

**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**

**GLOBAL TERRORISM AND ETHIOPIAN FOREIGN POLICY
DYNAMICS: A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS**

**By
KEDIR DARO ARERRO**

**ADDIS ABABA
JUNE, 2014**

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE
STUDIES OF THE ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFP	Agence-France Presse
ADFAT	Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
AIAI	Al Itihad Al Islamiya
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AML	Anti-Money Laundering
ANDF	Afar National Democratic Front
ARDUF	Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union Front
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcast Corporation
BPLM	Benishangul People's Libration Movement
CFT	Countering the Financing of Terrorism
CJTF_ HOA	Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa
CUD	Coalition for Unity and Democracy
EACTI	East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative
EAPCCO	Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization
EDP	Ethiopian Democratic Party
EHRCO	Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
EPPF	Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ERTA	Ethiopia Radio and Television Agency
EU	European Union
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FIC	Financial Intelligence Centre (Ethiopia)
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
HPR	House of People Representatives
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICPAT	IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism

IFLO	Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGOs	Inter-Governmental Organizations
IMET	International Military Education and Training
ISSP	IGAD Security Sector Program
MLA	Mutual Legal Assistance
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NIF	National Islamic Front
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OFDM	Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
OSALA	Oromo, Somali, and Afar Liberation Alliance
PISCES	Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
PREACT	Partnership for Regional East African Counter-Terrorism
RAND	Research and Development
SIRA	Security, Immigration, and Refugees Affairs Authority
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TPDM	Tigray People Democratic Movement
TV	Television
UDJ	Unity for Democracy and Justice
UEDF	Union of Ethiopian Democratic Forces
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNO	United Nations Organization
US	United States
USA	United States of America
UWSLF	United Western Somali Liberation Front
USAID	United States' Agency for International Development

Acknowledgments

Above all, always and forever, I thank Almighty God, Allah, for helping me to go through this all work. Then, my advisor, Professor V.K. Padmanabhan, deserves my most sincere and heartfelt appreciation and thanks for his scholarly and academic assistance, patience and willingness, which he was kind enough to offer me. Moreover, his search and provision of pertinent materials (books) for my study, prompt responses in the process of reading and commenting the draft script of my essay, his valuable comments, strategic guidance, and his friendly approach that he enthusiastically offered have certainly shaped my thesis to take its current essence and structure. Next, I'm grateful to the higher officials and diplomats in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for their kindly cooperation, encouragement and friendly sharing of experiences on the subject. I would also like to extend my deepest gratitude to all those, (specially, my brothers and sisters), who had extended immeasurable moral support to me throughout my stay here in Addis Ababa University.

Abstract

After the attacks of 9/11, the threat of global terrorism has emerged on top of national and international security agendas, widely perceived as a severe and very real threat to world peace. Responding to these unpredictable and unprecedented threats, states embarked up on a number of counterterrorism strategies among which foreign policy measures have been considered as priority instruments. However, some states' foreign policy practices are blamed as responsible for inviting terrorist threats against their own national security interests. Depending on this argument, the study attempts to examine if there is any link between Ethiopian foreign policy behaviors and the terrorist threats in the country. This is done by considering contexts of terrorism in Ethiopia i.e. the dimension of the threat, triggering factors, incidents and casualties of the threat and the government responses against the threat. In the process of collecting the relevant facts and allegations, as well as analyzing these data, the study has employed qualitative research methodology drawing mainly on governmental statements, policy papers, and official correspondences and mass media texts.

The thesis has demonstrated that the threat of terrorism is a growing phenomenon in Ethiopia. The terrorist groups functioning in Somalia (that are widely claimed to be al-Qaeda affiliates), in collaboration with the OLF and ONLF rebel forces, are targeting Ethiopia since the early years of 1990. The Eritrean Government's entanglement with these groups exacerbated the threat directed against Ethiopia. At the end, the study has concluded that some of the Ethiopian foreign policies are further intensifying the threat of terrorism against the country, though the policies are practiced based on its national security interests. Ethiopian foreign policies identified as attracting terrorist threats against the country's national security interest include: the military intervention in Somalia, a military cooperation with the USA (in the fight against terrorism), and the hostile relations with the government in Eritrea. The study suggests that the failure to reconsider and revise these foreign policy practices would have an exacerbating impact of the more terrorist threats on the national security interests.

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1. Background of the Study

This thesis will try to examine the concerns of terrorism in Ethiopia. The study is interested in identifying the cause-effect relationships between the Ethiopian foreign policy behaviors and the threat of terrorism in Ethiopia. This will be done by studying the milieu of terrorist threats to the country i.e. the dimension of the threat, factors behind the threat, incidents and casualties of the threat as well as the government responses (Counter-Terrorism activities) against the threat. At the end, the study is likely to come up with some ideas that can help to understand the link between Ethiopian foreign policy activities and the growing threat of terrorism in Ethiopia.

States' foreign policy behaviors and the threat of global terrorism, since the past decade, have been conceived as extremely intertwined, each one impacting upon the other. "The current wave of global terrorism, characterized by unpredictable and unprecedented threats against everyone, is not only a reaction to foreign policies of some states but also is facilitated by foreign policies of that states" (Karacasulu, 2006: 3). According to Rourke (2005: 102), especially following the attacks of 9/11 against the United States, the threat of global terrorism immediately topped the agenda of international relations, thereby continually influencing as well as being influenced by the foreign policy behaviors of states across the world. The threat has forced states to assume confronting terrorism as one of the most important fundamentals of national government's foreign policies.

Likewise, sticking their strategies to the values and goals that are set as national interests, most states started identifying and employing various foreign and domestic policies that can 'better' allow them to defend the actual and perceived national security threats of global terrorism. Common of these policies include diplomacy, consultative engagement, law promulgation and enforcement, sanctions, regional and international conventions, alliance formation, and military force (Sean, 2005; Pillar, 2008; Rabasa, 2009). The intent of these national strategies, according to Pillar (2008: 387), is: "to stop terrorist attacks against its

state, its citizens, state interests, and interests of their friends and allies around the world and ultimately, to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and to all those who support them".

In line with these intentions, some states have made commendable progress in combating these dreadful incidents while the strategies followed by some others, in contrast, further intensified the terrorist threats against their own national interests (Rourke, 2005; Sean, 2005; Karacasulu, 2006; Shinn, 2007; Savun and Philips, 2009).

Ethiopia, being one of the active members of the international community, is equally passing through (facing) this challenging period of global terrorism. Just like many states, the fight against terrorism has been one of the priorities of policies of the Ethiopian government over the last ten to fifteen years. The earlier terrorist challenges in Ethiopia have their roots in its immediate neighbors of Sudan and Somalia (Shinn, 2002; Rotberg, 2005; Goitom, 2013). In 1995, Egyptian terrorist organization called Al Gamaa al Islamiya, based in Khartoum, made an attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa; the Somalia based terrorist group named Al Itihaad Al Islamiya (AIAI), in a close collaboration with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)¹ had carried out a series of terrorist attacks in Ethiopia in the 1990s. Since then, the terrorist threats targeting Ethiopia got intensified further involving the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), other rebellion groups, and Eritrean government in the process (Ibid).

By realizing such vulnerability to transnational terrorism, the government of Ethiopia has been taking various foreign policy and domestic actions with a range of measures to combat international terrorism, which can be generally categorized as the legislative, consultative engagement, cooperative (bi/multilateral initiatives), conventions, military force, etc. Ethiopia has long been fighting terrorism militarily against some domestic and other terrorist groups in Somalia; it has also been jointly working with the US Government to counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa; besides, Ethiopia has ratified a number of

¹ ONLF is an insurgent group in Ethiopia revolted against the government with the mission of seceding Ethiopian Somali region apart from Ethiopia.

UN/AU/IGAD Counter-Terrorism conventions and protocols; and has enacted anti-terrorism legal frameworks.

However, some of Ethiopia's Counter-Terrorism strategies, such as the military Counter-Terrorism in Somalia and cooperation with the USA, by themselves seem attracting further terrorist threats against the country. For instance, the Ethiopian Defense Forces have long been conducting successive operations against terrorist groups operating from inside Somalia since early years of 1990. This allowed the Ethiopian rebel groups (ONLF and OLF) to get safe haven in Somalia and combine their role with AIAI (a group internationally designated as terrorist), to jointly threaten the government of Ethiopia. Reports show that series of terrorist incidents and casualties in Ethiopia are caused by these forces operating from Somalia (Woldeselase, 2010; U.S. State Department Country reports on Terrorism, 2006 - 2013; Shinn, 2002; 2005; 2007). The connection between the separatist movements in Ethiopia and the terrorist groups in Somalia, both being further activated by Eritrean sponsorship, has been detected, widely investigated and proven not only by the Ethiopian government but by the international community as well (ICG, 2005; Pham, 2009; Woldeselase, 2010; UNO, 2006, 2009 and 2011) . Ethiopia has also been strongly threatened by the giant international terrorist network- al-Qaeda, the organization which has frequently been intimidating Ethiopia, labeling it as the US "surrogate" in the region because of its military intervention in Somalia (2006) and in response to Ethiopia's counter-terror cooperation with the government of USA (Shinn, 2007; Rabasa, 2009).

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Since early years of 1990, there has been an increasing trend of terrorist threats in Ethiopia. The foiled assassination attempt Ethiopian Minister of Transport and Communication, Dr. Abdul-Mejid Hussein; the frequent bombings of Hotels, Bars, Restaurants and public means of transportations in Addis Ababa, Harare, Dire Dawa, Jigjiga and other towns of Ethiopia; the 2007 terrorist attack on Chinese Oil Exploring Company with about 74 fatalities; the 2012 terrorist incident that claimed the lives of five foreign tourists; several hostage takings etc readily come to mind when thinking about terrorism in Ethiopia. In the last 10 to 15 years, the terrorist attacks against Ethiopia has claimed the lives of more than

2000 citizens and injured over 3500, with massive loss of civilian properties as well (Woldeselase, 2010; U.S. State Department Country reports on Terrorism 2006 - 2013) . Conscious of Ethiopia's vulnerability to such threats of terrorism, the government has made the fight against terrorism one of the priorities of its policies, irrespective of causes that gave rise to vulnerability.

Few studies, available on terrorism in Ethiopia (Hussein, 2006; Woldeselase, 2010; Shinn, 2002; 2005, 2007; Smidt, 2008; Rabasa, 2009) identify those factors precipitating Ethiopia's vulnerability to terrorism. Almost all of these studies indicate the existence of alienated political movements or rebel groups claiming for ethnic secession, the country's geopolitical setting (more or less encircled by weak governments and failed/low statehood), poverty, and the growth of political Islamism in the Horn of Africa as features of the Ethiopian environment to be conducive to terrorist threats. In one way or another, most of these factors may explain the reasons behind the terrorist manifestations in Ethiopia. However, none of these studies, either implicitly or explicitly sketch the role of Ethiopia's external behavior in inducing terrorism to flourish. During the last fifteen years, Ethiopia has had to face terrorist threats many of which have international dimensions. Most particularly, Ethiopia has been fighting against the terrorist campaigns from Somalia and, ONLF and OLF- separatist movements, which are frequently reported as found responsible for the atrocities indicated above (Shinn, 2002; 2005; 2007; Dickson, 2005; Rotberg, 2005; Rabasa, 2009; Woldeselase, 2010; Goitom, 2013). The terrorist campaigns have been claimed to be more dangerous and complex when the Eritrean government aligned itself with the separatist movements targeting Ethiopia (Pham, 2009; Rabasa, 2009; Foltz, 2010; Woldeselase, 2010; Amtaika, 2013; Goitom, 2013). Such complications force one to raise questions like: Why have the terrorist threats been largely emanating from Somalia? and Why the Eritrean government does align itself with the terrorist groups targeting Ethiopia? This study argues that the Ethiopian foreign policy perceptions and behaviors are responsible for terrorist threats threatening the country. Infact, Burcu Savun and Brian J. Phillips, scholars in Pittsburg University, have described the interface between state's foreign policy behaviors and the terrorist threats. Their study, conducted at the global level in 2009, has come out with three foreign policy behaviors of states that are more likely to trigger terrorism against the state itself (Savun and Philips, 2009). The authors label such

foreign policy behaviors as active foreign policies. Three dimensions of these active foreign policies are: Involvement in Foreign Policy Crisis (conflictual or hostile relationship) with other state/s, Alliance Ties with the USA, and Intervention in Civil Wars of other States. According to these scholars, states that adopt more active foreign policies are likely to generate some sort of resentment among affected groups (internal or external), knowingly or unknowingly, and hence may be the target of terrorism by these aggrieved groups.

Examining the context of terrorist threats in Ethiopia in the light of the above premises provided by Savun and Philips helps to make a closer look at the relationship between Ethiopian foreign policy behaviors and the terrorist threats to the country. The attempt is to explore additional factors (if any) responsible for the growing terrorist threats against Ethiopia. In doing this, the thesis investigates if Ethiopia exhibits the foreign policy behaviors identified by Savun and Philips as triggers of terrorism, and then examines the contributions of these behaviors to terrorist threats threatening the country.

1.3. Objectives of the Study

The general objective of the study is to analyze the causal relationships between Ethiopian Foreign Policy behaviors and terrorism in Ethiopia. The specific objectives are:

- i. to examine the extent to which terrorism has evolved as a security threat to the national interest of Ethiopia;
- ii. to discuss the domestic dynamism in the process of framing the Ethiopian Counterterrorism measures;
- iii. to outline the Ethiopian counterterrorism policies and their implementation;
- iv. to assess the strengths and weaknesses of counter-terrorism policy and its practice in Ethiopia; and
- v. to investigate the role of Ethiopian foreign policies in heightening the threat of terrorism against Ethiopia.

1.4. Research Questions

To attain the stated objectives, this research takes on the following research questions:

- 1) Is terrorism a serious security threat to Ethiopia?
- 2) What are major Ethiopian counterterrorism policies?
- 3) What was the domestic dynamism in the process of adoption of the Ethiopian counterterrorism policies?
- 4) What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Ethiopian counter-terrorism policies?
- 5) Do some of the Ethiopian foreign policies have any role in triggering terrorism against the country?

1.5. Research Methodology and Methods of Data Collection and Analysis

This study adopts qualitative methodology for collecting and analyzing data. Qualitative methodology is preferred because it helps to gather and analyze data which requires in-depth understanding of the underlying and complex characteristics of a phenomenon that cannot be possibly measured or quantified but only can be elaborated, described or explained.

The information are mainly obtained from secondary sources like books, journal articles, internet sources, radio and television broadcasts, and published as well as unpublished materials. Analyzing official documents, archival materials, speeches and conference proceedings, seminar and news papers also served as relevant secondary/primary sources. This was carried out by selecting the materials that are persuasive of the study and which are considered to be relevant to the objectives articulated above. Added to these are interviews conducted with higher officials and diplomats in Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) that complemented the secondary sources. Unstructured in-depth interviews were conducted with officials and diplomats. The tool used in selecting the informants is purposive sampling, where respondents were selected on the bases of predefined purposes.

Research data are analyzed through narrative analysis. Narrative analysis is an approach widely used to analyzing and interpreting qualitative data. Narrative, according to Creswell (2007: 70), is a spoken or written text giving an account of an event /action or series of events/actions, chronologically connected. That means, it is a term assigned to any text or discourse, or, it might be text used within the context of a mode of inquiry in qualitative research, with a specific focus on stories produced by an event. Therefore, narrative

analysis here, as defined by Bamberg (2010: 4), is the study of any narrative texts (stories) such as oral or written narratives collected for research purposes. It is the study of written materials, public/policy documents, orally told or media texts to make sense of something in question. The method uses narratives/stories as the tools to explore something else i.e. narrative here is a phenomenon of study. During the process of analysis, narratives are guided by a theoretical lens or general perspective (a lens that lays out why things are the way they are or have become the way they are) (Creswell, 2007: 71). The theoretical lens selected for this research is a theory or perspective that shows the interface between foreign policy behaviors and global terrorism. The narrations of events or happenings outlined in chapters three to five are configured into a plot line (the general theoretical design of the study) so as to draw research conclusions at the end. This is a process of recognizing the stories of the event in to some general framework.

1.6. Significance of the Study

Materialization of this study will have the following importance:

- i. It will fill the gap in literature where written materials regarding the threat of terrorism in Ethiopia in general and its foreign policy ramifications in particular are rare.
- ii. It will contribute to the knowledge and understanding of security workers, diplomats and foreign policy makers as well as counterterrorism policy designers, enabling them to seriously consider the long-term consequences of policies upon national interest.
- iii. It will provoke further research activities in the interface of terrorism and foreign policy.

1.7. Scope and Limitations of the Study

This study is conceptually limited to the relationships between Ethiopia's foreign policies and terrorist threats against the country. The time limit of the narrative analysis is since 1991 (the coming to power of the current regime- EPRDF).

1.8. Organization of the Thesis

The paper has seven interdependent chapters; the first of which outlines background to the overall study where introduction, problem statement, research questions, objectives, research methodology, significance of the research as well as the scope and limitations of the study are sequentially traced.

The second chapter attempts to deal with the conceptual and theoretical framework of Global Terrorism and Foreign Policy. A brief discussion is made here about the concept and act of terrorism, the concept of national interest and national security, the meaning and determinants of foreign policy including the theoretical approach that associates terrorism and Foreign Policy behaviors. The attempt is to provide a conceptual and theoretical design for the study.

Under the third chapter, there is an attempt that will briefly outline terrorist threats in Ethiopia. It links terrorism, terrorists and the threat to Ethiopia as well as terrorist incidents and its casualties in the country. The objective is to indicate how terrorism has evolved as a serious concern for national security of Ethiopia.

Chapter four is the unit that will identify and examine counterterrorism policies, decisions and activities adopted and being implemented by Ethiopia.

The fifth chapter attempts to present the political context in which two of the major Ethiopian Counter-Terrorism decisions- military counterterrorism in Somalia (2006) and the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation of 2009 are endorsed. These two are selected because they were more contentious, and both passed through publicly held dynamic debates during the time of approving them. More than any other counterterrorism strategies, these two provoked persisting debates about this regime's conception of national interest; questioned and tested rationales behind policies advocated by the government as well. Accordingly, the chapter examines the contexts in which these policies were made in Ethiopia in the light of contending views held by the government and opposition political parties.

Chapter six tries to present the analysis part where some of the Ethiopian foreign policy behaviors are identified and analyzed in the light of the terrorist threats and Counter-Terrorism activities of Ethiopia discussed under the third and fourth chapters respectively.

The final chapter (chapter seven) comprises the conclusions and recommendations of the study.

Chapter Two

Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks

Introduction

This chapter presents the conceptual and theoretical aspects of the study with the objective of clarifying the way major concepts of foreign policy and global terrorism are generally interpreted, analyzed and understood. The concept of national interest and its constituent elements in relation to national security and foreign policy is briefly discussed. The meaning of foreign policy and factors (determinants) shaping foreign policy decisions are issues to be considered in the first section.

Terrorism, which is thought as an inevitable global phenomenon is another main issue of discussion in the chapter. In exploring the phenomenon of modern international terrorism, second section will try to highlight over the definition of terrorism. As it is demonstrated, definitions vary widely, while still there is a general consensus among scholars about what constitutes this act. For making the thesis to be precise, the meaning of terrorism used throughout this study is presented here. Discussion will then move to another important component of terrorism i.e. categories of explanations about the causes of terrorism on the international stage. Finally, global response to this acute security threat will be briefed. The theoretical framework, showing the causal relationships likely to exist between states' foreign policy behaviors and transnational terrorism, is also discussed at the end.

2.1. Conceptual Framework

2.1.1 National Interest, National Security and Foreign Policy

In clarifying the concepts of national interest, national security and foreign policy, this section attempts to demonstrate the interdependence of these elements in the process of conducting ideal foreign relations of a state.

2.1.1.1. Concepts of National Interest and National Security

There is no universal definition of the concept of national interest. However, in both domestic and foreign policy making, the issue of national interest continues to be core or vital to a given state. The complex nature of this concept emanates due to the fact that a

country's government sometimes sacrifices the national interest to maintain the ruling class interests. To the ruling class, according to Charles A. Beard (1989: 5-7), national interests are often subordinated to the interests of political power. When the two interests clash, the ruler will sacrifice the national interest to protect its regime interest. It is to minimize (if not to avoid) such complexity that a common understanding on this concept is insisted by Zhang Jiliang (1990: 58). He notes that without common standards about what constitutes national interest, it will be impossible to make the study of foreign policy scientific; it will also be difficult to have meaningful discussions on foreign policy. To this end, Jiliang (1990: 59) defines the concept of national interest in simple language as the common material and spiritual need of all the people of a nation state. As he elaborates, in material terms, a nation needs security and development. In spiritual terms, a nation needs respect and recognition from the international community. A more general definition is given by Gove (1976: 1505), who defines the term as "the interest of a nation as a whole held to be an independent entity separate from the interest of subordinate areas of groups and also of other nations or supra national groups." According to Gove, national interest is not subordinate to any other separate interests of limited sections of the society and also, cannot be easily excused to any interests of external actors as well.

For Malhotra (2001: 79), national interest is a key concept in foreign policy because it provides the material on the basis of which the latter is made. He notes that the primary foreign policy goal is conducting foreign relations in a way that should achieve identified national interests. The author also explains that the notion of national interest is central to any attempt of describing, explaining, predicting and understanding international relations.

These explanations give all the attributes of national interest. They tell that national interest is the most important element in international relations as it is the key factor in formulating the foreign policy of a state. Clearly stipulated national interests provide bases and clues for the formulation of state's foreign policy. It is a central element around which decisions relevant to state's survival revolve.

Therefore, only well articulated inputs of national interest (in terms of the country's geographical, economic, cultural and political priorities) results in successful making and conduct of foreign policy.

The issue of security is a very much entwined and a constituent element of national interest. National security, throughout history, has been found to be the core value. According to Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2003: 33), security is defined as a state of mind in which an individual or collectivity feels free from threats, anxiety or danger. Only when security interests are met to a certain degree can other national interests be realized. This conception of national security is clearly stipulated in Ethiopia's Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy White Paper as follows (MIP & AP, 2002:4);

In a fundamental sense, security policy is a matter of ensuring national survival. The alpha and omega of security is the insuring of national survival. Other national security issues may be raised only if national existence is ensured. Foreign affairs and security policy must be formulated first and foremost to insure national security. Issues of prosperity, sustainable peace, and stability and other related concerns then follow.

This statement clearly demonstrates the fact that the issue of security is the most fundamental element in maintaining a country's independent existence. It is the core issue in the process of preserving the survival of the nation. This is true since most countries' experiences show that other national interests (such as development, democratization, etc) are rated next only to national security. In the case of Ethiopia, as the above statement itself justifies, the issue of national security has been given primary concern since the inception of the country's modern history (since mid of 19th century). In the 20th Century, the issue of security has remained the element that controlled the attentions of successive leaders in Ethiopia. Even though such profound attention to national security might have negatively impacted other relevant concerns of the society, it has greatly contributed to the national security and territorial integrity of the nation.

2.1.1.2. The Meaning of Foreign Policy and its Constituent Elements

D) The Meaning of Foreign Policy

Just like many other concepts used in International Politics, Foreign Policy also does not have a universally accepted definition due to its varying approaches and methodologies of practice. Coulter (1991: 13) defines Foreign Policy as "decisions and actions that concern relations between one state and others in pursuit of their national interests." Others see it as the goals that states seek to obtain abroad: "the values that gave rise to those objectives, and the means and instruments through which they are pursued" (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1989: 37). Gove (1976: 889) defines foreign policy as "the underlying basic direction of a

sovereign state in its interaction with other sovereign states typically manifested in peace, war, neutrality, and alliance or various combinations of approaches to these."

