THEORETICAL UPRAISAL OF VERB INCORPORATION: THE CASE OF SHEKACHO CAUSATIVES

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A THESIS PRESENTED TO
THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS IN LINGUISTICS

JUNE, 1996
ADDIS ABABA

Addis Ababa University

School of Graduate Studies

Theoretical Upraisal of

Verb Incorporation: The Case of Shekacho Causatives

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to Dr. Baye Yimam, my advisor and instructor, who guided me perseveringly. He encouraged me with his insightful comments and constructive suggestions. He also supplied me with relevant reading materials which helped me to develop interest in the field.

I also wish to express my gratitude to the Shekacho native speakers who helped me in my research, particularly I would like to mention Adinew Adam and Anteneh Tilahun who worked with me as linguistic informants

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List of Abbreviations

ACC	=	Accusative
C	=	Complementizer head
CS	=	Causative
COMP	=	Complementizer
CP	=	Complementizer phrase
ECM	=	Exceptional Case Marking
ECP	=	Empty Category Principle
EPP	=	Extended Projection Principle
DEF	=	Definite
GB	=	Government - Binding
GF	=	Grammatical Function
GTC	=	Government Transparency Corollary
HM	=	Head Movement
HMC	=	Head Movement Constraint
I	=	Inflection Head
IP	=	Inflection Phrase
LF	=	Logical Form
Lit	=	Literal

ABSTRACT

Incorporation theory denies the existence of Grammatical Function changing (GF changing) phenomenon in our knowledge of language. This phenomenon is believed to be the side effect of verb incorporation. But we argue in this study that GF changing phenomenon does exist in our knowledge of language. We show that this phenomenon is the actual evidence for the existence of a level of representation which is higher (more abstract) than the level of D-structure to preserve the recursive device in language. This device cannot be preserved through the abstract levels of D-structure and S-structure since there is no difference between them in terms of metalanguages. Moreover, the S-structrue can be predicted from its D-structure as the D- structure is deducible from the S-structure and this situation leads a linguistic theory into a contradiction. To get out of this and account for recursivness and creativity in language, we have to assume a higher abstract level of representation on the basis of facts from causative structures of languages like Shekacho.

INTRODUCTION

In this study, we mainly focus on the problems of verb incorporation, particularly of causative construction, though the formal theory of incorporation includes other lexical categories such as nouns and prepositions. The basis of our discussion is Baker's (1988) theory of incorporation. As early as 1974, Aissen had proposed that morphological causative constructions in both Turkish and French could be derived from biclausal underlying structures through a transformational rule called "Verb Raising". But the theory of "Verb Raising" was not formalized as the theory of incorporation is. Besides, case relations and problems related to them were not discussed in Aissen's work as the theory of case was not developed then.

The formal theory of incorporation seeks to account for GF changing phenomenon. In the case of causative constructions of Shekacho, for instance, the subject of an embedded clause of an intransitive verb becomes the direct object of a matrix verb. But the causee of a transitive verb is changed into an oblique object in morphological causative constructions. Moreover, when a morphological causative structure is passivaized, the subject NP of an embedded

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clause becomes the subject NP of a matrix clause for an intransitive verb whereas the causee of a transitive verb remains oblique object. On the other hand, the direct object of an embedded clause becomes the subject of a matrix clause.

Baker considers such grammatical function changing properties as side effects of verb incorporation. When a verb of an embedded clause is incorporated into the causative morpheme of a matrix clause, a complex predicate is formed. Such predicates lead to changes of grammatical functions of arguments.

On the basis of the basic concepts of incorporation theory, a morphological causative construction and its periphrastic counterpart are derived from the same underlying structure. In this case, verb incorporation is ruled by the Projection Principle (PrPr) and the Empty Category Principle (ECP) which require that underlying structures of thematic relations be preserved. But the formal theory of incorporation does not preserve such structures since it violates the recursive device as we shall show in this study. The main problem here is that the level of D-structure alone cannot account for GF changing facts. A higher level of abstract representation, different from D-structure, should be

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assumed in order to account for such GF changing phenomenon in causative structures. This study is based on the spirit of such an assumption.

The study is divided into four main chapters. In the first chapter, the background of Shekacho is presented briefly. The theoretical frame-work of verb incorporation and its theoretical upraisal are discussed in chapter two. In chapter three, we show causative constructions of Shekacho as verb incorporations. Since an alternative more abstract frame-work has not been developed, we do not analyze the Shekacho data in terms of the theoretical upraisal of verb incorporation discussed in this chapter. The last chapter highlights the main points of the whole study.

1. BACKGROUND OF SHEKACHO

Shekacho is an Omotic language belonging to the Maji sub-group of Western Omotic. It is spoken in the Shekacho Zone of the Southern Ethiopia People's Region. There is some work on the Kaffa cluster, to which Shekacho belongs, but as Leslau (1955:135) says "--- not a single study has been published on Moca[1] ---". In fact, he himself is the first scholar to work on Shekacho. His first work titled Moca, a tone language of the Kefa group in South-Western Ethiopia (1958) is a very general description of the phonology and morphology of Shekacho.

The phonology part presents 21 consonant and seven vowel phonemes. The section on morphology deals with the basic patterns of nouns as CVCi/a or VCO, and that of verbs as CVCi/a or VCi/a. Besides, morphemes such as causatives, passives, reflexives, reciprocals and frequentatives are described. His second work is A dictionary of Moca (1959), with Moca-English and English-Moca entries.

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[1]Moca is another name for Shekacho

The language is head-final in its phrase structures as can be observed from the following examples:

(1) a) [2]gänja ašo

tall man

' a tall man '

b) markači gidire

beautiful girl

' a beautiful girl'

c) ta-se kero or ta kero

I-of house I house

' my house '

d) uro - se bušo or uro bušo

man - of boy man boy

' a son of a man ' (= a man's son)

---

[2]The type of transcription used is phonemic.

As shown in (1c) and (1d), the genitive case is shown either with the suffix /-se/ or with word order.

In a VP, the verbal head appears in final position:

(2) a) bonoši [$_{vp}$ gumbo - na aro-n [$_{v}$ hamm-ehe]]

they stick - by he-ACC hit - 3MSS

' They hit him with a stick '

b) addo [$_{vp}$ dimbaroo banä [$_{v}$ hamm-ehe]]

hunter forest to go - 3MSS

'The hunter went to a forest.'

