



**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY**  
**COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**  
**SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES**  
**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL**  
**RELATIONS**

**THE BILATERAL DIPLOMATIC RELATION BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND KENYA**  
**SINCE 2018: CONTINUITIES AND CHALLENGES**

BY  
EDLAWIT YESHEWALUL AMSALU

ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

JUNE, 2024



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Advisor: Yonas Ashine (PhD)

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Addis Ababa University  
College of Social Science  
Department of Political Science and International Relations

The Bilateral Diplomatic Relation between Ethiopia and Kenya Since 2018: Continuities and Challenges

By:

Edlawit Yeshewalul Amsalu

This is to certify that the thesis prepared by **Edlawit Yeshewalul Amsalu**, entitled “**The Bilateral Diplomatic Relation between Ethiopia and Kenya since 2018: Continuities and Challenges**” submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master Arts in International Relations and Diplomacy complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.

**APPROVED BY BOARD OF EXAMINERS**

**Advisor** Yonas Ashine (PhD)      Signature\_\_\_\_\_      Date\_\_\_\_\_

**Internal Examiner** Bayuligne Z. (PhD)      Signature\_\_\_\_\_      Date\_\_\_\_\_

**External Examiner** Haileyesus M. (PhD)      Signature\_\_\_\_\_      Date\_\_\_\_\_

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## **List of Acronyms**

AAAS	American Association for the Advancement of Science
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Cooperation
BBIN	Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and South Africa
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC	East African Community
EALA	East African Legislative Assembly
EDU	Ethiopian Democratic Union
EFDR	Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic
EIC	Ethiopian Investment Commission
ENA	Ethiopian News Agency
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense Force
EPRDF	Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP	Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party
ESM	Ethiopian Student Movement
FANSPS	Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy

FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
GDP	Growth Domestic Product
HoAC	Horn of Africa Cooperation
HST	Hegemony Stability Theory
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
INSA	Information Network Security Administration
KBC	Kenya Commercial Bank
LAPSSET	Lamu Port South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogden National Liberation Front
OROMARA	Oromo-Amhara
PP	Prosperity Party
REC	Regional Economic Commission
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
TPLF	Tigray People’s Liberation Front
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom

USA	United States of America
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
VCDR	Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

## Abstract

*Bilateral diplomacy is an ancient sort of diplomacy. As the prefix 'Bi' indicates, bilateral diplomacy is a diplomatic relation between and among the two states. The bilateral diplomacy is significant since the core area of the relationship is for cooperation and mutual benefit. Ethiopia, the ancient state in the world has had bilateral diplomatic relations with the neighboring countries and beyond. The study attempted to examine Ethiopia and Kenya's bilateral diplomatic relations in the context of continuity and challenges, by anchoring historical relations and tracing internal and external dynamics based on both sides' desire to be the hegemon in the region, with a focus on the period since 2018. Thus, a qualitative research approach with an exploratory design was utilized in this study. Accordingly, the study adopted both primary and secondary sources and, evaluated, examined, and analyzed the sources used in the study. The study identified that the dual relationship between the two countries has had a cooperative and hegemonic rivalry nature since 2018 from both sides and as a result, there are opportunities and challenges regarding the cordial relations between the two countries. Therefore, it is recommended that hegemony is a means to an end. Since there is a sort of dual relation- Ethiopia's cooperative and hegemonic rivalry with Kenya, Ethiopia must aim to establish a balance of power and achieve regional hegemony by employing the English School notion of societal integration, structural realism-offensive and defensive thinking, and idealism-economic development. To challenge regional hegemony, Ethiopia must take pragmatic political, social, and economic measures toward its neighbors, particularly Somalia. Moreover, Ethiopia must acquire internal peace and security to pursue regional power and to have a balanced dual relationship with Kenya. **Key Words:** Bilateral Diplomacy, Hegemony, Rivalry, Cooperation, Since 2018, Opportunities, Challenges*

# CHAPTER ONE

## 1. Introduction to the Study

### 1.1 Background of the Study

The independent foreign states held relations through the aim of customary and benefit, known as bilateral diplomacy. This diplomatic practice is so ancient that the kingdoms and empires sent their representatives to other peer kingdoms and empires. Greece, Egypt, and China can be mentioned as an example. Diplomacy is, according to Rt. Hon Sir Ernest Satow (1964), 'is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the government of independent states extending sometimes also to their relations with vassal states; or, more briefly still, the conduct of business between states by peaceful means'.

The sign of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, led to the modern practice of diplomacy and became the base for the then-diplomatic enactment. According to the Vienna Convention Diplomatic Relation (VCDR), reciprocity is essential for countries to continue their diplomacy practice. Reciprocity shows the equal share of immunity, privilege, and benefit from the relations with the sovereign countries. At the heart of the bilateral relationship, there are four major elements, namely political, economic, public diplomacy, and consular diplomacy (Rana, 2018).

In the neighboring countries- Ethiopia and Kenya diplomatic relations count a long period consisting of political, historical, economic, and other cooperative relations. Among the typology of the bilateral relation, affinitive (concrete link of ethnicity, religion, and few conflicts of interest) and regional affinities (limb of near neighbors that develop new affinities), can be mentioned to show the two countries relation. Even though they shared some sort of differences in their historical background such as colonial history- while Ethiopia had never been colonized and Kenya was under a Britain colony; ideologically-Ethiopia adopted feudalism and then socialism, under the Emperor Haile Selassie I and Military Junta (Derg)<sup>1</sup> respectively; Kenya with the time of President

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<sup>1</sup> The word Derg derived from Ge'ez- the ancient language of Ethiopia. Its meaning is committee.

Kenyatta's administration and after his death used to have the same ideology- Mixed economy. Nevertheless, these differences have not held back the harmonized relationship between the two states. The cooperation between the two countries was extended through economic and political aspects when Ethiopia was under the rule of the Military Junta- in terms of economic stand, bilateral trade relations, which withal was asymmetrical because of the constraint of the Ethiopian market ideology at the time. On the other hand, the common goal to protect both Ethiopia's and Kenya's territory from Somalia's' claims, grants the dual political facet relation (Onyango, 1995).

The inter-societal relation is the other factor for the mutual relation of the countries. International relations are mostly shaped by culture and identity. It is because culture can be a means to dispute or an end to joint action (Mohammed, 2023). Mohammed further illustrated that:

*Culture and identity can also shape power dynamics in international relations with dominant cultures and identities creating imbalances of power and privilege. The importance of culture and identity in international relations is multifaceted, shaping interactions, priorities, and power dynamics between nations. They contribute to national interests and foreign policy priorities, impact negotiations, cooperation, and competition, and shape the development of international institutions and norms. (p,50)*

Based on the above demonstration- Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia, supplementary explanations can be provided. In consonance with Fekadu (2008-2009), there is a tribal connection between the three countries. These are Borana, Gabra, and Garri. These tribes were drawn from two prime autochthonous- Somali and Oromo. Fekadu also acknowledged the aversion from Garri who claimed themselves as a Somali at the time of the sixties and seventies.

The other important leading factor for the two countries' relation is the geopolitics- the location that Ethiopia and Kenya have in the Horn of Africa. Onyango (1995) further explained that, it is essential that the two countries are closer in their position to one another lead to co-operation, and also the Ethiopia and Kenya have claimed, Somalia as their common enemy, thus, geopolitical cooperation is important since Somalia assert their territory and endure support form Soviet Union.

Accompanied by the political feature mentioned above, geopolitics is the most important leading factor for the two sides' relationship. In the opinion of Onyango, and Fekadu it is essential that the two countries are closer in their position to one another leading to cooperation, and Ethiopia and Kenya have claimed, Somalia as their common enemy, thus, geopolitical cooperation is significant since Somalia asserts their territory and enduring support from the Soviet Union. Ethiopia and Kenya's cooperation towards the issue of Somalia is extended to another security level of experience. This eventuality led to a triple partnership by including Somalia. Ingredients such as securing above allude countries' borders from terrorism attacks distinctly from Al-Shabab. They had also established a united troop to sustain the peace and security of the city of Somalia from Al-Khaida (Mahad, 2015, p, 40).

