integration process and in its absence, and little progress will be made. At the same time, economic integration can have political consequences, as when it contributes to establishing a political regime or enhancing regional peace and security (Mathew, 2003).

Many political leaders and governments that belong to sub regional and regional economic communities often endorse partnership or cooperation protocols but still fail to implement those protocols.

The lack of political will to implement regional agreements is major factor to wide spread disunity and under performance among African States.

“What we confront in Africa is primarily a political crisis, albeit with devastating economic consequences” Adebayo Adedeji. As long as African’s development crisis and prevalence of miserable poverty, is assumed to be primarily economic. It would be very difficult to grasp the ramifications. As the quotation by one of Africa’s eminent economists makes it clear, there is necessary dialectical relationship between governance, economic development and human welfare. Without a functioning, efficient and accountable political frame work, there can neither be a stable political order nor social and economic progress. Moreover, and most importantly for the subject under discussing, such a political frame work is also a crucial for cooperation with other states and for regional integration.

The case of the state of the North East Africa and the regional organization, IGAD discussed above indicates that crisis ridden states can hardly think beyond their immediate vicinity and their major focus would be on survival, a situation that makes it impossible to recognize the value of integration and cooperation with others. But most African states are in a vicious crisis, and help each other. As our example of IGAD has demonstrated Sudan took a sensible decision in 1993 by asking its neighbors to help in resolving its domestic conflict, and the protracted negotiations conducted under the auspices of the regional body eventually led to ending the over two decades long civil war that cost the lives of an estimated two million people and displaced more (Sarbo 2012). Lack of political will and political polarization is the challenges that hinder regional integration in the Horn of Africa. The political will of the Asmara government is differ from Addis Ababa and also the will of Nairobi differs from Khartoum and most of the number countries has become rivalries to be empowered and needed to overwhelmed to the member countries (Brouk interviewed 10,4,2011).

The attempts with in IGAD to forge a common approach to the sub-regional resolution of conflict have focused on structural reorganization than common policies and strategies. Central to these failures is the absence of political consensus and strong economic bondage (Medhane, 2003, 101). Priority is often to temporary political advantages, short term calculus of power and regime survival. The main concern of most of the governments of the sub region is the maintenance of their own-power within their states. The reasons are too many to mention (Ibid).

The absence of common political values, Such as democratic political cultures founded on tolerance and cultural diversity within an overarching national frame work is another factor

worse, the region is characterized by ideological polarization and by multiplicity of regional organization with overlapping membership (Ibid, 102). None of these countries is democratic in nature; no doubt the countries of the region, with the exception of Eritrea and Somalia, conduct elections. Yet elections, in most cases, do not lead to changes of leaders or government.

The current leaders of four of the countries of the region (Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan) have, for instance, been in power for almost two decades. In Uganda, the regime has been in power for 24 years, in Sudan 21 years, and in Ethiopia and Eritrea, for 21 years (Kidane, 2011:24).

### **4.1.3 Security Challenge**

IGAD has formulated wide-ranging and ambitious, social, economic environmental, political, security, and integration programs; However; Conflict in the IGAD region will continue to hinder any meaning full integration and development by curtailing economic activity, destroying infrastructure and remains a barrier to the flow of trade and investment” (Ameyo, 2010:25). IGAD therefore, needs to be re-informed and restructured and its mission and mandate formulated not only in a concrete and practicable way but also within the aim of serving primarily its own peoples, in order to be a relevant regional organization.

Even though IGAD adopted a number of protocols and declarations regarding peace and security, they cannot be materialized effectively. IGAD is also greatly dependent on outside donations and assistance and regularly organizes a donor’s forum. Since the beginning of the civil war in Somalia in 1991, the country has not had an effective central government. Likewise, Sudan has faced complicated internal problems for a long time. Those political and economic challenges in the region have threatened IGAD’s effectiveness and reduced its power.

Healy pointed out that IGAD does not have an effective security policy towards East Africa. Moreover, IGAD still uses old fashioned political mechanisms to stop the conflicts in the region which are respect for “the sovereign equality of all member states and non interference in the internal affairs of member states.” Importantly international actors, including the USA, France, Britain, China, and Italy have become strongly engaged in political development in East Africa, due to their geo-economic and geo-strategic interests. International actor’s involvement has made East Africa Complex and weakened the IGAD’s security policy (Healy, 2008).

The most immediate challenge that may hinder the successful implementation of the IPSS is the politics of the region. The Horn of Africa is composed of quarrelsome neighbors. For example, at one time Uganda failed to see eye to eye with Sudan over allegations that both countries were supporting each other's rebels. Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Eritrea and Djibouti have border conflicts that have in the past resulted in open warfare.

The conflict-prone nature of the Horn of Africa is sufficient to frustrate endeavors to implement and complete the nascent regional peace and security architecture. And Alex de Waal rightly identified, there are six major political obstacles in the way of building a robust peace and security architecture for the Horn of Africa. To mention it: (1) the lack of internal peace in most countries, (2) the fact that internal conflicts are rarely contained within the borders of our country, (3) the absence of a stable and consensual regional power order, (4) the disputed legitimacy of states and governments and the inability of democratic process to provide that legitimacy, (5) dependency on foreign financiers and especially the US and EU, and (6) the lack of autonomy of the key multilateral institutions.

In a recent talk, de Waal pointed out the absence of a sub regional hegemony as a further obstacle to peace and security in the Horn of Africa sub regional communities that can dish out role model such as SADC and ECOWAS which have found their regional hegemony in South Africa and Nigeria respectively. These states can single-handedly support and drive the creation of new sub regional institutions and even military interventions to create conditions conducive to peace and security. The fact that no single state in the Horn can command undivided hegemony, in terms of both hard and soft powers, over the rests of the region gave IGAD member states a disincentive for greater cooperation among themselves (Alemayehu: 2008).

