

**Political communication Vis-à-vis Anti-Terrorism  
Laws: The Case of Ethiopia**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Political Communication vis-à-vis Anti-Terrorism Laws: The Case of Ethiopia

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Addis Ababa University, 2014

Ethiopia uses legislation as one way of counterterrorism. This legislation is “Anti-Terrorism Proclamation; Proclamation Number 652/2009.” Against its principal aim of preventing every intent and act of terrorism, some claim that the law shackles the political communication in the country. The primary purpose of the study was to explore the impacts of the law on political communication as practiced by various political parties and media organizations.

In attempting to explore the impacts of the law, the Spiral of Silence and Media Politics Theories were used as theoretical framework of the study. Media-terrorism relations model was also employed to support the analysis.

The study is entirely qualitative method in which some political parties and print media organizations were purposively selected for the analysis. Accordingly, nine multi-ethnic political parties: Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front, All Ethiopia Unity

Organization, Ethiopian Democratic Party, Ethiopian Social Democratic-South Coalition Unity Party, Ethiopian Raie Party, Coalition for Unity and Democracy, Ethiopian Democratic Union, Unity for Democracy and Justice and Blue Party were selected. Seven media organizations: *Addis Zemen*, *The Reporter*, *Addis Admas*, *Ethio-Mihidar*, *Addis Guday*, *Fact* and *Lomi* were also selected for the study. Semi-structured interview with representatives of political parties and media organizations and textual data obtained from the publications were used in the study. The textual data collected from the publications were stories and features ran from 8 July 2013- 10 October 2013.

This study has found out that the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation affects the political communication by further weakening the already weak political communication by repressing opposition political parties and media organizations. The law suppresses opposition political parties by restricting political space, intimidating members and supporters as well as through routine surveillance. Similarly, the law affects the political communication of media by pressurizing journalists, challenging access to information and intensifying self-censorship. However, the study has found out that all the existing problems of political communications should not be considered as the byproduct of the proclamation.

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## Acronyms

AEUO	All Ethiopian Unity Organization
ATP	Anti-Terrorism Proclamation
CUD	Coalition for Unity and Democracy
EBA	Ethiopian Broadcast Authority
EDP	Ethiopian Democratic Party
EDU	Ethiopian Democratic Union
ENA	Ethiopian News Agency
EPA	Ethiopian Press Agency
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front
ERP	Ethiopian Raie Party
ERTA	Ethiopian Radio and Television Authority
ESD-SCUP	Ethiopian Social Democratic- South Coalition Unity Party
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
NEB	National Electorate Board
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OPP	Opposition Political Parties
UDJ	United for Democracy and Justice

# **Chapter One**

## **1. Introduction**

### **1.1. Background of the Study**

Political communication is “notoriously difficult to define with any precision, simply because both components of the phrase themselves are open to a variety of definitions, more or less broad” (McNair, 2011: 3). Many scholars define the phrase political communication in different ways. One of the commonest definitions is given below. Political communication is the study of interactive process between politicians, the news media, the society and it is the system that the role of communication in general and media in particular is shown locally, nationally and internationally in the democratic political system (McNair, 2011, P. 1; Franklin, 1995, 255 on Gibson & Rommele, 2007, p. 3; Norris, nd, p. 1 and Kaid, 2004, p. xiii).

Political communication can be performed between politicians and the media to address the people. In different ruling systems, the political communication strategies are so different. For example, political communication strategies are different in the contexts of revolution, coup d'état, public diplomacy, peaceful demonstration, terrorism, public rallies, rhetoric, propaganda, etc. In a democratic system, in which the system allows freedom of speech and expression, the political communication strategies are not bloodsheds like revolution, terrorism and coup d'état (McNair, 2011; Gibson & Rommele, 2007).

Political communication can be performed at the interpersonal and mass mediated level of communication. The mass media political communication as Bennet & Entman (2001: 2) state that “mediated political communication has been central to politics and public life in contemporary democracies.” Communicating politics is, therefore, a precondition for democracy especially in a representative one, which relies on opinion formation and interest mediation. Gibson and Rommele (2007:4) state that:

In representative democracies communication between leaders and led is a necessary condition for the political system to work. The people need to be informed about the political programs, policy issues, and political alternatives presented by the candidates or political parties (opinion formation); on the other hand, political representatives need to know the wishes and demands of those whom they are supposed to govern (interest mediation).

Political communication is an important thing in political and media systems. But there are some domestic and international factors that affect it. The international factors that affect political communication are the way communication is perceived to maintain the status quo of the powerful (Roselle, 2006). To maintain the status quo of the powerful more states are engaging in the type of communication they don't want or they can't perform. The political communication related with terrorism and counterterrorism is one of factors.

Terrorism is “a notorious and disturbing international phenomenon” (Whittaker, 2003). Terrorism has no one common definition around the world. Some of the definitions are

the manifestations of the institutional stands and interests. However, the incidents of terrorism are almost similar like bombings of a building, massacre of civilians, deliberate contamination of medication services, assassination of high ranking officials, poisoning of supermarket shelves, and other activities (Whittaker, 2003). In addition to this, he claims that the difference of terrorism from other crimes in its objective, action, targets and victims, chain of command and means of communication.

Thus, as terrorism is different from other crimes it is not supposed to be addressed by the existing laws. That is why, anti-terrorism laws are ratified among the United Nations member states in accordance with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, the Geneva Convention, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights globally and the African Charter on Human and Civil Rights and The African Union Convention in Preventing Terrorism at global, continental, regional and national level.

International Pen (2003: 14) states “international law on terrorism is extremely complex and examining the ramification for freedom of expression could be the subject of a far longer report”. However, according to Whittaker (2003: 264) “democratic states face the dilemma of how to morally justify counter measures that will stop terrorists atrocities without violating the societies own fundamental principles and standards of civilized conduct including international standards of human rights.”

Ethiopia, as a member of UN and other international organizations has its own anti-terrorism proclamation, “A proclamation on anti-terrorism proclamation, ATP here after, number 652/2009” that has been adopted to maintain and enhance “the right of the people to live in peace, freedom and security has to be protected at all time, from the threat of

terrorism” and “it has become necessary to legislate adequate legal provisions since the laws presently in force in the country are not sufficient to prevent and control terrorism” (Federal Negarit Gazeta, 2009: 4827). The proclamation as a source of law, statutory law, has its own interpretations and ramifications. The interpretation and implementation of this law has its own ramifications on civil liberties as well as human and democratic rights. It is in this context that this study intends to explore how the anti-terrorism law affects political communication in Ethiopia.

## **1.2. Statement of the Problem**

Enacting draconian and highly subjective antiterrorism laws and other laws that cripple independent media function is one of the external media’s challenges in entrenching democracy in countries in transitional democracies like most Africa states (Irex.org, 2009). Misuse of anti-terrorism laws creates some crackdown on the relationship between media and political parties.

The Ethiopian ATP has been described as “highly subjective” and looks like the law enacted for oppressing press freedom. On the other hand, Woldeselase (2010: 294) states, “Contrary to allegations by some international human rights advocacy organizations, the bill is not ‘draconian’ nor does it infringe the rights and freedoms of the people. It is in fact consistent with the constitution of Ethiopia.”

As a result, the law “drew international condemnation for granting the government broad power to criminalize reporting that it claims supports or glorifies terrorist groups” (Irex.org, 2009: 119).

Along the same lines, Global Campaign for Free Expression (Article 19) also states:

The proclamation seriously undermines freedom of expression rights in a manner that is unlikely to improve security. It gives broad and vaguely defined powers to authorities to criminalize speech that is not directly inciting terrorism and undermines the media's fundamental right to protection of sources in doing so, it violates Ethiopia's obligation under international law (2010: 11).

Not only at the international level but also at the national level, different political parties and media organizations express their concerns that the ATP is a law that was enacted for "Oppressing dissent". Currently, the opposition political parties, here after OPP, Unity for Democracy and Justice Party particularly, mobilized the people to participate in peaceful demonstration and petition of "Millions Voice for freedom" for the cancellation or amendment of the law.

The law has also attracted the attention of some researchers. For example, Biniyam Tamene studied the impact of the law on private press in 2013. Through interview and survey as a means of data collection he found out that "Overbroad and vague definitions of terrorism and other vaguely defined provisions in the anti-terrorism law are having a chilling effect on the media landscape in the country" (Biniyam, 2013). Moreover, his finding showed that the challenges the new law poses on working journalists' task on matters of public interest.

Although Biniyam studied the impact of the proclamation on the private press, how the proclamation affects the ruling and OPP as well as private and state owned media has not been investigated.

It is, therefore, the intention of the study was to fill that gap and hence examine how the legal framework of the proclamation affect communications of political parties and media organizations in relation to communicating political issues.

### **1.3. Rationale of the Study**

The logic behind doing research on the topic ‘political communication vis-à-vis the anti-terrorism laws: the case of Ethiopia’ is to get clear understanding on the following important points: (1) why study political communication? (2) Why choose the Ethiopian case?

#### **1. Why Study Political Communication?**

The researcher wants to study political communication because both terrorism and counterterrorism acts have an immediate impact on it. Terrorism in the most widely accepted usage of the term is fundamentally and inherently political. It is about power “The pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change” (Whittaker, 2003: 5).

Counter terrorism mechanisms to prevent and combat terrorist attacks are different. In the counter terrorism strategies, one of the works is adoption of legislations, which is more political. Whittaker states that “Although this point would not be acceptable to

everybody, there would be an agreement with a belief that counterterrorism policies often use political labeling which may be modified should a state's interests require it. Moreover, there is little debate that government repression may result in unforeseen consequences for public attitudes" (2003: 277).

The anti-terrorism laws of different countries of the world are controversial. Some of the human rights organizations claim that these laws are techniques of political oppression while press freedom advocates consider the laws as direct attack on the press to sustain political power.

The most serious and risky work of communicators in general and journalists in particular is to communicate politics. Political communication takes place between politicians, media and the people. The most serious communication that clash with tight laws and the ruling government is communicating politics because it is the question of power. Therefore, the study attempts to examine the impacts of the anti-terrorism law on the political communication of politicians and media.

## **2. Why Choose the Ethiopian Case?**

Like other countries, Ethiopia has also adopted ATP since 2009. However, the proclamation has attracted some serious criticisms from some international organizations and national political and media organizations for its "Vague and overbroad definitions, over empowerment of the police and its character of oppress the democratic commitments" (Reporters without Borders; Irex.org, 2009; Global Campaign for Free Expression, 2010). This law is not welcomed and interpreted correspondingly with all political parties (the ruling and the OPP) and private and government owned media at the

national level. That is why; United for Democracy and Justice Party, lately supported by the so called 33 parties, staged peaceful public demonstrations for three consecutive months and collected petitions that called for the amendment of the proclamation. Therefore, studying the impacts of ATP, in relation to politicians and media political communication is very important.

#### **1.4. Objective of the Study**

The general objective of the study is to explore how the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation affects political communication of political and media organizations.

Specifically, the study attempts to:

- ✓ Explore how the proclamation affects freedom of expression on issues related to political communication of political parties and press freedom
- ✓ Asses the pros and cons of the proclamation in the country's political communication practices.
- ✓ Explore how freedom of expression might be affected by the quest for national security.

#### **1.5. Research Questions**

The study is aimed at answering the following research questions:

- ✓ How does the proclamation affect freedom of expression on issues related to political communication of political parties and press freedom?

- ✓ What are the pros and cons of the proclamation in the country's political communication arena?
- ✓ How does the demand for national security affect freedom of expression?

### **1.6. Scope of the Study**

Research on political communication can include all political communication elements; political organizations (political parties, political actors, public associations, terrorist groups), media organizations and the citizens. However, because of limitations and for the purpose of easy management of data, the researcher is limited only to political parties and media. More specifically, the study focuses on 9 multi-ethnic political parties and 7 print media organizations, which focus on political, economic and social issues.

### **1.7. Significance of the Study**

The result of the research will be helpful for the government to examine the strength and drawbacks of ATP based on the findings. Besides this, it will help the government make some type of revisiting of the proclamation in relation to the argumentative points that rose from the subjects of the study.

The other significance of the study result is for media organizations in helping them to assess their coverage on ATP and learn their strong sides as well as shortcomings. Moreover, it has also provide a better insight to journalists how different media organizations working under ATP.

The study helps the OPP in showing their problems and the impact of ATP on political communication. Moreover, it will serve as a spring-board for future researchers who might be interested to work on the topic.

### **1.8. Organization of the Study**

This, political communication vis-à-vis the anti-terrorism laws: the case of Ethiopia, study is going to be presented in five chapters. The first chapter, introduction, incorporates the background of the study, statement of the problem, rationale of the study, objectives of the research, the research questions, scope of the research, significance of the study and organization of the study.

The second chapter, review literature, attempts to review different scholars' work on the topics of political communication, terrorism, media and terrorism, counterterrorism activities and media and terrorism as well as tries to set theoretical frameworks of the research.

The third chapter, methodology, presents and justifies the use of the major research techniques applied throughout the research work including research approach, sampling, data collection methods and data analysis methods and procedures.

The fourth chapter of the study entirely analyses and presents the findings of the study based on the data collected.

Finally, the study ends by concluding the major findings and forwards some recommendations under chapter five.

## **Chapter Two**

### **2. Literature Review**

#### **2.1. Political Communication**

Political communication is not an emerging discipline but it is as old as political activity. It is an activity, since almost 2500 years. The evidence for this is the publications of Aristotle “Rhetoric & Politics” in 350 BC (Vreese, 2006). The concept of political communication is related with the concept of two different disciplines: politics and communication. Politics is a quest for power and communication is a method of creating common understanding. To influence someone and to get power over the other needs effective communication. Therefore, for creating better understanding in a society and to get power, communication is crucial. According to Bennet and Entman (2007:2), “politics without communication is like having blood without veins and arteries; it is not really going anywhere.”

Changes in media and political systems make the political communication volatile. When the political system changes, the way the communication facilitates and performs also change. For instance, one way role of the society in political communication in authoritarian system is changed to a two way communication in democratic system. Similarly, changes in media system and technology changes political communication. Nowadays, the media system has changed in more competition and choice than ever before. It is marked by an increasing amount of globalization in the flow of political information, especially with the proliferation of internet and digital technology. Although

newer technologies have merged diverged platforms, conventional distinctions can still be drawn concerning inter-personal communications, within group networks and mass communications through the media (Norris, 2010).

According to Wolsfeld & Maark (2003) communication is a central component in a political process that enables to transfer message when leaders address the public, perform election campaigns, accomplish public debates and struggle for national and international attention. Thus, the masses would decide through their exercise of vote and influence of public opinion on the political process.

Political communication is the complex relationship between politics, the media and democracy (McNair, 2011). In most of the definitions of political communication politicians, people and the communication process are considered as elements. Political communication is a discipline that deals with “the interaction between media and political systems; locally, nationally and internationally” (Gibson & Rommele, 2007: 3). And this communication is multi-dimensional; it can be top-down, bottom-up or horizontal (Norris, 2010).

Political communication in its scope includes “any verbal and written political rhetoric, symbolic communication acts and political acts such as boycotts and protests” that enables the political system more understandable for the people (Glaber, 1981 in McNair, 2011: 3).

An important question that must be addressed, here is, ‘what makes a communication political?’ Denton & Woodward in McNair (2011) stated that the reasons that make

communication political are *its content and purpose, not the source of a message*. A communication to be political, it has to give emphasis on the purpose of the speaker instead of focusing on the speaker. If the purpose of the speaker is to “influence the political environment” then the communication is political. Therefore, communication undertaken by politicians, other political actors, non-politicians, voters and journalists for the purpose of achieving specific political objectives can be considered as political communication.

By observing the political communication within a society, it is easy to understand the level of democracy enjoyed (Rawnsley, 2005). Political communication is very important for the development of democracy in the political process. Any substantial political discussions of people in public bars, dinner parties, behind- closed door negotiations of governments and information glanced by journalists from meetings with high level sources are highly significant. Political communication “effects are phenomena that have consequence for the political system” (Bryant, 2008: 217).

Political communication that takes place through media plays “subversive and/ or supportive” roles in the political system (Rawnsley, 2005: 142). The practice of political communication is shaped profoundly by the relation between politicians and the media practitioners. Both of them adopt their marketing strategies. The politicians want to sell their programs, policies and agendas heavily on sophisticated use of media while the media want to maximize their profit by making the politicians’ agenda as a headline (Wolfsfeld & Maark; 2003).

Although political communication has significant roles in the democratic arena, domestic, international and communication related factors affect it. The domestic factor is related with leaders that may be “concerned to one degree or another with securing support for withdrawal or acquire scene.” The international factor affects political communication because it pursues “to maintain the superpower status.” The third factor is related to communication such as access to media, technique in crafting messages and news values (Roselle, 2006: 8).

### **2.1.2. Elements of Political Communication**

Political communication, as a system, has three important elements that have their own roles in the process by which political action is conceived and realized. These elements are “Political organizations, the society and media”, which are interdependent in the political world (McNair, 2011).

**1. Political organizations:** political organizations consist of political actors, political parties and public organizations. Political actors are groups of individuals who aspire to influence the decision making process through institutional means. Political parties are a collection of more or less like-minded individuals who have similar ideological structure. Public organizations consist of trade unions, consumer groups, professional associations, pressure groups and terrorist organizations (ibid).

**2. The Citizen:** political message has relevance when it properly reaches to the citizen. “Without the people no political message can have any relevance” (ibid). All political

communication is intended to achieve an effect on the receivers whatever the size and nature of them.

3. **Media:** the most important element in the political communication is media because it plays a crucial role in connecting the other two elements; the politicians and the Citizen. McNair (2011: 11) states “media function both as transmitters of political communication, which originates outside the media organization itself and as sender of political messages constructed by journalists and other producers such as bloggers.” This shows that how much media are effective in the process of political communication. It is not only passive transmitter of someone else’s idea but it can be a source of political message.

### **2.1.3. Mediated Politics**

Mediated politics means a system of politics in which politicians conduct politics through communication that reaches citizens via the mass media. According to Bryant (2008: 217) “Political effects of mass media are a subset of a large set of political communication effects.” Political communication can be taken place in different ways, among them mass mediated political communication is the one which have an effect in some type of change and/or maintain stability.

“Politicians believe that media [are] central to power” (Roselle, 2006: 13). The centeredness of the media to power shows, how a group or an organization that have a chance to get media access can reach and influence a wide audience through well-organized political messages. However, well-prepared political messages cannot reach to

the concerned body without the opportunity of publication or broadcasting. Thus, to get power politicians ought to access media.

Media play an important role in amplifying the political situation of the environment. Media have an impact to define the political atmosphere, influence on the nature of the environment, raise and lower the public mobilization, and legitimacy of political groups (Wolfsfeld, 2004).

Although the role of media in political communication and mediated politics is powerful, it has a problem too. Communicating politics through media leads to 'media malaise.' According to Norris (2000:4) media malaise refers to "accounts claiming that communication practices in political communication by the news media and by party campaigns hinder "civil engagement"- meaning citizens learning about public affairs, trust in government and political activism." The assumption is that, when politicians focus on media it will be difficult to get immediate feedback from citizens. This, in turn, makes the people to refrain from political engagement.

In mediated politics "the proposition that the media should provide a robust, uninhibited and wide open market place of ideas, in which opposing views may meet, contend, and take each other's measures" (Bennet & Entman, 2007: 2). However, the political power of politicians is the most determinant in media coverage. The intention for this is that "the greater the antagonists' power the more dependent the news media are on the actor for information. Weaker antagonists on the other hand, are forced to adopt themselves to media demands in order to gain access" (Wolfsfeld & Maark, 2003: 141). Therefore, to attract media attention the weaker antagonists' provide novel political actions. This

means “While the powerful can gain access to the media through the front door, the powerless are required to enter through the back door” (ibid: 142).

As media are the center of power, to get media access is very tough in authoritarian government systems and state-owned media systems. Authoritarian governments control communication channels, alternative political opinion demonstrations and popular mobilizations in a variety of mechanisms. Similarly, controlling the media under the state help to “de-politicize and de-mobilize a population, sapping their energy, generating passivity and depriving people not only of a voice but also of stimuli that might activate them” (Rawsley, 2005). Consequently, in most dictatorial political systems the state owned media try to divert or kill the stimuli for political mobilization and demonstrations by rebuffing media coverage.

Political communication is concerned about the role of the news media in conflict that concentrates to deal with the role of media in war, terrorism and protests. Therefore, the researcher comprehends political communication in relation with terrorism. The next topic deals about terrorism.

## **2.2. Terrorism**

Terrorism is a jargon that different individuals, organizations and institutions have developed their own gobbledygook. Because the basic concept of terrorism is essentially contested, value laden and open to multiple meanings located within broader cultural frames, to some extent, terrorism is in the eye of the beholder (Moeller 2009; Norris, 2003).

Terrorism is an abstract concept that lacks clear boundaries in the judgment of violent actions. To describe people as terrorist who “perusing legitimate ends by illegitimate means” is difficult to state it clearly. Because “one Person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter” (Guelke, 2006: 190). But, there are differences between terrorists and freedom fighters.

Freedom fighters do not need to terrorize a population into submission. Freedom fighters target the military force and the organized instruments of repression keeping dictatorial regimes in power. Freedom fighters struggle to liberate their citizens from oppression and to establish a form of government that reflects the will of the people. In contrast, terrorists intentionally kill mainly unarmed civilians, often women and children, often third parties who are not in any way part of a dictatorial regime (Bovard, 2003: 20)

Moreover, some people link the concept of terrorism with extremism while others believe that terrorism is the result of extremism. It might be similar, but they have a difference, too. According to Seib (2011: 3), “extremists are a group that preaches hatred and in a non-specific way urges the targeting of noncombatants but does not directly engage in the prescribed actions. Also, their messages might remain outside the definition of terrorism by, for instance, calling for attacks on combatants but not civilians.”

Likewise, Webel (2004) distinguished terrorism from other kinds of violence by its “bi-focal” character; the acts of violence are intended as a means to achieve certain goals and the concept is an “open” and “open-textured.” Therefore, the concept of terrorism is

value laden and it is in the eye of the beholder. However, it underscored two elements; absolute illegitimate violence and the acts are purposely to convey a message beyond the immediate target (Guelke, 2006).

### **2.2.1. Defining Terrorism**

There is no prevailing and international definition of terrorism. Almost none of the proponents of this form of political expression would admit to being a terrorist. They rejected the word terrorist and prefer to call themselves in more glamorous term like freedom fighters, national liberation or resistance movements, guerrillas, or mujahedeen (Robertson, 2007; McNair, 2011). This shows that, terrorism is a social construction and an action has been given that label becomes difficult to treat in a value neutral manner. Therefore, terms like terrorism and terrorist are labels that do not convey hard information.

The opponents of terrorism on the other hand, call them terrorist by giving their own definition. The Central Intelligence Agency of United States of America, defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated, violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience” (Webel, 2004: 8). On this definition, terrorism is a systematic, preplanned action that is created for political demand and to influence the people by committing violence against civilians.

