



**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**  
**SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**  
**INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES**

**COMMUNITY ROLE AND ENGAGEMENT IN AVERTING  
AL SHABAAB'S THREAT IN ETHIOPIA: THE CASE OF  
ADDIS ABABA**

**BY**  
**ASHENAFI NEGASH**

**JUNE, 2023**  
**ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA**

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES OF  
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**APPROVED BY BOARD OF EXAMINERS**

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## **DECLARATION**

This thesis titled, "**Community Role and Engagement in Averting al Shabaab's Threat in Ethiopia - The Case of Addis Ababa,**" is a new contribution of mine. The sources of all the information utilized in the thesis are properly cited, and it has not been presented for a degree at any other institution.

### **Declared by:**

Name of the student: \_\_\_\_\_

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### **APPROVED BY**

With my endorsement as a university advisor, this work has been submitted to Addis Ababa University's Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) for examination.

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Date of submission: \_\_\_\_\_

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## **Acronyms and Abbreviations**

<b>AIAI</b>	Al Itihaad al Islamiya
<b>AMISOM</b>	African Union Mission to Somalia
<b>AQ</b>	Al Qaeda
<b>ARPCT</b>	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter - terrorism
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>COIN</b>	Counter insurgency
<b>CSA</b>	Central Statistics Agency
<b>CT</b>	Counter – terrorism
<b>DHS</b>	Department of Homeland Security
<b>ENA</b>	Ethiopian News Agency
<b>FANSPS</b>	Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and strategy
<b>FDG</b>	Focus Group Discussion
<b>FDRE</b>	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
<b>ICU</b>	Islamic Courts Union
<b>IGAD</b>	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
<b>JTF</b>	Joint Task Force
<b>KII</b>	Key Informant Interview
<b>OAU</b>	Organization of African Unity
<b>ODIHR</b>	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>PSTCP</b>	Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes
<b>P/CVE</b>	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

<b>P/CVERLT</b>	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism
<b>SNM</b>	Somali National Movement
<b>SSS</b>	State Security Service
<b>TFG</b>	Transitional Federal Government
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNODC</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<b>UNOSOM</b>	United Nations Operation in Somalia
<b>USC</b>	United Somalia Congress
<b>VERLT</b>	Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to terrorism
<b>VOA</b>	Voice of America

## **Abstract**

*This thesis explores and analyzes the nexus between community role and engagement in averting al Shabaab's threat in Ethiopia – Addis Ababa. To acquire the relevant data for the study, the researcher employed qualitative research approach. Pertinent data was collected using key informant interviews, focus group discussion, and document review. Using purposive and snowball sampling techniques, interview was made with ten key informants and one focus group discussion, which include seven participants, was also conducted. The sampling techniques were used to choose fitting people who knew of the issue, were well - versed in the subject and felt connected to it the researcher was looking for. The data gathered from the aforementioned sources was triangulated by conducting appropriate document analysis in order to increase the study's credibility. Accordingly, the study argues that Ethiopia's success in averting al Shabaab's terrorism threat in Addis Ababa is related with its community – led counter – terrorism approach, which embraces the public as the owner of the fight rather than just a participant in the combat against the security threat posed by the terrorist group. The main factors for successfully averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia - Addis Ababa are; public education and awareness regarding terrorism threats mainly at residential block levels/grassroots/, community engagement in reporting suspicious activities and amicable public - government engagement on terrorism - related matters. It further argues that the safety and security of Addis Ababa residents cannot be protected by merely engaging Addis Ababa residents; rather, engaging the public from the border to the heart of the country and strengthening partnership with relevant regional and international partners is required. The study concludes that the approach is essential for the residents and local officials of Addis Ababa to peacefully carry out their daily activities. Based on the results of the findings it is recommended that the government should prioritize empowering the public to own the fight against the terrorist group.*

**Keywords:** al Shabaab, Community engagement, Counter – terrorism, Ethiopia

# CHAPTER ONE

## 1. INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Back ground of the Study

Following the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), intensive research has advanced many aspects of academic knowledge and practitioner practices in the counter - terrorism domain. Both strands continue to advance in terms of understanding, application, and capability. Despite these advances, the threat of violent extremism remains high and shows no signs of abating. Governments are increasingly looking to collaborate with communities in their counter - terrorism efforts, despite legal constraints (Spalek and Weeks, 2017).

Terrorism and other kinds of violent extremism pose a threat to weak states by undermining political institutions, creating an unfavorable climate for growth, and jeopardizing civil liberties and human rights. Furthermore, terrorist groups have used weaknesses such as permeable national borders, weak governance, limited law-enforcement capacity, shaky regimes, and local grievances to originate or thrive. As such, they call into question not just the state's power, but also its capacity to provide the essential security for advancement toward development goals (Choramo, 2022).

Attacks by violent extremist organizations have reached unprecedented proportions in Africa. Boko Haram, al Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Islamic State, and the Sinai Peninsula activities are blamed for the majority of high-intensity attacks and fatalities. Their membership spans national boundaries; some have established a presence in local communities, while others have control over territories in multiple states (Omenma and Onyango, 2020).

The Horn of Africa is teeming with weak, corrupt, and warring states, including Somalia, which is seen as a breeding ground for Islamist fundamentalists and terrorists. Nonetheless, the international community's response to regional terrorist threats has been limited and ineffective. Ethiopia and Kenya are both part of the strategically important Horn of Africa sub region. Around the southern tip of the Red Sea, over the Arabian Peninsula, is the Horn of Africa located, which is close to the Strait of Bab al-Mandab. It is an ideal location for projecting power and providing rear area support for military intervention in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The Horn of Africa is thought to be a potential breeding ground for terrorism (Nyambura, 2011).

Al Shabaab used relatively conventional guerrilla tactics against the Ethiopian military in Somalia throughout its existence. However, as its ties to the core of al Qaeda (AQ) have grown stronger, it has increasingly relied on suicide attacks to achieve its objectives. Initially targeting Transitional Federal Government (TFG) officials and infrastructure within Somalia, these attacks have recently expanded to include international civilian targets. On October 28, 2008, al Shabaab signaled the beginning of a strategy that would increasingly focus on suicide attacks against high-profile government targets with a series of five coordinated bombings across the country that targeted government offices, the Ethiopian consulate, and the United Nations Development Program compound (Wise, 2011).

Among other counter - terrorism measures, the African Union (AU; formerly, the Organization of African Unity (OAU)) has adopted the Convention to Combat and Prevent Terrorism in 1999, the Algiers Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2002), and the African Model Anti-Terrorism Law (2011). The African Union member states agreed to work together to prevent and combat terrorism, as well as to improve cross-border policing and surveillance in Africa (Omenma and Onyango, 2020).

Despite numerous international, regional, and sub-regional efforts to combat terrorism in the Horn of Africa, al Shabaab remains one of the threats to the region's security, stability and peace. There is also an ongoing debate in the literature regarding how to prevent terrorism threats, terrorists like al Shabaab, in a given area. Giving due consideration to this context, it is critical to identify the nexus between community participation/role and averting terrorism threat in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. Currently, the terrorist group is resurrecting itself in some pockets of the Somali regional state's Afer Zone, with the capital, Addis Ababa, as the obvious destination.

## **1.2. Statement of the Problem**

Al Shabaab (or The Youth), also known as Harakat al Shabaab al-Mujahideen, and its Islamist affiliates once ruled Mogadishu and large swaths of Somalia, but a sustained African Union military campaign in recent years has significantly weakened the group. Security specialists caution that the organization still poses the biggest threat to an unstable, war-torn nation. Al Shabaab has primarily targeted Somalian targets with its terrorist attacks, but it has also shown the ability to conduct lethal attacks in the area, including coordinated suicide bombings in the

capital of Uganda in 2010 and a devastating raid on a Nairobi mall in 2013. (Masters & Sergie, 2015).

Al Shabaab's interest in attacking Ethiopia has remained unchanged since its inception. The terrorist group's actions have been witnessed in various areas of Somalia and neighboring countries, where civilians have been mercilessly targeted and property has been damaged. In the current al Shabaab's new incursion in Ethiopia, Ethiopia's Somali region is for the time being becoming target. Unless immediately contained, the group would mobilize forces and public support in Somalia and the Somali region of Ethiopia (as we observe in other areas where terrorists operate) and possibly present a grave danger to the security and stability of the Horn region in general and Ethiopia in particular.

There are various debates in the literature about how to counter terrorist threats in a specific area. According to Briggs (2010), community engagement is critical in counter-terrorism efforts. Terrorists are a tiny and marginal minority, but they are integrated into their communities and are not, on the whole, loners working alone. This is why, as a principle now implicit in government policy, communities must play a central role in many different aspects of counter - terrorism strategy (Briggs, 2010). As a result, if terrorists pose a security threat, communities may be able to serve as an early warning system for police and intelligence agencies if they come across information or have concerns about specific individuals or groups.

The state bears the primary responsibility and obligation to prevent and combat terrorism, as well as to respect and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. To successfully counter this phenomenon, the state will need the support of society as a whole, including civil society and business. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), member states have recognized the value of such collaborative efforts in the form of public-private partnerships in combating terrorism (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights/ODIHR, 2014).

Other scholars, on the other hand, emphasize the importance of technology in preventing terrorist attacks. According to McAleenan (2019), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) successes in preventing foreign-origin attacks illuminate the strategies, tactics, and tools that must be deployed to address today's disparate challenges. The department has taken a multi-tiered approach to security, employing cutting-edge technology, improving intelligence-gathering and analytic capabilities, providing advanced training to frontline personnel, and

strengthening international partners' capacity (McAleenan, 2019). Here, the central focus in terms of averting the threat of terrorism is concentrating on technology. As a result, there exist debates among counter-terrorism scholars on how to avert the threat of terrorism in certain regions/areas, even though they all agree that the threat of terrorism should be prevented.

Limited research has been conducted on Ethiopia's accomplishments in combating terrorism, yet this subject merits further study. Some of these studies include, for example, the following: 'Trends and Responses to Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: The Ethiopian Experience' by Muluwerk Gebre in 2010; 'A Review of Ethiopia's Security Challenges in the Horn of Africa' by Colonel Goitom Farus in 2013; 'Ethiopia's comprehensive Approach to Counter - terrorism in the Horn of Africa: Challenges and Opportunities' by Girma Bogale in 2016 and 'Effectiveness of Ethiopia's Strategy(ies) in the Fight Against Terrorism - The case of Al Shabaab by Zelalem Mulugeta in 2022. Furthermore, a book titled "Terrorism in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa: Threat, Impact and Response" was written by Woldeselase Woldemichael in 2010. However, none of these works investigated, in detail, community's engagement and role in averting terrorism threats in the specified area of study.

Hence, considering the gap and given that the terrorist group is currently threatening Ethiopia's security and stability in unprecedented ways, by attacking civilians and destroying property in some pocket areas of the country, this study aims to investigate the nexus between community role/engagement and averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia - Addis Ababa - Bole Michael area. Al Shabaab's attack in border areas aims to build terrorist cells in Ethiopia, then utilize these cells as launch pads for additional strikes in the Country's center. According to official government reports, al Shabaab terrorist group suspects were renting houses and performing business activities in the Bole Michael/Rwanda area. Moreover, in October 2013, members of the terrorist group (suicide bombers) used Bole Michael /Rwanda neighborhood as their safe house to conduct a planned attack at Addis Ababa Stadium where over 20,000 people were watching a qualifier for the football World Cup between Ethiopia and Nigeria. However, the bomb they were preparing accidentally detonated at their residence due to their lack of preparation. If communities are included in counter - terrorism efforts and implemented appropriately, this strategy may deny the terrorist group's support base. The researcher argues, too, that the nexus between community engagement and averting al Shabaab's terrorism threat in Ethiopia – Addis Ababa is understudied.

### **1.3. Objective of the study**

#### **1.3.1. General objective**

The overall objective of this study is to understand the nexus between community engagement and the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts in Ethiopia, with a particular emphasis in Addis Ababa.

#### **1.3.2. Specific objectives**

Specifically, the study is intended to;

- Examine the nexus between public participation and averting al Shabaab's security threat activities in Ethiopia - Addis Ababa, Bole Michael area
- Examine the particular approaches in which Bole Sub - city authorities encourage and assist the community for fruitful participation in terms of averting al Shabaab's security threat activities.
- Assess the ramification of public participation – based counter - terrorism effort in the security and stability of Addis Ababa - Bole Michael area.

### **1.4. Research questions**

The study generally aimed to respond to the broad and detailed questions listed below.

- What is the link between public participation and counter - terrorism efforts?
- What are the particular approaches/methods in which government representatives may assist and encourage the community for successful participation in terms of averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa – Bole Michael area?
- How will community – led counter – terrorism approach affect the safety and security of the residents around the area and the local officials as well?

### **1.5. Scope of the Study**

The study attempted to investigate the relationship between community participation and averting the security threat posed by al Shabaab in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa - Bole - Michael area. All Weredas/sub-districts under Bole sub - city administration, commonly known as the Bole - Michael area, were included in the research - which appeared to be a major epicenter for public activity and security engagement. In order to give context, the research made a look at the years preceding and following May 2011, when the Ethiopian parliament named al Shabaab as a terrorist group, up to the present.

### **1.6. Significance and Implication of the Study**

Although the subject of counter - terrorism in general has been extensively researched and explored, the link between community engagement and averting terrorism threats in the specified area has not been studied. Some scholarly works focus on general terrorism threats in the Horn region and Ethiopia as a whole, while scholars overlook specific threat areas. This research attempted to bridge the gap in the academic works by investigating the implications of the relationship between community participation and security apparatus. Meanwhile, this research could be used for academic studies, further explorations, policy formulation, and other purposes.

### **1.7. Limitation of the Study**

The study's subject matter (matter of national security) falls within the category of sensitive topics; hence the researcher was constrained in a several ways. Due to the nature of the subject under research, the principal limitation was that all pertinent data for the study were not readily available. The study's participants were somewhat constrained in how they could articulate their thoughts because the subject matter was so delicate. The study is also limited in how it incorporates the voices of terrorist organization members because it is difficult to reach them for interviews. To compensate for the above limitations, the researcher interviewed relevant government officials with detailed knowledge of the area and analyzed documents such as the Ethiopia Herald newspaper, which is rich in information about the topic under study.

## **1.8. Organization of the Study**

The research is organized into five chapters. Chapter one deals with the introductory section that includes the background, statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, Scope/delimitation, significance and limitations as well as organizational structure of the thesis. The second chapter deals with the review of related literature in the area of community participation in terms of averting terrorism threats, which are relevant to the researcher's study. In this section theoretical and conceptual frame - works regarding counter - terrorism efforts are included. The third chapter covers the research methodology and design, which are applied to conduct the study. The fourth and most significant chapter examines the data presentation and analysis of the research, as well as the study's findings. Finally, chapter five presents the research's conclusion.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE**

#### **2.1. Conceptualizing Terrorism**

##### **2.1.1. Defining terrorism**

The threat of terrorism to international peace and security has been frequently reiterated by the international community. Terrorism can take many different forms and can be committed by anyone, anywhere, and for any number of reasons. Furthermore, it has explicitly rejected the association of any nation, religion, or ethnic group with terrorism (ODIHR, O., 2014). Although there is debate about the definition, it is crucial for this study to place it within the framework that I look into terrorism.

Although there is no single accepted definition of terrorism, labelling something as terrorism implies not only meet certain criteria, but that it cannot be rationalized by particular racial, religious, philosophical, political, ideological, , ethnic, , or other circumstances. Yet, there is a disputed idea that certain forms of violence can be justified in certain situations and that their use in such cases should not be considered terrorism. Besides that, an overly wide meaning of terrorism can be used to suppress nonviolent dissent and undercut democracy society.

Therefore, developing an accurate understanding of terrorism is essential to effectively combating it in a manner that complies with the rule of law and international human rights standards. This isn't just a result of the term's political and ethical implications. The use of the word also has important consequences for the legal framework for extradition, asset freezing and confiscation, the exchange of information, and mutual legal aid, both locally and abroad.

