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***ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY***  
**COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE**  
**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND**  
**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**MA PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATION AND**  
**DEPLOMACY**

**THE ETHIO-ERITREA RAPPROCHEMENT SINCE 2018 and**  
**ETHIOPIA'S QUEST for ACCESS to the READ SEA**

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August 2023

ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

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**BY- FREHIWOT ASERES AMETE**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO ADDIS ABABA UNIVERISITY  
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## **Abstract**

This essay's main objective is to evaluate the main aspects of Ethiopia's relations with Eritrea since 2018 and Ethiopia's quest for Red Sea access. In order to achieve this purpose, the study made an effort to discuss important elements of the Ethio-Eritrea reconciliation. The study used qualitative research methods. The data utilized to produce the results came from both primary and secondary sources. The relevant information for this approach was gathered through key informant interviews and document analysis. Determining the bilateral diplomatic and economic ties between Ethiopia and Eritrea was the aim of the study. Due to Ethiopia's democratic development, there is now a new opportunity for reconciliation.

Ethiopia's government has made a critical choice to put the Algiers Accord into effect since June 2018. The official end of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea signaled end of “no-peace no-war era”. The same month, Eritrea declared the end of the conscription system. In September, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea reached a tripartite agreement. The partnership between Ethiopia and Eritrea improved the nations' sentiments toward one another. Eritrea and Djibouti also resolved to reestablish their relations in the same month, September, which is another development on the Horn of Africa. At the end, both Ethiopia and Eritrea decided to withdraw troops from the border region.

The Red Sea's coast was historically considered to be a part of Ethiopia. Unfortunately, Ethiopia dropped the ball. Access to the Sea is Ethiopia's key national interest problem due to its significant overseas trade transactions. Ethiopia should now make the most of the ports close to her neighbor in order to lessen its reliance on the port of Djibouti. A new window of opportunity for access to the Red Sea could be created by the rapprochement with Eritrea.

The government of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was prepared to pursue tight diplomatic ties with Eritrea. "No peace, no war" has been the guiding principle of both nations for the past Twenty years. Reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea improved the situation in the area.

**Key Words:** rapprochement, access to the sea, Ethiopia, diplomacy, foreign trade, national interest, International law of the sea, people to people relations

## **List of Abbreviations and Acronyms**

OAU	Organization of African Unity
PMAC	Provisional Military Administrative Council
PERI	Political Economy Research Institute
PRC	People's Republic of China
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
ICRC	International Centre for the Rapprochement of Cultures
UNESCO	United Nation
LDC	Least developed countries
CCPCC	Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zones
EHRC	Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
HDI	Human Development Index
UNCLS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
EEBC	Ethiopia and Eritrea border commission
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense Force
FPC	Firearms Policy Coalition
TDF	Tigray Defense Forces
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
BC	Before Christ
ICJ	International Court Of Justice
FCA	Friendship and Cooperation Agreement
GDP	Growth Domestic Product

AU Africa Union  
NGO Non-Governmental Organization  
ELM Eritrean Liberation Movement  
TGE Transitional Government of Ethiopia  
ICJ International Court of Justice  
WTO World Trade Organization  
EPRDF Ethiopian People Democratic Front  
UAE United Arab Emirates  
UNICLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  
ICRC International Centre for the Rapprochement of Cultures  
ICT Internet and Communications Technology  
UAV unmanned Aerial Vehicles  
UNOVER United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea

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# CHAPTER ONE

## Introduction

### 1.1 Background of the Study

The Federal Democratic of Ethiopia is a landlocked nation in the Horn of Africa. Its neighbors are Eritrea to the north, Djibouti to the northeast, Somalia to the east and northeast, Kenya to the south, South Sudan to the west, and Sudan to the northwest. Ethiopia has a land area of 1,112,000 square kilometers (472,000 square miles). With about 116.5 million citizens as of 2023, it will rank as the 13th-most populous nation in the world, the second in Africa after Nigeria, and the most populous landlocked nation on Earth. Addis Ababa serves as its capital.

Ethiopia is historically significant nation. The Axsumite kingdom/Solomonic dynasty/inherited from the Damat dynasty around 100 BC and ruled the punt land until 6-7 Century AD. Due to losing its trade connections and external invasion, the Axsumite Civilization declined around 9th Century AD. The Damat dynasty established its kingdom in the northern part of Ethiopia, present-day Tigrayregion (Mark C. 2019), Slowly, Ethiopia's southern region gains governmental and economic clout. Geographically, the ruling nation moved from the Tigranes to the Amhara Nation, as well. Since the Zagwa Dynasty governed from LastaLalibela in the 12th century AD, Lalibela served as Ethiopia's capital from the late 12th to the early 13th century. The Gonderian era, which lasted for a century after that, began to take shape. "From 1508 CE to 1784 CE, powerful and important rulers governed Ethiopia from the country's capital Gondar".(Mark C. 2019, pp. 55).

The ZemeneMesafint, which occurred between 1769 and 1855 and was another notable event in Ethiopian history, saw the nation effectively split into several areas without an effective central authority. According to Mekonen, "Age of the Lords" Known to the local princes, the noble and nobles competed for dominance with those of different racial and religious backgrounds(Mekonen A. 2010).Thus the Gondarian Emperors were diminished.

Between 1855 and 1868 Emperor Tewodros II elevated the desire and idea of forging a powerful unitary central government and a modern state. He initiated a number of changes during his reign, including the abolition of slavery, the reduction of polygamy, and the centralization of government, the dismantling of the feudal system, the centralization of taxes, and the establishment of a professional army (Pankhurst R. 2001. pp 130)

Emperor Yohannes IV of Ethiopia was a powerful, forward-thinking leader from 1872 to 1889. His primary domestic concerns were to weaken the influence of the other regional nobility (and thereby establish a unitary government). He engaged in combat with Egypt from the east and south, with Italy in a tiger attack at the Red Sea port of Mitsiwa, and finally, with the Mahdist forces of Islamic revival (Ghelawdewos A. 2006).

The Scramble for Africa phenomenon occurred during the reign of Emperor Yohannes, the borders of the current Eritrea nation state were drawn. The Rubattino Shipping Company purchased the territories surrounding the Bay of Assab from the Sultan of Raheita, who was in power at the time, in 1869 or 1870. Along the new shipping channels created by the Suez Canal, the region operated as a coaling point. The Ottoman HabeshEyalet, which was based in Egypt, almost included it, but they withdrew in response to Eritrean opposition. In 1880, the first Italian settlers came. According to ethnic Stelios and Elias divisions in civil wars were documented using georeferenced data for the years 1997 to 2013. These occurrences of political violence included clashes between the government and rebel troops as well as violence against civilians were the result of Scramble for Africa. (Stelios M. and Elias P. 2016)

Later, when the Egyptians attempted to seize the ports and other locations in Eritrea during the Mahadist rebellion but failed, the British mediated a deal under which the Egyptians could flee through Ethiopia in exchange for letting the Emperor seize control of the lowland regions that he had been at odds with the Turks and Egyptians. Emperor Yohannes IV thought Massawa was included in this, but the port was actually given to the Italians by the British, who combined it with the already-colonized port of Asseb to make a coastal Italian possession. Following the death of Emperor Yohannes IV in 1889 (Richard G. 1965).

The Italians took advantage of the unrest in northern Ethiopia to capture the highlands and create their new colony, from that point on. Emperor Menelik II granted legitimacy to northern Ethiopia after Yohannes IV's death in 1889, allowing them to settle in the highlands and build their own colony, which would later become known as Eritrea (Ghelawdewos A. 2006)

Emperor Menelik II laid the groundwork for modernization. He was a strong believer in building a strong unitary state, and his efforts to extend Ethiopia's territory, whether voluntarily or coercively, had a significant impact on the process of defining the country's borders. (Henze, P.B. 2000). He guided Ethiopian soldiers to the Adwa victory. In actuality, the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs were founded in 1900 under Emperor Menelik II. Ethiopia and America established their first formal diplomatic relations in 1903, during his rule (Melaku M. 2014).

Following Ethiopia's victory over Italy at the Battle of Adwa, as Melaku state "where Italy launched an effort to expand its possessions from Eritrea into the more fertile Abyssinian hinterland, the Italian possession of maritime areas previously claimed by Abyssinia/Ethiopia was formalized in 1889 with the signing of the Treaty of Wuchale with Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia (r. 1889-191)". Menelik would subsequently repudiate the Wuchale Treaty because the translators had dumped him into consenting to turn the entirety of Ethiopia into an Italian protectorate. But due to circumstances, he was compelled to adhere to the principles of Italian sovereignty over Eritrea.

Menelik started marching his army toward Asmara four days after the Adwa fight. He arrived in Enticho, which was now free of the Italians, and dispatched scouts to inspect the road's condition leading to Asmara. Salsa, an Italian representative, arrived and pleaded with Menelik to hold off on crossing the Mereb into Eritrea. He informed the Emperor that the Italian King was eager to ratify Menelik's proposals for a peace treaty with Ethiopia. The Italians who had been rounded up at the Adigrat fort had to leave right away, according to Menelik. Meanwhile Menelik chose not to pursue them to the sea because, according to Gabre Selassie, "the road to Hamasen was not conducive to the march of a large army." However, the emperor must have had additional justifications for not going after the Italians at Massawaso Italy was compelled to sign an agreement on October 26, 1889 (Paulos M. & Getachew M. 2005).

Emperor Hile Selasse I, who succeeded Emperor Menelik II as Ethiopia's ruler, reigned from 1930 until 1974. Through a number of political and social changes, such as the introduction of

the 1931 constitution—the nation's first written constitution—and the outlawing of slavery, according to Arka, Hileselasse tried to modernize the nation by played a crucial part in the creation of the African Union and Leg of Nation and that make him One of the first African leaders to gain prominence on a worldwide scale(Arka A.2002).

Thousands of Eritreans simultaneously recruited in the army and served during the First and Second Italo-Abyssinian Wars, as well as the Italian-Turkish War in Libya. “A variety of companies that manufactured buttons, cooking oil, pasta, construction materials, packaging meat, tobacco, hide, and other domestic goods were also opened by the Italian Eritrea government. There were roughly 2,198 factories in 1939, and the majority of the workers were Eritreans”. The development of industry also led to an increase in the population of Eritreans and Italians in the cities. “In just five years, the territory's population of Italians rose from 4,600 to 75,000, and with the inclusion of Eritreans in the industries, trade and fruit plantations were spread throughout the country, some of which were owned by Eritreans. Finally The Italians fled Eritrea after the Eritreans fought for their revolution”. (Paulos M. &Getachew M.2005).

“In 1952 the British hand over their power to Ethiopia and Eretria the UN resolution of 1950 had virtually handed the whole of Eritrea to Ethiopia”. ( Tekeste N.1997:pp77). Two factors led to the emergence of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) armed conflict in 1961. i. the formation of the federation, ML has been engaged in a constant struggle. ii. The Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM), which unites Eritrean refugees in the Sudan, evolved into a nationwide underground movement by 1958 (Tekeste N.1997).

Meanwhile when signing the Organization of African Union (OAU) Charter in 1964, nearly all African nations acknowledged the colonial borders. Only Somalia and Morocco objected to the borders, and Ghana and Togo had some concerns about their border that divides the Ewe. However, the borders were left as they were. We are able to investigate the effects of the colonial boundaries freezing through the OAU compact in a “quasi-experimental” scenario that supports casual inference (Stelios M. and Elias P. 2016)

A unitary Marxist-Leninist one-party system with communist and later socialist philosophy made up the Derg's administration. In March 1975, the Derg abolished land tenure in opposition to Ethiopia's feudal system and launched a comprehensive land reform program through the Land

Reform Proclamation. These policies, which at first enjoyed widespread approval throughout the nation (Berouk M.2004).

A new cabinet was installed to carry out reforms, which included giving land to peasants, nationalizing industries and services under public ownership, and guiding Ethiopia into socialism. These changes were brought about by the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), which transformed Ethiopia from a modern imperial regime to a leftist-oriented military government in June 1974 (Edmond J. 1987).

Influential Derg nationalists still supported the idea of a unitary, multiethnic state called "Greater Ethiopia." While claiming to defend the right of all Ethiopian nationalities to self-determination, they pushed for a military solution. The various Eritrean factions continued to disagree throughout the 1970s and 1980s. These divisions mostly sprang from ideologies. In terms of ideology, the EPLF and the ELF at the time might best be characterized as leftist nationalists, whereas the ELF-PLF could be classified as a moderate nationalist. The major ELF fraction never ruled out the idea of an egalitarian federal union, despite the fact that the EPLF and the ELF-PLF continually fought for Eritrea's independence. Even though these organizations' differences appeared to be small, they were sufficient to impede the development of a unified front against Addis Ababa (U.S. Library of Congress 1990)

The 1991 events allowed Eritrea to become an independent country. After a protracted civil war, the military Derg regime was overthrown, and the independent fighters led by the two joined forces. The TPLF and EPLF had fought the central government for almost 20 years before they gained control of Ethiopia in May 1991, which allowed Eritrea to become an independent country. "As a result, between 1991 and 1992, as many as 150,000 Ethiopians were expelled and forced to leave their property and possessions behind (Kevin Hamilton, 2007: 7). This number included thousands of Eritrean spouses and their children as well as many Tigrayans". Ethiopia and Eritrea have worked together for nearly seven years as economic partners, ushering in a new period marked by cooperation. "The two neighbors soon began to disagree over matters of commerce and currency, and both claimed the border regions of Badme, Tsorona-Zalambessa, and Bure" (Matin P. and Patrick G.1999).

A border conflict starts a battle that results in a million refugees and killed about 100,000 people. According to political Economic Research Institute data, “Ethiopia expelled 77,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean descents were deported after having their possessions seized”.(Gilkes P and Martin P.1999) “This massive internal displacement was the result of the war's devastation. Around 7,500 Ethiopians residing in Eritrea were interned on the Eritrean side, and thousands more were deported” (Peri. 2007). The two nations signed a peace treaty in 2000. For the past 20 years, the "no war, no peace" stance has kept the conflict zone calm.

EPRDF, The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, came to power by force of arms, after civil wars in Ethiopia and Eritrea which had engulfed much of the north of the region for over a quarter of a century, resulted in the secession of Eritrea, de facto in 1991, and de iure in 1993. “The new Transitional Government, TGE, led by the EPRDF, publicly pledged its commitment to three radical reform objectives: namely, the decentralization of the state, the democratization of politics, and the liberalization of the economy” (Sarah V. & Kjetil T. 2003, pp 26) according to Genet “Though the federal system is structured based on language and ethnicity, it created unhealthy relationship among ethnic groups in the economy, politics, culture and history” (Getnet Addisu 2020)

On the transitional government power distributed based on ethnically as Sarah precise it “EPRDF retained key portfolios (PM, Defence, Security, Foreign Affairs, etc.), the OLF were offered significant positions including Information and Agriculture, and remaining cabinet jobs were distributed amongst representatives of other ethnic groups” (Sarah Vaughan 2003)

Dr. Abiy Ahmed was appointed Ethiopia's Prime Minister as a result of the EPDRF reform; however, his choice regarding Eritrea was odd, unexpected, and premature because it was still early in his tenure. According to Redie, he attracted the attention of Eritrean President Isayas Afewerke by pledging that Ethiopia would accept the EEBC's border decision and be prepared to execute it fully and unconditionally after receiving the Eritrean government's answer to his request on June 20, 2018. Following that a peace and friendship agreement with five principles was signed by the two leaders (Redie B. 2018).

By ending the fighting and decriminalizing various political groupings, Abiy Ahmed is dismantling a network of political taboos that have been a continuous in east African politics for

the past twenty years. The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in particular has been a seemingly unchangeable truth in a region with a long history of protracted hostilities. Therefore, merely putting up the idea that peace may be a possibility is a fundamental act of political transformation that modifies the boundaries of what is conceivable or imaginable on a political level. It is crucial to understand that this might signal the beginning of a big change in the way people talk about East Africa's security and stability(Nanjala N.2018).

