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**THE IMPACTS OF UAE'S INCREASING INVOLVEMENT IN THE HORN OF
AFRICA: THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA SINCE 2018.**

**BY
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Declaration

I declare that this thesis: The impacts of UAEs increasing involvement in the Horn of Africa: The case of Ethiopia since 2018 is my original work and never been presented in any institutions. I also declare that any information used in the study has been properly acknowledged and referenced.

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List of Acronyms

AI	Artificial intelligence
AU	African Union
BRI	Belt and road imitative
CFA	Cooperation framework agreement
DIIS	Danish institute of international studies
DP world	Dubai Ports International
EBC	Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation
EIC	Ethiopian investment commission
ENA	Ethiopian news agency
EPRDF	Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
ETB	Ethiopian Birr
GEIDCO	Gulf Electricity Interconnection Authority and the International Energy Linking Organization
GERD	Ethiopian renaissance dam
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HoA	Horn of Africa
ICG	International Crises Croup
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IPDC	Industrial Parks Development Corporation
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
IPSS	Institute for peace and security studies
ISS	International Security Studies
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
LNA	Libyan National Army
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MoFA	Ministry of foreign affairs
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NASA's	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NBI	Nile Basin Initiative
RSCT	Regional Security Complex Theory
TEUs	Twenty foot Equivalent Units
TPLF	Tigrarian Liberation Front
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAVs	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
UN	United Nation
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIP	United States institute of peace

Abstract

The UAE's post-Arab spring involvement in the Horn of Africa changed the region's political dynamics. The Gulf countries, especially the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, were concerned about the consequences of the Arab world's revolutions. The Muslim Brotherhood, a major wing in Egypt, was established in 1928 and has ideological differences with the governments of the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The movement advocated for young leadership and the reformation of Islam. However, the two countries monarchical types of government are staining against such a reformist movement. Following the civil war in Yemen, UAE and Saudi Arabia may have shifted attention to countering Iranian expansion and Qatar crisis. Both started competing with each other in the Horn of Africa to control and dominate the ports in the region: United Arab Emirates in Djibouti and Eritrea and later in Somaliland to counter Iranian expansion towards the Horn of Africa region. The UAE's involvement had a significant impact on the Ethiopian economy, as well as the region's peace and security. The involvement somehow benefited Ethiopia, especially in the rapprochement with Eritrea. Following the normalization of relations, trade between Ethiopia and the UAE increased, and investment, cooperation, and aid helped Ethiopia to overcome economic problems. The involvement benefits Ethiopia on the GERD issues because of its neutral stance and relationship with Ethiopia. However, the UAE's involvement also increased regional tensions, especially between Sudan and Ethiopia and Ethiopia with Egypt, which provoked conflict in the region. Because of their fleeting interest in the Horn of Africa, they are unable to provide dependable friendship to any nation in the region. Finally, though they brought the use of alternative ports to Ethiopia, they created conflicting types of relations between Addis Ababa and Somalia following the Berbera port development argument in 2016. Generally, the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa brought more challenges for Ethiopia because of its interest in the region.

Key words: GCC, GERD, Ethiopia, UAE, Horn of Africa

CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter will provide a clear and tangible introduction to the entire study. The focus of the study is about the impacts of UAEs increasing involvement in the Horn of Africa: The case of Ethiopia since 2018. The increasing of involvements from the UAE will have opportunities in some sectors of economic, political and social developments for Ethiopia, and if there is increasing rivalries between the great powers in the regions particularly in the Horn; it will have challenges on the socio economic and security issues. This chapter discusses the background of the research, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, scope, significance, limitations, and organizational structure of the thesis.

1.1. Background of the Study

The Horn of Africa, hereafter (HoA), also known as the Somali Peninsula, is a large peninsula of East Africa. It lies along the southern boundary of the Red Sea and extends hundreds of kilometers into the Gulf of Aden, and Ocean (Gashaw & Zelalem, 2016). The Horn of Africa traditionally includes four countries in the eastern tip of the continent: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Some know this region as the "Great Horn" which also includes Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, and Uganda (Gaas, 2019), which hosts 270 million people, hundreds of ethnic groups, and has different levels of human development, colonial history, and new political effects. Kidane(2011) on the other hand argued that the region presently consists of seven countries, including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda, which are members of the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), plus South Sudan, which became independent on 9 July 2011 and is the latest addition to the region . The region is bisected by the Gulf of Aden, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Red Sea, making it one of the most important seaports in the world. Bab al-Mandab is especially important for Asian commercial behemoths like China, Japan, and from the Gulf countries, which rely on it to send a significant amount of goods to Europe (Ychysthen, 2020). The Horn of Africa is one of the world's most politically volatile regions, with geopolitical factors and regional goals colliding to produce such explosive outcomes (Gaas, 2019).

It is well known, as the most volatile, dynamic, fragile, and turbulent region certainly it is the most militarized part of Africa. Conflict, instability, ethnic violence, terrorism, interstate and intrastate war, poverty, and other problems are common to the people of the region.

Distractive inter-state wars' such as the Ethio- Somalia War of 1977-78 and Ethiopia-Eritrea war in 1998-2000 and intra- state wars such as Ethiopia's 30 years' war culminated by the secession of Eritrea, Sudan civil war brings the new state South Sudan (Lyons, 2009) changed the map of Horn of African geo-political situation. Calabrese (2020) argued that, despite this, several local and regional issues remain unsolved in the region. Meanwhile, in the broader context of escalating US-China strategic rivalry, the Horn of Africa has quickly become a battleground in which Middle Eastern states compete with one another to advance their commercial and geopolitical objectives. According to Larssi and Sarti (2014) in the past decades, the horn of Africa in general and Djibouti, in particular, has become one of the most militarized zones than any of other nations in the world:- superpowers, emerging powers, and regional power rivals have stationed their military forces in the horn of Africa. Feierstein (2020) stated that the relationship between the Middle East and the horn of African are explained as from geography to cultural and political history as follows:-

The relationship between the Middle East and the Horn of Africa is centuries old and complex. The Red Sea, which is only 355 kilometers wide, has long linked rather than separated the Arabian Peninsula and Northeast Africa. While the world's attention is primarily focused on the region's "great power competition," primarily between the United States and China, the Horn of Africa has also become a central battleground for influence among competing regional players, primarily Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Egypt. As they pursue their interests in the region, from Ethiopia and Sudan to Somalia and Djibouti, these competing states are the main drivers of tension and instability in the Horn of Africa (Feierstein, 2020:1).

The Horn region is one of strategic for three basic reasons. First, the region lies in the coastlines of the Gulf of Aden, Bab el- Mandeb, and the Red Sea, a route that is one of the most important passages for world naval trade. Second, the region is also taken into account as the most important entry point to the African market by the leading countries of Asia and the Middle East. Third, the sizable population of the region, which comprises over 200 million people, contributes to a potential power base in securing their interests in global politics (Dike &Osasona, 2021).

Since 2001, the Horn of Africa region has seen a significant increase in the number and magnitude of foreign military deployments, particularly in the last decade. Foreign military sites in the Horn of Africa include land-based facilities (e.g., bases, ports, airstrips, training camps, semi-permanent facilities, and logistics hubs) as well as naval forces on permanent or regular deployment (Melvin, 20219). Among these great power states, the UAE has sought to expand regional port infrastructure in order to capitalize on the economic opportunities presented by China's Belt and Road Initiative. Along with its economic interests, the UAE is developing a long-term strategy to limit Iran's influence in the Arabian Peninsula and Africa. The UAE is working to achieve these two objectives by creating its own String of Pearls network of mixed military and commercial facilities (*ibid*). According to USAID (2020), Turkey and the Middle East nations have increased their engagement in the Horn of Africa significantly in recent years for a host of economic, political, and geostrategic reasons. The Arab Gulf states are pursuing ambitious plans to diversify their economies and see the Horn of Africa as an ideal region for future investment. The GCC states have invested in more than 430 projects in the Horn of Africa since 2000. Their total aid to and direct investment in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Djibouti has amounted to just under \$18 billion since 2003. According to Meester (2021), the United Arab Emirates is the second-largest investor in Eastern Africans next to Saudi Arabia, which are 133 projects in 2017. Sudan and Ethiopia are the leading countries receiving investments from the UAE. The most visible aspect of the UAE's presence is the proliferation of military base and commercial ports development in coastal areas along the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa (Melvin, 2019). However, this recent increase of the UAEs involvement in the Horn for military bases, commercial ports, and investments in the region will have a huge negative and positive impact on the region's economic and political developments, especially for Ethiopia.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

The Horn of Africa is well regarded as the most volatile, dynamic, fragile, and turbulent region in Africa and it is certainly the most militarized. Conflict, insecurity, ethnic violence, terrorism, interstate and intrastate conflict, poverty, and other issues plague the people of the region.

This unstable and dynamic region of the world is now at the focus of a battle between big powers and regional rising states to dominate politically and economically by establishing their highest presence in the region.

Due to the region's complicated rivalries, only Djibouti has more foreign military bases, primarily from the United States, France, Italy, Japan, China, and Saudi Arabia, while Eritrea has the UAE and Russia. Furthermore, Turkey has a base in Somalia, and the United Arab Emirates has a base in self-proclaimed autonomous Somaliland. The Gulf countries' involvement in the region, particularly the UAE's, has had a significant impact on the Horn's political and economic conditions. The involvement of the Gulf nations, particularly the UAE, in the Horn of Africa is based on both soft and hard powers. They provide financial aid to Horn of Africa states in order for them to stand against the Qatar axis as soft powers. Since 2015, they have invested in agribusiness, real estate, and port infrastructure development. This involvement in investment as well as political power appears to be detrimental to Ethiopian national interests.

On the other hand, as many media outlets reported when the intra-gulf rivalries expanded to the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia appears to be encircled by these rivalries, which will have a detrimental influence on the Ethiopian import-export transactions because it is a landlocked. For example, given the UAE's long involvement, tensions in Somalia have risen during the last five and six years. Similarly, competitors from the Middle East have attempted to militarize the Horn of Africa, which appears to be affecting Ethiopian national security and internal integrity. The UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa was designed to diversify its economy and secure its food supply, according to an international crises group (2018) research titled "the UAE in the Horn of Africa." The UAE, together with Saudi Arabia, had a crucial role in aiding the peace reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, according to the group. On the other hand, the analysis showed that, because of their involvement, they filled the two countries' economic gaps by depositing USD 3 billion in their respective national banks.

Observer Research Foundation (2019), in a report titled "Gulf's involvement in the Horn of Africa: lessons from African countries," for several decades, the Horn of Africa has been at the heart of global attention due to protracted armed conflicts, large-scale displacements, and severe food crisis. Following the involvement of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the foundation concluded that things have begun to shift gradually. The Horn of Africa is currently a departure from the past. The UAE's investment and commerce have benefited many African countries from investment and aid, like Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Ardemagni (2017) stated in his paper titled "the Horn of Africa gowning its importance to the UAE" that the UAE's pivot to the Horn strategy combines customized national goals, expanding regional influence, and military pride. The UAE's entry into the area should not be viewed as a competition with other regional powers.

He found that the UAE's aims, such as counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations, are shared by many international and regional countries, and that its contribution to the busy waterway complements the efforts of other actors, excluding Iran.

In his presentation paper titled "How Turkey and the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa is Changing the Region," Karim (2017) explains how Turkey and the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa is changing the region. The UAE has more security-oriented strategic goals, which are linked to Emirati plans in Yemen because both territories overlook the Bab al-Mandab strait. The Emirates recognizes that to become a vital actor for strait security, a bulwark against Iranian influence in the region, and a check on terrorist organizations, it must grow its presence on both sides of the Bab al-Mandab. This boosts UAE's political position from a Gulf economic hub to blue waterpower and strengthens the incentives for international involvement with the Gulf State. In his paper "Saudi Arabia and the UAE Look to Africa," Lons (2018) stated that by mediating conflicts and combining their assets in the Horn of Africa, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are slowly cementing an arc of political influence across the region." He concluded his paper by saying that "while the UAE has demonstrated increasingly sophisticated diplomacy and a noticeable capacity to mediate rivalries, its foreign aid policy is still driven by a transactional logic that seeks rapid returns on investment but lacks long-term strategic vision and". Though the UAE's involvement was driven by peace and security as well as economic factors, its primary goal was to counter Iranian domination in the region.

Mustefa (2021) mentioned in his thesis titled "Ethio-UAEs Relations: A Critical Analysis of Opportunities and Challenges for Ethiopia" that while the UAE's involvement in the region will benefit Ethiopia in terms of investment, trade, and port alternatives. He concluded his thesis by stating that as long as Ethiopia is a vital country in the Horn of Africa and not an island, achieving prosperity, security, and stability will be difficult, while the opposite prevails in its neighboring states and vice versa. As a result, "the UAE's relations with Ethiopia's neighboring countries have their effects on Ethiopia's domestic political, economic, and social conditions".

The above studies and working papers about the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa and its rivalry with other powers have been done from various viewpoints, but they have failed to accurately evaluate the current political and economic conditions, especially since 2018. They hoped and expected that the involvement would offer economic and peace prospects to Ethiopia and the region, but as time passed, numerous unexpected and new occurrences occurred throughout the region. Furthermore, the researchers attempted to study the impacts of the expansion of military bases in the region, but they did not examine the impacts for Ethiopia since 2018, because politics have changed over the last four years. In addition, while the preceding studies attempted to illustrate the regional impacts of rivalry and UAE involvement, their conclusions have changed over the last four years due to the geopolitical dynamics of the Horn and UAE. As a result, the researcher investigated how the UAE's involvement has affected Ethiopia politically and economically since 2018. The study will intensely focus on the above-mentioned untouched impacts of the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa since 2018, which have not been effectively addressed by previous publications. In most cases, the problem is a time gap.

1.3. Central Argument

The study's central argument is that as the United Arab Emirates' engagement in the Horn of Africa increases through military bases and commercial ports, it will have a direct influence on Ethiopia. Hence, Ethiopia needs national strategies and policies to overcome the challenges that come from the regional rivalries, especially because of the UAE's growing influence in the Horn.

1.4. General Objective

The general objective of the study was to examine the impacts of UAEs increasing involvement in the Horn of Africa with a particular focus on Ethiopia since 2018.

1.4.1. Specific Objectives

The study had the following specific objectives:

- ✓ To analyze the political impacts of UAE's involvement on Ethiopian since 2018
- ✓ To examine the economic impacts of the United Arab Emirates' involvement on Ethiopia since 2018

1.5. Research questions

The following points were the basic research questions of the study.

1. How UAEs involvement in the Horn of Africa is affecting the Ethiopian politics?
2. How does United Arab Emirates involvement in the Horn influences the Ethiopian economy?

1.6. Significant of the Study

The study will have very important significance to anyone who wants to know about the UAEs involvement in the Horn of Africa since 2018, and its impacts on Ethiopia. As the researcher explained in the statement of the problem section, due to the increasing involvement from the UAE to the Horn, Ethiopia is in fear of encirclement from the Arab nations. Therefore, the researcher thinks that this study will help Ethiopian government to maximize the positive impacts and to minimize the negative impacts that pose a challenge on Ethiopian socio-economic as well as political developments of Ethiopia. Last but not the least; the study can serve as additional reference that can pave the way for further research on the study area.

1.7. Scope or delimitations of the Study

The scope of the study area explained in different ways; conceptually the study is delimited to the impacts UAEs Involvement in the Horn of Africa with focus on Ethiopia since 2018. Geographically the study was limited to Ethiopia and the UAE within the framework of the Horn of African countries in general. In the study, the notion of the term ‘Horn of Africa’ is used in the sense of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan. The research timeline focused analysis starting from 2018, as the time heralded UAE activities to maximizing its involvement in the Horn of Africa. The researcher investigated these new situations within this period. However, as for comparison, the study floated back and forth within the period. The methodological scope of the study was collecting primary and secondary data through key informant interviews to the limited target respondents and descriptive analysis was employed to using content/inductive technique.

1.8. Limitation of the Study

During the data collection period, the researcher faces challenges from respondents, particularly at the UAE embassy in Addis Ababa, as well as difficulties in reaching key informants at the FDRE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Investment Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Trade, and Regional Integration to obtain information due to time constraints from informants and the sensitivity of the matter to national security issues to some extent.

One of the challenges driving this was the frequent changing of political dynamics in the region. In order to solve some of the challenges, communications with the respondents through the different platforms, like online interview method was pursued and by providing supportive letters to the institutions. Financial challenges also partly affected the research the possibility of finalizing data collection as planned. Despite the above limitations, the researcher tried his best to produce original research work.

1.9. Organizational Structure of the Study

This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter One comprises the introductory part, which includes background, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the study, the scope of the study, limitations of the study, and operational definition of terms.

The Second Chapter is literature review, conceptual and theoretical frameworks for the study. The Third Chapter presented the research methodology used to carry out the study. Chapter Four is also dedicated to the detailed presentation, discussion, analysis, and findings of the research based on the results from the data that collected. The final, Fifth Chapter ends with a summary, conclusion and recommendation of the study.

CHAPTER TWO

2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

This chapter consists of three sections. The first sections are focused definition of the main terms and concepts. The second also focused on assessing and providing some theoretical framework for the study. The third section covered a literature review that assesses relevant topics about the issue.

2.1. Conceptualization of the Basic Terms and Concepts

In this part, the focal point is conceptual analysis of different main points of the study. Conceptual analysis according to Babbie (2010, Pp.129), is, “conceptualisation is the mental process whereby fuzzy and imprecise notions (concepts) are made more specific and precise”. It is an analysis of the existed concepts based on the slaying of other scholars. In this part of the research, the researcher will bring the concepts of, geopolitics. Rivalries, Interstate Rivalries, international rivalries, and military base and foreign policy.

2.1.1. Geopolitical concepts, Rivalries, and Strategic Rivalries

➤ Geopolitics

As many have pointed out, geopolitics is a difficult term to define (kristof, 1960). Geopolitics, according to standard academic definition, is the geography of international politics, namely the relationship between the physical environment (location, resources, territory, etc.) and the conduct of foreign policy (Sporout, and sporout, 1960).The term geopolitics, according to Agnew (2002), first appeared at the end of the nineteenth century. Thinking worldwide was then formally linked to acting globally by geopolitical reason, although practical geopolitical practices began much earlier, when Europeans first saw the rest of the globe. It is a struggle for control of geographical entities with international and global implications, as well as the manipulation of such geographical entities for political gain. According to Owens (1999), despite its widespread use, the idea of geopolitics is contentious. Some see it as a particularly rudimentary kind of territorial determinism, while others see it as nothing more than a pretext for foreign violence. Flint (2016, P.13) stated, “Geopolitics is a way of seeing the world”. When political leaders, countries, organizations, and corporations consider how their actions will influence other political leaders, countries, organizations, and corporations.

Geopolitics is a word that provokes ideas of war, empire, and diplomacy, and it is the practice of states controlling and competing for territory. Geopolitics is more than the competition over territory and the means of justifying such actions: geopolitics is a way of “seeing” the world. At the end of the nineteenth century, the European powers indulged in an unseemly struggle for colonial control over Africa, what is known as the “scramble for Africa.” In a contemporary sense, the geopolitics of the “War on Terrorism” has produced alliances between states and the deployment of troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in bases across Central Asia. Inseparable from these “practices” of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, is the role of representation: the fight against “evil,” the spread of “democracy,” etc.

A geopolitical competition is a modern reality that is characterized by rivalry between states fighting for leadership on a global, regional, or even local scale (Brzezinsky, 2007). The goals that countries face as they enter a phase of interaction in terms of competition have many semantic components, through which quite often come to the surface completely secondary declarations, having no real value to a particular country's national security, but acting as a certain integrative factor that allows creating regulatory space for the organization of intra-bloc cooperation (Brzezinsky, 1983). According to O'Rourke (2020), the term geopolitics is frequently used as a synonym for international politics or international political strategy. It refers to the impact of basic geographic elements on international relations, as well as the examination of international relations from a perspective that sets a heavy focus on the impact of such geographic factors. On 2018, the UAE invested \$450 million in the development of Berbera's port as part of an effort to counter Qatari, Turkish, and Russian influence in the region (Melvin, 2018).

➤ **Rivalries**

According to Vasquez and Leskiw (2001), while the term rivalry appears in the common lexicon of international relations and diplomatic history, the study of interstate rivalries has only recently been the focus of systematic and scientific investigation. According to (Diehl & Goertz 2001.P:17) *“Rivalry is defined as a feeling of enmity between states this is due to two sides competing for power or accomplishments.”* These Interstate rivalries feature a pair of recognized states with a lengthy history of antagonism with one another. Rivalries are contests between states that see each other as dangerous competitors and see one other as foes (Colaresi, et al, 2008).

According to Vasquez (1996), the militarization of these conflicts distinguishes them from other types of competitive international relations, such as economic competition for markets. As a result, competition often involves the threat or use of armed action.

Rivalries are long-term, competitive relationships between two states that are characterized by periodic militarized disputes and reciprocal perceptions of threat, hatred, and mistrust. Spence (2012, P.24) stated, "Rivalry has typically been employed by international relations scholars to describe some sort of long-term relationship of enmity between states. Early work often used the term rivalry loosely, alongside other terms like international enemies." Vasquez (1996) similarly suggested, "Rivals are likely to regard each other as the source of substantial military threats, and events that occur within the rivalry relationship are likely to be perceived in terms of their significance for national security". According to (Goertz&Diehl 1995), Rivalries are thus defined primarily in terms of how two governments strive to resolve controversial situations, rather than the characteristics of disputants or the issues themselves. States are regarded rivals as long as they behave as such, such as by engaging in security competition and engaging in recurring militarized clashes (Vasquez and Leskiw 2001).

Interstate rivalry, according to Valeriano (2013), refers to "the antagonistic relationships between two international opponents, which are country states". The readiness of the states involved to sacrifice their own prosperity and growth in order to deny an advantage to a competitor state is a basic aspect of a rivalry. Discussing the concept of rivalry, Thompson (2001, 559) notes that "disputes about territory, influence and status, and ideology, therefore, are at the core of conflicts of interest at all levels of analysis". Interstate rivalry, according to Hensel (1999), is a situation in which two states have a profound competitive and antagonistic relationship that underpins the political framework in which interstate interactions occur and overshadows their diplomatic ties and interstate disputes. Most political science applications of "rivalry" and similar notions have concentrated on "enduring, militarized, interstate rivalries," or rivalries between two nation-states that involve frequent militarized conflicts and continue for extended periods. The rivalry concept, on the other hand, has a considerably broader range of potential applications (*Ibid*).

➤ **Strategic Rivalry**

Scholars such as Mazarr et. al (2018) Strategic rivalry or competition in international relations can be defined as a condition of antagonistic relations that does not result in armed confrontation. This suggests a shared desire for power, influence, and success at the same time that others are doing the same. Thompson (2001:559-560) said that, “strategic rivalries are about relative scarcity and overlapping interests and goals. According to Thompson(2002), strategic rivalry is a state of international relations in which global powers attempt to maximize their economic, political, and military interests while minimizing the rival's interests in the international system. Countries compete strategically in terms of importing energy resources, with the great powers remaining at the top due to their massive industrial complexes, massive machineries, and greatest populations. The UAE and other Gulf nations are striving for economic diversification, trading routes, and political dominance.

2.1.2. National and Regional Security

➤ **Security**

The traditionalists define “security as a freedom from any objective military threat to the state survival in an anarchic international system” (Šulovic, 2010: 2). Aside from that, the revisionist seeks security through diversifying it. Keeping in mind that the concept of security extends beyond the military, it incorporates the political, economic, sociological, and environmental aspects. Vertically, it encompasses people, social groups, humankind as a whole, as well as state-related concepts. Following the end of the Cold War, which might also be considered a watershed moment for many schools of thought in security studies, the key topic of argument was whether and how to widen and deepen the security concept (*ibid*).