In one way or another, all these definitions justify that foreign policies are strategies governments use to guide their actions toward states or any other actors. Moreover, the definitions also explain foreign policy as the process of identifying the elements which a state considers as constituting its core national interests abroad and designing effective strategies to attain, promote and protect them. As such, one can describe foreign policy as a set of principles and courses of action established by a government to explain its interaction with other countries or a group of countries. As Coulter (1991: 15-16) elaborates, a country's foreign policy goals can be achieved through employing instruments like diplomacy, economic action (might be aid, trade, or sanction), or military force, etc. In the light of this, Malhotra (2001: 185) lists five elements that he believes are common objectives of a foreign policy of all nations: "maintaining the integrity of a state; providing for national security; promoting national prestige and developing national power; promoting economic interest; and maintaining world order."

II) Determinants of Foreign Policy

The abovementioned conception of foreign policy by Malhotra is traditionally crafted in the mould of orthodox realist and liberal understanding of international relations which privilege the territorial state as the primary (and for realists the only) unit responsible for the creation and implementation of foreign policies in international relations.

However in recent times, most literatures recognize that any explanation of foreign policy typically involves multiple determinants which can be grouped into two broad categories: external (that includes international environment, such as how is international system organized; characteristics of contemporary international relations and actions of other actors) and internal (government organizations (the bureaucracy), political parties, identities, leaders, culture, societal (interest) groups, economy, etc). When explaining the equally-likely relevance of both factors in shaping state's foreign policy making, Schoeman (2006: 241) stresses the impossibility of discussing foreign policy conduct without paying equal attention to both the internal and external environments because domestic issues and concerns impact heavily on foreign relations of a state.

It is in this regard that foreign policy acts as a 'bridging discipline' between domestic and foreign issues, between the socio-political and economic processes that unfold at home and those that transpire abroad (Kaarbo, 2012: 3). It seems due to such contemporary complexities of international relations that many foreign policy analysts conclude that leaders cannot forge effective foreign policies without being aware of these connections (Schoeman, 2006: 243). Besides, as Juliet Kaarbo (2012: 1) notes, the recent and far-reaching changes in the world (such as the end of cold war, move towards greater political and economic integration, the emergence of new powers in the global South, and the expansion of new transnational challenges such as climate change and terrorism etc) present serious challenges to leaders who make foreign policy these days.

These changing global foreign policy contexts have severely been impacting foreign policy making of developing countries, especially that of Africa (a continent suffering for long from limitations of foreign policy options). As usual, the contemporary determinants of African foreign policy behaviors, according to Stephen Wright (1999: 19), are the end of cold war politics, cross-border security concerns (including the expanding terrorist threats), liberalization and democratization agendas (being perpetuated by globalization), and a debate over African identity.

2.1.2. Global Terrorism: Terminology, the Causes and State Responses

After the attacks of 9/11, the threat of global terrorism immediately appeared at the top of international agenda. In exploring the phenomenon of modern international terrorism, this sub-section presents the definition of terrorism and its causes on the international stage. The section also briefly outlines how states and international communities are responding to this threat.

2.1.2.1. Terminology of Terrorism

As plethora of literatures reveal, considerable theoretical work on terrorism revolves around definitions (see the discussions in Cooper 2001; Gibbs 1989; Hoffman 1998; Jenkins 2001; Ruby 2002; for a collection of definitions, see Goodwin 2006, Table 1). Yet, even after the world recognized the magnitude of the terrorist threat since September 11/2001 attack on USA, several researchers, security professionals, politicians, jurists, and others have still not been able to agree upon the most fundamental components of its

definition. Hoffman (2006:23), somewhat surprisingly, indicates that the only consensus which has been reached is that it might be impossible, or even unnecessary, to reach an internationally accepted definition of terrorism. Those who hold this opinion usually provide the line of argument that emphasizes "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter,"² with the implication, in their view, the issue of definition is subjective. Arriving at a consensual definition of the phenomenon of terrorism has been, therefore, a particularly difficult undertaking. Some definitions, as Hoffman suggests, are either too specific or too vague, concentrating on some essential "terrorist" aspects of the actions, strategies, or types of non-state organizations that engage in terrorism.

Hence, it is indispensable to adopt a working definition so as to have a common understanding on the use of the term throughout this study. Most commonly used definitions that refer to terrorism as an act intended to instill fear and anxiety in the public, are generally based on the literal meaning and historical use of the term "terrorism," its application dating back to the French Civil War³. These definitions rely on the psychological approach which seeks to achieve political goals by instilling fear and anxiety among its target population and which is perceived to be the primary operational tactic of modern terrorism as well.

Enders and Sandler define Terrorism as "the premeditated use or threat of use of extranormal violence or brutality by groups to obtain political, religious, or ideological objectives through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved with the policy making that the terrorists seek to influence" (2002:145-146). The U.S. Department of State (2002: 34) defines terrorism as- politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by groups or agents, usually intending to influence an audience.

These and most other definitions (not presented here) generally point to extra-normal, brutal and extraordinary aspects of terrorist violence, which is designed to mostly

² However, this stance is still controversial because most people held the belief which underpins Netanyahu's expression, "The thought that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter is unacceptable. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries do not blow up buses with noncombatants; terrorists and murderers do. Freedom fighters do not kidnap and slaughter students, terrorists and murders do..." (Netanyahu, 1986 :18)

³ The term "terrorism" comes from the Latin *terrere*, "to cause to tremble." The term became popularized during the "Reign of Terror" carried out by the revolutionary government in France from 1793 to 1794. (Juergensmeyer, 2003: 5).

intimidate civilian audiences. Therefore, for this study, terrorism is defined as the unlawful use or threat of violence by discontented factions or extremists who have an ethnic, social, religious, or political agenda against state actors, or a group of people, with intentions to intimidate, frustrate, or coerce a government, individuals or groups, or any sector thereof.

Terrorism is delineated as domestic or transnational on the basis of the actors involved and its scope of influence, though the two cannot be compartmentalized today. According to Richardson (1999: 2015), domestic terrorism occurs when the act of terrorism is confined to national boundaries and does not include targets or agents from abroad. State terrorism also forms part of domestic terrorism when state actors (police, military etc) resort to acts of terror against own nationals. It is transnational when the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, victims, or the mechanics of its resolution and its ramifications transcend beyond national boundaries (Ibid).

2.1.2.2. Causes of Terrorism on the International Stage: A Review of Selected Explanations

The literature on international terrorism has frequently assumed that the occurrence of terrorism, especially in its international and transnational forms, must be sought in external sources, nature of the state and the character of the international system which includes interdependence, globalization, foreign policies of states, and other aspects of the global system that generate motives and opportunities for terrorist activity. Various explanations in line with this accompany the sub-section as follows.

A) Globalization and Terrorism

The widely held belief about terrorism is that it is encouraged by the process of globalization where the expansion of transnational communities, the proliferation of weak states, advancement in technology, and the rise of non-state actors in international politics, have contributed to the reduction of the capability of states to control international terrorist operations (Bjorgo, 2005: 31; Crenshaw, 2001: 429; Cronin, 2010: 41). In the debate about the nexus between globalization and terrorism, there are various schools of interpretations. Most of them draw upon neo-liberal and structuralist interpretations of the impact of economic modernization and ever-changing ways of life on terrorist motivations.

Both the neo-liberals and structuralists seem to be in agreement that the new transnational terrorism occurs as a reaction against the threatening pressure exerted by both economic and cultural globalization. Stanley Hoffmann argues, for example, that contemporary terrorism 'is fuelled by a resistance to 'unjust' economic globalization and to a Western culture deemed to threatening local religions and cultures (2002: 112). In the post-9/11 edition of his book *Jihad vs. McWorld*, Benyamin Barber has similarly suggested that the new cross-border terrorism must be understood in the light of "the ongoing collision between 'the forces of integrative modernization and aggressive economic and cultural globalization' (McWorld) and 'the forces of disintegral tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism' (Jihad)" (Barber, 2003: 109). The first represents a sterile 'cultural monism', a 'trivialization and homogenization of values', a 'capitalism run world' while the second manifests itself in 'a raging cultural fundamentalism', seeking insulation from external forces, and fostering acquiescence and acquittal for bloody deeds of terror (Ibid: 110-113). According to Barber, "the former begets the latter, and only the globalization of civic and democratic institutions will provide safeguards against this vicious cycle." The structuralists like Kimmel (2003: 612) maintain that the malcontents of globalization (such as income inequality, superiority-inferiority complex, North-South division, etc) are more often drivers of terrorism.⁴

While the structuralist school argues that globalization must be checked, reversed or fundamentally changed to forestall its fostering of transnational terrorism (Lia, 2005: 199), the neo-liberal school argues that in the long-run, economic globalization will calm motivations for anti-market and anti-systemic violence by spreading prosperity, higher standards of living, political and economic reforms (Hoffmann, 2002: 114). According to the assertions of neo-liberalists, it is rather the incompleteness or unevenness of globalization in parts of the world that creates motivations for transnational terrorism, not economic globalization itself.

B) State Sponsorship of Terrorism

In the literature on terrorism, few thoughts assign great weight to the influence of 'state sponsored terrorism' as an explanation for the growth of international terrorism since the

⁴ For more on the Structuralists interpretation, see Brynjar Lia, *Globalization and the Future of Terrorism: Patterns and Predictions* (London: Frank Cass, 2005, pp. 170-195).

1960s. However, in most cases, scholars (Kegley, 1990: 70; Hoffman, 2003: 438; Napoleoni, 2003: 45) agree that state sponsorship of terrorism does not create, but only facilitates already existing groups that retain substantial operational autonomy. State sponsorship increases their effectiveness and, to a varying degree, influences their directions and '*modus operandi*' (Hoffman, 2003: 438). Brian Jenkins argued that state sponsorship 'puts more resources at the disposal of the terrorists' without which the group can't plan (Jenkins, 2001: 323). State support is, in many cases, still vital for the groups' operational strength (Ibid).

As Richardson points out, the motivations for state-sponsored terrorism vary greatly. Strong states may resort to state-sponsorship due to the prohibitive costs of open warfare, while weak states that support terrorist organizations do so because they believe that it is the only effective weapon against a militarily superior enemy (Richardson, 1999: 213).

C) State Strength: Weak and Collapsed States

While state sponsorship might have encouraged the growth of international terrorism during the Cold War, the existence of weak and collapsed states in the post-Cold War period has increasingly become a cause of concern as potential 'breeding grounds for instability, mass migration, and murder', as well as 'reservoirs and exporters of terror' (Rotberg, 2002: 132). Following September 11, as indicated by Rotberg, the United States deployed troops in or close to number of "weak states" where suspected al-Qaida terrorists and Islamist guerrillas had strong footholds, including Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Djibouti (due to its proximity to Somalia and Yemen), Georgia, the Philippines, and Western Africa (Ibid). However, as von Hippell (2002: 33) and others have warned, there is no complete consensus to assume that all collapsed states will attempt transnational terrorism.

Several other studies find out that state strength is a significant factor in reducing the scope of transnational terrorism. In a cross-country analysis for all countries in the period 1968-1977, Lai finds that "the greater the government's share of the state's GDP is, the lower the level of transnational terrorism against its interests" (2004: 36). There are probably several reasons for this, according to Lai. Strong states are more capable of providing security to

their populace and disrupting terrorist networks. They are also more capable of counteracting terrorism by reducing recruitment to radical groups through the provision of necessary services to the society (Ibid).

D) Ongoing and Past Wars

Armed conflicts also have various facilitating influences on transnational terrorism. While terrorism in some cases is an armed conflict in its own right, terrorist motivations are often rooted in ongoing or past wars in one way or another. Throughout the history of modern international terrorism, a common motive of perpetrators has been to bring back their forgotten war and grievances to the world's attention (Store, 2006: 123). The series of kidnappings and hijacking operations carried out by South Moluccan, or Ambonese, militants in the Netherlands between 1975 and 1978, according to Store, were all aimed at putting pressure on the Dutch government to support their struggle for independence from Indonesia. Another type of impact on terrorism from armed conflicts is that terrorism is the spillover, by-product, and reminder of armed conflicts in a country. As History shows, perhaps most frequently, terrorism occurs as part of or as a by-product of armed conflicts. Michael Doran (2002: 33) argues that in a civil war taking place between a government and its opposition movements, transnational terrorism has been experienced when foreign nationals and interests are targeted because of their assumed politico-military alliance with or intervention on behalf of the government in question. In addition, armed conflicts by themselves create propitious environments for international terrorist organizations, not only because such conflicts are rallying cries for the mobilization to militant groups but also in the numerous refugee camps created by the conflict, as well as among sympathetic diaspora communities, as Merkl explains. "Areas ravaged by armed conflict and civil strife often emerge as no-man's-land, controlled by non-state entities be they rebel groups, warlords, tribal chieftains, or drug cartels" (Merkl, 1986: 121).

E) Retaliation against Actions of the United States

The end of Cold War in 1991 left USA the only superpower in the world. Following this victory, the USA was full of confidence to lead the world forward to a period of peace and harmony seeing itself as the World's policeman, able to keep "rogue states" under control making them fall to the line (Crenshaw, 2001: 427). However the new world order turned

out to be quite different when much of the world disagreed with the perceived role of USA and its world view (Chomsky, 2006: 34). The disagreement got intensified due to the USA's frequent intervention in internal affairs of others and its repressive actions that forced many resentful groups to consider terrorism as the only way to strike back at the USA and its allies, the scenario which denied peace, stability and security for the world.

By listing several anti-US riots throughout the world, Naom Chomsky points out that often 'terrorist' acts were committed in response to several threats exerted by USA (Ibid). This idea is supported by Lloyd Pettiford and David Harding in which they exhaustively examined and exposed the US led turmoil mainly carried out in Arab countries. The authors concluded that American Foreign Policies must take much of the blame for the increase in terrorism since the US seems totally determined to ensure that the whole world is opened up to its unrestricted access and that any alternative form of society be regarded as strictly against its rules (Pettiford and Harding, 2003: 91).

2.1.2.3. State Responses to Global Terrorism: Counterterrorism Aspects

The Pre-9/11 response to terrorist activities was muted or marginalized in Foreign Policy making of many states. However, it was after the horror of September 11 that terrorism has become foreign as well as domestic policy priority of almost all states in the world.

Since September 11, international terrorism has emerged on top of national and international security agendas, widely perceived as a severe and very real threat to world peace. It is due to its casualties that the event found to be a threat that necessitates international alignment and cooperation on an unprecedented level. Expectedly, the 9/11 outrages were condemned by most of the world's governments (Rabasa, 2009: 5). Using this opportunity, the US government declared a 'war on terrorism'. As the then President Bush's claim justifies, the battlefields of this war extends to wherever the US government perceives terrorists hide, run or plan (Ibid).

Without consensus on the issue, most states have started following their own strategies of fighting against terrorism. Governments' anti-terrorism policies, as Jonathan R. White discusses, are found to be either proactive or reactive. Proactive policy involves aggressively going after the terrorists and eliminating their resources, infrastructure, and

personnel, while reactive policy concerns protective measures either to divert the attack or limit its consequences (2006: 121). A preemptive strike against the terrorists or their state sponsors (for example, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al Shabab in Somalia), are examples of a proactive policy. Reactive responses, on the other hand, include deterrence, embassy fortification, and UN or other regional institutions' conventions. Cooperation through global and regional institutions (such as UN, EU, AU, IGAD, etc) are encouraged with the following aims such as disrupting the financing of terrorism, responding to states and communities that support terrorism, enhancing international cooperation and data exchange on suspect immigrants and terrorists preventing recruitment and incitement of terrorist operatives, removing the causes of terrorism by contributing to missions aimed at creating international peace and stability and establishing legal measures and guidelines to both outlawed terrorist organizations and activities (Store: 2006: 3-12). Aligning around these lines of aims, the UNO and other regional institutions and governments across the world seems thriving to strengthen global security, where the US is playing the role of leading and/or "world policeman" in combating these terrorist outfits (Hoffman, 2006: 37).

2.2. Theoretical Framework

2.2.1. Foreign Policy Behavior and Global Terrorism: Depicting Causal Relationships

Scholars working on transnational terrorism are enormously coming out with empirical findings about causal relationships between terrorism and different variables such as regime type, level of economic development, and foreign policy behavior. Burcu Savun and Brian J. Phillips arrived with empirical evidence that suggests: states with active foreign policies are more prone to transnational terrorist threats than states that are not (2009: 11). Their argument justifies that states that adopt active foreign policies are more likely to foment some sort of resentment among foreign or internal groups, knowingly or unknowingly, and hence may be the target of terrorism by these aggrieved groups.

The scholars identified three activities of a state about what constitutes active foreign policies which are likely to create high levels of resentment abroad. These include: 1) engaging in foreign policy crisis with other states, 2) alliance ties with the United States, and 3) intervention in civil wars of other states. Each of these indicators measures different

aspects of a state's foreign policy that can arouse some sort of resentment among foreign or domestic actors.

Involvement in foreign policy crisis, according to Savun and Phillips (2009: 12), signifies state's engagement in conflict with other state/s. State's foreign policy, supported by military or conflicting instruments such as war, sanctions or subversive roles do more often create hostility abroad and reciprocally entangle with continued restlessness directed from the foreign state. That means, the more frequently a state engages in conflict with other states, the more likely that it will create resentment and hostility abroad, and thereby, more likely to attract terrorist threats, as Savun and Phillips find out. This holds true for Ethiopia as it has been found in hostility and tension with Eritrea and Somalia. These are countries, for long, considered as instigators of series of terrorist threats to Ethiopia. Somalia's long-held irredentist stance of seceding the Ethiopian Somali region serves a source of intense hostility with Ethiopia. The source of hostility between Eritrea and Ethiopia includes a border dispute that caused a war of 1998-2000, where Eritrea experienced a humiliating defeat. In response to such hostile relations with Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea found strongly busy in harboring and organizing terrorists targeting Ethiopia (Pham, 2009; UNO, 2009; 2011; Woldeselase, 2010).

A second indicator of active foreign policy is whether a state has alliance ties with the United States. The United States is probably the most visible foreign policy actor in the world. The frequency with which the United States intervenes in other states, its dominance in intergovernmental organizations, and its general economic and geopolitical prowess make it a high-profile actor. According to Savun and Phillips (2009: 12), the type of foreign policy the United States seeks inevitably creates some resentment among many people around the globe.

However, no matter how resentful a terrorist group may be against the United States, a direct attack on the US for the groups is relatively risky and costly due to the military, political and economic might of USA. Therefore, as the authors explain, terrorist groups may find it easier to target the US interests abroad rather than committing direct terrorist acts on the US soil. One way to achieve this goal is to target states that have close military

ties to the United States but do not have the same level of capabilities to counteract terrorism as the United States (Savun and Phillips, 2009: 12-13). They concluded that states that have close ties to the United States, especially in counterterrorism aspects, are more likely to be particularly vulnerable to transnational terrorism due to their strong association with the country that has the most active or involved foreign policy in the world.

This perception also applies to Ethiopia which has forged strong ties with the United States in a fight against terrorism in the Horn of Africa. The US Special Forces, for instance, have supplied support and training to the Ethiopian troops in the name of global war on terrorism (Rabasa, 2009: 78). This is mainly considered as cooperation to fight “terrorists” that have stationed in Somalia. The problem is that, based merely on military activity, the US might trigger the very thing that it has feared: the expansion of terrorism in Somalia as well as in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s interfering in Somalia, for instance, provoked the militants’ resentments and widened opportunities for them to rally against Ethiopia (Rabasa: 2009: 3).

A third indicator of a state's active foreign policy, able to attract terrorism, is its intervention in civil wars of others. As it is well known, interventions in civil wars are costly and risky endeavors, and unless state leaders have strong interest in the war region and hold the belief that success is within their reach, they are unlikely to intervene in civil wars (Aime, 2013: 12). The decision to intervene in civil wars, as Aime adds, reflects a high degree of commitment and involvement in other states’ affairs. By their nature, most interventions are controversial. They tend to antagonize the domestic group against which the intervention takes place, unless the intervention is perceived to be neutral by the disputants (Savun and Philips, 2009: 14). As these authors' study justifies, disadvantaged groups and their external sponsors (if there are any) are likely to hold resentment against the intervener state and may want to take revenge by carrying out a terrorist act against it. Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia has continued witnessing such resentments as discussed. It is evident that the 2007 terrorist plot against Chinese Oil Company in Ethiopia and other incidents that followed, in one way or another, were instigated by militant groups in Somalia. Therefore, this theory is relevant to critically analyze the growing threat of terrorism in Ethiopia based on the theory's premises.

Chapter Three

Terrorism in Ethiopia

Introduction

This chapter aims at examining and assessing terrorist threats in Ethiopia. In doing so, it tries to exhaustively consider the contexts of terrorism, terrorists and their threats as well as terrorist incidents and its causes and casualties in Ethiopia.

In the first section of the chapter, there is an attempt to provide background information about when and how the threat of global terrorism started to penetrate into Ethiopia. The second section presents a brief outline of the perpetrators or groups behind the terrorist threats to Ethiopia since early 1990s.

The third section discusses the terrorist incidents and casualties that Ethiopia has been suffering since the coming to power of the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) government, in 1991.

3.1. Global Context of Terrorism in Ethiopia

Cross-border terrorism has a long history in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa, which has experienced terrorist attacks even before 9/11 attack in the United States. Over the past two decades, according to Rabasa (2009: 14), a significant number of terrorist attacks and operations have taken place in this region that is linked to al-Qaeda and its affiliates having bases in Sudan and Somalia.

Ethiopia has long been affected by the terrorism perpetrated by these Sudan and Somalia-based groups. The threat was fomented by the following three happenings in the region: the creation of National Islamic Front Government in Sudan, the end of Siad Barre government in Somalia and the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime in Ethiopia, all providing a unique opportunity for the rooting and growth of fundamentalists (both political and religious) in the Horn of Africa.

Somalia, since the fall of the Siad Barre regime, emerged as a troubled and, finally, a failed state, serving as a safe haven for the breeding of terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, a giant global terrorist network. The new Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) Government, which took power in 1991 by overthrowing the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime, permitted the development of political parties, but cracked down later on those parties and individuals, venturing too far from the EPRDF goals (Asafa, 2005: 82). This forced a few organized groups to alienate themselves from the political ideology of EPRDF and to get engaged in rebellion. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) are instances of these groups.

The ONLF functioned briefly in the early 1990s as a political party in Ogaden (Which is part of Ethiopian Somali region). As Keller (2004: 30) writes, either lacking adequate indigenous Somali support or facing a heated opposition from the EPRDF, the ONLF group joined a more numerous, like-minded Al Itihaad Al Islamiya (AIAI) colleagues in Somalia. AIAI, according to Keller, uses religion as a tool to achieve political power. Keller added that some of Al Itihaad's top leaders are graduates from Islamic Universities in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (Ibid: 32).

According to Rabasa (2009: 34), al-Qaeda, based in Sudan⁵(early to mid 1990s), sought both to establish working relations with Islamists in Somalia (AIAI) and to create training camps in ethnic Somali areas of Ethiopia in the early 1990s. While Al Itihaad Al Islamiya's (AIAI) primary focus was on the establishment of an Islamist state in Somalia (Menkhaus, 2005: 25; Rabasa, 2009: 30), it also encouraged and engaged in subversive activities among ethnic Somalis in the Somali region of Ethiopia and carried out a series of terrorist attacks in between 1995 and 1997 (Appendix-III). Al Itihaad al Islamiya and its Ethiopian affiliates (ONLF and OLF), therefore, are believed to be the beginners of a terrorist threats to Ethiopia. These groups are reported as carried out bombings of hotels, transports, bars, and public buildings in Addis Ababa as well as in other areas of Eastern Ethiopia. The group also conducted several attacks going to the extent of attempting assassination of local, regional and Federal authorities (Ibid).

