Addis Ababa University
College of Business and Economics
Department of Public Administration and Development Management

Street-Level Bureaucrats in Policy Implementation: The Case of Addis Ababa City Administration Land Bank and Transfer Office

By

MESFIN SETEGN

JUNE 2018

ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

Addis Ababa University
College of Business and Economics
Department of Public Administration and Development Management

Street-Level Bureaucrats in Policy Implementation: The Case of Addis Ababa City Administration Land Bank and Transfer Office

By
MESFIN SETEGN

Advisor

FREHIWOT G/HIWOT (PHD.)

A thesis submitted to the Department of Public Administration and Development Management of Addis Ababa University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters in Public Management and Policy.

JUNE 2018

ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

Addis Ababa University
College of Business and Economics
Department of Public Administration and Development Management

This is to certify that the thesis prepared by Mesfin Setegn entitled "*Street-Level Bureaucrats in Policy Implementation: The Case of Addis Ababa City administration Land Bank and Transfer Office"*, which is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters in Public Management and Policy, complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

Approved by Board of Examiners:

______________________________ Signature_______________ Date________________

Advisor

______________________________ Signature_______________ Date________________

Internal Examiner

______________________________ Signature_______________ Date________________

External Examiner

______________________________ Signature________________ Date________________

Chair of Department or Graduate Programs Coordinator

Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Declared by:	**Confirmed by Advisor:**
Name: ___________________________	Name: __________________________
Signature: ________________________	Signature: ______________________
Date: ____________________________	Date: ___________________________

Table of Contents

Contents **Page**

List of Figures

Figure **page**

List of Tables

Table **page**

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

FDRE .... Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

LBTO .... Land bank and transfer offices

SLBs .... street-level bureaucrats

ULLHP .... Urban land lease holding proclamation NO. 721/2011

ULLP .... Urban Lands Lease policy

Acknowledgements

First and for most, I would like to thank God for the courage he gave me to accomplish this thesis. I would like to sincerely thank my advisor Frehiwot G/Hiwot. (PhD) for her constructive comments, valuable suggestions and good guidance. I equally thank Addis Ababa Land Bank and Transfer office workers for their time and willingness to be available for interview and discussion to provide the information needed as fully as possible which was necessary for my research work. Lastly but not the least, my thanks also go to those who commented on my study and provided input and assistance in any form during my thesis work.

Abstract

Public policies made at the 'top' will have to be implemented at local level by street-level bureaucrats who enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy and discretion in the execution of their duties. The implementation of the urban land lease policy (ULLP) by street-level bureaucrats in Addis Ababa land bank and transfer office (LBTO) is one such case. The operatives in the office have substantial autonomy and discretion from the directives and regulations enacted by the city administration council for better implementation of the policy through urban land lease holding proclamation NO. 721/2011 (ULLHP). Using Lipsky's street level bureaucracy as a theoretical framework, this study sought to assess the factors that influence the exercise of discretion, autonomy and coping mechanisms employed by officers at LBTO in the implementation of the ULLHP. Using qualitative case study through a triangulation of data collection methods such as in-depth face-to-face interviews with twenty respondents and documentary review, the study examined factors that influenced the role of officers and how the role of officers influenced the implementation of access to land for the public through tender in Addis Ababa. The findings of the study showed that, the work conditions of the officers, influenced the implementation of the ULLHP's provision. The factors- problem of resources, clarity of goals and objectives and control measures, were seen to influence the role of the officers and the decisions they take in providing access to land for the public through tender. It was further noted that the officers are not equipped with the necessary resources which in turn influence the extent to which they provide the necessary services to the public. The findings also reveal that the officers' level of experience and education has a significant influence on the extent to which they are able to develop coping mechanisms when the situation calls for it. There is a variation in the extent to which officers develop coping mechanisms to deal with the challenges and indeterminacies that confront them in the course of their work while the use of discretion seems to be very useful for respondents in situations where the policy is inadequate which in turn promote the implementation of the policy. The study therefore concludes that the coping strategies that street-level bureaucrats develop when they encounter indeterminacies in their work have implications for the outcome of policy implementation at the front-line. In this view, Addis Ababa City Administration and Land Bank and Transfer Office should work towards successful implementation of ULLP by managing the resource inadequacy; designing internal rules, procedures and frameworks; trainings and awareness creation which recognize the officers' autonomy and their exercise of judgment in the implementation of ULLHP as resources that needs to be used effectively. Also Policy makers has to understand the behaviour of street-level bureaucrats and acknowledge the manner in which they 'make' policy at the bottom and seek the input of street-level bureaucrats in the current efforts to streamline the ULLP.

CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

Ethiopia is driven by its vision to become a lower middle income country by 2025. In pursuit of this; the Ethiopian government promulgated prudent macro-economic policy and long-term development strategies of the country. From the several institutional reforms that have been undertaken, one of the key reforms is related to land lease policy which is vital to the success of development. In Ethiopia, as elsewhere in the world, land lease policy emanated from the fact that land is a source of wealth, economic growth, employment and a source of basic survival for the majority of the population (Yirga, 2014).

Article 40 (sub article 3) of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution (1995) stipulates that Land, both rural and urban, is the common property of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia. The right to ownership of land is vested exclusively in the state and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Based on this the farmers in rural areas can get farm land freely, but in the urban areas due to limited land supply urban land use policy and lease Proclamation No 721/2011 was enacted. To implement this proclamation, regulations and directives were formulated (www.ilic.gov.et).

Urban Land Lease Holding Proclamation No 721/2011 (ULLHP) aimed at enhancing development and enabling citizens to benefit from and contribute to the development, on the one hand, and to tackle the interests of a handful of rent-seeking parties aimed at making individuals wealthy and protected their wealth by using political authority. Such top down policy implementation has serious effects on implementation and impacts on policy as seen in the studies carried out by Lipsky (1980), Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003), and Hupe and Hill (2007).

Based on article 33 of the Urban Land Lease Holding Proclamation NO. 721/2011; Addis Ababa City Administration issued city Land Lease Regulation No. 49/2004 and city land lease implementation directive No. 11/2004 and granted the authority to Land Bank and Transfer

Offices (LBTO) to record, protect and transferred land (prepared and executed lease holding arrangement through tender) for the public (land lease directive No. 49/2004).

From lease hold and public allotment options, Proclamation No. 721/2011 emphasized that any urban land which has not been under leasehold system shall be permitted to be held only by lease system through tender except for few government and public institutions. The main problem with lease hold arrangement is that the land supplied for bid is very limited, and hence is quite competitive and expensive for investors. There are also implementation problems in transferring to lessees (Alebel & Berihu, 2017). According to their presentation at the 2017 World Bank conference on land and poverty; lease-hold system suffers from corruption and lack of transparency, the size of land that is available in each tender is very small in comparison to the demand, the limited land supply coupled with discretionary power of government officials to restrict, tighten or widen access to land creates a large rent; thus, attracting more speculators into the bid (ibid). Also, the World Bank (2012) study revealed land allocation is the second most corrupt area in Ethiopia following customs services. The most corrupt activity in the land sector occurs at the implementation stage suggesting that the level of corruption is influenced by the way policy and legislation are formulated and enforced.

From the street-level bureaucracy aspect, implementing a public policy (including the Urban Lands Lease policy (ULLP)) entails persons who are responsible for rendering services to citizens, otherwise known as Street-Level Bureaucrats (SLBs) who exercise their discretion to address the demands of service users of particular policies and programs (Lipsky, 2010). Street-level bureaucrats are public employees who interact directly with citizens and have substantial discretion in the execution of their work and their behaviors are crucial for the implementation of most policies because they make important discretionary decision in their direct contact with citizens who tend to define public policies not as crafted in statutes but as delivered to them by SLBs.

According to Parson (1995) Policy can be conceived at an operational level as the delivery of public service and enforcement of regulations on citizens and firms, consequently implementation research focuses on the content of such delivery-level behaviors (discretion, autonomy and coping mechanisms), their causes and consequences. Discretion at various delivery-level (including discretion by street-level bureaucrats (SLBs)) is one of the subject matter and variable in studying implementation behavior (Lipsky, 2010). According to Davis (1969, p. 4) a public officer has discretion "wherever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action and inaction". The operatives in the LBTO have substantial autonomy and discretion from the directives and regulations enacted by the Addis Ababa city administration council for better implementation of ULLHP (article 29, directive no 11/20011).

These bureaucrats work in a situations characterized by many demands and limited resources, they cope with this situation by rationing service, making biased priorities among cases and controlling clients, and modifying policy goals and client perceptions. According to Lipsky the coping behaviors of street-level bureaucrats systematically bias the delivery behavior in relation to the policy mandates (Lipsky, 1980, cited by winter, 2012). Also, a review by Hupe and Hill (2007, p. 280) indicated that, "Lipsky observes that public employees who interact with citizens behave in ways that are unsanctioned, sometimes even contradicting official policy, because the structure (condition/environment) of their jobs makes it impossible to achieve the expectations of their work. Through their decisions, street-level bureaucrats influence both citizens' levels of access to public services or welfare benefits (in this case, access to land), as well as their experience of that access". Hence, the role the operatives in LBTO play as service providers in these institutions could be informed by the conditions of their work, which may inform the extent to which they play a role in the implementation process in providing access to land to the public through tender.

Hence, the main purpose of this study was thus to examine the factors that influence the role and choices of officers in providing access to land for the public through tender.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

The previous method of land transfer failed to provide municipalities and cities the ability to collect adequate and proper fees because of personal interests and corruption (Melaku & Eyasu, 2016). Such experiences led to enact the new lease law (Urban Land Lease Holding Proclamation No 721/2011) that clearly declares that all urban land areas shall henceforth be transferred either by auction or allotment, suspending negotiation as means of modality. As per the objective of the lease policy, it is believed that by prohibiting allocation of land through negotiation, it is possible to discourage corrupt public officials seeking to personally benefit from illicit transactions at the expense of the people (Melaku & Eyasu, 2016).

Addis Ababa recently experienced both physical and socio-economic development which mainly attributed by the current Urban Land Lease policy, other than the other business and investment policies (Melaku & Eyasu, 2016). However, a number of studies been conducted on the land lease policy in Ethiopia and showed problems related to implementation and failures of the urban land lease policy. For instance, lack of institutional mechanisms to hold the bureaucrats accountable, wide gap between what the laws promised and what they actually delivered in many instances, gap between supply and demand, are found (Alebel and Berihu, 2017; Melaku and Eyasu, 2016; Zelalem Yirga 2014; Bacry Yusuf 2009).

Also, other studies conducted by Legesse (2015) and Belachew (2010) revealed the problems related to organizational capacity, structural influence and bureaucratic issues are apparent which directly or indirectly influence/shapes the behaviors (discretion/autonomy) and the output (coping mechanisms) of the street-level bureaucrats in the implementation of the lease policy. Even though the above few survey reports provide valuable detail on the failures of the urban land lease policy implementation which focused only on the institutional gap, to the knowledge of the researcher, there are no studies in Ethiopia that tried to show the problems and challenges from the perspective of street-level bureaucrats who play key roles in the implementation of the Urban Lands Lease policy. The gap thus created is what this study seeks to bridge, and make the research unique.

Like in any program or policy implementation, poor results may be attributed to a number of factors. According to Lipsky (1980) one way to look at this complicated issue is to look at the exercise of discretion, autonomy and coping strategies by the street-level bureaucrats (street-level bureaucrats on the area) on the implementation of the policy (Urban Lands Lease holding proclamation No. 721/2011), which gave great emphasis on lease hold arrangement other than allotment (except few government and public institutions) for access to land through tender process. The cities' LBTO granted the authority to prepare and executed lease hold arrangement for access to land to the public from the proclamation and city level directives and regulations. Here, the operatives in the office have great role on the creation of access to land through tender. However, the role of the street-level bureaucrats who would provide greater part of this service is barely considered in the implementation process. "They are constantly torn by the demands of service recipients to improve the effectiveness and responsiveness and by the demands of citizen groups to improve the efficacy and efficiency of government services" (Lipsky, 2010, p. 4). Street-level bureaucrats (SLBs) are thus expected to ensure that government policies and program s are put into reality, so to speak. However, the conditions of their work and the discretion they exercise in discharging their duties are rarely considered when policies are formulated and implemented.

The term 'street-level bureaucrat' is used in this study to refer to the operatives who prepare and execute the lease hold arrangement in LBTO in ensuring access to land as stipulated in the urban land lease holding proclamation 721/2011. The purpose of this study is to examine how the role (coping mechanisms) of the officers (operatives in LBTO) influence the access to land for the public through tender. Thus, an aspect that has mainly been overlooked in the implementation of the urban land lease holding proclamation 721/2011 is the need to efficiently incorporate the factors that characterise the work of street-level bureaucrats and in this case, the operatives, and the role they play to adequately ensure that the public have access to land. In Lipsky's (2010) theory on street-level bureaucracy, he perceives the reactions of service providers to their clients as highly characterized by the conditions of their work, hence influencing the effective implementation of policies and programs at the frontline.

In response to the above research problem, the purpose of this research is, therefore, to assess the factors that influence street-level bureaucrats exercise of discretion, autonomy (factors influence the role performed by the officers) and how they cope with the daily pressures when provide service to the public (how their role influences creating access to land to the public through tender) in Ethiopia by taking land bank and transfer office of Addis Ababa as a particular reference.

1.3. Research Questions

According to Creswell, (2014, p. 139) "The central research question is a broad question that asks for an exploration of the central phenomenon or concept in a study". In this regard, the main research question for the study is:

- What are the factors that influence the role of officers in LBTO on creating access to land for public through tender?

The following specific questions were also developed to narrow down the focus of the study and explore for even more in-depth answers:

1. What are the conditions of work that influence the role of the operatives in the Land bank and transfer office?
2. What factors influence LBTO officers to use their discretion and autonomy in implementing the lease hold arrangement process?
3. How the role of the street-level bureaucrats' does related to professional experience and educational qualification?
4. Does the role of the operatives promote or curtail the implementation of the urban land lease hold policy?

1.4. Objectives of the Study

The general purpose of the study was to explore the factors which influence street-level bureaucrats to exercise their discretion and autonomy (role and choice of the operatives) and how they cope (creating access to land to the public through tender) with daily pressures of their work in Land bank and transfer office of Addis Ababa.

1.4.1. Specific Objectives

1. To examine the factors that influenced the role of street-level bureaucrats in the implementation of urban land lease hold policy.
2. To find out if there is a variation in the role and choices of the street-level bureaucrats to use their discretion and autonomy in implementing urban land lease hold policy.
3. To examine how the exercise of discretion, autonomy related to the street-level bureaucrats' professional experience and educational qualification.
4. To examine how the role of street-level bureaucrats in the Land bank and transfer office influenced the extent to which they provide access to land for the public.

1.5. Scope of the Study

The study was limited in its scope due to the following reasons, to more thoroughly understand the role of the values of street-level bureaucrats in explaining policy implementation we must examine data at the individual level (Keiser, 2010). Therefore the study was limited in scope to examine the factors that influenced the role (the level of discretion/autonomy operationalized as role of SLBs) of SLBs in their services of providing access to land for the public through tender particularly in Addis Ababa city administration land bank and transfer office. Much of the research carried out on the urban land lease holding policy implementation choose the lease law (urban land lease holding proclamation No. 721/2011) and Addis Ababa city administration as the case study because of the role of the city in terms of socio-economic development contribution to the country at large, due to these two reasons this study selected the officers found in the Addis Ababa City Administration's land bank and transfer office and the lease law as its level of analysis. A mixed case study research design and approach was used to answer the research questions. The issues of time and finance and accessibility also influenced the scope of the study.

1.6. Significance of the Study

Studying the implementation of the urban land lease policy in Ethiopia has been an expedition of many researchers, largely with a focus on the outcome of the policy to service users. However, little emphasis has been placed on the street-level bureaucrats who directly are involved with preparing and executed lease hold arrangement for the public in the course of implementing the ULLH policy. The provision on urban land lease policy implies a responsibility on SLBs who provide a larger part of this service. Other issued directives and regulations by Addis Ababa city administration such as city land lease regulation No. 49/2004 and city land lease implementation directive No. 11/2004 for better implementation of Urban Land Lease Holding Proclamation No. 721/2011 also stresses on the role of operatives in providing access to land through lease hold arrangement by tender and a reminder to operatives on the responsibility that comes with this service. However, the conditions that characterise the work of these SLBs in discharging their duties are barely taking into consideration. "Street-level bureaucrats work in situations that often require responses to the human dimensions of situations" (Lipsky, 2010, p. 15). Hence an incorporation of the role of SLBs in the implementation of the policy is noteworthy.

With all the divergent views on urban land lease holding proclamation, it is important to assess how the Street-level bureaucrats' discretion and autonomy (role of SLBs) affects the implementation of this policy. This is particularly important since these are the people who play the day-to-day roles of implementing the policy. Some researchers point out that some policy dysfunctional dynamics are explained by workers' efforts to cope with psychological distress arising from their work (Walkup, 1997), and also from moral stress in organizations where new public management reforms have been implemented (Thunman, 2016), and also from perceptions of policy goals and their knowledge (May & winter, 2007). The study is thus significant in the quest to fill a gap and highlight an essential part of the literature that is mostly overlooked by policy implementers and researchers respectively.

In order to fine tune a policy or uphold good practices that promote better attainment of the intended goals of a policy, it is imperative that a study be carried out in order to inform the decisions of the policy makers and on the academic front, this study will be important to policy students as well as to policy practitioners.