It could be possible to get around the difficulty of defining terrorism by concentrating on preventing and/or penalizing behavior that is actually terrorist in nature. The global community has agreed that some behaviors count as terrorist offenses, despite not yet being able to agree on a definition of terrorism. Eighteen international treaties and accords have been enacted under the authority of the United Nations or one of its organizations that address these offences (such as hijacking an airplane) (ODIHR, O., 2014).

Based on this, the UN Security Council employs three cumulative factors in its Resolution 1566 (2004) to define terrorism:

- i. intent;
- ii. a goal;
- iii. certain circumstances, that embrace the following:
  - i. Crimes, including those perpetrated against people with the aim to kill or seriously hurt someone, or the taking of hostages;;
  - ii. Whether motivated by political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other similar reasons, the goal is to provoke fear in the wider community or a particular category of people, terrorize a population, or influence a government or other authority figure to engage in or refrain from engaging in any activities.
  - iii. That are categorized within the umbrella of and are characterized as terrorism-related offences by international protocols and conventions (Ibid, p.29, 2014).

The first UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in combating against terrorist activity endorsed the cumulative method employed for defining terrorism in Resolution 1566. He went on to argue that terrorist definitions in nation-specific legislation might legitimately include conduct in addition to the first two elements of intention and purpose stipulated by Resolution 1566 (ODIHR, O., 2014).

A portion of the expanding body of literature focuses on comprehending the terrorism problem by examining ideas like fundamentalism, radicalism, and extremism. Although each of these words are frequently used in the same sentence, they are not identical to one another. Fundamentalism currently is associated with intolerance of different groups. Fundamentalists exist in every faith, but while fundamentalism as an end in itself does not constitute a threat to society or national security, the issue is the development of extremism since fundamentalists may be inclined to extreme views (Davies, 2009).

Extremism is a disregard of alternative viewpoints. Radicalism starts when this mentality results in a moral hierarchy whereby extreme opinions are justifiable on moral grounds. An individual

can be prepared and motivated to engage in violent behaviour through both a mental and an emotional process (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2011). As part of the behavioral changes linked to this stage, radicalization triggers a process of change in the person's psycho-cognitive formation of new identities. Additionally, there are various levels of radicalization. Terrorist acts may come after radicalization. Given the politicization of religion in the modern world, including Buddhist, Christian and Hindu fundamentalism, political Islam and Jewish extremism, this trend is a complicated mixture of politics and religion. Pape (2005) draws the conclusion that religion is hardly the fundamental reason after studying hundreds of suicide bombers over a span of twenty-five years. The purposes are political. All extremists are terrorists, but not all extremists become into terrorists. Extremism and radicalization rarely result in acts of terrorism and violence (Ghosh et al., 2017). When referring to terrorism as a technique, Elworthy and Rifkind (2006) state that "(it is) the level of anger and hate that drives people to join their ranks." Addressing that rage and hatred is necessary. Terrorists may, however, have motives other than rage and hatred. They may fight for what they perceive to be the common good, a moral cause, or a sense of moral superiority that sets them apart from other forms of violence. This "moral good" needs to be addressed from a critical perspective. Terrorism has been characterized as a political act against governments and defenseless populations by security experts (Ibid).

Legislations at countries level should define terrorism and connect offences clearly, precisely, non-discriminatorily, and without retrospective application. Public officials, such as the police and the judiciary, should legally implement the pertinent laws and regulations in a transparent way. This is necessary for individuals to comprehend the legislation and modify their behavior as necessary. Additionally, it is essential for laying the groundwork for action against terrorism that is both successful and accountable and complies with both domestic and foreign human rights norms. This includes police action. Furthermore, since people have access to clandestine activities in a particular region and that aid governments in taking preventative steps, such countering activities should engage the community.

Terrorist acts are defined in Ethiopia under Proclamation No. 1176/2020 "Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes (PSTCP)" article 3 sub – articles one and two;

*1/ Whosoever, with the purpose of promoting political, religious or ideological reasons for terrorizing, or spreading state of fear among the public or segment of the community or coercing or compelling the Government, Foreign Government or International institutions:*

*a) Causes a person significant bodily harm;*

*b) Puts a person's life in peril;*

*c) Commits kidnapping or hostage taking;*

*d) Causes damages to property, natural resources, or the environment; or*

*e) Seriously obstructs public or social service;*

*2/ Where the action done to attain the aforementioned reasons results in a person's death or in serious harm to historic sites, infrastructure, property, or the environment's natural resources (PSTCP, 2020, Article 3, Sub Articles 1 and 2).*

According to Held (2008), many regimes define terrorism as a practice that just their rivals, as well as those who want to change laws or harm a particular political system, can engage in. Furthermore, attempts to define the idea usually spark debate since contradictory definitions may be employed to include the behaviors of certain groups while excluding others. As a result, any party may continue to claim a subjective justification for employing attacks in order to promote their specific political agenda or objectives.

### **2.1.2. Defining Counter - terrorism**

Counter - terrorism is a challenging idea to describe, just like terrorism. Its uncertainty primarily results from disagreements over what defines terrorism, terrorist organizations, and terrorist strategies. There is no one-size-fits-all counter - terrorism strategy because each terrorism-related dispute has specific traits of its own (Floros and Newsom, 2008). It is an all-encompassing approach that would necessitate exposing all facets of a government's authority both locally and globally. It includes prevention, deterrence, preemption, and responses (Whittaker, 2013). Operations to combat terrorism may vary depending on the type of danger that exists. According to Rogers (2008), even though terrorism is a method, which is difficult to completely avoid, actions, can be considered to thwart, demolish, and then eventually vanquish terrorist groups.

The reaction of nations to the threat presented by terrorism remains extremely contentious, despite the fact that terrorism has emerged as the most significant security concern of the twenty-first century (Ervine, 2010). The terrorism problem is intricate and dynamic. Its motivations,

funding and support systems, assault tactics, and target preferences are constantly changing, which increases the difficulty of developing a successful strategy to combat it. Furthermore, because of how global it has become, states must work together more closely to prevent a shelter to those who conduct or try to execute terrorism offences. Since terrorism has in fact grown into a global threat, there is a need for an international, prevention-focused reaction that encompasses a variety of immediate and lasting efforts, from tackling the root causes of terrorism's growth to strengthening the state's ability to prevent and fight it (UNODC, 2006).

The way a state frames a threat from terrorism will depend on its understanding of the actors involved, assumptions about their capabilities, and how it will react both domestically and overseas. To put it differently, a state needs to decide how to balance any counter - terrorism policy that is appropriate (Buros, 2011). However, among other things, this study focuses on community engagement and the role it plays in thwarting terrorist threats. On an increasing basis, the general public and specific groups are acknowledged as participants and partners in the fight against terrorism. Without community support, law enforcement organs are unable to successfully function their duties. Security is consistently provided by agreement, never through coercion. As a result, many states are already creating community-based counter - terrorism strategies that emphasize participation and support from the general public in order to increase effectiveness.

## **2.2. Factors Favorable to Terrorism**

While there is no single element that drives terrorist radicalization, some have been recognized as particularly relevant. At the UN level, conditions conducive to terrorism include "prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, a lack of rule of law, violations of human rights, ethnic, national, and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization, and a lack of good governance" (Silke, 2003).

Even though a variety of socioeconomic and political structural factors, including discrimination and other human rights abuses (including those brought on by counter - terrorism actions) and the absence of educational opportunities, may influence people to become terrorists, these factors alone are insufficient to explain how terrorists become radicalized. In order to understand mobilization, it is crucial to include other psychological, interpersonal, and ideological

components. These elements may assist to explain why one person may choose to become a terrorist radical while another with a similar position and history does not (ODIHR, O., 2014).

The way someone recognizes and responds to the surroundings and events is dynamic and influenced by cognitive and psychological elements, such as expectations, one's self-image, feelings of belonging and identity, views and attitudes. They may affect the emergence of negative displaced sensations/ unpleasant feelings, such as exclusion, rejection, oppression, disappointment, unfairness, dissatisfaction, rebellion, or dominance. Such conditions may make people more open to the allure of terrorism (Ibid).

The main pull elements are social interactions, group dynamics, and interpersonal connections, with the exception of cases when radicalization is self-directed or self-initiated. People are either recruited by terrorists or led into violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) by friends, classmates, or family members. Recruiters for terrorist organizations seek for, prey upon, and groom weak men and women. Once they have them under control through material and/or psychological assistance, they take advantage of faith to persuade or deceive the individuals to joining terrorist organizations (Sageman, 2004).

Some events produce a societal environment and widespread complaints when certain triggering variables are present, which results in the formation of terrorist organizations and terrorist operations. These human insecurity factors—including impoverishment, demographics, inequality in society and marginalization, displacement and political upheaval may create and foster an environment that is favorable for terrorism to flourish (Muzafar, 2015).

Other researchers, however, disagree with the foregoing reasons for terrorism in the current condition of circumstances unfolding throughout the world.

Regarding causation, the nexus between threats of terrorism and poverty is unclear. In fact, empirical evidence indicates that both impoverished people and developing nations are not prone to expose and face terrorism threats. According to a number of studies, people who engage in terrorism tend to be middle-class and educated than they are poor and ignorant. Individuals involved in violence are typically better off than their countrymen, according to research on the Italian Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof gang, Hamas, and Hizballah (Krueger and Maleková, 2003). According to the last three cases, those who are wealthier and more educated tend to have stronger public support for terrorist tactics (Krueger 2007; Gunning 2007). Given that educated

middle-class people generally gravitate toward political participation, this is not shocking in and of itself.

There exists some evidence that when economic inequality and ethnic divisions overlap, activists are more likely to resort to violence (Stewart 2008), but quantitative research have not identified a statistically significant relationship between a country's economic status and levels of terrorism (Krueger 2007; Piazza 2006). To summarize, poverty levels alone cannot explain why terrorism occurs. However, this does not mean that poverty should be ignored. According to World Bank data, 1.4 billion people, or more than a quarter of the global population, live below what is known as the poverty threshold, which is less than US\$1.25 a day. Yunus (2006) argued that poverty , "is the absence of all human rights" (Shah 2010). However, given that a large proportion of the world's population is not impoverished, the reason why do we have not much terrorism? These numbers alone support the idea that poverty is not the primary cause of terrorism.

Silke (1998) contends that certain people considers terrorists as illogical, while some have asserted that they experience mental illnesses and are psychopaths. Another theory is that indoctrination is to blame, which may still be seen in parts of the literature on radicalization today. In every instance, the intention—or at the very least the result—is to attribute the origin of the violence to the personality or mental condition of the offender, oblivious to the socio - political social framework, that the action is carried out. Most serious scholars on the subject agree that persons who use terror tactics "are essentially normal individuals". They will be distinguished, just like any other demographic group, which makes attempting to develop a single psychological profile difficult.

Despite the fact that religious identity, beliefs, networks, and institutions can affect how conflicts are perceived and the resources available to protagonists, Gunning and Jackson (2011) contend that the idea that religion is the main contributor to terrorism is empirically dubious and should be treated with caution.

According to the aforementioned views by many experts, there is no clear consensus on what creates terrorism in a specific place and culture.

### **2.3. Taking Basic Freedoms and the Issue of Human Rights into Account**

All people living under a state's control must be protected, and they must receive all the rights and safeguards guaranteed by international human rights legislation.

Traditionally, counter - terrorism policies and practices have been "community-targeted," in which, communities were targeted for data/evidence collecting and enforcement actions initiated through the demand of countries security. They have focused on tactics that include police stop-and-frisk, clandestine operations, and collection of information techniques to identify suspected terrorists and thwart their acts, especially during attack preparations. These actions constitute a necessary component of a successful counter-terrorism policy, though they must be implemented in accordance with the rule of law and human rights (Spalek, 2012).

However, the above-mentioned techniques entail limited collaboration or engagement with individuals or organizations from the community. They seldom examine the unique needs of women and men in local communities or how terrorism and counter - terrorism efforts, influences them differently and they do not try to win their confidence and support. As a result, they can put particular groups and people in danger of marginalization or even stigma (Ibid).

Countries are obligated to take preventive measures against terrorism, including violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism (VERLT), considering terrorism seeks to destroy the rule of law, democracy and human rights [and] has an immediate effect on the full realization of a variety of human rights, particularly the rights to life, liberty, and physical integrity. All steps implemented by these individuals and their respective organizations to combat VERLT are additionally required in accordance with international law, particularly international human rights law (ODIHR, O., 2014).

Action against terrorism and VERLT can be successful and vigorous while yet respecting human rights. Practically, it catalyzes for measures by obliging the state to take proactive actions to safeguard the rights to life, bodily integrity, and security. Additionally, as considered by the UN Global Counter - terrorism Strategy abuses of human rights are a factor in the rise of terrorism, making respecting, preserving, and promoting human rights a prerequisite for the efficacy of state responses (Ibid).

A number of human rights are especially in risk in the fight against VERLT and the threat of terrorism. Some rights cannot be changed in any way; however, others can. The inalienable right for being immune to tortured as well as other kinds of cruel and inhumane treatment or penalty cannot be limited in any way, not even in times of emergency. Nobody may be subjected to torture or other severe punishment as a result of any unique circumstance, not even the fight against terrorism. In the same spirit, it is never permissible to discriminate against someone due to his or her race, color, nationality, sex, language, religion, political viewpoint, or base of origin, material they own, area he/she came, being a member of a minority, or any other position (Ibid).

Violations of these rights, such as assault by law enforcement or an unwillingness to implement proper measures to examine attacks targeting specific persons or groups of individuals, are illegal and unproductive, since they might lead to VERLT (Rejali, 2009). Human rights protection necessitate the establishment of protections against abuse, such as judicial monitoring and accountability procedures.

When it comes to preventing terrorism in Ethiopia, the issue of human rights protection is always at the centre of discussion among key intellectuals, specifically security officials and human rights professionals. Whatever the researcher's argument, this study argues that preventing the threat of terrorism by engaging communities should respect basic human rights issues. In Ethiopia, human rights violations in the framework of terrorism prevention have been a heated topic over the past five years.

#### **2.4. Counter - terrorism and community participation**

According to research, successful counter-terrorism policing is dependent on a positive relationship between the police and the community with which they are attempting to collaborate (Bartlett & Miller, 2010). However, it is clear that in the field of counter-terrorism, police and community partnerships are difficult to maintain and are frequently fraught with tension as police work to build community trust (Baker, 2012). One example is the recognition that intelligence gathering is dependent on community trust as a critical mechanism for preventing a terrorist incident (Jones, 2010).

Community-based strategies are based on the idea that a community's level of cohesiveness and resilience directly affects that community's security. As a result, national counter-terrorism plans may attempt to develop societies that condemn violent extremist and terrorist ideas and

campaigners, while also enlisting the assistance of citizens, persons, and groups to achieve counter-terrorism aims. While technical resilience has traditionally been the focus of counter-terrorism guidelines, which includes safeguarding essential facilities and strengthening rescue efforts, there is growing recognition that fostering adaptability at the level of ideas to combat the allure of violent extremism and terrorism has received insufficient attention (Durodie, 2005).

The state bears the majority of the responsibility for upholding and preserving human rights, as well as preventing, combating, and minimising the effects of terrorist operations. To effectively combat terrorism, the state must enlist the assistance of the press, firm, the private sector, and social organisations (OSCE, 2007). Law enforcement professionals, other public officials, and the public must all work together to engage in and cooperate in the fight against terrorism.

However, it would be difficult to include communities in the fight against terrorism. Between law enforcement organizations and particular communities or the public, there might be misunderstandings and differences of opinion. While attempting to form partnerships, state officials should be aware that some people and organizations might be encouraged by personal objectives, which aren't always in line with those of the community.

In order to improve efficacy, national counter - terrorism objectives, strategies, and measures are pursued through locally driven, cooperative efforts that are customized to local settings. These community-oriented methods have become a hallmark of counter - terrorism activities. This development demonstrates the rising understanding that the general people and local communities are active participants and collaborators in counter - terrorism efforts rather than only the passive targets of law enforcement efforts. Community-oriented approaches to counter-terrorism aim to involve women, men..... coming from communities in, and maximize their assistance for, establishing policies and delivery while taking into account their differences and complexities in relation to, for example, ethnicity, religion, politics, emotions, grievances, locales, and histories (Spalek et al., 2008).

