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Department of Public Administration and Development
Management

Critical Assessment of the Practices and Challenges of Fighting Corruption in Urban Land Governance: The case of Bole Sub-city, Addis Ababa City Administration

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June, 2019
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Challenges of Fighting

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This is to certify that the thesis prepared by Zenamarkos Mesfin entitled “**Critical Assessment of the Practices and Challenges of Corruption in Urban Land Governance: The case of Bole Sub-city, Addis Ababa City Administration**”, which is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters in Public Management and Policy (MPMP), complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

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Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

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Acronyms

TI	Transparency International
AUCPCC	African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
UNCAC	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index

Abstract

The objective of this study was to investigate the practices and challenges of corruption in urban land governance in the case of Bole Sub-city Land Management Bureau of Addis Ababa City Administration. The study employed both quantitative and qualitative approach of data collection and analysis. Structured questionnaires and key informant interview guide were administered in data collection. 400 (Four Hundred) customers of the Bureau were sampled using simple random sampling technique. Whereas, non- random technique were used for selecting 8 key interviewees. Secondary data from annual report, performance reports, and different legislations were also used. Analysis was done using SPSS version .The findings characterizes the corruption within the Bureau as very deep rooted and challenging which evident from the greater portion of the respondents , the personal experience of corrupt act of their close persons, the greatest percentage of the respondents close person , the respondents believed that engineers of the Bureau were the most vulnerable to corruption, the greatest percentage of the respondent customers perceived the Bureau as the most corrupt bureau compared to other public service delivery offices within the sub-city. Corruption is so challenging within the sub city since the sub-city council is just a rubberstamp and not a true voice of the public which could not held the executive accountable. Empowering the sub city's council, making land laws accessible in a consolidated form , building strong institutional capacity of internal audit and undercover operation to detect the crime of corruption are the recommendations of this study.

CHAPTER ONE

1.1. Background of the study

In as much as there is no internationally accepted single definition of corruption, different international organizations and multilateral conventions defined it differently. The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), for instance, defines corruption as “acts and practices, including related offences proscribed” in the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) ; The World Bank on its part defined the it as “abuse of public office for private gain” (1997:8), while the Transparency International (TI) which is an international alliance against corruption defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”(2009,p.14). UNCAC (2016) contended that corruption is one of the key factors behind the poor service delivery and development outcomes observed in many developing countries, especially in Africa. And also the Commission blames corruption to be a major obstacle to poverty alleviation in these countries, and TI (2019) also contends that if it goes largely unchecked, corruption could be a threat to democratic governance around the world. Despite its contested conceptions, there is an international perception of corruption as one of the many evils of public administration.

The type of political power sharing has an impact on the nature of corruption even within the same country. Decentralization, as power sharing device, empowers local governments with a number of legal, administrative, financial and political powers. Indeed, the extent and type of corruption at the center and local administration machineries are not one and the same. That is why TI (2009) explains that the better accessibility and proximity of local governments than the central once to the people and the discretion that local officials have in exercising their functions can make local government highly vulnerable to corruption. Therefore, local governments could be the prime locus of corruption in a country.

Given the considerable number of countries which have adopted federalism as form of government, including Ethiopia, and the greater risk of local governments to involve in corruption , it is worth studying the impact of corruption on local governance, and to examine whether decentralization can help in combating t corruption particularly at the local level.

1.2. Statement of the problem

According to TI 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest scoring region on the spectrum, and has been lagged behind in transforming its fight against corruption into a meaningful result. Ethiopia is not an exception to this general trend of the Sub-Saharan African countries which have failed to build effective civil service machinery and to minimize the level of consequences of corruption. On the one hand, the 2018 CPI prepared by TI puts Ethiopia at the rank of 114 out of 180 countries with a score of 34 points out of 100 which shows the deep rooted problems of corruption in the country. On the other hand, the Mo Ibrahim Governance Index of the 2018 on its part puts Ethiopia at the rank of 26 out of 54 countries with a score of 36.5 points out of 100 in Transparency and Accountability which is the sub-indicator Safety and Rule of Law governance indicator. Here again, this African specific governance indicator shows it is high time for the country to step up its fight against this cancer of governance and to bring about excellence in public administration based on surgically formulated policies.

Nonetheless, the above two rankings of Ethiopia on the level of corruption are crude as long as it is the aggregate result of the nine regional states and two city administrations. Towards unpacking this study will focus on investigating the level and challenges corruption at local level with particular reference to urban land administration in the case of Bole sub-city, Addis Ababa. The study focuses on the urban land sector because the r the General Auditor of the Addis Ababa City Administration 2018/2019 report puts corruption in land sector as one of the top susceptible sectors to corruption in the city. Thus, there is a clear call for worth researching the practices and challenges of corruption in urban land governance in the case of Bole Sub-city of Addis Ababa City Administration; which is the heart beat of the country and city respectively.

1.3. Objective of the study

1.3.1. General Objective

The general objective of the study is to examine and hinder the practices and challenges of corruption in urban land governance in the case of Bole Sub-city of Addis Ababa City Administration.

1.3.2. Specific objectives

The specific objectives of the study are to:

- Examine the correlation between decentralization and corruption with specific reference to the decentralization in the urban land sector.
- Assess the prevalence of corruption in land administration in Bole Sub-city, Addis Ababa. .
- identify the challenges and predicaments of corruption in land administration
- To analyze the impact of corruption in urban land on local governance within Bole Sub-city, Addis Ababa. To suggest alternative policy options for combating corruption in the urban land administration in Addis Ababa.

1.4. Basic research questions

The following are the basic research questions of this study:

1. How decentralization helps for combating corruption at local government level?
2. What are the challenges of corruption in land administration in the Bole Sub-city of Addis Ababa?
3. How does the level and practices of corruption in land administration affect the local governance in Bole sub city of Addis Ababa?
4. What are the alternative policy and institutional options for tackling the problems of corruption in the land sector in Addis Ababa?

Scope of the Study

The scope of this research, considering the objectivity of the study and the elements of the process included, can be defined with different angles in order to answer the research question. The study is limited to Bole Sub-city land administration bureau. The scope of this study will analyze internal factors more than external ones. The office needs to have good governance in order to achieve successful government policy and anti-corruption movement. This paper is not focusing on analyzing the basics of the corruption and why local governance needed in the first place in bole sub city as it is not consider being important for the problem field in this thesis.

1.5. Significance of the study

The findings of this research would be used as an input for the policy makers of the city and country to formulate policies, design strategy or promulgate laws which would inhibit the negative effects of corruption to the minimal level. In addition, the study would contribute a new perspective and ideas for the development of a theory which governs the correlation between corruption and local governance.

1.6. Organization of the Study

This study will be organized into five chapters. The first chapter will present an introductory to the study. The second chapter dwells on the theoretical and empirical frameworks on the nexus between decentralization and corruption. It particularly uncovers the nature of corruption urban land and institutional options for combating it. The third chapter sets the methods of the research. The fourth chapter basically deals with data presentation, analysis and discussion,. The last 1 chapter will provide summary of findings, conclusion and possible recommendations that may arise from the study. .

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Theoretical Literature

2.1.1. Corruption Defined

Corruption is one of the many social phenomena which has no internationally accepted comprehensive definition. That is why different international organizations, scholars and legal jurisdictions defined it differently. In this section, some selected definitions of corruption are presented and analyzed as follows.

The 2005 United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) does not define corruption in the traditional way of legal instruments by defining it in the definition part of the instrument or allocating single article which defines the term. The UNCAC (2005) defines the term corruption implicitly in the preamble of the convention. It defines corruption as “...that the illicit acquisition of personal wealth” (Preamble , para.7). This definition pushes the limit of the traditional sphere of corruption which is only limited to the malpractices by the public officials and breach of trust in the private sector by private individuals also amount to corruption accordingly.

The 2005 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), defines corruption as “acts and practices, including related offences proscribed” in the convention. The convention implicitly at Article 8 defines corruption as illicit enrichment since an offence in the domestic law which is defined as illicit enrichment is considered as an act of corruption for the usage of the term corruption in the convention (AUCPCC ,2005).

World Bank (WB) defined corruption as “an abuse of public authority for the purpose of acquiring personal gain” (p.89), which is limited to the breach of trust by public officials or civil servants in the public sector with the intention of enriching themselves for financial or other gain. As per the WB definition, corruption is excluded from the private sector.

Transparency International (2009), an organization which is dedicated for the fight against corruption worldwide, defined corruption as “The abuse of entrusted power for private gain”

(p.14), which a more comprehensive definition since includes breach of trust by both the officials and employees of the public and private sector.

Fortunately, the UNCAC (2005) also expands the boundary of the term to include other actors in the political economy in addition to the ones public sectors. The convention declares that “ Each State Party shall take measures, in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to prevent corruption involving the private sector, enhance accounting and auditing standards in the private sector and, where appropriate, provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal penalties for failure to comply with such measures.” ,which equivocally includes the private sector in the term corruption (Article 12 ,UNCAC 2005).Similarly, the 2005 AUCPCC includes corruption in the private sector at Article 11 and states that state parties to the convention are bound to take all necessary measures to suppress corruption by and in the private sector.

