Addis Ababa University
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Building Local Emergency Response Capacity: The Missing Link Between Relief and Development

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Any mistakes, logical irregularities or errors, if appeared in the paper, are entirely the responsibility of the researcher alone and thus no one else would be blamed for or share the slightest guilt. In addition, unless and otherwise indicated, all the years used throughout the paper are in Gregorian calendar.

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Acronyms

ADLI	Agriculture Development Led Industrialization
ADP	Area Development Program
B.C.	Before Christ
BOPED	Bureau of Planning and Economic Development
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CIS	Corrugated Iron Sheet
CSA	Central Statistics Authority
DAP	Di Ammonium Phosphate
DPPC	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission
EC	European Commission
EECMY	Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus
EFSR	Emergency Food Security Reserve
EGS	Employment Generation Scheme
FFW	Food For Work
FSS	Food Security Strategy
FY	Fiscal Year
GIS	Geographic Information System
GNP	Gross National Product
Ha	Hectare
HH	Household
HYV	High Yielding Varieties
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
KA	Kebele Administration
Kg	Kilogram
KI	Key Informant
Km	Kilometer
LERC	Local Emergency Response Capacity
Masl	Meter above sea level
MFI	Micro Finance Institution

Table 1. Summary Table of Assistance Requirements for 2002

Food Assistance Requirements (MT)		Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Assistance (USD)		Capacity Building Requirements (USD)	
Grain	498,892	NDPPF	8,150,000	Early Warning Systems	936,715
Supplementary food	29,865	EFSR	232,500	EGS	3,399,024
Oil	28447	NFECS	5,527,321		
Total (MT)	557,204	Total (USD)	13,909,821	Total (USD)	4,335,739

Source: DPPC 2001

As the above table clearly portrayed, supplementary food assistance have been considered as important in addition to more general food assistance as well as support to alleviate underlying and inter related causes of poverty. Moreover, the complexity of the situation, the prevalence of poverty and the susceptibility of populations to the effects of drought dictate that relief, emergency preparedness and capacity building assistances to be provided in a multi faceted approach that will save lives, protect livelihoods, and encourage productivity.

Figure 1. Relief Food Imported from 1994-2001 (MT), DPPC



The recent famines and food shortages have required food aid intervention by international and national organizations. As indicated in the above figure 1 and table 2 below, widespread drought in 1999 and 2000 affected significant portions of the population. The number of people in need of assistance steadily rose from an estimated affected population of 2.3 million in early 1996 to over 10 million in 2000. These high figures were a reflection of three years of poor rainfall compounded by economic and environmental factors that left many families vulnerable. With conditions somewhat improved, the population requiring relief food assistance fell to 6.4 million for 2001. However, the same level of effort had not been made to address the root causes that make people vulnerable to disaster.

1.1.2 Country Food Security Strategy and its Implication on Building LERC

The March 2002 FSS of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, which is marked by a clearer focus on 'environmental rehabilitation as a measure to reverse the level of degradation and also as a source of income generation for food insecure households through a focus on biological measures' unlike the original 1996 FSS attempts to address both the supply and demand side of the food equation. That is, availability and entitlement respectively from both a national and household level perspective. Accordingly, the strategy adopted stipulates the following three areas of interventions, which are assumed to change the existing picture of food insecurity.

a. To increase the availability of food through increased domestic production
b. To ensure access to food for food deficit households; and
c. To strengthen emergency response capabilities

Here, emphasis have been given to those cross cutting aspects of food security that affect household income such as capacity building, agricultural research to generate technology, agricultural marketing and credit as well as infrastructure. This has been envisaged to be reinforced by promoting supplementary employment and income scheme.

Thirdly, separate strategies have been envisaged, which actually are the outcome of agricultural production increment on the one hand and off farm income improvement on the other. These deals with strengthening the emergency response capabilities of the government including the monitoring, surveillance, and early warning arrangements, the capacity for food and relief distribution, strategic reserves of food grains, and its analysis of the international food trade and aid situation; and institutional strengthening, networking, and capacity building.

By and large, the FSS issued in 1996 and latter updated in 2002, highlighted government plans to address causality and effect of food insecurity in Ethiopia. And this has been given due attention even in the 2002 PRSP which presents a broad outline for reducing poverty that is grounded in the development strategy laid out in the NDP. The poverty reduction strategy is centered around promoting economic growth and increasing income earning capacity of the poor, which further reinforce the present FSS. The PRSP comprises four main elements: (a) an agriculture-development-led-industrialization (ADLI) strategy, which is the core element for raising the income of the poor, (b) civil service and judicial reforms, (c) decentralization, and (d) capacity building. These four key elements of the government's economic strategy aim to address the underlying causes of poverty in Ethiopia, to which the FSS can be considered as a sub set. Particularly, the policies geared to agricultural development (ADLI) are undoubtedly a strong

part of the government's poverty reduction strategy. This strategy is well explained, bringing to the fore the fact that in a country where 80 percent of the population live in rural areas, and most of them are engaged in subsistence farming, poverty reduction requires agricultural growth. The ADLI contains various components needed for agricultural growth, including technology, finance, rural infrastructure, internal and external markets and the role of the private sector. The strategy is also differentiated according to the requirements of ecological zones. ADLI, now in place for several years, has been already yielding significant gains in growth and poverty reduction. Actually, a large number of farmers have benefited, over the last five years, from the implementation of an ambitious program of extension services and the increased use of modern inputs (fertilizers and seeds). This has led to an increase in yields in areas covered by these programs, which has compensated for declining yields in other areas. The Government is addressing the problem of declining yields through "Dry Land Programs" which combine soil conservation with use of improved inputs.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Emergencies are becoming a major global problem, increasing in their frequency of occurrence as well as the magnitude of the impact they have on local people. As a result, various humanitarian organizations are responding with relief assistance, the scale of which has been increasing over the years. For example, from 1990 – 1996, global overseas development assistance (ODA) for humanitarian aid rose from USD 500 million to USD 6 billon – a twelve-fold increase and some 12Percent of all development aid[7]. Regardless of all these efforts it has been speculated that, in the future, the scale and intensity of emergencies is likely to increase as unpredictable climate changes combines with rapid population growth to put a sizable proportion of the world's poorest countries at greater risks than in the past[8].

In the context of Ethiopia, where agriculture is the mainstay of the economy and is estimated to provide livelihood for the majority of its 60 million population, the case is not different. The country has been experiencing fluctuation in the rainfall pattern since the notorious drought of 1884/85 that claimed the lives of millions[9]. Massive emergency relief operations have been undertaken every ten years since then, with relatively small-scale relief interventions every three to five years. In the effort to mitigate the effect of emergencies on the lives of the citizens, the government, in collaboration with humanitarian non-governmental organizations, has been actively engaged in initiating and supporting relief activities. Accordingly, the inflows of food aid have in general been increasing over time (see table 2 below), and the same holds true for the number of people affected.

[7] @lliance, Building Resources for the Community Worldwide, V.6 No. 2, June 2001.
[8] Global Future, A World Vision Journal of Humanitarian Development, Q IV, 2000.
[9] Ethiopia-European Community, 2001

Table 2. Affected Population and Emergency Food Requirements from 1994-2001

Year	Affected Population (Million)	Relief Food Imported DPPC (MT)	Relief Food Distributed (MT)
1994	6.7	895,866	548,014
1995	4.0	498,563	230,930
1996	2.3	295,600	265,000
1997	1.9	427,800	352,600
1998	4.3	614,500	306,400
1999	2.5	775,500	502,600
2000	7.7	1,380,200	999,100
2001	6.2	639,264	575,670

Source: Assistance Requirements and Implementation Strategy: 2002, DPPC

The study area is no exception in terms of getting its share of catastrophic events that occurred elsewhere in the country, but with varying magnitude. Records indicate that since the devastating 1984/85 drought the area has been experiencing erratic rainfall pattern every year along with moderate drought (that called for significant relief work) every two or three years. In addition, serious drought has been encountered three times (in 1987, 1991, and 1992) during the past 15 years affecting almost all the people of the woreda. The government and NGOs operating in the area have been responding well to such emergencies.

What is becoming an issue, however, is the recurrent nature of these emergencies leaving negative impacts on the on going development undertakings. Most development efforts are at risk of being disrupted by emergencies. Emergencies nullify the impacts of development activities and destroy local economies, thus perpetuating poverty. Moreover, empirical evidence also confirms the oscillation between relief and development interventions, mediated by lengthy rehabilitation efforts, in what appears to be a vicious circle. Long serving development practitioners in the area find themselves in a position where they had once been (massive relief

work) after some years of implementing development interventions. Their development endeavor often seems unable to absorb threatening emergency shocks.

It is usually assumed that well planned and executed rehabilitation activities lead to the resumption of development intervention. However, such assumptions do not seem to hold in the face of the recurring relief and development cycle (as is the case in the context of the study area). Bridging the intermediate gap with rehabilitation activities does not seem to add value to development efforts nor sufficiently and sustainably mitigate the effects of disasters. One could thus postulate that there is a 'missing link' between relief and development that can that can reduce the vulnerability of communities and bring about a degree of resilience that could sustain the impacts of development efforts.

Thus, the issues that need to be addressed are: What could adequately link the widening relief - development gap if not rehabilitation? How could development efforts be planned and implemented without being affected by cyclical emergencies? How could the vicious circle of relief – rehabilitation - development be broken so as to allow development efforts to progress without interruption? What should be done to enable households to make the transition from relief to development i.e. by shifting from actions that meet only basic needs to ones that build up household assets and capabilities? How important are other alternatives such as building local emergency response capacity in changing the prevailing development trend? What strategies should be devised to integrate the building of local emergency response capacity with existing relief and development efforts?

1.3 Study Objectives and Hypothesis

1.3.1 Objectives: What to Address

The study has the overall goal of exploring the opportunities for "building local emergency response capacity (LERC)" as an integral component of relief and development interventions. The study will also examine if LERC is indeed the missing link between the two and if the building of LERC does lead to the betterment of the vulnerable community groups.

The specific objectives of the study are:

- To analyze the contributions of increasing agricultural production and household income from off and non-farm activities to build LERC
- To qualitatively analyze the vicious cycle of relief – rehabilitation – development intervention and examine the extent to which the building of LERC would reduce the backward and forward oscillation between the gains and losses in the development process;

- To draw strategies that help the reorientation of intervention strategies towards integrating LERC in the over all process, and

- To identify locally available copping strategies that could enhance the community's resilience if integrated with LERC.

1.3.2 Hypothesis of the Study

The study is based on the premise that local capacity is a dependent variable that is a function of rural peoples' production and productivity in the agriculture sector on the one hand and the income earned from off farm and non farm activities on the other. Accordingly, it is postulated that both agricultural productivity and off farm income earning opportunities, which are results of development interventions, are independent variables on which local capacity largely depend on. Figure 2 below depicts the hypothesized relationship between the dependent and independent variables.

Figure 2. Hypothesized Relationship Between Dependent and Independent Variables



As depicted in the above figure, performance in the agriculture and off farm sectors at household level are shown to be independent variables which have an important bearing on "productive asset possession," in general, and household capacity, in particular. Each independent variable in turn is a product of other factors, although no attempt will be made in this study to explore the magnitude of this relationship. Relief and rehabilitation programs as well as productive asset possession are depicted as "intermediate variables" that potentially complement the aforementioned independent variables.

1.4 Study Significance

The phenomena that are observed at the national level are the reflection of what goes on at the local level. National policies and strategies need to be based on the reality of local conditions if lasting solutions are to be found to the persistent problems described earlier. There is thus a need examine the local setting with the view to assessing the available potentials and opportunities, on the one hand, and possible threats and challenges to the livelihood of the local population.

This study is expected to shed some light on to what is actually going on in the study area and its surroundings concerning the issues discussed above. The outcome of the study would, in a small way, add value to the development works undertaken in the study area by World Vision and the local government. Moreover, it would provide pragmatic basis for higher-level policy makers to design strategies that best mediate between the vicious relief -development cycles under the reference of building LERC.

1.5 Limitations of the Study

The first limitation of the paper is associated with the inadequate access or paucity of literature dealing with the theoretical and empirical aspects of the particular topic under study. The available literature mostly deals with the link or integration between relief and development with emphasis on rehabilitation. Issues related to local emergency response capacities are not given adequate coverage in the literature accessed through print or on the Internet. At times when relevant literature is known to exist on the Internet it was difficult to cover the associated costs. Thus, most of the literature used only provide cursory treatment of the relevant topics and therefore could not describe the study topic in its fullness.

The second limitation lies on the representativeness of the sample size in relation to the population of the whole woreda. The sample size considered is certainly representative of the Kebele Administration (KA) from which it is taken. It is, however, far too small to represent the whole woreda. It was not possible to take additional sample from other KAs because of limited availability of funds to conduct the study.

1.6 Organization of the Paper

The organization of the paper takes into consideration the need for logical coherence among the parts and consistency in the presentation of arguments on the whole. The first part of the paper introduces the topic under study, dealing in particular with the background, the justifications for why the study is necessitated, its objectives, limitations and significance. The second section of the study provides operational definitions for some recurring terms and concepts so as to avoid

II. Working Definition of Terms

The following are some of the terms used in the study with a specific meaning in a given context, which may deviate their regular usage. The working definitions are provided here to assist the reader to differentiate between the use of same terms in other literatures, on the one hand, and in this study, on the other.

Local:

The term 'local' in this paper refers to the lowest administrative unit established by the government where the community under study is living. The administrative unit, that is the Kebele Administration (KA) defines the local and encompasses the physical, social, economic, and political environment that directly or indirectly affects the livelihood of community members.

Drought:

This term is used frequently throughout the paper to represent severe moisture stress (caused by lack/ shortage of rainfall) that leads to total crop failure or significant production shortfalls that subsequently lead to famine. The magnitude of the famine leaves the local communities no option but seek outside food assistance in order to save lives.

Emergency:

In the context of this study the term emergency refers to a crisis or urgent situation, the nature and scale of which not only disrupts and damages local livelihoods but also overwhelms the local population. Specifically, the term represents a disaster induced by drought/climatic changes (moisture stress, pest breakout, etc) that result in drastic shortfall in agricultural production and

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thus expose local people to excessive loss of assets. This in turn makes them highly vulnerable to similar recurring threats.

Capacity:

Refers to the potential that the 'local' has to cope with drought emergencies on its own prior to getting outside assistance. The potential refers to the options and possibilities for reducing dependence on external interventions. Specifically, capacity defines the overall financial, institutional, technical, managerial, and social assets residing in the local setting.

Relief:

This term is used to describe a set of activities related to the distribution of food commodities to drought victims on the basis of engagement in employment generation schemes or gratuitously for those unable to work. The purpose is to alleviate hunger meet the immediate and basic nutritional needs of the local people. It is the initial response for saving of lives during emergencies.

Rehabilitation:

Martin (1996) described rehabilitation as an intervention carried out for 're-establishing livelihood security among the poorest households in order to reduce vulnerability to future disasters, restart the local economy in a sustainable fashion, and avoid dependency'. Rehabilitation activities are carried out simultaneously with relief work or in the period of transition from relief to development so as to reduce the dependence of communities on external assistance for an extended period of time.

Vulnerability:

Vulnerability refers to the full range of factors (both food and non food) that place people at risk of becoming affected by disaster. People can be highly exposed to specific hazards but may have the resources to cope and therefore not be vulnerable, or be little exposed but vulnerable through having no resource with which to cope. The degree of vulnerability of an individual household or group of persons is determined by their exposure to the risk factors and their ability to cope with or withstand stressful conditions. In the context of this paper, however, emphasis is given to food vulnerability.

Disaster:

Critical events that disrupt the livelihood of communities primarily caused by drought, epidemics, flood, pest infestation, etc. For the purpose of this paper the drought variable is assumed to be the cause for disaster.

III. Literature Review

3.1 The Vicious Cycle of Interventions: Where the Missing Link Is

Emergencies are becoming a major global problem, increasing in their frequency of occurrence as well as the magnitude of the impact they have on local people. As a result, various humanitarian organizations are responding with relief assistance, the scale of which has been increasing over the years. For example, from 1990 – 1996, global overseas development assistance (ODA) for humanitarian aid rose from USD 500 million to USD 6 billon – a twelve-fold increase and some 12 percent of all development aid[10]. In the Ethiopian context the number of humanitarian organizations, both local and international, has increasing over time[11]. This is mainly because the prevalent and generally accepted image of the famine in Ethiopia has been one of hopeless inevitability, with food shortage and starvation being an unavoidable consequence of environmental hardship combined with economic and political mismanagement and social chaos (Patrick and Braun, 1994).

Available literatures shows that due to the persistent drought in the past three decades coupled with rapid population growth, Ethiopia required urgent relief and rehabilitation assistance programs. Thus, a massive operation involving more than a hundred NGOs was launched during the 1973/74-food crisis in the country. Later, most of these NGOs shifted from relief to rehabilitation and then community development programs. The frequency and intensity of

[10] @lliance, Building Resources for the Community Worldwide, V.6 No. 2, June 2001.
[11] As Abraham (1995) noted, there were 248 NGOs, both local and international, in the whole country. In 1997, however, this number was reported to increase to 307, as Costantinos and Haddas (1997) indicated. Still in 1998, the number was soared to 347, as Ato Tilahun, head of aid programs control and evaluation reported in 'Addis Zemen,' Feb. 22, 1998.

famine has increased since then and nearly 12 incidences have been registered to have threatened the country[12]. One of the most noticeable catastrophes was that of the 1984/85 drought that claimed the lives of more than million people. During this time almost all NGOs operating in the country accompanied by new entrants made their focus on relief undertaking making total shift from development[13]. Likewise, the drought occurrence in 1987/88, 1990/91, 1991/1992, 1998/1999, and 1999/2000 forced most NGOs and the government to adopt cyclical relief-development interventions bridged by rehabilitation.

More over, regardless of all these efforts, it has been speculated that, in the future, the scale and intensity of emergencies is likely to increase as unpredictable climate changes combine with rapid population growth to put a sizable proportion of the world's poorest countries at greater risks than in the past[14]. Most importantly, the occurrence of each drought has accelerated the depletion of household productive assets. As the intensity and frequency of occurrence was significant most households continued to lose their possession, and without these being replaced other disasters followed. In response, the cyclical relief-development interventions remained to serve as sequential mitigation measures and will continue to serve the same purpose unless and otherwise alternative steps are taken.

[12] Devereux 2000
[13] See Devereux 2000
[14] Global Future, A World Vision Journal of Humanitarian Development, Q IV, 2000.

