

Addis Ababa University

School of Graduate Studies

Institute for Peace and Security Studies

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AS STRATEGIC INTERVENTION IN THE STATE-BUILDING TRAJECTORIES OF ETHIOPIA SINCE 1991

By

Siraw Demas Dinku

July 03, 2023

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia



Addis Ababa University

School of Graduate Studies

Institute for Peace and Security Studies

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AS STRATEGIC INTERVENTION IN THE STATE-BUILDING TRAJECTORIES OF ETHIOPIA SINCE 1991

By

Siraw Demas Dinku

A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Addis Ababa University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Peace and Security Studies

Supervisor

Dr. Yohannes Tekalign

July 03, 2023

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Addis Ababa University

School of Graduate Studies

Institute for Peace and Security Studies

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AS STRATEGIC INTERVENTION IN THE STATE-BUILDING TRAJECTORIES OF ETHIOPIA SINCE 1991

By

Siraw Demas Dinku

Approved by Board of Examiners

Full Name	Signature	Date
Director of IPSS		
Dr. Fana Gebresenbet	_____	July 03, 2023
Thesis Advisor		
Dr. Yohannes Tekalign	_____	July 03, 2023
Internal Examiner		
Yonas Tariku (PhD Candidate)	_____	July 03, 2023
External Examiner		
Dr. Mohammed Seid	_____	July 03, 2023

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis titled "Security Sector Reform as Strategic Intervention in the State-Building Trajectories of Ethiopia Since 1991" is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University, and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Student's Name	**Signature**	**Date**
Siraw Demas	_____	July 03, 2023

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate.

Advisor's Name	**Signature**	**Date**
Yohannes Tekalign (Dr.)	_____	July 03, 2023

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis would not have seen the final light in the absence of a number of generous persons and institutions. Although it is difficult to name all, there are some persons and institutions that should not be escaped. The first of these was my thesis advisor, Dr. Yohannes Tekalign, who constructively provided relevant feedback and suggestions to enrich the theoretical, empirical and methodological bases of the thesis. Dr., I really appreciate the welcoming gesture and the sort of friendship you have shown me throughout my thesis work.

My sincere gratitude also goes to Dr, Andargachew Tilahun who ceaselessly encouraged me to work on this issue. His contribution in generously giving constructive comments and suggestions from the preparation of the proposal all the way through its final completion deserves great appreciation. I am also thankful to all resource persons and security sector institutions for devoting their time and energy to provide relevant data, including some previously classified documents that are not yet made available to the public.

Finally, it makes me unfair if I failed to appreciate the wonderful time I had with my brilliant young classmates and excellent professors at IPSS. The composition of the batch and the competency and personal integrity of the course instructors, program coordinators and admin staff was really fantastic. Generally, my stay as a graduate student at IPSS was enormously rewarding.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval sheet ……...…….…… i

Declaration ……...……...…….. ii

Acknowledgments ……..……...……...…….. iii

Table of contents ……...……..……..…….…… iv

List of tables ……...……...……..…… vi

Abbreviation and acronym ……..……...…….…….. vii

Abstract ……...……..…….…… ix

Chapter One: Introduction ……..……..……. 1

1.1. Background of the study ……...…….. 1

1.2. Statement of the problem ……...……. 3

1.3. Objectives of the study …… 6

1.3.1. General objective ……...……. 6

1.3.2. Specific objectives …….……..…… 6

1.4. Basic research questions ……...……..…… 6

1.5. Delimitation of the study ……-……..…….…… 7

1.6. Significance of the study ……. 8

1.7. Limitations of the study ……..……..……..….. 8

1.8. Structure of the thesis ……..……..…..…..……..… 10

Chapter Two: Review of Related Literature …….……...……..... 11

2.1. Introduction …….……..….... 11

2.2. Review of theoretical literature ……...……..….... 11

2.2.1. The conceptualization of security ……..……...…..…….. 12

2.2.2. Competing perspectives on security: The schools of thought ..…… 15

2.2.3. Security sector reform: Evolution and characterization …….…..…….....… 24

2.2.4. The nexus between SSR and state-building ……..…… 31

2.3. Review of empirical literature and research gaps ……..…..……..….. 35

2.3.1. International experiences in SSR ……..……..……...… 35

2.3.2. Research gaps ……..….. 38

2.4. Conceptual and/ or theoretical lens ……..…..…….……..... 40
2.5. Chapter summary ……...……...……... 43

Chapter Three: Research Methodology ……..……...……... 45
3.1. Introduction ……..…….. 45
3.2. Epistemological assumption ……..…..…… 45
3.3. Research approach 48
3.4. Research design and methods ……...…… 49
3.4.1. Data sources ……...……...…… 50
3.4.2. Study population and sampling ……...……..…… 50
3.4.3. Data collection instruments ……...…… 51
3.5. Methods of data analysis ……..……. 53
3.6. Mechanisms of data quality assurance …….……. 54
3.6.1. Issues of validity and credibility ……...…… 54
3.6.2. Ethical considerations ……...…… 54

Chapter Four: Analysis of Findings and Discussions ……...…..….. 56
4.1. Introduction …….…….. 56
4.2. Demographic characteristics of the study population 56
4.3. Analysis and interpretation of findings ……. 57
4.4. A critical analysis of the state of the State in post-199 Ethiopia .....…….. 58
4.5. Constitutional and legal bases for SSR in Ethiopia ……...…….. 64
4.6. DDR and SSR Experiences in Ethiopia (1991 to 2017 ……...…….…… 69
4.6.1. DDR Experiences in Ethiopia …….....…….…… 71
4.6.2. SSR Experiences in Ethiopia (1991 to 2017) ...……..…….…….…… 79
4.6.3. SSR Experiences in Post-2017 ……..…… 93
4.7. Inter-agency and intra-agency cooperation and competition ……..… 100

Chapter Five: Conclusion and Implications …….....…..… 104
5.1. Introduction ……...……..……..... 104
5.2. Conclusion and implications …….....……. 104
5.3. Areas for future research ……....…...……...……..... 107

References ……..…….…….……...…..…… 108
Annexes …….....……..……...…….…..…..… 118
Annex 1. Interview protocol …….……....……. 118
Annex 2. Consent form …….……. 123

List of Tables

Table 4.1. Officer ranks in the armed forces of Ethiopia by ethnic group (1995 to 2017) 85
Table 4.2. Positions held in the armed forces of Ethiopia by ethnic group (1995 to 2017) ,, 86
Table 4.3. Adjusted ranks and positions in the armed forces of Ethiopia (post-2017) …….. 97

.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIAI – Al Ittihad Al Islamiya

ANDM – Amhara National Democratic Movement

AU – African Union

AUC – African Union Commission

COEDF – Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces

CSS – Critical Security Studies

DCAF – Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

DD – Disarmament and demobilization

EBC – Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation

EFANSPS – Ethiopian Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy

EMoD – Ethiopian Ministry of Defense

ENSC – Ethiopian National Security Council

EPRDF – Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front

EPRP – Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party

EU – European Union

FDRE – Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

FPC – Federal Police Commission

HPR – House of Peoples' Representatives

HS – Human security

IIs – In-depth interviews

INSA – Information Network Security Agency

KIIs – Key informant interviews

MEISON – All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement

METEC – Metals and Engineering Corporation

NATO – Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization

NIUC – National Intelligence University College

OECD-DAC – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-Development Assistance Committee

OLF – Oromo Liberation Front

ONLF – Ogaden National Liberation Front

OPDO – Oromo People Democratic Organization

PP – Prosperity Party

R – Reintegration

R_2P – The Responsibility to Protect

RPCs – Regional Police Commissions

RSA – The Republic of South Africa

SPDM – Southern Peoples' Democratic Movement

SSG – Security sector governance

SSI – Security sector institution

SSIs – Security sector institutions

SSR – Security sector reform

SSRs – Security sector reforms

TGE – Transitional Government of Ethiopia

TMH – Tigray Media House

TPLF – Tigray People's Liberation Front

UK – United Kingdom

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Russia

WB – World Bank

WWI – World War First

WWII – World War Second

ABSTRACT

Security sector reform is taken as an essential intervention in a transition from violent conflict to peace or from authoritarian regime to democratic system. Although Ethiopia has experienced some comprehensive SSR interventions since 1991, democratic governance and/ or human security have still remained nightmares for its citizens. The objective of this thesis was, therefore, to critically examine the SSR experiences in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia and their implications for the security of the state and citizens by using international norms and principles within the human security paradigm as an analytical lens. To this end, a qualitative research approach was used to deeply explore and analyze the success and failure stories of SSR and the impacts it had for state-building. Accordingly, semi-structured in-depth and key informant interviews, document analysis, the analysis of the speeches of some government and security sectors' officials, and non-participant field observations were employed as data collection tools and thematic analysis was used to extract meaning from the data. The findings indicated that state elites had, more or less, devised constitutional, legal, policy, strategic, structural and other normative provisions for security sector governance and displayed them for mere public consumption. But in practice they produced other whitepapers contradictory to these constitutional and legal provisions for the governance of SSIs. Consequently, SSR was manipulated as a cover to win the minds and hearts of those citizens who aspire – and in deed practically paid sacrifices – for democracy, rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms at home and to get blessings in the face of the international development partners. Therefore, in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia SSR was a hype than reality. This has an implication for the efforts to pull the country out from the vicious cycle of violent conflicts and the apparent state weakness that privileged regime security at the cost of the security of the individual, communities and even the state. Unless the ruling elite is ready to sacrifice at least part of its monopoly over power, resource and status for the well-being of the people and the state, repeated engagements in SSR can produce nothing more than consuming time, energy and resources.

Keywords. Human security, regime security, security sector reform, state-building, state weakness

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

Contentious though, Ethiopia has a long history of statehood. Some scholars (Assefa, 2010; Keller, 2010; Tadesse, 1972) treated Ethiopia as one of the oldest independent states in the world. This group of scholars even went on to bring back the state of Ethiopia to the origin of the first human being. On the other hand, some other scholars (Asafa, 2009; Sorenson, 1993; Holcomb & Ibssa, 1990 cited in Levine, 2011, p. 317) considered Ethiopia as a mere late nineteenth century "imperialism invention". For instance, Asafa (2009) contends that Ethiopia was emerged as a colonial empire "with the help of the West during the partition of Africa by European powers…" (p. 5). There is still another interpretation of the history of Ethiopia which positioned itself at the middle of the two polarities. This group of scholars asserted that although Ethiopia has a long history of statehood extending to ancient times, it has got its present shape at the end of the nineteenth century (for instance, Merera 2006; Bahru, 2002).

These different and contentious ethno-nationalist perspectives or interpretations of the nature (and idea) of the state in the context of Ethiopia have been summarized by Merera (2006, p. 120) as *colonization thesis, national oppression thesis* and *nation-building thesis*. These among others pointers evinced the divergent interpretation of history regarding how the Ethiopian state evolved to its present form. In point of fact, we barely find the monopoly of truth in either of these interpretations, but the divergence in interpretation of history in itself is a sign of deficiency of historical legitimacy of the state.

Thus, it can be argued that lack of historical legitimacy of the state has been (continue to be) at the heart (structural cause) of the national conflict in Ethiopia over the past few decades. Since history has always been structural cause, obviously it would have a lingering effect on the legitimacy and continuity of the state. Thus, we need to look at again the narratives in the intent to understand the roots of insecurity. Among others, studies on such structural voids

appear sensible and to remain useful to pin down the mutual influences of security sector reform and trajectories of the Ethiopian state-building since 1991.

Triadic perspectives are meant the political theorems that conceived both to define the national conflict (problem) and narratives of the past that crafted to legitimize the problem. Moreover, each of these perspectives is constructed to propose own-defined resolve to the national problems. Thus, in 1991 since many of the political elite within the 'winners' camp' believed that (of course, explicitly stated in their political program) the problem rests on that Ethiopia was mere conglomeration of nation and nationalities (a kind of holding together), they propose the solution - a new state structure called ethno-linguistic federalism (in essence it is a kind of coming together).

Yet, ironically after three decades of political experimentation under the ethno-linguistic based federalism, Ethiopia now seems to have confronted with recurring political and security problems (the danger of disintegration – internal political insecurity dilemma). It would mean that after three decades, the new state-building project rather seemed to have brought Ethiopia nowhere. Ethiopia is at the verge of taking apart, and this highlights the proposed solution in 1991 is now seemingly part of the problem. We argue that such anomaly in itself deserves comprehensive study. Indeed, it is essential to understand how the state-building trajectories of Ethiopia have been altered, modified or transformed as a result of the state's engagement and disengagement with the internal security challenges.

Furthermore, in the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (EFANSPS), the EPRDF Government stated that "…our national security can be protected in a real sense through development and democracy" (FDRE, 2002, p. 21). The document also affirms a policy shift from an out-in to an in-out orientation in threat analysis (a kind of inward-looking). Poverty has been identified as looming threat, and securitized with the other referent objects (Fana, 2014). The shift in national security policy has to do a lot with the state-building process. Unlike the past, the national security policy has been obsessed with internal security challenges. Yet the overall orientation of the national security policy is statist.

At least in rhetoric and on paper as well, the prioritization of 'development' and 'democracy' as inputs for the security of the state, communities and individuals necessitates, among other things, security sector reform (SSR) grounded on the principles of human security. Therefore, as part of the broader SSR, how security sector institutions understood SSR and how the respective state actors in post-1991 have been strategically engaged with reforming the security sector and what implications it might have on state-building is the main focus of this research analysis.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

African states are characterized as one of the most fragile in the world and the key drivers of state fragility in Africa, according to Ncube and Jones (2013), are weak state institutions. To be more specific, Ncube and Jones stated "...over-centralization of power, ethnic exclusion and division, economic crises, unequal patterns of development and weak and unaccountable states as the major sources of fragility" (p. 15). Broadly, the most salient roots of fragility and/or insecurity of most states in Africa seemed to have emanated from their critical past (lack of historical legitimacy); the innermost makeup of the state, that is, weak idea of state – lack of cohesive organizing ideology, the burdens of competing loyalties (ethnic versus national or civic); all-embracing political and security reforms and related interventions of state-building such as reordering political society and the political space often expose a state to new threats (crisis of legitimacy, lack of viable institutions, etc.).

Ethiopia is no exception to these historical and empirical sources of state fragility and/or insecurity. Weak institutions, lack of historical legitimacy of the state – as manifested in the triadic interpretations on the idea and nature of state in Ethiopia discussed in the previous section of this thesis –, competing loyalties, apparent lack of all-inclusive political reforms could be taken as some of the sources of state fragility and/ or insecurity in Ethiopia. Yet, there are polarized views among scholars - including political and economic elites - about the nature (and idea) of the current Ethiopian state. For instance, Ethiopia is treated by some scholars as a 'fragile state' (Abbink, 2009; Sibuh, 2021) and as a 'failed state' by others (De Waal, 2021). Still a few scholars have regarded Ethiopia on par with other states; the notable

scholar in this line of thinking argued "Ethiopia is more than a state, not less than one" (Kaplan, 2021, p.1).

However, facts on the ground show that the current Ethiopian state appears to reflect almost all of the drivers of fragility put forward above by Ncube and Jones (2013). More importantly, Ethiopia also fulfills one or more of the three measures of fragility put forward by Ziaja, Gravingholt & Kreibaum (2019, p. 299) such as *violence control, implementation capacity and empirical legitimacy*. It seems in response to this fact that the post-1991 Ethiopian state elites have reoriented security policy and strategy towards domestic issues and concerns. As many scholars argue obsession with domestic security is a characteristic feature of most fragile and weak states because they have lacked the required political legitimacy from citizens. Such obsession with domestic security threats is also clearly reflected in the EFANSPS. By extension, does this security concern by the Ethiopian state elites meant to practically ensure regime security or state security or the security of the state, communities and citizens deserves in-depth analysis.

Furthermore, as stated in the preamble of the 1995 FDRE Constitution, the state-building efforts of Ethiopia aims at creating one economic and political community. This suggests the new authority structure that has been instituted in 1991 was just a kind of reordering the political society of Ethiopia under the ethno-linguistic lines so as to create a single political community. Sadly, Ethiopia has not yet achieved it; the absence of viable political community certainly demonstrates continued existence of insecurity. The country has been still found in a vicious circle of mainly internal tensions and conflicts – involving security sector institutions – leading to sporadic conflicts, bloodsheds, mass displacements and destruction of physical and socio-cultural assets. These phenomena are particularly evident in many parts of the country mainly after the 2018 division within the ruling party.

The worst scenario was that the split within the political leadership of the ruling EPRDF Government was followed by a parallel split within the security apparatus of the country. Accordingly, starting from the third of November 2020, unfortunately the national defense force and other security sectors of the country – some under the leadership of the rebel TPLF

and some under the incumbent Prosperity Party-led Federal Government – have been engaged in fierce battles against one another in separate frontlines. Even for a naïve observer, this security context recalls the issue of security sector reform and/ or governance to the forefront. In view of this, it appears appropriate to raise the question of whether there was any mechanism of political control over or effective governance of the security sector of the country in accordance with the post-1991 Ethiopian state-building process. Furthermore, if there was any effective governance, the issue of 'whose security' (the regime in power or particular groups within the regime in power) also deserves deep investigation.

In other words, although the country has experienced the so called 'security sector reforms' since 1991, whether these reform efforts actually meant to securitizing the regime in power or democratizing the security sector remains unclear. Or at least whether these reforms have maintained a fair balance between prioritizing security and political objectives remains unanswered. Understanding this deficit necessitates further research in the area. Thus, this thesis is essentially considered as a theory-backed assessment of the Ethiopian security sector reform from 1991 to present, for the obvious reason that the SSR was part and parcel of the strategic intervention for state-building. It aims to examine whether Ethiopia's SSR has achieved the intended goals, in consort with other intents such as to make sense of pivotal implications these interventions had on the process of state-building.

Furthermore, in Ethiopia, research on security sector reform is very much limited with few sector-based studies on defense sector reform (Mulugeta, 2017), police reform (Wallelign, 2018) and justice reform (Henok, 2015). As these studies were specific case analyses, they could not provide sufficient inputs for policy-making. In view of this apparent gap, this thesis covers security sector governance in the major security sector institutions and the interagency competition and cooperation among them. It is presumed that this relatively comprehensive analysis produces some generalizable findings that could give a more or less comprehensive understanding of the security sector reform process and its imperatives for successful state-building so that it could help to influence policy-making. Accordingly, the very intent of this thesis was just to fill this glaring gap, and empirically contribute to the current knowledge production in the field of peace and security studies. Moreover, the analytical focus of this

thesis was to understand how the security sector reform measures that have been undertaking since 1991 correspond with state-building endeavors.

1.3. Objectives of the Study

1.3.1. General Objective

The general objective of this thesis was to critically examine the security sector reform experiences in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia and their implications for the security of the state and citizens.

1.3.2. Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of this thesis were to:

- Analyze the normative stances and ideological corpus that have been used by state authorities to make security sector reform process in the security sector institutions;
- Explore the nature of control, oversight and accountability the state had established and exercised over the security sector institutions of Ethiopia;
- Examine the level of effectiveness and efficiency in security provision and of local ownership in the security sector reform processes; and
- Pinpoint relevant inputs (if any) from earlier security sector reforms for building of the Ethiopian state.

1.4. Basic Research Questions

This thesis attempted to respond to the following key research questions:

1) What normative stances and ideological corpus have been in place for both reforming and governing the security sector?
2) How the state had established and exercised control, oversight and accountability over the security sector institutions of Ethiopia?
3) To what extent effectiveness and efficiency in security provision and local ownership in the security sector reform processes were exercised by the SSIs and the state actors respectively?

4) What valid lessons and grander inputs have added on to trajectories of Ethiopian state building through the security sector reforms since 1991?

1.5. Delimitation of the Study

By definition, the security sector includes a number of state and non-state institutions and actors. But for the interest of time and manageability, the thesis destined to give ultimate focus on the following issues. In terms of breadth, this thesis broadly looked at the governance structures and practices of the core security sector institutions (such as defense, police and intelligence) of the state that have imperatives for the trajectories of state-building since 1991 with a relatively greater resonance for constitutional and legal frameworks, state ideologies, political theorems, policies and strategies that could guide the security sector reform process and its governance. Such a relatively inclusive analysis – in comparison with previous Ethiopian studies – was believed to give a more or less comprehensive understanding of the SSR process and its imperatives for successful state-building and contribute for policy-making. The pre-1991 historical state-building processes and practices were brought to the fore in order to understand the political and security context or background and give room for the study's justification of its findings.

The thematic focus of the thesis was on the issues of security sector governance at national security policy and strategic levels rather than at sectorial level mere technical issues and the day-to-day implementations or operations of the SSIs of Ethiopia. By extension, as many scholars and international organizations say (for instance, Wulf, 2011; Karkoszka, 2011; OECD-DAC, 2007; DCAF, 2009), the issue of reforming the security sector is about reforming essentially its governance. Accordingly, in this thesis SSR and SSG (security sector governance) were alternatively used. This is not unique to this thesis. In the African Union Commission Policy Framework on SSR (AUC, 2014) security sector governance, security sector transformation, security sector development, security sector review as well as security and justice reform were also used to alternatively signify SSR. USAID (2009) also used SSR, security system reform, security sector development, and security sector transformation interchangeably.

In terms of temporal scope, this thesis has covered security sector reform endeavors in the course of the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia (1991 – 2022). The reordering the Ethiopian political society since 1991 by the EPRDF ethnic elite is very unique from its predecessors. Accordingly, the current context was captured through empirical field data collection whereas the historical accounts were attended largely through document review and discourse analyses methods. In terms of geographical scope, the thesis has sought for constitutional, legal, normative and institutional issues and perspectives mainly at headquarters level. Specific case analysis at grassroots level may be covered by other peace and security studies researchers.

1.6. Significance of the Study

Security sector reform is a very recent development in security discourse and it reached to the academic and policy circle only after the Cold War Period (Ball, 2010). It followed that generally research in the area of security sector governance is very much limited and yet it remains debated (Lyons, 2012). This glaring gap is particularly evident in the developing countries' context like Ethiopia. Therefore, the analysis of the experiences of security sector reform and/ or governance in Ethiopia could contribute to broadening the scope of understanding in the area of security studies by empirically contributing to the current knowledge production in the field of human security in general and SSR in particular.

Furthermore, in practical terms, the *pervasiveness of violent conflict* and other threats to human security has made SSR compelling in the majority of African states (Bendix & Stanley, 2008, p. 12). Accordingly, a critical analysis of the premises and practices of security sector reform and/ or governance in Ethiopia could help to inform and improve policy-making and practice. The thesis could also serve as a springboard for future researchers to conduct in-depth analysis in the area.

1.7. Limitations of the Study

In a developing country context where general access to information is often very much limited, attempting to get reliable data on military, justice, security and intelligence matters

could be considered a nightmare. Accordingly, researching security sector institutions in Ethiopia, particularly getting reliable data, could be a difficult exercise. It follows that the secrecy of information in the security sector institutions could limit the quality of data and the credibility and/ or dependability of research findings.

Practically, for different reasons, some of the security personnel in the security sector institutions (SSIs) of Ethiopia were not willing or feeling free to share their thoughts. It seemed that the current security situation of the country was further complicating the process. However, as the researcher has spent more than two decades in the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense (EMoD) and established good contacts with other security sector institutions, he has the opportunity to easily access those relevant actors in the respective security sector institutions who could facilitate the data acquisition process.

But still it was extremely difficult to get those security sector actors who were selected to participate in the interview. Even those who were willing to participate in the interview did not provide genuine information about some issues the researcher knew very well and practically observed. The researcher has attempted to offset this challenge through triangulation of the interview data with secondary sources (like reports and speeches of security officials) and a subjective interpretation of the data based on his lived experiences and observations. Yet it is important to admit that the researcher's subjective attachment to these security sector institutions may bring some inherent bias in the research process.

Another limitation of the study might be the number and complexity of security sector institutions covered by the study. As the scope of the thesis extended to cover some major security sector institutions in Ethiopia – such as defense, police, justice and intelligence – at federal headquarters level only, some particularities in each case may be overlooked in the research process. However, this could also be the strength of the thesis. Above and beyond the limited number of case studies on SSR experiences in Ethiopia conducted by some previous researchers, this relatively comprehensive analysis helped us to come up with more or less generalizable findings that could inform policy and improve practice. It is only

through this approach that the state-building imperatives of the security sector can be adequately captured.

1.8. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is organized in five chapters. The first chapter broadly analyzed the historical, political and security background of Ethiopia as well as the theoretical context under which the research was conducted. Accordingly, it has justified the need to studying security sector reform and/ or governance in the broader context of the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia and it put the study within the broad framework of contemporary understanding of peace and security studies. The chapter also identified some of the conspicuous gaps left open by previous research and it showed how the study contributes to existing scholarship and policy by filling some of these glaring gaps.

The second chapter is largely a theoretical contribution through the process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis vis-a-vis existing security, development, governance and state-building literatures. The review of existing scholarship has helped the researcher to derive the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study which would guide the direction of analysis. Furthermore, some selected country case studies were considered to draw relevant practical lessons for our analysis. The third chapter presented and justified the preferred methodological issues and research design elements employed in the research process, including study population, sampling, data sources and data collection tools, data analysis, research ethics and data quality assurance. The fourth chapter mainly incorporated the analysis of data, interpretations and discussion of findings; and finally the conclusion and implications of the study were treated under the fifth chapter of the thesis.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter was to theoretically, conceptually, empirically and methodologically inform the thesis and to understand the apparent gaps in the area and avoid *reinventing the wheel* in the research process through a critical review of relevant academic and policy literatures related to the research title. In order to achieve this end, the chapter presented a critical review of the available theoretical, conceptual, empirical and methodological literatures, which could help to derive the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the study and to draw relevant lessons or experiences for subsequent policy recommendations. Therefore, this chapter could have some theoretical contributions through a synthesis of previous scholarship in the field of peace and security studies. Generally, in this chapter the researcher has made the review of related literature under the following themes or headings and sub-headings:

2.2. Review of Theoretical Literature

It is logical to clarify or understand the concepts and terms before directly proceeding to how to deal with the propositions, analytical frameworks and theories associated with the theme of analysis in different ways. It seems in cognizant of this that Baldwin stated: "If one has no concept of security, one cannot know whether one is threatened with losing it or not" (Baldwin, 1997, p. 8). Therefore, in this sub-section of the chapter, a critical review of the available theoretical literatures was made with specific reference to conceptual analysis (the definition and/ or interpretation of basic concepts and terms) and the analysis of some major perspectives related to security and security sector reform and/ or governance.