The FDRE Corruption Crimes Proclamation, Proclamation Number 881/2015, does not defined the term corruption, but listed out crimes of corruption from Article 9 to Article 33 in Chapter Two. Since Ethiopia is a party to both the 2005 AUCPCC and UNCAC anti-corruption conventions , it is quite obvious that the term corruption for the purpose of the interpretation in the .proclamations connotes as illicit enrichment or acquisition of personal wealth ; which a definition given by AUCPCC and UNCAC.

For the purpose of this research, the definition adopted by Proclamation Number 881/2015 is the working definition of the term corruption since it is this proclamation which is currently being enforced in the investigation and prosecution of corruption crimes in the geographical area of the research.

2.1.2. Causes of Corruption

Understanding the root cause of corruption is an indispensable input for the design and implementation of anti-corruption policy, strategy and laws. And hence a number of scholars have attempted to formulate a theory which could explain the driving force behind corruption. As a result, three major explanations or perspective have developed over the years.

2.1.2.1. Principal-Agent Model

This model considers the person with absolute power, who leads government and motivate officials as principal. The officials who are being motivated by the principal to be honest are considered to be agents by the model and one of such views is the economic theory of crime (Shah,2006).According to Becker (1968) as cited by Shah (2006) self-interested public officials act on the principle of cost benefit analysis and seek out or accept bribes if the gains from the corrupt act outweighs the risk associated with the corrupt act which is criminal punishment. Accordingly ,the antidotes for the crime of corruption are :

- Reducing the number of transactions over which public officials have discretion;
- Reducing the scope of gains from each transaction;
- increasing the probability for detection; and
- Increasing the penalty for corrupt activities.

2.1.2.2. The New Public Management (NPM) Model

Shah (2006) explained that the misalignment among the public sector mandate, its environment, and the organizational culture and capacity are the root causes of government officials being indulging in rent-seeking behaviors, with little opportunity for citizens to constrain government behavior and with less or no accountability. This view of NPM proposes holding government officials accountable by a contract and public servants would be in their position as long as they deliver their obligation under the contract.

2.1.2.3. Neo institutional economics Approach

The fact that citizens are not empowered enough to held government officials accountable or if doing so results in high transaction cost grant public officials to involve in corrupt acts. Neo-institutional economics treats citizens as principals and public officials as agents. Principals have bounded rationality since they make decision based on the incomplete information they have at their disposal. They face high transaction costs in acquiring and processing more information. In contrast, agents (public officials) are better informed. This asymmetry of information allows agents to indulge in opportunistic behavior that goes unchecked because of the high transaction costs faced by principals and the lack of adequate countervailing institutions

to enforce accountable governance. Since the asymmetry of information is the cause of corruption, this approach recommends citizen empowerment through devolution, citizens' charters, bills of rights, elections, and other forms of civic engagement assumes critical importance in combating corruption, because it may have a significant impact on the incentives faced by public officials to be responsive to public interest (Shah ,2006).

2.1.3. Governance Concepts

2.1.3.1. Governance Defined

Kaufmann Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) explained that though the concept of governance is widely discussed among policy makers and scholars, there is as yet no strong consensus around a single definition of governance or institutional quality. As a result ,various authors and organizations have produced a wide array of definitions.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines governance as “the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels, which comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences” (UNDP 2007,p128).And United Nations Economic and Social Commission (UNESCO) define the term governance narrowly as the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented or not implemented. (UNESCO ,2007).

Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) defined the term by combining the wide and narrow definitions of governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies;and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them” (Kaufmann Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010 p.4) .And they construct two measures of governance corresponding to each of these three areas, resulting in a total of six dimensions of governance:

(a) The process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced:

1. Voice and Accountability (VA) which is capturing perceptions of the extent to which a

country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression,

2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (PV)) which is capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional,

(b) The capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies:

3. Government Effectiveness (GE) which is capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation,

4. Regulatory Quality (RQ) which is capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.

(c) The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies

5. Rule of Law (RL) which is capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies

6. Control of Corruption (CC) which is capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests (Kaufmann Kraay and Mastruzzi ,2010).

The above six indicators have been indispensable to measure governance ;whether it is good or bad. In a more detailed explanation of good governance is provided by UNDP as “the very concept of ‘good governance’ at local levels denotes quality, effectiveness and efficiency of local administration and public service delivery; the quality of local public policy and decision-making procedures, their inclusiveness, their transparency, and their accountability; and the manner in which power and authority are exercised at the local level” (UNDP 2008,P.5).

In this research, the term governance adopts the definition provided by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010) “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised ” since it includes both the narrow and wider view of governance.

2.1.3.2. Decentralization Definition and Types

UNDP (1997) defines decentralization, or decentralizing governance as “the restructuring or reorganization of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity, thus increasing the overall quality and effectiveness of the system of governance, while increasing the authority and capacities of sub-national levels” (Page 4). The rationale behind decentralization is to enable good governance to flourish by increasing people's participation in economic, social and political decisions, empowerment and enhancing government responsiveness, transparency and accountability .The effects of decentralization on good governance depend to a large extent on the form and nature of the decentralization involved in the particular country (UNDP, 1997).

Accordingly, there four forms decentralization and namely: Devolution, Delegation, Deconcentration, Divestment/Privatization

I) Devolution

In this type of decentralization ,the lower-level units, such as provincial, district, local authorities that are legally constituted as separate governance bodies. The transfer of authorities to such units is often referred to as devolution and is the most common understanding of genuine decentralization. Through devolution, the central government relinquishes certain functions or creates new units of government that are outside its direct control.

II) Delegation

In this type of decentralization ,the semi-autonomous lower-level units, such as urban or regional development corporations to whom aspects of governance are delegated through legislation or under contract. This is a fairly common variant of decentralization that stops short of devolution, but involves significant delegation of authorities and responsibilities. Delegation refers to the transfer of government decision-making and administrative authority and/or responsibility for carefully spelled out tasks to institutions and organizations that are either under government indirect control or semi-independent. Most typically, delegation is by the central government to semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the government but

legally accountable to it, such as state owned enterprises and urban or regional development corporations.

III) Deconcentration

In this type of decentralization, sub-ordinate lower-level units or sub-units, such as regional, district or local offices of the central administration or service delivery organization delegate authority in policy, financial and administrative matters without any significant independent local inputs. It involves the transfer of authority for specific decision-making, financial and management functions by administrative means to different levels under the same jurisdictional authority of the central government.

IV) Divestment/Privatization

In this type of decentralization, units external to the formal governmental structure (nongovernmental or private), such as NGOs, corporations and companies. While sometimes included in discussions of decentralization, the nature of these transfers is not level-specific, i.e., transfers could occur at the same level, which is often the central one. These phenomena are best not treated as forms of decentralization, but of divestment. Divestment occurs when planning and administrative responsibility or other public functions are transferred from government to voluntary, private, or non-government institutions (UNDP, 1997). Below is Table 2.1 which displays the types of decentralization.

Table 2.1 .Types of Decentralization

Aspect of Governance transferred or shared	Aspect of Governance transferred or shared			Generic name
	Political (policy or decision making)	Economic or financial resource management	Administration and service delivery	
Autonomous lower- level units	Devolution	Devolution	Devolution	Devolution
Semi-autonomous lower-level units	Delegation	Delegation	Delegation	Delegation
Sub-ordinate	Directing	Allocating	Tasking	Deconcentration
External units	Deregulation	Privatization	Contracting	Divestment

Source : UNDP, Decentralized Governance Programme: Strengthening Capacity for People-Centered Development, Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau for Development Policy, September 1997, Annex #, Box 2, p. 33

2.1.3.3. Local Governance

Anwar and Sana (2006) defined local governance as the formulation and execution of collective action at the local level. Thus, it encompasses the direct and indirect roles of formal institutions of local government and government hierarchies, as well as the roles of informal norms, networks, community organizations, and neighborhood associations in pursuing collective action by defining the framework for citizen-citizen and citizen-state interactions, collective decision making, and delivery of local public services.

Whereas local governments are institutions which are the results of legislative act. Anwar and Sana (2006) explained that Local Government refers to specific institutions or entities created by national constitutions like the ones in Brazil, Denmark, France, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden, by state constitutions like the local governments in Australia, the United States, by ordinary legislation of a higher level of central government which the case of local governments in New Zealand and the United Kingdom, by provincial or state legislation like in Canada, Pakistan , or by executive order like the case of China and the purpose of forming local governments is to deliver a range of services in a geographical delineated area.

The term local governance and decentralization does not connote the same concept always. UNDP (2008) asserted that decentralization is primarily a national political, legislative, institutional and fiscal process. While local governance can be affected by decentralization processes, for example, if local governments are expected to provide services formerly offered through national organizations, it may or may not be accompanied by decentralization, representative or participatory democratic processes, transparency, accountability or other defining characteristics of 'good' local governance.

2.1.3.4. Urban Land Governance

Given the paramount importance of land in the political economy of land , its calls for a special attention. The contemporary rapid urbanization almost in every and each part of the world forces

policy makers both at local, national and global level to put a greater emphasis on the issue of urban governance. Alemie , Zevenbergen and Bennett (2015) explained that urban lands have high demand in any part of the world because of the ongoing urbanization along with the increasing population for the purpose of residence, green areas, investment, infrastructure, and social services.