## **1.2 Statement of the problem**

The interconnectedness of the nations is at its highest under this globalized system, where nations like Ethiopia are largely dependent on importing goods, technologies, and investments. All of this may be made possible using port. 95% of Ethiopia's marine trade, which involves 117 million people, is dependent on the port and transportation network of Djibouti. (Selam T.2021).

Emnet cited a staggering statistic in her 2013 publication: "Ethiopia consumes 16% of its foreign trade value, which equates to about two million USD per day for transit expenses." (Emnet A. 2013). After Abiy Ahmed took office as Ethiopia's Prime Minister (PM) in April 2018, his administration held discussions with Eritrea about normalizing relations. A historic agreement was signed by the two nations in July 2018 to put an end to 20 years of "no peace and no conflict." (Getachew Z. 2020). The rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea would face challenges to touch the ground easily, but could saw dawn if managed wisely, as Welehawerya contend. (Welehawerya G.2020).

There is no doubt about the importance of peace; the long-term stability and security of the two countries as well as the wider area. AbiyA Ahmed, the prime Minister of Ethiopia, promised that the nation will fully and unconditionally abide by the EEBC agreement, which formerPrime Minister MelseZenawi, had demanded for Badme and other territories. Although Abiy's choice was not in Ethiopia's best interest, it could have been. It shows that the country's foreign policy is inconsistent (Welehawerya G.2020).

The execution of the rapprochement has faced some challenges, including "concerns regarding the transparency, pace, and institutionalization of the normalization process".In reality Following the peace deal, improvements were made to the aging infrastructure, including roads, phone lines, and flights. There were also discussions about brand-new transportation and infrastructure

projects that would lead to the sea. “Questionable strategies like elite-driven agreements, exclusive public diplomacy, and a dearth of grassroots dialogue are also to blame”. (Getachew Z. 2020).

Ethiopia is the most populous country in Africa, “imports 95% of its goods, has the largest land area, and spends a lot of money every day on port services. In contrast, Eritrea owns the largest and most significant ports in the horn of Africa but receives no financial benefit from them”(Bahru Z. 2011). This is because of following Eritrea separation Ethiopia remain landlocked country. Ethiopia must need access to the red sea, but the question is how Ethiopia can regain its Red Sea ports. Beside Eritrea’s geographical feature limits her to give port service for another country. This means Ethiopia is the only border and landlocked country of Eritrea.

There has been a deluge of discussion about how this improved partnership would change the region's economic environment. Likewise, it was anticipated that these changes in the relationship would have a big impact on the Horn of Africa's trade, investment, and shipping. These suppositions were all correct. According to Bahiru Leaders of the two countries are cooperating to further enhance their economic relations thereby augmenting to integrated development endeavors in the horn region. However, the ultimate goal of rapprochement on the economic aspect of Ethiopia which is Ethiopia lacked it (Bahru Z. 2011).

### **1.3 Core argument (Research Hypothesis)**

A new agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea is intended to give Ethiopia access to the sea but Ethiopia’s ambition access to the Red sea would face challenges, this study examine the challenges of Ethiopia’s access to the Red sea and the Challenges on the implementation of the rapprochement.

### **1.4 Objective of the Study**

#### **1.4.1 General Objective**

The General objective of this study is analyzing the Ethio - Eritrea rapprochement and also to analyze Ethiopia access to the Red Sea.

## **1.4.2 Specific Objective**

The specific objectives of the study are to:

- I. Analyze History of Ethiopia access to the Red Sea
- II. Evaluate Ethio-Eritrea Rapprochement
- III. Identify Ethiopia access to the Red Sea

## **1.5 Research questions**

1. What effect has the enhancement of relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea?
2. Under what conditions the legal and procedural frameworks support the reconciliation?  
How has Policy been released addressing the implementation?
3. What are the challenges of Ethiopia's aspirations and the countries' interstate relations?  
And Getting to the Red Sea?
4. What impact does the Ethiopia Civil war has on the execution of the rapprochement?
5. Do you believe that the peace and friendship deal or the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea will have a substantial influence on Ethiopia's ability to access the Red Sea?
6. According to the information you have, how did Eritrea become officially involved in the Civil war in Ethiopia after the reconciliation has been made? What evidence supports this involvement?
7. What would be the general difficulties of reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea?
8. Do you have any information or data that you have developed on this subject that might be Useful for supplemental document for this study?

## **1.6 Significant of the Study**

After the study is completed, it will be crucial for delivering useful information on the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea for the country's knowledge base and bridging the gap between theoretical and empirical data. The results will also be used as a starting point for individuals who want to conduct additional study on the same or a closely connected area of the topic.

## **1.7 Research Methodology and Methods of data Collection**

The qualitative method, which is frequently used in political science research, serves as the overarching concept that underpins this investigation. In light of the fact that Kothari stated that "the objective of research is to uncover answers for the issues through the application of scientific techniques. Though each research study has its own unique purpose, the basic goal of research is to uncover the truth that is concealed and undiscovered thus far" (Kothari R. 1990) The methodology section of the study offers methods for evaluating all information and data collection, processing, and analysis in a way that readers can trust it. According to Igwenagu, "Methodology is the broad research plan that specifies how a research project is to be carried out and, among other things, describes the methodologies to be used in it (Chinelo I. 2016).

The right methodology to analyze a research topic like The Ethio-Eritrea Rapprochement since 2018 and Ethiopia's quest for access to the Red Sea would be qualitative approaches, because the topic is dynamic by nature and qualitative research methodology is subjective, contextual, and capable of being reorganized. This aids in-depth understanding, perspectives, confirming requirements, and resolving situations.

The exact steps or methods used to find, pick, process, and analyze information on a subject are known as research methodology. The methodology section of a research paper gives the reader the chance to assess the general validity and dependability of a study. The methods section responds to two key inquiries: How and where the data gathered or produced? How was it examined? Thus that text and images would be appropriate primary data gathering formats for this project. In-depth interviews are the most practical qualitative research technique since they offer systematic responses to the "what" and "why" research questions" (Olasile B. 2020)

For primary data, the Embassy of Eritrea based in Addis Ababa, as well as political party leaders, institutions, and Institute of the Ethiopian Foreign Relations and Strategic Studies are source of primer data. Government representatives, political specialists and practitioners, senior researchers with knowledge and publications, and people who follow the developments of the rapprochement are just a few of the informants. And they are chosen for this thesis by their direct relation on the topic matter.

### **1.7.1 Ethical Consideration**

Fairness, honesty, transparency, and the disclosure of techniques and the intended use of the research should all be supported by ethical considerations in research. Primary information received from various concerned government bodies, organizations, and responders would be retained for a reasonable span of time in this case. Data, organizational rules, and other highly secret material that must be kept confidential are given value and kept private, as are confidential files and concerns pertaining to the national interests of the two countries. Due to the fact that the information gathered is procedural, legal, and susceptible to interpretation, all sources used in the research will be recognized.

### **1.8 Scope of the Study**

Ethiopia and Eritrea both are placed in the eastern portion of Africa, notably in the Horn of Africa, until late 19<sup>th</sup> Century the world know them as one country or area. Therefore the scope of the study is on geopolitical, economic and social landscape of the two countries. Attention was given to the local political climate in the region where the event really took place and the impact that war between Ethiopia and the TPLF would have on Ethiopia's desire to build a port.

### **1.9 Limitation of the Study**

The relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea is not progressing as quick as anticipated; this circumstance may restrict the responses of government officials from both sides. It is anticipated that the availability of firsthand information will be limited (interview). The other difficulty is that high level authorities can not foresee the shifting political landscape due to its quick change of the political instability on the region.

### **1.10 Organization of the Paper**

The study is divided into four chapters. The first chapter provides an overview of the study's background, issue statement, main point, and overall and particular aims. It serves as the foundation for the selection of the research questions, the significance of the investigation, the research design and data collecting techniques, ethical issues, the study's restrictions, and

ultimately the format of the report. The second chapter discusses the conceptual and theoretical framework in relation to the study as well as the literature review.

The third chapter looks at the types of agreements made and the burgeoning inter-group relations in the Ethiopia-Eritrea border region. It examines the founding using firsthand information, as well as the present situation and expected outcomes. focuses on how the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea affected the negotiating process as well as the present dispute between the two nations and the third party, the TPLF. The study's fourth chapter finished with a discussion of what is actually taking place on the ground.

## **Chapter II**

### **Literature review and Theoretical Frame Works**

#### **Literature review**

In further detail, the main cause of the Rapprochement, and Ethiopia's historical backdrop of access to the Red Sea is discussed in this chapter. Throughout Ethiopia's history, all of its great monarchs have demanded a sea exit across the Red Sea. Following the development of the Gulf States as superpowers, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates in particular have shown a keen interest in the geopolitical and economic significance of the Red Sea.

#### **2.1 Causes of the Rapprochement**

The normalization of ties between Ethiopia and Eritrea did not happen overnight. Both states were compelled to normalize their relations for a number of reasons. According to Wallenstein (2015), internal and external factors—among which a change in priorities, a new leader, an economic crisis, and foreign interventions are crucial—are what cause governments to overcome their incompatibilities. Conflicts must mature before they can be addressed, claims Zartman (2001). The perception of the parties to the conflict at this point is very important. The parties to the conflict must be aware of its repercussions. As a result, both Ethiopia and Eritrea have fervently desired to escape the never-ending crisis. One informant claims:

The two-year conflict between the two states resulted in an 18-year standoff. The two countries' economics, politics, peace and security, development initiatives, and foreign policy were all impacted by the war and the ensuing standoff. Nobody is coming out of the crisis as a winner. As a result, there was a growing consensus on all sides that the "no war, no peace" situation had to come to an end. This fact can be used to imply that there were significant causes involved in the two countries' rapprochement. The leadership was also obliged to break the impasse due to the two countries' citizens' mounting structural problems and discontent with the dilemma.

### **2.1.1 Domestic Motivators for Cooperation**

Political changes in Ethiopia had a more significant impact than other factors, even though both subjective and objective factors compelled the two states to realize the rapprochement (Redie, 2019). Massive public demonstrations in Ethiopia put the TPLF's hold on power in jeopardy and forced a shift in the EPRDF regime's top leadership (Lyons, 2019).

The appointment of PM Abiy, an Oromo with reformist credentials, signaled the TPLF's declining influence within the EPRDF coalition and represented the most fundamental reorganization of political power within the Ethiopian body politic since TPLF guerillas overran Addis Abeba in May 1991, according to Michael (2018: 420). According to others, the EPRDF's change in power dynamics also resulted in a transfer of power from Ethiopia's north to south (Abdeta, 2019). Along with the notable domestic reform initiatives, the new administration changed the country's foreign policy, focusing it mostly on its neighbors. According to one important source prior, there has been a shift in foreign policy.

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It was not diplomatically wise as it did not help to maintain Ethiopia's interests in a divided region<sup>15</sup>. Although it narrates the principles of "inside-out", in practice the regime blames external actors for internal problems. In particular, the 2002 Ethiopian FP document classifies Eritrea as an enemy of Ethiopia. However, now the FP Directive has set similar criteria for neighboring countries, including Eritrea. The decision to normalize relations with Eritrea was therefore also part of Ethiopia's foreign policy realignment. Political liberalization in Ethiopia must overcome internal problems and external pressures. Ending the stalemate after two decades was among the policy measures taken by the new leadership to reduce simmering pressures. On

the interrelationship between political liberalization in Ethiopia and rapprochement with Eritrea, Hallelujah states that:

Both are connected in one way but not connected in another way. In part, the rapprochement with Eritrea is part of the political transformation in Ethiopia, but the issue of human rights and democratic principles are not a prerequisite for the relationship with Eritrea because there is no political liberalization in Eritrea. We can say that rapprochement is not based on democratization, but rapprochement based on peace, economic and social cooperation and cooperation on regional peace and security.

On the other hand, the growing Ethiopian economy needs not only alternative ports but also nearby ports. An Eritrean port, especially Assab port, is the closest and safest port to Ethiopia. As Ethiopia is a landlocked country, high dependence on the port of Djibouti does not make economic sense.

From the Eritrean side, the Isaias regime and the Eritrean people welcomed the normalization of relations with Ethiopia. In fact, Isaias interpreted the TPLF's loss of dominance in Ethiopia as his political correctness towards the TPLF. Before the change of leadership in Ethiopia, both regimes left no stone unturned to remove each other from power and destabilize their state. On the other hand, Isaias was given the chance to negotiate with a body that accepted the reality of Eritrean independence. The Eritrean people also applauded the rapprochement and official visit of the Ethiopian Prime Minister in Asmara. In this regard, as Ambassador Araya Desta, Head of the Permanent Mission of the State of Eritrea to the African Union and UNECA, pointed out:

The government of Eritrea was waiting for the overthrow of TPLF dominance by Ethiopian power politics and FP. The conflict itself was caused by issues that could have been resolved peacefully through negotiations between the two governments. There is no conflict between the people of the two countries. This was realized by looking at the sentiments of the people of both the countries during the mutual visits of the leaders of the two countries.

Because the new leadership that came to power is from the Oromo, the Eritrean people have been freed from threats to their sovereignty. For the Eritrean people, dealing with a leadership that recognizes Eritrean independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty is considered a major

victory. The Eritrean people thus interpreted the warm welcome of their president during his visit to Ethiopia as recognition of the cause they have fought for three decades.

In addition, the two-year bitter war and subsequent stalemate between the two countries has greatly worsened Eritrea's economy. Ethiopia, the only beneficiaries of Port Assab, shifted its trade route mainly to Port Djibouti and other alternative ports due to the war. This cut off the income Eritrea could have received from port services. In addition, the economic sanction imposed on Eritrea in 2009 also worsened the already fragile Eritrean economy and challenged the Isaias regime. Here, as Ambassador Araya revealed, "Two years of war and subsequent stalemate afflicted Eritrea, rather than a thirty-year liberation war waged against successive Ethiopian regimes". Thus, the internal economic and political deterioration forced the Eritrean government to reconsider the desire to take advantage of the opportunity created by the change of leadership in Ethiopia and its unconditional acceptance to implement the decision of the border commission.

After the signing of the "Declaration of Peace and Friendship", economic interactions such as telecommunications and air flights were immediately initiated. After Eritrea and Somalia agreed to end their 15-year standoff, Ethiopia and Somalia both called on the UN Security Council to lift sanctions imposed on Eritrea in 2009.

External/geopolitical factors The Horn of Africa is the most divided and insecure part of the world, facing a complex regional security problem. Needless to say, the ongoing intra- and inter-state conflicts were exacerbated by external powers interested in the geopolitical landscape of the region. The Horn of Africa's proximity to the congested international trade route, the Red Sea, has also been a focus of great power and emerging power rivalry that influences politics in the region. Although the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea has largely been initiated by the leaders of both states, this does not mean that the dynamic situation in the region and beyond does not affect the effectiveness of peace processes.

External powers with interests in the Red Sea region, such as the European Union, the US, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are putting pressure on the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments to normalize their relations. Due to its greater impact on the international trade route in the Red Sea and geopolitical interests, the crisis surrounding the Red Sea region,

especially the war in Yemen, has attracted the interests of various powers. As wrong (2018: 51) notes, “The simmering quarrel between Eritrea and Ethiopia has threatened the stability of a coastline packed with state-of-the-art military and telecommunications equipment as well as highly skilled foreign troops”. Here, for one, the US and the EU are not happy with the growing presence of China and Middle Eastern states in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea littoral, such as Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland and Djibouti (The Africa Report, 2018). To check the activities of China and Iran in the region, the US needs to have allies near Djibouti (Mosley, 2018).

