

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**

**SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**

**SOCIO-CULTURAL ASPECTS OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION IN  
RAYA AZEBO WOREDA, TIGRAY NATIONAL REGIONAL  
STATE**

**By**

**CHEKOLE HADIS TIKU**

**JUNE 2017**

**ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA**

*SOCIO-CULTURAL ASPECTS OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION  
IN RAYA AZEBO, TIGRAY NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE*

BY

CHEKOLE HADIS TIKU

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN SOCIOLOGY

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

JUNE, 2017

ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

SOCIO-CULTURAL ASPECTS OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION IN  
RAYA AZEBO WOREDA, TIGRAY NATIONAL REGIONAL  
STATE

Submitted by:

|                           |           |      |
|---------------------------|-----------|------|
| <u>CHEKOLE HADIS TIKU</u> |           |      |
| Student                   | Signature | Date |

Approved by:

|                      |           |      |
|----------------------|-----------|------|
|                      |           |      |
| Thesis Advisor       | Signature | Date |
|                      |           |      |
| Internal Examiner    | Signature | Date |
|                      |           |      |
| External Examiner    | Signature | Date |
|                      |           |      |
| Chairman, Department | Signature | Date |

## **Declaration**

I, Chekole Hadis, do hereby declare to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University that, this thesis entitled “*Socio-Cultural Aspects of Illegal Migration in Raya Azebo Woreda, Tigray National Regional State*” is a product of my original research work. It was not submitted, in full or part, for the attainment of any academic degree elsewhere. This work has accredited the views of the research participants. To the best of my knowledge, I have also fully acknowledged the materials and pieces of information used in the study. The reporting procedures do comply with the expected standards and regulation of the University.

Name: Chekole Hadis Tiku

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Date of Submission: June 2017

Department of Sociology, Addis Ababa University

## **Dedication**

*To All those who have been contributing to migration studies and research respondents,  
informants and participants whom I stood on their shoulders*

## Acknowledgements

*The thesis wouldn't have been realized, if it wasn't for the contribution of many.....*

First and foremost, my deepest gratitude goes to my advisor Dr. Abeje Berhanu who has been contributing his invaluable guidance and constructive comments throughout the thesis. The way he has been guiding me in the course of the thesis, was motivating and freedom friendly in a manner that could allow me to use the maximum level of my capacity.

And also, I would like to thank the research respondents, informants and participants not just for their willingness to collaborate in first instance, but also for their hospitality and guiding where my next steps would be through path wise, not study wise though; they were my road map as well.

Now, it is time to appreciate the college of social sciences and languages, Mekelle University for its institutional assistance by writing formal letter in the local language that could help communicate study area concerned bodies in a way that could facilitate the field work. This study wouldn't have been possible without any financial support. In this regard, Addis Ababa University deserves acknowledgment. The Tigray Bureau of Plan and Finance research and information officer Mr. Halefom also deserves the acknowledgment for his help in the construction of the locational map of the study area.

My father Hadis Tiku and mother Azmera Hagos, well I can't thank them enough. They have been alongside me since my childhood through my entire journey. Their every calling during my field stay was such a powerful engine that drove me to my fieldwork success. I thanks them a lot for that.

In such a short period of time and such little fund the field work would have been difficult to get through, if it wasn't for my relatives Haftu Hagazi and his wife Harfeya Kahsay, Kalayou Marye and his sister Taemo. I would like to acknowledge them for they made my field stay fantastic and conducive in a way that could help the fieldwork.

Genet Aberha (my wife), Haftamu Hadis (my little brother), Berhanu Abay (my best friend), Zenebu G/Selassie (my friend), I thanks you all for your indispensable assistance from field work through data entry to motivational contributions.

## Table of Contents

| Contents                                                                      | Page No |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| Acknowledgments .....                                                         | I       |
| List of Tables.....                                                           | VI      |
| List of Figures .....                                                         | VIII    |
| Abbreviations and acronyms .....                                              | IX      |
| Abstract .....                                                                | X       |
| CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .....                                               | 1       |
| 1.1. Background for the Study .....                                           | 1       |
| 1.2. Statement of the Problem.....                                            | 2       |
| 1.3. Objectives of the Study.....                                             | 6       |
| 1.4. Defining Key Terms .....                                                 | 6       |
| 1.5. Delimitation of the Study.....                                           | 10      |
| 1.6. Limitations of the Study.....                                            | 11      |
| 1.7. Structure of the Thesis .....                                            | 12      |
| CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW .....                                          | 13      |
| 2.1. The Phenomenon of Migration: An Overview.....                            | 13      |
| 2.1.1. Global Trends of Migration .....                                       | 14      |
| 2.1.2. Types of Migration.....                                                | 15      |
| 2.1.3. Illegal Migration Trends .....                                         | 16      |
| 2.1.4. Dimensions of Illegal Migration .....                                  | 17      |
| 2.1.5. Major routes and Destinations for Ethiopian Illegal Migrants.....      | 17      |
| 2.2. Theories to Explain the Socio-cultural Aspects of Illegal Migration..... | 19      |
| 2.2.1 THE MICRO-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE .....                                       | 20      |
| 1. Theory Of Value Expectancy.....                                            | 21      |
| 2. Mead's Theory of the Self .....                                            | 21      |
| 2.2.2 THE MESO-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE .....                                        | 22      |
| 1. Social Network Theory.....                                                 | 22      |
| 2. Transnational Social Space Theory .....                                    | 23      |
| 3. Institutional Theory of Migration.....                                     | 24      |

|                                                         |                                                                 |    |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| 2.3.                                                    | Empirical Evidences .....                                       | 25 |
| 2.3.1.                                                  | Causes of Illegal Migration.....                                | 27 |
| 2.3.2.                                                  | Journey and Destination Experiences of Illegal Migrants .....   | 30 |
| 2.3.3.                                                  | The Consequences of Illegal Migration .....                     | 33 |
| 2.4.                                                    | Conceptual Framework.....                                       | 37 |
| 2.5.                                                    | Analytical Framework.....                                       | 38 |
| 2.6.                                                    | Conclusion .....                                                | 38 |
| CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODS AND STUDY SETTING ..... |                                                                 | 39 |
| 3.1                                                     | RESEARCH METHODS .....                                          | 39 |
| 3.1.1                                                   | Research Approach .....                                         | 39 |
| 3.1.2                                                   | Research Design.....                                            | 39 |
| 3.2                                                     | Operationalization of Concepts.....                             | 40 |
| 3.2.1                                                   | Methods of Data Collection .....                                | 42 |
| 3.2.1.1                                                 | Sample Survey .....                                             | 42 |
| 3.2.1.2                                                 | Qualitative Data Collection Methods.....                        | 42 |
| I.                                                      | In-depth interview .....                                        | 42 |
| II.                                                     | Key Informant Interview.....                                    | 43 |
| III.                                                    | Focus Group Discussion .....                                    | 43 |
| IV.                                                     | Field Observation.....                                          | 44 |
| 3.2.2                                                   | Sampling Designs .....                                          | 44 |
| 3.2.3                                                   | Data Collection Instruments: Questionnaires and Guides.....     | 47 |
| 3.2.4                                                   | Methods of Data Analysis, Presentation, and Interpretation..... | 49 |
| 3.2.5                                                   | Pilot-Testing Practices and Lessons Learned.....                | 49 |
| 3.4.                                                    | Reliability and Validity of the Tools.....                      | 50 |
| 3.5.                                                    | Ethical Considerations .....                                    | 51 |
| 3.6.                                                    | Field Experiences.....                                          | 52 |
| 3.6.1.                                                  | Motivating Encounters.....                                      | 52 |
| 3.6.2.                                                  | Challenges Experienced During the Fieldwork .....               | 53 |
| 3.7.                                                    | Study Setting.....                                              | 53 |
| 3.7.1.                                                  | Geographical Location.....                                      | 53 |
| 3.7.2.                                                  | Major Economic Activities in the Woreda.....                    | 54 |
| 3.7.3.                                                  | Illegal Migration Trends in Raya Azebo.....                     | 55 |

|                              |                                                                                                     |     |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 3.8.                         | Scio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents .....                                               | 56  |
| 1.                           | Sex, Marital Status and Religious Affiliation of Respondents.....                                   | 56  |
| 2.                           | Age of Respondents .....                                                                            | 57  |
| 3.                           | The Educational Level of Respondents.....                                                           | 57  |
| 4.                           | Occupation of Respondents .....                                                                     | 58  |
| 5.                           | Linguistic ability of Respondents .....                                                             | 58  |
| CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS ..... |                                                                                                     | 59  |
| 4.1.                         | Causes of Illegal Migration.....                                                                    | 59  |
| 4.1.1.                       | <i>Community's Attitude about Illegal Migration</i> .....                                           | 59  |
| 4.1.1.2.                     | Illegal Migration as “Fashion”; something precious.....                                             | 59  |
| 4.1.1.2.                     | <i>Illegal migration as something everybody wants to do</i> .....                                   | 60  |
| 4.1.1.3.                     | <i>Illegal migration as a source of ‘prestige to families’</i> .....                                | 61  |
| 4.1.1.4.                     | <i>Illegal Migration And Marital Selection</i> .....                                                | 63  |
| 4.1.1.5.                     | <i>Illegal Migration, And Social Recognition, Exclusion And Ill-Treatment</i> .....                 | 64  |
| 4.1.2                        | <i>Major Local Employment Opportunities in Raya Azebo Woreda</i> .....                              | 73  |
| 4.1.2.1                      | <i>Youth Attitude Towards Local Employment Opportunities</i> .....                                  | 76  |
| 4.1.3                        | <i>Pressure From Others On Migration Decision</i> .....                                             | 79  |
| 4.1.4                        | <i>Cultural Proximity And Migration Decision</i> .....                                              | 80  |
| 4.1.5                        | <i>SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ILLEGAL MIGRATION</i> .....                                                   | 80  |
| 2.                           | <i>Social Capital that Pulls Illegal Migration</i> .....                                            | 82  |
| 4.1.6                        | <i>Individual Aspirations and Motivations</i> .....                                                 | 87  |
| 4.1.7                        | <i>The Role of Social Media on Illegal Migration</i> .....                                          | 88  |
| 4.1.8                        | <i>Other causes of Illegal Migration</i> .....                                                      | 89  |
| 4.2.                         | <i>JOURNEY AND DESTINATION EXPERIENCES</i> .....                                                    | 90  |
| 4.2.1.                       | <i>JOURNEY EXPERIENCES OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS</i> .....                                                | 90  |
| 4.2.1.2.                     | <i>The Major Illegal Routes/Channels</i> .....                                                      | 90  |
| 4.2.1.3.                     | <i>Factors That Affect Migrants' Choice Of Route</i> .....                                          | 91  |
| 4.2.1.4.                     | <i>Making the Trip: What Happens to Migrants in Their Trip to Middle East [Saudi Arabia]?</i> ..... | 93  |
| 4.2.2.                       | <i>Destination Experiences of Illegal Migrants</i> .....                                            | 97  |
| 4.3.                         | <i>CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION</i> .....                                                      | 102 |
| 4.3.1.                       | <i>Consequences of Illegal Migration at Individual Level</i> .....                                  | 102 |

|                                               |                                                                       |     |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 4.3.2.                                        | <i>The Consequences of Illegal Migration at Household Level .....</i> | 104 |
| 4.3.3.                                        | <i>The Consequences of Illegal Migration at Community Level .....</i> | 108 |
| CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION .....                |                                                                       | 112 |
| 5.1.                                          | <i>Causes Of Illegal Migration .....</i>                              | 112 |
| 5.2.                                          | <i>Journey and Destination Experiences of Illegal Migrants.....</i>   | 116 |
| 5.3.                                          | <i>CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION .....</i>                        | 117 |
| CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion and Implications..... |                                                                       | 119 |
| 6.1.                                          | <i>Conclusion .....</i>                                               | 119 |
| 6.2.                                          | <i>Study Implications .....</i>                                       | 120 |
| References                                    |                                                                       |     |
| Annexes                                       |                                                                       |     |

## List of Tables

|                                                                                                                            |    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Table 2.1: International emigrant trend in Ethiopia since 1990s through 2015.....                                          | 15 |
| Table 3.1: operationalization/specification of measurement .....                                                           | 41 |
| Table 3.2: In-depth interview informants .....                                                                             | 43 |
| Table 3.3: A summary of key informant interview informants .....                                                           | 43 |
| Table 3.4: A summary of sample size of survey respondents.....                                                             | 46 |
| Table 3.5: Illegal emigration flow in the study area .....                                                                 | 57 |
| Table 3.6: Sex, Marital status and Religious affiliation distribution of respondents.....                                  | 57 |
| Table 3.7: Educational level of respondents .....                                                                          | 58 |
| Table 3.8: frequency distributions showing major occupational categories in the study area .....                           | 59 |
| Table 3.9: language ability of respondents .....                                                                           | 59 |
| Table 4.1: Frequency distribution showing whether migrating to Saudi is considered a ‘fashion’<br>.....                    | 60 |
| Table 4.2: Frequency distribution showing whether illegal migration is something everybody<br>wants to do .....            | 61 |
| Table 4.3: frequency distribution showing whether illegal migration serves as source of family’s<br>prestige.....          | 62 |
| Table 4.4: frequency distribution showing whether families want to send their children to Middle<br>East.....              | 62 |
| Table 4.5: frequency distribution showing whether illegal migration affects marital selection...                           | 65 |
| Table 4.6: frequency distribution showing whether migrant returnees are socially excluded.....                             | 66 |
| Table 4.7: frequency distribution whether migrant returnees are given higher social recognition<br>than non-migrants ..... | 66 |
| Table 4.8: frequency distribution showing whether migrant returnees are ill-treated.....                                   | 67 |
| Table 4.9: frequency distribution showing whether illegal migration is seen as a good thing.....                           | 68 |
| Table 4.10: frequency distribution showing whether illegal migration is encouraged.....                                    | 69 |
| Table 4.11: ANOVA showing the variation of attitude score about illegal migration across four<br>TABIAs.....               | 72 |
| Table 4.12: multiple comparisons to determine the mean difference in attitude score between<br>four TABIAs .....           | 72 |

|                                                                                                                  |     |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Table 4.13: descriptive statistics summarizing youth attitude score towards local employment opportunities ..... | 77  |
| Table 4.14: ANOVA showing the variation of youth attitude score about local employment across four TABIAs .....  | 78  |
| Table 4.15: multiple comparisons to determine the mean difference in attitude score between four TABIAs .....    | 79  |
| Table 4.16: frequency distribution showing causes of migration .....                                             | 80  |
| Table 4.17: frequency distribution showing sources of information about destination.....                         | 84  |
| Table 4.18: frequency distribution of migration decision involvement.....                                        | 84  |
| Table 4.19: frequency distribution of source of fund for illegal migration .....                                 | 85  |
| Table 4.20: frequency distribution of causes of illegal migration .....                                          | 101 |
| Table 4.21: frequency distribution of the consequences of illegal migration on individual migrants.....          | 103 |
| Table 2.22: summary statistics about the consequences of illegal migration on individual migrants.....           | 104 |
| Table 4.23: frequency distribution of the consequences of illegal migration at household level                   | 108 |
| Table 4.24: a summary statistics about the consequences of illegal migration at household level .....            | 109 |
| Table 4.25: frequency distribution of the consequences of illegal migration at community level .....             | 110 |
| Table 4.26: a summary statistics about the consequences of illegal migration at community level .....            | 110 |

## List of Figures

|                                                                                                                             |     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Figure 1.1: flow-chart that shows the focus of this study .....                                                             | 10  |
| Figure 2.1: New arrivals in Yemen from 2006 to 2016.....                                                                    | 17  |
| Figure 2.2: a visual representation of the main illegal routes from Ethiopia.....                                           | 19  |
| Figure 2.3: Analytical Frame work.....                                                                                      | 37  |
| Figure 2.4: analytical framework.....                                                                                       | 38  |
| Figure 3.1: Convergent parallel mixed design.....                                                                           | 40  |
| Figure 3.2: The locational map of the study area.....                                                                       | 55  |
| Figure 3.3: Major economic activities in the study area.....                                                                | 56  |
| Figure 4.1: a histogram displaying community perception towards illegal migration .....                                     | 71  |
| Figure 4.2: means plot showing community attitude mean differences about illegal migration<br>between TABIAs .....          | 73  |
| Figure 4.3: pictures displaying the major economic activities in the study area.....                                        | 75  |
| Figure 4.4: Young people’s attitude toward farming.....                                                                     | 76  |
| Figure 4.5: means plot showing youth attitude mean differences about local employment<br>opportunities between TABIAs ..... | 80  |
| Figure 4.6: the four important roles of Social Capital .....                                                                | 88  |
| Figure 4.7: Pictures shared and posted on and/or via social media.....                                                      | 90  |
| Figure 4.8: the two major illegal routes from Raya Azebo to Saudi Arabia .....                                              | 92  |
| Figure 4.9: Comparisons of the Somali and Djibouti Illegal Migration Routes available for<br>migrants from Raya Azebo ..... | 98  |
| Figure 4.10: A women and her children abandoned and betrayed by her husband as a result of<br>illegal migration .....       | 106 |

## **Abbreviations and Acronyms**

|          |                                                                 |
|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| CSA      | Central Statistical Agency                                      |
| HDI      | Human Development Index                                         |
| HIV/AIDS | Human immunity Deficiency Syndrome                              |
| ILO      | International Labour Organization                               |
| IOM      | International Organization for Migration                        |
| MoLSA    | Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs                           |
| RMMS     | Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat                            |
| TCA      | Tigray Cultural Association                                     |
| UNCATOC  | United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime |
| UNDESA   | United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs        |

## Abstract

Illegal migration to Saudi has become usual phenomenon for most communities in Ethiopia. Many studies have attempted to explain the causes and consequences of this phenomenon. However, most of these studies tended to explain illegal migration from economic aspects: unemployment rates, wage differential, family economic crisis, etc as the main causes of illegal migration. Yet, illegal migration cannot just be explained by economic factors. Taking this in mind, this study endeavored to investigate the socio-cultural aspects of illegal migration. Specifically, it attempted to role of socio-cultural aspects in explaining illegal migration in all its stages. Indeed, by conducting a migrant survey with 128 potential migrants and 122 migrant returnees, by making in-depth interviews with 15 migrant returnees, by approaching 16 key informants, by conducting nine focus group discussions and by making field observation, this study found the role of socio-cultural aspects eminent. According to the findings of this study socio-cultural factors such as community attitude towards illegal migration, pressure from others, the presence of social capital both at home and abroad, cultural proximity, and soon create migratory intentions and induce migratory decisions. Besides, the presence of social capital coupled with the proximity of language and religion determine journey and destination experiences of migrants. The journey and destination experiences of migrants are also affected by the route followed (whether Djibouti or Somali route) and the associated risk, and the kind of jobs migrants engage in their destination (between inside home (housemaid), outside home (shop keeping, working in factories), drug dealing, and desert (livestock keeping). the study divulged the socio-cultural consequences of illegal migration al individual, household and community levels as well. Finally, this thesis calls for further investigation of the socio-cultural aspects (e.g. the emerging roles of social media), and for consideration of socio-cultural aspects in any policy intervention by government and non-government organizations to tackle the problem.

***Key words: Illegal migration, potential migrants, migrant returnees, social capital, cultural proximity, community attitude, human smuggling, trafficking in persons.***

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

### 1.1. Background for the Study

Today, international migration has become one of the most timely and high concern demanding issues in the world. As estimated by reports of international organizations like the IOM, more than 240 million people globally live outside their home countries legally and illegally. This figure represents 3.1% of the world's total population. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) report, of all these migrants, between 15% and 20% (i.e. 30-50 million migrants) followed illegal routes of migration (IOM 2016).

As part of the global community, Ethiopia accounts for a significant number of the international migration stock. As to the revised population database of CSA (2010), there were 548,000 Ethiopian international migrants in 2010. This figure has grown to 753,462 migrants in 2015 with Asia being the main destination (224,658 migrants migrated to Asia) followed by North America, being host for 211,630 Ethiopian migrants, according to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). Of the total figure of international migration went to Asia, the majority (123,669 or 55%) flew to Saudi Arabia (UNDESA 2015).

It is estimated that 60-70 percent of the total Ethiopians migrating are illegal migrants – either trafficked or smuggled – generally to the Middle East, particularly the Gulf States (Yemen, Saudi Arabia, etc) (MOLSA 2013, cited in Carter & Rohwerder 2016:1). Going down a little specific to the ground, illegal migration in Raya Azebo is among one of the main illegal migration source areas in Ethiopia (RMMS 2014). According to the woreda's youth and sports bureau rough report, about 6000 youth have migrated illegally into Middle East in the last four years since the mid of 2013 to the beginning of 2017.

The idea is that in spite of the fact that the country is reportedly one of the fastest growing countries in Africa even in the world over the last decade; Ethiopia remains one of the world's poorest countries. Still almost entirely dependent on subsistence agriculture and its per capita income is about a third of the regional average, and its Human Development Index (HDI) ranking is one of the lowest globally. Most Ethiopians find it difficult to earn a living and remain

highly vulnerable, with two-thirds of people living on less than \$2 a day and nearly half undernourished (Jones et al. 2014).

In such situations, migration seems to be the available alternative livelihood strategy for most people in developing countries including Ethiopians (Emerta 2010; ILO 2011; Carter & Rohwerder 2016). In light to this argument, large number of women and men are leaving Ethiopia each day to work both legally and illegally in Middle East; despite they are greeted with physical, sexual and psychological abuse (Jones et al 2014). Due to different factors such as restrict immigration policies, wage differential between illegal and legal works (average monthly income for illegal works range from 2000-3000 Riyal as opposed to 500-1000 for migrants hired legally (Milki 2014; TCA 2014)), the lack of legal means of migration, the majority of Ethiopian emigrants go illegally (IOM 2003; Barbara 2010; TCA 2014).

In addition to these economic forces behind illegal migration, there is an observable contribution by socio-cultural aspects. The cultural proximity (in terms of religion and language) between two countries, the social and cultural (and/or human) capital that individuals possess, the community attitude in which individuals are part of and so forth play indispensable role in illegal migration (see e.g. Haug 2008; Jones et al 2014; Milki 2014; Adsera 2015; etc...).

Noticeably, there is literature on why migrants are migrating to the Middle East following illegal routes and its impact on sending society. Most of these works, however, have focused on the economic aspects, by ignoring and/or giving little attention to the socio-cultural aspects of illegal migration, although the socio-cultural aspects as well play massive role. Moreover, they tended to focus on people trafficking by ignoring people smuggling, despite the illegal movement to Middle East is also characterized by migrant smuggling. Hence, this study is going to give a detailed examination to the socio-cultural dimensions of illegal migration (both smuggling and trafficking) from Woreda Raya Azebo to the Middle East (through Punt land into, via sea transport, Yemen and finally to Saudi Arabia).

## **1.2. Statement of the Problem**

Illegal migration has been mentioned among the most severe social problems taking new face since the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Zohry 2011). Illegal migration has been mentioned among the

most severe social problems taking new face since the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Zohry 2011). The problem has become dynamic in that the number people who move has increased and the routes of migration has point in many directions (IOM 2014). In most cases, migration has been characterized by hardship, neglect, brutal victimization and death of migrants. Abuse and death may occur during migration in the region not only due to the harsh environmental conditions of many migration routes but also as a result of the “social economy”<sup>1</sup> that has developed around migration, namely smuggling, trafficking and other forms of criminality, which may be compounded by collusion with certain State officials (Ibid:140).

Many have died or gone missing try crossing borders of countries. According to IOM estimate, about 4,077 migrants died or go missing in 2014 globally (IOM 2014:18). This figure has increased to 7,763 deaths in 2016 (IOM 2017). The Horn of Africa comprised an estimated 3.02 percent of this global figure.

In Ethiopia, significant migration beyond the Horn of Africa has begun after the 1974 revolution originally south wards to South Africa. From the total estimated 17,000-20,000 individuals entering every year South Africa, the majority were Ethiopians (Horwood 2009). However, in recent decades, Ethiopians go east wards to Yemen with a final destination Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries via Djibouti or Somalia (IOM 2014). Despite the ongoing conflict in Yemen, an estimated 111,504 arrivals were recorded by November 2016, a 21 per cent increase over the 92,466 arrivals in 2015. Migrant deaths in the oversea crossing to Yemen have similarly increased by 27 per cent on this route, with 104 recorded in 2016, compared to 82 in 2015 (IOM 2017:8).

Despite the bad news heard and shared on different media (social, mass or mobile), difficult experiences faced by migrants themselves, and the placement of bans on labour migration by the Ethiopian Government (IOM 2016); Ethiopians continue to cross borders of different countries illegally through different directions: Southern Route: passing through Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique to South Africa; Northern Route: crossing Sudan, Libya, Egypt and the Mediterranean route to European countries; and Eastern Route: via

---

<sup>1</sup> Social economy is what others call as informal institutions like the smuggling service (Bijack 2006)

Somaliland, Puntland, and/or Djibouti and Yemen, with intended destinations being the Gulf States, mainly Saudi Arabia (IOM 2016:19).

The third route further subdivided into two illegal routes. These are; one) through Somali-Ethiopia to Somali and the second one is through Afar to Djibouti. Both routes lead Ethiopian migrants into Yemen and from there potentially further onto Saudi Arabia (RMMS 2014). The current study, thus, focused on the third route. This study has attempted to examine the social, cultural and psychological dimensions of illegal migration from Raya Azebo through the two routes, Somali and Djibouti, into Yemen and finally to Saudi Arabia.

A number of studies have been conducted dealing with the issue of illegal migration in Ethiopia in general as well as in Tigray Region in particular. These studies have, mainly, focused on the economic aspects of illegal migration. They, rigorously, reported the contribution of migration in terms of remittance and how this, in turn, causes further migration (see for example, Emerta 2010; Gebrehiwot and Fikadu 2012; Bisrat 2014; Gashaw 2014; Carter & Rohwerder 2016). Besides, unemployment, family economic crisis, and other economic factors has been mentioned as pushing forces from behind and employment opportunities, relatively higher wages and others as pulling forces from destination (Elias 2013; Jones et al 2014 and RMMS 2014).

However, there has been little focus on the role of socio-cultural variables (social capital, community attitude, cultural proximity, individuals' desire to improve their social status, social media) in informing migration decision making in Ethiopia. Yet, some have tried to see the role, from limited aspect though: the role of family members and friends in migration decision (Milki 2014). Moreover, there has been pinpointing reports that the role of socio-cultural aspects is there and need to be investigated when they argued individuals migrate to change and improve their families' livelihoods and when they reported peer pressure causes illegal migration (Selemawit 2013; Jones et al 2014 RMMS 2014). Besides, based on studies that have conducted outside of Ethiopia, it is argued that socio-cultural variables such as social capital both abroad and home, cultural proximity (individuals' knowledge and information of another country), and community attitude have influence in migratory intentions (Wissink 2009; Mbaye 2013 and Adsera 2015). This study, thus, explains the role of socio-cultural aspects in illegal migration decision.

Furthermore, the existing literature in illegal migration from Ethiopia tended to focus on trafficking in persons, ignoring smuggling or mistakenly assuming if the two are the same. These studies investigated the violations and related terrible problems that Ethiopian women and girls have been facing with in the Middle East countries (Elias 2013; Selemawit 2013 and Jones et al 2014), despite male Ethiopians are also being smuggled to these countries. In fact, irregular migrants from Ethiopia are typically young males aged 28–35 from rural areas who lack formal education (IOM 2014:140).

Focusing on journey and destination experiences, earlier studies have reported that Ethiopian migrants face numerous problems in their attempt to migrate to Middle East. Still, studies in other countries claimed that there are intervening variables that cause differential journey and destination experiences between migrants (Mbaye 2013). And these intervening variables are again socio-cultural aspects. Socio-cultural aspects play crucial role in informing illegal migration pathways and risk factors associated with each pathways, intervening in suggesting and supporting in getting through the route challenges, in finding jobs, in settling down in potential destination. Thus, this study went further beyond just outlining the problems Ethiopian migrants face to explain the intervening variables that influence journey and destination experiences.

Even, the literature in relation to the consequences of illegal migration has emphasized on the effects of illegal migration on individual migrants (Temesgen 2014; Woldamlak 2014 and Jemal, 2015) and, if they go further, on the importance of remittance on migrant sending households (Bisrat 2014 & Carter & Rohwerder 2016) , except some (Gashaw 2014; Milki 2014). However, illegal migration can also involve other socio-cultural consequences on family and the community at large such as divorce, crime, health problems, up/down ward social mobility (based on success or failure in migration), the abandonment of elderly and children, etc.

Finally, although the Woreda, Woreda Raya Azebo, is one of the areas where illegal migration has been vastly evident (being the fourth in the regional state in terms of flow, according to RMMS (2014) and TCA (2014)) and having different socio-cultural, economic and environmental contexts, to the level of my review, it is suffered from lack of academic research of any aspect of illegal migration. This guarantees a place gap in the literature in addition to the

conceptual, and methodological gaps identified above. By considering this, thus, this study has made an attempt to study the socio-cultural aspects of illegal migration in Woreda Raya Azebo by selecting four TABIAs based on level of flow of illegal emigration and another variable, geographical location (urban vs. rural).

### 1.3. Objectives of the Study

Considering the research gaps identified in the statement of the problem above, this study has examined the place of socio-cultural variables<sup>2</sup> in explaining illegal migration in Raya Azebo Woreda focusing on four TABIAs namely Kara, Wargba, Hawelti and Mehoni Town. These four TABIAs were selected based on two important variables: level of migration flow and urbanity vs. rurality. So, based on this intention, three TABIAs were selected based on level of migration and the fourth Town to check the difference between urban and rural. Accordingly, the specific objectives were shaped up as follows:

1. Analyzing the role of community attitude, pressure from others, social capital, cultural similarity, individual aspirations, social media in illegal migration decision making,
2. Understanding the role of social capital in journey experiences of illegal migrants
3. Understanding the role of social capital and cultural similarity in determining migrants' destination experiences, and
4. Seeing the socio-cultural consequences of illegal migration on the migrants themselves and sending households and communities as well.

### 1.4. Defining Key Terms

**Socio-cultural Factors:** are the larger scale forces within cultures and societies that affect the thoughts, feelings, decisions and behaviors of individuals in a given society. These include attitudes, social interactions which would produce social networks whereby individuals' social capital is influenced, Cross cultural difference in terms of religion, language and other cultural elements.

---

<sup>2</sup> The socio-cultural variables that are given a due focus in this study include community attitude, pressure from others (family members, friends, relatives, community), social capital, religious and linguistic similarity, social media, individuals' desire to improve their social status and the role of smuggling service

**Community Attitude:** is a predisposition or tendency to hold positive or negative response towards a thing by groups of people live in a community. It refers to the generalized and typical way of thinking or opinion about things that could affect individuals' attitude, decisions and actions.

**Pressure from Others:** these are the forces stem from individuals in one's circles that would influence individuals' behavior.

**Social networks:** social networks are social structures made of a set of social actors ((such as individuals or organizations) and other social interactions between actors. They are general ties that result from social relationships. Social networks operate through the creation of social capital.

**Social Capital:** according to Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant (1992), cited in Massey et al (1993), social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition. It is meaningful and specific asset of individuals that individuals could count on during hardships. It refers to those assets [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely goodwill, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit. People gain access to social capital through membership in networks and social institutions.

**Cultural proximity:** refers to the level of distance between cultures of two countries. As far as this study is concerned, cultural proximity if defined as the level of religious and linguistic distance between sending community and receiving countries.

**Social media:** In broader sense, the term "social media" includes a range of tools and services that enable direct user interaction on computer mediated environments (Lampe et al, 2011:2). "Social media is a group of Internet based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content (Lallana, 2014:17, citing Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010:61). Based on these definitions and more going specific to the context of the current study, social media is internet

based application that tends to replace physical, real-life social interactions in creating ties and in disseminating information.

## **Illegal Migration**

There cannot be clear and universally applied definition for illegal migration. It, actually, is a complex phenomenon, having multi-dimensional feature. It can have varied meanings from different perspectives: from the perspective of sending and receiving countries, from the understanding of ordinary people as opposed to that of the state, from the view of developed in relation to developing countries, from legal and political in contrary to religious views (Pinedo 2009 and Barbara 2010). Nevertheless, illegal migration can be seen as the movement of a person or persons outside the norms and procedures established by states to manage the orderly flow of migrants into, through and out of their territories (Frehiwot 2017).

As discussed above, migration can be legal or illegal based on migrants' leaving, border crossing, entry, and work status. Illegal migration, therefore, refers to the illegal entry, work, and/or stay of a person to/in a country where he/she is not a citizen for. More clearly, it can be seen from two perspectives: sending and receiving countries.

“From the perspective of destination countries it is illegal entry, stay or work in a country, meaning that the migrant does not have the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations to enter, reside or work in a given country. From the perspective of the sending country, the illegality is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfill the administrative requirements for leaving the country” (Frehiwot 2017:11).

Drawing from the forgoing definitions and as applied to this study, illegal migration refers to the migration taking place outside the rules and procedures of legal migration from Woreda Raya Azebo into Saudi Arabia through Yemen without having legal travel documents such as passport and visa.

## **Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons**

Illegal entry and work of a person may or may not involve the migrant's will in decision making. Bearing this view in mind, various types of illegal migration can be detected. Nevertheless, the

two major forms include people smuggling and trafficking. Human smuggling and trafficking cannot be used interchangeably. The distinction between smuggling and trafficking is important for practical purpose. The distinction between the two is made clear in the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCATOC) (2004).

Article 3 of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air defines “smuggling” as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.”(UNCATOC 2004:54)

Article 3 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, on the other hand, defines **Trafficking in persons** as "The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation" (UNCATOC 2004:42). Trafficking in persons can take place within the borders of one State or may have a transnational character.

The bottom line, it is made clear that human trafficking and smuggling are not the same things. While human trafficking is against the will of the person and, usually, consent is sought from a person who has control over the victim, and involves women and children, smuggling, on the contrary, while often undertaken in dangerous or degrading conditions, involves negotiation between the smuggled and the smuggler. Unlike victims of human trafficking, the smuggled know why and where they migrate to. In human smuggling, migrants intentionally made ready for the smuggling and to pay (usually money) to the smuggler in return for illegal entry and work.

***Illegal Migrants:*** Regardless of the varied perspectives exist with regard to the definition of illegal migration; migrants can be labeled as illegal when they do either one of the following. First, when they enter a country without the required immigration inspection and/or authorization from the proper authorities. Second, when they successfully enters a country with fraudulent documentation, third) when they remain in a country without valid documentation regardless of their entry status (Pinedo 2009:3). Based on this, this study was dealt with the first

group of illegal migrants, that is, those migrants who enter illegally through sea outside the regularities of legal migration.


**Non-migrants:** involve individuals who do and do not plan to leave their country. They are usually the youth aged from 15-29, as defined by the FDRE Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture (2004).

**Migrant Returnees:** this refers to the migrants who returned to their homeland through deportation or based on their willingness. The study involves both migrant returnees and deportees and the term migrant returnee has been used throughout the study.