It is this high demand and scarcity of urban land that makes urban land governance susceptible to corruption. Burns, Deininger, Selod and etal. (2010) explained that land in general and urban land in particular is among all sectors, is susceptible for corruption due to it is a valuable asset. Hence, this value creates a door for corruption for those individuals who have such legal power like government officials since the gain from corrupt act outweighs the risk of being caught and punished. The demand for land and its scarcity also contribute as factors for bad good governance of land administration and management system.

Transparency International (2011) explained that land governance is fundamentally about understanding power and the political economy of land. It involves the rules, processes and structures through which decisions are made about the use of and control over land, the manner in which the decisions are implemented and enforced, and the way that competing interests in land are managed. Land governance encompasses different decision-makers, processes and structures, including statutory, customary and religious institutions. When taken together as a system, land governance is ultimately centered on how people use and interact with land.

Similarly , the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2005) defined land governance as the process of determining, recording and disseminating information about the ownership, value and use of land when implementing land management policies .

Therefore, Urban Land Governance is one of the public services provided by local governments since one of the purposes of local governance is providing public service in an efficient and effective way.

2.1.4. Corruption and Local Governance

The debate on the correlation between corruption and local governance (decentralization) is not a settled issue among scholars and policy practitioners. Shah (2006) summarized the arguments for and against the assertion that local governance breeds corruption as follows.

I) **Localization Breeds Corruption**

Personalism Vito Tanzi (1995) as cited by Shah (2006) argued that localization brings officials in close contact with citizens. This promotes personalism and reduces professionalism and arms length relationships. Personalism in his view breeds corruption as officials pay greater attention to individual citizen needs and disregard public interest.

Weak monitoring and vertical controls. (Prud'homme 1995) as cited by Shah (2006) argued that Impediments to corrupt practices also decrease as local politicians and bureaucrats collude to advance narrow self-interests while the effectiveness of auditing agencies and monitoring from the central level wanes. Localization may increase the motivation for corruption among public officials by creating an impression that they are subject to lower monitoring, control and supervision Shah (2006) . This is the direct application of the economic theory crime (Principal-Agent Model) which considers the public officials as a rational being who calculate a risk benefit analysis and they tempted to involve in corruption since weak monitoring and auditing reduces the risk of being caught and punished.

Fiscal decentralization and overgrazing Triesman Treisman (1999,2000, 2002) as cited by Shah (2006) argues that decentralized federal systems tend to have higher corruption ratings due to (a) their larger size; (b)more likely to have separate police forces at both central and sub-national levels (which increases corruption due to overgrazing) and their greater propensity to have a regionally elected upper house of parliament with veto power (which also may increase corruption as regional governments may buy off these veto-players or have greater leverage to protect their ill-gotten gains).

Interest group capture: Opportunities for corruption increase due to a greater influence of interest groups at the local level (Prud'homme ,1995).

The relation between localization and corruption depends on the environment in which the decentralization and local governance are operating. Shah (2006) explained that the effect of decentralization on corruption when there is a local capture by political and bureaucratic elites. There is little disagreement in the literature that in such a situation, localization without fundamental electoral and land reforms, is likely to increase corruption. On the contrary, the perception of localization as a breeding ground for corruption in the presence of democratic participation and accountability is neither grounded in theory nor in evidence.

II) **Localization Limits Opportunities for Corruption**

Localization's ability to curtail corruption opportunities has been commonly based on the potential for greater accountability when the decision making is closer to the people. This line of thought is supported from the following perspectives:

a) Competition among local governments: Weingast (1995) and Arikan (2000) as cited by Shah (2006) argued that for mobile factors of production reinforces the accountability culture. Such enhanced accountability has the potential to reduce corruption.

b) Exit and voice mechanisms at the local level: There is a general agreement in the literature that localization can open up greater opportunities for voice and choice thereby making the public sector more responsive and accountable to citizens-voters. Furthermore, due to regional heterogeneity of political preferences localization may reduce the range of potential capture by a unique nationally dominant party (Shah, 2006).

c) Higher levels of information: Seabright (1996) as cited by Shah (2006) argues that accountability is always better at the local level, since local citizens who are better informed about government performance can vote these governments out of office. Under centralization people vote for parties or candidates partly on the basis of performance in other regions and on issues of national interest. As a result accountability is defused and potential for corruption increases. The decentralization of the delivery of anti-poverty programs in developing countries promotes cost effectiveness and reduces corruption, owing to the superior access of local governments to information on local costs and needs.

D) Lower expected gains from corruption but greater probability of detection and punishment: Shah (2006) argues administrative decentralization causes a loss in control to higher levels, thus curbing their incentives to monitor and detect corrupt activities. However, it also lowers the expected gains from corruption as, following decentralization, the number of individuals who are in charge of a single decision is reduced. It is then more likely that corrupt agents are called to bear the consequences of their actions. This is also the direct application of the economic theory crime (Principal-Agent Model).

e) Political decentralization: Ahlin (2000) as cited by Shah (2006) argued that deconcentration has the potential to increase corruption, whereas political decentralization has the potential to contain it due to inter jurisdictional competition. This may result from a reduction in the information asymmetry between bureaucrats and the politicians that appoint them vis a vis a politically centralized systems.

f) Fiscal decentralization. Huther and Shah (1998) using international cross-section and time series data find that fiscal decentralization is associated with enhanced quality of governance as measured by citizen participation, political and bureaucratic accountability, social justice, improved economic management and reduced corruption.

Shah (2006) concludes that a small yet growing body of theoretical and empirical literature confirms that localization offers significant potential in bringing greater accountability and responsiveness to the public sector at the local level and reducing the incidence of grand corruption.

2.2. Empirical Literature

In this section empirical works on corruption and urban land governance are discussed and analyzed.

A research undertaken by Gurgur and Shah (2005) *Localization and Corruption: Panacea or Pandora's Box?* Attempted to fill the literature gap by presenting a framework in identifying the drivers of corruption both conceptually and empirically in order to isolate the role of centralized

decision-making on corruption. The researchers found out that for a sample of 30 countries (developing and industrial), corruption is caused by: a lack of service-orientation in the public sector, weak democratic institutions, economic isolation (closed economy), colonial past, internal bureaucratic controls and centralized decision making. And Decentralization is found to have a negative impact on corruption, with the effect being stronger in unitary than in federal countries.

The study of Nixon and Monocal (2018) entitled *Local Governance, Decentralization and Corruption in Bangladesh and Nigeria* was conducted with the objective of deepening the understanding of the links between decentralized governance and corruption, and what that implied for the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures at the local level by exploring those connections in Bangladesh and Nigeria. The research explored the performance of decentralized governance arrangements in particular settings, analyzed the nature and dynamics of corruption in those settings, and identified implications of both for the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts at local levels. The research findings suggested a strong two-way relationship between the ways in which decentralized governance functions and the forms of corruption that are observed in local settings. The research also clarified the impact of local anti-corruption initiatives, and suggested that, if such measures were to be more effective they need to address the weaknesses and incoherence in the system of decentralized governance as it is implemented in a given setting. Such a focus that has thus far been rare in anti-corruption efforts in both Bangladesh and Nigeria.

The research conducted by Thitu (2006) entitled *The Impact of Corruption on Governance: An Appraisal of The Practice of The Rule of Law in Kenya* with the objective of investigate the nexus between the effects of corruption on good governance and the effectiveness of the rule of law as an anti-corruption strategy relied on data which were gathered from books, articles, case law, international and domestic instruments and internet sources. The research found out that corruption has certainly impacted negatively upon good governance and the rule of law, it is the collapse of the rule of law and the failure to uphold its standards and tenets that has created fertile grounds for corruption.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH Design & METHODOLOGY

3. Methodology of the Study

3.1. Description of the Selected Study Area

The study conducted in Bole Sub-City which is among the ten sub-cities of Addis Ababa City Administration. As per the Addis Ababa City Government Revised Charter, Proclamation No. 361/2003, Article 2(5), a Sub-City is positioned at a second administrative stratum of the City. The Charter granted autonomy for the sub-cities with respect to the execution of policies and laws adopted by the central leadership of the City. Article 30 of the Charter provides that a sub-City within the area allocated to it in accordance with the principle of decentralization, function as a municipality in accordance with the central leadership of the City, administer *woredas* that are within its bounds and are responsible for having law and order observed within their locality.

In order to execute policies and laws adopted by the federal government and central leadership of the City, Sub-Cities have organized a number of bureaus with a variety of mandate. The Land Administration Bureau is one of such bureaus organized within the ten sub-cities with a mandate of executing land policies and laws. Bole Sub-city Land Administration Bureau is organized with same mandate.

The study area, Bole Sub-City, is located at the eastern part of the metropolitan. It borders Yeka Sub-City in the North, Nifas Silk Laphto Sub-City and Kirkos Sub-City in the West, Akaki Kaliti Sub-City to the South and Oromiya Regional National State to the East. The Sub-city is the largest of the ten sub-cities in terms of total area it occupies. It has with 122.08 Square Kilometers of land area under its possession (BOFED, 2011). It is organized into 14 *woreda* which are mandated to execute laws and policies within their boundary. The 14 *woredas* are accountable to the central administration of the Sub-City which is headed by a Chief Executive Officer.