3.2 The Relief - Development Continuum

The relief-development distinction is useful to describe two responses to human need that are premised on very different foundations. Relief is generally perceived as the short-term provision of physical commodities to victims of an acute crisis[15]. Rehabilitation can be considered as effective tool of linking relief and development whereby local capacities that have deteriorated as a result of emergencies are restored. Development, however, is understood as 'a process that enables chronically marginalized individuals, households and communities to achieve greater self-reliance in meeting human need'[16]. Esman et al., 1984 provided further clarification on how self reliance should be understood, insisting that, "self-reliance does not necessarily imply self-sufficiency, but enhanced capability through economic, social, and/or political change. This is achieved through the expansion of physical, human, and social capital, expanding economic productivity, social organization, and political power".

In one sense, relief and development processes are extreme opposites. For instance, it is argued that through the physical provision of goods and services, the relief approach creates a dependency relationship between donor and recipient (Jerry D.P. 1995). This dependency relationship reinforces long-term structural constraints to development, weakening household and community self-reliance. Conversely, evidence suggests that development approaches seeking to promote self-reliance, often by-pass the poorest, favoring instead stronger, better educated groups who have some asset base to build upon (Jerry D.P., 1995; John, 1991; Eberts 1995). Development approaches generally attempt to build upon existing physical and human

[15] See Catherine, 1992 for more detail
[16] See Catherine, 1992

assets to achieve their results. This inherently implies the tendency to overlook those without assets- the group to which the greater proportion of people in rural areas of third world belong.

In another sense, of course, the distinction between relief and development becomes blurred. At their core, relief and development approaches are responses to human need. Both approaches are oriented to providing a combination of goods and services that implicitly include a welfare element. As with relief programmes, "... development interventions involve some type of subsidy, e.g., subsidized inputs like credit or training" (Peter et al. 1992). Conversely, interventions typically classified as relief can include efforts to overcome structural constraints to development, implicitly containing a development- or self-reliance element.

Here, it is important to note that while the relief-development distinction can be a helpful means to classify interventions, it tends to blur important similarities between, and differences within, these approaches. A continuum approach thus is a more helpful way to conceptualize the different approaches: on one extreme the welfare element is dominant, on the other extreme the development or self-reliance element is dominant. A balanced approach to "... acute and chronic underdevelopment and marginalization characterized by a multiplicity of internal and external constraints requires a careful coordination of welfare and self-reliance approaches" (Peter et al. 1992).

3.2.1 The Controversy: Relief and Development - Rivalry or Complementary?

By definition, virtually all development interventions contain a welfare element. This welfare element involves the subsidized provision to a marginalized group or community by an external agency. Where some type of natural stress compounds marginalization, the welfare element is justifiably high. Where the degree of impoverishment is not transitory, but more of a chronic, it is generally held that the welfare element should be minimized to avoid dependency and more focused on attacking underlying structural constraints (Yaron, 1994). However, it is clear that even mature southern nongovernmental organization's development interventions involve some welfare element (Catherine, 1992).

Overtime, nevertheless, arguments have been arising as to the contextual importance of components along the relief - development continuum. On the one hand, there are arguments that attempt to brand relief as the enemy of development (Nimpuno, 2001). While on the other, relief can be considered as something that adds value to development undertakings at least in the short run.

Krisno Nimpuno (2001), who favors the 'enmity' argument emphasizes that disasters are caused not by natural hazards but by human vulnerability, 'our failure to adjust our lives to the known hazards around us', and that relief efforts make things worse rather than better. In his argument he gave much stress to the very assumption that a natural phenomenon does not cause disaster in itself[17]; rather 'it is the lack of protection against the hazard that precipitates disaster'. He thus defined relief as "the humanitarian response in situations where disaster management has failed",

[17] Tesfaye, 1997 also share the same argument

with the objective of saving lives and contain direct suffering. To best address his contest, Nimpuno further argued,

> Although the phase of saving lives is usually over in a matter of days, relief organizations often remain at disaster scenes for years. They rarely consider the requirements for an early changeover towards sustainable development. Relief operations therefore fail to address the causes of disaster that lie in the vulnerabilities to the hazards. On the contrary, they create new vulnerabilities by circumventing development regulations. The sufferings of disaster victims may in fact be made worse because relief workers have a tendency to base their support actions on their own social beliefs rather than on reality as experienced by the local population. There may be conditions that are normal and acceptable to them that appears to outsiders to be a disaster. The relief industry justifies its operations with the phrase 'when disaster strikes' and then proceeds with interventions that further ignore existing safety regulations and thereby add to the very vulnerabilities that cause disasters. The depressing reality is that few relief agencies bother to learn what preparedness is and they therefore lack the ability to disseminate such life saving knowledge. Relief has thus become the enemy of development (pp. 15).

In the midst of his argument Krisno seems to hold the view that relief can succeed in a transition to sustainable development. But shortly after denies whether or not this has ever been achieved, and he reverts back to his original position. Accordingly, he insisted,

> ... If a fraction of the money now used for relief were used for preparedness and vulnerability reduction, disasters would indeed be reduced. The relief industry is very capable of raising funds but regrettably uses these in destructive relief routine ... (pp. 18)

The one positive thing he had to say about relief was that it is a 'necessary evil', because, he said, once a disaster happens some victims need outside life saving assistance.

However, by arguing that agencies ignore preparedness and mitigation by prioritizing relief, Krisno seems to ignore the fact that the core businesses of many of the world's largest NGOs is poverty reduction. When disasters strike, outside assistance is required as relief provides the essential response that saves lives after disaster. Inherent in this argument is that relief should not be regarded as a development measure, i.e. one that seeks to build up assets or increase the poor's access to resources. Rather, it should be considered as an extraordinary response to extraordinary situation the aim of which is to prevent further death by meeting basic needs on a short-term basis. By implication, thus the poorest will always be the most vulnerable to disasters, and good development programmes reduce vulnerability not only to these but also to the regular stresses that are part of living in poverty. It should be noted that any disaster (be it manmade or natural) undermines development. How important, then, to be able to respond immediately in ways, which meet acute need and simultaneously recognize the context and long-term needs and aspirations of those affected. To state that 'relief is always anti-development' is therefore simply wrong. Inappropriate responses have occurred in the past even in areas of development work and thus past failures alone should not be the sole criteria by which development interventions are evaluated.

3.2.2 Alternative Approaches to Local Capacity Building

In the literatures most writers argue that how community participation is understood in development illustrates fundamental conceptual differences in approach[18]. Participation of the community has come to be considered a necessary condition for effective community development (Grace, Ewert, and Eberts, 1995; Oakley et.al, 1992). In the absence of community participation, development projects are said to fail due to "not meeting community felt-needs; being captured by the local elite; plus expensive, coercive, and bureaucratic project administration" (Tenkir, 2000). While participation is considered a necessary ingredient of development, how that participation is understood varies significantly. Peter Oakley (1992) suggests three broad interpretations of participation:

- As contribution to a development project, whereby community voluntary contributions of labour and in-kind resources lower implementation costs,
- As a means to build organization of previously under-organized groups, thereby expanding local social capital,
- As a means to empower marginalized groups to press for improved access to resources and government services.

It is simple to note that the last two interpretations can be condensed into two as both give emphasis to local capacity building through the expansion of local social capital and empowering the marginalized. Here, participation can be regarded as critical for extending social capital either for local capacity building or 'broader claim making in pursuit of community socio-

[18] A very detailed exposition of this issue reviewing available literature is found in Tenkir Bonger 1992, 1996, 2000; Dessalegn Rahmeto, 1995; Gebru Tareke, 1991.

political transformation'[19]. This approach, which Uphoff et al. 1983 defined as facilitation model, sees the principal constraint lying within the community, and therefore seeks to minimize external input in the resolution of local problems through facilitation. Activities that follow from this approach include conscientization, group formation for claim-making, and possibly cooperative projects (William C. Clark, et al., 1982).

The other major model of community development -- termed the assistance approach[20] -- places emphasis on achieving results of socio-economic improvement in the community; participation is seen as a contribution in achieving this end. Here, the principal constraint to development is considered to fall, in part, outside the community, and therefore requires technical and resource assistance from an external-to-the-community agency and technical specialists (Uphoff, Norman et.al, 1983). Activities that follow from this approach include income-generation, sub-sector or multi-sector interventions, and the provision of social services (William C. Clark, et al., 1982).

These alternative understandings of participation illustrate the breadth of community development approaches. At their root, the differences between these approaches are ideological. The facilitation model has been acclaimed by some academics (Ewert, Clark, and Eberts, 1994; Korten, 1990; Chambers, 1983). Others have argued this approach grounded more in ideology, and less in practice, suggesting a role for external assistance (Krishna, Uphoff, and Esman, 1997; Esman and Uphoff, 1983; Johnston and Clark, 1982). Commenting on 18 successful development projects in the South, Uphoff, and Esman conclude:

[19] William C. Clark, et al., 1982
[20] Uphoff, Norman et. al 1983

These were not pure bottom-up programs because initiative came from a variety of outsiders. But the outsiders knew how to enter into the conditions and outlooks of rural people, to fashion programs from the inside out, so to speak. The brought to this encounter the advantages of higher education and high-level contacts, but they knew better than to be patronizing or paternalistic. By showing deep respect for the capabilities of the people whose lives they hoped to help improve, and by being persistent as well as patient..., they helped fashion solutions to problems that mobilized and used resources of all sorts most effectively (Krishna, Uphoff, and Esman, 1997, p.294).

The assistance approach to community development dominates in most African and Asian countries[21]. Justification for the assistance model may come from a need for short-term tangible benefits, or a perception that external development constraints dominate, but is no doubt highly influenced by external donor objectives. In her review of NGOs' programmes in Africa, Lovell (1992) argues that, "both the rich and poor in Northern nations benefit from programmes of both government and nongovernmental organizations, in areas of health, education, social security, not to mention job retraining, and that this will not likely end in the near future". Indeed, she argues:

> Where social and economic development is just beginning for a majority of the people, and where government services remain nonexistent or ineffective for the poorest, with no signs of major change in the near future, NGO interventions will be needed for many years to come, supported by a sharing of the resources of the North with the South, will be needed far into the foreseeable future (Lovell, 1992, p.188-9).

[21] William C. Clark, et al., 1982

3.2.3 A Continuum of Response to Human Need

Despite the weaknesses and strengths of approaches in the continuum development agencies concerned with the short and long term consequences of their operations need to carefully balance the same. This should be made to meet acute and chronic physical need, but within an approach that does not create dependency, but [22]extends indigenous social capital necessary for long-term self-reliance.

Perhaps the most significant challenge to the self-reliance development model is its poverty reach. Development literature, particularly since the 1970s, has repeated the need for development to assist the poorest of the poor. This follows from the recognition that early efforts at development disproportionately benefit better-off members of the community. Evidence suggests that this is also a problem with community development efforts that move towards a pure self-reliance approach. In an often-referenced 1982 review of NGO projects, Judith Tendler argued that as NGOs moved into income-generation, away from more welfare-oriented approaches, the poorest of the poor were dropped as participants:

> The new development focus on income-earning activities [by NGOs], in sum, is a commendable transition away from the perception of the poor as fit only for charity. Just when this attempt to treat the poor as producers has resulted in the inadvertent exclusion of the poorest from the new production-oriented projects -- leading full circle back to a perception of the poorest as unreachable (Tendler, 1982, p.56).

[22] See Lovell 1992

Korten (1990) has described this as a move by NGOs from limited first-generation relief and welfare approaches, to more sophisticated second-generation small-scale self-reliant development projects. However, second-generation strategies -- particularly of the assistance variety -- require participants to have assets to build upon. For instance, income-generation programmes generally require participants have some skill, land, or other asset through which enhanced livelihood can be stimulated. Evidence suggests that micro-credit approaches in most African countries have generally by-passed the landless labourer class, even though they dominate the poorest income class, in favor of households with previous experience in trading and retail (Osmani, 1989). The result is average income levels considerably above the poorest of the poor (Buckland, 1995). Other studies indicate NGO development efforts target a relatively disadvantaged group, but not from the poorest of the poor (White, 1991; Carroll, 1992).

3.3 Drought/Famine History: Causes and Responses

Braun et.al. (1999) described famine as a catastrophic disruption of the social, economic, and institutional systems that provide for food production, distribution, and consumption; that has long been considered anomalies- crisis that must be remedied by short-term relief activities so that the normal processes of development can be resumed; that destroy life today, as well as the hope of development. In their description they indicated the geographical concentration of famine, that was prevalent through out the world earlier in this century, is nowadays confined to Africa, and countries in the rest of the world have found ways to deal with the problem, but Africa has not.

Devereux (2000) commented on the most common causes of famine relying on past experiences. Accordingly, he regarded deteriorated local economies as receptive of famine causing agents than absorbing the shock these triggers create:

> … Most famines in Africa were triggered by natural disasters: drought, insects, or extreme cold that devastated crops, or livestock disease that decimated herds and flocks. These natural triggers operated in contexts where local economies are weak (subsistence based, imperfectly integrated with wider markets) and the political will or logistical capacity to intervene was lacking. Some writers have highlighted the strength of pre-capitalist communities in buffering weaker members against livelihood threats, but it is now recognized that these informal insurance mechanisms provided limited resilience against severe covariate shocks, given the narrow economic base of these communities… (Devereux, 2000, pp. 87)

Literatures agree that while acute famines may appear to be similar across continents, their causes, their victims, and the policies needed to respond effectively to famines differ immensely. The book *Famine in Africa: Causes, Responses, and Prevention,* attempted to fill in empirical and conceptual gaps that continue to hinder analysis of famines in Africa. The analysis in *Famine in Africa* is based on three main premises. First, famine is largely a function of the failure of institutions, organizations, and policies, not just the failure of markets and production. Central, local, and community governments play key roles in causing famine as well as preventing it, and the absence of effective systems of government can be both a cause and a consequence of famine. De Waal (1989) also suggested the importance of understanding the triangular relationship among famines, economic disaster, and political regime behavior when

famine prevention and mitigation strategies are designed. Accordingly, when the failure of famine prevention policies threatens the security of a political regime, famine prevention can be expected to move to the top of the political agenda. Conversely, it can be concluded that participatory government makes it harder for politician to ignore concerns about famine implying the potential accountability of governments for famine.

An isolated drought is rarely a dangerous drought; only when a poor year follows others do drought take on unmanageable proportions (Degefu, 1987 and Buchanan et al., 1995). However, the relationship between drought and famine is strong where the resource base is poor, poverty is endemic, and public policy for famine prevention and mitigation is lacking (Degefu, 1987). When these conditions apply, even a single drought may well be dangerous.

The behaviour of markets for food, assets, and labour is critical in determining famine outcomes (Braun, 1991). Often, emerging food shortages coincide with increases in the sale of assets, the supply of labour, and the buying of food by marginal farmers. Sudden increases in food prices harm the poor because of their limited resources and income and their high budget shares devoted to food and other essentials. Ethiopia, for example, experienced huge increases in food prices during the famines of the 1980s and 1990s (Tesfaye, 1999).

Second, famines in Africa must be explained in a long-term context. They occur where and when poverty, often concentrated on fragile, degrading resource base, interacts with economic, agricultural, social, and demographic policies. These interactions make certain segments of society and regions vulnerable to even minor climatic and man-made shocks (Harden, 1993).

The genesis of food crisis in Ethiopia, for example, is a result of the interaction between environmental and socioeconomic factors, in both the short and the long terms, and a failure of policy to deal with them (Y.Tekolla, 1997). And as evidenced recurrently, drought remained to be a primary agent of famine in Ethiopia (Tesfaye, 1999). The agricultural production environment is under increased stress from drought. In 1984 average rain fall in the country was 22 percent below the long-term national average; in the worst affected regions it was more than 50 percent below average. And as drought is strongly associated with food production decline a 10 percent decline in rainfall below the long-term average results in a 4.4 percent fall in national production (Tesfaye, 1999).

Compounding to the same fact, as pragmatic findings suggest, production failures caused by drought, even those lasting several years, do not translate into famine unless other socioeconomic conditions are prevalent (Tesfaye, 1999 and Degefu, 1987). Such conditions are a result of deficiencies in public policy, which impair the growth of household out of poverty. These conditions include (1) lack of improved seeds, fertilizers, other inputs, and training associated with improved agricultural technology; (2) extensive environmental degradation partly because the poor lack alternative production technologies which limits the sustainability of any gains in productivity that are achieved; (3) lack of rural and urban non agricultural employment opportunities, which limits non farm incomes; (4) lack of integrated markets due to poor rural infrastructure, such as roads and transportation facilities, and state controlled marketing policies that impair incentives for farmers; (5) limited access to education, which contributes to a low labor productivity and rising birth rates; (6) financial markets that do not promote savings and do prevent borrowing in time of need; (7) poor health and sanitation

conditions due to lack of services and investment in health infrastructure; and (8) inappropriate macroeconomic policies, including exchange rate regulations and export taxes that historically have adversely affected the rural economy.

Third, just as the causes of famine are diverse, there is immense diversity in potential policy responses to famine. There is no optimal solution. Generalizations must take into account the wide range of famines in African settings. Even in situations in which almost everyone is poor, the depth of poverty determines the impact of famine and accordingly the capacity of households to cope with, and the assistance required from outsiders. Braun 1991 argued that the effects of food shortages and the loss of purchasing power are felt least in households with higher incomes and sound asset bases. This finding underlines the importance of combating the root causes of poverty in any famine prevention strategy and confirms the need for effective targeting of the absolute poor by relief interventions. The locations of the food insecure, their resource endowments, employment categories, and demographics are helpful criteria for vulnerability identification and mapping (Braun, 1991).

The social and economic resources mobilized to offset the impact of production shortfalls and market uncertainties are many and varied; there is no universal response. Further, although the details of response strategies vary from one region to another, broad commonalities emerge in the type and sequence of responses adopted across most localities (Tesfaye, 1999).

Tekolla (1997) specified the measures taken to close the gap between demand and supply (as the food deficit has been widening over the years), apart from continued effort to expand production,

that pertain mainly to the importation of food and the acquisition of food aid. Accordingly, in 1982, Africa imported food commodities valued at US$ 13.1 billion. In 1989, this figure climbed to US$ 13.1 billion after which it started its descent until it slumped to US$ 12.3 billion in 1991. The decline in food imports implies either the region's inability to foot import bills, its increased reliance on food aid or both.