Accordingly, a critical review on the meaning of security (though contested) and the different or competing perspectives associated with it, the commonly accepted definitions, conceptualizations and models of security sector reform and/ or governance (along with its kindred terms, like 'security sector' and 'security sector institutions'), and the nexus between

SSR and state-building were made. Subsequently, this would help us to draw the analytical lens and/ or conceptual framework of the thesis for the later analyses that were made in the sections that followed.

2.2.1. The Conceptualization of Security

It appears appropriate to indicate that the term 'security' has not yet acquired a universally accepted definition and/ or characterization by all scholars in the field. Thus any research endeavor with 'security' and its kindred terms and variables is first expected to examine the consequence of this lack of conceptualization for academic engagement and contributions for policy-making. Unless, a term, including 'security', is precisely defined it could mean either everything or nothing at all; the consequence of which would be a lack of analytical substance for intellectual engagement and contributions to inform policy or to improve practice. As it is undoubtedly difficult to conduct empirical assessments and take normative stances without having a clear insight of the nature and dimension of the term, let us first look at the disputes among security scholars in the conceptualization of the term 'security' and then the possible definition adopted for subsequent analysis.

To begin with, for many years the conceptual analysis of the term security has received little attention because security scholars were preoccupied with the policy agenda of nation-states (Wolfers, 1952; Baldwin, 1997). A slight cursor into the field of security studies explicitly shows that such terms as 'ill-defined', 'contested', 'neglected', 'under-developed', and so on are commonly found in the vocabularies of security scholars. Borrowing the term originally coined by W.B Gallie, in 1983 Barry Buzan described security as "an essentially contested concept", implies that the term encompasses a number of contradictions and inconsistencies leading scholars to ambiguity and disagreements among them. This depiction ingenuously indicates that the term has lacked a general definition and conceptualization applicable at all time and in all contexts. However, the absence of a universally agreed definition for 'security' was not considered by Buzan as a problem per se because – he believed – it does not pose a major challenge for intellectual communication (Buzan, 1983, pp. 10–11). Yet this (clear definition) is often a matter of necessity mainly for an objective empirical analysis

Buzan also described security as “an underdeveloped concept” and the major evidence provided for its conceptual underdevelopment in international relations was the limited empirical and theoretical literature devoted to ‘security’ comparative to ‘power’ (Buzan 1983, p. 3). To be more specific, Buzan provided five possible explanations for the ‘neglect’ and ‘underdevelopment’ of the concept of security: viz., its complexity or difficultness, its overlap with the concept of power, the failure of critics of realism to engage with security, the great emphasis given to strategic studies (the orientation of which was on policy issues), and the appreciation of its ambiguity mainly by people in the policy circle (pp. 6–9). However, the reasons forwarded by Buzan were not accepted by a number of security scholars; and the forefront in this regard was David Baldwin (1997).

Although Baldwin also supports the idea that security is ‘a neglected concept’, he appears to repudiate Buzan’s explanations defined above for the neglect and hence underdevelopment of the concept of ‘security’ by asserting that “On balance, none of Buzan’s explanations is very convincing” (Baldwin, 1997, p. 9). Accordingly, Baldwin insisted that rather than merely depicting it as “an essentially contested concept” the term 'security' should be more appropriately described as *a confused or inadequately explicated concept*.

Yet Baldwin understandably supports the assertion that security as a concept has been ‘neglected’; and he brought some relevant literature to support this position. The first literature was the study conducted in 1965 by Bock and Berkowitz that showcased the very few attempts made to provide a concise definition or conceptualization of national security. The second and third literature were the observation in 1975 by Richard Smoke that little attention was given to the term ‘security’ by the field of security studies, and the description of the term in 1991 by Barry Buzan as conceptually underdeveloped and the absence of conceptual literatures on ‘security’ (Baldwin, 1997, p. 8).

Baldwin criticized some of the eminent security scholars, including – but not limited to – Richard Ullman, Bary Buzan and colleagues, for considering their mere depiction of the term ‘security’ either as “essentially contested” or “neglected” as an excuse for their failure to precisely define and conceptualize the term ‘security’ (Baldwin, 1997). In line with this,

Baldwin continued to argue that "Security has been a banner to be flown, a label to be applied, but not a concept to be used by most security studies specialists" (p. 9).

Notwithstanding the above assessments, there were few attempts to conceptualize and define the term 'security' by some scholars. In 1952, Arnold Wolfers defined security as "the absence of threats to acquired values" (p. 485). In his attempt to define the term 'security' – although the issue of absence of threats is problematic – Wolfers was able to interestingly bring at least the subjective and objective dimensions of security into perspective and he was able to think of security beyond military threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity before more than seventy years ago from now.

Following Wolfers, some security scholars also attempted to define the term 'security'. A very recent literature by Sean Kay also defines security as "…the absence of a threat to the stability of the international system, or to countries, or to individuals" (Kay, 2015, p. 1). Although the inclusion of individual security into the security equation has no any gap, understanding security in terms of 'the absence of threats' appears problematic because, as Baldwin (1997) precisely stated, absolute security may be aspired but practically unattainable. Therefore, in the current context of the growing political, economic, social and technological complexities at local, national, regional and international levels, it appears a chimera to conceptualize the term security in terms of "absence of threats".

Against the existing noticeable conceptual gap in security studies literatures, Baldwin's characterization of the term security as "…a low probability of damage to acquired values" (p. 13) appears sensible. Baldwin had made an honest attempt to specify the conceptualization of security by defining it along with its major specifications, which could serve as analytical and normative frameworks for empirical investigations. Beyond defining the term, Baldwin formulated a series of seven questions to conceptualize and understand the entire spectrum of security; namely, *security for whom, security for which values, how much security, from what threats, by what means, at what cost, and in what time period* (Baldwin, 1997, pp. 12–18). In this conceptualization, Baldwin asserts that "…the values to be secured are variable, the degree of security sought is variable, the potential threats to security are

multiple, the means by which security may be pursued are many, the costs of security are inescapable, and the time period matters" (p. 25).

In his conceptualization of security, Baldwin argues that security is not the only value sought by individuals, communities and states. Hence, prejudging 'security' as an urgent value relative to other values makes it conceptually irrelevant for *rational policy analysis*. In determining the place of security (as one value domain) relative to other values, Baldwin used the *marginal value approach* founded on the law of diminishing marginal returns from the field of 'Economics' in which security competes with other values for scarce resources. In the words of Baldwin:

> Since security competes with other goals for scarce resources, it must be distinguishable from, yet comparable with, such goals. This requires that the relative importance of security be left open rather than built into the concept in terms of 'vital interests' or 'core values' (p. 24).

Such conceptualization of security appears to reflect the current security discourse widely held by scholars and security policy advocates. Proponents of human security and security sector reform in the Post-Cold War period as well as Disarmament, Demobilizations and Re-integration (hereinafter, DDR) assume the reallocation of resources from the security sector to other more productive sectors (Muggah, et.al, 2009). The restrictions imposed on the budget of defense expenditures and the expenditures of other security sector institutions also support the position that the values attached to security should compete with other values in the allocation of scarce resources, particularly in developing countries like Ethiopia. The definition given to the term 'security' in the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy appears to correspond with our conceptualization. In this document, 'security' is understood as "protecting the population from strife, war and disintegration" (FDRE FANSPS, 2002, p. 4). This definition does not entail a different form of conceptualization of 'security' adopted to inform the analytical focus of the thesis.

2.2.2. Competing Perspectives on Security: The Schools of Thought

As we witnessed in the above sub-section, the term security has not yet acquired a universal or all-encompassing conceptualization, more or less, accepted by scholars in the field. But

this does not mean that the term 'security' is undefined. Heavily influenced by their differences in worldview, epistemology and methodology, different scholars have different thoughts on the key issues of security discourse – security from what, to whom and by what means. Accordingly, in this sub-section, the thesis has provided a brief description and analysis of the traditional and the critical or contemporary schools of thought in security and their practical relevance in characterizing the post-1991 SSR discourse in Ethiopia.

Although the issues of security appear to exist since time immemorial, many scholars assert that Thucydides could be recognized as the first traditional realist thinker. In his extensive engagement or writings on the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides underscored on how the growing military strength of Athens had created the fear and suspicion of losing the balance of power – or simply a security dilemma – on the side of the Spartans and the ensuing response in the same fashion (military building ups) that had led to the outbreak of the War (Viotti, & Kauppi, 2012; Griffiths & O'Callaghan, 2002). Furthermore, in the words of Kay (2015) "…Through the *Melian Dialogue*, Thucydides demonstrated that, when it comes to international security, the strong do what they can, and the weak do what they must" (p. 24). By extension, Thucydides had long recognized national security in the international system as a quest for power projection for some and a struggle for survival for others.

A number of traditional security thinkers have built their fundamental thoughts about security on the basis of a more skeptical or pessimistic view of the social world or humankind drawn mainly from the empirical observations of Niccolo Machiavelli on how people actually behaved and the logical or analytical formulations of Thomas Hobbes. More or less, Machiavelli and Hobbes had treated human nature as 'self-centered', 'ruthless', and 'greedy', means that men/women inherently engage in everything they can to achieve their self-interest and unregulated ego. Although these earlier traditional security thinkers – such as Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes – appear to differ in their methodology and in the degree of understanding of human nature, they all underscored on the undesirability of life and the system of *anarchy* in which people live with; and consequently they sought for a strong sovereign elite (kings, queens and soldiers) to rule over the masses and then create and maintain order with absolute power and authority over their subjects.

It follows that ontologically the basic tenets of the traditional security thought seems largely influenced by some classical thinkers mentioned above. This position is supported by the basic assumptions of realism put forward by a number of scholars (for instance, Wohlforth, 2017; Kay, 2015; Glaser, 2013; Viotti & Kauppi, 2012). Broadly speaking, the realist school of thought has three main assumptions on how the international system actually operates; and these are, according to Wohlforth (2017, p. 2), *groupism, egoism and power-centrism*. On the basis of these three assumptions, realists define the nature of the relationship between political order in the international arena and state security. In such characterization of the international system and human behavior, realists argue that violent conflicts are inherent unless there is a world government or authority to regulate international relations. In short, insecurity is a common parlance in the context of 'anarchy'.

Other scholars also stated six major pillars of the traditional realist school of thought; namely: (1) the international system as 'anarchic', (2) international relations as essentially defined by 'power', (3) the state as an integrated 'unitary actor', (4) the state as a 'rational' (purposive) actor, (5) the state as a 'black box', (6) the state as a principal actor in the international system, and competition and war as defining characteristics of the international system (Glaser, 2013, pp. 14–15; Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, pp. 36–37). By extension, anarchy, self-help, black box, power maximization, arms race, high politics, military capabilities, and economic strength are common in the vocabulary of the realists' view of state security.

The characterization of the international system by realists as *anarchic* indicates the absence of central authority or world government which can enforce commitments or impose its authority to ensure absolute control over the entire system. So, in this self-help international system it is at the hands of each state to ensure its own national security or survival by projecting its maximum possible power on other states. In other words, the presence of 'anarchy' often leads states to behave or act as if they have no common intersection in the international arena. Accordingly, the interaction of states in the so called anarchic and self-help international system is considered as essentially a struggle for survival and superiority or power over an actual or perceived common threat rather than cooperation and interdependence for mutual gains.

Generally, in the context of the 'black box' of opposing states and the ensuing 'security dilemma', it is natural for each state to seek maximum security and to make every preparations to achieve this end through building strong military and economy, forming alliances, engaging in arms race, deterrence and balance of power. Realists consider the state as the only referent object (unit of analysis) to be secured and they strongly argue that the major threats to national security have external origin and military dimension. Consequently, in the realist perspective military might and perpetual preparations for war were taken as the ultimate strategies in the quest for maximization of state security.

However, fundamental transformations in the Post-Cold War Period international system (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010) have brought a parallel transformation in the international and domestic security dynamics of states and this exposes the limitations of the narrowly conceived state-centric (referent of the concept) and military-oriented (content of the concept) traditional realist understanding of security. Traditional realists consider the state as the only referent object and the only provider of security and they conceived of national security threats as military in their nature and external in their origin (Krause & Williams, 1996, p. 230). But the multiplication of actors and threats to the security of the state, communities and individuals in the Post-Cold War security dynamics has made the horizontal and vertical expansion of the concept of security a virtual reality.

It seems with this understanding that instead of defending their position some realists have tended to bring a relatively expanded and deepened understanding of security. The foremost in this direction were Barry Buzan and Mohammed Ayoob. In 1983, Buzan had attempted to expand the analysis of security threats from a mere focus on military strength to other sectors such as military, political, economic, social, and environmental dimensions (Kay, 2015). Similarly, in his book entitled: "The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System" Ayoob (1995) had attempted to include *domestic security* as a unit of analysis in the security calculus of particularly Third World states and hence, to some extent, challenged the 'black box' of states and the mere external origin of threats strongly advocated by traditional realism.

However, such attempts of widening and deepening the dimensions of security introduced within the realist school itself were seriously criticized by some ardent protagonists of the traditional security thought. For instance, the attempts made by Buzan and Ayoob to expand and deepen the concept of security has been considered by Legro and Moravcsik (1999, p. 53) as a retreat and surrendering to competing perspectives propagated by *liberal*, *epistemic*, *institutional theorists* – rather than defending the true essence of realism. Baldwin (1997, p. 23) also argued that bringing military, political, economic, social, and environmental dimensions into the security equation does not indicate essentially a different conceptualization, but different forms of security. Similarly, Gary (2020, p. 1) also considered the attempts made by Buzan and Ayoob as "rehabilitating realism" rather than bringing transformation in the traditional statist (state-centric) and violence-oriented (militaristic) perspective of security.

Apart from all these, a more serious critics of and fundamental shift from the realist thought have emerged in the critical security schools. The critical security studies (hereinafter, CSS) have brought a more expansive security agenda through broadening and deepening of its conceptualization (Bilgin, 2013; Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010). The broadeners have made a more expanded understanding of security through the horizontal inclusion of threats – such as social, political, environmental, health, and so on – in addition to military threats. Similarly, the deepeners have made a vertical inclusion of referent objects or unit of analysis, over and above the state, in security analysis. Taken together, the wideners and deepeners strongly argue that violence or military threat is not the only threat to security and the 'state' is not the only referent object or entity to be secured (Peoples & Vaughan-Williams, 2010).

By implication, in the critical security discourse there are other threats at least as equally relevant as – even more relevant than – violence or military threats and there are also other referent objects even more relevant than the state. Some scholars pushed this argument further and considered the individual as a unit of analysis or referent object as opposed to the state. The existing political order (at global, regional, national or domestic level) has been considered by CSS scholars as the source of insecurity for individuals and communities and, thus, they treated the state as the *means* – not the end – of security policy.

Subsequently, the concept of security has been expanded and deepened to the extent that it was interchangeably used with 'emancipation' – originally by Ken Booth. Booth (1991) defines 'security' as the absence of threats and 'emancipation' as the removal of any constraints – physical and human – that prevent individuals from the full enjoyment of their freedom of choice of life chances. In this definition, Booth acknowledges the conditions for both objective security (being secure) and subjective security (feeling secure); and it is only at the intersection of being and feeling secure that threats to security for both individuals and groups will be fundamentally eliminated (Booth 1991).

Such radical departure from the traditional statist security discourse towards people-centered security (individuals and communities) and from mere violence to a range of issues threatening life (such as political, economic, social, environmental and so on) has emerged under the designation of 'human security' – a unifying concept officially introduced to the Post-Cold War people-centered security analysis by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The shift of concern from interstate war to domestic armed conflict that necessitates humanitarian intervention and the emergence of globalization in international relations in the Post-Cold War period had led to a further consolidation of people-centered understanding of security; a shift from the nation-state to people (Bhattarai, 2013; Martin & Owen; 2010; Tadjbakhsh 2013; UNDP, 1994). The key argument put forward by UNDP (1994) is that "The world will never be secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and in their jobs" (p. 24).

Accordingly, UNDP defines human security as: "a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced" (UNDP, 1994, p. 22). Its concern is not with *weapons* but with *human life and dignity* (ibid). The broader definition includes seven dimensions of security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (UNDP 1994, pp. 24–25). These were summarized by Tadjbakhsh (2013) into *freedom from fear*, *freedom from want* and *freedom from indignity* (p. 44). The political objective of which was to make "people be able to live in a society that honours their basic human rights" (UNDP, 1994, p. 32) and the economic

objective was to shift attention and channel resources (human and material) to vulnerable people and generally the global South for the benefit of the North as well.

Of course, some scholars have been skeptical about the expansion of the conceptualization of security as much as 'emancipation' from the perspective of its analytical and practical relevance. The wideners and deepeners have been attacked in particular by realist scholars in view of the difficulty to differentiate what is and what is not a security issue and the dilemma this would create on policy makers regarding what to prioritize on the allocation of limited resources. For instance, in his critique against the deepeners and broadeners, Ayoob (1997) argues that it is possible to experience 'emancipation' in the absence of security and vice-versa. This may be well illustrated by the recent Ethiopian political and security context. For instance, in terms of security most Ethiopians feel relatively more secured during the EPRDF than during the first two to three years of Prosperity Party (hereinafter, PP) Government but vice versa in terms of 'emancipation' as manifested through human and democratic rights.

Ayoob further maintained that considering security as everything and as a panacea to all social ills makes it "analytically useless" (p. 125). Other neorealists posit that taking security policy analysis away from its traditional focus on the state as a referent object and military as a threat will end up in losing its academic flavor and practical relevance (Dorff, 1994, cited in Krause & Williams, 1996, p. 230). To further consolidate their position, some neorealists also added that as the intellectual significance of any scientific endeavor is measured in terms of its ability to exclude or filter (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999, p. 53), it has no relevance to expand the concept of security beyond its level of utility. Hence, some scholars consider human security as a development project introduced by people from the policy circle and hence it has no relevance for intellectual engagement. The most ardent critics of human security argue that by asserting everything from environmental degradation up to human rights as a security issue, it ends up in prioritizing everything and hence it means nothing (Martin & Owen, 2010). In a similar vein, Deudney (1999) argued: "if everything that causes a reduction in human well-being is labeled a security threat, the term loses any analytical usefulness and becomes a loose synonym of bad" (cited in Krause, 2007, p. 5).

Notwithstanding these differences, the introduction of the theory of securitization and de-securitization by the Copenhagen School has been taken as a useful analytical tool for defining the expanding and deepening realm of the security field. Securitization is a process through which a previously non-political issue can be politicized and finally securitized by a dominant actor through "discursive linguistic processes" (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 22). By extension, although any issue can be politicized (becomes a subject of public policy debate) and framed by a dominant state actor as an existential threat (perceived or real) to the designated referent object (securitizing move), it will be practically securitized only when such designation was finally approved through substantial public debates. Therefore, a securitizing move by state actors is different from actual securitization.

Beyond this, it is also difficult to consider human security as a mere normative prescription by the development community or people in the policy circle. For instance, long before the adoption of the concept by the UNDP in 1994, a number of scholars have attempted to consider some attributes of human security in the security calculus. For instance, Arnold Wolfers had underlined on the need to expanding national security beyond safeguarding territorial units as early as 1952. Lesser Brown had also included environmental and energy issues into the security calculus as early as 1977. Similarly, in 1983 Barry Buzan had also included military, political, economic, social and environmental dimensions into the security equation (Kay, 2015, pp. 3-4).

Probably the pervasiveness of the statist traditional realist perspective in the field of security since the Westphalia Treaty in 1648 to date may be attributed to its comparative analytical and empirical superiority over the contemporary or critical schools. Empirically or practically, the legacy of the First World War (WWI), the League of Nations, the Second World War (WWII), the Cold War, and even the United Nations, and, analytically, the objective measurement of the sources of security and insecurity are some of the indicators of the practical and theoretical significance of the realist thought. In a number of instances, international law or security governance through collective security did not stop the breaching of international commitments by individual states.

Generally, it is important to note that although the narrowly conceived statist and power-centric (often militaristic) understanding of security by the traditional realist school of thought appears analytically attractive or relevant, it was also practically proved to be problematic in the context of the undemocratic states of the Third world – particularly in Africa. The treatment of states by the traditional neorealists as 'black boxes' appears to conceal fundamental domestic issues or threats by externalizing them under the banner of national security. As stated by Glaser (2013) "Realism gives little or no weight to individual states' political systems, their leaders, and other specific attributes of their domestic political systems (p. 14).

The practical experiences of a number of African states have also proved that the security of the state does not automatically guarantee a parallel security for its citizens. One of the most brutal dictators in the history of humankind such as the Edi Amen Dada Regime in Uganda, Muammar Gadhafi's Regime in Libya, Charles Taylor's Regime in Liberia, Mengistu Hailemariam's Regime in Ethiopia and many others are cases in point. So putting the SSR experience in the current Ethiopian context within the traditional neorealist *statist* and *militaristic* perspective of security does not bring anything relevant for state-building trajectories in the post-1991 period.

However, it is important to note that giving ultimate focus and precedence to human security may sometimes be as difficult as putting security in a statist perspective. In terms of actual practice, human security may not sometimes be as attractive as its premises. From a practical perspective, the broad definition of human security which securitizes human rights may also create some challenges, particularly for Third World states in Africa and Asia. For instance, the inclusion of the R_2P (Responsibility to Protect) in one of the chapters of the Security Council gives aspiring Western powers a recipe to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries. Very recently we witnessed that the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had intervened in the Libyan domestic conflict by referring R_2P under the banner of the protection of civilians; but in practice it exacerbated the crisis. Therefore, we need to have a more inclusive and balanced understanding of security issues by bringing specific context or condition, time and space into play.

As the security of individuals is intimately linked with the state, it is difficult to remove the state from the referent object. The difference in our treatment of human security and state security should be understood as a matter of emphasis rather than exclusion or removal of either from the security calculus. Therefore, as convincingly described by Kerr (2013) we need a dual conceptualization of human security and state security because each is a necessary but not a sufficient approach to security. Moreover, the relevance of any concept should be measured in terms of solving practical problems without losing its academic flavor for intellectual benignity and in improving the life of humanity in general. So in the current Third World states state-building and security context as well as the available normative grounds centered largely on the lone individual, a bottom up people-centered approach or broader understanding of security encompassing critical issues by putting the individual (and communities) as a primary referent object is relatively better to address security challenges at individual, community, and national levels.

2.2.3. Security Sector Reform: Evolution and Characterization

In the preceding subsections of this chapter, we have tried to review the conceptualization of the term 'security' and the contestations associated with it by bringing the assumptions of the traditional neorealist school and the contemporary critical security studies into perspective so as to set the context for the birth or emergence of the SSR agenda. Therefore, in this subsection, the evolution of the SSR discourse in security policy analysis and the definition of SSR and its kindred variables as they apply to the state-building trajectories of Ethiopia in the post-1991 period have been made.

As we saw in sub-section 2.2.2 of this chapter, conceptual and policy debates about 'security' have witnessed dramatic changes since the legal or normative inception of state security in the Westphalia Treaty in the seventeenth century to date. However, the failure of nation-states to discharge their obligations of primarily security provision, the end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the USSR, the multiplication of actors at different levels (from local to global) in the security environment, and the erosion of the sovereignty of nation-states as a result of globalization have, among others, challenged and transformed the statist and violence-based security discourse persisted until the end of the twentieth century.

A number of reasons have been cited by scholars for the birth of security sector reform. The first often stated reason was the end of the Cold War that brought a shift from the previously geostrategic security cooperation and assistance focused on arms and training support – irrespective of the nature of the state – to development and democratic governance (Sedra, 2010; Gindarsah, 2015; Ball, 2010). Before the end of the Cold War, "Security for the elite and the regime flourished at the expense of the security for citizens, communities and often the state" (Ball, 2010, p. 30). But, in the Post-Cold War period the recognition that the nation-state is not only the provider of security but also a source of threat or insecurity, the increasing role of non-state security actors, and the experiences of democratic norms in post-conflict and transitional states, among other things, have necessitated a parallel transformation or shift in the governance structures, methods and practices of security sector institutions.

Of course, the role of the security sector vis-à-vis development and state-building was a point of discussion even before the end of the Cold War. In the 1960s, as a result of a series of military takeover of political power through coup d'état in Africa, Latin America and Asia, there were attempts by the development community to define the appropriate role to be given for the military. The main emphases of the policy debate were the misappropriation of resources by the military, the military as a school of nation-building, and the military as an agent of modernization. But, this optimism about the military had ultimately ended up in bringing the most repressive regimes and armed forces in the late 1960s and thus failed to fulfill its promises. As a result, the development community withdrew its development assistance to security (Wulf, 2000).

The second reason for the birth of the SSR concept was the nexus between security and development. In the Post-Cold War, following the *reconceptualization of development and security* (Sedra, 2010), it is widely recognized that security is a necessary condition for people to get out of the poverty trap (Moreno, 2008, p. 20). Beyond the theoretical literature, the World Bank's comprehensive empirical study on the life of the poor entitled "Voices of the Poor" which synthesized the experiences of over 60,000 thousand people from 60 countries also affirmed the optimism on the security-development nexus. In the study, safety

and security were identified by the poor people as one of their top priorities to eradicate poverty. This had led to a shift in policy interventions and reorientations in different walks of life, including security (Narayan & Petesch, 2002).

The nexus between security and development underscored on the urgency of primarily addressing the security of people to subsequently help them fight poverty and achieve development (Moreno, 2008; Gindarsah; 2015). Furthermore, Spear and Williams (2012) have taken the analysis on the nexus between security and development beyond conflict zones to include other areas such as health, poverty, demography, trade and resources. Yet, it is important to note that there are counter arguments against this elastic approach too. It is feared that combining security with development will ultimately end up in the favoring of the former at the expense of the latter (Spear & Williams, 2012, p. 2). But as stated by Wulf (2011), the reciprocal relationship between security and development is well established in the academic literature and policy circle. Wulf even essentializes such relationship when he said: "Security and development are inextricably linked. One cannot be pursued without the other" (Wulf, 2011, p. 340).

