ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINSTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT

CORRUPTION PREVENTION STRATEGY OF THE FEDERAL ETHICS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION:

It's Efficacy in Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement

By Berhanu Kifetew Assena

A Thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master in Public Management and Policy (Development Management)

June, 2016

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Advisor Jemal Abagissa (PhD)

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Approved by Board of Examiners:

Dr. Jemal Abagissa	______________	---------------
Thesis advisor	signature	date
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External examiner	signature	date
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Internal examiner	signature	date

Certification

This is to certify that this study was carried out by Berhanu Kifetew Assena of the Department of Public Administration and Development Management, College of Business and Economics, Addis Ababa University, under my supervision and that it has not been submitted for the award of any degree in this or any other university.

Dr.Jemal Abagissa	____________	----------------------
Thesis advisor	signature	date
Dr. Mulugeta Abebe	____________	-----------------------
Head of Department	signature	date

Declaration

I the undersigned declare that this thesis entitled ‘ **Corruption Prevention Strategy of the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission: It's Efficacy in Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement**’ is undertaken under the Department of Public Administration and Development Management, College of Business and Economics, Addis Ababa University, under the supervision of Dr.Jemal Abagissa. The ideas and views of this research work are solely those of mine, Berhanu Kifetew Assena, and the views of other researchers have been duly acknowledged.

____________________ --------------------------------

Signature Date

The above declaration is attested to by:

Dr.Jemal Abagissa __________ ---------------------------

Thesis advisor signature date

Dr. Mulugeta Abebe ______________ -------------------------

Head of Department signature date

Dedication

To my late father Ato Kifetew Assena for the strong faith he had in modern education who, while as a village farmer could have enjoyed his two son's invaluable labor in his farming, sent me and my older brother to school at early age. He sent a dozen plus children of his to school thereafter. He used to say " I am sending you all, my sons and daughters, to school to avenge the opportunity I missed to get educated". He deserves, and dictates as well, to be remembered with pride!

Acknowledgement

To my older brother Ato Abebe Kifetew who is the guardian of our extended family, and who always stood by my side under every situation I have been through in my life by my own choice. I couldn't have cruised this far without his support. My thanks to him has no limit and parallel!

To my wife Weyzero Tsigu Woldie who shouldered all family responsibilities alone during this master's program. I would not have crossed through this program without her invaluable care and support, I thank her very much. My children also deserve my great thanks for the support they provided me in every way they could.

I want to say thank you so much to my advisor Doctor Jemal Abagissa for his unrivaled patience, tolerance and generous advice during my work on this thesis.

To my teachers in the PADM, who deserve my great thanks for their inspiration throughout the program and for the Knowledge they imparted to me.

I also want to thank Ethics Liaison Officers in DFPhSA, Ethiotelecom, Sugar Corporation and the Ethiopian Road Construction Corporation; my colleagues in the Legal Service Directorate of the Sugar Corporation, in the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, and in the United Bank, S.C., for their time and invaluable support they extended to me in my effort in data collection and during my work in this study.

Acronyms and Abbreviations.

In this work:

AAU	Addis Ababa University
AU	African Union
CRIAC	Coalition of Religious Institutions Against Corruption in Ethiopia.
CSRP	Civil Service Reform Program that was launched in 1996 under the Prime Minister's office of the FDRE.
Dergue	The Provisional Military Administrative Council that ruled Ethiopia from September 1974 up until May 1991.
DFPhSA	Drug Fund and Pharmaceuticals Supply Agency.
DFID	Department for International Development, UK
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa.
ECC	The Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce.
EPRDF	The Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Revolutionary Front.
ERCA	Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority
ERCCorp.	The Ethiopian Roads Construction Corporation.
FEACC	The Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission (of Ethiopia).
FDRE	The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.
FIFA	The Federation of International Football Associations.
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan (in Ethiopia)
HoPRs	The House of Peoples' Representatives of the FDRE.
ICAC	Independent Commission Against Corruption (Hong Kong).
IER	Institute of Educational Research in Addis Ababa University.
NACC	National Anti-Corruption Coalition (the name for the national integrity system in Ethiopia).
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development; the FDRE.
OFAG	The Office of the Federal Auditor General; the FDRE.
PPPA	Public Procurement and Properety Administration Agency,

PPDCHB / Board /	Procurement and Property Disposal Complaint Hearing Board under the MoFED, FDRE.
PPPDS	Public Procurement and Property Disposal Service
SCorp	Sugar Corporation of the FDRE.
TUACM	Trade Unions' Anti-Corruption Movement in Ethiopia.
TI	Transparency International
WACM	Women Anti-Corruption Movements here in Ethiopia.
WB	The World Bank
YACM	Youth Anti-Corruption Movements here in Ethiopia. .

Glossary:

Dergue	The Provisional Administrative Council that eventually changed into Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia that has ruled Ethiopia from 1974—1991.
Public Institution	Refers to any government office established to provide goods and services of any nature to the public at large.
Ethiotelecom	A public institution which the sole provider of telecommunications and other communications networks in Ethiopia.

ABSTRACT

The objective of the study is to evaluate the ***Efficacy of the Corruption Prevention Strategy of the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission of Ethiopia in curbing corruption in public procurement so as to protect public resource from being looted.*** *To this end, the study evaluates and presents the efficacy of procurement business process evaluation, which is one major activity in the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC, focusing at public procurement, in curbing corruption in public procurement through the analysis of primary and secondary data. Primary data were collected from respondents and key informants drawn from different public and private institutions; and secondary data from pertinent government offices. The study employs explanations, deductions, percentage, triangulation of data in its analysis and interpretation of the data in its quest for answers for the research questions. The finding of the study shows that the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC has efficacy in curbing corruption in public procurement despite the fact that the strategy has not yet garnered sufficient state sanction, the most significant instrument, behind its implementation for its furthermost contribution in tackling corruption in the public procurement domain. Also the strategy needs to be owned and mainstreamed in each and every public institution so as to fend of corruption using their in-house capacity in a sustained manner, rules that give lee way to bypass the procurement legal regime need to be reconsidered as they are abused more often than note.*

Key words: FEACC, corruption, corruption prevention strategy, efficacy, curbing corruption, public procurement, business process evaluation.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Corruption is one of the threats against socio-economic development, political democratization, peace and tranquility of countries. According to the World Bank, the amount of resource claimed by corruption each year is estimated to be more than 5% of global GDP (US$ 2.6 trillion, World Economic Forum) with over US$ 1 trillion paid in bribes each year; when we come to Africa, the African Union (2002) estimates that 25% of the GDP of African states, amounting to US$148 billion, is lost to corruption every year (Sofia Wickberg, 2013:2).

The FIFA corruption scandal(https://frankvogl.files.wordpress.com/.../the-fifa-scandal-d...), the news of the illegal renovation of the South African President Jacob Zuma's Nkandla private villa by a sixteen million US dollar plus public money(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/march/31/), the leak from the office of the legal firm Mossack Fonseka (panamapapers.icij.org **)** that exposed hundreds plus public officials hiding the money they collected through graft and corruption, and the wealthy and public celebrities evading tax payments and the Petro-brass corruption case in Brazil (http://www.brunswickgroup.com), and so much so news of corruption scandal tell that corruption has become a paramount crime perpetrated by public office holders and the wealthy 1% alike across the globe against the laws and the interest of the working people and the poor.

Cognizant of this, the whole world has officially declared its commitment to tackle corruption as it adopted UNCAC in 2003, in Merida, Mexico(UNCAC, its preamble). International, regional anti-corruption agreements are signed; and national laws are promulgated. Anti-corruption watch dogs and other organizational setups are installed; modalities for cooperation and collaboration are formulated.

Ethiopia, as a citizen of the globe, cannot be spared by the havocs of corruption. It has been ravaged by corruption for so long. The ideological bulletin of the ruling party,

EPRDF "Addis Raiy", which in English means "new vision" states that rent seeking was identified as one of the formidable challenges/dangers/ of the current (EPRDF led) political and economic system during the "renewal movement" early in 2001("Addis Raiy", Volume 5, Issue no.1; 2014:53).
This bulletin of EPRDF further states that rent seeking and lack of good governance are two of the formidable challenges that hindered the implementation of the first Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) of 2010-2015; and consequently the nation's ongoing effort to attain the development goals, elimination of the widespread and entrenched rent seeking attitude and behavior is something that needs to be priority ("Addis Raiy", 2014:41).

Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no significant difference in accepting that corruption is a big challenge to be taken seriously before it is too late in Ethiopia. The ruling party, the opposition and especially the citizenry; all of them agree that there is a widespread and entrenched rent seeking attitude and behavior/*corruption* (italics- mine) in Ethiopia that call for robust move against corruption that lies in the government structure("Addis Raiy", 2014:41).

It is also the talk of the town and the result of several studies that corruption has taken root and established its terminal in government structure that is organized, manned, nurtured and led by the ruling party, the EPRDF, and become a formidable threat to the peace, development and the democratization process of the country that the EPRDF itself is vowing to achieve (Global Integrity Report, 2009; Kilimanjaro International, 2012; Plummer, 2012; Global Corruption Barometer, 2013; Sebastian Cavegard, 2016; "The Reporter" Amharic bi-weekly, 2016, volume 21, no.1656).

Nowadays, studies show that corruption in Ethiopia has grown to such a level that requires multi-dimensional, well synchronized, well thought out and sustainable institutional intervention (ArsemaTamyalew , 2010, Tewodros Dawit, 2009). The usual fashion of trying to address the problem by way of campaign that usually and naturally: i). focuses on the symptoms and not on the root causes of corruption; and ii), gets hijacked by the networks of corruptors and their Godfathers in the government and utilized against the champions of the anti-corruption movement themselves so as to derail the anti-corruption movement. And moreover, it is common knowledge that, campaign usually undermines due process and the rule of law one of the objectives that the anti-corruption movement is out to achieve (ECA 2004:17, Mekasha Abera, The Reporter Amharic biweekly, 2016, volume 21, no. 1654 &1656).

Findings in a Survey on Perception of the Level of Corruption By Foreign Investors in Ethiopia, by the World Bank(Plummer, Editor), 2012; the Corruption Perception Survey in Ethiopia by Kilimanjaro International (2012), and the TI reports for the five consecutive years 2011 through 2015(see Tables 1-4, 16, and 18) few among the many researched works, are pretty good proof that corruption is a threat enough in Ethiopia to worry much not only about its prevalence but also about the ways to tackle it before it derails the nation's effort for development and democratization.

Therefore, to carry out a research to know some more aspects of corruption, especially in the multi-billion public procurement, and to understand ways of preventing and combating corruption could be an attempt that may contribute something to the anti-corruption effort of the Ethiopian public.

1.1. Statement of the problem

For our country Ethiopia, May 1991 is a watershed in its modern history. It marked the end of decades old civil war and ushered in a new era where poverty reduction, rule of law and democratization of the political system became the first and foremost aspirations of the citizenry. These aspirations of citizens were shared by the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the ruling party since the downfall of the Dergue. The Program of EPRDF(EPRDF In Brief; online) and its various documents that deal with the political economy of the country, the Federal Constitution(1995) etc.; declare that these are the major objectives that the EPRDF is striving to achieve(GTP 2010 : vii, 96).

However, the government of EPRDF was not sure as to whether or not the state machinery and the civil servant were qualified(able, competent) enough to organize, coordinate and lead the country in the new era. Therefore, the government decided to evaluate the then state of the bureaucracy and the civil servant. The study that has been carried out under the auspices of the prime minister's office showed that, at all levels of the state machinery, besides technical and professional incompetence, one of the rarest things to find was ethical behavior in the governmental services. Provision of public goods and services were tainted with improprieties and corruption (IER, AAU, 2001, CSRP Report, and the First Nationwide Corruption Survey, 2001). The civil servant could hardly understand or accept that it is there to serve the people.

Based on the above stated compelling situation and some other factors, the Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission (FEACC) was established, manned with leadership and staff, Anti-Corruption Special Procedural and Evidence Law was enacted in the middle of 2001.

The FEACC establishment Proc. No. 433/2005 (as amended) mandates the Commission:

1. To strive, in cooperation with relevant bodies, to create an aware society where corruption will not be condoned or tolerated by disseminating ethics and anti-corruption education;

2. To prevent, in cooperation with relevant bodies, corruption offences and other improprieties from taking place,

3. To investigate and prosecute corruption offences and improprieties;

in its effort of organizing, coordinating and leading the anti-corruption movement of the country.

Besides the dissemination of ethics education, and corruption investigation and prosecution, the FEACC has carried out and is still carrying out several and diverse activities in its endeavors to prevent corruption from taking place.

Furthermore, corruption prevention as a strategy encompasses different activities that involve the organized public at large at different levels. These entities are organized and made part of the national integrity system of Ethiopia which is known by the name “National Anti-Corruption Coalition (NACC)” that was established in 2009. The NACC has its own charter of establishment, which also elaborates the way it functions and the missions and objectives it stands for (The Charter of the NACC, 2009). The central objective of NACC is to mobilize the citizenry in general and the working people in particular so as to strive to create a society with strong attitude that is intolerant of corruption and corrupts.

The other major activity in the corruption prevention endeavor of the FEACC is manifested through business processes/systems evaluation of public institutions.

In a bid to help prevent corruption in public procurement, the FEACC has prioritized and evaluated public procurement business processes, major activities within such processes, specific procurement transactions while they are being processed, procedures and manuals of hundreds of public institutions since its establishment. At the conclusion of each evaluation findings would be enumerated and recommendations forwarded. The recommendations are expected to be implemented by the institutions concerned as a remedy for the problems identified.

Furthermore, implementations of the recommendations were attempted even with the support and oversight of the FEACC. Public Procurement and Property Administration (PPPA), a federal regulatory government office established by Proclamation No. 649/2009, empowered to supervise public procurement activities and property administration in public institution is also there to assist public institutions in their procurement endeavors as well. And yet, there are procurement related complaints lodged and corruption offences reported, even from those very public institutions whose procurement business processes were evaluated several times by the FEACC. The Office of the Federal Auditor General (OFAG) of The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia(FDRE) is reporting significant financial and procedural irregularities related to procurement on the part of public institutions, each year to the House of Peoples' Representatives (HoPRs) of the FDRE.

There are studies carried out on the topic of corruption by Shimelis Ayalew (2005), that took up the case of the then Ethiopian Customs Authority and described the causes, susceptible work areas, and tried to show the prevalence of corruption in the Authority; by ArsemaTamyalew (2010), that carried out a sort of appraisal of the FEACC's performance from partners' (of the FEACC) perspective who objectively described the state of its performance and achievements; by Kilimanjaro International (2012), that dealt with the prevalence and more corruption prone public institutions in Ethiopia after 2001 nationwide corruption survey; and Sebastian Cavegard (2016), that describes the strategies and efforts of the FEACC in curbing corruption *in general*,(italics mine) in Ethiopia that have contributed significantly to the subject area of corruption and procurement in general. However, the efficacy of procurement business process evaluations of public institutions carried out by the FEACC and its efficacy was not dealt with sufficiently in particular. As public procurement is the single most money draining enterprise of the federal government that involves 60% plus federal budget each year, it deserves a closer look than the attempts undertaken so far. And this study is an attempt to contribute to fill this gap.

In view of the reports of pertinent government offices and the ever louder public outcry on the scourge of corruption, to learn whether or not the procurement business process evaluations, the findings and the recommendations thereof are failing, fully or partially, to bring about the desired result in public institutions is very important. Equally important is to know the underlying reasons for the prevailing reality with regard to corruption, in public procurement, in Ethiopia.

Therefore, it is very pertinent to carry out a research, which is overdue, to evaluate the efficacy of the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC, manifested in the form of public procurement business process evaluation, in curbing corruption and improprieties in public procurement and in safe guarding public resources devoted to the development of the nation.

To this end, this study will collect data from relevant sources, describe, analyze, explain and interpret same, and sift out the findings and forward recommendations to fill up the gaps learnt.

1.2. Objectives of the research

1.2.1. General objective of the research

The general objective of this research is to examine whether or not the evaluation of the procurement business processes of public institutions, which is one of the three major activities of the FEACC in its corruption prevention strategy, is helping to curb corruption in public procurement.

1.2.2. Specific objectives of the research

As the intended result from public procurement business process evaluation is not forth coming more often than not, the quest for an answer from citizens and multitude of stake holders is mounting by day. It is compelling to know the reason(s) why procurement related improprieties and corruptions are recurring in public institutions. Therefore, the specific objectives of this research are:

a. To identify whether or not public procurement in Ethiopia is suffering from corruption.

b. To explain the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC, examine its implementation process and procedures; and identify gaps, if any, in regard to best achieving the results intended.

c. To check whether or not procurement business process evaluation contributes to prevent corruption in public procurement.

d. To examine whether or not public institutions, whose procurement processes are being evaluated by the FEACC, are collaborating in the process and committed to the implementation of the recommendations.

e. To assess whether or not the problems diagnosed and solutions recommended by the FEACC are regarded as appropriate by the public institutions whose procurement processes were evaluated.

f. To identify if there are relevant parties that are not playing their part in preventing corruption in public procurement.

g. To forward recommendations that may enhance the effectiveness of the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC in curbing corruption in public procurement.

1.2.3. Research questions

i. Is corruption a problem in public procurement in Ethiopia?

ii. Are there flaws in the procurement process evaluation procedures of the FEACC itself?

iii. Is procurement business process evaluation helping prevent corruption in public procurement?

iv. How welcome and implemented are the process evaluations reports and recommendation(s) of the FEACC by the public institutions concerned?

v. Are the problems identified and solutions proposed regarded as relevant by public institutions whose procurement processes were scrutinized?

vi. Is the effort of the FEACC to prevent corruption in public procurement enjoying the collaborative support of other pertinent government offices?

1.3. Significance of the study

1.3.1. Its significance for the researcher

This study is done, first and for most to fulfill the partial requirement for the degree of Master in Public Administration and Development Management at Addis Ababa University.

1.3.2. Its Practical Significance

The result of this study will better inform the FEACC on the underlying problems within its public procurement business process evaluations and/or implementation of the recommendations thereof that need to be addressed in the future to get the results intended.

1.3.3. Its Significance to Policy Makers

As prevention is most preferred for it enables to root out sources of corruption and in most cases by far cheaper than cure, this study will be instrumental to better inform and draw attention of the government and other stake holders in the fight against corruption to give it due attention, deploy the right type and amount of resources to strengthen the implementation of the corruption prevention strategy.

1.3.4. Its Significance for Initiating Further Researches on the topic

As there is no research conducted in the Ethiopian context, to my best knowledge, on corruption prevention efforts, especially on the procurement business process evaluation carried out by the FEACC, this study will be a contribution to the academic discourse and also encourage others to do some research on the subject.

1.4. Scope of the research

The scope of this study is to examine **whether or not the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC is helping prevent corruption in public procurement.** To this end, data will be collected from the four public institutions that were selected from dozens of public institutions whose procurement processes were evaluated several times(see Tables13, &14.) including in the years 2013/14 and 2014/15 by the FEACCin a bid to enable the institutions prevent corruption from occurring in their procurement undertakings. These data will be examined. Suppliers to these four public institutions; and pertinent government offices to public procurement will also be part of the study as a valuable sources of data.

Furthermore, the study is limited to the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC and does not cover state anti-corruption agencies.

1.5. Public institutions that are covered by this study

Introduction:

The public institutions selected to collect data from for the study because they are institutions against whom repeated complaints related to procurement are registered with the FEACC, whose procurement and other processes were evaluated several times by the FEACC, they transact with billions of (birr) public money and they represent four different and major economic sectors. As the objective of the study is to examine the efficacy of the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC manifested in the form of procurement business process evaluations in curbing corruption in public procurement in public institutions, it is justifiable to select institutions that were the subject of several procurement business process evaluations, and selecting huge money mobilizers and distributing them across sectors to get balanced picture of the state of the efficacy of the corruption prevention strategy is also justifiable.

Ethio-telecom

Ethio-telecom was established by Regulation No. 197/2010.Its major objectives are to make world class next generation information technology service accessible, provide world class telecom service, expand telecommunications networks, provide communication services using integrated information technology platform, including rebroadcast of television services and provide domestic and international voice, data, video, services and build next generation network based workforce.

Sugar Corporation (SCorp)

It was established by Regulation No. 192/2010. Its major objectives are to grow and process sugarcane, sell products, research on sugar cane technology and machinery and spare parts, undertake projects and cooperate with education institutions to produce qualified man power in required quantity.

Ethiopian Road Construction Corporation (ERCCorp)

It was established by Regulation No. 248/2011.Its major objectives are to engage in domestic and overseas construction work contracts such as, roads, bridges, engage in the business of maintaining and rental construction machinery and equipment, to produce and sell construction materials.

Drug Fund and Pharmaceuticals Supply Agency (DFPhSA)

It was established by Proclamation No, 553/2007.Its major objectives are to enable public health institutions to supply quality assured essential pharmaceuticals at affordable prices in a sustainable manner to the public, to ensure enhanced and sustainable supply of pharmaceuticals, accumulate fund through sell of pharmaceuticals and manage its revolving fund to insure the realization of its objectives.

These four are selected among several dozens of public institutions whose procurement business processes were evaluated by the FEACC as late as 2013/14 and 2014/15. Each of these public institutions (had their procurement business processes, among their other activities, were reviewed by the FEACC several times in the past). The case of these four public institutions will be examined in the study, solely, for the purpose of testing the effectiveness of the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC in public procurement and to learn about the underlying problems in the prevention strategy, if any, that render corruption free public procurement a moving target.

1.6. Limitations of the study

Scarcity of data and lack of cooperation on the part of the institutions and respondents as the subject matter of the research is corruption which is a bit scary for many people due to various perceptions.

This limitation was manifested, as predicted earlier at the proposal preparation phase of the research, through the effort of data collection especially from the suppliers. Suppliers were not comfortable to respond to the questionnaires for fear of revenge in one way or the other in their future business relations with government entities. Few of them saying that they are new comers to the market, and others by saying that they are quite happy with the way tenders are managed in public institutions and see no reason to comment on the issue and turned down my request. Hence, I had to look for a substitute so as to get the sample up to the plan. And this has rendered the number of respondents from the private sector to be relatively smaller than the number of respondents from the other institutions in the study as can be seen from Table 15.

The impact of the above stated problem had its own influence in choosing sampling technique, that rendered random sampling to be less effective as it was for seen earlier in the stage of designing the proposal for the study. The fact that this researcher lacks experience in carrying out such a research can also be regarded as a limitation in the study.

Due to limitations in time and other resources, the study was forced to collect data only from the afore mentioned four public institutions and from a couple of suppliers that have office in Addis Ababa; and this may have its own undue influence on the efforts of the researcher to make this work more richer and more comprehensive.

1.7. Organization of the Research Report

The work will be divided into six chapters. The lineup of the chapters will follow the standard format for works such as this thesis.

