



**A Discourse Analysis of Aljazeera's Documentary
'Struggle over the Nile'**

Dejene Sojato


**A Thesis Submitted to
The Graduate School of Journalism and Communication**

**Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts in Journalism and Communication**

November, 2014

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

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School of Journalism and Communication

This is to certify that the thesis prepared by **Dejene Sojato** entitled *A Discourse Analysis of Aljazeera's Documentary 'Struggle Over the Nile'* and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Journalism and Communication complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

Signed by Examining Committee:

Examiner Megero Lencho (PhD) Sig.  Date March 2015

Examiner Hailu Gutema, PhD Sig.  Date March 2015

Advisor Abdissa Zerai (PhD) Sig.  Date March, 2015

Abdissa Zerai (PhD) 

Chair of Department or Graduate Program Coordinator

ABSTRACT

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Dejene Sojato

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Given the fact the politics of the Nile is full of tension, mistrust, anxiety, mystery, and diplomatic confrontation among the downstream and upstream riparian countries particularly between Ethiopia and Egypt since time immemorial, this study examines how Aljazeera's documentary series 'Struggle over the Nile' represents of the Nile riparian countries that attempt to establish their causes over the usage of the Nile river. Post Structural discourse theory is used as the theory and method for the analysis.

The study uses qualitative approach on the bases of textual analysis, using discourse analytical tools. The corpus of media texts is selected based on purposive rather than random sampling. It consists of three documentary series under a major title 'Struggle over the Nile', on issues of the Nile River and the relations among riparian countries struggling to secure their share from the river. The method for the analysis of the text is through the three types of text analysis, namely analysis of the meaning, the rhetoric and construction of subjectivity.

This study outlines the fact that documentaries are products of individual rather than absolute truth as the filmmaker is in direct control of arranging the sequences, omitting material, forming arguments and presenting ideas thus making it important to assess filmmaker point of view. Due to this fact this study reveals that Aljazeera's documentary demonstrated the dilemma of the downstream countries to maintain the status quo that resulted in their failure to bring the needed cooperation over the use of the Nile waters. There was a clash between the upstream riparian countries ideas of the bringing cooperation. Downstream countries expressed an antagonistic approach towards the downstream riparian countries; they opposed the modification of colonial agreements of 1929 and 1959. They wanted others to respect those legal frameworks as binding. Most of the informants of the documentary episodes were from Egypt and Sudan albeit the story affects other Nile basin countries. Therefore, the study concludes that the documentarian has to accommodate the interest of both parties in conflict to attain objectivity.

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Table of Contents

CONTENTS	Page
Acknowledgement	IV
Table of content	V
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background of the study	1
1.1.1. Statement of the problem	2
1.2. Objectives of the study.....	4
1.2.1. General c objectives.....	4
1.2.2. Specific objectives	4
1.3. Research questions	5
1.4. Significance of the Study	5
1.6. Organization of the paper.....	6
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE	7
2.1. Over view of the Nile river	7
2.2. Nile politics.....	8
2.2.1. Nile Basin Initiative (NBI).	9
2.2.2. Hydro-Hegemony and counter –Hegemony	11
2.3 Aljazeera	15
2.3.1. Aljazeera and pan-Arabisim	16
2.3.2. Aljazeera and Ethiopia.....	17
2.4. Theoretical Frameworks	19
2.4.1. Post-structuralist Discourse theory	19
2.4 .1.1. Key concepts of post-structural discourse theory	20
2.4 .1.2. Discourse theory and the media.....	28

2.4.2. Documentary theory and practice	28
2.4.2.1. Categories of documentary	32
2.4.2.2. Documentary films as rhetorical tools	33
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	35
3.1. Qualitative approach to research	35
3.2. The corpus: Sampling and selection criteria	35
3.3. Discourse practice analysis approach	36
3.4. Analytical strategy	37
3.4.1. Analysing the meaning	38
3.4.2. Analysing the rhetoric.....	38
3.4.3. Analysing construction of subjectivity	38
3.5. Summary	39
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION	40
4.1. Overview of the documentary series	40
4.2. Seeking legitimacy on rights	46
4.3. Hegemony and counter hegemony	50
4.4. Depicting us and them	56
4.4.1. Israel versus Egypt.....	57
4.4.2. Egypt versus Ethiopia	60
4.4.3. Building dams versus people	62
4.4.4. Forging common ground	64
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION	68
5.1. Conclusion	68
5.2. Recommendation	71
References	76
Appendix	77

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the study

Historically, the politics of the Nile is full of tension, mistrust, anxiety, mystery, and diplomatic confrontation among the downstream and upstream riparian countries particularly between Ethiopia and Egypt since time immemorial (Daniel, 2010). The Nile, at 6,671 kilometres, is the longest river in the world. The Nile is shared by 10 countries and has three main sources: Lake Victoria, one of the largest freshwater lakes in the world, from which the White Nile derives; the Blue Nile; and the Atbara River, both originating in Ethiopia. The riparian countries can be distinguished by dividing them into upstream and downstream countries. The upstream group includes Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The two downstream countries are Egypt and Sudan.

Egypt has made greater use of the Nile waters than all the riparian countries combined. This is due to the geographical, historic, and economic circumstances which have been obtained in Egypt. More than 86 per cent of the Nile waters originate in Ethiopia. Hence, Egypt assigns a prominent place to her relation with Ethiopia although it has by no means been always constructive. Generally, the basin has never seen cooperation until recent times. However, there has been cooperation between the two downstream countries (Sudan and Egypt) with 1959 water sharing agreement. The upper riparian countries (Tanzania, DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Eritrea, and Ethiopia) which contribute the entire Nile waters had been neglected from any negotiations and agreements on the utilizations of the river by the colonial powers.

The 1929 and 1959 agreements empowered Egypt to use and control the water of the Nile. While the first agreement grants Egypt veto power over any projects involving Nile water, the latter allows for full utilization of the resource, obliging Egypt to sharing only 15.5 per cent of the water with Sudan. Since those treaties placed Egypt in a hydro-hegemonic position, Egypt has managed to control the use and course of water from source to mouth. As a result, the River Nile has no basin-wide agreement and governing body, as the major international rivers do (Arsano and Tamirat 2005). Recently, in spite of the 1929 and 1959 agreements, the upper riparian states have challenged Egypt's monopolization of the Nile water by taking forward unilateral development projects. Ethiopia is the main source of the Nile waters but it is a country that has made the least use of the Nile waters. Over the past

few centuries, the country had found itself in vicious wars waged against foreign expansionists and internal rebellions. Hence, it had neither the time nor the resources to utilise the Nile waters. However, a succession of Ethiopian leaders have either sought to assert their right to an equitable share of the Nile waters or to carry out various projects in different parts of the country including the recently launched the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Hydropower Dam Project. The Project will be the largest hydroelectric power plant in Africa when completed as well as the 8th largest in the world. According to the Ethiopian government, as of February 2014, the dam is 30 per cent completed.

The potential impacts of the dam have been the source of severe regional controversy. The Government of Egypt, a country which relies heavily on the waters of the Nile, has demanded that Ethiopia cease construction on the dam as a precondition to negotiations, sought regional support for its position, and some political leaders have discussed methods to sabotage it. Egypt has planned a diplomatic initiative to undermine support for the dam in the region as well as in other countries supporting the project such as China, Italy, and Norway. However, other nations in the Nile Basin Initiative have expressed support for the dam, including Sudan, the only other nation downstream of the Blue Nile, which has accused Egypt of inflaming the situation. Ethiopia denies that the dam will have a negative impact on downstream water flows and contends that the dam will in fact increase water flows to Egypt by reducing evaporation on Lake Nasser ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Ethiopian_Renaissance_Dam), accessed on April 7, 2014).

This study attempts to examine how Aljazeera as an Arab media portrayed and presented the controversy of the Nile issues by analysing and applying poststructuralist discourse analysis. Considering the complexity of relations between the two Nile Basin countries, the research reviews Nile politics and defining facts that influences the current relations among Nile riparian countries with particular emphasis on controversies between Ethiopia and Egypt.

1.1. Statement of the problem

The Nile politics is highly complicated and controversial. The Basin has potential for clean energy (hydropower), irrigated and rain-fed agricultural production and increasing water use efficiency; for preservation and use for eco-tourism among many other benefits. However, the relations between upstream and downstream countries are characterized by confrontation and consistent struggle to maintain hegemony over the use of the Nile waters. As far as the Blue Nile goes, there are no common agreements that govern the utilization of the river.

In most international river basins, upstream countries are able to control the runoff because they have the superior geographical location, but the case among the Nile riparian countries is different. Egypt, which is the country farthest downstream, has always dominated hydro-politics in the Nile Basin. The colonial legacy, the global political climate, lack of international investment as well as few military and economic capabilities, the absence of coherent water policies, a weak and unclear international legal framework, and political instability have meant that upstream riparian countries were unable to assert their water interests (Cascao, 2008).

To manage these competing interests, all the Nile riparian states, including Egypt, took an initiative to establish a permanent legal institution which would be responsible for Nile Water governance. Accordingly, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was established in as an interim institution responsible for founding legal and institutional infrastructures. After a decade's negotiations, six riparian countries signed the CFA, while Egypt and Sudan refused to sign the agreement in 2010. The media have weighed in these developments.

Media have the power in constructing and shaping reality. They also play a crucial role in interpreting controversies among the parties. In relation to the on-going complicated relations between Ethiopia and Egypt, the media from both sides play a major role in interpreting their sides of the story. To this end, the current government of Ethiopia is not happy with the way the Arab media report about the country. In its Foreign Affairs, National Security Policy, and Strategy (2002) document the government stated that Arab media played a negative role either by their silence or by their distorted portrayal of Ethiopia. These problematic relations were heightening when the Ethiopian government broke off its diplomatic relations in 2008 with Qatar saying that the country (Qatar) became a major source of instability in the Horn of Africa. The statement issued by Ethiopian government accused Qatar's hostility to Ethiopia which included the output of its media outlets, a presumed reference to the Aljazeera Arab satellite television network. The Ethiopian government strongly condemned the Qatari government saying that it has left no stone unturned to cause harm to Ethiopia's national security providing supports for all groups which are prepared to foment instability in Ethiopia and undermine the country's security. The government accused the network of serving as a mouthpiece for armed groups like Ogaden National Liberation Front and Oromo Liberation Front (Tsegaye 2008, p. 1).

Against this backdrop, this study sets out to examine Aljazeera's documentary, 'Struggle over

the Nile' which was produced by Aljazeera's Egyptian journalist, Hussein Elrazzaz. The documentary was aired on Aljazeera Arabic and Aljazeera English in June 2011 a year after Egypt and Sudan refused to sign the CFA and a year after Ethiopia launched the biggest hydroelectric dam on tributaries of the Nile. It was again aired in December 2012 while Egyptians voiced their concerns on Ethiopia's insistence to construct the GERD. The documentary series was also translated into Amharic and aired on Ethiopian Television (ETV) with a title 'Yeabay Fiticha', literally means 'the Nile confrontation.

Taking account of Aljazeera's ideological position as the defender of the Arab interest and being owned by Arab government, studying how discursively shapes the narrative about the Nile is important. The issue of the Nile has previously been explored, for example in Muez (2012). The study examines the national and international press coverage of Ethiopia's decision to construct the GERD project on the Nile River. Drawing on a six-month textual data, an analysis and interpretation of three newspapers, one from each major Eastern Nile basin member countries (i.e., Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan) was conducted. Besides, three informants, one from each of the aforementioned countries were selected and interviewed, to triangulate the information gained via content analysis. However, this study is different from the previous study by its methodological approach and data source. The study examines a documentary portrayal of the upstream and downstream countries in their struggle to make a point on the use of the Nile River using poststructuralist discourse analysis as a method. It looks into the issue of the Nile critically examining Aljazeera's representation of countries in conflict.

1.2. Objective of the study

1.2.1. General objective

The study is guided by a general objective of examining Aljazeera's documentary portrayal of the upstream and downstream countries in their struggle to make a point on the use of the Nile River.

1.2.2. Specific objectives

The specific objectives the study sets out to achieve are the following:

- To investigate how the relations of power between upstream and downstream nations plays out in the Aljazeera's documentary series.

- To find out how the interests of both groups are discursively constructed on the documentary series.
- To examine how Aljazeera's documentary employ discursive strategies used to construct sameness and difference.

1.3. Research questions

The study will address the following research questions:

- How does Aljazeera's documentary represent the interest of upstream and downstream countries?
- How does the Aljazeera series play out relations of power between upstream and downstream countries?
- How does Aljazeera's documentary construct the 'us' and the 'them dichotomy'?

1.4. Significance of the study

This study focuses on examining how a foreign media treat Ethiopian issues. Thus, it will provide an opportunity for greater understanding of the particular medium (Aljazeera) under study. The study would also serve as a springboard for others who might be interested in studying documentary genres which are produced on local issues. It is worth nothing that there is a growing interest in the production of documentaries in the country.

This study focuses on a documentary produced by Aljazeera's Egyptian journalist Hussein Elrazzaz. This study examined Ethiopian issues coverage in the Aljazeera English network television. It would have been more inclusive and sound if it was possible to include more Arab media outlets within this study particularly on documentaries they produced at the pick of the controversy of the Nile. However, the study mainly focused on Aljazeera English. Thus, future studies should examine whether patterns of coverage in Aljazeera is similar in any other Arab media or not as this research indicates. Besides, future studies should also examine topics and themes presented on Aljazeera Arabic and Aljazeera English to get a clearer sense of how issues of controversies with particular reference to Ethiopian are treated.

1.5. Organization of the Paper

The thesis contains five chapters. Chapter one presents a general background to the study and the research problem, the objectives, the significance, and the scope and limitations of the study.

Chapter two looks at reviews of relevant literature and underlying theory that shape the study. In this section, basic theoretical perspective on discourse theory and documentary theory are presented. It also gives a brief background to the contexts of the hydro-politics and hydro-hegemony and counter-hegemony perspectives in relation to the Nile issues. The theoretical frameworks used in this study combined components of the literature on documentary theory and the literature on poststructuralist discourse theory within critical/cultural studies.

Chapter three discusses design of the study, the methods and analytical approach and techniques employed in the study. The chapter also explains and justifies the preference of qualitative techniques as ways for analysing the study.

In Chapter four findings of the study are presented and analysed in light of the theoretical frameworks. This is followed by discussion of findings in light of the media discourse theory. Chapter five concludes the study and provides some recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1. Overview of the Nile River

The Nile Basin, having the world's longest river (6,700 km) is shared among ten countries. The riparian countries can be distinguished by dividing them into upstream and downstream countries. The upstream group includes Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The two downstream countries are Egypt and Sudan. The two major tributaries of the Nile, the White and the Blue Nile, originate from Lake Victoria and Lake Tana respectively. Atbara River in Sudan is the confluence where these two tributaries meet and officially, this is where the Nile gets its name. In terms of water contribution, the Ethiopian highland sources are by far the largest (86 per cent) with the White Nile providing 14 per cent of all Nile water (Kameri-Mbote 2005).

The basin includes two main river systems: the White Nile, with its sources on the Equatorial Lake Plateau, shared by Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda; and the Blue Nile/Abay and Atbara/Tekeze, with their sources in the Ethiopian highlands of Lake Tana. The tributaries to the Blue Nile system in Ethiopia contribute more than 86 per cent of the Nile waters, while the White Nile contributes only about 14 per cent. Moreover, during the flood period, 95 per cent of the water originates from Ethiopia and only 5 per cent from East Africa. Sudan's contribution to the Nile water is minimal, and Egypt's contribution is virtually nothing (Swain, 1997).

The Basin has significant potential for clean energy (hydropower) development and power trade; for improving and expanding both irrigated and rain-fed agricultural production and increasing water use efficiency; for preservation and use for eco-tourism of designated biospheres which are significant to sustaining global biological diversity. There is also potential for broader economic-regional integration, promotion of regional peace and security; and most important for jointly ensuring the continued existence of the River Nile for posterity through prudent and judicious utilization (NBI, 2013).

International rivers are often the subjects of treaties providing for their shared use. States sharing common rivers usually harmonize their policies for the purpose of establishing agreed regimes. As far as the Blue Nile goes, while Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Sudan recognize its international character, there is no agreed regime governing the actions of the three states. As

a result, there is no integrated plan for optimum use and development of the waters of this river, which could benefit all concerned (Daniel, 2010).

2.2. Nile politics

Some prominent Egyptian leaders, such as former United Nations Secretary-General Butros Butros Ghali, said that 'the next world war will be over water, not over oil or land'. President Anwar Sadat also signalled that '[t]he only matter that could take Egypt to war is water'. Moreover, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak has already threatened to 'bomb Ethiopia' if the country builds any dam on the Blue Nile (Yakob, 2007). However, to date, no war has been fought over the Nile's water. On contrary, upstream countries, including Ethiopia, are starting to develop their economies; demands for increased water use have become more prevalent, leading to the hydro-political situation that the Nile Basin faces today.

The politics of the Nile is full of tension, mistrust, anxiety, mystery and diplomatic confrontation among the downstream and upstream riparian countries since time immemorial. Historical records have shown evidences that demonstrate the occurrence of diplomatic struggle and direct military confrontations between the upstream and downstream countries. This is partly because of the unfair distribution and utilization of the Nile waters among the basin countries. Several historical, bilateral and trilateral treaties dating from the colonial era that addressed water allocation in the Nile River continue to be politically relevant to contemporary negotiations.

In an effort to protect their interests in Egypt, the British oversaw the signing of agreements affecting the use of the Nile River that supported Egypt's downstream water interests over those of other Nile riparians. The 1902 Exchange of Notes between Ethiopia and Britain (on behalf of Sudan) prevented Ethiopia from developing any construction that would alter the flow of the Nile. In exchange Ethiopia received British recognition of Ethiopian independence. Ethiopia later repudiated this agreement in 1941.

