

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**



**ETHIO-ERITREAN RELATIONS SINCE 1991: EXPERIENCE FOR
SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN'S RELATIONS**

**BY
KIDANU ATINAFU TEMESGEN**

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JUNE 2014

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ACRONYMS

ABC	Abyei Boundaries Commission
AU	African Union
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
EEBC	Ethiopia and Eritrea Boundary Commission
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
ICG	International Crisis Group
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
MEISON	All Ethiopian Socialist Movement
NCP	National Congress Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PCA	Permanent Court of Arbitration
PFDJ	People's Front for Democracy and Justice
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLA-N	Sudan People's Liberation Army-North
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM-N	Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North
TBC	Technical Border Committee
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF	Tigrean People's Liberation Front
TSZ	Temporary Security Zone
UN	United Nations
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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ABSTRACT

The central focus of this study is on drawing lessons for Sudan and South Sudan after examining the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession relations. Specifically, this thesis attempts to assess Ethio-Eritrean relations before the outbreak of the 1998-2000 war, identify the factors spurring the Ethio-Eritrean impasse in the post-war period and draw lessons for Sudan and South Sudan from Ethio-Eritrean disparity. The study attempts to answer the following questions: Why did the pre-war agreement/s and relations failed to bring enduring harmony between Ethiopia and Eritrea? What are the potential and actual factors that led to the impasse regarding Ethio-Eritrean relations after the end of the war? What important lessons can Sudan and South Sudan learn from Ethio-Eritrean disparity to normalize and develop harmonious relations? The study employed qualitative methodological approach. To realize the stated objectives and address the questions, the researcher used both primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data were elicited through in-depth interviews with key informants whereas secondary data were gathered from books, articles, official documents and other pertinent publications. After examining the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience and ascertaining the view of key informants and assessing written documents, the study has come up with the following findings. First, the post-secession Sudan and South Sudan destabilization and proxy engagement need to be repudiated since it complicates the normalization process and widen the existing mistrust and animosity. Second, the culture of militarism needs to be replaced by a new political and diplomatic approach. Third, the negative implications of unaccountable and authoritarian rule should be overcome and replaced by a democratic system of governance, where the power of the elite is limited, the voice of the public heard and the rights of civil societies and opposition political parties guaranteed. Fourth, the forceful and abusive deportations of nationals of each other must come to an end since it threatens bilateral relations and people to people cordiality. Institutionalization of their relations and implementation of the agreements in good faith is the other compelling lesson to be drawn thereof by the Sudan and South Sudan.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

Eritrea was an integral part of Ethiopia until it was brought under Italian control in 1890 (Andargachew, 1993; Girma, 1993; Kidist, 2011; Tekeste, 1997). However, the Italian East African colony was ended in 1941 and Eritrea became a mandate territory of British until 1952 (Andargachew, 1993; Girma, 1993; Kidist, 2011). The subsequent diplomatic efforts of the Imperial Government to the United Nations (UN) federated Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952. However, the dissolution of the federation promoted the Eritrean armed insurgency for independence (Girma, 1993; Mesfin, 1990). The war for independence was first initiated by Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and later the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) both of which were the prominent liberation movements in Eritrea (Tekeste, 1997). The activities of the liberation movements also persisted after the downfall of monarchical rule and the coming to power of the military regime. In collaboration with Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the EPLF facilitated the dissolution of the military government in 1991 (Healy and Plaut, 2007; Daniel and Paulos, 2011).

The defeat of the military regime, *Derg*, and the coming to power of the EPRDF witnessed a remarkable development on the final fate of Eritrea as a result of which, Eritrea became independent following the 1993 Referendum. In the initial years of independence, Ethiopia and Eritrea established close relationship in economic, security, political and social fields (ICG, 2003; Kidist, 2011; Tekeste, 1997). They began formal state-to-state relations by signing a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 13 July 1993 (Kidist, 2011). However, such alliance and cordial relations did not last long since it was not free from suspicions and mistrusts, and in 1998 the two years border war flared up around the Badme area.

Following Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia, South Sudan is only the second case of a successful secession in postcolonial Africa (Tull, 2011). South Sudan and Eritrea gained sovereignty with the consent of their former 'motherland', though after a long and violent

struggle. Sudan and South Sudan faced a destructive armed struggle and civil wars since their formal independence in 1956 (Kimenyi, 2012). The discontent in the process of decolonization and the forced Islamisation done by the Muslim North brought the civil war in Sudan from 1955 to 1972 (Rolandsen, 2005; Varma, 2011).

On 27 February 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was signed between South Sudan Liberation Movement (popularly known as *Anyanya*) and the central government of Sudan (Rolandsen, 2005). The Addis Ababa Agreement made Southern Sudan an autonomous region with its own parliament and a High Executive Council (Ibid). However, violation of certain provisions of the Addis Ababa Accord by the Sudanese regime instigated the Southern rebel forces to realign and restart the war, which led to the eruption of a Second Civil War (Rolandsen, 2005; Varma, 2011). The Second Civil War, in which an estimated 1.5 million people died, began in 1983 and ended only in 2005 with the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) (Varma, 2011).

The CPA was concluded granting self-government to the South under the leadership of Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) and providing for holding a Referendum to be held in 2011 on the region's future status. The CPA was perceived as an opportunity to restore trust in the broken relationships between North and South Sudan. Some of the key factors that fueled the conflict were resolved, but the issue of national identity was not. South Sudan formally declared its independence in July 2011 after 98.8% of its people voted for independence in the Referendum and now became Africa's 54th state (Seri-Hersch, 2013; McNamee, 2012).

As noted by Kimenyi (2012), the post-Referendum relations between the two Sudans are on a downward trend; one that could easily result in escalation of war. Tensions over resources as well as borders heightened, which further create a complexity on the relationship and reconciliation process (Varma, 2011).

Thus, the overall focus of the study is to examine the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession hostility with the view to draw lessons that South Sudan and Sudan can learn from the experience of Ethiopia and Eritrea in the process of harmonizing their relationships and alleviating differences.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Before the outbreak of the 1998-2000 war, Eritrea and Ethiopia maintained warm relations and followed a robust joint regional agenda (ICG, 2003). However, their relations highly deteriorated due to the factors that led to the two years of tragic war. The war has had huge impacts on the economic, social and political life in both countries. The war cost tens of thousands of lives on both sides, with the estimated number of deaths ranging from 50,000 to 100,000 (ICG, 2003 & Kidist, 2011). In addition, the number of people that have been internally displaced by the war has been estimated to have reached around 650,000 (Kidist, 2011).

The war was ended after the signing of Algiers agreement in 2000. The ceasefire and peace agreement signed in Algiers in 2000 gave hope for the gradual normalization of Ethio-Eritrean relations and there was encouraging compliance for two years (ICG, 2003). However, tensions around common border are as high as they have ever been since Ethiopia and Eritrea signed the Algiers Accord (Ibid). Neither the peace accord nor the boundary ruling has ended the hostility and the destabilizing efforts of the two protagonists. Relations between the two countries are still marked by mutual recriminations and destabilization (Bahru, 2006), tension is overwrought and the two countries still remain apart.

Different writers attributed the Ethio-Eritrean hostility and discrepancy to different contexts in different publications. Kidest (2011) identified economic, political, and psychological factors as the driving elements for the outbreak of 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean war. Daniel and Paulos (2011) outlined the continuation of proxy confrontation and mutual destabilization as well as repercussion of the war has had impacted on the prevailing impasse (see also Abbink, 2003a&b; Kidest, 2011). Abbink (1998), further, noted that lack of institutionalized democracy in both countries and continuation of authoritarianism and neo-patrimonialism produced the continued hostility and discrepancy (see also Abbink; 2003b & Bahru, 2006). Martin Plaut (2005/6:179) added "the intransigence and inflexibility of both nations has prevented a final settlement from taking place." The unresolved border issue is the other hindrance leading to the existing disparity.

On the other hand, the people of South Sudan expected that the dissolution of the union would end many years of conflict between the two nations (Kimenyi, 2012). However, less than a year after the split, Sudan and South Sudan moved into a state of war again (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). In hopes of crushing the last of the insurgents within its boundaries, the Sudanese Government has started a new campaign of attacking the rebels in the Nuba Mountains (Varma, 2011; Lunn and Thompson, 2012). The two countries turned into violent conflict in the 'three Areas' of Abyei, the Blue Nile and South Kordofan since independence (Lunn and Thompson, 2012; Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). Besides the border issue, South Sudan and Sudan have unresolved issues on division of oil revenues, return of refugees, and access to seasonal grazing lands (Christopher, 2011; McNamee, 2012). Thus, the high expectation for a better future appears to remain an illusion in the absence of good relations.

Meanwhile, Sudan and South Sudan signed many agreements to solve their problem though viable and lasting peace is not observed.¹ The agreements were concluded on border issues, security arrangements, post-service benefits, oil, trade and other related matters. Unless Sudan and South Sudan put these agreements into effect, it is difficult to normalize their relations and lessen the confrontations. Clashes over those values can trigger war that can produce deep hatred, mistrust and erode their relations and impede the normalization process too.

In this regard, the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experiences present lessons for Sudan and South Sudan in the process of normalizing their relations and resolving disputes. However, most researches conducted before and after the split of Sudan exclusively focused on assessing the reasons that the overall peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea was unable to bring an end to the conflict (Kalewongel, 2008; Ashenafi, 2009) and draw lessons from the causes of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict and the roles of international community to resolve the conflict (Teka, 2010) shed light on the problems and prospects for Ethio-Eritrean relations in the aftermath of Algiers agreement (Robera, 2011) including the importance of the "Politics of Identity" in the Ethio-Eritrean war with reference to two Tigrigna Speakers (Mahari, 2012). All these works did not examine the two cases with the

¹ On the list of agreements see <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article44031>

view to draw experience that Sudan and South Sudan can learn from Ethiopia and Eritrea post-secession relations.

Hence, the study seeks to examine the two cases so as to draw lessons to the newly born nation i.e. South Sudan, and its former motherland, Sudan, from the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession impasse in the process of achieving sustainable peace and harmonizing their relationships. With such stated rationale, the central aspect of this enquiry is focused on assessing Ethio- Eritrean relations before the outbreak of the two years war and the factors that led to the impasse, which can serve as important lessons for Sudan and South Sudan in the process of stabilizing their relations. The conflict ridden nature of the region, the deep-rooted culture of militarism including issues of destabilization and proxy war are the rationales behind selecting the two cases so far.

1.3. Central Argument

This study argues that there are lessons that Sudan and South Sudan can learn from the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience.

1.4. Research Objectives

The overall objective of the study is to draw lessons for Sudan and South Sudan through assessing the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession relations. The study has the following specific objectives.

- ✓ To assess Ethio-Eritrean relations before the outbreak of the 1998-2000 War
- ✓ To identify the factors spurring the Ethio-Eritrean impasse in the post-war periods
- ✓ To draw lessons for Sudan and South Sudan from Ethio-Eritrean experience

1.5. Research Questions

The core question of the study is that how the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience provides lessons for Sudan and South Sudan in the process of normalizing their relations? The study also attempted to address the following specific questions.

- ✓ Why did the pre-war agreements and relations failed to bring harmony between Ethiopia and Eritrea?
- ✓ What are the potential and actual factors that led to the impasse regarding Ethio-Eritrean relations after the end of the war?
- ✓ What important lessons can Sudan and South Sudan learn from Ethio-Eritrean experience to normalize and develop harmonious relations?

1.6. Research Methodology and Methods

As Kothari (2004) noted, research methodology not only implies the use of various research methods but also the logic behind the selection of methods, the rationale behind the study undertaken, the means through which the problem is identified as well as the way data are collected and analyzed. In general, the aim of research methodology is to develop or articulate strategies and methods through which the validity and credibility of research is maintained.

1.6.1. Methodology

This study has employed qualitative approach. Qualitative research, as Dawson (2007: 15) outlined, explores "attitudes, behaviour and experiences." This approach is used to address research questions that require explanation or understanding of social phenomena and their contexts (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The question of 'what', 'how' and 'why' can be answered by using qualitative approach (Ibid). Basically, qualitative research is interpretive in the sense that it attempts to interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people attribute and draws conclusion through interpreting the data gathered from various sources (Kothari, 2004).

As mentioned above, this inquiry is directed at examining the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession relations so as to draw lessons for Sudan and South Sudan. In this regard, the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience can be clearly understood through effectively examining written documents and conducting interviews with experts and officials. It is also possible to draw lessons for Sudan and South Sudan through interviewing experts, officials, examining the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience and substantiating with

the ongoing realities. And those enlisted research objectives and questions can be addressed by using qualitative approach, and hence qualitative methodology best suits to this study.

1.6.2. Methods of Data Collection

This study used both primary and secondary sources of data. To collect primary data, I conducted in-depth interviews with expert from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Head of Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) Security Sector Program and Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) as well as Sudanese Ambassador to Ethiopia.² In-depth interviews, as Dawson (2007) elaborated, allow the researcher to achieve a holistic understanding of the interviewees' point of view on the issue through probing for more detail. In line with this rationale, I opted in-depth interviews so as to get detail understanding about the Ethio- Eritrean post-secession disparity through allowing informants free to talk.

The technique that I used to select key informants is purposive sampling-a technique in which respondents are selected on the basis of certain predefined criteria. This sample is purposively selected by the researcher since it enables me to identify participants who have closer connection to and knowledge of the issue.

Document review and analysis was the other method used to collect secondary sources of data. Secondary data have been gathered from books, journals, reports, news release, magazines and internet sources. These sources of data have been selected based on their reliability and suitability to the study undertaken.

1.7. Scope of the Study

The thematic focus of the study covers the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession relations and the lessons that Sudan and South Sudan should learn from Ethio-Eritrean experience on the

² I did not conduct interview with South Sudanese Ambassador to Ethiopia as a result of his unwillingness. Due to financial and political reasons, I did not go to Eritrea to interview officials from there.

management of their relations. Detailed explanation of events and agreements concluded before the unfolding of the hostilities in both cases are beyond the scope of the study.

1.8. Limitations of the Study

The most apparent challenges I faced were financial problem and securing more key informants. This study did not elucidate the view of more key informants as a result of their unwillingness. I attempted to ascertain the view of political analysts from African Union (AU) and one more expert from ISS including officials from South Sudan Embassy to Ethiopia but they ignored my request. Thus, the study relied more on secondary data.

1.9. Significance of the Study

As has been discussed above, the study seeks to assess the Ethio-Eritrean relations before the outbreak of the two years war and the factors responsible for the post-war disparity with a view to draw lessons that Sudan and South Sudan can learn from the experience of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Hence, this study is timely and will have policy implication for the governments of Sudan and South Sudan in the process of normalizing their relations. Besides, the study could be used as source of data for further investigations on the issue under study.

1.10. Organization of the Study

This study is organized into five chapters. The first chapter is an introductory section dealing with the background, research problem, research objectives and questions, methodology, sources of data, methods of data collection, significance as well scope of the study. The second chapter focuses on literature review focusing on the major historical issues of Ethiopia and Eritrea on the one hand Sudan and South Sudan on the other. Chapter three, on the other hand, presents the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession relations while chapter four focuses on the lessons to be drawn thereof by Sudan and South Sudan. The final chapter draws conclusion and possible recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW, CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

2.1. Literature Review

About half of today's nation states originated as a result of state break. In some cases interstate relation in the after-math of state breakup are peaceful and in others they tend to be violent and there is little consensus on how it could be smooth or hostile (Tir, 2005). For instance, the secession of Norway from Sweden, in 1905, was peaceful and the two countries solved their differences amicably without resorting to the use of force (Solomon, 2012). The Estonia-Russia relations in the aftermath of the breakup of Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) were smooth unlike the Ethio-Eritrea current situations (Tir, 2005). The most enduring challenge that put states into an irreconcilable position after secession or partition is accompanied by territorial dispute (Ibid). Most of the time, claims and counter claims were built over certain territory. In this section, the problems associated with state partition or secession is discussed with particular reference to the partition of India and Pakistan, Czech Republic and Slovakia, Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia as well as East Timor's secession from Indonesia.

India and Pakistan have tense, hostile and antagonistic relations since their partition as separate nations in 1947 (Sharma, 2012). They have experienced several full-scale wars, numerous border skirmishes and military deadlocks (Ibid). The key sources of conflict between India and Pakistan emerged over the control of Kashmir (Arif, 1994; Geller, 2005). Beyond the geostrategic and economic significance, the centrality of the Kashmir conflict has also been centered on its symbolic importance (Nasr, 2005). For India, retention of Kashmir is considered essential to its conception of a pluralist secular state while Pakistan, as a homeland for the Muslims, wanted to regain the lost Muslim-majority territory of Kashmir (Leng, 2005). Hence, control over Kashmir has become the *raison d'être* of both states and their unwillingness to compromise led to bloodshed and shadowed their relations for the last six decades. Their engagement in supporting dissident groups in

the territory of each other also enhanced hostility. Pakistan provided military and financial support for insurgents originated from Indian owned Kashmir and India also assisted dissidents in North West Pakistan (Geller, 2005). As Mukarji (1995) indicates, the militarized policy of each country and the absence of democratic forms of rule also played a central role in fuelling Indo-Pakistan post-partition disparities. India has suspended democratic governance in Kashmir and imposed martial law and paramilitary forces emerged where Pakistan is also engaged in training, arming and infiltrating militants for its own ends (Mukarji, 1995). The issue of nuclear competition also galvanized the Indo-Pakistan antagonism. The rise of Islamism and Hindu nationalism and their role in shaping state ideology and national identities in Pakistan and India has played an important role in the endurance of the rivalry.³

The Czech Republic and Slovakia emerged as separate entities after the dissolution of the federation of Czechoslovakia in January 1993. The dissolution of the federation was not free from tensions and retentions. Before the dissolution of the federation, Czech Republic and Slovakia concluded treaties which define their relations after the breakup (Pepe, 1993). The Czech Republic and Slovakia agreed to use common currency-Czechoslovakia's *koruna* (Ibid). Contrary to the agreement, however, the two countries introduced their own currencies soon after the partition that led to the deterioration of their relations (Ibid). The introduction of new currencies raised tensions and the bilateral trade relations between the two countries has dwindled so far. Protracted disagreements also prevailed on the division of the former Czechoslovakia's bank assets, army equipment, rail and airliner infrastructure (Ibid). However, through round-table discussion with some sorts of compromise, the two countries mitigated their differences and formed cordial relations nowadays, which could be an important lesson for Sudan and South Sudan.

Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia, in 2008, was characterized by neglect and palpitation in their relations. Contacts between the two countries ended following Kosovo's declaration of independence (ICG, 2010). The issue of diplomatic recognition of Kosovo's statehood is at the heart of the bilateral impasse (Ibid). Though Serbia refused to recognize Kosovo's statehood, the International Court of Justice affirmed

³ For more details see Vali Nasr (2005)

that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence did not violate the international law thereby leading to half of the UN member states recognizing Kosovo's statehood (Lehne, 2012). However, the government of Serbia strongly opposed Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence and attempted to control northern Kosovo forcefully thereby undermining the authority of the government (Džihic and Kramer, 2009). Territorial issues are also at the center of the controversy. Serbia and Kosovo turned into dispute on the status of the northern Kosovo municipalities, made up of Zubin Potok, Leposavić and Zvečan and Mitrovica (Woehrel, 2013; ICG, 2010). Furthermore, Serb religious monasteries/churches which are located within the territory of Kosovo also caused serious challenges (ICG, 2010). Serbia wants actual extraterritorial status for the most important monasteries while Kosovo attacked Serbian cemeteries and monuments founded within its districts (ICG, 2013).

East Timor, also called Timor-Leste, seceded from Indonesia after a UN supervised referendum was held in 1999, making East Timor one of the world's new nations following three years of UN administration. The Indonesia-backed pro integration militia caused massive destructions in East Timor following the referendum (Dolven, Margesson and Vaughn, 2012). After this tragedy, East Timor and Indonesia resorted to practical approaches to normalize their relations through putting historical traumas behind (Ibid). They forged energy cooperation agreements and other economic relations (Ibid). Though the two countries tried much to normalize their relations, they failed to agree on two segments of Oecusse's⁴ border and Memo area (ICG, 2010). Demarcation of those borders have been stalled due to the long history of shifting political borders, the lack of any single natural boundary and the sensitivities for Indonesia in establishing relations with its former province (ICG, 2010). The presence of unresolved border issues remains a catalyst for occasional tensions and conflict. And a series of incidents at both unresolved segments has occurred in 2009 (Ibid). Coordinated border management and the possibility of visa-free travel between Timor-Leste and the Indonesian province of West Timor was subsequently slowed down (Dolven, Margesson and Vaughn, 2012).

⁴ Oecusse is Timor-Leste's isolated enclave found inside Indonesian West Timor.

2.1.1. Historical Background on Ethio-Eritrea and Sudan-South Sudan Relations

The failure of African states to address the needs of large proportions of their populations is a proximate cause of a number of controversies surrounding self-determination. Due to this fact, Africa was replete with different secessionist groups for the last few decades. Until recently, secessionist groups sprung in Angola, Senegal, Comoros, Tanzania and Ivory Coast. Though the international community failed to recognize its separation, the Republic of Somaliland also unilaterally declared independence from Somalia in 1991. Successful secession was again observed in post-Cold War Africa i.e. South Sudan, next to the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia.

Conflict cannot be understood independently of the specific historical context. According to Bahru (2006: 16), "the weight of history lies heavy on the Horn of Africa". He further noted that the region witnessed long historical traumas and history probably accorded greater value (Ibid). And people use history to bolster "arguments and counter-agreements" which puts states into extreme and irreconcilable postures (Ibid). More specifically, Bahru argues that the current Ethio-Eritrean hostility and stalemate cannot be detached from the longstanding historical issues that the people of the two countries experienced. Abbink (1998) also argues that the two years of Ethio-Eritrean war partly resembles the particular history and relationship of the two insurgent movements, EPLF and TPLF. In what follows, the historical discontents that Ethiopia and Eritrea and Sudan and South Sudan experienced is highlighted thereby in order to identify the potential volatile issues that can lead to conflict in their future relationships.

Ethiopia and Eritrea in Historical Perspectives

As historical evidences suggest, Eritrea was part of the Kingdom of Aksum (Zewde, 2000). The geostrategic location of Eritrea attracted foreigners and, hence, different powers subjugated it following the demise of Aksumite Kingdom (Ahmar, 1984; Keller, 1993). The coastal areas of Eritrea were conquered by the Ottomans in the middle of the 16th century and remained part of the Empire until the late 19th century (Erlich, 1994). Egyptians also seized parts of Eritrea as Ottoman Turks lost the urge to continue controlling the area (Ibid). In 1882, the British controlled Egypt which forced the latter to

enter into an agreement, known as the "Hewett Treaty", with Ethiopia and evacuate from the territories disputed by the latter (Ibid).

Following the Egyptian evacuation, Italy seized the coastal areas of Eritrea notably Assab in 1882 and landed at Massawa in 1885 with the support of the British (Lobban, 1976; Zewde, 2000). By using these areas as springboard, Italy continued its expansion towards Ethiopia until it encountered defeat at the Battle of Dogali in 1887 (Kidist, 2011). The ambition of Italy to control Ethiopia also continued following its defeat at Dogali and approached Ethiopia diplomatically. In doing so, Italy concluded the Treaty of Wuchale with Emperor Menelik II in 1889 (Kidist, 2011; Červenka, 1977). Based on this agreement, Eritrea became the colony of Italy while Ethiopia remained independent. As Amare (1991) and Kinfe (2001) noted, the Wuchale treaty has drifted the Ethiopian and Eritrean people away from each other and develop their own cultural values and symbolism. The Kebesa people- the Eritrean highlanders who attach themselves with the Ethiopia empire felt disappointment and tended to see themselves as distinct from the Tigray in particular and Ethiopia in general (Trivelli, 1998).

Due to the ambiguity of Wuchale treaty and Italy's subsequent conquest of parts of Tigray, war broke out again between Italy and Ethiopia. Though the war culminated with the victory of Ethiopia at the battle of Adwa, in 1896, the Ethiopian government of the time left Eritrea under Italian rule and Mereb became the separating dot, Italy administered Eritrea until 1941. Three successive agreements were signed between Ethiopia and Italy in 1900, 1902 and 1908 to delineate the common borders between Ethiopia and its colony Eritrea (Kidist, 2011; Ciampi, 2001; Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). The 1000-kilometre border now disputed by Ethiopia and Eritrea had their root from those agreements. As Ciampi (2001) noted, due to toponymic confusion, misunderstanding among parties as well as incomplete knowledge of geography of the localities, the border was not delimited (surveyed) or demarcated. The colonial rulers interpreted the border unilaterally and drew a new borderline (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000).

Furthermore, Italian rule in Eritrea fostered development of light industries, commercial agriculture and different social services, which imparted a sense of Eritrean separate

identity (Kidist, 2011). A distinct Eritrean identity based on the growing gap between the socio-economic realities of Eritrea and Ethiopia thus began to take shape (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000) thereby inducing adverse consequences on their culture and psyche (Kinfe, 2001). During the five years of Ethiopia's occupation, the Italians drew distinction between Ethiopia and Eritrea through considering the former as 'uncivilized' and the later as 'civilized' (Tekeste, 1997; Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000) as a result of which Eritreans looked down and treated their kins on South of the Mereb as poor relatives (Trivelli, 1998). Such inflated self-perception was reinforced during the liberation war and is still very powerful in the political arena (Abbink, 1998). Though not totally assimilated, the close association of Eritreans with the Italians on a massive scale also exposed them to adopted Italian cultural traits in their everyday lives (Trivelli, 1998).

The Italian East African colony was ended in 1941 and Eritrea became a mandate territory of British until 1952. British rule also fractured the people of Eritrea along different units like Unionist, the Muslim League and the Liberal Progressive groups (Keller, 1993; Zewde, 2000). As Zewde (2000) aptly noted, during the initial years of its administration, the British government repeatedly showed that the fate of Eritrea shall be decided through popular vote. It was also believed that British supported the Eritrean separatists at the expense of the Unionists (Tekeste, 1997). Thus, similar with what Italians did, the British rule in Eritrea also indoctrinated the consciousness and sentiments further in the direction of separation and distinctiveness.

In general, the longstanding political entrapment of Eritrea by foreign powers sowed the seeds of present-day Eritrean nationalism (Lobban, 1976) and modern nationalists portrayed the propaganda of identity difference between the two peoples (Ahmar, 1984). Despite the closeness and complementarities between the people of the two countries in terms of culture, way of life, language, religion etc, the political elites of Eritrea down played the issue of convergence due to colonial past, external intervention and their political aspirations (Kinfe, 2001; Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). The current regime of Eritrea also exhaustively worked towards inculcating distinctiveness of the peoples of the two countries by emphasizing their historical experiences (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000).

However, it is erroneous to wholly attribute the quest for Eritrean secession to colonial rule that only hastened the consciousness of Eritreans in this direction. The occurrences and the uncompromising stances that took place under both the monarchical and military regimes of Ethiopia also played a lot in this regard.

Federation of Eritrea and its Subsequent Impact

Acquisition of Eritrea was a basic element of Ethiopia's foreign policy following the end of Italian occupation (Marcus, 1995). In doing so, Emperor Haile Selassie and his Officials worked diligently to get Eritrea, noting the historical integrity of the area to Ethiopia before colonialism and Ethiopia's unequivocal right of access to the sea (Marcus, 1995; Zewde, 2000). Nonetheless, the big powers of the time- the British, the United States (U.S.), France and the Soviet Union did not welcome Ethiopia's demand of getting Eritrea immediately. The Ethiopian government continued insisting on the Big Powers to respect its claims at different forums to get Eritrea and secure sea outlet. The UN General Assembly passed a resolution in 1950 recommending the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia by allowing autonomy to the former (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000; Tekeste, 1997; Zewde, 2000). The act of the federation was put into effect after two years.

Soon after the federation, the Ethiopia monarchy was pressed strongly to effect reunification of Eritrea with Ethiopia (Clapham, 1988). In doing so, the government intimidated opposition parties, crippled the press and trade unions and, Eritrea became another province of Ethiopia (Clapham, 1988; Markakis, 1988). The Eritrean constitution and flag was suspended (Lobban, 1976) as well as the political expression and the identity of Eritreans were undermined (Young, 1997). Finally, the federation was abrogated in 1962 and Eritrea was united with Ethiopia. The abrogation of the federation created room for Eritrean separatists to organize guerrilla movements for independence (Clapham, 1988; Mesfin, 1990). One year before the dissolution of the federation, a rebellion also broke out in Eritrea and the rebellion was dominated by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) (Young, 1997). With the support of Soviet Union and other Muslim states, ELF continued the armed struggle waged by the separatists that challenged the imperial forces throughout the

1960s. However, ELF failed to gain the allegiance of the majority of the population due to its strong affiliation with Muslim sects (Ibid).

Hence, in the 1970s the ELF was shadowed by the Marxist-Leninist EPLF that quickly gained the upper hand of indigenous support as well as Ethiopia's radical intelligentsia (Ibid). In collaboration with other dissident groups, EPLF also played great roles for the overthrow of the monarchy. This is to mean that since the inauguration of EPLF and the spread of urban dissent, revolt in Eritrea challenged the imperial regime thereby partly contributed to the outbreak of the 1974 revolution (Ibid).

EPLF-TPLF Relations

The downfall of the monarchy and the coming of the military regime (Derg) to power was not free from tensions and violations. The demands for establishing a 'Provisional People's Government' with the involvement of different sections of the population became a mirage (Andargachew, 1993). Instead of sharing power, the military monopolized power by evicting and massacring different key political figures (Young, 1997). The military regime incarcerated the highest military and civilian officials who served during the imperial regime (Andargachew, 1993) and much of the country's intelligentsia were either killed, imprisoned or exiled (Young, 1997). Reforms were introduced at the expense of the demand of the opposition groups which led to the protracted insurgency and the regime crumbled as a result of insurgent activities (Clapham, 1988). The regime was not ready to allow political concession to regionalist and secessionists. Instead, force was used to subjugate the rebels. Similarly, after the end of the Ogaden war-in 1978, the military regime started a cruel attack on Eritrea and recaptured all of Eritrea within not more than five months with exception of Nakfa-military base of EPLF (Ibid). This sowed the seeds of hostility, suspicion and conflict between the two parties.

The contact between the Tigrean and Eritrean liberation movements precedes the advent of TPLF, which was established in 1975 as small guerrilla movement (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000; Young, 1997). As the gravity of violence and brutality of the military regime increased, the relations between EPLF and TPLF became close. Tekeste and Tronvoll

(2000: 21) argue that the relations between TPLF and EPLF can be best described as "marriage of necessity than love marriage."⁵

From the outset, the two fronts had major ideological and political differences. Tension between the two fronts came to the surface as TPLF associated its struggle for the establishment of the independent republic of Tigray (Young, 1996; Bereketeab, 2010). This claim also extended to other Ethiopian nationalities and also applied to the various Eritrean nationalities, which was resented by EPLF (Young, 1997). The place of multinational movements in the united front that both movements tried to organize was the other contending issue that challenged the two fronts (Ibid). The EPLF advocated that multinational Ethiopian opposition groups, such as Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON), were eligible for membership in the united front, but this was rejected by the TPLF (Young, 1997). Besides, the TPLF demand that the Soviet Union be explicitly condemned because of its alliance with the Derg whereas the EPLF viewed that the Soviet constituted 'strategic allies'. Hence, condemning the Soviet Union did not go down well in the Eritrean camp (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000; Young, 1997; Bereketeab, 2010). Military strategy was another source of tension between TPLF and EPLF (Abbink, 1998; Young, 1996; Bereketeab, 2010). This means that EPLF wanted to follow conventional war from its secure bases whereas TPLF pursued a mobile style of fighting that did not involve holding territory until the expulsion of the Derg from Tigray (Young, 1996). All these and other differences led to the eventual breach of the relations between the two fronts in 1985 (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). For three successive years, the military collaboration and political contacts between the two fronts ended as well as TPLF's radio station in Eritrea was closed down (Young, 1996; Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). The logistical route, Barka, on which the TPLF used to channel aid was blocked by EPLF (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000).

Soon after the breach of bilateral relations, TPLF and EPLF followed destabilization of each other. TPLF supported Eritrean opposition movements in their fight against EPLF and

⁵Such kind of relations between the two fronts also persisted until the outbreak of the two years war of Ethiopia and Eritrea. They need each other to stabilize internal politics and strengthen their power.

EPLF also did the same by assisting different anti- TPLF movements (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). Such mutual destabilization continued after the two years of the Ethio-Eritrean war. Militarism was also the other aspect characterizing the relations between them as the two fronts inclined to solve their differences through military might. Militaristic thrusts and the act of destabilization also deteriorated the Ethio-Eritrean current relations too. The threat from the regime obliged the two fronts to reconciliation and compromise by relegating their differences to the background and collaborated to overthrow the Derg. The scale and intimacy of military collaboration between the two fronts grew, which resulted in the eventual collapse of the military regime in 1991.

As Young (1996) stated, EPLF support for the TPLF was largely based on securing its right to secede from Ethiopia and TPLF never hesitated from supporting Eritrea's right to independence. As a result, the downfall of the military regime marked the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia after a referendum held in 1993 and the two fronts hold power in their respective countries. Though Ethiopia and Eritrean maintained warm relations and followed a robust joint regional agenda after the secession of the latter, their relations have never been free from suspicion. As has been highlighted before; economic, political and psychological factors are the driving elements for the two years Ethio-Eritrean war (Kidest, 2011). Border issues are also at the heart of the Ethio-Eritrean disparities (the next chapter provides the full pictures of Ethio-Eritrean post-secession relations).

2.1.2. Sudan and South Sudan in History

The republic of Sudan is made up of two distinct parts; the north which is Arabized and Islamized and the south that is largely traditionalist and African (Raay, 1994). The 16th century was the turning point in the history of Sudan as it sets the stage for the total Islamization and Arabization of people of North Sudan and the non-Arab populations by Arab migrants (Ibid). The penetration of large numbers of Muslim Arabs brought the integration of the northern parts of Sudan into the larger pan-Islamic world (Debay, 2012) and much of Northern Sudan was transformed into an overwhelmingly Arabized and Islamized society (Girma, 1997). Following this, the act of Arabization and Islamization became a determining factor in categorizing the races into slaves and slave masters (Deng,

2006) in the course of which the non-Muslim black African in South was deemed as inferior and a legitimate target of enslavement while Muslims descendants of Arab origin were elevated to a position of respect and dignity (Girma, 1997).

Until the early nineteenth century, Arab penetration of Southern Sudan did not occur and people of Southern Sudan had very little contacts until the Turko-Egyptian conquest (Raay, 1994). Hence, the influence of Islam and Arabic culture on Southern Sudan was negligible (Debay, 2012) and the South people maintained their own ethnic identities and linguistic and traditional ties (Raay, 1994). The Turko-Egyptian rulers slowly penetrated the non-Islamic and non-Arab south through establishing trade routes (Girma, 1997). The Turko-Egyptian colonial rule was a brutal one for the South as it promoted the slave trade (Ibid). The Turko-Egyptian administration of Sudan was overthrown in 1880s by religious nationalist movement led by the *Mahdi* - Mohammed Ahmed (Ibid). Following the downfall of the Turko-Egyptian rule, the Mahdist state was established in Sudan. The primary goal of the Mahdist state was proselytization of Islam world-wide (Salman, 1983). To realize this mission, the Mahdist state engaged immediately in wars in all fronts (Ibid). The slave trade continued with greater vigor and Arabic language and Islam were imposed on the South forcefully and violently (Girma, 1997). Hence, South Sudanese identity was subjected to oppression.

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Rule and the North-South Disparities

Following the defeat of the Mahdist state, Anglo-Egyptian sovereignty known as Condominium rule was established in Sudan in 1898 (Holt and Daly, 1979; Johnson, 2003). However, on most occasions, Condominium rule remained theoretical as it was dominated by the British (Holt and Daly, 1979; Deng, 2006). Anglo-Egyptian rule in Sudan also left different legacies. In terms of border, it was during the Anglo-Egyptian rule that the boundaries of Sudan were demarcated (Raay, 1994). The number of provinces and boundaries of Sudan were changed throughout the years of Anglo-Egyptian rule (Holt and Daly, 1979), which complicated the current deals on the actual delimitation process between Republic of Sudan and South Sudan. Instantly, one of the most contentious areas

of dispute between the two states like Abyei was incorporated to Kordofan during the British administration.