As shown in (2a), only subject NPs trigger agreement with the verb. The nominative is the unmarked form whereas the accusative is indicated by /-n/. There is no distinction between definite and indefinite forms.

Concerning causatives, the morpheme /-i-/ 'CS' is used with either /k'ać'-/ 'do' or /tun-/ 'become' in periphrastic constructions like the following:

(3) a) uro nammi mič'č'-is k'ač'-i- ehe

man boy laugh-COMP do- CS-3MSS

' The man made the boy laugh.'

b) uro nammi mič'č' - is tun- i- ehe

man boy laugh - COMP become - CS - 3MSS

' The man made the boy laugh.'

The form in (3b) is more readily acceptable than the one in (a). We shall consider such forms in the course of the discussion.

2. THEORETICAL FRAME - WORK

2.1 INCORPORATION THEORY

According to Baker (1988), incorporation is the result of applying Move-Alpha to words rather than to phrases. In fact, the basic aim of incorporation is to account for the problematic properties of grammatical function changing phenomenon. This property of language is problematic since it violates the uniformity of the system of pairing form and meaning. This is observable from structures of Shekacho like the following:

(1) (a) uro mit'oo - n wodii - ehe
man tree - ACC plant - 3MSS
' A man planted a tree'

(b) mit'oo uro - na wodii - a - ehe
tree man - by plant - PAS - 3MSS
' A tree is planted by a man'

(1a) is an active sentence while (1b) is its passive counterpart. This is an instance of GF changing phenomenon. Both (a) and (b) are similar in meaning because the structures express the same semantic relationships between the arguments and the predicates in both sentences. But in both cases these relationships are expressed with different surface forms. In (1a), the agent is in a pre-patient position while in (1b) it is in post-patient and adjacent to a postposition. In (1a), the patient occurs preceding and adjacent to the verb while in (1b) it is in subject position. We can observe that the subject NP in (1a) becomes an oblique object in (1b) in which the object NP also has become the surface subject of the clause.

Similarly, in morphological causatives the subject of an embedded clause becomes an object of a matrix verb. Baker says, "These rules mask the cognitive unity of the phenomenon rather than revealing it, however," (p:1). Moreover, he claims, "--- no such rules exist in our knowledge of language," (P:1). For him, GF changing effects are attributed to incorporation in the sense that when a semantically independent word moves and incorporates into another word, a complex predicate is created. According to this claim, rules of encoding referential expressions in grammatical functions do exist in our knowledge of

language whereas rules of GF changing properties do not exist; the latter are part of the process of building complex predicates out of elementary units.

In order to develop his formal theory of incorporation, Baker adopted the frame-work of Government-Binding (GB) of Chomsky (1982), (1986 (a) and (b)). The general frame-work of GB is located within the more general study of language. According to this theory, the purpose of linguistic inquiry as practised today is to explain knowledge of language.

There are two subgoals in this inquiry; namely, knowledge of the essence of language and understanding how this knowledge comes to be what it is in a mature person. The theory assumes that every human child is born with a capacity which enables him to acquire any human language that he first encounters. It is believed that this innate capacity is a set of principles known as Universal Grammar (UG). The principles can be understood through a detailed and comprehensive description and analysis of individual languages. But, what does one realy search for when he seeks to explain the knowledge of language itself? According to Chomosky (1965), a linguist has to develop a model of linguistic

competence as opposed to linguistic performance. Competence is "---the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language," while performance is "---the actual use of language in concrete situations," (P:4).

In the Standard Theory, which is the basis for Incorporation, three levels of representations were developed as a model of UG: logical form (LF), surface structure (S-structure) and deep structure (D-structure). Logical form is the level where a structure is associated with meaning. D-structure is the level where thematic relationships are established. S-structure is the level that associates form, meaning and formal constraints inherent in language. By a successive application of transformational rules, all these levels are related in such a way that S-structure is derived from D-structure; LF is derived from S-structure, and PF (phonetic form) is also derived from S-structure. Incorporation theory is based on such theories of levels of representations and derivations and on subtheories of GB (see Baker (1988) chapter 2 for details).

The formal theory of Incorporation has the following three basic concepts: the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH), Head Movement (HM) and the Empty Category Principle (ECP), and the Government Transparency Corollary (GTC).

UTAH relates to the notion of D - structure. Baker defines it as follows:

> The Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH):
> Identical thematic relationships between items are represented by identical structural relationships between those items at the level of D-structure. (P:46)

In the case of verb incorporation, UTAH stipulates that GF changing processes are derived from an underlying structure through Move-Alpha. Observe the following causative structures of Shekacho:

(2) a) ašo aro ep - is tun - i - ehe
man he weep - COMP become - CS - 3MSS
'The man made him weep'

b) ašo aro- n ep - i - ehe
man he - ACC weep - CS-3MSS
'The man made him weep.'

(2a) and (2b) are thematic paraphrases of causativaization because in both sentences /aro/ 'he' bears the same thematic relationships with the

verbal root /ep-/ 'weep'. In both, it is a causee. According to UTAH, therefore, this NP should appear in the same structural relationship in the D-structures of (2a) and (2b). This further implies that the verb root in the D-structure of (2b) is an independent constituent of the embedded clause, similar to the verb in the D-structure of (2a).

But UTAH must be consistent with the Projection Principle (PrPr), which requires that the theta marking properties of /tun-/ 'become' and /-i-/ 'CS' be satisfied at all levels of representations. Hence, since the causative morpheme /-i-/ takes a clausal complement at D-structure, it must also take a clausal complement at S-structure; and /tun-/ must assign an external theta role to the subject (external argument) position of its clause. Similarly, as in XP movement, X^0-movement preserves structures by leaving a trace in the position of its extraction. In this way, the theta role assigner refers to a position which may contain either the selector or its trace similar to the theta role recipient which also refers to a position which may be occupied by the selected category or by its trace.

The other crucial point in the theory of incorporation is the concept of Head Movement and the Empty Category Principle. ECP is a requirement that a trace must have something to be identified with locally.

This can be met either by a theta marker or by its antecedent. In this connection, Baker quotes Travis's (1984:131) Head Movement Constraint (HMC) which says, "An X° may only move into the Y^0 which properly governs it," (p:53). Furthermore, he says, "...the HMC can be derived from the ECP; infact it is simply the empirical evidence that traces of X^0 movement are subject to this principle, as are all other traces of movement," (P:53).