According to Ball (2019: 4), the term "security" is employed in three major categories. The first is the yearning for safety or protection is referred to as security in this context. Second, the term is used for political reasons, referring to political processes, structures, and activities used to ensure the security of a specific political unit or entity. Global issues such as organized crime, terrorism, environmental degradation, natural resource disputes, uncontrolled refugee flows, illegal immigration, poverty, and famine have become hazards to humanity that appear to be as vital as traditional military defense (Iglesias, 2011).

The beginning of the nuclear age in the 1950s provided increased concentration and momentum to the study of national security issues, precisely as the Vietnam War experience in the late 1960s and 1970s and the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s weakened its credibility. Generally broadening in the face of adversity to take on a host of new international and, increasingly, transnational security challenges (Taylor, 2012).

2.1.3. Concept of National and Regional Security

➤ National Security

The word "national security" is used to justify the up keep of arms, the development of new weapon asylums, and the production of armaments (Brown, 1977). The protection of the nation as a whole is referred to as national security and its top priority is to protect the nation and its citizens from attack and other external threats by maintaining military forces and safeguarding state secrets (Holmes, 2015). National security is the measurable state of a nation's capability to overcome multi-dimensional threats to its people's apparent well-being and survival as a nation-state at any given time, by balancing all instruments of state policy through governance, and is extendable to global security by variables external to it (Paleri, 2008). Dimitrijevic (1975, as cited in Grizold, 1994) maintaining political independence as an attribute of internationally recognized national status of the state.

According to Nobilo (1988), national security is an intricate interaction between political, economic, military, ideological, legal, social, and other internal and external social factors through which individual states attempt to ensure acceptable provisions to maintain their sovereignty, territorial integrity, physical survival of their population, political independence, and equal opportunities for balanced and rapid social development. According to (Ibish, 2017), the UAE's national security is centered on counterterrorism and counter-radicalization efforts, as well as trade route security. The evolution of Emirati national security strategy in different situations, one of the interests was opposing all forms of radical Islamism.

➤ Regional Security

Despite widespread interest in regionalism, there is no agreement on its definition. However, Mansfield and Solingen (2010) defined regions as groups of countries located in defines a region based on geographic proximity, social and cultural homogeneity, shared political attitudes and political institutions, and economic interdependence.

According to Deutsch et al. (1957), high levels of interconnectedness across various dimensions, such as economic transactions, communications, and political values, determine whether a group of countries constitutes a region.

According to Thompson (1973), regions contain states that are physically close, interact often, and have common conceptions of numerous phenomena. Cotte (1992) said that the terms "region" and "security" are both extensively used but ambiguous and controversial phrases. In global politics, the term region has come to be more strongly connected with the world's continents: Africa, the Americas, Asia, Oceania, and Europe. The African continent experienced significant economic and political developments at the start of the decade of 2000. After two decades of political insecurity, socioeconomic problems, and marginalization, Africa has emerged as a new commercial and investment frontier, as well as a new object of traditional and emerging powers' geopolitical, economic, and strategic interests, significantly increasing its importance in the international scenario (Oliveira & Cardoso, 2015). The regional policy of the UAE is based on the expansion of commercial ports and the military presence in the Horn of Africa.

2.1.4. Concept of Military Base

➤ Foreign Military Bases Conception

Scholars like Schmidt (2014), argued that “foreign military bases are sovereign basing which is defined as, the long-term, peacetime presence of a foreign military on the other country's soil without interference into the host's domestic authority structures” (p: 17).

According to Lachowski (2007), a foreign military post is an established weapon of power projection that addresses a wide range of states' political, military, economic, and other interests. It is also a site from which operations are launched or supported, as well as a region or location holding installations or facilities that give logistical or other support to the great power's geopolitical goals. The government permits allies and governments with comparable notions about common interests or common threats to have a military presence in the host country (Karimifard, 2016). Dos Santos Lersch, and Sarti, (2014: 90-96), also argued that “foreign military bases are used to secure national interest, maintain the stability of the region, deterrence, influence regions, control natural resources, markets, and strategic positions, and fight against the war on terror as well as for communication and intelligence programs.

”The major and most traditional use for military bases is hosting ~~stâtpersonnel~~ personnel during an operation, being a platform for military operations, and serving as the location of test-ranging for weaponry as well as transport cost.” According to Sun and Zoubir (2011), many governments created foreign military facilities in order to defend their important interests.

2.2. Theoretical Framework

The majority of international relations scholars believe that the theory of international relations (IR) is difficult to describe. Theories of International Relations, according to McGlinchey (2017), allow us to understand and try to make sense of the world around us via a variety of lenses, each representing a particular theoretical position. Most theories of international relations are predicated on the assumption that states always act in their own best interests, or in the interests of their own country. Self-preservation, military security, economic success, and influence over other governments are all common state interests. Occasionally, two or more states share a common national interest. Two states, for example, may both desire to promote peace and economic exchange. States with radically opposed national interests may strive to settle their conflicts through diplomacy or even war (Schieder&Spindler 2014).

One of the key theoretical frameworks for understanding and analyzing state conflicts is realism, which is a highly diverse and controversial school of thought. While some scholars accept it and others fiercely oppose it, realism has long been a central figure in the subject of international relations (Wolfforth, 2008). According to McGlinchey (2021), the assumption of realism is that the state is a unitary actor. National interests drive the state to speak and act collectively, especially during times of war. Waltz (1979) stated that those Realists maintain that, in order to ensure survival, States will seek to maximize their power relative to others. Realists, according to Mearsheimer (1994), maintain that every state's primary interest is survival. As a result, foreign invasion and occupation are the most serious risks that every country faces. As a result, States constantly ensure that they have sufficient power to defend themselves and advance their material interests required for survival. Realists assume that all states have some military capability in order to exist, and that no state knows exactly what its neighbors plan.

Realism is a widely utilized theory of international relations in understanding state behavior in the international system, according to Elias and Sutch (2007).

The study is resort to use the basic assumptions of Realism as an analytical tool to explain and investigate the impacts of increasing involvement of the UAE to the horn of Africa, the case of Ethiopia. The researcher will also use a regional security complex theory for the study.

2.2.1. Neo-Realism (Structural Realism)

Classical realism has been reformulated as neo-realism. Its main proponent is Kenneth Waltz, who defined it in his 1979 book titled 'Theory of International Politics.' According to neorealist, structural factors shape international relations more than human nature, which includes motivation and strategy. It is also shaped by the anarchic concept, which has been widely decentralized, which asserts that all states have comparable demands, but what distinguishes them is their ability to meet those wants. States must therefore exercise extreme caution when deciding which state or states to collaborate with in order to expand their capacity to meet their needs (Baldwin, 1993). Neorealist states that power is very influential in international politics and internal power balancing means accelerating economic growth and increasing military spending. External balancing requires forming partnerships with other nations in order to balance the power of other powerful states or alliances of nations (*ibid*).

The year 2002-2008 was the turning point for the Emirate's economic and political policies. In this year, the UAE was able to build its influence through participation and integration in the world order and engagement with international financial institutions (especially the International Monetary Fund). At the same time, it attracted partnerships with the fastest-growing economies in Asia and Latin America as a means of diversifying its alliances (Ketbi, 2020).

This concept strengthens the current involvements of the UAE to the horn of Africa. The outbreaking of Arab Spring most notably in late 2010 and early 2011; the United Arab Emirates had expanded their influences to Africa and in the region in a deep manner.

Since 2011, the UAE has become increasingly concerned with defending against threats to models of sound governance, tolerance, and religious moderation in the Middle East and beyond (Mehari, 2016). This is one way that the emirates tried to balance their powers in international arena, to protect themselves from Iranian and other emerging powers. With his historical approach, Morgenthau contends that "the balance of power and measures aimed at preserving it are not only unavoidable, but are a vital stabilizing force in a society of independent states" (Morgenthau 1985).

Waltz (1979) contends, from a theoretical standpoint, that the balance of power system of international politics is an unavoidable result of its anarchical character. States' primary concern is not to maximize power, but to maintain their positions in the system.

According to Mehari (2016), the UAE's foreign and even domestic policies are centered on counter-terrorism (the emergence of Muslim Brotherhood movements), resisting Iranian regional dominance, and economic development (trade route and tourism). For realists, the constant rivalry of states whose foreign policy is determined by national interests is a permanent feature of the international system, and an equally constant reordering of the balance of power is the only form of stability available in a system where sovereign independence is valued as much (if not more) than stability itself (Sutch & Elias, 2007). External balancing entails entering into alliances with other nations to keep the power of other powerful nations or alliances of nations at check (Baldwin, 1993). This concept also supports the reason behind the involvement of the UAE in the Yemenis war, which leads expansions of the emirates to the horn of Africa. For McGlinchey (2021) realists consider war as the most effective method of counterbalancing the increasing power of terrorism. States ultimately count on self-help for guaranteeing their own security through balancing of powers by allied with others.

Berman (2021) stated that the United Arab Emirates has been remarkably free of major violent occurrences fueled by Islamic radicalism since its founding in 1971. The emirates have had to deal with a wide range of foreign ideological threats, including the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and various Shi'a militias and actors.

On June 3, 2013, the UAE allied with Saudi Arabia supported a military coup in Cairo that deposed Egypt's first democratically elected president, Mohammad Morsi, who died in prison. The triumph of the Egyptian coup provided a significant regional boost to the counter-revolutionary axis led by the UAE. Abu Dhabi's case was built on the idea that political Islam is a threat and that there is an urgent need to prevent Islamists from controlling or seizing power. This message struck a chord in several countries in the area and beyond (Bakir, 2020, Pp.158).

➤ Rivalries from Defensive Realistic Perspective

The battle for power as a defensive strategy is based on the anarchy structure of the international system, according to Kenneth Waltz's defensive realism. Internationally, the environment in which nations function, or the structure of their system, is determined by the fact that certain states prioritize survival over other short-term goals and act with relative efficiency to attain that goal (Waltz, 1979). According to this, states prefer a balance of power to allowing other states to flourish economically, militarily, and politically because it is regarded as a danger to their security and interests. According to defensive realism, nations should acquire the appropriate level of power to ensure their survival (*ibid*). The explanation of how states establish rivalry relations is anchored in realist theory of international relations, which also serves as the theoretical foundation for Neo-Realism. Realism, for the most part, sees state relations as a battle for material dominance among self-interested players, i.e. states (Donnelly, 2000).

In general, rivalry and competition for power and survival are important to Realism theory. However, the importance of rivalry in Realism has been emphasized further by neo-realists, but in a different way than classical Realism. Because neo-realists focus on the system rather than the model-human being state, they argue that rivalry between states begins with a change in the system's configuration and ends when that system changes again (Dreyer, 2012).

In an anarchic international system, states strive to resist or deter territorial occupation or military and political dominance of the state by a power state or coalition force state in order to create alliances (Baldwin, 1993). The Middle East region's power balance has shifted dramatically in favor of Saudi Arabia because of its military and economic alliance with the US. This development has harmed Iran's regional ambitions and driven Tehran to seek alliances outside of the Middle East region, which has meant battling the UAE and Saudi Arabia in its zone of influence, including the Horn of Africa (Aarts & Pwahaartsuvanl, n.d.).

The new Emirati regional policy is directed against Iranian expansion in the Middle East and beyond. Since 2015, when the UAE and Saudi Arabia started a war against the Houthi rebels, who are loosely allied with Iran, Yemen has been the main scene of this conflict from Abu Dhabi's perspective. This anti-Iranian dimension of the Emirates' foreign policy created new rivalries in the horn of Africa after the cold war era or USA and Russia (Steinberg, 2020).

The realist concept of defensive realism clearly supports the impacts of UAEs increasing involvement in the Horn and its impacts for Ethiopia.

➤ Maximizing Powers from Offensive Realism Perspective

Classical realists (such as Thucydides, E.H. Carr, Arnold Wolfers, and Hans Morgenthau) and offensive realists share the assumption that states are relentless in their pursuit of power and influence (Zakaria, 1998). For offensive structural realists, it is the anarchic international system and the distribution of power, not human nature, that shapes all great powers to maximize power and influence despite domestic or unit-level differences (*ibid*). Survival must be prioritized because state autonomy is required for the achievement of all other goals. States are rational entities in the instrumental sense of the term; that is, they consider their external situation strategically and select the strategy that appears to maximize their basic goal of survival (Waltz 1979). According to Mearsheimer (1995b, 2001c), states always have some military capability that allows them to harm and possibly destroy each other.

By combining these assumptions, Mearsheimer concludes that states quickly realize that the most efficient way to ensure survival in anarchy is to maximize their relative power with the ultimate goal of becoming the strongest power, hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001c). “Hegemony is defined as a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system (Mearsheimer, 1995a:86).

For offensive realists, expansion entails aggressive foreign economic, political, and military policies aimed at shifting the balance of power; seizing opportunities to gain more power; gaining power at the expense of other states; and weakening potential challengers through pre-emptive wars. From this definition and assumptions, we can see that the involvement of the UAE to the horn of Africa is supported by offensive realistic too. The UAE has been increasingly willing to turn to military force to defend its interests. It has been primarily challenging Iran and its proxies, and radical Islamist groups. That is why by carrying political interests; UAE intervened in Egypt, Libya, and Yemenis war (Ibish, 2017).

Rugh (1996) argued that for many years; the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has seen Iran as the greatest danger to its security. The UAE's hegemonic mindset stems in part from a traditional Persian sense of superiority, as well as the ayatollahs' revolutionary and expansionist enthusiasm. Hence, defending any attack from Iranian and its coalitions were the major fears of the UAEs since 21011. That is why the UAE follow deep involvement in Arab wars, and to the horn of Africa.

Schiliro (2013) suggested that the United Arab Emirates is challenged in the post-global crisis not only by reduced global demand, but also by competition from other countries and more stringent global financial markets. To resist challenges that come from other emerging powers, Dubai involved itself in finance, real estate development, shopping, tourism, exports, and re-exports. According Meester (2021), since one of the UAE's economic objectives in the Horn of Africa/Red Sea region is to control the region's trade infrastructure; the UAE is primarily interested in controlling the region's trade infrastructure. The concepts of the offensive realism are, therefore, clearly strengthened the idea of the increasing involvement of the UAE to the Horn of Africa.

➤ **Structural Realism and Security**

Reynolds (2009, P.13) argued that security studies are concerned with the threat, use, and control of military force, and now a days it is elaborated from military uses to the environment, migration, public health, economic interdependence and other non-traditional issues as follows:-

For structural realists, states are unitary, rational actors whose main objective is power maximization. This is anarchical nature of the international system, whereby there is no ultimate power or authority over states. State behavior and security interaction is therefore determined by the nature of the structure. The structure of the system is determined by the distribution of capabilities among dominant states, namely the resources (physical, economic, military) which each can dispose of.

According to Waltz (1979), there will be violence in an international political system if there is anarchy and a balance of power. Because some states may use force from time to time, all states must be prepared to do so-or risk being at the mercy of their militarily more powerful neighbors. The state of nature is a state of war among states. Waltz believes that chaos, destruction, and death are more closely associated with hierarchy (government) than anarchy. As a result, he contends that the use of force or the constant fear of its use is insufficient to explain the domestic/international divide.

In the offensive realist scenario, security moves are territorial expansions that involve actually taking something from others, rather than simply preparing to do so, as with arms procurement or alliance formation. Because territorial expansion is predatory in and of itself, it strongly implies future predatory intentions. As a result, while the ultimate goal of the expanding state is "security," its actual behavior on the way to achieving this goal may be virtually indistinguishable from pure aggrandizement (Mearsheimer, 2001).

Only four countries in the Horn of Africa host ten foreign military bases, with more foreign bases being negotiated. Djibouti alone is home to more foreign bases run by the US, France, Italy, Japan, China, and Saudi Arabia in the region. The United Arab Emirate (UAE) has a military base in Eritrea, and in Somaliland and commercial ports in Somaliland. This could have impacts for the region's stability and ability to provide for its own security. The purpose of the force buildup in the Horn of Africa region is to combat terrorism, piracy, and other maritime crime, to support peace operations, to evacuate nationals during emergencies, and to provide humanitarian assistance (Melvin, 2019). However, the emphasis on collaborative efforts to promote regional security is being supplanted by external military deployments to the Horn, which are driven by geopolitical, commercial, and military competition, often with negative consequences for regional security (ibid). This concept is also supporting the current long involvements of the UAE to the horn of Africa through military and commercial infrastructure development. Ani (2019:21) said that the AU has since expressed concern about the expansions of foreign military bases in some African countries, as follows:-

The use of the bases to carry out military operations in the Middle East such as in Yemen establishes future enemies for hosting countries. For instance, the UAE's Assab base in Eritrea is used in the Saudi-led campaign against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. This inadvertently implicates Eritrea in the war and automatically makes it an enemy of Iran and the Houthi rebels. For Somaliland, the UAE deal for a military base as well as a subsequent deal on the Berbera Port is a welcome development as it seeks both economic boost and international recognition as an independent country. However, the creation of a military base has now heightened tensions between the self-declared independent Somaliland and Somalia.

The increasing involvements of the UAE in the horn of Africa through military bases will also affect Ethiopian security. Hence, the concept of the realism security is important element for this study.

2.2.2. Theory of Regional Security Complexes (RSCT)

Barry Buzan and Ole Waever developed the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) in the 2003 work *"Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security."* A regional security complex theory has been defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another" (Buzan, 1991: 190).

Buzan and Wæver further clarify the central ideas of RSCT as follows:

"The central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones, security interdependence is normally into regionally based clusters: security complexes. The process of securitization and thus the degree of security interdependence are more intense between actors inside such complexes than they are between actors inside the complex and outside of it (2003: 4).

The explicit focus on nation-states and Great Power politics of Classical Realism and Neo-Realism has largely failed to explain the complex fluidity of the African setting. Meanwhile, RSCT believes that the uniqueness of specific regional settings must be acknowledged and examined, while also claiming to move away from classic IRs' reliance on a state-centric, military understanding of security challenges (Walsh, 2020).

The impact of geographical proximity on security interaction is strongest and most obvious in the military, political, societal, and environmental sectors. Regional security, therefore, pertains to the security interdependence among "a group of states or other entities" that distinguishes them from other surrounding groups. States are the central unit of analysis in the RSCT and recognize that this could be problematic for analyzing non-state-centric situations. With such a poorly developed political apparatus and with such fragmented civil societies like Africa in general and the Horn of Africa in particular, is incapable of giving adequate voice to its security agendas.

States having the same RSC shows a high level of interaction with each other whereas states that have different RSC witnessed lower interactions. Actions and motivations in the field of international security are heavily regional, i.e. the immediate neighboring is the target concern of the security actors. Most security concerns do not travel well over distances, and threats within an actor's immediate neighborhood are therefore most likely felt the strongest. The central idea in RSCT is that, since most threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones, security interdependence is normally defined into regionally based clusters: security complexes (Berouk, 2014: 2).

Due to the above facts, it is comprehensive and adaptable enough to apply the RSCT in the Horn of Africa. The seeds of current Horn of African security problems and messes are traced back to the colonial legacy where colonizers established a divide and rule policy in their respective colonies. Latter after independence many security problems existed in the region, which brings a spillover effect on the neighboring states.

On the other hand, Even though the states of the Horn of Africa appear to be dependent on each other, there may have to be a sharing of resources for instance the Nile river which currently changing the geopolitics of the region. The GERD case brings a great instability and insecurity problem in the region not only between Ethiopia and the lower riparian countries Sudan and Egypt but also to the entire region.

Due to the above facts, RSCT is the exact and best theory to assess the HoA dynamics and security complex. The basic security challenge in the future will be the advent of superpowers and Arab countries into the region will have a threat to the peace and security system of the region.

2.3. Empirical Framework

According to Sherwood (2017), the UAE's foreign policy has historically focused on the Gulf, the Arab world, the Muslim world, and the globe at large and the UAE has a long history of cooperating with other countries and was a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Aside from Arab allies, the UAE works with the United Nations on a global scale. Since 1991, the UAE has increased bilateral ties with Western countries, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The UAE became a partner (but not a member) of NATO's Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) in 2004.

Telci and Horoz (2018) on the other hand said the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has pursued an active foreign policy on both regional and global scales, especially in the post of Arab uprisings period. The UAE government has established close relations with the leading international actors such as the US and Israel has started to play an active role in the Middle East and eastern Africa politics through its alliances and activities at the regional level (ibid). The confrontation between the UAE and Qatar connects two key parts of the Emirates' regional policy: the war against Islamists and the containment of Iran (Steinberg, 2020).

According to Mehari (2016), the UAE's foreign and even domestic policies are centered on counter-terrorism (the emergence of Muslim Brotherhood movements), resisting Iranian regional dominance, and economic development (trade route and tourism). Islam is not regarded as a state doctrine that governs the UAE's policies. However, religion is at the heart of Qatar, Saudi and Kuwait's foreign policies, as is the survival of their respective monarchy and regional power (*ibid*).

2.3.1. UAE's Motivation for the Involvement

➤ Political and Security Motivation

Political reasons have been important elements in the UAE's participation in the Horn of Africa. Qatar's involvement in Horn conflict resolution is linked to efforts to promote the country as a global peacemaker. While the UAE-Saudi coalition ideologically aligned Qatar with the Muslim Brotherhood, such ideological distinctions were critical for the gulf nation (Mahmod, 20207).

Regional actors such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have viewed the Horn of Africa region as a potential venue for political struggle and these Political competitions are backed up by political collaboration, which is a popular tool for gaining external influence (Telic, 2018).

The UAE has been increasingly willing to turn to military force to defend its interests. It has been primarily challenging Iran and its proxies, and radical Islamist groups. That is why by carrying political interests; UAE intervened in Egypt, Libya, and Yemenis war. One of the United Arab Emirates' most important regional policies is to promote pro-Western and moderate policies in the Arab world. Along with Saudi Arabia, it viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as a hopeful moment of popular awakening but as the precursor to regional chaos (Ibish, 2017).

➤ Egyptian 2011 uprising and UAEs involvement

According to Ibish (2017), counterterrorism and counter-radicalization are major concerns for all Middle Eastern states, particularly Gulf monarchies, which are directly threatened by a variety of extremist groups, including Sunni Salafist-jihadist organizations like ISIL and al-Qaeda, pro-Iranian Shia extremist organizations like Hezbollah, and, as mentioned from the UAE's perspective, the Muslim Brotherhood.

Berman (2021, p.87) noted that the post-Arab Spring issues for the United Arab Emirates and their neighbors in terms of compiling extremists are as follows:

The UAE is mainly external to Islamic radicalism. It has rarely appeared within the Emirates, and the government has immediately suppressed any local manifestations that have occurred. The dynamic has influenced how Abu Dhabi views Islamic extremism, not only in the area but globally, and has been a primary factor in the UAE's rise as a powerful actor in the name of counterterrorism since 2010.

The Muslim Brotherhood is a religious and political group founded on the belief that Islam is not simply a religion, but a way of life. It advocates a move away from secularism, and a return to the rules of the Quran as a basis for healthy families, communities, and states the movement officially rejects the use of violent means to secure its goals (Wickham, 2015).

According to Pargeter (2016) since it is established in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement has grown to become one of the most influential social groups in the Middle East. Despite the repressive tactics taken against the group by several of the region's countries, particularly Egypt, the movement continued to operate.

The visit to the Gulf area by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in 1994 marked a watershed moment in relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the UAE. During his tour, President Mubarak warned the Gulf States about the Muslim Brotherhood's growing strength and influence and urged the UAE administration to rein in the movement's expanding influence (Freer, 2018). According to Harb (2017), following the election of the Muslim Brother Morsi, the UAE and Saudi Arabia began organizing a coup d'état with the Egyptian military with the support of United States.