The 1929 Nile Waters Agreement between Sudan and Egypt further prioritized Egyptian water needs and purported to give Egypt the right to veto future hydroelectric projects in British colonies (which then included Kenya, Sudan, Tanganyika, and Uganda) along the Nile, (Brunnee & Toope, 2002). According to the text of the exchange of notes the original 1929 agreement is between Great Britain and Egypt and while focused on development in Egypt and Sudan, the agreement also concerns other regions under British control. The

agreement is generally rejected by Nile riparians other than Egypt. However, Egypt uses the international law principle of state succession to argue that this treaty is still valid. Sudan and Egypt subsequently replaced the 1929 treaty in 1959 with the Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, which essentially allocated the entire flow of the Nile at the Aswan Dam to Sudan and Egypt. Unsurprisingly, this has caused regional tension amongst the other riparians, who invoke the Nyerere Doctrine, and general principles of international water law to contest the 1959 Agreement and claim a share of Nile waters (Knobelsdorf, 2005).

The complexity of the problem of the equitable sharing and utilization of the water of the Nile is underscored by the nature of past agreements which favoured Egypt and the Sudan. They entitled both countries the right to use the Nile waters and refused to recognise the right of upstream countries to utilise their water resources (Howell & Allan 1999). The colonial-era treaties predominantly benefited the downstream states, Sudan and Egypt, without much benefit to the now nine upstream states (Bulto, 2009). The effect of the treaties is to generally try to freeze upstream projects to secure a continuous and undiminished flow of water to Sudan and Egypt. Egypt, and to a lesser extent Sudan, have adopted a view consistent with those treaties that they have an “historical” and “natural” right to the full volume of the Nile and that upstream states may not disturb that right by impeding or otherwise affecting that flow (Bulto, 2009).

In direct opposition to this view is the view of Ethiopia, and to some extent, the other Nile riparian states. Ethiopia has argued that it has a complete sovereign right to exploit the waters that flow within its territory. This includes utilizing Nile waters in a reasonable and equitable manner even if there is a decrease in the quantity and quality of flow into Sudan and Egypt, (Bulto, 2009). As a result of these geographic and political circumstances, relations in the Nile Basin have often been cited as an example “of unremitting and open conflict, or at least incipient and barely camouflaged competition” (Brunnée and Toope, 2002)

2.2.1. Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)

To manage these competing interests, all the Nile riparian states, including Egypt, took an initiative to establish a permanent legal institution which would be responsible for Nile Water governance. Accordingly, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was established in as an interim institution responsible for founding legal and institutional infrastructures. The NBI was thus expected to smooth the process of basin-wide negotiation until such a time as the cooperative

framework agreement (CFA) could be put in place (Mekonnen, 2010). After a decade's negotiation, mediated by the World Bank, six riparian countries signed the CFA, while Egypt and Sudan refused to do so.

Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia all agree to the principles outlined in the CFA, however, there is one point of contention that remains unresolved and has been put on the back burner. This is the issue of how upstream use would influence downstream water security. The CFA defines water security as "the right of all Nile Basin States to reliable access to and use of the Nile River system for health, agriculture, livelihoods, production and environment" (NBI, 2010, 4). Currently, Article 14a of the CFA (2010), states,

... Nile Basin States recognize the vital importance of water security to each of them. The States also recognize that the cooperation management and development of waters of the Nile River System will facilitate achievement of water security and other benefits. Nile Basin States therefore agree, in a spirit of cooperation: (a) to work together to ensure that all states achieve and sustain water security... (P. 16).

Article 14b is where the contention lies. It was originally drafted to read "not to significantly affect the water security of any other Nile Basin State" (NBI, 2010). All riparian countries, excluding Egypt and Sudan, agreed to this language. Egypt then suggested that the article be replaced by the following: "not to adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of any other Nile Basin State" (ibid).

This language attempts to redefine water security in relation to current uses and withdrawals. As Egypt's current uses are based on the disputed historical treaties, other riparians have objected to this redrafting because it would perpetuate the historical arrangements that they have already rejected. As a result of this disagreement, deadlock emerged, prompting the signing of the CFA without 14b and despite the objections of Egypt and Sudan. It is unclear how this will be resolved or what the effect of CFA will be if Egypt and Sudan continue to hold out (Paisley and Henshaw, 2013).

Emerging Scenarios

It may be argued that under recent developments, there are several possibilities for further cooperation and regime formation. Under global change, due to international factors and the

increased political stability in the upstream countries, the Nile Basin is probably facing a counter-hydro-hegemonic moment.

This moment is the upstream countries' signing of the Cooperative Framework Agreement. From this point on, the following possibilities for cooperation emerge (Casção 2009b, 71):

1. Ratification of CFA and all-inclusive NRBC
2. Partial ratification of CFA and not-all-inclusive NRBC
 - a. Approval by Egypt and Sudan
 - b. Disapproval by Egypt and Sudan
3. No ratification, no NRBC, but multilateral cooperation
4. No ratification, no NRBC, only partial or non-cooperation

2.2.2. Hydro- Hegemony and counter hegemony

Jacoby (2008) describes a state of hegemony, in which nations are constantly engaged in conflict to attain and/or maintain their dominance. The conceptual framework of hydro-hegemony is similar in outlook, having been developed by Zeitoun and Warner (2006) from realist theories of hegemony (Gramsci 1971), regimes (Keohane 1982), and power (Cox 1992; Lukes 2005).

The conceptual paradigm is referred to as the Framework of Hydro-hegemony and examines the dynamics of hegemony operational at the river basin level. The framework of hydro-hegemony is applicable to situations where: there is considerable asymmetry of power; control of the flows is consolidated by the hydro-hegemon; and competition over water is stifled (Zeitoun, 2006a).

The Framework of Hydro-hegemony is applied to the Nile, Jordan and Tigris and Euphrates river basins, where it is found that current hydro-hegemonic configurations tend towards the dominative form. Hydro-hegemony is hegemony at the river basin level, achieved through water resource control strategies such as resource capture, integration and containment. The strategies are executed through an array of tactics (e.g. coercion pressure, treaties, knowledge construction, etc.) that are enabled by the exploitation of existing power asymmetries within a weak international institutional context.

The level of power asymmetry in a river basin is determined by the domination of one or several states over the others with regards to the three ‘pillars of assessment of the level of hydro-hegemony’ its ‘exploitation potential’ (technical capacity to build hydraulic infrastructures), its ‘riparian position’ (geographical position), and the levels of its structural, bargaining and ideological powers (Lukes, 1974 quoted in Cascao, 2006). It is argued to be the case in the Nile River Basin, with Egypt (Cascao, 2006).

Figure 1.1. – The framework of hydro hegemony

Form of Hydro-Hegemony	Main Water Control Strategy (Figure 3)	Form of Interaction over Water (Figure 2)	Likely distribution of water or benefits	Form of Conflict (Figure 1)	Water Event Intensity Scale (Yoffe 2001)
positive-sum	integration	shared control (stability)	EQUITABLE	no conflict	7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
↕					
negative-sum	resource capture, containment	consolidated control (contained instability)	INEQUITABLE	cold conflict	-1 -2 -3 -4
↕					
negative-sum	resource capture, containment	unconsolidated control (instability)	(NON-EQUILIBRIUM)	violent conflict	-5 -6 -7

Source: Zeitoun, 2006a

The three dimensions of power are defined in table 1.1. Structural power is “power as might”, in other words the ability of a state to mobilise capabilities (military might, economic strength, political support, etc.), but also its riparian position. The second dimension of power (bargaining power) refers to control of the rules of the game (Zeitoun, 2006a). It consists of narrowing the weaker state’s alternatives to compliance, when confronted with the stronger party’s demands (Lukes 2005). Finally, ideological power is the “power to prevent people from having grievance by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things” (Lukes, 2005 in: Zeitoun, 2006: 76).

Egypt uses the Nile River water more than any other country in the basin. It has developed extensive areas of land for irrigation in the last 100 years. Egypt claims to have developed a gross cultivable area of 7.21 million feddans (or about 3.03 million ha) in the Nile portion of the country, and uses more than 55.5 billion m³ water annually from the Aswan High Dam (Debay, 2008). So far, Egypt has based its Nile-related policy on an international water law principle known as the law of prior appropriation. The concepts of ‘historical rights’,

'acquired rights', and 'established rights' are derivatives and extensions of the law of prior appropriation.

Some scholars have argued that the form of hegemony that Egypt exerts in the Nile Basin is a negative type of hydro-hegemony (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). Egypt's consolidated control means that the status quo is in its favour and in order to maintain that control, it must engage in a number of tactics such as covert action, coercion pressure, treaties, international support, and financial mobilization (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006). Egypt has previously engaged in covert actions to destabilize Ethiopia. Daneil (1999) recounts Egypt's attempts to destabilize Ethiopia during President Abd El-Nasser's reign (Egypt second president, 1956-1970) where efforts were made to weaken Ethiopia through Egypt's support of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in its fight against Ethiopia. This war heavily contributed to the political, economic, and social instability in Ethiopia, and by supporting the ELF, Egypt was able to force Ethiopia to redirect its financial resources toward defence which prevented Ethiopia from developing its own water resources (Daneil, 1999). Another tactic which hegemons use to maintain the status quo is coercion pressure. This is very evident in Egypt's case where it has previously threatened military action to ensure that its share of the Nile's water is maintained. However, as previously described, this tone has shifted toward one that is now more diplomatic.

International support is another way of maintaining the status quo. During the colonial era, Egypt was regarded as a favourite of Britain and certainly benefited from that favouritism in the 1929 agreement which granted Egypt 48 km³ of the Nile's flow, while Sudan received 4 km³. The allocation essentially gave Egypt 97 per cent of the Nile's flow and allowed it to maintain its acquired rights (Waterbury, 2002). International support has also manifested itself via World Bank policies that give veto power to downstream riparians if the riparians feel that an upstream project will affect the downstream flows. This strategy has been used by Egypt in the past to block the implementation of projects in Ethiopia that the Egyptian government perceived as being detrimental to its interests. In addition, funding for projects from international donors such as the World Bank is not a neutral process; rather the funding policies and priorities "reflect an unstable balance of the professional preference of the experts who staff them with the national objectives of their member states" (Waterbury, 2002, 26). During the 1980s and 1990s, a number of Egyptians were appointed to the environmental and international law departments of the World Bank (Allan, 1999), suggesting that Egypt had the power to direct various development projects to its favour.

Waterbury (2002) also mentions the importance of the presence of Egyptian water experts in key UN agencies, the International Monetary Fund, and the African Development Bank.

Bilateral treaties are a fourth way to exert influence because they exclude other riparians. Zeitoun and Warner (2006) say that bilateral agreements do not serve to resolve differences because they result in “pre-empting the rights of the non-signatory states” (p. 447). Nowhere is this more evident than in the 1959 Agreement as discussed in a previous section. Because the 1959 Agreement guarantees Egypt a certain allocation of water, Egypt has tightly held on to it and refuses to re-negotiate its terms to account for Ethiopia’s needs. The Agreement acknowledges Egypt’s historic rights to the Nile’s water and has become “...Egypt’s ‘redline’ for ... negotiations in the basin” (Cascão, 2009, 245). The Agreement is Egypt’s starting point for negotiations in the Nile Basin and serves as a security blanket because it guarantees a certain quantity of water for the country (ibid).

Over many decades Egypt, with explicit Sudanese support and implicit international backing, has controlled the Nile water flow and thus firmly established hydro-hegemony. Through a combination of different strategies in the legal, political, and economic realm, Egypt has managed to sustain its hegemony and weaken others’ position to utilise the vast majority of the water resources.

Domestic factors in Egypt, coupled with East Africa’s growing self-confidence, are slowly changing the power relations in the Nile basin. Cascão (2009) identifies two major trends in the Nile Basin that have led to changes in the political dynamics. The first is the increased economic and political stability in upstream riparians relative to the previous ten years. This has led to a desire to develop water resources. The second trend is that upstream countries are now able to fund development projects without resorting to international donor agencies, such as the World Bank.

In her 2009 paper, Cascao applied her counter-hegemonic framework of analysis to the Nile River Basin and critically analysed Ethiopian counter-hegemonic processes against Egypt. She identified seven counter-strategies: i) reactive diplomacy, ii) active diplomacy, iii) cooperation, iv) mobilising international funding, v) the construction of expertise-based knowledge, vi) discourse alternatives, vii) claim on legal principles.

Ethiopia’s ability to access external funding to unilaterally develop its water resources represents a significant change in the dynamics within the Nile Basin. This ability is

essentially a way of challenging Egypt's hegemony. Ethiopia has been able to use Chinese funding to build large-scale dams for hydropower on the Tekezze-Atbara River. Plans also exist to complete the Tana-Beles Irrigation Scheme in the Blue Nile basin, also with Chinese investment (Casção, 2009). These unilateral development projects send political messages to downstream riparians that the status quo can no longer be accepted (Casção, 2009). Casção (2009) describes these unilateral projects with external funding as "the end of the enduring monopoly on Nile water by the downstream riparians and the current regime in the basin," (p. 256). The implications of this unilateral development are that Ethiopia can jump start its water resource development without input from Egypt.

Another strategy that Ethiopia has been engaging in to counter Egypt's historic hegemony has been to use active diplomacy. In 1991, Ethiopia signed a pact with Sudan which stipulated the two countries would cooperate on the Blue Nile and Atbara Rivers. Ethiopia also entered into a bilateral agreement with Egypt in 1993 (Casção, 2008). Ethiopia has also asserted its position in the Nile Basin by signing the Cooperative Framework Agreement. In so doing, it has aligned itself with the upstream countries and is sending a message that Egypt's insistence on maintaining the status quo is unacceptable. Ethiopia has made its position on international water law known (Casção, 2008). Since the CFA includes the principles of equitable and reasonable use and no significant harm, Ethiopia has asserted its stance.

In addition to echoing the principles of international water law, the NRBC's legal status presents an opportunity for Ethiopia to serve its interests by pursuing more counter-hegemonic strategies. Since knowledge increases power, Ethiopia has been developing its expertise and knowledge of water resources in order to counter Egypt's historic hegemony (Casção, 2008). According to Cascao (2008), the CFA is the strongest counter-hegemonic tactic and challenge to Egypt's hydro-hegemony that the upstream discourse coalition has put forward. Considering that the CFA has not yet been ratified, its impact, once in place, remains to be seen. However, the creation of a permanent joint river commission which would have the power to legally re-allocate the Nile water flow is the ultimate expression of changing power relations and diminishing Egyptian hydro-hegemony.

2.3. Aljazeera

Al Jazeera was born on 1 November 1996 with the strong financial support of the Qatari government. Nearly one hundred and forty million dollars were poured into its foundation for

the first five years by the Emir of Qatar (Miles 2005). To date, Aljazeera has been sponsored by the government and does not have the direct commercial pressures that other news channels have. Beside the strong financial support, when the BBC Arabic Project failed suddenly on April 1996 and left about 250 BBC-trained Arab journalists unemployed, Aljazeera gained solid professional and personnel backup by employing the staff (ibid).

Aljazeera put much effort in the following ten years into expanding its viewership around the world. It launched its English-language website in March 2003. In the summer of 2006, Aljazeera English (AJE), the world's first 24-hour English news channel headquartered in the Middle East, was launched to cover the estimated over one billion English-speakers worldwide. Its four broadcasting centres in Doha, Kuala Lumpur, London and Washington DC, cover the latest news in turn within a day 'following the sun' (Bussiness, 2006).

Some scholars note that Al Jazeera is the most popular and most controversial news network in the world (Miles, 2005). Aljazeera has produced both praise and criticism. Western media and governments criticized Aljazeera as anti-American and even pro-terrorist. The controversy generated mostly in the US has overshadowed the journalistic practices of the channel. US officials like Vice President Dick Cheney and the Defence Secretary at the time, Donald Rumsfeld, said that the network's journalistic practices were "inflammatory, irresponsible and frequently misleading" (cited in Cohen 2009). "We are being blamed for accurately reporting what is going on in the world from an Arab perspective," responded Al Jazeera officials (ibid).

2.3.1. Aljazeera and Pan-Arabism

Arab media discourse has been later developed to adopt the notion of al-Qawmiyya (Pan-Arabism), which moved away from the state controlled boundaries into Arab nationalism, promoting Arab unity and Arab interests. The notion of al-Qawmiyya al-Arabiya would unify all Arabs, irrespective of their religion or geographical boundaries (AbuKhalil 1992). The discourse of al-Qawmiyya reached its peak during the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser who came into government after the Egyptian revolution in 1952.

After the Egyptian revolution of 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser launched his radio Voice of the Arabs (VOA) which sought to promote his ideas of Arab nationalism (Lahlali, 2011). The radio was also used as a potent tool of communication to mobilise the Arab public to rise against imperialism, airing anti-colonial messages (James, 2006). However, some pro-

western Arab governments could not escape the wrath of Nasser's new radio, which gathered momentum and started broadcasting for 18 hours per day (James, 2006). The death of Abdel Nasser in 1970s marked the demise of his discourse of al-Qawmiyya. Instead of focusing on the Arab global culture and language, Arab media adopted a more localised discourse approach, which has often been in line with national governments (ibid).

Al Jazeera distinguished itself by its attempt to reach out to a large Arab audience, discussing issues that are pressing in the Arab and Muslim world, in general, and the conflict-ridden Middle East, in particular. Not only are Arab issues prominent on the network's news and discussion programs, but the very issue of Arabness is paramount. According to Suleiman Al Shammari (2006), Al Jazeera plays off and even feeds an Arab nationalist trend in its viewers. Through some of its programs and talk shows, "the channel promotes an Arab nationalist discourse wrapped in a democratic style which makes it easy for viewers to palate" (ibid). But Hirst (2008) argued that Aljazeera is no Sawt Al Arab. It may be vaguely reminiscent of the heyday of Nasser's Arab nationalism but it is very different for "neither in style nor content can Al Jazeera be compared to Cairo's Voice of the Arabs ... but some regard it as its closest successor.