Chapter One will contain the introductory part and the statement of the problem of the research; **Chapter two**, in here, relevant literatures, works from the academia, regional and international conventions and state legislations on corruption in general and corruption in public procurement in particular will be reviewed; **Chapter Three** presents highlights of experiences of countries in corruption prevention with special emphasis on the efforts, by the FEACC, in preventing procurement related corruption in Ethiopia at the federal level; **Chapter Four** will present the methodology of the study. Here, the research methodology, target population, sample size, sampling technique, questionnaire design development and administration of questionnaires and interviews/discussions as well as method of data analysis will be outlined; **Chapter Five** is where the data will be analyzed, findings of the research will be stated, discussed and interpreted; and **Chapter Six** will be the last chapter, and it is here that the findings of the research will be summarized, conclusions made and recommendations forwarded.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF LITERATURES ON CORRUPTION AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

Introduction

This chapter is devoted to the definition of corruption by different authors and legal instruments, its causes, its manifestations in procurement, its effects and the roles of governments in the fight against corruption.

2.1. Corruption

Corruption is a phenomenon with many faces. It is characterized by a range of economic, political, administrative, social and cultural factors, both domestic and international in nature. According to DIFD, corruption is not an innate form of behavior, but rather a symptom of wider dynamics. It opens up and closes down spaces for individuals, groups, organizations and institutions that populate civil society, the state, the public sector and the private sector. It is, above all, the result of dynamic relationships between multiple actors (DIFD,2015 : 14).

The term corruption originates from a Latin verb ***corruptus*** which means to ***break***, taking any given thing out of its normal/natural state of being, appearance or flow. Here the key issue is embodied in the term "to break", which, when brought into social context, refers to the violations of established rules, procedures, customs, practices of a given society, etc. Hence, corruption as a concept means any behavior which departs from ethics, morality, tradition, law and civic value (Bakamba,2009:3, in Dube, 2011 :18).

Corruption is a phenomenon that has multiple co-producers/drivers; and it is understood by the majority of writers, researchers, politicians, etc. to have negative influence on economic, political and cultural aspects of society. According to Myint, 2000, in Yemane Desta, 2004:5) corruptions occur in all nations, both developed and developing countries, in public and private sectors, as well as in non-profit organizations. The problem of corruption within or across nations is not a recent phenomenon, nor is it exclusively the problem of developing countries it exists both in developed and developing countries in different forms, degrees and has differing consequences as Ghazanafar& May, 2000, dully argue (in YemaneDesta, 2004:5).

2.1.1. Definitions of "corruption" from different literatures

To highlight how difficult it is to get one consensus and succinct definition of "corruption", Elaine etal say that the definition of 'corruption' itself has become corrupted - and that has complicated the problem of how corruption is perceived. And this in turn, they argue, led to regard, in most cases, actual corruption and perceived corruption to be one and the same thing (while they are not!), an understanding which affect the efforts of anti-corruption agencies and political leaders negatively,(Elaine Byrne et.al, (2010: 15).

Despite the fact that there is no a single and brief definition of 'corruption' that enjoy consensus across authors, organizations and countries, there are efforts to come up with some sort of unifying definition. In this regard, Merriam-Webster Dictionary,2010, is one that tries to provide a definition of 'corruption'. The dictionary defines 'corruption' as "…an impairment of integrity, virtue or moral principle; depravity, decay, and/or an inducement to wrong by improper or unlawful means, a departure from the original or from what is pure or correct, and/or an agency or influence that corrupts".

Knol(A Unit of Knowledge,2010, in Johan J. Coetzee, 2012:11-12)defines 'corruption' as "a general concept describing any organized interdependent system in which part of the system is either not performing duties it was originally intended to, or performing them in an improper way, to the disadvantage of the system's original purpose".

The Ministry of Health of the Republic of Botswana, defines corruption as soliciting or promising, giving or receiving, offering or accepting as a public officer, a bribe for carrying out or not carrying out official duties and responsibilities because of being influenced by the bribe(The Republic of Botswana, Ministry of Health :Anti-Corruption Policy,2013: ii).

UNODC(2005), defines ‘corruption’, as a form of behavior, which departs from ethics, morality, tradition, law and civic virtue (UNODC, 2005:).

The World Bank (WB), on its part, defines corruption, in its various literatures, as the "…abuse of power for private benefit…" Transparency International (TI) also defines corruption as the "…misuse of entrusted power for private gain…" These definitions of the World Bank and Transparency International are very precise so as to understand corruption (African Development Bank, and African Development Fund, 2014); in the day to day transaction and especially among ordinary people. However, in the opinion of this author, although these definitions are succinct enough to be memorable, they lack sufficiency in substance to enable people understand ‘corruption’ in its full depth and width.
All the above statements, from authorities on the subject of corruption, show that there is no single definition of corruption across nations and institutions. Rather, it is addressed in different ways by different writers; although most of them come together while describing behaviors that constitute corruption; or while describing the manifestations of same.

2.1.2. Definitions of "corruption" from different legal instruments

Both UNCAC and AU Conventions that are leading international and regional organizations, on the issue of corruption, do not provide concise and memorable definition of corruption as most of us are expecting from them due to the fact that they are instrumental in making the fight against corruption an international agenda. Both conventions avoid defining the term corruption, rather they prefer listing down those behaviors considered to be corrupt (criminal) behaviors in most literatures on the subject and also by state legislations.

As a matter of fact it is in state legislations that we may come across to attempts, if any, that may define the term ‘corruption” to ease interpretation and enforcement of the laws themselves.

Difficulties in arriving at a common definition of “corruption” are rooted in legal and political considerations, as well as in varying attitudes and customs in different cultures(African Development Bank, and African Development Fund, 2014).

This may be because it is difficult to clarify as activities that could be unacceptable in some countries and cultures could be regarded as acceptable in other countries and cultures. In other words, it means there is no universal definition of corruption as there is no universal culture.

Although it may be relatively shorter when compared with the ones provided by ranges of literatures on corruption, even state legislations, that are meant to affect only a given country and culture: and crafted by seasoned legal drafters, in most cases, fail to come up with succinct definition of corruption. For example, the Law on Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau, in the Republic of Latvia, defines ’corruption’ as bribery or any other action by a public official intended to gain an unmerited benefit for himself or herself or other persons through the use of his or her position, powers thereof or by exceeding them (Kriviņš, Anatolijs, 2014 : 27)

In the Zambian Anti - Corruption Act (1996:22-26) the word corrupt is defined as “… the soliciting, accepting, obtaining, giving, promising or offering of a gratification by way of a bribe or other personal temptation or inducement or the misuse or abuse of a public office for private advantage or benefit, and corruptly shall be construed accordingly. This attempt, by Zambian law, also is an enumeration of behaviors that are conventionally understood to be corrupt practices/behaviors and falls short of providing concise definition of corruption.

The same is true here in Ethiopia. The latest Corruption Crime Law (Proclamation No. 881/2015) of The FDRE defines corruption in two relatively long paragraphs under its Article 4(2). If we were to squeeze the definition of “corruption” provided by this law into a sentence of three to four lines it would read like ‘. . . corruption is any offence committed by a custodian of an office, be it in the government or in the private sector, in violation of his/her official duties proper by seeking promise or receiving gratification for him/herself or for any other person(s); or inflicting harm on another person's right . . .'.(Proclamation No. 881/2015).

Therefore, based on the above statements and definitions, corruption could also be defined, as ***an action or omission against an established rule of law, procedure and accepted norm on the part of the custodian of an office be it in the public or private realm, in it's abusive exercise of that authority, so as to obtain something for itself or to another person or to a group of persons; or to deny somebody its right for something.***

2.1.3. Types of Corruption

There is no one consensus list on the types of corruption among authors on this topic, too; as is the case on definition of corruption. Different writers come up with their own list of types of corruption. If one chooses to list down every manifestation of corruption as one and distinct type of corruption, then it is possible to write down more than a dozen names of behaviors that can be labeled corrupt. However, it is also possible, especially where the objective of the job is not to enumerate every impropriety that can be felt as corruption, to focus on the major types of corruption. Accordingly, major types of corruption may be classified as ***grand*** corruption, ***petty*** corruption and ***systemic*** corruption.

a) Grand corruption

The term "grand corruption" is often used to describe such acts, reflecting the scale of corruption and the considerable sums of money involved. (DIFD,2015:12-14).Besides taking the amount of money involved, the corrupt behaviors of leaders of the legislative body, of the judiciary, ministers, other executives also constitute grand corruption. This categorization is based [in most cases] on the magnitude of the monetary value of the act and on the position of the perpetrator in the higher government portfolio.

Political corruption is also regarded as grand corruption because of the players' high ranking political position they hold. Political corruption is the abuse of office by those who decide on policies, laws and regulations and the basic allocation of resources in a society; i.e. those who make the *rules of the game*. Political corruption takes place at the highest levels of political authority, (DIFD, 2015:12-14).It is manifested in policy making, legislations and in decisions that have institutional and national significance. It involves law makers, politicians, government ministers, senior civil servants and other elected, nominated or appointed senior public office holders. Political corruption may include tailoring laws and regulations to the advantage of private sector agents in exchange for bribes, succumbing to corruption dons and their mighty networks and as a consequence drawing policies and laws that disempower the public, anti-corruption agencies and the anti-corruption movement, granting large public contracts to specific firms against the procurement legal regime, or embezzling funds from the treasury of the state.

Political corruption renders anti-corruption movements to be a failure. This is what makes corruption in public procurement thrive, and this is because the corrupt acts are done with the knowledge and approval of top executives that have the monopoly of power to foil any attempt to hold corrupt officials accountable for their corrupt behaviors. The state has the power to make or break the success of any anti-corruption effort. This is one of the reasons why the study also examines the role of the legislature and the executive in the corruption prevention effort of the FEACC.

Bureaucratic corruption may be regarded as a junior sibling of political corruption which mostly occurs during the implementation of public policies (that result from political corruption). It involves bureaucrats and public administration staff both at the central and local level.

b) **Petty corruption**

This categorization is based on the amount of the money involved and on the position of the public servant involved in the corrupt transaction in government structure.

Petty corruption is one type of corrupt behavior that takes place, in most cases, in the lower echelons of state machinery by low ranking public servants. Petty corruption is manifested by the payment or taking of bribes or kickbacks of non-significant amount of money for the mutual exchange of favors. Although this type of corruption often involves small amount of payments, in aggregate the sums may be large,(DIFD, 2015:12-14).It mostly hurts those citizens at the grass root level; low income groups and their micro businesses, the women, the power less; and consequently makes, through time, the government loose the trust of the broad masses.

c) **Systemic corruption**

This categorization is based on the state of the acceptance of corruption as a norm entrenched in the custom and behavior condoned in general in a given institution or country; and not based on the economic value of the transaction tainted with corruption or with the status of the personalities involved in the corrupt practice.

Systemic corruption is a situation where corruption becomes more or less a norm in a given state or society (Carnegie Endowment, 2014:7). Under such scenario asking for a bribe and giving /offering a bribe is not something that is strange for citizens. Everybody says 'that is the way!', as the citizenry lose hope of getting its legitimate right for government services of any kind, be it service provision or administrative one.

2.2. Major causes of corruption

The major questions to be asked in order to know the root causes of corruption includes, but not limited to, what creates corruption, and what lets it grow, proliferate and thrive? It is important to examine it critically. We usually see conditions that exacerbate corruption being confused with the root causes of corruption

As an IMF working paper (Vito Tanzi, 1998) explains "Corruption is a complex phenomenon that is almost never explained by a single cause. If it were caused by a single cause, the solution would be simple. Of the many factors that influence it, some can be changed more easily than others. Because it is so complex the fight needs to be multi-dimensional and continue through a longer time period. The greatest mistake that can be made is to relay on a strategy that depends excessively on actions in a single area, such as increasing salaries of public servants, or increasing penalties; or creating anti-corruption office, and so on and expect results quickly" (Vito Tanzi,1998:30) This working paper further argues that to a large extent it is the state, through its many policies and actions, that creates the environment and the incentives that influence those who pay bribes and those who demand or accept them (Vito Tanzi,1998 p.30-31).

Corruption results from interactions, opportunities, strengths and weaknesses in each and every given socio-political system. It is, above all, the result of dynamic relationships between multiple actors (DIFD, 2015:14).It is a complex phenomenon with no simple explanation for its occurrence, with various definitions, manifestations, mutations of its nature, and with varied root causes in, and impacts on society. Furthermore; it is generally accepted that corruption is somehow linked with values, morality and ethics; there also seems to be a number of other co-producers in this equation (Vito Tanzi,1998:30).In any system, and even more so in a complex systems, numerous factors, also called co-producers, contribute for corruption to be there (Gharajedaghi,1982, in Johan J. Coetzee, (2012:7).

Leaving the varied and numerous packages of the causes of corruption as it may, there seems to exist concurrence, amongst the majority of writers and researchers, on most of the elements of the packages that are regarded to be the causes of corruption. The following are the basic causes of corruption upon which a significant body of authors seem to agree on.

2.2.1. Non-inclusive political and economic systems as a cause of corruption

The absence of inclusive political and economic system, i.e.; policy choice of governments, is one significant cause of corruption. This type of political scenario, which Acemoglu and Robinson (Why Nations Fail, 2012) call "extractive" political and economic policy, provides unbridled opportunity to the networks of elites in and around the political leadership to plunder the fruits of the economic growth of a nation; that is to say non-inclusive political and economic policies/institutions are power full causes as well as drivers of corruption.

2.2.2. Lack of good governance as a cause for corruption

Weak governance is one of the fundamental causes of corruption**.** The political and economic opportunities available in different political systems, as well as the strength and effectiveness of the state, social and economic institutions shape the conditions in which corruption can thrive. In particular, the centralization of power in the executive and deficient accountability mechanisms give actors ,especially elites, too much discretions that lead to corruption(DIFD, 2015:18-19).

The lack or absence of good governance denies citizens of their legitimate demands and desires to be realized, and a venue to seek for justice. Such a scenario forces people to look for any other means, outside of the established formal channels and venues, for these ones have failed them. To get their rights be it for the provision of goods that are economic in nature or services in the social, administrative and justice sector, people will be forced to pay bribes or do some favor to those people that are responsible for the distribution of the provisions.

2.2.3. Excessive regulations and requirements for authorizations

Opportunities presented by complex, poorly-defined, constantly changing and inadequate rules and regulations, lack of properly established laws and principles, or code of conduct applicable to public officials and lack of institutions to enforce them; lack of watch-dog agencies are among the causes of corruption (Yemane Desta, 2004:14).

Especially in developing countries, the role of the state is often carried out through the use of too many rules and regulations. These rules and regulations, in most cases are ambiguous. They are prone for different interpretations not only by different government offices but also by different public employees in one and the same office. Especially customs and tax laws are a very good example of rules and regulations that are ambiguous for want of skill in legal drafting or in most cases by design. Besides the inherent problems in the laws themselves, often several government offices must authorize an activity and several public servants must be contacted; and these are very good drivers of corruption in the public sector (Vito Tanzi, 1998:11).

2.2.4. Lack of Rule of Law

Lack of accountability, dysfunctional internal checks and balances a scenario under which the very obvious legitimate rights of citizens will not be observed and enforced before any state institution. Where rule of law fails citizens will be forced to buy their rights and those who want undue benefit against the legitimate interest of others, hence bribe givers that look for undue benefit and bribe recipients that collect illegal favor will be left loose to do whatever they may want (Vito Tanzi,1998 : 19).

2.2.5. Monopoly of decision making power and unfettered discretion

According to Jainbureaucratic discretionary power (in allocation of resources), the association of this power with economic rents, and weak accountability are among the major causes of corruption (Jain, 2001, in Bin Dong, 2011:15).

Discretionary decision making power is like possessing a signed blank cheque for the decision maker. This is because the 'measurement' in discretionary decision making lies in the mind of the decision maker and not in the books that could objectively be a scale to verify the behavior of the decision maker against and hold the decision maker accountable for his/her abuse.

2.2.6. The absence of clean and exemplary leadership

When the leadership is not clean or utilizes double standard, then corruption proliferates (Vito Tanzi, 1998:20). When leaders are themselves are corrupt and/their power base is dependent on networks of corruptors, in the first case, they will not be exemplary leaders, in the second case they will not let anti-corruption watch dogs, if there are any, enforce the full length of the severity of the law against suspects of corrupt behavior. In both cases the effect is one and the same, i.e.; the fight against corruption becomes an uphill battle and consequently corruption mushrooms and thrives in the country.

Therefore, one could argue that lack of inclusive political and economic institutions, lack of good governance and political commitment on the part of the leadership to tackle corruption, the absence of free and fair electoral process through which the citizenry could discipline politicians, decadence of ethical values and economic and socio-cultural factors are some of the causes for corruption. The absence of an independent anti-corruption watch dog, strong law enforcement, independent and competent judiciary, and the absence of comprehensive anti-corruption laws are among factors that exacerbate corruption.

2.3. Corruption in Public Procurement

2.3.1. What is Public Procurement?

Procurement

The African Development Bank defines procurement as follows: Procurement refers to the process of acquiring goods, works and services resulting in the award of contracts under which payments are made in the implementation of projects, in accordance with the governing Rules and Procedures and Guidelines of the financing agency or agencies(AfDB 2008 Rules, www.afdb.org/. in StephanusPetrusleRouxde la Harpe, 2009).

Public Procurement

The term "Public Procurement" refers to governments' activities of purchasing goods, services and works necessary to carry out their functions, mainly from the private sector, by paying out public money.

Pauwetal. (2009:228), note that public procurement refers to those government administrative activities that concern the purchasing of goods and services the government needs from the private sector. These range from basic office cleaning materials and other consumables through to mainframe computer systems, weapons systems and large public buildings (Pauwet al,inOpperman**,** 2014:12,).

According to the WB (199:18), public procurement is the acquisition of goods, services and works by a procuring entity using public funds.

In Ethiopia Proclamation No. 649/2009 defines procurement and Public Procurement under Art.2.5. and Art. 5.1. as obtaining goods, works, consultancy or other services through purchasing, hiring or obtaining by any other contractual means by utilizing public money.

The fundamental aim of public procurement is to satisfy community or public interest.
Good procurement should not only satisfy the immediate needs of individuals, but should also endeavor to save public funds and be fair to companies doing business with the government. In contrast, bad public procurement will increase poverty and inequality since funds will be utilized for needs other than social needs, it will provoke bad choices by encouraging competition in bribery rather than in quality and price. Corrupt public procurement will provide an inequitable, unstable and dangerous competitive benefit for those businesses who cannot afford a bribe (Wiehen&Olaya, 2006:29, in Opperman, 2014:14).
Furthermore, as it is both common knowledge and studies from various researchers show, huge amount of money is spent, especially in developing countries, in government procurement. And hence, the need for accountability and transparency is so important for the fact that the money comes from the public that is meant to ease poverty, bring about growth and development that will benefit citizens.

According to Wiehen&Olaya, proper and successful government procurement rests upon certain core principles of behavior also known as the Five Pillars of procurement. They are;

i. Value for money,
ii. Open and Effective competition,

iii. Ethics and Fair dealing,
iv. Accountability and Reporting, and
v. Equity.

As these pillars are dependent on one another, if any one of them is broken the procurement system as a whole falls down and the procurement undertaking goes astray from the intended public objective (Wiehen&Olaya, 2006:13, in Opperman, 2 014:13). Therefore, procurement is a chain of multiple processes that deals with expending billions of public money with the goal of acquiring goods, works and services, in most cases from suppliers in the private sector, to satisfy varieties of needs of the public that secured the approval of competent authority to be served. And also, its management and execution requires transparency and accountability.

2.3.2. Public Procurement Cycle

The process in procurement starts from the initiation of the need by user department and it is approved by the head of the department, as one way of acknowledging the requirement. This has to do with the process of acquiring goods, works and services. It begins when a department has identified a need and decided on its procurement requirement.

According to the Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya, the procurement process/cycle includes the following major phases:

i. Identification of requirements;
ii. Procurement planning;
iii. Definition/specification of requirements;
iv. Determination of sources;
v. Evaluation and selection of vendors;
vi. Contract award;
vii. Contract implementation/delivery; Storage; Payment; and Disposal.

(Kenya, Anti-corruption Commission, 2009: 6).

2.3.3. Manifestations of corruption in procurement

In order to develop an appropriate anti-corruption strategy it is vital to have a good understanding of the various forms in which corruption manifests itself in the public sector.

The following examples show some of the different manifestations: Bribery, Kick-backs, Theft of assets/Graft/Embezzlement, Extortion, Patronage and IT corruption. (Pauwet al., 2009:345;inOpperman, 2014 :17-18.).

Most of these manifestations of corruption, including fraud are also the ones that are prevalent in public procurement.

2.4. The Effects of Corruption

2.4.1. Economic Effects of Corruption

Corruption is a problem that thwarts the economic development process of a country (Kilimanjaro, 2012 : 12-15).

Corruption undermines competitiveness both in the private and public economic sectors; rule of law, merit and quality standards will be eroded, the provision of public goods and services will be disrupted (Kilimanjaro, (2012 : 15).

Hope and Chikulo (2000:23) state that corruption results in negative consequences of economic nature. It may increase the cost to organizations; stifle initiative and enterprise development thus slowing down investment and economic growth. Corruption discourages investment, restricts trade, reduces economic growth and distorts the facts and figures(that are important inputs for development planning and accountability) associated with government expenditure. Corruption is one of the co-producers of poverty, income inequality and it also contributes for service delivery to get weaker and weaker that makes the poor to suffer most for it is the poor that is most dependent on government support for varieties of services (Corruption Watch, 2014, in Opperman,2014:15-22).

Despite the fact that countries such as: South Korea under the dictatorship of the late General Park Chung-Hee; Singapore under the thirty years plus rule of its founding father the late Lee Kuan Yew; Taiwan under the dictatorship of the late Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang party; the People's Republic of China under the single party rule of the Communist Party of China; and the former USSR under the rule of its Communist Party, have accomplished an astounding success in economic development, Acemoglu and Robinson(2012),in their well-researched work passionately argue that, states that promote, to use their own terms, "extractive" political system that alienates the citizenry from the affairs of the state and "extractive" economic policy that is exploitative and disempowering towards the wider public are conditions that discourage citizens from striving for innovation and working harder. And hence a disincentive for economic development (Acemoglu, D.; Robinson, J., (2012),Why Nations Fail, p. 88-91).

Mauro (1995 in Hana et al 2011:7) provides an empirical evidence that shows , on a macro level, corruption impedes economic growth and development, other recent studies also support Mauro's conclusions. Dreher and Herzfeld (2005:7, in Hanna, et al, 2011) estimate that an increase in corruption by about one point, as measured by the perceptions based International Country Risk Guide index, reduces gross domestic product (GDP) growth by 0.13 percentage points.

Corruption in procurement can lead to waste of public funds and resources, inferior quality of products and services as well as deter qualified suppliers from doing business with government. Corrupt individuals and their networks also fight for the designing of economic policies and laws that will facilitate their corrupt behaviors.

Furthermore, corruption substantially affects income distribution and increases income inequality.Corruption is believed to have a detrimental effect on economic development and hence social welfare (Gupta et al, 2002, in Bin Dong, 2011:7).

Majority of literatures on the effects of corruption insist that corruption lowers economic growth because it reduces the incentive of private investment (Bardhan, P. and Mookberjee, D.,2006:Decentralization, Corruption and Government Accountability , in Bin Dong, 2011:7).

It also affects sound prioritization and planning as corrupt politicians prefer agenda and activities that are more likely to generate spoils/bribes for themselves to other priorities and choices; disregarded choices that may bring about benefit to the people but not to corrupt leaders and to their corruption networks that have symbiotic relationships with.

