

CONFLICT PATTERNS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA IN POST COLD WAR PERIODS.

**BY
ABERA SHUGUTE**

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COLLAGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE CENTER FOR
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This is to certify that the thesis prepared by Abera Shugute, entitled: Conflict patterns in the Horn of Africa in post cold war periods, and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement, for the degree of Master of Arts (in state and citizenship) complies with regulations of the university and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

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Abstract

The Horn of Africa is one of the most strategic areas in Africa and the world both in economic and political spheres. As a result, it had been the stage of a number of deadly conflicts which had regional and international ramifications. The fall of the Berlin wall and resultant end of the cold war which brought about a change in the global political landscape, had witnessed the collages of a number of government in the horn of Africa as well. These and other similar political developments that were unfolding in the sub- region had ushered a scenes of hope among many scholars and political activates that the gloomy scene of conflict would end of the Horn of Africa would extricate itself out of the social, economic and political morass bogged down for decades. However, things began to make uturn and most, if not all, of the state of the sub- region begin to mire in a state of vicious intra & interstate conflicts. Hence, conflicts in the Horn are very rampant: their sources are diverse and complex which involves numerous forces having wide – ranging and incompatible interests likewise to the pre – 1991 period. A number of factors are responsible for those situation to happen among which unsettled boundary problems created by colonial powers, the monopolization of state power by certain groups and to the exclusion of others which the challengers demands a number of political concessions starting from a redefinition of the state's image, to power sharing or decentralization & devolution to self determination in various forms, object poverty, the proliferation to "political Islam" and terrorism a conflict escalated under the pretext of control over meager natural resource and of the problem of statelessness in Somalia are the most important despite all this turmoil and political upheavals there are some efforts exerted by regional and continental organizations geared towards resolving some of the persistent conflict not ably that of the problem of southern Sudan and Somalia. The peace process in the Sudan seems to be on the right track, while the problem of in Somalia has deteriorated and escalated particularly with the coming induced the military involvement of Ethiopia. Ethiopia and Eretria still in a no war, no peace situation. Hence, regional co- operation and peace seems to be very gloomy as the prevailing situation of the sub-region clearly shows.

LIST OF THE ACRONYMS

AGF	African Governance forum
AIAI	Al – Itihaad Al- Islaam
BCEE	Border Commission for Ethiopia and Eretria
CDU	Coalition for Democracy and Unity
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF	Eritrean people’s Liberation-Front
EPRDF	The Ethiopia people’s Revolutionary Front.
EPRP	Ethiopia people’s Revolutionary party.
GOS	Government of Sudan
IAG	Inter – African group
ICG	International Crisis Croup
IGAD	Inter governmental Authority for Development
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogden National Liberation Front
PFDJ	People’s front for democracy and justice
PIAC	Popular Islamic & Arabic conference
RECSA	Regional Center on small Arms and Light weapons
SNM	Somalia National Movement
SPLF	Southern people liberation Front
SPLM/A	Sudan people’s Liberation Movement/Army
TFA	Transitional Federal Assembly
TNG	Transitional National Government
TPLF	Tigray people’s Liberation Front
TSZ	Temporary security Zone
UEDF	Union of the Ethiopia Democratic forces
UIC	Union of Islamic courts
UN	United Nations
UNOSOM	United Nation Mission for Somalia
US	United State
USC	United Somalia Congress
WSLF	Western Somalia Liberation Front

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CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND OF HORN OF AFRICA

In a narrow geographic sense, the Horn of Africa is that north-eastern part of the African continent which faces the Red Sea to the east, the Indian Ocean to the south-east and the Nile Basin to the west. The Horn of Africa conventionally comprises the key states of Ethiopia, Eritria, Djibouti, Somalia and including its Sudan and South Sudan for the purpose of this study, because of shares the common problem of the disputes over borders within and between states. That it will be argued these countries are linked directly impact on their neighbors (Mesfin W. 1999: 69). According to (Mesfin W. 1999; 69), all these countries have 100% of their land boundaries within the Horn. In other words, none has land boundary with any other country that is outside the Horn All these states share social and cultural values emanating from a centuries-old tradition of interrelationships, common religious practices and economic linkages.

The Horn of Africa is also one of the strategic vital areas in the world in terms of geopolitical consideration. The strategic importance of its location has always attracted outside interests, notably the proximity of the Horn of Africa to the highly sensitive region of Middle East where two factors- Oil and the Arab- Israel conflicts interface. In addition Bal el Mandeb and the Red sea are the main shipping route for goods from the Middle East and the Far East to Europe and the Americas (Sorenson 2008; 8).The discovery of natural resources, highly coveted by transitional corporation and States alike, also makes the region of strategic interests to the external actors, with the result that the global war on terror and the recent explosive of piracy have seen naval forces covering of the coast of the Horn. It is the source of the Nile River, which is the livelihood of the entire population of Egypt and half of the population of the Sudan (Mesfin, 2001, 77).

Besides, the Horn of Africa was also part of the cold war chess board and war regarded as an important stepping stone in the Gulf regions as Dabeil (2002:16) put it succinctly. However, the end of the cold war coinciding with the major internal political upheavals created power vacuum and led finally to the deconstruction of the state of Somalia, the fall of the Derge regime in Ethiopia & the independence of Eritrea (Debiel, 2002: 17). The countries of the sub-region, despite the aforementioned common features, have also great diversities among themselves in terms of their size, political history and resource endowments. Below is a summary of the political history and cultural landscape of the countries of the sub region (ibid).

Djibouti, a French colony, is the smallest state in terms of territory and population size and relatively a “a peaceful” nation in the sub-region. Djibouti proclaimed an overseas territory of France and later renamed as the French territory of the Afras and the Issas in the 1945 and 1967 respectively. Became independent in 1977 with Hassan Gouled Aptidon as the first president. It has been considered a haven of silence in a violent region, but it has also had its share of conflict, albeit not as pronounced as in other countries of the Horn (IAG, 1999: www.africa.upenn.edu). Its political dynamism is highly affected by the developments in Ethiopia and Somalia as it is linked culturally, politically and economically with both countries. Its economy, unlike all countries of the sub-region, totally depends on the service sector mainly on the port of the Djibouti (Schrader, J.1993).

Eritrea, which achieved formal independent that in 1993 after 30 years of bitter struggle from Ethiopia, is the youngest state and second smallest country in the sub-region – in terms of territory and population. It shares borders with Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Sudan. It was bonded with Ethiopia economically, culturally and politically. However, its relations with all its neighboring countries have always been very difficult since its independence. The internal political dynamics of the country is also soaring because of the bad economic performance, lack of good governance and human right abuses (Kassahun.B 2013).

Ethiopia, being the most populace and second largest country in terms of territory in the sub- region, is central to understand the conflict patterns in the sub-region. Ethiopia has been tumultuous partly because of its internal political dynamics and partly because of the problem with Somalia and later with Eritrea which fought a full scale wars in 1979 and 1998 respectively. It has experienced two fundamental political changes in 1974 and 1991. The internal political patterns of the country are very complicated and its relations with its neighboring countries have been also tense in a number of occasions except with that of Djibouti and Kenya (Kassahun.B 2013).

Somalia, before its independence in 1960, was under the colonial administration of the British and the Italians. After almost a decade of democratic rule (1960-1969), major General Mohammed Siyad Barre assumed political power through a blood less coup and ruled the country recklessly for about two decades. The increasing transformation of the state in to a repression apparatus at the end of the 1980s eventually led to its deconstruction by the different clan militias (Debiel, 2002;14). Hence the internal political crises coupled with the external political pattern that was taking place globally didn't allow the government to stay in power any longer finally its collapsed in 1991. It is now described as "failed state". Somalia, being the home of homogenous people both linguistically and religiously, turned out to be the one that has advanced farthest on the road to social disintegration (IAG, 1999: www.Africa.Upenn.edu) . Reinstating normal functions of government and tackling the problem of peace and development have remained to be impossible task to accomplish.

Sudan is largest country in terms of territory in the sub-region. However, the country's history since independence demonstrates that its development crisis is largely attributed to the frequent changes governing regimes hat alternated between civilian, democratic, and dictator or totalitarian system (Hardalla, 1999; 175). Behind this problem are the extensive of myriad of societies with pervasive conflicts and contradictions based on fragmented ideology that developed around ethnic, tribal, regional and sectarian identities (Hardallu 1999; 175). The attitude of the, North to the South, and those of southern to a

government center in Khartoum were entrenched during the Anglo- Egyptian Condominium (1898-1995) (Samson; 1999:/63).

According to Samson (1999:163) social status was generally defined by proximity to the center of the state and religion and ethnic organ became key factors in social status. The problem of North- South dichotomy and the current Darfur crisis are the most important security challenges facing this country. It would be very difficult to envisage vibrant socio- economic development in this giant country without giving a lasting solution to these problems.Hence, it is clearly from the above summary presentation that the countries of the sub-region are varied in a number of ways and one must avoid the attraction to over generation.

South Sudan For more than fifty years, north and south Sudan were unified as a country, but divided internally. On July 9, 2011, South Sudan declared its independence. Their separation in 2011 followed decades of civil war described broadly as a conflict between the “Arab” Muslim north and “African” Christian and animist south.¹⁵ ongoing conflict and unrest within and between the now-separate countries is indicative of the complex political and cultural divisions that have plagued Sudan for decades. The case of separation in hich some two million Darfur is were displaced and another 250,000 became refugees in neighboring Chad. As with the north-south war, casualty estimates in the Darfur conflict vary extensively. Studies suggest that between 100,000 and 500,000 died in the conflict’s early years, some directly in violence and many more from malnutrition and disease (Richard Williamson 2008).

1.2 Statement of problem

Over the last decades the Horn of Africa has been wracked by a major conflict¹ in Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea and to lesser extent, Djibouti (IGAD 2008). Conflict to the individual countries is often compounded by inter-state conflict of varying degree and intensity which take place at different times. More over recurrent drought resulting in famine, and other troubles among them environmental degradation and economic hardship are expressed in the impoverishment of broad section of the population. Internal displacement and flow of refugees have thus become the hall mark of the post cold war periods. In addition to a broad range of indicator of under development tearing apart the live of the Horn., the effect of vagarious of nature and human folly depict, the sub region as one of the most fragile and crisis ridden in the world. The major manifestation of the crisis are expressed in devastating inter-state wars state failure and breaking down and propagation of the flow of the small arms and human trafficking, and among others ((Kassahun.B 2013). Which devoted the lives of millions of innocent people and destroyed the countries insufficient resources that could have been bogged down for decades, it not for futures.

This problem is also further aggravated by the boundaries, created by Colonial Masters as the ruled and finally left the sub-region and these are the sources of intra and inter- state conflicts in the sub-region up until today.

The effect of this war to put many different ethnic people with in a nation that didn't reflect, or have the ability to accommodate or provide for, the cultural and ethnic diversity this pint of further illustrated by (Markakis, 1994:8) as follows.

¹ Conflict is the relation between two or more parties (individual or groups) who have, or think they have, incompatible goals. But conflict need not necessary be unpleasant, destructive, violent or insoluble.

The expansionist trend associated with the modern states in the region, which began with colonial partition of the Horn and continued in the post colonial period. The state incorporated regions that were never fully integrated even administratively in to its structure.

Another feature of the states in this sub region is what (Markakis 1994;8) coined “ethnocracy” meaning the monopolization of state power by certain ethnic group and the consequence of exclusion of the rest.

This situation makes accessing and controlling the limited resources of the state apparatus in the countries, a clear objective of any politician vying for political power. As a result, official state images and the legitimacy of those exercising power are being challenged. From within the challengers demands range from are definition of the state’s image, to power sharing or decentralization and devolution to self determination in various forms (Leencho, 2001;www.ploughshares.ca).

Peace and security in the Horn of Africa have been also constrained by the proliferation of “political Islam” and terrorism specially with the coming to power of the National Islamic front (NIF) led by Dr. Hassan al Turabi in the Sudan and the collapse of the collages of the Somalia states in 1991 & the resultant appearance of AL- Ittihad & later the Union of Islamic court (UIC) in the political scene of that country that have created remarkable political upheaval and disorder in the sub-region.

Another development which latter on turned in to a bloody borders conflicts, is that the parting of Eritrea from Ethiopia. However surrounded by various agreements. Ethiopia & Eritrea functioned as (pseudo) sisterly states with exemplary relations both during the interim period (1991-93) and the post 1993 during which Eritrea functioned as a full fledged state (Addis, 1998:33). However, as Leencho (2001; www.ploughshares.ca) put it bluntly, the divergence in the policies of both governments which is compounded by the ambition to translate Eritrea’s independence in to a spring board for rapid economic and

social development predicated on preferential access to Ethiopian resources and market brought about an end to the short lived cooperation verses a bloody war.

A has been reasonably tried to gleam on the situation that this sub-region is in and despite of the various efforts exerted to solve some of the long standing problems, conflict is still the hall mark of the Horn of Africa even after the end of the cold war. These conflict and instabilities have intra-state, inter-state and global dimensions. This study aspires to articulate and examine the conflict patterns in the Horn of Africa.

1.3 Hypothesis

In the Horn of Africa the struggle for power, control of power, control of resources, ideological and cultural dominance over others are the major factors shaping the conflict patterns in the sub-region?

1.4 Research Question

The following are some of the research question; this study will try to address:

- What is the underlying factor of the conflict patterns in the Horn of Africa?
- Why conflicts have become the hallmark of the sub-region even after the end of cold war?
- What are the external and internal forces that serve as the factors and agencies of the pattern of conflict in the Horn of Africa?

1.5 Objective of the Study

General Objective

The main of the objective of the study is to analysis the patterns of conflict in the Horn of Africa in post cold war periods.

Specific Objective

Since the Horn of Africa is one of the chaotic and economically weakened sub-regions of the continent, this study will attempt to look in the issues and patterns behind these phenomena. Hence the main objectives of this research paper will be able to:

1. Investigate the effect of intra and interstate conflict.
2. Identify the major factors interstate conflict and reasons for the continuation of the conflict patterns in the Horn of Africa.

3. Identifying the major factors and reasons for the continuation of the conflict pattern in the Horn of Africa.
4. To analyze the issues and patterns of the conflict in the Horn of Africa.

1.6 Research methodology

This research is a qualitative enquiry to the conflict patterns in the Horn of Africa in post cold war era. For the purpose of this research the social learning theory and depurative relative theory will be used as guided to the study. As the result analysis, the inter-state and intra-state conflict patterns in the Horn of Africa.

1.7 Data collation and analysis

1.7.1 Primary data

The researcher has used data from African Union and Horn of Africa government's reports on the level of the conflict nature, legislative proclamation and official's testimonies on conflict and terrorism and counter terrorism strategy documents. UN security council conflict resolution on the state and other regional actors in the Horn of Africa resolution like IGAD,AU, have also been consulted and analyzed.

1.7.2 Secondary Data

The qualitative research methods will be employed to analysis and interpreted the data gathered from the secondary sources such as: - Books, published or unpublished thesis, magazines, relevant documents, internet sources, periodicals, local foreign news papers, monograph, academic journals, research website, government and non government sponsored study reports diplomatic cable materials will be collected as secondary sources. Finally, reports of IGAD and AU as well as various age scholars in the field will be examined.

1.7.3 Method of Data Analysis

Data analysis involves employing several steps that include the gathering and organization of data, an initial reading through the information. It also involve interpreting the data in the light of comparing the findings with the past literature, theory

and that are inter related between inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

1.8 Limitation of the study

There a number of limitations to the research .The time allocation of the research project is constrain. Furthermore, the research needs collecting lots of published and unpublished resources. These tasks require visiting several organization and search websites that consumes significant amount of times, in addition to the time used for data analysis. A problem of large amount of primary data on conflict pattern of people across the region could be collected from the horn countries. The other limitation on arises from the availability of recent military and conflict documents considered sensitive to national security. Researcher's limited experience will be anther constrain.

1.9 Scope and Significance of the study

This paper is mainly geared towards discussing the conflict patterns in the Horn of Africa in post cold war periods. Hence, it is very difficult to discuss all issues, so it mainly focuses on a major conflict ridden region in the Horn countries such as;- Ethiopia, Eretria, Somalia, Sudan and to a lesser extent, Djibouti, it also includes intra-state & inter-state conflicts in varying degree.

1.10. Organization of the study

The research paper will be organized into five chapters including the conclusion part. The first chapter an overview to the historical background to the conflict patterns in the Horn of Africa. The statement of the problems, hypothesis, researcher questions, and objective of the study, scope and significance's of the study and research methodology incorporated will be presented in chapter two. Theoretical frame work and review of related literature will be presented in chapter two.

In this third chapter, are the issues and patterns that are responsible for the intra- state conflict in the sub region will be discussed. Especially the major conflicts that are unfolding in the core horn countries, Ethiopia, Somalia & Sudan will be discussed

thoroughly. The fourth chapter will be dedicated to the discussion of the issues & patterns of inter- state conflict. The Ethio-Eritrean conflict of 1998 -2000, the proliferation of political Islam in Sudan and the advent of the terrorist groups in Somalia and their regional ramifications are dealt in detail. Last, the concluding part will highlight the major points of the research work.

CHAPTER TWO

2. Theoretical frame work and Literature Review.

2.1 Conceptual Framework and the Concept of Conflict

In this section, definition of the concept of conflict will be provided. Through this definition an attempt will be made to understand why some conflicts are different from others. Although the focus will be on the inter-state dimension of conflicts, other level of conflict will also be highlighted & defined.

According to Johan Burton (1990: 2), conflicts are “behaviors that have the potential of being destructive of persons, properties and systems”. For him, the issues that lead to conflict are not the ordinary ideas, theories, preferences and interests about which debates and negotiations are conducted as part of normal social life. The focuses are rather deeply rooted in human behavior. In other words, conflicts are expressed through the manner in which people react to differences and reflect their frustrations concerning each other’s behaviors. Burton further links conflict to power, and as such, for him a conflict would be, “a situation in which authorities or power is being exercised without the sanitation or approval of those over whom it is being exercised” (Burton 1990: 126).

Burton (1989: 99) further contends that:

Conflict may not be over material goods and symbols that cannot be shared, but over commonly held or universal goals such as identity, recognition, absence of control through effective participation, security and such basic needs that are a part of the human development process.