This new notion of Arabism manifests itself to a certain degree in the very image the network projects of itself—its staff, its language, its name, and its location (Lahlali, 2011). Aljazeera employs people from various Arab nations. Its staff, some of whom came out of the BBC Arabic service, is Arabs from almost every corner of the Arab world, with no apparent domination of any single group. Aljazeera has come to play an important role in broadening pan-Arab interaction. As such, it projects an inclusive identity which crosses national boundaries. The pan-Arab overtones are not only subtle, but different and less contrived (ibid). In many ways, Aljazeera has reinvigorated a sense of common destiny in the Arab world and is even encouraging Arab unity, so much so that pan-Arabism is being reinvented on this channel. As a pan Arab satellite broadcaster, Aljazeera caters to a transnational regional audience that may be heterogeneous in some ways, but is nonetheless bound by language, culture, history, and to a lesser extent religion and geography (Lahlali, 2011).

2.3.2. Aljazeera and Ethiopia

Aljazeera's coverage of world issues has been the source of much controversy for years. As an outlet broadcasting from the Middle East it has been accused by many critics, especially in the West, of an anti-western bias. Being the leading news channel in the Middle East and its

coverage of the recent and current unrests in the Arab world has only reinforced that. On the other hand, Aljazeera is labelled by some in the Middle East as, supporting western governments and being an agent of the CIA because it presents the views of western leaders, and was the first Arab network to interview top Israeli officials (Kim & Jang, 2004). The Egyptian government banned the channel through the uprising for a few days on the grounds that it was deliberately inciting violence and unrest in the country (el-Nawawy, 2003). Aljazeera scholar Mohammed el-Nawawy (2003) contends that criticism from both the Arab and western world demonstrate that Aljazeera is a credible source of information. "The common understanding in the news business is that if you anger both sides you must be doing something right" (P. 56).

Similarly, Aljazeera's coverage of Ethiopian issues has been controversial for years. It is to be recalled that in 2008, Ethiopian government broke off its diplomatic relations with Qatar saying Qatar became a major source of instability in the Horn of Africa. The government in its statement said Qatar's hostility to Ethiopia "included the output of its media outlets", a presumed reference to the Aljazeera (Tsegaye, 2008). The statement cited Qatari support for Ethiopia's arch-foe Eritrea and backing for groups in Somalia where Addis Ababa has thousands of troops fighting Islamist insurgents.

On the other hand, the view of Ethiopian public is varied on Aljazeera's reports. The Ethiopian oppositions want Aljazeera to publicize the plight of a substantial segment of the population for fairness, equity, the rule of law, justice, religious and civic freedom, anti-corruption and empowerment, despite the fact that Ethiopian government once labelled Aljazeera as destructive element (Aklog, 2013).

In relation to the on-going complicated relations between Ethiopia and Egypt, the media which support the interest of one side or another play a major role in interpreting situations. However, the current government of Ethiopia is not happy with the way the international media portrayed the country, particularly the Arab media. In its Foreign Affairs, National Security Policy, and Strategy (2002) document, the government of Ethiopia states that the Arab media played a negative role by either their silence or their distorted portrayal of Ethiopia.

This research attempts to examine how Aljazeera as an Arab media portrayed and presented the controversy of the Nile issues in its documentary 'Struggle over the Nile'.

2.4. Theoretical Frameworks

2.4.1. Post-structural Discourse theory

The focus of this study is to analyse how Aljazeera portrayed the controversial issues of Nile on its documentary series 'Struggle over the Nile'. Post-structural discourse theory contributes to an analysis of the 'how-question' for this study. This section introduces the main relevant analytical instruments of the Post-structural discourse theory namely discourse, hegemony and social antagonism and agonism.

Poststructuralist Discourse theory is originally founded on Laclau's and Mouffe's classical work "Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, (1985). In this book, they developed discourse theory, building on Post-Marxism and Post-structuralism. They took concepts like antagonism and hegemony used in Post-Marxism, which were developed by Gramsci (1891-1937) and the concept of signifier from post structuralism. They enlarged the scope of discourse analysis to include all social practices, effectively making discourses and discursive practices synonymous with systems of social relations.

Post-structuralist discourse theory provides a serious challenge to mainstream theory, such as rational choice theory, in spite of the theory having been described as "young, open, and unfinished research" which does not "constitute a fully-fledged paradigm with a distinctive set of theoretical concepts, research strategies and methods" (Torfing, 2005: 3). However, as Torfing emphasizes, post structural discourse theory has already in different ways had a significant impact on the social sciences in general and on political science in particular. "Poststructuralist discourse theory is a tool for analysing the more or less institutionalized rules and meanings that condition the political construction of social, political and cultural identity," (ibid, 153).

In relation to this study about Nile politics, post structural discourse theory contains a range of concepts and arguments that seems helpful in order to analyse the documentary. The works of Laclau and Mouffe are organized around three basic concepts, discourse, hegemony and social antagonism (Torfing, 1999). These three key concepts complete the theoretical framework for this study. Discourse theory will provide us with tools to analyse texts, the concept of hegemony will provide us with a way to analyse how the discourses are utilized in the ideological battle to achieve hegemony, whereas social antagonism and agonism will help

us in the analysis of the construction of the ideologies. The next section explains these three key concepts.

2.4.1. Key concepts of Post-structural discourse theory

Discourse

The concept of discourse has been defined differently ranging from conversation between two persons to entire social systems. Here, the concept implies that all objects and meanings are shaped by a community of social actors (Howarth, 2000). Discourse is a system of meaning and accordingly, there is no such thing as an objective truth or meaning beyond a discourse. Thus there is nothing outside of discourse. Howarth (2000) explains the concept of discourse as follows:

Discourse is defined as concrete systems of social relations and practices that are intrinsically political, as their formation is an act of radical institution, which involves the construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between “insiders” and “outsiders” (P: 4).

Discourses always involve the exercise of power, as their constitution involves the exclusion of certain possibilities and a consequent structuring of the relations between different social agents (Howarth, 2000). Discourse involves political frontiers between two or more systems of meaning. Discourse is a contingent and historical construction, thus in our study of discourse we have to confine the analysis in space and time. It also means that discourses are always vulnerable to those political forces excluded in their production, as well as the dislocatory effects of events beyond their control (Howarth: 2000).

Torfinn (1999) defines discourse as “a relational ensemble of signifying sequences that provides the conditions of emergence of any meaningful object and as “a differential ensemble of signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly renegotiated” (Torfinn, 1999:85). The concept of signifier has its roots in Saussure’s theory (Howarth: 2000). According to him, the basic elements of a language are signs. Signs unite a sound-image (signifier) and concept (signified). Language comprises a system of linguistic and conceptual forms whose identities are not fixed by reference to objects in world, but by their internal differences.

There are three kinds of signifier; first there are some signifiers which have a fixed meaning, for example the signifier “tree”. The second kind of signifier is a floating signifier. It is a signifier that is overflowed with meaning because it is articulated differently within different discourses. According to Laclau and Mouffe (1985) every discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity by expanding signifying chains which partially fix the meaning of floating signifiers. The third kind of signifier is an empty signifier. An empty signifier is a signifier without a signified. A signifier is emptied of any precise content due to the sliding of the signified under signifier (Torfing, 1999).

Nodal points

A nodal point is a signifier that other signifiers are related to and get their meaning in relation to it. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) define nodal points as follows:

Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursively, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre. We will call the privileged discursive points of this partial fixation, nodal points” (Page, 112).

Nodal points are not characterized by a supreme density of meaning, but rather by a certain emptying of their contents, which facilitates their structural role of unifying a discursive terrain (Torfing, 1999). A short definition of a nodal point is “an empty signifier that is capable of fixing the content of a range of floating signifiers by articulating them within a chain of equivalence (Torfing, 1999).

Dislocation

Dislocation is central within discourse theory, because the creation of new hegemonic projects or rearticulation begins with dislocation. Dislocation happens when the structure is “unstable” and the known relationships are changing to a new one (Laclau 1990).

Undecidability

Undecidability is the name for the unrecoverable dilemma which occurs under wholly determinate circumstances. Laclau paid attention to three different levels of undecidability. The first level has to do with the ambiguity of floating signifiers, which stems from the fact that certain signifiers have different meanings in different contexts (Torfing, 1999: 62).

Articulation

The word “to articulate” means, according to Oxford Advanced Dictionary, to be related to something so that together the two parts form a whole. Laclau and Mouff (1985) use articulation in such way:

...articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we call discourse. The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we will call moments. By contrast, we will call an element any difference that is not discursively articulated (P. 105).

Laclau and Mouffe argue that all identity emerges through the disarticulation or re-articulation of signifying elements. Hence they define articulation as any practice establishing a relation among elements so that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. Articulation here is as a practice that establishes a relationship between elements. The identity of elements is modified as a result of this articulatory practice.

Elements and Moments

This articulatory practice can appear from different positions that Laclau and Mouffe called for moments. Moments are necessary parts of a whole; for example, the concept “individualism” is a moment which is a part of liberalism. Moments can be redefined through different articulations. There is a difference between moments and elements; elements have not been discursively articulated but they are open to different meanings.

Hegemony

Hegemony means leadership, authority and influence for, example, i.e. of one country over other groups of countries. Thus, we can talk about the hegemony of the USA after the end of the Cold War in 1989. Within discourse theory, the concept of hegemony means the hegemonic articulation to achieve moral, intellectual and political leadership. Torfing (1999) further defines the concept hegemony as follow:

The concept of hegemony is just another name for politics, but one which emphasizes the construction of identity, and conceives values and beliefs as an integral part of such an identity. Within this perspective, identity

is not the starting point of politics, but rather something that is constructed, maintained or transformed in and through political struggles (P. 82).

The notion of hegemony originally comes from Marxism. Lenin saw hegemony as the dominance and leadership of one class in relation to the rest of society. But Gramsci (Political Writing, 1977) changed the content of the notion of hegemony, showing that political and moral-intellectual leadership in a society involves the articulation of a variety of ideological elements. According to Gramsci, a political force becomes hegemonic insofar as it succeeds to transgress its own interests and present itself as the expression of a collective will, i.e. a national and popular character. In other words, hegemonic practices link different identities and political forces together to create a new social order. (Torfing, 1999) states that the hegemonic practice is not a passive consensus but legitimates actions.

Hegemony includes elements of force and repression because the articulation of the discursive elements takes place in a conflict of power (Torfing). Thus, we can define hegemony as:

...the expansion of a discourse or set of discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context crisscrossed by antagonistic forces (P.101).

An intervention of hegemony has been successful if one discourse became dominant where there was a conflict before. Hegemonic practices take place through the expansion of discourse that partially fixes meaning around nodal points. Hegemony brings us from the undecidable level of non-totalisable openness to the decidable level of discourse. In practice hegemony is revealed by being unquestioned and accepted discourse.

Laclau and Mouffe (1985) argued that hegemonic practices should depend on two conditions; firstly, the existence of social antagonism and secondly, instability of the political boundaries. If hegemony involves antagonism and is a form of politics, it follows that politics is inextricably linked to social antagonism (Torfing, 1999).

Hegemonic articulation ultimately involves some elements of force and repression. It involves the negation of identity in the double sense of the negation of alternative meanings and options and the negation of those people

who identify themselves with these meanings and options. The negation of identity tends to give rise to social antagonism (P. 120).

Hegemonic practices presuppose a social field criss-crossed by antagonisms, and the presence of contingent elements that can be articulated by opposed political projects striving to hegemonise them. According to this model, the major aim of a hegemonic project is to construct and stabilize systems of meaning i.e., Hegemonic formation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Hegemony is always the result of articulation, which consists of linking together different discursive elements in ways that always affect these elements. Any hegemonic order can be challenged. The condition for hegemonic articulation is social antagonism or social agonism, which I will now explain in detail.

Antagonism and agonism

The construction and experience of social antagonism and its transformation to social agonism is central to Laclau and Mouffe's (2006) theory of discourse. Antagonisms are understood as the clash of social agents with mutually constituted identities and interests but "Agonism removes the violent and destructive aspects from the antagonistic and transfers the enemy-other into the adversary order" (ibid). Laclau and Mouffe argue that social antagonisms occur because social agents are unable to realize their identities and because they construct an "enemy" who is deemed responsible for this failure. An antagonism is seen to occur when the presence of another prevents me from being totally myself (Howarth, 2000). The task of the discourse analyst is to describe the way in which the identities of agents are blocked, and to chart the different means by which these obstacles are constructed in antagonistic terms by social agents. Torfing (1999) explains:

The unity of a discourse is established by social antagonism. Social antagonism is a result of the exclusion of discursive elements, the differential character of which is collapsed through their articulation in a chain of equivalence. The chain of equivalence expresses certain sameness but the only thing the equivalential elements have in common is that they pose a threat to the discourse in question (P. 305).

Social antagonism will exist when a group of people feels threatened by others. Thus, they construct a chain of equivalence which is anti to the discourses of their opposite group. Antagonism introduces social experiences that cannot be accounted for by any positive or

essentialist logic of society. In other words, this antagonism will not necessarily lead to more rationalism or compromises. Laclau and Mouffe state that an antagonism are not internal but external to the social and constitutes the limits of objectivity. However, in a situation of social antagonism, the external threat is the central one constituting the subjectivity.

The original conception of social antagonism is the external enemy that prevents identity "A" from becoming fully constituted (Torfing, 1999). "Anti-A" negates the A but what is negated in social antagonism is always already negated by a set of dislocations. Therefore, the result is the negation of negation. In other words, an identity is dislocated as long as it depends on an outside that denies that identity but provides a condition for an identity. "Social antagonism is undoubtedly a double-edged sword, as it constitutes and sustains social identity by position a threat to that very identity" (Torfing, 1999:131).

Chains of equivalence

The logic of equivalence constructs a chain of equivalential identities among different elements that are seen as expressing certain sameness (Torfing, 1999:301). Chain of equivalence constructs a constitutive outside that threatens the differential logic of the discourse in question; however, when this differential system is confronted with an outside threat it will tend to emphasize the sameness of the threatened moments and thus create chains of equivalence.

Agonism

Agonism implies a deep respect and accept towards the other; indeed, the Greek 'agon' refers most directly to an athletic contest oriented not merely toward victory or defeat, but emphasizing the importance of the struggle itself – a struggle that cannot exist without the opponent. Notably Mouffe (2005) has been working on the notion of agonism. "While antagonism is a we/they relation in which the two sides are enemies who do not share any common ground, agonism is a we/they relation where the conflicting parties, although acknowledging that there is no rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their opponents. They are 'adversaries' not enemies. This means that, while in conflict, they see themselves as belonging to the same political association, as sharing a common symbolic space within which the conflict takes place. "We could say that the task of democracy is to transform antagonism into agonism" (Mouffe, 2005:20).

Mouffe argued that even in a situation of social antagonism, conflicting groups should not reject their opponent and create friend/enemy relationships. Rather, they should work on a friend/adversary relationship. “An Adversary is an enemy, but a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of democracy; liberty and equality.” (Mouffe, 2005:102). This type of agonistic relationships was called “agonistic pluralism” or “an agonistic model for democracy”. Mouffe (2005) introduced the concept “Politics” advocating for an agonistic relation in a democratic society.

Mouffe (2005) defined “Politics” as “a set of practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the political. According to this definition, “politics” is about an agonistic relation. Politics aims at the creation of unity in a context of conflict and diversity; it is always concerned with the creation of an ‘us’ by the determination of a ‘them’. The agonistic relation is a struggle between adversaries, in which the “politics” dimension is to establish an order and organize human coexistence. Ideologies have the central role for creating a social antagonistic or agonistic relation. Next section discusses the concept “ideology”.

Ideology

The traditional notion of ideology has been understood generally as manners of thinking, ideas, characteristics of a person, group, etc., especially as forming the basis of an economic or political system. In other words an ideology is an organized collection of ideas. Althusser (1993) defines ideology as our lived imaginary relation to the social reality: ideology turns individuals into subjects and has a real effect that cannot be false. Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of ideology (1985) is that it is misrecognition, but not of a true reality since reality is discursively constructed; rather ideology is misrecognition of the contingent and undecidable character of the social world in totalizing ideological myths and social imaginaries.

Ideology, objectivity and hegemony are used almost synonymously within poststructuralist discourse theory. In public discussions, some ideas seem to arise more often than others. For social scientists, one way of explaining such instances of common opinion is by the presence of an ideology. Every society has an ideology that forms the basis of the “public opinion” or “common sense”, a basis that usually remains invisible to most people within the society.

Torfinn (1999) defined the concept of ideology as a totalizing and reductive aspect of discourse that involves the constitutive non-recognition of the contingent and precarious character of discursively constructed identities. Ideology constructs the real world in terms of a set of fully constituted essences and tends to deny that these essences are contingent results of political decisions taken in an undecidable terrain (Torfinn 1999:116). Ideology involves a forgetting of any ultimate ability that prevents closure and ensures the limited and precarious character of the decidable forms of social identity.

Ideology is a core theory in discourse analysis, especially when dealing with media discourse. Ideology can be viewed as a way of representing the world. In this sense, our views of the world are ideologically and symbolically constructed. Ideology is considered to be a multidimensional concept. It has normative and political dimension. Van Dijk describes ideology as ‘... the basis of the social representations shared by members of groups. This means that ideologies allow people, as group members, to organize the multitude of social beliefs about what is the case, good or bad, right or wrong, for them, and to act accordingly’ (Van Dijk 1998b).