The Anglo-Egyptian relationships regarding Sudan were never smooth (Salman, 1983). Irrespective of the concession, the British took the upper hand in the administration of Sudan that soured their relations (Ibid). Besides, the 1919 Egyptian revolution and the killing of the Governor General of Sudan and the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian army in Cairo promoted the elimination of the the Egyptian military and administrative staffs from Sudan (Ibid) and the British government preferred to rule Sudan indirectly through using indigenous leaders. To this end, the North-South geographical division was instituted in 1922 and northern Sudanese were prohibited from traveling, trading, or working in the south (Girma, 1997; Verma, 2011). Separate policies were used in each entity. Islamic Sudanese nationalism in the north was elevated while the south was encouraged to develop along indigenous Christian lines. Muslim influence was excluded in the southern provinces altogether (Holt and Daly, 1979). Efforts were exerted to discourage the learning and use of Arabic language and dressing style by the inhabitants of South Sudan (Holt and Daly, 1979; Rauy, 1994). Unlike the north, education in the south was provided in English. Such separate colonial policy led to the revitalization of two antagonistic identities with two contrasting visions; an Arab-Islamic vision and a secular black African vision (Deng, 2006; Girma, 1997; Indris, 2005; Verma, 2011). The separate colonial policy also enhanced cultural, linguistic, racial and religious differences between the two parts of the country (Salman, 1983). The more flexible cultural communities were transformed into conflicting political entities (Indris, 2005), all of which would also influence the current Sudan-South Sudan relations.

Though the pattern of unequal development and status of northerners and southerners was established long before the British adopted an active policy of differentiation (Rolandsen, 2005), British administration in Sudan also created unbridgeable disparities in the area of development (Rauy, 1994; Indris, 2005). Unlike in South Sudan, British administration in the North enhanced the development of factories, irrigation schemes, schools and some other facilities (Rauy, 1994; Johnson, 2003). Such disparities forced the southerners to be at the bottom in terms of their involvement in the government and administration of the

country (Ibid). With numerous unresolved issues between the north and the south, Condominium rule was ended and Sudan became independent on 1 January 1956.

Post-Independence Civil Wars in Sudan

When Sudan was prepared for independence, the issue at center was how the fates of the south and to north would be dealt with. Fearing of domination by the northern elites, Southern Sudan nationalists propagated that unity with the north could be accepted on the ground that the system would be organized along federal structure, which would accommodate both the Afro-Arab identities (Indris, 2005; Johnson, 2003) and demanded regional political recognition with their distinct values.

Unfortunately, the demand of northern Sudanese nationalists for unification of Northern and Southern Sudan got acceptance and greater power was bestowed to the north in the run-up to the independence (Verma, 2011). Political hegemony of the north marginalized the south and the southerners demand for federation was neglected and, at independence, a unitary system dominated by the north was sustained (Deng, 2006; Johnson, 2003). The structure of the Sudanese state, its organic law, its institutions, and the basic divisions of power remained as before (Indris, 2005). Power was exercised based on the notion that only a Muslim state can legitimately rule over a Muslim majority and Sudan came to be seen as an Arab-Islamic state with a civilizing mission of entrenching Arabization and Islamization (Ibid). The activities of Christian missionaries were also restricted and Arabic was progressively introduced as the medium of instruction in schools (Johnson, 2003). Southerners were excluded from taking rightful places in the governments of their countries and prepared for direct physical and political confrontations (Raay, 1994; Johnson, 2003).

The absence of equitable power sharing paradigm and the discontent with the process of decolonization and the subsequent forced Islamisation perpetrated by the Muslim North had been central for the eruption of the First Civil War (1955-1972) which cost the lives of many Sudanese. After the bloody fight, the leader of the North- Jafar Nimeri- and the rebels of the South-represented by the *Anyanya* group- reached a peace agreement on 27 February 1972 that came to be known as the Addis Ababa Agreement, which brought a

relative peace and stability in Sudan (Rolandsen, 2005; Shinn, 2005). In the agreement, promises were made to speed up the development of economic, political and administrative institutions in the south. Southerners were provided with autonomy ranging from forming parliament to the formation of a High Executive Council (Shinn, 2005; Indris, 2005). The Agreement recognized the cultural and religious values of southerners and Arabic was made the official language for Sudan and English became the principal language for the Southern region without prejudice to the use of other languages (Shinn, 2005).

However, most of the provisions of the agreement remained on paper as the government of the north turned to manipulate Southern politicians and failed to allocate adequate budget for rehabilitating the south (Girma, 1997; Rolandsen, 2005). The North tried to sabotage development in the south and, poverty, disease, and illiteracy affected the vast majority of the southern population (Girma, 1997; Shinn, 2005). Hence, tension between the north and south was taking shape and escalating. The use and ownership of oil, the waters of Upper Nile and agricultural land of South Sudan galvanized the North-South tensions too (Girma, 1997). Following the discovery of oil in South Sudan, the government was inclined to redraw the boundaries in so far to carve the oil abundant region out of the southern territory (Indris, 2005; Girma, 1997) and attempts were made to construct oil refineries inside the north instead of the South (Rolandsen, 2005). Besides, in order to benefit from the irrigation projects, the government also attempted to redirect water from the south to the north through constructing the Jonglei canal (Girma, 1997; Johnson, 2003; Rolandsen, 2005).⁶

In 1983 the autonomy of the southern region was curtailed as well as Shari'a Law was imposed on the entire population of the country and Arabic became the exclusive official language (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012; Indris, 2005; Rauy, 1994). Thus, violence and racial discrimination against the south increased dramatically thereby intensifying the eventual escalation of insurgency in Sudan again. In the same year, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement emerged with its military wing called the Sudan People's Liberation

⁶ The very purpose of constructing the Jonglei was to control water evaporations so far to increase the total discharge of the White Nile. Unfortunately, the central government of Sudan never consulted southerners about the project, and attempts had been made to exclude the South from benefiting from project (Girma, 1997).

Army (SPLA) (Girma, 1997; Debay, 2012; Indris, 2005). The crisis led to the beginning of the Second Civil War in 1983, which continued until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and resulted in the death of millions of people in the meantime.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

The Second Civil War, which lasted for more than two decades, came to an end after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Parties to the treaty were the National Congress Party (NCP) of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) of South Sudan. The CPA called for a six-year interim period, during which the NCP and SPLM form a 'Government of National Unity' that is responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies. During the interim period, South Sudan was granted the right to self-rule to be followed by internationally monitored Referendum to determine its future status. The agreement also detailed the power sharing arrangements between national and sub national level administrations. Various principles for equitable sharing of common wealth including land, oil and other natural resource were also stipulated in the agreement.

Of the most important elements, the CPA provided special protocol regarding Abyei. To determine the status of Abyei, parties to the treaty agreed that residents of Abyei shall cast separate ballots that could be conducted simultaneously with the Referendum of South Sudan. The two parties also reached consensus for the establishment of the Abyei Boundaries and Referendum Commissions that are mandated to define and demarcate the boundaries of the areas of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms (Abyei) and to set criteria to identify legible voters for the Abyei referendum respectively.

However, the interim period was characterized by full of palpitations and neglects. The Government of National Unity did not function as a unified (Goldwyn, 2008). Despite the fact that CPA raised the hope for democratic transition, the tenets of authoritarianism and militarism remained intact. The Abyei Referendum was delayed for over approximately two years. Implementation of the wealth sharing components of the CPA has been slow, and in some cases, nonexistent (Ibid). Consensus was not reached on demarcation of the boundaries, especially where the Heglig field lies (Ibid).

What so ever, South Sudan seceded from republic of Sudan in July 2011 as determined by the internationally-monitored referendum. This, however, did not bring about peace to the two Sudans. Soon after South Sudan seceded, conflict arose over the control of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile region. The issues of division of oil revenues, return of refugees and access to seasonal grazing lands are also at the heart of the controversy. The two protagonists, NCP and SPLM that hold power in the North and South respectively are expected to diplomatically approach these unresolved issues.

2.2. Conceptual and Theoretical Perspectives

2.2.1. Conceptual Notes

Conflict--Conflict is embedded in society and cannot be separated from ongoing political and social process. It is a multi-faceted process having many meanings in everyday life (Wallensteen, 2002). Different writers defined conflict in different ways. For instance, Rwantabagu (2001) explained conflict as a struggle for mutually exclusive rewards or the use of incompatible means to realize a goal. Galtung (2004) also defined conflict as a struggle for survival, well-being, freedom, identity, all which are components of basic human needs. In a more comprehensive manner, Wallensteen (2002: 16) defines conflict as "a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources". Conflict occurs when two or more people or groups have, or think they have, incompatible goals.

War can be defined as the use of armed forces in a conflict, especially between countries. War implies the violent expression of conflict in a massive and organized way (destructive behavior). There is no single persuasive theory that explains the cause of war (Griffiths, O'Callaghan and Roach, 2008). Some theorists argue the structure of power and alliances in the international system as the underlying causes of war (Ibid). Others argue that political, economic, social, and psychological factors are the root causes of war (Ibid).

Peace for the most part remained an abstract concept, defined merely as the absence of war-also called negative peace (Ibid). However, the meaning of peace can also go beyond

the mere absence of war. In this study, the word peace is understood in its negative sense as absence of war. Hence, peace is understood to prevail when war is absent.

According to Wallensteen (2002: 8) **conflict resolution** is understood as "a situation where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement to solve their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other."

Normalization is defined as the restoration of the economic, political and cultural interactions between two parties to conflict.

Discussion on secession as a political concept requires a firm understanding of what **secession** is. **Secession** can be defined as the political divorce from a state to form another sovereign state either through unilateral declaration or multilateral deals. The territory that was previously under the sovereignty of one state becomes sovereign territory of another. According to Griffiths, O'Callaghan and Roach (2008) secession refers to detaching oneself from the scope of the state's authority thereby to form another entity. Waterman (1996: 348) also viewed secession as "a declaration by a new state-in-the-making to the state of which it had formed part and to the interstate system."

"**Post-secession hostility**" refers to the sorts of enmity or discrepancy which result from violent actions following the split of the state to form a different sovereign entity.

2.2.2. Theoretical Perspectives

There is no single cause of conflict. It can result from a combination of factors. Identifying and understanding the interactions between the various causes, dimensions and dynamics of conflict is essential in determining potential areas of intervention. According to Wallensteen (2002), interstate conflict- conflict between sovereign states, usually involves incompatibilities in geopolitik, kapitalpolitik, realpolitik and idealpolitik.

Geopolitik conflict occurs where particular types of territory are afforded such significance by one or more states. States may regard particular border areas as rightfully theirs for historical as well as strategic reasons. And control over them would also mean control over

an entire continent or even the globe. Hence, territorial issues have particular importance for interstate conflict. *Kapitalpolitik* conflict, on the other hand, relates to competition over resources and other economic assets. This means that economic issues like questions of oil prices, the drawing of pipelines, transportation routes, or relations between rich and poor, industrial and non-industrial producers are central in interstate conflict. In the case of *Realpolitik*, prime importance to conflict is attached to power and the power capabilities of the actors. This means that the goal of the conflicting parties is driven by the demand to gain the upper hand as regionally dominant. *Idealpolitik*, on the other hand, focuses with the importance of ideological and legitimacy issues in interstate conflicts. Two governments may dispute each other's rights due to the way in which they have been created or gained legitimacy. States enter into conflict when both sides fear of being overthrown by the other (For more details see Wallensteen, 2002).

According to realists, conflict is the inevitable aspect of international politics (Walt, 1998). This is due to the egoistic or aggressive nature of human beings and the anarchic nature of the international system as classicals and neo-realists respectively identify, viewing international affairs as a struggle for power by self-interested states (Ibid). The overriding goals of a state are survival or self-preservation, which can be attained through increasing its power⁷ (Weber, 2001). The anarchic nature of the system obliges states not to trust one another and be prepared to gear up for conflict through increasing economic and military power. Lust for power, prestige and, the quest for hegemony as well as obsession for internal security, therefore, moves state into conflict (Ibid). What so ever, both realism and neo-realism have the tendency of militaristic thrusts to maintain peace. However, the researcher argues that militaristic thrusts usually bring states into tensions, particularly when their relations are formed in the context of various unresolved issues.

Liberals, on the other hand, argue that war and conflict are not inevitable (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010) since human beings have the capacity to deal with them. To mitigate the various tendencies of conflict, liberal theorists prescribe several measures, like promotion of economic interdependence and democracy as fundamentals, among others. Unlike

⁷The term power here is used in its most literal and obvious form - military strength, military alliances, balance-of-power alignments.

realism, liberalism advocates that mutual beneficial cooperation can be achieved not only at the state level but also across international boundaries (Burchill, 2001; Jackson and Sorensen, 2010). In this vein, interstate cooperation is perceived as a means of improving communication, reducing misunderstanding, and fostering cultural and institutional mechanisms capable of mediating conflicts of interest that arise. However, cooperation will cease particularly where enforcement procedures are weak as liberal institutionalists posit (Burchill, 200).

Liberal theorists also believe that peace can be attained through economic cooperation and interdependence. The likelihood of violent conflict and use of force among states can be calmed down once they form common interest in trade and any other economic activities (Walt, 1998; Burchill, 2001; Jackson and Sorensen, 2010; Griffiths, O'Callaghan; Roach, 2008). The rationale here is that war would threaten each other's prosperity, and leaders come to recognize that the benefits of economic interdependence outweigh the costs of territorial conquest (Burchill, 2001). Besides, economic interdependence enables them to offset defense costs. Realists criticize the liberals' assumption of interdependence. Some realists argue that interdependence heightens the likelihood of war by increasing the number of opportunities for conflict or through producing inequalities and conflicting interests while others concluded that interdependence is unrelated to war (McMillan, 1997). The current Franco-German cooperation subjects the position of the realists to questioning. The current Franco-German economic and political cooperation has changed traditions of using military force as a means of resolving their difference (Burchill, 2001).

The other most pressing point raised by liberalism (liberal republicanism) is linked with the issue of democracy. In this regard, the US president, Woodrow Wilson, proposed that the "spread of democracy as a key strategy to maintain world peace" (Walt, 1998). Democracy is viewed as the best form of government, where peoples are free to have a say and participate in the day today life of the state (Weber, 2001). Accordingly, it is believed that democratic states are more peaceful than authoritarian entities (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010; Walt, 1998). Liberals, further, argue that democracies are inherently peaceful that do

not go to war easily and rarely fight with each other.⁸ The assumption here is that in a democracy there exists the culture of peaceful resolution of conflict through dialogue and negotiation. The activities of democratic governments are constrained by citizens who dislike war (Jackson and Sorensen, 2010).

Besides, participation of the public and the civil societies in the resolution of conflict is vital. In the words of McKeon (2005: 1) "when people become directly affected by armed conflict, they develop a central interest in contributing to its resolution." According to McKeon, traditional diplomacy and conflict resolution approaches rely on bringing political and military leaders of opposing groups into a process of dialogue and negotiation, which could not adequately address the complex and dynamic roots of the issues at hand. Besides the public, civil societies also contribute a lot in the peace process through creating conditions for talks, building confidence between the parties, shaping the conduct and content of negotiations and influence the sustainability of peace agreements (Ibid). Consequently, involving civil societies and public in the peace deal can be of paramount importance in dealing with conflict.

At times, conflicting parties might be taken away by their emotions and egos, which make them look to the past rather than to the future and to emphasize the destructive rather than the constructive (Galtung, 2004). Under these circumstances, creative mediators who could facilitate and empower the parties to arrive at new ideas and thoughts are vital. Hence, institutions, both regional and international institutions, are fundamental in the resolution of conflict as liberals argued.

The central focus of the study undertaken is on drawing lessons for Sudan and South Sudan after glossing over the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession hostility. As Bahru (2006) and Abbink (1998) argue, the current Ethio-Eritrea hostility resulted because of the absence of well institutionalized democracy and the continuation of authoritarianism. A research conducted by Kalewongel (2008) also identified that the border controversy between Ethiopia and Eritrea remains unresolved as a result of excluding the local people living

⁸This does not mean that democracies never go to war; they may go to war for humanitarian purposes. The UN actions in East Timor, Darfur, Somalia, and Bosnia can be mentioned as typical examples in this regard.

along the disputed border from the peace deal. As Robera (2011) noted, Ethio-Eritrean reluctance to cooperate also exposed them to different economic and political costs.

The study, therefore, draws lessons for Sudan and South Sudan through relying much on liberalists' perspective. The rationale here is that for Sudan and South Sudan to come out of the prevailing impasse and form harmonious relations. It is not the militaristic thrust that would bring peace between them as prescribed by the realists but democratization, as advocated by liberals. Though realists criticize the importance of public opinion in 'decision making'⁹, the empirical evidence from the Ethio-Eritrean experience reveals that popular participation is vital to effectively address disputes and halt the impasse. Besides, the presence of ports and different oil pipelines in Sudan and the abundance of oil reserves in South Sudan can meet the demands of both countries. In the light of this, the liberalists' prescription of forming cooperation and interdependence is plausible. Forming cooperation not only enhances economic benefits but also eases security problems coming from various quarters including external detractors.

⁹ For realists, reliance on public opinion could compromise the accuracy of a decision which would have been made with greater precision by qualified experts.

CHAPTER THREE

ETHIO-ERITREAN POST-SECESSION RELATIONS

As has been highlighted in the previous sections, Ethiopia and Eritrea have longstanding relations. Peoples of the two countries are not only bounded by common mythology, legend and history but also by blood and ancestral roots. Certain commonalities and complementarities in terms of culture, way of life, language, and religion persisted so far. However, colonial rule that snapped Eritrea from Ethiopia disrupted the intimate relationship of peoples of the two countries. Under this section, the Ethio-Eritrean relations before the outbreak of the war, the causes of the war and the factors that accompanied the post-war stalemate are presented as follows.

3.1. Ethio-Eritrean Relations (1991-1998)

Immediately after the demise of the military regime, the people of Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia (*de facto* in 1991 and *de jure* in 1993). The TPLF-dominated coalition government known as the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) was established in Ethiopia whereas EPLF (later named as People's Front for Democracy and Justice-PFDJ) government was formed in Eritrea. Though the relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia prior the 1993 Referendum was not formal, the TGE extended support for the smooth running of the referendum (Kinfe, 2004).

Formal relations between the two countries were established after the declaration of the independence of Eritrea. The state to state relations were formalized with the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 13 July 1993 (Kidist, 2011; Kinfe, 2004). Since then, various ministerial meetings were held and around 25 protocol agreements were concluded to regulate their bilateral relations (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). These protocols encompass defense pact, harmonization of economic and trade policies, and all public affairs including tourism, education, and health care services (Ibid). Joint Technical Committees in the fields of social, economic and political spheres were formed for the purpose of consultation (Kinfe, 2004; Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). A Joint Ministerial

Commission was also established with the mandate to supervise the implementation and progress of the agreements (Ibid).