The third reason for the birth of the SSR concept was the experiences of reforms in the developing world. The end of the Cold War coupled with the collapse of the Apartheid Regime in the Republic of South Africa spurred discussions among local actors on the issues of development, governance and security in other areas which led to the growing importance of civil society organizations and other interest groups that stressed on human security and democratic governance (Ball, 2010, p. 32). Furthermore, civilian control of the military (security governance) was also an issue of concern with the collapse of military regimes in Latin America and the wave of democratization in Africa (Gindarsah, 2015, p. 3).

The last reason is that the issue of SSR was born out from the experiences of successful transitions in Central and East European (hereinafter, CEE) states or the Former Soviet Union republics (Gindarsah, 2015; Ball, 2010). Following the disintegration of the Former Union of Soviet Socialist Russia (hereinafter USSR), in order to offset their security dilemma many CEE states were looking for European Union (hereinafter EU) and NATO for financial

and technical assistance and membership. But, to get membership they were required to first fulfill the prerequisites of democratic civilian control of the armed forces as put in place by EU and NATO. Varisco (2018) also added growing emphasis on governance and public sector reform, and the quest by donors for effective and accountable security sectors, academic engagement on civil-military relations and the emergence of human security as additional factors for the birth of SSR (pp. 99-100). The SSR concept has been further discussed and developed by scholars from British, Netherlands, Canada and Germany (Winkler, 2002 in Gindarsah, 2015).

As a result of the growing awareness on the relationship the security sector has with development and democratic transition, the issue of governance of the security sector has become an area of concern for both scholars and policy makers. Nowadays security sector reform is a norm particularly in the post-conflict and formerly authoritarian transitional states who aspire to meaningfully achieve democracy, rule of law, human rights protection, and sustainable development (Karkoszka, 2011; Sedra, 2010; OECD-DAC, 2007). Yet it appears relevant to indicate that the SSR concept was first emerged within the development community as a "donor agenda" (Ball, 2010, p. 33), which signaled the revitalization of assistance to the security sector for the purpose of people-centered development and democratization.

Having put the evolution of the SSR agenda into context, now let us move to the definition of SSR and some kindred concepts, namely: security sector and security sector institutions. As security related issues are almost always contested or at least evolved over time, it is not unusual to find different conceptualization of SSR and its kindred terms among scholars and the development community as well. Furthermore, the SSR concept has emerged very recently (Karkoszka, 2011) and is largely influenced by specific contexts (Wulf, 2011). With this background, the DFID Policy Guideline broadly defines the security sector as it "comprises all those responsible for protecting the state and communities within its jurisdiction such as core security actors, security management and oversight bodies, justice and law enforcement institutions, and non-statutory security forces" (p. 7). According to Hendrickson (1999, p 29 in Gindarsah, 2015, p. 5), the security sector is understood in

association with "the set of structure, institutions, and personnel responsible for the provision, management and oversight of security in a country."

The African Union Commission also defines the security sector as it "comprises individuals, groups and institutions that are responsible for the provision, management and oversight of security for people and the state" (p. 5) and as such it includes: primary security institutions, specialized intelligence and security institutions, public oversight and management bodies, justice and rule of law institutions, civil emergency units, and non-state security bodies. This definition is more or less the same as that provided by DFID. As per the OECD-DAC Handbook (2007, p. 22), the security sector makes up institutions and actors belonged to core security actors, management and oversight bodies, justice and the rule of law, and non-statutory security forces. Accordingly, a supportive political environment will lead to the effectiveness of security, justice and oversight institutions and actors, and this in turn will lead to the democratic governance of security and justice actors and institutions. Finally, the combination of the two will ultimately lead to successful SSR or security and justice delivery for the state and citizens.

A relatively more comprehensive definition is provided by DCAF. According to DCAF (2009), the security sector comprises of those organized group capable of using force along with the institutions and actors that manage, oversee and monitor them and those who involve in national security policy development and security provision. These include: statutory security service, executive and civil management jurisdictions, the legislature and legislative committees, justice institutions, civil society organizations (CSOs), non-statutory armed formations, independent oversight agencies, and external actors (p. 2).

Common to all of the above definitions provided by DFID, AU and DCAF is the fact that the security sector encompasses those actors authorized to use force along with the institutions and oversight bodies to ensure effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and accountability in discharging their responsibilities of security provision for the individual, groups and the state. The only deviation was the inclusion of external actors – beyond the state territorial jurisdiction – by DCAF who could support SSR and contribute to maintaining security in one

way or the other. It is important to note that what exactly constitutes the security sector yet remains debated (Leboeuf, 2017; Gindarsah, 2015; Schnabel & Born, 2011). Generally, security sector encompasses various actors involved in security and justice provision and in the management and oversight of security sector institutions.

For security sector institutions to achieve these roles, they need to be structurally and institutionally reformed. Accordingly, security sector reform could be understood in terms of creating mechanisms for improving the status of the security sector in order to enable it provide maximum security for the state and its constituencies (communities and individuals). It is about how the security sector is organized, becomes functional, and monitored to effectively and efficiently achieve its promises. In line with this, Eckhard (2016) defines SSR as "…planned improvements to existing structures and methods in a country's security sector, with the objective of improving security for the population. It is about how a security sector is internally and externally governed" (p. 6).

In the AUC Policy Framework, SSR is defined as 'the process by which countries formulate or re-orient the policies, structures, and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient, and responsive to democratic control, and to the security and justice needs of the people' (AUC, 2014, p. 5). It recognizes the role SSR has in regional integration, democratization, rule of law, sustainable development, good governance, and lasting peace and security. Nikolaisen (2010) also stated that the main focus of SSR is on the well-being and security of individuals and communities and hence it promotes human security and human development (pp. 49–50).

Inclusive Security and OECD (2017) also conceptualized SSR as a process targeted to bring improved human and state security through a more effective, efficient, and accountable security provision, management, and oversight under normative conditions of democratic civilian control, rule of law, and respect for human rights (p. 4). It is about the process of improving the actors of the security sector to enable them creating a secured community and state. Furthermore, Inclusive Security and OECD (2017) stated that the two principal objectives of SSR are *effectiveness* and *accountability* and each of this is defined as follows:

> EFFECTIVENESS is about improving the provision of security and justice to enhance overall wellbeing of both the state and its people while ACCOUNTABILITY is about ensuring security and justice actors' adherence to law and policies and sanctions for abusive conduct. No SSR program can be successful…without building of accountability and governance structures (Inclusive Security & DCAF, 2017, p. 4).

The main premise of the SSR concept is that a well governed and efficient security sector can contribute to ensure human security, rule of law, human rights, sustainable development, democracy, integration, and regional and international stability at large (DCAF, 2009). Therefore, SSR has now become a necessary precondition for a reformist state to achieve democratization, good governance, economic development, conflict prevention, post-conflict recovery and professionalization of its security forces (Karkoszka, 2011). Conversely, a poorly governed security sector can assume a reversal of these processes. As stated by DFID "A badly managed security sector hampers development, discourages investment, and helps to perpetuate poverty" (p. 8). This requires any aspiring reformist state to take the issue of security sector governance seriously.

In sum, the SSR concept broadly deals with the norms and principles on how the security sector should discharge its assigned duties and responsibilities of ensuring human and state security in an ideal democracy. To this effect, it applies the principles of good governance – such as accountability, transparency, rule of law, human rights, effectiveness, efficiency, participation, responsiveness, and so on – to security provision, management and oversight in the context of democratic civilian control. By extension, the governance aspect constitutes the core of SSR.

Therefore, the analytical focus of the thesis was on *governance* of the state security sector rather than on specific technical issues associated with planning and implementing SSR at sectorial level. The relevance of this engagement is well articulated by OECD (2007, p. 28) as follows: "Justice and security reform is…best approached as a governance issue and not simply as a technical activity". Other scholars also treated the SSR concept in this direction. One of whom is Wulf (2011, p. 13) when he stated: "Security sector reform is part of a governance reform program."

It is believed that the security sector can provide sustainable security to individuals, communities and the state if it is governed on the principles of good governance under the conditions of rule of law and democratic civilian control so as to discharge their duties and responsibilities effectively and efficiently (OECD-DAC, 2007). As defined by Kjaer (2014), governance refers to "the setting, application and enforcement of the rules of the game"; and *legitimacy*, *efficiency*, *democracy* and *accountability* are the core issues associated with it (pp. 11–12). Accordingly, how the security sector institutions of Ethiopia have been governed in accordance with democratic norms, good governance and rule of law was the main thrust of this thesis.

2.2.4. The Nexus Between SSR and State-building

The emergence of SSR as a concept is attributed to the growing need for state-building in response to the weakening and collapse of a number of states in the post-Cold War period. Accordingly, in the years followed security sector reform has been considered as a norm or an essential intervention in the context of post-conflict environment and post-authoritarian rule. Among the different state-building policy issues, SSR has emerged as a major policy prescription to promote stability and security through the rebuilding and transformation of SSIs in war-torn states (OECD, 2007; Sedra, 2017). A post conflict environment, according to Jackson (2010), is characterized by 'vulnerability to external shocks, internal conflict, competing economic and political structures and an inability to exercise effective legal control within its borders' (p. 119). It follows that a post-conflict SSR is often undertaken in a context in which violent conflict has of course ended but the state may be completely collapsed or at least its institutions might be weakened and its legitimacy eroded and thus unable to provide basic public services, including security, to its citizens. Therefore, SSR is an important component of the wider process of rebuilding states or state-building.

In the words of Chappuis and Hanggi (20029, p. 32) state-building is defined as an "attempt to create the institutional capacity necessary to sustain a minimum functional democratic state." Similarly, according to Paris and Sisk (2007) state-building could be understood as the process of "strengthening or construction of legitimate governmental institutions" in states affected by violent conflict. OECD (2011) also defined state-building as an "endogenous

process" of building the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state as manifested in smooth and healthy state-society relations. The commonly shared attributes in all these definitions of state-building are capacity enhancement, building viable institutions and legitimacy. Accordingly, we can characterize state-building as a long-term process of enhancing the capacities, institutions and legitimacy (consent of the governed) of the state. With this understanding, let us see the inherent relationship state-building has with SSR.

It is widely recognized among scholars and practitioners that SSR is not a standalone policy intervention separated from the wider change and transformation processes anticipated by states in transitions from violent conflict to peace and stability and from authoritarian rule to democratic governance. By extension, SSR interventions are part and parcel of constructing viable state apparatus and the wider political process of state-building. As correctly described by Jackson (2011) the SSR concept is intimately linked with state-building processes. Empirically, SSR has been an 'integral element' of the broader state-building process in those countries which emerged out from conflict such as in Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Iraq, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and others (p. 1810).

In post-conflict environments, SSR helps to build states that are capable to provide good governance, democracy and security to its citizens (Jackson, 2011). Such core values as democracy, good governance, accountability, transparency, rule of law, effectiveness and efficiency targeted by most SSR interventions constitute an essential component of state-building policies and practices (OECD, 2007). SSR enables war-torn states to restore and rebuild institutions that are capable to provide both human and state security in an effective and efficient manner and within a framework of good governance and democracy (Chappuis and Hanggi, 2009). The distinctive feature of SSR from other traditional mechanisms of restoring security in post-conflict states is its attempt to establish a common ground between security provision and legitimacy. Thus, as SSR puts the state's monopoly of violence or use of physical force within the framework of democratic governance, it helps the state to restore its legitimacy and to enhance its capacity to provide human security and state security by 'legitimate means' (ibid, p. 32).

In a similar vein, OECD (2007) stated that SSR contributes to state-building by enhancing its legitimacy through increased capability, accountability, and responsiveness to the needs of citizens. Moreover, in the absence of a well-functioning security sector, it is impossible for the state to achieve sovereignty or to exercise its supreme power to command and enforce obedience to its will within its jurisdiction. The supreme and final legal authority of the state within its territorial limit can be achieved through a monopoly of violence which gives it an executional capacity to enforce its assigned duties and responsibilities. Thus, when designed and implemented properly, SSR can contribute to building well-functioning and legitimate state institutions and thus molding the relationship between people and the state.

It seemed in response to the above premises that nowadays SSR has become a norm for states which emerge out from long and protracted violent conflicts and instabilities. It appears in cognizant of this historical development that Bendix and Stanley (2008, p. 97) described SSR as "the defining element of modern statehood." It is considered as a key intervention to bring lasting peace and sustainable development through preventing the relapse of conflicts and the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. This can be achieved mainly through transforming the roles, responsibilities and actions of SSIs to be managed and operated based on democratic norms and principles of good governance so that they can contribute to the overall state-building process (OECD, 2007). Generally, the nexus between SSR and state-building could be exemplified by the strong linkage the security concept has with sustainable development, democracy and good governance.

Yet, there are some scholars who feel skeptical of the contributions of SSR intervention for state-building. SSR is attacked for its focus on building state institutions and less regard for forging relationships between the people and the state (see Gordon, 2014; Jackson, 2010; 2011). They argue that the primary focus of SSR is on the state, its institutions and leaders and less on people, the community or the relationship between the people and the state. However, these arguments against SSR have been merely grounded on the implementation side rather than the conceptual and policy issues associated with it. The fact is that the emergence of the SSR concept in the post-Cold War period has been aligned more with human security than state security. Furthermore, as SSR introduces the principles of

democratic governance and accountability into SSIs, it helps to restore state legitimacy "by putting the needs and input of citizens at the center of the state security agenda" (Chappuis & Hanggi, 2009, p. 32).

As SSR programming and implantation require adequate time, sufficient resources, high expertise, and most importantly, political commitment and local ownership, SSR interventions in a number of post-conflict societies have failed to fulfill their premises. This rather suggests that in order to serve the objective of state-building, SSR interventions should actively involve civil society, academia, media and the wider public in its programming and implementation so that security sector institutions will be responsive to the needs and interests of citizens. This will develop a mindset of local ownership of the SSR and public trust and confidence in the state and its institutions.

Bringing the SSR and state-building nexus to the post-1991 Ethiopian context, the state has been both weak and predatory and hence SSR could be taken as an essential intervention for transition from authoritarian rule to democratic governance and state legitimacy and consequently the full enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms of citizens. International experiences also show that the dual objectives of both human security and state security have been achieved through well designed and executed SSR interventions. In line with this, the SSR experiences of most Central and Eastern European states and the Republic of South Africa provide important empirical backing to such position.

In sum, as correctly described by Gordon, (2014), building security sector institutions is instrumental to state-building and peace-building. SSR has to do a lot with state building because to the least it reinstitutes the state's legitimate use of physical force over its constituencies. SSIs often help to concoct the inherent influences of the state – monopoly of violence – as well as upholding legitimacy. Unless the state has exercised such a power, it cannot be said a state. The state can easily deliver the most desired public goods, including security, to individuals and communities only when it has resilient security sector institutions and actors operating under the principles and norms of democratic governance and

accountability. Properly executed SSR interventions could help war-torn states to reinstitute executional capacity, institutional setup, and to restore legitimacy.

2.3. Review of Empirical Literature and Research Gaps

Under section 2.2 of this chapter, we have tried to review the available conceptual, theoretical, and methodological literatures associated with security, the schools of thought and the SSR concept as they apply to inform or delineate the analytical focus of this thesis. Therefore, this subsequent section presented the empirical reviews with particular emphasis on international practical experiences in SSR as inputs for drawing relevant lessons and the research gaps in SSR experiences in the state-building trajectories of Ethiopia.

2.3.1. International Experiences in Security Sector Reform

As security sector policies and strategies are often formulated by officials at headquarters level and implemented by practitioners at field level, it is not uncommon to find significant discrepancies between theory and practice inherent to this process. Moreover, the SSR concept has emerged very recently as a largely prescriptive and normative donor-driven policy agenda and has been imposed on post-conflict societies. As a result, practical experiences on the formulation and implementation of SSR may differ in different contexts – the analysis of which would help us to draw lessons for possible policy recommendations.

In section 2.2.3, we have tried to review the evolution, conceptualization and premises of the SSR concept. In this sub-section of the chapter we have brought some practical experiences from Africa and beyond to understand whether the SSR concept has so far fulfilled its promises in real world contexts. As we saw in the previous subsection, although the SSR concept has emerged in the academic and policy literatures very recently, it becomes a norm particularly in post-conflict and post-authoritarian states transitions to sustainable peace and democracy. Cognizant of this trend, Leboeuf (2017, p. 6) and OECD-DAC (2007, p. 13) stated that in the last two decades a number of states in the world have undertaken SSR with the support of international donors.

Security sector reform is also a common practice in mostly post-conflict and in transition African states and the majority of post-conflict states have witnessed the need for some sort of SSR (with the exception of the Republic of Congo, Chad and Libya) through the involvement of external actors (Ansorg, 2017). She stated that as a result of high conflict cleavages between conflicting parties and lack of commitment by the same and stronger involvement of international actors, the SSR agenda in many African states was largely set by external actors and subsequently it ended up in a Westernized model. Such SSR activities dictated by external actors often doomed to failure mainly due to the apparent lack of trust and local ownership (pp.6–7). Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and South Sudan are some of the cases in point. Traditional or informal institutions and actors were often excluded and historical institutional settings were denied to begin from zero.

But Nadine Ansorg seemed to overlook the SSR dilemma experienced by most African states by simply projecting her focus of analysis on history, tradition and local ownership. On the one hand, external donors provide SSR activities with the required funds and technical expertise. On the other hand, local driven SSR programs have lacked the required expertise and funds and consequently ended up in authoritarian regimes. Hence, SSR programs in Africa need to strike a proper balance between external support and local ownership as well as between the role of informal and formal institutions.

Let us see the limitations of the SSR programs in Africa by bringing two country cases into perspective. The first case is Sierra Leone's SSR program. Following the end of the civil war in 1999, a relatively comprehensive SSR program was embarked with the involvement of the UN and the United Kingdom (hereinafter, UK) Government. The Sierra Leone military, police, justice, intelligence, and anti-corruption commission were the core targets of the SSR. Finally, donor policy incoherence (UK versus UN) and local competition for resources had resulted in failure of the SSR program (Bendix & Stanley, 2008).

The second case is Liberia's SSR program. In Liberia, a relatively narrowly conceived SSR Program encompassing DDR, the military, national police, and some other state SSIs – but gradually reduced to the military (US) and the police (UN) alone – was launched separately

by the UN bodies and the United States. But, a narrow focus, lack of coordination, and absence of local participation or ownership had finally led to failure (Weigand, 2015; Bendix & Stanley, 2008).

From the experiences of Sierra Leone and Liberia one can learn that in Africa the success of SSR programs has been constrained at both design and implementation levels. Even before raising the issue of local ownership, a narrowly conceived and designed SSR program can bring nothing more than silencing the gun at least temporarily. This position is supported and/ or explained by the SSR experience in Liberia. On the other hand, although SSR programs in Africa are well conceived and designed with the involvement of donors and local actors, actual implementation could be hampered by donor policy incoherence and the lack of commitment on the side of local actors as shown by the case in Sierra Leone.

Unless generalization exposed us to the risk of over-simplification, it appears that in Africa SSR is a failed experiment. Probably, the only exception to this is the Republic of South Africa (hereinafter, RSA) and Ghana. The Republic of South Africa is a good example in giving due emphasis for historical institutional settings and local context (choice and ownership) and subsequently the SSR activities were largely successful (Ansorg, 2017). This position on the SSR experience of the RSA was also supported by Bendix and Stanley (2008). They stated that although the SSR program in the RSA had received considerable funding from external actors, the whole process – from its inception to final execution – was done by South Africans themselves.

Outside the African continent, different empirical findings show that SSR has a success story in Central and East European states as well as in the Latin American states. Although reviewing each case is not within the scope of this thesis, from the practical experiences of CEE states and some Latin American states one can learn that if the premises of SSR are practically fulfilled both at the stages design and implementation as well as at headquarters and field levels by local and external actors who have a stake in SSR, the successful transformation of the security sector can bring a parallel transformation in sustainable development, good governance, rule of law and democratization.

2.3.2. Research Gaps

To begin with, in Ethiopia probably the security sector in general and SSR in particular are one of the few areas where research engagements appear very much limited. A number of reasons may be cited for the low level of research engagements in the security sector. The first commonly cited reason may be the sensitivity of the issue that led researchers to have little appetite to conduct research on security related matters. The second reason may be due to the sensitivity of the issue researchers might think that getting access to data would be a difficult exercise, if not a nightmare. Thirdly, they might not have the commitment and/ or courage to uncover constraints of the security sector and to face the risks followed, if any. In line with this, we should bear in mind that scholars have a moral and, more importantly, a professional duty to take all the risks and difficulties involved in their endeavor to produce knowledge in the respective disciplines and solve practical social problems.

Despite this fact, there were few attempts to investigate the practices of SSR in Ethiopia. In this regard, the first attempt was the article published on the Ethiopian Defense Force Reform in post-1991 by Mulugeta Gebrehiwot (2017). The objective of the article was to "chronicle" and "analyze" the transformation of the EPRDF's guerrilla fighters into a regular standing army of Ethiopia. The article heavily drew from the personal experiences – as a former guerrilla fighter and later on as a head of the DDR Commission – of the author himself. On this basis, the author concluded that the people's democratic army of the EPRDF has transformed into a strong professional national army and this is a uniquely important lesson other states – in Africa and beyond – can learn from.

But the article seemed to have both methodological limitations and factual errors. The author did not attempt any means to minimize subjectivity. As stated by the author himself, the article was primarily a chronicle or documentation of the success stories of defense transformation than conceptual and analytical. Moreover, his conclusion did not reflect the prevailing reality on the ground. In fact, the whole process of the so called defense reform was a crisis rather than success because surprisingly, the post-1991 'Ethiopian Defense Force praised by Mulugeta as a successfully transformed professional army was split in 2020 along

ideological (political party) and ethnic lines and fought in separate frontlines against one another.

Other attempts to conduct research on the SSR experience of Ethiopia were made by Yohannes Gebremeskel (2009) on defense reform for conflict prevention, Ewnetu Shegaw (2013) on institutional, legal and policy framework for police reform, Henok G. Gabisa (2015) on justice reform, Wallelign Zelalem (2018) on police reform, Oumer Abdi (2019) on community participation in SSG, and Gebrehiwot Kinfe (2020) on police reform and professionalism.

Although it is not relevant for the objective of this thesis to assess the methodological, thematic and other details of all these works, at least uncovering two of their relatively common features appear compelling. First, they lack critical analysis of the practical SSR experience in Ethiopia as they largely appear a selective assemblage of the success stories of mainly the defense sector. Second, all of these researches were based on narrowly conceived sector-based studies principally focused on defense and police reform, the limitations of which is well illustrated by OECD-DAC (2007) and DCAF (2009). The Liberian case also explains this gap. As these studies were sector-based and specific case analyses, they could not provide sufficient inputs for policy-making. In Ethiopia, up to the knowledge of the researcher, there is no research that attempted to employ such a comprehensive approach to study security sector reform. This thesis was therefore intended to fill this gap.

Finally, it is important to note that research engagement in SSR is limited not only in Ethiopia but also in other African countries as well. Varisco (2018) stated that the contribution of research and researchers for the SSR agenda and policy was very much limited. It seems due to this lack of academic engagement that SSR was primarily emerged as a policy agenda brought onboard by the donor community and largely remained prescriptive and normative. Consequently, SSR has lacked "...a strong theoretical and empirical basis" (p. 103). Earlier research on SSR was heavily influenced by donor policy and thus it largely focused on normative, technical and operational issues and was limited in scope. This is one

of the reasons why donor-driven SSG initiatives in most post-conflict countries of Africa have ended up in failure.

Therefore, the donor-driven, top-down and normative intervention imposed on the post-conflict societies in Africa under the banner of SSR could be challenged by developing conceptualizations, models and theories on the basis of local realities, interests and choices. For this, research provides the avenue both in driving new thinking which would influence conceptualization and practice of security governance initiatives in Africa.

2.4. Conceptual and/ or Theoretical Lens

As we saw in the previous sections of this chapter, the Post-Cold War security dynamics witnessed a shift not only in the referent object but also in the character and origin of threats to national security. Instead of simply taking the state as the only unit of analysis and projecting the origin of national security threats as having external origin, using other referent objects – beyond and above the state – and the role of domestic threats to national security have been well recognized and this was empirically supported with the occurrence of frequent civil-wars rather than inter-state wars, particularly in Africa. This gradual deepening and widening of the security concept has led to the emergence of people-centered understanding of security. Accordingly, today human security has captured the attention of not only international and regional security and development actors and national governments, but intellectual discourses as well.

Therefore, by taking the nature of the Ethiopian state and the available international legal regimes and/ or norms fundamentally grounded on the ideals of individual rights and freedoms, the primary unit of analysis in our SSR discourse should be the individual and communities. In a developing country context, although they all are relevant, due to the nature of threats and vulnerabilities facing humanity at home, human security matters more than state security.

Accordingly, this thesis fundamentally adopted the premises of the human security perspective as its analytical lens. Some may be skeptical about the analytical power of human

security to inform the thesis; but the *theory of securitization, de-securitization* and *securitizing move* introduced by the Copenhagen School helps us to give analytical focus for what constitutes the security concept in general and that of human security in particular. We should bear in mind that the SSR concept has been primarily born out from human security and it is based on international democratic norms and principles rather than on purely logical and theoretical frameworks and/ or foundations.

The SSR concept has emerged as a vehicle for human security and adopted as a norm particularly in the policy arena. The inherent interdependence between human security and SSR is well described by Wulf when he stated: "It[SSR] is about the security of every single human being within society, and about human security (Wulf, 2011, p 16). He goes on to argue that "After all, security sector reform means guaranteeing human security" (p. 21). However, the SSR concept does not cover every aspect or dimensions of human security such as economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (UNDP, 1994, pp. 24 –25), which together produce freedom from *fear*, freedom from *want* and freedom from *indignity* (Tadjbakhsh, 2013, p. 44).

Broadly, the SSR concept has four dimensions: namely, *political dimension* (democratic civilian oversight), *economic dimension* (allocation of resources), *social dimension* (actual security guarantee for citizens), and *institutional dimension* – structure and institutional separation (Brzoska, 2000; Wulf, 2000, p. 8; Wulf, 2011, p. 344; Anderlini & Conaway, 2012, p. 32). The *political dimension* mainly focuses on the various issues of good governance and the democratic civilian oversight of security institutions. The *economic dimension* addresses rational allocation of resources (budgets and finances) to prevent excessive funding and under-funding; accordingly identification of needs and objectives, affordability, prioritization of resource allocation, and efficiency and effectiveness in resource utilization are the main areas of reform.