Terrorism is a tool or method of communication. According to Rinehart (2006: 15) “terrorism is a tool of communication, conveying a message from the ground carrying out

such acts of violence to the larger population as a whole.” Similarly, Norris (2003: 6) states:

Terrorism is a method or a tactic of involving systematic coercive intimidation including the threat or use of violence in the destruction of property or physical harm to persons used as a mechanism of control. This process is exemplified by the use of sabotage, destructive riots, hijackings, assassinations, kidnappings, arson, mass poisonings, torture, rape, bombings, and unlawful imprisonment designed to instill fear, insecurity, and anxiety among its target population.

Terrorism is also considered as a method and strategy. Terrorism is a method to gain social, economic and political concessions and to provoke change. It is also a strategy to persuade the government to change specific policy by using violence against symbolic targets (Robertson, 2007). Hence, terrorism is not an ideology, a political party or a goal but a method of achieving a particular goal. The common goals are “intimidating a population, unduly compelling a government or [an] international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization” (Robertson, 2007: 27).

Terrorist groups use violence to achieve their goal. Biernatzki (2002:5) states “terrorism is the exercise of violence or the threat of violence against unarmed and/or unsuspecting population to coerce to meet the demands of the aggressor.” An important point from Biernatzki’s definition is that terrorism is a means to achieve the aggressor’s goal. ‘Who

is the aggressor' is the basic question that should be addressed here. According to Rinehart (2006: 16) terrorism can be "carried out by both state and non-state actors to achieve specific and purposeful goals." Therefore, terrorism can be carried out by the state and non-state actors. When terrorism is carried out by the state it is called state terrorism, which is a coercive intimidation initiated by government authorities directed against the people of another state (state sponsored) or against its own people. Non-state actors are a group of terrorists who are radical insurgents and minority dissidents that initiate political violence against the state (Norris, 2003; Biernatzki, 2002).

The characteristics of terrorism are also driven from the above definitions. The characteristics of terrorism are; terrorists use violence to draw attention, the targets are innocent people and their goal is political (Robertson, 2007).

### **2.2.2. Terrorism at Regional and Global Levels: Trends and Impacts**

Terrorism as a means of social and political change is as early as 48 AD when a Jewish religious group, *Zealots*, carried out violence against Roman imperialism to incite an insurrection. However, the term 'terrorism' is first coined by Edmund Burke in the eighteenth century to describe the French revolution against Robespierre's reigns (Rinehart, 2006; Robertson, 2007; Guelke, 2006).

After WWII, terrorism has been expanded, especially from late 1960s onwards. And this period is considered as "age of terrorism" because it was the era of decolonization. Many hijackings and hostage taking tactics were employed during this age. For example, the

hijacking of EL AL airliner en route from Rome to Lod on 23 July 1968 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Guelke, 2006).

Terrorists typically do not control territory, wear uniform, carry their weapons openly or maintain permanent bases. But they operate in new and unconventional ways. Terrorist acts are bombings of a building, the assassination of a head of state, destructive riots, hijacking, hostage taking, the massacre of civilians by military unit, the poisoning of products on supermarket shelves and deliberate contamination of over-the counter medication in chemist shop (Hoffman, 1998; Hoffman, 2006; Norris, 2003; McNair, 2011; Robertson, 2007).

Although terrorism has such a long history, the attacks of September 11/ 2001(Widely known as 9/11 attacks) increased the global attention dramatically (Robertson, 2007). The trend in the degree of using the term terrorism since the French revolution to the decolonization era and the 9/11 attacks is different. Before the 9/11 attacks, terrorism is considered as a means to change the system from dictatorial reign and imperialism. After 9/11 attacks terrorism become open textured. USA has labeled different groups and states as terrorists. Although terrorism “has been a feature of the political and cultural landscapes of America throughout its history” 9/11 changes many trends that have great impact on America’s global interaction (Robertson, 2007).

Most of the terrorist attacks before 9/11 especially, the late 1970s and 1980s were related with aviation; hijacking and hostage taking were the acts of terrorists. Henceforth, most treaties after ‘Black September’ (1972) were focused on aviation related issues (Hoffman, 1998). Nowadays, terrorism is becoming more complex in its conceptual framework and

level of manipulations. For instance, the concepts of terrorism are expanded from mass physical destruction to cyber terrorism. Similarly, the weapons that they use to perform terror acts also become more sophisticated. In short, terrorism is transcended in its form and scope encompassing many things within it.

In general, terrorism at the global level, especially fighting terrorism, makes the political world become more polarized among the proponents and opponents of counterterrorism mechanisms. This division leads to the labeling of some states as pro-terrorism and others as allies to fight terrorism. Currently, the relationship among Arabs, Middle East and North East African countries as a region has many threats.

### **2.2.3. Terrorism and Politics**

Terrorism is a pejorative term, intrinsically negative connotations, applied to one's enemy and opponents. Its notion is narrowly perceived as a form of political violence with application of different scenarios by political actors. It is usually labeled for an opposition to a legitimate state (Rinehart, 2006; Hoffman, 1998). Terrorism may be motivated by political, religious or ideological objectives and encouraged by local social, ethnic and religious conditions. Although terrorism is motivated and encouraged by different reasons, their goals are always political because they seek political power to conform their views (Whittaker, 2005; Robertson, 2007).

Terrorism, therefore, acquires its political content retrospectively based on the success or failure of those who employ political violence to achieve specific political goals like anti-

imperialism, revolutionary insurrection, nation building and/or radical Islamic jihad (Webel, 2004).

Terrorism can be “criminal, psychic, war and political.” Political terrorism directs both government policy on terrorism and how government sells its policy to its citizens. Political terrorism has also “revolutionary, sub-revolutionary, and repressive” subtypes. The revolutionary political terrorism is when a radical insurgents demand changes within the existing structure while repressive political terrorism carried out by the state in the interest of maintaining the status quo (Alali & Eka, 1991b in Biernatzki, 2002).

Terrorism is a “way of branding those who may violently oppose a particular policy or government.” Therefore, when political communication failed in between opposite ideas then faction is formulated in the view of political interest and the powerful (the government) label the other group as terrorist (Hebermas & Chomsky in Webel, 2004).

Webel (2004: 10) adds:

Yesterday’s ‘terrorist’ may become today’s or tomorrow’s chief (s) of state if they are successful in seizing or gaining state power. After accession to state power, the victors often (re) write the history books to (re) label themselves as ‘Freedom Fighters,’ ‘patriots,’ and/or proponents of national liberation and to denote their vanquished adversaries as ‘terrorists, autocrats, imperialists and so on.

In political point of view, the term terrorism is nothing more than branding a certain group who reflects antagonistic idea. In most countries experience political groups who

were labeled as a terrorist by the government of the time is changed to political parties when they reach consensus. The current South Africa and Zimbabwe ruling parties are the best evidence of the effectiveness of communication in politics (Engeland & Rudolph, 2008). However, when communication failed, the political parties in multi-party system changed to terrorist.

### **2.3. Media and Terrorism**

#### **2.3.1. Terrorism vis-à-vis Media**

Terrorism is highly communicational and media predominantly work on communication. Terrorism could not exist without the networks of communication channels that convey its impact and messages to broader audiences across the globe. The event of terrorism makes terrorists, media, government, and the public to deal with it. Terrorists create the event then media report the event while the government influences the event and the public understands it. Here, media plays a central role in between all of them (Lewis, 2005; Alkarmi, 2005).

Rodrigo in Biernatzki (2002: 17) has described the media and terrorism relationship in a thermometer and fever analogy. He states “the relationship of the media to terrorism and to the underlying social causes as that of a thermometer to a fever and to the disease of which the fever is only a symptom. The media detect the presence of the fever of terrorism and aid in diagnosing the underlying socio-political disease.” Therefore, media are crucial for the government to show the presence and level of terrorism then again for terrorists to give coverage during crisis.

### **2.3.2. Media-Terrorism Relationship**

The relationship between media and terrorism is not unidirectional though they cannot be equally important. Media are described as “oxygen of terrorists” but not the reverse because media would not cease to exist if terrorism ends (Anon, 2008). The common relation between the two is in creating and reporting events.

Hoffman (1998) believes that the media-terrorism relationship is symbiotic. However, Wilkinson (2003: 175-176) identifies four distinct relationships; pure indifference, relative indifference, media-oriented strategy and total break. In pure indifference relationship terrorists neither seek to frighten a given population beyond their intended victims nor to realize a propaganda coup through their acts. Relative indifference relationship perpetrators of violence remain indifferent about making headlines not out of indifference with regard to media. In media-oriented strategy the relationship is instrumental that terrorists’ effort is to provoke the media into action. When terrorists coerce the media and considered as enemies to be punished and destroyed, the type of relation is total-break. Furthermore, the media-terrorism relation can be seen from different perspectives; terrorists use media, media use terrorists and terrorists are media.

#### **2.3.2.1. Terrorists Use Media**

As discussed before, the act of terrorism is a means to achieve specific goal beyond the immediate victims. This demands communication in general and mass media coverage in particular. Since the end of World War II, terrorist groups use mass media extensively. Therefore, as Prime Minister Thatcher said media are “the oxygen of terrorism” and a

major activity of terrorists is looking for publicity. Terrorists like Al-Zawahiri believes that “more than half of this battle is taking place in the battle field of media” (Anon, 2008).

Nacos (2000: 175) states “terrorists are not interested in the deaths of three, or thirty, or even thirty thousand people, rather they allow the imagination of the target population to do their work for them.” The deaths of some victims are symbolic and it communicates beyond the immediate action when the media reports it. Then, media helps the terrorist to coerce government officials indirectly. “Without the media coverage the acts impact is arguably wasted, remaining narrowly confined to the immediate victim(s) of the attack, rather than reading the wider “target audience” at whom the terrorists’ violence is actually aimed” (Hoffman, 2006: 174).

Basically, terrorists want to interact with media to achieve their objectives. Alexander, et al (1979) in Anon (2008) states that the objectives of terrorist groups interact with media is for attention, recognition, and legitimacy. Addition to the three objectives, Nacos (2007) adds a fourth objective, respect and sympathy. Therefore, the objectives of terrorists to interact with media are to gain; 1) Attention and awareness of the audience and to condition the targeted population and the government for intimidation; 2) Recognition of the organization’s motives, why they are carrying out attacks; 3) Respect and sympathy of those in whose name they claim to attack and 4) A quasi-legitimate status and treat like the legitimate political actor.

### **2.3.2.2. Media Use Terrorists**

Terrorism as a violent politics attracts media because conflict and controversy has value for news media. Terrorists believe that their work is done when “terrorists signal to civilian noncombatants the Specter of their randomized annihilation. Once a citizen is cowed and its decision space transformed” (Kamolnick, 2011: 820). The media use bloodiest, sensational news about terrorists’ act to make headlines, which increase their circulations and revenue.

The issue of coverage for terrorists is debatable. Some argue that media should not cover terrorism acts as the coverage creates fear on the people and influence the government. Others believe that “terrorism is news and must be covered” though several reasons like personal interest of a journalist has an impact on the news (Anon, 2008). Nowadays, media that characterized by competition, providing coverage for terrorist is important by increasing audience size and circulation and thus for important advertisements” (Anon, 2008: 14).

### **2.3.2.3. Terrorists are Media**

There are three levels of terrorists’ participation in the media. First, terrorists are not supposed to influence the media in writing the report rather than choosing location, time and target adequately to get good coverage. Second, terrorists have a role in writing the message to media though the last decision is decided by the media practitioners. Third, the media are under full control of terrorists (Anon, 2008). When media are under terrorists’ control, the relationship is instrumental. Media serve as a weapon to

manipulate civilians to cooperate for their activity and coerce the government to address their question and the media practitioners are terrorists by using media power in their battlefield.

#### **2.3.2.4. Problems in Media-Terrorism Relation**

The quest for national security hinders the media terrorism relationship in some manner. When media give coverage for terrorist acts the perspective of the media is more important. “Mass media are the most important source of information and social control because they have helped make fear a part of our life, our language and our point of view” Altheide (2006:2)

When we say our life, the message those broadcast or publicized on media affects the social, economic and political life of the audience. “Fearful messages have strong effect on the political process partly because leaders can tap on the emotional churning from audiences basic concerns about safety for themselves and their families” (ibid: 5).

The language the news media use has a great effect on the media-terrorism relationship. The words available in Bush’s speech, which have “themes of evil, freedom, justice, fundamentalism, and civilization versus barbarism (amongst others), was promoted with little critical scrutiny by the news media, which become part of the crucial propaganda campaign in the drive towards war carried out in Afghanistan and Iraq” (Spencer, 2005:150). Hence, the language the leaders and the terrorist use without little inspection creates problem in the media-terrorism relationship.

When the media attuned to views of political leaders, it is considered as “governments little helper” (Domke, 2004). The point of view they establish and the perspective they give emphasis matters. According to Norris (2003: 3):

Media coverage err on the side of terrorists lending them legitimacy and credibility as well as unintentionally encouraging further incidents through a ‘contagion’ effect. Alternatively, do journalistic conventions err instead on the side of governments, due to an overreliance upon the framework of interpretation offered by public officials, security experts and military commentators, with news functioning ultimately to reinforce support for political leaders and the security policies they implement.

Therefore, in reporting terrorism, the journalistic standards of balance, truth, and objectivity ought to consider the point of view of the general bodies, not the specific targets. Working on terrorism for media practitioner is not a question of getting high circulation or high audience rate; rather it is a way of rescuing the life of civilians or abandoning them.

#### **2.4. Counterterrorism Activities**

Controlling terrorism without achieving consensus is difficult at national or international level. So, terrorism requires societies around the world to characterize the concept precisely (Rinehart, 2006). The “war on terror,” which is first used by Bush’s administration, is an abstract concept and some commentators claimed that it was a mistake to declare war on an abstraction. To fight terrorism effectively is unfortunate

because consensus on the problem is desperately needed. To secure international coalition against terrorism, states would have to agree on who should legitimately be fought as an international terrorist (Domke, 2004; Friedrichs, 2008).

Moreover, the counterterrorism efforts are weak because they “only inflates terrorism’s impact, reinforcing its power to intimidate and unsettle” rather than investigating the cause of it and coming to consensus on the legitimate way of solving it (Cohen, 2008: 46).

In the counterterrorism activities states treat politically motivated suspects and violent offenders in different manner. The strategies to deal with politically motivated violent offenders and suspects are accommodation, criminalization and suppression. Accommodation is a strategy of treat politically motivated suspects and violent offenders more leniently. Criminalization strategy is the state can insist on politically motivated suspects exactly in the same way. The third strategy, suppression, is a way of treating politically motivated suspects harshly (Guelke, 2006: 195-198). Among the three strategies to deal with politically motivated suspects or violent offenders “suppression does acknowledge the political nature of terrorism but usually denies any legitimacy to the cause for which it employed” (ibid: 198). Besides to those strategies Robertson (2007) proposed three important strategies to fight terrorism. These strategies are *preparation* (in advance defensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of people and property to terrorist acts), *prevent* (using a mixture of law enforcement, intelligence and military techniques to stop terrorist attacks) and *prosecute* (determining guilt and applying appropriate punishment).

### **2.4.1. Counterterrorism from International View**

The counterterrorism activities are argumentative. Since 1972, following Black September's attack in Israel's athletes at Munich Olympics, the then UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, asked the General Assembly to examine the issue. The USA put forward a draft convention but it encountered oppositions from third world states concerned that it would undercut the legitimacy of groups fighting for self-determination against colonial or minority rule (Guelke, 2006).

According to O'Donnell (2006) 13 international treaties were conducted in relation to terrorism. The first international treaty against terrorism was the 1963 Tokyo treaty concerned on board aircrafts. Most of the treaties contain dispositions concerning the protection of human rights. During 1972-1979 the laws enacted for prevention and punishment of certain acts of international terrorism were not effective. However, a draft submitted by India in 2000 was agreeable (Friedrichs, 2008).

"The war on terrorism is the first growth industry of the new millennium" (Bovard, 2003:1). Since 9/11 attacks, the world tried to bring war on terrorism and to defeat what they call terrorist groups though there is no an international consensus on who are terrorist.

There are an international laws enacted to counterterrorism. But there are some challenges in relation to the international laws. The first challenge is international law "does not have the status of federal law until authorized by the appropriate political authority." Therefore, to authorize the law states reshape the international law according

to their political interest. The other challenge is that international law is “always scrutinized by powerful interests whether governmental or private to ensure that individual rights are protected” (Forest, 2007: 1113).

The state may use different tools to prepare for preventing terrorism. Adopting anti-terrorism legislation, use intelligence and military techniques, monitoring weapon purchases and financial transactions and wiretaps on telephone and computer equipment are the most common.

### **2.4.2. Anti-Terrorism Laws**

Anti-terrorism laws are in advance measurements to combat terrorist attacks. For democratic states finding adequate law for terrorism is difficult. The laws and regulations that resulted from legislative activities may be superfluous and insufficient. Superfluity means “all the relevant rules taken together turnout to be entirely or almost unobservable complicated by internal inconsistencies in legislation” (Koltsova, 2006: 54). Different states anti-terrorism laws contradicts with legislations of human rights, Press laws and other constitutional laws of states as well as the international laws enacted at different times like UDHR, ICCPR, ACHPR, etc.

#### **2.4.2.1. Anti-Terrorism laws and Global Politics**

Terrorism is an international phenomena and it affects international politics. Similarly, the anti-terrorism legislations enacted throughout the world has an impact on the global politics. States have adopted their own legislation that is directly and indirectly under the influence of powerful states. After 9/11 attacks, a “war on terror” is used to reinterpret

and label “friends” and “enemies” of USA around the globe (Norris, 2003). Therefore, anti-terrorism laws have a significant impact on political communication, at the interpersonal or mass mediated level. The political communication is polarized among allies and enemies of counterterrorism.

Cohen (2008: 41) states:

The current language of the “war on terror” is doubly misleading. In political terms, the slogans coined by the United States have no precise definition; it stresses the means- intimidation and terror-employed by the enemy, but cannot identify that omnipresent yet invisible enemy who thus benefits from ‘the propaganda advantage of eternal mystery, which may heighten and indeed be used to manipulate collective fears.

Finding adequate response to terrorism is not easy for democratic countries because states want to suppress their political enemies. There is no any radical way of eliminating them; instead they are compelled to develop an arsenal of more subtle anti-terrorist methods (Friedrichs, 2008). The terrorists or the labeled “political enemies” are a group of individuals who ask for their rights in illegitimate way. So, mechanisms to prevent them should be suitable with the humanitarian laws.

The Security Council resolution 1368, which is enacted 12 September 2001, invokes the “inherent right of self-defense,” condemns the “terrorist attacks” of the previous day and regards such acts like many acts of international terrorism (Cohen, 2008). Hence, legislations that adopted to prevent terrorism should be to condemn terrorist attacks, not

violate the exercise of human rights. In the global politics, the anti-terrorism laws, directly or indirectly contradict this resolution.

Anti-terrorism laws change the communication system of the global politics. The main facilitating machine of terrorism is communication and the laws decreed to fight terrorism ultimately target the gorge of communication, media. The reason is that all terrorists, media organizations, or states believe that those whose names make the headline have a power (Seib, 2011). Nacos (1994) adds that friends and foes of the mass media agreed that the press has political power. No one doubts that whoever controls the press wields power.

The deployment or threat of terrorist violence represents the ultimate failure of conventional channels of political expression and legitimate forms of authority. However, the proliferations of new media change communication trends. The volume, speed, way of interactions and method of control are the advantages of internet for terrorists over traditional media (Seib, 2005).

#### **2.4.2.2. Anti-Terrorism Laws vis-à-vis Human Rights**

The very justification for terrorism is creating a new and better system in place of a corrupt and undemocratic political system. Terrorism is a threat to democracy, free exercise of human rights and development. Certain fundamental human rights; the right to liberty, personal security, life, property, and respect are typically violated by acts of terrorism (Robertson, 2007; Held, 2008, Hoffman, 1998). Yet, avoiding tyranny, guarantee essential rights and general freedoms to citizens are the desirable consequences

democracy produce (Dahl, 1998). Therefore, in order to avoid tyranny created by terrorists and guarantee human rights, fighting terrorism is significantly important. However, the fight against terrorism should respect human rights (Cohen, 2008).

Fundamentally, fighting terrorism is not violating human rights that terrorists violated. Terrorist offenses are prevented while rule of law, democratic values, human rights and fundamental freedoms are respected. Cohen (2008: 47) states “[the question of human rights] is not simply a matter of striking a balance between demands of the fight against terrorism and those of international human rights law, as it too often said, but insisting that any necessary resort to arms accepts the primacy of the law, the rule of law at both domestic and international level.”

Similar with terrorist acts, the efforts to counter terrorists has an impact on the right to collect, communicate and receive information (Biernatzki, 2002). One of the deprived freedoms in counterterrorism mechanism is freedom of expression, which is considered as the core of any freedoms and the basic democratic criteria (Dahl, 1998).

#### **2.4.4.3. Anti-Terrorism Laws and Media**

Media are the hub of the terrorism-government-public nexus (Biernatzki, 2002). After 9/11 attacks, pressures on media become more intense, especially as conservative groups attacked media networks for their perceived biases (Peter & Shoma, 2004). Most states consider the relationship between media and terrorist glorifies terrorism. However, the reality is not the presence of the relationship or not but it is a question of whether the relationship affects public opinion and government decisions making in a manner that

favors or assists terrorists (Hoffman, 2006). “If journalists attempt to explain the motives behind the event they can be accused of aiding an outlaw group. If they give too much attention to the victims of an attack they may create extreme pressure on a government to give in to terrorist demands”(Robertson, 2007: 9).

In addition to this, Hoffman (1998:155) states:

The relationship between publicity and terror is indeed paradoxical and complicated- publicity focuses attention on a group strengthening its morale and helping to attract recruits and sympathizers. But publicity is pernicious to the terrorist groups too. It helps an outraged public to mobilize its vast resources and produces information that the public needs to pierce the veil of secrecy all terrorist groups require.

Although media form an important part of the environment in which terrorists operate, there is no credible scientific evidence that establishes “a cause-effect relationship between media coverage and the spread of terrorism” (Biernatzki, 2002). Brian Jenkins (1983) in Biernatzki (2002:5) states that “terrorism is a product of freedom particularly freedom of the press.” In counterterrorism acts, legislations suppress media. Prime Minister Thatcher expressed that “democracies must find ways to starve the terrorists and hijackers of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend” (ibid: 6). However, this point of view would be an absurd prescription to break the thermometer that diagnoses the favor of terrorism.

The democratic states react to media coverage of terrorism in different ways. Wilkinson (2006: 155) distinguished them as laissez-faire, media-censorship and voluntary self-restraint policy options. In the laissez-faire policy there is no specific measures taken concerning media coverage of terrorists regardless of the situation. The media censorship policy forwards restrictions on the freedom of press and expression. The third policy, voluntary self-restraint is a mechanism of controlling the coverage depending on the style book of the media house.