**Current Migrants:** are those migrants who are at the time of study work and stay in their destination.

Based on the forgoing conceptual definition a flow chart is drawn to explain how the phenomenon of migration is complex and to show its patterns with an intention of delimiting the focus of this study (figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: flow-chart that shows the focus of this study



Source: Author's own construction, January 2017

## 1.5. Delimitation of the Study

**Thematically:** The phenomenon of illegal migration is characterized by multiple dimensions – economic, social, cultural, psychological, political, and many others. Following that, one can

find several types of illegal migration, and as a result, many types of migrants. Besides, illegal migration can affect different entities ranging from individual migrants through sending households, communities and countries to transit and receiving households, communities and countries. With this in mind, this thesis was made its focus on the socio-cultural dimension of illegal migration. Specifically, it focuses on the role of social capital (home and abroad), community attitude, cultural proximity (in terms of religious and linguistic proximity), pressure from others and social media (Facebook and WhatsUp) in illegal migration decision, experience and consequence.

**Methodologically:** this study was also delimited based on the units of analysis served as sources of information. Accordingly, observation units of the study were migrants (both returnee and potential migrants), government employees, household heads, elderly and religious leaders of both Christianity and Muslim.

**Geographically,** the study was conducted in Raya Azebo Woreda. The Woreda constitutes 20 Tabias under its administration. From these total TABIAs, four of them were taken randomly through stratified sampling technique based on level of migration flow and geographical location. These include Kara, Wargba, Hawelti and Mehoni Town.

## **1.6. Limitations of the Study**

- ✓ The document served as sampling frame for migrant returnees is a record of migrant returnees for training purposes and it might not incorporated all returnees exhaustively. This in turn might result in sample representativeness problems.
- ✓ Unavailability of reliable and relevant data also limited the study to just deploying primary sources of data to investigate the phenomenon. Finding a reliable and recorded data was difficult. Actually, the task created further burden for every governmental structure passes its responsibility over to the other government structure by claiming it is not their concern to record and document data. This would affect the study somehow.
- ✓ Another limiting factor was the kind of frustration among the youth as a result of distrust they have developed against the promises by the woreda representatives. The youth and even the elderly blame the representatives for their failure to put what they promise in to ground. So, they lose interest in government things. The thing is if someone stranger

approached them they think he is from the woreda who come to conduct such ‘endless and fruitless meetings’; to use the informants’ words. As a result they try to hesitate to be contacted. This also influenced the researcher-informant contact, at least in some instances. Hence, the researcher had to convince the participants to get their consent, and this in turn, produced some delays. Nonetheless, the researcher has overcome the problem by communicating the respondents the purpose of the study and his affiliation prior to any activity.

## **1.7. Structure of the Thesis**

The thesis has six chapters. While the first chapter sets a background for the study, chapter two presents literature review, chapter three explains the research methodology and study setting, chapter four is devoted to the presentation of the findings, chapter five provides discussion and finally, in chapter six conclusions and implications are presented.

## **CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW**

This chapter discusses the phenomenon of migration, reviews the existing literature, and explains theoretical foundations as how it relates to the research topic. It first presents the phenomenon of migration. It then, discusses theoretical foundations in order to draw assumption for the explanation of illegal migration particularly its socio-cultural aspects. It finally reviews the existed related empirical evidence.

### **2.1. The Phenomenon of Migration: An Overview**

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Migration can be defined as “a process of moving, either across an international border or within a state, whatever its length, composition and causes. It includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people and economic migrants” (Frehiwot 2017:4). It is the movement of people from one place to another within a country, or from one country to another for different reasons for, mainly, economic reasons. In developing countries, many people consider migration as the only option to improve their livelihoods (ILO 2011).

Migration is not a new phenomenon. In fact, it is as old as the human history itself. Humans have moved from one place to another within and outside their kingdom around the globe in search for food, in flight from enemies, in pursuit of wealth, spreading cultures, languages, etc. Historically, people have migrated for different reasons with varied directions of flows and fluctuating trends through time. During feudalism, for example, people were highly tied to their lands and as a result migration was a rare happening. It was limited to military occupations and trade expansions. Migration beyond a kingdom was rare except for war time (Ferrie and Hatton 2013).

However, since the mid 19<sup>th</sup> century, with introduction of industrialism and consequential transport and communication improvements, and with the discovery of the New World – the lands in South and North America and Australia -, intercontinental migration has expanded. The main reasons behind this expansion were explained in terms of economic sense as wage difference between the destination and sending countries and labour shortage in receiving countries. Besides, migrant network was held as key element in European migration. The major migration flows were from Europe into the New World and from Southern Asian countries like

India and China going chiefly to sugar producing and other tropical plantation economies (Burma, Ceylon, parts of South-East Asia and the Pacific Islands as well as the coast of Africa). This trend had continued until the First World War (Ferrie and Hatton 2013).

In the inter war period, international migration has declined once again. But, after the Second World War the decline in international migration during inter-war years was reversed with economic improvements (Ferrie and Hatton 2013). In 1973 a huge destination (Middle East) has emerged for international migrants. Large stocks of migrants have moved into Middle East from different parts of the world because of high manpower demand in this region. This is mainly due to an increase in oil price since 1973. The oil price increases of 1973 have exploded labor demands of the Arab World (Choucri 1983). Now days the Middle Eastern Asian countries have become the major destination places for migrants who enter the countries both legally and illegally. In 2015 Saudi Arabia alone hosted 10 million migrants, which was ranked the fourth in the world (UNDESA 2016).

What can be observed in the history of international migration is that there have been a decline and a boom in immigration and emigration rates. The main explanations that have been applied to the major intercontinental migration flows from Europe to the New World countries, the South Eastern Asian Migrations, and migration in the Middle East revolve around economic factors that is, wage differential and labour shortages. However, this cannot explain why poor countries have lower emigration rates (Ferrie & Hatton 2013). This last statement shows migration is not a simplistic phenomenon as such. Rather it is multi-faceted phenomenon which involves different actors, variables, institutions in the decisions making process. Hence, by considering such nature of migration, this study will focus on the socio-cultural aspects of (illegal) migration.

### **2.1.1. Global Trends of Migration**

There is difficulty in finding exact and accurate data about the trends of migration. The problem becomes worse when it is about illegal migration. Still, according to recent findings by the World Bank, there are over 1 billion migrants, that is 1 in 7 people globally (Frehiwot 2017; citing World Bank 2015). Of this figure, international migration accounts for more than 240 million people (UNDESA 2016).

Global trends of migration show that currently there are more destinations for migrants. In the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century almost all countries have started to be affected (either as sending transit or receiving) by migration (Frehiwot 2017).

Coming to Ethiopia, According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), there were 1.8 million migrants in Ethiopia in 2015. Of this total stock of migrants, 753,462 were emigrants to the rest of the world. The top two destination areas (in terms of continent) for Ethiopian migrants were Asia and North America, with 224,658 and 211,630 migrants respectively. In terms of destination country, Saudi Arabia placed at the top of the Asian countries with 123,669 migrants (UNDESA 2015).

To see the trend since 1990 through 2015, the country has experienced boom and decline in contributing to the international migrant stock. The 1990s has shown the highest flow of emigrants from Ethiopia with 1,686,181 because of political instability. Table 2.1 shows the trend in Ethiopian emigrant stock.

*Table 2.1: international emigrant trend in Ethiopia since 1990s through 2015*

| Distribution based on Gender | Year      |         |         |         |         |         |
|------------------------------|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
|                              | 1990      | 1995    | 2000    | 2005    | 2010    | 2015    |
| Male                         | 853 935   | 419 702 | 237 288 | 281 298 | 337 122 | 397 562 |
| Female                       | 832 246   | 396 482 | 204 873 | 238 184 | 286 876 | 355 930 |
| Total                        | 1 686 181 | 816 184 | 442 161 | 519 482 | 623 998 | 753 492 |

*Source: United Nations Database of international migrant stock, 2015*

## **2.1.2. Types of Migration**

Different types of migration can be discussed based on different criteria such as involvement of international border, duration of stay, entry and work status, reasons for migration, and complexity of the factors driving the movement. Thus, migration can take place within a country or between countries which referred as internal and international migrations, respectively. Migration can also be temporary or permanent based on the duration of stay. Migrants can be refugees, displaces, economic migrants, asylum seekers as per the reasons for their migration. Moreover, based on the irregularity of movements and complexity of the factors driving such

movement, migration can be classified as mixed flow. Finally, there can also be legal and illegal types of migration according to the migrant's status of leaving a country (origin), border crossing, entrance of a country (destination), and stay & work in a country (destination) (Frehiwot 2017).


### **2.1.3. Illegal Migration Trends**

Illegal migration is hardly quantifiable or measurable, given its clandestine nature, the lack of data sources and of a universally agreed definition, and its highly dynamic character (e.g. migrants in an illegal situation can be legalized, and migrants entering a country legally can become illegal upon expiration of their stay permits).

Nevertheless, the most recent global estimate of illegal migration suggests that there were at least 50million illegal migrants worldwide in 2010, a large number of whom rely on smuggling services (Firehiwot 2017:Training manual).

As we see the case in Ethiopia, there is no accurate data on the trend of illegal migration. This is mainly due to the reason that illegal migration is unrecorded and hidden. Nonetheless, as estimated by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, illegal migrants are estimated to be between 60-70 % of the total Ethiopian emigrants (Carter & Rohwerder 2016). Besides, the following graph shows the number of migrants newly arrived at Yemen from 2006 to 2016.

Figure 2.1: New arrivals in Yemen from 2006 to 2016



Source:

taken from IOM; Summer Academy II, Training Programme on a ‘Multidisciplinary Discourse on Migration: Ethiopian and African Region Perspectives’ (Frehiwot 2017:29)

### 2.1.4. Dimensions of Illegal Migration

The literature in illegal migration conceptualizes illegal migration as the movement of a person or persons through illegal routes for economic purpose in illegal work sector. In fact, the migrants are most often labeled as economic migrants. However, this doesn’t mean illegal migration involves just economic aspect. Rather it is a multi-dimensional issue involving social, cultural, economic, political, personal, security, human rights, etc dimensions. Taking this multi-dimensional nature of the phenomenon, the current study emphasized on the socio-cultural aspects. The following diagram shows the pattern of the phenomenon of migration and delimits the focus of this thesis.

### 2.1.5. Major routes and Destinations for Ethiopian Illegal Migrants


Migrants use numerous land, sea, and air routes to reach their desired destinations through both legally and illegally. Taking the case of illegal migration taking part in Ethiopia, recently conducted assessments (e.g. RMMS 2014; Carter & Rohwerder 2016; IOM 2016 and Frehiwot 2017) identified three main illegal routes available for Ethiopians. These include *Southern*

*illegal route*, Northern/western illegal route *and Eastern illegal route*. The southern route is on land route which extends through Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique and Swaziland. Migrants use this route to reach South Africa, and in some cases to enter the USA. This route is mainly used by migrants originating from the Southern Nations, Nationality and Peoples' (SNNP) Regional State.

The northern route on the other hand extends through Sudan, Egypt and Libya which are in most cases transit countries to reach Europe. Migrants originating from Oromia, Amhara and Tigray region mostly use this route. This route is also the most prominent for the secondary of Eritrean and Somali refugees hosted in Ethiopia. This sometimes leads Ethiopian migrants to engage on this route claiming to be Eritrean as a strategy to obtain asylum (Frehiwot 2017). This route is the most deadly of the three, especially for those who reach far north and try to get smuggled by boat from Libya to Lampedusa, Italy.

The last route, eastern route is desert and sea route which is a major route used by majority of Ethiopian migrants. Migrants use Somalia and Djibouti to reach the Middle East, more especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Current statistics indicate that this route is mainly used by migrants originating from the highlands of Ethiopia as well as Oromia Regional State. The following figure shows the visual description of the main illegal routes.

**Figure 2.2: a visual representation of the main illegal routes from Ethiopia**



*Source: Adopted from Frehiwot; Summer Academy II, Training Programme on a 'Multidisciplinary Discourse on Migration: Ethiopian and African Region Perspectives' (2017:31) (with key added)*

From the literature, it can be seen that the major destination countries for Ethiopian illegal migrants are Middle East countries, Europe (mainly Italy) and South Africa. Taking this fact in mind, this study focuses on the illegal migration to Middle East particularly through Yemen onwards to Saudi Arabia taking the eastern illegal route for these countries are assumed to be the main destination areas for migrants from Woreda Raya Azebo.

## **2.2. Theories to Explain the Socio-cultural Aspects of Illegal Migration**

Theories have been defined and explained in several disciplines and by several scholars taking broader, objective, instrumental and precise contexts (Mwanje 2001 Brown 2004; Tennis 2008; and Tesfaye 2015). Broadly speaking, Brown (2004:45) wrote, on social theories, as “interrelated sets of concepts that seek to make sense of social facts so as to show how the social world operates.” Emphasizing on the instrumentality of theories, and deploying a sociological approach, Wallace and Wolf (1995:2, cited in Tesfaye 2015:23) argued Sociological theories.....have everything to do with the world we live in-how we see it, understand it, explain it, as well as how we act in it and thus what it becomes.

More in precise terms, theories do provide explanation about the working nature of events in the world (Tesfaye 2015). As more related to this thesis, a theory is a system of assumptions, principles, and relationships posited to explain a specified set of phenomena (Tennis 2008:3, citing Bates 2005). The study at hand adopted many assumptions from a range of sociological theories to explain the phenomenon of illegal migration, coinciding with Bates' definition. In view of that, the study adopted a combination of assumptions derived from a range of sociological theories taking a micro and meso levels: theory of value expectancy, Mead's theory of the self, social network theory, transnational social space theory and institutional theory of migration.

The theoretical mix was done for two important reasons. First, to accord with the methodological triangulations pursued in the study. The Second reason was a single theory cannot fully capture the phenomenon of migration because its broader and complex nature dictates the employment of the assumptions of varied sociological theories. This conception was equally emphasized by O'Reilly (2012:6) who argued "while there are a lot of substantive migration theories there is something of a vacuum when it comes to a single theoretical framework providing coherence." In the same way, "it would certainly be unrealistic to expect that a one-size-fits-all theory explaining migration for all places and times will ever arise" (De Haas 2014:7).

### ***2.2.1 THE MICRO-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE***

One way to explain the phenomenon of [illegal] migration is taking micro-level and the role of the individual migrant in migration decision, behavior, experience and impact. The theories which try to approach migration from the rational choice perspective view migration as a rational and value-driven action. This argument was backed up by the writings of Max Weber who had to say actors engage in one of four types of actions, one of which being the rational action (Ritzer 2011). Following this, migrants decide to migrate and undertake the action of migration after a thorough calculation of the benefits and costs that are involved in migration. Simply put, individuals decide to migrate after they calculate the sum utility of moving in comparison to the sum utility of staying. Drawing on this context, migration is regarded as a rational action, maximizing the individual's net benefits (Todaro 1976, cited in Haug 2008). One of the theories that operate on the assumptions that migration occurs after a thorough calculation is the value

expectancy theory. In the following section, thus, the value expectancy theory is discussed emphasizing at migrants' aspirations and motivations for migration.

### ***1. Theory Of Value Expectancy***

Another micro-level theory that sees migrants as free agents that can act up on calculations is theory of value expectancy. The theory argued that migrants decide to migrate to certain destination instead of others according to sum of expected utilities over several dimensions. De Jong and Fawcett's (1981) model defines the intentions to migrate is associated with the sum of the expected utilities over the various facets including wealth, status, autonomy, affiliation, morality, comfort, and suggestion<sup>3</sup>. In this theory, of paramount importance is affiliation utility. Family members, close friends, groups whom one belongs to, and so forth offer sense of belongingness. Belongings provide place specific capital which affect individual's movement or stay. An individual's stay or move is influenced by place specific capital. That is, the utility of living near to family members, friends or being part of a [religious] group and community determines migration decision. In this context, an individual migrates to a particular place if he/she believed that the new place can give him/her more than what he/she is going to lose as a result of relocation. Therefore, an individual decides to migrate to a destination if his/her calculation favors potential residence over old residence in all aspects. Migration decisions take place only when the subjectively expected net utility of migration exceeds the expected net utility of staying at the place of origin (Haug 2008). The assumptions of this theory can be summarized as follows;

$$MD = \sum EU > \sum US;$$

Where MD stands for migration decision, EU indicates expected utility and US for utility of staying.

### ***2. Mead's Theory of the Self***

George H. Mead developed the theory of mind, self and society in order to understand the development of the 'self' in its full sense. In his theory, Mead argued that the social whole precedes the individual mind both logically and temporally. In Mead's theory, a thinking a self-

---

<sup>3</sup> Suggestion refers to the implications that societal attitude accords to migration.....

conscious individual is impossible without a prior social group. The social group comes first, and it leads to the development of self-conscious mental states. To Mead, individuals need to develop and accept the attitude and values of their community to develop a full self in order for they may actively play their role in that community (Lichtman 1970; Ritzer 2011).

Related to this, George H. Mead, one of the proponents of the theory of symbolic interactionism, developed the concept of generalized other in his theory of the self. While explaining how individuals specifically children develop self in its full sense, he came up with an important, at least as related to this study, concept: the generalized other. The concept generalized refers to ‘the attitude’ of a set of people, a group, or ‘an entire community’ which individuals are member of. In his argument, Mead asserted that individual members need to assume the attitude, perception of an entire group, or community and this, in turn, tended to direct their decision and action (Ritzer 2011:365).

This theory is adopted to particularly explain the role of community attitude towards illegal migration decision and the consequential action. Community perception towards illegal migration is more likely to affect individuals’ migration decision and to take action accordingly. Hence, this theoretical assumption of Mead was drawn to explain the role of community perception about illegal migration on individuals’ migratory decision and actions in Raya Azebo Woreda.

### ***2.2.2 THE MESO-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE***

Here, the phenomenon of illegal migration is approached from meso perspective. This perspective focuses on the role of different entities (family, friendships, relatives and institutions) in inducing migratory decisions and facilitating illegal migration (De Haas 2014). Corresponding to this social network theory, transnational social space theory and institutional theory of migration are explained in the following sections.

#### ***1. Social Network Theory***

The role of networks has been mentioned profoundly in migration studies. Boyd (1989) and Massey et al. (1987) have begun to formulate a new approach to the sociology of migration on the basis of networks (Haug 2008:588). This approach explains the importance of migrant

networks in illegal migration from creating intentions and inducing migratory decisions (Elrick 2005 and Mbaye 2013) through arranging illegal migration routes (Mbaye 2013) to influencing destination experiences of migrants (Poros 2011). Migration networks range from family members, kinship ties, close friends to community members, loose acquaintances and ties, and membership to institutions (Bijak 2006; Haug 2008). A migration network can be defined by a composite of interpersonal relations in which migrants interact with their family or friends. Social networks provide a foundation for the dissemination of information as well as for patronage or assistance (Haug 2008:588).

The point here is that migrant social networks make illegal migration easy by providing potential migrants with a choice of whether to migrate (social networks create migratory intentions (Mbaye 2013), then with access to information about illegal migration routes, assistance in their journey and even once they reach their destinations. This consequently influences illegal migration decisions. In a summary, social networks play preventive, pulling, arranging and facilitating, and pushing roles hence, affinity hypothesis, information hypothesis, facilitating hypothesis, conflict hypothesis, and encouraging hypothesis (Haug 2008).

Yet, migrant social networks operate through the creation of social capital which embedded in the relations between individuals (Elrick 2005). Social capital specifically focuses on the strong social relationships that individuals could count on during critical times. Thus the level of social capital possession affects whether one might migrate, where to migrate, when and how to migrate.

Therefore, the social network theory was assumed in this theory to explain the role of social capital in inducing migration decision, offering assistance during trip through the illegal routes and stay in their destination.

## **2. *Transnational Social Space Theory***

This theory is developed to fill the gap in theories of value expectancy and social capital. These theories assume space specific capital. As people move their access to these place specific capital will be affected. But for transnational social space theory this is not the case. Migrant networks create transnational capital thereby serving as bridge between people in different places.

Transnational social space knows no boundary. The assumptions of this theory that social networks create transnational capital were adopted in this thesis to explain journey and destination experiences of illegal migrants, and return migration. Mbaye (2013) argued that migrant networks, particularly family and friends play crucial roles in illegal migration. Networks assist individuals in finding a job more easily, learning information about how to cross borders illegally and meeting the financial cost of migration through informal credit mechanisms between individuals.

There is a close similarity between social networks theory and transnational social space theory, except transnational social space theory clearly argued the benefit of networks in connecting current migrants with those who did not migrate. The social networks theory indicated how social networks at destinations pull individuals; there is no clear argument about the role of ties for current migrants. Transnational social space theory acknowledges the presence of various migration related cross-border linkages between individuals and groups. As defined by Faist (2000:199, cited in Bijak 2006:7), “transnational social spaces consist of combinations of social and symbolic ties, their contents, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that can be found in multiple states.

These spaces denote dynamic processes, not static notions of ties and positions”. Apart from the networks theory, the presented approach builds on the concept of *social capital*, seen as the “resources that help people or groups to achieve their goals in ties and the assets inherent in patterned social and symbolic ties that allow actors to cooperate in networks and organizations, serving as a mechanism to integrate groups and symbolic communities” (Bijak 2006:7, citing Faist, 2000:102). This provided the thesis at hand with a theoretical framework entertain the role of networks in illegal routes of migration and experiences of migrants in their destination and after their return back to home. It also helps explain the role of social media in maintaining transnational networks.

### **3. *Institutional Theory of Migration***

Institutional theory of migration, like social networks theory, seeks to explain why migration is ongoing. Following Massey et al. (1993), Jannissen (2007) used institutional theory with regard to profit and non-profit organization which can be legal as well as illegal. These organizations

provide services and support in terms of lead ways, transport, labor contracts, documents, dwellings or legal advice for migrants. These organizations are often embedded in migrant networks (Jennissen 2007). Jennissen, further, argued:

*Large international migration flows strengthen material linkages between countries. If, for instance, travelling between the sending and receiving countries increases, cheap and frequent flight connections will be established. In this way, moving costs of future migrants will become lower. Subsequently, such lowering costs of mobility may lower the threshold that deters potential migrants from migration. Institutions may also be working with already settled migrants (i.e., voluntary organizations that help migrants to settle down in the host society). These institutions strengthen cultural linkages between countries. They lower, for instance, the (psychological) costs because of assimilation in the receiving society (Jennissen 2007:433).*

The bottom line, besides migrant networks, institutions play the role of facilitations and migration arrangements. Institutions range from for profit legal (job recruitment, counseling, etc) and illegal (human smuggling and trafficking) entities and enterprises to humanitarian organizations, NGOs, etc. (Bijak 2006:7). According to Bijak (2006), the institutional theory of migration is complementary to the social network theory extending the facilitating subjects to institutions from networks.

In institutional theory of migration, the role of the smuggling service in general and smugglers in particular is acknowledged. The smuggling service, as an institution, plays a significant part in illegal migration from convincing individuals for migration to passage arrangement and facilitation. Following that, this theory served as a framework to the analysis of the role of smugglers as migration facilitating institution in migration decision, in making the trip, and in destination experiences of migrants.

### **2.3. Empirical Evidences**

The literature in migration studies has revolved around the enquiry that why some people go and others do not. It tended to emphasize at the determinants of migration decision and migration destination. Taking on cultural aspect, Adsera (2015), for example, studied how language and

cultural distance between countries affect whether to migrate and where to go. Adsera argued that people's knowledge of a destination's language is an addition. In his study Adsera claimed that the impact of linguistic proximity on migration flows is much higher than even unemployment rates. Empirically, he compared the flow of immigration to France from Benin where French is the first official language, and Zambia, where French is not official. The results showed that migrant flow from Benin was much higher than from Zambia. This implies migration can be influenced by linguistic proximity. Yet, there is difficulty in measuring how proximate the language of the destination is.

Drawing on migrants' aspiration aspect, Van Meeteren, Engbersen and Van San (2009) argued irregular [illegal] migrants leave their origin in order to realize their respective aspirations. They, precisely, migration in terms of strive for better positions and realization of aspirations. The authors forwarded three types of migrants based on their aspirations including investment migrants, legalization migrants and settlement migrants. So, from this perspective, people migrate either to earn and save money for later investment after their return to their origin, or to find legal status of residence and or to settle down regardless of whether they obtain legal status or not.

The investment aspiration is clear and straight forward. The second two are a little bit confusing. Yet, in legalization aspiration the focus is on obtaining legal residential status, whereas the settlement aspiration is about settling down and living a descent life. In settlement aspiration obtaining legal residence status is not a primary thing (Van Meeteren, Engbersen and Van San 2009). But aspirations embedded in and influenced by social and cultural structures.

Siding on economic aspects, studies revealed that people leave their original settlements to improve their livelihoods. Individuals migrate by putting their lives at risk hoping for a better life (Mbaye 2013). Coming to Africa, however, there is a limited literature on illegal migration. Most of the existing literature about illegal migration tended to focus on illegal migration from Latin America (particularly Mexico) to USA (Mbaye 2013). To the level of my review, the same is true for the problem in Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, the large share of the previous study gave emphasis to mixed migration (Jones et al 2014 and RMMS 2014). Even if some focused on illegal migration there has been a tendency to overlook smuggling by just focusing on trafficking of women and children (Elias 2013; Selemawit 2013 and Jones et al 2014). Most significant for the

current thesis, such previous studies have ignored the aspects of [illegal] migration other than the economic ones (Gebrehiwot and Fikadu 2012; ILO 2013; Bisrat 2014; Hailemichael 2014 and Carter & Rohwerder, 2016) or have given little attention (Gashaw 2014; Jones et al 2014 and RMMS 2014) and or have focused on some aspects like the role of family members and friends in migration decision (Milki 2014). Then, what about male and female smuggled? What about the role of socio-cultural aspects (e.g. the role of social networks, social capital, institutions, affiliations, social media, etc...) in illegal migration?

### **2.3.1. Causes of Illegal Migration**

People move to other places/countries leaving their country of origin for various reasons. According to the studies carried out in various parts of Ethiopia came to agree on the view that economic factors are placed at the heart of most Ethiopians decisions to migrate. These studies commonly explained the causes of (illegal) migration in terms of push-pull analysis. Migrants run away from unemployment, low wages, lack of access to formal education, family circumstances, environmental factors, and poverty in their place of origin(e.g. Gebrhiwot and Fikadu 2012; Selemawit 2013; Jones et al 2014; Hailemichael 2014 and RMMS 2014). Migrants, on the other hand, pulled by the availability of employment opportunities and relatively higher wages in destination countries, migration success stories, the role of remittance as livelihood strategy (Elias 2013; ILO 2011; Bisrat 2014; Carter & Rohwerder 2016).

Gebrehiwot and Fikadu (2012) studied the role of out-migration as livelihood strategy in Gulo-Mekeda District in Tigray region. In their study, the authors found that poor households with weak migrant ties, low level of education, distance from market centre, shortage of financial capital to cover the cost of legal migration at one time, drought, landlessness, and unemployment are the major drivers of illegal out-migration in the District. In contrast to many other studies in the field (e.g. Haug 2008; Van Meeteren, Engbersen and Van San 2009; Milki 2014), Gebrehiwot and Fikadu argued that it was weak ties instead of strong ties that caused illegal migration from Gulo-Mekeda District to Middle East. Despite this, the authors reported economic factors as the main driving forces behind migration. In this regard, their findings coincided with other researchers' results (see for example, Selemawit 2013; Mbaye 2013; ILO 2011; RMMS 2014; Jones et al 2014, etc...).

A report by RMMS in 2014 about the attitude, knowledge and practice of Ethiopian migrants **revealed** that economic factors play significant roles in illegal migration of Ethiopians into Middle East. The Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat assessed the knowledge, attitude and practice of Ethiopian Migrants by interviewing 391 migrants from three groups of migrants – potential migrants, current migrants and returnee migrants – which were selected from different places of the country that are known to be sources of migration (Raya Azebo was selected for the assessment as one of the sources of migrants into Middle East). The findings showed that economic factors were placed at the top. Similarly, a study conducted in Tis Abay and Hara of Amhara National Regional State, also confirmed the findings of other authors that economic factors are the leading causes for Ethiopian migrants (Jones et al 2014).

Jones and her colleagues found that the reason for most of the girls who migrated illegally was to help their families improve their livelihoods by sending money back. Declining and uncertainty of agricultural productivity as a result of land degradation, deforestation, lack of water for irrigation, decline and change of rainfall patterns made the households in the study areas prone to poverty. This, in turn, has left daughters no choice other than migration. Here, the statement that girls migrated illegally to help their families improve their livelihoods by sending money back pinpoints implicitly that family pressure is behind girls' migration. This indication needs to be investigated in detail as part of the socio-cultural aspects study.

Furthermore, Selemawit (2013), in her Thesis “the vulnerability of Ethiopian rural women and girls”, studied the drivers of labour migration from Ethiopia to Middle East. Through lived experiences of 15 returnee migrants, she claimed that Ethiopian women and girls leave for the Middle East countries as house maid in order to, primarily, change the livelihood of themselves and their families. Similar to other such studies, the findings of this study showed that high rates of unemployment and diminishing economic opportunities in rural parts of Ethiopia are the most mentioned forces driving Ethiopian migrants to Middle East. Actually, peer pressure, migrant success stories, gendered roles that treat boys and girls unfairly are also contributing to the problem.

These empirical evidences from different parts of the country support the view that illegal migration is considered, by most people in developing countries including Ethiopia, as the only option to improve their livelihoods (ILO 2011 and RMMS 2014).

Nevertheless, illegal migration is not explained solely by economic factors. Rather, other factors also play roles in informing migration decision making (see for example, Jones et al 2014 & RMMS 2014). Such socio-cultural factors as culture of migration (which is associated with family and peer pressure), misinformation by the brokers, migration success stories, political factors, migrant networks, environmental factors, and personal and family circumstances influence migration decision making. Furthermore, parents, siblings, and peers are identified as having a profound influence on the migrants' migration decision making (RMMS 2014). Early and /or forced marriage, lack of access to formal education (especially for girls), pressure from brokers, and familial tension are also some of the factors that should not be overlooked for Jones and her colleagues too, they are not the leading ones though (Jones et al 2014).

However, the economic, social, and cultural factors at home cannot sufficiently push Ethiopians to migrate. There are, indeed, pulling factors at the destination countries that the migrants would aspire to have. The availability of employment opportunities that the nationals wouldn't want to engage in (which are considered, by some, as dirty jobs), the availability of a relatively higher wages, and so forth are motivating Ethiopians even by putting their lives at risk (Elias 2013 and Selemawit 2013).

In a nut shell, economic factors including unemployment (at home country) VS employment opportunities (in destinations), wage differential, family financial crisis, landlessness, etc can be considered as the prominent causes for many Ethiopians (e.g. Gebrehiwot and Fikadu 2012; Selemawit 2013; Jones et al 2014 and RMMS 2014). But, there are also other important factors that should be considered too. These socio-cultural factors include peer pressure and or migration success stories, positive perception towards migration, early and/early marriage, lack of access to formal education, social networks (or more precisely social capital), gendered roles which press girls' way out, false promises of brokers and so forth (Selemawit 2013; Jones et al 2014 and RMMS 2014).

Whilst these and other such studies reported that both economic and socio-cultural factors contribute to migrant decision making, they either focused on human trafficking (for example Elias 2013), or mixed migration (like Jones et al 2014 and RMMS 2014) and/ or only on women (e.g. Selemawit 2012), despite some pinpointing revelations (for e.g. in Selemawit, 2013; Jones

et al, 2014). Furthermore, there is a deficit of literature on how the socio-cultural factors contribute to the problem, despite some shallow evidences. Most significantly, although the Woreda is one of the known migrant source places in Ethiopia (RMMS 2014) (Woreda Raya Azebo is the fourth highest source of (illegal) migration in Tigray National Regional State) (TCA 2014), there is no, to the level of my capacity, any academic research done.

In a nut shell, the problem for this thesis was not in explaining using push-pull analysis, rather the problem with this thesis was the fact that earlier studies have left a room by neglecting socio-cultural factors as push and pull variables. The bottom line in this thesis is socio-cultural aspects, like economic ones, can serve as pushing as well as pulling factors. In this regard, Milki Getachew (2014) tried to investigate the role of family members and friends on migration. However, his study tended to resemble to early stage of migration – migration decision. Besides, socio-cultural aspects of migration go far beyond family members and friends to include larger social networks, institutions, social media, communities both real and virtual and soon.

Having these gaps in mind, this study tried to examine the socio-cultural factors of illegal migration by focusing on migrant smuggling of both sexes. The focus was, specifically, made on how community perspectives about illegal migration, pressure from others, social networks, cultural proximity and information dissemination through and on social media affect migration decision.

### **2.3.2. Journey and Destination Experiences of Illegal Migrants**

The second subsection focused on journey and destination experiences. Here, the emphasis was put on what the migrants have gone through in their trip, on their arrival. The attempt was to explain the role of social networks, institutions and social capital on helping them starting from inform them the route, help them make the trip, find job and settle and soon. This is based on the assumption that migrants experience journey and destination according to their ownership or non-ownership of social capital (Haug 2008 and Poros 2011), the level of linguistic distance and religious similarity and/or dissimilarity (Adsera 2015).

The bottom line, those who have ties abroad can easily have access to information about journey, make the trip, enter the country of destination without/little challenges, find jobs at the destination as opposed to those with no/weak ties (source). According to the transnational social

space theory, there are cross-border ties linking individual migrants and groups from both destination and origin. This linkage between individual migrants and groups make it easy for migrants to make the journey with relatively minimized risk, to cross border of countries, make it easy to find jobs, help migrants create new ties in their destination and continue existed ties back home (Bijak 2006).

The same is true for linguistic and religious distance levels. Adsera (2015) argued that similarity in language and customs between countries of destination and origin imply benefits that add to potential migrants' situation in deciding whether to migrate and where to go. Knowing a destination's language is an advantage in migration decision because it puts them (the potential migrants) in a position whereby they will have information about what life would look like in their potential destination, the type of jobs they might engage in, the wage levels they might earn, and so forth (Adsera, 2015).

Based on a survey study on the attitude, knowledge and skills of Ethiopian migrants, RMMS (2014:5) claimed that its respondents reported that they have heard about “extortion and robbery, exhaustion, dehydration, starvation and deprivation of sleep, mild to moderate or extreme physical violence, criminal kidnapping for ransom and degrading treatment and verbal and sexual abuse”. Other studies confirmed that Ethiopian migrants actually experience such challenges mentioned above (RMMS 2012).

However, migrant journey experiences can be varied according to the routes migrants follow (whether Somalia route or Djibouti route) and other factors as mentioned in the literature from countries other than Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, as far as my knowledge is concerned, no attempt has been made to articulate the importance of interventions in migrants' journey experiences. Taking this into consideration, an attempt was made to fill the gap.