Ideology is reserved to describe the desire for total closure by political projects and movements; it consists of the non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity, of the impossibility of any final structure (Laclau 1983:24 in Howarth 2000:123).

Myth and social imaginary

According to Laclau and Mouffe, ideologies can also function as a “myth”, when defined as a principle of reading of a given situation. The condition of emergence of myth is structural dislocation, and the function of myth is to suture the dislocated space by means of constructing a new space of representation (Torfinn, 1999). The role of myth is essentially hegemonic: it involves forming a new objectivity by means of the rearticulation of the dislocated elements (Torfinn: 1999:115). A myth is a metaphor for an absent fullness i.e. a fullness which cannot be realized at present. A myth is thereby transformed into a social imaginary. The notion of myth and social imaginary conceptualize the ideological forms of discourse that aim to construct society and social agency as positive and fully sutured identities.

Discourse theory provides tools towards an analysis of their Nile political position of upstream and downstream countries it offers the element of “social imaginary” and “myth”

and how the constitutive outside and a chain of equivalence of the inside have been constructed. The interest of this study is the analysis of ideological conflict between the upstream and downstream Nile riparian countries portrayed on documentary series to achieve political and moral hegemony over the use of the Nile waters.

2.4.1.2. Discourse theory and the media

On all occasions, Laclau and Mouffe's political identity theory is used as a theoretical framework to analyse media related identities. From a discourse-theoretical viewpoint, media are seen not just as passively expressing or reflecting social phenomena, but as specific machineries that produce, reproduce and transform social phenomena. For this reason, Torfing (1999) criticizes the classical sender-receiver-model, inserting a discursive dimension on each of the levels of the model, thus posing questions about the discursive nature of the meaning of the message, of the identity of real and would-be communicators, and of the identity of receivers. The signifier audience, for instance, cannot be understood in isolation from a number of discourses that attempt to construct the audience as consumers, citizens or masses.

Preliminary version of a research agenda can be found in Torfing's (1999) chapter on discourse theory and the media. He distinguishes three domains where discourse theory can be put to work: (1) studying discourses about the media and their place and function in society; (2) focusing on discourses of mass media, i.e. on the form and content of the discourses produced by the media; (3) defining media as discourse.

2.4.2. Documentary theory and practice

Documentary theory and practice have been somewhat marginalized within contemporary media studies and filmmaking. Accordingly, much of documentary theory is concerned with differentiating between its object of study and the more dominant mainstream practice of fiction film. Bill Nichols has discussed documentary film in terms of "discourses of sobriety" – namely discourses of economics, politics, science and history (Nichols, 2001, p. 39). Initially, this genre of film privileged an expositional and informative style that was linked with being truthful and objective, rather than using creative and imaginative content (Renov, 2004).

Michael Renov in his book 'Theorizing Documentary (1993) states that the concept of the document and its adjectivisation as a documentary has a genealogy that can be linked to

historicity, based on the two roots of the term, one from Latin and one from Old French. The original Latin word, 'docere', means the ability to teach, i.e. the conscious transmission of something that can be learned. The Old French root denotes "evidence or proof". Renov (2004) defines the documentary form as "the more or less artful reshaping of the historical world," in which four modalities or functions may arise, which he calls rhetorical/aesthetic, which make up the documentary text. These are to record, reveal or preserve; to persuade or promote; to analyse or interrogate; and to express.

More than half a century ago (in 1948), the World Union of Documentary established the following definition of a documentary:

Documentaries are all methods of recording on celluloid any aspect of reality interpreted either by sincere and justifiable reconstruction, so as to appeal either to reason or emotion, for the purpose of stimulating the desire for, and the widening of human knowledge and understanding, and of truthfully posing problems and their solutions in the spheres of economics, culture, and human relations (quoted in Leon, 1999:63).

In his theoretical work, Nichols (1991) suggests an open and rather unorthodox definition of documentary based on a multiple perspective. He believes that the documentary is a protean institution, consisting of a corpus of texts, a set of viewers and a community of practitioners and conventional practices that are subject to historical changes. He thereby sees the documentary as a conceptual shift in film theory, as it is not merely defined simply in terms of the argument, the purpose, the form, style and production methods, but instead he defines it by its changing nature as a social construct.

Since its very beginning, thus, documentary has been perceived as one of the most appropriate ways for spreading ideas and ideologies, either for or against the mainstream position. This is mainly due to the assumptions that characterize the public's reception of the genre: as Nichols argues, even when we acknowledge the creative activity that informed the movie, we still tend to consider single shots and sounds as pure documents of a reality that we could have observed ourselves. This oscillation between trust and distrust depends on the close kinship that documentary holds with those nonfictional systems that can be called "discourses of sobriety". Nichols (1991) also points out that systems such as science, economics, politics, education or religion are based on the assumption that they have

instrumental power, and that their discourse should effect action and entail consequences in the real world:

Discourses of sobriety are sobering because they regard their relation to the real as direct, immediate, and transparent. Through them power exerts itself. Through them, things are made to happen. They are vehicles of domination and conscience, power and knowledge, desire and will (Nichols, 1991:25).

Concerns about ethics in documentary film are not new, but they have intensified over the past several years in response to changes in the industry coupled with a lack of common standards to reference. The challenge in creating these frames of references lies in relationships between documentary film and journalism. Maccarone (2010) draws attention to the responsibility that filmmakers have for their subjects by raising questions of standards in documentary film. To Nichols, documentary film is “an institutional practice” that has rules, constraints and conventions that have been developed over time by documentarians. If Nichols is correct in his assessment that there is a social institution that loosely “governs” the practice of making documentary films, then there is a strong foundation for requiring standards of ethics, just as we do for the practices of other social institutions.

Nichols (1992) defines relationships between news and documentary film as derivative. The scholar suggests that documentaries as well as news aim to inform the audience, to tell the truth about the world. Winston (2000) uses journalism as a vehicle for speaking about ethics in documentary film because both claim to represent reality and hold tightly to the idea of truth telling. He suggests that documentary film has long been said to borrow from journalism.

Documentary film and television deal with reality in a more direct way than fictional narratives. Television documentaries have to be as objective as possible and are grounded on thorough inquiries, including interviews, audience surveys and investigations for relevant material in as many archives as possible. They can contain interview elements, visualizations in the form of graphics, experiments and demonstrations, and sometimes the author of the television documentary appears in front of the camera interviewing experts or speaking directly to the audience (Hickethier, 1993).

According to Ellis and McLane (2005) the documentary can be distinguished from fiction by five distinct characteristics. These are (1) subjects (2) purposes, viewpoints or approaches (3) forms (4) production methods and techniques and (5) experience offered to viewers.

(1) Subjects: Documentaries are primarily about topics broader than individual concerns, feelings, relationships and actions. They normally involve “public matters rather than private ones. People and places in them are actual and usually contemporary,” (Ellis and McLane, 2005: 2)

(2) Purposes: Documentaries are not made with the intention to entertain or to make audiences feel good. Their goal is to inform by passing on information with the hope that viewers will make better life choices (Ellis and McLane, 2005: 2).

(3) Forms: Rather than “creating content” documentaries extract and arrange its material from existing life experiences. Though any film will have a structure, documentaries “do not employ plot or character development as means of organization as do fiction film makers,” (Ellis and McLane, 2005: 2).

(4) Production method and technique: It is not just a matter of “what” is used in documentary that matters but also the *modus operandi* or the “how” of capturing the footage that is also taken into account. Basic realistic elements such as shooting on location instead of shooting in studio, using natural lighting instead of artificial light and using non-actors rather than professional ones are all examples of documentary’s production methods (Ellis and McLane, 2005: 2).

(5) Audience response: Ellis and McLane (2005) emphasize that documentaries offer audiences more than just an “aesthetic experience” but also “an effect on attitudes, possibly leading to action.” Audiences of documentary do not respond so much to the artist or the maker of the film as they do to its subject matter (Ellis and McLane, 2005: 3).

These characteristics are all in agreement with those values first championed by John Grierson who is also known as the father of the documentary mode as he was the first to theorise and give life to the documentary form (Ellis and McLane, 2005: 353). However, there are definitions which allude to a more specific style in qualifying a documentary. Considering the following statement by Paul Wells:

A non-fiction text use actuality footage, which may include the live recording of events and relevant research materials (i.e. interviews, statistics, etc.). This kind of text is usually informed by a particular point of view, and seeks to address a particular social issue which is related to and potentially affects the audience (quoted in Nelmes, 1999, P. 212)

However, as much as documentary theorists and film scholars agree that documentary resembles fiction in many ways (performance, narrative construction, narration, ideology, diegetic/extra-diegetic sounds, sound effects, structure), many also agree that documentary is not fiction. Bill Nichols (2001: 198) for example calls it “a fiction unlike any other.”

2.4.2.1. Categories of documentary

A more comprehensive mapping of documentary films has been created by Bill Nichols (2010). Nichols admits that each documentary film does not necessarily fall into one mode but can consist of a combination of modes. At the same time, the fluidity of the modes opens up the possibility for a variety of interpretations for documentary films. These modes serve as a skeletal framework that individual filmmakers flesh out according to their own creative disposition” (Nichols 2010: 143). The following summarizes features for each of the six Nichols’ modes of documentary film:

1. The poetic mode exhibits Modernist characteristics typified by the qualities of fragmentation, emotionalism, expressiveness and ambiguity.
2. The expository mode’s purpose is to disseminate information or to persuade. Images and footage are used to strengthen spoken narrative. A common feature is an authoritative voice-over as used in news and TV programs.
3. The observational mode uses film footage to chronicle a scene as it occurs. Seeking to be objective, the unobtrusive camera takes on the role of the audience, watching and observing the action.
4. The participatory mode relies on interviews, considering them to be a credible source of knowledge about the subject.
5. The reflexive mode focuses on the act of filming to apprise the viewer of the filmmaking process. An example is when one camera films a recording session taken by another camera.

6. The performative mode is identified as being subjective. Performed acts with an emotional intensity or uniqueness of vision are recorded to express the director's personal vision or enhance the narrative.

2.4.2.2. Documentary Films as Rhetorical Tools

Alongside this sociocultural aspect, an “aesthetic” dimension — this includes the editing and is identified by Corner (1986) as ‘the rhetoric’ of the documentary — plays a role in the impossibility of neutrality. According to Corner, each set of aesthetic/rhetorical devices within the range of documentary discourse (e.g. types of shot, forms of voice-over, conventions of interview method, editorial combinations of vision and sound, *vérité* sequences, use of music, etc.) brings potential pleasure to the viewer, thus obliterating objective perception (ibid.). Underlying this new approach is the assumed impossibility of neutrality, endorsed by many scholars in the field when discussing the sociocultural dimension of documentaries:

Documentary is inescapably an expression of the social relationships of its production and reception. The central for our understanding of the rhetoric of documentary, for the “how” of documentary construction is inseparable from the “why” of its accounting, and the rhetoric of neutrality generates the paradox of the impossibility of neutrality (Chaney & Pickering 1986: 31, quoting Dorothy Smith).

Documentary films are appealing because they show a different perspective of everyday life. Through this new experience people learn about past events, struggles, or heroism. Such films are an art form that contains much more than Hollywood special effects. Two qualities of documentary films that make them important to communication scholars are powerful narrative and perceived realism (Schowalter, 2000).

Powerful narrative

Like many films, documentaries utilize narratives to persuade the audience to feel or think a certain way. Narrative quality is measured by the internal consistency of the storyline, the quality of the editing, and the formatting qualities of the film. Narratives reflect popular culture and influence the audience by portraying stories of influential people, popular topics, or known tragedies. Narratives are important in showing how the emotive qualities of the artifact are successful in persuading the viewer (Schowalter, 2000).

Documentaries can provide narratives that describe complex political, social or environmental issues. Analysing these powerful narratives contributes to the ways scholars can comprehend documentary films. Uncovering the political themes in movies can be achieved by following Bill Nichols' method (1991), which "distinguishes between two forms of argument in documentary. Perspective 'is the view of the world implied by the selection and arrangement of evidence,' while commentary 'is the view of the world stated by the filmmaker or social actor recruited to the film'" (P. 90). The role of the critic is to identify the narratives in order to illuminate the messages that the filmmaker wishes to convey to the audience.

Perceived realism

Unlike many Hollywood films, documentaries are "real" in that they claim to present authentic or truthful accounts of history. The filmmakers' choices influence the believability of a film. Kerrigan and McIntyre (2010) contend that "for [a] documentary, it is about the documentary filmmaker's ability to ethically, truthfully, and skilfully capture and record a version of actuality on screen and use that to construct a narrative screen-based reality" (p. 117). Documentaries' perceived realism and ability to construct reality on the screen contributes to their persuasiveness in popular culture. Documentary films reflect the real world, but it is important to acknowledge that they manipulate reality through their attempts to represent it.

Audience expectations and assumptions contribute to the film's credibility. A documentary film is more believable because of the factual data it presents. Perceived realism influences an audience's ability to absorb the film's message and information. LaMarre and Landreville (2008) believe, "in terms of perceived external realism (i.e., degree of similarity between the message and reality), all of the documentaries were interpreted as more factually realistic than fictional films about the same content.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Qualitative approach to research

As indicated above, the usage of discourse analysis entails an intertwining relationship between theory and method. The methods used have to be closely connected to the theory and the research aim. This requires a methodological approach that makes it possible to analyse texts in quest for discourses as well as to analyse the meanings and representations that the different discourses intend to fix. In this regard quantitative research method is found to be less relevant in this study. This study is a typical qualitative research that investigates how the Nile riparian countries which battle for achieving hegemony over the Nile River represented in Aljazeera's documentary series 'Struggle over the Nile'. Qualitative analysis employing textual analysis was considered the most suitable method to understand the ideology, meaning creation and construction of the films and examine the kind of representations encoded by Aljazeera.

The qualitative analysis methods applicable to analysis of media content include text analysis, narrative analysis, rhetorical analysis, discourse analysis, interpretative analysis and semiotic analysis, as well as some of the techniques used in literary studies such as critical analysis, according to Hijams (1996). Within the broad hermeneutic tradition concerned with text analysis, there are two main strands particularly relevant to qualitative content analysis.

The corpus: Sampling and selection criteria

The corpus of media texts is based on purposive rather than random sampling. It consists of three documentary series under a major title 'Struggle over the Nile', on issues of the Nile River and the relations among riparian countries struggling to secure their share from the river. This documentary was directed and produced by Aljazeera's journalist Hussein Elrazzaz, an Egyptian citizen. The English and Arabic versions of the series were aired on the same days on Al Jazeera Arabic and Al Jazeera English, in June 2011. It was aired again in 2012 when the controversy over the use of Nile was heightened following Ethiopia's decision to divert the course of the Nile River for the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam which met strong opposition from Egyptian government. The documentaries are available on Aljazeera's website and youtube. This type of documentary belongs to a genre that can be categorised as the genre of politically committed documentary. Although every documentary can arguably be linked to a specific political ideology, what differentiates the

politically committed documentary from the rest of non-fictional films is its overtly politicised purpose together with, as in this case, the known political stand of the text producer, in this case the producer is an Egyptian citizen who has stake in the issue of the Nile.

Documentaries can provide narratives that describe complex political, social, or environmental issues. This study aims to investigate the stated documentary from a rhetorical perspective to understand how it framed the contested groups in a particular issue. This study seeks to explore how the documentary 'Struggle over the Nile' represent the two parties in controversy and utilize this popular media to entice people to the rivalry and cooperation among Nile riparian countries as well as how they effectively activate and manage meaning for the viewer.

3.2. Discourse Practice analysis approach

Discourse analysis is meant to provide a higher awareness of the hidden motivations in others and ourselves and, therefore, enable us to solve concrete problems, not by providing unequivocal answers, but by making one to ask ontological and epistemological questions (Olson 2007). Thus, it will not provide absolute answers to a specific problem, but enable one to understand the conditions behind a specific problem and make us realise that the essence of that problem and its resolution lie in its assumptions, the very assumptions that enable the existence of that problem. It can be applied to any text, that is, to any problem or situation.

Critical analysis reveals what is going on behind our backs and those of others and which determines our actions. It does not argue for or against the validity and truth of a certain research method, statement, or values, but focuses on the existence and message of texts and locate them within a historical overcome various forms of power over or to gain an appreciation and social context.

Discourse analysis has however much to say about media production, media content and reception. It can give us insights into how (unequal) power relationships are understood by media professionals, how they are represented within media texts and how audiences understand these asymmetrical relationships. With its focus on text and talk, discourse analysis Scan further our understanding of how language helps to perpetuate unequal relationships of power. As Deacon et al, (1999) state:

Discourse Analysis can show these processes at work in the realm of natural language by pointing to attempts to close meaning down, to fix it in relation to a given position, to make certain conventions self-evidently correct, to do creative repair work when something becomes problematic, and to make the subject positions of discourse transparently obvious without any visible alternatives (P. 154).

The concept of discourse is immensely popular with post-modernists in terms of how they undertake media analysis, the postmodern perspective has proven itself to be blinkered in terms of examining the increasingly concentrated nature of media ownership and how elite groups continue to influence and shape media content. Devereux (2003) points out:

... it can be used to examine how media texts are structured and how they may ultimately function at an ideological level. It can also be used to analyse the discourses employed by both media professionals and media audiences in the production and reception of media texts (P.107).

Discourse analysis studies real and often extended, instances of social interaction which take partially linguistic form. It is a resource for people who are trying to cope with the alienating and disabling effects of changes imposed upon them. With its critical views on the representational function of texts, Discourse Analysis should be a fruitful approach to the study texts in the documentary.