3.2. Research Method

3.2.1. Research Design

This research critically assessed the practices and challenges of corruption in urban land governance in the case of Bole Sub-city, Addis Ababa City Administration. And a case study design was selected by considering Bole Sub-city's Land Management Bureau a case. Kuamr (2011) explained that case study is the perfect design when the objective of the research to unveil the underlining causes for a certain phenomenon rather than confirming and quantifying. Therefore , case study research design was selected since the objective of this research was to acquire in-depth understanding of the practices and challenges of corruption in the Land Management Bureau of Bole Sub-city.

3.2.2. Research Approach

The study will adopt a descriptive cross sectional survey design. Both quantitative and qualitative research approaches will be employed to critically assess the practices and challenges of corruption on local governance in the case of Bole Sub-city, Addis Ababa City Administration in the administration of land. A cross-sectional study is preferable for this study since a cross-sectional survey method is applied for studies which gather data from a relatively large number of cases at a particular time (Kothari,2004).

3.2.3. Data Sources

In this research , both primary and secondary data were collected to critically assess the challenges and practices of corruption in Bole Sub-City Urban Management Bureau.

D) Primary data

- Primary data were collected from customers of Bole Sub-City Urban Management Bureau and the customers of the Bureau which is at sub-city level were approached and provided with a questionnaire right after they got a service..
- Primary data were also collected with the instrumentality of semi structured interview from 1 officer and 1 head of the Bureau, 2 members of Bole Sub-City Council , 2 senior officers of Addis Ababa City Government Urban Land Management Bureau, 1 senior

fellow at Federal Policy Studies and Research Institute , and an officer from Federal Anti-Corruption and Ethics Commission with the instrumentality of interview guide.

II) Secondary data

- The secondary data were collected from Official Annual Reports , Research Reports , Journals , Books and Internet sources to triangulate the data form primary sources.

3.2.4. Population and Sample of the Study

Data will be collected from the customers of the Bureau who are the population of the study.

3.2.5. Sampling Method of the Study

According to the 2018/2019 (2010 Ethiopian Fiscal Year) annual performance report of Bole Sub-City Land Management Bureau , the Bureau has provided its service to 68,105 customers. We will use this number of annual customers to calculate the sample size.

Yamane (1967:886) provides a simplified formula to calculate sample size.

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e^2)}$$

Where,

n = number of sample size,

N = Total number of study population

e = level of confidence to have in the data or degree of freedom which is set to be 95% for this study.

Using the above formula the sample size for **N**= 68,105 , **n** is calculated to be 397. The calculated **n** is increased to 400 to compensate for non-response.

3.2.6. Sources and Types of Data

All necessary primary data collected from of the 400 customers of land administration Bureau of Bole sub-city by means of structured questionnaire. Key informant interviews were held with **1** officer and **1** head of the Bureau, **2** members of Bole Sub-City Council , **2** senior officers of

Addis Ababa City Government Urban Land Management Bureau, **1** senior fellow at Ethiopian Policy Studies and Research Institute , and **1** officer from Federal Anti-Corruption and Ethics Commission with the instrumentality of interview guide. Both quantitative and qualitative data will be collected, analyzed, interpreted and presented.

3.3. Data Analysis Method

The primary data will be analyzed quantitatively by using the latest version of Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and descriptive statistics will be generated. Descriptive analysis will be done for each variable in the study by running frequencies, percentage and cross tabulation. Results will be presented thorough graphical techniques to depict the picture of magnitude and relationships of various study variables.

3.4. The Research's Ethical Consideration

The researcher will inform the respondents about the purpose of the research prior to collection of primary data. All secondary data sources which will be consulted in the course of the research work will be duly acknowledged and the researcher will also do his best to analyze the data with the highest possible ethical standard possible.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter deals with the presentation of data collected from the customers of Bole sub-city Land Management Bureau .The data were gathered from primary and secondary sources. The primary data were collected through questionnaire and interview. The secondary sources of data include annual reports, relevant legislations and policies.

4.1. Quantitative Data Presentation, Analysis and Discussion

4.1.1. Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Demographic characteristics of the respondent customers would help the reader to get a clear picture of the composition of the respondents. Thus, sex, age, marital status, education level and job status are the basic characteristics considered in this study as respondents' demographic characteristics. These demographic characteristics of the respondents are displayed below by Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Profiles of respondents

		Frequency	Percent
Sex	Female	177	44.3
	Male	223	55.8
	Total	400	100.0
Age	18-25	32	8.0
	26- 35	79	19.8
	36-50	152	38.0
	Above 50	137	34.3
	Total	400	100.0
Marital Status	Married	254	63.5
	Unmarried	126	31.5
	Divorced	20	5.0
	Total	400	100.0
Education Level	Read and Write	14	3.5
	From Grade 1-8	79	19.8
	From Grade 9-10	87	21.8
	From Level 1 - 4	117	29.3
	First Degree	62	15.5
	Second Degree	37	9.3
	Above Second Deg.	4	1.0
	Total	400	100.0
Job Status	Student	18	4.5
	Self-employee	147	36.8
	Government employee	94	23.5
	Private Organization Employee	102	25.5
	Unemployed	39	9.8
	Total	400	100.0

Source : Own Survey ,2019

As it is displayed by Table 4.1 above, in terms of sex, the majority of the respondents, 55.8 % (223) are males and the rest 44.3%(177) are females. The majority of the respondent customers 38.0%(152) were in the age group of 36-50 years and followed by the age group of above 50 years with 34.3% (137) .

In terms of marital status, the greatest portion of the respondents, 63.5% (254) were married and followed by the unmarried once with 31.5% (126). Those respondents who dissolved their marriage by divorce comprises of 5% (20) of the respondents.

Regarding the education level of the respondents , the greater portion of them 29.3% (117) were in level 1-4 and followed by Grade 9-10 category with 21.8% (87) of the respondents. The category of Grade 1-8 comprises of 19.8 % (79) of the respondents. The categories first degree ,second degree and above second degree comprise of 15.5 % , 9.3% and 1.0% , respectively .This means that the respondents who were holding university degree accounts for 25% of the total number of respondents.

Concerning the job status of the respondent customers , the greatest portion of the respondents, 36.8 % (147) were self-employed and followed by those respondents who were employees of private organization with 25.5%(102). Government employees who were served by the Bureau accounts for 23.5% (94) and student customers of the Bureau accounts for 4.5% (18). Those customers of the Bureau who had not a job comprises of 9.8% (39) of the respondents.

4.2.1. Corruption Perception in Urban Land Governance

One of the different ways to measure corruption is by gathering and analyzing the informed views of individuals and relevant stakeholders (World Bank ,2007). In this section , corruption in the Land Management Bureau of Bole Sub-city measured based on the informed views of the customers of the Bureau who have a firsthand information regarding public service delivery the bureau and practice , challenge and impact of corruption within the sub-city.

4.1.2.1. Personal Experience of Corruption

Since corruption by its very nature is concealed and hard to measure directly , seeking individuals opinion to detect and measure the heartbeat of corruption is indispensable endeavor in a scientific study. Therefore, respondents were asked about their personal or close family or friend experience of corrupt act during their interaction with the Bureau and Table 4.3 below displays their answer.

Table 4.3 Personal Experience of Corruption

		Frequency	Percent
Personal experience of corruption	Yes	88	22.0
	No	236	59.0
	I prefer not to say	76	19.0
	Total	400	100.0
Close person (family , relative or friend) experience of corruption	Yes	277	69.2
	No	99	24.8
	I prefer not to say	24	6.0
	Total	400	100.0

Source : Own Survey ,2019

As it is displayed by Table 4.3 above, the greatest portion of the respondent customers ,59% (236) , replied that they had no personal experience with corruption while they got a service from the Bureau .While they were asked about the experience of their close family and friends experience of corruption while seeking a service from the Bureau , their response shifted to the other side of the coin ; the greater portion of the respondents , 69.2 %(277) replied that they knew about the personal experience of corrupt act of their close persons . This is even greater percentage of respondents than 59% (236) who replied that they had no personal experience

with corruption. There is no possibility that both answers ,yes and No , to be true at the same time since there is no justifiable reason which insulates the respondents from corruption while their close family members and friends encounter with corruption since they got service from the same Bureau. The second reply which is 69.2 %(277) more acceptable since the respondents were trying to express their personal experience of corruption through their friends. In addition to that their response is quite compatible with Transparency International’s 2018 Corruption Perception Index in which Ethiopia got 34 points out of 100 points and put it at 114th out of 180 countries.

4.1.2.2. Type of Corruption

The 277 respondents who replied “Yes” to the question :Do you have any close person (family ,relative or friend) who you knew that he/she was asked to pay money in a form a bribe to get a service from the Bureau were asked about the type of corruption and their response is displayed below by Table 4.4 below.

Table 4.4 Type of Corruption

Type of Corruption	Frequency	Percent
Bribery	163	58.8
Embezzlement	44	15.9
Fraud	1	.4
Forgery	69	24.9
Total	277	100.0

Source : Own Survey ,2019

As it is displayed in Table 4.4 , the greatest portion of the 277 respondent customers , 58% (163) ,who replied “Yes” they knew a close person who is a victim of corruption , replied that bribery was the form of corruption they were subjected to get the service from the Bureau. Forgery which falsification of government documents is the second most common type of corruption as it is replied by 24.9 % (69) of the 277 respondents who knew the acts of corruption in the Bureau.