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Than the one million migrants who entered the EU, Eritrean migrants shared the largest number. This provokes a political and economic crisis in the EU. The main push factors for migration overflow are internal and inter-state conflicts and the search for a better life (BBC News, 2016). In order to stem the flow of migration and people-smuggling from the place of origin, the EU has therefore resorted to providing economic assistance to countries in the region to achieve economic development, deepen peace, ameliorate conflicts and strengthen democratic governance. The EU appeared to sideline human rights issues in its approach to Eritrea. The EU is thus putting pressure on both states from behind to end the stalemate. Consequently, the EU spared no time to appreciate the rapprochement initiated by Abiy Ahmed (Michael, 2018). Regarding the peace deal, the EU representative for the Horn of Africa, Alex Rondosac, says that “A new wind of hope is blowing in Africa and the prospects for real regional economic

integration have so far been created” (Reuters, 2018). Third, it is the diplomatic rift between the Gulf States that has contributed to the rapprochement between the two states.

The Yemen crisis has deepened the rift between the Gulf states by creating a diplomatic rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on one side and Qatar on the other. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have become more assertive since 2017 in their attempts to isolate Qatar from the Red Sea region (ibid.). The rivalry between the Gulf States has a direct impact on politics in the Horn of Africa. It divides countries in the region and increases competition. To reduce its vulnerability and security threats, Ethiopia has sought to balance good trade and security relations with countries investing in the region. Turkey and Egypt also wanted to assert themselves strongly in the Red Sea region. While Turkey has a strong desire to assert itself in Somalia and Sudan, Egypt, for its part, is trying to dominate Sudan and Ethiopia and create a counterweight to Turkey and Qatar. The development of UAE military and commercial bases in Somaliland and Eritrea, given the smooth relations between the UAE and Egypt and Egypt's position in Eritrea, created uncertainty for Ethiopia.

As the construction of the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam increases the tension between Ethiopia and Egypt, Egypt sought to strategically encircle Ethiopia. To reduce the feeling of encirclement by Egypt and balance the influence of other powers in the region, rapprochement with Eritrea is a boon for Ethiopia. Abiy Ahmed successfully used an opportunity brokered by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia (Mosely, 2018). The Emirates and the Saudi crown have also focused on capitalizing on investment opportunities created following the normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Thus, all these external factors contributed to the rapprochement of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

### **2.1.2 Dynamics of convergence**

A few weeks later, after former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn stepped down to help ease mounting tensions and initiate radical political reforms in the country (Burke, 2018), the EPRDF made a leadership change as part of reform schemes. As a result, Abiy Ahmed (PhD) was elected party chairman on 27 March and prime minister of the country on 2 April 2018 (Aljazeera, 2018). The election of Abiy Ahmed has influenced Ethiopia's domestic and foreign policy, especially with neighboring countries.

In his inauguration speech, Abiy Ahmed declared the end of two decades of enmity between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In addition, on 5 June 2018, the new Prime Minister of Ethiopia announced his governments' decision to unconditionally accept and fully implement the EEBC border decision. In his statement, he also called on the Eritrean government to end the state of "no war, no peace" and achieve peaceful coexistence. The invitation received a positive response from Eritrea, and on 20 June the Eritrean president announced that his government would send a delegation to Ethiopia. From 26 to 28 June 2018, a delegation of Eritrea led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs arrived in Addis Ababa to discuss the stabilization of their relationship for the common good of both countries (Redie, 2019).

As a result, mutual visits of the leaders to each other's country followed. First, on July 8, 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed visited Eritrea where he was greeted by crowds on the streets of Asmara. During Abiy's visit to Eritrea, the two governments signed a "Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship" on 9 July, formally announcing the end of the state of war between the two states and Ethiopia's commitment to implement the border decision (Peace and Friendship Agreement 2018). Through their statement, the two leaders also agreed to cooperate on political, economic, social, cultural and security issues and to open embassies in their respective capitals, restore trade, communication and transport links and work together for peace and security in the region (Redie , 2019) . A few days later, Isaias Afewerki, the president of the State of Eritrea, visited Ethiopia on July 14-16, 2018. President Isaias extended a warm welcome to the Ethiopian people during his visit to Ethiopia. During his visit to Ethiopia, the Eritrean embassy in Addis Ababa was reopened (Hirt and Mohammad, 2018). In addition, air flights and telecommunication links between Ethiopia and Eritrea were initiated, followed by the re-opening of the borders along Bure and Zalambessa on 11 September by pushing their troops back from the border.

The series of events and the euphoria that followed the rapprochement seemed to erase the memory of the two years of devastating war and the subsequent two decades of bitter hostility. It was a breakthrough in post-war Ethio-Eritrea relations (Wrong, 2018). As Wrong (2018) argues, rapprochement has set a new horizon of peace and hope in both countries and the entire region. The international community has also praised the two leaders, although all have reservations due to the unpredictable nature of the Horn of Africa's political dynamics. In this context, Wrong noted that:

Abiy's unconditional acceptance of the decision of an international commission on the disputed border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the issue that sparked the 1998-2000 war, is just one of a number of reforms he has announced since taking power. But it sent an electric jolt through the Horn and opened the way for a reconfiguration of relations between governments, political parties and armed militias (Wrong, 2020: 49).

Thus, political reform in Ethiopia not only led to the prospect of peace between the two rivals, but also changed the gloomy political landscape and ushered in a new horizon of hope in the region. As Mosley (2020: 49) notes, "Ethiopia's transition affected its relations in the Horn of Africa and the wider Red Sea region". Thus, rapprochement initiated by Ethiopia not only unblocked the stalemate with Eritrea for two decades but also restored diplomatic relations in HoA18. The restoration of diplomatic relations between Eritrea and Somalia as well as between Eritrea and Djibouti was a result of the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement. The rapprochement resulted in a tripartite agreement signed between the leaders of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia in September 2018 in Asmara. The leaders agreed to work for regional peace and strengthen economic cooperation in the region. AntónioGuterres, UN Secretary-General, hailed the new wind blowing through the HoA resulting from the end of two decades of impasse between Ethiopia and Eritrea as a meaningful lesson (Redie, 2019)

## 2.2Ethiopia access to the Red Sea at ancient period

In the past, the Horn of Africa was well-known for its high-end goods like gold, ivory, precious skins, incense, and slaves. It is believed that the pharaohs sent some of the first trading voyages to the region that is now Ethiopia and Somalia. Foreign merchants Greek, Egyptian, Arab and possibly India are reported along the Ethiopian coast as early as 1<sup>st</sup> century (Mordechai, 1980: 8).

Ethiopia which includes the present-day Eritrea is one of the oldest countries in the world though not in present shape. A unique, African civilization emerged at the beginning of the first millennium A.D in the northern highlands of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Axum, located in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia, flourished for almost seven centuries and become one of the most powerful kingdoms of the ancient world. The kingdom extended across the Red Sea into Southern Arabia and west to Sudan's Nile Valley (Tekeste, 2007).

The Abyssinian Kingdom is first mentioned in the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, a description of the coasts of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean written in the latter half of the first century A.D. Port of Adulis was important port during Axum was a metropolis trade center. Merchants carried all the ivory from beyond the Nile and exported to Adulis and so to the Roman Empire during the first historical king of Zoscales. (Jones and Elizabeth, 1960)



GIS; OLD ETHIOPIA MAP

The most important overland trade route to Ethiopia by the second millennium A.D. was the one from Egypt along the Red Sea coast through the Bogos and Marya territories, the area of the Beja Pastoralists of present-day Eritrea, across the river Marabe into Tigre to Amhara or to the heart of the Zagwe Kingdom in lasta (Mordechai, 1980 : 8)

According to Mordechai (198) another tread route from Egypt was along the Nile to the Christian kingdoms of Nubia (Dongola) and Alwa (Sennar) and from there through Chellega and Begemder to the northern markets of Ethiopia. “Merchants who preferred the sea to the land route landed at Sawakin or Massawa and from there reached the plateau by way of Hawakin or Massawa and from there reached the plateau by way of Hamasen to Tigre and Amhara, until the nineteenth century”(Mordechai, 1980 : 8).

Indeed as Richard précised, Eritrea to the north was racially, culturally and economically the most part of the historic Empire of Ethiopia and for the most part inseparable from Tigre province (Richard, 1965:204) this means even today the similarity of their culture, the language and tradition is visible.

### **2.3 Ethiopia access to the Red Sea at middle age**

In the middle Ages, Zeila was one of the key entry points to landlocked Ethiopia. Jimma, Keffa, and Gurageland traded goods eventually made their way to Zeila and Tajura to AliyuAmba and Ankober in Shewa (Mordechai, 1969).

Abyssinia was once again a maritime station around the beginning of the tenth century, and it held Massaua and Dahlak. According to Richard, Ethiopia had been an agricultural society from the sixth millennium BC, but once it lost its prominence as a major trading power, it mainly relied on agriculture and developed a rural economy. Small-scale trade predominated, but there were also significant market towns that served as rest places for traveling caravans. Through the middle Ages, maritime trade persisted, but it was under the influence of Muslim traders rather than the Ethiopian state (punkrust, 1961)

Ethiopia's connection to the Red Sea was fist established in the 8th century via a trading route to the Dahlak Archipelago, (it means international connection by the name of Ethiopia, it used by the name of Abissiniya). but until the late 13th century that a route between Shewa and Zeila gained popularity.Ethiopia's economy was based primarily on agriculture, but the country also exported luxury items like gold, ivory, and civet musk. Additionally, a sizable number of slaves, many of them were eunuch, came from Ethiopia and were sold in Arabia

## **2.4 Ethiopia access to the Red Sea at modern History**

Between 1855 through 1868, Tewodros II reigned as Emperor of Ethiopia. He brought an end to the decentralized ZemeneMesafint, and his administration is frequently seen as the start of modern Ethiopia. Tewodros II was born during the Era of the Princes, although he had no desire to be a member of the local nobility.

King Yohannes successfully unified Ethiopia and repelled outside forces' attempts to conquer it. He made provisions for a succession that would build on his successes and provide the foundation for preserving Ethiopia's independence.

According to Tekest (2007), the Italian occupation of Asseb in 1882 and the possession of a portion of the Abyssinian highlands in 1889 marked the beginning of Ethiopia's and Eritrea's modern histories. Additionally, these Italian-occupied lands were given the name Eritrea in 1890. In March 1896, Italy invaded Ethiopia from Eritrea, but was replaced at the Battle of Adwa. He also cited the agreements between Ethiopia and Italy. In treaties from 1900, 1902, and 1908, Ethiopia and Italy agreed to define the boundaries. The boundary was not clearly defined, and Ethiopia's request for it to be so was ignored. (Tekest, 2007)

As of Emperor Tewodros Emperor Menelik played a significant role to unify the country and to establish a strong colony in the horn of Africa in fact the expiration of colonialism endured him. Following Ethiopia's victory over Italy at the Battle of Adwa, as Melaku state “where Italy launched an effort to expand its possessions from Eritrea into the more fertile Abyssinian hinterland, the Italian possession of maritime areas previously claimed by Abyssinia/Ethiopia was formalized in 1889 with the signing of the Treaty of Wuchale with Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia (r. 1889-1911)”. Menelik would subsequently repudiate the Wuchale Treaty because the translators had dumped him into consenting to turn the entirety of Ethiopia into an Italian protectorate. But due to circumstances, he was compelled to adhere to the principles of Italian sovereignty over Eritrea. (Pankhurst, 2001)

Menelik started marching his army toward Asmara four days after the Adwa fight. He arrived in Enticho, which was now free of the Italians, and dispatched scouts to inspect the road's condition leading to Asmara. Salsa, an Italian representative, arrived and pleaded with Menelik to hold off on crossing the Mereb into Eritrea. He informed the Emperor that the Italian King was eager to

ratify Menelik's proposals for a peace treaty with Ethiopia. The Italians who had been rounded up at the Adigrat fort had to leave right away, according to Menelik. Meanwhile Menelik chose not to pursue them to the sea because, according to GabreSelassie, "the road to Hamasen was not conducive to the march of a large army." However, the emperor must have had additional justifications for not going after the Italians at Massawa so Italy was compelled to sign an agreement on October 26, 1889(Paulos&Getachew, 2005).

Emperor Hileselie II, He prevented Ethiopia from ever coming under colonial domination by preventing the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, he enacted a new constitution. He built new schools and upgraded the nation's highways. A goal of Selassie's was to transform Ethiopia into a modern nation ( Araya, 2004). During Emperor Hileselie II, his regimes take major and fundamental measures in the history of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

#### **2.4.1 Federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia**

The colonial system sowed the seed of secessionism. Eritrea would have remained an essential component of the Ethiopian homeland if the country had not been cut off from Ethiopia. There would never have been any discussion of secessionism, unlike the other regions of Ethiopia that did not experience the misfortune of being imposed by foreign power.

According to Richard, "A certain secessionist tendency was to manifest itself during the struggle for the decolonization of Eritrea. Although together they represented a small minority of the Eritrean population, there were two elements in the Eritrean political scene at the time that opposed any form of union between Eritrea and Ethiopia"(Greenfield, 1965 :227).In the beginning, there was a sectarian group that favored the actual secession of some of Eritrea and its fusion with Muslim populations outside of its borders. Its adherents were largely from groups residing on the outskirts of Eritrea, and they in no way represented the opinions of the vast majority of Eritrea's Muslim population. The second component was a group that aimed to reinstate Italian colonialism in Eritrea and was made up primarily of Eritrean workers for Italians and Italian seniors(Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997).

These movements lead the UN to decide on the future of Eritrea. "After eleven years of British administration and increasing political pressure inside and outside Eritrea, the United Nations General Assembly resolved on 2 December 1950 that Eritrea should be federated with

Ethiopia”(Greenfield, 1965 : 227).By a vote of 46-10-4 on 2 December 1950, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the federation of Ethiopia and the British-administered UN Trust Territory of Eritrea. On March 16, 1952, 68 candidates ran for a seat in the Eritrean Representative Assembly. On 11 September 1952, Emperor Haile Selassie signed the Eritrea-Ethiopian Act of Union and on 15 September 1952, Eritrea and Ethiopia legally joined the union.(Greenfield, 1965: 227)

The support that the secessionist movement in Eritrea received based on a purely sectarian appeal was soon replaced by a politically motivated objective, and by the mid-1960s the movement enjoyed wider support from some Arab countries for political reasons. The old regime in Ethiopia was generally perceived by the Arab world as a close collaborator of Israel and opposed to Arab interests. For this reason, some Arab countries felt justified in aiding secessionism in Ethiopia with the clear aim of weakening and undermining its government.(Negash, 1997)

ELF militants led by Hamid IdrisAwat began attacking government police stations in the Barka region of Eritrea on 1 September 1961. Following that the Ethiopian House of Representatives voted to dissolve the federation with Eritrea on 14 November 1962, and Ethiopia annexed Eritrea in November. As Bercovitch and Jackson mentioned at that time the governments of Syria and Iraq provided military assistance to the ELF from 1963. The Sudanese government provided military assistance to the ELF from November 1964. The Chinese government provided military assistance to the ELF from March 1967 to 1970 (Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997)

The governments of South Yemen and Libya replaced the governments of Syria and Iraq as providers of military aid to the ELF in 1970 (Jessup, 1998, 186-190). soon after the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) was founded by IssaiasAfewerki in 1970 and the EPLF received financial and military aid from Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Syria. Foreign ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) expressed support for Eritrean independence on 27 March 1973( Suhrke and Noble, 1977: 127-145; Tillema, 1991, 93-98).