The *social dimension* mainly focuses on actually ensuring the security of the individuals, communities and the state from internal and external security threats. Finally, the

institutional dimension mainly focuses on the definition of tasks and responsibilities among security sector institutions so as to ensure effectiveness, efficiency and accountability in security provision, management and oversight. This broad conceptualization, according to Wulf, (2011, pp, 344–345), enables us to put our understanding of SSR in the context of good governance, democracy and development – rather than in a narrowly conceived technical and institutional reform.

Intellectual engagements in SSR largely took normative stances. As some scholars said, even the debate between the traditionalists and non-traditionalists particularly in the Post-Cold War period led the security field itself to take a normative stance (Tarry, 1999). In the words of Tarry: "….The outcome is that the security debate has become fundamentally normative. Instead of focusing on what constitutes a methodologically sound and analytically meaningful definition, academics are engaged in a value-oriented debate about the actors that should be included and the issues that should be examined" (p. 1). Under this context, there are specific principles and norms suggested by scholars and the development community for the transformation of the security sector.

OECD-DAC (2007) recommended that SSR support for developing countries should be to help them achieve the following overarching objectives: establishing effective governance, oversight and accountability; improving and sustaining security and justice provision; and ensuring local ownership of the reform process. Furthermore, the AUC (2014) also recommended nine key elements of SSR programming and implementation that each Member State should follow: security sector review and needs assessment; national security strategies; institutional, legal and security policy frameworks; capacity-building and professionalization; institutionalization of partnerships and coordination mechanisms; democratic control and oversight; resource mobilization, funding and accountability; monitoring and evaluation; and communication strategy (p. 13).

Although SSR is context sensitive, there are commonly shared well-known norms and principles for the democratic transformation of the security sector, which constitute a theoretical model of SSR, namely, (1) a constitutional basis for the existence and functioning

of the sector's elements, (2) clear delineation of responsibilities and hierarchy of various services and organs, (3) rationality of budgetary outlays for the sector's existence, (4) legitimacy of its existence, (5) professional training and functioning of the sector's functionaries, (6) transparency, accountability, civil oversight, protection of human rights, and involvement of the civil society groups (Karkoszka, 2011, pp. 6–7).

The SSR program elements, principles and norms put forward above by AUC and Karkoszka do not show any significant deviation from the fundamental objectives, principles and norms first embraced by OECD-DAC in 2007. OECD-DAC considers *effectiveness* and *accountability* in security provision, management and oversight as the end goals of SSR and *democratic civilian control*, *rule of law*, and respect for *human rights* as the foundations towards that end. Therefore, in this thesis the SSR experience of Ethiopia in post-1991 was analyzed by adopting and integrating the norms and principles of good governance and democratic civilian control of the security sector suggested above by OECD-DAC, AUC and Karkoszka.

2.5. Chapter Summary

With the objective of setting the conceptual, theoretical, empirical, and methodological context for the thesis, first the attempts made by some prominent scholars to conceptualize the term 'security' and the intellectual disputes associated with it were presented. From this analysis, we understood that 'security has not yet acquired a universally accepted definition and its conceptualization is still evolving. In the discussions that followed, the thesis has tried to show that while the conventional theories of security sought to maintain the status-quo or normative values (such as state-centric and militaristic), contemporary theories appeal for change, transformation and emancipation and focused on the individual inner peace. It briefly reviewed the widening, deepening and humanizing of security and underscored on the conceptual and normative divide within the security field.

Accordingly, the thesis showed the shift of focus the security field has witnessed in the post-1990s from statist to human-centered and from mere violence (mainly military) to other threats as referent object and security threats respectively. Yet as there are security issues

which need global efforts, using the state as a referent object cannot be dismissed from the security calculus. By extension, a balanced perception of threats and understanding of referent objects should be required.

This was followed by a brief review on the emergence of the SSR concept and its characterization within the framework of human security. The review showed that at the center of achieving human security is security sector governance where the problems of insecurity and underdevelopment can be sufficiently alleviated. So in the subsequent discussions attempts were made to show the intersection of security, development and democracy under the context of a properly governed security sector.

The researcher also made a review of international experiences in SSR to draw relevant lessons for subsequent policy recommendations and this was followed by the analysis of existing research works in Ethiopia in the areas of SSR to identify the gaps and to justify how the thesis would fill them. Finally, the chapter explores the norms and principles used as a theoretical and/ or conceptual lens for the subsequent analysis of the SSR experience in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

The main purpose of this research was to explore, describe and explain security sector reform experiences and challenges in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia through the lens of the available normative frameworks (constitutions and other grand security policy and strategy documents) and through the perspectives and values of major actors of the security sector institutions, academics, parliamentarians, civil society organizations and the like. In order to achieve this objective, the chapter elaborates on the selected research approach, research design, research methods and procedures, data analysis, issues of validity, credibility and research ethics best suited to the study as informed by a prior corresponding ontological and epistemological position. This would, in turn, provide appropriate guidance as to how the general research process should advance.

3.2. Ontological and Epistemological Assumption

At the outset, we all should bear in mind that there is no one unifying ontological and epistemological position indisputably accepted and used by all scholars. The issue of ontology and epistemology has rather created a big gulf among scholars within and, particularly, across different fields of study. Before directly delving into the existing ontological and epistemological debates, first it appears logical to clarify their meaning. Therefore, in the words of Furlong and Marsh (2010, p. 185), "Ontological questions focus on the very nature of 'being'; literally an ontology is the study of 'being'… [or] 'existence'." This means that ontology signifies our view of the form and nature of the world and thus it shapes our orientation about what we perceive something as 'real' and what we do.

On the other hand, epistemology refers to a theoretical stance which would inform the overall research approach and design by clarifying how to study what we considered it 'real' (Creswell, 2012; Crotty, 1998). By extension, epistemology is 'a theory of knowledge' that underlines on the nature of relationship to be established between the 'knower' and what can

be ‘known’ in the process of conducting scientific research (Furlong and Marsh, 2010, p. 185) or "the researcher and that being researched" (Creswell, 2007, p. 17). Therefore, ontology and epistemology can guide the research process by focusing on how theory, research approach, design, methods and procedures are aligned with our understanding of what is ‘real’ and how to deal with it. Generally, Creswell (2003 cited in Creswell, 2007, p. 16) summarizes the essence of ontology and epistemology as: “…philosophical assumptions consist of a stance toward the nature of reality (ontology), how the researcher knows what she or he knows (epistemology), the role of values in the research (axiology), the language of research (rhetoric), and the methods used in the process (methodology).”

There are two broad ontological and epistemological debates on the form and nature of reality or ‘being’ and how to approach it; namely, positivism or objectivism and constructivism or subjectivism. These two philosophical assumptions or worldviews are often applied by paradigm purist scholars whose research engagement primarily aspires contribution to knowledge. In this regard, the first and oldest ontological position or worldview is positivism, which asserts the existence of a 'real world out there' independent of our knowledge of it (Furlong & Marsh 2010; Creswell, 2007). Positivism views the world as something made up of 'discrete objects' whose properties are independent of the researcher or observer. Therefore, all researchers are expected to view and understand these objects in the same way as long as they have the required 'skills and good judgment' (Furlong & Marsh, 2010, p. 190). In epistemological terms, this means that positivism puts the researcher as an independent or detached observer from that being researched.

On the other hand, constructivism argues against the positivists’ assumption of the existence of a ‘real world’ independently of *the meaning actors attach to their action*. Constructivism assumes that “Reality is not an entity waiting to be discovered....” (Pritchard & Woollard, 2010, p.7). It views the world as constructed by human-beings through social interaction and interface with the environment. Constructivism advocates the presence of a subjective and multiple reality as seen by different actors or observers (Creswell, 2007). Yet it underscores on the socially constituted nature of reality by putting the individual world as a subset of the larger unified social world (Belbase (2014). Hence, constructivism ignores the presence of

individual reality completely detached from the social world. In epistemological terms, constructivism does not consider the researcher as a completely detached observer from that being researched. As such, the researcher is expected to be as closer as possible to those being researched and interpret the meanings of their understanding of the world in which they live and work.

This thesis is informed by the constructivist view of the world. This is primarily because the term security itself is subjective in nature, that is, it means different for different people across time, space and condition. It follows that states, groups and individuals may not have the same perception of and reaction to security threats. Accordingly, this thesis considered institutions and structures as meaningful constructions of the key state actors by using their ideas, beliefs, identities, and norms (ideational factors) as their filters. The action and reaction of the actors and observers on the security sector institutions is determined by the meaning and significance they attach to them. This helps the researcher to get a comprehensive understanding of the security sector reform/governance experience in the post-1991 Ethiopian state-building in its totality. Therefore, instead of imposing a predefined conceptual framework on the participants of the study, the researcher tended to primarily approach the SSR experience in Ethiopia from the "emic" or the 'insiders' perspective.

At this juncture, it appears sensible to indicate that generally where to start in any scientific research endeavor is still contested. Some scholars concentrate on worldview or philosophical assumption as a starting point in researching while others give more emphasis for research questions and purpose. Paradigm purist positivists and subjectivists consider paradigm as a starting point to inform the subsequent determination of the best approaches, designs, methods and procedures. On the other hand, pragmatists tend to concentrate on research purpose and/ or questions as a basis or point of departure. In this thesis, the choice of its theoretical lens and the research approach, methods and procedures was informed by the paradigm purist subjectivist positions.

3.3. Research Approach

Informed by the ontological and epistemological assumptions outlined above, this thesis has used qualitative research approach to deeply understand the research agenda under treatment. The thesis did not mix quantitative and qualitative research approaches because in line with the selected worldview and epistemological stance for this analysis the researcher considered them as incompatible or polar opposites. Beyond this, the nature of the research issue and the basic research questions of the thesis have centered on the *what*, *how* or *why* questions – rather than *how many* or *how much* – which require a holistic understanding. The purpose was to get a more or less complete understanding of the SSR experiences in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia and come up with a full picture of the research agenda. Therefore, rather than limiting our analysis on a few discrete variables, as in quantitative inquiry, the thesis attempted to understand the perspectives of security actors and practical experiences of SSR in Ethiopia in its totality.

When the thesis employed qualitative approach, it implicitly acknowledges its reliance on a constructivist or subjectivist philosophical assumption. It follows that institutions and structures are considered as mere constructions by human actors, rather than givens. In line with this, the researcher sought to analyze the ideas, beliefs, assumptions, norms and practical experiences the key state and security actors have in their engagement with reforming security sector institutions. As the study was purely qualitative, the researcher has attempted to understand the issue through the 'emic' or 'insiders' perspective. This means that, rather than imposing some predefined concepts and variables, the researcher examined the issue in its totality through the views, perspectives and practical experiences of the research participants and then bracketed their ideas and perspectives in the research process through in-text and indented quotations.

Then as qualitative research is essentially a meaning-making process, rather than counting frequencies, interpretation of the perspectives and experiences of the research participants' in terms of the meanings they carry was made. This qualitative research approach tradition is interestingly stated by Furlong and Marsh (2010, p. 185) as: "...the world is interpreted by the actors and their interpretation is interpreted by the observer. Ariadne Vromen also

underscored on “the centrality of meaning, context and history” in qualitative research (Vromen, 2010, p. 255). Therefore, the study’s reliance on qualitative research approach gave the researcher to come up with an in-depth understanding of how the key state security actors thought about SSR and in consequence how they experienced it.

3.4. Research Design and Methods

Research design refers to what data is required, what methods are going to be used to collect and analyze this data, and how all of these are going to answer research questions (Kothari, 2004). Gray (2009, p. 131) also defined research design as “the overarching plan for the collection, measurement and analysis of data.” Hence, research design serves the researcher as a blueprint in the data collection, measurement, analysis, and interpretation process.

Informed by the selected research approach discussed under 3.3 above and its purpose, this thesis was expected to describe what SSR exactly looks-like in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia and then interpret what this means in terms of ensuring the security of the state, communities and the individual citizen. Practically, security sector reform is largely norm-referenced and thus it invites more of policy debates rather than theoretical and conceptual analysis. To further elaborate this position, a slight cursor into its evolution showed that SSR was originally emerged from the policy circle rather than from the intellectual debates.

The above background information about the nature of SSR suggests that the study should be evaluative in nature. Accordingly, the SSR experience of Ethiopia in the post-1991 state-building process was critically appraised by bringing international norms and local contexts into perspective. Thus this thesis made a critical appraisal of the perspectives and practical experiences of SSR in Ethiopia by using – among others – the FDRE Constitution, the OECD-DAC, and the DCAF as major SSR normative frameworks against which the success or failure stories of the security sector of Ethiopia have been evaluated. Yet it is important to note that the main thrust of this thesis was not limited to the analysis of the gaps between the international norms of SSR and practice or how ideas were interpreted into practice. Instead, its subject of analysis was extended to the exploration and appropriateness of the norms

themselves and how and to what extent ideas related to SSR have been evolved in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia as well.

3.4.1. Data Sources

Both primary and secondary sources of data have constituted the evidence bases of this thesis. Broadly speaking, the major primary sources of data for this thesis were those primarily affecting and get affected by security provision, management and oversight in Ethiopia. Data extracted from these primary sources through key informant interviews and in-depth interviews would help us to understand the perspectives and practical experiences of security sector reform/governance in Ethiopia and the apparent opportunities and challenges associated with it.

On the other hand, the secondary sources of data for the thesis were extracted from the review or analysis of various legal, policy and strategic documents of the country and other academic or theoretical contributions related to security and security sector governance. These secondary sources of data would mainly help us to understand the policy and theoretical context on security sector governance on the post-1991 state-building process in Ethiopia. Finally, the conclusion and implications of major findings of the study were made on the basis of the convergence of data obtained from the above primary and secondary sources.

3.4.2. Study Population and Sampling

In a research context, population refers to all subjects that the researcher wants to study (Kothari, 2004). Therefore, the study population for this research includes all affecting and gets affected by security provision, management and oversight in Ethiopia. On the other hand, the target population of the study includes only key actors of the major state security sector institutions of the country that are mandated to use force. Since it is practically difficult to access all of these state and security actors, the participants of the study were purposefully selected on the basis of relevance and accessibility.

Therefore, participants of the key informant interviews (KIIs) and in-depth interviews (IIs) were selected by using purposive sampling. Some of those people in the policy circle who have adequate information about SSR experiences in Ethiopia were accessed through snowball sampling. In this thesis, a total of 9 (nine) interviews – 5 with security sector institutions, 2 with academia, 1 with opposition political parties, and 1 with civil society organizations (CSOs) – were conducted in a face-to-face session. As the purpose of qualitative inquiry is looking for depth and variety in the data collected rather than ensuring representativeness of the study participants and convergence of responses, the number of those interviewed was, more or less, sufficient to get a wealth of information and reach the study's conclusion.

3.4.3. Data Collection Instruments

In line with the research approach and design proposed for the study, purely qualitative data were collected to answer the research questions and achieve its purpose. Therefore, the main data gathering instruments employed in this thesis were document review, key informant interviews, in-depth interviews, and non-participant field observations. As one instrument of data collection offsets the limitations of the other, this data triangulation (the utilization of different tools) would help the researcher to minimize unanticipated data quality distortions in the research process.

Document Review

A desk review of the available conceptual, theoretical, empirical, and methodological literatures was made to understand the analytical and policy context of SSR in Ethiopia and beyond. More importantly, the researcher reviewed the FDRE Constitution, different proclamations, policies, strategies, and other legal and normative provisions related to SSR. Some of the constitutional and legal frameworks or provisions were also used as supplementary normative frameworks against which the successes or failures of SSR experiences in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia have been compared. A significant portion of the normative frameworks for the evaluation of SSR experiences in

Ethiopia were adopted from FDRE Constitution, the OECD-DAC and DCAF frameworks for SSR.

Beyond all these, the researcher's affiliation with the Ethiopian Ministry of Defense and his experience of closely working with other security sector institutions of Ethiopia helped him to get access to some relevant policy documents and reports unknown to the academic community. Among others, the researcher was able to easily access the following key publications: Army-building in a Revolutionary Democracy (often called the *Red Book*), *Addis Raey* (in English, *New Vision*), *Wegagen Newspaper*, *the New Ethiopian Army-building Strategy that replaced the EPRDF's Red Book,* and others that were used by the EPRDF Government to guide the process of building a Defense Force manipulated as a guardian of its so-called revolutionary democracy. Until very recently, no one could access these publications except those members of the Ethiopian Defense Force mandated to undertake indoctrination activities.

Semi-Structured Interview

Interview is one of the most common tools of data collection in qualitative research. In capitalizing the comparative superiority of interviews over particularly questionnaire survey, Best and Kahn (2005) stated that research participants often 'prefer to talk than to write.' In addition to this, as unstructured interview often gives the participants of the study the freedom to express their views, ideas, feelings and experiences, it helps the researcher to get in-depth information about the perspectives and practical experiences of SSR in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia.

The semi-structured interview was conducted face-to-face with the selected key state security actors, academics, representatives of CSOs, and security experts. Beyond the information obtained through their direct responses to the questions posed by the researcher, the facer-to-face interview session with the participants of the study also gave the researcher the opportunity to further understand their feelings and emotions from a critical reading of their body language. As information in the security sector is often largely secured, the semi-

structured interview helped the researcher to discover some novel cases in the research process.

Non-Participant Observation

The researcher has made repeated visits in the selected security sector institutions of Ethiopia before and during the data collection period. In these visits, beyond the data obtained through document review and interviews, the researcher has the opportunity to observe as to how the security sector institutions behave and function. As such, the researcher recorded detailed field notes on what was observed or encountered and heard through informal communications with people working in these institutions.

3.5. Methods of Data Analysis

In principle, qualitative data analysis begins from the first day of data collection (that is, from the first qualitative document review, the first observation and the first interview). Accordingly, first a qualitative document analysis of the available legal, policy and strategic security documents and qualitative data collected through observations and interviews were analyzed. The qualitative document analysis has begun with developing content categories directly related to the research questions of the study. After coding the text in the content categories, the qualitative content analysis proceeds with the description of the nature of the main content categories themselves and then, the texts coded into these categories were both relationally and thematically analyzed to understand the premises and experiences of security sector governance in Ethiopia. The thematic analysis helped us to identify and interpret patterns and themes in the data

Beyond this, interview responses from all the study's participants were analyzed by using thematic analysis. As such, first all audio-taped interview data were transcribed and then the researcher went through (read) them carefully to look for the meaning they communicate. From these responses the researcher has developed or created broad themes that reflect the meanings they carry. As data in qualitative research is emergent, the categories were not sometimes overlapped with the research questions of the study. When this happened, rather than developing thematic categories that did not exactly reflect the responses or datasets, it

was apparently made adjustments on the research questions. Next, codes were assigned to the main themes and the researcher had gone through the transcripts of all the interviews and the responses were classified under the different themes. More descriptive major topics and sub-topics were formulated through a repeated data filtration process or through integrating the themes and responses.

Finally, after the analysis of the qualitative data collected, the next logical step was to find overall meaning and implications of the findings of the study by deeply exploring issues related to what was important in the data, why was it important, what could be learned from it, so what and the like. The fact that data analysis simply tells us what is in the data whereas interpretations and implications involve making sense of or extracting meaning from the data. Therefore the conclusion and implications of the findings of the study were made on the basis of the interpretations and, or the extraction of meaning from the data collected and thematically and relationally analyzed. In other words, conclusions and implications were followed from the analysis and interpretation of the data on first what it meant and then how it was related to the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia.

3.6. Mechanisms of Data Quality Assurance

3.6.1. Issues of validity and credibility

Validity and credibility constitute the major threats to any research endeavor. Borrowing from Merriam (2009), reliability in quantitative research denotes repeatability whereas in qualitative research the appropriate term is *credibility*, which refers to the interface between the results and the data or whether the findings directly emerge from the data collected. Therefore, in order to achieve validity and credibility, this thesis has applied the principle of data *triangulation*, *member checks* or *respondent validation*, *adequate engagement* (adequate time spent in the field) and *peer review* throughout the research process.

3.6.2. Ethical Considerations

As social research deals with human subjects, the issue of ethics in this context is related to the relationship between the researcher and the researched (research participants). Borrowing

from Silverman (2010) and Gray (2009), this thesis has been guided by such ethical principles as ensuring *informed consent* (to participate voluntarily), *confidentiality* (not to disclose their responses to anyone in any form without consent), *anonymity* (not to disclose their exact names and other identities without permission), *respecting privacy*, not to use *deception*, and *avoiding harm*, in any means, to the study participants.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1. Introduction

This chapter was organized to analyze and interpret the different datasets collected through different instruments of data collection and to discuss the findings of the study in the context of the available scholarship. The analytical themes or headings and sub-headings under which the data was organized, filtered, analyzed, interpreted and discussed have been primarily created by referring to the basic research questions of the study. However, it is important to note that as particularly qualitative data analysis is largely emergent, some of the themes or headings and sub-headings for the organization, analysis and interpretation of data and findings of the study were created and some of the research questions were revisited. Thus, the organization, analysis, and interpretations have all presented over the next few pages with apposite headings and sub-headings.

4.2. Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Study Population

In this thesis, the researcher initially intended to conduct interviews with fourteen study participants from academia, CSOs and officials and experts from selected security sector and related institutions. However, the volatile security situation of the country coupled with the unwillingness of some security sector personnel to participate in the study for clearly stated personal reasons, it was extremely difficult to get primary data mainly from some of the state security sector officials and experts as intended. In the end, there were a total of nine purposefully selected persons (5 from security sector institutions, 2 from academia, 1 from opposition political parties, and 1 from civil society organizations) who willingly participated in the interview. In order to compensate this decline in the number and variety of primary sources, the researcher has got very key previously classified secondary data mainly from the state security sector institutions.

In qualitative researches of this type, the socio-demographic characteristics of the study participants is mainly required to justify the quality (dependability, validity, relevance) and

variety of the sources as well as the data collected. Therefore, in this section of the chapter a detailed presentation of the socio-demographic attributes of the study participants was not made simply because they all were matured adults, well-educated, and experienced in the areas of security, peace, conflict, and related disciplines to provide in-depth valuable data that would help to achieve the stated objectives of the thesis.

Notwithstanding this fact, it appears relevant to highlight on the age distribution, educational status, and work experience of the study participants. Accordingly, almost all of the study participants were aged 40 years and above and this implies that they have physical, psychological and emotional readiness to participate in the study, to provide adequate information and to take responsibility for what they said or at least to understand the consequences of what they shared with the researcher. In terms of educational status, the participants of the study have second degree and above in different fields of study. As the variety, depth, quality and dependability of information provided increases with increasing level of educational attainment, the participants of the study have the required minimum level of education to critically assess the SSR experiences in Ethiopia. Finally, the minimum work experience of the study participants was eleven years, and this suggests that they were familiar with their respective areas of responsibility.

4.3. Analysis and Interpretation of Findings

The nature of security provision, management, and oversight cannot be separated from the political ordering of the state. The fact is that the sources of security and insecurity for the state, communities and individuals are deeply embedded in the nature and characteristics of political, social, economic and security organization of the polity or political entity. Therefore, in order to critically analyze the SSR experiences in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia, first the nature of the Ethiopian state should be understood to also serve as setting a context for the next analysis. Moreover, it is extremely difficult to examine the success or failure stories of SSR as independently from trajectories of the Ethiopian state system (nature of the state).

This was followed by the analysis of the constitutional and legal bases for the organization of security in Ethiopia and the SSR experiences that followed. It is important to note that a good place to start a critical analysis of the success and failure stories of SSR in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia is to look at the available normative frameworks, ideological, political and historical details for security governance. Then, in the section that followed the practical experiences of SSR in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia were analyzed and interpreted by bringing the available constitutional, legal, and security policy frameworks, and capacity-building and professionalization, democratic control and oversight and related normative frameworks of the security governance and reforms as analytical lenses. The analysis and interpretation of data in this chapter get concluded by exploring and pinpointing the major challenges of security sector governance in post-1991 and their impacts for successful state-building.

4.4. A Critical Analysis of the State of the State in Post-1991 Ethiopia

The year 1991 marked a watershed in the political-history of Ethiopia. Almost all the pre-1991 political leaders of modern Ethiopia had engaged in the twin purposes of modernization and consolidation of state (and personal) power on the basis of, more or less, a strong pan-Ethiopian identity. But, after the overthrow of the Marxist Regime in May 1991, the new ruling elites under the umbrella of the TPLF-dominated EPRDF have followed a radical departure from their predecessors by introducing the ethno-linguistic based federalism as an organizing principle for the so called 'New Ethiopia.' This is diametrically opposed to that envisaged by the previous Ethiopian political elites.

Accordingly, a new constitution was formulated and ratified on the 21st of August 1995 through which the so-called 'nations, nationalities and peoples' have generously given the right to self-determination up to secession (Article 39(1)), equality of their languages (Article 5), using and developing their language and preserving their history (Article 39(2)), self-government (Article 39(3)); and many more. To achieve this constitutional premise, nine regional states and two city administrations were created as per Article 47(1) of the 1995 FDRE Constitution. Two more regional states were created following the political reforms since 2018 and many more regional states supposed to be instituted over the next few years.

Then power was shared between the Federal Government and Regional States and, for almost the last three decades, ethno-national regional states have – with all its limitations – enjoyed the right to self-government on the basis of self-rule and shared rule. This new reordering of the Ethiopian political society has been hailed by ethnic elites at home and the international community (United States and its allies) as an ultimate savior of the longstanding historic state from disintegration and as a panacea to all social and political ills. As envisioned by the 1995 FDRE Constitution, creating 'one political and economic community' through the mantra of 'unity-in-diversity' seemed to have been romanticized, yet keep on serving as effective rulemaking rhetoric thus far.

Of course, the ethno-linguistic federalism introduced to address the question of nationalities long aspired by ethnic elites could not be taken as a problem in itself. This is because in view of international realities and domestic political and security context, addressing diversities at any level appears the order of that day. It was evident that with the disintegration of the former USSR and the end of the Cold War, globally for almost all states the politics of identity has become more dominant and urgent than the choice of economic system and political ideology (Miller, 1995, Smith, 1999). Furthermore, a number of Ethiopian scholars (see for instance, Assefa Fiseha, 2013; Alem, 2004; Tesfaye, 2010) also assert that ethnic federalism was the only available option for the EPRDF to maintain the unity and territorial integrity of the state.