⁵ For over a decade, Sudan has been a safe haven for a number of terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda, Islamic Group, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. (Greenberger, 1993: 12).

In addition to this, however, it has to be noted that the earliest terrorist threat to Ethiopia was from the government of National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan with the objective of expanding political Islam in the region. Beyond the objective of exporting Islamic ideology, the government in Khartoum had offered training and arms to those whom they believe would destabilize the neighboring states (Woodward, 1997: 121). As pointed out by Kiefe (2006: 11), the dissident groups like Oromo Islamic Jihad inside Ethiopia and in border areas, were backed by the NIF.

3.2. Terrorist Groups in and around Ethiopia: Affiliates, Allies and Sympathizers

The most well known global terrorist group operating in East African region is al-Qaeda. According to Rabasa (2009: 21), East Africa remains a priority area in al-Qaeda's global strategy. In the early 1990s, al-Qaeda established a base in Sudan, where a military-Islamist regime had taken power in 1989. Osama bin Laden, according to Shinn (2007: 3), had his headquarters in Sudan from late 1991 until Sudan forced him to leave in mid-1996. In 1992 and 1993, after the overthrow of Somali dictator Mohammed Siad Barre, al-Qaeda was soon created in Somalia (Ibid).

This presence of al-Qaeda in the region has become a security threat to post 1991 Ethiopia. Anti-government forces operating in or outside the country are said to be aligned with al-Qaeda affiliates active in neighboring countries (Goitom, 2013: 25). These dissident groups, including the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), with local agendas, are reported to have carried out acts of terrorism in Ethiopia. In the light of these allegations, the Government of Ethiopia attributes most terrorist attacks to one of three organizations operating in Ethiopia or from neighboring countries: Al Itihad Al Islamiya, the OLF, and the ONLF (Rotberg: 2005: 103).

Al-Qaeda's link to Ethiopia is well known. Most of the al-Qaeda related attacks in Ethiopia are believed to be carried out by a Somali-based organization known as Al Itihaad Al-Islamiyya (AIAI) or Islamic Unity in the early and mid-1990s (Goitom, 2013: 30). As this author adds, Al Itihaad acknowledged responsibility for several terrorist attacks in Ethiopia. Growing evidence indicates that AIAI receives training and support from al-Qaeda. In the

early 1990s, Abu Hafs al-Masri, also known as Mohammed Atef, sent a team of al-Qaeda operatives to Ogaden region of Somali in Ethiopia where they worked with AIAI (Shinn, 2007: 4-6). This person, believed to be nominated by Osama bin Laden personally, had a long history of operations in East Africa and in the Horn region (Ibid). Since its establishment in 1984, the ONLF has been fighting against the Ethiopian government (Foltz, 2010: 21).

The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) is another group alleged (by the government) as engaged in terrorist activities in Ethiopia. However, Assafa Jalata says that the OLF, established in 1974, claims to address the problem of continued marginalization of the Oromo Society (2005: 23) and claims it as not terrorist. Since the coming to power of the EPRDF, the ONLF and the OLF are fighting with the government to achieve their goals (Smidt, 2008: 136-137). Both groups seek ethnic national independence or autonomy from Ethiopia.

The Ethiopian government has reportedly considered the OLF as great threat and challenge to Ethiopia's stability as well as on the day to day activity of individuals. It was accused of orchestrating a series of bomb attacks in the country (Smidt, 2008: 139). According to Smidt, such incidents by the OLF forced the government to designate it as a "terrorist" organization. The government believed that it should be considered as a terrorist group for the fact that its violence has targeted civilians, civilian properties and government officials in different parts of Oromia and Addis Ababa, including the destruction of schools, the bombing attacks of the popular Blue Tops restaurant in Addis Ababa in 1997 and another attack on a hotel in Addis Ababa's Piazza neighborhood on 11 September 2003 (Woldeselase, 2010: 231). In addition, "Ethiopian security forces claim to have thwarted OLF attempts to blow up two fuel tankers in public places in 2003, and have intercepted twenty one OLF fighters trying to enter Ethiopia with twenty kilos of explosives in early 2004" (ICG, 2005:11).

The continued anti-Government move of OLF was further evidenced during the 2006 military intervention in Somalia. According to Woldeselase (2010: 237), the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and the Ethiopian forces had captured several of

OLF rebel members who had participated in UIC (Union of Islamic Courts) activities in Burhakable and other places. The rebels admitted their participation with the radical Islamists in Somalia.

Among these individuals captured, there were three members of the OLF Central Committee who participated in the conflicts of December 2006 and January 2007, when Ethiopian and TFG forces enter into Mogadishu. These are Kumsa Geda, Alinure Mohammed, and Tafa Digsisa. They had disclosed further information of the relations between the OLF, UIC and the Eritrean government in supporting the planning/arranging of the threat and finances for training and arming the OLF. Captured OLF members disclosed that around 270 OLF, ONLF, and UIC had been also trained in Mogadishu alongside with AIAI and Al Shabaab forces (Woldeselase, 2010: 237).

Another group, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO), which is considered as the militant wing of the ONLF, though having minor importance, had resorted to terrorist tactics in pursuit of their political goals (Shinn, 2005: 109). But these acts, according to Shinn, seem to be confined to the areas in which they have indigenous support: Somali state in the case of the ONLF, and the area around Bale Zone for the IFLO.

Besides, since 2006, the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia has given al-Qaeda enough reason to renew its interest and intensify smaller extremist groups both in the Horn of Africa in general and to target Ethiopia in particular. Following the intervention, al-Qaeda, or at least organizations claiming to speak for al-Qaeda, according to Shinn (2007:11), threatened to step up attacks against Ethiopia.

A previously unknown Islamic group in Ethiopia calling itself the Mujahedin of the Land of Two Migrations announced its formation on an Arabic language website at the end of 2006. It pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden, appealed for the establishment of sharia in Ethiopia, and warned of imminent attacks on US interests in Africa. Since then, a variety of groups have taken to the internet threatening Ethiopia and other supporters of the Somali Transitional Federal Government. They include the Youth Mujahedin Movement and the Brigades of Tawhid Wal Jihad in the Land of Somalia (Ibid: 11-12).

Finally, the government of Ethiopia and other sources indicated on several occasions that the Eritrean government had been organizing, equipping, and training the Benishangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM) and Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF) to cause terrorist violence in Ethiopia. BPLM killed forty seven civilians in Benishangul Gumuz Regional State during 2008 to 2010(Woldeselase, 2010: 213). In addition, it was reported that Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (EPPF) was sponsored and armed by Eritrean government to commit terrorism. Starting from 2006 upto 2007, EPPF was guided,

trained and were given a mission to kill innocents in Humera. The EPPF was reported as destroyed two Lorries and kidnapped six civilians who were taken to Eritrea in 2007. In addition, EPPF attacked the Ayiga and Semhal Hotel located in Humera and attacked Humera's electricity power transformer (Ibid: 214; Appendix-IV). Ethiopia in turn is found mobilizing and organizing anti-Isayas Afewerki groups in Addis Ababa to hasten the overthrow of the regime in Eritrea (Temesgen, 2012: 42).

As the above discussions imply, the ONLF, OLF, AIAI, al-Qaeda and Al Shabab are the groups identified as the major perpetrators of terrorism in Ethiopia. Eritrea's cooperation with these groups perpetuated the threat. Eritrea, according to Peter Pham (2009: 15), continued supporting Islamist movements and other insurgents in and around Ethiopia if they serve its overall strategic objective of undermining the Ethiopian government. To this end, Eritrea had lent support to all anti-Ethiopian forces including the OLF and the ONLF in Ethiopia and the Islamist insurgency in Somalia (Temesgen: 2012: 45).

3.3. Terrorist Incidents and Casualties in Ethiopia

Ethiopia, unlike other countries in the region like Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, is found to have a tough and effective security apparatus. Its security service and intelligence tactics are said to be firm, and some even would say harsh, and have developed an impressive operational capacity (Shinn, 2005:110). This security strength has been evident as it has thwarted numerous organized terrorist attacks against Ethiopia. However, whatsoever the security strength might Ethiopia possess, its security apparatus is far from infallible, particularly in countering attacks and plots from indigenous organizations, that are said to have links with external terrorist groups. In consequence, a significant number of terrorist attacks and operations, targeting Ethiopia, have taken place over the past ten to fifteen years, most of them believed to be carried out by alienated indigenous groups, having links perhaps with al-Qaeda network.

Therefore, this section tries to briefly outline some of the major terrorist incidents, its perpetrators and the casualties since early 1990s in Ethiopia. Most of the incidents that have occurred since the current government come to power, have usually been in the form

of bombings of hotels, public buildings and means of transportation, shootings, assassination attempts and, more recently, kidnappings and explosions.

The most embarrassing incident occurred in 1995, when Egyptian terrorists, associated with al- Gamaa al-Islamiyya (Islamic group), attacked President Hosni Mubarak while he was en route from the Addis Ababa airport to a summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). According to Donovan C. Chau (2007: 4), the eleven-man assassination team had been given safe haven in Sudan where they prepared for the assassination. As the author adds, the team was divided into two groups: nine were sent to Ethiopia to carry out the assassination; and the two remained in Sudan to plan and direct the killing of Mubarak. The weapons used in the assassination attempt were flown in to Ethiopia by Sudan Airways, although the Sudan government denied complicity. However, this terrorist attempt was thwarted by the Ethiopian security forces.

In January 1996, as noted by Shinn (2002: 3), there was a bombing of the government-owned Ghion Hotel in Addis Ababa; followed by a bombing of the Ras Hotel in Dire Dawa, Eastern town of Ethiopia a month later. Al Itihaad claimed responsibility for both bombings. There was an assassination attempt in Addis Ababa in July 1996 against Abdul-Mejid Hussein, the then Ethiopian minister of transport and communication. Abdulkadir Muhamud Dhaqane, Al Itihaad's spokesman in Mogadishu, quickly announced responsibility for the attack and reiterated Al Itihaad's complicity in the two hotels bombings (Ibid). According to Shinn, the spokesman added that Al Itihaad would continue attacking senior Ethiopian officials and would pursue its guerilla attacks in the Ogaden until the latter become independent. It was reported that in August 1996, a bomb ripped through the bar and lounge of Wabe Shebelle Hotel in Addis Ababa.

Believing that Al Itihaad was again responsible for the attack, Ethiopia started responding to these attacks with a military assault on Al Itihaad's followers in Somalia's Gedo region. This and other military actions taken by Ethiopian security forces destroyed Al Itihaad's bases in Luq and Buuloahaawa, killing hundreds of Somali extremists and a number of non-Somali Arabs who had flocked to the Horn (Goitom, 2013: 10).

Terrorist attacks continued in 1997- at a private hotel and in the post office in Harar town of Ethiopia, the Mekonen Hotel in Dire Dawa, and the Tigray Hotel, Blue Tops Restaurant, and Tana Market in Addis Ababa -6 (Shinn, 2002: 5). No one claimed responsibility and Ethiopian authorities ultimately arrested individuals linked to the OLF for most of these incidents. In 2002, there was an explosion in "Ethiopia Hotel", Addis Ababa, that killed one person with no body taking responsibility (Andualem, 2002).

Several terrorist acts by unidentified terrorist groups have caused severe human rights violations in different parts of Ethiopia (EHRCO, 2007:493). According to this report, as a result of grenades thrown at Sahlemariam Degifie club, woizero Yeshi Mengesha memorial bar, and woizero Aster Belachew restaurant on July 24, 2005 and at Wondimamachoch Hotel on July 26, 2005 in Jigjiga town by undefined persons, five individuals were killed, 31 others were wounded and considerable damage has been caused to property.

In April 2007, the ONLF attacked a Chinese oil exploration facility on the border with Somalia, killing sixty five Ethiopians and nine Chinese oil workers and abducting seven other Chinese, who were later released (Rabasa, 2009: 27).

The year 2008 also experienced some terrorist attacks as Woldeselase (2010: 243) points out. In April 2008, explosions occurred at two petrol stations [NOC] in Addis Ababa and three people were killed and 19 injured. In May 2008, a bomb exploded on a local minibus traveling from Arat Kilo to Meskel Square near the Ethiopian Mapping Agency in the Kirkos Sub-City district of the capital Addis Ababa and six people were killed and seven people injured. In May of 2008, again there were two bombings at two hotels in the town of Negele Borana, Oromia Region of Ethiopia, which killed three and injured five (BBC News, 2008-05-28). The two bombs were detonated in a three minute interval. The first exploded in the Kidane Mihret Hotel and the second in the Shuferoch Hotel, just a few yards away. This attack occurred on the seventeenth anniversary of the birth of the current regime (EPRDF). Although the Ethiopian government has not officially confirmed the perpetrators, a Mogadishu-based Somali radio station, Radio Shebelle, broadcast reported as the explosions were aimed against Ethiopians, 'the enemy of Islam', using the statement by the leader of a Somali militant group (Ibid). In October 2008, the Ethiopian trade mission in Hargeisa (Somaliland) was one of the targets of multiple suicide bombings that killed at

least twenty people; the attacks were blamed on al-Shabab, a Somalia's armed group with alleged links to al-Qaeda (Mohammed and Gettleman, 2008: 6).

In 2010, at least four terrorist incidents occurred in Ethiopia as indicated in Country Reports on Terrorism 2010: on April 24, a bomb attack at a tea room in the northern town of Adi Aro near the Eritrean border killed five people and injured 20. Ethiopian officials blamed Eritrean mercenaries for the attack as an attempt to disrupt the May 23 national elections. On May 6, a group of people lobbed hand grenades at a group assembled for a political opposition party meeting in Adaba, Oromia. Two persons died and 26 were wounded. Ruling party and opposition party members blamed each other for the attack, and no group claimed responsibility for it. On May 20, three days before national elections, a bomb exploded on a bus near the Eritrean border wounding 13 people (US Department of State, 2011).

Unidentified attackers, on 17 January 2012, shot and killed five foreign tourists and kidnapped four people near the Ertale Volcano in the Ethiopia's northern Afar Region (BBC News, 18 January 2012). At least three other tourists were injured and two Germans were among the kidnapped together with 2 Ethiopians. The dead included two Germans, two Hungarians and one Austrian. The news reminded that in this region, five Europeans and thirteen Ethiopians were kidnapped in 2007. All of those hostages were released later. In 2008, Ethiopia foiled a kidnapping attempt on a group of twenty eight French tourists in the area (Ibid).

The government placed the blame on members of a group that was trained and armed by the Eritrean Government. According to Country Reports on Terrorism (2012: 18), a number of insurgent groups from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti operate in this area. The Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF), a violent extremist group was backed by Eritrea. In retaliation, the Ethiopian military made incursions into Eritrea in March to target "subversive groups," including ARDUF, and a military base. In April, there was an attack by armed gunmen on a farm operated by Saudi Star Development in the Gambella region that killed at least five people (Ibid). On 12 March 2012, there was a shooting incident twelve miles from the town of Gambella in Ethiopia which killed 19

people and wounded eight others. The attackers were unidentified and the victims were Ethiopian residents travelling on public bus (BBC News, 2012-03-12). The following table summarizes terrorist consequences in Ethiopia.

Table 3.1: Summary of Terrorist Activities and Casualties in Ethiopia: 1991-2012.

Perpetrators	No. of attacks	Targets	Weapons used	Casualties		
				Fatal	Inju	Property loss
Al Itihad Al Islamiya and Al Gammal Islamiya	12	Officials, offices, Hotels, foreigners, vehicles,...	Explosives	38	97	>11,641,049.52 mln birr
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)	140	Civilians, civilian properties (railway lines, trains, hotels, restaurants, bus, trucks, ...)	Explosive, bombs and hand grandes	1317	2892	>51,068,065.85 mln birr
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)	86	Civilians and their properties, individuals, churches, vehicles,...	Explosive, bombs and hand grandes	420	285	- more than 40 vehicles burnt and destroyed, >2,036,000 million birr
EPPF and Eritrean organized groups (mostly cross-border attacks)	24	Civilians, tourists, civilian properties	Explosives, land mines	13	45	->10 vehicles and building ->0.2 millionn
Unidentified	11	Civilian, tourists, investors, vehicles	Explosive, bombs and hand grandes	>70	>36	1.5 to 3 mln
Total	273			1,858	3355	>70 million

3.4. Causes for Terrorism in Ethiopia

Terrorism has already evolved as a serious security challenge to Ethiopia, and as table 3.1 demonstrates, Ethiopia has been a particular target and has perhaps suffered more from terrorist attacks. However, for these growing terrorist threats to Ethiopia, many causes are possible such as being surrounded by weak government and collapsed states, secessionist movements and insurgent groups and ethno-religious landscape, as discussed below.

3.4.1. Weak Government and Collapsed States

The greater Horn of Africa- an area that includes Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya is home to interlocking conflicts, weak and failing states, pervasive corruption, and extreme poverty. As Bekoe (2006: 11) describes, these are states with less qualified statehood and whose governance structures have regularly been weak contributing to high levels of political marginalization and economic inequalities followed by continued destabilizations of the region. It is believed that this region is a breeding ground for terrorism as an important staging area, training center, and a favored place to target interests of perceived actor (Foltz, 2010: 31).

Somalia has been without a functioning government since 1991 (following the downfall of Siad Barre regime) remaining the most volatile and the most insecure environment. Its governance was exercised by clan-based warlords until the UIC (Union of Islamic Courts) gained control of Mogadishu in June 2006 (Menkhaus, 2005: 54). Somalia's internal turmoil has not yet calmed by any means.

Sudan, until its Southern part got recognition for independence (2011), was split along a north-south, ethno-religious divide between the Arabized (Muslim, North) and the African non-Muslim, south. Though the most ambitious separation was achieved, the region is still chaotic, where the Western cape of Northern Sudan (Darfur) has been engaged for long-time in ethnic cleansing and, the newly recognized Southern Sudan also get engaged in civil strife since the mid of December 2013 with many hundreds of fatalities and displacement of thousands being recorded.

Eritrea, in the Northern frontier of Ethiopia has been found a troubled and hostility perpetuating zone from where thousands of immigrants and refugees cross to Ethiopia to escape the repressive regime in Asmara (Amtaika, 2013: 60). The current Esayas Afeworki regime of Eritrea is blamed by some governments and institutions as guilty of destabilizing its neighboring states, most notably Ethiopia (Goitom, 2013: 17).

Such weak governments and political and social disorder throughout the region create an environment in which unrecognized power structures flourish. Due to this, the region has become a sanctuary and base for terrorist mobilizations and operations since the early 1990s and remains a priority area in al-Qaeda's global strategy (Rabasa, 2009: 13).

Accordingly, the weakness of these governments and the internal fighting and corruption of the regimes facilitated the ability of terrorists to easily move, plan and organize. Sudan had long been considered a 'rogue state' by much of the world community because of its support for international terrorism. For over a decade, Sudan has been a safe haven for a number of terrorist organizations (Greenberger, 1993: 12). Somalia is another country where the international community is seriously concerned about its terrorist activities. Since the ouster of the dictator Siad Barre government in 1991, Somalia has been without a central government. The absence of central authority, according to Foltz (2010: 14), has created a conducive environment for terrorist and extremist groups to flourish in Somalia.

3.4.2. Secessionist Movements and Insurgent/Rebel Groups

Although not usually referred to as terrorist groups, the many ethno-nationalist groups that have sprung up in Africa creating civil wars and power vacuums in already vulnerable areas have had an impact on terrorism in Africa. Since 1995, Africa witnessed an increase in the number of terrorist attacks against foreigners or foreign interests (Lyman and Morison, 2004: 3). According to Keller (2004: 32), most of these attacks stemmed from internal civil unrest and spilled over to regional wars, as African rebel movements and opposition groups resorted to terrorism in an attempt to further their political, social, or economic objectives.

On this ground, groups operating as alternative power centers and instigating civil wars are pervasive throughout the Horn of Africa in the form of secessionist movements, clans, warlords, insurgent groups, Islamist militants, and criminal networks (Shinn, 2007: 50). In most cases, such creations are products of the weak and failed nature of states and governments in the region.

As terrorism is one of the forms of violent manifestation of political contention, these groups in Ethiopia (and elsewhere in the region) are posing transnational terrorist threats to every country in either of the following two ways (Savun and Philips, 2009: 21): (1) groups outside the boundary are holding and instigating some sort of resentment against a state or (2) groups inside a country harbor and domesticate resentments of actors outside the country. Few instances of such groups operating in Ethiopia are discussed below.

The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) represents a separatist group in Ogaden (Ethiopia's Somali region), home to ethnic Somalis. The group has conducted small scale guerrilla activities since 1994, purportedly in defense of the Ogadeni people and resource exploitation by the state (Keller, 2004: 67). For long time, this group is reported as engaged in terrorist measures of achieving its goal. In addition to frequent small scale attacks, in April 2007, the ONLF fighters attacked a China's oil exploring facility on the border with Somalia, killing 65 Ethiopian and 9 Chinese oil workers and abducted 7 other Chinese, who were later released (Rabasa, 2009: 36). In June 2012, this same group, according to Rabasa, attacked an army garrison and killed 168 Ethiopian troops. Other ethnic based opposition groups that were found fertile ground for transnational terrorist threat to Ethiopia include the Afar National Democratic Front (ANDF), the Tigray People Democratic Movement (TPDM), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the ethnic Amhara Ethiopian People's Patriotic Front (Gadarowski and Copeland, 2013: 4). Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) which seeks autonomy in the Afar region from both Ethiopia and Eritrea attacked foreign tourists in Afar region causing five deaths in 2012 (Ibid).

One Ethiopian Oromo group, albeit of minor importance, with links to Al Itihaad is the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (IFLO). According to government reports, it has

conducted a few small scale attacks in Ethiopia's Bale Region. A new organization called the Oromo, Somali, and Afar Liberation Alliance (OSALA) announced its formation in Mogadishu in August 1997⁶. The group consists of the United Oromo People's Liberation Front, Oromo Abbo Liberation Front, Somali People's Liberation Front, Oromo People's Liberation Organization, the Afar People's Liberation Army, and the Islamic Union of Western Somalia (Ibid). "It vowed to put an end to centuries of Judeo-Christian ideological hegemony in Ethiopia and Eritrea by means of guerilla warfare and popular uprising" (Shinn, 2002: 5).

It is with such connections that since 1991, Ethiopia has been fighting several of such groups, who are backed by anti-Ethiopian groups in Somalia and Sudan and also by Ethiopia's arch-enemy, Eritrea (Rabasa, 2009: 36). Several of terrorist threats targeting Ethiopia are claimed to be directed either through or from these groups.

3.4.3. The growing tension between the Ethiopian Government and some sections of the Muslim Community

Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia, as many writers justify, have been fairly cordial in the last hundred years (Abbink, 1998; Hussein, 1995, 2006; Pankhurst, 2003; Shinn, 2002, 2005); but changing religious trends are beginning to challenge this status quo. As many of these authors cite, Ethiopia has long been known for its Christian (mostly the Orthodox) population and the country's leadership is largely Christian in consequence. However, the Muslim population which is nearing parity with Christians in number has been conscious about its long lived marginal role in the politics of their country.

