



**INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES
ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**

**THE ROLE OF FEDERAL POLICE IN PREVENTING AND
MANAGING INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICT IN ETHIOPIA: THE
CASE OF AFAR-ISSA BOUNDARY.**

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**JULY 2021
ADDIS ABABA**

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES OF
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DECLARATION

I Tesfaye Gebrehawaria, hereby declare that this thesis entitled “The role of Federal Police in Preventing and Managing Inter-Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: The case of Afar-Issa boundary” is my original work and it has not been presented for award of any diploma, degree or masters in any university or institution and all sources of material used have been duly acknowledged

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
DFPF	Deployed Federal Police Force
JPC	Joint Peace Committees
ANRS	Afar National Regional State
SNRS	Somali National Regional State
MOFA	Ministry of Federal Affairs
EFPC	Ethiopian Federal Police Commission
HPR	House of Peoples Representatives
HOF	House of Federation
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defence Force
IGR	Intergovernmental Relation
DFPF	Deployed Federal Police Force
FPCPS	Federal police Crime Prevention Sector
MOP	Minister of Peace
BAA	The indigene groups Berom/Anaguta/Afizere
STF's	Special Task Forces (forces deployed in Jos)
CRPF	Central Reserved Police Force
BSF	Border Security Force
CISF	Central Industrial Security Force
O.E.T.A)	Occupied, Enemy, Territory, Administration
M,H.A	Minister of Home Affairs
ICG	International Crisis Group

ABSTRACT

This thesis discusses in detail the Afar-Issa (Somali) inter-communal conflict, to assess the role of the deployed Federal Police force in preventing and managing the violent conflict. Conflict among Afar and Issa Somali ethnic groups is not a new phenomenon it is a protracted and intractable situations. The trigger cause of the conflict was natural resource scrambling, crimes committed by individual persons from each sides such as raiding animals, and killing peoples and currently the issue of boundary delaminates and territory claim have becoming the main issue of conflict. These series situations was invited the federal government to deploy a Para military police and with concerned stake holders on the contested territory to contain and manage conflict violent. The study is qualitative by design. Participants of the study were selected using purposive sampling technique. In this regard, the researcher organized three Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) where two group discussion were categorized from the Afar and Issa(Somali) pastoral local communities respectively, and the third group was composed of the deployed Federal Police officers. Generally, the participants of this study were 41 in number, among which 24 informants were involved in the focused group discussions and each group session were comprising of 6- 8 people and the rest 17 informants were involved as semi structured open ended interview from the concerned Federal institutions which means the deployed Federal police Division, the MOFA which is with the mandate to manage and oversight the conflict Zone and Afar and Issa Inter Ethnic security professionals and practitioners and the FDRE defense troops which is found in the conflict site participated as key informants. Secondary data mainly conflict incident reports and records of the Federal Police rapid response directorate about the damages and losing human lives looting properties since the 2011-2018.. The study is guided by the conflict violence transformation theory. The findings of the inquiry focus on the role of Federal Police in preventing and managing conflict, on conflict handling mechanisms being employed and what chronic challenges faced, and the neutrality of the Federal Police in delivering its duty. Thus, the study found out that there is an inconsistency in conflict management, the absence of efficient ways of communication among the stake holders, and direct prevention delay, insufficient cooperation from regional actors, inefficiency and insufficiency of Federal Police training and logistics, illicit arms trade, failure to prevent and control criminal offence those who are trigger cause for conflict clash, different chains of command and the absence of conflict transformation have been among the main challenges. In its concluding remarks, the study presents the prospects and opportunities for the more viable option to be taken to prevent and manage the Afar-Issa conflict.

Key Words: Federal Police, Inter-ethnic conflict, Intervention, containment Conflict violent, Conflict Management, Interregional relations, Traditional Conflict Resolution

CHAPTER ONE

1. Introduction

1.1. Background of the Study

Conflict is a worldwide reality; it exists in many spheres of life and society. And, conflict have becoming an alarming issues and spill over in all the developed and underdeveloped nations, (Jalali & Lipset, 1992). As Africa is a continent of diversity, leads to the conclusion that inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict is an inevitable reality, and it becoming a rampant and major problem for a national and regional integrity. In recent years, there has been an increasing number of intra and inter-state conflicts especially in plural and multi-ethnic societies (Levinson, 1994) and (wolff,2007).

According to, Osaghae, (2006) explained about ethnic conflicts there has been categorized as the stage of latent and the stage of manifest or outbreak violent conflicts. Latent conflict is simply exists at all levels of society and occur as part of a normal life, Osaghae, (2006). In most cases, they are underground and may not be obvious to the observer. The other stage of ethnic conflict is an actual potential manifestation of violent conflict. For example among the manifest conflict were captured national and international attentions were Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria were some an illustrative examples of manifest conflict violence in Africa (Debelo,. 2007). This implied that those two stages of conflicts are needs different conflict management mechanisms. At the stage of conflict violent deployment of central police force and intervene between the conflict parties to deescalate the ongoing violent is necessary .But when the conflict is at the latent sage and not manifested as violent the mandate belongs to the local police and traditional conflict management institutions.

As commonly known, historically the Horn of Africa region was scrambled by European colonizers during the nineteenth century by the triple alliances known as French, British, and Italian. And then those colonizer countries were divided the Horn of Africa among themselves with the exception of Ethiopia (Alexander, 2001). Following this they were also established boundaries that cut off across the same people who have also shared the same identities such as language culture and psychological makeup, dividing them in different political entities. (Yasin, 2010).

According to (Yasin, 2010), emphasises that the colonial legacy of border administration of the Horn and political and economical geopolitical interest of the region have been contributed to exacerbates ethnic conflict violence in the region for a long period of time. Moreover, Yasin. (2010), and (Adegehe, (2009) also argued about the conflict between the Afar-Issa ethnic groups cannot be considered as mere localised conflicts between neighbouring pastoral groups over water and pasture. However, there is deep involvement of external actor ranging from national governments in the region to cross border trader and to expansion territory. Beside to that, inter-ethnic dispute in a single state usually have regional spill-over effect. And also dynamic regional political orders and on some occasions the issue of nationalism which are having common language, culture and religion in the region Berhe & Adaye, (2007) an influence on trans-border ethnic conflicts. Due to these factors, countries in the Horn of Africa have experienced inter-state and intra-state war over the past decades.

The Horn of Africa region mainly comprise of Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and the Northern region of Kenya. In strictly geographic terms, however, only Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia comprise the Horn (Tadesse, 2004). Ethiopia also the second-most populous nation in Africa, and more than 80 multi-ethnic groups, with diverse religious faiths and the live together for long period of time in harmony way (Muhyadin. . 2006). Natural to this kind of diversity, traditional and age-old incidents of ethnic and religious conflicts are inevitable and apparently observed in many areas of the country from time to time (Abkadir,. 2014, Fentaw, 2009). For instance, according to the Ethiopian Federal Police report (2010:34) from 2003 to 2009 E.C “there were 291 major ethnic clashes takes placed in different time intervals and in different geographical locations of the country”. Those conflicts were taking place between the Afar-Hawiya (Somali) conflict, the Afar- Issa (Somali) conflict, the Issa (Somali)- Oromo conflict, Sheko-Megengir conflict of March 2002, the Anuak-Nuer conflict of December 2003, and the Gedeo-Guji conflict, the Somali Garre –Gabbra Oromo conflict, Berta-Gumuz conflict of January 2001 Oromo conflict, and Desantech –Hammer conflict. Those conflict violent were claimed the lives of 1,174 people wounded 1,201 people and 10,597 burnt residence houses and rustling animals in different areas of a country, (Teferi,.2012 , Federal Police report, 2017) . As discussed above, the major causes of most of the post 1991 conflicts between the various ethnic groups Ethiopia can be classified generally as socio—economic or socio-cultural scenarios. (Teferi, 2012).

Since the restructuring of the country in a federal system of government the police force had also established under the jurisdiction of federal and state matter FDRE Constitution, No. 01/1995, Article 51(14). But as per of the, FDRE Constitution NO .01/1995).Article 62(9), the power and mandate of the Federal Security forces have been specified with the exceptional role to protect the law of the land and to maintain local inter communal violence across a country . In this regard the rapid action respond police forces intervene in all inter-ethnic conflicts and played a significant role in containing the inter-ethnic conflict violence.

The Federal Police plays an important role by not only being involved in stopping conflicts once it was erupted but by also being involved in preventing escalate conflict violence from happening both by its presence between the conflicting parties, but also through the indigenous conflict management systems Report Crime Prevention Department, 2010:34 cited in (Abkadir, 2014).

The Afar -Issa conflict is the most protracted and intractable violent communal conflict in the Horn of Africa (Alemu, 2017). Before the Italian aggression, there was sporadic conflict and minor clashes competing for water and pasture land to be possessor between the Afar Issa clans. But during the post-Italian aggression, the conflict evolved to armed clashes and introduced new trend of war violence posterity to be part of the cultural construction of animosity (Alemu, 2017). Eventhough many researchers, Adegehe, (2009), Yasin,(2010) Mu,uz (2009) have investigated the trigger factors of conflict violent, of the Afar-Issa and they were also recommended to the concerned body but the problem has not yet been properly addressed by the successive central governments and the local inter- ethnic traditional leaders and pastoral communities, (Fentaw, 2009).

This statement implies that, the two predecessor Government and the new restructured federal Government (FDRE) employed the same conflict management mechanism to respond the conflict violent .Both depends on security forces deployment and focuses temporary control and contained policy till now had not been transformed the problem in a sustainable way rather it was characterized as a ‘fire-fighting ’ approach. The involvement of the conflict violence between Afar and Issa has also changed from simple traditional weapon spears to modern weapon like AKM, PKM and RPG group weapons, supported and supported by highly trained vigilante militants from each sides and the conflict issue and interest also changed from pasture and water scrambling to expansion of land and claim of territory,(Adegehe, 2009) .

Government as a general principle, whether it could be a Unitary or a Federal system, due to its control over national resources and security forces, dominantly the mandate to deliver justice and security to the society in a transparent, and in accountability manner and be a key player in deployment of security force between the conflict parties and restore peace and order to the normal situation within its territory. In addition, Inyang, & Abraham,(2013) elaborated that, police force, as one of executive body of government and the primary enforcer of the rule of law and security of the society and the tasks providing security to lives and property in most societies is the exclusive function of the conventional police institution. This statement tries to explain that any legitimized Government there have been an inherent responsibility and mandate to controlling any kinds of violence within its territory. In this regard, among the law enforcement institutions police force play a significance role and lion share in preventing and managing local communal violence. Therefore the countries which are adopted a federal system of government living with inter-ethnic conflict violence such as India, Nigeria, and Ethiopia have been used police forces as a primary option to quell and halt the conflict violence escalation.

According Wani (2017), Nigeria and India a countries which are a very aged in practicing a federal political concept and their economic growth and democracies have been found in good truck. But both nations are facing serious problems in way of nation building process. From the very inception both countries had adopted federal polity for accommodation among the different identities and segments, who are living in these two countries. Nigeria is a diverse country as far as its ethnicity is concerned. Same is the case with India has many cultures, communities, tribes, languages, and religions. (Mehra, 2020). Both of them were adopted federal system of Government as remedies to the susceptible and rampant violence between the Ethno-religious structural grievances (Wani, 2017) . The two huge federalist countries constitution have acknowledged and established a conflict management institution at Federal level with status of ministry like the minister of home affairs in India, and council of state known as house of federation empowered by the constitution with intent to intervention in the aspects of inter-ethnic conflict violence (Para, & Hoomlong,2012).

In the Indian Federal Government, the responsibilities for maintenance of internal security and the Federal paramilitary police forces, etc. have been entrusted to the Ministry of Home Affairs. According the Nigerian constitution section 216(2)/ (1999), the Nigeria Police system is

constituted as National police under the command of the Inspector-General of Police. The Inspector General of Nigerian police are accountable to the Nigerian President. The responsibilities for maintenance of internal security have been entrusted to the National police. Therefore, the above mentioned Federalist countries and not mentioned other countries have been employed police force as primary responder strategy to control and maintain inter communal violence. Therefore, in federal countries, the central government has unfetter power to play a significant role to prevent and manage conflict violent and with mandate to intervene in an autonomy state in case of crisis between ethno -religious or intra state situations.

The same to that the Federal Government of Ethiopia in order to control and mitigate the ethnic violence, automatically ordered the Federal police rapid action force to arrive at the conflict prone area. According to the FDRE constitution, the Federal and state governments have a concurrent power to determine and manage over their respective jurisdictions. Similarly the regional state also has a constitutional responsibility to maintain the constitutional order, ensure peace and security of the country, and protect security of the public unilaterally and bilaterally. Even though they have a concurrent power between the federal and state governments, but when the constitution is laid in danger and erupted violence within an autonomy state, the Federal government takeover the mandate of the state government and dominantly lead the law enforcement, whether it could be at the request of a state administration, to avert a deteriorating security situation within the requesting state when its authorities are unable to control it FDRE constitution Article (51)section (14); Proc.No.1.(1995) without the request of the Regional States if any act infringement upon fundamental human rights of citizens and national security occur, to carry out investigations. Therefore, according to the FDRE constitution the institutional mandate and responsibility to manage inter-ethnic conflict violence is belongs to the HOF and MoFA (Ministry of peace) in a formal way, while a traditional conflict resolution mechanisms is based on informal way utilizing traditional institutions and social organizations (Daniel. 2015).

The former Ministry of Federal Affairs currently replaced by the Minister of peace which is established by virtue of Proclamation, No. 471/2005 and proclamation.No1087/2018, respectively which is granted a special mandate to provide a proposal of security force deployment to the prime minister by evaluate the real facts of the conflict situation on the ground. Moreover, the MoFA supervise and follow up the proper execution of functions relating

to Federal Police and to intervene in the affairs of the states in the cases of violent conflicts between member States of the federation and to build the state conflict management capacities.

The Federal government has been mobilized its police forces in a bids to quell growing violence and unrest in the Afar –Issa (Somali) region, common boundary Awash Mille where lives of civilians and properties have been lost. The decision was made following requests from the two regions to ensure the safety of citizens and enforce the law. Based on the agreement of the two regional governments to intervene the federal force, and the federal government responds by deploy the Federal Police rapid response police Force, to the North Eastern Ethiopia Awash-Mille main road under the oversight of the MoFA(minister of peace) and the Federal police commission respectively.

The deployed Federal Police force has been covered 377 km distance of conflict prone area. In this regard the first, command police units covers 177kms the conflict prone from Awash to Gewane and from 20-25 km left and right far away from the main road. In this regard, the Federal police forces has been permanently stationed in Awash berta, Gewane, Endido"Office", Gedamaytu, Zingerogedel (baboon cliff) area and its environs to ensure that underlying animosity resulting from perennial ethno-religious hostilities do not erupt into a fresh round of violence. The second command police units have covered the remained conflict area from unduffo to mille left and right from the main road 25-30 km's under controlled. This police force was stationed in a small town and Kebele such as Ambule, unduffo, Adaytu and mille. The Federal Police is one of the Federal security sectors with duties to preventing and managing in affairs of inter - ethic conflict across the country. However, there was little attention paid to examining and to evaluating the played role by Federal Police in conflict preventing and managing. For this reason, this study seeks to investigate how the Federal Police preventing and managing the inter-ethnic conflicts and what challenges are facing during performing its duties, and also how perceived the Federal Police by the two communities in conflict preventing and managing from 2003-2010 E.C.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Violence conflict among Afar and Issa Somali ethnic groups is not a new phenomenon. It is a protracted and intractable situation. The trigger cause of the conflict most of the time was over grazing land, resources and currently the very motive attempting territorial expansion or the issue of border delineation Markakis & Markakis,(2019). After EPRDF's takeover the power in 1991 the country has restructured in ethnic based federal system of government and simultaneously the conflict situation of Afar-Issa also transformed from traditional conflict issue like an animal riding, water and grass pasturing to territorial expansion and border delimitation as a major cause of conflict issue (Adegehe, 2009 Tadesse & Adaye, 2007).

The Afar -Issa conflict prone area is the Awash - Mille main road and the seaport of the Addis Ababa Djibouti and the settlement of Issa community which was constructed on the three towns such as Adaytu, Unduffo and Gedamaytu following the road infrastructure .In this regard, the claims which is raised by the conflicting parties as the following. Afar claims the ownership of some of the territories in which the Issa are presently found such as the three hamlets, Adaytu, Unduffo and Gedamaytu and other is based on the claim that the Afar used to inhabit these territories in the past. In contrast, the Issa (Somali) claims that holding a referendum to decide on the fate of the contested territories as constitutional remedy (Adegehe, 2009) . The conflicting parties there had been held a different argument based on their conflict interest and they had not been reached in a bilateral agreement to end the conflict rather they provided their appeal to the federal government in order to mediate and manage the conflict violent by deploying police force and to design a sustainable solution.

The Federal government had been designed three conflict resolution approaches. The first is organized a joint peace committee (JPC) that include government officials in the federal, regional, zonal and Wereda level in both Afar and Somali regional states. The second is to design a mechanism to resolve regional boundary disputes through legal and peaceful means in accordance to sub article 1 and 2 of Article 48 of the FDRE constitution. This sub article1 stated that regional governments or parties in conflict could be solved by peaceful means and the same article sub article 2 stipulated that, if the demarcation issues had not solved by themselves peacefully, fore with submitted their appeal to the HOF to hold referendum (Yasin,2010) . The third way 'provided as resolution is to live together but Leave the Road' approach. As for the

safety of the main road, Herrie (2008:44) confirmed that “none of the Afar or Issa-Somalis allowed distancing themselves more than 5km from the main asphalt road.” Even though the federal government had been formulated three ways of alternative conflict resolution approach, But the first and the second approaches which have become a futile resolution .The third resolution approaches formulated by the Federal government is live together but leave the road approach. This approaches enable to constitute a buffer zone for the sack of road security and in order to prevent the eruption of conflict violent and to contain and managing the recurrent conflict violent by using Federal Police forces until to get an ending solution..

Based on the designed third approaches of the conflict resolution the federal government deploy police Force on the contested territory to prevent and manage conflict violent according to Article 51(14) Article 55(16) and article 62(9) of the FDRE Constitutions (,No.01/1995 a) and proclamation No 359/2003 System for the Intervention of the Federal Government in the Regions. As a result, the deployed Federal Police which has been stationed for a long period of time in the Afar-Issa/Somali/de facto boundaries in preventing and managing the conflict violent.

The Federal Police institution which has been structured from the composition of nation nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia and it represents the nine federal regional governments. In this regard it is important that Federal Police can be considered as an institution that legitimated by the two parties and expected to prevent and manage the occurrence of losing human lives and looting properties impartially. Moreover, Federal Police which is expected to play significant role in preventing and managing conflicts and contribute a lot in minimizing the risk of transforming conflict to violent. Therefore, the main objective of the Federal Police deployment along the contested boundary of Issa and Afar is to save the life and properties of the two communities from the recurrent violent and until get a sustainable solution.

Eventhough a number of authors such as, Mu,uz (2009) Yasin, (2010) (Adegehe,(2009) there were conducted a research about .the Afar-Isa causes of conflict violence, the two communities who were exerted traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, the conflict actors who are engaged in a conflict and also the predecessors central government which have been taken a political measures and formulated policies of the conflict management and resolution on the Afar-Issa . But the studies carried out by the authors was not addressed the security forces that

have been participated in preventing and managing the Afar -Issa conflict violent. And also the studies was not assessed the perception and thrust of the community on a security forces specially the Federal police in the aspect of impartiality, and the challenges facing the Federal police in conflict violent prevention and management .Therefore, the researcher who was decided to carry out a study on the role of the Federal Police in preventing and managing the inter- ethnic conflicts, which is the case of Afar- Issa (Somali) boundaries in North eastern Ethiopia.

1.3. Objectives of the Study

The researcher hopes to accomplish the following four objectives:

- To explore the role of Federal Police in preventing and managing the Afar-Issa ethnic conflict violence in the study area.
- To assess how the Federal Police coordinates and facilitates, the peace process with the conflicting parties and stakeholders.
- To identify what conflict handling mechanisms are employed and what chronic challenges of conflict prevention and managing exist in the study area.
- To investigate how the Federal Police are perceived by the local communities when discharging their operational duties and functions.

1.4. Research Questions

The research intends to assess the role of Federal Police in preventing and managing the inter-ethnic conflict between Afar and Issa. The study has tried to answer the following interrelated questions.

1. What is the role of the deployed Federal Police in preventing managing in the Afar -Issa ethnic conflict violence?
2. How do the Federal Police coordinate and facilitate the peace process with the Afar, Issa and other stakeholders?
3. What conflict mitigating approaches was being used the Federal Police, and what chronic challenge does Federal Police face in the conflict management between Afar –Issa?
4. How do local communities perceive the deployed Federal Police when implementing their operational duties and functions?

1.5. Significance of the Study

Conducting this study is decisive. Firstly because the study could create an awareness to the concerning bodies who are working on security sectors at the Federal level which have a power and mandate to deploy to the conflict prone. The second peculiar thing is the researcher believes that security practitioners and specifically the federal police and its stake holders enabled them how to contained a inflict violent. Thirdly it helps to understand the law of intervention system in the affairs of interstate or inter ethnic violence the FDRE constitution (Proc.No.01/(1995) (Proc No. /359(2003) respectively. Fourth the result of this study could also serve as bench mark and output in conflict management policy formulations.

1.6. Scope of the Study

Even though inter- ethnic conflict have been seen here and there in Ethiopia, but, in order to make the study manageable and comprehensively address the issues by the time, financial and material resources at hand the study focused only on, the “Role of Federal Police in preventing and managing the inter-ethnic conflict which is the case of Afar and Issa boundary” and this common boundary was including the two zones. One zone from Afar known as awash zone Three (Gabi Rasu) National Regional State bordering with the Ethiopian Somali National Regional State and the other zone is from Ethiopian Somali Regional State which is shinile zone bordering with the Afar zone Three (Gabi Rasu). These two ethnic groups have a conflict for a long time, experienced protracted conflicts. Therefore, this study was confined to Awash Zone Three (Gabi Rasu) in Afar Region and Shinile Zone in Ethiopian Somali Regional State which is the contested boundary with the Afar Zone Three that have been occurred in the period from September 2010 to 2018.

1.7. Limitations of the Study

First of all, there is lack of adequate literature in the Ethiopian security sector, especially police context that helps to review and organize the theoretical part of the study. Therefore, the literature part of this study is more dominated to foreign literature sources. Secondly as the research is targeted the two inter-ethnic conflicting parties, and they are with strong conflict interest, they were not transparent and genuine to give information during interviews. Beside to that this paper also did not include the views of concerned officials like (expertise) of the house of federation and the views of non-Afar- Issa communities who are dwellers in the three kebeles of Gedamaytu, Unduffo, and Adaytu because of time and finance scarcity.

1.8. Organization of the Study:

The study is organized into six chapters. Chapter one deals with the introduction outlining the background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, Research question, significance of the study, scope of the study, limitations and organizations of the paper. Chapter two is theoretical approaches and literature review about intervention in conflict management and countries practicing federalism and the employment of police in conflict management. Chapter three would be the research methodology which also includes description of the study area.. Chapter four Historical back ground on the emergence and development of the police and its mandate in conflict prevention and management and literature review on the practice of the Federal Police intervention on inter-ethnic conflict in Ethiopia. Chapter Five finding on the Federal Police intervention in the Afar Issa inter-ethnic conflict. Chapter six would comprise of conclusion and recommendations.

1.9. Operational Definitions of Key Words

- **Police:** refers to a socio political and quasi legal institutions charges with the responsibility of enforcing criminal law and the maintenance of law and order (Kasumu, 2017) .Police can also be defined as a civil organization whose members are give special legal powers by the government to carry arms and ammunition for the task of maintaining public order solving and preventing crimes and supporting other sisters security agencies to achieve internal security in the country.
- **Policing:** is the process of preventing crime and maintaining order (Crawford, 2008:147).
- **Intervention"** means according to the proclamation no. 359/2003 a system for intervention in the Regions pursuant to Article 62 (9) of the Constitution and includes measures to be taken in accordance with Article 51 (14) or Article 55 (16) of the Constitution.
- **Deployment: of security force means** In the context of Ethiopia .Federal Government solely deploy the Federal Police or defence force, or both to arrest the deteriorating security situation taking into consideration the gravity of the situation, system of intervenin proclamation No.359/2003).
- **Inter-Ethnic conflict:** This refers to tensions between two separate ethnic groups like Afar Vs Issa

CHAPTER TWO

2. THEORETICAL APPROACHS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

Conflict is not a new social phenomenon in the history of mankind. It is an inherent part of human existence. Conflict always exists as long as human beings live together and it is an inescapable human experience. However, violent conflict could be prevented, managed and transformed in a positive way rather than eliminate forever. Therefore, in order to understand the role of Federal Police in inter-ethnic conflict prevention and management, this section of the study thoroughly reviews the existing literature conflict, conflict mitigation approaches, theoretical frameworks and empirical studies related to this paper.

2.2. Definition of Conflict

Many authors in several ways and dimensions have defined conflict. Among them Johan Galtung (1973:25) who is the father of conflict theory define conflicts as, “ the situation where an action system has two incompatible goals.” It implied that parties with incompatible interests and goals they could not achieved simultaneously. Therefore this lead to competition to fulfill their scarcity. Thakore, (2013: 7) define conflict as “an outcome of behaviours. It is an integral part of human life. Whenever there is interaction there is conflict. Conflict means expression of hostility, negative attitudes, antagonism, aggression, rivalry, and misunderstanding.” Traditional definitions of conflicts according to which a conflict is a situation of opposing interests involving scarce resources, goal divergence and frustration.Indeed as conflicts are usually arisen because of differences in dynamic socio-cultural, politico-economical and physiological needs. Conflict may usually erupt when one party demands something or accuses the other for taking it/them. Samarasinghe (1999 cited in Yasin, 2010) defines conflict as “perceived incompatibility of humans goals or aspirations”. Coser, (1957), also defined conflict as “the clash of values and interests, the tension between what is and what some groups feel ought to be.” Accordingly, conflict is a situation which generates incompatible goals or values among different parties. According to the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute research center on security and conflict emphasize that, Conflict is the perception of threat, or actual occurrence of conflict is necessary for the initiation of conflict prevention or management measures (Swanström, & Weissmann,

2005). Another more recent argument is (Miller and King 2005) defined conflict as a confrontation when a party aspires towards incompatible or competitive means or ends which may be either manifest, recognizable through actions or behaviour, or latent, in which case it remains dormant for some time as incompatibilities are unarticulated or are built into systems or such institutional arrangements as governments, corporations, or even civil Society.