However, the inherent – and most important – questions for the interest of this thesis are: *Did the EPRDF leaders and their ethnic affiliates have the readiness to build a politically and economically viable Ethiopian state on the basis of rule of law, human rights, equality, equity, and democratic governance as promised? Is the balance sheet of trajectories of state-building in the past three decades illustrating a success or failure story?* This sub-section of the thesis was set to address these questions as a basis for the analysis of the security sector governance in the subsequent sub-sections of the chapter. It analyzed some of the key political developments in post-1991 Ethiopia that have a huge impact on the ways in which the security sector has been organized and governed.

A number of sources indicate that dissatisfactions and tensions with the reordering of the Ethiopian political society had begun to emerge starting from the transitional period. The July 1, 1991 Addis Ababa Conference – which adopted the Transitional Period Charter to function as an interim constitution and established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (1991 to 1995) to oversee, draft and ratify the Constitution – was attended by ethnic-based political parties only and dominated by the TPLF and its affiliates (Merera, 2004; Bachech, 2008; Shimelis, 2017). Other political factions – to state some but not all, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (*MEISON* in Amharic), the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF) – were calculatedly excluded. In this case, the Addis Ababa Conference could be simply described as the "Conference of Nationalities" (Bachech, 2008).

Even later developments showed that the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and other prominent ethnic-based insurgencies had withdrawn from the transition and resumed the armed struggle. Such exclusionary political dispensations seemed to have coupled with the longstanding aspirations of the TPLF for hegemony over the 'high politics,' rather perverted the TGE to be a mere self-serving consortium. The TPLF-dominated TGE was accused of arbitrary arrests of opposition political leaders, committing human rights abuses, and discriminations. In relation to this, on April 1, 1995, Amnesty International released a report on Ethiopia stating that: "The Ethiopian authorities are prosecuting officials of the former government for gross human rights violations, but the Transitional Government has not acted with equal determination against abuses by its own forces." This was the first alert for us about towards where the system was heading.

As per the news released by AFP on 31 March 1992, although the OLF had organized a peaceful demonstration to protest against the killing of its two leaders in Dire Dawa, the EPRDF forces opened fire in the direction of the crowd and killed ninety persons and wounded three hundred more people. Furthermore, Alex de Wwaal, who has been considered by many as the passionate supporter of the TPLF, wrote on the article published on 'World Policy Journal' in July 1992 affirmed that the hopes of democratic transition was halted by violent conflicts between the EPRDF and the former opposition groups (de Waal, 1992).

In the end, the political transition was concluded in 1995 by bringing a *de jure* multiparty politics – as stated in the FDRE Constitution – but a *de facto* authoritarian solo party rule in post-1991 Ethiopia. As a result, a minority ethnic elite political domination, resource control, social exclusion, inequality, human rights abuse, nepotism and corruption have become the defining attributes of the system. By extension, the ethno-linguistic federalism introduced by the TPLF-dominated EPRDF ethnic elites as a panacea to all political ills has become part of the problem. Consequently, although the reordering of Ethiopian polity since 1991 was envisaged to curb the challenges of disintegration, surprisingly enough after 27 years of iron-handed rules by the EPRDF, Ethiopia has once again found itself at the verge of disintegration. Not only has this proved to what extent were interventions of state-building ill-advised, but also partly symptomized that the short term policies have become long term problems of Ethiopia. Manifestly, such a trajectory of state building seems to be the Gordian knot of Ethiopian political debacle.

However, as an academic engagement, we should go beyond the outcome and trace the very kernel of the problem and discern its very cause. So, *why the post-1991 governing elites have failed to keep their promises of creating one political and economic community through what they often called 'unity in diversity?* For the EPRDF leadership, ousting the Marxist regime in May 1991 had both military and political goals. The post-war constitutional, legal, and political approaches that the EPRDF ethnic elite resorted in Ethiopia were emanated from its military victory. Accordingly, the constitutional order, legal order, political order, and other policies have originated essentially from triumphant nationalism, where the TPLF and EPLF were the leading titleholders. Many political ideals and other legal premises that Ethiopia set to have controlled over the succeeding years were mainly fetched from the political programs of the TPLF, and from the agreements of the infamous elite bargaining by the TPLF, EPLF and OLF men in *Senafe* (Eritrea) at the down of 1990. Therefore, the victors' peace was the one that manifested as early on 1991, gradually but surely it had turned to peace by admission and rule by law.

Furthermore, it seemed that the TPLF-dominated EPRDF ethnic elites have had an overlearning of the military victory against the Marxist regime as a result of which they

developed the mindset of ‘one size fits all’ strategy in their subsequent strategic engagement with various political actors in Ethiopia and beyond. Partly such a mindset by the EPRDF leadership allegedly to have propelled the interstate war of Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1991. Conceivably, the same leadership mindset dazed by overlearning of the military victory also seemed to have precipitated the military crisis in northern Ethiopia in November 2020.

It was also witnessed that over the past three decades the role of the ruling front and the government – even the state – was essentially indistinguishable. The EPRDF-led government has been conterminous with ruling front, and this was among other defining features of domestic body politic. Such relationship was officially stated in the Red Book prepared for building the Ethiopian Defense Force as a guardian for EPRDF’s ideology of revolutionary democracy. It affirmed that in the current practical context of Ethiopia protecting state security and security of the revolutionary democratic system is one and the same – two sides of a coin (p. 25). The Red Book blatantly stated as if the state and the party are one and the same (Ethiopia means EPRDF and vice versa). The argument behind this bold assertion was that in the absence of the EPRDF leadership role, Ethiopia will disintegrate. Consequently, the government made to have been conterminous with the ruling front would mean that politics has always taken precedence over policies. One could speculate intellectually to what extent such politics put out of action efforts of state building.

Moreover, from the very beginning the TPLF elites had no a clear vision of Ethiopia. In a series of interviews with mainstream and social media after the 2018 reform, the TPLF political elites had admitted the fact that their guerrilla struggle was intended to liberate and create the Republic of Tigray (Aregawi, 2008). In addition to this, the division emerged within the TPLF camp in 1988 between the strategic leadership and guerrilla fighters – what is often known as *enfishfish* – after the liberation of Tigray from the forces of the Marxist Regime is a case in point. Some guerrilla fighters had put down their arms and went home. This supports the position that their decision to rule over Ethiopia was incidental than intentional.

That is why, the TPLF-dominated EPRDF leadership had officially advocated building one political community but tacitly – sometimes openly – followed and exercised a policy of 'divide and rule' under the banner of appreciation and respect for diversities. From the very beginning, the leadership of the architect of the ethno-linguistic federal system clearly understood that if the system properly functioned as clearly stated in the 1995 Constitution, they would not be able dominate the existing political, economic and security policies, structures and functions as they did for the last three decades. Indeed in a truly representative democracy and stable political order, a minority ethnic elite like TPLF would not emerge as a dominant political and military power and put each title contender under its toes.

Furthermore, as indicated in chapter one of this thesis, Ethiopia is a weak state and hence the authority and legitimacy of not only the governing elite but also the state itself has been contested. Thus, predatory and abusive use of force characterizes the state's monopoly of violence Wulf (2021, p. 13). As in other weak states, the use of force is not often based on the "consent of the governed" and aimed to sustain regime security. Such abusive and predatory use of force was not possible in the absence of overlapping interests between the political elites and the leadership of security sector institutions for a shared goal of sustaining their monopoly of power and resources. Historically, the strategic leaders of the SSIs were largely ideologically entwined with the ruling party and hence they wanted to sustain existing power structures. During the seventeen years of armed struggle, the strategic leaders of the current state SSIs were once political leaders as well in the same way as the political leaders of the EPRDF were also once military leaders as well. Beyond this, they have also ethnic and family ties. In this context, it was difficult to differentiate between partisan politics and SSIs in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia.

Generally, the leadership of the EPRDF had seen ousting the Military regime and assuming political power as the only and final battle to engage with so as to create the Tigray Republic or to alleviate Ethiopia's longstanding deep-rooted political tensions and sustain its hegemony. But, in practice it was the beginning of a long battle to engage in state-building and nation-building. That is why, the adoption of ethnic-based federalism and granting the 'nations, nationalities and peoples' the right to self-determination upto cessation was

considered by the EPRDF leaders as a panacea to all the country's political, economic and social problems. They thought – as they often say – answering the question of nationalities has been the only question awaiting their struggle and leadership. They had failed to flexibly adapt themselves to the changing political, economic, social and security environment at different levels and, most importantly, to the growing demands of the people.

In the post-1991 ethnic federalism experiment, political elites from within the EPRDF party (and now PP) cell and outside have instrumentalized and exploited ethnic identity to merely monopolize and sustain power, resources and status. Unfortunately, after three decades of experimentation the 'divide and rule' strategy had turned against its own creator. Suspicion and lateral division within the EPRDF party cell itself and mass protests against the EPRDF Government have brought the reformist Abiy Ahmed into power. Although the incumbent Prime Minister took some bold measures and tried to open the political landscape, ethno-religious extremism and very capricious incompatibilities among the political and economic elite are now seemingly posing existential threat for the continuity of the state. Therefore, it is within this context that the SSR experiences in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia should be understood.

4.5. Constitutional and Legal Bases for SSR in Ethiopia

In any context – be it transition from violent conflict to peace or authoritarian rule to democratic system – security sector reform is guided by certain norms and principles which could serve as fundamental bases for security provision, management and oversight so as to ensure the safety and security of individuals, communities and the state. In line with this, the African Union Commission explicitly acknowledges that adequate legal and security policy frameworks are the foundations for member states to meaningfully engage in SSR activities. It further states that the security policy is expected to reflect the main national interests, core values, sectoral priorities, legal basis, and role of key actors in the security sector policy making and implementation process.

In the preceding sub-sections of this thesis, we have attempted to briefly show how the post-1991 reordering of the Ethiopian political society has ended in more of failure by mainly

looking at some of the political and social dimensions of state-building. However, this sub-section of the thesis has critically looked at whether the available constitutional and legal provisions as well as the ensuing security policy and strategy can provide adequate grounds for SSR activities in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia. To this end, a brief description and analysis of the provisions of the 1995 FDRE Constitution and the ensuing proclamations and regulations, the 2002 Ethiopian Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy, and the Ethiopian National Security Council for threat perception and security provision, management and oversight was made. Some other structures legally mandated for the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms were also explored. This was followed by a critical analysis of these provisions in the light of their relevance for security provision, management and oversight.

To begin with, the 1995 FDRE Constitution has provided the legal bases for the organization of security sector institutions in Ethiopia. Article 51(6) of the Constitution provides legal grounds for the establishment the state security sector institutions. Article 87 of the Constitution provides five basic principles of National Defense: equitable representation of nations and nationalities in the composition of the national armed forces (sub-article 1); the defense minister to be a civilian (sub-article 2); its mission to be protecting the sovereignty of the country and discharging any responsibilities under any state of emergency declared in accordance with the Constitution (sub-article 3); obeying and respecting the Constitution (sub-article 4); and to carry out its mission free from any partisan politics (sub-article 5). Accordingly, the 1995 Constitution clearly provides important grounds for civil-military relations and the democratic control of armed forces.

There are also some other legal frameworks for the provision, management and oversight of security in post-1991. As clearly stated in their respective proclamations – Defense Forces Proclamation No. 1100/2019, Federal Police Establishment Proclamation No. 720/2011, and NISS Proclamation No. 804/2013 – each security sector institution is subjected to democratic control and oversight by the legislative, executive and judicial organs of the government and the auditor general. By Federal Police Establishment Proclamation No. 720/2011, the Ethiopian Federal Police was accountable to the Ministry of Federal Affairs. But, in the

Amended Proclamation No. 944/2016 the Federal Police Commission is made answerable to the Prime Minister. This means that all these three key state security sector institutions are made answerable to the Prime Minister.

Therefore, without jeopardizing the national security of the country, the activities of these SSIs were made to be monitored and supervised by the designated Standing Committee of the House of Peoples' Representatives, the Prime Minister, the judiciary, and the auditor general. The Proclamations have also provided relevant grounds for the organization of security sector institutions along with their clearly defined powers and duties. In the legislative organ, there was the Foreign, Defense and Security Standing Committee of the House of People's Representatives mandated to monitor and oversee the performance of the security sector institutions.

In addition to this, the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy was also formulated in 2002 which, among others, defined the EPRDF Government's threat perception as well as the means to ensuring the security of individuals, communities and the state. The Security Policy and Strategy has, more or less, defined poverty and lack of good governance and democratization as looming security threats for the polity. Accordingly, different institutions which could help to ensure good governance and to accelerate the democratization process were created. Similarly, in order to fight poverty and achieve accelerated development five-year rolling poverty reduction strategies were formulated and implemented since 2006.

Furthermore, there is also a National Security Council which may, more or less, serve as a common platform for security providers. The Ethiopian National Security Council (ENSC) was established by Proclamation No. 257/2001. The Council has seven permanent members: The Prime Minister (Chairperson), the Deputy Prime Minister (Deputy Chairperson), the Foreign Affairs Minister (Member), the Defense Minister (Member), the Head of the Security, Immigration and Refugee Affairs Authority (Member), the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (Member), and the Head of the Office of the Prime Minister (Member and Secretary). The key functions of the ENSC were advising the Prime Minister with respect to

the integration and proper implementation of national security policies (foreign, domestic and defense). It also provides technical support in assessing national security threats and forwarding the measures to be taken along with their implementation guidelines.

As clearly stated in the literature review chapter of this thesis, SSR assumes what a security sector should look like in an ideal democratic system. By extension, in an ideal democracy where the boundary among the state, the government and the ruling party are clearly defined and separated not only on paper but also in practice, we can say that the 1995 Constitution and subsequent proclamations have provided more or less acceptable constitutional and legal grounds for the provision, management and oversight of security sector institutions. The Constitution also has important provisions for the protection of human and democratic rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals and communities (human security). Towards this end, some institutions like the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the Institution of the Ombudsman were legally created by Proclamation No. 210/2000 and Proclamation No. 211/2000 respectively.

However, when we critically assess some of the existing constitutional and legal provisions for security provision, management and oversight there are some gaps which deserve consideration. Article 87(2) of the 1995 Constitution stated that 'the Minister of Defense shall be civilian.' In response to this, by the Ethiopian Defense Forces Proclamation No. 1100/2019, both the Minister and the General Chief of Staff are made accountable to the Prime Minister. As the power and duties of each was clearly defined in the Proclamation, in theory this does not appear problematic. In reality, however, the role of the Minister in the activities of the defense force is very much limited – even in those that fall within his/her own jurisdiction (interview with FDRE Defense higher officer, 14 April 2023). This, among others, may have its own limitations for ensuring executive control and oversight of the defense forces directly through the Minister. Of course, there is indirect executive control and oversight of the defense forces through the Prime Minister. Furthermore, making both the Minister and the General Chief of Staff answerable to the Prime Minister may limit institutional autonomy and strategic leadership cohesiveness.

In the legislative organ, there was the Foreign, Defense and Security Standing Committee of the House of People's Representatives mandated to monitor and oversee the behavior and performance of security sector institutions. The security sector institutions were expected to report their quarterly and annual performance records to the Standing Committee. However, interview results show that members of the Standing Committee have not been well aware of the working culture of the security sector institutions. Their evaluation of the security sector was not different from that often propagated in the main stream state media outlets. Furthermore, it appears that the war in Northern Ethiopia and the sacrifices of the security sector institutions – mainly the military – seemed to obscure their critical appraisal.

The other impeding policy issue for security provision, management and oversight is the 2002 Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy definition of the referent object. The issue of 'whose security' – state security or human security – appeared obscured not only at policy but also at practical level. In the FANSPS, it was clearly stated that "…the foundation of the security policy was the ensuring of national survival. Other national security issues may be raised only if national existence is ensured" (FDRE, 2002, p. 3). By extension, although poverty and lack of good governance were also securitized, it appears that primary focus was given to state security. This has its own implications for security provision, management, and oversight.

Of course, in post-1991 we have witnessed a major shift of emphasis on security concerns or issues. More than its predecessors, the EPRDF-led regime understand well the roles allotted to it by greater powers. The policy shift seemed to have conditioned by strategic interests of greater and other powers, but essentially driven by innermost motives. Surely, the new policy shift has never been altered its overall declaratory policies (See the FDRE 1995 Constitution), but a kind of twist from outside-looking into inside-looking. The ultimate objective of this twist was not different from its predecessors – regime security. Moreover, such orientation (obsession with domestic security) is the characteristic feature of weak states.

The other legal and structural limitation for security provision, management and oversight was that the Federal Police and Ministry of Justice were not included by the Proclamation as permanent members of the Ethiopian National Security Council. Of course, as per the provisions under Article 2(a) and Article 2(b) of the Proclamation, the Prime Minister may designate them as members or invite them to attend meetings with an expert status respectively. However, their exclusion at the outset from the list of permanent members of the ENSC may be symptomatic of at least two things. First, it shows the EPRDF Government's obsession with traditional security (the state as a unit of analysis) and violence as a solution. As policies are often the outcomes of the intention of those who devise it, the EPRDF Regime's threat analysis appears to reflect narrow conceptualization of security, procured from the neorealist credo. Second, it also indicates the EPRDF Regime's overreliance on defense and intelligence with little or no commitment for justice, rule of law and accountability. This among others highlights that security is also a matter of prioritizing. In simple terms regime security has been maintained at the expense of very desirable national values such as freedom, justice, rule of law and accountability.

Generally, from the above analysis we may infer that in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia – with all their limitations – important constitutional, legal and policy provisions were made for security provision, management and oversight. For instance, Article 21 of the Federal Police Establishment Proclamation clearly stated the fundamental principles of its operation. Accordingly, team work (sub-article 1), making decisions on matters falling within its jurisdiction only (sub-article 2), its operations based on the principles of accountability and transparency (sub-article 3), the participation of the public (sub-article 4) and the principle of impartiality (sub-article 5) have been underlined. More or less, the same provisions have been found in other SSIs as well. However, whether these constitutional and legal promises were interpreted into practice by the post-1991 political leaders and state security actors of Ethiopia shall be addressed in the subsequent sub-section.

4.6. DDR and SSR Experiences in Ethiopia (1991 to 2017)

Any discussion of security sector governance is preceded by an understanding of 'whose security': the regime in power, the state, or the individual? The Post-Cold War world order

that led to the widening, deepening, and humanizing of security has brought a shift of focus in the referent object and the nature or source of insecurity. State security that for long occupied a privileged position as a unit of analysis has been preceded by the security of individuals and communities. Accordingly, the concept of human security has emerged and crystalized as a unifying concept for the analysis of the security of individuals and communities beyond and above the state.

Therefore, security sector reforms have often been made not only to protect the sovereignty of the state but also to ensure the safety and well-being of communities and individuals through a restructuring of the security sector. In countries affected by large-scale violence or brutal authoritarian rule, the state and its security sector machineries (the military, the police, and the intelligence) will not protect their people and subsequently citizens may not have trust and confidence in these institutions. In such contexts, the need for reforming SSIs not only highly demanded but also became a must to do undertaking (Ansorg, 2017). By extension, DDR and SSR have emerged as essential interventions towards ensuring human security particularly in those states emerged out of incessant conflict and in the transition from authoritarian regimes to a democratic system.

In the preceding sub-section of this thesis, we have briefly described and analyzed the constitutional and legal bases and policy contexts for DDR and SSR initiatives in the post-1991 reordering of the Ethiopian political society. Here, the vital questions that this thesis has raised and attempted to come up with definitive rejoinders were the following: *Were the SSIs acted in line with the stated constitutional, legal and other normative frameworks? Had they realized some of the objectives stated in the constitution, proclamations, and other normative frameworks, or failed to realize many of them? How could the failure and success stories of the security sector be synchronized in terms of state, community and individual security? Were these failure and success stories made to have reexamined to initiate the 2018 security sector reform?*

4.6.1. DDR Experiences in Ethiopia

The fact is that the foremost component that often vanished in most post-conflict societies is mutual trust, even the absence of viable institutions makes the case most horrible. In order to reclaim its inherent power of a state – that is, the monopoly of using violence over its constituencies – DDR is a must to do job (Ansorg, & Antwi-Ansorg, 2011). That is why DDR and SSR becoming inexorable in such societies. However, ensuring the local ownership of these essential tasks (DDR and SSR) is among other schemes of capable to make deeper efforts of confidence building, restore mutual trust and impress upon amiable operational settings.

To give some historical background to our analysis, by exploiting the growing public discontent against the Imperial regime and the power vacuum that followed in 1974 the military had come to power through a coup d'état. Upon dethroning the Imperial government and assuming political power, the military redefined its mission as a governor of the Ethiopian polity and the Military Regime was able to build one of the strongest militaries in Africa. For instance, the personnel strength of the military was estimated to be 230,000 (Mulugeta, 2017, p. 165) and 250,000 to 300,000 (Berouk, 2002, p. 3). One of the most visible achievements of the defense force during the repressive authoritarian regime was its victory over the invading Somalia forces.

However, internally armed struggles against the Military regime had gradually gained momentum as it continued to suppress public demands for self-rule and even some groups for secession from the Ethiopian state domain. The ethno-nationalist guerrilla forces along with the Eritrean Peoples' Liberation Front (EPLF) had overthrown the Military regime and the new ethno-nationalist coalition under the EPRDF emerged as a political hegemon in post-1991. Different reasons have been cited by different scholars for the defeat of the Military regime's period Ethiopian strong defense apparatus. More importantly, Fantahun Ayele (2009, pp. 232 - 246) identified five fundamental reasons for the defeat of the military with a relatively ill-equipped and small sized insurgent groups: failures related to applying the right counter insurgency; intelligence; command and control; conscription, training and organization; and war weariness and disillusionment.

On the collapse of the Marxist regime and the end of one of the longest civil-wars in Africa in May 1991, there were a number armed groups in Ethiopia, notably EPRDF, OLF, ONLF, and the Ethiopian Defense Force of that time. In such a post-conflict scenario, violence was in the hands of every combatant and safety and security were the most sought-after by citizens of the polity – particularly by the most vulnerable. Therefore, in order to re-institute the state's monopoly over the use of violence and then gradually establish the legitimacy of this monopoly of the use of force DDR and SSR have been important interventions for peace-building and state-building processes.

In June 1991, at the London Conference, the EPRDF insurgents have been nominated to be the national army of Ethiopia. Consequently, the former national defense force made to have demobilized, and the OLF combatants decided to be camped. But mainly due to their dissatisfaction with actions of the interim government, the OLF and ONLF political leaders had decided to continue the armed struggle and hence their combatants were not disarmed and demobilized. Accordingly, the official DDR Program in Ethiopia – from 1991 to 1997 (Mulugeta, 2017) – was intended to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate the ex-defense force of Ethiopia and the EPRDF guerrilla fighters. But the DDR program as a whole was one of the most contested, particularly with reference to the ex-defense force of the country.

Some sources (Getachew, 2015; Mulugeta, 2017) indicated that the ex-defense force of Ethiopia was successfully disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated. But members of the ex-defense force and some commanders of the current Ethiopian Defense Forces also confirmed that the main targets of the DDR Program were largely those physically injured and female EPRDF guerilla fighters (interview with a higher officer of the pre-1991 defense force, 22 April 2023 and with FDRE Defense higher officer, 14 April 2023). Although some published sources indicated that the DDR program had embraced and benefited members of the pre-1991 defense force of Ethiopia as well, they themselves and some other witnesses outside the former defense force confirmed that there was only DD (disarmament and demobilization), in the complete absence R (reintegration). In line with this, Ansorg (2017) was right when she said that a number of agencies have engaged with the issue of SSR and this engagement has, however, focused narrowly on disarmament and demobilization.

Following the interim government's call for members of the ex-defense force for DDR, a significant number had reported and those in all officer ranks – second lieutenants and above – were taken to Tolay, and the rest Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and privates (soldiers) had been camped at *Hurso, Dedessa*, *Tatek* and *Holeta* provisional collection centers (Getachew, 2015). Unlike Mulugeta (2017), Getachew admitted that from more than 350,000 ex-soldiers dispersed across the country, a majority of them gave their weapons to local administrations and integrated with the local community and the rest of them had reported and camped in the provisional collection centers (p. 501). In these centers, political indoctrination on the origin and just cause of the armed struggle and the fate of the country was given to the ex-soldiers for three months (August to November 1991) to re-orient their future political consciousness. After a final evaluation, consensus was reached to reintegrate with their host communities for which free transportation was made available; and for some fifty Ethiopian Birr monthly payments for seven months and for some others free agricultural land and other packages were provided (Getachew, 2015, pp. 501 – 502).

However, as one witness (a higher officer in the former defense force) revealed, there were only a small number of the ex-soldiers who were working in the different staffs and training centers had reported and taken to the provisional collection centers; and "…the treatment by the TPLF combatants was unforgettably hurting and disgusting…we were subjected to mental torturing, insulting, defamation, and even imprisonment." This position has also, more or less, shared by the international donors' community. In line with this, Mulugeta (2017, p. 152) stated that "All external donors mistook the demobilization camps for *concentration camps* and were opposed to the process." He further attested that although efforts were made to convince donors through regular reporting, organizing field trips, and forming a joint technical committee consisting of donors, international organizations and the DDR Commission, they remained stuck to their initial position and hence refused to provide funding for the DDR program (pp. 152–153). This lack of trust and confidence by the donor community was also an indicative of the cavities in the DDR process.

Beyond the bad treatment they had experienced at the demobilization camps, members of the ex-defense force argue that they had not got anything to help them integrate into their host

communities. They raised the “Arekka Town Massacre” in Welaita Zone in 1992 as a case in point. The EPRDF forces had opened fire and killed dozens of members of the former Ethiopian defense force who went out for a peaceful demonstration to the streets of Arekka town to demand reintegration.

The researcher has attempted to corroborate this position with other relevant persons. Interview with one of the senior members of the Ethio-Korea War Veterans Memorial Association also confirmed that despite some calls and announcements by state media for encampments, practically the DDR program was not intended to embrace members of the ex-defense force of Ethiopia. The TPLF leaders had in fact resorted to revenge rather than helping them to reintegrate. In the words of one higher officer, “…the TPLF leaders had used the ex-defense force to beg dollars from international donors in its name under the banner of DDR” (interview with one higher officer of the former defense force, 22 April 2023).