According to PrPr, the trace of an X^0 must be properly governed in the sense that an X^0 should be governed either by a head or by an antecedent. But X^0 - level categories are never theta marked since it is their XP - level categories which are governed by a theta marking head. "...by X - bar theory, only XP - level categories can be sisters of (complements of) a lexical head, and by theta theory (direct) theta marking takes place only under sisterhood. Thus, XPs are theta marked and not X^0s," (p:53). Therefore, the trace of an X^0 must be governed by its antecedent. In order to govern its trace, an X^0 must be adjoined to a y° which governs the XP that X heads at D - structure. Specifically, two conditions must be met for an X° category to govern its trace: first, an X° must C - command its trace. The idea of C - command according to Baker is that "... the first node of a particular type that dominates the C -

commander must also dominate the node to be C -commanded." (p:54). Second, for the trace of X° to be properly governed, there must not be an intervening element (a barrier) between the trace and its antecedent. The concept of barrierhood is defined by Baker as follows:

> Let D be the smallest maximal projection containing A. Then C is a BARRIER between A and B if and only if C is a maximal projection that contains B and excludes A, and either:
> i) C is not selected
> ii) the head of C is distinct from the head of D and selects some WP equal to or containing B (P:56)

With respect to condition (i), the adjunct breaks a government path between A and B. Since B is contained in an adjunct, it is not theta connected to A. But (ii) expresses the minimality condition of barrierhood. In this case, an intervening theta assigner breaks a government path. Therefore, the landing site of a moved X° must be within X° "Y" that properly governs XP, the projection of X since Y selects and theta marks XP. Accordingly, X° governs its trace and ECP is satisfied. But notice that the XP which is selected in the D - structure of an embedded clause can move to the spec position of CP where it is governed by C, the head of CP. In this case, the maximal projection of the highlighted X° will not be a barrier between the matrix V and the X°.

IP and CP are not also barriers between the two categories since they are selected and their heads do not select the phrase containing the moved X°. Concerning proper government Baker also says:

> My definition of government, however, now hinges on the broader notion of selection, rather than on theta role assignment. Thus, what we have realy derived is the statement that X can incorporate into Y whenever Y selects XP, the projection of X (P:61)

Hence, an X° can move cyclically; first to Infl and with the content of Infl it moves to the position of C, the head of CP. In this way, incorporation obeys subjacency, a condition that relates to barrierhood.

The third basic concept in the formal theory of incorporation is Government Transparency Corollary (GTC) which Baker defines as follows:

> The Government Transparency Corollary (GTC): A lexical category which has an item incorporated into it governs everything which the incorporated item governed in its original structural position (P: 64)

The concept of GTC can be illustrated by the following abstract structure of incorporation:

3) a)



In (3a), Y governs XP, but not WP since XP is a barrier falling between Y and WP as stated earlier. But, under GTC, it is possible for Y to govern WP as shown in (3b). The reason is that Y in (3b) is not now distinct from X. The concept of distinctness is defined: "X is distinct from Y if no part of Y is a member of a (movement) chain containing X, " (Baker, P:64). According to this definition, XP fails to be a barrier

between Y and X since it has now a trace whose antecedent is contained in Y, the potential governor. Hence, it is possible to say that XP becomes transparent for the purpose of government in such derived structures. When XP is transparent, the complex verb Y governs WP since X also governs WP before its incorporation into Y.

To sum up, we can see the concept of incorporation in two different ways. The first is that incorporation involves the movement of a verb from its original (initial) VP internal position to the position of Infl where it becomes part of the latter (Infl) and shares its relevant features. The movement is that of a zero-bar category. Since the position of Infl is a non-argument and a zero-bar position, it only receives a moved zero-bar category which, of course, leaves its trace to be antecedently governed. In such a way a verb can reach the C position of CP by a successive (cyclic) movement.

The second perspective of incorporation relates to morphological causatives. The incorporation of causatives differs from other local incorporations in the degree of its complexity: firstly, causative incorporation involves two clauses; secondly, its consequences are more

strongly determined by syntactic principles as has been discussed. The main focus of this study is on this second property of incorporation.

2.2. THEORETICAL UPRAISAL OF INCORPORATION

In this section, we shall deal with the basic assumptions of UG since the theory of incorporation is based on them. We shall also consider the three levels of abstract representations (D - structure, S-structure and LF) in terms of the metalanguages of competence and performance. Finally, we shall consider the basic concepts of the formal theory of Incorporation itself within the recursive device and in light of the creative aspect of language.

Chomsky's theory of UG is based on the rationalist account of mind. This philosophical approach is challenged by Sampson (1978, 1979) who proposes a non-nativist account of language universals. According to Sampson, the theory of linguistic universals depends on the notion of evolutionary processes in language. However, there are disanalogies between hypothetical assumptions and biological evolutions which relate modern languages to a common ancestral language. According to the latter, Sampson assumes that complex hierarchical syntactic properties

of modern languages evolved from non-hierarchical simple forms. He further claims that:

> If a language arises (phylogenetically and/or ontogenetically speaking) by gradual evolution, then the smallest elements will come into existence first, at successive steps, the community and/or the infant will come to form larger units by assembling units of the kinds they have already acquired. It follows that the outcome will be definable by phrase structure rules. Once a species of complex unit is established, however, it may itself evolve. (1978: 199).

Moreover, this theory predicts that it is possible for human languages to converge and share universals, "...eventhough there might be other, non-hierarchical potential languages which would be just as 'fit' if they were tried out in practice," (1979: 101). But this theory is not formalized in terms of principles with which individual languages could be described. Hence, we consider the nature of UG in line with Chomsky's nativist views.

It is admittedly known that the way a child acquires the rules of a language is a mystery. The assumption simply states that "... children come to the task of language learning equipped with an innate Universal

Grammar that narrowly restricts the option available for the grammar they are trying to acquire," (Jackendoff 1990:10). Similarly, Baker (1988:5) says, " Universal Grammar... divides the set of possible semantic relationships which a thing can have with respect to an action or state into linguistically significant equivalent classes..."

Jackendoff's or Baker's assumption contains two contradictory ideas, and as a consequence the linguistic inquiry which is based on it becomes ambiguous. On the one hand, a child seems to possess a general set of principles that enables him to know and use any human language. On the other hand, UG is restricted to the set of principles operating in a particular language which a child is exposed at the initial state. In other words, knowledge of language with the help of UG would be blocked after a child has been exposed to a particular language within the limited period of acquisition. This implies that a child is born with the ability to know any language but he becomes unable to use it afterwards, that is, after the acquisition of a first language.