2.4.2. Social Effects of Corruption;

Corruption impairs the ability of people to become less dependent on certain scarce primary resources, can also restrict the ability of society or an institution to develop 'other' resources that are more 'taken' than 'given'. The more developed a person is, the more resources he/she can create or extract from primary resources (Gharajedaghi, 1982: 13). Corruption negatively affects the ability of people not only to develop themselves, but also their ability to become less dependent on 'given' or provided resources and more dependent on 'taken' resources. This means that corruption impacts negatively on the ability of a person to create and manage resources, through exercising of entrepreneurial activities, and the aspiration to design a 'system' that is both attractive and inspirational for change (**Johan J. Coetzee,**2012:68-69).

Corruption affects the culture of a society because it locks people in a corrupt culture where they become dependent on the benefits of corruption. If corruption is led or shared by politicians and top officials, any reform effort will be resisted and is doomed to fail. Reasons are that no politician will support reform if he/she risks losing the support and power of his/her corrupt supporters who also share in the benefits of corruption. In a corrupt culture, people are tolerant of corruption. This tolerance exists because they either benefit from it, or they are alienated and do not have influence, or they do not participate in corruption (**Johan J. Coetzee,**2012: 72).

Corruption impedes social development in which the primary victims are often women, children, the disadvantaged and the poorest section of a society. It undermines competitiveness both in the private and public . . . social sectors; the provision of pubic goods and services will be disrupted (Kilimanjaro, 2012 : 15).

Corruption has a negative effect on service delivery especially within the health, education, housing and social services sectors because the money that is meant for infrastructure and development ends up in the pockets of corrupt officials and their cronies(Corruption Watch, 2014; Woods, 2012; in Opperman, 2014 : 15-22.).

2.4.3. Political Effects of Corruption;

Corruption is a problem that thwarts the democratization process of the political system of a country (Kilimanjaro,2012).Corruption can seriously prevent the development of good governance in a country, it also damages democratic culture, values and principles (Pillay, 2004:586, and TI, 2014: in Opperman,2014 : 15-22).

At its extreme, corruption leads to the wholesale perversion or overthrow of democracy as those at the top of government fight to maintain their position. Recent research on the links between corruption, development and stability has shown that corruption weakens the state's legitimacy and, in extreme cases, may lead to political instability or even war (Bottelier 1998, in ShimelisAyalew, 2005:41).

The existence of freedom of expression and free media are one of the effective instruments in the fight against corruption. Where people are free to express what they have known and the media is free to convey this idea and information to the citizenry, corruption will be denied the environment conducive that it deliberately creates and exploits to thrive. Free society is better empowered at least in two major ways; first it enjoys better right and access for information on the behaviors of the governments and its political leaders through the free media, and second it has the right to express itself and the means to convey its expression to fellow members of the society. The fight for freedom of expression, free media and political pluralism is by itself a significant contribution for the fight against corruption and vice-versa; these two movements have symbiotic relationship.

For democracy is a paramount instrument against corruption, corrupt governments and their political leaders tend to develop, more often than not, repressive tactics through state instruments for law and order that may suppress public criticism of their behavior

(Hope and Chikulo (2000:23),in Dube).Corruption undermines the rule of law, it also works harder to influences law makers and politicians to design policies and laws that will facilitate their corrupt behaviors and shield them from being held accountable for their deeds.

Dr. AlbericKacou, (UN Resident Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative) says corruption in Elections and politics erodes public confidence in leadership, in democracy and in governance. This can have far reaching consequences for peace, and security, human rights and the legitimacy of the state (UNDP, Tanzania Success Stories, Fighting Corruption, 2013:4).Corruption is significant cause for civil wars rendering states to fail; and opens new avenue for corruption to operate unbridled (Bottelier 1998, in ShimelisAyalew, 2005 :41, Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, 2012).
Any endeavor, be it in the political arena, economic development or social progress, will fail to bring about peace meal growth down the road let alone national transformation in an environment where corruption is a pervasive dominating reality in a any country. Worst will be the consequences where the leadership of a country is dependent on the political support it gets from the networks of corruptors. Therefore, any development friendly and pro-democracy government has to make tackling corruption to be in its priority list of what needs to be done, if it is there to strive to realize the wish of the people.

A more fundamental cause for the relative failure of anti-corruption strategies is that they are ‘more often limited to rhetoric, and are only rarely sustained’ (Wei 2001: 6; in Cobb L & Gonzalez M 2005. Corruption as a system of interlocking vicious cycles: Aetheling Consultants, Cobb & Gonzalez 2005).Wei suggests that this is because some political leaders fear the political risks associated with radical and entrenched reform of corrupt processes/practices and that the cost of creating significant reforms and achieving essential progress is often prohibitive.

“AddisRaiy” states that rent seeking(meaning corruption) and lack of good governance are one of the formidable challenges that hindered the implementation of the first GTP(2011-2015); and consequently the nations ongoing effort to attain the development goals, elimination of the widespread and entrenched rent seeking attitude and behavior is something that needs to be tackled (“Addis Raiy”, Volume 5, Issue no. 1;2014:41).

According to “Addis Raiy” rent seeking was identified as one of the formidable challenge/danger/ of the current politico-economic system during the renewal movement in 2001/02(Ibd, 2014:53).

In the opinion of this writer, it is this compelling cognition that persuaded the EPRDF led government of Ethiopia, as far as it’s declared policy on corruption goes, of course, to make fighting corruption to be among one of its agendas. The government, along with the establishment of anti-corruption watch dog, the FEACC, adopted three strategies that are mentioned earlier in this work, as the denomination of its policy on corruption, to be its road map in its effort to undermine corruption. One of the strategies which is the subject of this work is the “Corruption Prevention Strategy”. Here in under some part of this work is devoted to discuss pertinent issues related to corruption prevention strategy, that is, the evaluation of procurement business processes of public institutions by the FEACC in a bid to curb corruption in public procurement.

However, fighting against corruption requires making a very difficult choice, especially on the part of governments. The fight against corruption, for governments, is not like ‘walking in a rose garden’. It requires from leaders at the helm of political power to be ready to make very difficult choices; such as disowning the leaders’ class mate, an old friend, fellow ethnic compatriot, an in-law, an ‘indispensable’ political ally, etc . . .; in short leaders should know that it is as painful as chopping off one’s own finger, under worst case scenario, one’s own limb. Whatever the gravity of making the choice could be difficult, leaders cannot keep political allies and cronies, that are soaked in corruption ,at least by the public perception, around power and protect them from being accountable, and keeping the ever growing public grievance and protest at bay and stay in power.

Corruption is a sort of double blade sword for governments. When there is a state of corruption, the stability of any corrupt government is threatened from the outside by the protest and unrelenting pressure from citizens and from within itself by the demand of officials for reciprocity, as they are the ones that put the top leader at the helm of power, for unqualified protection for themselves and their spoils against the wave of anti-corruption movement. An in fighting among and between officials of the government over spoils sharing is also a problem within corrupt governments that threaten stability.

2.5. Conceptual Framework

The perspective that this study will be understood from

As there is no need for an effort to fix where the subject is not broken, the need for corruption prevention strategy is dependent on the existence and prevalence of corruption. The efficacy of corruption prevention strategy in curbing corruption in its turn is dependent on several factors; and major ones are the following.

First, if an assessment proves the existence of corrupt procedures and corruption, then selecting and designing effective corruption prevention strategy to combat it becomes the right response to the prevailing situation, hence the efficacy of the corruption prevention strategy(which is dependent factor) is dependent on the quality of the strategy; the higher the quality of the package of the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC the higher will be its efficacy and vice-versa.

Second, one of the tools utilized in corruption prevention strategy is the evaluation of the procurement business process performed by the FEACC. The proper and objective assessment of the procurement business process will have an immense influence on its ability to achieve the goal of curbing corruption in public procurement. Hence, the efficacy of corruption prevention strategy is dependent on the right (the quality) assessment of the procurement process; the higher the quality of the procurement process evaluation the higher will be the efficacy of the corruption prevention strategy.

Third, public institutions need to collaborate in the evaluation of their business processes, and implement the recommendations thereof in order to make the endeavor to curb corruption in public procurement a success. Hence, the efficacy of corruption prevention strategy is dependent on the collaboration in the evaluation process and on their commitment for implementation, by the public institutions, of the recommendations forwarded by the FEACC; the higher the collaboration in the evaluation process and commitment for the implementation of the recommendations the higher will be the efficacy of the corruption prevention strategy.

Forth, the implementation of the recommendations forwarded by the FEACC need to be sanctioned by state power to be successful. Otherwise leaders of public institutions will see neither carrot nor stick for their reaction to the recommendations intended to help them curb corruption in their respective institutions. Hence, the efficacy of corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC is dependent on the unequivocal support from pertinent state bodies ranging from the legislature to the government; the higher the support for the implementation of the recommendations the higher will be the efficacy of the corruption prevention strategy.

Figure.A-1; Four major independent factors that have critical influence on the degree of the efficacy of the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC



(Source: Developed by the researcher based on insights gained from literature reviews)

CHAPTER THREE

EXPERIENCES OF SOME COUNTRIES IN CORRUPTION PREVENTION

3.1. Introduction

It has been argued that most anti-corruption programs rely on legal and financial institutions such as the judiciary, police and financial auditors to enforce and strengthen accountability in the public sector. The assumption here is that more and better enforcement of rules and regulations will reduce corruption. The problem with such an approach is that in many poor countries the legal and financial institutions are weak and often corrupt themselves (Svensson J., 2005:19(3): 19–42).

Furthermore, people tend to disregard the fact that both the nature of corruption and the methods to be utilized in the fight against it are so complex. They also forget to make the fight multi-dimensional and continue through a longer time period. The greatest mistake most people make is that they tend to relay on a strategy that depends excessively on actions in a single area, such as increasing salaries of public servants, or increasing penalties; or creating anti-corruption office, and so on and expect results quickly(Vito Tanzi, 1998:30).

Most often than not governments, pertinent entities and other stake holders fall short of mobilizing the public and deploying due effort in preventing corruption from happening.

Sun Tzu in his famous book "The Art of War" said that the best general never fights wars rather denies them the opportunity to occur through deterrent/preventive preparation and vigilance(in Cleary, R . (2005).

President Thomas Jefferson(1787) said, while emphasizing the benefit of prevention, that the time to guard against corruption and tyranny is before they shall have gotten hold on the US. It is better to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to trust the drawing of his teeth and talons after he shall have entered (T. Jefferson, 1787,in Yemane Desta, 2004 : 12-13).

The above statements of the two insight full leaders in their time do emphasize the value of preparation and prevention in avoiding undesirable scenarios in any society. The Asian Development Bank shares this view. It says corruption occurs only where opportunities exist for corruption, miss-appropriation and abuse. Ways of preventing same is by promoting ethical behavior, putting internal control mechanisms in place and see them implemented (European Journal of Business and Management, www.iiste.org). According to the Office of Anti-Corruption and Integrity of the Asian Development Bank, a cornerstone of an effective anti-fraud and anti-corruption program is prevention—that is, to proactively identify and address areas that are susceptible to the risks of fraud and corruption in the future; and also to review ongoing project related procurements, identify vulnerabilities and recommend measures to better safeguard project resources(Asian Development Bank, 2015; 13).

This writer strongly agrees with the above stances. In the opinion of this writer, corruption prevention is the choice of strategy in combating corruption, be it in developing or developed countries, be it in smaller institutions or in the bigger ones. Innate anti-corruption initiative, disdain for abuse of power, corruption and improprieties is an indispensable psychological makeup/outlook to successfully beat corruption.

The writer claims that corruption prevention strategy to be the ***choice of strategy*** to combat corruption in developing countries, such as Ethiopia, because of the following reasons (few and not exhaustive list):

One, successful anti-corruption effort for a relatively lasting solution should be proactive and focus more on the root causes of corruption rather than on treating symptoms; and corruption prevention strategy by its nature gives the chance to treat the root causes of corruption

Two, lack of awareness, failure in the controls, checks and balances system etc… are great contributors and facilitators of(Johan J.Coetzee,(2012:67),and Amano Genemo, (2014),)corruption, to take place; and corruption prevention as a strategy focuses on these systemic mechanisms to be strengthened,

Three, its implementation triggers, relatively, insignificant social and economic collateral damage.

Four, in resource hungry developing countries such as Ethiopia, where anti-corruption watch dogs are both underfunded and under staffed, the strategy is cheaper and relatively affordable one, while it helps minimize conditions that are conducive for corruption to take place that, in its turn, would call for the costly law enforcement into play.

Five, as in most developing countries where political power is based on networks and is one means for making personal economic gain, it is an uphill battle and very difficult to get political and government leaders out of the armpit of these corruption tainted governments for investigation and prosecution.

(These last three arguments of the writer should not be construed to mean that deterrence/law enforcement is not important, not at all; rather it is an indispensable and complementary strategy with the prevention one).

3.2. The experiences of some countries

Despite weaknesses and the usual failures of countries in their anti-corruption efforts, there are several commendable efforts that are being undertaken to prevent corruption and few promising results in some countries. Very few countries may be considered successful, in relative terms, of course, in their fight against corruption.

The Self Administrative Region of Hong Kong (China) and Singapore are countries that are usually mentioned to have become successful, through their hard and relentless fight against corruption they waged and implemented for nearly half a century.

Hong Kong SAR's ICAC has always adopted a three pronged approach in its fight against corruption; they are: a). Investigation, b). Prevention, and c). Education.

The Operations Department is charged with investigating alleged corruption cases. It has wide-ranging powers including the use of informants and undercover agents.

The Corruption Prevention Department examines practices and procedures of government departments and public bodies with a view to identifying and eliminating opportunities that may lead to corruption. Through its Advisory Services Group the department also advises private organizations on ways to prevent corruption. Since 1998, the department has produced best practice packages containing advice on ways of minimizing corruption opportunities in areas such as procurement, tendering and information security (Australia, 2006:21, Web site: http://www.aic.gov.au, and Tony Kwok Man-wai, 2001).

The experiences of these two countries show that the scourge of corruption could significantly be undermined if there is the will and this will is walked.

In addition to these success stories, there are also other countries that can share some encouraging experiences in preventing corruption to other countries.

South Korea's experience in public procurement domain is one that may be mentioned in this regard. In South Korea, there exists the Public Procurement Services (PPS) that deals with all public procurements above a value of a certain threshold, US $45,000 for goods and services, US $2.7 million for construction projects. Out of US $45 billion spent annually on public procurement the PPS handles about $12.5 billion, or 28% leaving the rest to be handled by individual government agencies concerned (Kang, B., 2000; in Chris Hankes Drielsma, 2000 : 46).

In its effort to prevent corruption in public procurement, South Korea employs electronic data base and electronic bidding process to ensure transparency which is a vital and indispensable tool to curb corruption not only in public procurement but also in other under takings.

The other country where a better experience in preventing corruption from public procurement observed was Brazil. There, as the survey shows, the invitations to bid, announcement of recipient and signing of contracts are published officially. Bidders required to have 10% of the capital and required to provide financial statements and guarantees, along with their access to equipment and personnel. The lowest bid gets the contract. Delays in the project are sanctioned by financial penalties and barring from future biddings. Additions to the contract are very limited; normally a new bidding process is encouraged. The law stipulates that contractors are paid in chronological order, a complete shift from the earlier experience where there were double standards. Penalties are set out and strictly enforced against officials who break the rules, and all related procedures are subject to rigorous internal and external audits.(Sullivan, 2000), in Chris Hankes Drielsma, 2000 : 49)

One, among few African countries appreciated for their being on the right track in preventing corruption is Tanzania. This was achieved through a nation-wide anti-corruption movement called the **National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Actions Plan (NACSAP)**, that was formulated and launched in response to findings and recommendations of a Corruption Validation Study that was commissioned by the Union government in 1996, immediately, following the first multi-party elections in Tanzania. The Commission, led by **Judge Warioba**, drafted a corruption findings report commonly known as '**The Warioba Report'**. The report singled out "widespread corruption as flourishing at all levels of the society, as rampant and a key impediment to the successful achievement of development and economic objectives by the Government of Tanzania. "Negative" impacts of corruption cited in the **Warioba** Report included:

a) Massive economic losses from reduced government income
b) Miss-appropriation of public assets;
c) Contribution of corruption to the breakdown in social infrastructure, and
d) d). Erosion of public trust and confidence in government, with particular attention to the judiciary and public administration.

The NACSAP aimed to restore integrity in the management of public resources and national ethos. In 2000 the UNDP and some other Donor Development Partners formulated a program called "Strengthening Capacities to Combat Corruption in Tanzania" (SCCCT) to support the implementation of NACSAP. It is reported that Tanzania achieved this success mainly through establishment of integrity committees in ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) and Local Government Authorities (LGAs) and the establishment of anti-corruption clubs in tertiary institutions and providing them with the support they need. Encouraging freedom of the media in reporting cases of corruption was also one source of its strengths, (UNDP Tanzania Success Stories, Fighting Corruption2013. : 12).Here, as can be noticed, the citizenry is the major player, in the anti- corruption movement.

The other country in Africa recognized to have success story in corruption prevention is Botswana. A show case in the prevention of corruption was the Ministry of Health of the Republic. The ministry carried out its own survey of the prevailing internal situation, identified corruption prone processes and activities; and formulated its own institutional strategy for the prevention of corruption to be implemented from 2013 through 2022. Furthermore, it made all its departments to mainstream the agenda in their annual work plan. And this has resulted, as the report states, in a considerable improvement in preventing corruption in the ministry.

Furthermore, there is evidence that shows in some countries such as Botswana, Australia, and countries in Eastern Europe, government departments develop their own institutional corruption prevention policy and detailed scheme to tackle corruption in their institutions.

3.3. The Experience in Ethiopia

3.3.1. Introduction

Developmental State as a model in Ethiopia

After the end of the decades old civil war in 1991 it was time in Ethiopia to shift from war to peace and tranquility and from war supporting economy to an effort of poverty alleviation. With this understanding in mind, the major preoccupation of the era after the establishment of the Transitional Government in late 1991 and the subsequent establishment of the FDRE in 1996 was to fix the war ridden economy of the country. Since then Ethiopia has been taking varieties of reforms in the economic, political and social spheres.

The economic policy was changed from command economy towards market oriented economy (Shimelis, 2005:70-71). A complete monopoly over the means of production, such as land, manufacturing and service industries that began in 1975 were among the very few legacies of the Dergue that have survived the regime. The monopoly continued under the market oriented economic policy of the EPRDF led government. As time goes on the principles of developmental state began taking root and shape and became an official governing ideology of the EPRDF led government("Addis Raiy", Volume 5, Issue no.1; 2014:53). Under this development policy the government was at the center as a policy maker, law giver, an executive and regulatory machine and furthermore, as a wealth creating investor/individual citizen with a view of directing and facilitating development by addressing market failures and policy gaps (Andrzej Bolesta : 117). It has also became terminal for administrative, economic and social services and other provisions to citizens and any other entity alike(Amundsen 1999, in Shimelis, 2005:70).

This political and economic scenario began, through time, to prove how fertile ground it is for corruption to germinate, grow and proliferate across the country where there is deficit in the effort of tackling it.

Developmental state is a model where by vivid and strong intervention by the state in the economic activities of a nation is an official policy. Complete ownership of land (which is a significant means of production and development impute so far), strict control over financial institutions, trade, industry, and also on supplies of basic provisions is major manifestations of a developmental state (Kidanemariam B. Hailu,2014 : 23).Strict control by the state extends to investment , taxes, import-exports, etc. This reality is one of the causes and conditions conducive for the proliferation of corruption. The fact that there is rampant corruption in land administration, privatization, procurement, etc in Ethiopia (Tables. 1, 2, 9 &16) is a very good evidence to show government ownership of major resources of a country can be conducive condition, where there is deficit in the anti-corruption effort, for corruption (Amadi et al, 2014:168; Table 8 & 9). The government is not only the major property owner and major asset seller and unrivalled provider of goods and supplies in the country but also unparalleled procurer of goods, works and services in the country and from abroad. And it is the set of theses involvement and activity of the state that brings the government machinery in the center of corruption and makes it terminal of corruption. Understanding this inevitable scenario, the EPRDF identified corruption and rent seeking to be one of the formidable problems that can undermine the nations effort to grow, develop and democratize("Addis Raiy", Volume 5, Issue no.1; 2014:53).It has also put a legal regime and organizational arrangement in place to take care of corruption at the right time, in the opinion of this researcher, in the countries long journey in the path of renaissance

The EPRDF's prediction, the steps taken in making laws and establishing anti-corruption watch dog(s) in this regard, were correct and has been proved so in practice under its watch. However, the success that have been achieved is not up to the expectation of the citizenry (Tewodros Dawit, 2009:53)

Developmental state model as a development trajectory for Ethiopia is the preferred option to transit from law level and back ward level of development in the country towards development and industrialization (Andrzej Bolesta, p. 39, 40,). The existence of corruption in the country is not a logical outcome of developmental state model of development trajectory. The development model is not to be blamed for the existence and proliferation of corruption in the country. Corruption does exist in every political economy, be it in pre capitalist or capitalist systems. It is something that is embedded in every political system, except variance in degree of intensity, throughout history. The important issue here is the will and capacity of states to tackle it. The state of Ethiopia may be criticized, in the opinion of this researcher, not for the development path that it has chosen. It would and should be challenged rather for the deficit in the effort of fighting corruption, a bitter foo that it had for seen it and said it could be the political system's germ of destruction a decade and a half ago. Robust walking of this talk is very important today, more than any time before, as corruption (including lack of good governance) has significant potential to undermine any model of state including developmental state and peace and tranquility a country (Luca Amadi and EmeEkekwe, 2014:168). As developmental state is prone to corruption, one of the purposes of this study is to once again, as is the case with other stake holders, to call for a robust action against the scourge of corruption in public procurement.

This is the birds-eye view of the political economy, and one of its inevitable draw backs, corruption and its prevention strategy in public procurement, that is the subject of this study.

3.3.2. The state of corruption and public procurement

In the area of public procurement, there is a trend showing an increase in the number of complaints brought before the Procurement and Property Disposal Complaint Hearing Board, for which miss-conduct on the part of government officials is found to be one of the leading reasons as can be seen (in Table2)the details of the reasons why bid award decisions are reversed by the Board.

Table 1: Number of complaints lodged with the PPPDCHBin the years 2010/11;2004 through 2014/15; 2007. E.C.

Budget year.	Total no. of complaints lodged with the Board.	Total no. of complaints decided by the Board.	Performance of the Board in percentile.	Number of complaints as compared with earlier budget year, in percentile.
2010/11 (2003).	35	34	97%	-
2011/12 (2004).	48	41	85%	37%
2012/13 (2005).	101	100	99%	110%
2013/14 (2006).	109	106	98%	08%
2014/15 (2007).	117	109	95%	7%

(Source : the 2006.E.C.nd 2007.E.C. annual reports of the Board).

The data in Table 1, shows that complaints against public procurement are in the increase. The data in Table2,further shows that a considerable number of complaints upheld by the Complaint Hearing Board for want of legality on the part of the decisions made by procuring public institutions.

Table 2: Total number of complaints lodged with, and decisions made by the Board in the year 2006.E. C.

