

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY  
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**AN ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF ALIENATION**

**BY  
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SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
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# Table of Contents

	<b>Page</b>
Introduction.....	1
<b>CHAPTER ONE</b>	
The Idea of Alienation in Hegel.....	10
1.1. The Phenomenology of Spirit: Hegel’s Philosophy in General.....	11
1.2. Self-Consciousness: Its movement from the ‘Thetic I’ to Unhappy Consciousness .....	13
1.3. The World of Spirit or Spirit as the World and Beyond.....	37
1.4. The Idea of Alienation in Hegel .....	44
<b>CHAPTER TWO</b>	
The Idea of Alienation in Marx .....	49
2.1. The Nature of Man.....	50
2.2. The Idea of Alienation in Marx .....	55
2.3. Alienation, Objectification, and Reification .....	61
2.4. The Final Dissolution of Alienation .....	63
<b>CHAPTER THREE</b>	
The Idea of Alienation in Sartre.....	73
3.1. Historical Materialism .....	74
3.2. The Reality of Individual Praxis .....	82
3.3. Matter as Totalized Totality :Scarcity .....	89
3.4. Worked Matter as the Alienated Objectification of Individual and Collective Praxis .....	94
<b>CHAPTER FOUR</b>	
An Analysis of the Theories of Hegel, Marx and Sartre on Alienation .....	107
4.1 Critique from Without .....	107
4.2 Critique from With In .....	108
4.2.1. Summary .....	108
4.2.2 Critique .....	112
4.3 Conclusion .....	121
Bibliography	

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## **Introduction**

### **The Meaning of 'Alienation'**

Before its coinage and philosophical usage in the writings of Hegel, the term alienation has a long tradition ranging from the Bible to the writings of Rousseau. This is evident from our readings of Erich Fromm's "Marx's concept of Man" and an article entitled 'origins of the concepts of Alienation' by Istavan Meszaros. Fromm writes "the whole concept of alienation found its first expression in western thought in the old Testament concept of idolatry". (Fromm:1961:44). For Meszaros the problem has a long tradition ranging from the ancient to the present. "Preoccupations with this problematic in forms ranging from the Bible to literary works as well as treatises on Law, Economy and Philosophy-reflect objective trends of European development..." (Meszaros, 1970:1). For further confirmation one can look at Meszaros' article, especially from pp.1-5 and 15-22. In different contexts, the term or the idea of alienation is rendered to have various meanings. These includes the acts of deviance, selling or transfer, and cessation or separation.

In the Christian understanding, acts which are prohibited and sinful are thought to entail the alienation of man from the way of God. The consequences of the act of idolatry is a deviance from the way of God, a revolt against the way of God in which man would end up by alienating himself from the right course of life and ultimately from God. So here alienation would have mean sin or the acts of deviance and revolt (See Fromm, 1961:44 and Meszaros, 1970:1-3).

With the advent of capitalism alienation is interpreted to be consists in the selling or transfer of one's property or some part of the self like labor. According to Istavan Meszaros, Kant, for example, identified alienation with salability which is depicted in such statements as "the transference of one's property to some one else is its alienation" (Meszaros, 1970:6). Through the acts of selling or transfer the person, then, has alienated either something belonging to him like property or part of himself like a capacity.

It also has a meaning related to cessation or separation the historical root of which is related to the formulations of contractual state theories. In social contract theories the individual through a contract agrees to give some part of himself for something other in return. Thus, the individual has separated himself by conferring some of his potential capacities to another body in the formation of the social contract. He has alienated himself, though for a noble cause. (See Chiodi, 1976:125)

In most cases separation in the framework of social contract theory emphasizes the benefits for the individual through the separation. As a result, it hardly has a bearing to the understanding of alienation as a negative situation. Nevertheless, separation of the self qualifies as alienation in rare cases such as “the cession of self and property to an absolute sovereign is alienating because it cedes too much and receives too little in return” (Chiodi, 1976:125).

When it comes to the philosophical understanding of the notion of alienation Hegel takes the forefront. “It has been noted that the problem of alienation, at least in the form and meaning which it has in our culture today, found its first systematic formulations in Hegel,” (Chiodi, 76:174). Accordingly, alienation is understood in terms of estrangement and externalization. The whole process consists in the self’s externalization of itself in something other. This externalization forces the self to lose itself and to be estranged from itself. So that alienation from one self is equal with estrangement from one self.

This strong association of alienation with estrangement is evident in Erich Fromm’s analysis of the idea. For Fromm alienation is the dehumanization of man, his estrangement from himself and the world. “Alienation is essentially experiencing the world and one self passively, receptively as the subject separated from the object.” (Fromm, 1961:44). The passivity and receptivity, contrary to what man really is, are indicative of a dehumanized man who is estranged and alienated.

For Pietro Chiodi alienation is always associated with a notion of alterity. For him alienation is a process in which man is forced to be what he is not or not to be what he really is. So that he is forcefully altered from his proper nature and to this extent alterity is central to the understanding of alienation. “In the most general way, alienation can be defined as the process whereby someone or something is constrained to become other than that which it properly is in its being... In so far as it implies a ‘becoming other’ the notion of alienation presupposes therefore, in every case, that of alterity.” (Chiodi, 1976; 176). And Chiodi identifies the various philosophical interpretations of the idea of alienation; Hegelian, Marxist, Existentialist, with necessity and a particular understanding of the notion of alterity. Whatever the case the idea of alienation is always based in man’s estrangement, dehumanization and alterity.

## **The Idea of Alienation in Hegel, Marx and Sartre**

It has been said that the creation of the term alienation and its first systematic analysis goes to the credit of Hegel. The analysis of alienation in Hegel is profoundly related to his philosophy of history which is treated specially in the 'Phenomenology of Spirit'. So that any discussion of Hegel's idea of alienation is inextricably related to his idea of reality. According to John Palmentaz reality for Hegel is Spirit in the process of self-realization, spirit which is independent and active passes through certain stages towards its self-realization. This voyage of spirit is parallel to the stages man passes through and its self-realization necessarily coincides with the self-consciousness of man which is attained through the consciousness of other human beings and the world. What is central to the movement of spirit towards its self realization is spirit's self externalization, first done unconsciously, which amounts to be the world and human beings. Human beings as consequents of this externalization pass through various stages in which they advance from unconsciousness through consciousness to self-consciousness. In the empirical world this is realized in various human endeavors which range from daily activities to the spontaneous constructions of society and state. The process which is long and develops through a series of epochs finally reaches a level of reason at which spirit becomes self conscious through the self-consciousness of finite beings.

Spirit first took the world to be independent of it. Because it was not conscious that the world is its extension and because it can be either conscious or self-conscious through the self-consciousness of men. Spirit made the mistake that the world is independent of it. As a result of which it felt estranged from the world which is but its projection. "... unless it made this mistake, it could not be alienated; it could not feel itself to be victim of a world that is a projection of itself not yet recognized for what it is. Thus, alienation as Hegel conceive it, is possible only because spirit can be and indeed in certain of its phases must be, unconscious of some of its own activities and needs." (Palmentaz, 1975:89). Since spirit comes to know itself through the self consciousness of human beings it goes without saying that spirit's becoming conscious as its estrangement as well as the reconciliation of it presupposes the estrangement of man to the world and its overcoming. Thus to begin with man is necessarily alienated from the world and only comes to know through the development of consciousness its estrangement from the world. According to Palmentaz, man for Hegel is both a natural and social being and as a natural being the world is independent of him.

Through his encounter with the natural world man creates an environment which is populated by his fellow beings. Thereby he develops as a social being looking at himself only through the relations he has with other men. He has also, as a social being, needs which transcend biological needs like the need for recognition. Through his social encounters man gradually develops an awareness of himself, i.e. by becoming conscious of his fellows he also comes to realize that the social world which first appeared to be independent of him, is his own creation. As a result, man becomes self-conscious. What parallels to this self-development of man is the ever-developing awareness of the feeling of estrangement. To the extent that the peculiarly human need for recognition, is not attained, man remains weary and dissatisfied. "To be satisfied it must be recognized by other beings of its own kind; it must have its sense of its own worth confirmed by their behavior to it. Every rational, self-conscious being makes this demand on the other, and the making of it is involved in its rise to self-consciousness." (Palmentaz; 1975:94). Once man is raised to a level at which he is self-conscious i.e. conscious of his dissatisfaction, he is able, as a progressive being, to move forward, to change his situation to overcome his alienation and attain true knowledge and self-knowledge.

What is analogous to the process outlined is the movement of spirit towards self-realization through the overcoming of its alienation. After becoming conscious of its estrangement through the self-consciousness of man Spirit moves to the necessary reconciliation with itself through man's attainment of true knowledge. So when man becomes to see the world as the projection of spirit, the latter comes to feel at home with itself and the world. "Spirit comes to be at home in the world, becomes reconciled with itself, when it attains self-knowledge in the knowledge of it that man has; its recognition of the world as a projection of itself consists in man's recognition that it is so". (Palmentaz, 1975:90).

Then, if we look behind the metaphysical curtain, one can see that, Hegel's idea of alienation is interrelated to the notions of externalization and the need for recognition. So both man and spirit are alienated from the outset when they start to externalize themselves in need of self-realization. The cause is the need both have of being recognized for what they really are. If recognition is not to be given or if they are unable to attain it, the condition amounts to be that of alienation. Alienation set off by externalization culminates in their awareness of it which is but a necessary step towards its resolution.

Marx's conception of alienation negates Hegel's profound appeal to spirit as a self-transcendent being in the making of world history, rather he confines it to the natural and social situation of man. The rejection of the metaphysical background of Hegel's conception led Marx to conceive alienation as a purely human situation man as a social being. So that Marx's conception of alienation is articulated as a critique of Hegel.

What is central to Marx's idea of alienation is labor. Man is alienated from himself, nature and society through his struggle with nature which precisely is the exercise of labor. Alienation as Marx conceived it also presupposes a teleological definition of man as a species being. Through these two ideas Marx conceived alienation as a negative situation in which man is dehumanized and estranged from himself and nature.

For Marx man is a species being. Beside the satisfaction of his daily needs which are related to the reproduction of life man is essentially a free and conscious being endowed with a potential to be realized in history. As a species being he is a representative of the universality of man and the realization of his potential must coincide with the realization of the whole humanity. It is only through others and coupled with others that man can realize his species being which is beyond the satisfaction of biological needs. As a species being man is a human being with a capacity to change and transform nature and himself in and of itself.

Man's relation to himself, society and nature is executed through the exercise of labor. Labor is the expression of man's active capacities. Because it has a value more than the reproduction of life, labor is not a means to the satisfaction of need. It's value is not only instrumental but intrinsic to the development of man as a species being. "Work is for him [for Marx] the active relatedness of man to nature, the creation of a new world, including the creating of man himself" (Formm, 1961:47). But as a result of the development of division of labor and private property, labor is reduced from being an intrinsic component of man's self realization to a mere means. It is no longer exercised for its own sake. Rather it is exercised in order to procure what is necessary for the self-preservation of the individual. As a result man degenerates from a species being to a mere thing devoid of the capacity to develop himself. The reason is the alien character the product of labor assumed. The fact that labor is exercised for a narrow end thignified the product of labor as opposed and against man. The alien character the product of labor assumed would end up by

alienating man from his capacity, labor. The consequence of which is the alienation of man from himself, other human beings and from his species being. Thus, alienation for Marx is man's estrangement as a result of the fundamental negation of labor and its product. Labor is so essential to man that its negation would end up by alienating man from himself and nature. Alienation is thus, a process of self-alienation.

Parallel to Marx, Sartre propounded his theory of alienation against the metaphysical mystifications of Hegel's conceptions. Nonetheless, he retained from Hegel the role of externalization or objectification as alienation. Nor does Sartre confine the idea of alienation as a consequence of man's relation with nature through labor. The negation of man's self-realization as a result of the corruption of labor is only half of the problem. We also find other dimensions of alienation in Sartre.

For Sartre alienation is a state of alterity in which the individual is forced not to be what he really is or to be what he really is not. Sartre's idea of alienation, according to Pietro Chiodi, presupposes three elements. The first is the conception of existence as a project in the attainment of ends. The second is nature as a worked upon material (a field of scarcity) which is necessary for the success of the project and at the same time serves as a means to allow others to control and disturb the project. The third factor is the existence of other projects. "Alienation arises as the effect of existence in the field of scarcity which turns the practico-inert [the worked upon material] into the site of monstrous forces of the inorganic and of exteriority", (Chiodi, 1976:85). In the process of alienation, then, we find two factors altering the individual; nature and other individuals. But their power is not equal in the alienation of the individual. Nature as the worked upon material is necessary for the interaction of the individual with others. Its detrimental effect is to the extent that objectification is inevitable. So that its role as an alienating factor is necessary. The role of the existence of others in alienating the individual is also necessary since men live together and develop to human beings through inter-subjectivity. So that alienation in Sartre is to a greater degree associated with the existence of a multiple projects in a situation conditioned by the negativity of matter primarily and scarcity to a lesser extent.

The co-existence of multiple projects presupposes reciprocity as a necessary structure. Reciprocity is a fundamental structure through which men become what they really are. Men conceive themselves as a project in pursuit of ends and develop through the relation of inter-subjectivity only because reciprocity is a fundamental structure which conditions the relationship between men necessarily. However, in the context of scarcity, this a priori structure, reciprocity, is changed from that which links men internally in to a structure of struggle that connects men negatively. The reason is the dehumanizing effect of scarcity which forces men to oppose one another and negate reciprocity. Besides, man realizes his praxis by objectification in which the structure of reciprocity is objectified. This amounts to the concretization of that which is fundamentally real and as such conditions human relations. Thus, it is reduced and negated, so that because of the individual project of objectification, the structure of reciprocity is conceived as emanating from the praxis of the individual. And the realization of the latter entails the negation of reciprocity. As a result, the individual denies the projects of other individuals through which they, including himself, are estranged.

“My freedom is alienated in the presence of the other’s pure subjectivity which founds my objectivity” (Sartre, 1957 p, 375 quoted in Chiodi, 1976:88). So that for Sartre alienation is man’s necessary estrangement and alterity undertaken through the mechanisms of eraser and denial of others as real projects. Existence as a project, nature as a field of scarcity and the existence of others govern the process. They put the individual, through the structure of reciprocity, in a situation where by trying to objectifying himself at the expenses of others negates them and ends up by negating the structure of the relationship of reciprocity itself. The outcome is the always intact situation of conflict and struggle in which everybody tries to stand at the expense of others. Thus, alienation is a process of forceful alteration undertaken via others and nature. “Alienation, in being the real and rigorous process internal to the system, produces itself in alterity and in virtue of it” (Sartre, 1957 p.644 quoted in Chiodi, 1976:88).

### **Research Questions**

What is/are the causes of alienation? Why is man alienated from himself/herself, society and nature? Is it natural and fundamental and therefore unsurmountable? Or is it rooted in socio-economic structures which can be overcome with the change of these structures? And What are its implications for the nature of man?

## **What the Research Sets out to do**

The whole aim of the research consists in the attempt to clarify and solving the above questions in reference to the three thinkers. After the analysis of the problems and their solutions as they are discussed in the thoughts of Wilhelm Frederic Hegel, Karl Marx, and Jean Paul Sartre, the research will try to establish its own conclusion through analysis, reflection and critical reflection.

What is striking to the whole project of the research and pertains to the specified problems is the points at which the three thinkers' ideas on alienation converge and oppose one another. For Hegel alienation is necessarily manifested in the self-externalization of spirit and finite beings embarked through various stages. So in Hegel alienation is identified with externalization or objectification. To say this in other words alienation is equal with the relation the spirit and finite beings have with the world of objects (the Subject /object mode of relationship). Since the world of objects is reducible in the final synthesis to spirit, it is only an appearance to be resolved later on. So that with the elimination of the relation, objectification, alienation in Hegel is finally over come. For Marx on the other hand, alienation is not equal with objectification. Alienation is only a specified determination of the relation or a specific mode of objectification. For Marx objectification or the relation is real so that not to be resolved. Nonetheless, since alienation is only the specific determination of objectification, without the resolution of the relation it can be eliminated with the change of the causes responsible for the specific mode of the relation entailing alienation. The position of existentialism or Sartre is complex. It agrees with Hegel's identification of alienation with objectification. It also agrees with Marx's denial of the possibility of transcending the relation. Existentialism confers an irreducible character to the objective world. As a result of these two positions Existentialism holds that alienation can never be eliminated. For alienation is equal with objectification and the relation is real and irresolvable. (See Chiodi; 1976: page x).

Here the question of the subject/object relation (objectification) will be one of the central problems of this paper. Its meaning and relation to alienation and implications for the possibility/impossibility of "de-alienation" would be a point at which the research revolves. It is at this point that the views of the thinkers partially agree and partially disagree. So that the problem is a cross cutting one. In addition, the analysis of other concepts which have an important bearing on the theme of alienation, concepts like reification, alterity, recognition, reciprocity, scarcity, will be vital. To conclude, after the discussion of each thinker's views on the relevant ideas, questions and

problems, we will set out to compare and contrast their views. This will be followed by the analysis of what remains of the comparison. Finally, the research would try to resolve itself by establishing a definite conclusion of its own.

### **The Significance of the Research**

The problem of alienation is a profound one with both theoretical and practical significance. It is a recurring human problem which attracted the attention of many thinkers before its systematic philosophical treatment. In modern philosophy with its specific formulation in Hegel especially, we see a long series of debates among philosophers. What is striking to some of the participants of the debate, Kierkegaard and Marx for example, is the theoretical formulations of the problem with its solution in a way which would change the practical situation of the individual and society. Some like Kierkegaard even go to the extent of demanding a change of the way philosophy is done or knowledge is sought after. So, such debates can have a direct influence on the way of life of the individual. This latter demand is based in the historical process that gave birth to existentialism.

For, “Essentially the whole existentialist philosophy, from Kirkegaard on, is, as Paul Tillich puts it, “an over one-hundred-old movement of rebellion against the dehumanization of man in industrial society”. (Fromm, 1961:46). So that the significance of a research on alienation is easy to see. Since it is a profound human situation, alienation demands critical reflection.

## CHAPTER ONE

### **The Idea of Alienation in Hegel**

Though Hegel's idea on alienation is not explicitly developed in the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' it is an essential aspect of the whole movement of Spirit, especially at the level of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is located by Hegel between the other two levels; consciousness and reason. It is a stage where Spirit as well as man gain self-awareness and struggle to attain freedom. What was consciousness of objects turns into itself and discovers itself. This self-discovery is the emergence of self, Spirit and self-conscious man, whose primary goal is self-certainty. Since self-consciousness can be certain of itself only through other's recognition it externalizes itself. As a result it is alienated from itself as well as immersed in various conflicts the resolution of which requires the dialectical movement of Spirit to the final level, reason.

Thus, Hegel's idea on alienation is to be found in the detailed working out of the emergence and movement of self consciousness. Self consciousness is the self-consciousness of both man and spirit. Spirit through man's self-awareness also comes to know itself. And in its movement Hegel's idea of alienation is given. So that in order to see what Hegel meant by alienation a general introduction to the aim of the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' as well as its specific parts is necessary. For the whole task two books are selected. The first which is allotted for the introductory discussion, the meaning of the phenomenology and the three stages on the basis of which Spirit moves to Absolute knowledge, is a book by Robert Solomon entitled 'German Idealism'. While the book entitled "Genesis and structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit" a commentary on the phenomenology by a distinguished French scholar Jean Hyppolite is the main text on which the discussion of the entire chapter depends.

According to Robert Solomon, Philosophy, for Hegel, is the demonstration of the realization of Absolute knowledge. Beginning with lowest forms like knowledge of objects and transcendental self-knowledge (knowledge of forms of consciousness necessary for knowledge to be possible) philosophy advances to knowledge of self and the world as the manifestations of Spirit. The movement and development of knowledge which moves forward by showing the insufficiency of prior level culminates in Absolute Truth in which all the problems, contradictions, and insufficiencies of the lower levels are negated. What is peculiar to this movement is its dialectical

nature. “The dialectic is... a complex interplay of conceptions, some of which are simply improvements on others, some of which are indeed opposites demanding synthetic resolution, but others simply represent conceptual dead ends, which indicate a need to start over” (Solomon,:200). Thus, the ‘phenomenology of spirit’ is Hegel’s philosophical account of the dialectical movement of spirit towards absolute knowledge. By absolute knowledge it means, according to Solomon, a perfect knowledge of the whole which is a synthesis of particular position, one sided views, and different forms of consciousness. It is also the knowledge of the world in its different dimensions: philosophy, art, religion and practical life. It is equal with the self knowledge of what Hegel calls Spirit.

### **1.1. The Phenomenology of Spirit: Hegel’s Philosophy in General**

‘The Phenomenology of Spirit’ is divided into three parts: consciousness, self consciousness, and reason. The first deals with naïve epistemological consciousness and is demonstrated in three steps. These are sense certainty, perception, and understanding. At the lowest level, sense-certainty, knowledge is identified with a mere this or that which is grossly inadequate. Since there would be no knowledge without concepts and sense-certainty is knowledge of the immediate without any reference to concepts, it is not knowledge at all. Perception, in which concepts are used to organize experience, is the first form of knowledge. However, it is not adequate.

For the concepts in perception are “conditioned universals”, which does not fully ground the needed unity of experience. The level of understanding furnishes the needed unity by providing concepts which are “unconditioned universals”. What were mere aggregates of perception in the prior level ,a perception of a house, for example, in which distinct features are perceived without invoking anything that would make the perceived feature a necessary features of a house, are now organized by use of concepts like substance in a way which unifies experience. So at the level of understanding real knowledge is attained.

The next stage, self-consciousness, turns the direction of the dialectic from the external world to the self. “Consciousness becomes self consciousness when it understands itself as the source of the understanding” (ibid:201). Self-consciousness is the study of the self-whose genealogy ranges from naïve self certainty to unhappy consciousness. At the beginning, the self appears to be certain of itself. But confused by the nagging of desire and the challenges of life the supposed self-certainty is lost and the self ends up by becoming unhappy consciousness.

According to Robert Solomon, the main aim of the whole section of self-consciousness is to establish the thesis that the development of selfhood is social. It is not psychological nor epistemological. Solomon says that this is especially demonstrated by the parable of the master and slave. What the parable tries to ascertain is that the self is interpersonal and develops through mutual recognition or, more strongly, develops through a confrontation with other people. The self which found itself in this situation, tries to negate it and move forward. In parallel, spirit as the absolute truth of self-consciousness endeavors towards freedom by going beyond the master-slave relation.

The self which found the inadequacy of its situation in the master slave relation declares that the external world is meaningless and tries to enclose itself. This attempt towards autonomy would be followed by a denial of everything including oneself as meaningless. Such a self called unhappy consciousness by Hegel conceives itself as nothing in contrast to the divine reality it aspires to be part of. It is an embodiment of conflicts. The conflict between two consciousnesses, master and slave, is incarnated in this consciousness in the form of a clash between this world and the beyond. The impossibility of harmony between the two worlds is indicative of its utter unhappiness and divided self.

The whole movement of self-consciousness from narrow self-certainty to unhappy consciousness is simultaneously a movement of alienation and self-alienation. The inadequacy of the immediate self-certainty led self consciousness to externalize itself in need of recognition. So it there by alienated itself. The alienation is further strengthened in the subsequent levels till it reached unhappy consciousness who is a wholly alienated condition. These conflicts are to be resolved in the final stage.

At this final stage, reason, the prior conflicts pertinent to the very mode of existence are to be resolved. Reason negates and transcends the conflicts between self and others, man and God, and the conflict incarnated in a single consciousness. Spirit as absolute knowing is disclosed in the form of reason which is immanent in man and society and transcends them. Solomon says that it is in religion, especially Christianity, that Hegel found the harmony for the conflict between the divine word and the here below. For this harmony the historical Christ is a symbol of unity. So in the final result spirit is both substance and subject at once. Solomon concludes that "Reason in the

‘phenomenology’”, therefore, “marks the synthesis of a number of conflicts that have been introduced in the dialectic of the phenomenology itself, the inadequacies of traditional epistemological thought, the resolution of the master-slave relationship, and interpersonal conflict (including the internalized conflict of the unhappy consciousness)” (Ibid,205).

## **1.2. Self-Consciousness: Its movement from the ‘Thetic I’ to Unhappy Consciousness**

Self-consciousness is the culmination of the movement of consciousness from the external world to itself. The knowing of the external world presupposes a synthetic a priori unity which conditions the existence of the object. In this, the conditions of the existence of the object are similar with the conditions of knowing it. These conditions as a priori synthetic unity are contained in the understanding. Though at first it does not appear to understanding the fact is that in knowing nature understanding only knows itself. As a result “self-consciousness is the truth of consciousness. [...] its knowledge of another is a self-knowledge.” (Hyppolite, 1974:143)

Self-consciousness’ thus develops in the attempts to move upward to liberty. Self-consciousness which is primarily and fundamentally desire can attain its aim only through another self-consciousness. The two self-consciousnesses can find each other and interact as well in a mode of being which is externality or otherness. Hyppolite points out that this movement leads to the emergence of a dialectic of struggle for recognition which entails two opposed selves and from that conflict to liberty. What is noteworthy here is that the element of externality (or the mode of being of otherness) in which the actions and interactions are taking place transfers itself into the interior of self-consciousness. First, self-consciousness faces life as its counterpart. Life opposes the goal of self-consciousness which is to posit itself as a for-itself which is absolutely certain of itself. Life by inhabiting the realization of this goal forces self-consciousness to realize that life is the other through which it is estranged. However, in order to acquire the recognition self-consciousness needs and which life refused to give, self consciousness seeks recognition from another self-consciousness. However, this will lead to a conflict between two self certain self-consciousnesses. Self-consciousness becomes other to itself by appearing as other to the second self-consciousness. Otherness incessantly defines self-consciousness through the second self-consciousness only because life is the absolute other of self-consciousness through which the meeting of two self-

consciousnesses is possible. Self-consciousness has internalized the otherness of life so that it is rendered inadequate to itself- it is separated within itself as both the same and other of itself. Thus, since life as other or externality is the fundamental structure through which self-consciousness both conceives itself and meets with other self-consciousnesses, self-consciousness is always, as a result, separated within itself and is estranged. Hyppolite says that the internalization of the element of exteriority leads to the separation and reproduction of self-consciousness inside of itself. So that a duality of a living self-consciousness arises. This movement culminates, via the liberty of the Stoic and then the Skeptic's experience of profound liberty, in the unhappy consciousness "which is always divided within itself, a consciousness both of absolute self-certainty and of the nothingness of that certainty." (Ibid, 156). According to Hyppolite unhappy consciousness is an expression of the pain felt by pure subjectivity as a consequence of its complete alienation from its substance. As a result, it is the truth of the whole dialectic the resolution of which would lead to an upward movement of spirit to the level of reason.

### **The Essence of Self-consciousness**

Now we shall in detail discuss the entire movement of self-consciousness from its immediateness to the declaration of itself as pure subjectivity in unhappy consciousness.

To begin with self-consciousness, for Hegel, according to Hyppolite, is desire in the broadest meaning of the term. The question here is, as Hyppolite puts it, why self-consciousness is desire in general? The self-discovery of self-consciousness is essentially bound to its movement. Without the latter self-consciousness can not come into existence. For this movement in turn to be possible there must be a world for consciousness. But the world of consciousness must not be there as a given being in-itself which is for reflection only but as an object in the negation of which self-consciousness finds itself and poses itself. Hyppolite stresses the difference between the two worlds; the world for reflection and the world for negation, as he quoted from Hegel, "we must distinguish two moments. In the first moment self-consciousness exists as consciousness and the complete extension of the sensuous world is maintained for it, but maintained only in so far as it is related to the second moment, i.e. the unity of self-consciousness with itself." (Hegel, PGI 131 as quoted in Hyppolite 158). Thus, the status of the sensuous world is no more than an appearance. Its truth is contained in the I of self-consciousness and equal with the self. For Hyppolite, if the unity of self-consciousness with itself is to be possible through an act of negation, then, the world must

not be independent rather dependent on self-consciousness. As a result, self-consciousness becomes the reality of being. For being exists for the appropriation of the I which establishes itself for itself. In its immediateness, then, the I is equal with itself. This self-equality of the I, which Hyppolite called the 'thetic I' in reference to Fichte is not a mediated I. Through self-knowledge as both subject and object it came to self recognition and immediately posed itself as it is equal with itself. The thetic I, self-consciousness as self-knowledge "is expressed in the identity that I=I. The I that is an object is an object for itself. It is simultaneously subject an object; it poses itself for itself." (ibid:158). The meaning of this discussion is that the 'thetic I' which is equal with itself is a theoretical I that comes to know itself as a subject by immediately recognizing itself as its own object. Its self-equality relies in the fact that it immediately knows itself as its own object without mediation of any third object. Contra posed to this Fichtean stance, for Hegel self-consciousness is a practical I which comes to itself through other objects. Since its self knowledge is mediated by the knowledge of objects consciousness has, self-consciousness can not immediately posit itself for-itself. It is not primarily equal with itself. Rather, as a practical I, it posits itself for it-self through the negation of the object. Thus, while for Fichte self-consciousness is a theoretical I that is immediately equal with itself for Hegel Self-consciousness is a practical I that is not immediately equal with itself. That means since self-knowledge is not primary rather mediated through consciousness as knowledge of another, the primary equality, I=I, dissolves and can not be the starting point of self-consciousness. The thetic act can not be posed in its absoluteness. In contrast to the Fichtean starting point Hyppolite writes of the Hegelean starting point as follows. "The reflection of the I, which takes the sensuous world, the being-other, as its starting point, is the essence of self-consciousness, which, therefore, exists only through this return, only through this movement, qua self-consciousness, it is movement" (ibid, 158).

That is the I is always mediated through the negation of the object. Even in its recognition of the world as dependent, the I is related to itself through the object. Nonetheless, this movement of the self in negating the world and positing it self for itself is what is called desire.

