



**DISARMAMENT, DEMOBLISATION AND
REINTEGRATION IN POST 2018 ETHIOPIA: THE CASE OF
PATRIOTIC GINBOT 7 MOVEMENT FOR UNITY AND
DEMOCRACY**

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Acronyms

AFRRID	Action for Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Development
BPLM	Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement
DDR	Disarming, Demobilization and Reintegration
EPRDF	Ethiopia People’s Revolutionary Democratic Party
ERPO	Ex-Combatants Reintegration Project Office
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament Demobilization and Rehabilitation Standard
NDRMC	National Disaster and Risk Management Commission
NSAG	non-state armed group
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogden National Liberation Front
PG-7	Patriotic Ginbot7 for Unity and Democracy
TPDM	Tigray People’s Democratic Movement
UN	United Nation
XC	EX-Combatants

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ABSTRACT

The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process is a security instrument that prevents potential resumption of conflicts and security challenges arising from Ex-combatants. The main purpose of this study is to assess the DDR process of Patriotic Ginbot 7 movement for unity and democracy in Ethiopia in the context of post 2018 Ethiopia. To this end, this study employed qualitative case study research approach to assess the process, negotiation and implementation of DDR; involved actors and the implication of the DDR and political changes that resulted in post 2018 Ethiopia. Data was collect through in-depth interview, open-ended questionnaire and document review analyzed using thematic analysis. The key informant participants of this study were select purposefully based on their experience and engagement in the implementation of the process. This study mainly employed snowball sampling to contact ex-combatants of PG-7. The result of this study reveals that the implementation of the DDR process is not in accordance with the guiding principles of Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) of the United Nations. The research identified several shortcomings of the implementation such as lack of written peace agreement, the attitude of the community that cherishes guns as prized possessions, lack of commitment, problems of clear registration and favouritism, and lack of an integrated approach among actors are the major challenges. Moreover, the political changes unraveling in Ethiopia were both an opportunity and challenge to the DDR process of PG-7, where both the envisaged political change and the DDR had limitations of implementation. The process was mainly focus on demobilization whereas it gives less emphasis on disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants of PG-7. Thus, the DDR process should have been design with the focus on promoting peace and security for the people while also benefiting ex-combatants. It also requires political integrity of actors.

Key words: Armed groups, Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, Political reform

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) has appeared as the most critical aspects of a national and international post conflict interventions. Knight (2008) writes about the origin of the DDR process as peace building initiative that owes its genesis to former UN Secretary- General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's conception of peace building as a framework for guaranteeing that violent conflict would not reappear in post-conflict situations. The author explained that the main target on DDR materialized largely in response to the challenge posed by the Brahma report, which linked with explicitly the peacekeeping, peace building and socioeconomic development functions of the UN system (Knight, 2008).

DDR of ex-combatants may be a complex and continuous process that has economic, social, and political and security dimensions. DDR processes and programs contribute to security and stability by disarming combatants, removing them from military structures, socially and economically integrating them into society to handle peace and security challenges.

There are researches conducted on the realm of DDR in several parts of the world. As an example, Subedi (2015) studied DDR on the security dimension of the post conflict recovery emphasizing on the nexus between transitional politics and DDR. The author articulated the impacts of transitional politics to disarmament and demobilization. In this study, political will, security guarantee, cooperation and trust in fair distribution of power among key actors are the significant conditions for the success of a DDR process. In addition, Knight & Subedi (2014) underlines the requirement to consider disarmament as a new social contract between former combatants and their post-conflict environment. "Social contract may be a mutual agreement entered by both the government and ex-combatants through the submission of guns, the state successively expected to make sure safety, security, livelihood and opportunities of ex-combatants." (Subedi, 2014, p. 682) In the same way, Glassmyer (2008) conceptualized on the self-enforcing agreements as a security mechanism instead of military integration agreements to stop the reluctance of ex-combatants to prevent fighting and quick to remobilize to fight.

On the other hand, Torjeson and Macfrianca (2009) cited in (Guáqueta, 2009) recommend reintegration before disarmament, they like the ex-combatants to interact in to their community with their arms to avoid the security dilemma emanating from the lack of trust between ex-combatants and governments. The justification is that combatants feel fear after

they separated from their guns. However, if they are reintegrated within the community without disarming them; they are going to have the willingness to participate within the promotion of peace buildings within the post conflict recovery. Additionally, Verkoren (2016) argues that DDR should design to promote human or community security rather than national security which exclusively focused on the state security, number of weapons collected and people demobilized. The author emphasizes that, improving security in the community level, can enable people to abandon use of violence, and community-based activities are important to market security to the long run.

Latin American and African countries, after the end of many intra-state conflicts, used the fledgling concept of DDR to disband former military groups, downsize their national defense force, and provide each side with short- to medium-term alternate civilian employment (Steenken, 2017). Consistent with Knight (2008) assessment on the practice of DDR and SSR in Africa, since the end of the cold war, in Africa, there have been nineteen conflicts fought on the continent since 1990 to 2007, with only the Eritrea and Ethiopia conflict was an interstate conflict (Knight, 2008, p. 34).

Ethiopia as an African state emerged out of intra and inter-state war after 1991; had designed DDR programs afterwards.

The Ethiopian DDR program involving close to half of a million former soldiers and combatants including over 400,000 of the soldiers in Mengistu's regime who were demobilized in 1991, during 1992-4 another 50,000 and 21,200 the Ethiopian Revolutionary democratic front (EPRDF) army and also the Oromo liberation front OLF." (Mulugeta, 2017, pp. 143–144)

After the Eritrea–Ethiopia war, reintegration process had taken place for 148,000 ex-combatants/ fighters between 2000 and 2003 in Ethiopia (Muggah, 2008). Additionally, the country designed reintegration program in 2013 to reintegrate quite 350 ex-combatants/fighters of the Benishangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM) after the 2012 peace accord signed between Ethiopian government, and Benishangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM) (Humphreys, & Weinstein, 2007). Mulugeta (2017) drew a lesson from the Ethiopian experience where he showed that:

“DDR is not a technical fix to security institutions, but an important political decision that falls within the broader post conflict political arrangements that were

decided within a broader context of a transitional arrangement that came due to an inclusive political process.” (Mulugeta, 2017, p. 158)

The author remarks that Ethiopia successfully disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated sizable amount of ex-combatants and reduced surplus military forces mobilized during wartime. Even though, Mulugeta reports that this was a successful and inclusive DDR process, not everyone shares the feeling. There have been gaps within the process, for instance according to Maria et al.(1996), although, the process was effective to demobilizing and reintegrating of huge number of soldiers, the authors criticized the method for unequal treatment of ex-combatants in urban and rural; there was highly political affiliation and female ex-combatants had greater difficulties. Because they have lived an army life for a long time, many were no longer willing to accept traditional family roles (Maria et al., 1996). Additionally, one can argue that Ethiopia’s DDR days had not ended. There have been several-armed secessionists groups in and out of the country some of them were designate as terrorist political movement by the government. Since 1991, several Ethiopian parties inside and outside Ethiopia have had armed uprising as a strategy to overthrow the regime. Amongst these the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) are the most known opposition political movements with armed resistance.

This changed due to political change in 2018, the time that the EPRDF made a landmark political decision. The parliament by which all the 547 members are from one party EPRDF and its affiliates, analyzed that some policies and rules related to political participation and anti-terrorism law were oppressive and caused political instability in the country. As a result, in the first eight months of 2018, Ethiopia has experienced a head-spinning series of events (Badwaza & Temin, 2018). In January 2018, the government has decided to reform. It would respond to intensifying antigovernment protests that began in November 2015 by pursuing meaningful reforms, including the revision or repealing of laws that tightly constrained politics, preparations for free and fair elections, and the release of political prisoners. In the ensuing months, thousands of prisoners were freed, and the notorious federal crimes investigations unit in Addis Ababa, commonly known as Maekelawi, was closed. “In April 2018, Abiy Ahmed, a 42 year-old former military officer from Ethiopia’s largest ethnic group, the Oromo, was selected by the EPRDF as prime minister following the resignation of his predecessor, Hailemariam Desalegn.” (Badwaza & Temin, 2018)

Consequently, the government released political prisoners and erased three armed political parties Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Patriotic Ginbot-7 Movement for Unity and Democracy (PG-7) from the terrorist organizations list African news reported that the government said it had reached an agreement with key opposition parties over disarmament¹, demobilization and reintegrate sections of ex-rebels (Africa news, 2019). Among these, the PG-7 Movement for Unity and Democracy is the one which decided and announced to disband its armed members and to struggle in a peaceful way.

1.2. Statement of the problem

The Patriotic Ginbot-7 is dissolved and disbanded its armed members in September 2018. The process of disbanding armed members involves the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants that needs for a comprehensive and clear understanding at the conceptual as well as the practical levels. Thus, this study takes the case of Patriotic Ginbot-7 to understand the DDR processes in Ethiopia. To accomplish this objective, the study begins with an assessment of the processes of DDR in Ethiopia in the context of the political developments unraveling since 2018. Ethiopia's internal political developments present a unique context for the DDR making the case worthy of studying. Most literature (further explored in the literature review) on DDR focus on post-conflict stages that involve the armed group in active combat, usually ended in the defeat of the warring group and the ousting of authoritarian government through an internal armed struggle, an international intervention, mostly supported by foreign intervention or right sizing of the army as part of the security sector reform (Dzinesa, 2017; Giustozzi, 2016; MacKenzie, 2016). In these contexts, DDR is normally initiated through a "politically- agreed" situation, or the mandate of a peace support operation or by a victor after a military victory (Rufer, 2005). The initiation of DDR post-2018 in Ethiopia is unique because it does not fall under any of the above categories.

DDR has a pivotal role on the country's tranquility and safety by preventing the relapse of conflicts through disarming, demobilizing and incorporating combatants within social, economic and political aspects in their society.

¹ (<https://freedomhous.org/>, 2019).

“The particular threat arising from former combatants comes from their high levels of organization, their familiarity with fighting techniques and weaponry, and their willingness to use violence, and habit of using violence, as a mean of getting their way” (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007).

This implies that having armed rebel groups and ex-combatants in a country is a great challenge on the peace and tranquility of the society in different dimensions. First, it is an obstacle to conduct peaceful competitive elections. Second, it spoils the peace, social, political, and economic progresses. Third, it contributes for the social unrest and instability and aggravates violent conflicts; human and democratic rights of the people affected negatively due to the violent reaction of the government. Last but not the least; it challenges the state monopoly of the use of force. To this end, Ethiopia has a new experience of DDR recently in 2018. Thus, “DDR considered as a transitory tool, aimed toward facilitating the conversion from war to peace by helping individuals give up their lives as combatants and transform to a civilian life” (Bandoleerr, 2014, p.7).

The Ethiopian national political developments introduced reforms on the political, social and economic spheres of the country. “Abiy’s administration has pledged ‘reforms’ that will ease the legal and practical requirements for opposition parties to operate, though substantial changes are necessary before political parties can carry out activities freely” (Country Policy & Information note, 2019). For instance, exiled opposition groups such as Ginbot 7, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) that had been attempting to overthrow the governing coalition EPRDF through violent means had welcomed back by the prime minister. He was also able to end a twenty-year conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, there was an opening of political space, many prisoners of conscience were released, cabinet was reshuffled and representation of women in government increased (Country Policy & Information note, 2019).

This activities enables warring factions to have mutual understanding and willingness between the government and rebel groups to undertake DDR based on the political development philosophy ‘coming together or synergy’.

The ‘reform’ process was very complex and unique in which the demand for the political development is internal (homegrown) that makes its experience of citizen demand for political reform makes it different. Badwaza & Temin (2018) explained the complexity of the process as:

Abiy's reforms will not go unchallenged. Power struggles within the EPRDF leadership and its affiliated ethnic-based parties still simmer. Specifically, the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front, exercised outsized control over the government for many years' stands to lose influence and will be a spoiler. The government blames disgruntled elements within the party and government structures for recent instances of violence, including a grenade attack at a pro-Abiy rally in national capital in June. Escalating ethnic-based conflicts throughout the country especially within the Somali and Oromia regions also threaten to derail reforms (Badwaza & Temin, 2018).

The severe political instability, a huge number of internal displacements of people's, social uprising, and rebellions pressurized the EPRDF government to form a reform on some political and economic policies and laws of the country. As a result, the party revised the anti-terrorism proclamation, voting system reform and political participation laws and regulations, also as privatizing some state-owned firms. This political reform aimed toward opening the democratic space of civic participation and involved comprehensive reforms of the state institutions and therefore the constitutional, legal and policy frameworks that shaped the connection between citizens and therefore the state.