> Since the region's capacity to pay for food imports is limited, there has been a growing dependence on food aid to bridge the food gap. In 1982, the food aid requirements of the region amounted to 4.9 million tones. Due, partly, to the 1984-85 devastating drought, this figure hiked to 7.6 million tons subsequently. Having stagnated, for the most part, are around 6 millions tons over the years 1986-88, it further decreased during the ensuing two years and rose again to attain a level of 5.4 million tons in 1991, thus reflecting the sector's poor performance in a number of African countries (Y.Tekolla, 1997, pp.75)

The lion's share of the region's food-aid requirements is that of Sub-Saharan Africa, which was the largest recipient of food aid in 1995 with about 40 per cent of world deliveries (WFP, 1995). In this sub region food aid deliveries have been expanding since 1989 although there seems to have been a decline in these in 1993 and 1994. In 1989, Sub-Saharan Africa received food aid of 2.6 million tons in cereals equivalent. In 1992, this figure shot to 5.5 million and decreased to 4.2 (1993) and 4 million (1994). The food aid delivered to the sub region in the form of non-cereals increased continuously over the same period. The amount of food aid (non cereal) delivered to the sub region in 1989 was 295.7 thousand tons. This attained a peak of 573.6 thousand tons in 1994. More than one third of the total food aid delivered in the first half of 1996 was channeled through multilateral organizations (WFP, 1996).

Apart from importing food from abroad (either in the form of aid or purchase) there are copping strategies adopted at household level to overcome the threats of delayed responses from the government and other sources. The pattern of household response, as identified by Catherine 1992, generally involves a succession of stages along a continuum that runs from long-term risk management to crisis damage containment to the extreme instance of household collapse. Each response, at best, delays the onset of the next stage, unless conditions change or external help arrives. As households proceed along this path, it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate between a "copping" response, which implies a conscious choice between alternatives, and a "suffering" response (Tesfaye, 1999).

3.4 Dimensions of the Famine Problem in the Ethiopian Context

The number of food insecure people and the intensity of food insecurity have increased in many African regions during the 1970s and 1980s and under likely scenarios continued to rise in the 1990s (Tesfaye, 1999). During the last two decades, economic growth has been negative in Ethiopia (Tesfaye, 1999). Food production in Ethiopia in the late 1980s remained below 1979-1981 levels and this showed up in decreased food availability (Y.Tekolla, 1997). Moreover, the intervals between famine events have become too short to permit reconstruction of the rural economies (Tesfaye, 1999). Accordingly, as Tesfaye insisted, most survivors have been left with fewer assets and with an increasingly risky agricultural income base that offers little buffer against future crisis.

The prevalent and generally accepted image of the famine in Ethiopia has been one of the hopeless inevitability, with food shortage and starvation being an unavoidable consequence of

environmental hardship combined with economic and political mismanagement and social chaos (Patrick W. and J.V.Braun, 1994). Accordingly, the same authors attempted to indicate the occurrence of famine with respective causes in the context of Ethiopia as shown in the table below.

Table 3. A Chronology of Ethiopian Famines and Food Shortages.

Occurrence Time	Affected Areas	Attributed Causes and Severity[23]
1913-1914	Northern Ethiopia	Lowest Nile Floods since 1695. Grain Prices said to have risen thirty fold
1920-1922	Whole Country	Moderate drought. Loss of livestock and human lives
1932-1934	Whole Country	Deduced from low level of Lake Rudolf in Northern Kenya
1953	Tigray and Wello	Severity unrecorded
1957-1958	Tigray amd Wello	Rain failure in 1957 with locust and epidemic in 1958
1962-1963	Western Ethiopia	Very severe
1964-1966	Tigray and Wello	Undocumented. Said to be worse than 1973-1975 droughts
1969	Eritrea	Estimated 1.7 million people suffering food shortage
1971-1975	Whole country	Sequence of rain failures. Estimated 1.4 million dead. 50Percent livestock lost in Tigray and Wello
1978-1979	Southern Ethiopia	Failure of belg rains
1982	Northern Ethiopia	Failure of belg rains
1983-1985	Whole Country	Sequence of rain failure. Eight million affected. Estimated 1 million dead. Much livestock loss.
1987-1988	Whole Country	Drought of undocumented severity in peripheral regions
1990-1992	Northern, Eastern, and Southwestern Ethiopia	Rain Failure and regional conflicts. Estimated 4 million people suffering food shortage
1993-1994	Tigray, Wello, Addis	4 million people requiring food assistance, including demobilized army and Somali refugees. New droughts

Sources: Patrick W. and J.V Braun, Famine and Food Security in Ethiopia: Lessons for Africa.

Devereux (2000) quoting Weeb et.al 1994 noted the occurrence of famine in the horn of Africa since 253BC, and more than forty mass mortality famines are known to have afflicted Ethiopia in the past decades. Table 3 above compiles summary information on events of famine occurrences in the Ethiopian context during the last some 80 years. In Ethiopia, the worst of the famines have

[23] The authors of the book from which this table is excerpted do not distinctively exhaust the attributed causes and severity of each famine incidence for the various occurrence times.

been concentrated in the structurally food deficit regions of the north, east and south. In these regions, net annual incomes are among the lowest in the world (less than US$100 per capita)[24]. An estimated half a million people died from 1983 to 1986. In addition, at least 2 million people were officially classified as food insecure in each year during the 1980s, a figure that rose to more than 8 million during peak famine years such as 1985 and 1991. As evidences suggest[25], such recurring drought compelled most development agents in the country to make a frequent shift in intervention strategies, from relief to rehabilitation and to development, in a cyclical sequence and with out end point. This is an implication that local capacities are by far below the level that enable withstand drought effects on the one hand, and rehabilitation efforts were not able to give ending solution to the vicious cycle of intervention on the other.

It is indicated in the above table that the country, Ethiopia, is marked by recurring and devastating famine that predate as far back to 253 BC. Neither are food production and food availability in the contemporary days sufficient and reliable. And the scourge famine is unabated even today, the 21st Century. In addition, various sources indicate that the trend of cereal production and availability is declining. Cereal production per person has dropped by an average of 4 kilograms per year between 1961 and 1987. Cereal availability has been declining at an average of 3.3 kgs per person per year (for that cereal availability is highly correlated with cereal production). In the late 1980s, the country was producing less than 150 kgs of cereal per person, while the level required for a minimum subsistence diet is approximately 240 Kgs per person per year. However, the case is different for other food crops such as pulses and root crops (Patrick W. and J.V.Braun, 1994).

[24] Tesfaye, 1999 also share this same argument with Patrick W. and J.V Braun, 1994
[25] For more detail please refer to Abraham 1995, Costantinos and Haddas 1997; and Tegegne 1994.

3.5 World Food Situation and Prospect

Literatures present that by the year 2020 the world's population is projected to grow by some 30 percent, become more urban, and have more income. Meeting the world's food needs under these conditions will have profound implications for the world's agricultural production and trading systems in coming decades. IFPRI projections suggest that food insecurity and child malnutrition will remain widespread in 2020. It is estimated that many millions of people will suffer from hunger and its debilitating consequences. A recent Food Policy Report by Per Pinstrup-Andersen, Rajul Pandya-Lorch,, and Mark W. Rosegrant, presents the most recent IFPRI projections of the future world food situation and identifies recent developments and emerging issues that will influence the prospects for global food security.

3.5.1 Prospects for Food Security

Literatures indicate that overall positive trends disguise wide disparities in production and distribution of food among regions of the world (Y.Tekolla, 1997; Tesfaye, 1999; Anderson, 1994). Today more than 700 million people in developing countries do not have access to sufficient food to lead healthy, productive lives (Anderson, 1994). Same literature indicated that more than 180 million children are under weight. As many as 500,000 preschool children go blind each year as a result of Vitamin A deficiency. Lack of Micronutrients such as vitamin A and iron not only causes suffering and death but also cuts deeply into productivity.

Although enough food is now being produced to feed everyone if it were evenly distributed, access to adequate food is largely governed by income. Findings of IFPRI in 1994 indicated that of the 1.1 billion poor people in developing countries in 1990, 50 percent were in South Asia, 19

percent in Sub-Sahara Africa. 15 percent in East Asia, and 10 percent in Latin America. In South Asia and Africa, 50 percent of the region's populations live in poverty. While significant reductions are expected in both South and East Asia, the poor in Africa were expected to increase by 40 percent by the year 2000.

Anderson (1994) argued that if sustainable balance between world food production and needs (as opposed to food demand) is to be achieved in the coming years, four conditions must be met: (1) Economic growth must resume in the developing world, especially in Sub Sahara Africa; (2) effective policies to reduce population growth and to slow rural-to-urban migration must be adopted; (3) resources must be committed to development of rural infrastructure, to continuation of international and national agricultural research, and to provision of credit and technical assistance to give farmers access to modern inputs; and (4) measures must be developed to manage natural resources and to prevent environmental degradation.

IV. Study Area Description[26]

Omosheleko woreda is located 362 km S-E of Addis Ababa in the Kembata and Tembaro Zone of the Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples' Regional State (SNNPR). The population of the woreda in the year 2000 was 155, 845 living in an estimated area of 467.35 square km. The woreda is bounded by Sorro woreda in the North; Omo river in the South and West; and Qatcha Bira woreda in the East. The topography is predominantly mountainous and hilly. The altitude ranges from 800 masl at Gibe valley to 2600 masl at Bada Mountain. The minimum average temperature of the area is 12^0c and the average maximum is about 25^0c. Annual average rainfall varies from 800 in the lowlands to 1200 mm in the highlands.

Tembaro, Kembata, and Hadiya ethnic groups are among others that co-exist in the woreda. These three ethnic groups constitute nearly for the gross sum of 79 percent of the population. The dominant proportion of the people in the woreda are Christians out of which Protestant constitutes 58 percent followed by Orthodox (24.4 percent) and Catholic (3.5 percent).

Agro-ecologically the woreda is 14 percent Highland, 34 percent Lowland, and 51 percent Mid-highland (to which the study KA belong). Secondary data sources indicate that the land use system in the woreda is predominated mainly by crop production, which constitute 49.8 percent. 16 percent of the land in the woreda is used for grazing while 31.9Percent is covered by forest (man made and natural). Some 1.9 percent of the land is covered with bush and shrubs and with 0.39 percent wasteland. The major annual crops grown in the woreda are maize, sorghum, teff, wheat, and barely. The perennial crops grown include enset, coffee, ginger, and fruit trees.

[26] This part has entirely been adopted from World Vision Ethiopia Omosheleko ADP five years (2003 to 2007) redesign document.

V. Research Methodologies

5.1 Survey Design and Coverage

The selection of the study woreda, Omosheleko, was made purposively. Firstly, financial assistance to undertake the study was provided by an NGO[27] operating in the area. Secondly, the woreda had a long history of recurrent drought induced famine that had been averted through large-scale relief operations.

The selection of the sample KA was carried out by taking various factors into considerations. Firstly, the sample KA had a history of severe recurrent drought than other KAs in the woreda[28]. Secondly, information on household income should be available for the sample since household income is one major indicator that will be used for determining local capacity. Information was thus gathered on the recurrence of drought in all the 31 KAs of the district and 8 were found to have been significantly hit by recurrent droughts that had occurred since 1984/85. In addition, information from a wealth-ranking document prepared by WV-Omosheleko ADP[29] in Feb. 2002 was used to justify the selection. Out of the 8 KAs, information on wealth ranking was found for those 6 KAs and the same were considered for random sampling. Finally, one KA (with a total households of 791) was randomly selected out of the 6 KAs. This was followed by the random selection of 163 sample households (20Percent of the total households).

[27] In the area World Vision Ethiopia Omosheleko Area Development has been operating for long and until to date, and was found willing to support the study financially. In due course, the expenses of enumerators, logistic support, and stationary materials were covered by the same.

[28] The magnitude of significance was measured by the amount of commodity delivered to victims of the drought-induced famine after standardizing the varying population size of the available KAs'.

[29] The wealth ranking was made by World Vision in February 2002 for the consumption of the organization itself and is validated by the government for formal use.

The primary sampling units for the study are households. The number of households that need to be included in the study was determined considering the research fund generated from World Vision and homogeneity of communities under study. Duly, a total of 163 households were first determined to represent the total 791 households of the sampled KA prior to the selection of villages and stratification of their respective households into various income groups (poorest of the poor, the poor, the medium, and the rich).

The list of households was taken from the wealth-ranking document prepared by World Vision for the KA. In the wealth ranking exercise 82 HHs are regarded as rich, 124 HHs as medium, 216 HHs as poor, and the remaining 369 HHs as poorest of the poor. Therefore, by taking 20 percent of the households from each category 74 HHs were taken from the 'poorest of the poor' group, 44 HHs from the 'poor' group, 28 HHs from the 'medium' group and 17 HHs from the 'rich' group. Finally, systematic sampling method was used in the selection of households from the different income groups. Accordingly, every fifth household in the list has been taken as a sample. The following figure depicts the overall sampling procedure and design used in the process.

Figure 3. Diagrammatic Representation of Sampling Stages Followed



5.2 Questionnaires and Field Instruments

The main focus of the field survey was to generate data from primary sources using appropriate instruments. These are complemented by data from the secondary sources focusing on economic, social, geographic, administrative and agro-ecological parameters of the study area. The secondary data were obtained mainly from existing records of line departments at the Region, the zonal and the woreda levels as well as from NGOs working in the area. Both formal and informal publications were referred to. In addition to this, computer generated GIS maps, service statistics, census data and other data were explored.

Primary quantitative and qualitative data were directly collected from the field using formal sample household survey methods and focus group discussions respectively. Leaders of CBOs and selected key informants participated in the focus group discussions. All in all, the field data collection process employed the three types of data collection instruments.

A. Secondary Data Tabulation Sheets

The data tabulation sheets were used to collect information mainly from existing records and other quantitative sources of information and maps. These sources include early warning reports, historical records, service statistics, census data and other available data.

B. Key Informant and CBOs' Discussion Questions

These two instruments were used to collect qualitative primary data using relevant PRA tools and other methods. The major objective of using the PRA tools was to get information on community views and perceptions towards the topic under study. The instruments used were semi-structured questions related to local emergency response capacity. Key informant interview

and community group discussion were carried out using checklists. Accordingly, KA leaders, KA elders, two irrigation water user groups, and two credit and saving associations/groups were used as source of information.

C. Household Questionnaires

The household questionnaire consisted of different types of questions categorized under seven modules. The questionnaire was originally prepared in English and then translated into the local language to make it more convenient for the respondents. Much care was taken in translating the instruments into the local language so as to avoid 'on the spot' translation that would lead to conceptual errors. The questionnaire was pre-tested on 20 households and the comments and recommendations given by the enumerators were incorporated in the final version of the questionnaire.

5.3 Selection and Training of Enumerators

A one-day training was given to five enumerators and one supervisor who have been selected to conduct the household survey. The enumerators were screened and selected on the basis of their ability to speak, read and write English and the local language as well as the legibility of their handwriting. Additional selection criteria included completion of grade 12 and experience on conducting similar surveys.

5.4 Field Organization and Work

The organization of the fieldwork began with identifying whom to contact in the field. A list of tax paying and non-tax paying households was obtained from the KA administration office[30]. The list served as the population from which the sample was to be drawn. Following the identification of the 163 sample households each enumerator was sent out to locate and contact sampled households and agree on a suitable schedule for the interview.

Similarly, lists of the existing CBOs in the KA were collected from World Vision Ethiopia Office and three were selected for the focus group discussions.

5.5 Data Processing and Analysis

Field editing has been carried out at two stages in order to ensure the consistent collection of quality data. Firstly, the field supervisor reviewed and edited the questionnaires filled-in by enumerators out in the field. Secondly, the researcher critically reviewed the filled out questionnaires each evening. The researcher finally carried out the data entry, data cleaning and analysis using the SPSS^{+}. In this study, descriptive, frequencies, and cross tabs have been used for analysis.

[30] World Vision made stratification of households in accord to their income (wealth ranking) in Feb. 2002 in the KA and this has been used as a reference to complement the HH list obtained from the KA administration office.

VI. Major Findings and Discussion

6.1 Household Situations

6.1.1 Socio Economic Background of the Study Area

The people of Omosheleko woreda and Sigezo community are fundamentally farmers with the exception of few artisan groups scattered here and there. Subsistence economy, which is the principal feature of the farmers of most parts of Ethiopia, also characterizes the community of the study KA. Traditionally, the farming community of the woreda only knew two farming seasons, Meher and Belg, as they are known locally. One could also characterize the economy as that of mono-cultural as it was essentially based on enset.

Mudulla, the woreda town, has served as important market site for selling one's product and exchange of goods. Livestock production, which is common amongst most community members, supplements the economy. Off-farm activities are primarily limited to weaving, ironsmith, woodwork and petty trade whereby its contribution to the economy is not minuscule.

The people of Omosheleko had been self-sufficient and the rural economy had also been stable for years. Informants intimate that sharing of resources in the past was a common cultural practice that helped those without resources to cope with food shortage. With the passage of time, however, the economy began to totter up and as a consequence, the social fabric was seriously infringed. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the causative factors in detail yet, a few remarks are in order to capture the general pattern. For the last few decades,

there has been a consistent growth of population in the woreda at the rate of 2.87Percent[31]. This growth has taken place in the context of a culture where children are considered to be valuable assets. This is given credence by the fact that the average family size of the woreda is 6.38 people[32] (6.18 people in the study KA). While the population growth continued unabated, the law of diminishing return has been in operation virtually unrecognized until the situation reached a crisis mark. Each newly arriving batch in the family at some point required a plot of land to maintain their livelihoods and earn their daily breads. The constant factor, in this case, the land had to be redistributed thus allowing a process of fragmentation to occur almost continually. Unable to escape the vicious circle, the option that remained open was plowing unused land, which in the past had supported the eco-system.

6.1.2 Vulnerability Analysis

The recently conducted wealth ranking[33] in the study KA indicated that the majority of the community belongs to the 'poor' and 'poorest of the poor' income categories. Nearly 46 percent of HHs belong to the 'poorest of the poor' income group where individuals are said to struggle just to meet their basic minimum human need. People in this group usually work for other to obtain food. Their possessions may not be more than old and deteriorated thatched roofed house and less than 0.125 ha of backyard garden. The 'poor' income group accounts for 28 percent of HHs. Households at the lower end of this category are primarily engaged in daily labor, have no asset, occasionally beg for food, have poor thatched house, and have less than 0.125 ha of land. They are also reported to seasonally migrate to other areas in search of jobs. The top end of this category includes families that may have average sized thatched house, 1 chicken, 0.25 to 0.5 ha

[31] A Socio Economic Profile for SNNPRS compiled by BOPED, December 1998.
[32] Ibid.
[33] World Vision Ethiopia Omosheleko ADP: Community Wealth Ranking Document, February 2002.

of land, 1 cow (shared), 1 ox (shared), and 1 goat/ sheep/goat. Sixteen percent of the HHs fall into the 'medium' income group where HHs are said to have 1 ox (shared), 1 cow (shared), 0.25 to 0.5 ha of farm land, 2 chicken, 1 or 2 sheep/goat, and thatched roofed house at good stand. Better off HHs within this group may have 2 oxen, 0.5 to 0.75 ha of farm land, 20 to 30 enset plants, more than 20 coffee plants, 5 chicken, 1-5 large ruminants, 1-3 small ruminants, mostly thatched roofed house but some times have corrugated iron sheet roofed houses.

