

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY**

TOPIC

**FAITH AND REASON: THE DOUBLE SIDEDNESS OF FAITH AND
REASON AND THEIR ROLE IN A MEANINGFUL LIFE**

THESIS STATEMENT

A rationally examined life is perfectly consistent with a life that not only involves, but also requires, some kinds of faith. Faith and reason are not necessarily opposing epistemic states. Often they complement each another. Thus, faith and reason often bear a relation to each other of both codependence and reciprocity, each informing and influencing the other at critical junctures. Faith is essential to, and inseparable from, rationality.

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BY

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Abstract

The relation between faith and reason is a historically important philosophical problem discussed and debated among philosophers, theologians and scientists in the history of Western philosophy in general and philosophy of religion in particular. In spite of many attempts by many scholars to shed light on this philosophical problem, it is still a lingering question. Basically, different scholars that have worked on this philosophical problem categorize in one of the following approaches. The different approaches regarding this philosophical problem are fidesim, rationalism, pragmatism and critical rationalism. The two approaches, particularly, rationalism and fidesim advocate the extreme positions regarding the relation between faith and reason. They created a false dichotomy between faith and reason. I use the terms "faith-only position" and "reason-only position" to represent the epistemological positions of fideism and rationalism, respectively. However, faith properly understood, does not contradict reason. The alleged contradiction between faith and reason arises out of misconceptions that we have about the concept of faith. People believe that the investigations and findings of the natural sciences and beliefs held by faith are necessarily opposed to one another or can coexist. Others contend that if they can peacefully coexist it is, only in separate compartments, completely sealed off from one another. In this thesis, I argue that science and faith are not only mutually exclusive, but actually coexist well together. Indeed, the proper development of both is necessary for holistic personal growth and for an authentic humanity. There is also a wide spread and largely unquestioned tendency to assume that faith is confined to the province of religion, and that to have faith is necessarily to be religious. However, this way of understanding the concept of faith arises out of the belief that faith is the exclusive property of religious people. Faith is not the exclusive property of religious people; rather it is a basic feature of human life. Faith exists in its different forms and various types. There are both religious and secular forms of faiths. Faith, in this existential sense, is not opposed to reason rather they mutually support each other and work together. Therefore, I argue for the double sidedness of faith and reason in a meaningful life. By "double sidedness" I mean that there is a complementary relation between faith and reason. Therefore, we can talk about "reasonable faith" and "faithful reason" at the same time. Thus, a rationally examined life is perfectly consistent with a life that not only involves, but also requires, some kind of faith. Thus, faith and reason are not necessarily opposed epistemic states.

Introduction

Many scientists, as well as some theologians and philosophers, have argued that religious faith and logical reason are not compatible. Here, I do not mean logical reasoning that we teach in logic courses; rather I refer to the alleged lack of sufficient evidence for religious beliefs. Some scientists and humanists¹ have further suggested that natural reason alone is sufficient to provide us with answers to questions about the meaning of life and purpose of human existence². Pope John Paul II argues that this view of human existence has been influenced by contemporary secular positions that he referred to as “rationalism” and “scientism”.³ However, we should also note that some scientists, as well as many philosophers and theologians, have argued that faith and reason are indeed compatible.⁴

Throughout history, the relation between faith and reason has attracted the attention of great philosophers from the Christian, Muslim and Jewish faith traditions.⁵ The basic issue here is the relation between *faith and reason*, which involves whether important philosophical and religious beliefs are grounded in the authority of faith, or in reason, or in some combination of the two.

¹It is important to note here the term particularly refers to secular humanism. They believe that people are best able to solve this world's problems when they are free to use reason and knowledge as their tools. In this respect, secular humanists see themselves as allied with scientists and opposed to religious faith.

²Migliore, Daniel. *F See, for example, E. O. Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge: (New York: Vintage Books, 1998). One recent area of confrontation involving religion and science has been in the hotly-contested debate involving evolutionary theory and intelligent design. This debate could be viewed as just one more (and perhaps even the latest) battle in the ongoing "war" between religion and science. For an interesting historical account of this dispute, see J. Caiazza, the War of the Jesus and the Darwin Fishes: Religion and Science in the Postmodern World (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2007). My paper, however, does not examine that particular controversy; rather, it analyzes issues affecting the faith-reason debate in a broader context*

³See John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio: On the Relationship Between Faith and Reason* (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, (1998)

⁴See, for example, F. Collins, *The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief* (New York: Free Press, 2006). Collins, who served as Director of the Human Genome Project, presents an interesting defense of religious belief from the perspective of a practicing scientist.

⁵See, for example, from Muslim traditions, Avicenna and Averroes , St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Anselm and Augustine from Christian traditions and Moses Maimonides from Jewish faith traditions.

Are they having a contradictory relation or do they support to each other? Is faith and reason independent from each other or do they inform and influence each other at critical conjectures? What is the relationship of faith to reason? What is the role of faith in a rationally examined life? What is the relationship between faith and reason?

In the history of Western philosophy and theology, the debate about the relationship between faith and reason is one of the most hotly disputed topics. Even though many attempts have been made by different philosophers and theologians to solve this philosophical problem, it is still a lingering question. My project is aimed at demonstrating the double sidedness of faith and reason. In this paper, I will argue that a rationally examined life is perfectly consistent with life that not only involves but also requires some kinds of faith. Faith and reason are not necessarily opposing epistemic states. Often they complement each another. Thus, faith and reason often bear a relation to each other of codependence and reciprocity, each informing and influencing the other at critical junctures. Faith is essential to and inseparable from rationality. In order to achieve this, this project is organized into three chapters. The first chapter is concerned with the historical analysis of the concepts of faith and reason. I will critically evaluate the relationship between faith and reason as those concepts are defined by various philosophers and theologians. The second chapter deals with the relation between faith and reason, the concept of existential faith, and a critical analysis on the most common misunderstandings of the concept of faith. In addition to this, it also deals with the analysis of worldview, presuppositions, and faith in relation to the concepts of faith and reason. It also contains brief analysis of concepts like “faithful reason” and “reasonable faith” in order to justify the codependency and reciprocity between faith and reason. In the third chapter, we will look at the relation between faith and science and various ways of relating faith and science. In this chapter, I will also explore the indispensable

role of faith in scientific investigations and claims to scientific knowledge by critically analyzing interdependence of faith and scientific knowledge. Finally, at the end of this thesis, I will draw my conclusions.

Chapter One

1.1. The Concept of Faith and Reason

Many attempts have been made by different philosophers and theologians to address the philosophical problem of the relationship of faith and reason. There are several different positions on this issue. Two of the most important positions on how faith and reason relate to each other are fideism and rationalism. Fideism is the view that says truth which is essential in religious faith is more a matter of subjective commitment, inner commitment than an objective matter of reasoned argument. In other words, it is the view that faith and reason are independent ways of obtaining knowledge and that faith is the more superior way of obtaining religious knowledge than reason is. This view stated that, faith can and must stand on its own, without support from rational argument. Rationalism is the view that stated, it is wrong always, everywhere, and for everyone, to believe anything up on insufficient evidence. On this view one cannot be fully rational in accepting religious beliefs unless they can be shown by convincing reason to be true. Therefore, terms like, faith-only position, and reason-only position are used here to describe fideism and rationalism respectively.

One of the most straightforward proponents of the fideism is the early Church theologian Tertullian (155–230 CE), whose views are summarized in two vivid statements. First, he asks the rhetorical question: “What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem?”⁶ Athens, in this quote, symbolizes reason and the tradition of Greek thinking; Jerusalem represents faith, and the doctrines of Christianity that are held by faith. So, what, then does reason have to do with faith? His implied answer is “nothing at all!” His second famous statement is “I believe because it is

⁶David A Pailin, *Groundwork of philosophy of religion*. Westminster: Epworth press, 1986.P, 9-11

absurd,”⁷ which he wrote when discussing the Christian doctrine of the nature of Christ that appears to be contrary to logic. His point is that reason hinders our discovery of truth so much so that we should expect truths of faith to run contrary to it. Thus, reason is not just a dead end in the pursuit of religious truth, but it may be dangerously misleading.

For example, it is quite difficult to justify logically Jesus could be both fully divine and fully human. It seems to Tertullian rationally impossible that Jesus could be both fully divine and fully human. Here, there is logical contradiction regarding to the essence of Jesus. He suggested that in such cases reason hinders gaining religious knowledge by means of faith. His basic argument is that reason has nothing to do with religious matters. Faith does not need Reason to justify it. He is famous for his opposition to reliance on human reasoning for determination of truth about sacred matters. If his view is correct regarding to the relation between faith and reason, Tertullian is *not* merely saying that human reason has limitations which need to be recognized. He is saying that we ought not to rely on reason *at all*—in fact we ought to purposefully go *against* what reason suggests. Tertullian excluded reason from religious matters and proposed a faith- only position which I argue against in my project.

One should ask whether Tertullian in his work gives arguments, uses rational organization, and in other ways utilizes rational techniques to push for his position. If so, is not his own practice inconsistent with his message? Is not he using the very same techniques used by rationalist people? It certainly can easily appear that Tertullian is using the very same reasoning abilities to defend his point of view that he appears to be attacking. Therefore, the total exclusion of reason from religious matters is not practically acceptable. But I am not saying that all religious truth can be explored by our reason. While Tertullian may have been content with the faith-only

⁷Ibid

position, as pointed out above, other philosophers held that reason could be an important asset in demonstrating some religious truths that we also know through faith. Faith-only position refers to a religious view which says truth which is essential in religious faith is more a matter of subjective commitment, inner commitment than an objective matter of reasoned argument.

However, some philosophers, like James J. Example, argue that faith and reason never produce competing or contradictory claims *because* they never make claims about the same topics. Faith is a means of knowledge of God while reason is a way to gain knowledge about the natural world. They do not make competing claims because they are separate ways to gain knowledge about separate and non-overlapping intellectual domains. Therefore, James J. contends that there can be no conflict between faith and reason, because they never make claims about the same topic. Furthermore, Stephan J. Gould describes the relationship between faith and reason by calling non-overlapping magisterial⁸. But my point here is that we cannot separate faith and reason in all aspects of human life. The question here is can we explore everything in this world through reason alone. I do not think so. I will briefly explain Gould's concept of faith and reason in the third chapter of this project when I discuss faith and science. But the point that I would like to make here is that there is a misconception that faith is opposed to knowledge and knowledge to faith, because faith is holding to beliefs with little or no evidence in their support, or even in the face of evidence weighing strongly against those beliefs; whereas knowledge consists of affirmations for which adequate and convincing evidential support has been sought and found. Therefore, if we properly understanding the two concepts there could be no conflict

⁸Stephen Jay Gould, "Non overlapping Magisterial," *Natural History* 106 (March 1997): 16-22

between the two—that reason properly employed and faith properly understood will never produce contradictory or competing claim.

According to my point of view, we should not trust *exclusively* in our understanding in this mysterious world. Because there is much about the world that no one understands completely through reason. Reason cannot explain everything in this complex world. The world is mysterious in countless aspects and will always remain so. For example, the astounding fact of the world's sheer existence, its diverse constituents and ever-evolving character, as well as the fact of one's own conscious, reflective life as a fleeting part of the world, are deeply mysterious. Among the world's mysteries are the threatening presence and power of destructiveness, hurtfulness, and evil in their various guises, both within us and outside us. But also arrestingly mysterious are the constructive forces of creation, cooperation, and goodness we find to be at work in ourselves, in our societies, and in the world as a whole. Then there is the mystery of the future and of what it may bring in the way of new threats, problems, and perplexities, as well as of unanticipated alterations or even radical changes in personal or societal commitments and beliefs. Although scientists, philosophers, and theologians had made tremendous efforts to understanding specific features of the world, they could not understand the secret behind nature fully.

No one scientist, for example, can be the master of all of today's complex and far-reaching scientific knowledge or fields of scientific inquiry. It is also true that the whole course of any human life and its multifarious beliefs, commitments, and emotions are complex and many-sided, deeply rooted in one's particular acculturation, habits, and intuitions and in one's firmly held but largely unconscious assumptions. Hence, the course of a life cannot be reduced in its

every detail to clear and distinct rational explanations, we have to value the significance of faith in a human's meaningful life. Instead of totally relying on a human's power of reason in the expense of faith and vice versa the two should work together for meaningful life. This is one of the points that I defend in my project. Whereas others have maintained that faith and reason can, or even must, be in genuine contention over certain propositions or methodologies. Those who have taken the latter view disagree as to whether faith or reason ought to prevail when the two are in conflict. Whenever faith and reason conflict, faith (or reason) should prevail, it seems more epistemically realistic and sophisticated to think that rather than a general rule that always favors one side of the faith/reason divide that we need to look at each specific conflict individually and determine whether faith or reason is more credible on a case by case basis. But this does not mean the total separation of faith and reason.

Soren Kierkegaard (1835-1855), for instance, prioritizes faith over reason even to the point that faith is understood to be positively irrational.⁹ On the other hand, John Locke (1632-170) emphasizes the reasonableness of faith to such an extent that a religious doctrine's irrationality—conflict with itself, or with known facts—is a sign that it is unsound. Other thinkers also have theorized that faith and reason govern their own separate domains, such that cases of apparent conflict are resolved on the side of faith when the claim in question is, say, a religious or theological claim, but resolved on the side of reason when the disputed claim is, for example, empirical or logical. For example: “when, by faith, one comes to believe that Jesus Christ is fully God and fully man, even though reason might tell us that this is logically impossible because what it means to be fully God and fully man are incompatible, one should side with the claims of

⁹Alston, William, *History of Philosophy of Religion: the Rutledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 8. Ed. E. Craig. New York: Routledge, 1998. p. 238-248

faith over reason. And when faith tells us that the earth is 6000 years old and science says it is 4.5 billion years old, we should side with the claims of science when it comes to truths about the natural world. But, for me faith and reason is firmly connected. Every belief system is a *faith* system because its presuppositions are ultimately faith commitments. Thus, all reasoning is based upon certain basic *assumptions* about reality, and then faith and reason are always linked together. Contrary to this point, some recent philosophers, most notably the logical positivists, have denied that there is a domain of thought or human existence rightly governed by faith. They claim, instead, that all meaningful statements and ideas are accessible to thorough rational examination. This has presented a challenge to religious thinkers to explain how an admittedly non-rational or trans-rational (supernatural) form of thought can be holding meaningful cognitive content.

Thus, the dispute in religious epistemology regarding faith and reason is one of the most heavily debated topics of philosophy. Lingering questions remain. Medieval Muslim philosophers Avicenna (c.980-1037) and Averroes (126-1198) both believe that when there is a conflict between the claims generated by faith and those generated by reason that one should defer to the claims of reason over the claims of faith. St. Augustine, the bishop of Hippo and enormously influential Christian thinker of western philosophy, stated that he would never allow his philosophical investigations to go beyond the authority of God.¹⁰ Anselm attempted to defend against what he saw as partly an assault on faith, with an approach allowing for both faith and

¹⁰Reason by itself is not good enough to give us proper religious knowledge; instead, we have to begin with faith to set us in the right direction and, once we believe in God through faith, we can seek to understand the foundations of our belief through reason.

reason.¹¹ The Augustinian solution to the faith/reason problem is to (1) believe, and then (2) seek to understand.

For Augustine, faith, which he understands to be trust in a reliable source of information, is an indispensable element in knowledge. One must believe in something in order to know anything. Augustine insists on the necessity of belief for the attainment of knowledge.¹² Faith also transcends reason: “Therefore, what I understand I also believe, but I do not understand everything that I believe; for all which I understand I know, but I do not know all that I believe. But still I am not unmindful of the utility of believing many things which are not known...And though the majority of things must remain unknown to me, yet I do know what the utility of believing is¹³. Thus, knowledge begins with faith and faith provides a foundation for knowledge. I will briefly explain this point in my third chapter of this project. Faith itself is indirect knowledge (like testimony or authority).¹⁴ According to Augustine, faith has priority over reason in the search for truth in the following way. First, faith precedes full understanding. This point itself contains two elements – faith logically preceding understanding and faith proceeding towards understanding. To begin with, faith logically precedes understanding: “But unless, on the other hand, there were some things which we cannot understand unless we first believe them,

¹¹ Anselm followed Augustine’s view of the relation between faith and reason: faith seeking understanding. Thus, Anselm writes “I hold it to be a failure in duty if after we have become steadfast in our faith we do not strive to understand what we believe.” In his effort to understand his faith, he was consumed with the idea of proving God’s existence, and, in his first effort to do so; he offers a proof from *absolute goodness*.

¹² Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo. *What Augustine Says*, 17.

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ Ibid

the prophet would not say, ‘If you will not believe, you shall not understand.’”¹⁵ Augustine contends that one cannot come to understand truth without prior belief. After all, life is too short for one to seek all answers before coming to faith: “For there are innumerable questions the solution of which is not to be demanded before we believe, lest life be finished by us in unbelief.”¹⁶

However, this priority of faith does not mean that all questions are answered dogmatically before we can reason about them. Rather, faith means that we lay hold upon the positive reality of our existence and our relationship to God.¹⁷ That is, we first ascertain our own place as man created by God and our relationship with God the Creator. Starting from this point, we explore the truth about God and ourselves, e.g. who we are, where we come from and where we are going. He points out that in every sphere, faith precedes understanding; a prominent example he uses is that without faith a man could not even know who his mother was.¹⁸

While faith comes first in time, knowledge comes first in importance. In other word, faith is present prior to our thinking about any subject. We all reason from the perspective of an established worldview. We begin with faith presuppositions and then use them to reason. Our faith assumptions are the foundation for all our reasoning. Therefore, Faith and reason do not contradict, but complement one another. It is impossible to live meaningful lives without faith

¹⁵Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo. *What Augustine Says*, ed. by Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, c1982), 16

¹⁶Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo. *What Augustine Says*, 16

¹⁷Roy W. Battenhouse, ed., *A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 6.

¹⁸John M. Barton, “*Faith and Reason in Augustine*,” *Restoration Quarterly* 9: 3 (1966): 142; ATLA, EBSHOST (accessed 25 May, 2009).

because faith is a stance of trust, hope, and conviction that supports all purposeful life. This stance can be based partly on reason, but it cannot be wholly based on reason. In fact, one's faith is a source from which a significant amount of one's reasoning is apt to flow, a source of ultimately significant and deeply embedded and complexly entwined meanings, values, and commitments of various kinds that reason does not so much prove as presuppose.

Augustine strongly believed that while reason does not cause faith, reason everywhere supports faith. In any case, the phrase seems to imply a kind of feedback loop between faith and reason like that I am defending. For example, Science operates upon a belief in the uniformity of nature even though it does not account for it. Presuppositions of science, logic or morality are not natural objects of the universe. They are merely held by individuals to be true. They are presupposed. They are assumed *–by faith*. This is because I argue that faith and reason informs and influence to each other at critical point.