In addition to consciousness about marginalization, a shift in Islamic religious affiliation presents a looming danger to Ethiopia. Islam in Ethiopia, according to Ostebo (2008:419), has traditionally been Sufi (an Islamic sect which tends to resist the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism opposed to Wahabism), but Wahabism has already begun to compete as Ethiopian Muslim scholars leave the country for wahabi educations and return with Wahabi ideals (Ibid). Saudi Arabia is blamed as sponsoring these scholars to come there and get

⁶ BBC Monitoring Africa, "Ogaden rebel Group Welcomes Formation of New Oromo Rebel Alliance," 17 October 2000. (Cited in Shinn, 2002: 4).

trained in this Wahhabi creed and go back to spread it out (Shinn, 2005: 96). Several of the above writers stress the actual and potential influence of Wahabism as a religious creed representing an ideology that transcends borders and speaks to people's daily lives, able to seriously threaten the old status quo. While Wahabism does not equal terrorism, it is a fundamentalist movement that is creating conflict between its adherents and Sufi traditionists not only in Ethiopia, but throughout the world, thereby functioning as gateways to terrorism. Angel Rabasa (2009: 36), a senior political scientist at US Air Force's RAND Corporation (formed immediately after the end of the second World War to offer research and analysis to the US armed force), believes that the emergence of terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa in recent decades is linked to "the spread of Salafi and Wahhabi ideologies, which has put pressure on traditional and Sufi Practices, and in the emergence of extremists and terrorist groups influenced by these ideologies." According to this scholar, there are numerous indigenous radical Islamist groups in East Africa with varying degrees of affinity to al-Qaeda's extremist agenda, the most active being AIAI.

As Shinn (2005: 97) shows, the Saudi driven Islamic fundamentalism have already radicalized sections of Muslim population in Ethiopia. Though Whabi ideas are meeting strong resistance in many parts of Ethiopia, the battle between traditional followers of Sufism and the advocates of Wahabism has been joined since early years of 2000; " it is not clear where it will end" (Ibid).

Recently, tensions remain in a new dispute between some parts of the Muslim communities and the Ethiopian government, with the former accusing the later of interfering in religious matters and the later accusing the former of expanding radicalism in the country. One danger today, according to Ostebo (2008: 421), is that the conflict will generate its own jihadi logic, attracting external militants, who have been resentful of the government since 1990s, to engage in perpetuating Ethiopian instability. This is evident from the fact that most radical Islamic activities in Ethiopia, since 1990s, are being carried out by the following three organizations whose military factions have ties with Sudanese extremists, and extremist elements in Somalia and Eritrea whom provide them with weapons: Al-Itihad Al-Islamia (whose origin and major infrastructure are in Somalia); The Islamic Liberation Front of Oromo (ILFO) (its primary objective is self-determination for the Oromo and for

transformation of Oromia to an Islamic State); and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) (which is considered to be a relatively moderate Islamic movement).

Conclusion

The Chapter attempted to show the context of terrorism in Ethiopia by discussing the so called terrorist groups, terrorist incidents and the causes as well as its transnational nature. Accordingly, in the last twenty years, Ethiopia has witnessed significant number of terrorist incidents manifested through bombings of civilians and civilian properties, assassination attempts against higher government officials, attacking and kidnapping of tourists, etc. The attacks ravaged more than two thousand lives and civilian properties estimated above 100 million birr. The groups reported as acting behind these atrocities were the ONLF, OLF, AIAI, UIC, al Shabab and Eritrean Government. Somalia based terrorist groups (AIAI, UIC and al Shabab, succeeding one after the other) were found strongly linked to al-Qaeda and were highly sponsored by the Government in Eritrea. Poor governance and low statehood of states in the region, harboring of rebellion groups, the growth of political Islamism/extremism, neighboring countries' serving as terrorist safe havens, staging areas or transit points of terrorists combined with the almost twenty years of absence of central authority in Somalia, have been causing cross-border terrorism to flourish in Ethiopia.

Chapter Four

Ethiopian Counter-Terrorism Activities

Introduction

This chapter consists of three sections. The first section is about defining counter-terrorism and discusses the ways states are practicing it in general. Section two describes the Ethiopian Counter-Terrorism activities. It outlines the majority of Ethiopian counter-terrorism tools and instruments which include the institutional arrangements, the legislative measures, bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and military responses in fighting global terrorism. The final section presents the assessment of the Ethiopian counter-terrorism responses in terms of achievements and limitations.

4.1. An Overview of the Meaning and Practice of Counter-terrorism

Like the definition of terrorism, no consensus has been possible for defining Counter-Terrorism. Its ambiguity mainly emanates from the controversies surrounding what constitutes terrorism, terrorist groups and terrorist tactics. However, for the sake of having a common understanding in this study, Counter-Terrorism is conceptualized as state actions (that may include legislations, education, bi-lateral or multilateral cooperation, heightening security apparatus, military actions, etc) designed to tackle actual or perceived threats of terrorism. As Rogers points out (2008: 76) Policing, intelligence and building security apparatus, direct military action against terrorist paramilitary organizations, awareness rising, enactment of anti-terrorism legislations and bi/multilateral diplomacy through international institutions, etc are some common strategies being followed by states across the world. Several States have taken a number of important steps in this regard, Ethiopia being one of such states.

4.2. Ethiopian Counter-terrorism Activities: Institutions, Policies and Strategies

From the preceding chapter, it is evident that Ethiopia is the target of domestic and international terrorism directed from terrorist groups like the ONLF, the OLF, Al Itihaad Al Islamiya, Al Gamaa al Islamiya and Al Shabab. Due to the increasing severity of the

consequences of the tactics employed by these groups, Ethiopia has taken several steps in response some of which are briefly discussed below.

4.2.1. Institutional Arrangements

In order to effectively mitigate the threats to national security, the government of Ethiopia has a tough institutional security apparatus known as a National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). In earlier years, the national security activities had been run under the Security, Immigration, and Refugees Affairs Authority (SIRA). However, since 2006, the responsibility shifted to the newly instituted National Intelligence and Security Service. This restructuring, according to Woldeselase (2010: 292), contributed to the intensification of the intelligence activities and to transform them into an organization to provide decision makers with necessary strategic intelligence on which to base policy decisions. Accordingly, the NISS has become an institution mandated with a broad authority for intelligence, border security, criminal investigation and for overall counter-terrorism management in Ethiopia.

The objective of the NISS, according to the proclamation establishing it, is to protect and safeguard the national security of the country by providing quality intelligence and reliable security service (HPR, 2013a: 2). It is given the responsibility to formulate national intelligence and security policies, and devise methods for their implementation upon approval. Its powers and duties, in line with this, are outlined in the following articles of the proclamation accordingly:

1/ investigate any internal and external activity intended to overthrow the constitution and the constitutional order unlawfully; follow up threats against the national economic growth and development activities, serious good governance problems and conspiracies and collect intelligence and evidence and present it to the appropriate body;

2/ head and coordinate national counter-terrorism cooperation and coordination, represent the country in international and continental counter-terrorism relations and cooperate as head and leading representative;

3/ follow up and investigate terrorism and extremism and collect intelligence and evidence in collaboration with relevant organs;

A working-level task force, comprising of Heads of NISS, Ministry of Justice and the Federal Police,⁷ was recently established involving several other agencies, to develop closer operational cooperation among those agencies. This task force will also be responsible for furthering implementation of international conventions, including the IGAD MLA (mutual legal assistance) and Extradition Conventions (Task force Report, 2012: 6). In such a way, NISS, as Woldeselase (2010: 127) describes, has demonstrated a special success in spying and penetrating both domestic and external terrorist organizations and their members, and it has scored extensive achievements in convincing members of terrorist organizations to withdraw from the groups.

4.2.2. Legislation and Law Enforcement

There is no doubt that terrorism poses a serious threat to social and political values that directly relate to the full enjoyment of security in all aspects of life. Legal procedures have, in fact, been the primary methods of stifling such threats if properly addressed. On the basis of this fact, since the inception of the terrorist threats to Ethiopia's national security, the government has been actively working to legally respond to the persisting threats. The most important legislative measures Ethiopia has adopted in countering terrorism are the Anti-terrorism Act of 2009 and the Act of countering terrorist financing, being operational since 2009.

4.2.2.1. Anti-Terrorism Proclamation

The Ethiopian Ministry of Justice, according to article 23 of its proclamation No. 4/95, has adopted a legal Memorandum with the need to legally mitigate terrorist threats and "initiate the implementation of significant IGAD, AU and UN conventions on countering terrorism in Ethiopia" (Woldeselase, 2010: 294). It is this memorandum, which is proclaimed as Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009. Its draft, earlier before the approval by the parliament, was produced by the group comprised and made up of members from the National Intelligence and Security Service, Federal Police Commission and Ministry of Justice. In addition to these groups, it is believed that other ministries such as Ministry of

⁷ Statement by the Representative of the FDRE at the Sixth Committee on Agenda Item 110-Measures to eliminate International Terrorism, 68th Session of the UNGA, October 07/2013, New York, p.4.

foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense have significantly contributed some practical inputs for strengthening provisions of the legislation.

Following a thorough study, extensive discussions and debates on the provisions (HPR, 2009a: 13-29), the Ethiopian parliament, in June 2009, approved an Anti-Terrorism proclamation as the country's legal source which allows the fight against terrorism to be based on the legal framework.

Having 38 articles in seven parts, the provisions of Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism proclamation can be broadly grouped under the following categories⁸:

- 1) defining terrorism and terrorist acts and imposing penalties (parts I and II);
- 2) expanding police powers, including powers of arrest and detention (part III);
- 3) modifying trial procedures and evidentiary rules (part IV);
- 4) designating terrorist organizations and freezing assets (part V);
- 5) designating institutional and judicial jurisdiction over terrorism crimes (part VI);
- 6) miscellaneous provisions (part VII).

In general, this legislation is supposed to contribute a lot in curbing terrorism in Ethiopia. According to claims of Ethiopian government and some writers justification (Woldeselase, 2010: 293-294, Sasahulh, 2013: 3-4), the anti-terrorism law is based on various international conventions and has taken in to account the experiences of the legislations of a number of other countries who have proclaimed similar acts.

Depending on the provisions of the legislation, the government of Ethiopia has continued its law enforcement task despite oppositions against such government decisions as a strategy of abusing internationally respected human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is based on this legislation that the Ethiopian Parliament issued a resolution in May 2011 that declared five groups to be outlawed terrorist organizations (HPR, 2011). The groups include OLF and ONLF (violent domestic ethnic rebel groups); Ginbot 7 (a diaspora-based group that has called for the violent overthrow of the ruling party of Ethiopia); al-Qaeida; and al-Shabaab.

⁸ Federal Negarit Gazeta No. 57 28th August, 2009 page 4842

The government has accused, charged and brought hundreds of cases in to court using its comprehensive antiterrorism legislation. Few instances include the following. In February 2012, eight individuals suspected as al-Qaeda operatives in Bale area of Oromia region are arrested (US Department of State, 2013: 21). The government convicted other 46 people under the 2009 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, 24 of whom were tried in absentia, including the 11-person Al-Qaeda cell and three members of the ONLF. Also among those convicted were 12 journalists, opposition political figures, and activists whose trials were deemed by several international human rights organizations and foreign diplomatic missions to be politically motivated and based on evidence indicative of acts of a political nature rather than linked to terrorism (Ibid). The government also invoked the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation in charging a number of Muslims in connection with protests that alleged government interference in religious affairs, and accused one Muslim of accepting funds illegally from a foreign embassy (HRW, 2012).

Amnesty International and the Committee to Protect Journalists have been vocal critics of the anti-terrorism law. Amnesty International says the statute has been used to jail more than 100 journalists and opposition politicians during the past years. Many have been convicted and handed long prison terms⁹. The Ethiopian government, according to these reports, charged those arrested with either material or "moral" support for terrorist activity, or both.

4.2.2.2. Anti-Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism

Studies suggest that money laundering and terrorist financing are among the growing criminal activities in East Africa and the Greater Horn region¹⁰. In response, Ethiopia has adopted money related proclamation in 2013¹¹; earlier to this, it has established a Financial Intelligence Center in 2010 which is overseen by a board involving multiple government agencies. Though the 2012 Review Report of the Financial Action Task Force (International Cooperation Review Group) highlighted strategic deficiencies in the fight

⁹Amnesty International "Amnesty International report 2010: Ethiopia" 28 May 2010, available at <<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c03a82c28.html>> (accessed 12 December 2013).

¹⁰ US Department of State (2012), [Country Reports on Terrorism 2011](#). Bureau of Counterterrorism, USA. July 31, 2012.

¹¹ Proclamation No. 780/2013: a Proclamation on the Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism.

against terrorist financing, the 2013 report suggests certain progresses made and some government actions in controlling finance related terrorist activities in the country. According to the Report (Tu'emay, 2013: 7), the progress includes;

- a three-year strategic action plan has been developed and was under review for implementation.
- a comprehensive AML (Anti-money laundering) /CFT (Countering the financing of terrorism) law has been drafted by national experts and reviewed by an experienced expatriate consultants, an expert team set by the Council of Ministers of the Ethiopian Government for compliance with international standards and requirements. This law has already ratified in May 2013.
- the FIC (Financial Intelligence Centre) has developed, installed, and applied a computerized report management system capable of receiving, processing, and disseminating cash transaction reports and suspicious transaction reports. The system detects and analyzes suspicious cases of money laundering and terrorist financing to allow concerned law enforcement authorities to proceed if necessary with investigations.

According to different counterterrorism reports (Task Force 2012: 10; Tu'emay, 2013: 21; US Department of State, 2012 and 2013), the Ethiopian government froze assets allegedly used in planning terrorist acts, held investigations as to whether those assets can be legally confiscated. The government of Ethiopia's Charities and Societies Agency is responsible for monitoring non-profit organizations to prevent misuse of funds and terrorist financing. The government has routinely distributed the UN list of designated terrorists and terrorist entities to financial institutions (US Department of State, 2013: 20).

The Federal Police and the Federal State Prosecutor have investigated and prosecuted cases of terrorism financing and money laundering. Statistical reports from the Ministry of Justice (as cited in Tu'emay (2013: 15)) revealed that, between 2009 - 2010 and 2011-2012, 126 cases of terrorism financing were investigated and in the process of being prosecuted. During the same period, 141 cases of money laundering had been investigated and prosecuted. Most of these cases are pursued under the 2009 AML and antiterrorism law (Ibid).

4.2.3. Regional and International Cooperation

The fight against terrorism and its causes have, for long, been viewed as a joint and collective responsibility on the part of all members of the international community. Ethiopia, too, is actively involving in international cooperation in this field both through bilateral and multilateral (intergovernmental) arrangements.

4.2.3.1. Bilateral Cooperation

In order to enhance anti-terrorism capabilities and for jointly or cooperatively containing cross-border terrorist raids, Ethiopia has been forging strong alliances, coalition or ties with likeminded states. It has entered into specific bilateral arrangements or agreements governing the military, police and security cooperation with states among which the United States is the primary one and, the rest include its fellow East African countries (Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania).

Ethiopia's cooperation with the US is strong especially since 9/11 incident. As many observers agree, having one of the largest standing armies in sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia's relative strength and its active counter-terrorism role have led the US government to view it as a key and reliable ally in the region¹². In addition to the development and democratization assistance, the Government of Ethiopia's counter-terrorism cooperation with the US includes military, intelligence and security aspects (Plotch, 2010: 49). In this respect, Ethiopia has continued benefiting from regional programs designed by the US Government for counter-terrorism purposes in East Africa. These programs are: the Partnership for Regional East African Counter-Terrorism (PREACT) and Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF_ HOA) (Ibid).

The PREACT is established in 2009. It is a US funded and implemented multi-year, multi-faceted program designed to build the counterterrorism capacity and capability of member countries to thwart short-term terrorist threats and address long-term vulnerabilities (US Department of State, 2011: 16). It uses law enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives, including reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks, expanding border security, enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation

¹² Tesfaye Yitay, IGAD Affairs Director in MOFA, Ethiopia. Interview held on February 3, 2014.

among the region's security organizations, improving democratic governance, and discrediting terrorist ideology (Ibid).

The CJTF_ HOA, the US organized and led program, is established in 2002 and its base is in Djibouti. According to this program's official website (www.GlobalSecurity.org/military), the mission is to build capacities of regional partners in order to promote regional security and stability, prevent conflict, protect US and coalition interests through indirect approaches that focus on population, security capacity and basic human needs to counter violent extremism. These missions are usually generalized as '3-Ds'- Development, Defense and Diplomacy (Ibid). Recently, it also focused on training and military exchange. In this respect, US Army Special Forces and the CJTF_HOA continued to provide training to enhance Ethiopian border patrol and security skill. For several years, as Donovan C. Chau (2008: 26) reveals, US Department of Defense has been training Ethiopian troops for counter-terrorism operations in camps near the Somalia border, including Ethiopian Special forces known as Agazi Commandos.

In addition to military, Ethiopia and the US continued to cooperate in areas of intelligence and experience sharing on modern counter-terrorism techniques. Anti-terrorism Assistance Training has been given by US to Ethiopian frontline supervisors engaged in land border management at parts of entry and to senior police leaders on how to analyze terrorist activities including financing, confidential source handlings, etc (US Department of State, 2010: 22). In return, the Ethiopian government enhanced physical security, conducted investigations, and provided protective surveillance in response to threat information directed at US citizens and continued to collect and share intelligence on terrorist groups (US Department of State, 2006: 8).

In relation to its neighbors, Ethiopia and Kenya used their long-standing peaceful relations in jointly fighting terrorism. For instance, Kenya followed the same policy during the 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia by extending support for Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia and closed its border to control the flow of extremists to Kenya (WIC, 2007). According to Ambassador Dinna Mufti, Spokesperson of Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti are conducting joint

military trainings and sharing classified information as part of a joint military operation against Al-Shabab (ERTA, 2013c). Ethiopia also has bilateral MLA (Mutual Legal Assistance) and extradition agreements with Djibouti, Sudan and Kenya (Task force, 2012: 9). According to this report, Cross-border cooperation in investigation and prosecutions is a growing enterprise in Ethiopia with attention focused to date on police-to-police arrangements, notably with Interpol and East Africa Police Chief's Committee (EAPCCO). As such, the Government of Ethiopia is extensively participating in the multilateral exchange of information with neighboring countries, and, the EAPCCO is one for such exchange of information program (Ibid: 10-11).

4.2.3.2. Multilateral Cooperation

Multilateral cooperation, in this context, is used to denote a country's participation in initiating, endorsing and implementing counter-terrorism efforts of Inter-Governmental Organizations (Regional and Universal) to which that country is a member. The UN, AU and IGAD are IGOs in which Ethiopia is a member and is actively working to materialize the counter-terrorism efforts proposed and run by these organizations. The organizations' counter-terrorism strategies, according to Rosand et al (2010: 17), offers member countries a broad based long-term framework needed not only to thwart and respond to terrorist attacks, but to prevent violent radicalization of local population which might resort to terrorist violence in the future and which may become a greatest strategic challenge to counter-terrorism efforts. Since 11 September 2001, member states to such IGOs have expressed political commitment to develop the legal, institutional and practical capacities to counter international terrorism, and several states have taken a number of important steps in this regard. The 2006 UN Global Counter-terrorism strategy (adopted by UN General Assembly), for instance, calls for a holistic and inclusive approach to counter-terrorism having four pillars which include: measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; measures to prevent and combat terrorism; measures to build states' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations in this regard; and measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.

More than 18 such international conventions have been adopted within the UN context and the UN Security Council also adopted a number of resolutions concerning counter-terrorism. These call upon all states to cooperate with one another in order to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, to protect their nationals and other persons against such attacks, and to bring the perpetrators to justice.

Similarly, IGAD and AU are doing their level best to equip members to combat terrorism. For AU, some of its anti-terrorism conventions are: (a) the 1999 OAU counter-terrorism convention on the prevention and combating of terrorism, (b) the 2002 AU Plan of Action and (c) the 2004 AU Protocol to the convention. These conventions entail provisions on extradition, the exchange of information, capacity building, and other elements aimed at strengthening cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism in Africa. Member states of IGAD (and AU as well) have committed themselves to establish a sub-regional approach to counter transnational terrorism within the frameworks established by the UN and AU.

Ethiopia actively participated in the adoption of the convention on the prevention and combating of terrorism by OAU in 1999 (Woldeselase, 2010: 205). The AU, in September 2002, adopted a Plan of Action which guides members in implementing the earlier conventions. As part of the implementation, IGAD countries came up with IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT) launched in 2006 with five components¹³, namely: enhancement of judicial measures; optimization of interdepartmental cooperation; enhancement of border control and training; sharing of information and best practices; and promotion of strategic cooperation. Ethiopia has ratified a number of UN counter-terrorism conventions (Annex-2). Similarly, it has signed and ratified most of the AU's counter-terrorism conventions and protocols; and actively participated in the AU's counter-terrorism efforts¹⁴. In addition, Ethiopia is active member and initiator of IGAD's counter-terrorism instruments; it actively engages in IGAD's Security Sector Program, which builds the capacity of its member states to mitigate, detect and deter advances by terrorists¹⁵.

¹³ "Vulnerability Assessment of the IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism"; Conference report held in Addis Ababa, April 2007.

¹⁴ Interview held with anonymous Ethiopian diplomat in MOFA; February 10, 2014.

¹⁵ Tesfaye Yitay, IGAD Affairs Director in MOFA, Ethiopia. Interview held on February 3, 2014.

4.2.4. Military Response and Border Security

The government of Ethiopia, in order to respond to terrorist threats to its national security, started responding militarily against the Oromo Liberation front (OLF), the Somalia based terrorist group Al Itihad Al Islamiya (AIAI), UIC and al Shabab, and the ONLF in different places including in Ethiopia, southern part of Somalia and northern Kenya.

Following Al Itihaad's subversive activities among ethnic Somalis in parts of Eastern Ethiopia, especially among some members of the Ogaden sub-clan of the Darod, some of whom carried out a series of terrorist attacks up to and including Addis Ababa in the early years of 1990, Ethiopian government militarily intervened in Somalia in August 1996. As Woldeselase (2010: 135) indicates, it "whipped out Al Itihaad's bases in Luq and Buuloahaawa killing hundreds of Somali extremists as well as a number of non-Somali Arabs who had flocked to the Horn." Besides, a news report by the Daily Nation (2002) quoted in Chacha (2004: 63-64) indicates how the Ethiopian forces crossed the Ethio-Kenya border in 2002 and attacked groups supporting the OLF. In recent past (late 2006), the government of Ethiopia, facing a deteriorating security environment in Somalia that resulted in increased threats to its own security, and in support of the internationally recognized TFG of Somalia, militarily battled with insurgents and extremists that were formerly affiliated with the Council of Islamic courts, including the al-Qaeda affiliated Al Shabab factions (Zeray, 2007: 671). Since then, Ethiopian forces continued to provide critical military support to African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), peacekeeping forces which have been targeted by extremist elements.

In addition, Ethiopian forces countered and crushed Somali-based extremists who attempted to conduct attacks inside Ethiopia. In September 2010, Ethiopian forces have killed 129 and apprehended 75 members of a group led by the former head of Somali navy, Admiral Mohamed Osman (Woldeselase, 2010: 338). It is believed that this was the ONLF faction headed by Admiral Osman which has been based in Asmara for several years. The captives admitted to having been trained in Eritrea before setting out on this attempt to infiltrate Ethiopia's Somali Regional state (Ibid). According to Woldeselase and government claims, this was not the first time that the ONLF fighters from Eritrea have

been sent to Ethiopia. Several hundreds were sent to the Somali Regional State via the Islamic Courts Union in Mogadishu in late 2006.

Recent Ethiopian military counterterrorism response was indicated by Gadarowski and Foard (2013: 4). According to them, in March 2012, Ethiopian troops attacked three military bases in southern Eritrea for training rebels who killed five foreign tourists in the Afar region.

Addis Ababa confirmed sending troops into Eritrea for the first time since the border war from 1998 to 2000, although Eritrea alleges there have been other attacks over the years. Ethiopia's forces targeted three bases at dawn, raiding Eritrean military targets about ten miles inside south-eastern Eritrea. Eritrea claimed this attack was a diversion due to the border issues not resolved at the end of the war while Ethiopia absolutely blames Eritrea for instigating terrorist threats against its national security (Ibid).

