

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**

**SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**

**INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES**

FUNDING AND OWNERSHIP IN THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE AFRICAN  
PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA)

BY LIDYA GETAHUN AMARE

JUNE 2017

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“A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Peace and Security Studies”

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## **Acronyms**

ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
AfSol	African solutions for African problems
AFISMA	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APF	African Peace Facility
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AULOs	African Union Liaison Offices
AUPF	African Union Peace Fund
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
COMESA	Community of Sahel and Saharan States
EAC	East African Community
EASBRIG	East Africa Standby Brigade
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOBRIX	ECOWAS Standby Brigade

ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EDF	European Development Fund
EPC	European Political Community
ERM	Early Response Mechanisms
EU	European Union
FOMAC	Force Multinational de l'Afrique Centrale
IGAD	Intergovernmental authority on Development
IPSS	Institute for Peace and Security Studies
IR	International Relations
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NASBRIG	North Africa Regional Standby Brigade
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PoW	Panel of the Wise
PSC	Peace and Security Council
PSO	Peace Support Operation
RECs	Regional Economic Communities
RM	Regional Mechanisms
SADC	Southern African Development Community

SADCBRIG Southern Africa Standby Brigade

UN United Nations

## **Abstract**

*AU the same as the OAU having its own objectives was founded for regional integration and unity. Yet, their difference lies in their principle to attain their own specific goal which they were established to achieve. The OAU was aiming at forming a solidarity among the member states in order to put a stop to any form of colonization with the aim of forming a continent composed of free, independent and sovereign states. The AU on the other hand, by taking in to consideration the new security threats post-cold war, had the continental peace, security, and stability as an agenda. With that, came the power of the AU to intervene in matters of grave security threats resulting in the formation of APSA with its instruments for peace and security. Yet the organization since the start has not been financially secured having an impact on its autonomy of decision making power. This research paper is written mainly focusing on the funding of APSA operations. Seeing how the budget for AU-led missions to intervene in security issues in the continent is collected from the voluntary contribution of the member states and the support from external donors, there is a need to focus on the former to make sure that Africa is owning its security. Though in the past, there has not been a promising progress in this regard, there is now the 0.2 levy expected to change the financial stand of the AU radically. Yet, there are potential challenges that might come to picture at the time of implementation. Which the researcher believes makes the issue timely so as to deal with the impediments before they become a reason for a failure.*

## **Chapter One**

### **1. Introduction**

With the level of global integration and the evolution of “Security” itself, the referent object of security has stopped being the state for a long while now. As a result, the issue of security not only in Africa but globally started to be seen from the point of the people instead of the regime. Accordingly, the issues like environment, health and food security came in to consideration in the security scope (D.Williams, 2007). But even with that, the greatest threat in Africa has remained to be violence, more specifically intrastate conflicts. And various other security threats will materialize in connection to that.

Hence, in order to redirect the objectives of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which was established in 1963 to fight against colonization, into forming a regional institution for a better integration, solidarity and collectiveness, African Union (AU) was established in 2001 with its own Constitutive Act and Roadmap (Carbone, From OAU to AU:turning a page in the history of Africa, 2002). With that transformation, the African Peace and Security Architecture was framed aiming to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in the region through the African Union (AU), the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs). It was established composed on five main pillars i.e. the Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF), the Peace Fund (AUPF) and mainly the Peace and Security Council (PSC). In its early ages, it lacked the financial capacity to operationalize given most of the states still did not recover from their struggle for independence. It was financed by international partners, mainly the EU through the African Peace Facility (APF).

This financial challenge faced by the continent has led to the full dependency on the international actor’s peace operations in the past as well, more particularly on the UN (Jentzsch, 2014). But we have witnessed in various occasions where the UN led peace operations has failed to do the job. Among these are the cases of Angola in 1992, Somalia in 1992-93, Rwanda in 1993-94, Bosnia in 1995, the Ethiopia and Eritrean war (1998-2000), Sierra Leone in 1999, the case of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003-05 and in Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 (Jentzsch, 2014). On the other hand, there have been recent incidents where the AU-RECs-led peace missions with the collaboration with the RECs of different regions have resulted a positive outcome in the peace

interventions. We can raise here the case of Gambia, Mali and Central Africa Republic (CAR) as an example. This this efficiency has resulted accounting to the participation of the member states with regards to generating different resources. Which starts with having a fully operational and functional Peace and Security Architecture, which of course is highly reliant on the amount and sources of financing (APSA) (African Peace and Security Architecture: Roadmap 2016-2020, 2015).

### **1.1 Statement of the problem**

Regional institutions such as the African Union (AU) are established to bring together member states whereby they can prioritize their own interest as the same time the interest of the region. Yet, in the case of AU, it functions under Intergovernmentalism adhering to the sovereignty of the states. Baring that in mind, the issue of funding in peace and security, which is the main focus of this research, is addressed by the Constitutive Act of the AU. It states that the peace operations in the region are to be financed by any amount voluntarily contributed by the member states leaving it to be extremely financially dependent on the financing made by AU's international partners.

The question of whether African states can actually contribute more than what they are doing now is not the issue the researcher want to address. Rather, the researcher will raise questions such as what causes the APSA even the AU as a whole to be highly reliant on funding that is collected outside of the continent. Also, with the level of external financial input, is there an impact on the ownership of African security. Which can be seen from the power of the AU in making autonomous decisions concerning Africa. And if there are any impacts, what is needed to be done by the member states as well as the AU to come up with a system or work on what has already been agreed up on to improve the situation.

### **1.2 Research questions**

I will be trying to address the following research questions.

- Why is APSA (African Peace and Security Architecture) donor dependent?
- What are the implications of donor dependency for African ownership?
- Can AfSol (African-Centered Solution for African Peace and Security Problems) be

realized without regional funding?

- What can be done by the region to no longer be financially dependent on external bodies?

### **1.3 Research Objectives**

The research will have the following general and specific objectives;

#### **1.3.1 General Objective**

- The general aim of this research is to explore whether there is a relation between funding and ownership in the operationalization of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).

#### **1.3.2 Specific Objective**

The objectives of this thesis paper are;

- To identify funding gaps in supporting the effective operationalization of the APSA.
- To examine the viability of the notion “African Solutions for African Problems” in the context financial dependency.
- To unpack the narrative posting that African institutions, in particular the African Union is incapable of funding its security programs.
- To make recommendations.

### **1.4 Significance of the study**

What the researcher is hoping to achieve at the end of this paper is to make workable recommendations, by exploring if there is a relation between funding and ownership and then take that association to the case of African security. By doing so the researcher will be able to come in to conclusion weather Africa does own its security or not. The “African Solution for African problems” has been a slogan in various occasions for a while now. Which the researcher believes presupposes the region owning its security or at least having to lead it to some extent. But is that really the case from the point of the sources of funds allocated to the peace operations?

Hence, this research is aiming to make a contribution by answering that question using the means of exploring the nexus between the two. The researcher also believes this research is timely as Africa is engaging in to a new commitment where by it can secure funding from within the continent in the near future.

### **1.5 Scope of the study**

Raising the issue of external funds in Africa can trigger a lot of issues and questions. Even when we narrow the scope to security, there are a long list of donations that the region utilizes on a security programs; be it in the case of human rights, health, food, environment, children's rights or women rights. And while talking about ownership there is also different levels of ownership; either we are talking about full ownership, having a major share or a mere contribution. These are not the details the researcher plans to get in to in depth in the research. Rather the researcher will fully focus on finding out the relation between funding and ownership and its inference with regards to the operationalization of APSA. In doing so, it is not the capacity of the African counties or the exact level of ownership that the researcher plan to assess. The researcher will only be focusing on what ownership is in light of funding then look in to the African Union, particularly in relation to peace and security by going thoroughly as to the sources of its funds and draw a conclusion thereof.

### **1.6 Limitations of the study**

There were few limitations the researcher has faced while writing this research paper. The highest restriction incumbered in conducting this research paper was an issue of availability of experts which resulted from their busy work schedule and frequent traveling. Consequently, the researcher was not able to interview experts from the African Union, Peace and Security Council (PSC) employees and from other major concerned organizations as many as the researcher has intended. The other issue is the matter of the current internet connection problem that has made it rather difficult to conduct an interview through skype. Finally, even though there are various publications and the general assembly's decisions that have been made public in relation to which member states agree to contribute a certain amount in a given year, it was difficult to get access of the exact figure of their actual contribution to compare it to the one in their agreement.

### **1.7 Organization of the paper**

This research paper will be consisting five chapters. Chapter one will be an introductory chapter containing the background, statement of the problem, objective of the study, research question, significance of the study, scope of the study, limitation of the study and organization of the research paper. Chapter two will be dealing with related literature review, institutional framework and also theoretical framework. Chapter three will be where the study methods such as the research approach, source of data, instruments of data collection, data presentation method, tools of analysis and interpretation, description of the study, field work experience and ethical considerations will be dealt with. Chapter four will have the data presentation, analysis and discussion part while chapter five will be the chapter containing the conclusion and recommendation.

## **Chapter Two**

### **2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

In this chapter, the researcher looks at the literatures related to the issue will be dealt with in this thesis. As it is a starting point for the continental security and regional integration, the establishment of the African Union as a result of the transformation from the Organization of African Unity will be addressed. By giving more focus for the framework that is in place for regional security, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) will be the center of discussion. With that of course comes to picture the five main parts of the Architecture. Which are the Peace and Security Council (PSC), Panel of the wise (PoW), Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF) and the main focus of this research, the Peace Fund. Which are all integral parts of APSA in its mission for a joint front for the purpose of the region's peace, security and stability through the interventions for the purpose of conflict prevention, peace keeping, peace building and conflict management.

The specific matter discussed in this research is the funding of the APSA in its operations. By looking at the sources of funding in present time and also for the past decade the researcher will assess its nexus with ownership of African security, if there is any connection between the two. Accordingly, while the first part of this chapter will address the origin of the AU and the background and institutional framework of APSA. The other part of this chapter will deal with the Theoretical framework.