3.3. Analytical strategy

The focus of the strategy is how one should analyse the texts within discourse analysis. The method of this study builds on post structural discourse theory. Broadly, under the label of discourse analysis there is a vast number of research approaches. Discourse analysis does not constitute a single unitary approach, but rather a constellation of different approaches (Lea, 1996). There are therefore no standard approaches to examining texts, but rather a variety of ways of how to proceed. As stated by Phillips and Jørgensen (2002), there is no clear consensus as to how to analyse discourses (texts) and 'different perspectives offer their own suggestions'. Accordingly, in this study adopts a discourse analysis approach that incorporates different analytical tools based on different perspectives with the aim to bring new insights to the analysis. Howarth (2005) explained three kinds of textual analysis that are useful for this work. They are the analysis of 1) meaning, 2) rhetoric and 3) the construction

of subjectivity (Howarth, 2005). Hereunder I explain these three kinds of text analysis that are the methodological structure for this study.

3.3.1. Analysing the meaning

In the analysis of meaning, we are concerned with nodal points and floating signifiers. How should we look for the nodal points? A nodal point is a “centre” of a discourse in the sense that other elements get their meaning in relation to the nodal point. In other words, the method used to discover the nodal points is to find the “centre” of each discourse, to which all arguments in the end would be referred. There can be several nodal points within a discourse. The nodal points are empty signifiers because they are over-coded with meanings that cancel each other out. A study of the discourses’ of the Aljazeera’s documentary suggests that “right” is one of the main nodal points, and the other concepts such as historic, acquired, legal and sovereign get their meaning in relation to “right”.

3.3.2. Analysing the rhetoric

The logic of rhetorical articulation of floating signifiers shows the hegemonic battle. In this research, the analysis of rhetoric will concern the battle to achieve moral and legal ownership of the Nile River between the upstream and downstream countries. Hegemony here means a situation in which a particular meaning becomes the universal one (Laclau, 1996). Hegemony is limited in time; therefore, the hegemony is a project for a period of time in history. The major aim of hegemonic projects is to construct and stabilize a system of meaning or hegemonic formation (Howarth, 2000, Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 142). On a social level, such formations are organized around the articulation of nodal points, which underpin and organize social order (Howarth, 2000). The meanings of these privileged condensations are partially fixed on a particular set of signifiers. Hegemonic practices link different identities and political forces together in order to create a new social order. To analyse this hegemonic battle, one should observe the ideology-the myth and social imaginary- of the discourses that suggest a new social order.

3.3.3. Analysing construction of subjectivity

Discourses are intrinsically political; this is because their creation involves the formation of antagonisms and the establishment of political frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Howarth, 2000). According to van Dijk’s ‘ideological square’ it is very likely that the information suppressed refers to something negative about the authority or, conversely, to

something positive about someone or something in opposition to the authority. Generally one-sided picture of the issues discussed and fits in what van Dijk (1998) has called the 'ideological square': "1) express/ emphasize information that is positive about Us; 2) express/ emphasize information that is negative about Them; 3) suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about Them; 4) suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about us".

This study is especially informed by van Dijk's (1998b) discussion of the concept of group ideologies. The main social function of these ideologies is —the coordination of the social practices of group members for the effective realization of the goals of a social group, and the protection of its interests (van Dijk, p. 24). According to van Dijk, especially when conflicting group interests are involved, the typical content of group ideologies tends to be structured in a polarized way: —Self and Others, Us and Them ... We are 'Good' and They are 'Bad' (P. 25). The polarized structure of group ideologies might result in the polarization of discourses so that the in-group and their friends or allies receive positive description, while the out-group and their friends or allies receive negative description. The mass media could also be the site where dominated groups, provided they get access to it, can challenge the current socio-political dominance (Garrett & Bell, 1998).

3.4. Summery

The method of this study builds on post structural discourse theory. The data for this study is three documentary series. I analyse the texts through the floating signifiers "acquired" and "sovereign" around the nodal point 'right. The method for the analysis of the text is through the three types of text analysis, namely analysis of the meaning, the rhetoric and construction of subjectivity. The analysis of the meaning focuses on the nodal points and the articulated elements to fix the meaning of the floating signifiers. The analysis of the rhetoric focuses on the ideologies and the key concepts of myth and social imaginary. The analysis of construction of subjectivity is divided into two; 1) construction of ideas that focus on the construction of "inside" and "outside", chains of equivalence and constitutive outside. 2) Construction of political strategies that focus on the identification of the "outside" as "enemy" or "adversary".

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

4.1 Overview of the documentary series

The Aljazeera English's documentary is the main source for this research. It has its three-part series, under a major title "Struggle over the Nile". The three documentaries, Master no more, Legacy of dispute, and Tension and Suspicion, were aired on the same days for first time in June 2011 both on the Aljazeera Arabic and Aljazeera English channels. They were written, directed and produced by Aljazeera's Egyptian journalist Hussein Elrazzaz.

The first episode, Master no more, in the three-part 'Struggle Over the Nile' series examines attitudes towards the river in a country (Egypt) where 95 per cent of the population live along its banks and their fears that other Nile basin countries will challenge their historic control over its waters. The documentary narrates Egyptian efforts to control and be a master of the Nile - seeking to tame the river's unpredictable flow and ensure exclusive control over its use. Egyptians poet and political analysts describe their countries historical ties with the river Nile. They said Egyptian civilization is inextricably linked with Nile. The narrator said Herodotos's description of Egypt as a 'gift of the Nile' is fitting. Further, Everton Fox, Aljazeera's Mythologist reaffirmed the point saying without Nile Egypt is a land of barren and desert. Early explorers and adventurers were also interested to find the source of the Nile.

According to the documentary, Egyptians believe the Nile is unquestionably their river above and beyond any other Nile Basin country. The two Nile agreements also stated Egyptian historic right over the use of the river. But today, upstream countries are challenging this dominance and pushing for a greater say and greater share of the River Nile. Since 1960s African nations gained independence and challenged agreements which were signed when they were under colonial rule. To this day, Egyptians regard the 1929 and 1959 agreements as technically binding and they have refused to sign a new cooperative framework that revisits the usage of Nile waters.

The documentary revisited Egyptian efforts to control the Nile that included the construction of the Aswan High Dam. Aside the dam becomes a source of pride and prestige to Egyptians; it inflicted greater harm to communities particularly to Nubians who lived in southern Egypt and north Sudan. The efforts to build big dams on Nile River the documentary said causes negative impacts. In the interview, Lorry Pottinger, from International rivers USA said "Africa's large dams have not reversed poverty, they have not dramatically increased

electricity rates, they have not dramatically improved water supply for people living there ... What they have done is help create small industrial economy that tends to be companies from Europe and elsewhere and so these benefits are really concentrated in a very small elite.”

However, African countries continue to build hydroelectric power stations on the Nile river to meet chronic power shortages they have, stated in the documentary, With the exception of Egypt which has only 2 per cent shortage of the electricity other Nile riparian countries face chronic electric power shortages. Accordingly, Sudan (70 %), Ethiopia (85 %), Kenya (86 %), Tanzania (89 %) and Uganda (90 %) don't have electric power supply. Egypt does not oppose hydroelectric dams in the upper riparian countries but it will not allow upstream countries to build dams that will reduce the amount of water reaching Egypt, according to informants of the documentary. An Egyptian military analyst said “if someone is going to stop the water, Egypt will die of thirst. Then we will fight ... with all means available.”

Table 2. Informants of the documentary, ‘Master No More’

Interviewees	Nationality	Position
Abdo Shagar	Egyptian	Farmer
Abdul Ali Elshafei	Egyptian	Egyptologist
Abdul Monean Elgemacy	Egyptian	Fayoum University
Bassan Elshamma	Egyptian	Political Analyst
Hany Raslan	Egyptian	Political Analyst
Hassam Swailam,	Egyptian	Military analyst
Mamdouh Hamza,	Egyptian	Consultant Engineer
Moneer Beshir,	Egyptian	Nubian activist
Nader nour Eldin,	Egyptian	Agriculture Expert
Aba Dawit Ethiopian	Ethiopian	Orthodox Monk
Meles Zenawi	Ethiopian	Prime Minister
John Nyaoro	Kenya	Director of Water resources
Thonas Gutu	Kenyan	Fisherman
Terje Tvedt,	Norwegian	Bergen University Norway
Abdul Majld Mohammed,	Sudanese	Nubian activist
Ibrahim Rifai,	Sudanese	tour guide

Egypt does not need to enter in any agreements as there was not any project that affects its interest. History of suspicion and rivalry is not only on Nile but beyond the greatest river itself. A source of sustenance, but also one of tension even potential conflict the documentary concluded.

Table 3. Informants of the documentary, Legacy of Dispute

Interviewees	Nationality	Position
Ayman Abdul Wahab 44:	Egyptian	political analyst
Hany Raslam	Egyptian	Political analyst
Mohamoud Abulu Zaid	Egyptian	Former Minister of Irrigation
Rifaat Elsaid	Egyptian	Political analyst
Asfaw Dingamo	Ethiopian	Ministry of Water resources
Mwamutsya Ndebesa,	Kenya	Makerere university
John Nyaoro ,	Kenyan	Director of Water resources
Terje Tvedt,	Norwegian	Bergen University Norway
Atem Yaak Atem	South Sudanese	Journalist
Loro George Leju Lugor	South Sudanese	Minister of Agriculture
Alsadek Elmhady,	Sudanese	Former Prime Minister
Maymouna Hanza,	Sudanese	Nile University
Sharaf Elidin Bannaga,	Sudanese	Consultant
Yahia Abdul Majeed,	Sudanese	Former Minister of Irrigation
Beatrice Atm	Ugandan	Member of parliament
Maria Mutagamba	Ugandan	Minister of water and environment
Dane Kenedy University	USA	George Washington University

The final episode, Tension and suspicion, in the three-part Struggle over the Nile series explore the impact of Egypt's geopolitical rivalry with Israel and Ethiopia on the Nile. The documentary states the Nile is at the centre of geopolitical rivalry in the region. At its heart is Egypt, where suspicions about former enemies (showing Israeli flags) and tensions with an age-old civilisation (showing Ethiopia's pictures) reveal deep-seated fears about water scarcity and losing control of the river.

Arif Jamal,	Sudanese Nubian	University of California, Berkeley
Frank Muramuzi	Ugandan	Environmentalist
Simon D'Ujanga	Ugandan	State Minister of Energy
Toto Kloza	Ugandan	Tour guide
Everton Fox	USA	Meteorologist
Lorry Pottinger,	USA	International rivers USA
Peter Boshard,	USA	International rivers USA

The second episode, Legacy of dispute, examines the historical fascination with the Nile and the forces that shaped the way it is used today. It has two segments. In the first part of the documentary the narrator shed light on historical roots and present-day realities of the struggle over the Nile. It started by reviewing keying historical events: about exploration of the Nile, which led the colonization of African territories including the Nile basin. During the colonization periods most of the agreements and treaties on the use of the Nile waters were intended to protect the interest of the colonizers, in this case the British.

By 1902, Britain controlled Uganda, Sudan, and Egypt - the whole area around Lake Victoria. It also controlled Kenya. And they had an agreement with Ethiopia which secured the Blue Nile waters for Egypt and the Sudan. So in fact, by 1902, Britain was the ruler of the whole Nile basin. The documentary further argued that the way the British developed Nile control increased the regional inequalities in the Nile basin. At the same time, it is also very important to acknowledge that the British were the first to really approach the whole Nile basin as one planning unit - as one hydrological unit ... Britain was an imperial power with imperial strategic concerns. They also played power politics in the Nile basin of course.

Egypt and Britain entered into agreements in 1929 to secure the flow of the Nile River to Egypt there to protect Britain's economic interests. Other riparian countries were not the party of the 1929 and the 1959 agreements now challenging those agreements which give privileges to Egypt and to some extent to the Sudan. Upstream countries see the past agreements as the colonial relics and demand a new share of the Nile agreement. However, Egypt says its share is negligible and non-negotiable. The interviewees from Egypt argued that upstream countries have more water resources whereas Egypt is solely dependent on Nile. On the other hand, upstream countries argued the rainfall is unpredictable and the Nile is also their own resource emanated from their territories. The documentary concluded that

The documentary starts in reviewing the early efforts of establishing Jewish state in Sinai desert with plan to divert the Nile River through Suez Canal to Al Arish near to Palestine. Britain rejected the plan because it would affect her cotton farm production. But diverting the Nile to Sinai was not abandoned at all. Sadat used the Nile waters as bargaining chips to get back the Arab lands lost to Israel in Arab- Israel war in 1979. Consequently the Plan to divert to Sinai was implemented by Sadat's predecessor Mubarak. Some speculates Israel was the target but he rejected such claims.

Israelis also denied they have intention to get the Nile waters. The documentary hinted that Israel wants to establish relations with Africa, in upstream countries. Egyptian expert in interview states that Israeli's intention to establish relations with upstream countries is not to help them but to harm Egypt. But Israelis and upstream countries said their relations is purely government to government relations nothing to harm Egypt. On the other hand, Egyptians claim they failed to establish meaningful relations with African countries after the death of Nassir. The two governments of Sadat and Mubarek focused on establishing good relations with the west neglecting Africa. This helps Israel to have a strong foothold in Africa.

The second part of the documentary focused on upstream countries, particularly Ethiopia's effort to use the Nile. It stated that for more than 80 per cent of Ethiopians, the very thought of a light bulb is a dream and the Nile could help realise that dream. Harnessing the fast-flowing river descending from the Ethiopian highlands would generate electricity – reducing the country's chronic power shortage. But to date the full potential of the river remains untapped. But Egyptian saying any attempt to reduce the Nile flow to their country is considered as a hostile act so Ethiopia treads in fine line between exploiting the river for its development while not incurring harm to downstream countries, the documentary states.

Egyptians in interviews indicate that Egypt need to monitor the discharge of the river and prior notification before any project is implemented on the Nile Upstream countries. But most of the upstream countries in 2010 reject such veto powers of Egypt in Entebbe, Uganda. The documentary invited experts from Egypt and Sudan to review historical accounts of threats and confrontation coming from Ethiopia from the first Ethiopian king, Minilk I to the Soviet ally Mengistu. They said most threats were empty but some valid. And Egypt during the Sadat regime threatened Ethiopia with military attack if Ethiopia would decrease or stop the Nile flow getting help from Soviet.

The documentary states the Nile carries small amount of water compared to other trans-boundary rivers. And Sudanese water expert added that the water is not enough for Egyptian needs. In its conclusion, it states that the river Nile unites worlds of mountains, jungle, marshes, and deserts. But in a man-made world of nation states, a certain patriotism and politics the river has become a source of discourse. The Nile basin countries face a stuck of choice such as fear and tensions and cooperate or run the risk of confrontation and conflict. The Nile will endure but the continuing struggle over its waters can only spell ruin for all those who live in the banks at this great river.

Table 4. Informants of the documentary, 'Legacy of Dispute'

Interviewees	Nationality	Position
Ayman Abdul Wahab	Egyptian	political analyst
Hany Raslam	Egyptian	Political analyst
Mohamoud Abulu Zaid	Egyptian	Former Minister of Irrigation
Rifaat Elsaid	Egyptian	Political analyst
Asfaw Dingamo	Ethiopian	Ministry of Water resources
Mwamutsya Ndebesa,	Kenya	Makerere university
John Nyaoro ,	Kenyan	Director of Water resources
Terje Tvedt,	Norwegian	Bergen University Norway
Atem Yaak Atem	South Sudanese	Journalist
Loro George Leju Ligor	South Sudanese	Minister of Agriculture
Alsadek Elmhady,	Sudanese	Former Prime Minister
Maymouna Hanza,	Sudanese	Nile University
Sharaf Elidin Bannaga,	Sudanese	Consultant
Yahia Abdul Majeed,	Sudanese	Former Minister of Irrigation
Beatrice Atm	Ugandan	Member of parliament
Maria Mutagamba	Ugandan	Minister of water and environment
Dane Kenedy University	USA	George Washington University

All three documentaries are part of the analysis in this study. The main purpose of the present analysis is to provide an insight into a media content presented by Arab media, Aljazeera which deals with controversial regional issue, the Nile River. The method of this study builds on post structural discourse theory. The data for this study is three documentary series. This

study analyses the texts through the floating signifiers “acquired” and “sovereign” around the nodal point ‘right’. The method for the analysis of the text is through the three types of text analysis, namely analysis of the meaning, the rhetoric and construction of subjectivity. For this purpose three thematic approaches; seeking legitimacy on rights, hegemony and counter hegemony, and depicting ‘us’ and ‘them’ to analyse meaning, rhetoric and construction of meaning are used.

4.2. Seeking legitimacy on rights

This section explores how downstream and upstream Nile riparian countries articulate the concept of ‘right’ with the documentary film, ‘Struggle over the Nile’. A study of the discourses’ of the Aljazeera’s documentary suggests that “right” is one of the main nodal points, and the other concepts such as historic, acquired, legal and sovereign get their meaning in relation to “right”. The downstream countries, Egypt and the Sudan’s interpretation of right are the one that a colonial water agreement, particularly 1959, “no harm” is in the centre. An analysis of the discourses of upper riparian countries advocates that ‘equitable and reasonable share’ or “fairness” is one of the main nodal points.

The two principles which dominate the discussion, and are directly opposed, are the acquired right doctrine and the absolute territorial sovereignty (Waterbury, 2002). “The acquired right to a trans-boundary watercourse is achieved through long-standing historical use and resulting dependencies on it,” (ibid). In effect, the first user has more rights to the water flow than the second user, though these terms are necessarily difficult to define. Opposed to this is the absolute territorial freedom to use resources on one’s territory as one pleases. In case of the NRB, Egypt is a strong proponent of the acquired doctrine, while upstream states have advocated their sovereign right to the water. By far the most controversial treaty on the Nile is the bilateral 1959 Agreement which forms the backbone of the hydro-political dilemma in the Nile basin – downstream riparians want to maintain it while upstream riparian countries want to change it (Cascao, 2008: 245).