What Burton seems to be emphasizing is that when people’s aspiration are frustrated in a given situation by others irrespective of whether they are close to them or not, whether they involve power or material interest, it becomes difficult to reconcile interests involved in such situations.

On the other hand, James Lave (1989: 17) defined conflict as the: ..”natural competition between two or more parties about scarce resources, power and prestige. Parties in

conflict believe they have incompatible goals, and their aim is to neutralize, gain advantage over, injure or destroy another.”

For the above definitions, a conflict may be regarded as differences between and among individuals. These differences are further complicated by the nature of the conflict, mostly over goals, power values, motives, ideas, and resources. In the Africa context, conflict is often related to resources: power struggles, and in some cases the marginalization of the minority by the majority or vice versa, or political manipulation of the less developed groups by the sophisticated elite. In case of intra conflicts, the outcome often tends to be a conflict between the central government and the regions.

The demands for equal participation in the government or recognition of groups interests by the ruling group are some of the causes of most conflict in Africa and these seem to fall within the framework of Burton and Lave’s definitions of conflict.

Johan Galtung provides another definition of conflict. He states that “an action system is said to be in conflict if the system has two or more incompatible goal-states.” Galtung (1978: 434). In this system, the distinction is made between action-systems consisting of individuals and collectivities and another distinction is made between inter-and intra-system conflicts.

Individuals in this system represent human beings and collectivities represents nations. Galtung (1978: 434) define intra-system conflict as: “a conflict that can be found in the smallest subunits of the system down to the individual actors, where as inter-system conflict splits the system in parts, each system standing for its own goal-state.” On the other hand, Galtung (1978: 438) defines the conflict behavior approach as being “concerned with the behavior of the persons in this particular situation.”

Morton Deaton (1991) present another definition of conflict. According to Deaton, “conflict is a pervasive aspect of existence that occurs at all levels of social life, the interpersonal inter group, inter-organizational and international” (Deaton 1991: 26). According to him, most conflicts are mixed motive conflicts, in which the parties have both cooperative and competitive interests. In other words, a conflict can be constructive as well as destructive (Deaton 1991: 27). From this perspective conflict may be defined

as a process that originates when one individual perceives that another party has frustrated, or is about frustrate, some goal or concern of his or hers. In general five types of conflicts may be distinguished: intra-personal (with in the self), interpersonal (between individuals), intra group (with in group) inter-group, (between groups), and international (between states or nations) (Borisoff and Victor 1989: 1-2).

On the other hand, Demis Sandole defines conflict as a dynamic phenomenon a Manifest Conflict Process (MCP), comprised of phase of initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, abatement, and termination /resolution” (Sandole 1993: 6). In this context, a conflict is a process that has to go through certain specific stages. Each stages may be independent from or related to the one before it or the one it follow. While the cause of some conflicts in Africa tend to be rooted in material or political interests, at later stages of their progresses, some motives or interests become more important than others do, such as the ethnic group’s survival or preservation of the group’s dignity and prestige. This is often the case particularly in the instance relating to intra and inter-group conflicts (Sandole 1993: 6).

Equally the crisis of the state, feeds into the conflicts and insecurities there. All these factors require more scientific and critical studies of the conflicts and their regional dynamics. This volume seeks to contribute to the provision of tools those scholars, policy makers and concerned actors need in their search of scientific and critical, context-sensitive studies, relevant and well formulated policies and regional outlook, making concerted and rigorous efforts to find viable and durable solution to these extensive and intractable conflicts and insecurities.

The intra-and interstate conflicts very easily spill a cross international boundaries triggering conflict between states, resulting in inter-state conflicts. In recent decades interstate conflicts have been steadily waning, while intra-state conflicts have increased (Goor etal. 1996, Fearon and Latin 2003; Smith 2004; Zeleza 2008).

2.2 Defining Intra-State and Inter-State Conflicts Patterns

Conflicts as a social phenomenon are widely perceived to be part of daily life (Axt et al. 2006: 19). Its manifestation, however, varies contingent on a number of factors contestation, the actors involved, duration, and accessibility to conflict-sustaining technology and so on. Concerning the origin of conflicts two approaches are provided (Axt et al. 2006). The subjective and the objective. While the objective approach trace the origin of conflict to the socio-political fabric and structure of the society, the subjective approach attributes the origin of conflicts to the perceived incompatibility of goals and difference (Deutsch 1991). Underling this understanding is that in order for conflict to exist there should be position difference or interest opposition between groups over certain values (Axt et al., 2006: 6).

Conflicts are broadly categorized into two groups, the violent and a none violent. More specifically, five types of conflicts are described latent conflict, manifest conflict and crisis, and sever crisis and war. The first two are assumed to be non violent, the others are classified as engaging in violence /Axt et al 2006/. A further distinction is made between intra-state and inter state conflicts: (1) 'intra-state wars, fought between two or more state members of the inter-state system; (2) civil wars, fought with in the "microprobe" of a member state of the system by forces of the regime against an insurgent group "(Sarkees et al 2003: 58). This definition rests on the political status of the combatants. If they are recognized member of the international state system, but is located within a recognized state, the conflict is defined as intra-state or civil. Concerning intra-state conflicts Sarkees et al. (2003: 59) note:-

Intra-state wars are now those between or among two or more groups within the internationally recognized territory of the state. They include civil war (involving the state government and a none state actors) and intra-communal conflicts (involving two or more groups, none of which is the state government).

For the last 50 years the Horn of Africa has suffered protracted chronic and complex intra and inter-state conflicts (Cliffe 2004: 151). These conflicts fall into three categories: State

society: state-state; and society-society. While state-society conflicts relate to civil wars (communities with legitimate grievances challenge the state), state-state are conflicts between sovereign states. The third type of society-society, concerns communal strife (intra-communal and inter-communal, under the shadow of the state. What all types of conflict have in common is that the underpinning source is the state (Cliffe 2004: 151).

A fragile state or state crisis in the Horn of Africa has become the source of conflict and insecurity.

2.3 Causes of Conflicts

It is no exaggeration to state that conflicts the world over are characterized by numerous causes. Further, they are embedded in the socio economic, politico-cultural, historical identity constructions and experiences of the societies, the societies' relation with local, national, regional and international actors. This multiple context of causality shows that there is no single explanation to the conflicts in the Horn of Africa. To complicate matters, conflict causalities are categorized into root, proximate and tertiary causes (Singer 1996).

Some of the commonly alluded to causes are: territory, ideology, religion, language, ethnicity, self determination, access to resources. Market, dominance, equality and revenge (Singer 1996). In reference to interstate conflict, Pfetsch and Rohloff (2000) identify nine items, which historically constituted the cause of conflicts between states. These are territory (border), secession, decolonization, autonomy, system (ideology, national, power, regional predominance, international power and resources. None the less, there seems to be a broad consensus among scholars that the classical cause of conflict is territory (Axt et al. 2006: 12).

Relative Deprivation Theory (Gurr 1970) also attributes conflicts to a group's expected or actual access to prosperity and power. Relative Deprivation theory is closely connected to group entitlement theory (Hoyowitz, 1985), which attributes conflicts to ethnic identification (Smith 2004: 5) other theories that seek causes of conflicts include: poor economic condition theory, repressive political system theory and environmental degradation theory (Smith 2004: 7). Inequality and Marginalization theories locate the

causes of conflict in social relation in which certain groups are subjected to grave injustices and chronic marginalization. People, therefore, engage in conflict not only because they see it is just but because they see no alternative to alleviate their plight.

The drivers of conflicts are internal as much as they are external as they entail international, regional, national and local actors and networks which are at the sometime social, economic, political and military (Zeliza 2008: 15).

The causes of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa are:-

- Livelihood – Based resources (land, water, grazing, pasture).
- Culture (ethnicity, language, religion).
- Politics (power, inequality, domination, discrimination, marginalization, and alienation).
- External intervention (colonial, cold war, regional, the war on the territory and piracy).
- Life style (peasantry, sedentary, pastoral, nomadic, highland, lowland).
- Dysfunctional governance practices (absence of democracy, accountability, transparency; tyranny; dictatorship; sham and) or unrepresentative electoral practice; alienation, and marginalization of local indigenous institutions and practices, state legitimacy deficiency).
- Under development (lack of industrialization, investment; agricultural, pastoral and agro-pastoral economy; primary goods export, pre-capitalist economic dominance).

Combinations of some or all of these explain the conflicts that the Horn of Africa is experiencing. If we take, the Darfur conflict as an example, we can easily see that a combination of livelihood-based resource competition, culture, political, socio-economic and life style factors underpin it. The inter-state conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia (1998) also involves culture, politics, external intervention, socio-economic and dysfunctional governance practice (Zezeza-2008: 16).

2.4 Theoretical frame work of the sources of conflicts

The major objective of this sub-chapter is to look at some of the challenging theories of the sources of conflicts which are relevant to the conflict pattern in the Horn of Africa countries. In my argument;-

The analysis and understanding of the pertinent theories of sources of conflict is, highly imperative so as to understanding and comprehended the prevailing conflict in the Horn of Africa. Generally speaking it is suggested that the following are major reasons as to why policy- makers, actors and analysts can benefit from insights of conflict theories. First there is a fundamental assumption that theory is not simply an abstraction. Nor does it exist in isolation from the policy realm. Theory building closely follows the course of world politics. It often reflects our desire not only to explain change and problems, but also to provide better solution to problems of world order.

The first, theory reflects the accumulated wisdom of a discipline by building on comparisons between actors, events and outcomes in many different part of the world. As such theory can help us to learn from experience of others, and overcome the parochialism that often characterized the policy maker's mental universe.

Second, theory provides us with alternative lenses for explaining events an responding to them. However, it doesn't mean that theories furnish precise answers to all problems and questions. But they are indispensable instruments which help us to organize our thinking about them and formulate our reaction to events. Theories also help as anticipate; if not always predict exactly, the course of events in the world politics. In the section that follows, two major theoretical perspectives will be out lined and used as analytical frame work to explain the conflict patterns in the Horn of Africa and below is a brief account of each theory. These theories are the social learning theories and relative depritive theory. Although they do not exhaust the variety of theoretical frame work in conflicts, this study world limit to these two theories, as they are seminal in the conflict in the Horn of Africa.

2.4.1 Human Nature and Violence

Violence is deeply entrenched in the human nature itself and the unconscious human urge is widely used as a factor to explain the relationship between the innate potential and

drive for violence behavior (Jeong, 2000:65). Some even extend their arguments for their to the point that violence behavior originates in our animals past (Jeong, 2000:65). Among the proponents of this theory biologists and psychologists have used animal behavior or ethological studies to illustrate possible corollaries to human behavior (cunning harm. www.cain.ulst.ac.uk). However, this theory was discredited later on by various theorists and scientists and the conference which was conducted in 1986 in Seville, Spain laid the ground for the proliferation of new theories. John E.mack Seville statement of violence as follows:

In the Seville statement the signatories, who include psychologists, neuroscientists, geneticists, anthropologists, and political scientists, declared that there was on the basis of biological nature, Rather they said, war is a result of socialization and conditioning a phenomena of human organization, planning and information processing that plays on emotional and motivational potentialities. In short the Seville statement implies that we have real choices and that a new kind of responsibility in the conduct of human group is possible.

According to the statement of the above conference, the root cause of human conflict are to be found within nurture (the environment non nature (genetic) and debate pirating to the relationship between the nature and conflict become far from over.

2.4.2 The Frustration-Aggression Theory.

According to the frustration aggression hypothesis human beings as goal oriented organisms, naturally become aggressive when they are prevented from achieving what the desire (Jeong, 200:76). Deep rooted conflicts are caused by unmet or frustrated basic human needs – physical. Psychological and social (Fisher and et al, 200: 8). As natural blocked up energy seeks release, and aggressive action is directed to the sources of one’s frustration (Jeong, 200: 76). The fundamental tenets of his theory emanates from the proposition that all aggression whether interpersonal or international, have their root caused in the frustration of one or more actors goal achievement (Cunningham, 1998: www.cain.ulst.ac.uk). This is to mean that conflict erupted duto theUn-fulfillment of

personal or group objectives and the frustration that this breeds. Since the demand for basic human needs has always exceeded the supply, all human conflict can be traced to an actor's failure to obtain what is needs. According to the proponents of this theory, the frustration. Aggression hypothesis rests on the basic stimulus response. Individuals resort to their existence. In line with this Dollord et al (1993) argued that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presuppose the existence of frustration and contra wise, that the existence of frustration always lead to some form of aggression.

However, there is a common argument among the proponent of this theory that wide spread frustration among the population can be manipulated by political leaders in direct hostilities toward minority groups within a society or foreign countries. Some may argue that Hitler's affect on Jews and others ethnic minorities (in Europe) were used to divert the public attention away from bad economic condition in the early 1930s, (Jeong, 2000: 76). However, the extent to which such frustration generates aggression or lead to violent conflict is uncertain, Glossop (200: 76).

2.4.3 The social learning theory

Social learning theory is based on the assumption that aggression in not inherently entrenched in the nature of human being. It is rather something which is adopted from the environment in which we live in. To cite Cunningham (1998: www.cain.ulst.ac.uk) aggression is not innate or instinctual but actually learned through the process of socialization and one enquires aggressive attributes by learning them at home, in school and by interaction with their environment in general. This proposition is the most important pillar of the Seville statement, proponents of this theory have tried to understand the relationship between the individual, its environment and how it is related to group aggression.

Socialization in conflict prone area like Horn Africa is believed to have a negative impact on psychological makeup of the people especially on teenagers and younger adults. Children, who growth – up watching their parents and neighbors being hassled by the policy, army or “other” community often become petrol bomb wield teens (1998: www.cain.ulst.ac.uk).

This is the peculiar characteristic of despotic and non democratic government, where the arbitrary arrest and killing is a norm. It cats were raised from almost never kill rats when they grow up (Kuo, 1961, 43) and vice versa would be a relevant parable which could explain the condition in at most Horn states. Odero (2002: 124) also claims that the influence of traumata on generation need to be regard as a key to may conflicts. He further pushed his argument by saying that the children of parents traumatized by war are likely to become active players in the future violent conflicts (Odero, 2002: 124).

2.4.4 Relative Deprivation Theory

The Relative Deprivation theory is closely associated with the frustration aggression theory in that this theory stress that sometimes people perceived creates the inter groups hostility rather the actual relative status of the two groups (Draman, 2003: 9). This theory assumes the deep rooted conflict is caused by unmet or frustrated basic human needs physical, psychological and social (Fisher et al, 2000; 8). Relative Deprivation emanates from the failure to fill the gap between ever rising expectation and the absence of progressive towards better human life. According to Jeong (2000: 69) it is the intolerable gab between expected reality of life condition serves as a pre- condition for wide spread invest. This is also defined as “as actor” perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities (Jeong 2000: 69). This is particularly true in most developing countries where an individual or collective sense of entitlement performance coupled with distribution of wealth has been one of the most important cause o the conflict in developing countries. Jeong. (2000: 69) has tried to show the relationship between uneven distribution of wealth and conflict in the coupled with uneven distribution of wealth and power, tends to generate feelings of a growing gap between un materialized and perceptions about exiting economic, social and political conditions. Such as assumptions and feelings which are effectively manipulated by political leaders in pursuit in their political agenda are the root causes of social invest in most of the Horn of Africa.

Conflict and the demands for justice are also diametrically related. The quests for genuine justices are expressed in terms of demands for political right, demand for session and independence, demand for political participation, demand for economic right, and the

demand for social, culture religions rights. (Kinfе, 1999: 15-17). Hence, the demands for the above political and human rights are the major causes of conflict in countries of the Horn of Africa.

The goals of work based on this theory are to assist conflicting parties to identify and share their unmet needs, generate options for meeting those needs and to reach agreements that meet the basic human needs of all the sides (Fisher, 2000: 8).

2.4.5 Social Identity theory

Common history, traditions, languages, beliefs and values are the basic and objective criteria that distinguish one group from another and are also maintained by shared culture transmitted over generation as explained by the primordial and elements of myths, memories, values and symbols are used to close ethnic group. (Jeong, 2000: 71). This theory assumes that conflict is caused by feelings of threatened identity, often rooted in unresolved past loss and suffering (Fisher, 2000:8) Cannoningham (www.cain.vlst.ac.uk) is also of the view that identity boundaries between in groups and out-groups are established by a subjective group consciousness in order to simplify their respective external relations. However, such wider self awareness of their common history and destiny is weakened by social change such as modernization that often leads to competition with other communities (Jeong. 2000:71). Hence, identity can be used as instrument to pursue individual and group interests. That is why ethnicity is becoming the source of conflict in most part of the world. Political parties vying for political power most of the time used ethnic affiliation as an instrument to mobilize popular support. This argument is further strengthened by Jeong (2000: 72) that identity are manipulated to maintain the power of a dominant group and justify discrimination against other groups in education and employment.

This is manifested by the assumed physical and intellectual superiority of one group of human being over another category of people of different which use biological trait as a basis of subjugation (Kinge, 199: 8-6).

However ethnic and religious differences are not in themselves cause of conflict and ethnic communities may remain passive and immobilized for long periods. The salience of group identity is awakened by social derived inequality in material well – being or political access. Racial or ethnic distinctions are deepened by the denial of political participation as well as lack of physical and economical security. Discriminatory treatment along with repressive state control generates group grievances. Political and material demands reflect their efforts to seek justice for members of their groups (Teong, 200: 72). The goals of work based on the identity theory are build empathy and reconciliation between the parties through facilitated workshops and dialogue for conflicting parties to identify threats and fear they each feel and to build empathy, and jointly reach agreement that recognize the core identity needs of all parties (Fisher et al 200:8).

2.5 Review of Related literature

Understanding the ways in which violence might be erupted, prevented, managed and resolved or transformed made it the most important topic in the modern societies (Clements,www.cain.ulst.ac.uk).Therefore many scholars in the field have identified various causes of conflict entrenched in the economic, political; social and cultural spiritual world. Most of them also involve more than one cause (Linda & et al 2005: 495). The following are the most important sources of conflict wither relevant to this study, inter alia:

2.5.1 Political System as a source of conflict

Political systems adopted by government are considered as one of the major source of intra and interstate conflicts especially in countries ruled by autocratic and non-democratic political systems or within systems that are in transition (Clements, www.cain.u/st.ac.uk). Although adoption of autocratic and non democratic political systems seems to be an internal domain of state, most of the time spilled over to neighboring countries and become source of conflicts. In reinforcing this argument, Clements (www.cai.ulst.ac.uk) further accentuated those interims of established democracies for example, only 12% were involved in civil war where as 45% of one

party dictatorship were involved in civil war and 30% of state with transitional or uncertain democracies were involved in civil war.