#### **2.2 The transformation of the OAU to AU**

The main factor for the transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) as mentioned as the objectives of the AU under its Constitutive Act (Art 3) among other things is “to promote peace, security and stability and democratic principles, accelerate socio economic integration, defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and mainly to achieve a greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the African people” (Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000). To that end, keeping common structures with the OAU, AU was established following the three consecutive summits i.e. Lomé Summit (2000), which adopted the AU Constitutive Act, Lusaka Summit (2001), which

drew the Roadmap for implementation of the AU and the Durban Summit (2002), which launched the AU and convened its first Assembly of Heads of State and Government (African Union Handbook, 2014).

Integration in African, which is still under process is not an easy task. There is a view which goes to the extreme belief that uniting Africa is impossible to achieve. This idea emerged in view of the continent lacking the essential essentials for integration such as common language, race, ethnicity, culture as the same time the impact of historical background and the post-colonial territorial boundaries. Since its origin in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, “Pan-Africanism” has been the drive for Africa to legitimize actions and unity. To quote the former President of Ghana, HE Kwame Nkrumah “The salvation of Africa lies in unity.... for in unity lies strength” (Francis, 2005).

The Pan-African sentiment that has initiated AU’s formation does not seem to continue to do so for the implementation of its objectives. There are still examples we can mention where the efforts of the member states have resulted some remarkable achievements in capacitating the AU. For instance, the year of 2009 can be mentioned as a good example with this regard. Even though this regional institution faced challenges in all economic, social and political aspect it still managed to fund itself 66.36% from what was collected from only five countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa). But this only lasted for one year which was from 2009-2010. Since then the budget of the African Union has increased to 70% dependency on external support out of which 90% was for the purpose of regional peace and security (Miyandazi, 2016). The AU still remains to have an architecture that is built around the values, principles, objectives and structures for the prevention, resolution and management of crises as well as post conflict reconstruction and the development of Africa (African Peace and Security Architecture: African Union’s blue print for the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, 2016).

### **2.3 Background of APSA**

Before going in to the operations and structure, first what is meant by APSA needs to be explained. APSA is described through the different elements developed or are in the progress of development by the AU to attain security in Africa (Middleton, 2008). Achieving greater unity and solidarity, reaching political and social integration at the same time promoting peace, security and stability along with democratic principles and human’s and peoples’ rights are few of the

objectives of the African Union (Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000). To that end, APSA, which was developed alongside the AU at 2001 was formed by making the Peace and Security Council (PSC) its main pillar. As it was set out in the Constitutive Act and the Protocol Establishing The African Peace and Security Council (PSC), APSA was founded to provide the instruments for conflict prevention, resolution and management. (Annex, 2016)

The normative and institutional transformation that has occurred post-Cold War has led the region to a turning point in its quest for peace, security, stability and development. The former approach of non-interference was clearly not benefiting the member states; which was made even clearer after the horrific Rwandan genocide in 1994 (Karock, 2014). The non-indifference principle which was then integrated in the Constitutive Act of the AU under Art 4(h) and (J) has made a fundamental change by clearing the path for the AU to intervene in cases of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity to better serve and achieve the collective security and development that is desperately needed. Post the Rwandan genocide the AU has made multiple interventions through peace operations like in the case of Burundi (2003-2004), Sudan (2004-2007), Comoros (2006, 2007,2008) and in Somalia (2007-present) sowing the commitment and eagerness for continental security (Yohannes, 2016, pp. 53-54)

This unity and solidarity are to be achieved is by taking in to consideration the evolved social, cultural, political and economical needs of Africa (The African Peace and Security Architecture Handbook, 2014). Hence, with the establishment of AU and APSA the African context was given more emphasis as solutions to African problems were to be addressed in African context and by their own institutions. Meaning the full operationalization of APSA will result in AfSol. That is still facing challenges at point of implementation and sustainability. These problems to not fully putting into practice and benefit from AfSol results mainly from the lack of political will of the member states of the AU as well as the high level of dependency on external funding that immensely have an effect on the issue of ownership (Okello, 2016).

The three main principles of APSA i.e. “try Africa first” along with “Africa must unite” and the “responsibility to protect” which are said to exist under the sentiment of “Pan-Africanism”, shows the solidarity that has helped the continent in its liberation from colonization which can be such a powerful tool that can help the post-colonial Africa which also needs the integration and

national sovereignty especially when it comes to the issue of peace and security, source of funding and the member states contribution for peace missions. Efforts should be forwarded towards a system where Africans are in charge of decision making in matters of their own security by taking in to consideration the common shared history, values and culture. But various reservations have been manifesting from the leaders of the member countries at occasions such as the Accra summit on July 2007 and the AU summit following it as to the level of integration desired and its end goal (Pirozzi, 2009).

The above ideas of different literatures come under the assumption that there is a clear definition for “Common values” and “Ownership”. Since that’s not the reality, one needs to look in to their description at least under the African security context. At the expert workshop that was organized by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) in 2014, three dimensions of AfSol were acknowledged two of which were shared values and ownership. From what was forwarded at the workshop, shared values denote to matters such as human right, tolerance, reasonable leadership, commitment to justice, solidarity and collective security. While the other element under question, ownership, at its basic level refers to having a capacity to do something in one’s own way. Hence, for African security, it is when the interventions made by the AU are made in conformity with the best interest of Africa. Referring to measures taken with due consideration of the continent’s context, its priorities and needs. The capacity that was mentioned above as a precondition for ownership has multidimensions. It can either refer to the financial, material or logistical resources that can affect the success, vivacity and self-sufficiency of a peace support operation (Yohannes, 2016, pp. 63-66).

#### **2.4 Institutional Framework of APSA**

APSA is a composition of bodies that work together to make their common agenda a reality. It is therefore structured through the mix result of these complementary organs. That is the Peace and Security Council (PSC) which takes up on the decision-making role, the Panel of the Wise (Pow) which is an external body with an advisory part, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) which is responsible for the gathering of intelligence and analysis, the African Standby Force (ASF) with a military division as the same time the Military Staff Committee (MSC) which is there to advise and provide assistance in all matters relating to military and security requirements

for the promotion and preservation of peace and security in Africa and the Peace Fund which is in concerned with the cost and financing of APSA (Middleton, 2008).

#### **2.4.1 The Peace and Security Council (PSC)**

The PSC is established by the 2002 Protocol to be a decision-making organ for the prevention, resolution and management of conflicts in Africa (Protocol Relating to the establishment of the African Peace and Security Council, 2002). As stated under Art 5 of the establishing protocol, the PSC is composed of fifteen (15) member states that are selected by the General Assembly based on the principle of equitable regional representation. Out of these fifteen (15) member states ten (10) are elected for a two-year term while the other five (5) are elected for term year of three in order to ensure endurance.

The PSC in conjunction with the African Union Commission (AUC) have authorities over the deployment of Peace Support Missions (PSO), interventions that fall under Art 4 (h) and (j) if the Constitutive Act of the AU, implementation of common defense policy, peace-building, post conflict reconstruction, humanitarian actions and disaster management along with any functions decided by the General Assembly (Sturman, 2004).




Figure 3, Taken from a paper on EU and APSA by Roger Middleton Organogram showing the relationship between different elements of the APSA, 2008

#### **2.4.2 Panel of the Wise (PoW)**

The Panel of the wise, as mentioned under Art 11 of the protocol establishing the PSC, serves an advisory and supportive role to the PSC. It is composed of five highly respected Africans that has made a significant contribution to the continents peace, security and development. They shall be selected by the AUC Chairperson after consultation with the concerned member states with regards to regional representation. The PoW reports through the PSC to the General Assembly. The PoW provides opinions on issues surrounding peace and security, particularly in the areas of conflict prevention. Which on the ground refers to mediating in areas where there is a potential for conflict and handle issues that are too politically sensitive to be dealt with politicians (Middleton, 2008).

### **2.4.3 Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)**

In order to anticipate and prevent conflicts from materializing, the CEWS are established under Art 12 of the PSC protocol. It has functional roles of information collection, sharing and analysis followed by coordination and harmonization. It uses the ‘Situation Room’ located at the African Union, Conflict management directorate for the data collection and analysis purpose. The member states, RECs, the UN and other international organizations, the Pan-African Parliament, ACHPR, research centers, academic institutions, civil society organizations and the media are all used as a source of information for intelligence gathering (African Union Continental Early Warning System, 2008). As mentioned under Art 16 of the PSC protocol, it also needs to collaborate with the RECs to ensure effective partnership throughout the continent.

There are eight Regional Mechanisms that are taken in to account to be part of this structure including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental authority for Development (IGAD), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-SAD) the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Tiruneh, 2010).

### **2.4.4 The Stand by Force (ASF)**

It has been mentioned multiple times that Art 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act of the AU are the defining elements in the transformation of AU from its predecessor, the OAU. The ASF is the responsible body in APSA for materializing such interventions stated in the above-mentioned Art. Accordingly, Art 13 of the PSC protocol acknowledges the establishment of ASF and its mandates. From what was adopted by the member states, there is one brigade level standby for each five regions. Which are the North Africa Regional Standby Brigade (NASBRIG); East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG); Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale (FOMAC), Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG); ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRI) supported by civilian police (CivPol). If fully established, it will be a composition of multidisciplinary parties by including civilians and the military ready for an immediate deployment to any conflict zone in the region (Batware, 2011).

#### **2.4.5 The Peace Fund (AUPF)**

The Peace Fund, which is the main focus of this research is established under Art 21 of the PSC Protocol. This special fund is required to finance the peace operations and the peace support missions under APSA. The collection is to be made from voluntary contribution of the member states, private sectors, civil societies, individuals and fund- raising activities. Through this system, since 1993 i.e. its inception up until 2008 the Peace Fund has only received 6% of the regular budget. And though it was decided on August 2009 in the summit in Tripoli that the amount should grow to 12%, it has not been more than 7% until the year 2016 (Decision on the budget of the African Union for the year 2016, 2015). Even though APSA was established so that Africa can be the one to lead the Peace Support Operations (PSO) in Africa which is clearly most beneficial to the AU members by putting them at the highest priority in its agenda, the lack of capacity and willingness to come up with the funding for the PSOs has made it impossible for the organization to make an independent decision without negotiating with its partners concerning the tactical, strategical and operational parts of its missions (Coning, 2017). Consequently, it has not been able to mobilize resources to conflict areas where the interests of the partners are not met with that of the region's (Engel, 2013). Looking at the contribution of the African states to the Peace Fund from the year 2008-2011, it only amounts to 2% of the budget while 98% was collected externally (Karock, 2014). With this information, the questions of "Where is the fund coming from?", "Who is the major contributor?", "Is Africa's interest and context taken into consideration throughout the process? And if so, to what extent?" and "How does all this affect the operationalization of the AU, more specifically the APSA?" will be triggered.