To sum up conflict is an inevitable and necessary feature of domestic and international relations. The challenge facing governments is not the elimination of conflict, but rather, how to effectively address conflict when it arises Schell-Faucon, (2001). It means that conflict management institutions should be identifying the structural cause of conflict and expected to apply the conflict preventing and transforming approaches.

2.3. Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention strategy is a primary option for conflict practitioners. conflict prevention strategy is the activities of hard removal based on the conflict symptoms and negative consequences such as perception of a threat, or actual occurrence, of a conflict is necessary for the initiation of conflict prevention strategy (Weiss, 2005). According to Mayer, (2012) argument on the objective of prevention strategy it may gear toward making sure that a conflict does not arise to begin with, or they may focus on preventing a destructive escalation of a conflict that has already developed. The author adding also potential for a conflict to escalate in a destructive way can be mitigated by early detection and rapid response systems and by the establishment of on-going structures to monitor and address conflicts as they arise (May,2012).

According to Buxton. & Saloni, (2006), conflict can be perceived latently and in manifest stages. Latent conflict which simply exists normally with a society. This is hidden not obvious for conflict practitioners. The second stage of conflict is manifest or violent conflict. But, the Conflict prevention strategy is applied simultaneously for both stages of conflict. Therefore the only purpose of conflict prevention is to reduce manifest tensions and or prevent the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflict (Buxton et al., 2006). Regarding to this purpose there are three Strategies of conflict prevention or fall in to three broad categories based on the scope of their focus. The first conflict prevention strategy is direct prevention or operational prevention, this strategy works after breakout violence or exists tension between the conflicting parties or

recurrence conflict. This strategy most of the time implemented by the security forces who are deployed and intervene in a conflict violence zone. The second structural prevention strategy focuses on more long term measures that address the underlying causes of a potential conflict along with potentially escalating and triggering factors. These types of broader strategy more focused to eliminate the causes of conflict that trying to assure uneven distribution of resources and rights working on poverty reduction, and build a democracy. The border between the two is however, blurry and both can be implemented simultaneously.

The third conflict prevention conception or as “systemic prevention” was coined by Kofi Annan to refer to “measures to address global risks of conflicts that transcend particularly states”. Systemic prevention concerns issues that can be dealt with efficiently only collectively through global partnerships and frameworks on an international scale. This implied that in order to prevent the cause of conflict threat each countries are systemic established the strategy. Some major focuses highlighted by Annan, are illicit arms trade, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, conflict diamonds, and similarly, the prosecution of war crimes and human rights violations (Melander, 2018)..

According to (Kriel, 2007) explanation on the concept, direct prevention (also referred to as “operational “or “light” prevention aims at giving an immediate answer to an imminent crisis. The aim of prevention is then very clear and specifically targets the reduction of violence between identified actors, in a rather short- term perspectives. Example of practical measures that can be implemented in direct prevention can be fact finding monitoring negotiation, mediation, and confidence building.

According to the Carnegie Commission Conflict Prevention Measure, classifies into four broad categories. Those are, early response to early warning, preventive diplomacy (political, none – coercive measures); economic measures (sanctions, inducement, economic dispute resolution mechanisms); forceful measure (Swanström, & Weissmann, 2005).The above four classified prevention measures are designed by policy makers to address the cause of conflict at the beginning and to deescalate the ongoing conflict violence.

2.4. Conflict Management

According to Miller and King (2005) stated the main objective of conflict management is to limit the issue of incompatibility and avoid future violence by promoting positive behavioural changes in the parties involved (Aiyede2016). Conflict practitioners always busy to limit, mitigate and/or contain of a conflict without necessarily solving it (Swanston & Weissmann, 2005).The time of Conflict managing system is specified to intervene to the conflict prone before or during and after it has occurred. It implied that conflict management method is taking anti pain medicine without curable the symptom of diseases. This means retransforming the conflict violence to the normal situations and giving proper medicine and treatment to the patient to be healthy is the same true that resolving the cause of conflict in sustainable way. Conflict management is an approach taken when resolution seems to be impossible. It refers to the measures that limit, mitigate and or contain a conflict without necessarily solving it. It requires different levels of intervention.

Conflict management should imply a change, from destructive to constructive, in the mode of interaction. Zartman , (2020) has argued that conflict management refers to eliminating violent and violence-related actions and leaving the conflict to be dealt with on the political level

Conflict management is the process of limiting the negative aspects of conflict while increasing its positive aspects, (Usoro, Ekpenyong, & Effiong, 2014). It is the principle that all conflicts cannot necessarily be resolved, but learning how to manage conflicts can decrease the odds of non-productive escalation. As Dalung, (2013 cited in Usoro et al., 2014) asserts that conflict management entails long term management of intractable conflicts. He further explained that it is the variety of ways by which people handle grievances standing up for what they consider to be right and against what they consider to be wrong. Conflict management assumes an intervention mechanism, including monitoring and evaluation of conflict behaviours and the degree of compliance to resolutions on ending violence, demobilization of arms, or effecting concessions and remedies, which are very vital in easing tensions by all the concerned parties to the conflicts Akpuru–Aja 2007).

Conflict management therefore involves acquiring skills related to conflict resolution, self-awareness about conflict modes, conflict communication skills, and establishing a structure for

resolving conflict in the environment. It is process that embraces all articulated strategies, interventions and institutional mechanisms in controlling the escalation of conflict.

Conflict management has three different paths; conflict settlement, conflict resolution and conflict transformation. Conflict management involves the control of long-term or deep-rooted conflict. Conflict is seen as an irremovable consequence of differences in values and interests within and between communities.

2.5 Conflict Settlement

Conflict settlement refers to all outcome-oriented strategies for achieving sustainable win-win solutions and/or putting an end to direct violence. And the main objective is to end violent behaviour by reaching a peace agreement. These strategies do not necessarily address the underlying causes of the conflict. Based on the 'ideology of management', most conflict settlement researchers define conflict as the result of incompatible interests and/or competition for scarce power resources. Conflict may seem like a zero-sum game, but depending on interests and the stage of escalation, settlement can transcend the zero-sum situation and lead to a positive-sum (or win-win) situation (Reimann & Reimann, 2004:8)

This point is illustrated by realist rational actor models. As both rational choice and game theory are applied to the practice of conflict settlement, political and military leaders are perceived as rational actors. They calculate their interests and by the end work together towards rational and mutually beneficial goals. Game theory modeling shows how mutual satisfaction are natural results of egoistic or realist power politics, thus conflict settlement is a non-zero-sum game in which gain for one actor is not necessarily at the expense of others. Both parties must clarify contextual conditions and note the difference between their positions (short-term standpoints) and interests (fundamental long-term scales).

Conflict settlement strategies thus move in a very limited scope - of success and peace - meaning that a sustained win-win solution is regarded as success. Peace is seen in negative terms, with no set objective for longer term, positive peace - peace is not the goal, and the ending of violent conflict is. The primary concern with the upholding of established social norms (of right or wrong) is aimed at bringing the conflict to an end, without dealing with the underlying causes of it: a certain conflict might be settled permanently, but another similar or

related conflict may arise again later due to the same underlying causes of the initial conflict,(Reimann, 2004 & Muhyadin, 2006).

2.6. Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution refers to measures attempting to resolve the underlying incompatibilities of a conflict, including attempts to get the parties to mutually accept each other's' existence.

Conflict resolution strategies refer to all process-oriented activities that aim to address the underlying causes of direct, cultural and structural violence. It attempts to use game theory in order to overcome the self-defeating dynamics of zero-sum (win-win) conflict management approaches, thus reframing the conflict as a shared problem with mutually acceptable solutions. Conflict resolution addresses the causes of conflict and seeks to build a new and lasting relationship between hostile groups. In 1968, Burton used the model of game theory to show that most inter-state conflicts are the result of dysfunctional decision-making(Reimann, 2004: 9).

Conflict resolution strategies are process- and relationship oriented, which hosts non-coercive and unofficial activities such as facilitation and consultation. It will also draw in a greater number of involved actors, for example: the inclusion of civil society organizations. Most strategies take the form of medium-term involvement, but the very process of sustaining or developing dialogue is a short-term involvement(Kriel, 2007). Discovering a deeper common interests and shared needs through increased cooperation and improved communication may constitute a successful outcome of conflict management, with outcome defined here as the minimum requirement of satisfaction of the needs of both parties. (Reimann & Reimann, 2004).

Resolution goes beyond merely negotiating interests, but to meet all opponents' basic needs and simultaneously tries to respect the various underlying values and identities. It requires a more analytical, problem solving approach than conflict settlement. Significant social, economic and political changes that reform the institutional structure of society in a more just and inclusive way which lies in the scope of conflict resolution strategies (Spangler, 2003).

2.7. Conflict Transformation

Conflict transformation strategies refer to outcome-, process- and structure-oriented long-term peace building efforts. It aims to overcome the revealed forms of direct, cultural and structural

violence completely (Kriel, 2007). Conflict transformation not only moves beyond the aims of both previous approaches, but also takes up many ideas of conflict resolution, particularly Burton's "conflict prevention". Conflict prevention refers to "not merely the conditions that create the environment of conflict and structural changes required to remove it, but more importantly, the promotion of conditions that create cooperative relationships"(Reimann & Reimann, 2004:10) Protracted violent conflicts, therefore, can be seen as the result of unequal and suppressive socio-political structures. To deal with conflict will call for the empowerment or recognition of marginalized group's (Reimann & Reimann,, 2004: 10).

The conflict resolution approach lacks the focus on dialogue and cooperation between actors of unequal status: the need to fulfill basic needs give rise to deep-rooted violence and hatred in the first instance (Krie. 2007). Here lies an observable difference between conflict resolution and conflict transformation - where the transformation approach intentionally keeps "the aftermath" of the conflict in focus, conflict resolution has the inclination to concentrate only upon the immediate and short-term. Conflict resolution sees conflict as a phenomenon that is bad and as something that needs to be ended. The transformative approach asks that we recognize conflict and use it in a positive way that is to our advantage Reimann, 2004.)

2.8. Key Theories of Conflict Violence Transformation

The research was guided by the conflict or violence transformation theory. Conflict transformation is coined by Galtung, Miall, and Lederach by various nomenclatures. According to Miall, (2004). and Daniel, (2016), Violence transformation theory asserts that violent conflicts are transcended through various processes. Accordingly, conflict transformation is the shift of asymmetric to symmetric relationships or from unbalanced to balanced relationships through a process of conscientisation, confrontation, negotiation and development (Miall, 2004) It indicates non-violent social change. As the fundamental causes of conflicts which are imbalanced relationships shifted conflict is transformed or improved its impact.

Conflict transformation is thus changing a violent conflict into a non-violent (Galtung: 1958,). Galtung argues that peace must be defined by widely accepted social goals and that any state of peace is characterized by the absence of violence (Galtu: 1958,). Accordingly inter-ethnic conflicts are transcended and transformed their degree and gravity of violent nature.

Transformation is actualized through the real commitment to application of non-violent techniques by the parties and government security apparatuses as the goal of transformation is to create a new wave of togetherness from troubled past after a proper revelation of truth of what happened and requesting mercy, the rendering of justice in a way it ensures peace ((Lederach,1999.)

The very structure of parties and relationships are embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflict. Conflict transformation is a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict. In this case constructive conflict is seen as a vital agent or catalyst for change (Miall, 2004). Galtung, 1958) coined three kinds of violence in a conflict. i.e. structural violence or social injustice, cultural violence, and direct violence. He defines structural violence as injustice and inequality built into the structure of society that results in unequal power, and imbalanced opportunities or life chances(Galtung,1969). This violence is embedded within the institutions of the society but there is no clear actor that commits this violence. The system within the society allows uneven power and access to resources and to decide the distribution of wealth among groups. This kind of violence is common in societies with low income, and it's is an avoidable impairment of fundamental human needs. Individuals have unequal opportunities and ranks of education, wealth, health, and power due to the social structure (Galtung,, 1973). As long as there are social structures there always will be structural violence and social injustice. Through institution within the society social groups are marginalized, excluded and segregated from enjoying equitable distribution of values. Therefore this structural violence is the fundamental factor of conflicts.

Cultural violence is the employment of culture to legitimize violence against groups or individuals in its direct or structural form(Galtung,1969).This violence is a foundational principle for extended conflict. The existence of prevailing or prominent social norms make direct and structural violence seem natural or at least acceptable, and serves to explain how prominent beliefs can become so embedded in a given culture that they function as absolute and inevitable and are reproduced uncritically across generations

The third type of violence which is direct is a physical aggression committed by individuals or groups against others (Galtung,1969). Direct violence is characterized by high instability and easily recognized. It's the most visible, that occurs physically or verbally, and the victim and the offender are clearly identified. Direct violence is highly interdependent with structural and cultural violence: cultural and structural violence causes direct violence which on the other hand reinforces the former ones (Galtung,1969). Therefore, conflict transformation aims at mitigating the three types of violence in a conflict (Galtung 1958). The absence of these three kinds of violence means there is peace.

Conflict transformation involves a comprehensive and wide-ranging approach, emphasizing support for groups within the society in conflict rather than for the mediation of outsiders. Thus accordingly people within the conflict parties, within the society or region affected, and outsiders with relevant human and material resources all have complementary roles to play in the long-term process of peace-building. Conflicts are transformed gradually, through a series of smaller or larger changes as well as specific steps by means of which a variety of actors may play important roles (Miall,2004.).

Conflict transformation is realized by building peace constituencies at the grassroots level and across the parties at the civil society level, and by creating peace alliances with any groups able to bring about change, such as business groups, the media and the military. Peace-building is a long-term transformation of a war system into a peace system, inspired by a quest for the values of peace and justice, truth and mercy (Miall, 2004.). The key dimensions of this process are changes in the personal, structural, relational and cultural aspects of conflict, brought about over different time-periods (short-, mid- and long-term) and affecting different system levels at different times Conflict transformation is thus seen as peace-building that is structure-process. A comprehensive peace process should address complementary changes at all these levels(Miall,, 2004).

Conflict transformation is thus realizing the transformative and constitutive nature of violence. The transformation idea is that the energy of violence can be used for the constructive change process. Hence, the concern is not conflict rather violence. Conflict transformation is a process of transition from the cycle of direct violence and the invisible violence of structures and culture towards positive peace. Transformation involves continues process of addressing the circular

relationship of attitude, behavior and contradiction, and violence. Conflict transformation utilizes peace-keeping strategies for direct violence, peace-making strategies for structural violence, and peace-building strategies for cultural violence (Galtung: 1996). According to Johannes, (2003) creating new space of talks and communication for individuals and the whole society has a vital role in developing the capacity for sustainable peace. Creating a viable public space where reconciliation can be carried out is indispensable (Johannes, 2003). This space is where the four pillars of reconciliation truth, mercy, justice and peace meet (Lederach,..2005.). Therefore conflict transformation in a broader view means addressing the problem of basic human needs including addressing the deeper and longer-term relational and systemic patterns that produce violence (Johannes, 2003). It's turning physical violence into negative peace in a short term and transitioning negative peace into positive peace in the long term.

The study sought to find out the role of the Federal Police in preventing and managing the Afar-Issa inter-ethnic conflict. It examined the application and utilization of conflict transformation methods by the Federal Police to transcend the nature and violent impacts of the Afar-Issa inter-ethnic conflict

2.9. Some Federalist Countries Experience and Challenges in Managing Inter-ethnic Conflicts by Using Police Forces

Different literature indicated that countries which are adopting federal system of government the mandate to protect the constitution and to maintain peace and order over all a country have reserved in the hands of the federal or central governments. In this regard in the case of conflict crisis occurred beyond the capacity of the regional state to overcome by themselves the federal government employed Federal Police or central security forces as a primary option to conflict management strategy and deploy to the conflict zone. Therefore, this section tries to review the Nigerian and Indian Federal Police role in deescalate the communal violence and the challenges hinder the effectiveness of inter-communal conflict deescalating. For instance, slow actions to the violence, the issue of police impartiality, human rights violations, resource constraints and lack of training.

2.9.1. The Nigeria Experience

According to the Nigerian constitution, section Police Force is designated under the single jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and established as the National institution of security sector by denied the jurisdiction power of states to establish their own police force. According to Okereke,(2012) stated that the logic behind to design and stipulates a centralized police which is known as the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) is established for the purpose of enforcement of law and unity in diversity. In this regard the Nigerian Federal constitution is unique from the other federal countries in the world. As a federal state, the power of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is divided between the central government called the federal government and the 36 states of the federation section 2 of 1999 Constitution cited in (Michael, 2013). But exceptionally the police system had established under the jurisdiction of Federal government. Thus, federalism is not complete without the existence of state police or denied the state government to establish its own police force. Therefore the enforcement of law and order and managing ethnic conflict by using police force is in the hands of federal Government.

Several authors like (Para-mallam & Hoomlong,(2012), ICG (2012) (Afeni, Super Afeni, 2014) were reviewed about the inter-ethnic conflict violence and strategies to respond the Nigerian Government to deescalate the outbreak of conflict. In this regard as Countries with multinational ethnic and religious plurality or diversity, the arisen of violence between or among is an inevitable reality. Therefore in order to respond and pacify the ethno religious conflict escalation employed different conflict management strategies in Nigeria according to the analysis. For instance the two major conflict management strategies are often employed in Nigeria to control and maintain the ethno-religious conflict violence. The two strategies as mentioned by the researchers are the judicial inquiry and the coercive methods. One of the responses to manage the Jos crisis was established several commissions of inquiry have been set up to investigate the remote and immediate causes of the Jos crisis, in addition to other non-judicial committees and initiatives. The second strategies employed on Jos crisis were a coercive strategy. This strategy is most of the time practicing as primary option to deescalate the conflict violence by deploying police force and other security stockholders. But in a very serious situation ethno-religious conflict, and, if beyond the capacity of the police operation, government may be forced to make use of military force. In this regard the Federal police force in Nigeria, as

an example discussed below concerning about its role in conflict de-escalation and to curbing the outbreak of conflict.

2.9.2. Ethnic Violence and the Nigerian Government Responses

Nigeria, officially known as the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is the most populous and with multi-ethno-religious country in sub-Saharan Africa (Nwankwo, 2015). This ethnic diversity creates political and economical competition among them and it made to ignite conflict violence. Since 2001, violence has erupted in Jos city, capital of Plateau state, in Nigeria's Middle Belt region.

The other conflict eruption in Jos was because of terror attacks and suicide bombings against churches and security targets by suspected militants of Boko Haram, the Islamist group responsible for an unprecedented wave of terrorist attacks in the north. As a result thousands were killed, hundreds of thousands have been displaced internally and billions of dollars of property was destroyed. The ostensible dispute is over the "rights" of the indigene Berom/Anaguta/Afizere (BAA) group and the rival claims of the Hausa-Fulani settlers to land, power and resources. Indigene- settler conflicts are not new to Nigeria, but the country is currently experiencing Widespread inter communal strife, which particularly affects the Middle Belt. While commenting on the problem with the deployment of security forces (troops) to conflict areas to quell the crisis, Oromareghake and Akpator (2005) have this to say.

"the problem with the deployment of security forces that are not backed by intensive mediation effort is that it unnecessarily prolongs the stay of such security forces deployed in different parts of Nigeria. This is because the units of mobile police or armies frequently deployed to quell disturbances in Nigeria have neither the mandate nor the training to act as conflict resolution facilitator"

What the above quoted statement conveys is that the deployment of troops to crisis spots is never a competent method of dealing with this phenomenon of ethno-religious conflict. Because such troops lack adequate training in conflict management, they always cause more problems than the ones they are expected to solve. In other words, they become part of the problem rather than they have been invited to curb. The establishment of judicial commission or panel remains the second major management strategy used by government in Nigeria to intervene in ethno- religious crises. The method involves the selection of people from varied backgrounds to investigate the problems and submit report to the government based on the terms of reference given to the panel

to work with. Such commission often operates by calling for memoranda, organizing public hearing and paying visits to the areas of crises. The objective of such visits is to get first-hand assessment of the extent of the crises. The judicial method of conflict management in Nigeria has failed to resolve the problem.

2.9.3. The Nigerian Police Force Response to Jos Crisis

According to Omorogbe and Omohan (2005) cited in (Salawu, B. (2010) emphasise that Nigeria as multi-ethnic and multi-religious society conflict is a chronic and manifest problem for the Nigerian security. Among the Nigerian ethnic violence the Jos conflict between the indigene Berom/ Anaguta/Afizere (BAA) groups and the rival claims of the Hausa-Fulani settlers was erupted because of claim to land, power and resource. The escalation of the conflict within and around Jos prompted the Federal Government to resort to military intervention. Internal security operations carried out to suppress insurrection are supported by Section 217 subsection 2(c) of the(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). The provision allows for the military to act in aid of the civil authority in the maintenance of public order and internal security where the situation demands, subject to such conditions as prescribed by an act of the National Assembly (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013). This implied that Nigerian government was employed police force and military personnel as a primary option to control and reduce conflict outbreak in Jos In order to manage and deescalate the conflict violence. The Nigerian Government frequently employed two major conflict management strategies to tackle the problem of ethno-religious conflicts occur. Those two strategies are the coercive (deploying security force) and the judicial methods. The coercive method as the name suggests has to do with the deployment of mobile police and military troops to the areas of conflict with the objective of controlling the crises. In Nigeria this kinds of conflict management strategy the ethno religious conflicts has taken many forms depending on the magnitude of the crises in question. Police as the primary responsible of institution for law enforcement and internal security, often times intervene in violent conflicts involving diverse groups (Afeno., 2014).

In alight ethno-religious crises for instance, the conventional policemen are the first to be drafted to the crisis point and to be assisted by the mobile police-men in case the conventional corps cannot cope. But in a very serious ethno-religious conflict, government may be forced to make use of combined military force made up of the army, navy and the air-force. For instance

the Special Task Force (STF, a joint police-military operation) was first deployed to Jos after the 2001 crisis, indigenous and settler groups identified with it and were prepared to contribute to its success (Crisis Group, 2012b).

2.9.4. Challenges to the Nigerian Deployed Police Force

The Nigerian mobile police and the Nigerian armies have been used to suspend many cases of conflicts in Nigeria. They have succeeded in restoring order in most cases of violent conflicts, but their intervention usually gets to the violence scene after colossal wastage of human lives and valuable properties (Akinwale, n.d.). Because of late response, the coercive power of the deployed police force unable to curb the violence in preventable way rather attempted to manage after the crisis happened. Scholars Thomas, (1992) and, Pondy (1977) have shown that time lag would affect the effectiveness of conflict management activities. Some legal documented evidence of the failure of the Nigerian mobile police and the Nigerian military in their endeavours to prevent violent conflicts and restore social order are summarised here. According to Oromaregbe, and Akpator (2005), such method has created more bitterness than bringing relief. Commenting on the reasons for the failure of these two methods of resolving or managing ethno-religious conflicts in the Nigerian case, Omorogbe and Omohan (2005) said the main reasons for the poor performance of the often used conflict management mechanisms are poor logistics, delay in deployment of troops to the crisis areas, lack of cooperation by parties to the conflicts, non-implementation of white paper or recommendations submitted to the government by the panel of inquiry. According to Omorogbe and Omohan, (2005) argument even if the deployed police force play a big role in controlling the violence but because of the military nature of this kind of intervention however, the coercive method is usually associated with many vices such as rape, beating and in some cases shooting of innocent citizens. Consequently, this method of intervention in ethno-religious conflicts has not been successful as a mechanism.

This measure can only be successful if it is short-term and in full accordance with the law, but it has lasted as long as the crisis. Although it has defused tension in some areas, in the eyes of many residents, the security agencies have become part of the problem. When the Special Task Force (STF) and a joint police-military operation (JPMO) was first deployed to Jos after the 2001 crisis, indigenous and settler groups identified with it and were reparsed to contribute to its success. But what the challenges have been facing to the deployed police forces over the years,

its presence, many residents claim, has brought little relief, safety and security. More attacks, particularly against indigenes, and more deaths have been recorded. The STF's ranks were accused by the BAA of colluding with the Hausa-Fulani community, particularly Fulani herdsmen, in attacking villagers.

Due to all the reasons given above, the two conflict management strategies which have been used constantly at different crisis points in Nigeria have not yielded much positive results in terms of effective resolution of ethno-religious conflicts that have characterized the Nigerian political system. Even though the ten rule of engagement summarised below exists and given an orientation in time of deployment to the Nigerian security forces, but not refrain from extra judicial killing and brutality by the Nigerian police force is challenging issues (Afeni, 2014).

❖ The key rules of engagement could be summarised: by, (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013)

- *Maintain the principle of minimum force and proportionality at all times,*(Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013).
- *Use of force should be a last resort after every reasonable effort to contain a situation had been made,* (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013).
- *Use of force should only be resorted to if other means had failed or if not- use of force would result in the death or grievous injury to security personnel. For example, where there is evidence of a hostile act or hostile act,* (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013).
- *Use of force must be limited in intensity and duration and must be employed as a protective measure,*(Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013).
- *Decision to open fire must only be upon the order of the on-scene commander unless there is no sufficient time to obtain such an order*(Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013).
- *Fire must be controlled and aimed at non-vital body parts in order not to kill,* (Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013).
- *Avoid collateral damage ,*(Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013).
- *Render medical assistance and record deaths at incident after cessation of fire. Data gathered to be passed through appropriate chain of command ,*(Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013).
- *Protect internally displaced persons (IDPs) and assist agencies engaged in the distribution of relief materials,*(Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013).

- *Undertake activities that would aid in diffusing tension*,(Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013).