On June 3, 2013, the UAE and Saudi Arabia supported a military coup in Cairo that deposed Egypt's first democratically elected president, Mohammad Morsi, who died in prison. The triumph of the Egyptian coup provided a significant regional boost to the counter-revolutionary axis led by the UAE. Abu Dhabi's case was built on the idea that political Islam is a threat and that there is an urgent need to prevent Islamists from controlling or seizing power (Bakir, 2020). Since June 2017, the UAE, in collaboration with Saudi Arabia, has led a coalition of governments, including Egypt and Bahrain, in a diplomatic and economic blockade of Qatar (Roberts, 2017).

According to Verhoeven (2020), the UAE and Saudi Arabia were on opposite sides during the Arab Spring over the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the future of post-Qaddafi Libya. This positioning revealed deep schisms between Qatari and Emirati visions for the wider Middle East, and finally, as the two countries have become active foreign policy players in the Middle East, there has been an increase in interest to study their foreign policy abroad, including in the Horn of Africa(*ibid*).

➤ **UAE Involvement in the Libyan Revolution**

The UAE's anti-Islamist stance was only vaguely visible at the commencement of its operation in Libya in 2011 and Abu Dhabi has sought to prevent Islamists from taking power in Tripoli and instead backed an authoritarian regime. The UAE found a partner in General Khalifa Haftar, who attempted to extend his control from Eastern Libya to the entire country beginning in 2014 (Steinberg, 2020).

The UAE's ideological concerns in the Libyan uprising were that Turkey was expanding its form of political Islam across the MENA area through financial and military aid (*ibid*). The UAE's fears over Libya persist mostly owing to Turkey's participation in the growth of political Islam. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood who have fled their own countries have found a warm welcome in Turkey (Fahmy, 2021). According to Ferhat (2021), The UAE feared that Islamist-leaning parties would one day gain power and pose an existential danger to its survival. Since 2011, the UAE has been at the forefront of a regional war against Arab revolutions and political Islamist parties, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood.

On the other hand, Charles (2021) stated that the UAE offers critical support that keeps Haftar as a political force in Libya and the civil war running to secure its regional security. The United Arab Emirates gives direct military assistance to Haftar's soldiers. There have been over a hundred suspected arms deliveries from the UAE to Libya and Egypt since January 2020.

Since April 2019, the UAE has carried out over 850 drone and jet strikes on Haftar's behalf.

According to Hedges (2021), despite its strategic failure in Libya, the UAE continues to spend heavily in the country. On the diplomatic front, whether Haftar takes power or not, the UAE wants to continue bilateral engagement with its preferred institution. The UAE's presence in the North African country is intended to deter Islamist extremism, which will be promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the Arab world.

➤ UAE and Iran in the Yemen War

Rugh (1996) argued that for many years; the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has seen Iran as the greatest danger to its security. The UAE's hegemonic mindset stems in part from a traditional Persian sense of superiority, as well as the ayatollahs' revolutionary and expansionist enthusiasm. The UAE's territorial dispute with Iran over three small islands exemplifies the two nations' fragile relations and demonstrates the UAE government's strong distrust of Iran Charles (2021).

The three islands are strategically placed in the Persian Gulf, roughly halfway between the two countries. Iran unilaterally occupied the Greater and Lesser Tunbs islands in November 1971, only hours before the creation of the UAE, taking them over from the emirate of Ras al-Khayma, which later became part of the UAE (ibid). The new Emirati regional policy is directed against Iranian expansion in the Middle East. Since 2015, when the UAE and Saudi Arabia started a war against the Houthi rebels, who was loosely allied with Iran, Yemen has been the main scene of this conflict from Abu Dhabi's perspective (Mehari, 2016).

However, the anti-Iranian dimension of the Emirates' foreign policy is much less pronounced than its aversion to the Islamists. Although Houthi militia forces are likely not solely dependent on Iran for armaments, financing, and manpower, after three years of war, most observers agree that Iran and its Lebanese ally Hezbollah have aided Houthi forces with training and arms shipments (Steinberg, 2020).

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) with its collision Saudi Arabia try to avoid the expansions of the militia (Houthis) from the region. The internal Yemeni conflict escalated into a Saudi-Iranian proxy war following a military intervention led by Saudi Arabia. The UAE mainly wants to fight a local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood another party to the conflict in Yemen (Guggenheim, 2021). Since its entry into Yemen's civil war in 2015, the UAE's military role has been second only to its coalition partner, Saudi Arabia. In addition to the coalition's controversial naval blockade of the country, part of the UAE's dictating terms in south Yemen has been via control of the coastline, including a series of port cities and island outposts such as Aden, Mokha, Mukalla, Perim, and Socotra (Vertin, 2019).

UAE and Saudi Arabia decided to intervene militarily in Yemen in March 2015 to stop a Houthi (a Zaydi, Shiite rebel group) it became clear that they would need more boots on the ground, Ports, and air bases in strategic locations were also required and across the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, they found eager partners in Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia (Taylor, 2016).

➤ **Economic Motivations of UAE in the Horn**

The Horn of the African region has been located on the coastlines of the Gulf of Aden, Bab al-Mandab, and the Red Sea (Taylor, 2016). The leading Asian and Middle Eastern countries regard it as one of the most important access points into the African market (Steinberg, 2020). Furthermore, the Gulf countries' oil and natural gas exports to the European market are mostly routed through the Gulf of Aden, Bab al-Mandab, and the Red Sea. As a result, the stability of this region is critical for many countries (Telci, 2018).

According to Calabrese (2020), The Horn of Africa region's physically vital location bordering the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean, through which 80 percent of international marine traffic passes, gives strategic importance for the region. The region is predicted to have a population of over 136 million people, with more than 60% of the population under the age of 30. While the region's disproportionally young population (commonly referred to as the youth bulge) creates a slew of issues, the region's population growth-purchasing power, mineral and other natural resources can transform it into a major economic power. The area is home to some of Africa's and the world's fastest rising economies (Telci, 2018).

“The strategic importance of the Horn of Africa region stems from its proximity to the oil-rich Arabian Gulf and the rivalries looks out over the Indian Ocean, and on the other, it controls the southern entrance to the Red Sea, where the Bab al-Mandeb Strait is located” (Dore, 2021:5):

Schiliro(2013) suggested that the United Arab Emirates is challenged in the post-global crisis not only by reduced global demand, but also by competition from other countries and more stringent global financial markets and one of the primary lessons of the 2008 global economic crisis. The UAE has pursued an economic growth strategy that is strongly pro-business, promotes market liberalism and economic openness, and embraces globalization, while without upsetting the country's historic neo-patrimonial leadership system. The UAE's structural plan aims to convert agricultural, industrialize and urbanize the country, as well as change the production structure and local demand, as well as foreign trade and finance (Haouas&Heshmati, 2014).

2.3.2. The UAE in the Horn of Africa

➤ Emiratis Military Base Infrastructure in Eritrea

With the opening of the Embassy in Abu Dhabi in 1993 and the consulate in Dubai in 2001, the UAE was regarded as the first country with which the State of Eritrea established diplomatic connections. Since Eritrea's war for independence from Ethiopia, the UAE has been a staunch supporter of the country and the UAE is one of the top five aid providers to Eritrea, through the Abu Dhabi Development Fund, which was previously run directly by the government (Mehari, 2016). In recent decades, the UAE has grown its trade relations with countries in the Horn of Africa, and it has increasingly attempted to construct port facilities in the region to capitalize on the economic prospects presented by China's Belt and Road Initiative. Along with its economic interests, the UAE is developing a long-term strategy to limit Iran's influence in the Arabian Peninsula and Africa (Melvin, 2019). Since 2015, the UAE has used the Eritrean port of Assab as a launch pad for its military campaign against Houthi rebels, including air and sea assaults on Yemen's capital, Sanaa (Vertin, 2019).

The UAE's military bases on the Horn of Africa are potentially manifestations of broader Emirati ambitions to shape and secure economic and political developments in both Africa and the Middle East. Emirates commercial port deals are increasingly being accompanied by the building of military bases (Samuel, 2019). Chegraoui, Lyammouriet al (2020) said that Investment in port infrastructure has become a critical component of Abu Dhabi's Horn of Africa foreign policy. To that goal, the UAE relies not only on its substantial financial resources, but also on the competence of Dubai Ports World (DP World), a global port management behemoth affiliated to the Emirati ruling families and serving as the economic arm of UAE maritime diplomacy. DP World was awarded a 30-year license to construct Assab, Eritrea's port, in 2018. Eritrea's strategic location near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a key shipping lane used by oil tankers and other cargo vessels route to the Suez Canal, makes it an attractive investment destination for logistics companies (Miller, and Verhoeven, 2019).

➤ The UAE in Sudan

Sudan and the UAE have always had extensive trade relations. For example, trade between the UAE and Sudan increased by 153% between 2004 and 2008. Emirati investment in the country grew from \$1.3 billion in 2007 to \$2 billion by the end of 2009. The majority of the UAE's money is invested in services, industry, and agriculture. Increasing agricultural investment in Sudan could help to ensure food security in the UAE (Looney, 2014). After China, the UAE is Sudan's first investor. China has invested heavily in several sectors of the business, and it now controls close to 75% of the Sudanese oil industry. Sudan now produces 133,000 barrels of oil per day, a fraction of what it did before the country's south seceded in 2011, taking with it the majority of confirmed oil reserves. Chinese companies are now looking for new oil deposits in Sudan, as increasing oil output is a primary priority for the government.

In early 2017, the UAE agreed to provide the Central Bank of Sudan (CBoS) with a \$400 million emergency deposit (Burger, 2018). According to Abbas (2018), the UAE has spent more than Dh28 billion (\$7.6 billion) in Sudan's growth to date, with 17 companies now functioning in the varied industries of the African nation. However, as Mehari (2016) pointed out, Sudan's relations with the UAE are strained (to that matter with all GCC countries except Qatar) and Sudan has been regarded as Iran's most steadfast ally since 1992, when diplomatic relations were severed for more than a decade until 1999. As a result, the Arab Spring uprisings have been met with a ferocious regional counterrevolution aimed at undermining and derailing any democratic transition in the Arab world (Ani, 2021) said:

In the past, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have invested heavily in Sudan both during the era of former President Omar al-Bashir and after his removal from office in 2019. In 2015, Bashir joined the Arab Coalition forces and provided military support to the Saudi-led war in Yemen. After he left office, Emirati and Saudi support to the Sudanese junta not only continued but also increased significantly. (Para, 11-12).

In order to keep control over Khartoum politics, the UAE changed its strategy to promote Emirati interests, regardless of the impact on Sudan's political stability and economic advancement. Following the UAE's pioneering establishment of diplomatic relations with the Jewish state, despite opposition from many members of the political class and substantial parts of the public, one immediate goal was to expedite Sudan's recognition of Israel (Dorsey, 2021).

The UAE organized a covert meeting in Uganda in February 2020 between General and then-Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his Sudanese counterpart, Mr. Hamdok, at the expense of civilians. These great games from the Middle East nations will have a rough impact on political and economic developments of the poorer suddenness people (Ibid).

➤ **The UAE in Djibouti**

Butt (2021) claims that the UAE has military bases in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somaliland as of 2020, proving Abu Dhabi's importance in the Horn of Africa. Because of the regions easy access to the Red Sea, Mediterranean, and Gulf of Aden, all of which are important to the UAE's economic future as a global trading hub.

The military installations assure Abu Dhabi's ability to defend its interests and maintain its influence in East Africa at a time when the country is diversifying its revenue sources away from the petrodollar Chegraoui & Skah, etal, (2020).

At the time, the Emiratis were among the few investors interested in the small and impoverished former French province. Doraleh, a new container terminal built and operated by DP World, became the country's largest employer and the government's largest revenue source (Charles, 2021). According to Telci (2018), the Djibouti government filed an arbitration complaint against DP World in 2014 due to bribery allegations and after three years of review, DP World was cleared of all charges linked to its operation of the Doraleh port in Djibouti in 2017.

Mehari (2016:7), also said that “the UAE has a strong presence in Djibouti through Dubai Ports, a subsidiary of Dubai World Company, and, more recently, through its armed forces” as follows:-

The Chinese Navy, Doraleh has put UAE in competition with the Chinese investment in higher capacity container Port (1.2 million containers) oil terminal transit shipment with railway and pipelines connectivity with Ethiopia. Exceedingly profitable, the takeover of Doraleh Port by China was painful lose for Dubai Ports and indirectly to UAE. UAE withdrew from the management of the Port of Djibouti, closed its consulate, abandoned its plan to establish military base in Djibouti. It moved to the Port of Berbera in Somaliland. Since early 2016, Djibouti and UAE have resumed their diplomatic relations after mediation by Saudi Arabia, leading Djibouti to sever its relations with Iran. Despite official announcement of withdrawal from the management of the Ports, Dubai Ports still have significant investment and business in Doraleh Container and Oil Ports run by Horizon-a sister company of Dubai Ports).

Another factor influencing Djibouti and other horn countries' decision to sever ties with the UAE is the increasing involvement of other global and regional entities in the Horn of Africa region, such as Turkey, China, and Russia are seeking for ways to work with countries in Eastern Africa. (Telci, 2018).

➤ **The UAE in Somalia**

When the Somali Civil War began in 1991, the UAE maintained diplomatic relations with the Somali Transitional National Government and its successor, the Transitional Federal Government, and supported their government initiatives, according to Paul (2019). According to international Crisis Group (2018), the Somali administration of President "Farmajo" pretends to be impartial in the GCC competition, while the UAE regards it as too close to Qatar. Abu Dhabi appears to be stepping up its support for Somalia's regions, or federal entities.

Farmajo, for his part, has bolstered ties with Doha and Ankara while stifling rivals. Qatar and Turkey may be able to facilitate such reconciliation (Paul, 2019).

Following the UAE's increased support for the President's opponents, notably Federal Member States resisting central Mogadishu rule, the relationship between the federal government and the six federal states has been called into question. Such schisms weaken state institutions, allowing insurgent organizations such as al-Shabaab to thrive. Since then, the UAE has widened the rift by cutting aid programmes and withdrawing personnel from Somalia's capital, Mogadishu (Paul, 2019, & crises group 2018).

According to Chegraoui & Skahetal, (2020), these tensions reached a boiling point in Berbera, a tranquil port town in Somaliland, a self-proclaimed independent state. Because of its proximity to Yemen, where the UAE is a member of the current Saudi-led coalition fighting Houthi rebels, the port, where the UAE is constructing a large military complex, is strategically vital. The Somali government deemed the port-control agreement between DP World and Somaliland null and void. Somalia accused the UAE of arrogance and disdain, alleging that DP World could not legally sign the agreement without Mogadishu's approval (Melvin, 2018). Vertin (2019) also claimed that the UAE and Somaliland largely ignored strong protests from Somalia's federal government in Mogadishu, as well as UN and Mogadishu claims that concessions are violations of sovereignty because they deprive the federal government of money and accountability while providing Somaliland with international legitimacy.

Krieg (2021) accused the emirates of aggressively supporting the Somali breakaway provinces of Punt land and Somaliland in order to establish a mercenary-led counter-piracy army that would provide the UAE spans throughout the geo-strategically crucial Horn of Africa. In response to Yemen's southern secessionist ambitions, the Emiratis formed the Southern Transitional Council, a proxy organization that continues to ensure Abu Dhabi's access to Yemeni waterways. In Libya, the UAE took advantage of post-revolutionary polarization to organize the Libyan National Army (LNA), giving the Gulf state major control over North Africa's crucial corridor in eastern Libya.




Figure 1 . The breakdown of Somalia

Source: <https://www.hiiraan.com/news4/2018>

Paul (2019), and Krieg (2021) argued that to for its national interests motivations the UAE are highly invested in the horn African nation, at the expense of the federal government of Somalia as follows:-

Berbera, Somaliland: DP World port project; UAE naval base under construction

Punt land, Somalia: Ports, a Dubai-owned port operator, has secured the rights to develop the port of Bosaso; UAE trained and equipped Portland Maritime Police Force

Mogadishu, Somalia: Turkish military base; UAE-funded special forces training center; Port of Mogadishu operated by Turkish company Albayrak

Barawe, Somalia: DP World in talks with the regional government over developing the Barawe seaport.

➤ The UAE in Ethiopia

According to Jenber (2021:23), Ethiopia and the Gulf have had diplomatic and commerce contacts for a long time. However, until the early 2000s, commerce exchange remained extremely limited. Recently, the GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, have risen to the top of Ethiopia's trading partners list as following:-

The UAE is a strong trade partner of Ethiopia. The trade relationship between Ethiopia and the UAE has also shown great improvement in the last ten years. The total trade turnover between Ethiopia and the UAE from 2015 to 2019 was more than 2.47 billion USD. In 2015, it was 460.99 million and it reached 580 million USD in 2019. The trade relationship between the two countries was in favor of the UAE as Ethiopia imported more than 1.9 billion USD goods from the UAE, while it exported 525.96 million USD goods to the UAE. The UAE was one of the top four of Ethiopia's export destinations in the years under consideration. Agricultural products and semi-processed commodities are the main export items of Ethiopia, while it imports Petroleum, vehicles, electronics, machinery, fertilizers, and other consumer goods from the UAE.

In recent years, the Horn of Africa has evolved into a battleground for Middle Eastern rivals. Various groups have interacted with the region in pursuit of their own objectives (Vertin, 2019). Ethiopia has been the exception to this upheaval thus far and despite the growing rivalry for influence among the Middle Eastern axes, Addis Ababa has managed to avoid publicly picking sides and exploit its geostrategic significance as the region's hegemony to attract much-needed investment from a variety of partners (Paul, 2019). That is why Arab axis led by the UAE and Saudi Arabia create fertile ground for Ethiopia-Eritrea peace talks in 2018 (Allo, 2018).

According to ICG (2018), when the Eritrean and Ethiopian presidents signed the September deal, the role of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in brokering it was on clear display. The reconciliation was the catalyst for the UAE's extended involvement in the Horn of Africa (Jenber, 2021). Ethiopia has been looking at other alternatives to Djibouti in order to diversify its export channel and the Ethiopian government is concerned about the strategic national security consequences of relying too heavily on a single access point for trade and crucial supplies (Mosley, 2019). As a result, Ethiopia has prioritized securing access to neighboring ports, particularly the port of Berbera in Somaliland (Cannon & Rossiter, 2017).

DP World, which operates 77 ports globally, received a 30-year concession in Berbera, Somaliland, as part of the \$442 million transaction. The DP World venture would be developed in two stages, with the overarching goal of transforming Berbera Port into an East African maritime hub and a significant outlet for Ethiopia (*ibid*).

According to Lons (2018, as cited in Jenber, 2021), Ethiopia's rapprochement with Eritrea benefiting both countries and it would also provide the GCC countries access to Ethiopia, Africa's second most populous country with a rapidly rising economy. The following pictures are showed as DP World has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia's Ministry of Transport and logistics(the late ministry of transport) to develop the Ethiopian side of the road linking Ethiopia to Berbera into one of the major trade and logistics corridors of the country's international trade routes.

Following the signing of a peace treaty with Eritrea, Ethiopia has well positioned itself to benefit from the intricate engagement of the gulf nation in Red Sea ports (Jenber (2021), Lons (2018), Cannon, and Rossiter (2017) and Paul (2019). Ethiopia, the landlocked country relies on Djibouti for about 97 percent of its imports, but it now has clear opportunities to diversify its marine connections (Vertin, 2019).

CHAPTER THREE

3. RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN

3.1. INTRODUCTION

To address the objective, having a clear and vivid research methodology is critical. It is also a blueprint to the entire research activity because it shows the overall research flow: - how to collect data, as well as how to interpret the data. To this end, this section discusses the research design, the study area, sample selection strategy, methods of data collection, data analysis, and procedures.

3.2. Research Design

A research design is a plan, structure, and strategy for conducting research in order to find answers to research questions (Kerlinger 1986, as cited in Kumar, 2011). This study design followed a descriptive research design targeted to describe information. Descriptive research design is used to find and collect information on the characteristics of a certain problem or topic. Descriptive research explains and adds knowledge to a topic (Creswell, 2014). The goal, as the name suggests, is to describe the characteristics of a phenomenon or population. It seeks answers to the questions: what, who, where, when and how (Kumar, 2011). Since descriptive research examines the who, what, when, where, why, & how questions, the researcher uses the descriptive research design for the study.

3.3. Research Approaches

The research approach of this study was the qualitative approach. Data are collected from the intended respondents are described scientifically because the qualitative approach is suitable to effectively analyze and present the attitudes, opinions, and behavior of respondents in detail. According to (Creswell, 2014: 232), “qualitative method is a typical research approach which enables us to come up with data that cannot easily shaped by statistical procedures or any other means of quantification but the data are usually described in the form of words.

Due to this, the suitable approach to investigate the impacts of the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa: the case of Ethiopia since 2018 is appropriately described by using qualitative research approaches. The setting or study area where the research was conducted is the impacts of UAEs increasing involvement in the Horn of Africa: the case of Ethiopia in 2018. The researcher collected data in a cross-sectional way.

3.4. Sampling Technique

In order to obtain pertinent information from respondents and to reach the targeted respondent's non- probability-sampling technique is convenient. Based on this purposive or judgmental sampling technique will be applied. Because the issue necessitates further and specific information, which can only be obtained from experts and relevant parties. As a result, in purposive sampling, samples can be chosen based on their knowledge, relationship, and concerned expertise on the problem under inquiry (Langkos, 2014).

3.5. Sources of the data

In the study of the research, both primary and secondary data was collected, analyzed, and interpreted to achieve the intended objectives. The secondary source of data used as an equal and complimentary source for primary data because the issue is mostly circulated in the media outlets.

3.5.1. Sources of the Primary Data

The researcher planned to collect primary data through unstructured key informant in-depth interviews. Key informant interviews are qualitative in-depth interviews with community members who are aware of what is going on. These experts can offer insight into the nature of problems as well as solutions (Ibeh, 2018). According to Descombe (2007) interview is an appropriate method of research to gain insight into people's opinions, feelings, emotions, and experiences. Kumar (2011) also suggested that an investigator could gather detailed information during an interview by probing. As a result, in circumstances requiring in-depth knowledge, interviewing is the recommended method of data collecting.

3.5.2. Source of the Secondary Data

Secondary data was gathered from relevant literatures, such as books, internet sources, journal articles, published and unpublished materials, newspapers, agreements concluded and other documents, conference papers, organizational publication of the current increasing involvements of the UAE in the horn of Africa region.

3.6. Data Collection Instrument

3.6.1.Key Informant Interview

Key informant interviews are qualitative, in-depth interviews of 8 to 12 people selected for their first-hand knowledge about a topic of interest. Interviewers frame questions spontaneously, probe for information and take notes, which are elaborated on later (USAID 1996). In the study, the researcher applied unstructured key informant interviews to present interview guiding questions in the process of data collection. The respondents are selected based on the position they have and their knowledge of the issues. Accordingly, the researchers purposefully select key informants who can provide the best information. According to Kumar (2011), the major consideration in purposive sampling is the researcher's opinion as to who can supply the best information to meet the research objectives. It is incredibly helpful in comprehending reality, describing an occurrence, or developing something that is solely for an unfamiliar body. Based on this the researcher used one informant from each institution. The target interviewees are from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Ministry of Trade and Regional Integration of Ethiopia, Ministry of Finance of Ethiopia, Investment Commission of Ethiopia, IPSS, from Foreign Relation institute, and private well-known experts. Accordingly, the researcher contacted 12 key informants to interview for the purpose of this study. The researcher also conducted email interview with two ministries and one commission. Interview guiding questions was prepared in the English language.

3.7. Data Analysis and Interpretation Procedure

A research data analysis is a process used by researchers for reducing data to a story and interpreting it to derive insights. The data analysis process helps in reducing a large chunk of data into smaller fragments, which makes sense. Three essential things take place during the data analysis process, organization, Summarization and categorization (Terrell, 2012).