They also help decision-makers be more accountable to the public. The foundation of community-oriented initiatives is the development of cooperative connections between decision-makers, security experts, and male and female community leaders. The effectiveness of such strategies depends on establishing and keeping trust. A a community- oriented approach to counterterrorism is characterized by partnerships built on trust between communities and public

authorities, community backing for and involvement in the creation, execution, and assessment of various initiatives, plans, and actions, and counter - terrorism being framed and pursued in relation to community safety concerns, not merely the state's security (Ibid). Community-oriented policies and measures for countering terrorism realize and underscore the role of the public, particular communities and their residents, community-based organizations, and other civil society and private-sector organizations, in general, making them active stakeholders in the effort. These parties involved in the battle against terrorism must be motivated and given the resources they require, especially in the areas of prevention, planning, first aid, and rehabilitation.

Community-oriented methods regarding counterterrorism, as can be inferred from the community engagement approach, seek to strengthen public backing and trust in counterterrorism initiatives and procedures, including law enforcement actions, thus improving their sense of credibility in the minds of the general public and specific societies. Strategies, which highlight the need for, state authorities to effectively account for its counter - terrorism efforts to the general public and, in particular, to the people and communities who would be most directly affected by counter - terrorism policies and actions. They aim to provide people with more chances and ways to participate in decision-making, implementation, and review processes while increasing transparency, accessibility, and consultation.

In addition to practical constraints, there are research-related knowledge gaps that limit understanding of the role of non-state actors in countering violent extremism and radicalization that leads to terrorism (VERLT). The analysis of research work related to the roles and engagement of stakeholders in addressing fundamentalism, radicalization, extremism, violence, and terrorism reveals that the majority of that work focuses on government and state agencies, as well as international policies. Simultaneously, little attention is paid to the role of non-state actors in creating pathways to social inclusion. As a result, this is an important area that requires more in-depth investigation and discussion in order to inform researchers, authorities, and policymakers about the stakeholders' required engagement (Amath, 2015). As a result, it is apparent that the debate between those who believe that only state actors should engage in counter - terrorism efforts and those who argue supporting state actors and non-state actors should do so is still ongoing.

Working with community leaders can be especially helpful and improves the chances that preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (P/CVERLT) efforts will be successful. Community leaders can be effective mediators, facilitating collaboration between local governments and the general public to address a variety of public safety issues, including VERLT. Alternative narratives can be communicated by community leaders quite effectively. They can coach youth on the ideals of peace and tolerance and help them develop resilience against messages of hate since they are credible actors who are aware of the messages that connect with vulnerable people in the community (Barzegar et al., 2016).

The Israeli government emphasizes that terrorism is a form of psychological warfare and stresses the need to neutralize the psychological impact of terrorism to maximize the public's resilience against this threat. This vision is reflected in the two principal goals of the Israeli counter - terrorism policy: to prevent terrorists from influencing the national agenda and to preserve the psychological resilience of the civilian population. According to Israeli authorities, these two interlinked goals are best served by a citizenry that is empowered by knowledge and information against the traumatizing impact of the terrorist threat and the psychological warfare tactics utilized by terrorist groups. To this effect, the government runs comprehensive and diverse public education and awareness campaigns. These programs are utilized as a deliberate counter - terrorism tool in Israel (Bott et al., 2009).

The public's education on the fundamental rationale of terrorism is another priority for Israeli government. People who understand the dynamics and tactics of cognitive warfare are far more likely to be able to thwart terrorist attempts to influence their priorities and morale in daily life. According to Israeli officials, giving residents plenty of details as is reasonably possible builds public confidence in their government's ability to counter threats. In order for people to uphold their beliefs and not compromise them for greater security, individuals must have confidence in their government in order to not doubt its policies or abilities to protect them from terrorists (Ibid, 2009).

Hassan (2015) asserts that the civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) organizations make up roughly 60% of the counter-terrorism mercenaries and assist the government's special military in battling against Boko Haram terrorist groups in the north-east region of Nigeria. The civilian JTF may

replace the government's military JTF, which has been accused of violating human rights, effectively, claims Hassan (2015). Contrary to the civilian JTF, the government's military JTF is made up of security agencies from across Nigeria, including the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Air Force, Nigerian Navy, and paramilitary organizations like the Police and State Security Service (SSS), who may not be fluent in Hausa, Kanuri, or Shuwa Arabic or familiar with the region's geography, culture, or religion. Contrarily, the civilian JTF is thought to be made up of up to 500 young Muslims from Borno (Hassan, 2015).

There are many reasons for the high incidence and impact of violent extremism in East African nations. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) region is thought to be the most vulnerable to terrorism of all regions in sub-Saharan Africa because of its geographic location, persistence of conflict, absence of state structures, despair from the loss of hope, and the growth of extremism. Geographical location is a major factor, in addition to civil wars and political repression. The majority of the states are connected to the modern Islamic extremists because they all have coastline borders with the Arabian Peninsula, which has had a significant impact on their long-standing religious ties. Because governments are essentially incapable of monitoring the extensive coastline, traveling from the Persian Gulf states to the East African nations by sea is basically seamless (Foster, 2004, p. 38).

The majority of terrorism specialists acknowledge that the main objective of terrorist activities is to paralyse the general populace by instilling tremendous fear in them. Terrorists may not be able to stop future terrorist attacks on their own because the public will put pressure on the government to alter policy. Terrorists may lose access to this lethal weapon if efforts are made to increase public awareness of terrorism and citizens' physical and psychological fortitude. Effective citizen participation and rallying is essential for counter-terrorism achievement in two distinct respects: initially, appropriate knowledge and understanding of the terrorist threat prepare the public for a terror-related catastrophe, making citizens prepared to be collaborators in reacting to the specific problems; secondly, a strong public can withstand the psychological and other possible disabling effects of a terrorist attack (Bott et al., 200).

Although there is a concern about terrorism in the region of East Africa where Ethiopia is located, there is still disagreement among scholars about how to stop the threat of terrorism between those who favor state actors and those who support engagement between state and non-

state actors. Furthermore, given that the information is generated or obtained from different country perspectives that are not directly related to the environment of Ethiopia in general and Addis Ababa in particular, the studies' current state lacks empirical evidence, leaving theoretical gaps as well as geographical and temporal gaps that need to be filled.

## **2.5. Community Engagement to Prevent Terrorism**

Any successful project, especially one that aims to prevent terrorism, must include the process of community participation. Engagement involves more than just setting up a gathering with acquaintances. Effective involvement is a very difficult process that requires tact and meticulous planning. It can be more harmful to participate in law enforcement experts -community relations improperly or carelessly than not at all. Why, with whom, and how are some of the issues that come up when contemplating community participation to prevent terrorism (ODIHR, O., 2014).

Engaging the public helps create relationships based on mutual respect and trust that will serve as a foundation for future cooperation. It also helps create plans to assure public involvement and work with communities to solve problems, such as tackling serious terrorist threats. Who in the community should you talk to? Public involvement should, in general, be all-inclusive, embracing all communities and a broad range of people in the community, including at the grassroots level. Law enforcement personnel should be mindful not to talk to only specific groups, deceptive community leaders, or other people who agree with them. They should specifically try to engage with underprivileged, challenging to reach, or risk-taking people or groups. They should proceed with extreme caution when developing ties with such people, groups, or organisations if there is evidence that these people or groups are not unwaveringly committed to nonviolence and respect for fundamental human rights. To establish how much law enforcement personnel should support and empower such persons, groups, or organizations, and for what purpose, the short- and long-term advantages and risk factors should be thoroughly assessed (Ibid).

### **2.5.1. Youth Engagement**

It is frequently simple for law enforcement professionals to get in touch with young people, but challenging to interact with them. Young people may perceive experts negatively, avoid interaction with them altogether, or even try to challenge them when they have grievances

against society and the government. This is made worse in many places by a history of strained relationships between law enforcement officials and young people, particularly those from low socioeconomic or racial backgrounds. This may be the result of unprofessional conduct on the part of specific officers, and in other cases, institutional bias among specialists in favor of particular minorities (OSCE, 2013).

When compared to older persons, young individuals focus to employ several messaging techniques and information sources. Many young people rely heavily on social networking sites to preserve their friendships and social activities. Social media can be a useful tool for contacting young people and spreading important information.

By giving instruction in sports, physical education, art, and other types of youth-focused activities, law enforcement professionals can make connection, establish a place for regular dialogue, and promote nonviolent means of expression. The professionals might incorporate suggestions on terrorism avoidance throughout general campaigns to educate youngsters about keeping safe and can include lessons for preventing terrorism in broad security campaigns for children. Peer mentoring programs are often established or supported by law enforcement experts. In these programs, young individuals who have developed skills—such as training sports, taking classes in dance, taking part in community art initiatives, or participating in other activities—assist and mentor those who are younger or in their peer group. Local children may be asked to take part in training by law enforcement, especially for measures like stop-and-searches that commonly have a negative impact on children. Through these initiatives, youngsters and the law enforcement can interact more efficiently and share perspectives on how specific the law enforcement acts may influence young people (Ibid).

Furthermore, law enforcement agencies can organize events where children are able to learn concerning and take an active role in the duties of law enforcement. It aids in clarify law enforcement behavior and techniques so that youngsters acquire a better understanding of how law enforcement works to combat crime. It is much more probable that community-based the law enforcement teams with a population-reflective composition, sufficient experience, and the proper gender balance will be successful in forging productive connections with young individuals (Ibid).

### **2.5.2. Women Engagement**

A crucial component of security is taking gender roles into account. Conflict, terrorism, and counter - terrorism have varied effects on men and women and cause them to have diverse security worries. Despite this, gender bias has frequently been used to alter counter - terrorism methods and tactics (Huckerby, 2013).

There is a widespread misconception which violent extremism and terrorism exclusively affect men. Despite it continues to be possible for women to be found out for indoctrination and enrollment into violent extremist groups, the matter is still generally unrecognized and unaddressed. What drives Women's special ability to confront VERLT has oftentimes been restricted to stereotypical positions and has frequently been neglected. Women have to be engaged in the processes of decision-making, law enforcement, education, participation in the community, and campaigning in order to successfully tackle the conditions that generate terrorism and prevent it (Ibid).

Huckerby (2012) argues that it is essential to eliminate the obstacles that prevent women from actively participating in combatting threat of terrorism. Women should be able to actively engage in programs that are intended to guarantee the safety of their communities since they are members of those communities. Terrorist attacks and counter - terrorism initiatives usually target women. They can highlight instances where preventive measures backfire in their communities and are ineffective. This knowledge may be crucial in preventing the development or maintenance of circumstances that support terrorism threats (Ibid).

To involve women in preventing terrorism and combating VERLT, the law enforcement experts, especially community police teams, should try to empower women to get involved in interactions between members of the public and law enforcement experts. By adjusting the time, place, setting, and framework for conversations, it is feasible to assure the successful inclusion of women. As you would with a approaches to men, refrain from interacting with women solely to gather information. Cultivate real connections with organizations representing women based on the principle of active collaboration towards the accomplishment of common goals. However, they should also try to address women's more basic concerns about the safety of their neighborhoods. Law enforcement personnel should be transparent about their efforts to prevent terrorism (ODIHR, O., 2014).

Instead of confining what you do to a major, widely recognized associations or self-described political figures, interact with tiny, grassroots women's organizations more frequently. Similar actions encourages the development of platforms and safe venues where women are able to talk about the resources, strategies, and issues they have about coping with violent radicalization. Furthermore, acknowledging the fact that there will be multiple interpretations, support the efforts of civil society attempts to educate women about their political, religious, and cultural heritages. This will assist them in creating and debating moral messages that refute extremist narratives (Ibid).

### **2.5.3. Participating Religious Leaders and Faith-based Organizations**

Counter - terrorism initiatives must be careful to avoid stigmatizing or discriminating against any one religion or faith. Religious concerns are merely one of the many justifications that terrorists may use, but religion is not to blame for terrorism or VERLT. States should vehemently disagree with linking terrorism to any one faith. However, for several reasons law enforcement experts must interact with religious leaders and faith-based organizations, comprising the following (OSCE, 2012):

- Terrorist strikes might potentially target them as well as their communities.
- They can offer critical input on how counter - terrorism policies have affected and are viewed in their communities;
- Might be well - informed that there are people or things circulating in their neighborhood that offer justifications for terrorism.
- Their knowledge can assist the police determine whether some people are becoming more receptive to narratives that excuse terrorism, and
- They may be better equipped to aggressively and successfully contest some elements of these narratives.

### **2.5.4. Working with Medium, Small and Micro Enterprises**

Enterprises provide revenue, create jobs, and provide goods and services to the people, making them an important part of a country's infrastructure and fundamental to its resilience. For the law enforcement expert, interacting with businesses in avoiding terrorism is equally as crucial as interacting with people and organizations from civil society. Companies, for example, may

become the subject of terrorist attacks, or terrorists might attempt to acquire materials and machinery from businesses. Community law enforcement experts are well-suited to work with small and medium-sized businesses, whereas relationships among government entities and huge businesses may be conducted at a more centralized level. However, it is possible that in certain nations, engaging with companies of any size is outside the purview of community policing and is instead focused on gathering intelligence (ODIHR, O., 2014).

### **2.5.5. Ethnic Minorities Engagement**

The potential of law enforcement agents to interact amicably with people belonging to ethnic minorities in preventing terrorism is profoundly affected by the overall context of those partnerships along with the societal adjustment of both men and women from ethnic minorities. Law enforcement professionals might be able to expand on current measures to put into practice excellent law enforcement methods in multiethnic communities as well as other activities to make it easier for men and women who are members of ethnic minorities to participate in public life. A history of poor engagement and mistrust between law enforcement experts and ethnic minorities, particularly because of prejudiced behaviours and misconduct by law enforcement against ethnic minorities, may restrict and perhaps subvert law enforcement experts' ability to efficiently collaborate with ethnic minorities in curbing terrorism. Immigrants can occasionally bring with them negative experiences with law enforcement officials from other countries (OSCE, 2010).

It is crucial that law enforcement professionals' efforts to combat terrorism should not inadvertently stigmatize or discriminate against any one ethnicity, turning it into a suspect group. There is no nation, people, or ethnic group that can or should be linked to terrorism. In addition to being illegal and warranting legal action against law enforcement personnel, stigmatizing and discriminating against ethnic minorities can have the unintended consequence of fostering resentment, alienation, and hostility against law enforcement personnel. As a result, ethnic minorities may be much less inclined to cooperate with law enforcement officials in the fight against terrorism and VERLT (Ibid).

### **2.5.6. Involving Civil Society Organizations**

Specifically in connection to law enforcement personnel's efforts to stop terrorism and combat VERLT, civil society organizations can play several significant roles. Along these lines, law enforcement specialists should aim to build positive partnerships with civil society organizations. The nonprofit sector may help and encourage the productivity of law enforcement officers by, for example, increasing community unity and participating men and women across neighborhoods in promoting resolving issues, initiatives, such as those designed to address neighborhood complaints and conditions which foster terrorism, such as discrimination. They can assist law enforcement professionals by facilitating dialogue between the law enforcement expert and several members of the public, associations, and people, particularly those who are hesitant to interact with or hostile toward the expert. Additionally, they help communities understand the role and responsibilities of the law enforcement officer in preventing and countering terrorism while also communicating with expert one specific opinions and issues of the public regarding terrorism and preventing it (Cortright, 2011).

The organisations of civil society serves a crucial part in enabling law enforcement professionals to be more responsible to the public through preserving a consistent and open discussion on topics of concern, evaluating the effects of experts' decisions on societies and their members' rights, supplying advice on certain law enforcement expert initiatives for preventing terrorism and combat VERLT and suggesting alternative possibilities and identifying what is beneficial. To maintain public trust, security agencies must engage with those who are vulnerable to or attracted into VERLT in order to better comprehend them and/or steer them from following a path of radicalization that may eventually result in terrorism, whilst bearing in mind that carrying out so is not an indication of approval or support for these people or groups (Ibid).