Therefore, reason depends on faith, and then faith also depends on reason. In the abstract, this may sound like circular reasoning and someone may accuse me of committing the fallacy of begging the question. However, we often have to rely on cognitive faculties that we cannot establish to be reliable belief forming faculties in a non-circular way. This is one of the many lessons we learn from the history of epistemic skepticism. So, for example, you know your mind works as a reliable epistemic faculty, because it works. If it didn't work, you would never know. Because it is supposed to work to some extent that is why you can learn about facts, logic, and reality, reinforcing and enriching the faith you began with. In other words, we have reason to think that our mind is an epistemically reliable belief forming faculty but we cannot establish that fact without using our mind. It cannot be established independently of using our mind.

When it comes to knowledge, we have to start somewhere. Augustine's point may be that if we start having faith in God, or reason to it and then start, we will continue to experience a feedback loop of further evidences and rich faith that depends on that evidence, and discovers of more evidence, "Taste and see that the Lord is good."¹⁹ The point here is that faith may be about religious claims, but it need not be. One can have faith about non-religious claims. There are two kinds of faith— religious faith and secular faith. In either case, it is the central purpose of one's life and the focal point of one's orientation to the world.

Broadly speaking, there are two categories of views regarding the relationship between faith and reason: (1) Rationalism²⁰ holds that truth should be determined by reason and factual analysis, rather than faith, dogma, tradition or religious teaching. (2) Fideism²¹ holds that faith is necessary, and that beliefs may be held without evidence or reason, or even in conflict with evidence and reason.

Some suggest that reason²² alone can provide the necessary information and justification required for knowledge. If you cannot see it or touch it, it should not be believed, for the only truths worthy of belief are those that the senses can test or examine. Therefore, there are different

¹⁹ Ibid

²⁰ Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basiger. *Reason and Religious Beliefs: An Introduction to Philosophy of Religion*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p 45

²¹ Ibid , p 46

²² In this paper the word "reason" is used in different ways in different contexts. In epistemology "reason" referees to the process, or faculty of inference. However, in the context of discussion of faith and reason in religious epistemology, the term "reason" has a broader definition. "Reason" in this context means something like "the cognitive faculties, like the senses and inferential faculty that we rely on in normal, non-religious contexts." This is a rough and ready definition but it will help the reader understand why I use the word "reason" but then talk about the senses rather than inferences.

views in religious epistemology regarding the relationship between faith and reason. These views include: rationalism, fideism, pragmatism, and critical rationalism.

In this chapter I will discuss and critically analyze the aforementioned approaches towards philosophical debate between faith and reason. In addition to this, I will try to clarify the concept of existential faith with which I am working throughout this project.

1.1.1. Rationalist approach

When we look at particularly, strong rationalism²³, the central idea of strong rationalism is stated forcefully by the English mathematician M.K Clifford (1845-1879), as follows:

It is wrong always, everywhere, and for everyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. If man, holding beliefs which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of afterwards, keep down and pushes away any doubts which arises about it in his mind... and regards as impious as those questions which cannot easily be asked without disturbing it- the life of the man is one long sin against mankind. Inquiry in to the evidence of a doctrine is not to be made once for all and then taken as finally settled. It is never lawful to stifle a doubt; for either it can be honestly answered by means of the inquiry already made, or else it proves that the inquiry was not complete.²⁴

According to M.K Clifford any belief held upon insufficient evidence is reprehensible. This is true, because if we act upon poorly supported beliefs we are very likely to harm others as well as ourselves. So, Clifford's criticism of holding beliefs based on insufficient evidence is two-fold.

There is both an epistemic problem and a moral, or ethical, problem. When one forms a belief

²³There is another use of "Rationalism" in epistemology, in which it contrasts with *empiricism*. *Rationalism in this sense is the view that the most important truths are known by "pure reason" without reliance on sense perception. That is not the way rationalism is used in this point.*

²⁴ William K. Clifford, *The ethics of belief*, in George I. Mavrodes, ed., *The rationality of belief in God* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 159-60. [Also in PRSR, part 2.]

based on insufficient evidence one is making an epistemic mistake because knowledge requires that a belief be justified by sufficient evidence. But, just as importantly for Clifford, one is also making an ethical mistake. It is immoral to form beliefs in an epistemically irresponsible way because these unjustified beliefs may lead to harm. But also, and more fundamentally, by habitually accepting beliefs which are not supported by evidence, we make ourselves and others credulous, so that we may more easily be seduced by falsehood in the future.

Clifford focuses on the propositional aspects of faith and states that even if these beliefs provide comfort and solace, they are only rationally justified if they are empirically proven.²⁵ He expressed his view as follows.

For example, a ship owner was about to send to sea an emigrant ship..... Doubts had been suggested to him that possibly she was not seaworthy. These doubts preyed upon his mind, and made him unhappy... before the ship sailed, however, he succeeded in overcoming these melancholy reflections.He watched her departure with a light heart, and benevolent wishes...and he got his insurance money when she went down in mid ocean and told no tales.²⁶

Clifford insists that beliefs must be based on empirical evidence. Clifford works on the assumption that seeking out truth and avoiding error are worthwhile and constitutes not only our epistemic duty but just as importantly our ethical duty.²⁷ Clifford's epistemic concern and his insistence that all beliefs be empirically proven cause him to lose sight of the fact that at the

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basiger. *Reason and Religious Beliefs: An Introduction to Philosophy of Religion*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 46

²⁷ William K. Clifford, *The ethics of belief*, in George I. Mavrodes, ed., *The rationality of belief in God* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 159-60. [Also in PRSR, part 2.]

foundation of his theory lies on ethical and empirically unproven beliefs²⁸. In other words, Clifford's view does not live up to its own standards.

Clifford's dictum is narrow and cannot be applied universally. There are many beliefs which, as we have seen, cannot be verified in the way that scientific beliefs can. Although it is likely that the sun will rise tomorrow, as it did in the past, Clifford's analysis renders the belief that it will both intellectually and ethically irresponsible. This is because beliefs about the future transcend our empirical evidence. They cannot be empirically established. It cannot be conclusively proven that God exists or that the sun will rise tomorrow and yet both of these beliefs are reasonable beliefs²⁹. One wonders what sort of world this would be if we never formed beliefs either pertaining to the future or to that which is transcendent (beyond physical world), because, they cannot scientifically proven.

Clifford's maxim also renders all evaluative beliefs such as the belief that it is wrong to lie epistemically unjustifiable. The word "wrong" here is a term used to describe the moral standing of an act or omission. It describes the ethics of that act or failure to act. Such statements are not scientifically verifiable. If we adopt Clifford's maxim, we would live in a world void of all ethical and aesthetic beliefs. This is because; science has nothing to do with value judgments. This again demonstrates the fact that Clifford's maxim cannot be applied universally. Beliefs such as the belief that God exists, the belief that there are other people with mental lives like our own, and normative beliefs about beauty and art, for example, cannot be established by scientific methods but we are still justified in holding these beliefs. So, Clifford's Maxim is an appropriate

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ "Space and time constraints prevent me from making the case for this claim. So, it is an assumption of my paper but one that I think has been established by other philosophers. For further information see [insert works to philosophers who defend the claim that belief in God is rational and reasonable here]."

standard of the epistemic justification of some kinds of beliefs but not all. There are certain domains of knowledge like ethics and aesthetics those genuine cases of knowledge even though they cannot be established in a manner that meets the standard set out by Clifford's Maxim.

Thus, Clifford fails to do justice to an aspect of faith that forms the basis for morally and a socially enriched way of living. So, we can conclude that Clifford's standard is overly narrow and that, although it is an appropriate test for the epistemic justifications of some beliefs, it cannot be, and should not be, a required for all knowledge claims that satisfy the conditions set out in Clifford's Maxim.

Of course, accepting a belief without adequate evidence may result in serious consequences for oneself and, especially, for others. But, the question here is: is it possible to reduce everything to clear and distinct rational analysis or an entirely perspicuous set of rational explanations, goals, purposes, and ideals in this complex and mysterious world? Of course not since human life, in all its richness and diversity, cannot be fully reduced in all its detail to rational analysis. We have to find out ways to live productively and meaningfully in the world.

One objection raised against Clifford's view is that there are many people, especially those who must work hard for a living and have little education, who simply do not have the time or, perhaps, the ability to do the kind of serious thinking that he requires before one is entitled to have a belief. But not all rationalists, by any means, have been hostile to religion. John Locke (1632-1704) was a Christian whose standard for proper belief were essentially the same as those later stated by Clifford. He contends that Christianity, when properly understood, meets those

standards.³⁰ Locke argues that faith should never be set against reason. Positively, he claims that the sources and meaning of a revelation must be established by what he calls “reason.”

The Medieval philosopher Thomas Aquinas (c1242-1274) differed in some of his views from both Locke and Clifford. He agreed with Locke in holding that by careful rational investigation it is possible to make a convincing case for the truth of Christianity.³¹ He says;

There are some truths about God that can be learned through human reasoning, and other truths that can only be known because God has disclosed them through revelation. Both kind of truth are worth of our beliefs, and even the truths knowable by reason may and should be accepted on faith by those who lack the time, opportunity, or ability to verify them for themselves. Though the sources of two kinds of truths are different, they are not and cannot be in disagreement with each other, since only the false is opposed to the true.³²

There is a two-fold truth in which we profess about God. Some truths about God exceed the ability of human reason, like the Trinity, for example. But there are other truths about God that unaided natural reason is also able to reach, that God exists and is thinking being, for example. There are, consequently, some intelligible truths about God that are open to the human reason; but there are others that absolutely surpass its abilities.

St. Thomas held that our belief in eternal salvation shows that we know theological truths that cannot be known by human reason alone. But he also claimed that one could attain certain truths

³⁰For an excellent discussion of Locke's view, see Nicholas Wolterstorff, the migration of the theistic argument: From natural theology to Evidentialist Apologetics, in *Rationality, Religious Belief, and moral commitment*, ed Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University press,1986),pp38-81.

³¹ An important difference is that Thomas, unlike Clifford and Locke, did not lay on each individual believer (or even on each adult believer) the responsibility for providing rational justification for his her beliefs. For Thomas's view, see the article by Wolterstorff cited in note 12 and also Ralph McInerny, Analogy and foundationalism in Thomas Aquinas, in the same volume, pp 271-88

³² Michael Peterson,WilliamHasker,BruceReichenbach, and David Basiger. *Reason and Religious Beliefs: An Introduction to Philosophy of Religion*. (New York: Oxford University Press,1998), P 59.

about religious claims without faith, though such truths are vague and incomplete. For example, he thought we could know that God exists by observing the world and reasoning about our observations. In his famous Five Ways, which are only five argument *sketches* for the existence of God not fully developed arguments, Aquinas argues for the existence of God based on observation and reason alone. However, he thinks that specific Christian theological doctrine, like the Trinity, can only be known on the basis of divine revelation.

No contradiction can stand between these two truths. However, something can be true for faith and false (or inconclusive) in philosophy, though not the other way around. For example, suppose that scripture states that God created the world at a particular moment in time, while philosophy holds that it is eternal. Therefore, what is true in philosophy could be false in religion, and vice versa. This entails that a non-believer can attain to truth, though not to the higher truths of faith.

Religious skeptics like Clifford and Freud dismiss religious faith, characterizing it as a form of irrationality or sickness. They claim that religious faith is psychologically and philosophically problematic. Moreover, they consider faith to be a social problem. They say religious faith a problem of praxis in that it corrupts and infects others. Clifford and Freud claim that the belief that God exists is scientifically unproved and therefore, irrational, they argue indeed this belief cannot be proved and indeed should not be proved. They speak faith as a problem which corrupts and threaten people's rationality. They base their claims on a radical epistemology, according to which beliefs are only rational and thus valuable, if they are formed on evidential grounds. They reason that the belief God exists is not based on sufficient reason and is therefore irrational. They reduce faith merely to cognitive assent to propositions essentially to the belief that God exists.

Freud claims that faith is driven by fear and insecurity and he aimed to offer a genealogical explanation of its formation and social acceptance. Clifford and Freud have dismissed faith and characterized it as the form pathology. Yet, this standard of acceptability is narrow, and what emerges from these accounts is a false picture of faith. Their preoccupation with one standard of rationality means that the radical epistemologists overlook the fiducial aspect of faith and many of its positive effects. Moreover, their account is exclusive in that it rules reason out of faith and by insisting that faith can only be rationally formed on empirical evidence, denies the diverse ways in which people come to have faith.

At the opposite spectrum, we find the radical fideists, who separate the realm of faith and reason, thus insulting and protecting religious faith from rational criticism.

1.1.2. Fideistic approach

Contrasting with strong rationalism is "fideism" (or "faithism").³³ According to this view, faith can and must stand on its own a legitimate source of knowledge, without support from rational argumentation. For most fideists, to subject one's faith to independent rational evaluation is in effect elevating reason above God. They typically claim that the " truth" which is essential in religious faith, is more a matter of subjective, inner commitment than an objective manner of reasoned arguments. The general contention of the fideists has usually been that religious

³³ The term fideism derives from the Latin for faith. It is an epistemological theory that questions the power of reason to reach certainty and argues rather that truth can be attained only through faith. Most forms of fideism conceal a distrust of reason, particularly in the areas of morality and religion. In this context, therefore, faith can be understood as belief despite the absence of conclusive evidence: it also implies an emotional attitude of trust or reliance towards its object. Fideist thinkers consider such faith to be essential to religious commitment.

knowledge is beyond the limits of man's rational faculties and understanding. Religious life itself is the ultimate foundation of one's life- it is, in the phrase of Paul Tillich (1886-1965) one's ultimate concern.³⁴ But if this is so, then the idea of testing or evaluating one's faith by some external standard is serious mistake, which very likely reflects a lack of genuine faith. Thus, it is some time said that if we test God's world by logic or science, we are really worshiping science or logic than God. I will argue against this position further in detail in my project.

The "faith only" perspective says that reason plays no part in knowledge when it comes to matters of religion. As Tertullian said, "I believe because it is absurd!" This view asserts that the only valid way to know anything about God is solely through faith. Famous faith-only Christians include individuals such as Tertullian (160?-230?), Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), Karl Barth (1886-1968), and to a slightly lesser degree, Blaise Pascal (1623-1662).

One of the most influential proponents of the "faith only" movement was the Danish philosopher and theologian, Soren Kierkegaard. Among his many written works, his book, *Fear and Trembling*, especially sets forth his case

The theme of *Fear and Trembling* is the well-known story of God commanding Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac. Kierkegaard's literary skill is excellent as he captures the poignant emotions that Abraham must have felt as he traveled with his son to the mountain of sacrifice. According to Kierkegaard, Abraham – unable to ascertain a rational motive explaining God's command – had to make a "leap of faith" and obey God instead of his own reason.³⁵

³⁴Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basiger. *Reason and Religious Beliefs: An Introduction to Philosophy of Religion*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 46-48

³⁵Soren Kierkegaard (1813-185). *Fear and Trembling*. p. 75-80

This “leap of faith” stands at the core of Kierkegaard’s conception of faith and reason. In essence he taught that the only way to understand God was to let go of reason and venture out on faith alone. Kierkegaard contended that rational proofs of God’s existence were pointless and, even worse, an affront to his nature. He argued that, contrary to Romans 1, there was no such thing as natural revelation. Frederick Copleston, in his *History of Philosophy*, describes Kierkegaard’s philosophy:

God is not man, and man is not God. And the gulf between them cannot be bridged by dialectical thinking. It can be bridged only by a leap of faith, by a voluntary act by which man relates himself to God and freely appropriates, as it were, his relation as creature to the Creator, as a finite individual to the transcendent Absolute.³⁶

Here one may argue that by saying, if assembling arguments and evidence in favor of believing in God is useless, how does one come to have to faith? The answer, for Kierkegaard, is simply: you must commit yourself; you must take the "leap of faith" believing without having (or waiting) any reason or evidence to show your belief is true.

Moreover, the Swiss theologian Karl Barth claimed that God’s revelation has its reality and truth wholly and in every respect, both ontically and noetically, within itself. Revelation cannot be *made true* by anything else. The fullness of the “original self-existent being of God’s Word” reposes and lives in revelation. This renders the belief in an important way immune from both critical rational scrutiny and the reach of arguments from analogy. Barth was thus an incompatibilist who held that the ground of faith lies beyond reason.

³⁶Copleston, Frederick. *A History of Philosophy: Vol. II*. (New York: Image Books, 1994), p. 336

When we look at Blaise Pascal's views on faith and reason, his ideas seem in some degree similar with other fideists that I mentioned above. But Pascal's religious epistemology is almost universally categorized, along with William James', as advocating the practical rationality or belief. Thus, I will discuss Pascal's concept of faith and reason under pragmatist approach in the proper place.

The crucial point of Kierkegaard's argument is the assertion that evidential reason is limited. It cannot prove God's existence and from the point beyond which it cannot help, faith takes over. Evidential reason cannot create trust in God or fiducial faith. Faith is not reducible to evidential reasons or philosophical argumentation, nor does fiducial faith need evidence that God exists in order to be rational.

Even though the idea that faith involves commitment and risk taking seems to make a great deal of sense to many religious people, there are some real problems with fideism. One of problems is how does one decide which faith to leap for? The role of reason is indispensable in choosing among alternative possibilities that seem about equally plausible. Thus, surely it is essential to have some reasonable way in which the claims of competing belief-system can be assessed. In fact, it is surprisingly difficult to avoid engaging in rational evaluation of belief-systems. Fideism is the view that no rational proof is necessary for belief. Only personal commitment is vital, not reason all that is necessary for truth. In short, fideists place their faith in faith itself.

Fideism, however, fails as an adequate test for truth. First, fideism, as a religious epistemology, offers no test for truth. It is an unsubstantiated view. Second, simply believing something will never actually make that belief true. Third, some people have contradictory beliefs, but two

contradictory points cannot both be true. Hence, by belief alone, no truth can be established. There are many claims that are mutually exclusive, but mutually exclusive claims cannot all be true. If it is true that Jesus rose from the grave, then it is not true that Jesus did not rise from the grave. Both views can be believed, but both views cannot be true in the same way at the same time. Fourth, either fideists are making a truth claim or they are not, the fundamental question to ask a fideist is why he believes a given view. If the fideist attempts to provide us with reasons for his beliefs, then he is not a truly consistent fideist.

Although the “faith only” viewpoint does indeed contribute to our understanding of some important teaching concerning God, faith, and reason, it has made a serious error in attempting to disregard reason altogether. God created man a rational being and expects him to use his reason even in matters of faith. If reason is denied then we have no basis of certainty for Scripture and faith. More ever, Freud's and Clifford's account do not allow for the fact many beliefs are formed on other than an empirical basis and that these beliefs are nevertheless rational. And in denying this reality, they prevent serious dialogue among believers and non-believers from progressing.

The radical fideists also begin from the assumption that faith is, by necessity, divorced from evidential reason. Indeed, it must be they say, for one who has knowledge or rational proof does not have faith. What the radical aim to elucidate is that faith is more than fides; it is more than a cognitive assent to facts. It essentially includes *fidecia* a trusting, and an existential commitment. Yet, the radical fideists claim that evidential reason has a limited role to play incoming to have faith. Thus, they insulate faith and protect it, so that it cannot be talked about. Faith becomes a conviction which can be arrived at in only one way which is subjectively.

Oddly, fideism denies that some people come to faith based on reason, even when those people themselves tell us why they came to believe. Again this is damaging, because, it means that one has faith. It cannot be mediated or explained to the non- believers. This attitude and approach drives a deep wedge between those who have faith and those who do not have it.