1.7. Limitations of the Study

The study was not without limitations. The first challenge was the schedule of interview appointments, where interview sessions had to be postponed for later dates due to the tight schedules of some respondents. Besides, there were a few respondents who hesitated in agreeing to the terms of the interview or giving out some important information. The collection of relevant documentary sources was also a limitation to the study. There were not enough documents available at the research sites, and studies on the lease law have seldom focused on the role of street-level bureaucrats in the implementation process. These limitations notwithstanding, much in-depth information was retrieved from the interviews and the documentary sources available.

1.8. Organization of the Study

The study has been organized into five main chapters. A brief overview on the respective chapters are as follows:

Chapter one provides the overall view of the whole research. It highlights the background, problem statement, research questions, objectives, scope, significance and limitation of the research.

Chapter two covers the literature in the areas of theoretical and conceptual framework on which the study is based. It briefly looks at different approaches to policy implementation, and then reviewed literatures on the importance of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation. This chapter will end with identifying the gaps that this research seeks to fill.

The third chapter is dedicated to the methods and methodologies of the research; research design, sample size and sample size determination, types and methods of data collection, data gathering instruments, data analysis techniques and presentation modalities in brief.

The fourth chapter is concerned with analysis, presentation and interpretation of research results. This chapter mainly deals with what the processed information the researcher gathered through stringent adherent to the research methodologies as outlined in the third chapter represents.

Finally, the last and fifth chapter provides an in-depth discussion of the results as presented in the preceding chapter by putting the research objective and topic into spotlight. It offered an overall review of what the research has achieved and what drawbacks had taken surface. These sections of the study linked the results of the research with the preceding chapters to see whether the study has met its target or has fallen short of the targets. Recommendation and conclusion is incorporated as part of this chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Introduction

The purpose of this section is to outline the theoretical framework of this study and to put the whole study into perspective. It begins by introducing the principal theory upon which the research project is constructed. Then looking at the concept of policy implementation, factors which affect policy implementation and different approaches to policy implementation will be explored. Defining street-level bureaucrats and reviewing literatures on the discretion, autonomy and coping mechanisms of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation with particular emphasis on front-line professionals in public sector service delivery will follow. It will end by outlining the theoretical framework as well as analytical framework.

The use of theory in research serves as a backbone of the study, presenting an understanding of the conceptual underpinnings of the study as well as giving a more vivid and practical meaning when applied in real life events. “A social science theory is a reasoned and precise speculation about the answer to research questions, including statements about why the proposed answer is correct,” (King et. al. 1994, p. 19). An analytical framework has been developed by reviewing relevant academic literature that theoretically underlies the role of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation, specifically on public service delivery. These help the reader get clearer understanding of the theoretical foundation of the study. These ground setting fundamentals as a framework and guide in laying out variables, research questions and hypotheses for the study.

The theory of street-level bureaucracy developed by Michal Lipsky (2010) will be reviewed in this chapter as the theoretical framework of the study. The theory emphasizes the discretion and autonomy exercised by street-level bureaucrats in implementing policies, and the conditions of work that influence the decisions they take in the course of providing services to clients.

2.2. Principal Theory

This study builds on the theory of street level bureaucracy (SLBy) and is informed by Michel Lipsky’s (2010) book on the role of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation, entitled “Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of Individuals in Public Services”. Street level bureaucracies are the public services whose workers ‘interact with and have wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or allocation of public sanctions’ and through whom citizens ‘experience directly the government they have implicitly constructed’ (Lipsky, 2010, p. xi). Although there are many different types of public service workers, their work is not only ‘often highly scripted to achieve policy objectives’ originating in the political process, but at the same time it also commonly requires them to improvise in order to respond to the particular needs of individual clients. He further asserts that ‘when taken together the individual decisions of these workers become, or add up to, agency policy’ (Lipsky, 2010, cited by Hupe and Hill, 2007, p. 280). In other words, individual decisions of each officer in the LBTO constitute the final ‘Urban Lands Lease policy’ delivered by government.

According to Lipsky (1980, p. 13-23) street-level bureaucrats influence policy in two related ways. The policy-making roles of street-level bureaucrats are built upon two interrelated facets of their position: relatively high degrees of discretion and relative autonomy from organizational authority (ibid). In this case LBTO has the authority to record, protect and transferred land. This authority originated from the mother organization land development and management bureau and rules and regulations from Addis Ababa city administration. The exercise of discretion and autonomy in public policy implementation by street-level bureaucrats can affect the policy outcomes. In the implementation of Urban Land Lease Holding proclamation Street-level bureaucrats (the operatives in the LBTO) are said to have discretion in the execution of their duties, based on the preliminary study and review the directives and regulations that developed by Addis Ababa city administration the researcher realized that the front line workers exercised discretion and autonomy when they prepared and executed lease hold arrangements through tenders for the public. Even though there are government regulations, the professionals are said to have relative autonomy from organizational authority. If this is the case, the failure by Urban Land Lease Holding proclamation to produce the desired outcomes cannot be squarely put on the content or nature of the policy.

In different studies which are not in such type of public service workers like nurses by Bergen and While (2005), teachers by Mutereko (2009), shows that street-level bureaucrats do not simply take policies from the ‘top’ as ‘given’ but exercise their discretion and autonomy. This can have both either positive or negative effects. Findings on street-level bureaucracy further demonstrate that professionals who are working in social organizations that are on the front lines of service delivery engage in adaptive behavior to cope with the dilemmas posed by their positions in the system of service provision (Prottas, 1979).

This case study will show why implementation only succeeded when the organization was able to consider the discretion and autonomy (role) of street-level bureaucrats and their coping mechanisms while they are put under pressure by the key features of their work settings including: chronically inadequate resources; an ever growing demand for service; vague or conflicting organizational expectations and policy goals (Lipsky, 2010). The case study will also show why the top down control (managerial control), professionalism, rules and regulation was not sufficient for successful implementation.

2.3. Conceptual Foundation

2.3.1. Policy Implementation Defined

From the classical top-down scholars, Pressman and Wildavsky, (1973) cited by Hill, (2005, p. 176), defined implementation as: 'to carry out, accomplish, fulfill, produce, complete'. Another definition by O'Toole, (2000) cited by Goel, (2014, p. 300) stated as, "Implementation is broadly defined as 'what happens between the establishment of an apparent intention on the part of the government to do something, or to stop doing something, and the ultimate impact in the world of action". Howlett et.al, (2009, p. 160) argues that "the effort, knowledge, and resources devoted to translating policy decisions into actions comprise the policy cycle's implementation stage". Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), cited by Hill, (2005, p. 176), perceive policy implementation as 'those actions by public or private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions'. In view of this, policy implementation entails carrying out, fulfilling, producing and completing a policy. To Sabatier & Mazmanian, 'implementation is the carrying out of a basic policy decision, usually made in a statute (also possible through important executive orders or court decisions). Ideally, that decision identifies the problem(s) to be addressed, stipulates the objective(s) to be pursued, and in a variety of ways, "structures" the implementation process' (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980, p. 540).

In other words, policy implementation is a stage in the cycle of a policy. In essence, policy implementation encompasses actions directed at the attainment of the set objectives. This process is not as easy and as straight forward as it seems. According to Biruk (2014), these definitions suit the urban land lease holding proclamation 721/2011 in many respects (the top down approach starting from its formulation process). The decisions that were made at central government level are being implemented by front-line implementers found in public service delivery organization. There has been a lot of research on this matter and different views have been adopted by different scholars and practitioners. According to Parsons (1995, p. 461), cited by Muterko, (2009, p. 10) asserts that a “study of implementation is a study of change: how change occurs, possibly how it may be induced.” In this view, the study of urban land lease holding policy implementation is a study of how change can occur in the behavior of its implementers (street-level bureaucrats). It is also a study of how this change can be induced.

2.3.2. Factors Influencing Successful Implementation

The literatures investigated the factors that influencing successful implementation provides suggestions, advice and prescriptions on how to carry out a successful policy implementation. Most authors agree on factors such as: the logic of the policy; the relevance of policy standards and objectives; policy resources; characteristics of the implementing agencies; and the disposition of implementers for carrying out the policy decisions (Cloete and Wissink, 2000, p. 171, Weimer and Vining, 2005, p. 275). This section will look at some of these factors.

This first and one of the most important factors is the logic of the policy by (Weimer and Vining, 2005, p. 275). This means looking at the logic of the policy as ‘a chain of hypotheses’. As Weiner and Vining (2005, p. 275), any of the hypotheses in the chain “could be false or at least not universally true”. This creates a predicament for policy implementation because if the hypotheses are false, it implies that there is less likelihood that the policy implementation process will be successful. Weiner and Vining (2005) further clarify the issue by arguing that:

> *The characteristics of the policy, and the circumstances of its adoption, determine the hypotheses underlying implementation and the likelihood that they will be true. In general, the greater the legal authority the adopted policy gives implementers, the greater their capacity to compel hypothesized behavior. Similarly, the stronger the political support for the adopted policy and its putative goals, the greater the capacity of the implementers to secure hypothesized behavior (Weiner and Vining 2005, p. 275).*

For example, the chain of hypothesis for urban land lease holding 721/2011 could be that Proclamation No. 721/2002 that repealed the first lease law failed to provide municipalities and cities the ability to collect adequate and proper fees because of personal interests and corruption;

in practice negotiation became the dominant form of land transfer and this practice offered inadequate results leading to failure rather than success (Melaku & Eyasu, 2016). Therefore, 'if negotiation as means of modality replaced auction or allotment for transferring all urban land areas shall henceforth the problem would cease' and 'there are enough resources for the implementation of the policy'.

Based on Weiner and Vining (2005, p. 275) argument, a policy that fails to inspire and develop a hypothesised behavior which can lead to the desired outcomes will be viewed as illogical.

Most of the other factors are connected to the logic of the policy theory. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1981) cited by Cloete and Wissink, (2000, p. 172) listed 16 factors which affect policy implementation. These are clustered into three broad categories:

i. Tractability of the problems: That is, some problems are much easier to deal with than others. Parsons concurs with this assertion when he says 'it easy easier to put a man on the moon than to put a homeless family in a decent accommodation' (Parsons, 1995, p. 480).
ii. The ability of policy decisions to structure implementation: This means that 'original policy-makers can substantially affect the attainment of legal objectives by utilising the levers at their disposal' (Cloete & Wissink, 2000, p. 172). In other words, the LBTO has many levers at its disposal to make sure that the policy is implemented. This could be in the form of sanctions and rewards for the street-level bureaucrats.
iii. No-statutory variables affecting policy implementation: That is implementation also has an inherent political dynamism of its own (Cloete & Wissink, 2000, p. 172). Notions of power relations in implementation can also affect policy implementation in many respects. These could involve intra-organization or inter-organization politics. The preparation and implementation of auctions relying on the support of other departments in land development and management bureau.

Another factor which is important for policy implementation is the content of the policy (Cloete and Wissink, 2000, p. 178). Citing Lowi's (1963) categorization of policy as distributive, regulatory or redistributive, and explain that each type of policy has a different level of difficulty in implementation. Distributive policies are explicated as those policies that create public benefits for general welfare, while regulatory policies are those that specify rules of conduct as well as penalties for failure to comply. “Redistributive policies attempt to change allocations of wealth or power of some groups at the expense of others” (Brynard and Coning 2006, p. 196). The researcher believes, the urban land lease holding policy has some kernels of each typology. This makes it complex to implement.

Having said that, the literature has come a long way to highlight the complexity of policy implementation and delineated many factors that influence what would be regarded as successful policy implementation. Table 2:1 below gives a summary of the factors that would influence successful policy implementation.

Table 2.1: Summary of policy implementation success factors

Success factor	Defined as…
(Effective) Approach	A well-researched and structured process to implementation. Characterized by clarity of vision, through attention to detail and fast decision-making.
Commitment	A tangible and visible political and administrative will to deliver policy.
Cooperation	Collaborative behavior between stakeholders to a policy, characterized by goal alignment, the development of strong personal relationships, and a high willingness to share skills and information.
(Effective) Resourcing	The focused deployment of skilled and motivated resources in quantities sufficient to provide a critical mass.
Leadership	The ability to develop and command a following, characterized by clarity of vision and a legitimate mandate.
Location of political Responsibility	The power emanating from a place or position that holds political ownership for policy, and its ability to command authority over the deployment of resources.
Management style	The enthusiastic and optimistic behavior of management, and their ability to adapt to prevailing circumstances.
Ownership	A perceived state of belonging to, and responsibility for, a policy implementation program .
Role delineation	The clear demarcation of responsibility between individuals, Particularly between politicians and civil servants.
Skills and abilities	The capability and resourcefulness of individuals involved in implementation characterized by qualities such as extensive experience, adequate training and qualification, and a practical approach to policy management.
Stakeholder involvement	Broad and active consultations with persons or entities likely to affect, or be affected by, the policy.
Trust	A high degree of confidence in persons involved in the implementation initiative, characterized by belief that individuals will not sabotage the initiative, or cause deliberate harm.
(Use of) Networks	Utilizing one's personal-informed relationship with others to gain access to, or control over resources.
Values/beliefs	People's conviction of the 'rightness' or 'goodness' of a policy initiative, because it is consistent with their personal values.

Source: Giacchino and Kakabadse, 2003:144. Cited by Sibanda, 2011.

According to Brynard (2009), the factors that are listed in Table 2.1 have varying degrees of importance and their large number indicates the complexity of the subject matter. Some of the factors can be controlled by implementers to increase the chances of achieving a successful outcome but others cannot be controlled. For example, the environment in which policy implementation is to be put into action affects the implementation process, and the implementing organization may not be able to control that environment. This means that the success factors consist of the elements that can be controlled by the implementers and those that cannot be controlled.

The degree of importance of each factor will depend on how successful policy implementation is defined. Brynard (2009, p. 558) for example, defines successful policy implementation "as a strategic action adopted by government to deliver the intended policy decision and to achieve the intended outcomes". Success in this case implies achieving the expected functionality which can deliver the intended outcomes. In this respect, Brynard identifies commitment and co-ordination as core characteristics of successful policy implementation. While commitment is regarded as the core construct of policy implementation, it is directly dependent on the co-ordination of all the stakeholders involved. Commitment is, in this case, viewed as the ability to take ownership of a policy initiative and maintain it until the intended outcomes are achieved. To this end, Brynard (2005) argues that a government may have the most logical policy imaginable; the policy may pass cost benefit analysis with honors, and it may have the most impressive bureaucratic structure, but if those tasked with policy implementation lack commitment, little will be achieved.

It is evident from the literature review that factors which influence successful policy implementation are numerous and varied. The recognition and degree of importance of each factor or variable seems to depend on the perspective of the author.

2.3.3. Different Approaches to Policy Implementation

The issue of approach is critical to the success of policy implementation and is linked to the expectation that policies passed are supposed to "produce outcomes or lead to improvements in citizens' lives" (Brinkerhoff & Crosby, 2002). According to Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002), failure to produce the expected results has been partially due to the fact that "development policy has been the domain of economists and sectoral specialists" who seem to have confined their focus on the "what" question and ignored the "how" question. The "what" question is concerned with the content of the policy while the "how" question focuses on the broader question of implementation, in other words, the "how" question embodies the approach through which the policy decisions are translated into action. A theoretical shift from the focus on content of the policy to the process is what Parsons (1995, p. 457) refers to as "the within-puts, outputs and outcomes" which emphasizes policy implementation and delivery of policy goals. The focus on policy process shows that policy making does not end with the approval of the policy by decision makers. As Parsons (1995, p. 464) argues, policy implementation is essentially an "interplay and interaction between politicians, administrators and service providers". This view recognizes the critical role played by different actors, including those who deliver services to the target groups at the grassroots level.

Much of the literature on policy implementation identifies two distinct approaches to policy implementation namely, the top-down rational approach and the bottom-up approach. The exponents of the top-down approach see the policy implementation process as flowing down from the top structures of the state to the lower levels. The supporters of bottom-up approaches argue that the role of the target groups and those who deliver services should be seen as central to policy implementation processes (Matland, 1995). An analysis of the early literature on policy implementation clearly indicates that the top-down view of implementation dominated the phenomenon of implementation studies. The main focus of the proponents of this approach was to examine the policy decision and "the extent to which its legally mandated objectives were achieved over time and why" (Sabatier 1986, p. 22). The starting point of this approach is clearly posited as the policy decision made by the top officials of government and handed down through various administrative structures for implementation. To examine the extent to which the objectives of the specific policy were achieved, Sabatier (1986) suggests that the following key questions be asked:

i. To what extent were the actions of implementing officials and target groups consistent with (the objectives and procedures outlined in) that policy decision?
ii. To what extent were the objectives attained over time, i.e. to what extent were the impacts consistent with the objectives?
iii. What were the principal factors affecting policy outputs and impacts, both those relevant to the official policy as well as other politically significant ones?
iv. How was the policy reformulated over time on the basis of experience?

The above features clearly exhibit the hierarchical nature of the model and its underlying assumptions. In his analysis of Pressman and Wildavsky work, Parsons (1995, p. 464) observes that these earlier writers viewed a policy as "a hypothesis containing initial conditions and predicted consequences. If X is done at time t1, then Y will result at time t2". This line of reasoning is synonymous with the principle of causality which stipulates that, if action 'A' is executed under certain conditions, then 'B' will result. In this sense, implementation is viewed as "a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieve them" (Parsons 1995, p. 464). The difficulty which emerges from this train of thought is that the actions involved in the implementation process might have to come from various actors or agencies with varying interests and values, and this would minimise the prospects of achieving intended goals. In other words, the involvement of various agencies in the implementation process is bound to "form implementation deficit" (Parsons 1995, p. 464). Consequently, the interaction between goal setting and actions aimed at achieving the goals is viewed as a weakness rather than strength. The main argument of the top-down perspective is summed up by Parsons' (1995, p. 464) own articulation which states that, in order to achieve the intended outcomes of the policy "Goals have to be clearly defined and understood, resources made available, the chain of command be capable of assembling and controlling resources, and the system able to communicate effectively and control those individuals and organizations involved in the performance of tasks".