In the economic field, both countries decided to harmonize their development policies and strategies. To this end, a protocol that guides the fiscal, monetary, trade and investment policies of both countries was adopted (Gilkes, 1999; Kinfe, 2004). Consensus was reached to use the Ethiopian *birr* until Eritrea adopted its own currency (Kinfe, 2004). In return, with only service charge, Assab and Massawa were made free to import and export goods from and to Ethiopia (Ibid). In the field of trade, the agreement stipulated that free movement of goods and services for local consumption is allowed in their respective countries (Ibid). The provision did not include items coming from third countries (Kinfe, 2004; Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). They also allowed nationals of both countries to engage in any business activities without restriction (Kinfe, 2004). Rehabilitations of social infrastructure including health care, education, cultural and sport, social and labour relations were emphasized in the agreement as well (Ibid).

With regard to foreign relations, the two governments agreed to cooperate in the maintenance of peace and order in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea region and the world at large (Ibid). As members, the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea showed their commitment to strengthen the institutional capacities of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) (Ibid). To strengthen their relations, pledges were made to help one another in time of military attack, which came to be known as military pact (Kidist, 2011). Based on this military pact, it was believed that the Ethiopian government played a constructive role to defuse the 1995/96 Yemen-Eritrea conflict over the Hanish Islands (Kinfe, 2004). The Ethiopian government has also worked exhaustively to mediate Sudan-Eritrean hostility that resulted from Eritrea's support of different dissident groups in Sudan (Ibid).

Furthermore, the two countries also agreed for the free movement of peoples across borders including the establishment of their residence. The two parties concurred that the citizens of both countries could enter and re-enter territories without visa and authorization (Ibid). However, soon after the EPLF-led government seized power in Eritrea (*de facto*

independence), the primary measure taken was the deportation of Ethiopians including Tigreans living inside Eritrean territory. The government in Ethiopia did not take a reciprocal measure or even protest against the actions of the Eritrean government so as not to create a tense situation and allowed Eritreans to live in Ethiopia not only during the pre-referendum period but also after the secession.¹⁰

The expected outcomes of the above mentioned agreements were intended to provide significant impetus to the promotion and consolidation of peace and stability in the region and foster socio-political and economic cooperation of the two countries as well. Though Ethiopia and Eritrea were in agreement to harmonize the different aspects of their relations including the economy, very little progress was made on the implementation of the protocols (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). Thus, the outcomes of all the agreements and relations did not last long due to various reasons.

According to Tekeste and Tronvoll (2000), lack of political willingness and inability to act in the best interests of each other were the hindering factors that dragged back the implementation of the agreements and harmonization of relations. Esayas argued that the post-secession Ethio-Eritrean relations declined due to the fact that the agreements signed and relations formed between the two countries were not well institutionalized and the willingness to act accordingly was non-existent¹¹ (see also Bereketeab, 2010). Berouk further concurs with Esayas's view by stating that adequate and effective mechanisms to implement and operationalize the agreements were absent.¹² Acknowledging the relatively peaceful relations between the two countries prior the outbreak of the war, Berouk attributes the fragility of the Ethio-Eritrean relations to the deeper ideological differences and animosity that the two governments harbored.¹³ Berouk added that the relations were short-lived because the TPLF dominated government of Ethiopia allowed Eritrea to secede without conducting serious negotiations with regard to border demarcation, the issue of

¹⁰ Interview with Esayas Girmay, Diplomat at Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 25 February 2014

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Interview with Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher at Institute for Security Studies , 28 February 2014

¹³ Ibid

currency, the division of assets or liabilities and even as regards the modalities of economic cooperation (see also Medhane, 1999). Most importantly, the two governments did not negotiate on the measures to be taken after Eritrea adopted its own currency (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000), which resulted in the devastating bloodshed and prevailing disparity. The deterioration of the bilateral relations is discussed in more detail as follows.

3.2. The 1998-2000 War: The Underlying Causes and Outcomes

Understanding the real cause of the Ethio-Eritrean war has become the subject of much debate and writings on the part of academicians, diplomats and politicians (Dima, 2006). Consensus was not reached on the exact cause of the war. Some attribute this to the longstanding political tensions while others attached the issue to economic factors. Conflicting parties, on the other hand, considered border as the apparent issue of contention (Leenco, 2006). According to Esayas and Berouk, the Ethio-Eritrean war was accompanied by complex factors¹⁴ (see also Bereketeab, 2010), which could not be singled out wholly in this paper.

3.2.1. Economic Causes of the War

As mentioned, Ethiopia and Eritrea concluded key agreements to harmonize trade and investment policies and give unfettered rights to the national investors of both countries. To oversee the implementation of the agreement, several joint ministerial meetings were held from 1993 to 1996 (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). Various claims and counter-claims came to the surface particularly with regard to investment and free movement of peoples (Ibid). The issue of import and export was at the heart of the controversy. To deal with such and other divergences, the two governments agreed to set a Joint Review Committee in 1997 and the Committee concluded that the two countries adopted separate policies with regard to investment, tariff, and exchange and interest rate (Ibid). The Committee declared that the two countries had different views in the area of economic cooperation (Geburu, 2006) and the promise of economic harmonization remained insignificant.

¹⁴ Interview with Esayas Girmay, 25 February 2014 and Berouk Mesfin, 28 February 2014

According to various sources, the government in Ethiopia adopted and followed different protectionist policies (Dima, 2006; Bereket, 2010). The government has levied taxes on Eritrea's products imported to Ethiopia and, Eritreans were prohibited from importing Ethiopia's exportable products (Kidist, 2011). In this regard, a speech made by Eritrean President after the war started conveyed that "Ethiopian trade policy was designed to protect the market for Ethiopian manufactured products by drawing barriers for similar Eritrean products" (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000: 44). Medhane (1999), on the other hand, contends that the engagement of Eritreans in black marketing moved the government of Ethiopia to take the aforementioned measures that contravened the agreements. Abebe, on the other hand, argued that the economic relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea during the years of intimate relations were in favour of the latter, which contributed a lot to divergent policies that contravened the mutual understandings.¹⁵ The government of Eritrea also blamed the Ethiopian government of denying Eritreans from investing in the areas of insurance, transport, communication and banking (Kidist, 2011; Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000).

The Ethiopian government also blamed Eritrea about taxes levied on its good at Assab (Trivelli, 1998). Controversies and inflammations were bubbling especially when the Ethiopian government began to import refined petroleum products rather than crude oil since 1997(Ibid). Instead of using the aging Assab oil refinery, the Ethiopian government embarked on a policy of building up a six-month strategic fuel reserve by creating fuel depots all over Ethiopia (Ibid). Parallel to this, Ethiopia began to diversify its import routes and to shift more and more of her fuel imports away from Assab to Djibouti and even Mombasa (Ibid).

The irreconcilable differences in trade and investment policies between the two countries further forced Eritrea to introduce a new currency- *nakfa*-in November 1997 (Bereket, 2010), which exacerbated the controversy. Bereket (2010) attributed the introduction of *nakfa* to the Eritrean quest of ensuring sovereignty and asserts that Eritreans were worried about the use of Ethiopian currency for long. They feared that their economic autonomy

¹⁵ Interview with Abebe Muluneh, Head of IGAD Security Sector Program, 4 April 2014.

were to be subjected to the Ethiopia requirements thereby undermining the political self-determination that had been won with much sacrifice (Ibid).

Subsequently, the new Eritrean currency was introduced without consulting the Ethiopian government. The Eritrean government wanted the two currencies-*birr and nakfa* to bear the same value and be freely serviceable in both countries (Abbink, 1998; Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000; Bereketeab, 2010). However, the government of Ethiopia refused Eritrea's proposal and insisted on using hard currency as a medium of exchange (Kidist, 2011; Trivelli, 1998; Bereketeab, 2010). The Ethiopian government made clear that all cross-border transaction with Eritrea was to be conducted in hard currency- by using US Dollars (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). Furthermore, the old *birr* notes of Ethiopia were replaced with a new one thereby annulling millions of the old *birr* notes that were circulating in Eritrea (Abbink, 1998; Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). The use of US\$ as the medium of exchange created a financial setback for Eritrea due to its limited currency reserve and the replacement of old *birr* notes further angered Eritreans who wanted to purchase goods and services from the Ethiopian market by using the *birr*.¹⁶ It is this misunderstanding that bedeviled the cordial relations that existed between the two.

3.2.2. The 1998 Border Conflict

Though the question of border demarcation was raised prior the end of the Eritrean liberation struggle, the two parties postponed the issue temporarily. Since the split, the border remained un-demarcated presumably because the two sides were preoccupied with matters associated with the newly forged friendship and cooperation (Kalewongel, 2008; Bereket; 2006). It was relegated to secondary status as almost unimportant and not urgent agenda (Kalewongel, 2008). Due emphasis was not given to the demarcation of common boundaries until the relations between the two countries was exposed to economic disarray (Gerbu, 2006; Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000).

It was in summer 1997 that the question of border demarcation captured the attention of the two governments (Ibid). The issuance of a new regional map for Tigray, which

¹⁶ Interview with Abebe Muluneh, Head of IGAD Security Sector Program, 4 April 2014

incorporated the disputed Badme/Yirga Triangle and Adi Murug into Ethiopia, intensified the border discord (Kalewongel, 2008; Iyob, 2000). On August 1997, the Eritrean President wrote a letter to Ethiopian Prime Minister accusing the forceful occupation of parts of its territory specifically Adi Murug (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). A few days later, the President also wrote another letter stating that Adi Murug was inside Eritrea and that the Ethiopian forces dismantled the Eritrean administrations and expelled the officials (Ibid). The letter also expressed that similar actions had been taken around Badme. The combination of all the complaints led for the establishment of a Joint Border Commission in November 1997, which was entrusted with the responsibility to deal with the border problems (Kalewongel, 2008; Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000).

Two years prior to the holding of the second Joint Border Commission session, small groups of Eritrean forces entered a disputed territorial zone in the Badme area on 6 May 1998 (Ibid), which led to an open military clash between the Ethiopian and Eritrean units and the exchange of gunfire entailed casualties from the Eritrean side including the death of the commander of the group, high ranking officials and senior veteran liberation fighters (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000; Iyob, 2000). Following this incident, the Eritrea government mobilized a mechanized army unit and established itself in Badme and its surrounding (Ibid) followed by military action in other parts of the border such as Altena, Zalambessa, and Bure, south of the Port City of Assab (Abbink, 1998). The Ethiopian government was informed that Eritrean forces had crossed the border and occupied the area around Badme after which the Ethiopian government issued mobilization orders, which marked the opening of full-scale armed confrontation (Kalewongel, 2008). Thus, the skirmish and provocative military maneuvers that occurred along the common borders disrupted the cordiality and alliance between the two sides putting an end to the peaceful coexistence between the two countries.

One thing that should be underlined here is that the issue of border as the cause of the war is debatable. Most scholars objected to the assumption that border dispute was the cause of the Ethio-Eritrean war (see Bahru, 2006; Dima, 2006; Gebru, 2006). Esayas further contends, though the issue of border as the cause of the war is contentious, the incident that took place along the common frontiers can be considered as the pretext for the dissonance

between the two countries.¹⁷ Similarly, Berouk considered the border incident as the "proximate cause" for the start of the Ethio-Eritrean war.¹⁸ The incident marked the eruption of other accumulated grievances that the two regimes harbored against each other despite the cordiality that lasted for a few years. In view of the border being the major issue of contention, the arbitration process, therefore, solely focused on border incompatibilities. Medhane (1999: 160) asserts that finding solutions based on mere border dispute "will only do more harm than good" (see also Dima, 2006).

3.2.3. The Eritrean State Building Project

Soon after the formal separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, the leadership of Eritrea passed several rules and regulations to transform the society (Tronvoll, 1998). Among others, the government wanted to be self-reliant in political and economic as well as cultural affairs (Ibid). Having formulated a very ambitious plan, the Eritrean leaders rejected foreign aid and insisted that "Eritrea was doing fine and could go it alone" (Medhane, 1999: 138). This policy stems from the zeal to view Eritrea and Eritreans as exceptional from the rest of the world (Ibid). Hence, transforming and creating a new and prosperous Eritrea like 'Singapore' became the overriding agenda of the government (Berhane, 2006). To achieve this vision, creation of national unity was prioritized and, hence, the leader of Eritrea inclined to carve out and sever the common ethnic and cultural ties of its people with the neighbouring countries. More concretely, Berhane (2006: 34) stated that:

the motivation for engaging in war against its neighbors (though the energy and resources were needed for development) aimed at carving out a singular Eritrean identity and mental map, away from the common ethnic and cultural ties in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen. The border dispute with Ethiopia was intended to emphasize the division between highland Eritreans, who are culturally akin to those in Tigray.

Therefore, the war erupted as a result of the ambition of the Eritrean leadership in detaching the Eritrean highlanders from their kin living south of the Mereb River.

¹⁷ Interview with Esayas Girmay, 25 February 2014 and Berouk Mesfin, 28 February 2014

¹⁸ Interview with Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher at Institute for Security Studies, 28 February 2014

Specifically, Alemseged (2001) examined that the attack launched by the Eritrean government on Tigrayan primary school children in Makalle on 5 June 1998 was intended to accelerate the invention of otherness. Gerbu (2006) also stated that the war was an outcome of the ambition of Eritrean leadership to glorify a new national identity through negating its past. The regime wanted to reject the notion that Eritrea was part of Ethiopia, and military invincibility is used as an instrument to glorify distinct identity (Ibid).

3.2.4. Political Causes of the War

The formal independence of Eritrea and its subsequent recognition by the international community was done with full support of TGE. The international community was too optimistic about the future Ethio-Eritrean relations in anticipation that their bilateral relations will be smooth. The justification was that TPLF has been portrayed as the little brother of EPLF and the two fronts shared very close resemblance in terms of identity, nature of governance, economic policies, as well as political orientations (Medhane, 1999).

However, the two armed fronts- TPLF and EPLF-had political and ideological differences (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000, Medhane, 1999; Young, 1996, 1997). Throughout the years of their armed struggle, relations between the two fronts were not free from hostility and suspicion. A certain level of 'mistrust,' which did not become too noticeable to outside observers, characterized the historic relations of the two fronts (Trivelli, 1998; Bereketeab, 2010). As Trivelli (1998) further contends, a genuine compromise and reflective political debates were lacking on the part of the high ranking officials of the two fronts. For the leadership of TPLF and EPLF, compromise is equated with capitulation (Healy and Plaut, 2007) and imposition by force is prioritized over negotiation (Kidist, 2011). Abbink (1998), Bahru (2006) and Bereketeab (2010) stated that the deep rooted disagreements and the culture of autocracy that the two movements espoused plagued the two countries into a bloody fight.

According to Trivelli (1998), the post-secession relationship between the TPLF-dominated EPRDF government of Ethiopia and the PFDJ (successor of EPLF) of Eritrea was not a genuine alliance based on mutual cordiality and deep-rooted friendship. It was rather a political marriage of convenience based on temporarily shared political and economic

interests. In this regard, Dima (2006) and Tekeste and Tronvoll (2000) argued that EPLF needed TPLF to be strong enough in the political sphere of Ethiopia thereby to secure Eritrean independence while TPLF depended on EPLF's support to stabilize the situation in Ethiopia and gain control in Ethiopia. Healy and Plaut (2007) also noted that the unholy alliance and temporary friendship of the protagonists (virtually TPLF/EPRDF and EPLF) not only exacerbated the war but also shadowed a negotiated peace solution (see also ICG, 2003 and Kidist, 2011).

The adoption of divergent policies in both countries also had tremendous impact on the outbreak of the war. The TPLF-dominated EPRDF in Ethiopia adopted policies that contravened the policies of the PFDJ in Eritrea. The former applied federal state structure and formally granted the right to self-determination whereas the latter adopted a unitary state structure in a multiethnic country (Leenco, 2003). The EPLF-led government in Eritrea maintains that reorganizing the country along ethnic lines might increase ethnic awareness and tensions and cannot be a viable option for nation building (Medhane, 2004). Due to this fact, the governments of the two countries criticized each other on the grounds of their policy (Leenco, 2003). Since many of the ethnic groups of Eritrea exist on both sides of the Ethio-Eritrean border (specifically Afar, Saho, Tigrinya, and Kunama), the ethnic-based policy of Ethiopia was feared to jeopardize the Eritrean nation-building projects (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). Medhane (1999) concluded that the vulnerability syndrome resulting thereof seemed to have forced the Eritreans to take a pre-emptive action against neighbouring countries.

Writers on the subject also attribute the cause of the war to the issue of power competition. According to Ruth Iyob (2000), the Ethio-Eritrean war can be viewed as the war between the 'diasporic and hegemon state'.¹⁹ The government of Eritrea was too ambitious to be the dominant players in the Horn prompting the government of Ethiopia to see itself as the regional hegemon (Ibid). The asymmetry of vision and the contradictory roles of the 'diasporic state-Eritrea- and the hegemon-Ethiopia- led to a clash of interests. Leenco

¹⁹ The term 'diasporic and hegemon state' implies roles states play vis-a-vis each other as extensions of the way their governments see their collective national missions (or destinies) (Iyob, 2000).

(2003) further concurs with Iyob by concluding that diasporic state is just as aggressive and undemocratic as a hegemonic one. Tronvoll (2004 quoted in Kalewongel 2008) argued that the historically-rooted competition for regional hegemony was perhaps the most important reason that led the two friends to the largest and deadliest conventional war. In the words of Medhane (2004) too, more than border, the hegemonic project of Eritrea and its failure to oversee a democratic transition, even of the weak kind being practiced in Ethiopia, moved the two countries into full-scale armed clash.

3.2.5. Nature and Defining Features of Regimes

Since its formal independence from Ethiopia, power in Eritrea was excessively centralized and foreign policy-making became the exclusive domain of the President. As a result, the government pursued aggressive foreign policy that antagonized relations with its neighbours. Medhane (2004) further argues that for the same purpose of creating unity, the regime discouraged political pluralism, press freedoms, trade unions and professional movements. The political development in Ethiopia was relatively better as compared with the situation in Eritrea. The Ethiopian government partially opened the political space by allowing opposition parties to operate but genuine commitment to democratization remain farfetched (Gilkes, 1999; Kalewongel, 2008; Merera, 2007) and elections and press freedoms were systematically manipulated by the regime in power (Kidist, 2011; Merera, 2007).

More conclusively, Trivelli (1998: 287) portrayed the political structures of the two countries as "undemocratic, secretive and hostile to open public debate." In the words of Abbink (1998: 557) too, the post-1991 political structures of Ethiopia and Eritrea were seamlessly fitted into a model of 'neo-patrimonial politics' where personalized authoritarian rule based on strong bonds of personal loyalty persisted so far. Both regimes maintained the culture of autocratic rule where absolute power is cherished and the spirit and institutions of democracy was blurred (Ibid).