We have seen that the problem with Freud and Clifford is that they have tended dogmatically rule out from the area of discourse any way of life which does not conform to scientific or evidential standards. But we must recognize faith's fruits for life. Faith plays a positive and enriching role in the believer's life. It is the source of joy and comfort and provides a moral framework. To reduce faith into cognitive assent alone is mistaken. Faith complements and enriches the cognitive aspect of faith and provides architecture of leading a distinctive and meaningful way of life. Yet, to recognize the primacy of faith and the significance of trust within the life of believers does not mean detaching faith from reason.

In contrast to both rationalist and fideist positions, on the relation between faith and reason, I will argue against the misguided idea that faith and reason, or faith and the evidences of ordinary experience, are somehow opposed to one another or should be kept separate from one another.

Reason and faith are enemies of one another only when faith is viewed as forever fixed and unchanging, and as immune to critical reflection.

1.1.3. Pragmatist approach

Pragmatist approach is somehow similar to fideistic approach, but it has different variations. This approach justifies religious belief by arguing that it is reasonable to believe in God because of its practical "payoff"— even when the belief lacks convincing rational support³⁷. William James follows in the pragmatist tradition launched by Charles Sanders Peirce. Pragmatists held that all beliefs must be tested, and those that fail to garner sufficient practical value ought to be discarded.

William James, the American Pragmatist, was deeply interested in the practical effects of faith and religious experience. Pragmatism is a school of thought that argues that the truth of the belief should derive from the tangible difference it makes to our lives – the measure of truth, James liked to say, is its ‘cash value’ or practical payoff. If a person adopts a belief, and that belief proves its usefulness, and productivity, then in the Pragmatist’s sense it becomes ‘true’. Understanding in these terms, there may be a real value of religious faith that is not diminished by uncertainty about its rational claims.

In *The Will to Believe*, James makes the case that belief in the religious hypothesis is reasonable.³⁸ For certain propositions, he argues, it is right – perhaps even imperative – that we use our ‘passional nature’ and believe them because we want them, because they will bring us practical benefit.

³⁷Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basiger. *Reason and Religious Beliefs: An Introduction to Philosophy of Religion*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). p.71

³⁸*The Will to Believe and Other Essays* (London: Longmans Green, 1917), 9

In essay that responds directly to Clifford William James (1842-1910) argues;

For the "will to belief"- or, more accurately, the right to belief-in some cases in which we lack the strong supporting evidence Clifford considers essential. In the case of "genuine option"-choices which are "living", forced and momentous"-we may and indeed must make our decisions to belief or disbelief with our" passion nature". It should be noted, however, that James endorse this course only when clear- cut, objective evidence is unavailable; he does not advocate ignoring or denying the evidence³⁹.

In his response to W.K. Clifford, James points out that there are two ways of viewing humanity's duty in terms of opinion and belief. He points out that we are commanded to know the truth and avoid error⁴⁰. However, knowing the truth and avoiding errors are not one commandment stated in two ways. Instead, they are separable, and stressing one over the other will provide vastly different results. James maintains that those who place the avoidance of error above knowing of the truth, such as W.K. Clifford, are keeping their minds in a constant state of suspense out of fear of being duped⁴¹. James likens this to a general telling his soldiers to avoid battle so that they do not suffer any injuries. Victories over neither enemy nor nature are won by not taking action. Thus, James says that he is willing to face the occasional falsehood or dupe in order to eventually arrive at a true belief. James wants take into account that there are times when we can postpone making a decision until more sufficient evidence is provided.⁴² However, we can only postpone making up our minds if the option is not a crucial one with earth-shattering

³⁹ *Ibid.* p 10

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* p 11-12

⁴¹ *Ibid.* p 15

⁴² *Ibid*

consequences. James also points out that often the need to act is not so critical and urgent that we must risk acting upon a false belief than on no belief at all.⁴³

Therefore, James was a serious critic of Clifford's uncompromising empiricism. Clifford, like Hume, argues that acting on beliefs or convictions alone, unsupported by evidence, was pure folly. He likens such acting to that of an irresponsible ship owner who allows an untrustworthy ship to be ready to set sail, merely thinking it is safe, and then gives "benevolent wishes" for those who would set sail in it. Clifford concluded that we have a duty to act only on well founded beliefs. If we have no grounds for belief, we must suspend judgment.

James argued, *pace* Clifford, that life would be severely impoverished if we acted only on evidentially well founded beliefs⁴⁴. Like John Henry Cardinal Newman, James held that belief admits of a wide spectrum of commitment: from tentative to firm. The feelings that attach to a belief are significant. He defended the need we have, at times, to allow our "passional tendencies" to influence our judgments. Thus, like Pascal, he took up a voluntarist argument for religious belief, though one not dependent solely upon a wager. There are times, admittedly few, when we *must* act on our beliefs passionately held but without sufficient supporting evidence. These rare situations must be both momentous, once in a lifetime opportunities, and forced, such that the situation offers the agent only two options: to act or not to act on the belief James does, however, also give some evidential support for this choice to believe⁴⁵. We have faith in many things in life — in molecules, conservation of energy, democracy, and so forth — that are based

⁴³ Ibid.p15-20

⁴⁴ Ibid. p 20-21

⁴⁵ William James The will to belief. P 24

on evidence of their usefulness for us. But even in these cases “Our faith is faith in someone else’s faith.”⁴⁶ Our mental life effectively comprises a constant interplay between volitions and beliefs. Nonetheless, James believed that while philosophers like Descartes and Clifford, not wanting to ever be dupes, focused primarily on the need to avoid error, even to the point of letting truth take its chance, he as an empiricist must hold that the pursuit of truth is paramount and the avoidance of error is secondary. His position entailed that dupery in the face of hope is better than dupery in the face of fear.

In “The Sentiment of Rationality”⁴⁷ James concludes that faith is “belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically possible; and as the test of belief is willingness to act, one may say that faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in advance.” So, faith is not only compatible with doubt, but it requires its possibility. Faith is oriented towards action: it is a kind of “working hypothesis” needed for practical life.⁴⁸

Pascal lived in the age of the rise of rationalism. Revelation had fallen on hard times; man's reason was now the final source for truth. In the realm of religious belief many people exalted reason and adopted a deistic view of God. Some, however, became skeptics. They doubted the competence of both revelation and reason.

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Ibid. p 25

⁴⁸ Ibid

Although Pascal could not side with the skeptics, neither would he get along with the rationalists. Instead of arguing that revelation was a better source of religious truth than reason, he focuses on the limitations of reason itself. By *reason* Pascal meant the reasoning process. He did not deny the true powers of reason. He was, after all, a scientist and mathematician. Although the advances in science increased man's knowledge, it also made people aware of how little they knew. Thus, through our reason we realize that reason itself has limits. "Reason's last step," Pascal said, "is the recognition that there are an infinite number of things which are beyond it."⁴⁹ Our knowledge is somewhere between certainty and complete ignorance, Pascal believed.⁵⁰ The bottom line is that we need to know when to affirm something as true, when to doubt, and when to submit to authority.⁵¹ According to Pascal, evidential reasons cannot help one to decide whether God exists or not. Thus, as subjective, passionate, and practical decision must be made, one must take an epistemic leap of faith, even though one is making a practically rational choice to believe.⁵²

Besides the problem of our limited knowledge, Pascal also noted that how our reason is easily distracted and confused by our senses and also hindered by our emotions and passions.⁵³ "The two so-called principles of truth reason and the senses are not only genuine but are engaged in mutual deception. Through false appearances the senses deceive reason. And just as they trick

⁴⁹ Peter Kreeft, *Christianity for Modern Pagans: Pascal's Pensees Edited, Outlined and Explained* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), p. 238

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 124

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 236

⁵² Soren Kierkegaard. *Concluding unscientific postscript*. p. 200-204

⁵³ James Houston's translation, *Mind On First: A Faith for the Skeptical and Indifferent* (Minneapolis: Bethany House, 1997). This version was edited to retain only the individual *pensees* which are pertinent for apologetics. *Mind On Fire* also includes edited versions of some of Pascal's *Provincial Letters*, the ones he wrote against the Jesuits. The reader might also want to refer to Peter Kreeft's version (cf. note 1 above) which includes Kreeft's comments on individual *Pensees*

the soul, they are in turn tricked by it. It takes its revenge. The senses are influenced by the passions which produce false impressions."⁵⁴ Things sometimes appear to our senses other than they really are, such as the way a stick appears bent when put in water. Our emotions, or passions, also influence how we think about things. And our imagination, which Pascal says is our dominant faculty⁵⁵, often has precedence over our reason. A bridge suspended high over a ravine might be wide enough and sturdy enough, but our imagination sees us surely falling off. So, our finiteness, senses, passions, and our imagination can adversely influence our powers of reason. But Pascal believed that people really *do* know some things to be true even if they cannot account for it rationally. Such knowledge comes through another channel, namely, the heart

This brings us to what is perhaps the best known quotation of Pascal: "The heart has its reasons which reason does not know."⁵⁶ In other words, there are times that we know something is true but we did not come to that knowledge through logical reasoning; neither can we give a logical argument to support that belief.

For Pascal, the heart is "the 'intuitive' mind" rather than "the 'geometrical' (calculating, reasoning) mind."⁵⁷ For example, we know when we are not dreaming, even though we cannot prove it by rational argumentation. However, this only proves that our reason has weaknesses; it does not prove that our knowledge is completely uncertain. Furthermore, our knowledge of such

⁵⁴Ibid.58

⁵⁵ Ibid.53

⁵⁶Blaise Pascal, *Pensees*, trans. W.F. Trotter, 50

⁵⁷Kreeft, 228

first principles as space, time, motion, and number is certain even though known by the heart and not arrived at by reason. In fact, reason bases its arguments on such knowledge.⁵⁸ Knowledge of the heart and knowledge of reason might be arrived at in different ways, but they are both cases of genuine and legitimate knowledge. Neither can demand that knowledge coming through the other should submit to its own dictates.

The question that demands to be answered, of course, is this: if our reason is inadequate to acquire knowledge of God, even by means of arguments and evidence, how *does* one find God?

Pascal reasons this way:

"Either God exists, or he does not." But which of the alternatives shall we choose? Reason cannot decide anything. Infinite chaos separates us. At the far end of this infinite distance a coin is being spun which will come down heads or tails. How will you bet? Reason cannot determine how you will choose, nor can reason defend your position of choice.⁵⁹

At this point Pascal challenges us to accept his wager. Simply put, the wager says we should bet on Christianity because the rewards are infinite if it is true, while the losses will be insignificant if it is false.⁶⁰ If it is true and you have rejected it, you have lost everything. However, if it is false but you have believed it, at least you have led a good life and you have not lost anything. Of course, the best outcome is if one believes Christianity to be true and it turns out that it is! But the unbeliever might say it is better not to choose at all. Not so, says Pascal. You are going to live one way or the other, believing in God or not believing in God; you cannot remain in suspended animation. You must choose.

⁵⁸Ibid., 229.

⁵⁹Houston, 130-31.

⁶⁰Kreeft, 292.

In response to the unbeliever might say that everything in him works against belief. "I am being forced to gamble and I am not free," he says, "for they will not let me go. I have been made in such a way that I cannot help disbelieving. So what do you expect me to do?"⁶¹ After all, Pascal has said that faith comes from God, not from us.

Pascal says our inability to believe is a problem of the emotions or passions. Do not try to convince yourself by examining more proofs and evidences, he says, "but by controlling your emotions." You want to believe but do not know how. So, follow the examples of those who "were once in bondage but who now are prepared to risk their whole life. . . . Follow the way by which they began. They simply behaved as though they believed" by participating in various Christian rituals. And what can be the harm? "You will be faithful, honest, humble, and grateful, of good works, a true and genuine friend. . . . I assure you that you will gain in this life, and that with every step you take along this way, you will realize you have bet on something sure and infinite which has cost you nothing."⁶²

Remember that Pascal sees faith as a gift from God, and he believes that God will show Himself to whoever sincerely seeks Him.⁶³ By taking him up on the wager and putting yourself in a place where you are open to God, God will give you faith. He will give you sufficient light to know what is really true.

⁶¹ . Houston, 133.

⁶²Ibid 133.

⁶³Kreeft, 251- 255.

1.1.4. Critical rationalists approach

Both fideism and strong rationalism are approaches that advocate extreme positions. These approaches are committed fallacy of false dichotomy. This fallacy is committed when the arguer insists that the only two alternatives are possible in a given situation when in fact the alternatives presented are not exclusive-because more alternatives are still possible.

According to critical rationalist approach, it is possible rationally criticize and evaluate religious belief system. But this evaluation cannot be expected on the result in exclusive, universally convincing proof of such a system.

To put the same ideas in different words, this is an approach which says that religious belief-systems can and must be rationally criticized and evaluated although conclusive proof of such a system is impossible. Like strong rationalism, critical rationalism tells us to use our rational capabilities, to the greatest possible extent, in assessing religious beliefs.

Critical rationalism tells us to do all these things, but it warns us not to be overly confident or overly optimistic about the conclusiveness of such an investigations. Therefore, this approach emphasizes the role of reason in criticizing, or critically evaluating, religious beliefs, as opposed conclusively establishing such beliefs as true. It also takes a more modest and limited view of reason's capabilities, in contrast with the excessively optimistic estimate of reason incorporated in strong rationalism.

The critical rationalist is committed to the task of rational evaluation of religious beliefs, unlike the fidiest who takes his " leap of faith" and is then able to ignore issues of rational

justification. But the critical rationalist, unlike the strong rationalist, has no assurance that by proceeding properly she will be able to prove conclusively that one particular position is correct and that other are mistaken. So, unlike the adherents of either the other two views, the critical rationalist is never in the position of being able to decided, finally and for good, that the discussion concerning the truth and validity of her religious beliefs has reached its ultimate conclusion.⁶⁴

This view criticizes both strong rationalist view and fideistic approach towards the relationship between faith and reason. Critical rationalists stated that strong rationalist proves , and knows with certainty, that her own view as right, so her concern with other views can be limited to studying them to determine their errors, as well as look for best way by which their proponents can be persuaded to embrace the truth. And the fideist, once he has performed the "leap of faith" has very little need for alternative view- at most they may be of use by way of contrast, in displaying the excellence of the chosen view- which judge by its own internal standards, will always emerge as superior in any comparison.⁶⁵

This approach tells us that we should not pretend that great rational certainty is in fact available, but neither should we fail to exercise our power of reflection and rational thought while we are making the most important decisions of our life.

When one compares and contrasts critical rationalist approaches with fideist and rationalist approaches, the critical rationalists are more appropriate to the philosophical problem at hand. Because, this approaches in contrast to fideist approaches, appreciates the role reason in evaluating and criticizing religious belief -systems. Of course, we cannot deny the fact that reason has tremendous contribution in justifying and evaluating religious belief- systems.

⁶⁴. Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basiger. *Reason and Religious Beliefs: An Introduction to Philosophy of Religion*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.53

⁶⁵ Ibid. p, 53-53

However, the problem is that we cannot reduce everything into rational explanations in this mysterious world. As far as I am concerned, reducing everything into rational explanation is quite difficult. Therefore, we have to find ways that helps us to live in this world productively. And this is possible when we have a "lived faith". What is lived faith? I will briefly explain in details this concept in the proper place. The point I would like to show here is that different approaches that I mentioned so far, have understood faith solely as religious one. But this understanding of faith must be challenged. Because, faith has broad meaning than that of religious one and it embrace other forms of faith. The concept should not confine in to religious categories.

Before going to examine the relationship between faith and reason, it makes sense to have proper understanding of faith, and address questions like: what is faith? What are its roles in human life? What are some different conceptions of faith? How does faith relate itself to knowledge, reason, and experience? Does faith, on the one hand, and scientific methods and claims to knowledge, on the other, necessarily conflict with one another? Are there such things as secular forms of faith? Are all types of faith obsolete and superstitious in our modern age?

The concept of faith in secular society tends to be understood as a distinctly religious category. We commonly regard believers as persons who have faith and non-believers as those who have no faith. But this way of thinking displays a lack of appreciation for the fact that faith belongs universally to humankind. Faith is not the exclusive property of believers, but it belongs to humankind regardless of their beliefs that they have about particular religion. Even though many attempts have made by different philosophers, theologians and scientists to address what is the relationship between faith and reason? None of them are able to provide sufficient answer for

this philosophical problem. However, the question is still a lingering question and this is because of lack of proper understanding of the concept of faith and its role, in the whole human life. The widespread and largely unquestioned tendency to assume that faith is confined to the province of religion, and that to have faith is necessarily to be religious, must therefore be firmly resisted.

The faith I refer to in this paper is existential faith.⁶⁶ By *existential* I mean that faith with this meaning underlies, shapes, and supports the distinctive quality of a person's existence or life, its fundamental sense of purpose and direction, aim and orientation in life. I took this term from existentialism. Existentialism is the philosophy of existence, of the nature of human existence, its value, and its meaning. It is the school of philosophy that concerned itself with existential human predicaments. This definition seems ambiguous and subject to many interpretations. But we can have good understanding about this school of thought by looking on major themes that existentialists deal with.

What unify the existentialists are the themes and concerns that tend to show up in their work. Here are the central themes that recur again and again in existential philosophy. These are absurdity, rejection of meaning-giving narratives, alienation, anxiety, forlornness, responsibility, authenticity, individuality, passion/engagement, and death. Much of the existentialists' work was devoted to finding ways of living, and even flourishing, in a world with the problems we face in this complex world. So, existential faith has paramount significance for meaningful life in this mysterious world.

⁶⁶The faith, whether religious or secular, that a person openly *professes* and the faith that person actually *lives*, may in some cases be very different. It is one's lived faith, not just his or her announced faith, that most interests me here.

To speak of one's faith in this sense is to speak of the inner core of one's being, of one's dispositions, emotions, choices, and actions, as well as one's most firmly held convictions and beliefs. One's faith is that mysterious inner strength, resolve, and power that enable one to live in the face of bewilderments, insecurities, frustrations, failures, sorrows, or tragedies, and despite the haunting awareness of an always precarious and uncertain future, with resilient confidence and hope instead of debilitating skepticism and despair. An important aspect of existentialism is its irrationalism _ its belief rationality is not the only even the primary mode of human understanding and relating to the world. As the result of mystery of the world and its creatures, man experience difficulties and face different problems. Existential faith offers us courage and hope to live in this world practically. Our response to problems that we face in this world is motivated by the faith that we have, regardless of the kind of faith we have.

It informs every aspect of how one feels, how one chooses, and how one lives. It defines what one yearns to achieve and become at the deepest levels of one's being. It is the most fundamental character, quality, and direction of one's life. Many scholars claim that man is different from other creatures by the virtue of having rational faculty but for me not only that makes us unique, but we have also faith⁶⁷. Faith is the indispensable quality of life. It is an instrument that helps us to lead life in meaningful manner. It is important that we keep this conception of faith in mind as we continue to analyze the relationship between faith and reason.