The main reason for the failure of the OAU to address the evolved security threats was its incapacity to intervene in the cases of conflict in the region be it in the prevention or the management aspect of it (Transition from the OAU to the AU, 2002). Hence, the defining step in the establishment of the AU was so that the continent can now have a stand by military force that can rightfully intervene whenever there is major violation of human rights violations. Thus, it is safe to assume that the establishment and strength of the African standby force (ASF) is directly indicative of the actual change that has been brought by the change of OAU to the AU.

In the draft contribution to the African Union annual report that is to be published in 2017 the author, Cedric De Coning, points out that the source of financing is the vital factor that

determines whether the AU is being effective in its Peace Operations. And that it is only when it is no longer dependent on the support of its partners that the member states can have the sense of ownership over the AU (Coning, 2017). Though generally the continent lacks locally generated financing for its peace operations, there are still exceptions like in the case of Burundi in 2003 where South Africa covered \$ 110 million cost out of the \$140 million. And the recent mission in Gambia which was efficiently covered by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

### **2.5 Progress of the APSA Operations**

Starting from its establishment, APSA has been benefiting the most from the fund that has been coming from the EU among other external partners like the UN, USA and other European countries. The AU partners were willing to provide that financial support under the impression that if the organization is capable of effectively addressing the security issues of the continent, it will ease up the burden of the UN in its mission towards global peace (Brosig, 2015). To that effect, after the request of the African leaders and policy makers at the AU Summit in Maputo, African Peace Facility (APF), which is part of the European Development Fund (EDF), was established in 2003 having the principles of African ownership, solidarity and partnership between the two continents. It came to force soon after in 2004. Though it had two objectives at the beginning; which was financially aiding the AU PSOs and capacity building of the AU through APSA, it later added the Early Response Mechanism (ERM) in 2009. But even with the three objectives around 88.5% of the budget was still going to the PSOs (Kokolo, 2015). Especially with the AU-EU summit at Lisbon in 2007, where the Africa-Europe Strategy Partnership (JAES) a turning point was expected in the partnership. But the budget allocation at the AU shows that the current capacity building strategy needs challenging in order to address the imbalance at APSA (Vorrath, 2012).

Yet, the past decade journey of APSA has showed progress; different promising changes have occurred in many aspects of its operations. Over 100,000 military personnel have been deployed by African security institutions in the past 12 years. Moreover, out of all the UN-led operations 58% has been African troops (Tardy, 2016). The improvement can also be seen from the Peace Operations in Somalia (AMISOM) which was launched in 2007 and the AFISMA in Mali in 2013 where AU-led Peace Supports were deployed along with that of the UN.

It can be seen from the decision of the Assembly for every fiscal year that the member states pledge to contribute a specific amount for the operationalization of APSA. But how much of that amount is practically being contributed is the first question to understand the commitment and the responsiveness of the member states. For instance, in the financial year of 2016 USD 169,833,340 was to be gathered from the member states while USD 247,033,986 is to be secured from international partners (Decision on the budget of the African Union for the year 2016, 2015). But the expected and the actual assessed contribution of the member states as well as from the partners might not be the same figure. Consequently, the lack of unpredictable and unsustainable funding will pose limitation on the operations of the AU. We can infer the same results from the figure below on the gap of funding from the year 2011-2015 by comparison of the budget plan with the actual contribution. Even though there was no promising progress in the past years, AU is currently at implementation level of an alternative mechanism of funding that can bring a radical change in the coming three years. Which is discussed in detail in the fourth chapter of this paper.




Figure 4- Gap between budget and actual received contribution from the year 2011-2015 taken from Background Paper on Implementing the Kigali Decision on financing the Union, 2016

## **2.5 Ownership of African Security**

In any donor recipient relationship, there is a trade off partnership with ownership. which in that case of partnership there is a sense of equality that comes with it by taking in to consideration the responsibility of the donor, the responsibility of the recipient and the joint responsibility. But in

case of ownership, especially when there is a question of local ownership raised as a result of funder and funded relationship, there is an issue related to the question of who has the power in decision making, identifying and prioritizing needs, implementing and supervising the aid (Jerve, 2002).

From its starting point on, since the member states to the African Union were unable to come up with the resources to put APSA in to operation by themselves, they had to turn to international partners (Brosig, 2015). But the AU has been trying to find a way to be self-sufficient financially for more than a decade now so that the continent can acquire better ownership on its own peace and security operations (AU Audit Report, 2007). Among these failed attempts is the alternative mechanism proposed to secure continental funding. It was proposed by the former Nigerian President, Obasanjo the 10\$ levy on air travel and a 2\$ levy on hotel accommodations that was expected to raise \$ 700m annually for the AU (Progress Report of High-Level Panel on Alternative Sources of Financing the African Union, 2014).

In addition to the amount collected for the peace fund being very inadequate compared to the amount expected, the other problem lies as a result of it being voluntary making it highly unpredictable and undependable (Securing Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace and Security in Africa, 2016). Hence, as a result of these problems and by taking a lesson from the 0.5 community levy in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that has helped the western region immensely to be self-sufficient, Dr. Kabruka, the former High Representative on the Peace Fund proposed the 0.2 import levy as a way of financing the Union which was accepted in at the AU summit in Kigali in June 2016. Provided that the Declaration is implemented fully it is expected to generate \$1.2 billion in 2017 while the AU budget for that same year is \$ 700m.

Prioritizing security in Africa results from the fact that most of the states are still under constructing or reconstructing their states from post or an ongoing conflict with in the region. But even though there are views forming a direct link between funding and the ownership of African security, there is also a need to try and look in to other elements of ownership that might allow us to see that Africa owns its peace and security operations. Despite the fact that there are external supports, Africans still own their security by taking in to account that they at times serve as safe havens for still going conflicts, show inclusiveness by willingly deploying their troops resulting a

large number of causalities without withdrawal by claiming of legitimacy and sense of obligation (Rwengabo, 2016). The 2016 AfSol journal continues to explain by taking the example of AMISOM that the success of AfSol to African peace and security can be maintained when there is commitment from the member states by showing persistency in their interventions, Ownership by making the operation home grown and through acquiring or focusing on shared values that can redirect states from acting in self-interest to a Pan-African mentality.

## **2.7 Theoretical Framework of Regional Integration**

In the study of international relations (IR) there are different theories that define integration. By looking at the previous discussion about the sentiment of African Unity and the objective of the African Union as well as the actual implementation of the values incorporated in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the researcher is aiming at exploring the theory that will highly relate to the African context which then will be used to analyze discuss the data the researcher will be presenting in the fourth chapter.

Various scholars have tried to define a regional integration (Sheriff Ghali Ibrahim, 2015). In this part, four major integrational theories will be discussed. i.e. the Federalism theory, the Functionalism theory, the Neo-Functionalism theory and the Intergovernmentalism theory. As an integration presupposes a formation of a new supranational entity, the difference lies in the relationship of the integrating parties and the new formed unit which is discussed below.

### **2.7.1 Federalism**

In the case of integration through federalism, the parties will relinquish their powers for a benefit that can be attained collectively. Hence the power that used to lie in the hands of those parties before coming together will now be shared with the entity that is formed by coming together. Taking the example of the European Political Community (EPC) and the Treaty of Rome in the year 1958 shows the inclination of leaders towards federalism (Koslowski, 1999). Thus, the theory of federalism applies in circumstances where integration is derived by the need of solidarity and unification instead of having multiple competing states for which the member states of the integration will be forced to lose their autonomy to some extent (Sills, 1986). We can analogize this to the national cases where a country is governed with a federal system. For example, taking the case of Ethiopia, the nine regional states have formed a federal state, with a

federal government that has a power of intervening and imposing decisions when circumstances require. Decisions which are compulsory for the regions to comply with. Though the point of unity and forming a new supranational unit can also be seen in the case of the African union, the issue of “Sovereignty sharing” is still something the African member states are not ready to put in to practice.

### **2.7.2 Functionalism**

The focus of the functionalist theory on the other hand is on creating a functional organization through integration (Rosamond, 2000). Accordingly, it justifies the cause for integration as a reason for welfare of the community through empowering a functional body. It explains security in such a way that if economical needs of the people are addressed then they will be peaceful. And so, sovereignty in this case will transfer to the functioning body that is to bring about peace through trade and workshop. Which for this theory will be more effective than signing agreements and declarations (Sheriff Ghali Ibrahim, 2015).

With the classical functionalist theory exists a big assumption that the drive for integration has no relation with the political aspect of the community rather only their desperation for their social and economical need (Sheriff Ghali Ibrahim, 2015). Bringing this to the African context, there are multiple regional mechanisms in place to economically integrate the member states that still have not prevented the occurrence of conflicts not even among states within the same region. And of course, the question of transferring or sharing sovereignty from the member states to the African Union is also another issue which was also raised with the federalism theory (Sheriff Ghali Ibrahim, 2015).

### **2.7.3 Neo-functionalism**

The new version of functionalism that was founded by Ernst Haas and Leon Lindberg criticized David Mitrany’s classical functionalism (Dosenrode, 2010). In this revived version of the theory the focus is forwarded towards the political perspective of the integration process. Hence, states need to economically integrate in areas of “low politics” (Rosamond, 2000). The main concept in the Neo-functionalism theory is the “spillover” effect; that refers to an open-ended occurrence where an economical integration in one sector will have an impact on a related economic section (Haas, 1958).

The incapacity of the integrating states in this theory to take an independent action by themselves instead collaborate for a collective gain by putting a limit to their sovereignty which yet again poses a difficulty for the Neo-functionalism to explain the integration in authority sensitive areas such as Africa (Sheriff Ghali Ibrahim, 2015). Moreover, the concept of “Spillover” is unlikely to take place in Africa since regional integration in the continent is top-to-bottom.