Based on this concept collecting, organizing, processing, analyzing and interpreting, and inferring based on the primary and secondary data was the main task of this study. The primary interview data collected from the informants was examined and made it reliable with the other informants. The secondary data was also cross-checked with the primary data. The researcher assured the validity and trustworthiness of the finding by triangulation (cross-checking, comparing, and contrasting) of data obtained from multiple sources.

The researcher used the content or inductive analysis technique for the qualitative approach. Finally, the researcher presented and analyzed the data reference it with theories and previous studies.

3.8. Ethical Considerations

According to Creswell (2014), one of the most significant aspects of establishing the integrity and credibility of a study is its research ethics. This study was fully governed by the ethical principles and considerations of social research. In order to avoid biases in the study maintaining equal participation of the concerned institutions and intellectuals are very important. During the data collection period, utmost care is made to protect every respondent thereby building confidence with participants of the research. Permission from the individuals and informed consent of the respondents obtains before starting the interview. In order to keep the anonymity of the participants, no informants mentioned by name in any place in the research report unless the position and willingness of the respondents mandatory. All sources of information are duly acknowledged and carefully utilized with no distortion and unwarranted manipulation. The researcher only used the term informant and words like the other, one of, and informants. The researcher respected the views uphold by informants and appreciate their willingness to be part of the study. In addition, the researcher maintained the ethics of pure academic work that is free from any research bias or misconduct. All the data collected from primary and secondary sources are appropriately cited and free from any plagiarism.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF UAE's INCREASING INVOLVEMENT ON ETHIOPIA.

4.0. INTRODUCTION

As discussed in the previous sections, the relations between the Arabian Gulf nations and the Horn of Africa states has seen several historical events that have resulted in various consequences that have formed and reshaped the political structure and economic position of the two regions states. The relations between the Horn of Africa and Arab nations east of the Red Sea date back to over millennia, spurred by a mixture of trade and the spread of Islam. This is what gives the Horn its hybrid character a mix of African and Middle Eastern traditions and cultures. Trade and the expansion of Islam have fueled relations between the Horn of Africa and Arab countries east of the Red Sea for millennia (Jeffery, 2018).

Todman (2018) said that Middle Eastern powers have strengthened military ties with African countries and played a larger role in international counter-terrorism operations in the continent. The Gulf States' ability to use their growing economic strength has allowed them to expand their security influence in Africa. According to Mehari (2016), trade, tourism, counter-terrorism (including the rise of Muslim Brotherhood groups), and combating Iranian regional dominance are the four pillars that underpin the UAE's foreign and even domestic policies. Islam is not regarded as a state doctrine that affects the UAE's policies. In contrast, the other Gulf States, like Saudi Arabia, have a sharia-based foreign policy. Similarly, religion is at the heart of Qatar and Kuwait's foreign policy, as is the survival of their respective monarchy and regional prominence. Since 2004, the UAE has gradually grown more aggressive, leveraging the advantages of its geography natural riches, central location, and trade to develop concrete forms of power. The UAE has been more active in regional and international affairs in the last few years than it has been in the previous three decades combined (Kamrava, 2011). The UAE's economic diversification approach focuses on its role as a logistics hub and regional headquarters. It is a model based on maritime freedom, including passage through Bab al-Mandab, the narrow passage linking the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea, and the Strait of Hormuz (*ibid*).

A strategic aim is to have cooperating, even like-minded countries along the Red Sea corridor. Beyond basic economic concerns, the 2011 Arab revolutions endowed the Red Sea with strategic significance for the UAE. These protestors transformed the Middle East from a zone of entrenched autocracies into a complex of conflicts in which political Islamists affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other side, the UAE's role in the Yemen crisis, as well as wars in Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan, shows the region's increasing importance. As we stated in Chapter Two, piracy and maritime instability in the Red Sea also impact the UAE and its commercial activity in the region. As a result, the UAE was heavily involved in the Horn of Africa to safeguard its national interests, counter-terrorism, piracy, trade route hegemony, counter Iranian and Qatari engagement, and economic diversification. As we saw in Chapter Two, there are significant military bases and commercial port infrastructure construction in the region. The UAE's long involvement created controversy among international relations experts and professionals, as well as regional economists. I critically examine and explain the natures, dynamics, and severity of the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa since 2018, as well as its impact on Ethiopia, using the theories and concepts established in Chapter Two. Finally, these chapters divided into three parts. The First section of the study was about the background of the informant's. Second, we discussed about the political impacts of the UAEs increasing involvement to the region on Ethiopia since 2018. In this section, we raised the peace and security issues regarding the Ethio- Eritrea rapprochement, GERD and Somalia by comparing its impacts for Ethiopia. Finally, we discussed about the economic impacts of the UAEs involvement in the region since 2018 by referring Ethiopia.

4.1. Political Impacts on Ethiopia

As we have shown in previous chapters, the UAE was active in the Horn of Africa in order to establish military, economic, and security dominance. In order to do so, the emirates are competing with the other Gulf countries by building military and economic ports in Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. It also intervened in Ethiopia and Sudan to counter Qatari and Iranian dominance in the Horn. These rivalries, as well as the UAE's extended involvement, have had an impact, as mentioned in several chapters. Therefore, in this section, I examine the political implications of the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa since 2018.

This section discusses the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace treaty process, and its present situation, as well as the GERD and UAEs role in the negotiations. In addition, UAEs in Somalia and its impacts for Ethiopia are discussed.

4.1.1. Peace and Security Impacts

➤ Ethiopian –Eritrean Rapprochement

The Eritrean-Ethiopian War, which lasted from May 1998 to June 2000, was an extremely costly war, costing each country. Eritreans voted in favor of independence in the 1993 referendum, and the international community acknowledged Eritrea as a country in the next day. However, the two parties were unable to reach an agreement on exact boundaries (Araia, 2018).



Figure 1 Ethiopia- Eretria war map from 1998-2000s.

Source: <https://upload.wikimedia.org>

According to the above map, following Eritrea's independence, Ethiopia has nothing to do to gain sea access. More than 19,000 Eritrean troops were killed, and both sides lost more than 70,000 people. These estimates are still being debated on both sides. Ethiopia deported around 77,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean heritage, while Eritrea imprisoned and deported thousands of Ethiopians. Because Eritrea and Ethiopia relied on each other for trade, the conflict halted the partnership, leading in food shortages, unemployment, and poverty on both sides, among other socioeconomic concerns (Lata, 2003).

Peace reconciliation efforts have been made since Eritrea's independence, though only one has been successful. In 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a peace treaty and established a border panel to resolve the dispute. However, when the committee granted the town to Eritrea in 2002, Ethiopia opposed and urged more talks (*ibid*).

Therefore, the two countries were trapped in a stalemate for two decades, with occasional flare-ups of violence near the border. At the same time, tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea remained high (Barry, 2005). Even if Ethiopia attempted to bring peace with Eritrea and connect the region through various infrastructures, these attempts were hampered by the deadly 1998–2000 conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as the consequences of Eritrea's decades-long collaboration with other powers to destabilize Ethiopia (Melvin, 2019). They began supporting each other's insurgents and opposition movements (Mosley, 2014:3). Some major Ethiopian insurgent groups include the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Ethiopian Peoples Patriotic Front (EPPF), Ginbot 7, and Amhara democratic force. The Eritrean Government had supported these forces based in Asmara. They greatly contributed to the instability of the region. As a result, both Ethiopia and Eritrea had involved in proxy war, particularly in Somalia. The Government of Ethiopia had been supporting the Transitional Government in Somalia whereas the Union of Islamic the Government of Isayas Afeworki (Lyons, 2009: 174-175). However, many efforts done to reconcile the conflicts by the regional and international bodies it impossible to achieve the rapprochement between Addis Ababa and Asmara until 2018.

➤ **The 2018 Ethiopia Eritrea Peace Agreement**

The border conflicts had halted Eritrean and Ethiopian affairs over the past 20 years, and all the issues were over shadowed by these clashes (Salehi, 2018). The conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea were very harmful for their economy, especially for Ethiopia, a land locked nation with growing economy and population (*ibid*).

➤ **The Role of UAEs for the Peace Agreement**

At first glance, it seems as if the two countries realized the necessity of bilateral relations, but the fact is there was involvement of foreign countries in the peace talks (Lyon, 2019). The African continent is of great importance to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and these two countries have set their strategic interests on the continent.

In many cases, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have benefited from the support of their African allies in regional conflicts. For example, they have called on African countries, to cut off relations with Iran and Qatar or to engage in military aggression in Yemen in their support (*ibid*).

One of the key informants said that,

To assured the Ethiopian and Eritrean not side with Qatar, Turkey and Iran, Saudi and Emirates invest big money to the poorer Horn Africa nations. Out of fear of losing alliance and leaving a positive image on the world, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi acted as mediators in the built up tensions among African states, namely Eritrea and Ethiopia. That would also fulfill their objective of preventing the African states side with Iran or Qatar (KI.5).

From the above argument, we can understand that, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, both Ethiopia's and Eritrean allies, played an active role in Ethiopian prime minister's decision to negotiate with Eritrea with their financial sponsorship. In the light of the agreement between the two African states, as they poured in \$3 billion was a proof of the UAE push in the two states peace talks.

In any case, it appears that the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and, above all, the UAE and Saudi Arabia are making attempts to establish a new regional system based on which the security of the Persian Gulf region is tied to the security of the Horn of Africa region, and for the same reason strengthening their foothold on the African continent and, in appearance, pursuing peace and reconciliation among its political and economic allies (Melvin, 2018, Mosley, 2019, ICG, 2018).

1

On the other hand, Mehari (2016) stated that the UAE has supported Eritrea since its battle for independence from Ethiopia to destabilize the region. The United Arab Emirates is one of the top

¹ KI.1 (Key Informant 1, 07 April 2022) from foreign relation institute

KI.2 (Key Informant 2, 03 April 2022) from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia

KI.3 (Key Informant 3, 09 March 2022) with independent international relation expert and private advisor

KI.4 Key Informant 4, 26 May 2022) from Fiedrich Ebert Stiftung policy advisor

KI.5 (Key Informant 5, 30 March 2022) from Addis Ababa University

KI.6 (key informant 6, 14 March 2022) from Addis Ababa University IPSS

KI.7 (Key Informant 7, 03 April 2022) from AAU,FBE

KI.8 (Key Informant 8, 03 April 2022) from Arba Minch University

KI.9 (Key Informant 9, 30 March 2022) from Ministry of Trade and Regional Integration

KI.10 (Key Informant 10, 30 March 2022) from Ministry of Trade and Regional Integration

KI. 11 (Key Informant 11, 12 May 2022) from Ministry of Finance

KI.12 (Key Informant 12, 20 April 2022) from Investment Commission- Ethiopia

five aid donors to Eritrea, having previously done so directly through the Abu Dhabi Development Fund.

Eritrea established an embassy in the UAE in 1993, followed by a consulate ten years later. Trade between the two countries has grown dramatically, and Eritrea has established Business Councils in the UAE to encourage additional trade. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), one of the best ally for Eritrea continues to expand into the Horn of Africa in 2017 and 2018 to counter Iran's involvement in Yemen and the area. As a result, military bases and commercial ports were overloaded in Djibouti and Somalia (KI.2&KI.1). They said until the emirates long involvement to the Horn in 2008, relation between Ethiopia and UAE was not strengthening, but it was lent its support for Asmara to destabilize Ethiopia. Emirates tried control the red sea and regions to counter Iranian expansions as well as to build big military powers for defending itself as realism argued. Turkey, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, in particular, have attempted to divide and control Somalia by infiltrating the parliament. At the same time, Ethiopia experienced major protests, particularly in 2015, 2016, and 2017.

In 2015, when the Yemen war started, the UAE established its first military bases overseas in the Eritrean port of Assab and this port was transformed into a functioning air bases , deep water port and ,military facility. The move raised the ire of sustainability stronger Ethiopia, which views Eritrea as its primary external threat (Berouk, 2017).

During the installation of the base Ethiopia's fear was the establishment of an enhanced Emirati base would allow an embattled Eritrea to become out of its diplomatic isolation, and even given it the upper hand in their bitter 20-year conflicts (Ibid). Earlier this year (2017), the UAE established a second military base in port of Berbera on self- governing but unrecognized Somaliland, and the move raised hackles in the Horn of Africa (Mosley, 2020).

Not only the Somalia federal government criticized the establishment of the military bases in Somalia, but also Ethiopia was surprised and displeased by the establishment of the base. It is traditionally very close to Somaliland and is wary of all Gulf inroads into the Horn of Africa, which it considers its strategic back yard and an extension of its internal concerns (Melvin, 2018; Mosely, 2020; &Berouk, 2017).

From the above argument, one can understand that, the long involvement of the UAEs to the Horn created dispute between Ethiopia and the emirates. The militarization policy of the UAE

was very critical problems, for land locked Ethiopia. In addition, the emirates ambition to control major import export outlets of the Horn on was taken as the encirclement of Addis Ababa.

To regulate the relations with the emirates, Ethiopian officials flew to Abu Dhabi for talks in late 2015 because the Ethiopians felt slighted by the transactional and tactical approach of their Emirati, and Abu Dhabi and the Hailemariam government quickly found a *modus Vivendi* that worked and steered the relationship through confidence building to an increasingly strategic partnership (Kahn, 2018). Ethiopia had for at least a decade tried to find an international partner to develop Somaliland's Berbera port into a facility capable of handling large volumes of cargo and thereby reduce land-locked Ethiopia's almost total dependence on the port of Djibouti for trade. In addition, Ethiopia, rather than confrontation with the emirates it chooses working cooperatively to counter Egyptian and Eritrea destabilized policy (Mosley, 2020). This new relationship between Ethiopia and UAE, Mosely (2018) though emirates also Ethiopia stand during the Qatar crises used as the entry point for the emirates mediation between Ethiopia and Eritrea . Also emphasizes Abiy's eagerness to reach an agreement with Eritrea, which was backed up by the UAE. Abiy's first speech in April 2018 suggested his aim to mend relations with Eritrea, albeit this was met with suspicion given that Hailemariam echoed similar sentiments when he entered office as premier in 2012, with little effect (Melvin, 2019).

The above arguments show that, despite the EPRDF government's unconditional recognition of the Algiers Peace Agreement, the UAE's presence and mediation role was obvious. That is why, after Eritrea's affirmative response on June 20, Eritrea's team landing in Ethiopia on June 26-28, 2018, the Prime Minister landing in Asmara and being warmly welcomed by the Eritrean government and people. Prime Minister Abiy and President Isayas met in both capitals, Addis Ababa and Asmara, and delivered public statements. "We have decided to open embassies in each other's countries, allow our citizens to visit each other's cities, and allow our airlines and ports to function freely," Abiy said (Associated Press, on 8 July 2018).

Eritrea's President, Isayas Afeworki, also stated the following:

The Eritrean people now have the opportunity to express their sincere love and emotion for Ethiopians; we may believe that the decisions made by Ethiopia's Prime Minister were not easy. We can tell you, however, that we shall confront the future together. We will collaborate as one, in July 2018 (Associated Press).

From the addresses of the two leaders, it is clear that the two countries' distinct national interests have been jeopardized in recent decades. One can understand from the above argument, that

there was an attempt to make peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Under Hailemariam's administration. However, the EPRDF's decision to sideline the TPLF, along with Abiy's predisposition to govern from the prime minister's office, meant that he was in a position to implement some substantial policy changes (Leta, 2003).

According to USIP (2019), before and since Abiy came to power, the Arab states of the Gulf, particularly the UAE, have played a significant role as actors in some of the development and peace processes to aid regional integration processes and in terms of the impacts of their increased activity in the region. During Abiy's first months in office, he toured all surrounding nations, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. He has advocated for a more personalized, collaborative tone in Ethiopian regional diplomacy, and he has attempted to bring the Horn nations together in a collaborative and integrative relationship (KI, 1).

From the above two explanations, we can evaluate that how the new Ethiopian government's involvement in the Horn of Africa has interacted with changing Gulf nation dynamics. Mosley (2018), the Saudis and Emiratis supported Ethiopia and Eritrea in reaching a peace agreement in 2018. Because these two countries were fighting a proxy war with Iran in Yemen and Syria, they did not want Ethiopia and Eritrea to side with Iran. They attempted to protect their national interests by negotiating a peace deal with Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The Emirates have been enticed by Ethiopia's massive economy in the Horn of Africa because the UAE is developing green technology that will assist their economy immensely. The UAE requires markets for its products and technical investment (KI.3, KI.1, KI.1, & KI.5). Hence, the researcher understood from the above two ideas that the mediation of the UAE has two reasons. One to acquire assistance from the two biggest nations in the region when the emirates fought with Qatar and its allies and second they need markets for their technology products in Ethiopia, a country with a more than 110 million population.

Mosley (2018), ICG (2018), and Bloomberg (2022) shared a similar explanation;

The UAE has had a long influence in Eritrea for peace with Ethiopia for at least a decade, including under Hailemariam Desalegn's administration in Ethiopia. The UAE escalated its efforts when Abiy assumed government in April. A month after entering office, Abiy traveled to Abu Dhabi to see His Highness Shaikh Mohammad Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the late Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces. Later, officials from Emirates Red Crescent, a Red Crescent Society member in the UAE, visited Ethiopia to discuss relief programs with Abiy. These visits were in addition to Dubai's attempts to repair ties between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Moreover, ICG (2018) elaborated that the reconciliation of Eritrea and Ethiopia, as well as a flurry of other Horn of Africa diplomacy, has significantly strengthened the Gulf States' importance as geopolitical actors along the Red Sea. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are now at the center of conversations about the region's future, which is nonetheless plagued by volatility and insecurity. One of the key informants similarly shared that, a peace treaty signed by the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea was a package of commercial and security agreements that ended a long-running conflict that had been a critical regional fault line destabilizing the Horn of Africa, and the deal reached on 9 July 2018 by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki ended a 30-year stalemate between the two countries (KI.2.).

From the above argument, it can be understood that Peace reconciliation in the Horn of Africa by the UAE restored peace to the region, helping Ethiopian peace and security, while key informants(KI.1,2,3, &KI,7) desire to offer the Ethiopian Prime Minister more roles in the reconciliation. Normalized relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia would have a stabilizing effect across the Horn of Africa because the region has faced significant challenges, including civil war, support for armed proxies, mass displacements, and humanitarian crises caused by both conflict and poor governance (Melvin, 2018).

In consolidating the above arguments, an informant responded during the interview said, "Though the UAE's mediating role during the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace treaty was quite clear; the event was very crucial for Ethiopia to ensure peace and national security in the region" (KI. 6). He added that, before the rapprochement, Eritrea trained fighters on its territory and created several armed groups to attack Ethiopia.

However, Eritrea's anti-Ethiopian activity has dwindled after the agreement. Even if the two countries' relationship after the peace treaty was not normal as it happened, it did alleviate

tensions between them. Following Eritrea and Ethiopia's reconciliation, the two nations have eased the conflict for more than 30 years, bringing significant benefits to Ethiopia's peace and stability (Mosley, 2019).

From the above arguments delivered by the scholars about the fruits of the reconciliation, we can understand that, First, it has reduced tensions between the two countries and administrations in the years since Eritrea's secession. Nonetheless, following the peace pact People in both nations have rediscovered their passion for traveling from Addis Ababa to Asmara and vice versa. The separated families have been reunited. They even attempted to bring peace to the region by promoting peace and unity amongst their artists. Second, after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed took power, the TPLF, which had traveled to Mekelle, threatened the Ethiopian-Emirati-Eritrean alliance and, according to the Ethiopian government, began an attack on the Northern Command in an attempt to recover power. By releasing Ethiopian troops encircled by the TPLF, Asmara was critical in re-establishing its border.

The TPLF and the West both opposed the decision, but the Ethiopian government worked together to save the country from collapse. The two countries' reunion was recognized as a peace accord that spared Ethiopia from collapse and assured the country's continuity (Mosley, 2018).

"The rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has brought peace and development agreements among surrounding states to the Horn of Africa. He added that following the peace agreement, Eritrea, Somalia, and Eritrea sign peace and development treaties (KI.5). Later, Eritrea and Djibouti signed a peace treaty, and sanctions were lifted. Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea Sign Tripartite Agreement in Asmara, 2018 (Eritrea Ministry of Information, 2018). Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea have geographical, historical, cultural, and religious linkages, as well as vital common interests, according to the pact. The Asmara tripartite agreements have helped to attain these goals by respecting each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. From the above explanation, we can understand that, when the tripartite treaty was signed in Asmara 2018, one of its primary objectives was to collaborate to improve regional peace and security, as well as economic integration. They have been also eager to work together to resolve long-standing regional problems, allegedly agreeing that a more stable Horn of Africa would boost investor confidence and benefit the area.

Eritrea has reestablished connections with Djibouti following a decade-long border dispute and is in negotiations with Ethiopia to resolve the remaining issues. Finally, the prospect of peace

between Ethiopia and Eritrea is expected to calm the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia, a country with a population of over 100 million people, might realize its potential as a regional economic and military power if peace is achieved.

This political capital may be used to help the area become a unified economic powerhouse. One of the key informants said that though the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea brought peace and security for the next two years, since 2018, there was no agreement on what kind of policies the Horn of Africa should have. He said this antagonism of the Horn of Africa leaders with the wish of the UAE and USA, created conflict in Tigray (KI.4).

The battle to dominate the Horn of Africa has weakened the peace that they are attempting to establish because Eritrea closed its borders and the TPLF appeared to have US support, the conflict dragged on, but it was not able to bring enduring peace to the region (KI.1). Similarly, USIP (2019) said that Ethiopia has already used other ports around the Horn of Africa (including Djibouti and Somalia) since the reconciliation. So far, there has been more lessening of political tensions than sustained economic success. The return of Ethiopian opposition leaders and their armed organizations to Ethiopia has removed a severe nuisance while also exacerbating political conflicts that have long plagued governance. From the above arguments, the researcher can learn that the Ethiopian and Eritrea peace Reconciliation in Riyadh- has a long way to go in attaining peace and reconciliation between the two nations, but it is fearful that this peace agreement is not in the interests of the two peoples. Rather, it is in the best interests of the two major Gulf countries. Because Ethiopians who were eager to use the Assab port following the reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea are now confronted with fresh obstacles. It has leased for the UAEs Company for 30 years contract. As a result, the right to use any port in the Horn of Africa is commanded and determined by the emirates and Saudi Arabia, which is extremely perilous for Ethiopia's sovereignty (Melvin, 2018). This is one of the difficulties associated with the UAE's presence in the region. On the other hand, in recent times, despite the reopening of the border between the two nations on September 11, 2018, the lack of demarcation of the border between the two states will likely make the agreement's implementation more difficult than envisaged. This is owing to strong opposition, led by the TPLF, against the method of execution.

Among the other key informants put criticism on the current relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea saying that;

The ongoing fighting between the TPLF and the Eritrean government will make future collaboration and reconciliation attempts between Ethiopia and Eritrea much more difficult. As a result, the peace treaties between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and other Horn of Africa governments remain fragile; only time will tell if they will hold. He added that recently all borders are closed, and diplomatic relationships are almost on the verge of cutting, as Eritrea called its ambassador from Addis Ababa (KI.1).

Moseley (2020) strength this, President Isaias did not attend a ceremony in October 2019 to commemorate the inauguration of Ethiopia's Unity Park (which included heads of state from all other IGAD members), and Eritrea has not resumed its participation in IGAD, despite Ethiopia finally relinquishing the rotating chair to Sudan in November 2019.

Of course, numerous interests, particularly Eritrea and Ethiopia, which were unable to reach the Horn of Africa as they intended because the world's attention was focused on this region, surrounded the peace pact. The same key informant added, "The United States has long had its objectives for the Horn of Africa. When Eritrea is allied with Ethiopia, what Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the United States want in terms of the Horn of Africa design concept matters were difficult" (KI.1). However, they were unable to achieve these goals, resulting in disagreements among the three countries. And Ethiopia was unable to respond to such a query due to internal problems (KI.5, interviewed on 30 March 2022). According to Tekle (2022), Asmara's accusation of the TPLF came just a few days after rebel TPLF fighters and the Eritrean military clashed on two fronts in the border towns of Badme and Rama.