Then, the I as desire or a movement towards the negation the object is the essence of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is action; in desire, labor, and enjoyment which establishes itself for itself through the negation of the object. It is self-consciousness to the extent that "it will be able to objectify its certainty of itself by acting on the world; in desire, labor, and in enjoyment.

The world exists only to provide it only with the occasion to discover itself and pose itself for-itself as it is in itself.”(Ibid,160) The final goal of self-consciousness is to affirm itself for itself as it is in itself. Its organic aspect, the in itself, has to be modified in its interaction against the world and present it self for self-consciousness as it wants it to be. And action is its being- the how of this actualization. More accurately it itself is action- an agent and power of negation. I again quote from Hyppolite.

*“... The very being of self-consciousness, its becoming for itself, was its action (Tun). The word, which was for itself for consciousness, in the strict sense of the term, is preserved for self-consciousness, but only as a vanishing moment. Self-consciousness is desire and labor. It negates the world that presents itself to it and thus affirms itself in its independence” (Ibid,210).*

Thus, externalization and objectification are the essential moments of the movement of self consciousness. Later on we will see how this would necessarily lead to alienation.

Through consciousness, desire starts from the assumption of the phenomenality of the world so as to negate it. In self-consciousness it negates the world and affirms itself. According to Hyppolite, the object of desire is different from the object of sensuous consciousness. Any object in the face of it can be said to exist as well as not to. Because, desire would immediately appropriate it in order to affirm itself. As a result the object of desire is not the particular object but desire itself or the working out of the unity of self-consciousness through the negation of the object. “The end point of desire is not, as one might think superficially, the sensuous object. That is only a means-but the unity of the I with itself. Self-consciousness is desire, but what it desires, although it does not know this explicitly, is itself. It desires its own desire” (Ibid, 160).

This is tantamount to saying that rather than the particular object self-consciousness desires to affirm it self as desiring itself. Or to affirm itself as the final object, but as a subject, of its self desire. As a consequence, it can not find itself in a sensuous object. Rather, as Hyppolite ascertains, self-consciousness can find itself only in another but similar desire, in another self-consciousness. This movement of self-consciousness to find itself through the negation of the other situates it in a condition in which it must interact with three things; the word as embodiment of objects, life as mode of existence, and another self-consciousness which is its own kind. As desire it can find itself only in the final. For “Desire seeks itself in the other man, desires recognition from man” (Ibid, 160).

## **The First Appearance of Otherness**

Before we see self-consciousness's relation with this last kind of desire, the dialectical movement demands the treatment of the movement of self-consciousness in life. The self-seeking movement of self-consciousness is undertaken in life which serves as a medium. In its interaction with the object through the negation of which self-consciousness tries to affirm itself, it finds itself in life. Life is the broad and self-contained whole which opposes self-consciousness as other. Even if it dwells in life self-consciousness comes to the awareness that life is something facing it. The encounter is two fold. On the one hand, self-consciousness is part of life and its extension. On the other, the vastness and complexity of life makes it an alien to self-consciousness. Self-consciousness who is subject can not wholly identify itself with life which is "the universal, indestructible substance, the fluid essence that is equal to itself." (Ibid 154). As a result, life is same and other for self-consciousness at the same time. What necessarily follows is the separation of self-consciousness, through reflection, and affirmation of itself as independent in opposition to life. Accordingly, this necessary duality is the opposition of specificity, self-consciousness, claiming to be independent with the universal, life.

The first appearance of the element of otherness is not only in the direct opposition of self-consciousness with life. The particular object also becomes independent for self-consciousness which took the world as phenomena. According to Hyppolite, though self-consciousness seeks to affirm itself absolutely for itself, it will encounter the opposition of the object which is no less independent in-itself than it. The independence of the object is constituted in the otherness of desire. A desire satisfied now appears recurrently making itself and the object independent of self-consciousness. The nagging of desire by making the need for the object necessary make the object independent and itself the other of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness can not negate the object once and for all and is forced to seek the object. So in desire it is not seeking itself, rather the object. Thus, desire becomes the other of self-consciousness.

However, self-consciousness which is essentially for-itself must attain itself. This is possible through the presence of an object which is another self consciousness. The object now presented is both an I and an object. This self seeking act of self-consciousness through another self-consciousness has two consequences. While self-consciousness is able to find itself, its unity in another, the element of otherness which revealed itself in relation to the independence of the object

is further strengthened. "Life is the only element of substantiveness, the other of the I. But when life becomes for me another self-consciousness, a self-consciousness which appear to me at once alien and the same, a self-consciousness in which desire recognizes another desire and bears on it, then in this splitting and reproduction of itself self-consciousness reaches itself" (Ibid, 163).

Thus, the existence and movement of self-consciousness is necessarily conditioned by the existence of another self-consciousness. It is also no less true that self-consciousness is able to attain itself through otherness, by appearing to itself as for itself through another self-consciousness and by appearing to itself as other through which the second self-consciousness finds itself for itself. It splits itself, poses itself outside of itself in another self-consciousness as for itself, appears to itself and the other as other, and by negating that appearance it appears for itself as well as for the other self-consciousness as a being for-itself. "It must discover itself and be discovered: it must appear to itself as another and appear to another." (ibid, 163)

This movement of self-consciousness to find itself through another self-consciousness is, in short, a demand for recognition from the other as it wants to be seen-a demand the other in turn makes. But this recognition of self-consciousness as for itself is always possible through otherness. This will lead to the moment of the dialectic at which two self-consciousnesses, absolutely certain of themselves, oppose one another to death for recognition.

### **The Concept of Mutual Recognition**

The movement of self-consciousness towards another self-consciousness in order to attain itself as for-itself is what Hegel conceptualized by the idea of the mutual recognition of self-consciousnesses. For Hegel the idea of the mutual recognition of self-consciousnesses, says Hyppolite, is the expression of spirit realizing itself at the level of self-consciousness. Because, self-consciousness which emerges in the medium of life poses itself as desire in its absoluteness. Through the other self-consciousness it poses itself beyond or outside of itself to find infinity or poses itself as if itself is infinity. Spirit comes to self recognition in the mutual recognition of two self-consciousnesses because self-consciousness posits itself not as this or that particular I. But as a subjective inwardness- as subjectivity itself. Thus, it is a universal self whose subjectivity contains the element of infinite. It is this universal self with its limitless inwardness that is affirmed in the externalization of self-consciousness which is seeking recognition from another self-consciousness.

As a result Spirit comes to self-knowledge through this universal self which is posited as if it is infinite. That means it is Spirit.

In this movement self-consciousness for-itself is absolute self- certainty but for the other it is a living object, a given independent being in the medium of life. Since each self-consciousness can attain its truth, to be recognized as it is for itself, by recognizing the other as it is for itself, then, each must do what it demands of the other. Thus, we can say self-consciousness has come to existence. "I am a self-consciousness only if I gain for myself recognition from another self-consciousness and if I grant recognition to the other" (Ibid, 1666). However, this does not mean, in finding recognition from the other and in turn granting it, that self-consciousness does away with the element of otherness. The very idea of self-consciousness presupposes the element of otherness as it finds itself in the horizon of life. It is only by separating and opposing itself to life that it starts to emerge.

This opposition of self-consciousness with life is the opposition of self with the other. As it finds itself encountering life, self-consciousness opposes it as other so as to pose itself as independent being. Later on this other takes the form of another self-consciousness through the negation of which self-consciousness tries to affirm itself for itself.

*"The element of duality, of otherness is precisely the Dasein of life, the absolutely other, and ... this other is essential to desire. To be sure, the other is a self. This dialectical confrontation is the loss of the self as well as the other. The other is lost because I see the other only to find myself in it and not to affirm it as a being for itself. And I am also lost. For in seeing myself through the other, I have become for-an-other "I find myself as another." (Ibid, 167).*

The concept of Dasein is here meant to disclose otherness as the ultimate reality of life. Becoming other through the opposition with life and also another self consciousness is the fundamental fact of existence. According to the Hegelean dialect thus one can say that otherness is the being, the Dasein of life. According to the dialectic, the separation of self consciousness within itself or the confrontation of two self consciousness through which they are estranged is possible and real only because life as other is the fundamental structure conditioning the movement of self consciousness. Since life is the fundamental other (and permanently remains so) conditioning the movement of self- consciousness, self- consciousness realizes its in adequacy i.e. its equality and inequality with itself at the sometime, by internalizing the otherness of life. As a result its separated within

itself or its confrontation with another self consciousness could be reduced to and in fact derive their meaning from the opposition of life with self consciousness:

According to Hyppolite, this dialectic which appears to be the interaction of three terms, two self-consciousnesses and the element of otherness, is in reality an interaction between two terms; self and the otherness of life. Hyppolite stresses that it is only because life as the element of otherness is there, is given, that self-consciousness opposes itself and its duality is issued. This otherness is "life as the being of life", being for another which has not become being-for itself. Unconscious of itself life is there as absolute otherness conditioning the movement of self-consciousness. "For the duality of the I, the fact of speaking of two self consciousnesses, of a master and of a slave, is the result of this moment of nature, the result of the otherness of life." (Ibid, 168). Thus, otherness is the essential element without which the self can not do. All its attempt to negate otherness through another self-consciousness entails otherness which is necessary for its genesis in the first place. The following words of Hyppolite shows how self and other are inextricably intertwined and widely separated at the same time.

*"The other appears as same, as the self, but self also appears as the other. Similarly, the negation of the other, which corresponds to the movement of desire, becomes self negation as well" (Ibid, 109)*

Now, one can ask the implications of Hegel's idea of the mutual recognition of self-consciousness for the being of Humans as such. What does it mean that man as part of nature and at the same time differentiated from it and other animals, seek recognition? The answer simply is that the essence of self-consciousness is "being-for-itself in its purity, the negation of all otherness." (Ibid,169). Primarily man is one among living beings. It is there as a positivity, simply living consciousness. In the course of life, however, it finds itself being faced by life. From that experience on it realizes that no mere life but the attainment of autonomous self-consciousness is its essence. In the rise of self-consciousness the living thing is transformed from its mere positivity, living being, to one which has a negativity- a being the essence of which unfolds by negating its particular determination as life defined it. By negating its particular determination, it tries to rise beyond and above mere living and seek affirmation from another self-consciousness.

## **The Master-Slave Dialectic**

The experience of rising above life as an autonomous self-consciousness is achieved only by risking one's life. By risking one's life, by opposing life, one becomes a self-consciousness who needs the recognition of another to pose itself as such. By doing what is necessary against another, by waging war if necessary which in turn makes the preservation of life difficult, self-consciousness seeks recognition from another. An encounter which leads two self-certain consciousnesses to struggle to death. However what they seek is not the death rather a recognition from the other self-consciousness. Accordingly the essence of human life is different from animals—a difference which makes the former capable of spiritual life, stresses Hyppolite. The struggle for recognition is then a condition for a truly human experience. For Hege, says hyppolite, it is a category of historical life which makes human experience possible.

In the movement of the dialectic, the struggle for recognition, according to Hyppolite, leads to the experience of another moment. This is the experience of unequal recognition between two self-consciousnesses—the relation of master and slave. The master is a pure being for itself. By opposing life, by risking his existence and standing still in the face of death, the master chooses pure self-consciousness'. The slave, on the other hand, since it is afraid of death, chooses life rather than self-consciousness. So it remains in its positivity—a mere living thing. As a result, the slave recognizes the master as a being for itself but he in turn is not recognized by the master. The truth of this relation is the total separation of self and other. "The self is the master who negates life in its positivity; the other is the slave, a consciousness too, but only the consciousness of life as positivity, a consciousness in the element of being, in the form of thingness" (Ibid, 171).

Hyppolite says that this relation of master and slave as a new category of historical life paves the way for a dialectical reversal according to which true mastery belongs to the slave. The slave, who is afraid of death enormously so as not to risk his life and become self-consciousness, experiences another kind of death. This is a spiritual death that does not kill biologically. Rather in it the slave kills his being and regains true essence. But for this to be possible the slave must confront life. Thus "the two moments of self-consciousness, self and life, confront each other now as two unique figures of consciousness" (Ibid, 171).

If the dialectical reversal transforms the slave to a true master, then, how is the slave to become a pure self-consciousness for itself? In order to better understand the development of the slave, it is first necessary to deal with the master. The master who is not afraid of death raised himself above mere existence. But the master is related to itself as pure self-consciousness through the slave. It is through the recognition of the slave that the master is what he is. Furthermore, he is related to things through the slave and to the slave through things. His relation to the slave is mediated by his prior negation of things. By negating life, he became independent of things and so that the master of the slave. Through the slave the master also enjoys things.

The essence of the slave, on the other hand, is life. Its defeat in the face of death made him the slave of both life and the master. Whereas for the master things have no independence since he freely negates them via the slave, for the latter, however, things appear independently. Because he encounters them directly objects face the slave in their independence. What he can do is shape things, not negate them. Therefore, he recognizes the master as pure negation. Nonetheless, the independent self-consciousness of the master is not pure because it is mediated by and depends on the slave's recognition. On the contrary, the slave is not recognized by the master. He treats himself as he is treated by the master, he knows that he is a slave. But the slave treats the master not as he treats himself and the master also treats himself not as he treats the slave. Hence, recognition is one sided and partial.

What is striking is that the dialectic locates the reality of the master in the insubstantial consciousness of the slave. Here, one must ask as Hyppolite asks. "How can slave consciousness be the truth of self-consciousness when it is alien to itself and when its being lies outside of it?" (Ibid,174). The answer lies in the transformation of the being of the slave owing to its movement to the slave's experience of fear, service, and labor. For the movement the master is an essence, a symbol of liberty towards which it must ascend. This essence, which exists outside of the slave as long as he treats himself as a slave, starts to appear inside of him when he is shaken by tremendous fear. Such experience of fundamental fear make the slave break free from any particular determination of life. The fear troubles him so much that he cognizes for the first time life in its totality. He also comes to see the nothingness of any tie to a particular determination of life. In addition, the education he takes in serving the master disciplines him so as to detach himself from an attachment to a particular form of life. As a result, pure self-consciousness-absolute negativity

begins to appear for the slave as real. Furthermore, through labor the slave concretizes the for-itself of his self-consciousness by inscribing it in things. In the thing in itself he comes to see and affirm himself, his being-for-itself. In the thing, his self has gained actuality as well as permanence. "This being for-itself externalizes itself in labor and passes in to the element of permanence; laboring consciousness thus comes to the intuition of independent being as an intuition of itself" (Hegel, PGI, 119 quoted in Hyppolite, 176). Therefore, the completely separated self and other is once united.

The master-slave dialectic has two dialectical consequences. The first is that through the slave's self intuition in the being-in-itself, it will lead to the stoic's experience of liberty. Since the slave has succeed in attaining liberty in the form of an intuition of the for-itself in the in-itself, since its liberty is equal with the domination of objective being by self-consciousness and discovering itself there in; self-consciousness has transformed itself in the form of thought. This will lead to the stoic's experience of liberty which is but in a form of thought. The second point is that in the master-slave relation the germ of unhappy consciousness is planted. The relation of the master and slave is of a similar kind with the relation between God and man as the unhappy consciousness conceived it. Just as self as essence is opposed with other as nothingness in the master-slave relation, the particular, man, and God as the universal are contra posed in unhappy consciousness. Thus, the truth of the master-slave dialectic is stoicism and later on unhappy consciousness.

### **Stoic Consciousness**

The liberty of stoicism, according to Hegel, is the higher form of the labor of the slave that concretized his for-itself in the in-itself. The for-itself of pure self-consciousness and the in-itself of the being of life are joined in the slave's molding of things. This is equal with the rise of a self consciousness which is a form, universal form, through which the being of life is molded and presented. Thus, self-consciousness has transformed itself from a living self-consciousness into a thinking self-consciousness. The truth of the slave's self-consciousness now appears to be the thinking self consciousness of the stoic.

The decisive moment of the transition is the inscription of self-consciousness, its form in thing ness, without there by ceasing to be consciousness. The identification of self-consciousness and being-in-itself is effected while self-consciousness remains what it is i.e. autonomous being for itself. "Thus, to the extent that it is able to become an object to itself without there by losing itself

and vanishing, self-consciousness is now thinking self-consciousness.” (Ibid, 180). According to Hyppolite, the act of thinking for Hegel is equal with the realization of the unity of the I of self consciousness and the being of life. In thinking the I must be concretized, must become its own real object and as well the being of life must be life identified with the itself. It is no longer an alien thing, but one with the I. “The I discovers itself in being and remains close to itself in that other ness.” (Ibid,180) Thus, self-consciousness’ is united with itself through objectification. However, it would be soon separated from itself since the I would deny its self which is objectified in the thing and wills it self as a universal self independent of particular life forms. This is because the equivalence of thinking and freedom in thought which lead to the act of positing oneself in abstract freedom in stoic consciousness.

According to Hyppolite, thinking, for Hegel, is absolutely bound with the notion of freedom. The equivalence of thinking and freedom is derived through the identification of the act of thinking with that of willing. That means when one thinks, he is exercising the power of his will. This is especially the case for a consciousness which takes its essence to be thinking. Through the act of thinking it is realizing itself, it is willing itself as a thinking consciousness. Thus, if thinking is equal with willing and what one wills it itself as a thinking consciousness, then, one is affirming itself as a free consciousness whose essence is thinking. Free because, thinking consciousness is affirming itself in thought independent of any particular things. Since it aims at itself in thought independent of any particular embodiment or the life situation it is found in i.e. as if it is a spirit, it is evident that it is free whether the freedom is real or merely apparent. Thinking consciousness is, then, a self-consciousness that aims at it self i.e., to find it self and only itself in the element of being. Thus, the identification of thinking and freedom is brought through the willing of one self and only one’s self as a thinking consciousness. The stoic’ experience of liberty, observes Hyppolite, is the identification of will and thought. Stoicism, then, is the movement of self-consciousness to find itself, amidst particular determinations, as thought. It is thought seeking itself everywhere. The motive of this movement is the rise of self-consciousness above life, the attainment of freedom beyond any particular form of life. But since freedom is sought in thought, it is only formal and abstract freedom not real freedom attained through the negation of particular determinations. As a result, form and matter, self and other, are separated once again. Self-consciousness from a universal archetype of objects is changed into an activity of thinking affirmed

in abstract thought. Thus, we can see that self-consciousness is alienated from itself in the stoic consciousness.

For what self-consciousness seeks is to affirm itself in pure thought. As pure thought it is indifferent to the particular situation it is found in. However, things remain what they are particular determinations contained in themselves which now subsist in opposition to form, thought or self-consciousness. “When thought reflecting back on itself, determines itself as pure form, the differences within life, differences of social position, remain. The given content which, in spite of everything, remains impermeable to thought is the being other which emerges at the endpoint of this experience of dogmatism as determinability become permanent” (ibid, 184). As a result, though the stoic now has a universal will, since he wills only himself in every determination, a duality of content and form, between self and other, is engendered.

### **Skeptic Consciousness**

As a result, the development of self-consciousness, according to the dialectic of the phenomenology, necessarily moves to the next stage, skepticism. Jean Hyppolite points out that as the slave’s self-consciousness is the actualization of the being-for-itself of the master’s self, stoic self-consciousness which attempted to preserve its freedom in thought, is abstract and formal leaving content, the world of things, independent. On the contrary, skepticism exploits the determinations of life and experience, and negates them. It shows them to be dependent and inessential. It makes them disappear in self-consciousness. In skepticism, then, form is transformed from a vacuous medium for the positing of the I into a limitless power of negation. In skepticism “Form is no longer merely the absolute positivity of thought; it is omnipotent negativity [...] determination” (Ibid, 185). Therefore, the experience of freedom in thought, freedom which according to its essence is in-itself the negative, is actualized.

The meaning of the actualization of the negativity and freedom of self consciousness is strongly bound with the essence of self consciousness. Self consciousness is action that establishes itself by negating things. It is also endowed with a dimension of absolute freedom as subjectivity. Thus, when skeptic consciousness is able to affirm itself through the negation of particular things, it is affirming itself, not as this or that particular self, rather as a universal self which I is the essence of self-consciousness as an absolutely free and negative self consciousness. Thus, skeptic

consciousness is the actualization of freedom and negativity in their absoluteness or the essence of self .

The skepticism Hegel is talking about, according to Hyppolite, is ancient skepticism in contrast to modern skepticism. The latter presented in the writings of philosophers like Hume doubts every thing that attempts to go beyond the mere datum of experience. Ancient skepticism, on the other hand, questions the validity of the irreducible certainties of experience. One of the representatives of ancient skepticism is Plato who questioned the reality of the world of objects and conferred them task of the destruction of all particular determinations, so as to posit freedom in its absolute negativity. For absolute knowledge to be possible it must pass through this stage. And skepticism as a particular school of thought as well as historical fact has accomplished the task according to Hegel, says Hyppolite.

Skepticism for Hegel, says Hyppolite, is the experience of the dialectic by human consciousness. This can be clear if we refer to two essentially significant points. The first is that the 'Phenomenology of Spirit' is the description of the movement of spirit and also self-consciousness from narrow self-certainty to full realization of complete self knowledge. As such every step counts-every single step is universal and necessary and dialectic. Just like any other stage skepticism is, then, the experience of the dialectic- the dialectic at this specific stage with its peculiar characteristics by human consciousness. "The phenomenology of spirit", as a result, is an external description of the internal dialectical movement together with the parallel human experience by the philosopher. The second significant point concerns the meaning of skepticism as devoid of a universal form and concept. The particular thing can be a person, a thing or an idea. As long as it is a particular thing without a universal form it is unreal. Thus, skepticism is a universal experience by human consciousness of the nothingness of particular things and their dependence on self-consciousness. It is an experience the consequence of which is the showing of the nothingness of every particular that claims self-certainty. The relegation and reduction of the multiplicities and differences of life which claims independence, to reduce them to their dependence on self-consciousness. "All the differences within life, the determinations of experience in knowledge within life, the concrete and particular situations in the ethical world, are in fact only differences within self-consciousness." (Ibid, 186). As such, the reduction and relegation concerns particular selves also. Every particular self is vanity as long as it claims to be independent, stable and real.

Through this negation of all and everything what is affirmed, says Hypplite, is the grandeur of self-consciousness. But only till it will fall beneath its feet. That means the result of the skeptic's dialectical movement is two fold. The first is the absolute self-certainty of consciousness. Through the negation of all the determinations of life it finds itself in absolute self-certainty and starts to enjoy itself. This absolute self-certainty is not of a particular I rather an I reflecting through the very depths of subjectivity, contemplating itself absolutely in its negativity, through the negation of every contingency.

*“Thus consciousness procures for itself the unshakable certainty of its liberty; it brings its experience of liberty to light and raises it to truth. Thus, nothing subsists except absolute self certainty. All values, all positions, are values and positions of the I, but that I is not this or that particular contingent I, the vanity of which is also manifest. It is the very depth of subjectivity which is manifested only in this negative action with respect to all particular content.” (ibid, 187:8).*

In short, all the elements of otherness in its entirety is suppressed.

Nonetheless, owing to the famous dialectical reversal, the misfortunes of this absolutely self-certain and happy I will unfold soon. What it thought it has completely over come, the differences in life, the element of otherness and all contingencies will reveal themselves in its own face. As a result, it would become unhappy consciousness. But, how? The I that is absolutely certain of itself created itself through the negation of everything else. This self creation supposes negation which in turn presupposes the existence and subsistence of particular determinations. So that it can be negated and that the I can affirm itself absolutely. Hence, the I can not completely disassociate itself from what it certainly knows to be unreal. The subsistence of the contingencies teaches him that he is not absolutely self-certain I. If it were so, it would have disassociated itself from them completely. It finds itself in conflict with what it is not i.e, absolute self-certainty. As a result, it is broken and finds itself as opposition, i.e, as particular consciousness. Thus, “the subjectivity of self consciousness is a double consciousness.” (Ibid, 189). It is a double consciousness of absolute self-certainty, of particular consciousness (itself on the side of particular consciousness) and the opposition between the two. This duality, opposition or contradiction, is not internalized, however, in the skeptic's self-consciousness. That is why, to a large extent, the skeptic remains happy enjoying itself. As the truth of skeptic consciousness, unhappy consciousness internalizes the contradiction and is divided within itself.

Hyppolite writes of this transition as follows:

*“Yet the truth of this skeptical consciousness is unhappy consciousness in so far as it is the explicit consciousness of the internal contradiction of consciousness. Henceforth, it will no longer be the case that an I will confront another I in the midst of universal I, or a master oppose a slave from the outside, with stoicism and skepticism the two consciousnesses have become the split of self-consciousnesses within itself. Every consciousness is double of itself; it is God and man at the heart of a single consciousness.” (Ibid, 189).*

## **Unhappy Consciousness**

Unhappy consciousness is the truth of skeptic consciousness. What skeptic consciousness was in itself, unhappy consciousness is now for-itself. Unhappy consciousness is a consciousness divided in side of itself; a split of the reality of essence and the nothingness of actuality within a single consciousness. According to Hyppolite self consciousness, for Hegel, as long as it is not united within itself as a realization of reality and actuality, is in principle doomed to be unhappy consciousness. The reason is that the proper nature of self-consciousness is a self untied with itself through the unity of actuality and essence unhappy consciousness, according to the movement of the dialectic, is the necessary stage of the development of self-consciousness: A self-consciousness to realize its essence must pass through this stage.

Unhappy consciousness is subjectivity feeling the pain of its inadequacy. For Hyppolite identifies subjectivity with reflection on life. Subjectivity as a reflection on life is the consciousness of the inadequacy and the nothingness of life. So subjectivity is constituted in reflection and that reflection leads to a split from life. The split from life is realized in self consciousness which in turn is separated within itself. Hyppolite concludes that this split, the impossible unity of the self with itself in reflection, is the basis of subjectivity or is subjectivity itself.

The main achievement of unhappy consciousness against the skeptic, according to the stage it is found, is the concretization of the duality of the real and the unreal in a single consciousness which is divided within itself. The duality takes a number of forms as between self-consciousness absolutely certain of itself and a consciousness that feels its nothingness or between the divine and the here-below. As such unhappy consciousness has projected reality in the beyond and contra posed to it the here-below in which it dwells. The reality of the beyond, infinity, even if separated, exists only in relation to the specificity of self-consciousness. Then, self-consciousness within itself oscillates between these two extremes; of God, infinite reality, essence, and of man, finite

actuality, nothingness, non essence. In short, a situation of opposition between master and slave within a single consciousness. "It is changeable, having no essence, it is [unhappy consciousness] the consciousness of its own contradiction." (Ibid, 194). It goes up, it goes down. Now connected to the infinite, and now separated and falling to its finitude.

Though this subjectivity, this self- consciousness, appears to be a leap of freedom towards the infinite to find there a truth it lacked within itself and attain a unity with itself, it is "a subjective anxiety, the impossibility of escaping a duality that is essential to the concept of spirit." (Ibid, 195). Thus, according to the Hegelian dialectic, this duality is necessary so that spirit, which appeared for the first time in the struggle of two self- consciousnesses for recognition, can move towards self-certainty. Nonetheless, unhappy consciousness will overcome its misfortunes by transcending subjectivity. This it would do by alienating subjectivity itself and posing it as being. The out come of which would be a union of self consciousness and being. Since the negativity of the I, subjectivity as absolute and negative freedom, is responsible for the separation of self conciseness form its essence, the separation is concretized in Unhappy consciousness as a duality of self consciousness within itself. Unhappy consciousness would resolve the problem by abandoning its subjectivity. By abandoning subjectivity it means that self consciousness would objectify itself by abandoning its essence i.e it will renounce action. Thus, it would be able to objectify itself in things and be unified with itself. That means through self denial it tries to overcome alienation. This movement of unhappy consciousness is a movement of self-alienation. So that it can be rejoined to substance and be what it is, i.e, the for -itself in the in-itself. The movement has three phases.

The fundamental fact of unhappy consciousness is that it is a changeable consciousness. That means it is a consciousness that lacks a definite nature of its own. As a changeable consciousness it oscillates between two extremes. Now it takes it self to be an absolutely self-certain I, next a particular self consciousness without a universal essence or a consciousness with out self, and finally a consciousness' that is wholly without essence so that meaningless and nothing. Un happy consciousness is a changeable consciousness that swings from one extreme to, through the middle points, the other. The reason is the devastating effect of its two fold separation. Primarily it as subjectivity, is separated from life since as a self-consciousness whose essence is subjectivity it is itself a reflection of life or it reflects on life. The outcome of which is the knowing of the nothingness of life. As a result, it separates itself from life and searches for meaning inside of itself.

It then gradually comes to affirm itself as absolutely free I in abstract thinking. This is the stoic's experience of liberty. In the skeptic consciousness this abstract freedom is transformed into real freedom. For skeptic consciousness negates particular things practically. As such it is an absolutely self-certain I, freedom in negativity. Skeptic consciousness experiences itself not as this or that particular consciousness, rather as specific consciousness whose essence is the universally real subjective inwardness independent of any particular life form. Nonetheless, it would discover that it is not absolutely self-certain and universally valid I rather a particular consciousness. This awareness is equal with the discovery that its self is dependent on particular things. It is only through the negation of particular things that it is able to posit itself as an absolutely self-certain I. If they do not exist, it would not either. If it were an absolutely self-certain I that is universally valid, it would have existed despite the non-existence of particular things. This self-discovery of self-consciousness as a particular self means, in effect, the existence of something essential, essence, outside it. But since this essence exists within self-consciousness the fact that it is unable to be untied with this essence forces self-consciousness to project it in the beyond. Thus it is rendered within itself. It is alienated from life as well as separated within itself. This is unhappy consciousness- that consciousness which, called changeable, oscillates between the two extremes. It is a consciousness that is dual within itself. As a result it is forced to identify itself with the nothingness of life and project essence in the beyond. The essence is of self-consciousness's with which it is not able to be untied. An essence projected in the beyond and contra posed to the finite I as the result of the fundamental break.

The following words of Hyppolite summarize the situation well.