"The overall objective of political reforms is to form the government more accountable and attentive to citizens' concerns and aspirations. It involves guarantying democratic rights and therefore the rule of law employing embedding the ethos of participation and inclusion, freedom association, freedom to compete for political office, freedom of expression, free media, free and fair elections and therefore the separation of power"(Salih, Shete & Assefa, 2018).

Consider the quick and massive political reshuffles in Ethiopia; it is clear that complexities of political development have had implications to DDR processes. As Subedi (2015) and Mulugeta (2017) stated, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants is essentially a political process, especially in a peace process, which emerges from a negotiated peace process. From this, we can infer that changes made on politics affects the DDR process of armed rebel groups and DDR also will have its own effect on the political development since both the development and the DDR process aims at the promotion of peace and security at the end. In addition to this, DDR by its nature is a context-specific issue that needs close and deep analyzing of the situation, culture, the capacity, local security mechanisms, and political culture as well as other needs should be assessed in a tailored optimal approach

(Nicole Ball & Luc van de Goor, 2006). However, in Ethiopia, DDR was presented as a de-securitized, technical exercise and poorly studied field, there is no comprehensive academic studies on the recent DDR process undertaken since 2018. Therefore, the practice of the DDR process and its implications on the political reform as well as reverse implication of the reform needs further assessment. To this end, this paper tends to study the DDR process of PG-7 movement in Ethiopia in the context of post-2018 political ‘reforms’.

1.4 Objectives of the study

1.4.1 General objective

The general objective of this study is to study the DDR process of Patriotic Ginbot 7 for Unity and Democracy in Ethiopia in the context of post-2018 reform.

1.4.2 Specific objective

The specific objectives are:

- To analyze the driving factors for the armed struggle by Patriotic Ginbot-7 combatants
- To identify the key actors and their role
- To assess the 2018 DDR process, its negotiation and implementation.
- To analyze the implications of the 2018 political changes on the DRR process and vice versa.

1.5 Research question

The specific research questions guiding the research are:

- What are the motivations of the PG-7 to join armed struggle?
- Who are the actors involved in the process?
- How was the 2018 DDR process of PG7 negotiated and implemented?
- What are the implications of the 2018 DDR process on the political change and vice versa?

1.6 Scope of the study

This study is delimited first conceptually, on the DDR process in the context of post-2018 Ethiopia. Secondly the study is time bound. It focused only after the national political developments since 2018. Third, though, there are different DDR processes conducted in

post-2018, this study will focus on the Patriotic Ginbot-7 Movement for Unity and Democracy.

1.7 Operational definition

Combatant: for the purpose of this paper, in line with the definition set out in the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, a combatant is a person who is a member of a national army or an irregular military organization; or is actively participating in military activities and hostilities; or is involved in recruiting or training military personnel; or release, exit from an armed force or group; holds a command or decision-making position within a national army or an armed organization; or arrived in a host country carrying arms or in military uniform or as part of a military structure; or having arrived in a host country as an ordinary civilian, thereafter assumes, or shows determination to assume, any of these attributes.

Armed opposition political parties/rebel opposition groups: “engaged in a political struggle to redefine the political and legal basis of the society through the use of violence.” (Miklaucic, 2011) They often have clearly articulated political or socioeconomic objectives.

1.8 Limitations of the study

This study has some limitations such as; lack of local researches and well-documented materials to serve as a base. Most of the literatures treated in this work have come from researches in other countries. Therefore, the lack of secondary sources on the subject has limited the opportunity to triangulate the findings of various research outputs. The COVID-19 pandemic created some troubling conditions on my work and safety in different ways. The researcher had to go to Bahir Dar and Woreta, Gonder zone to collect data but public transport was totally closed in March up to mid-April 2020, thus it affects the time table of the research. The researcher was not able to conduct focus group discussion because of the pandemic.

The foremost challenge to conduct this study was the volatile political situation. Particularly, in Amhara Regional State, the case of the 2019 assassination of higher leaders of the regional government makes the participants to refrain from providing information for this research. There was a mistrusted relation among the people to deal with such politically sensitive issues. Moreover, some difficulties in terms of time, finance, data, and consent, limit the study to meet the intended objective. Even though, the researcher has faced these difficulties, different measures had taken to overcome the challenges. Among these, doing data collection, analysis and interpretation as fast as possible, persuasion and approach friendly

with participants and open ended questionnaire instead of focus group discussion was applied to tackle the challenges and to collect reliable data for this research.

1.9 Significance of the Study

The findings of this research will have the following significances. The main contribution of the study is producing knowledge on something that has not been studied before. It identifies some gaps in the implementation. Therefore, since political developments in Ethiopia and DDR are still taking place, it helps the program practitioners for the better improvement and implementation by giving context specific insights. It will also give information for other researchers who are interested on the area and related issues in the future.

1.10 Organization of the study

This study paper is organized in to five chapters: chapter one focuses all about the background of the study, statements of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, scope of the study, significance of the study, limitation of the study, and operational definitions of terms. Whereas, chapter two consists of literature review and conceptual framework that comprises definitions of DDR, settings to DDR, factors of success and failure of DDR, actors of DDR, attitudes of stake holders on DDR, state monopoly of use of force, background of PG-7 as well as approaches to DDR. Chapter three deals with research methodology, description of the study area, research design, data gathering methods, study population, sampling techniques, and methods of data analysis. Chapter four contain data analysis and interpretation and finally, chapter five is a concluding remark that holds conclusion and recommendations of the study.

2. CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

The researcher recently examines the processes of DDR in Ethiopia in the context of the political developments. Before assessing its implementation, relevant literatures relating to DDR was identified and reviewed. Through this review, many themes emerged, which become the basis of developing theoretical framework for the study, out of all of these, the following themes were selected to construct the theoretical framework for the study. Therefore, this chapter encompasses review of literatures, theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the study.

2.2 DDR Definitions

The terms disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) are widely used in relation to the discussions of post conflict security issues and peace building efforts. The definitions given to DDR are most guidelines not academic explanations. The definition of DDR developed from its evolving sorts of programs and its applicability. Muggah and O'Donnell (2015) inscribed that DDR interventions were administered with military-like precision supported conventional approach in 1980's. Hence, DDR was designed to handle the gang's behavior and motivation, which is named as community-oriented model. Today, DDR is undertaken during a broader goal to make conducive environment for sustainable peace and development than ever. It emphasizes on positive, over negative peace (Muggah, R and O'Donnell, 2015). As the authors stated that, the implications of DDR were dramatic. It is likely to end violent conflicts, promote security and stability within the short term, additionally ensure development within the future (ibid). This section, therefore, clarifies a number of the relevant and customary definitions of DDR to situate this research within the context of the broader academic debate. Based on the common UN definition of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration is defined as follows:

Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes (Security General, 2005).

The disarmament phase is mostly put as the first step of DDR components that focused on the collection and alienation of arms from the beholder it might be combatant or civilian. There is no assertive argument on the first step should be disarmament on the implementations but some authors put disarmament as one element of demobilization.

Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centers to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion (Security General, 2005).

Demobilization emphasized much on the disbanding of the personnel as well as their mentality to alienate them from their gun and their membership of armed groups. It requires “breaking down chains of the command and control structures operating over rebel fighters thus making it more difficult for them to return to organized rebellion”(Miklaucic, 2011, p. 12). According to Steenken (2017), demobilization includes the disarmament component. “Demobilization is the process of turning combatants into civilians. It involves the assembly, disarmament, administration, and discharge of former combatants, and it can apply to irregular combatants, guerrilla or freedom fighters, and even regular soldiers”(Steenken, 2017, p. 18). There is no standardized timeframe when does disarmament and demobilization should end. Steenken (2017), stated that the demobilization process may be a short, one- to five-day process or an extended stay in an assembly or cantonment area. It also may be preceded by a holding period or short-term stabilization procedure if the parties so choose (Ibid).

Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year (Security General, 2005).

Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic

process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance (Security General, 2005).

According to Knight & Özerdem, (2004)DDR programs can be identified as “*demilitarization*” and those take place in “*war to peace transition*”.

Demilitarization: involves a reduction in the number of military personnel following a decisive victory, attempting to reduce military expenditure in order to take advantage of the peace dividend (Knight & Özerdem, 2004).

War to peace transition: Within this setting, there is no clear victor emerges and DDR was undertaken as part of a peace settlement. In the time of transition from war to peace, the outcome of any DDR program depends predominantly upon the political context in which it is carried out, and the political will among the belligerent parties will remain the chief criterion for determining success. This situation happens where the state is in transition from direct violent conflict between different factions of whom aim is to control the state power. Hence, the emerging ruling government is conducting DDR of armed groups engaging in war (ibid).

The negotiation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program in South Africa was designed at the aftermath of the apartheid as one part of the post conflict transition in South Africa.

“The negotiations focused on the control of the national military during the political transition; the creation of a new defense force; and the integration of various, often opposing, armed forces into a new, united, post-apartheid national military, which was to become known as the South African National Defence Force (SANDF).”
(Lamb, 2009, p. 9)

South Africa’s experience shows that it remains affected by high levels of armed violence, with firearms being one of the leading causes of death and injury, an effect of the absence of a comprehensive disarmament process directly following the political transition (Lamb, 2009).

The DDR program in Sierra Leone also folds in the transition from war to peace that has been essential after a long civil conflict for decades before 2002. The peace agreement signed in November 1996 in Abidjan and July 1999 Lomé agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), made provision for DDR (Knight,

2008). The overall goal of the program was to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate ex-combatants in order to consolidate short-term security as well as to lay the basis for lasting peace in Sierra Leone (ibid). The DDR program in Sierra Leon was challenged with high degree of mistrust and suspicion among military groups; inadequate and untimely fund; lack of sub regional approach to the DDR process, lack of proper coordination and information flow among actors and failure to include the reintegration phase (Knight, 2008). The reintegration component was pushed to long-term processes due to the improper usage of funds.

AU's National DDR framework guideline defines DDR as,

Disarmament refers to the method by which the ex-combatant is disarmed and safely stored or destroyed of firearms. Demobilization could be a process of formal discharging from military or armed groups. Reinsertion is defined as short term assistance provided to ex-combatants (XCs) immediately after demobilization, as a type of transitional assistance to assist cover their basic needs which of their immediate families before entering in to the reintegration program. Reintegration is the longer-term process by which XCs regain a civilian life. This process is multi-faceted and includes social reintegration through which the XC is accepted back in to the community. Political reintegration where by the XC acquires a task in higher cognitive process processes; and economic reintegration which allows the XC to realize livelihood through gainful employment (African Union, 2014).

This definition of reintegration has a limitation to incorporate those ex-combatants reintegrate into the state army, police and any military service. Generally, DDR focuses on the immediate management of people previously associated with armed forces and groups; lays the groundwork for safeguarding and sustaining the communities in which these individuals can live as law-abiding citizens; and builds national capacity for long-term peace, security and development (Security General, 2005). Although there are different terms such as disarmament, demobilization, demilitarization, reinsertion, and reintegration used by different authors, for the purpose of this research disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is used.

2.3 Settings to design DDR

There are different situations and settings where the states engage in the design and implementation of DDR of armed forces, armed groups and militias. According to United

Nation, there are generally three main situations where DDR is taking place. These include; the downsizing of state armies, the disbanding of armed groups and militias as well as the DDR conducted in support of law enforcement.

The downsizing of State armies or armed forces: states may carry out DDR to downsize or restructure their organized, structured and trained professional armies and supporting institutional infrastructure such as; salaries, benefits, basic services, etc. (IDDRS, 2006). In this case, the Ethiopian 1991-1997 DDR programme is an exemplar. It was driven by multiple political and economic reasons. Politically, the EPRDF saw the defeated army as structurally unfit for the new political arrangement in the nation; it was oversized and was manned by conscripts rather than professionals; its internal means of control was an oppressive clandestine military security arrangement (Mulugeta, 2017). Economically, there was neither the need nor the capacity for the nation to have such a sizeable army. It was believed that small national army with a solid capacity and competency is required (ibid).

The disbanding of armed groups and militias: DDR may be employed when there are large numbers of armed groups or militia groups under poor command and control, without formal organization or structure, that draw on unskilled people (often unemployed youth, and kids and girls related to military and armed groups) for whom little or no training has been provided (IDDRS, 2006). In this situation, the failure to conduct successful DDR process may endanger the members of non-state armed groups to reintegrate combatants in to their community easily. “Also, leaders might not trust the social process, and should prevent a number of their soldiers from collaborating within the DDR process so on keep a reserve that they will call upon if the peace agreement doesn't hold and fighting resumes”(IDDRS, 2006).

DDR in support of law enforcement: DDR is planned to support law enforcement and therefore the (re-)establishment of legislation controlling arms during a condition of widespread social conflict involving an oversized number of armed community-based groups with strong ties to local communities (IDDRS, 2006). In this condition, people driven by causes that are not necessarily associated with broader political reasons; and there is an absence of organization, training or coordination among the groups involved (ibid).