The model is clearly prescriptive and assumes that compliance to authority and availability of resources would necessarily lead to successful policy implementation. Failure to achieve the intended outcomes would imply that policy implementers did not comply with the regulations or that the sources were inadequate. The model also places more emphasis on controlling resources, including individuals and organizations that are involved in the implementation process. Some of the proponents of the top-down rational approach such as Hood and Gunn (1993) went a step further and envisioned a model which would define what "perfect implementation" should include. They proposed the following five conditions to achieve perfect implementation;

i. That ideal implementation is a product of a unitary 'army'-like organization, with clear lines of authority;
ii. That norms would be enforced and objectives given;
iii. That people would do what they are told and asked;
iv. That there should be perfect communication in and between units of organization; and
v. That there should be no pressure of time.

These conditions further reinforce the argument of the proponents of the top-down approach that perfect implementation can be achieved when there is a strict system of control, effective communication and adequate resources. As Parsons (1995, p. 466) observes, this approach is "imbued with the ideas that implementation is about getting people to do what they are told, and keeping control over a sequence of stages in a system". The model fails to take into consideration the logical relationship between input, process and output. In addition, it fails to take into account the role played by other actors such as the private sector and civil society. Sabatier (1998, p. 280) also argues that top-down models "are difficult to use in situations where there is no dominant policy or agency, but rather a multitude of governmental directives and actors, none of them prominent". The top-down model also tends to ignore the mechanisms that are used by front-line workers and other policy groups to get around policy or to divert it to their own purposes. It is weaknesses such as these which led to scholars developing a bottom-up approach to policy implementation which recognizes and emphasizes the central role played by those who implement policy.

Lipsky whose work informs the theoretical framework of this research is regarded as the founder of the bottom-up approach (Hill and Hupe 2002, p. 51). The key advantage of the bottom-up approach is that it takes into account the informal and formal relationships of the various sub-systems involved in the making and implementation of policies. It recognizes the crucial role played by key private and public sectors as well as front-line workers in all stages of the policy process (Howlett and Ramesh 2003). The main difference between the top-down approach and the bottom-up approach is that the latter "begins at the other end of the implementation chain of command and urges that the activities of the so-called street-level implementers be fully taken into account" (Howlett and Ramesh 2003, p. 190). What the bottom-up approach points out is the fact that policy outcomes cannot be determined entirely by the policy makers at the top but by street-level bureaucrats who operate at the micro-implementation level. A comparison of the two approaches is presented in Table 2 below as articulated by Sabatier & Mazmanian, and Hjern, Porter, Hanf, & Hull.

Table 2.2: Comparison between top-down and bottom-up approaches

	Top-down (Sabatier & Mazmanian)	**Bottom-up (Hjern, Porter, Hanf, &Hull)**
Initial focus	(Central) government decision.	Local implementation structure (network) involved in a policy area.
Identification of major actors In the process	From top down and from government out to private sector (although importance attached to causal theory also calls for accurate understanding of target group's incentive structure).	From bottom (government and private) up
Evaluative criteria	Focus on extent of attainment of formal objectives (carefully analysed). May look at other politically significant criteria and unintended consequences, but these are optional.	Much less clear. Basically anything the analyst chooses which is somehow relevant to the policy issue or problem. Certainly does not require any careful analysis of official government decision(s).
Overall focus	How does one steer system to achieve (top) policy-maker's intended policy results?	Strategic interaction among multiple actors in a policy network.

Source: Hill, ed. 1998, p. 282.

The two approaches compared in Table 2.2 are not necessarily contradictory to each other, but can be used to complement each other depending on the policy issue and context. It is my contention that when it is feasible, a situation of mutual cooperation between different layers of government and other key actors such as the private sector and street-level workers would be more beneficial to policy implementation. On the other hand, there may be conditions in the policy environment under which each of the approaches is more appropriate than the other. For example, the top-down approach might produce better results in situations where there is a dominant policy or implementing agency while the bottom-up perspective might work effectively where "there is a multitude of governmental directives and actors, none of them pre-eminent" (Hill, ed 1998, p. 280). To this end, Brynard (2005, p. 9), points out that implementation research has reached a stage where "most theorists agree that some convergence of the two perspectives exists". This position is also supported by Matland (1995) when he argues that in the actual practice of policy implementation, the macro-level variables of the top-down model are tied with the micro-level bottom-uppers. This means that in the practice of policy implementation, positive results might be achieved when there is cooperation and mutual understanding between advocates of the two theories of policy implementation.

2.3.4. Defining Street-Level Bureaucrats

Some scholars have argued that, "street-level bureaucrats are responsible for translating clients into bureaucratically defined categories in order to provide services, treatment and order forms of assistance. Accordingly, street-level bureaucrats are often imbued with high level of discretion despite their low rank" (Scott, 1997, p. 37). In this regard, street-level bureaucrats are perceived to have a lot of information and experience on how services are delivered to citizens, and their functioning in society therefore influence people's lives socially and politically. Street-level bureaucrats have also been perceived as low-level government employees who implement policies on behalf of government. Hupe and Buffat (2014, p. 550-551) provide a vivid explanation of who 'street-level bureaucrats' are; "First, 'street-level' means they are working in direct contact with individual citizens. The latter include consumers, clients, pupils and their parents, and patients as well as car drivers, etc. Second, 'bureaucrats' implies that they are doing their work while in public service. They work directly with individual citizens, but may, in some cases, be employed by commercial corporations, such as prison guards in a privately run prison. Even then, however, it is decisive that they fulfill public tasks on behalf of the common good. Third, street-level bureaucrats have a specific occupation for which they have been trained in a sustained way. Because of these joint characteristics, street-level bureaucrats, by implication, have inherent discretion while functioning as policy co-makers."

According to Lipsky (2010, p. 3), "public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work are called street-level bureaucrats in this study. Public service agencies that employ a significant number of street-level bureaucrats in proportion to their work force are called street-level bureaucracies." "As individuals, street-level bureaucrats represent the hope of citizens for fair and effective treatment by government even as they are positioned to see clearly the limitations on effective intervention and the constraints on responsiveness engendered by mass processing" (Lipsky, 2010, p. 12). In current dispensations, street-level bureaucrats have the most influence in public policy implementation than the other actors involved.

2.4. Theoretical Framework

2.4.1. Theory of Street-Level Bureaucracy

This section looks more particularly at the theoretical framework on which this study is based. The theory explains the role played by street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation. According to Kerlinger, "a theory is a set of interrelated set of constructs (variables), definitions, and propositions that represent a systematic view of phenomenon by specifying among variables, with the purpose of explaining natural phenomena" (Kerlinger, 1979, p. 64, cited by Creswell, 2014, p. 54).

Scholars have widely adopted Michael Lipsky's (2010) work on street-level bureaucracy since its publication. Lipsky's book entitled "Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of Individuals in Public Services", informs the background of this study. Michael Lipsky's theory on street-level bureaucracy was first published in 1980, with the 30th Anniversary Expanded Edition published in 2010.

In his work, Lipsky gives an analysis of the behavior of front-line workers in policy delivery agencies (Hill and Hupe, 2002, p. 51). Policy delivery agencies are defined as public organizations which are complex and "characterized as rigid and slow, with effective action hampered by red tape" (Hill, 1984, p. 197). Lipsky refers to the front-line workers in these agencies as street-level bureaucrats. They include public servants such as teachers, nurses, social workers, those in the police force and others whose daily tasks bring them into contact with the public. Some authors such as Hill and Hupe (2002, p. 51) present Lipsky as the founding father of the bottom-up perspective due to his focus on the behavior of front-line workers in policy delivery agencies which is in contrast to those arguing in favor of a top-down approach.

Lipsky (1980, p. xii), argues that "the decisions of street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they carry out". Lipsky's argument implies that citizens or the policy target groups do not encounter public policy in its original form but in the form that has been determined by street-level workers. This means that there are two ways of understanding public policy. Firstly, the original or official way in which policy has been authored by policy officials at the top; and secondly, the way which is determined by street-level bureaucrats in their struggle to deliver services to the public.

To that end, Lipsky (1980, p. xii), argues that "public policy is not best understood as made in legislatures or top-floor suites of high-ranking administrators, because in important ways it is actually made in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers". The key point that Lipsky is highlighting is that the process of implementing public policy induces practices which help street-level bureaucrats to cope with the pressure of their work. Generally, street-level bureaucrats such as teachers, nurses, social workers and the police have to deal with large numbers of citizens (or clients) and high case-loads while often facing "inadequate resources combined with uncertainties of methods and unpredictability of clients to defeat their aspirations as service workers" (Lipsky 1980, p. xii). It is under such conditions of pressure and uncertainty that street-level bureaucrats adopt certain behaviors. Lipsky identifies a number of defining characteristics (conditions of work of street-level bureaucrats) which he regards as influential in how street-level bureaucrats implement (and indirectly make) policy. These are: discretion, autonomy, goal ambiguity and scarcity of resources. Each will be examined below.

2.4.2. Conditions of Work of Street-Level Bureaucrats

2.4.2.1. Street-Level Bureaucrats and Discretion

Lipsky does not explicitly define what he means by discretion. However, Davis (1969, p. 4) writes: "public officer has discretion wherever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action and inaction". According to Hill (1997, p. 181), some authors such as Bull (1980) and Donnison (1977) have drawn a "distinction between judgment, where the simple interpretation of rules is required, and discretion, where the rules give specific functionaries in particular situations the responsibility to make such decisions as they think fit". Hill (1997, p. 181) asserts that in any administrative system regulated by law, discretion is embedded in a rule structure in a form which specifies circumstances under which officials can do as they like. According to Lipsky's observation, it is the conditions of work and inadequate resources which compel street-level bureaucrats to use their discretion in order to cope with the pressures and uncertainties they encounter. Their work environment forces them to adjust their work habits to reflect lower expectations of themselves and their clients.

Lipsky (2010, p. 181) states that in general, street-level bureaucrats see themselves as restrained by the bureaucracies within which they work, "yet they seem to have a great deal of discretionary freedom and autonomy". They determine the nature, amount and quality of services provided by their respective agencies. In this respect, Lipsky (2010, p. 15) lists three reasons to justify the use of discretion. Firstly, the work of street-level bureaucrats is by nature too complicated to reduce to programmatic formats. Secondly, street-level bureaucrats work in situations that often require responses to the human dimensions of situations; and thirdly, discretion is not likely to be eliminated because it bears more on the function of lower-level workers who interact with clients than with the nature of the tasks. In the final analysis, clients are at the mercy of street-level bureaucrats whom they believe hold the key to their well-being. To that end, the role of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation cannot be underestimated. In many respects, street-level bureaucrats determine the rules of the game and they constitute an essential link between government and citizens, especially the needy. Their tasks impel them to evaluate the needs of each client in order to render effective assistance. This requires them to retain considerable discretionary freedom and autonomy.

2.4.2.2. Street-Level Bureaucrats and Autonomy

Autonomy is another key element of Lipsky's theory on street-level bureaucracy. It refers to the right to self-regulate or act independently. Lipsky (2010, p. 16) explains that street-level bureaucrats enjoy relative autonomy from the authority of their agencies. This implies that there are situations in which street-level bureaucrat acts independently from the authority of their agencies as they deliver services to their clients. Such situations occur when there is poor communication between management and street-level bureaucrats, or when there is disagreement with organizational goals. However, Lipsky clarifies that difficulties which arise due to disagreement with organizational goals or poor communication between management and street-level bureaucrats are easily overcome because street-level bureaucrats "for the most part accept the legitimacy of the formal structure of authority, and they are not in a position to dissent successfully" (Lipsky, 2010, p. 16).

In addition, Lipsky's analysis reveals that, in most instances the behavior of street-level bureaucrats in public organizations can be perceived as cooperative. To that end, the issue of street-level bureaucrats' autonomy should be understood in the context of the efforts they make to deliver services to their clients under conditions of pressure and scarce resources. That means that within the formal structure of authority and policy guidelines, street-level bureaucrats have the space to act independently and exercise discretion without upsetting the formal authority of their agencies. Lipsky's analysis indicates that the nature of the work done by street-level bureaucrats requires that they have and retain autonomy as well as discretion as tools with which to manage the complexity of their work. In other words, without discretionary freedom and relative autonomy, the work of street-level bureaucrats would be extremely difficult to execute.

Lipsky's analysis of the behavior of street-level bureaucrats contends that, to a large extent, street-level bureaucrats comply with the objectives of their agencies. However, the problem arises in situations where the "workers' interests differ from the interests of those at higher levels, and the incentives and sanctions available to higher levels are not sufficient to prevail" (Lipsky, 2010, p. 17). In these instances of conflict of interest between street-level bureaucrats and those at higher levels, street-level bureaucrats can withhold cooperation within their agency. They may also employ strategies such as excessive absenteeism, deliberately waste of or even stealing resources, and may adopt a negative attitude which impacts negatively on the organization (Lipsky, 2010, p. 17). In this respect, street-level bureaucrats require autonomy not only to make decisions about their work but advance their own personal interest as well. In the final analysis, Lipsky asserts that discretionary freedom and autonomy are the main source of power at the disposal of street-level bureaucrats, and they would resist any attempt by the top management to curtail it. In this regard, street-level workers use collective power such as workers' unions to strengthen their positions considerably and reduce managers' capacity to induce or enforce compliance (Lipsky, 2010, p. 23).

2.4.2.3. The Issue of Goal Ambiguity

Besides the significance of discretion and autonomy, Lipsky's analysis also reveals that the jobs of street-level bureaucrats are generally characterized by ambiguous goals which impede effective implementation of policies. For example, questions whether the goal of "public education is to communicate social values, teach basic skills, or meet the needs of employers for a trained work force" (Lipsky, 2010, p. 40). In addition, some policy goals tend to be too idealistic, a factor which creates confusion and complications for street-level bureaucrats whose task it is to translate such goals into action. Lipsky's argument suggests that ambiguity in policy goals causes stress and makes the job of street-level bureaucrats more cumbersome. To that end, Lipsky (2010, p. 41) delineates three sources of goal conflict and ambiguity, namely: (i) client-centered goals conflict with social engineering goals; (ii) client-centered goals conflict with organizational-centered goals; and (iii) goals conflict because the roles and functions of street-level bureaucrats are generally communicated through multiple conflicting reference groups. In his explication of the three sources of goal conflict and ambiguity, Lipsky (1980, 40) asserts that sometimes street-level bureaucrats' concern for clients, conflict with the social role of their agency, in this case Lipsky (1980, p. 41) talks of "client-centered goals versus social engineering goals". For example, in the case of education agencies such as public schools, teachers may promote the type of education that is oriented towards individual achievements while the social expectation is the type of education that is oriented towards citizenship and discipline. The tension in such a case may arise due to street-level bureaucrats' failure to balance individuals concerns with social expectations. Street-level bureaucrats are closer to clients as they deal with them directly and can sometimes use measures such as control of resources or in extreme situations they may use force to gain clients' compliance. This means that in instances of goal conflict and ambiguity, client-centered goals are likely to take precedence over social engineering goals. Again, this demonstrates the crucial role that street-level bureaucrats play when they use their discretion in determining eligibility.

Street-level bureaucrats also experience conflict and goal ambiguity when they encounter "tensions between client-centered goals and organizational goals" (Lipsky, 2010, p. 41). Lipsky (2010, p. 44) states that "The ability of street-level bureaucrats to treat people as individuals is significantly compromised by the needs of the organization to process work using the resources at its disposal". The biggest challenge for street-level bureaucrats is how to use limited resources in order to provide quality services to a large number of clients. Limited resources can reduce the capacity of street-level bureaucrats to be more effective in their work and this may cause conflict in bureaucracies within which they work. However, in some cases, street-level bureaucrats may become more efficient as they try to do the best they can with limited resources. Lipsky (2010, p. 45) argues that, while resource limitations cause tension within street-level bureaucracies at the operational level, it is the responsibility of "street-level bureaucrats to find a way to resolve the incompatible orientation towards client-centered practice on the one hand and expedient and efficient practice on the other". This means that street-level bureaucrats have no choice but to "muddle through" and do the best with the little resources at their disposal.

The third source of goal conflict and ambiguity emanates from what Lipsky (2010, p. 45) calls "the contradictory expectations that shape the street-level bureaucrats role". In this regard, Lipsky (2010, p. 45) delineates three sources from which role expectations arise namely: (i) "in peers and others who occupy complementary role positions; (ii) in reference groups, in terms of which expectations are defined although they are not literally present; and (iii) in public expectations where consensus about role expectations can sometimes be found". These different role expectations create goal conflict and ambiguity to the extent that they throw the primary role of street-level bureaucrats into confusion. A lack of clarity in regarding their specific roles and functions may limit street-level bureaucrats, personal actions and effectiveness. To that end, Lipsky (2010, p. 45) argues that "role ambiguity affects individual performance as well as organizational direction". It is apparent that the issue of role expectations is one of the challenges that street-level bureaucrats have to face when executing their tasks. It is likely that street-level bureaucrats would be influenced by role expectations from their peer groups who "appreciate the pressures of work and the extent to which street-level bureaucrats experience the need to have goal orientations that are consistent with resolving work pressures"(Lipsky, 2010, p. 47).