A central thesis of this paper is that faith, correctly understood, plays a vital and in eliminable practical role in secular as well as religious modes of life. Thus, a rationally examined life is perfectly consistent with life that both involves and requires some kind of faith. Faith and reason

⁶⁷This may be religious faith or secular one.

are not necessarily opposed but commonly work together and complement one another. Thus, there is a relation of codependence and reciprocity between faith and reason, each informing and influencing the other at critical junctures. Faith is seen as essential to and inseparable from rationality. Basically, this is the point that I am going to defend in my project.

This project intends to bring to light, and takes issue with, a number of serious misconceptions of the nature of faith and its roles in human life. In addition to this, the project aimed at demonstrating the relation of codependence and reciprocity between faith and reason. There are deferent misconceptions about the nature and role of faith. What are these misconceptions?

1.2. The Most Common Misunderstanding Towards the Concept of Faith

Most of the time people have a widespread and largely unquestioned tendency to assume that faith is confined to the province of religion, and that to have faith is necessarily to be religious. However, this way of understanding the concept of faith arises out of the belief that faith is the exclusive property of religious people. This, and other misconceptions, about the concept of faith, leads us to this seemingly intractable philosophical debate about the relationship of faith and reason. In order to solve this philosophical problem, we have to avoid misconceptions about the concept of faith.

The first most common misunderstanding towards the concept of faith is that to have some type of faith is necessarily to be religious, whereas to be secular in one's outlook is to have rejected and be rid of all forms of faith. However, a number of recent studies have shown that all people embrace some type of faith to carry them forward and to enable them to realize meaning in their

lives. R. Pannikar, for example, claims that faith is constitutive of the human person⁶⁸. James Fowler asserts that faith is a feature of living, acting, and self-understanding, of all human beings whether or not they would claim to be 'religious' in any traditional way.⁶⁹ And David Tracy associates human authenticity with a position of faith understood as a fundamental commitment to the ultimate significance of human existence⁷⁰. It is in light of such recent studies on faith that Dermot Lane asserts, 'the real issue today about faith is not whether one has faith but rather what particular kind of faith one has.'⁷¹ I strongly agree with Dermot Lane's concept of faith. Human beings may have different forms of faith but we cannot deny the fact that faith is the idiosyncratic quality of human beings. According to the view I am defending, denying this peculiar quality of human being is denying humanity. The point here is not whether one has faith or not but what is the relationship between faith and reason? Lane conveniently refers to this type of faith as 'primordial faith' so as to distinguish it from the explicit form of faith which we call 'religious faith.'⁷² Whether we call it primordial faith or existential faith, it belongs to all humanity.

The second misconception is that to have faith simply means to lay claim to a system of beliefs. However, the point here is that Existential faith is not just equal to belief or a particular set of beliefs, although it has an important aspect of belief. Faith should not be identified with belief because beliefs are a part of faith but not the whole of faith. Therefore, faith, in this existential

⁶⁸ R. Pannikar Faith as a Constitutive Human Dimension,' *Myth, Faith and Hermeneutics* (New York: Paulist Press, 1979). P, 190

⁶⁹ James Fowler, Introduction,' J. Fowler & R.W. Lovin (eds.) *Trajectories in Faith* (Nashville: Abington Press, 1980) P, 17

⁷⁰ David Tracy, *Blessed Rage for Order* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975). P, 8

⁷¹ Dermot Lane, *The Experience of God: An Invitation to Do Theology* (New York: Paulist Press, 1981).P, 64

⁷² Ibid. p 56

sense, informs one's most deeply rooted beliefs. It helps to give them their particular focus and character, but it is not identical with or reducible to those beliefs. Statements of belief can at best only partially express one's faith, because there is much about it that lies behind and beyond clear conceptual or verbal formulation.

A third misconception is that faith is opposed to knowledge and knowledge to faith, because faith is holding to beliefs with little or no evidence in their support, or even in the face of evidence weighing strongly against those beliefs, whereas knowledge consists of affirmations for which adequate and convincing evidential support has been sought and found. However, I will argue for indispensable role of faith in scientific investigations and in claims to scientific knowledge in the next chapter.

The fourth misunderstanding regarding to the nature of faith arises out of these second and third misconceptions. It is the idea that faith and the investigations and findings of the natural sciences are necessarily opposed to one another or can coexist, at best, only in separate compartments completely sealed off from one another.

The fifth one is that faith is purely emotional in character, having no cognitive relevance or significance, and a sixth is that it can be produced in its entirety by an act of the will. The final misconception is thinking that doubt is the sinister enemy of faith to be resisted at all costs because of strong personal faith, once established, must be by its nature something fixed, settled, and unchanging over the course of a person's life. Doubt is a healthy part of faith to the extent that it enables proponents and practitioners of particular forms of faith to see through and beyond

the symbols to the elusive depth, complexity, totality, and centeredness of what the symbols are meant to convey.

Thus, to address lifelong philosophical problem between faith and reason, the proper understanding of faith and its role in human life is vital. Faith does not belong, therefore, exclusively to the province of religion and there are intimate and indispensable connections of faith with knowledge in general and scientific knowledge in particular. In many respects existential faith is a response to a collection of problems that confront us when we try to live a fulfilling and meaningful life. This is clearly showed that faith and reason are not contradicted to each other rather they work together and support to each other.

Chapter Two

The Relationship of Faith and Reason

2.1. Introduction

The relation between faith and reason is one of the central problems in the history of western philosophy, in general, and the philosophy of religion, in particular. As I tried to describe in the previous chapter, there are two extreme positions regarding this philosophical problem. I firmly resisted both of these extreme views. These extreme views are: rationalism and fideism. Both of them deny what I have been calling “codependence” and “reciprocity” between faith and reason. According to these views, there are irreconcilable contradictions between faith and reason. The problems regarding these extreme positions, however, are obvious. I shall, therefore, attempt to show that this commonly alleged dichotomy between faith and reason is a false dichotomy that leads to the undermining of both of these extreme views on the relationship of faith and reason. My claim is that neither can function without the other. Therefore, understanding the complementarities of faith and reason will help to avoid both the extremes of rationalism, on the one hand, and fideism, on the other. Therefore, if we look critically at faith’s relation to reason, we will see that there is no genuine contradiction between the two. On the contrary, there is an important harmony and profound unity between them.

Basically, to address this philosophical problem between faith and reason, we need to first get a proper understanding of the nature and role of faith in the whole human life and indispensable role it has to our lives outside the context of religion. In this part of the project I will try to clarify

the concept of faith and try to demonstrate what I call the “double sidedness” faith and reason. Faith and reason are like two sides of the same coin. They are distinct but they always go together.

I will also explain and demonstrate the complementary truth that forms of faith and tacit influences of faith are necessarily involved in all processes of reasoning, scientific or otherwise, thus illustrating the concept of faithful reason and I will try to elucidate the concept of reasonable faith. This project simply explores the disastrous consequences for human existence, society, and culture if we separate faith and reason. Let us proceed with the clarifications of the concept of faith that I work with throughout the project.

2.2. What is Faith?

The term “faith” has many uses in our language. I can speak of having faith that the sun will rise tomorrow in the east. I can talk of having faith that the problems and suffering that I have faced today will not exist for me in near future. I can also talk of having faith that the food I am eating for lunch will not makes me sick. These are some of the ways we use the term faith in our day to day language. But I want to use the term faith in different sense from these common everyday uses. The faith I refer to in this project is an existential one, as I attempted to explicate in my previous chapter.

What is existential faith? The concept of existential faith should be understood as indispensable component of thought, feeling, desire, actions, and thus the whole of human life. Existential faith is the most basic quality and nature of any of trusting, hopeful and affirming human life. As

Smith rightly says, "faith is the quality of human living".⁷³ It is the most basic quality and nature of the whole life. It should not be identified with religion. It can be religious or secular. In other words, it is broader in scope and more encompassing than that of religious one.

Existential faith gives fundamental shape and direction, purpose and character, to the whole of a person's life and work. Furthermore, it is indispensable for all or nearly all forms of human life. Although existential faith is an important aspect of belief, it is not just equivalent to belief or a particular set of beliefs. Finally, existential faith lies at the heart of morality, science, and other significant modes of thought and life.

Accordingly, faith as I am endeavoring to describe it here is not a mere matter of belief or even belief of a particular kind, although it generally will have a content of belief. It is, as I have already stated, something obviously existential, something to which one bravely dedicate one's whole life and one's whole being in the face of the grave uncertainties and ambiguities of the world. We are living in the universe which is full of grave uncertainty and mysteries. There are number of issues that go beyond logical justifications and scientific explanations. From this fact, we can draw the conclusion that human reason is limited to explore all secretes behind nature. Scientists, philosophers, theologians and other authorities have been attempted to explain and clarify the unknown behind nature. Though they come up with number of explanations and justifications, none of them are able to come up with comprehensive explanations and justifications about nature of reality. I am not denying the fact that they have made tremendous contributions to human civilization. The current stage of human civilization is the product of

⁷³Wilfred Cantwell Smith. *Faith and Belief*: Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1987.p. 23

these people in one way or in other. But the point here is ,there are number of issues that human reason could not answer and will never be answer. These clearly show human beings are limited and imperfect being. Our ability to grasp reality and truth is limited. But this does not mean that there is no truth or reality at all as radical skeptics stated. Rather our capacity to fully understand these truth and reality are limited. This is because; it is logically unacceptable to expect perfect understanding of these truth and reality, since we are imperfect and limited being. How can we expect perfection from imperfection? Therefore, if it is quite difficult to reduce everything to rational explanations in this complex and mysterious world, we have to look ways that help us to live productively in the face of grave uncertainties, mysteries and difficulties. The only way that helps us to live in such a world is to have existential faith. That is why I firmly believe that a rationally examined life is perfectly consistent with both involves and requires some kind of faith.

There are different types of existential faith, such as religious form of faith, a purely secular form of faith, fundamentalist forms of faith, and liberal forms of faith. There are also traditional and nontraditional types of faith, and expressions of faith that are more communal and others that are more individualistic.

Wilfred Cantwell Smith expresses the aforementioned ideas as follow;

To have faith is to be human, in the highest, truest sense. . . . to appreciate this truth about humankind—to recognize faith in its multiformity as a uniform and central human category—is difficult for all Westerners, but perhaps especially in our day for secularists⁷⁴.

⁷⁴Smith 1987: p. 138

But the point here is that there are few if any among us who are totally not have some sort of deep-underlying faith, whatever form and nature it has, because, absolute, or almost absolute absence of faith is not mere secularism or professed non religion, but nihilistic skepticism and despair. To put the same idea in different words, as a result of the crisis of rationalism, what has appeared finally is *nihilism*. It is defined as philosophy of nothingness.⁷⁵ In other words, it is defined as the philosophical standpoint of nothingness. Nihilists define this as a "lack of faith/belief", while everyone else defines this as the "belief in nothing".⁷⁶ Nihilism generally goes hand-in-hand with feelings of despair, because it is believed that a nihilist will give up all hope once they realize that everything they know is meaningless or nonexistent. There are also many forms of nihilism, such as metaphysical, moral and epistemological nihilism.⁷⁷

Nihilism has a certain attraction for people of our time. Its adherents claim that the search is an end in itself, without any hope or possibility of ever attaining the goal of truth. According to nihilists, there is no objective truth and reality. This approach rejects the very essential quality of mankind which enables him \her to have hope and courage in the face of grave uncertainties and difficulties. So denying this quality is denying humanity for me. However, in the nihilist interpretation, life is no more than an occasion for sensations and experiences in which the ephemeral has pride of place. Nihilism is at the root of the widespread mentality which claims that a definitive commitment should no longer be made, because everything is fleeting and provisional.⁷⁸ This is obviously resulted from "absolutizing" the rationalist approach. If the

⁷⁵ Pope John Paul II. Encyclical Letter; *Fides et ratio*(faith and reason).p 64

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* p 65

⁷⁷ I do not want to discuss these points in detail so long as my focus is the concept of faith and reason.

⁷⁸ See *Fides et Ratio*, Encyclical letter, John Paul II ,(14 September 1998) p.53

complete devoid of faith leads to nihilism and despair, we can infer that far from reason's being necessarily opposed to existential faith, all forms of reason at critical point rely on stances of this faith. This shows the role of faith in human life. Both faith and reason have paramount significance in meaningful life and work together and supports to each other.

Pope John Paul also explains how faith supports reason and how theology supports philosophy.

The Holy Father stated the danger of absolutizing the rationalist approach as follows:

The man of today seems ever to be under threat from what he produces, that is to say from the result of the work of his hands and, even more so, of the work of his intellect and the tendencies of his will. All too soon, and often in an unforeseeable way, what this manifold activity of man yields is not only subject to 'alienation', in the sense that it is simply taken away from the person who produces it, but rather it turns against man himself, at least in part, through the indirect consequences of its effects returning on himself. It is or can be directed against him. This seems to make up the main chapter of the drama of present-day human existence in its broadest and universal dimension. Man therefore lives increasingly in fear. He is afraid of what he produces—not all of it, of course, or even most of it, but part of it and precisely that part that contains a special share of his genius and initiative—can radically turn against himself.⁷⁹

From this we can conclude that with the rise of rationalism, faith and reason became separated with disastrous consequences. The end result is the nihilism that we are now experiencing. Nihilism contains no hope of meaning and admits of no objective truth.⁸⁰ It recognizes only the utilitarian ends of power and pleasure. But this is problematic for me because, if we have no hope of meaning and objective truth, we can imagine what will be human life. In the absence of universal and objective values that binds human beings, human life becomes horrible. Thomas Hobbes describes this fact by saying that life in state of nature is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish

⁷⁹Ibid. p.47

⁸⁰John E. Fagan, "Fides et Ratio (Faith and Reason)." from *The Teachings of Pope John Paul II: Summaries of Papal Documents* (New York: Scepter Publishers, 2005): p 66

and short.⁸¹ So, the nihilist approach to reality is not logically acceptable and we have to challenge it. The precondition for this challenge is to have the proper understanding of faith-reason relationship. If we exclusively stand on the side of reason or on the side of faith, we are in extreme positions. The two extremes are the most danger. Aristotle expresses this fact in his known work Nicomachean Ethics by saying, Virtue is the mean between two extremes.⁸² For example, courage is the mean between fearing everything and fearing nothing.

Another example, giving a lot of money for the needy people not make someone generous, because it is waste, at the same time giving too little money also problematic because it is greedy. Therefore, what makes someone generous is that giving the right amount of money, for the right person, at the right time, for the proper reason. From this we can understand, virtue is simply using our mind properly and he shows the danger of the two extremes. Analogically, the two extremes positions on faith- reason relationship also dangerous. Creating a false dichotomy between faith and reason has negative impact on human life.

Pope John Paul the Second elaborated the possible consequence of absolute reliance on reason and the role of religious faith in human life. I would add that we cannot deny the fact that faith has tremendous contribution in our life, whether it is religious or secular one. Whatever form it has, human beings have faith that give them courage, strength, and hope for whatever challenges that they encounter in life. It is hardly possible to imagine the complete absence of any kind of faith. So here the question is not whether we have faith or not, but what kind of faith

⁸¹See Norman Melchert, *The great conversation: Historical introduction to philosophy*. 2nd ed. Mayfield Publishing Company. Mountain View, California, 1991.p. 341-344.

⁸² Brooke Noel Moore, Kenneth Bruder. *Philosophy: The power of ideas*. 6th. ed. The McGraw-Hill Companies: California state university.2005. p.262

we have and what is its relation with reason. It is never really a question of which of us exercises faith and which one does not. Faith is something within all of us. We all possess this quality as human beings. But I am not saying that all forms of faith are one and the same, because all kinds of faith are different in their nature and forms.

The Pope first explains the proper role of faith and reason on man's path to truth. Truth is known through a *combination* of faith and reason. The absence of either one will diminish man's ability to know himself, the world and God.⁸³ Human reason seeks the truth, but the ultimate truth about the meaning of life cannot be found by reason alone.⁸⁴

He then explains how they both complement and support one another with complete compatibility. Faith without reason withers into myth or superstition. Deprived of reason, faith is left with only feelings and experience. It loses its universality. John Paul also explains how faith supports reason and how theology supports philosophy; by saying human reason is inherently weak and inclined to error. Deprived of revelation, reason can go off course and miss its destination.⁸⁵

Even though we claim to live in an "age of reason," there are serious problems with modern "reason." Reason in and of itself is not sufficient for yielding a meaningful life in this complex and mysterious world. The absolute reliance on reason, at the expense of faith, results in serious

⁸³ John E. Fagan, "Fides et Ratio (Faith and Reason)." from *The Teachings of Pope John Paul II: Summaries of Papal Documents* (New York: Scepter Publishers, 2005): 64-71.

⁸⁴ Ibid. p.65

⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 67

problems. Pope John Paul the Second attempted to demonstrate the problems of extreme rationalism.

The first problem that the Pope addresses is called "skepticism." Due to our concrete thinking, it is easy to ignore intangible ideas. According to skepticism, the only important knowledge is obtained from our observation of material things. We can only know things through our five senses. Knowledge concerning abstract ideas, such as love, beauty and God, are either absurd or fantasy. Also abstract concepts, like freedom and justice, are perverted or bound to concrete things. Skepticism assumes that reason is limited to only sense perception. Any idea beyond particular material objects is not important. But the question here is can we give rational justifications and empirical explanations of every things in this world? What about things those go beyond empirical explanations?

The second problem with modern reason is a false autonomy, or independence. This false autonomy of reason is called "Rationalism." Rationalism assumes that human knowledge does not need faith. However, I argue instead that the two are mutually dependent. Faith has an essential knowledge aspect, and knowledge has an essential faith aspect.

According to rationalists, all the knowledge, that we need, can be personally verified by our sense perception or personal experience. We do not need to believe in anything, since we can prove it ourselves. Reason replaces faith. Unfortunately this presumption is not totally honest. Due to constraints in time and resources, even scientists must accept some knowledge on faith, even though it may not be a supernatural faith. Here there are important questions that we have to address before look at the relation between faith and reason. Can everything be reasoned?

Must all propositions, ideas and belief be exposed to the searching light for critical reflection?

Of course not

Someone who stands on the side of strong rationalists may argue against this by saying, every propositions, ideas, and beliefs must be exposed to the light of critical reflections. However, I insist that there is a limit to the rational and critical enterprise. Not everything can be grasped intellectually; Not everything can be reduced to an argument: Not everything can be expressed in language: what happen at the point where reason gets out? Can we reason out about any subject without relying on faith -based assumptions? Is it possible reasoning stands totally independent of faith? It is at this point faith plays the role and even an inevitable role. But it is not fair to consider faith mean something irrational. Because, irrational is something which is incompatible with general experience or reason itself. Whereas faith is simply different from and may be even higher than experience, or reason. Despite someone may oppose my idea, I strongly believe on the presence of ultimate presuppositions (also called basic assumptions or presuppositions, faith assertion) which are known with certainty and the foundation of all our other ideas. But these faith based assumptions themselves cannot be proved. Practically to reason out about any subject we have to set up with such faith-based assumptions. This view is defended by foundationalists.⁸⁶ The most common defense of this idea is the claim that from a purely logical standing point, not everything can be argued or there would never be an end to the arguing.⁸⁷ A long time ago Aristotle pointed out that every argument finally rest on something that cannot be proved.⁸⁸ There must be, as it were at least out post or final court of appeal. If foundationalists are

⁸⁶This idea is taken from my epistemology teacher Christopher Bernard (PhD).