On the other hand, Rufer (2005) classified the situations in the perspective of the level of the conflict in to four different contexts/settings where DDR takes place: These are:

- 1) A political-agreed end of a political conflict;

- 2) If a Peace Support Operation (PSO) with a robust mandate can secure a ceasefire or a fragile peace in the context of a failed state;
- 3) If there is no sustainable ceasefire, as is the case with failed states, and a PSO is lacking the funds to guarantee the country's security;
- 4) Finally, in the context of a military victory, the entire goals of these contexts are transformation, peace building and development.

For the purpose of this study, the researcher focuses only on the condition where the state conducts DDR to disband the existing non-state armed groups in Ethiopia in the context of the political development instigated in 2018. DDR activities are designed to, inter alia, stem war recurrence, reduce military expenditure, stimulate spending on social welfare, stop spoilers from disrupting peace processes, improve opportunities for their livelihoods, disrupt the command and control of armed groups, and prevent resort to the weapons of war (Muggah, 2010).

2.4 Factors determining success

In many literatures some DDR programs are said successful, for instance, as stated in the works of Maria et al.(1996) and Mulugeta (2017) the DDR experience of Ethiopia in the 1990s is referred as successful. Whereas the Disarmament and Demobilization of People's Liberation Army Fighters experience in Nepal is considered as an indication for and lesson of the failed DDR program as illustrated by Subedi (2015). The aim in this sub title is to show some indicators and factors of success or failure of disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants. To this end, the researcher tries to see the factors by considering the economic, political and social context of the state in subject.

Bosselmann & Pellegrini (2003) highlighted some crucial factors for a DDR to be successful. Among these, a stronger economy would help generate higher capacity to actually absorb substantial numbers of returning former combatants and other persons associated with them, into local labor markets. Because livelihood opportunities would be higher in a country with strong economic performance than in a country with weak economy, economy is a significant factor to successes and failure of DDR. Equally, "stable political and administrative institutions on different levels has great value to fulfill economic and other promises done to former combatants in exchange for laying down their weapons" (Thorgren, 2016, p. 5). In addition, the way in which the actors reach to peace and other factors related to the nature of the armed groups and causes of the conflict could affect the outcome of the DDR processes.

The experiences of ex-combatants in military life such as political, social, military training and indoctrination, socialization in to armed violence, and motivations, to disconnect or to reintegrate with the community; as well as the way how DDR is designed and implemented are the most important factors for the overall prospects of success or failure of DDR objectives (ibid).

2.5 Actors of DDR

There are different actors participated in DDR. According to Ipa-undp, (2002) actors take part “in DDR programs range from national and local government authorities, communities, UN agencies, the international financial institutions, bilateral donors, and international NGOs to local NGOs, grassroots’ organizations” (Ipa-undp, 2002) and of course combatants, ex-combatants, and their dependents (ibid). Generally, actors of DDR can be classified as local actors and international actors. Local actors include government, local non- governmental organizations, armed oppositions and the community. Whereas, the international actor include the international community that acts in support of local actors or attempts to drive the DDR process. Major decisions concerning the objective, strategies and planning of the program including the realization of the program are responsibilities of local actors with the support of international communities.

2.6 Attitude of stakeholders towards the process of DDR

As Miklaucic (2011) stated “the terminology surrounding DDR programs is also judged highly problematic by non-state armed group (NSAG) members; particularly, the emphasis on the “disarmament” of non-statutory troops wrongly suggests that they have been defeated or forced to surrender” (Miklaucic, 2011, p. 10). In reality we have observed that the Miklaucic’s view has precision in Ethiopia, during the implementations of peace agreements with armed groups. The OLF leader Dawud Ibsa was asked if OLF leaders returned to Ethiopia by disarming OLF fighters. Dawud replied: “the issue of disarming is very sensitive question; we do not want to be called those who were disarmed (“ትጥቅ ፈቱ መባል አንፈልግም”) because the word disarming implies the existence of one group that disarms the other group.”² This implies that the word by itself does not treat the actors equally. The one who is disarmed feels as defeated and they consider the disarmer as a winner. Thus, the attitude of the actors and stakeholders on DDR affects the success of the peace agreements and the

² <http://aigaforum.com>

implementation of DDR. The experience in Ethiopia from 2018 up to now particularly the disarming and demobilizing program of OLF combatants demonstrate that the connotation of the terminologies DDR varies and becomes as one of the complicated issue.

Furthermore, different stakeholders have different expectations and interests from the alleged DDR programs. For instance, “the International donors and agencies may require quick wins and clear exit strategies. On the other hand, local authorities, elites, former combatants and affected communities will require protracted engagement to avoid the reconstitution of old networks of power, authority and patronage”(Bryden, 2012). This has an impact on the success or failure of the program where different incompatible goals and interest should be managed with the predetermined objectives, clear monitoring and evaluating mechanisms.

2.7 State monopoly of force

State monopoly of legitimate use of force entails the legitimate manipulation and regulation of firearms and its personnel is exclusively reserved to the state.

State is distinguished as an institution by its monopoly of the legitimate use of force. Although the state may delegate the legitimate use of force, it remains the unique owner of that prerogative. Other institutions, agencies, or elements within society may exercise force, but without delegation from the state, any such exercise is unsanctioned and is thus illegitimate. In reality, no modern state, strong or weak, has an absolute monopoly on the use of force; however, the legitimacy of the use of force is central to the modern concept of governance. Today, many states are threatened by the loss of the monopoly of force and its legitimate use (Miklaucic, 2011, p. 17).

Similarly, in Ethiopia, there were different armed groups and individuals break the legitimate use of force with monopoly. Because of the way, DDR is designed to reinforce and extend the reach and legitimacy of state authority; political scientists and specific practitioners for careful investigation have increasingly singled it out. It is specifically because it has the anticipated consequences of allowing states to reassert their monopoly of violence that DDR is recognized as an inherently political and politicizing process and of special concern to social scientists (Muggah, 2010).

2.8 Political reform

There are controversies on the meaning of political reform. To see some of definitions; Robert stated reform means the transition from no and one-party to competitive party systems

and from military to civilian governments. Moreover, Oxford dictionary (2019) defines reform as making a change in political or economical in order to improve it so that they no longer behave in an immoral. Political reform is a practice that human being wants to change the previous thought that fails and replace the applicable one whether by force or democratic way. We have seen details of the government view on Ethiopian political reform. Recently, despite the PM explained about the government choice and the characters of the reform. Different doubts are expressed about the reality whether it is reform or not. However, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Ethiopia (FES) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) organized a conference in September 2018 and published journal reflections on Expanding Ethiopia's Democratic Space Aspirations, Opportunities, and Choices in November 2018. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2018) noted, Political reforms aim at opening the democratic space of civic participation and involve inclusive reforms of the state institutions and the constitutional, legal and policy frameworks which shaped the relationship between citizens and the state.

Further, political transition needs régime change for instance, Ethiopia experienced a political transition from military Derg régime to EPRDF, and it was a total dismantling of the existing political order (*ibid*). However, the current political reforms in Ethiopia distinguished from the 1991 transition in which the current government does not aim to dismantle the structure of the state institutions, but rather to reform these institutions within the confines of the current political developments (*ibid*). Reintegration of armed groups in to the society was one of the measures taken by the government at the time of a reform in accordance with other activities such as electoral reform, modifications of institutions, transformations of media, and justice system. Armed members of former insurgent groups are returning home to communities in Oromia, Amhara, Somali and South regions following the government's declaration of public amnesty and invitation to participate in peaceful political activities the insertion of such forces into an already tense ethnic and political dynamics in these parts of the country could easily fuel violent clashes. Violent confrontations between these rebel forces and federal and regional government security forces have already been witnessed in parts of the Oromia region (Badwaza & Temin, 2018). Therefore the DDR process is necessitated due to the presence of these non-state armed groups without the formal command and out of structure of the state security sector.

2.9 Background of the Patriotic-Ginbot 7 Movement

Ginbot-7 was a political opposition movement established in the United States on May 15, 2008 by 70 Ethiopian intellectuals including Berhanu Nega and Andargachew Tsige. Berhanu Nega was a vice chairperson of the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), an opposition party which competed successfully to become mayor-elect of Addis Ababa in 2005 election. The name Ginbot-7 refers “15 May,” the date of the Ethiopian general election in 2005, which was marred by the protests over alleged fraud that led the deaths of about 200 people (landinfo, 2010).

Ginbot-7’s mission

“The realization of a national political system in which government power and political authority is assumed through and democratic process based on the free will and choice of citizens of the country.”³

The Goals of the Patriotic Ginbot-7

The PG-7’s goals were to create the conditions where power is obtained in a peaceful, legal and democratic manner. To establish a forum where all political force in the country can come together to form an alliance on firmly grounded principles of democracy and the rule of law. To build consensus among the different stakeholder political forces, civic institutions; the military, security and police forces and various security of the population through inclusive and transparent discussions to determine the future of the country. As well as, to build a society where freedom of expression is respected and a vibrant independent media will be allowed to flourish in order to create an informed and empowered citizenry capable of freely organizing and participating in decision making and holding its elected leaders accountable. (Ginbot 7 n.d.) cited in (LANDINFO, 2012)

Form of struggle and principles of the PG-7 movement: PG-7 struggle does not have a dogmatic preference for any single strategy. Taking into perspective the changing circumstances of the country, the movement followed the best strategy among that best fits their objective. This includes that “peaceful struggle” works in a society where the government respects the rights of its citizens to dissent, and “armed struggle” takes place in an environment where the authoritarian rulers exercise total control over the judiciary, the military, security and police forces. It takes place in an environment with no independent and

³ www.ginbot7.org

accountable institutions that will protect the lives and property of citizens from the arbitrary decisions of the regime. A struggle that takes place in such an environment requires strategy and preparation to defend the people against attacks from the security apparatus (Ibid).

The PG-7 was exiled from Ethiopia in to Eritrea after July, 2012. Mr. Andargachew Tsige and Mr. Mesafint were the first persons to land in Eritrea then after in November, 2012 military training stations and office was established in Harena, the movement's intelligence group was in Emnehajer, a commando training camp in Aseb (wia), military training and residence in siqutir and Adi Ashegela IN Eritrea (PC, may 03, 2020) .

Ginbot-7 had allied with different political organizations and freedom movements. In 2010, PG-7 created a coalition called the “Alliance for Liberty, Equality, and Justice in Ethiopia” with Afar People’s Party and Ethiopian Movement for Unity and Justice⁴. In October 2016, it signed memorandum of understanding to work with Afar People’s Party (APP), Tigray People’s Democratic Movement (TPDM) and Oromo Democratic Front (ODF). In January, 2015 Ginbot 7 signed a unification agreement with Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front (EPPF), Before the unification the EPPF movement was led by Meazaw Getu as a chairman, Mengistu Woldesillase as political head, Kifetew Assefa as head of intelligence and information, Nurjeba Assefa as foreign Affairs head, Tadele Wondim as head of administrative stuff and logistics, Tesfahun Tegegne as head of military training centers⁵. On the side of Ginbot 7, Berhanu Nega was a chair person, Abebe Bogale, vice chairperson and Ameneshewa Tahelew (Assefa Maru), head of military operations and Zemene Kassie was the political head before the unification.⁶ After the unification, their names merged to Patriotic Ginbot 7 Movement for Unity and Democracy. From the unification afterwards a new committee with 82 members, 41 from each was formed. The movement has one front with Berhanu Nega as a chairman; Meazaw Getu as avice chairman, Zemene Kassie as political head and Ameneshewa Tahelew (Assefa Maru), head of military operations, Mengistu Woldesillase as head of civil disobedience, Tariku Grima as head of administrative staff and logistics, and Tesfahun Tegegne as head of military training centers⁷.

⁴ www.Ginbot7.org

⁵ <https://www.tesfanews.net/>

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Ibid

Since the establishment of the party, the leadership has mobilized Ethiopians inside and outside Ethiopia in Europe, Africa, Australia and North America. They want to gather support for the group's goals and create a cohesive network of Ethiopian opposition groups in exile (LANDINFO, 2012).

Ginbot 7 was accused for attempted coup dea'ta in on 24 April 2009. Although it has failed to meet the objective, the coup allegation was organized by members of Ginbot 7 to overthrow the government. Among the coup leaders, B/General Asamnew Tsige, B/General Tefara Mamo and others were locked in a jail and sentenced to life imprisonment. In April 2009, G7 was the subject of extensive attention for the first time, both inside and outside Ethiopia (LANDINFO, 2012). On the other hand, "Ginbot 7 described the allegation that it had attempted a coup as a "baseless accusation" that fitted a pattern of distraction and scapegoating by the government⁸. In the time between 2009 and 2011, the government reacted to G7 by arresting many people and charging them with membership in an illegal group, G7, plans to kill of government officials, plots against electrical and power supplies and planning to remove former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi(ibid). Ethiopian government labeled Ginbot-7 a terrorist group in 2011 until the mid-2018. In 2018, PG-7 was erased from the list of terrorist organizations due to the government reform. However, the movement alive no longer it has dissolved itself and disbanded its member. There are some sources that states as part of the PG-7 has allied with other seven opposition parties and created a new political party named Ethiopia Citizens for Social Justice (ECSJ).