As the US State Department report reveals, Ethiopian military forces continued counterterrorism operations in Somalia and were instrumental in combating Al Shabab in Southern and Central Somalia (2013: 19).

With regard to border security, the government of Ethiopia maintained a defensive military presence along the Somali and Eritrea borders to stem potential infiltration of violent extremists into Ethiopia. Within its borders, the force successfully identified an al-Qaeda cell, and then arrested and convicted cell affiliates (Ibid: 20). On this ground, bolstering defensive forces along the Ethio-Somalia border is sought as important mechanism of countering terrorist threats.

Accordingly, Ethiopia has become a leading country in the fight against terrorism in the Horn of Africa. That means, it has been performing adequate military tasks for the elimination of terrorist groups like Al Shabaab (the extension of Al Itihad) which has the aim of destabilizing the Horn countries like Ethiopia. However, what has to be noted is that through military means, it is possible only to minimize the impact of terrorism.

4.2.5. Miscellaneous Counter-Terrorism Measures

The aforementioned are not the only instruments or strategic directions of Ethiopian counter-terrorism efforts. In addition, Countering radicalization and violent extremism through awareness creation has remained a widely focused project by the government. In this regard, the government has been making significant efforts to improve awareness about

the dangers of terrorism among government institutions, university students and the society at large using workshops and mass media programs.

Largely in response to a sense that fundamentalist sentiment was growing among some parts of the Muslim population, the Ministry of Federal Affairs began a controversial nationwide training program for religious leaders to counter violent extremism. As the US Department of State report (2012: 20) points out, it is this Ministry and the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council that are running this controversial training program for Muslims on the subject of violent extremism. The program led to ongoing protests by some members of the Muslim community who alleged government interference in religious affairs (contrary to constitutional rights provided in FDRE, 1995: Article 11).

Other Ethiopian counter-terrorism measures include: use of the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), biometric security measures at immigration enforcement stations, at Bole and Dire Dawa International Airports as well as in other points of entry throughout the country (Ibid). Besides, since 29 July 2010, it is reported that the Ethiopian government has expanded the level and number of security measures in Addis Ababa, in order to protect violence attacks or threats of violence conducted by terrorists aimed at foreign interests. "These new security measures include vehicle searches and other checkups on entering venues that may be frequented by foreigners such as international hotels" (ADFAT, 2010: 2).

In general, as the elements of this section display, Ethiopia seems committed to combat terrorism using any means at its disposal because several terrorist attacks, mostly by al-Qaeda affiliates operating both inside the country and in turbulent neighboring states, has been targeting it. However, any measure to be taken in this respect must always remain in conformity with the applicable international law (the UN Charter and International Humanitarian and human rights laws). As Woldeselase (2010: 394) stresses and most others also agree, measures to combat terrorism will be effective as long as they are taken in conformity with international human rights' standards and the rule of law.

4.3. Assessment of the Ethiopian Counter-Terrorism Responses

4.3.1. Achievements of the Responses

4.3.1.1. Reduced Transnational Terrorist Attacks

By developing and implementing variety of anti-terrorism strategies, Ethiopia has showed success in thwarting several internally or externally organized terrorist attacks in the past years. It is found that Ethiopia has a tough and effective security apparatus that cannot be easily broken by terrorists. The tactics employed by the security and intelligence agents are said to be firm and timely and they have developed an impressive intelligence capacity in this respect (Shinn, 2005: 103). As a result, Ethiopia, since 1991, has not been a victim to large scale transnational terrorist incidents as such nearby countries like Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (Elise, 2010: 645).

The promulgation and enforcement of an anti-terrorism legislation is said to be contributing a lot to reduced terrorist activities in the country. As practical evidences demonstrate, terrorists usually prefer to operate in countries with weak legal and judicial regimes. In Kenya for instance, members of the parliament have refused to pass anti-terrorism legislation, mainly because they thought it was backed by the US (Elise, 2010: 650). Tanzania's government has passed domestic counter-terrorism laws to honor international commitments, but has done little to implement or enforce their provisions (Ibid) while Somalia has no anti-terrorism law. All these countries, however, as can be realized as well as Elise demonstrates, have experienced deadly terrorist attacks in recent years. Therefore, Ethiopia's adoption and strict enforcement of legal regime, despite its drawbacks in implementation, is an obstacle that frustrates terrorists to target and freely operate in Ethiopia.

The military action that Ethiopia has been conducting against terrorist groups in and around the country also severely stifled their operational capacities. As a result of intervention in Somalia, the UIC and its associates have been dispersed from their base there, though it offers no permanent solution. Nonetheless, military action in Somalia dismantled the safe haven and training infrastructures of the Islamist terrorists thereby curtailing their capacities to operate.

The anti-terrorism proclamation, on the other hand, brought a major obstacle to Eritrea and other terrorist organizations operating in Somalia since the proclamation has clearly stipulated those characteristics helpful to designate groups as terrorists thereby indicating punishment measures even in reaction to suspected cases and individuals. This measure is supposed to reduce recruitment opportunities available to internal or external dissident forces collaborating with Eritrea and other global terrorist networks.

4.3.1.2. Ensured Technical, Material and Financial Gains

Owing to its active counter-terrorism roles, Ethiopia is able to secure substantial amount of assistance in all forms from its global counterparts like USA and UNO. The UN and other regional and sub-regional bodies are willing to provide necessary capabilities to states struggling to eliminate terrorist threats. From such organizations, Ethiopia is benefiting a lot in terms of continued capacity building trainings for security workers, bankers, police, judges, consultation services to higher officials and material and technical supports.

A better technical, material and financial support to Ethiopia comes from the US government who has strongly aligned its counter-terrorism efforts with Ethiopia in the East African region. Ethiopia's large size armies, its relative strength and the government's active and vigilant counter-terrorism roles have led the US to view Ethiopia as a key and viable ally in this turbulent region of the Horn (US Department of State, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2013). Correspondingly, Ethiopia has become one of the largest recipients of US security assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the assistance has increasingly focused on the country's capacity to counter insurgencies, improve regional security and deter terrorism (Ploch, 2010: 54). In this respect, following the September 2001 incident, the US aids (largely military assistance) to Ethiopia increased from \$16.7 million between 2002 and 2004 to about \$1 billion in 2008 (Ibid). In the same period, Ethiopia also received increased funding from the International Military Education and Training Program, and the Pentagon's New Post-9/11 Regional Defense Counter-terrorism Fellowship Program which trains foreign forces in counter-terrorism techniques (US Department of State, 2010: 19).

According to Plotch, the US has assisted the Ethiopian National Defense Force's ongoing transition to an all-volunteer professional military force since military ties with Ethiopia resumed in 2001 (2010: 51). The report adds that Ethiopia has received significant US

Department of Defense Section 1206 assistance, totaling \$35 million in 2010. Initial assistance, according to the report, included C-130 engines and spare parts, and the latter programs supported the development of combat engineering, command and control, and night vision capabilities for the Ethiopian National Defense Force and its counterterrorism units. USA's Section 1206 and FMF (Foreign Military Financing) assistance has provided communications equipment to support Ethiopia's deployment and counterterrorism capabilities. Under EACTI (East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative), Ethiopia received \$13 million in Peacekeeping Operations and FMF funds for border security training and related equipment, including C-130 parts and communications gear (Ibid). The United States has provided subsequent support to improve the country's tactical airlift capacity. IMET (International Military Education and Training) courses for Ethiopia focus on counterterrorism, intelligence, English language instruction, and senior-level professional military education. Ploch (2010: 47-48) adds that FMF funds have supported US trainers at the Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff College. The Ethiopian government values these training opportunities, which includes, among others, such topics as the role of the military in a democratic society, as essential to developing a more professional force (US Department of State, 2012).

US aid to Ethiopia also includes programs that aim to mitigate conditions that may lead to violent extremism, or that may indirectly contribute to such ends. On this ground, as Plotch's report indicates, Ethiopia receives significant US assistance for education, health, and agricultural programs, including primary and adult education initiatives in predominantly Muslim areas. Under EACTI, the State Department provided community assistance and self-help projects, as well as education programs, to underserved communities in these areas. CJTF-HOA conducts civil affairs projects, including school renovation and health projects. The State Department and USAID support conflict management programs and efforts to improve service delivery among Muslim communities (Ploch, 2010: 48).

4.3.2. Limitations of the Counter-Terrorism Responses

4.3.2.1. Suppression of Political Pluralism and the Exercise of Human Rights and Freedoms

Many of the developing countries' anti-terrorism responses are usually blamed as impositions by the West (mainly the US interest) forged in the name of "war on terror", a project run by the UN (Atta-Asamoah, 2007: 20). In most cases, the project has continued disproportionately focusing on or driven by stability and security concerns in states that were labeled as vulnerable to terrorism, than on democratizing these states (Elise, 2010: 656).

Ethiopia and the entire Horn of Africa Sub-region are a working example of this trend of US and UN counter-terrorism efforts being driven by security concerns opposed to democratization. Especially the US, since 9/11, has strengthened its non-conditional assistance to authoritarian countries even that do not allow space for politically plural societies to emerge¹⁶. Regardless of its regime type and practice, the US is interested in helping those nations that are interested in fighting the "war on terrorism" (Tynes, 2006: 98). This is evident from the speech of Senior US defense official, who said "We'll do whatever it takes to make sure that terrorists don't kill Americans", as cited in Linda D. Kozaryn (2002).

The government of Ethiopia, usually taken as the only viable US partner in the volatile Horn region, has been embraced by the US as a useful security partner, there continued, equipping the government as long as commitment to "war on terror" is sustainable, despite the prevailing democratic deficit in the country. These tools, being received in the name of "war on terror", are serving as instruments of abuse against individuals, groups and institutions struggling for democracy thereby suppressing development to political pluralism (Copson, 2007: 132). For instance, in 2005, a year of contested Ethiopian parliamentary elections, it was reported that Ethiopia received \$7 million to purchase US made weapons and services¹⁷.

Along US lines, the UN counter-terrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa have also emphasized on what has been called "hard" action by expediting the ratification and implementation of international counter-terrorism instruments and comprehensive

¹⁶ See HRW- "Dangerous dealings – Changes to US military assistance after September 11"; (2002), available at <http://hrw.org/reports/2002/usmil/USass0202.pdf> (accessed 15 January 2014).

¹⁷ See US Department of State, (2010) "Country reports on terrorism 2009", (August 2010).

counterterrorism laws, training criminal justice officials, and generally encouraging countries to enhance their operational counter-terrorism capacity (Rosand, 2010: 9). This call for "hard" action by governments in a region where democracy is fragile and governance is weak, has led to increased repression through the abuse of counter-terrorism legislation by governments to crackdown on certain groups. In the case of Ethiopia, this has featured through the enactment of an anti-terror legislation which has been blamed and criticized by many as being a tool to close down space for political dissent and criticism against the government.

Two of the most practiced Ethiopian counter-terrorism responses, as discussed under the earlier section, are military action and the legislative (anti-terror) proclamation. In addition to suppressing political pluralism, both measures are blamed causing severe harms on the protection and implementation of internationally recognized human rights and freedoms.

The military action taken both in response to the UIC in Somalia and ONLF in Ethiopian Somali region, was reported to have caused death and displacement of many civilians, brought torture, inhuman treatment and arbitrary arrest in the warfare areas of different places. As reports by Human Rights institutions imply, many civilians of the Somali Regional State had been suffering from severe human rights violations and humanitarian crisis caused by the fight between Ethiopian military force and the ONLF rebel groups. Especially after mid 2007, many people had travelled and displaced from there to get refuge in Kenya and Somalia fear of violations committed by Ethiopian military force (HRW, 2008). The same report added that the Ethiopian military in cooperation with the TFG security forces have overreacted against the rebel actions indiscriminately and used direct shoot up and arms fire, having destructive impact on the survival of many civilians. According to the findings brought by independent studies, these forces committed torture, mistreated detainees, killed, raped and robbed civilian and their properties, sometimes to the extent of home to home joint security operations with Ethiopian soldiers (Salad, 2008: 10-14; Grubeck, 2011: 32).

Another Ethiopian counter-terrorism measure, the anti-terrorism proclamation and its enforcement, is strongly criticized as impairing the realization of fundamental rights and

freedoms of human beings. The critique starts from the definition where the definition about terrorist acts is found too broad, infringing basic rights like liberty, freedom of assembly and expression. Its broadness allowed to prosecute a wide range of conducts far beyond the limits of what can reasonably be considered as terrorist activity. The broadness of some ideas in the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation leads to concerns that its prohibitions highly contradict rights enumerated under the country's Constitution¹⁸. Under Article 30 of the Constitution, legally organized groups have the right to assembly, public demonstration, and petition. The expression of this right, however, seems to create criminal liability under Articles 1, 5, 6, and 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation. In this sense, the constitutional right to association (Article 31) is practically constrained by the implementation of the Proclamation since association could lead to the “moral support” of a terrorist group or participating in a terrorist organization. As many reports indicate, many journalists and political activists are arrested and prosecuted by the government under this proclamation (HRW, 2009, 2010, 2012; US Department of State, 2013). The evidence for prosecution consisted primarily of journal and online articles critical of the government and telephone discussions regarding peaceful protest actions (HRW, 2012: 6).

The anti-terror law also empowers the police and the intelligence agents with absolute power of search, arrest, and seizure¹⁹. It grants the police to arrest the suspected without warrant, as long as the police reasonably suspects that a person is committing or has committed a terrorist act. Official intelligence agent reports are also admissible, even if they do not disclose their source or how their information was gathered (Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, 2009: Art 23(1 & 2)). In this manner, intelligence reports based on information gathered through torture could be admitted in to evidence at trial, the act which contradicts the country's constitutional provision of Art 19(5) (FDRE, 1995).

4.3.2.2. Aroused Transnational Terrorist Resentment against Ethiopian

The commitment of Ethiopian government, in fighting terrorism, has not been mainly fruitful, if measured in the long-term consequences, as discussed above. Especially its

¹⁸ Ethiopia's Constitution protects freedom of speech and political association in Articles 29, 30 and 31

¹⁹ See the 2009 Ethiopian Anti-Terrorism Act (articles 19 to 20).

military engagement in Somalia further protracted the scenario by inviting international terrorist networks to target Ethiopia more than ever before. Ethiopia's anti-terrorism response by military means in Somalia, for the moment, appears to have achieved the goals in Mogadishu such as: (1) removing Eritrean influence; (2) preventing the ONLF and OLF from establishing a base in Somalia; and (3) removing the UIC that provided anti-Ethiopian separatists with a platform. The problem, however, is a legacy it left that some radicalized hard core Islamists in Somalia and Ethiopia further escalated transnational terrorist threats to Ethiopia.

As David Shinn (2007: 8) argues, the late 2006 Ethiopian intervention in Somalia forced Al-Qaeda on the run into Ethiopia, but also served as a rallying point for anti-Ethiopian/anti-government forces in and around the country. Attacks against the Ethiopian and TFG forces continued in 2008, following the early 2007 call to action by Al-Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri, who urged all 'mujahidin' to extend a fight against "Christian" Ethiopia (Rabasa, 2009: 31).

Though Ethiopian soldiers (in late 2006) took little time to control Mogadishu, the TFG was not strengthened; terrorist groups engaged in guerrilla fighting and caused massive cost on the side of Ethiopian soldiers (Hoene, 2010: 12). In turn, Ethiopian soldiers killed civilians, even women (Salad, na: 45); this led the human rights institutions to condemn the act of the Ethiopian government in Somalia. The ever-hostile Somali attitude towards Ethiopia increased various militant groups and perpetrated several terrorist attacks targeting Ethiopia (Plotch, 2010:12). The 2007 attack on Chinese oil exploring company in the Somali region of Ethiopia, the 2010 Hotel burst in Uganda (where the hotel owner was Ethiopian) are manifestations of terrorists targeting Ethiopia in response to its military role in Somalia since late 2006 onwards (Ibid).

Conclusion

In this chapter, it is observed that the government of Ethiopia has been taking several counter-terrorism measures in response to the ever-growing threats of global terrorism. The multiplicity of Ethiopian counterterrorism measures ranges from building nationally responsible institutional settings to diverse secret (invisible) intelligence activities. The

government has instituted major counterterrorism tasks with National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS). Shouldering a broad responsibility of leading and designing national counterterrorism policies in all forms, the NISS institution has continued supervising and coordinating overall counter-terrorism management in Ethiopia. The government has established a national Anti-terrorism task force comprising NISS, the Federal Police Commission and Federal Ministry of Justice as a pertinent body that can integrate and accelerate counterterrorism activities. The legal procedures being enacted targeting terrorist operations are also among major anti-terrorism strategies of Ethiopia. The Anti-Terrorism proclamation, adopted in June 2009, is one said to be born out of the pressing need of the Ethiopian people and government to avert the clear and present danger that threaten the peace, security, stability, democratization and developmental efforts of Ethiopia. However, these counter-terrorism efforts, for their broadness and mismatch with constitutional and international rights of some articles in the Anti-terrorism act, and especially the problem in implementing the act, continued generating protests and criticisms against the practice. In addition to these procedural settings, the regional and international cooperation such as ratifying and implementing counterterrorism conventions under the auspices of IGAD, AU and UNO as well as joint/bilateral agreements and cooperation going on with the United States and some neighboring countries are among major anti-terrorism policies of Ethiopia. Hand in hand, the government of Ethiopia has strengthened military response as indispensable measure against terrorist groups and institutions. This measure has started since mid 1990 and continued up to now. The military wars fought with Al Ithad Al Islamiya, the ONLF, the Union of Islamic Courts and currently with Al-Shabab are some cases.

These and other several anti-terrorism policies of Ethiopia are found contributing significantly thwarting several terrorist attacks targeting Ethiopia. At the same time, some of these policies of the Ethiopian government are blamed as denying constitutionally and internationally celebrated rights and freedoms of human beings.

Chapter Five

The Domestic Dynamism in the Framing of Ethiopian Counterterrorism Policies: Examining Roles of Key Policy Actors in the Process

Introduction

Divided into three sections, this chapter attempts to present the political contexts in which two of the major Ethiopian Counter-Terrorism decisions are endorsed. These are the decisions pertaining to militarily countering terrorism in Somalia (2006) and the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (2009). These two are selected because they were more contentious²⁰ and, both passed by publicly held debates during the time of approving them. Accordingly, the first section tries to briefly discuss the essence of 'dynamism in policy making', as used in this context. The second section considers the contending views advocated by opposing groups to convince each other and gather public support on the side of their stand during the process of getting approval of the two Counter-Terrorism decisions. The intention of this outline is to identify the rationale behind the decisions in the light of the prevailing opposing views. The final section presents a critique on the overall context of arguments held by the proponents and opponents.

5.1. Dynamism in Policy Making

Foreign policies are said to be integrated products of a dynamic interplay among the key policy makers of a country. In a society where such dynamism is optimal, nearly all decisions are taken within a context of internal pressures and, therefore, policy makers often do not have the freedom to just go ahead and take whatever decisions they feel would be best. As Henry Kissinger (1966: 511) wrote, policy making is not a calm, straightforward process. Instead, it is a clash of ideas and a test of political power and skills to determine which one of many ideas will dominate. The dynamism encapsulates stakeholders like policy making actors, political executives, the bureaucracies, the legislature, the political opponents, interest groups, the mass media and the public at large.

²⁰ Contending debates were held between proponents (most of the time represented by the government) and opponents (opposition political parties) of these decisions in Ethiopia.

In a free and open (democratic) society, majority of these actors are involved in the policy making processes, each attempting to influence the course of action on the basis of perceived self-interest. The process is usually much more complicated than the admitted complexities of the policy consequences would dictate (Pedelford, 1947: 213).

Such contextual complexity of policy making is referred to as 'dynamism in policy making.' Dynamism in policy making suggests the interplay of assumptions, choices and actions of policy actors in the process of framing of policy (Webber and Smith, 2002: 9-50). The objective of this chapter is to consider the political contexts of interaction (debates held) among key policy actors during the framing of two of the major Ethiopian Counterterrorism decisions: the 2006 military counter terrorism in Somalia and the 2009 Anti-Terrorism Proclamation. The political leaders often take an initiative to build a coalition that will ultimately help in providing a consensual base for themselves and for their policies. How were these processes undergone in the case of Ethiopia?

5.2. Roles of Policy Actors in the process of Framing Ethiopian Counterterrorism Policies

Two of the principal counterterrorism decisions made by the government of Ethiopia are its military response in Somalia and the anti-terrorism legislation. However, these two measures (among others), are found contentious both during their adoption as well as implementation phases. Therefore, the attempt in this section is to consider how contentious the adoptions of these decisions were in Ethiopia. This is done through outlining the stands of key decision-makers involved in the decisional process of convincing the public as well as the contending groups.

5.2.1. Militarily Countering Terrorism in Somalia (2006)

In 2006, after the split in Transitional Federal Government (TFG)²¹, there was an unfolding political crisis in Somalia when the religious militias and the Mogadishu warlords began to

²¹ The TFG was established at the Eldoret and Mbagathi conferences held in Kenya from 2002 to 2004 under international auspices to unify the Somali factions. After a split in the TFG, one of the factions, led by the speaker of the parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, moved to Mogadishu. The majority faction, led by President Yusuf and backed by Ethiopia and Kenya, moved to the Somali town of Jowhar

struggle for control of Mogadishu, leading to the Union of Islamic Courts' (UIC)²² victory in May 2006. In late 2006, shocked by this chaotic scenario, the Ethiopian parliament authorized the government to take all necessary measures against the force of UIC in Somalia in response to what it said 'plans for an invasion' by the Islamic courts movement. The parliament approved the resolution on 30 November 2006 by 311 votes to 90 against, and 16 abstentions, stating that: "Parliament hereby authorizes the government to take all necessary and legal steps to stave off a declaration of holy war and invasion by the Union of Islamic Courts against the country" (MOFA, 2006).

In the process of adopting this resolution, there was no consensus among the key policy making actors. In fact, there was a debate between the government and opposition parties, attempting to persuade each other and the public at large. What were the stances and roles of some key actors involved in the framing of this decision?

A. The Political Executive

In most countries, the executive branch is the most important part of the policy making process. This is especially true in national security and foreign policies. The most powerful figure in the executive branch is usually the country's head of government (the Prime Minister in case of Ethiopia). Based on such general assumption, this section attempts to outline the stance and roles of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia in the process of framing the military intervention decision in Somalia (2006).

Meles Zenawi was the then Prime Minister of Ethiopia, who had substantiated the decision and then led the National Defense Force in to Somalia in 2006. In requesting the parliament for an authorization to use military powers against the UIC, the Ethiopian premier told that

and later to Baidoa. However, none of the two consolidated power in Somalia up until early 2007 (Rabasa, 2009: 58).

²² The UIC was a group of Sharia Courts supported by the prominent Hawiye clans in Somalia and evolved as a major competitive faction in 2006 by defeating several warlords including those constituted and supported by the US. In June 2006, the UIC took control of much of Southern and Central Somalia including the capital city of Mogadishu. The UIC declared and tried to establish an Islamic state; ordered Somalis to comply with stringent Islamic rules with the period it controlled Somalia (Rabasa, 2009: 61).

the Islamists in Somalia have presented a "clear and present danger" against the country's peace and security regardless of Ethiopia's effort to negotiation (Afrol News, 2006). Arguing that the government's first preference was peaceful negotiation, the Prime Minister said that "we can't avoid the problem. If peace is not possible, based on international law, we will take steps commensurate with the present danger" (Horn Affairs, 2007). He outlined the efforts of the Ethiopian government to avoid military confrontation. Accordingly, the group was told to withdraw the anti-Ethiopian forces it gathered, to stop sheltering these forces and infiltrating them in to Ethiopia, to lift the Jihad war it declared against Ethiopia and address out differences through negotiation (Ethiopian Herald, 2006b).