The lower spectrum of those HHs that make up the 'rich' category are those with at least one ox but mostly two, one hectare of land, 1-2 cows, 20 coffee trees, 30 enset plants, have adequate farming tools, are able to feed their family without outside assistance, and own a corrugated iron sheet roofed house in good condition. Households in the better off segments of this category are in a position to give credit to others and also are able to employ the poor, 100 coffee trees, 200 enset plants, 2-3 ha of farm land, at least one pack animal, five to ten oxen/cow, five small ruminants, one CIS roofed house plus additional thatched house, and are able to educate their children. This income group accounts for about 10 percent of the HHs in the KA.

6.2 History of Drought-Triggered Famine in the Sigezo Area

Findings from the discussion held with key informants and secondary data from the Woreda Agriculture Office revealed that Omosheleko woreda and particularly Sigezo KA, is a drought prone area. The available information in this regard, however, is scanty. Nevertheless the little that is available indicates that drought is the foremost cause of disaster leading to chronic food insecurity in the woreda, in general, and the study area in particular. Out of the 31 KAs in the woreda, eight have been categorized as highly vulnerable while 15 were said to be affected to a

lesser degree in relative terms. The remaining eight were categorized as being relatively less prone to drought as compared to the rest.

No systematically documented data on the number of the needy population in the woreda and the quantity of relief food aid distributed was available neither at the woreda nor at the zonal level government offices. The relief food aid is usually channeled through various institutions and a compiled data is not available even in the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau of SNNPR. As a result, it was not possible to analyze trends over the years for the purpose of supplementing the primary data. This left the researcher only the option of exhaustively using the primary data, without the benefit of being able to complement the finding with secondary sources.

Table 4 presents the major drought incidences, the degree of severity, and the estimate of the affected population in the period between 1971 and 2000. The data was obtained from group discussion with key informants drawn from among the KA and CBO leaders. The table also incorporates information obtained from the woreda Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee members.

Table 4. Major Drought Incidences in Sigezo KA with Degree of Severity since 1970s

Years of Drought Incidences	Severity	Affected Population	Recovery Strategies
1971	4	4	Local Capacity + traditional strategies
1973	2	2	Local Capacity + traditional strategies
1974	2	2	Local Capacity + traditional strategies
1981	2	2	Local Capacity + traditional strategies
1985	1	1	Relief aid from WV
1991	2	2	WV Relief & Rehabilitation Program
1992	2	2	Relief aid from WV
1995	1	2	Relief aid from WV

Years of Drought Incidences	Severity	Affected Population	Recovery Strategies
1996	3	3	Relief aid from WV
1997	2	2	Relief aid from WV
1998	3	3	Relief aid from WV
1999	1	1	WV Relief & FFW programs
2000	1	1	WV &Gov't Relief, FFW & EGs Programs

Severity: 1= Very High 2= High 3= Medium 4= Low
Affected Population: 1= All 2= Most 3= Half 4= Few
Source: Interview with Woreda DPPC and Discussions with KA Key Informants, 2002.

The combined effect of drastic production shortfall caused by prolonged rainfall scarcity and soil infertility on the one hand, and the constantly increasing level of demand for food by the rapidly increasing population on the other hand has made famine to be the most common disaster in the study area. The occurrence interval at which drought occurred since the 1970's range between two to three years until 1995. Since then it became almost a yearly phenomenon. In recent years the event reached to a level of disrupting the undertaking of development endeavors in the study area as it necessarily calls for relief interventions.

The qualitative survey revealed that most of the people in the area have identified drought/shortage of rainfall and its resultant crop failure that leads to famine to be the major problem faced by the community during the last 20 years. Years of catastrophic famine include 1985, 1995, 1999, 2000 (very high severity) and 1973, 1974, 1981, 1992, 1997 (high severity). At the time of these famines a significant proportion of the population has been provided with relief food. The recent DPPC declaration document[34] specified the number of people in need of assistance for food in the study woreda to vary from 45Percent to 78Percent annually.

[34] Assistance Requirements and Implementation Strategy, DPPC, Addis Ababa, January 2002

The summary of drought-induced famine occurrence in Sigezo KA (presented in Table 4) shows that famine is not simply a periodic incident or transitory problem, but has a chronic nature. This could easily be detected from the sequence of years of drought incidence and the respective magnitude of affected population. Except for 1995 where there is a slight mismatch between the drought severity and the magnitude of people affected in all the other years there is a positive relationship, that is as the severity of the drought increases the size of the affected population also increases. This is a clear indication that communities were not able to sustain local capacities to react in response to emergencies. Rather, dependence on outside assistance remained leading mechanism for averting the threats to survival.

Community pointed out that local capacities were strong enough to absorb emergency shocks prior to the 1984/85 famine. The occurrence of the severe drought induced famine in 1984/85, which resulted in the loss of many lives, highly depleted or exhausted the capacity of the communities to withstand emergencies. Thus, the 1984/85 famine established a critical point of departure – from 'local capacity to manage emergencies' to a state where communities had to 'depend on relief aid' to avert the loss of lives from famine. The main reason for such a radical shift of survival mechanism, as told by the elders, was the severity of the 1984/85 drought. The drought was so prolonged, intensive and widespread that it resulted in an unprecedented depletion of household possessions, particularly the productive assets that serve as the very foundation of local capacities. Almost all households were reported to have lost most of their livestock due to the drought and were forced to sell their productive assets in order to buy food. From 1984/85 on wards, therefore, people in the area became increasingly vulnerable even to the slight shocks created by moisture stress. The elders and CBO members noted that the famine

breakouts of 1987, 1991, and 1992 were as much events triggered by the severe erosion of local copping capacities, as they were of intensive and widespread droughts. Likewise, although the scale of the damage was minimum, the droughts of 1991, 1992, and 1997 brought about significant depletion of household asset possession. As a result, the massive rehabilitation undertaking of World Vision Omosheleko ADP (1984/85 to 1992) that focused on the supply of productive agricultural inputs to farmers was unable to restore local capacities to their former levels.

6.2.1 The FY' 2000 Food Crisis in the Study Area

In 2000, Omosheleko woreda and other woredas in the whole SNNPR suffered a massive drought. Drought of such a scale perhaps was unprecedented ever after the 1984/85-famine threat. It is reported that about 89 percent of people in the woreda were under the threat of starvation in one way or another. The woreda in general was one of the areas in the region, which was particularly hard hit by the drought. Informants observe that the immediate cause of the famine of 2000 was the absence/shortage of rainfall for two consecutive years.

The people of Omosheleko staggered along to survive the consequences of drought by making strenuous recourse to all options traditionally employed. Food stocks waned, inter-village food transfer ceased as almost the entire community was swept by the famine, the meager assets available lost significance (particularly for the poor and very poor), animals died, oxen used for traction were consumed, existing government could not provide critically needed interventions adequately. The result was starvation of large scale where the toll increased from day to day.

6.3 Agricultural Productivity and Local Responses to Emergencies

6.3.1 General

Agriculture, comprising crop and livestock productions, is the major economic activity in the study area. Secondary sources[35] indicated that more than 92 percent of the households in the KA make their living primarily from agriculture directly or indirectly. This is complemented by off farm earning activities. Crop production constitutes the largest share of the production. The household survey also portrayed the same picture in that nearly 98Percent of households depend on agriculture (complemented by income generation from other sectors). Needless to say, therefore, that the performance of the agricultural sector has significant impact on the food security situation of the area at least in the short run. Key Informants and CBO members regarded the years 1999 and 2000 as periods of severe famine comparable to that of 1984/85. In Particular, 2000 was identified as a year of severe famine threat since the effect of the low level of production in 1999 was carried forward to 2000. During this critical year of famine 84.7 percent (135 households) of sampled households and 64 percent of the population of the study KA received food assistance.

6.3.2 Production Situation Vs Food Deficiency

Agriculture in the area is mainly rain fed and thus production is highly dependent on the availability of rainfall. The survey revealed that 82.2 percent of respondents were totally dependent on rain fed agriculture while the remaining 17.8 percent (29 farmers) had access to irrigation during the 2000 production year. Even then, the available irrigation potential was reported not to be adequate to enable the farmers cultivate all their farmland. Almost 73 percent

[35] FY'2000 Omosheleko Woreda Agriculture Office Annual Report

of irrigation users were unable to put their total farmland under irrigation. The survey results showed that the total area of land under irrigation was 5.25 ha. Some 16 respondents were shown to have 0.13 ha of land while the remaining 13 farmers owned 0.25 ha of irrigable land. In terms of income class, as portrayed in the table below, 39, 7, 16, and 17 percents of farmers from the rich, medium, poor and poorest of the poor classes had access to have been using irrigation in 2000, respectively.

Table 5. Income class of HHs cross-tabulated with Irrigation use

Description Of Characteristics		Irrigation Use				Total
		Yes	Percent of total	No	Percent of total	
Income Classes of Households	Rich	7	39	11		18
	Medium	2	7	26		28
	Poor	7	16	36		43
	Poorest of Poor	13	17	61		74
Total		*29*		*134*		*163*

Survey respondents stated that overall production during 2000 in the study KA was below normal. As indicated in table below almost 76.7 percent of respondents in 2000 produced by far below what they normally get while 4.3 percent of respondents produced nothing at all. In contrast, only 19 percent of the respondents said they were able to produce the same as in a normal year. Furthermore, 76.7 percent of respondents that claimed production to be below normal stated that no root crop production was possible in 2000. Rather, they were only able to obtain some harvest from drought tolerant crops such as 'enset' and 'Godere' the production of which again was stated to be below normal.

Table 6. Frequency of Crop Production Rate in 2000

S/N	Crop Production Rate	Frequency	Percent	Remark
1	Same as Normal Year	29	19	
2	Below Normal Year	152	76.7	
3	Not Produced	9	4.3	
	Total	163		

Further more, it is presented in the table 7 below that crop production rate in 2000 was same as normal year for those respondents using irrigation. Thus, all the 29 irrigation users claimed to have equivalent production to that of normal years. Discussion made with representatives of irrigation users revealed that production in their context is normal in most years provided that they use appropriate quantities of inputs. This clearly highlights the importance of adequate moisture availability in the soil through rainfall precipitation or irrigation in order to maintain production.

The survey results showed that 17.8 percent of the respondents use agricultural inputs and all of them were irrigation water users. The remaining 82.2Percent of the respondents claimed not to use any agricultural inputs during 2000 as moisture stress had been severe in the indicated year.

Table 7. Production rate cross-tabbed with input and irrigation use

S/N	Crop Production Rate	Input Use	Irrigation Users	Remark
1	Same as Normal Year	29	29	All irrigation users have used inputs in 1992 production seasons
2	Below Normal Year	0	0	
3	Not Produced	0	0	
	Total	29	29	

However, there is variation among input users in terms of the type and amount they were using in 2000, which again has an impact on crop productivity. Some 87 percent of the respondents (25 farmers) used fertilizer in 2000 while only one farmer used pesticides alone. Two farmers used fertilizer and HYV in combination while another farmer used fertilizer and herbicides. In comparison with the recommended rate of fertilizer application (which is one quintal/ha DAP and one quintal/ha urea), what farmers are using was not satisfactory. The quantities of inputs used showed inability of most farmers to purchase inputs be it in combination or separately. Only 12.5 percent of the farmers used adequate quantities of fertilizer in 2000 whereas the other 71.9 percent of the farmers used inadequate levels. The proportion of input users who use inadequate quantities in combination constitutes 10.3 percent of respondents as indicated in table 8 below.

Table 8. Type of Inputs used by irrigation users, frequency and percent

S/N	Input Type	Frequency	Percent	Quantity Assessment	
				Adequate	Inadequate
1	Fertilizer	25	87.1	12.5Percent	71.9Percent
2	Pesticides	1	3.4	3.1Percent	
3	HYV	0	0		3.1Percent
4	Inputs in combination	3	10.3		9.3Percent

Data obtained from the Woreda Agriculture Office shows that poor compliance with the recommendations of the extension package with regard to the amount and combinations of inputs applied to field crops is widespread in the whole woreda. Of those registered as user of the existing extension package more than 95 percent were sole users of fertilizer in 2001 production year and 93 percent in 2002. Those using the right combination of input with the right quantities in the indicated years stand at five and seven percent, respectively.

Discussion made with Key Informants also revealed the widespread tendency to use much lower quantities than what is suggested in the extension package even during normal production years. Even those irrigation users reported to use inputs below what is recommended as shown above table 8. Table 9 presents the summary of farmers' responses when asked the constraints they faced in the utilization of inputs during normal production years. The table lists the proportion of respondents against the listed reasons either for using inputs below the standard (both in terms of quantities and combinations) or failure to use any input at all.

The responses summarized in table 9 below show that, 81.6 percent of the sampled households identified high cost of inputs (49.1 percent by its own and 32.5 percent combined with others) as the major constraint to adopting the extension package fully. Secondary data sources indicate that there has been an increase in the amount of down payment overtime, from no down payment before 1990 to 25 percent in 1991 and to 75 percent since 1999. Moreover, down payment has totally been removed since 2001 following withdrawal of government subsidy. Alongside to down payment withdrawal, the cost of inputs kept on increasing steadily. That is from 180 birr/quintal for DAP in 1997 to 300 birr/quintal in 2002 implying a 40 percent net increase.

In combination with the high cost of inputs, procedural restriction has been identified to be a constraint by 17.8 percent of the respondents and separately by 1.8 percent of sampled households. Some 10.4 percent of households responded by stating that it was due to lack of interest that they did not participate in the extension package. Interestingly, 14.7 percent of surveyed households stated that they use locally available compost or manure as a substitute for the inorganic fertilizer.

In general, except for the respondents who said that they use organic fertilizers and the respondents that seem to show lack of interest, the rest are faced with problems of access despite their need.

Table 9. Reasons for not Participating in the Extension Package Approach During Normal Production Seasons

S/N	Description of Response	Frequency	Percent	Rank
1	High Cost of Inputs	80	49.1	1
2	No Access to Inputs	2	1.3	7
3	Procedural Restrictions	3	1.8	6
4	Organic Material Use	8	4.9	5
5	Not Interested	17	10.4	3
6	High Cost + Procedural restriction	29	17.8	2
7	High Cost + Organic Material	16	9.8	4
8	High Cost + Any of the rest	8	4.9	5
	Total	163	100	

Secondary data obtained from the Woreda Agriculture Office indicate that as a result of the constraints discussed above, the number of farmers participating in the extension package shows a decreasing trend overtime. This is both for the whole woreda and particularly for the study KA. The trend has been that the number has decreased from 27 percent in 1996 to 8 percent in 2002 after 4 percent increase in 1998 for the whole woreda. Similarly, in the study KA, the number of package adopting farmers has been decreased from 32 percent in 1996 to 14 percent in 2002.

In general, the use of agricultural input has become a critical issue from two perspectives. First, the production of staple crops is becoming unthinkable unless fertilizer is used. Farmers increasingly resort to the use of inorganic fertilizer in order to redress the nutrient depletion in the soil. One of the key informants aptly described the condition by stating that, "*Unless bribed through fertilizer provision our land refused to give us production*". As a result, farmers are

forced either to use inadequate input that their finance allow or apply the recommended rate of input by selling household productive assets. Discussion held with key informants highlighted the prevalence of selling productive assets to effect repayment. Particularly during the 1998 and 1999 production seasons, when widespread crop failure occurred, inputs purchased on credit basis were used. Consequently, most[36] farmers sold their productive household possessions to repay their loans. Similar incidences seem to happen with varying magnitude in other years. Therefore, in the context where agricultural production is the primary economic activity for 92 percent of people, failure to use inputs even in normal seasons poses the risk of severe food shortages for most people.

Second, emerging policies related to input uses are poorly compatible with the reality faced by rural people. The removal of government subsidy on agricultural inputs and the subsequent rise of cost is a case in point. On the one hand, the capacity of farmers to purchase inputs is deteriorating while input prices have steadily increased. On the other hand, there is a sharp decline in the price of agricultural produces at times of bumper harvests, which severely reduce expected income of farmers. Available data from the woreda agriculture office together with that generated from key informants pointed out areas of such market instability. The price of cash crops mainly ginger and coffee, for example, declined from 470 birr/quintal and 1470

[36] Only limited information is available on the magnitude of productive assets sold in response to the production failure in 1998 and 1999. 1998 was a period of bumper harvest that unfortunately resulted in lower market price for agricultural produces, in most cases even below covering cost of production. As a result, farmers were unable to repay the input loan they took from the woreda agriculture office and thus compelled to sell their productive assets such as livestock. On the other hand, the year 1999 was a year of poor production caused by failure of rainfall, although farmers used more or less equal amount of inputs to that of 1998. In this production year too, farmers were compelled to sell their productive asset to repay their loan. To assess and explore the magnitude of the effect, however, focused studies have not been carried out and thus qualitative estimations of key informants are considered.

birr/quintal in 1997 to 147 birr and 350 birr, respectively, in 2001[37]. While that of maize usually decline by some 50 to 70 percent whenever bumper harvest is obtained. In relation to such fluctuations in the price of farm produces, key informants said, *"... mostly, these days, we are producing to feed the consumer even at the expense of our production cost, ... no one is showing us practical concern when prices for our farm produces sharply decline ..."*

6.3.3 Implications on Local Response Capacity

In a condition where the existing economic base of communities is poor, as is the case for the study area, and hand to mouth living tend to predominate, the need to stabilize agricultural market is not optional. Communities in the study area are vulnerable to shocks of even a single drought. Thus, measures directed at supporting and stabilizing production are in alignment with building local emergency response capacities. The following two major areas of considerations should be made.

A. Minimizing the unintended effects of the extension package on local capacity of households

In the context of the study area and its overall situation, 'famine is largely a function of the failure of institutions, organizations, and policies, not just the failure of markets and production' (Tesfaye, 1999). Central and local governments as well as community institutions play key roles in monitoring the causes of famine as well as preventing its worst effects. The absence of effective systems of government can be both a cause and a consequence of famine as mentioned elsewhere in this paper. A notable example of this as indicated above in section 6.3.2 is where the extension package meant for boosting agricultural production in the area turned out to

[37] WV-Ethiopia Omosheleko ADP, five years (2003 to 2007) agreement document.

threaten the livelihood of communities. There was high probability of farmers who participated in the extension programme to deplete their productive asset like livestock in an attempt to repay credit. By implication, therefore, the design of policies, particularly the extension strategy, which should have been designed in such a way that it supports the building of local capacities, has instead contributed to eroding the same through unintended consequences.