The above-stated rules of engagement are standard parameters that conform to international guidelines on the conduct of security forces operations to contain. The main purpose of deploying security forces is to protect civilians from breaching their human rights. Hence, to avoid abuse of their mandates, security forces are regulated through institutional laws and codes of conduct including 'rules of engagement' while discharging their duties.(Para-Mallam & Hoomlong, 2013)

2.10. The Indian Experience

As per the provision of the Constitution of India quite specifically Police and public order are in the state list of the Seventh Schedules and the rules and regulations governing the state police forces are also framed by the state governments and contained in their Police manuals. However, the Union Government of Indian as a supremacy guard and protects every state of governments from external aggression and internal disturbance and in order to achieve the significant mandate of the federal government in relation to security interest of the union government has constituted seven police forces with specialised tasks at federal level under the minister of home affairs (MHA) (Article,355/1951). Therefore, the Ministry of Home Affairs has multifarious responsibilities, especially to create a strong relationship between the union and state governments. Among the main responsibilities belonging to the minister of home affairs are, management of Para-military forces, border management, Centre-State relations, administration of Union territories, disaster management (Ministry of home affairs, 2010). Among the specified task oriented established central police forces,(CPF) the central reserved police force CRPF is the largest central armed police force of India deployed for internal security of the country. In order to contained the ethno-religious violence, the Indian Constitution bestows extraordinary powers to the central government in case of a crisis that allows it to take over the police powers of the federated states (Roch,.2011). This implied that to tackle and quell the ethnic and religious violence employ police deployment as primary conflict management strategies.

2.10.1. The Indian Communal Violence and the Police Response

As Tran, (2010,:37) “Communal violence is defined as violence against an ethno -religious community by another such community”. Communal violence in a context of India has taken place between the communalism advocate majority group Hindu and the minority group which is treated as a second citizen Muslim community. For instance in 2009, India experienced 826 communal incidents that claimed a lot of lives death and caused injuries (Wan., 2017).

One of the major factors behind the deterioration in the communal situation is the rise of Hindu fundamentalism and its corresponding hegemonies ethnic nationalism based on Hindutva. In order to manage the inter communal violence the paramilitary police forces are the first responders to unique security issues, such as terrorism, and are the primary security forces operating in Punjab and Kashmir, regions that border Pakistan. As the concept of Federalism is a political remedy to accommodate interests and to minimise conflicts, the Indian constitution article 355 emphasise the federal government to have a power and deploy police force in specific circumstances (Tran, 2010).

The CRPF today focuses on cases related to wide-level disturbances, such as insurgency, food riots, and communal violence (Tran, 2010).. The Rapid Action Force (RAF) is a specialized branch of the CRPF that is assigned to deal with riots. In 1992, ten battalions were created to serve as a strike force in situations of communal violence, and each RAF battalion is stationed at ten different communally sensitive areas across the country (Tran, 2010). This clearly indicates that the union government has supremacy over the state governments in matters related to legislation. Experts note that this supremacy exists not only in legislative powers but in administrative.

This clearly indicates that the union government has supremacy over the state governments in matters related to legislation. Experts note that this supremacy exists not only in legislative powers but in administrative (Roch,2011). Even though the central reserved police force (CRPF) especially the specialized police (RAP) rapid action force were intervened or involved in State of Jammu & Kashmir, In State of Assam, in 2012 in a state of Gujarat. etc the Minority Muslims who are live to and communal conflict violence occurred, but the police force resided or biased to the majority group of Hindu community. In this regard Muslims have been massacred,

Muslim women have been raped, and properties were destroyed and burnt by extremist Hindutva forces.

2.10.2 Challenges the Indian Police in Managing the Communal Violence

The deployed Indian Federal police forces in the state of Punjab, Kashmir, Assam, North-East region, and the state of Gujarat communal violence of Hindu and Muslim have played a big role to contain the communal violence. However, it faced several challenges. The first one is lack of impartiality. As Wani,.(2017) stated that the Hindu community is socially economically and politically hegemonic control over all the other minority groups like Muslim community and caste. According to Wani,.(2017) this indicated that all job opportunities including police and military recruitment easy accessible to the Hindu community. And the police organization demographically unbalance with other Muslim community. This enables that while the police deploying to the conflict violation prone the police officer resided to their identity. As a result the police officers duties to de-escalate conflicts violence between Hindu and Muslim have not performed effectively.

In the State of Gujarat where during communal riots Muslims were killed, humiliated, Muslim women were raped and properties were looted by the persons who were involved in those riots against Muslims even the very surprising and embarrassing situation is that police and other armed forces were also supporting and assisting to the extremist Hindutva groups who were killing Muslims, (Wani, 2017). The second one is violation of human right, security forces misused their powers in a very extensive way and killed thousands of youth, children, old man those who don't have any guilt to be killed. Moreover, during the conflicts going on Muslim paramilitary officers were ordered to surrender their weapons and take a leave of absence of duty. By demobilizing the Muslims members of the taskforce, the window for biases in paramilitary performance had been opened. The third one is the paramilitary forces not deployed in a timely manner to deal with the crisis, even members of the paramilitary forces that were on active duty, but, the police deployed after the violation reached at high climax (Chaturvedi, 2017).

2.11. Ethnic Conflict Management in Ethiopia

Conflict management, simply put, is the constructive handling of difference. The assumption in conflict management is that not all conflicts can necessarily be resolved. Jeong, (2009) states that mismanaged conflicts erupt in violence and result in destruction of community; this destructive nature of conflict manifested in the form of violence is only reduced and controlled by conflict management strategies. Then conflict management is a cost effective intervention for countries with limited resource which cannot afford the wider and complex burden of post conflict situation as a result of over looked or unmanaged conflicts (Jeong, (2009). The fact that Ethiopia is the home of more than 80 ethnic groups with their language, religion and other cultural identities living together, leads to the conclusion that conflict is inevitable as long as it is driven by the existence of incompatible goals. Moreover, the diversity of the country also urges strong and functional conflict management institutions at all levels of the government structure. This section tries to see the efforts made by government bodies to manage conflict and the perceptions towards conflicts.

To have an understanding of how conflict management in Ethiopia operates, it is important to examine how responsible bodies, practitioners and different actors who have direct involvement in conflict management understand conflict. Government officials and those stakeholders mentioned above perceive conflict as a taboo and resemble it with violence. The inability to distinguish violence and conflict by these decision makers leads them to conclude that conflicts can be resolved and managed by mere indoctrination of the people involved in the conflict about the destructiveness of violence rather than resolving the conflict (Girshaw, (2004). Furthermore, government officials take the option of handling by coercive methods.

The second point that should be raised here is conflict management in Ethiopia is not systematic. Although there are minor differences from place to place, in general, the process is not performed in a systematic way. As a result, the intervention effort done by government bodies becomes costly, time consuming and unsustainable. As Girshaw discussed, the fact is that this unsystematic approach to conflict is the result of government officials' inability to see conflict handling mechanism as a process. To substantiate her argument, she raises the case of Oromia and Somali boundary dispute whereby government officials from both side were busy in urging

participant in the process to expose the perpetrators of the violence rather than discussing and identifying the root causes of the conflict (Girshaw, (2004).

The third point in relation to conflict management in Ethiopia is the fact that conflict has not usually been properly recognized and addressed until it becomes violence. The wrong belief of officials who are in different levels of administration that everything is in a peaceful situation while ignoring demands of different groups lead to government bodies to respond to conflict when the issue is manifested in violence and after the conflict resulted in death on both sides of conflicting parties. The disagreement over dispute began after the end of the transitional period but officials from both Regional States gave formal recognition when it erupted into violence in the year 2000 (Girshaw, 2004).

The fourth conflict management mechanism which is observed to have been widely used in the country as an instrument to handle conflict is organizing “Peace and Democracy Conference”. These conferences are organized by government bodies in which different parts of the society can be represented to discuss with government officials (Seyoum, 2010).

The above discussion demonstrates the fact that conflict management in Ethiopia can be characterized as a ‘fire-brigade’ approach and the inability to handle conflicts as a process and lack of sustainability in the process leads government officials who are in different level to perform nothing before and after violence occurs.

2.11.1. Ethnic Conflict Management Institutions

According to (Cohen. (1999), ‘ethnic conflict management refers to the capacity of political institutions to contain ethnic conflict within their mechanisms, routines and procedures for resolution’. While there is a growing recognition today that multi-ethnic countries should provide recognition to cultural and ethnic pluralism with a view to reduce conflicts, An ever inevitability of conflict in every state governance specially in Federal system requires an institutional framework and mitigation strategy in order to manage conflicts in constructive ways Conflict management institution is Purposely and constitutionally established independently in federal countries to intervene in times of inter-ethnic conflicts(Yilma , 2016).

Therefore, Government to discharge its constitutional responsibility, there has been established institutions to manage conflict at national and local level. This section discusses the major institutions in Ethiopia which involve in conflict prevention and management.

2.11.2. House of Federation

The House of Federation which is the upper house of the country's parliamentary system is represented as the higher body for managing and resolving conflicts in the country. Pursuant to Article 62(2) of FDRE constitution (.No. 01/1995-a), the house of federation is authorized "to find solutions to disputes or misunderstandings that may arise between states". The House facilitates all the necessary conditions to resolve disputes that may arise between the states provided that the concerned parties are willing to solve their disparities through dialogue and discussion. However, in case the parties are unwilling or the discussion fails, the House has the power to intervene and takes measures which could bring about temporary solution.

The constitution remits the House of Federation (HOF) as the legislative governmental organ responsible for conflict mitigation. The House is responsible for issues relating to the rights of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. It can decide on the right of self-determination, including the right to secession and it can identify solutions to disputes or misunderstandings that may arise between states. The HOF can recommend federal interventions if any State endangers the constitutional order or violate the constitution. Regarding border disputes; the House gives decisions based on settlement patterns and the interest of the people in all the disputed areas. For instance the border disputes between the border area of Oromia and Somali Regional state were attempted to be resolved through a referendum. The 2004 referendum in Meiso wereda can be taken as an example.

2.11.3. Ministry of Federal Affairs (Ministry of Peace)

The Ministry is mandated by Proclamation 471/2005 of the federal government to work on conflict management activities especially in the affairs of intra and inter-regions. The Ministry also involves in conflict which arises from border dispute and ethnic conflict. This institution involves in facilitating the resolution of conflict under two circumstances. The first is when Regions fail to resolve by themselves. The Regional States request the intervention of the Federal Government and the request comes to the Prime Minister's Office (Seyoum, (2010.

When the intervention is approved, the Ministry of Federal Affairs involves in facilitating the resolution of conflicts. The second circumstance in which the Ministry of Federal Affairs involves is without the request of the Regional States. This is applied when cases that authorize the intervention of the Federal Government in Regional states are based on the Proclamation No.359/2003 which is referred as “System for the Intervention of Federal Government in Regions”. This authorizes Federal Government intervention under three conditions: in case of deteriorating security situation, when the constitutional order is endangered, and in cases of human right violation.

The Ministry’s major task is facilitating the resolution of conflicts through different mechanism, not necessarily resolve conflicts by itself. The mechanisms this particular institution uses are organizing “Peace and Democracy Conferences” to bring conflicting parties and different stakeholders together, deploying modern and traditional conflict management and resolution mechanisms by bringing elders and traditional leaders together and demarcation between ethnic groups who are in conflict due to dispute over land after their mutual consent. And the last option to control the violence outbreak by deploying the Federal Police to the conflict scene.

2.11.4. Regional States and Local Authorities

There are institutions within Regional State which are directly and indirectly involved in handling conflicts in the region. These institutions are structured at Regional, Zonal and ‘Woreda’ levels. To mention some of the regional and local institutions, established based the regional constitutions were Peace and Security Bureau, Police Commission and Militia Office and finally regional justice system.

Regional states have a major responsibility to address local conflicts. In line with this mandate, they have undertaken conflict prevention, management and peace-building activities. For example, in some instances peace committees or Joint Woreda Task Forces were established to manage conflict. However there is need for expansion of these activities especially with regards to capacity building. Moreover, coordination/integration between basic local structures and intermediate (wereda, zone and region) government hierarchies and the federal government should be strengthened..

2.11.5. Traditional Conflict Management Mechanisms

Traditional mechanisms are increasingly playing an important role in conflict management and peace building by integrating with the modern conflict management strategies like, court, police and ad hoc inquiry committees. The Guurti system of the Somali communities, Meda of the Afar, Shimgilina and Erqi of the Amhara, and Tigray are examples of traditional conflict management institutions played a crucial role in resolving and managing conflict violence. The guurti are a group of advisory elders composed of clan leaders, and elders of the communities who advise the regional, zonal and wereda administration on security matters, inter-clan conflicts and other (e.g. border) disputes. These traditional leaders are integrated with the administration. The religious leaders can play an important role in maintaining peace and harmony among the different segments in Ethiopia.

Traditional justice mechanism has the advantage of being: more accessible to the people than the formal legal methods; less costly and speedier; open and participatory. However, they need to be enhanced. For examples, their mobility and documentation needs to be enhanced. Importantly, there is no mechanism to coordinate the work of traditional mechanism and the formal judicial system. Moreover in some instances these mechanisms are procedurally flawed as they tend to: ignore or limit fundamental rights of citizens (e.g., the right to be presumed innocent; freedom of movement); occasionally interfere with criminal (judicial) proceedings; and they remit collective guilt, especially in inter-group conflicts (Zewde & Pausewang, 2002).

2.11.6. Legal Grounds to Intervene in to Regions

The concept of intervention is provided for under Articles 51(4), 55(16) and 62(9) of FDRE constitution. It is defined in relation with these provisions as ‘a system for intervention in the regions pursuant to Article 62(9) of the Constitution and includes measures to be taken in accordance with Article 51(14) or Article 55(16) of the (FDRE Constitution, Pro, 1995.). As a national level various national legislations have been used during the implementation of projects. These can be emanated from the constitution of the federal democratic republic of Ethiopia, proclamations policies, and strategies, of the country. Therefore, it seems possible to conclude that there are three types of interventions under the Constitution(FDRE Constitution, Pro, 1995.)and system for interventions federal government in the regions(proclamation No,359/

2003). The first ground of federal intervention is when there is ‘a deteriorating security situation within’ a region and when the Regional ‘authorities are unable to control it.

Intervention should be requested only if the authorities of the requesting region are not able to control a deteriorating security situation. Security situation in a region may deteriorate for one or another reason. In such cases, the obligation to maintain the security of a region primarily rests upon the Regional Government itself. However, in cases where a deteriorating security situation goes beyond the control of a Regional Government, the Federal Government may extend its help to restore the security of the requesting region. It is only in the later situation that the system of intervention is functional. Intervention is a unilateral act of the Federal Government. But, in this case the Federal Government interferes into regions only upon their request.(Alamaw,2009)

The second ground of intervention is when regional ‘authorities are unable to arrest violations of human rights within their jurisdiction. The federal government then intervenes to contained the on-going human rights violation. This prerequisite for intervention on the grounds of human rights violations is the inability on the part of a region to arrest the same. Therefore, whenever human rights violations exist, the Federal Government may intervene provided that the Regional Government is unable to arrest such violation(,Proc,No.359/ 2003).

The third ground of intervention is a situation that ‘endangers the constitutional order. Where there is a situation that puts the constitutional order in danger the Federal Government is empowered to intervene and stabilize the situation. According to the Proc,No.359/ 2003) system for the intervention of the federal government in the regions article (12) sub 2 stated that, resolving conflicts between another Region or Nation, Nationality or People of another Region by resorting to non-peaceful means. This is a direct follow up of the duty of the Federal Government to protect and defend the Constitution and the order established thereby. The duty to defend and protect the Constitution and the order established under it is the first duty of the Federal Government. Of the different organs of the Federal Government, the House of Federation is the ‘ultimate defender of the constitutional order in Ethiopia. Consequently, intervention in such instance is left within the competence of this House (Alamaw,2009).

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CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

This section discusses the methodological procedures employed in the study. It is structured as follows; design of the study, location of the study, the target population, sampling methods and sampling technique research instruments, methods of data collection, methods of data analysis and ethical considerations.

3.2. Research Design

The methodology of this study is qualitative one. Because, Qualitative research focuses on the quality of things, what is their nature? What are they like? How can they be described? It often involves the views or internal worlds of participants, and may include data generated through the use of interviews, focus group, discussions etc. Qualitative research often gathers data from relatively small samples of people, and can provide a ‘micro’ view of whatever issues you are examining. The relatively small amount of data does not, however, make the researcher’s job easier. Because qualitative data often take the form of words, narratives and descriptions, which are not easy to analyse, the researcher must do a lot of intelligent interpretation of these data to identify relevant themes and to make these understandable and credible for the reader. Moreover, it is interested in meaning, notably, how people make sense out of their lives experiences etc. Also, in a qualitative research the researcher is central. He/she is the primary instrument of data collection and analysis. Unlike the quantitative methodology where data are collected through inventories, questionnaires or machine, in qualitative research data are mediated through the researcher or the human instrument (Cresswell, 2014). Furthermore, in a qualitative design the researcher present in person among the people and observe institutions or record behaviour; not in the laboratory, but in its natural settings. The other unique feature of the qualitative methodology is that it is explanatory.

The interest of the researcher lies in the process, meaning as well as in the insight to be gained through words or illustrations. Another important aspect of qualitative research is that the

researcher plays a pivotal role in constructing concepts, theories, and principles out of details of discussions, interviews and observations .

To sum up, qualitative method was used to meet the researcher need to explore new issues and test the effectiveness of mechanisms placed to deter social disorder in the peace dialogue after listening inhabitants lived experiences on the volatility of the area to peace maintenance.


3.3. Descriptions of the Study Area

The Afar and Somali regions are among these nine member states within the Ethiopian federation. The Afar National Regional State, which is a homeland of Afar people with a new capital named Samara located in northeast of Ethiopia. Similarly the Somali National Regional State with a capital in Jijiga is located in the eastern-most part of Ethiopia. Afar regional state is in the north-eastern part of Ethiopia with an area of about 150,000km² that stretches in the lowlands covering the Awash valley and the Danakil depression. Geographically, it is located between 39°34' and 42°28' East Longitude and 8°49' and 14°30' North Latitude. The region is bordered with Tigray region to the northwest, Amhara region to the southwest, Oromia region to the south, and Ethiopian Somali region to the southeast. It is also bordered with Djibouti to the east and Eritrea to the northeast. (Factors et al., 2016).

Ethiopian Somali Regional State is the second largest region in Ethiopia next to Oromia regional State that covers 350,000km², which is located in south-eastern part of the country. It is situated between 4° and 11' N latitude and 40 ° and 48' E longitude. The region is arid and mostly hot (18-45°C), mostly plain with an altitude 400-1600 meters above sea levels. The Ethiopia's Somali region also, divided in nine Zonal administrations and 47 Weredas. As, Abraham (2002:1 cited in Yasin,2010), Shinile zone as "one of the nine Zones of the Ethiopian Somali region and borders Djibouti and Somaliland in the north and east respectively; Jijiga zone in the southeast, and Oromiya and Afar regions in the south and west respectively". Shinelle zone has six weredas and the de, facto territory Issa settler three towns known as Gedamaytu, Unduffo, and Adaytu which are within the territory of this zone. While the Afar region, is comprised of five Zones and 32 Weredas. And among the five zones of Afar, zone Three (Gabi Rasu) comprises of six weredas and under the six weredas are consists of 75 rural kebeles and the total population of this zone is 197,751 of whom 108,995 were males and 88,756 were females (CSA,

2008). According to the current map of federal Ethiopia, Afar and Somali regions have a common border stretching from the Middle Awash all the way towards the border of Djibouti. Meanwhile the northwest point of the Somali region and home of the Issa/Somali, Shinelle Zone, is bordering two zonal administrations in the Afar region. Based on the 2007 Census conducted by the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA), total population of Afar and Somali regional states are 1,411,092 and 4,439,147 respectively. Based on figures from the Central Statistical Agency in 2005, Shinelle, home of the Issa/Somalis in Ethiopia has an estimated total population of 452,112, of whom 237,067 are males and 215,045 are females. The area is also prone to recurring violent conflicts, particularly between the Afar adjacent zone three (Gabi Rasu) and the Issa Ethiopian Somali) shinile zone pastoral and agro pastoral communities.

Map:1. Afar-Issa conflict zone



Source: Adopted from (Ali, 2008).

3.4. Population and Sampling Method

This research selected samples out of the unit of the population. Population, as stated by William et al., (2005) is the study object and consist of individuals, groups, organizations, human products and events, or the conditions to which they are exposed. The research problems that this study intends to address were basically related to a specific population termed as units of analysis in the study project. Thus, institutions responsible in enforcing laws and preserving the

community security as a whole and different group watchful to the area peace and tranquillity were accounted as population, on which the selection of key informants embarked. The sampling frame of this study, as sought in the phase of exploring the compatibility of the study sites, is the list of individuals employed in different institutes and community elders participated in the peace dialogue in conflicts arose in various times. The institutes occupied to establish peace in the area such as the former minister of federal affairs currently minister of peace, Federal Police, local police, elders and prominent persons, inter-regional security administrative bureau, and the political administration of the area are accounted as sampling units because the samples are picked from these sectors (Etikan, 2017)

3.5. Sample Size and Technique

The study employs non-probability sampling technique to select participants. Non-probability sampling techniques are mostly used in qualitative research; they also are used in quantitative studies when researchers are unable to use probability selection methods. However, as Russell (2009) noted, there are four common non-probability sampling methods: availability sampling, quota sampling, purposive sampling, and snowball sampling. Because these methods do not use a random selection procedure, we cannot expect a sample selected with any of these methods to yield a representative sample. Hence purposive sampling technique was used in this study to select key informants for interview (Gutterman, 2015). The sample size was 41 and the respondents were police personals from different ranks and the community members such as from the Afar and Issa (Somali) pastoralist community among those 24 informants were participated in focus group discussions and Seventeen (17) key informant interviews were held with critical security sector actors in and outside the deployed police division. Unstructured interviews, discussions were made with federal and State Security Bureau officials, the deployed north eastern Federal Police (division), local police, current Woreda officials, elders

3.6 . Source of Data

In conducting this research, both primary and secondary data were used. Primary data were gathered through semi structured interview from the already determined respondents, while institutional sources such as incident reports, damage/ causality statistics, joint peace committee minutes, local agreements, and Federal Police records, during the conflict management processes, correspondence, regular quarterly, biannual and annual reports, and minutes were

used as secondary sources. Document Analyses also employed this paper as a sources of secondary data mainly conflict incident reports and records of the Federal Police rapid response directorate about the damages and losing human lives looting properties since the 2011-2017.

3.7. Data Collection Instruments

The instruments used to gather primary data include semi structure interview and focus group discussion (FGD). To assess the deployed police force and community level experiences and perspectives, three focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted from this the one group discussion were conducted with deployed Federal police found there the rest two group discussion from the various indigenous groups who are spread across the Awash mile main road Woreda and kebeles were conducted. The sample size was 41 and the respondents were police personals from different ranks and the community members such as from the Afar and Issa(Somali) pastoralist community among those 24 informants were participated in focus group discussions and Seventeen(17) key informant interviews were held with critical security sector actors in and outside the deployed police division Unstructured interviews, discussions were made with federal and State Security Bureau officials, the deployed north eastern Federal Police (division), local police, current Woreda officials, elders.. The focus group discussions were organized in three group sessions each group of discussions were consisted of 6-8 peoples in each ethnic communities representing both male and female groups of the community and the third focus group discussions were conducted with a deployed federal police in a separate schedule. Interviews were also conducted, in Addis Ababa with experts on conflict prevention and resolution chief general director and under him directorate director in the Ministry of Federal Affairs,(currently Minister of peace) Federal Police crime prevention sector. For the purpose of this study, interviews were conducted with people who are believed to have experience and knowledge about the issues in the study area. To be fair representation of respondents, the researcher pick up three from the minister of federal affairs (minister of peace)three from the Federal Police high ranks, one from the minister of defense, five from the Afar national regional state administrative security bureau and police officers and five from the Somali national regional state administrative security bureau and police officers. The place of focus group discussions were took placed from Issa (Somali) National regional states security and

administrative bureau, and the communities who are living in a conflict area Gedamaytu, kebele, (Issa dwellers) and, Amibara wereda Endudo kebele (Afar dwellers) were selected purposively..

3.8. Ethical Considerations

The necessary ethical cares would will circumspectly taken by the researcher throughout the interaction between the researcher and the people directly and indirectly participate/affected in/by the study. This is because the well-being of research participants is the researcher's crown priority on top of the research questions. Thus, respondents were treated in full respect and the identity of the participants would kept confidential for the sake of their security and safety. Additionally, they have informed that an effort will be made by the researcher to avoid the potential risks may appear following their contact with the researcher and that they have a right to not give any information to the researcher and have the right to withdraw from the interview at any time they feel discomfort.

CHAPTER FOUR

Historical Development of Police Force in Ethiopia

4.1 Introduction

Due to the expansion of colonialism in Africa and the inconsistency of political ideology and lack of democratic governance there has not been built standard police institution in Ethiopia. According to Abkadir..(2014) stated that “any new government comes to power, the first its primary political measures was disbanded the previous police system by levelling it dependant and loyal to the over through regime rather being neutral. If one traces the evolution of the Ethiopian police, it have been disbanded and created six times. First, there was indigenous policing, which is established under the name of “Hibret” literally Unity. The second time Emperors Menelik II and Haile Selassie created a new police force, the *Zabagna* (Guard force) and later *Ye-Arada Zebegna* (city guard) that functioned from 1889 until the 1936. Thirdly the Italians have also reorganized the Ethiopian police during the war between 1936-1941. They disbanded the then police and created their new police known as *policia colonia*. Fourthly when the Italians were defeated by the British force, the *Polizia colonia* was replaced by Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (O.E.T.A). When Emperor Haile Selassie came to power, a new police, called the Ethiopian Imperial Police was created in 1942. This Ethiopian police was destroyed and replaced by new police for the fifth time by the socialist oriented *Derg* regime. Finally, in 1991 it was disbanded by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and a new police, the Ethiopian Federal Police was created based on the ideology of federalism Abkadi.. (2014). This chapter deals with the evolution of, indigenous policing and modern policing, structure, function, from its inception until now in Ethiopia.

4.1.2. The Evolution of Police and Policing in Ethiopia

Ethiopia has practiced a long history in establishment of its police force to keep its people’s peace and security. According to Aemero (1963:17), quotes in Abkadir,..(2014) Ethiopia had its own form of a police force for centuries a book called “Pentolian” which was written before 2575 years in Geez, (one of the ancient language of Ethiopia), that there existed a police force called Hibrat (unity) formed by king Sebtah. This force was vested with duty of maintaining internal stability by looking for thieves who stool both at night and during day time. During the

day of this force such duties like looking for thieves carried out by dividing the whole force into three groups: Farmers, the Clergy and the Bodyguards. Though this force didn't possess either the meaning or the status, that the modern police assume, we can recognize the existence of peace keeping with a kind of shift system to effect local stability. As a result of social dynamism there had been a need to recognize the existed new force along with the new social order.