Egypt’s main argument is based on the ‘principle’ of historic or inherent right to use the Nile. Egypt in particular argues that as a desert nation it has no other option for survival but to depend on the river, while Ethiopia and others have other options including torrential rain to satisfy their water and agricultural needs. To this day, Egyptian regarded the 1929 and 1959 agreements as technically binding and have to be respected (Master no More; 00:11:58).

The downstream riparian states, particularly Egypt insisted that upstream countries should acknowledge previous agreements as integral to any new agreement. Egypt also holds the view that she has “natural and historic” rights over Nile waters acquired by long usage and recognised by other states like Great Britain and Sudan, and that the Nile Water agreements have been declaratory of international customary law relating to fluvial law (Godana, 1985). Egypt has based its Nile-related policy on an international water law principle known as the law of prior appropriation. The concepts of ‘historical rights’, ‘acquired rights’, and ‘established rights’ are derivatives and extensions of the law of prior appropriation. This stand is reflected in Aljazeera’s documentary by Egyptian experts. Ayman Abdul Wahab, Egyptian political analyst states:

We must uphold agreements this is a logic applied to the national boundaries you can’t change because they were demarcated by colonial powers. The agreement takes into account the fact that Egypt was almost ‘entirely dependent’ on the river's water, unlike other headwater states which have ‘alternative resources’ such as heavy rainfall or the sources of the Nile which are on the equator, a region of heavy forests and long stretches of the savannah (Legacy of dispute: 00:40:19).

Wahab’s argument centred on upholding colonial agreement which gave and recognized Egyptian historic right plus the nation is found in desert and has no other alternatives but ‘entirely dependent’ on the Nile’s water. The narrator in the first episode of the documentary ‘Struggle over the Nile’ state that Egyptians dependency and adoration of the Nile river has lead them feel possessive apart from the fact that the British awarded them the 1929 agreement which declared Egyptian exclusive control of the Nile. Hany Raslan, Egyptian Political Analyst, argued that the ‘1929 agreement’ states that Egypt has the ‘right to veto’ power on any projects on the Nile River that would affect its share or flow of the Nile towards north, to Egypt because Egypt is ‘completely dependent’ on the Nile river while upstream countries have other alternatives (Master no more; 00:09:43).

The 1929 agreement which Egypt and Sudan replaced with 1959 agreement was a bone of contention between the two countries. Sudan once under the colony of British opposed the 1929 agreement of Nile as it gained its independence in 1955. Sudanese consultant engineer, Sharaf-Eldin Banaga, noted that most of the Sudanese believe the Nile agreement favoured Egypt. Any agreement on the sharing of the Nile waters should consider the size of the

country; Sudan has large landmass that needs more waters (Master no more; 00:27:43). Sudanese argued that the 1929 agreements which allocated 4 billion cubic meters of the Nile waters to their country violated their right and failed to meet their needs. The agreement gave Egypt the right to monitor the flow of the Nile even outside of its territory. Yahia Abdul Majeed, former Sudanese Minister of Irrigation, recalled that his roommate in college was monitoring the level of the Nile waters in Sudan (Master no more; 00:28:06). These arguments show Sudanese were unhappy about the 1929 agreement which allocated small amount of the Nile's waters compared to the size of their territory. The agreement also violated their sovereignty as it gave Egypt the right to monitor the flow of the Nile within Sudanese territory.

Egypt subsequently replaced the 1929 treaty in 1959 with the 'Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters' which essentially allocated the entire flow of the Nile at Aswan Dam to Sudan and Egypt. According to the narration of Aljazeera's documentary, Egypt secured the 1959 agreements after Sudanese leader seized power in coup d'état which some said it was orchestrated by the Egyptian leader Nassir (Master no more; 00:28:5). In November 1958, the Sudanese army General Ibrahim Abdu took power. Rifaat Elsaid, Egyptian political analyst, says that the new government of Sudan backed by Nassir was in good term with Egypt and signed the 1959 agreement which increases Sudan's share of the Nile waters from 4 billion cubic meters to 18.5 billion cubic meters while Egypt gets 55.5 billion cubic meters (Master no more; 00:30:09).

The two agreements (1929 and 1959 agreements) predominantly benefited the downstream countries, particularly Egypt without benefiting upstream countries (Bulto, 2009). Upstream countries said those agreements and other colonial time treaties are pre-empting their rights. This sentiment was reflected in the second episode of the documentary in which the narrator stated that upstream countries see the past agreements as colonial relics, (Legacy of dispute; 00:39:13). Bea Beatrice Atm member of Ugandan parliament, articulates, "we have to revise agreements signed on the usage of the Nile waters since a lot of things happened and there is a need to revise the agreement to benefit the Nile basin countries equitably (Legacy of dispute; 00:41:12). The right way to share the Nile waters is by reviewing legal frameworks that did not recognize equity according to her argument.

However, Egyptians say their share is negligible and non-negotiable. Egyptian Council of Foreign Affairs, Abdul Ati Elshafei said "This agreement gives us minimal amount of water

less than what we need we are not harming any other Nile basin countries. They don't need the Nile they get their water from nature. The annual amount of rainfall in the Nile upstream countries is 1.3 trillion cubic meters of rainfall. Egypt and Sudan only get 5 per cent of it and the rest wasted in evaporation and swamps" (Master no more; 00:49:01).

Consonant with the preceding argument, Egyptian Political analyst , Hany Raslam, said in the documentary that the amount of the rainfall in the entire Nile basin is 1.3 trillion cubic meters but while it arrives downstream, it is only 85 billion cubic meters which means less than 5 per cent; the difference is not used in upstream countries, therefore we should put aside the small one which is 5 per cent and focus on building joint projects between Nile basin countries this will save a lot of water and we can divide it fairly between Nile Basin countries (Legacy of dispute; 00:42: 57).

The arguments of Elshafei and Raslam are to assure fairness on the usage of the Nile waters; there should be consideration of the amount of rainfalls in the Nile basin of which Egypt and Sudan have consumed only 5 per cent of it so far. The Egyptian share is very minimal so Egypt would not make any concession. This Egyptian argument is refuted by Ethiopian Minister of Water resources Asfaw Dingamo: "rainfall is not entitled here to be negotiated because it is based on nature and it is green water, and green water is not negotiated in any international agreement. That is why Ethiopia is demanding because the Nile water as well as all waters within its territory are its natural resources. That natural resource (Nile) – is the resource of every Ethiopian people" (Legacy of dispute; 00:43:56)

According to Asfaw's argument, Ethiopia has the sovereign right over its water resources including the Nile. The argument is of Ethiopia's sovereign rights over the Nile is shared by other riparian countries. Since 1960s upstream countries gained independence from British rule and rejected colonial agreements which violated their rights including the Nile water agreements signed between Egypt and Britain (on their behalf). When upstream countries championed for "right", they demanded fair and reasonable utilization of the Nile water, and sought to disregard all previous agreements to which they were not party. The narrator in the second episode states that upstream countries once were under British colonies consider Egypt's privileges as a violation of their sovereignty. The upstream countries see the past agreements as the colonial relics and demand a new share of the Nile agreement (Legacy of dispute; 00:40:02).

The colonial agreement is Egypt's starting point for negotiations in the Nile Basin and serve as security blanket because it guarantees a certain quantity of water for the country (cascao, 2009). But upstream countries have argued that the Agreement of 1959 which they are not signatories violate their sovereign right to exploit waters that flows within their territories. John Nyaoro, the director of water resources at Kenya's Ministry of Water and Irrigation, said that the Nile agreement signed in 1959 between the two countries (Egypt and Sudan) shares the water which emanates from other riparian states between these two countries (Master no more; 00:10:35). On the other hand, Professor Yacob Arsano, an associate professor of political science and international relations at Addis Ababa University, states, "the exclusion of Ethiopia in the agreements of 1929 and 1959 was a mistake (Tensions and Suspicions; 00:33:15)

Egyptian concerns to maintain their rights over the Nile waters were presented by Egyptian politicians, academicians and military experts. Egyptians said those colonial agreements and the 1959 agreements between Sudan should be dealt with in the same way the borders of most of the Nile Basin countries were respected as the boarders drawn by the colonial powers and recognised by international law. Therefore, Egyptian Nile waters right, which is equivalent to an Egyptian veto against any water and energy projects, has been opposed by upstream countries claimed their sovereign rights on the Nile waters which emanates from their territories.

4.3. Hegemony and counter hegemony

To analyse this hegemonic battle, one should observe the ideology-the myth and social imaginary of the discourses that suggest a new social order. The logic of rhetorical articulation of floating signifiers shows the hegemonic battle. In this research, the analysis of rhetoric will concern the battle to achieve moral and legal ownership of the Nile river between the upstream and downstream countries. Hegemonic practices link different identities and political forces together in order to create a new social order. The myth and social imaginary are the key concepts that we should focus in the analysis of rhetoric. The suggestion of an ideal social order guides us to find the myth and social imaginary. Laclau (1990) introduces the concepts of myth and social imaginary to capture new forms of identification. Here myths are new spaces of representation that attempt to cover over dislocations (Howarth, 2000:111).

The founding myths of many ancient civilizations centre on famous rivers as Egypt's civilization relied on the river Nile. Egypt's history is defined as much by the flooding and drying beds of the Nile as by the pyramids. For a country described by Herodotus as "the gift of the Nile," control over the majestic river has been an existential Egyptian preoccupation since antiquity. There is a longstanding belief that for Egyptian, "the Nile is Egypt and Egypt is the Nile." While the first part may be true, nevertheless, other Nile countries may not agree with the second part. Upstream countries equally admire the might of the river Nile.

The myth and social imaginary of the upstream and downstream riparian countries show their superior ideological beliefs to achieve the political and moral hegemony. This research attempts to point out and discuss how Aljazeera's documentary represented ideological argumentation of the two parties to achieve political, moral and intellectual hegemony on the use of the Nile waters.

Aljazeera's documentary narrator states that the ancient writers description of Egypt as the gift of Nile is fitting (Master no more; 00:02:03). Aljazeera's meteorologist, Everton Fox, says that without Nile Egypt would be another part of the Sahara desert, it is the lifeblood of Egypt (Master no more; 00:03:12). The narrator states that Nile attaches to the source of life as 95 per cent of Egyptian population lives along the banks of the river on 5 per cent of Egypt's land and the rest is just desert. Furthermore, the narrator says Egypt is the birth place of agricultural technology aged thousands of years and is still in use. Abdo Shagar Egyptian farmer says he is still used to plough with two oxen, (Master no more; 00:07:38).

Explaining the historical attachments of Egypt, to the river Nile Bassan Elshammaa, Egyptologist, says that ancient Egyptian paintings and sculptures depicted large breast and bellies' which symbolize the fertility and generosity granted by Nile. People don't eat jewels they eat breads made of wheat that grew on the bounty of the Nile (Master no more: 00:06:56). The first episode examines attitudes of Egyptians where 95 per cent of the population live along the banks of the Nile. They fear that other Nile basin countries will challenge their historic control over their waters.

Ethiopians also admire the might of the Nile River. Yacob Arsano says that Ethiopians call the Blue Nile "the Abbai" – a word carrying a sense of reverence and adoration (Tensions and Suspicions; 00:25:03). Aba Dawit, Ethiopian Orthodox monk, says the Nile is one of the rivers mentioned in the holy bible (Master no more: 00:05:09). On the other hand, Sudanese Nubian, Ibrahim Rifai, says all Nubians live on the banks of the Nile. The Nile is our life.

Like a fish we would die if we left it (Master no more; 00:28:14). These attachments to the river are natural but it has also created a strong sense of belongingness. The documentary states that the dark side of Egyptian admiration leads them to feel possessive. For Egypt the Nile is unquestionably their river above and beyond the claims of any other Nile Basin country (Master no more; 00:08:45).

The admiration and curiosity to know more about the Nile river go beyond people who live in the basin. In the 19th century explorers travelled across the Nile basin areas in search of the source of the Nile. In 1859, the British explorer John Hanning Speke crossed to east Africa where he found a huge lake which he believed to be the source of the Nile. The following year, he travelled around this lake – today known as Lake Victoria - to discover the Nile flowing out from its northern side. Other explorers such as Samuel Baker, David Livingstone and Henry Morton Stanley helped complete the picture about the true source of the Nile, the narrator said (Legacy of dispute; 00:07:02). But people from upstream countries said it is a mistake to call it discovery. Mwamutsya Ndebesa, Makerere University argued that they were not the first to explore the river:

It was mistakenly called 'discovery', in most books in the past said Speke discovered the Nile as he was the first human being to see the Nile ... when actually he was the first European to see the source of the Nile but not discovered it, because he was even shown the source of the Nile by the Africans here (Legacy of dispute; 00:07:44).

Controlling the Nile has been the key undertaking of Egyptians throughout history. But it was the British once controlled the full length of the river Nile, harnessed it for their own benefits and created complicated relations among Nile riparian countries. The narrator states that by 1902, Britain controlled Uganda, Sudan, and Egypt - the whole area around Lake Victoria. It also controlled Kenya. And they had an agreement with Ethiopia which secured the Blue Nile waters for Egypt and the Sudan. So in fact, by 1902, Britain was the ruler of the whole Nile basin (Legacy of dispute, 00:11:08). Consequently, “from source to mouth the river was for the first time controlled from one centre; and from London, and by the British government” (Tvedt, 2010: 3).

According to Professor Terje Tvedt, Norwegian Geographer, when the British took control of Egypt in 1882, they very soon realised that they had become rulers of a society totally

dependent upon the Nile. So they understood from the very beginning that the economic development and political stability of Egypt depended upon [control of] the Nile (Legacy of dispute; 00:14:24). The British awarded Egypt the 1929 agreement which gives Egypt a veto power over the Nile with no consideration of other riparian countries. The agreement granted Egypt a veto power over any other riparian development projects that might affect the flow of the river to Egypt. The agreement states that “except with the prior consent of the Egyptian Government, no irrigation works shall be undertaken or electric generators installed neither along the Nile and its branches nor on the lakes from which they flow” (Article 4 (ii) of the 1929 Agreement). In 1959 Egypt and Sudan also agreed on dividing the river's waters without repudiating the former agreement. The agreement served to reestablish the pre-existing rights of Egypt, and might be said to have granted Egypt her natural and historic rights to the Nile water while giving limited rights to Sudan. On the other hand, the upstream states regarded the treaty as an outdated and colonial agreement that ignored the needs of other riparian nations (Cascão 2009:245).

Ethiopia, the source of about 85 per cent of the Nile's water, was not part of the agreement and refused to acknowledge it. In 1956, Ethiopia was one of the first upper riparian states to express its position on the agreement, stating that “Ethiopia simply does not acknowledge any existing treaty or other obligations preventing it from freely disposing of the Nile waters on its territory” (Godana 1985, as cited in Knobelsdorf 2005:630). In the same vein, following the achievement of independence in the 1960s, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya contested the validity of the agreements and refused to be bound by them (Cascão, 2009).

The colonial power in this case, Britain did not lay the ground work for upstream and downstream countries to reach an amicable rapprochement in the future. It is only Egypt that wishes to maintain the status quo. In the second episode the narrator notes, “to this day, Egyptians regard the 1929 and 1959 agreements as technically binding and they have refused to sign a new cooperative framework that revisits the usage of Nile waters” (Master no more; 00:10:58). To this end, Egyptian political analyst, Hany Raslan says, “Egypt need to monitor the discharge of the river and prior notification before any project is implemented. The Nile Upstream countries can use the water on the condition that they don't harm downstream countries and are obliged to notify Egypt” (Tensions and suspicions; 00:3023).

Aljazeera's documentary notes that Egypt considers any change to the agreement as tantamount to a strategic threat and has repeatedly threatened to use all means available to

prevent violation of the agreement (Master no more; 00:46:29). According to the narrator, securing the Nile is a matter of national security even if it could take a military action, a common feeling shared by most Egyptians. Abdu Shagar, Egyptian farmer, says, “We will fight anyone who tries to stop our resources” (Master no more; 00:15:18).

Upstream countries reject Egyptian hegemony over the Nile and push forcefully for greater share. Particularly, Ethiopia has argued that it has a complete sovereign right to exploit the waters within its territory. This includes utilizing Nile waters in reasonable and equitable manner even if there is a decrease in the quality of and quantity of flow into Sudan and Egypt (Bulto, 2009). In conformity to this argument, Meles Zenawi, former Ethiopian Prime Minister, said, “some people in Egypt have old-fashioned ideas based on the assumption that the Nile water belongs to them and that Egypt has the right to decide ... who gets what of the Nile water and that the upper riparian countries are unable to use the Nile water because they will be unstable and because they will be poor. These circumstances have changed, and changed forever” (Master no more; 00:12: 89).

Since 1960s African nations gained independence and are challenging agreements signed while they were under colonial rule. The state of South Sudan came into existence in the middle of this tension. As most of upstream countries did after gaining their independence, South Sudanese also oppose colonial agreements. Loro George Leju Ligor, South Sudanese Minister of Agriculture says that we must revise those agreements because South Sudan is no longer in the agreement (Legacy of dispute, 00:38:44).

The struggle to control and use the Nile was spearheaded by British and maintained by Egypt. For centuries, Egypt has sought to be Master of the Nile seeking to tame the river's unpredictable flow and ensure exclusive control over its use. The narrator notes that the founder of modern Egypt Mohamed Pasha in 19th century built the biggest dam on the Nile for the first time but it was Nassir who achieved to control the flow of the waters to tap its full potential building the Aswan high dam (Master no more, 00:18:16). The dam can only stop the flow of the river inside Egypt but the waters originated outside the borders so the construction of dam in any upstream country will negatively affect Egypt. A natural disaster such as drought affected the amount of waters but it is the construction of dams that worry Egyptians the most. The narrator states that the prospect of building dams warns Egyptians especially if that country is Ethiopia (Tensions and suspicions, 00:31:05). The technical capacity to build hydraulic infrastructures is one of the pillars of power asymmetry to assure

level of hydro-hegemony. The narrator says the number of hydro-electric dams along the course of the Nile is on the rise with the exception of Egypt, upstream countries launched projects that could threaten the natural flow of the Nile to Egypt (Master no more, 00: 46:04).