Radford (1981:21) quotes Chomsky as saying, "...the speaker has only tacit (i.e. subconscious) knowledge of the rules, and cannot bring them to consciousness." This means that a native speaker of a language

does not have conscious knowledge of the rules of his language. Therefore, it is clear that when a linguist is searching for what knowledge (expression) of language is, he is trying to describe the subconscious knowledge through the conscious knowledge of language. If he discovers the rules of the subconscious knowledge, he would solve the mystery of language acquisition. But this issue is a challenging one for a linguist. In connection with this, Jackendoff (1990:10) says:

> ...the community of generative linguists with their collective intelligence, have not been able to fully determine over thirty years of research, supported by centuries of traditional grammatical description yet of course every normal child exposed to English masters the grammar by the age of ten or so.

What does this imply? If it is Universal Grammar that restricts the option available for the grammar that a child is trying to acquire, the entity of UG must be more complex and abstract than the entity of the human mind itself. Since UG governs and determines the acquisition process of human language, it can be assumed that it is the basis of human knowledge of language while it itself exists above the releam of human consciousness. In other words, what a person knows is within the realm of his mind, and, what he knows can be expressed. In this case, the exercise of generative grammar is a futile one because the conscious

knowledge of a linguist cannot fully understand the subconscious knowledge of language, that is, UG.

But, contrary to this argument, according to the existing tradition of linguistic research, it is believed that the conscious knowledge of a linguist can understand the subconscious knowledge of language. If so, a linguist can possibly explain the essence of UG and (on the basis of this assumption) develop a model of explanation. In order to see whether such an assumption is practical, one needs to investigate the architecture of UG in terms of metalanguages and object - languages.

According to Chomsky (1965), the aim of a linguist is to develop a general set of principles of UG on the basis of properties of particular languages. It is assumed that two interrelated levels of competence exist: the competence of a particular language and the competence of language (UG); the former being a part of the latter. Consequently, one would assume two interrelated levels of metalanguages: a metalanguage through which we express the competence of a particular language and a metalanguage through which we express the competence of UG. If the metalanguage of the external language (or performance), in which a speaker - hearer discusses about the knowledge of language use is

included, we have three types of metalanguages. The metalanguages of the two levels of competence are intended to provide "... the basis for actual use of language by speaker - hearer," (Chomsky 1965:9). Since the theory of generative grammar is based upon ideal language use, we can deduce that the metalanguage of UG is the highest level of abstraction, and the metalanguage of the competence of a particular language is higher than that of the metalanguage of the performance of that particular language. Chomsky says, "Any interesting generative grammar will be dealing in the most part, with mental processes that are far beyond the level of actual or even potential consciousness," (1965:8). Now, it is clear that knowledge of language use can be expressed with the metalanguage of a particular language. But what are the metalanguages of the other two levels of competence? We cannot employ the metalanguage of performance to express the nature of competence (UG) because the level of abstraction of performance is by far lower than that of competence. If the metalanguage of performance is employed to show the model of UG, the abstract link which is established between performance and competence would be destroyed; and, as a consequence the theory itself would fall into contradictions. Let us illustrate this point through the following abstract structure:

(4)



Let ' L" ' be the set of all human languages which branches into performance (EL) and competence (IL). The latter in turn sub-branches

into the competence of a particular language (IL_1) and the competence of UG (IL_2). All the EL, IL_1 and IL_2 have branching nodes which contain object - languages and metalanguages. Additionally, let us assume f(ML) to be the function of the metalanguage of performance in which speech, writing and gesture are employed; fx (ML_1) be the function of the metalanguage of competence of a particular language and fx_1 (ML_2) be the function of the metalanguage of the competence of UG. Logically, in fx (ML_1) and fx_1 (ML_2) speech, writing and gesture cannot be employed. But in the existing tradition, speech and writing[3] are employed to discuss the model of UG, which is a paradox. This is not to deny the existence of UG, but to emphasize the fact that fx(ML_1) and fx_1(ML_2) are still undiscovered; and, the existing model of UG is not independent of the level of performance as a metalanguage.

Moreover, this paradox weakens the logic of the levels of representations assumed by the theory of Government-Binding. Logically, if language is a mirror reflection of the mind and performance is an "imperfect reflection" of competence, all the abstract levels of

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[3] In this discussion, speech and writing refer to metalanguage, a language which is employed to discuss the object language which is assumed to be a language employed to describe the world. One has to notice, however, that a single language can serves both purposes.

representations (D-structure, S-structure and LF) must be shown in their external forms (performance). In other words, we should have double co-occurrence of representations: the levels of representations which can be shown through the metalanguage of performance, and the levels of representations which can be shown through the metalanguage of competence; the former being the reflection of the latter. Reasonably, the model which is shown through speech or writing must be the model which belongs to the level of performance, which is an "imperfect reflection" of the abstract model whose metalanguage has not yet been discovered. This problem faces the theory of incorporation since it is based on the same assumption that the theory of GB is also based.

In order to question the strength of the formal theory of incorporation, it is necessary to consider its basic concepts first. One such concept is D-structure and the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH). This concept is proposed to strengthen the notion of D-structure as a general representation of thematic relations. But, contrary to this claim, we argue that there exists an abstract level of representation higher than that of D-structure. In relation to this point, we shall discuss Head Movement and the Empty Category Principle (ECP)

and the Government Transparency Corollary (GTC). Our main claim here is that Move-Alpha must preserve the recursive and the creative aspects of language.

The concepts of D-structure and UTAH are based on the identity of thematic relationships that result in identical structural relationships at D-structure. As it has been shown earlier, UTAH must be integrated with the Projection Principle (PrPr) to make the theory of Incorporation strong. The major consequence of this integration is that "... transformational processes neither create nor destroy categorial structure that is relevant to the lexical properties of items, including the thematic relationships that they determine," (Baker:49).