In 1952 Eritrea and Ethiopia are officially federated according to Bahru,” two years after the United Nations approved a resolution supporting the initiative of Emperor Haile Selassie. Haile Selassie cancels the agreement and annexes Eritrea in 1962. A year ago, a small group of

Eritreans began their three-decade long battle for freedom”.1991 - After fighting alongside rebels from the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) commanded by MelesZenawi, the rebel Eritrean People's Liberation Front under the command of IsaiasAfwerki takes control of Asmara. Mengistu is overthrown when the EPRDF invades the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa” (Bahru, 2011).

#### **2.4.2The Relationship between TPLF and EPLF**

The relationship between the Tigray People Liberation Front and the Eritrean People Liberation Front was a formless one, but on the part of the militant Tigrayans, counting on historical, cultural and kinship ties, it was believed that the new relationship with the EPLF would work. The pressure of a common enemy that drove the relationship to work, Yet unlike the greater part of the ELF, which was influenced by the Islamist lowlands from the beginning, the EPLF had a clearer idea of cultural and political developments in Ethiopia.

In November 1974, the EPLF agreed to train TNO members and allowed EPLF fighters from the Tigrayan community in Eritrea, including MehariTekle (Mussie), to joined TPLF. The first group of trainees was sent to the EPLF in January 1975(Aregawi, 2010).

When the militant Tigrayans were confronted by an aggressive military force in 1974, the Derg, who demanded total obedience from everyone, were in total defiance and sought support to launch an armed uprising. It was imperative for them to seek such support from the EPLF. But the EPLF leader, on the other hand, hoped to find an ally in Ethiopia who could cooperate in expanding their operating theater. It was a time when the EPLF was in dire need of support from Ethiopian sympathizers in its efforts to dislodge the remaining government forces concentrated in a few towns in Eritrea. Well-publicized reports of joint ELF-TLF operations inside Ethiopia in early 1975 must have motivated them to quickly link up with the Tigrean front (Young 1996, vol.34:105-120)

Like a number of movements that emerged after the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie's regime in 1974, the TPLF looked to experienced Eritreans for inspiration and later received help when they recognized their right to independence. However, as the TPLF's base of support and military skills grew in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Tigrayans developed their own distinctive policies and concepts of revolutionary struggle. These differences not only served to define and

distinguish the TPLF from the EPLF, but were also the cause of growing tensions and breakdowns in relations in the 1980s. Although pragmatism and the prospect of victory over the Ethiopian Derg led to reconciliation in 1988, important differences continued until Mengistu overthrown (Negussay, 2001).

ELF guerrilla fighters were trained in Syria, China and the Cubans in South Yemen. After the collapse of Haile Selassie's regime in 1974, a number of Eritrean officers from the Imperial Army joined the EPLF – as did others from the ELF – which meant that its military leaders inherited a tradition of professionalism. As a result, they emphasized training and relied on technology accelerated access by EPLE access to qualified and educated recruits (Tekeste, 1997)

The several groups spearheading the conflict between the two peoples ought to resolve their disagreements in a democratic manner and strengthen and expand their collaboration in order to achieve shared objectives based on shared beliefs. The opportunity to launch the counteroffensive and suppression that the Derg and its supporters are planning to cover up the gaps endangering the regime must be denied to them. With concerted fights and blows without rest, the various organizations ought to bury the regime.

The two organizations affirmed that they share the following core beliefs, which allow for collaboration and teamwork. They think: 1. Addis Ababa's expansionist and anti-democratic regime needs to fall. It's a dictatorship that has no qualms about putting an end to the struggle of the peoples of Ethiopia and Eritrea; a system that is unable to appease the demands of oppressed nationalities in Ethiopia for democracy and their right to self-determination, as well as the desire for independence in Eritrea. 2. Instead of resolving the region's problems, the Soviet Union and the United States' engagement only serves to intensify and generate new ones. We should reject and denounce their interference at this time, particularly that of the Soviet Union.

The two groups confirmed that they adhere to the same basic values, which promote cooperation and teamwork. They believe: 1. The anti-democratic and expansionist regime in Addis Ababa must fall. It's a dictatorship that has no qualms about ending the struggle of the peoples of Eritrea and Ethiopia; a system that can't satisfy Eritrea's desire for independence and democracy, or Ethiopia's oppressed nationalities' demands for democracy and their right to self-determination. 2. The Soviet Union and the United States' involvement in the region only serves to exacerbate

and create new problems rather than finding solutions to the existing ones. Right now, we ought to reject and condemn their meddling, especially the Soviet Union's.

## **2.5 The Derg Regime and the Civil war**

The Ethiopian Civil war was a war in Ethiopia and present day Eritrea, fought between the Ethiopia military Army known as the Derg and Ethiopian-Eritrean anti-government rebels from 12 September 1974 to 28 May 1991

In 1974 the Ethiopian Revolution ended the longest ruling monarchy in African history. Haile Selassie, the well-known emperor and statesman, was deposed in a revolution caused by inequality and lack of development and democracy within Ethiopia. The Marxist government that took over power was called the Derg, which is the Amharic word for committee. But what was supposed to be a committee quickly turned into a dictatorship under the control of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Shortly after the revolution, Mengistu began to purge the country of dissent in what was called the "Red Terror." Many young people died, others fled the country or joined armed opposition groups in the countryside (Sandra F. 2000). Various opposition groups of ideological affiliations ranging from communist to anti-communist, often of ethnic origin, began armed resistance against the Soviet-backed Derg, in addition to Eritrean separatists already fighting in the Eritrean War of Independence.

When Ethiopia severed diplomatic ties with Israel in 1973, one would have expected these Arab countries' support for the secessionists to end; on the contrary, it was escalated. Again, with the revolutionary change in Ethiopia in 1974 and the subsequent announcement by the interim military government of an unequivocal policy of supporting Arab countries, this change would see an opportunity to work with the interim military government of Ethiopia, some Ethiopia to help solve the problem in Eritrea. However, some Arab countries that refused to recognize the changes and intervened continued their support to an increasing extent (Iyob, 1995).

The Derg used military campaigns and the Qeyshibir (Ethiopian Red Terror) to suppress the rebels. In the mid-1980s, Ethiopia was ravaged by various problems, such as the 1983-1985 famine, economic decline, and other consequences of Derg policies, which increased popular support for the rebels. The Derg dissolved in 1987 and established the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) under the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE) in an attempt to

maintain its rule. The Soviet Union began ending its support for the PDRE in the late 1980s, and the government was overwhelmed by increasingly victorious rebel groups. In May 1991, the PDRE was defeated in Eritrea and President Mengistu Hilemariam fled the country. The Ethiopian Civil War ended on 28 May 1991 when the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of leftist ethnic rebel groups, entered the capital, Addis Ababa. PERE was dissolved and replaced by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia led by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (Araya, 1990).

Following the overthrow of the Ethiopian Socialist Party by Eritrean and Tigrayan rebels, a new political party called the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (or "EPRDF") was formed. After seizing power over the Ethiopian central government, the EPRDF implemented some fundamental reforms, including amending the constitutions provisions governing land policy, regional authority, and Eritrean independence.

## **2.6 Ethiopia access to the Red Sea in the post 1991**

Four phases can be distinguished in the post-1991 political order: regime transition, consolidation, domination, and contestation. The first phase, which lasted from 1991 to 1997, included an effort to rebuild the state and approve a new constitutional structure in order to facilitate the political transition to a democratic system. As a result, three drastic reforms were implemented: the state was decentralized, politics were democratic, and the economy was liberalized. 1995 saw the ratification of the new federal constitution, which laid the institutional basis for state-society relations beyond 1991. It lays out a new federal structure based on ethnic identity, grants ethnic groups popular sovereignty, and gives nationalities the right to self-determination, including "the right to secession." (David, 2012).

The years 1998 to 2005, which mark the emergence of the EPRDF as a solitary political party, are covered in the second phase. The EPRDF became the most powerful political force. A combination of unfavorable political conditions and their own weakness led to the elimination or appeasement of the nascent political groups. By drawing in the elites of the area and enlarging its range of influence, EPRDF became the most powerful political movement. The Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998, however, hampered the consolidation attempts. In actuality, the EPRDF was successful in winning the war on the battlefield. But it suffered a serious diplomatic blow that

seriously damaged its credibility. The society gave the EPRDF complete authority to protect the sovereignty during the war.

As a result, for the first time since taking office, the EPRDF had garnered broad public support. However, because of divisions among senior ranking officials within the TPLF, the EPRDF was unable to fully capitalize on this support to increase its legitimacy. The rift inside the TPLF severely undermined the power of the ruling party and changed the political landscape in Ethiopia (David, 2012).

David states that the hegemonic domination phase, which is the third phase, spans from 2006 to 2011. It was distinguished by the EPRDF's hegemonic control over the political sphere. Despite losing a substantial portion of its parliamentary seats in the 2005 election, the EPRDF was adamant about holding onto its position of authority and sent opposition politicians to prison who were suspected of orchestrating the post-election crisis. In addition, the government passed a number of laws and executive orders that increased governmental authority over the operations of political and civic associations. All things considered, the state strengthened its hold on power by substituting the new developmentalism ideology for the preexisting revolutionary democratic ideology.

The fourth phase (2011–2018) began when the EPRDF gained hegemonic status and the political groups in opposition virtually vanished. During this time, religious institutions, especially Islamic ones, became rivals to the state. Religious organizations have stepped in to take the place of political parties as a substitute societal force as a result of political power waning. Religious institutions began to emerge as a substitute for the political arena as a means of expressing societal concerns.

Rivals between religious groups and the state as well as within them have developed from this. In the years following 2011, the term "akerarenate" in Amharic, which refers to religious extremism, became a catchphrase in state-society relations. To address the new issues, the state has employed its authority and committed a significant amount of resources. But over time, religion has become a powerful factor in state-society ties (David, 2012)

## **2.7 Eritrea Separation from Ethiopia**

Eritrean and Ethiopian government representatives discussed Eritrea's relationship with Ethiopia during talks in Addis Ababa from 1 to 5 July 1991. The government agreed to recognize the right of Eritreans to hold a referendum on their status. On 16 December 1992, the United Nations General Assembly established the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea (UNOVER), which consisted of approximately 110 long-term observers. Issaias Afwerki was elected President of Eritrea on March 21 by the National Assembly. , 1993. A referendum on Eritrean independence from Ethiopia was held on April 23–25, 1993, and 99.8 percent of Eritreans voted for independence (Jessup, 1998: 186-190)

## **2.8 The War between Ethiopia and Eritrea**

The Eritrean–Ethiopian War, also known as the Badme War, was a major armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea that lasted from May 1998 to June 2000. After Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia, relations were initially friendly (Greenfield, 2020).

Armed troops from Eritrea crossed the de facto border at Badme shortly after, sparking the start of the conflict. The Ethiopian government claims that Eritrean troops broke an agreement that forbade armed military personnel from crossing the border into Ethiopia. The Eritrean soldiers were reminded of this arrangement by Ethiopian police, who also requested that they lay down their weapons in order to enter Ethiopia. The Eritrean army opened fire on two Ethiopian police officers because they refused to surrender, resulting in their deaths. Drawing from charts from the Italian colonial period, the Eritreans assert that Badme is their own territory. The Ethiopian government, according to the Eritrean government, attempted on a systematic basis to acquire Eritrean territory in order to extend their northern province of Tigray after 1991. They assert that officials from the Tigray government crossed the actual border in 1992 and erected new border markers far into Eritrean territory. (Sandra F. 2000).

After Ethiopians from the Tigray region relocated into this recently regained area, the local Eritreans started to face harassment. Up to the point where the Eritrean military were called in to defend the interests of the local population, Ethiopian territorial aggression and harassment were reportedly greeted with attempts at a peaceful resolution of the problem.

Ethiopia admitted that there are issues with the border demarcation between the two nations. But because Badme had never been governed by an Eritrean government—not since 1991, not even during the Italian colonial era—Eritrean advance into the Badme region was perceived as aggressive. The Eritrean military's occupation of Badme changed the nature of the border dispute from diplomatic negotiations to armed confrontation, notwithstanding the establishment of a bilateral border commission to settle border disputes (Sandra F. 2000).

The United Nations, the European Union, and the United States have endorsed a three-pronged peace deal drafted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The Framework Agreement, the Modalities, and the Technical Arrangements make up the three prongs of the agreement. The OAU approved the agreement in July 1999 after it was developed in conjunction with Ethiopia and Eritrea. But because Ethiopia has declined to sign the Technical Arrangements, peace has not yet resulted from it. The parties to the disagreement have both agreed that the border's determination will be decided by the UN. Even Nevertheless, there are still barriers to a formal agreement even though the outcome is predetermined.

Ethiopia opposes the Technical Arrangements paper because it does not call for a return to the pre-conflict state of affairs. This document would lead to the ultimate solution. The specific identification of all currently occupied areas and agreement on troop withdrawal from conflict areas, the modification of the Technical Arrangements to replace a U.N. Peacekeeping Force with a much smaller OAU observer mission, and the restoration of civilian control in all areas from which troops withdraw are the main roadblocks to the process' conclusion and an Ethiopian/Eritrea agreement. Ethiopia is certain that until a guarantee is in place to return control of all territories, it will not consent to the Technical Arrangements (Sandra F. 2000). .

There has been little indication that Ethiopia is prepared to sign the Technical Arrangements in their current shape, despite the peace accord being on the table. The United States and other nations have tried unsuccessfully to intervene diplomatically on numerous occasions. Ethiopia's demands seem to be frustrating Eritrea, which maintains that the Technical Arrangements cannot be changed. Eritrea seems to be fearful that Ethiopia will retake the disputed territory and restore its authority over the region if it agrees to the modifications to the Technical Arrangements that

Ethiopia is requesting. Eritrea will ultimately lose in this scenario since the issues that led to its invasions into Ethiopian territory will remain unresolved. Numerous nations have attempted to arbitrate the dispute and reach a consensus on

Numerous nations have endeavored to arbitrate the dispute and reach a consensus about the Technical Arrangements. To try to close the distance between Eritrea and Ethiopia's positions on the Technical Arrangements, high-level diplomatic delegations have been dispatched by Libya, Algeria, and the US to visit with the two leaders.

All sides, however, have remained firm in their positions, and foreign diplomatic missions have failed thus far. The fact that both nations have consented to the final U.N. border demarcation, but are unwilling to take the necessary action to defuse the armed confrontation and make the demarcation possible, frustrates mediators. Ethiopia and Eritrea have been fighting a verbal war that is similar to the fighting taking place on the ground, even though efforts are being made behind closed doors to end the conflict. Ethiopia has called Eritrea's "aggression" on several occasions. Eritrea's foreign minister has stated, "We will oppose and denounce any force or authority that compels us to withdraw from our own land and sovereignty" (Tseghenay 1/27/99).

According to Aron "by 2000 The Organization of African Unity forerunner African Union facilitates signing of peace accord in which both parties consent to accept the outcome of arbitration. 80,000 people perished during the two-year conflict. 2002: Badme is awarded to Eritrea by a Hague-based boundary commission, "Ethiopia asks for talks and says it wants to consult with Asmara before enforcing the decision, which Eritrea opposes. The standoff wins" (Aron, 2018). Since then the "no peace no war period remained for near to 20 years.

## **2.9 The new Era of Friendship and Reconciliation**

A Rapprochement have potential to change patterns of regional antagonism and reshaped countries foreign policy in regional context, in the case of Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement the impact created the new insecurity tension in the horn of Africa,

As a result of a vote in 1993, Aron noted that "Isaias Afwerki is elected president as Eritrea formally splits from Ethiopia. Ethiopia, which is ruled by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and his TPLF party for the following 20 years, initially has friendly relations with the Red Sea state. In

1998 - After two years of squabbles over trade and other contentious issues, border disagreements over control of the disputed town of Badme result in major combat. Over 70,000 Ethiopians with Eritrean origin have left their nation their home land(Aron, 2018).