Press freedom has routinely surrendered to national security issues on home front as well as foreign battle fields. With the quest of national security media operates under stringent and often draconian laws enacted to make them “willing tools” and “cheerleaders” of the state (Eribo & Jong-Ebot, 1997).

Unfortunately, the anti-terrorism legislations overlook the other end of media. If media are used in a more democratic way and allow them to freely exercise their freedom they are important to fight terrorism. However, “the most promising means of fighting terrorism through media is only rarely adopted” (Biernatzki, 2002: 16).

## **2.5. Terrorism in Ethiopia**

### **2.5.1. Terrorism in Ethiopia: Brief Overview**

In most African countries, terrorism is related with decolonization. In Ethiopia, terrorism has been familiar since 1970s with history of the Eritrean Liberation Front. According to the Global Terrorism Database, 133 attacks happened in Ethiopia by different perpetrators since 1970. Among those, 84 (63%) of the attacks have happened after

EPRDF came to power and 5 attacks were after the enactment of ATP (<http://www.start.umd.edu>: Accessed date 21 September 2013).

Before 1991, the main doers of terrorism were the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front (EPLF), Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF), Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) (ibid). In addition to these, Ethiopia has experienced state-terrorism when Marxist-Leninist regimes overthrow Emperor Haileselassie I in 1974 (United States Institute of Peace, nd).

After 1991, liberation fronts like Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) joined TPLF and Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) to establish the transitional government of Ethiopia. Nonetheless, OLF and ONLF quit the transitional government and started fighting for their freedom. Basically, Ethiopian domestic terrorist groups are motivated by historical grievance (Woldeselase, 2010). The perpetrators were armed guerillas, OLF, ONLF, Issa & Gurgura Liberation Front, Amhara Tribal Group, Former Members of Central Investigation Office, Al-shabaab, Somali Islamic Fronts, Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF), Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI), Al-Gama'at Al-Islamiyya (IG), individuals, bandits, and unknowns (<http://www.start.umd.edu>, Accessed date 21 September 2013). Besides, Ethiopian Peoples' Patriotic Movement (EPPF) and Benishangul Peoples' Liberation Movement have been the perpetrators of terrorist attacks (Woldeselase, 2010).

Currently, the FDRE house of peoples' representative has proscribed OLF, ONLF and Ginbot7 as a domestic and Al-shabaab and Al-Qaeda as international terrorist groups.

Three of the domestic terrorist groups were political parties during and after the transitional government of Ethiopia (Woldeselase, 2010). However, they resort from legitimate political organization to terrorist groups. The bombing of hotels in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa and the assassination attempt on Hosni Mubarak and Dr. Abdulmejid Hussein shows terrorism is a threat of Ethiopia. The number of terrorist attacks of OLF and ONLF differs among the data. For example, based on the data from the Global terrorism database OLF attacks 8 (4 is suspected) while ONLF 3 (2 is suspected) whereas Woldeselase states that OLF and ONLF did 140 and 86 terrorist attacks in Ethiopia, respectively. *(For more statistical information please refer Appendix X).*

### **2.5.2. Political Organizations in Ethiopia**

According to McNair (2011) political organizations consist of political actors, political parties, public organizations, pressure groups and terrorist groups. In Ethiopia, political organization directly refers to political parties because they are the only groups who conduct political activities legally. Other like pressure groups, political actors, political activists and public organizations are weak and willing tools or sacked from the political stage.

Since 1991 powerful political parties have been established though they are obliterated from legal politics or labeled as terrorist groups. For example, in 1992, election OLF and ONLF were strong political parties as well as in 2005 election, the existing Ginbot7 was a strong wing of the then CUD (Woldeselase, 2010).

Currently, the political parties registered by NEB are 75. Twenty three of political parties are multi-ethnic while the rest are ethnic. There is no strong conservative party that runs politics throughout the country, including the ruling party. The OPP also do not have cohesion among them; rather they are playing a “zero-sum Politics” (Bereket, 2011).

The current status of the Ethiopian political parties is a dominant party system. Before 2010 election, the House of Peoples’ Representatives was a place of diversified opinions as long as the parliament held representatives of different political parties and multi-party system was applied. However, since 2010 election, the parliament hosts dominant party system because the ruling party won all parliament seats except, two.

### **2.5.3. Media Organizations in Ethiopia**

In Ethiopian history, media had been owned by the state. But after the downfall of military regime, private ownership of press is allowed and freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed under article 29, the right to freedom of thought, opinion and expression.

As soon as freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed, the number of private press radically increased. In addition to the constitution, the government adopted media policy to exercise the private ownership of press. According to Skjerdal (2012), the proliferation of private publications increased from time to time. The number of newspapers and magazines that were licensed by the then Ministry of Information, in 1992-1996 were 265 and 120, respectively. As well, in 2001, 543 newspapers and 182 magazines were licensed.

During that time very critical presses like *Addis Zena*, *Eyta*, *Tobiya*, *Menelik*, *Meyisaw*, *Meznagna*, *Netsanet*, *Satenaw*, and *Seife Nebelbal* existed. But, in the post 2005 election, these and other publications were closed down because “14 journalists and media owners with 62 opposition members [were] charged by the public prosecutor primarily for outrages against the constitution, impairment of the defence forces and attempt to commit genocide.” Although the detained journalists were released the former stimuli could not be re-established. The number of operational press and critical newspapers and magazines has decreased (Skjerdal, 2012: 24-25).

The number of newspapers and magazine working on political, social and economic affairs has decreased through time. “The total number of newspapers circulated in January, 2013 was 18 while the magazines were 21. Of the 18 newspapers, 12 focused on political, economic and social issues whereas the rest focused on sport and health” (Dagim, 2013:14).

In the last one year, 94 newspapers and 169 magazines have received license from EBA, of those, 40 newspapers and 31 magazines are licensed to work on political, economic, and social affairs. Of again only 15 publications are operational. The newspapers are *Reporter* (bi-weekly Amharic), *The Reporter* (weekly English), *Sendek* (weekly Amharic), *Capital* (weekly English), *Yegna Press* (weekly Amharic), *Fortune* (weekly English) and *Ethio-Mihidar* (weekly Amharic). The magazines are *Lomi* (weekly Amharic), *Muhaz* (Monthly Amharic and English), *Konjo* (bi-monthly Amharic), *Addis Standard* (monthly English), *Inqu* (bi-monthly Amharic), *Jano* (bi-monthly Amharic), *Fact* (weekly Amharic) and *Addis Guday* (weekly Amharic)(EBA, Jan 2014).

#### **2.5.4. Counterterrorism in Ethiopia**

The Ethiopian penal code that was enacted in 1957 is the legal procedure of Ethiopia to punish criminals. Art 252 of the penal code declares “whosoever, raises or attempts to raise a revolt, mutiny, or armed rebellion against the Emperor, the state or the constitutional authority ... is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 5 years to life or in cases of exceptional gravity, with Death (Negarit Gazeta, 1957: 78). Although the penal code declares to punish illegitimate violence, it failed to address terrorism particularly.

Ethiopia has a role in global counterterrorism efforts. In most of international conventions and treaties on terrorism, Ethiopia has a commitment. Not only at the global level but also at continental level, Ethiopia demonstrated a commitment in the adoption of the AU convention on the prevention and combating of terrorism in 1999. The role of Ethiopia to fight terrorism in the Horn of Africa is momentous (Woldeselase, 2010).

One of the counterterrorism strategies that have been applied in Ethiopia is the adoption of the anti-terrorism legislation. Ethiopia endorsed ATP, proclamation number 652/2009 on August 2009. The proclamation has 7 parts and 38 articles. The proclamation is debatable among stakeholders. The justification for adoption of the law is that “the government has a strong conviction that promoting human security is central to managing the threat of terrorism (Woldeselase, 2010).

En route to this, the government justifies the essence of the proclamation in relation to the absence of strong legislations that prevent and control terrorism that the country enforces

now. And the law is convicted mainly guarantee the peoples' peace and live free from the threat of terrorism (Federal Negarit Gazeta, 2009: 4827).

However, some commentators argue that the proclamation is a technique to suppress political dissent. There bases for the argument are the superfluity of the law with the international humanitarian laws and the constitution and subject to scrutiny, especially related to expression, communication and privacy rights.

In the definition of "terrorist act" in Art 2(4) "a group, an association or organization which is composed of not less than two members with the objective of committing acts of terrorism or plans, prepares with the objective of committing acts of terrorism or assists or incites others in a way that commit acts of terrorism" (Federal Negarit Gazeta, 2009: 4828). A person who commits, plans, prepares, assists or incites acts of terrorism is all considered a terrorist group, which has broad implications. Hence, terrorist group is related with terrorist act; the proclamation defines terrorist act in Art 3 in broader way by including life and property.

whosoever or a group intending to advance a political, religious, or ideological cause by coercing the government, intimidating the public or section of the public or destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, or economic or social institutions of the country.

1) Causes a person's death or serious bodily injury; 2) Creates serious risk to the safety or health of the public or section of the public; 3) Commits kidnapping or hostage taking; 4) Causes serious damage to property; 5) Causes damage to natural resource, environment, historical or cultural

heritages; 6)Endangers, seizes or puts under control cause serious interference or disruption of any public service...is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 15 years to life with death” (ibid: 4829-4830).

The other critical article of the proclamation is criminalizing “encouragement of terrorism” that is stated in Art 6 of the proclamation. The article alleges “whosoever publishes or causes the publications of a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission or preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism... is punished with rigorous imprisonment from 10 to 20 years (ibid: 4831).

Similar to Art 6, “destroys or hiding evidence” (Art 10) and “false threat of terrorist act” (Art 11) and “failure to disclose terrorist act” (Art 12) have direct relation with the work of media. According to these provisions, media can’t report information from confidential sources. Having such in mind, when the reporter fails to disclose the terrorist act because of confidentiality of sources again, he/she is punishable based on the article that states failure to disclose terrorist act. If s/he reports the presence of terrorism and the terrorist may change the setting (place and time) makes the journalist accountable in a case of false threat of terrorist act. The proclamation is very tight to work as a journalist with serious implications for political communication.

### **2.5.5. Political Communication: Before and After the Enactment of the Law**

Legislations have an impact on issues they directly proclaimed or indirectly to the related subjects. The Ethiopian ATP has its own impact on the political communication of political parties and media organizations.

#### **2.5.5.1. Political Parties Communication**

For the purpose of assessing political parties' communication practice in Ethiopia, using two elections, 2005 and 2010, as a reference frame is very important. The pre-electoral period in 2005 election was open democratic space for political parties, civil societies and the media. Bereket (2011) states that the election campaign was "marathon" because the debate between political parties has lasted for 9 months long starting from September 2005. Besides, Bereket enhances that the peaceful demonstrations were called by the ruling and OPP at Meskel Square, the reserved area for celebrating the Ethiopian Meskel (True Cross) Holiday. The April 2005 peaceful demonstrations were historical and the number of participants unexpected."

The civil societies were the most driving machine in 2005 election. OPP were conducted peaceful demonstrations and riots even after the election through state owned media. In between the two elections, in 2009 three legislations were passed; the civil society, the press law and the anti-terrorism law that threaten dissenting voices.

According to Dagim (2013) the relationship between the private press and the government is unfriendly whereas they (the private press) have good relation with the OPP. One of the reasons for this unfriendly relationship is the restrictive laws that the

government adopted. Basically, after the enactment of the anti-terrorism law, the way political parties communicate has fallen within limited frames.

The Human Rights Watch (2009: 1) reports that “The law could provide the Ethiopian government with a potent instrument to crackdown on political dissent, including peaceful political demonstrations and public criticisms of government policy that are deemed supportive of armed opposition activity.”

In addition to this, the Human Rights Watch (2010:6) declares that the anti-terrorism law is “a punitive measure [that] restricts rights of freedom of expression and association have silenced independent voices and contribute to chilling freedom of speech and opinion more broadly.”

Unlike the 2005 election, the pre-electoral period of 2010 election, local officials and the ruling party members target opposition party offices and members through threats and harassments, closing offices, breaking up meetings, denying access of state resources and generally making carrying out political activities difficult (Human Rights Watch, 2010a). The 2010 election came with little or rare political communication. The campaign communication was limited by the NEB, the EBA and the government. The candidates’ debate started on February and there was no public demonstration though the government organized the following day of the Election Day against Human Rights Watch report. The role of media and civil society was too limited (Bereket, 2011: 286).

### 2.5.5.2. Media Organizations' Communication

In the broad political crackdowns of post 2005 election, journalists and politicians were arrested on charges ranging from treason to subverting the constitution. This incident by itself has negative implications for media and journalists. In 2005 election, the state-owned media offered unprecedented access to opposition figures and perspectives whereas in 2010 the ODP' access media based on their parliament seat. Since the ATP came to effect, media practitioners refrain themselves to work on very critical political issues (Biniyam, 2013).

According to Freedom House (2010), “[ATP] was theoretically designed to combat groups accused by the Ethiopian government of carrying out terrorist activities such as ONLF and OLF. However, its broad definition of who can be considered a terrorist caused a concern among international free expression groups, as did language imposing prison in terms of up to 20 years on those who write, edit, print, publish or disseminate statements deemed to encourage, support, or advance terrorist acts.”

The proclamation is grim to media and its impact is exceptional. As a result, Ethiopia is currently the second leading jailer of journalist in Africa, next to Eritrea (Freedom House, 2011) and the third top countries in the world that journalists flee to exile, next to Iran and Somalia ([www.cpj.org/exile](http://www.cpj.org/exile); Accessed date 1 October 2013) . The reasons for the exile are threat of imprisonment, threat of violence and harassment. For example, critical Amharic newspapers like *Addis Neger* and *Awramba Times* (but he came back home) managing editors and editors are fled the country after the enactment of the law.

Furthermore, around 14 journalists were accused on the basis of the proclamation and some of them were arrested.

#### **2.5.6. Reactions to the Law: From Domestic and International Community**

The supporters of the proclamation argue that “the law is more or less derived from the UK anti-terrorism law” (Bereket, 2011: 245). Furthermore, Woldeselase (2010: 293) states that “the law is based on various international anti-terrorism conventions and has taken into account experience of the legislation of a number of other countries with similar acts.”

Groups who are against the law claim that terrorism is not a threat for Ethiopia. Therefore, the proclamation has latent function. However, supporters state that terrorism is the threat of the Horn of Africa as a region and Ethiopia as a country because the area is surrounded by an international terrorist group, Al-shabaab and the Eritrean government (Bereket, 2011).

The very question of the law is not where it comes from; rather the suitability of the law with international covenants that Ethiopia ratified and the constitution as well. The law contains desperately broad definitions of terrorism, which can be encompassing even peaceful expression of dissent and political protest. It is particularly worrying media because it provides discretion to authorities to prosecute who encourage terrorism (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

Unlike the ICCPR provision, the ATP restricts freedom of expression. “It supposedly designed to confront the challenges posed by armed insurgents, has been used extensively

against politicians and journalists” (Freedom House, 2013). Whereas, Dr. Shiferaw (2013: 27) asserts that “what the government has done is to discharge the responsibility of respecting citizens’ democratic right, the constitution and constitutional rights and to ensure peace for citizen.”

## **2.6. Theoretical Frameworks**

The theoretical frameworks that the researcher applied for the study are Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann’s Spiral of silence, John Zallers’ media politics theory and Kevin G. Barnhurst’s model of media and terrorism relationship. These theories and model are applied in other contexts but the researcher used them as an ideal model for the study.

### **2.6.1. Noelle- Neumann’s Spiral of Silence Theory**

Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann’s ‘spiral of silence’ theory is crucial as a theoretical framework for the study. The spiral of silence mostly applies on topics that involve controversy and importance. Spiral of silence predicts that perceptions of a dominant viewpoint will result in actual dominance by that viewpoint “without support they will be more likely to remain silent” (Stone, Stingleary, and Richmond, 2003, p. 261-263).

In such manner, the boldness of one side and the silence of the other create the spiral of silence. The theory perceps before speaking out people employ sense about whether their opinion is acceptable to the group. The theory proposes that the media has the power to accelerate the muting of the minority in the spiral of silence (ibid, p. 262 and Griffin, 2006, p. 269- 410).

Spiral of silence theory is convenient as a theoretical framework to explore the impact of new legislatives, ATP in this case, on political communication because ATP creates political groups and media organizations remain silent, especially the dissenting voices. The other reason is that ATP has an impact in the political communication of Ethiopia by facing lack of support among communicators; media and political parties in particular. Moreover, although ATP by itself has an impact in isolating dissenting voices the role of media in accelerating the isolation is very high i.e. the state-owned media organizations are striving to isolate OPP and Private media by defaming in their documentaries and features. Therefore, spiral of silence theory has used as an ideal model for this study to investigate the impact of ATP on political communication of political parties and media organizations.

### **2.5.2. John Zaller's Media Politics Theory**

Media politics is “systems of politics in which individual politicians seek to gain office and to conduct politics while in office, through communication that reaches citizens through the mass media” (Zaller, 1991: 1). In this system, politicians, journalists, and citizens (also known as actors of media politics), are participat with their own interests and goals.

Politicians have a goal to use media to mobilize public support to win elections and to get their programs executed. The journalists have an independent role with the goal of attracting audiences and the citizens' goal is to monitor politicians on the basis of minimal effort (ibid).

As a result of varying interests, the actors of media politics create conflicts. The basic conflicts are between journalists and citizens, politicians and journalists, and politicians and citizens. The conflict of interest between journalists and citizens is related with the news produced by the journalist and the citizens' interest to consume it. Politicians and journalists have an interest of controlling the news. "Politicians have an interest in bamboozling the public but are unable because of journalists' interest in exposing them to do so" (ibid: 28). The third conflict is between politicians and citizens in the interest of citizens to seize politicians accountable in every political task.

This theory is an ideal model for the research that the researcher has conducted because in political communication, politicians, the media, even the terrorist tell us what to think about. They all want to attract our attention. Media politics theory has used as a theoretical framework for the study because the political environment has an impact on political communication elements; the citizen, media and politicians. ATP, as one of the political environment phenomenon has an impact on politicians and media organizations, because the interest of political communicators is influenced by ATP and lead to conflict.

### **2.6.3. Barnhurst's Media-Terrorism Relationship Model**

The convergence among the media, the public and terrorists is at the debate over terrorism and the media. The argument is whether media cause, intensify and aggravate terrorism or is it victim of terrorism. Barnhurst (1991) developed two models of media-terrorism relationship. These are the culpable and the vulnerable media model.

Culpable and vulnerable media models are important to study the impact of terrorism and counterterrorism activities towards media freedom. Regulations to counterterrorism such as adopting anti-terrorism laws have an impact on the exercising of media freedom. Particularly, ATP has an impact on media organizations because some of the provisions, like article 6 “encouragement of terrorism’ have directly violates constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

### **1. The Culpable Media Model**

The assumption of culpable media model is media cause and spread terror as it is powerful and effective and it ought to be controlled. To this model, the extensive coverage of terrorism by “the media cause or increase terrorism” (Barnhurst, 1991:115). The ways in which media effect on terrorism can be on the hypothesis of awareness, contagion and interference effects.

The culpable media model sees a causal link with terrorism that calls for regulation. This uncovers two dilemmas: cycle of coverage and control.

The first involves a cycle of coverage. As media cover terrorism, they incite more terrorism, which produces more media coverage. The result is more terrorism. The dilemma involves a cycle of control. If government and the media censor coverage, the control tends to harm the credibility of the government and/or the media. The terrorists may stop their acts, but they may be just as likely to resort to even greater violence (ibid: 125).

## **2. The Vulnerable Media Model**

The basic assumption of vulnerable media model is “the media are victims of terrorism” and any type of regulation is not essential (Barnhurst, 1991: 118). According to this model, the media can do nothing about terrorism but it is vulnerable because of terrorism.

The vulnerable model presents its own dilemma:

Any control on coverage even a natural one, will be ineffective because terrorists can shift to other forms of communication by striking vulnerable points in the infrastructure of liberal societies (ibid, 126).

Therefore, the media ought to be free and work to reduce their vulnerability. Although there is no agreement on whether the media cause terrorism or not, the treatment of terrorist events is important to reduce vulnerability.

## **Chapter Three**

### **3. Research Methodology**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

The research method that this study has used is qualitative. This is because qualitative method is relatively better in a research approach that aims at exploring and examining impacts of a new law: in this case, the impact of the Ethiopian ATP on political communication in a detailed manner.

#### **3.2. Population and Sampling**

The population or subjects of the research are all political parties and print media organizations. Included in the former category are both the ruling and the OPP and the later private and state owned media organizations.

According to the NEB (Accessed Date 5 September 2013), 75 political parties are formally registered and operational in the country. Of those, 23 are national parties while the rest are regional parties. Including all political parties and media organizations in the study makes the task harder. Therefore, sampling is important. To select the required sample, the researcher has used purposive sampling technique.

According to Baxter & Babble (2004), purposive sampling is appropriate to select the sample on the basis of the researcher's own knowledge of the population, its elements, and the nature of research objectives. This technique has been employed in the study because it enables the researcher to select the relevant sources of data.

Of 23 national political parties, some, All Amhara Unity Party (AAUP), Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement, Geda System Advancement Party (Geda), All Oromo People Democratic Party (AOPDP) and Wolene People Democratic Party (WPDP) are not included as they are all ethnic or regional based. They are excluded from the study as the main objective of the researcher is not to find out the effect of the law on a certain ethnic based political parties, rather it focuses on multi-national political parties or parties operational at the national level because the law did not adopted for a specific ethnic.

Parties like Ethiopian Peace and Democratic Party (EPDP), All Ethiopian Democratic Party (AEDP), Ethiopian National Unity Party (ENUP), All Ethiopian National Movement (AENM), and Ethiopian Democratic Unity Movement (EDUM) who are not currently operational are excluded because of the following reasons. First, these parties have only president and certificate except ENUP, the president of the party Ato Zerihun G/Egziabhere is arrested in terrorism case. Second, parties those have president haven't office to work regular office activities. Third, a party like Birhan for Unity and Democratic Party (BUDP), which has merged with Andinet are treated with the host party. Fourth, a party, Ethiopian Justice and Democratic Forces Front (EJDFF) was phase out and the representative of the party in Inter-Parties Forum has casted out by the court order.

Therefore, the following political parties are subjects of the study.

1. All Ethiopian Unity Organization (AEUO)
2. Blue Party (Blue)
3. Coalition For Unity and Democratic Party (CUD)

4. Ethiopia Democratic Union (EDU)
5. Ethiopia Social Democratic- South Coalition Unity Party (ESD-SCUP)
6. Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP)
7. Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
8. Ethiopian Raie Party (ERP)
9. Unity for Democracy and Justice (UDJ)

As indicated, the other groups considered for this study were media houses. The private presses that got license from the EBA to work on political, economic and social issues are 40 newspapers and 31 magazines. Among 71 press outlets, some of them have not yet started while others are suspended. According to EBA report (January, 2013) only 7 newspapers and 8 magazines are currently operational.