In addition, Ethiopia's and Kenya's relation is based in the principle of 'Peaceful co-existence between states and from the goal to strengthen independence.' (Yagya, 1990). Yagya said that the ten years' treaty signed by the two countries in 1979 proved this principle. The treaty is all about 'friendship and co-operation as well as agreements on mutual defense'. Besides this treaty many other treaties between and among Ethiopian and Kenyan committees of border helped for peaceful border sharing. Furthermore, in 1977-1978, Kenya ceded Mombasa port for shipping of Ethiopia's cargo (ibid).

According to the Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic (EFDR) Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS) (2000), the essence of the relation of Ethiopia and Kenya is in Connection with mutual market opportunity- Ethiopia to have an access of port from Kenya and from the side of Kenya to acquirer of electric power. The document highlighted that divergence occurred in the usage of Omo River from Ethiopia that enters Lake Turkana in Kenya.

This study covers the bilateral diplomatic of Ethiopia and Kenya Since 2018- the period coming of new reformed government in Ethiopia, and the risks and opportunities the relationship has with the concept of regional power.

## 1.2 Statement of the Problem

As it is stated above, the two countries' diplomatic relations is extended through interchangeable political, economic, and social interests. The cooperation of Ethiopia and Kenya with regard to dual security relations traced back many decades. In 1960, when Somalia gained her independence, timer the country became a threat to both Ethiopia and Kenya, Somali- the ethnic, found both in Ethiopia and Kenya, on one hand by using the Western Somali Liberation Front in the Ogaden region, on the other hand, Northern Frontier District, respectively made insecurity for both Ethiopia and Kenya. Besides, the threat of terrorism leads the two counties co-operation (Henok, 2011).

Recently, histories in the Horn of Africa in general and in Ethiopia in particular have been changed. In 2018 the month of April, Abiy Ahemed, was chosen as the prime minister of Ethiopia. Following this, Ethiopia pursued a political and social transition, which had direct impact on the security, economy and the country's position in the region. Furthermore, the alteration was not in terms of a particular individual but also, the political party transition from Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) to Prosperity Party (PP) in 2020 (Mosley, 2018). This major convention led the change of political ideology from the revolutionary democracy which was based on the philosophy of democratic centralism to 'synergy' or '*Medmer*'<sup>2</sup>, with the three philosophical aspects: a vigorous democracy, strong economy and, vigorous economy, and intensified consolidation between a regional affair and ingenuousness towards the world (Senassa, 2021).

This internal political transition of Ethiopia implies the new rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia. This rapprochement of the two countries led to the establishment of a new regional bloc between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia, which can change the existing regional organization known as IGAD (Henneberg and Stapel, 2021). On the other hand, there is an intergovernmental organization that was established by Kenya and other member states called the East African

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<sup>2</sup> Medmer is an Amharic version for the word synergy

Community (EAC). Through this organization, Kenya is a major member of the organization, that posture to be presiding within it. The country aims to have more economic dominance, through signing the common currency among the member states (Rane, 2013).

In terms of economy, the two countries use energy and trade as a means of integration among Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia, a landlocked country is searching for more access to ports beside Djibouti. One of it found in Kenya- Lamu Port. Thus, the road construction had been conducted between the two countries. Besides the construction of roads at the bases of ports, road as sole variable has an impact on the bilateral relation between the two countries. They both are on the project of constructing road projects; such as a highway road that intersects Addis Ababa and Nairobi. Energy is also a means that the two countries made consent on leverage of power. The other variable is trade. Even though they both have an increased trade relationship, Kenya has better trade relations with EAC (Dawit, 2017). This variable, as a means led the countries to build mutual infrastructure for the service of ports after 1991 (Natnael, 2019).

Generally, the diplomatic relation between Ethiopia and Kenya is based on the share of reciprocal social, political, and economic interests. It mostly leans on mutual integrity and development. Thus, both states have benefited from these major diplomatic agreements in different ways. Similarly, they have faced vulgar intimidating remarks from the side of security and instability.

Despite the above-mentioned assertions- the bilateral relation between the two countries in terms of security and economy-border conflict, Somalia issue, and economic integration in the time of pre-2018, there is limited study to dedicate that has been conducted to investigate the diplomatic relations of Ethiopia and Kenya post-2018 through the lens of the concept hegemonic aspiration. Even though there are materials, which deal with each country's foreign policy and diplomatic relations, there are a few literatures existed that have been allocated for both countries. The bilateral diplomatic relation between the two countries since 2018 is an issues that requires a research to fill the scant literature gap along with untouched concept- hegemony or regional power, to contribute in expanding the body of knowledge on the dual relation of the two countries.

The hegemon spirit between the two countries within the region, and recent political, social, and economic dynamics within the region and the global, have created a continual opportunity and challenges for the bilateral diplomatic relation between the two countries. A balanced study of the dual relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya since 2018 associated with opportunities and challenges that deserve research and analysis, since diplomatic relations and policy remarks are interlinked. Thus, analyzing the concept of hegemony or regional power through diplomatic relations and the opportunities and challenges that come after should be dealt with. Also, the two countries' current political and economic engagement is expanding, and increasing strategic cooperation brought interlink and development and has its risks.

Subsequently, this research takes into account, assesses, compares, explore and contrasts the bilateral diplomatic relation of the countries- the research intended to analyze Ethiopia-Kenya bilateral relation since 2018 by focusing on the two countries' bilateral diplomacy relation and the hegemonic or regional power aspiration over the region by analyzing the influential dynamics (global multi-polarity, external intervention in the Horn, the third states factors mainly Somalia, etc.) which influence the countries bilateral diplomatic relation.

### **1.3 Central Argument**

The Horn and Eastern African countries' politics, economy and social interactions are intertwined. Among them Ethiopia and Kenya have the desire to be the hegemon within this region and beyond in the continent. Moreover, this aspiration requires to be shaped by the return of geopolitics, the politics of intervention into the Horn and the Somalia factor. Thus, the dual as well as the other dimensional diplomatic relations that the two countries have is based on this spirit.

### **1.4 Objective of the Study**

The overall objective of the study scrutinized the bilateral diplomatic relation of Ethiopia and Kenya in the context of continuity and challenges, by anchoring historical relations as well as

tracing internal and external dynamics based on the aim of being the hegemon on the region from both sides, in the particular reference of since 2018.

The specific objective includes the following:

- To analyze the implication of hegemony in international relations,
- To examine the hegemon rivalry between and among Ethiopia and Kenya; and the effect on their bilateral diplomatic relation,
- To assess the potential opportunities and the challenges through the countries' bilateral diplomatic relations to maintain the relation since 2018.

## **1.5 Research Questions**

Based upon the research problem and the aforementioned overall and specific objectives, the central question of the study is: How does the intention for being hegemon in the region offers challenge and set opportunities for the Ethiopia and Kenya bilateral diplomacy relations in the since 2018?

The study addressed the following specific research questions:

- What is the implication of hegemony in international relations?
- How the hegemony rivalry does affected the bilateral diplomatic relation between Ethiopia and Kenya?
- What are the potential opportunities and challenges through the countries bilateral diplomatic relation and how will the two countries maintain the cordial diplomatic relation since 2018?

## **1.6 Research Methodology and Methods of Data Collection**

### **1.6.1 Methodology of the Study**

This study employed a qualitative research approach to address the research problem since the approach is significant to collect a wide range of data from many sources, and an interpretive understanding of the issue under the study. The study adopted a socially constructive worldview. This worldview allowed the researcher to interpret perspectives; also, inductive way of

understanding this worldview, a researcher can construct meaning on the subject matter (John, 2007).

Exploratory is a design used in this research. Exploratory research can provide greater insight than confirmatory research through dialectical reasoning. The purpose of using an exploratory design is to: generate new ideas, gain knowledge of the subject, formulate the problem precisely, gather information to explain concepts, and assess the feasibility of the study (Ananya, 2019)

## **1.6.2 Sources and Methods of Data Collection**

### **1.6.2.1 Sources of Data**

This study collected both primary and secondary data. Primary data were collected from a member of Kenya Embassy consular staff in Ethiopia, and a senior diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia- which are both relevant institutions that deal with the priority of the bilateral diplomatic relations of Ethiopia and Kenya. Furthermore, an interview was held with the researcher at the African Affairs research directorate in the Institute of Foreign Affairs, which is mandated to oversee the affairs of Ethiopia and Kenya.