In relation to UTAH and PrPr, two concepts play a crucial role in connection with structure preservation: the first is that both the theta role assigner and the theta role receiver must refer to a position; and the second is that the position must contain either the category or its trace in the case of Move-Alpha. It is true that these relations do preserve a given structure. But do they preserve the recursive and the creative aspects of language? Since the first concept focuses on the abstract concept of position, it may preserve recursion. It is assumed that while

the syntactic frame of a language (for instance SOV) is iterative, the items which occupy the theta positions are not[4]. In this case, the second concept, which states that the position must contain either the category or its trace, is not important for the preservation of the recursive device as such since it focuses on items of theta assigners and theta role receivers, it is a given category which leaves a trace because of transformations. If so, it is a given category which is also preserved. If a given category of a given syntactic frame is preserved by leaving its trace, the recursive device of language would be destroyed because the theta position which is occupied by a category or its trace cannot be free to operate recursively. In other words, there is no available syntactic frame for the recursion to operate since all theta positions are occupied by either categories or traces of a given clause. Let us illustrate this with the following abstract incorporation by assuming that a person utters an infinite morphological causative structure in a given syntactic frame:

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[4]In principle, one cannot separate a given syntactic frame from its associated lexical and phrasal categories. In line with the recursive and creative aspects of language, a given syntactic structure along with its categories is expected to be changed (or transformed) recursively into another structure which is in turn changed into another structure, and so on, infinitely. But, this process is impossible at the levels of D-structure and S-structure since a given syntactic frame is recursively filled by different lexical and phrasal items. Hence, in order to discuss problems related to this process, it is necessary to separate a syntactic frame from its associated lexical and phrasal categories.

(5)



(5a) shows the syntactic frame of morphological causative while (5b) represents abstractly the set of infinite utterances of morphological causative structures which could be produced through the recursive device of (5a).

As shown in (5a), YP is the projection of Y which selects XP whose head is X: X is incorporated into Y by leaving its trace. Therefore, (5a) meets conditions of UTAH and PrPr. But in (5b) we have a mere syntactic frame of incorporation. All the abstract terminal nodes of this syntactic frame must be filled with appropriate lexical and phrasal categories recursively. Logically, to fulfill this, the syntactic frame of (5a) has to be free of any categories and traces. Since the process is recursive, different syntactic frames cannot be produced for (5b) infinitely because the production of different syntactic frames for each clause excludes (5a) which is the basis of (5b) (notice that (5a) abstractly exists in all recursions of (5b), otherwise, the concepts of recursion and creativity would become indiscernible).

Unless the syntactic frame of (5a) is freely available, this infinite flow of structures of causatives would be blocked. But (5a) cannot be available for (5b) as it is because all its theta positions are occupied by phrasal and lexical items and also there is no principle which makes it free within current assumptions of UTAH and PrPr. In this case, the recursive device of language would be destroyed. Hence, it is reasonable to say that the integration of UTAH and PrPr falls into contradiction since

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by preserving a single structure it destroys the recursive property of language.

In relation to this problem, one needs to also consider the concept of X-bar theory since it is the basis of HMC and GTC. This sub-theory is a fundamental requirement of D-structure to piece together lexical items. According to X-bar theory, phrasal categories are projections of lexical heads such as Noun, Verb, Adjective and Preposition. Non-lexical categories such as complementizer (C) and Infl (I) are also heads which form similar functional projections. It is on the basis of this sub-theory that the structure of a clause is formed by combining different maximal projections and heads. In other words, there is not a single head which is projected into a full structure of a clause according to X-bar theory. If there is no single head which is projected into different phrasal categories, there would be no structure of a language at all.

This point is relevant to the preservation of the recursive device. In order to maintain recursion, one of the following conditions must be met: first, a given syntactic structure of a clause should be a projection of a single head, or, second, different lexical and phrasal categories of a structure should be linked to some kind of abstract category at some

level. If one or the other of these conditions is not met, the recursive device of a syntactic structures would not exist because every category would project and iterate separately. In this case, contrary to X-bar theory, no lexical or phrasal category could be pieced together at the level of D-structure. In other words, if there does not exist an abstract concept of head which projects into maximal categories of syntactic structures, D-structure could be destroyed and the basic concepts of incorporation such as HMC and GTC would also become vacuous. I believe that in order to avoid such problems, one has to assume an abstract level of representation which is higher than the present level of D-structure itself. The processes of causativization can be empirical evidence for the existence of such a level. Observe the following for example:

(6) a) a subject XP becomes an object XP.

b) dubaačo gänä - noši mič'č́- is - tun - i - ehe
singer woman PL laugh-COMP become-CS-3MSS
'The singer made the women laugh.'

c) dubaačo gänä - noši-n - mic'č́- i - ehe
singer woman - PL -ACC laugh - CS - 3MSS
'The singer made the women laugh.'

As stated earlier, in Shekacho, the subject of an intransitive clause becomes an object in morphological causative structures such as (6c). When (6c) is passivized, which is possible in this language, we can observe the following GF changing phenomenon:

a) an object XP becomes a subject XP; and, a subject YP becomes an oblique YP as in (7):

(7) gänä- noši (dubaačo-na) mič'č'-i - a - hete
woman- PL (singer-by) laugh- CS-PAS-3PS
'The women have been made to laugh (by the singer).'

As shown in (6) and (7), the subject NP of the embedded clause has become an object NP, and this object NP in turn becomes the subject NP of the main clause. The subject NP of the main clause is changed into an oblique NP (in the passive construction). Both (6) and (7) are clear cases of GF changing phenomenon and do violate the theta criterion because in both an argument is associated with more than one theta positions. Such a GF changing phenomenon is not a simple mechanical readjustment of constituents in which a subject NP becomes an object or vice versa. Rather, it requires an abstract device with which

the recursive power of language is preserved. It is clear that the level at which the subject of an embedded clause loses its function as subject is not equivalent to the level of D - structure because a structure which is represented at this level is destructured by GF changing phenomenon through Move - Alpha. Logically, when an NP loses its function as subject in one level of representation, it never gets a different grammatical function such as object at a different level of representation.

If we assume that the NP gets two different grammatical functions at different abstract levels, we face two problems. On the one hand, if the same NP appears as subject in one structure and object in other, the concept of D - structure would become non - existent since there are no separate metalanguages that can be associated with the two abstract levels. On the other hand, if the difference between the two levels of representations is preserved through chain co - indexing mechanisms in line with the Projection Principle, the recursive nature of language would be destroyed as it has already been shown. Therefore, when an NP loses its function as subject, it must be transformed into an abstract level of representation beyond the level of D - structure. Accordingly, a structure which involves GF changing phenomenon must be an

imperfect reflection of the process of Move - Alpha operating at a higher level of representation.

I assume that at this level of representation exists an abstract category that is found in all maximal projections of functional and lexical categories at the level of D - structure. Moreover, this higher abstract level involves a metalanguage which is different from speech, writing and gesture. (The form of this higher level of representation and its associated principles will be a subject of my future research).