⁸⁷ E. D .L. Miller. Question that matter: An invitation to philosophy. The McGraw-Hill companies,inc,1996.p. 13

⁸⁸ Ibid. p.13-14

true and every philosophical system or propositions or arguments necessarily rest at some points or other some ideas which are certain and basic and indemonstrable then you must believe here, if no place else the faith too makes a contribution. These obviously show the inevitable role of faith in our reasoning. Thus, the two are inseparable in human life. That is why John Paul stated that "the human being - the one who seeks the truth - is also the one who lives by belief."⁸⁹The Holy Father clearly declared that religious faith and reason are compliment and support to each other. But the question her is that, is faith limited to religious category only? I believe that religious faith is one form of existential faith which includes other forms of faith such as secular one. So, it would be much of a mistake to dismiss faith regarded in this existential manner as it would be to dismiss as critical reason. Both are necessarily involved in any kind of affirming, responsible intellectual endeavor, and both are essential to any kind of flourishing, meaningful life. This is the important and far-reaching idea I have sought to emphasize and explain here.

However, there is a great tension in contemporary society on the relationship of faith to reason between religious perspective and secular perspectives. They highly criticize to each other. Their views are somewhat problematic for me. For example, for the secular person to claim that religion must be seen as a matter of clinging doggedly to so-called faith without recourse to evidence and reason, and that to be secular is firmly to reject reliance on faith in favor of exclusive appeals to evidence and reason. This way of expression misconceives both religious and secular outlooks.

⁸⁹Fides et ratio, p. 31

Similarly, for the religious person to claim that his or her view must rest solely on so-called “faith” in sacred authorities or sacred texts, and that critical, open-minded appeals to evidence and reason are somehow impious or threaten the integrity of religious conviction, is to misinterpret the nature of religion and much that is basic and permanent in the histories of religious traditions.

To think in these ways is to make the differences between secular and religious outlooks and the possibilities for meaningful dialogue, interaction, and consensus building between them appear more wide and unbridgeable than they actually are. Most of the time people perceive secular outlooks as non-faith views and religious outlooks as faith views. According to me, the two are both faith views. But they are different forms of faith views. Despite the difference among these two forms of faith, dialogue and communication are still possible, because human beings have shared something in common by the virtue of being human. There are universal core problems. These are not only the problems of religious people but also the problems of secular people also. These problems are the problems of humanity. No matter whether we are religious or secular in our outlooks, we all raise metaphysical, epistemological and axiological questions that are universal in nature. This shows that we human beings share something in common, despite the fact that we are different in culture, religion philosophy and the likes. Therefore, dialogue and communication are possible among different faith views. But if we create a dichotomy between faith and reason, there is no room for dialogue and communication among different forms of faith. This may have serious effect in humanity that has different forms of faith.

Enrique Dussel argues that it is necessary to affirm that all of humanity has always sought to address certain "core universal problems" that are present in all cultures.⁹⁰To put the same ideas in different words, there are universal existential human predicaments that human beings share in common by the virtue of being human. These problems are not the problems of particular culture or community rather they are the universal problems that we found in all traditions. These basic core problems have inevitably been faced by all human communities. Human beings in every culture have been raising fundamental questions that are metaphysical, epistemological and axiological in nature. For example what are real things in their totality and how they do behave? Questions related with the mystery of their own subjectivity and nature of freedom and creation of social and ethical world. How we interpret the ultimate foundation of everything that is real? Human beings ask similar questions despite their differences in culture and faith.

Here are some fundamental questions—questions of a deeply existential and not merely theoretical character—that must be dealt with in some manner by all of us. What is the meaning of life? What basic or perhaps even ultimate values should guide the living of our lives? How should we best exercise our capacity for judgment and choice? How should we live in the face of an uncertain future and the inevitability of death? How can we deal with problems of guilt, shame, regret, and despair? What account should we give of the presence of evil in ourselves and in the world, and how should we respond to that presence? What does it mean to be a human being, and what is the place of humans in the world? How can we find inspiring and appropriate models and exemplars for living our lives? All human beings deal with these questions though their approaches are not the same. The key point here is, any serious approach to these questions,

⁹⁰Enrique Dussel (UAM-IZ, Mexico, 2008) <www.enriquedussel.org> .The rational response to these core problems first acquire the shape of mythical narratives.

whether religious or secular, must give a central role to faith when the concept of faith is properly analyzed and understood. This makes faith central to every aspect of our lives and being.

However, this fact is denied in our contemporary society. The possibility of dialogue and communication between secular and religious outlooks appear more wide and unbridgeable than they actually are. Accordingly, faith has nothing to do with secular outlooks, and reason and evidence has nothing to do with religious outlooks.

These ways of thinking can have divisive and alienating consequences in a pluralistic society and an increasingly interlinked world such as our own, a society and world that are in urgent need of exposing and resisting distorting caricatures of differing points of view and of continuing to search for grounds among them of mutual cooperation and understanding. Thus, there is misunderstanding on faith relationship to reason in our contemporary society and I will try to shed light on this issue further.

2.3. The Misunderstanding of the Faith-Reason Relationship

Both secularism⁹¹ and relativism⁹² heavily influence contemporary society. These views have come about largely as a result of a misunderstanding of the faith-reason relationship. Faith and reason are usually defined in such a way as to mean that religious ideas have no connection with

⁹¹To be “secular” is to live one’s life with an orientation towards the present world, as opposed to living one’s life from the perspective that life is everlasting. Since religions generally contain an eternal perspective within their worldviews, secularism is demonstrated in actions that seek to restrict religious views or considerations from influencing public policies and activities.

⁹² For this notion the conceptions of truth and morality are not absolute, but relative to the individuals, or groups holding them. It holds that all criteria of judgment in particular situations are relative for the individuals involved apart from any fixed standards.

logic. This way of defining the faith- reason relationship is mistaken because of two reasons. First, it is not appropriate to confine faith into religious category, since there are different forms of faith. Faith exists in many forms and religious faith is one among these different forms of faith.

All humans are not *religious* but the vast majority, if not all of them, *do* have some sort of existential *faith*. There is such a thing as secular faith. A significant number of people have in the past, or are in the present, adherents and practitioners of some type of purely secular outlook and commitment. Such persons do not characterize themselves as religious, do not identify with any specific religious tradition or community, and do not subscribe to any set of recognizably religious teachings or practices. In fact, for various reasons they explicitly reject religion in all of its forms, so far as the focus and direction of their own lives is concerned. But such persons are generally, in my view, persons of faith. In other words, secularists are also the man of faith though the form of faith that they possess is quite different from that of religious one. Therefore, the relations between religious and secular perspectives are generally not relations of faith, on the one hand, and non-faith, on the other, but relations of *different kinds of faith*.

Secondly, even if we look at particularly to religious faith, it is hardly possible to claim that logic has no contribution for religious matters as the above definition illustrated. But most of the time people perceive faith and reason are contradictory to each other.

The *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* explains the relationship between faith and reason in the following way:

Reason generally is understood as the principles for a methodological inquiry...Some kind of algorithmic of *demonstrability* is ordinarily presupposed. Once demonstrated, a proposition or claim is ordinarily understood to be justified as true or authoritative. Faith, on the other hand, involves a stance toward some claim that is not...demonstrable by reason. Thus faith is a kind of attitude of trust or assent.⁹³

The preceding definition portrays faith as a subjective attitude towards some belief one wishes to affirm. Some secular skeptics have gone even further and defined faith-beliefs as superstitious notions that thrive only in the absence of reason or science. They see faith in terms of something one believes in that is either lacking in or entirely contrary to reason. These views of faith and reason are mistaken because all reason is ultimately based upon certain *presuppositions* within our worldview. I will explain more regarding to this point in the proper place. Now let us critically evaluate secularist and relativist views on the relationship of faith to reason.

2.4. Secularist View on the Relationship of Faith and Reason

Many secularists argue that all types of religious dogmatism, especially the kind contained in creeds and professions of faith, should be restricted in the interest of keeping people's personal religious beliefs from negatively affecting others who have different beliefs. This means public institutions must attempt to be religiously neutral. The perception that faith-beliefs should no longer be permitted to influence public institutions or policy in the interest of fairness to everyone is now widely regarded as a prerequisite for civil liberty.

Behind this secularist view of religion often lays the conviction that faith-views are really beyond empirical verification or rational proof. Secular intellectuals frequently treat

⁹³ James Swindal, "Faith and Reason", *Internet Encyclopedia Of Philosophy*, par. 1 (2001 [cited 1 May 2002]) ; available from the World Wide Web at <http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/f/faith-re.htm>.

contemporary religious belief as little more than superstition. Many advocates of secularism contend that it was not God who created man but rather man who has created the idea of God. In their view civilization can advance only as it moves beyond such ancient religious “myths” in favor of enlightened reason and modern science. This clearly shows the contradiction that they posed between faith and reason. True knowledge, they contend, is found through rational or empirical means. For me, true knowledge has an essential faith aspect and Faith has an essential knowledge aspect. Though many scholars stated that faith and knowledge should be viewed as incompatible with or opposed to one another, the two are mutually dependent.

Therefore, the above mentioned secularist views of the faith-reason relationship originated from two misunderstandings of the idea of faith that I will briefly explain them in my third chapter of this project. These are:(1) faith is opposed to knowledge and knowledge to faith, because faith is holding to beliefs with little or no evidence in their support, or even in the face of evidence weighing strongly against those beliefs, whereas knowledge consists of affirmations for which adequate and convincing evidential support has been sought and found.(2) It is the idea that faith and the investigations and findings of the natural sciences are necessarily opposed to one another or can coexist, at best, only in separate compartments completely sealed off from one another.

2.5. The Relativist View of the Relationship of Faith to Reason

Relativism’s major premise is that no absolute truth exists except that there is no absolute truth.⁹⁴The attempt to discard a belief in absolute truth then leads people to affirm that everyone is entitled to hold certain personal beliefs no one else has the right to question or judge.

⁹⁴E. D .L. Miller. Question that Matter: An Invitation to Philosophy. The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc,1996.p 15

Supposedly religious beliefs cannot be tested for truth and therefore everyone's beliefs must be regarded as equal. Everyone is entitled to religious beliefs free from rational scrutiny and may choose whatever faith-views they want to. The total exclusion of reason from faith views may have serious consequence in human life. According to the above view everyone has the right to choose and follow whatever views that they want. There are different forms of faith, some are very traditional and dogmatic which affects our life negatively, and other are liberal and open-minded that contributes and shape our life positively. Faith has different forms and natures. So to identify these different forms and natures of faith, we need to have a tool that helps us to evaluate the strength and weakness of particular form of faith. Reason is an instrument to do these activities.

Relativism's ultimate assumption that absolute truth does not exist is false because it is ultimately self-contradictory. Relativism asserts that there is no such thing as absolute truth even as it posits this belief to be absolutely true. For relativists to be consistent with their own position they would have to admit that the supposed truth of relativism itself is relative, which completely undermines it.

Based on this fact, we can draw the conclusion that both secularism and relativism have come about largely as a result of a misunderstanding of the faith-reason relationship. Therefore, clear demarcation that established between faith and reason by secularists and relativists are not logically acceptable and faith and reason are always linked together. This is exactly the opposite of how most people see the relationship between them. However, faith and reason should not be seen as standing in sharp separation from one other or as being hostile to one another, despite the fact that both secular and religious people all too frequently view them in this way. I submit

that reason and existential faith should be understood as working constantly in our lives and in those things we take to be most profound and important in our lives. So, we can speak meaningfully of reasonable faith and faithful reason at the same time. Before going to discuss the double sidedness of faith and reason, it will be logical to show the complex relation among faith, worldview and presuppositions. Exploring the relation among these concepts in-depth helps us to have proper understanding of faith and its role in meaningful life.

2.6. Faith, Presuppositions, and Worldviews

The English word for *worldview* comes from the German *weltanschaaung*.⁹⁵ It literally means “life perspective” or “way of seeing.” It is simply the way we look at the world. You have a worldview. I have a worldview. Everyone does. There are different worldviews such as the Aristotelian worldview, Newtonian worldview, Christian worldview non-Christian worldview scientific worldview and the likes.

A worldview is a conceptual scheme by which we consciously, or unconsciously, place or fit everything we believe and by which interpret and judge reality.⁹⁶ It is the cognitive lens through which we view the world. It is the perspective through which interpret reality. It is our frame of reference. It is the means by which we interpret the situations and circumstances around us. It is what enables us to integrate all the different aspects of our faith, and life, and experience. A

⁹⁵Encyclopedia of Philosophy: p 12

⁹⁶ Ronald H.Nash. Faith and reason.(Zondervan.1988), p. 24

worldview is simply a way of viewing the world.⁹⁷ Philosopher W.P Alston argues for the significance of worldview as follow:

It can argue on the basis of facts concerning the nature of man and the condition of human life that human beings have a deep-seated need to form some general picture of the total universe in which they live, in order to be able to relate their own fragmentary activities to the universe as whole in away meaningful to them; and that a life in which this is not carried through is a life impoverished in most significant respect.⁹⁸

The right glasses can put the world into clear focus. The correct worldview can function much the same way. Some one looks at the world through wrong worldview, the world will not make much sense to him, or what he thinks make sense will, in fact, be wrong in important respect.

Every subject we think about is filtered through our worldview. Worldviews are ultimate in the sense that they govern our entire outlook on life. If there is ever any tension between our worldview and some perception of reality, we usually interpret reality to conform to our worldview. We make judgments about everything, especially other views, with our current world. Therefore, our worldview is our life view wherein we try to integrate the sum and substance of life together in a way that makes sense to us. What is the relation between worldview and faith? Before addressing this question, it will be important to have very good understanding about the relationship between presuppositions (basic assumptions) and worldviews.

Presuppositions are at the heart of worldviews. Presuppositions lie at the heart of our beliefs about reality. The essence of every worldview is rooted in its transcendent, metaphysical,

⁹⁷ George Grant. "What? The Purpose of the Lives":*Stirling Bridge* (September 1997: King's Meadow Study Center), p. 3.

⁹⁸Ronald H. Nash. Faith and reason.(Zondervan.1988), p. 24-26

governing assumptions about the nature of reality. Here are some of presuppositions ultimately shape our worldview and have great influence upon how we think and reason?

There is no personal deity (atheism). Universal economic laws are the driving force behind history⁹⁹ (Marxism). Rational thought is the best way to arrive at ultimate truth (rationalism). The universe is essentially made up of matter and energy (materialism). The material world is not real; it's only an illusion¹⁰⁰ (according to some form of Hinduism). These are some of the presuppositions which are serving as the foundation for our worldviews.

Our most basic assumptions or presuppositions about reality collectively form the foundation of our worldview. Presuppositions are interconnected. They work together to form a web of basic beliefs. These presuppositions shape our worldview grid. This becomes the screen through which we interpret our whole universe.

Each of us is an individual creature in a vast universe. We are finite beings with limited knowledge. We cannot, and do not, know everything there is to know. This means that in order to reason about anything at all we must first *assume* certain things about reality. At the heart of every philosophy of life are certain basic assumptions about what is real and true. Everyone has these assumptions or presuppositions about what they perceive reality to be. Day to day thinking involves the use of premises from which we draw conclusions. But these premises are themselves based upon certain *assumptions* about reality.

⁹⁹ .Karl Mark and Friedrich Engels Collected works. New York and London: International publishers,1975. p. 66

¹⁰⁰Brooke Noel Moore, Kenneth Bruder. Philosophy: The power of ideas. 6thed. The McGraw-Hill Companies: California state university.2005.p.495

When germinating a certain plant, for example, experienced farmers know that proper amount of water; air, soil, and temperature are all required. But their premises are based on a very general assumption that the germinating - process requires the same ingredients and procedures today as in the past. It is assumed that the *present* will be like the *past*; *farmers* in this case, are presupposing that *nature is uniform*. The assumption that nature is uniform is a primary assumption we use every day. In fact, it is a prerequisite for scientific methodology.

Scientific investigation would make no sense without reliance on the uniformity and order of the universe; the reliability at some critical points of the five senses; the applicability and usefulness of logical and mathematical reasoning; the general reliability of past scientific findings and understandings; the extreme value and importance of devoting one's life to scientific investigation and seeking to understand fundamental principles, constituents, and laws of the world; the honesty and integrity of one's scientific colleagues; and the hope of making steady and significant progress in scientific understanding. Uncertainties are involved in all of these commitments, even though they are essential to scientific theorizing.

All these assumptions are not *proven* by science. Scientists *assume* that uniformity in nature is true so that experiments can be performed. The fact that scientists observe uniformity within their limited experiences does not prove its *universality* nor does it guarantee that uniformity will still hold true *tomorrow*.

Since presuppositions, such as the uniformity of nature, the reliability at some critical points of the five senses; the applicability and usefulness of logical and mathematical reasoning; the general reliability of past scientific findings and understandings which are the heart of

worldviews, simply taken for granted, our worldview is ultimately a faith-view. Every view of life, expressly religious or supposedly non-religious, is a belief system that begins with assumptions held by faith.

Most of the time we are tempted to identify faith with determinate set of beliefs: Consequently, we some time if not always go about describing the faith of individuals, groups, or traditions as only compendium of beliefs. But faith should not be identified with belief. Though beliefs are part of faith, it is not the whole of faith. Beside of this, although it is very usual to confuse worldviews that are ingredients in faith with the whole nature of faith itself, it is not the same thing with faith. Worldview can give conceptual content to faith but should not be thought to be the same thing as faith.

C.S Lewis stated this concept of faith metaphorically as follow:

I do not merely see the sun when it rises, he says: by the means of it I am enabled to see everything else.¹⁰¹

Analogically, faith frames everything else in one's outlook on the world and one's way of living in the world. One's worldview is framed by faith and in a fundamental sense gives expression to one's faith. There are religious as well as secular worldviews that can be associated, but should not be thought to be identical with particular forms of faith. These are such as the worldview of Buddhist which says; there is no permanence or substantial persistence of the self¹⁰². The worldview of Ad vita vedantist is the other which says, such things as individuality, diversity,

¹⁰¹ See Lwies 1980.p 140

¹⁰² Brooke Noel Moore, Kenneth Bruder. Philosophy, The power of ideas: 6th.ed. The McGraw-Hill Companies, California State University: 2005.P.520.

and temporal passage are finally, unreal, and the sole reality is Brahman.¹⁰³ The worldview of the Muslim, Jew or Christian includes the idea of personal God who has created the universe and all things on it, and who communicate his will and purpose to human being by the means of definitive special revelations. From the above examples, we can draw the conclusion, worldview can be associated with faith, but it is not identical with particular forms of faith. Rather worldview can give conceptual content for particular form of faith.

Worldviews are also not only important aspect of religious faith but also important aspect of secular forms of faith. For example, Marxist argues human history is the history of class struggle. There is struggle among economic classes and confidently predicate the ultimate victory of an oppressed group whose members are regarded as the only truly productive persons in society with the subsequent inauguration of a classless society having no need of governmental restriction and control.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, much more than an explicit worldview is involved in these forms of faith although the worldview is an important part of it.