#### **2.7.4 Intergovernmentalism**

With this relatively realist theory as contrary to the Neo-functionalism theory, here the states play the main role in the integration process. The national governments will have a control on the nature of the integration by taking in to consideration their own best interest (Sheriff Ghali Ibrahim, 2015). For the main supporters of Neorealism/ Intergovernmentalism, Stanley Hoffman, Andrew Moravcsik, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, the process or the end result of the integration does not replace the interests of the states better yet the national governments attempt to attain that same interest through the cover of integration and when that interest is no longer fulfilled their interest to integrate will not be there. For this we can take the example of Morocco withdrawing from the AU and Mauritania leaving the ECOWAS (Sheriff Ghali Ibrahim, 2015).

In the anarchical system of states in the supranational organization and in the international relations, the theory mainly bases its concept on the various rational decisions made by the leaders of the national government leaders to best serve in most cases their economical and political interest (Moravcsik, 1991). Hence, the reason for states to choose to integrate rests up on their desire to minimize the cost of cooperation while attaining their national advantage. And this in effect makes the organization incapable of making an independent decision leaving the forming states as the main actors with actual powers to make a difference on the outcome (Sheriff Ghali Ibrahim, 2015).

Taking a look at its founders, the AU was established by strong influential national leaders, the late Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Gaddafi, former president Thabo Mbeki of South African and former president Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria with no intention of putting a limit to their authority or national sovereignty as a result of the newly formed continental integration (Ama, 2008). Explaining that as most things in the world the theory takes in to consideration the unequal power difference among member states and their decisions which directly will impact the

power of the supranational organ, which in this case is the African Union. More specifically when trying to understand the issue of source of funding in the continent in relation to the contribution of the member states and the power of the organization to make an independent decision, this theory better explains the African context.

## **Chapter three**

### **3. Research methodology**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter discusses the method that is used to conduct this research paper. It provides a detailed explanation of the type of data collection, the tool used to collect the data, the kind of data presentation and how the collected data is analyzed and discussed. As it is briefly mentioned in chapter one, the introductory part of this paper, this is a qualitative research with chosen methods and tools to gather the information needed. The participants to the research were also selected based on reasonable criteria. There are also additional primary materials that are used to support and explain the data presented in the coming chapter.

#### **3.2 Approach of the study**

This qualitative research is made in a descriptive manner. Whereby documents such as academic writings, journals, books, Arts, declarations, assessment reports, Impact report, handbook, protocol, decisions of the General Assembly and any other publications made by the AU is reviewed. Issues related to the topic in these documents are well elaborated and discussed before reaching a logical conclusion. An additional source of data for the research was the interviews conducted with key informants which are experts on the topic area. It's after this procedure that the information gathered is interpreted and analyzed in light of a theory that is discussed in the second chapter.

##### **3.2.1 Sampling**

For the data collection of this research, the researcher has used a purposive sampling. That is by selecting the organizations and the respondents by their experience on the topic area and the issues that the researcher is raising. Since the question of funding at the African Union, more specifically in the operationalization of APSA and its effect of ownership is the main focus of the paper, the researcher has selected the African Union (AU) since it is the concerned organization, the European Union (EU) because it is the major contributor to APSA, the Institute of Security Studies (ISS) and the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) for their outstanding knowledge and exposure on the issue. Accordingly, the researcher have interviewed, Ms.

Raheemat Momodu, Head of ECOWAS at the Liaison Office to the AU, Ambassador Abiodun Bashua, Former African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson and served in various capacities in AU-UN missions, Mr. Sandy Wade, Head of Political, Press and Information Section, EU delegation to Ethiopia, Mr. Thorsten Clausing, Head of Peace and Security Section, EU Delegation to the African Union, Dr. Ndubuisi Christian Ani, Researcher, Peace and Security Research programme, Ms. Liesl Louw-Vaudran, Independent Journalist & Analyst and Ms. Michelle Ndiaye, Director of the African Peace and Security Programme (APSP) at the IPSS.

### **3.2.2 Tools of data collection**

After choosing the respondents as explained above, the researcher proceeded to the part of data gathering. the researcher have used the interview method of data collection. Out of the seven interviews, the researcher had personally interviewed five of the respondents. The other two experts reside in South Africa so the interviews were conducted over Skype. The researcher has forwarded for each interviewee eleven (11) question regarding the topic area in light of their organization and their position therein. The responses received from the experts are presented with the discussion following every issue. The subtopics chosen to present the information collected and the discussion are in accordance with the interview question, which is annexed at the end of the research paper.

### **3.3 Data analysis**

The presented data is further discussed and analyzed in their respective subtopics that they are presented under. In this stage, the information is interpreted and presented in a way that can fully address the research question and objective as the same time make sense of the whole arguments that are raised in the research so that it can rightly lead to the conclusion and recommendation part of the thesis.

### **3.4 Ethical consideration**

While doing this research the following ethical considerations will be taken in to account.

- In any interview the researcher conducts, the researcher has notified her name and the institution where the researcher learns as well as the purpose of the study.

- The researcher will only reveal the name and position of the interviewees only when they give their permission to do so.
- If the researcher comes across any confidential information during data collection, the researcher will make sure to keep that way.

## **Chapter Four**

### **4. Findings and analysis**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

As explained in the previous chapter as to how the data is collected and analyzed, this chapter will present the data and the discussion on the topic area. Both the responses to the interview questions and documents that are primary data are presented in this chapter. Moreover, it is to be recalled that in the second chapter of this paper theories of International Relations were discussed briefly explaining the issue of integration in the process of formation of a supranational entity. Thus, in this chapter, the data collected is going to be discussed in light of the specific theory which the researcher have chosen and that will lead to the conclusion part of the thesis.

Looking at the general overview of the responses the researcher has received from the respondents with regards to why the funding for APSA, even the AU in general is not being secured from within the continent the issue of financial capacity was not near the top of the list. It was rather in related to a reflection of how the member states do not have faith in the organization or what it stands for. And that is when one should raise a question of, then why did the member states integrate if not to have an empowered continental organization that has within its discretion to intervene in matter of peace and security as it sees fit. That is why the researcher chose to select from the theories that specifically give explanation to why parties or members to a supranational body come together to form it. This means to dig deeper than the agenda presented and try to see the underlying interests that truly motivates that cooperation. That is exactly what need to be understood for the case at hand i.e. the African peace and Security and the fundamental cause for its lack of local financing. Then, and only then is that we can try to suggest solutions that can actually make a difference in the continent. Hence, the Intergovernmentalism or Neo-realism theory of integration as indicated in the second chapter of this paper, for its features indicated there, will be used on the case of Africa and support the discussion on the data collected to make a reasonable interpretation.

#### **4.2 Operations of APSA and its financing**

The first question forwarded to all the experts was whether they consider the AU or APSA financially dependent on external support. Out of the seven key informants, the researcher

interviewed, six of them were not even reluctant to say based on the figures that presented in various publications, yes, APSA is donor dependent (Abiodun Bashua, 2017). But the one exceptional response that the researcher has gotten for this question from the respondent at the AU. That is, what do we mean by “dependent”? do we mean that that APSA will be nonexistent without the external funding? In that case no. (Momodu, 2017). Which raises the issue of having a unified view on the definition of dependency. A single definition has not been provided for the term “Dependency”. Yet among the interpretations out there, there is one that seems fitting for this context. That is dependency refers to a scenario where a certain thing is a necessary condition for the existence or functioning of another; making the former a subordinate and the later a dominant party in an established relationship (Zhang, 2015). The respondent further explains by saying that we can see cases like Gambia in 2017 and Guinea-Bissau in 2012 where interventions were made by ECOWAS using its own money. We first need to question the narrative used and quantify dependency and make it more specific. Meaning that APSA is a framework and various things fall under it. Even with that case in mind, the common descriptions about the African dependency are not acceptable for Ms. Raheemat. There is a need for a recognition for the work that is being done which no one can oppose. The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) do invest a lot for the peace and security of their region where the perfect example can be the 0.5 community levy of ECOWAS. But we cannot say the same when we come to the AU. So, it is no question that the AU needs to do more with respect to finding a source of funding within the continent so that Africa can be able to take actions whenever they are needed without waiting for a confirmation a negotiation from the donors that can only make any mission less effective. The other point raised here was that the difference between the peace initiatives and the peace operations in the continent. It is at least better when we can fully finance our initiatives and require the funding for the operation elsewhere. At a point where we are expecting our international donors to pay the salaries of the employees of the AU, it is hard to talk about financing the peace operations. Thus, we first need to be able to finance the basics and take initiatives while expecting the external funding for the peace missions for which we are at least paying with our lives (Momodu, 2017).

For someone observing the continent from the outside, it might seem that lack of financial capacity of the member states is what is accounting for this reservation of member states to not be willing to fund the AU. But the issue of economical capacity is among other factors for their

reservations. There is a lot of resource in different parts of the regions that can be utilized for the purpose regional security and development. The most common reasons as to what accounts for the involuntariness of the member states to some extent was similar, yet there were different reactions that are all mentioned below.

#### **4.2.1 Factors accounting to the financial dependency of APSA**

The basic problem that accounts for the dependency of the organization on its international partners is as a result of “Dependency Syndrome” (Abiodun Bashua, 2017). The direct interpretation of such syndrome refers to an attitude and belief that a group cannot solve its own problems without outside help. It is a weakness that is made worse by charity” (Google, 2017). The capacity of the Member States to fund the organization has not been the same for the past decade. But when we look at the progress in the contribution to the AU through this time frame, it has been decreasing compared to its starting point. When it was established the organization had external donors to support it since it did not have the capacity and it had struggles for liberation movements making the continent weaker and unstable both politically and financially.

The other major cause for the unwillingness of the member states is the question of national sovereignty. The understanding here is that if the African Union is funded by the member states to the amount that they decide to do so or even more than that, the expected result is that the organization will then be empowered (Wade, 2017). That empowering will result in giving it a capacity to intervene in matters of any state given that the circumstances fall under the list mentioned under its Constitutive act. Though a security threat or any kind of crises is not looked-for in any given state, since Africa had the luxury of learning from the experience of the EU of what it means to have a powerful and influential organization, the interference by the AU-led missions might not always be desired. That unwanted intervention and the desire to deal with peace and security issues at a national level creates a barrier to the member states to be fully committed to the union (Wade, 2017). This sound justification, which is also shared by the researcher explains as to how the AU can be best explained by the Intergovernmentalism theory. What differentiate this theory from the rest is that in the Neo-realism theory, the interest of the states before integration and afterwards remain the same. Hence, the national interest of the nations will remain at the top of agenda which can hinder a full execution of the kind of integration that Africa needs.