Hence, in 1782 Ethiopian King Adiam Seged Eyasu established a force under the name of “*Leba-Aden*” (meaning Thief-Hunter). Though it was not given the name Police, ‘Leba Aden’ was more organized, sophisticated and had good reputation at the time. During that time, there was a system of crime investigation where there was a strong believe that a criminal once having committed a crime could not escape forever. This was because of the presence of a system of investigation by technical branch called “*Leba-Shay*” literally “Thief (Abkadir, (2014).

4.1.3. The Formation of Modern police In Ethiopia:

Security and justice in Ethiopia are characterised by a long standing pluralism of law enforcement groupings and the police are just one of a number of dispute resolution mechanisms in the country,(Woldekidan,. 2016).

The governor of Hararge (one of the provinces), Ras Mekonnen, had played a big role in creating and introducing new security agencies and importing new security concepts from outside during his visit. And then after, he was established a police force called “*Dewaria*” around 1906. Eventhough “*Dewaria*” as a security force was created by Ras Mekonnen of Hararge one of the province, but the formation of modern bureaucracy including the police force more consolidated in a national level in Ethiopia is attached with Emperor Menelik.

The term *Dawaria* means patrol or watchmen in Arabic. He saw the London Police in one of his visit and he wanted to model his force after what he saw. It was claimed that he sent some members of his force to Turkey for training. This indicates that our first external relationship related to policing started with Turkish Police and the need of training had come into the mind of officials at this period (Woldekidan,. 2016)..In the history of the Ethiopian policing system many security agencies were known in different names. In 1906, the security agency known by *Dewaria* established by Ras Mekonnen was responsible for security and order maintenance in Hararghe Province. By the request of Emperor Menelik II, to Ras Mekonnen who was the

governor of Hararghe, and he sent police Dewaria to Addis Ababa to serve as a police force and it was replaced by *Arada Zebenga* in 1916 . Members of the Zebenga were trained to obey and implement orders and laws adopted by the government. They were duty bound to receive orders from superiors who send them to the rank and file of police members. As the result of invasion by Fascist Italy, *Arada Zebenga* was abolished in 1936. During the time of invasion, the police force named *policia colonial* had taken the role of the abolished *Arada Zabagna*. This police force served from 1936 to 1941 until the resumption of the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie to his throne (Woldekidan,. 2016).

Soon after the defeated of the Italian invaders, the police force came to be known as Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (O.E.T.A) and carried out the responsibility of security from 1941 to 1945. After one year of the restoration of the throne of the Emperor, the Ethiopian Imperial Police Force was established by the Proclamation No. 6 of 1942. Since the reinstitution of the Ethiopian Imperial Government up to the overthrow of Mengistu regime in 1991, the Ethiopian Police Force was centralised and was commanded from the Police Head Quarters only.

4.2. Independent Policing After the Return of Emperor Hailesillassie from 1941 to 1974

After the mission accomplish of the British armed forces from Ethiopia, the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (O.E.T.A) came to an end. Hence, the Imperial Ethiopian police force was re-established on the approval of Emperor Haile Selassie in June 1942 under police proclamation No. 6 of 1942. From this time the name was changed from O.E.T.A. to Ethiopian Imperial police force (Beraket 1981:34, Abkadir., 2014). According to article 17 of this proclamation, the main functions of the police were stated as the prevention of crime, the apprehension of criminals, the maintenance of law and order, the protection of the safety of people and property, to assist the prosecution, and the regulation of traffic. In so doing, they have to ensure that every citizen is accorded due process of the law (Andargachew, 2004:8, cited in Abkadir..2014). At this time a new internal procedure code was introduced which stated that the police would be composed of superior officers, inspectors, non-commissioned officers, and constables as determined by the Minister of Interior (Kaplan, 1971:465 in Abkadir.. 2014).

Recruitment and police training at the earliest stage was carried out with no least standard of criteria. The recruitment were mainly took placed in Addis Abeba specially from the

unemployed people and peasants outside Addis Abeba. These recruit men, after some preliminary training, were posted to various main towns in the country (Banks, 1957:2,in,Abkadir,2014).The number of police stations were reached 54 in number. Academic status of the recruited men were very poor simply includes the unemployed and the illiterate peoples most of them were peasant. Because of this they were not very much committed to legality.

Security service delivery to the society was not equally distributed. Police posts were usually found in the larger towns and cities or along the main roads. The societies living outside the towns was mainly in the hands of the Territorial Army, supported by the regular army. According to Kaplan (1971:464-65),in Abkadir, (2014)most of the people lived in widely scattered, small and remote villages or in isolated farms. Thus, a visit by the police was an occasion of some importance and usually was noted with apprehension. According to (Mogous, 1971:154)cited in Abkadir,2014) in 1945,under the coordinator of an Ethiopian deputy police commissioner's positions a training programme for the policemen was developed in 1944, faced with the greater bulk of the constables who were illiterate, an educational programme was established in each police station to teach the force how to read and write (Mogous, 1971:7-9, Abkair, 2014).

In order to reorganize and upgrade those who were trained short term and illiterate police force and to beef up their physical appearance and to aware police science, the emperor Hailesillassie was prepared and established a modern training center in western Addis Abeba known as kolfe police training center(*Fetno derash gibi*).The training was guided by the British sixteen police officers returned to the police and the training was undertaken at the Kolfe Training Centre, where the famous Nelson Mandela was also trained and lasted for four months (Mogous, 1971,in,,Abkadir. 2014)..

Administratively, the Ethiopian police force was structured as one of the department within the Ministry of Interior. However, early in 1970 it was to the Minister of interior but with a certain amount of autonomy. This indicates that police institution in Ethiopia was upgraded from department to agency from agency to commission under the over sight of a ministry of interior. In the provinces the command of the force was put under commissioners of police working in collaboration with the provincial governors, but remaining under the direct command of the

Chief Commissioner of Police. This resulted in serious question of dual loyalty and contradictions were common(Abukdir, 2014).

Abba Dina Police College was one of the legacy of emperor Hailesillassie established in Addis Ababa in 1946. This academic institution was opened by the helping of Swedish Police officers. The Swedish police officers were put down criteria to Young Ethiopians with grade six educations were recruited and were brought to conduct the training. From this time onwards the Ethiopian police have begun to enter the age of modern policing in its proper sense. Since 1960, the collage was fully Ethiopianised in terms of its faculty members. The recruitment of candidates was gradually upgraded, and they were required to complete grade 12 educations (Andargachew, 2004:16, Abkdir, 2014).

Generally, Emperor Haile Selassie played a big role in modernize the police system for instance about 300 officers were sent to India, Germany, Canada and Israel to be trained as professional police officers with the assistance of West Germany, mainly in terms of vehicles and some relevant communication technologies. There were also specially trained riot control squad and police laboratories and technicians though these were not found in all parts of the country. The Emperor also established a paramilitary rapid response police force, known as “Fetno Derash”, consisting, of about 3000 members was trained with the assistance of Israel Government in 1962 (Andargachew, 2004:22, Abkdir, 2014).The main purposes of the trained and constituting the riot control squad and the rapid response police (Fetno Derash”) were to avoided and control the Marxists and Leninist political factions and groups protest anti the monarchical regime over all the country specially in the capital city. The second purpose was in order to maintaining peace and security across the country. The "Fetno Derash" were paramilitary in character and were involved in all war fronts.

4.2.1. The Ethiopian Police Force during the Derg. (1974-1991)

According to Abukidir.(2014) the Ethiopian indigenous police force known as *Dewaria and Arada Zebenga* police were gradually evolved to the existing modern police reached. After the enactment of the Imperial Police Force Proclamation No 6 of 1942, the process of reorganized of the police force department and the establishment of the Abadina Police College (now called the Ethiopian Police University College) that expedited the use of scientific knowledge and

professional skills in policing were taken place. The Abadina police college from its establishment up to its upgrade to the University college of Addis Ababa had played a crucial role in Ethiopian history by producing many professional police officers in different skills and sectors such as crime investigation, crime prevention, forensic science, traffic emergency control and signal radio communications. But this good track was not continued and lagging back after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie, from his throne. Instead, replaced by new police by the socialist oriented Derg regime and during this period the police did not have clear principles and strategies except their practice of repressing and executing political opponents (Abukidir, 2014). The Marxist government of the Derg's came to power and the police were renamed as "Revolutionary police" and then "people's police" (Andargachew 2004:24). Abukidir, (2014) states that in the early part of the period of revolution, the importance of the police was to some extent played down. Even though the political power was radically changed from monarchical government to Marxist government but the police institution continued the status quo without amendment of the previous police structures, and police establishment of proclamation No 6 of 1942. The police force maintained more or less the same structure and was centrally commanded from Addis Ababa (Hassen, 2005, & Abukidir, 2014). The Derg was confused as to whether or not the police should be replaced by the militia. The Derg tried to tie up policing to the ideology of communism. According to (Abukidir, 2014), the vision of police was stated as being to intensify the class struggle. Based on this vision the police were given at least in theory the following functions: to protect properties which were nationalized from what was regarded as anti-revolutionary and anti people; to implement the progressive proclamation and laws of revolutionary Ethiopia; to participate in development of the socialist economy; and to protect the country from internal enemies.

According to Abukidir, (2014) the Derg government believes that feudalism is a source of all sorts of crimes and conflicts towards of a communism perspective. Therefore, revolution to destroy the old regime (feudalism) and build socialist government as this by itself was to decrease crime; replace the police work by that of the militia; to take out those criminals who build their lives on crime to agricultural land and make them productive; organizing the workers and making sure they expose criminals; and preventing the consumption of alcohol on day time etc.

Police institutions during the Derg period were left without any real power because most of their mandates were taken by different organizations. The investigation department was taken to “special investigation” department, which was directly led by the Derg committee. The lower level of crime investigation, prevention and law enforcement were taken by local administration, here after referred as kebele which were authorized to imprison, investigate and even kill offenders.

Andargachew(1986:70,)cited in Abukidir,(2014) states that the revolutionary squad of the urban dwellers and rural peasant associations were expected to take over the role of the police. The police were left with the role of traffic policing because even the police stations were run by revolutionary guard committees known as (*Abyiot Tibeka*).To sum up, the police did not have clear principles and strategies during the *Derg* rule. It could be summarized as having been undemocratic, centralized, bureaucratic, and paramilitary in nature and alienated from the population.

4.2.2. The Ethiopian Police from 1991 to the Present.

According to Andergachaw (2004:23) cited in, Abukidr. (2014) stated that after the downfall of the Derg regime in 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) took over the government and disbanded the police force and the country was left without police officers for some time. A transitional government was established in the country by a charter. In terms of Proclamation No 8 of 1992, the re-organisation of the Ethiopian police after the disbanding of the police that was operating under the Derg rule was based on the following principles:

- *the decentralisation of the police force*
- *the composition of police to ensure that they consist of all nationalities*
- *the changing of the police from the paramilitary to a civilian and a professional agency and oversight by civilian representatives.*

The creation of a standardised police organisation throughout the country Under Article 10 Proclamation No 8 of 1992 that established National/Regional Self-governments, the regions were given the power to establish their own police force. Under this proclamation the national security issues were located under the central government. Thus the Federal Police was

responsible to manage security issues like counter terrorism, money laundering, organized crimes and standardization of the police from 1991 until 1994, (Abukdir, 2014).

Based on the above security reform policy and recruitment criteria, for the first time the Federal Police Force was formed from the following three entities. The one is former police officers who were selected by the community those who have a good conduct and were free from any political criminality to reintegrate the new police force. The second category was the ex. EPRDF army combatants and members that were brought from the army by recruiting those who had fulfilled the minimum criteria at least grade four and above and also tried to select who have good conduct and with physical appearances, politically committed and loyal to the people's revolutionary democratic front (EPRDF). Third and the last category was of the new recruits. This served as a basis for the present Federal Police. The next task of the commission was to train these police officers. During the EPRDF government also attempted to share modern police experience from the western countries and others. In this regard delegated higher officers went to Sudan, South Africa, England and Germany to learn experiences and to get help. South Africa and Sudan send their trainers to train the police and 12 British experts were called to help reorganize the police and were deployed in all the fields. The German supplied the police with cars and forensic equipments (Hassen, 2002:18, cited in (Abukdir, 2014). Consequently, 522 riot control officers (*Adma Bitena*) were recruited and trained from the EPRDF army in the year 1991 under the authority of the central transitional government. This anti-riot force was responsible for ensuring safety during protests, protecting institutions and building up of peace and security. In the year 1992, additional special police officers (*Liyu Tibeka*) were recruited from Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front members and trained at Kolfe Police Training Centre. In most part of the country the police institutions began to operate with the acceptance of the society so that this could bring about relative peace in the country (Andargachew, 2004: 26, cited in (Abukdir, 2014).

According to Woldekidan, (2016) the existing federal police activities was categorized into the period from 1991 to 2003 and from 2004 until to date. The first period was characterised by reorganising the police and focusing them to crime prevention, investigation and law enforcement tasks especially more engaged in peace keeping (Selam Ena Meregagat) activities.

The second phase focused on strategic issues and police transformation to be more professional and accountable to the community.

Ethiopian Federal Police Commission is one of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) public sector organizations and its head quarter is located at Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia, Federal Police Commission proclamation Number 720/2011. This proclamation defines the objective the Federal Police commission as maintaining peace and security of the public by complying with and enforcing the constitution and other laws of the country, and preventing crime. The proclamation also describes duties and powers of police organization. According to the proclamation, Federal Police is responsible for crime control within designed areas of jurisdiction all of which relate state security and international affairs fall under their remit. They also have coordinating duties at the national level. For instance, the Ethiopian Federal Police provide training, professional and technical advices, conduct researches and also provide support for regional police commissions.


The proclamation indicates the positions of the commissioner general and deputy commissioner general in the commission whom are not police or military in profession. It also covers matters related to the appointment and duties of police officers and these issues have been fleshed in the staff regulations. The proclamation describes the abandonment of military ranks within police and the military path. It also covers the relationship between the federal and regional police.

As indicated in figure two the Federal Police commission was restructured in four main departments, such as Crime Prevention Main Department, Crime investigation & Forensic Main Department, Human Resource Development & Administrative main Department, and Ethiopian Police University College. Each main departments are also incorporates four and above directorates. But for the purpose of this paper the Federal Police crime prevention main department is more necessary to elaborate about its duties and objectives. In this regard the federal crime prevention department had been structured in four peculiar police directorates. even though the Federal Police general objective is to keep peace and security across a country but the deployment is indifferent operational aspects and mandates. One of the directorates the Federal Rapid reaction Police Directorate was established with a mandate to prevent and manage inter- ethnic violence. When disruption of security occurs which is beyond control of regional state administrations, restore law and order within the regional state upon the request of the

regional state administration or in the case of conflicts that may arise between two or more regional state administrations when so ordered by federal government in terms of Article 22; (proclamation No(,720/, 2011). And safeguard security of borderline or peripheral checkpoints, dry ports, air ports, fuel depots, railway lines, main bridges and communications networks, main hydropower generation plants, mining sites and other federal government institutions in terms of Article 9;Federal Police establishment proclamation No, 720/2011). The second formed paramilitary police force known as anti-Organized Crimes and Anti-Terrorism Directorate mandate is Provide security services to high level federal government official sand protect the constitution and institutions established by the constitution from terrorist sects across the country. The third police force squad is security and Law Enforcement Directorate. As Dewar, (2008) stated that, mainly this department constituted for the sack of deterring illegal protest or riot control. This riot control department incorporate five divisions and with the support provider special professions. Each divisions consists of three battalions and this forces are not restricted only in Addis Ababa but by request the regional government and by order of the federal government based on the law of intervention system proclamation No.(,359/ 2003)deployed indifferent capital cities of regional governments in Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian Federal Police commission is accountable to minister of peace. This only applies to aspects related to management issues. The organization operates independently when it comes to operational police work.

Figure :2. Organisational Arrangement of Ethiopian Police Force from 2004 to today



Source (Ethiopian police Force, 2011)

CHAPTER FIVE

Analysis, Findings and Discussion

Afar and Issa have had a long history of local violent conflicts. Short rainfall and general harsh ecological and climatic conditions usually push these people to move in search for grazing land and water. This brings a fierce competition over the scarce resources which in-turn breeds deadly conflicts between the two groups (Kassa, 2001). Besides, there are culturally related conflicts such as animal raiding and a culture of rewarding warriors. Aggressively fighting is usually seen as sign of heroism, and thus prominent warriors are rewarded according, (Muhyadin, 2006).

In post 1991 political and state structural changes have restructured the non-ethnic based provincial administrations ruled by highly centralized governments for centuries into ethnically-based regional states. However, ethnic regionalisation has transformed the conflict into intra-federal boundary conflict by brought new actors. Afar people formed their own state, while predominantly Issa pastoralists were put under Somali regional state administration. As a result, in addition to already existed local conflicts, other local conflicts that are directly linked to permanent claims of both urban and rural areas have blown up between the two Afar-Issa ethnic groups. These conflicts were entailed with an intense competition over administrative power and economic resources.

Among the recent deadly conflicts carried out between the Issa and Afar communities within the three weredas, such as in Gewane wereda *Undufo* kebele, in Amibara wereda *Gedamaytu* kebele, in Mille wereda *Adaytu* kebele and the surrounded rural areas. Though the Afar people and government have claimed that historically these places where belong to them, but most of these areas specially the three hamlets are now occupied by Issa community. There are a number of newly established towns in different places along the border between Afar and Somali people. After the over through of the Derg regime and the EPRDF coming to power, the Issa community have expanded new territories and constructing massive houses in previously grazing land and in the formerly disputed settlements. Hence, these areas become as a flash point for violent and deadly conflicts continued until recently (Afar community FGD April 2018).

The following sections discuss on some of the violent incidents that took place in the main road awash mile known as Gedamaytu, Ambule,, unduffo, Adaytu and its rural kebeles and also the conflict prevention conflict management and conflict resolution mechanism's. The purpose of analyzing the conflict in the Afar Issa boundary was to identify actors involved in the conflict, and to understand the deployed Federal Police responds whether proactively prevent or not. By doing so, it becomes clear to identify the potential partners in the effort to manage the conflict and to understand the impediment for the peace maintenance process.

5.2. The Conflict in Ambule:

Ambule, which means (in literally word) home to large birds, in Afar language was a very recent settlement of Issa/Somalis located about 15 km from Gewane town. Even though the joint peace committee meetings undertaken in post-Derg era prohibited any new constructions and expansion of the already established hamlets of Adaytu, Unduffo and Gedamaytu, Issa/Somalis rather used earlier settlements along the road as a springboard to set their foot on another.

Since its establishment, Ambule has been demolished three times. According to informants, the former security and administrative bureau of Awash zone (Three) 15/03/2018, Ambule was supposed to be established in order to settle demobilized ex-soldiers of Djibouti Republic. The informant added that, due to the appeal of the Afar National Regional State(ANRS) or as suggested by others for fear of infiltration of Eritrean backed Somali insurgents. Former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi addressed federal as well as regional officials from the Afar and Somali regional states in January 2009 and urged them to find a lasting solution for the Afar-Issa/Somali conflict within three months' time. And also the informants said that the prime minister criticized Afar 'historical right argument that demands the restoration of the 1940s border with Somalis at Erer River near Dire Dawa as well as condemned Issa' view towards referendum as a lasting solution for any land on which "their goats may graze for couple of days". Based on the above he further gave an order for federal representative officials and Somali regional government officials to demolish the recent illegal settlement of Ambule. Accordingly, in mid of February Somali authorities who had taken the responsibility for the mission at Ambule have reported that they could not reach to consensus with the Issa settlers as for their evacuation from Ambule. As a result,the federal government decided to deploy the federal forces to ensure the safety of the main road and the security of the society. On February 2009 Federal Police took

responsibility to evacuate those illegal settlement, as interviews with ministry of federal affairs in Addis Ababa may(2018). Based on the decision of the FDRE prime minister, Federal Police was deployed to oust the militant Issa /Somali/settlers in organised way by announce them to abolish the new constructed villages and also ordered the Afar militants to return back by showing and wave them the Ethiopian flags and wearing a Federal police military uniform , but they could not abided and respect the order given rather they prepared and decided to counteract themselves, (Federal Police FGD April 2018). According to the interview with assistance commissioner of the Federal Police, April (2018) explain that, the Federal Police as a government security agent with the primary responsibility to maintain peace and order of the society and government immediately decided to take proportional action at the militant Issa/Somali/settlers.

The Issa militant illegal settlers in the buffer zones were above 200 with modern weapons and trained militants and a lot of civilians at the back in order to provide logistics and morals according to the police commander interview in April, (15/2018). The Federal Police were moved from its stationed camp to this specific conflict violent area with the commandments of police commander and full armed with full trained status of paramilitary. Eventhough, the Issa settlers' were fought for a one day inside the trench with the Federal Police but, they were not survived and protect the supposed fourth illegal constructed small towns known as *Ambule* in the strategic place for transportation to the sea port. As a result from the participants of Issa militants group 16 were killed and 20 wounded. On the other hand from the Federal security forces also 2 police officers were killed and 7 police officers wounded. After the accomplishments of the operation the Federal Police have been stationed for a long time in order to prevent from the illegal expansion of Issa ethnic groups. According to the interviews on April, 15/, (2018), with a police commander who was coordinator to the Federal police which was participated on the operations stated that,

“According to the Afar-Issa National Regional States and the coordinator of the ministry of federal affairs (MOFA) have reached an agreement, notwithstanding, previously settled and constructed the three small towns known as Gedamaytu, Unduffo, Adaytu, but, the activities of new construction of houses, occupying new lands, and resettling communities there have been prohibited. More over the agreements prohibited that as the country depends on the Djibouti sea ports the Awash mile main road should be secured from any insecurity and refrain from the Afar Issa gun men movements, (buffer zone) and cross the main road both ethnic

groups should govern by the rule of the “ buffer zone” until an agreement is reached on the demarcation of the contested territory between the Afar and Issa. Even though the agreements specified the detail direction of the buffer zone of the boundary, but the conflicting parties were not respects specially the Issa ethnic groups were breaching the agreements and tried to construct a new villages known as “ Ambule” which is serve for the Issa illicit traders. The Afar National Regional State,(ANRS) was provide claim to the previous let prime minister office about the situations happened by the Issa and the prime minister office automatically responded to the appeals which provide by (ANRS) and the prime minister was urged to the Somali National Regional State (SNRS) in order to respect the agreement by the Issa communities and also to abolish the new constructed towns. But the Issa illegal settlers were not gave a positive respond. As the prime minister had aware about the negative respond of the Issa settler he had decided to deploy the Federal security force under the coordinator of the ministry of Federal affairs. While the Federal Police was arrived at the conflict prone, in order to assure its neutrality for the conflict parties all requirements were fulfilled such as the Federal Police identity cards, wearing Federal Police uniform, Federal police cars with federal plate number, and wave the Ethiopian flag among them and we were also negotiated and urged them in order to evacuate the new constructed village but their respond to our legal requests was a bullet at the direction of our troops. According to the interview of police commander April,15/,(2018)

Ethiopia as very dependent country to the Addis Ababa-Djibouti sea port, the insecurity of the Awash-Mile main road the Federal government consider as national threat. Therefore, the Federal government evacuate the Issa vigilante contrabandist groups from the new constricted town by using coercive forces were to secured the main road ,rather to save the Afar lives and damage properties.

5.3. The Conflict in "Arba'ila"

Arba, ila is a village with sources of water and boreholes located along the Afar regional state Zone Three Amibara wereda" Arba, kebele "and between Somali regional state Shinile zone Mulu and Afdem wereda kebeles adjacent. It is a border area between the pastoralists Arba, kebele Afar clans and Issa pastoralists Afdem kebele. These clans practice livestock rearing which comprises substantial portion of the household economy, and the Arba,ila moist land is use for their grazing and watering areas. As the areas have water boreholes that serve all year round and have good dry-season grazing reserves, the pastoralists come to these areas to feed and water their livestock in the dry seasons or when there is drought in other parts of the region.

Consequently, the area has remained prone to resource-based conflicts Interview with Afar elders, March (2018).

This particular violent conflict occurred in April 06/ 2005,E.C following an incidence of the Afar and Issa herders crossed into the contesting territory, as their fathers and grandfather have being living with protracted conflict and animosity, it is expected to getting fighting the two herder men, and touched hand by hand, while, they are on straggling to win each other another Issa (Somali) herder man came to help on the side of the Issa identity herder man and then over shutting the Afar herder and remain wounded. The result was that the Afar wounded herders gun was took by the Issa gun men herders not only that his gun but also more than 400 flock animals raided by the Issa herders.

Again on the next day and the same conflict scene on April /08/2005)E.C the Afar region Zone Three chief Administrative Amibara wereda chief administrative the deployed Federal Police representatives Awash Arba defense force basement representatives while, they were in visited the conflict area in order to absorb and investigate the situations what was happened in the *arba ila* between the Afar and Issa conflict parties but simultaneously the Issa militant gun men produce a tactical plane and shifting another cite of conflict front and opened an attack on the Afar towards the *Tiea* mountain. At the result from the Afar side one person died five persons wounded one AKM weapons with the plate No EN8541 yielded by Issa, and on the side of Issa one person was killed and one person wounded.

On April (09/2005)E.C extending the previous day the clash took placed along the place of Addis Ababa- Hirer road and Tiea mountain between the Afar and Issa. At the result from the Afar side five persons was killed one person wounded and 49calf, 164 cattle,155shep and goat raided by the Issa and from the Issa side also two persons killed four (4)persons wounded.

The Afar elders reported the incidence to the Minister of Federal Affairs as well as to the Federal Police and demanded for the return of their properties and the raided animals. While the Federal Police and the minister of federal affairs were trying to convince the Issa elders to give back the raided cattle, another incidence that aggravated the situation occurred. On April 20/ 2005,E.C nearly a month after the incident by the effort of the Federal Police and its stakeholder by facilitating the reconciliation the two elders returned 164 cattle,207 ships and goat, 14 calf's,

and the weapons took from the killing person Afar by Issak was also returned to the elder councils Interview with (Federal Police, on March, (2018). The actors in this particular violent conflict were local clan, armed men, of the respective communities. The local governments' involvement in the conflict in favor of their respective clans and regions intensified the conflict in different forms. As a result, the local government of both clans mobilized youngsters and local armed men alongside their clan, opened route for high flow of illegal arms from different places for the supply of the conflict, Interview with (Federal Police, April,15/2018).