Seven opposition parties dissolved themselves last week to create a new entity called Ethiopia Citizens for Social Justice (ECSJ). The new party's leader is Professor Berhanu Nega, an economics professor who has been involved in Ethiopia's opposition since the late '70s. The seven parties are: Patriotic Ginbot 7, Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), All Ethiopian Democratic Party (AEDP), Semayawi Party, New Generation Party (NGP), Gambella Regional Movement (GRM), Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ) party. Africa report (2019) cited in (Country Policy & Information note, 2019, p. 37)

⁸ www.Ginbot7.org.18 April 2012

The emphasis of this study is on the disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating of the disbanded members. Are they pass in this three phases? If they how were it undertaken, is the main questions.

2.10 Conceptual framework

Approaches to DDR

Although no doctrinal approach to DDR yet exists, a considerable literature has nevertheless emerged in recent years—much of it descriptive, theoretical and distillations of so-called best practices and ‘lessons learned’(Muggah, 2014). However, there are different approaches to DDR. Among others, the researcher selected three approaches such as integrated approach, consensus approach and community-based approach.

UN Integrated approach to DDR

The integrated approach to DDR is founded by United Nation as the general guidelines and principles of DDR from different experiences. According to the integrated approach, DDR programs represent a part of a natural continuum in peace process. Disarmament and demobilization are considered as an emergency stabilization phase that involves as a military matter.

The purpose is to prevent a relapse into violent conflict. Integrated approach of UNPKO advocates the coordination and synergy among actors of DDR, integrated assessments and risk analysis, planning, programming and operations, integrated strategic purpose and objectives in the entire Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process. The integrated DDR standards (IDDRS) show how DDR can contribute to building security, reconstructing the social fabric and developing human capacity, resulting in the establishment of a sustainable, long-term peace-building capacity that continues to function once a UN mission comes to an end (IDDRS, 2006). Therefore, the integrated approach also emphasize on the third parties intervention, coordination and harmony among UN bodies for the successful mission. Integrated DDR missions were launched in late 2004 in both Darfur (Sudan) and Haiti (Muggah, 2014). The integrated approach should include five features such as people centered, well-planned, flexible, integrated, accountability and transparency, and national owned.

Consensual approach to DDR

This approach bases its assumption on a new social contract (agreement) that must be reached among the different types of returnees (refugees, internally displaced persons, and ex-

combatants), other newcomers and those who stayed behind to collectively deal with crime carried out during the conflict and to rebuild communities (Knight & Özerdem, 2004). This approach mainly based its rationality on the consent and willingness of armed groups to put down their gun in favor of peace and to be part of that peace building. The authors express how the contract is undertaken as following very well.

This social contract must be based on participatory democratic principles; Planners must base DDR on an awareness of the root causes of violence and conflict, aim for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration components of the DDR process to work closely together at all times, and plan for the transition to long term recovery and development. An integrated and targeted approach requires the advance coordination of a diverse group of actors involved in the process. More importantly, in order to avoid the possibility of creating convicts between the local community and former combatants, the needs of the wider community also should be considered (Knight & Özerdem, 2004).

The authors emphasize on the need to consider disarmament as a new social contract between former combatants and their post-conflict environment. In other words, the security-focused concept of disarmament should be expanded so that it encompasses the socio-economic implications of the DDR process on former combatants and their dependents. The consensual disarmaments of ex-combatants may not require cantonment to demobilize the combatants. Since, they gave their consent to disarm and to disband from the former command; demobilization can be achieved without this action. This willingness suggests that demobilization without cantonment would create a locale-specific reinsertion orientation, allowing for sessions that are regionally and culturally specific. Such an approach would avoid the inevitable delays encountered within cantonment sites and the subsequent security concerns that may result in threats to the peace process. It would also serve to concentrate assets on the reinsertion and reintegration activities as opposed to maintaining cantonment sites. The cash component of the orientation assistance might be an effective tool, but it needs to be carefully targeted as part of an overall reinsertion package. However, the reintegration process should avoid the provision of a lump sum payment because of its limited utility for addressing a wide scope of problems in relation to the social and economic reintegration of former combatants.

This approach needs a strong trust building between the armed groups and the government. Nevertheless, in this approach, the authors did not indicate the monitoring and evaluation

mechanisms of the DDR process that took place in this way. Furthermore, it overlooked the apparatus how to handle the risk of relapsing in to armed conflicts and social unrests due to the familiarity of former combatants with violence and aggressiveness behavior that is developed and internalized for a long time in to their personality through strong political indoctrination as well as socialization.

Community-based Approach

(Willemijn et.al.(2016) suggest that DDR should be undertaken in the way it can promote human/community security rather than security which is the focus of traditional security in which the referent subject of security is the state. However, human security is an emerging concept by which individuals are the referent object of security and concerned at the protection of individuals from a possible threat. Thus, the authors emphasized on the design of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants should involve community based approaches. The assumption in this community-based approach is that the community security should become the aim and bottom-up approach is preferable in wide ranging strategy. They believe that community based approach enables to prevent the failure of DDR programs designed to promote national security.


Altogether, such a holistic security promotion strategy should endeavor to make people and communities better able to protect themselves and to create a living that does not depend on war and violence. “The process needs to be tailor-made to address the characteristics of its sociopolitical, economic and physical environment” (Knight & Özerdem, 2004, p. 513). In other words, it should aim at making guns redundant. 'Community-based' and 'Second-generation' DDR initiatives lend motivation for such a wider security promotion approach. What they show is that the optimal approach is very context-specific. An analysis of the conflict, of local security mechanisms, and of the needs and capacities of communities, therefore, has to be the first step, despite the fact that this takes valuable time.

Community-based approach is more suited for the long-term reintegration program of Ex-combatants. Some activities such as the documentation, collection, control and disposal of small arms and light and heavy weapons and disbanding of military commands and structures may not require the direct involvement of the community.

Towards an Integrated Consensual Approach

As it is discussed above, DDR is the process by which former combatants lay down their gun and weapons to stop fighting and engaged in to civilian life or the state police, defense, and

army force. It takes place in different situations. The most literatures Mulugeta, (2017); Maria et al., (1996); Willemijn Verkoren, Rens Willems, Jesper Kleingeld and Hans Rouwdem, (2016) focused on the practices and lessons of DDR on the aftermath of the armed conflicts, ceasefire and war. Much of these looks at the DDR process aimed at either demilitarization or weapons reduction; DDR processes planned at the periods of transition from war to peace and political victory (political transition). However, there are many types of conflicts, post conflict contexts, and settings where DDR takes place. During instability, absence of sustainable peace and abundance presence of security threats due to the armed opposition parties, rebel groups, and informal militants; states pretend to engaged in to DDR to disband non state armed groups and to keep state monopoly of use of power (Miklaucic, 2011). This form of DDR is also conducted when state is on the path of the security sector reform, economic, social and political reform where there is no change in structure and government. Therefore, this study tends to assess the DDR process of PG-7 in the context of political developments that is rarely studied; the researcher has applied “integrated approach” and “consensual approaches” to analyze the DDR process. These two approaches are preferred because both enables to understand the process in accordance with IDDRS principles and guide lines; help to assess the DDR process with predefined criteria; and are contextually suited for the reason that PG-7 had the consent to disband its army.



Designed by the researcher, 2020

3. CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

3.1. Introduction

In order to achieve the objective of the study, a clear and appropriate research methodology is vital. This section is comprised of description of the study area, the research methodology, research design, sampling design, and, the source of data, method of data collection, methods of data analysis of the study and ethical consideration.

3.2. Description of Study area

The major part of my researches conducted in Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia, for a number of reasons. First, all the head offices of the relevant governmental, non-governmental and international organizations and agencies which participated in DDR process are located in Addis Ababa. Second, the agreement to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate Patriotic Ginbot7 was carried out by the federal government. Third, the party that is the case of this research is a national party, which is not an ethnic-based or regional party like OLF, TPDM, ADFM and ONLF. It is sound to argue that it will be logical to go to the place where the DDR is actually took place. Most of the ex-combatants of patriotic Ginbot7 are found in Amhara regional state, particularly Bahir Dar and Worta, in Gonder. These places are selected because, most of the Ginbot-7 armed resistance was found and mostly the party's movement was active, landed after returned from Eritrea and the process of demobilization took place. Therefore, due to the above reasons the researcher went to the North West region of Ethiopia for fieldwork.

3.3. Research methodology

3.3.1. Research Design

Research design is the structure of the research, that show how all of the major parts of the research project, the samples or group, work together in addressing research question. Likewise, research design is the arrangement of conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy in procedure (Kothari, 2004).The purpose of employing researcher design is to describe the nature of a situation, as it exists at the time of the study and to explore the causes of a particular phenomenon. In the line of the above pieces of evidence and description, using this method for this study was found appropriate and sound. The researcher opted to use this kind of research considering the desire of the researcher to obtain first-hand data from the

sources so as to formulate rational and sound conclusion and recommendation for the study (Kothari, 2004).

The research design that would be employed in this study is a case study research design. The case study design is appropriate based upon the assumption that the case being studied is a typical of cases of a certain type and therefore a single case can provide insight into the events and situations prevalent in a group from where the case has been drawn. Since the objectives of this study are to explain and analyze the practices and implication of the DDR processes and political reform in Ethiopia, an explanatory method will be employed. Due to the nature of the research, it is proposed to employ qualitative approach, so the researcher will be used case study design as explanatory manners for qualitative research through the instruments of data collection such as in-depth interview, open-ended questionnaire and document analysis. Explanatory method is appropriate in investigating the DDR practices or trends in the Patriotic Ginbot-7.

(Kumar, 2011) suggested that, “in selecting a case therefore, you usually use purposive, judgmental or information-oriented/snowball sampling techniques.” Therefore, from a non-probable sampling, purposive and snowball sampling is adopted.

3.3.2. Sample and Sampling Techniques

Sampling techniques of the study would be employed non-probability sampling. As Neuman (2014) stated in qualitative research, the purpose of research may not require having a representative sample from a huge number of cases. Instead, a non-probability sample often better fits the purposes of a study. Hence, purposive and snowball/information-oriented techniques are used to deals in detail.

Purposive sampling

Thus, the research employed purposive sampling to select key informants that are relevant to the research. Because, as William (2006) discussed, purposive sampling enables the researcher to select what he/she thinks is relevant based on specialist knowledge or selection criteria. Therefore, 10 key informants were selected purposively for interview from the FDRE National Disaster and Risk Management Commission (1), FDRE Office of the Prime Minister (1), NGO (AFRRID) (1), Amhara National Regional State Peace and Security Office (1) Amhara National Regional State Police Commission(1), Amhara National Regional State Disaster Prevention and Food Security Coordination Office(1), PG-7 former leaders(2), and Ex-combatants of PG-7 (2).

Snowball sampling

Due to the lack of information on the exact location of the ex-combatants, snowball sampling was used to select participants. Thirteen informants were selected for interview and 25 participants filled Questionnaire from pg-7 ex-combatants. The researcher has had contact with three PG-7 ex-combatants who have engaged in the DDR process in 2018, who are known to the researcher on the bases of information obtained from personal contacts. From each respondent the researcher has obtained names and addresses of other ex-combatants who have come from the same party (PG-7) and pass the same DDR process in 2018. The respondents thus identified has been interviewed and asked to identify other respondents for the researcher. This process was continued until the researcher has collected the needed information and up to redundancy comes.

3.3.3. Source of data

Primary Sources of Data: For this study purpose, the primary source of data has gathered from PG-7 ex-combatants and leaders, government officials and experts by using in-depth interview and open- ended questionnaires.

Secondary Sources of Data: A secondary source of data was obtained from the PG-7 documents and DDR program reports and documents. Accordingly, both published and unpublished materials, documents, articles, journals, books, reports, and magazines concerning the issue under study are used.

3.3.4. Data Collection Tools and Methods

The research type employed in this thesis is qualitative research that explores attitudes, behavior, and experiences through such methods as interviews. It attempts to get an in-depth opinion from participants. Prabhat and Meenu (2015) stated that, the researcher requires many data gathering tools or techniques. Tools may vary in complexity, interpretation, design, and administration. Each tool is suitable for the collection of a certain type of information. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, data has been collected through in-depth-interview, structured questions and document analysis data collection methods.