Regarding with destination experiences of Ethiopian illegal migrants, studies conducted by Selemawit (2013), Jones et al (2014), and the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (2014) showed that Ethiopian migrants in general and illegal migrants in particular are greeted with different problems in their destination areas. Sexual assault, beating, hunger, heavy work load, denial of salary, physical and psychological abuse, suicide, murder, and other crimes have been mentioned as the main problems Ethiopian migrants face in Middle East (Abebaw 2013 and

Selemawit, 2013). Selemawit (2013) investigated the vulnerability of Ethiopian rural women and girls in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. By carrying out phenomenological research on returnee migrants in Addis Ababa, she argued:

*The domestic workers' right abuse in most cases starts right at the arrival by confiscating travel documents to have full control over their movement and make them dependent on their employers. After domestic workers are locked in apartments, the abuse will continue in different magnitude. Long working hours with heavy workload, withholding of salary, and discrimination in defiance of racial, religious and gender identities are common trends exercised against domestic workers (2013:44-45).*

Likewise, a study conducted by Elias (2013) divulged that migrants, particularly girls who work as home maids, live through harsh conditions – they got beaten, given electric shocks, abused by the owners of the house which they work for. Most of these problems left unreported because the migrants fear that they might be fired, left unemployed, caught by a police and deported to their country of origin before they realized their dreams.

A report by Jones and her colleagues also went through the challenges at destination countries. They disclosed that migrants ran into lord and slave like relationship, excessive work hours with incomplete wages and withholding of pay, physical and sexual abuse, psychological ill being (2014). Moreover, domestic workers reported loneliness, homesick, cultural humiliation, and miscommunication as the experiences they usually faced during their stay (Woldamlak 2014). Taking an extreme position, some scholars relate the situation of African migrants in general and Ethiopian migrants in particular in Middle East to 'modern Slavery' (Selemawit 2013:6, citing Fitzgibbon 2003).

Although these studies reported the experiences of Ethiopian migrants in Middle East, they overlooked the roles of social capital and cultural proximity on destination experiences. Besides, there is a tendency to focus on experiences of housemaid and women and girls in general. But, in reality, Ethiopians also engage in employments other than housemaid as shepherds, shop keepers, factory workers, etc. these studies failed to document what happens to these migrants and their focus on women migrants provide another room for research. Taking this gap in mind, this study examined journey and destination experiences of illegal migrants of both sexes, with

the aim of filling the gap in the literature on human smuggling and contributing to the experiences of housemaids who enter the Middle East countries illegally via sea transport. Females, usually, migrate legally through air transport (RMMS 2014).

### **2.3.3. The Consequences of Illegal Migration**

Illegal migration, inevitably, has consequences on the migrants themselves and the sending household, the community and the sending country at large. This micro, meso and macro level impact can have economic, social, cultural, and health dimensions. This subsection, therefore, discusses the issue by drawing empirical evidences from previous researches done in different parts of the country (Ethiopia) under subheadings of consequences of illegal migration on migrants, and the consequences of illegal migration on the sending households and communities.

#### **1. The Consequence of Illegal Migration on Individual Migrants Themselves**

Inability to stand the financial expectations of family, neighbors and the community at large, mental health problems, low self-esteem, social, cultural and economic reintegration problems have been claimed as the main effects of illegal migration at individual level (for instance, Selemawit 2013; Gashaw 2014; Michael 2014; Woldamlak 2014 and Jemal 2015). Most of these effects are assumed to be ill-effects of destination experiences of the migrants. Woldamlak (2014), for example, in his study “the psycho-social conditions of migrant returnees up on their arrival at Bole International Airport”, stressed that the bad experiences migrants came across in Middle East such as verbal humiliation, different types of abuse including physical, sexual, verbal, enforced cultural isolation, undermining of cultural identity went further to produce mental health problems on migrants.

Some of the effects outlined by Woldamlak (2014) like cultural isolation indicated how important the role of social networks would be. The presence of social networks in destinations prevents such these and other related consequences of illegal migration. This shows the importance of social networks, cultural proximity and soon reaches the impact of illegal migration on individual migrants, and, as it shall be seen later, on sending households and communities. In addition, the phrase ‘inability to stand the financial expectations of family

members, neighbors and the community' implies Woldamlak's study implicitly approved migrants were in pressure from their families, neighbors and community.

Besides, incapability to bear the (financial) expectations of parents, family members and even neighbors also contribute to the (re)integration challenges. They feel ashamed to return back home without having enough to repay their debt and to improve their living standard and that of their family (Woldamlak 2014). This, in turn, affects the psychological wellbeing of the migrants (Selemawit 2013). In the same way, Jemal (2015) investigated the experiences of 10 Mass deported migrants from Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Mersa Town of North Wollo. Jemal tried to study how the families and the community have perceived the deportee's sudden deportation. Varied perceptions have been revealed, by the study, based on each family's understanding of the situation there at Saudi Arabia. Some with better understanding of the situation welcomed the migrant returnees, despite the money they had at hand and the sudden deportation. Others, on the opposite, couldn't accept their coming back without having money, at least for debt repayment.

This situation of migrants, according to a study done by Michael (2014), result in some reintegration challenges. Michael studied the reintegration challenges of illegal migrant returnees by interviewing eight returnees. The results showed that migrant returnees face different reintegration challenges. These challenges can be both economic and social.

*On the one hand, lack of employment opportunities, organizing excessive returnees in an enterprise, severe market problem of the sheds (business center) allocated, failure to fulfill infrastructures for the allocated sheds, procedural difficulty to access business start-up loan, inadequacy of the start-up loan repayment grace period, lengthy & non-responsive government bureaucracy, incoherent & inconsistent leadership, and on the other hand, declining family care & support, family and peer pressure, community misconception and self-imposed social isolation were pointed out by the study to constitute the social reintegration challenges (Michael 2014:51-67, with italics added).*

Some went far beyond the immediate effects of migration on to see the consequence of the problem on the social life of the migrant returnees. Gashaw for example studied the marriage situation of the migrants. In his study, he summarized the influence before and after the migrants

return to their home town. The main consequences include divorce, children abandonment and the like (Gashaw 2014).

## **2. The Consequence of Illegal Migration on Migrant Sending Households and Communities**

Illegal migration has significant effect on the sending households and communities as well. Some studies have been conducted focusing on the socio-economic impacts of illegal migration on the sending households as well as the community at large. Bisrat (2014) examined the impact of international migration on the socio-economic well-being of migrant sending households in Irob Woreda of Tigray National Regional State. He specifically, analyzed the importance of remittance on the individual migrant sending households' livelihood. By carrying out a survey of 145 households which were selected using snow-ball sampling technique, the study disclosed the contribution of remittance to the households' daily consumption, healthcare, education, and housing. Indeed, the household heads reported, according to the findings of the study, that remittance has a significant role in their livelihood.

However, in a cumulative sense of the effect, international migration is deteriorating agricultural productivity by taking the productive labour away (Bisrat 2014). Similarly, young women emigration is thought to retard the socio-economic development of a sending community. Gashaw (2014) investigated the impact of young women emigration from Mekane Selam Town in Borena Woreda into the Arab world on socio-economic development of their home community. After interviewing teachers as key informants, surveying emigrant and non-emigrant families and making observation, he concluded that emigration has negative consequences on socio-economic development of sending communities, despite some short financial crisis relief.

The majority of his respondents (59% emigrant and 64.5% non-emigrant families) claimed that migrant returnees contribute to the retardation of the town's socio-economic development (Gashaw 2014:108). Actually, migrant returnees create additional burden to their families and the community. According to this view, the migrant returnees become dependent on their family for their basic and other needs, become jobless, have poor social relationships and suffer from health problems. Furthermore, the findings found that young women's emigration has, negatively, influenced the town's girls' education by aspiring them to move to the Arab world. A


large number of teachers, emigrant families and non-emigrant families (80% and 82% respectively) agreed on the argument that emigrants contribute to females' school dropout (Gashaw 2014:109).

Gashaw (2014) went on to look the impacts of culture in terms of dressing style, language mix and religion. To this end, the results of his study (based on the responses of 65% of the respondents) showed that the dressing style of the emigrants themselves and the girls in the town as well was changed into the Arab dressing style (2014:110). In relation to the influence of emigration on religion, the findings noted that emigrants have influenced religious affiliation.

The literature on the consequences of (illegal) migration has suffered from similar problems as the works on the causes and destination experiences. Despite the studies have examined the economic effects and to some extent the socio-cultural consequences of illegal migration on individual migrants and sending households and communities, they have just examined the problem in relation to women migrants. There is no enough evidence to conclude that male illegal migration would produce the same consequences.

## 2.4. Conceptual Framework

Figure 2.3: Analytical Frame work




Source: author's own construction based on the review of literature (2017)

The above diagram shows the conceptual framework of the study. It links of the main concepts related to illegal migration and theoretical assumptions from different theories which are relevant to this study. Based on the framework, analytical framework is drawn in figure 2.4 as follows. The analytical framework guides the overall course of investigation, and findings and discussion.

## 2.5. Analytical Framework

Figure 2.4: analytical framework



Source: author's own draw (January, 2017)

## 2.6. Conclusion

There are several studies on the phenomenon of (Illegal) migration from Ethiopia to, generally, Middle East. Yet, these studies have tended to focus on the importance of economic aspects, specifically how migration has become alternative livelihood strategy for most people in Ethiopia (Gebrehiwot and Fikadu 2012; Bisrat 2014 and Carter & Rohwerder 2016), despite little emphasis on some socio-cultural aspects (Jones et al. 2014 & RMMS 2014). Additionally, the existing literature has placed higher emphasis on human trafficking which usually involves women and girls (Elias 2013; Selemawit 2013 and Jones et al 2014) by overlooking human smuggling which involve both male and female, and characterize the illegal migration from Raya Azebo.

Finally, although the Woreda, Raya Azebo Woreda, is one of the areas where illegal migration has been vastly evident (being the fourth in the regional state in terms of flow, according to TCA (2014)), it is suffered from lack of any academic research of any aspect of illegal migration. This guaranteed a place gap in the literature in addition to the knowledge gap identified in the literature.

## **CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODS AND STUDY SETTING**

### **3.1 RESEARCH METHODS**

#### **3.1.1 Research Approach**

By taking side on pragmatic stand, drawing on the suggestion that researchers should use both quantitative and qualitative approaches to understand a given problem best for single data set can't help uncover a problem fully, and based on the demands of the multi-faceted nature of illegal migration, this study was approached both quantitatively and qualitatively (called triangulation or mixed research approach). Accordingly, sample survey has been employed to collect the quantitative data, while individual in-depth interview, personal observation, key informant interviews and focus group discussion have been used to gather the qualitative data.

#### **3.1.2 Research Design**

As far as this study is concerned, the researcher utilized cross-sectional survey design to guide the migrant survey. In a cross-sectional survey, “data are collected at one point in time from a sample selected to describe some larger population at that time” (Babbie 1990:56).


In line to this, the application of the cross-sectional design helped out to know the community perception, attitude towards local employment opportunities, the role of pressure from others and social capital, and the consequences of illegal migration at the time of the study with help potential migrants. Yet, in often instances where there is a limited time to undertake longitudinal survey and an investigation of a phenomenon over time is required, scholars recommend an approximate type of design: approximating longitudinal survey (Babbie 1990). This design particularly helped uncovering what forces caused migrant returnees to migrate some time ago. On the other end, the qualitative research design helps describe a problem through interpretative ways, with the help of words.

However, a design as how to synthesize and combine data sets is needed, hence, this study deployed convergent parallel mixed design. In convergent parallel mixed method design both types of data (quantitative and qualitative) are collected concurrently, analyzed separately, and

the results are merged and the merged results are interpreted in the end. “The key assumption of this design is that both qualitative and quantitative data provide different types of information—often detailed views of participants qualitatively and scores on instruments quantitatively—and together they yield results that should be the same (Creswell 2013:269).”

The drawing below (Figure 3.2), adopted and modified from Creswell (2013) and Tesfaye (2015), represents a convergent parallel mixed design. The model guides the whole research process.

*Figure 3.1: Convergent parallel mixed design*



*Source: Modified by the researcher after Creswell (2013:270) and Tesfaye (2015:74)*

## 3.2 Operationalization of Concepts

**Operationalization** is “the process whereby the researcher specifies empirical observations that may be taken as indicators of the attributes contained within a given concept. Through his

operationalization work, the researcher specifies the operations that will indicate the value of cases on a variable” (Yeraswork 2010:163).

Table 3.1 specifies variables, indicators and levels of measurement for the six main concepts that will be addressed by the survey method: (a) community perception which is perceived to exert pressure on the youth in order to migrate, (b) information that is to what degree migrants have/had information about illegal migration, (c) attitude towards local opportunities which are perceived to contribute to migration decision making, (d) cultural proximity, (e) social capital, and (f) illegal migration.

*Table 3.1: operationalization/specification of measurement*

| S.N. | Concept                      | Variable                                   | Indicators                                                                                                                     | Level of Measurement                   |
|------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
| 1.   | Cultural proximity           | Yes                                        | Whether respondents religious affiliation is Muslim or Christianity and/or respondents ability whether to speak Arabic or not. | Yes/No:<br>• Nominal scale             |
|      |                              | No                                         |                                                                                                                                |                                        |
| 2    | Community perception         | Attitude score based on likert scale items | Community perception towards migration                                                                                         | Likert scale score<br>• Interval-ratio |
| 3    | Information                  | Yes                                        | Respondents' information about illegal migration, illegal routes, and destination.                                             | Yes/No<br>• Nominal scale              |
|      |                              | No                                         |                                                                                                                                |                                        |
| 4    | Local economic opportunities | Attitude towards local opportunities       | Asking the respondents for their attitude towards local opportunities                                                          | Likert scale score<br>• Interval-ratio |
| 5    | Social capital               | Yes                                        | Whether respondents have/had support from others in their illegal migration or not.                                            | Yes/No<br>• Nominal scale              |
|      |                              | No                                         |                                                                                                                                |                                        |
| 6    | Illegal migration            | Yes                                        | Asking respondents for legality/illegality of their migration                                                                  | Yes/No<br>• Nominal Scale              |
|      |                              | No                                         |                                                                                                                                |                                        |

## **3.2.1 Methods of Data Collection**

### **3.2.1.1 Sample Survey**

With an attempt of capturing the opinion of the community and youth, the role of social capital and pressure from others in migration decision, and assessing and examining consequences of illegal migration, the researcher carried out surveys with non-migrants representing the youth in the TABIAs and migrant returnees.

The migrant survey with non-migrants basically addressed how illegal migration is perceived, how the youth see local employment opportunities, how the pressure from others influence migration decision, and social capital creates illegal migratory intentions and the consequences of illegal migration as they observe in their respective Tabias.

Another set of survey respondent was migrant returnees. A migrant survey was conducted with migrant returnees in order to one) see the community attitude towards illegal migration (particularly, how the community perceives going to Saudi, migrant returnees, and migrant households), two) youth attitude towards local employment opportunities, three) the role of social capital on guiding migrants' journey and destination experiences.

### **3.2.1.2 Qualitative Data Collection Methods**

#### **I. In-depth interview**

The concept of “interviewing” covers a lot of ground, from totally unstructured interactions, through semi-structured situations, to highly formal interactions with respondents. Interviewing is done on the phone, in person, by mail—even by computer. Interviewing can be structured or semi-structured (Bernard 2006:210).

So, in this study, **in-depth interview** was carried out with migrant returnees. This method of data collection was mainly used to understand migrant journey and destination experiences. Such issues as what happens to migrants' choice of illegal pathways, what happens in their trip to Middle East, and what happens to their destination experiences were addressed through this particular method. As a whole, 15 migrants were approached for the interview, as presented in detail in table 3.2.

*Table 3.2: In-depth interview informants*

| Tabia       | Male | Female | Total |
|-------------|------|--------|-------|
| Kara        | 2    | 1      | 3     |
| Mehoni Town | 2    | 1      | 3     |
| Hawelti     | 3    | 1      | 4     |
| Wargba      | 3    | 2      | 5     |
| Total       | 10   | 5      | 15    |

*Source: constructed by the author, April 2017*

## II. Key Informant Interview

Key informants are people who know a lot, at least about their domain, and willing to share their knowledge with the researcher (Bernard 2006). In key informant interview the informants talk with the researcher for relatively longer hours about an issue. This method was basically employed to understand the causes and consequences of illegal migration. Accordingly, the key informants contacted include people from various segments of the society and several sectors of government institutions. These were elderly, religious leaders (from both Christianity and Muslim), government office holders (youth and sports bureau of Woreda and tabia levels, micro and small enterprise expertise), teachers, and police officers. Table 3.3 summarizes the key informants contacted for the research.

*Table 3.3: A summary of key informant interview informants*

| Domain               |              | Tabia    |             |          |          | Gender    |          | Total     |
|----------------------|--------------|----------|-------------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|-----------|
|                      |              | Kara     | Mehoni Town | Hawelti  | Wargba   | M         | F        |           |
| Elderly              |              | 1        |             |          | 1        | 2         |          | 2         |
| Religious leaders    | Christianity |          | 1           | 1        |          | 2         |          | 2         |
|                      | Muslim       | 1        |             |          |          | 1         |          | 1         |
| Teachers             |              | 2        |             | 1        |          | 2         | 1        | 3         |
| Health practitioners |              | 4        |             |          |          | 3         | 1        | 4         |
| Police officers      |              |          | 1           |          |          | 1         |          | 1         |
| MIS                  |              |          | 1           |          |          | 1         |          | 1         |
| Model farmers        |              | 1        |             |          |          | 1         |          | 1         |
| <b>Total</b>         |              | <b>9</b> | <b>3</b>    | <b>2</b> | <b>1</b> | <b>14</b> | <b>2</b> | <b>16</b> |

*Source: author's own construction (2017)*

## III. Focus Group Discussion

Sometimes it is preferable to collect information from groups of people rather than from a series of individuals. Focus groups can be useful to obtain certain types of information when

circumstances would make it difficult to collect information using other methods to data collection. Focus-groups typically have 6 to 12 members, plus a moderator. A group of eight people is a popular size. If a group is too small, one or two loudmouths can dominate it, and if it gets beyond 10 or 12, it becomes tough to manage. The participants in a focus-group should be more or less homogeneous (Yeraswork 2010).

In this study, FGDs were mainly conducted to capture the main societal and familial forces behind migration decision and the main consequences of illegal migration. Indeed, nine separate group sessions were held for (1) house hold heads that did send their children in Hawelti and Mehoni Town, (2) house hold heads who did not send their children in TABIA Kara, (3) non-migrants in Kara and Wargba, and (4) migrant returnees in all the selected TABIAs, one in each. The groups for migrants were made up of more or less same sex.

#### **IV. Field Observation**

Field observation was also played crucial part in enriching and triangulating the information gathered through the forgoing data collection methods particularly FGDs and migrant surveys. For instance, the availability of local employment opportunities was observed to see whether unemployment is really causing illegal migration or the underestimating attitude of the youth towards local employment opportunities. Here, specifically, the introduction and expansion of irrigation system commonly known as ‘GOLGOL Raya’ and the plantation of Khat and coffee were watched by the researcher. Besides, the emerging role of social media through video and picture posting and sharing in illegal migration was also observed. And an attempt was also made to confirm some data given by key informants through the researcher’s personal observation.

##### **3.2.2 Sampling Designs**

It is important to understand what sampling is, before going to see what sampling designs and related sampling techniques are. Sampling refers to the procedure whereby a sample is extracted from a general population. There are two most commonly recognized sampling designs in carrying out a study both in qualitative and quantitative social research. These designs include probability and non-probability sampling designs (Babbie 1990).

As noted in the United Nations Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) Statistics Division (2005), Probability sampling refers to the means by which the elements of the target population - geographic units, households and persons - are selected for inclusion in a sample survey. Probability sampling design designates for equal chance of inclusion for the elements of a target population. Indeed, the migrant survey in this study was guided mainly by this particular design.

One pre-requisite for using probability sampling design is availability of convenient sampling frame or a list of elements from which a random sample is to be drawn (Bernard 2006). For this study, a document consisting of all youth of Raya Azebo Woreda wasn't available. In such a situation, stratified sampling is appropriate (Yeraswork 2010). Stratified sampling is a way to sample populations for which there are no convenient lists or frames (Bernard 2006:157). As a result, the sampling technique for this study was stratified sampling. Specific study areas were stratified depending on the levels of migration flows.

The Woreda was first stratified into two big geographical categories as Urban and Rural. In this thesis, the geographical location considered as urban is the place with significant difference from the other Tabias. Even if the Woreda has six Tabias considered as urban on the basis of administrative criterion, no difference can be observed between these areas and the rural Tabias except for Mehoni town. Therefore, the urban cluster consists of just stratum town and was taken to represent the urban cluster. The rest 19 Tabias were categorized under the rural stratum and were again identified into three strata based on level of emigration as high, moderate and low. Finally, three Tabias were selected (one from each stratum) using **simple random sampling**. Accordingly, Hawelti (high), Wargba (Moderate) and Kara (low) were taken to make up the study Tabias.

As the survey had two sets of respondents: non-migrants and migrant returnees, two different documents were needed as sampling frames. While a document consists of all youth in respective Tabias served as a sampling frame for non-migrants, sample migrant returnees drawn from a record of migrant returnees in each of the Tabias. The total number of youth of Tabias was 3862, 2275, 1448 and 2026 for Mehoni, Hawelti, Wargba and Kara, respectively which summed up to 9611 youth, where as the total size of migrant returnees was 89, 230, 179, and 134 for Mehoni, Hawelti, Wargba and Kara, respectively which give a total size of 632 migrant returnees. Therefore by subtracting total migrant returnees of the selected Tabias from the whole

youth of the Tabias, the total size of non-migrants became 8979 youth; 3773, 2045, 1314 and 1847 for Mehoni, Hawelti, Wargba and Kara

Sample size was determined by sample size calculator software at 95% degree of confidence for each population of the migrant categories, and 8.6% and 7.9% margin of error for the total youth population (8979 youth in four of the Tabias selected for the study) and for total population of migrant returnees, respectively. *Fluid Surveys UNIVERSITY* survey sample size calculator determined the sample sizes of 128 and 122 for potential migrants and migrant returnees, respectively, which constituted 250 survey respondents. Finally, the sample size was administered proportionate to the size of the total youth in each Tabia selected. The sample size for each Tabia is a multiple of proportion of each Tabia proportion (P) and sample size (n/N \*sample size). P for each Tabia is the ratio of each Tabia youth/migrant returnees and the total youth/migrant returnees (N) of Tabia selected. Accordingly, the sample size for potential migrants and migrant returnees, respectively, were 54 & 17, 29 & 44, 19 & 35 and 26 & 26 for Mehoni, Hawelti, Wargba and Kara, in that order, and drawn using simple random sampling technique. The details are given in table 3.4.

*Table 3.4: A summary of sample size of survey respondents*

| Tabia        | Non-migrants |           |            | Migrants Returnees |           |            | Total      |
|--------------|--------------|-----------|------------|--------------------|-----------|------------|------------|
|              | Male         | Female    | Total      | Male               | Female    | Total      |            |
| Mehoni       | 25           | 29        | 54         | 8                  | 9         | 17         | 71         |
| Hawelti      | 13           | 16        | 29         | 22                 | 22        | 44         | 73         |
| Wargba       | 9            | 10        | 19         | 18                 | 17        | 35         | 54         |
| Kara         | 12           | 14        | 26         | 13                 | 13        | 26         | 52         |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>59</b>    | <b>69</b> | <b>128</b> | <b>61</b>          | <b>61</b> | <b>122</b> | <b>250</b> |

*Source: author's own construction (January, 2017)*

In contrast to probability sampling, there is no statistical theory to guide the use of non-probability samples. They can only be judged through subjective evaluation (UNDESA 2005). In view of that, the selection of informants for interviews, key informant and in-depth, and participants in FGDs were led by non-probability sampling design. Judgmental and quota sampling techniques were used to select the informants and participants. While the informants for the key informant interview and participants in the FGDs were selected purposively based on how it was relevant for the study, informants for an in-depth interview were chosen based on quota. Initially, the quota was set to six migrants from each selected Tabias, though, actually, 15

migrant returnees were contacted nine lower than expected. Accordingly, a total of 31 informants and nine FGDs were selected and conducted.

### **3.2.3 Data Collection Instruments: Questionnaires and Guides**

The most widely employed instrument in surveys is questionnaire. Questionnaire is a set of structured questions which is administered to random sample, which is another key element of survey method, to test research hypotheses, to address specific objectives or to answer research questions (Babbie 1990).

To this end, a structured questionnaire was prepared and adopted, modified and translated into the local language (Tigrinya) to gather information from survey respondents (*see annex-1b for reference*). The questionnaire was prepared involving items that could address issues on community perception to understand culture of migration and attitude towards local employment opportunities, and structured questions. The first set of likert scale measures included ten items which were prepared based on review of previous studies (Jones et al. 2014; RMMS 2014). The minimum and maximum scales to the items are 0 and 5, respectively. Accordingly, the maximum possible sum total for the first set of likert scale would be 50 and the minimum would be equal to 0. Whereas, for the second set of likert scale the max and min would be 40 and 0, respectively.

These items include: 1) going to Saudi is seen as ‘Fashion’, 2) most youth in this TABIA want to go to Saudi, 3) families who send their children to Saudi gain high respect, 4) every family wants to send its child to Saudi, 5) migrant returnees can marry whom they want to irrespective of what they have achieved, 6) migrant returnees gain high social recognition, 7) migrant returnees are socially excluded in their communities, 8) migrant returnees are ill-treated in their community, 9) illegal migration is perceived as a good thing by the community, and 10) going to Saudi is encouraged in this community.

Whereas the second set of items involve eight items and were developed to measure youth attitude towards local employment opportunities. these likert scale items include: 1) Most youth think illegal migration help people generate more income than local employment opportunities do, 2) if people migrate they can improve their livelihood rather than working around, 3) people should go to Saudi if they are to improve their livelihood, 4) those who migrate are accorded with high recognition more than those who engage in local employment opportunities, 5)

families of migrants are given due respect as opposed to those whose children work around, 6) you feel annoyed of yourself, if you work around has everyone of your friends left for Saudi, 7) local employment opportunities are meant to be left for newcomers from other parts of the region, and 8) most youth in this TABIA want to move for Saudi instead of engaging in local employment opportunities.

Structurally, both close-ended and open-ended questions were included. Yet, the close-ended questions covered the most part of the questionnaire while a few of them followed open-ended formats in situations that demanded probing and detailed explanations accounted by respondents. For further evaluation, see Annex-1a regarding structured questionnaire items prepared for survey respondents, and its translation to local language Tigrinya, Annex-1b.

Moreover, as far as the qualitative data collection methods were concerned semi-structured guides that elicited qualitative information (meanings, words and ideas) through deeper consultations with informants, key informants and FGDs participants were developed. The checklists have also guided the field observations. All of these checklists were constructed following open-ended semi-structured formats. The details of the checklists employed for the interview and discussion guides are available in the annexes. Thus, please see Annex-2 for the in-depth interview guide; Annex-3 for the key informant interview guide; and Annex-4 for the focus group discussion guide.

Regarding to the administration of the instrument, interviewer-administered technique (with the help of enumerators) was employed as the random sample was constituted migrants that had no education at all. Besides, in one of the case Tabias, the questionnaire was distributed out to the respondents for it was believed that the respondents might have completed at least 10<sup>th</sup> grade.

Accordingly, of the total 128 questionnaire administered to potential migrants, 122 found to be valid, the rest six were unqualified for analysis due to lower response rates. The non-response rates were higher in Mehoni Town (four) because the questionnaire was given to the youth to be filled. In the rest, the questionnaire was interviewer-administered. Generally, 95.83 percent of the total questionnaire collected through migrant survey with non-migrants was fit for analysis and entered SPSS version 20, 4.166 percent or six were unfit. While of the 122 migrant returnees

determined the study made use of the data collected with 120 of them; the two found to be invalid for analysis.

### **3.2.4 Methods of Data Analysis, Presentation, and Interpretation**

The data collection, presentation, interpretation and analysis was followed the convergent parallel mixed research design. Indeed, both qualitative and quantitative data were presented and interpreted concurrently. First the data were presented separately corresponding to the appropriate techniques. The quantitative data set was analyzed using statistical techniques including mean, ANOVA, multiple regression and presented in the form of tables, percentages, and graphs, while the qualitative data set was analyzed through thematic analysis and given in statements, quotations and soon. Then, one's the data set was analyzed and presented in such ways, similarities and differences were sort out for interpretation. Thus, both data sets were merged at the interpretation and discussion stage.

### **3.2.5 Pilot-Testing Practices and Lessons Learned**

Pilot-testing or field testing is important to establish the validity content of the questionnaire and to improve questions, format and scale (Creswell 2013). The practice of pilot testing can also help consider usage of words in order to prevent ambiguity and confusion. Hence, the pilot testing exercises helped to examine the validity and reliability of the questionnaire items.

The researcher executed the pilot testing at the end of January 2017 in other TABIAs of the study Woreda. As a whole five questionnaires were conducted for the pilot testing in Genete which was not included in the actual study Tabias. Despite the gap between the main fieldwork and pilot testing was not that much long, the pilot testing yielded constructive results for modifying the questionnaire and the items within it.

Pilot-testing practices contributed to the questionnaire and the items within it in several ways. For one thing the field testing indicated the ambiguous usage of words in some of the items. So, it helped consider of wording as commonly understood in the communities in some questions. For instance, in the likert scale items the word “modern” was reconsidered to “fashion” and the word “shame” to “annoy”. As a result the items were improved as “going to Saudi is considered

as ‘fashion’ from “going to Saudi is a sign of modernity” and engaging in local employment opportunities when every one of your friends is migrated, you feel annoyed instead of ashamed of yourself. So, in this regard, the pilot testing practice helped improve the clarification of ambiguous concepts. Besides, the pre-testing informed in using the proper translation of the questionnaire into the local language. Some words have been detected as creating difficulties of understanding as there is difference in the local language in usage of words to refer to one thing as they appeared in texts and spoken officially, and as spoken in the study areas. Therefore, the field testing helped consider the usage of words while translating the questionnaire.

Furthermore, the pre-testing contributed to consider other perspectives to add on the content of the questionnaire in the respondents’ explanation for open-ended questions. Among others, the role of social media in illegal migration was added in the items in source of information for illegal routes, and destinations.

In conclusion, the pilot testing created indispensable opportunities for the re-arrangement, refinement and modification of the questionnaire and the items within it. On one hand it helped detect the gap in the instrument and on the other hand it facilitated the attempts to fill the gaps identified in the questionnaire instruments. Actually, the length of items, and conceptual difficulties were further refined and adjusted as per the contexts on the ground. The insertion of additional questions and removal of a few questions and addition or removal of choice categories was part of the lessons and the modifications that came along with the pilot testing exercise.

### **3.4. Reliability and Validity of the Tools**

Reliability and validity are the concerns of researchers who develop quantitative approach. “Quantitative researchers endeavor to show that their chosen methods succeed in measuring what they purport to measure. They want to make sure that their measurements are stable and consistent and that there are no errors or bias present, either from the respondents or from the researcher” (Dawson, 2007: 114). Validity and reliability refer to the trustworthiness and consistency, respectively, of instruments, data and research findings (Bernard 2006).

There are many ways of testing validity and reliability of instruments, data and the findings as a whole. As to validity, which is the instrument’s ability to capture the context in ground, the pilot

testing practice increased the validity of the research, while the preparation of the instrument by adopting concepts and statements from previous studies (Jones et al. 2014; RMMS 2014) increase the consistency of the measurements that is reliability.

### **3.5. Ethical Considerations**

Any attempt to an empirical study should be done in consideration with ethical norms as they contribute to the trustworthiness of the reports of the study. Ethics in the context of research involve a set of norms and principles that researchers in their respective disciplines obey and apply (Babbie 1990; Bernard 2006).

Initially, a formal letter was sought from the department of sociology AAU in order to facilitate the researcher's access of to the fieldwork. Besides, a letter of cooperation in local language, explaining the researcher's permanent and current affiliation status, was given to the researcher by Mekelle University College of social sciences and languages. These letters communicate the objective of the study to relevant government structures and institutions in Woreda Raya Azebo. With the help of this letter the Woreda's Youth and sports bureau arrange and facilitate the fieldwork by writing cooperation letter to concerned bodies at TABIA levels.

Furthermore, a letter of informed consent was written and plainly read and explained to the participants as key informants, in-depth interviewees, and FGD discussants. The researcher communicates the purpose of the study orally to the study participants. Participants were made aware that they have the right to refuse to participate and to stop participation at any time. Moreover, in the consent form, it was made clear and communicated to the participants that participation would not cost them a thing and they would neither be compensated for their involvement. And also, the participants were informed that the information they would offer would be used for thesis endeavor. As to the sample survey, the participants were made to confirm their voluntary participation through written consent form. Sample format is attached (see Annex-5).

Yet, in the situations where written consents were unlikely to function, oral consent ensured generating mutual understanding between the researcher and research participants, otherwise migrants were not forced to participate. The names of the research participants, either pseudo or

real ones, are not included under any context in the research report. Rather, generic terms like informant or discussant, coupled with few specific markers that identify involving institutions, appeared most often in the analysis.

### **3.6. Field Experiences**

Field work holds numerous experiences for researchers. These experiences might constitute genuine cooperation from research participants and government institutions and bad encounters offering challenges for the field work. The fieldwork for this study conducted in about forty days from the end of February to the beginning of April 2017. Accordingly, the following section, thus, discusses the collaborations of research participants and government offices, and challenges faced during the field work.

#### **3.6.1. Motivating Encounters**

The researcher wouldn't skip without talking about the generous help he has got from the research respondents, informants and participants. It was encouraging. In addition to their willingness to participate in the research at first instance, they were providing the researcher with through pathways for his next and following steps. Moreover, in most circumstances where an empirical study is conducted, it is common for researchers to buy some refreshments for study participants particularly FGD discussants. However, in this case, it was the research participants who tried to cover the costs for refreshments. Particularly, the hospitality of the research participants in Wargba and Hawelti was amazing. In two-three instances, they bought the researcher lunch, and soft drinks. The bottom line, the research participants facilitated and opened up great opportunities for the fieldwork.

Another encouraging encounter come from the cooperation of the College of social sciences and languages of Mekelle University by writing a formal letter in the local language of the study area that is Tigrigna, besides the formal letter given by the department of sociology AAU in English, served as a bridge in communicating the researcher with public institutions in the study area. So, the collaboration started at this stage. In addition, the youth and sports bureau, the bureau of social affairs, and planning and finance bureau of Woreda Raya Azebo cooperated a lot by giving cooperation letters, and other related contributions.

### **3.6.2. Challenges Experienced During the Fieldwork**

Despite the collaborations from research participants and public institutions, there were challenging experiences during fieldwork. In the context of documentation, unavailability of updated, relevant and timely recorded document regarding current migrants and migrant returnees constitute the lion's share of the challenges. It was difficult to know exact information about emigration and return migration flows due to lack of recordings and due to the fact that illegal migration is hidden and done outside of the regular migration procedures.