The world was shocked when Ethiopia and Eritrea struck a historic agreement on peace and cooperation in July 2018 to "end" their two-decade-long hostilities, as announced by the new Ethiopian Prime Minister AbiyAhmed(Tadesse, 2019). "On September 17, Eritrean President IsaiasAfwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a peace deal in the Saudi city of Jeddah, marking one more significant step towards repairing their relations"(Goitom, 2018).

Dr. Abiy Ahmed expressed a desire to implement the EEBC's rulings in full, and by doing so, he urged that Eritrea be given support. His fervent appeal for peace to the Eritrean President produced unexpected results for the ongoing diplomatic progress between the two enemies. "The decision to implement the Algiers Accord and the EEBC judgments was greatly aided by the new prime minister.This rapid development is thought to have significant implications for the security of the Horn of Africa" (Kidanu, 2020).

Getachew strongly argued against some of the criticisms leveled at the bilateral relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. "The normalization agreements between Prime Minister Abiy and Eritrean President IsaiasAfwerki were elite-driven rather than policy-driven, and were not made public. This opaque strategy created uncertainty among the public on both sides of the border. The public in either country, as well as outside observers, are unsure of the national benefit of the Abiy-Isaias relationship as of yet". The success and viability of the peace process as a whole have been questioned as a result (Getachewe, 2020).

In general rapprochements have potential to change patterns of regional antagonism and reshaped countries foreign policy in regional context, in the case of Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement the impact created the new insecurity tension in the region, Harrell mentioned that "the cases of Brazil, Russia, India and China all bring out the complexity of the regional-global nexus. Foreign policy is always greatly influenced by the regional context, including changing regional power dynamics (particularly within South Asia and East Asia), shifting patterns of regional insecurity (particularly in the form of new categories of threat), and increasingly complex social and

economic regionalization patterns. Regions are also central to historic self-understanding” (Andrew, 2006)

## **2.10 Struggles to Regain Ports on the Red Sea**

The Red Sea is a semi enclosed tropical body of water located between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean and is bordered by Egypt Sudan Eritrea and Djibouti on the west and Yemen and Saudi Arabia on the east Although the Red Sea is known for its natural beauty with extensive coral reefs it is also an important shipping route for the oil tankers and other ships traveling through the Suez Canal (Clapham,2007).

It was an important trade route in antiquity Its importance declined with the discovery of an all water route around Africa in The opening of the Suez Canal in made the Red Sea one of the chief shipping routes connecting Europe with East Asia The closing of the canal after the Arab Israeli War the building of pipelines to the Mediterranean Sea and the construction of supertankers too large for the canal diminished the sea's importance as a commercial artery especially for petroleum In however the canal was reopened and enlarged and traffic through the sea increased again (UNEP No. 166, 1997)

The Red Sea has quickly become the subject of new geopolitical intrigue as an unprecedented clash between the Gulf and Horn of Africa states reshapes politics, economics and security on the world's most extensive waterway. Friends and foes have drawn closer together in this increasingly crowded quarter as the Red Sea and its environs are filled with greater strategic importance. Opportunities and risks abound, and as with any emerging frontier, the rules of the game have yet to be written (Vertin,2019). Concerning the demarcation of Africa countries territory he precise that, Africa deals with a legacy of scrambles for territory by competing colonial powers, followed by the enduring idea of national sovereignty supported by international institutions; colonial history has been very different in different places. In the case of Africa, Africa is stuck in an outdated economic nationalism, supported not only by local political actors but also by donor agencies and other powerful outsiders who insist that the national perspective should be taken as a framework for policy-making and planning.

In the international media, Africa is portrayed either as homogenous, poor and in crisis; or as a collection of weak nation-states. Both reinforce the view of the marginality of Africa, where the

landlocked are the most marginalized and marginalized of all. A poor picture does little to encourage investment or economic optimism (Wilson, 2008).

The intention to control the Red Sea and the passage to the Indian Ocean make the Horn of Africa a strategic area. The Arab attempt to turn the Red Sea into an "Arabian lake" and the spread of Muslim fundamentalism coupled with Egypt's role and vital interest in controlling the Nile River make the politics of the region complex (Napier, 2011).

The Gulf States are asserting themselves in the Horn of Africa like never before. This unprecedented increase in political, economic and strategic engagement across the Red Sea is challenging old assumptions and erasing old boundaries. The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are seeking to expand their spheres of influence – including through commercial ports and military bases on Africa's Red Sea coast (Napier, 2011).

Following a military cooperation agreement reportedly brokered by Saudi Arabia's King Salman, in April 2015 the UAE began using the old port of Assab as a staging point for its military campaign against Houthi forces in Yemen, including air and naval strikes. The construction of a multilateral base quickly followed. In addition to allowing Saudi and UAE forces to operate inside Eritrea, a number of reports indicate an agreement between Eritrea and the United Arab Emirates for a 30-year lease of the Assab base, Eritrean (Vertin, 2019).

The port of Assab was first used by Italian ships in the 19th century and later served as the primary maritime and commercial port for Ethiopia until the advent of the Ethiopia-Eritrea war in 1998. A tentative rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea that may bring plans to redevelop the commercial port of Assab will have implications for Assab stakeholders and for competing ports in the region (Yacob, 2003).

Beside, Dr, Yacob explanation for reclaiming Assab is for a very long period; Eritrea neglected Assab and did not utilize it as a port. After Eritrea was united with Ethiopia by federation, which also brought Assab to its "mother land," Ethiopia began using Assab as a legitimate seaport. Around 26 million birr, or about 260 million birr in today's money, were invested by Ethiopia in the first phase of building Assab during the reign of the Emperor. The military regime also spent around 3 billion dollars to reconstruct Assab and made it a port that provided complete port services. Ethiopia built roads, schools, hospital and many others infrastructures in Assab. When

Ethiopia left Asab after Eritrean secession, the port had a capacity of managing 2.8 million metric tons(Yacob H. 2003).

On the other hand Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates turned to Eritrea only after initial plans to base their anti-Houthi campaign in Djibouti fell apart following a bitter diplomatic row and an intensifying dispute over the operation of Djibouti's port container terminal by UAE giant Dubai Ports World (DP World). The war in Yemen thus effectively served to bring the previously isolated Eritrea out into the cold. Experts believe that the scale of the new military infrastructure in Assab suggests that Abu Dhabi plans to maintain a presence after the war in Yemen and may see the site as a strategic depth vis-à-vis Iran and a hub from which to send forces around the world(Verhoeven, 2018).

International Relations have long been centered on the issue of order, including its causes, characteristics, and determinants, According to Hedley Bull's classic definition (Bull, 1977: 3-4).It is "a pattern that leads to a particular result, an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or values." Bull's main focus was on the world order, but others (such as Thompson in 1973 and Vayrynen in 1984) focused more on the significance of regions.

Assab now hosts a substantial number of Emirati naval, air, and ground assets—including warships, unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), fighter jets, helicopters, and armored ground units. It is also able to accommodate large military transport aircrafts through a new channel, docking facilities, barracks, and hangars accompanying the existing runway. Assab has also been used to train and dispatch Yemeni forces as well as troops and mechanized units from neighboring Sudan, who in 2015 were also enlisted by the Saudi-UAE coalition to fight in Yemen.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates turned to Eritrea only after initial plans to base their campaign against the Houthis in Djibouti fell apart following a tense diplomatic row and an intensifying dispute over the operation of Djibouti's port container terminal by UAE giant Dubai Ports World (DP World). The war in Yemen thus effectively served to bring the previously isolated Eritrea out into the cold. Experts believe that the scale of the new military infrastructure in Assab suggests that Abu Dhabi plans to maintain a presence after the war in Yemen and may see the site as a strategic depth vis-à-vis Iran and a hub from which to send forces around the world. Red sea(Vertin, 2019).

African states on the Red Sea must find a way to take advantage of this surge of new investment without surrendering their sovereignty or being drawn into political rivalries that offer little reward. They would also have recently established regional dialogues with the aim of developing a common vision of deepening relations with the Persian Gulf, including the formulation of a common development agenda. The Gulf States, in turn, should move beyond payday diplomacy and recognize that their long-term interests are best served by developing a detailed analysis and position on domestic politics in the Horn of Africa (Weber. 2017).

They should refrain from exporting the Gulf crisis to the region while deepening and expanding their cooperation with African partners – including investing not only in individuals but also in public and private institutions. Together, the political, economic, and security interests in this emerging arena could be served by the establishment of a “Red Sea Forum,” where concerned states would come together to discuss common interests, identify pressing threats, and propose common solutions. The United States and China, each with military presence and interests in the region, should seek to achieve some kind of balance as the Red Sea emerges as a potential arena for great power competition, while using their respective influence to urge the Gulf states to resolve the ongoing Arabian Gulf countries (Mabon& Robert, 2022).As Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on its press release, exclusion of the horn of Africa and Ethiopia from the red sea forum which is a new geopolitical architecture formed by the Gulf States is totally wrong.

According to The United Nation's Almaty Program of Action, adopted in 2003, there has been incremental progress in the structural transformation of LLDCs. With little diversification in exports composition, LLDC countries are more vulnerable than their coastal neighbors. In the period after 2000, resource-rich LLDCs outperformed their resource-scarce peers in terms of real income and exports per capita. However, most of that growth was based on a surge in commodity prices in the last decade. Trade costs experienced by landlocked countries still remain very much above those of transit countries. They seriously constrain the transformation of the economies of the LLDCs.

But there have been many positive developments during the implementation of the Programmed of Action.

Investment in access infrastructure has been given priority during this period. The World Bank Group, for instance, more than doubled its share of projects contributing to the Almaty objectives.

- Furthermore, raising awareness of trade facilitation issues resulted in significant reduction in lead time to import and export on most corridors. Time in ports or at the borders has been reduced – sometimes dramatically as shown by the example of East Africa.
- Facilitation and logistics indicators such as the LPI or the Doing Business show that, although LLDCs’ performance is lagging, they are slowly converging to the performance levels of their transit neighbors.
- LLDCs have made also important progress in related dimensions of connectivity, such as the development of Internet and Communications Technology (ICT).

Progress has been slower in other areas. Such is the case of implementation of regional cooperation schemes to facilitate transit of goods, or reform of the services sector such as trucking. LLDCs are involved in many bilateral, regional, and even multi-lateral agreements. However, quite often, many transit agreements are written very loosely and do not always specify the ways governments can implement and administer them. Also, there are some overlaps and conflicts. Some agreements such as bilateral treaties tend to be protectionist, and not conducive to the development of quality services (2023 The World Bank Group)

## **2.11 The Theoretical Approach of the Rapprochement**

### **2.11.1 Cooperation, competition and conflict**

Beriker indicated that one of the most important studied issue in the area of Social Sciences concerning condition for cooperation and competition is, “Cooperation versus competition divides Competition and cooperation is one of the major analytical dimensions of the model (the vertical axis of the FPC). There are two courses of actions that a participant can choose in interacting with other actors” (Beriker, 2008). “Understanding Processes of Cooperation and Competition and the Factors Contributing to the Development of a Competitive or Cooperative Relationship is connected to the nature of goal interdependence, and the other to the nature of the

actions taken by the parties involved. In this approach, cooperative orientation and reframing are two concepts that are emphasized and elaborated “(Deutsch and Coleman,2000).

Conscious statecraft—which can take many different forms, from collaboration to rivalry to war—and its unintended consequences both have a role in shaping the temporal conditions of peace and conflict when interactions in this complex system collide. Although war may not be your thing, it is "interested in you." Because history shows that the Hundred Years War did, in fact, come to an end and because current events show that even 144 years of postal cooperation stand the test of time, these conditions are ephemeral(O’Neill, 2023).

O’Neill figured out that Conflict is a temporary state of competitiveness, just like collaboration. Conflict involves both the persistent nature of war and its characteristics. Continuous analysis and clarity regarding the potential types of conflict are elicited by this. Recent examples that provide a decent foundation for predicting potential war and conflict scenarios are Albert Palazzo's war cycle and Frank Hoffman's conflict architecture. And concepts that build power and influence can be achieved through cooperation without the usage of negative or violent interactions. Although the weight of each party's benefit may not be equal, it is a beneficial contact nonetheless. When the topic of collaboration is brought up, discussion naturally turns to other facets of national power that might offer alternatives to military action when that isn't practical or desirable. (O’Neill 2023).

Meanwhile, the mental model of collaboration, rivalry, and conflict is simultaneous, dynamic, and large-scale. It does not involve a linear development of violence, unlike the peace-war spectrum. Both of these national power characteristics as well as all of them could have the conditions at once. Domains operate in a similar manner. The conditions are dynamic and vary in size and intensity as well.

### **2.11.2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties**

“The term “treaty” is used to cover a binding agreement between subjects of international law that are governed by international law. Treaties are a principal source of international law. According to Article 38 (1) (a) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice the Court shall apply international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the consenting states.” Like any other agreements the law of the sea also

binds agreements between sovereign states, “The law of the sea is a body of customs, treaties, and international agreements by which governments maintain order, productivity, and peaceful relations on the sea” (Khanal, 2017).

States have used treaties to establish their mutual expectations for many centuries—both orally and in writing. “The written treaty, which is subject to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is the main method of determining mutual expectations today. From the end of World War II through 2003, the UN, which receives copies of most treaties, has registered over 50,000 bilateral and multilateral treaties. China contributed more than 6,000; France, nearly 7,000; the US, about 10,000 each; and Japan, about 10,000”(William, 2011).

According to William's description of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which was adopted in 1969, "State treaties are the only ones covered by this universal treaty on treaties." “The drafters wanted to mold a State treaty regime first—saving an international organization treaty regime for another day. States generally prefer less specific agreements than do private international traders in order to retain maximum flexibility in their respective dealings” (William, 2011).

A legally binding agreement between objects of international law and that is subject to international law is referred to as a "treaty." International law mostly derives from treaties. “The International Court of Justice shall apply international treaties, whether general or specific, establishing rules expressly acknowledged by the consenting states, in accordance with Article 38 (1) (a) of its Statute. The law of the sea, which is a corpus of norms, treaties, and international agreements by which governments preserve order, productivity, and peaceful relations on the sea, binds agreements between sovereign states in the same way that other laws do”(Khanal, 2017).

### **2.11.3 The Cultural Dimension of Rapprochement**

On the other hand, the cultural dimension of rapprochement, according to UNESCO, implies “that international security and social inclusion cannot be attained sustainably without a commitment to such principles as human dignity, hospitality, and solidarity which are the cornerstones of human coexistence, in all faiths and secular ideologies”. The activities of the

International Centre for the Rapprochement of Cultures (ICRC), under the auspices of UNESCO (Category 2)

“In accordance with an agreement between the Director-General of UNESCO and the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the ICRC was created on the Ministry of Culture and Sports of the Republic of Kazakhstan as of June 25, 2019”. The development of an attempt by the Republic of Kazakhstan to have the UN Secretary General Assembly declare the years 2013 through 2022 as the resulted in this agreement (resolution 67/104 December 2012). The importance of interpersonal relationships is described by Gebrehiwot in his news broadcast as "the most significant aspect of the rapprochement" since it pertains to the focus on enhancing interpersonal relationships. It goes without saying that using a people-centered approach to conflict resolution is necessary to achieve effective reconciliation and long-lasting peace (Gebrehiwot, 2018).

#### **2.11.4 Ethiopia Right of Access to the Red Sea**

There are 44 landlocked countries in the world, of which 31 are classified as LLDCs: 15 in Africa, 10 in Asia, 2 in Latin America and 4 in Central and Eastern Europe. Sixteen of these landlocked countries are also classified as least developed countries (LDCs). Ethiopia is a land locked country with a huge number of populations and large number of area coverage; losing access to the sea is a great loss to her nation, in terms of politically, militarily, and economically. The United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea now gives a landlocked country a right of access to and from the sea without taxation of traffic through transit states and also has a programmed of action to assist landlocked developing countries.