*"It stands contra posed to itself, and it experiences itself as another self-consciousness. Master and slave are now God and Man. But if it is admitted that man does not exist without God, then conversely God does not exist without man. Yet unity can not absorb one of the consciousnesses into the other. They stand contra posed to each other in such a way that unhappy consciousness is the continual transition of one self-consciousness to the other." (Ibid, 196)*

That means since Essence can not exist without self-consciousness which is particular consciousness and unity is not yet possible, self-consciousness oscillates between the two extremes.

(Unhappy) self consciousness conceived as a transition from nothingness to essence is, according to the dialectic, points out Hyppolite, the concrete existence of spirit mediating the transition. Since spirit would come to self-realization through the self consciousness of man, the concrete existence of spirit is demonstrated in the struggle of self-consciousness. The struggle is unhappy consciousness, as a changeable consciousness, making an attempt towards the attainment of essence. In other words, it is spirit through the transition struggling to realize its self-knowledge. The transition of unhappy consciousness from nothingness to essence, according to Hyppolite, has three phases. The first phase takes the form of a rudimentary opposition between essence as the immutable and non-essence as the changeable. The transition would fail at this stage because of two reasons. The first is that unhappy consciousness is dominated by separation and internal conflict to such an extent that it is not able to effect the transition. The second reason is the contrasted terms are not developed fully, i.e., the immutable as essence and non-essence as changeable are too broad terms leaving the development of the transition in its infancy. As a result, the transition would effect a second phase in which the process would be complemented partially. Rather than the immutable and the changeable, now God and man, the universal and the specific, are contra posed. According to Hyppolite, Judaism is the historical manifestation of the first phase while Christianity would be the representative of the second. After the world is divinized and transition completed partially through the incarnation of Jesus Christ in the second phase, the last phase marks the completion of the transition and the realization of unity.

What is Hegel trying to say here is that the incarnation by making the appearance of the immutable in earth would narrow the gap between both God and man. As a result the attainment of essence by self – consciousness seems convincing from a religious point of view. For it is believed in religion, Christianity, that the incarnation is the concretization, of God in a human form. As such it would mediate between the two poles. However, it is questionable whether the appearance of God in a human form makes sense. Another way of saying this is that whether the claim of a particular man to have an essence of God is acceptable. This seems hardly possible since it is impossible to have the essence of God for an individual. What I am trying to say is that though it is believed in Christianity that God appeared in a human form in the figure of Jesus Christ, it is not logically plausible to accept such a statement. If there is a proof for the existence of God one might agree with Christians. But when there is no such proof, why would one accept that there is such thing the

incarnation which is the embodiment of God in a human form? They may point out the existence of the historical Jesus Christ. Even if there is the historical Christ believed to be the son of God, he can not be the physical embodiment of God because he is human only. As a result, one can see that the claim to the reality of the incarnation is unconvincing.

Unhappy consciousness is self consciousness projecting its essence in the beyond. It is pure subjectivity because it is a thinking self-consciousness expressing itself wholly in contemplation. At the same time it is a self lost completely. But contrary to this, unhappy consciousness is unwilling to objectify itself and as pure subjectivity it continually negates its self objectified in the thing. As a result it is separated from itself. That is why it projects its essence, which it is unable to objectify in the beyond and is in flight from reality. Because of this unhappy consciousness is a self consciousness without self certainty. It is a self consciousness, of pure subjectivity, that is radically separated from itself.

Before we discuss the transition that is embarked in three phases and which is the realization of the essence of self-consciousness, let us remain ourselves what this essence is. The tasks to be accomplished by unhappy consciousness is to be self; to be itself, to be one with itself, i.e, to be for itself and in-itself at the same time. Unhappy consciousness is the peak of subjectivity, pure subjectivity, which as for itself is opposed with being-in-itself. The opposition is between specificity and universality( the specific and the universal). Self- consciousness failed to be self because it continuously negated every determination it found itself in. Its incessant rejection of every concrete situation makes it a self-certainty without truth. It aspired to pose itself, its being-for-itself in the-in-itself, but its negation of the given, concrete situation, left it with a self which is divided and without identity with itself. "Self certainty", ascertains Hyppolite, "can not be in-itself without losing itself and becoming a thing." (Ibid:203). Thus, the prior alienation which we observed in the very movement of self consciousness and according to which the self separated itself, posed itself as the other and through the negation of that other made itself for-itself, must be complemented by another self-alienation. According to this second kind of alienation, the self must pronounce its subjectivity, abandon its freedom which is the negative and agree to be a thing without there by negating it. It must agree to abandon its capacity of negation which is equal with losing itself since that capacity is what it is for-itself. Only then, as a result of the second alienation, that the self can be what it is in-itself for itself.

In the first phase as is said, the self-alienation of subjectivity contra poses itself as changeable consciousness with the immutable. Though both extremes, essence and non-essence, exist within a single consciousness contra posed to each other self-consciousness identifies itself with non-essence. "Because it is the consciousness of this contradiction, consciousness stands on the side of changeable consciousness and it appears to itself to be the non-essential" (Ibid, 197). Since its essence is projected in the beyond, self-consciousness necessarily tries to move upward and find itself there in i.e, to join its self with essence and be united with itself. Nonetheless, this upward lead is doomed to failure in advance. Because the upward movement itself is changeable consciousness and the immutable I is posed as transcendent in principle. Thus, the attempt of changeable consciousness' would fall to reach the transcendent and necessarily falls into the realm of non-essence.

In the second phase, however, the condemned upward movement of self consciousness is redeemed in the immediate unity of the universal and the specific through the incarnation. For the possibility of this immediate unity two things have happened. The first is that the misfortune of unhappy consciousness is not only attributed to the nothingness of life but to the essence of the I. It is not only the meaninglessness of life but subjectivity itself, as self internally rent and self opposed, responsible for the misfortune of unhappy consciousness. The consequence of this self examination is the development of both subjectivity and the consciousness of life. The consciousness of life unhappy consciousness holds become more profound and real. And the development of subjectivity means that it is transformed in to a consciousness having a universal form rather than a self of certain particular consciousness. The very being of self-consciousness as subjective inwardness, is developed, though still a specific consciousness, in to having a universal form independent of any particular consciousness.

The second cause making the immediate unity possible is the appearance of the immutable in specific consciousness. Through the incarnation the immutable appears in a specific human form in the figure of Jesus Christ. Through the incarnation the immutable itself as God, is transformed in to the universal embodied in specific consciousness. We can see that both terms, the immutable and the changeable, are transformed in to the universal and the specific. The universal is embodied in specific consciousness through the incarnation and the specific is developed in to a subjectivity having a universal form. The former yawning lucane is narrowed as the result of the incarnation.

Thus, through Christ, the two are joined immediately. Unhappy consciousness no longer remains in the extreme, it is no longer a changeable consciousness. It now has a universal form.; nor is the immutable inaccessible. As God it has become the universal embodied in specific conciseness. The union, thus, is effected in the figure of Christ whose incarnation transformed unhappy consciousness from that which was merely attempting to ascend in to the ascent itself.

Nonetheless, the immediacy of the union, i.e, the immutable taking sensuous form, entails the necessary vanishing of the immutable and makes the union inadequate. This does not mean the union is not effected. Rather it is effected at a lower level forcing unhappy consciousness to remain in its bond, subjectivity. This leads to the last phase in which specific existence discovers itself as universal in spirit and becomes “consciousness for-itself of the reconciliation of its specific existence with the universal.” (Ibid, 201). This is the last stage of the phenomenology called reason and at which substance and self-consciousness are united.

Another way of saying why the unity at the second phase failed is that self-consciousness did not conceive the unity, which is its object, conceptually but perceived it as a feeling. The consciousness of the unity in self-consciousness is not thought. Because of this the unity is alien to self consciousness and it remained divided within itself. As a feeling it is not genuine and it disappeared immediately. If it were conceptualized by self-consciousness, it would have been genuinely united with itself. What self-consciousness was unable to comprehend, Hegel argues, is that, like Christ is the unity of the Immutable and the specific, it itself, unhappy consciousness, is untied with its essence, the immutable. “One thing is not the case for unhappy consciousness; that its object, the immutable-which essentially for it has the figure of specific existence, is unhappy consciousness itself, the specific existence of consciousness.” (Hegel, PeG, 163 quoted in Hyppolite, 208).

This anguish, a feeling of the absence of divinity, will incite self-consciousness to express and affirm itself for-itself through the negation of things as usual. Hegel further says that though the truth is not evident for it, this consciousness, in-itself, has discovered the truth, attained its essence through the feeling of the absence divinity. Because through that feeling of absence, it has self “the object of its pure feeling, and it is itself that object.” (Hegel, PGI, 164s quoted in Hyppolite, 209). In-itself, through the incarnation, self-consciousness is transformed and has become the universal,

the figure of the immutable. So the unity is completed as long as self-consciousness is concerned in-itself. But what about for it, for-itself?

For this to be possible self consciousness must complete the second kind of alienation. This second kind of alienation is still negation but the self must negate itself, not something else. Nonetheless, through self negation, self consciousness is able to find itself. Primarily, it tries to externalize itself by negating what lies out side it. It continually do that and reaches pure subjectivity as the peak of the separation of self from substance. That prior alienation, which fails to give self consciousness a subsisting identity, is now itself to be negated. According to the dialectic, it is going to succeeded because self-consciousness has agreed to wholly objectify itself by totally alienating its subjectivity-the negation of the negation

The movement begins by the abandonment of the claim to freedom and autonomy. The abandonment is essentially related to the recognition by self-consciousness that God is the source of the freedom and action- the being of self consciousness. The incarnation has changed the entire meaning of the world. It has sanctified the world. Through the incarnation the world is redeemed. It is transformed in to a world that belongs to God- a world that owes its existence as well as meaning to divine intelligence. This is nothing else than God gave his only son, Chris, to save the world, to save humanity. The in carnation is, thus, God's act of redeeming the world. Thus everything in the world is blessed through the savior, Jesus Christ. To the extent that everything in the world is the creation of God, it is good. Thus, as long as the actions of self consciousness, its freedom in negativity, owes their origin to the immutable, points out Hyppolite, then, they are the manifestations of the transcendence of God. Through the incarnation the immutable has divinized the world and via specifity have become actual reality so sensuous existence is transformed in to a symbol which represents the grace of God. When one acts, works or consumes... he is only, executing what belongs to the immutable. Thus, his actions, desires, and capacities are, in itself, a gift from God but which self-consciousness exercises only for-itself. At the same time action is a reality as the actuality of the divine. What self-consciousness do, Hyppolite Stresses, in its silence as well as "disquiet", is experience what God allowed. As a result, self-consciousness is not autonomous as it used to claim.

Hyppolite writes of the renunciation of freedom as man's essential act. "On all sides, action is reflected toward a transcendent goal. Active consciousness merely appears to act. Inside and outside it, God acts.... This recognition of God, who alone acts, is man's essential action." (Ibid,211-12). Thereby unhappy consciousness admits its nothingness and the greatness of the immutable. However, not deliberately but due to the moment of necessity (through the dialectical reversal) man who admitted his nothingness appears to be great. Because it is man himself who posed and recognized God. So what appears to be the humiliation of man turned out to be its elevation. As long as the recognition originated from the act of man, man has not totally abandoned his will nor alienated his subjectivity entirely. For the full self-negation and abandonment of the will, unhappy consciousness must transform itself to ascetic consciousness. Accordingly, the self renounces its will and action, and alienates its being-for-itself entirely and becomes a thing. "In posing itself as a thing, through asceticism, obedience, and the alienation of its particular will, consciousness discovers-or we discover for it that the thing is a manifestation of the self and that self is universal self and universal being-for-itself" (Ibid,213).

In order for this to be possible, i.e., unhappy consciousness alienate its subjectivity wholly, become a thing and through that become a universal self, all the contents of specific consciousness must be destroyed. The ascetic will try to accomplish this through alms giving, thanks giving, fasting and penance. So that the self can totally be free of what Hyppolite calls 'the guilt of action'. Furthermore, he points out that the medieval Christian church has played an important role as a mediating factor. It facilitated the unity by presenting the two extremes for each other. The motive of the mediation is the destruction of specific consciousness and thereby the advancement of the self to universality. When the self has accomplished this it will feel as well as comprehend the nothingness of both its action and being. It has become a thing. And through the mediation of the church it is transformed into a universal self. Thus, it has finally found itself in the thing and the thing in itself. The unity is established and the being-in-itself and the being-for-itself are united. Seen from a higher point of view, the unity is the last stage of the phenomenology. Reason, which is spirit's self-realization through the self's unity of the in-itself and the for-itself. "The self, being-for-itself, thus become the unity of selves, universal self rediscovering itself in being. This being-for-itself of the in-itself is spirit.... This new stage is the unity of consciousness (the in-itself) and self-consciousness (the for-itself), that is, reason" (Ibid).

Here one can argue that it is not at all clear how self-consciousness remains in that unity to be a self. If the self has totally alienated its subjectivity which is equal with the destruction of specific consciousness, then, where comes the for-itself in the it-self? It seems that in rejoining itself with substance the self is totally lost and what is real is the thing. It may be said that in the universal self the for-itself of self-consciousness is maintained. Or spirit which is simultaneously subject and substance keeps the for-itself of self-consciousness alive. This seems hardly the case. Only one side of the coin is glittering as the result of the burning out of the other. In objectifying itself, self is lost and the thing only has become real. Though it is difficult to see the point, Hyppolite concludes in a way that does justice to both sides: objectivity as well as subjectivity. "Thus, the whole development of unhappy consciousness expresses the development of subjectivity which renounces itself and through this self-negation reestablishes objectivity. But that objectivity is no longer the pure and simple in-itself, it has become the in-itself for it-self or the for-itself in-itself, a substance that is at the same time subject, a substance that poses itself as what it is" (Ibid, 204).

This, movement from substance to subject and from subject to substance, according to Hegel, is a double movement of alienation. Attempting to find itself the self is lost in the first and according to the second by losing itself, it has regained itself. Hegel concludes about the double movement as double alienation as follows.

"One aspect of the movement is that by which substance alienates itself from its substantiveness and becomes self-consciousness; the other is that by which self-consciousness alienates itself and become thing ness, or universal self." (PGS 05 quoted in Hyppolite, 204).

### **1.3. The World of Spirit or Spirit as the World and Beyond**

Self-consciousness developed fully and through complete self-alienation gained universality led to reason. This universal self-consciousness, reason must become a thing in-and for itself, i.e, spirit. Thus, the truth of reason is spirit. Reason when developed fully abandons its mere potentiality, universal self-consciousness, and becomes the world. This world is spirit and by reflecting back on the world as history, spirit knows itself and becomes absolute spirit.

According to the dialectic of the phenomenology, spirit is: absolute self-knowledge, history, and 'a we' or cogitamus. The essence of spirit as absolute self-knowledge is, as the last section tired to show, its development from narrow self-awareness to freedom and complete self-knowledge

through the development of self-consciousness. Thus, let us discuss spirit as a we and history. "spirit is a we". According to the dialectic, the development of self-consciousness presupposes the existence of multiple self-consciousnesses. The development of self-consciousness is a process which demands the recognition of other consciousness. Self-consciousness can not develop in isolation. Rather develops through inter-subjective relationships through which it gains as well as grant recognition as an independent and free being-a being for it self. Thus, unlike Descartes' pure and isolated I, the cogito for Hegel is not the point of departure of the dialectic. Opposed to a single consciousness which stands on its own and is able to develop in isolation, a cogitamus is the starting point of the Hegelean dialectic. The cogitamus is the co-existence of multiple self-consciousnesses as a we. This is the a priori condition for the development of self-consciousness which would take the necessary form of mutual recognition in which, however, conflict is inherent. This cogitamus, nonetheless, is not a mere we – it is spirit at the same time. As the necessary struggle as well as mutual recognition of two self consciousnesses is the first appearance of spirit mediating between them, the cogitamus is spirit serving as a background for the development of self-consciousnesses. Or the cogitamus, the co-existence of multiple I's at the same time, is the coming to itself of spirit.

Thus, spirit is the cogitamus as opposed to the cogito of the development. The various self-consciousness find themselves through it and vice versa. Spirit does this by allowing conflict and harmony which are the necessary conditions of the development. At the same time, it goes towards itself by transcending the multiple self consciousnesses. Thus, spirit is a we which preserves multiple I's at the same time transcending them. "Spirit is this we precisely in so far as it simultaneously brings about the unity and the separation of the I's" (Ibid, 324).

"Spirit is History." As we observed reason marks the first reconciliation of the individual and the universal. For this reason or universal consciousness its object is the world in its totality. The world in its totality is not equal with nature. Nature represents spirit out side of itself. Since it is lost in nature spirit incessantly negates its determination in nature. Through the continuous negation ends in defeat i.e, spirit is unable to find itself in nature, nonetheless it transforms nature to have a spiritual essence. "Spirit is thus the genuine development of that universality which self-consciousness reached as Reason" (Ibid, 326). Rather than conceiving itself as subjective self-certainty in its immediateness or as the negation of being... spirit "knows itself as this world, as the world of human history, and conversely, it knows this world to be the self" (Ibid, 326).

Spirit as a we, a cogitamus, is what has been discussed in the last section. The dialectical development as the world, which we are going to discuss now, has three stages; immediate spirit, spirit alien to itself, and self certain spirit. These three moments of the development of spirit have respective counterparts in world history. These are: The ancient world of Greece and Rome, the modern world, and the contemporary world.

Primarily “spirit exists immediately. It is there as a historically given i.e, the existence of a people- a community of individuals aware of themselves as living in the concrete totality of a people” (Ibid, 334). There is no separation or opposition between self-consciousness and the world nor with self-consciousness itself. Self-consciousness is merely distinct from substance which is manifested in self-consciousness as its goal and its in-itself. Spirit is this substance which is divided into the individual and the universal. These respectively being self consciousness as self-certainty and the goal towards which self-consciousness must evolve.

According to Hyppolite, this first moment, for Hegel, is represented by the beautiful ethical life of the Greek polis at which spirit and also the self is immediately one with itself. Every section of practical life, the state, the familial ties, the mores... are lived by the self as spontaneous extensions. It finds itself there wholly. No element of otherness is manifested in the Polis. Nor is there an opposition either between the self and the polis or within the self. There is only simple differences like the distinction between human law and divine law. The distinction is such that one is constituted in the other. As a result, morality is equal with the custom of the polis and the self is united with itself to the extent of acting instinctively or spontaneously. The same is true for spirit. Spirit is synonymous with nature. It is immediately united with itself through nature and the harmonious ethical life of the polis. However, the problem is that immediate unity is the anti-thesis of the essence of both the self and Spirit, Hyppolite observes. The genuine unity of spirit is not immediate rather is a mediated one which can be realized after the posing and working out of contradictions. The same is true for the self. The self can realize itself only after its essential nature, subjectivity as negativity, is posed in opposition to being and that opposition is synthesized. Thus, according to Hyppolite, this first moment of the development of spirit represented by the Greek polis must be negated. “Because the ethical world is immediate, it must be undone, but because the immediateness is a beautiful moment in the development of spirit, spirit always seek to rediscover it and reflectively to reconstitute it” (Ibid.357).

The next dialectical moment concretized in the imperialism of Rome marks the emergence of the self. The self appears immediately as universal i.e, valid in and for-itself. This validity is issued from law that conferred equality to all. As the result of the destruction of the polis by war the citizen is replaced by the private person who is exclusive person and the negation of particular determination. His being is posed through law which establishes private property as the goal. The self no longer finds itself in the state, or society nor in private property it seeks. This transformation which granted universal validity to the self and made its actual content private property, ends up by alienating the self. Hegel identifies the universal validity of the self with its loss. "The universal validity of the self is the reality that has become alien to it. That validity is the universal actuality of self, but such validity is immediately its surrender; it is the loss of the essence of the self" (Hegel, PEG;40 quoted in Hyppolite, 369). For the essence of the self is not equal with private property.

The dialectical import of the Roman world of law is the emergence of the self. The self which is universal immediately is an embodiment of a contradiction. For a genuine universality of self-consciousness is a result of mediation and self-alienation. A universal self in immediacy is an illusion. Thus, the self in the Roman world is external and alien to itself. Its essence eludes it. The Roman world of law is, nonetheless, the emergence of the first form of spiritual self. In this spiritless world of Romans as compared to the beautiful or Greek city, spirit has come to self-awareness for the first time. According to the dialectical movement, spirit will recourse to the second stage, the world of culture and alienation, at which it is completely alien to itself.

In the latter world spirit will gain real content through the abandonment of its immediate self. As a result of self-alienation it would be substantive. Hyppolite summarizes the transition from the immediate self to spirit alien to itself via the Roman world of law as follows. "... The immediately universal self which give rise to a world and which is no less immediately its own contrary must voluntarily alienate itself. That alienation allows the constitution of a new reign of spirit, a region at the end of which the self will have made itself universal. This reign is that of spirit alien to itself which opposes immediate spirit (Ibid, 375).

## **The World of Culture and Alienation**

The history of Europe from the middle Ages to the eighteenth century is called a period of culture or civilization. To the dialectical movement it represents a concrete illustration of the development of spirit to universality through the negation of the self's immediate universality posed in the prior moment. The Roman world of law equated the content of self with private property. But the self did not find itself there. At this stage self consciousness negates its particular determination and takes wealth and political power to be its essence. But only till it will find out that they are nothing. As a result it will alienate itself and transform itself to faith and pure intellection which are moments immediately prior to the realization of universal self.

The world of culture, according to Hyppolite, is predominantly a world of alienation. Culture is simultaneously the cause and out come of the self alienation of spirit. Spirit for which the new world appears as other alienates itself to find itself and be substantive. Culture is then the expression of this movement of spirit. Since spirit realizes itself through self consciousness, the outcome of the actions and movements of the individual self-consciousness are called culture. Thus, this world of culture is a world of alienation. Hyppolite confirms this by saying that "unlike the first world of spirit, the second is not harmonious totality quietly resting in itself, it is torn, divided world, a world of spirit become alien to itself." (Ibid, 377)

The world is substance which in turn is the content of spirit. When the world becomes alien to self-consciousness, spirit is separated from itself. The content of self becoming other to self consciousness, spirit is estranged from itself. "The distinctive characteristic of this stage of spirit is that substance has become of the self an alien world in which it no longer recognizes itself." (ibid, 378). Hyppolite warns here that we must not forget a fundamental fact. Everything exists in spirit. The world which exists in opposition to self-consciousness is spirit in opposition to itself. "It is merely spirit that exists, as opposed to spirit that knows itself: it is a world of immediate self which is thus posed in its exclusiveness, no longer discovers itself" (379).

The peculiar character of this stage is the movement of self-consciousness as self-negation. The self which discovers its emptiness in its immediate universal self continually negates itself and acquires substance. Conversely, the movement gives substance form, order and performance.

Through self negation, the self which is empty, gains substance and there by transforms substance. This, according to Hegel, is the development of culture through self-alienation.

*Nevertheless, the action and development by means of which substance becomes actual are the very estrangement of personality, for the self which is valid in-and-for-itself immediately that is, without estrangement, lacks substance and it is the play thing of tumultuous elements. Its substance is there fore its very alienation, and alienation is the substance in which spiritual powers arrange themselves into a world and there maintain themselves. (Hegel, PGS 40 quoted in Hyppolite 308).*

As a result of this movement, the self alienation of spirit, which gave rise to substance spirit is united with the objective world. This unity which is actuality or a presence, however, is not a unity of self and essence genuinely. In the former what is achieved in the form of actuality is the unity of spirit with the objective world which is not yet the unity of spirit with its essence. In this latter unity, spirit would become for it self what it is in-itself and would know itself as such. In the former, however, spirit is united with the world which is not yet developed fully so as to be the essence of spirit. The genuine unity is to be realized in the beyond, in faith. Now the world of faith, the beyond, is opposed to the here below, pure consciousness with actual consciousness. The dualism, according to Hyppolite, is the mark of the unhappy consciousness of spirit; spirit that is strange to itself.

That means the union achieved as the result of the realization of culture entailed a more acute alienation. Though the self which was empty has acquired content, that content is mere contingency, not its essence. Faith is posed as the precondition for the real unity. Though the consciousness of faith projects its essence in the beyond, Hyppolite says that unity has an objective character for consciousness. Because in that consciousness content as the substance of spirit is not merely desired. Rather is represented essentially. "Faith and culture stand contra posed, but both are forms of the alienation of the self. The self certainty of self consciousness has become alien to itself in the one world as well as in the other" (Ibid, 381). The two worlds oppose each other to the extent that man lives in the earthly which lacks essence and searches for his essence in the city of God which is far from actuality. Spirit is separated between two selves; actual self and absolute self. The separation is "a dualism which expresses the torment of spirit obliged to live in one world and to think in the other" (Ibid, 380-381).

The dualism is further expressed in the opposition of faith with pure intellection. Faith is the objective representation of essence since it poses and affirms the immutable. It is an in-itself that posits essence objectively. Due to this substantiveness, faith lacks the certainty of self-consciousness. On the contrary, pure intellection is subjectivity that is absolutely certain of itself. It is a for-itself that freely negates and reduces everything to itself. However, it lacks solidity-is devoid of substantiveness which is the mark of faith. Thus, the two oppose each other necessarily. The opposition between faith and pure intellection is manifested, observes Hyppolite, in the Enlightenment's combat against faith. The enlightenment represents pure intellection over and against faith by worshiping reason as the ultimate criteria of reality. As a result spirit here is nailed in two worlds. Although they are the anti-thesis of each other, pure intellection as well as faith represent some part of the essence of spirit. "It [spirit] finds pure intellection, which reduces everything to the self, as well as pure essence, which is thought that lacks the movement of intellection. Faith is merely one element the other is concept" (Ibid, 382).

Both worlds lack something essential in respect to their peculiar constitution as a result of which they do not separately exhaust the essence of spirit. Nonetheless they have one thing in common, says Hyppolite. The two worlds which owe their respective value to the difference between them and exist as long as they are opposed, entail taken together, a fundamental truth. This is the reality of the unity of spirit through the dissolution of the contradiction of the two worlds. From the actual world pure intellection posed it self as concept through the negation of everything else. And through the negation of all content as the vanity of life faith posed spirit, in its substantiveness, as the final essence. What we have is concept, the for-itself, on the one hand and on the other spirit as substance, as an in-itself. The remaining task is to unite the two worlds by reducing them in to one and destroying the contradiction. This is to be done through or by religion which would unite pure consciousness and actual consciousness or faith and concept.

Another way of describing the progress is by referring to the two moment through which spirit developed to self realization. In the moment of the first alienation, spirit is untied with the objective world through actual consciousness. But since actual consciousness lacked essence spirit is alienated from its self. As a result, the dialectical movement lead to the second moment which represents the separation and opposition between self and essence, develop the separation further and poses it as the opposition between pure intellection and faith.

When this latter opposition is suppressed as the self-discovery of spirit in both worlds and the negation of everything else, there remained nothing to be untied. For the outcome of the second alienation has incorporated the result of the first moment, developed it fully and finally negated it in its self-discovery. Religion is, thus, the decisive moment of the dialectic representing spirit that has untied its pure consciousness and actual consciousness. Prior to the emergence of religion as the highest dialectical moment, the self gained universality by posing itself as concept and reducing everything else to itself. And in religion through the unification of actual consciousness and pure consciousness, concept and faith, a dialectical moment that goes parallel to the self-discovery of spirit, "it has denounced the alienation where by man transposes the world here-below to the beyond; that is, it reduces these two worlds in to one in which overcoming all self-alienation, spirit becomes absolute freedom." (Ibid, 384)

One can see that pure intellection is actual consciousness developed fully while pure consciousness is represented by faith. Thus, the unity of pure intellection and faith is a unity of actual consciousness and pure consciousness. It is a unity of spirit with the world, a unity of substance and self-consciousness (as a universal self) – a unity of spirit with itself without any further alienation. This is a last stage of the phenomenology, reason, at which a higher synthesis is brought to existence through religion.

#### **1.4. The Idea of Alienation in Hegel**

As our discussion of the movement of self-consciousness, as Hegel analyzed it and Jean Hyppolite interpreted, testifies it is simultaneously a movement of alienation. The self, from the "thetic I", to the resolution of unhappy consciousness, is necessarily alienated from itself and nature. The same is true for spirit. In what follows we will discuss the idea of alienation as Hegel conceived it. The meaning of alienation, how it is actualized especially in relation to the essence of self, whether it is wholly negative or has some positive significance, and the possibility for "dealienation" are the primary points of the discussion. What we need to bear in mind is that the self is action and moves necessarily (which entails externalization), the element of otherness is the inherent dynamic of life (which entails estrangement), and the essence of the self is not subjectivity or objectivity in separation. But both in a united form. As long as the self claims to be one without the other and thinks that it is a self, it is the embodiment of contradiction and alienation is dancing at its very heart.

Self-consciousness is action and moves necessarily. Without movement there is no self-consciousness. From the world of objects, as consciousness, it moves to itself and discovers itself as self-consciousness. It also moves from one moment to the other in order to develop fully and realize its essence. Self-consciousness is primarily action. As desire or labor it acts against the world of things. It proves its self certainty for itself as well as for others by confronting and negation the world. So it must necessarily externalize it self. In that self externalization it poses itself out side of itself. It appears to itself same and other at the same time. It is separated within itself. For without that separation it is not able to pose itself outside of itself. The separation is the indication of the disparity of self-consciousness with itself. Thus, it is estranged from itself. In order to fulfill itself, it externalizes it self and that externalization alienates it from itself.

Self-consciousness always finds itself in life which is same and other at the same time. It is able to pose itself as self-consciousness by separating and contra posing itself to life. As subjectivity it is reflection and the consciousness of the inadequacy of nothingness of life. So life is the fundamental other to self-consciousness. It does not find itself in life. It is estranged from itself as a result of the otherness of life. The otherness of life forces self-consciousness to realize that otherness in itself and be separated from itself. The otherness of life later on takes a form of another self-consciousness through the recognition of which self-consciousness affirms itself as it is for itself. However, even in that recognition the element of otherness is not suppressed. Because the second self-consciousness in turn demands recognition and self-consciousness necessarily appear as a self-for-other. Beside the separation of self which is required so as to pose itself out side of itself and be recognized by the other as for-itself, it has become other for the other self-consciousness as well as for-itself. It is estranged from itself and lost itself.