At this stage, one can simply claim that there is a higher level of abstraction above the level of D - structure, at which are found conditions of GF changing phenomenon. Following this and contrary to Baker's claim, one can assume that GF changing properties do exist in our knowledge of language and that it is when we fail to consider principles of language within the concepts of recursion and creativity that GF changing phenomenon becomes a mystery. It is reasonable to say that a structure in which GF changing phenomenon is observed must be an imperfect reflection of a representation at a higher level of abstraction. On the contrary, if one follows the assumption that the level of D - structure is the only abstract level of representation and imposes structure

preservation principles on GF changing phenomenon, the consequence will be a devastating one for the principles of Universal Grammar in general. For instance, why does a language build a complex predicate? Baker never deals with such crucial questions which have weakening effects on the theoretical significance of incorporation.

3. DATA ANALYSIS

In this section, we examine causative structures as results of verb incorporation in line with Baker's theory.[5]

3.1 SHEKACHO VERB INCORPORATION

According to Baker (1988), the claim that morphological causatives are derived by movement rules becomes clear when viewed in light of its strong similarities to subject - to - subject raising, which involves the same rule. Raising verbs appear in two different S - structure configurations:

(1) a) It seems that Mark is happy.

b) Mark seems to be happy.

---

[5] We do not analyse the data in relation to the theoretical upraisal of the preceding section since we have not developed principles and rules operating at the level of abstraction claimed to exist.

The NPs of these two structures get theta roles from the same predicates. Raising verbs like 'seem' select propositional complement. Moreover, they do not permit any kind of external argument. By the Projection Principle (1a) and (1b) have the same underlying structure shown in (2) since both are projections of the lexical properties of 'seem'.

(2) $[_{cp}\ [_{ip}$e Infl seem $[_{cp}\ [_{ip}$ Mark Infl be happy]]]]

In (2), the matrix clause lacks a thematic subject. A clause without such a subject is ungrammatical according to the Extended Projection Principle (EPP) of Chomsky (1982). There are two logically possible ways to fill in this null subject position: either a thematically empty pleonestic subject 'it' is freely inserted or the subject NP of the embedded clause is moved to the empty subject position for reasons of case requirements. The moved category has to leave its trace inorder to satisfy ECP and PrPr.

The verb incorporation account of causatives is similar to the property of such verbs because a causative morpheme systematically appears in two different S - structure configurations which are thematic paraphrases as shown in the following examples of Shekacho (3a), Amharic (3b) and Oromo (3c):

(3a) i) ašo aro ep - is tun - i - ehe

man he weep-COMP become - CS - 3MSS

' The man made him weep.'

ii) ašo aro - n - ep - i - ehe

man he - ACC weep - CS - 3MSS

'The man made him weep.'

(3b) i) Abbat liǰ - u wiha ind - yi - t'ät't'- a - a- därräg-ä

Abbat boy - DEF water COMP-3P -drink-3MSS CS-do-3MSS

'Abbat made the boy drink water.'

ii) Abbat liǰ - u - n wiha a - t'ä t't' - a - w

Abbat boy - DEF - ACC water CS - drink - 3MSS - 3MSO

'Abbat made the boy drink water.'

(3c) i) Barsisa - n akka iǰolee - n - bar - ani - tah - sis - e

teacher - NOM COMP children - NOM know - 3PS become - CS - 3MsS

' Teacher made children know.'

ii) barsisa - n iǰolee bar - sis - e

teacher - NOM children know - CS - 3MSS

' Teacher made children know.'

In the case of Shekacho, we can assume that /-i-/ 'CS' has a single set of theta marking and subcategorization frames specified in the lexicon. It takes an agent external argument and a propositional direct complement which states the caused event. But /-i-/ is an affix having a morphological sub categorization frame which means that it must attach to a host, a verb in this case. Since /-i-/ has a single set of lexical properties, it occurs in only one D-structure configuration shown in (4):

(4) $[_{cp}[_{Ip}$ aso $[_{cp}$ $[_{Ip}$ aro ep -]] - i - ehe]]

According to the Principle of Stray Affix Filter (Baker 1988:151), the causative affix must satisfy its sub-categorization frame at S-structure, and similar to the ways in which raising verbs get a surface subject, there are two logically possible ways for /-i-/ to meet this requirement: either a verb root such as /tun - / /-därräg-/ and /tah-/ with no thematic property[6] is inserted in the matrix clause to which the causative morpheme is suffixed or the verb root of the complement clause moves to incorporate the causative affix in the matrix clause. Hence, the causative morpheme /-i-/ appears in two different S-structure configurations as shown in (5):

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[6] Verbs such as /tun - / 'become' , /-därräg - / 'do' and /tah-/ 'become' are non-thematic in the sense that they lack arguments at D - structure. The evidence for this is that they do not have thematic relationships in morphological causative structures.

5. a) ašo aro ep - is - tun - i - ehe

man he weep-COMP become-CS-3MSS

'The man made him weep.'

b) ašo aro -n - ep - i - ehe

man he- ACC weep-CS-3MSS

'The man made him weep.'

The derivation of the periphrastic structure from the D - structure of (4) is not as complex as that of the morphological causative one. As it has already been discussed, the non - thematic verb /tun-/ is inserted at the level of S - structure for the causative morpheme /-i-/ to get attached to. Hence, (5b) can be represented as follows:

6)



But in order to derive the S - structures of morphological causatives from their D - structure counterparts, we have to follow some syntactic principles of UG. Specifically, we shall consider some causative structures of intransitive verbs first:

'The singer made the women laugh.'

Lit.'The singer made the women become laugh.'

ii) dubaačo gänä - nošı - n mič'č' - i - ehe

singer woman - PL - ACC laugh - CS - 3MSS

'The singer made the women laugh.'

7b) i) nae' noroo šet - is tun - i - hane

girl baby fear - COMP become - CS - 3FSS

' The girl made the baby fear.'

ii) nae' noroo - n šet - i - hane

girl baby - ACC fear - CS - 3FSS

'The girl made the baby fear.'