Some of the world's saltiest and hottest saltwater can be found in the Red Sea. It is one of the busiest waterways in the world, carrying maritime trade between Europe and Asia and connecting to the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal. “The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which went into effect in 1994, accorded landlocked nations, the rite of passage to and from the sea as well as freedom of transit. “States without seacoasts should have unrestricted access to the sea in order to experience the freedom of the seas on an equal footing with coastal States. In order to achieve this, States bordering the sea and States without seacoasts shall, by joint consent with the latter, and in accordance with current

international conventions, accord: (a) To the state having no seacoast, on the basis of reciprocity, free transit through their territory; and (b) To ships flying that state's flag, treatment equal to that accorded to their own ships or to the ships of any other states, with regard to access to seaports and the use of such ports(Aril A. 2017)”(Khanal, 2018).

“The African Maritime Transport Charter of 1993 and the 1965 United Nations Convention on the Transit Trade of Landlocked Countries, to which Ethiopia is a party, recognize the right of landlocked Member States to unrestricted access to the sea subject to their compliance with the laws and regulations of the transit States. These international agreements don't have much of an impact on the countries that would have to give the requested rights, such as the transit right. As a consequence, bilateral treaties between the various nations involved have typically been used to resolve the access to the sea issue. Aside from that, it is also recommended for states without access to have good ties with their neighbors” (Khanal, 2018).

The Red Sea's importance in world politics possibly advantageous or detrimental to Ethiopia's attempt to cross the Red Sea, More than ten percent of world trade passes through the Red Sea annually making it two of the ten most important waterways in the world. “This attracted the attention of numerous actors around the world, including policymakers in the Middle East, the United States, and Europe to deal with unified policies’ (W.Dume, 2021).

A clause in the 1900 treaty that defined Ethiopia's northern and western borders with Eritrea stated that Italy could not transfer the lands included in the treaty to any other state. In other words, if Ethiopia decided to part ways with the territories, Italy was obligated to return them to Ethiopia. According to Abebe “Ethiopia was in a better position than any other country to claim an outlet to the sea given its prior right, the historical, cultural, and ethnic ties between Eritrea and Ethiopia in the south and south-east, as well as the requirement to have a sea outlet that was genuine” (Tisika, 2007).

Moreover, at the time of the Cairo Declaration, “Eritrea was a province of Ethiopia. Relevant colonial treaties in the context of Ethiopia can only refer to international agreements between Ethiopia and the surrounding colonial powers; most likely include treaties with Italy and other colonists. The Boundary Commission members shall be established with a mandate to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border in accordance with pertinent colonial treaties (1900,

1902, and 1908) and applicable international law, so far as AHG/Res. 16(1) adopted by the OAU Summit in Cairo in 1964, Article 4 is concerned” (Tekeste,2007).

Also, “Ethiopia would have demanded the restoration of its right of access to the sea, but the Algiers Agreement instead revived invalid colonial treaties and made Ethiopia a landlocked country. The Algerian agreement did not bring peace or guarantee Ethiopia's legitimate rights to access the sea. It is now paying for what it failed to do in December 2000. The government is caught between a stamp printed in Algiers and the will of the people(Tekeste 2007). in fact the Algiers Agreement appears to only cover part of the Badme and others, but it considered a valid agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, revoking the colonial agreement of 1900, 1901, 1902.

## **2.12Economic implication of Landlockdness**

Bing landlocked certainly carries huge costs. This is dramatically underlined by the threat any political disorder, 30 per cent of Africa’s population lives in landlocked and resource-scare countries. Landlocked nations face greater transport costs and are dependent on the transport, infrastructure and ports of their coastal neighbors. It is more difficult for these countries to integrate into global markets, including manufacturing which to date has been the most reliable driver of development.

A draft document prepared by the Ministry of Peace has proposed that the current administration should seek to reaffirm Ethiopia’s strategic and economic national interests in the Red Sea. These interests have been of great geopolitical importance to Ethiopia for centuries, until Ethiopia has become landlocked (Ashenafi E. and Selamawit M. 2023)

Titled “**Ethiopia’s National Interest: Principles and Content,**” the draft document emphasizes the imperative for Ethiopia to exercise its right to construct and utilize ports, ensure access to the Red Sea, as well as the Eden and Gulf Peninsula regions, and exercise its right to port development and utilization.

The Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region has become a magnet to superpowers competing for their geopolitical, geo-economic, and geostrategic interests, according to the document. Therefore, “Ethiopia should engage with other nations in the area to ensure its access to the ports and be able to overcome geostrategic impediments in this respect, the draft document noted, before such actions start to impede the development of the region,” it states.

The document provides a list of priorities, including the preservation of the country's territorial integrity, enhancing regional influence, promoting peace and security, effectively advancing Ethiopia's interests in the Red Sea and Gulf Peninsula area, and fostering pan-African development. Establishing principled bilateral and multilateral relationships, securing Ethiopia's right to use the Nile River, ensuring access to ports, and maximizing the utilization of untapped natural resources, is also listed as priorities.

Considering its proximity to the Red Sea, "coupled with its growing population and economy, Ethiopia should promote its security, geopolitical, and economic interests in the red sea." The document further asserts that the African Union should have ultimate authority over Africa's water resources, seas and ocean shores.

This document outlines a new plan for Ethiopia to reconstruct its national identity. It addresses the necessary steps, principles, and approaches required for the implementation of Ethiopia's revitalized nation-building project at various levels. It emphasizes Ethiopia's new national identity project on the global stage and suggests the registration of patent rights. The nation-building document recommends that the envisioned national values incorporate a range of factors, including the country's diversity and historical heritage (Ashenafi E. and Selamawit M. 2023). To handle the current rate of Ethiopia's economic expansion, which is essential for greater regional integration and prosperity, the Horn needs upgraded ports and infrastructure. For this reason, Prime Minister Abiy has prioritized ports on his trips abroad (David, 2018).

Throughout his quick visit of Ethiopia's neighbors, which includes Somalia, Sudan, and Djibouti, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has emphasized port developments again and time again. The potential of the abandoned Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa being restored is increased by the improving relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Additionally, the conflict in Yemen has given neighboring African ports—the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been utilizing its base in the port of Assab, Eritrea, to besiege and bomb Yemen's vital port of Hodeide—new geostrategic significance—just 25 kilometers across the Bab al-Mandab straits (David, 2018).

Locked in land since the 1998 border war with Eritrea began, Djibouti has accounted for 90% of Ethiopia's foreign trade; it is evident that Ethiopia is trying to reduce this reliance. It is important to realize, though, that Addis has no intention of using Djibouti less; rather, it wants to diversify its maritime access and lower freight costs through greater competition. Actually, because

Ethiopian, Chinese, and Djiboutian authorities have made significant investments in modernizing and expanding the infrastructure capacity along the Djibouti corridor, these trade volumes will only increase.(David S. 2018).

## Chapter Three

### Difficulties and Implementation of the Rapprochement

#### Introduction

Due to geopolitical importance of Horn of Africa, various countries, like Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, have been plagued by unrelenting violence and crises. The overall objective of the study is to examine the difficulties and execution of the Ethio-Eritrea reconciliation. Also take into account how Ethiopia access to the Red Sea has been impacted by the conflict between Federal Government of Ethiopia and Tigray region. The continuation of diplomatic and people-to-people ties between Ethiopia and Eritrea following their reconciliation was also addressed on this thesis.

After separating from Eritrea, Ethiopia achieved political and economic steps, and its peacekeeping operations in South Sudan and Somalia were at least somewhat successful. Eritrea's secession from Ethiopia, however, hampered the nation's economic progress and actually weakened Ethiopia's influence in the region (Amsalu K. 2020).

The EPDRF's accelerating economic growth and political upheaval may drive Ethiopia to take action to seek a solution with Eritrea. In Saudi Arabia Jidda, where Dr. Abiy Ahmed received the Nobel Prize, the two neighboring nations signed a peace and friendship pact because that Eritrea has a potential sea outlet and that Ethiopia, with its massive and rising economy, also has a need for seaports. The borders were opened following the accord for peace and friendship. The infrastructure for communications and transportation was repaired, Ethiopian Airlines started flying between Addis Abeba and Asmara, and families were reunited close to the border (Tadesse Kassa2019).

It also addresses the question of whether the peace negotiations may stop the ongoing fighting in the area. The likelihood that Ethiopia and Eritrea should adhere to their agreement in this regard is high, but the fighting in the area fundamentally altered its dynamics and led Eritrea to involve in the TigrayWar, Ethiopia's attempts to reach the Red Sea will be strongly impacted by the peace and friendship agreement or the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Landlocked

countries must meet various criteria in order to access the ocean. Unfortunately, Ethiopia lost its coastline territory when Eritrea separated from it in 1991 (Godius K. 2018).

### **3.1 Reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea: implications**

The president of Eritrea would not have started negotiations without Ethiopia's decision to implement the Algiers Accord, which has been in effect since June 2018. The era of no peace and no war came to an end when Ethiopia and Eritrea's war was officially declared over in July 2018 in which the two leaders meet<sup>1</sup>. Eritrea announced the termination of the conscription system in the same month. Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea came to a trilateral agreement in September.

The relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea has improved thanks to their teamwork. Another milestone in the area was the decision by Eritrea and Djibouti to resume diplomatic relations in the same month, September. In the end, it was determined that both Ethiopia and Eritrea would withdraw their soldiers from the border area.

As the public diplomacy coordinator for the Ethiopian foreign ministry, Kassa highlighted how the Ethio-Eritrea reconciliation altered how the international community viewed both Ethiopia and Eritrea. The friendship agreement between the president of Eritrea and Ethiopia's prime minister was recognized by the international world as a key step in reestablishing peace, love, and harmony between the two countries. It makes obvious the importance of collaboration and investment opportunities. In order to implement the agreement, policies and procedural papers are necessary; the government is working on these issues.

Both governments have been taking such positive steps in the continuous process of rapprochement. Because the government is making real progress, the world respects Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's initiative and actions. The peace and friendship deal will have a significant impact on Ethiopia's social, political, and economic situation as well as that of its neighbors.

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<sup>1</sup>. Interview with Kassa Behilu (PHD). Public relation expert in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, On May 05/2023

The two countries' hostilities came to an end with the rapprochement, and formal diplomatic ties were established between them. Similar to Eritrean families who visited Addis Abeba, residents of Addis Abeba went to Asmara to reunite with their 20-year-old abandoned family, people to people relation started immediately after the peace agreement was taking place (Belay R. 2020).

Because the peace and friendship pact put an end to long-standing demands for the issues of human rights, migration, and war costs, Ethiopia was more widely accepted in Africa and throughout the world. The two leaders were able to speak for peace and stability for the area and between the nations, and they also confirmed that what is occurring on the ground is objective if things continue in the same way. The implementation of the rapprochement was forward-thinking.

Berketeab also agreed on Nonetheless, it was expected that a successful end would be attained from the start and throughout the course of the partnership. As excellent nation in the horn of Africa Ethiopia contributes significant regional peacekeeping efforts and serves as the African Union leader. Ethiopia also made an effort to promote harmony and goodwill in Africa (Bereketeab R. 2019).The implication of the Reconciliation is mostly positive, when it looks on Social, political and economic aspects, the reconciliation able to reestablished the rule of law, peace, and to rebuilt infrastructure, like health center, schools,

The fighting led to massive internal displacement in both countries as civilians fled the war zone – by the end of May 2000, Ethiopia occupied about a quarter of Eritrea's territory, displacing 650,000 people, and destroying key components of Eritrea's infrastructure.

There is a great wind of hope flowing throughout the Horn of Africa, according to Antonio Guterres, the UN Secretary General, in his description of the recent development in the area (UN News 2018). No one could predict the mechanics of this wind of hope, making it special.

Moreover, the key decisions made by the leaders of both countries have changed the political animosity in the region and lowered tensions between the two nations<sup>2</sup>. The world had hoped that the two leaders would honor their commitments.

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<sup>2</sup>. Interview with Kassa Behilu (PHD). Public relation expert in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, On May 05/2023

Since the peace deal made by the two leaders independently there is no going back at this point, and each country is now accountable for the rapprochement's success.

The Algiers Agreement border demarcation issues have not been resolved by the Eritrean administration and prior Ethiopian leaders, which has put pressure on Ethiopia's diplomatic efforts to alleviate tensions in border contentious regions like Badem and others. Ethiopia made the decision to proceed because the Algiers pact, which required Ethiopia to accept the EEBC judgments, is sacrificed in favor of the reconciliation (AlyV. 2018). Dr. Tassew pointed out while maintaining peace and security in the area at the same time need to preserve national interest of the country. He also advised "People need peace because they are people. Citizens of a nation require security. Ethiopia should be required to make this reconciliation for the sake of peace and security for both its citizens and those of its neighbors, but as a major country, Ethiopia needs foreign policy experts.

### **3.2 The challenges of the rapprochement**

The emergence of the TPLF in the region, the characteristics of the Eritrean government, the western influence due to the Horn of Africa Geopolitical Importance, clarity of the rapprochement itself, Ethiopia's internal politics, Ethiopia's historical adversaries, the lack of policies and procedural documents, and the Rule of Law in both Countries are some common responses to questions about the challenges of the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement.

#### **3.2.1 Internal political unrest in Ethiopia and how it affects relations**

There numerous causes for the recurrent conflicts in Ethiopia. First and foremost, perverse historical narrations and historical polarization are affecting the current conflicts in the country. The historic power antagonism of Tigray and Amhara, as well as Amhara and Oromia, is persisting. The historic power struggle of these three ethnic groups has remained uncontrolled and unmanageable even in current Ethiopia. Moreover, political entrepreneurs are the major causes of the recurrent conflict in Ethiopia<sup>3</sup>. The diverse interest politician is contributing to the conflicts at a regional and national level.

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<sup>3</sup>. Interview with Moges Agegn (Mr.). Public relation expert in Ezama party, On May 15/2023

Not only do disparate political groups exist in Ethiopia, but there is also discord inside the ruling party itself. Conflict has evolved out of political differences, power struggles, battles for linguistic domination, and territorial disputes among political entrepreneurs. Conflict and instability are thus being caused by the absence of a national political consensus and a shared political history in the nation. Pervasive conflict in the nation is also a result of the inadequacy of national institutions to handle conflict. Ethiopian institutions and institutionalization are weak; instead, they are partisanship inside the government.

The nation's hooliganism and vandalism, violations, mob justice, and disturbances cannot be stopped by the institutions set up to settle disputes. Consequently, there are an increasing number of conflicts in the nation, some of which have escalated to the point of war and are still out of control. Moreover, wealth, ethnic divisions, and territorial disputes all contribute to the nation's problems. (Berihu, 2021)

Ethiopia's internal political instability, particularly the differences between the governing bodies in the new reform of Ethiopia's government structure and the former EPDRF leaders, may be the first and most difficult obstacle to the Ethio-Eritrea reconciliation<sup>4</sup>. Since the EPDRF has adopted a reformist stance and the new reformist Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has come to power and the prosperity party emerged, soon later the peace and friendship agreement established. All of these developments have upset the previous EPDRF leaders. As we have all noticed, the TPLF, a former coalition party in the EPDRF, concentrated its administrative power under the Tigray regional government, and it now demands its own administrative structure and power.

The Tigray region's proximity to Eritrea in terms of geography and its turbulent past as a battleground between the TPLF and the previous EPDRF is of utmost importance. Ethiopia should have been in conflict in the region where the reconciliation is taking place if Ethiopia is a friend of Eritrea and cannot simultaneously be a friend of the PTLF because they share the same interests (Terere B. 2020).