The lack of commitment of leaders to instill genuine democratic system is also one major cause of conflict in the post cold war African context with regards to this Odunuga (2001: 48) has forwarded the following:

While it is accepted that most of the leaders of modern Africa accepted the notion of democracy when bidding for leadership, they have not been able to establish a political environment that could have allowed for the development of a political culture that would be devoid of intolerance, distrust extremism, and violence.

This in a clear manifestation of the idea propelled by the American political philosophers, HannaAreadt, who lived from 1906 – 1975 that “the most radical revolutionary will become conservation on the day after revolution”. Hence the quest for a democratic order is the cause of the inter & intra state conflict in the contemporary. World order -in Africa in general and the Horn of Africa in particular.

The internal challenges for any in comment government ago emanates from their subjects who are either dissatisfied with the performance of the incumbent government with regards to the internal cause of conflict participation of third annual African Governance Forum (AGF III) which was conducted from June 28-30/ 2001 in Bamako, Mali identified the major cause of internal conflict in Africa today as follows:-

“ ... the breakdown of governance resulting from the manipulations of ethnic religious, and others societal differences by power elites poor governance practices such as a lack of accountability and transparency produce cultures of miss management, rent seeking and impunity. The protected efforts such as policies as systematic exclusion, socio economic marginalization, disregard for the rule of law and violation of human rights often trigger or exacerbate conflict. Failures in developing a share

vision for a United nation amid communal and other diversity or in augmenting and utilizing the social capital inherent in traditional institution and practices can also undermine national cohesion and lead to internal conflict and state collapse.” (AGF, Final Report P.25).

A conflict over who controls the National Government has also international dimensions. The external dimensions emanate from neighboring countries who are not happy with the united Nation and other international organization which prohibited the interference of states in the internal affairs of any state, in practice often have strong interests in the governments of others states and use a variety of means of leverage to influence who holds power in those state (Goldstien, 2001: 2011). As a result today many states are in conflict due to interference in the internal affairs of others states. Such efforts may extend from a simple manipulation or influence on anther state’s elections at other times, a stare supports rebel elements that seek to over throw the second states constitutional order altogether (Goldstien, 2001: 211) within regard to this, professor Adebayo Adedegi (2001: 3) has put a very typical example, which is worth mentioning:

More often than not, it manifests itself more in a bilateral rather than a multi lateral form. Examples are South Africa in Lesotho, Senegal in Guinea Bissau and although it is often ferociously denied Ethiopia, Uganda, and Eritrea individual, and surreptitiously jointly, in Southern Sudan.

For this project to succeed, the US government poured considerable amount of resources interims of weapon, financial support and military training for the aforementioned country replacing the proxy wars of the cold war. However, the effort of the US government wasted in vain shortly without yielding the intended result due to the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eretria. The involvement of a number of neighboring states mainly Uganda, Rwanda & Burundi, in the internal affairs of Democratic Republic of Cong (DRC is also a classical example of such type of conflicts.

2.5.2 Ethnicity as a source of conflict

Chiot in [in Monney] (2005: 497) identified five level of ethnic conflicts, inter alia: (1) multi ethnic societies without serious conflict (e.g. Switzerland), (2) multiethnic societies without controlled conflict (e.g. United States and Canada) (3) societies with ethnic conflict that has been controlled (e.g. South Africa) (4) societies with serious ethnic conflict leading of warfare (e.g. Sri Lanka) and (5) societies with genocidal ethnic conflict including “ethnic cleansing” (e.g. Rwanda & Kosovo).

However, the mere existence of several ethnic groups in any given societies cannot be the source of conflict by itself unless manipulated by the urban elites and politicians in pursuit of their respective interests. However, it is the lack of satisfactory political arrangements, which accommodate the interests, and aspiration of most ethnic groups, it not all (big and small alike) that made ethnic pluralism a major source of conflicts that have ruined social cohesion in many African countries (Odunuga 2001: 42). According to Goldstien (2001: 220):

Thus it would be very safe to inter from the above propositions that it is the existence of such practices that in most of the cases. Ethnic pluralism triggered and ignited ethnic hatred, which final led to deadly conflicts either to protect poser and privilege or to challenge such power and privilege (Clements. ww.cain.ulst.ac.uk). Hence ethnic conflicts have been one of the horrifying sources of conflict that human being witnessed in the aftermath of the cold war starting from the ex-republics of the former USSR, Yugoslavia and Albania in eastern and central Europe to Rwanda and Burundi in central Africa and currently in western Sudan. If not managed amicably and meticulously, seeds of such conflicts and also being planted in the Ethiopian soil especially in the aftermath of the May 7, 2005 election.

2.5.3 The economic factors as a source of conflict

The resource based conflict in Africa are of two broad categories namely these conflicts over scarce resources such as grazing land and water and those over abundant resources such as the mineral rich in the democratic republic of Congo (DRC) which attracted external interventions during the cold war period.

Conflict over economic resources and distribution of wealth within and among state is the most important source of international conflicts in Africa (Goldstein, 2001: 214). Odunga (2001: 46) stated the economic factors are a major cause of conflicts in Africa. He further pushed his argument that since politics and economics are interwined, it is inevitable that the distribution of wealth plays a major role in determining political stability in any society Odunga (2001: 46). Aristotle many years ago also expressed the relationship between economy and violence stating that “poverty is the parent of crime and revolution” hence poverty aggravate in Horn of Africa without any exceptions Odunga (2001: 46).

Although, currently there is a big debate about the relation between economic factors and peace, it is clear that most modern wars are concentrated in the poorest countries (Clements. www.cain.ulst.ac.uk). Out of the entire countries classified as having low development by the 1997-2001 and only 2% of those countries classified as having high development experienced civil war in the same period (Clements, www.cain.ulst.ac.uk).

To strength the above argument the world Bank in its report entitled “Breaking the conflict Trap – civil war and Development policy” enumerated that war causes poverty but poverty also increases the likelihood of civil war. According the above report of the bank, countries with low economic performance are most likely to be exposed to dangerously could not be exception to this scenario. The current Ethio- Eritrean conflict, the crises in western Sudan and problem in Somalia are mainly attributed to economic situation of these countries.

According to Odunuga (2001: 46) One other common cause of conflict is conflict over scarce land, water and other natural resources in which competing groups go to great lengths to acquire for themselves are also very rampat. This is also the case in the Horn of Africa where scarce and strategic resources such as vital minerals and oil (as in the case of the Sudan) and water (as in the case of the Nile basin countries are the source of intra and interstate conflict respectively. With regard to water resource Tvedt (1992: 80) has expressed the situation in the Nile basin as follows:

.....imbalance between water contribution and water use will become increasingly contentious in the Blue Nile basin as a result of demographic economic and development factors which are more or less independent of the will of the leaders of the countries concerned. Skillful and practical state management in all the riparian states is required if open hostilities and water war are to avoided and negotiations and successful basin wide agreements achieved.

Hence in the absence of such mechanisms and arrangement there might be a possibility of entering in to a basin wide conflict trap. The current Darfur an crises is mainly attributed to a conflict over a grazing land between the black Africans and Arabs. The conflicts elsewhere in Africa for example neighboring countries are typical example worth mentioning.

2.5.4 Conflict over Territory.

There cannot be little doubt that territories have a profound impact of the needs that states feel the threat they perceived, the prospect they have and the relations they have with their neighboring countries. This is because the state value home territory with in an almost fanatical devotion and as a result border dispute tend to be among the most intractable in International relation (Goldstein, 2001: 203). The most common conflict arise of territorial conflict are secession interstate borders territorial waters and airspace (Kinfe, 1998: 10) is a case in point. Un- democratisation leading to forceful territorial claims are the major source of conflicts (Kinfe, 1998:10).

2.5.5 Terrorism as a source of conflict

The basic definition of Terrorism is a controversial since it has political motivation. One person's freedom fighter is anthers terrorist (Goldstien, 2001: 236). However, it is not a new phenomena in human experience and it has come as one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the aftermath of the cold war era (Kinfe, 2005). Terrorism, according to above authors in the premeditated use or threatened use of violence by an individual or group to gain a political or social objective, to demoralize

civilian population in order to use its discontent as leverage on national government or other parties to a conflict (Goldstien 2001: 236). Linda (2005: 498) also put it very succinctly, it may be used to publicize a cause, promote an ideology, achieve religious freedom, attain the release of a political prisoner or rebel against a government.

Terrorism however is characterized by the use of violence against civilians. With the expressed desire of causing terror or panic in the population are distinguished from other form of violent conflicts, which targeted state apparatus and the military (Kinf 2005). The tactics that these groups employ to secure recognitions of their social and political needs always rely on surprise, cunning and probing for vulnerability in the powerful (Clements www.cain.ulst.ac.uk). It employed a Variety of tactics, including assassinations, sky jacking, suicide bombings, armed attacks, kidnapping and hostage taking threats, and various forms of bombing (Linda 2005: 498).

Terrorism can also be international and local. The former type of terrorism involves international terrorist groups, which target foreign countries and their respective institutions, governments, or citizens (Linda 2005: 498). The Bombings of the premises of the Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania and the assassination attempt on the life of the Egyptian president in Addis Ababa are typical example of international terrorism attacks. Terrorism in the national political of countries is not clear whether it is source of conflict or a means of leverage to influence the incumbent government to yield to the demands of the groups engaged in such acts. Hence, the reluctance to engage with actors defined by one side as “terrorists or to address issues that motivate political violence threatens to increase intra state and global conflicts.

CHAPTER THREE

3. Patterns and Issues of Intra-State Conflict in the Horn of Africa.

The downfall of the cold war has ushered in a new phase international relation that is characterized by new forms of conflict. Whereas the cold war conflict was mainly between the West and the East, with devastating effects on the third world, the new era has seen the emergence of new and in some countries the intensification of intra-state conflicts which always have a potential to assume an international character. /Victor Shale, WW, Diplomacy.edu./

Africa in general and the Horn in particular has experienced more of this internal conflict than other parts of the world, resulting in the trend towards” Afro-pessimism”, the view that holds that Africa is doomed to remain in a state of ever increasing conflict, making development and democratization an impossibility, at least in the short term (Henderson-Wille, 2002). Okechukwu Emeh (<http://.globapolicy.org>) described the tumultuous situation of the continent as follows:

Despite the hopes and dreams brought by the end of the cold war and apartheid in Africa, the new era could as well be described as tumultuous time on the continent, capturing this development that seems like taking one step forward and two steps back are the enduring dilemma of political, social and economic crises in many African countries today. These crises include maladministration, political repression and instability, electoral fraud, virulent ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism, civil unrest, armed conflict, proliferation of illicit arms, violent crimes, economic crunch, famine, hungry, emerging and reemerging diseases/AIDS, Ebola, malaria, and tuberculosis environment degradation and underdevelopment.

In the Horn, the lines of confrontation are most often “drawn over issues of exclusion, identity, and the frustration of basic needs under condition of mis-development and the crumbling hold and legitimacy on an improvised state” (Anyadike, 2002). Anyadike (2002) also argued that conflict in Africa arise as a result of a global economic system

that keeps Africa locked into a cycle of poverty and domination, aggravating local conflict over power and wealth. Most African countries that have experienced violent/armed & conflicts are characterized by wide gap in power, and resource distribution, both vertically among different classes, and horizontally among people belonging to different religious ethnicities clans, races, regions (Nzoma, 2002).

This chapter is an account of the intra state conflict patterns in the Horn of Africa.

3.1. The Political and Economic Factors

3.1.1. Political Exclusion, Marginalization and Bad Governance

In the Horn region, colonial style polity based on domination of diverse national groups is a the counter of the problem and most of the countries of the region practiced dictatorial and exclusivist politics ensuring marginalization of the communities and national groups Worsened their poverty while at the sometime heightening the completion for the control of limited resources and thus violence and often in the struggle for power and influence / Seyoum, 2005: WWW.sidamaconcern.com). In most of the region, there are substantial segments of population fact are marginalized, excluded and discriminated against / Seyoum, 2005: WWW.sidamaconcern.com). The conflict pattern in most states of the Horn of Africa emanate from the political exclusion of the general public from governance and decision making processes which affect their daily life. Governments, more often are required to fulfill the basic needs of citizen. Which also entail the involvement of people in the activities of governance and decision making processes. The denial to involve the general public in these process disallow them access to their needs, while projecting government as self-centered rather than state centered institution, which in turn leads to agitation attempts to forcefully remove governments from power, that will result in conflicts between state and none state actors (ACMC 2006).

Basically marginality and social exclusion has its roots during the colonial era, however, much has not charged since then. As (Seyoum, 2005); puts the white root has always been the main cause of conflict in Africa. The European colonial powers have been playing a divisive rule which favors one ethnic group to the detriment of others. Such

negative experiences are still current and are the major causes of Africa's tragic history. Marginalizing is expressed mainly in depriving political rights which are the source of all sorts of socio-economic powers as Seyoum (2005: WWW.Sidamaconcern.com) asserted it clearly that political induced discrimination leads to discrimination in economic and social life.

As Kiefe (1998:15) explained succinctly, marginality and social exclusion is manifested in terms of denial of certain groups of the society from participating in the political decision making process which also affects key economic and social decisions. He also further stated that this involves the right to be heard through active participation in the democratic process and is true of most contemporary grievances in countries that have introduced the rudiments of democratization (Kiefe, 1998:15). Like the colonial system, neither participatory nor accountability has been passed on to local structure by post-independent governments as Fantu (2002:36-37) put in the following passage:

In response to the inherited institutional handicap, centralization of decision making become the preferred mode of economic and political management, greatly undermining the constitutional importance of court, legislatures and sub-regional government, thus, policies come to be determined solely by the concern with stability order and nation building rather than by conditions for development. Leaders believed themselves to be above the law, using political office to confer economic privileges on themselves and their supports.

According to Seyoum (2005:www.sidamaconcern.com) the central problem of post-independence of African countries is that in the Horn region, colonial style based on domination of diverse national groups is the center of the problems at one time or another, most of the countries of the region practiced dictatorial and exclusivist politics. The ensuring marginalization of communities and national groups worsened their poverty while at the same time heightening the competition for the control of limited resources and thus violence.

Hence rebellion groups fought against marginalization removed dictatorship in a score of countries include Somali and Ethiopia (Seyoum, 2005 www.sidamaconcern.com). however, the above arguments reveals that not with standing the recent shift in many African countries, democracy as an alternative to single party, personal and military rule, in Africa is still in profound trouble meaning strengthening the key multi party democratic institution and decentralization of decision making to the lower level have not taken root (Fantu, 2002: Seyoum, 2005 www.sidamaconcern.com).

The horn of Africa, especially the border area of these countries is inhabited by cattle reader's herders and account the largest grouping of pastoralist in the world. Sudan for instance, has highest percentage globally, Somali is third, and Ethiopia is fifth (ACMC, 2006). However, due to a number of reasons, the political powers are in the hands of settled agrarian societies which prejudiced the economic viability and political efficiency of pastoralist's society Thus pastoralists groups were relegated to marginal position alienated from the social, economic and political process of their respective countries. Hence, the argument forwarded by (Fantu, 2003:39) which states that "...if the territorial integral of many African countries to be preserved the prevailing gross economic and political disparities must be addressed" is applicable to all countries of the Horn allowing their cities to have a say in the economic, social and political processed of their respective countries.

3.1.1.1 Conflict Dynamics under the EPRDF led-Government in Ethiopia

Ethiopia is the key in the Horn in terms of its population size and history and had experienced major political, social and economic transformational as well as division in to two states since the down fall of the military regime in 1991. Hence what happened in Ethiopia has an all-too-direct bearing on the overall political, economic situations of the countries of the sub-region.

The perennial nature of conflicts could be explained by the nature of Ethiopia state, which is traditionally exclusionary and its system of dominating the large majority of the people is usually based on sheer firepower, hence they have class, ethnic, religious and

regional dimensions (Merera, 2002:117; Asnake, 2004:55). Seyoum , 2005 (www.sidamaconcern.com) ,also share the above idea in that in Ethiopia, the problem of nations and nationalities is so critically attributed to the rise of liberation movements including TPLF, EPLF, OLF, and ONLF. Centralization and consolidation of state power and alienation of the countries nations and nationalities were the major issues shaping the internal conflict patterns of (Kinfu, 2001:254)

In 1991, when the previous military regime collapsed, there were numerous armed fighter groups operating in the country with a wide range of political programs and due to this reason there were a number of speculations forwarded by different local and foreign analysts and politicians that Ethiopia would be married on to conflict along ethnic lines and replicate the chaos in Somali (Matsouka and John, 2001:54).

Be this as it may, however, the demise of the Mengistu regime in 1991 is considered as a turning point where the issue of nations and nationalities become the fundamental tenets which brought the present federal system in to existence. Ethiopian ethnic diversity, which immediately reflected in the Transitional period charter of 1991 and in subsequent proclamation and subsidiary laws, become the central principles of the new regime's policy (Abate, 2004:6). Asnake (2004:51) is of the opinion that the most important feature of the political changes in post 1991 Ethiopia is the recasting of the Ethiopia state through a model of ethno-linguistic regions and multi-party democracy.

The establishment of the regional states on the basis of ethno-linguistics criteria and the promulgation of the constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia in 1995 are the land marks which shape the contemporary political system of the country. The constitution stipulate in its Article 46(1) and (2) that the federal democratic Republic shall comprise of state and shall be delimited of the settlement patterns, languages identity and consent of the people concerned (Mesfin, 1999:157). However, the political changes that are closely associated with the re-constitution of Ethiopia state pose opportunities and challenges in the management of inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts in the country and greatly impacted the condition of peace and instability (Asnake,

2004:52). Asnake (2004:56) also goes on to saying that conflict over issue of ethnic identity and governance and control over administration structure and ethnic territories in multiple identity regional states are the two broad trends of ethnic conflicts in contemporary Ethiopia.