The Afar and Issa conflict is by nature a very dynamic, protracted, intractable and frequently happened. Therefore, to write down all conflict incidents in this paper beyond the capacity of this paper and difficult to manage because of time and space, instead of provide as summarized in easily way to understand the situation of, the conflict scene, time line of the conflict, the actors, effects of the conflict, roles and responds of the deployed federal police in corporate below in table one. In order to buttress the repeated and protracted nature of violence in Afar-Issa de facto boundary Awash mille, notwithstanding the presence of the Federal Police Force, the researcher selected the following episodes to buttress the point.

Table 1: The Sample time lines of Afar-Issa ethnic violence, and actions taken by the Federal Police since 2010-2018

No.	Period	Clash in Group	Place	Casualties			Triggers	Federal police Responds
				Death	Wounded	Looting & Rustling Animals		
1	6/12/2003E.C	Afar & Issa	Afar Gela, alo, area	61	56	633	Animal Raiding	Quell violence Pick died wended person returned the raided animals
2	11/12/2003	Afar & Issa	Inside afar gela,alo Area	1	1	-	Animal Raiding	Deterring and facilitates to pick the injured men
3	20/12/2003	Afar & Issa	Afar Enddo area	2	-	-	Raiding camel and goat	Deterring and return the looting animals
4	30/1/2004	Afar & Issa	Afar Indido area	-	-	-	Pasture	Halt and prevent From recurrence
5	4/4/2004	Afar & Issa	Between Afar and Issa Afdem area	1	5	-	Unknown	Halt and maintain

6	02/06/2004	Afar & Issa	Afar Gela,alo area	1	-	-	Revenge	,quell and facilitate for negotiating
7	28/05/2004	Afar & Issa	Inside Afar Indido Woreda	2	2	-	Unknown	quell the violence
8	12/06/2004	Afar & Issa	Inside Afar Alidar kebeles	-	-	-	Unknown	Halt the violence
9	9/07/2004	Afar & Issa	Inside Afar Indido	2	1	-	Animal Raiding	Deter and accords the violence
10	21/08/2004	Afar & Issa	Inside Afar Indido	-	1	-	Unknown	quell the violence & facilitate for negotiation
11	30/8/2004	Afar & Issa	Inside Afar Indido	3	4	1	Animal Raiding	Deter and accords the violence
12	15/08/2004	Afar & Issa	Inside afar mille and Adaytu area	-	1	3	Animal Raid ing	Quell The violence
13	16/08/2004	Afar & Issa	Inside Afar Galileo area	1	-	2450	Animal Raiding	contain and returned each the animals
14	26/09/2004	Afar & Issa	Inside Afar Indido	16	12	-	Animal Rustling	Deterring
15	29/09/2004	Afar & Issa	Inside Afar ZinjeroGedel(ba boon cliff)	4	7	-	Animal Rustling	Quell the violence and take wounded to hospital
16	30/09/2004	Afar & Issa	Inside Afar Endudo	7	-	-	Animal Rustling	Halt the violence
17	02/10/2004	Afar & Issa	Inside Afar (selay, tuli)	2	2	-	Animal Rustling	Quell the violence
18	04/10/2004	Afar & Issa	Afar Gewane	-	1	300	Animal Rustling	Deterring the violence and returned the raiding animals
19	08/11/2004	Afar and Issa	Gewane agriculture college	1	-	-	Killing	Deterring and discusses
20	05/12/2004	Afar and Issa	Gedamaytu Area	1	-	-	Animal Rustling	Returning looting animals
21	05/02/2005	Afar and Issa	Afar 'Molele' area	-	1	171	Animal Rustling	returned to the raid animals to each parties
22	05/02/2005	Afar and Issa	Afar Gela,alo	1	-	-	Animal Rustling	Halt the violence and returned the looted animals
23	27/12/2005	Afar and Issa	Gedamaitu area	1	-	-	Animal Rustling	preventing the violence and returning the looted animals
24	09/04/2005	Afar and Issa	Gela,alo	-	-	-	Water	Arranging shifting program
25	21/05/2005	Afar and Issa	Afar dubti wereda water spring area	-	-	-	Animal Rustling	quell the conflict &Return the raid animals

26	23/05/05	Afar and Issa	(Abensa)kebeles	1	3 -	35	Animal Rustling	halt the violence &
27	27/05/2005	Afar and Issa	(Alayid)kebeles area	1	1	1	Injuring	contained the violence
28	06/06/2005	Afar and Somali	<i>Between Issa and Afar Arba, Illa River</i>	1	1	-	Herders attack	Quell the violence &
29	08/06/2005	Afar and Issa	Tiea mountain	2	2	-	Un Known	quell the violence&&
30	09/06/2005	Afar and Issa	Tiea, mountain	7	5	36	Armed attack	Halt the instability & returned the raided cattle's
31	10/08/2005	Afar and Issa	Ditrkalo area	2	9	9	Un Known	Quell the violence made negotiation
32	04/08/2005	Afar and Issa	Undufo area	2	5	700	Animal Rustling	Intervene Federal Police and hunting suspects
33	29/07/2005	Afar and Issa	Inside Afar "gela,alo" Woreda	-	-	1687	Animal Rustling	stopping violence & facilitate to return raid Animals
34	08/09/2005	Afar and Issa	Mulu Woreda hardem area Issa inside	4	9	-	Pasture and water	Intervene & stopping the violence
35	08/09/2005	Afar and Issa	Afar Amibara Woreda Arba, Illa'' kebele	4	16	457	Animal Rustling	Intervene & deterring the violence
36	2006	Afar and Issa	Gela,alo	28	26	1572	Animal Rustling	Maintain and facilitate to conciliation
37	2007	Afar and Issa		6	10	-	Pasture and water	contain and facilitate reconciliation
38	2008	Afar and Issa		24	20	3541	Animal Rustling	Negotiate and return animals
39	2009	Afar and Issa	Gela,alo and Gewane, Delahle Kebele	-	-	540	Animal rustling	Quell & facilitate for negotiation
Sum				188	220	17,736		

Sources: Federal Police Report 2010-2018

Table:2 Summary of the Afar – Issa Casualties Sinse 2010- 2018.

Years in Ethiopian Calendar	Killed	Wounded	Raided Domestic Animals
2003 E.C.	64	57	6233
2004 E.C.	41	36	2754
2005 E.C.	26	60	2925
2006 E.C.	28	26	1572
2007 E.C.	6	10	Unknown
2008 E.C.	24	20	3541
2009 E.C.	Unknown	Unknown	540
Total	189	209	17,565

The Federal Police force has implemented many operations to manage the conflicts between the Afar and Issa communities. It intervenes when conflicts arise. For instance in 2008 E.C. it had returned 31 cattle 1942 sheep, 7 donkeys, and 1174 camels that were raided from the Afar community by the Issa Somalis. And it returned 89 cattle, 223 sheep, and 75 camels that were looted by the Afar from the Issa Somalis.

In 2008 E.C. the Afar have raided 145 cattle, 18 camels, 118 goats, 166 sheep and 26 donkeys (total 457 domestic animals) from the Issa community. The Issa Somalis have raided 596 cattle, 340 camels, 903 goats, 225 sheep and 28 calves (total 1687 domestic animals) returned by negotiation (1050) animals to the Afar community. The Afar Elders also returned to the Issa Elders 457 domestic animals to their owners.

5.4. The Deployed Federal Police Role in Preventing, and Managing the Afar – Issa Conflict

5.4.1. Conflict Preventing Role

The inter-ethnic conflict between the Afar and Issa-Somali communities has been for prolonged time. It continued for generations. In the last decade, the Afar – Issa conflict has broken out and brought a lot of atrocities. It went beyond the capacity of the Afar –Issa (Somali) National regional states. Both regional state police failed to prevent and control the severe conflict between the Afar and Issa communities. It attributed a serious human rights violation. and Issa (Somali) communities are settled inside the historical territories of Afar National regional State.. Even if the Gebi Rasu (Zone Three) and from the Shinile zone Two wereda known as Mulu Wereda and Afdem Wereda are belong to the Afar regional states by de facto, but the

Somali national regional state incorporated the two Weredas and also the three towns flash points annexed and incorporate under Shinile Zone and large population of Issa Somalis live in the Gebi Rasu Awash zone. There are resource competitions and repeated clashes. There have been recurrent conflicts and violations over scarce pastoralist resources and territory.

Conflict between Afar and Issa has been taking place for the last six decades. The intensity of conflicts and violent clashes has been ever increasing across regime and system. For most of the period since 1997, there was tense conflict up until 2015 when a peace deal was brokered by the federal government of Ethiopia that gave back the three Kebeles (Gedamaitu, Undufo and Adaytu) to afar regional state.

Since September 2010 the situation of the areas became deteriorated. The previously established Joint Peace Committee begun to decline and was unable to deal with the Afar-Issa conflict. The Federal Police force has been deployed in the Afar - Issa conflict areas starting from 2010 to prevent and manage conflicts. The Federal Police rapid response force directorate been set up and deployed formed of division, command and force structure. Among the seven divisions, the northeastern division of the Federal Police force has been deployed in the Afar – Issa community conflict zone. The northeastern division stretched from Awash to Mille. It patrols conflict areas along the Addis Ababa- Djibouti main asphalt road and protects the main road facility by reigning buffer zones to the left and right sides of the road. This deployed northeastern Federal Police division has four commands or battalions. The first command's order station headquarter is Awash and its mission is preventing conflicts among the Afar, Amhara, Kemise Oromo and Argoba communities. The second command is headquartered in Gewane and its mission is to prevent the Afar – Issa conflicts around the areas of Gedamaytu, Endifo, Gelaelo. The third command is stretched from Adama to Awash to patrol the areas. The last and fourth command's order station headquarter is Mille and is deployed stretching from Adaytu to the Ethio-Djibouti border to patrol the areas of conflict.

As security situation of the study area became deteriorated in 2012, the federal government sent its police force to arrest the conflict. The deployment of into the conflict areas within the Afar and Issa (Somali) also to halt and control the violence. Violation became rampant. The main asphalt road was blocked due to conflict between the Afar and Issa communities. The conflict escalated further; lootings, raiding, killings as well as raping of girls reigned.

According to the Federal Police Report (action plan), the Federal Government send the Federal Police Force to the Afar- Issa conflict areas between 03/07/2012 – 17/08/2012. The violence was immediately put under control by the Federal Police violent conflict containment. The Federal Police force managed to control the violence and arrested some pioneer leaders of the violation, robbers and other criminals. It restored stability and order; the displaced persons who were forced flee their hamlets to save their lives started to return to their home. The deployed Federal Police division had three sub-divisions; the peace-keeping force, the intelligence group and the investigation group. On 17/08/2012 it organized 'neutral investigation commission/group'.

The Federal Police force remained in the conflict area to stabilize the area and curb possibilities of conflict. However conflicts between the Afar and Issa communities continued. Inter-ethnic conflicts were erupted and re-erupted; the Federal Police force was there though. On 13/02/2013 conflict arose around "Arba-Ella "River as Issa Somalis shot two Afar people; one died, and one wounded and one gun looted. In the clash between the Afar and Issa shepherds, the Issa Somalis raided 164 cattle from the Afar. On the next day, 14/02/2013 the Federal Police officers who are deployed in the area returned back the raided cattle to their owners. On 15/02/2013 conflict erupted around Te'a Mount between the Afar and Issa Somalis; one died, five wounded from the Afar side and one gun robbed; one died and one wounded from the Issa side. On 16/02/2013 the conflict continued around Te'a Mount and on this day; five died, one wounded and 35 calves looted from Afar side; two died and four wounded from the Issa side. On the same day evening there was conflict in Awash between the Afar and Issa Somalis; two Somalis wounded, and one Afar woman abducted/kidnapped and 155 sheep and goats and 14 calves were raided by the Issa Somalis. The Federal Police ensured the return of the raided sheep, goats and cattle to their owners. It retrieved persons who were kidnapped by the conflicting sides. On 23/02/2013 the Federal Police force brought back guns that were robbed by the Issa Somalis from the Afar. On 24/02/2013 it brought back 52 sheep and goats of the Afar previously raided by the Issa Somalis. In spite of the Federal Police efforts to curb the conflict and restore stability, the Afar- Issa conflict persisted for months. On 25/02/2013 conflict has arose in Amibara Woreda, Gibbe Kebele and one Afar herdsman died out of the clash. The Issa Somalis shot the herdsman to death and grabbed his gun. The cause of the initial conflict between the Afar and Issa herdsmen was a quarrel on water and pasture and water for their herds. This quarrel and clash between the

shepherds spread to neighboring Afar and Issa areas. The inter-ethnic conflict extended and intensified. It escalated in its scope and effects. It has caused great human and material losses.

The Federal Police then brought Zonal and Woreda administrators from both regional states, military officers from the Northeastern division, security administration officials and regional police commissions together to investigate the causes, effects and the actors/participants of the conflict. It took some measures to restore peace and order in the conflict area. It reorganized the Joint Peace Committee. Elders, religious leaders and government officials from both regional states were selected to form the Joint Peace Committee. The Federal Police together with the Ministry of Federal Affairs initiated occasional and persistent peace talks and discussions within the Joint Peace Committee. Independent investigation group was established to find out the causes of the conflict. This investigation group was part of the deployed Federal Police Force comprises police and military officers, government officials and civil individuals. The Federal Police tracked down the suspects and criminals who were responsible for the conflict.

On March 14, 2016 an Issa Somali killed an Afar. The Afar man was looking after or herding his cattle with his child. An Issa Somali fired at them causing the death of the father and wound of the child. He also took the gun of the Afar father. The incident was in Gewane Woreda; Undufo Kebele *Dalahelay* village and Makurev (Tele station) hamlet. Then after, the Afar were organizing and preparing themselves for revenge against the Issa community. At the same time the Federal Police force got information about the incident and ongoing situation. Then 30 Federal Police officers were deployed to the conflict area to arrest the ongoing radicalization process of the conflict. The Federal Police force entered to the area with three directions; a group of 4 police officers entered to the middle of the conflict weaving the FDRE flag to avoid offensives from both sides; the second group inclined to the left side and culmed the Afar from approaching the other side; and the third group went to the right side to prevent the Issa Somalis from going to the middle of the conflict. The conflict was immediately curbed at its initial stage and with no damage happened. The Federal Police then established a committee of 20 persons 10 from Afar and 10 from Issa communities. The committee was tasked with facilitating reconciliation by compensating the victims and following up and handing over the criminal to police. The committee delegated a duty to the clan of the criminal to search and catch him. The victim Afar family was compensated and stability restored. Later on the criminal was arrested

into custody via collaborative efforts of the Federal Police force and Somali regional state police. He was handed over to the Gewane Woreda court and convicted. He also was made to return the gun he took from the Afar father. According to interviews with the deployed Federal Police officers on 10/04/2018 many illegal armed individuals were arrested. The Federal Police force mobilized the zonal police departments of Gebi Rasu and Shinile zone, and the regional peace-keeping force of Afar and Somali states to launch campaign through which illegal armed criminals were controlled. Many suspects were arrested and handed over to the court.

5.4.2.Conflict Management Role:

According to (Kriel, 2007:11)“ conflict management involves the control of long-term or deep-rooted conflict and making the ongoing conflict more beneficial and less damaging to all sides”. It utilizes coercive, non-coercive, official and unofficial strategies such as; fact-finding missions, facilitation, negotiation, mediation, peace-keeping, power-mediation, sanction, peace-enforcement, arbitration, and consultation. (Kriel, 2007) also identifies three paths of conflict management, i.e. conflict settlement; conflict resolution; and conflict transformation.

Among the state agencies, the role and contribution of the police is very crucial in the maintenance of law and order in the society. The functioning of the police must be looked at from the point of view of the people and not just from the point of view of the government. In this regard the Ethiopian Federal Police Commission has been established by virtue of Proclamation No. 271/ 2000. It was established as an autonomous federal government organ in 2000 (Federal Police Proclamation No. 271/2000) and reestablished in 2011 through Proclamation No. 720/2011 (Ethiopian Federal Police Commission Establishment Proclamation No. 720/2011). It was also reorganized to ensure the fulfillment/observance of the FDRE constitution and laws. It recruits, train, employ and administers police officers in accordance regulations No. 268/2012 issued by the Council of Ministers. The objective of the Federal Police with Commission is to maintain and ensure peace and security of the public and the state by respecting and ensuring the observance of the Constitution, the constitutional order and other laws of the country and by preventing and investigating crime through the participation of the public. Article 6 (22) of the Ethiopian Federal Police Commission Establishment Proclamation No. 720/2011 gives the Federal Police Commission powers and duties to maintain law and order in regions based on intervention rules and orders given by the federal government. And it

cooperates with the concerned regional police commissions to tackle with situations beyond the control of the regions. It operates in regions upon the quest of the regional states or the order of the federal government. The Federal Police force deploys to regions to maintain peace and order, to prevent and manage conflicts.

The deployed Federal Police forces are important actors who also play different roles in the conflict between Afar and Issa clans in the study area. Their main role in the conflict zone is to maintain law and order, which includes protecting lives and property of the two pastoral communities. They carry out patrols and operations whenever the conflict arises in order to restore peace and prevent the conflict from escalating. And also they are not interested in arresting perpetrators and prosecuting them but rather try to create an opportunity for conflicting parties to negotiate and iron out their differences before it becomes severe. They also educate the public, especially the two community elders religious leader local administrative and herders, about the need to co-exist in peace and to report cases of wrongdoings to the police rather than retaliating

Apart from the police and soldiers, who are called upon to restore peace anytime the conflict erupts, joint peace committees are set up in every villages of the conflict prone area. The joint peace committees are made up of mainly the Afar-Issa security Administrative bureau, council of elders, religious leaders, traditional rulers and a government official like minister of federal affairs or currently minister of peace as a coordinator.

The primary duty of the joint peace committee task force is to liaise with the police in order to maintain peace in the various villages. Other responsibilities are to 1) Prevent confrontation between inter clans communities and ; 2) Provide security to the movable pastoral communities to go about their activities without fear or intimidation; and 3) Serve as a rapid response team whenever the conflict erupts (interview from the member of JPC, April 2018).

The Federal Police intervenes in the internal affairs of the regional states under a variety of circumstances to give effective protection and remedies to victims of human rights violations. Upon request by a regional state council or the highest executive organ to the Prime Minister through the Ministry of Federal Affairs (Ministry of Peace), the Federal Government deployed its police force to intervene where grave and deteriorating security conditions in regional states

occur. The Federal Police Force intervenes to assist regional law enforcement organs to maintain law and order through the use of appropriate measures proportionate to the circumstances.

The Federal Police force is deployed to regional state under three conditions; first in times of conflict within a regional state and if the respective state asks for Federal Police. Second if conflict breaks out between two regional states and if the conflict is dangerous and human rights are being violated, the federal government can deploy its police force without request for it to curb the conflict. The third ground of intervention is a situation that 'endangers the constitutional order. Where there is a situation that puts the constitutional order in danger, the Federal Government is empowered to intervene and stabilize the situation (Alamaw 2007.). In time of conflict the Federal Police force engaged in conflict containment activities.. The Ethiopian Federal Police Commission, in the proper execution of its functions, is supervised and followed up by the Ministry of Federal Affairs (the current Ministry of Peace).

5.4.3. Conflict Settlement

This stage involves all outcome-oriented strategies for achieving win-win solutions and putting an end to direct violence but not necessarily addressing the underlying causes of the conflict (Kriel: 2007: 11). Coercive and non-coercive measures can be used to end the violent conflict through ceasefires or separating the conflicting parties. According to a top-level Federal Police officer with a rank Assistance commissioner interviewed during the field research on 15/6/ 2018 remarks that the deployed Federal Police force used to immediately settle the Afar- Issa conflicts. For instance on February, 2013 many conflicts occur between the Afar and Issa communities. The deployed Federal Police force then took series of measures to settle the conflicts. It took direct conflict de-escalation measures to put the ongoing violations to an end. An informant from the deployed Federal Police (interviewed on 17/04/2018) said“ *the Federal Police force used diplomatic and forceful means to end the arising Afar – Issa conflicts. Conflict was arisen on 25/09/2014 and the deployed Federal Police force entered to the middle of the conflict waving the FDRE flag to stop the ongoing conflict and separate the conflicting forces. Then the conflicting sides withdrew and the conflict was calmed.*”

5.4.4. Conflict Resolution

This phase uses such process-and relationship-oriented activities to address the underlying causes of violence(kriel:2007:12).The conflict resolution stage hosts facilitation and consultation, inclusion of many involved actors, sustaining dialog, and cooperation and communication. The deployed Federal Police force has been taking conflict resolution measures regarding the Afar – Issa conflicts even though the resolution actions didn't address the root causes of the conflicts. Peace talk negotiations and compensation were initiated by the Federal Police to settle the Afar – Issa community conflict. For example on December 2016 there was camel raiding between the Afar and Issa communities. On December 29, 2016 Afar attempted to rape four Issa women around Mulu Woreda. The Issa Somalis irritated by the act and were preparing for retaliation. They were organizing their armed group to attack the Afar as a revenge for the attempted rape. The Federal Police got information about the preparation for revenge from its local informants and advanced to the area and avoided the conflict. The Federal Police force set up a peace committee comprising elders from both communities and Woreda administrators from both regional states. Discussions and bargaining held within the committee. The Afar men admitted the alleged attempted rape. The Afar agreed to offer the four women with 40,000 Birr compensation. Finally with the facilitation of the Federal Police force the Afar and Issa communities were reconciled.

According to the Ethiopian Federal Police Commission Establishment Proclamation No. 720/2011 the Ethiopian Federal Police Commission and regional police commissions shall establish a Joint Council with a view to strengthen their relationship. Using this provision the Federal Police Commission established a joint police council comprising the Federal, Afar regional state and Somali regional state police commissions to deal with the Afar-Issa conflict. A senior officer from the Federal Police commission remarked (20/03/2018)“*the Federal Police coordinated the Afar and Somali regional police commissions in preventing and managing the conflict. It mobilized them to take preventive measures. This Joint Police Council had an important role in facilitating conflict resolution.*”The Federal Police commission and its police officers had direct contact with the Afar and Somali police commissions through the joint police commission. The joint police council is presided over by the Commissioner General of the Federal Police Commission.

The north eastern division of the Federal Police was stationed along the Addis Ababa-Djibouti main asphalt road. The object of the north eastern division is to protect the Addis Ababa Awash-mille main asphalt road, to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts between the Afar and Issa communities, to control contraband, human smuggling, and human trafficking, and illicit small arms trade. The Federal police, i.e., north eastern division is now stationed in the conflict areas between Afar and Issa to prevent incidental clash and violence to curb if conflict arises to restore peace and order and to resettle conflicts between the Issa and Afar communities. Regarding the Afar-Issa conflict, the main responsibility of the Federal Police is prevention and management of conflict. Prevention of conflict means the Federal Police interfere if there are possibilities of conflict. Interviewees from the Federal Police force (17/03/2018) confirmed that the deployed Federal Police force took measures such as outlawing illicit weapon possessions, buffer zones and time-off commands to manage the conflict. The Federal Police took post-conflict and reactive measures to stop conflicts. These measures were aimed at restoring security of the area. A deployed Federal Police officer (on 17/03/2018) said that:

“During the Afar- Issa conflict raiding cattle is common. There were frequent attacks and counter-attacks to bring back the raided cattle. To avoid retaliation offensives between the two communities the Federal Police force took appropriate actions. Post conflict management measures that were being taken by the Federal Police were restoring peace and order, conflict resettlement and reconciliation, bringing back spoils or raided cattle to their owners, taking wounded persons and victims to medical treatment centers and burying dead bodies. For example, in 2014 conflict arose between the Afar and Issa communities. The Federal Police then intervened and brought back raided cattle by following the footsteps or path of the cattle. The Federal Police force worked in collaboration with the local community to bring back the spoiled cattle and capitals to their owners.”

To restore peace the Federal Police had to restore justice. The victims or their families were offered with compensation. The deployed Federal Police initiated compensations according the norms and culture of the communities. The Federal Police in its efforts to resettle conflict promoted just compensation to victims. According to interviews with the deployed Federal Police officers on 13/03/2018, the Federal Police collected information from the federal intelligence institutions regarding the inter-ethnic conflict. Therefore, it affirmed, analyzed and investigated the intelligence about the conflict. Then the Federal Police force would immediately report the issues to the commission if there were possibilities of Afar- Issa conflict. The Federal

Police force, after receiving intervention confirmation, would intervene to stop the inter-communal conflict.

5.5. Conflict De-escalation and Violence Prevention

The Federal Police force takes post conflict measures to stop and manage the Issa- Afar conflict. The FGD with the deployed Federal Police conducted on 24/03/2018 implied that when conflicts arose between the Afar and Issa Somalis the Federal Police intervened and took immediate actions to make the conflict over. The Federal Police lifted dead bodies and wounded persons. It organized peace committees at different levels to promote peace and reconciliation between the Issa –Afar communities. The Federal Police first warn the respective regional authorities to avoid and stop the conflict. And if the respective regional authorities do not avoid and stop the conflict the Federal Police commission deploys its police force to stop the Afar – Issa inter-ethnic conflict. The deployed Federal Police forces discussed with the local people and authorities about the origin and causes of the conflict and the interests of the participations of the conflict. The Federal Police officers told the researcher that they collected information about the causes and chronology of the conflict, about the identities and interests of the participants of the conflict, about actors of the conflicts, etc.

A senior Federal Police informant (17/04/2018) said “the Federal Police commission gave directives and orientation to the deployed Federal Police officers. The orientation was regarding with whom the Federal Police officers shall cooperate, regarding the actions that would be taken regarding the dynamics of the conflict etc. During the orientation the deployed Federal Police officers were told to abstain from taking excess actions. Instead they were directed to stop the conflict through peaceful measures without using forceful measurements.”

The Afar and Issa communities are well-equipped with modern fire arms. Conflicts between these communities are severe and become beyond the control of the Federal Police force. Conflicts might be difficult to stop without physical power. The Federal Police force formed committees and informed the community leaders from both sides to tell the participants of the conflicts to retreat and withdraw from the conflict area. The Federal Police force used forceful means to stop the conflict if the conflicting parties refuse to retreat and withdraw from the conflict area.