The major point to be made here is that worldviews in both their explicit and implicit aspects are important component of faith but do not constitute the whole meaning of faith. This implies that everyone reason through a view of reality that is rooted in faith-based assumptions about the reality they perceive to be true. Everyone has a faith-based worldview which means there are no neutral areas of life. Every aspect of being and activity is interpreted through our worldview grid.

¹⁰³Ibid. p. 498

¹⁰⁴ Karl Mark and Friedrich Engels Collected works. New York and London: International publishers.1975.p. 125

When I come back to my point, science operates upon a belief in the uniformity of nature even though it does not account for it. Presuppositions of science, logic or morality are not natural objects of the universe. They are merely held by individuals to be true. They are presupposed. They are assumed—*by faith*. All these show the faith relationship to reason is not contradictory as many believed. There is a perfect harmony between the two.

Most people see faith in terms of something one believes in that is either lacking in or entirely contrary to reason. These views of faith and reason are mistaken because all reason is ultimately based upon certain *presuppositions* within our worldviews. “All men presuppose whatever the name they use for it, a synoptic view of reality as a whole.

Therefore, in order to reason about any subject each of us must presuppose the existence of certain *pre-conditions* in order to form the premises from which we will draw our conclusions.

As a result, faith and reason are firmly connected. Every belief system is a *faith* system because its presuppositions are ultimately faith commitments. Secular beliefs have their own particular set of faith based presuppositions. *Reason is not separated from faith; reason is based upon faith.*

If all reasoning is based upon certain basic *assumptions* about reality then faith and reasons are always linked together. This is exactly the opposite of how most people see the relationship between them. They do not understand that faith actually *precedes* reason at critical points.

Faith is present prior to our thinking about any subject. We all reason from the perspective of an established worldview. We begin with faith presuppositions and then use them to reason. Our faith assumptions are the foundation for all our reasoning. There is no subject area where conclusions do not involve primary assumptions held by faith. The fact that we all view the world according to some set of assumptions about reality means that we all have a faith-view. Presuppositions are at the heart of every worldview regardless of whether that worldview is religious or secular. This implies that the double-sidedness of faith and reason and their contribution in meaningful life. So we can talk about faithful reason and reasonable faith at the same time. Reason and faith supplement to each other. Neither can function without the other. Both are involved and required in meaningful life.

2.7. The Double Sidedness of Faith and Reason

2.7.1. Faithful Reason

It is difficult to have a faith which has nothing to do with rationality. Similarly, it is quite difficult to have reason which is not relying to faith at critical point. This clearly shows the double-sidedness of faith and reason. Based on this fact, we can speak about significant place of faithful reason and reasonable faith in human life. I will discuss reasonable faith in the proper place. But now let me explain faithful reason first. Here I want now to turn my attention a bit more specifically to the topic of faithful reason by looking briefly at the critical role of faith in both our moral outlooks and practices and achievements of scientific thought.

When we look at our moral outlook and practices, they are given strength and credibility by our tacit convictions that a moral life is worth, and it is possible to live together in such a way as to

bring about a morally better world and the likes. Thus, we must be convinced that we are genuinely responsible and free and the universe is amenable to the moral efforts we exert in our freedom. We also must be convinced that the lives of other are intrinsically valuable and worth to our moral efforts and respectful regards.

Our moral outlooks and attitudes are raised from our tacit convictions that we firmly held by faith. This shows us that there is implicit faith in our moral outlooks and attitudes. There is implicit faith behind reasoning in general and moral reasoning in particular. Therefore, our commitment to moral principles and living of them exemplify faithful reason. I am not saying that here faith and morality are one and the same.

Even though faith and morality are not one and the same, the two are intimately related. When we compare the concept of faith with the concept of morality, the former is more holistic concept. The concept of moral responsibility has something to do with free will. That means we are morally responsible for our actions if we are free. Accordingly, we are not morally responsible for actions that go beyond our control. However, there are dozens of things that are beyond our control. Examples of such things is past actions (inactions) for which one is personally responsible and for which one may feel gnawing remorse, regret or guilty. Being now in the past these actions cannot be changed. One cannot have present control over what has already happened. Past actions and their consequences may profoundly threaten one's sense of moral value and erode feelings of capacity for moral actions in the future. But the character and focus of one's faith may provide resource that enable for forgiveness and rekindling of hope, resources that enable one to reestablish a sense of self-worth and to find new assurance of such misdeed- in the past and to live more responsible life in the future. Thus, faith strengthen one's

moral capacity and determination by enabling one to come positively to terms with past actions over which one no longer has control.

In a similar way, we may have little or no control over actions of others persons or institutions that have very bad effect for our own lives or the lives of others. The acts may have great impact on humanity. We cannot avoid their evil consequence or undo their harmful effects. We can subject them to moral judgments but we have no way to change them by the means of moral actions. So we have to look mechanisms that help us to live under this circumstance. The only means that we have to cope up with those actions that go beyond our control is through faith. Therefore, faith with its hidden resources of strength, hope and courage, may enable us cope with events or action beyond the reach of moral decision and actions. The faith that is the underlying quality of our whole life can give us the courage and hope to persist despite our inability of change wounding circumstances in which we find ourselves or others. Therefore, faith can provide a binding sense of the why of life, of its all-encompassing purpose and value, and in that way enable us to find inner poise and peace even when sorely beset by evil deeds of others which we have no moral purchase or control.

There are also other examples of events beyond our control, events lying beyond the scope of moral decision and action is that of accidents and natural happening that have disastrous effects but are unforeseen and unpredictable and the fault of no individual person or group. These are we can call them natural evils. Natural evils such as floods, earthquake and tornadoes are events that we have no moral control. They are produce extreme anguish and anxiety. Our faith enables us to continue to live and affirm our lives despite such difficulties and threats. Thus, faith place morality within a large context of confidence hopefulness, motivation, and meaning. As

philosopher Ledwig Wittgenstein once stated, a strong faith can make one feel absolutely safe in one's inner being even when stressed by risk and dangers on every hand.¹⁰⁵ Thus, all of the above situations—beyond personal prediction or control—are problems for faith, not for moral actions, except in considerable extent morality itself, depends critically on the centered act of the whole person that is existential faith.

There are fundamental assumptions that are presupposed in morality and tacitly involved in its outlooks and practices. These assumptions are like human freedom is real; we are capable of discovering and confirming (not just inventing) basic moral values with which to direct our free choices and actions in a responsible fashion; we live in the world that permits moral improvement and thus the justifications and realizations of moral hopes; it is possible for us to work effectively with others towards a better world for all, and it is incumbent one to do so.

All of the above basic assumptions are responsible for our moral reasoning and acting and they are highly related with existential faith. These are presuppositions that we held by faith. Moral responsibility presupposes human freedom. It is difficult to imagine moral responsibility without free will. It would make no sense to speak of having moral responsibility in general if we were not capable of choosing freely for or against those responsibilities, and thus of being personally and ultimately responsible for doing so. It also would make no sense to speak of a person's having a particular moral obligation that the person is incapable of acting on.

It would be nonsensical, for example, X is obliged to identify for the police the visual characteristics of the person who robbed a bank in his presence when it turns out that X is blind.

¹⁰⁵See Monk. 1991;p. 51

This clearly shows that one cannot be responsible (obliged) to do something that one constitutently is capable of doing.

Also, one cannot expect to reason meaningfully about his /her obligation if he or she is not free to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of possible rational justifications for those obligations. Thus, both practices and outlooks of morality rest on essential assumptions of the reality of human freedom. The possibility of responsible moral actions and the assumptions of freedom to perform the action go necessarily together.

Faith also constitutes important background for morality because it applies to all types of thought and endeavor, but morality has domain of inquiry, thought, and action that is distinctively its own. However, I mean only to say, that although faith is different from morality and broader in its scope than morality, morality is a crucial constituent in the life of faith. Faith lies in the background of morality, inspiring, motivating, shaping and informing it in various ways.

Scientific outlooks, for their part, also rest on and give expression to sometimes tacit and sometimes explicit testaments of faith. Scientific investigation as I mentioned earlier, would make no sense without reliance on the uniformity and order of the universe; the reliability at some critical points of the five senses; the applicability and usefulness of logical and seeking to understand fundamental principles, constituents, and laws of the world; the honesty and integrity of one's scientific colleagues; and the hope of making steady and significant progress in scientific understanding. Uncertainties are involved in all of these commitments, even though they are essential to scientific theorizing.

Furthermore, the concept of faithful reason is clearly expressed by most widely recognized and respected scientific thinkers of all time, Albert Einstein, and Paul Dirac who made profound contributions to subatomic physics.

Let me quote Paul Dirac statement that gives evidence of his unquestioning confidence in the power of mathematical reasoning not only to unlock the secrets of the world but also to reveal what he believed to be its deep mathematical structure and character. Paul Dirac stated that:

Schrödinger and I both had a very strong appreciation of mathematical beauty, and this appreciation . . . dominated all our work. It was a sort of act of faith with us that any equations which describe fundamental laws of Nature *must* have great mathematical beauty in them. It was like a religion with us. It was a very profitable religion to hold, and can be considered the basis of much of our success¹⁰⁶.

His statement thus gives clear expression to what I am calling faithful reason, a reasoning deeply informed by faith. In order to elaborate further the idea of faithful reason, let me cite the example of Albert Einstein

Einstein had such complete and unquestioning faith in absolute causal determinism and in the idea that the universe is utterly law like, mathematically structured, thoroughly rational, and in principle intelligible through and through, that he was never able to accept or even seriously consider the idea that, at the quantum level or elsewhere, there is a significant role for chance and indeterminacy¹⁰⁷.

Einstein's scientific reasoning was deeply informed by his scientific faith, and his scientific faith merged easily into his religious faith.

¹⁰⁶ Olive, David I. 1998. The monopole: In *Paul Dirac: The man and his work*, ed. Peter Goddard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 88–107.

¹⁰⁷ There is debate about how fundamental causal determinism was to Einstein's objection to quantum theory. The physicist Jeffrey Bub gives evidence for the view that what was primarily at issue for Einstein was his conviction that "the properties of systems described by the [quantum] theory" must be "*determinate*, that is, that the values of the physical magnitudes are definite without regard to any consideration of the observational context" (Bub 1988: 61). This comment still leaves open the question of whether quantum phenomena involve real or only apparent elements of chance. For some passages that affirm the importance of strict causal determinism in Einstein's outlook, see Isaacson 2007: 84, 323–24, 333.

Einstein's profoundly compelling religious vision in its connection with his scientific theorizing, a prominent example of what I am calling faithful reason, lay strongly behind his conception of the role and competency of natural science and provided much of the motive and impetus of his scientific achievements. His reason was solidly rooted in and inspired by his existential faith, and his lifelong practice as a scientist gave evidence of this faith. Einstein's and Dirac's faiths are not isolated instances, but that something like such modes of faith—again, religious or secular—permeates all scientific endeavors. The practices and accomplishments of scientists in general illustrate the concept of faithful reason, as do the practices and accomplishments of all who seek to interpret the character of and put into practice a moral life. The same is true of other modes of thought and life.

Further explanation for this point will carry out in the third chapter of this project. Now let us back to the concept of reasonable faith.

2.7.2. Reasonable Faith

As I mentioned previously, in the case of faithful reason, we can speak meaningfully about faithful reason, we can also speak meaningfully, then of reasonable faith. That is, by the same token, all viable and plausible forms of existential faith require the guidance, support, and articulation at significant junctures of reason. So we can speak meaningfully of *reasonable faith*.

The critical examination and evaluation of faith is important.

To have a reasonable faith, it is not necessary to have a strong rational foundation for our faith.

That mean it is possible to have reasonable faith without having rational basis for our faith. We

cannot reduce all things to rational explanations and this does not mean reason and faith are completely different and nothing has to do to each other.

Fullness of life does not and cannot require fullness of rational understanding of everything in one's life or in the world in which one lives. If it did, it would be unattainable. Because, we cannot and do not know everything there is to know.

On the other hand, it would be negligent, indeed, to base one's whole life on beliefs and commitments that deliberately resist or ignore any sort of rational development, articulation, or defense. This would be a way for blind faith, superstition, and dogmatic acceptance of irrational beliefs. It would be to live a completely arbitrary and unreflective life. This is not a kind of life that we supposed to live as unique creature that different from other creatures. Human beings have special faculty that makes them different from other organisms. So, we have to apply this faculty in our day to day life so that our life to be meaningful. In this connection, the familiar Socratic dictum that the "unexamined life is not worth living" rings true.¹⁰⁸ What Socrates is saying is that any aspect of life which is not subject to critical reflection is not worth to human life. This clearly shows the role of reason to critically examine and evaluate all aspects of life.

Someone may argue against me by having the misguided idea that faith and reason, or faith and the evidences of ordinary experience, are somehow opposed to one another or should be kept separate from one another. But reason and faith are not enemies of one another rather they supplement and support to each other. Any aspect of life whether it is religious or secular should

¹⁰⁸ E. D. L, Miller. Question that matter: An invitation to philosophy. The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 1996.p. 10-11.

be subject to rational examination. Therefore, the relationship of faith to reason is irrefutable and inseparable,

To put the point in another way, it is entirely reasonable to recognize the role of faith in confident human life and to see reason as rooted to a significant extent in the whole character, focus, and direction of a life of faith.

Thus, whatever the style, pattern, or path of a person's life may be, and whether it is religious or secular, faith of this sort is both profoundly involved and required. This is simply because, human beings to have courage, strength, hope, trust and the likes, this sort of faith is indispensable. These are the resource that we acquired by our faith. A person's reason will typically reflect and help to give form and expression to his or her faith. Without such Reflections and examinations inter- philosophical dialogue among different philosophical traditions, inter-faith dialogue among different forms of faith is unthinkable.

So, we should certainly aspire toward a reasonable faith, a faith that is well grounded in experience and reason, well equipped to support the whole course of a person's life, and one that takes careful account of optional paths of life and thought. In other words, we should aspire toward a faith that is humble and open-minded not merely assertive, a faith that is devoted throughout life to learning from the outlooks and commitments of others. There is no faith of all. Faith is not the exclusive property of religious people, but all of us have faith. And we should be ready to acknowledge that no single path of life, no matter how persistently thought about and pursued, write everything about the extreme evil of mystery and wonder packed into the world.

All of our respective paths and forms of faith are like teaspoons dipped into an enormous, everlasting ocean of reality and truth. The comprehensive understanding of such everlasting ocean of reality and truth is not possible for imperfect and limited being. But, we can still live these teaspoons with courage and conviction even while acknowledging their final limitation and inadequacy. This kind of humility is an essential element in a sound, healthy, and reasonable faith. Of course, we can and should also decide consciously and carefully among different kinds of faith. Decision making presupposes choice and to choose among given alternatives of faith we have to critically examine possible alternatives. Here the role of reason is obvious. And some are worse and some are much worse than others. Some are more challenging and richly fulfilling than others.

Someone may challenge my idea by contending that there is no such thing as faith without conviction, i.e. firmly held beliefs. I am not saying that faith is completely defended by reason. But a dogmatic and close-minded faith affords little possibility of improvement, review, or development, and it cannot enter into mutually constructive and meaningful dialogue with those whose lives are based on and give expression to other forms of faith. If faith is dogmatic and close-minded, it will have disastrous consequences for human existence, society, and culture. Any kind of faith that is not subject to rational scrutiny become dogma and not ready for communication and inter-religious dialogue which considered as vital for modern pluralistic society.

A faith that is not open to ongoing confirmation or possible disconfirmation either in whole or in part is a species of faith that should be called seriously into question. This caveat is a central part of what I mean by the phrase *reasonable faith*.

Chapter Three

Faith and Science

3.1. Introduction

The relationship between faith and reason is once again a hot topic in politics, ethics, science, and religion. So, it is important to explore the relationship of faith to science here, in order to show the double sidedness of faith and reason and their contribution in meaningful life. As we know, science is an organized endeavor to explain the properties of the physical world by means of empirically testable theories constructed by a research community trained in specialized techniques¹⁰⁹.

When we look at particularly on the relationship of faith to science, many books (and scholarly articles) have been written about science and faith, from a broad range of perspectives, both Christian and secular, scientific and philosophical. In other words, there are different views on the relationship of faith to science. For example, Edwin K. P. Chong Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering and Mathematics stated different view of science and faith in his seminar notes at Colorado State University. These are the two-realmview, Complementarity view, direct interaction view and presuppositional view.¹¹⁰

According to the two-realm view, faith and science involves two distinct, non- overlapping areas of truth. This view of faith and science also clearly stated by eminent scientist, an important

¹⁰⁹C. John Collins, Science & Faith friends' orfoes? (Crossway Books: A division of a good news publishers w h e a t o n illusion,2003) P. 29- 31

¹¹⁰ Edwin Chong, Faith and Science , April 22, 2007. Colorado State: University.

sociopolitical thinker Stephen Jay Gould in his book *Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life*.

There is no conflict between science and religion. Science tries to document the factual character of the natural world, and to develop theories that coordinate and explain those facts. Religion, on the other hand, operates in the equally important, but utterly different, realm of human purposes, meanings, and values—subjects that the factual domain of science might illuminate, but can never resolve. Similarly, while scientists must operate with ethical principles, some specific to their practice, the validity of these principles can never be inferred from the factual discoveries of science.¹¹¹

Gould describes the relationship between faith and reason by calling “non-overlapping magisterial” (NOMA). NOMA is a simple, human, rational, and altogether conventional argument for mutual respect, based on non-overlapping subject matter, between two components of wisdom in a full human life: our drive to understand the factual character of nature (the magisterium of science), and our need to define meaning in our lives and amoral basis for our actions(the magisterium of religion).In this usage, a "magisterium" is a domain of authority in teaching; the basic principle of NOMA is that religion and science are non-overlapping domains of intellectual authority. Because they do not overlap, they cannot contradict each other, and they should coexist in mutual respect.

Whereas complementarity view of faith and science offers non- inter acting complementary approach to the same reality. They accept very different point of view, ask and answer very different questions. Example, Faith asserted that God created life on earth whereas Science

¹¹¹Stephen Jay Gould, *Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life* (New York; The Ballantine publishing Group,1999).P 5-10

describes the process by which life on earth came about. This clearly shows the complementary of faith and reason.

Direct interactionist views state that faith and science may directly interact that either offering rational support for the other or raise rational difficult for the other. For example, Big bang theory tends to support Biblical understanding that the universe had a beginning. On the other hand, theory of evolution raises difficulties for the creation claims. Finally, there is presuppositional view, which says, faith tends to support presuppositions of science and science tends to hold up some presuppositions of faith. For example, Christian theism supports propositions of science such as, the existence of truth, the rationally orderly nature of reality, adequacy of our sensory and cognitive faculties as tool for studying natural world. On the other hand, correspondence theory of truth offers justifications for some propositions of theology.

However, in this chapter I will argue there is no a sharp contradiction between faith and science. The complete separation of faith and science and considered them very independent from each other is not practically acceptable if we have proper understanding about the nature and meaning of faith. The notion that I am going to defend here is that all aspects of human thought, including the natural sciences, are dependent at crucial points on faith as I conceive it and that faith thus conceived is not the exclusive province of religion.