Moreover, in order for the member states to be willing and forthcoming to finance the AU, they need to have faith on what it stands for and accept the value of its existence (Ndiaye, 2017). The establishment of the OAU in 1963 under the pan African sentiment was to fight slavery and to fight for the freedom of the oppressed to which the member states were fully committed to and we have seen the result of solidarity when the parties to the integration are full heartedly devoted to the cause for establishment. Now that all nations are free from slavery and the threat to our peace and stability is no longer on the outside the transition of the AU was demanded so as to prevent the reoccurrence of the horrific incidents like that of the Rwandan Genocide (Bashua, 2017). Though the new transformed union is given a discretion to intervene under the principle of non-indifference, as discussed before in the previous paragraph the reason for its establishment is in a way the reason for its disempowerment. Hence if the member states do not have faith in the organization and on what it actually does, it will be difficult for them to voluntarily hand in their money to the AU. Here, the researcher believe brings in to picture the issue of integration yet again and the commitment the states have to that organization. It is not the mere act of coming together of the member states that brings about solidarity for the African people. Rather our interest in that cooperation and unity matters the most. If states are integrating based on their sole interest of serving their national interest and not for the continent's peace, security, development and stability through cohesion then there will not be a determination and effort they put in for its accomplishments.

When the APSA was established in 2003, the goal was to be able to come up with a frame work engaging the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Regional Mechanism (RM) so that the continent can attain a continental security through integration and intervention. But when we see how strong these mechanisms have grown throughout the years, it's the RECs that have progressed and have gotten stronger and are more acceptable by the member states. Thus, the researcher also shares the views of the respondent (Ambassador Bashua) that even when a state is capable and willing to contribute to regional security they are more lenient to the RECs of their specific region than that of the African Union. This can be reflected from the active participation of African states in their respective region and not showing the same effort towards the AU. This showing what was intended to be beneficial to the APSA framework i.e. working alongside the RECs is not being fully operational. This does not mean that the states do not come together every year and pass a decision by the general assembly as to the amount that they will contribute

that year. The decision specifically will state the contribution that is to be collected from the member countries at the same time, the rest that is to be gathered from its international partners. With this aspect, it is of the opinion that what they lack in one aspect is a faithful implementation of their own decision and failing to commit to the agreement they have reached.

The researcher has also received an opinion that if the continent was under the circumstance where it needs to come up with the funding itself and there were no willing donors to support its operations, then it will capacitate itself. And so, all the donors for Africa is a destruction for our progress (Momodu, 2017). Though this is a big assumption to take, the researcher does believe that if the member states have no willing donor to fall back to, they would have made a better effort to come up with the money themselves. Hence, in a way, the willingness of the international partners is one of the causes for the financial dependency. This raises the question of why the partners actually do fund the operations so willingly? Is it because of the goodness of their heart and a genuine concern about African security or is it so that they can have a say in the decision-making process at the AU and having the desire to have an influential power to impose their interest through the conditions for the funds that can result in Africa doing their bidding. That was the question the researcher specifically forwarded to the respondents from the EU delegation. Surprisingly, the researcher received two extremely different responses.

The one side of reaction that the researcher has gotten is that their motive for investing this much money on Africa's security is pretty much clear. The EU, as any kind of donor would be, will not be so willing to fund almost fully the peace operations in Africa, if it has no interest in taking part or having a voice in the decisions that are going to be made (Wade, 2017). Thus, according to this respondent, it is only because the EU wants to be able to influence the decisions of the AU that it provides its financial assistance. If that was not the case then the money would have been used in their own country for their own people as it is the tax payer's money that is being spent. On the other hand, the other diverse answer was that the EU has no interest in meddling in the decision making. Nor does it have any desire to influence the decisions of the AU towards their own interest by making the funding accompanied by any instructions (Clausing, 2017). Instead what the EU wants is for Africa to work on building its capacity so that in the future it can be an organization that is fully independent and capable to finance its own operations. Personally, the researcher finds the second one a bit further from the reality. Though the EU or any kind of donor

might have a pure interest of capacitating Africa to some extent as a result of globalization and global integration, in most cases money is spent for a certain agenda and in almost in all cases the one that is coming up with the money wants something in return.

As explained before what could have made APSA and the AU a more effective organization is if the member states believe in what it stands for and share its values. The core idea of establishing APSA has the assumption of that the member states have common values. That common values like the pan Africanism can only make a difference and be a point of motivation if it is shared by every member. Hence, another factor for member states' reservation is not sharing common values. And this has led us to be dependent on what we should be consider as "our developmental partners" (Ndiaye, 2017).

There is also the incapacity aspect the member states that can be accounted for the dependency. That has resulted from the national governments struggling to manage the situations in their country let alone make a contribution to the AU. This at times has resulted from the embezzlement of funds by public officials that has resulted in putting these countries in debt (Ani, 2017). What can be mentioned at last with regard to this is that the misguided conception that the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) is the only organization responsible for global peace and security (Bashua, 2017), thus for the continent of Africa. And in effect not being approaching in taking things in to their hands and make their contribution. But the reality remains that the peace and security issues of Africa is purportedly undertaken on behalf of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) by the Africa Union (AU).

Taking all these multidimensional reasons provided by the interviewees, the researcher believes that it has been made clear to some extent as to what accounts for the lack of AU financing. Which are mainly the fact that the member states do not have faith in AU and does not feel responsible for its financing. These will later expand to causing other reasons for that will result in insufficient funding.

In any circumstance parties who chooses to integrate with other states to form a united front has a reason for doing so. The same for the OAU and the AU and the reason for their establishment. Starting from the first one, as mentioned in the seconds chapter the reason for the foundation of the OAU was so the continent can fight for its freedom from slavery. So, this quest that was at

the heart of every member state to tackle the common enemy and the desperation to see change in the status quo had made it accomplish its purpose. This can be an example of how integration can be effective in solving common problems. It also shows how much it makes a difference when the states that willingly organized themselves to form such an organization need to believe in the whole purpose of it. That in effect will make them to be forthcoming in putting efforts to make the organization more empowered. It was because the issue of slavery and white domination in the continent was a pressing issue that affected almost all the member states that OAU was full heartedly recognized and had a significant result. But when we critically look at what happened after the liberation movements were successfully completed makes you question just how much do the African member states actually want to integrate to still make a change in their situations, be it in respect to protection of human rights, security or development. When that freedom and self-governance was then attained, which was clearly at cost of genuine integration, what came next was an embarrassment to the continent which it unfortunately is still engaged in and still paying the price. This of course does not mean that the OAU did not have a flow. As treaties to security evolved to conflicts start arising within the continent and among the member states, it was no longer an efficient system.

Thus, the transformation of OAU to a more integrated unit, that works for the continent's peace, security and stability through the RECs and RMs was a matter of necessity. And so, the AU was formed in order to achieve a better unity and solidarity among the member states to acquire a regional integration by granting the AU a right to intervene in circumstances where there is a grave violation of human right and human security. This non-indifference principle was intended to serve the interest of the member states. Which would mean that the member states are the ones that has to put an effort to put it on the ground and benefit from it. A mechanism that was put in place to implement was through the RECs as the same time the APSA framework which still has not been fully operational.

As mentioned in chapter two of this paper APSA was recognized alongside the AU having its five distinctive bodies. Each having a vital role to play in the continental security and stability. Mainly the ASF that is capable of intervening whenever there are security threats in the different regions of the continent. And for that to be always on guard and make an effective and timely intervention, it need an adequate financing. For that reason, the Peace Fund at the AU can be seen

as the core element of this whole operation. Both the ASF and the Peace fund are areas to work on in order to get an improvement on the APSA operations. When there is such shortage in local funding, it's not only affects the time duration of the response it also raises the issue of external influence in decision making. These influences might not always serve the best interest of Africa which makes it contradict with the whole purpose of AU's establishment. Hence, though it is inevitable for the continent to seek financial aid from the external world in different sectors such as health, education, development, with such arrangement it will make the peace and security of the African people in the hands of outsiders as well. This in effect puts under question the amount of faith the member states have on the organization. It is only when the when the AU can take matters in to its own hands with the interventions it makes, that it can acquire the respect and commitment it requires from the states and the RECs. Only then there will be a visible accomplishment and legitimacy as to its reason for its existence and it will in fact start to make a difference that is entirely based on the interest of Africa.

#### **4.3 Ownership of African Security and the feasibility AfSol (African Centered Solutions for African Problems)**

The question of financial dependency in the previous question was intended to lead to the main issue of the paper which is ownership. Not only that but also to look in to the operations of APSA and the practicality of the African Centered Solution for African problems with the financial standing that The AU have had for the past decade.

##### **4.3.1 Ownership of African Security**

Does the dependency on external donors, International partners or our developmental partners, what so ever we decide to call them, have any implication on the ownership of African security? If so what are these implications was the next question to the interviewees which were addressed as follows.

It goes without saying that funding is part of ownership. But is it an integral one or something that can be compensated by other measures is in the opinion the base for how we address this matter. With the way that the funding for APSA is being secured there is definitely an implication on the ownership of African security. (Abiodun Bashua, 2017). Even the name "Africa Union" is taken from the European version of it. (Wade, 2017). Yet, there is a view that

the ownership of the Continent's security still remains in its hands since the act of the European Union only extends to building African capacity (Clausing, 2017). From the ones that said the ownership is affected, the most common implications of this external donor dependency on the peace interventions that are made and are being made by the African Union in the continent are discussed below.

Africa as an independent and autonomous continent, is supposed to make decisions with regards to the matters of the continent without any external pressure. Yet, that is impossible to attain with the amount of funds that is being secured externally. And those interventions will result in the loss of control on the outcome of security challenges in the region like that of the case of South Sudan and Burundi. It is clear in every circumstance that "He who pays the piper dictates the tune" (Bashua, 2017). This can happen in various aspects. One is that the AU led interventions will not be timely to address the matters at the appropriate time (Momodu, 2017). This resulting from inability to act on the strategies that are already framed by the union by the lack of funding and waiting for the donors to actually decide on giving their money, or not.