By using purposive sampling technique, newspapers and magazines that have published in Amharic and have high circulation (have better copy selling rate among others based on EBA January 2013 data) were selected for this study. Accordingly, *The Reporter*, *Addis Admas* and *Ethio-Mihdar* newspapers have been selected. The study also used the same criteria to select the magazines. Accordingly, *Lomi*, *Addis Guday* and *Fact* were selected. The state owned newspaper, *Addis Zemen*, was also considered in accordance with the criteria that applied to choose the private media. *Addis Zemen* is included in study to examine the impacts of the law on the state owned media.

### **3.3. Data Collection Tools**

In the data collection process, the researcher has used semi-structured interview and textual analysis to collect data.

#### **3.3.1. Semi-Structured Interview**

Interview is one of the methods used to collect the data. Interviewing is used for a qualitative research for a variety of purposes. The strength of collecting data by interview has the potential to see multiple perspectives on a given topic (Newcomb, 1991: 93). According to Baxter & Babble (2004: 326-327) the most common advantages of interview for communication research are to learn about phenomena that cannot be directly observed, to get a richly detailed manner what an interviewee thinks and feels about some phenomena, to study informants language use- their vocabularies and idioms, to assess the extent to which preliminary findings from one method will “ring true,” and to gain insight into the interviewee’s code of communication.

The interview protocol type that was used in the study is semi-structured interview. Semi-structured interview refers to “focused interview that involve a serious of open ended questions based on the topic areas the researcher wants to cover. The open ended question of nature of the question defines the topic under investigation but provides opportunities for both interviewer and interviewee to discuss some topics in more detail” (Hancock, 2002: 9). The use of semi-structured interviews is recommendable, as it permits a certain degree of control over the interviewee’s answers while at the same time providing both interviewer and interviewee with a high degree of freedom to hold a

relaxed conversation. In addition to this, semi-structured interviews are useful when the concepts and relationships are relatively well understood (Given, 2008). In semi-structured interview, the researcher asks predetermined questions, which is prepared in advance. In addition to the predetermined questions, probe and follow up questions are crucial (ibid).

The interview has conducted in-person. According to Given (2008: 815) “in-person interview is a data collection method where the researcher is in the same location as the participant and asks to which the participant responds. It is a face-to-face interview between the researcher and the respondents.”

Thus, the researcher has used semi-structured interview for the study because this format gives control and freedom for the researcher and the respondents, respectively. The researcher could control the interview procedure on the specific questions that the researcher develops before on the issues of political communication vis-à-vis anti-terrorism law. General questions that answered by all respondents and specific questions that have responded by respondents from particular groups were included in the interview questions (See Appendix I). In addition to those in advance prepared questions probe and follow up questions were existed during the interview. On the other hand, the open-ended questions asked by the researcher gave an opportunity for the respondents to express themselves in a more humble way.

In the study, the respondents were selected from the ruling and OPP as well as the private and state owned print media organizations. The interviewees were the Secretary General of ESD-SCUP, the President of CUD, the President of EDP, the Foreign & Public

Relations Head of EPRDF, the Vice President of EDU, the Political Affairs Head of Blue Party, the Public Relations Head of UDJ, the Government Communication Affairs Office State Minister, the President of ERP and the Public Relations Head of AEUO from political parties. And the Editor-in-chief of *Ethio-Mihidar*, the Acting Editor-in-chief of *Fact*, the Political Editor and book reviewer of *The Reporter*, the Editor-in-chief of *Addis Zemen*, the Editor-in-chief of *Lomi*, the Senior Editor of *Addis Admas* and the Editor-in-Chief of *Addis Guday* from media organizations.

### **3.3.2. Textual Analysis**

The other data collection method used in the study is textual analysis. According to Lindolf and Taylor (2002) textual analysis emphasizes how qualitative researcher is inherently concerned with describing and interpreting the symbolic qualities of social action. Here, the term text refers to the printed texts and the audio-visual documents produced within a specific period.

Therefore, the main textual data used in this study were newspaper and magazine texts published in a specific time. Data that would help us understand the political discourse of the publications on the ATP and political communication were selected for the study. Therefore, the researcher analyzed the seven newspapers and magazines (namely; *Addis Zemen*, *The Reporter*, *Addis Admas*, *Ethio-Mihidar*, *Lomi*, *Addis Guday* and *Fact*) terrorism and related issues 8 July 2013- 10 October 2013. In addition to these texts, the study tries to analyze the proclamation itself. The main reason why the researcher has decided to use this time is that UDJ conducted peaceful public demonstrations and

petitions under the motto “Millions Voice for freedom” during this time. The main purpose of the demonstration was to ask the government to amend or cancel ATP.

### **3.4. Method of Data Analysis**

The unit of analysis for the study was newspaper and magazine articles such as news, editorials and feature stories appeared in different columns. The texts were taken as a unit of analysis when they explicitly covered the issue of terrorism, anti-terrorism, and political communication of political parties and media organizations.

The other unit of analysis for the study was the interview transcripts. The data collected through interview, which is rich and detailed, has been analyzed thematically. The approach of the study was qualitative which is more interpretive and descriptive. After gathering the data from the newspapers and magazines and all the interview data has transcribed, translated from Amharic to English, and organized under different topics and sub-topics in accordance with their relevance.

#### **3.4.1. Data Analysis Procedure**

The Data collected through Interview and text analysis were both in Amharic. Therefore, before starting of the analysis, the researcher transcribed the audio recorded material and then translated into English. And the translation was similar for the texts from newspapers and magazines. The data analysis procedures the researcher followed after having the displayed data are:

1. Distillation (reduction of data): the collected data from 17 interviews and seven three months' publications was immense. Therefore, concentrating on some important data is the first procedure in the analysis and presentation.
2. Generating themes: varieties of themes are included based on the research questions, the interview questions, the literatures that reviewed under the literature review part and the theoretical frameworks that applied for this study.
3. Thematic coding: after the themes were identified the data that collected through interview and text analysis have grouped and coded thematically under each theme.
4. Story interpretation: after thematically coding the collected data it presents qualitatively. And interpret the story based on the themes and concepts that reviewed before.
5. Identifying Findings: under each theme there was a finding, therefore, the researcher identifies the findings in each themes.

## **Chapter Four**

### **4. Data Presentation and Analysis**

#### **4.1. Introduction**

The purpose of this study was to explore the impacts of ATP on political communication in Ethiopia. With the aim of exploring the impacts of ATP, the research questions on how ATP affects freedom of expression and pros and cons of ATP have been addressed.

As explicitly stated in chapter three, the study has conducted based on the qualitative data that was collected through interview and textual analysis. The interview has been conducted with purposely selected political parties and media organizations. The interview respondents of political parties were from EPRDF, EDP, ESD-SCUP, EDU, UDJ, CUD, ERP, AEUO and Blue Party. The newspapers and magazines were *Addis Zemen*, *The Reporter*, *Addis Admas*, *Ethio-Mihidar*, *Addis Guday*, *Lomi*, and *Fact*. A textual data has collected from those publications within a particular time frame, 8 July 2013- 10 October 2013 that are specifically related with terrorism. Thus, the presentation and analysis of the data obtained from both tools has put together under different topics and subtopics.

#### **4.2. Anti-Terrorism Proclamation**

##### **4.2.1. Counterterrorism in Ethiopia**

To deal with politically motivated terrorists and suspects there are three strategies. These are accommodation, criminalization and suppression (Guelke, 2006). The Ethiopian

government uses criminalization and suppression most often. The government criminalizes political groups by labeling them.

According to the survey conducted by EPA and ENA, the preventive measures of terrorism taken by the government are low compared with the threat of terrorism<sup>1</sup>. The government of Ethiopia is entitled to be in charge of counterterrorism in four important ways. These are threat identification, community based prevention, enacting legislations and using military forces (informant 1 from EPRDF, personal interview, 26/3/2014). Hence, terrorism is unconventional crime; the counter terrorism efforts are weak because they only inflate terrorism's impact instead of investigating the cause (Cohen, 2008).

The first responsibility of the government in counterterrorism is threat identification. The government identifies suspects of terrorism that threaten the peace and security of the nation. It uses those national and international threats and criminalization and prosecution strategies to counterterrorism. Therefore, the government identifies Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, OLF, ONLF, and Ginbot 7 and labeled them as terrorist groups. The strategies to counterterrorism are preparation, prevention and prosecution (Robertson, 2007). This is important to criminalize them and to prevent terrorism.

The second task of the government is establishing community based prevention of terrorism. This is also Robertson's (2007) counterterrorism strategy. Many plans of terrorist attacks are disclosed by the people. The people of Ethiopia do not welcome terrorists. In relation to this, an informant from UDJ (personal interview, 14/3/2014) says

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<sup>1</sup> *Addis Zemen*, 1 October 2013

“the main savior that protects Ethiopia is the people. The people by nature are peace loving and they are not ready to host terrorists.”

Using military force for counterterrorism is the third strategy to fight organized terrorist groups. Especially, the defense force has played irreplaceable role to counter organized terrorist groups such as, Al-Shabaab that promote jihad against the people and the state is one of the extents to counterterrorism.

The fourth aspect, which is enacting legislations is an important issue that came to effect after 9/11 terrorist attacks. Legislations are one of the mechanisms to prevent terrorism (Robertson, 2007). After the UN Security Council Resolution was adopted, all countries adopt their own legislation. Hence, Ethiopia enacted ATP, numbered 652/2009.

#### **4.2.2. Anti-Terrorism Proclamation: Pros and Cons**

Although there are some groups who believe that ‘moral framework’ is better in fighting terrorism than the legal framework,<sup>2</sup> the law was enacted in August 2009 amidst criticism by moderate members of EPRDF, international human rights organizations, Western diplomats and intellectuals at its draft stage for the fear that it halts the political rights of people as well as OPP and journalists in which EPRDF considered them as inherent foes<sup>3</sup>. For democratic countries fighting terrorism by legislations is not easy because of the intention of the state to overwhelm or eliminate political enemies (Friedrichs, 2008).

ATP had an opportunity to share experiences of different countries that enacted the law before. Woldeselase (2011) stated that ATP was enacted, “based on various international

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<sup>2</sup> *Ethio-Mihidar*, 2 October 2013

<sup>3</sup> *Fact*, August 2013

anti-terrorism conventions and has taken into account experiences of legislations of a number of other countries with similar acts.” In addition to this, informant 1 from EPRDF (personal interview, 26/3/2014) states that the ATP embedded the values of human right aspects, the constitution and the country’s development, security and democratic agenda.

On the other hand, Mushe Semu on his article published on *Addis Guday* (August 2005) stated that EPRDF had a latent motive to enact draconian law that stifles OPP and media practitioners. That is why; they didn’t take lessons from the experiences of other states. Whereas the law is a general application law; its impact is harsh on political groups, journalists and civil society organizations. Another interviewee from the ruling party contradicts this view. According to informant 2 from EPRDF (personal interview, 11/4/2014), Ethiopia enacted the law because of two reasons “to respond for the global request of UN Security Council and to protect the country from its inherent threat of terrorism.” The international law is not authorized unless the state adopted it according to the local political interests (Forest, 2007). Similar to this, when the resolution was introduced in Ethiopia, ATP has been reshaped by the interests of Ethiopian politicians. ATP did not give notional definition for terrorism, but gave functional definition. Like other countries anti-terrorism law, the Ethiopian ATP defines terrorist acts (Article 3), not as terrorism because the act of terrorism consist the functional definition of terrorism.

There are controversial views in the essence of the law. Some of them are supporters of the law while others are not. But there is no one who reflects the assumption that enacting the law is a fault. An informant from *Addis Admas* newspaper (personal interview, 22/3/2014) says “ATP is not essential. It should be continued like the legal procedures

that maintain peace and security until 2009. Although the law is not necessary, I don't believe that enacting the law is wrong. But some important democratic commitments should have been taken into consideration.”

According to informant 2 from EPRDF (personal interview, 11/4/2014) “the Ethiopian people suffered from the blunt of terrorism before the enactment of the law. The law is essential unless someone thinks in arrogant neocolonialism mentality and believes that the Ethiopian people shall deserve less protection.” Moreover, ATP has its own pros and cons.

#### **4.2.2.1. Pros of ATP**

According to informant 1 from EPRDF (personal interview, 26/3/2014), ATP benefits Ethiopia in three important aspects. These are protecting attacks before happening; make the people who are engaged in terrorism accountable and differentiating acts of terrorism from other related crimes. This view seems to be supported by a survey conducted by EPA and ENA. According to the survey, more than 65 % of the respondents believe that ATP ensures peace and security in the nation<sup>4</sup>. Furthermore, the ATP has its own positive roles for Ethiopia. The undeniable fact is that the law threatens OPP and the news media. The Human Rights Watch (2009) also predicts the force of the law to crackdown political dissents that deemed supportive of armed opposition activity. Therefore, ATP has been enacted to fulfill political goals of the ruling party, hinder freedoms of OPP and threaten members and supporters of OPP as well as halt the progress of free press. On the other hand, these claims are all considered as illogical allegations. And groups who ask for the

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<sup>4</sup> *Addis Zemen*, 28 August 2013

cancelation of this law have the motive to see the country in mass blood bath<sup>5</sup>. The reasons for supporting ATP is to enhance peace and security of the nation; confinement of terrorist attacks, provides freedom for the justice system, make terrorist groups face shortage.

ATP enhances the peoples' right to life, security and liberty<sup>6</sup>. As a matter of fact, the geopolitical location, East and Horn of Africa is unrest. The neighbor and neighboring countries political situation is fragile and harbors of terrorists. Therefore, the law is crucial to prevent the attacks of terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab who wants to unstable the Horn of Africa<sup>7</sup>. Thus, it is a preliminary measure to prevent terrorism with legal framework.

ATP confines the spread of terrorist groups and their acts. Terrorism is a networked task that connects the creator of the idea, the financial supporter, the planner and the doer. In this chain, there are also people who glorify and condone the acts. Therefore, the law confines the people to involve in that chain (informant 1 from EPRDF, personal interview, 26/3/2014).

ATP provides severe punishment that extends to 25 years vigorous imprisonment and sentence to death. This punishment is deterrent for others on one hand and gives the judge freedom to interpret the law and punishes on his/her kind interpretation (an informant from EDU, personal interview, 21/3/2014). But an informant from UDJ (personal interview, 14/3/2014) refuses the intensification of punishments stated in penal

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<sup>5</sup> *The Reporter*, 11 August 2013

<sup>6</sup> *Addis Zemen*, 4 August 2013

<sup>7</sup> *Addis Zemen*, 26 September 2013

code. Petty crimes like rebuke are exaggerated as a serious terrorism case against the people and the national security. This sort of exaggerating petty crimes makes the court busy.

ATP prevents terrorist attacks by making them to face shortage of support; financial, media coverage and public support. This law broadly interpreted and halts contacts with terrorists is a crime, which is a direct attack against freedom of expression. But it is an indirect way of controlling the expansion of terrorists (an informant from *Addis Guday* magazine, personal interview, 18/3/2014).

#### **4.2.2.2. Cons of ATP**

Yacob H/mariam (PhD) in his interview with *Lomi* magazine claims “in my view, ATP is not necessary because there is no an Ethiopian terrorist. There may be external terrorist groups who threaten the security of Ethiopia. So strengthening the border security is the remedy, rather than enacting draconian law” (September 2013). People like Yacob who opposes ATP believe the law is not necessary for Ethiopia with justification.

ATP represses bodies that threaten the power of EPRDF<sup>8</sup>. Accordingly, most OPP and media organization believe that the motive of the law is wrong. Hence, there is an adage which states that, ‘if one’s motives are wrong, nothing can be right.’ Therefore, the motive is to sustain its power without criticism and to maintain the state hegemony<sup>9</sup>. An informant from *Lomi* magazine (personal interview, 18/3/2014) utters “laws that enacted post 2005 election have one important motive-revenge. So ATP has a motive to revenge

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<sup>8</sup> *The Reporter*, 18 August 2013; *Fact*, August 2013

<sup>9</sup> *Lomi*, August 2013

the main actors of 2005 election i.e. OPP, civil society organizations and media organizations.” An informant from ERP (personal interview, 19/3/2014: PI) says:

The proclamation goes out of its objective, which is stated in the preamble. Despite of finding remedies for loopholes genuinely and making everything transparent EPRDF uses the law to weaken political forces. This law maintains the power of EPRDF at the expense of the public right. Thus, this is marginalizing the voice of the people with legal package, which is unacceptable at this time.

ATP contradicts FDRE constitution and international agreements that Ethiopia signed<sup>10</sup>. So the contradiction of ATP against the constitution and the international agreements shows the presence of “superfluity of the law” (Koltsova, 2006). Moreover, “the local and international communities raise the law is draconian and it is against international covenants, which Ethiopia ratified and the constitution” (Human rights watch, 2009). According to an informant from *Addis Zemen* newspaper (personal interview, 20/3/2014), “ATP of Ethiopia is labeled as anti-freedom of expression because of the presence of gaps with the constitution and contradicts with principles of freedom of expression. This situation pours cold water on the progressive democratic system.”

Besides, an informant from Blue Party (personal interview, 20/3/2014) says that ATP violates the human rights aspect in relation to searches, communication hacks and hijacks and freedom of expression. Terrorism acts violates certain fundamental human rights, the right to life, personal security, liberty and respect (Robertson, 2007; Held, 2008;

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<sup>10</sup> *The Reporter*, 1 September 2013; *Lomi*, August 2006; *Lomi* August 2006; *Lomi*, August 2006; *Fact*, September 2006

Hoffman, 1998). However, counterterrorism laws on the other hand violates other basic rights i.e. freedom of expression, the right to demonstration and assembly.

ATP requires responsible usage of the executive and judiciary body, which is not available in the current Ethiopian revolutionary democratic system. “With the presence of coercive government and with the absence of free judiciary system, ATP served intentionally to sustain EPRDF’s power and weaken OPP” (an informant from AEUO, personal interview, 19/3/2014). EPRDF is not using the law in responsible manner. The analogy to express the responsible usage of the law is like “having nuclear weapon at the hand of USA and Iran” (*Addis Guday*, July 2013). With the absence of autonomous judiciary system no one will be free accused in terrorism cases. The prisoners are journalists, OPP leaders and members as well as human right activists. This shows that ATP can’t balance the issue of national security with human right protection<sup>11</sup>.

ATP suppresses dissent voices. Among Guelke’s (2006) strategies to deal with politically motivated offenders and suspects suppression “does acknowledge the political nature of terrorism but usually denies any legitimacy for the cause it employed.” The European Union Parliament claimed the interpretation of the law is apprehension though the enactment has no doubt. The interpretation with the absence of independent judiciary system is dangerous. The government uses ATP to suppress the right to freedom of expression illegally. Using this law and punishing nearly 20 journalists from 8-20 years

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<sup>11</sup> *The Reporter*, 1 September 2013

imprisonment is not justifiable<sup>12</sup>. But the survey conducted by EPA and ENA shows that the law is not used to suppress OPP and violates human rights<sup>13</sup>.

ATP restricts political space. Because of its wrong interpretation, the law limits the participation of OPP, civil society and journalists<sup>14</sup>. This leads the people to think that the law is dangerous and no one rescues unless he/she is unborn<sup>15</sup>. Whereas people refrain from joining politics, the communication between OPP, media and civil society organizations have been blocked, uncertainties on political communicators has increased and the political space is restricted. In relation to this, *Fact* (August 2013) quotes an article published in *Addis Raie*, “post 2005 election the government acquired lessons in practice and took some measures to make the political space free for legitimate citizens and limit the political space for illegitimate ones. Thus, ATP limits the political space for groups who want to seize power out of democratic procedures.”

ATP intimidates people to join politics. “Honestly speaking, if the law found timid person, it would intimidate badly. If you fear ATP and refrain from politics the aim of the law is achieved, instead of protecting Ethiopia from terrorist attacks” (*Addis Guday*, July 2013). In such manner, ATP terrorizes the people. Abreha Desta on his article published in *Lomi* (August 2013) states:

ATP is a terrorist. It enforces someone to do something without interest.

Don't we terrorized after the enactment of the law? ATP states if you do or speak something you will be responsible, accused, arrested etc. So, is

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<sup>12</sup> *Lomi*, July 2013

<sup>13</sup> *Addis Zemen*, 28 July 2013

<sup>14</sup> *Addis Guday*, July 2013; *Lomi*, August 2013

<sup>15</sup> *Ethio-Mihidar*, 4 September 2013

there anything which terrorizes people more than this? Therefore, I renounce ATP because I oppose terrorism, rather than glorifying terrorism.

ATP fails to consider preparatory action. Punishing someone without evidence is inappropriate. For example, if someone buys an axe, the purchase of the axe might be considered a preparation to kill someone. But, it is unlawful to accuse someone only by looking at the axe unless he/she shows some preparatory acts<sup>16</sup>. This means the preparatory acts have to be cue for the presence of terrorist attack. Punishments without considering preparatory acts lack legal relevance. Accusing someone in the case of intent, mental element, to pursue terrorist attack has a problem of ATP to consider the preparatory acts.

#### **4.2.3. The Issue of National Security**

The issue of national security is interpreted in broad and vague manner in the current Ethiopian context. Fundamentally, national security issues should be identified and clearly stated by the legislative body (an informant from ESD-SCUP, personal interview, 24/3/2014). Guarantying the national security issues should not violet the public right to know. The legislations enacted to ensure national security should give emphasis to entertain dissent voices (Eribo & Jong-Ebot, 1997).

It is the government's strong conviction to promote national security and manage the threat of terrorism (Woldeselase, 2010). However, the issue of national security is interpreted as power security and/or state security. Considering the national security as

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<sup>16</sup> *Ethio-Mihidar*, 31 July 2013

state security is not as such argumentative. According to an informant from ERP (personal interview, 19/3/2014) “national security is totally dependent on state security and the state within the territory shall be responsible for national security.” But hiding information from the people that may not hurt the youths’ health’, privacy of individuals, honour of citizens and the military forces is not standardized. The reasons behind this are “lack of transparency and the arrogant and ignorant behavior of EPRDF” (ibid).

Predominantly, the issue of national security in Ethiopia looks inward. When it rarely looks outward they accuse the Eritrean government and criminalize Al-Shabaab. The inward looking of national security helps the government to marginalize dissent voices by disallowing publications, snatching camera and tape recorders, suspending the media house, revocation of license and closing down legal entities” (an informant from *Fact* magazine, personal interview, 24/3/2014).

Consequently, the issue of national security is interpreted in broader ways that accuses journalists in sedition and treason. To secure the national, instead of embargoing information from publication or arresting and/or accusing media workers is not an appropriate response. But in modern democracy, national security is guaranteed by strong diplomatic relations and military force (an informant from UDJ, personal interview, 15/3/2014).

The other thing which makes the issue of national security broad is the individuals’ problem in access to information. The legally exempted information for individuals and legitimate interest is declared on proclamation 590/2008. The proclamation gives the

right for the officials to protect information that may endanger for the national security. According to an informant from *Addis Zemen* newspaper (personal interview, 20/3/2014) “problems in accessing information is a crime though no one asks the public officials. The main reason is that they personally depend on that organization. If they provide information, they feel as they lost something.” Therefore, the issue of national security in Ethiopia hinders media practitioners to get access to information and limits freedom to write and publish.