The bilateral agreements concluded between the two governments were hardly transparent (Bahru, 2006). The agreements were concluded at party level excluding civil societies and other organizations thereby making relationships highly personalized between the

leadership of the two countries.²⁰ The way such relations were conducted lacked transparency and accountability. Dima (2006) asserts that the informality and lack of transparency of the mutual understandings contributed to their undoing. The public was not informed about the growing dissonance between the two regimes until May 1998 (Iyob, 2000; Bereketeab, 2010). Lack of open dialogue and negotiations between governments of the two countries opened room for the prevalence of misinterpretation of each other's intentions and expectations (Dima, 2006). Dima (2006) further argues that lack of public accountability and public debates not only shadowed the bilateral relations but also blurred the resolution of the conflict itself.

3.2.6. Psycho-Social Factors

The other important factor which accompanied the deterioration of the bilateral relations relate to psycho-social issues. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, colonial rule had left a negative psycho-social context on the Eritrean people. The complex of distinctiveness on the part of a section of the Eritrean elite is the result of their separate existence under the Italian rule (Medhane, 1999; Trivelli, 1998; Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). These groups considered themselves as unique, exceptional and civilized as compared with their Ethiopian counterparts. This state of affairs led matters to unwanted cultural, economic and political competition thereby perpetrating the axis of divergence (Bereketeab, 2010; Leenco, 2003). According to Medhane (1999), the liberation fronts in Eritrea had a patronized attitude toward the Tigrean movements whereas Tekeste and Tronvoll (2000) stated that EPLF portrayed itself as a senior and dominant front in the region since it predated the establishment of the TPLF. Such feeling of superiority and seniority was coupled with prejudice and seemed to have shaped the position of the two regimes against each other thereby exacerbating the dissonance in their relations in the post-1991 years.

The perception that EPLF (PFDJ) government upheld in terms of its military capability and potential to be invincible eventually contributed to the outbreak of the war. In military

²⁰ Interview with Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher at Institute for Security Studies , 28 February 2014

terms, the Eritrean government exaggerated its might vis-a-vis the EPRDF (Kidist, 2011; Berhane, 2006). This simplistic and chauvinistic claim originated from EPLF's role in contributing to the overthrow of the military regime. The regime that holds power in post-independent Eritrea maintained that a tiny country had defeated the greater Ethiopia that enjoyed massive support from US and Soviet Union, which rated the role of other fronts as minimal (Gebru, 2006). Besides, the Eritrean political elite concluded that neighbouring countries including Ethiopia are in a state of political disarray and incapable of defending themselves (Kidist, 2011; Abbink, 1998). Hence, exaggerating its military myth and superiority complex, the government of Eritrea attempted to impose its will on the Ethiopian government forcefully (Kidist, 2011). However, Eritrea's view of militarily weak Ethiopia became a mirage that faded into thin air when the actual armed engagement commenced.

Not only the military miscalculation but also the Eritrean greed to manipulate and overwhelmingly control the Ethiopian economy further impacted on the bilateral economic relations between the two (Medhane, 1999). The Eritrean government wanted to build a miraculous economic stature known as the 'Singapore syndrome', which was not only entertained by the leadership of the country but by the people in the street (Ibid). The government of Eritrea wanted to make the country the industrial and financial centre of the Horn through unfettered access to the resource and economy of its neighbours.²¹ This line of distorted thinking was to be realized through "illicit trade, black market forgery and illegal business transactions" (Medhane, 1999: 140). Unfortunately, the measure taken by the Ethiopian government in response to the illegal trade activities shuttered Eritrea's ambition realizing economic miracle thereby leading to a serious deadlock.

3.3. The Peace Process and the Signing of the Algiers Agreement

Since the escalation of the conflict, the international community was engaged in mediating the Ethio-Eritrean war. A U.S. team led by Susan Rice and a Rwandan team led by Paul Kagame were invited to mediate and halt the escalation of the war (ICG, 2003). The US-Rwanda delegates produced a four-point plan for the resolution of the border conflict

²¹ Interview with Esayas Girmay, 25 February 2014 and Abebe Muluneh, 4 April 2014

(Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). The first part of the plan states that the conflicting parties should solve the dispute amicably. The other principle of the framework discusses the deployment of small observer mission at Badme thereby requesting the Eritrean forces to re-deploy from Badme and the return of the former civilian administration. The third principle, on the other hand, depicts the swift and binding demarcation and delimitation of the disputed border by a qualified and mutually recognized technical team. The last part of the proposal recommended the demilitarization of the entire common borders. However, the US-Rwanda plan failed to end the war due to the fact that Eritrea refused to accept the framework as a result of which the war continued with great vigor (Ibid).

The resolution of the Ethio-Eritrean war became the major preoccupation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in its various Ministerial and Assembly meetings as well (Ibid). Proposals adopted by OAU concurred with the US-Rwanda Plan, which required the restoration of the *status quo ante* and Eritrea's withdrawal from Badme and its environs to the position that they held prior to May 1998. Ethiopia initially accepted the OAU Framework as well as the accompanying Modalities of Implementation but Eritrea had grave reservations and refused to accept either (ICG, 2005). Heavy fighting resumed in February 1999, in which Ethiopia retook Badme – a victory that was greeted with spontaneous celebrations in Addis Ababa (Solomon, 2004; Kinfu, 2004). Eritrea accepted the OAU Framework Agreement after the humiliating defeat that it suffered at Badme area.

Though Eritrea expressed its agreement to the OAU Framework, Ethiopia began to challenge the OAU peace efforts. Ethiopia judged the third document prepared by the OAU, the UN and the U.S. on the technical arrangements for implementation as unacceptable (ICG, 2003). The Ethiopian government submitted a list of questions demanding clarification (Ibid). The government also suspected Eritrean commitment to accept the peace proposal and understood Eritrea's acceptance of the OAU Framework as a strategy to buy time, reorganize its army and launch counter-attacks on Badme (Kalewongel, 2008). Hence, air strikes and massive attacks continued up until the signing of the ceasefire on 18 June 2000 at Algiers.

The central pillar of the ceasefire agreement was the establishment of the 25-kilometre deep and demilitarized Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) inside Eritrea to be monitored by a UN peacekeeping force. Pursuant to its resolution of 1312 (2000), the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)²², which was mandated to monitor the redeployment of Ethiopian forces from positions they had taken after 6 February 1999 as well as to oversee the deployment of Eritrean forces within 25 kilometers distance from the new deploying positions of the Ethiopian forces (ICG, 2005). UNMEE was also charged with the responsibility to chair the Military Coordination Commission and monitor the clearing of mines in the TSZ (Ibid). In early 2001, UNMEE had already started its operation on the ground and over 4,000 military personnel including 200 military observers were deployed based on the UN Security authorization (ICG, 2003; Kalewongel, 2008).

Witnessed by the UN Secretary General, the OAU, the European Union and the U.S. the conflicting parties concluded the Algiers Peace Agreement on 12 December 2000. Divided into six articles, the Algiers Agreement was intended to end the conflict. The preamble of the Agreement outlined that the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea accepted the OAU Framework Agreement and the Modalities for its Implementation.

The first part of the Agreement showed that the parties agreed to terminate military hostilities and the use of force against each other whereas the second part discussed the issue of release and repatriation of all prisoners of war and humane treatment to each other's nationals and persons within their respective territories. The remaining parts of the Agreement were devoted to the establishment of commissions that would work to bring an end to the conflict. Pursuant to Articles (3), (4) and (5), an independent and impartial body was setup to investigate the origins of the conflict designated as a neutral Boundary Commission composed of five members charged with the task of delimiting and demarcating the border based on pertinent colonial treaties of 1900, 1902 and 1908 and applicable international law. The Claims Commission was formed with the mandate to decide on issues of compensation. Most importantly, the parties to the treaty agreed that decisions of both Boundary and Claims Commissions were final and binding.

²²See UN Security Council Resolution 1312 (2000)

3.3.1. Decision of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC)

As discussed above, the Ethio-Eritrean war flared up due to the minor border incident that occurred along the common frontiers. To address the border dispute, the conflicting parties ceded their case to the International Court of Arbitration. To this end and based on the Algiers Agreement, the EEBC was established and started its work on 25 May 2001 (Kalewongel, 2008). After examining the available evidences, the EEBC reported its ruling on 13 April 2002. The Boundary Commission invalidated Ethiopia's claim of Kunama and awarded this area to Eritrea and the flash point on which the two parties fought, Badme, was ceded to Eritrea (Healy and Plaut, 2007). However, the Boundary Commission avoided any reference to the location of Badme in relation to its delimitation line in both the maps and the text of its report (White, 2002; Healy and Plaut, 2007). On the other sectors of the border, the Commission granted Tsorona, Fort Cadorna and the Acran region, Guna and Monoxeito to Eritrea and Ethiopia acquired Zalambessa and its surrounding, all of which were bitterly fought over during the war (Healy and Plaut, 2007). The decision of the Commission divided the Irob area between Eritrea and Ethiopia (Abbink, 2003a).

The reaction of the conflicting parties to the decision of EEBC was different. Prior to the release of the EEBC ruling, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister announced that the contested areas of Badme, Zalemessa, Aiga, Bure, Irob, Alitena and Bada were granted to Ethiopia (Healy and Plaut, 2007). The Eritrean government was delighted with the decision of the Commission and the Eritrean President said that Badme would relapse to Eritrea (Solomon, 2004; Kalewongel, 2008). Once the ruling of the EEBC became clear it became apparent that Badme had been awarded to Eritrea. The miscommunication emanated from the informal conversation that the observer of OAU staff made to the headquarters indicating that Badme had been awarded to Ethiopia (Healy and Plaut, 2007). This message was also relayed to the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia as well (Ibid).

Soon after the release of the decision of the EEBC and the fate of contested area determined, the Ethiopian government opposed and invalidated the decision of the EEBC. The Ethiopian government appealed to the Boundary Commission stating that errors had

been made and adjustments would be required during the demarcation phase (Ibid).The Ethiopian government further noted that the demarcation process should proceed based on human geography, which should not divide homesteads or separate communities from vital water sources or roads (ICG, 2005). The Commission rejected Ethiopia's allegation and further stated that the demarcation could only be conducted on the basis of that decision and the Commission had no authority to alter the boundary line (ICG, 2005; Kidist, 2011; Solomon, 2004).

The Ethiopian government then suspended cooperation with the Commission and appealed to the UN Security Council (Healy and Plaut, 2007). Though no positive outcome ensued, Ethiopia repeatedly showed for the reopening of the Commission's ruling and demanded discussion with Eritrea before the actual demarcation of borders takes place. Eritrea, on the other hand, has stuck to the legally correct position that the ruling be implemented in full and without alteration (Ibid) thereby dismissing Ethiopia's call for dialogue. Instead of opening dialogue with Ethiopia, Eritrea blamed the international community and the United Nations in particular for not forcing Ethiopia to accept the decision. Due to lack of progress on border demarcation, the Commission announced in 2007 that the virtually demarcated border on electronic maps should be the internationally recognized border between the two countries (Kidist, 2011; Kalewongel; 2008).

3.4. Factors Underpinning the Ethio-Eritrea Post-War Stalemate

As a result of the inability of the two countries to reach agreement on the operationalization of the decision of the EEBC, resolution of border disputes in particular and normalization of their bilateral relations in general has stalled. Under this section, the factors spurring the stalemate after the end of the direct confrontation are discussed as follows.

3.4.1. Unresolved Border Issues

As a result of the uncompromising stance and the relative intransigencies of both sides, border issues remain stalled. The willingness on the part of the conflicting parties to reopen discussion on how the actual border demarcation could take place or on the

implementation of the decisions of the EEBC with no precondition is still unobservable. The two sides seem to be not willing to moderate their positions so far to end the border deadlocks. Hence, the unresolved border issues are thus at the heart of the existing stalemate.

According to Berouk and Abebe, the importance of Badme on which the two sides fought has left arduous consequence in entrenching the prevailing impasse.²³ From Ethiopia's side, the government failed to abide by the ruling of the EEBC because doing so would amount to ignore the memory of the troops who gave their life to regain Badme (Leenco, 2006). The Ethiopian government also spent huge amounts of finance in the war. Strong resistance and criticism from domestic stakeholders came to challenge the Ethiopian government urging it not to cede Badme to Eritrea. Not only the politicians but also members of the Badme and Irob communities at large vowed not to give a piece of territory to Eritrea and stood against the decision of the Commission (Solomon, 2004). In the light of this, it will not be easy for the Ethiopian government to give Badme to Eritrea despite the binding nature of the decision of the Commission. From the Eritrean side, conceding Badme is highly unlikely due to two reasons: their troops shed blood in order to gain Badme and a neutral Boundary Commission awarded the area to them (Leenco, 2006). Therefore, Badme becomes a highly symbolic spot for national prestige on both sides and a major source of the Ethio-Eritrean disparity (Abbink, 2003b).

The inadequate conflict resolution strategy employed by the international community also left another repercussion for the stalemate (Dima, 2005; Getachew, 2006). The agreement mandated the EEBC to delimit and demarcate the border based on pertinent colonial treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable international law (Article, 4). However, as has been highlighted in chapter II, the colonial rulers interpreted the border unilaterally and drew new borderlines, which was subjected to frequent changes leaving them undemarcated as a result of toponymic confusion, misunderstanding among parties as well as incomplete knowledge of geography of the localities (Ciampi, 2001). Though not mandated by the agreement, the EEBC decided borders without consulting local peoples and based on the decision, the flash point- Badme- was awarded to Eritrea. As Abbink

²³ Interview with Berouk Mesfin, 28 February 2014 and Abebe Muluneh, 4 April 2014

(2003b) contends, the colonial ruler- Italy- and an independent state-Eritrea- never had any exercise of administration or control over Badme and beyond since this had long been administrated by Ethiopia. Hence, the peace process that neglects the voice of local populations and fluidity of border changes did much harm than good.

As Berouk asserts, not only the flawed conflict resolution strategy employed but also the failures of the international community to influence the two countries to come to terms also impacted on the prevailing situation.²⁴ It is argued that instead of influencing Ethiopia to accept the ruling and collaborate with the Commission during the demarcation process the international community, particularly the US, was suspected of favoring Ethiopia thereby blocking the operationalization of the Commission's ruling (Bereketeab, 2010). The Eritrean leadership was thus annoyed and became too suspicious about the importance of various institutions like UN or AU. Due to the limited influence of the international community, the promises of Algiers Agreement remained on paper thereby perpetuating the existing no-war no-peace situation (Getachew, 2006; Bereketeab, 2010).

3.4.2. The Politics of Destabilization and Proxy War

Destabilization and mutual intervention largely remained the characterizing features of the situation in the Horn of Africa. For instance, prior to the downfall of the military regime, Ethiopia supported the SPLM/A while the Sudanese government established a strong link with the ELF and later EPLF in their fight against the Ethiopian government (Abbink, 2003a). Similarly, the Siyad Barre regime of Somalia extended support to the Western Somali Liberation Front in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia while Ethiopia in return assisted northern Somalis in what is now Somaliland against the Siyad regime (Ibid). Sudan and Eritrea were also engaged in destabilizing each other by supporting the Eritrean Islamic Jihad and the Sudanese opposition National Democratic Alliance respectively (Ibid).

Though the Algiers Agreement brought an end to the devastating effects of the war, consensus was not reached on the demarcation of borders and normalization of the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The ruling of the EEBC had not been implemented

²⁴ Interview with Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher at Institute for Security Studies , 28 February 2014

as a result of which disagreement about the border remains intact. The unresolved nature of the border disputes led to the escalation of destabilization and proxy engagement (Ibid). The Ethiopian government accused Eritrea of extending support to different insurgents notably the Oromo and Somali ethno-nationalist groups while Eritrea blamed the Ethiopian regime as well (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000; Bereketeab, 2010). During the crisis in the aftermath of the 2005 Elections, the government of Ethiopia blamed Eritreans of having a hand in the turmoil (ICG, 2005) and in response Ethiopia also assisted the Eritrean Democratic Alliance and other smaller groups, such as the Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization in their fight against the Eritrean regime (Abbink, 2003a; Kidane, 2011; Bereketeab, 2010).

The consequence of the act of destabilization is pivotal in exacerbating hostility and perpetuating the impasse.²⁵ This created deeper antipathy and irreconcilability between the two regimes (Ibid). Each of the parties to the conflict maintained that peace will not prevail unless the other is annihilated. In the light of this, the ex-Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, repeatedly highlighted that peace in the Horn is "impossible with the present government in Eritrea in place"(Abbink, 2003a: 417) and stated that the Eritrean government is the enemy of both the Eritreans and Ethiopians as well (Tekeste and Tronvoll, 2000). In response, the government of Eritrea never hesitated from emphatically stating that rapprochement with the present Ethiopian government is unthinkable under any circumstances (Abbink, 2003a). The very purpose of both governments is, therefore, to destabilize each other with their extended support to respective opposition groups (Abbink, 2003a; Solomon, 2004). Considering the severity of the act of destabilization, Tekeste and Tronvoll (2000) argued that durable peace in Ethio-Eritrean relations will not prevail as far the politics of destabilization is concerned. In the words of Abebe too, it is difficult to curtail the impasse and normalize the relations between the two under these circumstances.²⁶

The two countries not only delved into destabilizing each other but also the Horn at large. Instead of breaking the stalemate, both countries have been sending troops to neighbouring

²⁵ Interview with Esayas Girmay, 25 February 2014 and Berouk Mesfin, 28 February 2014

²⁶ Interview with Abebe Muluneh, Head of IGAD Security Sector Program, 4 April 2014

Somalia in what appears to be a proxy war. The Ethiopia-backed Transitional Government of Somalia to fight the Islamist and terrorist groups by obtaining support from Ethiopia whereas the Eritrean government supported the Islamist groups and other anti-Ethiopian forces that sprung inside Somalia (Kidist, 2011; Kidane, 2011), which was viewed as a security threat by Ethiopia given their irredentist rhetoric and radicalization agenda. The Ethio-Eritrean engagement in the Somalia crisis marked the unresolved nature of the war. In this connection, it is stated that the Eritrean engagement in proxy war with Ethiopia is intended to force Ethiopia to accept the EEBC decision (ICG, 2010).

3.4.3. Unfolding Authoritarianism

As Abbink (2003a) contends, transition to democracy in Ethiopia and Eritrea is slowed down to varying degrees. The regime in Eritrea failed to open-up the political space for the public to engage freely in the political affairs of the country (ICG, 2010). The post-war stalemate provided justifications for Eritrean leaders to suspend the implementation of the 1997 draft constitution by opening up the space for democratization (Kidist, 2011; Berhane, 2006; Healy, 2007). Preoccupied with the threat coming from intellectuals and other senior liberation war veterans, the regime suspended democracy and election in Eritrea (ICG, 2010) as a result of which the power of the President was consolidated with great vigor through intimidating or arresting opposition groups (Abbink, 2003a; Kidist, 2011; Healy, 2007). Open public debates and political pluralism thus rarely flourished in Eritrea (Healy, 2007).