“The other appears as same, as the self, but the self also appears as the other. Similarly, the negation of the other, which corresponds to the movement of desire, becomes self-negation as well” (Ibid, 168).

The alienation of self from itself, its estrangement and loss is presented in two moments of the dialectic profoundly. These are the master-slave dialectic and unhappy consciousness. In the master-slave dialectic the slave, before he regained his essence by dominating the object, is a figure who is totally alienated from essence. The ideal lies outside of him in the master and the slave is a mere living creature not far from the way an animal lives. He is recognized as such as the result of

the fear to oppose life and arise above it. Not only is the slave unable to pose it self as it is for-itself. It is a mere consciousness in which, as opposed to the self of the master, otherness is concretized. Thus, the slave is a figure which represents the total loss of self. In the consciousness of the slave, self-consciousness is alienated from itself as well as estranged from life.

When it comes to unhappy consciousness the contrary seems evident. As pure subjectivity, unhappy consciousness has self, but as self which is totally alienated from substance. Since the essence of self-consciousness is equal with both subjectivity and objectivity, unhappy consciousness through incessant negation retained subjectivity only and failed to objectify itself. So that unhappy consciousness is a self which is never equal with itself. It is completely alienated from its essence and estranged from life. It is true that through the negation of the object it has tried to externalize it self. But since it also further negated its particular determination it remained a self, pure subjectivity, which is not equal with itself. Its is also true that pure subjectivity, freedom as infinite negativity, is its essence. But only have of it essence. That is why, then, it is required to negate it and realize its essence in its completeness, i.e, the in-itself which is for-itself. From this arises another kind of alienation-alienation which objectifies. Rather than that which splits the self and reprocess it in the other, there by estranging it from itself, the second one unites the self with itself by objectifying it.

### **Alienation as Objectification and Externalization**

What has been discussed so far ascertains that alienation for Hegel is necessarily interrelated with objectification or externalization. Self-consciousness which is primarily or essentially desire or action tries to realize itself by acting against the world of things. That means it tries to actualize itself through externalization or objectification. "To objectify oneself in something external is to consume or fashion or otherwise use it to satisfy a need" (Palmentaz, 1971:72). According to my understanding of the Hegelean analysis of the movement of self-consciousness, externalization refers to the first moment while objectification pertains to the second. Accordingly, the self tries to externalize itself by consuming and shaping things through negation. The out come of which is the alienation and separation of self from itself as well as from life. Because it there by negates what is externalized. Nonetheless, according to the second moment, the self totally alienates itself, negates its pure subjectivity, its negative capacity, and becomes objectified a thing which is no more

capable to negate. Any ways, alienation for Hegel is necessarily related with objectification and externalization.

### **Alienation: Negative or Positive**

Alienation for Hegel is not wholly negative. The first moment is both positive and negative while the second one is positive. Let us see first the second one. By alienating its subjectivity, renouncing freedom, the self is objectified. It is transformed into a universal self and is united with itself. So that the second moment of alienation is positive. While the first one is both positive and negative at the same time. The self is alienated from itself as a result of the movement of desire as externalization. This situation is negative because the self is estranged from itself, become other as a result of externalization. Nonetheless, the situation has a positive import in so far as externalization allows self consciousness to cognize itself as object so that making the future unity of being-in-itself and being-for-itself possible in advance. So that what is a wholly negative situation in which the self is estranged from itself, is given a positive significance. As a result Pietro Chiodi says that "... it would seem that the idea of alienation is incompatible with anything that is seen as positive since, in this case, the demand for delineation would lose all sense" (Ibid,1976:80).

### **Alienation or Estrangement**

The two words seem to have a similar meaning. Both seem to refer to the becoming other of self. However, alienation seems more broad and inclusive of estrangement. Because it necessarily entails the meaning of estrangement as the loss of self and something more, the separation of self within itself. Pietero Chiodi argues in the contrary and says that alienation is the loss of self in the other (Entfremdung) while estrangement (Entausserung) can be translated by the term session (See, Chiodi, 1976 pa. 125). For Jean Hyppolite the case is such that estrangement (entfremdung) is the becoming alien of self and is more profound than alienation (entausserung). Because alienation does not necessarily indicate the becoming of other and tends to separation. As for me leaving aside the relation with the German words, alienation is the separation of self and becoming other to itself. Because the separation is fundamental that the self is estranged from itself. So alienation is estrangement plus separation. If we look at the movement of the self in the phenomenology, the self is always in split but is estranged only often. Because through separation it sometimes reaches itself even if for a moment. "... a self-consciousness in which desire recognizes another desire and

bears on it, then in this splitting and reproduction of itself self-consciousness reaches itself” (Hyppolite, 1974:165). Although the self has reached itself through the other it is at the same time estranged there. Because it there by necessarily appears as a being for other. Thus, for Hegel, too, it seems that alienation is found with separation and estrangement. What is peculiar to his position, however, is the positive significance of alienation since only through alienation as separation and estrangement, that the self can realize itself.

### **The Inevitability of Delineation**

For Hegel as alienation is necessary the over coming of it is also inevitable. This is related to the movement of spirit which realizes itself through the self’s renunciation of its subjectivity. Through the destruction of specific consciousness it is transformed to universal self which is spirit preserving and transcending multiple self-consciousness. Though it is not clear how the self remain so if its content is destroyed, it is dealienated through objectification. That means the subject/object mode of relation in which self-consciousness stands by opposing the world is suppressed in the unity of being and subject, Spirit, which itself becomes substance and subject at the same time, has related itself and become Absolute freedom.

As a result, the movement of the dialectic has come to an end through the development of insufficiencies and the resolution of contradictions. The whole development is a double movement of alienation; from substance to subject and from subject to substance. We can conclude by quoting the following words of Hegel again.

“One aspect of the moment is that by which substance alienates itself from its substantiveness and becomes self-consciousness; the other is that by which self-consciousness alienates itself and becomes thingness, or universal self” (Hegel, 25 quoted in Hyppolite, 1974:204).

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **The Idea of Alienation in Marx**

The whole philosophy of Karl Marx, according to Frederic Bender, is informed by three fundamental principles. These are the historical argument, the argument on economy or practical life and the ethical argument. The first one contrasted the whole tradition of western philosophy with historical materialism. It criticizes, Bender says, western philosophical tradition as one sided, abstract and idealistic in favor of historical materialism which is a dialectical philosophy of change and becoming. The second thesis of the philosophy of Marx, says Bender, concerns the nature of man and argues against his alienation from it. Any social reality which alienates man must be rejected and replaced by one in which man overcomes his alienation and realizes his essence fully. In relation to this, capitalistic mode of production, for Marx, is social reality in which man is alienated. Thus, the capitalistic mode of production must be rejected and replaced by one in which man develops fully. The third thesis called the economic argument concerns the economic super structure or practical life. For Marx the laws that govern the economic structures grounds the entire development of practical life and the complete development of which would ultimately and dialectically lead to the down fall of capitalism and the emergence of a new mode of social organization called communism. (See Bender, 1972:p1)

Marx's idea of alienation has similarities, differences and oppositions with that of Hegel. Just like Hegel, Marx conceives alienation to be essentially related to the self- realization of man in the process of history. Unlike Hegel, however, alienation for Marx is not necessary in the sense that it is not the inherent aspect of the necessary development of man in history, rather its corruption. Nonetheless, alienation acquire the status of necessity via the capitalist system which necessarily alienates man. Nor is it equal with objectification. Alienation is the necessary product of capitalistic mode of production which estranged the worker and humanity in general through and by the alienation of labor. To Marx's idea of alienation thus, the concept of labor is most important. As it will be evident, the idea of labor is essentially related to Marx's idea of human nature and its realization. So rather than alienation what is necessary for Marx is the development of man through various historical periods of which capitalism is one. As a result of capitalism alienation is inevitable but only till it will be over come in another historical period, communism.

Erich Fromm summarizes the interrelation between the human potential for freedom, alienated labor and its overcoming in communism as follows

*The concept of active, productive man who grasps and embraces the objective world with his own powers can not be fully understood without the negation of productivity; alienation. For Marx the history of man kind is a history of the increasing development of man, and at the same time of increasing alienation. His concept of socialism is the emancipation from alienation, the return of man to himself, his self- realization”(Fromm, 1961: P.43).*

Marx's idea of alienation is, thus, essentially related to the notions of human nature and labor. As a result, in this chapter we will begin by discussing what Marx meant by human nature. A discussion of the causes and different manifestations of alienation would follow and finally we would see the theoretical as well as practical overcoming of alienation in communism. In so doing, we will, as much as possible, discuss the thought of Marx in relation to Hegel. Because, Marx, who developed his thought against the Hegelean background, has had much to draw as well as reject from Hegel. Of all ideas, the dialectic according to which everything moves through insufficiencies and contradictions, through the negation of them, so that to develop itself fully and realize itself, ties the thought of Marx with that of Hegel. A dialectic which is a philosophy of movement, of becoming in the process of history marks the relation of Hegel with Marx. "... focusing on the question of the dialectical aspect of Hegel's philosophy will illustrate the most fundamental sense in which Hegel influenced Marx. A dialectical philosophy such as that of Hegel or Marx will be essentially a philosophy of becoming which, once translated into terms of human action, is essentially historical, for it is only in the flux of history that these actions become interrelated" (Bender, 1972:2-3).

The discussion and exposition of the ideas of Marx on alienation and related themes in this chapter depends, to a greater extent, on Marx's 'Philosophic and Economic Manuscripts' of 1844. It also draws from Erich Fromm's book entitled 'Marx's concept of Man'.

## **2.1 The Nature of Man**

Erich Fromm begins the discussion of Marx's concept of Man by saying that unlike sociologists who take man to be a white sheet of paper, a tabula rasa, Marx has a definite idea of human nature. This nature of man, however, is not equal with the character of man prevalent in certain society or a particular period of history. It is the general nature of man, man's essence in contrast to different

forms of the existence of man in history. Accordingly, Marx differentiates, Fromm observes, between two kinds of appetites or drives. "... Marx distinguishes two types of human drives and appetites; the constant or fixed ones, such as hunger and the sexual urge, which are an integral part of human nature, and which can be changed only in their form and the direction they take in various cultures, and the "relative" appetites, which are not an integral part of human nature but which owe their origin to certain social structures and certain conditions of production and communication" (Fromm, 1961:25)

The first kind is that which is fixed or constant, part of the essential nature of man and changes only in its form. The need for food and the sexual drive are of this kind. The second type is called relative or artificial appetites the origin of which is related to certain social structures or peculiar conditions of production and communication. The need for money as a result of the capitalistic mode of production is characteristic of the second type of wants.

Human nature for Marx is not an abstraction which, being inherent in every individual, actualizes itself necessarily. Rather it is an inherent human potential as a naturally given potential and develops only through social and historical process. Man remains the same as a raw material of this potential and at the same time changes and transforms himself through history. Thus, history is a process man creates in the movement of self-realization. It is inextricably related to the process of work and production in which man creates and realizes himself. Marx also conceived man to be essentially activity. Fromm says that, for Hegel, man is said to be alive to the extent that his is productive and is related to the world productively. That is, not passively as a receptacle, but actively through incessant action by means of which he translates his potentialities into actualities. Fromm writes the following relating the nature of man as conceived by both Marx and Hegel.

*"For ... Hegel, as well as for Marx, man is alive only in as much as he is productive, in as much as he grasps the world outside of himself in the act of expressing his own specific human powers, and of grasping the world with these powers. In as much as man is not productive, in as much as he is receptive and passive, he is nothing, he is dead. In this productive process, man realizes his own essence, he returns to his own essence, which in theological language is nothing other than his return to God" (Fromm, 1961:30).*

According to Fromm, central to Marx's idea of human essence is the notion of movement owing to which man passionately endeavors for its object both theoretically and practically. The movement is not mechanical, rather conscious, passionate, energetic and vital. "The principles of movement

must not be understood mechanically but as a drive, creative vitality, energy; human passion for Marx “is the essential power of man striving energetically for its object” (Fromm; 1961:30). We can see for ourselves the essentiality of movement for Marx in relation to the essence of man. In the ‘*Philosophic and Economic Manuscripts,*’ analyzing the estrangement of man as a result of alienated labor in which activity appears as passivity or suffering, Marx asserts that life is nothing else than activity “what is life but activity” (Marx 1844:74).

In order to understand Marx’s idea of human nature, Fromm points out, understanding his idea of the relationship between object and subject is necessary. Unless the crude senses of man are humanized, man is not different from animals. For man to become a human being the whole of nature as well as the world of objects must be Humanized. If man seeks what he desires animalistically, objectification and appropriation would turn out to be the loss of the object and oneself. But if, on the contrary, man is able to modify his senses to the extent of transforming crude nature to human nature and his artificial behaviors to what is natural, then, the object would be the confirmation of his being. And the distinction between subject and object would be transcended.

For this to be possible on the one hand, the crude senses of man must be modified, developed and become proper human senses and faculties. On the other hand, nature, the world of objects, must be transformed into objects proper to the senses of the human being. When senses are related to the object as an end in itself, the object would be related to man and to itself in a human way. As a result of which the human being, his senses and practical faculties like the acts of loving and willing, will be related to the object and to itself in a human way. In the process, Fromm says, love has an important role. Because the desire for and enjoyment of the object are devoid of egoistic intent, satisfaction generally becomes a human satisfaction.

*“The eye has become a human eye when its object has become a human, social object, created by man and destined for him... They [the senses] relate themselves to the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself and to man, and vice versa. Need and enjoyment has lost their egoistic character, and nature has lost its mere utility by the fact that its utilization has become human utilization (Marx, 1844: quoted in Fromm, 1961:84 ).*

Thus, an activity which is real to the extent that it passionately strives for the object in a human fashion, is the realization of the essence of man. As a result, objectification and appropriation would be the affirmation of the being of man in the object. On the subject/object distinction and its dissolution in a genuine human activity, Fromm says that “... the object is an object yet it ceases to

be an object, and in this new approach man becomes one with the object, although he and it remain two. Man, in relating himself to the objective world humanly, over-comes self-alienation” (Fromm, 1961:33). The fact of remaining two while united as one seems the creation of a synergy in which two distinct things are united as one while being two.

The essence of man as activity, active and productive relatedness to nature, is the direct result of the reason that man is what Marx calls a species being. As a species being man is a free, self-conscious, and universal being. He is in active relatedness to nature which is its inorganic body. He is nature’s extension but a self-conscious extension. Unlike animals which are spontaneously identified with their life activity, man distinguishes himself from his life activity to the extent that he is conscious of himself. Thus, he is both a subject and an object, of himself. Self-consciousness basically differentiates him from animals. The reason, according to Marx, is that man is a species being. “Man is a species being not only in the sense that he makes the community (his own as well as those of other things) his object both theoretically and practically, but also (this is simply another expression for the something) in the sense that he treats himself as the present, living species, as a universal and consequently free being” (Marx, 1844:75). That means he is a species being in the sense that he considers himself as a living representative, in flesh and blood, and also mind, of the whole humanity and nothing short of to be a symbol of the entire race. So that man is a free and universal being. Bender says that the species character of man lies in the reason that man “as one who recognizes that his fulfillment lies in his proper integration in to the common life of mankind as a whole, rather than asserting his individuality to the determinant of his fellows” (Bender; 1972:7).

Nature, according to Marx, forms the physical basis for the species character of man. Both theoretically and practically nature is the inorganic body of man with which he must interact continuously and also the direct means for his self-preservation. Furthermore, nature is essential for the realization of man in that it is the material on which he acts, exercise his being in the form of labor. Nature is the material for his active-productive life. The universality of man arises from the fact that, as a representative of the species, he interacts with nature more universally. As a species being he is also a free being. The reason is that the aim of the interaction with nature goes beyond the preservation of life. It is bound to activity for its own sake, creativity itself. Through active relatedness with nature he fulfills himself and transforms his potentiality into actuality. So

that man is a free being to the extent that he interacts with nature and creates freely. “Productive life is ... species-life. It is life creating life. In the type of life activity resides the whole character of a species, its species character and free conscious activity is the species character of human beings” (Marx, 1844: 76).

Marx says that the creation of the objective world, the transformation of inorganic nature, is the proof of the species being of man. It is evident that both animals and man produce. However, the intent as well as the how of the production differs greatly. Animals produce instinctively what is necessary for their survival. They produce only themselves and produce according to a standard that is peculiar to their species. On the contrary man produce not only himself but the entire world. He produces consciously and freely. In fact, man is able to produce marvelous things when he is free from any physical need. He also produce not only according to a standard peculiar to his species but according to the standards of any species. As a result, Marx concluded that man is able to create in accordance with the laws of beauty. He ascertains the species character of man through the productive relatedness of man to nature and the objective world as follows.

*“It is just in his work upon the objective world that man really proves himself as a species being. This production is his active species-life. By means of it nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species life; for he no longer produces himself merely intellectually, as in consciousness, but actively and in a real sense and sees his own reflection in a world which he has constructed” (Marx, 1844:76-77).*

For Marx, then, free labor, as the medium through which man is actively related to the world and to himself, is the means through which he realizes his essence. Thus, as it is central to Marx’s concept of human nature, it is also the primary and sole cause for alienation of man in capitalistic mode of production as a result of which it takes the form of alienated labor. Erich Fromm says that Marx primarily called the productive activity of man self-activity and condemned labor as perversion of self-activity. “Marx originally called man’s function “self activity”, not labor and spoke of the “abolition of labor” as the aim of socialism. Later, when he differentiated between free and alienated labor, he used the term “emancipation of labor” (Fromm; 1961:40). As a result, he equated the aim of socialism with the abolishment of labor. Later on however, he differentiated between free labor and alienated labor, regarded the former as the life activity of man and called for its emancipation. Fromm observes that Marx here retained the conception of Hegel for whom labor is the “act of man’s self-creation” (Fromm, 1961:36). Similarly, for Marx labor is an activity

in and of itself, not something to be changed into a commodity which is its perversion and degeneration.

According to a passage quoted from 'Capital' by Fromm, labor for Marx is a process in which both nature and man take part. Man who is part of nature distinguishes himself from and opposes himself to nature in order to secure the fruits of nature in a form suitable for his desires. This interaction with the external world changes nature and transforms the nature of man as well. Thus, labor is a process in which man, in his own will and autonomy, begins to interact with nature and shapes and control the material relations he has with nature "labor is the self expression of man, an expression of his individual physical and mental powers. In this process of genuine activity man develops himself, becomes himself: work is not only a means to an end – the product – but an end in itself, the meaningful expression of human energy: hence work is enjoyable" (Fromm, 1961:41-42). Thus, as free activity, the significance of labor is equal with the realization of the essence of man. But labor is changed into unfree, forced so that alienated labor when it is reduced to a commodity, into a means for the self preservation of man. The result is the alienation of man from himself, other human beings, his species being, and nature. Thus, the alteration and estrangement of man.

## **2.2 The Idea of Alienation in Marx**

According to Frederic Bender the idea of alienation is one of the three pillars on the basis of which the whole philosophy of Marx is formed. In combination with a critique of practical life which is based on capitalistic mode of production, and a radical critique of Western philosophy, the ethical argument, according to which Marx condemned any society that alienates man from his nature and sought to replace it by one in which man fully realize his potential, is the principle of the thought of Marx that guides the entire movement of his philosophy. The same is true for Erich Fromm. Fromm says that "the central theme of Marx is the transformation of alienated, meaningless labor into productive, free labor" (Fromm, 1961:43).

Marx's idea of alienation is expounded in the 'Philosophic and Economic manuscripts' together with the idea of human nature and the over-coming of alienation in communism as a condition for the actualization of genuine human existence. In what follows, we would discuss Marx's idea of alienation focusing on its meaning, i.e. what alienation means for Marx, its relation with concepts such as objectification and reification, and its causes as well as different manifestations.

Marx begins the analysis of alienated labor by stressing the failure of political economy to explain the emergence of private property and related ideas like capital, labor, exchange, competition... etc. The causes reside in the method of political economy which assumes as a fact what it should have explained. As a result, Marx claims, rather than a primordial condition, the analysis of alienated labor shall begin from a contemporary economic fact. This fact is the increasing destitution of the worker in proportion to the amount of objects he produces. Through the analysis of this fact, Marx delineates the causes of alienated labor in which lies the cause as well as features of the alienation of man.

Marx says that the more the worker produces the less he become himself. The worker becomes the cheapest commodity when he produces more and more. "The devaluation of the human world increases in direct relation with the increase in the value of the world of things" (Marx, 1961:71). This devaluation of the human world is the worker's loss of self and reality as the result of the product or labor. The product of labor, according to Marx, is the actualization of labor. It is the objectification of labor. However, the condition the worker is found is such that objectification, the inscription of labor in an object and its presentation in a particular and definite form, appears to be the loss of the object. "This fact simply implies that the object produced by labor, its product, now stands opposed to it as an alien being, as a power independent of the producer... The performance of work appears in the sphere of political as a vitiation of worker, objectification as a loss and servitude to the object, and appropriation as alienation" (Ibid, 71).

According to Marx the worker in the product of his labor does not only aim at the objectification of labor, its becoming of an object. The object does not only exist external to the worker but exists autonomously and confronting the workers. It is no longer under his control. Rather the object rules over and opposes the worker as an alien being. "The life which he has given to the object sets itself against him as an alien and hostile force (Ibid, 72). As a result, the worker is destituted to the point of starvation. In capitalist mode of production, the worker risked not only the means of his physical existence but also the means of his life activity. The reason is the alien character of the relation between the worker and the product of his labor. This is relationship of the worker to the external world of objects i.e. to nature "as an alien and hostile world" (Ibid, 72).

Now it is obvious that the worker creates everything by means of nature. Marx says that without nature the worker can produce nothing. Nature is the means of his production in two senses. First, nature provides what is necessary for his physical existence. Existing without nature, without what nature provides, is unthinkable. In the second sense, nature is the material upon which labor can be exercised, be creative and alive. Without nature, labor, which is so essential for the activity of man, would be non-existent. Marx argues that the more man appropriates and exploits nature, it becomes less the source of both his physical existence and the exercise of his labor. Since the exploitation of nature necessarily leads to its diminishing, the worker will be unable to interact with it directly and will be forced to accept work. He is forced to earn the means of his existence by selling his labor. The direct result of which is that he has become a worker for the sake of preserving his life. This reduction of labor into a commodity, Marx says, is the enslavement of the worker in to the product of labor. For, from now on, he is unable to control the object of labor and no longer to produce in labor freely. “The culmination of this enslavements is that he can only maintain himself as a physical subject so far as he is a worker, and that it is only as a physical subject that he is a worker” (Ibid, 72). That means not as a free and universal being i.e.-species being.

This alien character of the relationship between the worker and the product of this labor is only the result of a much fundamental alien relation. This is the relation of the worker with the activity of production itself. Marx underlines that how could the worker be alienated from the product of labor, unless he is alienated in the activity of production itself? Since the product is the finality of the production activity, it is the summary of the alienation in production. “Production itself must be active alienation – the alienation of activity and the activity of alienation” (Ibid, 73).

According to Marx the alienation of the worker in production is constituted by the fact that he is lost. When he is at work he does not feel himself to be alive or at home. Self- denial, a feeling of misery, physical and mental mortifications are characteristics of the worker when he is in the activity of production. Since his work is not voluntary, since work, rather than being done for satisfying a need, is reduced to a means for the satisfaction of other needs, its alien character is evident in the fact that it is abandoned like a plague when there is no direct compulsion to do. In short, the alien character of forced labor is constituted in the fact that it is not part of the integral nature of the worker, i.e. it is external to the worker. In addition to the above features the external character of work, according to Marx, is evident in the fact that work belongs not to the worker but

to someone else. In that the worker himself, as long as he is at work, is not his own rather belongs or is owned by someone else, the capitalist.

As a result, Marx says that man is estranged to the extent that he feels himself to be alive and active only during consumption and procreation. These activities which are in fact truly human degenerate into animal functions. For they are separated from other human functions since what is of human is lost. Man finds himself in his animal functions and the distinction between the two has become insignificant. This de-generation, estrangement, is the overall result of the alienation of man in the activity of production. The cause is the alien and external character of work and the result the degeneration of man. The relationship of the worker to the activity of production, according to Marx, is

*“... the relationship of the worker to him self as alien being, activity as something alien, and not belonging to him, activity as suffering (passivity) physical and mental energy of the worker, his personal life (for what is life but activity?) or an activity which is directed against himself, independent of him and not belonging to him. This is self – alienation against the above mentioned alienation of the thing” (ibid, 77).*

In this passage is also vividly exposed Marx’s idea of alienation. The supreme end of man in life is or must be man. His development and realization of his potential through activity. Anything which assumes independence over and against him, will alter him drastically by changing everything positive and good into its opposite. What is natural and good; strength, activity, production and creativity, is altered into something unnatural and bad; suffering, passivity, emasculation and mortification. As a result of the independence and rulership of what is external and alien to man over him, man is estranged. This is expressed in his feelings of misery, self-denial and self loss which are at the same time the manifestations of alienation.

Form these two conditions of alienation, alienation in the product of labor and alienation in the activity of production, Marx infers a third kind of alienation. This is the alienation of man from his species being. It can be remembered that man is a species being. His is a self-conscious, free and universal being. The species character of man resides in his relation with nature the condition as well as result of which is free and creative production. To the extent that man makes, through active relatedness with nature, the expression of life and himself his supreme goal, he is a species being. The free construction of the objective world, as consequence of his active relatedness with

nature, is the objectification of his species being. So the goal of species life is activity itself, the expression and realization of human potential. However, alienated labor changes the active relatedness of man with nature in such a way that species life is separated from and reduced to a means of individual life. Man produces in alienated labor, not for the fulfillment and flourishing of himself and humanity, but to maintain his individual physical existence.

This separation of species-life from individual life and its reduction to a means, according to Marx, necessarily leads to the alienation of man from species being. The direct and necessary consequence of which is the alienation of man from nature and himself. The alienation of man from himself and nature is actualized in his relationship with other man. That means the alienation of man from species life, himself and nature entails his alienation from other man. For man, according to Marx, is related to himself through other man and vice versa. Marx claims that which is real for man in his relationship with labor and the product of labor is also real for his relationship with other men, their work and the products of their work. "A direct consequence of the alienation of man from the product of his labor, from his life activity and from his species life is that man is alienated from other man, when man confronts himself he also confronts other man" (Ibid, 77).

Marx argues that the fundamental and primary cause of the alienation of the worker is the fact that the production of labor as well as production itself belongs not to the worker but to the capitalist. The argument has two grounds. The first is that since the capitalist owns the product of labor and the production activity as private property, the worker, in production, is thus alienated from himself. Not only does the product and the production activity not belong to the worker. But the worker himself belongs to the capitalist. As a result, he is alienated from species life, nature, and other men. According to the second argument, since the alienation of man from himself, species life and nature is realized through his relationship with other man only then, that the alienation of the worker is actualized in his relationship with the capitalist. Marx says that the worker, through alienated labor, creates and actualizes a relationship of another man to labor. This other is the capitalist who does not work but possesses work and the product of work. Thus, Marx continues, contrary to the principles of political economy private property is the realization of alienated labor. "Only in the final stage of the development of private property is its secret revealed, namely, that it is on the one hand the product of alienated labor, and on the other hand the means by which labor is alienated, the realization of this alienation (Ibid, 79).

The argument is two faced and far from being clear. For private property is both the cause and the necessary result of alienated labor. Nonetheless, it seems that the process is a dialectical one whose accomplishment took several hundred centuries. Accordingly, capitalism would be the final stage in which private property is developed fully as the result of the complete alienation of labor. It seems that, primarily, external circumstances like the contraction of nature forced man to abandon free production and sell his labor. This is equal with the beginning of private property and division of labor. For to sell labor as a commodity there must be someone able to buy it. Thus when both developed fully through dialectical relation one entails the other i.e. alienated labor entails private property and private property becomes the cause as well as realization of alienated labor.

Let us go back to Marx's discussion of the relation between the worker and the capitalist according to which the worker through his relation with alienated labor created the relation of the capitalist to the object. The relation is reminiscent of the Hegelean dialectic of master and slave. Just like the master who is related to himself and to the world of objects through the slave, the capitalist is related to himself as well as to the object through the worker. Marx distinguishes three features of the relation between the worker and the capitalist. The first is that the capitalist acts against the worker in the same way as the worker acts against himself. However, the worker does not treat the capitalist as he treats himself nor the capitalist treat himself as he treats the capitalist. This is the very relation of the master and slave in which recognition is partial and one-sided. But the other two features of the worker/capitalist relation differ markedly from the master slave relation. The second feature identifies the practical mind set of the worker in relation to production and the result of production with the theoretical mind set of the capitalist. As a result, which is the third feature, the capitalist experiences everything the worker has experienced. "... everything which appears with the worker as an activity of externalization and an activity of alienation appears with the non-worker as a condition of externalization, a condition of alienation" (Marx, 1844:300). In short, according to Marx, both the worker and the capitalist are alienated as a result of alienated labor. In contrast, the master in Hegel has a different self-consciousness, a consciousness of freedom and of being for – itself, from that of the slave who does not even have a consciousness to distinguish itself from mere living objects. So one can conclude that where for Hegel the slave is a figure who is completely alienated from himself, and the master to some extent since his autonomous self depends on the recognition of the slave, for Marx both the worker and the capitalist are alienated from themselves, nature and other human beings.

### **2.3 Alienation, Objectification, and Reification**

Alienation for Marx is, thus, a result of alienated labor owing to which man is estranged from himself, other men, species life and nature.

*“Alienation (or “estrangement) means, for Marx, that man does not experience himself as the active agent in his grasp of the world, but that the world (nature, other men, he himself) remain alien to him. They stand above and against him as objects, even though they may be objects of his own creation. Alienation is essentially experiencing the world, and one self passively, receptively, as the subject separated from the object” (Fromm, 1961:44).*

For Marx alienation is not equal with objectification. As is evident from the prior discussion, Marx equated alienation with objectification only in a capitalist mode of production in which labor is alienated. It is clear that man who is activity externalizes himself necessarily. In this interaction with nature he tries to objectify himself through labor. Marx has said that the product of labor is labor concretized and actualized. This objectification is not necessarily alienation so far as two conditions are fulfilled. The first is that labor must not be alienated. The second one concerns the way in which man is related to nature. He must be related to nature in such away that the subject object distinction must be avoided. This is possible when man has humanized both his crude natural senses and the objects of nature. This in turn would be achieved when man drops his egoistic urges and relates himself to the object for the sake of the object itself in accordance with the essence of the particular organ in activity.