The primary data were endorsed by the secondary data. The meta-ethnography was utilized for the reason that the paper uses secondary data analysis. The documents utilized in this study focused on an appraisal based on careful analytical evaluation of reports, Ethiopia and Kenya government documents, publications, and research reports of various stakeholders on the bilateral diplomatic relations of Ethiopia and Kenya, the period since 2018, and the hegemonic rivalry.

### **1.6.2.2 Method of Data Collection**

To collect primary data from a member of the Kenya Embassy consular staff in Ethiopia, a senior diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, and a researcher at the African Affairs research directorate in the Institute of Foreign Affairs, organized checklists were employed. The checklists were prepared separately (for the Kenya Embassy consular staff in Ethiopia, and a senior diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia one checklist prepared and for a

researcher at the African Affairs research directorate in the Institute of Foreign Affairs another checklist prepared), which included open-ended questions with advance coding.

Secondary data were collected by reviewing relevant documents and analysis. There is a maneuver of published articles, books, book chapters, academic journals, digital library theses, and news (mainstream and social media platforms). These sources of data were collected to review and analyze the bilateral relations of Ethiopia and Kenya, the historical events that interlinked the two countries' relations, the period 2018, and the concept of hegemony in international relations and in the two countries relations, and the opportunities and challenges.

### **1.6.2.3 Method of Data Analysis**

Data from the primary source were acquired, evaluated, and interpreted. The document review and analysis results were also examined, summarized, and interpreted.

### **1.7 Ethical Consideration**

Ethical consideration is very crucial in the research project. Therefore, in this research, the researcher consisted of necessary research ethics and principles through proper acknowledgment of sources and information conducted in the research.

### **1.8 Scope of the Study**

The nucleus of this study is to scrutinize the cause and effect of hegemony in the bilateral diplomatic relations of Ethiopia and Kenya. The study spans the post-2018 relationship of Ethiopia and Kenya since there is contemporary development, both internally and externally between the two countries.

### **1.9 Significance of the Study**

For anyone interested in pursuing and understanding the Ethiopia and Kenya bilateral diplomatic relations, this study has its significance. As mentioned, this study, which focuses on the 2018 diplomatic relations of the two countries, assessed the hegemonic spirit implication on the dual relations is among the rare studies found in this area.

Therefore, the study would contribute to the establishment of foreign policy and academic debate. Also, the study would help endeavors to further study by providing the scant literature binding together.

### **1.10 Limitations of the Study**

The study of the bilateral diplomatic relations of Ethiopia and Kenya, opportunities and challenges, and the concept of hegemony requires to grasp of significant data and data analysis from relevant stakeholders. However, this study encountered difficulties such as limited materials- lack of previous studies related to the dual relation of the two countries and with the period after 2018, and also related to the concept of hegemony and opportunities and challenges. Besides, the absence of cooperation, the longest bureaucratic process, and the precariousness of the institutions to accept interviews was another challenge- although the author with a lot of effort conducted an interview.

### **1.11 Organization of the Study**

The study is organized into four chapters. The first chapter offers a general background to the problem this research examines. Specifically, it sets out the research problem, objectives, questions, and the core argument that escorts the study, in addition, to methodology, source of data collection, method of data collection, and method of data analysis.

The second chapter provides a literature review, and conceptual and theoretical framework for the study of diplomacy. In this chapter, the researcher provided an intense literature review; and outlined the two countries' diplomatic relations by providing the historical background in terms of foreign policy through different administrative periods, and areas of cooperation. In addition, the nexus of theories of international relations and hegemony is visible in this chapter to show how the spirit of hegemony impacts the dual relationship between the two countries. The conceptual framework illustrated the intersection of bilateral diplomacy and hegemony and the opportunities and challenges.

The third chapter deals with the cooperation and hegemony rivalry of Ethiopia and Kenya. The last chapter analyzes the opportunities and challenges as an output from the cordial relation of Ethiopia and Kenya since 2018. At last, there is a brief conclusion.

## CHAPTER TWO

### 2. Literature Review, Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

#### 2.1 Understanding the Concept of Diplomacy

The term Diplomacy is widely recognized across the globe, utilized by individuals ranging from scholars and journalists to everyday people to signify peaceful negotiations in various circumstances. Despite its widespread use, it is essential to inquire into its meaning, origins, function, and purpose. To begin with, the word diplomacy is well described in a dictionary of diplomacy as:

*The conduct of relations between sovereign states through the medium of officials based at home or abroad, the latter being either members of their state's diplomatic service or temporary diplomats* (Berridge and James, 2003, p 69-70).

Although sovereign states also appoint diplomats to global organizations, the conventional practice of diplomatic missions over the past five centuries has been to send diplomatic representatives to foreign countries.

Before the birth of Christ, diplomatic activities took place in the ancient Near East through the development of written civilization and modern culture. Diplomacy at that time was the same as diplomacy today. At this time, the “Great King” used diplomacy and representatives with other kingdoms for reconciliation. Similar diplomatic practices were used in ancient Near Eastern civilizations such as Akkadian Mesopotamia, Assyria and Babylon, Achaemenid Persia, Greece, and Italy. Ancient Near Eastern civilizations were also known to send military attaches to other great kings for limited periods. However, there is no evidence that they were exempted from permission to envoy as they are now (Bjola and Kornprobst, 2018,).

Diplomacy originally originated from the Greek city-state. In 432 B.C., the Spartan Council received a message from the messenger and his Patron Hermes. The international sovereign state received the word ‘diplomat’ from the Greek. The word ‘diplomat’ was derived from the Greek

word διπλασιάζω *diplasiazo*, meaning “I Double”. They carry messages from the prince known as diplomas, which are official documents. In the Byzantine Empire, on the other hand, the Romans conducted their diplomatic affairs according to the concept of *ius naturale* – natural law; also known as Byzantine diplomacy. Over time, the advent of profession and art in Rome, and the practice of diplomacy evolved from demagogues sort to instructed commentators (Nicolson, 1942).

During the European Revolutions, countries employed diplomats to resolve inter-state relations rather than simply administer diplomas. Diplomats participate practically and intelligently in the management of public affairs. The role of diplomats in managing the country’s public affairs continued until the 1780s. These are the period of recognition of the official status of the diplomat, the period of recognition of the status of other countries of the diplomat, and the period of exemption. This can be explained in more detail as follows:

*Being derived from the study of treaties, ‘diplomatic’ was strongly connected to issues of alliance, war, and peace (as these were the issues typically covered by treaties), and to the secrecy with which these treaties were most often associated. Furthermore, by its connection with diploma, the term also had a strong affinity with privilege. This affinity was made even stronger by the usage of ‘diplomatic corps’ to designate the collective of ministers, a collective which was increasingly claiming (and being accorded) several privileges and which was largely constituted by the nobility, the foremost carriers of privilege (Leira, 2016, p, 32).*

To emphasize this portion of view- diplomacy is an ancient practice, it is important to mention Rt. Hon. Sir Ernest Satow (1964). In his book ‘A Guide to Diplomatic Practice’, he listed out those diplomats who served their country before the word ‘diplomat’ even existed. According to Sir Ernest Satow, Machiavelli who served from 1469 to 1527, was one of the most famous diplomats of his time. D’Ossar 1536-1604, Kaunitz 1710-1794, Metternich 1773-1859, Pozzo di Borgo 1764-1842, the first Lord Malmesbury 1764-1820, Talleyrand 1754-1838, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe 1786-1880, were respectively listed on the book. In addition, according to the author, there were diplomats such as Count Cavour 1810-1861, and Prince Bismarck 1815-1898, who performed a dual function- they were political leaders and diplomats at the same time.