#### **4.3. Impacts of ATP on Political Communication**

ATP is a double-edge sword that has two missions, which is on fighting terrorism and repressing OPP and media organizations (an informant from ERP, personal interview, 19/3/2014). The edge of repression threatens peaceful political struggle because some of the provisions are directly against citizens. “[ATP] contains desperately broad definitions of terrorism, which will be encompassing even peaceful expression of dissent and political protest” (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Whereas, the law guarantees national security, restricting political space, freedom of expression and extends suppression. And this suppression increases peaceful political struggle changes to armed struggle (an informant from CUD, personal interview, 25/3/2014). When dominant viewpoints result in actual supremacy the rest will be suppressed by them and remain silent (Stone, Stingleton and Richmond, 2003). An article about peaceful struggle of OPP might be interpreted as encouragement of terrorism while the dissent voices of OPP interpreted as condoning terrorism. The consequence of such type of coincidence has led to exile and jail of many

OPP and journalist<sup>17</sup>. Besides, the OPP are not upholding their opinions and the presses also exercise their right under the dominant one.

In relation to this, the former Ambassador of USA to Ethiopia, Donald Booth said “Ethiopians shall get alternatives in political opportunities. Human right aspects stated in constitution are not properly respected in the implementation. Mainly, the US is worried about the large number of journalists and politicians in custody. This testifies that ATP is being used to suppress freedom of speech and press freedom” (*The Reporter*, 11 August 2013). Similarly, the EU parliament team who visited Ethiopia from July 15-17/2013, said human rights violation in Ethiopia is perilous. ATP and other laws suppress organizations that have important role in the building of democratic system. Therefore, the journalists and OPP members should be released without any precondition and the laws should be revisited<sup>18</sup>. Human Rights Watch (2010) states “ATP is a punitive measure restrict rights of freedom of expression and association have silenced independent voices and contribute to chilling freedom of speech and opinion more broadly.”

On the contrary, informant 2 from EPRDF (personal interview, 11/4/2014) says that “the very nature of counterterrorism laws is to protect democracy from anti-democracy. Terrorism is the threat in the democratic political process. Thus, ATP rescues democracy from terrorist. It is not intending to violate democratic commitments.”

With regard to human rights violation, the law has an impact on the political communication arena of OPP and media organizations.

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<sup>17</sup> *Fact*, September 2013

<sup>18</sup> *The Reporter*, 24 July 2013

### **4.3.1. On Political Parties**

Pre 2005 election, the political space was good in relative to the progressive situation of democratic system. The communication of political parties was “marathon” and huge “April demonstrations” were remarkable events at that time (Bereket, 2011). “Democratic institutions were listening grievances and the political sphere was somehow free from government. This condition might be understood as a fault of the government and then adopting different tight laws such as the press law, the civil society organizations proclamation and ATP to suppress the political movements of OPP, media and civil society organizations. That was why; election 2010 was dimmed since they were busy in implementing the laws” (an informant from EDP, personal interview, 21/3/2014).

These situations were totally inverted in 2010 election. According to Human Rights Watch (2010a) report “the pre-electoral period of 2010 election, local officials and the ruling party members target OPP offices and members through threatens and harassments, closing offices, breaking up meetings, denying access of state resources and generally making political activities difficult.” One way is threatening by the ATP. The best indication is the Nekemte leaders of EDU arrested during the election campaign. Bereket (2011) also confirmed that 2010 election was coming with little or rare political communication.

The government uses the law to silence oppositions. All the accused and arrested individuals by ATP are all dramatic. The EFDFF (Forum) fellows of ESD-SCUP, Olbana Lelisa and Bekele Gerba are taken into custody in EPRDF’s dramatic accusation, as they

were at Kenya to be trained by OLF. Whereas, the reality is that they delivered information about violation of human rights at Oromia for the people from Amnesty International” (an informant from ESD-SCUP, personal interview, 24/3/2014). Such type of intentionally organized accusation illustrates the vagueness and broadness of the law that opens easily for interpretation. Therefore, no one will be free from such type of accusation unless ATP is amended or canceled<sup>19</sup>.

ATP blocks the political communication of OPP. According to an informant from Blue Party (personal interview, 20/3/2014) “publishing party voice, getting halls for public meetings and using public areas for peaceful demonstration are all closed after effective date of ATP. These challenge OPP faces to reach out the people, even including their members.” As a result political communication of OPP to connect with members and constituencies has been blocked.

It is important to note that all OPP are not equally affected by ATP. Members of UDJ, AEUO, ERP and ESD-SCUP are arrested in terrorism related case. UDJ is the major victim of ATP because the former Vice President of the party, Andualem Arage, the Addis Ababa Central Committee, Natnael Kebede the EFDF (Forum) fellows Bekele Gerba & Olbana Lelisa and supporters of the party who provide professional support for UDJ Eskindir Nega, Wubshet Taye and Reeyot Alemu (she was member before the secession of Blue Party) are arrested (an informant from UDJ, personal interview, 14/3/2014). AEUO’s five leaders in *West Gojjam* as well as the *Assosa* district leader are in custody. The *Assosa* district leader has jailed because he was delivered information

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<sup>19</sup> *Addis Admas*, 10 August 2013

about unlawful immigration of Amharic Speakers from *Benishangul Gumuz* regional state for abroad media (an informant from AEUO, personal interview, 19/3/2014).

The other effect of ATP is on ESD-SCUP *Wolaita Zone Areka Woreda* party leaders. They were arrested when they were working on public mobilization and creating political awareness at the market. They were accused of intending to commit terrorist attack on the market day (an informant from ESD-SCUP, personal interview, 24/3/2014). ERP's leader at *Alamata* was arrested when he was providing information for foreign media about the reconstruction and redevelopment activities of the area that was appealed by many dwellers (an informant from ERP, personal interview, 19/3/2014).

The above discussion indicates that ATP affects the political communication of OPP in different ways. Consequently, when the political communication is affected, reaching out to the people has become difficult for OPP. This is because party leaders are extremely intimidated and are under surveillance.

#### **4.3.1.1. Exertion on Stage Politics**

Stage politics for this analysis means the way of transmitting political messages on stages that many people attend. Stage politics includes peaceful demonstrations and public meetings. Peaceful demonstrations are conducted after requesting permission. Conducting peaceful demonstration is a right, guaranteed in FDRE constitution article 30, entertains all sort of questions but it takes the security related restrictions into consideration<sup>20</sup>. The FDRE constitution Article 30 (1) of states “everyone has the right to

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<sup>20</sup> *The Reporter*, 28 July 2013

assemble and to demonstrate together with others peaceably and unarmed, and to petition.”

Stage politics needs open political space; there should not be any limitation. Before enactment of ATP, the political space was much better. Conducting peaceful demonstrations, public meetings and other political events were relatively easy. After ATP “lower level executive bodies of the government and police have their own power to repress dissent voices” (an informant from EDP, personal interview, 21/3/2014). An informant from ERP (personal interview, 19/3/2014) says “barring peaceful demonstrations and public meetings and announcing as the political space is free is a joke. In EPRDF political sphere there is always red line. And somebody who crosses that line is labeled as terrorist. Therefore, ATP is a double-edge sword with the mission on terrorism on one hand and to suppress dissenting voices on the other hand.”

Most of the respondents of the study agree that ATP affects stage politics taking place out of Addis Ababa. The executive bodies at different levels of regional states and the security forces make performing stage politics tough. The reasons for such bottleneck boils down to EPRDF’s policies and the way they orient those bodies. An informant from CUD (personal interview, 25/3/2014) says that “working out of Addis Ababa is terrible because of the setup of police officers and lower level cadres. They are anti-OPP. In Gamo Gofa, West Gojjam, and Kafa administrative zones members of CUD were arrested and beaten while they were conducting or planning to conduct stage politics.”

What is granted in the constitution is prohibited by police and ‘Cadre’ forces<sup>21</sup>. The text analysis of the newspapers and magazines also demonstrated the challenges of conducting stage politics. There are different mechanisms to make the stage politics difficult. The mechanisms are 1) total prohibition of peaceful demonstrations<sup>22</sup>; 2) halting peaceful protests by police force<sup>23</sup>; 3) merging another pro-EPRDF demonstration<sup>24</sup>; 4) arresting and beating members who work on mobilization campaign<sup>25</sup>; 5) arresting leaders<sup>26</sup>; 6) changing the time and place of demonstration after announcements made<sup>27</sup>; 7) limiting the area and route of the demonstration including not allowed to start from office<sup>28</sup>; 8) conducting antagonistic demonstrations<sup>29</sup>; and 9) officially renouncing the stoppage of such type of movements by the Prime Minister and Government Communication Affairs Office<sup>30</sup>. All these incidents were repeatedly happening within the three month time frame.

According to ATP (3(6)) any act that “endangers, seizes or puts under control, causes serious interference or *disruption of any public service*” is considered as terrorist act.

This means, when peaceful demonstrations are taking place, there is a disruption of

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<sup>21</sup> *Addis Guday*, August 2013; *Addis Guday*, September 2013

<sup>22</sup> *Addis Zemen*, 23 September 2013; *The Reporter*, 2 October 2013; *Addis Admas*, 17 August 2013

<sup>23</sup> *The Reporter*, 25 September 2013; *Addis Guday*, September 2013; *Lomi*, September 2013; *Ethio-Mihidar*, 25 September 2013; *Ethio-Mihidar*, 2 October 2013

<sup>24</sup> *The Reporter*, 18 August 2013; *Addis Admas*, 31 August 2013; *Addis Guday*, August 2013; *Addis Guday*, August 2013; *Lomi*, September 2013; *Fact*, August 2013

<sup>25</sup> *The Reporter*, 4 August 2013; *Addis Admas*, 31 August 2013; *Ethio-Mihidar*, 28 August 2013; *Ethio-Mihidar*, 4 September 2013

<sup>26</sup> *The Reporter*, 29 September 2013; *Addis Admas*, 28 September 2013; *Addis Guday*, July 2013; *Addis Guday*, August 2013; *Lomi*, September 2013

<sup>27</sup> *Addis Admas*, 31 August 2013; *Addis Admas*, 21 September 2013; *Addis Guday*, July 2013; *Lomi*, September 2013; *Ethio-Mihidar*, 10 July 2013

<sup>28</sup> *Addis Admas*, 28 September 2013; *Addis Admas*, 5 October 2013

<sup>29</sup> *Lomi*, July 2013

<sup>30</sup> *Addis Admas*, 5 October 2013

public services like transport. Therefore, such type of broad interpretation helps the ruling party to inhibit them under legal package.

On the contrary, informant 2 from EPRDF (personal interview, 11/4/ 2014) says:

All arguments of the OPP are not free from fallacy. As you can't hit your opponent below the belt, you are not morally capable to ask for political space to instigate crime. Someone who arrested after having all legal procedures in the judiciary system and uses the right to defend and appeal show as martyrs is not allowed in democratic sphere. There is wide political space to accommodate any dissent. However, there is no space to glorify terrorism and comprehend terrorists as martyrs in all countries. Why it is double-standard when it comes to Ethiopia.

In relation to the challenges of peaceful demonstrations, there are three important themes based on the above argument. The first theme is that most of the stage politics were conducted to ask for cancelation of ATP and the release of political prisoners. This is conceived as glorifying terrorism and there is no democratic space for it. That is why, the government extortions of the OPP's peaceful demonstrations at different towns systematically at work.

The second theme is that the challenges of OPP face when they conduct stage politics are anecdotal anomalies, rather than the system inherent problem. "Police brutality is one of the anecdote existed throughout the world including well established democracies.

Therefore, in Ethiopia these problems may happen at different places though they cannot substantiate them. And the government does not guarantee anomalies but find remedy.”

The third theme is that the right to demonstration is inviolable and inalienable constitutionally guaranteed right. It is not what the government give and take because it is an inherent right. However, “time and space related matters restrict the right in some manner. Some of the reasons like the place already occupied, other demonstration is already planned, the area is on development, the security forces are busy and the likes are not logical for OPP. So asking them to transfer to other time and change the place is not prohibition. But OPP are not interested even to listen the concerned organs response” (informant 2 from EPRDF). The government’s response towards the limitations is constitutional. Article 30 (1) the second paragraph states the reasonable restrictions of the right; “appropriate regulations may be made in the interest of public convenience relating to the location of open-air meetings and the route of movement of demonstrators or, for the protection of democratic rights, public morality and peace during such a meeting or demonstration”

#### **4.3.1.2. Extreme Intimidation**

The main objective of terrorists is to create extreme intimidation. So the primary role of anti-terrorism laws should target such extreme intimidation. Despite its very target, ATP creates extreme intimidation among politicians. Government executive bodies use different ways of intimidating OPP leaders and members as well as the people.

One way of intimidating OPP leaders is through their families. “Unknown persons call on family phones and rebuke as they will kill their son/father” (an informant from AEUO, personal interview, 19/3/2014). They also using out-casting strategy on members of OPP from social affairs in their community like *Idir* and *Ikub* and from social services they acquired as a resident of the area (an informant from CUD, personal interview, 25/3/2014). Discouraging OPP’s members is creating contagion effect with terrorist groups and extremists at different times are also another intimidating mechanism<sup>31</sup>. “At different times, UDJ is described as terrorist or partnering with terrorist by the state owned media. Such unfounded allegation creates extreme intimidation and makes the party refrain from engaging in political activities” (an informant from UDJ, personal interview, 15/3/ 2014).

To intimidate OPP, the government allegoric claim of marriage between OPP and terrorists/extremists, what it called “unholy marriage.” Informant 2 from EPRDF (personal interview, 11/4/2014) says that these parties (UDJ and Blue Party) pronouncing that their objective is establishing secular government. However, they are seen aliening with groups whose intents are to establish state religion, particularly Sharia, which directly contradicts with their objective. The OPP are posited with assumption that any group, targeting establishment of either secular or religious state, as far as it supports in weakening EPRDF no problem to cooperate with. This is what they call unholy marriage.

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<sup>31</sup> Lomi, September 2013

The other way is intimidating the people not to participate in peaceful demonstrations and other events organized by OPP.<sup>32</sup> In this situation, the government executive bodies and cadres warn the people against attending stage politics. Doing so would result in being dropped from government's social services.

#### **4.3.1.3. Routine Surveillance**

The other critical problem in the political communications of Ethiopia is the routine surveillance of dissenting voices. "In addition to calling through unregistered phone numbers for intimidation and scaring our office visitors, surveillance of leaders, members and supporters of the party's communication services is the usual task of EPRDF" (an informant from Blue Party, personal interview, 20/3/2014). This surveillance is against the constitutionally guaranteed right of privacy. According to Art 26(1 & 2) of the Constitution:

1. Everyone has the right to privacy. This right shall include the right not to be subjected to searches of his home, person or property, or the seizure of any property under his personal possession.
2. Everyone has the right to the inviolability of his notes and correspondence including postal letters, and communications made by means of telephone, telecommunications and electronic devices.

On the other hand, ATP permits sudden (article 16) and covert search (article 17) and surveillance of communication tools to gather information (article 14), which is against

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<sup>32</sup> *Addis Zemen*, 7 October 2013

the Constitution. The sudden and covert searches on OPP leaders and members by security forces at office, home and transport repeatedly taking place without court order.<sup>33</sup> Article 14 (1 a-c) of ATP states: “1/ To prevent and control a terrorist act, the National Intelligence and Security Service may, up on getting court warrant: a) intercept or conduct surveillance on the telephone, fax, radio, internet, electronic, postal and similar communications of a person suspected terrorism; b) Enter into any premise in secret to enforce the interception; or c) Install or remove instruments enabling the interception.”

The other facet of surveillance is on the bank accounts of the OPP. This surveillance “blocks the financial support acquired from internal and external supporters of the party. This is one of the drawbacks of ATP” (an informant from EDU, personal interview, 21/3/2014). In this way, everyone who wants to support a party gets his address and full name registered. This also helps the government to keep them under surveillance. The surveillance takes place on their communication services and bank accounts, which is perceived by OPP as the government spying its own people.

Informant 2 from EPRDF (personal interview, 11/4/2014) denounces that the Ethiopia government is not spying on its citizens. But there are some restrictions of the rights by court order. When the national security requires and the police reasonably suspects, surveillance will take place. This surveillance is under judiciary scrutiny and supervision, not allowed randomly for police to undertake it. Therefore, ATP’s objective is to prevent before huge catastrophe happened and surveillance is part of the prevention mechanism.

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<sup>33</sup> *Ethio-Mihidar*, 7 August 2013

### 4.3.2. On Media Organizations

Private presses were proliferating before the 2005 election. However, the post 2005 elections changed the situation. Although the government released the arrested journalists, the private press environment could not continue with its previous pace (Skejerdal, 2012). One of the reasons for this is the enactment of tight press law and ATP in 2008 and 2009 respectively.

Mass media plays a significant role to counterterrorism and extremism though it rarely adopted. The reason for that is the presence of unscientific assumption on a cause and effect relations between media coverage and the spread of terrorism (Biernatzki, 2002). To play this role media should provide updated, balanced and factual information to the people<sup>34</sup>. However, in the name of counterterrorism, ATP is used as a tool to suppress the private press, which helps to sustain the dictatorial system in the country<sup>35</sup>. Therefore, ATP undermines mass media's role to counterterrorism.

Similar with terrorist acts, the efforts to counterterrorism have an impact on right to collect, communicate and receive information (Biernatzki, 2002). ATP mainly threatens the private press. An informant from *Lomi* magazine (personal interview, 18/3/2014) says “after the enactment of ATP, we are not allowed to publish at public printing presses, police prohibition and intimidation increases, prohibition of attending press conferences also escalates, the state owned media proscription as extreme media rockets.”

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<sup>34</sup> *Addis Zemen*, 9 August 2013

<sup>35</sup> *Addis Guday*, July 2013

Along the same line, an informant from *Ethio-Mihidar* newspaper (personal interview, 18/3/2014) states that ATP targets private press differently. The state owned media practitioners are more secured because they report what the government requires. “When the government says ‘someone is fundamentalist’ they blow up as ‘s/he is a terrorist.’ Hence, nobody asks the evidence why they labeled somebody terrorist.”

Moreover, an informant from *Fact* magazine (personal interview, 24/3/2014) claims “the targets of ATP are not all private press, but only selected media houses.” In the tag of private press, there are some private presses serving as a wing of the government. The government intentionally provides information to show as the activities of the government are correct because private presses give coverage.

An informant from *Addis Zemen* (personal interview, 20/3/2014), on the other hand, says “although ATP enabled us to take care of terrorist attacks, it makes us to live in fearful and uncertain environment. The law doesn’t favor state owned media. There is no privilege for state owned journalists.”

The law violates the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression and press freedom. That is perhaps why Human Rights Watch (2010) calls it punitive measure. For instance, Reeyot Alemu was arrested for the reason that she expressed her thought freely<sup>36</sup>. But according to informant 1 from EPRDF (personal interview, 26/3/2014) “freedom of expression has its own limitations, which is clearly stated under Art 29 (6) of the constitution. Therefore, there is constitutional ground to restrict freedom of expression in ATP. Therefore, communication is one of the ways of promoting terrorism.

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<sup>36</sup> Lomi, July 2013

Jenkins (1983) in Biernatzki (2002) states “terrorism is a product of ... freedom of the press.” The Ethiopian government also believes that media particularly, free media are advocators of Colour Revolution that was manifested during postelection 2005. Therefore, media freedom is restricted in Ethiopia for the fear of not promoting terrorism.

A story on *The Reporter* (11 August 2013) states that ATP prohibits murdering and huge property destruction to profess ideological, political or religious motives. Besides, the law prohibits pretending, preparing, trying, plotting, encouraging, and supporting terrorist attacks. Therefore, either the journalist or the political leaders are accountable if they commit the above mentioned acts without considering education level, profession, and public acceptance. This is the principle of rule of law; everybody is equal before the law.

Informant 2 from EPRDF (personal interview, 11/4/2014) says that media freedom is not absolute freedom. It exercises under legal framework. It is also a purposive freedom. It is not exercised at the expense of peace and security of the nation. Fundamentally, all sets of basic rights are inseparable. They are interdependent and complementary. Therefore, one set of basic rights cannot override at the expense of others. Citizens have the right to life, development, self-development and movement and press freedom cannot override at the expense of these rights. Freedom by its nature shows harmonious relationship among competing and equal competing rights. One’s right to freedom of expression cannot override on the others right to life. In general, right is restricted by law.

The law has a chilling effect on the press, particularly the private ones. However, creating the chilling environment for media is an absurd prescription of the government to “break the thermometer that diagnoses the favor and social condition of terrorism”, according to

the thermometer-favor analogy of Miquel Rodrigo in Biernatzki (2002). The Barnhurst (1991) media-terrorism model, the culpable media model states two different dilemmas in relation to terrorism: coverage and control. According to this model media's effect on terrorism can be the hypothesis of awareness, contagion and interference effects. Therefore, the ATP of Ethiopia emphasizes to counterterrorism by minimizing the effect of media on terrorism by controlling them. However, this control "tends to harm the credibility of the government and give time for terrorists to resort to another attack" (Barnhurst, 1991). In general, the effect of this law on media organizations is more visible as it puts more pressures on journalists, makes access to information difficult and imposes self-censorship.

#### **4.3.2.1. Pressure on Journalists**

To be a journalist and to own press is very difficult in a country, in which democracy is not developed. *Fact* magazine in its article published on August 2013 states about the feature of press and journalist in Ethiopia.

Press and journalist have unique feature in Ethiopia, in which democracy is "ON" and "OFF" like night club lights to magnify the dance. In this case, press is the voice of the people and journalist is the mouth of the people. And like street trade using force against them is intentionally plan to make the people silent. When we examine the current situation of Ethiopia it turned back to the vicious circle existed before 1991.

As stated earlier, both the state owned media and the private ones end up serving their interests alienating with somebody and considering people as a spectator, not a part of their work. ATP by itself puts pressures on journalists in their daily activities, especially in the private press journalists. The pressures will result in the exiling, arresting, labeling, discriminating, hacking communication services and closing down the media. All these pressures make media “willing tools and cheer leaders of the state” under the guise of fighting terrorism (Eribo & Jong-Ebot, 1997).

An informant from *The Reporter* newspaper (personal interview, 28/3/2014) says “ATP exerts pressure on private presses and journalists. The evidences are media organizations closed-down; journalists living in exile and jailed are all from private presses. *Addis Neger* and *Awramba Times* (he came back) journalists left the country because of fear of imprisonment.”

The number of Ethiopian journalists who are in exile has increased. It is third, only next to Iran and Somalia (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2010). At different times the number of journalists leaving the country for various reasons. Some of the reasons are fear of imprisonment, the government security forces’ intimidation and the detention of their families. In 2013, journalist Serkalem Fasil, a journalist who was working at different newspapers and magazines before thrown to jail in relation to post 2005 election crisis, was exiled because of her husband’s imprisonment<sup>37</sup>.