2.4.2.4. The Problem of Resource Limitation in Policy Implementation

In addition to the challenges of goal conflict and ambiguity, street-level bureaucrats have to contend with limited or scarce resources. Limited and a scarcity of resources have been identified as critical constraints that street-level bureaucracies have to deal with in their efforts to deliver public services. Lipsky contends that, in general, street-level bureaucrats have to make decisions about providing services to people under conditions of limited time and information. Limited resources in the work environment, amplify the pressure and stress levels of street-level bureaucrats. Such conditions create high levels of uncertainty due to "the complexity of the subject matter and frequency or rapidity with which decisions have to be made" (Lipsky, 2010, p. 29). As a result, many street-level bureaucrats act without reliable information which in many instances would be too costly and difficult for street-level bureaucracies to obtain. In addition, Lipsky (2010, p. 29) asserts that "street-level bureaucracies characteristically provide fewer resources than necessary for workers to do their jobs adequately". Lipsky cites an example of a situation where teachers are expected to teach overcrowded classes despite limited resources such as teaching materials and time. Situations of high student-teacher ratios mean that a teacher will spend more time maintaining order and less time on learning activities. It would be difficult for a teacher to achieve desirable outcomes under such conditions. Apart from limited resources such as information and time, street-level bureaucrats may lack the required skills and experience to do their work. In this respect, Lipsky (2010, p. 30) writes: "street-level bureaucrats often experience their jobs in terms of inadequate personal resources, even when part of that inadequacy is attributable to the nature of the job rather than rooted in some personal failure". This means that there is a close relation between variables such as the level of education or qualification, work experience and job performance. In other words, a street-level bureaucrat who is adequately trained and has more work experience is likely to handle the work pressure better and produce better results than one who is less qualified and less experienced. This argument suggests that street-level bureaucrats who are better equipped in terms of skills and long service are likely to cope with job related problems better than the less skilled and inexperienced ones.

The problem of limited and scarce resources experienced by street-level bureaucrats is exacerbated by the phenomenon of demand and supply. The demand for public services tends to increase when new or more resources for service extension are made available. In other words, providing more funding does not necessarily lead to an alleviation of resource limitation. It can, in fact, lead to an increase in demand as more people apply for services. A high demand for services is likely to continue, and resources will continue to be insufficient. Therefore, street-level bureaucrats will continue to have to use their discretion to determine who should receive what service. In other words, who do they regard as eligible for services. They have to make hard choices about how best to spend available resources in an environment of limitless needs. To that end, Hill and Hupe (2002, p. 53) conclude that for Lipsky, "implementation of policy is really about street-level workers with high services ideals exercising discretion under intolerable pressures". The conditions of pressure, goal conflict and ambiguity compel street-level bureaucrats to develop mechanisms to ration scarce resources in order to cope with their work. Some of the coping mechanisms employed by street-level bureaucrats will be discussed in the next section.

2.4.3. How Street-Level Bureaucrats Cope with Their Work Pressures

The theory of street-level bureaucracy directs our attention to the daily routine of people whose behavior is often unexplained. The essence of Lipsky's argument is that street-level bureaucrats have significant power. A crucial source of power is their exercise of discretion which is inescapable because their work requires them to make decisions about other people. As argued in the previous section, the discretion exercised by street-level bureaucrats is brought to bear in the rationing of resources in situations where demand for services exceeds supply. Lipsky delineates various mechanisms which street-level bureaucrats employ in allocating resources between competing clients, mostly non-voluntary ones. Such mechanisms help street-level bureaucrats to cope with pressure by bringing control over a difficulty and ambiguous work environment. Lipsky identifies three broad coping mechanisms through which this control is achieved: (i) modification of client demand; (ii) modification of job conception; and (iii) modification of client conception (Hill, 2007, p. 395).

Firstly, Lipsky's analysis of the modification of client demand presents various forms of demand control which are at the disposal of street-level bureaucrats. These forms include instances whereby delay is deliberately perpetuated, such as withholding information, or stigmatizing the delivery process (Hill, 2007, p. 395). This demonstrates street-level bureaucrats' ability to ration the distribution of scarce resources and control their work environment. Lipsky (1980, p. 90) asserts that clients experience the withholding of vital information in two ways, namely: "they experience it as favoritism when street-level bureaucrats provide some clients with privileged information to manipulate the system better than others; they also experience it as confusing jargon aimed at creating barriers to understanding how to operate effectively within the system". The presumption is that service demand will decline if people have no knowledge of the service.

The modification of job conception occurs when street-level bureaucrats change the objectives of the job in order to match their own ability to perform. For example, this entails re-engineering of own job description. One of the ways how street-level bureaucrats modify their jobs is what Lipsky (2010, p. 93) refers to as "psychological withdrawal". This results in a situation in which street-level bureaucrats are not "bothered" anymore by the discrepancy between what they are supposed to do and what they actually do. Such situations tend to discourage innovation and promote mediocrity amongst the workforce.

The modification of client conception seems to occur in a subtle fashion. It happens when street-level bureaucrats are unable to deliver services to all their clients and they devise conceptual mechanisms to divide up the client population and rationalize the division. The common mechanism in this respect involves “creaming off those clients who seem most likely to succeed in terms of bureaucratic success criteria; or it may simply involve differentiating between those clients deemed to be deserving and undeserving” (Hill, 2007, p. 395). In this case street-level bureaucrats exercise discretion to determine eligibility, even in situations where there are formal requirements to provide clients with equal opportunities.

It is clear from the above explication that street-level bureaucrats wield substantial power in policy implementation processes because of their relative autonomy and discretion associated with the nature of their work. Their role in policy implementation is critical in that, as they control scarce resources, they also make policy in circumstances which impel them to devise strategies which enable them to maintain order in their environment. Hill and Hupe (2007, p. 53) point out that Lipsky has been criticized for creating “heroes of street-level bureaucrats, because while they are caught in situations that are fundamentally tragic in the original sense, they still try to make the best of it”. It is apparent that street-level bureaucrats play an essential, yet paradoxical role in policy implementation. Their discretionary power to determine clients’ eligibility and ration resources accordingly seems to pose a challenge to street-level bureaucracies. The question that comes to mind is: how does management cope with the independent behavior of street-level bureaucrats? What measures are put in place to ensure that the activities of street-level bureaucrats do not contradict the goals and intention of the policy? These questions draw our attention to the issues of control and accountability which will be discussed in the next section.

2.4.4. How Do Authorities Manage Street-Level Bureaucrats’ Discretion and Autonomy?

While it is evident that street-level bureaucrats play a significant role in policy implementation, their activities seem to be difficult to control from a managerial point of view. In this respect Riccucci (2005, p. 1) points out that administrators and managers of bureaucratic systems have less impact on street-level bureaucrats. The fact that street-level bureaucrats possess a great deal of discretionary power and autonomy makes them difficult to manage and supervise. As a result, managers of bureaucratic systems find it difficult to “change the direction, nature, or culture of their organizations” because of their critical role as front-line workers, with the capacity to influence the direction and outcome of policies (Riccucci, 2005, p. 1). However, this does not imply that the activities and discretionary freedom exercised by street-level bureaucrats is totally unrestricted. There are rules and control measures that public organizations put in place to guide and limit discretionary freedom and autonomy.

Some authors such as Baldwin (1997) suggest that the activities of street-level bureaucrats can be controlled through various systems such as inspection systems; schemes that give effect to clients' views; managerial decisions; disciplinary bodies; contracts which are designed to enforce accountability; monitoring and evaluation systems which focus on the performance of individual workers. However, Baldwin is quick to caution that the concept of discretionary freedom is narrow if it is only seen in the context of rules and regulations. A broader context of processes and constraints experienced in policy implementation provide a wider scope to understand discretionary freedom of street-level bureaucrats. Rules and regulations that are rigid in nature are likely to cause more stress and frustration for the workers who are already under conditions of immense pressures of inadequate resources. To that end, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003, p. 173) assert that, in general, jobs of street-level bureaucrats require discretion, and this phenomenon "cannot be reduced to following rules and procedures because such workers are involved in face-to-face contact with citizens". This makes discretion inevitable in the activities of front-line workers who go on to decide which rules or procedures to apply and in what context. In this respect, Lipsky (2010, p. 161) asserts that the nature of services that street-level bureaucrats provide "calls for human judgment that cannot be programed and for which machines cannot substitute". It is the inevitability of human judgment at the street-level that makes it difficult for managers to control street-level bureaucrats particularly in a direct way. However, Lipsky (2010, p. 147) argues that street-level bureaucrats see themselves as professionals and as such, they are governed by occupational or professional values. As professionals they expect their managers to trust that they will use discretion to deal with their tasks in an adaptive way. In this regard, Hupe and Hill (2007) write:

> *The combination of discretion, rule application, and the principally undetermined character of what the professional will be confronted with, presupposes a degree of trust in his or her competence to produce desired responses, and to deal with situations that may be exceptional in a sensible and creative way (Hupe and Hill 2007, p. 282).*

In other words, in situations where it is not possible to control street-level bureaucrats directly, managers have to trust that such workers will be guided by their professionalism in executing their tasks. Issues such as trust, organizational culture and professional norms into which street-level bureaucrats have been socialised become important in shaping their behavior. This seems more appropriate considering that much of the tasks performed by street-level bureaucrats occur in places that are inaccessible to their managers and supervisors.

There are many other factors which can influence the behavior of street-level bureaucrats in a positive way. Riccucci (2005, p. 68) points out those factors such as professional interests and norms have a salient effect on the behavior of front-line staff. In addition, work norms, shared knowledge and beliefs regarding work routines and outcomes is presumed to form part of the organization's culture which ultimately guides the work of street-level bureaucrats (Riccucci, 2005). Other authors such as Brehm and Gates (2005, 68) concluded that street-level bureaucrats "behave in certain ways because they embrace the norms of public service and these norms are shared and reinforced by their co-workers". This means that the behavior of street-level bureaucrats is also controlled by their work environment. In a similar vein, Lipsky (2010, p. 13) points out that "the work environment of street-level bureaucrats is structured by common conditions that give rise to common patterns of practice and affect the direction these patterns take". Again, this indicates that street-level bureaucrats "internalize the culture of the organization which, consciously or unconsciously guides their day-to-day activities" (Riccucci, 2005). Formal policy directives offer little help to managers and supervisors to cope with the behavior of street-level bureaucrats, but factors such as trust, professionalism and organizational culture seem to have more impact. In the last chapter of his book, Lipsky proposes the enhancement of professionalism as a way of managing street-level bureaucrats. At the same time he warns that professionalism also has its own shortcomings because professionals sometimes develop a tendency to work in isolation (Lipsky, 2010, p. 203).

Other factors which are likely to win the cooperation of street-level bureaucrats are open and participatory styles of management. Riccucci (2005) points out that, such features of management have the capacity to induce positive responses from street-level bureaucrats and promote cooperation with management. Education is also identified as a critical factor that develops a sense of work ethic and influences how street-level bureaucrats perform their jobs. In this respect, street-level bureaucrats who are not formally educated can be trained on the job and socialized into the culture of professionalism. In addition, workshops can be set up with managers or supervisors and staff to discuss the consequences of various behaviors of street-level bureaucrats. Such workshops can help street-level bureaucrats see the broader picture of the actual services delivered by their organizations and promote consensus building (Riccucci, 2005). These workshops can also provide an opportunity for managers and supervisors to redirect the behaviors of their staff. Such workshops could also serve as an occasion for managers and supervisors to give feedback to street-level bureaucrats regarding how their practices affect service delivery and clients alike. This indicates that street-level bureaucrats are not malicious and cunning functionaries who take advantage of the power they have over the poor to do as they please. Rather, they use their discretionary freedom and autonomy to make policy to manage the dilemmas of their work environment.

These conditions of work that Lipsky identified may influence the role that street-level bureaucrats perform in the discharge of their duties. It can be inferred that the success of implementing a policy or program partly depends on the role performed by the street-level bureaucrat, hence, a critical focus on the conditions that underlying their work environment.

2.5. Review of Related Empirical Studies

Following Lipsky's seminal work, many scholars have conducted studies in different areas of public policy implementation to investigate the influence of street-level bureaucrats. This section explores such studies. Although the focus of this study is on land lease policy, it is important to note that this review will not be limited to such public policy alone. This is because the nature of policy implementation is basically the same. As shown by Lipsky (2010), the behavior of street-level bureaucrats tends to be similar among most street-level bureaucracies.

The discretion exercised by street-level bureaucrats has received some attention in policy implementation literature by many scholars, like Tummers and Bekkers (2014, p. 528) argued that when street-level bureaucrats have a certain degree of discretion, this will make the policy more meaningful for the clients′.

Some studies have also revealed that, implementing special education policy at the street-level could be impeded by the failure to train regular classroom teachers to teach children with special needs and absence of adequate funding (Weatherley & Lipsky, 1977 cited by Mary, 2016, p. 11). Also, Hill (2003, p. 270) argues that "when implementers ask, "What implications does policy X has for my behavior or the behavior of my organization? And cannot easily locate the answer in policy itself, they might turn to implementation resources for examples of organizational structures, routines, paperwork, and practices that fulfill policy intentions.” In addition, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975, p. 449) have argued that “a policy may be implemented effectively, but fail to have a substantial impact because it was ill-conceived -or because of other circumstances. Hence, successful program performance may be a necessary – but not sufficient – condition for attainment of positive alternative outcomes.”

Likewise, scholars have argued that the role that street-level bureaucrats play in policy implementation have a great influence on what a policy turns out to be in the end and not necessarily the agencies or bureaucracy in itself (Kornov et.al., 2014, Lipsky, 2010, McLaughlin, 1987, Weatherley & Lipsky, 1977). Also Mutereko (2009), revealed that school teachers have considerable discretion in determining the kind of task they assign to their learners, and most teachers make discretional choices to advance the goals of the Department of Education and to enhance the understating of learners, Factors which forced these teachers to use their discretion are due to poorly defined goals, inadequate resources and excessive workloads. Uprety (2013) also suggest that the street-level bureaucrats face a high service demand from community forestry user groups and have inadequate organizational resources to meet such demand. It also indicates that those front-line workers prioritize their activities through several informal procedures, behaviors and strategies as well as built-in mechanisms. These archetypal informal coping strategies help them manage their substantial work load and almost unlimited service demand from community forest user groups.

Yanow (1987) argued that the "meaning" of policy is created in context, not only from the actual words of legislation but also from the knowledge and values implementers bring to their jobs and from the milieu in which implementation occurs” (Cited by Hill, 2003, p. 272). Another study by Bergen and While found that the extent to which nurses adopted the case management role, and the model of choice, depended on two major interrelated variables, namely: (1) the clarity of policy guidance; and (2) the extent to which it coincided with professional (nursing) values (Bergen and While 2005, p.1). So, it is clear here that the values of street-level bureaucrats are important in determining how and the extent to which they can exercise their discretion.

A number of studies have been made on the land lease policy in Ethiopia: Alebel and Berihu (2017) findings suggest that the implementation of the land lease policy still requires re-examination of constraints and opportunities with the aim of devising appropriate measures and strategies for action towards sustainable urbanization. The institutional mechanism should be designed to provide 'appropriate' incentive for developers and accountability for bureaucrats. It should also help to facilitate cities to transition from dependence on revenue from land sale to modern taxation, and consider the capability of the rural citizens, who are expected to displace as urbanization progresses, to access the opportunities and their entitlements for integration into cities throughout the urbanization process.

Tefera Beyera (2017) study results revealed the challenges urban land lease proclamation were faced: inaccessibility of information about the application of lease proclamation, lack of clarity on the requirements and process of land allocation, unaffordable land price to the citizen , proliferation of squatter settlements; Institutional and organizational capacity limitation and lack of good social awareness.

Melaku Tanku and Eyasu Kumera (2016) has clearly identified the widespread unethical practices both from the government and non-government side which include corruption, favoritism, partiality, delayed response, unnecessary bureaucratic red tapes, abuse of power, rent seeking behavior, speculation, illegal brokering etc., in the areas of land allocation which strongly require corrective and preventive actions.

Zelalem Yirga (2014) findings revealed that although the existing Ethiopian government considered urban land lease tenure as a tool to cure urban challenges, the lease policies have not been formulated in such a way to meet many of their objectives. The study also revealed that payments for the duration of the lease are not equal to what the market considered to be the value of the lease. The principles and practice of getting revenue from increasing land value is not addressed. The tools initiated to discourage speculators are controversial. Lessees' right of transferring and pledging use rights are restricted. The paper concluded that a more harmonized and legitimate urban land policy framework is needed.

2.6. Street-Level Bureaucrat's Role as Coping Mechanism

When the above conditions prevail, street-level bureaucrats may resort to the need to develop coping mechanisms as a means of adequately delivering services to their clients. According to Lipsky, (2010, p. 18) "the role of street-level bureaucrats, like other roles, may be conceived as a set of expected interests as well as expected behaviors. Street-level bureaucrats may be shown to have distinctly different interests from the interests of others in the agencies for which they work". The role of the street-level bureaucrats is basically defined by the discretion they exercise and the resources they possess. Thus to understand street-level bureaucracy one must study the routines and subjective responses street-level bureaucrats develop in order to cope with the difficulties and ambiguities of their job (Lipsky, (2010, p. 18).

The discussion of the conditions of work above indicated that, the conditions of work are basically characteristic of the work environment hence, it is not unusual for the street-level bureaucrat to resort to initiatives to fill the gap created by the indeterminacies that confront their job. According to Krizand Skivenes, (2014, p. 72) "if policy aims are contradictory or cannot be known (if, for instance, there are so many new rules that workers simply cannot keep up with them), or if they cannot be implemented (because of a lack of financial backing), this creates dilemmas for workers that they need to resolve. Workers may exercise the discretion they enjoy as street-level bureaucrats to deal with these dilemmas, and their resulting actions and decisions may be contradictory to the original policy aims."