As mentioned above, the word diplomacy is abused in many ways. Nicholson (1942) builds his argument by pointing out several key points to show how the word diplomacy has been misused. He first explained that diplomacy and foreign policy are used interchangeably, and in other cases are used to refer to that end in negotiation. As Nicholson argues here, diplomacy is a tool for conducting negotiations, not a response to negotiations. He also said that diplomacy has two uses. That is. It defines professions and professionals. For instance, you may hear people say, “I work in diplomacy”, which is incorrect. Nicholson’s argument is based on the catastrophe at the limb of politics that is revealed by such confusion.

Berridge (2010) explained that among the elements of power, diplomacy is the crucial one. Diplomacy is used to promote a country’s national interests without coercion, regulation, or agitprop. Preferably, diplomacy represents a formula means of communication between representatives or the application of a strategy.

Communication is part of diplomacy. Diplomatic communication takes place through well-established organizations. It can be used either to make peace through mediation, or it can be used to wage war. That is why the institution is more important. Actors with double recognition support communication. These representatives are the states and their ambassadors (Bjola and Kornprobst, 2018). Those actors are recognized in the UN Charter and Vienna Convention (2005). Diplomacy is also about:

*Producing, managing, and distributing public goods, that is, goods that are important for the well-being of a community and where the use by some members of the community does not reduce the availability of the public good to others. Traditionally, diplomacy has been primarily about engaging in communication to achieve a particular type of public good: the protection of the state against external interventions i.e. security (p 6-7).*

The purpose of diplomacy is “to preserve peace by preventing conflicts”. In the era of globalization, diplomatic practices are also changing. This is because the goal is to eliminate territorial boundaries between countries in social and economic terms. (Abdurahmanli, 2021).

Among the types of diplomacy such as mediating, multilateral, public, and so on dual or bilateral diplomacy is the major one. Bilateral diplomacy held between the countries, who established consulates or embassies to enhance the relation (Ibid). The chores of diplomacy are ceremonial (protocol, representation, and visits), management (day-to-day problems, promotion of interest such as political economic, and military tourism, explanation and defense of policy, strengthening bilateral relations, bilateral coordination, multilateral cooperation), information and communication (assessment and reporting, monitoring), international negotiation, duty of protection, contribution of international order (normative, rulemaking, mediation/ pacific settlement).<sup>3</sup>

Diplomacy is a very broad activity that uses the state as a major actor. However, the actors of the practice have changed accompanied by the evolution of the world system. National Geographic Society (2023) asserts that diplomacy is:

*The art and science of maintaining peaceful relationships between nations, groups, or individuals. Often, diplomacy refers to representatives of different groups discussing such issues as conflict, trade, the environment, technology, or security (n.p).*

From the National Geography Society's expression of view, let's borrow two words that are used to show what diplomacy is- art and science. The argument over the question of whether ‘diplomacy is an art or a science?’ is the basic in the academy. James (2009) affirms his point of view by explaining the interlace of art with culture. Art is the outcome of culture- culture is innovative, cognitive, defined by as a work of art, and a way of presenting a particular society. This makes cultures different in different parts of the world. As a consequence, countries will have diverse cultures that communicate, treat, appreciate, recognize, and accept other cultures that are not

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<sup>3</sup> Barston (2013)

identical. James raised issues of soft power and diplomatic skills. He argued that soft power is based on three understructures- “on the state’s culture, political value, and foreign policy”. He further clarified that:

*Soft power is a conscious effort to make one’s culture attractive to another to provide the chance (because there is always a chance that the other will not like it or flat out reject it as not compatible) of understanding, cooperation, or negotiation. Soft power involves negotiation (p, 12-27).*

This contrasts the concept of soft power and hard power. Hard power refers to military power within politics as is essentially war-making. The tools that implement art in diplomacy are cultural, public diplomacy, and globalization. European cultural diplomacy began in 1923. This was used as a mechanism to spread European culture almost throughout the world through the creation of cultural institutions. On the other hand, public diplomacy promoted the use of soft power through consulates and embassies. Globalization also inculcates the former two in a great path. Thus, for James diplomacy declivities toward an art than a science; he said

*The art is somewhat programmable; however, government have become aware of an inability to easily mold arts to fit their needs. It is as if they were trying to use a screwdriver as a hammer, although they are savvy to the idea that there are situations where it is neither an appropriate nor an effective tool. (Ibid)*

Those who recognized diplomacy as a science set a diplomatic execution since diplomacy. According to Guha (2018,p 1-2), soft power is a “traditional element of diplomacy”, and he argued that there is a new perspective on diplomacy besides the soft power that goes beyond the remunerative and cultural gain, and that is science diplomacy. Science diplomacy is not a phenomenon of this century. The Byzantine Empire was most well-known for its science and technological diplomacy. At the time, the emperor used science as a tool to maintain stable international relations and planned a program to visit Magnaur Palace. In the medieval period, the Jesuit Missionaries were also known for science diplomacy. Science and scientific research were appliances for the Missionaries to track diplomacy with other states - this is recorded as the first execution of science diplomacy. In London, there were fellows named at another time as Foreign Secretary of the Royal Society before World War II. Their function was to have detailed and recent information on the innovations in science and technology. Nowadays there is an American

Association for the Advancement Science (AAAS). In addition, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), can be raised as instances of science diplomacy. Guha referring to the former US Secretary of State's Science and Technology Adviser-Dr. Nina defined science diplomacy as: 'Science diplomacy is the use of scientific interaction among nations to address the common problems facing humanity and to build a constructive, knowledge-based international partnership.'

The issues that need to be considered in science diplomacy have been sorted out recently: Glickman, Turekian, et al, 2017). i), measures aimed directly at meeting the national needs of the country; ii), measures aimed at meeting interests that transcend national borders; iii), measures primarily aimed at meeting global needs and challenges.

For others, diplomacy is the combination of crucial components which are science, art, and statecraft. <sup>4</sup> Humans' inability to be self-sufficient prompted cooperation. Diplomacy, as a broader kind of cooperation, has a long history of influencing the formation of the governmental system in different parts of the world. Greater empires maintain their authority through diplomatic relations; yet, the presence of war means the absence of diplomacy. Diplomacy has not been abandoned by the current world order; rather, it has advanced in terms of level, actors, and system of conducting diplomacy. The notion and practice of diplomacy serve as the foundation for this subject. The bordering countries on the African continent-Ethiopia and Kenya is examined, as well as their bilateral diplomatic relation is discussed.

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<sup>4</sup>According to Fatima (2016), science is the process of inspection which goes with analysis and examination of advantage and disadvantage of a given matter. Diplomacy can use the process of science through the foreign policy to allocate resource, analyze, decision making, to provide thesis and synthesis. On the other hand Fatima observed that, diplomacy is an art. 'The art of Diplomacy', plays a huge role in the bilateral diplomatic relations. On the contrary, to secure the national interest of state, it is very significant to secure art in diplomatic practice. By the state craft, Fatima argued, in the era of technology and promulgation. Thus, the statecraft

### **2.1.1 The Pursuit of Bilateral Diplomacy**

Among the classifications of diplomacy, bilateral diplomacy is one of the most customary diplomatic practices. The Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) provided clear guidelines for the continuation of bilateral diplomacy (Rana, 2020). Chapman (1998) asserted that in 1815 a treaty was signed between five of the Great Powers (Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia) to ensure the balance of power. Furthermore, he said:

*The idea of a 'just equilibrium' was one to which all five great powers subscribed by the end of the Vienna Congress but with different degrees of support. The balance of power was not to be simply a territorial arrangement; it was, more importantly, a strategic and military balance (p, 16-19).*

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which consists fifty three articles, which the state approved on 18, April 1961, under the essence of the UN which deals with the 'Sovereign equality of States, the maintenance of international peace and security, and the promotion of friendly relations among nations.' The convention also believed that securing resilience and entitlement in the diplomacy practice would enhance the optimistic relation between states despite their differences (UN, Treaty Series, 2005). Bilateral diplomacy has typologies based on the state's most important considerations including cooperative, affinitive, fragile and unbalanced, wary, sometimes hostile, deeply adversarial, work in progress, regional affinities and low engagement (Rana, 2018).