Although the new basis of reconstituting and reordering of the Ethiopia state, society and government is considered by the current government and its supporters are the sole panacea for the age old problem of the country and nothing short of it would heal the wounds of the past. However, it is adamantly opposed by two extreme powers, *interalia*, those forces of centralization which considered the prevailing political arrangement as divisive which ultimately disintegrate the country and those forces of fragmentation which demanded for further devolution and decentralization. According to former group federalism, while modeled on the basis of ethno-linguistic diversity, will trend to be anti-liberal and anti-majority, susceptible to conflicts and disintegration and undermine nation wide free movement of citizens. Further more, Minase (206:2) criticized the rate at which the issue of nation and nationalities is accommodated in the constitution of the federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The new federal arrangement is prone to critique because it not only follows an ethno-linguistic line for state formation but also in the sense that it allows the right to self determination including secession (Abate, 2004:6-7).

The argument forwarded by the above authors is that designing federalism on the basic of ethno-linguistic is also noted as a factor that could cultivate ethnic strife, increased separatist tendencies and even triggered armed conflict between and among the various ethnic groups of the country. This is exactly in line with what D. Elazar claims that in the federalism consent should be the basic of division and sharing power no “language, religious or national myth” Abate (2004:13). Merera (2004:256) also criticized this innovation by the EPRDF regime that it neither met the demand of the hitherto marginalized groups nor neutralized the old dominate group.

In challenging the argument of the above group, Kifle (2001:477) has put the source of this discontent that...although the democratic process at large seems to have gone a long way in providing regional and national profile to many neglected nations it is resented by some because it has removed the old basis of legitimacy and introduced a new set of criteria of power sharing (ellipses mine).

The conflict nature of the contemporary political arrangement of the country can be generally categorized as follows:

3. Conflict over governance between the different political parties between and among the parties in the system and those which are, because of variety of reason.
4. Conflicts between the various ethnic groups that are related to the new federal arrangement and exacerbated by the conflict stated above in number one.

With regards to the issue over governance, the marginalization of the major contending forces from the June of 1992 conference and the transitional period are considered by many critics as the genesis of the problem. In line with this argument, Mararra (2004:250) succinctly sums up that the EPRDF leaders were keen on the consolidation of their hard-won victory and thus made sure to invite selective weak parties most of which were created overnight and selectively excluded the actual or potential real power contenders from the process.

Political parties which have attended the June conference such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) did not even manage to participate in the first national election conducted in 1995. The inability of the OLF, which is considered by many Oromo elites as bona-fide and legitimate freedom fighter of the Oromo people, to work with EPRDF and its subsequent withdrawal from the Transitional government of Ethiopia (TGE) had triggered another cycle of conflict in the country (Matsuoemka and John, 2001:52). The OLF charges that the Oromos in general and its supporters in particular were being subjected to human rights abuses including assassinations, and that the TGE was merely continuing Abyssinian hegemony with Tigrayan's now replacing the Amharas (Matsuoka and Sorenson, 2001:52).

The prevailing federal system is also characterized by a number of ethnic conflicts various sporadic intra-ethnic conflicts have been observed during the post 17 years in the Somali, Oromo, afar and SNNPRs regions. These were mainly as a result of ethnic conflicts and tensions related to inter-ethnic rivalried and conflicts in multiple identity, regional states tension in majority-minority relations and problem relating to delineation or regional boundaries (Asnake, 2004:55). ...analysis of inter-ethnic conflict in made in the subsequent section.

The May 2005 national and regional election was also another chapter in the political history of Ethiopia that needs through understanding and analysis. It was a turning points in that all legal resisted political (parties were given ample opportunities to air their programs via public mass media and organized peaceful demonstration all over the country. Voter's turnout was also the largest in the history of the country. However, the episodes of the aftermath of election have played each a destabilizing effect and triggered the politics of ethnic hatred and which finally tarnished the country's image. The incumbent government and the major contending political parties mainly the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and the Union for Ethiopian democratic Forces (UEDF) could not agree on the result of the election. The opposition political party accused the government for mainly manipulating the results of the election and this resulted in the death of hundreds of innocent civilians and damage of public property. This is the most important conflict dynamic characterizing the political landscape of the country.

In sum, the adoption of a federal arrangement and multi-party political system in Ethiopia are very crucial in reversing the spiral of decline and further disintegration of the country. Considering the complexity of resolving the long standing conflicts and enormity of task required to build sustainable peace in the country, the efforts exerted to maintain nation wide peace, security, law and order sound to be bolstered. The prevailing peace and economic liberalization has changed Ethiopia beyond imagination. Ethiopia; through still one of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa, is one of the fast growing none-oil economies. However, much has remained to be done in concretizing and consolidating

the above achievement. The process of democratization and ensuring suitable and the economic growth through out the country coupled with the introduction and further consolidation of more inclusive and participatory and democratic politics well-suited to the socio- economic and political setting of the country are very crucial in resolving the long standing problems of the country. The government is required to take impressive and fundamental political that can confidence measures the confidence and enhance the participation of the opposition political and marginalized groups on the democratization process. The government should also take fundamental measures meant to ensure transparency and accountability and impartial democratic institution, effective political parties with broader constitution and alternative policy form are very important in completing the various cycle needed to build a fully fledged democratic order. If this is done, Ethiopia would be able to come through with a credible democratic order, which could have a far reaching positive implication in resolving the long standing conflicts of the country (Kinfu 2001:477).

Ethiopia is the core country in the sub-region in terms of its geo-political and socio-economic setting as hinted some where else in the section. Its central position, and a population far out weighting those of its neighbors, makes Ethiopia is indisputably the core state in the Horn (Clapham, 2007:71). What is happening in Ethiopia will have an all-to-direct bearing in influencing the conflict patterns of the Horn of Africa negatively or positively. The prevailing situation of the country would affect the sub-region positively and negatively. As a result of the prevailing peace and security in Ethiopia, the country is becoming a factor for peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. To ensure peace and stability in the sub-regional level, Ethiopia is working at bi-lateral and multi-lateral level through IGAD and AU.

3.1.1.2 State Collapse and Complex Political Emergency in Somalia

Unlike Ethiopia and the other countries which experienced the political processes, the ouster of the Barre regime in Somalia was followed not by a replacement of government but by a prolonged period of violent anarchy and warfare (World Bank report 205:11). The dynamics underlying the collapse of the Somalia state in to conflict can be traced

back, according to Bayne (2001:6) to the process of independence, subsequent social, economic and political developments, and Somalia's relationships with the two super power, the USSR and the USA, during the cold war era.

As a result the demise of the Siyad Barre regime in 1990 threw the country into anarchy. As Seyoum (2005:www.sidamacocnern.com) put it, profound insecurity, violence, inter-clan warfare, cross boarder military engagement with neighboring states and frequent natural calamities which continued to claim the lives have been characterizing the potclial land escape of the country, consequently, hundreds of thousands of Somalia are dispersed through out the world as refugees. This complex emergency situation eventually promoted a UN peaces enforcement operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1993-1995 (Menkhaus, 2000:www.relifweb.int).

Analyzing the Somalia case, Maria Nzoma, (200) also argues that mis-governance has been the root cause of the conflict that has prevailed in Somalia both before and since the 1991 episode. Nzoma (2002) reasserted by saying:

During the brutal and authoritarian regime of Mohammed Siyad Barre that continued for 21 years, the fabric of the society was slowly and meticulously dismantled. Siyad Barre's manipulation of clans had created atmosphere of mis-trust and hostility that gradually weakened both the traditional and the national institutions. So when the government collapses in January 1991, the institutions were not solid enough to prevent the whole country form disintegrating. In this regard Somalia existed as a state only from 1960-1991, when the last military regime was ousted and the country disintegrated into fiefdoms, controlled by rival factions led by predatory war lords. The prevailing situation henceforth has been a Hobbesian night mare, where there is neither rule of low nor institution to regulate relations and protect the most vulnerable from the most vicious.

According to Marchal (2004:115) the social structure and organizations in the country, including the low-level of urbanization also attributed the prevailing stalemate in Somali is the result of Said Bare hostile policy to any public political assertion of Islamic agenda. Marchal (2004:115) further pushed his argument that the current development of Somali is the result of a number of factors *inter alia*, the development of Islamic charitable activities and the subsequent influence in the social realm of the urban dwellers, the development of business activities in an extra-ordinary way despite the fact that the country is in a state of civil war for more than 15 years and due to other factors which occurred in parallel with the development of political Islam.

The legacy of deep clan division, poor governance and myopic political leadership continues to haunt the country and prevent the formation of government of national unity and Somali is divided into three Separate regions which followed different trajectories since 1991 (Menkhual, 2005:19). This problem is further compounded by the impotency of the Transitional National Government (TNG) established by the Arta Peace conference in 2000 despite the hope of many Somalis (Marchal, 2004:137). The architects of the Somalia National Peace Conference (SNPC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on development to be based on representation of Somali's civil society. It was, therefore, organized on the basis of clan, with an agreed up on formula for numerical representation by clan (Daarood, 175; Hawiye, 175 Digle Milifle 175; Dir 205 [of which 100 were Isaaq] and minorities 90 (Menkhaus, 2003). This conference as its predecessors was also not inclusive of all the warring factions and since it is structured by few groups who are friends of the late Djiboutian president, Hassen Guled Aptidon, was destined to fail (Marchal, 2004:137) key actors, including punt land, Somalia land and a number of militia leaders in the Mogadishu area were not brought into the talks ensuring large collection of rejectionists at the outset (World Bank report, 2005). As a result, the Abdiqasim administration miserably failed to measurably improve the political and economic situations of the country and posed a daunting challenge to the government. Shortly, it was challenged by a significant bloc of clans, regions, and militia which the administration will either have to co-opt or defeat (Menkhaus, 2003).

The current Transitional Federal Government was established in 2004 in exile in Kenya after numerous and long negotiated peace deals sponsored by various actors in the region and beyond. However, the envisaged peace and instability could not be materialized because of the weakness of the TFG to assert power all over the country as it is challenged by other faction leaders especially by the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) which controlled the south-central; Somalia including the capital Mogadishu. The UIC which sought to set up a state based Sharia law is believed to be an agent of international terrorist groups like al Qaeda and al Itihaad al Islammiya and backed by a number of countries notably Eritrea (Menkhaus, 2003).

The intervention by Ethiopia to support the internationally backed TFG may be sound in the sense that this will reinforce the position of the government to exercise the monopoly of power all over the country and neutralize elements of the UIC declared Jihad on Ethiopia. However, concerned effort must be exerted to replace the Ethiopian forces by an international peacekeeping force, since the people of Somalia may not tolerate the existence of Ethiopian troops in their soil any longer.

3.1.1.3 The Sudan after the 1989 Events

The Sudan is the largest and one of the core countries in the Horn of Africa. The conflict in the Sudan which started immediately after its independence in 1956 has been the most important security challenges faced by the Horn of Africa nearly for five decades until the signing of the final Naivasha agreement of May 26, 2004 and January 10, 2005 (Kinfu, 2006: www.addis-epiidp.org). According to Woodward (1999: www.addis-epiidp.org) and Seyoum (www.sidamacocnern.com), the core-periphery relations have always been central to its armed conflicts which apparently is linked to religious, racial and ethnic differences, as well as to socio-economic divisions which resulted not only on in years of civil war, mainly in the south, but also declining the socio-economic conditions for the major of the population of over two decades with mounting dangers of state collapse, and also the possibility of that, like Ethiopia and Somalia, Sudan will be and those of Southerners to a government centered in Khartoum were entrenched during the time of the Anglo Egyptian condominium (1949-1955).

The major genesis of the conflict has been attributed to the undemocratic governance of the Northern imposed up on the southern and other non-Arab and non-Muslim population of the country, *inter alia*:

...Both during and after colonial rule, Southerners have been underrepresented in terms of parliamentary membership and occupation of strategic government positions. Northerners were given more education opportunity and were made to occupy the lower government ranks during the colonial period. Though the northerners needed the alliance with the southern Sudanese in the struggle against British colonialism, when independence was achieved the alliance became outdated and the representation of southerners in constitutional became merely a decoration. Moreover, the government in Khartoum made it clear that it would suppress any attempt by Southerners that would threaten the country's unity" (DMPF/OSSREA, 2000 in Maria Nzoma, 2002).

Due to these problems the marginalized societies especially the Southerners have demanding for more autonomy from some type of federal arrangement to full independence form early days of independence onwards. To end this conflict, various reconciliation and mediation efforts has been made by various countries; international and regional organizations. Among them, the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was noted as somewhat glorious as it could bore fruit for more than a decade until it was annulled by President Nimeiry in 1983. This, in fact, was followed by another cycle of conflict escalated due to the joining of the forces between Anya Anya II and the group led by Colonel John Garang in 1983 (Kinfе, 2006:www.addis-eiipd.org). Nimeiri introduced the Islamic law "Sharia" to be applied al over the country including on the Christian and Aminist Southerners. As a result, the conflict escalated and reached its climax in the late 1980's which resulted in the death of millions due to the violence and resultant famine. In 1989 the coup that brought General al-Basjir and Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi and Islamizaitition of the country had dragged the problem from bad to worst.

In describing the political landscape of the period, the French Newspaper Le Monde in an article entitled “OIL, ISLAM, CHINESE, WEAPONS AND AMERICAN MONEY” on the prospect it held for the Sudan observed that the positions of the two sides are incompatible. The first thing that separates them in Sharia (Islamic law), the ideological distinction of the Islamic regime in Khartoum that has been in power since 1989. If a federal-style constitutional proposal is adopted, the SPLM/A wants the capital to be neutral. But as far as the Islamic regime is concerned, Khartoum is the capital of the north and is therefore Muslim.

Knife (<http://www.addis-epiid.org>) further asserts that the issue of self-determination, the establishment of secular government and the demand that the capital should also be secular were questions that were pregnant with implication however, such compromises were unthinkable for the Northern elites and their alliance during this time and “federalism” itself was frowned upon by some in the North since it could lead to similar demands from the minorities regions of the north, such as Darfur and thereby to the Balkanization of Sudan (Houlihan, 2006:17). As a result key situations emerged in the first months after the 1989 coup complicating the internal political disturbance of the country (Alex de Wall, 2004:183). As a result, series of meetings and negotiations under the auspices of IGAD failed to produce concrete outcomes (Seyoum, 2005: www.sidamacocnern.com). However, it is only during the signing of the IGAD brokered agreement on the Declaration of Principle (DOP) in May 1994 that the future status through an internationally supervised referendum was affirmed (Kinfe, 2006:www.addis-eiipd.org). The DOP underscored on the establishment of a secular and democratic state recognizing that Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society (Kinfe, 2006:www.addis-eiip.org).

However, the Darfurian conflict which flared into a full scale armed conflict and considerably weakening the optimistic prospects of the comprehensive peace accord signed between the Khartoum government and the Southern People Liberation Movement/Army/(SPLM/A), has precipitated a major political and humanitarian crisis (Houlihan, 2006:17). In a similar manner Kinfe (2006:www.addis-eiipd.org) has

forwarded that although the signing of the final protocols at Navisha provided the long waited silver lining on the lengthy Sudan civil war its optimistic prospects were considerably diluted by the new crisis in Darfur which has precipitated a major political and humanitarian crisis.

The signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is a landmark in the determining the final fate of the country as Luka Biong Deng (2005:244) put in the following excerpt:

The CPA is one of the rare achievements not only in the Sudan but indeed in Africa as it offers a unique resolution of one of the most complicated and protracted civil wars in Africa. It offers a unique mechanism for resolving issues of religious diversity and setting a new basis for national unity based on the free will of the people. The organic and external guarantees provided for its implementation clearly show that it would extremely be difficult for any part of the CPA to dishonor or abrogate it and if it happened it will be tantamount to constitutional disorder with dire repercussion for the unity of the Sudan. Muslims, Arab extremists and terrorist elements in the Sudan and the impact of the ultimately death of Dr John Garange are likely to work against the full implementation of the CPA.

However, many political critique commented that the peace agreement which is farmed by the polarity of North-South dichotomy can not be sustained in the long run if all the Sudanese political forces are not somewhat incorporated (Houlihan, 2002:18). This argument is also further reinforced by Nikolai Hutchinson, Christian Aid Sudan, in his report “The Sudan Peace Process and future EU Priorities” as follows:

A peace agreement in Sudan will likely be signed some time soon. However, the on-going conflict and gross human rights violations in Western Sudan point to the fragility of the current peace process. The conflict in Sudan is not simply a North-South issue, but rather one of center over periphery, a crisis of governance and exclusion of the diverse people of Sudan in determining their own development. Despite the on-

going peace process, to date there has been insufficient emphasis by all actors on expanding space for political parties, the independent media and civil society.

In order to reach on a lasting peace, the political forces from all over the country which were excluded from the very beginning of the negotiation and were [also] denied any important role in the transition shall allow re-entering to the political arena of the country (El-Affendi, 2007:82). With regard to this Kinfe (2006:ww.addis-eiipd.org) reasserted that there could have been no progress without the SPLM/A and the Khartoum government making the necessary compromises and they were made as a result of a close assessment of their won particular interest.

The tragic crisis in Darfu is an illustration of what could happened when important constituencies feel excluded from a peace deal: it no longer becomes a peace deal, but a recipe for ear (El-Affendi, 2007:82). This and other conflicts in the country should be give due attention. Considering the problem in the Sudan as North-South dichotomy will not yield the intended result and will definitely affect negatively the implementation of CPA. It is estimated that this five-years-old Darfurian conflict has left millions dead and others forced flee from their homes in western Sudan. To end this violent conflict 9,000 UN peacekeeping mission out of the 26,000 are already in place. However, this is very minimal compared to the enormity of the task and the government in Khartoum should refrain itself from “the foot peacekeeping put in succinctly. The Government of the Sudan is required the conduct intensive public relations campaign in order to feminize the sprit and intensions of the CPA among the Northerners and contain forces such as the Legal Association of the Muslim Scholars that work against the implementation of the peace accord (Deng, 2005:254).