According to the Eritrean Ministry of Information (2022), "it was no secret that the TPLF leaders were planning new military attacks. Their major goal is to re-occupy our land, which international law recognizes as Eritrea's sovereign territory, and to resume their hatred-fueled pillage and atrocities on Eritrean soil." Moreover, an Ethiopian Observer reported (May 30, 2022) that rebel fighters in the Tigray region say fighting has resumed with neighboring Eritrea. Getachew Reda, a spokesperson for the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), reported on Twitter on May 31 that Eritrean forces shelled the Tigray village of Sheraro on May 28 and 29.

Legesse Tulu, an Ethiopian government spokeswoman, told the media that he had no information about the purported combat but that it could be a ploy by the TPLF to blame the Eritrean government the observer concluded its report.

From the above argument, it can be understood that the peace deal agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea was not as the people expected from both sides, because diplomatic and economic relations are now cutting or not at a clear stance. On the other hand, there is a fresh conflict between the TPLF soldiers and Eritrean on the borders, this will very harmful to Ethiopian national security. Inclusive peace treaties are more successful and likely to stick. That is, the groups with complaints, conflicts, or disagreements must participate in the negotiations and agree to accept the outcomes (USAIP, 2019).

This means that Ethiopia's Tigray area, which has the longest border with Eritrea, must play a positive and active role.

The tensions between Abiy's federal government and Tigray's authorities remain high. It is difficult to guarantee a constructive role for Tigray in the Ethiopia-Eritrea deal and sustainable peace between the nations without first reaching a political agreement on the roadmap for Ethiopia's transformation and Tigray's involvement in it (KI.2).

From the above explanation, one can understand that, after a brutal struggle between the TPLF and the Ethiopian federal government, both parties are now spreading misinformation against one another. Though we cannot imagine the period of conflict, it appears that it will occur. The UAE, on the other hand, which mediated the peace and provided military backing to the Ethiopian government, was heavily criticized by the international community, because it lacks inclusiveness, even the reconciliation was made without the participation of the great regional body, IGAD (KI.4).

That is why the TPLF is attempting to end Ethiopia and Eritrea's hidden alliance. As a result, a researcher believes that the UAE's engagement in the Horn of Africa and attempts at reconciliation have heightened tensions in the region more than ever. Somalia, on the other hand, was one of the concerns that Eritrea and Ethiopia had to resolve before they could reconcile.

When Ethiopia sent troops into Somalia in 2007 to assist the interim government in chasing out the Islamic Courts movement, which had control of many places including the capital Mogadishu, the Eritrean government claimed that Ethiopia, the US's main ally in the volatile Horn of Africa region, is deliberately destabilizing Somalia to maintain control over it (Hiiraan online, 2007).

One of the key informants said:

The signing of a Tripartite Agreement' between Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia following the reconciliation in September 2018 reduced the tensions. The

agreements lacked specificity, yet they were critical in ensuring regional peace and stability (KI.6).

The peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea aided attempts by other states, most notably Somalia and Djibouti, to re-establish contacts with Eritrea. In the previous decade, Eritrea's relations with both of these countries have deteriorated. Relations with Somalia deteriorated because of Eritrea's reported support for militant groups in the Somali Civil War. Eritrean President Afwerki and Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed met in Asmara in late July 2018, renewing relations (Yoel, 2018).

Following the restoration of peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a tripartite agreement titled Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Cooperation between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea was signed to collaborate on Horn peace and development. The three leaders' goal was to shape the regional order by their national interests (Eritrea Ministry of Information, 2015).

However, informants said that, though the tripartite agreement have brought peace and development to the region, this agreement are broken following the new president took power in Somalia; Power may shift in the Horn of Africa as Somalia elects a new leader, President Hassan sheik Mohamud. Mohamud, 66, who ruled Somalia from 2012 to 2017, defeated President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known locally as Farmajo, in a run-off election on May 15. While Farmajo developed close ties with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, Mohamud has long had ties with the rulers of Ethiopia's northern Tigray region, which fought a war with Abiy's forces and Eritrean allies from late 2020 until a truce was reached in March (KI.1, KI.2, KI.6& KI.8). According to Bloomberg (2022), the power transfer in Somalia has encouraged the Tigrayans, who are considering attacking the Eritrean capital of Asmara. Tigray Region President Debretsion Gebremichael congratulated Mohamud on his victory and expressed his willingness to collaborate in the overall stability of the area, building on excellent pre-existing relations.

According to (KI.4) President Hassan Sheikh Mohammed, who is said to be linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, established good neighborliness during the EPRDF regime of Ethiopia when he was a Somalia president.

According to the above argument, the newly elected Somalia president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, was a significant ally of the Tgriayan liberation front-TPLF while the front dominated Ethiopian government structures before 2018. During his former presidency, Somalia's new president had tight cooperation with the EPRDF in the war against al-Shabaab. Now, TPLF leaders have affirmed that the president's victory was historic, and those who collaborate with him do so because they believe it values the TPLF. As a result, the TPLF is attempting to sow discord and reclaim power by pitting the Somali government against Ethiopia. On the other hand, the newly elected president believes that the port that Ethiopia is dreaming of in Berbera with DP World is sure to fight with Ethiopia because it not respects Somalia's sovereignty according to the Somalia government. Former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's predecessor, was a strong regional friend of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. In September 2018, the three signed a Horn of Africa tripartite agreement with Eritrea's Isaias Afwerki, promising close political, economic, social, cultural, and security relations. A month before the regional deal, Farmajo inked a similar agreement with Eritrea. Farmajo was hounded by allegations that he sent hundreds of Somali recruits to Eritrea during his tenure. Families of children deported to Eritrea in 2018 have called with the Somali government to respond (The Conversation, 2022). From the above argument, we can understand that, the TPLF regional leaders rejected this link between the three Horn African countries.

On the other hand, Somalia's recently elected president accused the outgoing president of violating the country's sovereignty by selling soldiers to Asmara. As a result, the TPLF hopes to capitalize on these differences in order to reclaim power in Ethiopia and beyond. That is why they celebrate Mohammud, the new and powerful ally of the front, on resuming power in Somalia. Even though the TPLF group submitted this letter as congratulations to the newly elected president, according to one of the key informant interviewees, the regional government has complained against the UAE and the late Somali administration as well.

Because the TPLF believes that, the UAE aided the Ethiopian defense forces when they began fighting with the Ethiopian federal government. On the other hand, the newly elected president views the UAE's involvement in Somalia as detrimental because it divided the country into three major fronts, such as Somaliland, Punt land, and Mogadishu.

This Somalia, particularly the recently elected president, believes that the UAE has violated Somalia's national integration. Furthermore, the TPLF rose to worry about the UAE's direct and indirect involvement in the Ethiopian northern conflict by giving military and financial assistance to the Ethiopian government. Though the information has not been validated, the UAE is admittedly shipping many medical and other humanitarian supplies to Ethiopia, according to a TFIGLOBAL report. The UAE Ambassador to Ethiopia, Mohamed Salem Al Rashedi, stated, "The UAE has a great relationship with Ethiopia, and this help is part of the UAE's wise leadership's directions to provide humanitarian and development assistance to brotherly and friendly peoples." The Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) requires modern armament systems to combat the rising TPLF-backed militants. The UAE was said to be supplying Ethiopia with drones (TFIGLOBAL, reported on 23 October 2021). From the above arguments, one can understand that TPLF requires the newly elected Somali presidents not only to fight Ethiopia but also to prevent the Emirates from dominating Somalia and the region. In addition, TPLF believes that the presence of the UAE in the Horn creates a strong Ethiopia and Eritrea, strong Ethiopia, and Eritrea means the front is insecure which is why it accused UAE much time in the international community. One of the words that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamed stole from Somalia during his election campaign was President Farmajo's attachment to Ethiopia.

He claimed that he has forgotten that he is the leader of a sovereign state. If his rhetoric continues after the election, it will inevitably be a threat to Ethiopia. From the above arguments, it can be understood that the new president of Somalia established good neighborliness during the EPRDF regime of Ethiopia when he was a Somalia president, and its alignment with TPLF was very high. Therefore, following his taking power this tripartite treaty, as well as the peace and security, will be changed because the Eritrean stands will be in a different position.

This is harmful to the region in general for Ethiopia in particular. Similarly, BBC reported (May 24, 2022) that, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo confirmed their presence in Eritrea while transferring over administration to the new president. "The 5,000 soldiers finished their military training last year, but their return was delayed, due to the election season," he stated.

Recruits were accused of being active in the civil war in northern Ethiopia, where the federal government is fighting the Tigray People's Liberation Front. Hassan Mohamud's shocking announcement that Somali troops were shipped to Eritrea for training shows that Somalia suffers from poor relations with Eritrea.

Following the election of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as President of Somalia, the United States has stated its intention to send troops to Mogadishu to fight Al-Shabaab. The Somali president immediately thanked the United States and said he would welcome the request. While this decision may improve relations between the United States and Ethiopia, it will bring difficulties for the tripartite treaty signed between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, and they will not be able to work together (KI.4).

From the above explanation, we can understand that Eritrea, which disagrees with the US and the West, may support al-Shabaab in response to the US deployment of troops to Somalia, which could harm Ethiopia. When reconciliation was made between Ethiopia and Eritrea, four years ago politics was smooth between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea including the UAE. Now politics is changing in the world. After the late president of Somalia, Farmajo defeated, this tripartite relation is a breakout, and this created the changing of political alignments.

The politics in the Horn of Africa is also going too affected. The relationship between Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia is somehow backing crises in the movement because of this regional and global political change. Following the new president come in Somalia, USA, Egypt, and the UAE are coming back to Somalia. For Ethiopia, it is also harmful to its national security. Finally, the researcher thinks that the reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea mediated by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has not been successful since the beginning of time. In particular, the fact that Tigray, which shares the long borders with Eritrea, was not invited, led to the war in Tigray. The involvement of the United Arab Emirates and Somalia in the war has also hampered the reconciliation process between Addis Ababa and Asmara. On the other hand, the UAE did not discuss a single day of sustainable development when it traveled from Djibouti to Asmara, from Asmara to Khartoum to Somaliland has made the country a transitional ally not a permanent friend for a single nation in the Horn. That is why the peace agreement between the two countries, which started secretly, was secretly disbanded and opened up another war zone.

➤ **The UAEs in Somalia and the Security Impacts on Ethiopia**

Somalia has long had cultural, religious, and commercial ties with the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula, which sits across the Gulf of Aden. Throughout the 1980s, Somalia became more reliant on economic assistance from the conservative, wealthy oil-exporting states of Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (Nelson 1982).

When the Somali Civil War began in 1991, the UAE maintained diplomatic relations with the Somali Transitional National Government and its successor, the Transitional Federal Government, and supported their government initiatives. Since its inception in 2010, the UAE has also provided official support to the Punt land Maritime Police Force (Paul 2019).

According to Crisis Group (2018), the late Somali administration's President "Farmajo" pretended to be neutral in the GCC competition; however, the UAE saw it as too close to Qatar.

The decision by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to cut ties with Qatar, and more crucially, their pressure that others follow the lead, has put the Federal Government of Somalia (Somali government) against many of its federal member states. This has posed a significant barrier to the country's beginning state-building process (ISS 2017). The election of Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed in 2017 coincided with increased tensions between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors. Though Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates pressured their regional partners to cut ties with Qatar, Somalia's President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed declared neutrality in the Qatar conflict shortly after taking office. He most likely made this gesture to show unity with Turkey, Somalia's largest foreign investor, which supports Qatar. In doing so, he provoked the UAE, Somalia's main trading partner (Paul, 2019).

Abu Dhabi condemned Somalia's neutrality stance under President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, popularly known as Farmaajo, whose political campaign was supported by Qatar in 2017. The UAE denounced Farmaajo for strengthening ties with Qatar and Turkey; Farmaajo later accused the UAE of financially aiding Somali separatists. Tensions between Somalia and the United Arab Emirates rose in March 2018 when Somalia rejected an Emirati-Somaliland port agreement. Somalia claimed that the UAE had harmed its sovereignty by avoiding direct talks with the central government (Charles, 2021).

On March 23, 2018, the foreign minister of the semi-autonomous Somaliland territory, Saad Ali Shire, stated, "If Somalia decides to attack Somaliland" over the port's development, we shall have the right to defend our territory" (Horn diplomat, 2018).

The relationship between the federal government and the six federal states has been thrown into doubt because of the UAE's growing backing of the President's opponents, particularly the Federal Member States defying central Mogadishu rule. Such schisms erode national institutions, allowing insurgent groups like al-Shabaab to emerge (KI.2).

Since then, the UAE has widened the schism by suspending aid programs and withdrawing personnel from Mogadishu, Somalia's capital. These tensions reached a boiling point in Berbera, a calm port town in Somaliland, a self-proclaimed independent state, according to Chegraoui&Skah et al, (2020). From the above explanations, we can understand that the port, where the UAE is building a massive military complex, is strategically important due to its closeness to Yemen, where the UAE is a member of the current Saudi-led coalition fighting Houthi rebels. The Somali government announced the DP World-Somaliland port-control agreement was invalid. Somalia accused the UAE of arrogance and disgust, claiming that DP World could not legitimately sign the arrangement without the approval of Mogadishu. Therefore, the involvement of the UAE in Somalia created different armed groups, including the strong regional states financed and trained by the UAE and its allies. Krieg(2021)and the same key informant similarly said that, that Somalis have accused the UAE of attempting to partition their country into clan-based fiefdoms by pitting regional administrations, particularly politicians in the northwestern and northeastern regions, against Mogadishu's central government. The UAE has already developed a military base near the coastal city of Berbera. It has also acquired two separate contracts to operate the ports of Berbera and Bossaso in the country's northwestern and northeastern areas, respectively.

The agreements irritated the national government, which petitioned the United Nations Security Council in March to take action against Abu Dhabi for infringing on its sovereignty.

The Gulf countries, notably the UAE, are seeking to militarize the Horn of Africa region by providing military support, military training, and increasing naval forces in the region. In addition, they provide military equipment support to the Horn of Africa governments and factions such as Somaliland. Military equipment assistance and the construction of military bases in this region will have an impact on Ethiopian national security and peace (KI.5).

The same key informant added that Ethiopia's borders with its neighbors are unclear. For example, Ethiopia's borders with Sudan and Ethiopia's borders with Somalia are not defined. Therefore, if the UAE continues to provide military weapons to these nations, Ethiopian stability and security would suffer because one day they will attack Ethiopia, which is extremely dangerous for Ethiopian national security. Similarly, Mengying and Xinfeng (2019) argued that the UAE has also circumvented the federal administration and made direct contact with local state administrations, such as training coast guards in northern Somalia's Punt land region. It has even sold weapons to Somaliland and aided internal terrorists.

From the above arguments, it can be understood that intensified rivalry between Somalia's federal government and federal member states impedes the federal government's effectiveness in state building. Thus, if there is a boundary dispute between Ethiopia and its neighbors, they will try to resolve it by attacking Ethiopia, which will have a direct impact on Ethiopia's security, because they are militarized by the UAE. The United Arab Emirates' development of a military base in the non-recognized state of Somaliland, combined with its considerable investments in the Berbera commercial port, has been a significant cause of tension between the Government of Somalia and the authorities in Somaliland (Telci, 2017). According to the regional security complex theory, most security problems do not move well over long distances, therefore risks in an actor's immediate proximity are likely to be felt the most forcefully.

Regional security complex theory (RSCT) said that, most threats spread more easily over short distances than long distances, security interdependence is typically defined as regionally based clusters: security complexes (Berouk, 2014). Hence, if there is an internal conflict in Somalia following the UAE's involvement, this security may affect Ethiopia. The most failed Somalia government is affecting Ethiopia's peace and security. Therefore, the regional security complex theory is the best theory to study the current involvement of the UAE in the region and its impacts on Ethiopia.

One of the key informants said:

Ethiopia sees a divided Somalia as a major threat. This is because a weak and divided Somalia as a state would serve as a hub for anti-peace forces and extremist groups seeking to disrupt Ethiopia's peace. Furthermore, an unstable Somalia impedes investment and weakens regional economic integration, and it may destabilize the Horn of Africa's peace and stability. As a result, a fragmented Somalia has a direct negative impact on Ethiopia's and the Horn region's peace and stability (KI, 1 & 4).

From the above explanations, we can understand that the UAE's involvement in Somalia was divided and weakened the federal government of Somalia because of its stance during the Qatar crisis in 2017. On the other hand, without the approval of the Somali government, the Emirates government sought vengeance and began constructing the port of Berbera in partnership with Somaliland and Ethiopia. However, one of the key informants said that the issue of Ethiopia's willingness to invest in the multilateral Berbera Port contract was mainly commercial and has nothing to do with the creation of a unified Somalia State.

From Ethiopia's perspective, the Berbera port is the nearest and can open up the large eastern region of Ethiopia to external trade, particularly through the usage of the area's vast livestock resources he said (KI.9).

Therefore, even if the port of Berbera will serve Ethiopia in the new future, it has more drawbacks than advantages; Because Ethiopia received its share without Somalia's approval. For the researcher, the most important thing for Ethiopia is to have a strong Somalia, rather than a port and an interest in Somalia, which the UAE destabilized. Krieg (2021) underlined that the African Union and UN expressed their concerns over the UAE's involvement in Somalia's internal affairs, with the AU claiming that Abu Dhabi's influence might damage the war-torn nation's security and state-building efforts.

The international community is concerned that the UAE's unilateral relationships with illegal regional administrators will weaken the national government's authority throughout the country, emboldening the al Shabab al-Qaida-linked militia. On the other hand, the emirates aggressively supported the Somali breakaway provinces of Punt land and Somaliland to establish a mercenary-led counter-piracy army that would provide the UAE spans throughout the geostrategic ally crucial to the Horn of Africa. From these arguments, we can take that, for its national interests and motivations, the UAE is highly invested in the Horn African nation, at the expense of the federal government of Somalia (Vertin, 2019; Telic&Horz, 2018).

Following Qatar's crisis, the UAE attempted to divide Somalia due to Mogadishu's neutrality on the issues. Furthermore, they attempt to choose personal agreements and relationships with regional governments without the authorization of the Somali government. This has an impact on internal integrity and sovereignty. The sovereignty of the nation was in a dilemma because these regional governments were highly militarized and financed by the UAE. The central government cannot take any action against these regions (KI.4).

From the above argument, we can say that, during their involvement in Somalia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) supported regions for revenge and punishment of the Mogadishu administration, because it had allied with Qatar during the Gulf crises. As a result, they have provided financial assistance and military training to regional militias. Then, they now have a powerful arm, and many regional states, including Somaliland and Punt land, began to act as independent nations, ignoring the federal government. Internationally, it is the violations of rules of sovereignty and independence, agreed upon by the UN and its agencies (*ibid*).

➤ Impacts on GERD

River Nile has long been a source of dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia (Khorrami 2020).

However, the British government's acknowledgment of Egypt's "natural and historical claim to the waters of the Nile" through the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1929 was a major cause of conflict because it required upstream countries to respect these rights (ibid).



Figure 3 Source of Nile River:

Source: <https://www.pinterest.com/pin/426012445977197744/>

The above figure (3) clearly shows the origin and routes of the Blue and White Nile Rivers. The figure is important in this study for comprehending the Nile River issue.

The famous 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan is an insult to the Nile Basin, starting with its entire name (Agreement between the Republic of Sudan and the United Arab Republic of Egypt on the full utilization of the Nile waters). This deal represents the two countries that contribute no Nile waters agreeing to use the Nile's "complete" capacity as if the previous injustices were not enough. By establishing a reservoir at Aswan and sharing the benefits of the dam, these two countries expanded their earlier "shares" in the 1929 agreement (Tedla, 2017).

The famous 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan is an insult to the Nile Basin, starting with its entire name (Agreement between the Republic of Sudan and the United Arab Republic of Egypt on the full utilization of the Nile waters). This deal represents the two countries that contribute no Nile waters agreeing to use the Nile's "complete" capacity as if the previous injustices were not enough. By establishing a reservoir at Aswan and sharing the benefits of the dam, these two countries expanded their earlier "shares" in the 1929 agreement (Tedla, 2017).

When Ethiopia started working on the \$5 billion GERD in 2011, Egypt was in the grip of the Arab Spring. Egypt has campaigned for greater influence over dam construction since Abdel Fattah al-Sisi assumed power in a 2013 coup. Egypt's worries are concentrated on any impact of water flow to Egypt, which claims the lion's share of water rights under colonial-era treaties signed between 1929 and 1959; the Arab League, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, has consistently supported Egypt's position on Nile resources (Mosley, 2019). However, Ethiopia, which supplies more than 80% of Nile water, opposes these colonial-era treaties to which it was not signed and has worked for years to build an alternative framework for regional collaboration through the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), which was launched in 1999 (KI.3). The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Project (GERD) is a hydropower dam being built on the Abbay/Blue Nile River in Ethiopia. With a total annual flow of 77 billion cubic meters, Ethiopia accounts for 86 percent of the Nile flow. Accessing and using Ethiopia's water resources is a question of survival rather than choice. The Nile is an important source of income for Ethiopia's 110 million inhabitants. The GERD intends to lift millions of Ethiopians out of poverty by giving access to energy and affordable electricity to the service, industrial, and agricultural economic sectors.

Furthermore, according to Jenber (2021), Egypt perceives the GERD project as a direct threat and affront to its national security, economic prosperity, and status as a leading power in North Africa. The Egyptian government also attempted to link GERD politics to identity politics to gain support from Arab governments, particularly because Cairo worries Sudan may eventually side with Ethiopia. Before the most recent round of negotiations, Minister Shoukry traveled to Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to convey Egypt's position on the subject, which has received backing from the majority of Arab League members, including the UAE (KI.4&2). As said in the above arguments, Egypt is concerned that the GERD will restrict the flow of Nile freshwater to downstream countries in the coming years. Cairo is demanding a legally binding deal with Ethiopia and Sudan to ensure that this does not happen again.

In recent years, reaching an agreement on this issue has proven difficult. As we have seen from the above argument, Egypt considers the GERD projects as a threat to its national interests.

However, according to Capital newspaper (reported, August 03, 2021) that “Egypt’s major concern was not the flow of water; rather, from a geostrategic standpoint, a rising and assertive Ethiopia may undermine Egypt's diplomatic power in North-East Africa and the Middle East”.

Egypt and Sudan will gain benefits from GERD without investing a single coin, and the negative impacts will be insignificant enough to quiet the strongest critics. They oppose the project because they fear losing geostrategic power and for domestic political consumption interests, the newspaper concluded. From the above arguments, the researcher understood that Egypt's complaint regarding GERD is not due to the River's annual flow. However, their argument is the completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) will promote Ethiopia's total economic activities and position as an African geopolitical power. The Egyptians believed that the larger Ethiopian economy would lead to Addis Ababa's hegemony in the region. When Ethiopia began construction of the dam, it ensured that the yearly flow of the river would not be altered, and both Egypt and Sudan are well aware of this fact. That is why their concerns are more political than technological, even if they may not work today. The completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) will boost the country's overall economic activities and promote Ethiopia as an African geopolitical power (Africa press, 2021). Most people in Ethiopia think today that the recent attempts to disturb the dam is more political rather than technical.