In other words, IGAD member states present split hegemony, with each possessing different forms of power, whether hard or soft. For example, Ethiopia has an edge in military power while Kenya has comparative advantage in its economy. Sudan being the largest country in the continent, recently tapped its oil reserves. Even Djibouti has an advantage in its strategic location for the transshipment of sea faring cargo. No single IGAD state can overwhelm its neighbors through the use or threat of use of its hard power (Ibid).

So, the Horn characterized by the absence of a hegemonic state willing to take up political and military responsibility for peace and security endeavors. The lack of such as hegemony in the region has had a negative impact on the Somali conflict, and may even be considered as one of the reasons that explain its persistence to date (Appuli, 2011).

The political and security challenges are even more daunting with the existence of interstate conflicts as well internal conflicts and civil wars in all states. Sarbo (2012), contested that legitimacy also characterizes the political systems of almost all the states of the region. The collapse of the state in Somalia, and the chaos that lasted for two decades has serious implications for the stability of the entire region and beyond.

#### **4.1.3.1 Inter-state conflict**

The Horn of Africa has experienced more interstate wars than any other region on the continent. It has seen four inter-state wars and at least three violent conflicts in the post-independence era (kidane, 2011:10). Among the region's major wars the three fought between Ethiopia and Somalia. The first, over Somalia's claims to the Somali inhabited Ogden region of Ethiopia, started in 1961, escalated in 1964 and lingered until 1967 as low intensity conflict. The second Ethiopia- Somalia war again fought over the Ogden problem took place between 1977 and 1978 and involved external intervention such as Cuba and USSR in support of Ethiopia. The third war between these countries occurred between 2006 and 2009. After a decade and half of statelessness, Somalia appeared to have re-established the state under Islamic court union (ICU) which brought most of Somalia under its control in 2006 (Ibid).

Ethiopian troops succeeded in removing the (ICU) from power but could not pacify Somalia. The TFG, which go after the tails of Ethiopian troops to power, enjoyed little legitimacy in Somalia. It was widely viewed as a creation of outside powers and largely made up of warlords who have divided up the country in to small fiefs. After the removal of the ICU from power, a more radical Islamic insurgency group, Alshebab, emerged and along with the amount of the ICU under continued to fight against TFG and Ethiopian troops. The UN brokered negotiation between the TFG and the moderate wing of ARS and it resulted in agreements to form a TFG-ARS unity government and the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia.

The 1998- 2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is perhaps the largest war the region has seen in the post decolonization era at least in terms of casualty figures.

Disputes between Addis Ababa and Asmara arose over access to Eritrean ports and how the new Eritrean currency related the Ethiopian currency. The classic imperatives of state and nation building drove both regimes to set fourth unconditional goals and refuse compromise on these questions and the vital issue of territoriality, legitimacy and identity. It is notable that Eritrea, Africa's newest state has had border conflicts with each of its neighbors: Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Sudan (Lyons, 2006:7).

In May 1998, Eritrea armed forces occupied the disputed symbolically important border town of Badme, a use of military force that Ethiopia regarded as illegal territorial annexation. This skirmish quickly escalated in to full scale war. The historical links and rivalries between the two states, peoples, ruling parties and leaders made the violence particularly painful (Ibid).

After a period of military stalemate and un productive negotiations, Ethiopia launched a major offensive in may 2000, broke through defenses and forced Eritrea to pull its troops back to pre may 1998 Positions(Ibid:16).

In December 2000, the Algiers treaty was signed ending the war and establishing the Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary commission, which was tasked with demarcating the boundary between the two countries. On 13 April 2002, the commission gave its ruling which delineated the entire border between the two countries on the basis of the colonial treaties. By its ruling, the town of Badme, the flash point of the war, placed in Eritrea, but Ethiopia, despite reluctantly accepting the commission's ruling, has yet to allow the demarcation of the boundary on the ground. In the absence of such progress, the commission declared its task completed after a virtual demarcation of the border, however, the border problem remains unsettled, since Ethiopia has neither allowed physical demarcation nor accepted the virtual demarcation (Kidane, 20011:12).

In addition to the above four major wars, the region has also seen smaller inter-state conflicts. The Kenya- Somalia conflict during Kenya's 'Shifta' wars (1963-67) is one such conflict. Uganda and Sudan also experienced armed conflicts and tense relations over accusations of support for each other's rebel groups.

Other contentious but currently dormant border issues in the region include those between Uganda and Kenya, between Kenya and Sudan over the Elemi triangle and those between Ethiopia and Sudan. These unsettled issues have not precipitated violent conflicts yet but future conflicts cannot be entirely ruled out with south Sudan breaking away from the rest of the country, border problems between the two Sudan is likely to prove more challenging, especially since the contested areas include important sources of oil (kidane 2011:13).

#### **4.1.3.2 Intra state conflict**

Internal strife and civil wars have been common in all states of the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia faced rebellions from Eritrea and Tigray in the North to the Ogden and the Oromo regions in the South for several decades. Except for brief periods, Sudan was engaged in civil war particularly between the North and the south, since its independence in 1956. The crisis in Darfur is only the latest in the agony Africa's largest country. Somalia has become the epitome of a failed state since its last government collapsed in 1991. Djibouti is inhabited mainly by two ethnic groups, the Afar and Issa, but tension between the two has at times deteriorated to the level of civil war as witnessed in the 1990's. Underlying tensions between the Christian and Muslim populations of Eritrea remains a cause for concern. Rival factions of the liberation movements, dominated by each of these communities fought bitter wars amongst each other even before independence from Ethiopia. Very often tensions in relations between the states have exacerbated the internal conflicts, as each state supported and created safe havens for the armed oppositions of its neighbors (sarbo 2012:46).