The other implication is the continuing divergence of views between the African Union Commission (AUC) and the Regional Economic Community (RECs). If the commission was able to fund the operations of the RECs then they would have been more accepting of the orders of the commission which can in effect have an impact on the leadership of the AUC (Momodu, 2017). It's not only the relationship with the RECs that is affected by this funding arrangement. The relations that it has with the EU and UN is also under a question mark as an outcome of this reliability on the money that is coming from those organizations. Though the AU wants to be considered on equal grounds with these institutes and wants its voices to be heard, the unpleasant fact that it cannot lead almost all its interventions without seeking the support of an external partner to give it a go ahead by financing the peace operations will have an otherwise impact (Momodu, 2017). While with regards to the RECs and the subsidiarity principle, it can only be practical if the AU actually is a higher authoritative organ with its own financing.

Moreover, the inability to establish and operationalize an African Standby Force (ASF) can be seen as another implication. Even though there has been a progress in the operations of the ASF the operations are still highly controlled and influenced by where the fund is coming. We can take the example of AMISOM where the soldiers have not been paid their salaries for fifteen (15)

months because the European Union (EU) refused to pay them until the neighboring countries start to do more in the protection of human rights (Bashua, 2017). Moreover, looking in to the future with this respect, looking it the budget proposal of Trump's administration to cut the funding on peace operation of South Sudan shows just how much the standby forces are practically out of the control of the AU (Momodu, 2017).

This lack of autonomy in making an independent decision making of the Commission, thus makes it unable to serve the best interest of the continent all the time. Rather will be in a way a tool to implementing the desires of the outside world who could buy a stake in the region with their money that was forwarded in a way of support or donation. That in mind it makes it quite difficult to have a circumstance where African centered, even African led solutions can truly be implemented.

The operations of the APSA specifically is manifested through the peace interventions in the AU led peace missions. And though there are good improvements that can be seen from the assessment study of the operationalization of APSA as the same time the APSA impact report, there are still gaps that needs to be worked on. In the former, there are issues mentioned in different dimensions of the APSA operation that shows the areas that need to be done better to have an improved outcome.

Among these lies the matter of collaboration between APSA or the AU with that of the RECs. As it was brought up to attention in the interviews with the respondents, there is a problem with the intended implementation of the APSA alongside RECs/RM. Which was to be achieved with the principle of subsidiarity that can be seen in the Constitutive Act of the AU, the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council and further explained in chapter eight of the handbook of APSA. This collaboration is somehow hindered as a result of the attitude on the side of the RECs that the AU should only take up on the task of collaborating the actions that are taken by the RECs (The relationship between the AU and the RECs/RM in the area of peace and security , 2014). Taking the example of ECOWAS which a REC that is well-organized and precedent to APSA has an already established and implemented system to secure a dependable and sustainable funding from within the region (Momodu, 2017). Though the members of ECOWAS, which are the states in west Africa are also the members to the African Union and thus expected to contribute to the AU budget, from what has been seen up until now the states are

more forthcoming to funding their own REC than the AU since the former is close to home better equipped to serve their interest. This empowered organ can then lead to questioning the subsidiary principle seeing how the AU is short handed in collecting the budget that was supposed to be provided by the member states. And this lack of a dependable, sustainable and predictable funding has led the AU to keep on being highly dependent on the funding it gets from its external partners and that of course makes it difficult for the AU to have that leadership role it was intended to have. Yet, progress can be seen with the communications between the two as a result of the liaison offices at the AU notwithstanding the fact that it needs more than having a better communication in place to work on their relationships and see an actual change on the ground (The relationship between the AU and the RECs/RM in the area of peace and security , 2014).

It can be inferred from the impact report of APSA that was published in 2016 that there are various conflict clusters in the continent that APSA has addressed. Not only that but to what level it was successful and by which mechanism. In the data presented in the report, out of the 88 conflict clusters that have been going on in 2015 APSA has managed to address 29 of them (APSA Impact Report, The state and impact of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2015, 2016). In the 29 interventions that were made by APSA and the RECs through diplomacy, PSO or mediation, that same year there is a high level of success both on the side of AU and the RECs (APSA Impact Report, The state and impact of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2015, 2016). These measures taken shows a great deal of improvement from the past years showing the prioritization of the AU and the RECs/RM to intervene in the matters of continental security and stability. Though clearly a better priority is given to these AU-led or REC-led peace missions and so improved outcomes are being seen, the same kind of change has not been seen from the point of local funding to either of the two organs with the exception of ECOWAS. When the implementations of all the peace operations by the standby forces are highly reliant on the fund that is allocated to it, the success of the mission is inevitably reliant on a predictable funding that has made it possible. The ownership of such success in that case truly be the continent's and the states that have contributed to its operationalization.

#### **4.3.1.1 Decision making at the AU**

In a peace intervention, decision making exists in every step which is made by the AU. It starts with the decision to intervene or not in a given conflict, then what is the right time to do so and by which mechanism it should be addressed. All this is up to the AU to decide, or at least it should be if it can make an independent decision on the matters of the continent's peace and security. And each and every decision is entirely conditional on the financing of such actions and since AU in most cases is not able to secure the budget for its programs and operations, it will greatly affect the autonomous power AU should have over Africa.

When discussing further the issue of capacity and the reservation to pay their share of the contribution from the member states as a result of donor's willingness to provide the financial support, it raises the various commitments entered by the EU to build capacity of the region and make it self-governing in the near future. But the capacity building should have been seen by the improvement of the states in the process of financing the AU. Not having that tangible progress but still receiving donations from the partners shows the willingness on our partners side to be more involved in the matter of African security. Which can be seen either as a form of a real concern for global security or from a security threat that extends abroad if not dealt with in Africa. Like in the case of terrorism and radicalism. The other side can be seen from the intention of the donors to be able to pull strings in the decisions that will be made by the AU and have an influential voice in the African peace interventions. With regards to this, the common example that keeps on being raised is the case of Libya in 2011. It was to be recalled that the AU has already came up with a plan to deal with the Gaddafi administration in a way that it saw fits best. But since that plan could not be practical without money, money that the AU could not come up with and had to seek from external partners to act, a timely response at the same time the African solution for that incident could not be provided. Consequentially, it has been witnessed the amount of loss the country even the continent had to endure as a result of that western intervention that could have been avoided. what accounted for lacking that money at that time and even now is not because the amount is too high that the AU as an organization that claims to be on an equal ground as EU could not afford. Rather it was an outcome of the still existing mentality of the member states that they are members to the AU that they will utilize the integration only to the extent that it serves best to their national interest. Even the states in the

north part of Africa, who has a relatively better financial stand compared with most of the African countries were not offering to cover the cost for Libya because it was not their nation that was under attack.

#### **4.3.2 AfSol (African Centered Solution for African Security Problems)**

After discussing the financial dependency and the implications it has on ownership, the next issue raised is related with the African Centered Solutions and how possible it is in light of the issues that were just raised with regards to funding. If the AU remains to be an entity without a financial independence by securing the funding for its interventions within the continent and be able to make uninterrupted decision making where others do not feel like they have a stake and a say on the matter, the idea of AfSol will remain to be a lofty idea and an empty goal (Bashua, 2017).

There is also a view that the external donors will not be a problem as long as the funding that is contributed in such a way is too much that it comes with strings attached. So, the line lies where an independent decision making is jeopardized resulting from that external funding (Momodu, 2017).

Thus, as its discussed in the previous chapter, in order for AfSol to be attainable the member states need to stay focused on the common shared values that were the base for the AU. And also secure the funding for its peace operations through alternative funding mechanisms and by making reforms on its structure, procedure and rules (Ndiaye, 2017). The researcher also agrees that if the African states do not start to put their money where their mouth is it will make it rather difficult to come up with a solution that is African to the continents problems. And so, the reforms that were suggested by the respondents can be presented as a solution. But the defining element is the level of commitment the states show to work on the reform plans and its implementation. Here also, the proposition made by one of the interviewees saying that the external funds are not a problem as long as it is not too much that it will influence the AU's decision is in the researcher's opinion under the assumption that there is a clear line to identify what is meant by "Too much". It raises the question where is the exact amount that makes it qualify as problematic or not. Instead of that, the African states should focus on working on a mechanism that can make them capable of financing the AU fully and be dedicated in its implementation.

#### **4.4 Alternative funding mechanisms**

Sine the fact remains that the level of ownership and leadership of the AU depends on the amount of financing that is secured locally (General Assembly decision in the report of the Peace and Security Council on its activities and the state Peace and Security in Africa, 2015), there is desperate need for a resource mobilization and alternative mechanisms by which funding can be collected from the member countries. It is to be recalled that such mechanism was presented on the 21<sup>st</sup> ordinary session of the AU assembly and the fifteenth anniversary of the OAU by the former Nigerian president, his excellency Olusegun Obasanjo, his excellency Edem Kodjo, former secretary general of the OAU and her excellency Luisa Diogo, former prime minister and minister of finance of Mozambique. In such suggestion, it was proposed that tourism and traveling can be the sources of local income generating that can be used to finance the AU.

The levy was to be collected \$2.00 from hospitality per stay in a hotel and \$10.00 from flight tickets for flights originating from Africa or with destinations in Africa (Modalities of implementation of the two options retained by the assembly of head of states and government of the African union on alternative sources of financing the African Union, 2013). However, this mechanism was never accepted and implemented in the continent. This was resulting from the disagreement from the member states saying that the few countries that are highly engaged in the tourism industry meaning they will be the ones taking the large part of the contribution.

As a result, by taking in to consideration the past experience of the RECs there has been a recent agreement reached by the member states to finance the African Union. Now it is possible to see what is agreed up on in the declaration and the challenges that might face in implementation by looking in to how the other suggestions were reacted to by the member counties.

##### **4.4.1 Kigali's Declaration (0.2 levy)**

The Kigali Declaration was made on July 18, 2016 in Rwanda, Kigali at the twenty seventh ordinary session of the assembly of the African Union. It was agreed that the levy collected from the import of all eligible goods to the continent to finance the AU's Operational Program and Peace Support Operations. Each member state's assessed contribution that is declared by the national administration is to be transferred to the African Union through an account opened for such purpose in the Central Banks of all member states. The proposition was made by learning

from the experience of ECOWAS, the 0.5 community levy (Decision on the outcome of the retreat of the Assembly of the African Union, 2016). That has helped the intervention in the West Africa self-sponsored or at least not fully dependent on the external funding (Momodu, 2017).