B. Boosting Household Level Agricultural Production as an Instrument to Reduce Vulnerability and Enhance Retention of Productive Assets

In the overall context of building local response capacity of farmers, boosting household level agricultural production is important. In the study area, those households unable to produce enough were vulnerable to the threats of recurrent emergencies because they lack adequate quantities of food to enable them to withstand the shock. As a result, they are forced to deplete their productive assets. In 2000, as revealed through the survey, the period of food insecurity has shown positive relation with productivity status of farmers.

Table 10. Period of food sufficiency and production level cross-tabulated, 2000

Description of Responses		**Total Months HHs were food Sufficient in 2000**									
		3	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**
Irrigation Production	Yes					5	9	6	1	3	5
	No	8	26	48	35	1	2	3	5	6	
	Total	8	26	48	35	6	11	9	6	9	5

As can be seen from table 10, a total of 82 farmers (50.3 percent of the respondents) had sufficient food only for three to five months. Likewise, 21.5 percent of the respondents had enough food for six months in same production year. The remaining 28.2 percent of the sampled households had enough food for seven to twelve months, out of which only 5 had enough meal throughout the year while 9 for eleven months.

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Where mode of production is taken into consideration 71 percent of the sampled households who did not have access to irrigation had enough food for only three to six months. Only 10 percent of non-irrigation users responded to have enough food for more than seven months. On the other hand, all the 29 irrigation users reported to have enough food for more than seven months in 2000. Five of the irrigation using respondents reported to have sufficient food for twelve months. Decrease in the period of food deficiency or increase of food sufficiency in drought years such as 2000 justify the need to have in place opportunities to preserve assets and thus local capacities. This was confirmed by key informants who noted that extended period of food sufficiency at household level in 2000 enabled communities to withstand the threats of famine until outside assistance arrived. By implication, hence, those households with more than seven months of sufficiency period (39 percent of the respondents) were able to retain their asset without being affected by the famine.

6.4 Household Income and Local Responses to Emergencies

6.4.1 General

Since the 1984/85 drought induced famine in the area humanitarian organizations such as World Vision, EECMY, Kale Hiwot, etc have been implementing relief and rehabilitation activities in response to frequent drought and famine that have occurred since then. Over time, however, it became clear that relief and rehabilitation strategies in and by themselves could not mitigate the chronic food insecurity situation in the area. Therefore, the introduction of income generating activities as part of development intervention has been thought indispensable in bringing about sustainable food security at household level. To this end, cash and in kind credit programs were

implemented[38]. Following government policy changes that came in three years ago, Micro Finance Institutions have started operating in various parts of the country. In the study area, Omo MFI has been providing credit and saving services since 1999.

Though more than 92 percent of people in the area depend on fragile agricultural production systems for their livelihood sustenance the study identified the importance of off farm and non farm activities as being highly complementary to the farming system. Non-farm activities also enable people to shift from sole dependence on agriculture to engagement in off farm and non-farm economic ventures specially at times of difficulties. This has mainly been because of the risks and uncertainties that beset agricultural production in the area as members of one solidarity group noted. As shown in table 11 below, only 26 percent of the respondents confined their occupation to the agricultural sector in 2000, majority of which were poor and poorest of poor income groups. The remaining 74 percent of the respondents reported to engage in both off farm and non farm activities either complementing agriculture or as an independent entity.

In terms of occupation in specific market based economic activities, 30 percent are involved in petty trading while 21.5 percent sell firewood. A further 13.5 percent of the respondents are also engaged in working as daily labourer either migrating to other areas or working for richer households in the study KA itself. Some, 5.52 percent of the respondents reported to be engage in other non-agricultural occupations such as carpet making, weaving, etc.

[38] From 1986 to 1989 WV first implemented the Revolving Agricultural Inputs Loan Scheme (RAILS) that mainly emphasize on delivery of in kind agricultural inputs on credit basis. From 1990 to 1996 Revolving Loan Scheme that incorporate delivery of non-agricultural loans was on work. Still later in 1997, the organization has shifted to the implementation of Micro Enterprise Development Scheme that mainly was emphasizing on provision of cash credit. In 1999, following the change in government policy, the organization totally ceased those credit programs.

In terms of income classes of the respondents, 66.7 percent of the rich were engaged in petty trading, as were 50 percent of the medium income families. About one third or 32.6 percent of the poor had been engaged in firewood sale and 18.7 percent in petty trading. Some 33 percent of the poor were confined to subsistence farming. Among the poorest of the poor income class families 28.4 percent were engaged in firewood sale and 23 percent in petty trading. Among this group 20 percent of the respondents were without any significant economic engagement except practicing limited back yard farming.

Table 11. Occupation Other than Agriculture Cross Tabulated with Income class of respondents

Occupations	Income Class of Respondents				**Total**	
	Rich	Medium	Poor	P.Poor	Frequency	Percent
1. No Other Activity	4	9	15	15	43	26
2. Weaving	1	0	0	1	2	1.24
3. Carpentry	0	0	0	1	1	1
4. Carpet Making	0	1	0	1	2	1.24
5. Petty Trading	12	14	8	17	51	30
6. Daily Labourer	0	2	4	14	20	13.5
7. Firewood Sale	0	0	14	21	35	21.5
8. Occupations Combined	1	2	2	4	9	5.52
Overall	18	28	43	74	163	100

6.4.2 Credit Services Towards Diversifying and Maximizing Household Income

As depicted in the above table 11, most of the respondents (74 percent) are engaged in activities other than agriculture as supplementary sources of livelihood for household sustenance. As discussion with key informants and credit groups indicated, however, households face shortage of initial capital either to expand existing businesses or start up new businesses. Data obtained from the woreda council indicated the absence of lending institutions in the woreda except for Omo MFI. The scale of operation of Omo MFI, as information generated from the same

portrayed, is limited only in nine KAs, including the study KA, Sigezo. In the study KA, the service coverage of the MFI was rather low in 2000 and even decreasing over time. In 1998, for example, the number of credit clients in the study KA was 26 and rose to 91 in 1999. Then the figure declined to 44 in 2000. The number further dropped off to none in 2001 and in 2002. However, the saving service provided by the MFI has continued and to date clients from the study KA have made a total saving of Birr 27,716.

Table 12. Credit Clients of Omo MFI during 2000

Income Class	Credit Received		Total
	Yes	No	
1. Rich	3	15	18
2. Medium	5	23	28
3. Poor	7	36	43
4. Poorest of the Poor	4	70	74
Total	19	144	163

Based up on the findings of the household survey (see table 12 above), only 11.6 percent of the respondents had access to cash credit given by the MFI in 2000. Despite the unmet demand for credit, the remaining 88.4 percent of the respondents were without access to credit.

Respondents took credit for various reasons. Except one client who borrowed money to meet household consumption, the remaining 18 respondents (96 percent) took credit for the purpose of agricultural input purchase, livestock purchase, and to start new businesses. Thus, seven respondents used the credit for starting new business, six other respondents purchased livestock and a further six purchased agricultural inputs.

Table 13. Purpose of Credit Taken By Clients of Omo MFI

Credit Taken For	Income Class of Respondents				**Total**	
	Rich	Medium	Poor	P.Poor	Frequency	Percent
1. Agricultural Input Purchase	1	0	2	2	5	
2. Livestock Purchase	1	2	2	0	5	
3. Start New Business	1	0	3	2	6	
4. Household Consumption	0	1	0	0	1	
5. Agric. Input + Livestock	0	1	0	0	1	
6. Livestock + New Business	0	1	0	0	1	
Total	3	5	7	4	19	

In general, the qualitative survey showed that the need for credit on the part of the community is pressing despite the history of defaulting that exists in the area. Key informants also admitted, "*there were/are/will be defaulters in our community, as there also were/are/will be those who timely pay what they have taken*". Hammering on its importance to alleviate the food insecurity situation prevailing in the area one key informant articulated, "*Credit will chase poverty if given in time (the right season) and quantity (amount) to the right person (those with experiences paying timely) with adequate time to reimburse*".

6.4.3 Household Income and Its Impact on Local Capacities

In the broadest sense, major sources of household income in the study area include engagement in agriculture (crop and livestock), off farm and non-farm activities. As the study revealed, these sources are not mutually exclusive, rather communities undertake them simultaneously and/or in alternative. As respondents indicated both in the household survey and in the discussion, communities in the study area are experienced in making a temporary shift in occupation so as to generate additional income. In table 11 above, for example, 43 respondents claimed to be engage

in no other occupation except agriculture during normal time. Nevertheless, this same figure dropped to 18 (see table 14) as the other 25 respondents made a shift to other income-generating schemes. This was induced by the fact that agricultural production in 2000 was either inadequate, as was the case for irrigation users, or totally collapsed, in the case of rain fed farmers. On the other hand, 20 farmers had reported to make a living from being employed as daily laborers during normal times (see table 11), but this figure rose to 44 in times of food shortage (see table 14). By same token, 51 respondents reported to make petty trading as their occupation (see table 11) during normal times, yet decreased to 22 (see table 14) as households were forced to use their investment capital for consumption.

Such a temporary shift in occupation at times of famine inherently imply how households in the study area attempt to cope on by their own even before putting trust on the assistance of outsiders. This has been the result of deepest conviction farmers developed through experience, "*nature (physical environment) has significantly decreased its provision long ago and now it is time for us to go for maximum possible use of our social and economic environments*" quoted from the saying of a key informant. The need to strengthen such local initiatives through development related interventions such as credit provisions particularly during normal times are not only optional but also a must. The locational advantage the area has (surrounding the woreda town) in addition to having extensive potential for bulk production of coffee and ginger provides good opportunity for enhancing market based economic ventures. In the light of this, concerted and sustained effort needs to be made to promote a relevant shift in occupation, from mere dependence on fragile agricultural farming system to diversified off and non-farm occupations,

in the context of complementing agriculture occupation or enabling farm households develop independent additional occupations.

Table 14. Main Income Sources than Crop Sale Cross Tabulated with Income Classes of Respondents in 2000

Description of Income Sources	Income Class of Respondents				**Total**	
	Rich	Medium	Poor	P.Poor	Frequency	Percent
1. No other source	0	4	5	8	18	
2. Tree Sale	1	4	6	8	19	11.7
3. Seedling Sale	2	1	3	7	13	9
4. Fruit Sale	2	1	2	3	8	5
5. Business Income	1	8	4	9	22	13.5
6. Daily Labourer	0	3	14	27	44	
7. Fattening	11	4	7	5	27	16.6
8. Gift from others	0	1	1	4	6	3.45
9. Vegetable Sale	0	0	1	1	2	1.25
10. Monthly Wage	1	0	0	0	1	0
11. Sources Combined	0	2	0	2	4	2.5
Overall	18	28	43	74	163	100

Household Income: Status and Main Sources

Household income in the study area was found to be a function of three major sectors of engagement: livestock and livestock product sale, crop sale, and sources other than agriculture. In 2000, 42.3 percent of the respondents have been engaged in livestock and related production while 17.8 and 74 percent of respondents earned income from crops and sources other than agriculture, respectively (see table 14). Average income earned from sale of livestock, crop, and non-agricultural sources amounted to Birr 136, 97, and 137 per respondent, respectively. In terms of income category, the rich earned Birr 427 while the poorest of the poor has an average income of birr 72 per respondent from sources other than agriculture.

Two common denominators are shared among all the three income sources, as shown in Table 15. First, the rich in all cases obtained much more income (twice or third the average) compared to the other income classes. And this is the result of inequalities in productive asset possession and existing capital. Second, the maximum average income obtained by respondents from the three sources in aggregate is far below the poverty line[39]. In addition, there was also expenditure variation among households even belonging to same income classes.

Table 15. Average Income obtained in 2000 from various sources (Birr)

Sources of Income	Income Class of Respondents				**Total**	
	Rich	Medium	Poor	P.Poor	Average	Percent
1. Livestock Sale						
Respondents	15	15	16	23		42.3
Average Income (Birr)	207	142	141	76	136	
2. Crop Sale						
Respondents	7	2	7	13		17.8
Average Income (Birr)	247	99	76	59	97	
3. Sources Other than Agriculture						
Respondents	18	24	38	66		74
Average Income (Birr)	427	147	114	72	137	

How To Expend Income Matters The Building of Local Capacity

Household expenditure pattern in the area varies in accordance with the income class of respondents, which further depends mainly on the level of income generated, and priorities of the needs prevailing. The survey results indicated (table 16 below) that household income obtained in 2000 was mostly used for purchase of additional food, as food deficiency was top priority.

[39] One dollar per day per person has been regarded as a bench mark for poverty line

money. This provides a good entry point for interventions directed at enhancing the local saving culture (be it stressed or relaxed) during good times so that farmers could use it as investment on existing businesses or to start new businesses. A 23 years old solidarity group member who has benefited from the saving service delivered by Omo MFI, said, *"... I have never seen a situation that allow most of my community undertake a relaxed saving. Rather, most of us persisted to save at the cost of our present need so that our children will have something to enjoy in the future with decreased suffering ..."*.

Moreover, respondents were asked what they would have spent their money on had they been able to get more income in 2000. As depicted in the table 17 below, the majority (48.47 percent) of the respondents (63 percent of which are poorest of the poor) opted for additional food followed by 17.79 percent for livestock purchase. Some 13.5 percent of respondents expressed their inclination towards agricultural input purchase (all of which would likely be irrigation water users) whilst 10.34 percent were interested in starting new business.

Table 17. Expenditure if More Income was obtained in 2000

Expenditure Items	Income Class of Respondents				**Total**	
	Rich	Medium	Poor	P.Poor	Frequency	Percent
1. Additional Food	1	4	24	50	79	48.47
2. Agricultural Inputs	2	8	5	7	22	13.5
3. Livestock Purchase	4	10	8	7	29	17.79
4. Household Furniture	0	0	1	1	2	1.23
5. Cloth	1	1	0	2	4	2.45
6. Schooling for Children	0	0	1	0	1	0.61
7. Electronics	2	0	0	0	2	1.23
8. House Construction	4	3	0	0	7	4.29
9. Start New Business	4	2	4	7	17	10.43
Overall	18	28	43	74	163	100

Clearly, there are wide differences on how additional income is spent among respondents of the different income classes. As indicated in table 17 above, 70.27 percent of the poorest of the poor income class and 55.8 percent of the poor income class households could have spent their additional income on the purchase of more food and clothing. Only the remaining 29.7 percent and 44.2 percent of these income classes, respectively, had the intention to invest on productive ventures. Such differences in expenditure priorities are result of variation in household economic resources and the severity of the problems at hand. Accordingly, those households with immediate unsatisfied home needs tend to likely spend their income on consumption. Nevertheless, households to strive for the creation of productive asset, once their immediate needs are satisfied. A key informant expressed his feeling regarding income generation and expenditure, *"Recurring droughts forced us to do two things which we do not like most. First, we are becoming branded as buyers of food, which for years we were the producer. Second, following the occurrence of drought triggered famine, we tend to persist selling our assets, which for years we strived to buy."*

6.5 Productive Asset Possession and Local Responses to Emergencies

6.5.1 General

The creation of asset, as the study explored, was found to be a function of household income, be it generated from agricultural and/or off and non-farm sources. Discussion with key informant revealed that people in the area perceive asset possession – both productive and unproductive – as a means of survival during bad times and as a traditional means of storing household surplus. In rare cases community perceive assets as prestige. In analyzing the variety of assets identified during discussion with key informants and CBO members it was possible to distinguish between

the two types of assets that farmers have at their disposal. Firstly, there are assets that represent stores of value for liquidation, which are acquired during non-crisis years as a form of savings and self-insurance. These may include small livestock or personal possessions such as jewelry. Secondly, there are assets that play a key role in generating income, such as land and draught animals. These are less liquid as stores of value, and are much more costly to the farm household in their disposal. Accordingly, the study revealed that households first would dispose of assets held as stores of value before disposing of productive assets.

For almost all respondents, however, the year 2000 was not meant for asset creation, but rather for depletion. As indicated in table 21 below, for example, 15 respondents sold their livestock to cope with the threat of famine. Similarly, a further 20 respondents were forced to sell (6 respondents) or consume (14 respondents) their store of seed. There were also among the sample nine respondents who pledged/sold their farm land. In addition, a further 14 respondents sold various household possessions. As key informants described, "*...depletion of asset from one social group (mostly the medium, the poor and the poorest of the poor) is always accompanied by accumulation else where (mostly among the well to do) in same community ...*".

6.5.2 Asset Ownership Status

Assets which community members in the study area recognize as very important include land, livestock, agricultural tools, and other household possessions such as furniture (purchased in the local market) and equipment which households use for income generation. It is clearly presented in the table 18 below that asset ownership among respondents was not as such satisfactory in 1992. Almost all respondents (except one) have claimed to have assets but were not adequate

enough (in terms of quantity and combination with each other) to absorb emergency shocks of the magnitude that occurred in 1992. Just over 34 percent of the respondents had only farmland of various sizes. Those that have livestock in combination with farmland accounted for 33.13 percent of the households. Household who owned farmland in combination with agricultural tools and livestock represented just under 12 percent.

Table 18. Overview of Respondents' Asset Possession

Type of Asset owned	Frequency	Percent
No Asset	**1**	0.6
Livestock	4	2.5
Land	**56**	34.4
Agricultural Tools	3	1.8
HH Possession	2	1.2
Livestock + Land	54	33
Livestock + Agricultural Tools	2	1.2
Livestock + HH Possession	2	1.2
Land + Agricultural tools	9	5.5
Land + HH Possessions	8	4.9
Jewel + HH Possessions	1	0.6
Livestock + Land + Agricultural tools	19	11.7
Livestock + land + household possessions	2	1.2
Total	**163**	**100**

The survey findings show that 95.7 percent of the respondents own their own land (see table 19 below). The remaining 2.46 percent of respondents had own, rented and shared land in combination. Only three respondents were without access to farmland in any form.