### **2.1.2 The Bilateral Diplomatic Relation between Ethiopia and Kenya**

The two countries' bilateral relations have begun since Kenya gained its independence in 1963. Winrose (2022) explained that diplomatic ties between Ethiopia and Kenya were established long ago when Ethiopia established a consulate there. While Ethiopia maintained cordial ties with the British colonial government, it provided substantial backing to the Kenyan Mau Mau rebellion, which opposed British colonial control. Kenya opened its consulate in Addis Ababa and Emperor Haile Selassie made a state visit to Kenya following Kenya's independence, indicating an improvement in relations.

*Figure 1- Image of Mzee Jomo Kenyatta and Emperor Haile Selassie I*



*Image taken from an online article by Mildred Europa Taylor (2021) under the title of ‘Emperor Haile Selassie’s Gift that Left Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta Fuming’ with the publication of The Habesha Media.*

The bilateral relation of the two countries were under the principle of cooperation during the era of Haile Selassie. In addition Winrose (2022), stated that Kenya and Ethiopia's relations at the time included the 1964 signing of a military pact, the removal of the visa requirement, and the drawing of their shared border. Together with establishing a trans-border committee and holding several meetings, Kenya and Ethiopia were able to reach an agreement on how to share resources. Ethiopia gave Kenya permission to use Omo River at this point. He also pinned, the desire for Kenya-Somalia to accept the state of Somalia in 1963 had an impact on Kenya's previous foreign policy. Different ethnic groups will want to try to split from Kenya if it does not protect its geographical integrity. Ethiopia was likewise affected by this. When Ethiopian and Djiboutian territory is joined

along with Kenya, Somalia's goal of uniting her lost area into a single Greater Somalia will be realized. The former's assertiveness in adhering to the Organization of African Union (OAU) on territorial integrity led to Kenya and Ethiopia signing a Defense Pact in 1964.

On the contrary, in light of ideological differences, the security factor was a major influence in shaping Ethiopia and Kenya's convenient relationship during the Cold War era, particularly from 1974 to 1991. The political landscape of Ethiopia and Kenya, particularly concerning their national status and territorial integrity, was in danger due to shifting political conditions at the national, regional, continental, and beyond continental levels brought on by the unstable post-Cold War political environment and the rise of Somali advocacy (Nigusu and Ketebo, 2022). The authors also said that the lack of Somalia's militarism and advocacy meant that security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya would be amicable under Haile Selassie I's rule and unpleasant and antagonistic under Colonel Mengistu. However, the two adjacent Horn countries were able to coordinate their policies throughout the Cold War era due to their shared threat from Somalia.

Furthermore, another factor influencing Ethiopia and Kenya's relationship is "Boundary Diplomacy." Ethiopia's Emperor Haile Selassie I and Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, conversed about the extremely complex region known as Gadaduma and Goduma. Both leaders arrived at a decision in 1970 by drawing a boundary. In exchange for Kenya receiving the Goduma wall, the disputed Gadaduma little land belt was given to Ethiopia under the terms of the 1970 Ethiopia-Kenya border agreement (Ibid, 790). Besides, Nigusu and Ketebo (2022) elaborated that, the pastoral communities of both countries agreed to use water to cross frontier lines for their cattle during the peaceful division of the border between the Gadaduma and Goduma strip of land, but not for pasture. The peaceful and cooperative approach to resolving the boundary dispute between the two states had aided in the development of the cordial political, economic, and social ties between the governments and peoples of the two countries. This cooperative method was unaffected by political theory differences even during the Cold War. While there has been a constant presence of peaceful boundary diplomacy, it is important to note that there have been some undeniable complications surrounding the frontier areas between Ethiopia and Kenya. These complications have primarily resulted from both sides' incompetent implementation of the articles

in the 1970 Frontier Accord. On the other hand, it is also clear that Kenya and Ethiopia have overcome the challenges posed by the colonial boundary, resolved their frontier issues peacefully, and carried out the majority of the settlements outlined in the boundary accord.<sup>5</sup>

All things considered, the main features of Ethiopia and Kenya's dual relationship during the time of Haile Selassie I and the Derg Regime (Military Junta Committee), were mutual leaders' understanding, Somalia as a shared enemy, and political-economic, border, and societal cooperation.

Ethiopia's and Kenya's diplomatic relations are based on appreciation and cooperation.<sup>6</sup> Meles (2014) in his findings sorted out the areas of the bilateral diplomacy between Ethiopia and Kenya. The very reason to endorse this work after even a long period, along with few references is that the situations are more or less similar and it is important to take the reference which deals with the variable intensely:<sup>7</sup>

**A. Doctrine(s) in Ethiopia and Kenya Sovereignty-** the demarcation of the territory in Africa is settled by the colonial powers. Therefore, Ethiopia and Kenya face similar obstacles to the rest of the African countries. The challenge that the two countries faced derived from Somalia-Somalia claimed territorial lands both from Ethiopia and Kenya. For instance, the former colonial power of Kenya was Britain. At the time Kenya gained her dependence in 1963 the Northern Frontier District was not marked distinctly. From 1897-1981 the Ethiopian and Somalia border were demarcated after lots of process. However, it did not settle the border conflict between the two countries. Somalia's desire is not about the fixation of the land of Ogaden but, it is demanding to approve the "people of the Ogaden to self-determination, and of recovering land, which Somalia claims, that it "lost" because of the 19<sup>th</sup> century treaties

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<sup>5</sup> Due to the ongoing cross-border attacks, the Ethiopian and Kenyan governments organized a summit that took place in Tika, Kenya, on August 7–11, 1975. The representatives of rival tribal leaders from both nations were invited to this summit in order to work out their differences. The Ethiopian-Kenyan joint frontier security commission also decided during the Tika conference to initiate radio communication between the two countries' police forces along the border in an effort to stop the customary cross-border raids (Ibid).

<sup>6</sup> Aklilu Kebede, 2014- Amharic versio- 'YeEthiopia Yewuchi Genegnunet Ketent Eskezare'

<sup>7</sup> Meles Alem, 2014, 'A Comparative Assessment of Ethio-Kenya Diplomatic and Foreign Policy: 1991-2012'

that Ethiopia signed with the various European colonial powers.”<sup>8</sup> The same is true for Kenya as well.

#### **B. Absence of Peace and Security in Somalia and Its Consequences on Ethiopia and Kenya:**

both in the exterior and interior of the two countries. Meles(2014) said that the Ethiopian government at the time gave protection to the citizens, unlike Kenya’s government. Ethiopia after Abiy Ahmed took the leading role in 2018 “the tripartite alliance” was made between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. The goal was to create a locally based political system within the region. It is believed that the three of the leaders have the same leadership behaviors- “opposed to federalism, the accommodation of ethno-national diversity and institutionalized governance. Instead, they prefer a centralized state under the command of strongman who rules by fiat.” (Goitom, 2021, n.p). Kenya was suspicious of this alliance and made an unofficial disagreement with Ethiopia.<sup>9</sup>

#### **C. The Spread of Illegal Weapons and Immigration**

**D. Terrorism-** the absence of peace, stability, and security in the land of Somalia gave birth to the terrorist group called Al-Shabaab. The group is a threat to both Ethiopia and Kenya, special since the time Somalia's instability led to illegal armed contraband, terrorists attack inside the countries’ territory, and maritime piracy. (Ibid, P, 59). I February 2023, the newly elected Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud called for the assembly in Mogadishu with three of “brotherly neighboring countries” as Aljazeera reported. The assembly is that the capital city of Somalia is about to mobilize the three countries to fight against Al-Shabab.

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Besides the above-mentioned variables of bilateral relations, Ethiopia and Kenya engaged in economic development areas such as port access, hydro energy, telecommunication, and banks. Both Ethiopia and Kenya also work to pursue regional power.