Meles outlined the following measures which he claimed constituted a "direct attack" on Ethiopia by the UIC (afrol News, 2006): a public declaration of Jihad against Ethiopia; a public declaration of the UIC's intent to unify "Greater Somalia," including portions of Ethiopia; its clear link to the international terrorists; and arming, training and transporting violent insurgents (OLF and ONLF) into Ethiopia. Meles also noted the close coordination between the UIC and the Eritrean Government with the common goal of overthrowing the ruling party, EPRDF (Ibid).

In strictly associating the UIC to international terrorist link, Meles Zenawi stated that:

... you have the jihadists led by Al-Ithaad Islami, which I am sure you know, is registered by the United Nations as a terrorist organization. And so, for us, the Islamic Courts Union is not a homogeneous entity. Our beef [complain] is with Al-Ithaad, the internationally recognized terrorist organization. It so happens that at the moment the new leadership of the Union of the Courts is dominated by this particular group. Indeed, the chairman of the new council that they have established is a certain colonel who also happens to be the head of Al-Ithaad known by targeting several attacks against Ethiopia. Now, the threat posed to Ethiopia by the dominance of the Islamic Courts, by Al-Ithaad, is obvious.²³

In this Press conference, the Ethiopian Premier strongly pinpointed to Sheik Hassen Dahir Aweys, once head of the Al-Itihad, an organization on the UN and United States' list of terrorist organizations and the man that Ethiopia holds responsible for terrorist acts in its

²³ See Press Conference, Prime Minister of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi (June 26, 2007), available at <http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/Archive/PM%20Meles%20Zenawi%20Press%20Conference%2027th%20June%202006.html>, (Last accessed 19 February 2014).

territories. The premier also emphasized the link between the attack against Ethiopia and the UIC when he accused the latter for infiltrating rebels to Ethiopia who repeatedly attacked the country.

Commenting on some opposition parties' fear that Ethiopia might be criticized by the international community for the military action, Meles said that the Government of Ethiopia could not refrain from defending itself while waiting for the approval of others who were not facing the brunt of the UIC. "Not all countries will support us, since countries respond to their own interests. After all, the UIC had not declared Jihad against the UN, but against Ethiopia" (Horn Affairs, 2011). But at the same time, Meles was pledging to seek international support for Ethiopia's actions, as reported by Sudan Tribune (2007). In any case, he echoed that the government would have to pay the price to defend the country. He criticized the stand of opposition political parties against the decision. Meles described the stand of some of the opposition parties as "imprudent and a historic mistake" (Sudan Tribune, 2006).

B. The Parliament

The political executive, led by the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, presented the initiation to the parliament to get authorization for militarily responding to situations in Somalia. The Ethiopian parliamentarians, thereafter, continued debating on the decision to reach a consensus on the initiative of the Prime Minister, who had asked for an authorization to use military powers against the UIC (The Ethiopian Reporter, 2006a). It was after a week of inter-party negotiations that the parliament approved the resolution.

This resolution of Ethiopian parliament (30 November 2006) authorized the government to take all legal and necessary measures against any invasion by the UIC, subject to the prior exhaustion of all peaceful avenues (Ibid). This implies that the resolution did not authorize automatic military action. Averting military conflict through dialogue was set as a condition for a military option. However, the effort to find a peaceful route turned out to be a failure (Ethiopian Herald, 2006c).

The parliament adopted the motion by 311 against 99 votes, with 16 members abstaining. Echoing Prime Minister's earlier speech to parliament, the resolution said that the

legislative body sees a "clear and present danger" from Somali Islamists, and suggested that the parliament would not allow any group to pose threat to the security and sovereignty of Ethiopia (The Ethiopian Herald, 2006a).

One of the most resonating contentions advanced by the parliament held that the forces under the umbrella of the UIC and the Eritrean government were working on the basis of a common design and motive to achieve a common purpose- destabilizing and endangering the territorial integrity and political independence of Ethiopia (The Ethiopian Reporter, 2006c). The resolution stated that a combination of four factors had created a condition of a "clear and present danger" against the country's territorial integrity and political independence: a) the presence of Eritrean troops- a country with an entirely non-Somali agenda in Somalia; b) the consolidation of power in the hands of radical Islamic militants, part of whom Ethiopia considers as 'terrorists' with the manifest intention of annexing Somali speaking region of Ethiopia; c) UIC's declaration of a holy war against Ethiopia; and d) the presence of armed Ethiopian and other foreign forces working with common design and purpose with the UIC (The Ethiopian Herald, 2006a).

The then speaker of the Ethiopian parliament, Teshome Toga, held that it was reasonable to the government to proportionately respond to the acts of Jihadists, unless they stop their provocation and rescind the jihad declared against Ethiopia. He said, in case of any rejection by the Jihadists to dialogue, the government would not hesitate to take actions that would protect sovereignty of Ethiopia (Afrol News, 2006).

On the basis of such claims, the resolution of the parliament authorized the government to take all necessary and legal steps to avert the danger arising from the repeated declaration of a "holy war" against the Country, stating inter alia that:

the Parliament believes there is a clear and present danger to our country where the UIC has been training, sheltering and arming Ethiopian groups (that are trying to overthrow the government) and international terrorists; rival Eritrea is fighting a proxy war in Somalia to destabilize Ethiopia; and the Courts have an expansionist intent to annex the Somali-speaking parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti (The Ethiopian Herald, 2006a).

However, the issue was found divisive in the Ethiopian parliament where majority of opposition members of the parliament expressed the fear that the vote could be perceived by the international community as 'war-mongering'.

C. The Opposition Political Parties

Many Ethiopian opposition parties opposed the decision for military intervention in Somalia. The parties were unconvinced about the occurrence of an attack against Ethiopia, and even if such an attack did occur, they were questioning the significance of its scale and effect as to trigger Ethiopia's self-defensive response. The UEDF (Union of Ethiopian Democratic Forces), for instance, strongly echoed concern and skepticism about the gravity of the danger posed against Ethiopia and the overall intent of the government (The Ethiopian Reporter, 2006a). This sentiment was echoed in a vigorous debate that took place in the parliament. When the Prime Minister presented a four point resolution to the parliament seeking authorization to take any means necessary to curb possible attack from forces in Somalia, opposition parties pressed the premier to provide genuine evidence that Ethiopia is indeed attacked by the UIC (McCrummen, 2006). In a televised parliamentary debate, most opposition parties remained opposed to the resolution after deliberating with the government on the evidence.

Defending the UEDF's (Union of Ethiopian Democratic Forces) position on the resolution, Professor Beyene Petros, then member of the parliament, expressed his doubts in the following terms:

If sporadic incursion warranted a declaration of war, there would be no peace anywhere. Here, we are only being told of sporadic incursions and there is nothing to show us . . . an act of invasion. Therefore we do not believe the threat is being appropriately defined [nor] that it justifies such resolution (The Ethiopian Reporter, 2006d).

Beyene Petros, agrees with the government that Ethiopia might have been attacked by Ethiopian rebel forces operating from within an area under the control of the UIC. However, as clarified in the Reporter, his party has opposed the characterization of such attacks from insurgent groups as "invasion" by the UIC and has refused to support the resolution that authorized the government to declare war on insurgent groups (Ibid). The Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM) was another opposition party that opposed the resolution by its leader Bulcha Demeksa (McCrummen, 2006). The Coalition for Unity and democracy (CUD), the major opposition political party, also opposed the resolution. The party instead proposed for the intervention of international arbitrators. In its press release made on 5 January 2007, the party denounced the war in Somalia as a "cover-up" for domestic repression. According to the party's statements, the ruling party

deliberately exaggerated the Islamist threat by "producing false evidence to the Ethiopian people as well as to the international community to go to war inside Somalia to divert attention from the domestic political crisis that has gripped the nation since the May election of 2005" (Ethiomeia, 2007). The press release acknowledged that the CUD had issued a statement warning the risk of taking the nation to war to achieve short term objectives to be balanced against the long-term interest of Ethiopia, alleging the EPRDF's interference in the internal affairs of Somalia as a short term interest.

Among the active opposition political parties, United Ethiopian Democratic Party- Medhin, expressed a full support to the resolution. "After a thorough discussion on the issue, we accepted the resolution as a declaration of self-defense", said party leader, Lidetu Ayalew (The Ethiopian Herald, 2006c).

However, in the final session of the parliament on the issue, majority of opposition political parties either abstained or voted against the resolution (The Ethiopian Reporter, 2006a, b and d; Ethiomeia, 2007; Dagnachew, 2006).

5.2.2. The Framing of Anti-Terrorism Proclamation

In 2009, the government of Ethiopia has endorsed a very controversial legal procedure termed as Anti-Terrorism Proclamation. The Ethiopian parliament passed this law in June 2009 with 286 votes in favor, 91 against and one abstaining. The law and its application have been controversial since its promulgation. While majority opposition political parties and some segment of the public are opposing the content, necessity and misapplication of the law, the government of Ethiopia has been working hard to collect public support in bringing the law in to effect. Therefore, this section attempts to bring in light such arguments held by the political parties, the mass media and the public, in the process of convincing each other and the masses about the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation.

A. The Arguments among the Political parties

In most cases, the government representatives are central advocates of anti-terrorism law with responsibility of persuading the public at large. However, majority of the opposition political parties opposed the promulgation and the application of the proclamation.

It was only some years later after the adoption and implementation of the proclamation that the activities of publicizing the issue started. Though late it was, at least three hot televised debates over the anti-terrorism law were conducted between the opposition parties and the ruling party. The discussion hereunder, therefore, draws its elements from such debates held by the Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency (ERTA), political parties' independent press releases or conferences and interviews conducted with party representatives by different Mass Medias.

One of the issues debated among the representatives was the rationale or reason for promulgation of the proclamation.

The ruling party attested to the existence of clear and present danger of terrorism in Ethiopia coupled with the inadequacy of ordinary laws to deal with this reality called for special anti-terrorism legislation (ERTA, 2013a). In showing the seriousness of the danger, EPRDF went to the extent of asserting that Ethiopia is much more exposed to terrorism than Afghanistan and the United States. The evidences that the representatives of EPRDF invoked to buttress their claim are predominantly terrorist acts which are briefly outlined in the third chapter of this study.

Representative of the EDP (Ethiopian Democratic Party, one of the oppositions) supporting the EPRDF, referred to the obligation of states to pass anti-terrorism legislation imposed by UN Security Council resolution 1373(2001)²⁴, which was echoed by the representatives of EPRDF, as another justification for the enactment of the law (Ibid). According to this view, there is a consensus at the UN level that terrorism is a global challenge as a result of which the Security Council instructed every state, including Ethiopia, to pass anti-terror laws. Among the opposition parties, as evidenced from the debates, the EDP has been in favor of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation right from the endorsement. In support of this stance, Channie Kebede, EDP representative, commended the cautious measures being taken by

²⁴ This is a resolution unanimously adopted by UN members on 28 September 2001. It imposed a number of binding commitments on all member states of UN. These obligations required states to prohibit both active and passive support for terrorists, to deny terrorists financing, and to freeze the assets of terrorists and their supporters. Moreover, states were required to deny safe haven to terrorists, to increase their vigilance against passport and identification forgery, to tighten their border controls, and to work toward enhancing international cooperation against terrorism (UN Security Council resolution 1373, 2001).

the government saying terrorism is an apparent threat to Ethiopia (ERTA, 2013b). Channie stressed the need to keep a vigilant eye on terrorism which, he said, destroyed lives and property in Addis Ababa as well as in different parts of the country at various times. He did not, however, hide their party's desire for a slight amendment to the law (Ibid). Representatives of other opposition political parties²⁵, on the other hand, argued that although there have been incidents of terrorist attacks, the threat of terrorism in Ethiopia has not been to an extent that justified the special anti-terror laws. They claimed that the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation is passed with a view to use it as a tool to dismantle political opposition, dissent and intimidate private journalists (who are found critical writers about the politics) (ERTA, 2013a).

During the parliamentary motion for endorsing the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, the only opposition member of the parliament, Girma Seifu, for his part said, his party (CUD) is openly working to revoke the anti-terror law as the law itself is terrorizing the public (Reporters Without Border, 2013). He also added that he does not believe there would be a terror act from within the country on Ethiopians. This view was also expressed by Yilqal Getnet (the representative of Semayawi opposition party), who underestimated the terrorist operations in Ethiopia (ERTA, 2013a).

In reacting to such claims, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, in his earlier press briefing²⁶, criticized the opposition parties' stance of opposing anti-terrorism law in the country. He stressed that such enactments are required to safeguard citizens' security. All countries, as the premier further justified, need anti-terrorism laws because of the imminent danger faced by the world community, and they are required to have it by international agreements. According to his argument, if opposition political parties accept that political differences will not be terrorism, the anti-terrorism bill will not affect those who have a different political opinion unless the group indulged itself in violent means of achieving political ends other than resolving political differences through peaceful political means. Semayawi and Andinet opposition parties' representatives alleged that the Anti-Terrorism

²⁵ Blue (Semayawi) Party, Unity for Democracy and Justice Party (CUD), and Ethiopian Federal Democratic Unity Forum (Medrek). Members with senior positions represented the parties in the debate.

²⁶ See http://www.ethiopiainvestor.com/index.php?view=article&catid=69%3Aarchives&id=413%3Aarg-anti&tmpl=component&print=1&page=&option=com_content&Itemid=89

Proclamation is a 'smokescreen' to cover EPRDF's intentions. Including Medrek (another major opposition party), these parties repeatedly hammered the motive behind the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation right from the inception of the idea. For these groups, the law is intended to suppress the opposition and imprison journalists (ERTA, 2006a). The Secretary General of UDJ (Unity for Democracy and Justice), in discussion with Reporter newspaper, also supported this stance of opposition parties. As he elaborated, the existing law was sufficient to punish the perpetrators without the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation which, as he expressed, stripping people off constitutional rights (Wudineh, 2013). In his opinion, all terrorist threats that the government said to have foiled are pure orchestration to induce fear and legitimize this proclamation. He said, "given the objective reality in Ethiopia right now, we do not believe that there are Ethiopians who would engage in acts of terrorism in their own nation" (Ibid).

Dr. Haile Michael (President of Ethiopian Civil Service University), as a key advocator of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, criticized such stance of opposition political parties and stressed the relevance of the law to Ethiopia in his conversation with the Ethiopian Herald.

How can political parties take a position lamenting the proclamation as it is against them? How can they say that they do not need this proclamation while they also will be victims? Terrorism targets citizens and innocent people who may also be a member of any political party. There should not be any justification to make the proclamation against constitutional rights. But dismissing the law is a short sighted view. We could say this game is 'playing with fire' because the fire is there to affect anybody. The law does not target anybody other than the terrorists (Ethiopian Herald, 2013a).

For Dr. Haile Michael, the proclamation has immense advantage to fight terrorism; it is very important to limit any future potential terrorist threats, for the country's development and for democratic unity of its people, for harmonious co-existence of the Nation, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia (Ibid).

B. The Mass Media and the Public Opinion

To keep public opinion from diverging too much from state policies, as long time practices show, governments use propaganda or try to manipulate the media. In order to persuade people to accept (if not to like) its policies, governments spend great effort on propaganda (the public promotion of their official line) to win support from the public (Kissinger, 1966: 515). States use television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and other information media for

this effort. In Ethiopia, state owned Television and Radio dominate the task of mass media and is able to shape the public opinion towards government policies. These media play two interdependent roles in gathering support on the side of the government in Ethiopia: one is informing the public about the issue (through news, programs, documentary films and other mass media information, all reflecting the content, saliency and ordering the priority of issues) and the second is displaying public reactions on the issue (through surveying opinions, presenting public debates, etc).

Noticeably, ERTA (Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency) had played crucial roles in mobilizing the masses in favor of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation since the endorsing of the law by the legislature. Facilitated by Mass Media and some opposition political parties, on few occasions, a segment of Ethiopian public got the opportunity to express their stance on the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation. The ERTA has organized some public debates between opposition political parties and the ruling party. It has also transmitted a series of public opinions and explanations about the necessity of the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation given by the experts in this regard (ERTA, 2013b; The Ethiopian Herald, 2013b). Most of these opinions collected and disseminated by ERTA are found in support of the proclamation.

On the other hand, few peaceful demonstrations by some sections of the society were seen on the streets of Addis Ababa, organized by the opposition political parties. These segments of the public opposed the necessity of Anti-Terrorism Proclamation (Press TV, 2013; Reuters, 2013; Reporters without Border, 2013).

5.3. Reflections on the Dynamism of the Ethiopian Counterterrorism Policy Framing

As the above discussions illustrate, the decisions to militarily counter terrorism in Somalia as well as the legal enactment in this regard, have encountered oppositions from some sections of the society. When we look the military intervention decision in Somalia, majority of the opposition members of the parliament opposed the action. However, due to their limited number in the legislature, they were unable to reverse the decision.

The contending arguments presented by the opposition representatives mainly revolve around government intention, the relevance and future consequences of the military action. Some members argued that the government's military decision is a "cover-up" for domestic repression it carried out in response to the 2005 national election results. The intention of the government, according to the accusing party (particularly the CUD), is to divert both internal and external attention away from what was happening by the moment in the country²⁷ (Ethiomeia, 2007). Theoretically, this argument seems based on the general fact that governments sometimes adopt foreign policies for the specific purpose of generating public approval and hence gaining domestic legitimacy (Baum, 2002: 265). This helps the government (at least in the short term) to calm down pressing anti-government movements inside and outside the country. Policies of this sort are often labeled as "diversionary foreign policy" (Ibid). In line with this, however, there was no convincing ground that can firmly elucidate the case of Ethiopia as diversionary strategy.

Others opposed the decision considering that the threat posed by the UIC is not as significant as the claim made by the Ethiopian government if measured in terms of its scale and effect. This argument also seems rarely convincing because the threat posed by the UIC was fully linked to international terrorist networks whose power significance and level of attacking capacity cannot be estimated as easily as states' defense force abilities. This difficulty is evident from what had happened to US by al-Qaeda during the 9/11 attack.

However, whatever the oppositions' justifications may be, the ruling party, championed by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, decided to take military action against UIC on the basis of justifications discussed earlier. The government's argument that the UIC is acting as a proxy for Eritrea and that it is providing a safe haven to the Ethiopian rebel forces operating within Eritrea and Somalia was also supported by the findings of the UN

²⁷ The Ethiopian intervention in Somalia was after one and half years of the regional and national elections in Ethiopia (May 2005). Some international observers wrote as this election was controversial depending up on the procedural problems occurred during the election. The electoral process, according to Christopher Clapham (2009: 181), produced a "crisis of governance" in Ethiopia. Elsa Gonzalez Aime added that "these elections put in question the legitimacy of the government and its state model for some local and international actors" (Aime, 2011: 7).

Monitoring Group (UNO, 2006)²⁸. BBC also assured that UIC's mission and its leaders profile is similar to al-Qaeda (BBC News, 2006). Ethiopia's claim of the condition in Somalia as plots by global terrorists was also found to be reasonable²⁹ based on the chain of command in UIC which was controlled by more radical individuals such as former Al Itahaad Al Islamiya's military commander Shaykh Hassan Dawir Aweys (designated as a terrorist by the USA) who also took responsibility for several terrorist attacks in Ethiopia since early 1990s; and Adan Hashi Ayro who also seems to be in charge of the Al-Shabab militia and responsible for several nasty terrorist atrocities in Somalia (Woldeselase, 2010: 227). As David Shinn, who is familiar with the geopolitical dynamics of the region commented, "some leaders in the UIC, certainly including Hassan Dahir Aweys, wish to reenergize the Greater Somalia concept by incorporating into Somalia those Somali-inhabited parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti" (Shinn, 2006). Accordingly, the official view held that the only feasible recourse available was to take a self-defensive measure against the forces that host and infiltrate what Ethiopia deems as anti-peace elements to its territory and the stationing of foreign jihadists on its border.

In regard to the enacting of the Anti-terrorism Proclamation, from the very beginning, there have been opposing views about the intent, necessity and consequences of the proclamation. Majority members of the opposition parties and a few sections of the society opposed the elements of the proposed anti-terrorism proclamation and its practice. Their

²⁸In its 2006 Report to the Security Council, the UN Monitoring Group announced the participation of forces of Eritrea, OLF and ONLF in the war leading to UIC's occupation of Kismaayo. They also reported the shipment of arms to ONLF, OLF and the UIC from Eritrea. (Washington Post, 15 Nov 2006).

²⁹The International Crisis Group acknowledged that a number of the UIC leaders have been linked to al-Qaeda. At least one senior al-Qaeda figure—Abu Talha al-Sudani—was believed to exert considerable influence over the court leadership. (ICG, 2006: 9-10); The US State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 stated that the Council of Islamic Courts had become hijacked by the Shabaab, which it described as a "small extremist group affiliated with al-Qaeda that consists of radicalized young men, between 20 and 30 years of age. Many of its senior leaders are believed to have trained and fought with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan" (US Department of State, 2006: 131). US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, told reporters in mid-December, "The Council of Islamic Courts is now controlled by al-Qaeda cell individuals, East Africa al-Qaeda cell individuals. The top layers of the court are extremists. They are terrorists" (Cauthorne, 2006).

lines of argument included: infringement on constitutionally recognized rights³⁰, it shutdown space for opposition political practice, and further terrorize the citizens of the country. On the contrary, proponents echoed the relevance³¹ of the proclamation by pointing out the several "terrorist atrocities" committed up on its citizens. They argued that the objective of the Anti-terrorism Proclamation is to fight terrorism in all its forms and it would be applied for this sole purpose, said the EPRDF representative Shimelis Kemal during the debate held among the political parties by ERTA (ERTA, 2013a). Echoing this stance, the government of Ethiopia continued putting in to practice all the provisions of this controversial Anti-terrorism legislation.

Conclusion

Compared to other policy decisions made by the Government of Ethiopia, the process of approving the decisions of militarily countering terrorism in Somalia and the act of Anti-Terrorism Proclamation was a bone of contention because there were sections of the society that have not been convinced about the necessity of these actions. As the above discussions reveal, the majority of political opposition were not convinced about the relevance of these counter-terrorism decisions for Ethiopia.

However, the government championed the approval by arguing that there is "a clear and present danger" to Ethiopia's territorial integrity and sovereignty- alleging the threat as posed by Eritrea, Islamist militants of Somalia, Ethiopian insurgents and the international terrorists sheltered in Somalia- in case of the military intervention decision; and in the case of Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, the inadequacy of existing legal procedures to prosecute cases of terrorism and implementation of the obligations of Ethiopia under the UN/AU to secure international order as a responsible member to these institutions, are presented as reasons for government action.

³⁰ "Despite a strong constitutional basis for freedom of assembly, association, press freedom, and freedom of information, the Ethiopian government has systematically used the anti-terrorism law to prosecute and frighten opposition leaders and journalists, putting a straight jacket on the political dynamism and media," said unnamed opposition party representative to Reporters without Border, (2013).

³¹ Two factors pronounced by the government of Ethiopia that constitute *the raisons d'être* for Ethiopia's anti-terrorism proclamation: threats of terrorist attacks and state's obligation to combat terrorism.