Many of the civil wars are triggered by domestic factors, such as problems of diversity management and national building, including the real or perceived uneven development and technocratic characteristics of the state, even though some form of external intervention might be involved. Others are reactions to repressive rule and ineffective governance, while yet others are triggered by intrastate power struggles. A few were triggered by ideological disputes. The Ethiopian people's revolutionary party (EPRP), a leftist organization, which fought the military government in the late 1970s, is an example (Kidane 2011:14-15).

The collapse of the Somali state in 1991 resulted at least in part, from the country's civil wars. Since the collapse, the country has endured wars among various warlords, 1991-2006; in

puntland against the fragile state of Somalia, 2004; ICU Vs the Alliance for the Resonance of and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT), 2006; TFG Vs ICU, 2005-2006; TFG against the Alshabab and Hizbul Islamiya, 2009 present (Ibid).

#### **4.1.3.3 Inter communal conflict**

Further to civil war, the Horn countries have faced many inter communal armed conflicts. These are often fought between ethnic and clan groups over resources such as land, water, and even livestock. While not limited to pastoralist these conflicts tend to affect such communities disproportionately. In some case governments aggravate the conflicts by interfering on outside or the other, as the case of Darfur and Gambella in Ethiopia show. If certain identity groups engage in rebellion or resist policy measures, government tends to intervene in communal conflicts by supporting rival identity groups (Kidane 2012:16).

Countries inter communal conflicts, which have often intensified with the availability of small arms, have contributed to instability and economic disruption in the region. Such inter communal conflict in the Horn is Jonglei in south Sudan, in 2010, Ethiopia intercommunal conflict includes these between: Afar-Issa identities (2002); Afar-kereyou (2002-2003); Anuak-Dinka (2002); Anuak-Nuer in (2002-03) | Gummuz- Oromo (2008); Borana-Guji (2006); Borana- Kerso (2008); Ogaden- Sheika (2002); and Oromo Somali.

Kenya's inter communal conflicts include: Borana- Gabra (2005); Dongro- Turkana (2006); Luo-kikuyu (2008); Polet- Jurkana (2006 and 2008) and Toposa- Turkana (2008). And intercommunal conflict in Sudan includes. Aqar (Dinka)- Agok (Dinka) (2006); Misirya- Rizeigat Baggara (2008); Murle- Bor Dinka (2007); Murle Nuer Lou (2006); Nuer Lou- Mol Dinka (2008). Somalia and Uganda have also had a sizeable number of inter-communal conflicts.

## **4.2 Structural challenges**

### **4.2.1 Lack of managing relations among the member states**

One of the challenges facing IGAD is managing relations among the member countries. The region facing serious problems emanating from conflict and rivalry between the various states of the region, as we have seen, in Somalia, a founder member of IGAD has had no government for two decades, and the consequences are far reaching for all the members and beyond. Eritrea which joined the organization upon independence in 1993 withdraws its membership in 2007,

and is at loggerheads with other members over the crisis in Somalia. On the other hand, Kenya and Uganda have concentrated their efforts on the EAC, while Sudan is consumed in its internal problems in the south (with a referendum on independence in 2011), Darfur, and fending of external pressures as its president has been charged by the international criminal court (ICC) on war crimes and crimes against humanity and faces the prospect of another indictment on genocide (sarbo, 2012:43).

#### **4.2.2 Weak institutions**

The implementation of preferential trade requires or more advanced steps such as the harmonization of production and marketing need to be grounded in solid bureaucratic procedures. Regional institution also need if economic integration is too succeeded. Such capacity is very unevenly distributed in the IGAD region. It is almost nonexistent in the most fragile countries, Somalia and Eritrea, where for entirely different reasons, institutions are weakest. South Sudan too is at a very early stage of institutional development (Healy, 2011:17).

The primary reason for the poor institutionalization and the limited success of IGAD resides in the initial situation of political integration process in the Horn of Africa, marked by fragile inter-state relations, violence intrastate conflicts, major military conflicts recurring massive humanitarian crisis, spars bases of resources and traditionally un-attractive policy approaches for cooperation. First this implies the existence of fundamental hostilities of member states interests, which should be settled before and during integration. Second the region is characterized by the fact, that it is extremely difficult to anticipate political developments. Today's partners turn in to apparent enemies tomorrow. (Terlinden, 2009:6). As Brouk's explanation poverty, over lapping of membership and lack of political commitment are the main challenges of IGAD that makes institutionally weak.

Coordination is needed among integrating countries to develop a common economic policy. This will be impinging on governments' freedom of action and touches again on the question of sovereignty. Economic harmonization with other countries implies restrictions on the ability of individual governments to determine the economic trajectory of their country and define their development goals. Rule of law, enforcement of property rights and efficient judiciary systems are all needed to support the legislative and regulatory framework that are the foundation on which regional economic integration is normally achieved. Institutions are required to monitor

anti competitive practice, including informal Quotas and trade barriers. Regional trade dispute mechanisms are needed to handle disagreements. Some common standards of governance are therefore central to the success of an integration venture (Healy, 2011:17).

#### **4.2.3 Over- Lapping Membership**

One of the main challenges of intergovernmental authority on development (IGAD) is over lapping of membership. Two IGAD members, Kenya and Uganda, are also members of EAC formed in 1967 by Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. It was established on the foundation of one of the most ambitious regional integration projects of the colonial period. After independence a combination of political and economic stresses overwhelmed the organization and its joint assets were divided up in 1977 (Alemayehu, 2008, Healy, 2011: 19).

The EAC was officially re-launched in 2000 and has now increased its membership to five, bringing in Rwanda and Burundi. It is one of the most active and advanced of the African REC's. Kenya is the regional power house of the EAC (Ibid).

All IGAD members except Somalia are members of the common market for eastern and southern African states (COMESA) but only four of them Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda, have acceded to the COMESA free trade Area (IGAD minimum integration plan, 2010). COMESA launched its custom union in June 2009 and has recently started negotiations with the EAC and SADC for the three organizations to establish a tripartite FTA. Their progress toward closer trade integration appears to have spurred IGAD to establish its own FTA and to align its activities more closely with the RECs that are making progress.