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<sup>8</sup> Daniel Kendie, 2007, ‘Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute’ (p,13)

<sup>9</sup>Roba D Sharamo and Selam Tadesse Demissie, 2021, ‘Reconfiguring Alliance in the Horn of Africa’ (p.9)

<sup>10</sup> Goitom Gebreluel, 2021, ‘The Tripartite Alliance Destablising the Horn of Africa, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/2/1/somalia-hosts-regional-summit-to-discuss-fight-against-al-shabaab>,

## 2.2 Foreign Policy

As long as a human being is not sufficient, there will always be an interaction of humankind in a particular territory and abroad. Thus, cogent decision-making is required in one and the other situations. “black-boxing” or “billiard ball model”, is applied in international relations- the collective or separate decision-making parallel to the state and/or national interest.<sup>11</sup> The foreign policy analysis theories are authenticated to define the cumulative and discrete foreign policy decision-making, thus, catalogs are made to show the role of foreign policy analysis.<sup>12</sup>

The foreign policy and diplomacy of Africa were enhanced and consolidated during the Middle Ages-the Renaissance in Europe to Africa, Christianity and Islamization of Africa, Colonization, and Pan-Africanism were the major factors in Middle Age of African foreign policy and diplomacy (Don Nanjira, 2010).

## 2.3 Ethiopian Foreign Policy

Ethiopia is one of the ancient countries in the world, and it also engages in foreign relations. This specific research work focuses on the recent internal political transitional period in Ethiopia in 2018. As a result, foreign policy is examined from the previous administration to the transitional period.

### 2.3.1 Frameworks of the Ethiopian Foreign Policy from 1991-2018

The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Tedros Adhanom (2015), had contemplated Ethiopia’s priorities in foreign relations concerning regional

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<sup>11</sup> V. M. Hudson, (2014), ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory’ (p,3-4)

<sup>12</sup> Explanandum is one of the catalogue. According to Hudson it is expected to be explained in the foreign policy analysis. When foreign policy decisions are made, they must correspond with the outcome of the state at various levels. This decision-making demands measure, passivity, and ambivalence. The other catalogue of foreign policy analysis is explanans. This catalogue is required to rend explanation in foreign policy analysis. Both the verdict of FPA and the decree are governed by explanans of FPA. There is some opposition to this assumption. The verdicts argued that there is a lack of information on foreign relations and that makes it difficult to make a decision. However other authentication of FPA like multifactorial/multilevel, multi-/interdisciplinary, integrative, agent-oriented, and actor-specific, the problems can be solved.

stability, unity, and development. He said that after the EPRDF government took power in 1991, the government changed its focus area to the country's internal fragility and problems, political and economic. By referring to the document of FANSPS, he had picked out crucial threats to the country's survival that the document has recognized which are the growth of population within the backward economic performance and anguished poverty rate. Furthermore, it acknowledges the desire for democracy and good governance throughout the country.

Negara (2018), highlighted that the transformation of foreign policy perspective and intention is visible under the EPRDF regime, though, internal and external factors are remained as the priorities of the foreign policy concern. These two priorities are the foundation of the foreign policy of Ethiopia under the rule of EPRDF. When Negara explained the internal variables of the foreign policy priorities under the EPRDF including factors like economic backwardness and poverty (by admitting backwardness and poverty of the country and giving priority to counteract to those states threats inferred the switch of foreign policy procedure from outside-in to inside-out. Economic diplomacy is the pillar strategy to achieve this particular policy priority.

The other internal affairs issue that influenced foreign policy is the nature of the domestic political system. While Tedros Adhanom showed this issue as the desire for good governance, Negara elaborated that the domestic political system includes the truancy of democracy and also good governance that determines the foreign policy decision-making and orientation of the country. On the other hand, Negara tangled the external factors for foreign policy properties under the government of EPRDF. External factors consist of political issues in Africa in general and in the Horn of Africa in particular, as well as the global political system.

Despite, labeling the neighboring countries as enemies of the country, the regime took external variables as political and economic situations that are employed as the prime concern. External Ethiopian foreign policy contains regional and sub-regional factors (the country has shared boundaries and trans-boundary resources; besides the country is a landlocked country, and the changing political dynamics of the Horn of Africa and more). The foreign policy on these core

external determinants put political dynamism in the Horn of Africa as the major determinant factor. The other issue is global factors. The global political fluctuation and contemporary international events such as terrorism, environment, and the emergence of other powers from Asia and elsewhere, the country had redefined its foreign policy (Ibid).

### **2.3.2 Implications and Determinants of Ethiopia's Foreign Policy Priorities: 1991-2018**

Depending upon the above priorities of Ethiopia's foreign policy, the implications can be seen from each side of the priorities. For this purpose, it is important to employ Negera's (2018) division of foreign policy priorities into internal and external in broad with bases of enhancing economic development and good governance. Tedros Adhanom (2015) has proclaimed that the implications to the internal priorities, for the sake of economic transformation, the country ameliorated the production and competitiveness of the agricultural sector and also improved the industrial sector by adding value to the exported items. In terms of good governance, Ethiopia by recognizing the diverse nature of the country from the side of ethnicity, religion, and other, the government has formulated a constitutional and institutional system.

From the side of external determinants, Tedros explained that the country has a shared vision and action for development and peace with the rest of the sub-region. Relations with the neighboring countries are vital for economic and regional unity. Therefore, the country has developed infrastructural-based relations; for instance, road construction with Djibouti, Sudan, South Sudan, and Kenya to take the people-to-people relation, and trade to a high level. The issue of the Great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, as a means of ensuring development, and also the utilization of one of the trans-boundary resources of the Nile River with the principle of equitable water sharing, Tedros said that it will also benefit the downstream countries. He added that the amalgamation between and among Ethiopia and sub-regional will provide the integration of the continent and this will help to bring African unity, prosperity, and peace by 2063.

Tedros Adhanom has shown that the four sub-regional security of, Ethiopia took measures by deploying troops to Darfur, Abyei, and also in Somalia, along with African Union and IGAD. Particularly in the fight against terrorism, Ethiopia took a magnificent measure against the terror group known as al-Shabaab in the sub-region, and ISIS, at the international level.

Ethiopia dares to go after a green economy strategy that aims to achieve a carbon-neutral economy by 2030. This is through appropriate and wise accumulation of natural resources that helps for sustainable and comprehensive development. Thus according to the statement of Tedros, the country has succeeded in energy development from renewable resources. Ethiopia has also in 2015, submitted to INDC, to agree with the Climate Summit in Paris. Concerning the emerging power, Ethiopia has strengthened its relations with the South and South-South Cooperation. While the country is focused on this power, it doesn't mean that the country has neglected its relationship with the other former powerful partner. Even though this plan was aimed in the pre-reform government of Ethiopia, achieving green based economy is still essential with the reformed government. The Ethiopia and Kenya government in particular and in cooperation are working for the achievement of green economy (carbon- neutral) and are supported in the world system.

In particular, the exceptional Ethiopia's foreign policy towards Eritrea, Sudan, and Egypt must be explained because it has unique features. This is concerning the country's foreign priorities. This is because according to the FANSPS document, it says that the foreign policy of the Eritrea is mostly affected by various emotions including:

*On the one hand, there are those who have not accepted the independence of Eritrea, and they see this from the "port access" point of view. There are those who have difficulty to control their feelings, insisting that we were one people and remain one people. Many cannot differentiate between the Eritrean people and the regime and, starting from the wounds of war, they call for a permanent estrangement between the two countries. All of them exaggerate Eritrea's value to our economic and political development. When viewed dispassionately, and in the context of our development and democracy priority, the reality begins to change (2002, p, 33-34).*

Berouk Mesfin (2012), has shown that both Ethiopia and Eritrea had a common agreement on the international relation, to ‘cooperate closely on all matters relating to international relation and to work towards adopting common strategies and common policies on important regional and international political and security issues to achieve a common objective.’ Also, concerning to peace and security they had consent on security affairs “They shall refrain from engaging in any act that threatens the peace and security of either party, including propaganda and any other subversive actives. Furthermore, they shall not allow or harbor within their territories hostile elements or groups engaged in destabilizing the peace and security of either country” (p, 96).