In-depth Interview: The researcher will use both unstructured and semi-structured interview to get rich and valuable information. The total number of 23 participants being participated in interview from PG-7 leaders, government officials engaged in the DDR program as well as from ex-combatants. 10 of the interviewees are key- respondents selected purposively and

other 13 participants are ex-combatants from the study population participated in interview. The interview sessions was conducted in Amharic language translated into English.

Open-ended Questionnaire: was employed in the form written interview format that used for the sake of avoiding contact due to COVID- 19. Based on this, the researcher has collected primary data from PG-7 leaders and ex-combatants, by preparing questions in a written form. It is preferred because, it allows the respondents to provide detail information, feelings, attitude, and understanding of the subject matter thoroughly, in the way it can situated to gather qualitative data. Hence, data was collected up to the data saturation point is happen. Thus, the researcher have collected up to 25 participants from PG-7 have filled and the data becomes repeated.

Document analysis: The researcher has reviewed documents from news reports, magazines, legal documents and other related documents on the issue.

Description of Key Informants and Participants

A. Key informants

To conduct the study, the researcher used key informants interview. The participants of this interview were from the Amhara Regional State Police Commission, Peace and Security Office, Amhara Regional State Risk and Disaster Management, AFRRID (NGO), National Risk and Disaster Management Commission (NRDMC), Office of the Prime Minister, PG-7 Leaders, and Ex-combatants. The description of the key informants is present at annex one on the table based on their organization and position.

B. Participants of for interview and questionnaire

The respondents of the interview and the structured questions were from patriotic ginbot-7 for unity and democracy. Thirteen respondents participated for interview and 25 respondents have filled the questionnaire. The characteristic and background of the respondents were classified in terms of age, level of education and years of membership in PG-7.

Characteristics					
Age	<25	26-35	36-45	45-55	>56
	2	10	14	8	2
Level education	Illiterate	Secondary education	Diploma	Degree	MSc/MA
	4	18	11	3	2
Year of membership	<5	6-10	10-15	>15	
	5	23	6	2	

Table 3.1: description of respondents of interview and questionnaire

3.3.5. Method of Data Analysis

The researcher will employ qualitative data analysis method by which the qualitative data collected by means of document analysis, interview in the written form and in-depth-interview will be analyzed in the form of thematic analysis, which was identify, analyze and report patterns and themes within the data. Thus, the data will be analyzed in the form of sentences and meaning which is obtained through interview techniques.

3.3.6. Ethical consideration

The study was conducted with due consideration of the ethics of the research. In the courses of primary data collection, the free and informed consent of the informant to participate was obtained. The researcher also informed the participants that their privacy and use of anonymity to keep their identity confidential without their explicit consent. The participants were also told that agree to participate and also withdraw from the interview at any time by their interest. All sources are acknowledged appropriately and no information will be manipulated for any other purpose except for this research. During the transcription stage, the researcher gave due attention to address the similarities of the context and findings of the interviewee's oral statement. To improve the validity of the study, triangulation of data sources and methods were used. The researcher also employed peer review to reduce bias and enhance the validity of the research.

4. CHAPTER FOUR: THE DISARMAMENT, DEMOBLIZATION AND REINTEGRATION PROCESS OF PG-7

4.1. Introduction

This study aims to assess the DDR processes of ex-combatants in the context of the ongoing political reform in Ethiopia. This chapter deals with the analysis and presentation of the data that have been obtained through face-to-face and written in-depth interviews and document review methods. Data was collected from a total number of 48 individuals, 23 of whom participated in interviews, where 10 of the interviewees are key informants from different stakeholders and 13 are ex-combatants of the Patriotic Ginbot 7. In addition, 25 ex-combatants have responded to written questionnaires. In order to assess the Ethiopia's experiences of DDR process of ex-combatants of rebel groups; there is no standards and legal frameworks in the country. As per the conceptual framework, this research has adopted eight thematic areas drawn from the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) and consensus approaches to understand the implementation of DDR in Ethiopia. Out of the several issues that were identified to assess various aspects of the DDR process of PG-7, here the researcher has used the eight themes to show the process. Thus, the following contents are designed to meet the objectives of the study and answer the raised questions.

4.2. Driving Factors for Armed Resistance by Patriotic Ginbot 7

Patriotic Ginbot 7 for Unity and Democracy was an armed political party established in May, 2008 with the primary goal of regime change. The party used holistic strategies to struggle, predominantly, armed resistance (gorilla fighting) and public disobediences are common instruments. One of the respondent from the movement explained as:

Our party had different mechanisms of struggles. Among these guerillas fighting, public disobedience, and rebellions are the common ones. These struggles were directed in Eritrea, where the executives, military training and chief of command were found. Mission from Eritrea was send and the overall freedom fighting in Ethiopia was controlled from Eritrea (KII09, May 06, 2020).

Thus, the PG-7 strategy included the use of violent means to overthrow the then ruling government (EPRDF). The researcher questioned why PG-7 decided to involve in armed resistance instead of peaceful political struggle to bring regime change. As a result, the ex-

combatants identify several reasons that drive the movement to prefer armed struggle. The major causes of armed struggle by PG-7 are the followings.

4.2.1. Lack of Political Liberty

Ex-combatants stated that, one of the major causes of engagement in to PG-7 to fight against the ruling government is the absence of political liberty in the country. There were thousands of political prisoners in the country due to their political position and membership to opposition political parties. “The absence of freedom to practice our political beliefs freely and smoothly pushed us to hold gun and fight these oppressive regime”⁹.

4.2.2. Lack of Democratic, Free and Fair Election

(LANDINFO, 2012) illustrated that even though the government of Ethiopia held elections for parliament in 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010, the implementation has been criticized for favoring the ruling party, which is the dominant party with strong influence on the administration and the courts. In the same way, PG-7 respondents have a claim on the fairness of the election and democratic political competitions. They and their movement decided to use violent forms of resistance to change the ruling party. The movement did not register for the 2010 election because it believed that the election was only symbolic and insignificant for the political transformation of Ethiopia. This implies that they have no confidence on the trustworthiness of the elections in Ethiopia.

4.2.3. Lack of Justice

According to the respondents’ response, PG-7 was pushed in to armed resistance for the reason that, the massive murder of people, torture, ethnic conflicts, violation of democratic and human rights, lack of equality and social injustice led the movement to conclude that there was little hope for justice and democracy in the country. Consequently, PG-7 preferred to use violence as a means of overthrowing the government and building democracy, sustainable peace, and development.

One informant expressed his reason for joining the armed resistance as:

Due to the dictator ruling system in our country my father sentenced in to prison for a long period of time. We were not able to visit him. We only heard he might be in Humera. But, after all he had died in prison. Our family faces psychological trauma

⁹ (pc, May 04, 2020)

and difficulty in economy. Therefore, I felt I should resist such undemocratic system and engage in PG-7 to fight the government. (PC, April 29, 2020)

Another informant shared his story:

There is no democracy in our country. The ruling party's repressive governance, murder of freedom fighters, the dictator and domination of one party from the coalition EPRDF and the killing of my father by the government pressurized me to armed resistance (pc, May 05, 2020).

Generally, participants explained many driving factors to PG-7 to hold guns and firearms as a means to change the status quo and to take the power. As the PG-7 document shows, the movement intended to follow undemocratic way to overcome the existing political instability, insecurity, and conflicts and lastly it tend to establish democratic government in the country.

4.3. The Process of DDR Negotiation with Patriotic Ginbot 7

According to KII08, the process of the negotiation to disarm and demobilize the armed members started immediately after the resignation of former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn¹⁰. The Movement had made its own assessment of different scenarios and had the insight that something had changed within the government. From the assessment, the organization decided to return to Ethiopia and to work in peaceful and legal manner. Five executive leaders of the movement represented the negotiation between PG-7 and the federal government to demobilize the members; namely Berhanu Nega, Andargachew Tsige, Ephrem Madebo, Neamen Zeleke and one person whose name is not public. On the other hand, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Lema Megersa, at the time President of Oromia regional state, and currently Minister of National Defense, were the negotiators representing the government of Ethiopia. The negotiation was held in Washington DC, USA in 2018.

4.4. The Agendas of the Negotiation

As key informant Andargachew Tsige (KII07) said, there were many political and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration issues coming in to discussion. However, the negotiation of the PG-7 and the government was conducted orally without written peace agreement. Both of the key informants from PG-7 Andargachew Tsige and Ephrem Madebo stated that, the condition in 2018, the reform after the coming of PM Abiy Ahmed builds

¹⁰ (KII08, May 25, 2020)

different political mind-sets in Ethiopia. Thus, there was a positive willingness and mutual understanding between different actors to accelerate the reform. Andargachew explained the situation as “the tricky thing is that we have no a written peace agreement.” Even though it is an oral agreement, he said we have dealt with different issues. The issues raised in the negotiation are related with the causes of the PG-7 armed resistance and how to handle the issues of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants.

“Earlier in June 2018, PG7 announced a unilateral ceasefire – suspended all armed operations – with the view to engage in peaceful struggle” (Country Policy & Information note, 2019). Also, Efreem said to show PG-7s willingness and commitment to the negotiation, we decide a unilateral ceasefire internally (KII08). The issues of the negotiations include:

- The demobilization process of the ex-combatants
- Building of independent institutions
- Democratic election
- Postponing of the 2020 election

The demobilization process was agreed in a sense that the armed members will be disarmed, demobilized, rehabilitated and reintegration. As Andargachew stated, “Although it is orally we have agreed to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate all PG-7 forces inside and outside Ethiopia.” The PG-7 has started to find funds from external states like Sweden, Norway and Germany for this purpose. While all states showed interest, the German government decided to cover all the funds and signed with the government of Ethiopia to give around 40 million Euros. Thus, the PG-7 and the federal government have agreed on the good beginning of demobilization and promised to accomplish this effectively.

Among the agendas for negotiation, postponing of the 2020 election was difficult to agree on easily. As per PG-7 time table of the election was not reliable and suggested that it must be postponed. While the government’s position on this was that it was a constitutional issue that it can’t be pushed. Both of them agreed on other issues easily¹¹. Here the ideal reform has a greater role as an engine of the mindset that everyone was eager to support the reform.

¹¹ (KII08, May 25, 2020)

4.5 The Implementation of the Negotiation and the Process of DDR

4.5.1 The Implementation of the Negotiation

All most all respondents argued that, the launch was ‘good’ as per their assessment of the implementation and negotiations on the political platform. For example:

- On the side of Patriotic Ginbot7, the armed struggle stopped and brought in its fighters and leaders to Ethiopia in September, 2018;
- On the side of the government, Patriotic Ginbot7 was removed from the list of terrorist groups; individuals arrested for being members of Patriotic Ginbot7 were released;
- There was a starting of building of independent and credible institutions such as the establishment of an independent electoral board, freedom of the media, freedom of expression, and freedom of speech.

However, the study participants noted that among the agreements, there are various problems and delays in the successful disarming, demobilizing, and ongoing re-integration process of combatants. The details will discuss in the implementation process as follow.

4.5.2 The Implementation of the DDR Process

Approximate number of PG-7 ex-combatants

The total numbers of combatants believed by the PG-7 those eligible for benefits offered by a DDR program are 8000¹² including men, women, boys and girls participated in PG-7 armed-group. This number includes injured combatants, active combatants, and logistic service providers. It also includes members inside Ethiopia and Eritrea who served in the PG-7 as a fighter/soldier, prisoners due to the missions and works of the movement, work at public disobedience, intelligence and other mission given by the movement. The number 8000 seems huge and exaggerated but the rationale to be inclusive as such is that these members were considered as ‘shiftas’ and terrorists because of being members of terrorist organization ‘PG-7’ by the government. As a result they lose their regular social cohesion, regular jobs, wealth, and farm lands. Among these, 300 combatants were in Eritrea.

¹² (KII7, May 04, 2020)

Disarmament

The disarmament phase started in Eritrea by disarming around 300 combatants in Eritrea from August 06, 2020 to August 13, 2020 under the direct command from the PG-7 leadership. From 14 to 18 August 2020 the movement collected all weapons and handed it over to the government of Eritrea. In September 2020 the military structure of PG7 was dissolved.