Table 19. Land Access Status

Type of Access	Frequency	Percent
Owned	156	95.7
Rented/Borrowed	2	1.2
No Access	3	1.8
Owned + Rented	1	0.6
Owned + Share Cropping	1	0.6
Total	163	100

Discussion with key informants revealed that livestock in the area provide essential products to owners, such as meat, milk, manure, traction power, transport, fuel, skins, hides, and other products. Average holding of the same, as summarized in the table 20 below, was by far below the required quantity and quality to meet listed purposes. Almost 84 percent of the respondents own large livestock while all the respondents claimed to have small livestock such as chicken. In particular, 42.9 percent of the respondents had less than one on average while 51.5 percent of the respondents had one cow on average. Just under 20 percent of the respondents all of which belong to the medium and rich income classes had one donkey on average.

Table 20. Type and Average Number of Livestock Owned

Type of Livestock	Average Possession	Number of HHs	Percent
Oxen Owned	0.9	70	42.9
Cows Owned	1.0	84	51.5
Calves Owned	1.0	32	19.6
Heifers Owned	1.0	33	20.3
Sheeps Owned	1.5	44	27
Goats Owned	1.7	37	22.7
Chickens Owned	4.0	163	100
Horse Owned	1.0	6	4
Mule Owned	1.0	3	1.8
Donkey Owned	1.0	32	19.6

In general, discussion with key informants revealed the very importance of having assets. All participants of the discussion branded assets as major forms of savings, part of local resilience, old age and health insurance, and transferable to generations as inheritance. Most important is the relentless effort households exert to create dispensable assets, even at the expense of their short-term or immediate need.

6.5.3 Agricultural Production and Household Income towards Asset Creation

In the context of the study area, agriculture, off farm, and non-farm activities are major sources from which households income is derived. And as discussed in the previous sections of the paper, these three sectors of engagement complement each other. Farmers mostly use income generated through off farm and non-farm engagements to purchase agricultural inputs. Incomes obtained through engagement in agricultural activities are also used for supporting existing non-farm businesses.

However, as recurrent drought affects the performance of these sectors, the income of households in most cases has persistently been deteriorating. Key informants stated, "... *opportunities to diversify and maximize our income are getting narrow as our community has increased in number ... specialization on existing occupations is also becoming difficult as adequate initial capital for investment from lending institutions is out of reach...*" As a result, key informants indicated, 'hand to mouth' pattern of living became the dominant living style making investment on asset creation elusive. Despite such grim situations, households persistently attempt to save money and even invest on purchase of assets that add value to the performance of household economy.

6.6 Coping Strategies and Responses to Emergencies

Although the effect of droughts often covers wider geographic area, the capacity of the local people to withstand the shock varies among households. Discussion with key informants and KA administrators indicated that there are groups of people in the study area, which are most

vulnerable to drought-induced famine. These include households with large family size or large number of dependants (children, aged and disabled); those families with smaller land holding or no livestock resources, no oxen to plough with; those with none or few stands of perennial crops; and those without access to or control over farm land. This means that, although the occurrence of drought in the area affects the whole community, all households are not equally vulnerable to the threat or do not adopt uniform copping mechanisms. This is because the types of coping strategies adopted by farmers, as identified by the survey, are partly the result of households' production performance and partly the income of households from engagement in off farm activities.

Furthermore, as communities in Sigezo KA show by variation in the ownership of productive assets and average annual income, so do the traditional copping strategies and institutional responses. Key informants and CBOs indicated that seasonal shortages for the rich and the medium income class families produce famine conditions for families of the poor and very poor income classes. As the study indicated, the periods from October to January in 2000 were period of food deficits for some rich income class households and most medium households (where change in consumption pattern had been adopted as coping strategy). However, these same periods were periods of famine for most households in the medium income and those in the poor and poorest of poor categories (where irreversible strategies such as sale of productive assets had been adopted as coping mechanism). Thus, poor and very poor households in the KA, having smaller holdings and a weaker resource base, were more vulnerable to stress than are the richer families, and began to suffer earlier during food shortages. In addition, the study has revealed

that the poor resort to early sale of livestock, pledge farms, incur debt, sell labor, and borrow grain than the rich as part of their coping response.

6.6.1 Local Responses (Coping Strategies) and Local Capacities

Households in the study area did not respond arbitrarily to variability in food supply in 2000. People who live in conditions that put their main source of income at recurrent risk have developed self-insurance strategies to minimize risk to their food security and livelihood. As the survey identified, coping strategies were fundamental to the survival of farmers in the area in 2000, particularly when outside food assistance has been delayed by an average of a month and a half.

The survey results revealed that people prone to threats of emergencies induced by drought have their own copping strategies or ways of responding to the stress situation (see table 21 below). At times of food scarcity, people in the study area used to respond by resorting to a number of mechanisms to withstand the worst effects and adjust their way of living. The most common strategies employed by farmers in the study area during 2000 were categorized into reversible and irreversible strategies. As indicated in the table 21 below, the reversible strategies deployed by households in 2000 were highly related to consumption patterns that mainly include reducing the daily quantity (147 HHs) and frequency (150 HHs) of meals served and eating less preferable food items (134 HHs). These strategies along with others such as working as daily laborer, eating wild food and borrowing food grain or cash were found to make up the reversible strategies[40].

[40] Reversible strategies are those mechanisms frequently deployed by households to meet temporary food deficiencies and that do not bring about fundamental change in the future life of victims. The irreversible strategies, on the other hand, are those which households deploy in extreme cases and can potentially affect the economic base of their livelihood.

On the other hand, strategies such as out migration, selling productive assets and household possessions, selling firewood, withdrawing children from school and pledging/selling farmland or productive assets were extreme measures which can not be reversed easily. As shown in the table 21 below, the community branded these strategies as irreversible. More specifically, 44 households temporarily migrated to other areas to get work, 15 respondents sold their livestock and 20 other farmers sold or consumed planting seed, 23 children dropped out of school, and nine households pledged their farmland during 2000. Some 14 other households sold their respective home possessions. One can thus judge the likely consequences posed by the adoption of these irreversible strategies on the economic base of households.

Table 21. Copping Strategies Cross Tabulated with Duration of Deployment

Coping Strategies	Total Months Strategies has been used and Frequency of HHs										Total Frequency
	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
I. Reversible Strategies											
1.1 Reduce No. of Meal Served	2	5	36	63	31	8	1	1			147
1.2 Ate Less Preferred Food	3	4	26	60	31	9	1				134
1.3 Borrowed Food	1	0	17	35	12	2					67
1.4 Reduced Meal Size	2	5	39	63	32	8	1				150
1.5 Ate Wild Food	0	2	4	4	15	3					28
1.6 Borrowed Money	1	0	3	2	0	0					6
1.7 Work as Daily Laborer							8				8
II. Irreversible Strategies											
2.1 Migrated to get Work		0	5	8	25	6					44
2.2 Children School Dropped											23
2.3 Sold Livestock		1	5	8	1	0					15
2.4 Sold Planting Seed			3	2	1	0					6
2.5 Consumed Planting Seed			8	5	1	0					14
2.6 Sold HH Possession				12	1	1					14
2.7 Pledge/Sold Farmland											9
2.8 Firewood Selling				15	14	1					35
Overall	9	17	146	269	165	38	3	1			

Discussion with key informants and finding from the household interview, showed that most households exercise more than one set of strategies at the middle and severe stage of the scarcity period (period where there is a delay or absence of external assistance). Majority of the respondents (more than 80 percent) persisted with the use of such combined coping strategies as reducing number and frequency of meal, eating less preferred food, and borrowing food particularly at the middle and severe stages of the famine threat. At the early stage, however, households incline to use any of these strategies separately. At the severe stage, on the other hand, households adopt the irreversible strategies selectively and with great care until outside institutions deliver food assistance. Such a careful attempt to adopt copping strategies was all about preserving productive assets of households that affect their long-term resilience.

In general, such selective and planned responses to emergencies demonstrate that households rarely apply any measure unless the scarcity is well felt in their way of life. This in turn is closely associated to the practice of how the available food stock is used. The assessment on the number of meals served a day serves as an indicator of the consumption culture in that people have meals three times and possibly more than that a day in normal times.

Table 22. Quantified Combinations of Copping Mechanisms

Number of Strategies Adopted	Number of Respondents adopting the same	Remark
1. One Copping Strategy	4	3 borrowed money and 1 ate less preferred food
2. Two Copping Strategies	7	Reducing the number and size of meal took the major part
3. Three Copping Strategies	37	70Percent of respondents have adopted reducing number of meal, eating less preferred food, and reducing meal size in combination in 1992
4. Four Copping Strategies	96	59Percent of respondents have adopted reducing number of meal, eating less preferred food, borrowing food and reducing meal size in combination in 1992
5. Five Copping Strategies	19	Diverse combinations
Overall	163	

In addition, the range of coping strategies pursued by farm families in the study area shows change overtime. The outcome of discussion held with key informants show that three major trends appear to be developing in the context of the study area. Firstly, risk minimizing agricultural strategies appears to be highly complemented by off farm undertakings. Over the years, repeated sale and reacquisition have depleted domestic and productive asset levels. Strategies that diversify income sources through off farm employment and nonagricultural production appear to be gaining prominence but somewhat at the expense of agricultural copping strategies. Some of these non-farm strategies often include practices that are known to be environmentally damaging (such as fire wood collection for income generation, tree cutting for wood work, etc), but that provide a last resort in crisis conditions. Secondly, strategies that relied on social support and reciprocity for overcoming food deficits are eroding due to the integration of individual households into the cash economy. Remark given by one of the key informant best

express the situation, "*during our days people were opting to share pains but today only joys*". Thirdly, a shift has been observed in the responsibility for coping with drought from the individual household and local community levels toward the national government and locally operating non-governmental organizations through famine relief programs. Discussion with key informants disclosed that sentiments of self-reliance to withstand the threats of famine are lacking among local people in the study area. People are psychologically defeated to face the recurrent incidences. This trend reflects the reduction in the flexibility of response or resilience of small farm households.

Key informants also remarked that local resilience to drought has decreased as compared to the situation some 25 to 30 years ago. This is attributed to the prevalence of recurrent drought (as indicated in table 4) that accelerated the depletion of assets over time. In addition, elders of the KA, represented in the key informant groups, expect drought-induced famine to occur in the area in the future with a higher degree of severity. According to the perception of community elders, vulnerability to famine has increased over time because of the recurrent shortage or lack of rainfall, decrease in agricultural out put, loss of livestock due to disease and sales to cope with food deficits, increasing soil infertility and the compounding price escalation for fertilizer, and reduction in the size of per capita land holding and rapid population growth. Overall, household asset ownership has diminished through time while poverty level has increased in the area.

6.6.2 Institutional Responses and Local Capacities

Institutional responses (the provision of food or cash) are vital tools in bridging food deficits particularly when the local capacities of communities are unable to cope with the severity of the drought. The institutional responses are presumed to be commensurate with the intensity of the

drought so that plights associated with pervasive lose of productive assets and/or mortality would be averted. In 2000, both the government and World Vision had been giving relief support to victims of the famine in the study area. The results of the survey show that 84.7 percent of sampled households in the study area received food assistance from these institutions during 2000.

The Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee has been organized a number of years ago at the woreda level with the objective of assessing the drought situation, screening the needy people, organizing relief food aid distribution and also executing employment generation schemes (EGS). In principle, the Early Warning Team, the technical arm of the committee has the responsibility for carrying out periodic assessments on the situation of crop production and livestock development thereby submitting a report to the committee regularly. Nevertheless, the committee and the team rarely meet unless disaster occurs.

World Vision Ethiopia and EECMY have been implementing various projects in the woreda over the last decade. Emergency relief was the initial reason that prompted the organizations' to get involved in the woreda. The interventions, however, shifted to an integrated development approach in later years for both organizations. During emergency periods the organizations provided relief aid through EGS, free handout (in serious cases), nutritional support to mothers and children, and FFW programs. On its part, World Vision carries out regular food situation analysis that mainly includes weekly crop and livestock market analysis, quarterly crop assessment (most part of which is undertaken by government experts), and bi-annual food

security monitoring survey (nutrition survey). Any noticeable deviation from the normal would be given attention that tends to be translated into action as deemed important.

In terms of improving and/or maintaining local capacities, the role played by these institutions was significant. In particular, the relief aid provided by the World Vision during stress periods have saved lives and was found to be highly effective as a short-term response. The same records of success prevail in DPPC, CRS and EEMYC but with lower magnitude. What was lacking, however, was joint and integrated work among these institutions while working for same goal.

6.7 Relief and Rehabilitation Programs and Local Responses to Emergencies

6.7.1 Timeliness of Relief Responses and Local Capacities

The survey portrayed that responses to emergencies from concerned institutions - both NGOs and Government – in the study area are found to be delayed and inadequate. Some 76 percent of HHs indicated that the delivery of commodities in 2000 was late by some 45 days on average. Nearly all the respondents from the poorest of the poor and poor income categories (96 percent and 100 percent) considered the response to be untimely. Only those 13 percent of the respondents (most of which belong to the rich and medium income categories) felt that institutional responses were timely. The delayed response failed to avert the depletion of productive assets as households had adopted irreversible copping strategies as a last resort. Some households, particularly those in the poorest of the poor, poor and medium income classes, were forced to sell their productive assets (along with the adoption of temporary migration) to bridge the food deficit encountered in 2000 and continued to sell until food assistance was obtained. In this regard, as indicated above, 15 respondents sold their livestock, 20 others consumed or sold

seed meant for planting, nine farmers pledged their farmland and other 14 sold various household possessions.

On the whole, in 2000 institutional response time was late on average by 45 days for the poorest of the poor category, 45 days for the poor category, 26 days for the medium income class families, and 15 days for the rich families. The delay is considered against the last time households exhausted the reversible strategies and began to go for the irreversible. This difference in copping with food deficiencies suggests two strategic premises for action. Firstly, as the length of time households remain vulnerable decreases so does the tendency to adopt irreversible copping strategies. Secondly, this variation in vulnerability is the result of differences in household economic status implying the need to intervene in improving household income.

Table 23. Timeliness of Relief Assistance Cross Tabulated with Income Class of Households in 2000

Income Class of Respondents	**Timeliness of Response**				**Total**	**Remark**
	Yes	Percent	No	Percent		
1. Rich	7	60	5	40	12	
2. Medium	8	33	16	67	24	
3. Poor	0	0	37	100	37	
4. Poorest of the Poor	3	4	62	96	65	
Total	18	13	120	87	138	

The woreda DPPC and World Vision Omosheleko ADP management has also indicated the prevalence of delayed responses to emergencies, mainly caused by two factors. First, unless the Federal DPPC declares the needs for food distribution NGOs are not allowed to act on their own. This has also been indicated in the 1994 NPDPM Guideline which states that '... if a woreda is affected by a disaster to the extent that the victims need external intervention, and that the

external input required can be mobilized from within the concerned zone or region, the RDPPC can declare that area to be disaster affected. ... When they do not have resources of their own to alleviate, mitigate and prevent the occurrence of a disaster woreda, national level intervention will be the only intervention ... such an intervention shall, again, be preceded by a declaration of a disaster at the national level' (NPDPM, 1994, pp.26). Most importantly, the guideline regards timing of relief operation as an important factor in saving lives and livelihoods, and ensuring effective resource utilization (pp.33). In most cases, nevertheless, the DPPC releases information for action once the emergency has taken the worst course in its effect. In 2000, for example, World Vision was only allowed to start relief activities some 45 days after the ideal time for intervening. The time taken to procure and mobilize the required resources after the declaration negatively affected the timeliness of responses.

Secondly, there has not been an effective process for gathering and utilizing timely and appropriate early warning data to support decision-making. World Vision has been carrying out periodic early warning data gathering (such as Nutrition Survey twice per annum, weekly crop and livestock market survey, and crop assessment every quarter). However, much has not been done to translate findings into timely action at higher levels. The local government, on the other hand, has not been in a position to conduct meaningful early warning activities in the past. Recently, some practical initiatives have been taken by the woreda DPPC. This group has a plan in place to develop a system for periodic assessment of agricultural production, screening of eligible groups for food aid, reporting the need to concerned institutions and planning and implementing the food for work program.

On the other hand, the findings of this study have revealed that the types of coping strategies employed by households not only indicate the household's vulnerability, but also correspond to the timeliness of institutional responses. As relief documents of World Vision show household coping strategies that do not involve asset disposal normally indicate moderate vulnerability and institutional response tend to remain development orientated with little emphasis on relief. Once divestment begins to occur, household vulnerability to food shortages becomes high and thus calls for immediate institutional responses.

In general, the success of response mechanism to the recurrent drought-induced famines is highly dependent on the specific strategies adopted by the local people and the humanitarian organizations. And this in one or the other way could serve as a starting point for formulating appropriate coping strategies to mitigate the worst effects of future drought induced disasters.

6.7.2 Adequacy of Responses and Local Capacities

It has also been indicated by the majority of surveyed households (95.2 percent) that the amount of commodity they received in 2000 was inadequate to take them through the deficit periods. The average amount of commodity received in 2000 stands at 183 kg for 5.7 average deficit months and 6.1 average vulnerable family members. The working food rationing policy stipulated by government allow the provision of 12.5 kg of grain per person where the per-person provision gets multiplied for households having a maximum of five family members. However, those households with family size larger than five are also supposed to get the same quantity food ration as those having five members. Thus, 62.5 kg of commodity was the ceiling set by the government for all families with greater than or equal to five members. Accordingly, the per-person distribution remains matching to household size if the family size does not exceed five.

The findings of the study indicated that the inadequacy of food allocation specifically to those households with family members greater than five was inadequate. Accordingly, 60.9 percent of sampled households were with family members greater than five and reported to have received lower food assistance that their family size would warrant. In response, the copping mechanisms adopted were value adding for the depletion of productive asset causing irreversible erosion of self-recovery capacities.

Apart from such inadequacies in terms of food ration allocation (only 4.8Percent of respondents indicated to receive adequate assistance) there also were institutional deficiencies in supplying relief food for the whole duration of the emergency period. The average food supply that should have been distributed[41] was 440 kg of commodity for 5.7 average deficit months. When calculated in terms of the rationing norm the average amount distributed in 2000 (i.e. 183 kg of commodity) could only bridge 2.37 deficit months (a difference of 2.33 deficient months without food assistance).

Some of the issues that highlight the problems related to timeliness and adequacy of institutional supply both by World Vision and the government are discussed below.

a. Inaccurate estimation of the need as a result of the use of poor assessment techniques. It is the Federal DPPC that has the mandate to declare the magnitude of the emergency, the number of people in need of relief food and the respective amount of commodity required. The woreda early warning technical committee was in charge of reporting the number of victims along with the quantity of commodity required indicating the duration of assistance. However, the technical committee did not have at the time the capacity to undertake a full assessment of the situation

[41] Expected distribution = average vulnerable family size x deficiency period x per month rationing norm

and thus only provided a rough estimation. Such estimations, however, undermined the magnitude of the real situation in that 58 percent of households have been reported to be food deficit in the woreda in 2000 including children. However, the real figure rose to 67 percent [42] as the number of relief beneficiaries' for the year indicated. Moreover, crop assessment and Food Security Monitoring Survey conducted by WV in 2000 indicated that some 89 percent of people in the woreda were food deficit out of which only 58 percent of them were reported to be in need of assistance.