### **2.6. The Genesis of Al Shabaab and the Threat it Poses to Ethiopia and the Horn Region**

After Said Barre was expelled from Somalia in 1991, chaos broke out there. The United Somalia Congress (USC) maintained control of southern Somalia and Mogadishu, while the Somali National Movement (SNM) seized power in the country's north. The USC established an interim administration led by Ali Mahdi Muhammad on January 26, 1991, but the SNM refused to

accept it. The Republic of Somaliland was founded after SNM proclaimed the northern Somali territories independent in May 1991. The United Nations intervened when violence broke out between competing group leaders, which caused thousands of Somalis to be displaced, starve, and die. A UN relief effort known as United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), branded "operation provide relief," was launched in August 1992 in response to the political upheaval and humanitarian catastrophe. UNOSOM I created an atmosphere that made it possible to distribute humanitarian aid (Buluma, 2013).

Fighting between the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which is also called as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) or Supreme Council of Islamic Courts, and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) erupted in Mogadishu in May 2006. The ICU was founded in 2000 by former al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI) members. Because there were no governing structures in place due to the general turmoil of the 1990s, these courts were founded to administer justice in the districts where they had been established. Each court kept a militia, and eleven of these courts decided to combine the power of their militias to take over Mogadishu (Ibid).

In order to challenge the courts, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) funded warlords known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter - terrorism (ARPCT). They fought bloody battles in June 2006, during which the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took over Mogadishu and a large portion of southern Somalia. The ICU had pushed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to Baidoa by the end of 2006. After that, things became worse, and early in 2007, Ethiopian soldiers drove the UIC out of Mogadishu. The ICU's military arm, al Shabaab, started acting independently in early 2007. Al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI), which intended to create an Islamic state in the Horn Region, gave rise to this organization. The Ethiopian military's presence in Somalia inspired supporters to fight against what they referred to as "foreign invaders" (Ibid).

In the initial Ethiopian military operation in southern Somalia in 2006, al Shabaab sustained significant losses; but, by April 2007, it had recovered and had emerged as the principal armed opposition to the Ethiopian army and the Transitional Federal Government. It gained widespread support from Somalis both at home and abroad, even those who detested its extremism, very rapidly. The majority of Somalis perceived it as a legal form of resistance to an unconstitutional foreign occupation (Menkhaus, 2021). Al Shabaab consistently defined its goals between 2007

and 2012 more in terms of what the organization opposed than by advancing a vision for the future. For instance, it opposed the Somali transitional government, whomever was in charge of it, and it opposed any conduct or actors that were believed to be against Islamic law. It also fought Ethiopian and later African Union forces in Somalia and wanted to push them out. Its internal disagreements continued to center on its strategic objectives. However, the majority of the group's members and leaders were focused on an Islamo-nationalist agenda: the establishment of an Islamic state in Somali-populated areas of the Horn, including northern Kenya and eastern Ethiopia. Some of the group's leaders embraced al-Qaida's vision of an eventual global Islamic caliphate (Ibid).

Outside of Somalia, al Shabaab has started to grow, posing challenges for the West as well as countries like Kenya and Ethiopia. When militants murdered 62 people in the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, al Shabaab claimed responsibility (Karimi 2013). Additionally, a significant number of people from the United States and Europe have moved away from their native countries and joined the organization as active members. Al Qaeda has a history of doing this, but for a tiny, grassroots organization like al Shabaab to recruit abroad shows that they might represent a serious threat and serve as the next important breeding ground for a global terrorist threat (Pitts, 2015). Al Shabaab will continue to torment residents of the Horn Region and nations close to the area if the world ignores Somalia and its potential to be the next stage of the Global War on Terrorism. It may even start to spread outside of the African continent (Ibid).

Al Shabaab persevered in the face of a string of terrible failures from 2011 to 2013, adapting its strategies and reinventing itself to revive its fortunes. Al Shabaab still faces significant challenges in the present, and some of its methods may be seen as marks of weakness or desperation rather than strength. Nevertheless, the group has managed to overcome these challenges and continues to pose a grave threat of terrorism to Somalia and the countries in the region (Bryden, 2015). In the face of significant external challenges and internal problems, al Shabaab has shown incredible resiliency. In the short to medium run, the group is expected to continue to be a significant armed spoiler if historical performance is any indicator of future tendencies. Its adversaries include a weak, disorganized, and infiltrated Somali army, a weak and dubious-legitimacy Somali government, international peacekeepers who want to start withdrawing in 2021, and a terrified and risk-averse Somali populace. Its asymmetric warfare strategies give it the freedom to pick the location and timing of its assaults and armed conflicts,

and its Amniyat network gives it access to better intelligence. Despite all of its flaws, it encounters minimal opposition (Menkhaus, 2021). Al Shabaab might take over the Somali army and conquer most or all of Mogadishu if African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) entirely departs Somalia, which would result in the collapse of the FGS. In the worst-case scenario, the regional governments would have significant difficulties and there would probably be a large-scale influx of Somali refugees (Ibid).

Al Shabaab has not only attacked Ethiopia's peace, security, and prosperity in rhetoric, but has also taken tangible efforts to harm citizens and damage property in the country. Al Shabaab has always sought to spread its brand of Islamist extremism to nations nearby. It carried out a lethal strike in Uganda in 2010 and has a significant footprint in Kenya. Since 2009, both nations have sent soldiers to African Union forces supporting the Somali government in its struggle against al Shabaab throughout Somalia. Al Shabab aimed for, but was unsuccessful, to create a presence in Ethiopia in past periods. In early 2007, military commander Aden Ayrow led a force into Ethiopia in response to Ethiopian troops taking over Mogadishu in order to help Somalia's then-transitional federal authority. The offensive was quickly thwarted (VOA English - July 26, 2022).

The late leader of the group, Ahmed Abdi Godane, during the time began training a loyal unit called Jabhat, or Ethiopian Front, which was tasked with carrying out attacks in Ethiopia. Due to strong Ethiopian intelligence, the unit was unable to accomplish much. Later he was given the position of al Shabaab's intelligence wing, the Amniyaat, to undertake actions in Ethiopia. Among them were the unsuccessful bomb attempt towards a football stadium in Addis Ababa in 2013 and a suicide bomb attack on a large shopping center in Addis Ababa in 2014 (Ibid, 2022). Furthermore, the terrorist group is presently targeting various places in Ethiopia's Somali region, demonstrating its ongoing determination to undermine Ethiopia's peace and security.

Overall, the FGS, regional member states in Somalia, regional nations in the Horn of Africa, and Western and international organizations operating in the Horn are all expected to continue to face a serious and ongoing threat from al Shabaab. Complex suicide attacks in Somalia and the Horn of Africa will continue to pose a threat to soft targets like hotels and retail centers. Al Shabaab manages to carry out terrorist acts with a fair amount of ease, at little expense, and with minimal danger despite having significant internal flaws. It has also demonstrated success in using local

resentments to forge strategic alliances and recruit new members. Al Shabaab's ongoing danger means that Ethiopia, Kenya, and other foreign parties concern about the group's broader security risks will persist to play a significant contribution in Somalia for the foreseeable future (Menkhaus, 2021).

## **2.7. Theoretical Framework**

To assess the role and engagement of community participation in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia – Addis Ababa, the study considers the liberalist perspective on terrorism. The liberalist view on international politics, compares to the realist approach, ignores the notion of perpetual conflict and inescapable competition between nations and contends that transnational social ties that unite people offer an arena of opportunity for collaboration. Liberal theory, contrary to the realist perspective, asserts that ethical responsibilities regulate government behaviour (Bull, 2012, as cited in Warsame, 2021).

Non-state actors, according to liberalism, are important in international relations and should be considered alongside state actors. Interdependence, relationships, and engagements between countries, according to liberalism, help and endure safety and security. The liberal theory of terrorism assumes that terrorists are opportunist groups with the primary goal of destroying individual peace, interdependence, interactions, and cooperation. As a result, whether led by community members or not, terrorism is condemned and should be stopped (Ibid).

Participating the populace in problem-solving yields a variety of long-lasting solutions to a particular issue or situation. First, it facilitates the purposeful inclusion of persons who are excluded from political and economic processes through the redistribution of power (Arnstein, 1969). Additionally, it brings individuals together to create and decide on their surroundings. Individual empowerment results through participation because it teaches people how to evaluate their needs, determine priorities, and take charge of their surroundings (Kreuter et al., 2000). Community participation is a means to embrace beliefs and attitudes towards any program and to give the program a nonprofessional's perspective. Participating in the community may also give one the opportunity to utilize government officials, property, and expertise in technology that they might not have had previously (Bracht and Tsouros 1990). The principle of ownership, that provides the feeling of identity and ongoing responsibility for any program, is what engagement fosters most (Carlaw et al., 1984). Underscoring the applicability of this theoretical orientation is

the growing realization that no government or authority has the resources to properly tackle all problems in society, and in the case of security, that local residents, as stakeholders in their communities, not only have a better understanding of their communities but also discuss a common desire to promote and protect them.

The public's acceptance of the liberal reaction to terrorism determines its effectiveness. To win over the people, a commitment to protect law and order and constitutional authority must be translated into effective action. Liberalist holds that a restricted and properly - defined response to terrorism is required. Any counter – terrorism measures taken should solely target the terrorists themselves and should not go beyond what is necessary given the circumstances. Moreover, the measure must be reliable. The general public must be persuaded that the state's intervention is both essential and successful in achieving its goals. It must be abundantly evident that this particular form of violence provides a problem that is qualitatively distinct from that of regular crime and as such manifest itself as a threat that requires a specially unique solution. Any such initiative must be proved to be effective in terms of how well it works to combat terrorism and defend civil liberties in order to be credible. Liberalists argue that the government would suffer from a credibility gap and very likely fall short of gaining the rate of community assistance required towards either the construction or maintenance of specialist anti-terrorist measures if it is unable to adequately justify their implementation (Chalk, 1995).

According to the theory, counter-terrorist measures should be used and maintained under ongoing parliamentary monitoring and independent judicial oversight. The important point is that the state is made publicly responsible to its acts and those proper channels exist for grievance redress in order to strike a balance that does not unnecessarily restrict or abuse human rights and freedoms. Therefore, anti-terrorist measures should be created in accordance with exact guidelines so that everyone involved may accurately determine their own rights, obligations, and duties. The most effective method to accomplish this is to make sure that civil authorities, who are also responsible to the community for their conducts and thus fully incorporate the influence of the democratically expressed will, continue to have control over the anti-terrorist policy (Ibid). Liberals take into account the various non-state players who perform different roles, which make their theory appropriate for the issue of counter – terrorism. Furthermore, it assumes that multilateralism, as opposed to unilateralism, enhances state security. International organizations reduce the issue of security dilemma and increases the scale of cooperation incentives among

states (Anyim, 2019). Since the theory holds states accountable for their acts and works to safeguard individual safety and security by respecting the law of the land, it generally urges the public to take part in averting terrorism threats.

Hence, given the dynamic condition of terrorism, this study employed the aforementioned theoretical lens/framework to examine the nexus between community engagement and averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia – Addis Ababa.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD**

#### **3.1. Introduction**

The main goal of this study is exploring community role and engagement in averting al Shabaab's security threat to Ethiopia – Addis Ababa. Ethiopia has been fighting al Shabaab considering that the terrorist group is a threat to the nation's security and its prosperity as well. The terrorist group also continue threatening to attack Ethiopia's interests starting from border areas to the heart of the country, the capital city, Addis Ababa even though al Shabaab failed to inflict major damage in Ethiopia. Hence, collecting data, making analysis and interpretation to study the nexus between community role and engagement in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia – Addis Ababa is of immense.

In this chapter, the philosophical foundation being considered, the methodology and research design employed, the sampling techniques selected, the data sources and collection tool used, data analysis and interpretation and ethical consideration sections are discussed.

#### **3.2. Philosophical Foundation**

The constructivist/interpretivist research paradigm was used for this study. Instead of a truth that can be discovered by a process of measurement, interpretivists adopt a relativist ontology in which a single phenomenon may have different interpretations. Instead of attempting to generalize the basis of understanding for the entire population, researchers typically obtain a greater understanding of the phenomena and its complexity in its specific context by adopting an interpretivism approach/perspective (Creswell, 2007). Since the aim of this study is to understand the nexus between community engagement and role in preventing the threat posed by al Shabaab in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, it is evident from this argument that the paradigm and the aim of the paper are aligned.

#### **3.3. Methodology**

The researcher used the qualitative research method. This is due to the fact that qualitative data collection allows for the gathering of qualitative data, that helps in the examination of how decisions are made and can provide detailed insights into the issue. The qualitative method also

attempts to interpret data and provide meaning. It is also beneficial to understand how the social life and other aspects of the study population are organized (Richards, 2006). The qualitative technique encourages respondents to provide more in-depth insights into the problem, in contrast to the quantitative method. Furthermore, it is suggested to use an open-ended approach. Since the qualitative technique itself encourages in-depth discussion, subjectivity should be recognized while using it (Ronald et al., 2007).

According to Creswell (2013), the qualitative approach includes methods in which the researcher tries to interpret, examine, and predict certain phenomena through self-reflection. As a result, the data gathered will be evaluated subjectively in the study.

### **3.4. Research Design**

A case study, according to Kumar (2011), is a research design where a single case serves as the foundation for the research in drawing assumptions through in-depth studies of that single case. Because this case is thought to be "peculiar," it can be appropriate in drawing assumptions in cases that are associated with it. As a result, this study will use a case study approach and have characteristics comparable to those in the aforementioned elaboration.

Moreover, the study used an exploratory approach because the goal is to, as previously stated, assess community role and engagement in averting terrorism threat in Addis Ababa, Bole - Michael area and to observe its implications on counter - terrorism prevention strategies while also seeing how both community participation and fight against terrorism are interrelated. As Kothari (2004) explains, this type of research is used for investigating problems.

Furthermore, the exploratory research design is employed in interpretative studies when the why, what, and how issues are to be addressed. This style of study uses an unstructured research design and an open-ended, participatory approach to data collection. This design allows the researcher to be flexible, which aids in studying the unstudied (Question pro, 2020). According to Kruger (2004), reading a descriptive paragraph may give a greater understanding of community members' positions than merely looking at demographic statistics. This is one of the benefits of qualitative research over quantitative research.

### **3.5. Sampling**

The approach that is used in this research is non-probability sampling, particularly the purposive and snowball sampling methods. The purpose of using non-probability sampling is that it is a sampling method that does not use the chance to select a section of a population, but rather the researcher deliberately selects the section of the population to gather information (Kothari, 2004). According to Morse (1994), purposive sampling assists in identifying respondents who have relevant knowledge and experience, are able to explain, are assertive, have enough time for an interview, and they are ready to engage in the inquiry. Due to the nature of this study, the researcher chose non-probability sampling, especially purposive sampling, which comprises picking instances based on the researcher's judgement of which will be the most beneficial (Bloor and Wood, 2006).

Because the snowball method is used as a networking technique that expands from a specific individual, group, or organization to multiple other informants, it is chosen to obtain additional data (Kumar, 2011). This was due to the fact that a knowledgeable individual with the requisite competence would be appropriate for the task at hand. As a result, this sampling method is pertinent to my field of research.

After taking into account the nature of the research and other pertinent factors, the researcher selected the aforementioned sampling techniques for this study. The purposive sample method was used to choose intelligence professionals, military commanders, and administrative bodies because they were well-versed in the subject and felt connected to it. Additionally, the sampling included people who knew of the issue the researcher was looking for, such as various people in the neighborhood of Bole Michael area, Addis Ababa. The study concentrated on the Bole Michael area of Addis Ababa because, according to official government sources, it was where al Shabaab suspects moved about the most frequently.

### **3.6. Data Sources and Collection tools**

To gather the pertinent data for the study, the researcher has employed primary as well as secondary sources of data. Creswell (2013) states that qualitative research should include several sources of data where the researcher examines documents, observes behaviors, and interviews participants to obtain rich information rather than relying on a single source.

The researcher used qualitative data collection tools to get the required data. The required data was collected using key informant interview (KII), Focus Group Discussion (FDG) as well as document reviews.

Rees (1996) notes that qualitative research entails broad questions about human realities and experiences and studies them through extended interactions with people in their natural environments, producing a wealth of descriptive data that aids in our comprehension of their emotions and attitudes. Focus groups and interviews are frequently utilized in qualitative research. In addition to ensuring that participants are understanding and responding to questions correctly, this enables a researcher to get more information from them. Rees (1996) asserts that the goal of qualitative research is to understand people's thoughts, perceptions, and experiences from their own, as opposed to the researcher's, perspective.