Another challenge was related to the arrangements of FGDs. In some instances, the researcher forced to cancel FGDs as a result of participants' failure to come altogether. Actually, the researcher cancelled two FGDs with household heads in Wargba and potential migrants in Mehoni Town. Related to this was refusals to be tape-recorded, particularly by Muslim female migrant returnees were exemplary challenges.

Finally, although it would not describe the participants in all study TABIAs, there were challenges of seeking for payments in return for involvement in the research. This was particularly prevailed in Mehoni town where FGD discussants were seen to withdraw from the discussion by the time they were informed that they would not be compensated for their participation.

## **3.7. Study Setting**


### **3.7.1. Geographical Location**

This study was conducted in Raya Azebo Woreda by taking four sample tabias. Raya Azebo is geographically located in Southern part of Tigray National Regional State. It is 120kms far to the south of the capital city of the Regional State – Mekelle – and 649kms far to the north of Addis Ababa – The capital of Ethiopia. More precisely, the Woreda is located in a distance of 16kms south-east to the Zonal administration, Maichew. Boundary wise, Raya Azebo is bordered on the south by Amhara Region, on the southwest by Alamata, on the west by Ofla and Endamehoni, on the northwest by Alaje, on the north by Debub Misraqawi (Southeastern) Zone, and on the east

by Afar Region. The administrative center of this woreda is Mehoni (CSA 2007). The total area of the Woreda is 176, 867 hectare. Of this total hectare, 47214.95 hectare is farm land.

Based on the information from the Woreda's planning and finance officer, Raya Azebo Woreda constitutes 20 Tabias (kebelles) and 79 quishets (Gott) under its administrative structure. For the total 20 tabias, a random sample of four tabias (Mehoni town, Hawelti, Wargba and Kara) were selected for the study. The following map shows the location of the study areas.

*Figure 3.2: The locational map of the study area*



*Source: drawn by Tigray Regional National State Bureau of Plan and Finance (TBPF), January 2017*

### **3.7.2. Major Economic Activities in the Woreda**

As per Raya Azebo Woreda bureau of planning and finance, the Woreda is described as having a conducive landscape and climate for living and agricultural activities including farming (both irrigable and non-irrigable), animal husbandry and breeding, Chat production, and bee keeping. Accordingly, the main economic activity in Raya Azebo Woreda is agriculture involving farm

production, livestock, khat and coffee plantation. Yet, the center of the Woreda, Mehoni Town, people engage in non-agricultural activities as well such as in government agencies, self employment, trade and soon. The following figure shows some of the main agricultural activities.

*Figure 3.3: Major economic activities in the study area*



*Source: taken by the author (2017)*

### **3.7.3. Illegal Migration Trends in Raya Azebo**

The trends of illegal migration cannot be explained plainly for various reasons. One among the others is that the movement is undertaken outside rule and regulations as a result timely records and documents hardly kept. Yet, a rough report from Raya Azebo Woreda youth and sports bureau indicated that 5954 individuals have migrated illegal to Middle East in the last four years since 2013 till the beginning of 2017 (*see table 3.5 for the details*).

Table 3.5: Illegal emigration flow in the study area

| Tabia       | 2013/14 |        |       | 2014/15 |        |       | 2015/16 |        |       | 2016/17 |     |      | Total |
|-------------|---------|--------|-------|---------|--------|-------|---------|--------|-------|---------|-----|------|-------|
|             | Mal     | Female | Total | Mal     | Female | Total | Mal     | Female | Total | Mal     | Fem | Tot  |       |
| Irba        | 50      | 21     | 71    | 12      | 16     | 28    | 28      | 04     | 32    | 21      | 05  | 26   | 157   |
| D/Bagie     | 55      | 21     | 76    | 21      | 14     | 35    | 12      | 15     | 27    | 10      | 14  | 24   | 162   |
| Korame      | 81      | 27     | 108   | 20      | 13     | 33    | 10      | 05     | 15    | 08      | 04  | 12   | 168   |
| Ulaga       | 44      | 47     | 91    | 28      | 12     | 40    | 24      | 08     | 32    | 22      | 06  | 28   | 191   |
| W/Wuha      | 49      | 46     | 95    | 18      | 19     | 37    | 13      | 21     | 34    | 11      | 19  | 30   | 196   |
| Werabaye    | 79      | 41     | 120   | 21      | 31     | 52    | -       | -      | -     | 18      | 10  | 28   | 200   |
| Maru        | 95      | 45     | 140   | 19      | 13     | 32    | 16      | 01     | 17    | 20      | 05  | 25   | 214   |
| Kara        | 92      | 42     | 134   | 79      | 05     | 84    | 10      | 05     | 15    | 12      | 04  | 16   | 249   |
| Kukufto     | 134     | 51     | 185   | 19      | 21     | 31    | 24      | 03     | 27    | 16      | 02  | 18   | 261   |
| Taigea      | 83      | 37     | 120   | 51      | 31     | 82    | 28      | 02     | 30    | 22      | 15  | 37   | 269   |
| Hada alga   | 126     | 53     | 179   | 21      | 11     | 32    | 25      | 05     | 30    | 31      | 04  | 35   | 276   |
| Mehoni Town | 50      | 39     | 89    | 42      | 38     | 80    | 43      | 30     | 73    | 40      | 18  | 58   | 300   |
| Wargba      | 110     | 52     | 162   | 33      | 23     | 56    | 25      | 32     | 57    | 22      | 30  | 42   | 317   |
| Mechare     | 136     | 63     | 199   | 19      | 24     | 43    | 28      | 26     | 54    | 24      | 25  | 49   | 345   |
| Ebo         | 121     | 16     | 137   | 20      | 12     | 32    | 86      | 22     | 108   | 79      | 20  | 99   | 376   |
| Hadish      | 194     | 101    | 295   | 15      | 12     | 27    | 41      | 05     | 46    | 38      | 04  | 42   | 410   |
| Kign        |         |        |       |         |        |       |         |        |       |         |     |      |       |
| Horda       | 57      | 12     | 69    | 21      | 27     | 48    | 140     | 44     | 184   | 126     | 41  | 167  | 468   |
| Ganeta      | 259     | 28     | 287   | 12      | 14     | 26    | 76      | 10     | 86    | 68      | 39  | 107  | 506   |
| Hawelti     | 93      | 28     | 121   | 79      | 56     | 135   | 96      | 44     | 140   | 94      | 30  | 124  | 520   |
| Bala        | 115     | 75     | 190   | 19      | 20     | 39    | 130     | 170    | 300   | 62      | 30  | 92   | 621   |
| Total       | 2023    | 845    | 2686  | 495     | 405    | 900   | 855     | 452    | 1307  | 744     | 315 | 1061 | 5954  |

Low (157 - 311)

Moderate (312 - 465)

High (466 - 621)

Source: modified by the author following RAWYSB's report (March, 2017)

### 3.8. Scio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

#### 1. Sex, Marital Status and Religious Affiliation of Respondents

Table 3.6 below presents sex, marital status and religious affiliation of the study respondents. The table shows that from the total 242 respondents participated, 117 of them were male while the rest 125 were female.

Table 3.6: Sex, Marital status and Religious affiliation distribution of respondents

| RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION * MARITAL STATUS * GENDER Cross tabulation |                       |          |                |           |          |         |       |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------|----------------|-----------|----------|---------|-------|
| GENDER                                                           |                       |          | MARITAL STATUS |           |          |         | Total |
|                                                                  |                       |          | MARRIED        | UNMARRIED | DIVORCED | WIDOWED |       |
| Male                                                             | RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION | ORTHODOX | 35             | 42        | 12       | 1       | 90    |
|                                                                  |                       | MUSLIM   | 10             | 16        | 1        | 0       | 27    |
|                                                                  | Total                 |          | 45             | 58        | 13       | 1       | 117   |
| Female                                                           | RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION | ORTHODOX | 33             | 53        | 9        | 1       | 96    |
|                                                                  |                       | MUSLIM   | 8              | 17        | 4        | 0       | 29    |
|                                                                  | Total                 |          | 41             | 70        | 13       | 1       | 125   |
| Total                                                            | RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION | ORTHODOX | 68             | 95        | 21       | 2       | 186   |
|                                                                  |                       | MUSLIM   | 18             | 33        | 5        | 0       | 56    |
|                                                                  | Total                 |          | 86             | 128       | 26       | 2       | 242   |

As it is shown in table 3.6, the majority (128 or 52.9%) of the respondents were unmarried. While 86 (35.3%) of them were married, 26 (10.7) divorced and 2 (0.8%) widowed. Regarding to religious affiliation of the respondents, the table indicates that the majority (186 or 76.9 percent) of the respondents were Orthodox Christianity followers, while the rest 23.1 percent of 56 respondents were Muslim.

## 2. Age of Respondents

As far as non-migrants are concerned the age range taken was from 15 – 30, while the migrant returnees constituted ages beyond 30 which accounts for 8.67 percent of the total respondents. Nevertheless, the average of the survey respondents was 25 years.

## 3. The Educational Level of Respondents

In relation to educational status of the respondents, the majority (75 or 31 percent of them) were uneducated. Significant number (72 of them) completed higher primary education, while 19.8 of the respondents had only lower primary. Only few (3) reached high school and above. Comparatively, non-migrants have higher educational level than migrant returnees. About 27 percent of non-migrants reach high school and above as opposed to migrant returnees who accounted just for 12 percent of those who reached high school and above (*see table 3.7*).

*Table 3.7: Educational level of respondents*

| EDUCATIONAL LEVEL * CATEGORY OF MIGRANTS Cross tabulation |                      |            |                   |            |           |            |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|------------|-------------------|------------|-----------|------------|
| EDUCATIONAL LEVEL                                         | CATEGORY OF MIGRANTS |            |                   |            | Total     |            |
|                                                           | Non-Migrants         |            | Migrant Returnees |            |           |            |
|                                                           | Frequency            | Percentage | Frequency         | Percentage | Frequency | Percentage |
| UNEDUCATED                                                | 17                   | 13.93      | 58                | 48.33      | 75        | 31         |
| LOWER PRIMARY<br>EDUCATION                                | 25                   | 20.50      | 23                | 19.18      | 48        | 19.83      |
| HIGHER PRIMARY<br>EDUCATION                               | 47                   | 38.52      | 25                | 20.83      | 72        | 29.75      |
| HIGH SCHOOL                                               | 31                   | 25.41      | 13                | 10.83      | 44        | 18.18      |
| ABOVE HIGH SCHOOL                                         | 2                    | 1.64       | 1                 | 0.83       | 3         | 1.24       |
| Total                                                     | 122                  | 100        | 120               | 100        | 242       | 100        |

*Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)*

## 4. Occupation of Respondents

Based on the survey results, out of the total respondents, 24.5 percent or 63 engage in farming activities. In the second, 17.1 percent of them get their livelihood by engaging in petty trading. And also a significant number was engaged in livestock husbandry and trade accounting for 12.5 percent and 11.7 percent, respectively.

*Table 3.8: frequency distributions showing major occupational categories in the study area*

| Occupation Of Respondents | Frequency | Percent |
|---------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Farming                   | 63        | 24.5%   |
| Livestock Husbandry       | 32        | 12.5%   |
| Trade                     | 30        | 11.7%   |
| Petty Trading             | 44        | 17.1%   |
| Daily Labourer            | 25        | 9.7%    |
| Metal And Wood Works      | 3         | 1.2%    |
| Other                     | 60        | 23.3%   |
| Total                     | 257*      | 100.0%  |

*Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)*

*\*multiple responses were possible*

## 5. Linguistic ability of Respondents

*Table 3.9: language ability of respondents*

| Language of respondents | N    | Percent |
|-------------------------|------|---------|
| Tigrigna                | 242  | 56.81%  |
| Oromo                   | 15   | 3.52%   |
| Amharic                 | 87   | 20.42%  |
| Arabic                  | 50   | 11.74%  |
| Afar                    | 24   | 5.63%   |
| Other                   | 5    | 1.17%   |
| Total                   | 426* | 100.0%  |

*Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)*

*\*multiple responses were possible*

Table 3.9 above, shows that Tigrinya is the main language spoken by the respondents followed by Amharic and Arabic. 56.81 percentage or 242 of respondents spoke Tigrinya, while 20.42% and 11.74% spoke Amharic and Arabic respectively.

Thus, reflecting back on the assumptions of social network theory and transnational social space theory the religious and linguistic similarity can contribute illegal migration intention and decision making.

## CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS

This chapter presents the main findings of this study. It first displays the causes of illegal migration. The chapter then presents the journey and destination experiences of illegal migration and finally, the consequences of illegal migration.

### 4.1. Causes of Illegal Migration

#### 4.1.1. *Community's Attitude about Illegal Migration*

This section highlights the communities' perspectives regarding illegal migration to Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia or Jeddah to use the term commonly used in the communities. Based on sum total of the ten items discussed in the methodology part in chapter three was computed to see how illegal migration is perceived in the study area. An attempt was also made to understand if there is difference in attitude towards illegal migration across the tabias. Hence, community attitude towards illegal migration was given in terms of average score or means across the study TABIAs. However, before going to the attitude score that was computed by summing up points from the items, and comparing means across the TABIAs, I see it important to look at some of the statements individually.

##### 4.1.1.2. Illegal Migration as “Fashion”; something precious

There were buzzes about illegal migration seen as “fashion” in the Woreda, Raya Azebo Woreda. Having this in mind, the respondents were asked for their level of agreement on the statement “going to Saudi is seen as ‘fashion’ in this TABIA”. A significant number (40.3% or 100 of them) of the respondents agreed with the statement that migrating to Saudi illegally is seen as “fashion” in their community with 31.4% agreement and 9.9% strong agreement to the statement as presented in Table 4.1.

*Table 4.1: Frequency distribution showing whether migrating to Saudi is considered a ‘fashion’*

| Migrating To Saudi Is Considered As A “Fashion” |           |         |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Likert Scale                                    | Frequency | Percent |
| Neutral                                         | 9         | 3.7     |
| Strongly Disagree                               | 21        | 8.7     |
| Disagree                                        | 112       | 46.3    |
| Agree                                           | 76        | 31.4    |
| Strongly Agree                                  | 24        | 9.9     |
| Total                                           | 242       | 100.0   |

Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)

However, according to the evidences from in-depth interviews, this trend has been changing recently. Some three to five years back people used to perceive going to Saudi as fashion. Going to Saudi used to be regarded as a big deal. For example, a migrant deportee in Hawelti TABIA explained the situation as follows:

*If it was three to five years ago, you could have observed young fellows going to Saudi in masses following each others' footsteps. They did that not because of economic related problems; rather they did that because everyone else was doing that. I, myself, had no economic reason for my migration. I went to Saudi because I heard my friends were going to Saudi.*

#### **4.1.1.2. Illegal migration as something everybody wants to do**

It has been argued that migration has become a culture. It has become something everybody wants to do (Johns et al. 2014). So, accordingly, the respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement “going to Saudi is one of the things most youth in this TABIA want to do”. And the results, shown in Table 4.2, are interesting with the overwhelming majority (78.1%) showing agreement (40.5% strongly agreed; and 37.6% agreed).

Table 4.2: Frequency distribution showing whether illegal migration is something everybody wants to do

| Going To Middle east Is One Of The Things Most Youth In This Tabia Want To Do |           |               |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------------|
| Likert Scale                                                                  | Frequency | Valid Percent |
| Neutral                                                                       | 4         | 1.7           |
| Strongly Disagree                                                             | 9         | 3.7           |
| Disagree                                                                      | 40        | 16.5          |
| Agree                                                                         | 91        | 37.6          |
| Strongly Agree                                                                | 98        | 40.5          |
| Total                                                                         | 242       | 100.0         |

Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)

Based on the descriptive statistics it could be concluded that going to Saudi is given due value. This study found that ‘going’ to Saudi – Jiddha – is seen as something people show that they are as fit as someone else to go, that they are not lesser than someone else, with 78.1% of the respondents gone for it. This, in turn, has a positive relationship with migration decision making.

#### 4.1.1.3. *Illegal migration as a source of ‘prestige to families’*

Here, the core of the argument is the role of remittance in improving households’ livelihood and thereby status. Based on this, the respondents were asked for their opinion on the argument that families who send their children to Saudi are accorded with high social status in the community. In this regard the descriptive statistics (frequency) shows that the current study produced similar results as previous studies with 37.2% (90) and 32.6% (79) of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed respectively.

**Table 4.3: frequency distribution showing whether illegal migration serves as source of family’s prestige**

| <b>ILLEGAL MIGRATION INCREASES FAMILY STATUS</b> |           |               |
|--------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------------|
|                                                  | Frequency | Valid Percent |
| Neutral                                          | 10        | 4.1           |
| Strongly Disagree                                | 6         | 2.5           |
| Disagree                                         | 57        | 23.6          |
| Agree                                            | 90        | 37.2          |
| Strongly Agree                                   | 79        | 32.6          |
| Total                                            | 242       | 100.0         |

**Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)**

Related to the above assertion is that families want to send their children to Saudi. This is based on how the community portrays the social place of parents who send their children and based on suggestions made by others to them. In order to have more understanding about whether families want to send their children, respondents were asked for their agreement or disagreement to the statement that families want to send their children. The study revealed that 55.8% (135) of the respondents favored for the argument that families want to send their children to Saudi. The details are presented below in table 4.4.

**Table 4.4: frequency distribution showing whether families want to send their children to Middle East**

| <b>EVERY FAMILY WANTS TO SEND ITS CHILLD TO MIDDLE EAST</b> |           |               |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------------|
|                                                             | Frequency | Valid Percent |
| Neutral                                                     | 12        | 5.0           |
| Strongly Disagree                                           | 8         | 3.3           |
| Disagree                                                    | 87        | 36.0          |
| Agree                                                       | 108       | 44.6          |
| Strongly Agree                                              | 27        | 11.2          |
| Total                                                       | 242       | 100.0         |

**Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)**

Table 4.4 indicates that the parents themselves want to send their children abroad; in most cases they don't say it openly though. What they do is they tell to their children success stories and good deeds of other children from their neighbors. Rarely though, there are parents who directly tale their children to go to Saudi. Let me share you the experience of a 19 year old female migrant returnee in Kara;

*They [the parents] nag me always, every night and day, in every situation where we gather to have meal or to talk with each other. They say neighbor's daughter went to Saudi, she started sending money to her parents, she helped her brother to go to Saudi, ohh... she built a house for her parents and other related things. As time goes, I started to feel the pressure from inside; still I didn't decide to migrate. Eventually, after all these indirect sayings to tell me to go to Saudi didn't work, they [the parents] made their mind that they had to send me Saudi. My father went to market to sale an ox to fund my migration. They did all this things without me knowing. I was told that I had to go to Saudi. I didn't agreed, I wouldn't think of migrating till they bring me the news. I cried and begged them not to let me go. Finally, my mother came closer to me, guess what she told me. You would expect her to hag me and say 'it's okay daughter, leave it, and stop crying'. No! She didn't do that. To the opposite, she tried to convince me to accept their proposal as my father went this much. She told me 'your father sold his ox, don't let him down, my daughter. I have trust in you! I didn't have a choice other than going to Saudi.*

*In-depth interview with a female migrant returnee [22/03/2017]*

The above girl's experience indicates to what extent parents' want to send their children so that the children would send them money back. The finding is in concurrence with other previous studies, "in some instances parents tell their children to migrate" (RMMS 2014:4). This was proved to be true by the evidences from FGDs. A woman in focus group discussion that was conducted in Kara rose how family pressure is important in migration decision making. She [the participant] continued.....

*The problem is not solely with the youth. It is also with us, with parents. For one thing, we talk about other children's good doings in front of our children. This puts them in pressure because it shows that we want them to migrate. The second thing is that if we,*

*parents try to convince our children to stay and work around rather than migrating, they will listen to us. But we fail to do so. This also shows how much we want them abroad sending us money.*

*A female FGD participant in Kara [09/03/2017]*

Additional evidence that supported the idea that families want to send their children abroad was also produced from key informant interviews. A 53 year-old man from Hawelti shared his experience that he wanted his child to go to Saudi, though the man is one of the wealthiest men in the TABIA, if not in the Woreda. He said that he told his son that it would be better if he went to Saudi just like his friends do. Strangely, his son rejected to accept his father's proposal and chose to work around.

Parents' desire to see their children overseas is evident and it can be manifested through several ways: (1) by making their children feel down by comparing them with their friends in the community who manage to contribute to their respective households' livelihood by migrating to Middle East; (2) by undermining what the children do around for it can't improve the household's livelihood, and (3) by dejecting their education and encouraging them to withdraw, and soon (Jones et al. 2014).

#### **4.1.1.4. *Illegal Migration And Marital Selection***

It has been said that marital selection is determined by a person's socio-economic status. This implies that there is high tendency for people to marry someone whom they share their socio-economic status with.

In the study area, however, illegal migration in itself seems to play a role in marital selection. The thing is that differences were observed between migrant returnees and those who did not migrate at all. In relation to this participants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed to the argument that migrant returnees can marry whom they want to marry regardless of what they have achieved. The responses are given in the table here under.

*Table 4.5: frequency distribution showing whether illegal migration affects marital selection*

| <b>RETURNEE MIGRANTS CAN MARRY WHOM THEY WANT TO IRRESPECTIVE OF THEIR ACHIEVEMENTS</b> |           |               |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------------|
| Likert Scale                                                                            | Frequency | Valid Percent |
| Neutral                                                                                 | 9         | 3.7           |
| Strongly Disagree                                                                       | 5         | 2.1           |
| Disagree                                                                                | 98        | 40.5          |
| Agree                                                                                   | 89        | 36.8          |
| Strongly Agree                                                                          | 41        | 16.9          |
| Total                                                                                   | 242       | 100.0         |

***Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)***

Based on table 4.5, the mode is disagree (98 or 40.5%) followed by agree (89 or 36.8%) and strongly agree (41 or 16.9%). However, by reducing the levels of the Likert scale in to two levels as agree and disagree, respondents found to be in favor of the statement with 53.7% showing agreement on it.

Correspondingly, according to focus group discussion in Wargba, individuals who were addicted and who were seen as ‘worthless’ that no one would be willing to marry their children to them have become worthy and socially respected after their migration. They have enjoyed respect from the community to the extent that they can select anyone they want to as their marital partner. Moreover, illegal migration has become a way out for individuals who fail to find a marital partner. In cases where individual’s marriage proposal is rejected there is high likelihood of migration to Saudi with an intention of accumulating money and become wealthy.

#### ***4.1.1.5. Illegal Migration, And Social Recognition, Exclusion And Ill-Treatment***

The sixth, seventh and eighth statements are associated with migrant returnees’ social exclusion (as a result of failure in their migration), societal recognition, and ill-treatment in their communities. The question was to see the perception of each community towards whether migrant returnees are socially excluded, recognized, and ill-treated. The statements are presented as follows; migrant returnees are socially excluded, migrant returnees have high social recognition irrespective of their achievement and migrant returnees are ill-treated in their society.

As far as social exclusion is concerned, a vast majority (71.9%) disagreed to the statement, while just 11.2% of them agreed. 5.4% stayed neutral.

**Table 4.6: frequency distribution showing whether migrant returnees are socially excluded**

| <b>MIGRANT RETURNEES ARE SOCIALLY EXCLUDED</b> |           |               |
|------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------------|
| Likert Scale                                   | Frequency | Valid Percent |
| Neutral                                        | 13        | 5.4           |
| Strongly Disagree                              | 25        | 10.3          |
| Disagree                                       | 174       | 71.9          |
| Agree                                          | 27        | 11.2          |
| Strongly Agree                                 | 3         | 1.2           |
| Total                                          | 242       | 100.0         |

**Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)**

The majority of the migrants replied that migrant returnees are not excluded in their society just because they are migrants. In fact, they are rewarded with high respect, if they are, somehow, successful. As it could be observed from table 4.6, 11.2% (27) migrants claimed for the argument. This result is in agreement with Milki's findings that individuals who do not migrate are given less respect than migrants (2014). That is migrants receive higher recognition than non-migrants. Migrant returnees gain higher social recognition for primarily non-migrants assumption that they [migrant returnees] would come back with a lot of money. This, in turn, leads to migration decision.

In fact, using the majority lens, migrant returnees are accorded with high societal recognition just because they are returnees/deportees (ጥሪዝ) irrespective of their achievements. At least it stays till their true status is revealed. The statistics are given in table 4.7.

**Table 4.7: frequency distribution whether migrant returnees are given higher social recognition than non-migrants**

| <b>MIGRANT RETURNEES REGARD HIGH SOCIAL RECOGNITION IN THEIR COMMUNITY</b> |           |               |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------------|
|                                                                            | Frequency | Valid Percent |
| Neutral                                                                    | 5         | 2.1           |
| Strongly Disagree                                                          | 5         | 2.1           |
| Disagree                                                                   | 53        | 21.9          |
| Agree                                                                      | 165       | 68.2          |
| Strongly Agree                                                             | 14        | 5.8           |
| Total                                                                      | 242       | 100.0         |

**Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)**

Based on the results displayed in Table 4.7, the greater part of the survey participants approved the statement, “migrant returnees receive high social recognition in their community”, with

68.2% (165) and 5.8% (14) agreed and strongly agreed. This idea goes in line with data produced from one of the focus group discussions with potential migrants conducted in one of the case TABIAs (Wargba). The participants discussed how much respect is given to migrant returnees in their community. In their discussions, the discussants compared the societal recognitions given to returnees, those who have been to Saudi, to that of teachers who work around.

Here, let me bring to light conspicuous statements forwarded by one of the participants. She said;

*When we see a teacher who passes by, we say, 'what is that he/she is so proud of about' that he/she is walking that, this way, he/she is just a teacher! But, in cases we see someone who has been to Saudi, we say, 'how is he/she so lucky that he/she has been to Saudi'. We accord him/her our compliments by saying 'he/she is deportee (እሱ ኮ ጥሪዝ ነው፣ እሷ ኮ ጥሪዝ ናት በማለት፡፡).*

According to the discussants, such recognitions and compliments stay for three to four months; afterwards they start to fade away because the real status of the returnees would start to be revealed.

The third statement is related to how migrant returnees/ deportees are treated by their respective communities. The respondents were asked their community ill-treats deportees as opposed to non-migrants. The responses were against the statement with 77.7% disagreed and 4.5% strongly disagreed.

*Table 4.8: frequency distribution showing whether migrant returnees are ill-treated*

| <b>ILLEGAL MIGRANT RETURNEES ARE ILL-TREATED BY THEIR COMMUNITIES</b> |           |               |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------------|
| Likert Scale                                                          | Frequency | Valid Percent |
| Neutral                                                               | 17        | 7.0           |
| Strongly Disagree                                                     | 11        | 4.5           |
| Disagree                                                              | 188       | 77.7          |
| Agree                                                                 | 23        | 9.5           |
| Strongly Agree                                                        | 3         | 1.2           |
| Total                                                                 | 242       | 100.0         |

**Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)**

As the table indicates it is only 10.7% that has gone for the statement. There no negative discrimination on the basis of one's migration status. Actually, they are treated better than those who did not migrate.

#### 4.1.1.6. Going to Saudi As a Good Thing

Migrants were also asked if illegal migration is seen as a good thing in their respective TABIAs. The distribution of responses looks like the following.

**Table 4.9: frequency distribution showing whether illegal migration is seen as a good thing**

| GOING TO SAUDI IS SEEN AS A GOOD THING IN THIS TABIA |           |               |
|------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------------|
| Likert Scale                                         | Frequency | Valid Percent |
| Neutral                                              | 4         | 1.7           |
| Strongly Disagree                                    | 7         | 2.9           |
| Disagree                                             | 20        | 8.3           |
| Agree                                                | 144       | 59.5          |
| Strongly Agree                                       | 67        | 27.7          |
| Total                                                | 242       | 100.0         |

**Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)**

From Table 4.9 it can be seen that out of the total 242 survey participants, 87.2% have shown agreement with the statement that ‘going to Saudi’ is a good thing. “I put the phrase ‘going to Saudi’ in quotation because I observed something odd in relation to usage of the phrase. In most cases, going to Saudi is seen as different from migration. I have come across individuals who argued that going to Saudi is not migration, it is something else. You migrate when you are in need of, to support your household’s livelihood. But you go to Saudi, of course one reason is to support one’s livelihood, just for the sake of itself”.

*There are reasons that gave me the courage to make such odd assertion. In my field trip to some of the study TABIAs, I had a chance to visit relatives. In most of our chat, we made migration I mean ‘going to Saudi’ our focus. The household was one of the well to do families in the community. It has possessed everything, if not more than, those who have been to Saudi or have been there sending remittance owned. He [the head of the household] has built a fine house, he has been earning more than 80,000 ETB in three to four months period. Yet, he had a positive perspective towards ‘going to Saudi’ and sent his younger brother by funding (11,000) his migration. He kept on telling me about what would happen, had he been in Saudi. After all, he shared me that he has been planning on going to the area one day. I asked him that you have all the things those who have been to Saudi deemed to have, why are you so eager to go to Saudi? His answer, I have to see that place. My next question was that had your*

*brother asked you the money you gave him for his migration to work around instead, would you be willing to give him the money? No! Quick answer*

From the above quotation it could be concluded that illegal migration is no more illegal. It is no more deviation. Rather it has become one of the things most youth want to do and what communities expected the youth to do.

The last, but not least, statement produced to measure community perspective about illegal migration is encouragement. Here the migrants were asked if the community encourages migration to the Middle East. About 67.4% of the respondents replied yes; while 15.3% disagreed, 17.4% kept their neutrality.

**Table 4.10: frequency distribution showing whether illegal migration is encouraged**

| MIGRATION TO MIDDLE EAST IS HIGHLY ENCOURAGED IN THIS TABIA |           |               |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------------|
| Likert Scale                                                | Frequency | Valid Percent |
| Neutral                                                     | 42        | 17.4          |
| Strongly Disagree                                           | 8         | 3.3           |
| Disagree                                                    | 29        | 12.0          |
| Agree                                                       | 140       | 57.9          |
| Strongly Agree                                              | 23        | 9.5           |
| Total                                                       | 242       | 100.0         |

**Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)**

However, data from key informants and in-depth interviews with migrant returnees produced exactly opposite results. As a 70 year-old informant indicated the community started to hate and develop negative view on illegal migration. He shared a poem being played in most cases where migration is the agenda. Here is the poem, written in the local language (ትግሪኛ);

□□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□  
 □□ □□ □□ □□ □□ □□□□  
 □□ □□□□ □ □□□ □□□□  
 □□□□ □□□□ □□ □□□ □□□□  
 □□□□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□  
 □□□ □□□ □□□ □ □□□  
 □□□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□ □□□□  
 □□□ □□ □□□□□□ □□□□ □ □□□□

Here is its direct translation into English:

*Who forced you to go to Saudi, covering such a long journey,  
By leaving Raya and ignoring its precious opportunities as livestock and farming,  
By putting your life at risk of sinking,  
To get back home deported without earning a thing,  
To become additional parents' burden and create more trouble,  
I beg you to work here and develop the community.*

*A 70 years old key informant in Wargba [27/02/2017]*


The poem conveys a message that puts emphasis on the irrelevance of going to Saudi deflating local employment opportunities, placing one's own life in danger with high probability of deportation if you are lucky to cross sea, and eventually, to come back home empty handed without earning any to repay what you spent for migration. So, this indicates how much the community started to discourage migration. Besides, the phrase 'who forced you to go to Saudi', implies that even if the pressure from others is there, individuals get through them by improving their livelihood as far as the precious local opportunities as livestock and farming are there.

All in all, except some odds there is highly positive attitude towards illegal migration in Raya Azebo woreda. Everybody loves to talk about Saudi and respects someone who has been to that country. Even the migrants consider themselves as special and superior to those non-migrants to the extent of undermining local employment opportunities as it shall be seen latter.

### ***Back to the Big Picture***

What is the essence of all this? What implicates to community perspective? The collective tenet of all the forgoing discussion is that there is strong positive perspective about [illegal] migration in Raya Azebo Woreda. Illegal migration has become no longer an exception. The idea that migration has become embedded into the community's ways of life is persistent in most parts of Ethiopia thereby affecting migration decision by putting pressure on girls and boys (RMMS 2014). Based on the issues selected to measure community perspective about illegal migration, an attitude score was computed to measure one trait, community perception. Accordingly, a descriptive statistics is produced and displayed in Figure 4.1.

**Figure 4.1: a histogram displaying community perception towards illegal migration**



**Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)**

From Figure 4.1, one can conclude that there is slightly strong positive community perspective towards illegal migration with an average (mean) score of 25.56, standard deviation of 3.64 and mode of 25 signifies that. The similarity of mean, mode and median (26) and coupled with low standard deviation implies the data are approximately normally distributed and with lesser variability and the vast majority of the respondents replied that there is positive community perspective about illegal migration. It is, however, important to make hypothesis test and assumptions whether it is held true across the various variables that could possibly affect attitude scores.

### ***Making Comparisons between the TABIAs***

Analysis of variance commonly known as ANOVA was conducted in order to see if the mean attitude score remains equal for the four TABIAs. In other words, ANOVA was computed to see whether there is a difference in perceptions towards illegal migration across the four TABIAs. The result in Table 4.11 shows that there is variation in community attitude towards illegal migration across the four TABIAs.

Table 4.11: ANOVA showing the variation of attitude score about illegal migration across four TABIAs

| ANOVA                                       |                |     |             |       |      |
|---------------------------------------------|----------------|-----|-------------|-------|------|
| SOCIETAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS ILLEGAL MIGRATION |                |     |             |       |      |
|                                             | Sum of Squares | Df  | Mean Square | F     | Sig. |
| Between Groups                              | 164.644        | 3   | 54.881      | 4.327 | .005 |
| Within Groups                               | 3018.926       | 238 | 12.685      |       |      |
| Total                                       | 3183.570       | 241 |             |       |      |

However, at this stage which TABIAs result in the difference in attitude score from the average score cannot be known. Therefore, post hoc test and means plots is important to determine the differences.