NGOs strictly follow the formal schedule and figures released by the Federal DPPC to procure and deliver commodities. Such rigid procedures restricted humanitarian organizations such as World Vision and restrained them from taking timely action despite the need. The hierarchical and often lengthy decision making process lacks the flexibility needed to promptly respond to the changing conditions of farm households and is not sufficiently sensitive to the genuine demand of the poor for outside assistance.

Limited capacity on the part of the government to provide resources sufficient for the existing number of the needy. The local government had limited resource to respond to the emergency of the 2000 famine. In same year the government to assist victims in the study area had mobilized a total of only 1,500 MT of commodity. Compared to the then need as indicated above, the supply was by far below what it was supposed to be. Had World Vision been not responding to the situation, severe consequences would have been occurred. On top of this, distribution undertakings on the part of the government were not as per the stipulated norm. The amount the government had been distributing in 2000 per person was 5 to 7 kg while the norm was 12.5 kg per person, which World Vision and other NGOs in the area strictly adhered to.

[42] WV-Omosheleko ADP FY'2000 Annual Report, pp. 24.

6.7.3 Targeting the Needy and Organization of Efforts among Responding Institutions

Clay, et.al, 1997 defined targeting as 'restricting the coverage of an intervention to those who are perceived to be most at risk in order to maximize the benefits of the intervention while maximizing cost' (pp.5). In this line, however, discussion held with key informants and CBO members and the results of the household survey imply the existence of some bias in relation to targeting the needy. Only 84.7 percent of the sampled households were reported to have received food assistance in 2000, but still 95.2 percent of the sampled households were food deficit. When analyzed in relation to income class, as indicated in the table 24 below, only 88 percent of households received food assistance from the poorest of the poor category while 79 percent from the poor income group. On the other hand, 86 percent and 67 percent of households received food assistance from the medium and rich income classes, respectively. This meant that between 12 percent and 21 percent of households from the poorest of the poor and the poor income categories did not receive food assistance at all despite the real need in 2000.

Table 24. Relief Assistance Cross Tabulated with Income Class of Households in 2000

Income Class of Respondents	Relief Assisted in 2000			**Total**	**Remark**
	Yes	Percent	No		
1. Rich	12	67	6	18	
2. Medium	24	86	4	28	
3. Poor	37	79	6	47	
4. Poorest of the Poor	65	88	9	74	
Total	138	84.7	25	163	

Woreda Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Committee and Key informants indicated that appropriate targeting mechanisms are not in place to identify the needy so that they can be addressed in time and with the required quantity. On the one hand, the number specified by the

Woreda DPPC for the whole woreda is not representative and hence for the KA/study area. To identify real victims woreda DPPC has been making rough estimations, as detail assessment is considered costly and tiresome. As a result, under estimated figures are used for planning relief interventions.

On the other hand, strategic beneficiary selection mechanisms are lacking as selection has been presumed to be the sole responsibility of KA leaders (As indicated in the 1997 EGS guideline, Administrative Targeting is used in most cases) in the context of number of victims specified by Woreda DPPC for the area. Apart from the distorted reflection of the reality (whereby available resources do not match requirement) there is personal bias towards the selection of beneficiaries for assistance. Those undertaking the selection usually practice nepotism resulting in unfair rationing of food.

In general, it has been noted that joint works (among locally operating NGOs and government) are not accustomed particularly with targeting the most needy with the available scarce resources at time of emergencies. The state of hectic rush that prevails at such times compromise the quality of service delivery backed by poor information synthesis and fragmented action taken by locally operating institutions towards the same goal. Socio economic profiles (except the wealth ranking document made by World Vision in 2002) that could provide detailed information on household vulnerability status are not available. Added are lack of systematic recording of events for the purpose of early warning, top down and slow pace of information flow to determine the scale and magnitude of emergencies and respective responses required, and absence of community based early warning system.

6.7.4 Rehabilitation Undertakings and Local Capacities

Experiences in the context of the study area shows rehabilitation efforts always come after the occurrence of drought catastrophe. Inherently such an approach was not able to add value to the prevention and preparedness of famine disaster but only attempt to enable farmers recover from the threat through provision of seeds and farm tools. Key Informants criticized the rehabilitation strategy deployed by government and World Vision on the basis of two concrete areas of weaknesses. First, such supply of input, as many of the key informants agreed, has never been matching to the scale of damage famine used to cause in the area. What farmers lose as a result of famine occurrence outweigh what they gain through rehabilitation. As a result, farmers were net losers in the overall process, and when such incidences persist to happen it overwhelm future hope of farmers. A key informant in the group discussion remarked, "*efforts were geared not against the occurrence of famine but against its threats. Famine comes, as it likes to happen and make confrontation with World Vision and our life. If defeated, it just flee away but if not it surrender our livelihood.*'

Second, as experience in the area shown, achievements of rehabilitation efforts were even subject to the threat of drought induced famine whereby upcoming catastrophe cause the same get eroded. By implication, rehabilitation lacks the ability to dent the possible plights of future famine occurrence. Key informants voiced in the discussion saying, "*following every drought occurrence, World Vision usually supply our community with important agricultural inputs so that life could restore back to its status quo. Nevertheless, such assistances never guaranteed the lasting flee away of famine from our community. Recurrent drought is still the enigma that bother us despite the relentless effort World Vision and government are making to ameliorate*

problems related to the depletion of our productive assets". The need to anchor on a continuous and impacting local capacity building efforts, thus, seem to have paramount importance.

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VII. Conclusion and Implications for Recommendations

Food Insecurity is not the ALPHA and OMEGA of the poor in the Sigezo KA. It has beginning in the past and will be ended in the future if treated strategically.

Firstly, food insecurity is not the 'alpha' of the community as it has a beginning at a certain to come to in the history of the area. Analysis of past events with community elders (as represented in the key informant groups) indicated that there was food security in the KA some 30 years ago. Incidences of emergencies in the past were not as severe as what they look like today where by then local people themselves overcome the difficulties. Outside assistance had never been expected to bridge food deficit gaps that the communities encountered. Rather local capacities were strong enough to withstand drought-induced famines at least with some tolerable level of suffering.

Over and above, sharing of resources with in and among communities was widespread in the past at least to get through small-scale emergencies. The tradition to help one another had been used to justify the cultural contribution to equitable distribution of resources (though not the productive assets) whereby local people enjoy life in their own context. This used to give communities the opportunity to share pains and sufferings.

As time went on, nevertheless, the increase in population accompanied by the resultant effects of declining land holding, degraded environment, and diminished production and productivity increased vulnerabilities of the local people to emergencies that could have been overcome by local capacities. Productive assets of households kept on deteriorating as the frequency and

intensity of emergencies has been increasing over time. As a result, local productive capacities tended to operate well below what they used to as compared to the past. In due course, a simple shock pose a threat to the livelihood of the communities unless and otherwise outside assistance was obtained.

Secondly, food insecurity is not the 'omega' of the poor, meaning, it has an end some time in the future. The issue at stake therefore is how to restore or rebuild the lost local capabilities so that communities could be able to live on the provisions of their environment on a sustainable basis. Household should have adequate productive assets so as to ensure the placement of bargaining positions at their disposal in their concession with nature. In its whole, such local capacity should be framed in the very context of the global economic, social, and political settings. Well-structured pathways should therefore be established to allow forward and backward interactions among local and global development actors. The following major conclusions and recommendations are vital in justifying the need for building local emergency response capacity through boosting agricultural production and productivity and maximizing off and non farm incomes of local people.

7.1 Reorienting Existing Intervention Strategies Towards Reducing Vulnerabilities

Assessment of interventions existing in the woreda and even in the study area from secondary sources indicated that much has been done by World Vision and the government particularly in areas of building the socio economic infrastructures of the area. These include the construction of health posts and health centers, education institutions, crossing structures, vet clinic and posts, water schemes etc. It would appear that greater share of the available budget in the woreda has

been allocated to the accomplishment of these infrastructures particularly on the part of World Vision[43]. Nevertheless, these accomplishments have improved the communities' physical access to basic services but mostly not accompanied by economic access. Accordingly, 72.4 percent of respondents have physical access to health institutions with in less than one hour walking distance while 27 percent within one to two hours of walking distance. However, 67 percent of the respondents indicated that they are economically unable to afford the access to the health services. In addition, 79 percent of respondents stated to have the access to education services within less than an hour's walk while 20 percent within one to two hours of walk. Secondary sources[44], however, indicated that only 43 percent of school-aged children in the KA had actual access to education in 2000. The remaining 57 percent were not able to access the educational institutions primarily constrained by financial limitations. In FY'2000, as the survey portrayed, 41 percent of respondents claimed to have children who have dropped out school. Nearly 87.9 percent of the respondents have attributed the high drop out rate to failure to buy school materials for their children. Some 41 percent of respondents have access to potable water from protected spring, 12.3 percent from public tap, and 46.6 percent from unprotected sources with a daily average per capita consumption of 26 litters. Seventy one percent of these respondents obtain water within 30 minutes of walking distance while the remaining 20 percent within 30 to 60 minutes of walking distance.

Compared to the international standard for access to basic services what exists seems satisfactory. Particularly, the access to education, health, and potable water supply appears to be acceptable though not exactly adequate. However, it is evidenced during the survey that

[43] Presentation of actual figures is only possible upon request of the organization. For the time being, this document is restricted at stating only the qualitative magnitude.
[44] FY'2000 Annual Report of the Woreda Education Bureau

coverage in terms of economic ability to afford the services is far below what it is presumed to be. It is thus rational to deduce that development practitioners working in the area should give due attention to interventions that directly maximize the economic status of households. Interventions that directly impact household income should be designed. To this end, locally operating institutions should attempt capitalizing on locally available indigenous resources such as organic fertilizer preparation, tapping available water sources for irrigation[45], and the introduction of other innovative technologies. To cope with the increasing price of inorganic inputs emphasis should be give to the preparation of organic inputs such as compost, as some community based initiatives are underway to build up on.

Attention should also be given to increasing credit services so that households will have options for economic engagements. This has to be accompanied by facilitation efforts to organize communities into CBOs. This will enhance the creation of productive assets along with maintaining existing ones.

7.2 Simultaneous Implementation of Intervention Strategies Should be Enhanced

Relief and rehabilitation activities should be considered as an on going intervention like the development activities but in the context of strategically building local capacities. Analysis of the relief – development continuum in the context of the area from secondary sources[46] has shown that development agencies often undertake continuum components separately. For example, unless there occurs a life threatening emergency the government does not allow relief and rehabilitation undertakings. Exceptionally, there had been experiences in executing development

[45] More than 72 unused water sources (8 rivers and 64 springs) are documented to exist in the woreda. Limited studies are underway to identify potentials of these sources for further irrigation development.
[46] Annual Reports of WV-Omosheleko ADP for 1997 to 2001

and relief activities simultaneously (with the main focus on the supply of food for children alone). This is despite the need for the parallel implementation of these strategies as acute demand for food is always there among the most vulnerable. Vulnerable community segments are always there be it in the normal or abnormal production seasons seeking assistance for their sustenance. However, development interventions in most cases tend to by pass these group as such interventions require some asset to build up on.

7.3 Need for Timely Famine Mitigation Interventions

Time effective response involves being prepared to respond when the need arises with the required quantities. Accordingly, effective food security monitoring should be geared to warning of the erosion of the subsistence base of households and should also be tied to triggering local level responses. A crisis situation arises when households shift from using reversible non-asset stripping strategies to non-reversible ones, which limit their options. Relief programs geared towards food handouts will do little to re-establish the long-term viability of local communities. Although relief focuses on preserving lives, mitigation activities focus on preserving livelihoods. The timing of mitigation interventions should be aimed at safeguarding people's capital and assets as well as existing social structures that buffer vulnerable households against periodic stress.

Timely response is more likely to occur when interventions are designed to enhance existing copping mechanisms and are closely linked to a food security monitoring system that is sensitive to change in household coping strategies. For example, food for work/cash for work interventions would occur in the dry season after a poor harvest to prevent people from selling

off their productive assets. Seeds and tools may be distributed during the next cropping season if poor production in the current year has forced many households to eat their seed stocks and sell their tools. In addition, livestock interventions would be implemented to preserve these assets through the dry season.

To effectively establish food security monitoring systems in the area and to implement appropriate interventions, the involvement of NGOs like World Vision and enhancing joint action with respective government offices is essential. Experience from the area has made it apparent that maintaining NGO presence is critical for timely and adequate responses to food shortages, in addition to the important development undertakings these institutions carry out.

All in all, timely relief interventions must be implemented to allow farm families to retain their productive assets and enable them to pursue nondegrading coping strategies. The timeliness of interventions will depend up on the effectiveness of decentralized food security monitoring and decision making for detecting food deficit households early enough, and the preparedness of the local government and locally operating NGOs to respond. To this end, local emergency capacity building efforts should be directed at minimizing both the impact of the immediate emergency and the time that would be required to recover from it. To achieve this, farmers must be kept on their land and their productive assets (such as livestock, farm implements, and planting seeds) should be retained so that they are prepared for the next growing season.

7.4 Targeting the Most Needy with Appropriate Intervention

A wealth-ranking document prepared by World Vision in February 2002 indicated that the poor and poorest of the poor make up 74 percent of people in the study KA. By implication, a significant proportion of the population in the area is either without the minimal productive asset (such as land, livestock, etc) or own fragmented assets, which can not accommodate further development undertaking on it. Unless and otherwise these people are capacitated to have the resource base for further self improvement through appropriate interventions, they will continue to be vulnerable to disasters. This means that exceptional treatment of those most vulnerable community segments should strategically be adopted despite the dependency presumption that promote the by passing of these groups. More importantly, capacity-building efforts including provision of productive assets (like livestock, seeds, farm tools, etc) and access to cash credit should be extended to the most vulnerable groups. As indicated in the 1994 NDPDM and that of the 1997 EGS guidelines a contingency EGS plan should be prepared so as to justify inclusion of the most vulnerable in having access to food even during normal seasons where the situation does not allow declaration of relief. In addition, a strategic change in targeting approach should be adopted – from Administrative targeting to Community Based Targeting as the latter involves decision regarding an individual's eligibility to benefit from an intervention and thus nepotism problems related to Administrative targeting would be checked. Unless the poor are treated in such a way, the resultant social and environmental crisis will be greater.

7.5 Policy Considerations

As an out come of the study, the following famine mitigating strategies that take account of the policy and the local environments should contextually be considered. To this end, all development practitioners operating in the area should work hand in hand without let up.

Firstly, technological innovations have to some extent been promoted on the basis of available potential in the study area. These innovations include appropriate irrigation technology (that mainly focus on exploiting the provisions of existing rivers), introduction of genetically improved livestock (only one bull station located in the woreda town have been rendering service to more than 100,000 people, which is poorly staffed and equipped), and increased use of organic fertilizers and drought resistant cultivars. Particular emphasis should be given to the production, processing and preservation of enset as almost 95 percent of people in the woreda depend on it as staple crop[47]. Secondary sources[48] have shown that households participating in projects with a technology promotion component had substantially higher agricultural yields than non-participating households and get through the famine period with less stress.

Secondly, public works projects that provide employment have played an important role in supporting the purchasing power of people who have become dependant on the labour market due to drought. As the results of the survey show only five households have been participated in FFW or cash for work undertakings and in relative terms these were better off in terms of withstanding the effect of the drought. Such projects, which involve the building of infrastructure such as roads and bridges upon which further development depends, will have sustainable impact.

[47] Baseline survey conducted by World Vision in March 2002
[48] FY'1999 Annual Report of the Woreda Agriculture Office

Thirdly, a precondition for carrying out effective emergency relief interventions is to have a functioning and appropriate early warning systems. Especially World Vision has put much effort into developing and fine-tuning of information systems relevant to crisis prediction and prevention in the area. However, the lack of financial or administrative capacity (particularly on the part of the government) and hierarchical structure to pass timely decision for responding to warning signals reduces the relevance of this information. Analysis has shown, for example, that because the Federal DPPC had not timely gave green light to NGOs in the area a minimum of 45 days delay had been encountered in relief food distribution. To this effect, community based early warning systems should be put in place that work jointly with concerned bodies.

Fourthly, increased emphasis should be given to optimizing population size concomitant to the existing potential of the area. As the survey indicated, the average family size was 6.18 with 13 person one year or under, 26 percent one to five years, 25 percent five to fifteen years, 29 percent fifteen to fifty five years, and 7 percent greater than fifty-five years. In aggregate, only 29 percent of the population is productive while the remaining 71 percent is dependent implying a 1:4 dependency ratio. In the context of the area such a population profile has effects of two folds. First, as population continues to increase land has to be redistributed thus allowing a process of fragmentation to occur almost continually. Secondary sources obtained from the woreda bureau of agriculture[49] indicated that individual land holding in the woreda decreased from average 1.2 ha per household in 1989 to 0.71 ha per household in 1999 mainly caused by population increase. This made agricultural mechanization difficult while allowing subsistence agriculture to continue. Second, household investment on productive businesses has declined as increase in population maximized consumption expenditures of productive resources. Members of key

[49] FY'1999 Annual Report of the Woreda Agriculture Office

informants, particularly those elders, indicated "*our income from all sources is low to allow us to investment on businesses with good returns. This is mainly because what we earn is not adequate even to address our basic consumption requirements*". Thus, this leaves little option but to go for intensive family planning intervention.

Fifthly, mechanisms should be framed to ensure that farmers will obtain the most appropriate market price specially for cash crop produces such as coffee and ginger which the study KA produces in bulk. The price fall indicated elsewhere in this document for these crops has to be reversed so as to check the likely disincentive to future production of these crops and erosion of the income of the farmers.