Identifying the most rampant form of corruption which is bribery is not enough to address or mitigate the challenges caused by corrupt acts in the Bureau. Therefore, the 163 respondents who replied Bribery ,were asked why the money was paid and how much was paid in the form bribery. And their responses are displayed by Table 4.5 below.

Table 4.5 The reason and amount of bribery

		Fre.	Percent
The reason behind payment of bribery	To get a title deed	81	49.7
	To get better compensation	3	1.8
	To speed up any service	75	46.0
	To have better evaluation of the land and construction	4	2.5
	Total	163	100.0
The amount of money paid in the form of bribery	From 1000 To 10,000 Br	2	1.2
	From 10,001 Birr to 25,000Br	23	14.1
	From 25,001 To 50,000Br	86	52.8
	From 50,001 To 100,000Br	37	22.7
	From 500,000 to 1,000,000Br	15	9.2
	Total	163	100.0

Source: Own survey,2019

As it is depicted by Table 4.5 above, the greater percentage, 49.7% (81), of the 163 respondents replied that they knew a bribe has been paid to get a title deed which is a certificate that proves a person possesses a plot of land and it is a very valuable piece of property ownership evidence since it is a rebuttable documentary evidence. It is the manifestation of this that title deed registration service is the most demanded service from the Bureau as it is displayed in Table 4.2 above. Therefore , if the service of title deed issuing the most in demand and vulnerable service,

the anticorruption effort of the city government in general and that of management of the Bureau should give a due attention to minimize and curb corruption.

The second popular reason for the payment of bribery among the 163 respondent customers of the bureau with 46.0% (75) was speeding up the service delivery as it displayed by Table 4.5 above. This is not surprising since long queue of customers, disorganized customers' files in offices of the bureau and unsatisfied customers has been observed by the researcher during the time of data gathering. This a clear manifestation of the inefficiency and lower quality of the service delivery of the Bureau. However, the Bureau in its six month performance report disclosed that it has achieved a customer satisfaction of 97%; which a far cry from the reality on the ground. Therefore, it becomes compulsory for the customers as any rational being to look for alternative which is paying a bribe and getting the service in a shorter period of time and reducing their opportunity cost of waiting in the crowded long queue of customers. Implementing the reform tools without any exception and improving the service delivery of the bureau is mandatory to combat and defeat corruption which would arise from a poor quality of public service delivery.

Concerning the amount of money paid in the form of a bribe, the greatest percentage of the respondents, 52%(86), replied that they new from 25,001 to 50,000Br had been paid as a bribe. 22.7 % (37) of replied that from 50,001 to 100,000Br had been paid. And 9.2% (15) of them said that a money between 500,000 to 1,000,000Br had been paid in the form of bribe which is very frustrating giving a large amount of money involved in the crime of corruption. According to Becker (1968) as cited by Shah (2006) self-interested public officials act on the principle of cost benefit analysis and seek out or accept bribes if the gains from the corrupt act outweighs the risk associated with the corrupt act which is criminal punishment. Proclamation 881/2005 of the FDRE, deals with crimes of corruption, at Article 10 provides that bribery is punishable with simple imprisonment of not less than one year and a fine not less than Birr three thousand . For an officer of the bureau whose salary is on average 10,000(fifteen thousand Birr), a bribe of 50,000 Birr is worth to risk personal liberty since the reward outweighs the punishment of a year and three thousand Birr given the low probability of being caught and punished before a

court of law. Therefore, corruption criminal laws should be amended so that they are strong enough to deter potential corrupt officials.

4.1.2.3. The Most Vulnerable To Commit Corruption

Identifying the most susceptible service delivery area , type of corruption , reason behind and amount of finance involved is instrumental to understand the nature and magnitude of corruption in the Bureau. To this end , the customers of the Bureau were asked to about the public servant within the Bureau who is more vulnerable and tempted to indulge in corrupt practice. Table 4.6 below displays their response.

Table 4.6. The Most Vulnerable To Commit Corruption

	Frequency	Percent
Supporting Staff	47	11.8
Engineers	155	38.8
Legal Officers	8	2.0
Supervisors	100	25.0
Officials of the Bureau	90	22.5
Total	400	100.0

Source: Own Survey, 2019

As it is displayed above in Table 4.6, the greatest percentage of the respondent customers, 38.8% (155) replied that engineers of the Bureau were the most vulnerable to descend to the acts of corruption. Next to the engineers , supervisors and officials of the Bureau, who are expected to safe guard the Bureau from the evil acts of corruption , were perceived by 25% (100) and 22.5% (90) of the respondents ,respectively .This is very scary since strong internal control is one of an effective mechanisms which would detect and deter corruption in any public organization. In the case of the Bureau , the guardians of the public interest against corruption and its agents are more susceptible to commit corruption. Therefore, a system of internal and external control should be

put in place to shade more light on the activities of the engineers and to close any loopholes and wider discretion that would lead to commission of corruption.

4.1.2.4. The Level of Corruption

The respondent customers of the Bureau were asked about the level of corruption within the Bureau as compared to other public service delivery bureaus. And their response is displayed by Fig 4.1 below.

Table 4.7 The Reason for highest level of Corruption

Vulnerability		Frequency	Percent
The Reason for highest level of Corruption	The greater value of land in the sub-city	81	20.3
	The greater scarcity of land in the sub-city	19	4.8
	Weakness of the justice system	51	12.8
	The wide discretionary power of officers of the Bureau	190	47.5
	Weak institutional capacity	48	12.0
	Lack of Oversight from the Addis Ababa City Administration	3	.8
	Lack of internal control and oversight	4	1.0
	Underpaid staff of the bureau	4	1.0
	Total	400	100.0

Source: Own survey ,2019

As it is displayed by Table 4.7 above, the greatest percentage of the respondent customers, 47.5%(190) , believed that the wide discretionary power of officers of the Bureau is the reason behind for the highest level of corruption within the sub-city. The greater value of land in the sub-city is the reason which was justified by 20.3% (81) of the respondent customers. Weakness of the justice system, Weak institutional capacity and the greatest scarcity of land within the sub-city were reason which were put forward by , 12.8%, 12.0% and 4.8% of the respondent customers ,respectively. Therefore , the discretionary powers of the officers of the Bureau should be minimized if the fight against corruption within the Bureau is to bear fruit.


4.1.3. Transparency

Transparency is one of the antidote for corruption since the two are inversely related; The higher the transparency is in an organization , the lower is the occurrence of corruption. To understand the level of transparency within the Bureau, respondents were asked about accessibility of legal instruments related to land , asset disclosure and complaint procedure. The replies of the respondents will be presented in this section.

4.1.3.1. Accessibility and Knowledge of land directives

Most often the Bureau applies land directives issued by the City Administration Council which govern issues related to title registration , compensations , surveying and expropriation of land for public use. The respondents were asked if they had knowledge of the all proclamation , regulations and directive on the use of land which are applied by the Bureau to deliver the requested service. The responses of the respondent customers regarding their accessibility and knowledge of the land directives are displayed by Figure 4.3 below.

Fig.4.3 Accessibility of Land Directives



Source: Own Survey, 2019

As it is displayed in Fig 4.3, the greater percentage of the respondents, 61.25% (245), replied that they had no accessibility and knowledge of the land directive which is applicable to their case. This lack of access and knowledge of the law which is applicable to the service they were demanding from the Bureau could create a loophole for an officer to exploit the customers by demanding a bribe. In other words, since the customers were unaware of their rights and duties, they might be forced to buy their rights. Therefore, since knowledge of the laws which are applicable to public service creates a demanding customers who knows his/her rights, all the land directives which are currently in force should be made available to the customers.

Those customers who said they had no access and knowledge of the land directives were asked why they could not access and acquaint themselves with provisions of the directives. Their responses are displayed by Table 4.8 below.

Table 4.8 The reason for inaccessibility of land directives

	Frequency	Percent	
The reason for inaccessibility of land directives	Because the Bureau does not made them available	74	30.2
	There are too many amendments and repeals	72	29.4
	There is no Consolidated laws on land	61	24.9
	Only few have access to them	36	14.7
	I am not interested	2	.8
	Total	245	100.0

Source: Own Survey, 2019

As it is displayed by Table 4.8 above , out of the 245 respondent customers who have said they said no access and knowledge of land directives , the greater percentage of them ,30.2%(74) , attributed their inability to get and be versed with the directives on the Bureau’s failure of making the directives available to everyone. During an observation conducted by the researcher during data collection, it has been witnessed that only the type of service , standard of service delivery and some political rhetoric of the ruling party were made accessible by big poster. Whereas , the binding land directives were not made a available to the public even in the form of sell. The researcher has attempted to purchase a directive from the Bureau , but there is no such service in Bureau.


The greater number of amendments and repeals on the directives was blamed by 29.4% (72) of the respondents. And lack of consolidated land laws was identified by 24% (61) of the

respondents. This lack of access and knowledge of land laws would create a huge expertise gap between the officers and service users which would be exploited by the former to pursue a private gain. Therefore, the Bureau should make all the legal instruments and more specifically the directive available by sell or through its official webpage. The greater the legal awareness of the service users, the lesser is the exploitation of the service users by the officers of the Bureau.