Thus, this locally generated financing is aimed to grant an opportunity to Africa a chance to secure a predictable, sustainable, equitable and accountable funding from within Africa that can result in ownership of the member states. (Decision on the outcome of the retreat of the Assembly of the African Union, 2016) This adaptation of the recommendations included in the report made by Dr. Donald Kaberuka, who was at that time the High Representative on the Peace Fund to have three (3) thematic windows, namely Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy; Institutional Capacity; and Peace Support Operations, as well as clear governance structures and independent fund management body. (Decision on the outcome of the retreat of the Assembly of the African Union, 2016)

There are different reactions to this new decision by the African Union even though there is not a party that can deny that it is a turning point for the continent given that it is fully implemented.

It might seem quite an unreachable and too difficult of a goal for Africa when seeing the true reason for the financial dependency of the AU for more than a decade. One way of justifying this is that the question of financial capacity has not been the major reason for member states to not contribute (Wade, 2017). If the cause for the states not being forth coming to fund the AU was the lack of desire to empower that supranational entity by learning the lesson from the EU, then nothing has changed now and the results will be the same as the past (Wade, 2017). The other comment the researcher have gotten with regards to the practicality of the new funding mechanism is that it is too ambitious (Louw-Vandran, 2017). The presumption that it will be fully operational by the year 2018 is too much to strive for. That is because the mechanisms in place be it in legislations or institutional at least at this time need a reform in order for such mechanisms to work. Yet, as stated in the assembly decision its planned to generate \$ USD 325 mil in 2017 and a \$ USD 400 mil in 2020 (Decision on the outcome of the retreat of the Assembly of the African Union, 2016) which if attained can be a major source of funding for the continents peace program and operations. Which we can see the details in the table below.

<i>Header</i>	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
<i>Operational Budget</i>	150	163	165	174	182
<i>Program Budget</i>	297	312	327	344	361
<i>Subtotal</i>	447	475	492	518	543
<i>Peace and Security Budget (P&amp;S)</i>					
<i>Window the researcher (PEACE Support)</i>	1,222	1,283	1,347	1,414	1,485
<i>Window II (Mediation &amp; Preventive Diplomacy)</i>	35	37	39	41	43
<i>Window III (Capacity building)</i>	3	15	15	15	15
<i>Reserve (Art 21.4 of the Protocol)</i>	10	15	20	25	30
<i>P&amp;S Subtotal</i>	1,270	1,349	1,420	1,495	1,572
<b>Total</b>	<b>1717</b>	<b>1824</b>	<b>1912</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2115</b>

Table 2-Projected Budget of the African Union taken from Background Paper ON Implementing the Kigali Decision on financing the Union, 2016

#### **4.4.1.1 Potential challenges in the implementation of the 0.2 levy**

To make sure that there is a high chance of succeeding with the alternative funding mechanism that was recently decided on, its best to try and foresee the possible challenges that might occur and focus on those to get a better outcome. The first and main challenge is the faithful implementation of the 0.2 levy. It has not been a year since the decision has passed and yet there are countries that are showing complains, mostly island states, seeing how they will be subjected to a higher amount in the contribution (Momodu, 2017). Which was the same issue raised with the previously proposed alternative mechanism. But it's only when the relatively stronger states decide to take the first step and take the bigger responsibility that this sort of mechanism can be beneficial or even be practical (Louw-Vandran, 2017).

It is clear that it's only when the member states fully commit to the execution of the levy on the imported goods in every state that the anticipated results can be attained. Hence the second implementational challenge which is the level of commitment. Moreover, the governments of all the states in Africa need to have the political will to put in to practice the collection of such funds through their authorities. Like in the case of the experience of ECOWAS's approval of its funding, though it was approved in 2006 it became operational in 2015 (Bashua, 2017).

Also for the states to be capable of fully implementing the levy the assembly's decision need to be domesticized and put to ground. As it is a problem with many declarations and reports made

by the AU assembly in the past, if it's not provided instruments to submerge it in to the national system of the member states there will be no change in the source of funding, the leadership or ownership of the peace operations in Africa (Ndiaye, 2017).

What needs to be reminded here is that just because we now have this mechanism in place, it does not mean that we no longer need our developmental partners. And though the 0.2 levy is expected to be a means for African independence with regard to its peace programs and operations that all depends up on how much the member states diligently follow through with the plan for a long time (Ndiaye, 2017). One way of making the states more forthcoming in paying their part of the contribution the lesson we can take from the UN; "Naming and Shaming". That is by publicly announcing the ones that did not do their parts. Devoting, which refers to excluding those who did not make the contribution from voting, is also another method that can be used (Bashua, 2017).

In addition to that it is the national authorities that declare the amount that is collected from the import transactions. This leaves no room for the AU to disproof or to confirm the declared amount which can be problem. Not only that but this authority provided for the local governments can also be questionable as a result of corruption (Bashua, 2017). Hence, in order for the continent to have an effective alternative source of funding, these are the few issues that we need to keep an eye on and make an attempt to address them promptly.

#### **4.5 Additional alternative mechanisms**

It has been already discussed in the previous sections how the 0.2 levy on import goods can be a significant stepping stone for Africa's independent and brighter future. At the same time, the possible obstacles that might stand on the way of its implementation are also presented. Thus, it's being on the safe side for Africa to think of additional ways that we might be able to generate funding for our peace operations and also the initiatives. The first suggestion with regard is concerning the 15 selected countries that compose the peace and security council (The protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union). This privilege that is given only to the chosen member states can be accompanied with some amount of fee from the states that can be used for the peace and security missions (Momodu, 2017).

Moreover, we have seen from the case of Ebola that working with the private sector to generate income for a certain cause is highly advantageous (Momodu, 2017). So why not for peace and security? This way not only make the AU financially independent but also makes it more responsible and give the African people more power to hold the organization accountable (Momodu, 2017). Hence, if more effort is made on the public-private partnership by working with the private investors, the diaspora community and business sectors in the continent, there is a high chance of capacitating ourselves by our own money (Ndiaye, 2017). Yet this might raise the issue of another kind of dependency on the private sectors and the personal interests that might come with it. Sharing the view of my respondent, I personally believe that when the continent is faced with security urgency, it is a better alternative to turn to the private sectors in Africa. Notwithstanding the fact that this choice should not be considered to the amount that the AU's decisions fall under the hands of wealthy Africans. This still does not mean that we should not fully commit to the one that has already been agreed on. Since too much time is already spent on the approval of the 0.2 levy, it is best not to spend even more time looking towards an additional mechanism rather put all our energy in bringing the agreement on the ground and make the goal a reality (Bashua, 2017).

#### **4.6 Africa's future in leading its Peace and Security**

Researching on the shortcomings of the African Peace and Security and trying to understand the main causes for such inadequacies can help to better foresee the upcoming years. And for Africa and its coming years ahead, the continent can have turning point in history provided its willing to work on what has been lacking in the past. The researcher believes this is especially the best time to commit ourselves to financing the AU ourselves and own the peace interventions locally since there is a well thought of financing plan declared by the Assembly waiting to be fully implemented. Though there are challenges that might occur when domesticizing the decision and putting it on the ground, if the member states are committed to the cause the AU itself it will bring about a radical change in Africa's capacity to lead and own its security. In addition to the long overdue unaddressed financial challenge of the continent, this makes now a right time to make changes in securing regional funding because the partners that have been voluntary to provide support can at any time change their decisions as a result of the change in administration.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Conclusion**

The emergence of the AU after the transformation from its predecessor, the OAU has resulted in a different approach to regional security. The OAU's national sovereignty sensitivity has now been replaced with a more engaging principle. This has resulted from the various post-cold war conflicts which were mostly intrastate. More precisely the Rwandan Genocide in 1984 and catastrophic impact on the continent can be marked as a turning point for this change of mechanism in dealing with regional peace and security. This, the "Non-interference" principle inserted in the OAU charter got replaced with the "Non-indifference" principle which is included in the Constitutive Act of the AU. Yet, what remained the same in both organizations is the "Pan-Africanism" that has been the strong drive for both their formations and the regional integration. Which is the cause for the more revolved principle of "Non-indifference".

The Constitutive Act thus provides the AU the power to intervene in matters on peace and security, provided the circumstances are serious. For the AU to have the institutional, financial and personal resources, the establishment of APSA with its five integral organs plays an excessive role. It is through this framework and by collaborating with the RECs/RM that Africa can be able to realize the African solutions to African problems where by the continent can have the ownership of its peace and security. Among the resources that are backbones to this operations and programs, finance have an immense part to play. It is only when AU can secure the amount required that it can operationalize the APSA framework. For that reason, the Peace Fund is established as one part of APSA. This is fund that is the collection of member state's voluntary contribution and external funding from AU's international partners have been highly dominated by the funds that come externally compared to the actual amount provided from within the region. Showing how the AU member states function under the Intergovernmentalism way of integration.

This financial dependency has implications on the ownership of African security. Though the finance element is not the only factor to take in to consideration in evaluating the level of ownership, it still plays a significant role. When support is determinant of the logistics and the

success an operation, it means It has taken part of the ownership as well. There have been various reasons for what accounts for the gap in the member states contribution. Among these, lack of faith in the AU as an institution, the national interest of not wanting the AU-led interventions which is related with state sovereignty and autonomy are included. The commitment, political will and the willingness of the external partners can be considered as the cause for deficiency of dependable regional funding.

Though Africa have been looking for an alternative mechanism to finance its organs and operations, it is only recently that the member states could come to an agreement which is the Kigali declaration on the 0.2 levy. That is to be applied on all the member states in the eligible goods imported to the continent. If fully implemented, this mechanism will provide the AU a capacity to fund all its operational budget, 75% of the program budget and 25% of its PSO. That can lead to the AU having a predictable, sustainable and dependable funding to fully implement the APSA framework.

But this mechanism is not without its challenges. The implementation requires a full dedication and commitment from both the AU and the member states. Though the budget plan indicated in the research and also the detailed contribution of each member countries under the annex part is for the coming three years that is until the year 2020, the AU need to follow through in the years after to attain sustainable change in owning its peace and security interventions.