From these narratives and counter narratives of DDR experiences we can infer that as the then EPRDF leaders did not make a role distinction between partisan politics and national defense force and police force, they considered the whole former defense force and police force as ardent enemy of not only of theirs but also the polity as a whole. Consequently, they were not in a position to allow the ex-soldiers and police officers of Ethiopia to be reintegrated into the society and to earn a living even in low status jobs. As a result, a significant proportion of members of the previous national defense force and police force had become homeless and street beggars. Surprisingly, some leaders of the EPRDF have considered this horrific scenario amounted to a 'national disgrace' committed on those who got wounded and died for a national cause as their blessing; and in a number of meetings where the researcher had participated, it was heard from the political and strategic military leaders of the EPRDF period that they allowed them to live even such miserable life 'because the EPRDF government is democratic'.

However, it could be argued that the dissolution of the previous defense force and police force of Ethiopia and the treatment that followed for members of the defense force and police force during the EPRDF regime appears to violate some professional, legal, ethical and moral

standards. At least in a counter narrative, it is argued that whatever the nature of the state might be – authoritarian or democratic – the ex-soldiers and police officers were officially the security apparatus of the polity who stood to protect national interest. They were the national defense force and police force of Ethiopia who successfully defended the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state against foreign aggression and organized domestic violence and hence they got wounded and died for a national cause. If there was anything wrong with the national interest, it is the political elite, not members of the armed forces and police forces, who should be made accountable.

The post-2018 political and security sector leaders of Ethiopia appeared to regret for they did not allow members of the former defense force and police force to get even pain killers for their wounds and pensions and allowances for the sacrifices or services they rendered for the sovereignty of the state and the safety of the people. Whether it has been done wholeheartedly with full awareness of past injustices and state-sponsored crimes or because they thought they are the enemies of their enemy (TPLF), the ex-soldiers and police officers are now recognized by the incumbent PP government political leaders and military and police commanders as the former defense force and police force of Ethiopia who died and wounded for a national cause and hence they began to get respect and some services.

Therefore practically the DDR activities in the post-1991 period were almost entirely made on EPRDF former guerrilla fighters and hence there was an apparent lack of inclusivity and sustainability in the DDR and security sector reform efforts. This is a reflection of the country's longstanding poor political culture where each successor follows a political ideology which is the antithesis of his immediate predecessor and hence it begins a new path of state-building and peace-building initiative almost from zero. In this case, Ansorg (2017) was right when she said that in Africa SSR initiatives have often ignored existing formal and informal institutional settings.

We may argue that even the DDR program targeting the former EPRDF combatants was not intended to serve one of the core objectives of DDR – to reduce the size of the defense force and to invest in professionalization. Only those EPRDF insurgents who were physically unfit

and unwilling to continue as active members of the newly organized defense force were demobilized and reintegrated. Moreover, latter experiences showed that the DDR program even for the former EPRDF insurgents was not largely successful. Except those TPLF former insurgents who were made to settle at the fertile *Dansha* Area, near *Humera*, the great majority of particularly female demobilized former combatants had continued to earn a miserable life. In a research project sponsored by the Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff College and Defense Women's Affairs Directorate to study the leadership status of female soldiers, the researcher had practically observed the failure of the DDR intervention praised by some as successful. One of the reasons for the failure of the DDR for the EPRDF insurgents was that the government had, among others, serious limitations in political commitment, technical expertise, and financial resources.

Notwithstanding the differences in the success and failure stories of DDR, as some scholars and political commentators have often said, the DDR program (1991-1997) might be judged successful merely because violent conflict did not relapse and the number of the armed forces was significantly reduced. However, the relative stability and order in the post-conflict period could not be merely attributed to the DDR process. The defeat of the former defense force and the collapse of the Marxist Regime should not be interpreted in merely military terms. The collapse of the former socialist states and the ensuing new global order coupled with the mental and physical fatigue they have experienced in the seventeen years fighting against the insurgents could make them to remain passive. The TPLF's historical attachment with neighboring states, the Middle East and the West could not provide them any room to resort to violence against the EPRDF Government.

Furthermore, the program for members of the ex-defense force could be best described as disarmament and demobilization with almost no reintegration. This could be explained among others by two practical experiences. First, they were made simply beggars in the streets of major towns. If the DDR program actually benefited them and reintegrated into the host community, a significant number of them would not have been engaged in such low status lifesaving options. Given the moral status of the Ethiopian society as a whole plus their professional integrity, begging is the last option to save life.

And second, the EPRDF political elites and the strategic military leadership had later proved that the DDR program was not intended to benefit members of the ex-defense force. In order to win the hearts and minds of members of the current defense forces and further reinforce their allegiance with the ruling party, the EPRDF leaders time and again stated that they generously allowed members of the former defense force even to be street beggars simply because 'the EPRDF government is democratic.' They warned members of the current defense force that if the EPRDF government is ousted by election or whatever means and opposition parties seize government power, they would not give them the opportunity even to be beggars (interview with FDRE Defense higher officer, 14 April 2023). The point was that members of the current Ethiopian Defense Force should show their allegiance to the EPRDF party for their survival. This same propaganda tactic was used by the EPRDF leadership and the senior officials of other SSIs to ensure the security sector's overall loyalty to the party.

In Ethiopia the second attempt to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants was made between 2001 and 2003 through a financial support from International development assistance. As indicated by Robert Muggah and colleagues, the DDR program was anticipated to bring macro-economic recovery and/ or stability by rechanneling resources away from the defense sector to the more productive sectors like public health, education, and other social services. The DDR was targeted to address more than 148,000 former combatants with an approximately 174 million US Dollars (Muggah, et al., 2009, p. 193). The study conducted by Muggah and colleagues (2009) showed that the DDR project was more successful in Tigray Region in achieving its end comparative to the Amhara Region, Oromia Region and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region (SNNPR).

However, this study did not empirically exhaust the cavities in the DDR program. First of all, only little has been so far known about this DDR program even in the Ethiopian Defense Forces. Interview conducted with some senior leaders of the FDRE Defense Forces showed that they have no adequate knowledge about the DDR program design and implementation in the post Ethio-Eritrean war. One of the interviewee stated that particularly those combatants from Tigray Region who participated in the war with Eritrea were not disarmed and demobilized. They were rather retained as active members of the Ethiopian Defense Forces

except a few with major physical injuries that did not allow them to continue. The interviewee further attested that both the new recruits from Tigray Region and the former TPLF combatants in the seventeen years armed struggle who were summoned by the national call for the defensive war against Eritrea were not disarmed and demobilized. In the years that followed, the overwhelming domination of Tigrigna speaking soldiers (rank and file) in the Ethiopian Defense Force could be partly explained by this historical juncture.

Surprisingly, in more or less like the first DDR program (1991 to 1997), the main targets of the second DDR program (2001 to 2003) were – in addition to *local militias* – also members of the former defense forces of Ethiopia who joined the FDRE Defense Forces and participated in the defensive war against Eritrea (interview with FDRE Defense higher officer, 14 April 2023). Following the official call made to them by the incumbent EPRDF government, a significant number of members of the former defense forces had joined the FDRE Defense Forces for two major reasons. The first obvious reason was their true love and commitment to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their country and the second reason was their long-awaited sentiment to avenge their defeat and suffering in the hands of the EPLF guerrilla fighters (interview with a higher officer of the former defense force, 22 April 2023).

Another interviewee who was victim of the DDR program stated that the 2001 division within the TPLF had also contributed to this "harsh and painful" measure taken against members of the former defense forces for the second time (interview with a higher officer of the former defense force, 22 April 2023). He further argued that the TPLF wing led by the then prime minister feared that members of the former defense forces may be manipulated by the TPLF 'rebel faction' led by Siye Abraha and General Tsadikan Gberetensay for its political and personal interest because – based on their request – they were organized by the latter under one Division – its size not specified for national security reasons – to independently fight against the Eritrean forces. Although not officially recognized by the then political elites and military leaders, they were instrumental to the victory of the FDRE Defense Forces against the Eritrean forces. However, immediately up on the end of the

conventional war with Eritrea, the Division was disbanded and members were demobilized with a few selected to continue as members of the FDRE Defense Forces.

Generally, going back to the 1991 post-conflict scenario, certainly DDR was a must-to do-step because reinstating the inherent executional power of the state – monopoly of violence – is meant significant numeric dwindling of security actors within the security sector. In that sense, we can argue that the DDR was just the necessary condition for sustainable peace. However, as Ansorg (2017) argued, in Africa, including Ethiopia, many initiatives of such kind have hardly ever consulted, or barely integrated to the interests, views and aspirations of bottom millions. She further asserted that a number of agencies have engaged with the issue of security sector reform and this engagement has, however, focused narrowly on disarmament and demobilization. Unless we executed the DDR to the level that effectively works for the successfulness of other initiatives, including SSR, it would rather add new problems to other sectors. Thus, the pitfalls in the 1991 to 1997 and 2001 to 2003 DDR Programs could have significant impacts on the subsequent SSR interventions of peace-building and state-building. So, the logical question which should follow this analysis is that did these DDR initiatives lead to successful SSR and transformation? This shall be examined in significant details below.

4.6.2. SSR Experiences in Ethiopia (1991 to 2017)

Following the DDR and the ratification of the Constitution in 1995, the EPRDF government had dissolved the former SSIs of Ethiopia and organized new security sector institutions. The former defense force, police force and local kebele security units were considered inimical to the policies and interests of the new governing elite and hence completely disbanded. In order to align the security sector institutions with the post-1991 new political arrangement, the EPRDF Government had organized its own national defense force and federal police force almost entirely from the previous guerrilla fighters of the ruling coalition drawn mainly from TPLF, Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), Oromo People Democratic Organization (OPDO), and Southern Peoples' Democratic Movement (SPDM) and officer ranks for the military and police personnel were distributed accordingly.

The often cited major reasons for the dissolution of the former security sector institutions (mainly the national defense force and police force) were that the former police and military officers were alleged for being 'unprofessional' and participated in the violation of 'human rights' (Mulugeta 2017; Getachew, 2015). But, paradoxically, from members of the former national defense force, those with irreplaceable professional knowledge, skills and attributes were allowed to continue to facilitate the transition of the security sector – mainly the defense and police force – from a guerrilla fighter to a regular army without having any significant leadership roles at strategic, operational and higher tactical levels. This however raises some questions. *If members of the former national defense officers and police officers were actually unprofessional, how could they professionalize the newly organized defense and police forces?* Until very recently, the education and training design and process of the post-1991 SSIs was dominated by the former defense and police officers.

Getachew (2015) also stated that the dissolution of the ex-defense force emerges from two basic principles of the EPRDF party: (1) mixing the undemocratic ex-defense forces with the democratic EPRDF forces will finally end up in bringing the Military Regime back, and (2) it intended to build a small sized modern army fairly composed of all the nations, nationalities and peoples (p. 504). Generally, there are a set of claims and counterclaims of paying no attention to each other's supportive details. As stated in the argument, the former national army and police force were disbanded for the very reason that they lack professional integrity, then again it comes to state that some professionals made to have continued with the new army and police force. It is known that, several army officers and others (rank and file) who made to have deinstitutionalized in 1991, were called yet again to join the national defense force to reinforce the defensive war with Eritrea in 1998. These among others are rather echoed more on the cavities of the then DDR than confirm its thoroughness, and lacking inclusivity and local ownership.

However, the real yardstick could be the extent that the newly organized security sector institutions have actually contributed to a more robust human security and state security in the post-1991 state-building process. To this end, the success and failure stories of the SSR in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia were primarily evaluated through this

analytical lens. In this context, the first normative dimension considered for the analysis of security sector governance was *democratic civilian control* of the armed forces. As we have seen in the preceding sections, constitutionally the SSIs were made under civilian control. The Constitution and subsequent legal frameworks have provided some legal and normative foundations for executive, legislative and judiciary control and oversight of SSIs. By legal provisions, the armed forces shall be commanded by the executive and their budgets shall be supervised by the Parliament and some issues that fall outside the jurisdiction of military courts shall be seen by the judicial organ.

Surprisingly, the above provisions were, more or less, true at rhetoric or face value but fatally deceitful in reality. The justifications for this position can be found in the subsequent strategic papers and other publications, the speeches of some government officials and strategic leaders of the SSIs, and the lived experiences of members of the SSIs. The triangulation of these three sources can justifiably show us not only how the SSIs were practically governed but also the kind of SSIs the regime had sought to build in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia. In this case, a good starting point could be to look at the subsequent strategic security documents or whitepapers that the ruling elite (the executive) had prepared to interpret the constitution and subsequent legal and policy provisions into practice.

The first whitepaper was the Red Book believed to be written by the late Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi. Although the armed forces had been constitutionally sanctioned to be free from partisan politics (Article 87 sub-article 5), in practice it was proved to be the vanguard of EPRDF's revolutionary democracy so as to ensure regime security rather than human security in more or less the same way as the previous two regimes (Imperial and Marxist) of Ethiopia. This is clearly reflected in the Red Book titled: "Army Building in A Revolutionary Democracy" published by the ruling party (EPRDF).

In this book, the EPRDF Government explicitly stated that there is no difference between protecting the security of the Ethiopian state and protecting the security of EPRDF's revolutionary democratic system. It states the possibility to use them interchangeably as

required (EPRDF, p. 27). Accordingly, the objective of building armed forces to protect the security of the state and the security of the party's ideology had been presented as one and the same. This explicitly contradicted with the defense clauses prescribed under Article 87 of the 1995 FDRE Constitution. More surprisingly, the recruitment into the armed forces was limited to certain groups only. The upper, urban and educated classes were not allowed to join the defense force (EPRDF, pp. 27 – 28).

The other material used by the ruling EPDF elite to instill the party's political ideals was known in Amharic as አዲስ ራዕይ ጦፅሔት – in English, 'New Vision Bulletin" – published every two months on which members of the armed forces had expected to read page to page and discuss on its contents in syndicates. The contents of this publication had specifically targeted opposition politics. It celebrates and re-narrates the success stories of the EPRDF in all walks of life and the flaws of opposition political parties and key figures among them. More or less, the same was true about the contents and orientation of what was called "Wegagen Newspaper." The only difference from the above two publications is that the Newspaper was published and distributed by the armed forces themselves. By extension, it seemed that there was no basic difference between the EPRDF political elites and the strategic leadership of the armed forces in terms of political orientation and commitment to revolutionary democracy.

Beyond this, in several meetings and discussion forums in which the researcher had participated at the eve of the 2018 reform, the top political leaders – most of them hold cabinet ministers position – as well as the strategic leadership of the SSIs had repeatedly ordered members of the armed forces to open live bullets on peaceful protestors by bringing the Chinese Communist Party's experience of national disgrace – the 1989 *Tiananmen Square Massacre*, also known as the *June Fourth Clearing* – as a good lesson to learn from. They attempted to convince members of the armed forces to take measures on peaceful demonstrators and organizers by asserting and sometimes intimidating them that the downfall of the EPRDF party would be the end of development and democracy at best and the disintegration of the state at worst.

The same partisan leadership behavior was observed in the 2005 disputed election. Members of the armed forces were told, retold and convinced (often heavy-handedly) not only to give their election cards to the EPRDF party but also to forcefully quell protests and detain opposition party leaders in the aftermath of the election. What the EPRDF political elites and most strategic military leaders did both in the 2005 election and in the eve of the 2018 reform was one and the same. But the difference was in the reaction of the armed forces. In the 2018 reform, the armed forces did not accept and act as they were ordered by the EPRDF political elites and some military leaders. Indeed, in the 2005 election also a number of members of the armed forces were fired and some detained – mostly Amhara and Oromo officers – for refusing what they were told to do and some for allegedly conspiring against the ruling party.

Therefore, in most – though not all – of the EPRDF rule there was a big gulf between rhetoric and practice or reality in terms of building viable security sector institutions dedicated to ensure human security. This seemed to emerge from the growing lack of trust and confidence between the ruling elite and the wider public. Therefore, as in other weak states, coercion was the only mechanism for the EPRDF governing elite to ensure legitimacy through imposing the ideals of revolutionary democracy in the minds and hearts of the armed forces. The armed forces allegiance with the ruling party might be explained by two interrelated factors. The first explanation is that historically – in the 17 years guerrilla struggle – the strategic leadership of the ruling party and the armed forces had strong ideological, ethnic and family ties and this relationship continued to this day.

The other explanation is that when some members of the armed forces had refused to align with the ruling party's ideological interests, they were subjected to character assassination or defamation, intimidation, imprisonment, exile and murder. By extension, they were not in a position to truly exercise their constitutional mandates or to question and challenge the malpractices (partisanship, nepotism and so on) of the ruling party and its affiliates within the armed forces structure. This leads us to the position that during the EPRDF rule some members of the armed forces themselves had needed protection in more or less the same way as ordinary citizens did (that is to mean the guardians of the state needed a guardian for

themselves). This was also partly explained by the armed forces failure to create a strong institutional identity and cohesion.

Beyond all the above stated empirical experiences, the last thirty years practical reality in Ethiopia regarding *democratic civilian control* of the SSIs might be well explained by the civil-military relations literature. In his seminal work titled: "The Soldier and The State" published in 1957, Samuel Huntington proposed two models of civil-military relations/on how the armed forces can be made under democratic civilian control: *objective control* and *subjective control*. In the *objective control* model where the two realms (civil and military) are completely different, neither will interfere in the activities and mandates of the other as defined by law (Huntington, 1957). Often, security policies and strategic issues are devised by civilian authorities whereas operational and tactical issues will be the preserves of military leaders. Therefore, the responsibility of the armed forces is not to develop policy and strategy but to implement it. This is, according to Huntington, the characteristic feature of democratic control of armed forces.

On the other hand, in the case of *subjective control* where no clear boundary exists between the two realms, political elites can exercise unlimited control over the armed forces of the state. They simply organize and manipulate the armed forces of the state to merely sustain their monopoly over power and resources. To achieve this end, the ruling elites often create lateral and vertical divisions within the armed forces structure to diminish their institutional identity and unit cohesion. Ranks and positions in the armed forces are given to those who have ethnic, religious, regional and family ties with the ruling political elite. For the purpose of control, civilian political elites are positioned within the armed forces structure. According to Huntington, this is the characteristic feature of civil-military relations in most undemocratic authoritarian regimes.

As we witnessed in the last three decades of EPRDF rule, the *subjective control* model suggested by Huntington is best explained by the TPLF elites' control over the security sector institutions of Ethiopia in general and the defense force and federal police force in particular. For instance, in the House of Peoples' Representatives (HPR) Six Years Second

Special Meeting that was held in the immediate aftermath of the crisis in Northern Ethiopia and broadcasted live by the Ethiopian Television, the Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmed, reported that the armed forces of the country were controlled and manipulated by one group. The following table shows the distribution of officer ranks and positions by ethnic group in the armed forces of Ethiopia.

Table 4.1. Officer Ranks in the Armed Forces of Ethiopia by Ethnic Group (1995–2017)

No.	Military ranks	Ethnic composition		Total
		Tigre (%)	Other ethnic groups (%)	
1	Four Star Generals	60	40	100
2	Lieutenant Generals	50	50	100
3	Major Generals	45	55	100
4	Brigadier Generals	40	60	100
5	Colonels	48	52	100
6	Lieutenant Colonels	66	34	100
7	Majors	53	47	100
	Average	**52***	**48**	**100**

**** Reported by the Prime Minister as 55%***

Source: *Extracted from the PM's Speech at the HPR Six Years Second Special Meeting (Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-43KpkmB24&t=3815s)*

As shown in Table 4.1 above, more than half of the higher officer ranks in the FDRE Defense Forces had been occupied by one ethnic group. This figure would be more marked when evaluated relative to Article 87(1) of the 1995 Constitution, which provides for the equitable representation of all nations and nationalities in the Defense Forces, and the percentage share of the total population of the Tigre ethnic group from the entire population of all ethnic groups of Ethiopia. For a naïve observer, this might be something surprising – of course it is surprising. However, we should analyze this in the context of the following three questions: *What historical details could justify this ethnic imbalance? What is the state of the state in the last thirty years relative to this imbalance? In the armed forces, should ethnic*

representation be an issue of much concern? This and related questions shall be analyzed and explained after looking at the distribution of positions in the armed forces structure.

Table 4.2. Positions Held in the Armed Forces of Ethiopia by Ethnic Group (1995–2017)

No.	Positions	Ethnic composition		Total
		Tigre (%)	Other ethnic groups (%)	
1	Defense Headquarter	80	20	100
2	Military Commands	100	-	100
3	Mechanized divisions	100	-	100
4	Infantry divisions	80	20	100
5	Mechanized brigades	85	15	100
6	Infantry brigades	80	20	100
7	Training institutions	85	15	100
	Average	**87**	**13**	**100**

Source: *Extracted from the PM's Speech at the HPR Six Years Special Meeting (Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-43KpkmB24&t=3815s)*

In view of the historical backgrounds of the FDRE Defense Forces – as the profession of arms is basically different from many other disciplines – it is not unusual for positions to favor the Tigre ethnic group officers. This is because in the profession of arms there is significant overlap between military ranks and positions. Therefore, due to the historical roots of the armed forces, the dominance of one ethnic group in the higher officer ranks is also expected to be reflected in the positions held within the FDRE Defense Forces structure. But, the surprising thing is that even the relatively small number of officers from other ethnic groups had been excluded from assuming positions in the different structures within the EMoD. This has an implication for deciding or shaping the future of the individual soldier and the defense force. Higher officers from other ethnic groups were not in a position to decide on strategic, operational and higher tactical issues significantly affecting their fate and the future of their institution (EMoD).

However, it is important to note that this imbalance – in officer ranks and positions – within the armed forces structure has, of course, some historical roots. Although, there were some

rooms to maintain relative balance or at least minimize the domination – as long as meritocracy and experience remained the uncompromised yardsticks – it is not unusual to expect a relatively higher proportion of officer ranks and hence positions held by officers from one ethnic group. This is particularly the case in the ranks of general officers and hence in the strategic leadership positions in the defense forces structures. The experience of the TPLF veterans in the seventeen years armed struggle against the Marxist regime relative to the veterans of other ethnic groups had partly helped them to assume comparatively higher military ranks (and hence leadership positions) at the time of the reorganization of the Defense Force in 1995. More optimistically, we might assume that the responsibility to narrow the gap in terms of ethnic representation (mainly in military ranks) within the armed forces was not strategically thought, led and enforced. More than the ranks and positions, what matters was the way the armed forces had been built to be the guardian of the ruling party's revolutionary democracy.

On the other hand, in a strict sense although it might be debatable from the perspective of meritocracy and professionalism, a fair representation of nations and nationalities in the armed forces (by rank and file) is a constitutional mandate that should not be compromised at any cost. Furthermore, in the context of prevailing minority group dominance in the political realm and mistrust between the political elite and the populace, the manipulation of the state SSIs as a mere source of legitimacy is not something unusual. The TPLF elites might be deliberately worked to sustain their monopoly over power, resources, and status through keeping their ethnic affiliates dominance (by military rank and position) within the armed forces structures. The interview of one former general officer and once the director general of Information Network Security Agency (INSA) seemed to support this position. In his interview with a journalist of Tigray Media House, Major General Teklebirhan Weldearegay stated: "We should not engage with the task of saving and sustaining a country established through force. Ethiopia might benefit something from our struggle. But Ethiopia was not our target" (TMH, 25 April, 2020). This, among others, leads us to feel more skeptical about the image the TPLF elites had on Ethiopia.

Generally, in spite of all these disruptions of human security (minority group domination, corruption scandals, violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and so on), it appears logical to admit that the ERPDF political elite – mainly the leadership of TPLF – was able to successfully maintain a relatively stable state order and averted threats from external aggression and domestic insurgents. In other words, they were, at least, able to maintain regime security of course at the expense of the security of individuals, communities and even the state (human security). They were able to build a strong state security sector not only in Ethiopia but also in the Horn region that practically contributed to international peace and security.

The other normative dimension considered for the analysis of security sector governance was *building sustainable institutional capacity* of the armed forces – in terms of infrastructure, information system, human resource, executional capacity, and so on – leading to institutional effectiveness and efficiency in security provision. Thus, the post-1991 SSR experiences in the state-building trajectories of Ethiopia shall be examined by taking the readiness or capacity (manpower, training and weapons) of the state SSIs to discharge their missions as a unit of analysis. Although attempts to build strong professional security forces had begun long before the ascent of the EPRDF into power, remarkable progresses were made in the last thirty years to further consolidate operational effectiveness and efficiency.

Accordingly, in the last three decades of EPRDF regime, one of the success stories in the security sector was the expansion of education and training institutions intended to build the executional capacity of the security personnel. The SSIs have been engaged in developing basic infrastructures and facilities, producing competent and mission-oriented manpower, and modernizing weapons and materials. To achieve this end, a number of education and training institutions have been organized under each security sector. In this regard, the Ethiopian Defense University, the Ethiopian Police University, and the National Intelligence and University College are cases in point. Within each higher education institution, there are also some colleges and faculties that offer mission-oriented education and training in their respective areas of specializations.

In the Federal Police, the Ethiopian Police University was opened to educate and train police officers in the areas of police science, police management, crime prevention, crime investigation, tactics, traffic control, criminology, medical science, and so on. The Ethiopian Police University that had evolved from Aba Dina Police College in 1946 was one of the oldest education and training institutions in Ethiopia. Since 1946, the University has produced several professional police officers who competently discharge their duties and responsibilities in domestic, regional and international missions.

In the FDRE Defense Force, the Ethiopian Defense University was organized to train and educate military officers in the areas of the various fields of engineering, technology, medical science and human resource management for the objective of modernizing the whole defense establishment. The University has one of the best training infrastructures, facilities and laboratories in Ethiopia. A number of public and private universities in Ethiopia often use the University's facilities and laboratories to practice their students. The FDRE Defense has also a number of mission-oriented first and second degrees offering education and training institutions entirely focused on professional development of the military. They are one of the most preferred educations and training institutions in the region for the education and training of security personnel.

Similarly, in the National Intelligence and Security Service, the National Intelligence University College (NIUC) was established to build the capacity of its personnel in intelligence information gathering, intelligence analysis, countering terrorism and so on so as to defend, protect and achieve national security and interests of Ethiopia from any threat. The University College has a number of regular first degree and second degree programs and short-term need-based trainings. Although it has no more than a decade and half, the University College was able to produce competent intelligence and security professionals that would help NISS to ensure national security interest and public safety. It has one of the best training infrastructures, facilities and learning resources.