To conclude, five years have already elapsed since the CPA was signed. The signing of this agreement, although initially overshadowed by the death of John Garang, has given, no doubt, peace a chance to pay its dividend. The power-sharing schemes and the efforts that the being undertaking to reconstruct the war-torn south are encouraging. However,

much if expected from the parties to the agreement to subscribe to the terms and condition of the agreement and to do everything possible to continue with the momentum of the agreement to end the misery of the people of the Sudan. Building more effective and inclusive peace processes, nurturing democratic institutions, protecting human rights and promoting equitable economic development as part and parcel of a broader conflict resolution strategy should be taken as a building blocks.

3.1.2 Natural Resources and Unequal Access to Wealth

Politics and economics are inseparable and the inequitable distribution of wealth has serious repercussion in determining the political stability in any society (Oduniga, 1999:46). Contemporary literatures on the natural resources nexus conflict reflected that there is string correlation between natural resources and conflict with the end of the cold war.

The classical model of the relationship between natural resources and conflict focuses on the scare natural resource, however, more recently research have come to view an abundance resources such as oil has an equal, if not more, important factor because it provides economic opportunity for the contending parties (Petter, 2004:16). Natural resources make conflict inevitably in two ways: they highlighted other divisive factors in societies in rivalry over access to these resources, and most important they provide economic leverage to contending parties. Natural resources, according to Le Billion (2004:349) turned into an important source of rebel funding; indeed, there is strong evidence that longstanding rebel groups in Angola and Cambodia began to rely on resource-looting after the end of the Cold War caused them to lose their superpower funding. Obi (2007:14) is also of the view that the scramble for and exploitation of Africa's resource has been intensified as Africa is integrated to the rapidly globalizing world. As a result several long running civil wars in mineral-dependent states-like those in Sudan seemed to grow seriously in the 190s (Ross, 2004:349).

It should be clearly note, however, that the mere existence of resources alone do not cause conflict and it is the way (s) in which they are constructed, transformed (produced),

distributed and mediated through market and power relations by certain interests that lead to conflict (Patey, 2007:14). Patey (2007:14) further argues that the resource curse hypothesis does not adequately capture the histories, contradictions and various interest and processes at work in Africa's complex conflict as the resource may be a cure for those that lose their land, homes and rights for resources extraction to take place, it is a blessing for those extractive external force and their local allies.

In view of the above assertions, this researcher would be analyzing how scarce resources such as land, grazing areas and water points are shaping the conflict dynamics in the Horn and on the other hand the resource curses thesis is applicable in the case of resources abundance in the Sudan.

3.1.2.1 The oil-conflict Nexus in the Sudan

African countries endowed with and solely dependent on oil and other strategic mineral resources, as the experiences of Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nigeria clearly shown so far are more likely to have experienced conflicts of varies intensity than the other resource-poor countries. This is linked to the discourse that oil development has been largely framed around the 'resources curse thesis', which posits that oil wealth fuels state corruption, profligacy, social crises and violence civil conflict (Obi, 2007:8). Sudan, which only started exporting oil in 1999, is the third largest oil producer in sub-Saharan africa only surpassed by Nigeria and Angola which have the production capacity at 2.58 million b/d and 1.24 million b/d respectively (www.bp.com:2006:16). Although the genesis of the conflict in the Sudan pre-date the discover of oil, close attention is paid as source of wealth and power, and an object of possible conflict (Obi, 2007:7). The discovery of this strategic resource in the South, which had been in the state of civil war since independence, has brought new dimension and further complicated the conflict. Obi (2007:9) in his report title "Oil and Development in Africa: Some lessons from the oil factor in Niger for the Sudan" compares the experience of Africa's largest oil producer, Nigeria, with Sudan and the role oil has played in conflict, post-conflict reconstruction and national unity in both countries,. He further underlines that oil by self is no the cause of violence or corruption,

but rather these is mainly attributed to the politicization fo the oil factor that result in the revenues earned from the oil production becoming the excusive rewards of a mere fraction of the population (Obi, 2007:7).

In line with the forgoing argument the discovery of significant oil reserves especially in the south and resultant production in 1999 has reshaped Sudan's civil war (Wal Dunay, 1998:20). Lee J.M Seymour (2001) also observed the real important of the oil sector in the content of the Sudan's protracted conflict as follows:

Oil has been transformed the basic parameters of north-south violence since the potential for oil development entered political calculations in the mid 1970s and with the onset of large-scale production over the past three years, the soil rent has created new structure of profit, power and political control that have reshaped the capabilities of, and incentives for, key actors in the conflict.

Hence, no enduring settlement to Sudan's war can be achieved unless the oil dimension is effectively addressed (Wal Dunay, 1998:20). Kok (1992:110) .also explained the intimacy between conflict and the issue of oil in the Sudan as follows:

There can no fair oil revenue sharing formula in the Sudan without a prior power-sharing scheme among the relevant group/regions in the country. Oil is power, and neither it nor any other sources of wealth and power can be fairly shared in the Sudan without first putting in place a fair system of power sharing.

As argued above oil have become the most important bone of contention between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and its rival the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Cognizant of this fact the issue of oil have become of the stumbling-block of the peace deal. The peace process has addressed the oil issue in order to resolve a major cause of conflict and to serve as the basis for a just peace.

The multinational oil companies and foreign investors involved in the oil business in the Sudan need to recognize that Sudan's potential oil fields could be developed to the interest of the country and the companies if and only if there is peace and stability than in the current state of affairs and refrain from any act that would jeopardize the current peace process. In line with the above argument, Obi (2007:35) clearly showed in the following excerpt how the issue of oil is instrumental in facilitating the full implementation of the CPA and sustaining the country integration, if it harnessed in the interest of the parties to the conflict. In the absence of genuine and holistic approach it would definitely jeopardize the peace process and pose serious challenge to the country's national unity.

...oil can act as a basis for national unity where a national class is fundamental to the accumulation process. However, it can paradoxically be the basis for disunity and separatisms, where the fairness of the hegemonic project of national unity in a multi-ethnic context is bitterly contested by those who feel that they have been sidelined or cheated.

Every effort must exert to reverse the paradoxical effect of the oil stated above. Oil revenue should contribute positively to the peace building and post-reconstruction and development of the country. Both parties need to develop and acquire the political will and managerial capabilities required to manage effectively and efficiently this resource in the interest of the entire people of the Sudan. There must also be the willingness and commitment to take into account, as a wider framework, the interest of other forces of the country which are not parties to the CPA.

3.1.2.2 Other Natural Resources

One of the greatest challenges for peace and security in the Horn of Africa has been and will remain to be the question of sharing of resource that are within the jurisdiction of a state and that also are trans-boundary in nature. Natural resources by their nature may not cause conflict, but they may prolong it and often central to the political economy of war.

All the pastoral areas of the region; from the Sudan across to the horn of Africa, including Somali and Ethiopia, down to the Northern Frontier regions of Uganda and Kenya are in turmoil (Muhereza, nd). Hence, competition among ethnic and clan groups over access to and control of scarce natural resource leads to conflict in the Horn Africa.

The main natural resources such as livestock, cash crops, charcoal, marine resources, frankincense and potential oil and mineral reserves are the key conflict drivers in Somalia (World Bank, Report, 2005). This is mainly true in all the relatively resources rich (South- central) and resource-scarce (Somaliland and Punt land) regions where there are recurrent clashes among and within pastoral, semi-pastoral and agriculture clan groups for access to and control of land for crop cultivation, animal grazing and use of water points (World Bank, Report, 2005). However, the absence of any legally recognized authority and lack of regulating mechanism have increased the use of force to settle dispute over resources sharing and management of common resources (World Bank Report, 2005).

The crisis in the Durfur also revolves around the issue of resource and is largely caused by the consequence of scarce resource (Knife, 2006) and also compounded by problem related to environmental calamity, political opportunism and regional politics. The Arab Militia known as Janjaniweed and the SPLA as well as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) being the major actors in the conflict, western powers have also been accused of covertly exacerbating tension to counter recent Chinese-Sudanese oil cooperation, and deter further oil deals by China in the region (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia).

The movement of nomadic people, with out respecting the national boundaries of both countries, back and forth from both sides of the border between Ethiopia and Kenya in search of water and grazing has been the major sources of inter-ethnic strife. Although these conflicts did not involve the governments of both countries directly, they has been sources of instability.

Other resources such as grazing areas and water regimes, not to mention the issue of the Nile and other trans-boundary rivers, are also sources of conflict in the sub-Oregion. The Afar and the Issa ethnic groups, despite their age-old of neighborhood and cultural affinities, they have had experienced continuous violent and non violent conflicts over the use of various natural resources. This problem is vividly observed during times of drought resulting in the frequent violent confrontation as both ethnic groups are forced to go beyond one's won territory in search of available grazing and water for their herds (Tadesse and Yohas, 12).

The awash, as the only water resource in the area, bisects the two major ethnic groups in eastern Ethiopia. However, due to the fact that both ethnic groups are pastoralists and the area is highly arid, they need the Awash River badly. However, since there is no effective government body or law in the area to distribute the water equitably, the conflict still persists.

The conflict between Bume and Surma in the Omo valley is also worth of discussing. These two ethnic groups are also living in Ethiopia but in the south. The mostly violent conflict between them due to pastoral land between them and also due to the need for the use of the Omo River has been a regular phenomenon in the area. Thus, the relation between the two ethnics has been severally affected, especially in the past ten or twenty years, to the extent that no one member of either of the ethnic groups can travel in the other's territory.

Devastating conflict of the same nature was [also] witnessed between Anyuak and the Nuer in Gambella in 1992/93 caused by the dispute relating to agricultural and pastoral land, fishing and last but not least the quest for power at a regional level (Seyoum and Heran, 2004:34). The conflict between the Anuak and Nuer is traditionally attributed to the incompatibility nature of the Nuer and the Anuak's strong emotional ties with their land, particularly the Nuer'sn crucxla search for grazing land and drinking water in territories belonging to the Anuak (Medhane, n.d). However, the genesis of the conflict goes beyond the incompatible livelihoods and it is the result of interplay of various

internal and external factors and its regional dimension is also very critical in shaping the conflict dynamism of the sub-region.

In general, natural resources can significantly influence conflict dynamics, and they can be both a factor, among others, contributing to the outbreak of violent conflicts as well as a reason for prolonging them. The conflicts related to natural resources are not confined to the national boundaries of the states of the region. They have spill over effects as resources endowments are uneven and as some of the resource are shared by two or more states. Moreover, this is also complicated by the movement of the settlers in search of water and grazing lands fro their animals which usually ended in bloody inter-ethnic strives the discovery of oil deposits in the Somali part of Ethiopia and Gambella is complicating the already delicate situations and is shaping the conflict dynamics in these areas. The bloody massacre of the Chinese and Ethiopians is a clearly testimony how the discovery of such resources have been influencing the peace and security of the region.

3.1.3 Poverty

Poverty brings about instability and insecurity, which breed underdevelopment. The reverse is also true. Democracy must deliver on the bread and butter issue; otherwise the continent could slide back into situations where the politics of poverty gives rise to the poverty of politics.

The issue pertaining to the relations between poverty and conflict is debatable. Some consider theta poverty causes conflict, while others argue that only the reverse is true. For instance, Draman (2003:5) is of the opinion that poverty is both a cause and a consequence of conflict and they become the biggest challenges to sustainable development with the end of the Cold War. The relationship between poverty and conflict is similar to that of the relationships between the egg and hen. They are closely related as both bear in mind images of destitutions, suffering of human being and destruction of public property and natural resources (Revstegenh, 7:2001).

According to Kaplan (1994:www.theatlantic.com), Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy, overpopulation, resources scarcity and the increasing erosion of nation-states are all emerging as real “strategic: dangers not only to the region but the world community as a whole.

This lack of opportunities can intensify the sense of grievance among social groups suffering discrimination, when opportunities are scarce; discrimination can take away any hope of finding employment. One of the serious problems of the countries of the Horn is the problem of unemployment which exacerbated urban insecurity. This is because of the sentiment that it is always better to be a king in a jangle than a deprived and malnourished messenger in the slums and shanty cities and towns of Africa. Illiterate gunmen, according to World Bank Report, saw war, plunder and extortion as their only livelihood in Somalia, hence, this is a clear manifestation of the idea put by Aristotle “*poverty is the parent of revolution and crime*”.

Poverty is fundamental in shaping the dynamics of conflict in the Horn of Africa. Abject poverty and recurrent economic downturns have been undermining the legitimacy of successive governments in the Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Sudan and currently in Eritrea. It appears to be both a cause and a consequence of conflict which provided legitimate ground for violence and is clearly a significant factor which needs to be addressed as it yields a double dividend by simultaneously addressing security considerations and development concerns. Various opposition political parties and armed guerrilla fighters have managed to mobilize the urban unemployed and rural support around the issue of social exclusion and poverty. The pre-1991 period is a classical example in explaining how the various guerrilla fighters have managed to mobilize the rural population against the military governments in Ethiopia and Somalia. The same is also true in the case of the Sudan. The prevailing strong resentment and resultant resistance to the Ethiopian government by the unemployed youth are also the result of the governments’ failure to address the problem of unemployment in urban areas. In Sudan, for instance, the acute poverty of the south compared with the North, as well as the feeling that the Northern

contributed to the outbreak of conflict in 1983 (Cospon, 1991). The deplorable unemployment situation is also believed to have been contributing immensely to civil strife in Somalia, with the existence of thousands upon thousands of illiterate young men who have no marketable skill whatsoever and who use their guns as the only means of livelihood (Yahye, 2007).

3.1.4 External Intervention and the proliferation of Small Arms

3.1.4.1 External Interventions

The complexity of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa can not only be attributed to the intra-state forces at work; it also involves internal and external actors which have a stake in the region. As a result the internal political dynamism of these states and the sub-region has been distorted heavily. For example, the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments, which are at loggerheads since 1998, have also joined in the list of foreign governments accused of involving in the current Somali conflict as it is asserted by Lyons (www.icar.gmu.edu) as follows:

The border stalemate and the underlying problems of authoritarian political processes and fragile governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea are inherently linked to larger conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have demonstrated the capacity and willingness to use proxy forces to undermine the other. Armed insurgent groups such as the OLF, the ONLF and the EPPF have had offices in Asmara. Eritrea has provided sanctuary and military assistance to these groups and has sought to infiltrate fighters into Ethiopia through Sudan and more importantly, Somalia. The Ethiopian government attributed a series of 2006 bomb blasts against civilian targets in Addis Ababa and other cities to explosives provided by Eritrea. By the same token, Ethiopia has supported fragments of the Eritrean Liberation Front, the Eritrean National Alliance and other armed opposition movements intervention by proxy has been a less risky form of conflict than direct military action but is likely to escalate unless the underlying issues are resolved.

The boundary disagreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has escalating swiftly the domestic political crisis in Somalia. Ethiopia has sent its forces into Somali to assist the TFG and crush remnant of the UIC. Consistent with a deeply ingrained pattern of supporting the enemy of one's enemy, Eritrea has provided armaments to a wide range of anti-Ethiopian forces operating from Somalia, hoping to anti-Ethiopian forces down in the Ogaden, a region of Ethiopia predominantly inhabited by ethnic Somalis and Muslims (www.icar.gmu.edu). According to Mehari (the Report, 2006) involvement of the Eritrean government stems from the belief that such threat of regional war and domestic instability in Ethiopia would pressure the international community to force Ethiopia to accept the border decision.

Hence, Somalia is being used as a battle ground of these two rival and militarily powerful states. As a result, efforts deployed so far to reinstitute the Somalia state have been delayed and the sub-region would be bogged down onto another cycle of deadly conflict. The Eritrea government is considered by sate of the region and beyond as a primarily source of instability and is blamed of providing covert and over assistant to the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and extending support to the SPLM/A and working very closely with the UIC Mehari (the Report, 2006).

Ethiopia and Djibouti are endeavoring to build stable democratic institutions in the Horn, but Eritrea was "the tragic exception of this picture" testified assistance Secretary of State for Africa Jandayi Frezer before the Foreign Relation Committee of the Senate of the united State of Africa. She went on to say that President Isais Afewerki is sponsoring instability in Ethiopia, Darfur and Somalia and is undermining UN peacekeeping operations (the Reporteds, March 15, 2008:11). The assistance secretary also condemned the Eritrean government for its wide spreading strategy of fomenting instability throughout the Horn of Africa ands the domestic human right situation in Eritrea still deplorable appalling and is progressively deteriorating (the Report, March 15, 2008:11). Eritrea is not the only supported of the Islamist opposition, however, assistance flowed

from multiple sources including the Somali Diaspora, state and private interests in the gulf countries, and Al Qaeda affiliated organizations (Bendana, www.janconsulting.com) . The Gulf state “Qatar: is also one of the external actors believed to be actively involved in the conflict of the sub-region. A statement released by the foreign Ministry of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) indicated that “all those who are prepared to stir up instability in Ethiopia and undermine the country’s security have been given support and encouragement by “Qatar”. The same statement further stated that “this has gone beyond Qatar’s strong ties with Eritrea; it has indeed provided direct and indirect assistance to terrorist organizations in Somali and other areas and has been one of the most important supporters of terrorism and extremisms in our region (The Capital, April 28, 2008). This is a clear indication that allegations of extra continental involvement in the conflict of the sub-region have also been the order of the day. Hence, according to report of the World Bank (2005:37), the developments in Somalia need to be understood within the boarder context of the region wherein Somali is often the battleground for divisions between its Africa and Arab neighbors where incompatible regional interests have been critical in delaying national reconciliation and a political resolution to Somalia’s problem.

There are wide spread reports coming from different sources that the connection between Al Qaeda network and al-Shababa terrorist leader operating in Somali, blaming al-Shababa for various terrorist attacks in the region and nothing that the group operates with the Eritrea support and as a result of this Ethiopia is facing serious security challenge mainly from the Somalia region such as the massacre of 70 Chine and Ethiopian working for Chinese Oil company the engagement of the US in support of Ethiopia as well as direct financial assistance and capacity building to the security institution of the TFG has also increased as Somalia increasingly became seen as the newest front in the “war on Terror” (Bandana, www.jan-consulting.com).

In sum, external involvements, either from international organizations or foreign powers, so far have been influencing the evolution of the Somali negatively countries which are supporting clan’s leaders who are sympathetic to their strategic interest are impacting

negatively and delaying the political reconciliation and subsequent reinstating of the Somali state. The proxy war between Eritrea and Ethiopia; and covert and overt involvement of the states of the region is responsible for the failure of the successive governments that took power after 1991 in Somalia. International actors such as the UN and EU are not also practicing what they used to preach in the case of Somalia. Regional organizations such as the AU and IGAD are also severely constrained by lack of requisite resources and capabilities. Hence, Somalia is a living testimony where external intervention has been failed utterly and the issue of peace and stability is still a nightmare (www.icar.gmu.edu).