Sixthly, policy level considerations should be made to enhance households' access to credit services. In the woreda, erratic and unreliable rainfall, low development of irrigated agriculture, land degradation and poor soil fertility coupled with ever declining land to population ratio and increasing landlessness are diminishing the sectors ability to ensure household food security and provided the necessary saving for expanded production. The need to emphasize on off and non-farm interventions through micro enterprise development is necessary. To this end, well-designed credit intervention should be expanded to address those without asset, that is, attention should be given to those without asset than being bias towards the better off. In the area, as experience shown, credit intervention can create employment opportunity for un/under employed and serve as main or supplementary income sources. Income from this source even is more significant when viewed not only from consumption side, but also form its potential to create asset for providing a more permanent food security for households. For many poor and the poorest of the poor income categories (that constitute 74 percent of the study area), the landless

and women in particular, it has demonstrated to be a more reliable source of income and has significant contribution to families well being. Diversification of economic activities through micro enterprise promotion enhances productive utilization of labour and other resources unexploited due to poor economic performance.

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Annexes

Addis Ababa University
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Household Survey Questionnaire

Annex 1: Household Survey Questionnaire

Remark: The purpose of this questionnaire is purely academic and is meant for no other purpose. Thus, as a respondent you should feel free to provide the most realistic information you can render. In addition, no one else would access the information you give, as it is absolutely confidential.

100. Background Information

101. Name of Interviewee (Preferably HH Head) _____ | 101 |

102. Name of Enumerator (Code) _____ | 102 |

103. Time of Interview Commenced _____ | 103 |

104. Time Interview Ended _____ | 104 |

105. Total Time Taken (104 – 103) _____ | 105 |

200. Household Characteristic

201. Sex of HH Head | 201 |

1= Male 2= Female

202. How many household members are there in each age group

1= One year or under 2= 1 - 5 3= 5 – 15

4= 15 - 55 5= >55

202	
Code	No. of Members
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	

203. Marital Status of the HH Head

1= Single 2= Married 3= Widow 4= Divorced

203

204. Religion of the HH Head

204

1= Orthodox 2= Muslim 3= Protestant 4= Catholic 5= Others (Specify)

205. Highest Level of School Completed for the HH Head

205

0= No Education 1= Read & Write 2= Grade 1 – 4

3= Grade 5 – 8 4= Grade 9 – 10 5= Grade 11-12 6= Above Grade 12

206. Occupation other than Agriculture

206

0= No other activity 1= Weaving 2= Tannery

3= Carpentry 4= Black Smith 5= Carpet Making

6= Petty Trading 7= Daily Labour 8= Others (Specify)

207. Social Class to which the household belong

207

1= Rich 2= Medium 3= Poor 4= P.of the poor

300. Household Resilience

301. Have you received adequate rain in the past production season (I.e. 1993)

301

1= Yes 2= No

302. If Yes to Question 301, was the rain timely?

302

1= Yes 2= No

303. What type of Land Access do you have?

303

1= Owned 2= Rented/Borrowed
3= Share Cropping 4= No access

304. Did your family experience food shortage at any time during last year (I.e. 1993)?

304

1= Yes 2= No

305. If Yes to Question 304, during which months did you experience food shortage?

305

1= Meskerem 2= Tikimt 3= Hidar 4= Tahisas

5= Tir 6= Yekatit 7= Megabit 8= Miazia

9= Ginbot 10= Sene 11= Hamile 12= Nehase

306. How did you cope in order to have enough food?

306

1= Reduced the number
2= Ate Less Preferred food
3= Children Discontinued School
4= Sold Livestock
5= Borrowed food
6= Sold Seeds Meant for Planting
7= Consumed Seeds Meant for Planting
8= Reduced the size of meals
9= Ate wild food
10= Migrated to get work
11= Sold Household Possession
12= Borrowed Money
13= Others (Specify)

307. Total number of months your household used any of these strategies in the year 1992? | 307 |

308. Number of months your family was food sufficient in the year 1992? | 308 |

309. Number of days your family ate less than two meals per day in the year 1992? | 309 |

310. Have You Received any Relief Assistance in 1992? | 310 |

1= Yes 2= No

311. If Yes to Question 310, what amount of Commodity have you received (in Kg.)? | 311 |

312. If Yes to Question 310, did the amount you get satisfied the need of your Family members? | 312 |

1= Yes 2= No

313. If Yes to Question 310, from where did you get the assistance? | 313 |

1= NGOs 2= Government 3= Others (Specify)

314. What institutional engagements did you have in your local area in 1992? | 314 |

1= Idir 2= Iquib 3= Mahiber 4= Others (Specify)

315. Did you and/or any of your family members participate in FFW/Cash for work activities carried out in the area in 1992? | 315 |

1= Yes 2= No

316. If Yes to 315, what amount of commodities have you obtained? | 316 |

317. If Yes to 315, what amount of money have you obtained? | 317 |

400. Household Agricultural Production

401. How do you rate crop production during 1992?

401

1= Same as Normal Year
2= Below Normal Year
3= Above Normal Year
4= Not Produced

402. If production for 1992 was below normal years, what were the causes?

402

1= Rainfall Shortage
2= Shortage of Fertilizer
3= Shortage of Labour
4= Shortage of Land
5= Pest Infestation
6= Hail Storm
7= Others (Specify)

403. Is there potential for irrigation cultivation in your PA?

403

1=Yes 2=No

404. If yes to 403, do you produce using irrigation?

404

1=Yes 2=No

405. If Yes to 404, what is the area of your irrigation land (in Hectare)?

405

406. Did you participate in the new extension program in 1992 E.C?

406

1= Yes 2= No

407. If Yes to 406, did you apply agricultural inputs in 1992 E.C?

407

1= Yes 2= No

408. If Yes to 406, what inputs did you apply?

408

1= Fertilizer 2= Herbicides 3= Pesticides
4= Others (Specify)

409.How do you assess the quantities of inputs applied?

409

1= Fertilizer Adequate
2= Fertilizer Inadequate
3= Herbicides Adequate
4= Herbicides Inadequate
5= Pesticides Adequate
6= Pesticides Inadequate

410. If no to Question 406, what were the reasons?

410

1= No money to purchase Inputs 2= No access to inputs
3= Not able to access the extension package due to procedural restrictions
4= I use organic materials (Manure, Compost, etc)
5= Not interested

411. How do you plough your land?

411

1= Using Family Labour 2= Using hired Labour
3= Using owned oxen 4= Using rented oxen
5= Using borrowed oxen 6= Others (Specify)

412. How many livestock did you own in 1992?

412	
Code	No.

1= No Livestock 2= Oxen 3= Cows 4= Calves

5= Heifers 6= Sheep 7= Goats 8= Chicken

9= Horse 10= Mule 11= Donkey 12= Others

413. What is the source of feed for your livestock?

413

1= Communal Grazing Land 2= Purchase from market
3= Crop residue 4= Own Grazing Land
5= Others (Specify)

414. What are the major livestock problems?

414

1= Disease 2= Feed Shortage 3= Shortage/lack of drinking water
4= Others (Specify)

415. What amount of income did you earn from livestock (livestock and livestock product) in 1993? (In Birr)

415

500. Household Income and Credit

501. Have you received credit during the year 1993? | 501 |

1= Yes 2= No

502. If Yes to 501, for what purpose did you borrow? | 502 |

1= Agricultural Input Purchase
2= Livestock Purchase
3= Start up new business
4= Expansion of existing business
5= Household consumption
6= Others (Specify)

503. What were the source(s) of the credit? | 503 |

1= Traditional Institution
2= Local Money Lender
3= Friends/relatives
4= Micro-finance Institution
5= Others (Specify)

504. What was your annual income from agricultural activities in 1992? (In Birr) | 504 |

505. What was your HH's main income source other than crop sale in 1992? (One source only) | 505 |

1= No other source 2= Tree Sales 3= Seedling Sales
4= Fruit Sales 5= Business Income 6= Daily Labour
7= Livestock Sale 8= Gifs from Family and Friends 9= Others (Specify)

506. How much was your income from that source? (Birr) | 506 |

507. What was your second income source other than crop sale in 1992? | 507 |

1= No other source 2= Tree Sales 3= Seedling Sales
4= Fruit Sales 5= Business Income 6= Daily Labour
7= Livestock Sale 8= Gifs from Family and Friends 9= Vegetable Sales
10= Others (Specify)

508. How much was your income from that source? (Birr) | 508 |

509. How did you spend your income in 1992 (rank the first four in order of importance)

509

1= Food purchase
2= Business Expansion
3= Household Consumption
4= Social Affairs
5= Debt repayment
6= Saving
6= Agricultural Input purchase
7= Children Schooling
8= Other (Specify)

510. If you had more income in 1992 what would you spend it on? (Only one priority)

510

1= Additional Food
2= Agricultural Inputs
3= Livestock
4= HH Furniture
5= Cloths
6= Schooling for Children
7= Electronics
8= Others (Specify)

511. If No to Q. 501, what were the reasons not to get credit?

511

1= Lending institutions do not exist
2= was found defaulter
3= Unable to fulfill requirement of lending institutions
4= Not interested

600. Household Asset Possession

601. What productive Assets do you own?

601

1= Livestock
2= Land
3= Jewell
4= Agricultural Tools
5= Household Possession
5= Others

602. What purposes would these assets serve to you?

602

1= Use at time of drought/emergency
2= Prestige
3= To run existing business
4= Others

700. Households' Access to Basic Services

701. What is the one main source of water for members of your household?

701

1= Protected Spring
2= Public Tap
3= Unprotected spring/river
4= Rain Water collected from roof
5= Others (Specify)

702. How long does it take you to get water and come back?

702

1= 0-30 minute
2= 30-60 minute
3= > 1 Hr
4= Others

703. How much water (on average) would you collect per day (in Liters)? | 703 |

704. Is this amount adequate to address the requirements of the family? | 704 |

1= Yes 2= No

705. How far is the nearest primary school from your home? (Round Trip) | 705 |

1= No School 2= < 1 hour 3= 1 - 2hrs 4= > 2hrs

706. Do you have children who dropped out of school or do not go to school at all? | 706 |

1= Yes 2= No

707. If Yes to Question 705, what are the reasons? | 707 |

1= School is too far 2= Can't buy School materials/Uniform
3= The child work at home 4= Others (Specify)

708. How far is the nearest health institution from your home? | 708 |

1= No Health Institution 2= < 1 hour 3= 1 - 2hrs 4= > 2hrs

709. Do you and your family get medical treatment services at all time you need? | 709 |

1= Yes 2= No

710. If No to Question 709, what are the reasons? | 710 |

1= No health institution around 2= Unable to cover medication expenses
3= Other (Specify)

Thank You Very Much for Your Cooperation!

Addis Ababa University
Department of Regional and Local Development Studies
Checklist for Discussion with Members of CBOs
March 2002

Annex 2: Focus Group Discussion With Credit and Saving Associations

Date of interview _____
Name of Association _____

Discussion Participants (name, sex, and position in scheme)
(a) _____
(b) _____
(c) _____
(d) _____
(e) _____
(f) _____
(g) _____
(h) _____
(i) _____

Background

1. Total Number of members in Credit and Saving_____
2. Total Number of households in the Credit and Saving Association_____
3. What are the major economic activities of the Credit and Saving Association? (Crop production, livestock, non-farm activities, etc)
4. What were the purposes of the loans extended? List down the loan portfolio
5. How long was the credit period for the different purposes?
6. What is the performance of the loan repayment for the different portfolios?
7. How is granting of loan and collection managed?
8. Rank those off and non-farm activities according to the amount of loan granted to members?
9. If the loan grant to off and non-farm activities are considered low, what are the major reasons?
10. List down the potential of off and non-farm activities according to their importance? Explain the major reasons?
11. What are the major problems that hinder improvement of members' wellbeing of the households in the Association? Why?
12. When was the Association established? (Month/year) _____
13. Why and how was the scheme initiated? How were the needs of the beneficiaries identified? Who was involved in the process? What was the nature and level of participation of the beneficiaries?
14. What in your opinion should be done to exploit the potential sources of income? (At policy and program level).

15. What should be done by the locally operating MFIs to exploit and further enhance the function of the saving and credit Association?

Objectives of the Scheme

1. What were the main problems that the scheme attempted to solve? What were the causes and consequences of these problems?
2. What were the proposed solutions to the problems? Why do you think these would work?
3. What were the objectives of the scheme?

Activities Carried out by the Association

1. How do members utilize the loan obtained? (Utilization program, , basis, frequency of loan repayment) What problems does the association encounter in the management and administration? Does the association regularly monitor and supervise how best the members utilize the loan?
2. Did the association train its members? What were the types of training provided? Number and sex of trainees? Who provided the training? For how long? Who covered the expenses? How useful was the training? Do trainees apply the skill acquired? How? (Detail description) what problems were encountered in providing training?
3. What fixed and non-fixed assets does the association have? (detail description)

Impact of Scheme on Beneficiaries

1. What effects did the Credit and Saving Association has on the standard of living of individuals, families and the community? (Impact on behavior of beneficiaries, impact on income of beneficiaries, impact on household access to food, impact on food availability in the community, impact on employment, etc), How are these impacts measured? How does the community feel about these impacts?
2. What impact did the scheme have on the root structural problems in the community?
3. How do beneficiaries of the association compare with original community expectations?

Future Plan and Sustainability

4. What lessons have you learned from the experience of the association? (Describe both positive and negative lessons of experience)
5. What is the future plan of the association? (Brief description of activities-physical and financial) what are the envisaged sources of fund for the implementation of future plans?
6. What are the programs and specific activities that should be modified in order to strengthen the association? Why should these changes be made? How are these changes going to be implemented?
7. Can the association manage the scheme without external assistance? Why? How?

Addis Ababa University
Department of Regional and Local Development Studies
Checklist for Discussion with Elders and KA Leaders
March 2002

Annex 3: Focus Group Discussion With Elders and KA Leaders

1. Describe how essential family and community resources are shared within the KA? Focus only on essential resources such as food, shelter, clothing, labour and other important household items (particularly with reference to those people who do not have enough resources for their own families).

2. Describe any joint action that people have undertaken in the past with or without outside support. Do people participate in such activities even if they personally do not have any thing to gain, but for the well being of other people? How willingly do people contribute their time, labour, and resources for the common good of their communities? What is their motivation to participate in such joint actions?

3. Identify the vulnerable (in terms of food) individuals and groups with in your community. Describe how vulnerable individuals and groups are regarded and cared for within the community? Are there any special groups or arrangements within the community that care for the special needs of such people?

4. Describe times and events from the past which you consider to be bad for the community. Describe any critical events (with particular emphasis to drought induced famine) from which the community recovered well? (Please list those events chronologically, the magnitude of their effect, why the community was able to recover, etc).

5. What sorts or community support groups exist? Have they emerged from within the community or are they 'outside' groups?

6. What local capacities do the community need to be built so as to make copping with disaster not challenging?

7. How do you perceive past and present relief, rehabilitation, and development undertakings by the government and NGOs in your KA, and vis-à-vis other KAs in the woreda?

8. What are the major problems of the PA? What are the causes and effects of the problems?

9. How do you evaluate the role of WVE in assisting the PA solve its problems? Are its projects/programs relevant?

10. What are the different organs of the PA? What is their respective role and responsibility?

11. What activities did the different organs of the PA accomplished in the past 3 years? (Explain in detail)

12. What are the types and number of CBOs established in your PA? What was the PAs role in initiating, promoting, and strengthening the CBOs?

13. How are the CBO performing now? What are their problems? What are the causes and effects of the problems? How did you help or plan to help the CBOs in overcoming their problems?

14. How do the other communities in the PA view the CBOs?

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Department of Regional and Local Development Studies
Checklist for Discussion with Members of CBOs
March 2002

Annex 4: Focus Group Discussion With Irrigation Water Users

Name of Association _____
Date of interview _____

Discussion Participants (name, sex, and position in scheme)
(j) _____
(k) _____
(l) _____
(m) _____
(n) _____
(o) _____
(p) _____
(q) _____

Background

16. When was the Association established? (Month/year) _____
17. Why and how was this site selected? (e.g. vulnerable people, potential, etc)
18. Why and how was the scheme initiated? How were the needs of the beneficiaries identified? Who was involved in the process? What was the nature and level of participation of the beneficiaries in the identification of needs?

Objectives of the scheme

1. What were the main problems that the scheme attempted to solve? What were the causes and consequences of these problems?
2. What were the proposed solutions to the problems? Why do you think these would work?
3. What were the objectives of the scheme?

Preparatory Activities Carried Out to Implement the Scheme

1. What were the main preparatory activities carried out to implement the scheme? (Awareness, organizing, and infrastructure, etc)
2. Who were involved in the implementation of the scheme? What was the role of the different government and non-governmental organizations? What was the role of the beneficiaries in the implementation of the scheme?

Activities Carried out by the Association

4. Number of member households of the Association when it was initially established and now, area under irrigation.

Year	Number of member households			Total population	Area under irrigation (hectare)
	Male	Female	Total		
1999					
2000					
2001					
2002					

5. How do members utilize the water? (utilization program, user fee-amount, basis, frequency of payment) What problems does the association encounter in the utilization of the water? Does the association regularly maintain irrigation infrastructure? How much was spent for maintenance last year?
6. Did the association need credit for its members? Did it obtain? Who was the source of credit? What were the procedures for obtaining the credit? How much did it obtain? For what purposes was it utilized? How was it distributed to male and female members separately? What was the total amount of credit distributed by year and sex? Did you face any problem in obtaining credit? In repayment?
7. Did the association train its members? What were the types of training provided? Number and sex of trainees? Who provided the training? For how long? Who covered the expenses? How useful was the training? Do trainees apply the skill acquired?
8. What fixed and non-fixed assets does the association have? (detail description)

Organization and Management of the Association

1. How is the scheme managed? Do you have a management committee? How many? How many are female in each of the organs? What is the respective role and responsibilities of the different organs? Does it have by-laws? What are its contents? How were the different organs elected?
2. Have your members faced any marketing problem for their products? What are the problems? Has the association assisted its members in solving their marketing problems?

Impact of Scheme on Beneficiaries and Communities

5. What effects did the irrigation scheme have on the standard of living of individuals, families and the community? (Impact on behavior of beneficiaries, impact on income of beneficiaries, impact on household access to food, impact on food availability in the community, impact on employment, assets, etc), How are these impacts measured? How does the community feel about these impacts?
6. What impact did the scheme have on the root structural problems in the community?

Future Plan and Sustainability

1. What lessons have you learned from the experience of the association? (describe both positive and negative lessons of experience)
2. What is the future plan of the association including maintenance? (Brief description of activities-physical and financial) what are the envisaged sources of fund for the implementation of future plans?
3. What are the programs and specific activities that should be modified in order to strengthen the association? Why should these changes be made? How are these changes going to be implemented?
4. Can the association manage the scheme without external assistance? Why? How?

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any University and all the sources of materials used for the thesis are duly acknowledged.

Name: Fassil Abate
Signature:
Date: June 2002
Place: Addis Ababa University

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as a university Advisor

Tadesse Dadi