The education and training infrastructures, facilities and learning environment of the education and training institutions of the above mentioned SSIs have provided opportunities

for quality education, training, innovation and technology all of these have some implications for executional capacity-building and professional development of their manpower. Almost, in the last thirty years of EPRDF regime, SSIs were capable enough to execute their respective assigned tasks and hence it might be safely stated that they were effective in terms of accomplishing their duties and responsibilities. However, this raises two interrelated questions: First, *Is effectiveness measured in terms of accomplishing their duties and responsibilities as provided by laws and policies or by some groups within the EPRDF camp?* And second, *how the SSIs had achieved that effectiveness?*

The above two questions would lead us to the third normative framework for the assessment of the successes and failures of SSR experiences. This normative framework used for the analysis of security sector governance was *accountability and transparency* in security provision. Thus the post-1991 SSR experience in the state-building trajectories of Ethiopia was examined by taking *accountability and transparency* in security provision by SSIs as a unit of analysis. In principle, it is a yardstick for whether security provision in the SSIs was made in adherence to the laws and policies as well as the sanctions for malpractices. In so doing, we briefly revisited the available accountability laws or policies, structures and practices. However, it is important to note that due to the secrecy of information in the operations of most SSIs, we do not expect *accountability and transparency* in the same way as in other public sector institutions.

Within this context, in the last three decades of the EPRDF regime although there have been some constitutional, legal, policy, and structural provisions and institutions for accountability and transparency in the activities and malpractices of SSIs, the practical reality on the ground was flatly different. There were clearly defined missions given to the SSIs by law, and for the accomplishment of which accountability structures have been more or less crafted. Among others, the 1995 Constitution and subsequent proclamations, regulations and policies have put reporting mechanisms and sanctions for malpractices. However, the EPRDF political elite had reoriented the mission of the SSIs towards maintaining regime security rather than the security of individuals, communities and the state as provided by law. Accordingly, the professional integrity and executional capacity of the SSIs was meant to protect the power

and status of the ruling elite. By extension, SSIs were not practically made accountable for the atrocities and violations of human rights they have allegedly committed on innocent citizens in different occasions of course under the command of the EPRDF elites and their affiliates in the security sector structures.

Furthermore, just like other public sector organizations – even more than them – every year SSIs have got significant shares from the allocation of annual government budgets. In addition to government budgets, some SSIs – such as defense force and police force – have accrued additional incomes from their engagement in international peacekeeping operations (PKOs). For instance, it was reported that once the foreign exchange earning the defense force had got from PKOs was the highest in Ethiopia next to coffee. In spite of this, previously – under the pretext of secrecy of intelligence and security information – there was no external auditing on how the allocated budgets and other incomes of the SSIs have been used. Even the role of the Parliamentary Stranding Committee was not more than hearing what the leadership of the SSIs had brought onboard. It seemed partly due to this reason that the general officers of the Ethiopian Defense Force had allegedly involved in the Metals and Engineering Corporation (METEC) and other corruption scandals.

However, as per the recently revised proclamations (post-2018), the state SSIs have put under both internal and external auditing mechanisms for ensuring transparency and accountability while discharging their duties and responsibilities. This is one step better than what was prevailed in the last three decades. Ye, more than the mere presence of legal provisions and structures, the issue of moral accountability and professional integrity are practically more relevant to ensure transparency in security provision. This is because in the SSIs, most of the transactions made to buy weapons and some key intelligence missions have not been made official and open for scrutiny or auditing by the designated public bodies.

In a strict sense, as effectiveness is often measured in terms of the accomplishment of the stated missions and objectives – often defined by the regime in power – the capability and professional integrity of the personnel of the SSIs did not actually guarantee accountability and transparency in the provision of security for citizens and the state. Practical experiences

showed that the capability and professionalization of the security personnel had been manipulated by the EPRDF political elites to ensure their power, resource and status at the expense of the privileges and fundamental freedoms of citizens. As a result, the constitutional, legal and policy provisions intended to ensure accountability and transparency in the activities of SSIs had largely remained on paper.

The other dimension used to analyze the SSR experience in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia was the issue of *local ownership*. In the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia, the political elite within the regime seemed to have the sole ownership of SSR programming and implementation. In practice, the state elites have simply closed their doors and produced the so called SSR and imposed on the populace to abide by and implement them without any significant stakeholder deliberations. For instance, data obtained from interviews with some officials of the SSIs and CSOs confirmed that opposition political parties, civil society organizations (CSOs), the media, women associations, and other traditional organizations have not ever participated in any SSR programs in Ethiopia.

In the words of one interviewee from CSOs: "To be honest, yet we have no engagement with any security sector institution because we are not invited to get involved in the security issues of our country" (interview with one of the top leadership of CSOs, March 30, 2023). The interviewee further stated that "If there is a room, we want to have a principled engagement with the SSIs in the future." It seemed that even the CSOs personnel themselves did not have awareness about their duty and responsibility to participate in the design and implementation of SSR activities. Of course, in Ethiopia as CSOs are at their infancy and, in the last thirty years, they were under attack by the regime, it is difficult to expect much from them in the realms of security provision, management and oversight.

On the other hand, although opposition political parties have enough awareness and more assertive position about their role in SSR activities, the elites of the regime did not allow them to get involved in the SSR interventions of state-building. They were rather competing for security provision, management and oversight with the ruling political elite. In the context of a weak state where different groups compete for their own security, it is common

to see competition rather than cooperation between the regime in power and opposition political parties for ownership and control over SSIs. However, as the SSR activities were not yet supplemented by essential backings from the people, they would not be effective without they got secured local ownership.

Generally, from the analysis of SSR experiences in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia by using some constitutional, legal, policy, strategic and other normative frameworks we can easily understand that there was a big gulf between rhetoric or premises and actual practice on the ground. Most of the internationally recognized normative frameworks for security provision, management and oversight with the aim of ensuring human security were officially recognized and made to guide the activities of SSSIs. But in reality the ruling elite had left aside these guiding principles and redefined security provision in the direction of regime security. Ultimately, public investments to increase the capability, effectiveness and efficiency of the security sector for almost three decades had produced nothing more than regime security and the insecurities of citizens.

Some scholars, (for instance, Getachew, 2015; Mulugeta, 2017), have attempted to judge the success of the post-1991 SSR carried out by the TPLF-dominated EPRDF regime by simply picking the victories of the Defense Force in the counteroffensive operations against OLF, Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI), and the war with Eritrea as if the concept of SSR is merely limited to operational capability and effectiveness. Of course, during the last three decade of EPRDF rule, there were some attempts to professionalize the SSIs so as to increase their effectiveness and efficiency. But such improved effectiveness and efficiency was not meant for the security of individuals, communities and even the state. They were merely instrumentalized or manipulated to ensure regime security at best and some groups within the regime at worst.

4.6.3. SSR Experiences in Post–2017

As we have seen in section 4.4 of this chapter, upon ousting of the Marxist regime, the EPRDF political elites had engaged in a reordering of the Ethiopian political society along ethno-linguistic lines. As can be learned from both the official statements that the EPRDF

regime have been delivered over the past three decades, the communiqué it had often sent to different countries and global institutions, and as clearly stated in the preamble of the 1995 FDRE Constitution, the reconfiguration of the Ethiopian state structure in keeping with the ethno-linguistic homelands of constituting the federal state was resorted just to redress the past-injustices. Unfortunately, the system that was introduced and exercised for almost three decades by its sole creator to bring justice had in the end – whether manipulated or implemented – become a source of injustice. As a result, the suffering of the people in the hands of the creators of the system had led to public protests and discontents and split within the party structure that ended up in the demise of the EPRDF and the birth of the PP Government.

The political and security context of the country at the time of the ascent of Abiy Ahmed to the Prime Minister's Office is well illustrated by his report to the House of Peoples' Representatives Six Year Second Term Meeting in the aftermath of the November 2020 crisis in Northern Ethiopia. The Prime Minister stated that while he entered into the Palace as a head of government there were a number of states within the state. Particularly, the SSIs were states in themselves. He stated that the National Intelligence and Security Service had its own well trained and equipped armed force, media (*Abbay Media*), and huge money in transaction. In the Prime Minister's words, "The security sector institutions were better described as family associations rather than state institutions. As such, leadership positions within the SSIs were held by family ties rather than professional knowledge and competency." He attested that at the time of the reform, those often known as security sector institutions were almost absent.

Cognizant of the political and security situation of the country, the PP government did not consume time to engage in wide ranging reforms, one of which was the reforming of SSIs. To pull out the country from the prevailing crisis, the PP government has attempted to undertake SSR involving the National Defense Force, National Intelligence and Security Service, Federal Police, INSA and Financial Intelligence. The Prime Minister argued that "literally, rather than reform it requires to completely disbanding the defense force and intelligence service." Accordingly, several proclamations, regulations, policies and strategies

that were instituted by the EPRDF political elites to monopolize power, resources and status have been revisited and some of them were removed. Although there were no noticeable gaps in the available constitutional provisions for the democratic control of the armed forces, new strategies for building the armed forces of the state have been prepared to replace the Red Book. In addition to this, the existing proclamations that put some restrictions in the provision of security and the management, oversight, accountability and effectiveness of the respective SSIs have been revised.

As SSR is a process rather than a project, it appears too early to judge the success and failure stories of the post-2018 reform executed under the leadership of the current Prosperity Party Government. Cognizant of this, the researcher has attempted to analyze the process of its formulation, local ownership (in terms of creating public or stakeholders deliberations), capacity-building and professionalization of the security sector, and legal provisions for the management and oversight of security sector institutions. The thesis also examined whether the strengths and weaknesses of the previous security sector reforms have been used as inputs to the current reform. It also looked at whether the reform is on the right track or it needs another cycle of reform.

Given the political, economic and security context of the country at the time of the ascent of the PP government to power, the urgency of SSR was undeniably visible in almost all walks of life. Moreover, the involvement of the security sector officials in the corruption scandals, human rights violations and other atrocities committed during the EPRDF regime has made the case more urgent. It seemed in cognizant of this reality that the political elites of the PP government have taken SSR as a priority from the first day of their ascendancy to power. Although, the government had no choice other than reforming the security sector, and in fact it was actually taken as the savior of the state apparatus, the SSR has from the very start some clearly visible limitations.

The first limitation is that the reform was solely made by the PP government elites without any significant deliberations with relevant stakeholders. Opposition political parties, CSOs, gender associations, and other relevant society groups were not participated in the design and

implementation process. This could have a lingering effect in the long-term implementation and success of the SSR intervention to achieve its objectives. Secondly, it seemed that the post-2018 SSR has not drawn relevant lessons from previous security sector reforms. Instead, the reform was made without adequate assessment of the weaknesses and strengths of the previous experiences of security sector governance/ reforms in Ethiopia. As a result, some of the challenges associated with security provision, management and oversight in the last three decades may continue to prevail in one way or the other.

The third limitation as stated by Fitz-Gerald (2020) was related to the issue of 'policy coherence.' For the appropriate sequencing of SSR programs, a well-recognized national security policy and strategy framework is required prior to embarking on any sort of security sector reform. Yet a number of deliberations with key stakeholders were organized – in some of which the researcher has participated – to get inputs for the preparation of the new National Security Policy and Strategy and it is now referred to the Prime Minister's Office for final approval. In spite of this, practical experiences in the last three decades of EPRDF rule showed us that instead of the gaps in terms of legal and policy frameworks for security provision, management and oversight, the apparent lack of political commitment to interpret constitutional and legal premises into practice has been the main challenge for the success of security sector reform efforts.

The fourth limitation is related to political commitment in the practical implementation of the SSR. Reform, especially security sector reform, has been a buzzword in the vocabularies of the new leadership of the country. But in keeping its promises, there are some indications that the PP Government has begun to slip back to the political behavior of its predecessor. For instance, in his report to the House of Peoples' Representatives Six Year Second Term Meeting in the aftermath of the November 2020 crisis in Tigray, the Prime Minister stated that the Republican Guard has finished its mission and will be integrated with the national defense forces. However, in reality the Republican Guard has still existed. In its news hour, Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation reported that among the graduates of the Ethiopian NIUC, some of them were Republican Guards (EBC, May 31, 2023). It appears dangerous to

organize another highly specialized force (by training and weapon) outside the jurisdiction of the national defense force.

The other limitation is that from the Prime Minister's report about the reorganization of the Defense Force by ranks and positions at the time of the reform suggests that the reform continues to favor ethnic representation at the expense of meritocracy and professionalization. For instance, in the speeches of the PM at the HPR Six Years Second Special Meeting and broadcasted live by the Ethiopian Television, it was reported that the percentage share of higher officer ranks and positions of the Tigre ethnic group in the armed forces was reduced by more than half. This seemed impossible unless experiences and merits (professionalism) have been compromised because as stated by the Prime Minister himself fifty five percent of the higher officer ranks (majors to general officers) were assumed by those from the Tigre ethnic group. The following table clearly shows the details of such changes made by the PP government in the distribution of ranks and positions between Tigre and other ethnic groups in the armed forces of Ethiopia.

Table 4.3. Adjusted Ranks and Positions in the Armed Forces of Ethiopia (post-2017)

No.	Positions and ranks	Adjustments made	
		From (%)	**To (%)**
1.	General and higher officers	52	26
2.	Commands	100	25
3.	Mechanized divisions	100	50
4.	Infantry divisions	80	40
5.	Mechanized brigades	85	44
6	Infantry brigades	80	40
7	Staffs (Defense headquarter)	80	25
8	Education and training	85	25

Source: *Extracted from the Speeches of the Prime Minster at the HPR Six Years Second Special Meeting (Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-43KpkmB24&t=3815s)*

It is skeptical as to why the post-1991 political elites have seriously taken ethnic representations within the armed forces structure. Two explanations could be provided by bringing the *subjective control* model from the civil-military relations literature and Article 87(1) of the 1995 Constitution into perspective. In authoritarian regimes like EPRDF, control over the armed forces is often made possible by creating divisions (ethnic, religious, regional, racial) and weakening institutional identity and unit cohesion. By extensions it could be argued that the EPRDF elite had put the equitable representation of nations and nationalities in the armed forces structure under Article 87(1) of the FDRE Constitution simply to achieve control and ensure regime legitimacy. Let us further explain this latter argument.

One may argue that the security sector was organized on the basis of the basic principles of the FDRE Constitution, the respective security sector proclamations, and the 2002 Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy to solely serve national interests. However, it could be argued that such even constitutional, legal provisions and policies for security sector governance were defined by the EPRDF elites to simply serve ideological interests and sustain their monopoly of power, resources and status. At least two reasons can be provided to justify this line of argument again.

In the *Red Book* titled "Army Building in a Revolutionary Democracy", the EPRDF political leadership explicitly stated that they considered the 1995 Constitution as a basis for building the armed forces of Ethiopia merely because it helped them to build a defense force which would be a guardian of revolutionary democracy. To put this point as is:

> We say that our constitution is an important starting point for the political development of the army, not only because our Constitution clearly states that the army must be a loyal guardian of the Constitution. Not that other democracies have followed such an approach. Rather, it can be said that the main reason why this statement was clearly stated in our Constitution is because the Constitution is believed to be a sufficient and worthy starting point for the political development activities to build an army that will be a guardian of the revolutionary democratic system (p. 88).

This quotation clearly evinced the extent that policies have been preceded by politics in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia. At face value, the 1995 Constitution and the ensuing proclamations and security sector policies and strategies seemed largely attractive and feasible. These legal provisions and polices were propagated at various deliberations in public spaces not only to build public trust and confidence at home but to win the hearts and minds of international donors. As the saying goes, *the devil is found in the details*. Beyond the *Red Book*, the other two publications such as "አዲስ ራዕይ መጽሔት" (New Vision, in English) and *Wegagen* Newspaper had been used to cultivate partisan mentality within the armed forces. These two publications simply put the EPRDF as the only available option for Ethiopia's existence a state and they presented opposition parties as existential threats to the polity. Generally, the three publications stated above were openly violating the constitutional, legal and policy premises for security provision, management and oversight.

The second justification is that historically the strategic leaders of the SSIs had common ideological and political orientation with the ruling party and hence they were instrumental to sustaining existing power structures. That is why the strategic leaders of the security sector institutions had been attending party conferences and they were contributing monthly payments to their mother party as other political cadres did. In the context of overlapping partisan politics and security sector interests, it is not surprising for SSIs to merely serve, privilege, and sustain regime security at the expense of human security.

The other challenge may be the fact that the SSR that was initiated almost five years ago could not prevent the country from the vicious cycles of violent conflict and insecurity. Although the roots of insecurity could be traced back to the political, economic and social crises long before the ascent of the PP government to power, the number and intensity of violent conflicts and the suffering of citizens have been increasing rather than declining. Still the security sector is part of the problem. By extension, the repeated cycles of security sector reforms could not yet prevent the state and its citizens from vicious cycle of violent conflicts and threats of insecurity. Therefore, after almost five years it appears that the existing much praised security sector reform begs for another reform.

Generally, within the last five years of SSR, significant progresses have been made in the operational capability (training, manpower and weapons) of SSIs. Extensive trainings of security personnel have been underway; new forces have been created; some modern weapons (including unmanned aerial vehicles) and technologies have been introduced; basic infrastructures and facilities have been upgraded; and so on. However, this does not guarantee the success of security sector reforms. Experiences show that the success of any SSR program primarily requires strong political commitment and ownership on the part of those who undertake it. Accordingly, the implementation of the SSR initiated in 2018 and the related legal and policy provisions necessitate major political commitments from the leadership of the incumbent PP government and the top strategic leadership of the SSIs and local ownership of relevant stakeholders.

4.7. Interagency and Intra-Agency Cooperation and Competition

More than any other public organizations, SSIs are expected to cooperate and coordinate their actions towards achieving a common objective of ensuring national security interest and the safety and security of the wider public. Cooperation and better coordination will help them to effectively and efficiently deliver their services. In order to successfully achieve their shared goals and objectives, SSIs may cooperate at the level of policy development, program design, service delivery or both. Therefore, as indicated by Inclusive Security and DCAF (2017), those who involved in reforming the security sector should have a prior enough awareness about the issue of cooperation or the inherent interdependence among different security sector institutions.

The inter-agency and intra-agency cooperation (and competition) among the SSIs of Ethiopia was analyzed by looking at the formal and informal mechanisms (if any) established to achieve their share goals and the practical realities of their service delivery. From a review and analysis of the available documents and interviews with some security experts, we understood that yet there no formal provisions and institutions mandated to coordinate cooperation among SSIs. Some may consider the National Security Council as a formal mechanism to coordinate cooperation for effective and efficient security provision. However, its function is limited to advising the Prime Minister with respect to the integration and

implementation of national security policies. Moreover, it is not possible to imagine cooperation and coordination in the absence of Federal Police Commission and Ministry of Justice as members of the National Security Council.

Moreover, in the two conferences – where the researcher participated – organized by the Institute of Foreign Affairs along with Jigjiga University (January 21, 2023 at Jigjiga Town) and with the Ethiopian Defense War College (March 2, 2023 at Bishoftu) which brought various security sector officials, experts and academia from different institutions to discuss on national security issues, among others, the need to create some mechanism – may be formal policies, strategies, structures and institutions – for the cooperation and coordination of SSIs was emphasized. Indeed, the presence of coordination and cooperation mechanism is a key to the success of security sector reform efforts. In line with this, the AUC (2014) also stated that SSR programming and implementation by member states should take into account the institutionalization of partnerships and coordination mechanisms among SSIs.

Furthermore, the interview with one expert from NISS may further substantiate the urgency of cooperation. The interviewee underscored on the point that although NISS provides timely intelligence information, other SSIs have often been reluctant to take the necessary actions. The interviewee further attested that reliable intelligence information for a number of incidents – including the November 2020 crisis in Tigray – that had posed serious national security threats has been timely provided to the concerned bodies by NISS (interview with an expert of NISS, March 18, 2023).

Another interviewee from Federal Police Commission also stated that "although there were no formal structures for security sector coordination and cooperation, in the EPRDF time SSIs were practically cooperating and working in a more integrated manner as one institution to accomplish their mission." The interviewee argued that it is not the presence or absence of structures matters most "…because in order to accomplish our mission it is mandatory to go to other SSIs to get intelligence data or to get other form of support" (interview with a police officer, May 4, 2023). But practical experiences show that in recent years the SSIs have been working alone as if they did not stand for a commonly shared national objective. In addition

to their failure to exert a combined effort in the event of some serious national security threats, they sometimes compete and quarrel each other due to overlapping of responsibilities and some personal and group interests for hegemony over power and resources. This is particularly the case between the regional and federal police commissions as well as between the regional police commissions and the defense forces.

For instance, as per the Federal Police Commission Establishment Proclamation No. 720/2011, regional police commissions (RPCs) are subordinate to the Federal Police Commission (FPC). In order to strengthen relationships and cooperation as well as the coordination of tasks, a Joint Council was established (Article 18 Sub-article 1) and presided by the Commissioner General of Federal Police Commission (Article 18 Sub-article 2). The powers and duties of the Joint Council were, among others, to follow up the application of uniform standards in the recruitment, training, employment and administration of police officers in all the regions (Article 18 Sub-article 2). In principle, this provision enables police officers to work jointly towards discharging their duties and responsibilities effectively and efficiently.

However, the reality on the ground was flatly different. Of course, in much of the EPRDF regime before the 2018 reform there was, more or less, relatively better coordination between the FPC and RPCs. Information obtained from the life experiences of one interviewee indicated that in almost all of those three decades of EPRDF government, the FPC had the upper hand over RPCs and hence police service across the polity was better coordinated to accomplish its mission (interview with a police officer, May 4, 2023). However, when regional states had begun to organize their own special forces, such cooperation and coordination were seriously disrupted and changed to competition. The emergence of regional special forces, had posed serious challenges not only for the federal police officers but also for the defense forces of the country. The regional special forces were comparable with the defense force in terms of training, logistics, and, to some extent, weapons.

Of course, there were also regional rapid response forces during the EPRDF period in the 1990s. First, the Tigray Regional Government had organized rapid response forces and other

regions (mainly Oromia and Amhara) began to follow the Tigray Region's example. But the EPRDF leadership had understood its danger at the earliest and hence they decided to disband such kind of force organization by regional states. It seemed the lack of trust among the top political leadership, the regional states governments and the people that make the recent decision to disband the special forces so controversial.

Notwithstanding the above differences, although the presence of policies, strategies, structures and institutions had their own contributions to facilitate and guide cooperation and coordination in security provision, it was the mindset of the security sector personnel which matters most. As some interviewees said if there was better cooperation and coordination in the absence of any formal mechanism during the EPRDF period than now, it could be better to understood this in terms of personal and group competition (and confusion) rather than institutional weaknesses. Despite this fact, as the missions and activities of SSIs are inherently interdependent the need to create a formal mechanism to cooperation and coordination of their functions seems a must to do job.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

5.1. Introduction

Security sector reform has now recognized as an essential intervention in the transition from violent conflict to peace and from authoritarian regimes to democratic system. It has been used for restructuring the security sector so as to reinstitute the state's monopoly on the use of force and to engage in subsequent interventions of democratization and development. The overall objective of this thesis was to analyze the SSR experiences in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia by taking international and national legal and policy provisions and other normative frameworks as analytical tools. Therefore, this chapter was organized to precisely locate the conclusions made based on major findings the study and their implications for informing policy. Accordingly, conclusions and implications as well as areas for future research were made on the basis of the major findings of the thesis and the subsequent discussion that were made in the light of the available scholarship.

5.2. Conclusion and Implications

In Ethiopia comprehensive SSR interventions were initiated as early as the 1991 reordering of its political society. At face value, some of the constitutional, legal and policy provisions which could serve as a basis for SSR were, more or less, comparable to international SSR norms and principles. They have provided some norms and principles for democratic control and professionalism of security sector institutions, and accountability, management and oversight mechanisms in the provision of security. But, in practice most of these provisions had remained on paper and thus security sector governance was not guided by legal and policy provisions. The key security sector institutions of Ethiopia were made to serve a 'rent-seeking elite' at the expense of the safety and security of the people (communities and individuals). Therefore, on the basis of this finding, one major conclusion of the study was that in the post-1991 state building trajectories of Ethiopia, security sector reform has been more of hype than reality.

For this, two parallel explanations could be provided. First, although the post-1991 legal order, political order and other policy provisions were essentially originated from triumphant nationalism and hence fetched from the political programs of mainly the TPLF, some important legal and policy provisions inserted – in the FDRE Constitution and in subsequent proclamations – to win the hearts and minds of innocent citizens and to please their international partners and donors might be considered as obstacles to realize their quest for power, resources and status. Accordingly, the EPRDF elites had formulated other whitepapers – contradictory to available legal and policy provisions – that helped them to build SSIs dedicated to guard their revolutionary democratic ideology as a tool to monopolize power, resources and status. Second, since as early as 1991, there were no effective check and balance or accountability mechanisms that could force the EPRDF elites to strictly follow what were stated in the guiding documents of the polity than to do whatever they wish.

On the other hand, in practical terms history has helped the EPRDF elites to put the SSIs under their toes and to gradually build their hegemony. Since the seventeen years guerrilla struggle, the strategic leadership of the 1995 newly organized security forces (mainly the military, police and intelligence) had strong ideological, political and ethnic affiliations with the top leadership of EPRDF. That is why in a number of incidents, any split within the ruling party cell directly led to a parallel split in the security forces. The 2001 division within the TPLF camp and later, the 2018 split within the EPRDF party cell and the subsequent parallel splits within the security sector institutions are cases in point.

Furthermore, Article 87(1) of the 1995 Constitution also helped political elites to divide and weaken the security sector institutions (mainly the military and police) and put them under their control. Under the banner of constitutional provision for ‘fair’ ethnic representation, they systematically prevented the armed forces to create strong institutional identity and unity and consequently, this made them easy prey to political elite manipulation. Therefore, based on the above major findings of the study, the other conclusion of the thesis was that security sector reform in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia was meant to maintain regime security at best and the security of particular groups within the regime at

worst. The consequence of this was not only the suffering of individuals and communities (human security) but also the insecurity of the armed forces themselves and the state.