Five IGAD members Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia and Kenya, have joined the community Sahl-Sahelion states (CEN-SAD). The organization was Muamer Gaddafi's brain child and focuses more on people to people activities than on regional integration measures.

The Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia are members of the Arab league whilst such major state of the region as Uganda and Kenya, being the members of EAC, seeks to circumvent the regional integration scheme that would be dominated by Ethiopia (Alemayhu, 2008). In the words of Brouk mesfin: the only country loyal to the organization is Ethiopia. Kenya and Uganda are loyal and more concentrated their efforts to the East African community.

Overlapping membership of states in the various sub regional communities weakens the ability of states in the sub regions to pull together their resources in building up relevant security institutions. It also causes potentially conflicting political commitment of states to opposing objectives of the various sub regional organizations. Moreover, it can also be used by states to evade the responsibility to address specific security problems by claiming that responsibility lies with one or another sub regional organization (Girmachew cited at Alemayehu, 2008). REC's pursue essential identical mandates and objectives, leading to wasteful duplication efforts. Overlapping among REC's also adds to the burden of member states, not only financially but also copes with different meetings policy decisions, instruments, procedures and schedules (ARIA,I:41).

### **4.3 Rivalries among members' states**

Unhealthy competition is seen as a serious bottleneck to integration and development in Africa. Regional integration is often hampered by internal divisions within constitute states of regional groupings. When the groups are expected to serve as building blocks for wider continental integration then cracks begin to appear in the building (Nwonwu).

Competition, to be a hegemonic state in the IGAD region is common. The rivalry between the three major states, namely, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan remains a problem for the organization to effectively perform its will and establish some sort of order. Sudan is the largest country and an oil producer. However, it lacks a strong army, diplomatic and political skills to deal with the diverse region and support an activist policy. It considers itself culturally part of the Middle East region, and due to the Islamist ideology of its regime looked at with suspicion among its neighbors, especially Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Eritrea.

Kenya is the economic power house of the region, but also lacks the military muscle as well as the political inclination to play a politically active role. Ethiopia with nearly half the population of the region and a long tradition of statehood has a strong military muscle, demonstrated with the defeat and occupation of large area of Eritrea in 2000, and invasion of Somalia in 2006 has the potential for a leadership role. Although it is land locked, economically poor and mired in conflicts with Eritrea and Somalia (Sarbo 2012: 43).

#### **4.4 Subversive activities**

Official distrust of the border lands is deepened by the tradition of mutual interference and subversion that characterizes regional relationships in the Horn. Neighboring states tend to prey on one another weakness of governance and to exacerbate any unites that result. Troubled relationships between the respective political centers and the marginalized peripheries have been recurrent sources of tension and potential conflict in the region, heightened by the vulnerability of the later to malign influences from neighbors (Healy, 2011:3).

Governments in the Horn of Africa have intervened in each other's internal conflicts for a variety of reasons. Some support insurgencies in a neighboring country because of ethnic ties, even when they do not obtain support from populations of neighboring countries because of ethnicities, even when they do not obtain direct support from governments of these neighboring countries (Kidane, 2011:13). Insurgency movements in Ethiopia's Somali- inhabited Ogden region, such as the western Somali liberation front (WSLF), for example, were supported by the Somali state before its collapse in 1991. The 'shifta' wars in Kenya's Somali inhabited north Eastern province were also backed by the Somali state, which aspired to unite all Somali- in habited areas in the region under the Somali state.

Sudan supported the Eritrean liberation movements, such as Eritrean liberation front (ELF) and the Eritrean People's liberation front (EPLF). It also supported the Tigray people liberation front (TPLF) against the regime of Mengistu Halimariam. By the same token, Ethiopia supported the struggle of south Sudanese people with whom the Ethiopian establishment had little in common either linguistically or culturally. Uganda also supported the SPLM/A while Sudan reciprocated by supporting Uganda's LRA (Lord Resistance Army) and other Ugandan rebel groups. Sudan supported the Eritrean Islamic Jihad in 1993-94 and Eritrea reciprocated by supporting Sudan's opposition groups, the National democratic alliance (Healy 2011:3 and Kidane, 2011:14).

Eritrea currently is supporting various Ethiopian insurgency groups against the Ethiopian regime, while the Ethiopian regime retaliates by supporting Eritrean opposition groups, including the Eritrean democratic alliances and other smaller groups, such as the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization (RSADO) (Kidane, 2011:14). Eritrea is also accused by the UN Security Council, the U.S.A government, the African union and IGAD of supporting Somali insurgency groups against the TFG as an extension of its conflict with Ethiopia. Although the Ethiopia- Eritrean

conflict appears dormant, its existence has significantly heightened the risks associated with borderland insecurity throughout the region. Through its own history, the Eritrean government is intimately acquired with the stresses and strains among the communities that inhabits Ethiopia's periphery and has shown an inclination to instigate or revive insurgencies there as a means to destabilize Ethiopia. By the same token, Ethiopia is attempting to maintain an economic stranglehold on Eritrea as part of the enduring conflict (Ibid).

Conflict between north and south Sudan has drained the potential of the region and provided an opening for cross border subversion that involved wider alliance in the region. The new state of South Sudan is still at an early state in establishing its relationships in the region. Despite it become independent, conflict had broke, out at several points on the border, first in Abyi where there is a border dispute, subsequently, in south kordofan and Blue Nile, where people's movement (SPLM) supporters have come under government attack. The violence is currently being contained with the help of Ethiopian forces.

Regimes have supported rebel groups in a neighboring country as extensions of their foreign policies, including destabilization of regimes. They have antagonistic relations. Ethiopia and Kenya responded to what they perceived as a Somali threat to their national integrity by establishing mutual defense pact in 1964. Moreover, successive Ethiopian regimes countered Somalia's support for irredentist movements by aiding insurgency movements such as the Somali national movement (SNM) and Somali Salvation Democratic front (SSDF) against the Somali state to weaken its ability to pursue its claims over the Ogden (Kidane, 2011:14). Ethnic overlap in the border areas provides opportunities for rebels to cross borders to escape government controls and facilitates cross border supplies to sustain rebellions.