4.1.3.2. Asset Registration

According to Proclamation on Asset Disclosure and Registration , officials and officers of the Bureau should disclose and register their asset to the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. Since the Commission has a responsibility under the proclamation to make the register of the assets available to the public, the respondents were asked if they knew any officer or official of the Bureau who disclosed his/her asset to the Commission. Table 4.9 displays their response.

Fig 4.4. Asset disclosed by officers/officials of the Bureau



Source: Own Survey, 2019

As it is displayed by Fig. 4.4 above, the greater percentage of the respondents, 87.75%, asserted that they do not know any official/officer from the Bureau who have disclosed his/her assets. The rest of the respondents 12.25% replied that they do not know of such asset disclosure. This means that almost all of the respondents did not know about the asset owned by the officers and officials of the Bureau. Then It becomes clear that the amount, type and whereabouts of the assets of the civil servants is not known to the public. This where the issue transparency comes into the picture. With less transparency, there is a wider opportunity for the evil acts of corruption within the Bureau. Therefore, asset owned by the officers/officials of the Bureau should be disclosed to the public to ensure transparency.

4.1.3.3. Compliant Handling

Complaining procedure is one an effective ways to tackle the practices of corruption by masking the decision of an officer subject to review and scrutiny by higher official. This would in its turn ensures transparency which one of the qualities of a good governance. Therefore, the respondents were asked about the complaint handling system of the Bureau and their response is displayed by Table 4.9 below.

Table 4.9 An established system of complainant handling


		Frequency	Percent
Is there an established system of complainant handling within the Bureau ?	Yes	336	84.0
	No	38	9.5
	I do not Know	26	6.5
	Total	400	100.0
Have you ever complained to the higher ranking officer against the decision of an officer ?	Yes	182	45.5
	No	218	54.5
	I do not Know	0	0
	Total	400	100.0

Source: Own Survey, 2019

As it is displayed by Table 4.9 above , the greater percentage of the respondents, 84.0%(336) , asserted that there is an established system of complain handling system. The researcher also witnessed the customers complaining about the service they were receiving. And also , the performance report of the 2018/19 (2010 Ethiopian Budget Year)of the Bureau claims that the Bureau had handling 100% of the complains brought to its attention. The more effective and operational system of grievance handling , the better the public service delivery becomes since inputs from the service users makes the organization to improve its service delivery in consideration of the service users.

Nearly half of the respondent customers, 45.5%(182), replied that they had complained to the higher ranking officer of the Bureau against the decision of an officer . The fact that the grievance handling system is in place is a good thing for the betterment of the service delivery of the Bureau, however , handling customers complain effectively requires more effort and energy from the Bureau. To calibrate the quality of the complaint handling system of the Bureau , the 182 customers who have an experience of complaining to the Bureau , were asked about their satisfaction with the system.

Fig. 4.5 Satisfaction With Complain Handling



Source : Own Survey ,2019

As it is displayed by Fig. 4.4 above , the greater percentage ,49%, of the 182 respondents who had previous experience of complaining to the Bureau , asserted that the complaining handling procedure of the Bureau was poor .This is very disappointing since customers grievance handling systems are like a thermometer which tests the quality of the service delivery of an organization. And there is a gap between a realities on the ground the Annual Performance Report which reported 81.63% of customers were satisfied with the service delivery of the Bureau which is far from the truth. Therefore, the Bureau should look into its complain handling system to accommodate the interests of the customers.

4.1.4. Rule of Law

Another antidote for corruption is the rule of law which is also one of the qualities of good governance .And hence, the respondents were asked a serious of question on rule of to assess the extent of the application of the principle of the rule of law.

4.1.4.1. Adherence to rules and procedures

Applying the law uniformly for all cases irrespective for or against whom the rules works is the basic tenet of the rule of law. The respondents were asked about the application of the law during service delivery and Table 4.10 displays their response.

Table 4.10. Application of the rule of law

		Frequency	Percent
To what extent the Bureau follows the rules and regulations during service delivery	Very high	8	2.0
	High	26	6.5
	Medium	184	46.0
	Low	157	39.3
	Very Low	25	6.3
	Total	400	100.0
Service delivery by the Bureau is based on preexisting laws	I Strongly Agree	6	1.4
	I Agree	171	42.8
	I disagree	199	49.8
	I strongly disagree	24	6.0
	Total	400	100.0

Source : own survey ,2019

As it is displayed by Table 4.10 , the greatest percentage of the respondents ,46% (184), replied that Bureau’s adherence to rules and regulations during service delivery is medium. And 39.3% (157) of them reduced rule based service delivery of the bureau to low. On the other hand , the greatest percentage of the respondents, 49.8%(199) , disagree with the affirmation that service delivery by the bureau is based on preexisting laws. Whereas ,42.8%(171) , of agree with the affirmation. Here , if we triangulate the responses of the respondent customers response at 4.1.3.1 Accessibility and Knowledge of land directives it is a contradictory answer. In section 4.1.3.1 Accessibility and Knowledge of land directives , the greatest percentage of the respondents replied that they did not have accessibility and knowledge of the applicable laws at the Bureau. If this is the case , there is no way that the respondents know the adherence of the Bureau to rule of law. Therefore , the replies of the respondents is not acceptable.

4.1.4.2. Clarity and accessibility of Laws

The respondents were asked about the clarity and accessibility of laws related to land .And Table 4.11 below , displays their response.

Table 4.11 **Clarity and accessibility of laws**

		Frequency	Percent
Preexisting land laws are applicable to service delivery are clear, transparent and accessible	I Strongly Agree	14	3.5
	I Agree	98	24.5
	I disagree	210	52.5
	I strongly disagree	78	19.5
	Total	400	100.0

Source : Own survey ,2019

As it is displayed by Table 4.11 above, the greater percentage of the respondents,52.5% (210), disagree with the assertion that preexisting land laws are applicable to service delivery are clear, transparent and accessible. Those who strongly disagree with the assertion accounts for 19.5% (78) ,of the respondents. This is compatible answer with that of section 4.1.3.1

Accessibility and Knowledge of land directives in which the majority of the respondents asserted that they do not have access and knowledge of the applicable laws. If they do not have access and knowledge of the laws , it is natural that the laws unclear and vague.

4.1.4.3. Payment of Bribery

The respondents were asked if they were paid a bribe to get a service from the Bureau since they did not know the law give them a property right back then and their response is displayed by Table 4.12 below.

Table 4.12 **Payment of Bribery**

		Frequency	Percent
Have you ever paid a bribe to get a service from the Bureau because you did not know the law give you the right ?	Yes	14	3.5
	No	386	96.5
	Total	400	100.0

Source : own survey ,2019

As it is displayed by Table 4.12 above , nearly all the respondents ,96.5 %(386) , replied that they had not paid a bribe for a service which was basically their right since they did not know the law. Only the brave once, 3.5%(14) , who dared to tell the truth replied that they bought their basic since they did not know the law. In most cases , some public officials and officers use the gap in the knowledge of the customers to extort a bribe. Since the greater percentage of the respondents expressed that they were not familiar with the applicable laws more respondents should have paid the bribe to buy their own rights .Unfortunately , to protect themselves from legal liability , they declined to tell the truth. Here again the reasercher would like to emphasis the need of making laws more accessible , less vague and complied is an indispensable tool to minimize corruption to its lowest level possible.

4.2. Qualitative Data Presentation and Analysis

To solidify the quantitative results, key informant interviews were held with **1** officer and **1** head of the Bureau, **2** members of Bole Sub-City Council , **2** senior officers of Addis Ababa City Government Urban Land Management Bureau, **1** senior fellow at Ethiopian Policy Studies and Research Institute , and **1** officer from Federal Anti-Corruption and Ethics Commission with the instrumentality of interview guide.

4.2.1. The Nexus Between Decentralization and Corruption

Whether decentralization improves or aggravates corruption is not a settled issue and there are a number of scholars who argue for and against decentralization with respect to its relation with corruption. A senior fellow a senior research fellow at Ethiopian Policy Studies argued that basically decentralization highly reduces the practices and challenges of corruption since with decentralization comes a greater and closer accountability , transparency and autonomy. Currently, in most parts of the world public services are under the jurisdiction of local governments since it brings about higher quality of public service. However, the local people should be an active participant and they should have a strong grip on the local executive through their council. In the opinion of the senior research fellow, the greater local autonomy enjoyed by local authorities would lead to a wider and more complex corruption if the strong public oversight and control is absent (Senior Research Fellow personal communication ,May 15, 2019).

According to Article 32(1) of the Revised Addis Abba City Government Chapter, Proclamation 361/2003, the current 10 Sub-City Councils have the following powers among others :

- ❖ approve economic, social development and municipal service plans of the respective sub city;
- ❖ receive, examine and decide upon the annual and periodic reports from the chief executive of the respective sub-City;
- ❖ allocate the budget set aside to it by the City Council;
- ❖ constitute the committees of the council of Sub-City;

Sub-City Councils have such strong administrative powers and if they exercise their power accordingly, the executive has no an option except promoting the interest of the public. Two members of Bole Sub-City Council were asked about their control over the executives. They were bold enough to say the council was just ceremonial and had never rejected a report submitted by the executive. And regarding the economic, social development and municipal service plans of the sub city, they said that the council was just expected to approve not to resist since both the council and the executive were from the same party (Bole Sub-City Council Members ,Personal Communication ,May 15, 2019).