According to Ogbazghi (2011), the current political space of Eritrea best portrayed a sort of "Personal Rule" whereby the state and its apparatus formed a cult of personality of the incumbent strongman. Berouk concurs with Ogbazghi stating that the post-1991 Eritrean economic and political life was "hijacked" by a single individual and the issue of transparent and accountable governance system was voided.²⁷ Willingness from the regime to modify authoritarianism became unlikely and all aspects of the administration were controlled by the sole political organization- PFDJ (Ibid). The military with its hierarchy of

²⁷ Interview with Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher at Institute for Security Studies , 28 February 2014

regional military commanders is under the direct control and leadership of the President too (Ogbazghi, 2011). The relationship between the state and civil society was characterized by a sort of personal tyranny rendering civil society organizations not to engage in any form of policy activism or advocacy matters (Ibid). The government was too suspicious about the existence of privately owned media (Healy, 2007). Hence, nowadays, only government owned media operated in the country and the government intervenes at any time to deter the dissemination of "unnecessary material" to the public (ICG, 2010).

Compared to its Eritrean counterpart, the regime in Ethiopia is not overtly dictatorial (Gilkes, 1999). As most scholars assert, commitment to establish a mature democracy is still not observed and a stable institutional political structure that will survive the current regime has not yet been put in place (Abbink, 2003a). Though the EPRDF government conducted different rounds of elections, the legitimacy of the election processes still remains a highly contested issue (Kassahun, 2010). This is mainly due to the fact that the state apparatus, which manages the election process, lacks credibility and neutrality in providing level playing field to all the stakeholders (Kassahun, 2010; Merera, 2007). Incentives for competitive politics and legitimate electoral process under a multi-party framework and policy choices thus remain minimal (Kassahun, 2010) and the freedom of opposition political parties to operate have been circumscribed (Merera, 2007; Wondwosen, 2009). Following the 2005 election crisis, the government intimidated and arrested opposition leaders and their supporters (Wondwosen, 2009). Currently, power is monopolized by the single party. With regard to the independence of media, state repression against the private media increased dramatically (Kassahun, 2010). Consequently, press freedom and civil society organizations working in different socio-economic and political fields are being manipulated.

The forgoing discussion, thus, indicates that the ruling regimes in both countries rely on military power to restrict civil liberties and retain dominance. Following the Algiers Agreement, both regimes responded to political challenges by repressing dissent and restricting political space (Getachew, 2006) and normalization of relations between the two countries remained the exclusive agenda of the politicians entirely (Bahru, 2006). Opportunities for civil societies and the public to take the initiative in breaking the impasse

are not yet observed since they are continuously inhibited (Ibid). Getachew (2006: 68) further contends that maintenance of durable peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea is challenging "without democratizing both societies and tabling a realistic agenda that considers the economic and security interests and the historical realities of both entities." With absence of a democratic and accountable government, where the voices of the mass are neglected, it is difficult to break the no-war no-peace situation and normalize relations between the two countries.²⁸

3.4.4. The Ethos of Militarism in Eritrea

The regime in post-war Eritrea is suspicious of its neighbours and the wider world at large. Based on two rationales, the Eritrea government maintained that the international community always acts to the detrimental of Eritrean interests: by suppressing the quest of Eritreans for independence after the end of colonial rule, which is accompanied by the unimplemented nature of the Algiers promises (ICG, 2010). The government also considered neighbouring countries as enemies of Eritrea (Ibid). Not only the neighbouring states, the government does not trust even its population as a result of which the International Crisis Group in its 2010 Report labeled Eritrea as "siege state" where the government is suspicious of everything.

As a result of its siege mentality, the Eritrean government built a militaristic social system and militarized politics, which spilled into its foreign policy (Ibid) whereby around 10 percent of the Eritrean population has been tied up in military service (Healy and Plaut, 2007) and the defense expenditure constitutes roughly 9 percent the Gross Domestic Product (ICG, 2005). Since the cessation of the military hostility with Ethiopia, thousands of forces have graduated from the 'Sawa National Service' camp and the majority of the youth are employed in the army (Berhane, 2006; Healy, 2007). Massive remobilization of demobilized fighters and National Military Service conscripts increased drastically (Healy, 2007). Increasing air force training flights and other new trenches along key defensive

²⁸ Interview with Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher at Institute for Security Studies, 28 February 2014, ISS Office, Addis Ababa.

positions remains intact (ICG, 2005) and now Eritrea has become one of the militarized nations in Africa (ICG, 2010).

Therefore, militarism and authoritarianism best define the political environs of the Eritrean government nowadays. Rather than using conventional diplomacy, the Eritrean government resorts to military adventurism in the form of proxy war to force the Ethiopia government to accept the ruling of the EEBC. The government is still behaving like a guerrilla movement with absolute power of life and death over its constituents, and its foreign policy was often conducted aggressively, albeit naively (ICG, 2010).²⁹ Whereas aggression is used as a preferred means to defend any perceived threat to its sovereignty the behavior of the Eritrean government not only affects its internal development but also its relations with all its neighbours (Healy, 2007). The militarized policy of Eritrea forced the Ethiopian government to be suspicious and less cooperative. In order to offset the threat coming from militaristic Eritrea, the Ethiopian government is also deeply involved in cultivating its combat forces so far. The two countries continued to re-arm through buying aircraft, armoured vehicles and artillery from Eastern European suppliers (Plaut, 2005/2006) and heavy deployments of forces along the common borders still remains intact (Solomon, 2004).

According to Berouk, the two governments holding power in Ethiopia and Eritrea are battle-hardened and hence, the ethos of militarism is deep-rooted and highly potent in their day to day activities.³⁰ Their engagement in proxy warfare and destabilization activities best defines the culture of militarism. As Abebe contends, it is the culture of militarism that disrupts the stability of the region.³¹ The thinking here is that, unless the culture of militarism is replaced by new political and diplomatic proficiency, peace will not prevail in

²⁹After decades struggle for liberation, the Eritrea's claim to sovereignty was expressed peacefully through a referendum. The regime holding power in post-independent Eritrea is oppressive as that which it had fought so long to liberate itself from. The Presidential has unchecked powers with indefinite military conscription policy. Similarly, the SPLM with its military wing, were accused of inflicting atrocities against civilians in South Sudan and there existed few mechanisms to check accountability.

³⁰ Interview with Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher at Institute for Security Studies , 28 February 2014

³¹ Interview with Abebe Muluneh, Head of IGAD Security Sector Program, 4 April 2014

the region and the stalemate will persist unabated in the years to come. In this regard, Bahru (2006: 23) rightly stated that:

If there is one thing that the two countries and their peoples should learn from history, it is the fact that recourse to arms has not solved any of the outstanding problems.....There is in short no alternative to sober discussion and dialogue in order to achieve the peace and development that the two countries so desperately need.

CHAPTER FOUR

LESSONS FOR SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN

South Sudan formally declared its independence in July 2011 after the majority of its eligible voters decided in favor of independence. Despite the formal separation, the present relations between Sudan and South Sudan are tense and the two countries contested over a range of unresolved issues. Among others, the two Sudans entered into protracted disagreement on the issues of border, citizenship and financial arrangements, including those pertaining to revenues from the sale of South Sudanese oil that transit through Sudan for export. The alleged engagements of the two countries in supporting rebels of each other also bedeviled their relations. Taking into consideration the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience, the following lessons are drawn thereof by Sudan and South Sudan that could help them in the process of normalizing their relations.

4.1. The Border Disputes

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended over two decades of the Civil War called for the demarcation of the borders of Sudan and South Sudan within six months (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). Pursuant to the Presidential Decree of September 2005, a Technical Border Committee (TBC) was established to demarcate the boundary between Sudan and South Sudan based on the 1956 map (ICG, 2010). The TBC was expected to submit its finding to the Presidency by identifying areas that could not be agreed upon. While the TBC agreed on most of the boundaries, a handful of the areas remained contested (Ibid). The areas contested by the two countries cover the northern-most border running from Upper Nile to the White Nile State, the oil fields of Unity State and the Southern Kordofan, the area that forms the western-most dividing line between Bahr-el-Ghazal and Southern Darfur as well as the northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and south Darfur (ICG, 2010; Johnson, 2010).³² Hence, the border between the two Sudans was neither fully delimited nor demarcated during the interim period.

³² Specifically, the disputed areas include the Kafia Kingi, Kaka Town, Megenis Mountains, Jodha, Abyei, Heglig (Panthou) as well as Jau.

Remarkable border disputes between Sudan and South Sudan witnessed following the independence of the latter (Kimenyi, 2012). Divergent claims with respect to territorial issues ensued and open armed clashes occurred over Abyei, Southern Kordofan (which contains the disputed Heglig oil field) and Blue Nile regions (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2013). In the hope of crushing the insurgents within its territory, the Sudanese government started a new campaign of attacking the rebels around its southern part specifically in South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). Subsequently, the Sudanese air force crossed the border of South Sudan and entered Unity state, considering this area as the haven for dissident groups (Gramizzi and Tubiana, 2013). Sudan's infiltration into the territory of South Sudan reflects the act of hostility against the government of South Sudan (Ibid), which also took a retaliatory measure and entered into the territories of Sudan notably the town of Heglig (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012; Hsiao, 2012). Open armed clashes also took place in another contested territory, Abyei (For more details see section 4.2.). Due to such provocative military maneuvers, South Sudanese and Sudan forces were heavily deployed.

After months of bloodshed and tension, Sudan and South Sudan agreed to maintain a safe border through which different socio-economic activities can be carried out easily. Greater emphasis was given to the swift demarcation of shared borders as well as establishment of Integrated Border Management approaches. The agreement also called for the formation of a Joint Demarcation Committee and Technical Team with the mandate to supervise the demarcation process and provide technical assistance during the actual demarcation process respectively.³³ However, according to Omer Salih Abubakr, demarcation of the border is not yet finalized even if the two countries agreed on it critically.³⁴

As mentioned before, the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea remained un-demarcated at the time of the independence of the latter. It was described as not-urgent issue, which later forced the two countries to pay heavy cost. The un-demarcated border was used as a pretext for the outbreak of the brutal and devastating war that cost the lives of thousands of

³³ See the Agreement Between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan on Border Issue (2012)

³⁴ Interview with Omer Salih Abubakr, Sudanese Ambassador to Ethiopia, 1 April 2014

peoples from both sides. Millions of dollars were also expended for the procurement and acquisition of sophisticated weapons (Solomon, 2004). The issue of border is still very contentious despite the ruling of the EEBC and the un-demarcated border is becoming a state of frozen hostility thereby exposing peoples living along the common borders to different hardships (Plaut, 2005/2006).

The un-demarcated border between Sudan and South Sudan is quite worrying as well, given the heavy reliance of both states on oil revenues coming from border areas. As Kimenyi (2012) stated, much of the known oil deposits of the two Sudans located along the common border. Not only oil, the disputed areas between the two countries are rich in other minerals including the arable land itself (Ibid). Demarcation of border thus becomes the question of determining who have the authority over a certain resources located in different colliders. The presence of huge natural resources along the common frontiers can create the possibility of forceful grabbing of fields that do not officially belong to them. Though the government of Sudan denied (Sudan Tribune, 9 April 2014), South Sudan accused the unusual movement and incursion of the Sudanese army along the border areas (Sudan Tribune, 8 April 2014). As discussed in chapter three, the Ethio-Eritrean intimate relations were shuttered by the skirmishes and provocative military maneuvers that took place around border areas. Sudan and South Sudan, therefore, shall curtail such sorts of provocative moves and military adventurism along the common boundaries so as to harmonize their relations. In this regard, Berouk strongly contends that mutual recognition and respect of the shared borders is decisive for these two countries to live in peace.³⁵

As the saying goes "good fences make good neighbors" (Kimenyi, 2012: 7), mistrust and anxiety and insecurity can be mitigated as far as the two countries fully operationalize and demarcate their borders. In this regard, Sudan and South Sudan can come out of the prevailing border deadlocks when there is political will and readiness to compromise for anything that must be compromised³⁶ (see Rolandsen, Breidlid, Jumbert, 2012). According to Abebe, demarcation of borders and normalization of the Ethio-Eritrean relations remain

³⁵ Interview with Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher at Institute for Security Studies , 28 February 2014

³⁶ Interview with Esayas Girmay, 25 February 2014 and Berouk Mesfin, 28 February 2014

unresolved due to the absence of "political will" and the uncompromising stances of the two governments.³⁷ It is quite challenging to curtail border deadlocks and normalize relations without the willingness and commitments of the parties to the conflict. It is also obvious that demarcation of the borders may not satisfy the interests of the two Sudans on equal basis. In the light of this, the two Sudans are forced to adopt and follow compromise in any forthcoming negotiations with regard to border demarcation and normalization process. The Ethio-Eritrean experience further reveals that ascertaining the ideas and opinions of peoples living along the disputed border areas would be of paramount importance to solve the border problems. According to Kalewongel (2008), the overall peace process between Ethiopia and Eritrea was unable to bring an end to the conflict in general and the border dispute in particular due to the exclusion of local peoples living along the disputed areas from the peace deal. The EEBC failed to ascertain the ideas of local peoples before passing its ruling thereby leading to the occurrence of the flawed decisions. In this regard, the two Sudans shall better consult and involve local peoples during the negotiation and the signing of agreements. The rationale here is that implementation of the deals become easy when it is conducted involving the public in general and local peoples living in the disputed territory in particular. Besides, ascertaining the ideas of local peoples is also essential to avoid the unnecessary divisions of homesteads and relapse of territories that do not belong to the other.

Analysts, on their part, argued that demarcation of borders between Sudan and South Sudan should be better "soft", which allows traders, pastoralists and migrant workers to move easily and form socio-economic and cultural linkages (Musso, 2011; ICG, 2010). The September 2012 Border Accord between the two Sudans also emphasized the establishment of such kind of arrangement. Peoples from both sides shared pasture and water sources for centuries and formed socio-cultural linkages.³⁸ Thus, the establishment of "soft" borders can benefit communities living on both sides of the border whose potential to avert local disputes is high.

³⁷ Interview with Abebe Muluneh, Head of IGAD Security Sector Program, 4 April 2014

³⁸ Interview with Omer Salih Abubakr, Sudanese Ambassador to Ethiopia, 1 April 2014

4.2. Centrality of the Abyei Dispute

Abyei straddles the border between Sudan and South Sudan. It is a small territory permanently settled by the Ngok-Dinka, a subset of South Sudan's largest ethnic group (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). The nomadic Misseriya of Sudan also extensively used the land and water sources in Abyei for seasonal grazing and herding of cattle. It is this mixed use of the land that prompted the transfer of Abyei to Kordofan in 1905 (Ibid). The Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka co-existed in Abyei for centuries and their relations were smooth (Jensen and Fick, 2009; Johnson, 2010). However, relations between these groups were severed following the independence of Sudan from Anglo-Egyptian rule (Ibid). The discovery oil in Abyei exacerbated disputes between the Sudan and South Sudan the spillover effect of which impacted the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka cordiality.

Though the CPA called for the demarcation of the Abyei boundaries before the end of the interim period, consensus was not reached between the governments of Sudan and South Sudan. As per the requirements of the CPA, the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) passed its decision and based on the decision of the Commission the Heglig and Bamboo oil fields fell within Abyei (ICG, 2010). The government of Sudan rejected this decision of the Commission noting that the Commission placed a significant portion of its oil reserves in the disputed territory-Abyei (ICG, 2010; Jensen and Fick, 2009; Winter and Prendergast, 2008). As a result of such discord, the case was then presented to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in 2009, which redefined the Abyei area and placed Heglig and Bamboo fields outside of Abyei (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012; ICG, 2010). The government of Sudan once again opposed the ruling of the PCA resulting from its quest to control the remaining oil reserves of Abyei and the Greater Nile Oil Pipeline that crosses this area (ICG, 2010; Johnson, 2010). Implementation of the decision of the PCA, therefore, was practically voided and fighting for Abyei remains a real threat.

The economic importance of Abyei to both sides is very potent thereby making the area the hot spot for the disparity between Sudan and South Sudan currently. However, based on the decision of the PCA, most oil fields were labeled outside Abyei and hence, the main sources of contention has been lessened. In this regard, Greenidge (2011) stated that the historical and political importance of Abyei still outweigh its economic or strategic value.

The SPLM and the people of South Sudan considered Abyei as an area that was wrongly taken from the south on the basis of an agreement with a local chief before Sudan's independence (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011). The permanent settlers of Abyei, the Ngok-Dinka, also served as the political wing for SPLM in its struggle against the power elite in the North (Greenidge, 2011). Hence, the government of South Sudan strengthened their claim over Abyei assuring the Dinka that the land of Abyei belongs to them. Similarly, the government of Sudan seems unwilling to lose Abyei because it was part and parcel of Sudan since 1905 (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). Besides, the government of Sudan maintains that the Misseriya will turn against Sudan when are they excluded from participating in the Abyei issue (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011). The Misseriya groups are the pro-Sudanese forces who sacrificed a lot during the two civil wars. Hence, for Sudan, Abyei is an area that must be secured at all cost and compromise on Abyei is thus unthinkable (Greenidge, 2011).

With the ambition of securing Abyei, both sides turned into protracted disagreement on the eligibility of voters who would participate in the Abyei Referendum. The South claimed that only the permanently settled populations should participate in the Referendum while the North proposed the inclusion of the Misseriya as voters in the Abyei Referendum (Greenidge, 2011). The government of Sudan demanded the Misseriya tribes to take part in the Referendum in order to outweigh the numerically small Ngok-Dinka and put Abyei under its control (Ibid). Due to the absence of progress in moderating positions, the issue of Abyei became a delicate issue during various high-level meetings and the Referendum to be conducted following South Sudan's Referendum is not yet finalized (Sandrai, 2013) as a result.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the two-year Ethio-Eritrean war and the post-war stalemate highly revolved around a small territory-Badme. As Berouk aptly noted, though Badme is not resourceful as Abyei, it remains a "flashpoint and a curse" in enhancing the Ethio-Eritrean post-war disparity.³⁹ The two governments entered into a bloody fight so as to secure Badme the ownership of which is the sticking point on the demarcation process.