Arresting is another way of putting pressure on journalists. According to Freedom House (2011), Ethiopia is the second jailer in Africa, next to Eritrea. Journalist Eskindir Nega,

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<sup>37</sup> Lomi, July 2013

Wubshet Taye and Reeyot Alemu are arrested but there are more journalists who got judgment with their absentia. After the investigation of this study and during the analysis three journalists namely, Asmamaw Hailegiorgis (senior editor of *Addis Guday*,) Edom Kasaye (she was *Addis Zemen* staff) and Tesfalem Woldeyesus (freelancer at *Fortune* and *Addis Standard*) as well as six “Zone9” bloggers (Befekadu Hailu, Zelalem Kibret, Abel Wabela, Mahlet Fantahun, Natnael Felek and Atinaf Berhane) were arrested. This shows the continued pressure on the private press journalists to stop or change their profession.

Informant 1 from EPRDF (personal interview, 26/3/2014) says that no one is arrested because of the content s/he writes. Finding legal faults in magazine and newspapers is easy. Scanning the contents of presses and thousands unlawful words, sentences and paragraphs can be enough to trace. So, what the government has done is tolerating them. About the arrested journalists “the first question is, ‘are they political activists or journalists?’ This should be addressed. What they and their supporters are saying as far as the government tolerates journalists, commit terrorism in the name of the journalist. So, why a journalist who promotes massacre and mass destruction is free from accountability? There is no exemption for the journalists from accountability”

According to the above statement Eskindir, Wubshet and Reeyot who are under custody are not journalists, rather they arrested in their association with terrorism and convicted with terrorism. Similarly, informant 2 from EPRDF (personal interview, 11/4/2014) says:

When they ask Eskindir should be released without precondition, they should not forget what he did. Eskindir was not arrested when he buttering butter on Ethiopia, rather he is a convicted terrorist. He used to be a

publisher but now he is not working as a journalist affiliated with any media organization. When commit a crime, the law doesn't keep silent because of his past history. For your surprise, the problem of this government is magnanimity; compromise the rule of law.

For informant 2 from EPRDF when parties or organizations ask for the release of prisoners it is always on a cherry-pick for their political benefits. The history of an individual doesn't count while s/he commits crime. For instance, Eskindir was editor-in-chief and publisher of *Ethiop*, *Wonchif*, *Menelik*, *Habesha*, *Askual* and *Satenaw*<sup>38</sup>. However, he is not working for specific media house or blog, but he used to.

According to respondents from media organizations, no journalist was arrested in their respective houses except the columnists of the defunct *Fetehe* newspaper, Eskindir and Reeyot. But, more than arresting the law puts pressure on journalists to severe self-censorship because:

1. The law prohibits bailout without cogent reason. This makes the journalist potentially feel obstruct (an informant from *Addis Admas* newspaper, personal interview, 22/3/2014).
2. Although finger prints and other modern intelligence instruments are present, putting someone at custody only with their suspect scares the journalist to work freely (an informant from *Addis Guday* magazine, personal interview, 18/3/2014).

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<sup>38</sup> Lomi, July 2013

3. The decline of pardon and clemency requests of journalists unlike the other politicians<sup>39</sup>.

The other way of exerting pressure on journalist is through labeling. “Labeling by the state media is a cue to reshuffle the media operation. The government does not hesitate to shut down the press(s) before election 2015 unless there is some change (an informant from *Lomi* magazine, personal interview, 18/3/2014). According to informant 2 from EPRDF personal interview, 11/3/2014) press is usually accountable by other media and the labeling by EPA and ENA assessment is appropriate. He also said that media is an appropriate powerful public institution. Hence, media should be entrusted with public accountability. Media is not insulated from public criticism and it should be open for that. Absolutely free commercialism and sensationalism leads to autocracy because absolute power corrupts absolutely. Therefore, as far as media exercises great power it should be open to criticism. “In Ethiopia media environment, illegal practitioners perceived as a rule while the rule perceived as exception. This means, legal and ethical journalists are considered as idiots while blacklegs of the profession who have not training on the profession and writes sensational stories confirmed as champions of the profession” (ibid).

Journalists are anxious because of the hacking and spamming of communications. The security forces send email in the name of terrorist organizations. For example “when *Fetehe* newspaper was operational, the EPRDF persons sent an email as they are Al-Shabaab and as they subscribe the newspaper. They did this to accuse the newspaper by

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<sup>39</sup> *The Reporter*, 4 September 2013; *Ethio-Mihidar*, 9 October 2013

ATP in associating with terrorists” (an informant from *Fact* magazine, personal interview, 24/3/2014). Similarly, an informant from *Addis Guday* (personal interview, 18/3/2014), is uncomfortable to talk freely on phone and social media because of the government’s routine surveillance.

#### **4.3.2.2. Problems in Access to Information**

According to a respondent from EDP (personal interview, 21/3/2014), a journalist who writes truth should be encouraged and should have access to information; nobody should deny a journalist access to information. The people also need to know the truth through the media. However, the newspapers and magazines being published during election 2005 were not reporting the truth. Most of their reports were made-up stories. For these types of journalists granting access to information is not compulsory.

On the contrary, an informant from EDU (personal interview, 21/3/2014) says:

When you become a politician, you have to respond to questions of media, whoever it is. It can be from ERTA, BBC, Esat (Ethiopian Satellite TV) or print media. This means, the sources of information for media are politicians and the people. Whereas, because of the gathering information from politicians makes journalists accountable for that information; the way they collect and why he write, shows the government’s power to extinct media in the country.

After ATP has come into effect, to access information for media consumption has become very tough because of some reasons. The first reason is the exaggerated nature of

the quest for national security. When an official from government office is requested for information by a private press journalist, he/she rejects the request in pretext of national security. Although the press law treats access to information matters including the exemptions, officials do not implement it wisely. According to informant 1 from EPRDF (personal interview, 26/3/2014) “there is no any declaration considering all things are the matter of national security. The journalists in the same way are not supposed to report the information they have if it threatens national security.”

The second reason is the vague interpretation of association with terrorists. Any type of communication with terrorist organizations is treated under ATP as association with terrorists. Therefore, information about the proscribed terrorist groups is mostly accessed from foreign media reports because ATP does not have clear demarcation on communication related issues. Therefore, news about terrorist groups is sourced from foreign media reports by changing hard news stories in humor soft news (an informant from *Addis Admas* newspaper, personal interview, 22/3/2014). According to informant 2 from EPRDF (personal interview, 11/4/2014) “association of terrorist doesn’t include innocent relationships but it forbids to associate with their activity.”

The third reason is using communication technologies to gather information is hard. Before the enactment of ATP the information media acquire through telephone, postal services and email were very important. Currently, “there is a problem in the information that is accessed through these communication technologies. Unless we specifically meet the sources face to face and have recorded documents the information is not consumed.

This in turn kills the passions of the journalist to access information quickly” (an informant from *Addis Admas* newspaper, personal interview, 22/3/2014).

The fourth reason is reluctance of the source to provide information. The threat of ATP leads to reluctance of sources to provide information that they know. The source of their fear is, the information published on press will be one of the evidences at court (an informant from *Ethio-Mihidar* newspaper, personal interview, 18/3/2014).

The fifth reason is using confidential sources is impossible after ATP was enacted. According to an informant from *Addis Guday* magazine (personal interview, 18/3/2014) there are some challenges in handling sources because of the sources’ character. Some sources are not willing to provide information. The others are interested proving information off the record without identifying their name and address. In such occasion, the journalist tries to compromise their interest and the choice of the source for the security of the source. Now, this pressure is implementing not only from the sources’ security but also from the survival of the press. Thus, ATP enforces media organizations to stop using anonymous and confidential sources by off the record mode.

The last reason is fear of journalists’ to access information from OPP. The law makes the communication between private media and OPP under fear. “A journalist is not certain about a news or feature reports s/he writes about OPP. The only thing every journalist believes is always the probability of being sued may be because of a single word, sentence, or paragraph. This is a direct battle to restrict OPP political communication to address the people (an informant from *The Reporter* newspaper, personal interview, 28/3/2014). Freedom House (2010) states that language imposing prison up to 20 years

on those who wrote, edited, printed, published or disseminated statements deemed to encourage, support or advance terrorist acts. This creates chilling effect on media and OPP and keeps silent because of the uncertainty that will result in the vague interpretation of the law.

#### **4.3.2.3. Self- Censorship**

According to the vulnerable media model to counterterrorism “any type of control even a natural one will be ineffective because terrorists can shift to other forms of communication by striking vulnerable points” (Barnhurst, 1991). Therefore, any type of media regulation is not essential. Intensified self-censorship may increase the vulnerability of media and the expansion of terrorism.

One of the impacts of ATP on media organizations is increasing of self-censorship. “ATP is another pressure for a journalist who has also suffered from penal code and press law. The denial of bailouts and the forceful collection of evidence make the law harsh” (an informant from *Addis Admas* newspaper, personal interview, 22/3/2014). Therefore, the choice for journalists is self-censorship, not only on the contents but also the words they use in the writing.

“ATP roped with different issues; freedom of expression, national security, human and democratic rights, religious and ethnic issues. Hence, there is no free way to work deep investigation on those issues. Moreover, more self-censorship is taking place on ethnic, religious and terrorist groups related issues” (an informant from *Ethio-Mihidar* newspaper, personal interview, 18/3/2014). The other sensitive issues that need more

self-censorship are “election affairs, promotion and demotion, authorities profile and corruption” (an informant from *The Reporter* newspaper, personal interview, 28/3/2014).

As a result of intensified self-censorship, journalists refrain from reporting newsworthy issues. An informant from *Ethio-Mihidar* newspaper (personal interview, 18/3/2014) says that discarding important news stories due to a spiral of fear of ATP has become a common experience.

Self-censorship by discarding reports is intensified because of vague interpretation of encouraging terrorism and reporting terrorism. The most important aspect to consider during self-censorship is whether the article they write is in a manner that favors or assists terrorists or not (Hoffman, 2006). The journalists could not clearly understand where reporting terrorism stops and encouraging terrorism begins.

According to informant 2 from EPRDF (personal interview, 11/3/2014), “reporting terrorism acts and encouraging them have a big difference. All journalists understand it as far as they are mentally healthy except Temesgen Dessalegn [Editor-in chief of defunct *fetehe* newspaper]. He writes about a convicted terrorist as ‘the iron man, which is directly related with glorifying terrorism”

Wilkinson (2003) identifies four important media-terrorism relationships. These are pure indifference, relative indifference, media-oriented strategy and total break. Among these relationships, media-oriented strategy relationship is instrumental to provoke the media into action. Giving media coverage to a terrorist at cover page of the press is giving reputation for obscure persons and makes them as legitimate political actors, which helps

them to recruit more human resources. Similarly, when the media coverage emphasized on the side of terrorists it encourages terrorism unintentionally (Norris, 2003).

According to informant 2 from the EPRDF (personal interview, 11/4/2014), encouragement of terrorism consists: considering terrorists as martyrs, serving as a propaganda tool, giving social support, showing sympathy, requesting for the release of terrorists without precondition and considering them as they are innocent political or conscience prisoners.

According to Hoffman (1998) the paradoxical relationship of media and terrorism is publicizing about them. The publication is a missile that serves and harms them. Publication is an effort for media when it works to gain attention, recognition, respect, sympathy and legitimacy (Nacos, 2007). On the other hand, media helps “outraged public to mobilize its vast resources and produces information that the public needs to pierce the veil of secrecy” (Hoffman, 1998).

This means, media should report about terrorism. Media should write about terrorism. One of the ways of counterterrorism is publicizing the act on media. Media are entrusted with responsibility of neglecting terrorists’ legitimacy by exposing their evil activities, the way they profess and fatalities and injuries they perpetrated.

## **Chapter Five**

### **5. Summary of Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations**

This study has explored how the Ethiopian ATP affects political communication. This chapter presents summary of the major findings. The chapter also presents the concluding remarks and recommendations.

#### **5.1. Summary of Findings**

As the common saying goes, ‘from a firing pan to the fire’, the political communication in Ethiopia goes from worse to worst following the enactment of ATP. The law aggravated the already poor but unhealthy political communication.

The country is entitled with the right to fight terrorism through early threat identification; community based prevention and enacting legislations mechanisms as well as using military force.

The research found out that the ATP, as it stands now, has pros and cons. The pros of ATP are preventing terrorist attacks before committed, making liable the one who commit, differentiating acts of terrorism from related crimes, enhancing the peoples’ right to life, security and liberty, confining the spread of terrorism, deterring others and preventing attacks by halting support.

However, ATP has drawbacks; it represses power threats, violates human rights, intensifies EPRDF’s hegemony by threatening OPP and media, suppresses dissent voices, restricts political space, intimidates people, and arrests suspects without strong reason. It

is seen serving the ruling party as a tool to sustain its hegemony. It also limits freedom of expression and restricts political space. ATP silences OPP by blocking their communications, denying publishing party voice, preventing them from getting halls for meetings and public areas for peaceful demonstrations, exercising routine surveillance on members and creating extreme intimidation on them.

ATP is used as a tool to isolate private media through infringement of their rights. ATP creates chilling effect on selected private media organizations, which led to the closing down of some media houses and imprisonment and exile of journalists.

The media have roles in supporting the fight against terrorism through raising public awareness. Nonetheless, in the current situation though enacted to strengthen the fight against terrorism, ATP put pressure on journalists, made access to information difficult and intensified self-censorship.

## **5.2. Conclusion**

The study has demonstrated that the existing desperate form of political communication of OPP and media organizations helps the ruling party to suppress them easily. The impact of ATP on political Communication, therefore, is to aggravate the existing polarized, isolated and marginalized political communication to more polarized, more isolated and more marginalized.

With respect to freedom of expression, ATP affects freedom of expression of OPP and the private press. It affects political communication of OPP by making stage politics difficult, creating extreme intimidation and exercising routine surveillance. The law

provides excess power for the police and security officials against legitimate freedoms. Moreover, the lower level government executive bodies interpret the law vaguely though the language in which it was written also vague, to repress dissent voices. Similarly, the law represses the private press by putting pressure on journalists, challenging access to information and intensifying self-censorship. This situation in general creates chilling effect on the political communication.

The issue of national security is being interpreted in broader and subjective manner. It looks inward and gives emphasis on citizens. This, in turn, creates oppression by violating the public right to know. ATP as one of the mechanisms to protect national security overrides over the right to freedom of expression.

### **5.3. Recommendations**

Based on the research findings the following recommendations are forwarded.

The vague interpretation of provisions of the law by lower level executives affects political communication of OPP and media organizations. Therefore, the government should train them on the issue.

Because of ATP and subsequent measures, politicians and journalists are exiled, arrested, harassed, and humiliated. This results in weakening of OPP and private media in the country. Therefore, the government should revisit the law and modify it in accordance with international standards.

Issues of national security should be identified clearly by the legislative body. Failure to do so will result in subjective interpretation of the issue.

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## **Appendix I: Questions for interview**

### **For all Participants**

1. Do you think that terrorism is a threat for Ethiopia?
2. What is your impression towards the political groups which are labeled as terrorist group by HPR?
3. What do you think about the anti-terrorism proclamation of Ethiopia?
4. What is your idea about the situation of freedom of expression in Ethiopia since the enactment of the Proclamation?
5. What are the specific articles that hinder freedom of expression?
6. What are the negative impacts of the proclamation to political communication?
7. What do you think about the positive impact of the proclamation?
8. What the question of national security looks like in Ethiopia?
9. What exactly is permitted under the concept of national security?
10. How freedom of expression is balanced with the demand for national security?
11. Where national security starts and freedom of expression ends?

### **For the government**

1. What is the scope of the party to counterterrorism?
2. What is the motive behind the law?
3. What is the state response for political parties who claim the law is used to make political communication silent?

### **For opposition parties only**

1. What is your general impression towards the law? Is it really necessary or not?
2. Suppose if you are a government how could you counter terrorism and what will be your scope?
3. Is there any member from your party accused or arrested just because of the law?  
Can you explain the case

**For all media organizations**

1. How do you see terrorism from media perspective? Is that vulnerable or culpable?

**For state media only**

1. In your survey with ENA, On July 21, 2005 EC edition, what were the real respondents that makes you to conclude in such manner?
2. In most of the articles written on Addis Zemen words like Fundamentalism and terrorism use in a confused manner, can u make it clear what is the difference among them?
3. What do you want to say for the people who are struggling for the amendment or cancellation of the law?

**For private media only**

1. What is the current working atmosphere of journalists under the law?
2. Do you think that the proclamation has an obstacle for media? How?
3. What the relationship between the political parties and media organizations looks like?
4. What communicating politics looks like after the enactment of the law?
5. Have you refrain from reporting an event because of considering the anti-terrorism law? What was it?
6. Which subject is become sensitive to the law?
7. Is there any journalist from your media house accused or arrested just because of the law? Can you explain the case?
8. What do you think about interviewing the so called terrorist group leaders for media work?

## Appendix II: List of Interviewees

<b>Political Parties</b>				
<b>No</b>	<b>Name of interviewee</b>	<b>Party</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Interview date</b>
1	Alemu Koyra	ESDP_SCUP	Secretary General	24/3/14
2	Ayele Chamiso	CUD	President	25/3/14
3	Chane Kebede	EDP	President	21/3/14
4	Desta Tesfaw (Informant 1)	EPRDF	Foreign & PRs, Head	26/3/14
5	Gebbru Berhe	EDU	Vice President	21/3/14
6	Getaneh Balcha	Blue	Political Affairs, Head	20/3/14
7	Habtamu Ayalew	UDJ	Public Relations, Head	14-15/3/14
8	Shemelis Kemal (Informant 2)	EPRDF	Government Communication Affairs Office State Minister	11/04/14
9	Teshale Sebros	ERP	President	19/3/14
10	Yeeyobezer Zewdie	AEUP	Public Relations, Head	19/3/14
<b>Media Organizations</b>				
1	Getachew Worku	Ethio-Mihdar	Editor-in-Chief	18/3/14
2	H/meskel Beshewamyelah	Fact	Acting Editor-in-Chief	24/3/14
3	Neamin Ashenafi	The Reporter	Political editor & Book reviewer	28/3/14
4	Nigus Wodajenew	Addis Zemen	Editor-in- Chief	20/3/14
5	Senay Abate	Lomi	Editor-in-Chief	18/03/14
6	Solomon G/egziabher	Addis Admas	Senior Editor	22/3/14
7	Yohannes Kasahun	Addis Guday	Editor-in-Chief	18/03/14

Appendix III: Articles from Addis Zemen

ተ.ቁ	ቅፅ/ ቁጥር	የታተመበት ቀን	አምድ	ርዕስ	ፀሐፊ
1	72/302	2/11/05	አጀንዳ	የባንዳው "አነግ" ዳግማዊ ክህደት በካይሮ	ቶሎሳ ኡርጌሳ
2	72/303	3/11/05	"	አገርንም ህዝብንም የሚቃወም "ፓርቲ"	ዳዊት ከመገናኛ
3	72/305	5/11/05	"	"ግንቦት ሰባት" ያመነው ተላላኪነቱና አንድምታው	መርጋ አድማሱ
4	72/308	8/11/05	"	በሃገርና በህዝብ ጥቅም ላይ የተወጠረ ባዶ ሴራ	እልፍነሽ ፅጌ
5	72/308	8/11/05	ፖለቲካ	የሽብር ተመሳሳሪ: ከሼህ ጁንዲ እስከ ሼህ ኑሩ ይማም	አጨሌ ከአ.ግቢ
6	72/309	9/11/05	"	የአክራሪዎች ድብቅ ተልዕኮ በማክሸፍና በማጋለጥ ከስጋት እንላቀቅ	አብዱልፈታህ ከሸጎሌ
7	72/310	10/11/05	አጀንዳ	ሽብርተኝነትን ለማገዝ አዋጅን መሻር	ዳዊት ከመገናኛ
8	72/316	16/11/05	"	የሃይማኖት አክራሪነትና ጽንፈኝነትን ያልኮነ ፖለቲከኞች	መዝሙርና ቤላል
9	72/317	17/11/05	ርዕስ-አንቀፅ	አክራሪነት ህዝብን ዋጋ እንዳያስከፍል መንግስት ይበልጥ ይንቃ	
10	"	"	አጀንዳ	የሃይማኖት አክራሪዎች የመጨረሻ ክስረት	
11	72/321	21/11/05	ዜና	ሽብርተኝነትና የሃይማኖት አክራሪነት ለኢትዮጵያ ስጋት መሆናቸውን አንድ ጥናት አመለከተ	በጋዜጣው ሪፖርተር
12	"	"	"	የሼጎ ኑሩ ይማም ግድያ የሃይማኖት ፅንፈኝነት ወደ ሽብርተኝነት መሸጋገሩን ያሳያል	የማነ ገ/ስላሴ
13	"	"	አጀንዳ	የሽብርተኝነት መገለጫ	ግርማ ለማ
14	72/324	24/11/05	ርዕስ-አንቀፅ	የአክራሪዎች መረን ያለፈ ድርጊት የእርምጃ እርምጃ ይፈልጋል	
15	"	"	አጀንዳ	የአሳቱ ዳር እስራቶች	አጨሌ ከአ.ግቢ
16	72/328	28/11/05	ዜና	አክራሪ ሃይሎች በፈፀሙት ፀረ-ሰላም ተግባር ሰዎች ህይወታቸው አለፈ	በጋዜጣው ሪፖርተር
17	"	"	ፖለቲካ	በፖለቲካ ድስት የተቀቀለ የሃይማኖት ሩዝ አይጣፍጥም	ግርማ ለማ
18	72/329	29/11/05	ርዕስ-አንቀፅ	አክራሪዎችና ድርጊታቸው በቸልታ ሊታለፍ አይገባም	
19	72/333	3/12/05	ዜና	የሃይማኖት ፅንፈኝነት የመንፈስና የሰብአዊ መብት ጥሰት ያስከትላል- የአ.አ. እስልምና ጉዳዮች ከ/ም/ቤት	የማነ ገ/ስላሴ
20	72/335	3/12/05	ፖለቲካ	የፀረ-አክራሪነት ትግሉና መገናኛ ብዙሃን	በጋዜጣው ሪፖርተር
21	"	"	"	አክራሪዎች ሃይማኖታችንንና አገራችንን ለመጉዳት የሚያደርጉትን ጥረት እንቃወማለን (የኢ.ድ.አልፈ.ጥር በዓል ተሳታፊዎች)	ዘላለም ግዛው
22	72/339	9/12/05	"	አጥባቂነት፣ አክራሪነትና አሸባሪነት	አብዱልፈታህ ከሸጎሌ
23	72/341	11/12/05	አጀንዳ	ከአክራሪነት ወደለየለት ሽብርተኝነት	ዮናስ ዘአሎምፒያ
24	72/346	16/12/05	"	አክራሪነት መቼም የትም ተቀባይነት የለውም	ብሩክታዊት ጸጋዬ
25	72/350	20/12/05	"	የዳበረ አጀንዳ ሳይቀርፀ ሰልፍ መጥራት ምን ይሉታል	ዮናስ ዘአሎምፒያ
26	72/351	21/12/05	ዜና	ጉባኤው (የአ.አ ሃይማኖት ተቋማት ጉባኤ) እሁድ ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ ለማካሄድ ጥሪ አደረገ	
27	72/352	22/12/05	ርዕስ-አንቀፅ	አክራሪነትን በፅናት ማውገዝ ጊዜው አሁን ነው	
28	"	"	ፖለቲካ	አክራሪነት፣ ዲሞክራሲና ሰብዓዊ መብቶች	ግርማ ለማ
29	72/355	25/12/05	ርዕስ-አንቀፅ	አክራሪነትን እናውግዝ፣ ለህገመንግስታችን መከበርም ዘብ እንቁም	
30	72/356	26/12/05	ዜና	መላው ህዝብ አክራሪነትንና ፅንፈኝነትን እያወገዘ ነው	