Details of the complaints.	Number of cases decided under the sub-category
Total number of complaints lodged with the Board in the budget year..	109.
Total no. of cases decided by the Board.	106
Total number of bids that are found to have violated the procurement laws and consequently cancelled.	6.
Total number of procurements that are recommended to be rectified because of the unlawful irregularities committed in the process.	16.
Total number of complaints that lacked credibility.	19.
Total number of complaints that are resolved by the parties themselves outside of the Board.	3.
Total number of complaints lodged after the period of limitation has run out.	19.
Complaints that are based on issues that cannot be complained against.	12.
Complaints that are rejected because they have not observed the due process of complaint lodging.	10.
Total number of complaints that are not within the institutional jurisdiction of the Board	19.
Total number of complaints decided based on counter complaints by public/procuring institutions earlier decisions made by the Board.	2.
Complaints that are under investigation by the Board.	3.

(Source : adapted from the 2006.E.C. and 2007. E.C.annual reports of the Board).

Table 3; Total number of complaints lodged with, and decisions made by the Board in the year 2007.E. C.

Details of the complaints.	Number of cases decided under the sub-category
Total number of procurements cancelled for want of legality	6
Total number of procurements recommended for the rectification of irregularities observed in the process	18
Total number of procurements found to have been carried out as per the laws, and okayed to proceed.	22
Total number of complaints that are resolved by the parties themselves outside of the Board	4
Total number of complaints lodged after the period of limitation has run out.	16
Complaints that are rejected because they have not observed the due process of complaint lodging.	7
Complaints that are based on issues that cannot be complained against.	12
Total number of complaints that are not within the institutional jurisdiction of the Board	17
Total number of complaints decided based on counter complaints by public/procuring institutions earlier decisions made by the Board.	7
Complaints that are under investigation by the Board.	8
Total number of complaints lodged with the Board in the budget year.	117

(Source : adapted from the 2006.E.C. and 2007. E.C.annual reports of the Board).

Table 4.Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International (TI), in the last five consecutive years on Ethiopia:

Reported Year.	Points Earned	Rank among nations of the World.
2015	33%	103/168
2014	33%	110/175
2013	33%	111/177
2012	33%	113/176
2011	27%	120/182

(Source: Adapted from the reports of Transparency International Corruption Perception indices for the years 2011-2015, inclusive).

This report of the TI shows the level of corruption in Ethiopia is alarming.

The data in Tables 1; 2; 3; and 4show that there are significant number of procurements that did not observe the laws; and expenditures that are not done in line with the rules and regulations for such public transactionsand the high level of corruption prevalence (TI CPS) tell that there is a good reason to worry much about corruption in public procurement and other public expenditures as well in Ethiopia; and to work harder to prevent it from continuing to happen unbridled.

3.3.3. The FEACC, its organizational portfolio and major strategies in its fight against corruption

The FEACC has since 2009, has organized itself in five operational directorates, five support directorates and three services structure. To date it has about 410 staff in its pay role. One among the operational directorates is the Corruption Prevention Directorate whose performance is evaluated by/in this research.

The major anti-corruption strategies in Ethiopia are enshrined in Article 6 of Proclamation No. 433/2005(as amended), they are:

i). In cooperation with relevant bodies, to strive to create an aware society where corruption will not be condoned or tolerated by promoting ethics and anti-corruption education;
ii). In cooperation with relevant bodies, to prevent corruption offences and other improprieties;
iii).To exposes investigate and prosecute corruption offences and impropriety**.**

It is also called the “Three-pronged Strategy”, originally bench marked, some fifteen years ago while the FEACC was under establishment, from the ICAC of Hong Kong.

A. Ethics Education Promotion

The purpose of disseminating ethics education among the public in general and among the youth in particular is to help create a society that abhors and fights corruption. A recent study on the attitudes of university students carried out by Amano Genemo(2014) in Adama Science and Technology University shows that students are not [less] concerned about corruption. Majority of the students covered in the study expressed their preference to work in government offices that they think will give them opportunity to enrich themselves by whatever ways and means. The study further shows, even those students graduating from natural science departments want to get employment opportunity in government offices that are widely perceived as corruption hubs, such as tax collecting offices and customs authority(Amano Genemo,2014:95). These findings of the study underline the need for robust ethics education promotion andvalue building, especially amongst the youth and to strengthen corruption prevention work to tackle corruption from its sources. Hence, dissemination of ethics education is one among the best strategies to help create a society that does not condone corruption. It is in view of this understanding that the FEACC is working harder, in collaboration with multitudes of non-state actors, to disseminate ethics education.

i) The role played by the FEACC in disseminating ethics education

To this end, the FEACC employs several methods to disseminate ethics education among the wider public in general and the civil service, the justice administration, the business community, artists, journalists; students in rolled in elementary, secondary and tertiary education level, religious institutions, civic organizations, trade unions, in particular. . .etc.. The Ethics Education and Communications Affairs Directorate, which is one of the operational directorates in the **FEACC**, is responsible for the implementation of this strategy. This effort is carried out through print media (such as broachers, bulletins, and leaflets) and electronic media (such as radio and television). It also organizes hundreds of forums, each year, whereby face to face training programs are carried out by different trainers drawn from the FEACC itself and from outside sources. Some of the training materials(modules) were prepared by the FEACC itself for the purpose of facilitating ethics education training by itself and also by members of the NACC that are partners (of the FEACC) in the anti-corruption struggle.

The data in Table 5 presents, concisely, the efforts being deployed by the FEACC in the promotion of ethics education.

Table 5. Summary of the implementation of Ethics Education Promotion Strategy of the FEACC from 2001/02 through 2014/15.

	Training on Ethics Education offered to.	**Number of trainees**
1.1.	Civil servants in the government offices and public enterprises	**199,586**
1.2.	Ethics Liaison Officers in different public institutions.	**4,890**
1.3.	Trainers (people trained so that they will train members of their community/constituencies).	**9,392**
1.4.	Private citizens drawn from different sections of the society that attended awareness creation training 0n corruption by the FEACC..	**4,913,933**
1.5.	Private citizens drawn from different sections of the society that attended awareness creation training 0n corruption by the members of the NACC.[TEACHINGS BY RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS TO THEIR BELIEVERS IS NOT INCLUDED].	**5,642,486**
	Total	10,770,287
	Ethics Education Promotion through Print Media.	
2.1.	Quarterly /bi-annually magazine on anti-corruption	**334,000**
2.2.	Brochures, leaflets, posters and stickers	**3,218,250**
2.3.	Annual performance report of the FEACC, profile of the FEACC and relevant information to stake holders.	**84,059**
2.4.	Training modules on ethics and corruption prevention.	
2.5.	Articles printed in various newspapers and insertions	**24,944**
	Total	
	Ethics Education Promotion through electronic media.	
3.1.	Short messages on corruption on television and radio	**994**
3.2.	Television and radio dramas	**83**
3.3.	Talk shows, panel discussions, teleconference, question and answer programs on television and radio.	**41**
3.4.	Documentary films on television	**5**
	Total	**3,662,376**

(Source: Adapted from a publication in 2011dedicated for the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the FEACC; and from annual reports of 2011/12; 2012/13; 2013/14 and 2014/15 by the FEACC).

ii) The Role played by the Organized Public in disseminating Ethics Education

Corruption prevention as a strategy encompasses different activities that involve the organized public at large at different levels. [Currently there are about 151 anti-corruption forums that are organized at the federal level. The idea of organizing and encouraging different sections of the society, such as the youth and the women was first initiated and brought into practice by the Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Regional State (SNNPRS) in the year 2004(SNNPRS Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Annual Report, 2004, Haile Melekot etal, Success Stories, 2007: 66). Few years after this initiative, as the FEACC saw some merit in it, this experience got the chance of being scaled-up nationwide through the support of international donors. These entities were organized, came together and formed and became part of the national integrity system of Ethiopia which is known by the name "National Anti-Corruption Coalition (NACC)" which was inaugurated in 2009. The NACC has its own charter of establishment, which also elaborates the way it functions and the missions and objectives it stands for (The Charter of the NACC, 2009). The central objective of the NACC is to mobilize the citizenry in general and the working people in particular so as to strive to create a society with strong attitude that is unfriendly to corruption and corrupts.

The public mobilization effort, manifested in the form of the NACC, is a strategy that has, in the opinion of this writer, a paramount and indispensable contribution to mobilize strong support from the citizenry to the anti-corruption struggle that cannot get depleted. The organized and mobilized public is the single most important instrument in the hand of citizens to pressurize the government to get committed to the anti-corruption movement by using its voting card; for it has the opportunity to punish the government by voting it out of its hard won and hard maintained power whenever it betrays the cause of anti-corruption.

Table 6; List of the National Anti-Corruption Coalition (NACC) members by organization type

Representative of Members	Total Members
Government organization representative	24
Federal and regional anti-corruption representatives	14
Regional states that do not have anti-corruption commissions	10
NGOs and Professional associations	43
Media	25
Faith-based organizations	5
Trade and sector associations	27
Opposition parties (from only those that have seat in the Federal Parliament).	3
Total members	**151 = 100%**

[Source :Adapted fromArsema,2010, p, 23]

Table 7.Ethics education trainings performed by the members of the NACC.(2013/14,(2006),).

No.	**Name of Coalition/ Name of the member of the NACC that offered the training.**	**Number of people who attended the training by the coalitions**
1	Youth Anti-Corruption Coalition	128,193 People
2	Women Anti-Corruption Coalition	295,246 People
3	Ethiopian Trade Unions Federations and Confederations Anti-corruption Coalitions	34,667People
4	Religious Organizations Anti-corruption Coalitions	10,060,166 People [this includes the number of believers that were thought some sort of ethics education while practicing their faith.]
5	Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sectorial Associations Anti-corruption coalition	10,878 People

No.	Name of Coalition/ Name of the member of the NACC that offered the training.	Number of people who attended the training by the coalitions
6	Professional Associations Anti-corruption Coalition	408 People
7	Charity Organizations Anti-corruption Coalition	4,888 People
8	Media Organizations and Associations Anti-corruption Coalition	They provided awareness raising education for millions of people through their media channels.
9	Health Professionals Anti-corruption Coalition	4,717People
10	Artists Anti-corruption Coalition	376 People
11	Education Professionals Anti-corruption Coalition	496 People
Total:		**10,540,035 People**

The above tabular presentation shows an example of the hundreds plus training activities carried out by the member associations of the NACC in a bid to help the anti-corruption movement nationwide for many years since their establishment in the states and national level.

B. Investigative and Prosecutorial performances (Deterrence)

The establishment of the FEACC was 'inaugurated' by taking former top leaders of the EPRDF to court, albeit the distrust/ unease/on the part of the public with regard to the motive of those moves in that time space, the government boldly defends its stance by stating that it has secured conviction against those suspects.

Since the second half of 2001, about 39,137 tips-off were registered with the FEACC for investigation, thousands of corruption cases and several thousands of suspects were taken to the court by the prosecutors of the Commission; and some 1,647 (see Table8)of thesuspects were convicted, hundreds of millions of birr(in cash form), vehicles, several machinery, trading houses, residential houses and buildings; and land which is worth billions of birr were confiscated from convicts by courts and got back to government ownership. Table 8presentssome part of the outcomes of the investigative and prosecutorial efforts by the FEACC.

The achievements of the FEACC in its investigative and prosecutorial endeavor from 2001/02 through 2014/15.

Table 8. The performance of the FEACC in its investigative and prosecutorial endeavor from 2001/02 through 2014/15.

S.N	Description	Aggregates on the specifics in the first 14years	Annualized Average per year
1.	Number of tips-off brought to the attention of the FEACC	39,137	2796
2.	Number of tips-off that are within the jurisdiction of the FEACC, and managed by same	15,860	1,133
3.	Number of cases taken to the courts	2,293	164
4.	Number of cases decided upon by courts	1,080	78
5.	Number of suspects convicted	1,647	118

[Source: Adapted from the publication for the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the FEACC; and from annual reports of 2011/12; 2012/13; 2013/14 and 2014/15].

Table 9;The types and the value/number/quantity of restrained and confiscated property in the year 2012/13(2005), 2013/14(2006) and 2014/15 (2007.E.C.).

Type of Asset	(2005) Restrained	(2005) Confiscated	(2006) Restrained	(2006) confiscated	(2007) Restrained	(2007) confiscated
Ethiopian birr, Shares and Bonds	473,313,640.00	21,741623.61	359,101,701	8,609,348.41	10,320,456.27	74,775,882.
US Dollar	13,000.00	—	—	—	87,782.27	—
Sudanese Pound		—	—	—	27,746.70	—
Trading Houses (in number)	10	_	8	9	8	—
Factory (in number)	1	_	1	_	_	_
Residential houses (in number)	72	—	140	—	37	3
Vehicles (in number)	38	2	165	3	55	4
Buildings(in number)	—	_	2	—	4	—
Heavy Construction machineries: Loaders , . . etc.,(in number)	—	_	_	_	15	_
Land	108,709.3 m2	22,000 m2	72,673m2	395 m2	—	26,244.4 m2
Gold	—		—	—	—	81,422.76 g. (worth birr21,144, 742.00)

(Source: Adopted from the published performance reports of the FEACC 2012/13, 2013/14, and 2014/15).

C. Corruption prevention

The Government of Ethiopia has adapted a preventive approach, as one of its three pillar strategies, to combating corruption. The rationale for this approach has to do with its cost effectiveness, sustainability, and participatory nature (ArsemaTamyalew, 2010:18-19).

The corruption prevention Strategy of Ethiopia emanates from Article 6(2) of Proclamation No.433/2005 (as amended) of FDRE. The FEACC's strategy of corruption prevention in public procurement is derived from this law that establishes the duties and responsibilities of the FEACC itself; and also learned from the experience of ICAC of Hong Kong. This shows that there is prevention of corruption as a strategy in the overall anti-corruption policy of Ethiopia.

Besides having a general corruption prevention strategy that is intended to be implemented everywhere in every encounter, there is also a relatively elaborate track (strategy) that is particularly dedicated to corruption prevention in public procurement; and efforts in this regard are being exerted by the FEACC.

This particular corruption prevention strategy aims at curbing opportunities for corruption in public institutions by way of evaluating their procurement business processes by focusing on observance of rules and procedures that are meant to govern the process throughout the procurement cycle, the integrity of staff that is demonstrated in the whole process, the state of supervisory checks and balances and the level of transparency in the flow of the process; and also the issue of accountability at the end of the process.

Moreover, its success requires building capacity within each and every public institution or in a given one center that can directly manage and oversee the proper implementation of the rules and procedures of the prevention strategy. Furthermore, any success in this endeavor is highly dependent on having the leadership of each public institution committed to make sure that every element of the strategy is implemented in the procurement cycle and, any deviation is sanctioned. As the findings of this study show, the government's reluctance to hold executives accountable for their behavior needs to be stopped before it is too late and citizens' patience is worn-out completely, which in the opinion of this author is fast approaching.

Business Process evaluation

Without disregard to the significant relevance of the remedial measure, law enforcement, preventing corruption from taking place has paramount strategic importance. The experience of Hong Kong also endorses similar understanding. In this regard the FEACC carried out and is still carrying out several commendable activities to help eliminate the root causes of corruption since its establishment in 2001/2. Since its establishment, the FEACC has organized a directorate, under the name "**Corruption Prevention Directorate"** that is responsible for the implementation of its corruption prevention strategy.

The major responsibilities of this directorate are:

i) to carryout ordinary/regular business process evaluations (future oriented),

ii) to carryout real time preventive review/intervention in an ongoing target

iii) transaction that is complained against,

iv) to provide advisory service on the prevention of corruption in public institutions and private ones alike, and

v) to provide counseling in the preparation of institutional code of ethics both in the private and public sectors.

The Corruption Prevention Directorate of the FEACC is responsible to implement the corruption prevention strategy in public institutions by executing two or more complementary tasks within or outside of public institutions. One of the tasks is to train staff members of relevant work units and the Ethics Liaison Officers of Public institutions on the instruments for tackling corruption in the process of procurement in their respective public institutions. The other task is to review the business process of public institutions based on its annual plan of action which is future oriented and urgent/real time preventive intervention, which is complaint driven, in ongoing procurement transactions.

As established by business process reengineering carried out in 2008 within the FEACC, the procedure for business process evaluation/review is initiated either by a request by a stake holder, by earlier surveys, studies or by the FEACC itself. After a public institution and a process or a task in the institution is selected by the directorate, the mission is given to one of the units for a detailed plan of action for the business process review decided/selected to be undertaken.

However, as can be seen (in Table 12.) the size of the Directorate's staff, their expertise and skill is not up to the immense burden and challenges of the prevention strategy. One of the findings of the research informs similar limitations in the Directorate.

Table 10;The size, education level and work experience/service of human resource deployed in the Corruption Prevention effort/Directorate/ of the FEACC.

S. No.	Education level of staff	Number of staff in the level	Serial no.	Years of service/ experience	Number of staff in the service bracket
1.	BA/BSC	28	1.	0 < 6	10
2.	MA/MSC	5	2.	6+ <10	6
3.	PhD.	1	3.	10+	18
Total numberof staff		34			34

(Source: By the author from the materials from the FEACC)

Despite the limitations stated above the Corruption Prevention Directorate has carried out several hundred business process reviews of hundreds of public institutions in a bid to plug loopholes that may contribute for corruption to take place in those public institutions.

The business process evaluations for the purpose of preventing corruption largely focuses on capital goods and services procurement, property/asset administration, land administration and other pertinent tasks and activities that are frequently exposed to corruption and irregularities. The following tabular presentation presents the summary of the corruption prevention efforts and results of the FEACC.

Table 11.On Business Processes (Regular Process Review)

No.	**The type of preventive measures taken by the FEACC in the public institutions**	**2001/—2010/11 [1993-2003. E.C.]**	**2011/12 [2004.E.c.]**	**2012/13 [2005. E.c.]**	**2013/14 [2006.e.c.]**	**2014/15 [2007. E.c.]**
1.	Business Processes (Regular Process Review)	299 reviews	75 public institutions	72 reviews	73reviews	82 reviews
2.	Support rendered for the implementation of recommended solutions.	192 support that was rendered for the implementation of recommendations	64 public institutions	29 public institutions	136 public institutions	74 public institutions

(Source: Adopted from the publication for the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the FEACC; and from annual reports of 2011/12; 2012/13; 2013/14 and 2014/15).

Table 13 shows the high volume of work accomplished in the last fourteen years by one single directorate of the FEACC. The prevention directorate has carried out 591 business and activity processes of public institutions and also has provided 495 counseling and implementation support to public institutions.

Table 12; the types of business processes and activities reviewed by the directorate; in the years 2012/13(2005.E.C.) and 2013/14(2006.E.C.).

S.no.	Type of activity/process reviewed	Quantity of the reviews in number.		Aggregate no.	Total
		2012/13 2005.E.C.	2013/14 2006.E.C.		
1.	Procurement and disposal/sell	49	36	85	51.21%
2.	Land Administration	4	1	5	3.01%
3.	Revenue and Tax	-	3	3	1.81%
4.	Justice Administration	1	-	1	0.60%
5.	Human Resource and Property Administration	39	24	63	37.95%
6.	Public work/construction	-	9	9	5.42%
Total		93	73	166	100%

(Source: adopted from the annual report by the FEACC for the years 2012/13 and 2013/14)

Table14 shows greater portion of the preventive effort 94 out of the 166business process reviewed, which is (51.21% + 5.42%) 57%, was deployed on the prevention of corruption in public procurement.

In terms of resource, what the FEACC is getting from the government is not comparable with what other corruption watch dogs are getting from their respective governments. In the opinion of this researcher and based on the comparison data in (Tables26 and 27). Show that the FEACC used to operate under tight financial constraint; and yet have scored significant success.

Besides this future oriented and proactive preventive exercises, there is so called Urgent/Real Time preventive intervention (Table15).

Urgent/real time preventive interventions are activities that are being deployed to save public money, usually, against procurement that is getting nearer to the end tip of the pipe line in the process of expenditure. Urgent/real time preventive intervention is complaint driven and transactional, as opposed to systems review which is based on survey and is future oriented.

Table13:Urgent/Real time preventive reviews made on ongoing Procurement processes in public institutions based on complaints.

No.	The type of preventive measures taken by the FEACC in the public institutions	2001/-2010/11 [1993-2003. E.C.]	2011/12 [2004. E.c.]	2012/13 [2005. E.c.]	2013/14 [2006.e.c.]	2014/15 [2007. E.c.]
1.	Urgent/Real time preventive review of process	65 urgent preventive reviews	15 urgent preventive reviews	22 urgent preventive reviews	19 urgent preventive reviews	22 urgent preventive reviews

(Source: Adopted from a publication dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the FEACC; and from annual reports of 2011/12; 2012/13; 2013/14 and 2014/15).

Table 14; The amount of money saved from embezzlement as a result of the urgent preventive intervention by the FEACC.

	Type of public institution	**Object of the procurement**	**Amount of money saved from embezzlement**	**Remark**
1. 2013/14 (2006.E.C.)	3 public institutions	Several multi-purpose buildings construction, Power Generators procurement	More than Birr112,437,222.30 million	The former defective tender was scrapped by the preventive intervention of the FEACC and another tender was carried out that brought about decrease in the cost.
4.2014/15 (2007.E.C.)	25 public institutions.	For the procurement of goods and services	More than Birr 609, 245,929.00	Several tenders were cancelled and retendered due to the preventive intervention of the FEACC,

(Source: adopted from the annual reports by the FEACC for the year 2013/14 and 2014/15).

As can be learned from Table 16, the FEACC has succeeded in saving hundreds of millions of birr public money in twenty four months, a money that exceeds the total amount of budget that it had obtained in the last fourteen years from the Federal Government .

Furthermore, it shows how fruit full the business process, especially urgent/real time preventive intervention in public procurements in progress could be if it were to be implemented by people that are more qualified and more skilled; and of course if it were to be done with the full force of the sanction of the government.

3.4. Overview of public procurement regime and its governance in Ethiopia.

The Public Procurement regime in Ethiopia is laid out in Public Procurement and Property Administration (PPPA) Proclamation No.649/2009; and in Public Procurement and Property Disposal Service (PPPDS) Regulation No.184/2010.

The principles that are stated in proclamation no. 649/2009 (Art.5.) and meant to govern public procurement undertakings are: value for money spent; non-discrimination; transparency in the process; accountability and careful handling and proper utilization of public property.

The governance of the process of public procurement ranges from procuring public institutions up to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.

To make sure that this set of principles with regard to public procurement is observed, relevant regulatory and executive government offices are duly established that are meant to operate under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. There is also complaint hearing board under the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. In each and every public institution there is procurement endorsing committee (in some institutions more than one for procurement is such a day today job) in some institutions. These committees are answerable to the leader of the respective institution.

Despite existence of all these elaborate rules of the game, other efforts and seemingly established checks and balances, according to the reports of the OFAG and the FEACC, there are rampant irregularities and corruption in public procurement in Ethiopia. And this is the fact that calls for, among other pertinent government offices, the FEACC's corruption prevention effort and intervention in the procurement undertakings of public institutions.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter deals with the design and methodology of the study.
To this end Primary data were collected from key informants and respondents and secondary data such as printed reports and other materials from relevant parties that participated in the study. These data were categorized, processed, described, analyzed, and interpreted. Population, sample, sampling techniques, data collection instruments and collection procedures are presented.
Factors that influence the degree of the efficacy of the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC were also examined.