But this is not the case for Marx as long as the condition of man hitherto is concerned. The subject/object distinction is inherent in all relations of man with nature so far. So it is not avoided and its realization is regarded as the aim of communism. Let us focus on the first requirement according to which objectification would not entail alienation but only if labor is not alienated. In free labor man objectifies his species being. “It is just in his work upon the objective world that man really proves himself as a species-being. This production is his active species-life. By means of it nature appears as his work and his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s species life” (Marx, 1844:75). Thus, for Marx, objectification, which is necessary, is positive as long as labor is not alienated.

When it comes to the capitalist mode of production in which labor is alienated the significance of objectification takes the opposite direction. Through work and its product man loses himself as well as the object. The cause is the external and unnatural character of forced labor-labor as a

commodity. As a result, objectification would be the loss of the object and the appropriation of the object alienation. “The performance of work appears in the sphere of political economy as a vitiation of the worker, objectification as a loss and as servitude to the object, and appropriation as alienation” (Marx 1844:71). Appropriation appears as alienation because the more the worker exploits nature, it would cease to be the source for his physical existence as well as the exercise of his labor. As a result, he would accept wage labor which is the alienation of labor.

One can see that, therefore, objectification in forced labor necessarily leads to alienation – the estrangement of man from himself, his species being, nature and other human beings. As the alienation of man from labor is realized in his relation with other men, the devaluation and dehumanization of the human world continuously increases with the increment of the objectification of alienated labor. In the mean time, the power of objects grows so monstrously that it assumes objective character and rules over the human world absolutely. People have begun to see and shape their identity as well as personal relationships through and as the relation between things.

Rather than humanizing nature and their natural behavior, men, controlled by the now objective relation of things, thingify their relation. so that they appear to be no more than objects. This idea is what Marx calls reification or fetishism.

*“our own product is turned against us. It appeared to be our property, but actually we are its property. We ourselves are excluded from true property because our property excludes the other person. Our objects in their relation to one another constitutes the only intelligible language we use with one another. We would not understand a human language and it would remain without effect on the other hand, it would be felt and spoken as plea, as a begging, and as a humiliation and suffered with shame and with a feeling of supplication: on the other hand, it would be heard and rejected as effrontery or madness. We are so much mutually alienated from human nature that the direct language of this nature is an injury to human dignity for us, while the alienated language of objective values appears as a justified, self-confident, and self-accepted human dignity” (Ibid, 124).*

According to Fromm, not only the object but the social and political structures that are created by man become his rulers above and against him. So that man sinks into a fragment no better than a tool. “It is not only that the world of things become rulers of man, but also that the social and political circumstances which he creates becomes his masters ... The alienated man who believes that he has become the master of nature, has become the slave of things and of circumstances, the powerless appendage of a world-which is at the same time the frozen expressions of his own

powers” (Fromm, 1961:53). Therefore, in capitalist mode of production, objectification, which culminates in reification, is the necessary mark as well as a actualization of alienation.

## **2.4 The Final Dissolution of Alienation**

For Marx alienation would be overcome in a social mode of production which does not alienate labor. This social arrangement called communism concerns not only the economic aspect of life but also the overall development of man. It is not the actual realization rather the condition for the full realization of the potential of man. In communism man is affirmed with all freedom and autonomy. The advent of communism and its actualization is related to the negation of private property. By private property Marx does not mean, says Fromm, objects created for use. Rather the ownership of the means of production by certain group of people called capitalists who, as a result, can hire the worker under certain terms the latter is forced to accept. ““Private property” in Marx’s usage, then, always refers to private property within capitalist class society and thus is a social and historical category: the term does not refer to things for use, as for instance, in a socialist society” (Fromm, 1961:33).

According to Fromm, socialism is not a flight from reality nor an abstraction and loss of the objective world. Nor is it a return to a primitive state of nature. For Marx the aim of socialism is not the increment of wages nor the establishment of equality of income. An increment of income, Marx says, would be nothing else than a better wage for a slave. It would not restore the human dignity for the worker and work. The case is similar regarding the establishment of equality of labor. It would only transform the relation of the worker to production into a relation of every man to work in which society would be the capitalist. In short, socialism is not only the economic betterment of the worker. When socialism aspires to abolish private property it is not then to transfer property to the worker so that it can be improved economically. Rather the aim is to abolish alienated labor, the root cause of human alienation, so that man can develop, flourish and be what he really is.

Man is, says Fromm, the supreme end of socialism. “It is to create a form of production and organization of society in which man over comes alienation from his work, from his fellow man, from himself and from nature in which he can return to himself and grasps the world with his own powers, thus become one with the world. Socialism for Marx was, as Paul Tillich put it, “a

resistance movement against the destruction of love in social reality. It is nothing less than creating the condition for the truly free, rational, active and independent man: it is the fulfillment of the prophetic aim, the destruction of the idols.”(Fromm,1961:58)

The question is, then, how is that alienated labor, with the abolishment of private property, overcome in communism? According to Marx, communism, as the condition for the genuine development of man, overcomes private property in two phases; crude communism and positive communism. The first represents the dialectical development and negation of private property while the second is the positive expression of the overcoming of private property.

Crude communism aims to negate private property abstractly. It does not avoid the distinction between capital and labor nor destroy the roles of worker and capitalist. It extends the role of the worker to all men and changes society into a universal capitalist. The two parts of the relation, labor and capital, are developed to a supposed universality that all men find themselves in a condition of labor and capital is accepted as the universal power of the community. The society has become a community of work and of equality of wages. Hence crude communism negates the personality of the individual in the same way as private property did. It does not allow the free development of individuality. Thus, crude communism is the logical expression of private property, of the relation of the worker to his labor under private property in a system which claims to be communism but in actuality is a disguised and crude communism to the extent that it does not overcome private property genuinely and extends the role of the worker to all men.

According to Marx, crude communism expresses itself in two forms. The first is a form of universal envy which attempts to reduce and level down everything into a common level. General or universal property, which is now the aim of crude communism, is opposed to individual private property. The aim is the negation and reduction of any individual private property which exceeds the common level set by crude communism. The second is that the power of private property grows out of control in such a way that it tends to destroy everything incapable of being possessed as private property. Talent and sentiment can be mentioned. Marx argues that the evidence for how insignificant the appropriation of crude communism lies in its destruction of the world of culture and civilization.

More than anything else the destructive effect of crude communism is shown, claims Marx, in its attempt to own collectively what is exclusively private: marriage. Crude communism opposes marriage with a community of women according to which women become communal and common property. For Marx this aim of possessing woman collectively is an evidence for its crude and unreflective character. It is the expression of the infinite degradation of man, laments Marx. If man interchanges his personal and individual relation with a single woman by that in which he is related to a community of women, it is the indication of the complete alienation of man from his species being. For, according to Marx, the relation of man with a woman is the most immediate, necessary, and natural relation a man can have with other human being. It is the reflection of the degree to which nature has become human nature to man and vice versa. Since the relation of man to woman is the integral part of his nature, man's natural species relationship is demonstrated in it. The extent to which man has become man, has become a genuine species being is revealed in marriage. Thus, to the extent that crude communism attempts to negate marriage, it is the representation of the perversion of humanity.

*“The relation of man to woman is the most natural relation of human being to human being. It indicates, therefore, how far man's natural behavior has become human, and how far his human essence has become a natural essence for him, how far his human nature has become nature for him. It also shows how far man's needs have become human needs, and consequently how far the other person, as a person, has become one of his needs, and to what extent he is in his individual existence at the same time a social being. The first positive announcement of private property, crude communism, is therefore, only a phenomenal form of the infamy of private property representing itself as positive community” (Ibid, 88-89).*

Marx says that what would follow crude communism, as its more developed form of expression, even if it is conscious of being the overcoming of alienation and the return of man to himself, and also is able to abolish the state, is influenced, controlled and debased by private property. As long as the developed form of crude communism has not understood the positive nature of private property, especially in relation to marriage and the human nature of needs, it would not be able to reconstitute man properly. Marx argues that it has grasped the concept but not the essence of private property. That means, for the genuine actualization of communism, the proper understanding of the positive nature of private property is essential. In addition, the overcoming of private property must entail and be accompanied by the humanization of both nature the natural

behavior of man. Marx says of communism as the over coming of alienation and all the conflicts of life as a result of alienated labor, and as a condition for the full and real actualization of human potential in the necessary progress of history as follows:

*“Communism is the positive abolition of private property, of human self-alienation, and thus the real appropriation of human nature through and for man. It is, therefore, the re turn of man to himself as a social, i.e. really human, being, a complete and conscious return which assimilates all the wealth of previous development, communism as a fully developed naturalism is humanism and as a fully developed humanism is naturalism. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution” (Marx, 1844:89).*

If communism is the overcoming of alienation and the return of man to himself through the positive abolition of private property, then, in this abolition lies the solution for all opposition. But, how? How is the opposition between essence and existence, freedom and necessity, objectification and self-affirmation, man and nature, individual and species, man be reconciled? How does the positive abolition of private property entail the reconciliation? And, what does Marx mean by a positive abolition of private property?

For Marx the development towards communism is a natural and necessary process. The necessity is, according to him, contained in the nature of private property itself. Just like alienated labor caused private property, private property would entail communism. For Marx all the development of the objective world is constituted in and can be explained from the view point of the development of the economic system. All the segments of the objective world like religion, the family, the state, law, morality, science, art ... etc, which expresses the alienation of man and in which man is alienated, are particular manifestations of production and fall under its general law. Thus, when private property is abolished, man would overcome alienation and return to himself from all these forms of both production and alienation. “Religion, the family, the state, law, morality, science, art, etc are only particular forms of production and come under its general law. The positive super session of private property as the appropriation of human life is therefore the positive suppression of all alienation and the return of man from religion, the family, the state, etc to his human i.e. social life” (Ibid, 90). The key to the over coming of alienation as well as the return of man to himself, thus, is social life.

For Marx activity, mind, free labor, the human significance of nature and the significance of man for himself as well as others ... all gain their essence as well as their human worth in being social. Society, according to Marx, must not be understood in opposition to individual life. Individual life itself is the expression of social life. There is no difference, let alone opposition, between individual life and species life. As a result, he identifies, through society, man and nature as one. "Thus society is the accomplished union of man with nature, the veritable resurrection of nature, the realized naturalism of man and the realized humanism of nature" (Ibid, 91). This seems an idealist and abstract claim for Marx who criticized the whole tradition of Western philosophy as idealist and abstract. He further claims that in individual life species life is affirmed and species life ascertains itself in species consciousness and exists as a thinking being universally. Though man is a particular individual he is also the whole who as subjectivity, experience and thought, is the expression of society. This seems a reference to Hegel for whom the life of the individual is the realization and expression of spirit. Nonetheless, it seems that Marx is arguing that alienation can be overcome only if the individual is able to identify himself with society to the extent that subjectivity, both theoretically and practically, is the expression of social life. His claim is different from Hegel only because he invoked no supra natural entity and added the practical dimension of life along side the theoretical. With that exception in mind, Marx's claim is as bold and idealistic as that of Hegel. In certain respects he even surpasses the idealist and abstract claim of Hegel. For Hegel has pointed out that opposition between the individual and life, the element of otherness, is the fundamental background at which the individual conceives himself, develops by separating and opposing himself with life.

It is possible to see how species life is affirmed in individual life. Because, when the individual does not reduce his species being into a means for the maintenance of his individual physical existence and exercises his labor freely, then, he is thereby on the way to realize species life. But to say that this would amount to a whole sale identification of individual life and social life in such a way that subjectivity is both the realization and expression of social life seems a bit difficult to comprehend. Where of subjectivity, individuality, would come unless the individual is able to conceive himself, as a particular individual, in separation and opposition to life and other human beings? One of the reasons for the difficulty of comprehending Marx's position could be the always in tact compulsion of the individual, for instance in the form of scarcity, under necessity

which forces him to pursue his particular interest. Necessity may also defy the complete merge, the social union, by setting apart the individual from social life through the inscription of the laws of dynamism which breeds difference. To interpret the situation in a way which favors the position of Marx there must be at least a very sophisticated civilization which would compensate for the categories of difference and scarcity. In fact Marx has underlined the role of necessity in the march towards communism. The following passage quoted from 'Capital' by Erich Fromm confirms this. "Beyond it [the realm of necessity] begins that development of human power, which is its own end, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can flourish only upon that realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working day is its fundamental premises" (Marx, capital III; 945-6 quoted in Fromm, 1961:76). Nonetheless, Marx has boldly claimed that the way towards the realization of freedom in communism solely depends on the identification of individual life with social life which is attainable through the socialization of labor.

Marx says that just like private property is the sensuous expression of the alienation of man, his becoming of alien and objective entity for himself devoid of all human sense, and sinks into the level of objects, the positive abolition of private property would entail the sensuous appropriation of the essence of man. The appropriation would restore man in his objectivity as well as subjectivity when he pursues the object in accordance with his essence i.e. actively not in immediate and exclusive consumption or in the form of possession, having. The human senses which are alienated for the reason that they seek the object in order to have it, would be "delineated" and will be restored to their essence when they are, along with the positive abolition of private property, related to the object in the right manner. This rightful manner of relating oneself to the object is akin with the seeking of the object for its own sake, dropping immediate and exclusive enjoyment in which egoistic drives are inherent, and in affirming our humanity in relation to the object. As a result, the senses as well as the object are transformed in to the senses and objects of a human being. Transformed in such a way that not only the individual affirms the humanity of himself and others in relation to the object, but the object also does the same. The direct consequence of this, according to Marx, is the emergence of social organs in which the object as well as man is transformed in to a social object, and society becomes a being for man through the object. Hence, rather than being lost in the object, the appropriation of the individual

would become the appropriation and objectification of the whole humanity. Because he would affirm humanity as a whole in his appropriation.

Marx writes of the transformation as follows:

*“The supersession of private property is therefore, the complete emancipation of all the human qualities and senses. It is this emancipation because these senses and qualities have become human, from the objective as well as the subjective points of view. The eye has become human eye when its object has become a human, social object, created by man and destined for him. The senses have, therefore, become directly theoretical in practice. They relate themselves to the thing for the sake of the thing, but the thing itself is an objective human relation to itself and to man, and vice versa. (In practice I can only relate myself in a human way to a thing when the thing is related in a human way to man). Need and enjoyment have lost their egoistic character, and nature has lost its mere utility by the fact that its utilization has become human utilization ... It is only when the object becomes a human object, or objective humanity, that man does not become lost in it. This is only possible when the object becomes a social object, and also when he himself becomes a social being and society becomes a being for him in this object” (Marx, 1884:93).*

The relation has two sides: objective and subjective. Man as a subject can develop his faculties and senses true human faculties and senses, when the objective reality becomes a human reality. On the subjective side the senses and faculties must develop freely as a subjective human faculty capable of human joy and affirm themselves as human faculties. But this is possible when the objective world is in turn transformed into a human world. The external reality must be transformed in such way that it affirms and actualizes the reality of human faculties and senses. As a result, through the object man finds himself and becomes his own object. “... it is only when objective reality everywhere becomes for man in society the reality of human faculties, human reality, and thus the reality of his own faculties, that all objects become for him the objectification of himself. The objects then realize and confirm his individuality, they are his own objects i.e. man himself become the object” (Ibid, 94). According to Marx, the accomplishment of this second task has been undergone throughout the previous ages. Especially natural science, though in alienated form, has contributed a great deal. What basically remains is the transformation of natural science into a human science which, by transforming the natural world into a human one and making man its primary object, would realize the union of man with nature and himself. For this to be possible, Marx says, sense perception must be the method of science. As a result, man would become “the direct object of natural science, because directly perceptible is for man directly human sense experience as the other person who is directly presented to him in a sensuous way” (Ibid, 97).

Then, what remains for communism to achieve under this background is the humanization of the senses. Especially the humanization of needs. For capitalism has created and always creates artificial needs for the satisfaction of which man suffers. Fromm points out that only on the basis of a specific view of human nature that Marx made the distinction between true human needs and artificial needs. Though the distinction may appear purely subjective, for Marx “man’s true needs are those whose fulfillment is necessary for the realization of his essence as a human being” (Fromm, 1961:63). Generally speaking when socialism is able to discern and eliminate those artificial needs unnecessary for the full realization of man, then, one can say human behavior as well as needs are humanized. “The principal goal of socialism, for Marx, is the recognition and realization of man’s true needs, which will be possible only when production serves man and capital ceases to create and exploit the false needs of man.” (Fromm,1961:63).

For communism to be real and the realization of man genuine, two additional things, according to Marx, are necessary. These are that the independence of man must be positively affirmed and that it must be evident that the contradiction of life created as a result of private property can be solved only practically. According to the first, man rather than posting an alien being, like God, for the creation and continuity of his life, he must see that nature and man is its source as well as responsible for its continuation. This must be affirmed, Marx says, not negatively in the form of atheism which negates the claim of religion. Rather positively by acknowledging that nature and man are their own source and continue to evolve on their own account.

According to the second principle, real practical action is only able to actualize the aims of communism and resolve the contradictions of capitalism. Marx writes

*“It is only in a social context that subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity, cease to be antinomies and thus ceases to exist as such antinomies. The resolution of the theoretical contradiction is possible only through practical means, only through the practical energy of man. Their resolution is not by any means, therefore, only a problem of knowledge, but is a real problem of life which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it saw there a purely theoretical problem” (Marx, 1844:95).*

For the full realization of communism as Marx conceives it, social harmony, argues John Palmentaz, is necessary. Palmentaz stresses that only by and through a society which is harmoniously united that communism would achieve its ideal and live up to its promise. The idea

of social harmony is held by Palmentaz especially to compensate what is lacking in Marx in relation to the practical and detailed means for the actualization of the ideals of communism. Palmentaz identifies social harmony with a strong tie between people to the extent that they share common standards of life that would secure their over all development and prohibit the rise of conflict. If it arises, they would be able to solve it without much loss. Social harmony, according to Palmentaz, might be defined “as a condition in which people are so strongly attached to shared standards that conflicts seldom arise among them, and when they do can be settled by procedures they all accept as just” (Palmentaz, 1975:427). A shared standard of justice, loyalty, trust, affection, equality, freedom, in short, love is the essential virtue for such a society to be possible. As a result of social harmony the society would be one in which adverse competition and conflicts of all sorts are avoided. Above all organized violence as a mechanism to solve problems must not be speculated even, Palmentaz points out. All sources which would lead to the rise of conflicts must be dried. If problems, conflicts and crimes arise, they must be solved by moderate means. For Palmentaz the key for creating such an harmonious society lies in the betterment of social conditions. Since social conditions are held responsible for all kinds of ills in society, changing and transforming social conditions is considered to be the true solution for all social problems. Once society is able to attain a certain level of harmony, then, the achieved harmony itself would function as a source for more integration and flourishing. So that through social harmony a society “whose members do not resort to force to impose their wills on one another, who share the same ideas of justice, settling disputes amicably, and living trust-fully and affectionately together, as free men and equals” (Ibid, 397), can be achieved.

Thus, through positive suppression of private property, which is practical, man appropriates his object in a human fashion in which the humanity of the entire race is affirmed. Alienation is overcome and the object/subject distinction transcended in a much profound unity of the subject and the object in which man is his own object and the object is the realization, the objectification, of his essence. Man is affirmed in all his potential, and autonomy. Communism is actualized as a condition for the realization of man with all his freedom. Therefore, it seems that Marx is able, arguing for a practical social union of man and nature, to resolve all the conflicts between man and man, man and nature, individual life and species life, freedom and necessity, essence and existence, objectification and self-confirmation. The key is the union of the subject and the object in which man is able to objectify himself at the same time affirming himself. Thus, according to Marx,

through free labor in communism, man is able to overcome alienation once and for all and ascend to the realm of freedom.

Erich Fromm concludes of what communism would realize as follows:

*“For Marx, socialism meant the social order which permits the return of man to himself, the identity between existence and essences, the overcoming of the separateness and antagonism between subject and object, the humanization of nature, it meant a world in which man is no longer a stranger among strangers, but is in his world, where he is at home (Fromm, 1961:69).*

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **The Idea of Alienation in Sartre**

Jean Paul Sartre works out his theory of alienation in the book 'Critique of Dialectical Reason' the main aim of which is uncovering the meaning, intelligibility and truth of history. For Sartre history is a dialectical movement that totalizes the totalizing praxis of individuals. Hence individual praxis is the origin and reality of the totalizing development of history. This totalization which is effected through individuals praxis entails alienation as a result of the realization of the praxis of the individual.

We find two types of alienation in Sartre which are related to objectification, scarcity and exploitation. According to the first, the individual must necessarily interact with the material environment. This relation is conditioned by the negativity of matter and causes the domination and negation of praxis by worked matter. Thus, objectification leads to the loss of the being of the individual and his estrangement. According to Sartre this is a primitive kind of alienation caused by the counter finality of worked matter negating the project of individuals. The second kind of alienation is the negation of man by man through the destruction of the reciprocal bounds of interiority. As an extension of the negativity of worked matter antagonism and separation connects individuals negatively. So that rather than recognizing the project of the other each tends to denial and negation of the end of the other. As a result man is alienated from himself and other men through scarcity and exploitation.

Sartre expounds these two forms of alienation through the analysis of the necessary movement of individual praxis. Praxis which originated from need becomes, as multiplicity of praxis and through its relation with the material environment, the totalizing movement of history. According to Sartre this totalizing movement of history is a dialectical progress which can be comprehended by dialectical reason or historical materialism only. Thus, in order to understand Sartre's idea of alienation it is necessary to begin with the discussion of historical materialism. Then we will proceed to his analysis of the nature of need and praxis at individual level. Finally we will see his idea of alienation as the inherent aspect of the movement of praxis and its relation with worked matter. All the discussion relies on the 'Critique of Dialectical Reason' which is the major work of Sartre according to commentators like Pietro Chiodi.

### **3.1. Historical Materialism**

Sartre opens the introductory part of 'Critique of Dialectical Reason' by claiming that historical materialism has an absolute validity both as a movement of being and as a theory of knowledge. Sartre differentiates the dialectic of historical materialism from the concept of rationality found in science. For the scientific pursuit rationality is constituted in its method of investigation which is subordinated to the concrete data uncovered, it also identifies reason with the mind as an empty unifier and takes reason to be independent of any particular system. In contrast, the dialectician situates himself within a definite system and defines a reason. The dialectic of historical materialism, say Sartre, locates rationality at the heart of the object itself. It is both a movement of the object and a method to comprehend this movement. "For the dialectician, it is grounded on a fundamental claim both about the structure of the real and about that of our praxis. We assert simultaneously that the process of knowledge is dialectical, that the movement of the object (whatever it may be) it is itself dialectical, and this two dialectics are one and the same" (Sartre, 1960:20)

At this point Sartre is troubled by the connection between being, action and knowledge. He points out that for Hegel the identity of being, action and knowledge ascertains the "apodicity" of dialectical knowledge. For Marx, on the contrary, being is irreducible to knowledge and action is more effective than knowledge. The problem, however, is, Sartre argues, that how can one and the same movement govern these multiple processes? If it is granted that thought is both being and knowledge of being, would not this entail a necessary contradiction between the knowledge of being and the being of knowledge? Sartre says that even if dialectical reason is capable of demonstrating that thought, as being, is contained in the single movement that animates the whole of history, this would not there by resolve the contradiction. The problem is to establish the identity of being and knowledge with out relapsing in to either idealism or empirical contingency.

One of the theoretical stances propounded in response to the problem is what Sartre calls external dialectical materialism. It consists in the elimination of knowledge and positing of being as it is without any medium or perspective. The object of thought, for dialectical materialism, is nature as it is without man. Since knowledge is the relation of man with nature, argues Sartre, the elimination of man in relation to being eliminates knowledge also. In Dialectical Materialism the nature of man is assessed from out side through natural laws which are believed to be contained in

nature as extra human entity. The movement begins from dead matter and through natural history culminates by viewing man and social history as its extension. Sartre claims that since social history is derived from natural history which is thought to be governed by pure, universal and dialectical laws, man and society are reduced to dead objects. "... thus, a position out side man, and on the side of things is adopted so that the idea can be seen as thing signified by things rather than as a signifying act" (Ibid, 27-28). Man is reduced to a mere bundle of particular reactions due to physio-chemical processes. And the notion of truth is relegated to that of expediency as if it is a result of a designed test or trial. So that Sartre says "The advantage of this conception is that it avoids the problem; it presents the dialectic, a priori and without justification, as the fundamental law of nature" (Ibid;27).

Sartre argues that external dialectical materialism is idealism disguised as materialism. External dialectical materialism is self-contradictory since it is a doubling of personality. Sartre's argument is that if man is reduced to a mere bundle of delayed reactions, determined by natural laws, how can he be said to know either himself or nature? Sartre also argues that the laws of dialectical materialism are constructed from particular laws and applied to universal phenomena. However, according to him, no one is able to decide against or in favor of dialectical materialism. It must be left to the concern of metaphysical speculation. For Sartre dialectical reason is possible only as a human praxis for men in a particular society at a certain level of its development. Sartre says that the social world determines the possibility as well as reality of dialectical reason. "In short if there is to be any such thing [historical materialism] to produce it and to have it imposed on one, to live it and to know it, consequently, this materialism, if it exists, can be true only within the limits of our social world." (Ibid,35). Sartre concludes that though the conditions which make the dialectic possible are contradictory, it is owing to their contradictory movement that the dialectic movement is made possible.

In order to justify dialectical reason Sartre proposes five governing principles. The first argues that dialectical reason is valid a priori necessarily. The a prior validity is not a constitutive reason which determines experience in advance. Rather, it is the a priori universality and necessity of dialectical reason in every experience. There by, however, making it for the dialectic to transcend any particular experience. Since experience can not ground necessity for the reason that it is a mere fact, Sartre locates the necessity of dialectical reason in the general movement of history.

According to the second principle, Sartre claims that the duality between being and knowledge must be rejected. It is true that being can not be reduced to knowledge. Since dialectical knowledge, as a whole, grounds itself in itself dialectically, then, it also grounds the unity of being and knowledge. "Being is the negation of knowledge, and knowledge draws its being from the negation of being" (Ibid,35). Through the negation of the other one makes its own existence possible.

The other principle ascertains dialectical reason as the only truth of history. The determinism of Dialectical Materialism as well as analytical reason must be rejected. For the world would be an illusion and man a mere object other objects. Sartre contends that it is only in virtue of dialectical reason that the unity of necessity and freedom is possible. Man creates the dialectic to the extent that the dialectic created man. This is a contradiction but a contradiction that must be, points out Sartre, lived dialectically. In addition, Sartre claims that there is no such a thing as men or the nature of man. What exists is people or individuals who individually totalize and in turn are totalized by the particular society they belong to. That means the dialectic which as totalizing movement springs from the actions of individuals in turn defines them as a historical and social totality and totalizing movement.

The fourth principle of historical materialism locates the reality of thought in material objects and of material objects in thought. The reason is grounded in the fact that thought itself is a material being so long as the dialectic is a materialist dialectic. As a result, it necessarily refers to action. Sartre says that thought in fact is only a moment of action. Thus, praxis is the reality of the dialectical movement. The praxis of each is related to the world of things through the praxis of the other and to the other through things. The out come dignifies man while humanizing objects. The dialectic is, according to Sartre, nothing else than this relation of praxis with objects and the praxis of the other. The dialectic also makes praxis capable of transcending the object which is given through the praxis of the other by making the latter appear as an object.

The last principles of the dialectic confirms the resultant nature of the dialectic as conditioned by past movements. According to Sartre, the dialectic is neither a blind force nor a metaphysical fate. Even before it can be a totalizing force the dialectic is a result of certain basic conditions in a specific society owing to the relation of the totalizing praxis of individual. What it issued from

these relations of totalizing praxis determines the content, the sequence of negations, the moments of struggle, the nature of conflicts,...It is also governed by the structures of materiality, past conditions, the perpetual interaction of internal and external factors, and the interplay between different forces. Sartre summarizes the point as follows.

*“... It is first and foremost a resultant; it is not the dialectic which forces historical men to live their history in terrible contradictions; it is men, as they are, dominated by scarcity and necessity, and confronting one another in circumstances which history or economy can inventory, but which only dialectical reason can explain. Before it can be a motive force, contradiction is a result... The dialectic, if it exists, can only be the totalization of concrete totalizations effected by a multiplicity of totalizing individuals.” (Ibid,37)*

The existence and intelligibility of dialectical reason is mainly attributed by Sartre to the notion of totalization. Dialectical reason, says he, as a law of both being and thought can be said to exist and is intelligible only if there is a developing totalization that can be grasped immediately by a thought which perpetually totalizes itself in its grasp of the totalization from which it emerged and rendered itself the object of the totalization. The notion of totalisation, thus, guarantees the existence and intelligibility of the laws, movement, content, etc.. of dialectical reason. As a result, Sartre thinks that it is necessary to ask what he calls the fundamental question. “Is there a region of being where totalisation is the very form of existence?” (Ibid;45)

Sartre makes a differentiation between the notion of totality and totalization. Totality is a passive residual of a past action while totalisation is a developing activity. A totality, according to Sartre, is a being, a natural or created object, which, though strikingly independent of its parts, is related to itself either directly through its relation to the parts or indirectly through its relation with the relation the parts has with one another. “A totality is defined as a being which, while radically distinct from the sum of its parts present in its entirety, in one form or another, in each of these parts, and which related to itself either through its relation to one or more of its parts or through its relation to the relations between all or some of them” (Ibid,45)

Ontologically, a totality has a status of the inert or the in-itself. Sartre takes an object created for non-utility purpose, a photograph for example. This object as an inert or in-itself is a totality by virtue of a past action which enables it to be constituted as a totality. But since the action has died in the object, the totality together with its synthetic unity is only an in-itself, an inert-a residual of a

past action. And as a result of its being in exteriority, its existence in the outside, the synthetic unity of the inert as passive totality decomposes. Hence, the passive totality faces the lot of infinite disintegration.