3.2. Ways of Relating Science and Faith

The alleged conflict between science and faith has become one of the most exciting areas of discussing among theologians, scientists and philosophers in the history of western philosophy.

The relation between science and religious faith has lively history. Science, at times, has conflicted with religious faith and theologians have questioned the conclusions engendered by the so called “Scientific Method.” As Ian Barbour states in his seminal book religion *On Age of Science*, regarding to the relationship between science and religion, there are four ways of relating the two fields namely, conflict model, independency (separation) model, complementary model, and integration model.¹¹² I am going to explain these models in detail before taking my own position on the relationship of faith to reason, which is the main agenda of this project.

3.2.1. The Conflict Model

For many people, to speak of the two disciplines of science and religion, it is to embark a long recital of conflict and contradiction. This is the position that described for the first time in J .W. Darper's book *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science* (1875) followed by A.D Whit's book *A History of Warfare of Science with Theology with Christendom*¹¹³.(1896)

According to this model, there are many differences between these two fields of science and theology. While experiment is the main tenet of scientific methodology, it is experience, whether numinous, mystical or moral, which decided the content of religion and theology.¹¹⁴ Historically, the conflict story seems to have begun with Gallilo Galili (1564-1642) who in 16th

¹¹²See also Sarojini Henry, the encounter of faith and reason, inter religious dialogue. Indian institute of science and religion, Pune and ISPCK, Delhi, 2005), p .3

¹¹³ Ibid

¹¹⁴ Ibid

century endorsed the Copernican astronomy in which the earth and the planet revolve in circular orbits around the sun.¹¹⁵

The second case of conflict is the debate over Charles Darwin's theory of evolution proposed in 19th century. Darwin argued all living organism—which were always seen as the most obvious example of God's creative power— only evolved through the mechanisms of natural selections operating on random variation across enormous time spans.¹¹⁶

This model proposes, as the name suggests, that science and religion are in fundamental opposition, and that this has always been the case. The idea is clearly expressed by Worrall when he writes that “Science and Religion are in irreconcilable conflict ... There is no way in which you can be both properly scientifically minded *and* a true religious believer.”¹¹⁷

The major reason for a fundamental conflict between science and religion was highlighted honestly and in a straightforward manner by physicist Richard Feynman in the *Meaning of It All* (1998), he says that it boils down to a matter of attitude. Regardless of what the goal of the inquiry is, science fosters doubt and investigation based on empirical evidence; religion, on the other hand based on dogma and revelation. It is hard to see how those attitudes can logically coexist in the same brain.

¹¹⁵Ibid

¹¹⁶So long as my purpose here is to show the area of conflict between faith and science, I do not want to explain Darwin's theory of evolution and his concept of natural selection. If you want to have very good understanding about this theory you can read Darwin's theory of evolution. But the point here is that this is one area of conflict between religious faith and science.

¹¹⁷ Worrall, J. 'Science Discredits Religion', in Peterson, M.L. & Van Arragon R.J. (eds.) *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion*, Blackwell (2004), p. 60.

Here, it is significant to analyze the contemporary arguments of conflict such as scientism and creationism before completing this model.

3.2.1.1.Scientism

The idea that the scientific method alone is the reliable path to knowledge is called scientism; scholars advocating this position argue that science portray an objective verifiable truth because, in their research, scientists make observations, from hypothesis and thereafter design experiments to test the hypothesis¹¹⁸. Scientism is often coupled with materialism, the concept that matter is the fundamental reality of the universe. Therefore, scientism is often taken to be synonymous with scientific materialism. All these have led to the belief that science can stand to explain the universe and our presence in it. This idea was supported by logical positivists of the early 20th century who promulgated the idea that science is an objective and value- free activity. The logical positivists of whom the best known is Alfred Ayer (1910-89) maintain that experience is the source of all knowledge.¹¹⁹

Logical Positivists asserted that science provides a complete explanation of the world. There is nothing beyond scientific knowledge. Nothing is real if it cannot be observed by the methods of “objective” science. Bertrand Russell defines Logical Positivism as follows, “Whatever knowledge is attainable must be attained by scientific methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know”.¹²⁰ Science is considered the only valid pathway to truth;

¹¹⁸Sarojini Henry, *the encounter of faith and reason, inter religious dialogue* P. 23

¹¹⁹ Ibid

¹²⁰Russell , ‘The Conflict Manager and its Social Origins’, *Science and Christian Belief*, vol. 1(1) 1989. , pp. 3-29

therefore other sources of truth are excluded. The claim of scientism that science is the only valid path to knowledge is, however questionable.

This is because; there are many ways of obtaining valid knowledge. Some lie outside the domain of the scientific method. To deny the validity of non scientific information is to deny aesthetic moral, religious knowledge, or personal private knowledge. As the matter of fact, there are matters and values and meanings that are outside of science's scope. Science cannot explore everything in nature. Therefore, science is the best way of acquiring knowledge but it is not only way of acquiring knowledge.

3.2.1.2.Creationism

Creationism stands for the instantaneous origin of all things through the action of some the super natural process, so that things are assumed to have created as they are now, except for some minor changes.¹²¹A creationist considers the Bible to be the source of scientific information about the origins of the world. So, he presents a particular biblical interpretation of origins as a basis for a scientific understanding of creation and rejects the views of contemporary scientists. The creationist argued that since creationism has a scientific backing, it ought to be a valid model comparable to Darwin's theory.¹²²

¹²¹Numbers, R, *The Creationists*, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992) p 86

¹²² Ibid

To sum up—conflict model suggested that *science and faith provide alternative explanations* to origins and therefore, that they are in competition with each other. Thus, we must reject either faith or science.

3.2.2. The Independence (Separation) Model

Although some concrete examples of conflict situations discussed in the last section, it does not necessarily mean that the science -faith debate can be categorized exclusively in terms of conflict. Indeed, the relationship between science and faith is so complex and the conflict model is not sufficient for me. Beside the conflict model, another popular model, that science and religion faiths are not related. The proponents of this model argue that the method employed in science and religions are radically different.¹²³ While science supplies a technical knowledge religion offers a whole philosophy of life. Science with its experiments and logic tries to understand the order in the universe whereas, religion aided by theological reflection, aims to comprehend the purpose and meaning of human existence on earth.¹²⁴

In this model the differences in approach, method and language between the scientific and theological search for truth are emphasized. It seeks to build walls between Science and Faith. It claims *that Science and Faith provide different answers* to the same questions. Thus, the argument is that science and theology must kept separate, since the content as well as the method used in science and religion is totally different. This means that we have the view religion and science as totally independent and autonomous. It is further argued that while no conflict is

¹²³Sarojini Henry *the encounter of faith and reason, inter religious dialogue* p 34

¹²⁴Ibid

possible, neither can one of them contribute substantially to the other. Thus, what we know about the material world through scientific experiment and what religion and religious thinkers teach about the transcendental reality have to be compartmentalized.¹²⁵

3.2.3. Complementarity (dialogue)Model

In this model, science and faith are seen to present complementary answers to the same questions. This model maintains that science and religion are addressing the same reality from different perspectives, providing explanations that are not in any kind of rivalry to each other, but rather are complementary.

They are seen to be in dialogue. There is seen to be one truth, *common truth*, but there are two faces of this truth. According to this view, the two disciplines must be in dialogue, interact with each other and complement each other. According this view, in many ways one cannot separate science and faith. This is the point that I would like to argue in this chapter. In one way or other the two, faith and science depend to each other. As I stated in the seconded chapter we can talk about reasonable faith and faithful reason in meaning full manner.

Complementary model does not fall into the trap of naïve reductionism in thinking that scientific explanations are the only ones that matter, but is willing to consider the broader, ultimate questions that lie beyond science, yet without at all demeaning the value of scientific knowledge in the process. I am not denying the value and contributions of scientific knowledge in human life but we should not absolutizing science without considering questions that go beyond science.

¹²⁵Barbour, I, *Religion in an Age of Science*, SCM, London, Chapter 1,1990 p. 3-30.

Scientific investigation raises nonscientific questions that are important, but outside the domain of science to address. These include metaphysical and ethical questions such as the source of the laws of physics, the use made of science, and the source of values used in science comes from outside science. For example, ecological, bioethical questions such as are raised by genetic engineering.

Faith supports science in many ways and there are similarities in methodology between science and theology. Science is based on presuppositions that are not provable. It has content that arises from observation and experiment. It develops models that best explain the “way things are” - interpretations of science - theories. Science is thus not just objective facts, but governed by presuppositions and beliefs.

Similarly, theology is also based on presuppositions that are not provable just like science. It also has content that arises from scripture, tradition and experience i.e. there are rational grounds for faith. It also develops models and beliefs that best explain the “way things are”. Theology is not irrational, myth, or blind faith but based on content. Theology is not fixed, but open, exploring by reason the “facts about God”.¹²⁶ Thus, the two approaches can best make sense of the way things are. Science needs theology and theology needs science to make sense of the world.¹²⁷ From this we can infer that faith needs reason and reason needs faith and the two can work together.

¹²⁶ John Polkinghorne. *Belief in God in the age of science* New Haven and London: Yale: University Press, 1998. P.1

¹²⁷ *Ibid*

3.2.4. Integration Model

The conflict and independence models, as we have noted, still have their influence in some scientific and religion circle. At the same, a new trend has arrived giving scholars the hope that there can be shared concerns as well as mutual support between the two diverse fields of science and religion¹²⁸. Many scholars are working on this model and find it one of the most exciting and controversial intellectual project of our time.

The main reason of this model is the dissatisfaction, felt by many scholars, with the enlightenment ethos which elevated science as supreme program of rationality, and relegated religion to an irrational position. The main tenets of the enlightenment paradigm are an exclusive confidence in reason, a naive endorsement of universal truth, a subject- object dualism and optimistic anthropocentric worldview.¹²⁹ In his book *Transformation of Mission*, David Bosch points to the complete bankruptcy of the rationality of modern period and appropriately remarks, Enlightenment culture -science, philosophy, education, sociology, literature, technology- has misinterpreted both humanity and nature ,not only in some respects, but fundamentally and totally.¹³⁰ The extreme reliance on reason is the essential characteristics of the enlightenment thinkers. They believe that faith has nothing to do with scientific knowledge. However, the two pioneering scholars working in the area of philosophy of science, Thomas Kuhn and Michel Polanyi, whose books *The structure of scientific Revolution* and *Personal knowledge*

¹²⁸Sarojini Henry, *the encounter of faith and reason, inter religious dialogue* p. 45

¹²⁹ Ibid

¹³⁰David Bosch, *Transforming Mission*, p.355

respectively have been widely recognized for their innovativeness regarding to this issue.¹³¹ With Kuhn, we have come to apply social- critical theory and to understanding scientific knowledge a socially constructed. Polanyi has shown the persistence of the contribution of the knowing subject, the observer, in all knowledge. All these imply that there is intimate relation between faith and knowledge in general and scientific knowledge in particular.

3.3. Critical Analysis regarding the Interdependence of Faith and Scientific Knowledge

As I pointed out in my previous chapters, there is a misconception between the relation of faith to knowledge in general and scientific knowledge in particular. To put the same idea in different words, faith and the investigations and findings of the natural sciences are necessarily opposed to one another or can coexist, at best, only in separate compartments completely sealed off from one another. However, I am going to argue for indispensable role of faith in scientific investigations and in claims to scientific knowledge. Faith and science are not opposed to each other although many argue that there is a contradiction between the two.

At the top of all these agendas some people assume that religion and science stand in stark opposition to one another. They often tend to identify religion with faith, and faith with a set of poorly supported or unsupportable beliefs, and thus to conclude that science and faith have nothing to do with one another.

¹³¹Sarojini Henry, the *encounter of faith and reason, inter religious dialogue*. p 51

For example, philosopher Susan Haack in her book *Defending Science within Reason: between Scientism and Cynicism* explains the contradictory relation between faith and science. She writes,

I hadn't forgotten that according to some philosophers, among them both Peirce and Popper, belief has no place in science. I agree that faith, in the religious sense, does not belong in science; though in their professional capacity scientists accept various claims as .true, this usually is, or should be, tentative and always in principle revisable in the light of new evidence.¹³²

There are number of things that we have to take in to account from the above passage. First, Haack assumes that faith and belief are the same which is not correct for me. The second point is that faith is identified, at least for here purpose, with religion, and thirdly scientific claims are said to be revisable in principle in the light of new evidence whereas religious one are not. Her concept of faith is dogmatic and not flexible. But if we look at human history, it tells us quite different. She is religious conservative person, but this is not what the history of religion tells us. We see that people change their faith in the course of time. She demarcates a clear cut between faith and science. Accordingly, there is irreconcilable contradiction between the two. For me her concept of faith is too narrow that limited to religious category only. But faith has a broad meaning and should not identify as religion. Haack further supports her argument by saying;

Religion, unlike science, is not primarily a kind of inquiry, but a body of belief—"creed"—is the word that comes to mind. . . . Religious belief is supposed to be, not tentative or hedged, but a profound, and profoundly personal, commitment. To disbelieve, or to believe wrongly, is sinful, and faith, i.e., commitment in the absence of compelling evidence, often conceived as a virtue. . . . By contrast, although in their professional capacity scientists sometimes accept many propositions as true—some of them very confidently and firmly, and not a few pretty dogmatically—faith, in the religious sense, is alien to the scientific enterprise. This is why it sometimes said that belief has no place in science¹³³

¹³²Susan Haack, *Defending science within reason: Between scientism and cynicism*. (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2007), p.62

¹³³Ibid. p. 267

The basic point that she made here is that faith or belief has no place in scientific propositions or scientific reasoning. This view of the relations of science and faith arises out of lack of the proper understanding of the concept of faith. Moreover, existential faith, as I have been characterizing it here, is not blind acquiescence to external authority, and it does not just consist of creeds or propositional beliefs. Haack's conception of faith is narrow because she identifies faith with religion and excludes other forms of faith.

She fails to understand that existential faith underlies and frames specific claims to scientific knowledge, which is what I intend now to show in greater detail. I argue against Haack's sharp opposition between faith and science by critically analyzing the proper relation between the two. The concept of *faithful reason* that I discussed in my previous chapter will be upheld, and it will be shown to apply as fully to scientific investigations and claims to knowledge as it does to all other types of investigation and knowledge. Implicit in these points is that science is not the impersonal, detached, self-sufficient, self-contained, and wholly objective enterprise it is sometimes assumed to be but is itself a prominent example of what Polanyi calls personal knowledge¹³⁴.

On this point, one should note that I am not denying the objectivity and universality of science. It is true that science transcends all cultural particularities and search for objective, universal truth. Whenever we get at the truth, we transcend culture, we transcend our upbringing. The discourse of science is a good example of where we should hold out hope for transcending our

¹³⁴ For further details of PolanyiMichael's concept of personal knowledge you can read his book entitled *Personal Knowledge*. Polanyi, Michael. *Personal Knowledge: Towards a post-critical philosophy*. NewYork: Harper Torchbooks, 1962.

tribalism. Therefore, I have no doubt on the universality and objectivity of science. But I do reject the notions that the natural sciences alone are equipped to bind the world's peoples together, that they are purely objective and culture-independent in a way that other aspects of cultures are not, that faith and religion come down to the same thing, and that science has or should have nothing to do with faith.

Micheal Polanyi a professor of physical chemistry developed a philosophy which showed that personal judgment and human values are intrinsic to scientific research. According to him personal judgments and values of the individual scientists are part of his \ her scientific investigations.

For Polanyi, Enlightenment thinking has led to the false ideal that science provides us with a totally impersonal knowledge. In his book *personal knowledge: Towards a post Critical Philosophy*, he has shown rather convincingly that all knowledge including scientific knowledge is personal.¹³⁵ It is practically impossible to eliminate from knowing process the knower (subject). According to Polanyi, the act of knowing includes judgments and opinions of the subject. In all forms of knowledge there is the personal participation of the knower. In Polanyi's view, several factors are vital to knowledge, namely, a tacit dimension, passion, a network of beliefs and commitments which are all integral.¹³⁶ Polanyi has also shown that belief is the source of all knowledge. "All truth," claims Polanyi, is but the external pole of beliefs and to

¹³⁵Mincheal Polnayi , *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical philosophy*(London: Routledge and Kagan Paul,1958).p. 17

¹³⁶See also Sarojini Henry, the encounter of faith and reason, inter religious dialogue. Indian institute of science and religion, Pune and ISPCCK,Delhi,2005. p.50

destroy all would be to destroy all truth.¹³⁷ Polanyi thus promotes St. Augustine's saying: Unless you believe, you will not understand. Polanyi expands what the post-critical philosophy:

We must now recognize belief once more as the source of all knowledge. Tacit assent and intellectual passion, the sharing of idiom and of cultural heritage affiliations to like-minded community: such are the impulses which shape our vision of the nature of things on which we rely for our mastery of things. No, intelligence, however, critical or original, can operate outside such a fiduciary framework.¹³⁸

Polanyi points out a scientist's work involves a necessary apprenticeship to a long tradition of scientific research, the learning of skills and the personal gifts of intuition, imagination, judgment, courage and patience and all these involves a certain amount of commitment and dedication. Thus, for Polanyi, faith informs and shapes science and the personal is not divorced from science.

Polanyi emphasizes that whether it is in the field of religion or science, every body works with a commitment. In his view, commitment is the set of beliefs and this network has a tacit element¹³⁹. The fiduciary framework that Polanyi advocated, however, is not an irrational position. He affirms that it may be a case holding onto unproven beliefs and that of taking chance, but it is not a case of acting irrationally. Polanyi however warns that a fiduciary framework does not eliminate doubt, and that we must humbly acknowledge the uncertainty of our own conclusion. Therefore, Polanyi would advocate that even the fiduciary framework be

¹³⁷Ibid. p.51

¹³⁸Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical philosophy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958).p.286.

¹³⁹Sarojini Henry, the encounter of faith and reason, inter religious dialogue. p.51

open to criticism. All we can do is to continue to hold onto unproven proofs. Only critical stance can free us from self- deception and from statements accepted as a once- and for all creeds¹⁴⁰.

Midgley Mary his book (1994) *Science as salvation: A modern myth and its meaning* say:

Science cannot stand alone. We cannot believe its propositions without first believing in a great many other startling things, such as the existence of the external world, the reliability of our senses, memory and informants, and the validity of logic. If we do believe in these things, we already have a world far wider than that of science.¹⁴¹

There is indispensable role of faith in scientific investigations and in claims to scientific knowledge. After all scientists are human beings and they are a person of faith no matter the kinds of faith that they may have. Faith is the most basic quality of human beings. In the process of scientific investigations, individual scientist does not escape the critical reliance of existential faith.

The most firmly held but generally unspoken and unacknowledged assumptions, commitments, loyalties, habits of thinking, and the like that lie behind scientists' particular inquiries and assertions about the world—*when taken not in isolation but together*—bring into focus significant aspects of the overall quality, orientation, and outlook of their lives.

These tacit outlooks and dispositions are deeply rooted in who the scientists are, not merely as purveyors of knowledge, but as whole persons. And whole persons, as I argued earlier, are persons of faith.