Therefore, decentralization and corruption are related negatively if there a strong public participation and control over the executive

4.2.2. Causes of Corruption in Land Administration

Land administration, tax administration, road construction and large scale purchases are the sectors which have been identified as the most vulnerable to corruption by the government. What is the rationale behind this categorization?

A senior fellow research fellow at Ethiopian Policy Studies explained that the basic reason for this classification is the greater amount public money which is involved in the sectors (Senior Research Fellow personal communication, May 15, 2019). If this is the case, Bole Sub-city Land Management Bureau Could not is an exception. Head of the Bureau explained that given the highest value of land in the City of Addis Ababa in general and the sub-city, there is a higher risk corruption in the Bureau compared to others say Education Bureau. The pressure comes from the public, government officials and private sector. The head identified bribery and forgery of documents as the two most common forms of corruption are the two most common forms corruption He explained that there is a strong internal control in place and that is why 32 employees of the Bureau were arrested on suspicion of corruption last year (Head of the Bureau ,personal communication , May 9/2019).

A senior officer from Addis Ababa City Government Urban Land Management Bureau in her part explained that in addition to the higher value of land, male dominated leadership of the land management bureau of the City and Sub-City is also another enabling factor for corruption. Another senior officer from the same Bureau explained that the political unrest since 2014/15

(2008E.C) if fuelling the demand for land and house in Addis Ababa. According to him, the political violence in many parts of the country, including towns adjoining Addis Ababa, has been causing internal displacements. As result, Addis Ababa is being seen by many as sanctuary of peace and tranquility in which no one would worry about the possibility of being a victim of political violence which would led to internal displacement. This fear of political violence puts a pressure on Addis Ababa's land which is already on higher demand for residence, investment and infrastructure development. Obviously this highest demand creates favorable condition for corruption in a Bureau which is in charge of managing this limited resource (Personal Communication , May 13/2019).

An officer from Federal Anti-Corruption and Ethics Commission on his part, in addition to the above factors , the lower level of morality and ethics on the part of the public is among the main causes of corruption in the land administration and other sectors. He also explained that the higher cultural and psychological value attached to ownership of land forces an individual to secure a land at any cost including giving a bribe (Personal communication , May 7/2019).

4.2.3. Challenges of Corruption in Land Administration

Corruption in the land sector has a number of challenges given the higher value of land in the political economy of any society. An officer from Bole sub-city Land Management Bureau explained that the customers of Bureau perceived the Bureau as a corrupt and always complained against the decision of frontline officers even if the decision legal and sound. This mistrust from the service users causes the Bureau to not to be efficient since valuable time is wasted on checking a decision of frontline officers (Personal communication, May 9/2019)..

An officer from Federal Anti-Corruption and Ethics Commission on his part explained that this mistrust of customers of the bureau would spillover to other sectors like tax administration. People would be tempted to conceal their tax since they do not trust their money would be spent on for the common good (Personal communication, May 7/2019).

A senior research fellow at Ethiopian Policy Studies explained that by its very nature corruption causes unequal distribution of wealth. Those who secured possession of a land by means of corruption would create additional wealth by using the land a means of production .Whereas ,

those who were denied of their right to hold a land would be in a disadvantageous position to create wealth and hence they will be left behind (Personal communication, May 15, 2019)

A senior officer from Addis Ababa City Government Urban Land Management Bureau in her part explained that corruption in the land sectors causes the price of urban houses to rise even higher from their current price which is unaffordable for the lower and even middle class society in Ethiopia. This is because corruption in the land management bureau would cause the uneven and inequitable distribution of land . And this would in turn leaves the property market at a mercy and monopoly of few (Personal Communication , May 13/2019).

4.2.4. Mechanism of Controlling Corruption in Land Administration

The interviewees proposed some mechanisms in order to control and minimize the practices and challenges of corruption within the Bureau.

An officer from Bole Sub-City Land Management Bureau proposes to regulate the relation of engineers with customers. He explained that engineers have a task of going along with the customers to survey the plot of a land the customers claims and to report back to the Bureau. There is a higher probability of soliciting a bribe from the customer for whom he/she conducts measurement .Therefore , to minimize the risk of negotiating for corruption between the customer and engineers , committee of five experts including the engineers should conduct the measurement(Personal communication, May 7/2019).

A senior fellow research fellow at Ethiopian Policy Studies recommends making the sub-city council more representative of the local people than to be an agent of the ruling party , holding free and fair election to create a council which comprises of parties from both sides of the ruling and the opposition parties and strengthening the current sub-city council through training so that it would tighten its grip on the executive including the Land Management Bureau (Senior Research Fellow personal communication ,May 15, 2019).

Head of the Bole Sub-City Land Management Bureau proposes strengthening the internal audit work process of the Bureau which is currently is not in a good shape because of lack of manpower (Head of the Bureau ,personal communication , May 9/2019).

A senior officer from Addis Ababa City Government Urban Land Management Bureau in her part recommends the inclusion of more women to at least 50% of the leadership positions of the land management bureau of the City and Sub-Cities since women are less likely to indulge into the acts of corruption (Personal Communication , May 13/2019).

Another senior officer from the Addis Ababa City Government Urban Land Management Bureau recommends that relieving the pressure on Addis Ababa for urban land through the development of satellite cities .He explained that when the demand for urban land shared by other satellite cities around Addis Ababa , the price of land in Addis Ababa stop inflating or even decrease and as a result corruption would decrease and could be down to a controllable level(Personal Communication , May 13/2019).

CHAPTER FIVE

Summary of Findings, Conclusion and Recommendation

4.1. Summary of Findings

The objective of the research was to investigate the practices and challenges of corruption in urban land governance in the case of Bole Sub-city of Addis Ababa City Administration. To achieve this objective, the research has employed a descriptive cross sectional survey design. Both quantitative and qualitative research approaches were applied. Primary data were collected from customers of the Bureau and key informant interviewees. The main findings of the study are summarized as follows:

4.1.1. Demographic characteristics of the respondent customers

- ❖ The majority of the respondent customers were males 55.8 %, married 63.5% , and were in the age group of 36-50 years, 38.0% .
- ❖ The majority of the respondent customers ,29.3% , had an educational level of level 1-4
- ❖ The majority of the respondent customers, 36.8 % , were self-employed

4.1.2. Corruption Perception in Urban Land Governance

- ❖ **Type of service requested:** The greater portion of the respondent customers, 58.5%(234), sought title registration service followed by those who sought compensation service ,14.3%(57) . Therefore , if the fought against corruption is to bear fruit , it should focus on making the service of title registration more transparent , reduced discretion of the officers and subject to more horizontal and vertical supervision.
- ❖ **Personal Experience with Corruption :**the greater portion of the respondents , 69.2 % (277) replied that they knew about the personal experience of corrupt act of their close persons .
- ❖ **Type of Corruption:** the greatest portion of the 277 respondent customers , 58% (163) ,who replied “Yes” they knew a close person who is a victim of corruption , replied that

bribery was the form of corruption they were subjected to while getting a service from the Bureau.

- ❖ **The reason for payment of bribery** : the greater percentage, 49.7% (81), of the 163 respondents who replied that they knew a bribe has been paid to get a title deed and the second popular reason for the payment of bribery among with 46.0% (75) of the 163 respondent customers of the bureau was speeding up the service delivery.
- ❖ **Amount of money paid for bribery** : the greatest percentage of the respondents, 52%(86), replied that they knew from 25,001 to 50,000Br had been paid as a bribe.
- ❖ **The Most Vulnerable To Commit Corruption:** the greatest percentage of the respondent customers, 38.8% (155) replied that engineers of the Bureau were the most vulnerable to descend to the acts of corruption.
- ❖ **The Level of Corruption:** the greatest percentage of the respondent customers of the Bole Land Management Bureau , perceived the Bureau as the most corrupt bureau compared to other public service delivery offices within the sub-city .
- ❖ **The Reason for highest level of Corruption:** the greatest percentage of the respondent customers, 47.5%(190) , believed that the wide discretionary power of officers of the Bureau is the reason behind for the highest level of corruption within the sub-city.
- ❖ **The rate of Corruption:** the greater percentage ,47.5% , of the respondent customers replied that the rate of corruption within the sub-city is alarmingly increasing and 36% of the respondents customers believed that rate of corruption is increasing.

4.1.3. Transparency

- ❖ **Accessibility and Knowledge of land directives** the greater percentage of the respondents, 61.25%(245), replied that they had no accessibility and knowledge of the land directive which is applicable to their case.
- ❖ **The reason for inaccessibility of land directives** out of the 245 respondent customers who have said they said no access and knowledge of land directives , the greater percentage of them ,30.2%(74) , attributed their inability to get and be versed with the directives on the Bureau's failure of making the directives available to everyone.