To manage competing interests, riparian countries including Egypt established the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) to smoothen the process of basin wide cooperation until the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) is put in place. After a decade's of negotiations six riparian countries signed the CFA while Egypt and Sudan refused to do so. The narrator says that in an unprecedented manner, six of the eight nations signed a new agreement declaring greater autonomy and decision making (Master no more, 00:13:28). According to Cascao (2008), the CFA is the strongest counter-hegemonic tactic to challenge Egypt's hydro-hegemony the upstream discourse coalition has put forward.

Egyptians consider the issue of Nile is as a matter of national security and opposed any change of its current use. Hassam Swailam, Egyptian military analyst, says it is redline for Egyptian existence because Nile is Egypt's only resource (Master no more, 00:14:16). The intent of such positioning seems by all accounts to be perpetuated through Egyptian attempts to continue to impose 'red lines' on, or at least to stall, the negotiations. Thus far, the status quo continues to reflect the power relations in the basin in favour of the basin hegemon.

However, upstream countries push for greater saying and share on the Nile. In the second episode of the documentary, the interviewee Beatrice Atm, member of Ugandan parliament says there is a need to revise the agreement to benefit the Nile basin countries equitably (Legacy of dispute, 00:41:12). Egypt wants to maintain its current use based on the disputed historical treaties. In the second episode of the documentary Egyptian political analyst, Hany Raslam states that the colonial agreements gave Egypt minimal amount of water so we should put aside (Egyptian share) and focus on building joint projects between Nile basin countries (Legacy of dispute, 00:44:31). According to Raslam's argument, to achieve fairness on the use of the Nile waters, it is not for Egypt to concede its current share but to help other riparian countries to use other resources.

Egyptian myth of the "historic right" is an attempt to cover over the dislocation in which upstream countries introduced a different interpretation of right, equitable and reasonable way to share the Nile waters. Upstream countries accuse Egypt digging its hill by refusing to relinquish from its previous positions entrench its positions. Egypt says that its share is negligible and non-negotiable. Accordingly, Egypt refused to sign the CFA as the fact on the

ground is favourable to Egypt's position. At the end of the second episode Egyptian politician, Raslan says, "we don't need to rush to sign things for foreseeable future. What is important is what is on the ground. The fact there is no any big dam being constructed which affects Egyptian interest" (Legacy of dispute, 00:45:33). However, the narrator notes that the status quo is unlikely to hold as upstream countries demanding larger share (Legacy of dispute, 00:46:17).

The role of myth is essentially hegemonic: it involves forming a new objectivity by means of the rearticulation of the dislocated elements (Torfing, 1999). According to the hydro-hegemony framework, the hydro-hegemon uses four water resource control tactics: coercion, utilitarianism, norms, and ideology (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006). Cooperation is a dislocated element in hegemonic struggle over the control of the Nile River. We should make this question "what did the upstream and downstream riparian countries suggest as the ideal social order?" Here the myth, "Egypt is the gift of Nile" provides moral values and norms. This condition for emergence of myth is structural dislocation and the function of myth is to suture the dislocated space through the constitution of a new space of representation (Torfing, 1999).

In analysis of the debates between upstream and downstream riparian countries on the issues of "Nile use rights", the myth is their presentation of the norms and values within these issues. The dream of a win-win solution is an example of social imaginary. Social imaginary is a myth in which the fullness of the surface of inscription continues to dominate (Torfing, 1999). Myth is thereby transformed into a social imaginary or to a horizon that sees as a future project. This project is constructed in social antagonism that excludes other alternatives.

Deeper examination of each arguments presented by politicians and academicians from upstream countries reveals evidence of counter-hegemonic mechanisms employed by the non-hegemonic states, with the aim to change the outcomes of water control and allocation towards a more equitable configuration.

4.4. The 'us' and 'them' Dichotomy

Discourses are intrinsically political; this is because their creation involves the formation of antagonisms and the establishment of political frontiers between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' (Howarth, 2000). According to van Dijk's 'ideological square', it is very likely that the

information suppressed refers to something negative about the authority or, conversely, to something positive about someone or something in opposition to the authority. Generally one-sided picture of the issues discussed and fits in what van Dijk (1998) has called the 'ideological square': "1) express/ emphasize information that is positive about Us; 2) express/ emphasize information that is negative about Them; 3) suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about Them; 4) suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about us".

This study is especially informed by van Dijk's (1998b) discussion of the concept of group ideologies. The main social function of these ideologies is —the coordination of the social practices of group members for the effective realization of the goals of a social group, and the protection of its interests (van Dijk, p. 24). According to van Dijk, especially when conflicting group interests are involved, the typical content of group ideologies tends to be structured in a polarized way: —Self and Others, Us and Them ... We are 'Good' and They are 'Bad' (p. 25). The polarized structure of group ideologies might result in the polarization of discourses so that the in-group and their friends or allies receive positive description, while the out-group and their friends or allies receive negative description. The mass media could also be the site where dominated groups, provided they get access to it, can challenge the current socio-political dominance (Garrett & Bell, 1998).

This study examines this condition of social antagonism by showing the construction of chains of equivalence and the constitutive outside. I analyse the debates on 'the right to use the Nile waters' to show the construction of chains of equivalence and the constitutive outside. The discourse analysis of the concept of 'right' in Aljazeera's documentary shows the ideological antagonism to fix the meaning of the acquired right and equitable right principles. To describe the construction of subjectivity I distinguish how the informant of the Aljazeera's documentary series constructed their agonistic political strategy identifying the 'outside' as 'enemy' or 'adversary'.

4.4.1. Israel versus Egypt

Drawing on Arab mental representations, values, assumptions, and beliefs, which Fairclough (2001) refers to as members' resources, about Israel, and reflecting on Arab (Egypt)-Israeli conflict, the documentary categorically included Israel's involvement in the Nile controversies. The nationality of the documentarian may have a factor to include Israel in the Nile conflict knowing the longstanding discord between the two countries.

The narration of the third episode of the Struggle over the Nile starts with the statement, “the Nile is a key to geopolitical rivalry in the region at its heart Egypt where suspicion about former enemies (showing Israel’s flag) and tensions with old-age civilisation (showing Ethiopian pictures) reveal deep seated fears about water scarcity and losing control of the river (Tensions and Suspicions, 00:02:41). The documentarian speculates Israel has had vested interest on Nile traced back even before it had statehood. According to the documentarian Israel had an intention to use the Nile for the establishment of the state of Israel. The plan was to divert the course of Nile via Sinai desert to Israeli settlement near to Palestine. But the British the then ruler of Egypt rejected the plan because it would affect their cotton production (Legacy of dispute, 00:3:51).

The narrator went on explaining the reason Israel wants to establish diplomatic relations with African upstream Nile countries. “Since its establishment in 1948, Israel is surrounded by hostile Arab neighbours. Israel seeks to find friends elsewhere. Israel establishes relations with non-Arab African countries” (Tensions and suspicions; 00:11:53). According to this narration having inauspicious relations with its Arab countries, Israel sought friends in Africa where Egypt has had a vested interest. The narrator noted that Egypt is wary of Israel’s activities in Africa. Egypt suspects Israel is trying to politically outflank Egypt by being friendly with countries that could influence the flow of the Nile river. Egyptian Helemy Moussa, expert in Israel Affairs, explains, “Historically, the most important relationships Israel built on the African continent were with Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya. And it is no coincidence that all of them are upstream countries where the Nile originates. They did build relationships with other countries. But the river Nile was the major factor behind the formation of Israeli policy and strategy” (Tensions and Suspicions, 00:19:54).

Further explaining Moussa’s point on Israel’s policy and strategy establishing relations with upstream Nile countries, Hany Rasleam, Egyptian political analyst, states “Israel has a clear strategy since its establishment. It focuses on having a presence in upstream countries to create problems for Egypt on the issues of the Nile River to encircle and create internal difficulties because if Egypt has a water crisis and then it will have development problems and national security and preoccupied with its internal problems” (Tensions and Suspicions, 00:21:07).

The documentary shows Israeli ambassador to Kenya with local farmers. The ambassador, Jacob Keidar said the basic assistance Israel gave to local farmers is to enable them to

achieve more yield and crops with less labour and, water and fertilizers. The narrator states that Israel empowers local communities in Africa and winning friends (Tensions and Suspicions, 00:10:49). He went on to say that others suspect Israel's presence in Africa particularly in upstream countries like Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia is more to do with politics than with aid. Sadia Almhadi, former Sudanese minister, states, "Israel is not charity; it seeks to harm Egypt. It is the nature of Israel politics" (Tensions and Suspicions; 00:11:26).

In 2010 (a year upstream countries signed the CFA), Israel's foreign minister Lieberman became the first high level official to visit African countries since 1960s arouse concerns in Egypt. They felt Israel is muddling in their backyard (Tensions and Suspicions; 00:20:01). The documentary however speculates that the minister's visit coincided with intense point in which Egypt and other Nile riparian counties failed to reach an agreement on sharing the Nile waters. Egyptians said Israel is behind the renewed pressure their country faced to make concessions.

Israel and upstream countries rejected Egyptians' accusation of forging relationships to harm Egypt. Asfaw Dingamo says Israel can't dictate us what to do with the Nile. The visit of Lieberman is strictly government to government business (Tensions and Suspicions, 00:19:54). Ambassador Keidar also noted that the minister came with big business delegation to establish economic ties with African countries.

The narrator said that Israel faced tough competition in 1960s with Nassir who was one of the founding fathers of the Organization of African Union (OAU) earned respect in African countries. In 1967 Israel- Arab war, OAU condemned Israel's invasion but Nassir's successor Anwar Sadat failed to capitalise on Egypt's strategic relations with Africa. Instead he builds relations with the west and secured peace with Israel. He turned his back against pan-African policy. Hosni Mubarak followed his predecessor (Tensions and suspicions, 00:13:06).

The assassination attempts of Mubarek in Addis Ababa in 1995 caused his turn away from the African states. His absence was a strategic error allowing Israel to gain a political foothold in Africa. By 1990s many African nations reopened their embassies in Israel and established diplomatic relations (Tensions and Suspicions, 00:15:04).

The documentarian states that the diversion of the Nile to Sinai once planned by Israeli has never been abandoned. Sadat used the Nile waters as a barraging chip to get back the Arab lands lost to Israel in Arab- Israel war in 1979. These fears have made Egypt suspicious about

reported plans to divert the Nile to a former enemy (Tensions and suspicions: 00:03:06). The interviewee Nabil Elaraby, Egyptian Foreign Minister, says the two countries made peace but the idea of materializing the plan was void. Abdul Ati Elshafei said Sadat's plan was a good trick played to secure the signing of the peace agreement though; he never intended to implement the plan or the Nile offer (Tensions and suspicions, 00:07:02).

However, the plan to divert the Nile water to Sinai was implemented by Sadat's predecessor Mubarek, some speculates the target was Israel but Hosni Mubarek rejected such allegations. In a film footage taken at the inauguration of the project he said, "This is an Egyptian project we have sufficient water we will give water to anyone if someone wants to give us water they are welcome" (Tensions and Suspicions; 00:08:00).

Israelis reject such notion to out manoeuvre Egypt. Raphael Semiat, Water Research Institute Israel, we have no any intention to get the Nile water. It is a mere speculation; we resolve our water problems in Ngaave desert implementing an innovative technology. Uri Shamir Institute of Technology Israel said the technology is useful anywhere else (Tensions and Suspensions, 00:09:17)

4.4.2. Egypt versus Ethiopia

The narrator states in the third episode of the Struggle over the Nile that the first Egyptian president after the revolution who visited African countries including Ethiopia but the struggle over the Nile won't be resolved; it goes back thousands of years. Egypt and another African oldest civilization seem to be locked in bitter rivalry (Tensions and Suspensions, 00:32:07).

Acrimony between the two civilizations has always centred on the Nile. The narrator traced back the rivalry some three thousand years at time of the first King of Minlik I. Aljazeera's interviewee Yahia Majeed, former Sudanese Irrigation minister says the first king of Ethiopia Minilik used to threaten Egypt saying he would divert the course of the river to the Red Sea away from Mediterranean. This threat was made and all the rulers of Egypt used to send gifts to emperors to stop diverting the river (Tensions and suspicions, 00:34:06).

Abdul-Moneam Gemaey, Egyptian historian "by the time Mohamed Ali began to rule Egypt in 1805, many threats had been made by the Ethiopian emperors to stop the water reaching Egypt. Most were just empty threats - but some were valid. Every time there was a new ruler

in Egypt, they would threaten him and blackmail him so that he paid gold to the Ethiopian emperor (Tensions and suspicions, 00:36:34)

The narrator noted that the difference in religion is another factor for conflict, from the 4th century onwards Ethiopia became a Christian state and from 7th century Egypt adopted Islam (Tensions and suspicion, 00:34:54). Here the missing element that should be included is that the relationship Ethiopian Orthodox Church had with Egyptian Coptic Church which lasts till 1959. The split between the two churches was one of the turning points in Ethio-Egyptian relation aside from the controversies over the Nile. The main reason for the separation of the two churches was according to Erlich, (2012) the Egyptian decision to sign the 1959 Nile agreement and the construction of the Aswan High Dam. This was one of the turning points in the history of Ethiopia as the Egyptian Church was a decisive factor in legitimising the monarchical powers in Ethiopia.

Reviewing the confrontational relations between the two countries, the narrator states that at the end of the 19th century, Egyptian Kadive Ismael grandson of Ali tried to occupy all areas of the Nile basin. He managed the Sudan and for the first time face to face across the common boarder but his expedition failed in war with Ethiopia. Egypt's army was crushed in 1876 and they had to retreat (Tension and suspicion, 00:37:26). In the next century by 1950s it became more personal diminution by leaders larger than life – Egypt's President Nassir, and Emperor Haile Selassie both saw themselves as African leaders. In 1970s political changes in each country raised tensions further. Egypt abandoned the leftist ideas and Soviet Union and turned to the west. Ironically, a few months later in September 1974 the Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie was overthrown in military coup, which turned Ethiopia into a communist country. The two countries got right back to where they started political standoff on different sides of the Cold War. Once again the river Nile was at the centre of this tension.

When Egypt's relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, the Soviet Union in coordination with Ethiopia responded by building dam over the Nile river to stop the flow of the water to Egypt to punish Sadat for being a friend with the west. But Sadat threatened Ethiopia with military attack if Ethiopia would decrease or stop the Nile flow (Tensions and suspicions, 00:39:13).

In these days, the documentary noted that Ethiopia continues to use the Nile without compromising Egyptian concerns. In his interview with Aljazeera documentarian Assfaw

Dingamo said Ethiopian government and people demand equitable share of the Nile. "We are not an enemy of Egyptian people or government" (Tensions and Suspicions, 00:41:13).

Egyptian politicians and academicians in their interviews expressed their fears and suspicions about cooperating with Nile. They articulated the antagonistic relations continue to exist as far as there is a plan being implemented over the Nile. People from Ethiopian side attempted to pursue an agonistic strategy of cooperation with Egyptians despite the fact that Egyptian approaches and positions were antagonistic in nature.

4.4.3. Building dams versus people

Hydro-hegemony is taken as 'hegemony at the river basin level, achieved through water resource control strategies including building dams. It was the founder of modern Egypt Mohamed Pasha who constructed the first dam to control the flow of the Nile river but Nassir only achieved the control of the flow of the Nile constructing the Aswan High Dam. The Project was immense and the concretes used could build 17 great pyramids. As Terje Tvedt, Bergen University, noted that the Aswan dam has given Egyptian a guarantee that there would always be water during drought in 1970s and 1980s in Sudan and Ethiopia, (Master no more, 00:18:16).

Elsewhere the river is untamed, people in upstream countries live at the mercy of the Nile experiencing at times either famines or devastating floods. Playing with nature is costly for the river and those who lives there. Aswan high dam, the man's greatest effort ever to control the Nile the annual flood and huge water supply for Egypt behind its great wall but there was the price to be paid. Nader Nour Eldin, Egyptian agriculture expert minted out that prior to the construction of the dam the river Nile used to bring 4 million tons of fertile silt each year. It was deposit on the land. It was like a natural fertilizer (Master no more, 00:25:01).

This silt washed from the Ethiopian highlands was no longer carried to Egypt. It is now dropped uselessly to the bed of the manmade reservoir behind the dam due to this, Egyptian farmers are increasingly relied on artificial fertilizers. Abdu Shegar, an Egyptian farmer, said that his grandfather used only one sack of chemical fertilizer for a hectare of land but these days each hectare needs seven sacks (Master no more, 00:28:19).

The loss of natural fertility on Egypt's farmland is not the only negative effect of the Aswan high Dam. Situated on the bank of the river Nile, Nubia is a home of many ancient temples. But during the 1960s following the construction of the Aswan high dam, the rising high water

threatened to submerge these monuments. Archaeological sites were saved but people living in the area received no such consideration (Master no more, 00:27:55).

Nubians in South Egypt and North Sudan were forced to move. Abdul Majid Mohammed, Nubian activist in Sudan said that Nubians were displaced from their hometown. "It is harsh we paid huge sacrifices" (Master no more, 00:30:49). Civilisation of thousand years was uprooted. The Nubian called their land the land of gold but it has gone forever just for a meagre sum of money. Moneer Beshir, Nubian activist Egypt, says "they whip out our identity none of the new settlement is on the bank of the river" (Master no more, 00:32:49).