The researcher thinks that Egyptians want to maintain the historic water usage hegemony on the river and the Sudanese follow Egypt though it cannot work in this century. According to Walelign (2021), Khartoum and other parts of Sudan are prone to recurrent flooding due to their location near the convergence of the Blue and White Niles. Furthermore, due to Ethiopia's mountainous topography, practically all of its rivers pour down steep gorges with tremendous intensity. The resulting erosion of fertile topsoil is a disadvantage for Ethiopia, but a boon for Sudan and Egypt. However, there can be too much of a good thing, and the accumulation of silt over time can wreak havoc on a dam's holding ability.

One of the key informants said; "Far from being a threat to Sudan, the GERD should be regarded as a blessing for Sudan. The dam's reservoir will not only hold back extra rainwater, eliminating the possibility of floods, but it will also keep the excess water in a cooler storage region than Sudan has to offer"(KI.2).

He added that it would also significantly lower the amount of silt that flows to Sudan, reducing the likelihood of silt clogging its dams. In other words, Sudan will directly benefit from GERD-generated electricity. The major role of GERD, on the other hand, is to create power, and power generation has no impact on water flow because the water is directed back to the mainstream, therefore it will have no impact on Egypt's Nile water share(KI.3&4).

From the above argument, it is clear that Egypt and Sudan's concerns about the Nile River extend beyond the annual flow of water from Ethiopia. Because they know how the dam benefit their economy in the future. However, it is undermining Ethiopian economic predominance in the region, even if it is impossible. Mehari (2020) said that despite Ethiopia's previous denial that any enforceable agreement concerning its right to the Nile River was unacceptable; the Africa Union (AU) has reached a breakthrough deal and led the three countries to sign a cooperation framework agreement (CFA). At this point, it is unknown what effect such a formal agreement will have on the CFA, or whether Ethiopia's position and interest in the CFA can be maintained at all.

The involvement of the African Union (AU) through the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government emphasizes the notion of African solutions to African problems Ethiopia is keen to reinforce the African Union (AU)-led tripartite negotiation on the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam (GERD) as the union is the best platform for resolving the dispute. However, Egypt and Sudan attempted to undermine AU's mandate saying, "This is an unacceptable (forum) by any parameters (KI.6).

From the above explanations, it can be understood that the Sudanese and Egyptian efforts were to put the colonial treaty into action, which Ethiopia has not signed. However, the influence of interests from outside the region and beyond the African continent will be reduced, and colonial treaties will be given less weight because these colonial treaties established expectations of monopoly and unfair usage of Nile waters. After the AU initiatives failed, Egyptians seeks the UAE, which has significant assets in Ethiopia, and close relations with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. It also has influence in Sudan and maintains strategic ties with Egypt, as Cairo's strong ally in addressing many regional concerns. As a result, it is the best-suited mediator to resolve the GERD dilemma (Al-monitor, 2021). They hoped that the Emirates' mediation efforts in the GERD crisis would be successful in shattering Ethiopian resistance and securing a binding legal agreement between the three countries. According to the most recent Arab League declaration, most members support Sudan and Egypt in their GERD politics.

Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates' growing military and commercial involvement in the Horn of Africa have coincided with drastic political change in some of the region's countries, most notably Sudan and Ethiopia. This interest from Saudi Arabia and the UAE is motivated by a desire to restrict Iranian influence and position them to capitalize on Africa's expanding economic potential, although the two countries will occasionally compete in the region (Telci, 2018). Realism theory said some states may use force from time to time, all states must be prepared to do so-or risk being at the mercy of their militarily more powerful neighbors (Waltz, 1979). Ethiopia and Sudan, the region's political and economic superpowers, are witnessing serious political transformations. Ethiopia is Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, started liberalizing the economy, while Sudan's long-time authoritarian leader, Omar al Bashir, and was deposed by a popular pro-democracy movement (Melvin, 2019).

As the political revolution has overtaken Ethiopia and Sudan, the UAE has acted quickly to ease the severe hard-currency shortages that both countries are experiencing. Mr. Abiy's first move upon taking power in April 2018 was to secure US\$3 billion in aid and investment from the UAE (Steinberg, 2020). Although the important reason for the Saudi-UAE drive into the Horn of Africa is security, the commercial incentive cannot be neglected. The Horn is home to over 160 million people. If the region's sociopolitical conditions improve, further economic integration between the coastal countries and the greater Horn, spurred by the Eritrean-Ethiopian peace treaty and would open up significant potential for trade and investment (Horoz, 2018).

The UAE has increased its investments in the Horn of Africa as a logistics and transshipment powerhouse, to control the regional port management industry and secure commercial shipping lanes. The UAE has a significant advantage in controlling seaways, defining the future of maritime trade in the Red Sea and the western Indian Ocean, and keeping Dubai's Jebel Ali Port as a vital hub of trans-regional business (Mahmud, 2020).

The UAE is militarily and economically interested in the Horn of Africa region, they require a stable region to maintain dominance. Therefore, in terms of the Nile, the UAE's offer to mediate between conflicting parties in the dam dispute indicates its commitment to Red Sea security as well as a rising dependence on crisis diplomacy as a tactic of power projection. Influencing the Red Sea implies having negotiating instruments as well as additional military and commercial choices (KI.1&6).

The UAE has close ties with Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Politically, the UAE and Egypt have agreed to minimize Turkish influence among other things. Since 2013, the UAE's connections with Egypt have grown stronger. The two countries agreed in 2019 to establish a \$20 billion investment fund to assist economic and social projects in Egypt and the UAE. Abu Dhabi and Khartoum have also strengthened ties since Sudan joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Since then, the UAE has donated to Khartoum and has recently offered \$50 million for economic development projects throughout Sudan.

Furthermore, the UAE maintains close political and economic links with Ethiopia. Between 2010 and 2019, Addis Ababa and Abu Dhabi traded for approximately \$450 million (Aldardari, 2019). Informants said the United Arab Emirates and Saudis could play a prominent role in fostering collaboration because of their close ties with Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. To do so, they must avoid antagonizing one side in favor of the other; that is, they must set aside their particular relations with Cairo and act neutrally (KI.4). The UAE and Saudi Arabia have several reasons to cooperate, including the desire to protect their food security interests, maintain their difficult regional influence, and potentially gain an advantage over Iran, Qatar, and Turkey (KI.1&5).

Since the unsuccessful GERD negotiations in Africa Union and the UN Security Council, only limited regional mediation exists, and perhaps it is now the turn of the emirates. The UAE has significant ties with Ethiopia and supports its administration in a variety of situations, particularly internal conflicts. Its strong diplomatic history with Egypt is also well known, as the two countries share many common views and positions. Indeed, Egypt has been waiting for the UAE's involvement from the beginning of the GERD crisis, believing that their pressure on Ethiopian leadership will persuade them to meet Egyptian demands (El-Menawey, 2022).

From the above argument, one can understand that the UAE's and Saudis' recent peacemaking efforts between Eritrea and Ethiopia and boost their global profiles as negotiators if they can play a key role in creating a long-term solution to one of the region's most contentious challenges. They might take comfort in Cairo's lack of other options to ideological differences with Iran and Turkey, Egypt is unlikely to respond to Emirati and Saudi calls for compromise by moving to Ankara or Tehran.

Given Abu Dhabi and Riyadh's recent increasing involvement in the Horn of Africa, Cairo cannot rely on its key Arab allies to encourage Ethiopia to take a more constructive approach. Furthermore, given Ethiopia and Sudan's roles in supplying food to these nations, they are unlikely to interfere in Egypt's favor because GERD might boost their food security. The dam can regulate water flow into Sudanese farmland, a substantial portion of which is leased to Emirati and Saudi Arabian enterprises due to these nations' preference for Sudan as a food basket (Khorrami, 2020).

Regarding the GERD, the UAE has not published a statement in support of any one country about the dam, its position is less clear than that of other Gulf States. It has, however, joined its Gulf neighbors in expressing support for a diplomatic dialogue between the three countries to assure all parties' water security. The UAE has also expressed an interest in mediating. This may be due to its close relation with Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt (KI.2).

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) believes that a successful conclusion of negotiations on the GERD is within reach and recognizes the great opportunity it presents to enhance and accelerate regional integration. Bolstering cooperation and sustainable development in the region and beyond in the spirit of "African solutions to African challenges," according to a statement issued by the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the Security Council on 3 August 2022 (All African.com, 7 August 2022).

In this context, we can understand that, the UAE emphasizes the African Union's (AU) critical role, welcomes the three nations' commitment to the AU-led negotiations, and encourages them to continue negotiating in good faith. The UAE supports the parties' goals of reaching an agreement and resolving their disagreements in order to maximize the benefits to them and their people. The UAE is operating by its vision for the region's future, in which it wishes to play a larger role than any other country, through investments and relations in the Horn of Africa. The UAE maintains close ties with Ethiopia and Sudan.

The UAE has billions of dollars invested there, to extend its dominion over the region's straits in the southern Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, thereby dominating the higher waters. The emirates adopted neutrality on the Nile River as a policy (Teller Report, 2021). From the above explanations, one can understand that despite Cairo and Khartoum's requests for assistance; the UAE has advocated the continuation of meaningful diplomatic conversations and fruitful negotiations to resolve any disputes.

This impartial stance could be critical for Ethiopia's security. Whenever Mohammed bin Zayed talked Al-Sisi about the dam concern in 2021, he expressed the UAE's desire to alleviate the GERD conflicts among the three states. On March 26, 2021, the UAE formally offered to mediate the dam dispute, and on March 31, the UAE invited Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt's foreign ministers to Abu Dhabi for dam discussions (Ramani, 2021).

The UAE aims to mediate an agreement that would allow Ethiopia to fill the dam while also ensuring that downstream countries Egypt and Sudan have enough access to Nile River water. Of course, the UAE-Ethiopia alliance infuriated Egyptians. Many Egyptian scholars and governmental institutions stated that the UAE was unwilling to engage in one of Egypt's primary security concerns in the region because Abu Dhabi was hesitant to put the pressure on Ethiopia that Cairo desired to facilitate a political and legal settlement involving the construction, filling, and operation of the GERD (Al-monitor, 20219).

When the UAE provided humanitarian help to Ethiopia's Tigray region, including 46 tons of food and health supplies, they said it was by the state's leadership's directions to provide humanitarian and development aid to brotherly and friendly peoples. However, Egyptian officials stated that the Emiratis support Ethiopia in its fight against the TPLF. This could spark a conflict between the UAE and Egypt. Egypt backed the TPLF, placing Cairo and Abu Dhabi in confrontation (KI.6).

He said The Egyptian government has escalated its long-standing policy of destabilizing and undermining Ethiopia by "fully supporting anti-peace elements" and pitting neighbors against it. Egypt has increased its efforts to destabilize Ethiopia and the fragile Horn of Africa region."

One of the key informants similarly said; "the Egyptian establishment has been providing financial, military, and diplomatic assistance to arm and unarmed Ethiopian forces for more than a half-century to destabilize and weaken Ethiopia and thwart its ambition to exploit the Nile River's resources". Egyptians are backing the 'Gumuz' rebels and TPLF forces to destabilize Addis Ababa to achieve their objectives. From the above arguments, one can understand that The Egyptians are looking for a stronghold for Gumuz as well as the militarily defeated and outlawed Tigray People's Liberation Front.

The Egyptians are looking for a base for Gumuz, as well as the militarily defeated and outlawed Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which they previously sponsored, and other factions. The Egyptian government is also pushing Sudan into a fight with Ethiopia to weaken both countries. Egypt's objective of attempting to gain a foothold in the Horn of Africa is intended to restore the country's dominance in the Middle East.

For decades, Egypt positioned itself as a mediator in the Middle East crisis, gaining political, financial, and military assistance from the West. However, the growth of Gulf countries and other Arab world allies aided in the reduction of Egyptian power in the region. These attempts raise tensions between the UAE and Egypt, prompting Cairo to accuse the UAE of taking a neutral stance on the GERD dispute issues.

On 6 Nov 2020 UAE then Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan commented on the Ethiopian crisis during a phone call with Josep Borrell, the EU high representative for foreign affairs. He said *“The UAE stands with friendly countries in their war against terrorism and extremism,”* about the UAE's support for the Ethiopian government against the TPLF.

The Emirate's support for Ethiopia in its war against the TPLF could trigger a crisis between the UAE and Egypt. Egypt might step in to support the TPLF, putting Cairo and Abu Dhabi in indirect conflict (Tone Times News, 2020).

These rivalries between Egypt and the UAE in the region for dominance help Ethiopia in some cases by reducing Egypt's long hand towards destabilizing the nation and the Horn in general. Egyptians blamed the emirates for linking the UAE's position on the Renaissance Dam and all African issues to Israel's strategy and goals. Throughout the continent, noting that there is a widespread belief that Israel is using the UAE as a diplomatic tool in the continent, capitalizing on Abu Dhabi's ability to leverage its economic power. Cairo appears to be irritated by Abu Dhabi's stance on the dam situation. Indeed, the Emirati mediation on the Sudan-Ethiopia border issue generates suspicion in Egypt, as it is designed to buy a Sudanese position on the dam in favor of the Ethiopian position (teller report, 2021).

“While the emirates have excellent relationships with Ethiopia in many ways, including diplomatic and economic, they have also begun agricultural development projects in Egypt and Sudan using the Nile. As a result, Egypt has a competitive advantage over Ethiopia in the water sector” (KI.5).

Individually, the emirates stated that the GERD politics and disagreements should be resolved through discussions. Conflict and mistrust between Egypt and Ethiopia, domestic pressures, rising tides of nationalism, and climate unpredictability have all indicated that Nile issues are likely to remain tense in the years ahead. However, the UAE is ideally positioned to take the lead in supporting Egypt (Mehari, 2016).

Though many scholars pointed out some of the UAE's neutrality on the GERD dam issue, the researcher argued that the UAE has good ties with Ethiopia, but it will continue to support Egypt and Sudan in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam because the UAE maintains strategic ties with Egypt and Sudan. As previously stated, the main purpose of the UAE's engagement in the Horn was to combat a group known as the Muslim Brotherhood. Following the election of the Muslim Brother Morsi, the UAE and Saudi Arabia began organizing a coup d'état with the Egyptian military.

They not only contacted the then-Minister of Defence, Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi but also they organized anti-Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood protest movement, which had formed around an alliance of young activists known as Tamarrud ("revolt"). General al-Sisi led the military coup that ousted the government and assumed control (Harb 2017).

For realism theory, the battle for power as a defensive strategy is based on the anarchy structure of the international system. Internationally, the environment in which nations function, or the structure of their system, is determined by the fact that certain states prioritize survival over other short-term goals and act with relative efficiency to attain that goal (Waltz, 1979).

One of the key informants similarly said that the Emirates are no such long-term friend. With whom they engage, it is only for a limited period. In addition, their influences on what is so ever going on in this region will be short-lived because they have transactional aspects of the emirates engagement. Therefore, when they were friendly with Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt, they tried to mediate the GERD politics but again they lost interest sometimes (KI.4). He said, *"they can't find something tangible out of that transactional engagement"*. The same applies to the Emirate's attempt to mediate Ethiopia and Sudan on the contestable international boundary, it was short-lived. They tried when they perceived it was complex they left it out. Thus, they have a chance to play a role, positive or negative but they are not reliable. Most of the time complicate things further rather than find solutions.

From the above arguments, it can be understood that the involvement of the UAE in the Horn of Africa was to protect its short-term interests, which were countering Iranian and Qatar expansions to the region. On the other hand, Egypt is the UAE's right hand in the Horn of Africa, balancing the region's Muslim Brotherhood movement. Therefore, the UAE may not want to see Egyptian as well as Suddenness bored presidents because of Nile River water.

The Emirate's proposal for a negotiated solution to the Renaissance Dam issue was supported by Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt, and has been endorsed by other countries and institutions. Nevertheless, informally they have said, let me mediate these discussions. “This is seen as an impediment to Ethiopia's efforts to bring the matter to the forefront of the African Union, and the UAE's approach is seen as a rejection of the AU's decision. In addition to supporting the Egyptian cause, the Emiratis' claim is a great loss to Ethiopia (KI.6). Although the country has not taken a clear stance on the dam, it has shown its support for Egypt, which could lead to other security problems in Ethiopia, including the disruption of the dam (KI.2).

When Addis Ababa refuses the June 15 Arab League resolution seeking a UN Security Council intervention in the dispute between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan over the filling of the GERD, all opportunities for the UAE's direct engagement as a mediator in the regional conflict are shattered (KI.6). Abu Dhabi was thought capable of playing a positive role in breaking the diplomatic stalemate; nevertheless, Abiy Ahmed was sticking to his 'African solutions for African problems' stance, accusing the Arab League proposal of attempting to 'Arabize' a wholly African issue (Italian institute for international political studies, 2021).

From the above explanations, it is obvious that, while the UAE's stance on the GERD is unclear and appears neutral, the emirates are still on the side of Egyptian benefits. Whenever Egypt raises the issue of GERD as an agenda item at an Arab League meeting, the GCC countries back Egypt. Even though Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have had good relations with Ethiopia since 2018, they have consistently sided with Egypt and echoed its claim for historic water rights in recent Arab League sessions, and the league has issued repeated resolutions on the GERD. Despite having an economic relationship with Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia affirmed its support for Egypt's position in the GERD dispute, which calls for all parties to reach a binding agreement regarding the operation of the massive project, and pledged to work with Cairo to overcome obstacles and increase economic cooperation.

Saudi added that this is to strengthen the preservation of peace and security on the African continent by engaging in serious negotiations between the concerned GERD parties, as this is the best solution to reaching an agreement that satisfies all parties, and the importance of exerting good efforts during the negotiation process (leader's magazine, 2020).

This demonstrates that the GCC countries' stance on Ethiopia's disagreement with Egypt over Nile politics is influencing Ethiopia-Gulf relations. Moreover, none of the Arab League states has welcomed the projects that are currently being built in Ethiopia. That is why the league expresses its concerns over the GERD filling and starting of energy generation, stating that Ethiopia must not fill the dam without the consent of the three countries. This is a symbol of the league's support for Egyptian and Sudanese positions on the Nile River. Thus, the neutrality of the UAE is symbolic not reality because they give full support to Egyptians regarding the Nile water.

"Though behind Ethiopia's antagonism with Egypt is their long-running conflict over the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam." The Gulf crises and protracted presence in the Horn of Africa complicated Nile water discussions. Despite severe tensions over the planned expulsion of thousands of undocumented Ethiopian migrant workers because Saudi wants Ethiopia to embrace what Egypt wants, Ethiopian relations with Saudi Arabia remain amicable. The kingdom remains a significant source of finance for Ethiopia, but the Saudis' rising military presence in the Horn feeds into long-held Christian worries of Arab/Muslim powers (KI.2).

The kingdom remains a significant source of investment for Ethiopia, but the Saudis' rising military presence in the Horn of Africa plays into old Christian worries of Arab/Muslim powers. Ethiopia has borne the most severe impacts, with an estimated 500,000 workers in Saudi Arabia alone. Around 23,000 Ethiopians in the country face deportation. The scenario has political overtones: both Saudi Arabia and the UAE appear to be attempting to use the possibility of mass expulsion to push Horn governments into breaking ties with Qatar (ICG, 2017).

From the above argument, one can understand that the Gulf nations, especially the Saudi and UAE pushing Ethiopia to accept Egypt's demand regarding the Nile water issues.

The involvement of the UAE in the Horn makes Ethiopia stressed regarding the GERD, national security projects, not only elevate the country economically, and solidify its role in the African region, but to also unite a nation fractured by recent changes in government, and ethnic violence. "Egypt has succeeded in convincing the Arab world that Ethiopia is posing threat to Egypt's water rights". This is because of the delays of the construction of the project due to internal problems in Ethiopia (KI.1).

According to De Waal (2019), given Cairo's strategic importance to the Arab world, the GCC countries consider Egypt's stability as crucial to maintaining the regional balance of power. For that purpose, they back Egypt's claim on dam filling and related concerns, which is detrimental to Ethiopia's interests. In conclusion, the involvement of the UAE in the Horn of Africa increased regional tensions, especially between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt. Egypt and Sudan supported internal conflicts to weaken the federal government. This will be dangerous for Ethiopia's peace and security conditions in the region.

4.2. Economic Impacts on Ethiopia

As we have seen about the political impacts of the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa since 2018 the case of Ethiopia, the involvement affected Ethiopian peace and security including the GERD. In this section, we also discuss the economic impacts of the UAE's involvement in the horn of Africa for Ethiopia. The section examines the trade, investment, investment in port development, and aid of the UAE in the Horn of Africa and its impacts on Ethiopia.

4.2.1. Trade

Ethiopia's relationship with the Gulf began with long-distance trading relations before the seventh century A.D. However, this long-standing link has not developed as much as it should have into significant economic and political ties and mutual benefits (Jenber, 2021).

Ethiopia and the Gulf have had trading links for a long time. However, until the early 2000s, trade exchange remained extremely limited. Recently, the GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait, have risen to the top of Ethiopia's trading partners list (KI.9).

Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates established diplomatic ties in 1973. Until Ethiopia launched its Dubai Consular Office in August 2003, the UAE was accredited to the Riyadh embassy. Because of the two nations' rapidly expanding commercial and political ties, the United Arab Emirates established an embassy in Addis Ababa in 2012. Similarly, Ethiopia established an embassy in Abu Dhabi in 2013 (Ministry of foreign affairs, accessed on 10 May 2022).

Many exchanges of official delegations have occurred since the two countries expanded their relations at the level of embassies in their respective capitals. The two sides established the Joint Ministerial Commission (the first meeting was held in March 2007 in Abu Dhabi, and the second in March 2010 in Addis Ababa), which is regarded as one of the manifestations of the two nations' strengthening relations (*ibid*).

Over the previous ten years, the two countries' trading relationship has grown significantly. Ethiopia exports agricultural and semi-processed commodities such as coffee, skin, fruit and vegetables, live animals, meat and meat products, cereals, spices, oilseeds, natural gum, chickpeas, kidney beans, sesame seeds, and flower and vegetables, among others, and imports from the United Arab Emirates petroleum, lubricants, and grease, vehicles, electronics, woven fabrics, fertilizers, machinery, aluminum, ceramics, and consumer goods (KI.9).

The same informant said the founding of the Gulf Pharmaceutical Industry in Addis Ababa and the opening of the international office of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Addis Ababa prepared the ground for the two nations' trade relations to be developed. The United Arab Emirates has made considerable investments in ports, logistics, and trade advancements to safeguard its port empire across the strategically important Bab el-Mandeb Strait by the Red Sea, while considerably increasing its international trade and regional soft power (Melvin, 2019). Ethiopia has been a crucial platform for expanding Emirati influence, with Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia helping to arrange a peace accord with Eritrea following a two-year state of war between the two countries (Mosley, 2019 &advani, 2019).

Following the Arab revolutions that began in 2010, and particularly in the aftermath of the disastrous Saudi-led war in Yemen that began in 2015, the UAE has led a concerted confrontational foreign policy. With the rise of China's globally ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, India's ambitions in the Indian Ocean and Western states' efforts to maintain military hegemony in the region, Gulf States are positioning themselves as mediators of maritime routes and territorial hinterlands surrounding the Arabian Peninsula (Advani, 2019). “To serve their national interests and maintain dominance in the Horn region, the Gulf nations, particularly the UAE, have increased their investments in the Horn of Africa, focusing on infrastructures such as roads, investment, real estate, humanitarian, banking, and port sectors. This will benefit Ethiopia by bridging gaps in investment attractiveness, port availability, and infrastructure development capacities such as roads, among other things” (KI.8). He added that banking development has also benefited from the UAE's presence in the Horn of Africa, as it has deposited \$3 billion at Ethiopia's national bank and has backed Ethiopian green initiatives in Addis, such as the Unity Park project, which is extremely beneficial to Ethiopians (KI.4).

The above arguments show that the Gulf nations' involvement in the Horn region resulted in substantial shifts in trade. Ethiopia has been a crucial platform for expanding Emirati influence, with Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia helping to arrange a peace accord with Eritrea following a twenty-year state of war between the two countries. Since then, it has continued to enter Ethiopia with aid while also carrying out critical development initiatives.