According to the respondents, the involvement of PG-7armed forces in Eritrea and Ethiopia in the process of disarmament was not consistent and inclusive. Although the disarmament phase was intended to include PG-7 forces in Ethiopia, it had several problems. Firstly, the number of combatants inside the country is not well known. Thus, it was a challenge to disarm the armed forces in the country. Second, as it is discussed in Chapter 3, most of the Patriots' Ginbot7 armed struggle combatants were originally from the Amhara region, the area where possession of guns is psychologically tied with individual's self-confidence and pride. "Culture of pride/respect is one aspect of culture of the people for both possession and misuse of small arms as a result people are interested to carry guns for pride but they also use guns in wrong and unnecessary conditions" (Aemro, 2017, p. 11) . Given the local psychological and cultural value of fire arms to the community it was decided to legalized and privatized the small weapons to the individuals and only heavy weapons were collected by the government. Based on this, 1, 050 individual and group/heavy weapons were identified, from the combatants inside Ethiopia, to be collected to the government¹³. However, small arms are decided to be given as a reward for the combatants. Third, the Amhara national regional government and Special Force discouraged the disarmament process of armed forces at the time. One informant stated that:

"In fact, there were the Amhara nationalist pressures to include the combatants into Amhara national regional government special force and equip them." (PC, May 26, 2020)

Demobilization

As Andargachew Tsege, stated, around 8,000 members of PG7 were registered and presented to reintegration process. PG-7 soldiers filled forms to categorize them as enabling the government to differentiate necessary assistance to ex-combatants in accordance with their

¹³ (K1109, May 6, 2020)

needs. The demobilization phase includes assembly in the cantonment, pre-discharge orientation, and transportation. But the cantonment did not include the entire combatants. The camp was prepared for XC who were in Eritrea, assembled them in Wortu Agricultural College. It implies that the combatants in Ethiopia did not include in the cantonment. The rationale of the actors was the combatants inside Ethiopia were in their community and they can stay with their family until the reintegration process started. The orientation session includes psychosocial training that is provided by Action for Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Development (AFRRID) with purpose of helping ease the ex-combatants feelings of isolated and preparing them to live peaceful life with the society by ‘reducing their antisocial behavior’.

Manager of the AFRRID stated that,

The organization’s basic assumption is that the returnees need decent reception from their community as well as they have to take a kind of training on the current situation of the state and feeling of the community towards them is positive as a freedom fighter. So they want to hear they are heroes than imposition and indoctrination on any political topic. Consequently, we have provided a psychosocial training to change the psychological makeup of ex-combatants assembled in the camp (KII03, April 06, 2020).

In addition, 2000 members have taken reorientation training in Bahir Dar Leadership Institute with two rounds¹⁴. PG-7 leaders also provided additional reorientation session as they had stopped the armed resistance from 2018 onwards and had decided that every member should live peacefully within their community.

On the other hand combatants reflect that the training is not enough to have any skill, knowledge, improvement that can help them to get sustainable job and income, maintain their social relation and inclusion.

In terms of transportation the coalition of Amhara Police Commission, Militia, and the region’s Peace and Public Security Office established a committee to follow up the safe and secured transportation of the combatants. This was strictly done starting from Humera to Woreta camp. The second phase of transportation was helping the combatants to go to their

¹⁴ (KII09, May 06, 2020)

chosen destination for those who want to visit their families. Hence, 251 combatants in the camp have given ETB 9,100 for clothing and transport expenditure.

Reinsertion

At the beginning, PG-7 has provided an immediate assistance with around ETB 6 Million starting from the Eritrean government stopped providing logistics up to the FDRE takes the responsibility (KII08, May 25 2020). Having come in Ethiopia, Amhara National Regional State Disaster Prevention and Food Security Coordination Office provided a transitional safety net package as a form of reinsertion until the sustainable reintegration process would take place. Its objective was to address the immediate basic needs of the demobilized ex-combatants. This package provided for 251 ex-combatants in addition to the 9,100 mentioned above. Among these 141's financed in cash with ETB 3000 and 110 ex-combatants received ETB 3000 in cash and 3000 in kind (food, cleaning materials) (KII03, April 06, 2020). 26 ex-combatants receive reinsertion relief for their basic need form NDRMC in Addis Ababa¹⁵. It is notable that this does not include the entire combatants reported for demobilization and reintegration.

Reintegration

At the reintegration phase, the government and PG-7 established two governmental and non-governmental organizations respectively. The former is "Ex-combatants Reintegration Project Office (ERPO) under the command of the Prime Minister's Office led by Tesfaye Yigezu. The later is Action for Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Development (AFRRID) a non-governmental organization established for providing relief, rehabilitation, reinsertion, reintegration and sustainable development support for the ex-combatant returnees. AFRRID has a manager named Tewodros Yilma, and is led by a board, which has seven members. ERPO has not been effective and functional thus far; informants indicated that this is because the establishment of the office is mainly by the government cadres not technical expertise personnel¹⁶. The German government wanted to regulate the issue of the reintegration and its fund. For this reason, they sent an expert to oversee how the Ethiopia government is handling the DDR process, found the ERPO technically unfit (KII07, May 04, 2020).

On the other hand, a key informant, an advisory of the NDRMC expressed that,

¹⁵ (KII01, April 04, 2020)

¹⁶ (KII07, May 04, 2020)

We have giving them the temporary reinsertion assistance still from different budgets. Now we are in problem. The reintegration process is very late. This is because the lack of commitment towards the German government. we tried to push them but they are still saying within the short period of time we will start reintegrate them but we should have clear documentation of the profiles of the ex-combatants (KII01, April 04, 2020).

This fragmentation among the actors contributed to the delayed implementation of the reintegration segment. On the other side, “AFRRID has prepared different long term reintegration and development projects funded by the government of German with the finance from ETB 100, 000 up to 150,000 for each ex-combatant.”¹⁷ But this project is still in the shelf without any meaningful action because of the misunderstanding between the government and the Germany on the fund.

As key informant interviewee stated,

The German government wants to manipulate the overall process of the DDR with full engagement, commitment, strict study, identification and documentation of the profile of the Ex-combatants in accordance with standards of DDR programs. In doing so, 20% of the fund will be used to organize the infrastructure of the task force like car, office, and different payments (KII07, May 04, 2020).

Another key informant added,

On the other hand, the interest of the Ethiopia government is to lead the project with monopoly with the intention of using the fund to reintegrate all ex-combatants from PG-7, OLF, ONLF, ADFM, TPDM and other regionally organized forces in Afar, Benshangul Gumuz Gambela assumed to be around 35,000 ex-combatants (KII08, May 25, 2020).

The process of reintegration is now on a hold back, every PG-7 combatant waiting for it eagerly to resume. Around 5000 PG7 combatants were demobilized in Amhara region as a whole¹⁸. Local actors in Amhara National Regional State did some reintegration activities for a number of persons. There was different reintegration choices presented to ex-combatants to choose from. These include education, employment as civil servant or state force (police,

¹⁷ (KII03, April 06, 2020).

¹⁸ (KII09, May 06, 2020)

national defense force and regional special force), trade and farming. Based on the on their interest, 27 ex-combatants got free education in higher education's such as in Addis Abeba University, Bahr Dar university, Debre Markos University, and Debre Tabor University with Bachelors and Masters programs¹⁹; 350 ex-combatants were integrated to the Amhara special force²⁰; and unknown small number of members getting back to their previous position and institutions as civil servant. In addition, some ex-combatants has got farming land around Metema; some provided housing and working places around Bahir Dar²¹. However, most of the ex-combatants are idle in the community. At the Reintegration phase some of the ex-combatants face difficulty to return to their former office positions after a long period of resigning²². One informant said:

I will not be functional and will not fit my past position now; similarly, the institution will not get what is expected from my position due to the different experience i.e I have a military life for a long time. Therefore, I prefer to wait what the government does for me by using the immediate assistance given to me. (KII10, May 07, 2020)

These implied that, the delaying of demobilization and reintegration process with assistance creates idle minds and dependent personality towards the combatants. 110 men still live in the camp have full of free time with permanent salary of ETB 3,000 and free food, healthcare, shelter, and cleaning materials by the government for two years. There are also ex-combatants who are forgotten, and were not included in the reinsertion and reintegration programs. Hence, the mind of young adults is involved in different antisocial behaviors such as, using drugs, criminal activity and violent behaviors, and remobilized easily by different forces.

Key informant KII10 claims that, the failure of DDR leads them to participate in unlawful activities.

There are some members struggled in Ethiopia were not included in the relief programs , so they are engaging in different forces such as Fano, Wolqayt Asmelash

¹⁹ (KII10, May 07, 2020)

²⁰ (KII09, May 06, 2020)

²¹ (Ibid)

²² (KII10, May 07, 2020)

Committee and other illegal actions. In addition, there is a crime against the community, in Gonder town, combatants commit robbery on cars, and they are remobilized themselves (KII10, May 07, 2020)

One informant also stated as:

“አንድ የታጠቀና ትጥቅ የፈታ አካል ካልተቋቋመ ቀጥታ ወደነበረበት በረሀ ይገባል። ከእኔ ጀምሮ የማደርገው ይህንኑ ነው። ምክንያቱም መንግስት በእኛ ላይ የማታለል ስራ ሰርቷል።”

If an armed and later disarmed body is not rehabilitated and reintegrated in to civilian life, he will relapse in to his previous life. Including me, I will do this because the government deceived on us. (PC, May 11, 2020)

Overall, the reintegration phase has several problems. First, the necessary assistance that each category required was not identified well. Correspondingly, the reintegration programs are not prioritized based on the necessary assistances to the categories. Second, all the members of the PG-7 around 8,000, are looking for the reintegration program whether employed or unemployed. However, one key informant stated that the German fund is aimed at only for ex-combatants who returned back from Eritrea. The first criterion for providing immediate assistance and long-term reintegration was crossing the border. That means not every combatant is going to be reintegrated. This is not correct as the aim of DDR is to transform the combatants from to military life to civilian status by disarming demobilizing and reintegrating them in to civilian status providing sustainable job opportunity and income in order to prevent the reoccurrence of violent conflict due to XC. These activities should include all workers of a rebel group. Third, there are members who are registered and became beneficiaries of different forms of assistances from different projects. This needs for strict biometric registration system. Fourth, there are members who are laid down without any assistance, particularly, the PG-7 members those were in prison and in Ethiopia. “The reintegration process was intended to reintegrate disabled ex-combatants and families of scarified members 176 in number” but not done yet²³.

Generally, ex-combatants coming from Eritrea have disarmed effectively; some has demobilized; some are assemble in the camp to be demobilized, and they are on the process to reintegrate. DDR process of ex-combatants from Eritrea has better implementation progress than ex-combatants inside Ethiopia. The demobilization process was not good

²³ (KII09, May 06 2020)

enough. Getting financial support is one of the ingredients of DDR process. The combatants have not got enough skill and mental readiness for reintegration in to the society. The people- centered characteristics of DDR that focuses on the people's security; the combatants mind change and non-instrumental value of DDR that grant the sustainable peace and tranquility of the society is overlooked.

4.6 Actors Involved in the Process and Their Role

As it is stated above, various actors participated in the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. All the prominent actors were internal actors, the most important actors are: the FDRE Government, Patriotic Ginbot 7 for Unity and Democracy, Amhara National Regional State Government, NDRMC, Amhara National Regional State Peace and Security Office, Amhara National Regional State disaster Prevention and Food Security Coordination Office, Amhara Regional State Special Force, Amhara Police Commission, ERPO, AFRRID, and other stakeholders in different level have involved in the process of DDR. The community also has a significant role in welcoming of PG-7 and supporting them with moral, providing food and money for immediate assistance in Bahir Dar. From the external actors, the governments of Sweden, Norway, and German (under the EU) showed their interest of supporting the reintegration process. But only the German government was committed to provide about 40 million EURO representing the EU.

Action for Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Development (AFRRID)

AFRRID is a nongovernmental organization established in 2018, the document of AFRRID (2018), reported that since its establishment it has conducted a number of activities. For instance, it collaborated with the NDRMC, PG-7 Movement for Unity and Democracy to facilitate smooth demobilization of the former combatants, of PG-7 from Eritrea. AFRRID had requisited and mobilized resources for the provision of basic relief (transport, shelter, clothing, food and health services) to support of the demobilization process that took place early September 2018. AFRRID also facilitated psychosocial training for ex-combatants and 15 former prisoners to help them recover from the traumatic experience they sustained due to the inhuman treatment they faced at the detention and prisons throughout the country. It also provides legal counsel and representation to prisoners in collaboration with experts in the field.

National Disaster and Risk Management Commission (NDRMC): was the main responsible government organ for the mobilizing of the resources to the ex-combatants up to

date. The source of the resource is the federal government. Thus, NDRMC managed the demobilization and reinsertion activities by regulating the budget. Starting from the entrance of ex-combatants, NDRMC provides all immediate assistance in cash and in kind.

FDRE government: is involved from the negotiation up to the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of PG-7 Movement for Unity and Democracy. The government finances the demobilization process. The ex-combatants stated that they have received about ETB 100,000 up to now for each as temporary assistance. The source of this money is sourced from the National Disaster and Risk Management Commission budget. Its major role was the commitment it shows to release all political prisons of PG-7, the revision of the anti-terrorism law and enables the members of the PG-7 to move freely as any civilian in the country.