Regarding interview with key informants and conducting focus group discussion, one FGD (that comprises seven people) and interviews with key informants (which include ten people) was made. To increase the credibility of the research, the data acquired from the above sources were also triangulated by conducting documents analysis on the Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009, Ethiopian Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation No. 1176/2020, the FDRE Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and strategy (FANSPS), the Ethiopian Herald newspaper, and other sources of data like the Ethiopian News agency, public speeches of officials, published and unpublished materials, newspapers and non – government media. Finally, these data have been interpreted in light of the liberalism theoretical framework since state actors and non – state actors were considered while studying the nexus between community role and engagement in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia – Addis Ababa.

### **3.7. Data analysis and Interpretation**

Thematic data analysis was used for the research because it is qualitative research focusing on understanding, exploring, and interpretation aspects to discover specific information from a given circumstance. Crucial steps have been implemented while performing this: most important and reliable information was first separated from the mass of information gathered. The data that contained analogous or coherent content were grouped and categorized to make analysis and interpretation less difficult and more simple. Braune and Clarke (2006) contends that the

thematic method of analysis is the best way to identify, analyze, and report data because it organizes and describes it in detail and interprets the various aspects of research. This is the reason why the researcher preferred thematic analysis from other methods of data analysis. The study used the triangulation method (used different data sources) to ensure that the information is as accurate as possible.

### **3.8. Ethical Consideration**

Certain ethical considerations are required and expected from one researcher during the research. First, the researcher presented an official letter to the selected relevant body requesting interviews and access to certain available documents that could serve as sources. During the interviews, the researcher asked questions that are neutral and do not offend either the interviewee or the institution they belong.

Furthermore, the researcher made an effort to analyze the provided information objectively, without bias or attachment to a political point of view or ideology. The researcher also made every effort to present the findings as accurately as possible, with no false alterations.

However, the researcher believes that al Shabaab is a terrorist organization that present a grave threat to the peace, stability, security, and development of the Horn region in general, and Ethiopia in particular, and I would like to state unequivocally that this is my personal bias regarding the terrorist organization.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **4. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

In this section of the study, data presentations and analysis of the researcher are presented. Since the objective of this study is to explore public engagement and its role in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia the case of Addis Ababa, interviews with relevant military commanders, intelligence experts, administration bodies and different people were conducted. Furthermore, one focus group discussion (FGD) was made on issues which demand detail idea of the community that helps answer the research questions of the study. To increase the credibility of the research, the data acquired from the above sources were also triangulated by conducting documents analysis on the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009, Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation No. 1176/2020, Ethiopia's Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS), Ethiopian Herald news paper; and other relevant data like government and non – government media.

Accordingly, the data presentation and analysis of the above documents, interviews and FGD being conducted are presented in the following three sections/themes.

#### **4.1. Public Education and Awareness Regarding al Shabaab's Terrorism Threats**

Educating the public and making people aware of their surroundings in terms of terrorism threats is a vital step that administrative components at various levels in Addis Ababa city administration in general and the Bole Michael area, in particular, are doing. A society that lacks an adequate understanding of threats cannot protect both its own and its environment's safety. Administrative organs at the city and local levels organize various public awareness programs on security and peace concerns and teach those who attend the scheduled programs on how to avoid terrorism threats in their specific areas. Although several city administration sectors contribute to educating and raising public awareness, the Addis Ababa City Administration Peace and Security Bureau is the primary city administration body in charge of doing so. Through the organization of public events and the utilization of its four organs, the bureau carries out educational and awareness-raising campaigns at the local level. The Office of Religion and Peace Value Building Sector, Security and Information Sector, Security and Operation Sector, and

Public Organization Sector are the four divisions/organs of Addis Ababa City Administration that are critical to addressing the community at the grassroots level. Despite the fact that all sectors have the right to work with the community on peace and security issues, including terrorism threats, the public Organization Sector is the key organ of the Addis Ababa City Administration's Peace and Security Bureau in terms of mobilizing and involving the public in security and peace issues at the city (central command of the city), sub - city, wereda, different district levels, and residential blocks. It is not uncommon to hear government officials at the municipal and district levels emphasize that community involvement and participation are critical in preventing security threats such as al Shabaab's terrorism threat.

In an event held by the city administration to inform and raise public awareness about peace and security issues, including al Shabaab's terrorism threats, in the capital, former Addis Ababa City Administration Peace and Security Bureau Chief Kenea Yadeta stated that without public participation, efforts to establish a lasting state of peace and security throughout the city would be ineffective (Ethiopian News Agency, April 18, 2022).

Not just municipal administration bureau heads are responsible for educating and increasing public awareness. In terms of educating and increasing public awareness, leaders at the wereda and sub-city levels follow suit. Zemenu Desalegn, Kirkos Sub-city Manager, emphasized the importance of educating the public and raising awareness about preventing security threats in the city, saying that everyone should actively participate in awareness-raising activities that focus on peace and security issues and protect their surroundings to ensure the city's peace and security (Ibid).

Those who attend programs organized by the city administration, however, do not include all types of residents of the community; rather, discussions focusing on public education and awareness regarding al Shabaab's security threat/ issue are mostly undertaken with community members who are mostly members of different organizations run by administration organs such as the women and youth associations.<sup>1</sup>

To educate and raise public awareness about security threats, especially the terrorism threat posed by al Shabaab, the Addis Ababa City Administration Peace and Security Bureau employs a variety of organizational structures. Local residents talk about the safety and security of their

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<sup>1</sup> FGD, Participant 2, April 21, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

neighborhoods in various parts of the city. The subjects they talk about rely on how threats behave in their specific areas.

According to an interview with an informant<sup>2</sup>, Ethiopia has been working in tandem with different levels of the public in terms of averting threats posed by terrorist groups, mainly al Shabaab. Since 2006, the terrorist organisation has been known for posing a real and immediate threat to Ethiopia's stability, security, and economic growth. However, it does not mean that the terrorist group was not a threat to the peace and security of Ethiopia before 2006 even though the group was operating using different local names. However, in 2006, the government was forced to take defensive action against al Shabaab since the group had openly declared war on Ethiopia. In the fight against the terrorist group, the government concentrated on educating and raising public awareness about the threat presented by the terrorist group throughout the country, particularly in Addis Ababa. In this instance, both government and private media played a crucial role in raising public awareness of the threats posed by al Shabaab terrorist group.<sup>3</sup>

According to the informant, the government's approach to public education and raising awareness about the security threat posed by al Shabaab to the country and the capital is both clear and effective. The plan focuses on making Ethiopians and Somalis not just fight terrorism threats, but also to make Ethiopians and Somalis (since al Shabaab's base is in Somalia) the "owners of the fight" against the terrorist group. In this case, because the public owns the fight against the threat posed by al Shabaab terrorist group, they would be eager to share credible information with various government organs, including the administration, police, military, and intelligence agency. As a result of the community's collaboration with the government in exposing persons suspected of terrorism activity, the Ethiopian government is able to prevent terror threats posed by al Shabaab terrorist group not only within Addis Ababa but also in border areas (before they reach central Ethiopia). Most suspects of the al Shabaab terrorist group and their sympathizers were apprehended in border areas before they could cause any damage in Ethiopian cities, including the capital.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, one of the mechanisms for empowering people to be owners of the fight against al Shabaab's terrorism threat is allowing Somali and Ethiopians to speak for themselves about their own and their environment's peace and security

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<sup>2</sup> KII – 01, March 30, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>3</sup> Ibid

<sup>4</sup> KII – 01, March 30, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

issues, rather than simply the government speaking about the people in issues related to terrorism threats through various media outlets.

However, trust between law enforcement experts and the public is essential for engaging the public in awareness creation programs regarding al Shabaab's terrorism threats in their local areas. Law enforcement personnel must be free of corruption, accepted in their communities, and well-trained and professional in their duties. Furthermore, the government is expected to adhere to the rule of law, work hard to address societal problems such as poverty and racism, establish sound administration, and increase the ability of security installations from the central command to the grass root levels.<sup>5</sup>

The researcher's review of the Ethiopian Herald newspaper regarding public participation in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Addis Ababa corresponds with the informant's beliefs. Publications of the Ethiopian Herald newspaper in 2006, when the Ethiopian National Defense Forces were deployed to Somalia for self-defense against terrorists, indicate that the newspaper's main focus was to let the public speak for themselves (making the community the owner of the combat towards terrorism threats) about the danger posed by the terrorist group, rather than echoing government officials' voices. As a result, the newspaper was echoing not just the words of Addis Ababa residents (Ethiopians), but also the voices of the people of Somalia (Somalis living in Ethiopia), which helped to avert al Shabaab's terror attack. According to the Ethiopian herald publication titled "Somalis residing here condemn fundamentalists";

*Some Somalis residing in Addis Ababa said they condemn fundamentalists operating in Somalia to oust the legitimate transitional government of that country by force for they put the lives of the Somalis at risk.....the terrorists are trying to make the region a safe – haven for terrorists..... Fayissa Hassen, who stayed for a long time in Ethiopia due to conflicts in Somalia, said the current situation in Somalia has reached to an alarming point..... Shermark Seid Shebel, another Somali, commented that Ethiopians and Somalis should also jointly tackle attempt of terrorists and fundamentalists aimed at creating suspicion and mistrust between them, he added. (the Ethiopian Herald, 2006, July 28, p. 1)<sup>6</sup>*

Similarly, another statement published in the August 4, 2006 issue of the Ethiopian Herald newspaper titled "Somali nationals call for all-round assistance for TFG" aimed at educating and

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid

<sup>6</sup> See - The Ethiopian Herald. (2006, July 28, P. 1). "Somalis residing here condemn fundamentalists". Newspaper, Vol. LXII, No. 275, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

raising public awareness about averting al Shabaab's security/terrorism/threat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, reads as follows;

*Somali nationals residing in Addis Ababa denounced the fundamentalist militia forces that captured Mogadishu as terrorists and anti – Islam. They also urged IGAD to immediately deploy its peace – keeping force in Somalia and rescue the country from the repeat of falling into ruins.....In a discussion they held with Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency journalists on the unfolding crisis in Somalia, yesterday, Mohammed Essey said that the so – called Union of Islamic Courts is bent on dismantling the region and exacerbate the crisis in Somalia. He added that the Union is planning to attack Ethiopia and Kenya. Mohammed noted that some of the fundamentalist forces that perpetrated terrorist acts in Addis Ababa some years back are in Mogadishu (the Ethiopian Herald, 2006, August 4, p. 1)<sup>7</sup>.*

The Ethiopian government's main objective in disseminating the voices of many communities through different media in times of adversity posed by al Shabaab terrorist group is, as can be seen from the evidence presented in the newspaper and the idea advanced by the informant, to empower citizens to lead the fight against al Shabaab. If the public is educated and is aware of being the owner of the fight against the terrorist group, the sole responsibility of law enforcement organs, including the military, would be to fulfil its supporting role for the community (KII – 01, March 30, 2023). Additionally, interacting with Addis Ababa city inhabitants alone won't guarantee the safety and security of Ethiopians in general and Addis Ababa people in particular. Instead, security and law enforcement effort is required to eradicate the threat from its source by involving Somalis and Ethiopians as a whole due to the depth and breadth of al Shabaab's network and behavior. This was the very reason that compelled the Ethiopian government to join the fight against al Shabaab in Somalia after securing the willingness of the then Somalia administration and the support of relevant regional, continental, and international organizations, even though some Somali scholars and their supporters regarded Ethiopian involvement in Somalia as a foreign invasion and the source of al Shabaab's foundation and resurrection.<sup>8</sup>

The main instruments in terms of educating and creating awareness among the public in the fight against al Shabaab's security threat are government and non – government media as well as administration organs at the grassroots level. Moreover, they were working hard to let both peoples of Somalia and Ethiopia be owners of the struggle against terrorism which help law

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<sup>7</sup> see – The Ethiopian Herald. (2006, August 4, p. 1). "Somalis nationals call for all-round assistance for TFG". Newspaper, Vol. LXII, No. 281, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

<sup>8</sup> KII - 02, March 27, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

enforcement institutions to play their supporting role during Ethiopia's involvement in Somalia's war against the terrorist group.<sup>9</sup>

Moreover, another point which shows public engagement and role was at the core policy of the Ethiopian government in terms of averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia was implicated in the Ethiopian herald's July 25, 2006 publication. The statement in the newspaper entitled "Role of Somali is Irreplaceable: Ministry" reads;

*The recent crisis in Somalia should be resolved by the will and active participation of the Somali people, the Ministry said. In its statement sent to ENA yesterday, the Ministry said the good – will of neighboring countries, including Ethiopia could not substitute the crucial role of the Somali people in resolving the crisis in that country. The decisive role in resolving the crisis in Somalia is in the hands of the people and the political forces of that country, it said, adding neighboring countries including Ethiopia could not play the key role of the Somali people in resolving the crisis besides supporting efforts toward that goal (The Ethiopian Herald, 2006, July 25, p. 1.).<sup>10</sup>*

Furthermore, community participation should play a leading role than the military to successfully avert threats which emanate from terrorist groups (Maru, M. T. 2015)<sup>11</sup>. He noted that;

*The Ethiopian Doctrine on counter - terrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) differs from others in several highly related respects.....Traditional military-led COIN and CT strategies (including peacekeeping missions) cripplingly depend on the expeditionary army, whereas the Ethiopian Doctrine focuses on liberating areas for local communities to organize, arm themselves, and fight back against terrorists. It also focuses on traditional narratives of solidarity, thereby promoting credible voices and messages of hope against despair. Additionally, the counterinsurgency soldiers must always follow and support the political and civilian officers. Thus, political work and community development advances before military operations.<sup>12</sup>*

Hence, allowing the public to speak for themselves about al Shabaab's terrorism threats and how to avoid them has two main goals: to make the public owners of the fight against the group and to engage the community as primary actors in terms of averting the threat posed by terrorist group, which aids the supporting role of law enforcement organs, including the military. As a result, the community is the key actor in the fight against the fight of al Shabaab, rather than law enforcement agencies.

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<sup>9</sup> KII – 01, March 30, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>10</sup> See – The Ethiopian Herald .(July 25, 2006). "Role of Somali is Irreplaceable: Ministry "

<sup>11</sup> See - Maru, M. T. (2015). "The secret to Ethiopia's counter - terrorism success". *Al Jazeera*, Accessed March, 10, 2023.

<sup>12</sup> Maru, M. T., 2015, p. 3

Furthermore, the researcher's review of Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation No.1176/2020 (PSTCP) shows that public education and awareness regarding averting terrorism – related threats is included in the proclamation. According to Article 35 sub – Articles 1, 3 and 4 of the proclamation the government is required to create awareness creation programs, especially for children and the youth, to prevent the threat of terrorism. In connection to that when we look at the stipulation of Article 35 sub – article 1 “The Government shall have the responsibility to prevent the recruitment of children and youth for terrorist causes, prevent the inculcation of terrorist ideas or notions of extremism and educate them.”<sup>13</sup> Moreover, sub – article 3 reads, “The Government shall educate persons or sections of a community exposed to ideas of terrorism and extremism to free them from such outlook and ideology and, where necessary, provide them with medical support.” In all these cases, public education and awareness regarding al Shabaab's terrorism threats are crucial to avert threats posed by the terrorist group.

Emergency management efforts in the US were primarily geared towards dealing with natural disasters before 9/11. After the horrific attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre, which claimed the lives of thousands of defenceless civilians, terrorism assumed an increasing prominence on the national political scene of the United States. The post-9/11 era's disaster resilience efforts initially concentrated primarily on terrorism and related preparedness. However, as time went on, disaster response and management strategies changed, adopting what is best known as an all-hazards approach. Terrorism is at present among the biggest issues that ought to be addressed in community awareness and education events, according to citizen readiness proponents. Courses for terrorism-specific awareness building and education are scarce. The general population is cautioned that by following a few uncomplicated precautions, they can improve their odds of responding effectively and calmly to an emergency (Bott, C., 2009).