From these findings, we can learn that SSR needs political commitment particularly from those who devise it. It requires the governing political elites to make some compromises on their monopoly over power, resources and status for the ultimate objective of development and democracy. However, overlearned by the victory against the Marxist regime and the narcissistic mindset they developed, the EPRDF elites had never been ready to do so. They considered elite bargaining and compromise as a defeat. As such they followed a mindset of 'one-size fits all' strategy throughout their tenure as rulers of Ethiopia. Unless the post-2018 political leaders of the country have learned to compromise their interests and aspirations, and monopoly over power, resources and status and engage in genuine elite bargaining and compromise, state de-legitimacy and the violations of the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens continue to remain the foremost existential security threats of Ethiopia.

This has some serious implications for the security sector and state-building. As in other weak states where the idea of state is so weak, the political elites would be resorted to more violence en route for securing their legitimacy. In addition to the visible deficiency of legitimacy, over reliance of political violence will remain basic attribute of the system. In other words, the deficit of legitimacy by the state will mainly been filled by SSIs (mainly the military, police and intelligence). As the SSIs allegiance correlates directly with the vested interests, aspirations and security needs of their creator or maker, they will continue to become instruments of regime maintenance. In such a security arena, different actors will continue to fight each other to maximize their own security. Ultimately, human security will be endangered.

This scenario clearly characterizes the security context in which the country found itself today. Although the post-2018 leadership of the polity has been attempting to build a strong professional security force, the source and intensity of violence is still increasing and national and human security threats have still persisted. The fact is that the absence of non-partisan security sector institutions in the last three decades had less to do with professionalism, but it

seems to be correlated more with the sense of allegiance to the ruling elite of the state. The very kernel of the problem associated with the security sector was its loyalty to the regime rather than the people and the state. Ultimately, citizens' fundamental rights to live in dignity and to live a life free from fear have been gravely endangered. In this context, the state's 'monopoly of violence' in the absence of the consent of the governed will take the country nowhere, but to authoritarianism at best and anarchy to the worst.

5.3. Areas for Future Research

This thesis has tried to examine the SSR experiences of Ethiopia in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia. In so doing, rather than looking at the specific details at grassroots level, a comprehensive state-level and headquarters level analysis of the laws of the land and subsequent proclamations, policies, strategies, and structures that provided legal and normative frameworks for security sector governance was made. Such strategic engagement may miss some specific details relevant for improving practice. As every case is unique, taking institution as a unit of analysis may help to explore some specific details as to how each specific security sector institution was governed. Therefore, this cavity could be filled by future research.

The other important area of future research could be the trust and confidence individuals and communities have on security sector institutions. In this thesis, the SSR experience of Ethiopia was analyzed from the perspectives of those who were mandated for the provision, management and oversight of security (and justice). Therefore, for a complete understanding of the failure and success stories of the SSR experiences in the post-1991 state-building trajectories of Ethiopia, future researchers could engage in large surveys to analyze the perspectives of the receivers or consumers of this service (security), which could help to see the other side of the coin.

REFERENCES

Abbink, J. (2009). 'The Ethiopian Second Republic and the Fragile Social Contract.' *Africa Spectrum, 44*(2), pp. 3–28. Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of African Affairs. https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/download/122/122-122-2-PB.pdf

Alem, H. (2004). 'Ethnic Pluralism as an Organizing Principle of the Ethiopian Federation'. *Dialectical Anthropology,* 28, pp. 91-123

Amnesty International (1 April 1995). 'Ethiopia: Accountability past and present: Human rights in transition.' AFR 25/006/1995. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9e3a.html

Anderlini, S. N. & Conaway, C.P. (2012). 'Security Sector Reform.' In *Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A Tool Kit for Advocacy and Action,* pp. 31-40 http://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wr-content/uploads/2012/04/06_ssr.pdf

Ansorg, J.T and Antwi-Ansorg, N.A. (2011). 'Monopoly, legitimacy, Force: DDR-SSR Liberia.' In Melanne, A. & Michael, M. (eds.), *Monopoly of Force: The Nexus of DDR and SSR,* pp. 265 – 284. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press

Ansorg, N. (2017). 'Security Sector Reform in Africa: Donor Approaches Versus Local Needs.' *Contemporary Security Policy,* 38(1), pp. 129 – 144

Aregawi B. (2008). *'A Political History of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (1975–1991): Revolt, Ideology and Mobilization in Ethiopia.'* Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Vrije University, Amsterdam

Asafa, J. (2009). 'Being in and out of Africa: The Impact of Duality of Ethiopianism'. *Sociology Publications and Other Works.* http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_socopubs/78

Assefa F. (12 Nov. 2013). 'The Challenges of Building a Multicultural State: Putting the Conflict in Perspective.' *Abyssinia Law*. http://www.abyssinialaw.com/study-on-line/item/1090-multicultural-state

Assefa, F. (2010). *Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: A Comparative Study* (3rd revised ed.). Nijmegen, The Netherlands: Eclipse Printing Press.

AUC (2014). *African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR).* Adopted at the 20th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 27–28

January 2013. Addis Ababa: The Defense and Security Division (DSD) of the Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the African Union Commission (AUC)

Ayoob, M. (1995). *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Ayoob, M. (1997). 'Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective.' In Krause, K. & Williams, M. (eds,), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, pp. 121–146. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

Bachech, D. (2008). 'The Crisis of Ethnic Identity and Democracy in Ethiopia.' *Sudan Tribune*, Friday 23 May 2008

Bahru, Z. (2002). *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991 (*2nd ed.). Oxford: James Currey.

Baldwin, D., A. (1997). The Concept of Security.' *Review of International Studies*, 23, pp. 5–26

Ball, N. (2010). 'The Evolution of the Security Sector Reform Agenda.' In Sedra, M. (ed.). *The Future of Security Sector Reform*, pp. 29–44. Ontario: The Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)

Belbase, S. (2014). Radical versus Social Constructivism: An Epistemological-Pedagogical Dilemma.' *International Journal of Contemporary Educational Research*, 1(2), pp. 98–112.

Bendix, D. and Stanley, R. (2008). 'Security Sector Reform in Africa: The Promise and the Practice of a New Donor Approach.' *Occasional Paper Series*, Volume 3, Number 2. Durban: The African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

Berouk M. (2002). *'The Role of Military Power in Ethiopia's National Security (1974-1991).'* Unpublished MA Thesis, Addis Ababa University

Best, J.W. & Kahn, J.V. (2005). *Research in Education* (9th ed.). New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India.

Bhattarai, R. (2013). 'Chapter Two – Human Security: Concepts and Criticism.' In Upreti, R., Bhattarai, R. & Wagle, G. (eds), *Human Security in Nepal: Concepts, Issues and Challenges*, pp. 11–32. Kathmandu: Nepal Institute for Policy Studies (NIPS) and South Asia Regional Coordination Office of NCCR (North-South)

Bilgin, P. (2013). 'Critical Theory.' In Williams, P., D. (ed.), *Security Studies: An Introduction* (2nd ed.), pp. 93–106. London and New York: Rutledge

Booth, K. (1991). 'Security and Emancipation.' *Review of International Studies*, 17(4), pp. 313–326

Brzoska, M. (2000). 'The Concept of Security Sector Reform.' In Wulf, H. (ed.) *Security Sector Reform*, pp. 6–13. Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion

Buzan, B. (1983). *People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books

Buzan, B., Waever, O., and de Wilde, J. (998). *Security: A new framework for analysis.* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Chappuis, F. and Hänggi, H. (2009). 'The Interplay between Security and Legitimacy: Security Sector Reform and State-Building.' In Julia, R. & Patrick, S. (eds.), *Facets and Practices of State-Building*, pp. 31–56. Leiden: Brill | Nijhoff

Creswell, J. W. (2007). *Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, London and New York: SAGE Publications

Creswell, J. W. (2012). *Educational Research: Planning, Conducting, and Evaluating Quantitative and Qualitative Research* (4th ed.). Boston: Pearson Education

Crotty, M. (1998). *The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process.* London: SAGE Publications

DCAF (2009). 'Security Sector Governance and Reform.' *DCAF Backgrounder*. Geneva: DCAF https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/100124/18_SSR_SSG_en.pdf

Dewaal, A. (1992). 'Ethiopia Transition to What?' *World Policy Journal*, 9(4), pp. 719-737

Dewaal, A. (2021). "Five Scenarios of State Collapse in Ethiopia - Reinventing Peace". *World Peace Foundation.* https://www.sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/five-scenarios-of-state-collapse-in-ethiopia/

DFID (nd). Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E

E.P.R.D.F. (n.d.). *Army-building in a Revolutionary Democracy*. Addis Ababa: Branna Printing. Amharic version

E.P.R.D.F External Relations Unit (2016). *New Vision: E.P.R.D.F's Ideological Bulletin*. 11th Year, Volume 5, Number 5, May to June 2016. Mega Publishing: Addis Ababa. Amharic version

Eckhard, S. (2016). *The Challenges and Lessons Learned in Supporting Security Sector Reform.* Schwerin, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)

Fana G. (2014). 'Securitization of Development in Ethiopia: The Discourse and Politics of Developmentalism.' *Review of African Political Economy,* 4(S1), pp. S64 - S74

F.D.R.E. (1995). *Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.* Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

F.D.R.E. (2002). *Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy.* Addis Ababa: Ministry of Information, Press and Audiovisual Department

F.D.R.E. (February 2020 E.C). *FDRE Army Building Strategy.* Addis Ababa: Branna Printing. Amharic version

Fantahun A. (May, 2009). *'The Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse 1977 – 1991.'* Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Addis Ababa University

Fitz-Gerald, A. (2020). 'Ethiopia's Defense Reform Agenda: Progress and Challenges.' In Melaku Geboye, Dereje Feyissa & Mamo Esmelealem (eds.), *Ethiopia in the Wake of Political Reforms*, pp. 463-487. Los Angeles, C.A: Tsehai Publishers

Furlong, P. and Marsh, D. (2010). 'A Skin Not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science.' In David, M. & Gerry, S. (eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (3rd ed.), pp. 184–211. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan

Gebrehiwot K. (2020). 'Police reform and professionalism in Ethiopia: The case of Ethiopian Federal Police Commission.' Unpublished MA Thesis: Addis Ababa University

Getachew D. (2015). *The Ethiopian Military and the History of Wars: From Axumite Empire to FDRE*. Addis Ababa: Branna Publishing. Amharic Version

Gindarsah, I. (2015). *Security sector reform: A literature review.* Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Glaser, C. (2013). 'Realism.' In Allan Collins (ed.), *Contemporary Security Studies* (3rd ed.), pp. 13-27. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Gordon (2014). 'Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the State or its People?' *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, pp. 1–22. London: Routledge

Gray, D. E. (2009). *Doing Research in the Real World* (2nd ed.). Los Angeles: SAGE Publications

Gray, R. (Dec. 23, 2020). Rehabilitating Realism Through Mohammed Ayoob's "Subaltern Realism" Theory. Birmingham University & E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2020/12/23/rehabilitating-realism-through-mohammed-ayoobs-subaltern-realism-theory/

Griffiths, M. and O'Callaghan, T. (2002). *International Relations: The Key Concepts.* London and New York: Routledge

Hendricks, C. (2006). "Introduction: From State Security to Human Security in Southern Africa". In Cheryl. H. (ed.). *From State Security to human Security in Southern Africa: Policy Research and Capacity Building Challenges*, pp. 1–8. ISS Monograph Series, No. 122, April 2006

Henok G. Gabisa (2015). 'Justice System Reform Programme in Ethiopia: Is Rule of Law Lost in Translation?' *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 23(2), pp. 291–313.

Huntington, S. (1957). *The Soldier and the State.* Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Inclusive Security & DCAF (2017). *Inclusive Security*. Washington, D.C.: Inclusive Security and DCAF

Jackson, P. (2010). 'SSR and Post-conflict Reconstruction: The Armed Wing of Statebuilding?' In Mark Sedra (ed.). *The Future of Security sector Reform*, pp. 119–135. Waterloo: The Center for International Governance Innovation

Jackson, P. (2011). 'Security Sector Reform and State-building.' *Third World Quarterly*, 32(10): pp. 1803–1822

Kaplan, R. (July 2021). "Ethiopia's Problems Aren't Postcolonial: The Country Seems on the Verge of Falling Apart. Here's why it won't". *Foreign Policy*, July 2021. https://www.foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/09/ethiopias-problems-arent-postcolonial/

Karkoszka, A. (2011). The Concept of Security Sector Reform. Published in *Political Science,* https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Concept-of-Security-Sector-Reform-Karkoszka/f961d63d2dadff20acc72297d2ce009d31eb76b8

Kay, S. (2015). *Global Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Quest for Power and the Search for Peace* (3rd ed.). Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishing

Keller, E. J. (2010). 'Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Political Transformations in Ethiopia: Historic and Contemporary Processes.' In Deng, F. M. (Ed.). *Self-Determination and National Unity: A Challenge for Africa*, pp. 57–90. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press

Kerr, P. (2013). 'Human Security.' In Allan Collins (ed.), *Contemporary Security Studies*, pp. 104–116. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Kjaer, A. M. (2014). *Governance: Key Concepts*. Cambridge: Polity Press

Kothari, C., R. (2004). *Research methodology: Methods and techniques* (2nd ed.). New Delhi: New Age International Publishers

Krause, K. & Williams, M. (Oct., 1996). 'Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods.' *Mershon International Studies Review*, 40(2), pp. 229–254

Krause, K. (2007). 'Towards a Practical Human Security Agenda.' *Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Policy Paper – №26.* Geneva: DCAF https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/PP26.pdf

Leboeuf, A. (2017). *What is A Good Security Sector Reform?* Paris: French Institute of International Relations (ifri)

Legro, J.w. & Moravcsik, A. (1999). 'Is Anybody Still a Realist?' *International Security*, 24(2), pp. 5–55

Levine, D. N. (2011). 'Ethiopia's Nationhood Reconsidered.' *Análise Social, XLVI* (199), pp. 311–327

Lyons, T. (2012). 'Governance: A Security Perspective'. In Joanna, S. & Paul, D.W. (eds.), *Security and Development in Global Politics: A Critical Comparison*, pp. 115–129. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press

Martin, M. & Owen, T. (2010). 'The Second Generation of Human Security: Lessons from the UN and EU Experience.' *International Affairs*, 86(1), pp. 211–224.

Merera, G. (2004). 'Ethiopia: Constraints to Transition and Democratization.' In Nhema, G. Alfred (ed.), *The Quest for Peace in Africa, Transformation, Democracy and Public Policy*. Addis Ababa: OSSREA.1

Merera, G. (2006). 'Contradictory Interpretations of Ethiopian History: The Need for a New Consensus.' In David Turton (ed.). *Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective*, pp. 119–130. Oxford: James Currey.

Merriam, S., B. (2009). *Qualitative research: A guide to design and implementation.* Revised and expanded from qualitative research and case study applications in Education. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons

Miller, D. (1995). *On Nationality*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Moreno, J.C. (2008). 'What is Meant by Security Sector Reform.' Ministry of Defense of Spain Working Group No. 04/07 (ed.), *Security Sector Reform: The Connection between Security, Development and Good Governance*, pp. 17–28. Madrid: The Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies

Muggah, R., Bennett J., Girgre, A. and Gebru Wolde (2009). 'Context Matters in Ethiopia: Reflections on a Demobilization and Reintegration Programme.' In Robert Muggah (eds.), *Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War*, pp. 190-205. Oxon: Routledge

Mulugeta G. (18 April 2017). 'The Ethiopian post-transition security sector reform experience: Building a national army from a revolutionary democratic army.' African Security Review, 26(2), pp. 161-179

Mulugeta G. (17 May 2017). 'Transition from War to Peace: The Ethiopian Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Experience.' *African Security Review*, 26(2), pp. 143–160

Narayan, D. & Petesch, P. (2002). *Voices of the Poor: From Many Lands.* Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press

Ncube, M. and Jones, B. (2013). "Drivers and Dynamics of Fragility in Africa". *Africa Economic Brief*, 4(5), pp. 1–16. Africa Development Bank Group. https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb

Nikolaisen, T. (2010). 'The Security-Development Nexus' Impact on policies Towards the South.' Unpublished Master Thesis in Human Geography, University of Oslo

OECD-DAC (2007). *OECD-DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice.* Paris: OECD

OECD (2011). *Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility*. Paris: OECD. http://www.oecdilibrary.org/content/book/9789264074989-en

Oumer A. (2019). 'Community participation in security sector governance in post-1991 Ethiopia: The case of Dire Dawa City Administration.' Unpublished MA Thesis, Addis Ababa University

Paris, R. and Sisk, T. (2007). 'Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding.' *Research Partnership on Postwar Statebuilding*, pp. 1–12. New York: International Peace Academy

Peoples, C. & Vaughan-Williams, N. (2010). *Critical Security Studies: An Introduction.* London and New York: Routledge

Pritchard, A. & Woollard, J. (2010). *Psychology for the Classroom: Constructivism and Social Learning*. London: Routledge.

Schnabel, A. & Born, H. (2011). *Security Sector Reform: Narrowing the Gap between Theory and Practice.* The Hague: DCAF

Sedra, M. (2010). *Security Sector Reform: Understanding the Concept, Charting Trends and Identifying Challenges*. Ontario: The Center for International Governance Innovation

Sedra, M. (2017). *Security Sector Reform in Conflict Affected Countries: The Evolution of a Model.* London and New York: Routledge

Shimelis, H. (2017). 'Challenges and Prospects of Decentralization Process in Ethiopia.' *International Journal of African and Asian Studies*, Vol. 40, pp. 55 – 65

Sibuh, G. (2021). "State Fragility, Failure and Collapse in the New World Order: A Critical Assessment of the Applicability of these Concepts in the Case of Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia". *Academic Journals, Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution*, 12(2), pp. 13–24. https://academicjournals.org/journal/JLCR/article-full-text-pdf

Silverman, D. (2010). *Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook* (3rd ed.). Los Angeles: SAGE Publications

Smith, A., D. (1999). *Myths and Memories of the Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Spear, J. and Williams, P. D. (2012). "Conceptualizing the Security-Development Relationship: An Overview of the Debate". In Joanna, S. & Paul, D.W. (eds.), *Security and Development in Global Politics: A Critical Comparison*, pp. 1–33. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press

Tadesse T. (1972). *Church and State in Ethiopia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Tadjbakhsh, S. (2013). 'In Defense of the Broad View of Human Security.' In Mary Martin & Taylor Owen (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Human Security*, pp. 43–57. https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315885926.ch3

Tarry, S. (1999). 'Deepening' and 'Widening': An Analysis of Security Definitions in the 199s.' *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, 2(1), pp. 1–13

Tesfaye, H. (2010). 'Multiethnic (multinational) federalism in plural societies: Does it make a difference?' http://aigaforum.com/articles/Multiethnicfederalism

UNDP (1994). *Human Development Report 1994.* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press

USAID (2009). 'Security Sector Reform.' *The Quarterly Journal*, 9(1), pp. 113–124

Varisco, A. E. (2018). *Research in Security Sector Reform Policy: The Case of Sierra Leone*. London: Palgrave Macmillan

Viotti, P. and Kauppi, M. (2012). *International Relations Theory* (5th Edition). Boston: Pearson Education

Vromen, A. (2010). 'Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches.' In David, M. & Gerry, S. (eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (3rd ed.), pp. 249–266. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan

Wallelign Z. (2018). 'Security Sector Reform in Ethiopia: A Study on Amhara National Regional State Police Force.' *International Journal of Humanities, Art and Social Studies (IJHAS)*, 3(4), pp. 47–60.

Weigand, F. (2015). *Investigating the Role of Legitimacy in the Political Order of Conflict-torn Spaces*. Working Paper. London: International Development (LSE)

Wohlforth, W. (2017). 'Realism and security Studies.' In Cavelty, M. & Banzacq, T. (eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies* (2nd edition), (*no page number*). London and New York: Routledge

Wolfers, A. (1952). 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol.' *Political Science Quarterly*, 67(4), pp. 481–502

Wulf, H. (2000). *Security Sector Reform in Developing Countries*. Eschborn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)

Wulf, H. (2011). 'Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries Revisited.' In Austin, B., Fischer, M., & Giessmann, H.J. (eds.), *Advancing Conflict Transformation. The Berghof Handbook II*, pp. 337–357. Opladen/Framington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers. https://www.berghof-handbook.net

Wulf, H. (March 2021). 'The Rule of Law: Undermined and Under Attack Questioning the State Monopoly on the Legitimate Use of Physical Force.' *Policy Brief No. 195.* Tokyo: Toda Peace Institute

Yohannes G. (2009). 'Security sector reform of the Ethiopian Defense Force in an effort to prevent conflict: Challenges and prospects.' Unpublished MA Thesis, Addis Ababa University

Yonas A. (July 2019). 'Preventing Violent Extremism in the Horn: The Case of Ethnic Extremism in Ethiopia.' *Policy Paper European Institute of Peace*. https://www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Ethnic-extremism-in-Ethiopia-policy-paper-July-2019.pdf

Ziaja, S., Gravingholt, J., & Kreibaum, M. (2019). 'Constellations of fragility: An empirical typology of states.' *Comparative International Development*, 54, pp. 299–321 https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-019-09284-3

ANNEXES

Addis Ababa University

School of Graduate Studies

Institute For Peace and Security Studies

Annex I. Key Informant Interview Protocol

A. INTRODUCTION

The study entitled, '***Security Sector Reform in the State-Building Trajectories of Ethiopia Since 1991'*** is intended to get Masters of Arts Degree in Peace and Security Studies from Addis Ababa University Institute for Peace and Security Studies. The objective of the study is to *understand how the security sector reform measures that have been undertaking since 1991 correspond with state-building endeavors*. The findings of the study will be used to inform policy decision making and hence contribute to *improving practice*. This KII interview will take maximum of two hours. And, thanks for your time and willingness to share your thoughts with us.

B. IDENTIFICATION

1. Name: (OPTIONAL) _____
2. Gender: 1. Male _____ 2. Female _____
3. Occupation: _____
4. Education background: _____
5. Organization of the key informant: _____
6. Position: _____
7. Address: a. Tel/mobile (Optional) _____ b. email: (Optional) _____
   c. City/town: _____ d. Region: _____

C. KEY QUESTIONS

On accountability and oversight

1) Is there adequate legal and constitutional framework for the governance of the security sector? How does the actual exercise of control compare to the legal premise?
2) Are the mandates, roles and responsibilities of different providers clear and distinct?
3) Which oversight mechanisms, internal and external to the security sector, exist for budgets and expenditure? To what extent is oversight restricted by secrecy?
4) What internal oversight structures are there? Is there protection for whistle blowers?
5) How transparent are military policy, spending and management to parliamentarians, the media and the general public?
6) How was the policy making of national security (including national defense and justice sector) executed? Were the policy trends and the role of power relations attuned due to historical or structural causes?
7) Which degree of political influence does the government or politicians have over the security sector institutions (mainly the military and the police)? What is the attitude of the government towards the military and the police?
8) Was formal policy making resorted or engulfed by informal networks? To what extent were the security and justice provision instruments representative? Were some peoples or groups influential over the others in the security and justice provision instruments? What were the legitimate fears and hopes of those whom felt sidelined?
9) Was the rule of law maintained and human rights respected or the constitution served as mere rulemaking instrument (rule by law)?
10) Do any civil society organizations monitor the SSIs for human rights violations and corruption? How do their reports feed into the system?
11) Was the governance model of Ethiopia perceived as friendly or imminent danger to the security of its neighbors?

On Capacity

1) Is government-provided finance for the security sector institutions sufficient for the roles and capabilities that they are required to provide?
2) Are the security sector actors adequately equipped and/or trained for the roles and tasks assigned to them? How are the training and education of the SSIs organized? Is there training in international humanitarian law and human rights standards?
3) Are the military and police engaged in international peacekeeping operations, and which (positive and negative) effects does this have on the overall situation of the military and police?
4) What is the level of support in the government and in security and justice institutions for reform?

On Management

1) How is the security sector structured, managed and led? Or how is policy development, programming, planning and management organized? What are the roles of political and security sector leaders? How are budgets prepared and implemented?
2) Do SSIs have a written mission, vision and values statement and code of conduct? Are these in accordance with rule of law, human rights standards?
3) Are there measures in place to ensure cost effectiveness in the use of personnel and resources? How widespread is corruption?
4) How are budgets prepared and implemented? Is there a planning cycle, and how are responsibilities divided?
5) Does the military, police or intelligence and branch of them or local commanders control-revenue generating operations?
6) Are all incomes and expenditures from such operations part of the overall government budget? How is the recruitment and promotion of staff organized? Is there equal opportunity and are there mechanisms to improve the representation of women, minorities and other groups in the armed forces? Does the sector have a merit-based recruitment, selection and promotion system? Is it based on equal opportunity?

7) Are the human rights of the armed forces protected? Which procedures and policies are in place to protect personnel from human rights violations, including bullying and sexual harassment?
8) Who are the potential agents of change in the police who could support a reform process and who are the potential spoilers? What incentives are there for change? Have the benefits of embracing change been identified and explained?

On Norms or Cultures

1) How would you evaluate the culture within security and justice institutions? Do they see themselves as providing a service to the public?
2) What do security providers see as their role? Whom do they consider to be the beneficiaries of their service?
3) What do they think the public want from them and how do they involve them in their work?
4) What do they see as the major types of insecurity and injustice?
5) Do they have equal opportunity policies and what is the extent of participation of women and minority groups?

On quality and availability of information

1) Is the level of quality, reliability and availability of official statistics (e.g. levels of crime, court records) fair and adequate?
2) Are there effective and respected human rights organizations that monitor and document the behaviour of state and non-state actors and their compliance with human rights and humanitarian law?
3) Are there civil society groups that can hold security and justice institutions to account through the collection of performance data?
4) How could the capacity of these institutions be developed to help monitor performance and track the impact of security and justice reforms?

On Cooperation and Coordination

1) What formal and informal procedures exist for co-operation among security sector institutions?
2) How do they coordinate and cooperate with one another? Is this cooperation structured and institutionalized?
3) Who prepares reports and assessments for senior decision makers? Do senior officials receive individual intelligence, security and justice reports?
4) What challenges (and opportunities) did you face in working with other security sector institutions?
5) What should be improved and what should continue?

Annex II: Consent Form

Your participation in this interview is fully on your consent. You are not obligated to respond to any questions if you do not wish to do so or feel comfortable to reply. You can leave the interview at any time. You are not obligated to share your personal experiences, if you do not wish, so you can skip the question. Your personal identification is confidential and all the information disclosed to this interview will apply to this and only this research.

Do you have any question regarding the study? .....

Are you willing to participate in the interview? 1. Yes 2. No

Thank you so much for your willingness to take part in the interview