5.5.1. Conflict Management: Conflict Limitation and Containment:

According to FGD with the deployed Federal Police conducted on 24/03/2018 the Federal Police force identifies the factors of the newly arisen conflict. The Federal Police officers study and investigate the root and immediate cause of the conflict. The cause and the nature of the conflict can be tribal/communal, political, economic or religious. After investigating the conflict between the Afar and Issa communities the Federal Police forces strived for conflict resettlement and management. The Federal Police officers brought together the community and political leaders of the Afar and Issa communities to discuss on how and in what manner the conflict should be resettled. The political and community leaders of the Afar and Issa revealed their interest and needs. This was an important input to the Federal Police to understand the dynamic aspects and cause of the conflict and then to resettle it. The Federal Police helped the political and community leaders to bargain and to reconcile.

The fundamental causes of the conflict between the two ethnics are related with land and identity questions. There are many triggering factors (immediate causes) for the Afar –Issa conflicts. The immediate causes for the recurrent conflicts are maladministration, lack of developmental infrastructure, homicides, robbery, cattle raiding etc. After the Federal Police force identified the triggering factors it mobilized the local Afar and Issa communities and their leaders to solve and address the immediate causes of the conflict. Thus the role of the Federal Police in the Afar-Issa conflict was as a third party mediator. A Federal Police interviewee on 21/03/2018 remarked

“the Federal Police force was mediator. It played a mediatory role in settling the Afar – Issa conflict. The Federal Police force mediated the counterparts of the conflict. It pressurized both sides to withdrawal from the conflict and address pre-reconciliation issues such as compensations and bringing back the spoils or raided cattle to pave the way to agreement and reconciliation. The Federal Police force controlled gun carriers from entering the conflict areas to avoid the recurrence of the conflict. It was deployed to prevent the possibilities of inter-communal conflict.”

The deployed Federal Police forces have utilized movement sanction to limit the scope of the conflict by restricting the movement of people with guns. The Federal Police banned gun carriers or gunmen from moving place to place and informed the local authorities to tell the people (their respective subjects) not to carry firearms. The Federal Police officers grabbed guns (firearms) of

the participants of the conflict and of those who carry. The Federal Police, though it was not enough, hunted actors and participants of the conflict and brought them to the law for legal trial.

The Addis Ababa – Djibouti main road is the de facto boundary between the Afar and Issa people. The deployed Federal Police force applied separation mechanism. To prevent additional conflicts it separated the communities and limited the movement of people. People who carry gun were forbid not to approach beyond five kilometers near to the main asphalt road. The Federal Police force banned movement being carrying gun beyond 5 kilometers left and right near to the main road. Those who were found being approaching with gun beyond 5 kilometers to the main road were grabbed their guns and were taken into custody.

5.5.2. New Settlement Establishment and Occupation and Expansion of Territory:

Land claims are an important aspect of the Afar-Issa conflict. Within the boundaries of the Afar regional state there are Issa Somali settlements. The Afar community claims that, the land to be their historical land. The Issa Somalis also claimed the land and demanded self-determination rights. Limiting the scope of the root cause of the Afar – Issa conflict, the Federal Police prohibited new settlements and land expansion. A deployed Federal Police officer told the researcher (18/03/2018)

“both the Afar and Issa Somalis are nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists. In search of water and grazing land, they move from place to place. Thus the conflict became more complex when new occupations of land and new settlements done. The Afar and Issa communities have partially started sedentary life where they permanently settled in a certain area. They compete with one another for the limited resources and conflicts occur. The Federal Police force issued regulations that ban new settlements and occupation of land in the contested areas till the conflict permanently solved.”

According to the FGD with the Afar community members conducted on 17/04/2018 the fundamental cause of the Issa – Afar conflict is the question of land. The Afar accuses the Issa Somalis that they occupied their historic land in the Gebi Rasu zone. They said that, the Issa Somalis are invading their natural resources in the area. There are Issa settlement centers in the Gebi Rasu zone. The Afar communities frustrated that the Issa Somalis completely dominate and to take over the area in the hands of Issa Somalis .. Competition for grazing land and water resources causes conflict between the Afar and Issa communities. As the communities are pastoralists and semi-pastoralists grass and water are crucial for their life and their capital.

During times of drought one community goes to the other side in search of grass and water. The partition of water and grass creates frustration and causes conflict. The Afar and Issa herdsmen share the grass and water. Conflicts arise when the herdsmen compete for the water and grass. The Federal Police officers were deployed at conflicting areas. They regularly patrol the grazing lands and water wells.

The Federal Police force made the herdsmen to use the water and grass in turn. It is prohibited to establishing new hamlets in the Gebi Rasu zone. The Federal Police prohibited building new houses especially in Adaytu, Unduffo, and Gedamaytu areas to prevent possibilities of conflict. The Federal Police force identified the areas with different symbols.

In 2008 E.C the federal government negotiated an agreement between the Afar and Somali regional states which prohibits new settlements or building new hamlets in the contested areas from Awash to Mile. The two communities were also agreed not to build new hamlets and not to interrupt the traffic flow through the main asphalt road. However, according to the FGD with the Afar community members conducted on march 16/2018 the Issa Somalis had established new hamlet called Ambule which is found among *Gewane* and *Undufo*, *Adaytu* and *Gedamaytu* into the newly established village. This act has violated the previous agreement between the Afar and Issa Somalis not to establish new village. The federal government met the Afar and Somali regional states administrators and warned them to demolish the newly established village. The administrators failed to demolish the new hamlet.

Then the Federal Police deployed into the area on April 01, /2009 to demolish the new illegal constructed village that provide claim by the Afar. The Federal Police force entered the village waving the Ethiopian flag. The Issa militias (numerically 50-100) fired bullet at the Federal Police force. The Federal Police force respond with military offensives to arrested the militias and control the village. Then the Federal Police force controlled the village and completely demolished it with fire. The Federal Police force established a camp and stationed there. In the violent conflict between the Issa militias and the Federal Police force 20 people were killed and wounded from the Federal Police and the militias. The village has been the main contraband transition route.

Revenge and feud bloods are common cultural traits of both the Afar and Issa Somali communities. Often the triggering factor to conflict is homicide. Hence, there would be revenge and offensives as responses. The clash between individuals expands and become inter-ethnic conflict. Most clashes between individuals trigger violent conflict between the two communities. Thus, according to the FGD with the deployed Federal Police conducted on 24/03/2018 the Federal Police force after entering into the area strictly banned retaliations and counter-retaliations. The Federal Police denounced actions and intentions relating to retaliations. Instead, those who faced grievances were told to bring their case to the court and quickly inform the Federal Police officers. The EFP avoided the possibilities of revenge and retaliations by hunting the criminals and bringing spoils and raided cattle to their owners.

The EFPPF force, in order to hunt the actors and participants of the conflict, arrested those who hide criminals and those who give protections for the criminals. The Federal Police gave awareness and guidance to the community and local authorities on the execution of the commands or rules. The Federal Police officers held many public meetings to create awareness at the grass root level. They remarked the adverse effects of conflict on the lives of the communities. Public conferences were held at different places. The Federal Police force called the communities to hand over criminals and to protect the security of their areas.

Initially, the Federal Police force had shortage of intelligence about the conflict areas. Lack of information about what is going in the conflict areas challenged the Federal Police force to effectively control the situation. Clashes between individuals became inter-communal conflicts. The Federal Police force could not restrain this at the initial stage. According to interviews with the deployed Federal Police officers on 17/04/2018 to tackle this problem then the Federal Police force organized chains of intelligence. The Federal Police force recruited local intelligence informants in the conflict areas. It has trained local informants from among the community. Through the intelligence chains the Federal Police force was able to leak information about the conflict areas situation.

The central command post of the Federal Police force reports to the deployed Federal Police about it has seen, heard and performed regarding ongoing events in the conflict area. These reports would be made available to all higher-level authorities. The main group coordinator in the conflict area would immediately send out radio, telephone, fax, and text messages and

information to the command post leadership at all level to evaluate the Federal Police performance by contacting daily.

The Federal Police officers timely explain the government directives to the public and execute it without hesitation. The Federal Police force watch over the conflict area to ensure the security of the people. It patrols the conflicting areas and the main asphalt road to maintain order. The Federal Police force provided protection to innocent citizens. It convinced the communities that all actions being taken were to ensure the peace and development of the area.

Conflicts were rampant here and there. The conflict zone is too large to cover all. The Federal Police couldn't function well at first. It was unable to effectively perform and execute its operations. Thus to tackle this, the deployed Federal Police established strong command posts in every conflict area to manage the conflicts and for maintaining conflict violence purpose.

Interview from the Federal Police commission remarked on march 15/2018)

“the commission coordinated partners to manage the conflict. It identified areas of threat to security and deployed its police force. It identified situations that cause or lead to conflict and collected information to identify the fundamentals and triggering factors of the Afar Issa conflicts. The Federal Police force hunted down and arrested those who made trouble and intensified conflicts. The Federal Police command post arrested suspects to investigate and prosecute them under the law.”

The Federal Police force made pressure upon the community leaders that the persons who have died and injured in the conflict to be compensated according to their culture. Victims were relieved and displaced persons were rehabilitated. The interviewee from the Afar and Issa communities told the researcher that even though the Federal Police force could not dry out the source of the conflict, it was able to manage conflicts that arise between the Afar and Issa people.

5.6. Coordination and Facilitation of The Conflict management;

The Federal Police force worked in collaboration and cooperation with the regional and local police because the regional and local police know the area better than the Federal Police. It worked in collaboration with the ministry of federal affairs, defense force, regional, zonal and Woreda administrations and security bureaus, joint peace committees and regional polices.

5.6.1. Local Community, Tribal and Religious Leaders

Deployed Federal Police officers interviewed on march 07/2018, remarked that the Federal Police force established joint councils that comprise community, tribal and religious leaders from the Afar and Issa people. It cooperated with the community leaders in convincing the people. The Federal Police works most of the time by participating the communities and mobilized the communities through their council elders tribal and religious leader . The community leaders had essential contribution in the conflict resolution and reconciliation process between the two communities. The tribal leaders work to keep the conflict from escalating. Together with the police, they prevent conflict and pressurize to restore peace. They bring back raided cattle and compensations were made for human fatalities. The Federal Police force have been performed its mission of peace process and conflict settlement not based on researchable policies simply by pushing the traditional and religious leaders to solve their problems, by creating a conducive environment between the conflicting parts. In the traditional conflict resettlement process the role of the community leaders was more significant. The Federal Police mobilized the community leaders for conflict resettlement and reconciliation. Conflict resettlement processes without the elders and clan leaders are void and unacceptable by the local communities. Clan leaders played an important role in peace-building and in the repatriation of internally displaced persons.

5.6.2. Council of Community Elders

Elders of the Afar and Issa communities have great influence. The FGD with the deployed Federal Police conducted on 24/03/2018, indicates that the Federal Police force formed councils of elders to initiate peace talks. There were many council of elders at different levels. Each council of elders has 20 members. It constitutes 20 elders, 10 from the Afar and 10 from the Issa community. This council of elders worked in cooperation with the deployed Federal Police force during conflict prevention and conflict management efforts. The elders of the two communities bargained to reach on agreements with the help of the Federal Police. Here the role of the Federal Police was mediating the discussion and peace deals among the elders. The Federal Police didn't dictate commands and decisions regarding the peace deal bargains rather than facilitating the peace process.

A deployed Federal Police officer (19/03/2018) said *“the Federal Police force initiated the establishment of the Joint Council. The Joint Council comprises representatives from the Afar and Isa communities, the Federal Police, the Ministry of Federal Affairs, the administration of both regions, and security administrations. Agreement and reconciliation has been reached within the joint council.”* Interviewees (on 06, 2018) from both communities remark that once the Federal Police force has moved in, the peace and security situation of the conflict area has been improved. The Federal Police force officer’s move around the conflict area to protect peace and security. They regularly patrol the conflict zone to ensure the safety of the communities.

5.6.3. Joint Peace Committee

The Ministry of Federal Affairs organized a Joint peace Committee to initiate peace and stability in the Afar – Issa conflict areas. The Joint Peace Committee worked with the Afar and Somali governments, the security administration, and the Federal Ministry of Federal Affairs to settle and resolve the inter-communal conflict. This joint peace committee brought victims to compensation, recovers raided cattle, brought criminals to justice and paved ways for peace agreements between the conflicting parties. The Joint Peace Committee conducted a bi-weekly conference and presented reports regarding the state of reconciliation and conflict resolution.

According to interviews with key informants from the Ministry of Federal affairs (16/05/2018) the main Joint Peace Committee was composed of delegates from the Ministry of Federal Affairs, Federal Police Commission, Afar and Somali Regional Security Bureaus, and Afar and Somali Regional Polices. The Joint Peace Committee was established to watch over and solve the Afar- Issa conflict at least temporarily. The committee studied the courses and dynamics of the conflict. It prepared documents regarding the causes and effects of the conflict. It also devised mechanisms and strategies through which the conflict between Issa and Afar communities would be solved. The Federal Police established many joint peace committees at different levels to resolve and manage the Afar Issa disputes. These joint peace committees were established at regional, zonal and local levels. The joint peace committees were partners of the Federal Police during the times of conflict and post conflict issues. With the assistance of the Joint Peace Committee the Federal Police force could effectively manage the conflict. Although it was ad hoc, the Federal Police and the joint peace committee were able to settle the Afar – Issa conflict. Additionally the Federal Police force worked in cooperation with the defense force,

security and intelligence agencies, and NGOs to relief and rehabilitates the displaced persons by the Afar Issa inter-ethnic conflict.

The defense force assisted the Federal Police by collecting intelligences and controlling the conflict areas. There was a group of higher authorities from the Federal Police, ministry of federal affairs and defense which was established to lead the operational command of the deployed Federal Police forces. The central operational command of the Federal Police worked jointly with intelligences authorities to cope up with lack of information about the conflict and about what is going on in the Afar – Issa conflict areas.

5.6.4. The Defence Force

Interviewee from the Federal Police commission (21/05/2018) noticed *“the Federal Police force worked together with the defense force. The defense force gathered information and provided it to the command post to take necessary corrective measures. It worked hand in hand with the Defense force to prevent conflict and stabilize the conflict areas. The defense force reigned law and order by taking immediate and necessary actions. For instance it immediately moves to confirm if complains of killings, raiding or offences come.”* When the conflict is beyond the capabilities of the Federal Police, the defense force enters and backs the Federal Police in halting and managing conflicts. According to the interviews with Federal Police key informants on 14/05/2018 unruly conflict was arose on 15/05/2014 between the Afar and Issa communities. The deployed Federal Police could not arrest the violent situation. The conflict went beyond the capacity of the Federal Police force. Thus the defense force intervened and arrested the violations. It overcame and ended the inter-ethnic conflict.

5.6.5. The Former Ministry of Federal Affairs (the current Ministry of Peace)

The Ministry of Federal Affairs identified factors serving as causes of conflicts among the two communities. It conducted a study proposing recommendations to keep communities away from conflicts and instability. The Ministry of Federal Affairs implemented the findings and recommendations of the studies upon approval. It devised and developed mechanisms and strategies on conflict prevention and conflict management. The Federal Police commission made use of the studies conducted on the Afar- Issa inter-communal conflict by the Ministry of Federal Affairs. The Federal Police force implemented the recommendations of the studies and utilized

the strategies and mechanisms of conflict prevention and conflict management specified by the ministry. Interview from the ministry affairs march, 17/2018) posited that the Ministry of Federal Affairs has taken measures to build conflict management capacity of state and local government officials. It trained the local authorities to equip them with conflict management skills. The Ministry of Federal Affairs intervened in the affairs of the Afar and Somali states in cases of violent conflicts as to build the states' conflict management capacities. The Ministry of Federal Affairs gave basic trainings on conflict management mechanism skills to the concerned regional (Afar and Somali states) and local institutions. The Federal Police and the Ministry of Federal Affairs gave instructions and trainings to the Afar administrative security office and the Afar regional police commission on basic conflict prevention and conflict management skills.

The Ministry of Federal Affairs issued regulations regarding the conflict and sent them to regional and local governments for implementation. The Federal Police force monitored the proper implementations of the guide lines and regulations. The concerned Federal Police officers evaluated the performance of these authorities. They identify the reasons for their failure and took necessary measures.

The Ministry of Federal Affairs as federal government institutions with mandate to manage conflict violent and also provides an advisory opinion about conflict resolution to the ministry of council and in general to the prime minister offices. In this regard the studies have been taken on the Afar-Issa pastoral conflict by the ministry of federal affairs were fulfils cause of conflict or the trigger factors, such as scarcity of water , pasturing, animal riding, killing peoples and the main is territory claim. Based on the provide studies the role of violent containment and deescalate the already break out of violent have belongs to the Federal police and deployed under the oversight of the ministry .And the structural political and economical conflict problems cause would solved by provide and distributed economic infrastructure by design peace building strategies. Therefore, the Federal Ministry of affairs played two roles such as the role of conflict containment and de-escalation and the roles played on peace building on a conflict prone , interview from the ministry of affairs on march,18/2018).

“the Ministry of Federal Affairs was tasked with strategy formulation, manual preparation, and organization of conferences on conflict prevention and resolution. The Federal Police force was tasked with implementing these conflict resolution and conflict management strategies. Along with the deployment of the

Federal Police the Ministry of Federal Affairs organized committees to mobilize the local communities to resettle the conflict in cooperation with regional and local authorities. To restore peace and order, the Ministry of Federal Affairs organized ad hoc conflict resolution committees, include from every section of the society and along with federal, regional and local authorities and stake holders. The Ministry of Federal Affairs and the Federal Police worked hand in hand to curb and manage the Afar- Issa inter-ethnic conflicts.”

On May 2013 the Ministry of Federal Affairs sent an independent investigation commission to find out the causes of the conflict; to identify those responsible for it; and, in collaboration with the police and defense forces, to track down the criminal suspects. The Ministry also coordinated and provided assistance to internally displaced persons, people who had lost their homes or their subsistence during the conflict.

The Ministry of Federal Affairs has duty to facilitate the resolution of disputes arising between Regional States. It facilitated the resettlement of the Afar and Somali border conflicts. As the inter-communal conflict between the Afar and Issa communities has transformed to border dispute and land claim conflict between the Afar regional state and the Somali regional state, the conflict resolution was at national level between the regional states authorities, not at the communal level. The Ministry of Federal Affairs devised and implemented solutions to disputes and conflicts between the two regions. It has implemented the solution mechanisms through the Federal Police and other stakeholders. The role of the Federal Police was, here, executing the operational violent conflict containment under the oversight of by the Ministry of Federal Affairs.

According to Federal Police commission informant (16/08/2018), agreement has been concluded on March 2013 between the Afar regional national state government and the Somali regional national state government that was initiated and negotiated by the Ministry of Federal Affairs. According to the agreement, the two regional state governments agreed the main road from Awash to Mille to be free from any kind of firearms and armed encroachments. Thus the role and task of the Federal Police force is executing this agreement concluded between the Afar and Somali regions.

5.6.6. Regional, Zonal and Local Authorities

The FGD with the deployed police officers conducted on mach, 24/2018) states that the Federal Police force had chains and contacts with the respective regional, zonal and local authorities in

the conflict area. The Federal Police collected and exchanged intelligence and information from and with the regional, zonal, and local authorities regarding the Issa- Afar conflict. The deployed Federal Police brought together the regional administration authorities from both the Afar and Somali regional national states to design mechanisms through which the conflict is resettled and reconciliation is reached.

The role of the local government authorities was to create awareness in the community to avoid situations that lead to conflict. They Identified individuals who involve in the conflict and disturb the area and surrender them to the Federal Police force. They provided immediate information to the Federal Police and local security forces if there are illegal activities or threats. The Federal Police worked with regional security bureaus and administrations (Somali and Afar), regional polices, local administrations of the Afar Issa communities.

5.7 Afar and Somali Regional Police

The FGD with the deployed Federal Police officers conducted on 10/04/2018 asserted that the deployed Federal Police officers were strange to the area especially at first. They didn't even understand what was going on around. They didn't have knowledge about the dynamics of the Afar- Issa conflict. The conflict areas were very tough to patrol. The Afar and Somali regional polices joined them. They worked jointly. The two regional polices assisted the Federal Police force in hunting criminals and patrolling the areas. The regional police officers had a far better knowledge about the conflict and conflict areas. The Federal Police force cooperated with the regional polices to manage the Afar – Issa conflict. The Federal Police force got information from the local police departments. The Federal Police investigated the cause and effects of the conflict, identified the pioneers and participants of the conflict and interrogated criminals with the assistance of the regional polices. In times of conflict between the Issa and Afar people the Federal Police force worked in collaboration with the military and regional polices.

5.8. The Council of Police Commissioners

The Council of Police Commissioners, composed of regional police commissioners and Federal Police assistant commissioners, was established mainly to increase mutual understanding and cohesion among regions as well as between Federal Police and regional polices. The Council is chaired by the Federal Police commissioner General. The council is responsible to decide on plans and programs to be implemented in the regions. The Council of police commissioners gave

directions the Federal Police force on how to deal with the issue and what mechanisms should be followed by the police officers to halt and prevent the inter-communal conflicts between the Afar and Issa. The Federal Police force obtained information and classified data about the profiles of the conflict area wherein it will be/was deployed. The Council designed action plans and gave to the deployed Federal Police force.

5.9. Conflict prevention and Settlement Mechanisms:

5.9.1. Conflict Prevention

A. Separating Conflicting Parties: Buffer zone and Movement Sanction:

Key informants from the Federal Police commission (08/06/2018) and FGD with police officers (10/04/2018) indicated that the Ministry of Federal affairs and the Afar and Somali National regional state administrations issued regular buffer zone commands and directives to prevent conflict. The deployed Federal Police force enforced the buffer zone regulations. Those who disobey and violate the buffer zone commands would be stripped of their weapons. Sometimes conflicts arise between the community and the Federal Police as the community members violate the buffer zone commands. For instance in 2006 E.C. the Federal Police power grabbed 76 weapons, 142 bullets and 114 magazines from those who violated the buffer zone regulation.

B. Attempting to Deterrence

Deterrence is mostly used for the purpose of war or conflict prevention. It is the least cost alternative war/conflict prevention mechanism. It could be the best and cheapest strategy to prevent conflicts that may arise between the Afar and Issa communities. The deployed Federal Police officers (09/04/2018) told the researcher that they utilized deterring methods to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts between the Issa and Afar communities. They trap down actors and criminals who were responsible for the inter-communal conflict. Many were arrested and persecuted due to their wrongdoings. The deployed Federal Police force (DFPF) brought many suspects and criminals into custody of law. For instance in 2015 around 10 suspects and criminals from both communities were arrested and convicted. These people were responsible for the arising and escalations of the conflicts.

The Federal Police restrained clashes between individuals before they become inter-communal conflict. As the Afar and Issa communities in the study area are pastoralists there is recurrent

cattle raiding and there are attacks and counter-attacks to bring back the cattle. The Federal Police usually intervene in the conflict between the Issa and Afar communities and bring back the cattle to their owners as a mechanism of resettling the conflict.

A senior Federal Police officer interviewee (14/05/2018) remarked

“From June 14, 2010, - May 30 /2011 there were recurrent conflicts around Gela’elo and ZinjeroGedel (baboon cliff) between the Afar and Issa communities. The communities fought over water ponds. They utilized the oases for drinking for themselves and their cattle. These water wells are very essential for their lives. They competed for these oases and violent conflicts occasionally arise. There were killings, cattle raiding and retaliations. As revenges spread, the conflict became severe. Thus the Federal Police force deployed into the area. Two battalion were stationed in “Gela’elo” and two other battalion in “Zinjero Gedel” (literal meaning (baboon cliff). The Federal Police force was halting conflicts in the area. Hence the deployed Federal Police force mitigated the conflict from spreading out to other areas.”

5.9.2 Conflict Settlement Mechanisms:

A. Legal Mechanism: Litigation:

A senior interviewee from the Federal Police commission march 26 /2018) informed the researcher that after entering and curbing the conflict, the Federal Police took legal measures. Criminals/suspects were hunted down and taken into the local custody to face justice through legal institutions or the court. The Federal Police force isolated communal and tribal leaders who intensified the conflict. It first collected information to identify local governmental authorities and communal leaders from the Afar and Issa sides those who works to escalate the conflict. Then, the Federal Police force took relentless measures to stop the conflict and ensure the rule of law.

A deployed Federal Police officer on March 14/2018) said that,

“the intentions of litigation are restoring justice and restrain the victims from revenge. In the Afar- Issa inter-ethnic conflict many criminals were arrested and convicted. Homicide and cattle raiding were triggering factors for the conflicts.

The family or relatives of victims attack the enemy side as retaliation. Revenge and counter-revenge become rampant and the conflict escalates to inter-ethnic conflict. A lot of people died out of violent Afar- Issa inter-ethnic conflicts. These conflicts were at the initial stage inter-personal clashes, but later on they became inter-communal violence. To deescalate the clashes the Federal Police force arrested suspects of homicide and cattle raiding and interrogated them. Inter-personal clashes were suffocated at their initial state before they become inter-ethnic conflicts.”

The Federal Police used litigation mechanism/process to resolve the Afar- Issa conflict in the court. Although this mechanism was not persistent, it was useful in handling individual conflicts but constraining in addressing the multiple effects that may arise as a result of the original cause of dispute.

B. Peace Deal Mechanisms: Negotiation, Mediation and Arbitration

According to the FGD with police officers conducted on march,/2018 the Federal Police brought together the elders, clan chiefs and religious leaders of both the Afar and Issa communities and formed joint peace committees at various levels. The joint peace committees comprise figures from all sections of the Afar and Issa societies. These committees also include concerned regional, zonal and local government authorities. The Federal Police initiated negotiations and bargains within the joint peace committees. The members of the committees negotiate and reach on agreements. They come up with resolution proposals. The Federal Police was tasked with facilitating the peace talks and deals. It didn't participate in the negotiations. But if the joint peace committees failed to reach on agreements and to bring solutions, the Federal Police would interfere and mediate the negotiations. It facilitated bargaining and negotiations within the peace committees. Sometimes the participants of the negotiation from both the Afar and Issa communities fail to agree as they favor their group and incline to their group interest priority. Thus the role of the Federal Police was to hear both sides and impose binding decisions. The Federal Police employed arbitration if all diplomatic mechanisms failed to reach on agreements and attain peace.