Integration of actors: all the process of the disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating phase were not done in coordination. There is inconsistency of different bodies in providing assistances, demobilization and the reintegrating mechanisms. The lack of integration among actors to the implementation of DDR affects the process to delay and to be complex. Single funding, planning and implementation are unlikely to be effective.

4.7 The Implication of the ‘Political Reform’ on the DDR Process

Ethiopia is undergoing a potential change, set off by the 2018 appointment of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed following continued antigovernment resistances and protests. The PM has pledged to reform Ethiopia’s authoritarian state, ruled by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) since 1991, and amend the country’s repressive electoral, terrorism, and media laws (<https://freedomhous.org/>, 2019). Thus, one of the main stated objectives of the ‘reform’ was to improve the political system, to unify and build up national feelings. The unification of Ethiopia based its assumption on synergy, tolerance and reconciliation. The political development made in 2018 on Ethiopia’s political setting enables different armed opposition political actors to stop armed resistance. As a result, the ‘reform’ has its positive implication by creating motivation and trust among the government and PG-7 to agree on disbanding of their force. On the other hand, the government’s activities to change the political landscape, reform of electoral system, a light of political liberty, and freedoms regarding to the use of media and others implied to PG-7 that, the use of violence as a means to take power becomes meaningless. Therefore, the reform contributed to motivate and change the mentality of political organizations to choose peaceful political struggle in

their country. Likewise, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of rebel groups mitigates the tension arising from their violent action, changed the hostile relation of the ruling party's and opposition parties, building hope on peaceful and democratic competition. Furthermore, it also contributes to social cohesion and reconciliation.

However, the major negative implication of the reform on DDR is that the reform moves the direction of concentrating, decisions and activities of the government tighter and tighter. This means, many new things, conflicts, riots, internal displacements, election and currently the covid-19 pandemic all in one make the attention of the government to lack focus. Informants also indicate that there are no known priorities. Something which was burning issue might be forgotten when another issue arises. This is a great problem that things did not fixed in time and become everyday homework of the government. The problem of prioritizing results the demobilization and reintegration of PG-7 ex-combatants to be complicated. The poor implementation of the process produces threats on the peace and stability of the region by which different illegal groups used the combatants to raise grievance.

4.8 Challenges and Drawbacks of the Implementations and the DDD Process

Lack of written peace agreement: written peace agreement is first and for most essential element in the proper implementation of DDR. Yet, the volatile political situation in Ethiopia at that time makes the PG-7 to agree to disband its army with no written peace agreement. The negotiation between PG-7 and government of Ethiopia did not set out a clear vision, approach and intended outcomes of the DDR. There was no determined timeline, only it was agreed to conduct in short time but it has not shown much progress within two full years.

Lack of commitment: some informants suspect that there is sabotage on the side of the government. They said this because, the government is paid money for ex-combatants without any long term reintegration around ETB 100,000 and still they are paid but the projects planned by AFRRID are ranged between ETB 100,000 to 150,000. This has led them to think that the government intends to create a sense of victimization and confrontations among the former members of PG-7 and their leaders particularly with important figures of Ethiopia Citizens for Social Justice (ECSJ) and their party²⁴. Simultaneously, the German government is also the main problematic actor in the delay of the process. They cannot provide the promised fund for reintegration purpose. They argued, as they want follow

²⁴ KH09, May 06, 2020

biometric registration of ex-combatants profile before providing money. Nevertheless, the time is gone and the ex-combatants become out of mind. They are tired of lots of registrations by different bodies. The critic towards German is not on having biometric registration, the problem is first they did not getting in to action. Second, they can do this parallel with the provision of relief for the Ex-combatants. Third, the early engagement is better for all because ex-combatants are losing their time, their productive age without any meaningful rehabilitation. On the other side, the critics goes to the Government of Ethiopia why it needs to look only on the funds of the donor, lacks national belongingness to the DDR process (national ownership). It must consider the security risks due to failed DDR and should take action through planning, budgeting, as well as evaluation of outcomes with strict follow-up.

The attitude of the community with the familiarity of guns: makes the disarmament phase challenging. As a result, there are combatants reintegrated into the community without the proper disarmament and demobilization. The other problem is on the demobilization phase, which is not undertaken as reengineering of the mind of combatants to help them to change their mind of use of violence and firearms.

Problems of clear registration and favouritism: the number of the combatants of the PG-7 was not known exactly. First, Lower level and middle level leaders of PG-7 gives exaggerated reports of numbers of members. In addition, there is no identification mechanism whether someone was a combatant or not. This creates difficulty when the Amhara region calls to register the combatants inside Ethiopia. As former PG-7 internal public disobedience leader now a member of the board in AFRRID stated that only 1050 combatants from internally armed resistance were showed for disarmament²⁵. many of the combatants in Ethiopia did not present to the registration to escape giving up of their arm. While, the organization called to register for demobilization huge number of combatants came to be part of the reintegration fund.

There are 8,000 combatants registered and waiting for reintegration²⁶. However, as (KII01 April 04, 2020) informed that the reintegration process intended by the German government is considering only combatants who cross the border. This program is designed to reintegrate all combatants in Ethiopia from PG-7, OLF, TPDM, ADFM and ONLF returnees from

²⁵ (KII09, May 06, 2020)

²⁶ (KII08, may 25 & KII07, May 04, 2020)

Eritrea. Based on this, only around 300 combatants are part of the reintegration process from PG-7 (KII01, 2020). This is unusual criterion to identify the targets of the DDR and beneficiaries of reintegration programs. The program should first set out the eligibility criteria for beneficiaries and participants of the DDR process. It may be one man-one gun, or one adult- one gun or the responsibility may be given to the commanders of the armed group. The selected criteria must be agreed by national stakeholders and commanders of the movement. Most of the informants explained that the lower and middle level leaders of the movement report their families and relatives to be registered for the reintegration projects. This implies that, there are persons who got inappropriate benefits from the reintegration program come in. Thus, it needs a biometric system to deal with the problems of registration.

Lack of integration among actors: unincorporated activities of actors, donors and implementing entities affect the successful implementation of the process negatively. For instance, the poor synergy and cooperation of the government of Ethiopia and government of Germany hindered the progress of the DDR process.

To sum up, looking in to the consensus and integrated approach in the DDR process, the good will and consent of armed groups to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate their combatants has a greater role on success of the implementation. The PG-7 has made a unilateral ceasefire within the party without any external force from the government or any other body. This implies that on the one hand, the Movement aspires to support the political development; has the willingness to change the existing political situation; to take part on the peace building effort started by the new group led by PM Abiy Ahmed as well as to consolidate a relative peace and security in the country. On the other hand, the condition PG-7 demonstrated that it was at a militarily stalemate stage in which the combatants and the leaders are tired of being in desert and in exile in Eritrea for a long time. As the informants confirmed that, their member size was decreasing time to time. Therefore, the emerging political change is used as an opportunity to lay down guns on the side of PG-7. The government's invitation to peace was at proper time after they are weakened and before they cut hopes of political struggles in Ethiopia. The condition supposed the PG-7's commitment to accept the call of the government to negotiate on unite to ensure peace and stability in Ethiopia. It enables both of them to negotiate easily to disband the combatants. The consent to disband the military has benefits on the implementation of DDR. First, cantonments may not necessarily require for disarming and demobilizing the members since they have the consent. Second, the reorientation work to disband from the former military command may

be simplified. Third, economically, it is cost minimized because especially, combatants who were inside Ethiopia can acquire the immediate basic assistance from them and their families and the cost of the facilities for camps can be utilized to reintegrate XC.

Nevertheless, the problem is on the implementation of the process. There was no trust between the government and the combatants. This was happen when the disarmament and reintegration phase. Combatants did not report to the government what type of firearm they hold, the number, the type and even the army did not registered effectively. On the other hand, the government lacks commitment to reintegrate them. Once they are disbanded it become a less concerning issue by the government. The DDR process of PG-7 did not consider fully the principles of UN integrated approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standards. The implementation of the process lacks roadmap. It has drawbacks on having a written peace agreement, planning, integration, accountability and transparency.

5. CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The study attempted to assess the 2018 PG-7 DDR process, its negotiation and implementation; the actors and the implications of the 2018 political reform on the DDR process in order to answer the research question raised in the first chapter. By employing the methods in chapter three, this paper has drawn the following conclusion.

5.1. Conclusion

DDR is a process of transforming combatants from military life in to civilian status by targeting at peace building and prevention of security challenges that arise from ex-combatants to deal with the post-conflict situations. It is a combatant focused program that needs achievable parameters. With regard to the process and implementation of DDR, it is sound if someone asks, “did DDR actually take place in Ethiopia in 2018?” After the agreement to stop armed resistance, PG-7 and the government of Ethiopia has deal very well on the fate of the combatants. Consequently, they have orally agreed to conduct full-fledged disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process. In addition, there is beginning and indications of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration with its shortcomings and there are attempts to set out the institutional structures needed to plan and implement DDR for example NDMC, ERPO regardless of its functionality and AFRRID as an NGO. Therefore, the researcher can conclude that there was no proper disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process of ex-combatants in post-2018. While this implies that, there was not proper adherence to international standards it does not mean that some activities did not take place. The process has limitations to accomplish the preconditions and procedures of UN integrated approach. Some combatants engaged in to their community without an appropriate transformation in to civilian status. There was a problem of integration and cooperation of actors. It is not well-planned and timely bound. The accountability of actors and monitoring of the implementation of DDR lacks due emphasis towards the government.

Regarding with DDR and reform, the researcher understood that DDR in the context of political transition, transition from war to peace and military reduction is quite different form DDR in the context of reform. As Ethiopian experience indicates in 1991, there was immediate disarmament and demobilization. However, DDR in reform is not as clear-cut as in transition. In Ethiopia, the political reform holds many things especially on the political arena, regarding the opposition political parties, the Diaspora and the political prisoners to grasp the attention of the people. There were pressures on armed political parties outside

Ethiopia to get in before the Ethiopian New Year. There were high unrealistic expectations on what the 'reform' should achieve, proven to be difficult as expected. There was less attention given to the disarmament and reintegration phases while demonization as disbanding the opposing military structures was serious.

The good lesson I observed in the disarmament phase is that, it has considered weapons ownership and cultural cues regarding to the attitude of the community related to weapons. As a result, the disarmament phase takes an alternative of documentation and legalizes of small arms to the owners rather than disarm coercively.

5.2. Recommendation

Based on the findings of this study the following recommendations are given.

Disarmament demobilization and reintegration process of ex-combatants and proper disbanding of armed resistant's has a role in relation to the mitigation of security threats in the country. It improves the regional security and peaceful relation with neighboring countries by giving an end for proxy war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It promotes democracy, changes way of life of combatants, enables them to contribute on the sustainable peace and development. Therefore, in order to achieve the alleged consequences of DDR, it must be planned, monitored, and evaluated. The government should have revised the structure of ERPO and other relevant institutions with proper finance and expertise. Moreover, the safety and security of the community that absorbs the combatants has to be at the center of the focus besides the stabilized consequence. The study identifies several problems within the reintegration element that the impediment of demobilization and reintegration components have on the combatants and the community. Combatants have become idle in the city Bahir Dar and Wortu, in Gonder zone engaged in conflict, organized crime, violence and drug abuse are reported. Therefore, they become source of insecurity to the community. The hope of the reform and the DDR; the intended goals peace building and accelerating the reform are causing unintended security challenges. The government should have focus on the double-edged implications. Besides, the combatants have a possibility to remobilize themselves in the camp and out of the camp with other forces. This needs immediate political response by the government.

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Annex One: List of key informant interviews

No.	Code	Type of participant	Role	Sampling technique	Date of interview
1	KII01	FDRE national disaster and risk management commission	Advisory of NDRMC	Purposive	April 04, 2020
2	KII02	FDRE Office of the prime minister	Leader of ERPO	“	April 05, 2020
3	KII03	NGO(AFRRID)	Manager	“	April 06, 2020
4	KII04	Amhara regional state peace and security office	Head of the office	“	April 30, 2020
5	KII05	Amhara regional state police commission	Commander	“	April 30, 2020
6	KII06	Amhara regional state disaster and risk management commission	Finance	“	May 01, 2020
7	KII07	PG-7 former leader	Secretary general		May 04, 2020
8	KII08	PG-7 former leader	Executive	“	May 25, 2020
9	KII09	Ex-combatants of PG-7	PG-7 member	Snowball	May 06, 2020
10	KII10	Ex-combatant of PG-7	PG-7 member	Snowball	May 07, 2020

Annex Two: Interview Questions

Informed consent

My name is Yalemget Abebe Melak. I am a postgraduate student in Addis Ababa University, institute of peace and security studies. I am studying “Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in post 2018 Ethiopia: the case of Patriotic Ginbot 7 Movement for Unity and Democracy” for the partial fulfillment of requirements of Master’s Degree in peace and security. I kindly request your willingness to participate in the interview and give your response. Your response is vital for the study and your participation is voluntary. When I conduct the interviews, if you do not mind I will record the conversation not to miss useful information. The information I will record will be deleted after the end of my study and any information you will give serves only for this study and keep confidential. Your name and profile will not be mentioned in the study paper. You can ask any question during the interview session and you can skip question that you do not feel comfortable.