'Bureaucrats develop routines to deal with the complexity of work tasks. Indeed, for some analysts, routinization is virtually equivalent to bureaucratization. For other, routinization inevitably occurs in bureaucracies because of the scarcity of resources relative to the demands made upon them. At times, street-level routines and simplifications virtually are the policies to be delivered'. (Lipsky, 2010, p. 83-86) The coping mechanisms developed by the street-level bureaucrats may influence the extent to which a policy is implemented. Routinization is one such coping strategy of SLBs. Although there are other actors involved in the implementation process, the street-level bureaucrats are the ones who directly interact with policy beneficiaries. Hence the role SLBs play may have a significant influence on how the client benefits from the service provided by the SLBs.

According to Lipsky, (2010, p. 83) street-level bureaucrats develop three main coping strategies, "First, they develop patterns of practice that tend to limit demand, maximize the utilization of available resources, and obtain client compliance over and above the procedures developed by their agencies. Second, they modify their concepts of their jobs, so as to lower or otherwise restrict their objectives and thus reduce the gap between available resources and achieving objectives. Third, they modify their concept of the raw materials with which they work- their client- so as to make more acceptable the gap between accomplishments and objectives,"

These imply that, street-level bureaucrats tend to utilize available resources and modify clients as well as their job in order to meet the demands confronting them; however, some of these mechanisms may seem to be discriminatory among clients to the neglect of others. Lipsky identified four main related reasons why street-level bureaucrats treat clients differently. "First; to a degree the society wants bureaucracies to be capable of responding flexibly to unique situations and to be able to treat people in terms of their individual circumstances. Second; street-level bureaucrats often want to make an improvement in their clients' lives. Third; and almost obviously, bureaucracies are simply often required to differentiate among recipients and Forth; differentiation often assists street-level bureaucrats in managing their workloads" (Lipsky, p. 105-106). Lipsky suggests that the behavior of street-level bureaucrats is guided primarily by the need to make their work more predictable and hence controllable. In sum, SLBs may adopt these strategies (routinization, creaming-discriminating clients, limiting clients' access to information among others) in coping with the daily workload (clients' service provision).

In the analysis presented above, the role of street-level bureaucrats, as service providers makes them an important group of actors in policy implementation. That is, the role of the SLBs in preparing tenders may be influenced by the conditions of work as discussed above. The theory of street-level bureaucracy is relevant for this study as it sheds light on realities that confront the daily activities of street-level bureaucrats. That is, it provides a basis for examining the factors that influence the role of SLBs in preparing and executing tenders.

2.6.1. The Role of Street-Level Bureaucrats in Land Bank and Transfer Office

Urban Lands Lease Holding Proclamation No. 721/2011, is aimed at enhancing development and enabling citizens benefit as much as their contribution to the development on the one hand, and the interest of a handful of rent-seeking parties aimed at making individuals wealthy by using political authority as a protection and source of benefits, without adding any development values by miss appropriating land rents, on the other.

The newly enacted proclamation No. 721/2011 has emphasized that any urban land which has not been under leasehold system shall be permitted to be held only by lease system (Art.3) has addressed important issues that are not covered in previous lease policies such as: failure to push permit holders to make annual rent payments for use rights, the absence of formalizing informal tenure, and consolidation of the permit and leasehold tenure systems. The intent is to create uniformity of the informal settlement of the old possessions with the new, consolidated leasehold system. The new proclamation clearly states that lease payments are provided when informal land settlements are unified with old possessions and are merged with newly leased lands. The effect of transfer of land right or the status of a landholding, in the event of the above two situations, is a “lease benchmark price” (minimum lease price). The lease rates are applicable to possessions converted into leasehold tenures and serve as the lease bench mark price of the local area. According to the 2011 urban land lease policy, urban land shall be allowed on lease basis only through tender or allotment.

Proclamation No. 721/2011 provides detail lists that can request for urban land lease holding through allotment. Under this law, except urban land holdings granted by allotment for two entities, the budgetary government and religious institutions, all other users of the land allotment were assigned administratively to public agencies or state-owned enterprises. These institutions are required to pay land use rent as those granted use rights through auction. Even though the law is a Federal law, the power of implementation through subsidiary legislation is given to Regions and City administrations. According to article 33 of the proclamation, Regions and City administrations shall have the powers and duties to issue regulations and directives necessary for the implementation of the Proclamation.

Accordingly, Addis Ababa City Administration issued city land lease regulation No. 49/2004 and city land lease implementation directive No. 11/2004 necessary for the implementation of the Proclamation. From the assigned responsibilities to Land bank and transfer office, preparing and implementing land auction is the critical role for realizing the objectives and emphasis of urban land lease holding proclamation No.721/2011. The office organizes independent team from different education background which responsible for the overall process. The researcher identified specific intervention areas (information related to urban lands prepared for tender, publicity of urban land tender plans and tender process) which can be explained from the street-level bureaucracy perspective. Hence, the team has substantial autonomy and adequate discretion from the procedures enacted for the implementation of urban land lease holding proclamation and gives them decisive role in the realization of its objectives.

However, studies carried out on the implementation of urban land lease policy have rarely focused on the role of street-level bureaucrats and with particular regard to the preparation of tenders. Despite the amount of evidence from these studies done on the implementation of the policy, and review of literature from other studies, little emphasis has been made on the role that street-level bureaucrats perform at such sensitive public service. It is worth considering the role and choices of the SLBs and the effects on the implementation of the urban land lease policy, an issue which has not been given much attention.

The empirical analysis and the theoretical framework discussed thus guided the researcher to empirically examine the roles that the SLBs perform while preparing and executing the tenders and to examine the extent to which that provision on urban land lease policy is being implemented. In Brandon's article, which examined empowerment with a major emphasis on 'street-level policy', he cited Lipsky (1980, p. 24) that, "public policy is not best understood as made in legislatures or top-floor suites of high-ranking administrators, because in important ways it is actually made in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers" (cited by Brandon, 2005). This implies SLBs are not only policy implementers but also they are policy makers.

2.7. Analytical Framework

From the theoretical literature review and combining the empirical evidence the researcher developed this analytical framework that can guide the search of the proposed research questions. The behaviors of SLBs are crucial for implementation of most policies (Lipsky, 1980 cited by Winter, 2012, p. 260), SLBs make important discretionary decisions in their direct contact with citizens who tend to define public policies not as crafted in statutes but as delivered to them by SLBs. These bureaucrats work in situations characterized by many demands and limited resources. They cope with this situation by rationing service, making biased priorities among cases and clients, controlling clients, and modifying policy goals and client perceptions. According to Lipsky, the coping behaviors of SLBs systematically bias the delivery behavior in relation to the policy mandates (2012, p. 260).

The variables of the study were adopted from the theory of street-level bureaucracy identified by Lipsky (2010) and contextualized in relation with the objectives of the study. To Creswell, "a variable refers to a characteristic or attribute of an individual or an organization that can be measured or observed and that varies among the people or organization being studied" (Creswell, 2014, p. 52). In order to examine the factors that influence the role of officers in preparing and implementing tenders, it was wise to first establish the relationship between what factors influence their role as street-level bureaucrats, and second, how the role they play affects the extent of service they provide to the customers. That is, the need to establish causal relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable of the study.

Figure 1: Analytical Framework

Independent variables   Role of SLBs as dependent variable



Source: Author's Design (Developed and modified from Lipsky's Theory of Street-Level Bureaucracy.)

Figure 1, shows the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable. Role of SLBs in creating access to land through tender was operationalized as dependent variable. According to Lipsky, (2010, 18) "the role of street-level bureaucrats, like other roles, may be conceived as a set of expected interests as well as expected behaviors. Street-level bureaucrats may be shown to have distinctly different interests from the interests of others in the agencies for which they work". The role of the street-level bureaucrats is basically defined by the discretion they exercise and the resources they possess. Thus to understand street-level bureaucracy one must study the routines and subjective responses street-level bureaucrats develop in order to cope with the difficulties and ambiguities of their job (Lipsky, (2010, 18). The measures adopted by officers to cope with the demands of customers of LBTO may influence the implementation of the urban land lease holding proclamation 721/2011 provision related to access to land through tender.

The problem of resources was operational in this study in relation to the resource constraints that affect the role of officers. These may include resources for managing the tender preparation and implementation. Limited resources in the work environment, amplify the pressure and stress levels of street-level bureaucrats. Such conditions create high levels of uncertainty due to "the complexity of the subject matter and frequency or rapidity with which decisions have to be made" (Lipsky, 2010).

Ambiguity of Goals was operational in the study as the objectives and standards that the officers are expected to adhere to in the discharge of their duties. Such measures put in place by administrative structures, may be incorporated in the directives and regulations prepared for implementation of the lease policy. The theory of street-level bureaucracy stipulates that, the goals of street-level bureaucracies tend to be ambiguous and difficult to achieve, and this ambiguity may have existed for a period of time without been addressed.

Control methods may influence the role of the SLBs, in the extent to which they provide service to the customers of the office (access to land through tender). In order to understand how the role of tender execution team influence the implementation of urban land lease policy, there is the need to examine the conditions of work that confront the services they deliver as street-level bureaucrats. Thus, this analytical framework was adopted from the theory of street-level bureaucracy to examine whether the conditions of work of the SLBs influence their role in the implementation of the urban land lease policy.

2.8. Conclusion

This chapter presented the underlying conceptual and theoretical foundation of street-level bureaucracy. Drawing from relevant literatures and views of scholars and researchers conceptions of policy implementation in relation with street-level bureaucracy as well as the empirical studies about urban land lease policy have been discussed. The theory of street-level bureaucracy, developed by Michael Lipsky (1980; 2010) has been incorporated as the main theoretical framework for the study. The theory brought to light essential characteristics of SLBs, which influence the way they implement policy. Very often, researchers overlook the work conditions of SLBs when studying the implementation of urban land lease policy, as well as the end result of the policy and its effect on target beneficiaries. Hence, the chapter has presented an analytical framework for examining the factors that influence the role of SLBs in the implementation of urban land lease policy. The theory was also employed in this study to analyse and interpret the finding of the study.

CHAPTER THREE

3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

This chapter presents mainly the methodological approach that was adopted for the study. It presents the research strategies and design employed, as well as the rationale for choosing the methodology and its suitability for this research. Additionally study population, method of data analysis and ethical consideration of the study are discussed.

3.2. Research design

The descriptive case study approach was employed in this study to examine the factors that influenced the role and choices of SLBs in providing access to land for the public through tender. According to Yin, (2003, p. 2). “The distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena, in brief, the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events”. This strategy provides an “all-encompassing method” for systematically studying and describing a phenomenon (in this case, the role of SLBs in policy implementation) within a real-life context (Yin, 2003, p. 14). Furthermore, the case study method provides an empirical framework for collecting, analyzing, and triangulating multiple sources of quantitative and qualitative evidence, including documents, interviews, observations, and surveys (2003).

Yin (2003) states that using a case study strategy is mostly beneficial to answer questions that relate to how and why questions. He also explains that with case study, a researcher does not have control over behavioral events and focuses on present or contemporary events as opposed to historic ones. A case study has been defined as “a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence” (Robson, 2002: cited in Saunders et al., 2007). The goal of a case study is to expand and analytically generalize theories where input of observation can be added to research (Yin, 2003).

Case study can be either single or multiple. A single case study will focus on one organization from a single industry, for example this study. Multiple case studies however allow the researcher to present data on more than one organization either from the same or different industry.

The use of case study in this research will particularly add knowledge of what conditions that affects/influence to use discretion and how they cope with the challenges on their daily work by the employees of LBTO on the implementation of urban land lease holding policy that will add to the research by representing real events and processes applied. It will also be used to add to findings from the various literatures, where gaps, if any, can be highlighted, presented and be used as a basis of knowledge for the researcher and anyone interested in the topic.

3.3. Research Approach

The study employed mixed approach to collect the data. According to Creswell (2014, 11), “researchers are free to choose the methods, techniques, and procedures of research that best meet their needs and purposes”. Besides, identifying a particular methodological approach helps the researcher to appropriately collect and analyze data depending on the objectives of the study and the research questions that the study seeks to answer. Greenhalgh and Taylor (2000, p. 116) assert that qualitative methods are used to “study things in their natural setting, attempting to make sense of, or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them”. In addition, qualitative methods take into account the complexities of human behavior. In other words, the researcher carries out research about people’s experiences.

According to (Pelto and Pelto, 1997, 148) the qualitative approach has ability to provide complex textual descriptions of how people experience a given research issue. It also provides information about the “human” side of an issue – that is, the often contradictory behaviors’, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and relationships of individuals in the implementation of the policy by street-level bureaucrats. Qualitative data refers to “all non-numeric data or data that have not been quantified and can be a product of all research strategies” (Saunders et al. 2007).It is practical when the researcher wants to transform data that has been observed or reported without the use of numbers, only words. Qualitative approach of analysis is usually used when the sample size of the study is small-scale. Disclosing the factors that influence the role of officers in LBTO on creating access to land for public through tender through single case study, and comparing them with existing literature was the method the researcher followed in this study. The purpose of this research was to investigate certain factors in-depth and provide a better understanding of them. Therefore, a qualitative research approach was employed for this study.

The quantitative methodology was selected to complement the qualitative methodology. Quantitative and qualitative research methods complement each other despite their obvious difference (Reason and Rowan, 1981, 17). They (ibid, 17) argue that "in quantitative research, the emphasis is on collecting data that leads to dependable answers to important questions, reported in sufficient detail that it has meaning to the reader" (1981, 17). The advantage of quantitative is that it is objective and can be measured so that comparisons can be made. Furthermore, quantitative methods are generally very easy to replicate and so have a high reliability (Sarantakos, 2002, 45). These two techniques of collecting data will be complemented and enriched by document analysis. The combination of research methods in a study is called triangulation and it will be done to improve the validity of the research. Therefore, a mixed research approach is the method the researcher employed for this study.

3.4. Case Selection and Sampling Method

According to Yin (2003), for a researcher who is designing their case study research, the first step prior to data collection would be to select the final case (s) that will be a part of the case study. Scientifically, researchers choose cases depending on the research objective and by considering other factors. This means that research objective may influence the case as well as the researcher himself may select the case that is appropriate according to population, resource etc. Yin (2003) advises that, in such scenario, the researcher screens the final candidate case studies prior to beginning data collection to avoid any problems that occur during the data collection process.

Land bank and transfer office and the staffs incorporated as subunits of analysis, so that a more complex-or embedded-design is developed. The subunits can often add significant opportunities for extensive analysis, enhancing the insights into the single case Yin, (2003). The office is selected as a case for this study based on two reasons. First, LBTO is the major responsible department in related to transfer land for any construction by tender in accordance with lease law; conclude lease contract; hand over the land; and collect lease payment based on the lease contract. Generally, the office specifically responsible in preparing and run auction of plots of land, provide information for the public about the auction and organize responsible team which prepare and implement the whole processes. Second, experiences and services of LBTO staffs give chance for direct contact with service recipients at the time of tender preparation and its implementation. Due to the above reasons, LBTO is the appropriate choice for this study.

The key respondents were selected from the LBTO. A purposive sampling method was employed to select the respondents based on the objectives of the study. Therefore, respondents were selected based on their knowledge and expertise in the lease hold arrangement for the public through tender. The respondents are basically operatives who working in the office. According to Lund, (2012) The main goal of purposive sampling is to focus on particular characteristics of a population that are of interest, which will best enable you to answer your research questions. In this regard, an expert sampling method was employed in order to explore and obtain more observable implications of the cases, hence, "respondents are chosen in a non-random manner based on their expertise on the phenomenon being studied" (Bhattacherjee, 2012, 69).

3.4.1. Sample Selection

Addis Ababa city government administration Land development and management bureau has different departments that are established for different purposes. Among the rest this research focused on Land bank and transfer office and its employees. This is because of their role and nature of their work environment is found appropriate in understanding and explaining the research purpose, research question and the theoretical perspective which this study adopted in order to understand and analyses the research question.

The selection of study subjects (candidates) for this research was conducted with non-probability or judgmental or purposive sampling method. Currently, more than 50 dedicated employees found in the office. From them, researchers selected twenty (20) respondents; managers, team leaders, team leader's secretaries and officers as presented in the table below. They are selected purposively as all the selected candidates are involved at all phases of the lease auction implementation, and meet the selection criteria. This method also agrees with Yin's (2003), proposed method of candidate selection, in the sense that certain pre-selection criteria were checked when candidates are selected. The criteria followed in this research are:

1. All candidates have involved in preparation and implementation of land lease auction at all phases.
2. They are all still working in the office.

Table 3.1: Interviewee candidate (Source: Primary Data)

Category	Number of respondents
Managers	2
Team leaders	5
Team leaders secretaries	2
Officers	11
Total	**20**

Table 3.3 shows that respondents of the interviewees from each team those are highly involved in the preparation and implementation of lease auction for the last one year. These were selected as they have a knowledge or experience about the auction preparation and implementation.

3.5. Data Sources and Data Collection Method

The case study approach according to Yin (2003, p. 14) "relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, as another result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis." A case study researcher should be able to obtain more in-depth information of the case been studied based on the wide variety of data sources at his or her disposal. Creswell (2014, p. 188) argues that, "the data collection steps include setting the boundaries for the study, collecting information through unstructured or semi structured observations and interviews, documents, and visual materials, as well as establishing the protocol for recording information." The researcher employed a triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data collection strategies to obtain the data from the field. The primary sources of data were basically face-to-face interviews. Documentary sources served as secondary data for the study.