## **4.5 Economic and social challenges**

The economies of the IGAD region possess significant structural obstacles to the attainment of regional economic integration. Poverty, over lapping of production and inadequate infrastructure are the root problems.

### **4.5.1 Poverty**

Poverty is widespread in the IGAD member countries. But the incidence of poverty tends to be greater in ecologically fragile, marginal agricultural areas, where people do not have fall back

positions (mersie, 2008:6). All countries of the Horn are in the bottom of the UN Human development Index (HDI), where a large proportion of the population lives below the poverty line and average life expectancy is under 60 years. The population is mostly rural and the largest percentage of the workforce is engaged in agricultural labor (Healy 2011:12).

The mapping of poverty by geographical area in Ethiopia shows poverty tends to be lower envisages with adequate and stable rainfall, moderate population density, and high market access. The worst village is characterized by poor topography and soils, low and variables rainfall, high population density and poor market access. Poverty is associated with both environmental degradation and conflict (PAES cited at Mersie, 2008:7).

Much of the region is arid or semiarid, accounting for 80%. The rest are sub humid and humid totally 20% out of this agriculture, crop farming and cash crops cover only 7% of the region; the major of the population depends on substance agriculture and pastoralist. The world's largest concentration of pastoralist population is found in the Horn with Sudan as the world's largest, and Somalia and Eritrea third and fourth respectively (Higgins, 2003).

Livestock are indispensable sources of human livelihood and welfare in all pastoral areas of the IGAD region. They are the main sources of individual and collective wealth with Animal production and marketing being the major sources of food, income, employment and social status for most of the population. To manage this pasture based Livestock production, pastoralists practice seasonal or annual mobility of Livestock in search of pasture over a large area of range land crops. This mobility leads to conflict over range resources and political violence in (Solomon, 2010:5). It has been difficult for the pastoralists to utilize traditional migratory routes in search of food due to inter-ethnic hostilities, "commercialized" rustling of livestock enclosure or privatization of communal lands and fencing off flood plains to fodder and grain production.

**Table 4: Livestock population in IGAD countries**

|                    | Cattle<br>(Million) | Sheep (million) | Goats<br>(million) | Camel<br>(million) |
|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Djibouti (2002)    | 0.3                 | 1 (sheep&goats) | No data            | No data            |
| Ethiopia (2004)    | 41                  | 25              | 23                 | 0.15               |
| Eritrea (2003)     | 2                   | 2               | 1.7                | 0.1                |
| Kenya (2004)       | 13                  | 7               | 9                  | 0.8                |
| Somalia (2004)     | No data             | No data         | No data            | 6                  |
| Sudan (2004)       | 40                  | 49              | 42                 | 3.7                |
| South Sudan (2009) | 11.7                | No data         | No data            | No data            |
| Uganda (2004)      | 5.8                 | 1               | 6                  | No data            |

Source: (Melaku Desta cited in Healy 2011), prospects for Building regional Economic cooperation in the Horn of Africa.

Available data indicate that 41% of pastoralists in the Horn fall below the poverty line of USD 2.0 per day. Despite, dry land crop production and Livestock sectors hold much potential for poverty alleviation; it is invisible to the policy makers as potential sources of income (Ibid).

The region has over the last five or so decades faced rapid environmental degradations, manifested in frequent droughts and chronic food and water shortages. Global climate changes and various human activities, including rapid population growth change in land use patterns and chronic conflict, have contributed to the environmental degradation which has culminated in economic and social dislocation, displacement and widespread resource based conflicts (Kidane: 2011:23). The deteriorating environmental conditions have exerted increasing pressure on the region's populations, especially peasants and nomads, and have resulted in land and water based communal conflicts.

With except of Sudan and recently Uganda and Kenya that have discovered oil, the region does not have significant mineral or other important resources under exploitation. Nor does it have a meaningful manufacturing capacity. Productivity in agriculture and animal husbandry (employing the majority of the population) is low. It uses the same technology of generations ago. Over all, there is economic stagnation, with serious consequences at an alarming rate, with very few prospects of employment and meaningful life. The population of Ethiopia alone increases by over two million annually. The growth of sea piracy, human smuggling, and the scenes of people drowning in their hundreds in the Indian Ocean and the red sea while trying to

escape poverty and hopelessness and in search of a better life elsewhere is only one indication of this situation. Moreover, environmental degradation and diminishing resources are serious problems affecting all states in the region (sarbo: 2012:45).

Inability to implement sustainable management of natural resources and environmental protection in the fragile pastoral areas while promoting the key productive sectors Livestock and dry land farming is one of the challenges of IGAD. Pastoral areas in the region continue to experience persistence economic crisis, which to a large extent, has resulted in severe degradation of natural resources, poor land use practice such as over grazing and water management and rapid spread on noxious weeds.

#### **4.5.2 Lack of complementary in Trade flows**

Like the most of the developing economies, the manufacturing sector remains small. IGAD member states depend for their exports on a relatively small number of primary commodities in which they often find themselves in competition with one another (Healy, 2011:12). Overlap exists in a large number of products. Over lapping trade flows refer to the scenario where the regional trading blocking (RTB) members produce similar goods and export these goods to same or similar markets. This overlap in the kinds of goods produced and or the markets for the goods may affect the potential for economic gains for each country in the RTB in two ways (a) firstly, the prospect for intra-regional trade will be reduced if all members are producing the same goods, (b) secondly, a RTB may result in some members capturing a greater share of the external market at the expense of other smaller/ weaker members (Casella, 2003:10).

Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda are significant producers of coffee, although different types and provenance are recognized in the international market; Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan are major exporters of livestock and livestock products; Sudan and Ethiopia both produce sesame and oil seeds for export; what is a lucrative regional export commodity from Kenya and Ethiopia. However, while most of this is exported, a significant volume is traded within the region, where different agro-ecological and climate zones provide localized comparative advantage. Examples are wheat and coffee, grown in high land regions and sold to coastal communities.

Ethiopia and Eritrea both export gold and have substantial potash deposits. Sudan and South Sudan the regions only oil producers but commercial exploitation of gas elsewhere is a distinct

possibility. This import on the other hand consists overwhelmingly of manufactured goods from outside the region. This locks the countries of the region in to a disadvantaged relationship as suppliers of commodities to a global economy whose markets are both erratic and unpredictable.

This pattern of trade has produced very low levels of formal intra-regional trade and means that the economies are in competition in one another. Intra-IGAD regional trade has been quite low due to poor light tariff and non tariff barriers, exacerbated restructure and lack of facilitation. Since most IGAD countries produce and export raw materials rather than processed goods, there is little that they are importing from each other. This situation is aggravated by incentives such as Quota free and Duty free (QFDF) everything but arms (EBA) and African growth opportunity act which make it appear more lucrative to export to developed countries such as EU, and USA instead of trading with other African countries (392-TORs-for-study-on-a simplified-Trade-Regime-(STR)-in –the-IGAD-Region.pdf).

Another distinctive is the relatively low tax base in some countries. Government revenue from taxation accounts for just 9.9% of GDP in Ethiopia compared with 20.9% in Kenya, so Ethiopia is much more wary about the loss of duties that would result from forming a custom union (Country reports: 2011). In 2007-08, as much as 37% of Ethiopian tax revenue came from import and related duties (Heally, 2011:13). Officially intra regional trade appears to be growing. As indication of this, the value of exports with in IGAD doubled between 2000 and 2006. (However, Kenya's trade with Uganda accounts for much of the growth and may indicate deepening ties with in the EAC rather than IGAD).

The level of intra-IGAD trade by country showed in table below which illustrate considerable variation in the extent of regional trade by IGAD member states. The leading trade countries are Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti. For much of the last decade, both Sudan and Ethiopia have lagged far behind in their trade relations across the region.

**Table 3: Intra IGAD and African trade in 2007, by country**

|          | Intra-IGAD exports (US and Million) | Intra-IGAD imports US \$million | Africa's share in exports (%) | Top two products                       |
|----------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| Djibouti | 370                                 | 103                             | 43                            | Food machinery and transport equipment |
| Ethiopia | 100                                 | 170                             | 8                             | Food and manufactured goods            |
| Eritrea  | No data                             | No data                         | 33                            | Food; ores, metals, precious stones    |
| Kenya    | 992                                 | 28.5                            | 49                            | Manufactured goods and food            |
| Somalia  | 3                                   | 38.5                            | No data                       | No data                                |
| Sudan    | 28.5                                | 107.5                           | 3                             | Food and fuels                         |
| Uganda   | 51                                  | 902                             | 33                            | Food and manufactured goods            |

*Source assessing regional integration in Africa (ARIAIV) (UNECA, Addis Ababa 2010)*

Generally the formal- intra-regional trade is very low and limited scope for integration.

Yet when the focus is shifted to informal trade relations, the process of regional economic integration suddenly appears more meaningful. There are close social and economic ties linking people across borders and these under pin trading network that play a vital part in the economic life of the region, cross border trading is particularly important for sustaining pastoralists' livelihood in Somalia, where formal trading regimes have collapsed with the demise of the state.

Cross border cooperation is common in the IGAD region, informally, such as Kenya- Ethiopia (Moyale), Sudan- Ethiopia (Metema), Uganda- South Sudan, Uganda-Kenya and Ethiopia-Djibouti despite official states that informal across border trade worth up to US \$ 500-1000 permitted (Ethiopian- Sudan) and (Uganda- Kenya), there is no formal agreement regarding this or other aspects of cross border trade. There is high degree of socio-economic interaction between Kenya and Ethiopia. Cross border of goods, most of it informal, is significant. The attempt of the Ethiopian side to formalize such trade activity has not succeeded. Almost all those who took licenses have returned it claiming that they cannot make any margin after paying the license fee and taxes.

The cross border scheme agreed up on with Sudan in 2001 has three basic objectives availing consumer goods to the remote border area communities on both sides by encouraging cross border marketing of local produce through granting of border trade license to local operators. The license permits cross border trade in pro agreed list of goods of a specified value (about US\$ 1,000) transacted with in a defined radius (90 km). The second objective is to strengthen closer relationship between the countries in general and the third, to encourage gradual transition to

formal trade. There is no particular bilateral cross border agreement between Kenya and Uganda. Most of the trade is regulated by EAC harmonization rule and formal channel. (Gebrehiwot and Andulem, 2008:18; 20).

The ability of informal cross border traders to survive and adapt to change represents a robust resource for market based cooperation and local economic security in parts of the Kenya. Somalia border lands the end state of an economic community particularly exists already with free (Unregulated) movement of people and capital, and free (unrestricted) movement of goods across borders. Elsewhere, as between Sudan and South Sudan, the trend is away from integration as new borders and barriers have to be navigated.

Border communities often have stronger socialites with their kinsmen across the borders than with any of the representatives of central government institution they are likely to encounter. This makes for an environment that favors informal trading, smuggling and tax evasion.

#### **4.5.3 Poor infrastructure**

Efficient and safe transport is essential to all IGAD member states and plays an important role in the development of agriculture, industry and other economic sectors. Adequate transport infrastructure remains a crucial condition to achieve the over arching objective of regional integration. It is also to create an open, unified regional economic space for private operators a single market open to competitive entry and well integrated in to the global economy (MIP, 2010:29)

The IGAD sub region suffers from poor and under developed infrastructure, making it difficult for regional trade as well as security (Sarbo, 2012:45) and it is characterized by in adequate level of investment in infrastructure, which has resulted in poor transport service. The sub region has not been able to attract significant investment levels which it requires to support higher levels of economic growth. Consequently, IGAD efforts have been focused on lobbying, facilitation and advocacy on behalf of the member states in the development of regional priority projects (MIP, 2010:29).