Thank you for your collaboration in advance.

Interview Questions Prepared for Former PG-7 Leaders key respondents

PART I. GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION OF THE RESPONDENT

1. Sex-----
2. Age-----
3. Educational Qualification-----
4. Field of study-----
5. Your position-----
6. Your responsibility-----
7. How long have you participated in Pg-7 movement in armed struggle? -----

Part two

The purpose of this interview guide is to gather information for the study “the Disarmament, demobilization and Reintegration of former combatants (DDR) processes in Ethiopia in the context of post-2018 reform: The case of patriotic Ginbot-7 movement.”

1. Who led the negotiation agreed between PG-7 and the ruling Government to disband the armed members?
2. How long did the negotiation process take?
3. What were the main items on the negotiation agenda?
4. Which items were easily agreed upon by the two parties?
5. Which aspects of the negotiation were difficult?
6. How were the negotiation and the DDR process implemented?
7. Who are the actors involved in the process of implementation?
8. What was their role?
9. How is the DDR program of PG-7 expressed in terms of inclusiveness of all combatants that found outside and in-side of the country?
10. How is the DDR of PG-7 ex-combatants evaluated
 - a. How many ex-combatants are disarmed?
 - b. How many small and heavy weapons are collected/ surrendered?
 - c. How many armed personnel are demobilized?
 - d. How many ex-combatants reintegrated and have received full reintegration support?
 - e. What reintegration options were presented to ex-combatants and which option do they choose?
 - f. Which types of reintegration options are more successful in providing sustainable reintegration for men and women?
 - g. How many ex-combatants ended up abandon the programme?
11. To what extent did the DDR programme deliver the outputs as planned, and was this delivered within the planned timeframe?
12. How has the security situation evolved in the country during, and after, the DDR programme?
13. What evidence to show if, and to what extent, the DDR programme has contributed to a change in the security situation?
14. What was the implication of the political reform of the ruling governments on the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of the PG-7?

15. How does the DDR process imply to the political development in Ethiopia?
16. What are challenges related to the implementation of the negotiation and the DDR program?
17. What do you suggest as a solution to the problems faced during the implementation of DDR?
18. Anything you would like to add?


Annex three: Questionnaire

ቀን-----

ለአርበኞች ግንቦት ሰባት የቀድሞ ተዋጊዎች የተዘጋጀ መጠይቅ

ያለምጌጥ አበበ መላክ፣የአዲስ አበባ ዩኒቨርሲቲ የሰላምና ደህንነት ጥናት ተቋም የሁለተኛ አመት ተማሪ፣ሲሆን “Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in post 2018 Ethiopia: the case of Patriotic Ginbot 7 Movement for Unity and Democracy” በሚል ርዕስ ጥናት እየሰራሁ እገኛለሁ። የዚህ መጠይቅ ዓላማ እ.ኤ.አ. በ2018 የተካሄደውን በአርበኞች ግንቦት 7 ውስጥ ስላሉት የቀድሞ ተዋጊዎች ትጥቅ የመፍታት፣ የመበተንና ወደ የማህበረሰባቸው እና በመንግስት ህይለኞች (ፖሊስ፣ ልዩሃይል እና መከላከያ) ውስጥ የማዋህድ DDR ሂደትን በተመለከተ መረጃ ለማግኘት ነው።

ጥናቱ በአሁኑ ጊዜ የተከናወነውን ታጣቂ የፖለቲካ ፓርቲዎችን የትጥቅ ትግል መተውና በውስጣቸው የነበሩ ታጣቂ አባሎቻቸውን በመበተን መልሶ የማቋቋም ሂደትን አስመልክቶ ስለሂደቱ የነበረውን ድርድር፣ ትግበራውን ፣ ተዋናዮችን እና ሚናቸውን፣ እንዲሁም የተጀመረውን የለውጥ ሂደትና እና DDR የአርስበርስ ተፅዕኖዎች ትክክለኛ መግለጫዎችን በማውጣት የነበረውን ክፍተት መለይት ነው። የጥናቱ ውጤት ለድህረ ምረቃ ክፍል መስፈርትን ለማሟላት ሲሆን የተሰበሰበው መረጃ ሙሉ በሙሉ ጥቅም ላይ የሚውለው ለአካዳሚክ ዓላማ ብቻ ትኩረት በመስጠት ነው። ስለዚህ ተመራማሪዎች የተሰበሰበውን መረጃ በምንም መንገድ አላግባብ እንደማልጠቀም ላረጋግጥላችሁ እወዳለሁ። በጥናቱ ውስጥ ለጥያቄዎች እውነተኛ ምላሽ ለጥናቱ ትክክለኛነት እና አስተማማኝነት ወሳኝሚና አላው። ስለዚህ ሁሉንም ጥያቄዎች እንዲያዩ እና ተገቢ ምላሽ እንዲሰጡ በ ትህትና እጠይቃለሁ።

 ስምዎን አይጻፉ።

ስለትብብርዎ በቅድሚያ አመሰግናለሁ!!!

ክፍል 1: የምላሽ ሰጪው አጠቃላይ መረጃ

1. ጾታ-----
2. እድሜ-----
3. የትምህርት ደረጃ-----
4. የትምህርት መስክ-----
5. አሁን ያሉበት ሁኔታ-----
6. አድራሻ-----
7. በትጥቅ ትግል የአርበኞች ግንቦት 7 አባል በመሆን ምን ያህል ጊዜ ተሳትፏል? -----

ክፍል 2: የሚከተሉት ጥያቄዎች የሚያተኩሩት ስለአጠቃላይ የአርበኞች ግንቦት 7 የቀድሞ የትጥቅ ትግል ላይ የተሳተፉ አባሎችን የትጥቅና የጦር መሳሪያ አፈታት፣ ወታደራዊ መዋቅርን መበተንና አባሎችን መልሶ ከማበረሰቡ ጋር የማዋህድ ሂደት ላይ ሲሆን በትኩረት እና በጥልቀት ለጥያቄዎቹ ማብራሪያ እንዲሰጡ የሚጠይቁ ናቸው፡፡

- 1 በአርበኞች ግንባር ግንቦት 7 ውስጥ መሳሪያ ለማንሳትና ለትጥቅ ትግል ያነሳሳዎ ምክንያት ምንድን ነው?

- 2 ከአርበኞች ግንቦት-ሰባት የትጥቅ አባልነት እንድለቁ ያደርገዎት ምንድን ነው?-----
- 3 በአርበኞች ግንቦት 7 እና በገዥው መንግስት መካከል የታጠቁ አባላትን ለመልቀቅ ድርድሩ እንዴት ነበር?-----
- 4 በአርበኞች ግንቦት 7 እና በገዥው መንግሥት መካከል የታጠቀውን የትጥቅ አባላት ለመበተን ድርድሩን የመራው ማነው?-----
- 5 የድርድሩ ሂደት ምን ያህል ጊዜ ወሰደ?-----
- 6 በድርድሩ አጀንዳ ላይ ዋና ዋና ነገሮች ምን ነበሩ?-----
- 7 በሁለቱ ወገኖች በቀላሉ የተስማሙት በየትኞቹ ነገሮች ናቸው?-----
- 8 ከድርድሩ የትኞቹ ገጽታዎች አስቸጋሪ ነበሩ?-----
- 9 የድርድሩ እና የDDR ፕሮግራሙ አተገባበር ምን ይመስላል? -----
- 10 በአተገባበሩ ሂደት ውስጥ የተሳተፉ ዋና ዋና ተዋናዮች እና ባለድረሻ አካላት እነማን ናቸው?-----

- 11 በጥያቄ ቁጥር 9 ላይ የዘረዘሩላቸው አካላት ሚና እና ያደረጉት አስተዋጥስ ምን ነበር?-----

- 12 የተሳተፉ አካላት በቅንጅት ለአንድ አላማ ከመስራት አንጻር ምን ይመስላሉ?-----

- 13 በፕሮግራሙ ውስጥ ማህበረሰቡ የነበረው ተሳትፎና አስተዋጻኝ ምን ይመስላል?-----

- 14 የቀድሞው ፓርቲዎ የDDR ፕሮግራም በአገር ውስጥም ሆነ በውጭ የሚገኙትን ሁሉንም ተዋጊዎች ከማካተት አንጻር እንዴት ይገለጻል?-----

- 15 ለእርስዎ እና ለሌሎች የትግል ጓዶች የተከናወነውን የመሳሪያ አሰባሰብ፣ የትጥቅ አፈታት፣ ከወታደራዊ መዋቅሩ የመበተን እና የመልሶ ማቋቋም ሂደት ምን ይመስል ነበር? እባክዎን የጊዜ ሰሌዳውን በማካተት በሰፊው ያብራሩ -----

- 16 ለእርስዎ የቀረቡት የመቀላቀል አማራጮች ምንድናቸው?-----

- 17 ከላይ ከዘረዘሩት መካከል የትኛውን አማራጭ መረጡ?-----
- 18 በDDR መርሃ-ግብሩ ምን አይነት የመልሶ ማቋቋም ድጋፍ ተደረገልዎት?-----

ክፍል 3: የአርበኞች ግንቦት 7 የቀድሞ ተዋጊዎች DDR ፕሮግራም ውጤታማነት የሚገባሙ ጥያቄዎች.

1. ፓርቲው ስንት የታጠቀ ሀይል ነበረው?-----
2. ምን ያህል ታጣቂዎች መሳሪያቸውን አስረከቡ?-----
3. ስንት ቀላል እና ከባድ መሣሪያዎች ተሰበሰቡ?-----
4. ስንት የታጠቁ አባሎች ተበተኑ -----
5. ምን ያህሉ የቀድሞ ተዋጊዎች እንደገና ወደመጡበት ማህበረሰብ ተቀላቀ? -----
6. ምን ያህሉ የመልሶ ማቋቋምና መዋህድ ድጋፍ አግኝተዋል?-----
7. እርስዎ በተደረገልዎት የመልሶ ማቋቋም ድጋፍምን ያህል ተደስተዋል?-----
8. ምን ያህል የቀድሞ ተዋጊዎች ፕሮግራሙን ጥለው ሄዱ?-----
9. የDDR መርሃ ግብሩ በታቀደው መሠረትና በተያዘለት የጊዜሰሌዳ መሰርትምን ውጤት አስገኝቷል?-----

10. በፕሮግራሙ ወቅት እና ከዚያ በኋላ በአገሪቱ ውስጥ የነበረው የደኅንነት ሁኔታ እንዴት ይግልፁታል?-----

11. የDDR መርሃግብሩ በፀጥታ ሁኔታ ውስጥ ለውጥ እንዲመጣ ምን አስተዋፅኦ አለው? ምን ማመላከቻዎችስ አሉ?-----
12. ገዥው መንግስት በፊርማው በአርባኞች ግንቦት 7 DDR መልሶ ማቋቋም ላይ የተደረገው የፖለቲካ ማሻሻያ ምንምን ነበር?-----
13. የታጠቁ የፖለቲካ ፓሪቲዎች ትጥቅ በመፍታት በሰላማዊ መንገድ የፖለቲካ እንቅስቃሴያቸውን እንዲያከናውኑ ከማስቻል አንጻር የኢትዮጵያ የፖለቲካ ተሃድሶ አንድምታ እንዴት ይገልጻሉ?? -----
14. የ DDR መርሃ ግብሩ ለፖለቲካ ማሻሻያው (ለለውጡ) ምን አንድምታ አለው?? -----
15. ከድርድሩ ትግበራ እና ከ DDR መርሃ ግብሩ አፈፃፀም ጋር ተያያዥነት ያላቸው ችግሮች ምን ምን ናቸው-----
16. ከለውጡ አንጻር በDDR ትግበራ ሂደቱ ውስጥ ለአጋጠሙ ችግሮች መፍትሔው ምን ይመስልዎታል? -----
17. መጨመር የሚፈልጉት ማንኛውም ነገር ካለ? -----

ውድ ጊዜዎን ሰውተው ስላደረጉልኝ ትብብር ከልብ አመስግናለሁ!!

DECLARATION

This thesis entitled- Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in post 2018 Ethiopia: the case of Patriotic Ginbot 7 Movement for Unity and Democracy is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University, and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been properly acknowledged.

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