## Post Hoc Tests

Table 4.12: multiple comparisons to determine the mean difference in attitude score between four TABIAs

| Multiple Comparisons                                            |           |                       |            |       |                         |             |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------------------|------------|-------|-------------------------|-------------|
| Dependent Variable: SOCIETAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS ILLEGAL MIGRATION |           |                       |            |       |                         |             |
| Tukey HSD                                                       |           |                       |            |       |                         |             |
| (I) TABIA                                                       | (J) TABIA | Mean Difference (I-J) | Std. Error | Sig.  | 95% Confidence Interval |             |
|                                                                 |           |                       |            |       | Lower Bound             | Upper Bound |
| KARA                                                            | WARGBA    | .90340                | .65913     | .519  | -.8020                  | 2.6087      |
|                                                                 | HAWELTI   | 2.00476*              | .66175     | .014  | .2926                   | 3.7169      |
|                                                                 | KETEMA    | 1.99066*              | .64935     | .013  | .3106                   | 3.6707      |
|                                                                 | MEHONI    |                       |            |       |                         |             |
| WARGBA                                                          | KARA      | -.90340               | .65913     | .519  | -2.6087                 | .8020       |
|                                                                 | HAWELTI   | 1.10137               | .64757     | .326  | -.5741                  | 2.7768      |
|                                                                 | KETEMA    | 1.08726               | .63489     | .319  | -.5554                  | 2.7299      |
|                                                                 | MEHONI    |                       |            |       |                         |             |
| HAWELTI                                                         | KARA      | -2.00476*             | .66175     | .014  | -3.7169                 | -.2926      |
|                                                                 | WARGBA    | -1.10137              | .64757     | .326  | -2.7768                 | .5741       |
|                                                                 | KETEMA    | -.01410               | .63762     | 1.000 | -1.6638                 | 1.6356      |
|                                                                 | MEHONI    |                       |            |       |                         |             |
| KETEMA                                                          | KARA      | -1.99066*             | .64935     | .013  | -3.6707                 | -.3106      |
|                                                                 | WARGBA    | -1.08726              | .63489     | .319  | -2.7299                 | .5554       |
|                                                                 | HAWELTI   | .01410                | .63762     | 1.000 | -1.6356                 | 1.6638      |
| *. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.        |           |                       |            |       |                         |             |

## Means Plots

Figure 4.2: means plot showing community attitude mean differences about illegal migration between TABIAs



Now, from the above post hoc test and means plots we know not only the attitude score in the four TABIAs is not equal but also how they differ and which TABIA deviated from the average. In the above means plots, Kara TABIA is with the highest (around 27) average attitude score followed by Wargba TABIA with about 26, indicating there is strong positive perception about illegal migration in these TABIAs than in the other two TABIAs. The maximum difference in mean between the TABIAs is +/- 2. The difference in community perception towards illegal migration between the study TABIAs can be related to a difference in educational level, religious affiliation and employment opportunities.

In conclusion, it could be said that for Kara TABIA<sup>4</sup> having slightly stronger positive attitude towards illegal migration can be implicated from its dominant religion that is, Muslim. It is assumed that illegal migration or going to Saudi as known in the TABIA had historical and cultural relevance. According to a key informant in Wargba, historically, illegal migration was most popular in Hijira-Werabaye, which is part of Kara TABIA. The 75 years old man explained;

*.....As I can tell from experience, in the beginning, illegal migration started around “Hijura-Werabaye” and other surrounding Muslim neighborhoods. Currently, however,*

<sup>4</sup> Despite Kara tabia has the lowest flow of illegal migration; there is higher positive community attitude towards illegal migration. This seems contradicting each other. However like it is put in the limitations of the study section the data available might not be exhaustive and might not show the true picture of illegal migration flow.

*you can't find one TABIA which is not affected by this problem. It is affecting the whole Woreda. Large number of youth is leaving for Saudi.*

*A 75 years old key informant in Wargba [08/04/2017]*

As it could be understood from the words of the key informant, illegal migration to Middle East had been associated with Islamic religion. Following that it seems the perception is still persisted. This assertion was strengthened by discussions with focus groups in which migrants specifically potential migrants have been having good perception towards those who have been to Saudi, and going to Saudi in general. Thus, as it has already discussed before, illegal migration is seen as a good thing in itself. It has become something youth in Raya Azebo Woreda want to do.

#### ***4.1.2 Major Local Employment Opportunities in Raya Azebo Woreda***

According to Raya Azebo Woreda bureau of planning and finance, the Woreda is described as having a conducive landscape and climate for living and agricultural activities including farming (both irrigable and non-irrigable), animal husbandry and breeding, Khat production, and bee keeping. Accordingly, the major economic activities in the Raya Azebo Woreda involve farm production, livestock, chat and coffee production. Yet, the capital of the Woreda, Mehoni Town, people engage in non-agricultural activities as well such as in government agencies, self employment, trade and soon. Based on the survey results, out of the total respondents, 24.5 percent engage in farming activities. In the second, 17.1 percent of them lead their livelihood by engaging in petty trading. And also a significant number was absorbed in livestock husbandry and trade accounting for 12.5 percent and 11.7 percent, respectively (*for the details see table 3.8 in chapter three*).

In addition, the above argument was strengthened by key informant interviews claiming Raya Azebo Woreda is a major destination to domestic migrants from other parts of the Regional State and a destination for investment. This indicates the Woreda is with plenty of opportunities for livelihood diversification. A key informant, an elderly from Wargba, narrated while he was replying for a question, 'how do you see illegal migration?'

Well, in other parts of the region, where there is no farm land, there is shortage of rainfall and lack of irrigation with mountainous landscape, illegal migration may be seen as a way out, as an alternative livelihood strategy. Coming to this TABIA, we will find exactly opposite picture. We have plenty of farm land, irrigable as well as non-irrigable, relatively conducive environment for livestock breeding and husbandry. We have large grazing land, although it is being taken by investors these days. What I am saying is that if the youth have the courage and commitment to work around, this Woreda holds them good opportunity. We see youth from other parts of Tigray region and some parts of Amhara coming to this area to improve their livelihood and succeed. In an environment with such opportunity, illegal migration shouldn't have been something that somebody even tries to consider. Nonetheless, there is large flow of illegal migration among the youth from this Woreda, basically to Saudi Arabia.

*A key informant interview [26/03/2017]*

*Figure 4.3: pictures displaying the major economic activities in the study area*



*Source of photography: taken by the author during data collection*

An interview with a migrant returnee, in his 30s, in Wargba TABIA also supports this view. The deportee argued that the main reason for high flow of migration from this area is lack of willingness and flavor among the youth to work around. He continued to explain;

*Figure 4.4: Young people's attitude toward farming*



*I, like most of my friends, had migrated once to Saudi spending a lot of money and putting my life in jeopardy hoping for better life. Unfortunately, I got caught and deported back to home earning no-thing. Nevertheless, after my return I started working as farmer by renting irrigable farm lands from those who leave for Saudi. .... (a moment of laugh) if it wasn't for them, what would have happened to us here'? At the moment, as you can see, I have 4 blots, even if it is rental. And this last month (February), I have earned ETB 150,000 from a half blot of land by selling tomato. Now, the blots are planted onion. I am expecting above ETB 80,000 from all the four blots for it is onion, tomato is better than onion in productivity.*

*a migrant returnee in Wargba [24/04/2017]*

*Source of Photography: taken by the author as part of data collection process*

On the other hand, contrary to this, focus group discussants in Mehoni Town and Hawelti TABIA explained that youth migrate to Middle East because they lack employment opportunities. However, despite there are vast agricultural investments and irrigation system being introduced in high coverage into the Woreda, the youth go to Middle East ignoring to participate in such opportunities. The following section dealt with youth attitude towards local employment opportunities.

### 4.1.2.1 Youth Attitude Towards Local Employment Opportunities

Going from community perspective a little deeper, this sub-section presents youth attitude about domestic employment opportunities. In some cases, people migrate by underestimating local employment opportunities (TCA 2014). A likert scale with eight items was produced to check this proposition in Raya Azebo Woreda. An effort was made to gauge the attitude of youth about local employment opportunities, based on the attitude sum score of these eight items. The mean score is high with 21.84 and standard deviation of 4.32. Since the statements were against local employment opportunities high attitude score indicates that the young people in Raya Azebo Woreda underestimate local employment opportunities, while the standard deviation shows differential attitude across the four selected TABIAs.

Table 4.13: descriptive statistics summarizing youth attitude score towards local employment opportunities

| Descriptive Statistics                          |     |         |         |         |         |                |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----|---------|---------|---------|---------|----------------|
|                                                 | N   | Minimum | Maximum | Sum     | Mean    | Std. Deviation |
| ATTITUDE TOWARDS LOCAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES | 242 | 11.00   | 32.00   | 5286.00 | 21.8430 | 4.31538        |
| Valid N (listwise)                              | 242 |         |         |         |         |                |

Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)

Focus group discussions that were conducted in Kara Tabia depicted that most youth in the community, most often migrant returnees, tend to undervalue employment activities that the ‘locals’<sup>5</sup> engage in. These employment activities include basically farm irrigation activities, locally known as “Golgol”. If one goes to some of these irrigation activities, he/she will learn that they are occupied by people outside the Tabia. It is one of the main destinations for internal migrants from mainly Ofla Woreda, and other parts of Tigray Regional State. In the middle of our discussion about how the locals see the domestic employment opportunities, a 19 years old female participant said, “We were working in one of the irrigation farms collecting tomato.

<sup>5</sup> It is not common to see real locals, who are born to and grown up in the TABIA, working in these activities. They think they over fit the local employment opportunities.

There was a deportee whom we knew passing by chance. We greeted to each other and the owner of the farm (the employer) asked him if he could work with us, collecting tomato. What! Work, here! He told the owner that there is no way he could work with us. You know why, because he had been to Saudi.” So, no matter how much underrated, ‘dirty’ jobs they used to engage in the Middle East countries, the youth do not seem to be interested in .working here.

I felt I had to make some observations to what extent these irrigable farms are owned by the real owners, the Tabia residents, in relation to migrants to that place. I managed to see 50 blocks (block is equivalent to  $\frac{1}{4}$  hectare) by asking a key informant in the TABIA. Of the total 50 blocks I have seen, almost two-third was rented out to immigrants from other parts of the Woreda and the Regional State in general.

From the findings, one can conclude that there is low attitude towards domestic employment opportunities in the study TABIAs, at least. However, test of variance, ANOVA, suggested that there is difference in attitude across the four TABIAs.

*Table 4.14: ANOVA showing the variation of youth attitude score about local employment across four TABIAs*

| ANOVA                                           |                |     |             |        |      |
|-------------------------------------------------|----------------|-----|-------------|--------|------|
| ATTITUDE TOWARDS LOCAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES |                |     |             |        |      |
|                                                 | Sum of Squares | df  | Mean Square | F      | Sig. |
| Between Groups                                  | 1264.720       | 3   | 421.573     | 31.128 | .000 |
| Within Groups                                   | 3223.313       | 238 | 13.543      |        |      |
| Total                                           | 4488.033       | 241 |             |        |      |

The F score 31.128 produced as compared to the critical zone of 2.64 given in a cell linking dfb 3 and dwf 238 indicates high variability in means between the four TABIAs which is significant at alpha 0.05 with P = .000. This means that there is high differential attitude towards domestic employment opportunities across the study TABIAs. Indeed, a post hoc test was conducted to determine the difference and presented in table 4.16.

## Post hoc test

Table 4.15: multiple comparisons to determine the mean difference in attitude score between four TABIAs

| Multiple Comparisons                                     |               |                       |            |      |                         |             |
|----------------------------------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|------------|------|-------------------------|-------------|
| ATTITUDE TOWARDS LOCAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES          |               |                       |            |      |                         |             |
| Tukey HSD                                                |               |                       |            |      |                         |             |
| (I) TABIA                                                | (J) TABIA     | Mean Difference (I-J) | Std. Error | Sig. | 95% Confidence Interval |             |
|                                                          |               |                       |            |      | Lower Bound             | Upper Bound |
| KARA                                                     | WARGBA        | -2.54245*             | .68108     | .001 | -4.3046                 | -.7803      |
|                                                          | HAWELTI       | -.75119               | .68379     | .691 | -2.5203                 | 1.0180      |
|                                                          | KETEMA MEHONI | 3.59753*              | .67097     | .000 | 1.8615                  | 5.3335      |
| WARGBA                                                   | KARA          | 2.54245*              | .68108     | .001 | .7803                   | 4.3046      |
|                                                          | HAWELTI       | 1.79126*              | .66914     | .039 | .0600                   | 3.5225      |
|                                                          | KETEMA MEHONI | 6.13997*              | .65603     | .000 | 4.4426                  | 7.8373      |
| HAWELTI                                                  | KARA          | .75119                | .68379     | .691 | -1.0180                 | 2.5203      |
|                                                          | WARGBA        | -1.79126*             | .66914     | .039 | -3.5225                 | -.0600      |
|                                                          | KETEMA MEHONI | 4.34872*              | .65885     | .000 | 2.6441                  | 6.0533      |
| KETEMA MEHONI                                            | KARA          | -3.59753*             | .67097     | .000 | -5.3335                 | -1.8615     |
|                                                          | WARGBA        | -6.13997*             | .65603     | .000 | -7.8373                 | -4.4426     |
|                                                          | HAWELTI       | -4.34872*             | .65885     | .000 | -6.0533                 | -2.6441     |
| *. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. |               |                       |            |      |                         |             |

The above post hoc test shows the mean difference between each of the TABIAs. The maximum mean difference is recorded to be +/-6.14 which the mean difference between Wargba and K/Mehoni. The variation in the means occurred because of the mean deviations in Wargba to the highest and K/Mehoni to the lowest. It is not surprising that Wargba and Kara TABIAs have the highest mean scores against local employment opportunities, having recorded highest average attitude scores in favor of illegal migration, as discussed earlier. The difference is significant at 0.05 alpha level except for the difference between Kara and Hawelti. The mean difference between Kara and Hawelti is insignificant for P (0.691) is greater than 0.05.




Figure 4.5: means plot showing youth attitude mean differences about local employment opportunities between TABIAs

Means plot also shows that mean variation in attitude towards local employment opportunities is caused by mean score in Wargba and K/Mehoni. From this it can be understood that in Wargba TABIA there is highly negative attitude towards domestic employment opportunities as compared to the youth in K/Mehoni.

### 4.1.3 Pressure From Others On Migration Decision

This study revealed that the influence of peer groups or family members as motivational factors behind the decisions to migrate to Middle East is found to be very strong. 57.1 percent of the total survey respondents mentioned pressure from others including family pressure, peer pressure and community pressure as contributing to their migration decision: 18.1% of responses mentioned family pressure, 20.2% of responses peer pressure, while 18.8% of the responses gone for community pressure.

Table 4.16: frequency distribution showing causes of migration

| MIGRATION Frequencies            |           |         |
|----------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Causes of Migration              | Frequency | Percent |
| Family Pressure                  | 148       | 18.1%   |
| Peer Pressure                    | 165       | 20.2%   |
| Religious Similarity             | 31        | 3.8%    |
| Language Similarity              | 17        | 2.1%    |
| The Need To Improve One's Status | 130       | 15.9%   |
| Community Pressure               | 153       | 18.8%   |
| To Regard Societal Recognition   | 135       | 16.5%   |

|       |      |        |
|-------|------|--------|
| Other | 37   | 4.5%   |
| Total | 816* | 100.0% |

*Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)*

*\*multiple responses were possible*

The pressure from families, friends and the community was observed to be varied according to place of birth and gender (*see annex-6 to see the details*). Family pressure was high on female migrants as compared to males, 42.6% to 34.5%. This could be associated with caring and supportive inclination of females. It is said that females do not see their parents suffer (Jones et al. 2014).

#### ***4.1.4 Cultural Proximity And Migration Decision***

This study claimed that cultural proximity also contributes to migration decision, besides to pressure from others. As is shown in table 4.18, 3.8 percent and 2.1 percent of the cases pinpointed to religious similarity and linguistic proximity, respectively. The data produced from in-depth interviews with migrant returnees, however, indicated that the role of cultural proximity is manifested in journey and destination experiences. Muslims as opposed to Christians and those who speak Arabic as opposed to those who do not, experience the trip and destination in different ways.

#### ***4.1.5 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND ILLEGAL MIGRATION***

Individuals choose to migrate into places where they can find support in getting information about migration routes, in making safe trip, in finding jobs and in settling in the destination. But, this doesn't mean individuals with no migrant networks at destination don't migrate, they do migrate, as there are pushy ties at home. The presence of close social tie at home, on the contrary, prevents illegal migration. Therefore, it is crucial to see the role of social capital in four ways. These include illegal migration preventing social capital, illegal migration facilitating social capital, pulling social capital, and pushy social capital.

##### ***1. Social capital that prevents Illegal Migration***

For one thing, the presence of strong and healthy social ties at home prevents migration decision. The argument is that less emigration is observed in circumstances where individuals have good relationship with their friends, family members in their origin. These are illegal migration

preventing social ties. This is supported by evidences from focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. It was mentioned that as there are families and friends who push on individuals to migrate, there are also others that convince, if not force, and avert individuals from migrating. this is in contrary to families want to send their children to Saudi. A female migrant returnee, aged 23, explains the role of social capital (particularly parents) in preventing illegal migration as follows:

*You can't blame every family as pushing because there are others who on the contrary persuade their fellow individuals to work around and prevent them from migrating. I had a friend of mine before I have migrated to Saudi who tried to come with me in my second migration. I told her to withdraw her education and to come with me. I created all the possible success we might achieve if we go to Saudi. She finally agreed to my proposal and we set the date for our departure after negotiating with smugglers. Her mother never knew all these things until the date of our departure. But you can't hold the truth back. It came out anyway and the mother heard from others that her daughter was leaving for Saudi. More shocking, she learnt that her daughter was leaving at the same day the news is brought by to her attention by asking the sources. She never had any clue what to do. She just ran to nearby town. How fortunate she was, we were yet to get in the bus. She came in front of the bus and started crying and screaming loud putting her hand on the head. She kept on saying 'my daughter! Daughter...!' the police men came around and asked the mother, the screaming mother, whether her daughter took her something like money for smuggling payment in attempt of knowing what made her scream. She continued her scream loud and clear; 'just give me my daughter! She is my daughter!' That moment, that scream prevented the girl (my childhood friend) from migrating. That screaming changed things for better. Her mother did what my mother did not dare to do. Don't ask me where she is now. Immediately, after that moment, the mother and her husband decided for their daughter that they should sway her and give her money to start small business around so that she would settle and throw her thoughts of Saudi. Now, she is running a small business of her own in Mekelle town. I am here, as you can see me, frustrated having no hint of my next step."*

This plainly signifies how much parents' courage to say their children no and their ability to talk into them to stay and work around by promising them to try to provide them with the necessities for start up business can prevent illegal migration.

This statement is backed up by the affinity hypothesis of theory social network theory that the existence of relatives and friends at the place of residences reduces the tendency to migrate. According to this hypothesis, non-economic factors such as close links to a community, strong local kinship ties, high investments in a community as well as assimilation difficulties in a new community all reinforce the tendency not to migrate (Haug, 2008: 589, citing Ritchey 1976; Uhlenberg 1973).

## ***2. Social Capital that Pulls Illegal Migration***

The existence of family members, friends, and relatives at destination increase the likelihood of illegal migration. Social capital at destination supports potential migrants in migration routes, in making the trip to the destination by paying the potential migrants smuggling payments, by locating them job opportunities and soon.

Based on the findings of this study, it was discovered that migrants mentioned social capital (migrants meaningful ties with friends, relatives and family members) has an eminent role in migration decision in relation to 1) getting information about illegal migration, 2) influencing them to decide for migration, 3) helping decide destination, 4) accessing information about the illegal routes, 5) funding smuggling payments, 6) helping them settle at destination and 7) assisting them in finding jobs.

The role of social capital in informing migration routes is evident. As shown in table 4.19, friends have been mentioned as the main source of information of illegal channels or routes of migration for 147 migrants or 12.1% of the respondents followed by relatives with 57 (4.7%) of the respondents argued so. The role of family members should not be denied here being sources of information for 27 (2.2) migrants.

Similarly, respondents were also asked about the role of others in informing about destination. In this regard, respondents mentioned friends (5.6% or 68 of the responses), relatives (2.5% or

30 of the total responses), and family members (2.1% or 26 of the responses) as their source information about their destination (Table 4.17).

*Table 4.17: frequency distribution showing sources of information about destination*

| Sources Destination Information         | Frequency | Percent |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| FRIENDS RETURNED FROM SAUDI             | 68        | 5.6%    |
| RELATIVES FROM SAUDI                    | 30        | 2.5%    |
| FAMILY MEMBER                           | 26        | 2.1%    |
| SOCIAL MEDIAS LIKE WHATSUP AND FACEBOOK | 8         | 0.7%    |
| OTHER                                   | 3         | 0.2%    |
| NOT APPLICABLE                          | 1075      | 88.8%   |
| Total                                   | 1210      | 100.0%  |

*Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)*

The study also found out that migrants get the help of friends, relatives, family members in their choice of destination, and smuggling payments. In this respect, participants were asked who was involved in their decision making. Accordingly, the descriptive statistics are produced and presented as follows.

*Table 4.18: frequency distribution of migration decision involvement*

| Decision involvement                                     | frequency | Percent |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| I DECIDED BY MYSELF                                      | 45        | 3.7%    |
| MY FRIEND                                                | 36        | 3.0%    |
| MY PARENTS                                               | 21        | 1.7%    |
| MY MARRIAGE PARTNER                                      | 13        | 1.1%    |
| FAMILY MEMBER OTHER THAN PARENTS (FAMILY OF ORIENTATION) | 29        | 2.4%    |
| NOT APPLICABLE                                           | 1066      | 88.1%   |
| Total                                                    | 1210      | 100.0%  |
| a. Group                                                 |           |         |

*Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)*

As shown in Table 4.18, out of the total 140 respondents, who have or had decided their destination prior to their migration, only 45 (3.7% of the cases) of them decided independently. The rest admitted that their destination decision was intervened by others including friends (36), parents (21), marriage partner (13) and family members other than parents (29).

Besides, migrant social networks play significant part in supporting potential migrants in paying for smuggling services and in making the trip in general. Migrant social networks assist potential migrants starting from initial smuggling payments for domestic smugglers through sea boat fees to smuggling payments for external smugglers in Yemen. They [the migrant social ties]

prevent potential migrants from torture and exploitation, which would happen otherwise. The findings of the study claimed similar arguments.

*Table 4.19: frequency distribution of source of fund for illegal migration*

| Sources of fund                          | Frequency | Percent |
|------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| WITH THE HELP OF MY PARENTS              | 86        | 7.1%    |
| RELATIVES FROM ABROAD                    | 12        | 1.0%    |
| BY MYSELF                                | 70        | 5.8%    |
| FROM A FRIEND WHO IS/WAS LIVING IN SAUDI | 6         | 0.5%    |
| A FAMILY MEMBER                          | 27        | 2.2%    |
| NOT APPLICABLE                           | 1009      | 83.4%   |
| Total                                    | 1210      | 100.0%  |
| a. Group                                 |           |         |

*Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)*

The above frequency distribution shows how important parents are in funding potential migrants' smuggling payments with 86 of the respondents (7.1%) indicating parents as main source of funding. The second source of (expected for potential migrants) fund for migrants is/was family members (siblings) (27 of the total responses or 2.2% of the cases) who have been in or to Saudi. The role of relatives and close friends was also observed as important with each serve(d) a source of fund for 12 (1% of cases) and 6 (0.5% of cases) migrants, respectively.

The role of family members and relatives was extended by the evidences gained from in-depth interviews with migrant returnees. There are situations where family members and relatives abroad forced to pool relatives and family members from home. According to a 22 years old female interviewee, migrant social networks spend up to 100,000 ETB to help others make to Saudi. She continued to explain the situation based on her experience as follows:

*It puts you in much pressure to be a pioneer migrant to your family and other relatives. I have stayed for four years in a series. But I stayed there for others not for myself. I got deported without earning any to start up business here at home. I spent around ETB 93,500 to fund for others migration. 7000 riyal for my sister, 2500 riyal for my brother, ETB 11000 for my uncle's daughter, 4000 riyal for my sister's son and 3000 riyal for my little brother.*

This experience of her implies the contributions migrant networks make in phenomenon of illegal migration is prominent. This single girl help five individuals migrate to Saudi imagine

how many individuals, in turn, these would pull. This is supported by information and facilitating hypotheses of social capital theory. According to these hypotheses, the more friends and relatives live in different places, the more they provide information about possible destinations and migration channels, and this in turn, increases the likelihood of migration decision. Moreover, these friends and relatives play role of facilitating adjustments to new locations by helping the new comers in search of jobs, by helping them inhabit in the new locations, by creating new social ties and soon (Haug, 2008).

### ***3. Social Capital that Pushes Individuals to Migrate***

This is highly related to pressure from others. Often times the social ties individuals have are seen to put them [the individuals] in pressure of deciding or doing something they wouldn't do if not. This role of social ties can be seen in two ways. **For one thing**, in cases where individuals are in conflict or in loose connections with their families, relatives, neighbors or community members, there will be high probability of migration for these individuals. As it was discussed earlier in this chapter, pressures from family (148 of the ticks or 18.1% of the cases), friends (165 or 20.2% of the cases), neighbors and the community (153 or 18.8% of the cases) in general have been mentioned among the main socio-cultural factors that induced individuals to make decisions and consequently to migrate. Moreover, betrayals among family members is said to contribute to [re]migration. This assertion is strengthened by in-depth interviews. A 19 years old female interviewee shared me her friends experience while we were talking about the magnitude of the impact of illegal migration on betrayals among family members, relatives and friends. She said:

*The effect of illegal migration, in relation to betrayals, is huge. Let me tell you the story of my friend to show you how bad its effect is. We (me and my friend) had been together to Saudi. We had worked for about two years in a row. In the end, we got caught and deported to our home. But in the mean time, while we were working in Saudi, she was sending money to her mother's brother so that he would deposit the money to her. You know she was smart. She kept on telling me that I had to safe money for I could start my own business back home. She somehow managed to send about ETB 100,000. But, unfortunately, her uncle was not to be trusted. When we deported and got here his reaction wasn't good. He wasn't happy for her return. The thing is that he spent more*

*than 75% of the money for his own business. In the beginning, he told her she sent him only ETB 50,000. She had got nothing to do. She said okay give me that. Next time, I told you that you sent me ETB 50,000 I was wrong it was just ETB 20,000. She, my friend, got disappointed and get frustrated. She has re-migrated again promising to herself not to trust anyone.*


**Second**, social ties tend to encourage individuals to migrate and arrange all the necessary things for their migration with an eventual objective of repaying them either by sending them money back and/or by helping them migrate themselves. This argument is associated with the idea that families want to send their children to Saudi as confirmed in previous section, in community attitude section, and endorsed by encouragement hypothesis of the theory of social networks. Social networks theory argued that families may encourage members of their family to migrate for work, e.g. as a strategy to secure the household income (Hugo 1981: 196; Stark 1991).

#### **4. Social Capital which Facilitates Illegal Migration**

Illegal migration facilitating social capital is the kind of capital that arranges and facilitates the necessities of illegal migration for potential migrants at home starting from sponsoring the fund for smuggling service. Here the pushy element is not involved. But the presence of social capital that potential migrants would believe it would facilitate their journey would increase the likelihood of migration intention. And actually, family members, friends and close relatives are seen to fund migration. Nevertheless, the facilitation role of social capital, as it shall be seen later, is best expressed in journey experience of migrants.

The following diagram summarizes the four roles of social capital in illegal migration decision.

Figure 4.6: the four important roles of Social Capital



Source: Drawn by the author based on the study findings and theoretical assumptions of social networks theory

#### 4.1.6 Individual Aspirations and Motivations

Yet, the individual motivations and aspirations are not to be overlooked. Individuals have the ability to take initiations, if not decisions/actions, to do something outside the pressures from others. Based on the findings of the study, it was learnt that individuals make decisions to migrate on their own to satisfy their desire to improve their social status (15.9% or 130 respondents) (see table).

From the above description, it could be said that they [the migrants] go to Saudi because they assume that working around could not let them improve their livelihood, at least in short periods of time. This assertion is in agreement with the assumptions of the theory of **theory of value expectancy** that people move for other places leaving their homeland after they calculate the expected utility of leaving in comparison to the utility of staying. 15.9% of the survey participants admitted that they decided to migrate in order to improve their own status.

Moreover, as it can be seen in table 4.24, 45 (3.7%) of the ticks in relation to who might have involved in migration decision making were made in favor of migrants' self decision. The decisions are influenced by what people believe they might know about their potential destination. Their knowledge of the language of the destination, their knowledge of types of jobs they would engage in, and their knowledge of customs and soon affects whether to go or stay.

#### ***4.1.7 The Role of Social Media on Illegal Migration***

Social media is growing dramatically constituting most of people's real-life social relationships. The usage of social media is increasing regardless of countries development levels, government systems, internet access levels. Social media is there affecting almost every one's life no matter where they live. There are no as such things as discrimination, bias, stratification in the social media world in relation to information sharing, dissemination etc (Chen-Lie 2015).

People use social media to communicate ill-doings of governance, policy reforms, expansion of epidemic diseases (*an emergency outbreak can be spread through social media like Twitter faster than the disease itself (Lallana, 2014:48, citing Christine McNab)*), natural disasters, terrorist acts and soon. Besides, social media enables people to create working 'social bonding despite geography' (Lallana, 2014: 27). Through social media sites especially Facebook and WhatsUp individuals maintain their social ties regardless of how distanced they are from their ties. This argument is backed up by the assumption of transnational social space theory that migrants can maintain their ties back at home. This could be concluded that social media encourages [illegal] migration by making migrants feel less lonely.

In fact, the role of social media in regarding to illegal migration doesn't stop at this level. Social media provide potential migrants with information about illegal migration, possible destinations and other migration related things. To have more clear understanding about the roles of social media on illegal migration, respondents were asked what things they learnt through social media. In the course of my survey, I have come to learn that the most popular social media sites in Raya Azebo Woreda include Facebook and WhatsUp. Indeed, a pointing figure of respondents sided with the role of these social media sites in informing potential migrants about migration illegal routes, as shown in table 4.25.

From table 4.26, it could be noted that 32 of the responses (2.6%) gone for social media. Moreover, another thing migrants had able to learn about through social media was about destinations. Eight of the ticks confirmed that social media play part in destination information dissemination (see table 4.21).

Although the figures are too small in relation to the other sources of information, the findings point out that more research is needed on the importance of social media on illegal migration as a source of information and as strong social bond for migrants.

*Figure 4.7: Pictures shared and posted on and/or via social media*

Besides, I observed videos and pictures being shared and posted in WhatsUp and Facebook sites by migrants from Saudi that could tell a lot about their destination experiences. I was able to watch some of the videos and pictures. They were meant to, not explicitly though, show how the migrants live happy and stable life and to motivate the youth for migration.



Source: Migrant Returnees

#### ***4.1.8 Other causes of Illegal Migration***

Drawing from evidences from key informant interviews and in-depth interviews, the government's failure to keep its promises and the false promises of smugglers; modern Snakeheads as some call them (Yen 2013) also play crucial roles in illegal migration decision. During the mass deportation in 2014, the government of Ethiopia promised for the deportees that it would provide assistance for the migrants to begin a new start at home. Actually, however, the migrants haven't got any yet, despite some training claiming to create employment opportunities. So, this created frustration and distrust among the youth towards the government representatives and thereby, causes remigration. Moreover, the [internal] smugglers also contribute to the problem. The smugglers go to the extent of causing couples to end their marriage because of the falsely exaggerated opportunities which might exist in Middle East countries and the likelihood of success. Individuals, thus, get divorced to migrate as it shall be seen latter in the consequences of illegal migration section. This shows the role of institutions in illegal migration decision as explained by institutional theory of migration.

## **4.2. JOURNEY AND DESTINATION EXPERIENCES**


### **4.2.1. JOURNEY EXPERIENCES OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS**

Despite small drop shots from some writers, what happens to migrants in their journey and to their route choices has been given little attention. Nonetheless, the experience of migrants who try to cross borders illegally need be to seen. With this in mind, based on existing literature and in-depth interviews, this study attempted to grasp the problem in three categories. The first category stressed on the identification of illegal routes to Middle East, Saudi, the second deals with what happens to the route choice of migrants that is how do they choose among the available illegal routes, the third focuses on what happens to these migrants in their trip by classifying it as before crossing the sea, while crossing the sea and after crossing the sea.

#### **4.2.1.2. The Major Illegal Routes/Channels**

Based on the findings of the study it is found that there are two routes which are part of the eastern illegal route of illegal migration. The first sub-route leads migrants through Afar and Djibouti to Yemen with final destination of Saudi Arabia. This route is shortly known as **Djibouti route** by the migrants. The second one is through Somali-Ethiopia and Somalia to Yemen with final destination of again Saudi Arabia which is called as **Somali route**. The Djibouti route starts from Alamata – Addis Ababa – Harare – Jigjiga – Wuchale (a border between Ethiopia and Somalia) – Hargiessa (the gathering place to start journey to Somalia) – Burio (after eight hours of car transport, it depends on how fast you pay though) – Bossasso (the coast) to Yemen finally Saudi Arabia. The Somali route covers Alamata – Wuhallimat – Bishutu – Galafi – Hayou (Djibouti) to Yemen and then to Saudi Arabia. The following road map shows the two illegal routes for migrants from Raya Azebo Woreda.

Figure 4.8: the two major illegal routes from Raya Azebo to Saudi Arabia



Source: adopted from TCA (2014)

Therefore, migrants from Raya Azebo Woreda either take the Djibouti or Somali route, to deploy migrants' terminology. Many factors have been depicted as determinants for migrants' choice of route. To choose either one of the routes, involves interplay of different factors including the probability of risk that are involved with each route and one's social capital among other things. The next section, thus, presents the factors that determine migrants' choice of route.

#### 4.2.1.3. *Factors That Affect Migrants' Choice Of Route*

The main intervening variables in migrants' route choice have been social capital and risk factor. That is the probability of danger which may be associated with each route and the presence of social capital that can support in evaluating the routes by providing information and in overcoming the risk once the route is chosen.

Drawing on evidences from in-depth interviews, migrants choose their route based on their evaluations of the likelihood of risk a given route may hold in relation to the advantages and

disadvantages of each. Regarding migrants' choice of route, a male in-depth interview interviewee, aged 29, had to say the following:

.....In regard to the route, there are two routes available for migrants to reach Saudi. The first one, which I migrated five times through, is Djibouti route. This route is very dangerous. It is this route where most Ethiopians are tortured and being beheaded. The other is Somalia route. This route is relatively less dangerous but more lengthy. This route requires migrants to spend up to two weeks on journey on foot, by vehicles, and on sea. During their journey, migrants suffer from starvation, long and tough journey, and other exploitations, physical, sexual etc... So, these two routes have their advantages and disadvantages. The Djibouti route is shorter; you can arrive at Saudi within a week and you can cross the sea in hours. However, in so doing this, either you have to have money to pay or relatives who can pay for you or you have to experience lots of suffer before and after you cross sea. The suffer gets worse and worse after migrants cross the sea. Smugglers await migrants immediate to their arrival at Yemen as soon as they cross the sea. After they caught and imprisoned them they start to torment and convince (force) them (the smuggled) to tell their parents at home or their significant others, if any, (relatives, family members or close friends) who have already migrated to send them money. If you have no one who can send you the money that you are asked, you will be tortured and beaten at least till you lose your consciousness or to the worst, to death. Nevertheless, this route is relatively shorter. The **Somali route**, on the other hand, compared to Djibouti, is safer. Even after you cross the sea what await you are not the smugglers as the case is in Djibouti route, what awaits you is Red Cross society. In the mean time, it takes you longer periods of time and needs you to cover weeks long and desert route on foot; you have to spend 32 - 52 hours of sea route. The suffer changes its face. Here, suffer is from starvation of food, lack of water, tough journey, etc. this, however, doesn't mean there are no smuggling problems; what does this mean is that the problem decreases.

His ideas straightforwardly endorses that among the underlining factors behind migrants' choice of route include risk factor and the likelihood support of others (social capital).