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<sup>4</sup>. Interview with Mr. Denboba Alemawe, lecturer in Civil Service University. On May 17/2023

There are formal and informal, internal and external actors in the recurrent conflicts in Ethiopia. There are formal groups like political parties and informal groups like hooligans and social media warriors which provoke and aggravate conflicts. Political parties like TPLF, PP, OLF, and National Movement of Amhara, Oromo Federalist Party, and Ogaden national liberation front. Furthermore, a collection of youth groups like Fano and Para Militias in Amhara and Qeerroo in Oromia are the informal actors of conflict in Ethiopia<sup>5</sup>. In addition for Ahimed, these groups have triggered conflicts either through influencing the government or directly taking violating actions by themselves. Social media activists are also aggravating conflicts in the country. The major conflict enablers in Ethiopia are Media. Media inflame small conflicts and broadcast hatred speech of extremist individuals as well as government officials. Finally, external actors are also actors of conflict in Ethiopia. The neighboring countries of Ethiopia have their national interests. Therefore, Eritrea, Egypt, and Sudan have directly or indirectly been involved in the recurrent conflicts in Ethiopia

### **3.2.2 The Diplomatic Ties between Ethiopia and Eritrea on the Reconciliation**

The political relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea alone may be one of the challenges to peace. As a reason Sara mentioned the official diplomatic processes were not institutionalized, the diplomatic aspects did not originate from the people who live near the border, and public diplomacy was not present<sup>6</sup>, Ethiopia also gave the Algiers Accord as a gift at the bargaining table, inciting the hatred of numerous political parties, governmental organizations, and others and increasing the likelihood that the reconciliation would not occur.

Sara raised the issue of clarity, the rapprochement was unclear, there is no clear plan for how to put it into action, Although the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea is appreciated, the agreement between both leaders and their policy orientation is still unclear

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<sup>5</sup>Interview with Ahimed Nure, lecturer in Civil Service University Department of political Science. On May 17/2023

<sup>6</sup>Interview with Sara Getachew (phd) an expert and practitioner on the politics of the Horn of Africa. On May 20/2023

Regarding the difficulties in reconciliation, though the Ethiopian soldiers have not yet left the disputed border the normalization of relations is still in danger, especially if hardliners in Ethiopia's security establishment try to prevent the points, therefore all border crossings have again been closed due to unregulated movement people and nonexistence regulations of economic activity (Muller T. 2019).

The government declared that Ethiopia and Eritrea's recent formal ties were constructive. According to deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign affairs, Demeke Mekonnen, on his interview with Fana Broadcasting "Ethiopia is working to transform its relations with neighboring countries in a high level on bilateral and commercial areas. The two countries are working to transform their bilateral relations into strong economic cooperation based on shared interests, in the areas of port utilization, trade transactions, customs services, among others, in an effort to ensure the benefit of the two peoples". The relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea has improved over the past few years. Leaders agreed to put the EEBC resolution into action and work together to promote regional cooperation, growth, and peace with is a strategic move.

Therefore requirements for diplomatic relations should be institutionalized and require written processes so that they are known to all government agencies. Every action should be mentioned in detail, and public diplomacy needs to be promoted.

Nebiyu described that "the stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea was characterized by working against each other's interests and advantages in every aspect. Though the agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea cannot be a treaty, since not approved by the parliament, but general road map or major areas of the agreements, has shifted the approaches between the two states." Unlike his argument in the principle of making a treaty with other state, the ultimate power is in the hands on the president or Prime Minister therefore Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed can mad any treaty on the behalf of the country.

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<sup>7</sup>. Interview with Nebiyu Daniale, Member of Parliament, Addis Ababa Ethiopia. On May 17/2023

### 3.2.3 The effects Civil war on the rapprochement

The EPRDF coalition supported the TPLF during its 27-year rule of Ethiopia. These include OPDO, ANDM, TPLF, and SNNPR; Abiy (OPDO) was a member of TPLF, which exercised real power and made decisions. This justification is backed up by Negeri a journalist at Addis standard magazine, who claims that "Abiy's rapprochement with Eritrea angered the Tigrayan leadership and came as several high-ranking Tigrayan former officials were put on trial for abuses and corruption." Disagreements emerged between Tigrayan authorities and the ruling party following Abiy's ascent to power and the implementation of his policies during his administrations (Tiksa, 2020).

Seleam mentioned that "The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), which governs the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia, began a military offensive against Ethiopia's armed forces on November 4. The most recent military activity was purportedly sparked by a supposed surprise nighttime raid by the TPLF on a large Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) post in Tigray, which resulted in the murder of non-Tigrayan troops and the attempted plunder of heavy artillery and munitions"(Seleam, 2020).

The Civil war in Ethiopia will undoubtedly be the reason for the dalliance of the rapprochement to be implemented<sup>8</sup>.in addition Tsega continued by saying that the involvement of the Eritrean government in the aftermath of the battle with Tigray compounded matters. This military reaction was implemented following months of growing tensions between the TPLF and the Abiy administration.

Why Ethiopia was under intentional pressure and on what condition the Ethio-Tigray war brought significant influence on Ethiopia's effort towards the rapprochement. According to Tsega during the lockdown the Tigray region violation of Human right propagated on western media on the issue of rap, child abuse and shortage of basic necessity, like food, water and shelter. In addition unknown number of migration flew to neighboring countries;

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<sup>8</sup>. Interview with TsegaLeuel, peace and security expert, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. On May 25/2023

Those things created conducive environment for the international media and condemned Abiy's administration. Also First, Ethiopia should be under international pressure as long as the conflict is not under its direct control. The government is burdened by problems involving human rights, food, shelter, insecurity, migration, etc. Second, the Tigray region is anticipated to be the main location for the implementation of the peace and friendship agreement's provisions, along with the Algiers Agreement's border dispute. The war with Tigray, which was also the cause of the delays in the rapprochement, has already had an effect.

Before the dispute occurred between federal government and the TPLF leaders, the two sovereign states, Ethiopia and Eritrea actually made up. However, the problem is that the TPLF is a long-established entity with an armed force and the only third party in the region that cannot grant the federal government supremacy. the Ethio –Tigray war lead the Tigray region without Government for certain period of time<sup>9</sup>, there was uncontrolled movement of people and goods from both sides,

He also added that the new peace agreement gave official permission for social interactions which existed between the peoples during the "no peace, no war period," After the diplomatic agreement was initiated and until the war between Ethiopia and the TPLF officially started, there were formal and informal movements of people and goods between Ethiopia and Eritrea, which is Tigray region. Tigray region is on the border of Eritrea for more than 500 kilometers.

### **3.2.4 The Impact of Eritrea's Involvement in Civil War in Tigray**

Though the government of Ethiopian made no comment on this matter at the time, Eritrean troops are in Tigray supporting Ethiopian forces<sup>10</sup>. He said that, In fact, both nations are sovereign states, and any nation that is invaded must receive support from regional organizations. AMESOM and EGAD are involved in the situation in eastern Africa, but Eritrea is not a part of either organization. As a result of the Ethiopian government's denial, many respondents declined to explicitly reply to the question. On the other hand, Ethiopia really needs to block the TPLF on the other part.

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<sup>9</sup>. Interview with Gebreselase Hagose (phd) peace and security expert, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. On May 25/2023

<sup>10</sup>. Interview with Nbiyu Daniale, Member of Parliament, Addis Ababa Ethiopia. On May 17/2023

In addition he mentioned that a good deal of secondary evidence supports Ethiopia's reconciliation with Eritrea, which Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed pushed for, In an effort to defeat the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), whose changed their name to the Tigray Defense Forces(TDF). Eritrean soldiers have been stationed in northern Ethiopia for more than six months.

The US government's denunciation of Eritrea's involvement in the conflict, as Mohamed said, is the first formal evidence of this reality by the world community. In May 2021, "Ethiopia acknowledged Eritrea's involvement in atrocities against civilians, confirming earlier reports by human rights organizations, including the state-backed Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC), which highlighted "grave Human rights violations and an attack against civilians in Axum city, Tigray. Eritrea's involvement in the Tigray conflict and accusations of terrible atrocities carried out by Eritrean soldiers against civilians were first dismissed by Ethiopia as a "complete lie"(Mohamed, 2021).

Ethiopia joined the Civil war for various reasons; Eritrea's involvement in the conflict changed the dynamics of the conflict<sup>11</sup>. Ethiopia may win Eritrea's support, but its foreign policy toward the region and its reputation as a proponent of African peace and security had been erased from the international political scene by pulled Eritrea into its conflict in Tigray, hoping that the TPLF's defeat would be decisive, putting domestic issues ahead of Ethiopia's hegemonic position in the region. Due to his handling of the Tigray situation, Abiy has lost the respect of other nations in the area.

Meanwhile the involvement of Eritrea has broader implications for the two countries' diplomatic, economic, and social ties. A large portion of Tigray was under the control of Eritrean soldiers who were following their own goals independent of Ethiopian command; Eritrea was openly supporting Ethiopia militarily. What business advantages does the conflict offer Eritrea? A former defense minister for Ethiopia and prominent member of the Tigray People's Liberation Front said “Eritrean Isaias Afwerki has long desired access to Ethiopia's economy; by doing so, he will be able to further his goals.

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<sup>11</sup>Interview with Sara Getachew (phd) an expert and practitioner on the politics of the Horn of Africa. On May 20/2023

The potential for crimes against the Tigrayan people and the vulnerability of Eritrean refugees in Tigray are serious ramifications that could negate the benefits of restoring political order or even plant the seeds of a civil war”.

### **3.3 Ethiopia-TPLF peace agreement/Pretoria Peace Deal**

The Ethiopia- Tigray peace agreement, commonly called the Pretoria Agreement or the cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) is a peace treaty between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the government of Ethiopia and the Tigray people’s liberation Front (TPLF) that was signed 2 November 2022, where in both parties agreed to a “permanent cessation of hostilities” to end the Tigray war (Mohamed, 2023).

According to t Mohamed, the situation in Tigray remains complex and challenging, with various armed groups controlling different parts of the region. TPLF controls only 35% of the territory, while the rest is under the Ethiopian army and its allies. The peace deal has not brought complete stability to the region, with on-going reports of violence and looting. Some 3,000 people have been killed since the signing of the agreement. The formation of the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF) during the war has undermined TPLF’s authority, deepening a growing perception that it alone cannot lead the national struggle (Mohamed, 2023).

TPLF believe that Abiy’s government side-lined them, cutting them out of a rapprochement with their former comrade and then archenemy<sup>12</sup>, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, and singling out Tigrayans for prosecution for corruption and human rights offences. For their part, Abiy’s allies argue that the TPLF never accepted losing power, blocked reforms and sought to sabotage the new authorities.

Finally TPLF agreed to: Respect the authority of the government. “Refrain from aiding and abetting, supporting, or collaborating with any armed or subversive group in any part of the country,” Respect the “constitutional mandate of the federal Government” to send troops and security forces into Tigray (Mohamed, 2023).

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<sup>12</sup>. Interview with Moges Agegn (Mr.). Public relation expert in Ezama party, On May 15/2023

### **3.4 Ethiopia Access to the Sea; Legal and Procedural Processes**

It is critical for landlocked nation to overcome their geographic disabilities through the development of adequate infrastructure. Both within their own borders and in neighboring states, in order to engage in global trade and grow economically (Dale 1998; Hausmann 2001)

Geography From the proceeding, it is apparent that the Italia conquest was motivated neither by Eritrea's cultural or political homogeneity but rather by its strategic and economic significance. A glance at the map demonstrates that Eritrea is a long coastal strip mostly not more than sixty kilometers deep, but effectively land-locking Ethiopia. Alien control of the coast has meant, on the one hand, the ability to control commerce passing through the Red Sea and to deploy naval power, and, on the other, the ability to control Ethiopia's import-export trade and the capacity to launch an offensive into Ethiopia (Dale 1998; Hausmann 2001).

Massawa is the most significant coastal center and its deep sea port lies within 40 miles of the Ethiopian plateau. A network of trade routes connects the port to most areas of the Ethiopian plateau, particularly the northern region, and includes commodities such as gold, ivory, Slaves or coffee. Their journey ultimately took them around the world. From its inception, the port played a crucial role as it enabled Ethiopia to enter the trade network that flourished between the ancient civilizations of the east and later Europe. Ethiopia lost Massawa to the Turkish and Egyptian empires beginning in the 16th century, yet a significant amount of trade persisted through the port despite possible restrictions from outside authority. The Suez Canal's inauguration in 1869 increased the port's and the Red Sea coast's overall significance, which prompted European powers to divide the area. Meanwhile Dale and Hausmann mentioned background of the red sea costal Ahimed justified the history of Massawa was Ethiopia's natural boundary.

Ahimed mentioned historical back ground of Ethiopia. "Ras Alula Abanega had said, "The Red Sea itself has been and will continue to be Ethiopia's natural boundary." There is a lot of wisdom in what he is saying. He is saying Ethiopia can't be denied what nature has bestowed on it<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> Interview with Ahimed Nure, lecturer in Civil Service University Department of political Science. On May 17/2023

He didn't say we deserve it because of our proximity to the Red Sea. He said it is a natural boundary. Historically, the kingdom of Axum controlled most of the Red Sea from both sides.

Ahmed added his explanation Ethiopia's right access to the sea based on demography, the Afar Triangle. The Afar lives in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea. Demographically, 1.5 million Afars live adjacent to the Red Sea<sup>14</sup>. If you claim Afar's of different citizenship shouldn't be considered as one, it should be recalled that all Afars come together to elect the Sultan, their traditional leader, to Asaita (Afar region). Eritrean and Djibouti Afars send their delegation to take part in the election. They not only have one language and culture, but, undeterred by boundaries, they are also governed under one sultanate. This means, both history and demography don't undermine Ethiopia's claim.

It is also the case with the Somali. There are Somalis in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Somalia. Somalis of Djibouti can access the Red Sea; Somalis of Somalia can access both the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, while Kenyan Somalis can access the Indian Ocean; so what did the Ethiopian Somalis do to be deprived of an access to the sea? Had it been because of a shortage of resources, it would have been understandable. Ethnic similarities the territory under consideration did not constitute a political unit until it was carved out, from Ethiopia, in the course of the 1880's, and christened Eritrea, the Red Sea.

By so doing, the Italians imposed a colonial boundary which divided Ethiopian people's from each other. Ethiopia had access to the Red Sea Emperor Haile Selassie sitting by the Red Sea. This is history. It can't be erased. Some one can't tell this isn't Ethiopian history. We can debate about how it came and got away but it happened. So, whether it is during the time of Alula or Haile Selassie, history is telling us something. There are facts which we can agree on, not figments of our imagination.

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<sup>14</sup> Interview with Ahmed Nure, lecturer in Civil Service University Department of political Science. On May 17/2023

According to Ahimed, the Ethiopian Claims to Eritrea Both at the conference of the Council of Ministers of the Four Great Powers and, later, at the general assembly of the UN, Ethiopia claimed Eritrea on ethnic, geographic and historical grounds. In recognition of the validity of the claims, the general assembly stated in the preamble to Resolution 390, that it adopted the federal solution by taking into account, inter alia , the rights and claims of Ethiopia based on geographic, historical, ethnic or economic grounds, including in particular Ethiopia's legitimate need for adequate access to the sea

Since Ethiopian foreign policy toward Eritrea was based on the 1952 Confederation. In socialist era, President MengistuHilemariam battled to keep the country united while pursuing his majesty's foreign policy. Ethiopia's foreign policy toward Eritrea deteriorated when the EPDRF assumed power, and the country split apart in 1991. Ethiopia's approach toward Badem and other troubled regions changed once AbiyAhimed came to power. Ethiopia gave the bordering disputed territories to Eritrea as a result of this reconciliation (Christopher C. 2018).

Some respondents motioned that Ethiopia must reshape its foreign policy towards Eritrea. One of the legal documents every country should have to fulfill its national interest is through different policies. And foreign policy is pillar of all policies. The main goal of foreign policy is to direct a state's acts and relationships in its interactions with other states. War, alliances, and global commerce can all be manifestations of diplomacy, which is a tool of foreign policy. “Foreign policy plays a part preventing problems from developing to conflicts that require military settlements, it resolve conflict through talking, meeting, and making agreement. The president is responsible for determining foreign policy based on international diplomatic principles” (Christopher C. 2018).