The UAE also agreed to finance an oil pipeline between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and Emirati corporations have boosted their investment in Ethiopia in particular. Furthermore, it strengthens the UAE's soft power because the states are more reliant on its presence (Mosley, 2019).

Such measures are also an attempt to compete with Turkey, Iran, and Qatar, whose growing connections with East African states are causing Abu Dhabi concern. Both events are considered provocative by the UAE, which has since attempted to support Somalia's autonomous areas while undermining the Somali government (Jenber, 2021). DP World, the UAE's sea-trade facilitator, had invested \$442 million in Somaliland's Berbera port. According to DP World, this opens a new point of access to the Red Sea and will complement DP World's existing port in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa.

In April, DP World's chairperson visited the President of Puntland, another Somali autonomous territory, to discuss more investments in the UAE-developed Bosaso port. In February, the UAE and Ethiopia committed to working together to make Somaliland a "major regional trading hub," which will assist the UAE's partner Ethiopia to obtain more market access and, in turn, strengthen the UAE's trading and economic capabilities. Furthermore, the UAE's connection with Ethiopia, which also invests in Somaliland's Berbera port, has assisted it in gaining greater influence over it (ICG, 2019). Ethiopia is a major commercial partner for the UAE, and the two nations have strong cultural and familial links on a variety of fronts. In East Africa, Ethiopia is a major commercial and business partner for the UAE. The country offers a big and growing consumer market of up to 110 million people, as well as promising economic potential and vast, diverse resources that remain mostly unexplored in a variety of areas (Mosely, 2020).

This collaboration also demonstrated Ethiopia's involvement in EXPO Dubai to expand opportunities for bilateral commerce exchanges with participating countries during the World's Greatest Show (Emirate news agency, 2019). One of the key informants said the two countries' trade relations are in a good position during the last ten years. For instance, the trade relation between Ethiopia and UAE in 1997 was 3.3 million dollars.

In the last five years, trade relations between the two nations have topped 2.5 billion USD. Between 2016 and 2020, Ethiopian exports to the UAE were more than 650 million USD, while imports from the UAE totaled more than 1.8 billion USD (KI.9).

As various official export data and the following table demonstrate, almost all Ethiopian exports rely primarily on agricultural items (Ministry of foreign affairs, accessed on 8 June 2022). Ethiopia's main export item is coffee, followed by oil seed, animal, and animal products, and pulses. Although coffee is Ethiopia's dominant export product, meat and meat products, oilseed, pulses, and other animal products account for the majority of Ethiopian export products to the UAE market (Ethiopia's Recent Trade Performance) (KI.9).

Table 4.1 Ethiopia export to UAE (2016-21)

Year	Ethiopia export to UAE (USD Million)	Growth in %	UAE's share of Ethiopian allover export in%
2016	91,159,408.98		3.48
2017	127,638,054.28	40	4.46
2018	111,178,022.29	-13	3.93
2019	135,243,548.87	22	5.05
2020	185,573,157.90	37	6.36
2021	198,876,349.60	41	7.1
Total	650,792,192.32		

Source: Ministry of Trade and Regional Integration- May 2022.

From table 1, one can understand that in the last six years Ethiopia's export to UAE has increased. For instance, in 2016, Ethiopia exported 91.3 million dollars, and in 2017, it was 127.63 million dollars. On the other hand, in 2018 and 2019, it was 111.178 and 135.2 million dollars and during 2020 Ethiopia exports about 185.57 million dollars and it reached 198.87 million dollars in 2021 to the UAE (email interview with the ministry of trade on 30 March 2022).

In order to elaborate more, when we see the export trends of Ethiopia in 2020, Ethiopia exported \$247M to UAE. During the last 23 years, the exports of Ethiopia to the United Arab Emirates have increased at an annualized rate of 20.6%, from \$3.31M in 1997 to \$247M in 2020 (KI.9). According to above table 1, Ethiopia's economy is in its early phases of development, and the majorities of its exports to the United Arab Emirates are agricultural commodities rather than manufactured goods. From the above figures, the trade relation between Ethiopia and UAE has been increasing in the last ten years this will have a positive impact on the Ethiopian economy.

Again, from the above data, one can understand that the Ethiopian export rate is growing. For example, Ethiopia's exports increased by 40% in 2017 from 2016 and decreased to -13% in 2018. According to the one key informant from the Ministry, the decline in the export in 2018 was due to internal conflict and drought.

In addition, it rises to 22% in 2019 and 37% in 2020. On the other hand, the UAE's share of Ethiopia's export is 6.38%, which is almost double 2016, 3.48% this also shows us that the trade relationship is still increasing and the involvement of the UAE in the Horn of Africa is benefiting Ethiopian economy.

Table 4.2 Ethiopia's import from UAE (2016-22)

Years	Import (USD million)	Growth	UAEs Share Ethiopian All import (%)	Trade Turn Over With UAE	Growth	Trade balance with UAE
2016	393,895,397.65		2.34	485,054,807		-302,735,989
2017	260,554,970.40	-34	1.73	388,95,025	-20	-132,916,016
2018	375,101,447.48	44	2.26	486,279,470	25	-263,923,425
2019	387,166,915.18	3	2.65	822,440,464	7	-251,923,366
2020	798	22	3.68	657,127,881	26	-288,951,566
2021/22	800 million dollars	41				
Total	3.7 billion			2,539,065,640		1,237,481,262

Source: Ministry of Trade and Regional Integration, May 2022

From the above table 2, we can understand that Ethiopia's imports from the UAE in 2022 were 800 million dollars, which is more than double 2016, 393.8 million. In 2017, Ethiopia imports 260.5 million dollars and in 2018, it was 375.10, in 2019, it was again 387.1 and finally in 2020 was 471.5 million dollars (email interview on 30, March 2022). The UAE exported \$798 million to Ethiopia in 2020. The main products exported by the UAE to Ethiopia are refined petroleum (\$253 million), nitrogenous fertilizers (\$54.7 million), and automobiles (\$41.6 million). United Arab Emirates exports to Ethiopia have increased at an annual rate of 16.5 percent over the last 23 years, from \$23.8 million in 1997 to \$798 million in 2020 (UAE profile, accessed on 08 June 2022). From the above data, one can understand that the UAE-Ethiopia relations especially in the last ten years are increasing over the previous ten years; Ethiopia's trade relationship with countries in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has made significant growth.

Ethiopia's double-digit economy is an appealing package for firms not only in the UAE but also throughout the Arab world. When we see the trade turnover between the two countries. From 2015 to 2020, the total trade turnover between Ethiopia and the UAE was more than 2.53 billion USD. It was 460.99 million in 2015, and it was increased to 522 million USD in 2019 and 657 million USD in 2020. This demonstrated that trade between Ethiopia and the UAE is on the right track because the turnover of a particular stock market is a solid indicator of the market's general good conditions. Market turnover measures the amount of trading activity that occurred on a given business day in the market as whole or individual stocks, and it can be expressed in two ways: traded value in rupees and traded volume in transactions. Higher stock turnover suggests better liquidity, which means the stock is simpler to sell in the market (Encyclopedia, accessed on 9 June 2022).

4.2.2. Investment

As previously said, the Gulf States' engagement in the Horn was to secure both short- and long-term interests. In the short term, the Yemen war, for example, made it critical for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to establish a Red Sea military base. Economically, they aspire to enter undeveloped ports, energy, and consumer sectors in the Horn of Africa as gateways to rapid economic expansion across the continent (Mosley, 2020). The UAE, Qatar, and Turkey, in particular, see China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which includes projects in East Africa, as an opportunity to strengthen their ties with Beijing (ICG, 2019). One of the key informants said; “until 2014, there was a food shortage in the Arab world. Around 2014, the Gulf nations came up with the idea of diversification of the economy plan and started investing to develop agriculture in East Africa, especially in Sudan” (KI.1). From the above explanations, one can understand that the Gulf's involvement in the Horn focuses on policy problems important to the power structure, including economic and security policy: GCC countries are entirely reliant on oil exports for revenue, but recent fluctuations in the energy market are forcing them to diversify their economic foundation. The involvement of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the Horn of Africa before Yemen's proxy war against their archenemy Iran was also boosting their interest in military and economic participation in the Horn of Africa (DIIS, 2019).

The Gulf countries' race for economic and political power in the strategically vital Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been competing with Qatar and its ally Turkey to forge alliances with countries in the predominantly Muslim peninsula that hugs the western coast of the Red Sea corridor, a major international shipping lane that connects the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean and transports an estimated \$700 billion in seaborne commerce annually (Mosley, 2019).

In order to control the trade route the Gulf nations were deeply involved in the Horn of Africa. A politically turbulent period in the Horn of Africa combined with a low oil price of USD 20 to USD 40 per barrel in the 1990s. Following a rise in food prices in 2008, the Gulf States rushed to purchase farmland in Sudan and Ethiopia as a safeguard for food shortages. The Gulf States invested \$13 billion in the Horn of Africa between 2000 and 2017, primarily in Sudan and Ethiopia. One of the most essential aspects of Gulf business is the investment of funds outside. Gulf countries (such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Oman) have been working for some time to maximize their returns in emerging foreign markets (Gas, energy, exploration, and drilling), as well as from other sources such as real estate companies, shipping companies, and industrial establishments, and other such investments that benefit these countries' economies (The Economist, 2019).

Table 4.3 Gulf countries' investment in the Horn of Africa 2000-2017

		National alignment of investor			
					
		Saudi Arabia	United Arab Emirates	Qatar	Kuwait
Recipient		233	104	12	16
		16	19	4	13
		1	2	2	1
		1	5	-	-
		1	3	-	1

Source: Riyal Politick (clingendael.org)

The table above represents the number of investments made in the Horn of Africa by each Gulf state between 2000 and 2017, and we can conclude that Ethiopia and Sudan received the greatest investments. Although this pattern may represent Sudan's historical and religious ties to the Gulf to some extent, it indicates that they are involved at a high rate. During the given time, Ethiopia received 233 investment projects from Saudi, 104 from UAE, 16 from Kuwait, and 12 projects from Qatar. In the years 2000-to 2017, Ethiopia was the first investment destination for the Gulf countries. The focus of investments on Ethiopia and Sudan also reflects the relative prominence of these two states in regional affairs, enhancing their advantage. Around one-third of Ethiopian investments were concentrated in Addis Ababa (mostly in industry and a variety of services), another third in the Oromia region, and the other third was dispersed throughout the country mainly in both agriculture and manufacturing (Meester, Berg, et al., 2018). Since 2018, the UAE has been particularly drawn to Ethiopia's political transition and subsequent economic reforms,

demonstrating its desire to invest in the country.

The UAE's rising ambition to capitalize on Ethiopia's advantageous economic conditions, along with its goal to keep its regional competitors out of the region, prompted Abu Dhabi to increase its participation in Ethiopia. The UAE has committed 3 billion USD (one billion in assistance, which was immediately deposited in the National Bank of Ethiopia, and two billion in investments) to help Ethiopia's political and economic reforms under the new government (Cafiero&Cok, 2020). Eagle Hills, an Abu Dhabi Real Estate Company, invested two billion USD (T.G., 2019) in a real estate project in Addis Ababa that has the potential to revolutionize the image of the city and enhance the lives of thousands of Ethiopians by creating job opportunities and addressing housing issues. This day was the long involvement of the UAE in the Ethiopian economy via investment and aid instruments. Ethiopia possesses vast irrigable farmlands with fertile soils and a suitable climate for the production of a diverse range of crops, fruits, and vegetables, which can attract foreign direct investment.

GCC countries, on the other hand, has the desire and capacity to capitalize on Ethiopia's attractive economic and investment opportunities. Because the majority of these countries rely on imported foods, they must invest, primarily in agriculture, which would benefit both sides by enhancing cooperation and development (KI.7&9). From the above explanations, one can understand that the investment opportunities in Ethiopia have attracted the Gulf nations, especially the UAE to feed its people and diversified their economy following the oil price fluctuation since 2008.

Table 4.4 Licensed UAEs Investment Projects by Sectors (May 2002- February 2022.

No	sector	Total	Pre-implementation	implementation	Operation			
		No of project	No of project	No of projects	No of projects	Capital in “000”	Perm empl	Tem emp
1	Agriculture	21	7	6	8	394,998	570	587
2	Manufacturing	64	24	12	28	2,694,076	1,139	10,540
3	Mining	1			1	34,891	30	40
4	Education	1			1	2000	20	40
5	Health	1			1	2000	12	
6	Hotels and restaurants	3	2		1	4500	20	
7	Transport, storage, and communication	2			2	14,300	20	
8	Real estate	22	4	3	15	130,431	207	91
9	Constriction	8	1	4	3	122,091	38	25
10	Others	3		1	2	16,800	26	20
11	Grand Total	126	38	26	62	3,418,147	2,082	11,363

Source: Investment commission-Ethiopia, April 2022

Table 4, shows the summary of licensed UAEs investment projects by sectors and status from 17 May 2002- to 09 February 2022. From the table 5, we can understand that the UAE's involvement in Ethiopia via investment is increasing. From 2002 to 2022, 126 UAEs projects were invested in Ethiopia. Their capital was 3.41 billion ETB. Of the 126 projects, 38 are still pre-implementation and 26 projects are started their implementation. On the other hand, of the 126 projects about 62 are started and produced the services. According to the investment commission, the UAE companies create permanent jobs for about 2,082 Ethiopian and about 11,363 temporary employments for Ethiopians (KI.11). From the table, we can also understand that the main sectors of the UAE investment are manufacturing, real estate, agriculture, and construction sectors, which are the main Ethiopian income generator as well as employments alternative for Ethiopians.

As seen in table three, manufacturing and agriculture have the biggest investment value of the main industries. These two sectors are generally seen as critical assets for the Gulf and the Horn of Africa. Food-insecure Gulf governments are interested in large expanses of undeveloped rich land in the Horn of Africa. Simultaneously, African countries, particularly Ethiopia, seek to move from being primarily commodities exporters to having significant manufacturing enterprises.

Because GCC countries rely on imported food, they invest mostly in Ethiopia's agriculture sector to ensure food security. The rise in oil prices since 2000, as well as food prices in the late 2000s, encouraged and forced GCC countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE to lease farmlands in Ethiopia (Meester& Berg, et al, 2018). According to sources from the ministry of trade and regional integration and investment commission, to the GCC countries, Ethiopia's geostrategic location as a gateway to the African continent, Africa's leading efficient and strong airline, and growing road and railway infrastructure networks connecting it with its surrounding African countries, and ongoing power generation projects are all potential opportunities that make it an appealing destination. Of the above 126 investment companies, 37 projects are originally from the UAE alone, whereas the rest of the investment projects are jointly invested within Ethiopia and other international investors. For an example of these projects, 48 are jointly operating with Ethiopian compiness. On the other hand, UAE jointly invests with, Germany, Somalia, USA, South Korea, Bahrain, India, Tanzania, China, South Africa, Djibouti, Canada, Iran, Turkey, Netherlands, Ireland, Egypt, Switzerland, Iraq, Hong Kong, Sudan, Algeria, Bulgaria, and Brittan (email interview with EIC, interview on 20,2022).




Figure 2 The distribution of the UAEs investment in the Horn of Africa.

Sources: Riyal Politik (clingendael.org)

According to the figure 6, the UAE's investments in Ethiopia are heavily concentrated in the Addis Ababa and Oromia regional states of Ethiopia.

The Amahara, SNNPR, and Tigray areas were next. According to the Ethiopian Investment Commission, 43 of the 126 investment projects are being implemented in Oromia, with Addis Ababa and Amhara following with 40 and 11, respectively. Despite the fact that the investment was initiated jointly, UAE-based companies have invested in Ethiopia's SNNPR, Afar, Direedawa, Tgray, and Somali regions. Geographically, Emirati investment in Ethiopia is broad, with Addis Ababa and Oromia hosting the majority of projects once again. The single greatest Gulf investment in the Horn is a USD 3 billion UAE capital outlay in Ethiopia's Somali region in 2017 for the construction of a sugar plantation (Jenber, 2021).

4.5.2.1. Investments in Ports

Ethiopia, the world's most populated landlocked country, gets 95 percent of its foreign trade from Djibouti. It plans to diversify its sea access options and has an interest in the development of Berbera's port and other associated facilities. The Berbera corridor will be built and connected to a modern highway in southern Ethiopia. It will help the economies of eastern and southern Ethiopia thrive (Mosely, 2019). Informants said Berbera is on track to becoming significant commerce and a logistical corridor connecting Ethiopia to the Somaliland trade metropolis (KI.4&11). DP World and its partners want to invest up to \$1 billion over the next ten years in developing supply chain infrastructure along the corridor.

According to the corporation, this will encompass dry ports, silos, warehouses, container yards, cool and cold chain depots, freight forwarding, and clearing activities (KI.7). Though the first phase of construction has been reported to be completed about 80% (EBC, 9 June 2022), it will create new jobs, attract new businesses and investment along the corridor, and diversify and strengthen the country's access to international trade by providing a direct, seamless, and efficient link between Ethiopia and Berbera Port (vudria,2021). From the above argument, it is clear that DP World's agreement with the Ethiopian government calls for the formation of a joint venture logistics business to carry out logistics activities from origin to destination. DP World will provide export services from Ethiopia to Berbera Port. It will also provide import services from the port of loading to the delivery of shipments (ministry of transport and logistics, accessed on, June 2022).

Import and export trade, trade transactions, and trade costs is affecting Ethiopia since 1991; similar factors also affect the other Horn African nations. Ethiopia as a land-locked country used the port from Djibouti and its trade is affected by the efficiency, rules, and regulations of the Djibouti government. Whenever the prices of the ports and coasts raise, in Djibouti, Ethiopian traders, consumers, and producers are affected. Therefore, Ethiopia is likely to be affected by the cost of transit things from Djibouti because Ethiopia was highly deepened the ports in the nation. If there are alternative ports, it is truly benefiting Ethiopia because if there are more ports the prices of transactions will go down or there is a chance of getting services at low prices and time (KI.7).

Ethiopia aims to diversify its port access facilities and services to improve its trade corridor access routes; utilizing the Berbera corridor has the potential to make Ethiopia a leader in logistics operations, increasing the competitive advantage of delivering our products to the global market. Berbera's newly built terminal will expand the port's container capacity to 500,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) per year, up from the present 150,000 TEUs (Cannon, 2017). Depending on the above arguments, it is clear that the port project, which is finishing up, will not only serve as an alternative corridor for Ethiopia, but will also provide efficient service by allowing imports from the port of Somaliland to enter Ethiopia directly, quickly, and efficiently. Overall, Ethiopia's push to encourage port competition will certainly lead to greater economic stability. As a result, the UAE's involvement in the port's building as a competitor nation to the Horn benefits Ethiopia by delivering quality services at affordable prices, as competition always tends to cut prices and provide decent products.

Ethiopian import-export trade, which is heavily reliant on Djibouti, is influenced by cost prices, and time. Because Ethiopian enterprises and the government pay between \$1.5 billion and \$2 billion in port fees to Djibouti each year, the port may potentially reduce shipping costs for Ethiopian cargo (the exchange Africa, 2022). The UAE is building ports in Djibouti, Somaliland, Eritrea, Djibouti, and many nations in the region by using the same company (DP World) at the same time; it is a port monopoly, not competition. If any attempts to monopolize ports by a single company, there will be a security problem for the region, including Ethiopia, because the owners monopolize it or there are no competitors to provide port services. By this, Ethiopia and others will have less freedom and less security in port things, it may hold the military shipment of the country (KI.6). He said even if the involvement of the UAE in the Horn of Africa will minimize Ethiopia's port cost by giving alternative ports in the region, the security will be very difficult for Ethiopia, and the prices are high because of the port monopoly by the UAEs company.

When the UAE started involved in the region, they tried to utilize ports from Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somaliland and punt land. It is problematic for Ethiopia in every direction, and Ethiopia is encircled by this involvement. It is one thing to deal with these neighboring countries like Somaliland, Djibouti, and Eritrea, and it is a different matter to deal with external powers, which come with only strategic transactional interests and monopolized the ports in the region. Moreover, it is always s problem for Ethiopia (Belete, 2022, interview). From the above arguments, one can understand that the UAE's port expansion in the Horn of Africa will boost Ethiopia's import-export commerce; the nature of the emirates' involvement in the Horn makes it impossible to use the region's ports. Because of the monopoly of port usages there. If the Ethiopian government and the UAE go to war, the Ethiopian economy will collapse. Moreover, Ethiopia will have less ability to ship military types of equipment because of the port ownership. One of the key informants said that UAE's port developments including in Somaliland were for not only commercial purposes but also they build military bases there. Therefore, the military presence in the Horn of Africa is at crucial times, there are points in time for example proxy wars, which may lead to import and export trades being blocked out (KI.7& 8). For Ethiopia and the trade routes are affecting and the concentration of so many military powers and rivals here, in one side the rivals will balance the world, on the other hand, it's also risky for Ethiopia because any time war will be a breakout this will create a blockage to use any ports here in the region (KI.8).

The UAE's DP World was granted a 30-year concession to oversee and develop not just the commercial port in Berbera, but also the military base, which was completed in June 2019. The military installation was intended to provide additional capacity for the UAE in Yemen, as well as security for Somaliland's coastal waters and shoreline, as well as the Berbera commercial port operated by DP World. As part of the basing arrangement, the UAE is reportedly training Somaliland's coastguard, police, and security forces (Melvin, 2019).According to the above justifications, even though the UAE's presence in the Horn of Africa will supply alternative ports for Ethiopia, it will not continue due to the region's militarization. The ports of the majority of the Horn of Africa have been converted into military bases and economic hubs for the United Arab Emirates. If the Horn of Africa is at war with Ethiopia and the UAE, Ethiopia may be in difficulty because of the seaport. As a result, it is critical to refer Ethiopia to Kenya, which is unaffected by the Arab world's influence. When Ethiopia agreed to develop Berbera in 2016 with DP World and Somaliland, the Mogadishu government reacted that it is a violation of Somalia's sovereignty.

In the next days of the agreement, Somalia's lower house of parliament backed the federal government's rejection of the Berbera port deal entered into by semi-autonomous Somaliland, Ethiopia, and DP World. The lower house had voted to reject the deal through a landslide with 168 of the 170 lawmakers, which is 99% of the seat, nullifying all agreements between the United Arab Emirates-based company and Somaliland. Therefore, it is well known that Ethiopia's work with Somaliland conflicts with Mogadishu (KI.1).

The Somali government condemned the tripartite agreement between Somaliland, Ethiopia, and DP World to operate Berbera Port, declaring it unlawful and "null and void." In a statement issued following the agreement on March 2nd, Somalia's Ministry for Ports and Marine Transport questioned the constitutionality of the pact, claiming that it threatens Somalia's unity and sovereignty. The so-called deal is both flawed and harmful to the Federal Republic of Somalia's sovereignty (Hiiraan Online (2018), Mosley (2019), Middle East Monitor (2018), and Melvin, 2019). From the above arguments, one can understand that though Ethiopia's ambition on the port was to use the port for its import and export trades, the federal government as a violation of UN rules of sovereignty took it.

However, it is weak in its internal affairs, according to the argument above the parliament voted 99% against the agreement. Though the above arguments highlighted the disadvantages of using Berbera port without Somalia's approval, the researcher disagreed since Ethiopia requires a port to help its import-export commerce, which relies on Djibouti port, which is inefficient and has high prices. On the other side, Ethiopia wishes to use the Kenyan ports of Berbera and Lamu, while ports in Sudan existed prior to the emirate's involvement in the Horn of Africa, particularly during the EPRDF government. Having alternative ports is therefore critical for Ethiopia's developing economy and population. Similarly, the partnership with Somaliland is aimed towards acquiring more ports rather than dividing Somalia. As a result, Ethiopia does not need to wait for Somalis to reconcile because it is an internal issue. As a result, when Somalis reach an agreement, it is possible to use ports without interfering in the country's internal affairs and to renew and agree on accords (Melvin, 2018).