³⁹ Interview with Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher at Institute for Security Studies , 28 February 2014

The two sides feared public criticism and the prospect of political crisis once compromise is done on Badme. Badme, therefore, is a highly politicized spot which is compounded with deeper passion, animosity and misgivings that can complicate the future engagement between the two countries. Similarly, Abyei is a highly politicized territory with greater potential to fuel conflict and entrench stalemate between the two Sudans.

In the bid to make the Misseriya the permanent residents of Abyei, the Sudanese government is in favor of the Abyei stalemate (Rendón and Hsiao, 2013). The uncompromising stance of the two countries on the implementation of the Abyei Protocol, on the other hand, is capable of pushing the two sides into full-scale bloodshed. The issue can trigger another intractable conflict between Sudan and South Sudan (Debay, 2012; Akol, 2013; Winter and Prendergast, 2008). Besides, the implementation of other outstanding arrangements incorporated under the CPA or other interstate concords signed between the two countries can be dragged once the Abyei issue remains stalled for unlimited period of time (Jensen and Fick, 2009; Debay, 2012). The two governments are thus required to soften their positions regarding Abyei and operationalize the Protocol to end the Abyei deadlock.

Furthermore, the dispute over Abyei is not limited to interstate conflict but also involves the Ngok-Dinka and the Misseriya groups as well. The relations between these two groups deteriorated for the last few decades and series of disputes between them provoked following the independence of South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 13 April 2014). The cost of the Abyei stalemate is pivotal in fueling and deteriorating the Misseriya and Ngok-Dinka relations including groups who have a historical right on land and other sources in Abyei. In this vein, the October 2013 unilateral referendum held by the Ngok-Dinka communities depicts the growing grievance on the flawed nature of the Protocol itself (Arno, 2012). As Omer Salih Abubakr stated, the two ethnic groups are agro-pastoralists that rely on the pasture and water resources of Abyei and their fights emanate from using such resources.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Interview with Omer Salih Abubakr, Sudanese Ambassador to Ethiopia, 1 April 2014

The two governments can mitigate the clash between these two groups through changing their life style and improving livelihood.⁴¹

Political elites from both Sudan and South Sudan used tribalism very seriously. Unless the status of Abyei is determined, the Sudan-South Sudan proxy engagement in crisis regarding Abyei is inevitable. In this regard, since the signing of the CPA, the government of Sudan encouraged different armed groups to displace the sedentary Ngok-Dinka southward (Johnson, 2011; Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). The Sudanese government still supports and collaborates with armed members of the Misseriya tribes and armed groups to forcefully seize Abyei as well as expel the Ngok-Dinka from the area (Sudan Tribune, 17 March 2014, 13 April 2014). The continued attacks organized by the government of Sudan further undermined the longstanding co-existence of the Ngok-Dinka and Misseriya. The use of ethnic clashes as a means of realizing sectarian ends should cease if peace is to prevail in Sudan-South Sudan relations.⁴² Instead of engaging in proxy wars, governments of the two countries require to maintain good relations with important constituencies in Abyei and facilitate independent dialogue between the Ngok-Dinka and the Misseriya to strengthen and build confidence.

4.3. The Issue of Citizenship

The other major debacle that adversely impacts on the relations between Sudan and South Sudan is the issue of citizenship/nationality. Controversies between the two governments surfaced with respect to the determination of the status of southerners living in North and northerners in the South. The government of South Sudan advocated for the establishment of dual citizenship in that southerners living in the North and northerners in the South should be allowed to possess citizenship of both countries (Manby, 2012; Musso, 2011; Sikainga, 2011). Accordingly, the 2011 Nationality Act of South Sudan allows dual nationality to South Sudanese irrespective of the place where they live (Manby, 2012). Contrary to the demand of its South Sudanese counterparts, a month later, the government of Sudan amended the old nationality law that automatically abrogated the nationality of

⁴¹ Interview with Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher at Institute for Security Studies , 28 February 2014

⁴² Interview with Omer Salih Abubakr, 1 April 2014 and Berouk Mesfin, 28 February 2014

South Sudanese living in Sudan (Manby, 2012; Musso, 2011; Sikainga, 2011). This position of the Sudanese government was also hinted during the interim period in that the government made clear that citizenship to South Sudanese living in Sudan would not be granted once the South secedes (Sikainga, 2011; Debay, 2012). Hence, over 350,000 South Sudanese have already been deported from Sudan since November 2010 while more than half million still remain in Sudan (Manby, 2012; Kimenyi, 2012).

Though the governments of the two countries initiated the "Four Freedoms Agreement"⁴³ in March 2012, implementation of the deal was stalled and the government of Sudan ordered the South Sudanese to leave the country by April 2012 (Kimenyi, 2012). Southerners residing in Sudan have been dismissed from their work and children have been deprived to enroll in schools and to get health care services as a result of which thousands of Southerners, notably the university students, government officials, private and public workers, etc, returned to South Sudan (Manby, 2012). As a counter measures, the government of South Sudan also issued a press release announcing that Sudanese citizens should hold valid visas to enter the South (Ibid).

After a period of deadlock, Sudan and South Sudan signed another agreement on the status and treatments of nationals of each other and related matters. This agreement resembles the March 2012 "Four Freedoms Agreement". According to this Agreement, the two states affirmed the establishment of a Joint High Level Committee to oversee the adoption and implementation of joint measures as regards the status and treatment of nationals of each state in the territory of the other. Parties to the treaty agreed to allow nationals of both countries the freedom to reside, move, acquire and dispose of property, and undertake economic activities in both States.⁴⁴ This agreement was intended to bolster positive interactions among peoples and build socio-cultural and economic ties that will enhance relations between the two States.

⁴³ The Four Freedoms Agreement gives the citizens of both countries the freedom of residence, movement as well as the freedom to dispose property and undertake economic activities in either country.

⁴⁴ See Framework Agreement on the Status of Nationals of the Other State and Related Matters Between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan (2012)

Since the outbreak of the Ethio-Eritrean war, governments of the two countries arbitrarily expelled the citizens of each other living in their respective territories. Though the Ethiopian government allowed Eritreans to live inside Ethiopia, it had forcefully expelled around 75,000 Eritreans from Ethiopia following the escalation of the war (Human Rights Watch, 2003). The documents proving Ethiopian nationality of people of Eritrean descent were confiscated, property rights were cancelled and travel papers in many instances were marked “Expelled—Never to Return”(Ibid: 3). Deportation of Ethiopians from Eritrea already started in 1991, which led to the expulsion of 50,000 people without taking any of their possessions with them (Abbink, 1998). Detention and expulsion of Ethiopians from Eritrea also continued with great vigor following the outbreak of the war in 1998 (Human Rights Watch, 2003). Such arbitrary, forceful and abusive expulsion of citizens raised mutual suspicion and deepened antipathy and hatred among peoples of the two countries (Abbink, 1998, 2003a).

As discussed above, millions of South Sudanese are currently living in the territory of Sudan and most of them want to establish their domicile there forever (Manby, 2012). They have no desire to return to South Sudan. As the Ethio-Eritrean experience further entails, the consequence of forceful and abusive deportations of nationals of one another is most threatening to interstate relations and people to people cordiality and trust as well. Sudan and South Sudan are thus required to end the forceful expulsion of nationals living in each other's territory. Instead, the two countries expected to undertake joint actions to keep the safety and welfare of all the Sudanese and South Sudanese. In this regard, a strong arrangement that pave the way for the peaceful repatriation (if mandatory) of each other citizens with their possession is needed.

The other option is to allow citizens the freedom to choose their places of domicile. In this regard, Debay (2012) strongly argues that, though maintenance of dual citizenship is quite challenging, allowing nationals of both countries to choose their domicile in either part would have greater importance to end the question of nationality. Taking into account the tragedies observed in Ethio-Eritrean relations, Esayas and Berouk also argued that, instead of engaging intensively to deport citizens of each other, promoting conditions that facilitate cross-border trade, cultural exchanges and other mutually beneficial activities can have

significant impetus in the process of normalizing relations and building confidence between the two Sudans.⁴⁵ Forming integrated economic activities and socio-cultural intermarriages can have the potential to cool down the deep-rooted antipathy and mistrust that the peoples of the two countries harbored so far (Kimenyi, 2012; Widdatallah, 2012).

4.4. Resource Utilization

The secession of South Sudan is quite worrying to Sudan as 75% of oil production originates in the South (Lunn and Thompson, 2012; Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012) and hence the loss of much of the oil reserves resulted in a significant loss of the revenue (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). As a result of the reduction of the revenues from oil, the government of Sudan demanded the South to pay \$32 per barrel for oil shipments through the pipeline to Port Sudan (Ibid). Contrary to the proposal of the Sudanese government, the regime in South Sudan wanted to pay transit fee based on the international norm of \$1 per barrel (Ibid). As a result of the absence of a mutually acceptable transit fee and the rumors that the Republic of Sudan was stealing South Sudan's oil, the government of South Sudan shutdown all oil production on January 2012 and refused to use the pipelines and port facilities that are owned by Sudan (Kimenyi, 2012; Lunn and Thompson, 2012).

The impasse created during the shutdown of oil production schemes endangered the revenues of both countries. The revenues earned from oil production declined thereby forcing the two countries to introduce budget austerity (Sandrai, 2013; Rolandsen, Breidlid, Jumbert, 2012; Kimenyi, 2012). Besides, the two countries were obliged to cut billions of *pounds* from their budget to agriculture, education as well as health care services (Kimenyi, 2012). Closing of oil productions thus means taking a suicidal path since oil is the principal sources of revenue for both countries. The closing of oil production also augmented inflation and depletion of oil reserves (Kimenyi, 2012; Sandrai, 2013). After months of deadlock, Sudan and South Sudan reached an agreement in

⁴⁵ Interview with Esayas Girmay, 25 February 2014 and Berouk Mesfin, 28 February 2014

September 2012 as a result of which South Sudan agreed to pay 1.60 US\$ per barrel to Sudan for oil processing services and 8.40 US\$ per barrel for transportation services.⁴⁶

Subsequently, the recent deadlock between Ethiopia and Eritrea seems to have prompted Sudan and South Sudan to deal with the impasse once and for all. Though varying in degree, the virtual breakdown of their relations and the cost of the post-war disparity are too devastating to the economy of both Ethiopia and Eritrea (Plaut, 2005/2006; Kidist, 2011; Trivelli, 1998). As a result of the prolongation of the stalemate and the hostility with Ethiopia, the Eritrean government is exposed to different economic mishaps. The stalemate forced Eritrea to abandon its economic role as the external trading partner for the Ethiopian hinterlands (Healy, 2007). The revenues earned from port services come to an end since Ethiopia turned to use the Port of Djibouti rather than Assab and Massawa (Plaut, 2005/2006). Eritrea lost hundreds of million dollars that it used to earn from port services. The consequences of the disparity also forced the Ethiopian government to lose the age-old and convenient nearby sea outlets and pay an increased fee for port service to Djibouti (Solomon, 2004; Robera, 2011).

Though South Sudan possessed huge oil resources, the available pipelines, refineries and port facilities to prepare and ship its oil to the international market belongs to the Republic of Sudan (Kimenyi, 2012). The oil is shipped via Port of Sudan and the refineries are located in Sudan. In the long run, South Sudan can build its own pipeline through other routes. However, the current capacity of the country to build different pipelines and other infrastructural services, which are important to access the global markets, is quite challenging and too expensive (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). Therefore, South Sudan must strike an acceptable deal to have access to the service of the oil infrastructures and refineries owned by the Sudan until it constructs its own. The benefit of cooperation between the two countries is imperative to the Republic of Sudan as well. Sudan can generate incomes from transportation fees levied on oil piped from the South to the coast, rent from port, as well as charges from the processing of South Sudanese oil.

⁴⁶ See the Agreement Between the Republic of the Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan on Oil and Related Matters (2012).

The forgoing discussion thus indicates that the two Sudans can benefit mutually from forming cordial relations. Cooperation enables peoples of the two countries to access goods and services easily from either part. Sudanese and South Sudanese cooperation also enables both to offset unnecessary defense costs. Taking into account the conflict-ridden fragility of the region, cooperation and cordiality between the two Sudans not only maximize the interests of the two parties but the spillover effect of their cordiality would have tremendous impact on the stability of the region at large.⁴⁷ To be better off and mutually benefit from such economic engagement, the two countries need to institutionalize their relations and calm down aggression towards each other⁴⁸ (see Musso, 2011). The establishment of strong institutions enables both countries to outwrought greed and curtail aggression through making a level field suitable to channel dialogue for any divergence that unfolds.

4.5. Transition to Democracy

As one closely looks at the current situation, transition to democracy in Sudan and South Sudan is minimal or even non-existent. The political environment prevailing in both countries is inimical to the existence of pluralistic political process, where press freedom was guaranteed, dissents are heard, civil societies are allowed to operationalize, and the rights of political parties are respected.

A press release by the Human Rights Watch (2012) conveys that the government of Sudan has stepped up censorship of the print media. The newspapers are subjected to various methods of censorship and punitive measures have been taken for publishing articles on sensitive issues (Ibid). Harassing journalists and political parties spread in the wake of the recent fighting with South Sudan as well (Ibid). The government arbitrarily shutdown several civil society organizations and other liberal forums, which are working for the promotion of multiculturalism, democracy and human rights in the country (African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies, 2013). Since the deterioration of the bilateral relations and the outbreak of the war with South Sudan, the Sudanese government banned the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) as a political party and many of its

⁴⁷ Interview with Esayas Girmay, 25 February 2014 and Abebe Muluneh, 4 April 2014

⁴⁸ Interview with Berouk Mesfin, 28 February 2014 and Esayas Girmay, 25 February 2014

members were subjected to arbitrary arrest and detention for which the National Intelligence and Security Services are largely responsible (Ibid). The space for dialogue and negotiation on human rights and other critical issues to determine the future of the country has severely shrunk. The scale of violence unleashed by the government drastically increased in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur areas thereby leading to the proliferation of different insurgent groups.

Contrary to the promotion of diversity, tolerance and pluralism, the government also seems to be inclined to impose a singular Arab- Islamic identity throughout the country (Sikainga, 2011). Once the South secedes, the President promised to turn Sudan into an Islamic state where "Sharia and Islam will be the main source of the Constitution by declaring Islam, the official religion, and Arabic the official language" (Kron, 2010). As the President made clear in his speech, the place for cultural diversity will come to an end in Sudan (Ibid). Analysts, on their part, strongly criticized such trends taking into account the diverse nature of Sudan's population and its impact in fuelling conflict in the country. The oversimplified ambition of creating an Islamic state can intricate grievances among many communities thereby leading to the proliferation of rebels and insurgent movements (Hsiao and Jones, 2011; Sikainga, 2011). According to Hsiao and Jones (2011), the prevalence of instability and unrest in the country provides an incentive for external powers including South Sudan to engage in the pursuit of self-interest. Thus, the project of Islamizing the country through negating diversity needs to be challenged.

Like in Sudan, the political transition of South Sudan did not witness remarkable progress. The government that holds power developed a "winner-takes-all" mentality (ICG, 2011) as a result of which around 97 percent of the seats in parliament was seized by the SPLM and affiliates (Thomson, 2013). State authority is excessively centralized in the hands of the executive branch of the government and decisions are often made unintelligibly without consultation or oversight (Knopf, 2013). The constitutional making process was conducted excluding the wider population and the Constitutional Review Commission was dominated by the ruling party (Jok, 2013). Building a participatory civilian party structure with authentic grass-root mobilization and organization across communities and identity groups becomes an illusion (Knopf, 2013). The concept of political opposition appears to be

missing and opposition political parties are regularly intimidated and harassed by SPLM-affiliated security agents (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012). The government was too suspicious and defensive in its engagement with civil society and the creation of a favorable environment for the operation of different civil societies thus shrinks down (Knopf, 2013). Informing the public on the progress of Sudan-South Sudan negotiations is uncommon (Jok, 2013) and public opinion was disregarded as well as media independence and autonomy was curtailed (Knopf, 2013). Even within the internal political structures of the SPLM, debates are not encouraged, dissents are not voiced, and participatory decision making remains farfetched (Ibid).

The regular removal of different officials from office characterized the political environs of South Sudan too (Ibid), which can lead to the segmentation of elite. The President removed officials and replaced them by his preferences and most cabinet ministers are constituted of the Dinka Rek clan at present (Sarwar, 2013). The government is repeatedly accused of discriminatory attitude towards other ethnic groups and failures in ensuring equal representation for all ethnic groups in the government structures (Ibid). The December 2013 South Sudanese crisis partly indicates the inequitable and the non-inclusiveness of ethnic groups in the government structure and the regular removal of officials from their positions.⁴⁹ The point to be drawn thereof by South Sudan here is that the unequal representation and excessive centralization of power is pivotal in fueling disparities, which create a breeding ground for protests and intervention of other actors. The prevalence of intractable instability further provides an incentive for external power interventions for the sake of advancing power base or destabilization agenda. Besides, the consequent internal regime insecurity in South Sudan can affect North-South normalization process.

As discussed before, the political environs created after Ethiopia and Eritrea separated partly is indicative of less transition to democracy and open public debates. Secrecy and hostility to open public debate characterizes the political space available in the two countries (Trivelli, 1998). Lack of accountability and public debates not only shadowed the bilateral relations but also blurred the resolutions of the conflict itself (Dima, 2006).

⁴⁹ The December 2013 crisis in South Sudan, for instance, partly the result of the sudden dismissal of the entire cabinet by the President on July 2013

Suppression of the media and different civil-political groups characterized the political features of the two countries. As a result of the unfolding authoritarianism in both countries, the issue of normalization of the Ethio-Eritrean relations is subjected to the will of elites only thereby perpetuating the prevailing no-war no-peace situation.

Hence, the point to be drawn thereof by Sudan and South Sudan is to curtail authoritarianism and unaccountable administration.⁵⁰ Transition to democratic systems of governance can have the potential to maintain internal stability thereby widening opportunities to Sudan and South Sudan to get more time for the resolution of unresolved issues. Besides, elite's propensity to war can be calmed down once the two countries established a well institutionalized democratic system. According to Rolandsen, Breidlid, Jumbert (2012), resolution of the Sudan and South Sudan conflict could not be addressed by the leadership of the two countries alone but requires more parties to take part in dialog around the negotiating table. It should not be limited to elites only but the chance for different civil-political or other groups including common peoples of both countries to take part in the normalizations process must be enlarged. These sections of the society can contribute a lot in the resolution of the Sudan-South Sudan conflict through devising alternative solutions, ensuring accountability, building confidence, as well as lobbying.⁵¹ Therefore, the predatory political structures of both countries that suppress dissent, political pluralism, civil society organizations and the autonomy of the media need to be transformed into an all-inclusive and accountable dispensation.