The findings of this study show that social capital is important in choosing between Djibouti and Somali routes. Based on the data produced from in-depth interviews, migrants who take Djibouti route are usually with family members, close friends and relatives already migrated to Saudi because when someone takes this route it, by default, means that he/she is going to pay a price usually money to external smugglers in Yemen sea border, immediately after they cross the sea. So, you need to have someone who is going to pay you and get you out of that or else would be worldly hell.

#### **4.2.1.4.      *Making the Trip: What Happens to Migrants in Their Trip to Middle East [Saudi Arabia]?***

Despite some differences according to the route chosen and migrants' level of capital, Ethiopian migrants face numerous dangers. The dangers Ethiopian migrants face discussed here by classifying them into three phases. The first phase covers overland journey till they reach sea coast, second phase involves sea crossing problems and the third phase constitutes transit experiences after sea.

According to the migrant returnees, migrants suffer from shortages of water, starvation, fears of being caught by security officers in Djibouti or theft by Somalis, feelings of fatigue from long (overland) journey, etc. By recognizing this statement, a male migrant returnee, aged 31, said:

*I took Djibouti route. In my route, I have encountered a lot of bad things. I had to see dead bodies left behind, people handicapped, died out of starvation and shortage of water. We (me and my friends) were forced to stay in hiding camps during day times, to walk during night times on foot with limited food and with no water. During these times, our friends have left behind. The smuggler doesn't care about who is following, who is left behind. He just leads whosoever could follow him. His only worry is not to be caught by security officers. Not alone the smuggler, even friends would not care about each other. They would not look backward to see whether their friends could follow them or left behind. You know, in illegal migration, everybody becomes selfish.*

*An in-depth interview with Migrant returnee in Hawelti (24/03/2017)*

Migrants argued the Somali route is relatively less dangerous. Yet migrants face numerous problems including tough journey, starvation, robbery by Somalis, lack of water. To borrow a migrant returnee's words in Kara:

*Till we reach Ethio-Somali border, the journey was relatively okay. The problem started as we reached at Hargessa, as we entered Somalia. We had to cover about 8 hours of over land journey crowdedly From Hargessa to Burio. During the journey we felt sick out of suffocating smells. As we arrived at Burio we encountered local gangs, the smugglers ran away leaving us prone to the gangs. The gangs beat us, took all our property. We got frustrated having no hint of our next step because the 'leaders' ran away. Yet, how 'lucky' we were! One of our friends was somehow able to hide his cell phone putting inside his pants from the gangs. So, we managed to call friends in other places and asked for their guidance. By so doing, after uncountable suffer; we reached at coast – Bosasso.*

The bottom line, the two routes – Djibouti and Somali – involve their own risks. The risk associated with each route is judged in relation to the migrant's ability in terms of his social, cultural or economic capital to overcome the risks.

The challenges never end at this phase. It continues on to sea crossing, though differences are there between the two routes in crossing sea. Djibouti route is said to offer migrants with relatively shorter sea crossing time; one can reach Yemen in hours. Following this route, migrants can cross sea in three to four hours on average. This comparative advantage, thus, reduces sea time journey stresses, and makes suffocation resulting from small boats carrying huge number of migrants, far beyond their capacity, pass quickly – before they knew it. This route, however, lead migrants directly to external smugglers; another phase of suffer, the third phase. The external smugglers await and capture migrants immediate to their arrival at Yemen border. Taking this route tells the smugglers that you are ready to pay or you have someone who can send you rescue money. Otherwise, you would be imprisoned, tortured, paralyzed as a result continuous extortion, till you convince someone, usually, parents to anyways send you money, or to the worst, till you die or become unconscious. If migrants are not able to pay and manage to escape all the extortion, they will be subject to trafficking in persons.

On the other hand, if migrants follow Somali route, they have to cover 30 to 50 hours of sea crossing time till they reach Yemen. During this long sea crossing hours, migrants suffer from stresses drowning suspicions, may be drowned, feel sick out of smells from dead bodies; yet the likelihood of capture decreases given that migrants are lucky enough to cross sea and arrive at the Yemen border. The third phase of suffer for migrants following the Somali route take another form. Migrants suffer from again days-long journey on foot to make it to their final destination – Saudi Arabia. In their journey they experience dehydration, fatigue, and soon. In this route, migrants have the chance to choose either to pay so that they can go by vehicles or else they can go on foot.

To have more information about the sea crossing and onwards experiences, migrant returnees were asked what they have encountered in the course to Saudi. In this regard, 21 years of age male interviewee in Hawelti, who migrated via Djibouti, argued:

*The sea crossing journey started at Hayou (a coastal area in Djibouti). After we reached Hayou we stayed for two days till the sea transport is arranged. Once the transport is arranged, we got into the boat and crossed the sea in less than seven hours. Immediately, after we arrived at Yemen, we encircled by soldier like men wearing ranger clothes with bicycles and smuggling cars to easily capture migrants who might try to run. Then, they forced us to enter the cars. After they ensured no one was left behind, they started the cars and took us to strongly fenced camp through illegal ways. They didn't take us through the main road because they would be exposed to security officers before they got money from us. After we reached in the torture camps, they told us to call someone whosoever could rescue us by sending money in Arabic for those who could speak the language and in Amharic for those who couldn't speak. Ethiopians were with them to help them [the external smugglers] translate and torture us – Ethiopians. It was at this stage that the extortion begun. Some of the migrants including myself, fortunately, were from a well to do family back home and we called them to send us money. So, we would not be tortured till the due date. But, there were some of our friends who didn't have anyone who could send them money. Ahh!.....the torture started. Some parts of the body had been pulling out from the migrants, our friends. They [the “Ethiopians” – the Arab don't extort, they hire Ethiopians to torture Ethiopians] had putting water bottle with its*

*hole directed towards the eye of the migrant and hit the bottle from behind stacked to the eye so that the eye would be pulled out. Unfortunately, we had to see that. We had to see our friends being cut their fingers, pulled out their teeth. We felt the torture beyond them. The camp became a worldly hell. Eventually, I and some of my friends who managed to pay left the camp with uncertainties of our next destiny. Only God knows what further would have happened to them, to our friends. Since then, I have never heard a thing about them. You don't have any idea what Ethiopians have gone through to make it to Saudi. After we left the camp, we called our friends who had already been there and got their guidance and then support in settling down and finding jobs.*

*A male migrant returnee in Hawelti [24/04/2017]*

From this it could be understood that there is no chance for the poor, at least who couldn't be able to pay ETB 20,000 to 30,000 by himself or with the support of others, to go through Djibouti route. If someone with no ability of paying such amount of money, they have to break prison and run away from the camp, if not they hardly see themselves out of that hell with all of their body parts functioning well. In relation to this, a migrant returnee in Wargba said:

*I had no money, except ETB 3,000 for sea transport, to pay for the smugglers, both internal and external. I just migrated lumped together with others who had enough money to go through Djibouti route. Till I reached Yemen, I had faced no problems. But, after I made it to Yemen, I got captured with others and had to pay money. I had no money. I had no one who could help me pay either. And the inevitable was coming, the extortion. So, I decided I had to break the prison and I 'successfully' made it.*

Figure 4.8 summarizes the risks that are involved in each route.

Figure 4.9: Comparisons of the Somali and Djibouti Illegal Migration Routes available for migrants from Raya Azebo

| <b>Somali Route</b>                                                        | <b>Djibouti Route</b>                                                     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Weeks long and tough journey                                               | Starvation                                                                |
| Starvation                                                                 | Dehydration                                                               |
| Thirst                                                                     | Running and hiding from Djibouti security officers                        |
| Dehydration                                                                | Saphocating smell and feelings of sickness out of dead bodies left behind |
| Saphocation out of long hours of journey in a crowded smuggling vehicle    | Torture and loosing of body parts specially after crossing sea            |
| Feelings of sickness as a result of dead bodies in days long sea transport | Raping and other sexual abuses                                            |
| Problems of theft by Somali gangs                                          | Relatively risky journey before and after crossing sea                    |
| Relatively safe journey before and after crossing sea                      | Relatively shorter journey                                                |
| Relatively longer journey both overland (weeks long) and sea (days long)   |                                                                           |

Source: in-depth interview and literature review

#### **4.2.2. Destination Experiences of Illegal Migrants**

This study showed that migrants' destination experiences vary across different variables. These variables, according to the migrant returnees, include migrant social networks (social capital), cultural proximity, in terms of religion and language, and the type of employment migrants might engage in. The presence of family members, close relatives and friends in destination areas make migrants feel at home, reduce feelings of lonely, make employer switch easier and consequently help migrants have good experience of their destination. So, social capital play indispensable role in migrants' destination experiences.

Indeed, despite some odds based on type of employment activities Ethiopians engage in, there are circumstances where migrants feel like if they are at home, where migrants make

engagements with whom they love and where they enjoy together in weekends (Fridays and Saturdays in Arab's case) and make some home-land like practices. Related to this is “**Tirha**”, as termed by the migrant returnees. **Tirha** refers to the activities that Ethiopian migrants perform in Fridays and Saturdays by coming together, see each other and by enjoying in rental house that would be rented by mainly those with legal residence status – those who have **Igama**, a concept used by migrant returnees to refer to legal migration. In Tirha, according to a male migrant returnee, aged 21, in Hawelti, “[Ethiopian] migrants perform many religious and cultural practices. They perform marriage practices, baptize/christen their children and arrange parties.”

Tirha is a good thing in that it helps migrants feel less lonely and more home-like feelings, and ultimately, it helps the migrants have good experiences of their destination. But on the other hand this may encourage further migration. They send, post and share videos and pictures on and/or via WhatsUp and Facebook that show the dances, enjoyments and other seducing/seemingly exciting things they perform in Tirha.

Likewise, the ability to speak one's destinations' language and having similar religious affiliation to that of the destination make a difference in experiencing a destination. As it has been mentioned in earlier sections, the level of religious and linguistic distance between sending and receiving societies has an immense role in illegal migration. Depending on the interviews with migrant returnees, Muslims as opposed to Christians and those who can speak Arabic as opposed to those who don't experience the destination well. This is mainly because they can easily integrate to the destination for they have similar religious affiliation and they can easily communicate with Arabs. To boost this argument let me use a migrant returnee's words in his explanation of the role of linguistic and religious proximity in migrants' destination experience:

*.....Here is the thing. If your religion is similar to theirs (that is if you are Muslim), they will respect you and treat you well, at least as human being. On the contrary, if you are Christian, they will see you as the damned, as evil that they don't even trust you with their livestock and their children. They gave up you for police officers so that you would be deported. As for the Arabs, it is good for the animals to be protected and breed, if you are Muslim for you can pray and perform other religious practices. In regard to language, there are differences between those who speak the language and those who don't. This is seen in relation to salary; if you can speak their language you can tell them*

*what you have been through, your situations at home, you can be hired with twice more salary than those who can't speak. It is better for you, if you can speak their language even if you are not Muslim.*

*A male migrant returnee in Hawelti [24/04/2017]*

Equally important in migrants' destination experience is the type of employment activities that Ethiopian migrants engage in. on the basis of in-depth interviews with migrant returnees, I classified these employment activities into four broad categories: desert, inside home activities, outside-home employments and drug dealings. The desert employment includes looking after livestock like camel, goat and sheep. These employments are usually occupied by male Ethiopian illegal migrants. These migrants rarely see people as a result they feel lonely and depressed. They spend much of their time with the livestock. Their exposure to humans is only during Tirha in which their employers come to see their livestock. When their employers visit them they bring them [the migrants] 'fresh food' – better than they eat during non-Tirha days. They miss their social ties at home. So, these migrants don't have good destination experiences.

The second category of employment is home category. In this category, female legal and illegal migrants are hired and constitute inside-home activities, most commonly mentioned as housemaid in the literature (see for example, Elias 2013; Selemawit 2013). These migrants, like desert migrants, rarely, participate in Tirha. In fact, they become busy during Tirha for their employers invite relatives and friends to their home. This means that the housemaid will have extra burden of serving the guests in Tirha. These migrants feel depressed. Studies have reported that housemaids experience bad relationships with their employers. They got harassed culturally, sexually; they got beaten; they got thrown from towers; they got given electric shocks; they got be cheated and so many other bad things happened to them. But, the current study revealed that the experience to these bad things is more evident in those migrants who enter the countries through legal means than in illegal migrants. This is because illegal migrants are said to enjoy freedom of employer shift; they can escape from the bad things as the employers wouldn't have any leverage on them. Besides, illegal migrants are said to enjoy higher salaries than 'legal'<sup>6</sup> migrants. It is learnt that, from the migrant returnees, in spite of higher payments by migrants for

---

<sup>6</sup> Although being legal doesn't serve any difference for Ethiopian migrants.

legal migration, they are paid less than the illegal migrants. In order to have clear understanding about the issue let me deploy here the words of a migrant returnee aged 26:

*For an outsider who just sees the term legal, illegal migration would not, by any means, be compared to legal migration. Practically, however, the term ‘legal’ is just a cover. Despite safe entrance of a country, migrants who enter Saudi legally experience a lot of abuse and exploitation: physically, they got beaten; socially, they got discriminated and reduced to less human, to non-human creature; verbally, they got insulted; sexually, they got raped; psychologically, they feel lonely and stressed; and culturally, they got humiliated. Besides, legal migration offers no freedom of movement; you can’t just walk away and switch employers as the case in illegal migrants. The thing is, in legal migration there is high risk of detection and deportation if migrants try to escape because their passport and other identification documents are in the hands of their employers. Another thing while comparing legal and illegal migration is income generation. Income wise, illegal migrants earn more than legal migrants earn. Illegal migrants hired for a monthly salary ranged from 1500 Riyal to 3000 Riyal, legal migrants, conversely, earn less than 1000 Riyal. Legal status doesn’t make a difference for Ethiopian migrants; we all are Habesh – a term the Arabs use to refer to Habesha [Ethiopians].*

*A male migrant returnee in Hawelti [10/04/2017]*

According to the study findings, freedom of movement, differential income generation, treatment of legal migrants (housemaids) as slaves, higher payments for legal migration (legal migrants spend more than ETB 80,000), the formalities and bureaucracies involved in legal migration (legal migration takes migrants up to one year to make it to middle east) are among the factors for choosing illegal migration. To have more understanding about why migrants choose illegal migration, respondents were asked for their reasons to choose illegal migration. The results are presented in table 4.20.

*Table 4.20: frequency distribution of causes of illegal migration*

| Causes of Illegal Migration                     | Frequency | Percent |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| ILLEGAL MIGRATION GENERATES MORE MONEY          | 65        | 3.4%    |
| ALL MY FRIENDS HAVE/HAD MIGRATED ILLEGALLY      | 9         | 0.5%    |
| I DON'T/DIDN'T HAVE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL | 10        | 0.5%    |

| INFORMATION                               |      |        |
|-------------------------------------------|------|--------|
| THERE IS/WAS NOT LEGAL MIGRATION          | 12   | 0.6%   |
| LEGAL MIGRATION TAKES MORE TIME           | 45   | 2.3%   |
| INABILITY TO FUND LEGAL MIGRATION         | 112  | 5.8%   |
| ILLEGAL MIGRATION ALLOWS FOR MORE FREEDOM | 40   | 2.1%   |
| OTHER FACTORS                             | 1    | 0.1%   |
| NOT APPLICABLE                            | 1642 | 84.8%  |
| Total                                     | 1936 | 100.0% |

*Source: migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)*

As it is shown in table 4.20, inability to fund legal migration, the ability of illegal migrants to generate more income than legal migrants, the relative freedom of movement in illegal migration earned the highest ticks by the survey participants with 112 (5.8%), 65 (3.4%) and 40 (2.1%) responses, respectively.

The third employment category identified is drug dealing. It was learnt that Ethiopian migrants are also work as drug dealers. Indeed there is a saying being relayed in the communities to extend this fact – “ፋፋ ፋፋ ፋፋ ፋፋ ፋፋ”. This literally means either a package of money or a package of dead body. When I first heard the saying I became curious to know more about it. Then I asked the migrant returnees for what the saying is all about. It is about the migrants who engage in drug dealings in order to get huge money by putting their life at risk. These migrants can earn huge money but if they got caught dealing drugs, they would, automatically, be extorted and shot to death. So, destination experience of these migrants can be characterized by fears of being detected, caught, and tortured and even losing their lives. But the impact goes beyond the migrants to their communities back home. For one thing, if they are lucky enough to make it to come back home, they continue on using and dealing drugs. This contributes to the expansion of drug use and dealing. Second, it affects their health negatively.

The fourth and final category of employment is outside home activities. These include the economic activities in factories, shops, store keeping, and others. Both legal and illegal migrants can participate in these types of activities. It is for those who engage in these employment opportunities that Tirha has more meaning. During Fridays and Saturdays these economic activities are closed and the workers have chances of coming together and see each other. These migrants feel less stressed. But engagement in these activities is affected by one’s social, cultural and human capital.

### 4.3. CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION

This section discusses the consequences of illegal migration. It mainly focuses on the socio-cultural impacts of the problem. An attempt was made to grasp the effect at individual, household and community levels. Before going directly to make discussions at each of the levels it was important to give highlight on the major effects that were given due focus in the thesis. At individual level, the impacts include social exclusion, mental disorder, HIV/AIDS, social status, family respect and betrayal; at household level, divorce, spouse betrayal, HIV/AIDS; and at community level, HIV/AIDS, abandonment of elderly and children, crime, and loss of family member(s) and the consequent family grief.

#### 4.3.1. Consequences of Illegal Migration at Individual Level

In relation to the individual migrant, illegal migration causes many psychological and socio-cultural problems on individual migrants. In line to this, the current study found out that physical disability, mental disorder and HIV/AIDS are the major negative effects of illegal migration at individual level. To support this, migrants were asked for their opinion on a series of possible consequences to identify the effects of illegal migration. Accordingly, as it could be observed from table 4.21, the highest number of respondents identified mental illness followed by HIV/AIDS and social exclusion with 227 (11.8%), 202 (10.5%) and 143 (7.5%) responses, respectively.

*Table 4.21: frequency distribution of the consequences of illegal migration on individual migrants*

| The Consequences Of Illegal Migration On Individual Migrants | Frequency | Percent |
|--------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| SOCIAL EXCLUSION                                             | 143       | 7.5%    |
| HIV/AIDS                                                     | 202       | 10.5%   |
| MENTAL DISORDER                                              | 227       | 11.8%   |
| AN INCREASE IN SOCIAL STATUS                                 | 196       | 10.2%   |
| SOCIAL RECOGNITION                                           | 198       | 10.3%   |
| FAMILY RESPECT                                               | 196       | 10.2%   |
| OTHER                                                        | 50        | 2.6%    |
| NOT APPLICABLE                                               | 707       | 36.8%   |
| Total                                                        | 1919      | 100.0%  |

*Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April 2017)*

Drawing on the above table, the consequences of illegal migration cannot always be negative. Rather it can also boost individuals' status (196 responses), their recognition in their societies

(198) and accord individuals with great respect from their families (196 responses). However, these positive effects, the social status individuals are rewarded for, the respect from their families and the community members stay no longer than three to four months. After three to four months, their prestige comes to an end and fades away. Moreover, if migrants, unfortunately, returned home failed to earn and send any money to support their families and themselves, their status would be lowered, even their families would not respect them.

In addition to this, migrants were also asked to give point values to these effects in order to understand the magnitude. The points ranged from 0 – 7, indicating I don't know to very high. To this end, a descriptive statistics is produced as follows corresponding to each effect after a summary statistics.

*Table 2.22: summary statistics about the consequences of illegal migration on individual migrants*

|        |         | Statistics       |          |                 |                              |                    |                |
|--------|---------|------------------|----------|-----------------|------------------------------|--------------------|----------------|
|        |         | SOCIAL EXCLUSION | HIV/AIDS | MENTAL DISORDER | AN INCREASE IN SOCIAL STATUS | SOCIAL RECOGNITION | FAMILY RESPECT |
| N      | Valid   | 242              | 242      | 242             | 242                          | 242                | 242            |
|        | Missing | 0                | 0        | 0               | 0                            | 0                  | 0              |
| Median |         | 3.00             | 6.00     | 7.00            | 5.00                         | 5.00               | 5.00           |
| Mode   |         | 0                | 6        | 7               | 5                            | 5                  | 6              |

*Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April 2017)*

In the above summary statistics the mode 7 illustrates that the effect of illegal migration on mental disorder is very high, while 6 shows high effect on HIV/AIDS. Besides, the median scores for HIV/AIDS and mental disorder (that is 6 and 7) also confirm the fact that the magnitude is high and very high, respectively

The descriptive statistics (see annex-7 for the table) demonstrates that there is high magnitude of effect in relation to mental disorder and HIV/AIDS. Out of the total 242 migrants, 182 replied that illegal migration has very high effect on mental disorder. This is followed by HIV/AIDS. 97 of the total respondents argued that the effect of illegal migration on HIV/AIDS is high. In relation to the positive impacts, the impact is not to be overlooked. Actually, 58, 50 and 64 respondents argued that illegal migration has high effect on the individual migrants' status, their recognition in their society and respect from their families, correspondingly. This is also extended by the data from FGDs and In-depth interviews. To this end, a migrant returnee in

Wargba said, “They help their families change their clothes. They help their families built houses. They help their families improve their livelihoods. They deserve to be respected”.

Yet, according to the evidences from the same source (FGDs and In-depth interview), these positive effects are conditional. As it has been discussed previously, the positive effects of illegal migration are subject to the achievements of the migrant, the contribution of the migrant to his family’s livelihood, the perception of the non-migrants that the migrants might be returned home earned a lot of money, and are temporary.

Furthermore, based on key informant interviews, the introduction and transmission of different diseases is also evident as a result of illegal migration. Migrants because of the tortures they might have experienced, giving up in life and frustration they become care less about themselves. Being addict of alcoholic drinks and other drugs push the youth towards unsafe sexual intercourses. Consequently, they become diseased of different STDs. The problem doesn’t stop here. It goes, as it shall be seen later in the next subtopic, beyond the individual migrant to non-migrant family members. This is very true of couples who either one of them have migrated. Their partners bring them back home more problems than solutions to their pre-migration existed problems.

#### ***4.3.2. The Consequences of Illegal Migration at Household Level***

The consequences of illegal migration don’t stop at individual level. The effects go beyond the individual migrants to affect their households. Spouse and family member betrayal, distrust, diseases, and divorce are among the main effects of illegal migration on households. **Spouse betrayal** is manifested in circumstances where either of the couple migrated and sends money to someone else instead of their marriage partner. In this regard, an interview with a key informant shows the picture. He said;

Figure 4.10: A women and her children abandoned and betrayed by her husband as a result of illegal migration

*The betrayal and abandonment is high. There is a woman over there with her children who has been abandoned and betrayed by her husband for years. As you can see she is staying in a house even animal can't stay in. It is poorly built and deteriorated. He went to Saudi long time ago and lives there by remarrying to someone else.*

*A key informant in Wargba, aged 70,  
[11/04/2017]*



Source: Taken by the author

Moreover, it is also evident to see migrants **betrayed** by their **family members** at home. The migrants send money to a family member in order that their family member would deposit the money to them so that they would start up their own business in case they returned home deported. But the families at home spend the money either by thinking they can replace the money or by hoping the migrants would stay longer and send much more money. In the mean time, the migrants might get caught and deported. In this case, the family member whom the migrants used to send money betrays them. Here, let me share you a story of a migrant returnee in Kara who became homeless. She explained the situation as follows:

*In the beginning, I had migrated only to support my family. What I did was the same thing, supporting my family by sending money and help them migrate to Saudi, to where I was. I helped five individuals to go to Saudi. Besides, I was sending money to my mother for her own business. As a result she built a fine, in comparison to the neighborhood, house. I had done all this in my four years of stay in Saudi. At the end, I got caught and deported, inevitably. When I got here the mood was not good. Particularly, my mother's reaction was an, believably, negative. There reason was I didn't have that much money*

*when I got back here, home. Inversely, she (my mother) started to be annoyed at me; she kept on saying, 'these all years for nothing'. But even worse and that made me almost homeless is the betrayal from my brother. I sent him money to build me a house. He did build the house. But it was in his name. When I got here, he was in Saudi (I helped him in his migration), and he told me that I could stay in the house till his return and that as soon as he is back, he would make it in my name. Finally, he came back home deported. When he came, he told me that he built the house for himself and that all the cost was from his own pocket. In fact, he threw me out from the house by telling me that he is going to marry and he needs the house for himself.*

*A migrant returnee in Kara aged 22 [20/04/2017]*

These two stories plainly showed how illegal migration leaves households helpless and abandoned, and how it creates distrust between family members and close relatives and friends. Not only illegal migration causes households to be abandoned it also causes more burden. There are situation in which migrants gave birth and send to their families at home. To this, a 60 years old man in Hawelti said:

*I have a friend of me in Mechare (another TABIA in Raya Azebo Woreda) who sent five of his children to Saudi. We meet once in a while. Then, once I asked him if his children support him via remittance. He laughed at me and said "supportj" "they send me childrenj" and he added that he would be happy if they could support themselves.*

*A key informant in Hawelti, aged in the region of 60 [26/04/2017]*

Regarding to **divorce**, it has been argued that illegal migration is intervening in marriage. People go to Saudi by ending their marriage. Actually, people, particularly women, get married to get divorced in order for they migrate freely. There is a perception that if a woman get married once and divorced she can freely do whatever she wants to because she freed herself from the gossips and rumors (from the pressurizing saying that no one wanted her (ቆግ ቀረች! መባል)) that unmarried woman might experience. Further, pressure from others particularly family members and close friends contributes to the level of divorce. Friends or family members tell to each other that what kind of life are you in? You don't have to live like this. Leave it and come to Saudi, I can make you all the necessary arrangements to make it to Saudi and so forth. Finally, internal

smugglers get into couples. The smugglers create a life of dream to either member of the couple and persuade them to separate or divorce their partner and migrate to realize their life of dream which is exaggeratedly and misguidedly drew to them by a smuggler.

Another way whereby the effect of illegal migration goes into households beyond the individual migrant is through sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). As it has been discussed in the previous section, one of the most severe effects of illegal migration on individuals is HIV/AIDS. When they come back to their partners infected with HIV virus, there is high probability of transmitting the Virus into the non-migrant. This statement was stressed by a key informant in Kara health center. He said:

*As a health worker, whenever you saw a migrant returnee coming for checkups, by default, you would say he is HIV positive because there is slight probability of coming back without infected by HIV Virus from Saudi; and when you saw couple one of them being deportee, you would say there is a likelihood that both of them are HIV positive because there is high probability of unsafe sexual intercourse for he is deportee (ጥሪግ!).*

*A health officer in Kara health center [23/04/2017]*

The effect of illegal migration on betrayal, divorce, and abandonments is extended by migrant survey. Indeed, migrants were asked for the effect of illegal migration on households in relation to these variables, and its magnitude as well.

*Table 4.23: frequency distribution of the consequences of illegal migration at household level*

| Effect Of Illegal Migration On Households     | Frequency | Percent |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| Divorce                                       | 230       | 49.7%   |
| Betrayal (Spouse, Family, Friends, Relatives) | 233       | 50.3%   |
| Total                                         | 463       | 100.0%  |

*Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April 2017)*

Based on table 4.23 above, out of the total 242 survey participants 230 of them (49.7%) replied divorce, while 233 of them (50.3%) ticked betrayal (from spouse, family member, friends or relatives). Despite higher figure of tick the above description couldn't show how high the effect could be on each of the consequences. With this in mind, the respondents were asked to indicate the magnitude based on a range of values (from 0 – 7) that signify from I don't know to very high. Accordingly, the degree has been identified as very high for both divorce and betrayal.

*Table 4.24: a summary statistics about the consequences of illegal migration at household level*

|        |         | <b>Statistics</b> |                            |
|--------|---------|-------------------|----------------------------|
|        |         | DIVORCE           | FAMILY AND SPOUSE BETRAYAL |
| N      | Valid   | 242               | 242                        |
|        | Missing | 0                 | 0                          |
| Median |         | 7.00              | 7.00                       |
| Mode   |         | 7                 | 7                          |

*Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April 2017)*

The above summary statistics gives us a mode and median scores of 7 which indicates very high effect of illegal migration on households in this regard. Going deeper, high divorce rate as a result of illegal migration contributes to remarriage because in their return migrants might have high chance of [re]marriage. Similarly, the betrayal between family members, couples, relatives and friends mean loosening tie and distrust is increasing. In this regard, I recommend further investigation.

#### ***4.3.3. The Consequences of Illegal Migration at Community Level***

This subsection discusses the socio-cultural consequences of illegal migration at community level. Accordingly, drawing on migrant survey, FGDs, Key Informant Interviews and In-depth interviews, this study identified that abandonment of elderly and children, crime, transmission of HIV/AIDS, loss and death of migrants, religious frustration and other cultural odds as the consequences of illegal migration in the communities.

As it has already been explained, illegal migration expands STDs in migrant sending communities. If we are to take the estimations of Kara health center director in Tabia Kara, more than 65 percentage of the resident is living with HIV/AIDS. This is mainly, according to the Director, because of [illegal] emigration to Saudi. The main reason for its expansion in communities is the perception of the people in the Tabias towards migrant returnees, deportees; the perception that deportees have been to Saudi and are returned with much more money.

In relation to abandonment of elderly and children, opposing ideas have been raised by the study participants. At one end, migrants assume that illegal migration causes the elderly and children to become helpless. At the other end, there were migrants who believed that elderly could get support if they send their children abroad that they wouldn't get otherwise. Yet, based on the survey participants, the argument resembled to the belief that elderly and children are being

abandoned as a result of illegal migration. In so doing, the survey participants were asked to approve the effect and give value to see how high the degree of the effect is on abandonment of elderly and children. The results are produced in table 4.25.

*Table 4.25: frequency distribution of the consequences of illegal migration at community level*

| Effect Of Illegal Migration On Community | Frequency | Percent |
|------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| ABANDONMENT (CHILDREN, ELDERLY, ETC)     | 176       | 33.7%   |
| DRUG USE AND SALE                        | 156       | 29.9%   |
| ROBBERY                                  | 190       | 36.4%   |
| Total                                    | 522       | 100.0%  |

*Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April 2017)*

The above table shows that from a total of 242 respondents 176 of them (81.9% of the cases) approved that illegal migration could result in abandonment of children and elderly. But this doesn't show how severe it is, the magnitude of the impact. In order to know the magnitude, a summary statistics has been produced as follows.

*Table 4.26: a summary statistics about the consequences of illegal migration at community level*

| Statistics     |         | ELDERLY AND CHILDREN ABANDONMENT | HANGING AND MURDER | DRUG USE AND SALE |
|----------------|---------|----------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| N              | Valid   | 242                              | 242                | 242               |
|                | Missing | 0                                | 0                  | 0                 |
| Mean           |         | 4.01                             | 4.78               | 3.88              |
| Median         |         | 5.00                             | 6.00               | 5.00              |
| Mode           |         | 0                                | 7                  | 0                 |
| Std. Deviation |         | 2.637                            | 2.585              | 2.941             |

*Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April 2017)*

The median and mean scores of 4.01 and 5, respectively, for abandonment indicate that illegal migration moderately contributes to abandonment. Although it is not high or very high, it is at least beyond fair.

The third consequence of illegal migration identified in the study is crime. This was measured in terms of drug use and sale, and hanging and murder. Despite it is hard to find and compile evidence about crime; an attempt was made based on interview with police officers and survey administration with migrants. To this end, the survey study showed that the survey participants approved that illegal migration contributes to crime and has high contribution to criminal activities with six and five median scores of hanging and murder, and drug use and sale, correspondingly.

Likewise, interviews with police officers supported the fact that illegal migration plays its part in the expansion of crime. According to a police officer in the Woreda temporary custody, illegal migration contributes to crime in two ways. For one thing, migrants use illegal migration as escape strategy. After the youth commit crime they migrate to Saudi in order to escape from imprisonment. The second way is, deportees engage in criminal activities to spend the money they have brought about from Saudi.

This idea is strengthened by an interview with a key informant who argued:

*.....they drink alcoholic drinks; they have become addicted. Hence, we see them spend the money they have brought from Saudi in bars and chat chewing rooms and chatting with fellow friends who did and did not migrate about what they have “enjoyed”<sup>7</sup> during their stay in Saudi till they finish the money. After they finish all the money they have brought with they will get into criminal activities like theft and hanging. They try to hang even elderly who go to church early in the morning.*

*A key informant in Mehoni town aged 72 [26/04/2017]*

Furthermore, academicians, practitioners, media reporters, governments and others have been argued that illegal migration is accountable for loss and death of countless lives. In the same token, the study participants blame illegal migration for it takes many lives from the Tabias. A 75 years old man in Hawelti expressed their sorrow as follows:

*We hear “someone didn’t make it to Saudi, someone’s son died trying to cross to Yemen; someone’s daughter got lost” almost every day. You see mourns here and there in the community. We lost more youth because of illegal migration much more than we lost as a result of Badme (a battle field for Ethio-Eritrean war). We are left with no young people. In places where there is lack of transportation, you can find no youth who can carry a pregnant woman to health center and a deceased to its grave and bury it.*

*A key informant in Hawelti [15/04/2017]*

---

<sup>7</sup> Some migrants see their stay as enjoyment.

Finally, illegal migration also affects culture in terms of religion and dressing styles. For many years the followers of Christianity and Islam used to live side by side peacefully. The relationship used to go to the extent of marriage relationships. It wasn't that much problematic to converse one's religious affiliation or marry someone with different religious affiliation. It was not unusual to see generations of mixed religious affiliations. That was believed to be a good thing. Moreover, they have had the same dressing styles. You can't see extreme dressing styles in Islamic followers like one can observe these days. Now days, what could be observed is totally different and unacceptable. The returnees put on clothes that fully cover their whole body and this is very strange thing.

The other thing is related to religious conversion and re-conversion. According to a key informant in Hawelti,

*The youth, in their migration, they had to converse their religious membership and change their names to names that are common to Islamic followers. With the ordinary people, it has become okay. It is becoming usual for people to change their religion and re-baptize. The in-tolerable thing is what we see in church people – in priests. For one thing, it is strange to see a priest change his religious affiliation and his name. Today, however, it has become common to see priests converse their religion and migrate to Saudi. The other and disappointing thing is that after they have done all these things – converse their religious affiliation, change their names to Mohammad, Mustafi, etc – we observe that they came back and provide the church services they used to provide before their migration. It is frustrating; we are frightened God may cause devastating things to us. It shouldn't have been that way. They can re-baptize, pray and live like their ordinary counter parts.*

*An elderly in his 60s in Hawelti [24/03/2017]*

The old man's argument indicates that illegal migration also causes people to be less religious. Seeing priests (religious leaders) migrate by changing their religious affiliation signifies that religion is decreasing in its sacred feature. The power of religion to guide people's everyday lives is declining as well.

## CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION

*Drawing on literature review, a limited literature has been observed on the socio-cultural aspects of illegal migration in Ethiopia.*

Illegal migration has become the feature of mobility from developing countries into developed countries. Crossing borders illegally and migrant deaths in trying to cross sea has been becoming headlines of media (Mbaye 2013). Scholars in the field have been compiled as to why people leave their original residence for new ones. Some viewed migration as economically driven. Others as socio-culturally and still others as security issue.

### **5.1. Causes Of Illegal Migration**

There has been a tendency to see and explain [illegal] migration by leaving socio-cultural aspects aside. In spite of some indicators that socio-cultural aspects play a role in illegal migration and pinpointing reports that these aspects need to be investigated further, in actual terms, and as far as my review is concerned, they have been given little attention. The current study found that community perception towards illegal migration, youth attitude towards local employment opportunities, pressure from others in one's circle (significant others), social capital (preventing, facilitating, pulling and pushing), cultural proximity, individuals' desire to improve their social status in their communities, and social media as determinant factors behind people's intention to migration as well.

Some scholars argue that individuals are affected by the set of attitudes and predispositions that are hold by a group of people that the individuals are member of. Such predispositions influence what individuals believe, think, and how they behave. In relation to this, George H. Mead argued that an individual's mental state is influenced by his/her social group (Ritzer 2011). The way people respond to a situation is the product of the community attitudes they are affiliated to. This simply means that if there is positive community attitude, there is high likelihood that individuals in the community will have positive attitude towards that situation, and thereby decide and act accordingly. This study indicated that there is high positive community attitude towards illegal migration. Drawing on Mead's argument, this in turn implies that the youth in the study area has positive attitude towards illegal migration. To Mead, individuals need to develop such attitude and act accordingly if they are to have a self. Mead further argued "..... We carry this

organized set of attitudes around with us, and they serve to control our actions, largely through the “me” (Ritzer 2011:369)”

Following that, the positive attitude of the community in the study area about illegal migration directly contributes to the individuals’ intention to migrate, make decisions and act accordingly. As put by Mead, individuals develop the attitude of the community to which they are member of, directed by it and act accordingly (Ritzer 2011). This is supported by Jones and her colleagues’ findings which argue culture of migration as affecting migration decision (2014). Moreover, this study extended the findings produced by a study by the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS). RMMS (2014) reported that an embedded culture of migration put boys and girls in pressure of deciding for migration.

Related to community perception towards illegal migration and assumed to influence migration decision is youth attitude towards local employment opportunities. Despite the area is described as conducive environment with plain landscape and as offering plenty of opportunities for living and livelihood diversification, it is on the other extreme, known for its high flow of illegal migration to Middle East basically to Saudi. One accountable reason for this, as disclosed by this study, is lack of flavor, courage and commitment to engage in domestic employment opportunities among the youth. This is in agreement with other studies findings which reported that in some cases people, particularly the youth migrate by undermining domestic employment opportunities (TCA 2014).

The underestimation of local employment opportunities is manifested in many ways. For one thing, there is **high flow of internal migration** to this area. Had proper documentation and record of migrants existed, it would have been known to what extent the area has become major internal destination for youth from other parts of the Regional State. The high flow of internal migration to this area demonstrates that there is employment opportunity in the study area. Second, **the existence of high proportion of rental irrigable farm lands** also indicates that the locals underestimate the domestic employment activities. In Kara TABIA, for example, 2/3 (about 67%) of the irrigable farm land (GOLGOL<sup>8</sup> as commonly known in the Woreda) is taken by non-actual owners, internal migrants both temporary and permanent. The third manifestation

---

<sup>8</sup> In fact, GOLGOL RAYA is the term developed to refer to the irrigation system being in action in the area.

could be some **exemplary young fellows** who have improved their livelihoods by engaging in irrigation works, khat production and trading, and so forth, some of them being failed as migrants. There are youth who lead successful life without leaving their communities. The fourth is **the perception of potential migrants towards migrant returnees**. Based on the study findings, potential migrants treat migrant returnees with higher recognition than those who work around.

Moreover, this study found that the pressure from family, close friends and relatives puts individuals in pressure so that they decide to migrate. Family members specially parents put their children in pressure by talking about other children's good deeds directly to the children or indirectly still in the children's presence in whatever circumstances where they gather. Moreover, children placed in pressure when their friends from their neighborhoods manage to contribute to their families' livelihoods by going to Middle East. They would think they have to do the same thing to help theirs.

The above argument is supported by the assumption of sociological determinism that the social action of people is treated as an outward flow or expression of forces playing on them rather than as acts which are built up by people through their interpretation of the situations in which they are placed (Ritzer 2011: 383, citing Blumer 1962/1969: 84). Similarly, Milki Getachew (2014) argued that family members and friends play huge role in migration decision. Furthermore, studies conducted by Selemawit (2013), Elias (2013), Jones et al. (2014), RMMS (2014) indicated the importance of pressure particularly family pressure behind migration decision when they argue that boys and girls migrate to relief their parents financial crisis.

To put it briefly, the deliberate or accidental conflict of individuals with their significant others at home plays pushing role. This is built on the fourth hypothesis of social network theory that intra-familial conflict within the community also causes migration (Haug 2008:589, citing Hugo 1981:196).

It is assumed that social capital also affects whether to go or stay in many ways. One way by which social capital influences individuals' migration decision is through persuasion. Family members, friends, relatives convince or persuade their fellow individuals to migrate by making them belief that they would improve their livelihoods if they migrated, and by promising them

they would arrange them all the necessities of migration. Another way is individuals' belief that they would get the support they would need during their migration. Still another way is the experience of individuals themselves to see individuals from their community who have migrated and able to improve their livelihoods. Based on these and others, four roles of social capital can be discussed. These four roles include social capital that prevents illegal migration, social capital that facilitates illegal migration, social capital that pulls illegal migrants, and social capital that pushes individuals to migrate.

Pushing social capital, on the other polar, refers to those ties that put individuals in pressure of migrating. The study findings divulged that in some instances, parents tell their children directly to do what their friends do that is to migrate and send back money. This is coincided with RMMS (2014) report. Social capital not only push people to migrate rather they also facilitates their migration. So, it is individuals' knowledge that they have someone else who would facilitate their journey motivates them for migration. This is what we call facilitation role of social capital (Haug 2008)

As there are pushy social ties at home that force people to migrate there are also social ties at potential destination that attract potential migrants to migrate. These attracting social ties at destinations are social capital pulling illegal migration. There is high likelihood of migration in communities where pioneer migrants exist in high stock. In the study area it is not unusual to find more than one child who has been in and/or to Middle East. What is known as chain migration is common in the area. Everyone in one's circle follows everyone else in that circle. There are numerous manifestations for this. This is in agreement with Mbaye's arguments that the presence of family members, close relatives and best friends at destinations cause illegal migration (2013).

Yet, we should not be one sided to conclude that social capital causes illegal migration. There are also social ties that prevent illegal migration from happening. Contrary to the other roles of social capital, in the prevention role of social capital individuals convince and persuade their fellow individuals to stay and work here instead of leaving their community (Haug 2008).

The fifth cause of illegal migration is related to cultural proximity between sending and receiving societies. Studies indicated that the level of religious and linguistic distance between two

countries affect the flow of migration between the two countries (Adsera 2015). That is the knowledge and information of destinations' language, types of works and customs (e.g. similarity/dissimilarity of religious one's affiliation) influence individuals decision to migrate (Van Meeteren et al. 2009). The probability of migration decision grows with the presence of closeness between origin and that of potential destination in terms of religious affiliation, language fluency, having information about what kind of job [potential] migrants might engage in, and so forth. Being in the same page, the study claimed that migrants' linguistic and religious proximity somehow affected their decision to migrate.

## ***5.2. Journey and Destination Experiences of Illegal Migrants***

Drawing from a thorough interview with migrant returnees, this study revealed numerous challenges Ethiopian migrants who follow the illegal routes face during their journey and destination stay. In revealing the challenges this study is in agreement with previous studies (see e.g. RMMS 2012; RMMS 2014 for journey challenges, Abebaw 2013; Elias 2013; Selemawit 2013; Jones et al. 2014 for destination experiences). But unlike the previous studies, this study examined the intervening variables in journey and destination experiences of Ethiopian illegal migrants. These variables include social capital, cultural proximity, type of employment activities migrants engage in their destination in this case Saudi Arabia, and the illegal route migrants follow as there are challenges involved in each route.

The presence or absence of social capital basically at destination influences migrants' experiences. Furthermore, the level of religious and linguistic distance contributes to the differential destination experiences of Ethiopian migrants in Saudi Arabia. Muslims as opposed to Christians and those who speak Arabic as opposed to those who do not, experience the trip and destination in different ways.

However, this doesn't mean migrants with social capital at destination, proximate religious affiliation and language, and soon enjoy life at their destination, and wouldn't face problems in their journey. This study also showed how important is power difference in migrants' destination experience even if they do have similar religious affiliation and even if they do speak the language of their destination. The argument is that even if Ethiopian migrants try to speak Arabic and affiliate to the same religion to that of the Arabs, they still being treated as slaves, to take the

extreme face of the migrant exploitation, like Selemawit (2013)'s findings. This is also highly linked to what Bourdieu argued that the product of linguistic habitus at work within a linguistic market is influenced by power relations (ed. Ritzer 2005).

### **5.3. CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION**

In relation to the individual, it has been argued that illegal migration causes many psychological and socio-cultural problems on individual migrants. Studies have showed that migrant returnees report that they seek psychiatric treatments for their mental illness as a result of social isolation and abuses of any kind (Girum 2013). Migrants also return with other health and physiological problems such as kidney infection, HIV/AIDS, physical disability, etc. Furthermore, [illegal] migration affects individuals socially. For example, difficulties of readjustment with family and the community (Gashaw 2014; Yemisrach 2015), lowered possibility of marriage and remigration have been mentioned among others in the literature (Abebaw 2013; Yemisrach 2015). This study, however, found out that illegal migration affects marriage possibility positively, deviated a little from Abebaw (2013) and Yemisrach's (2015) findings. This study uncovered that migrant returnees can easily marry whom they want to. In fact, individuals migrate when they don't find any with an intention of getting plenty after their return from Saudi.

In most cases, individuals migrate in order to contribute to their households' livelihoods. Indeed, there has been a tendency to perceive illegal migration as livelihood strategy for households (Elias 2013; Bisrat 2014; Carter & Rohwerder 2016). Going further beyond this economic explanation, some argued that illegal migration also results in abandonment of children, spouse betrayal, and divorce (Gashaw 2014). Following Gashaw's findings, this study revealed that spouse and family member betrayal, distrust, diseases, and divorce are among the main effects of illegal migration at household level.

Studies have attempted to grasp the consequence of illegal migration at community level in terms of economic aspects. They reported loss of productive labour force, dependency on remittance, the contribution of remittance in economic development of communities (see for example, Gebrehiwot and Fikadu 2012; Carter & Rohwerder 2016). Yet the effect of illegal migration is huge and the study of the consequence of illegal migration goes far beyond the mere economic

analysis to encompass other aspects as well. To this end, this study identified that abandonment of elderly and children, crime, transmission of HIV/AIDS, loss and death of migrants, religious frustration and other cultural odds as the consequences of illegal migration in the communities.

In relation to abandonment opposing arguments raised. At one end, migrants assume that illegal migration causes the elderly and children to become helpless, agreeing Gashaw's (2014) findings. At the other end, there were migrants who believed that elderly could get support if they send their children abroad that they wouldn't get otherwise, by deviating from what Gashwa's study has reported. Yet, based on the survey respondents, the argument resembled to the belief that elderly and children are being abandoned as a result of illegal migration with 176 of them (81.9% of the cases) approved that illegal migration could moderately contribute to the problem – the abandonment of children and elderly.

Furthermore, academicians, practitioners, media reporters, governments and others have been argued that illegal migration is accountable for loss and death of countless lives. In the same token, the study participants blame illegal migration for it takes many lives from the TABIAs. Finally, illegal migration also affects culture in terms of religion and dressing styles. In this regard, this study found that illegal migration has negative effects on religion and other cultural elements including dressing style, in agreement with Gashaw (2014)'s findings.

## CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion and Implications

### 6.1. Conclusion

Illegal migration has been argued as multi-dimensional phenomenon involving many aspects. Taking this argument in to consideration, this study examined the socio-cultural aspects. Most often, illegal migration is explained in terms of its economic aspects. The main forces involved in migration decision are considered to be economic forces. Nevertheless, this study found out that there are also other factors contributing to the phenomenon of illegal migration in all its stages: from migratory intentions and actual decision making through movement and destination stay to consequences. Accordingly, the major socio-cultural factors that influence people's migratory intentions and thereby, illegal migration decision include the attitude of an entire community which individuals are member of, the individuals' attitude towards local employment opportunities, pressure from others, the presence or absence of social capital at home and abroad, cultural proximity between sending and receiving countries, individual aspirations, social media, false promises of [internal] smugglers and government's failure to keep its promises.

Individuals develop the attitude of an entire community which they are affiliated to. Following that, there is positive attitude towards illegal migration in the study areas. This positive attitude of the entire community is, in turn, assumed by and influencing youth attitude in the community. Similarly, individuals also migrate based on their assumption that engaging in here couldn't help improve one's livelihood. Another important factor in migration decision is the pressure from others. Families, friends, neighbors, community members tend to put individuals in pressure so that they will decide to migrate. Besides, social capital has crucial role in illegal migration decision. These roles are summarized as: preventing, pushing, facilitating, and pulling. The level of cultural distance particularly in terms of religion and language also influences illegal migration decision for this increases individuals success possibilities in their destination. Finally, the government, in many instances, has failed to keep its promises for migrant deportees in 2014. There back the migrants were promised to get all the necessary assistance they might need to start business at home from the government. Actually, however, the migrants haven't got any except continuous disappointing trainings. This, in turn, leads to frustration and distrust, thereby remigration.

In relation to journey and destination experiences, it is important to see behind the actual experiences. It is argued that there are intervening variables that determine migrants' experiences. These mainly include social capital and cultural proximity. The presence of likelihood of help in times of trip and destination challenges, and individuals' information about illegal routes, (and the risk involved in each route) and destination minimize the harsh experiences of migrants.

As the factors causing illegal migration are not just individual aspirations so are the consequences. The effects of illegal migration are not just at individual level. Illegal migration affects sending households and communities as well in many aspects, socio-culturally, economically, etc...

## **6.2. Study Implications**

- As it has been seen, the literature in socio-cultural aspects of illegal migration is poor, particularly in Ethiopia. Therefore, this study showed that illegal migration cannot be explained just in economic terms and implies further investigation of socio-cultural aspects is important.
- Second, this study came to learn the role of social media in terms of WhatsUp and Facebook in illegal migration. This implies that there are emerging aspects of illegal migration that require further study.
- Third, this study shows that any intervention endeavor to tackle illegal migration should consider the socio-cultural aspects as well because these aspects contribute to the phenomenon as importantly as other aspects of illegal migration including economic ones.
- This thesis has revealed that there is wage differential between legal and illegal migration. Illegal migrants are paid much higher than legal migrants in the destination. Moreover, the exploitations and other bad experiences are faced by legal migrants. Indeed, legal migrants have lower, if any, chance of movement: they hardly switch employers. This seems that illegal migration is encouraged. Therefore, the government should be looking into bilateral and/or multi-lateral negotiations as how its citizens have to be treated in a way that could encourage legal migration.

- It is also learnt that the majority of migrants have lower educational levels. This, in turn, makes the migrants prone to exploitation and suffers. Therefore, there should be a policy with programs and projects that could help give the youth trainings and awareness boosting opportunities.

## References

- Abebaw Minaye. 2013. Experiences of trafficked Ethiopian domestic workers who returned from the Gulf States: Implications for intervention and policy development. Addis Ababa University, School of Social Work.
- Adams, John, Hafiz Khan, Robert Raeside, and David White. 2007. Research Methods for Graduate Business and Social Science Students. California: Sage Publications Inc
- Adsera, A. 2015. Language and Culture as Drivers of Migration, IZA World of Labor, ISSN 2054-9571, Iss, 164. Retrieved from <HTTP://dx.doi.org/10.15185/izawol.164> 20/12/2016
- Babbie, E. 1990. Survey Research Methods; 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., USA: Wadsworth Inc
- Barbara L. 2010. Migration and Migration History, Version: 1.0, in: Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 6. 5. Retrieved from URL: [http://docupedia.de/zg/Migration\\_and\\_Migration\\_History/10/01/2017](http://docupedia.de/zg/Migration_and_Migration_History/10/01/2017)
- Bernard, R. 2006. Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. 4<sup>th</sup> ed. Lanham, AltaMira press.
- Bian, H. 2016. Mixed Methods Research; Office for Faculty Excellence, East Carolina University. <http://core.ecu.edu/ofe/statisticsresearch/mixed%20methods%20new.pdf>: 26/11/2016
- Bijack, Jakub. 2006. Forecasting International Migration: Selected Theories, Models, and Methods. Central European Forum for Migration Research, working paper 4, Warsaw
- Bisrat Weldesselasie. 2014. International Migration and its Effects on Socio-Economic Wellbeing of Migrants Sending Households: Evidence from Irob Woreda, Eastern Zone, Tigray National Regional State. A Thesis Submitted In Partial Fulfillment Of Requirements For Completion Of MADegree In Development Studies, Mekelle University, Ethiopia.
- Brannick, T. and W. Roche. 1997. Business Research Methods, Oak Tree: Dublin.
- Brown, K. David. 2004. Social Blueprints: Conceptual Foundations of Sociology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bulsara, C. 2016. Using a Mixed Methods Approach to Enhance and Validate Your Research, Brightwater Group Research Centre, Notre Dame University. Retrieved from

<https://www.scribd.com/document/251893008/Using-Mixed-Methods-Approach-to-Enhance-and-Validate-Your-Research>: 26/11/2016

- Cameron, R. 2011. Mixed Methods Research: The Five Ps Framework; Australia, Gladstone: Central Queensland University.
- Carter, B. and Brigitte, R. 2016. Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Ethiopia: Rapid Literature Review. GSDRC: Applied knowledge series.
- Chen-lei, M. 2015. Analysis of WeChat Behavior of Chinese University Students; Jiangxi University of Technology, 330098 Nanchang, China; 5th International Conference on Education, Management, Information and Medicine.
- Choucri, N. 1983. Migration in the Middle East: Transformation and Change. Middle East review
- Creswell, J. 2013. Steps in Conducting a Scholarly Mixed Methods Study. DBER Speaker Series Discipline-Based Education Research Group University of Nebraska: Lincoln.
- Creswell, J. 2014. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches; 4<sup>th</sup> ed., Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications Inc.
- Creswell, W. John. 2009. Research Design Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Los Angeles: Sage Publications Inc.
- CSA. 2007. Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 population and housing census of Ethiopia. Retrieved from [https://www.ecastats.uneca.org/aicmd/Portals/0/Cen2007\\_firstdraft.pdf](https://www.ecastats.uneca.org/aicmd/Portals/0/Cen2007_firstdraft.pdf): 26/11/2016
- Dawson, Catherine. 2007. A Practical Guide to Research Methods: A friendly Manual for Mastering Research Techniques and Projects. Spring Hill road, UK: Oxford.
- De Haas, Hein. 2014 Migration Theory: Quo Vadis? International Migration Institute Working Papers, paper 100, UK, Oxford: University of Oxford press.
- De Jong, G.F. and Fawcett, J.T. 1981. 'Motivations for migration: an assessment and a value expectancy research model', in De Jong, G.F. and Gardner, R.W. (eds) Migration Decision Making: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Micro level Studies in Developed and Developing Countries. New York: Pergamon, 13-58.

- De Jong, GF; Fawcett, JT. 1981. Motivations for migration: an assessment and a value-expectancy research model. In: De Jong GF, Gardner RW, ed. Migration decision making: multidisciplinary approaches to microlevel studies in developed and developing countries. New York, Pergamon, 13-58. (Pergamon Policy Studies on International Development)
- De Vaus, David. 2001. Research Design in Social Research., UK, London: Sage Publications.
- Elias Ashene. 2013. Trafficking of Ethiopian Women and Girls to the Middle East. Submitted to Central European University Department of Public Policy in Partial Fulfillment for the Degree of Masters of Art in Public Policy, Hungary: Budapest.
- Elrick, Tim. 2005. Migration Decision Making and Social Networks. EU Marie Curie Excellence Grant Project (Unpublished)
- Emerta Assaminew, Getachew Ahmed, Kassahun Abera and Tewodros Makonnen. 2010. International Migration, Remittances And Poverty Alleviation In Ethiopia Ethiopian Economics Association / Ethiopian Economics Policy Research Institute (EEA/EEPRI) Working Paper No 1, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Ferrie, P. Joseph and Timothy J. Hatton. 2013. Two Centuries of International Migration. IZA Discussion Paper Series No. 7866
- Frehiwot. 2017. Summer Academy II, Training Programme on a Multidisciplinary Discourse on Migration: Ethiopian and African Region Perspectives
- Gashaw Muhammad. 2014. Young Women's Emigration from Borena Woreda (District) to the Arab World and its Impact on Socio-Economic Development of the Area: The Case of Mekane Selam Town. Ethiop. J. Educ. & Sc. Vol. No .2
- Gebrehiwot Weldegebrial and Fikadu Beyene. 2012. Causes and consequences of out-migration on rural households' livelihood in Gulomekeda district, Tigray, Ethiopia. Wudpecker Research Journals, Agricultural Research and Reviews Vol. 1(1), pp. 26 - 33, Retrieved December 5, 2016 [<http://www.wudpeckerresearchjournals.org/ARR>]

- Girum Arayaselassie. 2013. Ethiopian Women Domestic Workers in Middle East: Expectations and Experiences. A Master thesis submitted to the department of Anthropology, Addis Ababa University
- Godri, Iren. 2004. A Special Case of International Migration: Ethnic Hungarians Migrating from Transylvania to Hungary. Yearbook of Population Research in Finland 40, pp. 45-72
- Habte Haile. 2015. Socio-Economic Impacts Of Migration of Ethiopians to the South Africa and Its Implications for Ethio-Rsa Relations: The Case of Kembata-Tembaro and Hadiya Zones. A Thesis Submitted To The School Of Graduate Studies Of The Addis Ababa University In Partial Fulfillment Of The Requirements For The Degree Of Master of Arts In International Relations. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Hailemichael Nigusu. 2014. Causes and Consequences of Human Trafficking: A Case Study in Metema Town. A thesis submitted to the school of graduate studies of Addis Ababa University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Social Anthropology, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
- Haug, S. 2008. Migration Networks and Migration Decision Making; Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 34:4, 585-605.
- Holden T. Mary and Patrick Lynch. 2004. Choosing the Appropriate Methodology: Understanding Research Philosophy. Waterford: Waterford Institute of Technology.
- Horwood, C. 2009. In Pursuit of the Southern Dream: Victims of Necessity: Assessment of the Irregular Movement of Men from East Africa and the Horn to South Africa. International Organization for Migration, Geneva.
- ILO. 2011. Trafficking in Persons Overseas for Labour Purposes: The Case of Ethiopian Domestic Workers. Research Conducted by: Play Therapy Africa Ltd Edited by: Animaw Anteneh, ILO Country Office Addis Ababa.
- IOM. 2014. Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration. International Organization for Migration: Switzerland, Geneva.
- IOM. 2016. 2015 Annual Report. International Organization for Migration Special Liaison Office (IOM SLO) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

- IOM. 2017. Migrant Deaths and Disappearances Worldwide: 2016 Analysis. Global Migration Data Analysis Centre: Data Briefing Series, ISSN 2415-1653, Issue No. 8.
- Jemal Fentaw. 2015. Experiences of Mass Deported Youth Migrants from Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; the Case of Mersa Town, North Wollo. A Thesis Presented as a fulfillment for the Degree of Masters of Social Work at Addis Ababa University, Addis Ababa
- Jennissen, R. 2007. Causality Chains in the International Migration Systems Approach. *Popul Res Policy Rev* 26:411–436 DOI 10.1007/s11113-007-9039-4
- Jones, Nicola, Elizabeth Presler-Marshall, Bekele Tefera, Guday Emirie, Bethelihem Gebre and Kiya Gezahegne. 2014. Rethinking Girls On The Move: The Intersection Of Poverty, Exploitation And Violence Experienced By Ethiopian Adolescents Involved In The Middle East ‘Maid Trade’. A report submitted to Overseas Development Institute and funded by Oak Foundation.
- Klanarong, Nisakorn. 2012. Social Network of Illegal Thai Migrants Working in Food Shops in Malaysia. Thailand: Thaksin University.
- Kuhn, S. Thomas. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, second ed. *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Foundations of the Unity of Science Volume II • Number 2*, USA, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Lacey, A. and D. Luff. 2007. Qualitative Research Analysis. The NIHR RDS for the East Midlands: Yorkshire & the Humber.
- Lallana, C. Emmanuel. 2014. Social Media for Development. Academy of ICT Essentials for Government Leaders: United Nations Asian and Pacific Training Centre for Information and Communication Technology for Development. ISBN: 979-11-952979-2-4(93300)
- Lampe, Cliff, Robert LaRose, Charles Steinfield, Kurt DeMaagd. 2011. Inherent Barriers To The Use Of Social Media For Public Policy Informatics. *The Innovation Journal: The Public Sector Innovation Journal*, Volume 16(1), 2011, article 6.
- Lichtman, R. 1970. George Herbert Mead’s Theory of the Self. A MA thesis submitted to McMaster University, Hamilton Ontario.

- Massey, S. Douglas and Maria Aysa. 2005. Social Capital and International Migration from Latin America. Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in Latin America And The Caribbean; United Nations Population Division: Mexico City.
- Mbaye, M. Linguere. 2013. Barcelona or Die: Understanding Illegal Migration from Senegal. IZA Discussion Paper No. 7728, Germany, Bonn
- Michael Temesgen. 2014. Reintegration Challenges of Returnees: Exploring the Reintegration Challenges of Irregular Migrant Men Returnees from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A Thesis Submitted to the School of SocialWork in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Social Work (MSW), Addis Ababa University School of Social Work.
- Milki Getachew. 2014. The Roles of Family members and Friends in Youth International Migration Decision: the Case of Returned Migrant Youth in Wore-Illu Woreda- South Wollo, a Thesis Submitted to the School of Social Work in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters in Social Work, Addis Ababa University.
- Ministry of Youth, Sports and culture. 2004. Federal democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Youth National Policy. Ethiopia: Addis Ababa.
- O'Reilly, Karen. 2012. International Migration and Social Theory. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Patton, M. 1990. Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, 2nd edition, Sage: Newbury Park.
- Pinedo, M. 2009. Illegal immigration: A Study of Hispanic Ministries in the United States and the Responsibility of Christians to Government. Alabama: Apologetics Press, Inc.
- Poros, Maritsa. 2011. Migrant Social Networks: Vehicles for Migration, Integration, and Development.
- Ritzer, George (ed). 2005. Encyclopedia of Social Theory; Vol. I, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications
- Ritzer, George. 2011. Sociological Theory; eighth ed. New York: McGraw Hill Inc.
- RMMS. 2012. Desperate Choices: Conditions, Risks and Protection Failures Affecting Ethiopian Migrants in Yemen.
- RMMS. 2014. Blinded by Hope: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices of Ethiopian migrants. Series studies No. 6

- Selamawit Bekele. 2013. The Vulnerability of Ethiopian Rural Women and Girls: The Case of Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. A thesis submitted for the requirements for the degree of MASTERS OF Humanities and Social Science In the subject Sociology, Uppsala University.
- TCA. 2014. An Assessment of Youth Irregular Migration in Raya Azebo
- Tennis, T. Joseph. 2008. Epistemology, Theory, and Methodology in Knowledge Organization: Toward a Classification, Metatheory, and Research Framework. In *Knowledge Organization*. 35(2/3): 102-112.
- Tesfaye Zeleke. 2015. Interaction, Institutions, and Impacts of Tourism on the Bishoftu-Modjo-Hawassa Route, Central Ethiopia. A dissertation submitted to the department of Sociology, Addis Ababa University
- UNCATOC. 2004. United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols, United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, New York
- UNDESA. 2005. Designing Household Survey Samples: Practical Guidelines Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistics Division, Studies in Methods, Series F No.98, New York: United Nations Publications.
- United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2015. Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015).
- Van Meeteren, Masja, Godfried Engbersen, and Marion Van San. 2009. Striving for a Better Position: Aspirations and the Role of Cultural, Economic, and Social Capital for Irregular Migrants in Belgium; *International Migration Review*, Rotterdam: Erasmus University.
- Wissink, M. 2009. The Dynamics of Intentionality: Migration Intentions in a Hub for Transit Migration in Turkey. A Master Thesis Submitted to Social and Cultural Sciences, Centre for International Development Issues, the Netherlands: Radboud University Nijmegen.
- Woldamlak Abera. 2014. Psycho-social Conditions of Migrant Returnees from Middle East Countries up on Arrival at Bole International Airport: Implication for Intervention. Thesis Submitted to the School of Psychology, Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the requirement for Master of Arts Degree in Social Psychology, Addis Ababa Ethiopia.

Yemisrach Feraw. 2015. Experience of Eight Deported Women Ethiopians who returned from Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A Thesis Submitted To Addis Ababa University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Masters in Social Work.

Yen, Emmy. 2013. Illegal Migration in China: Social Perspectives on Modern “Snakeheads”. Center for Languages and Literature Chinese Studies: Lund University.

Yeraswork Admassie. 2010. Social Research Methods. Addis Ababa University, the office of vice President for research and Dean of Graduate studies.

Zohry, A. 2011. A Proposed Framework for the Study of Illegal Migration; Working Papers Series, No. 01: Egyptian Society for Migration Studies.

## Annex-1a

ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY  
COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY (MA PROGRAM)  
SURVEY INSTRUMENT (QUESTIONNAIRE)

*General Instruction (to the interviewer): the questionnaire has three parts and thus, you are kindly requested to follow the instructions and ask all the questions provided in each part. Thank you in advance for your assistance.*

**Part One: Identification**

Name of the TABIA: \_\_\_\_\_

Interviewers Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Interview ID: \_\_\_\_\_

Interview date: \_\_\_\_\_

**Part Two: Socio-demographic information**

***Instruction: encircle the number of your answer for each question.***

1. What is your Gender? (Male = 1 Female = 2)
2. What is your Age? -----
3. What is your marital status? (Single = 1, Married = 2, Divorced = 3, Widowhood = 4)
4. What is your education level? .....
5. What is your religious affiliation? (Muslim = 1 Orthodox Christianity = 2 Other = 3)
6. What languages do you speak? (Tigrigna = 1, Amharic = 2, Arabic = 3 Other = 4)
7. What is your Ethnicity? (Tigray = 1, Oromo = 2, Amhara = 3, Other = 4)
8. What are the livelihood activities your household is engaged in? (Farming = 1, petty trading = 2, other = 3)

***Part Three: Socio-cultural Causes of Illegal Migration  
Community's Attitude towards Illegal Migration***

9. Indicate your level of agreement on how illegal migration is perceived in your community.

*Instruction: Put “√” in the cell by the side of each statement corresponding to your level of agreement (whether strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree or strongly disagree) and check only one answer per condition.*

| S.N. | Statement                                                                                     | Strongly Agree (5) | Agree (4) | Neutral (3) | Disagree (2) | Strongly Disagree (1) |
|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------|-------------|--------------|-----------------------|
| 1.   | Migrating to Middle East is considered as “fashion” in this TABIA regardless of its legality. |                    |           |             |              |                       |
| 2.   | Going to Middle East is one of the things most youth in this TABIA want to do.                |                    |           |             |              |                       |
| 3.   | Sending one's child to Middle East increases the family's status in the community.            |                    |           |             |              |                       |

|     |                                                                                                                                  |  |  |  |  |  |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| 4.  | Every family in this TABIA wants to send its child to Middle East.                                                               |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5.  | Returnee migrants can easily marry to someone whom they want to regardless of their achievement.                                 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6.  | Returnee migrants are socially excluded in this TABIA regardless of their achievement.                                           |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7.  | Returnee migrants regard high social recognition in the community irrespective of their channel of migration (legal or illegal). |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8.  | Returnee migrants who migrated illegally are ill-treated in this TABIA regardless of their achievement.                          |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9.  | In this TABIA, migration to Middle East is seen as a good thing.                                                                 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10. | People in this community have positive attitude towards illegal migration.                                                       |  |  |  |  |  |

### ***Attitude towards Local Employment Opportunities***

10. Show your level of agreement on how illegal migration is important in comparison to local opportunities in your community. *Instruction: put “√” in the cell in front of each statement according to your level of agreement (whether strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree or strongly disagree) and check only one answer per condition.*

| S.N. | Statement                                                                                                                                   | Strongly Agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly Disagree |
|------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|-------|---------|----------|-------------------|
| 1.   | Illegal migration enables people to generate more income than local employment opportunities.                                               |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 2.   | Illegal migration helps the youth in improving their livelihood than local employment opportunities do.                                     |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 3.   | It is important to migrate for people to improve their livelihood rather than engaging in local employment opportunities.                   |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 4.   | Returnee migrants have higher social status than those who engage in local employment opportunities.                                        |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 5.   | The families of returnee migrants are given great respect than those families whose children are engaged in local employment opportunities. |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 6.   | Engaging in local employment opportunities when every one of your friends is migrated, you feel annoyed of yourself.                        |                |       |         |          |                   |
| 7.   | Illegal migration increases one's dignity more than local employment opportunities do.                                                      |                |       |         |          |                   |

## Causes of Illegal Migration

### A. To Non-Migrants

11. Do you have a plan to migrate? (Yes = 1, No = 2)

If your answer to question number 11 is 2, skip question number 12 - 31 and go directly to segment three

12. What is your reason that you are planning to migrate?

Instruction: indicate how important each reason is in informing migration decision making by using numbers 0 to 7 and put your value in the box by the side of each phrase. 0 stands for I don't know 1= not important, 2 = very hardly important, 3 = hardly importance, 4 = fairly important, 5 = slightly highly important, 6= highly important and 7 = very highly important. (Tick all that applies).

| Reason                               | Value |
|--------------------------------------|-------|
| I. Family pressure                   |       |
| II. Migrant networks                 |       |
| III. Religious similarity            |       |
| IV. Language                         |       |
| V. The need to improve social status |       |
| VI. Community pressure               |       |
| VII. To gain societal recognition    |       |

VIII. Other, please specify and indicate its importance

---

---

---

13. Do you have any plan to migrate? If so, how do you plan to migrate? (Legally = 1 Illegally = 2)

**If your answer to question number 13 is 1, skip question number 14 - 31 and go directly to segment three**

14. If your answer to question number 11 is 2, why illegally? Encircle all that applies.

- I. Because illegal migration generates more wages than legal migration.
- II. Because all my friends migrated via the same route that I am intending to migrate through.
- III. I don't know about legal migration.
- IV. Because the formalities and bureaucracies in legal migration.
- V. I don't have money to fund legal migration.
- VI. If other, please specify

---

---

---

## B. To Returnee Migrants

15. Why have you migrated? Identify your reason that forced you to migrate.

Instruction: indicate how important each reason was in informing migration decision making by using numbers 0 to 6 and put your value in the box by the side of each phrase. 0 stands I don't know 1= not important, 2 = very hardly important, 3 = hardly importance, 4 = fairly important, 5 = highly important, and 6 = very highly important. (Multiple responses are possible).

| Reason                               | Value |
|--------------------------------------|-------|
| I. Family pressure                   |       |
| II. Migrant networks                 |       |
| III. Religious similarity            |       |
| IV. Language                         |       |
| V. The need to improve social status |       |
| VI. Community pressure               |       |
| VII. To gain societal recognition    |       |

VIII. Other, please specify

---

---

---

16. How did you migrate? (Legally = 1 Illegally = 2)

17. If your answer to question number 12 is 2, why illegally? Give your reason for migrating illegally. Instruction: encircle all that applies.