“Ethiopia in the current uses Berbera ports not more than 2% of its import-export trades but it is a plan for the future use because it is under construction at the moment. In addition, Ethiopia only bought 19% but is for future utilization not at the moment. So, nobody knows whether we are going to use Berbera in the future or not because it is depending on the political, peace, and security realities of the region(KI.4)”

Surprisingly his estimation becomes true because according to media reports, Ethiopia loses 19% share of the port Berbera. The Somaliland government announced on 11 June that Ethiopia has lost 19 percent of its stake in the port of Berbera over failure to fulfill conditions required to complete the ownership deal, with the government of Somaliland (KI.4). This effectively reverses the agreement made in 2017 between Ethiopia, Dubai port giant DP World and the Somaliland Port Authority on the Berbera port. Somaliland Finance Minister Saad Ali Shire said, “Ethiopia failed to meet the conditions needs to acquire the stakes before the deadline”. So it has no stake now, but it needs to note that ownership does not matter (reported on June 10, 2022, by VOA, East African, Horn Diplomat, World news net, Hiiraan online, and different media in Ethiopia). The Ethiopian government was not officially responded to Somaliland’s decision. However, Ambassador Dina Mufti, the spokesperson of Ethiopia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, on Friday 10, June 2022 told reporters that the Ethiopian government would look into the new development (Al Ain Amharic reported on 10 June 2022).

From the above breaking news, and the estimation of the informant we can understand that Ethiopia’s effort to use port Berbera will be short-lived because the country is not able to fulfill the requirement like a financial contribution for the construction of the port. The Ethiopian government planned to build a 260-kilometer road from the Berbera location to the country's border. The two countries collaborated with DP World and the UAE government to rehabilitate Berbera's port, which is crucial to the marine linkages between the Horn of Africa and the Middle East (Melvin, 2019). However, the researcher also argued that this breaking news happened because of the political change in Somalia and Somaliland. Immediately after Sheik Hassan Mohamud was elected as president of Somalia, the US government announced that the US will be sent troops to Mogadishu aiming to counterterrorism and assist the Somalia government, and the US announcement was welcomed by the newly elected president of Somalia (many international and local media reported this announcement). On the other hand, Somaliland are working hard to get recognition from the US as an independent state for decades, though still, America couldn't give her face to Hargeisa. Due to china's stake in Djibouti, the US needs to build a military base aiming to curve china's domination in the region. In addition, Somaliland wants to utilize these two country rivalries by giving seacoast for USAs military base installation.

An American researcher Meservey (2021) pushed the US government to give recognition for Somaliland as the following;

"A strong relationship with independent Somaliland would hedge against the US position future deteriorating in Djibouti, which is increasingly under Chinese domination. To do so, the US government should recognize Somaliland as a country of the Horn of Africa"

On the other hand, Washington is growing concerned that the Chinese are becoming too comfortable with Djibouti, home to the US's only permanent military installation in Africa, Camp Lemonnier. President Donald Trump withdrew the 700 US troops stationed in Somalia; many of them were based at the Baledogle air base, which has been attacked by the al-Shabaab militant group. Berbera has a Soviet-built airport with one of Africa's longest runways that served as NASA's emergency landing site in the 1980s (the Africa report, 2021). Somaliland is the only country actively opposing Chinese influence in the region (Global politics, 2021).

From the above explanations, the researcher argued that, in the last two and half years, the relationship between Ethiopia and US was full of threats and intimidation because of the war in the north of Ethiopia. Therefore, to get support from Americans, Somaliland may be deleted the agreement with Ethiopia, though they said it is a financial case. The US had sent a survey team to scope out the Berbera port, and personal talks with US Defense officials, and the interest is there (Somaliland officials, accessed on November June 2022).

On the other hand, since Ethiopia has had a close relationship with China in the past decades, the US wants to see the Ethiopian government, not allied with the Chinese. The researcher thinks that the behind the loss of Ethiopia's share from the Berbera port will be the US and it is very difficult for Ethiopia's economy, which is depending on the only ports in Djibouti for decades. Things are very hard for Ethiopia now than ever due to the political changes and the involvement of the UAE in the region. Finally, the UAE, increasing investments in the Horn of Africa, focusing on infrastructures such as roads, investment, real estate, humanitarian, banking, and port sectors, will benefit Ethiopia by bridging gaps in investment attractiveness, port availability, and infrastructure development capacities such as roads, among other things. Banking development has also benefited from the UAE's presence in the Horn of Africa, as it has deposited \$3 billion at Ethiopia's national bank and has backed Ethiopian green initiatives in Addis, such as the Unity Park project, which is extremely beneficial to Ethiopians.

However, the long involvement also affected Ethiopian port usage because of the UAE's system of relationship with the Horn. Whenever they move from the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean, their impacts also vary which is harmful to Ethiopia, the largest landlocked country in the world (Mosely, 2020).

4.6. Diplomatic interactions between Ethiopia and UAE

As we have seen before the long involvement of the UAE created a peace agreement with Eritrea and the region. To protect its national interests, especially to counter Iranian domination in the region countering terrorism, the UAE worked hard to get allies from the horn of Africa. To strengthen their relationships the highest governmental officials from both countries are contacted more times since 2018. Ethiopia and the UAE established diplomatic connections in March 2004, when Ethiopia's then-foreign minister, Seyoum Mesfin, visited the emirates. The visit marked the start of contemporary relations between the two countries (UAE embassy, Addis Ababa, accessed 20 July 2022).

Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Ethiopia in May 2009, and again in March 2013, and the Ethiopian Prime Minister visited the emirates in January 2014. Similarly, Sultan bin Saeed Al Mansoori, UAE Minister of Economy, visited Ethiopia in March 2014, and Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, visited Ethiopia in March 2018, and Prime Minister of Ethiopia visited the United Arab Emirates in May 2018, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi visited Ethiopia June 2018.

Ethiopian Prime Minister visited the United Arab Emirates, July 2018, Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the United Arab Emirates, December 2018, Visit of the Ethiopian prime minister visited the United Arab Emirates, March 2019, During February 13/2020 Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed visited UAE. On November 20 /2019, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), to strengthen bilateral defense and military cooperation. Similarly, on June 22/2021 Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Demeke Mekonnen visited UAE. On February 22/2021 A delegation led by the National Defense Force Chief of Staff, General BerhanuJula is in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for an official visit to the country on January 29/2022 Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed traveled to Abu Dhabi. National and international media outlets broadcast these events.

According to (the Ethiopian news agency, accessed, on June 10, 2022), during the visits and contacts of the highest officials from the two nations, they have discussed bilateral and regional relations, security, and other developmental issues. From the above diplomatic relation, we can understand that the relationship between Ethiopia and UAE increasing in all sectors. To strengthen corporations and investments, UAE and Ethiopia signed different agreements in 2018. On December 18/2018 Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates have agreed to combat cross-border financial crimes, on June 15/2018 United Arab Emirates have agreed to invest more than 3 billion USD in Ethiopia, and by August 10/2018 The two countries agreed to build an oil pipeline linking Eritrea's port city Assab and Addis Ababa, The MoU was signed on Saturday, January 12, 2019, in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), according to the online newspaper Sabq-a.com, January 14/2019 Ministry of Water, Irrigation and Electricity has signed MoU with Gulf Electricity Interconnection Authority and the International Energy Linking Organization (GEIDCO) to start feasibility study of electricity link between Ethiopia and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

On July 15, 2019, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have signed a 100 million USD grant memorandum of understanding (MoU) targeting innovation and technology, in November 9/2020 United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Ethiopia are considering the possibility of cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), on September 30/2021(ENA) Ethiopian Ministry of Mines and Petroleum today granted mineral production licenses to five foreign and one local mining companies (all events were reported by the international and local media).

Currently, UAE through its development Bank which is called, the Abu Dhabi Development Fund is supporting one Road Project i.e, the Gedo Menabegna Road project which is part of the Gedo-Fincha Lemelem Bereha Road Project with an amount of 10 Million USD in the form of a soft loan and it has currently considering six projects to finance in future (KI.10).

Among these submitted projects, the Fund has shown its interest to support Jijiga and Dilla Water Supply projects and for the realization of this, the Fund has received the feasibility studies but has not given us its final decision approved (ibid). On the other hand, according to media outlets, on July 25/2018 The Emirates Red Crescent has donated 50 million Birr that would enable the building of 1000 houses for internally displaced people (IDPs) from Bale, Gujji, and Borena Zones of Oromia Regional State, by April 1/2021 United Arab Emirates provided 47metric tons of food and medical supplies to Ethiopia in support of the humanitarian situation in Tigray region,

on April 26/2022/ the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has sent 420 tons of relief and food aid to Addis Ababa, and 280 tons of assistance to Mekele, Tigray regional capital, in the past three months, according to the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation(Ethiopia news agency, accessed on, 12 June 2022).

From the above diplomatic reactions, aid, and cooperation, one can understand that since 2018, the UAE and Ethiopia's relations was increased. They have signed many agreements that benefit both countries' development and relationship. To conclude, following the involvement and rivalries between the Gulf nations, investments and trade transactions are increased at a faster rate. Moreover, following UAE's involvement, many Ethiopians benefited from jobs by the UAE-based companies in Ethiopia. However, the involvement also affected the Ethiopian import and export process because of the demilitarized of the Horn of Africa by the UAE and other Gulf nations. Finally, as we have seen in Somaliland Berbera, the Ethiopian ports' alternative and usages are affecting following the emirates' long involvement to the region (KI.3).

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1. SUMMARY

In the previous chapters, an attempt has been made to explain the major impacts of the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa since 2018 on Ethiopia. The main political and economic impacts of the involvement of the UAE in the region have been discussed in different chapters under different Headings. On the other hand, the UAE's involve in the Horn of Africa in military, trade, ports, and security has been described. Both the political and economic impacts of the involvement have been discussed in line with the conceptual and theoretical framework of the study. As we have seen in different chapters in the study, the 2011 Arab revolutions endowed the Red Sea with strategic significance for the UAE because the then Arab springs started throughout Northern Africa. The protesters remodeled the Middle East from a zone of entrenched autocracies a posh of conflicts within which, political Islamists attached with the Muslim Brotherhood, whom the UAE and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reputed terrorists, perceived to be winning initially in Egypt. On the other side, the UAE's role in the Yemen crisis, as well as wars in Somalia, Eritrea, and Sudan, shows the region's increasing importance to the Emirates (Kamrava, 2011). Piracy and maritime instability in the Red Sea affects the UAE and its commercial activity in the region. As a result, the UAE was heavily involved in the Horn of Africa to safeguard its national interests, counter-terrorism, piracy, trade route hegemony, counter Iranian and Qatari engagement, and economic diversification. As we saw in Chapter Two, there are significant military bases and commercial port infrastructure construction in the region in the past ten years including by the UAE. The UAE's long involvement created controversy among international relations experts and professionals, as well as regional economists. Politically, one of the impacts of the UAE's involvement was the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eretria in 2018. This peace reconciliation mediated by the UAE restored peace to the region, benefiting Ethiopian peace and security. As we have seen before, the UAE's role during the Ethiopia-Eritrea peace treaty agreement was very clear; this is very important for Ethiopia to ensure peace and national security in the region because Ethiopia and Eritrea have a history of conflict and attacking each other. The rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has brought peace and agreements for development among neighboring nations too.

Following the peace deal, Eritrea, Somalia, Somalia, Eritrea signed peace and development agreements. Later, Eritrea and Djibouti reached a peace agreement, and the sanctions posed on Eritrea were lifted. Even if the relationship between the two countries following the peace deal was unclear, it did reduce tensions and reconnect their people. This brought peace and stability to the region; a stable region means a stable Ethiopia; so, the UAE's presence in the Horn of Africa is benefiting Ethiopia in maintaining peace and security with its neighbors. However, from the beginning, this reconciliation lacks clarity and inclusiveness. This created ongoing conflict between Ethiopia and Tigrayan forces and currently, the borders are closed and there is war with TPLF. The ongoing fighting between the TPLF and the Eritrean government will make future collaboration and reconciliation attempts between Ethiopia and Eritrea much more difficult. On the other hand, the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa increased tensions in the region, especially in Somalia and the border between Ethiopia and Sudan. During their involvement in Somalia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) supported regions for revenge and punishment of the Mogadishu administration, because it had allied with Qatar during the Gulf crises. As a result, they have provided financial assistance and military training to regional militias. Then, they now have a powerful arm, and many regional states, including Somaliland and Puntland, began to act as independent nations, ignoring the federal government. UAE's involvement was characterized by militarized division groups, which were also harmful to Ethiopia. Though peace was ensured following the UAE's involvement in the region, Power may shift in the Horn of Africa as Somalia elects a new leader, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Mohamud, 66, who ruled Somalia from 2012 to 2017, defeated President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known locally as Farmajo, in a run-off election on May 15. While Farmajo developed close ties with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, Mohamud has long had ties with the rulers of Ethiopia's northern Tigray region, which fought a war with Abiy's forces and Eritrean allies from late 2020 until a truce was reached in March. The power transfer in Somalia has encouraged the Tigrayans, who are considering attacking the Eritrean capital of Asmara. Tigray Region President Debretsion Gebremichael congratulated Mohamud on his victory and expressed his willingness to collaborate in the overall stability of the area, building on excellent pre-existing relations. This will create unstable the Horn and Ethiopia.

Regarding the GERD project, the UAE's stance was neutral but informally it supported the Egyptian and Sudanese demand for the Nile water. The United Arab Emirates can play a prominent role in fostering collaboration because of its close ties with Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. The UAE has several reasons to cooperate, including the desire to protect its food security interests, maintain its difficult regional influence, and potentially gain an advantage over Iran, Qatar, and Turkey. The UAE established a good friendship with Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt. This benefited Ethiopia to control Egypt's accusations during the last two years. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) believes that a successful conclusion of negotiations on the GERD is within reach and recognizes the great opportunity it presents to enhance and accelerate regional integration. Bolstering cooperation and sustainable development in the region and beyond in the spirit of "African solutions to African challenges," according to a statement issued by the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the Security Council on 3 August 2022 (All African.com, 7 August 2022). Economically, the UAE's involvement in the region, help Ethiopia and the Horn countries to take a share of UAE's an investment and trade activities in the last ten years. To serve their national interests and maintain dominance in the Horn region, the Gulf nations, particularly the UAE, have increased their investments in the Horn of Africa, focusing on infrastructures such as roads, investment, real estate, humanitarian, banking, and port sectors. This will benefit Ethiopia by bridging gaps in investment attractiveness, port availability, and infrastructure development capacities such as roads, among other things. Over the previous ten years, the two countries trading relationship has grown significantly.

Ethiopia exports agricultural and semi-processed commodities such as coffee, skin, fruit and vegetables, live animals, meat and meat products, cereals, spices, oilseeds, natural gum, chickpeas, kidney beans, sesame seeds, and flower and vegetables, among others, and imports from the United Arab Emirates petroleum, lubricants, and grease, vehicles, electronics, woven fabrics, fertilizers, machinery, aluminum, ceramics, and consumer goods. For instance, in 2016, Ethiopia exported 91.3 million dollars, and in 2017, it was 127.63 million dollars. On the other hand, in 2018 and 2019, it was 111.178 and 135.2 million dollars, and in 2020, Ethiopia exports about 185.57 million dollars and it reached 198.87 million dollars in 2021 to the UAE. On the other hand, United Arab Emirates exports to Ethiopia have increased at an annual rate of 16.5 percent over the last 23 years, from \$23.8 million in 1997 to \$798 million in 2020.

The involvement of the UAE in the Horn of Africa boosted the trade relationship between the two countries. On the other hand, the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa brought investment to Ethiopia. From 2002 to 2022, 126 UAEs projects were invested in Ethiopia. These investment projects created job opportunities for more than 2,000 Ethiopian this is one of the impacts of the involvement. More ever, the involvement brought strong diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and UAE, and this increased the trade relationship between them. The UAE has increased its investments in the Horn of Africa, focusing on infrastructures such as roads, investment, real estate, humanitarian, banking, and port sectors. This is benefiting Ethiopia by bridging gaps in investment attractiveness, trade, port availability, and infrastructure development capacities such as roads, among other things. Banking development has also benefited from the UAE's presence in the Horn of Africa, as it has deposited \$3 billion at Ethiopia's national bank and has backed Ethiopian green initiatives in Addis, such as the Unity Park project, which is extremely beneficial to Ethiopians. Though the involvement brought investment, job creation opportunities, aid and loan, and port alternatives for Ethiopia, this involvement also brought security problems to the region. The ports of most of the Horn of Africa have become military bases and trade centers of the United Arab Emirates. Finally, the political developments in Somalia caused problems for Ethiopia. Since, after the newly elected president assumed office in Somalia, Ethiopia canceled the development and use of port Berbera. However, due to political upheavals in Somalia, the alliance between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea was not good as before. This caused a misunderstanding between the political authorities of Ethiopia and Eritrea. In general, the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa affected Ethiopia's economy and political relations in the region.

5.2. CONCLUSION

In earlier chapters, we assessed the political and economic impacts of the UAE's increasing presence in the Horn of Africa for Ethiopia since 2018. To do so, the researcher attempted to assess the impacts by combining expert ideas with theories and secondary data sources. According to the thesis, the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa has an impact on Ethiopia's peace, security, and economy. Politically, while the UAE's engagement benefited Ethiopia in reaching an agreement with Eritrea and establishing excellent relations with Somalia and others, it also increased security complexity due to the rise of the TPLF and others in the region.

The involvement also heightened tensions between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt concerning Nile water issues. On the other hand, the UAE's long involvement in the region has resulted in a split Somalia, which poses security challenges for Ethiopia. The UAE's involvement in investment, trade, aid, and loan provided opportunities for Ethiopia, but it also had an impact on port accessibility in the region. The UAEs control practically all ports and military bases in the region, effectively encircling Ethiopia, and posing a political and economic menace to the country. Finally, the UAE's long involvement in the region caused turmoil and weakened Ethiopia.

5.3.RECOMMENDATION

We conclude this chapter with a recommendation to suggest for Ethiopia's regional situation, especially resulting from the long involvement of the UAE in the Horn. Ethiopia needs accurate knowledge of the Middle East, especially the UAEs mentality of their expansions, their politics, soft and hard power, and the economic interests to the Horn. As we have seen before the interest of the UAE's involvement was short-term and long-term, which any application in the future too, then, they tried to establish transactional types of relationships within the Horn of Africa .This affected Ethiopian import-export trade and peace and security. Ethiopia must strengthen its relationship with neighboring countries like Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, and Kenya and must work to widen the port alternatives with cooperation and respect for each other. Ethiopia also avoids interference in neighbors' internal issues because Ethiopia's port availability is dependent on these nations. Ethiopia must increase its trade and investment relations with the UAE and other Gulf countries because they have a big customer there. Finally, Ethiopia must employ innovation and friendly diplomacy with China, Russia, and western countries. However, partnership with countries such as China and Israel is essential in the case of the Renaissance Dam. Economically also cooperation with China and Russia is very advantageous for Ethiopia.

Glossary

- Arab League:** The Arab League is a union of Arab-speaking African and Asian countries.
- Bab al Mandeb:** is a strait located between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula, and Djibouti and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa.
- Belt and Road Initiative:** is basically considered as a foreign policy initiated by China to enhance the economic condition of the country through the development of international relationships.
- Foreign Military Bases:** is a military base that is geographically located outside of the territory of the country whose armed forces are the principal occupants of the base.
- Global Superpower:** is a nation that's part of the world's trillion-dollar club, an organization consisting of the world's top grossing nations
- Gulf of Aden:** The Gulf of Aden, formerly known as the Gulf of Berbera, is a deepwater gulf amidst Yemen to the north, the Arabian Sea and Guardafui Channel to the east, Somalia to the south, and Djibouti to the west.
- Hard Power:** is the use of military and economic means to influence the behavior or interests of other political bodies
- Horn of Africa:** It is the easternmost extension of African
- Long Involvement:** it is the act or an instance of involving someone or something His involvement of others was inexcusable
- Militarization:** is the process by which a society organizes itself for military conflict and violence.
- Political Islam:** it is a distinctive aspect of a broader 20th-century development that is often called Islamic Resurgence, in which Muslims worldwide seek to strengthen their understanding of and commitment to their religion
- Qatar Crises :** The Qatar diplomatic crisis was a diplomatic incident that began on 5 June 2017 when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt severed diplomatic relations with Qatar and banned Qatar-registered planes and ships from utilising their airspace and sea routes, along with Saudi Arabia blocking Qatar's only land crossing.
- Rapprochement:** is a re-establishment of cordial relations between two countries.
- Regional Powers:** States, which wield unrivaled power and influence within a region of the world, possess regional hegemony.
- Revolution:** is an upheaval in which the government is replaced, or the form of government altered, but in which property relations are predominantly left intact.
- Soft Power:** is the ability to cooperate rather than coerce (contrast hard power)

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Appendix – 1

List of Key Informants

No	Name (symbol)	Organization	Position	Date of interview	Types of the interview
1	KI (1)	Foreign relation institute	International relation and diplomacy director	07 April 2022	Face to face interview (Office).
2	KI (2)	Ministry of foreign affairs	Expert of public diplomacy	03 April 2022	office
3	Dr. Alemayehu Areda (KI (3)	International relation expert and private advisor		09 March 2022	Face-to-face interview
4	Dr. Belete Belachew (KI.4)		International relation analyst and policy advisor	09 April 2022	Face to face (office)
5	KI (5)	AAU, department of international relation and diplomacy	PHD student	30 March 2022	Face to face
6	KI (6)	AAU	PHD student at IPSS	14 March 2022	phone interview
7	KI (7)	AAU	Economic lecturer at FBE	03 April 2022	Face to face (office)
8	KI (8)	AAU	International trade lecturer	03 April 2022	Face to face(office)
9	Tages Mulugeta (KI, 9).	Ministry of trade and regional integrations	Regional integration and trade negotiation director	30 March 2022	Face to face (office).
10	Ministry of trade and regional integration (KI.10)	MTRI		30March 2022	Email interview
11	Ministry of Finance (KI ,11)			12May 2022).	Email interview
12	Investment commission	EIC		20 April 2022	Email interview

Appendix- 2:

In-Depth Interview Guide Line for Key Informants

The purpose of this interview guide is to gather information to research the partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts in the center for African and Asian studies. Thus, this instrument is designed to gather information concerning the impacts of the UAE's increasing involvement in the Horn of Africa: the case of Ethiopia since 2018. The information that you provided us intended to serve for the identification of determinant impacts that the involvement could bring to Ethiopia. Therefore, you are kindly requested to provide as accurate information as possible. I confirm that all data given by you will be treated confidently. Could we start our discussion by introducing each other? (By telling name, age, current positions, and workplaces?)

1. Full Name: -----
2. Age -----
3. Position and workplace -----

Interview Guiding Questions

1. How politically important and influential are the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the international community including Ethiopia?
2. How does the war in Yemen brought significant shifts in powers' rivalries in the region? And its impact on Ethiopia?
3. What are the pros and cons of competition between regional and external powers in the Horn? How does such competition affect, trade, economy, peace, and security conditions in the region including Ethiopia?
5. How does the UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa affect Ethiopia's politics and economy?
6. How do the involvements from the UAE affect the GERD?
7. Does the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea benefit Ethiopia and the Horn?
8. The involvement of the UAE is based on the commercial port infrastructures and direct investments (in agriculture, real state, trade, etc.). How does it affect the Horn trade and economy including Ethiopia?
9. How is the UAEs involvement in the Horn Ethiopian trade, investment, and port accessibility?
10. What advantages did Ethiopia gain following the UAE's involvement in the Horn??And how does it affect Ethiopian diplomacy in the region?