4.6. Cessation of Destabilization

Ongoing development nowadays shows that Sudan and South Sudan are replete with and threatened by domestic military and political oppositions. In Sudan, for instance, ongoing crisis is witnessed in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur areas resulting from political and socio-economic marginalization perpetrated by the central government of Sudan (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011). Since the separation of South Sudan and the deterioration of their relations, Sudan and South Sudan accused each other of participating

⁵⁰ Interview with Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher at Institute for Security Studies , 28 February 2014

⁵¹ Ibid

in destabilizing one another. In this regard, Omer Salih Abubekr acknowledged the inevitability of accusation as far as conflict of interests is concerned.⁵²

The continuation of instability and conflict in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur regions provide a perceived mechanism to South Sudanese design to destabilize the regime in Sudan through supporting different insurgents. Accordingly, the Sudan government repeatedly accused South Sudan of extending assistance to the rebels in those areas (Christian, 2012). The government expressed the allegation to the Security Council noting that South Sudan is supporting rebels that operate in Sudan. The message expressed that the government of South Sudan assisted rebels in Sudan with finance, logistics and material.⁵³ Though the government of South Sudan denied lending support to the insurgents of Sudan, the reality on the ground revealed that it is supporting the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N) and the rebels in Darfur (Christian, 2012; Hsiao, 2012; Widdatallah, 2012). The military and logistical cooperation between SPLA and SPLM-N are still powerful despite their official split since July 2011 (Christian, 2012; Rolandsen, Breidlid, Jumbert, 2012; Hsiao, 2012).

Similar with its Sudanese counterparts, South Sudan also faced a growing numbers of armed conflicts both within and beyond its border since independence. Well armed insurgents and military groups existed in Unity and Jonglei states (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011). The government of South Sudan did not hesitate to blame the Sudanese government for exacerbating the crisis in these areas. The government alleged that the government of Sudan is supporting the armed militias and rebels in Unity state and Jonglei (Jumbert and Rolandsen, 2011; Hsiao, 2012; Widdatallah, 2012). The regime in Sudan poured arms and other logistical support to the Nuer militia, also called the South Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army in Unity state and to South Sudan Democratic Movement/ Army in Jonglei and Upper Nile states (Small Arms Survey, 2012; Hsiao, 2012;). Recently, South Sudan also blamed Sudan for providing support to the rebels led by Riek Machar who fights the central government (Sudan Tribune, 9 April 2014). Hence, through supporting rebels, Sudan and South Sudan de-legitimize and destabilize each other.

⁵² Interview with Omer Salih Abubakr, Sudanese Ambassador to Ethiopia, 1 April 2014

⁵³ See Security Council Report (2013)

Although there appears to be less direct confrontations, the Ethio-Eritrean engagement to destabilize each other through supporting different dissident groups has been witnessed over the last few years. Arming internal oppositions and other proxy forces characterized the post-war relations between the two countries. While the Ethiopian government backed the Transitional Government of Somalia to fight different insurgents and terrorist groups destabilizing the region, Eritrea assisted and sided with the Somali insurgent forces such as al-Shabab and Hozbul Islam as well (Kidist, 2011; Kidane, 2011). The Ethio-Eritrean mutual destabilization and proxy engagement subsequently perpetuates the animosity and mistrust.⁵⁴ Likewise, the post-secession destabilization in Sudan and South Sudan is quite worrying since it undermines the ongoing normalization process and fuels the already tense relations. Normalization of relations between the two becomes too difficult to achieve as long as both countries intervene in the affairs of each other. The involvements of the two governments in proxy arming of dissident groups can create an insecure environment and a new power centre that the two countries can no longer control. Sudan and South Sudan thus need to end mutual intervention and de-legitimization of each other's sovereignty so as to make their future bright.

4. 7. Cessation of Militarism

Around the end of the First Civil War in Sudan, oil was discovered in different parts of the country. As a result of the outbreak of the Second Civil War, effective utilization of such precious resources was not observed so far. Since the beginning of the 21st century, however, government revenues from oil substantially increased that allowed securing sophisticated weaponry. The use of force and violence to secure territorial or resource claims dates back to the independence of the Republic of Sudan from Anglo-Egyptian rule. For instance, since the discovery of oil in South Sudan in the late 1970s, the government of Sudan attempted to forcefully redraw the boundaries and carve the oil abundant region out of the southern territory (Indris, 2005; Girma, 1997). The post-CPA period also shows that the ethos of using force as an instrument for maximizing the interests of the regime is powerful. The crisis in Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile regions best manifest the

⁵⁴ Interview with Esayas Girmay, 25 February 2014 and Berouk Mesfin, 28 February 2014

regimes tendency of using military invincibility to suppress dissents. Instead of solving the crisis in these areas diplomatically, the regime in Sudan waged war and used force.

The government that was established in South Sudan during the interim period also spent significant amount of its budget for the security sector. Preoccupied with the issue of maintaining national security and implementation of the CPA, the SPLA purchased different armaments with the intention of empowering its military strength (Small Arms Survey, 2012). The expenditure allocated to the security forces exceeds the budget allocated for education and health care services by four and five time respectively (Mutiga, 2011). The SPLA, the national army of South Sudan, consists of around 210,000 personnel (Small Arms Survey, 2012) as a result of which South Sudan currently is one of the heavily militarized states in the Horn (Mutiga, 2011). Though the government promised to disarm and demobilize its force until 2017, the ongoing reality reveals that SPLA continues importing sophisticated weapons to upgrade its capabilities (Small Arms Survey, 2012).

The major factor that severely contracted interstate relations and the stability of the Horn of Africa is the longstanding tradition of using force, military, as the means to realize national interest or self egos.⁵⁵ Since the formal split, deemed by their military might, Sudan and South Sudan turned into direct confrontations over the control of most congested areas. The military engagement of Sudan and South Sudan in Abyei and other disputed areas has been occurred (Debay, 2012; Hsiao, 2012). Both used the militias and other spoilers in an effort to influence the political situation of one another (Ibid). They deployed their armies that stand in close proximity along the North-South border. According to the Satellite Sentinel Project 2013 Report, the September 2012 Agreement required for the demilitarization of forces from shared and contested borders. However, the two countries violated the agreement through positioning their forces within the agreed-upon demilitarized buffer zone (Ibid). The use of force as an instrument to realize self-egos

⁵⁵ Interview with Abebe Muluneh, Head of IGAD Security Sector Program, 4 April 2014

undermines not only the bilateral relations between the two countries but the stability of the region at large.⁵⁶

In this regard, the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience must remind Sudan and South Sudan to terminate militarism so as to harmonize their relations. As discussed in chapter three, the use of might as a principal means to dominate neighbouring countries characterized the post-secession political disposition of the Eritrean government. The leadership of Eritrea upheld and prioritized the view that military invincibility as a means of its state building and hegemonic project (Gebru, 2006). It is this tenacity that severed Eritrea's relations with neighbouring countries including Ethiopia. The longstanding history of Sudan and South Sudan also dictates recognition that the use of physical force did not fulfill any of the "Arabization and Islamization" projects of various elite groups after the end of Anglo-Egyptian rule.

Sudan and South Sudan hence require prioritizing negotiation and dialogue as the viable mean to effectively address and deal with their various differences than embarking on mobilization or militarization of forces. Instead of using coercive means to realize self interests, the two countries are expected to adopt negotiation and other amicable dispute resolutions mechanisms. According to Ambassador Omer Salih Abubakr, all the issues on which Sudan and South Sudan contested can be solved only through political dialogue or round-table discussions than military means.⁵⁷ Omer Salih Abubakr further added that the use of force could not be a viable option to harmonize their relations and differences. In the words of Hsiao (2012) and Musso (2011) too, negotiations remain the best means for the two parties to settle their differences. The culture of militarism that arduously harmed millions of their ancestors during the First and Second Civil Wars thus need to be repudiate unconditionally.

4.8. The Issue of "Good Faith"

Last but not least, Sudan and South Sudan should build good faith and trust in implementing the different bilateral agreements accordingly. After months of bloodshed

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷ Interview with Omer Salih Abubakr, Sudanese Ambassador to Ethiopia, 1 April 2014

and tensions, Sudan and South Sudan concluded different agreements in September 2012 regarding border issues, security arrangements, treatment of nationals of each other, port-service benefits, oil, trade and other economic matters. These agreements raised the expectation that South Sudan and Sudan were on the path to peace (Ismail and Kumar, 2013).

All the agreements signed between the two parties were meant to be implemented in a coordinated and simultaneous fashion by both parties. However, six months later, none of these happened (Ismail and Kumar, 2013; Akol, 2013). In this regard, as Ismail and Kumar (2013) stated, the government of Sudan is less cooperative and uncommitted to put the agreements into effect thereby putting the maintenance of peace questionable. The government of Sudan presented various preconditions regarding the implementation of the September 2012 agreements (Ismail and Kumar, 2013). The alleged participation of South Sudan on the side of different rebel groups of Sudan complicated the situation in this regard (Akol, 2013). The relative intransigency of the Sudanese government on the implementation of the mutual concords was also witnessed even during the interim period (Ismail and Kumar, 2013). The uncooperative stances of the Sudanese government on the implementation of various agreements further perpetuated the suspicions on the part of South Sudan officials (Hsiao, 2012). Officials from South Sudan maintained that the regime in Sudan has strong intention of destabilizing the South (Ibid).

According to Berouk, the cultures of abiding to certain concords and the belief in negotiations and dialogue were unlikely when one looks at the political environs of Ethiopia and Eritrea.⁵⁸ As discussed before, though Ethiopia and Eritrea concluded several protocols before the opening of the hostility, the implementations of the accords in good faith was not that much encouraging or even non-existent. Esayas attributes the unimplemented nature of the various accords to the failure of the Eritrean government and thus considered the leadership of Eritrea as "rogue" whereby the habit of respecting

⁵⁸ Interview with Berouk Mesfin, a Senior Researcher at Institute for Security Studies , 28 February 2014

international law and other inter-state agreements became futile.⁵⁹ The unfolding of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrea war also resulted from the lack of implementation of the various agreements including the Algiers Agreement too. The two countries agreed to solve their border problems through International Court of Arbitration given that the decision of the EEBC remained on paper. Normalization of the Ethio-Eritrean relations was thus stalled not only because of the unresolved nature of border issues or the act of destabilization but also the inability to put the agreement into effect on the part of both.

Therefore, the Ethio-Eritrean experience should serve as a lesson for Sudan and South Sudan to be committed and willing enough to operationalize the mutual understandings fully. Various incompatibilities between the two countries are solvable if the two sides cooperate and commit to put all the accords into effect. Any sort of delay and indifference on the implementation of agreements concluded so far can complicate the normalizations process. Resolution of conflicts can be hindered and maintenance of durable peace between the two countries becomes a mirage when the conflicting parties lack genuine commitment to carry out the terms of the agreements reached.

⁵⁹ Interview with Esayas Girmay, Diplomat at Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 25 February 2014

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

Eritrea seceded from Ethiopia after decades of bloodshed. The two countries did not conduct serious negotiations on various issues prior to the conducting of the 1993 Referendum. Serious negotiations have not taken place with regard to the demarcation of borders, the issue of currency, the division of assets or liabilities as well as the issue of citizenship, which affected their peaceful co-existence subsequently. Similarly, though the CPA pointed out various arrangements to be conducted before the Referendum of South Sudan, the implementation of the Agreement was farfetched. The demarcation of the north-south border remains unresolved and consensus has not been reached on the eligibility of voters who participate in the Abyei Referendum including the delimitation of its boundary. The issue of citizenship and financial arrangements particularly those pertaining to the revenues from the sale of South Sudanese oil that transit through Sudan for export also bedeviled the Sudan-South Sudan relations since the secession. Hence, in this paper, attempt has been made to shed light on how the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience provides lessons for Sudan and South Sudan in the process of normalization of relations.

As discussed before the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea remained un-demarcated at the time of independence. The cost of the un-demarcated border between the two countries later forced them to pay heavy costs and the post-war strained relations were also intertwined with border issues. Similarly, the border between Sudan and South Sudan is still not demarcated and the two countries contested over a range of territories. Border areas of the two Sudans are rich in oil and other resources and hence the presence of porous boundary between the two countries is quite challenging. It widens opportunities for the two countries to forcefully grab fields that do not officially belong to them thereby leading to intractable disputes. Considering the consequence of the un-demarcated borders and based on the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience, Sudan and South Sudan should undertake swift actions to end the border deadlocks. In this regard, the issue of political will and commitment through entering into negotiations and compromise is decisive for Sudan and South Sudan to solve impending border problems and normalize their relations. It should be recalled that the intransigency and the uncompromising stances of the two

governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea culminated in the border discord and normalization of their relations became an illusion. The Ethio-Eritrean experience further implies that involving and ascertaining the ideas of local peoples living in the disputed territories is crucial to solve border disputes since local communities can play a lot in the process of carrying out various deals with regard to border issues. Besides, through involving local peoples living on both sides of the borders the two Sudans can overcome the unnecessary division of homesteads and socio-cultural and economic sites.

Similar measures have to be taken so as to bring an end the Abyei dispute, which is a flash point that arduously impacts the Sudan- South Sudan relations. Abyei is nowadays a highly politicized spot with the potential to fuel conflict and entrench stalemate between the two Sudans. The two countries entered into an open conventional war over Abyei since the independence of South Sudan. The military engagement of the two countries either in the form of proxy war or direct military moves are evidently observed until recently. Such kind of provocative stances can lead both countries into intractable conflict. It is such provocative moves that flared up around Badme that further diverted the Ethio-Eritrean cordiality into an open hostility. Governments of the two Sudans thus need to soften their position regarding Abyei and end their military engagement and implement the terms of the Abyei Protocol so as to end the deadlock.

The Ethio-Eritrean experience also revealed that the arbitrary, forceful and abusive expulsion of nationals of each other can raise mutual suspicion and deepen antipathy in people-to-people and interstate relations. From the very beginning, the forceful and abusive expulsion of nationals is contrary to upholding the very fundamental rights of the peoples. The impact of forceful deportation of nationals can leave bad psychological perception particularly to those who are the victimized in the process. Sudan and South Sudan thus should consider ending the forceful expulsion of nationals living in each other's territory. Instead, the two countries are expected to undertake joint actions to keep the safety of each other's nationals and peacefully repatriate (if mandatory) them with their possession. Allowing peoples to choose their place of residence is also the other option to end the issue of citizenship.

The other point to be drawn thereof by Sudan and South Sudan is curtailing authoritarian and unaccountable sorts of rule. The rationale here is that the presence of authoritarianism produces grievance and instability thereby widening opportunities for the prevalence of mutual intervention through the extended support of each other's insurgent movements. The war-mongering stance of political elites can be controlled through developing a well-institutionalized democratic system. Besides, creation of an amicable political environment where civil societies, experts and coordinated and responsible opposition groups participate freely can provide the leverage to break the stalemate and normalize the relations between Sudan and South Sudan. These sections of the society can generate alternative solutions for the resolution of the conflict and normalization of the relations between the two Sudans. The predatory political structures of both countries that suppress dissent, political pluralism, civil society organizations and the media, therefore, need to be transformed in a comprehensive, accountable and transparent manner. It is due to the absence of well-institutionalized democratic systems of governance that the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession relations were bedeviled and the discrepancy persisted so far.

The relations between Sudan and South Sudan in the post-secession period were marked by mutual recriminations and destabilization. The two countries involved in destabilizing one another by extending support to rebels that operate in each other's territory. In this regard, the government of South Sudan backed the SPLM-N in the fight against the government of Sudan while the government of Sudan supported different insurgents in Unity state, Jonglei and Upper Nile areas. The consequence of mutual intervention is thus quite threatening to the peaceful co-existence of the two countries. The normalization of Sudan and South Sudan relations can be hindered as long as the two governments intervened in the affairs each other. Repudiation of mutual intervention is one of the important lessons that Sudan and South Sudan should draw from the Ethio-Eritrean post-secession experience.

The post-secession Sudan and South Sudan destabilization and proxy engagement marked the culture of recourse to conflict. The point here is that the belief in the use of force cannot solve any of the outstanding problems that the two countries face. The history of the two countries openly speaks that militarism did not solve the north-south longstanding

issues rather than leading to the death of millions during the First and Second Civil Wars. Unless the two Sudans replace the culture of militarism by a new political and diplomatic proficiency, peace will not prevail and normalization of their relations will become a mere wish. The Ethio-Eritrean experience further strengthens this claim and the compelling lesson here is that recourse to arms could not be taken as an option to solve various contested issues.

The issue of good faith is the other important factor that Sudan and South Sudan should take into account. Various issues that Sudan and South Sudan contested on can be solved through putting all the agreements into effect. All the agreements signed between the two parties are meant to be implemented in a coordinated and simultaneous fashion by both parties. Commitment from both parties is needed to operationalize the agreements and maintain durable peace. Such kind of culture was largely absent as one looks at the political environs of Ethiopia and Eritrea. The unfolding of the 1998 Ethio-Eritrean war and the post-war stalemate partly resulted due to failure to implement the bilateral agreements reached. Hence, the important point for Sudan and South Sudan to come out of the prevailing stalemate and normalize their relations is that the agreements signed before and after the Referendum should be implemented in good faith by both parties.

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Annex 1: Interview Questions

1. How do you assess Ethio-Eritrean relations before the outbreak of the war?
2. What do you think that the pre-war agreement/s and relations failed to bring harmony between Ethiopia and Eritrea?
3. What do you think the causes of the Ethio-Eritrean 1998-2000 war?
4. What do you think the potential and actual factors that led to the impasse regarding Ethio-Eritrean relations after the end of the war?
5. How do you assess Sudan-South Sudan relations since the secession of the latter?
6. What important lessons do you think that Sudan and South Sudan can learn from Ethio-Eritrean disparity to normalize and develop harmonious relations?
7. Is there anything you want to recommend, as a way out, to Sudan and South Sudan?

Annex 2: List of Key Informants

NO	Informant's Name	Institution	Position	Date and Place of interview
1	Omer Salih Abubakr	Embassy of the Republic of Sudan in Ethiopia	Ambassador	1 April 2014, Sudan Embassy Chancery, Addis Ababa
2	Berouk Mesfin	Institute for Security Studies	Senior Researcher	28 February 2014, ISS Office , Addis Ababa
3	Esayas Girmay	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA)	Diplomat	25 February 2014, MoFA office, Addis Ababa
4	Abebe Muluneh	IGAD Security Sector Program	Head	4 April 2014, IGAD office, Addis Ababa

Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Kidanu Atinafu

June 2014

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate.

Dr. Kassahun Berhanu

June 2014