C. Traditional Conflict Management Mechanism: Reconciliation:

The traditional conflict resolution mechanism is less complex, more time saving and gives a chance to parties in conflict to participate in solving their own problems and handling their own affairs (Tirist Girshaw: 2005).The Federal Police utilized the culture and traditions of the local

Afar and Issa communities to resolve and manage the conflict. It applied traditional conflict management mechanisms to promote mediations and reconciliations between the communities.

The Afar community has a traditional conflict resolution system called 'Maada' and the conflict resolution mechanism of the Issa community is called 'Her'. To resettle the Afar – Issa dispute the Federal Police employed traditional conflict resolution mechanisms used by the Afar and Issa communities. The Federal Police facilitated reconciliation between the Afar and Issa communities. The Afar and Issa religious and tribal leaders have substantial power and influence upon the communities and even on the regional governments. The Issa and Afar tribal leaders play a vital role in resolving the inter-ethnic conflict.

The FGD with the Federal Police officers march /2018) remarks that the Federal Police utilized reconciliation mechanisms to resolve the conflict. The Federal Police selected religious leaders, elders, political leaders, and security administrators from both the conflicting sides to talk to each other and discuss to resolve the conflict between the Afar-Issa communities. Respondents stated that the indigenous conflict management mechanisms make groups respect solutions given by elders and discharge their respective duties accordingly without the need for other coercive measures. Groups tell the facts to elders in fear of bitter effects in the future. The persons responsible for the wrongs can confess their wrongdoing, apologize and ask forgiveness and victims can accept the apologies and forgive.

D. Community Based Mechanisms: Public Peace Forums and Conferences

Owasanoye et al., Agarwal, (2000) states that the significance of the alternative dispute resolution methods other than litigation have been found satisfactory, popular and it encompasses a variety of methods for the resolution of disputes between two parties belonging to a country. In addition, they offer the conventional advantages like less expensive and dispensation of quick justice, including choice of venue for the resolution of disputes. Based on the peace action plans, the Afar- Issa joint peace committee implemented alternative methods like cooperative, collaborative and negotiation as a means of modern mechanisms and indigenous resolution to consolidate people to people relation.

Key informants from the Ministry of Federal Affairs (16/05/2018) and Federal Police commission (12/06/2018) stated Tammany forums were held between the Afar and Issa

communities. The sessions focused on evaluation of Regional and Local Governments responsible leaders, on the resolution implementation processes and identifying aggravating factors of the conflict. The Ministry of Federal Affairs and the Federal Police in the area have made joint efforts with the leaders of the two communities to meet and solve their problems. During the conflict, the detainees were released, closed roads were opened and services were provided, and an agreement was made to seize weapons in conflict zones to maintain the peace and security of the area. The forums pointed local administrations, Afar and Issa religious leaders, some clan elders and government authorities were involved as external actors. Therefore, on the discussion prevailed and reached into consent, they should be withdrawing their hands from the conflict. Additionally, prominent individuals were identified and indicated to restrict from what they did, unless they will be taken responsible for the risk regarding to the conflict in the area. In the peace conferences, the victim families' issues were resolved by organized local councilor elders through indigenous conflict resolution. Illegal pressure groups were arrested. As a result the conflict resolution mechanisms brought positive effects between the two conflicted groups and security was granted. Awareness was created for all the people and others in the study area.

The Afar and Issa communities participated in the peace conferences. However the public peace conferences couldn't bring the intended effects/results. The Issa communities demanded referendum to be held to exercise their self-determination rights. They called for referendum to secede from the afar regional state and establish their self-administrative entity. The Afar community and Afar regional state government banned the demand of the Issa community for referendum, and they claimed the land where the Issa currently living in was their [historic] land and possession. The Afar claimed the Issa communities within the Afar regional state were newcomers and were not native to the place they are residing now.

5.9.2.1 Conflict Transformation mechanism: Boundary Demarcation

According to the Federal Police commission report (February, 2016), on December 11, 2014 the Afar and the Somali national regional state governments have been agreed to demarcate boundaries between them as a sustainable solution to the Afar – Issa inter-communal conflict. The peace deal talk was initiated by the prime minister office and was negotiated by the federal affairs ministry. Upon the presence of the two presidents of the regional states, an agreement was

reached and signed. A committee of boundary demarcation was constituted. The committee of Afar and Issa boundary demarcation comprised members; two officials from the ministry of federal affairs, currently ministry of peace (MP) two officers from the Ethiopian defense, force (EDF) One police officer commanders from the Ethiopian Federal Police commission, two higher officials from the Afar regional state, and two senior officials from the Somali regional state. The ad-hoc committee was comprised of nine people in number and with highly oriented and trustful by the two regional governments and communities. It started its operation on 23/01/2015 and successfully finished on 21/02/2015.

The demarcation has been made according to the agreement. Accordingly the three hamlet conflict areas resided and incorporated into the Afar regional state as a special Kebeles of the Issa community. In this regard the Gedamaytu integrated to Amibara Woreda, Undufo to Gewane Woreda and Adaytu to Mille Woreda. Here, the role of the Federal Police was to execute and enforce the demarcation agreements signed between the two regional state governments. The role of Federal police in this project not only confined in peace keeping, but also participated in the border demarcating ad-hoc committee by one higher police officer commander. Eventhough following the bilateral agreement the border demarcating processes was finished on time and reported to the Afar-Issa regional Governmental states and incorporated the three kebele under the regional administrative of Afar, but the issue of language, the issue of self-administrative within the Afar region (special wereda) and the issue of development claimed by the Issa community had not been answered by the ad-hoc committee.

Following the EPRDF reform the former president of Somali National regional state Abdi ille was jailed to prison. The previous its affiliate party "*agar party*" was changed its name and status to Somali democratic party (SDP) and constituted the prosperity party in equal political representation and contribution. The new cabinet of the Somali Regional State has criticized and blamed the Abdi ille administration decision to transferring the three kebele to Afar regional state. At the result the new Somali national regional state nullified the agreement in an extraordinary meeting it held on May 03 in Jijiga city, announced the unilaterally withdrawal of from a 2014 agreement transferring three towns to Afar regional state. The Somali Regional State argued that the decision given by the ad-hoc transferring the three towns was unconstitutional (fully inhabited by Somalis who do not want to be under Afar Region) an

illegal, immoral and illogical decision imposed on Issa (Somali) by contrabandists who wanted to sow discord between the brotherly Somali and Afar People, as the minister of federal affairs key informants interview on march 04/2018. The violence has returned to the prior situation and the conflict area under control of the Federal security force and the ad-hook made all scarifications to transform the conflict violence was remained futile.

Table:3 Demarcation of administrative boundaries between the Afar and Somali Regional States: according the agreement signed on 11/11/2014.

No	Towns	Region, Zone and Woreda Incorporated In (Demarcated To)			Villages within the Towns	Bordering Mountains between the Afar and Somali Regional States
		Region	Zone	Woreda		
1	Gedamaytu	Afar	Gebiresu (Zone 3)	Amibara	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Medenne • Af'Ase 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Asebot • Wereba • Dibibistu • Jini Ofle • Degermole • Hadgura • Mumed • Fu'E
2	unduffo	Afar	Gebiresu (Zone 3)	Gewanne	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delehile • Fa'O • Mudu'Ela 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fu'E • Yefo'O • Iroli
3	Adaytu	Afar	Awsiresu (Zone 1)	Mile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Iroli • Askol • Mega'Are

(Afar-Issa Demarcation Ad-hook Committee)

5.8. Challenges to the Effective Operations of the (DFPF)

5.8.1. Conflict Management: Stability vs. Violence

Conflict managements, to be successful to curb a conflict, have to focus on stability. The Afar – Issa conflict has a recurrence patterns. Conflicts are constant between the Afar and Issa-Somali communities. The Federal Police failed to ensure stability in ways that severely minimize the likelihood of violence. Effective conflict management is attainable by restoring stability and reducing the possibilities of violence in the conflict area. Informants from both the Afar (18/04/2018) and Issa communities (23/04/2018) disclosed that the Federal Police didn't essentially bring stability and effectively decrease the possibilities of violence. There was

gradual change from instability to stability and from violent conflicts to non-violent clashes. But the change has been incremental and didn't last long. Conflict between the two communities seems to continue as the Issa demand for self-rule and special Woreda status. The Federal Police didn't focus on eliminating the fundamental causes of the conflict. It didn't devise strategies to resolve the Afar – Issa conflict once for all. The mechanisms are designed to control and handle the inter-communal Afar and Issa conflict. The Federal Police didn't attain sustainable solutions to the problem, but control and manage it for a while.

5.8.2. Conflict Management Inconsistency: Absence of Legal Framework and Effective Deterrence:

The management of conflict must be fully consistent with the values of the rule of law. Conflict managements should pay attention to the observance of rule of law. According the Focus group discussion (FGD), with Afar March 2018, march and with Issa communities march (2018) the Federal Police did not pay much attention to the restoration of justice and rule of law. It is tied with issues of negotiation and compensation based on diplomatic way. As riding animals and killing persons are the trigger factors and causes for initial violence those who criminal suspects would not effectively hunt down and brought to the law. Criminal offences are blurred and do not face justice. The conflict management was not fully persistent with the value of rule of law prevalence. This is a challenge to the permanent solution to the inter-ethnic conflict. Conflict managements without rule of law enforcements became fruitless. The Federal Police hesitated to take legal measures on those who posed repetitive chaos and threats to peace and stability.

A data report from the Federal Police commission shows that throughout the year of 2008 E.C. many conflicts arose between the Issa and Afar communities. Throughout that year 2144 domestic animals have been raided from and by both communities. However only 4 persons, two Afar and two Issa Somalis have been arrested and sent to the court. When we compare the conflicts arose and the cattle raiding happened, and the legal action of the Federal Police force, legal actions against criminals was by far little. Thus the deployed Federal Police's commitment to take and follow legal mechanisms was low.

There was no procedure through which the actors of the conflict are bound by the law. Deterring punishments to the actors of the conflict and to those who involved were not as much as

required. Most of the time, conflicts between the Afar and Issa communities were resettled through dialogues and elder reconciliations, not by arresting criminals and bringing them to justice. This contributed to the absence of deterrence and deterring laws. Justice restoration methods were not always followed. The Federal Police force focused more on peace restoration methods than justice restoration methods, and on (ad hoc) conflict resettlements than (perpetual) conflict resolutions. The Federal Police failed to devise containment as a conflict prevention strategy.

5.8.3. Fire-Fighting Approach: the Absence of Direct Prevention and Comprehensive Strategy:

The interventions concepts made by the Federal Police were that of a fire-fighting approach which cannot sustainably address the root causes of the Afar- Issa violent conflicts. The local community interviews on April 2018 implied that most of the Federal Police efforts were not directed towards direct conflict prevention. The Federal Police force couldn't constantly patrol the conflict areas to prevent possibilities and situations that might lead to conflict. Usually it intervened when conflicts are already arisen and many damage followed.

According to data from the interview with Afar (09/04/2018) and Somali (11/04/2018) communities, the predominant practice for resolving conflict was as a “fire fighting strategy”. Informants confirmed that even though the regions did have different approaches to solve conflicts; these efforts are mainly on monitoring and administration of conflict rather than prevention. According to the finding of the study, there was a lack of coordination and cooperation between the two regional governments to address the on-going conflict timely and efficiently.

During the Afar- Issa inter-communal conflicts, the Federal Police was sent and deployed to curb it. After curbing the conflict it should have devise conflict prevention and resolution strategies. The Federal Police Commission, at institutional level, and the Ministry of Federal Affairs at national level didn't have comprehensive strategy to resolve and prevent the Afar – Issa conflicts.

The deployed Federal Police force didn't have detailed manual on how to intervene and how to act. At the institutional level the Federal Police commission has no documented rule of

engagement on conflict prevention, conflict resolution and conflict management mechanisms and strategies. The deployed Federal Police acts and moves based on verbal commands and guides from the higher authorities. There was no national conflict management manual; the defense and Federal Police work via conventional (as usual) and executing system.

5.8.4. Contraband Hunting:

The deployed Federal Police force focused on controlling contraband. According to the Focused Group Discussion with the Afar (17/04/2018) and Issa (21/04/2018) communities the Federal Police members deployed in the conflict area involved in hunting contrabands for themselves. An interviewee (19/04/2018) said

“the Federal Police force didn’t give due emphasis to the Afar-Issa inter-communal conflict. The Federal Police officers were busy hunting down contraband business. The police officers used to hunt down, seize and sell the contraband, and then use the profits for themselves. They chase after smugglers and make money from the contraband traders. Some police officers don’t care about preventing conflicts. For example, when the main Addis Ababa – Djibouti asphalt road was declared a buffer zone (free zone), the Issa communities have approached and crossed the buffer zone for revenge and cattle raiding. The police officers were highly tied with contraband hunting. Hence the Federal Police force failed to prevent them from approaching and crossing the buffer zone when it should have defended this breach of the buffer zone commands. Then severe conflict arose between the Afar and Issa communities and 12 Afars and 6 Issas were killed and 30 camels were raided.”

5.8.5. The Absence of Efficient Ways of Communication and Intervention Confirmation Delay:

The deployed Federal Police force waits for commands from the higher authorities. Even if the deployed Federal Police are there in the immediate vicinity of the conflict area, the police force have to first report the outbreak of the conflict to the central command and the commission and waits for permission to intervene. Until the police are allowed to intervene, much damage and violation would be done. This contributed to the dormant reaction of the Federal Police force. While the conflict going on and violence are rampant, the Federal Police force waits for commands from the higher authorities.

For instance, the focused group discussion with Afar and Issa (April, 2018) revealed, conflict arose between the Issa and Afar communities on March 16, 2011. The two communities were

fighting each other out of competition for the water wells (pond) and grazing land. The conflict was around Gela'elo and ZinjeroGedel. Violation and catastrophes were going on. The Federal Police force was stationed near to the conflict area. The Federal Police couldn't immediately intervene to stop the ongoing violations. It had to report about the rising of the conflict and wait for approval for intervention.

The Federal Police force received an order to intervene and take appropriate actions to culminate the conflict. It raised killed and wounded persons from the ground and took them to medical treatments and buried the dead. The police force called the Afar and Issa elders to collaborate the Federal Police force in returning the raided cattle. The Federal Police force however intervened after a lot of violations and losses occurred. Many people were killed, wounded and displaced. But if the Federal Police force have had intervened early, many lives and properties would have been saved, an informant said.

5.8.6. Government Officials and Tribal Leaders: Insufficient Cooperation with the Federal Police (Failure to Cooperate):

Some State and local governments have defaulted to effectively discharge their responsibility pertaining to conflict management. The focus group discussions (FGD) with the deployed Federal Police officers on March, (2018) showed that local authorities and tribal leaders of the Afar and Issa communities failed to cooperate with the Federal Police force. The officials and tribal leaders complained about the intervention of the Federal Police. The two parties of the conflict pressurize the Federal Police force to take wrong actions against the enemy side by misinforming or duplicating breaches. They give distorted and exaggerated information to deceive the Federal Police force to take hasty actions against the enemy side. Some local administrators and community leaders from both the Afar and Issa want the conflict to escalate.

Local community leaders and actors of the conflict mobilize the community to commit violence against the deployed Federal Police force and its security bodies. An interviewee from the Federal Police commission (06/07/2018) told the researcher saying

“there was conflict between the Afar and Issa communities around Awash Arba on April 15/2013. Armed men from the Afar community were approaching to the conflict area to combat with the Issa Somalis. The Federal Police officers stopped them and made them to return back. Then the administrator of the Awash Arba Kebele gathered the Afar community and persuaded them to have hostile

perception against the Federal Police force. He reputed the directives and commands of the Federal Police. He complained the way the Federal Police force operates to prevent the conflict that, according to him, the Federal Police force was discriminating the Afar community and favored the Issa community.”

The communities hide criminal suspects. They don't hand criminals over to the Federal Police. The criminals got protection via ethnic and clan affiliations. The community takes responsibility of the killer and pays compensation. The Federal Police couldn't effectively arrest criminals and resettle the conflict.

According to key informants from the Federal Police commission (16/05/2018) state and local government officials have not been in a position to develop a legal framework and provide institutional support in line with the Constitution which calls for ensuring smooth relationships between the peoples of the country and the free mobility of individuals from one State to another. They more often espouse parochial views and much more localized interests that can provoke conflicts. They also have neither the capacity nor the awareness of conflict management mechanisms. Consequently, conflicts, in some of the State and local governments, tend to be reinforced rather than managed effectively.

An interviewee from the deployed Federal Police force (11/04/2018) remarked

“some local leaders and tribal leaders provoke conflict and incite retaliations. There was a problem of exaggerating the amount of property plundered and the number of persons killed by the conflicting party. This makes tough the peacemaking efforts of the Federal Police and a blockade for bargaining. Local authorities were not cooperating well with the Federal Police force in our efforts to prevent and manage conflicts. The local communities and security staffs provide wrong information to the Federal Police force to make it stay away from the conflict area to seek revenge against the conflicting party. Local leaders blow away propagandas to make the community have a distorted understanding of the deployed Federal Police and to act violently against us.”

5.8.7. Self-Determination Mechanism: Referendum

The fundamental cause of the Afar – Issa conflict is land claims at large. Hence the fundamental solution to the conflict would be settling the land claim questions. The House of Federation is the responsible government organ to deal with and solve such land claim conflict and border disputes between regional states. The standard practice usually followed by the House of Federation in resolving border conflicts between member States of the federation is holding a referendum. However the case of the Afar – Issa conflict over land claim is complicated. The

lands in which the Issa Somalis live and which are claimed by the Issa Somalis are physically far away from the borders of the Afar and Somali regional states. The contested areas are completely within the Afar regional state boundaries. Thus, referendum, which may bring a sustainable solution to the causes of the conflict, couldn't be attainable.

Federal Police (FGD) on march /2018) with the revealed that the Afar regional state doesn't want referendum to be conducted which is a permanent solution to the conflict. The main cause of the conflict is a claim that is difficult to resolve, so it is impossible to come up with a lasting solution. According the respondents, the root causes of the Afar – Issa conflict are related with natural resources; such as land, water and grazing land (grass) and territory claims. To deal with the conflict once for all and bring sustainable solution to the recurrent dispute, there should have been devised strategies to solve the root causes of the conflict. The Federal Police and the Ministry of Federal Affairs didn't heed attention to the radical solutions to the Afar – Issa conflict. They failed to devise mechanisms to effectively dry up the fundamental causes of the conflict. They come up with conflict management agendas. The conflict has to do with the regional state government, Federal Police and Ministry of Federal Affairs' inability to draw up legal frameworks and guideline for the utilization of natural resources. The natural resource rivalry between the Afar and Issa pastoralists causes recurrent conflict in the area.

5.8.8. Conflict of Interest: Absence of Goal Commonality between the Afar and Somali Elites:

Federal Police officer informants march 07/2018) remarked that each Regional State supported its respective ethnic group rather than searching for common or joint resolution of the conflicts. The members of the joint peace committee favor their community. Clan and religious leaders often don't easily compromise and reach on agreements. They only look for 100% gains out of the negotiation with the other group. Thus negotiation and bargaining are most of the time without fruits.

The security authorities and government officials in the conflict area are inclined only to their clan's interests and they don't work for tolerance and mutual peace of the two communities.

Indigenous conflict mechanisms in the study area are ineffective in preventing the re-escalation of conflict between the Afar and Issa groups. Clan leaders sometimes inclined to their own clans.

Members of the joint peace committees of the two neighboring communities tend to favor their own ethnicity.

5.8.9. Federal Police Equipment Inefficiency and Insufficiency:

According to personal observation of the researcher (2018) the Federal Police force encountered with lack of essential inputs such as man power (human resource) and vehicles. The Federal Police force lacks sufficient human resources, material resources and logistical skills to handle and prevent the conflict. The Federal Police force officers were equipped with inefficient materials. The equipment were backward and outdated. The deployed police officers didn't have modern and sophisticated police equipment. The deployed Federal Police didn't have effective surveillance and intelligence equipment. There was shortage of patrolling vehicles. They didn't even have enough vehicles for transportation to the conflict area. While the Federal Police force was deployed in the conflict area they need transport facilities to get into the areas where new conflicts arise. The Federal Police don't have sufficient transport and communication facilities. Out of lack of transport facilities, the Federal Police task force couldn't arrive early at the areas of conflict when new conflicts arise. A Federal Police officer said (09/05/2018) and the researcher empirically observed that the Federal Police force didn't even have cars for transport. The researcher saw Federal Police officers asking Addis – Djibouti drivers to pick them up to arrive at the conflict area. There was a shortage of police officers and vehicles. Thus the Federal Police force couldn't efficiently respond to the conflicts arise between the Afar and Issa communities.

5.9. Hero Cult, Blood Feuds and Retaliation

The FGD with the deployed Federal Police force (10/04/2018) posited that the Afar and Issa communities' culture promotes killing and revenging the enemy side. Killing a man from the conflicting side is honorable in both communities, and the killer is rewarded as a hero. Revenge gains an individual status and honor. Cultural factors such as the hero cult and blood feuds contribute to escalation of conflicts. The Afar- Issa inter-communal rivalry often entails violent clashes and cattle raids. This usually results in homicides which in turn give rise to blood feuds. Revenge and trophy's killing along with cattle raiding is much valued in both cultural systems of values. Letting go of retaliation causes a conflict to grow. Revenge and counter-

revenge is common and rampant within the culture of the Afar and Issa communities and it is difficult to end the conflict once for all.

5.9.1. Illicit Arms Trade and Light Weapons Licensing

According to the FGD with the deployed Federal Police force (10/04/2019) there were a lot of incidents of cattle raids perpetrated by individuals carrying small arms in the conflict areas. The increased possession of small arms has aggravated resource- and power-based conflicts among the Afar and Issa ethnic groups. The Afar and Somali regional state governments and police failure to control illicit arms trade contributed partly to the escalation of the inter-communal conflict. The Afar and Somali regional state are not heedful of the registration and licensing of small arms. This lax practice of the regional police to arms control abused the effort to identify the origin of the arms.

5.9.2. Failure to Prevent and Control Criminal Offence:

An informant from the deployed Federal Police force said (11/04/2018)

“most of the time the Afar-Issa conflicts occur after criminal offences have been committed. Criminal offences are the triggering factors for the inter-ethnic conflict. The preventive mechanisms for the Afar- Issa conflict should be controlling crimes. But the Afar and Somali regional police failed to control crimes which trigger conflicts between the Afar and Issa communities. The failure of the regional police of the Afar and Somali states to prevent and control criminal offences pose a burden/load on us to deal with the Afar- Issa inter-communal conflict. The conflict between persons leads to conflict between the communities. Offensives and counter-offensives escalate the conflict.”

The joint committee had also the mandate to oversee the process of arresting the criminal suspects involved in earlier violent conflicts. However prosecution of the criminal suspects was unreasonably protracted. When conflicts arise the state governments didn't manage to intervene on time to halt violence. One of the factors that triggered the recurrent violence between the Afar and the Issa ethnic groups was failure by Afar and Somali state police to immediately apprehend and prosecute the criminal suspects who participated in the earlier violence. Since local authorities do not take actions to prevent a conflict, the conflict escalates and becomes difficult to resolve. Peace talks are held after a person dies and a lot of destruction.

5.9.3. Different Chains of Command

The Federal Police Commission till May 2016 was accountable to the Ministry of the Federal Affairs. Since May 2016 to October 2018 it was accountable to the Prime Minister office. Starting from October 2018 till now it is accountable to the Ministry of peace. According to interviews with deployed Federal Police commanders (on 25/04/2018) the deployed Federal Police force gets commands and authorities from two different institutions, i.e., the Federal Police commission and the ministry of federal affairs. There is lack of harmony between the commands and orders come from these two different institutions. This degrades the efficiency of the Federal Police in effectively preventing and managing conflicts. The Federal Police force waits for approval and intervention confirmation from the Federal Police commission and federal affairs minister. It didn't have discretion mandates to act independently to prevent and manage the Afar – Issa conflict.

5.9.4. Conflict Transformation

The Afar-Issa conflict is longstanding and has continued through generations. Initially the conflict was at the communal level between the Afar and Issa communities and was marked by repeated minor clashes among sub-clans competing for pasture and water. But, key informants (16/05/2018) from the Ministry of Federal Affairs revealed, gradually the conflict has transformed into conflict between the Afar and Somali regional states. The conflict evolved to armed clashes among clan members. Similar confrontations had continued between both ethnic groups during the Imperial and Derg regimes. Currently, competition for resources overlaps with disputes over borders and markets. The conflict became border disputes between the two regions. The inter-communal conflict followed by land claim conflicts between the regional states. These conflicts have been aggravated by border disputes between the Afar and Somali State governments. The manner and factors of the conflict have completely changed.

5.9.5. Federal Police Training and Doctrine

The Ethiopian Federal Police training and instruction doesn't give due emphasis to conflict prevention and management. According to key informants from the Federal Police commission (15/04/2018) the Federal Police are equipped with traditional policing skills like, crime

prevention, and crime investigation. Conflict prevention and management trainings to the police officers have not been taken into consideration. An interviewee said

“the Federal Police training focuses on ordinary crime control career. The training and instruction to recruited police officers are traditional ones that emphasize only on crime control and to some extent investigation. Thus the deployed Federal Police officers lack sufficient knowledge and skills in preventing and managing the Afar – Issa conflict.” The Federal Police force doesn’t take reasonable actions, being sometimes too little and sometimes more than necessary.

The Federal Police force is not trained in the modern conflict management system and doctrine. The Federal Police officers are trained in a traditional way and unable to efficiently design modern conflict management mechanisms.

The Federal Police force worked with the concerned bodies at the institutional level, but there is a problem of taking arbitrary action on an individual basis. Instead of stopping, preventing and managing conflict, the deployed Federal Police officers were involved in crime control while it is the responsibility of the regional state police.

Key informant interviews from the Federal Police commission (12/06/2018) indicated that the Ethiopian Federal Police force faces with difficulties in prioritizing tasks according to the urgency and severity of the problems. It sometimes misuses or doesn’t properly use the intelligence and fails to communicate with local community. The Federal Police force had little efficiency and capacity to prevent and manage a conflict. The deployed Federal Police officers have been failed to properly enforce the instructions and directives of the relevant authorities. The Federal Police officers didn’t act in an organized manner to halt and prevent the ongoing conflict.