Addressing the main issue of this research, that is the ownership of the APSA operations, the researcher believes as big as a role finance has on ownership, it still is not the only factor. There have been many cases where the neighboring countries were the once to send immediate military support to a conflict in the continent. We can mention the case of AMISOM and quick response of the IGAD member countries, and the case of Gambia that was efficiently supported by the ECOWAS. This is an effort and a sacrifice made by Africans for their African brothers and sisters in crises. Thus, Africa does own its security but not as much as it should have taking in to account the sensitivity of the issue of security and the capacity of most the member states. Where the determining factors of an operation of APSA is not entirely decided by the AU taking only in to account the interest of the African people, it is difficult to say that is a regional ownership of such operations. Given that the 0.2 levy is agreed up on and set out to be implemented starting

from this year (2017), there is a high chance for the continent to leave this financial dependency in the past and move forward to a more independent future.

### **Recommendation**

It has been discussed in detail where the problem lies when it comes to securing funding from the member states of the AU. Hence, the researcher forwards the following recommendation to have a better performance and success in the near future;

- To make an Institutional and Structural reforms in the member states so that the 0.2 levy is implemented. This is the way to assure its full implantation and also a manifestation of the commitment by the member states. This new mechanism can only seem too ambitious if we plan to remain with the system in place.
- Since the 0.2 levy is left for the admiration offices of the member states to declare their national contribution, it can be subject to corruption and manipulation. Therefore, placing an oversight body over these national organs that can closely oversee the activities can help reach the planned amount in the budget.
- The other aspect that can benefit the financing of AU is to have a better working relationship with the private sectors and the NGOs. By providing a mechanism where they can benefit from such arrangements as well.
- The last recommendation is, since the Kigali Declaration is still one of the agreements made by African states left for their voluntary implementation, it can provide a better outcome if the document is made to have a mandatory effect on the agreed member states.

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## Annex

### Annex-1 Interview questions for the experts at the AU, ISS and IPSS

1. Do you think APSA is financial dependent on external donors?
2. What do you think accounts for the financial dependency of APSA?
3. Does the dependency on external funding any implications on the ownership of Africa security?
4. Would you like to share any opinions on these implications?
5. From the perspective of an African-driven agenda for "African problems" in peace and security, could one possibly envisage this reality happening with donor dependency?
6. Looking at the contribution to the African Union Peace Fund, there hasn't been significant progress in light of regional contributions (REC's, RMs). What could account for this gap?
7. What measures do you think the African Union, as a continental body can take to rectify this situation above in (5)?
8. What can member states do to improve the issue in (5) above?
9. What are your views on the implementation of "Financing the union' or the "0.2 Levy" as an alternative funding mechanism? What challenges do you think it will face?  
( <https://www.AU.int/financingAU> )
9. Are there any other alternative mechanisms you could think of in light of funding APSA that might make a difference and help the AU become independent financially?
10. At its core, what accounts for the lack of funding by AU member states in funding their own projects?
11. Are there any other relevant issues you might want to shed light upon in respect of funding AU projects and how the AU can maintain its financial independence?

## **Annex-2 Interview questions for the experts at the EU Deliration**

1. What do you think APSA is financially dependent on external funding? if so what do you think accounts for that dependency?
2. Does the dependency on external funding any implications on the ownership of Africa security?
3. Would you like to share any opinions on these implications?
4. From the perspective of an African-driven agenda for "African problems" in peace and security, could one possibly envisage this reality happening with donor dependency?
5. EU, as a major contributor has been funding APSA thus the peace operations of the region. Do you think that has any impact on the relationship of the two continents in relation with the degree of Independence in decision making?
6. Looking at the contribution to the African Union Peace Fund, there hasn't been significant progress in light of regional contributions (REC's, RMs). What could account for this gap?
7. What measures do you think the African Union, as a continental body could take to rectify this situation above in (5)?
8. What could member states do to improve the issue in (5) above?
9. What are your views on the implementation of "Financing the union' or the "0.2 Levy" as an alternative funding mechanism? What challenges do you think it will face?( <https://www.AU.int/financingAU> )
10. Are there any other alternative mechanisms you could think of in light of funding APSA that might make a difference and help the AU become independent financially?
11. At its core, what accounts for the lack of funding by AU member states in funding their own

projects?

12. Are there any other relevant issues you might want to shed light upon in respect of funding AU projects and how the AU can maintain its financial independence?

### **Annex-3 Potential Revenue for Member States from a Union levy of 0.2 per cent**

	GDP 2014- Millions of USD (World Bank)	Percentage of Country GDP to the total	Imports of goods (USD at current prices in millions) - 2014 UNCTAD	Percentage of country's import to the total	Estimated revenue from a 0.2% levy on the import bill (USD Millions)			
					2017	2018	2019	2020
Algeria	213,518.4	9.0	58,580.00	9.9	128.02	131.86	135.82	139.90
Angola	146,675.7	6.2	28,586.80	4.2	62.48	64.35	66.28	68.27
Benin	9,575.3	0.4	3,823.31	0.6	8.36	8.61	8.86	9.13
Botswana	15,813.4	0.7	8,070.64	1.2	17.64	18.17	18.71	19.27
Burkina Faso	12,755.5	0.5	3,136.12	0.5	6.85	7.06	7.27	7.49
Burundi	2,868.8	0.1	769.25	0.1	1.68	1.73	1.78	1.84
Cabo Verde	1,854.8	0.1	771.60	1.9	1.69	1.74	1.79	1.84
Cameroon	32,050.8	1.4	7,048.82	0.1	15.40	15.87	16.34	16.83
Central African Republic	1,838.0	0.1	381.46	1.3	0.83	0.86	0.88	0.91
Chad	12,790.7	0.5	3,100.00	0.1	6.77	6.98	7.19	7.40
Comoros	647.7	0.03	278.26	0.4	0.61	0.63	0.65	0.66
Congo	14,077.1	0.6	7,474.90	0.0	16.34	16.83	17.33	17.85
Côte d'Ivoire	34,254.0	1.4	11,177.66	1.5	24.43	25.16	25.92	26.69
Democratic Republic of the Congo	35,909.4	1.5	6,600.00	1.2	14.42	14.86	15.30	15.76
Djibouti	1,589.0	0.1	803.00	0.2	1.75	1.81	1.86	1.92
Egypt	282,242.2	11.9	71,281.83	12.5	155.78	160.46	165.27	170.23
Equatorial Guinea	16,731.1	0.7	5,600.00	0.8	12.24	12.61	12.98	13.37
Eritrea	3,857.8	0.2	1,131.45	0.2	2.47	2.55	2.62	2.70
Ethiopia	53,638.5	2.3	18,990.62	3.7	41.50	42.75	44.03	45.35
Gabon	17,412.5	0.7	3,857.47	0.6	8.43	8.68	8.94	9.21
Gambia	851.0	0.0	387.20	0.1	0.85	0.87	0.90	0.92
Ghana	37,176.6	1.6	14,600.20	2.5	31.91	32.87	33.85	34.87
Guinea	6,578.8	0.3	2,241.61	0.4	4.90	5.05	5.20	5.35
Guinea-BissAU	1,209.5	0.1	214.19	0.0	0.47	0.48	0.50	0.51
Kenya	60,936.4	2.6	18,396.30	3.1	40.20	41.41	42.65	43.93
Lesotho	2,080.5	0.1	2,144.01	0.4	4.69	4.83	4.97	5.12
Liberia	2,122.0	0.1	2,100.30	0.4	4.59	4.73	4.87	5.02
Libya	41,319.3	1.7	19,000.00	2.5	41.52	42.77	44.05	45.37
Madagascar	10,673.5	0.5	3,227.42	0.6	7.05	7.26	7.48	7.71
Malawi	5,720.1	0.2	2,774.37	0.6	6.06	6.25	6.43	6.63
Mali	11,978.7	0.5	4,009.18	0.6	8.76	9.02	9.30	9.57
MAuritania	5,092.2	0.2	2,646.30	0.4	5.78	5.96	6.14	6.32
MAuritius	12,616.4	0.5	5,610.27	0.9	12.26	12.63	13.01	13.40
Mozambique	17,080.9	0.7	8,746.82	1.6	19.12	19.69	20.28	20.89
Namibia	13,429.3	0.6	7,883.18	1.4	17.23	17.75	18.28	18.83
Niger	8,168.7	0.3	2,190.00	0.4	4.79	4.93	5.08	5.23
Nigeria	568,498.8	24.0	60,000.00	9.2	131.13	135.06	139.11	143.29
Rwanda	7,903.4	0.3	2,562.66	0.5	5.60	5.77	5.94	6.12
Saharawi Arab D.R.	-	0.0	45.72	0.0	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11
Sao Tome and Principe	337.4	0.0	169.72	0.0	0.37	0.38	0.39	0.41
Senegal	15,658.1	0.7	6,556.66	1.1	14.33	14.76	15.20	15.66
Seychelles	1,510.7	0.1	1,143.30	0.2	2.50	2.57	2.65	2.73
Sierra Leone	4,893.3	0.2	1,568.19	0.3	3.43	3.53	3.64	3.75
Somalia	1,374.6	0.1	1,250.00	0.2	2.73	2.81	2.90	2.99
South Africa	349,818.5	14.8	121,965.07	20.1	266.55	274.55	282.78	291.27
South Sudan	11,006.8	0.5	-	0.0	-	-	-	-
Sudan	81,893.9	3.5	9,211.30	1.6	20.13	20.73	21.36	22.00
Swaziland	4,482.3	0.2	1,690.00	0.3	3.69	3.80	3.92	4.04
Togo	4,575.8	0.2	2,529.45	0.4	5.53	5.69	5.86	6.04
Tunisia	47,423.4	2.0	24,827.64	3.9	54.26	55.89	57.56	59.29
Uganda	27,464.5	1.2	6,073.53	1.1	13.27	13.67	14.08	14.50
United Republic of Tanzania	49,319.5	2.1	11,997.60	2.0	26.22	27.01	27.82	28.65

<b>Zambia</b>	26,963.4	1.1	9,539.02	1.6	20.85	21.47	22.12	22.78
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	14,719.4	0.6	4,200.00	0.8	9.18	9.45	9.74	10.03
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,364,978.38</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>602,964.39</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,317.75</b>	<b>1,357.28</b>	<b>1,398.00</b>	<b>1,439.94</b>

*\* Taken from Background Paper ON Implementing the Kigali Decision on financing the Union, 2016*

**DECLARATION**

I, the undersigned, declare that this research is my original work that has not been submitted for any degree or examination in any other university and that all sources of materials used for the research have been duly acknowledged.

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Confirmed by:

Name \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_