Contrarily, the FANSPS (2002,) document sees both Sudan and Egypt as core states for development. The former is needed for port access, to build sustainable peace and security. Thus, Ethiopia demands integration with Sudan on the base of peace and democracy. Regarding the Nile, Ethiopia sees the support of Sudan for the fair and equitable use of Nile water as a fundamental advantage. Nile River equitably and fairly, and development but also it is concerned about democracy. As is stated the priority of Ethiopia’s foreign policy are building democracy and development. Thus, consisting democracy with foreign relations of Egypt did not go beyond the country’s priority set. In addition, the FANSPS took Kenya as an important neighbor for economic benefit for both countries through diplomacy. Kenya is a collider between Ethiopia East Africa and South Africa. Besides, Kenya can utilize a sufficient amount of electric power from Ethiopia; and both countries can enhance Omo River and Lake Turkana for different purposes. The policy direction of Ethiopia towards Kenya mainly, according to FANSPS based on the national interest was “development and security”- remaining the stability, keeping the peace and security for the economic development.

After the 2018 transition of government in Ethiopia- the foreign policy document is reformed. According to the draft reformed Ethiopian foreign policy, the principles are: principle based nations and citizens’ relation and cooperation; trustworthy and mutual benefited relation with the neighboring countries and the entire African countries; the now and then correlation with the neighboring countries bases on estimation and sovereignty integrity; creating tranquility and association between and among nations; if instability and dispute occurred Ethiopia will take

neutral position and assist to settle the dispute between the parties through law and order; Ethiopia obey the international, regional and sub-regional treaties and agreements she signed; when there is contrasting situation which are significant problem for all sovereign nation peace and security and stability, Ethiopia oppose the action by one's own effort and through partnership; based on international, regional and sub-regional consensus, Ethiopia will take measures to maintain the national interest and feasible welfare.<sup>13</sup> Unlike the previous foreign policy document of Ethiopia, this document does not list either countries or intentional organizations. In particular, Ethiopia's sub-regional relation with her neighboring countries hinges on the hereinafter essences such as image building, citizens issues, economic interconnection, political matters in question and international arena, port service/issue, adequate relations with neighboring countries, joint development of the cross-border natural resources, conforming substantial peace and security in the region, utilizing cross-border resources and immense lakes for reciprocated development, and area of cosmic lakes.<sup>14</sup>

## **2.4 Determinants of the Foreign Policy of Kenya**

The then, Republic of Kenya Foreign Policy Framework by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reformed in 2014. After Kenya gained her independence in 1963 the first foreign policy was published. The 2009 Kenya's Foreign Policy Framework document which was inaugurated under former President Mwai Kibaki is identical to the foreign policy of Kenya in 2014 by the period of President Uhuru Kenyatta. The document consists of four chapters; the first chapter is about the policy context, and the second illustrates the basics of Kenya's foreign policy, philosophy, etc. The pillars of the policy and instruments of implementation are mentioned in the document.

The economy is the fundamental foreign policy of Kenya along with other pillars. The objectives of Kenya's foreign policy according to the document are to protect Kenya's sovereignty and territorial integrity; a), promote sub-regional and regional integration and cooperation; b), Enhance regional peace and stability; c), advance the economic prosperity of Kenya and her people; d), Project Kenya's image and prestige; e), promote international

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<sup>13</sup> Reformed EPRDF Foreign Policy, 2018, (p, 8)- Amharic version

<sup>14</sup> Ibid,

cooperation and multilateralism; f), promote and protect the interest of Kenyans abroad; and g), enhance partnership with the African Diaspora and descendants;

These pin points of the foreign policy of Kenya are directly quoted from The Republic of Kenya Foreign Policy, (2014, p,9-19).

Amina Mohamed (2016), contends that there are master plans to ensure economic development through economic diplomacy- foreign direct investment and tourism; export through different regional and international market platforms; and durability of the economy of Kenya's citizens.

Here, paying attention to the international policies and actions of two former Kenyan presidents-- Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta is worthwhile. According to Kaburu (2020), after two terms of election, Mwai Kibaki's presidency ran from 2002 to 2013, facing the daunting challenge of restructuring the nation's economy, Kibaki's administration created two national strategic plans on development during his first term, which ran from 2003 to 2007. These are wealth and employment economic recovery. Kenya's foreign policy was greatly influenced by the two policies. By building new embassies to facilitate the flow of foreign direct investments into Kenya, Kibaki's administration chose an economic-driven diplomacy as a new foreign policy stance. The structure of Kenya's foreign policy decision making process under the Kibaki administration was influenced by internal political dynamics as well as his personality, beliefs, and leadership style. It has been described as decentralized, with various actors, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and parliament, becoming more involved in the process. Kaburu also highlighted that, one of the many foreign policy decisions that shaped Kenya's foreign policy behavior during the Kibaki presidency was the country's 2011 military engagement in hot pursuit of Al Shabaab in Somalia. This marked a paradigm shift in the practice of Kenya's foreign policy, as the country had not involved its military outside of its borders since independence, save in multilateral peacekeeping missions. Kibaki's second term as president, 2008–2012, focused on the establishment of a new constitution in 2010.

The other figurative former President of Kenya is Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta who led Kenya from 2013-2020. Winrose (2022), asserted that; he tenets of President Uhuru's foreign policy—regional security, free movement of people and goods, the bolstering of regional entities, and national equality—were encapsulated in the Jubilee manifesto. These principles underpin both Pan-Africanism and sub-regionalism. Winrose also acknowledged that, since it placed a strong emphasis on portraying Kenya as a regional leader while reaffirming Kenya's sovereignty and enraging the Western powers, Uhuru's foreign policy is not a radical change from the past. Uhuru is also known for his role in regional peace and security. At the time Kenya was the Chair of AU peace and Security, Kenya overwhelmingly perpetrated for the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and South Sudan stability.

The two main features that impact Kenya's foreign policy are terrorism and ethnic politics. Elvis (2016) argued that, while Kenyan politics are dynamic during election seasons, ethnic politics primarily affects how those who are elected or running for office influence and advocate for a particular policy change. For instance, most of the ICC conjectures used the situation as a method for campaigning in the approach to the 2013 elections, when Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto met with leaders of eastern Africa in their respective countries to garner support for "Africans solving African problems." (p,9). He also said that they were able to organize African Union leaders to criticize the ICC and paint it as a Western court that intimidates African leaders after winning the 2013 election with the help of their respective ethnic groupings and certain ethnic groups who supported them. With regard to terrorism, Kenya is making a valorous measure by cooperating with neighboring countries to combat terrorism which significantly arises from Somalia-based terrorist group Al Shabab.

## **2.5 The Concept of Hegemony**

Hegemony and hegemon are the translation of two Greek words, ηγεμονία (hegemonia) and ἡγεμών (hēgemón). Wilkinson (2008) clarified that hegemony was a concept that was used by not only the Greeks but also several European nations, including France (hégémonie), Germany (hegemonie), Italy (egemonia), and Spain (hegemonia). This linguistic classification demonstrates the concept's significance within and between those nations. Wilkinson added that, for the Greek

scholars, hegemonia could only refer to leadership or serving as an example; more frequently, though, it had a more predominant meaning, such as power or command principle, empire; the 19th century saw the reinstatement of this meaning.

The name Antonio Gramsci is also mentioned whenever the word hegemony is used. He was born in the tiny Italian village of Ales in 1891, in the extremely destitute Sardinia region (Monasta, 2000). At the time of Gramsci, the Bolshevik model had encouraged the Communist Party revolution to spread throughout Europe. From 1921 until 1926, he served as the leader of “Third International Marxism.” His six volumes of books, which he wrote between 1947 and 1951 while incarcerated, have made him well-known. Among other things, he developed the concept of hegemony during this period, along with other facets of thought, the state, civil society, and Gramsci’s perspective on the history of Italian unification, as well as his modified version of Marxism and opposition to Benedetto Croce’s philosophy. His book “Prison Notebooks,” published in 1971 during the Cold War, is credited with making him the most well-known Marxist (Böhm, 2018).