5.9.6. Private Ownership, and Public Access to [Advanced] Firearms

The FGD with the Federal Police officers (10/04/2018) designates that the Afar and Issa Somali communities have advanced weapons. The participants of the conflict used modern weapons such as bombs, machine guns, AKM, PKM, RBG, sniper, and PKM. The Afar and Issa communities are massively armed and have heavy and the same weapons as the Federal Police force equipped with. The Federal Police force doesn’t have an upper hand in terms of weapons comparing with the armed Afar and Issa communities and thus the deployed Federal Police force

is unable to halt, prevent the conflict and take necessary measures. When the Federal Police force intervenes in the middle of conflict with the Ethiopian flag waving, the gunmen shoot and attack. There are threats of violence against the deployed Federal Police by the conflicting communities. Physical (armed) attack upon the peacekeeping Federal Police prevents it from working wholeheartedly.

The presence of vast amount of small arms and light weapons freely and out in the hand of violence promoting culture inculcated illiterate pastoralists has contribute a lot to violence.

5.9.7. Long Stay of the Deployed Federal Police Force:

The FGD with the Federal Police officers (10/04/2018) implies that the conflict has a recurring nature, and the police are too bored to prevent and manage it. The same Federal Police force has stayed in the conflict area for a long period of time. The Federal Police officers don't change; the old policemen wouldn't be replaced by new ones, so the long stayed Federal Police officers become exhausted of the severe warming and toughness of the environment. They lose energy to effectively prevent and manage the Afar – Issa conflicts. Because the Federal Police force deployed in the conflict area for a long time and being depressed, it lacks motivation and capacity to manage the conflict. The weather at the conflict area is so severe that the Federal Police force can get tired and make unable to do the tasks efficiently. A deployed Federal Police officer said (10/04/2019)*“as you see (the researcher) the conflict area is very hot (extreme warming) and unfavorable air condition, thus we become tired. Long stay in this tough area with the unfavorable weather condition made us too much tired.”*

5.9.8. Remote Location and Rough Surface of the Conflict Area:

According to interviews with the deployed Federal Police officers (10/04/2018) and personal observation in the study area the conflict area is so distant from the major road infrastructures. There is no paved ways for vehicles to the conflict areas. Thus because of the distance, the Federal Police force could not arrive quickly and respond. There is no convenient way for the vehicles that prevents the Federal Police force from arriving quickly. The location of the conflict and the camp where the troops are located are so remote that it is difficult to arrive at the conflict area immediately and to end the conflict. The Federal Police force is stationed far away from the conflict areas and fails to arrive early when conflicts arise. The Federal Police commission has a

shortage of patrolling cars. The topography of the conflict area is so tough and inaccessible to vehicles. The Federal Police can't easily enter to the conflict areas. The very difficult landscape plus the absence of transportation infrastructure, make the conflict area unreachable for the ill-equipped Federal Police force.

5.9.9. The Absence of Task Concentration (Task Disorientation)

The deployed Federal Police force doesn't concentrate to conflict prevention and management. According to interviews (10/04/2018) with deployed police officers the Federal Police force was tasked with extra works. It has five main objectives in the Afar and Issa conflict areas. These five tasks are; protecting of the Addis-Djibouti asphalt road; controlling contraband; controlling illicit arms trade; controlling illegal human trafficking/smuggling; and conflict prevention and management. Thus the deployed Federal Police force gives priority to other tasks rather than conflict prevention and management.

5.10. Perception of the Local Community towards the Deployed Federal Police Force:

The Federal Government is with a dual jurisdiction and responsibility to deployed and stationed the Federal Police along the Awash mile main road Afar and Issa boundary. The one legal jurisdiction is as a dependant of Addis Ababa Djibouti port, the main road must be secured and free from any un stability. The other one deployed Federal Police in the contested Awash mile and the three hamlet towns, is to deescalate the erupted conflict violence between the Afar and Issa. According to the interviewed higher officials of the Afar security bureau on march 16/2018) said that before deployed the Federal Police to the conflict prone area there were a day to day killing peoples, raiding and looting our animals. But, after the Federal Police intervene being insecurity is reduced and we have felt happy. The deployed Federal Police had played a robust role in preventing and managing the violence. The Federal Police deal with conflicts by creating a coalition of the stakeholders like joint peace committee, with the higher officials of the respective regional, zonal and wereda security bureau, traditional leaders. The main duties of this coalition stake holders was helped and those who injured peoples are taking to hospital returned the raiding and looting animals to the owners, making a reconciliation between the conflict parties. On the other side as the Afar focus group discussions (FGD) stated that, the Federal Police as a mediator was not impartial in time of conflict and disarmament. One key

informant stated that the Federal Polices killed their compatriot, elders in many instances when they were at war with Issa (Afar FGD (16/08/2018)).

"In 2006 E.C within the Afar territory with the, particular place of Amibara Woreda, Indido Afdem and under the mile Woreda, Adaytu kebeles was erupted a conflict with Issa, and the Federal Police immediately intervene to the erupted violent and circling the area and tried to take action because, the Federal Police with a primary responsibility to protect and respect the agreements of buffer zone Addis Ababa Djibouti main road. The Issa militant already they know what they are breached the law of buffer zone and then automatically escaped and rushed out from the area with their guns without any challenging from the Federal Police. Because intentionally being partial with the Issa ethnic then after from the member of the Federal Police with Issa tribe identity killing one of our elders and also took his gun. Moreover, the Federal Police order us to lie down our gun in order to disarmament as a result 40 arms we bought by sealing our camels and goats for the purpose of our self-defense and protect our animals was took away to their camps."

As conflicts evolved to armed clashes the Federal Police force intervenes to halt it. Thus the local communities don't want Federal Police interventions if they are the one which has an upper hand in the armed clash. A Federal Police officers interviewed on 13/04/2018 said "

in times of conflict between the Afar and Issa communities the winners of the armed clash complains about the early intervention of the Federal Police force, and the loser complains about the delay or nonintervention of the federal force. There have been clashes between the community and the Federal Police, and there were casualties from both sides."

The local authorities and the communities complain on the intervention of the Federal Police. Sometimes the local communities act violently to the deployed Federal Police. The police officer respondents (10/04/2019) said that, the hostile reaction of the local authorities and the local communities prevent the Federal Police force from early arrival and from taking proactive measures.

The FGD with the Afar and Issa communities (on April, 2018) indicated the deployed Federal Police officers are being tied with corruption and abuse of power. Respondents from the Afar and Issa communities remark that the Federal Police officers were highly involved in contraband hunting. They posit that the police officers make money through corruption and abuse of power.

5.10.1. Afar Community's Perception towards the Deployed Federal Police Force:

The Afar community argued that the deployed Federal Police officers are highly involved in contraband hunting for themselves. An Afar interviewee conducted on 18/04/2018 said

“some of the Federal Police officers have misconduct. They look for contrabands and take bribe from the illegal traders. In the area there are a lot of illegal/contrabandist traders, human traffickers and smugglers, and illegal arms dealers. This makes the deployed Federal Police officers in the area absorbed/attracted to making money through corruption and abuse of power. Thus we the Afar people have suspicion and mistrust of the deployed Federal Police.”

Because the location of the conflict is in the Afar region, the Afar regional statesmen do not want the Federal Police to enter and held on a regular basis. Some Federal Police officers degenerated the reputation of the deployed Federal Police by assisting or favoring one community against the other. For example according to a Federal Police report on 05/03/2013 a Somali Federal Police officer has shot and killed an Afar elder and took his weapon.

The FGD (17/04/2018) with the Afar community members indicated that the local communities perceived the Federal Police intervention as a grievance and in violation of their autonomy. Thus, this hostile perception of the Afar community towards the Federal Police intervention avoids the Federal Police from legal actions such as punishing the actors of the conflict; imprison the criminals and processing the legal trial and deterring the counterparts of the conflict. Accordingly the Ethiopian Federal Police force sometimes takes unfair actions beyond the limits of law and commands. This creates grievances, and antagonistic perceptions and reactions of the communities against the deployed Federal Police force.

Lack of neutrality: the Federal Police force grabs the guns of one community while to the other community don't. This degrades the legitimacy of the (involvement) intervention of Federal Police. An Afar interviewee (20/04/2018) said

“the Federal Police force doesn't actually prevent violations. It intervenes after a lot of casualties occurred. The Issa Somalis launch surprise attack on us and raid our cattle and then immediately hide themselves from the conflict area. The Federal Police force arrives the area after all demises happen. When we organize and prepare for defense and to bring back our cattle the Federal Police officers come and grab our guns.”

A deployed Federal Police officer informant (on 12/04/2018) remarked

“if the Federal Police force is stationed around the Issa community the Afar would perceive that they are being discriminated by the Federal Police. If the Federal Police force is stationed around the Afar community the Issa Somalis would condemn it as if it is discrimination against them.”

The buffer zone regulations in the conflict area created trouble for the communities. An interviewee (19/04/2018) said that in June 2012 the Afar community was skeptical of the Federal Police as it enforced command that the public should not enter carrying gun five km to left and right sides of the asphalt. Their understanding of the Federal Police was that the Federal Police would be in favor of the Issa and discriminate against the Afar community.

All the conflict areas are within the afar regional state. According to the FGD with the Afar community members (17/04/2018) and Afar regional state officials interview (15/03/2018) they demand the autonomy of their constituency be respected. They want to get rid of the Federal Police force because they see the Federal Police as it was undermining the jurisdictional autonomy and rights of their regional state.

5.10.2. Issa Community’s Perception toward the Deployed Federal Police Force:

The FGD with the members of Issa community conducted on 21/04/2018 implied that the Federal Police most of the time takes reactive measures not proactive. It delayed to intervene in the conflict area between the Afar and Issa communities. The Federal Police force intervened usually after losses happened. Because of the dormant reaction of the Federal Police conflicts caused a lot of losses and human rights violations. Most of the time during the conflict between the Issa and Afar communities, the Federal Police force does not arrive early to take preventive actions. An interview (22/04/2018) with an Issa man reads as

“when the Federal Police force deployed to the conflict areas, we welcomed it and set up a residence camp for the police officers. We made the necessary cooperation at the time. But the Federal Police officers do not arrive immediately when a conflict arises. Thus many demolitions happen till the Federal Police arrive and intervene to halt it.”

According to the interviewed higher officials of the Somali security bureau (16/05/2018) said “before the Federal Police deployed to the conflict prone area there were day to day killings, raiding and looting animals. But, after the Federal Police intervene being insecurity is reduced and we have felt happy. The deployed Federal Police had played a robust role in preventing and managing the violence.

5.10.3. Border Agreement Dysfunction:

With the federal government being the mediator, the government of the Afar and Somali regional states reached to a border demarcation agreement in 2014. The border pact says the Somali regional state should transfer three towns to Afar regional state. In May 2019 the Somali region unilaterally withdrew from the agreement refusing to give up three Kebeles to Afar regional state.

The Somali regional executive council nullified the border pact that has transferred the three towns of Gedamaytu, Undufo and Adaytu to the Afar Regional State labeling it unconstitutional as it imposed alien decision without consulting the will of the local population.

The Somali regional government then sent a complaint letter to the federal government that the 2014 agreement was unconstitutional and the federal government should ensure the political and socio-economic rights of Somalis in the three towns that were illegally transferred to the Afar Regional administration indicating seven resolution points. The regional government demanded that the people in the three towns should be allowed to govern themselves, have an access to an education system in their mother tongue, Somali language to be the working language for government institutions and court system, and the local population to be fully represented in administrative and legislature councils both at the Zonal and regional levels.

The agreement withdrawal posed a security threat to the study area, instigating new phases of conflicts. The three conflicting towns are still at the hand of federal security forces due to the absence of dependable security situation. This shows that the Afar-Issa conflict is still unsolved and has remained security threats to the regional states and local population. Despite it has vital role in preventing violations, the role of Federal Police in managing and transforming the Afar-Issa conflict was very minimal.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The main questions addressed in the study were; What are the role of the deployed Federal Police in preventing and managing inter- ethnic conflict to maintain peace and security in the study area? How do the Federal Police coordinate and facilitate the peace process, with the Afar –Issa conflict and stake holders? What conflict handling mechanisms are being used and what chronic challenge are facing in the conflict between Afar -Issa ethnic? How are the deployed Federal Police perceived and legitimized by the local community in implementing their operational duties and functions in a neutral way?

6.1. Conclusion

The main characteristic of the Afar- Issa conflict is a protracted and intractable. It persists for a long time being recurring and causing a lot of damage on human lives and properties. The very shameful thing is, the government neglects its supreme responsibility and too late to address the trigger causes of violence and busy on merely and unnecessary conflict management activities, rather than transforming the violence to sustainable peace and stability between the conflicting parties territories.

The minister of federal and pastoral development affairs (MOPDA) currently minister of peace (MP) mainly had employed as a conflict management strategy setting more than two dozen of conferences, and countless consultation workshops and joint meetings and dozens of accords have been made but this was in vain. By and large, the federal government chose to once again postpone lasting solution associating lasting Issa-Afar peace with the imperative of ensuring development to both communities; and it preferred to manage and control direct violent incidents using Federal Police and national defense detachments which do not provide more than fire brigade function; yet, these forces were not spared of partisan involvement accusation and direct violent assaults from both sides. The deployed Federal Police forces need to be well-equipped, in terms of personnel, weaponry, communication and transport support, to perform their role. But according to the key interviews of Federal Police there were insufficient logistics to support the peace keeping processes.

The deployed Federal Rapid police force has stationed across the Hot Spots Awash to Mille. Only the use of punitive measures by these forces tentatively succeeded in de-escalating violent incidents. It means that the Federal Police force remained in the conflict area to prevent and manage potential conflicts before outbreak to violence. It worked jointly and in collaboration of other stakeholders at different levels. The Federal Police force has been preventing and managing arising conflicts. It has devised strategies and utilized different mechanisms. However, the Federal Police force was not as efficient as desired in preventing and managing the Afar-Issa conflict. It had failed to effectively prevent prior to outbreak a conflict to violence. The Federal Police force most of the time intervened after outbreak a violence and a lot of deaths and losses happened. The conflict management efforts couldn't result in incremental and sustainable improvements of the security situation of the study area.

According to the finding of the research, the ineffectiveness of the Federal Police force in preventing and managing the conflict attribute from many technical and structural challenges. These challenges are, to enumerate some; the Federal Police equipment inefficiency and insufficiency, conventional police training; rather than giving special skills on the dynamism of inter ethno-religious conflict prevention and management, long stay in the conflict area without shifting, inefficient way of communications, and task disorientation.

Conflict prevention and management tactics and strategies that were not applied properly by the deployed Federal Police and this have brought about very little viable results especially in terms of violence transformation. Because the issues claimed by the conflicting parties were not solved genuinely, instead controlling and curbing the direct violence to reduce damage.

The Federal Police force deployed into the study area has been challenged by lack of enough logistical supplies and obliged not to properly undergo its conflict prevention and management tasks. Additionally, the Federal Police force encountered not sufficient cooperation from local community leaders and public officials.

Above all, the Federal Police have worked out in sufficiently in undertaking actions and developing ways for conflict transformation.

6.2. Recommendations

Based on the conclusions and findings of the study, the researcher made the following recommendation.

- ❖ Violation Prevention and Stability: the Afar – Issa inter-ethnic conflict causes many casualties and destructions. Violence triggers another waves of violence in form of revenges. The deployed Federal Police force should pay sufficient attention for violation prevention. The Federal Police force should heed attention to stabilize the conflict area. And should effectively prevent and contain the conflicts before they became cause for recurrent conflicts.
- ❖ Legal Framework and Effective Deterrence: this is the restoration of justice and rule of law. In preventing and managing the conflict the Federal Police force should restore justice and reign rule of law. The deployed Federal Police should deter potential actors and participants of the conflict by punishing those who are involved in the conflict.
- ❖ Crime Prevention and Crime Control: most of the time crime in the study area leads to clashes and conflicts between the two communities, hence the Federal Police force and the regional polices should control crimes to avoid inter-communal conflicts. Crimes should be prevented before they cause conflict in the study area.
- ❖ Contraband Hunting: according to the finding of the research the deployed Federal Police officers are highly involved in contraband hunting for themselves. Due to this the police officers don't pay much attention to the conflict. Thus the Federal Police officers should abstain from abusing power and should pay enough attention to the prevention and management of conflict. The Federal Police commission also should ensure that the deployed Federal Police officers are delivering their duties responsibly.
- ❖ Effective Communication: rapid and efficient communications are very important for the effective performance of the deployed Federal Police force. The deployed police force reports and waits for intervention confirmations when radicalization is going on. Due to the Federal Police force delays to intervene to arrest conflicts. Thus this procedure should be improved.
- ❖ Efficient and Sufficient Equipment: the Federal Police force doesn't have modern and enough equipment. Comparing with the conflicting parties, the Federal Police force has

less or equal equipment in terms of firearms and logistics . The police force didn't have transportation and patrolling cars. Thus the Federal Police commission should equip the Federal Police force with efficient and sufficient equipment.

- ❖ Illicit Arms Trade Control and Light Weapon Licensing: illegal arms trade in the conflict area is rampant. The community can easily access modern weapons. Firearms that are possessed by the community members are not licensed. Thus illegal arms trade and failure to license light weapons aggravate the inter-communal conflict. The deployed Federal Police and other concerned bodies should control illegal arms trade in the conflict area and the local communities should register and license their weapons.
- ❖ Vertical Chain of Command: the deployed Federal Police force receives different commands and directives from the Federal Police commission and the ministry of federal affairs (minister of peace). This restrains the police force from efficiently fulfil its mission. Therefore the commands and directives should be harmonized and shall be vertical command structure.
- ❖ Federal Police Training and Doctrine: the deployed Federal Police officers were trained in conventional and traditional manner of police profession which is to protect the supreme law of the land, to enforcing the normal law and the decisions giving by court . They were not trained to prevent and manage communal and ethnic conflicts. Therefore the deployed Police training should consider and include conflict prevention and conflict management skills. Unless otherwise the Federal Police commission and other concerned bodies should recruit and train special police force whose duties are focused only on preventing and managing inter-ethnic conflicts.
- ❖ Long term Stay: since the deployment of Federal Police force into the conflict area in 2010 the police officers are the same. They have been deployed and stayed in the area for around ten years. Some of them are accustomed to the contraband and illegal trade in the area. They are highly involved in hunting contraband to make money. And some other police officers were tired of the long stay with the tough weather condition. Therefore the Federal Police officers shouldn't be stayed for a long time. They shall be changed and replaced (shifted) with new Federal Police officers.
- ❖ Task Orientation/Concentration: the deployed Federal Police force was tasked with extra works. It has five main objectives in the Afar and Issa conflict areas. These many burdens

or duties to the Federal Police force make it obsolete and disoriented. Hence the deployed Federal Police force should only be tasked with preventing and managing the inter-ethnic conflict. The Federal Police force should be oriented towards the conflict prevention and management and should concentrate there.

- ❖ The root causes of conflict should be well established to know the strategies to use in managing it; the managers of conflict should not rush and employ force to manage any conflict; there should always be active channels for effective communication between the conflicting parties and equitable, just socio-political environment should always be created to forestall the emergence of conflict, leaders should always be proactive on conflict issues through effective communication and dialogue not until when there is a breakdown of law and order.
- ❖ Rule of engagement: most of the time break out of the conflict violence in Ethiopia is enter-ethnic (inter regional) and intra state conflicts. In order to control and stop the outbreak of violence the federal Government has been deployed its security forces to manage and mediate the conflicting parties. Therefore, the researcher recommended that, the deployed Federal Police and security stake holders should be guided by rule of engagement. The existence of national rule of engagement helps to accountable the peace keeping force in regarding protect the civilian's human rights and being neutral or respect the rule of impartiality.
- ❖ As the Afar-Issa conflict violence is a dynamic and very series one, it may need to establish some sort of department or commission only handling with a mandate to investigate the main cause of conflict issues.

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APPENDIX-1
ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIE

Guiding Questions for Interview

Dear respondent this research is being conducted to examine the role of federal police in preventing and managing inter-ethnic conflict in Ethiopia the case of Afar Issa boundary. Therefore the researcher wants to inform you in advance that the information which obtained from you is being utilized for only the intended purpose and will be kept confidential. And your genuine information may contribute a lot for the study and its findings. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

These questions are forwarded to those who are believed to have enough experience in conflict management and resolution (believed to be competent to answer the questions as expected). Please answer all the questions to the best of your knowledge.

Interview guideline for experts who are working at federal institutions and in both Afar and Issa (Somali) National regional states works in security Administrative bureau, police and concerning security professional informants:

Back ground information

- **Sex:**
- **Age:**
- **Educational background**
- **Responsibility**

Code No	Sex	Age	Academic	responsibility	Federal Institution	Region	
						Afar	Issa/somali
1	M	60	12 th	Admi/ and security bureau		Afar	
2	M	55	BA	Admi/ and security bureau			Issa/Somali
3	M	45	Diploma	Zone Administrative		Afar	
4	M	40	Diploma	Wereda Administrative		Afar	
5	M	42	Dploma	Police comander		Afar	
6	M	34	12 th	Dep/inspector		Afar	
7	M	47	BA	Zone Administrative			Issa/Somali
8	M	67	Illiterate	elder			Issa/Somali
9	M	41	Diploma	Zone police commander			Issa/Somali
10	F	34	12 th	inspector			Issa/Somali
11	M	37	MA	General Director	Minister of peace		
12	M	43	BA	Researcher officer	Minister of peace		
13	M	39	BA	Researcher officer	Minister of peace		
14	M	47	MA	Assi/commissioner	Federal police		
15	M	48	BA	Assi/commissioner	Federal rapidresponse police		
16	M	41	BA	commander	Federal police		
17	M	48	BA	colonel	Minister of Defence		

1. What are the key conflict violence prevention and management activities conducted by the Federal Police ?
2. What are the pre-conditions taken into consideration while the federal government deployed Federal Police on inter-ethnic or regional states conflict?
3. What mechanisms or methods do the deployed Federal Police employ to maintain peace and security in the dispute area ?
4. Who are the stake holders participating in conflict preventing and managing activities with federal police?
5. What are the limitations and strong sides of the Federal Police that have explained by the two ethnic groups while conflict preventing and managing?
6. What are the main challenges had faced in conflict preventing and managing?
7. Would you explain please whether there is clear guide line how the Federal Police intervene in every conflict incidents? Are there clear guideline on how to manage the incidents and how to communicated with concerned government institutions at federal and regional levels? Are there clear guide line on the chain of command and the report system?
8. How does the Federal Police applied official conflict management approaches and traditional conflict management approaches, or formal and informal in Afar –Issa conflict?
9. What role do they play the two regional, zonal and Woreda security administrative bureau in prevention and managing conflicts with cooperation the Federal Police ?
10. Does the deployed Federal Police all activities based under the federal system of intervention law ?
11. Do they take the Federal Police a training concerning an Ethnic conflict management, before they deployed ?
12. Do the local security administrative bureau at Wereda and, Zone level cooperate with the Federal Police to bring conflict suspects before the law?

APPENDIX- 2

Focus Group Discussion guideline: for Local community Study sites and Federal police Group :1

Date: 24 March, 2018

Place of discussion: Amibara wereda Indido kebele

Time of beginning: 2:30 PM Time of Ending: 4:25 PM

Focus group discussion Afar communities

Participants' profile:

CodeNo	Sex	Age	Education level	Responsibility/occupation
1	M	45	illiterate	pastoralist
2	M	55	12 th	Chief of kebele
3	M	60	illiterate	Religious leader
4	F	57	8 th	Trader
5	F	52	illiterate	Pastoralist
6	M	65	illiterate	Elders
7	M	35	10 plus four	Youth chairman
8	F	33	7 th	Women chairman

Group :2

Date: 31 March, 2018

Place of discussion: Gedamaytu kebele ISSA (Somalis) ethnic dwellers :

Time of beginning: 9:00 AM Time of ending: 11:20 AM :

Participants Profile

Code No	SeX	Age	Academic level	Responsibility
11	F	50	iliterate	pastoral
12	M	70	illiterate	Religious leader
13	F	54	9 th	Chief of kebele
14	M	43	illiterate	pastoral
15	M	67	Illiterate	Traditional leader
16	F	36	Illiterate	Herder/ pastoralist
17	M	29	10 plus four	Youth coordinator
18	M	64	Illiterate	Peace committee

Group : 3

Date: 06 March, 2018

Place of discussion :Awash berta Federal police camp :

Time of beginning: 9:00 AM Time of ending: 11:20 AM

INFORMAT PROFILE:

Code No	SEX	Age	Academic level	Responsibility/Ranks
20	M	30	Diploma	Assi/inspector
21	M	27	10 plus four	Chief sergeant
22	M	35	10 th	Sergeant
23	F	26	10 th	Ass/sergeant
24	M	40	Diploma	inspector
25	M	45	Diploma	Chief inspector
26	M	29	10 th	Constable/driver
27	m	37	BA	commander

1. Did you have felt good when the Federal Police were deployed here.?
2. Doe the Federal Police is working in coordination with local authorities?
3. Do you think that peace and security of the area has improved after the Federal Police were deployed ?
4. Do you believe that the Federal Police have played a significant role in de-escalating the conflict?
5. Would you like the Federal Police to stay longer?.
6. Does police only involved in managing the conflict between the Issa and the Afar or other stake holders also participated ?
7. Does the deployed federal police peace keeping activities with in the legally defined its mandate ?.
8. Does the Federal Police give rapid response to the conflict incident ?
9. Does the federal police deterring efficiently the escalated conflict in the Afar Issa boundary ?
10. How are the deployed Federal Police forces perceived by the respective community(Afar and Issa)?
11. Are they considered to neutral or partial in regarding to handling their cases? Whose side are they considered to be ?
12. Is the Federal Police trusted and preferred by the two actors in conflict?

APPENDIX- 3

Observation Guideline

- Existence and Accessibility of the deployed Federal police in the conflict prone.
- The Federal Police efforts to coordinating and facilitating the stake holders in peace processes.
- The situation of providing enough logistics and police personnel to the deployed Federal police .
- The procedure of joint peace committee discussions, and passing decisions to return raiding animals and payment blood money.