The problem in the Sudan is also exacerbated by the involvement of state and non-state actors which are internal and external to the Horn. Hence, the competition extends to Sudan, with Eritrea helping rebels in both eastern Sudan and Darfur, and Ethiopia and Eritrea bidding for Khartoum's support. In this connection, Lyons (www.icar.gmu.edu) mentioned the following:

This gives the regime in Khartoum added leverage at a time when the united States is pressing it for action in Darfur and for better implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the north-south conflict in Sudan. These surrogate wars add another layer to the Ethiopia -Eritrea conflict by creating opportunities for escalation, even while the direct border confrontation is in stalemate.

The Eritrean and Chadian governments are accused by the GoS for fuelling the conflict in the Darfur by supporting to JEM and other rebel groups. Eritrea has militarily, logistically and politically assisted the Darfur gunmen in its continuing attempt to destabilize Sudan (Hoile, 2005:24-25). The agreement signed in Asmara between Darfur gunmen and the Beja congress, an armed anti-government groups based in Eritrea is cases in point which clearly testify the above assertion. It is widely believed that the Darfur insurgents have been receiving considerable amount of assistance from power

which are external to the horn of Africa as well. David Hoile (2005:25-25) have clearly showed the involvement of the US in the Darfurian conflict as follows:

There have also been reports of some degree of America involvement in sustaining the insurgency that the CIA has reportedly supplied arms and money to Darfuru rebels...Washington is using Darfur's rebels, as it did in Southern Sudan thirty years old insurgency, to destabilize the Khartoum regime, whose polices have been deemed insufficiently pro-America and too Islamic (Hoile, 2005:25). Hoile (2005:26) is also of the opinion that the involvement of the increasingly energy hunger USA is highly motivated because Sudan has oil, as well as that other previous commodity water.

The involvement of China in African armed conflicts is also vivid. Communist china's intervention in armed conflict in the pre-1989 period were not connected to China's materials needs or demand for resources, but suit were generally politically motivated initiatives made in the context of an extension of radical politics on the mainland or as part of wider strategic maneuvering vis-à-vis western powers and the Soviet union (Large, 2007:52). However, after the reform of the 1989, economic and material needs were made to assume a more central role in guiding the country's relations with the continent reflecting far-reaching changes in china's domestic politics and development (Large, 2007:53). Chinese new state politics and diplomacy were geared to serve and promote the country's new resource and emerging geopolitical needs and agendas (Large, 2007:53).

Another none-state actor which is deeply immersed in the conflict in the Darfur is the international territories' network *al-Qaeda*. *Al-Qaeda's* involvement in the Darfurian conflict according to Hoile (205:27) is mainly attributed to the inaccessibility and Islamic heritage of the area, its proximity to several failed or semi-failed state, porous borders, and its inaccessibility to western intelligence services make it a very attractive location to hide in and from which to attack. The Islamic government on the other hand was supported by Iran, Yemen and Malaysia (Samson, 1999:163).

Olisa as cited in Nyong'o (2005:85) noted that external intervention in an internal conflict could be problematic, even if carried out on humanitarian grounds unless all sides see the intervening force as indeed neutral and is in their interest for it to succeed in its mission. External intervention in the Somali conflict by the UN with strong backing from the US government failed mainly because the aforementioned conditions spelt out of Olisa were not met (Nyong'o, 2005:85). Following the collapse of the Siad Barre dictatorship and the disintegration of the Somali state, the warring factions have little appreciation for external intervention and whatever military force came from outside could neither shake nor subdue the guerrilla fighters' determination to carve territory for themselves at the cost of thousands of human lives (Nyong'o 2005:85).

3.1.4.2 Proliferation of Arms

With the end of the cold War and the collapse of governments in Ethiopia and Somalia in 1991, the overthrow of the elected government of General El Basher the elected government of Sadiq el Mahdi in 1989 the Horn of Africa has been left with large stockpiles of arms and weapons in the hands of the military personnel's of the defunct regimes of both countries. A lot of arms go into civilian hands that were in need of such deadly weapons very badly. As a result, the availability and proliferation of small arms and their illegal trafficking have complicated the problem of peace and security in the Horn of Africa.

The transformation of a culture of weapons to a culture of violence resulting in the increasing demand for arms often occurs when a state can not guarantee security to its citizens or control the illicit activities in which these weapons are utilized (Wairagu, 2004:114-1125). Wairagu (2004:112) also goes into saying that:

The breakdown of law and order opens the demand for arms, as security becomes an individual, clan or ethnic matter of concern. Situations or conflicts are pushing many communities into arming themselves for self defense and to secure their property. There is growing regional and

international concern that the easy availability of illicit small arms is escalating conflicts and is also undermining political stability with devastating impact on human and state security.

The acquisition of such weapons has encouraged resorting to violence and war in order to resolve disputes or grievances. This is particularly true in present day Somali where there are not effective government machines capable of protecting the life and property of its citizens and lack of accountability is creating a culture of impunity (World Bank, 2005:34).

Arms and ammunition supplied to the Somali National Front, June 1997

Type of weapon	number	amount of ammunition
Ak-47 assault rifle	1008	252 000 bounds
12.5mm Browning. 50 calibers heavy	9	14 850 rounds
Machine gun		
82mm mortar	9	450 bombs
82mm B-10 anti-tank gun	9	450 shells
PKM/PKT machine gun	12	6000 rounds
37 m, anti-aircraft artillery	1	1500 rounds
23mm anti-aircraft artillery	1	1500 rounds

Adopted: From the Report of the panel of experts on Somalia, 2002

Due to the pervasiveness and persistence nature of conflicts in the Horn of Africa, continued proliferation of small arms makes minor conflicts more fatal and this is the case in Somali. The culture of militarization those begun under Barre's regime become rampant during the civil war, when guns and military force no longer remained the dominant of the ruling elite (World Bank, 2004:345). According to Waigru (2004:112), the resultant urge to be better armed and to seek revenge against attackers is increasing demand for such weapons and changing the nature of conflicts in the region. Somalia is a

typical example where small arms are easily accessible and purchased on the open market (World Bank, 2004:34). These light weapons have their origin from the neighboring countries and the Report of the Panel Experts on Somalia (2003) revealed as follows:

Weapons shipments destined for Somalia tend to originate in or are routed through Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. From these countries, transporting arms to Somalia is straight forwards. The main entry points are the ports that serve Punt land (Boosaso), Mogadishu (Marha and El Ma'an) and Kismaayo, together with the airstrip[s] around Mogadishu.

However, the effect of the proliferation of small and light armaments is not limited to Somalia only as the report of the panel of expert revealed is in the following excerpt:

The problem of the arms flows into and through Somalia is a problem with consequences for the security and stability of the wider region. The Panel has found evidence linking violations of the arms embargo with illicit arms flows to neighboring countries, piracy in Somali and international waters, and the activities of armed groups and extremists beyond Somali's borders.

Free movement of the people between Ethiopia and Sudan across the border, that illicitly arm trafficking become rampant thus contributing to worrisome conflict in the (Gambella) region between the Anyuak and the Nuer which took usually place during dry seasons when both experience severe shortage of water (Seyoum and Heran, 2002:34-35). This is further compounded by the fact that most of the region's borders are porous and the capacity to monitor them effectively is very minimal (Sabala, 2002:70). The same is also true in the pastoral border areas of the countries of the sub-region where free movement of people is very rampant.

The effect of the proliferation of small armament is not limited to the pastoralist and the border areas only. Maintenance of peace and security in major cities is becoming problematic the enforcement of law and the maintenance of public order are becoming highly risky as security official often face criminals armed with weapons more sophisticated than their own and this is the case in Kenya where AK-47 remains the weapons most commonly used in criminal activist in Nairobi (SAbala, 2002:38).

Cognizant of this fact, countries in the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa regions have signed an agreement setting up a centre on small to combat the proliferation and use of illicit light weapons and strengthen cooperation in the region on 15th of March 2000 in Kenya dubbed under the theme Nairobi Declaration., the major objectives of the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa (RECSEA), among other things, would be to promote cooperation at regional and international levels and to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacture and use of illegal small arms and light weapons. The center would also promote peace and sustainable development in the region by “encouraging accountability, law enforcement and creating mechanism for efficient control and management” of weapons. According to the agreement, the centre would facilitate information sharing between governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society in matters relating to the trafficking of small arms (24 June 2005 (IRIN), Nairobi). In sum the easy availability of small arms, both locally and regionally, has made conflicts so intense and fatal changing the dynamics and nature of the conflicts between and among communities in border areas of the sub region. In rural areas, where small modern arms have replaced traditional weaponry in ethnic warfare over scarce natural resources have dragged the problem from bad to worst.

3.2 Ethnic and Identity Factors

The mere existence of different ethnic groups and religions do not necessarily cause conflict. Using ethnic and tribal affiliation as the root causes of conflict is misleading, because it hides the real causes (Paglia, www.afrciaeconomicanalysis.org). It is rather the manipulation of the populace along ethnic or religious lines for political or other socio-

economic gains turns different groups against each other, resulting in widespread violence and even civil wars.

According to Odunuga (1999:42) it is admitted that fewer than 10 per cent of the 186 countries in the world are ethnically homogenous. However, the lack of satisfactory political arrangement has made ethnic pluralism a major source of conflict that have ruined social cohesion in many African countries which makes it always difficult to have these different groups working in concert to achieve common goals for their societies (Odunuga, 199:42). This is, this, the result of what Mazrui (19756) in Markasis (1994) calls "ethnocracy" meaning the monopolizations of state power by certain ethnic groups and the consequence of exclusion of the rest. This situation makes accessing and controlling the limited resources of the state apparatus in the countries, a clear objective of any politicians or interest group vying for political power. As a result official state images and the legitimacy of those exercising power are being challenged from within and the challengers' demands range from a redefinition of the states' image, to power sharing or decentralization and devolution, to self determination in various forms (Leencho,2001:www.ploughshares.ca). According to Fantu (2002:36) Africa's pervasive problems with tribalism and ethnic conflicts are rooted in the failed strategies of state building following decolonization.

This is particularly true in Somalia, the Sudan, to a certain degree in Ethiopia and Djibouti. The political disharmony which is currently manifested in the core countries of the Horn is a by product of politicization of ethnicity ultimately subjecting societies to other source of conflicts such as religious, economic and cultural (Fantu, 2002:L36).

Sudan is typical example which experienced such type of conflict. Sudanese ethnic identities have been constructed by historical and cultural habits and the perceived common ancestry, history or customs, rather than biological and physical characteristics, have contributed to the ethnical identification of the self (Paglia, www.africaeconomicanalysis.org).

The uneven development and resultant discontent is further exacerbated by Numeri's conversion to extreme Islamic fundamentalism and the subsequent strict enforcement of Koranic law on the whole country, coupled with continuing economic inequalities and age-old antagonisms, led to growing discontent among the Southern population during the years following 1973 (de Waal, 104:137). According to Samson (1999:163) being a Muslim and an 'Arab' is virtually synonymous with the privilege of full membership of the state, and a defense against exploitation. This has been intensified by the advent to the state power of the National Islamic Front lead by Dr. Hasan al Turabi in 1989 who was the real president until his relations with the president turned at loggerhead.

In the case of Ethiopia, ethnic conflict, in the sense of one ethnic group waging a war against another, or pogroms motivated by ethnic hatred, such as that we have been in some societies, has been a very rare event in the history of Ethiopia (Hizkias, www.unu.edu). Hizkia (www.unu.edu) pushed further his argument that the norm in the country, if not in the region, with the exception of recent developments in Somali, has been ethnic coexistence rather than ethnic warfare,. Unlike to the situation in the Sudan, being a member of any specific ethnic group ion the Ethiopia context is not attached to the full memberships of the state, associated privileges and a defense against exploitation. This being the general truth, various ethnic clashes of varied intensity under the pretext of "settlers" vs "native: have been witnessed in the last 17 years in parts of Oromia, southern National, nationalities and peoples (SNNP), Gambella, Afar Regional State and recently in Benshangul-Gumuz. Disagreements over issues of a population's identity have developed xenophobic sentiments among the various ethnic groups of the country. The Silte-Gurage identifies questions and resistance by the Wolayita people to the infamous WOGAGDO are relevant scenarios over issue of ethnic identity and governance (Asnake, 2004:56-57).

The conflict in the Afar regional state of Ethiopia with its multifaceted consequences: nationalism, inter communal conflict (e.g. Afar-Issa conflict), competition for power among political parties and on some occasion, inter-clan conflict over resources is worth discussing as its regional ramification is very high and greatly related to the conflict

dynamics in the Horn of Africa (Tadesse and Yonas, 4). The Afar governments that incorporated is an essentially element in conflict in Afar, thus linking the three Afar section that reside in the three country of the Horn: Djibouti; Eritrea and Ethiopia (Tadesse and Yonas: 4). Despite of national borders, the perception that 'Afar is one', influenced by the Afar Diaspora, has been and still is the main ideological driving force of the Afar nationalists and political activities. This was clearly demonstrated during the Djibouti crisis (1991-1994) when Afar from Ethiopia and Eritrea were mobilized in support the FRUD on the one hand and Ethiopian Issa-Somali were mobilized in support of the government in Djibouti (Tadesse and Yonas:11). Conflict in the areas inhabited by Afar is greatly linked to the conflict dynamics of the horn of Africa as it is shaped by the policies adopted by the three governments of the Horn in which the afar exist. The security related problem in the afar region are at present mainly associated with the Ethiopia- Eritrean border conflict and the less accommodative and participatory governance practices in Eritrea has scope beyond the Afar in Eritrean, embracing the two Afar in Ethiopia and Djibouti (Tadessen and Yonas:11).

Another conflict which have similar, if not severe; regional ramification is the local conflict the Gambella Regional State of Ethiopia the Gambella Regional State, as it is christened currently, despite its huge natural resource potential and vulnerability was marginalized in all fronts. The major local protagonists in the conflict of the Gambella are the Anuak and the Nuer who chiefly clash over natural resources. However, it has been transformed in its nature and intensity over the past several decades by the political developments from either side of the frontier, as well as by complex relations among indigenous peoples, and between them and immigrants and officials from highlands areas of Ethiopia (Medhane, nd). According to Meckelburg (Www.uni-koeln.de) its status as a border region, its multi-ethnic composition, its exposure to the Sudanese civil war and the inner- Ethiopian dynamics between center and periphery, as well as the development in oil drilling are the factors which contributed to the recent extension of the conflict in the area.

In contemporary Somalia, as discussed in the preceding sub-sections, nearly all armed conflicts break out along clan lines. Clan identities are malleable that can be shaped by leaders to pursue control of resource and power (World Bank, 2005:15). However, unlike to other state of the sub-region, the Somali experience demonstrates that clan is a double sword which closely links Somalis and tears them apart. The manipulation of clan identities and resultant politicization are used to underscore differences, sharpen cleavages; and mobilize clan members and wage war, thus seriously damaging inter- and intra-clan structure and relations (World Bank, 2005:18). Somali notorious individualism coupled with reliance rooted in clan loyalty is one of the most formidable roadblocks that the TFG is facing to reinstitute the Somali state. The identification of the FG leadership, for instance, as narrow political and clan collation, rather than as an inclusive government of national unity, has left many Somali feeling disenfranchised by the transitional process and that is why clan constituencies of the ousted court remained hostile to the current government (Bryden, 2007:14). However, clans are also considered as forbearers of peace as there are potential source of reconciliation in order to reinstate the Somali state and should take into account the clan and sub-sub-clan considerations.

Until the 1960s, ethnic divisions were latent in Djibouti. However, conflicting international tension in the horn of Africa, together with France's policy of favoring the Afar community to the detriment of the Issa create internal tensions (www.arab.de) the French governments divide and rule policy and the provision of preferential treatment to the nomadic Afars on ground of fearing of the association of the Somali with pan Somali-nationalism have been the major genesis of ethnic conflict in Djibouti (www.arab.de). The Somali, however, were dominate in Djibouti vile and were often between educated and more fully integrated in the commercial life of the colony. As a result, the Issa and other Somali began to seek independence while the Afar preferred to maintain the French connection. An ethnic contradiction continues to exist (www.conflict-prevention.net). When Djibouti gained its independence in 1977, however, the representation of the Afar in new government which constituted nearly half of the population was much smaller than that of Issa, who held a dominate position a situation that persists more or less, to this date (Tadesse and Yonas:4). Adding fuel to the fire, the political development of the

1991 in the northeastern part of Africa complicated the internal and external conflict dynamism of this tiny country. The removal of Siad Barre of Somali and Mengistu Haile Marima of Ethiopia and subsequent eruption of civil war in the former and influx of Mengistu's sympathizers to the tiny city-state created a flow of refugees (www.conflict-prevention.net) which aggravated the internal problem and complicated the country's relations with immediate neighbors.

In sum, the problem of ethnicity is rampant and has a wide range impact on the conflict patterns of the Horn of Africa. Ethnic conflicts in the sub-region are more or less interrelated to the internal political nature of the countries under discussion but with wide-range sub-regional spillover ramifications. Ethnic conflicts in the Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti's are fuelled by forces which are internal as well as external to the sub-region. The conflict in the Somali, for instance, is directly and directly exploited by immediate neighboring countries such as Djibouti's, Ethiopia, Kenya and Eritrea and other Gulf states that do not share common border with it.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. Patterns and Issues of Inter-state Conflict In the Horn of Africa

Conflict pattern in the Horn of Africa, as explained in the previous chapter is shaped by two broad categories or types. One the one hand are those that begin as internal conflict (intra-state conflicts) in the sense that they involve primarily domestic forces and issues and patterns. On the other hand are those conflicts that begin between two or more states. It needs to be noted, however, that both categories of conflict eventually take a regional and/or international character as other state and non-state actors in the region or far beyond become involved.

The Horn of Africa is still one of the most volatile regions in the world despite the euphoria ushered with the end of the cold war and the resultant collapses of authoritarian regime in Ethiopia and Somali. Most of the states are at loggerheads to each other and the following are the major sources, but not limited to, of inter-state conflicts manifested in the post cold war period.