When it comes to objects created for utility purpose, objects like tools, machines, consumer goods, Sartre says that the present action which attempts to utilize them makes them appear like totalities by reviving the praxis which, in their creation, totalized them by working out their inertia. Sartre calls the relation these objects have with men practico-inert as a result of which they attain a practico-inert status. By this he means the control the objects enforce on men through the contradiction of the inertia of the objects and the praxis of men. Let us take a bath room to concretize Sartre's notion of totality. A bath room with shower, a toilet seat and a sink for washing. The bath room is a residual of past action. But as an object for use its synthetic totality is kept alive by human activity which continually keeps it from disintegrating by the act of utilization. As a totality it is related to itself through its relation with the shower or the washing dish or through the relation these two have with one another. In addition it acquires its meaning through the constant usage of men, but it is not equal with any of these elements in separation.

Sartre says that without an activity everything would fall back to the inertia. It is owing to an activity that a developing unification, which gives a synthetic unity to the inert and transform it to the practico-inert, is issued. Totalization just like totality keeps synthetic labor, which conditions the relation of the whole to its parts and to itself, alive. Nonetheless, different from totality totalization is a developing activity which continues unifying as long as the praxis of men is exercised. Totalization is an act on the practical field in order to **synthesize** the complex multiplicity. It is praxis attempting a formal unity, an organization of the diverse elements of the practical field. Thus, the field i.e the material environment is the undifferentiated correlative of praxis and its milieu. While praxis is the principle of the movement of totalization as a developing unification aiming at the synthetic unity of the diverse ensembles of the field.

The movement of totalization, according to Sartre, has two moments; that which unifies and that which differentiates. The first unifies the differentiated elements of the field while the second differentiates the undifferentiated elements and oppose them to one another so that they can be unified. This double movement of totalization, according to Sartre, is dialectical reason itself-its

existence and movement. It is only within the context of totalization that all the laws of dialectical reason acquire validity as well as intelligibility. Take, for example, the negation of the negation. It can be an affirmation only within the system of totalization. A determination in the practical field is a negation since praxis separates certain elements from the formerly established unity. It then opposes that separated element to the rest and develops a synthesis through the opposition. While the first determination is a negation, the final conflict in the process of differentiating unification is the negation of the negation. Sartre summarizes the movement of totalization as a unification through differentiation in the following manner.

*“Within the practical field, the correlative of praxis, every determination is a negation, for praxis, in differentiating certain ensembles, excludes them from the group formed by all the others; and the developing unification appears simultaneously in the most differentiated products (indicating the direction of the movement), in those which are less differentiated (indicating continuities, resistances, traditions, a tighter but more superficial unity), and in the conflict between the two (which expresses the present state of the developing totalisation). The new negation, which, in determining the less differentiated ensembles, will raise them to the levels of others, is bound to eliminate the negation which set the ensembles in antagonism to each other. Thus, it is only within a developing unification (which has already defined the limits of its field) that a determination can be said a negation and the negation of the negation is necessarily an affirmation” (46-47)*

Sartre claims that ontologically viewed, dialectical reason is the movement of totalization itself while epistemologically it is the apprehension of the movement to a knowledge which is itself totalizing in its attempt of comprehension. But this does not mean that the movement of totalizing knowledge is, as a comprehension of ontological totalization, a new totalization. Rather dialectical reason is a totalizing process contained in a totalizing process. Or the words of Sartre “totalization must include within itself its own reflexive retotalization as an essential structure and as a totalizing process within the process as a whole” (Ibid,47)

For Sartre the backbone and spring board of the critical investigation, which is a task of the philosopher, is the fundamental identity between the life of the individual and human history. This ontological identity grounds the complex relation between freedom and necessity as the essential moment and ultimate reality of the dialectical movement. The unifying synthetic movement of the dialectic connects freedom and necessity permanently. They oppose one another perpetually. Necessity is issued by the movement of the free totalizing praxis of the individual when it becomes the movement of history. Nonetheless, Sartre says that necessity exists neither in the freely

developing interiority nor in the passive diversified field of exteriority. Rather it is alive there in the movement from one to the other. The individual exteriorizes his interiority through labor which, as objectification, unties and puts a mark on the inert. On the other hand, he also, through his interaction with the field, interiorize exteriority. Interiority is the subjectivity of the individual which expresses itself in self-conscious and free praxis. However, it is a priori determined, to a greater or lesser extent, by exteriority. Exteriority is that which constitute or is constituted by nature, created objects, the agent and others as material begins. This also includes different ensembles like groups and the dialectical process and its system. In short, exteriority is what Sartre calls objectivity. Thus, in the interaction between the two; in interiorizing exteriority and exteriorizing interiority, resides necessity. This is a certain level of the dialectical process referred to by Sartre as the practico-inert.

In this dialectical movement, according to Sartre, the power of exteriority is immense. It is the motive force of the dialectical movement by conditioning man both from within and without. In the first case, it conditions the praxis of man through need. For man is, as Sartre says, a material being with material needs. And from without it conditions him by forcing him, as a result of his relation with the inert, to interiorize exteriority and re-interiorize the exteriority of worked matter. From this results what Sartre calls practical multiplicity which is the relation of matter to itself through human praxis which changes inert matter into worked matter. Practical multiplicity as the out come of the unifying inertia of praxis issues necessity which in turn severely determines the being of man and his relation with other men. The following quotation summarizes the dialectical movement which began by the relation of praxis to the inert (the relation between exteriorized interiority and interiorized exteriority), and through worked matter as practical multiplicity (re-interiorized exteriority) ends up by severely determining the relations of men.

*“Thus we shall never find men, who are not mediated by matter at the same time as they mediate different material regions. A practical multiplicity is a certain relation of matter to itself through the mediation of the praxis which transforms the inert into worked matter, just as the collection of objects which surrounds us imposes its mediation on the practical multiplicity that totalizes us. Thus, the history of man is an adventure of nature, not only because man is a material organism with material needs, but also because worked matter, as an exteriorization of interiority, produces man, who produces or uses this worked matter in so far as he is forced to re-interiorize the exteriority of his product in the totalizing movement of the multiplicity which totalizes it. The external unification of the inert, whether by seal or by law, and the introduction of inertia at the heart of praxis both result in necessity as a strict determination at the heart of human relations” (Ibid,71-72).*

A newly constructed village composed of 2 dozens of condominium resident buildings can be considered as an example of practical multiplicity. The buildings sequenced in a row are related through the sharing of different resources like water, and electricity generator, pavement and parking area. They determine the way the residents live. The structure of the buildings determines the life of the people by prescribing acts which can be undertaken in the house and outside it. The coloring, the thickness of the walls, the direction they have in relation to light, the open space between two buildings all affect the way people live. Among other things they condition the mood, the sense of closeness or separatedness, of the residents

The outcome of this vast and vicissitude dialectical movement of totalization, history, imprints man, who as a particular moment of the dialectic totalizes, and is totalized, with a contradiction with himself. Man is opposed to himself as a product and a producer. Necessity defines him as a product of worked matter according to which he retains the status of the inert through objectification. Sartre says that whenever this individual looks back on his life he finds himself as a robot reified through the inert. On the other hand, praxis makes him capable of transcending his reified, objectified self. This dictate of necessity, according to Sartre, produces “within every one and within every multiplicity the continually resolved and the constantly renewed contradiction between man-as-producer and man-as-product.” (Ibid,72). This is nothing else than the structure of alienation. Through practical multiplicity and owing to the dictates of necessity, man is defined by matter, opposed to himself and becomes other to himself.

According to Sartre, this unraveling will show alienation to be the a priori condition of human praxis. The activity of the individual is alienated and his human relations are reified only because alienation exists as a priori as a structure that conditions the practical relations of the individual to the object of his praxis and to other individuals. “It is in the concrete and synthetic relation of the agent to the other through the mediation of the thing and to the thing through the mediation of the other, that we will be able to discover the foundation of all possible alienation” (Ibid,66). Furthermore, the uncovering of the structural condition of alienation would lead to the discovery of the practico-inert as a domain in which is established an equivalence between what Sartre calls alienated praxis and worked upon inertia. Thus, by following the movement of the dialectic as it reveals the connection between the organic and the inorganic, man and matter, praxis and worked matter, we shall see Sartre’s idea of alienation.

### **3.2. The Reality of Individual Praxis**

Individual praxis is the fundamental basis of history as a movement of totalization. It is only as a consequence of individual praxis as totalization that history is a movement of totalization. For individual praxis which is dialectical and totalizes through itself is a movement of action that transcends contradictions through negation. It is also a real medium through which matter is transformed. Sartre attributes the reality of action to need. According to him, need is the first appearance of totality, totalization and the negation of the negation in the relation between man and the material ensemble. In this relation which is a “Univocal bond of interiority” need manifests itself as lack on the side of the organism. This lack is the first appearance of negativity as a result of which the organism is set in contradiction with the inorganic environment.

The organism tries to resolve this negativity by transcending the organic towards the inorganic. So that the negation of the negation appears for the first time. This movement of the organism is also a movement of totalization for the reason that the organism transforms the material ensemble into a field of possible appropriation. The organism as a dialectical being interacts with the environment dialectically i.e. totalizes it through unification and differentiation, and through the negation of negation which is the self affirmation of the organism.

Sartre says that when need appears the inorganic ensemble is transformed into a totality with a passive unity. As an organism whose being is at stake it must interact with the environment so that it secures existence. This interaction which is necessary transfers totalization and contradiction from the organism to the inorganic environment. So that the inorganic is transformed into a totality with passive unity. Nevertheless, the organism is affected back to the extent that it transforms the inorganic. The organism which is a being with bonds of interiority must externalize itself. This is equal with saying that it falls under the control of the laws of matter. Sartre says that the organism can in fact assimilate itself to matter and appropriate what it needs when it has changed itself into inorganic materiality, into the inert. “The man of need is an organic totality perpetually making itself into its own tool in the milieu of exteriority. The organic totality acts on inert bodies through the medium of inert body which it is and which it makes itself. It is inert in as much as it is already subjected to all the physical forces which reveal it to itself as pure passivity, it makes itself inert in its being in so far as it is already externally and through inertia itself that a body can act on another body in the milieu of exteriority” (Ibid,82)

Thus, the organism by exteriorizing (externalizing) itself, i.e, by making itself a tool, an inert, through the medium of which it interacts with the external, is able to attain inertia. A man digging can be an example of how man changes it self in order to work on matter. The man who is digging can do so by imitating the movement of the tools. It digs, he digs: it bends he bends... Inertia is a kind of force and principle of movement owing to which it organizes itself, and unifies the field and appropriates what it needs. This leads to, according to Sartre, the origination of instrumentality, purpose and labor. The organism has become its own means, instrument, in order to secure itself of its own end, while the movement is made possible by the process or organization through inertia, labor. Thus, contrary to the prior transference which is from the interior to the exterior, the organism transcends exteriority towards interiority. The organism is now able to control and overcome the inertia of things through its own developed inertia. This is equal with the preservation of its existence and the emergence of praxis. In this latter transcendence the organism projects itself into the future. The future is identified with its end. As a result, what Sartre calls dialectical time came into being. Dialectical time is a principle of living unity through which the organism synthesizes the past and the future through the present and identifies the future with its end. That means, the organism, being certain of its existence at the present time also becomes certain that the future is equal with its secured existence.

According to Sartre, this dialectical identification of the future with the existence of the organism as certain is disturbed by the fact of scarcity. Scarcity breaks the cyclical process by falsifying the identification of the future with the past. Sartre claims that this break is necessary so that the organism can become, rather than the end of need as function, its own destiny. Thus, the break, by changing the future reality of the organism in to possibility, makes the transition from function to praxis real. That means scarcity throws the organism from its future which is projected as real back into the present at which it realizes the possibility of its impossibility. This realization of the possibility of extraction give raise to praxis. Thus, according to Sartre, praxis is exteriorized function or transcended interiority.

Praxis which emerges from need in such a way is a totalization through which the organism, by moving towards its end, transforms the material ensemble into a totality. The aim of praxis is to reestablish the organism which is negated by its lack in the relation between need and the environment. The movement of praxis as totalizaiton imposes a passive unity on the field so as it

can exploit the environment as a means, as a tool, for its purpose. However, the inertia of the field acts back on praxis and moves it with passive synthesis in its turn. This is the penetration of praxis, of interiority, by the forces of exteriority. As a result, a new kind of relation between praxis and the material environment arises. That means the multiplicities of the material field drive their organization from the unifying movement of praxis. It is only in relation to and through this unity that they meaningfully exist. While praxis, as a result of the unified field, is forced to re-interiorize exteriority. It is penetrated by exteriority to such an extent that a passive unity, the inert, dominates at the heart of the organism. But the synthesizing movement of praxis is still able to work out exteriority owing to its univocal bond of interiority.

According to Sartre, the reality of labor is strongly linked to the preservation of the organism. Having this end in mind, man interacts with and unifies the material ensemble so that the field can furnish what is needed. This is done through the construction of tools and the devising of strategies according to which the field can be unified and the object sought attained. Hence, labor is a totalizing movement whose aim is to organize the means so as to attain the end. It is exteriorized function i.e. as need raised from function, labor raised from need. It is the expression and realization of the two fold relation of the organism with itself and the environment. On the one hand, a relation of interiority of the organism with itself makes the unification of the field by man possible. On the other, a contradiction between man and the environment arises according to which man partially determines and negates the environment.

For Sartre the movement of labor is equal with transcending this contradiction. It constitutes the environment as field of its possibility and negates it. The specific aim is the partial determination of the whole, the field, which would lead to an affirmation through opposition. Labor is, then, this movement which separates itself from the whole by posting itself for itself. But this separation is a moment that must be transcended or resolved. For unless labor is able to reintegrate itself with the whole, is not even able to survive. Before the contradiction is resolved, it seems that it can be resolved in a number of ways including reintegration and extinction, the separation leads to the opposition of man with himself. That means when praxis determines and separates the field through a developing unification, man is conditioned back by the inertia of worked matter which oppose man to himself by separating him within himself.

“Thus, he sets himself in opposition to himself through the mediation of the inert and conversely, the constructive power of the laborer opposes the part to the whole in the inert within the natural unity” (Ibid,89)

When the process of the development of labor reaches at its peak, the relation between man and the inert would interchange. This developed form is the specialization of labor as a result of division of labor. It would invert the relation between a man and the inert by making the inert the one who defines man. The inert, in this case the machine, determines the environment and constructs man in its own image. As a result, the machine attains an interiority, though a false one, since it had become capable of relating itself to itself and to other machine. Man, in contrast, is characterized by exteriority. That means man is dominated by the machine to such a degree that he becomes the tool of the machine devoid of any bond of interiority rather overwhelmingly dominated by exteriority. Further more, since labor is a relation between men its domination by the machine alters the relation between man as the relation between tools. This reification and the becoming object of man, together with the prior moment in which the negativity of matter haunts back man and separates him within himself, is alienation. Man is attacked by the inertia of worked matter and exploited by the machine. It is out of this that Sartre develops his idea of alienation.

However, we have not reached the dialectical level at which alienation can be comprehended fully. For this genuine intelligibility a discussion of the relationship between men, prior to its reification, is necessary. Although human relations are conditioned by social, historical and technical milieus, Sartre claims that, referring to Marx, human relations must be differentiated from any mode they might take in a specific society in which they can be alienated and reified. The point is that social and historical conditions do not generate the relation between men. They only determine its specific content. The cause and foundation of the relation between men is human relation itself. As such labor is not the foundation rather presupposes a relationship between them. Labor is only a specific organization of this relationship. So everything, from the constitution of a group to the organization of society, follows from the primary relations of men. “The relation which have established themselves between those initially separated objects, men, were not products of problems of the organization and division of labor. On the contrary, the very possibility of a group or society being constituted depends on the permanent actuality of the human relations” (Ibid,96)

For Sartre the relation between men is, surely, a relation of exteriority. But it is only the relation of the exteriorization, reification, of the objective relation of interiority. To the extent that the forces of exteriority determine it, it also transcends them from within. It is not a mere outcome of social and technical conditions. According to Sartre, if humans were mere results of certain conditions, it would be difficult to say that they are reified. It is reified because it is primarily a free activity, a project which attempts to transcend particular historical conditions. "... men make history to the extent that it makes them. This means that relations between men are always the dialectical consequences of their activity precisely to the extent that they arise as a transcendence of dominating and institutionalized human relations" (Ibid,97)

So the human relation is a dialectical relation which accompanies and is accompanied by the individuals' relation to materiality both within and external to him. According to Sartre, this relation is not a potential which exists in every one but realized in few. This would make it a subjective disposition liable to external forces for its realization. It is rather the integral part of humans the possibility of which is related to every thing human. Viewed from this perspective isolation or a particular oppressive relation, say between a master and a slave, is a particular realization of this relation. "Human relations' are in fact inter-individual structures whose common bond is language and which actually exist at every moment of History" (Ibid,99). Different from language as inert totality or a developing tantalization, the relation between men, when it is reduced to the actualized relation of men who are living together, is neither totality nor totalisation. It is, according to Sartre, a constantly changing, unlimited spread of reciprocities "It is a changing indefinite dispersal of reciprocities" (Ibid,100). This indefinite dispersal of reciprocities rests on two elementary forms of relations: duality and trinity. Whatever the case, reciprocity is the foundation of relation between men.

### **Reciprocity**

Reciprocity is a binary relation or a relation between two men in which they recognize each other mutually. It is the actualization of a relation which, though it appears at a particular time, happens as if it has existed always. For example, a relation between two men who share a taxi happened at that particular moment. But it is the actualization of a relation which has existed for eternity by making their interaction possible. The tie between the two individuals is reciprocity which is given in advance as a timeless structure of every one and every thing. According to Sartre, reciprocity is

not an abstract universal link that ties people like machines. It is not either an inborn will from which arises a desire to treat everyone as an end in itself.

Reciprocity is, rather, the mutual recognition of the projects of individuals. The individual who is situated in a particular social and historical context is defined in advance by collective praxis. Nonetheless, through the actualization of his praxis he tries to transcend his being which is defined by the historical situation. This praxis of the individual as a project of transcendence demands recognition from the other who in-turn seeks the same recognition. So reciprocity is a concrete bond between men who have ends projected into the future. Thus, the individual praxis is the sole factor in determining the bond of reciprocity. Though its content is already determined by collective praxis and the material ensemble to which it belongs, individual praxis, as the actualization of the project at hand, determines the particular bond of reciprocity each has with everyone. It is from the point of view of the project of each that the humanity and personality of every one is assessed and recognized.

Thus, it is easy to see that reciprocity is in radical opposition to alienation and reification. However, according to Sartre, it does not save individuals from alienation and reification. The first reason is that reciprocity is mediated by worked matter, which as a foundation of institutions that define men in advance, conditions reciprocity. The other reason lies in the fact that reciprocity is not a relation in which men regard each other as ends. Since man is a material being concerned with the future he does not even regard himself as an end. For the sake of safe guarding the future he works on matter by changing himself into a means. The aim is the transcendence of man towards the world through objectification. Then, man as his own end is the other that he will become in the future. "Consequently, insofar as my project is a transcendence of the present towards the future, and of myself towards the world, I always treat myself as a means and can not treat the other as an end" (Ibid,112)

Thus, alienation is not even far from reciprocity which is its fundamental opposite. This can be seen in the structure of reciprocity which, through its realization, makes an alienating relationship possible. The structure of reciprocity has four ways of realization which finally would lead to conceiving the other as an object. The first is that just like me the other is also the means of his own transparent project. Secondly, the individual by recognizing the other as a praxis tries to

incorporate him in his own developed totalization. The third point is that the recognition of the other in his march towards his own goal is conceived in the same way as I conceive mine, and finally, I consider myself as his means and object, and vice versa.

On this basis Sartre differentiates between negative and positive reciprocities. In positive reciprocity, individuals make themselves the means of the project of the other in order to become their own means in their respective project. The goal can be a shared one or a separated one. When it comes to negative reciprocity the individual, while serving the other, refuses to see himself as a means in the project of the other and in fact, tries to use that service into a trap by means of which the other is changed into a means. This, according to Sartre, is a struggle in which men try to manipulate each other by reducing themselves into a means in the project of the other. So that they can delude the other and make him their own means. But the struggle is not, Sartre points out, a combat to death as Hegel claimed. Here Sartre seems to interpret Hegel saying that the clash between two self-consciousnesses is a struggle in which one seeks not the mere defeat of the other so as to gain its recognition rather its death. But just like Sartre, the struggle for Hegel is a combat, though fought till death, it is not the death of the other but a recognition from the defeated other that self-consciousnesses seek. Thus it is not the death of the other that the individual seeks. Rather, the manipulation and destruction of the project of the other is a means for the success of one's project the possibility of which is negatively determined by scarcity of some sort. That means, matter mediating between the projects of the two individuals made antagonism and struggle inevitable. Thus, reciprocity, through scarcity and the negativity of matter, entailed alienation in which men refuse to recognize the project of the other and in fact treat the other as an object.

In order to demonstrate the point we can look at how inhumane relations emerge out of their humane counterpart. According to Sartre, since every sort of relationship relies on the bonds of reciprocity, even the relation between a capitalist and an exploited laborer emerges out of it. For the relation to be possible each must recognize primarily the free individuality of the other. Sartre says that on the part of the capitalist their agreeing is based on the recognition of the freedom of the laborer who accordingly, agreed to work freely. Reciprocal relationship even holds for the relation between master and slave. Though the master never explicitly makes a recognition of either the freedom or humanity of the slave, an implicit recognition is betrayed by his denial and every attempt to deprive the slave the means of development. It is only because the master knows that the

slave is capable of human flourishing that he takes every measure to inhibit any means towards that end. Though the master-slave relation seems far fetched, the point is that inhumane relationships develop out of their human counterparts. Thus, reciprocity engenders alienation through the constraint of scarcity. However, it must be made clear that reciprocity is not the cause. Rather, the negativity of matter is so monstrous that it even changes reciprocal relationship into relations which are alienated. The fundamentality of alienation is, therefore, unmasked by its destructive effects on reciprocity.

However, it must be emphasized that reciprocity contains the possibility of "dealienation" though the constantly lived violence of matter makes dealienation either a possibility only or that which disappears the moment it is effected. This can be seen in the complex structure of human relations as a result of the existence of plurality of men. In this complex web of relation of a multiplicity of human organisms, each is related to the other through affirmation and negation. The plurality is, according to Sartre, the organic dispersal of organisms drawing its reality from social milieu, institutions and instruments. Through the negation of the multiplicity, the praxis of each advances a unifying project. Thus, it affirms its project through transcendence. However, it is also negated by the movement of the praxis of the multiplicity of men or a multiplicity of men negate a multiplicity of other men. Thus, we can say that though it sometimes connects men positively, reciprocity is severely conditioned by the relation of each to all in the complex web of relations of multiplicities of human organism. Except for the possibility of dealienation it contains reciprocity is, therefore, changed through the negativity of matter into a medium of alienation.

### **3.3. Matter as Totalized Totality: Scarcity**

It can be remembered that the human relation is initially united by worked upon matter. Matter issues that initial unity as a result of the synthesizing action of praxis which has unified it. According to Sartre, the relation of men to matter is conditioned by the structure of scarcity. Every determination of matter by men and vice versa is conditioned by scarcity which is a fact of history initially transferred to matter from men. Scarcity, Sartre says, though contingent is a fundamental and universal relation of man to man through their relation to matter. The quality of man as human and its history as human history is possible as a result of scarcity. It is that which make man what it is.

Scarcity is contingent for the reason that it is possible to imagine unlimited resources and a world without scarcity. But it is impossible to imagine a world without praxis or labor since the utilization of even unlimited resources require labor. Thus, whether there is scarcity or not matter would determine human relation through counter-finality i.e. by negating it. However, without scarcity the quality of men would change. For scarcity is the sole factor in determining the relation of human beings to every other and to matter. Because of this, according to Sartre, the contingency of scarcity attains a status of necessity.

Sartre is here envisaging two types of relation between men and matter. The first is conditioned by the contingency of scarcity which assumes a necessary character by defining men as what they are at present. The other is a relation of men with matter and through matter to each other without scarcity functioning as a condition. What is common to both these relations is what Sartre calls counter-finality. Worked matter swallows human praxis and returns it as a counter force that annihilates the ends of men. This is primitive alienation which negates men by contradicting their end. As a result human history appears as non-human history. For the totalizing movement of history tends towards the negation of man. "History, at this level, has a fearful and depressing meaning; it appears as though what unites men is an inert demonic negation, taking away their substance, that is to say, their labor, and returning it against all men in the form of active inertia and totalisation by extermination" (Ibid,123)

Sartre coins scarcity with the possibility of human history. But this is not equal with saying that, he claims, the possibility of all history is determined by scarcity. Scarcity determine the possibility of human history and is, as such, its basis. But scarcity, according to Sartre, does not determine the reality of human history. He is saying that scarcity is the necessary, but not sufficient, cause of human history. Without it there would be no human history. But for the latter to be possible the existence of other factors are necessary. Accordingly, there are human societies without history. As a result of the lack of other factors these societies led a repetitious way of life in which they are adapted to scarcity. They are able to keep a minimum equilibrium between their need and scarcity so not break the repetitious way of life which is devoid of civilization. So, for Sartre, the idea of a people with no history is not absurd since scarcity, which is universal, is no more a rule than the possibility of human history.

Scarcity, according to Sartre, is the negative relation of the organism to the material environment. It is a quantitative fact that marks the insufficiency of a certain resource in relation to the number of men in a specific milieu. In the environment men are related to each other, to different structures, and to the environment itself. As one of these structures, scarcity fundamentally relates men to each other and to the environment negatively.

By changing the environment into a practical field of tension, scarcity mediates between the praxis of men. Through that mediation a negative unity is transferred from matter to men. That means the totalization of matter, via scarcity, unites men in such a way that antagonism and struggle become inevitable. Because scarcity puts the being of man in question. So that the possibility of extinction is brought at the door of each. "This means, therefore, that the first totalization effected by materiality manifests itself (in a given society and between independent social groups) both as the possibility of universal destruction and as the permanent possibility that this destruction through matter might come to any individual through the praxis of other men" (Ibid,127)

Thus, scarcity severs the human relation of reciprocity by changing everyone into a threat for the existence of the individual. The mere fact that the multiplicity of individuals means the consumption of resources and products the individual needs. By interiorizing the environment as a danger to human life, which leads to the annihilation of resources, everyone annihilates the other. Sartre says though "Scarcity is not the absolute impossibility of humans" it makes co-existence impossible. As such society is a rationally stratified ensemble which selects its dead in advance. Behind this deliberate stratification lies the commutativity of each member as the reality of society. Every one has a possibility of survival and no one is indispensable. The fact, according to Sartre, is that every body sees himself and others both as a possible survivor and as avoidable surplus members. This truth which is contained objectively by every one makes the individual a being at stake. Though he tries to transcend the danger by realizing his praxis, the individual is doing nothing-else than digging his own grave. For the more he consumes, the lesser the probability for him and others to survive. That means his praxis, returns to him as counter-finality through matter. The consequence is the becoming other of man due to the becoming other of his action. By this Sartre means that the impossibility of co-existence separates each of them since every one is a danger to the survival of the other. Since the danger comes to the individual from himself also, he becomes the other to himself. The otherness is contained in and expressed by the fact that each

treat all as a surplus from a strange land whom he wants to get rid of. "Through socialized matter and through material negation as an inert unity, man, is constituted as other than man, man exists for every one as non-human man, as an alien species" (Ibid,130). In light of the non-existence of such thing as human nature, for Sartre, one might ask the meaning and validity of the categories of human and non-human. Sartre says that even if there is no such thing as human nature, non-humanity comes from the humanity of man a result of a specific relation of man to the environment. This relation, dominated by scarcity, makes the relation between men a non-human kind. Sartre ascertains that in the realm of scarcity every one contains an inert non-humanity which is the interiorization of the negation of man by matter. Thus, non-human relation is the expression of the negativity of matter which determines man through scarcity.

Sartre works out the destructive effect of scarcity against reciprocity. In reciprocity everyone recognizes the project of the other to the point of integrating it with his own praxis. Sartre says that since the history of men is a history conditioned by scarcity, reciprocity is unintelligible without scarcity. But the non-human relation brought by scarcity would not exist without the reciprocal relation of men as the foundation of all relations pertaining to men. Scarcity, as the relation of everyone to matter, then, changes, through reciprocity, all men into men of scarcity, into both cause and victim of scarcity. It finally becomes a social structure that determines the material environment objectively.

As the relation of each man to the other, which is a relation of exteriority mediated by matter, scarcity defines each man as external object. Scarcity also unites every potentially dispensable group in to a totality who works to wards the negation of all but the preservation of itself. But this negative unity is a false reciprocity since the group is united externally as discrete entities are enveloped. However, reciprocity continues to exist and the forces of interiority and exteriority oppose one another abruptly. Thus, every one recognizes the praxis of the other only partially and does this as a discrete entity isolated by the negativity of scarcity. That means the two centered joint of reciprocity is broken into multiple discreet entities who recognize each other as one who is dominated by the external. Sartre writes "In pure reciprocity, that which is other than me is also the same. But in reciprocity modified by scarcity, the same appears to us as anti-human in so far as this same men appear as radically other-that is to say, threatening as with death" (Ibid,132).

This, according to Sartre, is an outline of the abstract but basic structure of the reification and alienation of human relations. It entails the first appearance of evil in the form of the non-humanity of praxis. The interiorization of scarcity through the perception of the praxis of the other as non-human dissolves the immanent bond of reciprocity. The awareness of the impossibility of coexistence leads to the denial of reciprocity itself by making all, in relation to every one, an objective danger. "Thus, man is objectively constituted as non-human and this non-humanity is expressed in praxis by the perception of evil as the structure of the other" (Ibid,132). What betrays the domination of alienation over and against reciprocity is the proliferation of conflict and antagonism even when there is no material scarcity. The reason is the transformation of every one in to men of scarcity who regard all as the other and as an embodiment of evil who must be fought back and annihilated. In short, violence which connects men now through their separation, makes the fundamental fact of the alienation of man real.