¹⁴⁰Sarojini Henry, the encounter of faith and reason, inter religious dialogue.p.52

¹⁴¹Mary Midgley, *Science as salvation: A modern myth and its meaning*.(London and New York: Routledge.,1994),p.108.

3.4. Indispensable Role of Faith in Scientific Investigations and in Claims Regarding Scientific Knowledge

Most of the time scientific findings and modes of inquiry are often wrongly assumed to stand in sharp contrast with, if not in blatant contradiction to, approaches, attitudes, and outlooks of faith. But my point is that there is no such a sharp contradiction between faith and science.

There are factors that affect the claims of knowledge in general and claim to scientific knowledge in particular and rest finally on stances of personal and communally shared forms of existential faith. What are these factors that influence the ongoing practicing of scientists? The critical analysis of these factors helps us to understanding the inter independence of faith and reason.

The first factor for example, is reliance on the five senses. Reliance on sensate experience is crucial to scientific theories. Because, it constitute the empirical basis on which these theories are confirmed or disconfirmed, a basis without which no scientific theory can be regarded as a satisfactory theory. This reliance is presupposed by natural science. It is the larger frame work in which they function. There can be no ultimate scientific proof of this reliance, because all scientific proofs must finally take it for granted. Convincing scientific theories must make specific and precise predictions, and these predictions must be empirically confirmed. Without their five senses, more ever scientists would be unable to communicate with one another. There could be no scientific conference, journals, or cooperative works in laboratories. This aspect of faith is necessary for science to be proceeding. It is not and cannot be proved by scientists. It

rather must be presumed by them. Scientists cannot be universal skeptic about sensate experience and still be scientist.

The second factor that influence the claims to scientific knowledge is that the acquired habits and skills of the practicing scientists. It not only is the case that scientific observations generally are guided by theoretical assumptions of which practicing scientists may not be immediately aware. It also is the case that the instruments on which scientists depend for confirmation of particular theories are themselves the products of theoretical outlook and assumption. Habits and skills require special kinds of aptitude, interest, discipline, and commitment. They are tacit elements in the teaching and learning of them that cannot be expressed by explicit directions or rules.

All scientists work with a large, and mostly unconscious, set of background beliefs, many if not most of which are acquired through their earlier education and initiation into the scientific community. These beliefs and the skills and techniques they inform provide an essential context of relevance and meaning for whatever theory assessments or research projects scientists might undertake. Scientists claim to knowledge and the strategies and practices reflecting those claims are not detached and impersonal but things in which they are personally involved and for which they must take personal responsibility. Therefore, there are indispensable and pervasive elements of what is unspoken and unconscious—and yet firmly depended and acted on—in the makeup of persons in all walks of life. These elements affect not only what persons believe but also how they act and live. The absolute and unquestioning trust of persons in these tacit elements, a trust on the basis of which they may devote considerable portions of their lives and life's work, are likely to figure prominently in the centered acts of the total person I have identified with existential faith.

The tacit features of scientific outlooks and practices, and the implicit confidence reposed in them, are vital ingredients in scientific claims to truth, and they and the confidence given to them help to give structure and character to the lives of individual scientists. What they are as scientists affects the fullness of what they are as persons, and what they are as persons—including but not restricted to the effects of their scientific habituation and training—affects their practices and claims as scientists. Their tacit commitments as scientists both influence and are influenced by the commitments of their whole lives of faith. Where the one leaves off and the other begins is not at all easy to determine. The two cannot be so easily compartmentalized and separated off from one another as is sometimes believed.

The third factor that influences the claims to scientific knowledge is established scientific culture and community. Scientific thinking takes place within an established scientific culture and community and in the context of the modes of discourse and analysis that culture and community have developed up to the present time. In other words, no scientist can start from scratch. Scientific thinking is take place in a given culture and the individual scientist also grew up in that community and culture. All must carry out their investigations in the context of an existing community and its accepted language and culture.

Lee Smolin demonstrates in his book *The Trouble with Physics: The Rise of String Theory, the fall of a Science, and what comes next*, the impact of community for claims to scientific knowledge.

Community and its current outlook and convictions can strongly influence what sort of investigations take place at a given time in the natural sciences.¹⁴²

He exhibits the significant extent to which group culture and convention can tacitly influence the work of scientists. Secondly, it is important to note that uncritical group consensus can become as powerful and restrictive as to shut the door to the possibility of plural approaches to scientific problems, thus running the risk for greatly inhibiting scientists' creativity and openness to different and possibly more productive ways of thinking.

Thus, the factors of the encompassing influences of cultural settings and inheritances can have a negative as well as a positive effect on the thinking of scientists. Without it, they would have no place to start and no context within which to operate. They must repose tacit confidence in most aspects of their scientific culture in order to make explicit contributions to other aspects of it. But this does not mean there is no room for questioning, criticizing, and innovating in the areas of cultural consensus. Because the dogmatic acceptance of cultural consensus, blind scientists to possibilities of fresh approaches and new ways of theorizing. Scientist's confidence in logical and mathematical reasoning as a principal means of ferreting out and explaining natural processes is generally tacit, unquestioned, and unqualified. J. M. Coetze observes, for example, that;

In the area of animal physiology, criteria of proof usually come framed in statistical terms; the statistics in turn depend on the mathematics of probability, and the mathematics of probability rests on rarified philosophical assumptions. All in all, a body

¹⁴² See for further details Lee Smolin, *The trouble with physics: The rise of string theory, the fall of a science, and what comes next*. Boston, New York: Houghton Miffl in. 2007, P.275

of difficult theory which even the professional scientific practitioner revisits only rarely and more or less takes on faith. (Coetze's foreword to Balcombe 2010: x)¹⁴³

Scientists' basic outlooks on the world rest on unquestioning assumptions which are held by faith. And of course scientists are not only members of scientific communities and participants in the cultures of those communities but also of more encompassing societies and cultures. They bring to their scientific investigations influences of these wider societies and cultures as well, including the language they speak and the views, interpretations, and categorizations of the world implicit in their native languages.

Both scientific culture and its special language (including the language of mathematics) and the larger surrounding culture and language influence in numerous tacit ways the thinking and approaches of scientists. In other words, the work of particular scientists is made possible by contexts of meaning that are prior to, implicit within, and essential to that work. Whatever is made explicit in the way of questions, claims, arguments, and proofs rests on a bedrock of much that is tacit and inexplicit. Scientific persons, like all persons, are influenced and shaped in profound ways by the cultures in which they stand.

The fourth factor underlying claims to scientific knowledge is trust in the reasoned claims of others and in their honesty and capability in setting them forth. Smolin stated that

[n]o scientist can directly confirm more than a small fraction of the experimental results, calculations, and proofs that form the foundations of their beliefs about their subject; few have the skills, and in contemporary science no one has the time. Thus, when you join a

¹⁴³Balcombe, Jonathan. *Second nature: The inner lives of animals*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. p

scientific community, you must trust your colleagues to tell the truth about the results in their domains of expertise.¹⁴⁴

Claims to scientific knowledge having trust on our colleagues and instruments on which scientific research so crucially depends are inescapable for all scientists. But this does not mean such wide spread trust must always and in all respect be unqualified or unquestioning. The competence and credibility of others must sometimes be questioned with good reasons. Therefore, we can conclude that trust there is presupposed as a tacit and pervasive component of scientific practice. Thus, implicit trust in the honesty and reliability of the work of other scientists, past and present, is unavoidable.

Trust is a central component of the various forms of existential faith—religious or nonreligious—that give fundamental quality and character to the lives of individual scientists, just as it does for persons involved in other modes of life and fields of endeavor. Here as elsewhere, knowledge and faith can and must work together, not in opposition to one another.¹⁴⁵

Another factor underlying scientific inquiry and scientific claims to knowledge is conviction of the general order and rationality of the universe and of our capacity as humans to comprehend at least significant parts of that order and rationality.

Mary Midgley remarks that belief in a law-abiding universe is “a real belief, not just a policy” and “a precondition of any possible physical science.” And she elsewhere notes that “order is

¹⁴⁴Smolin 2007: 287

¹⁴⁵We are talking not merely of professed faith but of the actual faith that gives structure, character, and direction to the whole of one’s life. Professed faith and actual faith are not always the same. One’s actual faith is reflected in the way in which one lives one’s day-to-day life, and in the convictions, dispositions, and commitments of one’s innermost being, not in what one may casually, prudentially, or in authentically claim to believe.

what science studies; if it is to proceed on any given subject matter, it has to assume in advance that there is order there, that it will be penetrable to mind.”¹⁴⁶Polanyi gives voice to this contention when he writes of “the intuition of rationality in nature” that must be “acknowledged as a justifiable and indeed essential part of scientific theory.”¹⁴⁷

Haack chimes in with her similar observations that “it is incomprehensible why anyone would try to find out how things are in the world if they didn’t think there is a real world which is a certain way and not other ways” and that it is “incomprehensible why anyone would seriously engage in scientific inquiry, or in everyday empirical inquiry, if he didn’t think the world is knowable to some extent by creatures with powers such as ours . . .”¹⁴⁸ They point to an implicit assumption or conviction that is essential to the work of natural scientists.

The order and rationality of the universe must be presupposed by scientists as a tacit acknowledgment without which their investigations would make little sense. Here, there are two important things that we have taken into account. The first point is that one need not be a traditional epistemological realist or correspondence theorist in order to have the assumption. Rather one can be a kind of pragmatist. The second point is that when we speak of the intelligible order of the world we do not have to think that the world has no elements of disorder or that it exhibits total, unqualified lawfulness. We do not have to assume, in other words, strict causal determinism or that the world is in principal knowable in its every aspect.

¹⁴⁶Midgley 1985: 110, 79

¹⁴⁷ Polanyi 1962: 16

¹⁴⁸Haack 2007: 139.

Finally, last factor implicit in the search for knowledge, and claims for knowledge is deeply motivating passions, purposes and values. These elements of passion, purpose, and value are presupposed in scientific inquiries and achievements; without them, the acclaimed findings of the natural sciences would not have been possible.

This factor also figures tacitly but with critical importance in the investigations, theories, and justifications of the natural sciences. Theologian Langdon Gilkey speaks of “the unremitting eros to know, the unrestricted passion of the rational consciousness to explain, to understand, and to judge validly—that lies back of all science as a human activity.” He points out that

Without passion no method is possible. For method demands *care*, a determination to know and so an unceasing dissatisfaction with not knowing; it thus also requires patience, rigor, self-discipline, and hope—and all of these presuppose a deep passion to know, cool and untemperamental as [scientific] inquiry may seem from the outside.¹⁴⁹

According to Gilkey, scientists are profoundly motivated by the passion to know and to know as truly and fully as possible. For him the scientific mind cannot aspire toward a knowledge that is disinterested or devoid of anterior bias, prejudice, or emotional fixation “without such a passion to know superseding all other interests”.¹⁵⁰

People usually say science has now shown such and such to be the case. But science does not do anything. It does not make pronouncement, address and resolve problems, or establishing claims to knowledge. It is particular scientists who do these things.

¹⁴⁹Langdon Gilkey, *Religious dimensions of scientific inquiry*. *The Journal of Religion* 50, n. 3 (July): 1970. p. 245–79.

¹⁵⁰Gilkey 1970:p. 255–56

Scientists are first and for most human beings and secondarily professional engaged in particular kind of work. The particular scientist is the person of faith. The point that we have keep in our mind is that scientists are required to live effectively in the world as children and adults and to have appropriate and sustaining basic attitudes towards the world long before they becoming mature practicing scientist. And as human being they must continued to do so.

From the above discussion we can draw the conclusion that Existential faith and reason do not stand in opposition to one another. Despite the fact that many argue against this idea regarding to the relationship of faith to reason, someone may argue against my position by saying faith is irrational and nothing to do reason. For Instance, this argument is supported by George Smith in his book *Atheism: the Case against God* and he expressed his idea as follows:

Insofar as faith is possible, it is irrational; insofar as faith is rational, it is impossible. . . . A belief can be based on faith *or* reason, but not both. . . . [A]s soon as a belief is rationally demonstrated, it ceases to be an article of faith. . . . [F]aith is possible only in the case of beliefs that lack rational demonstration. . . . [F]aith must entail belief in the absence of rational demonstration. . . . To believe on faith is to believe in defiance of rational guidelines. . . . [The concept of faith [is] irreconcilably opposed to reason.¹⁵¹

Here, Smith expresses a belief shared by many philosophical, scientific, and religious thinkers. However, when we look at George Smith argument concerning to the relationship of faith to reason critically, it is not practically acceptable. He undermines the practical significance of reason in religious life. We should not forget as a whole person, we are person of faith. There is no such a contradiction between faith and reason, if we understanding the concept of faith properly.

¹⁵¹George Smith, *Atheism: the Case against God*. Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1974.p. 123

So, we see once again that existential faith and reason do not stand in opposition to one another. Reasonable faith and faithful reason are not contradictions but commonplaces. This is as true for claims to knowledge in the natural sciences as it is for other kinds of knowledge. Faith and reason are in constant interaction with one another. Each can be challenged by the other, but each also is dependent on the other. Reason needs faith and faith needs reason; each plays an essential role in relation to the other. Without reason or rationally based claims to knowledge, faith would have no intellectual content and thus could not be a centered act of the whole person. Without faith, reason would lack much of the implicit context of meaning, motivation, purpose, and value that is operative in the whole of life and that is essential to its operations.

Concluding Remark

I have argued that there is no adequate existential faith without reason and no adequate reason without existential faith. It is difficult to have faith which has nothing to do with rationality. Similarly, it is quite difficult to have reason which is not relying to faith at critical point. I strongly believe on the double sidedness of faith and reason. We can speak about significant place of faithful reason and reasonable faith in human life. I submit that reason and existential faith should be understood as working constantly in our lives and in those things we take to be most profound and important in our lives. So we can speak meaningfully of reasonable faith and faithful reason at the same time. Reason and faith supplement to each other. Neither can function without the other. Both are involved and required in meaningful life.

I have argued specifically to the topic of faithful reason by looking briefly at the critical role of - faith in both our moral out looks and practices and achievements of scientific thought. Our moral out looks and attitudes are raised from our tacit convictions that we firmly held by faith. Therefore, our commitment to moral principles and living of them exemplify faithful reason. This shows us that there is implicit faith in our moral out looks and attitudes. There is implicit faith behind reasoning in general and moral reasoning in particular. I am not saying that here faith and morality are one and the same.

Scientific outlooks, for their part, also rest on and give expression to sometimes tacit and sometimes explicit testaments of faith. Scientific investigations would make no sense without reliance on the uniformity and order of the universe; the reliability at some critical points of the five senses; the applicability and usefulness of logical and seeking to understand fundamental

principles, constituents, and laws of the world; the honesty and integrity of one's scientific colleagues; and the hope of making steady and significant progress in scientific understanding. Uncertainties are involved in all of these commitments, even though they are essential to scientific theorizing. Faith does not belong, therefore, exclusively to the province of religion and there are intimate and indispensable connections of faith with knowledge in general and scientific knowledge in particular. In many respects existential faith is a response to a collection of problems that confront us when we try to live a fulfilling and meaningful life. This is clearly showed that faith and reason are not contradicted to each other rather they work together and support to each other.

It is entirely reasonable to recognize the role of faith in confident human life and to see reason as rooted to a significant extent in the whole character, focus, and direction of a life of faith. Thus, whatever the style, pattern, or path of a person's life may be, and whether it is religious or secular, faith of this sort is both profoundly involved and required. This is simply because, human beings to have courage, strength, hope, trust and the likes, this sort of faith is indispensable. These are the resources that we acquired by our faith. A person's reason will typically reflect and help to give form and expression to his or her faith. Without such Reflections and examinations inter- philosophical dialogue among different philosophical traditions, inter-faith dialogue among different forms of faith is unthinkable.

To have reasonable faith, it is not necessary to have strong rational foundation for our faith. That mean it is possible to have reasonable faith without having rational basis for our faith. We cannot reduce all things to rational explanations and this does not mean reason and faith are completely different and nothing has to do to each other.

Faith is central to every aspect of our lives and being. It is the basic quality of human being. Thus, denying this peculiar quality of human being is denying humanity. Therefore, there are few if any among us who are totally not have some sort of deep-underlying faith, whatever form and nature it has, because, absolute, or almost absolute absence of faith is not mere secularism or professed non religion, but nihilistic skepticism and despair. To put the same idea in different words, as a result of the crisis of rationalism, what has appeared finally is *nihilism*.

Although people have a widespread and largely unquestioned tendency to assume that faith is confined to the province of religion and that to have faith is necessarily to be religious, I argued that this way of understanding the concept of faith arises out of the belief that faith is the exclusive property of religious people. This and other misconceptions about the concept of faith, leads us to lifelong philosophical debate between faith and reason. In order to solve this philosophical problem, we have to avoid misconceptions about the concept of faith. But the above way of thinking displays a lack of appreciation for the fact that faith belongs universally to humankind. Faith is not the exclusive property of believers, but it belongs to humankind regardless of their beliefs that they have about particular religion. Even though many attempts have made by different philosophers, theologians and scientists to address what is the relationship between faith and reason? None of them are able to provide sufficient answer for this philosophical problem. However, the question is still a lingering question and this is because of lack of proper understanding of the concept of faith and its role, in the whole human life.

Therefore, I have argued that faith is operative at the deepest levels not only of religious but also of secular out looks on and responses to some of the most crucial challenges, issues, and exigencies of life in the world. The examples of religious and secular faith to which I have

pointed out in my project give support to this statement. Reason in and of itself is not sufficient for meaningful life in this complex and mysterious world. The absolute reliance on reason at the expense of faith resulted in serious problems. In fact, one huge loss of modern man is that they over-emphasize technology and idolize materialism, thus leading to dehumanisation, depersonalisation and secularisation and alienation between men.

I have also exhibited the presence of faith and the major role played by it in claims to knowledge in general and claims to scientific knowledge in particular. Science and faith are not mutually exclusive, but actually coexist well for the development of both is necessary for holistic personal growth, for authentic humanity.

The relationship between faith and reason is then, not as clear-cut as we think and cannot be easily weighed for their respective degrees of importance for the understanding of truth. Reviewing the history of human horizons during the present era, it can be said in general the two extreme positions, strong rationalist and fideism have been failed. Therefore, my project is aimed at disproving the false dichotomy that stated by these extreme positions and showing the complementary relation between faith and reason.

Even though many enlightenment thinkers including Emmanuel Kant believe that faith and reason are separable, there is no such a clear-cut between the two. This is because every human being has the inherent power with which to critically examine all aspects of life including the life of faith. Everything should be subject to scrutiny and sever test of rationality. But reason by itself is not sufficient to explore every secret behind nature. What we can infer from this is that faith

and reason is [that] the opposite sides of the same coin. We cannot separate faith and reason from meaningful human life. Neither can function without the other.

Finally, I hope that this study will stimulate further thought on a fascinating and important topic, one that relates intimately to our daily lives as religious or secular persons. It also is a topic that bears crucially on the many aspects of our social and political interactions that relate explicitly or implicitly to our different forms of faith.

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