“The peace and friendship deal between the two countries is largely the work of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President IsaiasAfewerki. The twoleaders committed to fostering collaboration across political, economic, social, cultural, and security issues in 2018 peace agreement. They chose to restore diplomatic relations, trade, and communication links that had been put on hold for 20 years”. (Aliye, E.2020).

Foreign policy is one of the legislative frameworks that support the diplomatic exchanges between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopia's diplomatic efforts must be focused on eliminating or at

the very least decreasing external security risks<sup>15</sup>. According to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia's Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy, which was published in November 2002? “The foreign friends that the country can rely on to help create a regional and global environment that is conducive to its peace and security should be increased, according to the strategy other objectives of diplomatic action include foreseeing potential risks and resolving them via dialogue and negotiation”. (Berouk M. 2012),

Principles for External Relation, Article 86 of Chapter 10 of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia's Constitution, sets the goals and principles of national policy. 1. To support foreign policy initiatives that upholds national values and respect for the nation's sovereignty. 2. To encourage respect each sovereignty, state equality, and non-interference in other state internal affairs. 3. making sure that Ethiopia's interests are promoted by international accords and that the nation's foreign relations policies are founded on equality of states and shared interests. 4. To adhere to international agreements that guarantees Ethiopia sovereignty and interests of its Peoples. 5. To create and advance a thriving economic unity and friendly ties between the people of Ethiopia and other African nations. 6. To look for and encourage pacifist resolutions to international conflicts.

In general, the Ethiopian government's foreign policy goals are supported by four major pillars: preserving national sovereignty and territorial integrity, advancing national interest, economic diplomacy, and citizen-centered diplomacy. Ethiopia's foreign policy towards Eritrea is based on fundamental national interests, and the main goal of foreign and international relations is to uphold peace and security in Ethiopia and its surrounding nations. Even though immediately following the rapprochement the procedural and legal framework on the agreement was not issued<sup>16</sup>.

for this matter government branches or offices on the ground had no idea what is permitted, not permitted, what is limited, or not limited, who is allowed, and not allowed; such things was not

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<sup>15</sup>. Interview with Sara Getachew (phd) an expert and practitioner on the politics of the Horn of Africa. On May 20/2023

<sup>16</sup>. Interview with Sara Getachew (phd) an expert and practitioner on the politics of the Horn of Africa. On May 20/2023

oriented for low level government branches which made the implementation complicated and caused the new crisis like, overflow migration, illegal money transaction etc.

The countries' relationship is subject to a perplexing ideological conflict between Realist and Hegemonic HST theories in international relations. Many countries are taking a stand against the Legitimacy of international hegemonic institutions, including the UN Security Council ICC, WTO and others. BRICS and other regional powers are also creating a new platform for international relations. Especially, many nations are becoming more adept at criticizing global accords. The decline of global IR institutions has led to many countries seeking to safeguard and advance their national interests in the Red Sea. This involves the occupation of diverse ports and the installation of advanced military equipment. Theiopia is being directly and indirectly targeted by Eritrean regime,. Ethiopia is being directly and indirectly targeted by the Eritrean regime, which is one of many actors in the region (Alula, 2018).

In the past, Ethiopia's foreign policy has been appropriate and successful. However, a Red Sea dynamic has altered the underlying assumptions of the program, which will negatively and directly impact the efficacy of the policy going forward. Among the causes are the ways in which globalization has changed and how our foreign policy is founded on it. Based on the effectiveness and appropriateness criteria as well as this review, Ethiopian Foreign Policy has already recorded the following successes: relative stability and tranquility across time, Cooperation and economic integration with surrounding nations, involvement in the active maintenance of peace in South Sudan and Somalia, IGAD has an active diplomatic role in settling disputes in the area. But in order to maintain and build on past successes in foreign policy, the government must review and reorient strategy in order to accommodate fresh and expanding developments in the Red Sea<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup>. Interview with GebreselaseHagose (phd) peace and security expert, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. On May 25/2023

As said by Alula Ethiopia has not been successful in its policies towards Eritrea. Since Eritrea's geopolitical position is becoming increasingly important for international geopolitical demand, Ethiopia's growth and democracy agenda faces a serious security danger from Eritrea. Ethiopia's policy towards major actors in the military and political dynamics of the Red Sea is therefore ineffective. In addition, Ethiopia's foreign policy is insufficient since its underlying presumptions are too out of date to account for recent changes in the Red Sea (Alula, 2018).

### **3.3.1 International Law of Ocean**

“The ideals of freedom, sovereignty, and humanity's common inheritance serve as the cornerstones of international law of the sea. The idea of freedom and the idea of sovereignty have always dominated maritime law. Governments employ the law of the sea, a body of international agreements, treaties, and customs, to preserve peacefulness, prosperity, and order on the seas”(William R. 2011).

The UNCLOS grants landlocked states a number of rights, including the right for ships flying their flags to "enjoy treatment equivalent to that given to other foreign ships in maritime ports" and the right for ships flying their flags to pass innocently through their territorial sea. Furthermore, landlocked governments must adhere to the same flag-state duties as coastal states, according to UNCLOS. Landlocked states would be unable to exercise any of these rights without access to the sea. This encompasses the right to free passage in the high seas and in the exclusive economic zones (EEZ).TadesseKassa(2019)

According to Article 69 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, landlocked States have the right to fairly participate in the exploitation of an appropriate share of the surplus of the living resources in the exclusive economic zones of coastal States in the same sub region or region. This right is based on the relevant economic and geographical circumstances of all the States concerned.

As of the United Nations' Protocol on the Law of the Sea, the terms and conditions of such participation shall be decided by the States concerned through bilateral, subregional, or regional agreements, taking into account, among other things: (a) the need to prevent effects that would be harmful to the coastal State's fishing communities or fishing industries; (b) the extent to which

the landlocked State is participating or is entitled to participate in accordance with the Protocol; and (c) the need to avoid effects that would be harmful to the coastal State

Did the Ethio-Eritrea rapprochement or the peace agreement could bring significant impact on Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea? Abreham's answer was, "as long as there is a peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as both countries are sovereign independent states, Eritrea have willing to facilitate port service as any costal country in the world<sup>18</sup>".

There must be some sort of guiding principle that should control the import export activity in order to provide and receive services. Since this is not the first time Ethiopia and Eritrea have come together, efforts must be made to ensure that the execution is successful. Policies must be created and made widely available. "The two states have already begun taking measures to resume business ties in the context of these unresolved issues. Ethiopia has begun using the Red Sea port of Assab, which is owned by Eritrea, and Ethiopian investors have been looking into business possibilities there. However, the regulations governing the restart of trade have not yet been made public, and much like in 1993, these issues are either not being prioritized or are being handled in a cumbersome way".(Welehawerya G.2020).

It is necessary to amicably resolve Ethiopia's right of access to the sea, which should be accomplished by a bilateral agreement between the landlocked State of Ethiopia and the transit State of Eritrea in line with international law. Ethiopia may even have to utilize Eritrea as a transit nation in accordance with the seven-point agreement on peace, friendship, and comprehensive cooperation that was signed on September 16, 2018, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

Ethiopia could be the sole ally able to use the Eritrean port because its economy is still expanding and will do so in the future. Ethiopia would continue to lead the continent in GDP growth regardless of Eritrea; progress would be hastened by an open and vibrant economy to its north. Despite the fact that Ethiopia has already utilized other Horn of Africa ports

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<sup>18</sup>. Interview with Mr. Abreham Aman, Eritrea Embassy Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

As Ethiopia grows, Eritrea continues to be a crucial outlet (like those in Djibouti and Somalia). Since there hasn't been consistent economic development in recent years, political tensions have subsided more so than they have, thus it can be advantageous to forge relationships that benefit both parties. Just as much as Eritrea needs Ethiopia's cooperation, Ethiopia also needs Eritrea's.

There are three different types of respondents when we come to on the issue of Ethiopia's access to the sea. The first group holds liberal views and believes that Ethiopia should have access to the sea through peaceful negotiation and agreement. The second group holds that Ethiopia should have access to the sea through diplomatic channels, but ownership of the sea outlet is still necessary. The third group holds that Ethiopia must have ownership of the sea outlet by any means necessary. Ethiopia lost some sea outlets voluntarily or forcibly, which is a great loss to a nation politically, militarily, and economically. In contrast to Ethiopia, many nations in the globe paid significant scarifications throughout history to gain sea access. Because being landlocked isolates a country from crucial sea resources, such as fishing, lack of access to maritime commerce, and developing military strength,

## Chapter Four

### Conclusion

The rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea was beneficial for Ethiopia's ties with other countries, and it is essential for the stability of the horn of Africa. Superpower nations and international organizations back Prime Minister Abiy's efforts for a variety of reasons. President Esaias Afewerki and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed are aware of the challenges involved in bringing about reconciliation. Additionally, they both require the support of the international community in order to alter their approach to international diplomacy, which is why it seems dramatic. Every person deserves peace and stability in addition to their fundamental requirements of food, clothing, shelter, and development. Ethiopia imports more than 80% of the resources required for development in order to support its economy and growth, and in order to feed its 117 million people, she must gain access to the global economy. However, when Eritrea supposedly gained independence, the entire population suffered.

It is understandable that once a nation becomes autonomous, there is no peaceful way to regain control; however, for the past 30 years, it has remained unclear whether Ethiopia's quest for access to the Red Sea could be resolved through rapprochement or any other kind of agreement. In the twenty-second century, it is wise to negotiate or deal in a manner that is acceptable internationally. Additionally, it is wise that the prime minister made this rapprochement at this time, perhaps to increase the number of ports available, as Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea should currently be through international agreements and the law of the sea, with the consent of Eritrea,

One of the factors contributing to the implementation of the rapprochement's delays is the Ethio-Tigray war. Although immediately following the rapprochement the procedural and legal framework on the agreement was not issued,

If international law is a guiding principle based on bilateral treaty or agreements and if it is matter on Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea, as a tool, knowingly or unknowingly throughout history Ethiopia deal different treaties with different international actors, those treaties are witness for Ethiopia's agreement on specific issue, the 1900, 1902 and 1908 treaties between

Ethiopia and Italy, during 1991 Ethiopia is the 1<sup>st</sup> state to give recognition for Eritrea independent which was the country's get way, and The Ethio-Eritrea reconciliation in 2018 Ethiopia promised to unconditionally hand over Badem and other conflicting areas. The primary obstacles to the reconciliation and Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea continue to be the geopolitical significance of the horn of Africa, the involvement of outside powers, poverty, and a lack of local knowledge.

Due to Ethiopia's size in terms of population, terrain, resources, and history, it is clear that numerous emperies and kingdoms have governed there at various moments in history. The past treaties and agreements that have been formed also support this. The ongoing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is also a result of this transfer of power from one location to another. In general, the lack of a strong, long-lasting power to rule the horn of Africa has made the political situation there worse.

Eritrea was a colony of Italy. Additionally, Eritrea was a British protectorate from 1941 to 1952 after being taken prisoner by Britain during World War II. This evidence implies that Eritrean resistance fighters began to rise up about this time. The ELF movement began with the desire for Eritrea's independence. Eritrea ultimately achieved independence in 1993 following a protracted civil war, while Ethiopia remained a landlocked nation. (Dickens O.2018).

The important issues of economic problems of landlocked countries have been largely unexplored in the mainstream economics literature;the fate of landlocked economies is often viewed as predetermined, defined by its existing relation with their coastal neighbors. By modeling the unique asymmetries of the two economies in a repeated game setting, we show that bilateral cooperation between a land locked country and its coastal neighbor offers possibilities of a coordinated change of domestic policies by both countries to improve the economic welfare of both.

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## Appendix I

Dear Respondents:

This questioner is to collect information for Master degree in International Relation and Diplomacy at Addis Ababa University; it analyzes the Ethio - Eritrea rapprochement, implementations challenges, and also analyzes the impact of Ethio – Tigray war on Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea. This questionnaire is designed to draw your honest view regarding your response. The information you provide will be treated with high confidentiality and used for academic purpose only. Please be honest in all responses; hence your co-operation, truthfulness and assistance will be highly appreciated for the needed outcome.

Thank you so much in advance for your precious time and cooperation!

### PART ONE: Background of Respondents

Department \_\_\_\_\_

Position \_\_\_\_\_

Please circle or underline for the below questionnaires

Gender:        a) Male                      b) Female

Level of Education:    a) Diploma                      b) Degree                      c) Master degree                      d) others,  
please specify \_\_\_\_\_

### PART TWO

Q.1 what effect has the improvement between Ethiopia and Eritrea?

Q.2 what circumstances the legal and procedural frameworks support the reconciliation? Has a Policy been released addressing the implementation?

Q.3 what are the obstacles to Ethiopia's aspirations and the countries' interstate relations?

Getting to the Red Sea

Q.4 what impact does the Ethiopia Civil war has on the execution of the rapprochement?

Q.5 Do you believe that the peace and friendship deal or the rapprochement between Ethiopia and Eritrea will have a substantial influence on Ethiopia's ability to access the Red Sea?

Q.6 According to the information you have, how did Eritrea become officially involved in the Civilwar in Ethiopia after the reconciliation has been made? What evidence supports this involvement?

Q.7 what would be the general difficulties of reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea?

Q.8 Do you have any information or data that you have developed on this subject that might be Useful for supplemental document for this study?

## **Appendix II**

### **List of informant during interview**

Interview conduct with –

Dr.KassaBehilu, Public relation expert in Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr.MogesAgegn - Public relation expert in Ezama party

Mr. DenbobaAlemawe, lecturer in Civil Service University

Mr. AhimedNure, lecturer in Civil Service University Department of political Science.

Mr.NbiyuDaniale, Member of Parliament, Addis Ababa Ethiopia. On May 17/2023

Dr.SaraGetachew, an expert and practitioner on the politics of the Horn of Africa.

TsegaLeuel, peace and security expert, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Dr. GebreselaseHagose, peace and security expert: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

## **Appendix III**

Agreement on Peace, Friendship and Comprehensive Cooperation between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea hereinafter referred to as the Two Parties;

Considering the close bonds of geography, history, culture and religion between the two countries and their peoples;

Respecting each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity;

Desiring to achieve lasting peace and cement their historical ties to achieve their lofty objectives;

Determined to establish comprehensive cooperation on the basis of complementarity and synergy;

Determined further to contribute actively to regional and global peace and security; reaffirming the Joint Declaration on Peace and Friendship that they signed on July 9, 2018 in Asmara;

Reiterating their commitment to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations;

**The Two Parties agree as follows;-**

### **Article One**

The state of war between the two countries has ended and a new era of peace, friendship and comprehensive cooperation has started.

### **Article Two**

The two countries will promote comprehensive cooperation in the political, security, defense, economic, trade, investment, cultural and social fields on the basis of complementarity and synergy.

### **Article Three**

The two countries will develop Joint Investment Projects, including the establishment of Joint Special Economic Zones.

### **Article Four**

The two countries will implement the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission decision.

### **Article Five**

The two countries will promote regional and global peace, security and cooperation.

### **Article Six**

The two countries will combat terrorism as well as trafficking in people, arms and drugs in accordance with international covenants and conventions.

### **Article Seven**

The two countries will establish a High-Level Joint Committee, as well as Sub-committees as required, to guide and oversee the implementation of this Agreement. This Agreement is made at Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on this day of September 16, 2018 in two original copies in Amharic, Tigrinya, Arabic and English languages; in case of discrepancy in interpretation, the English version shall prevail.

For

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Abiy Ahmed Ali

Prime Minister

For

The State of Eritrea

Isaias Afwerki

President