Chapter Six

The Ethiopian Foreign Policy Behavior and Terrorist Threats in Ethiopia: Analyzing the Causal Relationships

Introduction

This chapter tries to present the analysis part of the study, where some of the Ethiopian foreign policy behaviors are identified and analyzed in the light of the terrorist threats and counterterrorism activities of Ethiopia discussed under preceding chapters. The first section of this chapter attempts to summarize the theoretical bases of foreign policy behaviors that are likely to stimulate terrorism against any country. The second section identifies and examines Ethiopian foreign policy behaviors responsible for terrorism threatening the country. The final section presents a summary of terrorist threats and incidents that happened in Ethiopia as a consequence of its foreign policy behaviors.

6.1. Foreign policy Behaviors Likely to Induce Terrorist Threats: A Summary of Theoretical Foundation

Burcu Savun and Brian J. Philips (2009), drawing on 163 states as samples for analysis, empirically tested and proved the positive/casual relationships between some foreign policy behaviors of a state and threats of terrorism against that state. They identified three foreign policy contours of a state likely to stimulate terrorism against the state, labeling them as "active foreign policies": having a crisis (conflictual) foreign policy with other states, alliance ties with the USA, and intervention in civil wars of other states.

Involvement in or having foreign policy crisis, here, refers to a state's continual existence in conflict with other states. According to Savun and Philips (2009: 12), the more frequently a state engages in conflict with other states, the more likely that it will create resentment and hostility against itself by different groups affected by such relations. The conflict might be of any type ranging from distrusting of each other upto and including the military confrontation. Aside from direct violence, states in interstate disputes can provoke any kind of hostile activities against one another to undermine the enemy's condition (Ibid).

A second indicator of active foreign policy is whether a state has alliance ties with the United States. Savun and Philips proved that states that have close ties to the United States attract more terrorist threats than the others. They stressed the role of military alliance with the USA as the major one in this regard.

A third indicator of a state's active foreign policy is intervention in civil wars of foreign states. By their nature, as the analysts indicate (Ibid: 14), most interventions are controversial because they tend to antagonize some groups against the intervener, unless the intervention is perceived to be neutral by the disputants. As the analysts find out, "intervening with the attempt of changing balance of power on the battleground usually makes the target of intervention better off by prolonging and intensifying hostile movements against the intervening state".

Savun and Philips concluded that the foreign policy behavior of a state plays an important role in creating conditions favorable for heightening terrorist threats against the state itself. They have proved that these three foreign policy activities of a state are positive and significant predictors of the level/frequency of terrorist incidents that a state might experience. According to their findings, having a foreign policy crisis with other states increases its propensity to terrorism by 30 percent; having a military alliance with the US increases a country's vulnerability to terrorist threats by 179 percent; while interventions in civil wars of others adds about 35 percent vulnerability to terrorist threats (Savun and Philips, 2009: 15-19).

6.2. The Ethiopian Case: Is there any Association between Foreign Policy Behaviors and Terrorist Threats in Ethiopia?

6.2.1. Involvement in Foreign Policy Crisis

Is Ethiopia having conflict or hostile relations with other states? If any, are these hostile relations contributing to terrorism in Ethiopia? In what ways?

History demonstrates that Ethiopia had passed and still passing through deep hostilities and tensions with Eritrea and Somalia. The sources of hostility between Ethiopia and Eritrea

include a border dispute that aroused a war of two years. Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a brutal border war from 1998 to 2000 and they have left considerable unfinished business because the subsequent peace agreements meant to end that conflict have not been implemented (Rabasa, 2009: 72). This unfinished business forced both countries to continually exist in 'no peace - no war' conditions. Eritrea soon embarked on supporting anti-Ethiopian forces inside and outside Ethiopia, such as the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front- in Somali region), OLF (Oromo Liberation Front- Oromia region), and other rebellious groups in all forms (Pham, 2009: 05).

In response to the ongoing problem created by Eritrean-sponsored insurgencies in the South-East and South-West of the country, Ethiopia required to maintain a large standing army with the capacity to project power and self-defense across its national border (Goitom, 2013: 20). Such conditions persisted between Ethiopia and Eritrea further manifesting itself in a form of "proxy war" undergone in Somalia, in 2006.

Historically, Ethiopia's relation with Somalia has not been a healthy one due to the long held Somalia's irredentist claim against Ethiopia. In the past few decades, at least two different wars were fought between the two countries. As it is recorded in history, the "Greater Somalia" dream, held and provoked by some segment of Somalis brought an unending hostility between Ethiopia and Somalia. This "Greater Somalia" claim has a mission of uniting all Somalis in the region under one state by seceding Somali inhabited parts from Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti (Dagne, 2002: 18). Since 1991 to the mid of 2000, this irredentist claim was discredited due to a complete state failure in Somalia. But the attempt for its revival was undergoing by the UIC in 2006; however, this move was immediately contained by Ethiopia during the military intervention in Somalia (Dagnachew, 2006).

In addition to the agenda of "Greater Somalia", what has put Ethiopia's relations in tension with Somalia is the creation of political Islamism in Somalia. Ethiopia opposes such development in the region claiming that "the strengthening of militant Islam has been an oppositional ideology that can rally disaffected young people and latch on to local discontent" (Mohammed, 2007: 3). One danger of it, today, is that the hostility attitude

towards such development generated its own jihadist logic, attracting Somali and foreign Islamic militants (Ibid). A related danger is that Ethiopia's tradition of religious tolerance began to be compromised further intensifying the hostility.

As the discussion under the third chapter reflects, a series of terrorist threats targeting Ethiopia have been directed either from Somalia or Eritrea or from both (instigated in collaboration). Eritrea's resentment against Ethiopia, developed following the defeat it experienced in the two years war (1998 - 2000), began to manifest in the form of undertaking all retaliatory activities that can possibly undermine Ethiopia. "After a brutal war, Eritrea truly got frustrated, and one manifestation of this is that it began to support anti-Ethiopian groups in Somalia and within Ethiopia" (Pham, 2009: 13). Most of the ONLF-led terrorist incidents and significant part of the OLF's threats to Ethiopia as well as terrorist incidents committed by rebel groups in Afar and Benshangul Gumuz regions were more or less believed to be instigated and organized by Eritrean government and terrorist affiliates in Somalia. The ONLF, harbored in Somalia and Eritrea, has taken responsibilities for some of the terrorist incidents that has been indicated in chapter three (table 3.1.), including for the worst attack on Chinese and Ethiopian oil workers in April 2007, killing nine Chinese and sixty five Ethiopians as well as wounding five more. Several Ethiopians were taken hostages during the attack. As the observers claim, the attack was fully organized by Islamist insurgents in Somalia (Crilly, 2007). Besides, many authoritative reports witness that the Eritrean government has made persistent efforts to strengthen these terrorist groups by providing all assistances such as training in Eritrea and Somalia and supply of various types of weapons. The AU, IGAD and the International community, at various times, have expressed concern and have asked Eritrea to stop sponsoring the Somali terrorist organizations. According to the UN observers' report of November 2006, Eritrea's support to terrorist groups in Somalia was among the worst. "The Eritrean government allegedly provided the UIC at least 28 separate consignments of arms, ammunition and military equipment. Eritrean military officers and troops have assisted the UIC by providing not just weapons and training, but also political assistance" (UNO,

2006b). There is solid evidence in UN Panel reports and confirmation of captives³² on this. For instance, the November 2006 Report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1676 (2006) revealed that: "on 24 July 2006 an aircraft containing an arms shipment and senior Eritrean military officers arrived at Mogadishu's Esaley airport. The arms consisted of unknown numbers of rockets and other anti-tank weapons" (UNO, 2006a). The Report also disclosed Eritrea's support for the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) via the UIC, stating that:

On 8 July 2006, a shipment of arms transported by camels and donkeys, and under the escort of 70 members of UIC along with 160 ONLF fighters, entered Ethiopia through the Abudwag district of Somalia. And in August 2006, 2000 fully equipped combat troops from Eritrea were deployed to different locations and training camps in Somalia (Ibid).

In its report released in December 2011, the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea accused the government of Eritrea of planning to disrupt the African Unity summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It accused Eritrea of training rebels and planning to carryout bombings in Addis Ababa by (i) attacking the AU headquarters with a car bomb as African leaders took breaks; (ii) blowing up Africa's largest market (Mercato in Addis Ababa); and (iii) attacking the area between the Prime Minister's office and the Sheraton Hotel, where most Heads of state stay during AU summits (UNO, 2011).

Eritrea's decision and appetite to continue sponsoring the fundamentalist Islamic terrorist groups in Somalia and Ethiopia, according to Goitom (2013: 17), is associated with its intention to create another war front and coalition against Ethiopia. Roland Marchal, a senior research fellow at the National Center of Scientific Research, Paris, underpins this fact stating that:

Eritrea's clandestine involvement and support to the Islamic Extremists and separatist terrorists of the Horn of Africa sub-region can be traced back to the Ethio-Eritrea war of 1998-2000 and has to be considered part of its military strategy in a bid to avenge its defeat. To draw Ethiopian attention away from trying to solve the border conflict on the northern front, Eritrea established temporary alliances with Hussein Aidid and Al-Itahaad, and helped build their military capabilities in order to support the enemy of its enemy (Marchal, 2004: 138).

³² "Abdi (Shabab member) says he and several hundred other standout students were flown to Eritrea and given an additional two-month advance training in explosives and guerrilla war fighting tactics; he added that instructors teaching for making roadside bombs, car bombs , and suicide vests ,etc were a mix of Somali and Eritreans" (Ryu, 2007).

The above discussion is intended to demonstrate how Ethiopia's existence in hostile or conflictual relations with some of its immediate neighbors is contributing for increased vulnerability of Ethiopia to the threat of terrorism.

6.2.2. Alliance Ties with the United States of America

Savun and Philips (2009: 14-16), in their theory, indicated that a tight alliance with the USA, particularly in a fight against terrorism, ultimately generates hostility from the side of terrorist networks, especially linked to al-Qaeda. The Ethiopian counterterrorism discussion under the fourth chapter clearly demonstrates the form and level of alliance formed between Ethiopia and the USA. As presented there, Ethiopia's alliance with the US is found strong especially since the 9/11 incident. The reason for the existence of such relation is not hidden as Jendayi Frazer, US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, expressed when responding to interview held with Terrence Lyons:

The United States regards Ethiopia as a strategic partner, particularly in relation to the global war on terrorism, and it is not hard to understand why. If you look at the region, [the United States] has tremendous problems with Sudan, and it has relations with Eritrea that are about as bad as they can be. Obviously, the United States can't have a strategic partner with a government in Somalia while Somalia struggles to organize itself. Djibouti, with which the United States has good relations and has built military facilities in, is tiny and is never going to be the pillar around which the United States builds a regional strategy. So Ethiopia is it. In particular, Ethiopia and the United States share a common concern about the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. The United States linked the UIC to al-Qaeda, while Ethiopia saw the UIC as being linked to its rivals in Eritrea. When in late 2006 and early 2007 the Ethiopians moved into Mogadishu, the United States was very pleased and saw that as a victory in the war on terrorism (Lyons, 2007).

By strongly allying with the US, Ethiopia seems benefiting a lot from all assistance supplied by the US government in the form of material, financial and technical supports as well as capacity building and experience sharing (especially for the military and legal personnel). However, in consequence to this alliance, Ethiopia has been intimidated, warned and made to suffer much from terrorist threats and attacks instigated and directed by groups resentful about such ties with the USA, alleging Ethiopia as the US surrogate in the region . Ethiopia started entertaining such hostilities particularly following its military incursion in to Somalia in 2006, (the decision made, in one way or another, based on its

national security interest as demonstrated under the fifth chapter). Its alliance with the USA provided a pretext for Islamic militants in Somalia and Middle East to rally their groups around a jihadist agenda calling Ethiopia's intervention as a proxy of America. With the attempt of invoking Islamic hostility against Ethiopia, Mohammed Hassan, one of the proponents of the militant Islamists expressed Ethiopia as, "the Ethiopian army is at present being reformed as a local mercenary force in the service of the Americans that can be used against any country in the region" (Hasan, 2007: 4).

The proxy claim was much more echoed by the Middle East hard core Islamists whose representative, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who was Bin Laden's deputy by then, declared a Jihad against Ethiopia, calling it as a crusading state that has collaborated with Western Imperialism against Islam. In a videotaped message, he called for guerilla war against American and its Ethiopian ally³³. As David Shinn mentions, the Al-Qaida website, the Reform Forum (Muntada al-tajdid) was full of articles and responses demonizing Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia. "Ethiopia is portrayed as a vengeful, crusading state that has collaborated with the USA against Islam. By declaring Jihad against Ethiopia, al-Qaeda called for volunteers from all over the Islamic world to join forces in Somalia to revenge Ethiopia using any tactic available" (Shinn, 2007: 11).

6.2.3. Intervention in Civil Wars of other States

Intervention in civil wars of foreign states has been empirically proved by Savun and Philips as one of foreign policy behaviors that can engender resentments of some groups in civil war against the intervening actor, unless the intention of the intervention is purely neutral. As discussed under the fifth chapter, Ethiopia has had this experience of intervention carried out in late 2006, Somalia. The intervention was carried out following the emergence of the Islamic militants as victorious in most parts of Southern Somalia under the leadership of Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). As can be justified from the then Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's talk, Ethiopia's intervention was not neutral.

³³ "In a January 2007 audio message, al-Qaeda's second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, calls upon Muslims everywhere, specifically those in Yemen, the Arabian peninsula, Egypt, North Africa, and Sudan, to participate in a jihad against Ethiopia and provide Somali Muslims with men, experience, money, and advice to defeat the Ethiopian forces, whom he refers to as the "slaves of America." (Rabasa, 2009: 3-4).

... the Government of Ethiopia's aim was to convince UIC "fellow travelers" that the Government of Ethiopia would be forced to act militarily to prevent the UIC from defeating the TFG and continuing its expansion. The ultimate objective was to remove the UIC's Jihadist leadership by letting people know that such a government in Somalia is unacceptable to Ethiopia. The Government of Ethiopia intended to convince key Somali actors that Ethiopia had the capacity and commitment to intervene effectively and repeatedly if necessary to prevent the consolidation of an extremist regime in Mogadishu³⁴.

However, it was this foreign policy decision which has opened wider opportunities for anti-Ethiopian forces based in Somalia to renew their resentments, mobilize masses and launch threats, thereupon multiplying the dimensions of terrorist threats against Ethiopia. It is found that the UIC reportedly provided military support to the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the little known United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF), both of which maintained offices in Mogadishu and continued instigating terrorist threats against Ethiopia (Shinn, 2007: 11). Ethiopia's nemesis, Eritrea, strengthened its ties with these forces thereby supplying arms to and training Islamic Court militia, the ONLF and OLF (UNO, 2006a). Besides, al-Qaeda renewed its interest of intensifying terrorist networks in the Horn of Africa with a particular target of threatening Ethiopia. As Shinn (2007: 11-12) indicates, following the intervention, several previously unknown al-Qaeda cells, or at least organizations claiming to speak for al-Qaeda, were created in and around Ethiopia vowing allegiance to Osama bin Laden, appealing for the establishment of sharia in Ethiopia, and warning of imminent attacks on US interests in Africa.

The consequence of intervention became ironic when the groups claimed that Ethiopia is allying with the USA³⁵ (especially in the name of war on terror), which have led to an increase in the threat of terrorism. Allying with the USA is "playing into the hands of extremists within the Islamic Courts and the broader al-Qaeda strategy to justify the resort to a call for international fighters and acts of terrorism against an enemy of Islam and a foreign occupying force" (Botha, 2007: 5). Botha compared this with a delicate chess game

³⁴ Leaked Cables of US Embassy Addis Ababa, a December 04, 2006 Cable presents a meeting between Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and US Senator Russ Feingold; Posted online on November 24, 2011 by HornAffairs; available at <http://hornaffairs.com/en/2011/11/04/senator-inquires-ethiopian-motive-military-capacity-ethiopia-somalia-intervention-2006/>, accessed 11 March 2014.

³⁵ The USA, in the eyes of Islamic terrorist groups, is considered as an enemy of Islam, working to establish domination over Islam throughout the world (Botha, 2007: 6).

between Islamist extremists who would use each and every opportunity to justify their strategy and recruit new members or secure more support against the United States as ‘champions’ against terrorism. Adopting this strategy has further resulted in moderate Muslims moving into the camp of extremism in Somalia. It is therefore evident that although the TFG (Transitional Federal Government of Somalia) and Ethiopia might have won the battle against the Islamic Courts in 2006, they lost the war against extremists, because the intervention further enhanced the perception that Ethiopia, as an important ally of the United States, acted against Islam. As a result, a steady influx of jihadi volunteers from across the Muslim world strengthened the al-Qaeda presence in Somalia in late 2006. Although estimates of their numbers varied widely, most observers believe several hundreds arrived in Somalia (ICG, 2007: 4-5).

6.3. The Terrorist Threats and Incidents Instigated and Committed against Ethiopia in Response to its Foreign Policy Behavior: A Brief Summary

Ethiopia's hostility with Eritrea and groups in Somalia, military cooperation with the USA, and the 2006 intervention in Somalia, all together, allowed the country to be encircled by intertwined terrorist threats. The threats are intertwined because, for instance, the terrorist threat directed from Somalia has involved the government of Eritrea, terrorists from al-Qaeda and Ethiopian insurgents, interlinking all resentful groups against Ethiopia. In such a way, the terrorist threats targeting Ethiopia, in response to its Foreign Policy Behavior, are extremely complicated.

The Earlier distinguished terrorist group in Somalia was Al Ithaad Al Islamiya (AIAI). The objective of AIAI has always been to establish an Islamic state in the Horn of Africa by any means possible (Woldeselase, 2010: 225). From there in Somalia, AIAI extended its operation in to Ethiopia's Somali region linking up with the ONLF, having the purpose of threatening Ethiopia in collaboration. Using this connection, AIAI has actively participated in a series of bombings and other attacks in the Ogaden and other parts of Ethiopia particularly since 1996. AIAI also linked itself with the OLF to assist a coordinated attack on Ethiopia from 1998 (Ibid).

As information gathered under chapter three informs, AIAI was the responsible group behind the early 1990s several terrorist incidents in Ethiopia such as the bombings of Ghion Hotel in Addis Ababa, Ras Hotel in Dire Dawa, foiled assassination attempt against Abdul-Mejid Hussein (the then Ethiopian Minister of Transport and Communication), and Wabe Shebelle Hotel in Addis Ababa (look in to Appendix-III for detail). Beyond taking responsibility for these attacks, reports add that Abdulkadir Muhamud Dhaqane, Al Itihaad's spokesman in Mogadishu, warned the persistence of the attack until the Ogaden region become independent from Ethiopia. Therefore, most of the terrorist threats and incidents committed by ONLF in Ethiopia, in one way or another, were instigated in Somalia by AIAI. What should be noted here is that AIAI's embarking on terrorism against Ethiopia is in response to Ethiopia's long held hostile stand against the group's "Expansive Islamic Republic of Greater Somalia" mission.

Following the 2006 Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia, insurgents in Somalia have intensified terrorist attacks and successfully used roadside bombs, hit-and-run attacks, and targeted assassinations against government officials of TFG and Ethiopian military personnel, which lasted up to the Ethiopian military withdrawal in 2009. The intervention has sewn the increasing radicalization and scaling anti-Ethiopian sentiments high among majority of Somalis. According to Matthew Blood (2008: 19), the UIC leadership before intervention was originally a mix of moderate and conservative Islamic actors. But after the intervention, the insurgency (veterans of the war) no longer maintained this character. Battle-hardened al-shabab militants, most of them al-Qaeda members, espoused a far more radical anti-Western ideology, with long-term plan of destabilizing their ally- Ethiopia (Ibid). Mehari Tadese Maru, Head of the African Conflict and Prevention Program at the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Study, told to allAfrica.com that, "terrorists in Somalia have a lot of willingness to attack Ethiopia; [for time being], they just don't have the capacity to do so in short term, and the counterterrorism in Ethiopia is also very strong, thereby thwarting the group's threat ambition against Ethiopia" (allAfrica, 2013).

In retaliation to the intervention, the Somali militants, in collaboration with the ONLF, were reported as instigating the 2007 terrorist attack on China's Oil Exploring Company in Ethiopia killing 74 workers. In 2008, multiple suicide bombings targeting the Ethiopian

Trade mission in Hargeisa (Somaliland) killed at least twenty peoples. The 2010 Hotel burst in Uganda (where the hotel owner was Ethiopian) was also taken as manifestation of terrorists targeting Ethiopia in response to its military role in Somalia since late 2006 onwards.

Eritrea's role in intensifying terrorist threats against Ethiopia has been demonstrated through smuggling of arms/weapons into Somalia, providing refuge for terrorists, serving as a pass way for international terrorists to Somalia, training and equipping terrorists and other members of militants, and deploying special terrorist forces in to Ethiopia. Some reports show that Eritrea has systematically been supporting anti-Ethiopian forces including the OLF and ONLF and other terrorist groups and individuals targeting Ethiopia - by providing financial, skill training, political support and offices in Asmara. It allowed the leaders of the militant groups (OLF, ONLF, AIAI, UIC, Al-Shabab and others) to open offices in Eritrea and get organized there. Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist groups operating in Somalia has Eritrea as a common state sponsor with the ONLF, as many reports claim (Foltz, 2010: 14; Goitom, 2013: 19; Pham, 2009: 23; Rabasa, 2009: 33-38). Eritrea was also reported as providing more than 400 small arms and a number of explosives to ONLF to commit terrorism in Ethiopia (Woldeselase, 2010: 244). Eritrea is serving as a bridge through which International terrorists and weapons pass into Somalia and then to other countries in the Horn of Africa.

Hundreds of Islamist insurgents were flown with Eritrean assistance from Somalia to Syria and Libya for military training. UN investigators also detailed military aid given to the Islamists by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Arab states friendly to the West. Iran also supplied 125 shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, 80 of which arrived by sea and the rest by air (Ibid: 249).

Among terrorist plots against Ethiopia by Eritrea, its government was found responsible for the 2010 bomb attacks in Northern part of Ethiopia that killed seven people and injured thirty three (Appendix-IV). Eritrea was also reported as harboring, training, equipping and deploying in to Ethiopia members of the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF) which was held responsible for the kidnapping of five Europeans and thirteen Ethiopians in 2007; kidnapping attempt on twenty eight French tourists in Afar (2008); an attack on a farm operated by Saudi Star Development in Gambella that killed five; a shooting incident that killed nineteen and wounded eight (2012) in Gambella; and the

terrorist attack that occurred near the Ertale Volcano (Afar) in 2012 which killed five foreign tourists and kidnapped four people (look in to Appendix-IV for detail). The worst of Eritrea-led terrorist threat against Ethiopia was the one planned and organized to blow up Addis Ababa during the gathering of Heads of African states for the AU annual summit in 2011(UNO, 2011). This threat was recognized and thwarted soon. It was following this plan by Eritrea that the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea accused the government of Eritrea warning to refrain from such sinister roles in the region.

With such growing evidence that the Eritrean government was funneling money, weapons, personnel and other supplies to Al-shabab, AIAI, ONLF and other terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa region, IGAD and the AU, in addition to the UN, in different occasions, identified and warned Eritrea as a regional and international threat bent on using Somalia as a base to export terrorism (Appendix-V).

Conclusion

The chapter tried to indicate how some of the Ethiopian foreign policy behaviors are contributing for terrorist threats to get intensified against Ethiopia. Ethiopia's prolonged stay in tension with Eritrea and Somalia, Ethiopia's alliance with the USA in fight against terrorism, and its military intervention in Somalia, all further triggered terrorist threats targeting Ethiopia. Terrorist threats and incidents committed against Ethiopia since 1990s have their roots in Somalia and Eritrea. Though the attacks have carried out by the members of ONLF and OLF (Ethiopian rebellion groups), organizing, training, planning and equipping have been taking place either in Eritrea or Somalia by anti-Ethiopian forces there.