The time for regional infrastructure projects in Africa has rarely been better than in the last decade. Funds from the African development bank, World Bank, and USAID have also been secured for HOAI infrastructure projects and several of them are already being implemented.

However, regional politics continue to militate against truly comprehensive integration schemes: currently south Sudan's need for connectivity is clearly recognized whereas Eritrea, owing to its political isolation, hardly features in the program (Healy, 2011:49).

One of the challenges in the IGAD region is social problems. The population is growing fast with the resulting increased pressure on eager resources and the environment. Within the next two decades Ethiopia alone would be among the ten most populous countries in the world/ the region also suffers from endemic diseases like Malaria, tuberculosis, river blindness, and HIV/AIDS. Without accelerated and sustainable economic development and focal progress the region cannot manage the every growing need social and economic problems. This requires not only concerted efforts within each of the states, but also enhancing joint endeavors within a regional framework to tackle the common problems (Sarbo, 2012:49).

#### **4.6 Challenges on human and financial resources**

The implementation of the IPSS will require a lot of human and financial resources, which currently the organization does not have. One of the problems that continue exists in African regional economic communities (REC's) are the issue of financing (Appuli, 2011:367). Most often, RECs are dependent on external funding for almost all of their programs, as the member states do not meet their membership obligation. On this matter, Konare and Amoaka have observed:

*Africa's integration cannot be founded solely by the traditionally reliable financial contributions of partner states or outside support. Relying principally on assessed contributions has proven unsustainable for regional economic communities. Dependence on external assistance is not a viable way to buttress-- integration in general ensuring a brighter future for Africa's integration requires more than a precarious dependence on the limited traditional sources of funding (Appuli, 2011:367).*

By the end of 2008, Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda were paying arrears accumulated over the previous years in membership contribution to IGAD. Some of the IGAD programs like ICPAT are funded by donors to the tune of 100 percent.

CEWARN is funded from regular member states' contribution and supported by development donors such as the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) since recently GIZ

(Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit) and US Agency for international development (USAID). It had initiated the rapid response funds to help to help finance projects targeted at preventing, de-escalating or resolving pastoral and related conflicts in the region. The fund is intended to improve the flexibility and build up the required capacity to respond to early warning signals and address crisis in a timely and appropriate manner. With the revitalization of IGAD in 1996, the presence of the IGAD partners form and the friends of IGAD, a group of partners who work closely with the IGAD secretariat, steadily increased Wuluf and Debeil (2009). Commander Abebe Muluneh noted that IGAD is not a program oriented rather it is Donor ridden organization. Table 4 Contributions received from member state

| Country  | Amount paid in USD |
|----------|--------------------|
| Djibouti | 408,72.00          |
| Ethiopia | 976,625.26         |
| Kenya    | 1,530,293.26       |
| Sudan    | 2,125,539.52       |
| Uganda   | 3,078,259.00       |
| Total    | 8,119,488.78       |

*Source: IGAD annual report of 2009.*

As regards human resources, the IGAD secretariat is not adequately staffed. A number of professional posts have not been filled over the years is the lack of financial resources. One therefore, wonders how the IPSS will be implemented if this situation continues (Appuli, 2011:368).

Efforts to fill the many vacant posts failed to restructure of the IGAD secretariat still under way. The high number of vacant posts has impacted on the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization as a whole. There are 14 posts in the organizational structure of IGAD secretariat that have full vacant since 2005 remain 50 due to budget constraints. Cumulating, the secretariat is now operating at 50 percent of its human resource capacity still the constraints is present in the IGAD region. In addition, the following posts fell vacant in the course of 2009 for reasons cited below.

**Table 5 posts fell vacant in 2009 in the IGAD organization**

| No | Vacant post  | Grade | Reason      |
|----|--|-------|-------------|
| 1  | Director, peace and security division              | P5    | Transferred |
| 2  | Director of administrative and financial division  | P5    | Transferred |
| 3  | Director of ICPAT                                  | P5    | Resigned    |
| 4  | Director CEWARN                                    | P5    | Retired     |
| 5  | Program manager, dry land agriculture research     | P4    | Retired     |
| 6  | Program manager, information and documentation     | P4    | Retired     |
| 7  | Program manager transport and communication        | P4    | Retired     |
| 8  | Program manager on finance administration at ICPAC | P5    | Retired     |

*Source: IGAD: Annual report of 2009*

## Chapter Five

### 5.1 Conclusion

IGAD is one of the Regional Economic Communities (REC's) in Africa, which encompasses eight member countries including Eritrea, a country that recently withdraw from the organization. IGAD was established in 1986 with a narrow mandate to combat the widespread drought and desertification, that was ravaging the region (IGAD, 1996), and revitalized in 1996, to expand its mandate and to promote regional peace and stability.

The four primary areas of focus of IGAD were food security and environmental protection, infrastructure development (transport and communications) and regional conflict prevention, management and resolution and humanitarian affairs (IGAD, MIP, 2010 and ARIA, V: 18).

Since its coming in to existence IGAD faces many serious challenges. These are, political, security, economic, social and human and financial resources.

One of the challenges that stand out and cut across all regions is the problem of ceding sovereignty. The member's states anxiously guard their sovereignty and continue to create more and more elaborate regional organizations and expand their responsibilities. In the IGAD region sovereignty is highly prized and jealously guarded, especially in the new emerging states. Lack of political will is one of the few challenges to implement regional integration in the Horn of Africa.

The attempt to forge a common approach to the sub regional resolution of conflict has focused on structural reorganization than common policies and strategies. Central to these failures is the absence of political consensus, political values and economic bondage.