According to informants<sup>14</sup>, public education and creating awareness regarding community participation and role in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Addis Ababa are made using

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<sup>13</sup> See - Article 35 sub Article 1 and 3 of Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation No. 1176/2020

<sup>14</sup> KII – 01, 02, 03, 04, 05 and FGD participants 1, 2 and 3, Addis Ababa Ethiopia

different platforms and mechanisms. Among the mechanisms and platforms, the main ones are the following.

#### **4.1.1. Educating and raising awareness among business owners**

Holding dialogue with business organizations about terrorism threats is critical to averting al Shabaab's security threat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. According to the liberalism theoretical point of view, business organizations are among the actors in combating terrorism concerns in a specific area. It is not simply the state's responsibility to prevent, monitor, and battle terrorism threats. Partnership between the public and private sectors is critical for successfully countering terrorists like al Shabaab. According to an interview conducted with the residents of the Bole Michael neighborhood in Addis Ababa, government representatives, primarily those who work for the wereda peace and security sector, communicate with business owners on a variety of occasions about peace and security issues and how to prevent threats related to al Shabaab terrorist group, though the conversations aren't always regular and well-planned.<sup>15</sup>

Those who own and work in hotels and pensions, in particular, play a critical role in combating al Shabaab's terrorism threats in their communities by successfully registering the profile/identity of their customers who stayed in the hotels/pensions and providing daily reports to respective community police officers, which aid law enforcement organs in preventing threats emanating from terrorism, including al Shabaab. Since business owners are conscious of the importance of protecting their customers' security and safety, they respect their customers' privacy while also assessing security threats in their particular surrounds and reporting to appropriate bodies whenever there is a threat in their area. Due to the intermittent educating and awareness – raising efforts made by responsible bodies, these actions are commencing to become routine behaviors of business people. To make the discussion well – planned and coherent, however, takes a lot of work.<sup>16</sup>

The informants<sup>17</sup> claimed that the government's ability to collect taxes is being strengthened by the daily reports it receives from various hotels and pensions. As a result of the hotels' and pensions' daily reports on the number of guests who have stayed with them, the revenue-

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<sup>15</sup> KII - 03, 07 and 09, April 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>16</sup> Ibid

<sup>17</sup> KII – 03 and 04, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

collection divisions of the government at the city, sub - city, and wereda levels are also better informed about the amount of money the hotels and pensions are bringing in on a daily, monthly, and annual basis. Hence, the work done by law enforcement professionals also improves the government's ability to collect taxes. In this manner, the activity being undertaken by law enforcement organs to avert al Shabaab's security threat in Addis Ababa is strengthening the business – security – revenue collection partnership/nexus, mainly in the lower echelon of the government/wereda level.

In the academic community, there has only recently been a greater understanding of the numerous additional roles that the private sector now plays in combating terrorism. As an example, Bures (2012) examined the function that private organisations today perform in combating the financing of terrorism by looking beyond the scope of the more conventional sectors (as cited in Phelps, M., 2021).

#### **4.1.2. Educating and creating awareness for people in residential blocks**

Addis Ababa city Administration has different administrative structure which spans from the city to local levels. Accordingly, the most well – known structures of the administration are - city administration, sub - cities, Woreda, Sub Weredas (sefer) and residential blocks. According to informants, such organizational structure is helpful to avert al Shabaab's security threat in the capital in addition to the structure's importance for administrative purpose.

Though the value of technology in preventing terrorist attacks in Addis Ababa cannot be overstated, it cannot, by any means, replace the crucial role performed by communities at the grassroots level. Nothing can be kept from the public as long as there is trust between the government and the people. Some threats and covert activities that cannot be detected using advanced technology can be easily identified through the active participation and engagement of local communities, as al Shabaab's terrorist suspects cannot be hidden from the community under any circumstances. An effective and efficient counter - terrorism mechanism is one that educates and raises the public's awareness about the group's terrorism threats commencing at the federal level and progressing via regions, sub - cities, Weredas, and residential blocks. This organizational structure is preventing al Shabaab from posing a security threat in Ethiopia, and particularly in Addis Ababa. Furthermore, it is vital to work hard to dry the swamps of poverty

and instability that produce terrorism in order to eliminate the threat at its foundation before it disseminate and extends significantly.<sup>18</sup>

According to an informant who lives in the Bole Michael area, the segments of society organized at the residential block level (local communities) are the most essential actors in preventing al Shabaab's security threat in their environment. According to the informant;

*The crucial sort of organizational structure to combat al Shabaab's security threat is the residential block organizational structure. Since they are locals to their respective areas, those who are a member of the structure come from all social strata. Meetings that inform and raise public awareness of their environment are irregularly held in residential block-type structures under the guidance of the wereda leadership. The leadership of the wereda evaluates the opinions of the residents, and if there are any security-related issues, they share the information with the appropriate law enforcement agencies. In this method, the community (people of the block) can identify suspected al Shabaab terrorist elements and subsequently defend their neighborhoods. However, the wereda leadership do not consistently engage with the community about security issues, and some members of the residential blocks are unwilling to attend meetings that address these threats.<sup>19</sup>*

Another informant claimed that the current political state of affairs unfolding in Ethiopia is limiting administration organs to consistently engage the community in the fight against al Shabaab. According to the informant;

*The administrative apparatus undoubtedly plays a crucial role in motivating and mobilizing society in the fight against terrorists such as al Shabaab. According to the current state of affairs in Ethiopia, the administration body is more or less preoccupied with resolving ethnic-based conflicts. As a result, the administration pays little attention to combatting al Shabaab's terrorism threat, though law enforcement agencies do it on their own. As a result, whenever the administrative organ becomes preoccupied with day-to-day operations, an independent strategic entity specializing in counter - terrorism issues, facilitating counter - terrorism debates, monitor terrorism threats and mobilize the public in counter - terrorism is required.<sup>20</sup>*

Informants also noted that the residential block type of structure helps law enforcement experts to get different tip – offs regarding al Shabaab's security threats since some taxi drivers and their assistances as well as “enforcers (*tera askebariwoch*)/ “ተራ አስከባሪዎች” are well – networked with some of those who are organized in the residential blocks. Moreover, in the residential block

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<sup>18</sup> KII – 01, March 30, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>19</sup> KII – 03 , April 4, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>20</sup> KII – 02, March 27, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

type of structure; commission workers/brokers, shoe shiners, and other sections of the society who do have deep knowledge on specific areas and who do interact with wide section of the society contribute critical role in peace and security issues in their respective environment.<sup>21</sup>

Moreover, discussions which are made regarding al Shabaab's security threat, at the residential block level, are specific and friendly since the discussions includes a coffee ceremony called "*Buna Tetu or "ሉኛ ጠጡ"*" (literally meaning let's have a coffee) program. In the coffee ceremony/programs, representatives from the government ,most of the time those who are from the peace and security office of respective weredas and community police officers as well, educate and raise awareness of the public about security threats including al Shabaab's terrorism threats so that the public would wisely protect their surroundings.<sup>22</sup>

Nevertheless, not everyone who attends the discussions is a resident of the neighbourhood; rather, discussions focusing on public education and awareness regarding security and peace issues tend to be held out with similar faces of neighbourhood residents who are typically members of various organisations run by administration structures, like women's and youth associations.<sup>23</sup>

To address the security threat posed by al Shabaab in Ethiopia - Addis Ababa, the country should not replicate the strategies developed by other countries. Instead, the Ethiopian government prioritizes trusting the local community (the people) and educating them about al Shabaab's terrorism threats in their environment. Residents of Addis Ababa, in particular, do not tolerate the terrorist group's activities and the threats it poses to the people, either morally or on other grounds. By doing so, al Shabaab has been successfully prevented from causing meaningful harm to our society.<sup>24</sup>

The Israeli government, according to Bott, C., (2009), emphasizes that public education has a useful function. There is a civic obligation component to preparation and preparedness activities in Israeli society and culture. Everyone must presume their own accountability for being aware of the threat and to develop adequate behaviour in order to maximise the likelihood of existence and support for their relatives. Having a preparedness plan is not exclusively a government

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<sup>21</sup> KII – 03, 05, 06 and 10, April, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>22</sup> FGD, participant 2, April 21, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>23</sup> KII – 04, 05, 08 - April 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>24</sup> KII – 01, March 30, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

commitment in Israeli society, and as a result, citizens are not passive observers when it comes to emergency situations that must be treated by Israeli authorities. Both the government and the people appear to bear responsibility for putting into practise a national culture of readiness as a capable and willing partner in moments of calamity. The government is responsible for providing the necessary education to inform the population about the threat and survival strategies (Ibid).

#### **4.1.3. Education and creating awareness for youth and women organization**

Extremist violence has substantially increased in recent years. These groups increasingly target women and women's rights all across the world. They terrorize communities and rip apart the social fabric via sexual and gender-based violence. The gendered aspects of violent extremism have been acknowledged in various UN Security Council Resolutions. For men, women, and children, these have different effects. Often, women are solely viewed as the victims of violent extremism. However, women actually perform a variety of roles. They serve as first responders and preventers. They guide civil society organizations and promote resiliency in local communities. Promoting women as peacemakers acknowledges their contributions to violence prevention and peacebuilding and maintains respect for everyone's human rights in regions affected by violent extremism. If women are included and their opinions are considered, averting and combating violent extremism (P/CVE) will be more successful, long-lasting, and meaningful (Giscard d'Estaing, 2017). The gender-responsive framework employed by UN Women is based on human rights concepts and incorporates conflict sensitivity techniques. With a goal of including the government and society, UN Women's assistance focuses on capacity building, inclusive procedures, and people-centric approaches to CT and PVE (Brown & Sayedatah, 2022).

The communities strategy for combating and preventing youth involvement in terrorism should be based on the knowledge of how young people join violent extremist groups. There are many intricate ways to join violent extremist or terrorist organizations. Many young individuals are enlisted by sympathizing family members or are persuaded to join because they think doing so will protect their families or communities. Others are conned, trafficked, abducted, or compelled to join groups (Darden, 2019). In such a case, educating and raising awareness among young

people is critical to successfully preventing security threats related with al Shabaab's terrorism threat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

When compared to the total population young and women constitute a sizeable portion of the population of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.<sup>25</sup> As a result, putting a lot of effort into programs to raise awareness of terrorist concerns among women and young people about the threats to security posed by al Shabaab is crucial to keeping the peace and prosperity of Addis Ababa and its residents.

According to interviews and FGD made with participants, the Addis Ababa city administration's organizational structures, from the city to various district levels, which comprises women and youth is playing crucial role in terms of thwarting threats posed by al Shabaab terrorist group. The city Administration do make different awareness creation discussions with the youth and women, which focus on averting terrorism, related threats, including al Shabaab. According to one FGD participant;

*The organizational structures like the youth league, women league, and peace army (currently established) are well – aware about al Shabaab terrorism related threats in their respective areas. The education and awareness creation work done in these types of organizations is helping to narrow a room for terrorists, like al Shabaab since those who are organized in the structures organ do not accept the objective of the terrorist group.<sup>26</sup>*

In the context of Ethiopia, the government also conduct awareness creation programs to the youth regarding peace, security and development issues in coordination with other continental organs for those who are represented from different structures. According to Ethiopian news agency, for example, published on November 29, 2019 reads;

*.....Addis Ababa hosted a two-day workshop for African youths under the theme “Peace Ethiopia: Cross-Regional Dialogue and Experience Sharing”. The workshop was organized by the Government of Ethiopia, in association with the African Union (AU), to deliberate on youth's engagement and participation in nation building, normative frameworks on youth's roles in peace and nation building,,.....African leaders need to further enhance the engagement of youth in peace and other regional issues in order to play their multi-faceted roles (ENA, November 29, 2019 )<sup>27</sup>.*

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<sup>25</sup> Central Statistics Agency (CSA) – Ethiopia, 2007

<sup>26</sup> FGD, participants 2 and 7 April 21, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>27</sup> See – Ethiopian News Agency. (November 29, 2019). “African Youths Urge for their Active Role in Promoting Peace, Dev't”. [https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en\\_11014?](https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en_11014?)

The youngsters who participate in these trainings do broaden their knowledge of topics related to al Shabaab's terrorism threats in addition to what they already know about those topics. The young people who take part in these discussions would especially benefit from the opportunity to increase their awareness of terrorism-related issues because they do share different experiences from the youth who came from other African states due to al Shabaab's extensive international network.

Base on the interviews conducted with informants, discussions with youth and women which focus on al Shabaab's terrorism threats are common in Addis Ababa. Youth and women participate in discussions called coffee ceremonies which do took place at residential block levels/grassroots levels/ and discuss security threat issues with government representatives and to each other as well. According to the informants important tip – offs regarding terrorism - related issues are acquired from them.<sup>28</sup>

According to a participant in the FGD, discussions among the young and women about the security situation in their area are interactive, and people uncover suspicious behaviors, even the wrongdoings of their families. When it comes to al Shabaab terrorism objectives, people do not accept it morally or culturally since they believe it destroys their economy and social fabric.<sup>29</sup>

However participants two and three who took part in the FGD asserted that grassroots discussions about peace and security issues are not inclusive and representative. Additionally, law enforcement agencies do create programs to raise awareness of security threats among young people and women after incidents have happened rather than before.

Participant one, two, and three of FGD argues that the priority for preventing al Shabaab's security threat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, should be drying the terrorist group's supply from its base, because the terrorist group's incursions at border areas have the ultimate goal of attacking Addis Ababa and its people. Furthermore, according to an Ethiopian News Agency statement, al Shabaab is interested in destabilizing the peace and security of central Ethiopia. According to the statement;

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<sup>28</sup> FGD participants (1 and 6), interview with key informants 03,06, and 10 - April, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>29</sup> FGD, Participants 1 and 5, April 21, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

.....Al-Shabab, an offshoot of the Islamic Courts has been operating in Somalia for the last 16 years with the objective of forming Islamic Greater Somalia by incorporating the Ogaden area of Ethiopia, North Frontier District of Kenya and Djibouti.....The group reportedly launched attacks in three villages in Bokol area in the villages of Washaaqom , Aato and Yeed. This is the first cross border attack ever conducted on Ethiopian territory by Al-Shabab. Why did Al-Shabab dare to conduct this attack? A more profound analysis for the attack shows that Al-Shabab launched the attack in a bid to establish terrorist cells in Ethiopia and to use these cells as jump seats and launch further attacks in the center of Ethiopia (Ethiopian News Agency, July, 2022)<sup>30</sup>.

According to the aforementioned information, the terrorist group's ultimate goal is to establish a foothold in certain regions of Ethiopia. Additionally, it hopes to eventually organize a cell there and launch a targeted attack on the nation's capital and other major cities, undermining Ethiopia's standing internationally. However, the awareness-raising initiatives being carried out with various young people and women in various communities, as well as with the organizational structures like the “peace army” (which is recently established by the governments), women's leagues, and youth leagues...are helping as al Shabaab’s terrorism prevention measures in Addis Ababa. Furthermore, involving women in preventing al Shabaab's security threat activity in Addis Ababa helps to increase women's participation and decision-making in peace and security agendas, which are currently claimed by women in order to realize the full flourishing of their rights.

#### **4.2. Community Engagement in Reporting al Shabaab’s Suspicious Activity**

In response to an increase in terrorist attacks throughout the world during the preceding few decades, security have been reinforced to prevent hard target areas such as government institutions and defence installations. As a result, some terrorists have started targeting less heavily fortified soft targets, such as offices, hotels, restaurants, schools, and shopping malls. The level of terrorist threat to civilians has escalated as a result of this change in emphasis (Bott, C., 2009).