4.1. The Research Design

A research design is the conceptual structure within which a research is conducted; it constitutes the blue print for the types and sources of data, population and sample, collection and analysis of data(Kotari 2004: 31).

As stated from the outset, the purpose of this study is to examine the efficacy of the evaluation of the procurement business processes/activities of public institutions carried out by the FEACC in a bid to prevent corruption in public procurement. To this end, responses from respondents, interviews from key informants and secondary data from relevant government offices and from other sources were the sets of data that were required for the study. Questionnaires were designed in five Likhert scale to encourage respondents and secure responses from all the respondents addressed and a set of eleven questions were designed for the discussion with key informants from four regulatory government offices regarding public procurement.

4.2. Types of data that were collected, the target population and sample size

Ethiotelecom, Sugar Corporation, PhFSA and ERCC are among 25 federal public institutions in which the FEACC have carried out procurement business process evaluations in the years 2013/14 and 2014/15. The FEACC have devoted much time and resource to these public institutions and consequently, these public institutions have had their procurement business processes evaluated several times in the past. Besides, these public institutions represent four major economic and social sectors in the country, they are managing a capital of billions of birr public money each and are big purchasers. On the strength of these facts the study believed they will be preferred institutions to test the efficacy of the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC and consequently selected them as one of the pools of population, besides other public and private institutions, to select respondents from. The PPPA, PPPDS, FEACC, OFAG and the PPPDCHB were also selected as population because they are the first of stake holders in the front line with regard to public procurement.

The study used primary and secondary data that were collected, categorized, processed, analyzed and interpreted through qualitative method. To this end, fixed list of questions with pre-categorized answers were developed in five Likhert scale by the researcher that could be self-administered by each respondent. And also selected key informants from relevant public institutions that were approached by the researcher directly to respond to some pertinent issues that require first- hand information, direct experience and expertise.

The primary data collected from respondents through questionnaires and discussion with key informants; and sets of secondary data collected from different public institutions such as the FEACC, the OFAG and the PPPDCHB will be utilized to answer the research questions of the study.

However, as it is helpful to understand circumstances under which the topic of the research is being appreciated, materials prepared for some other purposes by public institutions and the FEACC, such as audit reports, annual performance reports, comments and other materials are collected and presented in tables and in figures.

4.2.1 Secondary Data

Besides sets of primary data collected through questionnaire, interview and discussion with key informants; secondary data were also collected from:

The FEACC, OFAG, and thePPPA;and were duly utilized.

4.2.2 Primary Data

a) Population and Sample Size

In the context of research, population refers to the complete set of individuals (subjects), objects or events having common observable characteristics in which the researcher is interested (Agyedu et al., 1999).

The population in this study comprises those people who are involved in public procurement activities in each of the four public institutions, relevant staff members in those government offices (PPPA, PPPDS and the OFAG) with the responsibilities of enforcing the procurement laws and supervising public procurement activities in every public institution, the Complaint Hearing Board in Public Procurement and those suppliers that took part in biddings in those selected four public institutions. Also the director and staff members of the Corruption Prevention Directorate of the FEACC are within the domain of the target population.

Table 15; **Sample Size and list of institutions respondents were drawn from.**

S.N	Institutions and place of assignments where respondents (samples)were drawn from	Total size of population	Size of population that have information and experience and therefore are relevant to the study	Number of respondents
a.	Four procurement endorsing/bid committee members from each of the four procuring public institutions in the study.	41	41	16[40%]
b.	An expert from Finance and Accounts Department; and a Planning officer from	84	19	8[38.0%]

S.N	Institutions and place of assignments where respondents (samples)were drawn from	Total size of population	Size of population that have information and experience and therefore are relevant to the study	Number of respondents
	each of the procuring public institutions in the study.			
c.	A purchasing officer, and a property Administrator from each of the procuring Public institutions in the study.	63	17	8
d.	One Ethics Officer from each of the Procuring public institutions in the study.	12	12	4
e.	From PPPA(among relevant staff members)	8	8	2
f.	From PPPDS(among relevant staff members)	9	9	2
g.	Twelve bidders among those bidders that participated in bids that were carried out in those four procuring public institutions in the study.	153	153	12
h	From the Procurement and Property Disposal Complaint Hearing Board members.	5	5	2
i	From the FEACC: 1 director, 6 team leaders and 6 experts.	34	34	13
	Total Sample size	409	298	**67**

4.3. Sampling Technique

Sampling is selection of people to participate in a given research usually with the goal of being able to use these people to make inferences about a larger group of individuals/ population. There are several ways to ensure that the sample drawn is as representative of the population as possible so that any conclusion drawn may be as close to the characteristics of the population as possible (Creswell, 2012 : 205)

In line with this, the researcher tried to get the right target population and the right respondents(samples) among the population that have the relevant information and are willing to respond to my quest and give out data to make the study a success.

In this regard, due to the discomfort the topic of corruption evokes across the spectrum of people from different social groups and due to the peculiar nature of corruption, any sort of information on issues related to corruption is very difficult to collect. To mitigate this challenge, as Creswell in his book Educational Research, (2012 : 205 – 209), recommends, the researcher had to utilize purposive and snow ball sampling techniques so as to get those members of the target population that have acquaintance with procurement process and corruption prevention works by the staff of the FEACC in their respective public institutions; and that have relevant experience and information on tenders and the procurement processes.

4.4. Data Collection Instruments

Questionnaire was utilized as one instrument for data collection from respondents; and some key questions were also formulated for the purpose of putting the interview sessions held with key informants from the PPPA, PPPDS, the FEACC and the PPPDCHB in motion. Set of primary data collected through questionnaires, interviews and secondary data collected from pertinent government offices such as the OFAG, the FEACC and the Procurement Complaint Hearing Board have generated the amount and types of data required for the research, and were also sufficient for triangulation purpose.

4.5. Data Collection Procedures

The consent of relevant bodies to formally access their premise, staff, management and relevant data was very important to carry out the research. To this effect I collected a "to whom it may concern" letter from the coordinating office of the Department of Public Administration and Development Management. And I got the opportunity to present the letters to all of the institutions I collected data from and I asked for permission and I succeeded to access their premise and their staff in my first attempt in collecting the data that I intended to in my proposal. About two companies turned down my request to collect data from their staff; therefore I had to go to other companies for replacement. In two public institutions, it took me about ten days to collect the questionnaires that I distributed for their response. Except for the inconvenience and the time unduly wasted, finally I have succeeded in my effort and collected data from 67 respondents as planned.

4.6. Methods of Data Analysis.

Generally speaking the study, starting from the types of data collected and the instruments utilized, was performed by employing qualitative research method; furthermore, some techniques of data analysis that are understood to be quantitative approaches, such as percentiles and triangulation of data were also utilized for a better result.

Accordingly, tables, figures, and percentiles were utilized to analyze the sets of data collected in the search for answers, from the data collected, for the questions of the study. In addition to the above methods of data analysis, those data collected from all the three categories of respondents on similar questions were triangulated so as to mitigate for the possible bias from one of the three categories of respondents by the data obtained from the other two categories of respondents. The most part of the data from key informants were utilized to interpret the data, frame the findings and arrive at conclusions.

Findings and conclusions of the study were deduced and interpreted from the tables, the figures and the discussions with key informants. Explanations, narrations and deductions were made to reach at conclusions.

As stated earlier in this chapter, data were collected from respondents through questionnaire, key informants by way of discussion, reports and other relevant materials. After all the data gathered were organized in tables and figures. The data collected through questionnaires were processed by utilizing Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software so as to get reliable outcome from the data analysis.

4.7. Ethical Issues in the research.

Every respondent and interviewee was asked for his/her willingness and secured the good will to participate in the study beforehand in my data collection effort.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

5.1. Introduction

The objective of the research is to examine ***the efficacy of the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC that is manifested in the form of procurement business process evaluation of public institutions in a bid to curb corruption in public procurement.***

As stated in Chapter Four, on ***Research Methodology***, respondents in this study were 67 people from three categories of institutions; that is, from the FEACC whose corruption prevention strategy is the object of this study, from suppliers in the private sector and from procuring public institutions and other government offices that have supervisory mandate over public procurement as well. Data were also collected from the OFAG, the FEACC, PPPDCHB and the procuring public institutions. All the works done to this end, i.e.; analysis of the data, the findings and their interpretations; and the underlying reasons for the findings as supported by the data collected will be presented in this chapter.

5.2. Demographic characteristics of Respondents.

Gender

In research undertakings giving equal opportunity to both sexes assists to get evenly distributed viewpoints. And also if further discussions from gender perspective were needed in the study, having balanced number of respondents from both sexes will be relevant to get balanced outcome. Although there is no need for such discussions in this study, the gender variable is collected to show that there was an effort to consider respondents from both sexes.

Figure 1.Gender profile of the respondents



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The Gender profile of the respondents in the study was 85% male and 15% female. It shows that the male participants are dominant than the female participants. The imbalance could be due to the fact that the issue at hand was a unique matter and it needed a snowball sampling technique to reach at informants that are better informed about the corruption prevention works of the FEACC, corruption and procurement. Accordingly from those that were believed to have relevant information, female informants were 15%.

Age

The second demographic characteristic in the study was the age of the respondents. Age shows in some degree of accuracy the experience a person has in both professionally as well as individually. Hence, it is assumed that as age increases, the experience and the knowledge as well as the information pool a person has increases.

Figure 2. Age profile of the respondents



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

Accordingly, as shown in fig.2 the respondents that are in 31-50 years of age bracket are 63% and 18-30 years of age bracket occupy 27% of the respondents, while above 50 years of age possess 10% of the respondents. Thus around 73% of the respondents would have more than 10 years of experience in their respective organizations. This means that most of the respondents do have the knowledge about the FEACC and its endeavor to tackle corruption.

Education profile

The next demographic factor considered in the study was the education level of the respondents, to see if they have relevant level of education back ground needed for their respective post they held and are equipped with the minimum requirement to perform their duties and responsibilities.

Figure 3. Education level of the respondents



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

Accordingly as shown in fig. 3, 56% of respondents possess first degree while the 41% have second degree& above. The remaining 3% are high school graduates. It can be inferred from the data that 97% of the respondents have tertiary level education to accomplish their tasks in their procurement related works.

Occupation/place of assignment of participants at their work place.

The last demographic profile used in the study is to see the place of assignment of respondents in the institution each respondent is working so as to determine whether or not respondents have access to relevant data and information.

Figure 4.Occupation of the respondents of the study



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

Hence according to the data in fig. 4, suppliers and bid participants from the private sector that took part in tenders in the procuring public institutions constitute 27% of the respondents. Members of procurement endorsing committee constitute 25% of the respondents while 7% of them are experts from Finance and accounts departments. Purchasing and planning officers hold 9% of the respondents while 32% of the respondents are from other pertinent government offices, such as the PPPA, PPPDS, PPPDCHB and from the FEACC (from its corruption prevention directorate).

5.3. Corruption as a problem in Public procurement in Ethiopia.

5.3.1. Some facts on the state of corruption in Ethiopia.

The state of corruption prevalence in public procurement in Ethiopia is an alarming one. The reports of the OFAG (Table 16) on the subject, do not only show that there are rampant irregularities and breach of procurement laws of the country by government entities but also this behavior is marching forward unabated.

Table16; 2008/09;2009/10;2010/11and 2011/12 annual reports of the OFAG on the financial health and performance of Public Institutions.

S. No.	Fiscal year.	Procurements that didn't observe the laws and procedures	Unverifiable expenditures	Illegal payments
1.	2011/12	353,568,759	3,507,062,927	137,363,575
2.	2010/11	313,263,670	2,032,423,012	237,164,457
3.	2009/10	83,383,007	1,940,811,592	584,611,188
4.	2008/09	99,563,153	44,498,094	15,301,282

(Source: Adapted from the 2008/09;2009/10;2010/11and 2011/12 annual reports of the OFAG on the financial health and performance of Public Institutions).

As may be seen from Table 16,year after year similar breach of procurement laws with the details and the amounts of money involved are reported to the legislature and the leadership of the executive as well. Complaints that come to the FEACC (Tables 8, 9 and 10) and to the PPPDCHB(Tables 1, 2, and 3) tell that corruption has become a formidable threat to good governance, democratization and growth and development in Ethiopia. The report of the Transparency International (Table 4) also shows how alarming is Ethiopia's standing among nations of the world with regard to corruption prevalence.

Hence corruption is a big problem and a formidable challenge in Ethiopia as it was for seen by the ruling party, the EPRDF, in 2001 and in the years that followed (Addis Raiy, 2014).

5.3.2. The availability of equal opportunity in Public procurement process

Since the first objective of the study was to determine if corruption in public procurement is a problem in Ethiopia, one of the statements addressed to respondents to reflect on the issue was ***"Tenders, limited tenders and procurements through direct***

price quotation that are carried out by public institutions give equal opportunity to suppliers".

In this case, for it was believed that all the respondents drawn from three categories of institutions, i.e.; from procuring public institutions, the private companies(that are suppliers) and the FEACC have information on the issue, responses of the respondents were triangulated so as to get balanced opinion on the statement in the questionnaire.

Table 17. The availability of equal opportunity in Public procurement process

Sr. No	Response	FEACC	Public Institutions	Suppliers	Average
1	Strongly agree		16.70%	16.70%	11%
2	Agree	8%	27.80%	58.30%	31%
3	Neither agree nor disagree	8%	25%	8.30%	14%
4	Disagree	75%	16.70%	16.70%	36%
5	strongly disagree	8%	13.90%	---	7%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

As can be seen from Table 17, on average terms 36% of the participants (from the three categories of respondents) of the study disagree with the statement that say there is equal opportunity for suppliers in procurement process while 31% agree that there exists equal opportunity in the procurement process. In the opposite ends, those that strongly agree constitute 11% and those thatstrongly disagree constitute 7% of the participants respectively. Those who disagree(36%) and strongly disagree (7%) in total constitute 43%, while those that agree(31%) and strongly agree (11%)in total constitute 42%. And 14% of the respondents did not want to take stand on the statement.

Hence, the data in Table 17 shows that a greater percentage (43%) of respondents, than those in the neutral or in the agreeing category, disagree and strongly disagree with the statement that say there is equal opportunity in the procurement process. Hence it can be interpreted that the procurement process is vulnerable to corruption since there is no equal playing ground for suppliers in the procurement process in public institutions.

5.3.3. The obtainability of Value for Money in public procurement

Corruption free procurement process will bring about the intended result ,i.e.; value for the money spent in the procurement. Hence, a statement which says "***Tenders, limited tenders and procurements through direct price quotation secure value for money to procuring public institutions***" was paused to respondents from the procuring public institutions and the FEACC to reflect their experience and thoughts on the issue.

Figure 5. The obtain-ability of Value for Money in public procurement process



	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor dis agree	dis agree	strongly disagree
FEACC		8%	17%	67%	8%
Public Institutions	12%	32%	24%	21%	12%
Average	6%	20%	20%	44%	10%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

According to Figure 5, on average terms 44% and 10% of the participants disagree and strongly disagree (respectively) with the notion that procurements made secure value for money for the procuring entities, while 20% of them agree and 6% of them strongly agree that they do. The neutrals that "neither agree nor disagree" with the statement constitute 20% of the participants of the study.

The result is that the majority(54%) of the respondents do not believe that the procurement processes secure value for money for the procuring entities, while only 26%of the respondents believe that the procurement processes secure value for money for the procuring entities. Hence, it can be inferred from the data that the procurement process is vulnerable to corrupt practices and consequently fails to bring about the value for the public money spent on public procurements.

5.3.4. The state of transparency in Public procurement process

Transparency in public procurement process is one key parameter in procurement that is believed to bring about success in the endeavor to achieve corruption free public affairs management in a given society. It is a method of putting all the information pertinent to a specific issue in the public domain open to stake holders. Hence in turn the process will not have loopholes and hidden spots that are fertile ground for corrupting procedures and committing corruption. activities. In this regard, the statement paused to respondents runs as "***Tenders, limited tenders and procurements through direct price quotation are transparent***" which is designed to capture the experience of the participants, if the procurement process is led through a transparent procedure.

Table: 18; the **state of transparency in Public procurement process.**

sr. No	Response	FEACC	Public Institutions	Suppliers	Average
1	Strongly agree		16.70%	16.70%	11%
2	Agree	33%	38.90%	50%	41%
3	Neither agree nor disagree	17%	13.90%	25%	19%
4	disagree	50%	19.40%	8.30%	26%
5	strongly disagree		11.10%		4%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

As per the triangulated analysis (Table 18), on average 41% and 11% of the respondents (respectively) agree and strongly agree that the procurement process is transparent, while 26% and 4% of the respondents (respectively) disagree and strongly disagree with the statement. The strong side of the response shows 11% and 4% of the respondents strongly agree and strongly disagree with the statement, while the remaining 19% are neutrals neither they agree nor disagree.

Table 18 shows that 52% of respondents agree and strongly agree with the statement, while 30% of respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the statement. A point that may be interesting on this point is that 50% of those respondents drawn from the FEACC, who are expected to be better informed about the overall state of corruption in most public institutions, disagree with the statement.

Nonetheless, the respondent's view is that public procurement process is transparent.

5.3.5. The state of procurement process and vulnerability to corrupt practices

Vulnerability to corrupt practices can be assessed through the study of the level of risk attached to the process and in turn the level of control systems in place for a specific process to mitigate the risk attached to it. The study questioned the respondents with A short and simple statement which says **"*Procurement process in your (government) office is not vulnerable to corruption*"** was paused to respondents.

Figure 6.**The state of procurement process and vulnerability to corrupt practices**



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

On average terms, the data in Figure 6 shows that 37% and 9% of the participants disagree and strongly disagree (respectively) that the process is not vulnerable. On the other end 36% and 6% of the respondents agree and strongly agree that the procurement process is not vulnerable to corruption. The remaining 13% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

Accordingly, the data in Figure 6 shows that a greater percentage (46%) of respondents than in the agreeing category (42%) do not believe that the procurement process in public institutions is not vulnerable to corruption as the statement states. Which means that they believe it is vulnerable to corrupt practices.

5.3.6. Procurement procedures and corrupt practices

The statement presented to the respondents runs "***The Procurement process in your office is run through corrupt procedure***" to assess whether the procurement process in respective public institutions is run through corrupt procedures.

Figure 7; **Procurement process procedure and corrupt practices**



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

Based on the data in Figure 7, on average terms 8% and 7% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the procurement process is run through corrupt practices. On the other end 42% and 15% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree that the procurement process is run through corrupt practices. The remaining 28% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

Accordingly, the data in Figure 7 shows that majority (57%) of the participants both from the FEACC as well as from respective public institutions do not agree with the statement that procurement process is run through corrupt procedure. Hence, public procurement is not run through corrupt procedure.

5.3.7. Extending favor in procurement process as anorm

A statement was presented to respondents from the private sector(the suppliers side)which says **“*Extending favor and recognizing ones support is a norm accepted in procurement*”** to collect their reflection on the issue.

Figure:8. Extending/extending favor in Procurement process as a norm



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The data in Figure 8 shows, on average25% and 17% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that extending favor and recognizing ones support is a norm in procurement. On the other end 17% and 8% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree that such a norm does exist. The remaining 33% are indifferent with a response “Neither agree nor disagree”.

Hence, the data(Fig. 8) shows that a greater percentage (42%) of respondents, than those in the neutral or in the disagreeing and strongly disagreeing category, believe that extending favor and recognizing ones support is a norm accepted in procurement process. Thus, suppliers recognize the support, in one way or the other, given to them and they reciprocate by extending some sort of benefit to those who helped them on the procurers' side.

5.4. FEACC and its procurement process evaluation Procedure

5.4.1. Preparedness of experts of the FEACC to familiarize themselves with the procedures of public institutions that they evaluate.

In any Process evaluation work an expert undertakes, the expert needs first to familiarize him/herself to the situation at hand and understand the issue in its complete sense. The paused to respondents in here was **"*The process evaluating experts of the Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption commission properly familiarize themselves with the situation and get a workable knowledge of the institution whose business process they are going to evaluate*".**

Figure 9.Preparedness of experts of the FEACC to familiarize themselves with the procedures of public institutions that they evaluate.



	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor dis agree	dis agree	strongly disagree
FEACC		75%	25%		
Public Institutions	6%	44%	31%	17%	3%
Average	3%	60%	28%	8%	1%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The data in Figure 9 shows, majority(63%)of the respondents either agree or strongly agree that the process evaluating experts of the FEACC properly familiarize themselves with the situation and get a workable knowledge of the institution whose business process they are going to evaluate. Respondents that neither agree nor disagree constitute 28%, while 9% of them disagree.

Hence, it can be understood to mean that there is no flaw in this regard with the procedure of process evaluations being undertaken by the FEACC.

5.4.2. The state of planning for business process evaluations of public institutions by the FEACC.

The statement presented to test the perception of the respondents on this issue reads as "***The process evaluation undertakings of the FEACC are led by clear and transparent/simple plan of Action*"**. It is intended to know if the evaluation of the process is led by plan of action which would govern the way the evaluation goes and reach the intended target.

Figure 10.The state of planning for business process evaluations of public institutions by the FEACC.



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaire).

The data in Figure 10, shows on average terms 51% and 8% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the process evaluation undertakings of the

FEACC are led by clear and transparent/simple plan of action. On the other end 15% and 0% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 26% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

Accordingly as majority (59%) of the respondents agree that the process evaluations being undertaken by the FEACC are led by clear and transparent/simple plan of action, which means that there is no flaw in this regard with the procedure of process evaluations being undertaken by the FEACC.

5.4.3. The state of understanding between the FEACC and pertinent public institution under procurement evaluation.

The study forwarded a statement reads as **"*The plans for the process evaluation undertakings are agreed at by both the FEACC and the pertinent public institutions*".** It is intended to know if the evaluation of the process is led by plan of action that is communicated and agreed up on by both the process evaluator (FEACC) and the process evaluated (respective public institutions).

Figure11.FEACC and Public Institutions agree on Plans for business process evaluation



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires)

The data in Figure 11 shows, on average, 44% and 7% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the process evaluation undertakings of the FEACC are led by clear and transparent/simple plan of action that are communicated with and agreed up on by the respective public institutions. On the other end 8% and 0% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 40% are indifferent with a response “Neither agree nor disagree”.

Accordingly, the data in Figure 11 show that majority of the respondents(51%)either agree or strongly agree that the process evaluation undertakings of the FEACC are led by clear and transparent/simple plan of action that are communicated and agreed up on between the FEACC and the respective public institutions.

Hence one can say that there is no flaw in this regard with the procedure of process evaluations being undertaken by the FEACC.

5.4.4. Technical and professional competence of employees of FEACC

On the competence of experts respondents were made to react to the following statement; **“*The Experts of the FEACC that perform the business process evaluations are professionally and technically competent to make such daring an endeavor a success*”**. Here, it was intended to know if the evaluation of the process is undertaken by professionally and technically competent experts and such competency brings success in the intended corruption prevention works of the FEACC.

Figure 12.FEACC experts possess professional and technical competency.



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

On average terms 46% and 4% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) the experts of the FEACC that perform the business process evaluations are professionally and technically competent to make such daring an endeavor a success. On the other end 10% and 3% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 37% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

Accordingly, the data in Figure 12 show that 50% of the respondents either agree or strongly agree that the experts of the FEACC that perform the business process evaluations are professionally and technically competent to make such daring an endeavor a success. Only 13% of respondents disagree or strongly disagree with the statement.