Sartre asks, how can matter as scarcity unite men negatively when free human praxis is a complex web of reciprocal relationships. "In other words, given that the possibility of totalizing comes from praxis, how can matter control totalizing action through scarcity so as to make totalize every individual totalization?" (Ibid,134). He answers that materiality determines them and unites them negatively because scarcity makes the interior relation of reciprocity powerless. What do exist is people untied and separated by matter so as becoming an object or a means in the project of the other. That means no one can help being swayed by the inertia of matter. The developing totalization effects the interiorization of negative unity which ends by reifying and destroying reciprocity. This in turn would be exteriorized in the synthesis of the world which has become a site of conflict. And then re-interiorization follows... making the process necessary and alienation inevitable. Sartre concludes "we are united [negatively] by the fact that we live in a world which is dominated by scarcity" (Ibid,134)

In order to demonstrate how scarcity alters men by falsifying reciprocal relationships we can take people waiting for a taxi as an example. It is 8:00 in the morning. At one corner of Addis there are about 25 people waiting for a taxi. Some of them are restless to arrive to job while others have private matters to attend to. All are in a hurry. After two minutes a taxi arrived peopled by 10 men. At the moment the door is opened and before the people in taxi get out, the 25 people ran to the taxi strangling and colliding with one another. Two people fall on the asphalt while a woman could

stand on her feet after an awkward move because of the push she received. After a bitter struggle 14 managed to get into the taxi. Ten of them secured a seat while the remaining four embarked in a verbal fight for the unoccupied 2 seats. They abused one another for a while and finally 2 of them were forced to leave the taxi which concluded the verbal and physical friction. We can see that the whole relationship is not a humane one in which the humanity as well as the ends of men are recognized. They were encountering each other as sub-human entities in a violent structure defined by scarcity. So we can say that they have become other in their attempt to hold a seat in the taxi. It is only because such an incident is a common fact of everyday life in Addis that the visible alteration is concealed. So that the example shows how men negate and alter each other in a structure conditioned by scarcity.

Just like Hegel who interpreted the confrontation of man by man in terms of the confrontation of man by life as its foundation and cause, Sartre says that men negate each other only because matter negates man. Since life is inconceivable without the interaction of praxis with matter, worked matter through scarcity negates man and the negation of man by man is the interiorisation of the negativity of matter. "... under the rule of scarcity, the negation of man by man, adopted and interiorized by praxis was the negation of man by matter in so far as matter is the organization of his being outside him in nature" (Ibid,151)

### **3.4. Worked Matter as the Alienated Objectification of Individual and Collective Praxis**

Sartre hopes to work out a general relation of man to matter regardless of scarcity. To account for the relation of praxis and worked matter without involving scarcity seems hardly possible. For scarcity conditions this relation. Sartre aspires to do so by relegating the mediation of scarcity to the back i.e he is trying to develop a logical structure that can explain the relation of man to matter regardless of scarcity. In view of the fact that production negates the negation of scarcity a positive relation between man and worked matter in which praxis transcends scarcity is possible. However, this does not mean that the possibility and intelligibility of history is conceivable without the negativity of matter. Rather as the fundamental structure of existence, the negativity of matter conditions every thing including alienation.

This, according to Sartre, is the level of objectification in which the genuine foundation of all alienation is uncovered. This alienation is different from and is the basis of the otherness engendered through scarcity. Objectification which is positive in the sense that it is the realization of praxis and its transcendence of scarcity, is also the foundation of alienation according to Sartre. In the prior moment it is through scarcity that matter negated man. But now in this second moment, which Sartre recalls the moment of labor or man, matter, without presupposing scarcity, in and of itself, defines and negates man through objectification. Objectification which is the realization of praxis through the production of tools and goods, is necessary for man to exist. It is also the medium through which matter estranges and negates man. It is the realization of the domination of matter over man as a result of which man becomes alien.

For Sartre capitalistic relations of production in which the few exploit the majority is not the real foundation of the domination of man by matter. Rather part of the entire dialectical problem and its specific realization. It is objectification generally that causes alienation. At this level the real foundations of alienation appear: matter alienates in itself the action which works it, not because it is itself a force nor even because it is inertia, but because this inertia allows it to absorb the labor power of others and turns its back against every one. "In the moment of passive negation, its interiorized scarcity that made every one appear to others as other. In the moment of labor—the human moment in which man objectifies himself in producing his life—the inertia and material exteriority of objectification means that, whatever else human relations may be, it is the product which defines men as others and constitutes them as another species, as anti-human; and that it is in the product that people produce their own objectivity, which returns to them as enemy and constitutes them as other" (Ibid,151). Accordingly, this is a level in which alienation reigns through objectification. Sartre hopes to analyze and disclose the structure of objectification as counter-finality and necessity.

### **Matter as Inverted Praxis: Alienation as Objectification**

The relation between matter and praxis causes counter-finality by inverting praxis against itself. The inertia of worked matter swallows the inertia of praxis and returns it back against itself as fatality. This fatality is the opposition and destruction of either praxis or its end by the negativity of worked matter through objectification. Counter-finality, for Sartre, is the primitive form of alienation which sets the counter movement of matter against praxis. Counter-finality, then,

alienates man by drawing him into the sea of otherness through the violent snatching of his ends-his being. For counter-finality to be possible Sartre outlines three necessary conditions. The first is that for worked matter to invert praxis, the needed negativity must be given by matter as its natural disposition. The second is the fatality of human praxis which is caused by reasons related to the physical surrounding. And as fatality it must destroy the elements of the field systematically. Nonetheless, it must be absorbed by the inertia of matter on the last resort. The final and most important condition, according to Sartre, is the commonality of the actions of praxis. The actions must be undertaken by every one and every where as deliberations of every day life. But this does not mean that they are universal. Rather are generally done as part of every day life in a specific context which, nonetheless, has a universal appeal. These actions, according to Sartre, are numerous, identical, irreducible and are unified by the matter they unify.

Counter-finality can be understood as unintentional but destructive out come of deliberate actions which are conceived necessary for the continuation of life. But from the point of view of the dialectic, it is the domination and determination of man by the negativity of matter. The determination is so violent that it has a characteristic of fatality. In order to demonstrate his idea of counter finality, Sartre discusses the case of agricultural China. In need of more arable land the peasants of China cut down trees in large quantities. The result of this deforestation is over-flooding that destroys their lives. The act, the cutting down of trees, is numerous and part of every day life. The peasants have to cut down trees so that they can get more land for ploughing. It has also a fatalistic character. They destroy trees massively and systematically. The counter-finality which disrupts their life through the destruction of the harvest and the village has a natural character. Over-flooding as a result of deforestation is the out come of the natural disposition of the Chinese land. We can also mention the counter finality of over-ploughing in Ethiopia which causes drought.

Sartre says that praxis is made other through objectification. These acts which unified matter are in turn unified negatively by the coming back of the inertia of matter from outside. The cutting down of trees lead to deforestation which entailed over flooding which, in turn, unified the peasants from out side and negatively as a danger to be resisted. "In being realized, human ends define a field of counter-finality around themselves. Through the unity of counter-finality deforestation negatively unifies the enormous masses who people the great plan of China" (Ibid,164). Thus, deforestation, through over-flooding as interiorized exteriority, negatively unites the peasants. The reality of

counter-finality as depicted by deforestation is the transformation of the demands of men from matter in to a demand of matter from men. That means praxis ends up by becoming other than what it is. It is praxis, through objectification, that caused the field of counter finality which is the milieu of otherness. Sartre says that objectification as the exteriorization of interiority is the unity of praxis as other and becomes alienation through the interiorization the forces of exteriority as counter-finality.

Sartre says that men loss their humanity for the thing when, trying to transcend the conditions of materiality, they objectify themselves. This loss is the humanization of matter which subsequently came (equal with) to have a life of its own and determine the life of men. This particular coin of Gold which is used as a medium of transaction in 16<sup>th</sup>c Spain for example came to life as result of human labor. But it gradually acquires a life of its own, becomes independent and other. Not only in its material configuration but it is other precisely because it manifests itself as counter-final.

*“... Since it was other through its inertia, through its molecular structure, and through the reciprocal exteriority of its parts, that is to say, as matter, it absorbed recurrence and made of it into a sort of spontaneous resistance on the part of matter to the wishes and practices of men. In this case, inertia itself merges with alterity, and become a synthetic principle producing new forces. But these forces were negative; gold took on a ‘life of its own’ mediating between real praxis, whose unifying power and negativity is absorbed, and the mere succession of physical phenomena, whose dispersion in exteriority it re-affirmed... this magical life turns praxis back on itself and transforms ends into counter ends.” (Ibid,173)*

All the discussion so far ascertains the supremacy of the reality of worked matter over and against man. It confirms the essentiality of worked matter while betraying the inessentiality of man and his praxis. As a result, Sartre asks whether a dualism of matter and man arises. He also asks the reality and status of man in relation to the domination of praxis by worked matter. Instead of dualism, he says, the dialectic is a dialectic of monism according to which the opposite between man and worked matter is a moment of contradiction to be resolved. Sartre argues that since everything in the world acquires its meaning through social life, worked matter is able to define man through social life. Thus, the world is a world for man. It is a human world. Yet the universe and everything in it are material entities. All existence is material. This contradiction, Sartre says, must be resolved in a way which does not subjugate man to matter. Man can act on matter and produce his life as a material being only. But he is still and primarily a human being. Even for man to be alienated he must be free primarily. Thus, it is only through and by man as a free being that matter gets its

reality. This is equal with saying that man is the primary reality of the world. The following words of Sartre succinctly stress the primary freedom of man.

*“There is a choice; either man is primarily himself, or he is primarily other than himself. Choosing the second doctrine simply makes one a victim and accomplice of real alienation. But alienation presupposes that man is primarily action, servitude is based on freedom; the human relation of exteriority is based on the direct bond of interiority as the basic type of human relation man lives in a universe where the future is a thing, where the idea is an object and where the violence of matter is the ‘midwife of history’. But it is man who invests things with his own praxis, his own future and his own knowledge” (Ibid,181)*

We can see that alienation presupposes freedom and that man is primarily a free being. We can also see that historical materialism is a monist dialectic according to which man produce his life in the interaction with matter only as a material being. But it is not evident that man is the primary reality of the world nor that the contradiction between man and matter is resolved or can be so in away which does not entail the domination of matter over man. Even if it is through social life that matter acquires its reality, if man can exist only as material being and the domination of matter continues like this forever, then, where resides man as the primary reality of the world? It seems no where. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the world is not a human world. Therefore, although man is primarily free and a human being, as the result of the world which is a world of matter he is materialized and alienated. How man is altered through objectification can be clear from the following example.

Let us take a young man who works for a certain business firm and raised to a level of executive recently. He is a regular person who spends his time, beside work, in recreational activities including acquaintances. However, he gradually disassociates himself from friends and becomes preoccupied with labor. He is a hard worker man who manages one wing of the company. He is also admired by the bosses as a bright boy with a very good future including the possibility of getting some share of the company. As a result, he withdraws from other activities of life and immerses in activities related to work. He begins to express and evaluate himself in the sum he earns and the expensive things he bought like the fancy apartment he lives in, the cozy furnitures and the expensive stuffs like his gold watch and money above all. After a couple of years he gets some share of the company. But he is completely isolated from friends and relatives. We can see that from objectifying himself through work he moved to affirm and express himself by and through the things he owned. This led to the building of a self image on the basis of the things

acquired rather through relations he might have. As a result, he becomes other. Though the example is simple and has nothing to do with counter finality it describes how man is altered through objectification. On this I can mention a novella entitled 'The Death of Ivan Illich' by Leo Tolstoy in which he accounted for a regular middle class man. Illich who led a normal life is finally sickened unto death without any physical cause. Tolstoy undergrounds the cause of the sickness in moral corruption. Though it is Ivan Illich through whom this moral corruption is portrayed, the decay is a social one since his life was not different from many people rather followed the normal course allowed by his society. So that the story depicts how men are altered through the very structure of action, objectification, which determines the values and institutions of society.

### **Alienation as Exploitation**

Sartre treats the specific relation of praxis to tools and machines as the subsequent level of dialectical investigation. The relation is an extension of the general relation of praxis and worked matter. Just like it, it is the domination of man by the machine. The machine defines man through demands to which man must adopt itself so as to work on the machine. As a result he is depersonalized and made other. The demands of the machine, as exigency, are, according to Sartre, different from expectations. Everyone has expectations in his relation with the other and as such expectation is part of the reciprocal bond of interiority. But the demand or the exigency of the machine is a kind of imperative to which the worker must submit. The exigency alters man to the point of making the origin of praxis other than need. Though need does not cease to be the general basis of praxis, the machine, by altering the praxis of man, makes him the slave of the machine rather than who has ends and works for its realization. This simply means to acquire his means of subsistence, man is forced to become the slave of the machine which degrades him and robs him of his end.

The machine through which man is altered is the means through which another man objectifies his project. This is capitalistic mode of production in which the workers are exploited by his very subservience to the machine. Thus, the worker is made other, is alienated by the exigency of the machine. Sartre summarizes the process as follows.

*“Exigency, in fact, whether in the form of an order or a categorical imperative, constitutes itself in every one as other than him. (He can not modify it, but simply has to conform to it; it is beyond his control, and he may change entirely without it changing; in short, it does not enter in to the dialectical movement of behavior). In this way, exigency constitutes him as other than himself. In so far as he is characterized by praxis, his praxis does not*

*originate in need or in desire; it is not the process of realizing his project, but, in so far as it is constituted so as to achieve an alien object, it is, in the agent himself, the praxis of another and it is another who objectifies himself in the result” (Ibid,188).*

The result is antagonism lived by men as false reciprocity. The workers compete with one another in order to sell their labor. On the other hand, the owners of the means of production negate the praxis of the workers by inscribing their ends in the machine which in turn makes demands from the workers. Thus, the ends of the capitalist are recognized while the worker, not only is not given recognition, is deprived of his project. According to Sartre, the capitalist himself is conditioned by exigency which comes from interest as a being-outside himself. The desire for more wealth can be an interest which conditions the capitalist from outside. But it is not as degrading as the exigency of the machine on the worker. The outcome of the ends of the capitalist, over-production, for example, realizes itself as a counter-finality against the ends of the worker. A reduction of wage rate can be considered as counter-finality for the worker while it is a finality for the capitalist. An increase in wage would have the opposite implications. Hazardous working conditions could also be another example.

The point is the two-fold alienation of man as the result of the exigency of the machine and the demands of a certain group of men from another in which the bonds of reciprocity are destroyed. “To sum up, the intelligibility of material contradictions within a developing process is due to the fact that, through negation as material unity within the social field, every finality is a counter-finality; and to the fact that, on the other hand, to the extent that all the movements of matter are sustained and directed by men, every counter-finality is objectively, at its own level, and from the point of particular practice-inert ensembles, a finality” (Ibid,196,). In other words, the domination of worked matter over men, in the specific form of the relation of man to the machine, has the effect of both deteriorating man, making him a non-human in the milieu of the non-human, and issuing antagonism between groups of men which is a struggle between two non-humanized men. Hence, man is alienated.

### **Alienation as Necessity or the Necessity of Alienation**

According to Sartre the reality as well as intelligibility of dialectical reason and history as totalizing movement is strictly bounded with praxis. Dialectical reason and History owe their absolute certainty to praxis. However, certainty is not enough for Sartre. Historical materialism

must be grounded in necessity, necessity points to the negativity of matter. It is the inherent aspect of the movement of the negative which alters human praxis by a unification that separates.

Necessity is the becoming other of praxis in relation to the negativity of worked matter. The inertia of worked matter deprives praxis its ends by consuming and turning back its inertia against itself. This happens necessarily in the relation of worked matter and praxis. And the objective experience of necessity is engendered by the negative unification of men by matter through counter-finality. Sartre says that it is not owing to either individual or group praxis that matter effects inertia that unites negatively. Rather, matter which is mediated by the every day praxis of everyone becomes the locus of negativity which antagonizes itself to the ends of men. This negativity of worked matter is experienced by men whose ends are destroyed by it. Such is an objective experience of necessity according to Sartre. "Necessity appears in experience when we are robbed of our action by worked matter" (Ibid,224)

Sartre says that in order to grasp necessity objectively it is crucial to understand the interplay between objectification and objectivity. Take for example the role of gold in Spain in the sixteenth century and how it turned from a medium of transaction into a weapon of destruction. As a product, gold is the objectification of the praxis of men. Then it becomes an objective reality constituting and defining men. It becomes a pure exteriority that determines the life of the individual from outside. Finally, through over accumulation and the out flow of gold, objectification, entailed objective reality which is lost due to its own negative movement, over accumulation causing inflation.

The objective experience of necessity, according to Sartre, is always bound with the discovery of a result broader than the intended end of the individual. This broader result is the becoming other of every action which always accompanies the realization of the intended result. Thus, besides recognizing that he has achieved his end, the individual must notice the coming into existence of a result other than his own. That means the action when realized becomes other. This otherness always occurs side by side with the realization of an action and makes the end other. Not only the end or the action, but it also makes the individual other. For the being of an individual is equal with the objectification of praxis. The individual can notice the becoming other of his praxis when it is realized or can notice otherness as a broader structure which always comes into existence when praxis is realized. Thus, in his awareness of necessity the individual has an awareness of himself as

other and vice versa. Sartre concludes "It is therefore necessary to recognize oneself as other in one's own individual objectification on the basis of another result." (Ibid,226)

Necessity, the becoming other of action through the dictates of necessity, can be seen in the experience of a judge who has executed innumerable cases in his career as a chief magistrate for the last 20 years. In the name of justice he has deliberated a lot of verdicts which have freed, imprisoned and sometimes have caused the death of many. He is sure that he has done the right thing. But it is an every day fact that he notices some signs on the faces of the men pronounced guilty- signs which make him doubt whether he is doing the right thing? What if I am wrong? Is this really justice? Why is that I feel empty? One may say that the judge is a free conscience but also must recognize those signs which haunt him and force him to doubt himself. Because the decisions he deliberated in the name of justice which are in fact good, are causes, at the same time, of the suffering of young men, the breaking up of families which is followed by the destitution of children forced to be raised in orphanage. Thus we can see how action becomes other.

Necessity for Sartre is the destiny of freedom in exteriority. Its experience is ultimately based on the ability to take full responsibility for one's action. This includes the admission of responsibility even for an action which is altered. In fact, beside the realization of the act, the action always becomes other. Thus, it is when one is able to say both; 'this is what I intended' and 'this is not what I desired' or 'though this is not what I intended I can see that it is the result of my own action', that one is able to experience necessity through freedom. According to Sartre, the two can not be separated. Though necessity is the anti-thesis of freedom, it is unthinkable without freedom. For without freedom everything falls in to the rule of determinism in which conceiving alteration is impossible. It is only because freedom primarily is real that it is altered necessarily or that alteration is effected through necessity. Thus, freedom always points to necessity and necessity presupposes freedom. "... the basic experience of necessity is that of a retroactive power avoiding my freedom, from the final objectivity to the original decision, but nevertheless emerging from it; it is the negation of freedom in the domain of complete freedom, sustained by freedom itself, and proportional to the very completeness of this freedom... it is the historical experience of matter as praxis without an author." (Ibid,226). Thus, the recognition of oneself both in the produced thing and in praxis is the experience of necessity through freedom and freedom in necessity.

Sartre asks the fundamental questions-whether the experience of necessity through freedom is alienation. He replies in the affirmative. For man, through the experience of necessity, discovers himself as other. In other words, the question is whether necessity entails alienation. Since through the becoming other of praxis man is estranged, necessity entails alienation. But Sartre thinks that a distinction must be made between alienation as exploitation and alienation as objectification. He agrees with Marx who identified alienation with exploitation. But it is evident that alienation has a more profound base than exploitation which is objectification. For Hegel alienation is equal with every form of objectification. However, Sartre is cautious in this regard and agrees with Hegel only partially. Sartre holds this position in view of that moment of praxis through which man transcends the world towards himself. But this is only a moment of the reality of praxis which is and more profoundly an objectification in which man transcends himself towards the world.

Since praxis is a univocal relation of interiority between the organism and the environment it is free and as such does not entail alienation. But the moment of this relation forces man to objectify himself in a material environment which does not belong to him and take the material totality as his objective being thus man is alienated. Thus, it is more reasonable to say that every form of objectification is alienation even for Sartre. Because the reality of praxis lies not in its passivity which constitutes a dimension of freedom and can be liberating (It seems rather, its reality lies in its movement, in its realization, in objectification). But it must be made clear that objectification in and of itself does not entail alienation. Rather it is because objectification is permanently dominated by the negativity of matter as counter-finality that alienation is inevitable. Thus, man must realize his praxis, objectification is necessary. So that he is mediated by the negativity of worked matter which forces him to take the totality of worked matter as his objective reality. Though there is always a dimension of freedom, man can not be saved, except exploitation, from alienation. For alienation is the necessary result of the necessary relation of man with materiality. Sartre writes.

*“We must recognize that the original relation between praxis as totalization and materiality as passivity obliges man to objectify himself in a milieu which is not his own, and to react as inorganic totality as his own objective reality... there can be no doubt that as soon as man begins to designate himself not as the mere reproduction of his life, but as the ensemble of products which reproduce his life, he discovers himself as the other in the world of objectivity; totalized matter, as inert objectification perpetuated by inertia, is in effect non-human or even antihuman. All of us spend our lives engraving our maleficent image on things, and it fascinates and bewilder us if we try to understand ourselves through it, although we are ourselves the totalizing movement that results in this particular objectification.” (Ibid,227)*

So we have seen two kinds of alienation in Sartre or we can interpret it as three. The first and fundamental one is the out come of the negativity of matter which alienated man as counter finality through objectification. The inertia of praxis necessarily turns back on itself and contradicts itself with the end of man as the result of its determination by the negativity of worked mater. Hence objectification entails alienation. The second is the result of scarcity which made men other and anti-human through lack. By endangering their lives, scarcity issued antagonism between them as a result of which the bonds of reciprocity is broken and men alienated. The final one is the extension of the mediation of scarcity. It is exploitation as alienation in which men combat each other and deny to recognize their ends. It is specifically expressed by the relation of man to the machine due to which man is deprived of his project and deteriorated to the points of becoming a tool. The capitalistic mode and relations of production and the social institutions, structures and relations engendered by it are the expressions of alienation as exploitation in which man is changed into a non-human entity.

What we must emphasize is that throughout his analysis, Sartre concentrated not on describing alienation, rather explaining its causes and structures. So that we need to say a few words to describe it. We can understand that alienation for Sartre is a process of alteration due to scarcity, the exigency of the machine, exploitative relations or the negativity of worked matter. It is an alteration in which man is changed in to a tool, an object, or a non-human entity. It is the negative modification of man that deprives man of his being, project and end. Through the denial of his project, his future i.e. through the denial of the sole factor, praxis, responsible for his humanity, alienation altered men to the point of not recognizing each other as human beings. In short, alienation is a necessary process in which men are changed into non human entities and recognize each other as such.

One must ask the possibility of 'dealienation' for Sartre. We can see for ourselves that alienation can be over come as long as its cause is equated with the exigency of the machine and the exploitation of man by man. That is alienation can be overcome by changing this relations in to humane relations in which the humanity of the project and end of man is recognized. But when it comes to the other two causes it seems that over-coming alienation is hardly possible. For scarcity

is a contingent but necessary fact of human existence which rules over men at least up to now. Even if men could win over scarcity by devising means and mechanisms that makes abundance a reality, it is still impossible to overcome alienation. For the root cause of fundamental alienation is objectification. That which is necessary for the continuation of the existence of men. Since life is unimaginable without objectification, alienation is inevitable. That means that which is necessary, objectification, is the medium through which men are attacked by the violence of matter. It is the medium through which the negativity of worked matter alienates men by falsifying, as counter-finality, their project in which resides their being.

However, Pietro Chiodi argues that since the very concept of alienation presupposes the ability on the part of the individual both to lose and regain his being, then, delineation is possible. "... the subject of alienation must be conceived as having the capacity to lose his own being, while nonetheless eventually reappropriating it" (Chiodi,1976:79). The question of the possibility of delineation meets no difficulty, as we have seen in the former chapters, either from a Hegelean or Marxist point of views. For Hegel alienation would be overcome since the subject-object mode of relation, in which the subject loses himself by objectifying himself, has a status of appearance to be resolved when spirit comes to self-knowledge and synthesizes the subject and the object. For Marx, on the other hand, alienation would be overcome in a definite time when alienated labor is negated by a socialized labor in communism. So, the problem of the possibility of delineation poses a difficulty only in regard to Sartre and not allowing possibility of dealienation would be a contradiction since, as we said above, alienation presuppose, together with the loss of the self, its regaining.

The difficulty is multiplied by Sartre's identification of alienation with objectification which in turn is identified with real alterity. "... when Sartre maintains that alienation is bound to alterity to the extent to which alterity is equivalent to objectification, ... alterity, instead of foundation of possibility, becomes the necessitating element of alienation in the objective" (Ibid,88-89). Nonetheless, Chiodi points out that dealienation is possible even for Sartre. This is related to the constitution of the individual within the group-in-fusion which is untied from the inside. The group negated multiplicity and makes the individual break free from alterity by negating the negation of worked matter. The group does this by interiorizing objectivity as a common objective in which everyone is affirmed with his freedom. With the negation of multiplicity the group attains

a spontaneous unity in which individuals are related reciprocally through a common objective. Thus, with the disappearance of multiplicity, objectification dissolves together with alterity. “De-alienation, therefore, implies internalization of objectivity in the extra-individual unity of the group for which objectivity is none other than the interiority of the group with in itself, ‘the objective’ as internal finality” (Ibid,95) That means, the immanence of interiority is empowered through the group in fusion to swallow the exteriority of the objective.

However, dealienation has a character of an instant and contains, says Choidi, its own dialectical disappearance. The reason is the unsurpassable negativity of matter which annihilates the group in fusion by forcing the individual to objectify himself. That means since the negativity of worked matter and the individual as discreet entity are more real than the group the latter would disintegrate because of their necessary negative movement. “There is a zero point at which the maximum de-alienating force of the group-in-fusion encounters the minimum, but irreducible, resistance of the practio-inert alterity. This is the starting point for a gradual process of inversion where in the group, passing from the oath, through organization to institution, falls back into the alienation of series” (Ibid,96) Thus, we can conclude that Sartre is able to escape from contradiction by allowing the possibility of de-alienation in relation to the group, through de-alienation is a reality of an instant. It is reasonable to say that the interplay between freedom and necessity is such that man is alienated necessarily and remains altered for eternity.

Since alienation is the inherent aspect of the structure of action itself, it is, therefore, a necessary reality of existence which men are condemned to live through their freedom.

*“The paradoxical nature of the human situation is thus defined in the critique by the co-presence of the demand for de-alienation and the impossibility of that de-alienation. This zero point is what Sartre defines as necessity or destiny: ‘freedom’s destiny in exteriority’.”*  
(Chiodi, 1976;92)

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **An Analysis of the Theories of Hegel, Marx and Sartre on Alienation**

In this paper we have discussed three different theories of alienation. It has been shown that the theories have similarities, difference and oppositions with one another. In this chapter we will first examine the validity of the problem of alienation from a post modernist point of view. As part of the movement of post-modernism structuralism challenges the centrality of the individual point of view on the basis of which theories like Marxism and Existentialism posed the problem of alienation.

In the second section of this chapter we will summarize the views of Hegel, Marx and Sartre as briefly as possible. Then we will compare and contrast them. We will also try to criticize one on the basis of the other ie, Marx, for example, on the basis of Hegel. Throughout the undertaking, we will try to develop a theory of alienation which the writer of this paper thinks right and convincing. Finally, we will proceed to the last section in which a conclusion would be drawn.

#### **4.1 Critique from Without**

According to Lawrence Coohen, the problem of alienation would become insignificant if schools of thought that raise the problem are shown to be not convincing. Discussing the emergence and nature of post- modernism as responses to modernity, Coohen contraposes Marxism and Existentialism with Structuralism. According to him, contrary to structuralism which takes supra individual entities (facts) as its point of departure, Existentialism and Marxism are not concerned with the analysis of facts but the meaning of facts for the individual. They are theories that try to grasp reality from the individual point of view. As a result, the central problem both in Marxism and Existentialism is the alienation of the individual. Thus, the analysis and diagnosis of the problem of the alienation of the individual characterizes these theories for Coohen. When it comes to structuralism this individual centered philosophical view point of the world is not convincing. As a result, the problem of alienation is not one of the central questions of philosophy for structuralism.

Coohen points out that the problem of alienation disappears from the scene as a result of the emergence of post-modernism on the basis of structuralism. For structuralism the individual is not the standard of reality. Human existence becomes meaningful if it is viewed form supra- individual

entities like language and culture. So that in structuralism the centrality of the individual would lose any significance. “Structuralism rejected the centrality of the self and its historical development that has characterized Marxism, Existentialism, Phenomenology, and Psychoanalysis (...) The study of abstract relations within systems or “codes” of cultural signs (words, family relations, etc) is the key to understanding human existence” (Coohen, 2003:4). This is a clear case of change of paradigm which replaces supra-individual structures for the individual. We must ask the consequence of this paradigm change for the problem of alienation-whether the question of alienation disappears together with the replacement of the individual.