Scholarship concerning terrorist organisations as well as evaluation of terrorist attacks have resulted in a deeper comprehension of the characteristics and acts that are expected to occur

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<sup>30</sup> See - Ethiopian News Agency. (July, 2022). “National Defense Force On High Alert to Crush Al-Shabab Insurgents”.  
[https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en\\_37590?p\\_l\\_back\\_url=%2Fweb%2Feng%2Fsearch%3Fq%3DAI%2Bshabaab%2Battack%2Bin%2Bethiopia%2Bstadium%2Bsoccer%2Bmatch](https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en_37590?p_l_back_url=%2Fweb%2Feng%2Fsearch%3Fq%3DAI%2Bshabaab%2Battack%2Bin%2Bethiopia%2Bstadium%2Bsoccer%2Bmatch)

before a disaster in the months, days, or minutes before the event. These pre-incident measures provide chances to perform engagement at each level of attack preparations. Terrorists are required to gather armament products, carry inspection, move between spots and observe safety equipment, all of which strengthen the possibility that they will meet people who are part of the public. Persons of the general populace might come across issues that just don't appear right in the ordinary course of what they do every day, whether it's somebody acting strangely or an object that doesn't appear to correspond there. When encountered with these persons or objects, the public is likely to be puzzled of what to do or how they should decide whether what they view poses a threat or requires help. An informed public can work with law enforcement and intelligence agencies as a force multiplier to help stop terrorist attacks if given the right instructions on what constitutes "suspicious" in terms of terrorist activity and what to do if something is noticed to be suspicious (Ibid).

The section that follows provides an overview of Ethiopia's approach to combating al Shabaab's security threat in Addis Ababa, including how the community reports suspicious activity and how it aids in the fight against terrorism-related issues.

Given that al Shabaab's deep interest in terms of destabilizing Ethiopia in general and the center of the country in particular remains intact, participating the community in the capital city to prevent terrorism related threats is a must to done activity to the government. According to review of relevant documents and participants in an interview as well as FGD, when it comes to al Shabaab security threats, the public in Addis is keen and report almost all suspicious activity whom they believe are odd and uncommon in their area. The successful operations against the terrorist group in side Ethiopia and in the areas Ethiopia participated for peace – keeping missions are related to the active community participation and security related tip – offs acquired from the public.<sup>31</sup> More specifically, in terms of exposing suspects in connection with the failed suicide bombers attack by al Shabaab in the center of Addis Ababa stadium in October 2013, when Ethiopia vs. Nigeria was being watched by more than 20,000 people, the engagement of law enforcement organs and the community of Bole Michael area was critical and decisive in terms of preventing future similar attacks in the area. Before the terrorists arrived at the Addis Ababa Stadium, where they planned to attack, the bomb that the terrorist group's suspects had

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<sup>31</sup> KII, 01 and 02, April, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

prepared exploded. The interest of the relevant law enforcement experts was to conduct an investigation into the blast to prevent further attacks in the capital or other parts of the country. In this regard, community of the area actively engaged with pertinent law enforcement professionals to provide information and identify the suspects of the terrorist group who were renting homes nearby. Hence, the community participation in terms of reporting suspicious activities in the area was invaluable, too.<sup>32</sup>

The awareness of the public in terms of reporting suspicious activities in connection with al Shabaab's failed bomb attack at Addis Ababa stadium football World Cup qualifying match of October 2013 is demonstrated in the statement published in the Ethiopian Herald newspaper titled "Taskforce identifies attempt of terrorists' acts, urged the public to remain vigilant". Accordingly;

*..... following a bomb blast occurred at a residential house rented by two unknown individuals in Bole sub – city commonly known as Rwanda area last Sunday, the National Intelligence and Security Service and Federal Police Joint – Counter - terrorism Taskforce said that it would continue investigating the cause of the blast. Accordingly, the Taskforce has come with additional evidences while carrying on to further investigate the cause, .....The Taskforce called on the public to keep up their effective cooperation in order to protect terrorist attacks both from inside and outside (the Ethiopian Herald, October 15, 2013)<sup>33</sup>.*

Based on the statement above, community reporting in connection to al Shabaab's suspicious activities is critical. The government demand for the public "to keep up effective cooperation" demonstrates the public played critical role in terms of reporting suspicious activities in an effective manner even before the failed October 2013 attack of the terrorist group.

Furthermore while elaborating the failed attempts of al Shabaab, voice of America reported that (which substantiate community role in reporting suspicious activities of the threat posed by al Shabaab terrorist group);

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<sup>32</sup> KII- 02 and KII – 03, April, 2023, Addis, Ethiopia

<sup>33</sup> See – The Ethiopian Herald. (October 15, 2013). "Taskforce identifies attempt of terrorists' acts, urged the public to remain vigilant". Newspaper, Vol. LXX No 030, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

*Over the past five years, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and the self-declared republic of Somaliland have all been attacked by Somalia-based al-Shabaab militants. Ethiopia, which invaded Somalia in 2006 to fight Al-Shabaab, has since evaded a large-scale attack. According to Tewolde Mulugeta of Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the country's secret to preventing attacks is public involvement. While it is not clear how many prospective attacks Ethiopian security forces have prevented, one bomb did explode inside a central Addis Ababa house in 2013. Police believe the attackers were preparing it for a large football match taking place that day (Voice of America - English, September 18, 2015)<sup>34</sup>.*

The researchers review on Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009 and the recently revised Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation (PSTCP) No. 1176/2020 regarding community role and engagement in averting al Shabaab's terrorism threats more specifically in relation to reporting suspicious activities of the terrorist group are included in different Articles of the proclamations. Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009 Articles 12, 22 as well as 35 show the importance of community role and engagement in averting terrorism threats in Ethiopia in relation to reporting suspicious activities of terrorists. According to Article 12 of the proclamation;

*“Whosoever, having information or evidence that may assist to prevent terrorist act before its commission, or having information or evidence capable to arrest or prosecute or punish a suspect who has committed or prepared to commit an act of terrorism, fails to immediately inform or give information or evidence to the police without reasonable cause, or gives false information, is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from 3 to 10 years.”<sup>35</sup>*

Furthermore, Article 35 states *“Whosoever fails or is unwilling to make the requested cooperation, pursuant to Article 13, 14, 15, 21 or 22 of this Proclamation, or intentionally makes any hindrance on the crime prevention or investigation functions of the police is punishable with rigorous imprisonment from three to ten years.”<sup>36</sup>*

Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation (PSTCP) No. 1176/2020 also implicitly promote public role and engagement in terms of exposing suspicious activities of terrorists like al Shabaab. Article 15 sub – Article 1 of the proclamation stipulates;

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<sup>34</sup> See - Voice of America - English. (September 18, 2015). “Ethiopia Successful in Preventing Al-Shabab's Attacks”. <https://www.voanews.com/amp/ethiopia-avoids-al-shabab-attacks/2969120.html>

<sup>35</sup> See – article 12 of Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009

<sup>36</sup> See – article 35 of Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009

*“Whosoever without justifiable cause fails to immediately notify to the police or appropriate law enforcement organ knowing that any act provided for in Articles 3, 6, 7, 9 to 10 of this Proclamation is about to be committed, being committed or committed or the identity of the suspect shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment from one year to three years.”<sup>37</sup>*

The government has made some very strong demands, but the proclamations also tacitly recognize and encourage the value of public participation and engagement in preventing terrorism threats, including al Shabaab, because nothing can be kept from the public. Therefore, the government's interest in this case is to receive terrorism - related tip-offs that aid in thwarting or averting a terrorist attack by the group and other terrorist elements (In addition to the compelling nature of the proclamations).

### **4.3. Public-Government Engagement in Countering al Shabaab’s Terrorism Threats**

A clear knowledge of each party's obligations and roles is crucial to the government-public partnership in counter - terrorism activities. arguably the greatest and most important responsibilities of a nation is to educate its citizens on multiple possibilities pertaining to the country's security as well as their personal safety. The public needs to know this information in order for them to be able to take responsibility for their own safety and the security of their own homes. A counter - terrorism plan that encourages an active and strong public engagement must include information dissemination as a crucial and necessary element. A logical and comprehensive plan for threat messaging must be developed for a homeland security strategy to be effective. Taking the issue of trust in to Consideration, terrorism-related communications need to be two-way conversations, just like any other successful communication. The only way for both sides to support each other's efforts and abilities is through smooth flow of information between them. This will also make it easier for both parties to agree on the types and scope of responsibilities in the event of serious terrorism-related threats. This does not, however, imply that law enforcement experts disclose all information they have with their informants in the relevant locations. The issue of compartmentation (the informants are only required to know what is relevant to them) remains intact.

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<sup>37</sup> See – article 15 sub article 1 of Ethiopian Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation (PSTCP) No. 1176/2020

In 2006, al Shabaab posed a grave danger to Ethiopia's safety and security, according to an interview with an informant.<sup>38</sup> Following the threat posed by the terrorist group, Ethiopia implemented a clear strategy for preventing the threat posed by the terrorist group, which included: eliminating the problem at its source, raising society's awareness of al Shabaab's security threat, bolstering security institutions, and fostering regional and international cooperation to prevent terrorism-related threats. As a result, public-government engagement in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, has been enhanced. Following the policy, the public's role and engagement in averting the security threat posed by al Shabaab increased.<sup>39</sup>

According to the informant, in relation with promoting international and regional cooperation in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia, the policy assisted Ethiopia by developing and tightening its engagement of intelligence with intelligence, police with police, and military with military of other countries like Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti. In terms of eliminating the terrorist organization at its source, there was strong international collaboration with the US, too. As a result, the clear policy Ethiopia implemented, in particular, the public-government partnership established, the emphasis placed on respective law enforcement agencies, and the amicable cooperation Ethiopia established regionally and internationally, assisted Ethiopia in successfully averting al Shabaab's security threat in the country. Furthermore, the policy strengthened Ethiopia's role in regional peace and security issues.<sup>40</sup> Overall, community awareness and engagement from the border to the heart of Addis Ababa has been the key to Ethiopia's success against al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa.<sup>41</sup>

Following Ethiopia's involvement in fighting al Shabaab inside Somalia in 2006, the media played a critical role in strengthening public-government engagement in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Addis Ababa. Almost all government and non-government media played significant role in educating and raising awareness about the terrorist group's threat, as evidenced<sup>42</sup> by the public's involvement in averting October 2013's planned attack at Addis

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<sup>38</sup> KII – 02, March 27, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>39</sup> KII - 02, March 27, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

<sup>41</sup> KII - 01, March 30, 2023 and KII - 02, March 27, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>42</sup> Though the goal of the terrorist group was to attack in Addis Ababa stadium, the plan failed due to well - organized and tight security as well as government – public engagement.

Ababa stadium.<sup>43</sup> Regarding the fight against al Shabaab terrorist group inside Somalia, al Shabaab worked hard to depicting Ethiopia as an invading power. As a result, al Shabaab made relentless effort utilizing various media to portray Ethiopia as a “Christian state”, and some Somalia scholars joined the propaganda, propagating Ethiopia as a cause for the foundation and growth of al Shabaab. Due to this issue, Ethiopia's goal to weaken al Shabaab in a short period and evacuate its forces promptly was thwarted by al Shabaab propaganda and some Somali scholars. Furthermore, the Somali people were susceptible to al Shabaab propaganda.<sup>44</sup>

Interviews and focus group discussion with informants in the Bole - Michael area reveal a solid public-government partnership in combating al Shabaab's security threat in Addis Ababa. Aside from extensive media coverage of the terrorist group's threat, local administration and various law enforcement agencies are eager and determined to engage the public. As a result, robust community participation in discussions planned by local wereda peace and security office representatives and relevant community police representatives demonstrates public-government engagement on terrorism-related issues. In such cases, the public help by reporting security-related tip-offs to the organizers of the discussion.<sup>45</sup> In addition to other sources, the people and local administrative bodies serve as the government's primary information sources. Information gathered at the community level aids law enforcement agencies that focus on terrorism-related issues in analyzing and using the information for the intended purpose.<sup>46</sup>

Another informant, however, stated that public-government cooperation is insufficient and weak in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Addis Ababa. The government lacks concrete information about al Shabaab since it does not fully engage the community in the fight against the terrorist organization. In this instance, mass arrests are made by the government to serve as a deterrent rather than finding the actual targets. These occasions frequently occur during African Union meetings and events.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> KII - 02, March 27, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>44</sup> While the Ethiopian government was engaging with the then Somalia government and relevant regional organizations to fight the threat of terrorism, the terrorist group unleashed persistent propaganda to portray Ethiopia as an invading country.

<sup>45</sup> FGD April 21, 2023; KII – 03, April 4, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>46</sup> KII – 02, March 27, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

<sup>47</sup> KII – 08, April 5, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

The researcher has also reviewed the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia's government Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) document. Ethiopia's government developed and released the FANSPS document in 2002. The document implicitly implies public participation in issues relating to terrorism. According to the FANSPS (2002)<sup>48</sup>, ensuring that the continued existence of the nation is a subject of security policy, therefore other security concerns might only be brought up if national existence is guaranteed. Accordingly, the primary goal of developing any kind of foreign policy or security strategy is to ensure the survival and security of the country by addressing backwardness, the infancy of good governance and poverty internally.<sup>49</sup> As consequently, obtaining rapid growth in the economy, democratization, and harmonious relations is of paramount relevance to the country's survival. Poverty and backwardness are what pose the nation's main national threats. The safeguarding of these national interests and security forms the basis of all of the nation's dealings with other nations. Additionally, the document specifies that the primary internal security threats to the nation be domestic. The material states that until rapid economic development and the establishment of democratic governance prevail, the likelihood of growing impoverishment, in along with the deficiency of democracy as well as efficient governance, could end up resulting in the country's collapse and higher susceptibility to outside forces. Since it places the economy at the very core of a country's security policy, the idea claims that the government ought to focus on economic issues along with the notion that all foreign relations should be based on the development of the economy. The document states that a nation's ability to withstand threats to its internal and external security depends mostly on rapid economic growth. Hence, the country's social – economic performance should be considered as counter - terrorism actions. Therefore, addressing the factors that encourage terrorists like al Shabaab, such as poverty, backwardness, and unemployment, are the best way to combat terrorism. As a result, this is how the public-government engagement is framed in the policy and strategy document.

Making the public to engage in the sense of “ownership” against security threats, including threats emanating from al Shabaab terrorist group, to the country is also implicitly implied in the

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<sup>48</sup> See - The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy And Strategy, published in 2002 by the Ministry of Information.

<sup>49</sup> FANSPS, 2002, P. 1 and p. 34 - 35

Ethiopia's Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FNSPS) view. According to the document;

*Open discussions on policies empower the people to closely monitor the government's implementation of these policies, and would ensure the introduction of a culture of transparency and accountability and indeed, democracy. If members of the public truly understand the objective, goals, strategies and policies, they can play a positive role in ensuring that policy implementation is on track.<sup>50</sup>*

Furthermore, Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009 and the recently revised Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation (PSTCP) No. 1176/2020 encourages (in addition to their compelling nature) public – government engagement in matters of al Shabaabs terrorism threats. According to Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009 Article 15<sup>51</sup> sub – Articles 1 and 2 respectively;

*1/ Whosoever leases a house, place, room, vehicle or any similar facility shall have the duty to register in detail the identity of the lessee and notify the same to the nearest police station within 24 hours.*

*2/ Any person, who lets a foreigner live in his house, shall have a duty to notify the nearest police within 24 hours, about the identity of the foreigner and submit a copy of his passport.*

Furthermore, Article 33 sub – Articles 1 and 2 of the recently revised Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation (PSTCP) No. 1176/2020 consolidates Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009. According to Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation (PSTCP) No. 1176/2020 Article 33<sup>52</sup> sub – Articles 1 and 2;

*1/ A lessor who rents house, premises, buildings, Organization facilities, vehicles or any other equipment and facilities shall have the responsibility to keep documents relating to name, address, occupation, and Nationality of the lessee until two years after the termination of the lease.*

*2/ Whosoever provides accommodation to a foreigner in its premise shall submit a copy of the details within in seventy two hours about the identity of the foreigner and the copy of his passport to the nearest police station.*

Regarding preventing al Shabaab's terrorism threats, the aforementioned legal requirements are beneficial from two angles. On the one hand, it enables the lessor—the owner of the property—to broaden and deepen their understanding of threats related to terrorism in general and the

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<sup>50</sup> FNSPS, 2002, p. 52

<sup>51</sup> See – article 15 sub – articles 1 and 2 of Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009

<sup>52</sup> See – article 33 sub – articles 1 and 2 of Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation (PSTCP) No. 1176/2020

terrorist group in particular. On the other hand, it promotes public-government engagement with regard to terrorism-related issues because it does not affect the lessor's ability to earn an income; rather, the government's request is for information about the details/identity of the lessee.