- I. Because I had information that illegal migration generates more wages than legal migration.
- II. Because all my friends had migrated via the same route that I have migrated through.
- III. I didn't know about legal migration.
- IV. Because of the formalities and bureaucracies in legal migration.
- V. I didn't have money to fund legal migration.
- VI. If other, please specify

---

---

---

If your answer to question number 16 is 1, skip question number 18 - 31 and go directly to segment three

### Sub Segment four: Social Capital

#### A) To Non-Migrants

18. Do you have information about the journey? (Yes = 1, No = 2) .....

19. If yes, where do you get the information from? **Instruction: encircle all that applies).**

I. Friends who have already migrated

II. Relatives who live in Middle East

- |      |                                              |     |                        |
|------|----------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------|
| III. | My family member who has been to Middle East | IV. | I have migrated before |
| VI.  | If other, please specify                     | V.  | Social media           |

---



---



---

20. Do you have information about the destination? (Yes = 1, No = 2)

21. If yes, who is your source of information? **Instruction: encircle all that applies.**

- |     |                                   |      |                                                  |
|-----|-----------------------------------|------|--------------------------------------------------|
| I.  | Friends who already have migrated | III. | A family member who has been to the destinations |
| II. | Relatives who have migrated ever  | IV.  | I have been to various places before             |
| VI. | If other, please specify          | V.   | Social media                                     |

---



---



---

22. Have you decided your destination? (Yes = 1, No = 2)

23. If you do, who is involved in deciding your choice of destination? **Instruction: encircle all that applies).**

- |     |                                          |      |           |
|-----|------------------------------------------|------|-----------|
| I.  | I decided by myself                      | III. | My family |
| II. | My friends help me decide my destination |      |           |
| IV. | If other, please specify                 |      |           |

---



---

24. What is your smuggling fee? (Please tell me the number) \_\_\_\_\_

25. Who is going to cover your smuggling fee? Instruction: encircle all that applies

- |     |                                     |      |                                        |
|-----|-------------------------------------|------|----------------------------------------|
| I.  | My family                           | III. | My best friend who live in Middle East |
| II. | My relative who live in Middle East | IV.  | By myself                              |
| VI. | Other, please specify               | V.   | Equb                                   |

---



---

#### B) To Migrant returnee

26. Have you had information about the journey? (Yes = 1, No = 2)

27. If yes, where did you get the information from? **Instruction: encircle all that applies.**

- |     |                                          |      |                                              |
|-----|------------------------------------------|------|----------------------------------------------|
| I.  | Friends who had already migrated         | III. | My family member who has been to Middle East |
| II. | Relatives who were living in Middle East | IV.  | I have migrated before                       |

V. If other, please specify

---

---

28. Where have you been to?

- I. Saudi Arabia
- II. Yemen
- III. Other, please specify

---

---

---

29. Did you have information about your destination? (Yes = 1, No = 2)

30. If yes, how did you get the information? **Instruction: encircle all that applies.**

- |                                              |                                                   |
|----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| I. Friends who had already migrated          | III. My family member who had been to Middle East |
| II. Relatives who were living in Middle East | IV. I had migrated before                         |
| V. If other, please specify                  |                                                   |

---

---

---

31. Who did involve in your destination decision making? **Instruction: encircle all that applies.**

- |                                       |                                                               |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| I. I decided by myself                | III. My friends who had been to various possible destinations |
| II. My family member who had migrated |                                                               |
| IV. If other, please specify          |                                                               |

---

---

32. What was your smuggling fee?

33. Where did you get the money to cover for your smuggling fee? **Instruction: encircle all that applies.**

- |                                              |                                                  |
|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| I. From My family                            | III. From My best friend who live in Middle East |
| II. From My relative who live in Middle East | IV. By myself                                    |
|                                              | V. From Equib                                    |
| VI. Other, please specify                    |                                                  |

---

---

#### **Part four: Consequences of Illegal Migration**

34. Please indicate how important the impact of illegal migration is on each of the following.

Instruction: use any number from 0 to 6 to indicate how important the impact of illegal migration is and put in the box by the side of each phrase. 0 stands I don't know 1= no effect, 2 = very low effect, 3 = low effect, 4 = fair effect, 5 = high effect, and 6 = very high effect.

| Effect |                                     | Degree |
|--------|-------------------------------------|--------|
| I.     | Divorce                             |        |
| II.    | Spouse betrayal                     |        |
| III.   | Abandonment of children and elderly |        |
| IV.    | Drug use and sale                   |        |
| V.     | Robbery                             |        |
| VI.    | Social exclusion                    |        |
| VII.   | HIV/AIDS                            |        |
| VIII.  | Mental disorder                     |        |
| IX.    | Higher social status                |        |
| X.     | Social recognition                  |        |
| XI.    | Family respect                      |        |

XII. If other, please specify and indicate how high the effect is

---



---



---

□□□□-  
□□□ □□ □□ □□ □□□□□ □□ □□□□□ □□ □□ □□ □□□□ □□ □□□□ □□□ □□ □□ □□  
□□□□□ □□ □□□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□ □□ □□□□ □□□□□ □□ □□□□ □□ □□ □□□□ □□  
□□□□ □□□□ □□ □□ □□□□ □□ □□ □□ □□□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□  
□□□□ □□ □□ □□ □□□□ □□ □□ □□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□ □□□ □□  
□□□□ □□ □□ □□□ □□ □□ □□ □□□ □□ □□ □□ □□ □□□□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□□ □□□□  
□□□□□

0000 00000 00 00 0000 0000 0000 000000 00000 00 00 000 0000 0000 0000 0000  
 0000 000000 0000 000000 00000000 00000 0000 00000 00000

1. □□ □□ □□□□ \_\_\_\_\_
2. □□ □□ □□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□ \_\_\_\_\_
3. □□□□ □□□□ □□ □□□□□□ \_\_\_\_\_
4. □□ □□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□ \_\_\_\_\_

1.  $\square\square\square (\square\square\square\square - 1, \square\square\square\square\square - 2)$
2.  $\square\square\square\square$
3.  $\square\square\square\square\square\square\square (\square\square\square\square\square\square - 1, \square\square\square\square\square\square\square - 2, \square\square\square\square - 3, \square\square\square\square/\square - 4, \square\square\square - 5)$
4.  $\square\square\square\square\square\square\square\square\square (\square\square\square\square\square\square - 1, \square\square\square\square\square\square\square\square\square - 2, \square\square\square\square\square\square\square\square\square\square - 3, \square\square\square\square\square\square\square - 4, \square\square\square\square\square\square\square\square\square - 5)$
5.  $\square\square\square\square\square\square\square (\square\square\square\square\square\square\square - 1, \square\square\square\square\square - 2, \square\square\square\square - 3)$
6.  $\square\square\square\square\square\square\square\square (\square\square\square\square - 1, \square\square\square\square - 2, \square\square\square\square - 3)$
7.  $\square\square\square\square\square (\square\square\square\square\square - 1, \square\square\square\square\square - 2, \square\square\square\square - 3, \square\square\square\square - 4)$
8.  $\square\square\square\square\square (\square\square\square\square\square - 1, \square\square\square\square\square - 2, \square\square\square\square\square\square - 3, \square\square\square\square\square - 4, \square\square\square\square - 5)$

1. □□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□/□□ □□□/□□□□

| □.□. | □□□                                                             | □□□<br>□□□□□□<br>□ | □□□□□□ | □□□<br>□□□□ | □□□□□□□<br>□ | □□□□<br>□□□□□□□<br>□ |
|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|--------|-------------|--------------|----------------------|
| 1    | □□ □□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□<br>□□□□                                |                    |        |             |              |                      |
| 2    | □□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□□ □□ □□□ □□<br>□□□□□ □□□□ □□ □□□□ □□□□          |                    |        |             |              |                      |
| 3    | □□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□□□□<br>□□ □□□ □□□□□□ □□□ □□□<br>□□□□□□□ |                    |        |             |              |                      |
| 4    | □□□ □□□ □□ □□ □□□ □□□ □□ □□□                                    |                    |        |             |              |                      |

|    |                                                                                        |  |  |  |  |  |
|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
|    | □□□□ □□□□□                                                                             |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5  | □□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□□ □□ □□<br>□□□ □□□□□ □□ □□□□□/□ □□<br>□□□□□ □□ □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□<br>□ |  |  |  |  |  |
| 6  | □□ □□□ □□□□□ □□□ □□ □□□<br>□□□□□□ □□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□□<br>□□□□                            |  |  |  |  |  |
| 7  | □□□ □□□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□□□□<br>□□□□□□□ □□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□□                                 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 8  | □□□ □□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□<br>□□□□□□□ □□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□                                       |  |  |  |  |  |
| 9  | □□□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□ □□□□<br>□□□□□□ □□□□                                                 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 | □□□□ □□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□□ □□□<br>□□□□□ □□□□□□                                             |  |  |  |  |  |

□□□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□

2. □□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□□□□□ □□□□□□□□□□/□□ □□□/□□□□

□□□□□ □□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□ "√" □□□□ □□□□□ □□□ □□□□□□□□/□□ □□□□□□□□□□/□□ (□□□□□  
□□□□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□ □□□□□□□□□ □□□□ □□□□□□□□ □□□□ □□□□□□□□ □□□□)

| □.□. | □□□□                                                       | □□□□<br>□□□□□□□ | □□□□□<br>□ | □□□□<br>□□□□ | □□□□□□□<br>□ | □□□□□<br>□□□□□□□<br>□ |
|------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------|------------|--------------|--------------|-----------------------|
| 1    | □□□ □□ □□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□<br>□□□□□ □□□□□□                |                 |            |              |              |                       |
| 2    | □□□□□□ □□ □□□ □□□□□□□ □□□□□<br>□□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□ □□□□□     |                 |            |              |              |                       |
| 3    | □□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□□□ □□<br>□□□ □□□ □□□□□□               |                 |            |              |              |                       |
| 4    | □□ □□□ □□□□□ □□□□□□ □□ □□□□<br>□□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□□          |                 |            |              |              |                       |
| 5    | □□□ □□ □□ □□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□<br>□□□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□□ □□□□ |                 |            |              |              |                       |
| 6    | □□□ □□□□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□<br>□□ □□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□    |                 |            |              |              |                       |
| 7    | □□ □□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□<br>□                         |                 |            |              |              |                       |
| 8    | □□□□□ □□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□<br>□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□          |                 |            |              |              |                       |

□□□ □□□ □□□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□ □□□

□. □□□□□□ □□□□□□

3. □□□□□ □□□ □□□□ □? (□□ = 1□ □□□□□ = 2)

4. □□□□ □□ □□□□□□, □□ □□□ □□□ □□□ □? (□□ = 1□ □□□□□ = 2)

□□□ □□□ 4 □□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□□, □□ □□ □□□ 5 – 26 □□□□ □□ □□□ □□□□□ □□

5. □□□□□ □□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□?

□□□□□ □□□ □□□□□□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□ □□ 0 – 8 □□□□□ □□□□□ 0 □□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□□ 1 =  
□□□□□ 2 = □□□□ □□□ □□□ 3 = □□□□ □□□□ 4 = □□□□ 5 = □□□□□□ 6 = □□□□□ 7 = □□□□ □□□□ 8 =  
□□□□ □□□ □□□□□□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□

|        |          |
|--------|----------|
| □□□□□□ | □□□□ □□□ |
|--------|----------|

|                            |  |
|----------------------------|--|
| □□□ □□□□                   |  |
| I. □□□ □□ □□□ □□□          |  |
| II. □□□□□ □□□□□            |  |
| III. □□□□□ □□□             |  |
| IV. □□□□ □□□ □□□□          |  |
| V. □□□ □□□□□□              |  |
| VI. □□ □□□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□ |  |
| VII. □□□ □□□□□□ □□□/□      |  |

1. □□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□□□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□? (□□□□ = 1□ □□□□□□ = 2)

□□□□ □□□ 6 □□□□□ 1 □□□□□□ □□ □□ □□□ 7-26 □□□□ □□ □□□□ □□□□□ □□□□

2. □□□ □□□ 6 □□□□□ 2 □□□□□□, □□□□□?

□□□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□

- I. □□□□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□□□  
 II. □□□ □□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□ □□□□□□  
 III. □□□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□□□□  
 IV. □□□ □□□□ □□□□□□  
 V. □□□ □□□□ □□□ □□ □□□□□□□  
 VI. □□□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□□  
 VII. □□□□□ □□□ □□□ □□ □□□□□□ □□□ □□□□□□  
 VIII. □□□ □□□□□□ □□□/□

□.□□ □□□ □□□□□□

3. □□□□□ □□ □□ □□□ □□□□?

□□□□□ □□□ □□□□□□□ □□□ □□□□□ □□□ □□ 0-6 □□□□□ □□□□□ 0 □□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□□ 1 = □□□□ □□□□□ 2 = □□□□ □□□ □□□ 3 = □□□□ □□□□ 4 = □□□□ 5 = □□□□□□ 6 = □□□□ 7 = □□□□ □□□□ 8 = □□□□ □□□□ □□□□□□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□

| □□□□□                       | □□□□ □□□ |
|-----------------------------|----------|
| I. □□□□ □□□□□               |          |
| II. □□□ □□ □□□ □□□          |          |
| III. □□□□□ □□□□□            |          |
| IV. □□□□□ □□□               |          |
| V. □□□□ □□□ □□□□            |          |
| VI. □□□ □□□□□□              |          |
| VII. □□ □□□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□ |          |

VIII.□□□ □□□□□□□/□ □□□/□

4. □□□□ □□□□□? (□□□□ = 1□ □□□□□□ = 2)

5. □□□ □□□ 9 □□□□□ 2 □□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□□?

□□□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□

- I.    □□□□ □□ □□□ □□ □□□□□
- II.   □□ □□□□ □□□□□ □□□ □□□□□
- III.   □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□□□
- IV.   □□ □□□ □□□□□□
- V.    □□ □□□ □□ □ □□□□□□
- VI.   □□□ □□ □□□ □□ □□ □□□□□
- VII. □□□□ □□ □□ □ □□□□□ □□ □□□□□

□□□ □□□□□ □□□/□

□□□ □□□ 9 □□□□ 1 □□□□□□ □□ □□ □□□ 11- 26 □□□□ □□ □□□ □□□□□ □□□□□

□□ □□□ □□

□. □□□□□ □□□□□

6.   □□□□ □□ □□□ □□□□/□ □? (□□ = 1, □□□□□ = 2)

7.   □□□□ 1 □□□□□□□ □□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□□□/□□?

□□□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□

- I.    □□□ □□□□ □□□□□□
- II.   □□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□□□
- III.   □□□ □□□□□
- IV.   □□□□□ □□□□□ □□ "facebook□WahtsUp□" □□□□□□
- V.    □□□ □□□□□□ □□□/□

8.   □□□□□□ □□ □□□ □□□□/□ □? (□□ = 1, □□□□□ = 2)

9.   □□□□ 1 □□□□□□□ □□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□□□/□□?

□□□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□

- I.    □□□ □□□□ □□□□□□
- II.   □□ □□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□□□
- III.   □□□ □□□□□
- IV.   □□□□□ □□□□□ □□ "facebook□WahtsUp□" □□□□□□

□□□ □□□□□ □□□/□

10. □□□□/□□ □□□ □□□□□/□ □? (□□ = 1□ □□□□□ = 2)

11. □□□ □□□ 15 □□□□ 1 □□□□□□ □□ □□ □□□□/□ □□□□□/□□?

□□□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□

- I.    □□□□ □□□□
- II.   □□ □□□□ □□□□
- III.  □□ □□□□
- IV.  □□ □□□/□ □□□□
- V.   □□□□ □□□

12. □□□□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□ □□? -----

13. □□ □□□□ □ □□□ □□□□□□ □□ □□□□?

□□□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□

- I.    □□ □□□□□□
- II.   □□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□□
- III.  □□□□□
- IV.  □□ □□□ □/□□□□□ □□□□□
- V.   □□□ □□□□
- VI.  □□□ □□□□□□ □□□

□□ □□□ □□□□□□

14. □□□□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□/□ □? (□□ = 1, □□□□□ = 2)

15. □□□□ 1 □□□□□□□ □□ □□□□ □□ □□□□ □□□□□/□□?

□□□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□

- I.    □□□ □□□□ □□□□□□
- II.   □□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□□
- III.  □□□ □□□□□
- IV.  □□□□□ □□□□□ □□ "facebook□WahtsUp□" □□□□□□

□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□/□

-

16. □□□ □□ □□□□□/□? (□□□□ □□□□ = 1 □□□□ = 2 □□□□ = 3)

17. □□□ □□□□□/□ □□□□□□□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□/□ □? (□□ = 1, □□□□□ = 2)

18. □□□□ 1 □□□□□□□ □□ □□□□ □□ □□□□ □□□□□/□□?

□□□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□

- I.    □□□ □□□□ □□□□□□
- II.   □□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□□
- III.  □□□ □□□□□
- IV.  □□□□□ □□□□□ □□ "facebook□WahtsUp□" □□□□□□
- V.   □□□ □□□□□□ □□□□/□

19. □□□ □□□□ □□□□□ □□ □□ □□ □□□□/□ □□□□□□/□□?

□□□□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□ □□□□□□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□

- I.    □□□□ □□□□□
- II.   □□ □□□□ □□□□
- III.  □□ □□□□□
- IV.  □□ □□□□/□ □□□□

V.      □□□□ □□□

\_\_\_\_\_

20. □□□□□□ □□□□ □□ □□□□/□? -----

21. □□ □□□□ □ □□□□ □□□□□/□□?

□□□□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□□□□□ □□□ □□ □□□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□

- I.      □□□□□ □□□□□
- II.     □□ □□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□□□
- III.    □□□□□
- IV.    □□ □□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□□□
- V.     □□□ □□□□□
- VI.    □□□ □□□□□□ □□□

\_\_\_\_\_

□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□ □□□□□ □□□

22. □□□□□ □□ □□□□ □□□ □ □□□? (□□ = 1□ □□□□□ = 2

23. □□□ □□□ 27 □□□□ 1 □□□□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□?

□□□□□ □□ □□□ □□ □□□□ □□ □□□□ □□□ □□ "√/" □□□□ □□□□/□□□ □□ □□ □□□□□ □□ □□ 0-8 □□□□□□  
□□□□ □□□□□ □□□ □□□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□ □□□/□□□□□ 0 □□□□□□ □□□ □□□□□□□ 1 = □□□□□ 2 = □□□ □□□□□  
□□□□ 3 = □□□□ □□□□ 4 = □□□□ 5 = □□□□□□ 6 = □□□□ 7 = □□□□ □□□□ 8 = □□□ □□□□ □□□ □□□□□□

| □□□□□ |                                | □□□□ |
|-------|--------------------------------|------|
| I.    | □□□□                           |      |
| II.   | □□ □□□ □□□□□ □□□□□ □□□□ □□□□□□ |      |
| III.  | □□□□□ □□□□ □□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□    |      |
| IV.   | □□□ □□□□□ □□□□                 |      |
| V.    | □□□□                           |      |
| VI.   | □□ □□□□□□□ □□ □□□□ □□□         |      |
| VII.  | □□ □□ □□/□□□□                  |      |
| VIII. | □□□□ □□□□                      |      |
| IX.   | □□□□ □□□                       |      |
| X.    | □□ □□□□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□         |      |
| XI.   | □□□ □□□□□                      |      |

□□□□□□ □□□□□□ □□□□/□ □□□ □□□□ □□□□/□

\_\_\_\_\_

## ***Interview Guide for In-depth Interview***

### ***Segment One: Identification***

Name of the TABIA: \_\_\_\_\_

Interviewers Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Interview ID: \_\_\_\_\_

Interview date: \_\_\_\_\_

### ***Segment two: Interview Guide***

The in-depth interview guide for youth returnees has five main parts and different items under each part. The main parts of this interview guide are; background information, reason for migration, social capital and migration decision, journey experiences, destination experiences and consequences. The interview guide is open-ended which gives a space for participants to freely express their opinion.

#### **Reason for migration**

1. Tell me in what situations you were living before you migrated to KSA? (Probe: your schooling, with whom were you living? your father and mother working and living status, your occupation, your age, your marital status, your knowledge of illegal migration?).
2. Tell me why you decide to migrate? (Probe: what created your intentions to migrate, what problems did you face? Tell me the role of friends, parents, relatives and others in your illegal migration decision making).
3. Where did you get information about illegal migration? (Probe: your families and friends' knowledge and experience of migration).
4. How did you decide to migrate? (Probe: who motivates you or does anybody decide on your behalf? Was the decision based on your will or were you forced by somebody else?).

#### ***Journey Experiences***

- Tell me about the journey. About the fund, who sponsored you? How did you enter Middle East? How long did you spend on the trip? How was the trip? How much was your smuggling fee? How did you cover the smuggling fee? Did you have information about the way to Middle East? How did you get the information? Who helped you in your journey?
- Why did you leave Raya Azebo? And why you choose the Middle East as your receiving country?

#### ***Destination Experiences***

**A) On Arrival**

- Tell me about your first arrival in Middle East. Did you find things as you expected?
- Were you worried about being arrested by the Middle East authorities? Were you arrested in Middle East? What was happened to you? When you were in prison, did you worry that you might be imprisoned for a long time or deported? How could you finally get released? How many times did you really experience such threats?
- How did you find information about employers?
- Who supported you in your search of work?

**B) Work Conditions**

- What was your occupation in Saudi?
- Did you like it?
- Tell me about the working condition (working hours, the wages, danger, etc...).

**C) Off Work Conditions**

- Did you have any extra time after work? What did you do after work? Did you have a day off each week, if you had, did you have any entertainments?
- How was the dorm that you were living in?
- How was your relationship with your employer?
- If something happened to you, who could help you?
- If you can use a word to describe the life in Middle East, what will you choose?

## **Interview Guide to Key Informants**

### ***Segment One: Identification***

Name of the TABIA: \_\_\_\_\_

Interviewers Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Interview ID: \_\_\_\_\_

Interview date: \_\_\_\_\_

### ***Segment two: Interview Guide***

- What is your position in this institution?
- How do you explain illegal migration of youth from Raya Azebo Woreda to Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries? What do you think of the causes of illegal migration in this TABIA? Who is migrating? Tell me based on age, gender, educational level, etc.....
- How do you explain the situation of youth repatriated from KSA to Raya Azebo Woreda?
- What do you think are the factors which influence youth“ migration decision?
- How do you describe the roles of family members, friends and the community in general in illegal migration of youth?
- Tell me about the social and health impacts of illegal migration in this TABIA. Its impact on families and community.
- Is there anything that you would like to add?
- What do you think of the health impacts of illegal migration? How many returnee migrants come to your center to seek health services?
- Do you think illegal migration has impact on crime rate in this TABIA? If so, how?
- Do you think illegal migration has any impact on religion? If any, how? Tell me about religious conversion and reconversion.

*Annex-4*

### ***Focus Group Discussion Checklist***

#### ***Segment One: Identification***

Name of the TABIA: \_\_\_\_\_

Interviewers Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Interview ID: \_\_\_\_\_

Interview date: \_\_\_\_\_

***Segment two: FGDs Checklist***

- How do you evaluate illegal migration? Discuss its importance in comparison to local employment opportunities.
- How do you see the community's treatment to returnee migrants in comparison to those who engage in local employment opportunities?
- Why do youth migrate? Discuss on the various causes of illegal migration. How do you evaluate the importance of family pressure, societal perception towards illegal migration, religion, and etc on migration decision making?
- Discuss the consequences of illegal migration in your TABIA in relation to health, crime, family deformation, abandonments of children and elderly, etc.

## DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY (MA PROGRAM)

### Informed Consent

**Dear Interviewee:**

**Please read each of the following elements of informed consent. If you agree to participate in this research after reading each of the elements and having them presented to you orally, please indicate so by signing on the line below.**

- I have been informed that my participation in this research is voluntary. I have been informed that voluntary participation includes the right to refuse to consent to participate in the interview, the right to refuse to answer particular questions, and the right to terminate my participation at any time without consequences of any kind. I have been informed that I will not need to provide an explanation for my refusal. I have been informed that participation in this research constitutes granting an interview, which may last about one and a half hours.
- I have been informed that my participation should not cost me any expense, nor will I be compensated in any ways for my participation.
- I have been informed that this research is being conducted to more fully understand the reasons for illegal migration and my experiences during the smuggling trip and after arriving in the Middle East.
- I have been informed that the results of this research will be used as data for a thesis.
- I have been informed that my participation will be strictly confidential. No identifying information, such as names, addresses or phone numbers, will be included in the field notes and the thesis; and a list with my identification will be separate from field notes and consent agreements and stored with specific cautions.
- Additionally, I will be asked to provide information about criminal behaviors, such as the method I used to smuggle into the Middle East. I have been informed that the potential risks are reduced because this study is completely anonymous and confidential.
- I have been informed that tape-recording will be used in this study. If I agree with the use of tape-recording, my interview will be transcribed as soon as possible and the tape will be destroyed two days after transcription is completed; if I disagree, the interviewer only take notes during the I have read each of the elements of informed consent. My signature below indicates that I agree to participate by giving an interview.

---

Signature

Date

*Anex-6: gender, place of birth and causes of migration cross tabulation*

| \$MIGRATION*GENDER*PLACEOFBIRTH Cross tabulation |        |    |
|--------------------------------------------------|--------|----|
| PLACE OF BIRTH                                   | GENDER | To |

|                                                  |                |                                  |            | Male  | Female |        |
|--------------------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|------------|-------|--------|--------|
| RURAL                                            | WHY Migration? | FAMILY PRESSURE                  | Count      | 51    | 63     | 114    |
|                                                  |                |                                  | % of Total | 34.5% | 42.6%  | 77.0%  |
|                                                  |                | PEER PRESURE                     | Count      | 58    | 63     | 121    |
|                                                  |                |                                  | % of Total | 39.2% | 42.6%  | 81.8%  |
|                                                  |                | RELIGIOUS SIMILARITY             | Count      | 10    | 9      | 19     |
|                                                  |                |                                  | % of Total | 6.8%  | 6.1%   | 12.8%  |
|                                                  |                | LANGUAGE SIMILARITY              | Count      | 5     | 6      | 11     |
|                                                  |                |                                  | % of Total | 3.4%  | 4.1%   | 7.4%   |
|                                                  |                | THE NEED TO IMPROVE ONE'S STATUS | Count      | 47    | 49     | 96     |
|                                                  |                |                                  | % of Total | 31.8% | 33.1%  | 64.9%  |
|                                                  |                | COMMUNITY PRESSURE               | Count      | 53    | 62     | 115    |
|                                                  |                |                                  | % of Total | 35.8% | 41.9%  | 77.7%  |
|                                                  |                | TO REGARD SOCIETAL RECOGNITION   | Count      | 49    | 50     | 99     |
|                                                  | % of Total     |                                  | 33.1%      | 33.8% | 66.9%  |        |
| OTHER                                            | Count          | 11                               | 13         | 24    |        |        |
|                                                  | % of Total     | 7.4%                             | 8.8%       | 16.2% |        |        |
|                                                  | Total          |                                  | Count      | 71    | 77     | 148    |
|                                                  |                |                                  | % of Total | 48.0% | 52.0%  | 100.0% |
| URBAN                                            | WHY Migration  | FAMILY PRESSURE                  | Count      | 18    | 16     | 34     |
|                                                  |                |                                  | % of Total | 36.7% | 32.7%  | 69.4%  |
|                                                  |                | PEER PRESURE                     | Count      | 22    | 22     | 44     |
|                                                  |                |                                  | % of Total | 44.9% | 44.9%  | 89.8%  |
|                                                  |                | RELIGIOUS SIMILARITY             | Count      | 5     | 7      | 12     |
|                                                  |                |                                  | % of Total | 10.2% | 14.3%  | 24.5%  |
|                                                  |                | LANGUAGE SIMILARITY              | Count      | 3     | 3      | 6      |
|                                                  |                |                                  | % of Total | 6.1%  | 6.1%   | 12.2%  |
|                                                  |                | THE NEED TO IMPROVE ONE'S STATUS | Count      | 17    | 17     | 34     |
|                                                  |                |                                  | % of Total | 34.7% | 34.7%  | 69.4%  |
|                                                  |                | COMMUNITY PRESSURE               | Count      | 21    | 17     | 38     |
|                                                  |                |                                  | % of Total | 42.9% | 34.7%  | 77.6%  |
|                                                  |                | TO REGARD SOCIETAL RECOGNITION   | Count      | 18    | 18     | 36     |
|                                                  | % of Total     |                                  | 36.7%      | 36.7% | 73.5%  |        |
| OTHER                                            | Count          | 8                                | 5          | 13    |        |        |
|                                                  | % of Total     | 16.3%                            | 10.2%      | 26.5% |        |        |
|                                                  | Total          |                                  | Count      | 24    | 25     | 49     |
|                                                  |                |                                  | % of Total | 49.0% | 51.0%  | 100.0% |
| Percentages and totals are based on respondents. |                |                                  |            |       |        |        |
| a. Group                                         |                |                                  |            |       |        |        |

Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April, 2017)

Annex-7: frequency distribution showing the magnitude of the consequences of illegal migration at individual level

| SOCIAL EXCLUSION |              |           |         |               |                  |
|------------------|--------------|-----------|---------|---------------|------------------|
|                  |              | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Perce |
| Valid            | I Don't Know | 70        | 28.9    | 28.9          |                  |

|                                     |                      |           |         |               |                    |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|--------------------|
|                                     | Very Low Effect      | 29        | 12.0    | 12.0          | 40.9               |
|                                     | Slightly Low Effect  | 19        | 7.9     | 7.9           | 48.8               |
|                                     | Low                  | 31        | 12.8    | 12.8          | 61.6               |
|                                     | Moderate             | 25        | 10.3    | 10.3          | 71.9               |
|                                     | Slightly High Effect | 8         | 3.3     | 3.3           | 75.2               |
|                                     | High Effect          | 35        | 14.5    | 14.5          | 89.7               |
|                                     | Very High Effect     | 25        | 10.3    | 10.3          | 100.0              |
|                                     | Total                | 242       | 100.0   | 100.0         |                    |
| <b>HIV/AIDS</b>                     |                      |           |         |               |                    |
|                                     |                      | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid                               | I Don't Know         | 35        | 14.5    | 14.5          | 14.5               |
|                                     | Very Low Effect      | 5         | 2.1     | 2.1           | 16.5               |
|                                     | Moderate             | 1         | .4      | .4            | 16.9               |
|                                     | Slightly High Effect | 33        | 13.6    | 13.6          | 30.6               |
|                                     | High Effect          | 97        | 40.1    | 40.1          | 70.7               |
|                                     | Very High Effect     | 71        | 29.3    | 29.3          | 100.0              |
|                                     | Total                | 242       | 100.0   | 100.0         |                    |
| <b>MENTAL DISORDER</b>              |                      |           |         |               |                    |
|                                     |                      | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid                               | I Don't Know         | 14        | 5.8     | 5.8           | 5.8                |
|                                     | Very Low Effect      | 1         | .4      | .4            | 6.2                |
|                                     | Low                  | 1         | .4      | .4            | 6.6                |
|                                     | Moderate             | 6         | 2.5     | 2.5           | 9.1                |
|                                     | Slightly High Effect | 6         | 2.5     | 2.5           | 11.6               |
|                                     | High Effect          | 31        | 12.8    | 12.8          | 24.4               |
|                                     | Very High Effect     | 182       | 75.2    | 75.2          | 99.6               |
|                                     | Not Applicable       | 1         | .4      | .4            | 100.0              |
|                                     | Total                | 242       | 100.0   | 100.0         |                    |
| <b>AN INCREASE IN SOCIAL STATUS</b> |                      |           |         |               |                    |
|                                     |                      | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid                               | I Don't Know         | 41        | 16.9    | 16.9          | 16.9               |
|                                     | Very Low Effect      | 5         | 2.1     | 2.1           | 19.0               |
|                                     | Slightly Low Effect  | 5         | 2.1     | 2.1           | 21.1               |
|                                     | Low                  | 8         | 3.3     | 3.3           | 24.4               |
|                                     | Moderate             | 49        | 20.2    | 20.2          | 44.6               |
|                                     | Slightly High Effect | 60        | 24.8    | 24.8          | 69.4               |
|                                     | High Effect          | 58        | 24.0    | 24.0          | 93.4               |
|                                     | Very High Effect     | 16        | 6.6     | 6.6           | 100.0              |
|                                     | Total                | 242       | 100.0   | 100.0         |                    |
| <b>SOCIAL RECOGNITION</b>           |                      |           |         |               |                    |
|                                     |                      | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid                               | I Don't Know         | 40        | 16.5    | 16.5          | 16.5               |
|                                     | Very Low Effect      | 4         | 1.7     | 1.7           | 18.2               |
|                                     | Slightly Low Effect  | 4         | 1.7     | 1.7           | 19.8               |
|                                     | Low                  | 11        | 4.5     | 4.5           | 24.4               |
|                                     | Moderate             | 35        | 14.5    | 14.5          | 38.8               |
|                                     | Slightly High Effect | 75        | 31.0    | 31.0          | 69.8               |
|                                     | High Effect          | 50        | 20.7    | 20.7          | 90.5               |
|                                     | Very High Effect     | 23        | 9.5     | 9.5           | 100.0              |
|                                     | Total                | 242       | 100.0   | 100.0         |                    |
| <b>FAMILY RESPECT</b>               |                      |           |         |               |                    |
|                                     |                      | Frequency | Percent | Valid Percent | Cumulative Percent |
| Valid                               | I Don't Know         | 43        | 17.8    | 17.8          | 17.8               |
|                                     | Very Low Effect      | 3         | 1.2     | 1.2           | 19.0               |
|                                     | Slightly Low Effect  | 4         | 1.7     | 1.7           | 20.7               |
|                                     | Low                  | 4         | 1.7     | 1.7           | 22.3               |
|                                     | Moderate             | 21        | 8.7     | 8.7           | 31.0               |
|                                     | Slightly High Effect | 51        | 21.1    | 21.1          | 52.1               |
|                                     | High Effect          | 64        | 26.4    | 26.4          | 78.5               |
|                                     | Very High Effect     | 52        | 21.5    | 21.5          | 100.0              |
|                                     | Total                | 242       | 100.0   | 100.0         |                    |

**Source: Migrant survey (Feb-April 2017)**