(7) shows agenitive in ((7ai) and (7aii)), and stative in ((7bi) and (7bii)). In both cases, the subject of the embedded clause surfaces as a direct object in the morphological causatives. The main claim here is that periphrastic structures like (7ai) are biclausal in meaning. The complement clauses appear as semantic arguments of the causative predicates. There is also a distinct morphological verb for each clause.

complement clauses appear as semantic arguments of the causative predicates. There is also a distinct morphological verb for each clause. Sentence (7bii) is another way of expressing (7bi). The former contains only one verb which happens to be morphologically complex. The similarities between the two structures is that (7bii) is a thematic paraphrase of (7bi), the same thematic roles relate the same verb roots to the same noun phrases in both structures. This means that (7bii) is also biclausal in its meaning though it appears monoclausal in its form. If the same theta relations manifest in both (7bi) and (7bii), both structures should derive from one D-structure following UTAH. Hence (8):

(8)



In order to derive the S-structure of (8), which is (7bii), the verb root /šet-/ has to move to the causative morpheme /-i-/. When it moves, it should leave its trace to satisfy ECP. Following HMC, the causative affix /-i-/ and the verb root /šet-/ combine to form a complex predicate. This gives us the S-structure shown in (9) below:

(9)



As it is shown in (9), the verb root has moved cyclically within the complement clause and then to the position of the matrix verb. It is from this position that the incorporated verb governs its traces.

Now, let us see how case is assigned in such structures. For the time being, we shall consider structural case assignment in periphrastic causatives because it helps us to understand the nature of morphological causative case assignment:

10) a) urää noroo tokar -is - tun - i - hane

woman baby sleep-COMP become-CS-3FSS

'The woman made the baby sleep.'

Lit. 'The woman made the baby become sleep.'

b)


CP
Spec
C'
IP
C
NP
I'
N
VP
I
-hane
uräa
CP
V
Spec
C'
tun-i-
IP
C
NP
I'
N
VP
I
noroo
V
tokar-

In (10), the complement clause has no agreement element to identify and license /noroo/ as subject nor is there a dummy prepositional element to show this. We cannot assume that the subject of the complement clause receives a kind of inherent case because such case is generally associated with a patient thematic role. The only option we have is to assume that the complementizer /-is/ governs and assigns case to the causee.[7] In this case, IP in this language is transparent for government by C.

But in the case of morphological causatives of intransitive verbs, the complex verb governs and assigns accusative case to the causee in the manner of Exceptional Case Marking (ECM) verbs (see Chomsky 1982, 1986b). Also in this case, IP becomes transparent for government by the complex verb. Hence, the causee surfaces as a direct object of the complex matrix verb:

---

[7] The complementizer head /-is/ assigns an unmarked case to the causee. It is difficult to decide whether the case is nominative or accusative, at this stage. Probably, this case may be manifested in tone since Shekacho is a tone language.

(II) urää noroo - n - tokar - i - hane

woman baby- ACC sleep- CS- 3FSS

' The woman made the baby sleep.'

As it is shown in (11), the causee displays /-n/ the accusative affix. Moreover, such NPs become subject and trigger subject agreement in passive structures like (12) below:

12) a) noroo (urää-na) tokar-i - a - ehe

baby (woman-by) sleep-CS-PAS - 3MSS

' The baby has been made to sleep (by the woman).'

(Shekacho)

b) iǰolee - n bar - sis - am - ani (barsisa-tin)

children-NOM know-CS-PAS-3PS (teacher-by)

'Children have been made to know (by teacher)'

(Oromo)

As it is shown in (12), if the causee surfaces as a direct object, it must be governed and assigned case by the complex verb. Both the causee object and the traces of the moved category, that is the verb, are properly governed by the complex verb. This kind of government is possible by GTC. The complex verb is at the right structural position to

govern everything in the lower clause. CP and IP are no more barriers because the complex verb has passed through them and incorporated with the heads of each.

When the cuasee moves to the matrix subject position in passive structures like (12), principle A of binding would not be violated as the trace of the moved category is governed by the complex verb and is in the domain of the nearest subject as required by the theory. This is shown in (13) below:

(13)



But the causee of a transitive verb in morphological causatives does not surface as direct object as shown below:

(4a) i) ašo nammi mawo-n may-is tun - i - ehe

man boy food-ACC eat-COMP become-CS-3MSS

'The man made the boy eat food.'

ii) ašo mawo-n nammi-na maǰ-i-ehe

man food- ACC boy - by eat-CS - 3MSS

'The man made the boy eat food.'

(14b) i) ašo-noši bušo mas'afoo-n ta-s emm-is tun - i - hete

man-PL boy book - ACC me-to give-COMP become-CS-3PS

'The men made the boy give the book to me.'

ii) ašo-noši mas'afoo-n ta- s bušo-na emm- i- hete

man-PL book-ACC me-to boy- by give- CS-3PS

'The men made the boy give the book to me.'

(14c) i) ašo addo daharoo-n wit'-is tun - i - ehe

man hunter lion-ACC kill-COMP become-CS-3MSS

'The man made the hunter kill the lion.'

ii) ašo daharoo-n addo-na wit'-i- ehe

man lion - ACC hunter-by kill-CS - 3MSS

' The man made the hunter kill the lion.'

As shown in 14(a-c (ii)), the subject of the complement clause surfaces as an (oblique) object of a preposition head while the object of the verb of the same clause remains direct object. According to Baker, this can be accounted for in terms of "VP-to-COMP" movement in which the intermediate structure permits the verb to land in the specifier of CP . He says, "...the verb can land in this position if and only if it takes its entire VP projection along with it," (P:170). In light of this, (14cii) can be represented as (15) below:

(15)



(15) Satisfies ECP because the traces of the moved categories are governed cyclically. CP is not a barrier between the antecedent of the verb root adjoined to the matrix verb and the trace in the VP because it is selected by the matrix verb. VP is not a barrier either since its head is not distinct from the head of the trace. The complex verb assigns structural case to the lower object by GTC, since it has incorporated the embedded verb, it can govern whatever the embedded verb used to govern while in its original position. But there is no way that the causee can get case. The complex verb cannot govern the position of the embedded subject because CP is a barrier by minimality. The head of CP selects IP which is distinct from the V of IP which contains the causee. Therefore, a dummy prepositional element must be inserted in the manner shown in (16) to assign case to the causee /addo/

(16)



In Shekacho, this dummy prepositional element is /-na/ and hence the causee appears as an oblique object NP. Accordingly, it is possible to say that the theme NP is theta marked and case assigned by the complex verb while the causee is governed and assigned case by the dummy preposition. In this case, it is the theme NP which becomes the subject of the passive structures of morphological causatives of transitive verbs. Consider the following:

(17) a) ašo- noši daharoo-n addo-na wit'-i- hete
man-PL lion- ACC hunter- by kill-CS-3PS
' The men made the hunter kill the lion.'

b) daharoo addo-na (ašo-noši-na) wit'- i- a- ehe
lion hunter- by (man-PL-by) kill- CS-PAS- 3MSS
'The lion has been made killed by the hunter (by the man).'

c) ašo- noši urää- n Gidače-na yet'-i- hete
man-PL woman-ACC Gidače-by hit- CS- 3PS
'The men made Gidace hit the woman.'

d) urää Gidače-na (ašo-noši-na) yet'-i - a - hane
woman Gidače-by (man-PL-by) hit - CS - PAS - 3FSS
'The woman has been made hit by Gidače (by the men).'