Even though IGAD adopted a number of protocols and declarations regarding peace and security, they cannot be materialized effectively. The most immediate challenges that may hinder the successful implementation of IPSS are the politics of the region. The region is composed quarrel some neighbors. As already noted, the region witnessed major conventional inter-state conflicts and long period of civil war in almost all of the member states. As a result of this conflict three new states come in to existence, in 1991 Eritrea and the unrecognized state of

Somaliland and the third one is south Sudan which becomes independent state in 2011. Absence of regional hegemony is a negative impact on the region.

The other challenges of IGAD are structural problems, which include lack of managing relations among the members' states. The serious problems facing this region are emanating from conflict and rivalry between the various states of the region and IGAD is institutionally weak and such capacity is unevenly distributed in the IGAD region. Over lapping membership is also the challenge of IGAD. Over lapping membership of member states in the various sub regional communities weakness the ability in the sub regions to put together their resources in building up relevant security institutions.

Unhealthy competition to be a hegemonic state in the Horn of Africa is seen as a serious bottleneck to regional integration, especially among Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan. The other problem is distrust and suspicions among the member states. Neighboring states tend to prey up on one another weakness of governance and to exacerbate any opportunities which brings integration.

An attempt to economic integration is not successful. Lack of complementary (over lapping of production), poverty, and lack of infrastructure are economic challenges. Regional trade among IGAD members has been quite low due to poor light tariff and non tariff barriers, exacerbated restructure and lack of facilitation.

Since most IGAD countries produce and export raw materials rather than processed goods, there are few that they are importing from each other, and low level of tax base is another problem.

Poverty, ecological fragile, marginal agricultural areas are other problems in the region. All countries of the Horn are in the bottom of the UN Human development Index (HDI), where as large proportion of the population lives below the poverty line and average life expectancy is under 60 years.

IGAD, sub region suffers from poor and under developed infrastructure, making for regional trade as well as security and it is characterized by in adequate level of investment in infrastructure, which has resulted in poor transport service. In the case of social service, the population is growing fast with the resulting increased pressure on eager resources and the

environment. The region also suffers from endemic diseases, such as malaria, tuberculosis, river blindness, and HIV/AIDS. Furthermore the region is also affected by human and financial resources. A number of professional posts have not been filled over the years due to the shortage of financial resources.

## **5.2 Recommendation**

The researcher interest in regionalism stems from these complex problems facing this part of Africa, and is convinced that wisely crafted regional integration schemes can address many of these concerns and bring about hopes of lasting peace and social and economic progress for all people. The best hope for Africa as a whole lies in deeper regional and continental integration. There is no doubt that, as already noted, regional integration faces many serious challenges, and in order for these initiatives to achieve their full potential certain bottlenecks at both the national and regional levels have to be removed. The obstacles are, however, not undefeatable.

- Firstly, the structures of regional integration in the IGAD sub region need to be rationalized. There are many initiatives, with over lapping memberships, duplication of mandates, and very few successes. Most of the member countries belong to more than one regional grouping, with resultant problems of diversion of loyalty, resources, skills, and commitment. The multiple memberships are costly to the country and may at times result in conflicting policies. This problem of overlapping memberships of competing groups needs to be addressed quickly so as to allow clear political commitment to the IGAD.

- Secondly, as the case of IGAD has demonstrated, interstate and intra state issues can easily cripple noble initiatives, including regional integration schemes. Therefore, reconciling national and regional interests helps states to cooperate on the common goals of regional integration and development, which can benefit all.

Bringing the region's conflicts under control requires bold and fundamental change. The border conflicts that lead to interstate wars can be dealt with through effective and proactive measures by regional organizations. However, to become effective a regional organization such as IGAD would require a level of independence from member states as well as external powers so that it could operate as a neutral body. Moreover, since intra-state and interstate conflicts are intertwined, the organization would need to deal with both.

- Thirdly, as this research tried to explain in chapter four most of the states of the Horn of Africa is non democratic. But political transformation is needed. They should be democratic and stop to support insurgencies to bring peace and stability in the region. To advance regional integration, borders should be open to maintain full social, cultural and economic interactions with their identity groups across borders with little hindrance. Without institutional transformation, current democratic efforts lack the foundations to develop in to genuine democratic systems that bring the marginalized segments of society in to the political process.

- Fourthly, for effective economic integration, many issues need to be given due attention. IGAD should give priority to production and devote substantial resources to production capacity. It is to be noted that the veritable gains of Africa's self reliance will be derived from the integration of the productive structure. Harmonization of national efforts to improve agricultural productivity and restructure industrial production, to depend more on domestic rather than on imported imputes are major components of cooperative programs that IGAD should have to promote so as to have significant impact on the development of member states.

Another important point is that, the success of economic integration requires the combination of cultural, social and political aspects. Such inextricable linked should serve to facilitate the achievement of the economic objective of integration scheme. Hence, measures such as removal of visa requirements for citizens of the region, promoting cultural exchanges through organizing seminars, workshops conference and researcher exchanges. Government should call and host different section of people (students, civil and professional associations, academicians, political parties and other local NGO) in the process of economic integration.

- Fifthly, development of adequate transport and telecommunication infrastructure are very essential for economic integration in the IGAD region. Therefore, continued support for an intensification of concerted efforts, towards the development of such sectors are required. The researcher is convinced that joint regional projects can be more beneficial than going it alone. Several areas cited in this regard, including transport and communications, regional common interest and the environment, regional energy pool, regional security, research and higher education, good governance, political and social stability, security cooperation and crime prevention are some of the promising areas of cooperation.

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## Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university, and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Name of the students: **Gebregiorgis Abraha**

Signature : \_\_\_\_\_

Date of submission: \_\_\_\_\_

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as a university advisor.

Advisor Name: **Mohammed H. (Dr.)**

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Date of submission \_\_\_\_\_