3.5.1. Interview

The researcher conducted face-to-face semi-structured interviews to gather primary data from the twenty respondents in the LBTO. A questionnaire with open-ended as well as closed-ended questions was administered during the interviews. The space for open ended comments allowed the interviewees a degree of freedom to explain their thoughts and highlight special areas in which they exercise discretion in the implementation of the policy and to allow a certain responses to be questioned in greater depth (Honey, 1987, p. 55).

Open-ended questions were used to collect qualitative data while closed-ended ones were used in order to generate quantitative data. The key feature of quantitative research is that it deals with numbers and statistical analysis. The closed-ended questions in a quantitative research are intended to test certain theories or measure causal relationships between variables. For example, one of the questions in the questionnaire sought to establish whether or not level of professional experience or education impacts on the extent of LBTO officers use of discretion and autonomy.

3.5.2. Document Analysis

Document analysis will be used to support the analysis by reviewing different documents of LBTO. Some of the documents that will be analyzed include proclamations, directives, regulations, quarterly and yearly reports, plans, will be reviewed to collect additional data to understand about the whole department. Even if detail literature review is done which are conducted in both developed and under developed countries related to public service delivery and public policy implementation, there is limited or no research or document on urban land lease holding proclamation 721/2011 especially regarding the street-level bureaucrats in LBTO.

The researcher adopted triangulation of methods to improve the credibility, validity and reliability of the data. Triangulation refers to the use of more than one approach to the investigation of a research question in order to enhance confidence in the ensuing findings (Bogdan, & Biklen, 2006, p.56). The researcher used face-to-face interviews as well as Document Analysis techniques in order to facilitate validation of data through cross verification from more than one sources.

3.6. Method of Data Analysis

The responses from the closed questions in the questionnaires were analyzed descriptively, using statistical package for social science for Windows version 25. Frequency tables and bar graphs were used to present summary statistics. The Chi-Square tests were used to compare categorical data between working experience and education with the role of the officers over tasks. Cross tabulation were used to explore relationships in the data. This choice has been made because cross tables are easy to understand and they also appeal to people who do not want to use more sophisticated measures.

Thematic content analysis will also be used to analyze responses to the open ended comments in the questionnaires. The analysis of this transcribed data was based on pattern matching logic, which ‘compares an empirically-based pattern with a predicted one’ (Yin, 2003, p. 116). The ‘predicted pattern’ here comprised findings from the previous stages; together with the literature available, (Bergen and While, 2005, p. 4). Put another way, findings from other studies at times were used to compare the results.

The findings of the study were interpreted in relation with the variables of the study. Thus, the aim is to present the study findings in light of the theoretical underpinnings of the study. The rationale was not to falsify the theory, but, in as much as the theory provides a generalized knowledge of the phenomenon this study explored, the study’s empirical findings and observations will provide a test for the theory of street-level bureaucracy, as well as answers for the study’s research questions. It also seeks to develop meaning for the role of SLBs in the implementation of urban land lease policy in terms of access to land for the public through tender.

Generally, analyzing data was based on developing and applying a certain method that will break the data down into results that are tested against the factors that influence to use discretion. Factors that influence to use the discretion have been derived from the literature and this research tends to use a pattern matching technique where findings will agree, disagree or add knowledge to existing literature.

3.7. Research Validity and Reliability

Measures need to be put in place to ensure that data collection methods and analyses procedures are accurate for the purposes of validity and reliability. Four tests have been identified by social science researchers to test the quality of any research work; construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability (Yin, 2003, p.33-34).

Construct validity

"This involves establishing correct operational measures for the concepts been studied" (Yin, 2003, p.34). Concepts were thoroughly explained to the respondents to avoid any misrepresentation of the study's objectives. Any flaws in the measurement of the study's variables could create some bias hence, the researcher make sure that respondents have a clear meaning and understanding of the concepts, and terms that were employed in obtaining the data. Yin (2003, p. 36) further argues that, another way of improving the construct validity of the study is "the use of multiple sources of evidence, in a manner encouraging convergent lines of inquiry." The interviews, observations and document sources that were obtained and carefully guided by a data collection protocol to ensure that accurate and precise data were collected and to prevent interpreting wrong information.

External validity

Eternal validity involves "establishing the domain to which a study's findings can be generalized." (Yin (2003, p. 34). In order to generalize this study's findings to other cases, the processes and measures for collecting data were properly documented, "such as a protocol for documenting the problem in detail and the development of a thorough case study database" (Creswell, 2014, p. 204). This was also to make it easier to replicate the study by other researchers and in similar cases. The study may be replicated in similar cases; such as studies on street-level bureaucrats or other public workers responsible for implementing policy at the frontline. In general, "it is easiest to maximize validity by adhering to the data and not allowing unobserved or unmeasured concepts get in the way" (King et al., 1994, p. 25).

Internal validity

Internal Validity involves establishing a causal relationship in the study. According to Creswell, 2014, p. 202), "triangulating different data sources of information by examining evidence from the sources and using it to build a coherent justification for the themes, help to increase the validity of a qualitative research". The basic premise of the study is to examine the factors that influenced the role of SLBs in providing access to land through tender. This therefore raised the possibility of a causal relationship in the study; hence the research will used a triangulation of different data sources to explore this case.

The themes derived from the analysis of the study's findings showed a causal relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable of the study. It was observed from the study that, the independent variables of the study – problem of resources, goals and control measures have a direct influence on the role of the SLBs. That is, influencing the decisions they take in providing access to land for the public through tender.

Despite the descriptive nature of the study, the study's objective of examining the factors that influence the role of SLBs in providing access to land for the public through tender implied the need to identify a causal relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable of the study. That is, the influence of the conditions of work on the role of the SLBs leads to influence the role of the SLBs when providing access to land for the public through tender. In as much as the triangulation of different data sources helped to examine the causal relationships in the study, it also ensured that the study's approaches and findings were accurate (Creswell, 2014, p. 202).

Reliability

Reliability involves "demonstrating that the operations of a study such as the data collection procedures can be repeated with the same results" (Yin, 2003, p. 34). In other to reduce any biases it the study, the interviews, observations and documentary data sources were properly documented, as well as the protocols that were employed in the data collection and analysis. "It is helpful to note in this log [of records] whether the information represents primary material (i.e., information directly from the people or situation under study) or secondary material (i.e., secondhand accounts of the people or situation written by others), it is also helpful to comment on the reliability and value of the data sources" (Creswell, 2014, p. 194). The presence of this information would make it easy for other researchers to repeat the same study with the same instruments and processes. The protocols used in gathering data for the study help to increase the reliability of findings.

3.8. Ethical Considerations

According to Israel & Hay, (2006), cited by Creswell, (2014, p. 92). "Researchers need to protect their research participants; develop a trust with them; promote the integrity of research; guard against misconduct and impropriety that might reflect on their organizations or institutions; and cope with new, challenging problems.” Research authorization letter was received from Addis Ababa University of Public Administration and Management Department. By providing the recommended letter, permission obtained from the LBTO to carry out the study. When interview conducted, sufficient information was verbally explained about the purpose of study. In the interview, the consent from the participant was needed before starting and thanks them at the end of the interview. Participant granted free will to withdraw from interview at any time based on her/his interest. So each respondent gave informed verbal consent after being told the purpose and procedures of the study. All responses were kept confidential and anonymous. Their names were not mentioned in the write-up to ensure their confidentiality. The responses of the officers are reflected in the report using the codes R1 to R20 for the different officer’s responses.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Introduction

This chapter reports on the results of the empirical investigation conducted to explore the factors which influence street-level bureaucrats to exercise their discretion and autonomy (role and choice of the operatives) and how they cope (creating access to land to the public through tender) with daily pressures of their work in Land bank and transfer office. The main objective of this chapter is to present the findings and analysis of the fieldwork. The findings are organized into six sections which correlate with those of the interview schedule.

4.2. Findings and Analysis

4.2.1. Profile of Respondents

The first section of the questionnaire sought to obtain general background information regarding the age, gender, position and educational qualification of the LBTO workers. In addition, the section established their years of experience as LBTO workers. Some of the findings are summarized in Table 4.1 below.

As indicated in Table 4.1, a total number of 20 respondents were interviewed. Of which, 4 % of the 20 officers were females between 30 and 41 years old with Ba/BSc and only one LBTO female officer with Ma/MSc. Concerning the levels of education it is interesting to observe out of the 20 officers who were interviewed, 80 % of them had their second degree. The results in the table below show that all the twenty officers met the required educational qualifications and had more than one year experience as LBTO officer.

Table 4.1: Profile of Selected LBTO workers

Respondent Code	Age	Qualification	Years of experience	Gender	Position
R1	47	Ma/MSc	11-15	Male	Manager
R2	41	Ma/MSc	6-10	Male	Manager
R3	34	Ma/MSc	1-5	Male	Team leader
R4	40	Ma/MSc	6-10	Male	Team leader
R5	36	Ma/MSc	6-10	Male	Team leader
R6	39	Ma/MSc	6-10	Male	Team leader
R7	40	Ma/MSc	6-10	Male	Team leader
R8	37	Ba/BSc	1-5	Male	Team leader secretary
R9	41	Ba/BSc	6-10	Female	Team leader secretary
R10	35	Ma/MSc	1-5	Male	Officer
R11	31	Ma/MSc	1-5	Male	Officer
R12	38	Ba/BSc	6-10	Female	officer
R13	33	Ma/MSc	1-5	Female	Officer
R14	35	Ma/MSc	6-10	Male	Officer
R15	30	Ma/MSc	1-5	Male	Officer
R16	38	Ma/MSc	6-10	Male	Officer
R17	30	Ba/BSc	1-5	Female	Officer
R18	32	Ma/MSc	1-5	Male	Officer
R19	34	Ma/MSc	1-5	Male	Officer
R20	27	Ma/MSc	1-5	Male	Officer

Source: Own survey

4.2.2. Familiarity with the Goals and Objectives of the urban land lease law

This section sought to establish whether the LBTO officers are familiar with the goals and objectives of the urban land lease law.

One of Lipsky's arguments is that when policy goals and objectives are clear, it becomes easier for street-level bureaucrats to implement policy and achieve the desired outcomes. On the other hand, ambiguous policy goals and objectives cause confusion and result in policy failure. Public service goals also tend to have an idealized dimension that make them difficult to achieve and confusing and complicated to approach (Lipsky, 2010, p. 40). Lipsky makes this assertion on the basis that, the work of street-level bureaucrats tends to be characterized by ambiguous and less clear goals which eventually become difficult to achieve. Street-level bureaucrats providing public services tend to find themselves in a paradox of what their responsibilities are, and what aspect of agency goals and objectives they are expected to deliver to clients. Based on the above theoretical framework the respondents asked four related questions under this section. The results are presented and analysed below.

The results show that 95% of the interviewees are familiar with the goals and objectives of urban land lease law. Furthermore, the results show that only one person was not familiar with the goals and objectives of urban land lease policy. However, after discussing the question further, the interviewee explained that she had misunderstood the question, and that she was in fact familiar with the goals and objectives of the urban land lease policy. Taking the interviewee's change of mind into account, one can conclude that each of the LBTO workers is familiar with the goals and objectives of urban land lease policy.

Once it was determined that each of the LBTO officers were familiar with the urban land lease policy, they were asked to rate the extent to which urban land lease policy goals and objectives were clear for them. Officers were to use the ratings: not clear; quite clear; or very clear. As the table 4.2 illustrates, 40% of the respondents indicated that the goals and objectives of the urban land lease policy are quite clear for them while 60% indicated that they are very clear. Of interest is that none of the interviewees rated the goals and objectives of the urban land lease policy as being not clear. However, the interviewees were asked whether the clarity of goals implies that they are easy to implement. The responses were varied, some of the respondents stated that the goals are easy to implement. One officer said:

> *The goals and objectives of urban land lease law are clear and easily implemented. I don't have any problems with them. Maybe it is because I have been involved in LBTO for a long time and I have gained a lot of experience (R1).*

Furthermore, one of the officials explained that the goals and objectives of the ULLH Policy are generally clear and easy to understand, but the problem is implementation. He stated:

> *The policy is not implemented as it is stipulated in the policy documents. The policy documents look impressive and well formulated but what happens on the ground is different, and this is because there is no political will from the city administration, this makes the implementation of ULLHp a big challenge for those on the ground (R10).*

The views expressed by this official point to the complexity of different factors that affect the implementation of the ULLH Policy. It is apparent that most of the officers encounter various challenges when trying to implement the ULLH Policy on the ground. This indicates that, while they are predominantly unanimous regarding the clarity of policy goals and objectives, this does not easily translate into effective policy implementation on the ground. As shown by the responses of the officer, there are a multitude of factors which could make the policy goals difficult to achieve. Some studies have indicated that, the role that street-level bureaucrats play in policy implementation have a great influence on what a policy turns out to be in the end and not necessarily the agencies or bureaucracy in itself. (Lipsky, 2010; McLaughlin, 1987, 174; Weatherley and Lipsky, 1977, p. 176).

The workers were also asked whether the goals and objectives of ULLHP sometimes clash with their own goals and objectives as officer. The workers were asked to express their responses in terms of: not often; quite often; or very often.

The results indicate that 40 % of the respondents did not have goals that clashed with those of the ULLH Policy. However, 40% felt that they did quite often, and the rest 20% say that they clashed very often. The implications of such a phenomenon could be high levels of stress amongst officers which may amplify the challenge of policy implementation. The issue of goal conflict was further explored by asking these respondents to elaborate on their opinions. Below are some of their responses:

> *My goal as Manager is to ensure that the office grows and has a good reputation, to achieve this goal I have to consider the situation of the workers which the policy does not do. In this way goals clash because goals of the ULLH Policy do not consider the local situation of workers. For example, as Manager I deal with absent workers mostly in the time of auction (R1).*

> *My goal as Manager is to ensure that the office runs smoothly and has a good reputation. I have to help the case team. But sometimes this is difficult because there is also too much paperwork to be done, and time is not enough to achieve good results (R2).*

Table 4.2: Familiarity with the Goals and Objectives of the urban land lease law

Interview questions	Response	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Are you familiar with the goals and objectives of Urban Land Lease Holding proclamation No. 721/2011 listed below?	Yes	19	95.0	95.0	95.0
	No	1	5.0	5.0	100.0
	Total	**20**	**100.0**	**100.0**	
How clear are the goals and objectives of Urban Land lease Holding Proclamation No. 721/2011 for you?	Quite clear	8	40.0	40.0	40.0
	very clear	12	60.0	60.0	100.0
	Total	**20**	**100.0**	**100.0**	
How often do the goals and objectives of Urban Land Lease Holding Proclamation No. 721/2011 clutch with your own goals and objectives?	not often	8	40.0	40.0	40.0
	quite often	8	40.0	40.0	80.0
	very often	4	20.0	20.0	100.0
	Total	**20**	**100.0**	**100.0**	
Are there any challenges that you face when trying to execute the tender process?	Yes	8	40.0	40.0	40.0
	No	12	60.0	60.0	100.0
	Total	**20**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

These responses indicate some of the sources of goal conflict and the situation that many officers are faced with on the ground. Some of those officers that felt that there is no clash between the ULLH Policy goals and their own explained this as follows

"They do not clash at all because as a team leader I am guided by the policy and I do what the policy stipulates" (R3).

"They are not clashing at all as they are aiming at distributing resources equally to the citizen, hence I as team leader in the office also aim at achieving this goals" (R4).

These responses give the impression that a few workers subscribe fully to the goals and objectives of the ULLH Policy. From a cynical point of view, it could mean that some of the officers have no personal goals, but only perform the tasks that are stipulated by the policy. The section on goal clarity and objectives was concluded by exploring the challenges regarding the implementation of the "tender process" aspect of the policy. The "tender process" in LBTO involve a variety of skills and expertise.

Regarding the challenges that they face when trying to execute the tender process, 40% respondents expressed that they encounter challenges when trying to implement the tender process. The result further show that 60% of the respondents do not encounter challenges when implementing the tender process as part of the ULLH Policy. They say:

"Sometimes there is no support from the mother office and there are no sufficient funds allocated to implement" (R8).

"Top management involvement in the process and lack of sufficient time relate to the numbers of participants in the process" (R12).

The responses quoted above reveal a certain level of frustration and despondence experienced by these two officers. It is therefore more likely to conclude that significant part of workers face implementation challenges here, which questions the feasibility of achieving the tender process component of the policy.

4.2.3. Functions of Officers

The third section of the questionnaire focused on the functions of the officers and sought to establish which ones they find not so difficult to perform, quite difficult to perform or very difficult to perform. In addition, the interviews were also aimed at identifying whether the officers adopted any specific strategy to cope with the functions they find quite difficult to perform or very difficult to perform. Table 4.3 below summarizes the responses of officers in respect of the core functions they are expected to perform.

Table 4.3: Functions of officers

3.0	**Functions**	**Not so difficult**	**%**	**Quite difficult**	**%**	**Very difficult**	**%**	**Total %**	**total**
3.1	Preparing Information relating to urban lands prepared for tender	16	80	4	20	-	-	100	20
3.2	Publicity of urban land tender plans	12	60	8	40	-	-	100	20
3.3	Tender process	4	20	12	60	4	20	100	20

The findings show that 80% respondents did not find it so difficult to perform Preparing Information relating to urban lands prepared for tender. This function entails making sure that all the information relating to urban lands prepared for tender documented and ready during the tender process. The results indicate that, in general, the majority of the respondents have no serious difficulty with performing their tasks.