5.4.5. Focal point of the Procurement process evaluation work of the FEACC

The statement to test respondents' perception on this issue was **"*The business process evaluation undertakings focus on real problems in the public institutions being evaluated*".** Here it was intended to know if the business processes evaluations undertaken are focusing on corruption vulnerable and risky areas where the maximum impact can be attained in the process of enhancing corruption prevention capability.

Figure 13.Focal point of the Procurement process evaluation work of the FEACC.



	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor dis agree	dis agree	strongly disagree
FEACC	8%	58%	25%	8%	
Public Institutions	8%	44%	31%	14%	3%
Average	8%	51%	28%	11%	1%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The data in Figure 13 shows that on average terms 51% and 8% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the business process undertakings focus on real problems in the public institutions being evaluated. On the other end 11% and 1% of the respondents disagree or strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 28% are indifferent with a response “Neither agree nor disagree”.

Accordingly, the data in Fig. 13 shows 59% of the respondents believe that the business process undertakings focus on real problems in the public institutions being evaluated.

5.4.6. Credibility of the Recommendations in solving corruption problems.

The study forwarded a question that runs as “***The recommendations forwarded consequent to the evaluation is credible enough to be regarded as a solution*”.** The recommendations to be implemented by the public institutions needs to be credible enough and regarded as a solution for the corruption problems.

Figure 14.Credibility of the Recommendations in solving the corruption problems.



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

As the data in Figure 14 show, on average terms 60% and 10% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the recommendations forwarded consequent to the evaluations are credible enough to be regarded as solution. On the other end 6% and 3% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 21% are indifferent with a response “Neither agree nor disagree”.

Hence, the data show that the majority (70%) of the respondents believe that the recommendations forwarded as the result of the evaluations are credible enough to be regarded as solution.

5.4.7. The ability of business process evaluations to uncover real problems in public procurement processes

The statement forwarded to respondents reads as “***The evaluation activities focus on pertinent issues and go deeper into the real problems***”. The deeper the evaluation goes the better the outcome and problem solving capacity the report of the evaluation would possess. Thus it was pertinent to the perceptions of respondents in this regard. The perceptions of respondents in this regard looks like the following.

Figure 15.The ability of business process evaluations to uncover real problems of corruption in public procurement procedures



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

Based on the data in Figure 15, on average terms 46% and 3% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the process evaluation activities focus on pertinent issues and go deeper into the real problems. On the other end 18% and 3% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 31% are indifferent with a response “Neither agree nor disagree”.

Accordingly, the data in Figure 15 show that a greater percentage (49%) of respondents, than those in the neutral or in the disagreeing and in the strongly disagreeing category, believe that the process evaluation activities focus on pertinent issues and go deeper in to the real problems.

5.4.8. Objectivity and workability of the recommendations of the FEACC.

The study forwarded a statement that reads as “***the recommendations of the process reviews forwarded by the FEACC are not objective and not workable*”.** Any recommendation that is needed to solve a problem needs to be objective and workable; otherwise all the effort exerted to find the problem becomes wasted with the baseless and misguided recommendations.

Figure 16.Objectivity and workability of the Recommendations of FEACC.



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

As the data in Figure 16 show, on average terms 6% and 0% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the recommendations of the process reviews forwarded by the FEACC are not objective and not workable. On the other end 44% and 14% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 36% are indifferent with a response “Neither agree nor disagree”.

Accordingly, the data in Figure 16show that the majority (58%) of the respondents do not believe that the recommendations of the process reviews forwarded by the FEACC are not objective and not workable, which in turn means that the recommendations forwarded by the FEACC are objective and workable.

5.5. The contribution of procurement process evaluation work by the FEACC to prevent corruption

5.5.1. Decrease in the number of irregularities after corruption prevention works by FEACC

The testing statement on this issue says “***After procurement process evaluation, procurement became less susceptible to irregularities*”.** One of the key reasons that process evaluations are performed is to ensure consistent implementation of rules and regulations as well as reduce susceptibility of the process of procurement to irregularities and corruption.

Figure 17.Public procurement is less susceptible irregularities after process evaluations



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The data in Figure 17 show on average terms 40% and 4% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that after procurement process evaluation, procurement became less susceptible to irregularities. On the other end 24% and 3% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 29% are indifferent with a response “Neither agree nor disagree”.

Accordingly, the data in Figure 17 show that a greater percentage (44%) of respondents, than those in the neutral or in the disagreeing and in the strongly disagreeing category believe that after procurement process evaluations, procurement became less susceptible to irregularities while 27% of respondents disagree with the statement. 29% of respondents are in different to the statement.
This means that the vulnerability to irregularities has reduced.

5.5.2. The state of observation of rules and regulations pertinent to procurement processes after procurement process evaluation works

The study forwarded the following statement, “***After procurement process evaluation, procurement rules and regulations on procurement are being observed*”.** The other key reason why procurement process evaluations are performed is to encourage and assist the observation of procurement rules and regulations while undertaking procurement activity.

Table19. The **state of observation of rules and regulations pertinent to procurement processes after procurement process evaluation works**.

Sr. No	Response	FEACC	Public Institutions	Suppliers	Average
1	Strongly agree	----	11.40%	16.70%	9%
2	Agree	50%	54.30%	58.30%	54%
3	Neither agree nor disagree	25%	25.70%	---	17%
4	disagree	25%	8.60%	16.70%	17%
5	strongly disagree	--	--	8.30%	3%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The analysis of the data in Table 19 was made by triangulating the responses from the FEACC, sampled public institutions and private sector suppliers to balance the effect of bias and get weighted information. On average terms 54 % and 9 % of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that after procurement process evaluations, procurement rules and regulations on procurement are being better observed. On the other end 17% and 3% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 17% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

Accordingly, the data in Table 19show that majority(63%) of the respondents believe that after procurement process evaluation, procurement rules and regulations on procurement are being observed.

Hence, all the three parties drawn from different stakeholder agree that the process evaluations that were undertaken by the FEACC did bring change in the observation and adherence, on the part of public procurers, to the procurement rules and regulations.

5.5.3. The state of earlier corrupt practices in public procurement after preventive procurement business process evaluation works were done.

The respondents were asked to respond to the idea stated as ***"After procurement process evaluation, earlier problems that were being manifested in the procurement process are eliminated".*** The other key reason that process evaluations are performed is to eliminate the problems that were being manifested in the procurement process.

Table20.Elimination of earlier problems after procurement process evaluation.

Sr. No	Response	FEACC	Public Institutions	Suppliers	Average
1	Strongly agree	--	5.70%	--	2%
2	Agree	17%	34.30%	63.60%	38%
3	Neither agree nor disagree	42%	40%	9.10%	30%
4	disagree	42%	14.30%	18.20%	25%
5	strongly disagree	--	5.70%	9.10%	5%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The analysis of the data in Table 20 was made through the triangulation of responses from FEACC, sampled public institutions and private sector suppliers to balance the effect of bias and get weighted information. On average terms 38 % and 2 % of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that after procurement process evaluation, earlier problems that were being manifested in the procurement process are eliminated. On the other end 25% and 5% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 30% are indifferent with a response “Neither agree nor disagree”.

Accordingly, the data in Table 20 show a greater percentage (40%) of respondents, than those in the neutral or in the disagreeing and in the strongly disagreeing category, believe that after procurement process evaluation, earlier problems that were being manifested in the procurement process are eliminated.

Hence, this shows that the process evaluations that were undertaken by the FEACC do have an impact in eliminating earlier problems that were manifested in the procurement process.

5.5.4. Decrease in the number of complaints on procurement after procurement process evaluations were carried out.

The respondents were asked to respond to the idea stated as “***procurement related complaints have decreased in number after the business process evaluations were carried out in the public institutions*****”**. The other key reason that process evaluations are performed is to reduce the procurement related complaints in the procurement process.

Table21. Decrease in the number of complaints

Sr. No	Response	FEACC	Public Institutions	Suppliers	Average
1	Strongly agree		2.80%	8.30%	4%
2	Agree	33%	41.70%	41.70%	39%
3	Neither agree nor disagree	17%	25%	33.30%	25%
4	disagree	50%	27.80%	16.70%	32%
5	strongly disagree		2.80%		1%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The analysis of the data in Table 21 was made through the triangulation of responses from FEACC, sampled public institutions and private sector suppliers to balance the effect of bias and get weighted information. On average terms 39% and 4% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that procurement related complaints have decreased in number after the business process evaluations were carried out in the public institution. On the other end 32 % and 1% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 25% are indifferent with a response “Neither agree nor disagree”. But the Board’s complaints register show an increase.

Accordingly, data in Table 21shows that a greater percentage of 43% of respondents, than those in the neutral or in the disagreeing and in the strongly disagreeing category, believe that procurement related complaints have decreased in number after the business process evaluations were carried out in the public institution.

Hence, the perception of the majority of the three groups of respondents is; the process evaluations that were undertaken by the FEACC do have an impact on reducing the number of complaints in the procurement process.

5.5.5. The increment of value for money in public procurements after procurement process evaluations by the FEACC

The testing statement on this issue runs as "***Better goods and service are being obtained for the money spent on procurement***". The other key reason that process evaluations are performed is to increase the procurement of better goods and services for the money spent, which in turn brings value for money for the procuring entity and wisely utilizing the limited resources availed to the public institutions.

Table22.Improvement of value for money in procurement process

Sr. No	Response	FEACC	Public Institutions	Suppliers	Average
1	Strongly agree			16.70%	6%
2	Agree	25%	41.70%	25.00%	31%
3	Neither agree nor disagree	42%	27.80%	41.70%	37%
4	Disagree	33%	19.40%	8.30%	20%
5	Strongly disagree		11.10%	8.30%	6%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The analysis of the data in Table 22 was made through the triangulation of responses from FEACC, sampled public institutions and private sector suppliers to balance the effect of bias and get weighted information. On average terms the data show that 37% of the respondents believe that the process evaluations are helping obtain better goods and services for the money spent on procurement while, similar size, 37% of the respondents are indifferent on the ability of the process evaluation work in bringing better value for money spent on procurement. The remaining 26% disagree with the statement.

Hence, in relative terms more respondents agree that process evaluations and corrective recommendations are helping obtain better goods, services and works.

5.5.6. The decrease in the number of reports on corruption and improprieties after corruption prevention evaluation works.

The respondents were asked to respond to the idea stated as **"*Reports on corruption and improprieties on procurement are no more there after the business process evaluation*".** The other key reason that process evaluations are performed is to reduce the procurement related complaints in the procurement process.

Table 23. Decrease in the number of reports on corruption and improprieties after corruption prevention evaluation works.

Sr. No	Response	FEACC	Public Institutions	Suppliers	Average
1	Strongly agree				0%
2	Agree	25%	11.10%	33.30%	23%
3	Neither agree nor disagree	17%	50%	25%	31%
4	Disagree	58%	33.30%	33.30%	42%
5	strongly disagree		5.60%	8.30%	5%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The analysis of the data in Table 23 was made through the triangulation of responses from FEACC, sampled public institutions and private sector suppliers to balance the effect of bias and get weighted information. On average terms the data show that a greater percentage (47%)of respondents, than those in the neutral or in the disagreeing and in the strongly disagreeing category, believe that reports on corruption and improprieties on procurement are still there even after the procurement process evaluation. The remaining 31% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

Hence, a greater percentile of respondents agree that the process evaluations that are undertaken by the FEACC do have an impact but it did not eliminate the report on corruption and improprieties on procurement.

5.6. The state of the acceptance of the works of FEACC by public institutions

5.6.1. The relevance and acceptability of the outcomes of evaluation works to prevent corruption in procurement.

The study forwarded a question stated as "***The outcomes of business process evaluations by FEACC are relevant and useful to prevent corruption in procurement***". The relevance and acceptance of the works of FEACC carried out in public institutions can be measured through the level of the implementation of the recommendations of the outcomes of the evaluation works to prevent corruption in procurement in the public institution.

Figure18.Outcomes of Evaluations works are relevant to prevent corruption



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The data in Figure 18 show that on average terms 47% and 19 % of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the outcomes of business process evaluations by FEACC are relevant and useful to prevent corruption in procurement. On the other end 6% and 0% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 28% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree"

Accordingly, the data in Figure 18show that majority (66%)of the respondents believe that the outcomes of business process evaluations by FEACC are relevant and useful to prevent corruption in procurement.

5.6.2. As to where should the responsibility of corruption prevention be placed.

The respondents were asked to respond to the idea stated as "***The right place for procurement business process evaluation to be undertaken is by the public institutions themselves***". The corruption prevention work can be undertaken either by institutions like the FEACC by one center, or by the public institutions themselves through decentralized approach.

Figure 19.**As to where should the responsibility of corruption prevention be placed.**



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

On average terms 62% and 11% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the right place for procurement business process evaluation to be undertaken is in the public institutions themselves. On the other end 10 % and 4% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 13% are indifferent with a response “Neither agree nor disagree”.

Accordingly, the data in Figure 19 show that the majority (73%) of the respondents believe that the right place for procurement business process evaluation to be undertaken is in the public institutions themselves.
Further on this issue, key informants that were interviewed by the researcher(Annex.1)suggest that it is beneficial to let public institutions undertake such evaluation studies by themselves. However, these key informants have also reiterated and emphasized that the involvement of the FEACC in corruption prevention in public institutions has several benefits such as it creates an atmosphere of obedience on the part of the executives of the public institutions and on the other hand it gives confidence and energy on the part of those people that carryout the corruption preventive work. They also said that the FEACC should directly participate in major preventive works; and even carry out some major preventive works by itself. And, furthermore the FEACC should constantly build the in-house capacity of public institutions and keep the staff members that carryout the preventive work refreshed.

5.6.3. Whether or not recommendations of the FEACC are fully implemented by Public institutions

The testing statement on this issue runs as **“*The recommendations are duly implemented by the public institutions whose procurement processes we reevaluated*”.** The relevance and efficacy of the evaluation of procurement business process of public institutions, by the FEACC, is manifested through the implementations of the recommendations of the preventive work by the public institutions concerned. Hence it is pertinent to find out whether the recommendations are getting the chance of being implemented in public institutions concerned. Figures20.Recommendations are duly implemented by the public institutions

Figures20. Recommendations are duly implemented by the public institutions



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The data in Figure 20 show, on average terms that 54% and 1% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the recommendations are duly implemented by the public institutions whose procurement processes were evaluated. On the other end 14% and 1% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 30% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

Accordingly, the data in Figure 20 show that majority (55%) of the respondents believe that the recommendations are duly implemented by the public institutions whose procurement processes were evaluated.

5.6.4. The level of support that the evaluating team from the FEACC is getting from the staff of institutions being evaluated to bring success

The testing statement on this issue runs as "***To make the process evaluation a success, offering l support to the evaluators by the staff of respective institutions is important*****".** As the experts from the FEACC assigned to undertake the business process evaluation activity are not the employee of the institution whose process is being evaluated, it is believed that there must be an overall support extended to the experts so as to facilitate the evaluation task and for its timely and proper completion. Therefore to test whether or not the process evaluation team was provided with the right support from the institutions is important because any review that is not based on the relevant and adequate impute cannot be expected to bring about the intended success down the road.

Figure 21.The level of support that the evaluating team from the FEACC is getting from the staff of institutions being evaluated



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The data in Figure 21 show on average terms that61% and 32% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the necessary relevant support was provided by the public institutions concerned while its procurement process evaluation was conducted by experts from the FEACC. On the other end 6% and 0% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 1% are indifferent with a response “Neither agree nor disagree”.

Accordingly, the majority (93%) of respondents believe that to make the process evaluation a success, extending relevant support to the evaluator by the staff of respective institution is important; and same was provided.

5.6.5. The level of recognition given to the reviews, findings and recommendations of process evaluations

The respondents were asked to respond to the idea stated as ***"Staff of the public institutions evaluated recognizes the review, its findings and recommendation(s) as valuable".*** It is an important first step to recognize and accept the reviews, findings and recommendations of the commission as valuable for public institutions before implementation and get the benefits there from. Therefore this attitude was tested through the above stated question.

Figure 22. Recognition is given to the reviews, findings and recommendations of process evaluations.



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

According to the data in Figure 22,on average terms 69% and 8% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the recommendations are accepted by the public institutions whose procurement processes were evaluated. On the other end 4% and 0% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 18% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

Accordingly, the data show majority (77%) of the respondents believe that staff of public institutions evaluated recognize the review, its findings and recommendations as valuable. Hence, if the respondents that participated in the study recognize the works of FEACC as valuable, it shows the efficacy of the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC.

5.7. Acceptance level of the problems identified and solutions proposed by Public Institutions

5.7.1. Support given by the leaders of public institutions for corruption prevention works

The respondents were asked to respond to the idea stated as ***"Leaders of the public institutions concerned provide support for the business process evaluation"***. Leaders of the public institutions are mandated with the implementation of the vision, mission and objective of their institutions besides other roles and responsibilities given to them by the laws and regulations relevant to their institutions. The supports given by the leaders of the public institutions play vital role in the success and failure of the business process evaluation work in identifying the problems as well as proposing solutions. And therefore a test had to be made to know the reality.

Figure 23.Support from leaders of public institutions for the process evaluation works



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The data in Figure 23 show on average terms 37% and 10 % of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) with the statement. On the other end 15% and 0% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 38% are indifferent with a response “Neither agree nor disagree”.

Accordingly, the data in Figure 23 shows that a greater percentage (47%) of respondents, than those in the neutral or in the disagreeing and in the strongly disagreeing category, believe that leaders of the public institutions concerned provide support for business process evaluations while 15% of respondents disagree with the statement. And 38% of respondents are undecided. Thus among those who took a stand a greater percentage of respondents believe that leaders of public institutions provide support for business process evaluations.

Hence, the problems identified and the solutions proposed by the FEACC do have a considerable level of acceptance from the leaders of public institutions and a better chance of being implemented.

5.7.2. Regard given to the findings and recommendations of preventive procurement business evaluations by the leaders of public institutions as relevant to minimize the number of corruption incidents.

The testing statement on this issue runs as ***“The problems identified and solutions proposed are regarded relevant for the improvement of their procurement by the public institutions concerned”***. Believing the problems identified and solutions proposed bring about improvement helps in accepting the works of the FEACC as well as recognizing and appreciating the efficacy it has in the corruption prevention works.

Figure 24.Problems identified and solutions proposed are regarded as relevant by the Institutions



	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor dis agree	dis agree	strongly disagree
FEACC	8%	75%	8%	8%	
Public Institutions	22%	56%	17%	6%	
Average	15%	65%	13%	7%	0%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

Figure 24 shows that on average terms 65% and 15% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the recommendations are duly implemented by the public institutions whose procurement processes were evaluated. On the other end 7% and 0% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 13% are indifferent with a response “Neither agree nor disagree”.

Accordingly, the data in Figure 24 show that80%of the respondents believe that the problems identified and solutions proposed are regarded relevant for the improvement of their procurement process by the public institutions concerned.

Thus if institutions regard the problems identified and the solutions proposed by the FEACC positively and consider it relevant then the evaluation works will have a better chance of bringing success in the corruption prevention works.

5.7.3. Corruption prevention works of FEACC in public procurement and the desired result

The statement paused to respondents runs as ***"The work done by the Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption commission to prevent corruption in public procurement process is bringing about the desired result"***. The efficacy and the relevance of the work that the FEACC is undertaking in the prevention of corruption in public procurement can be measured through the perception in the general public that the corruption prevention works are bringing the desired result.

Figure 25.The corruption prevention work and the desired result.



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The data in Figure 25 show that on average terms38% and 8% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the work done by the FEACC to prevent corruption in public procurement is bringing about the desired result. On the other end 17% and 4% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 32% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

Accordingly, the data in Figure 25 show that a greater percentage (46%) of respondents, than those in the neutral or in the disagreeing category believe that the work done by the FEACC to prevent corruption in public procurement is bringing about the desired result, while 21% disagree and 32% is indifferent.

This tells that a little shy to 50% of the respondents believe that the procurement process evaluations by the FEACC are bringing about the desired result.

5.7.4. On the level of change that is felt, in the reduction of procurement related corruption after corruption prevention works by the FEACC.

The testing statement on this issue runs as ***"The FEACC's recommendations and proposed system changes are not helping prevent corruption in public procurement bringing about the intended outcome"***. If the recommendations and system changes are not helping prevent corruption, then the relevance/ efficacy of the FEACC's work in corruption prevention will be a waste of time and resource. Hence it was pertinent to gauge the perception of the public with regard to this issue and to this end data was collected.

Figure 26.Preventive procurement process evaluations and the desired outcome



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires)

The data in Figure 26 show that, on average terms 8 % and 1% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the FEACC's recommendations and proposed system changes are not helping prevent corruption in public procurement. On the other end 51% and 19% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 19% are indifferent with a response “Neither agree nor disagree”.

Accordingly, the data in Figure 26 show that majority (70%) of the respondents disagree with the statement that say that the FEACC’s recommendations and proposed system changes are not helping prevent corruption in public procurement and bringing about the intended outcome.

Hence, the majority believes that the corruption prevention strategy of FEACC is bringing the desired outcomes and is moving in the right direction.

5.8. The level of collaborative support extended to the works of the FEACC by other pertinent government offices

Some facts on the commitment of the federal government in budget allocation to the anti-corruption endeavor

On the issue of empowering the FEACC, in terms of resources, the data in Table 24, shows that the government committed, for the period covered in the data, on average, about 0.00026% of its federal budget for the anti-corruption effort of the federal government(i.e; to the FEACC).

Table24.The size of the budget of the FEACC from the coffer of the Federal Government in the last five consecutive years.

Budget year	Total budget of the Federal Government for the years, in birr.	The budget allocated to the FEACC for the years, in birr.	FEACC's share from the total federal budget in percentile (%).
2014/15.	178,565,906,571	46,449,460	0.00026
2013/14.	154,903,290,899	39,994,790	0.00026
2012/13.	137,836,047,105	37,891,290	0.00027
2011/12.	117,812,640,055	34,893,600	0.00030
2010/11.	77,227,982,827	19,898,700	0.00026

(Source: Author's calculation based other data from Federal Budget Proclamations no. 687/2010, 719/2011, 766/2012, 806/2013, and 862/2014 (the FedralNegaritGazet).

Table 25.Macro-Economic Indicators: Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda

Country	Country's Population	Country's Gross Domestic Product (purchasing power parity)	The budget allocated to the anti-corruption efforts in the nation	Expenditure as % of GDP
Ethiopia	88,013,491	$77.47 billion	$2.2 million(including the budget of the seven regional states commissions' budget)	0.003
Kenya	39,002,772	$62.56 billion	$24.6 million	0.04
Uganda	33,398,682	$43. 22 billion	$9 million	0.02

(Source: Adapted from ArsemaTamyalew, 2010 : 34).

The data in Table 25, further, show that the anti-corruption effort in Ethiopia is, by far, the least funded one as compared to the budgetary commitment demonstrated by governments in neighboring African countries.

In view of the expansion of Ethiopia's economy, the prevailing bad governance, the ever increasing prevalence of rent seeking and corruption(see Tables 2, 3, 4, 8, and 16), the amount of resource assigned to the anti-corruption effort is not up to the state of corruption in the country and the serious challenges it has already paused.