The Islamic militants of Somalia, in collaboration with the international terrorists, are instigating terrorism against Ethiopia in response to its stand to deter or contain the Greater Somalia dream and the growth of Political Islamism in the region. Eritrea in turn instigates and sponsors terrorism against Ethiopia as a retaliation to the border dispute, where Eritrea experienced a humiliating defeat during the two years war with Ethiopia. Accordingly, some of the Ethiopian foreign policy behaviors are actually responsible for terrorism threatening the country though the exhibition of these foreign policy behaviors is believed to be in line with the country's national interests.

Chapter Seven

Conclusions and Recommendations

7.1. Conclusions

This thesis has attempted to examine the concern of terrorism in Ethiopia. It has tried to establish the link between Ethiopian foreign policy behaviors and the terrorist threats in the country, specifically by demonstrating how some foreign policies of the government are resulting in fomenting terrorist resentments against the country.

Foreign policy behaviors of Ethiopia and cross-border terrorism have persisted for long time impacting upon each other. The threat of terrorism has at least twenty years of history in Ethiopia, particularly in its Southeastern part (Somali inhabited region), which has experienced terrorist attacks even before the 9/11 attack. The earliest terrorist attacks in Ethiopia were conducted by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in the mid years of 1990. The ONLF is a secessionist political movement aimed at seceding Somali ethnic group apart from Ethiopia. In the early years of 1990, lacking adequate indigenous Somali support and facing a heated opposition from the EPRDF (the party with government power), the ONLF joined a like-minded Al Itihaad Al Islamiya (AIAI), a terrorist group based in Somalia with a strong link to al-Qaeda. Since then, these groups have been reported as committing several terrorist attacks against Ethiopia. Their targets were mainly civilians, civilian properties, government institutions and officials.

The threat of terrorism has got intensified following the two years war (1998-2000) fought between Ethiopia and Eritrea in which the latter experienced a humiliating defeat. Owing to the absence of a lasting solution to this border dispute, Eritrea resorted to destabilizing Ethiopia using any means available as retaliation. One means of achieving this end being used by Eritrea has been supporting anti-Ethiopian forces operating inside or outside Ethiopia. Accordingly, Eritrea has seen the Ethiopian rebel forces as an opportunity to threaten or undermine Ethiopian government. The Government of Eritrea strongly gets engaged with the ONLF, OLF, ARDUF (Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front), opposition groups in Amhara and Benshangul Gumuz regions, and Somalian Islamist

militants to threaten Ethiopia. It has invited these groups to gather and freely operate in Eritrea; given offices in Asmara; trained, equipped and deployed the terrorist groups; served as transit point to and from the Middle East, not only for the rebel groups but also the international, well-experienced terrorists as well as for the weaponry. To this end, in majority of the terrorist attacks that targeted Ethiopia, Eritrea has been involved either directly or indirectly.

In response to these growing threats of terrorism, Ethiopia has been working by devising several short and long-term counter-terrorism policies and strategies since the commencement of the threat against its security. Multiple of the Ethiopian Counter-Terrorism activities include: the institutionalizing of counter-terrorism activities under the National Intelligence and Security Service with a tough security and intelligence workers; proclaiming of laws such as Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, and the Proclamation for the Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism; regional and international cooperation through initiating, ratifying and implementing Counter-Terrorism conventions and protocols under the auspices of IGAD, AU and UNO; forming joint or bilateral cooperation with the USA and some neighboring countries. Especially, Ethiopia's cooperation with the USA in the fight against terrorism has been strong enough. In addition to this, the government of Ethiopia has a practice of military counter-terrorism strategy as a last resort against terrorism. Militarily countering terrorism by Ethiopia has started in the mid of 1990 and continued up to these days. The 2006 military intervention in Somalia was a tangible instance of this policy.

In many cases, if weighed in short-term goals and objectives, these counter-terrorism policies and strategies of Ethiopia seem contributing a lot in thwarting several terrorist threats targeting Ethiopia. However, some of the Ethiopian counter-terrorism measures, combined with some foreign policy behaviors, are found equally contributing for further intensification of the terrorist threats against the country. The military counter-terrorism measure in Somalia (example, the 2006 military intervention), strong counter-terrorism alliance with the USA, and the long held hostile relation with the government in Eritrea have been foreign policy behaviors exhibited by Ethiopia which are found responsible for stimulating and intensifying the threats of terrorism against itself.

When Ethiopia intervened in Somalia, the threats of terrorism against it got complicated. The intervention became a magnet for recruitment of nationalists and extremists residing not only in the Horn of Africa region, but also terrorist experts and weapons from the Gulf States as well. Using the intervention occasion, Islamist terrorists renewed their agenda and strategies of recruiting new members among the disaffected Muslim communities by declaring a jihad war against Ethiopia, appealing that 'Ethiopia is a Christian state invading Islamic Somalia collaborating with the USA'. This facilitated the multiplication of al-Qaeda affiliates targeting Ethiopia. Eritrean government used this opportunity to further intensify the threat against Ethiopia. It recruited, organized, trained, equipped and deployed terrorist groups in and around Ethiopia.

Therefore, majority of the terrorist threats and atrocities directed against Ethiopia for long, have been instigated and sponsored as well as led by the government in Eritrea and terrorist groups created and sheltered in Somalia though the OLF and ONLF are often placed in forefront. It is very important to note that the terrorists in Somalia and the government of Eritrea are doing this in response to some of the Ethiopian foreign policy behaviors described above. The operational capacity and threatening power of the OLF and the ONLF could be insignificant or marginal in the absence of the scenarios in Somalia and Eritrea.

7.2. Recommendations

As noted above, the growing threats of terrorism against Ethiopia are directly or indirectly linked to some of its foreign policy behaviors exhibited with the aim of securing national interests. Even though these foreign policies were, in one way or another, adopted in line with Ethiopia's national security interests, their byproducts resulted in generating the threats of terrorism against the country. For instance, the military intervention decision in Somalia was based on national security interest of Ethiopia in the light of the then scenario in Somalia. Without intervention, it would be impossible to counterbalance the foreign supports the UIC forces were receiving. In the absence of Ethiopian intervention, the UIC forces were likely to expand across Somalia and develop capacity to launch a large-scale campaign of war and terror against Ethiopia. However, the military intervention provided only short-lived results to Ethiopia having the long-term effect of generating more popular

support for al-Shabab than the group could have earned on its own while simultaneously pushing extremists toward al-Qaeda.

In order to minimize the likely terrorist threats arising as a consequence to such foreign policy behaviors, strategic approaches for Ethiopia should include the following:

Normalizing Relations with Government in Eritrea: Following the defeat Eritrea experienced in the war with Ethiopia (1998-2000), it found destabilizing the latter as a better strategy to revenge. In pursuing its battle against Ethiopia, Eritrea is using terrorist groups to exert pressure on Addis Ababa. The government in Asmara is doing this in a variety of ways such as by sheltering the leadership of terrorists, allowing free pass for international terrorists and weaponry, providing training camps, even providing training assistances and weapons. As Eritrea is frequently accused of mobilizing and equipping militants in Somalia, Eritrea's peaceful coexistence with Ethiopia might also significantly contribute for having a stable Somalia as well. Based on this necessity, the government of Ethiopia should be fully aware that the fight against terrorism cannot be won by security and military means alone. Working to create conditions conducive for settlement of hostile relations with Eritrea has to be the priority area of Ethiopian Foreign Policy and Relations. The International Community comprising of UNO, AU, EU and IGAD, who have already recognized the destabilizing role of Eritrea in the region, should approach the Ethio-Eritrean case as a regional problem. All have to be fully aware that Eritrea is destabilizing the region as retaliation against Ethiopia. IGAD and AU must treat the government in Eritrea as a responsible member of the continent who can negotiate and bargain its interest round the table, instead of marginalizing and dehumanizing it as completely trivial regime.

Minimizing Military Involvement in and Strengthening Public Diplomacy with Somalia: From the outset, it should be noted that crisis in Somalia has had a negative impact on Ethiopia's internal security. Several terrorist attacks and threats in Ethiopia have been coming from terrorist groups sheltered in Somalia using Ethiopian Somali as a pretext and gateway. Therefore, it is a widely held claim that Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia has been mainly one of the geopolitical self-interest- containing the irredentist claim, limiting Eritrea's influence and destroying terrorist safe havens. However, pursuing national interests alone could not become a working formula to create a stable Somalia that cannot

project a threat to Ethiopia. This was evident following the 2006 intervention. Although Ethiopia's intervention is less controversial and seems to underpin Somalia's security, Somalis and many analysts are deeply suspicious of Ethiopia's motives due to the historical animosities between the two countries. These animosities date back to 1964 border clash, the 1977 War and the 2006 Intervention. Accordingly, Ethiopia's military-led involvement in Somalia has increased the probability and expression of resentment of Somalis against Ethiopia. Instead of a unilateral intervention, it is advisable for Ethiopia to facilitate multilateral military deployment in Somalia.

Besides, strengthening public diplomacy with Somalia is an indispensable policy measure for Ethiopia to erase negative images about its intention. The common understanding is that many Somalis perceive that 'Ethiopia desires only a weak and disunited Somalia that will not pose a security threat to it at any point in the future.' These perceptions have been further exacerbated by the undermining role played by Eritrea and Egypt, which are continually acting as spoilers in Ethiopia's constructive attempts to bring peace and stability to Somalia. So, any Ethiopian engagement in Somalia will be simply interpreted as an attempt to divide and weaken the country, even when Ethiopia is acting in good faith.

In the light of such perceptions, what Ethiopia has to do is to intensify public diplomacy or the work of image protection through intense cultural relations or exchanges, Ethiopian embassy engagement with civil Societies and ordinary Somalis in Somalia etc, so as to remove the misperception held by the larger population of Somalia. The foreign ministry should increasingly take into account the concerns of ordinary people because issues at the grassroots of the society today have become the 'bread and butter' of diplomacy at the highest levels. The ultimate intention of the public diplomacy should be to convince Somalis that Ethiopia is acting in good faith. It should communicate that the best for Ethiopia is a friendly and unified Somalia that has no interest in Somali irredentism and is capable of maintaining internal security and preventing the rise of groups like Al Itihaad and al-Shaba.

Revising the Political Strategy of Cooperation with the USA: Owing to the United State's experience of frequent interventions in internal affairs of foreign states and its repressive actions, coupled with the economic, political and military might, extremists have

been forced to consider terrorism as the only means to strike against the USA and its allies. Being a reliable military ally of the United States in the region, Ethiopia has been a target of global terrorist organizations led by al-Qaeda. USA's defense based counter-terrorism strategy seems working for time being. This is also a preferred and persisting way of cooperation between Ethiopia and the USA where Ethiopia seems benefiting from the latter's military assistance. But the defense approach cannot be sustained indefinitely, especially as a counter-terrorism policy, due to its spillover effects and drawbacks witnessed. For successful counter-terrorism in the long-term, more cooperation with the US outside of the military domain is essential, particularly in the fields of poverty reduction, education, public communications, law enforcement and legal affairs. Above all, USA's counter-terrorism program in the Horn of Africa should be developed as a regional effort rather than as the stake of separate entity. The strategy to support counter-terrorism in Ethiopia should never be designed in a manner that might undermine or isolate some other state/s in the region. Such approach is further triggering animosity against Ethiopia due to the countries in the region are too interlinked, have porous borders, all are jealous of each other, and have a long history of destabilizing one another. These are scenarios complicating effective counter-terrorism in the region. Therefore, in designing counter-terrorism strategy in the East Africa, USA have to consider all states in the region (Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania) possessing equal responsibility of stabilizing the region. Besides, the Ethiopian foreign policy designers should carefully examine the long-term and /or the other-side consequences of alliance with the USA.

Holding Dialogue and Reconciliation with the Ethiopian Rebel Groups: Frequent reports blame the ONLF and OLF rebel forces as two of the major perpetrators behind terrorist threats in Ethiopia. External adversaries of Ethiopia, such as militant Islamists and the government in Eritrea, are using these groups as an instrument of projecting threats inside Ethiopia. This way of enemies' penetration in to Ethiopia is equivalent to the Ethiopian saying "ውሻ በቀደደ ጅብ ይገባል", expressing the danger of the scene. And the collaborations between and among the external enemies and the rebel groups are found strong with the principle of "የጠላቴ ጠላት ወዳጄ ነው", the Ethiopian equivalent saying to "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" approach.

With access to foreign support and the free use of the facilities offered by neighboring enemies, the OLF and ONLF terrorist attacks, over all, have taken several hundreds of civilian lives and damaged huge amounts of civilian property. If not ended with a lasting solution, the probability for the continuation of the threat by the group is high for sometimes coming in the future. Therefore, instead of highly focusing on the security, legal and military means alone, the government should commit itself to hold a sustainable and indigenous reconciliation programs with all rebellion forces in the country. The government, as consensual and representative actor of the Ethiopian society as a whole, must react in an alternative manner from the ways preferred by the rebel forces. By engaging in a violent means, these groups are demonstrating their own inability to compete peacefully for winning a competition. It is the responsibility of the Ethiopian government to take initiatives of developing the culture of peaceful resolution of divergence of interests and conceptions held by naturally diverse Ethiopian Societies. Conducting series of discussions or negotiations between the government and the rebel forces is a must specially working through traditional structures and trying to encourage political accommodation through dialogue.

In general, counter-terrorism of course, should not be sustained simply as a military, security or legal response to terrorism. Taking into account of the national, regional and international environments in which terrorism occurs is a must to rightly identify its origins and features so as to provide a lasting solution. Therefore, identifying and prioritizing actual and potential sources of national security threats, improving the existing strategies and policies in line to the changing environments, and undermining the economic, social and political conditions conducive to terrorism are the best of the approaches to win the fight against terrorism for Ethiopia.

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Appendix-I

Guiding Questions for Unstructured interviews held with Ethiopian Diplomats in Ministry of Foreign Affairs

- 1) What are the general phenomena/conditions of terrorism in Ethiopia? (Is Ethiopia prone to terrorism? How?)
- 2) From where is (the source of) the major terrorist threats in Ethiopia? (External or Internal? How?)
- 3) What are the root causes of terrorism in Ethiopia? Are there triggering factors?
- 4) What are the major Ethiopian Counter-Terrorism Policies and strategies? Is it possible to categorize some of these policies as foreign and others as domestic?
- 5) What are the strengths and limitations of these Counter-Terrorism activities?

Appendix-II

International Counter-Terrorism Conventions Ratified by Ethiopia

1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 14 December 1973.
2. International Convention against taking of Hostages, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 17 December 1979.
3. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 15 December 1997.
4. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1999.
5. Convention on Offenses and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, signed at Tokyo on 14 September 1963. (Deposited with the Secretary General of the International Civil Aviation Organization).
6. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague on 16 December 1970. (Deposited with the Governments of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America).
7. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971. (Deposited with the Governments of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America).
8. Protocol on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 24 February 1988. (Deposited with the Governments of the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and with the Secretary General of the International Civil Aviation Organization).
9. OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted at Algiers on 14 July 1999 (entered in to force on 6 December 2002): Status as at 31 January 2009; 8. (Source: MOFA, Ethiopia, Office of the Directorate for the International Conventions, Agreements and Resolutions)

Appendix-III: Attacks carried out by Somalia Islamist Militants in Ethiopia (AIAI,

Date of attack	Place of attack	Target	Weapons used	Damages		
				Killed	Wounded	Property lost
1995	Jigjiga	Ogaden, Genet Africa and sunshine Hotels	Explosive	1	8	Extensive
2/2/1996	Dire Dawa	Dire Dawa Ras Hotel, Ethiopian Airline Ticket office, Post office, and Degatu Bridge	Explosive	1	3	> 1.8 Million Birr destroyed
20/06/1996	Dire Dawa	Railway-cargo train	Explosive	2	4	> 4, 830, 698.78 Birr
4/07/1996	On the way from Addis Ababa to Mekele	A bus (Plate No: 3-20361-AA)	Explosive	19	62	> 284, 647.67 Birr
8/7/1996	Addis Ababa (Premises of the Ministry of Communication)	Assassination attempt against Dr. Abdul Mejid Hussein	Explosive	2	2	-
5/8/1996	Addis Ababa	Wabi Shebelle Hotel	Explosive	2	5	> 1, 284, 647.67 Birr
18/1/1996	Addis Ababa	Ghion Hotel	3 Kg Explosive	9	5	>3, 436, 224.62 Birr
15/9/1996	Dire Dawa (a place known as Ruz Tera)	Foreigners	Explosive	1	0	
June 1996	Between Shensa and Herwa	Cargo train plate no.: 105	Explosive	1	2	> 4830.78 Birr
1998	Ogaden Zone	Red Cross Staff	Explosive	0	6	-
August 2002	Jigjiga	Aden Hotel	Explosive	0	0	Property damage
May 2006	Jigjiga	London Cafe, Family and Central Hotel	Explosive	0	0	Property Damage

Al-Shabab)

N.B.: Numerous other bomb attacks, not included in the above list, were carried out by AIAI in the Somali Regional State before 1998. (Source: (Woldeselase, 2010: 423-424)).

Appendix IV: Cross-border terrorist attacks by groups organized by Eritrea

Date of attack	Place of attack	Target	Weapons used	Damages		
				Killed	Wounded	Property lost
2007	Addis Ababa	Planned attack on buildings, transport, power stations, officials, to disrupt AU Summit	23 C-4 explosives, 66 detonator fuses, 4 international Mobile Tel.	Thwarted and perpetrators arrested		
14/11/2006	Humera, the Ayiga Hotel	Civilians	Explosive	0	0	Property damage of 100,000 Birr
14/11/2006	Humera, Semhal Hotel	Civilians	Explosive	0	0	UNMEE Satellite Dish destroyed
3/12/2006	Humera, Kebele 06 Ketena 3	Civilians	Explosive	0	0	Property damage of 15,500 Birr
19/12/2006	Humera, Kebele 06 Ketena 3	Civilians	Explosive	1	4	ISUZU truck destroyed; other damage > 20,000 Birr
13/12/2006	Humera, Kebele 01 Ketena 8	Civilians	Explosive	0	2	Car blown up while loading; other damage, 23,589 Birr
25/12/2006	Humera, Kebele 01 Ketena 4	Civilians	Explosive	0	0	Electricity transformer burnt down
Dec 2006	Dansha	Civilians	1 anti-vehicle; 1 anti-personnel mine	0	0	-
Dec 2006	Between Sherara and Humera	Civilians	1 anti-vehicle; 1 anti-personnel mine	2	4	-
Dec 2006	Between Humera and Adi Goshu	Civilians	1 anti-vehicle; 1 anti-personnel mine	0	4	ISUZU truck destroyed
14/12/2006	Between Humera and Adi Goshu	Civilians	1 anti-vehicle; 1 anti-personnel mine	0	0	1 truck destroyed
2006	Between Sherara and Humera	Civilians	1 anti-vehicle; 1 anti-personnel mine	0	11	2 trucks destroyed
25/12/2006	Between Sherara and Humera	Civilians	2 anti-vehicle; 1 anti-personnel mine	0	0	1 ISUZU truck destroyed
16/4/2007	Sheraro Shemblema	Civilians	1 anti-vehicle explosives	0	0	Attack foiled
30/12/06	Dansha	Civilians	2 anti-vehicle explosives	0	0	Attack foiled

13/07/2007	Humera	Civilians	4 anti-vehicle explosives	0	0	Attack foiled
20/07/2007	Humera town	Civilian	2 anti-vehicle explosives	0	0	Attack foiled
22/07/2007	Dansha		3 anti-vehicle explosives	0	0	Attack foiled
23/07/2007	Humera town	Civilians	4 anti-vehicle explosives	0	0	Attack foiled
26/6/2007	Tehatay, Adeyabo Aditeku	Civilians	4 anti-vehicle explosives	0	0	Attack foiled
Aug 2007	Sheraro	Civilians	2 explosives	0	0	2 houses destroyed
Feb 2000	Berket	Tractor	Explosive	0	0	Tractor destroyed
Feb 2008	Main Highway at Humera	Tractor	Explosive	0	0	1 car burnt
13/3/2008	Humera	Civilians	Explosive	8	16	A bus destroyed

(Source: (Woldeselase, 2010: 462-463)).

Appendix V: Excerpts from the Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Arms Embargo, Submitted to the United Nations Security Council (2006).

Sheikh Yusuf Inda 'Adde arrived in Asmara on or about 14 November 2005 from Saudi Arabia. Inda 'Adde went to Eritrea to obtain assurances that the Eritrean authorities would supply arms to the Al-Ithaad leadership in Mogadishu. Inda 'Adde returned to Somalia, arriving in Mogadishu on or about 21 November 2005.

Also, on or about 14 November 2005, officials from the Eritrean Foreign Office who were posing as business men arrived in Mogadishu. The team met with Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys. The same delegation also met with the spokesman of the members of the transitional Federal Institutions in Mogadishu, Colonel Ommar Hashi Adan, who briefed them on the situation in Somalia and thereafter appealed for extensive Eritrean support to match the continues assistance allegedly given to the TFG by Ethiopia. The Eritrean officials told Colonel Omar Hashi to put his request to the Eritrean representative in Mogadishu. The delegation expressed the purpose of using them as a platform to mobilize and support an anti-Ethiopian agenda, also directed at the Ethiopian opposition elements (insurgent groups).

The Eritrean envoy in Mogadishu is Elias Habte Selassie. As his ability to move freely around Mogadishu is limited, he operates through an informal local network of people, including a number of local assistants. The envoy's activities are dominated by dealings with dissident Ethiopian ethnic groups who are concentrated in Banaadir and the lower Shebelle regions. Accordingly, he has been instrumental in developing good cooperation between the militants and the dissident ethnic groups.

During the aforesaid periods, the Government of Eritrea provided at least four separate consignments of arms, ammunitions, and military equipment to the militant fundamentalists in Somalia, as follows;

Around 3 March 2006, an Aircraft with Registration No. E-B69 transported the following arms, ammunitions and military equipment directly from Asmara to Baledogle airport (Lower Shebelle region) of Somalia:

- (i) 200 boxes of Zu -23 ammunition (anti-aircraft);³⁶
- (ii) 200 boxes of B -10 ammunition (anti-tank);
- (iii) 200 boxes of DShk ammunition (anti-aircraft);
- (iv) 200 boxes of Browning M2.50 ammunitions (heavy machine guns), Ammunition for Zp - 39 (anti-aircraft);

³⁶ Zu -23s are much used by Somali militias as heavy machine -guns for ground attacks, mounted on the back of "technicals".

- (v) 50 Rocket-Propelled grandes (RPG) launchers and boxes of ammunitions (anti-tank);
- (vi) 50 light anti-Armour weapons;
- (vii) 50 M -79 grande launchers; and
- (viii) Communications equipment to be mounted on technicals.

The consignments were delivered by Elias Habte Selassie to Sheikh Abdi Salan Ali Ibrahim, a military commander of the militant fundamentalists; around 5 March 2006, an Aircraft arrived at Baldogle airport from Eritrea, containing the following arms, ammunitions and military equipment;

- (i) 1,000 AK -47 (short version)
- (ii) 1,000 pairs of binoculars;
- (iii) 1,000 remote control bombs;
- (iv) 1,000 anti-personnel mines;
- (v) Ammunitions for 120 mm Mortar;

Around 7 March 2006, and again around 14 March 2006; a dhow arrived from Eritrea at the port of El Ma'an, North of Mogadishu. The vessels contained ammunition for the militant fundamentalists.

Declaration

I, the undersigned, declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university and that all sources of material used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

Kedir Daro Arerro

June 2014

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate.

Prof. V.K. Padmanabhan (M.A, M.Phil, Ph.D.)

June 2014