- ❖ **Asset Registration:** the greater percentage of the respondents ,87.75% , asserted that they do not know any official /officer from the Bureau who have disclosed his/her assets. The rest of the respondents 12.25% replied that they do not know of such asset disclosure .This means that almost all of the respondents did not know about the asset owned by the officers and officials of the Bureau.
- ❖ **An established system of complainant handling :**the greater percentage of the respondents, 84.0%(336) , asserted that there is an established system of complain handling system. And nearly half of the respondent customers, 45.5%(182), replied that they had complained to the higher ranking officer of the Bureau against the decision of an officer .
- ❖ **Satisfaction With Complain Handling :**the greatest percentage ,49%, of the 182 respondents who had previous experience of complaining to the Bureau , asserted that the complaining handling procedure of the Bureau was poor .

4.1.4. Rule of Law

- ❖ **Application of the rule of law :**the greatest percentage of the respondents ,46% (184), replied that Bureau's adherence to rules and regulations during service delivery is medium. And 39.3% (157) of them reduced rule based service delivery of the bureau to low.
- ❖ **Clarity and accessibility of laws:** the greater percentage of the respondents,52.5% (210), disagree with the assertion that preexisting land laws are applicable to service delivery are clear, transparent and accessible. Those who strongly disagree with the assertion accounts for 19.5% (78) ,of the respondents.
- ❖ **Payment of Bribery:** nearly all the respondents ,96.5 %(386) , replied that they had not paid a bribe for a service which was basically their right since they did not know the law. Only the brave once, 3.5%(14) , who dared to tell the truth replied that they bought their basic since they did not know the law.

4.2. Conclusion

This study has attempted to investigate the practices and challenges of corruption in urban land governance in the case of Bole Sub-city Land Management Bureau of Addis Ababa City Administration. To assess the practices and challenges of corruption within the Land Management Bureau of the sub-city, demographic characteristics of the respondent customers, corruption perception in urban land governance, transparency and rule of law were analyzed. The findings of this study illustrates that corruption within the Land Management Bureau of Bole sub-city was deep rooted and challenging. Specifically, corruption in the form of bribery was challenging and affecting the service quality of the Bureau negatively.

4.3. Recommendations

Based on the above findings of the study, the following recommendations were forwarded:

- 1. Consolidation of all legal instruments related to land:** The diversity of land proclamations, regulations and directives makes it very difficult to understand and demand once rights. Therefore, the city government land management bureau should consolidate the laws into a single document. Bole sub-city Land Management Bureau on its part should make the laws available for everyone in a print or digital form. The more transparency of the rules are, the less the probability of corruption.
- 2. Building the Institutional and Personal Capacity of Sub-city Council:** building the capacity of the council through training so that there would be able to challenge the executive. The wider autonomy enjoyed by the executive should be checked by the council. And in the long run, holding free and fair election which would help to the council to be a true representative of the sub-city dwellers and so that it would promote their interest.
- 3. Minimizing Discretionary Power:** Those work tasks which enjoy a wider power of discretion should be performed by a team of experts. And those tasks which necessitates

to go outside of the Bureau with a one to one customer interaction should be performed with a team of 3 to five experts.

- 4. Keeping the gender balance in the top management of the Bureau:** the gender equality at officer and lower level management at level within the Bureau was very balanced. Nevertheless , women were not represented at the top and medium level management positions. The gender balance by itself has a positive impact to deter corruption since women are less likely to involve in corruption.
- 5. Building internal audit capacity:** One of an effective tools to combat corruption is a strong internal audit control in addition to control from other parties. The Bureau's understaffed internal audit work process should be reinforced with manpower ,materials and training so that it would become a competent watchdog of public resource.
- 6. Undercover Operations :** since corruption by its very is concealed and a complex crime , a counter undercover operation to detect it should be a apart of combat strategy. In collaboration with the police , the Bureau should entrap by going into the underworld of corruption.

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Appendix 1.1: Survey questionnaires

Addis Ababa University
School of Graduate Studies
Department of Public Administration

Critical Assessment of the Practices and Challenges of Corruption In Urban Land Governance:
The case of Bole Sub-city, Addis Ababa City Administration

I would like to assure you that your responses will be kept confidential and only to be used for research purposes only.

Instruction:

- No need to write your name
- Answer all the questions by making a circle on your choice or

I. Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

1. Sex: A. Male B. Female
2. Age: A. 18-25 B. 26-35 C. 36 – 50 D. Above 50
3. Educational status:
A, Illiterate B. Primary education (1-8) C, Secondary education (9-12)
D. Certificate E, Diploma F. Degree G. Second degree and above
4. Marital Status: A, Married B, Unmarried C, Widowed D, Divorced
5. Job Status:
A. student B. unemployed C. Self-Employee D. Government Employee
E. Any other _____

II. Corruption Perception in Urban Land Governance

6. The type of service you seek from the Bureau
 - A. Title registration (issuance of land tenure certificate) service
 - B. Compensation service
 - C. Back seal service
 - D. Surveying service
 - E. Other (Specify) _____

7. Do you have any personal experience about the existence of corruption in the Urban Land Bureau in Bole Sub-City?

A. yes B. No C. I would rather not to say

8. If you answer **Yes** to Question 6 above , what type of corruption (More than one answer is possible) ?

A. Bribery B. Embezzlement C. Fraud

D. Forgery E. other_____

9. Do you have any close person (family ,relative or friend) who you knew that he/she was asked to pay money in a form a bribe to get a service from the Bureau ?

A. yes B. No C. I would rather not to say

10. Who are most vulnerable to commit corruption in the Bureau ?

A. Supporting Staff B. Engineers C. Officials D . Others

11. The level of Corruption in Urban Land Management Bureau of Bole Sub-City is

A. Greater than other Bureaus within the sub-city from which you got public service

B. Less than other Bureaus within the sub-city from which you got public service

C. Almost the same with other Bureaus within the sub-city from which you got public service

D. I do not know

12. If your answer for question number 9 above is yes, what is your justification ? (more than one choice is possible)

A. The greater value of land in the sub-city

B. The greater scarcity of land in the sub-city

C. Weakness of the justice system

D. The wide discretionary power of officers of the Bureau

F Weak institutional capacity

G. Lack of Oversight from the Addis Ababa City Administration (Mayor , City council or auditor General or Courts)

H. Lack of internal control and oversight

I. Underpaid staff of the bureau J .Any other _____

13. What the current trend of corruption in the land management sector based on your personal observation?

- A. Alarmingly Increasing
- B. Increasing
- C. No Substantial Change
- D. Declining
- E. I do not know

14. Out of the services being provided by the Bureau, which one is mostly affected by corruption?

- A. Title registration (issuance of land tenure certificate) service
- B. Compensation service
- C. Back seal service
- D. Surveying service
- E. Other (Specify) _____

15. What is /are your reason for Answer to Question 14 above?

III Transparency

16. Do you have access to all the legal documents (Directives) applied by the Bureau ?

- A. Yes
- B. No

17. If No to the above question 1, why ?

- A. Because the Bureau does not made them available
- B. There are too many amendments and repeals
- C. There is no Consolidated Directives on land
- D. Only few have access to them
- E. I am not interested
- F. Other (Specify).....

18. Have officials and employees of the bureau disclosed their asset to the general public ?

- A. Yes
- B. No

19. Are there established system of complaining within the Bureau ?

- A. Yes
- B. No
- C. I do not know

20. Have you ever complained to the higher ranking officer against the decision of an officer ?

- A. Yes
- B. No

21. If you answered **yes** to the above question 20, how do you rate complain handling procedure of the Bureau ?

- A. Very satisfactory B. Satisfactory C. Fair D. Poor E. Very Poor

IV. Accountability

22. To what extent the Bureau follows the rules and regulations during service delivery ?

- A. Very high B. high C. Medium D. Low E. Very low

23 Impartial service to all customers are being delivered by the bureau .

- A. fully
B. mostly
C. fairly
D. hardly
E. not at all

24. Employees treat customers reasonably based on evidence and only on evidence.

- A. I strongly Agree
B. I Agree
C. I disagree
D. I strongly disagree

V. Rule of Law

25. Service delivery by the Bureau is based on preexisting land laws

- A. I strongly Agree
B. I Agree
C. I disagree
D. I strongly disagree

26. Preexisting land laws are applicable to service delivery are clear, transparent and accessible

- A. I strongly Agree
B. I Agree
C. I disagree
D. I strongly disagree

27. Have you ever paid a bribe to get a service from the Bureau because you did not know the law give you the right ?

- A. Yes B. No

28. Have you ever get a service from the Bureau even though it is against a preexisting law ?

- A. Yes B. No

Appendix 1.2: Interview Guide

Addis Ababa University

School of Graduate Studies

Department of Public Administration

Critical Assessment of the Practices and Challenges of Corruption in Urban Land Governance:
The case of Bole Sub-city, Addis Ababa City Administration

I would like to assure you that your responses will be kept confidential and only to be used for research purposes only.

1. What is/ are the main drivers of corruption in Bole sub-city urban land governance ?
2. In your opinion ,what are the loopholes for corruption in Bole sub-city urban land governance ?
3. How do describe the role of customers in the process of corruption crimes within the land administration ?
4. What could be done by the leadership of Bole sub-city urban land management bureau to reduce corruption significantly?
5. What are the most common practices of corruption in the management of land in Bole sub-city?
6. What are the main challenges caused by corruption crime in the sub-city as a whole and the Bureau in particular ?
7. How do you describe the magnitude of urban land corruption crime in Bole sub-city?
8. What measures do you suggest to fight corruption effectively in Bole sub-city urban land governance?