5.8.1. The support provided by the government

The support that could be expected from the prime minister's office can be seen in two different ways where the first is through putting pressure on public appointees with regard to the implementation of the recommendations forwarded by FEACC and the second is by supporting the law enforcement bodies in holding accountable the leaders of the public institutions when there is a wrong doing.

5.8.1.1. The support from the Office of Prime Minister's for the implementation of the recommendations

The testing statement on this issue runs as **"*The office of the Prime Minister or/and the Public Enterprises Supervising Agency tell executives of public institutions to implement the recommendations of business process reviews*".** Such kinds of supports are critical impute for the recognition and for the enhancement of the implementation of the recommendations of the business process reviews and have a deterrence effect in the future; since it shows that the government has a strong stance in fighting corruption and corrupt behaviors. This was also tested through questionnaires in the study.

Figure 27.The office of the Prime Minister sanctions the implementations of recommendations.



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The data in Figure 27 show that, on average terms 24% and 1% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the office of the Prime Minister or/and the Public Enterprises Supervising Agency instruct executives of public institutions to implement the recommendations of business process reviews carried out by the FEACC. On the other end 17 % and 3% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining majority of respondents (56%) are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

Accordingly, the data in Figure 27 show that the majority (56%) of the respondents neither agree nor disagree with the statement that the office of the Prime Minister or the Public Enterprises Supervising Agency instruct executives of public institutions to implement the recommendations of business process reviews. Such figure and scenario shows the majority of respondents are not convinced that the recommendations of the evaluations have government support.

5.8.1.2. Office of Prime Minister holds officials accountable for their actions

The study forwarded a statement that says "***The office of the Prime Minister or/and the Public Enterprises Supervising Agency made appointees be held accountable for the violations of law relevant to procurement***". Accountability is a scenario where officials and public servants are questioned and judged for their official behavior; that is for the actions they took and decisions they made. In places where there is such a system that makes people account for their behaviors corruptors are discouraged and corruption gets reduced; and thereby, contributes for corruption prevention. In view of this, the study deployed efforts to collect data to verify the idea of making public officials accountable for their behaviors.

Table26.Support from the prime minister's office to hold the public appointees accountable

S. No	Response	FEACC	Public Institutions	Suppliers	Average
1	Strongly agree		2.80%	18.20%	7%
2	Agree	33%	38.90%	18.20%	30%
3	Neither agree nor disagree	33%	38.90%	18.20%	30%
4	disagree	33%	11.10%	45.50%	30%
5	strongly disagree		8.30%		3%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The analysis of the data collected to this end was made through the triangulation of responses from the FEACC, sampled public institutions and private sector suppliers to balance the effect of bias and get weighted information as is displayed in Table 26. On average terms 30% and 7% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the office of the prime minister and Public Enterprises Supervising Agency make officials with corrupt misconduct be held accountable. On the other end 30% and 3% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 30% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

Hence, the data in Table 26 show that 37% of the respondents believe that the office of the prime minister or/and the public enterprises supervising agency made appointees be held accountable for the violations of laws relevant to procurement. While 33% of the respondents do not believe that such accountability is there at all in practice.

Accordingly, even though in relative terms the data shows that 37% of respondents believe that the prime minister's office or the Supervising Authority for Public Enterprises hold public officials accountable for their deeds in relative terms; the data also shows there is an equal and opposite quartet that believes the government is not, in this regard, discharging its legal responsibility. Including the neutrals, a total of 63% of respondents are not convinced that the government holds executives accountable for their abusive behavior.

Most of the key informants during the interview session stated that they do not remember to have heard or seen that any high ranking official was referred by the government of the FDRE to law enforcing agencies to be held accountable (Annex 1).

5.8.2. The timeliness of the audit works and reports undertaken by the Office of the Federal Auditor General

The respondents were asked to respond to the idea stated as "***The Office of federal Auditor General has audits and reports on procurement related complaints at the right time***". The timeliness of the audit helps to make necessary inquiries in to the complaints of procurement related issues and make adjustments and take corrective measure to the issues as well as report the incidents of corrupt practices to the HofPR's and the FEACC.

Table27. The OFAG audits and reports on procurement related complaints at the right time

Sr. No	Response	FEACC	Public Institutions	Suppliers	Average
1	Strongly agree		5.90%	8.30%	5%
2	Agree	11%	23.50%	33.30%	23%
3	Neither agree nor disagree	78%	38.20%	41.70%	53%
4	disagree	11%	23.50%	8.30%	14%
5	strongly disagree		8.80%	8.30%	6%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The data in Table 27was analyzed through the triangulation of responses from FEACC, sampled public institutions and private sector suppliers to balance the effect of bias and get weighted information.

On average terms 23% and 5% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the OFAG performs audit and reports same to pertinent government offices at the right time. On the other end 14% and 6% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 53% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

Accordingly, the data in Table 27 show that the majority (53%) of the respondents are indifferent to the statement that the OFAG performs audit and reports same to pertinent government offices on the performance of procuring public institutions at the right time.

5.8.3. The support from the House of Peoples Representatives of FDRE.

The respondents were asked to respond to the idea stated as "***The House of Peoples' Representatives of the FDR of Ethiopia holds officials of public institutions and refer them for investigations that are reported against by the OFAG***". The HofPR'sof the FDRE has standing committees that are delegated to supervise the performance and financial health of public institutions that includes performing surprise visits at the work places of the public institutions. Furthermore, the reports that it gets from the OFAG are there to facilitate the discharging of its responsibilities in holding officials, inter-alia the Prime Minister, with corrupt misconduct accountable. To verify this, sets of data were collected from different sources.

Table 28.The support from the House of Peoples Representatives of FDRE

Sr. No	Response	FEACC	Public Institutions	Suppliers	Average
1	Strongly agree		2.90%		1%
2	Agree	45%	25.70%	25%	32%
3	Neither agree nor disagree	36%	48.60%	41.70%	42%
4	disagree	18%	8.60%	16.70%	14%
5	strongly disagree		14.30%	16.70%	10%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The analysis of the data(in Table 28) were made through the triangulation of responses from FEACC, sampled public institutions and private sector suppliers to balance the effect of bias and get weighted information. On average terms 32% and 1%of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the HofPR'sof the FDRE holds officials of public institutions and refer them for investigation that are reported against by the OFAG. On the other end 14% and 10% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 42% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

Accordingly, the data in Table 28 show that a greater percentage (42%) of respondents, than those in the agreeing or in the disagreeing category are not convinced that the HofPR's takes measure against officials for their misconduct as a reaction to the reports from the FEACC. Thus, the HofPR's action to hold public officials as per the audit of the OFAG is not up to the expectations of the 42% of respondents.

Most of the key informants during the interview session stated that they do not remember to have heard or seen that any high ranking official was referred by the HofPR's of the FDRE to law enforcing agencies to be held accountable (See Annex

1).The size of those that agree or those who disagree is less than the size of those that are indifferent on the issue.

5.8.4. The support from Public procurement and Property Administration Office

The testing statement on this issue runs as "***The Public procurement and property Administration agency holds officials of public institutions and referred them for investigations that are reported against by FEACC and the OFAG***". The PPPA is the primary institution in the administration of procurements and properties in Ethiopia. It is mandated with various tasks related with procurement, among which the maintenance of clean public procurement system is one.

Table 29.ThePPPA recommends executives to be held accountable

Sr. No	Response	FEACC	Public Institutions	Suppliers	Average
1	Strongly agree		5.90%	8.30%	5%
2	Agree	10%	26.50%	33.30%	23%
3	Neither agree nor disagree	80%	38.20%	33.30%	51%
4	disagree	10%	11.80%	16.70%	13%
5	strongly disagree		17.60%	8.30%	9%

(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The analysis of the data in Table 29 was made through the triangulation of responses from FEACC, sampled public institutions and private sector suppliers to balance the effect of bias and get weighted information. On average terms 23% and 5% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the PPPA holds officials of public institutions and refer them for investigation that are reported against by the FEACC and the OFAG. On the other end 13% and 9% of the respondents disagree and strongly disagree with the same statement. The remaining 51% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

Thus, the PPPA's action to hold public officials accountable based on the reports of the FEACC and OFAG is not up to the expectations of the more than half (51%) of the respondents in the study.

Here, too, most of the key informants during the interview session stated that they do not remember to have heard or seen that any high ranking official was referred by the PPPA to law enforcing agencies to be held accountable (Annex 1).

5.8.5. The support from Ethics Liaison Officers of the respective public Institutions

The testing statement on this issue runs as "***The Ethics liaison officer collaborates in the review and facilitates the implementation of the recommendations***". The Ethics liaison office is organized to support the leaders of public institutions to promote Ethics and prevent and combat corrupt practices in their respective organizations. They are directly accountable to the leaders of their respective public institutions and also report to the FEACC on matters that relate to serious misconduct and corruption (Regulation No. 144/2007).

Thus the support that can be obtained from the office of the Ethics Liaison Officers of public institutions has immense impact in the fight against corruption since they are one of the front runners in the quest to defeat corruption in the Ethiopian Public Service. Therefore, data was collected on this matter from respondents in this study.

Figure 28.Ethics Liaison officers collaborate with the process evaluation works



(Source: Authors calculation from the data gathered through questionnaires).

The data in Figure 28 show that on average terms 47% and 10% of the participants agree and strongly agree (respectively) that the Ethics Liaison Officers collaborates in the review and facilitates the implementation of the recommendations. On the other end 13and 0% of the respondents disagrees and strongly disagrees with the same statement. The remaining 31% are indifferent with a response "Neither agree nor disagree".

According to the data in Figure 28 the majority (57%) of the respondents believe that the Ethics Liaison Officers collaborate in the review and facilitates the implementation of the recommendations. Hence such collaborative support from the Ethics Liaison Officers helps the FEACC's corruption prevention works to meet the desired objectives.

5.9. Findings of the study

5.9.1. Corruption as a problem in public procurement in Ethiopia

a. Key informants state that preparation of the technical specification of goods, services and works, the criteria for eligibility to take part in the bids, technical evaluation of bids , bid award and contract administration are phases more prone to corruption in public procurement.
b. Suppliers do not enjoy equal opportunity in public procurement process, which is proof for the existence of vulnerability to corruption.

c. Generally, the procurement process is not believed to be run through corrupt procedures, however the value obtained from the money spent on procurement is low.
d. Most of the respondents from private companies believe that extending favor and recognizing one's support is a norm accepted in procurement process.

5.9.2. Explaining the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC, examine its implementation process and procedures, and identify gaps, if any, in regard to best achieving the result intended

a. The experts of the FEACC properly familiarize themselves with the situation and get a workable knowledge, of the institutions whose business process they are going to evaluate.
b. Most respondents agree that the business process evaluation undertakings of the FEACC are led by clear and simple plan of action that is communicated and agreed upon between the FEACC and the public institution concerned.
c. Most respondents agree that the experts of the FEACC that perform the business process evaluations are professionally and technically competent to carryout successful business process evaluation.
d. Most respondents agree that the recommendations from the evaluations are credible enough to be regarded as solutions.
e. Most respondents agree that the process evaluation activities focus on pertinent issues and go deeper in to the real problems.
f. Most respondents agree that the recommendations forwarded by the FEACC are objective and workable.

5.9.3. Checking whether or not procurement business process evaluation contributes to prevent corruption in public procurement.

a. A greater percentage (that is less than 50%)of respondents than those in the neutral or in the disagreeing category believe that vulnerability to irregularities are reduced after procurement business processes were evaluated by the FEACC.

b. Majority of the respondents drawn from the three categories of stakeholders agree that the procurement business process evaluations that are undertaken by the FEACC did bring change in the behavior of procurers with regard to the observation and adherence of public procurement rules and regulations.
c. A greater percentage of respondents than those in the neutral or in the disagreeing category believe that the process evaluations that are undertaken by the FEACC do have an impact in eliminating earlier problems that were manifested in the procurement process.
d. A greater percentage of respondents drawn from the three categories of stake holders agree that the business process evaluations undertaken by the FEACC do have an impact on reducing the number of complaints in the procurement process. However, the complaint register of the complaint hearing board shows that there is a moderate increase in the number of complaints lodged with the board, which is partially explained, as key informants claim, by the increased volume of the national economy, public procurement and increase in the awareness of suppliers.
e. Respondents drawn from the three categories of stakeholders agree that the process evaluations undertaken by the FEACC do have impact on improving the obtain-ability of better goods and services for the money spent on procurement, but it does not secure majority.
f. Respondents drawn from the three categories of stakeholders agree that the process evaluations undertaken by the FEACC do have impact but it did not eliminate the reports on corruption and improprieties on public procurement.

5.9.4. On examining whether or not public institutions, whose procurement process are being evaluated by the FEACC, are collaborating in the process and committed to the implementation of the recommendations.

a. Majority of the respondents believe that the outcomes of business process evaluations by FEACC are relevant and useful to prevent corruption in procurement.

b. Majority of the respondents believe that the right place for procurement business process evaluation to be undertaken is by the public institutions themselves. Further on this issue, key informants that were interviewed by the study suggest that even though it is use full and important to let public institutions undertake such evaluation studies by themselves, they have also reiterated that the FEACC must play major role in supporting such studies as well as undertaking major prevention studies (the FEACC) itself.

c. Majority of the respondents believe that the recommendations forwarded by the FEACC are duly implemented by the public institutions whose procurement processes were evaluated.

d. Majority of the respondents believe that providing information and other support to the evaluators by the public institution whose process is being evaluated is valuable to make the process evaluation a success and support was provided in evaluations performed thus far.

e. Majority of the respondents believe that staff of the public institutions whose procurement business processes were evaluated recognize the review, its findings and recommendations as something use full and valuable; this also in turn show the efficacy of procurement business process evaluations by the FEACC.

5.9.5. On assessing whether or not the problems diagnosed and solutions recommended by the FEACC are regarded as appropriate by the public institutions whose procurement process were evaluated.

a. A greater percentage of respondents than those in the neutral or in the disagreeing category believe that leaders of the public institutions concerned provide support for the business process evaluation.
b. Majority of the respondents believe that the problems identified and solutions proposed by the FEACC are regarded relevant, by the public institutions concerned, for the improvement of their procurement process.
c. A greater percentage of respondents than those in the neutral or in the disagreeing category believe that the works done by the FEACC to prevent corruption in public procurement are bringing about the desired result.
d. Majority of the respondents believe that the corruption prevention works of FEACC are bringing the desired outcomes and is moving in the right direction.

5.9.6. Whether or not there are relevant parties that are not playing their part in preventing corruption in public procurement.

a. A study shows that the FEACC is the least funded anti-corruption agency among its African neighbors. Furthermore, FEACC's share from the budget of the Federal Government, each year, from 2010/11 through 2014/15(inclusive), on average, is about 0.00026% (Tables 24 % 25).
b. Majority of the respondents neither agree nor disagree with the statement that the office of the Prime Minister or/and the Public Enterprises Supervising Agency instruct executives of public institutions to implement the recommendations of business process reviews by the FEACC. Therefore, so long as there is consensus on the existence of wide spread corruption in Ethiopia, the neutral position taken by the

majority of the respondents is nothing different or less than saying that the government's position on corruption is not serious.

c. A greater percentage of respondents than those in the neutral or in the disagreeing category believe that the office of the prime minister or/and the Public Enterprises Supervising Agency made appointees be held accountable for the violations of laws relevant to procurement. While 33% of the respondents do not believe that such accountability is there. Hence, even though in absolute terms the data shows that there is support to hold public officials accountable for their deeds in relative terms, the data also shows there is equal and opposite 33% that believes there is no enough support regarding the holding of public appointees accountable. Plus 30% is neutral.
d. The majority (53%) respondents neither agree nor disagree on the timeliness of the performance and financial audits carried out by the OFAG. As formal audit against the performance and the financial health of public institutions is a legally established procedure to be performed by the auditor general, the indifference taken by the majority of respondents is nothing less than saying proper and timely audit is not being carried out.
e. A greater percentage(42%) of respondents neither agree nor disagree on the fact that the HofPR'sof the FDRE holds officials of public institutions and refer them for investigation that are reported against by the OFAG. Thus, the House of people's representatives' action to hold the public officials as per the audit report of the OFAG is not up to the seriousness of corruption in Ethiopia.
f. A greater percentage of respondents neither agree nor disagree that the PPPA holds officials of public institutions and refer them for investigations that are reported against by the OFAG. Thus, the public procurement and property administration agency's action to hold the

public officials as per the reports of the OFAG is not up to the state of misconduct by public officials.

g. The majority of respondents in the study believe that the Ethics Liaison officers collaborate in the business process reviews and facilitate the implementation of the recommendations thereof. Hence such collaborative support from the Ethics Liaison officers helps the FEACC's corruption prevention works to meet the desired objectives. And also this supportive scenario needs to be exploited by the FEACC by capacitating these officers for more contribution in curbing corruption in their respective institutions.

5.10. Discussion of the findings

As studies from Shimelis Ayalew (2005), Tewodros Dawit (2009), Arsema Tamyalew (2010), Kilimanjaro International(2012), and Sebastian Cavegård (2016) show there is widespread and entrenched corruption in Ethiopia. The fact that the state is the owner and the vendor of the single most critical means of production, land, the greatest investor and procurer, and this is done through various ministries, public enterprises and other government entities have immensely contributed for the proliferation of corruption. The fact that 381 (in 2012/13) and 391(in 2013/14) tips-off came to the FEACC from Addis Ababa City Administration that involve land (the second highest was ERCA with 116 and 143 tips-off in the same years), (Annual Reports of the FEACC for the years 2012/13 and 2013/14), and repots of the OFAG that show land administration and public procurement have become the hubs of corruption justify that the monopoly of decision making power, on the countries resources, in the hands of the state is contributing for the proliferation of corruption. Although the developmental state path, which is the choice of the state in Ethiopia is the right choice for the country and have been delivering fairly in the hitherto development effort of the country, the blanket intervention approach in economic activities gave opportunities and accesses to the "thieves of the government" to loot unchecked. These facts tell that corruption is pausing a formidable challenge to the countries renaissance journey on which the working people and the poor have much at stake more than anybody or entity. The findings of this study also tell the same story.

The study shows that the corruption prevention activity of the FEACC is on the right track and has begun bringing changes in enhancing corruption intolerant public procurement system in the public bodies; and is more or less delivering the desired results.

The study also shows that this strategy has helped to save hundreds of millions of birr public money (Table 14 shows more than half a billion birr public money was saved from embezzlement in procurement alone in the last two years). It has also helped minimize irregularities in public procurement to some extent. However, some works of the Corruption Prevention Directorate of the FEACC show that there are still reports of procurement related irregularities in public procurement, for instance; in Sugar Corporation even after several assistances were provided to the Corporation by the FEACC. According to The Reporter vol.21 no.1674 nearly half of sugar projects are behind schedule in terms of time and payments effected to the contractors that are performing the jobs are over the amount of the jobs they have accomplished due to gross irregularities in the contracts entered into between the contractors and the Corporation.

The reason for this mainly lays with the gap in the implementation of the recommendations of the evaluations undertaken so far for want of proper sanction from pertinent public offices as it was heard from key informants in the study. Therefore it is high time that, side by side with deterrent measures, the government and the legislature put their weight behind the corruption strategy of the FEACC; let the walk overtake the rhetoric.

As the experience of countries, Botswana (2013), Tanzania(2013), South Korea, and New South Wales show; authors such as Hanna et al, (2011) , Vito Tanzi (1998), Bin Dong (2011), and Tewodros Dawit (2009) explain; key informants to the study tell and the experience of the SNNPRS Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (Hailemelekot et al (2007) do inform that corruption prevention strategy is one that pays of in fighting corruption . It is time for States men and other policy makers to learn from these local experiences and from abroad; and strengthen the prevention strategy in the fight against corruption.

Respondents in the study say that the FEACC has the professional competence and the skill to perform the right procurement process evaluations. However, earlier studies (Tewodros Dawit, 2009), the profiles and the size of the staff of the Corruption Prevention Directorate of the FEACC, and discussions with key informants do show that there are gaps to be filled, so as to make their endeavor to curb corruption in procurement more successful, both in size, knowledge and their collaborative skill in their dealings with procuring public institutions they are evaluating. Therefore, the capacity of the FEACC needs to be enhanced further to boost the level of the efficacy of its corruption prevention strategy.

Key informants in the study have emphasized the need for awareness creation among the people within and outside of public offices to tackle the scourge of corruption in public procurement. As the experience of Botswana (Chris Hankes, 2000), Tanzania (UNDP, 2013) tell the grass root anti-corruption movement of the wider public is the most reliable force in the fight against corruption. The experience of the SNNPRS' Women Anti-Corruption Movements (SNNPRS Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Annual Report, (2004), and Haile Melekot et al, (WB 2007), also show that empowered community based and civil society organizations are reliable and natural allies of anti-corruption movement. This is because the working people, the poor, the women and the young are the ultimate victims of corruption and consequently are strategic and natural allies of anti-corruption movements. These sections of the society have nothing to lose in fighting against corruption except the misery that corruption brings about to them while benefiting the elites of the ruling class and their networks. Other forms of coalitions of interests of the private sector and civil society are very good partners for anti-corruption endeavors (Pope, 1999, in Shimelis Ayalew, 2005:49).

Furthermore, if people do not recognize the activity they are witnessing or participating in as corrupt or at least as harmful, then they are not likely to react to it as such, and they are not likely to attempt to change the behavior (Independent Commission Against Corruption, 1994:13-14).

Therefore, informing / training / educating, organizing and mobilizing the wider public against corruption should be taken as an indispensable instrument in corruption prevention.

The state sanction being accorded to the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC is not as robust and un equivocal as the downward spiraling governance and the state of corruption in transition from transactional and isolated to systemic and more entrenched in state and non-state entities alike demands. Although an anti-corruption movement that depends solely on the goodwill of the state is vulnerable to betrayal, the sanction of the state for the anti-corruption effort has paramount leverage in its outcome. As a matter of fact, it is nearly impossible in developing countries to carryout effective anti-corruption struggle without support from the state. In the opinion of this researcher the renaissance mega project of Ethiopians to claim their earlier glory and appeasing corruption are exclusive to each other. If today's call from the broad masses of the people for unadulterated struggle against corruption is not met with the right response at the right time, one needs not to be a fortune teller to say that the call of the public may not stay limited to anti-corruption, it may it may transform into security and political problem, (Carnegie Endowment, 2014). Making the right decision before it is too late will make or break our great renaissance project, the march to our past glory.

For prevention is preferred to cure, the government should lend a hand to corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC to be implemented in each and every government office. As a new beginning is the only viable option when the status-quo is failing to tackle corruption, the government should begin to think out of the box of partisanship in the case of corruption and act against those members of the government who are corrupt themselves or are Godfathers of corruption networks.

The Legislature, as it should speak and act in the name and on behalf of the people and none other, should contemplate a new beginning, too. It should start instructing the government to hold public officials to account for their corrupt behaviors, or call for a vote of no confidence against corrupt members of the government.

With all possible nasty consequences at the start, beginning from the leading pack in the country is the one that has a lasting influence in the anti-corruption effort because first it will help to garner public trust and public support which is a critical impute to the struggle and second the challenges will be minimized as foot soldiers of corruption will be left without their generals. Realizing the Ethiopian dream, the renaissance project of Ethiopians, can only be achieved past the cross roads created by corruption and bad governance, the ball is in the court of the State.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION

Introduction.