As far as I am concerned that would not be the case. There are three possibilities. Either structuralism is right and the theories which put the individual at the centre are wrong or vice versa. The third one is a case in which all are invalid. Leaving aside the third one, let us concentrate on the first two. If theories like Marxism and Existentialism are correct, then, things continue as normal and the question of the alienation of the individual would be one of the basic questions of philosophy. But the problem is what if structuralism is correct? What if reality is constructed through structures that surpass the individual? Would this amount to the disappearance of the problem of alienation? I reply in the negative. As long as structuralism or any other theory is not able to show that the individual is not alienated the problem would remain in tact. Even if the individual disappears from the central place he held in the philosophical scene, it is still possible that he is alienated. As long as one is not able to show that there is no such thing as alienation, what would change is how we conceive it. So that structuralism or any other theory can conceive it in its own terms based on its paradigm. So that the problem of the alienation of man is a valid one.

## **4.2 Critique from With In**

### **4.2.1. Summary**

In chapter one we have discussed Hegel’s theory of alienation. For Hegel alienation is the essential aspect of the movement of Spirit, especially at the level of self-consciousness. Self consciousness is located by Hegel between the other two levels, consciousness and reason. It is a stage where Spirit and also man gain self awareness and struggle to attain freedom. The movement of self-consciousness towards freedom is also a movement of alienation that passes through certain necessary stages which stretches from narrow self certainty to unhappy consciousness. This

movement begins when consciousness turns from the external world and finds itself as its own object. Self-consciousness primarily finds itself as desire and tries to affirm itself through the negation of the objects of desire. Since desire appears incessantly and becomes independent, self-consciousness is unable to affirm itself for itself. Positing itself for itself, itself as its own good, is the ultimate aim of self-consciousness whose essence is action and negation. As a result self-consciousness externalizes itself and seeks recognition from another self-consciousness.

In this externalization self-consciousness faces life as its opposite and counter part. Life opposes it by contradicting its goal of becoming independent, of affirming itself for itself. Opposition between subject and substance appears for the first time. This opposition leads self-consciousness to the realization of the inadequacy of both itself and life. It is thereby estranged from itself since through externalization it came to the awareness of its inadequacy. Self-consciousness came to know itself as a self which is not equal with itself, which is both same and other of itself. Nonetheless, self-consciousness would continue seeking recognition from another self-consciousness which it could not gain from life. Thus arises a confrontation between two self-consciousnesses; master and slave. They struggle to death in order to be recognized as a self who is independent and who posits itself for itself in its absolute negativity. Through objectification the slave liberates itself and the dialectic movement would culminate in unhappy consciousness who is a wholly alienated figure. The slave's becoming of an independent self through objectification and negation leads to Stoic consciousness who affirms its self as freedom in thought. The inadequacy of abstract freedom leads to Sceptic consciousness who affirms its self as absolute negativity by practically negating particular things. However, its inability to disassociate itself from particular things entail an internal break of self-consciousness; a duality of essence and non-essence within a single consciousness. This is unhappy consciousness who identifies itself with particular consciousness and projects essence in the beyond. It is a wholly alienated consciousness since it is separated from its own essence. Unhappy consciousness is the absolute other of itself who is unable to find itself and be united with it. Finally, through the renunciation of action, of freedom as negativity, unhappy consciousness affirms Spirit. Thus, Spirit comes to full self-awareness and through it self-consciousness is unified with itself.

Thus, from the first moment in which self-consciousness externalizes itself to the last in which it renounces its freedom, the movement of self-consciousness is a movement of alienation. It is a movement in which self-consciousness is separated within itself and becomes the other of its self. The first encounter with life is the awareness of oneself as other. Even in mutual recognition consciousness appears to itself as other through the mediation of the second self-consciousness. Thus, separation through externalization and alienation through objectification characterizes the movement of self-consciousness.

Hegel's identification of alienation with objectification can be grasped in the transition from Sceptic consciousness to unhappy consciousness. Sceptic consciousness was able to attain absolute self-certainty through the negation of particular things. But its inability to liberate itself from particular things in which its self is objectified lead to unhappy consciousness as the radical separation of self-consciousness within itself i.e. the realization of its self as particular consciousness without essence and separated from and opposed to the essential which exists in the beyond (But the projected essence is its own with which it is unable to be united.) Furthermore, the centrality of objectification in Hegel's idea of alienation can be demonstrated by appealing to the essence of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is action which proves its self certainty by acting on and against things. This takes the forms of desire, labor and enjoyment. It is only in its relation with things through objectification that self-consciousness can posit itself for –itself. This objectification leads to alienation since self-consciousness does not find itself there rather is rendered inadequate to itself and becomes the other of itself. That is why it continually embarks on a flight from reality. Stoic consciousness and unhappy consciousness are good examples of this flight. They are an embodiment of the alienation of the self that is wholly separated and estranged from itself. The self that it is unable to find itself either in the world or in itself so that forced to project itself in contemplation.

The second chapter of this paper has discussed Marx's idea of alienation. Marx's idea of alienation presupposes two ideas; the idea of human nature (the realization of which requires the free development of human labor) and the development of man in the necessary progress of history. When this necessary process of history reaches the stage of capitalism man is alienated as a result of private property which reduces labor to a commodity. Thus, for Marx, alienation is the necessary

product of capitalistic mode of production in which the worker is estranged through the alienation of labor.

Marx conceives human nature in terms of a passionate movement through which man is actively related to nature. This active relatedness of man to nature is possible when man produces freely and strives to attain its object in a human nature. Rather than seeking the object egoistically and as a means towards another end, he seeks the object as an end and affirms the humanity of himself and others in it. This affirmation of oneself in the object by seeking it humanly is the humanization of nature. This in turn would humanize the crude and natural essences of man. Accordingly, man is a species being. He is a free, self-conscious and universal being who produces freely and seeks the object in a way that affirms the humanity of the entire race. As such a human being his fulfillment is equal with the fulfillment of all humanity. Thus, objectification is the appropriation of the object and the realization of the essence of man.

In the capitalist mode of production objectification becomes the loss of the object and the estrangement of man. This is because labor is reduced to a commodity in which the worker participates in order to maintain his existence. He produces not freely but through compulsion and the activity of work belongs not to him but to another, the capitalist. Thus, rather than affirming his being in the activity of work he denies it and is mortified in the process. Thus, man is alienated in the activity of production and also from the product of his labor which has become independent of him and opposes itself to him. As a result man is alienated from himself, other human beings, nature and his species life. The cause is the becoming a means of the activity of production which is an end and essential for the realization of his essence. Since work belongs to another it is imposed from the external and as a result the worker is lost in it. Thus, man is altered and estranged.

As a remedy Marx has recommended a new organization of society, Communism, the advent of which he anticipated necessarily. With the positive supersession of private property man would be able to engage in the activity of production freely. He would be able to identify himself with nature and society through socialized labor. This depends on the humanization of the objects of desire or nature in general and the humanization of crude natural senses through socialization. As a result, alienation would be overcome and man would realize his essence fully.

Chapter three has discussed Sartre's idea of alienation (we will summarize his idea briefly since we will return back to him in the next section.) By taking historical materialism as the sole truth of history he has shown how the totalizing movement of history emergence from individual praxis. He has also shown how individual praxis through its interaction with nature endangers alienation. This is caused by the negativity of worked matter which ,as counter-finality, annihilates the ends of praxis. As a result man is alienated through objectification. Sartre also has shown how scarcity as a contingent but necessary fact causes the estrangement of man by changing humans in to non-humans. He has also demonstrated the alienation of the worker in a capitalist society as a result of his determination by the exigency of the machine and the domination of the capitalist. Finally, Sartre has tried to establish that alienation can not be surmounted since it is an out come of the necessary structure of action.

### **4.2.2 Critique**

#### **Marx's Critique of Hegel**

Karl Marx polemically argues in the 'Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts' against Hegel's theory of alienation. He has three arguments against Hegel. The first denounces Hegel's theory of alienation as mystification while the second refuses to accept the Hegelean identification of alienation with objectification. Thirdly, Marx argues against the solution Hegel proposes for alienation.

According to Marx, Hegel's theory of alienation replaces the abstract and speculative alienation of self-consciousness for the real and actual alienation of man. Rather than treating and analyzing a concrete human being in a specific society, Hegel analyzed the universal and necessary movement of self-consciousness as a manifestation of Spirit. So that he ends up by retaining an abstract and idealistic picture of man and his alienation. Thus his theory of alienation explains not the alienation of real and actual man, rather of an abstract man. "For Hegel human nature, man, is equivalent to self -consciousness. All alienation of human nature is thus nothing but the alienation of self – consciousness" (Marx, 1844: 323) For Marx, as a result, Hegel's theory of alienation is a mystified theory which is unable to comprehend the alienation of real human being.

For Marx, Hegel is entirely wrong in equating alienation with objectification. Objectification causes the loss of the object, and entails alienation, for Marx, in a capitalist mode of production which is a necessary but specific stage of the development of man in history. The reason for

objectification to entail alienation in a capitalist mode of production is private property which alienated labor by reducing it in to a commodity. But when it comes to Hegel objectification necessarily engenders the alienation of man or self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is able to exist only through externalization. Not only is objectification necessary in the movement of self-consciousness, but things themselves come in to existence through this movement. The phenomenal world exists only as a moment of the movement of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness, by objectifying itself in things, make the existence of things real and conceives itself there in. However, self-consciousness takes the externalized self as object or the object as its self. Then, this movement leads to alienation since self-consciousness is not equal with its externalized self or the **object. Since it finds itself as other. So that it is estranged. Thus, alienation,** according to Hegel, is equal with objectification.

For Marx this act of equating alienation with objectification is entirely wrong. He thinks that objectification is necessary while it does not necessarily lead to alienation. There are three reasons according Marx which make for man to externalize and objectify himself necessarily. The first is that man is a natural being whose essence, thus, exists outside him in nature. So that he objectifies himself in order to be connected with this essence. Man is also a being who has a desire for objects which exist in the external. Thus, an appropriation through externalization makes him an objective being. Thirdly, as objective being man is also an object for another objective being, another man. So that objectification is necessary. However, it does not, according to Marx, entail alienation. Because the act of externalizing itself is a natural and objective activity for a being who is objective and natural. Since man objectifies objective capacities which he is endowed by nature, he is thereby not only not alienated but is affirming himself as a natural and objective being. So that the objects created as a result are the conformations of his essence. Marx, thus, writes:

*“When actual, corporeal man ... establishes his actual, objective essential capacities as alien objects through his externalization, the establishing is not the subject but the subjectivity of objective capacities whose action therefore also is objective. An objective being acts objectively and would not act objectively if objectivity did not lie in its essential nature. It creates and establishes only objects because it is established through objects, because it is fundamentally part of nature. In the act of establishing, this objective being does not therefore descend from its “pure activity” to the creating of the object, but its objective product merely confirms its objective activity ;its activity as that of an objective natural being” (ibid,325).*

Thus, one can see that Marx has demonstrated that objectification is the natural and objective activity of a natural and objective being, man, through which he realizes his objective capacities. This is clear and convincing. However we must ask whether man does not go beyond, in objectification, the realization of his objective capacities. After establishing his objective capacities- whether he does not take the objects created as his own essence? It seems that though objectification is a natural activity, man by taking the objects created, thus, as his own essence, is estranged. For he does not find himself in the objects i.e, he appears to himself through the objects both as same and other. This is, accordingly, what Marx missed or is unable to see and unwilling to accept. As a result, we can see that objectification necessarily leads to alienation.

Furthermore, Marx denounces the solution proposed by Hegel to overcome alienation. The remedy Hegel propagated is philosophy or absolute knowledge in which spirit comes to complete self-knowledge and realization. As a result, Spirit as a subject is reconciled with nature as a substance. From this follows the reconciliation of the in- itself and for- itself of self-consciousness. Through reason as the full realization of the self-knowledge of Spirit, self-consciousness also reaches a level of complete self – knowledge as a result of which the in-itself of self- consciousness is affirmed in the for itself and vice versa. Thus, alienation is overcome in movement of spirit. For Marx this overcoming is an act of philosophical imagination which practically means nothing for the individual who is suffering from real alienation. The individual in a specific society who is alienated as a result of alienated labor (from a Marxist point of view) is not made free in this movement of Spirit. For alienation is overcome by Hegel in thought only. Rather for Marx alienation can be overcome by a practical means which is informed by thought. It is a practical project the realization of which requires action.

For me two of the criticisms of Marx against Hegel are correct. It is evident that Hegel mystified his theory of alienation by explaining the alienation of self-consciousness and ignoring the alienation of real and concrete individual. Thus, one can say that Hegel's theory of alienation in this respect is significant only as a general concept of reference and not as one which unravels the condition of the individual in society. I also agree with Marx's rejection of Hegel's solution. For that solution is not different from a promise of a blessed life in heaven for a destituted man suffering in earth. It even seems short of that promise since the overcoming of alienation as a result of the self realization of Spirit promises to liberate man as thinking being while leaving his

practical life aside. Thus, I think that Marx is right and quite agree with him regarding these two criticisms.

### **A Response from a Hegelean Point of View**

However, I strongly disagree with Marx's rejection of Hegel's identification of alienation with objectification. For man is alienated through objectification as a result of which he is altered and becomes other. Objectification is necessary and man is inevitably alienated as a result of it. The necessity of objectification can be established easily or is established in the prior discussion. Self-consciousness can discover itself only through externalization, by objectifying itself in things and appearing to itself through them. Or man as a natural and objective being objectifies his natural capacities by producing objects. It is only when man, through his relation with objects, becomes an object and an object in the eye of another, that he is able to continue to exist and conceive himself as a self-consciousness or as a human being.

It can also be shown how objectification necessarily leads to alienation. Speaking from a Hegelean point of view, self-consciousness, after the act of objectification, takes the thing in which its self is imprinted as its genuine self i.e, the –for itself which is free and posits itself for itself as an absolutely self-certain and adequate being. However, the thing in which the self is objectified appears both the same and other to self-consciousness. It is same since the self is inscribed in it. It is other since it is an object different from self-consciousness. As a result, the thing marks the otherness of self-consciousness to itself. And speaking from the view point of Sartre, objectification necessarily causes alienation since man takes the thing produced as it own essence. After working out matter, objectifying himself in worked matter, man takes the product, which is radically different from him, as his being i.e. as an object which represent his essence. Since the object does not represent his essence rather is the radical other of man, he returns to himself, through the mediation of the object, as other. He is estranged. Thus, objectification entails alienation.

Jean Hyppolite argues against Marx on behalf of Hegel. For him to reject Hegel's identification of alienation with objectification in a way Marx did is an over – simplification of the philosophy of Hegel. It is reductionism which, as a result, ended up viewing alienation as caused by alienated labor only. For Hegel, according to Hyppolite, alienation is the necessary result of otherness which is the Dasién of life. The category of otherness is a fundamental structure that defines the

individual a priori. It defines the individual fact of existence independent of the period one lives or the particular situation one is found in. Thus, man, different from what Marx claimed, i.e., the alienation of man in capitalistic mode of production only, is alienated necessarily. Accordingly, Marx's theory of alienation is reductionist. He has claimed that objectification entails alienation 'only in capitalistic mode of production in which labor is alienated. On the basis of this Marx has rejected Hegel's identification of objectification with alienation. But when it comes to Hyppolite, not only the kind of objectification found in capitalistic mode of production, rather every form of objectification entails alienation since man becomes other through objectification. As a result, Hyppolite concludes that Marx has over simplified the philosophy of Hegel: It has over simplified reality in to the super structure of the economy which is its specific segment. In effect, this is equal with saying that Marx's theory of alienation is reductionist.

Thus, Hyppolite Writes:

*"... (Hegel) ... cannot have confused the historical alienation of the human Spirit with objectification without some valid reasons, other than those one might find in the economic structure of the period and the stage reached by the capitalist system. By objectifying himself in culture, the state, and human labor in general, man at the same time alienates himself, becomes other than himself, and discovers in this objectification an insurmountable degeneration which he must nevertheless try to overcome. This is a tension inseparable from existence, and it is Hegel's merit to have drawn attention to it and have preserved it in the very centre of human self-consciousness. On the other hand, one of the great difficulties of Marxism is its claim to overcome this tension in the more or less near future and hastily to attribute it to a particular phase of history. It is surely an over simplification to imagine that this tension can be reduced to a super-structure of the economic world. It is undeniable that the capitalist system represents a form of human alienation, but it can hardly be the only one. Is there not in love, in human relations, in the mutual recognition of men, in technology by means of which man creates and builds his world, and in the political and administration of the state, even where socialist, a representation of the self external to it self, a recognition of the self through the other which presupposes a kind of separation or alienation which one may continually seek to displace but which forever subsists and is consequently part of the very notion of the Absolute that is open to man?" (Hyppolite 1965; 87)*

Hyppolite here not only naked and repudiated the criticism of Marx, but also made what Hegel meant by alienation through objectification clear. The self created different objects in which it is objectified. These include objects for use (tools and consumer goods), objects for entertainment and communication like language ( in art and culture) and other objects like the state. The self does this by externalizing and objectifying itself in them. Finally, it takes these things to be its self, i.e to

be things which represent its being. However, they betray it by becoming independent, and ruling over and against it. Thus, it discovers its self as other through them. Therefore, objectification entails alienation.

Thus, we are able to establish the equality of objectification to alienation contrary to Marx. However, we must question whether the real meaning of objectification is that found in Hegel. This is to say that the term objectification in the real meaning of the term is not found in Hegel or rather the Hegelean objectification does not exhaust the whole meaning of objectification. The reason is that Hegel is talking about the objectification of self consciousness rather than of man. Thus, Marx is right in pointing out that the only kind of labor Hegel Knows is that of Mind. "Labor is man's coming-to-be for himself within externalization or externalized man. The only labor Hegel knows and recognizes is abstract, mental labor. So that which above all constitutes the essence of Philosophy- the externalization of man knowing himself or knowledge thinking itself. Hegel grasps as its essences" (Marx, 1844: 322). Thus objectification in Hegel retained a meaning related to the activity of mind in the forms of either seeking recognition, contemplating ideas or creating objects which mainly require thinking. Though nothing can be created with out mind, to take mind as a full human being is incorrect. There is such thing called body with legs and arms, full of blood and which, by using mind only as an organizing principle, can act and produce. Thus, to the abstract labor of mind exists manual labor and objectification is the activity of both. Except in activities like pure thinking, the labor of mind is real only through manual labor. Hence, to the extent that Hegel equated labor to the activity of thinking, what he meant by objectification is incomplete and thus does not render alienation fully intelligible. For it is not as a mere thinking being that man is alienated rather as a full human being.

### **Alienation from the Viewpoint of Sartre**

We find the whole aspects of objectification in Sartre's theory of alienation. Not only in accounting objectification through both manual and mental labors, but in other respects also Sartre compensates for what Hegel and Marx lacked. On the one hand, he agrees with Hegel that objectification entails alienation. However, the labor which objectifies constitutes or is constituted by both mental and manual activities. This he called praxis. On the other hand, Sartre treats the alienation of real man in a specific society. So that he escapes from the Hegelean tendency of mystification and becomes closer to Marx who envisaged the reality of the world through the

active relatedness of man to nature, praxis. Furthermore, Sartre acknowledged Marx's theory of alienation and incorporated it in his theory. For estrangement of man caused by alienated labor in the specific level of history, capitalism, is alienation as exploitation and capable of being removed. However, it is not what Sartre calls fundamental alienation which, just like Hegel, he identified with objectification. As a result, Sartre's theory of alienation can be considered as a synthesis of the theories of alienation of Hegel and Marx. It is a theory of alienation in which he revised Hegel from a Marxist point of view or developed Marx from a Hegelean point of view. Nonetheless, Sartre disagrees from both in refusing to accept the possibility of de-alienation. For him alienation is the necessary aspect of existence and as such can not be over come.

For Sartre the genuine intelligibility of the world is possible only as history which is a totalizing movement. The reality of this totalizing movement of history emerges from praxis which is its ultimate foundation. According to Sartre, Historical Materialism is the only philosophy capable of comprehending the totalising movement of history and individual praxis by means of dialectical reason.

What is central to Sartre's historical materialism is the notion of totalisation. Totalisation is a developing synthesizing movement that unifies the diversified elements of the field. It emerges from individual praxis which is forced by need, as lack, to interact with the natural environment. The multiplicities of individual praxis give rise to history as a totalizing movement which totalises them. The totalizing movement as a synthetic development has, whether in individual praxis or history generally, some essential moments owing to which it is able to unify the dispersed elements of the field. This includes determination as negation, the negation of the negation as affirmation, differentiation, unification and contradiction as the inherent aspect of the movement. On the general level of history, the resultant nature of the movement as conditioned by past situations is one of the most significant aspect of the dialectical movement. Finally, historical materialism is a philosophy of monism that conceives the individual as a material being with material needs and nature as a material entity to be worked up on. In relation to this Sartre has claimed that though every existence in universe including man is material, man as a free human being is the ultimate reality of the world. However, we can criticize Sartre for not establishing man, who is free being, as the reality of the world. For the ultimate outcome of his dialectic is the definition and destruction of man by the supremacy of worked up on matter. Furthermore, historical materialism is a

philosophy in which action, being, and thought are synthesized through the transcendence of their own contradictions.

Sartre's idea of alienation is embedded in the realization of individual praxis. The individual, for Sartre is a being with its own end projected into the future. The individual is also a being related to other human beings reciprocally. Reciprocity is a fundamental human relation in which individuals recognize the end and praxis of each other. Reciprocity is a relationship of interiority as opposed to a relation of exteriority which is conditioned and determined by worked up matter. The individual praxis must interact with the natural environment for its realization. For Sartre the natural environment is an inert- a material totality without its own principle and force of movement. The individual praxis, in order to procure what it needs for self preservation, unifies the environment. It can do this by changing itself into an inertia so that he can overcome the resistance of the object and unify it. By becoming an inertia the individual is reduced to a material entity with force and capable of acting on the environment. AS a result of the unifying movement of praxis the inert is changed into a practico- inert which is worked up on matter organized and unified by praxis- a totality that is a residual of past praxis. From this also arises what Sartre calls practical multiplicity which is the relation of worked matter to itself through the mediation of praxis and which determines praxis severely.

On the basis of this we can understand Sartre's idea of alienation. Primarily the individual is related to both other human beings and to the natural environment through the bonds of interiority. To the material environment he is directly related through need while reciprocity connects him to other individuals. However, this relation of interiority is penetrated and determined by the forces of exteriority-the negativity of worked up on matter. Praxis unifies the natural environment so that the individual can get what it needs. Nonetheless, the negativity of worked matter rebounds the inertia of praxis and sets it against itself. The negativity of worked matter is a totality inherent in matter that annihilates the ends of praxis as counter-finality. This is alienation through objectification. For counter-finality to be possible Sartre has mentioned three prerequisites. The negativity of matter as a natural disposition, a fatality of praxis that destroys the environment systematically, and the communal and everyday aspect of this praxis. As a result the praxis of the individual in its realization, objectification, is counter attacked by the negativity of worked matter. Thus, it is deprived of its finality- its end. This is, for Sartre, fundamental alienation in which man losses

himself through objectification. We can see that Sartre has established the reality of praxis, the negativity of worked matter and how praxis loses its ends by the counter-finality of worked matter. As a result, one can not but agree with Sartre's identification of alienation with objectification. Thus, we can see that just like Hegel but in a more profound and realist manner (it is to say that not idealistically but by analyzing praxis as the ultimate foundation of reality) Sartre is able to show how objectification entails alienation.

There are two other kinds of alienation in Sartre. The first is the result of the negative effect of scarcity against reciprocity. Scarcity is a lived fact that reduces everyone in to a surplus man that can be avoided. Even if it is a contingent fact it assumes a status of necessity since there is no any means so far to overcome it. Scarcity creates antagonism between men and risk their life by making the possibility of extinction concrete. Each regards the other responsible for this risk and tries to secure his existence at the expense of the other. Thus rather than reciprocity in which men recognize the ends of the other, the category of otherness as the structure of the relation of men came into being. Each sees the other as anti-human and becomes the other of himself since he endangers his own life. Scarcity, hence, altered men by changing them in to non-human so that they are alienated. We can relate Sartre's idea of alienation through Scarcity to Hegel's parable of the master and slave.

The slave is primary the slave of not the master but of life. It is because he is unable to boldly face the danger of life that he is not recognized even as a self and become the slave of the master who on the contrary, by risking his life till death is recognized as a self capable of negating the attacks of everyday life. Then, if we say scarcity antagonized men by endangering their life, we can also say that while the master is able to over come or boldly face this war of all against all, the slave failed to do so. Thus, the master is recognized as such because he fought and over other men in a structure of relationship defined by scarcity. By risking his life till death i.e. by becoming non-human, he become a master. On the contrary the slave is defeated and became a slave of the master. Though the analogy may seem far fetched, it makes the interpretation of the master slave relation form the point of view of scarcity possible. In a way this can also be considered as the concretization of the Hegelean dialectic.

The last kind of alienation in Sartre is alienation as exploitation. This is reminiscent of Marx's idea of alienation. It takes the specific forms of the exploitation of the worker in his relation to the machine and the owner of the means of production in capitalist class society. The worker is changed in to a tool as a result of the compulsive demand of the machines. The exigency of the machine defines the worker as its tool and robs him of his end. As a result, the worker degenerates to the level of becoming non-human. The capitalist also exploits the worker and deprives him of his ends, since the latter is forced to work for the realization of the ends of the capitalist. Thus, the bond of reciprocity is broken and the worker is not only not recognized as a human being with a project, rather is made to live without an end and changed in to a mere living object. What is evident in both relationship is the counter- finality of the exigency of the machine and the ends of the capitalist against the end and survival of the worker. Exploitation, therefore, alienates man by altering him in to a tool.

### **4.3 Conclusion**

As far as I am concerned, Sartre's idea of alienation is strongly convincing. Not only in comparison to Hegel and Marx but in its own terms as well. He surpasses Hegel by working out the detailed movement of praxis in which objectification entails alienation. So rather than identifying alienation with objectification and showing its general movement, Sartre is able to demonstrate how objectification engenders alienation. Sartre's idea of alienation also goes beyond that of Hegel in that it explains two other kinds of alienation. When it comes to that of Marx, Sartre is able to show the equivalence of alienation with objectification. This, in effect, is equal with showing the inadequacy of Marx's idea of alienation. Sartre also has encompassed Marx's theory of alienation since alienation is also caused by exploitation. Like Marx for whom alienation would be removed definitely with the dissolution of the system of capitalism, Sartre also says that alienation as exploitation can be overcome. The other basic difference between Sartre on the one hand and Marx and Hegel on the other is the problem of the overcoming of alienation. For Sartre alienation can not be overcome.

As a result in this paper, I argue that Sartre's idea of alienation is correct and convincing while Marx missed the essential nature of alienation and Hegel is right to a greater extent. Since we have established the identity of alienation with objectification as its fundamental structure, it is evident that Marx, by overlooking this fact, missed the essential nature of alienation. What we find in Marx

is a reduction theory of alienation that grasps only its specific form. When it comes to Hegel one can see that he grasped the essential nature of alienation through objectification. But by limiting objectification to mental activity and the spiritual part of life, Hegel confines alienation to a certain dimension of life ignoring the main part, practical life. We accuse him of ignoring real individuals and treating self-consciousness as if it is a full human being. That means the mystified and idealized nature of Hegel's treatment of alienation. And also the solution he proposed in which alienation is over come in thinking only. This last point strengthen Sartre's conviction that fundamental alienation can not be over come. After describing a situation in which man, beside the realization of his ends, is forced to recognize the becoming other of his action as a result of the dictates of necessity, Sartre writes the following which we can take as a concluding remark.

*“Should we describe this as alienation? Obviously we should, in that he returns to himself as other. However, a distinction must be made: alienation in the Marxist sense begins with exploitation. Should we go back to Hegel who sees alienation as a constant characteristic of all kinds of objectification? Yes and no. We must recognize that the original relation between praxis as totalization and materiality as passivity obliges man to objectivity himself in a milieu which is not his own, and to treat an inorganic totality as his own objective reality. It is this relation between interiority and exteriority which originally constituted praxis as a relation of the organism to its material environment, and there can be no doubt that as soon as man begins to designate himself not as the mere reproduction of his life, but as the ensemble of products which reproduce his life, he discovers himself as other in the world of objectivity: totalizes matter, as inert objectification perpetuated by inertia, is in effect non- human or even anti-human. All of us spend our lives engraving our maleficent image on things, and it fascinates and bewilders us if we try to understand our selves through it, although we are ourselves the totalizing movement which results in this particular objectification. (Sartre, 1960: 22) .*

So that I argue on the basis of Sartre that alienation is the necessary out-come of the realization of praxis. In order to secure their existence as well as realize their project men must interact with nature and objectify themselves by working on matter. However, the negativity of matter annihilates praxis and falsifies the ends of praxis as counter finality. As a result men are fundamentally alienated. It is also evident that scarcity alters man through antagonism and conflict. It antagonizes men in to non-humans by destroying inter-subjectivity through which men become humans. Furthermore, man is alienated in a capitalist society through his relation with the machine and the capitalist. I also agree with Sartre that alienation can not be overcome. The alienation caused by the relations of the worker to the machine and the capitalist can be over come since it is

possible to change that relation by organizing society differently like in socialism. So that Marx is right in saying that alienation i.e. the only one he recognized and which is caused by alienated labor can be overcome when alienated labor is replaced by free human labor in a communist society. It is still possible to conceive the overcoming of alienation that is caused by scarcity. For it is not entirely impossible to have a limitless material condition. However, it seems that overcoming fundamental alienation caused by objectification is hardly possible. For the necessity of objectification together with the necessity of the counter-finality of worked matter makes alienation necessary and at the same time irresolvable. Since we cannot not act and produce our life, we are condemned by necessity to be alienated.

To conclude, I have argued that Sartre's idea of alienation is strongly convincing and Hegel is right to a large extent while Marx missed the essential character of alienation. I have tried to show the fundamentality of alienation which, as a result, defines and alters us to the extent of changing us in to non-human organisms or a tool. I have tried to establish the identity of alienation with objectification. This can be considered as the thesis of the paper. I have also tried to show the existence of two other kinds of alienation which are caused by scarcity and alienated labor. While it is possible to overcome the alienation caused by alienated labor and also plausible to imagine resolving the alienation caused by scarcity, I have tried to show, on the basis of the views of Sartre, that fundamental alienation is un-overcomeable.

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