However, the rest two functions: Publicity of urban land tender plans and Tender process seems to be a quite difficult for 40% and 60% respondents respectively, especially those in the case team which execute the process. In this respect, the researcher undertook to establish what strategies officers employ to cope with those functions they find either quite difficult or very difficult to perform. Some of the explanations below illuminate the coping mechanisms employed by the officers.

These responses reveal that officers adopt different strategies to manage and cope with those functions which they find difficult to perform. Some of the coping mechanisms evident in the responses include, but are not limited to: referring the issue to managers; seeking the advice of colleagues on the issue; discussing the issue with the concerned office. The coping mechanisms employed by different officers seem to depend on the context and the issue to be dealt with. An analysis of the various responses indicates that there are issues which officers feel competent to manage by their own or with the help of their colleagues and there are also issues which are referred to managers because they are too difficult for officers to handle. But in general, the information gathered shows that the majority of officers do not have difficulties performing their core functions, or if so, find their own ways of circumventing such problems.

4.2.4. Issues of resource

Officers were asked to indicate which resources are adequate at their office and also, how they cope with a situation of inadequate resources at their office.

Responses illuminate the severity of the lack of financial resources for most of the respondents. 60 % respondents indicated that a shortage of funds is the biggest challenge. The shortage of tender materials, time and skilled personnel were regarded as inadequate by equally 80 % of the respondents. Of interest is that 20 % respondents indicated that they have enough skilled personnel at their office. Some of the respondents explained that, they are being paid very low wages. This phenomenon seems to have negative implications for policy implementation as it can lead to high skilled personnel turnover, which in turn threatens the office to meet its established objectives.

Despite the evident shortage of resources, officers adopt various strategies to cope with this situation and try to find ways to perform their functions. The respondents explained that:

> *The time is not enough especially to tender process, to cope I have to use my own time to finish the work. I am happy that even my colleagues are prepared to sacrifice and work extra hours even though they don't get paid for doing so (R18).*

It is apparent that, despite the shortage of resources which amplify the pressure and conditions of uncertainty, officers adopt various coping mechanisms which assist them to perform their functions. Studies have indicated that, the manner in which street-level bureaucrats exercise their discretion and make decisions concerning the people they process is highly influenced by the limited resources that they work with. (Lipsky, 2010, Brodkin, 1997) According to Lipsky (2010, p. 29-31), the problem of resources arises as a result of the ratio of workers (SLBs) to clients, time, as well as the personal resources of street-level bureaucrats. Inadequacy of resources seems to compound the pressure already suffered by officers.

4.2.5. The Use of Discretion and Autonomy

The next section of the questionnaire aimed to ascertain the extent to which officers use their discretionary power and autonomy to take decisions when performing their functions. Three key areas were emphasized, namely the officers' (i) use of discretion; (ii) their extent of autonomy; and (iii) what informs their use of discretion and autonomy? The results are presented and analyzed below.

The officers were asked whether they had substantial autonomy in performing their functions as stipulated by the directives and procedures. The responses were varied. 40% respondents feel that they are restrained in the ways they can perform their functions.

> *It is not always easy to act independently as officers because the team leaders are always on our backs, sometimes they come unannounced, so one is always conscious of this, and I feel that it stifles my creativity as officer. It is as if they want to find mistakes. (R19)*

> *I am always guided by procedure document regarding my duties and responsibilities, and the office tells us what to do, so I honestly don't feel that I have autonomy as officer. (R20)*

These explications reveal the reasons why some officers felt that their freedom to act independently is quite restrained. In this case, the officers feel that their actions are being strictly monitored by their superiors, and this limits the space to be innovative and act independently.

However, the rest 40 % think that they are autonomous to some extent. They elaborated on their experiences differently:

> *I do not feel quite restrained by the authorities I feel I have great freedom to act because I am in charge here. I do their job but when it comes to the running of the case team I am in charge and I cannot do it unless I have freedom to take decisions regarding the tender process and other issues which I have to deal with daily (R6).*

> *As team leader I believe I must be given a chance to run the case team and take decisions without being supervised all the time. This has been my experience as team leader and I believe I have autonomy to some extent (R5).*

Only 20 % stated that they feel they have substantial autonomy, and that they have the authority to act independently of their authorities.

> *Without autonomy I cannot function as Manager, I am here on the ground and I have to deal with people and issues here and take decisions in the interest of the office and customers. But this does not mean that I disregard the guidelines, no, I am still guided by them but not in a rigid way (R1).*

Table 4.4: The use of Discretion and Autonomy

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
How would you rate the extent of your autonomy in the performance of your duties?	To no extent	8	40.0	40.0	40.0
	To some extent	8	40.0	40.0	80.0
	To a great extent	4	20.0	20.0	100.0
	Total	20	100.0	100.0	
Which of the following informs your discretion and autonomy?	Professional experience	12	60.0	60.0	60.0
	Education	4	20.0	20.0	80.0
	Both	4	20.0	20.0	100.0
	Total	20	100.0	100.0	

The respondents further asked to indicate factors such as professional experience, level of education or both influence their use of discretion and autonomy. The responses show, 60% respondents who feel that they have discretion and autonomy feel that this is due to their professional experience. 20% respondents indicated that education was the reason for their use of discretion and autonomy, while only 20% cited both as the factor that determines to what extent officers exercise discretion and autonomy.

During the interviews it became apparent that the majority of the respondents who cited professional experience as a basis for their use of discretion and autonomy are officers who have been in the office for a number of years. Some of them explained that as officers they feel that they are knowledgeable on issues and their professional experience helps them to take decisions and act independently as officer in the case team.

> *I have been a professional teacher for about ten years and I have been involved with LBTO for fourteen years now. As you are in the teaching field you grow and learn good communication skills to communicate with the community and educators. So this experience is important for my job as manager in LBTO (R1).*

Those who cited education as the driving force that informs their discretion and autonomy explained that education gives them confidence and authority as officer. In this respect, one respondent explained:

"Education gives me confidence and authority to take decisions when necessary, and when I come across problems in my work I always do my research" (R17).

It is apparent that professional experience and education are key variables which influence the officers' use of discretion and autonomy at different levels. Professional experience features prominently as it is viewed as an important asset by the majority of officers. However, the researcher contends that in reality, the two variables are intrinsically connected and have a symbiotic relationship. This section has explored how officers rate their use of discretion and autonomy in the performance of their functions. The basic argument is that discretionary freedom and autonomy give officer's power to perform their functions under conditions of stress and shortage of resources.

4.2.6. Control measures

The respondents were asked to whom they are accountable for their performance; all the case team officers said that they are accountable to team leaders for their performance. According to the office Manager, LBTO team leaders are primarily accountable to LBTO manager, they also feel that they are to some extent also accountable to the officers and team leaders because as leaders they need to set a good example.

They were also asked the method used to assess their performance; the officers explained that team leader check attendance registers and weekly plans with its result or output of the performed job. Once in a week the team leader conduct weekly discussion on performed tasks. The top officials also organize monthly meetings to discuss issues of concern and update them on new policy issues. In such meetings team leaders are trained in managerial skills to empower them to manage their team efficiently.

Regarding the question about the support or system that may help them to cope with or increase their performance; 80% of the respondents said there is no such kind of system/techniques to support and to improve their capacity. One respondent said:

> *I wish we have some kind of system/techniques to support and to improve the capacity of the officer. For instant, making the tender process modernized and computerized. Make more awareness on the urban land lease holding proclamation, direction, and regulation for the public (R15).*

4.3. Chi-Square Test

Based on the research question and objectives the researcher hoped to understand the relationships between the exercises of discretion, autonomy (role of the officers) related to the street-level bureaucrats' professional experience and educational qualification. The Chi-Square tests used to compare categorical data between working experience, education and the role of the officers over tasks. This choice has been made because to determine whether the association between two qualitative variables is statistically significant. For the purpose of this analysis, only the Pearson Chi-Square statistic is needed.

Table 4.5: Summery of Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square test	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Education qualification * Preparing Information relating to urban lands prepared for tender	20.000[a]	1	.000
Education qualification * Publicity of urban land tender plans	7.500[a]	1	.006
Education qualification * Tender process	3.333[a]	2	.189
Level of experience * Preparing Information relating to urban lands prepared for tender	20.000[a]	1	.000
Level of experience * Publicity of urban land tender plans	7.500[a]	1	.006
Level of experience * Tender process	3.333[a]	2	.189

Source: SPSS 25.
Note: For all cases, N of Valid Cases = 20 Significance level = 0.05

Based on the above summarized table results, we can state the following findings:

i. There was significant association between education qualification and preparing information relating to urban lands prepared for tender. Since the ($p < 0.001$) is less than our chosen significance level a=0.05 we can conclude that there is an association between level of education qualification and preparing information relating to urban lands prepared for tender.

ii. Evidence from the sample shows that there is a significant association between level of education qualification and publicity of urban land tender plans. The p-value for the chi-square statistic is ($p< 0.006$), which is smaller than the alpha level of .05.

iii. No association found between level of education qualification and tender process. The corresponding p-value of the test statistic is ($p=0.189$).

iv. There was significant association between level of experience and preparing information relating to urban lands prepared for tender. The corresponding p-value of the test statistic is ($p < 0.001$).

v. There was significant association found between levels of experience publicity of urban land tender plans. The p-value for the chi-square statistic is ($p< 0.006$), which is smaller than the alpha level of .05.

vi. There was no association found between Level of experience and tender process. The corresponding p-value of the test statistic is ($p=0.189$).

4.4. Discussion of the Findings

This study examined the factors that influenced the role of SLBs in providing access to land through tender. The work of Lipsky provided the framework for the investigation through a descriptive case study and mixed data collection approach. Lipsky, (2010, p. 3) stipulates that, "public service workers who interact directly with citizens in the course of their jobs, and who have substantial discretion in the execution of their work are called street-level bureaucrats." Most citizens encounter LBTO through officers, the service received by the citizens are the only ways to know or experience the ULLH policy. This makes the importance of street-level bureaucrats of the office critical in the formulation and implementation of the ULLH policy. Lipsky says when taken together the individual decisions of all these workers become, or add up to, policy. Put differently, the individual decisions of LBTO officers in the implementation of ULLHP become the urban land lease policy regardless of what is in the policy documents.

The findings of this study on the implementation of the ULLH Policy by LBTO officers that have been reviewed have revealed multifaceted problems that officers encounter when providing access to land to the public through tender. These problems include inadequate resources such as finance 60%, facilities 60%, tender materials 80%, time 80% and skilled personnel 80% of the respondents described inadequacy of this key resource at as well as lack of commitment and political will from the mother organization. These are the key challenges that affect the implementation of the ULLH Policy. Street-level bureaucrats work under conditions of limited resources. Lipsky notes that resources are chronically inadequate relative to the tasks workers are asked to perform (2010, p.27). Their workload also means that performing to meet the expectations of the policy may become difficult.

Despite these challenges, LBTO officers seem to have sought ways to manage creating access to land for the public through tender at their office. This study revealed that officers employ a wide range of strategies to cope with the challenges they face. Lipsky says that street-level bureaucrats acting as partners are simultaneously acting as ‘business owners’ interested in achieving results ‘consistent with agency objectives’ (Lipsky 1980, p. 18). Lipsky (2010) argued that a condition of work compels SLBs to adopt coping mechanisms in delivery services to their clients (target groups). This has been verified with regard to the implementation of the ULLH Policy. The decisions of officers and the various devices they invent to cope with the challenges of inadequacy of resources, the methods they use when executing tender process and extra time have become part and parcel of the ULLH Policy. In this view, officers’ autonomy and their exercise of judgment in the implementation of ULLP need to be recognized as resources which need to be used effectively (Widaningrum, 2007, p.13).

The case study has also shown the significance of street-level bureaucrats having substantial autonomy and the ability to exercise adequate discretion in the execution of their functions. As Lipsky (2010, p. 181) stated, street-level bureaucrats see themselves as restrained by the bureaucracies within which they work, “yet they seem to have a great deal of discretionary freedom and autonomy”. By using their discretionary power and autonomy street-level bureaucrats determine the nature and quality of service provided by their office. Lipsky justifies the use of discretion because the work of street-level bureaucrats is too complicated to be reduced to programmatic formats.

It is apparent that many respondents view the use of discretion as an essential component in the performance of their functions. The discretion that the officers exercise as street-level bureaucrats have a high stake in shaping the outcome of the policy they implement, 60 % of the respondents believed the exercise of discretion helps them and the customers to attain the outcomes of the policy. Discretion seems to help them to cope with a variety of challenges as they deal with tender process and clients on the ground. The use of discretion seems to be very useful for respondents in situations where the policy is inadequate. These are situations where officers have to provide access to land to the public through tender.

The findings of this research also reveal that the use of discretion and autonomy is largely influenced by variables such as professional experience and education. While Lipsky (2010, p. 203) presents professional experience as an important factor in dealing with street-level bureaucrats, he also cautions that it has shortcomings because professionals sometimes develop the habit to work in isolation. However, the findings of this study have shown that the majority of respondents 60% regard professional experience as an important resource in performing their functions. The chi-square tests were shows that, there was significant association between level of education and experience with preparing information relating to urban lands prepared for tender and publicity of urban land tender plans.

This study has also identified ways in which officials try to manage and control the actions of officers, such as executing unannounced spot checks. As Lipsky pointed out, the activities of street-level bureaucrats are difficult to manage and supervise because of their discretionary freedom and autonomy. Riccucci (2005, p. 1) also points out that administrators and managers of bureaucratic systems have limited impact on street-level bureaucrats. This gives street-level bureaucrats the leverage to influence the direction and outcome of policies. However, the findings of this study reveal that officers are subjected to strict and regular monitoring and supervision by LBTO team leaders and supervisors. The methods used to control the activities of officers include systems such as inspection of attendance registers, monthly reports about the running of the respective assignment which each officer has to submit to the office. Baldwin (1997:365) argues that the understanding of the concept of discretionary freedom and autonomy should not be confined to the context of rules and regulations because these can amplify the stress and frustration which street-level bureaucrats are already experiencing. To that end, Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003:173) argue that jobs of street-level bureaucrats require discretionary freedom and autonomy because these workers deal directly with their clients. This fact was reiterated by different officers during the interviews.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Conclusion

The conclusions made in this study, firstly, show their convergence with the theoretical assumptions made by Lipsky on street-level bureaucracy; and secondly, indicate the factors that influence policy implementation. The conclusions derived from this research are the following:

5.1.1. This study has shown that the officers in Land Bank and Transfer Office can be characterized as street-level bureaucrats as explained by Lipsky. The officers, in the implementation of ULLP through ULLHP, have a considerable degree of discretion and autonomy from LBTO management and the regulations and procedures enacted by the city council. That is, the role of officers as street-level bureaucrats, influenced the implementation of the ULLP. The findings of the study seem to authenticate Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy which takes seriously the critical role played by lower level officials in policy implementation. Also, this study highlights the limitations of a strict rational top-down model to policy implementation and reiterates the value of discretionary power and autonomy of street-level bureaucrats for public policy implementation.

5.1.2. The findings of the study showed that, the conditions of work, i.e. Problem of resources, clarity of goals and objectives and control measures are factors that influenced the role and choices that the officers had to make at the LBTO. These are the key challenges that affect the implementation of the ULLH law. These factors in the working environment of the officers create challenges that make it difficult for them to perform up to the tasks they are assigned. Also, these circumstances made it difficult for the officers to adhere to the principles and standards of the services they deliver to the public. Therefore, in order to deliver their services to the public, the decisions they made concerning the tender process and the appropriate measures to adopt were basically shaped by these conditions of work. Despite these challenges, LBTO officers seem to have sought ways to manage creating access to land for the public through tender at their office. This study revealed that officers employ a wide range of strategies [like, referring the issue to managers; seeking the advice of colleagues on the issue; discussing the issue with the concerned office and working extra time] to cope with the challenges they face, the methods they use when executing tender process have become part and parcel of the (ULLHP) law.

5.1.3. There was no emphasis on necessary resources and measures for the officers that are responsible for implementing a greater part of the policy's objectives. If the officers are not equipped with the necessary resources, it will hinder the extent to which they provide the necessary services to the citizen.

5.1.4. This study revealed that it is difficult to separate experience from education in the manner that they influence professional discretional choices therefore, professional experience and education are key variables which influence the officers' use of discretion and autonomy at different levels.

5.1.5. The study has identified that the role of the officers, as defined in the study as the coping mechanisms and strategies that they develop to deal with the conditions of work that confront them, affected the extent to which they deal with tender process and clients on the ground. The use of discretion seems to be very useful for respondents in situations where the policy is inadequate which in turn promote the implementation of the policy. These arguments therefore imply that, the choices and the decisions that the officers make concerning which coping strategies to adopt, which influenced the implementation of the ULLP provision on access to land to the public through tender arrangement. Also, it can be inferred that, the discretion that the officers exercise as street-level bureaucrats have a high stake in shaping the outcome of the policy they implement.

5.2. Recommendations

The success or failure of policy implementation should be perceived from different angles. The urban land lease policy is usually criticized on the basis of the outcomes (auction price, available plots and access to land). Some would conclude that if the results are not satisfactory, the policy is therefore inadequate. However, as this study has shown, some street-level bureaucrats profess that the use of discretion was very effective in the attainment of ULLP outcomes. There-fore, based on the major findings of the study the following recommendations are forwarded:

5.2.1. There is the need for the team leaders to cooperate with the head managers and administrative bodies in the Land Bank and Transfer Office and concerned institutions to consider the prevailing conditions that confront the work of the officers, and direct them to the appropriate channels for redress.