The security and safety of residents of Addis Ababa cannot be ensured by concentrating al Shabaab's terrorism threats prevention efforts solely within the city. In this regard, the government is working hard in terms of strengthening public – government partnerships starting from the border up to the center of Addis Ababa. The statement of Ethiopian News Agency (ENA)<sup>53</sup> titled “Residents of Gode Town Laud Measures Taken Against Al-Shabaab by ENDF, Somali Special Force” demonstrates the importance of amicable public – government partner in boarder areas in relation to averting al Shabaab's security threat to Ethiopia and the capital city as well. The statement of ENA reads;

*.....It is to be recalled that terrorist Al-Shabaab group which tried to infiltrate through Eastern Ethiopia has been successfully thwarted by the joint efforts of the security forces. ....Youth and the entire community are working in collaboration with security forces to ensure peace in Gode..... Gode Town administration Security Head, Hashi Abdi for his part said the residents have been providing huge amount of support to the security forces that had destroyed the terrorist group. The active involvement of the residents in guarding their peace will help prevent Al Shabaab from repeating its evil acts in Ethiopia that it has been carrying out in neighboring Somalia (Ethiopian News Agency (August 7, 2022)).<sup>54</sup>*

Public–government engagement regarding averting al Shabaab's security threat in Addis Ababa was witnessed in the October's 2013 failed plan of al Shabaab terrorist group. According to Sudan Tribune (2013);

*Ethiopian security officials on Wednesday said that Al Shabaab, a Somali terrorist group allied to Al-Qaeda, was behind a failed bomb attack in Addis Ababa in October.....Police told Sudan Tribune that the suicide bombers planned to bomb Addis Ababa stadium when over 20,000 spectators were watching a qualifier for the football World Cup between Ethiopia and Nigeria.....“The failed terrorist attempt at Addis Ababa Stadium was one among the number of similar attempts foiled due [to] joint coordinated efforts of the people and government of Ethiopia” NISS said in a statement (Sudan Tribune, December 25, 2013)<sup>55</sup>.*

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<sup>53</sup> Ethiopian News Agency. (August 7, 2022). “Residents of Gode Town Laud Measures Taken Against Al-Shabab by NDF, Somali Special Force”. [https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en\\_37666](https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en_37666)

<sup>54</sup> Ibid

<sup>55</sup> Sudan Tribune. (December 25, 2013). “Al Shabaab behind plot to bomb stadium, says Ethiopia”. <https://sudantribune.com/article48270/>

As a result, in the foregoing assertions, public-government engagements in preventing al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia play a critical role. More importantly, the Sudan Tribune statement, ".....similar attempts foiled due [to] joint coordinated efforts of the people and government of Ethiopia," demonstrates that public-government engagement in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia was the key to preventing the group's interest in Ethiopia, even before the October, 2013 failed attack.

The respondents claim that since the effects of al Shabaab's terrorism threat include chaos and the destruction of both lives and property, an amicable public-government partnership in preventing al Shabaab's security threat in Addis Ababa is essential to the safety and security of the officials and local community as well. According to an informant;

*People in Addis Ababa's streets are increasingly having their automobiles, cellphones, and other properties stolen. Despite seeing the robbers rushing around them after stealing the items, the community remains silent. However, when it comes to terrorism threats like al Shabaab, the community report everything they know about the suspects of the group because the government and non-government media have worked actively in educating the society. As a result, the government should use the lesson of a strong community engagement culture in combating terrorism threats like al Shabaab to prevent other crimes like robbery and theft of property like cars and mobile phones, which is currently becoming a new normal in Addis Ababa's streets.<sup>56</sup>*

According to Spalek (2012), the belief that communities can combat terrorism, entails community engagement and collaboration work with law enforcement agencies through a variety of means, both nationally and locally.

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<sup>56</sup> KII – 03, April 4, 2023, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

#### **4.4. Findings**

Despite many attempts by al Shabaab to target Addis Ababa, the terrorist group has been unable to fulfil its goal of destabilization. Given al Shabaab's strong desire and practical attempts to attack the country (as evidenced by the data presented and analysis performed), Ethiopia has been successful in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia - Addis Ababa. The main factor for its success was the community-based counter - terrorism approach it has taken in the fight against the terrorist group. In this particular instance, Ethiopia appears to be using a liberalist approach to counter - terrorism by involving both state and non-state entity in its fight against al Shabaab. Ethiopians, particularly residents of Addis Ababa, have come together in their fight against al Shabaab, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or political differences, according to the responses and the researcher's document analysis and interpretation. The main factors for successfully averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia - Addis Ababa are public education and awareness regarding terrorism threats mainly at residential block levels/grassroots/, community engagement in reporting suspicious activities, and amicable public - government engagement on terrorism - related matters. As a result, these are enabling the local administration and people of Addis Ababa in carrying out their usual activities in the capital in a peaceful manner, despite al Shabaab's determination to carry out an attack in the capital. According to the study, Ethiopia is employing a community-led/based counter-terrorism approach in Addis Ababa, which has resulted in its success in averting al Shabaab's terrorist attack. The approach also embraces the public as the "owner of the struggle" rather than just a participant in the fight against the security threat posed by al Shabaab.

The study shows that government effort in terms of community engagement and making the community owner in the fight against criminal activities like property theft is not as strong as that of the community participation and engagement seen in the fight against terrorists like al Shabaab. In the latter case, the community is determined to track down and report suspicious activities of terrorist organizations like al Shabaab whenever they witness information about suspects. Therefore, the government should adopt the will and culture of combating terrorism-related threats within the Addis Ababa community in order to battle criminal actions like robbery of properties in the capital's streets.

Given its economic strength, Ethiopia appears to be savvy in determining the best counter-terrorism policy and plan to combat the terrorist group's threat. In fact, the importance and effectiveness of technology in neutralizing al Shabaab's security threat cannot be overstated. However, in countries such as Ethiopia, where the economy is still developing and other sectors of the economy demand attention, it is difficult to prioritize technology as the first option for completely monitoring and averting the threat posed by the terrorist group. Rather, developing countries can successfully avert the threat of al shabaab's terrorism by implementing community-based counter-terrorism policies and strategies as priority option, that empower and fully engage the public, and by employing technology that takes into account the level of economy they have. Given its success in the area, even advanced countries should consider Ethiopia's community-based counter-terrorism strategy because technology cannot adequately understand and read the thoughts and deep interests of terrorist suspects, which can be easily identified when active community engagement is implemented in each and every target area.

The researcher takes into account the limitations placed on community engagement in averting al Shabaab's terrorism threat. The public may not always be as informed as it should be, and the success of preventing terrorist threats may also be hampered by a lack of knowledge and expertise in choosing appropriate targets. The researcher contends that technology becomes crucial in these situations.

In general, the study holds that community engagement and the use of cutting-edge technology play significant roles in thwarting al Shabaab's terrorist threats and that they complement rather than replace one another. Community-based counter-terrorism policy and strategy, however, appears to be effective and pertinent in nations like Ethiopia where other economic sectors should receive focus in order to transform the populace into economic advancement.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### 5. CONCLUSION

Ethiopia has been fighting al Shabaab for a long period considering that the terrorist group is a threat to its prosperity. The group was also threatening the peace and security of Ethiopia since al Shabaab sees Ethiopia as, inter alia, the main impediment to the achievement of its goal of establishing the Islamic Greater Somalia through the integration of Ethiopia's Ogaden area, Kenya's North Frontier District and Djibouti. According to respondents and the documents reviewed, the skirmish it is making in some border areas of Ethiopia is not its mere objective rather al Shabaab's main goal is to organize cells (establish a foothold) in some areas of the country and then to mobilize these cells for a major attack in the center of Ethiopia, the capital Addis Ababa. The terrorist group's recent (as of July 2022) incursions on the Ethiopia-Somalia border in the Afer Zone of Ethiopia's Somali Region are evidence of its desire to establish a foothold in Ethiopia. The villages of Washaaqom, Aato, and Yeed were the targets of the group's unsuccessful attacks in three villages in the Bokol region.

Giving due attention to this situation, this study aimed to identify the nexus between community role and engagement in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. Though there is no disagreement among scholars regarding averting terrorism threats, there is still a debate among scholars on how to avert terrorism threats unfolding in different areas. The literature consulted for the aim of this study reveals that there are those who support just state actors as main actors in the fight against terrorism and those who favor both state and non-state actors as parties to avert terrorism threats, including al Shabaa's security threat. To arrive at a plausible conclusion, the study highlighted a crucial question: what relationship exists between community engagement and averting the security threat posed by al Shabaab in Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa? Accordingly, the study revealed that community role and engagement was the main factor in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Addis Ababa.

Despite the terrorist group's strong desire to disrupt Addis Ababa, al Shabaab has yet to cause serious damage in Ethiopia's capital. The Ethiopian government's effectiveness in averting the terrorist threat posed by al Shabaab in Addis Ababa is related to its community-based/led counter-terrorism approach, particularly in the war against the terrorist group, al Shabaab. Moreover,

according to informants and reviewed documents, the safety and security of Addis Ababa residents cannot be protected by merely engaging Addis Ababa residents; rather, engaging the public from the border to the heart of the country and strengthening partnership with relevant regional and international partners is required since terrorism is carried out in a networked and sophisticated manner.

According to the study, both state and non-state entities are essential in thwarting the threat emanating from the terrorist group, al Shabaab. Thus, public education and creating awareness about terrorism threats, particularly among youth, women, business owners, and people at the residential block/grassroots level, community engagement in reporting suspicious activities, and amicable public-government partnership in terrorism-related matters are the main factors for the successful prevention of al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa. More importantly, according to respondents, the “*let's have coffee/ ቡና ጠጥ*” dialogues which involve diverse people, focus on peace and security issues, and take place at the residential/grassroots level are crucial for law enforcement experts. In such discussions, law enforcement experts receive key tip-offs that are critical for their activities in averting terrorism-related concerns, including al Shabaab's security threat in Addis Ababa.

The community-based/led approach to counter - terrorism, which aims to empower rather than merely engage the public in the fight against the threat of terrorism posed by al Shabaab, is therefore essential for the residents and local officials of Addis Ababa to peacefully carry out their daily activities.

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# Appendices

## Appendix A

### **I. Guiding Interview questions for law enforcement experts and administration bodies**

1. How do you see the threat presented by al Shabaab to the peace and development of Ethiopian/Addis Ababa?
2. What are the main factors for the breeding of terrorism in Ethiopia?
3. What were Ethiopia's policy and strategy in practice to combat terrorism? Are these strategies successful? How do you evaluate their advantages and disadvantages? Their implications in a head of time?
4. Do you think that Ethiopia was successful in terms of averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia mainly Addis Ababa? Why ?
5. How do you express the nexus between public participation and counterterrorism efforts?
6. How do you see the importance of public engagement in terms of averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia/Addis Ababa?
7. How do you evaluate authorities – community nexus in averting al Shbaab's terrorism threat?
8. What are the particular approaches that government officials encourage and assist the community for fruitful participation in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia/Addis Ababa?
9. What are the implications of public participation based counterterrorism activities to the safety and security of Ethiopia, the residents of Addis Ababa and the local officials as well?
10. Any point you want to add regarding the topic.

### **II. Interview questions for different parts of the community**

1. How do you see the threat presented by al Shabaab to the peace and development of Ethiopian/Addis Ababa?
2. Do you think that the fight against al Shabaab in Addis Ababa is successful ? why ?
3. What is the nexus between public participation and counterterrorism efforts?

4. How do you see the importance of public engagement in terms of averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia/Addis Ababa?
5. What seems your awareness regarding the fight against al Shabaab's security threat in Addis Ababa?
6. How do you evaluate your/the public Participation in Suspicious Activity Reporting in connection with Al shabaab's security threat?
7. How do you evaluate government representatives – community nexus as far as the threat of terrorism is concerned around your area?
8. What are the particular approaches that government officials encourage and assist the community for fruitful participation in averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia/Addis Ababa?
9. What are the implications of public participation based counterterrorism activities to the safety and security of the residents of Addis Ababa and the local officials as well?

The participants of the interview includes:

<b>Code of the informant</b>	<b>Name of the institution</b>	<b>Location of interview</b>
KII – 01	Ministry of Defense	Addis Ababa
KII – 02	Ministry of Defense	Addis Ababa
KII – 03	Addis Ababa City Administration	Addis Ababa
KII – 04	Addis Ababa City Administration	Addis Ababa
KII – 05	Resident of Bole – Michael	Addis Ababa
KII – 06	National Intelligence and Security Service	Addis Ababa
KII – 07	Resident of Bole Michael	Addis Ababa
KII – 08	Resident of Bole Michael	Addis Ababa
KII – 09	Works around Bole Michael area	Addis Ababa
KII - 10	National Intelligence and Security Service	Addis Ababa

III. One focus group discussion was held with seven participants who are relevant to the information the researcher was looking for. The discussion points were;

1. How do you see the nexus between public participation and counterterrorism efforts?
2. How do you evaluate the importance of public engagement in terms of averting al Shabaab's security threat in Ethiopia/Addis Ababa?
3. What is your/the public Participation in Suspicious Activity Reporting in connection with al shabaab's security threat?
4. What are the implications of public participation based counterterrorism activities to the safety and security of the residents of Addis Ababa and the local officials as well?
5. How do you evaluate government representatives – community relationship as far as the threat of terrorism is concerned around your area?

The participants of focus group discussion includes;

<b>Code of the participant</b>	<b>Remark</b>	<b>Location of FGD</b>
Participant – 1	Participated in peace and security issues in his area	Addis Ababa
Participant – 2	Participated in peace and security issues in his area	Addis Ababa
Participant – 3	From Addis Ababa City Administration	Addis Ababa
Participant – 4	From Addis Ababa city Administration	Addis Ababa
Participant - 5	From Addis Ababa city Administration	Addis Ababa
Participant - 6	Participated in peace and security issues in his area	Addis Ababa
Participant - 7	Participated in peace and security issues in his area	Addis Ababa

## Appendix B

To assess and analyze the nexus between community role and engagement in averting al Shabaab's terrorism threat in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, the researcher has made a review on the following pertinent materials.

- The Ethiopian Herald. (2006, July 28, P. 1). "Somalis residing here condemn fundamentalists". Newspaper, Vol. LXII, No. 275, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- The Ethiopian Herald. (2006, August 4, p. 1). "Somalis nationals call for all-round assistance for TFG". Newspaper, Vol. LXII, No. 281, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- The Ethiopian Herald .(July 25, 2006). "Role of Somali is Irreplaceable: Ministry"
- Maru, M. T. (2015). "The secret to Ethiopia's counter - terrorism success". *Al Jazeera*, Accessed March, 10, 2023.
- Ethiopian News Agency. (November 29, 2019). "African Youths Urge for their Active Role in Promoting Peace, Dev't". [https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en\\_11014?](https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en_11014?)
- Ethiopian News Agency. (July, 2022). "National Defense Force On High Alert to Crush Al-Shabab Insurgents". [https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en\\_37590?p\\_1\\_back\\_url=%2Fweb%2Feng%2Fsearch%3Fq%3DAI%2Bshabaab%2Battack%2Bin%2BETHIOPIA%2Bstadium%2Bsoccer%2Bmatch](https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en_37590?p_1_back_url=%2Fweb%2Feng%2Fsearch%3Fq%3DAI%2Bshabaab%2Battack%2Bin%2BETHIOPIA%2Bstadium%2Bsoccer%2Bmatch)
- The Ethiopian Herald. (October 15, 2013). "Taskforce identifies attempt of terrorists' acts, urged the public to remain vigilant". Newspaper, Vol. LXX No 030, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
- Voice of America - English. (September 18, 2015). "Ethiopia Successful in Preventing Al-Shabab's Attacks". <https://www.voanews.com/amp/ethiopia-avoids-al-shabab-attacks/2969120.html>
- Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009
- Ethiopian Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism Crimes Proclamation (PSTCP) No. 1176/2020
- The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS), published in 2002 by the Ministry of Information.

- Ethiopian News Agency. (August 7, 2022). “Residents of Gode Town Laud Measures Taken Against Al-Shabab by NDF, Somali Special Force”. [https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en\\_37666](https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/en_37666)
- Sudan Tribune. (December 25, 2013). “Al Shabaab behind plot to bomb stadium, says Ethiopia”. <https://sudantribune.com/article48270/>