4.1 Political and Historical Issues

The politico-historical propensity between and among the states of the sub-region is one of the sources of instability in the Horn of Africa. The following are worth discussing to fully comprehend the different issues and factor related to conflictual inter-state relations that have been unfolding since the end of the cold war.

4.1.1 The Political-Economic and Historical Underpinning to the Ethio- Eritrea Conflicts

The pattern conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia is the most important conflict which has been crippling the issue of peace and security in the sub-region. As Clapham (2007:67) clearly observed, the Ethio-Eritrean conflicts is not the only conflict in the sub-region, not would its resolution necessarily lead to the resolution of other long standing conflicts, however, it geopolitical centrality and poisoning effect on other conflict, including those such as Somali which are essentially unrelated to it, makes it most main problem to deal with.

The historical relationships between the TPLF/EPRDF and EPLF/PFDJ played a determinant role in the unfolding of the conflict situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Therefore, assessing the type and nature of relation between the TPLF and EPLF will help us understand the fundamental and immediate cause of the 1998-2000 conflict between the two countries.

The relationships between the TPLF and EPLF started when the former began struggle against the dictatorial military regime (the Derg). In fact the seizure of political power by the Derg after the popular revolution of 1974 that brought an end to the imperial regime in 1974 forced many sections of the society to start armed struggle. Most of these groups were new to armed struggle and needed the support of the more experienced EPLF which had been fighting against the central government of Ethiopia since 1961. Meanwhile, a group of Tigrayan students who left Addis Ababa University in 1975/76 built a peasant-based movement in Tigray (Henze, 2001:260). As one of these movements, the TPLF looked to the EPLF “for inspiration and later received assistance up on recognizing their right to independence (Yopung, 1996:106).

As a result, the TPLF got support from EPLF occasionally but relations were uneasy as the Eritrean looked down on the Tigrayan’s (TPLF) as “provincial amateurs”. Despite the sensational attachment the TPLF developed toward EPLF, “give the behavior of the Eritrean toward Tigrayans, the expectations of the former were unrealistic” (Medhane, 1999:44). For instance, Eritrean looked, during the armed struggle, up on the issue of liberating Tigray at least with discomfort and at best with suspicious. The EPLF was concerned that this issue might confuse or overshadow the Eritrean cause.

To illustrate this point further, Melaku Tegegn (1994:69) stated the following:

Emanating from its supremacist feeling, the EPLF's view of the Ethiopia left was outwardly arrogant, and it has always belittled the scale of the mass revolution in Ethiopia and presented it as something inferior to the nationality movement in Eritrea.

Nevertheless relations continued based on common aspirations and goals. However, TPLF's highly successful peasant mobilization in the early 1980s enhanced its importance as a movement. Hence, the growing importance of the TPLF to the struggle against the Derg boosted its confidence and implied the benefits of the relationship with the EPLF were now mutually advantageous. The increased success in TPLF's movement gave it the confidence to begin challenging the EPLF on a range of military and political issues that bred antagonism between the two organizations (Young, 1996:118).

As TPLF's base of support and military skill grew in the late 1970's and 1980's it developed its own distinctive policies and conceptions of struggle (Young, 1996:105). One fundamental difference and source of conflict between the TPLF/EPRDF and PFDJ was their differing interpretations of national self-determination. The TPLF proclaimed the right of all ethnic communities in Ethiopia to national self-determination including independence. The TPLF argued that these principle applied ... (ellipse mine) to communities in Eritrea as well (Young, 1996:106). These and other similar differences have been characterizing the relations between these armed guerilla movements. Although PFDJ and TPLF/EPRDF were brought together to fight the common enemy and achieve respective goals, the deep-rooted ideological incompatibilities that have existed between them prior to 1991 began to surface and constrained their relations.

The conflict from 1998-2000 between Ethiopia and Eritrea came as a surprise to many. However, an assessment of the underlying cause of the conflict might reduce the extent of unexpectedness of the conflict. Some of the causes are rooted in the history of the two countries. Among these are, according to Kifle (2004:99-100):

- To colonization of Eritrea in 1989 and its separation from Ethiopia;
- The hiatus which developed because of the separation of Eritrea while it was under Italian colonial rule, British rule and federation with Ethiopia;
- Colonial rule and its effect on the drive for secession;
- Eritrea's separate development and its effect on the Eritrean culture and psyche;
- Bitterness causes by the three decades of Eritrea's liberation struggle and its impact of the socioeconomic and psychological attitude and outlook of the Eritrean society and others.

In addition to this, failure to acknowledge the new political and economic developments in Ethiopia which seemed to have surpassed the situation in the newly independent Eritrean state may have complicated the situation. Clapham (2007:67) observed that the history of relationships between the EPLF and TPLF, and the discrepancy between the EPLF's sense of being the 'senior partner' in the liberation struggle against the Derge regime, and the evidently less powerful position of an independent Eritrea. Compared with Ethiopia, in terms alike to population, economy and diplomatic standing compounded the problem.

There are also widespread perceptions that this war is a perversion create by the leaders of the two countries in order to divert attention from the real political challenges in their respective countries. Eritrea's Afewerki, for instance, was not only faced with the daunting task of reconciling the ELF and the EPLF, but is equally expected to democratize and contain potential division among the various and diverse ethnic groups (G. Gwexe, //www.accord.org). However, it will be questionable whether above perception holds true in the case of Ethiopia as the government has already started taking measure towards democratizing the country. On the other hand, the above perception holds true in the case of Eritrea as the conflict itself was initially provoked by the government in Asmara.

Moreover, the worsening the economic and social conditions in all the countries under discussion is shaping the conflict patterns in the Horn of Africa. Notably Eritrea's and its

relations with Ethiopia during the last decades of peace in this respect contributed to the outbreak of the war between the two nations.

In the economic sphere, both countries decide to work together by coordinating their development policies and strategies. As result, various agreements covering issues of fiscal, monetary, trade and investment policies were signed, (Kinfu, 2001:58). In discussing economic relations between the two countries, however, one of the important points to be raised is the nature of the economic relations between the two countries in the post 1991. The type of relation was 'based on Ethiopia's economic patronage' (Addis, 1998:51). This was mainly because, "the Eritrean economy is very small and impoverished and the Human Development Index is 0.483, which gives the country a rank of 157th out of the 177 countries (HDI Report, 2007/2008). For instance, according to Henze (2001:168), "from the view point of geography, culture history and experience, the most logical region for Eritrea's to relate economically is the rest of Ethiopia". This is further illustrated by the fact that Tigray is a natural reservoir of labor for Eritrea while Ethiopian regions further to the south are natural sources of raw materials for Eritrean industries. Trade was another contentious economic issue between the two countries as G.Gwexe (www.accord.org) clearly described in the following passage:

Trade was another contentious economic issue between the two countries. The Eritrean, in particular, with their lofty idea of creating "An African Hong Kong" wanted preferential trade treatment from Ethiopia so that Eritrea could easily buy Ethiopia raw materials and flood them back in the Ethiopia market as manufactured goods. However, this plan was fundamentally flawed as it simplistically assumed that Ethiopia has neither plan nor ability to sue her raw materials for her own industries. When Eritrea could not get such trade concessions from Ethiopia, she retaliated by refusing a land-locked Ethiopia her much-needed access to the Assab port.

The rest of Ethiopia is also considered as a huge market onto which Eritrea can export its industrial products. This meant the Eritrean economy highly depended on the support and inducement, provided at high domestic sacrifice, by Ethiopia. In a nutshell, in Ethiopia there was a general perception that the standing arrangements were skewed in favor of Eritrea as they allowed her to largely benefit at the expense of Ethiopia (G.Gwexe, <http://www.acord.org>).

Nevertheless, the “EPRDF decided that there was a limit to the support and inducement which Ethiopia could provide to Eritrea because of its commitment and responsibility for reconstruction and development activities which needed to be under-taken in Ethiopia” (Kinfе, 2004:115).

This kind of attitude was further intensified with the introduction of the new currency in Eritrea and assorted errors of assumptions made by the government in Asmara about the parity of the Nakfa with the Birr (Kinfе, 2004:114). With regard to the values of the currencies of the two countries, Eritrea proposed the same value at the rate of one to one freely serviceable in both countries (Takeste and Kjjetil, 2000:33). They [the Eritrean] simplistically assumed that nakfa and Ethiopian birr would be used in both countries with an equal buying power (G. Gweze, <http://www.acord.org>).

However, this visible difference between the two countries was ignored deliberately by the Eritrean government and there was no agreement on the measures to be taken as far as the implementation of the new Eritrean currency is concerned. Since both countries had already agreed to use Birr as the medium of exchange for trade between them, it was obvious it would be difficult to control Nakfa, while in the meantime; its circulation would have multiplied the existing drain or endangered the economy of Ethiopia. The rejection by the Ethiopia governments of the new Eritrea’s proposal on trade has created resentment from the side of Eritrea.

When the trade disagreement between the two sides reached its climax, the Ethiopia government introduced new bank notes in order to counterbalance the uncontrolled flow of old from Eritrea and proposed that the settlement of accounts between the two

countries should be made in hard currency through a letter of credit (LC) system, similar to Ethiopia's trade with other countries (Medhane, 1999:149).

Eritrea straight away rejected the LC system as this policy would prevent it from taking advantage from the Ethiopian economy as before, furthermore, the Ethiopian government restricted the transactions around border areas not to exceed two thousand birr. Consequently, the freezing of the Ethiopian Birr circulating in Eritrea instantly led the Eritrean economy to dive into failure. As a result, the protocol agreement on economic harmonization and trade reached a dead end.

Thus, among other things, the introduction of the Nakfa and Ethiopia's response to it in terms of its trade policy, led the two countries to armed confrontation on the border areas in May 1998. It can be seen that this fundamental policy divergence escalated occasional disputes over the frontier that had previously been of little significance.

A number of political analysts have argued that the social dimension of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict is mainly attributable to the politics inside the regime in Asmara. Accordingly, one way of looking at the causes of the conflict between the two countries is studying the historical relationships the EPLF has with the Eritrean peoples, particularly after independence. Some of the manifestations of their relationships are pointed out by Addis B. (1998:65) as follows:-

- The EPLF is not based on the motivated support of the people. This deprives it of the attributes of a popularly nurtured movement.
- It is foreign inspired as it has been affected by the legacy of older movements. This sets it apart from the common folk.
- As a consequence of lack of solid social base, its communication gap with the people is huge.

The above assertions by Addis B.(1998:65) are very difficult to accept as the people of Eritrea was supporting the armed struggle with full commitment and vigor and have been providing the government with the required financial and human capital needed to wage

war with Ethiopia lack of motivated popular support and solid base of the general public, according to the evaluation of this writer, were not major problems in the Eritrean until recently. However, the reason why it went to war with Ethiopia, as explained somewhere else in this research, is mainly attributed to the nature of the leadership and resultant inability of bring fundamental socio-economic transformation in Eritrea.

Accordingly, Isaias Afewerki was quick to quarrel with every one round: the Sudan, Djibouti, Yemen and Finally Ethiopia. This regional security concern forced Ethiopia, Sudan and Yemen to form the San'a forum in order to counterbalance the challenges stem from the Eritrean side.

4.1.2 The Proliferation of Terrorism and Political Islam

Intra and inter-state conflicts caused by multitude of factors were rampant in the Sudan prior to the 1989 change of government and the removal of General Siyad Baree in 1991. However, the proliferations of terrorism and political Islam have been the most important factors influencing the peace and security of the sub-region particularly after the end of the Cold War. This is clearly manifested in Somalia and the Sudan. The end of Barer's regime and resultant collapse of the Somali state and the coming to state power of the National Islamic Front (NIF) in 1989 in the Sudan are the most important factors which are responsible for the prevailing instability, protracted and unresolved conflicts in the sub-region.

4.1.2.1 Political Islam in the Sudan and it' Regional Ramifications

Sudanese relations with its neighbors in the aftermath of the 1989 episode were based on Islamic ideology. Cognizant of this fact, De Waal wrote the following:

The North-East Africa has been a laboratory for political Islam. The Nile Valley has been incubator of radical Islamists theory and practices. After 1989, the Sudan becomes the Arab world's militant Islamic state. Meanwhile, the Horn of Africa becomes one of the main theatres of conflict between Jihadists and their enemies (De Waal, 2004:1).

Although the geneses of conflicts between and among the state of the region are varied, region began to dominate only after the National Islamic (NIF) assumed state power in the Sudan. According to Alex De Waal (2004:182) the key problem emerged in the first months after the 1989 coup as the NIF seized power in Khartoum because its Islamic project was never purely domestic. The NIF, in particular its ideological leader, Hasan al-Turabi, made clear his view that the post-colonial nation state was a failure, and that instead there was a new Islam force at work which would change the international configuration of states (Woodward, 1999 in <http://www.addis-eiipd.org>). In the 1990's Sudanese relations with its immediate neighboring countries and the rest of the world was based on Islamic ideology. The coming to state power of EPRDF in Ethiopia and the perception that Ethiopia is divided among ethnic lines, the weakening of the SPLA and independence of Eritrea was considered by the Sudanese government as an added leverage which would enable it to materialize its plan of Islamization of the entire sub-continent. As a result, al-Turabi devised an ambitious plan of establishing a Muslim commonwealth encompassing all Muslims of the sub-region towards this end, the Popular Islamic and Arabic Conference (PIAC) was established in 1991 with Turabi as secretary-general and agreed to support Oromiyah Islamiyyah among the Oromo of Ethiopia, and Jihad Eritrea among the Muslims of West Eritrea with the aim of destabilizing the state of the sub-region (Woodward, 1999:in <http://www.addis-eiipd.org>). With regards to this, De Waal (2004:2) clearly stated that in the Nile Valley and the Horn of Africa, a political Islam has been fused with local political struggles to create new manifestations, which have lasting consequences for the countries concerned and which also have a wider impact upon political Islam (De Waal, 2004:2). The above was compounded by the role of the media, which projected the Sudan as a 'pariah' and hostilities between the Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia continued until the onset of the Ethiopia-Eritrean conflict (Kifle, 2006 in [/www.ak-sophiabooks.org](http://www.ak-sophiabooks.org)).

As a result, Sudanese's relations with its immediate neighbors deteriorated dramatically. Sudan became a hub for the export of militant Islamism, bringing it into undeclared war with its most important neighbors and ultimately confrontation with the United States (De

Waal, 2004:182). Sudanese continuous islamization was further reinforced by its involvement in the assassination attempt by militants of the Gama'a al Islamiyya on the life of the Egyptian president in Addis Ababa. There were evidences that revealed weapons used by perpetrators in the assassination attempt were transported to Ethiopia via Sudan Airways and the travel documents of the terrorist's were also prepared in Sudan (Kinfe, 2005; De Waal, 2004:206). This was considered as a wakeup call to the Ethiopian government by many political analysts and advised to revisit its idealist's foreign policy orientation towards its neighbor states especially the Sudan. In retaliation to this the Ethiopia government has taken various diplomatic measures although relations were shortly normalized right after the eruption of the Ethio- Eritrean conflict.

To curb this move an alliance of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda was formed under the aegis of the US government in a bid to isolate, contain, and if possible overthrow the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Khartoum, which has been labeled as a territories government or pro-terrorist groups. However, it failed without yielding the intended result due to the Ethio-Eritrean conflict and each began bidding for Sudanese support (Plaut and Gilkes, 2000:4). Later on, Ethiopia and the Sudan successfully realigned (Plaut and Gilkes, 2000:4). The Sudanese government in subsequent years, showed its pragmatism by expelling Osama bin Laden and handover Carlos the Jackal to France in 1994 (De Waal, 2004:206). Moreover, Ethio-Sudanese relation was, according to Kinfe bolstered by the cooperative agreement signed which include, but not limited to, Petroleum Trade, Mining and Energy, Trade and industry, Investment, Custom and Port Usage, Road Infrastructure and Transportation, Transport and communication and Air Transport and aviation. The positive relationship between Ethiopia and the Sudan is also clearly mirrored in the context of some of the understandings which have surfaced over the Nile recently. One of them is the Nile Basin Initiative (Kinfe, 2006 in [//www.addiseiipd.org](http://www.addiseiipd.org)).

However, bilateral relationship between Eritrea and Sudan is not as good it was prior to the 1991 period because of the involvement of the Eritrean government in the conflicts in the Southern and Eastern Sudan. The government in Eritrea has been providing an all

round assistance to the SPLA and now it is mired up to its neck in the conflict in the Darfur.

4.1.2.2 State Collapse and the Proliferation of Terrorist Groups in Somalia

The downfall of the Barre's Regime and resultant collapse of the Somali state has created a power vacuum in the entire Somalia for more than seventeen years. This has created a fertile breeding ground for international territories. Robert I. Robert (ed.) in his book entitled "Battleuing Terrorism in the Horn of Africa" describes the situation of the Horn of Africa as follows:

Although Afghanistan and Iraq are at the epicenter of America's war on terror, terrorist groups threaten other parts of the world as well. One of the most dangerous is the greater Horn of Africa region-Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, , Somali and the Sudan along with Yemen, their volatile neighbors, al Qaeda has already stuck in the region, and the area's complex history, shared poverty, poor governance, underdevelopment, and renowned resistance against Western colonizers have created an intricate web of opportunity for potential terrorist (Rotberg, 2005).

Dirbil (2006:48) attributed Somalia's total collapse on the eve of the end of the Cold War marked by continuous internal unrest, long unguarded coastline, porous border, and deteriorating socio-economic conditions as a fertile ground for harboring terrorist groups that have link with international terrorist organizations/. This is also clearly presented in the report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) as follows:

Islamists organizations have become more prominent in the past decade. The most important, the indigenous al-Itihead al-islami aims to establish an Islamic state in Somalia and in the Somali-inhabited region of eastern Ethiopia (then Ogaden). In the early to mid 1990s, it organized militias in attempt to gain control of several key Somali towns. It committed several acts of terrorism against Ethiopian government targets in 1995. While its goals

have focused relatively narrowly on Somalia and Ethiopia, it has had links with international Islamist terrorist in the past, including al-Qaeda. The possibility of continued or renewed ties should be closely monitored (ICG Report in <http://www.globalpolicy.org>).