31	"	"	ዜና ትንታኔ	አክራሪነትን ማውገዝና መዋጋት የወቅቱ አጀንዳ	በጋዜጣው ሪፖርተር
32	"	"	ርዕሰ-አንቀፅ	ጆሮ ያለው አዲስ አበባን ይስማ፤ የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብን ይስማ	
33	"	"	አጀንዳ	የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ ሽብርተኝነትን የሚሸከምበት ትክክል የለውም	ከፍለዮሃንስ አንበርብር
34	"	"	ፖለቲካ	ሠላምን አንግሶ አክራሪነትን በማውገዝ የጋራ መግባባትን የፈጠረ ጉባኤ	በጋዜጣው ሪፖርተር
35	72/357	27/12/05	ዜና	"አክራሪነትን መታገስ ለልማት እንቅፋት ነው" የአዲስ አበባ ነዋሪዎች	በጋዜጣው ሪፖርተሮች
36	"	"	አጀንዳ	የወሃቢን አሸባሪነት ካጋለጠው የአውሮፓ ህብረት ሪፖርት ባሻገር	ሸረፋ ከድር
37	"	"	ፖለቲካ	ፀረ-አክራሪነትና ፅንፈኝነት ትግሉ ተጠናክሮ ቀጥሏል	ነፃነት ታደሰ
38	72/359	29/12/05	ዜና	የኦብነግ አመራር አባል በኢትዮጵያ ሰላምና ልማት ለመጠቀም ወሰኑ	ኢዜአ (ጅግጅጋ)
39	"	"	አጀንዳ	የፀረ-ሽብር ህጉ የሚያስፈራው ህገወጦችን ብቻ ነው	መሐሪ ይፍጠር
40	72/363	3/13/05	ዜና ትንታኔ	የአክራሪዎችና የሽብርጸኞች ጉዳይ	በጋዜጣው ሪፖርተር
41	"	"	ርዕሰ-አንቀፅ	አክራሪዎችና ፅንፈኞች በቃችሁ ሊባሉ የግድ ነው	
42	"	"	ፖለቲካ	"አክራሪነትና ፅንፈኝነት የህልውና አደጋ መሆኑ አፅንዖት የተሰጠው ጉዳይ ነው" ጠ/ሚ ኃ/ማርያም ደሳለኝ	በጋዜጣው ሪፖርተር
43	73/2	2/1/06	አጀንዳ	ሰላማዊ የትግል ስልቶችና የአፈፃፀም ጥበብ ከፀረ-ሽብርተኝነቱ አንፃር	ዮናስ ዘአሎምፒያ
44	73/4	4/1/06	አጀንዳ	ፅንፈኝነትና ሽብርተኝነት በአንዳንድ ተቃዋሚዎች እይታ	ተስፋዩ ለማ
45	73/7	7/1/06	አጀንዳ	የፀረ-ሽብርተኝነት ህጉን በማጨለም ለጥቃት አታጋልጡን	መሐሪ ይፍጠር
46	73/10	10/1/06	አጀንዳ	"ነፃውን ጥሬስ ማን ይታደገው"	አውላቸው ከበደ
47	73/13	13/1/06	ዜና	"በተቀነባበረ ሴራ ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ የማድረግ መብታችንን አጥተናል" ሠማያዊ ፓርቲ፤ "ፓርቲው ሰልፍ እንዲያደርግ ተፈቅዶለታል" አዲስ አበባ ከተማ አስተዳደር	የማነ ገ/ስላሴ
48	73/16	16/1/06	ፖለቲካ	የፀረ-ሽብርተኝነት አዋጅ አስፈላጊነት አሁንስ ግልፅ አልሆነላችሁም	ካይደኪ ዳንኤል
49	73/				
50	73/18	18/1/06	አጀንዳ	"ዶ/ር ብርሃኑ ነጋ ከሰሞኑ የአክራሪነት አንፃር	ታክለ ቢራራ
51	73/20	20/1/06	ዜና	አንድነት ፓርቲ ሰልፍ አካሄደ	የማነ ገ/ስላሴ
52	73/21	21/1/06	ዜና	ህዝቡ የሃይማኖት አክራሪነት ከፍተኛ የሰጋት ምንጭ መሆኑን እንደሚያምን አንድ ጥናት አረጋገጠ	በጋዜጣው ሪፖርተር
53	"	"	ርዕሰ-አንቀፅ	የሽብርተኝነት አደጋን የምንመለከተው አክራሪነትንም በመታገል ነው	
54	73/23	23/1/06	ዜና	ኢትዮጵያ አልሸባብ ስጋቷ እንዳሆን አድርጋለች	ትንሳኤ ገመቹ
55	73/25	25/1/06	ፖለቲካ	ከናይሮቢው የሽብር ጥቃት ምን እንማራለን	አበበ ያዘው
56	73/27	27/1/06	ፖለቲካ	አሸባሪነትን በጋራና በፅናት መታገልሰላም ዋስትና ነው	ደዲሞስ ዘካዛንቸስ
57	73/29	29/1/06	ፖለቲካ	"የመንግስት ኃላፊነት ሰልፍ ማድረግ ህገ-መንግስታዊ መብታቸው ስለሆነ እንዲስተናገድ ማድረግ ነው" ጠ/ሚ ኃ/ማርያም ደሳለኝ	በኃይሉ ሳህለድንግል
58	73/30	30/1/06	ፖለቲካ	"ሽብርተኝነትና አክራሪነትን በሰፊው መታገል አለብን" ጠ/ሚ ኃ/ማርያም ደሳለኝ	በኃይሉ ሳህለድንግል

## Appendix IV: Articles from The Reporter

ተ.ቁ	ቅፅ/ ቁጥር	የታተመበት ቀን	አምድ	ርዕስ	ፀሐፊ
1	18/1378	7/11/05	የአገር ውስጥ ዜና	በሼህ ኑር ኢማም ግድያ የተጠረጠሩ ግለሰቦች መያዛቸው ተነገረ	
2	18/1379	10/11/05	ዜና	ከ42 በላይ የአንድነት ፓርቲ አባላት ታስረው በዋስ ተፈቱ	ታምሩ ፅጌ
3	18/1380	14/11/05	ዜና	የአውሮፓ ህብረት የፓርላማ ቡድን በኢትዮጵያ የሰብዓዊ መብቶች ጥሰት አሳሳቢ ነው አለ	በየማነ ናግሽ
4	18/1381	17/11/05	ፖለቲካ	ዉጤት አልባው ፀረ-ሽብር ትግል በሰማሊያ	በዮህንስ አንበርብር
5	18/1382	21/11/05	ፖለቲካ	ሰላማዊ ሰልፍን እንደትግል ስልት	በሰለሞን ጎሹ
6		"	ቆይታ	"የቢሮ ፖለቲካ ስለበቃን ወደ ህዝቡ ሄደን ማስተማርና መቀስቀስ አለብን" አቶ አስራት ጣሴ	
7	18/1384	28/11/05	ዜና	ተቃዋሚ ፓርቲዎች በመንግስት ላይ የሚያቀርቡት አቤቱታ ቀጥሏል "የደረሰባቸውን ኪሳራ በመንግስት ለማወራረድ ሚያቀርቡት መሰረተ-ቢስ ክስ ነው" መንግስት	በውድነህ ዘነበ
8		"	ቆይታ	"ተስፋ የተጣለበት የመድብለ ፓርቲ ስርዓት ህገ-መንግስቱን በሚፃረር ሁኔታ ተጨናግጏል ነው የምንል" አቶ ጥላሁን እንደሻው የመድረክ ሊ/ር	በሄኖክ ረታና ውድነህ ዘነበ
9	18/1385	1/12/05	ርዕሰ-አንቀፅ	የኢትዮጵያ ተቃዋሚዎች ከዚምባብዌ ምርጫ ሊማሩ ይገባል	
10		"	ፖለቲካ	የመድረክ መስቀለኛ መንገድ	በየማነ ናግሽ
11	18/1386	5/12/05	ቆይታ	"ኢትዮጵያውያን በፖለቲካ ጉዳዮች አማራጭ እድሎችን ሊያገኙ ይገኛል" ዶናልድ ቡዝ	በዮህንስ አንበርብር
12	"	"	እኔ ምለው	የፀረ-ሽብርተኝነት ህጉ ለምን ያስፈራል	በቦንያ ሰ.
13	18/1387	8/12/05	ዜና	ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ ከ"ፅንፈኞች" ጋር እየተንቀሳቀሰ ነው ያሏቸውን ተቃዋሚ ፓርቲዎች አስጠነቀቁ	በዮህንስ አንበርብር
14	"	"	ልናገር	ዓለምአቀፍ የሰብዓዊ መብት ተሟጋች ድርጅቶች ውግዘትና የመንግስት ክርክር	በመስፍን መንግስቱ
15	18/1388	12/12/05	ዜና	"በህጋዊ መንገድ ተቋቁሞ እየተንቀሳቀሰ የሚገኝን ፓርቲ ስም ማጥፋት ወንጀል ነው" አንድነት ፓርቲ	በታምሩ ፅጌ
16	"	"	እኔ ምለው	የፀረ-ሽብርተኝነት ህጉ ለምን አያስፈራ	በግርማ ሰይፉ
17	18/1391	"	ዜና	ሰማያዊ ፓርቲ በሃይማኖት ተቋማት ጉባኤ ላይ ተቃውሞ አቀረበ ፤ፓርቲው ከ33ቱ የፖለቲካ ፓርቲዎች ስብስብ ጋር ተለያየ	በታምሩ ፅጌ
18	18/1392	26/12/05	ዜና ሃተታ	ከፀረ-ፅንፈኝነትና አክራሪነት ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ በስተጀርባ	በሄኖክ ያሬድና በዮህንስ አንበርብር
19	"	"	"	የፀረ-ሽብርተኝነት ህጉ ይቀየር ለመንግስት የማይሰሙ ድምፅ	በሰለሞን ጎሹ
20	"	"	እኔ ምለው	አሁንም የፀረ-ሽብርተኝነት ህጉ ለምን ያስፈራል	በቦንያ ሰ.
21	18/1393	29/12/05	ዜና	የሰማያዊ ፓርቲ አመራሮችና አባላት ለሰዓታት መታሰራቸውንና መደብደባቸውን ገለፁ	በታምሩ ፅጌ
22	"	"	"	የጋዜጠኛውና የፖለቲካ አመራሩ ያቀረቡት የይቅርታ ጥያቄ ውድቅ ተደረገ	በታምሩ ፅጌ
23	18/1394	3/12/05	ዜና	አንድነት የጀመረውን ገቅናቄ "33ቱ ፓርቲዎች" ተቀላቀሉት አለ	
24	19/1395	1/1/06	ምን እየሰሩ ነው	"ጊዜው ሳይረፍድብንና 11ኛው ሰዓት ሳይደርስ መነጋገር አለብን" አቶ ተሻለ ሰብሮ	ታምሩ ፅጌ
25	19/1396	5/1/06	ዜና	አንድነት ፓርቲ ሰላማዊ ሰልፍና ቅስቀሳ የሚከለክል ደንብ በድብቅ ወጥቷል	በታምሩ ፅጌ

26	"	"	"	የኢህአዴግ ም/ቤት ፀረ-ሰላም ኃይሎች ያላቸውን አስጠነቀቀ	በውድነህ ዘነበ
27	19/1399	15/1/06	ዜና	የአልሸባብ የናይሮቢ ጥቃት እየተወገዘ ነው	በጋዜጣው ሪፖርተር
28	"	"	ርዕሰ-አንቀፅ	ሽብርተኝነት መወገዝ አለበት	
29	"	"	ዜና	የሰማያዊ ፓርቲ የተቃውሞ ሰልፍ አራት ኪሎ ላይ ታገተ	በዮናስ አበይ
30	19/1400	19/1/06	ዜና	የአንድነት ሊቀመንበር ፖሊስ ጣቢያ የዋሉት አባላትን ለማስፈታት ነው አሉ	በታምሩ ፅጌ
31	19/1401	22/1/06	ዜና	አንድነት ፓርቲ መልዕክት ከማስተላለፍ ወጪ ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ አላካሄድሁም አለ። ሽብርተኝነትን የሚያወድስና የሚያሞካሽ በህግ ያስቀጣል መንግስት	በታምሩ ፅጌ

## Appendix V: Articles from Addis Admas

ተ.ቁ	ቅፅ/ ቁጥር	የታተመበት ቀን	አምድ	ርዕስ	ፀሐፊ
1	13/704	13/11/05	ዜና	አንድነት በህዝብ ጥያቄ በ16 ከተሞች የተቃወሞ ሰልፍና ስብሰባ አጠራረው	አለማየሁ አንበሴ
2	"	"	ነፃ አስተያየት	የሼኩ ግድያና የሃይማኖት ጉዳይ ፓርቲዎችን እያነጋገረ ነው	" "
3	"	"	የሰሞኑ አጀንዳ	"ለውይይት የተዘጋ በር የለም፤ መንግስት በሩ ክፍት ነው" ዶ/ር ሽፈራው ተ/ማርያም	" "
4	13/706	27/11/05	ዜና	አንድነት፣ በአባላቱ ላይ እስርና እንግልት እየተፈጸመ መሆኑን ገለፀ	
5	"	"	"	"ሰማያዊ ፓርቲ፣ ግንቦት 7 እና አክራሪዎች ጋብቻ ፈፀመዋል" ሙሉጌታ ውለታው (የፌዴራል ጉዳዮች ሚ/ር ሚኒስትር ድኤታ)	በናፍቆት የሴፍ
6	13/708	4/12/05	ዜና	በፀረ-ሽብር አዋጁ ላይ የፓርቲዎች ክርክር መራዘሙን ተቃዋሚዎች አልተቀበሉትም	" "
7	"	"	ዜና	"የፀረ- ሽብር አዋጁ ካልተቀየረ ማንንም አይምርም" ኢ/ር ይልቃል ጌትነት	" "
8	13/709	11/12/05	ዜና	አንድነት ፓርቲ የመቀሌና የወላይታ እቅድ ተጨናገፈብኝ አለ ተቃዋሚዎች ከአክራሪዎች ጋር የፈፀሙት ያልተቀደሰ ጋብቻ ለህዝቡ ስጋት ሆኗል- አቶ ሸመልስ ከማል	በአለማየሁ አንበሴ
9	"	"	የሰሞኑ አጀንዳ	"እውነተኛ ሽብርተኝነትን አጥብቀን እንቃወማለን" ዶ/ር ነጋሶ ጊዳዳ	
10	"	"	ነፃ አስተያየት	"መንግስት ህገ-መንግስቱ ሲጣስ ቆም አይመለትም" አቶ ሸመልስ ከማል	
11	13/710	25/2005	ዜና	ነገ በመስቀል አደባባይ ሁለት ሰላማዊ ሰልፎች ሊካሄዱ ነው	
12	"	"	ፖለቲካ በፈገግታ	በምርጫ ያጣነውን የፓርቲዎች ክርክር በ"ፀረ-ሽብር ህጉ" አገኘነው	ኤልያስ
13	13/712	2/13/05	ዜና	መኢአድ የእስር፣ የድብደባና የወከባ ጥቃት ደረሰብኝ አለ	ናፍቆት የሴፍ
14	"	"	"	አንድነት በአዳማና በአዲስ አበባ ማጠቃለያ የተቃወሞ ሰልፍ ያካሂዳል	ሰላም ገረመው
15	"	"	"	ሰማያዊ ፓርቲ ሰላማዊ ሰልፉን ለመስከረም 12 ለማዛወር ተስማማ	ናፍቆት የሴፍ
16	13/special	5/13/05	ነፃ አስተያየት	የፖለቲካ ፓርቲዎች 2005ን እንዴት አሳለፉ?	
17	13/713	4/1/06	ዜና	አንድነት የነገውን ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ ለመስከረም 19 አዛወረ	ሰላም ገረመው
18	"	"	"	ሰማያዊ ፓርቲ እሁድ ያስመረቀውን ተያትር በቪ.ሲ.ዲ ለህዝብ ሊያቀርብ ነው	ናፍቆት የሴፍ
19	13/714	11/1/06	ዜና	ሰማያዊ ፓርቲ የሰላማዊ ሰልፍ ቦታ ላለመቀየር ወሰነ	" "
20	13/715	18/1/06	ዜና	ግንቦት 7 የጦር መሳሪያ ድጋፍ ከኤርትራ እንደሚያገኝ ገለፁ	ማኅሌት ፋሲል
21	"	"	"	ዶ/ር ነጋሶ ጊዳዳ ለ3 ሰዓት ታስረው ተፈቱ	
22	"	"	ፖለቲካ በፈገግታ	"ኢህአዴግ፣ የምትቃወሙትን እኔ ነኝ የምሰጣችሁ እንዳይሉን"- ተቃዋሚዎች	ኤሊያስ
23	13/716	25/1/06	ዜና	ጠቅላይ ሚኒስትር ኃ/ማርያም የተቃዋሚ ፓርቲዎች ሰልፍ ላይቀጥል ይችላል አሉ	
24	"	"	"	ኢዴፓ፣ የተቃዋሚዎች ሰልፎች ግብ የላቸውም አለ	አለማየሁ አንበሴ
25	"	"	"	አንድነት ፓርቲ የአዲስ አበባ አስተዳደርና ፖሊስን እከሳለሁ አለ	
26	"	"	"	ኢራፓ፣ የነገው ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ ከፅ/ቤት እንዳይጀምር መባሉን ተቃወመ	አለማየሁ አንበሴ

## Appendix VI: Articles from Ethio-Mihidar

ተ.ቁ	ቀ/ሰ/ ቁጥር	የታተመበት ቀን	አምድ	ርዕስ	ፀሐፊ
1	1/26	3/11/05	ዜና	አንድነት በጎንደር የሚያደርገውን የተቃውሞ ሰልፍ ለሳምንት አራዘመን በአስር ላይ የሚገኙት አባላት የርሃብ አድማ ላይ ናቸው	
2	"	"	-----	ሠላማዊ የትግል ስልቶችና የአፈጻጸም ጥበብ	ታዲያስ ታንቱ
3	1/27	10/11/05	ዜና	"በጎንደርና በደሴ ከተሞች ከ90 ሺ ህዝብ በላይ ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ ወጣ" አንድነት ፓርቲ	
4	"	"	የኔ አይታ	ፖለቲካዊ ንቃት ለፖለቲካችን ፈውስ- ከህዝብ አንጻር	መሰከረም አበራ
5	1/28	17/11/05	ዜና	የሰማያዊ ፓርቲ የተቃውሞ ሰልፍ ሊቀጥል ነው፤ ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ ተጠቅሟል	ኤፍሬም በየነ
6	1/29	24/11/05	ዜና	የፀረ-ሽብር ህጉ ከህገ-መንግስቱ ጋር ይቃረናል ተባለ	
7	1/30	01/12/05	ዜና	አንድነት በባህር ዳር የተቃውሞ ሰልፍ አካሄደ	
8	"	"	ፊት ለፊት	"ሐይማኖታዊ ጭቆናን መታገል ፖለቲካዊ ጥያቄ ነው" አ/ር ይልቃል ንትነት	
9	"	"	ዜና	አንድነት ከፍተኛ ጫና ውስጥ መግባቱን ገለፀ	
10	1/31	8/12/05	ዜና	አንድነት በመሰከረም የተቃውሞ ሰልፍ ሊያደርግ ነው	
11	"	"	ጉራማይሌ	የኢህአዴግ ቀለም አልባው ሽብር "መንግስትነትን ሽፋን በማድረግ ሽብር"	አናንያ ሶሪ
12	"	"	ዜና	አንድነት በኢድ-ዓልፈጥር በዓል ላይ ጉዳት የደረሰባቸው ዜጎች ሁኔታ አሳስበዋል አለ	
13	1/32	15/12/05	ዜና	የፓርቲዎች የፀረ-ሽብር አዋጅ ውይይት በኢ.ቲ.ቪ እንዳይቆራረጥ ተፈርቷል	
14	"	"	ርዕስ አንቀፅ	የህግ የበላይነትና የፍትህ ልዕልና ይከበር	
15	"	"	-----	በአስር ተጀምሮ በአስር ያበቃው የመቀሌው ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ	ደምሴ መንግስቱ
16	"	"	-----	ይድረስ ለሠላማዊ የኢህአዴግ አባላትና አመራሮች - የፓርቲያችሁን ህቡዕ አሸባሪ አመራር በአስቸኳይ አጋልጣችሁ ለፍርድ አቅርቡ	አናንያ ሶሪ
17	1/33	22/12/05	-----	በአዲስ ዓመት መቀጠል የሌለባቸው ሌቱ የመለስ "ራዕዮች"	
18	"	"	ርዕስ አንቀፅ	የተንካራ ተፎካካሪ ፓርቲ ያለህ!	
19	"	"	-----	የፀረ-ሽብር አዋጁ ይሰረዝ ሲባል	ስለሺ ሃጎስ
20	1/34	29/12/05	ዜና	የሰማያዊ ፓርቲ አመራሮች በፖሊስ ድብደባ ደረሱበትን አሉ	
21	"	"	ጉራማይሌ	የፀረ-ሽብር አዋጁ ለም ይሰረዝ	ስለሺ ሃጎስ
22	"	"	ማህበረ-ፖለቲካ	ከፀረ-ሽብር አዋጁ ሰላባ ላለመሆን መፍትሄው አለመወለድ ብቻ ነው	ሙሉቀን ተስፋው
23	"	"	ፊት ለፊት	አሸባሪና አሸባሪነት	
24	"	"	ዜና	ኢ.ቲ.ቪ የፀረ-ሽብር አዋጅ ውይይትን እንዳይቆራረጠው ፓርቲዎች ገለፁ	
25	1/35	1/1/06	ዜና	አንድነት በአዳማ የተቃውሞ ሰልፍ አካሄደ	
26	"	"	ፊት ለ ፊት	አሸባሪና አሸባሪነት	
27	1/36	8/1/06	ዜና	ርዕዮች የጠባቂዎች ገደብ ተጣለባት፤ ከአቶ ገ/ዋህድ ባለቤት ኮ/ል ሐይማኖት ተስፋዩ ጋር ተጋጩ	
28	1/37	15/1/06	ዜና	"የተቀውሞ ሰልፍ ቀበና ድልድይ ላይ ታገተ" ሰማያዊ ፓርቲ	
29	1/38	22/1/06	ዜና	የአንድነት ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ መቋረጥ ተቃውሞ አስነሳ	
30			ፊት ለፊት	አንድነትና 33ቱ ፓርቲዎች ስለ ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ	
31			ዜና	"አሸባሪነትን በሞራላዊ ህግ እንጂ በአሸባሪ ህግ መቆጣጠር አይቻልም" ዓረና ትግራይ	
32	1/39	29/1/06	ርዕስ አንቀፅ	የሳዝናል፣ ጋዜጠኞችን ለይቶ የማግለል ሥራ ይቆም	
33	"	"	ዜና	ጋዜጠኛ ውብሽት ታዬ የሲኤንኤን አዋርድ አሸናፊ ሆነ	