5.2.2. Addis Ababa City Administration and Land Bank and Transfer Office should work towards successful implementation of ULLP by managing the resource inadequacy and designing internal rules, procedures and frameworks which recognize the officers' autonomy and their exercise of discretion in the implementation of ULLHP as resource that needs to be used effectively.

5.2.3. In order to equip employees with the basic skills and knowledge of the service and to boost their utilization of discretion and autonomy, trainings and other awareness creation need to be done by identifying their respective needs and capabilities by the organization management.

5.2.4. In as much as the effective implementation of the policy is essential, there is a need for the government agencies and institutions responsible for the implementation process to observe the officers who primarily interact with the public at the front line, as the decisions they adopt shape the outcome of the policy eventually.

5.2.5. Policy makers to present clear policy objectives and organizational structures that are conducive to good street-level work has to understand the behaviour of street-level bureaucrats and acknowledge the manner in which they 'make' policy at the bottom. It is thus imperative to seek the input of street-level bureaucrats in the current efforts to streamline the ULLP.

5.2.6. Future researchers can incorporate (the methods employed in the data collection and increased the number of cases) and raise more issues and include wide range of urban public service providers so that the findings of this study could be tested more widely.

References

Alebel B. Weldesilassie, and Berihu Assefa Gebrehiwot. (2017). *A Critical Assessment of Urban Land Leasehold System in Ethiopia*. Ethiopian Development Research Institute

Bacry Yusuf, Sileshi Tefera and Admit Zerihun (2009) *'Land Lease Policy In Addis Ababa'* Produced and distributed by the Addis Ababa Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Associations with financial support from the Swedish Agency for International Development Cooperation, Sida.

Baldwin, R. (1998) *Rules, discretion, and legitimacy in Hill, M. (Ed) The Policy Process: A Reader.* (2nd ed). Prentice Hall: New York.

Bardach, E. (1977). *The Implementation Game*: What Happened After a Bill Becomes Law? MIT: Cambridge.

Belachew Yirsaw (2010), *'Urban Land Lease Policy of Ethiopie: Case Study on Addis Ababa and Lease Towns of Amhara National Regional State'.* FIG Congress 2010 Facing the Challenges Building the Capacity. Sydney, Australia, 11-16 April 2010

Bergen, A. & While, A. (2005) *'Implementation Deficit' and 'Street-level Bureaucracy': policy, practice and change in the development of community nursing issues.* Health and Social Care in the Community, 13, 1-10.

Bhattacherjee, Anol. (2012). *Social Science Research: Principles, methods, and practices. (2ndEd).* Florida: University of South Florida.

Biruk Shewakena, (2014). *Public Policymaking in Post-1991 Ethiopia: The Case of Urban Land Lease Policy.* Addis Ababa University Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Bogdan, R. C. And Biklen. S. K (2006). *Qualitative research in education: An introduction to theory and methods.* London, Allyn & Bacon.

Brandon, T., (2005). *Classic Review, (Review of the book Street-Level Bureaucracy: dilemmas of the individual in public services, by M. Lipsky. 1980)* Disability & Society, Vol. 20, No. 7, pp. 779-783, DOI: 10.1080/09687590500335840.

Brinkerhoff, W. and Crosby, B.J. (2002). *Managing Policy Reform: Concepts and Tools for Decision Makers in Developing and Transitioning Countries.* Kumarian Press: Bloomfield.

Brynard, P.A. (2005). *Policy Implementation: Lessons for service delivery.* http://www.unpanl.un.org/introdoc/groups/public/documents (accessed: 2011/09/21).

Brynard, P.A. (2009). *Mapping the Factors that Influence Policy Implementation.* http://www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/122 (accessed: 2011/09/21).

Brynard, P.A. and de Coning, C. (2007) *Policy implementation* in Cloete, F, Wissink, H. and de Coning, C. (Eds) *Improving Public Policy From Theory to Practice*. (2nded) Van Schaik Publishers: Pretoria.

Creswell, J. W. (2014). *Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches.* (4th ed.). Sage Publications.

Davis, K.C., (1969). *Discretionary justice: A preliminary inquiry,* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Elin Thunman, (2016). *Coping with Moral Stress in the Swedish Public Services*. Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 6 Number 3. September 2016

Ellis, K., Davis, A. & Rummery, K., (1999). *Needs Assessment, Street-level Bureaucracy and the New Community Care.* Social Policy & Administration. Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 262-280. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9515.00150

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. (1995). *Proclamation of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, proclamation No. 1/1995*. Addis Ababa Berhanena Selam Printing press.

Federal Negarit Gazeta (2011). *Proclamation No. 721/2011*: A Proclamation to Provide for Lease Holding of Urban Land.

Giacchino, S. and Kakabadse, A. (2003). *"Successful Policy Implementation: The route to building self-confident government".* International Review of Administrative Sciences. 69, 2:139160.

Gideon Sibanda, (2011). *Street-level Bureaucracy: A Case Study of the Implementation of the Adult Basic Education and Training Policy in the Pinetown Education District of KwaZulu-Natal*. Unpublished.

Goel, S., (2014). *'Bureaucratic Attitudes'—an Intermediary Variable of Policy Performance*. 18(4) 299–308. SAGE Publications. Los Angeles, London.

Hill, H. C., (2003). *Understanding Implementation: Street-Level Bureaucrats' Resources for Reform.* Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 265-282. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3525850

Hill, M. (1998). *The Policy Process in the Modern State. Ed*. Prentice Hall: London.

Hill, M. and Hupe, P. (2002). *Implementing Public Policy*: Governance in Theory and in Practice. Sage Publications: London.

Hill, M. and Hupe, P. (2007). *"Street-level Bureaucracy and Public Accountability*". Public Administration. 85, 2:279-299.

Hima Uprety, (2013). *Street-level bureaucrats and coping mechanism: Reflection of community forestry implementation.* Nepalese Journal of Public Policy and Governance, Vol. XXXII & XXXIII, No. 1&2, Jan-Dec, 2013

Honey, M. (1987). *Hermeneutics. Human development*. 30, 69-82

Howlett, M. and Ramesh, M. (2003). *Studying Public Policy: Policy cycles and policy subsystems*. Oxford University Press: Toronto.

Howlett, M., Perl, A., & Ramesh, M. (2009). *Studying Public Policy*: Policy Cycles & Policy Subsystems. Oxford University Press.

Hupe, P. & Buffat, A., (2014). *A Public Service Gap: Capturing contexts in a comparative approach of street-level bureaucracy*. Public Management Review, Vol. 16(4), pp. 548-569, Routledge.

Hupe, P. & Hill, M., (2007). *Street-Level Bureaucracy and Public Accountability*. Public Administration, 85(2), pp.279–299.

Israel, M., and I. Hay. (2006). *Research ethics for social scientists: Between ethical conduct and regulatory compliance*. London: Sage.

Keiser, L., (2010). *Understanding Street-Level Bureaucrats' Decision Making: Determining Eligibility in the Social Security Disability Program*. Public Administration Review, pp.247–258.

King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., & Verba, Sidney. (1994). *Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Križ, K., & Skivenes, M. (2014). *Street-level policy aims of child welfare workers in England, Norway and the United States: An exploratory study*. Children and Youth Services Review. Elsevier Ltd. p. 71-78. Retrieved from: http://hdl.handle.net/1956/8979

Legesse Tigabu. (2015). *the Ethiopian Urban Land Lease Holding Law: Tenure Security and Property Rights.*

Lipsky, M. (1980). *Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. Russell Sage Foundation:* New York.

Lipsky, M. (2010). *Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services*. (eds-30th Anniversary Expanded Edition), New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Lund, (2012). *Research Strategy: Purposive Sampling. Lard Dissertation*. Lund Research Ltd. Retrieved from dissertation.laerd.com/purposive-sampling. Php

Matland, R.E. (1995). "Synthesizing the Implementation Literature: The Ambiguity-Conflict Model of Policy Implementation". Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART. 5,2: 145-174.

May, P.J. & Winter, S.C., (2007). *Politicians, Managers, and Street-Level Bureaucrats: Influences on Policy Implementation*. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 19(3), pp.453–476.

Maynard-Moody, S. and Musheno, M. (2003*). Cops, Teachers, Counsellors: Stories from the Front Lines of Public Service.* University of Michigan Press: Ann Arbor

McLaughlin, M. W., (1987). *Learning from Experience: Lessons from Policy Implementation.* Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis Summer 1987, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 171.

MelakuTanku and Eyasu Kumera (2016), @Ethiopian Institute of Architecture building construction for city development (Eiabc), Addis Ababa University, urban policy chair

Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: *Dilemma of the Individual in Public Services,* 30thanniversary expanded ed. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010). 300 pp. $18.95 (paper), ISBN: 9780871545442; $28.95 (eBook), ISBN: 9781610446631.

Mutereko, S. (2009). *Policy Implementation and Street-level bureaucrats' Discretion, Autonomy and Coping mechanisms: a case study of National Curriculum Statements at a school in Pietermaritzburg.* Unpublished M.Soc.Sc Dissertation, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg.

Parsons, W. (1995). Public Policy: *An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis.* Edward Elgar: Brookfield.

Pelto, P. and G. Pelto (1997*)."Studying knowledge, culture and behavior in applied medical anthropology."* Med Anthropol 11(2): 147-63.

Pressman, M. and Wildavsky, X. (1973). *Implementation: How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland;* University of California Press: Los Angeles.

Prottas, J.M. (1979) *People Processing: The street-level bureaucrat in public service bureaucracies.* Lexington Books Lexington.

Reason, P & Rowan, J (1981) (Eds.), "*Human Enquiry: A Sourcebook in -ew Paradigm Research."* Wiley, Chichester

Riccucci, N.M. (2005). *How Management Matters: Street-Level Bureaucrats and Welfare State Reform.* Georgetown University Press: Washington D.C.

Sabatier, P., &Mazmanian, D. (1980). *The Implementation of Public Policy: A Framework of Analysis. Policy Studies Journal.* Vol. 8(4), pp. 538-560. University of Illinois, Urbana III,UnitedStates.Retrievedfromhttp://search.proquest.com.pva.uib.no/docview.1300125236?accountid=8579

Sabatier, P.A. (1986). *"Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches to Implementation Research: A Critical Analysis and Suggested Synthesis".* Journal of Public Policy. 6,1: 21-48.

Sarantakos, S. (2002) *"Social Research – 2nd edition.",* Basingstoke & New York, Palgrave.

Saunders, et al. (2007).*Research Methods for Business Students. Fourth edition, UK*: Prentice Hall, Pearson Education Limited.

Scott, G. P., (1997). *Assessing Determinants of Bureaucratic Discretion: An Experiment in Street-Level Decision Making.* Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 35-57. Oxford University Press.

Soren winter, (2012).*Implementation.* The sage hand book of public administration.

Tefera Beyera Bayuma, (2017). *Assessing Urban Land Lease Policy Implementation in Ethiopia: The Case of Ambo Town*. Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research (IJIR) Vol-3, Issue-4, 2017 ISSN: 2454-1362, http://www.onlinejournal.in *Theory and methods.* London, Allyn & Bacon.

Tummers, L. and Rocco, P. (2015). *Serving Clients When the Server Crashes: How Frontline Workers Cope with E-Government Challenges.* Public Administration Review, 75: 817–827. DOI: 10.1111/PUAR.12379

Tummers, L., & Bekkers, V., (2014). *Policy Implementation, Street-level Bureaucracy, and the Importance of Discretion,* Public Management Review, 16:4, 527-547, DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2013.841978

Van Meter, D. S., & Van Horn, C. E., (1975). *The Policy Implementation Process. A Conceptual Framework. Administration and Society.* Vol. 6, No. 4. Sage Publications.

Walkup, M., (1997). *Policy Dysfunction in Humanitarian Organizations: The Role of Coping Strategies, Institutions, and Organizational Culture Journal of Refugee Studies*. Oxford University Press 10(1):37-6

Weimer, D. and Vining, A.R. (2005). *Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice.* Prentice Hall: New Jersey.

Widaningrum, A. (2007) *Street-level Bureaucracy*: dilemmas of providers in health centers. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/EROPA/UNPAN027473.pdf Accessed 4.9.2018.

William, K. (2006): *The Research Methods Knowledge Base*. Cornell University. http://trochim.human.cornell.edu/kb/index.htm)

Wilson, J. (2010): *"Essentials of Business Research: A Guide to Doing Your Research Project"* SAGE Publications.

Yanow, D. (1987). *Criticisms: what implementation research has not taught us?* Policy Studies Review, 7, 103-115

Yin, Robert K. (2003). *Case study research: Design and Methods (3rd ed.).* California: Sage Publications

Zelalem Yirga, (2014). *Critical Analysis of Ethiopian Urban Land Lease Policy Reform since Early 1990s.* FIG Congress 2014. Engaging the Challenges – Enhancing the Relevance Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 16-21 June 2014

Appendix

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSTY

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

MASTERS PROGRAM IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND POLICY

Questionnaires to be filled by permanent employees of land bank and transfer office.

The purpose of this questionnaire is to collect primary data for conducting a study on the topic, **"The role of street-level bureaucrats in policy implementation: the case of Addis Ababa land bank and transfer office "**as partial fulfillment to the completion of the Masters of public management and policy Program at Addis Ababa university. This study is purely for academic purpose and in no ways that affects the respondent's personality. It will be kept confidential. So that, you're genuine view, frank opinion & timely responses are very valuable in determining the success of the study. Therefore you are kindly requested to extend your cooperation honestly by providing relevant information and filling out the following questionnaires that are prepared for this intention.

Name: - MESFIN SETEGN Tel. 910- 825-006

Email: - mesfinsetegn2@gmail.com

1. Personal Details

1.1 Age: ________

1.2 Gender: Male___ Female______

1.3 Professional and educational qualification

certificate	diploma	BA/BSc	MA/MSc

1.4 Level of position____________________

1.5 How long have you been working in Land Bank and Transfer Office?

0-5	6-9	10-14	15or more	

Section 2: Goal and objectives of the urban land lease holding Policy.

2.1. Are you familiar with the goals and objectives of Urban Land Lease Holding proclamation No. 721/2011 listed below?

Yes	No

1/Urban land lease holding shall be permitted in a manner that ensures the collective benefit and progress of the public. 2/The lease bid offer and land delivery system shall adhere to the principles of transparency and accountability and thereby avoid corrupt practices and abuses to ensure impartiality in the process. 3/Bid price shall reflect the prevailing transaction value of land. 4/The land delivery system shall give precedence to the interests of the public and urban centers to ensure rapid urban development and equitable benefits of citizens and thereby ensure the sustainability of the country's development

2.2 How clear are the goals and objectives of Urban Land Lease Holding proclamation No. 721/2011 for you?

Not clear	Quite clear	Very clear

2.3 How often do the goals and objectives of Urban Land Lease Holding proclamation No. 721/2011clutch with your own goals and objectives?

Not often	Quite often	Very often

2.4 Are there any challenges that you face when trying to execute the tender process?

Yes	No

2.5 If yes, how do you cope?

Section 3: Functions of officers

The core functions of the officers are listed below: Tick which ones you find not so difficult to perform, difficult to perform, and very difficult to perform.

3.0	**Functions**	Not so difficult	Quite difficult	Very difficult
3.1 3.2	Preparing Information relating to urban lands prepared for tender Publicity of urban land tender plans			
3.3	Tender process			

3.4 How do you cope with those functions which you find quite difficult to perform?

3.5 How do you cope with the functions which you find very difficult to perform?

3.6 Are there other functions that you perform outside of your specified duties?

Yes	No

3.7 If so, why do you perform these additional duties?

Section 4: Issue of resources

The issue of resources is important for the successful implementation of the tender program s. Do you have enough of the following key resources at your office?

No	Resource	Yes	No
4.1	Finances		
4.2	Facilities		
4.3	Tender materials		
4.4	Time		
4.5	Skilled personnel		

4.6 If you do not have enough of any of these resources, how do you cope with the issue?

4.7 How do the coping strategies affect the customer’s access to land?

Section 5: Discretion and autonomy in the performance of tasks

The questions below seek to determine the extent to which you make your own decisions when performing your responsibilities as tender process officer in situations where resources are lacking.

5.1 Are your duties and responsibilities specified in an official job description?

Yes	No

5.2 How would you rate the extent of autonomy in performing your formal duties?

To no extent	To some extent	To a great extent

5.3 To what extent do you use your discretion in the performance of your duties?

To no extent	To some extent	To a great extent

5.4 If you perform additional functions, to what extent do you use your own discretion/judgement?

To no extent	To some extent	To a great extent

5.5 To what extent do you think the exercise of discretion helps you and the customers to attain the outcomes?

To no extent	To some extent	To a great extent

5.6 Which of the following informs your discretion and autonomy?

Professional Experience	Education

5.7 What challenges do you encounter when exercising your discretion?

5.8 How do you cope with those challenges?

5.9 If you perform additional functions, to what extent do you have autonomy in performing these functions?

To no extent	To some extent	To a great extent

Section 6: Control and accountability

6.1 To whom are you accountable for your performance?

6.2 Do you get assessed on how you perform your duties?

Yes	No

6.3 If so, how often do you get assessed?

Not often	Quite often	Very often

6.4 What method is used to assess your performance?

6.5 To what extent are you guided by written rules in the performance of your tasks?

To no extent	To some extent	To a great extent

6.6 Is there any system of support to help you cope with or increase your performance?

Yes	No

6.7 Do you have any recommendations to make?

Thank you for your participation.