The activities of these groups were not limited to the national borders of the republic of Somali. In fact the most imminent threat of Ethiopia' security was from the eastern Somalia frontier (De Waal, 2004:207). Rather their cross-border activities provoked an Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia since 1996, after Al-Itihaad Al-Islam (AIAI) claimed the responsible for the terrorist acts in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Southern Somali has also long been served as a base for armed groups opposed to the Ethiopian government, including the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and recently, al-Itihaad (ICG in//www.globalpolciy.org). Similarly, hundred of civilian were also killed by an explosion at the premises of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998 which was a clear indication that the Horn of Africa has turned to be hot bed of terrorist attaches.

Mahari (2006) argued that the cleavage of territorial expansion under the "Greater Somalia" banner and religious resentment fused with ethnic ties provided historical and religious justifications to mobilize moderate Somalis and radical Islamists within and out side Somali. Meari (2006) further quoted Dahir Aweys, leader of the Council of Islamic court and known for his inflammatory remarks, as saying vehemently on a number of occasions that "Ethiopia is the Israel of the Horn of Africa and well shall not allow it to meddle in the internal affairs of our country."

The widespread and protracted war in Somali involving not only the UIC and the TFG, but the multitude of other combatants that have clear regional implications including the reasonable possibility of reigniting a state-to-state war between Ethiopia and Eritrea and fomenting acts of terrorism in very vulnerable neighboring states (Mehari, 2006). Furthermore, Pham (2006:12) asserted that there are credible reports that foreign militants including Arabs, Pakistanis and Sudanese were fighting alongside the Islamists

in recent clashes in Somali. This is a clear manifestation of the involvement of not only actors in the sub-region but also other actors outside of the Horn of Africa.

4.2 Border Issues

The colonial legacy and its continuation bear strong effect on the people and nations of the Horn of Africa. Inter-state conflicts in the sub-region, as the cases in other parts of the continent, have many interrelated and intertwined causes and reason. Many of them are the result of the internal political developments of the states. However, leaders so as to divert the attention of their populace usually quarrel with their immediate neighboring countries under the pretext of claiming a lost territory. The arbitrations of borders erected by the colonial power and the co-existence of similar nationalists divided by these borders have been used as a pretext and at times contributed to wars. Adding fuel to the fire, the problem is further aggravated by the artificial boundaries created by colonial master as they ruled and finally left the continent and these are still the sources of inter-state conflict in Africa in general and the Horn in particular.

Markakis (1994:8) observed that:

The expansion trend associated with the modern state in the region, which began with colonial partition of the Horn and continued in the post colonial period, the state incorporate regions that were never fully integrate even administratively into its structure.

The Ethiopia- Eritrean border conflict and the Ethio-Somalia cross border conflict have been taken as the major conflicts worth discussing to understand clearly the situation in the Horn.

4.2.1 The Ethio-Eritrean Border Conflict

The Ethio-Eritrean conflict has been fought over many different and intertwined issues and has a wide range regional ramification for the state of the Horn of Africa one of the obvious aspects of the war is a border conflict between the two states, with each claiming the border area of Badame as part of their territory (Maxted and Abebe, 2001). When Eritrea became formally independent in 1993, the issue of demarcating the boarder was

not high on the agenda. As Kiefe (2004:115) put it clearly that reason behind this was that partly because of the euphoria of success over the military regime and partly because of the existence of other urgent and more pressing problems for the leadership of both countries. Kiefe (2004:115) further stated that while the Eritrean leadership had to grapple with the challenging task of state formation, the Ethiopian leadership was preoccupied, among other things, with the task of national reconciliation, the drafting of a new constitution and the challenges of reconstruction and development.

Moreover, Ghidey Zeratsion, founding and former member of the Central committee of TPLF stated that:

“The border issue was raised for the first time at the meeting between the TPLF and EPLF in November 1984. At this meeting, the EPLF raised the issue and wanted to demarcate the boundary...the areas under consideration were Badme, Tsorena-zalambessa, and Bada. The TPLF agreed that there are areas between Ethiopia and Eritrea where they are not clearly demarcated. At the same time it argued that it was not prepared for such discussion and had not made documentary studies on the issue. Furthermore, the TPLF argued that it was not in a position to sign border agreements on behalf of Ethiopia because it did not have the legitimacy to do so. And hence, the TPLF proposed to maintain the existing administrative areas as they are and prepare the necessary documents for the final demarcation after the fall of the Derg. The EPLF was convinced by the argument and both agreed to postpone the demarcation and maintain the existing administrative regions” (www.tand-tesfana.com).

Although, the EPRDF led government had acquired the mandate to discuss about border issue after it seized political power in 1991, it did not bring the issue into discussion with the Eritrean government. The matter was relegated to the background until the eve of the eruption of the conflict. Had the problem been solved on time, it could have not served as

a pretext for the invasion of Ethiopia. Solomon (2004:42) argued that this is partly attributed to the failure of the Ethiopia government to establish internationally and legally accepted State-to-State relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

With the introduction of Nakfa in 1997 the issue of territory surfaces high on the agenda and discussion on its begun in earnest. Regrettably, while negotiations were underway, events on the ground took a negative turn leading to skirmishes on the ground (Kinfe, 2004:119). According to Addis (1998:77-78) the major stumbling block to the escalation of the conflict was Eritrea's refusal to withdraw its troops from the contested territories which were under Ethiopia. Knife (2004:119) is also of the opinion that although the territorial claims induced by the desire of national definition may have been a contributing factor, things were brought to a head-on collision by the economic relations of both countries. Although the boundary was often mentioned as an official cause of the conflict, the fundamental and most pressing factors on the conflict were rather politico-economic issues. As Ghidey conspicuously put it, the border is only a pretext, which ignited the tensions growing out of the economic contention and unresolved grudges (www.tend-tesfana.com).

As Eritrea has rejected the resolutions of the OAU, and the sanctuary Council Ethiopia resorted to use force and retook Bademe on February 16, 1999 via a military operation called operations Sunset which forced the Eritrean authorities to accept the OAU Framework Agreement within 24 hours (Kinfe, 2004:163).

The conclusion of the war with Ethiopia victory has led the signing of the Algiers agreement exactly two years after the beginning of the conflict. This agreement provided for the settlement of the disputed border and compensation claims between the parties to the conflict and the deployment of UN peacekeepers. As result of this agreement the Eritrean and Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC) was established to delimit and demarcate border based on the colonial treaties of 1900, 1992, 1998 and applicable internal law. There was public protest right from day one of signing of this agreement that the colonial treaties mentioned could not be applicable as their were violated by the invasions of Ethiopia by Italy and subsequent agreement reached by both parties after the

end of the second World War. Moreover, the ruling of the BCEE which do not reflect the objective relation the ground has also dragged the matter from bad to worst. As a result, significant elements of the agreement i.e. demarcation of the border area between the two countries remain unimplemented and cross-border tensions are still soaring from time to time.

The border conflict has also developed into a protracted and costly stalemate, with regional and international consequences. The impact of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict was not merely confined to the two countries and had overwhelmingly altered the alliance structure of the entire sub-region. Ethiopia and Eritrea, regardless of their different in their respective local policies and backed by Uganda and the US, had formed alliance giants Sudan. However, this hostile alliance against the Sudan was crumbled with the eruption of the conflict in 1998. Along with the Sudanese government, Djibouti was also immediate beneficiary of the conflict as the entire import-export of Ethiopia was shifted from the port of Masswa and Assab to the port of Djibouti the consequence of this conflict also extends to Somali, where both governments extend their covert and overt support to opposing side among the factions of the Somali political forces. According to Ghidey, intending to get allies both of them is extending the ear to neighboring countries and destabilizing the region (www.tand-tesfana.com). In addition, further escalation of the Ethio-Eritrea proxy war in Somali may disrupt the deadlock and tempt one or another party to reopen conflict along the border which in turn definitely has increased the opportunities for terrorist infiltration of the Horn and East Africa and for ignition of a larger regional conflict (Lyons, in www.icar.gmu.edu).

In sum, the BCEE ceased to exist on November 2008 after six years of existence without implementing its rulings and most of the areas designated as Temporary Security Zones (TSZ) which is demarcated 25kms on the Eritrean side of the de facto border are occupied by Eritrean troops. The dissolution of the border commission with out finalizing its task and evicting of the peacekeeping troops, according to this researcher, would have two opposite scenarios. First and foremost, in the absence of any legal body mandated to accomplish the remaining task, i.e. demarcating the border, it is natural that the vacuum created will be exploited by the parties to the conflict to pursue their respective interest

which finally would lead to confrontation. This scenario will linger the conflict between the two countries in particular and the sub-region in general. The second scenario is that of the parties to the conflict are serious and interested to settle the stalemate, they would come into negotiation and set-up another commission which would accomplish the remaining demarcation process. This would pave the way for further negotiation and rectify some of the impracticalities and anomalies which the commission itself admitted to exist. However, this is not likely to happen at least in the near future considering the position pursued by the Eritrean government which have been demanding the implementation of the ruling of the commission without any slightest modification. However, this does not mean that even demarcating the border area as stipulated in the ruling of the commission would resolve the problem. The current Ethio-Eritrean problem, according to this researcher, should be resolved based on a wide range of issues reflecting the situation on the ground.

In line to the above argument Clapham (2007:67) clearly recognized that the facile assumption underlay the failure of the ill-fated Boundary Commission, which assumed that the demarcation of the frontier was essentially a technical matter, to be resolved by qualified international lawyers meeting in Europe, is the fundamental problem which contributed for the lingering of the current problem between the two belligerent countries. Clapham, (2007:75) further pushed his argument that the failure of the BCEE to settlement rested on the Commission's willful refusal to recognize that an outcome imposed at the end of a bitter war would not simply be reversed by decision announced from the Hague with no mechanism to enforce them, and any solution to wider issues in relations between the two countries that does not acknowledge the realities on the ground must be equally fruitless. Such conflicts in the Horn and elsewhere in Africa could not be resolved permanently by mechanism of the kind that have been prescribed in the Algiers agreement as frontier went to the heart of the self-perceptions not only of the two governments, but of the societies in both sides of the contested border which in some measure they represented (Clapham, 2007:67-68). Whatsoever the argument, these countries should not be allowed to resume this conflict as the internal and external impact of this conflict is ripple. Resumption of this war would undermine the peace and security

of the entire horn, not to mention the cost they are going to pay in terms of human life and destruction of the economies of both countries.

4.2.2 Expansionist Threat of Greater Somalia

The Ethio-Somalian conflict, which has also been going on for many years over ownership of the Ogden territory is one of the most important sources of conflict which has been characterizing Ethio-Somalia relations right from the independence of Somali. According to Grenfield (1994); this conflict has its origins in the 1980s.

The most unsettling problem has been that the successive Somali regimes have rejected the pre-independence boundary agreement, criticizing them as the colonial making reached out without the wishes and consent of the Somali people. The eastern part of Ethiopia, Ogaden has been claimed by Somali and conflict has been continued and then until the IGADD brokered 1988 agreement on Normalization of Relationship between Ethiopia and Somali has been signed by the leaders of both countries.

For Ethiopia, according to Mehari (2006), the Ogaden War was a war against invasion by Somalia while on the contrary for Somalia; it was an extension of the expansions establishment of the “Greater Somali” dream. The elder of the Union of Islami Court (UIC) Shekh Aways officially made it clearly on several occasions that his organization “will not leave any stone unturned to integrate Somali brothers in Kenya and Ethiopia and restore their freedom to live with their ancestors in Somali (Mehari, 2006). Because of this and other pronouncements by leaders of the UIC, relations between the Ethiopian government and the UIC turned to be erratic which finally lead to the military incursion of Ethiopia.

Be this as it may, the Ethiopia’ longest, unprotected and porous 1,600kms long border with Somali is also as source of concern for the Ethiopian government. Both sides of the border are inhabited by Somali speaking pastoralist. The absent of central government in Somalia and nearly absent of border control has resulted in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, illegally imported goods and smuggled drugs which exacerbated the lawlessness in this part of the sub-region (Mwhari, 2006). In addition to this there are also related problem such as the seeping effect of Islamic fundamentalism to the Ethiopian Muslim community, infiltration of terrorist to Ethiopian territory and the insurgencies by secessionist groups in Southern Easter Ethiopia.

Conclusion

It had been hoped by many people that the end of the Cold War would bring new and fairly era in world politics. However, contrary to the foregoing argument, it witnessed the eruption of violent conflicts in Easter Europe, Africa and some parts of Asia. The genocide in Rwanda and civil war in Somali are classic examples which clearly depict the conflictual situations that are unfolding in Africa in the aftermath of the end of the cold war.

The factors shaping conflict patterns in the Horn of Africa are indeed numerous and diverse in both their character and consequences. While these conflicts are political in nature, for many countries particularly in Africa, some of the underlying factors that cause most of these conflicts are lack of absence of good governance, scramble for natural resources, high levels of poverty and inequitable distribution of resources (Sahle:www.diplomacy.edu; World Bank Report,2000:49). Delicate border tensions such as the one between Ethiopia and Eritrea, authoritarian governance and abject poverty as witnessed in all countries; state collapse which allowed international terrorist groups to gain a foothold in Somali, the most recent ethnic conflict and /or cleansing in Kenya and Darfur, the over all growing regional dynamics of conflict in general have increased the apprehension of a potentially mounting catastrophic conflicts on this strategically important region. The border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is also soaring as the Eritrean government is obstructing the smooth operation of UNEEM and the hope for the peaceful conclusion of the conflict looks very gloomy.

Unlike in the two world wars and during the Cold War where nation-states were the major actors in international conflicts, recently there are new emerging conflicts that are highly destructive, within and across state boundaries (Shiale:www.diplomacy.edu). Most of these conflicts involve ethnic groups and terrorist who seek to control existing states, or to establish their own states (Bradshaw, 1999:13).

As a result of all these, the Horn of Africa becomes one of the hot spots and worrisome region on the African continent. In contrary to the euphoria of early 1990s, the security situation of the entire sub-region has gone from bad to worst.

The following excerpt from (Seyoum H. 1990). may also clearly depict the real situation in the Horn of Africa.

As if [the Horn of] Africa is an animal with horns whose purpose is to fight, those who named it as such much be thinking if this geo-political expression has lived to its intended purposes. Evidently, there is a not logical reason that this region should posses a natural propensity for conflict and violence...yet violence and conflict has unfortunately become of the defining elements of the region.

In summary, a conflict in the Horn of Africa has dramatically increased in their level and intensity throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Almost all countries of the sub-region have severally affected either by intra or inter-state conflicts. The major causes of the conflict are entrenched in the socio-economic inequalities, abject poverty, state collapse and history.

The effects of these conflicts are dynamic complex and diverse. The major victims of these conflicts are civilians and non-combatants citizens. The numbers of displaced people and death tools in Somali over the past new years have increased as fighting between the Ethiopian backed TFG and the UIC intensified. Millions were also displaced internally due to the Ethio-Eritrean conflict in both sides of the Mereb River. The current conflict in the Darfur is also classic example which is in line with the foregoing discussion. Millions are also dying because of epidemic disease such as Malaria, HIV/AIDS and Calorie as government institutions in these conflict ridden areas are very weak to provide the basic social services. In the case of Somali such institution are completely absent. The impacts of these conflicts in the overall economic performances of these nations are also very dismal.

Recommendation

In order to effectively deal the issue of the peace and security in the sub-region, understanding dynamically and meticulously the every-changing pattern of conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa, the factors that engender conflict and of how conflicts influence development is very important. Hence the working on the forthcoming issue may improve the situation in the Horn of Africa.

Improving Governance, Managing conflict, and Rebuilding States

African countries need to introduce inclusive, participatory and democratic polities well-suited to their ethnic diversity. Under the right conditions diversity can promote, rather than impede, social cooperation and stable growth (World Bank, 2000:49). The establishments of board based governments (Inclusive Government) are essential to ameliorate the conflicts in the sub-region. This is because conflict prevention will not be successful if not based on Africa's own experience and capacity to respond to crisis. In this case it is very important to quote Professor Wagari Maathia. According to the professor, African governments need to develop their version of democratic governance, it is very important to recognize that they have to share power and must be inclusive and that they must recognize diversity and finally that they must settle conflict of whatsoever amicable and peacefully.

Ensure fast and steady economic development that ensures the benefit of all Citizens

Countries of the sub-region in order to ensure sustainable peace and security need to develop their economies consistently in manner that ensure the benefit of all their citizens. Democracy alone can not yield the intended peace and security unless accompanied by commensurate economic development that delivers on the bread and butter issues as well.

Enhance the constructive Engagement of CSO, NGOs and Citizen Diplomacy²

The role of dependable and vibrant Civil Society Organization (CSO) and non-Governmental Organization in the effort geared towards achieving a lasting stability in the Horn of Africa need to not be undermined the governments should support CSOs discharge their responsibility. CSOs should take active role in the efforts geared toward ensuring rule to law, democratization process s and in conflict prevention, resolution and management. CSOs on their party should also refrain from rent seeking activities that may jeopardy their credibility active and collaborative involvement by regional institutions and international donors is also critical for resolving conflicts and building peace in Africa (World Bank, 200:49).

Governments should also give citizen diplomacy a chance to play its role in the management of intra and inter-state conflicts. Citizen's diplomacy is important in bridging the gap between governments and opposition political parties, civil society organization, elites and the public at large. The Ethiopian council of elders who have negotiated the release of EDU leader and the subsequent pardon granted by the government is classic example which testifies the important of such mechanism in the management of conflicts. Such mechanisms have proved to be effective in the case of the self-proclaimed Somaliland which managed to put its house in order with out any external intervention.

Hence, the same mechanism should be adopted in the resolution and management of others conflicts as they are instrumental in opening opportunities for communication, cross-cultural understanding and joint efforts to explore the means of addressing the parties' needs.

Any efforts geared toward bringing a lasting solution to the current intra and inter state conflicts in the sub-religion should also take into account the complicated local, regional and international web of interest that are

² Citizen diplomacy can be defined as an approach that brings together the professional, opinion leaders and other influential individuals from communities or countries in conflict without their official statues to collaborate in finding solution to the conflict².

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Declaration

I the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for any degree in any university and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Name _____

Signature _____

Date _____

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as university advisor.

Name _____

Signature _____

Date _____