## Appendix VII: Articles from Addis Guday

ተ.ቁ	ቅፅ/ቁጥር	የታተመበት ቀን	አምድ	ርዕስ	ፀሐፊ
1	7/171	ሃምሌ 2005	ወቅታዊ ጉዳይ	ሁለት ሰዓታት በጠቅላይ ሚኒስትሩ ፅ/ቤት	
2	7/172	"	ሰሞነኛ ጉዳይ	አንድነት ፓርቲ በጎንደር በጠራሁት ሰልፍ ከባድ ችግር ገጥሞኛል አለ	
3	"	"	ቃለምልልስ	"ይህ ሥልጣን ከአቅሜ በላይ ነው የሚል የኢህአዲግ ተሟሚ የለም" የተከበሩ አቶ ግርማ ሰይፉ	በአስማማው ሀ/ጊዮርጊስ
4	7/173	"	ወቅታዊ ጉዳይ	የአንድነት የተቃውሞ ሰልፍና የሚሊዮኖች ድምፅ ለነፃነት	
5	7/174	"	ሰሞነኛ ጉዳይ	ሰማያዊ ፓርቲ በድጋሜ ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ ጠራ	
6	"	"	"	ኢራፓ ያለ ብሄራዊ መግባባት እውነተኛ ዲሞክራሲ አይመጣም አለ፤ ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ እጠራለሁ አለ	
7	"	"	"	ለአውሮፓውያኑ መንግስት ቃሊቲን አናስገበኝም አለን አሉ	
8	7/175	"	ወቅታዊ ጉዳይ	የኢትዮጵያ መንግስት በእብሪት አካሄዱ እንዲቀጥል መፈቀድ የለበትም	እስክንድር ነጋ
9	"	"	ነፃ መድረክ	ከሁሉ በፊት ብሄራዊ መግባባት ይቅደም	ተሻለ ሰብሮ
10	7/176	ነሃሴ 2005	ሰሞነኛ ጉዳይ	የሰሞኑ የፖለቲካ ትኩሳቶች አቅጣጫ	
11	'	"	ነፃ መድረክ	የሰማያዊ ሰላማዊ የተቃውሞ ሰልፍ ምን ለውጥ አመጣ	አ/ር ይልቃል ጌትነት
12	7/177	"	ሰሞነኛ ጉዳይ	ድናልድ ቡዝ " አሜሪካ የኢትዮጵያን ፖለቲካ በቅርብ ትከታተላለች" አሉ	
13	"	"	ቃለምልልስ	"ሥልጣን በማን እጅ እንዳለ አይታወቅም" አቶ አሰራት ጣሴ	በአስማማው ሃ/ጊዮርጊስ
14	"	"	ነፃ መድረክ	የጸረ-ሽብርተኝነት ህግና የኢህአዲግ የአመኑኝ ፖለቲካ	ሙሴ ሰሙ
15	7/178	"	ነጻ መድረክ	የሼህ ኑሩ ገዳይ ማን ነው? ለምን? አቶ ግርማ ሰይፉ	
16	7/179	"	ወቅታዊ ጉዳይ	የሰላማዊ ሰልፎቹ ፍጥጫ	
17	"	"	ቃለምልልስ	"ህወሐት የተነሳለትን ዓላማ ስቷል" ወ/ሮ አረጋሽ አዳነ	አስማማው ሃ/ጊዮርጊስ
18	7/180	ጳጉሜ 2005	ወቅታዊ ጉዳይ	የሁለቱ ሰልፎች ወግ	
19			ርዕስ አንቀፅ	የፍጥጫ ፖለቲካ ውጣ፤ የመቻቻል ፖለቲካ ግባ	
20	"	"	የአመቱ አበይ ጉዳዮች	የነቁት ተቃዋሚዎች	
21	7/181	መስከ 2006	ዐቢይ ጉዳይ	የፖለቲካ ለውጥ ያስፈልገናል	
22	7/182	"	ሰሞነኛ ጉዳይ	እስክንድርና ርዕዮች ለስካሮቭ ሽልማት ታጭተዋል	
23	"	"	ሰሞነኛ ጉዳይ	የፖለቲካኛ እስረኞች በምህረት አይለቀቁም? "በኢትዮጵያ የፖለቲካ እስረኛ የለም" መንግስት	
24	"	"	ዐቢይ ጉዳይ	ማረሚያ የሚያስፈልገው ማረሚያ ቤት	
25	"	"	ነፃ መድረክ	የርዕዮች አለሙን ነገር ሳስበው ሳስበው	ሃብታሙ አያሌው
26	7/183	"	ሰሞነኛ ጉዳይ	የአንድነት ከፍተኛ አመራሮችና አባላት ታስረው ተለቀቁ	
27	"	"	ወቅታዊ ጉዳይ	አልሸባብ፤ የኢትዮጵያም ሥጋት	
28	7/184	"	ሰሞነኛ ጉዳይ	አንድነትና 33ቱ ፓርቲዎች ፖሊስና መስተዳደሩን በህግ እንጠይቃለን አሉ	
29	"	"	ወቅታዊ ጉዳይ	የታገተው የአንድነት ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ	
30	"	"	ነፃ መድረክ	የጉልበት ፖለቲካ ይቁም	ሃብታሙ አያሌው

## Appendix VIII: Articles from Lomi

ተ.ቁ	ቅፅ/ ቁጥር	የታተመበት ቀን	አምድ	ርዕስ	ፀሐፊ
1	2/63	ሃምሌ 2005	ቆይታ	ቆይታ በቃሊቲ ከእስክንድር ነጋና አንዱዓለም ነጋ	በትረ ያዕቆብ
2	"	"	ነፃ አስተያየት	"በሰላማዊ ሰልፎች ላይ ተሳተፉ" እስክንድር ነጋ	
3	"	"	ከነፃው ጥሬስ	ጋዜጠኞቿን በልታ ዝም የምትል አገር-ኢትዮጵያ 12	ፍፁም ካሳሁን
4	"	"	እውነትና ታሪክ	የፕሮፌሰር በየነ ዲሞክራሲ አርበኝነት ሸፋፋ ሚዛን ይብቃው ብንልስ	ግርማ ሰይፉ
5	"	"	መድረክ	"ርዕዮች የተከሰሰችው በፈጠራ ነው" አቶ አለሙ ጎቤቦ (የርዕዮት አባት)	
6	"	"	አጀንዳ	"ርዕዮች ሃሳቧን በነፃነት ስለገለፁት ነው ለእስር የተዳረገችው" እስክዳር አለሙ (የርዕዮት አህት)	
7	2/64	"	ኢዲቶሪያል	የዲሞክራሲው ግንባታ የሚጠናከረው መንግስትን የሚፎካከር ጠንካራ ፓርቲዎች ሲመጡ ነው	
8	"	"	ወቅታዊ ጉዳይ	ተፈጥሮአዊ መብታችንን አትቀሙን	ግርማ ሰይፉ
9	"	"	ከነፃው ጥሬስ	ጋዜጠኞቿን በልታ ዝም የምትል አገር-ኢትዮጵያ 13	ፍፁም ሰለሞን
10	"	"	ፖለቲካ	ሰማያዊ ፓርቲ ሌላ ሰልፍ ጠራ	
11	"	"	ቅኝት	የሰደተኛ ጋዜጠኞች ጨዋታ	ዳዊት ከበደ ወየሳ
12	2/65	ሃምሌ 2005	ኢዲቶሪያል	"ሰልፍ" ከሰላማዊ የትግል ስልቶች አንዱ እንጂ ብቸኛው አይደለም	
13	"	"	ወቅታዊ ጉዳይ	"የልጅ አዕምሮ እንዳይጎዳ ከሃገር መውጣትን መርጫለሁ" የእስክንድር ነጋ ባለቤት የሰርካለም ፋሲል የመጨረሻ ቃል	
14	"	"	መግት	አቶ ግርማ ሰይፉ ታሪክ ሳያውቅ ለዘለፋ የቸኮለ ሆኖ ነው ያገኘሁት	በየነ ጴጥሮስ (ፕ/ር)
16	"	"	ከነፃው ጥሬስ	"የአሜሪካ መንግስት በኢትዮጵያ ላይ ማዕቀብ መጣል ይገባዋል" በኒውዮርክ ታይምስ የታተመው የእስክንድር ነጋ ደብዳቤ	
17	"	"	መድረክ	የተቃዋሚዎች ህብረት የሚፈራርስበት ምክንያት በስመ ተቃዋሚ ተቃቅፎ መሳሰሉ ለትልቁ ዓላማ	ሲሊያና ሸመልስ
18	"	"	ፖለቲካ	ዶ/ር ነጋሶ መድረክን ወደ ውህደት መግፋት እንደማይገባ ደብዳቤ ፃፉ	ዶ/ር ነጋሶ ጊዳዳ
19	"	"	አጀንዳ	የ"ሚሊዮኖች ድምፅ ለነፃነት" እና የአንድነት መሪዎች እንደጋንዲ	ግርማ ሞገስ
20	"	"	ገመና	ይድረስ ለአቶ ሙሹ ሰሙ:- "ዝም ባለ አፍ ዝምብ አይገባም"	
21	"	"	ዜና	አንድነትን ለመቃወም ኢህአዲግ ያዘጋጀው ሰልፍ ባለስልጣናቱን ከፋፈለ	
22	"	"	አጀንዳ	የሰማያዊና የአንድነት ፓርቲዎች ሰልፍ ለተቃውሞ ጎራው ያስተላለፈው መልዕክት	አብዲ ከማል (ከናዝሬት)
23	2/66	ነሃሴ 2006	መድረክ	ፀረ-ሽብር ህጉ አሸባሪ ነው! ሽብርና ፀረ-ሽብር ህግን አልደግፍም	አብርሃ ደስታ
24	"	"	ከነፃው ጥሬስ	ጋዜጠኞቿን በልታ ዝም የምትል አገር-ኢትዮጵያ 14	ፍፁም ሰለሞን
25	"	"	ቆይታ	"ውበሽት ልጁን መጨበጥ እንኩሞን አይችልም፤ በወር 100 ብር ብቻ ነው የሚፈቀድለት" ባለቤቱ ብርሃን ተስፋየ	አለልኝ መኮነን
26	"	"	ዳሰሳ	የኢትዮጵያ ህገ-መንግስትና ፀረ-ሽብር ህጉ ሲጣረሱ	ተማም አባቡልጉ
27	2/67	ነሃሴ 2005	ፖለቲካ	"በመንግስት የችግር አፈታት ዘዴዎች አዝናል፤ አፍረናልም" ሰማያዊ ፓርቲ "የኢትዮጵያ የፖለቲካ ምህዳር ብልሽት ከጊዜ ወደ ጊዜ እየባሰበት መጥቷል" (አቶ ጥላሁን እንደሻው የመድረክ ሊቀመንበር)	
28	"	"	ከነፃው ጥሬስ	ጋዜጠኞቿን በልታ ዝም የምትል አገር-ኢትዮጵያ 15	ፍፁም ሰለሞን

29	"	"	መድረክ	የሰልጣን ጥመንነት የወለደው የፀረ-ሽብር አዋጅ (የጋዜጠኛ ርዕዮተ አለሙ ደብዳቤ ከቃሊቲ)	
30	"	"	"	የ"ሚሊዮኖች ድምፅ ለነፃነት" ዘመቻና የመቀሌአችን መታፈን ከነመፍትሄው	ግርማ ሞገስ
31	"	"	ዳሰሳ	የኢትዮጵያ ህገ-መንግስትና ፀረ-ሽብር ህጉ ሲጣረሱ	ተማም አባቡልጉ
32	"	"	ሙግት	"ተቃዋሚ ፓርቲዎችና የሃይማኖት አክራሪነት ጋብቻ ፈፀመዋል" አቶ ሙሉጌታ ወለታው (የፌዴራል ጉዳዮች ሚ/ር ዴኤታ) "ኢህአዴግ በሙስሊሙ ህብረተሰብ ገብቶ የሚያማስለው ነገር ለኢትዮጵያ ብቻ ሳይሆን ለቀጠናው አደገኛ ነው" ኢ/ር ዴልቃል ጌትነት (የሰማያዊ ፓርቲ ፕሬዚዳንት)	
33	2/68	ነሃሴ 2006	ፖለቲካ	የሽብርተኝነት ምንጭ ጭቆና ነው	አብርሃ ደስታ
34	"	"	ሙግት	"የኃይል እርምጃ ለህዝብ ጥያቄ መቼውንም መልስ አይሆንም" ከ33ቱ ፓርቲዎች ትብብር የተሰጠ መግለጫ	
35	"	"	ዳሰሳ	የኢትዮጵያ ህገ-መንግስትና ፀረ-ሽብር ህጉ ሲጣረሱ	ተማም አባቡልጉ
36	2/69	"	ዳሰሳ	የጸረ-ሽብር ህጉ ለምን አያስፈራ?	ግርማ ስይፉ
37	"	"	ርዕስ አንቀፅ	ድብብቁ ይብቃ	
38	"	"	ህግ	የኢትዮጵያ ህገ-መንግስትና ፀረ-ሽብር ህጉ ሲጣረስ	ተማም አባቡልጉ
39	2/70	ጁጉሜ 2005	ርዕስ አንቀፅ	የኢህአዴግ አመራር ለለውጥ ፈቃደኛ ነው?	
40	"	"	ነጥብ	የአንድነቶች ሰላማዊነት ፅናት በርቤና ፍቼ አሮሚያ	ግርማ ሞገስ
41	"	"	ቅኝት	አንዱዓለም አራጌ፤ የሰላማዊ ትግል ተምሳሌት	ቴዲ ጋ
42	"	"	ትኩረት	ሃገሪቷን የሚያስተዳድራት ማነው? የባሌ ሮቤ ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ ለምን ተደናቀፈ? ከአንድነት ለዲ/ሲና ለፍትህ ፓርቲ የተሰጠ መግለጫ	
43	3/71	መስከ 2006	ወቅታዊ ጉዳይ	ስለሰማያዊ ፓርቲ የተቃውሞ ሰልፍ-	ይድነቃቸው ከበደ (የፓርቲው የህግ አማካሪ)
44	"	"	ከነፃው ፕሬስ	ጋዜጠኞቿን በልታ ዝም የምትል አገር-ኢትዮጵያ	ፍጹም ሰለሞን
45	"	"	ፖለቲካ	አንድነትና 33ቱ ፓርቲዎች በጋራ ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ ጠሩ	
46	"	"	"	ወደ መስከረም 12 የተሻገረው የሰማዊ ፓርቲ ሰልፍ ከሰማያዊ ፓርቲ የተሰጠ መግለጫ	
47	3/72	"	እንግዳችን	"ኢትዮጵያዊ አሸባሪ አለ ብዬ አላምንም" ዶ/ር ያዕቆብ ኃ/ማርያም	
48	"	"	ከነፃው ፕሬስ	"የማልጨርሰውን ነገር አልጀምርም" ርዕዮተ አለሙ በበዓል ቀን የርሃብ አድማ ርዕዮተ ምን ልትነግረን ነው?	
49	"	"	ትኩረት "	የአንድነት ፓርቲ ሰልፍ በመንግስት ዕውቅና አግኝቶ ለመስከረም 19 ተላለፈ	
50	"	"	ካነበብነው	"ሰማያዊና አንድነት ፓርቲ የፅንፈኞች ተባባሪ ናቸው" ጠሚ ኃ/ማርያም ደሳለኝ	
51	3/73	"	ከነፃው ፕሬስ	አሸባሪነትስ እንደአስከንድር ነጋ: ርዕዮተና እስከንድር የ"ሰካሮቭ ሽልማት ታጩ	አባ መላ
52	"	"	ካነበብነው	አንዱዓለም አራጌ የዓመቱ ሰው በመባሉ የዶ/ር ነጋሶ ጊዳዳ ምስጋና	ግርማ ሞገስ (ተርጓሚ)
53	"	"	ፖለቲካ	"ለተቃዋሚዎች እንቅስቃሴ መንግስት የህግ ጥበቃ እንዲያደርግ እንጠይቃለን" ከ33ቱ ፔቲሽን ፈራሚ ፓርቲዎች የተሰጠ መግለጫ	
54	"	"	እይታ	4ኪሎ የታገተው የሰማያዊ ፓርቲ ሰልፍ	ፍቅሩ ባልቻ
55	2/74	"	ፖለቲካ	እኔን እሰሩኝ ያሉት ነጋሶ ለምን ታሰሩ?	ዳዊት ሰለሞን
56	"	"	"	"እነሱ ህግ ሲጥሱ እኛ ከሚጥሱት ጋር አንተባበርም" የተከበሩ አቶ ግርማ ስይፉ	
57	"	"	አጀንዳ	ሰማያዊ ፓርቲ የገነነው በጥንካሬው ወይስ በኢህአዴግ ድክመት	አርሴማ ዘ-በሄረ ሃበሻ
58	"	"	ጥበብ	የአንድነት ፓርቲ ሰልፍ ምን መልክ ነበረው?	ዮናስ ወ/ሰንበት

## Appendix IX: Articles from Fact

ተ.ቁ	ቅፅ/ቁጥር	የታተመበት ቀን	አምድ	ርዕስ	ፀሐፊ
1	2/6	ሃምሌ 2005	1 በሉ	የግፉዓን ዕድሜ ምን ያህል ይረዝማል	ተመስገን ደሳለኝ
2	"	"	ማህበራዊ ሂስ	ትግል ለነባሩ አዝዛዝ	ዳዊት ታደሰ
3	2/7	ነሃሴ 2005	1 በሉ	አውራውን ፍለጋ "በድብልቅልቁ አምላክ"	ተመስገን ደሳለኝ
4	"	"	-----	ዳገት ላይ እኔ ጠፋሁ	አለማየሁ ገላጋይ
5	"	"	ልዩ ዳሰሳ	የአደባባይ ሰልፉ መንገድ፤ የታንጎ ዳንስ ነገር	ሙሉነህ አያሌው
6	"	"	-----	የኢህአዴግ ልግመትና የዚህ ትውልድ ሠላማዊ ጥያቄዎች	ዳንኤል ተፈራ
7	2/8	"	ርዕስ አንቀፅ	የፀረ-ሽብር አዋጅ እንዲሻሻል እንጠይቃለን	
8	"	"	1 በሉ	የፀረ-ሽብር አዋጁ የጠሉትን መምቻ	ተመስገን ደሳለኝ
9	2/9	"	1 በሉ	የእኛ "መንግስት"	ተመስገን ደሳለኝ
10	"	"	-----	ነፃነት የሌለን የነፃ ሃገር ዜጎች	ቴዎድሮስ ተ/አረጋይ
11	"	"	የህግ አምድ	ህግ የህብረተሰብ ወይስ የመንግስት	ጌታቸው ታምራት
12	"	"	-----	ከተዋውሞ ሰልፎች ባሻገር የማሸነፊያ ስትራቴጂው ወዴት አለ	ዳንኤል ተፈራ
13	2/11	ጳጉሜ 2005	----	ሀገሪ ገመናሽ የመጨረሻ ክፍል እቁጣጣሽ ሃገሪ "የሃይማኖት አባቶችሽ" የተቃውሞ ሰልፍ ጠሩልሽ	በድሉ ዋቅጅራ (ዶ/ር)
14	"	"	"	ተስፋ አለኝ	ነጋሶ ጊዳዳ (ዶ/ር)
15	2/12	መስከ 2006	ከሰሞኑ	እስክንድር ነጋና ርዕዮት አለሙ የ"ሻካሮቭ ሽልማት" እጩ ሆኑ	
16	"	"	"	ውንሽት ታዩ ደግሜ ይቅርታ ለመጠየቅ አላሰብሁም አለ	
17	"	"	ርዕስ አንቀፅ	መልዕክት ለተፎካካሪ ፓርቲዎች	
18	"	"	-----	ስርዮትና ጥምረት ለተቃውሞው ፖለቲካ	ሚካኤል ዲኖ
19	"	"	"	ከሰላማዊ ሰልፎች ተጠቃሚው ማነው	ዳንኤል ተፈራ
20	2/13	"	ከሰሞኑ	"የኢትዮጵያ መንግስት ዓለም አቀፍ ስምምነቶችን እየጣሰ ነው" አርቲክል 19	
21	"	"	የወቅቱ አጀንዳ	የአንድነት ሰላማዊ ሰልፍ ምን ይዞ ይመጣ ይሆን	
22	"	"	"	የቢሆንና ባይሆን ኖሮ ወጎች	በድሉ ዋቅጅራ (ዶ/ር)
23	2/14	"	-----	የእስክንድር ነጋ ጉዳይ ለአፍሪካ ጉዳይ ሊቀርብ ነው	
24	"	"	ርዕስ አንቀፅ	የደህንነት ስጋቶች ይለዩ	
25	"	"	ልዩ ዳሰሳ	የአልሸባብ አዲሱ መንገድ፤ ተራ ወይስ ተጨባጭ ስጋት	ሙሉነህ አያሌው

## Appendix X: Terrorism Attacks in Ethiopia

No	Name of perpetrator	No. of attacks	Fatalities	Injured
1	Eritrea Liberation Front	20	32	0*
2	Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front	3	1*	0*
3	Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front	10	317*	200*
4	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party	5	41	8*
5	Western Somalia Liberation Front	1	4	*
6	Armed Guerillas	1	*	*
7	Oromo Liberation front (OLF)	8 (but 4 suspected)**	13	36
8	Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	3 (but 2 suspected)**	86	77
9	Issa & Gurgura Liberation Front	1	100	0
10	Amhara Tribal Group	1	61	0
11	Former Members of Central Investigative Office	1	0	0
12	Al-Shabaab	2 (but 1 suspect)	100	0*
13	Somali Islamic Front	1	0	0
14	Coalition for Unity & Democracy (CUD)	4	0	0
15	All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP)	1	0	0
16	Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front	1	0	0
17	Al-Ittihaad Al-Islami (AIAI)	2 (but 1 suspect)**	5	0
18	al-gama'atal al-islamiyya (IG)	1	2	1
19	Individual	1	123	*
20	Bandits	1	1	0
21	Unknown	65	123	396

\*unknown

\*\* Different when compare to Woldeselase (2010), According to the no of attacks AIAI- 12; OLF- 140; ONLF- 86 )

Adopted from: *The Global Terrorism Database at: [http:// www. start.umd.edu](http://www.start.umd.edu)*