The general objective of the study was to examine whether or not the evaluation of the procurement business processes of public institutions, which is one of the three major activities of the FEACC in its corruption prevention strategy, is helping to curb corruption in public procurement. To this end sample institutions were selected, respondents were identified and addressed for their perceptions and opinions. The data collected were processed, analyzed, interpreted and findings were sifted out. The summary and the conclusion of the research and the consequent recommendations are presented here in below.

6.1. Summary

The study shows that there is wide spread corruption in Ethiopia; and Public procurement is one type of government transaction that involves tens of billions of birr public money each year, and is very much tainted with corruption.

The phases in the procurement cycle that are more prone to corruption are the preparation of technical specifications, evaluation of bids for their technical offers, bid awarding and contract administration; i.e.; receiving the deliverables from suppliers and paying out the contract money to the suppliers.

The efforts of the FEACC, by way of evaluating the procurement business process of public institutions, is found to be useful, both potentially and in practical terms in curbing corruption in public procurement. Both leaders and employees alike seem to concur, as respondents to this study say, in the benefit of the business process evaluations by the FEACC, and on the importance of implementing the recommendations thereof.

Majority of key informants believe that lack of knowledge and skill both in the procuring and public procurement regulatory institutions as well as in the private sector (suppliers) is one cause weaker discharging of regulatory responsibilities and leads to the brewing of fertile ground for corrupt practices by making procurement vulnerable to corruption.

Majority of respondents believe in the need for and benefit of empowering and capacitating public institutions to carry out business process evaluations by themselves in their own public institutions. However, the respondents emphasized the need for building the executing capacity of public institutions by the FEACC and handling some bigger reviews together with the staff of public institutions concerned; and even at times carrying out some reviews by the FEACC itself.

On the other hand, on some questions the majority and on others a little shy of 50% of the respondents to the study are not convinced to say that the HofPR's, the Prime Minister's Office, and other pertinent government offices to public procurement are sanctioning the implementation of the recommendations of the business process evaluations conducted by the FEACC. Key informants to the study deferred to say that pertinent government power centers are employing the authority leverage at their disposal and discharging their legitimate responsibilities in combating corruption in public procurement; and are not sanctioning the implementation of the recommendations of the corruption prevention works of the FEACC.

6.2. Conclusion

Saying Public procurement in Ethiopia is susceptible to corruption would be understating the problem. Public procurement as a transaction in the public domain is very much tainted with corruption.

The phases in the procurement cycle that are more susceptible to corruption are the preparation of technical specifications, evaluation of bidders' technical offers , bid awarding and contract administration; i.e.; receiving the deliverables from bid winners and paying out the contract money to the suppliers.

The corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC manifested in the form of procurement business process evaluation of public institutions is contributing to curbing corruption in public procurement. In public institutions where their procurement business processes were evaluated, the study shows that, earlier irregularities are minimized, laws and regulations that govern public procurement are better observed and complaints are not increasing as was the case prior to the evaluations of the business process. The Urgent/Real time corruption prevention interventions by the FEACC are saving, as the study shows, hundreds of millions of birr public money from embezzlement each year.

The gaps in the size of staff, knowledge and skill, and the lack or the total absence of incentives to retain skilled and experienced professionals in government offices are unduly denting the level of the efficacy of the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC in public procurement.

The most detrimental gap that render the corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC less effective emanates, in the opinion of respondents and key informants in the study alike, from the inaction of pertinent public offices both in the legislature and the executive branch. The corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC left alone, for its implementation, without government sanction.

In general the following points conclude the findings of the study:

a. There is corruption and other misconducts in public procurement in Ethiopia.
b. The procurement business process evaluations carried out by the FEACC are led by proper procedures and there is no gap in the evaluation procedure.
c. Procurement business process evaluations of public institutions carried out by the FEACC are helping to prevent corruption in public procurement.

d. The findings, recommendations and system changes that the FEACC arrives at after the process of evaluating the procurement processes in public institutions are considered as relevant, implementable as well as beneficial to corruption prevention activities in public procurement.
e. The way the FEACC does its corruption prevention activities has been met with a positive response as it is on the right truck to bring about the necessary changes in bringing corruption intolerant public procurement system in the public bodies.
f. The support given by different government bodies is weak and needs further improvement to better enable the FEACC discharge its duties and responsibilities of combating corruption.

6.3. Recommendations

As the findings of the study stated in the preceding parts of this work show, the procurement business processes evaluation of public institutions, the leading major activity in the corruption prevention strategy, which is carried out by the FEACC, is contributing to curb corruption in public procurement. However, it is the conviction of the study that the strategy is not delivering to the fullest of its potential, as the findings of the study show the number of report on corruption is on the rise.

The major reasons for these are;

The first reason, as key informants to the study tell, is the low level of the executing capacity of staff in the procuring public institutions, public procurement supervising authorities and in the private sector engaged in supplying goods, services and works to public institutions.

Secondly, the fact that the procurement business process evaluations in every public institution of whatever nature, are being carried out by the FEACC from one center also have detrimental effect in the efficacy of the procurement process evaluation strategy. This is nothing less than disregarding the physical, logistical, manpower and lots of other resource limitations that are naturally there in every institution and especially in the FEACC(Tewodros Dawit,2009).

However, the weakest link and the determining factor, in this regard, is the deficit in action on the part of the legislature and the government to do and provide everything that meaning full anti-corruption struggle takes.

Therefore, the study recommends the following:

1. For prevention is preferred to cure, the government should lend a hand to corruption prevention strategy of the FEACC to be implemented in each and every government office, should begin to think out of the usual box of partisanship in the case of corruption and act against those members of the government who are corrupt themselves or are Godfathers of corruption networks.
2. The Legislature should start instructing the government to hold public officials to account for their corrupt behaviors, or call for a vote of no confidence against corrupt members of the government.
3. The corruption prevention strategy needs to be decentralized. The FEACC should walk on two major tracks in this regard. That is, building the capacity of public institutions so as to enable them to fend off corruption from their institutions mostly by themselves; and the FEACC carry out major preventive activities directly by itself,
4. Every public institution has capacity in IT. Therefore, all aspects of every tender such as the estimate of the total value, specifications, and time factors can be floated online, in the open, so that stakeholders can access information which will ultimately help minimize corruption in public procurement.

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5. The National Anti-Corruption Coalition (NACC) does have an immense potential to organize and mobilize the wider public, who is the ultimate victim of corruption, against the scourge of corruption. Therefore, to tap this potential of the NACC fully it needs to be empowered and begin managing and leading itself with the close assistance of the FEACC and without any interference from any other state entity. It could be the single most powerful pressure group, on the issue of tackling corruption, against every actor in the state and private domain. So far it is there as a national integrity system but the space and the empowerment it enjoys is nearly nothing.

6. Ongoing initiatives for the dissemination ethics education among the younger generation need to strengthened starting right from the early school days with closer participation and supervision of the FEACC should be undertaken. It is high time for the curriculum on Ethics Education to be amended.

7. Exemption from the binding rules of procurement need to be scraped off from the procurement legal regime; as key informants say such an exemption rule is there in most cases to be abused by influential individuals.

8. Robust dissemination of ethics education need to target the young at their early age in school.

9. Regulatory government authorities such as the PPPA should focus, in their supervisory undertakings, strictly on those phases in the procurement cycle that are most susceptible to corruption; and enforce the laws pertinent to public procurement.

10. The anti-corruption effort in Ethiopia needs, more than ever before, unqualified political, budgetary and logistical support from the legislature

and the government so that it can protect the wealth of the nation that is under the custody of the government.

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The Charter of the NACC.

United Nations Convention Against Corruption.

ANNEX

Annex 1

Interview chart;

Initial **interview questions** with key informants; and the summary of **their responses**.

These interviews were conducted from April 20 -29, 2016 in the respective offices of the interviewees; that is, in the PPPA, PPPDS, the Procurement and Property Disposal Complaint Hearing Board whose Secretariat is in the PPPA, and the FEACC's Corruption Prevention Directorate.

		Name of the Government Institutions key informants drawn from; and major points that the interviewees forwarded.			
	Initial Questions for the Interview	**From PPPA (Two interviewees)**	**From PPPDS(Two interviewees)**	**From Procurement Complaint Hearing Board (Two interviewees**	**From the FEACC (One Interviewee).**
1.	Do you share the concern of the public that there is corruptio n in public procurem ent? Why/why not?	-Yes I share the concern, - complaints lodged with the PPPA is ever increasing, & it is the talk of the town the government also admits,	-Yes I share the concern,	-Yes I share the concern, -The complaints the Board Reviews tell same story	Yes I share the concern,
2.	From your experienc	-Planning phase, -specification preparation, tailoring	-Planning, -specification preparation,	-specification preparation Phase, -Bids Evaluation - Contract management	-Specification preparation, technical evaluation, award

	e, which phase of the procurement cycle is more prone to corruption?	specification that fits in to the situation of a given would be bidder/ bidders, -bid evaluation process,	-Technical evaluation of bids, -awards, -Contract management	-Goods and works delivery, -Payment,	
3.	What are the other major problems that you see in the procurement process that make the preventive efforts ineffective?	-Public Institutions & Suppliers lack procurement knowledge & skill,, -Lack of skilled human resource especially in government offices, -lack of integrity on the part of leaders of public institutions, - weak contract administration on the part of public institutions,	-lope holes in the public procurement legal regime, example, limited tender, -Public Institutions & Suppliers lack procurement knowledge & skill,, -Lack of skilled human resource especially in government offices, -Lack of accountability & double standard in law enforcement,	-Public Institutions & Suppliers lack procurement knowledge & skill,, -Lack of skilled human resource especially in government offices, -Lack of accountability,	-So called special procurements that are under taken with the consent of pertinent govt. bodies; procurement in bigger projects they tend to go out of the rules; they lack transparency,
4.	Do you think the Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption commission can play a role in preventing corruption, specifically in	-Yes, it warns & intervenes when it deemed it necessary -improprieties after contract signing can only be brought before other executive government offices, mostly before the FEACC.	-Yes, the FEACC tries to handle cases free of conflict of interest when compared to other executive government offices,	-Yes, it warns & intervenes when it deemed it necessary,	Yes I do,

	procurement, in Public Institutions?				
5.	Do you feel that public institutions believe that the intervention of the FEACC is helping them prevent/reduce corruption?	-Yes for those that are with integrity, -no for those who want undue benefit from procurement transactions	-No, most of them do not think this way rather they consider the FEACC as an intruder against their behavior(corrupt), -they are unwilling to implement the recommendations because, few feel that they are disempowered; and most dislike the FEACC	-Yes for those that are ready to comply, -no for those who want undue benefit from procurement transaction.	In most cases yes
6.	Are procurement related complaints from suppliers increasing/decreasing? What do you think is the reason for being so?	-Yes it is in the increase because, - volume of public procurement is in constant increase, -irregularities are in the increase, -suppliers awareness on their rights are growing by days,	-Yes it is in the increase because, - volume of public procurement is in constant increase, -irregularities are in the increase, -suppliers awareness on their rights are growing by days, -PPPDS encourages suppliers to report any irregularity in any procurement process ,	-Yes it is in the increase because, - volume of public procurement is in constant increase, -irregularities are in the increase, -suppliers awareness on their rights are growing by days,	-They are in the increase E because; -awareness of the society has increased, -trust on the FEACC, -volume of the economy/procurement has increased,
7.	Do you think the methods used by the	-yes, it helps curb corruption, -it has deterrent effect by itself as it shows that procurement has	-Yes, the experts in the FEACC are skilled in identifying corruption prone areas,	-generally, yes -but lack of expertise knowledge in procurement on the part of the FEACC is a significant impediment	-Yes where the recommendations are duly implemented,

	Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption commission; such as the review of procurement business process are effective in curbing corruption?	gained attention by the FEACC		in this regard,	
8.	Do you feel other kinds of corruption prevention strategy, like capacitating/enabling institutions to carry out such preventive works by them-selves would be more effective and a better	-Yes it will be better if the corruption prevention activity is made part of the institutional responsibilities of each government office, - the FEACC should play a robust supervisory and capacity building role with its right to intervene at any stage of the preventive process government office concerned,	-Yes it will be better if the corruption prevention activity is made part of the institutional responsibilities of each government office, - the FEACC should play a robust supervisory and capacity building role with its right to intervene at any stage of the preventive process government office concerned,	-yes, it has to build the capacity of responsible units in each public institution, -at the same time the FEACC should provide protection for the unit carrying out the preventive activity as they may be exposed to vengeance, -the FEACC should be ready to intervene directly whenever it detects the institutions lack the capacity required and the unit is being harassed not perform their responsibilities properly by corrupt officials and suppliers from within or from outside, -the FEACC should maintain close supervision on the units activity so that undue	-Yes, in the long run such a strategy will be much more effective and sustainable,

	suited strategy?			intervention is kept at bay,	
9.	Do you think pertinent supervising authorities (offices) are discharging their responsibilities toward procurement ? If yes; how? If no; why not?	-almost none, -network and cronyism are undermining all efforts against corruption in public procurement,	-No, - accountability on the part of public officials is almost none,	-in most cases no, -there is overt reluctance, with regard to corrupt officials, on the part of the Parliament, the PM office and Public Enterprises Supervising Agency which is now elevated to ministerial level.	-No, holding officials to account for their corrupt behavior is very weak, -lack of enforcement capacity, -lack of executive capacity,
10.	What would you recommend to make corruption prevention activities by the FEACC manifested in the form of procurement business process evaluatio	-The FEACC needs to have its own prevention strategy in public procurement, -to garner public support and cooperation from citizens it should make its performances open to the wider public through different media outlets, -in its preventive activities better involve government offices that are	-experts from the FEACC should demonstrate that they are there to help government offices and not to harass them, -it would be better if they are obeyed for respect rather than for fear of their authority,	-the FEACC needs to be properly staffed with professionals that are equipped with sufficient knowledge and expertise/skills,	Build /enhance the professional capacity and skill of its staff, and –work in collaboration with other pertinent govt. offices such as the PPPA,

	n more fruit full?	subject of its review,			
11.	What would you recommend to tackle corruption in public procurement?	-Public procurement can be made more open and transparent by utilizing IT, -those who have committed corruption, including their Godfathers at the top of government &political hierarchy must be brought before the court,	-Ethics education promotion to aware society that fights corruption, -schools, religious institutions and CSO's, other non –state actors should be empowered by the government - the wider public needs to be organized and mobilized against corruption be it in the public and private realm, -we need to foster patriotism and develop national consensus on lawful utilization fair distribution of national wealth.	-Ethics education promotion to aware society that fights corruption, -schools, religious institutions and CSO's, other non -state actors should be empowered by the government - the wider public needs to be organized and mobilized against corruption be it in the public and private realm,	Introduce, -fair, -accountable, -transparent, -transparent and -simplified public procurement system; and also time wise the procurement activity need to be more efficient one.

Annex 2

Questionnaire for respondents drawn from the staff of those four public institutions and the FEACC.

This group of questionnaires is designed to collect data for a research under taken by the researcher under the topic "**Corruption Prevention Strategy of the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission: It's Efficacy in Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement**" from relevant and responsible sources such as you.

The following "Questionnaires" are designed for examining whether or not the evaluation of the Procurement Business Process of public institutions, which is one of the three major activities of the FEACC in its corruption prevention strategy, is helping to curb corruption in public procurement.

The response and answers given for this study will be used for the study and for the study purpose only and the identity and the response of the respondents will be kept in great confidentiality.

You are **NOT REQUIRED** to write down your name in this questionnaire document.

Part I. Respondents demographic characteristics:

Guide: CIRCLE among the choices for the variables.

a. Gender

Male	Female
1	2

b. Age

Age group	Response
18-30	1
31-50	2
Above 50	3

c. Education Level

Education Level	Response
Elementary schooling	1
High school	2
First degree	3
Second degree and above	4

d. Occupation

Member of procurement endorsing committee	Expert from finance and accounts officer	Purchasing officer	Planning officer	other
1	2	3	4	5

Part II. Questionnaires for Respondents

Instruction ;

Mark “ × ” in the box of your choice among the alternatives provided for each statement.

Q.no.	Content of each of the questionnaires.	I strongly agree (1)	I agree (2)	I Neither agree nor disagree (3)	I disagree (4)	I strongly disagree (5)
1..	Tenders, limited tenders and procurements through direct price quotation that are carried out by public institutions give equal opportunity to suppliers					
2..	Tenders, limited tenders and procurements through direct price quotation secure value for money to procuring public institutions					

3.	Tenders, limited tenders and procurements through direct price quotation are transparent.					
4.	Procurement process in your (government) office is not vulnerable to corruption.					
5.	The procurement process in your office is run through corrupt procedure.					
6..	The process evaluating experts of the FEACC properly familiarize themselves with the situation in and get a workable knowledge of the institution whose business process they are going to evaluate.					
7.	The process evaluation undertakings of the FEACC are led by clear and transparent/ simple plan of action.					
8.	The plans for the process evaluation undertakings are agreed at by both the FEACC and the pertinent public institutions.					
9.	The experts of the FEACC that perform the business process evaluations are professionally and technically competent to make such daring an endeavor a success.					
10.	The business process evaluation undertakings focus on real problems in the public institutions being evaluated.					
11.	The recommendations forwarded consequent to the evaluation is credible enough to be regarded as a solution.					
12.	The process evaluation activities focus on pertinent issues and go deeper into the real problems					
13.	The recommendations of the process reviews forwarded by the FEACC are not objective and not workable.					
14.	After procurement process evaluation, procurement became less susceptible to irregularities.					

15.	After procurement process evaluation, procurement rules and regulations on procurement are being observed.					
16.	Earlier problems that were being manifested in the procurement process are eliminated.					
17.	Procurement related complaints have decreased in number after the business process evaluations were carried out in the public institution					
18.	Better goods and services are being obtained for the money spent on procurement.					
19.	Reports on corruption and improprieties on procurement are no more there after the business process evaluation.					
20.	The outcomes of business process evaluations by the FEACC are relevant and useful to prevent corruption in procurement.					
21.	The right place for procurement business process evaluation to be undertaken is the public institutions themselves.					
22.	The recommendations are duly implemented by the public institutions whose procurement processes were evaluated					
23.	To make the process evaluation a success, offering technical support to the evaluators by the staff of respective institutions is important.					
24.	Staff of the public institutions evaluated recognize the review, its findings and recommendation(s).are valuable.					
25.	Leaders of the public institutions concerned provide support for the business process evaluation					
26.	The problems identified and solutions proposed are regarded relevant for the improvement oftheir procurement by the public institutions concerned					

27.	The work done by the FEACC to prevent corruption in public procurement process is bringing about the desired result.					
28.	The FEACC's recommendations and proposed system changes are not helping prevent corruption in public procurement bringing about the intended outcome..					
29. .	The Office of the Prime Minister or/and the Public Enterprises Supervising Agency tell executives of public institutions to implement the recommendations of business process reviews.					
30.	The Office of the Prime Minister or/and the Public Enterprises Supervising Agency made appointees be Held accountable for the violations of laws relevant to procurement.					
31.	The OFAG has audits and reports on procurement related complaints at the right time.					
32.	The House of Peoples' Representatives of the FDR of Ethiopia holds officials of public institutions and refer them for investigation that are reported against by the OFAG.					
33.	The PPPA holds officials of public institutions and referred them for investigation that are reported against by the FEACC and the OFAG.					
34.	The Ethics Liaison Officer collaborates in the review and facilitates the implementation of the recommendations.					

Thank you for your time and invaluable contribution!

Annex 3.

Questionnaire for the Suppliers who had the opportunity to participate in bids from the four public institutions that is included in the study.

This group of questionnaires is designed to collect data for a research under taken by the researcher under the topic "**CORRUPTION PREVENTION STRATEGY OF THE FEDERAL ETHICS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION COMMISSION; It's Efficacy in Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement**" from relevant and responsible sources such as you.

The following Questionnaires are designed to examining whether or not the evaluation of the Procurement Business Process of public institutions, which is one of the three major activities of the FEACC in its corruption prevention strategy, is helping to curb corruption in public procurement.

The response and answers given for this study will be used for the study and for the study purpose only and the identity and the response of the respondents will be kept in great confidentiality.

You are **NOT REQUIRED** to write down your name in this questionnaire document.

Part I. Respondents demographic characteristics:

b. Gender

Male	**Female**
1	2

b. Age

Age group	**Response**
18-30	1
31-50	2
Above 50	3

c. Education Level

Education Level	Response
Illiterate	1
Elementary schooling	2
High school	3
First degree	4
Second degree and above	5

Part II. Questionnaires for Respondents

Instruction ;Mark " × " in the box of your choice among the alternatives provided for each statement.

S.no.	Content of each of the questionnaires.	I strongly agree (1)	I agree (2)	I Neither agree nor disagree (3)	I disagree (4)	I strongly disagree (5)
1.	Tenders, limited tenders and procurements through direct price quotation that are carried out by public institutions give equal opportunity to suppliers.					
2.	Tenders, limited tenders and procurements through direct price quotation are transparent.					
3.	After procurement process evaluation, procurement rules and regulations on procurement are being observed					
4.	Earlier problems that were being manifested in the procurement process are eliminated.					
5	Procurement related complaints have decreased in number after business process evaluations in the public institution					
6.	Better goods and services are being supplied for the money spent on procurement.					
7.	Complaints on corruption and improprieties on procurement are no more there after the business process evaluation.					
8.	The Office of the Prime Minister or/and the Public Enterprises Supervising Agency makes appointees be held accountable for the violations of laws relevant to procurement.					
9.	The Office of the Prime Minister and/or the Public Enterprises Supervising Agency made					

	appointees be Held accountable for the violations of laws relevant to procurement					
10.	The OFAG audits and reports on procurement related complaints at the right time.					
11.	The House of Peoples' Representatives of the FDR of Ethiopia holds officials of public institutions and refers them for investigation that is reported against by the OFAG.					
12.	The PPPA holds officials of public institutions and refers them for investigation that is reported against by the FEACC and the OFAG.					
13.	Extending favor and recognizing ones support is a norm accepted in procurement.					

Thank you for your time and invaluable contribution!

Annex 4

List of those twelve private companies (suppliers) that were covered by the study,

1. Afro Tsion Construction Privately Limited Company, Addis Ababa, Bole Sub-City.
2. AmbaselTrading House, Addis Ababa, Kirkose Sub-City.
3. East Africa Pharmaceuticals, PLC., Addis Ababa, Bole Sub-City.
4. Guna Trading House, Addis Ababa, Bole Sub-City.
5. HagbesMotors,PLC, Addis Ababa,Bole Sub-City.
6. Julfar Pharmaceuticals, PLC., Addis Ababa, Bole Sub-City.
7. Jupiter Trading PLC.,, Addis Ababa, Kirkos Sub-City.
8. Meaza Stationary, PLC., Addis Ababa, Kirkos Sub-City.
9. MOENCO, Addis Ababa, Bole Sub-City.
10. NOC, National Oil Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Bole Sub-City.
11. Rama Construction, PLC.,Addis Ababa, Bole Sub-City.
12. YENCOMAD Construction Company, PLC.,Addis Ababa, Bole Sub-City.