The narrator stated that despite their displacements from homelands, Nubian's have done a lot to keep their tradition and distinctive language. Many Nubian songs centred to return to the Nile. There are still many Nubian communities in northern Sudan like their forefathers on the banks of the river Nile. Even now they are under threat. In 1992 the Sudanese government announced its intention to build a huge hydroelectric dam in Nubia. The plan project known as Kajpar dam would use the Nile to boost Sudan's power supply. Once again Nubian's being is sacrificed for development (Master no more, 00:35:41).

Arif Jamal, University of California, Berkeley Sudanese Nubian, in interview with the documentarian said that there is no social or environmental assessment being done and the community was against it. And the narrator noted that environmental and human factors made many international donors very wary of providing loans for large hydrological schemes on the Nile but the rise of new power on the world stage has given a new momentum for unconditional loans (Master no more, 00:35:57). Peter Boshard, International Rivers USA, said that the China funds projects that the western nations not dare to start because of the catastrophes and human costs. The narrator says The Meroe project is such projects funded by Chinese.

Lorry Pottinger, International Rivers USA says:

"Africa's large dams have not reversed poverty, they have not dramatically increased electricity rates, they have not dramatically improved water supply for people living there ... What they have done is help create small industrial economy that tends to be companies from Europe and elsewhere and so these benefits are really concentrated in a very small elite" (Master no more: 00:39:18).

The narrator said that the number of hydropower stations on the river Nile is on the rise. Uganda is constructing two hydropower stations on the outlets of Lake Victoria but they don't generate enough electricity for the growing needs of the country. The fall is threatened by the construction of new dam. The Busha Gali Dam a new hydropower station met only a fraction of the country's electricity requirements. Frank Muramuzi Ugandan environmentalist says "extracting more waters to generate electricity, the level of Lake Victoria went down more than two meters" (Master no more, 00:44:26).

Narrator noted that Lake Victoria is the largest lake in Africa and one of the most renowned sources of the Nile yet it is slowly and gradually shrinking. The increasing number of hydropower stations on the Nile is withdrawing greater amount of water to generate electricity. Thonas Gutu, Kenyan fisherman says "we don't have enough fish as the hydropower will pull the water out of the lake" (Master no more, 00:46:04).

The narrator stated that Egypt does not oppose hydroelectric dams in the upper riparian countries but it will not allow upstream countries to build dams that will reduce the amount of water reaching Egypt. Hassam Swailam, an Egyptian Military analyst says, "if someone is going to stop the water, Egypt will die of thirst. Then we will fight ... with all means available" (Master no more, 00:46:57). Explaining Ethiopia's position on the Nile, former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said "Egypt will not be able to stop Ethiopia from building dams on the Nile. That is history... and that will not be part of the solution... (Tensions and Suspicions; 00:31:28).

According to the arguments of the anti-dam campaigners, indigenous people living on the bank of the Nile, and their livelihood would be threatened by dam constructions whereas those building dams in Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda argued that they have rights and good reasons to build dams.

4.4.4. Forging common ground

As antagonism can be resolved through hegemonic intervention to arrive at objectivity according to Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, it is possible that here we can observe a move from antagonism to objectivity, with the quasi disappearance of the reluctant cooperation discourse.

For more than 80 per cent of Ethiopians, however, the very thought of a light bulb is a dream. The Nile could help realise that dream. Harnessing the fast-flowing river descending from the Ethiopian highlands would generate electricity – reducing the country's chronic power shortage. But to date the full potential of the river remains untapped. Decades of civil unrest and war have hindered Ethiopia's ability to develop. Instead, it remains one of world's poorest countries, according to the documentary. In his interview with the documentarian Kifele Harro, Ethiopian Engineer, said that Ethiopia has a huge potential in hydroelectric generation and the government plan to generate 10,000 megawatt of electricity in five years. Projects implemented such as Tana Beles hydroelectric projects don't affect the flow of the Nile river.

The numbers of hydropower station are increasing to meet chronic power shortages. However, the construction of dams in Africa was not only opposed by right groups on the documentary but also by local groups and individuals. Among the opponents of Ugandan's decision to construct hydroelectric plant on Lake Victoria, Toto Kloza, Ugandan tour guide, said he earns his livelihood from drifting on the lake but the construction of the hydroelectric dam on the Lake Victoria would affect his business. However, the documentary noted electric power shortages in African countries particularly in the upstream Nile riparian countries are chronic.

Egyptians said any attempt to reduce the Nile flow to their country is considered as a hostile act. The narrator said Egypt keens to uphold its veto power. In his interview with the documentarian Hany Raslan, Egyptian political analyst, said that Egypt need to monitor the discharge of the river and prior notification before any project implemented on the Nile. Upstream countries can use the water on the condition they don't harm downstream countries and obliged to notify Egypt. "You may satisfy your need but don't harm mine" (Tensions and suspicions, 00:30:23). To reconcile differences, Asfaw Dingamo, Ethiopian Minister of water, said that Ethiopian government and people demand equitable share of the Nile. "We are not the enemy of Egypt people or government" (Tensions and suspicions, 00:41:13).

Inline with to this argument Ethiopian academician, Yacob Arsano, notes that the lack of transparency between countries creates some suspicions and unknown fears. These unknown fears come from Egypt because the water comes from Ethiopia (Tensions and suspicions, 00:30:11).

Equating Egypt and Ethiopia, Helimi Shaarawi, Egyptian political analyst, says that a lot was written about Ethiopia because it is a country of great civilization like Egypt. "There is always a feeling it is equal to Egypt but Egypt is always more important. "Ethiopia never had the same role" (Tensions and suspicions, 00:37:06). In describing the relationship Egypt has with upstream countries, Mohamoud Abulu Zaid, former Egyptian minister of irrigation says, "The relation between us and them was not amicable. They believe we would take all of the water and they would get nothing. When we went to meet them in their countries they said you are taking our water. I don't want to say the relations were hostile but certainly it was not friendly" (Legacy of Dispute, 00:41:05).

Recalling Egyptian refusal to sign the CFA in Entebbe, John Nyaoro, Kenyan Director of water resources, says "All the time they walk out, but they still come back ... because there is no other source that they can be able to use ... and what we have been telling them, the only simple way is cooperation" (Legacy of dispute, 00:45:37). Such a clear manifestation of power is, in realist terms, the end goal of a state. According to that same realist position, the conflict that arises here is the norm, and cooperation is not to be expected. On the other hand, Meles Zenawi, is quoted reaffirming Ethiopia's determination to pursue its plans to build dams on the Nile. He noted that the way forward is to seek a win-win solution through diplomatic efforts... not for Egypt to try and stop the un-stoppable (Tensions and suspicions, 00:31:34).

At the end of the documentary series, it is stated that the Nile river carries small amount of water compared to other trans-boundary rivers. This assertion was reaffirmed by Salah Yosef, Sudanese Nile expert. He said the Nile is not enough for Egypt and this creates uncertainty. The scarcity and worries of water shortage is shared by Beatrice Atim, Ugandan Member of Parliament, and Everton Fox, Aljazeera's meteorologist, who said the weather forecast is unpredictable and could affect the flow of the Nile River. They called on calmness and regional cooperation. Egyptian political analyst stressed the need for cooperation from both sides. Yackob also said there is no need to fear, fight or one country monopoly. Kenyan fisherman said the Nile river is a natural resource, it is a gift of God and he urged to use it just like their forefathers.

A chains of equivalence constructs a constitutive outside that threatens the different logic of the discourse in question; however when this differential system is confronted with outside threat it will tend to emphasize the sameness of the threatened moments and thus create a

chain of equivalence. This is evident in Egyptian experts interviews in which they toned down their rhetoric to seek sameness with fellow riparian countries. Hani Raslan, Egyptian political analyst, noted that Egypt wants to play a commanding role in Africa but in 1970s Egypt neglected this role. This withdrawal created an impression on Africans that Egypt has abandoned them (Tensions and suspicions, 00:14:08). Abdul Al Elshafei, Egyptian expert says, “We are the offspring of one mother, the river Nile. We should have engaged with them rather than the USA, Europe or Asia” (Tensions and suspicions, 00:21:07).

The narrator explains that the scarcity of waters creates fear, suspicion and tension in the Nile valley. Such sentiments are exacerbated by the uncertainty of nature. Averting such catastrophe needs calm heads and regional cooperation, the documentarian concluded. Antagonism is accrued by identifying the other group as the “outside” and itself as the ‘inside’ which the outside and the inside are in conflict. To define itself, it is necessary to construct the elements of the “outside”. The chains of equivalences are a way to convince the identification. An antagonism are understood as the clash of social agents with mutually constituted identities and interests but agonistic removes the violent and destructive aspects from the antagonistic and transfers the enemy-other into the adversary. The claim of this study is that the ideologies of the two Nile riparian groups constructed in a mixture of antagonistic and agonistic relations. The ideologies and political beliefs between the upstream and downstream Nile riparian countries are antagonistic, while their political strategies upstream countries toward downstream countries are agonistic. Constitutive outside is constructed as the opposite, i.e., one that blocks the identity of the inside. This was evident in the documentary, *Struggle over the Nile* where Israel (outsider) was mentioned as party to spoil relations among Nile basin countries with an intention to hurt Egypt. But Egypt as an African country wants to protect the Nile from its enemy (Israel) and Egypt sought to have its former commanding role in Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Conclusion

The aim of this study has been to investigate how Aljazeera's documentary present respective attempts of the Nile riparian countries to establish their causes over the usage of the Nile river. The three Aljazeera's documentaries: Master no more, Legacy of dispute and, Tension and Suspicion, are described and analysed was produced by Aljazeera's Egyptian journalist Hussein Elrazzaz.

The study reviews the complicated Nile politics and the struggle to maintain hegemony over the use of the Nile waters. The method of this study builds on post structural discourse theory. The method is a fruitful approach to the study of documentary discourse. It can give insights into how (unequal) power relationships are understood by media professionals, how they are represented within media texts and how audiences understand these asymmetrical relationships. The data used for this study were analysed through the floating signifiers "acquired" and "sovereign" around the nodal point 'right. The method for the analysis of the text is through the three types of text analysis, namely analysis of the meaning, the rhetoric and construction of subjectivity.

Consequently, the findings revealed that Aljazeera's documentary suggests that "right" is one of the main nodal points, and the other concepts such as historic, acquired, legal, and sovereign get their meaning in relation to "right". The downstream countries, Egypt and the Sudan's interpretation of right are the one that colonial agreements, 1929 and 1959, "no harm" is in the centre. An analysis of the discourses of upper riparian countries advocates that 'equitable and reasonable share' or "fairness" is one of the main nodal points.

Concerning the research question how Aljazeera's documentary represent the interest of upstream and downstream countries, the study identified that two main floating signifiers in Aljazeera's documentary discourses that are: 1) acquired right (No harm) and 2) sovereign right (reasonable and equitable). These two principles are floating signifiers, because the concepts got different meanings according to who makes use of them. These two signifiers were articulated differently around to the nodal point. The downstream and upstream countries articulated the floating signifiers with the goal of determining the meanings of right these two concepts have been under debate not for years only among the Nile riparian countries but to a large extent also among scholars, journalist and researchers. When

upstream countries championed for “right”, they demanded fair and reasonable utilization of the Nile water, and sought to disregard all previous agreements to which they were not party. The downstream riparian states, particularly Egypt on the other hand, insisted that upstream countries should acknowledge previous agreements as integral to any new agreement.

Concerning the research question how Aljazeera plays out power relations upstream and downstream countries, the study analysed debates between upstream and downstream riparian countries on the issues of “Nile use rights”, the myth is their presentation of the norms and values within these issues. The founding myths of many ancient civilizations centre on famous rivers among these the Nile is for Egypt. Egypt’s history is defined as much by the flooding and drying beds of the Nile as by the pyramids. For a country described by Herodotus as “the gift of the Nile,” control over the majestic river has been an existential Egyptian preoccupation since antiquity. There is a longstanding belief that Egypt should control the Nile are now challenged by upstream countries where the Nile waters originate. Egyptian myth of the “historic right” is an attempt to cover over the dislocation in which upstream countries introduced a different interpretation of right, equitable and reasonable way to share the Nile waters. The myth and social imaginary of the upstream and downstream riparian countries show their superior of the ideological beliefs to achieve the political and moral hegemony. This study quoted interview sources of the documentary making hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses to achieve political, moral intellectual hegemony over the use of the Nile waters.

Cooperation is a dislocated element in hegemonic struggle over the control of the Nile River. We should make this question “what did the upstream and downstream riparian countries suggest as the ideal social order?” Here the myth, “Egypt is the gift of Nile” provides moral values and norms.

This condition for emergence of myth is structural dislocation and the function of myth is to suture the dislocated space through the constitution of a new space of representation (Torfing, 1999).

With regards to the research question how Aljazeera’s documentary constructed the ‘us’ and the ‘them’ dichotomy, the study examined antagonism between the two groups through two key concepts; chains of equivalences and constitutive outsides. Antagonism is accrued by identifying the other group as the “outside” and itself as the ‘inside’ which the outside and the inside are in conflict. To define itself, it is necessary to construct the elements of the

“outside”. The chains of equivalences are a way to convince the identification. Antagonisms are understood as the clash of social agents with mutually constituted identities and interests but agonistic m removes the violent and destructive aspects from the antagonistic and transfers the enemy-other into the adversary. The claim of this study is that the ideologies of the two Nile riparian groups constructed in a mixtures of antagonistic and agonistic relations. The ideologies and political beliefs between the upstream and downstream Nile riparian countries are antagonistic, while their political strategies upstream countries toward downstream countries are agonistic. Constitutive outside is constructed as the opposite, i.e., one that blocks the identity of the inside. This was evident in the documentary, *Struggle over the Nile* where Israel was mentioned as party to spoil relations in the Nile basin with intention to hurt Egypt.

This study examines this condition of social antagonism by showing the construction of chains of equivalence and the constitutive outside. The study analyses the debates on ‘the right to use the Nile waters’ to show the construction of chains of equivalence and the constitutive outside. The discourse analysis of the concept of ‘right’ in Aljazeera’s documentary shows the ideological antagonism to fix the meaning of the acquired right and equitable right principles. To describe the construction of subjectivity, the study distinguishes how the informant of the Aljazeera’s documentary series constructed their agonistic political strategy identifying the ‘outside’ as ‘enemy’ or ‘adversary’.

The downstream countries including Ethiopia attempted to pursue an agonistic strategy of cooperation at the centre of their arguments with the downstream countries despite the fact that the downstream countries arguments and positions were antagonistic in nature. However, politicians and academicians from upstream countries presented themselves as “friends” who were not oppose the Nile. Thus they present themselves as the “inside” – not the “outside” or the “enemy” – of the downstream countries. Politicians and academicians from particularly from Egypt expressed their rejections to make concessions on their current uses established over long usage and recognized by legal documents that upstream countries are not signatories. The nature of the ideology of the downstream countries would reject reforms that the upstream countries were recommending. Politicians and academicians from Egypt and Sudan also positioned the upstream countries as “a group of the inside” who were helping the ‘enemy’, Israel.

This study on Aljazeera's documentary demonstrated the dilemma of the downstream countries to maintain the status quo that resulted in their failure to bring the needed cooperation over the use of the Nile waters. There was a clash between the upstream riparian countries ideas of the bringing cooperation. Downstream countries expressed an antagonistic approach towards the downstream riparian countries; they opposed the modification of colonial agreements of 1929 and 1959. They wanted others to respect those legal frameworks as binding as other colonial time agreements accepted by Africans after they gained their independence. However, upstream countries want to stress Egypt and Sudan to understand the unfairness of their share criticizing colonial legacies.

5.2. Recommendations

This study examined three documentary series under the major title; 'Struggle over the Nile', produced and aired by Aljazeera in June 2011. The documentary explores the complicated relations among Nile riparian countries.

It is worth noting that documentaries, like the mass media, also generate images of reality. In this case, the realities are constructed upon subjective experiences and used as a way to construct meaning of a particular subject. Documentaries work, like so many other informational media, to tell a story. The approach of telling a story is chosen by e.g. producers, editors or documentarists, which makes it subjective. The documentary used in this study is produced by Egyptian journalist. When watching an interview on the documentary series, one would wonder why more individual interviewees were chosen from Egypt and Sudan rather from upstream countries that contribute significant amount of waters to the flow of the river Nile. One would also wonder why Israel is included in the story unless the producer wants to project his enmity or his country's age-old conflict with Egypt. It is evident that the documentarian's choice of interviewees and his story angle vindicate subjectivity. It would have been imperative for the documentarian to accommodate the interest of both parties in conflict. Nile riparian countries that happen to be in conflict with Egypt would prefer to have equal saying on every issue that concern them. They also need a fair representation from the medium that claims independent from sources. Therefore, the documentarian has to detach himself from groups that have their own vest interest and strike a balance for objective portrayal of groups in conflict.

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Appendix A

The following list provides links to the articles used in the analysis. They were all accessed in March 2014.

<http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/struggleoverthenile/2011/06/2011667594146703.html>

<http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/struggleoverthenile/2011/06/2011669249391471.html>

<http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/struggleoverthenile/2011/06/20116695818330430.html>

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Ethiopian_Renaissance_Dam.html

<http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/struggleoverthenile/2011/06/201166132748118853.html>

<http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/struggleoverthenile/2011/05/201153115454402150.html>

<http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/struggleoverthenile/2011/06/201169163324772204.html>

<http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/struggleoverthenile/2011/05/201153181349369966.html>

<http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/struggleoverthenile/2011/06/20116121519467550.html>

http://www.nilebasin.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=42

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Jazeera_English

Appendix B

Pictures taken from the three documentary series