The S-structures of such clauses can be shown in a form of a tree like (18):

(18)



The process does not violate binding theory. The moved VP has already taken the lower object NP out of the domain of the specified (nearest) subject accessible to it. Since the direct object of the embedded clause is governed by the complex verb, the governing category of this NP is the entire matrix clause. Hence, the direct object of the embedded clause can become the subject of the morphological causative structure. In the passivaized structure, the trace of the moved NP is bound to its antecedent in the position of the main clause.

To conclude, morphological causative constructions and structures of simple verbs are similar on the surface. This similarity may lead us to the conclusion that morphological causatives are formed in the lexicon. But, the syntax of simple and causative verbs is not the same. On the basis of the theory of incorporation, the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH) and the Projection Principle (PrPr) require biclausal structures for the analysis of morphological causatives. In other words, morphological causatives have extra sentential (S) nodes that categorially represent the inherent property of the causative affix, which is one of having a clausal complement.

But this difference between structures of simple verbs and complex causatives is not clear on the surface because the complex causative verb, like its simple counterpart, governs everything in its VP which is possible by GTC (government transparency corollary) . Besides, the complex causative verb can assign as many cases as its simple counterpart. To this effect, Baker says, "...a complex verb can only assign as many case indexes as a simple verb can (the Case Frame Preservation Principle)," (P.173). For instance, the case frame of Shekacho dative construction is two and that of a simple transitive verb is one. In the case of dative constructions, one of the preverbal NPs is assigned case by the goal preposition/-s/ 'to' and the other NP is assigned accusative case by the verb. Observe (19) for further illustration:

19) a) i) buso mas'afoo-n Ayali-s emm-ehe
boy book-ACC Ayali-to give- 3MSS
'The boy gave the book to Ayali.'

ii) arä aro-n yet'-hane
she he-ACC hit- 3FSS
'She hit him.'

19) b) i) ašo- noši daharoo-n addo-na wit'- i- hete

man-PL lion-ACC hunter-by kill- CS - 3PS

'The men made the hunter kill the lion.'

ii) uro mit'o-n wodi-i - ehe

man tree - ACC plant-CS 3MSS

'The man planted the tree.'

The morphological causative structure of transitive verbs as shown in (19b,i) is similar to the dative structure shown in (19a,i). In both, the verbs assign accusative cases to the object NPs. Besides, the causee of (19b,i) is assigned case by the preposition /-na/ 'by' similar to the dative case of (19a,i).

Moreover, morphological causative structures of intransitive verbs like in (19a,ii) are similar to structures of simple transitive verbs like (19b,ii) in that both the complex verb /wodi-i-ehe/ and the simple verb /yet'-hane/ assign accusative case to their object NPs. Hence, the case frames of the simple verbs have not been violated by the syntactic rules that incorporates the verb.

4: CONCLUSION

The theory of incorporation claims that morphological causative structures and their periphrastic counterparts are derived from the same underlying structure on the basis of the Uniformity of Theta Assignment Hypothesis (UTAH). In the process of verb incorporation, a complement verb moves to the position of a causative morpheme of a matrix clause to form a complex verb. In line with the Projection Principle, a moved verb must leave a trace which has to be properly governed. In the case of head movement, the trace is only governed by its antecedent in line with HMC which requires that a barrier category must not exist between a trace and its antecedent.

GF changing phenomena apparent in causative structures are assumed to be the side effect of the process of incorporation. In line with the theory of incorporation, the causee of an intransitive verb and the direct object of a complement clause are governed and assigned case by the complex verb to meet GTC while the causee of a transitive verb is assigned case by a dummy prepositional element/-na/ in Shekacho.

But in general, the theory of incorporation faces some problems. First of all, there is no clear difference between the levels of D-structure and the level of morphological causative structure in terms of abstraction because both levels employ the same metalanguage. This means that phrasal and lexical categories of D-structures are associated with categories of S-structures in a one-to-one fashion. This collapses the two levels into one hence showing no degree of abstraction between them.

Second, the integration of UTAH with PrPr fails to be significant for the requirement of structure preservation since it destroys the recursive device. According to PrPr, a moved category of a given syntactic frame must leave its trace in order to preserve a syntactic structure. But this violates the recursive device since a theta position which is already occupied by a trace or by a category of a clause cannot be free to operate recursively.

Third, basic concepts of incorporation such as HMC and GTC are groundless because there is not any abstract category which binds all non-lexical, lexical and phrasal categories with one another at the level of D-structure. In relation to the assumption that a structure must be a projection of a single head, X-bar theory never explains what principle

forces lexical heads and phrasal items to combine, and what principle keeps the unity of constituents of a given syntactic structure. The implication of this is that it obliterates the underlying structure, and violates the recursive device since it predicts that each lexical item projects into phrases separately.

Finally, from structures of periphrastic and morphological causatives, we observe change of grammatical functions. The abstract level at which a causee loses its grammatical function of subject of a complement clause is not the same as its function at the level of D-structure. Moreover, when it loses its function as subject, it never gets another grammatical function such as object at another level.

This loss of grammatical function is an empirical evidence for the existence of a higher level of abstract representation. We assume that when a given grammatical function loses its function, it is changed (transformed) into a higher abstract level of representation for the purpose of recursion. Therefore, a causative structure which shows change of grammatical function must be an imperfect reflection of a structure at a higher abstract level. This abstract level, which has a different metalanguage, integrates creativity with recursion. I assume, though with

little justification at this stage, that this level does not only solve problems of incorporation but also helps one understand principles of UG itself. Hence, it is necessary to develop a theory of a higher level of abstract representation of syntactic structures.

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my work, and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

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Place _____

Date of Submission _____