According to Gramsci hegemony is the idea that one social class is superior to another, but only in an unrepressed manner. He goes on to say that in order to fully investigate the issue of hegemony, other elements that transcend welfare and the state, like non-state actors, must be taken into consideration. According to Böhm (2018), Gramsci’s hegemony takes the following forms:

*Hegemony as a form of authority combines power and legitimacy; in turn, authority that only consists of domination is never legitimate. This relationship of power and legitimacy is the basis for the theory of hegemony which implies that legitimate authority can only be established and maintained through a combination of coercion and consent (P, 34-35).*

Additionally, Böhm (2018) clarified Gramsci's theories from his "Prison Notebook." The theories are arranged like a ladder, with one serving as the foundation for the others. The integral state is one of the rungs. Compared to the rest of Europe, Gramsci's native Italy had a distinct state structure. There also arose an international bureaucracy. He described the state as "the balance

between political society and civil society," which combined "dictatorship and hegemony" to create the integral state. The former speaks of political society's use of oppression, while the latter illustrates a widely held understanding of civil society. Hegemony in an integral state goes beyond simply consolidating political power. As a result, power is not only wielded by the government of a specific country but also by <sup>15</sup>civil society. Part two of the ladder is civil society. Gramsci would rather illustrate how the state and civil society interact than develop the idea of civil society. Although civil society is a part of the state, it is neither wholly dependent on nor fundamentally integrated into the state, nor does the state itself only consist of civil society. Subaltern groups have been given a chance by civil society.

The other strand of the theories is power. Gramsci refers to Machiavelli when discussing the issue of "power." Both coercion and consent are necessary in accordance with Machiavelli's theory of power. Furthermore, both humans and animals possess power. The Gramsci dimension of power is a marvel that necessitates other facts to be subservient, useful, cunning, and cautious. Here, in addition to Böhm's point, Yilmaz (2010) has enumerated the characteristics of power. Yilmaz claims that the Frankfurt School, a proponent of critical theory, defined the various forms of power. These are: open power, which a state may use to exert pressure on another state to grant its wishes. This is a more active kind of power.

Covert power is a type of power where nations use it to dominate one another by ignoring one another's agendas and pursuing their own. There has to be a limit to the political rope. Although more passive, covert power is nevertheless well-organized.) Agents who enter a relationship constrained by a system of rules and regulations, which can be either verbal or physical in nature, are referred to as structural power. The other basic basis of hegemony is the historical bloc.

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<sup>15</sup> Subaltern is designated as the potential of exploiting politics to pursue one's own interest and also as an expression of the state's lack of political autonomy. The lack of political autonomy is expressed in the non-conformism necessary to maintain the collective spirit of the group. When group members' membership differs in terms of traditional practices and beliefs, fragmented and subordinate groups emerge in civil society, creating a variety of shared meanings attributed to each groups.

Locally, the alliance of social class forces against the minority social class is how hegemony in the historical bloc is put together. The relationship between hegemony and historical blocs, however, is constant and always leans toward an "alliance of social forces."<sup>16</sup> The state and global order are shown to be colluding in the passive revolution. Passive revolution is the rise of the counter-hegemony against the international system, spearheaded by civil society. As a result, a society's modern hegemonic values will develop. According to Gramsci, a "war of position" is a major element in the subjugation of politics and the economy. Gramsci defined the "war of position" as the use of a particular group's authority in a political scuffle (Böhm, 2018). According to Böhm, Gramsci also postulated the existence of the international and the social function of intelligence.<sup>17</sup>

It is necessary to examine how international relations theories account for hegemony to comprehend it more broadly. As believed by Tim Anderson (2022), using the notions of the hegemon and hegemony, modern international relations research has investigated and analysed behaviours, approaches, viewpoints, objects, or attributes that centre on, intersect with, or surpass the three conventional paradigms of world politics—the person, the state, and the international system. He also stated that hegemony may refer to a strong ability to exert pressure, influence, or control over the international system's structures and the conduct of its constituents on a global scale, but it does not include circumstances in which we have established official, direct control over foreign governments or territories. Consequently, the upcoming subsection will examine the hegemonic perspectives of international relations theories.

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<sup>16</sup> Gramsci define historical bloc as the association between, 'culture/ideology and economy- Superstructure and Structure'. This relation also known as dialectical connection. Gramsci adopted this concept from Marxism that shows the possession and the absences of social establishment which is surrounded by economical attentiveness (Franzisk Böhm, 2018, 'Hegemony Revisited: A conceptual Analysis of the Gramscian Concept of Hegemony in International Relations Theory'), (T.J.Jakson Lears, 1985, 'The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities), (Fernando Ludwig. 2022, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and the (Transnational) Historical Bloc. Theoretical Contribution to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century International Relations.

<sup>17</sup> The social function of intellectuals is to drive society to either rescue or replace hegemony following a passive revolution. These intellectuals are elites. The elites are a part of class society; they are not independent. Existence of the international according to Gramsci, hegemony can be strengthened by the presence of the international arena. The "dialectical relation of national and international element" is where hegemony is exercised.

## 2.6 Theoretical Framework: Realism, Liberalism and the English School

### I. Realism

Realism and realpolitik are synonymous terms. It addresses political power. One of the most prominent and ancient schools of thought in international relations is realism. The majority of realism was thought to be present in international relations during the 20th century. Power is the central idea of realist theory. But there's no consensus on what power entails. Realist scholars have differing perspectives on what constitutes power. One definition of power is the ability to possess the entirety of a nation's essential resources. The economy, military, diplomacy, and other significant facts are these assets. However, "capabilities relative to the capabilities of other states" is the definition of power. The "materialist view" is the term used to describe how these two parties define power Viotti and Kauppi (2012).

Both realists and neo-realists concur that, in the context of global anarchy, a state's primary objective is to survive. Their primary concern is this. Furthermore, states can only logically assure their survival by raising their strength. States that have more power are shielded from attacks by those with less power because they may fear those with more power. It would be absurd to take any other action because a weak state would be exposed. Besides, states find it too terrifying to not attempt to use all of their power. Waltz refers to this as the "security dilemma." He contends that a state becomes afraid and feels threatened when it observes another state attempting to bolster its security, and it realizes that it must do the same. As long as no state has a disproportionate amount of power over another state or coalition of states, and as long as states collectively maintain a stable "balance of power" arrangement, it need not result in war (Weber,2005).

The classical realism and structural realism have their contesting argument on hegemony as the following:

- **Classical Realism:** Dirzauskaite and Cristinel (2017) cited Hans Morgenthau in stating that there could be an equilibrium or disequilibrium in the global power structure. The former concerns the state's ability to maintain balance and control within the global system, whereas the latter addresses the lack of balance that allows one state to assume total

authority over all others. They also argued that Realists believed that their understanding of the global system led to their perception of hegemony. These are that the state is seen as the primary actor in international affairs, that the lack of authority in the international system created anarchy in the global system, and that the national interest—security and sustainability, in particular—is what motivates every country. When hegemony is combined with the balance of power theory, however, no hegemon can maintain its dominance for long because, in theory, counterbalancing will eventually take place. Put differently, the theory postulates that when a hegemon materializes, other players will work to undermine it and create a counterbalance.

- **Structural Realism:** There are two opposing schools of structural realist theory, known as offensive and defensive realism, each with its own set of guiding principles and recommendations for public policy. Kenneth Waltz and other defensive realists contend that states should not aim to increase their proportion of global power because doing so will only make the system penalize them. They contend that hegemony is particularly recklessly pursued. Henry Kissinger (1957) has also made an additional statement on the power and defensive concept.<sup>18</sup> The opposing viewpoint is held by offensive realists like John Mearsheimer, who contend that it makes strategic sense for governments to amass as much power as they can and, in the appropriate situations, to achieve hegemony.

In general, hegemony, to the realists, generally has to do with the state and its capacity to subjugate power within the international system. As a result, there will be mistrust and vulnerability in the international system due to the strong state's dominance over the weak state.

Based on the above justifications of realism- both classical and structural- the dual relation of the two countries and rivalry to hegemony reveal through realist theory. The two countries Ethiopia and Kenya in the Horn and Eastern Africa respectively, are striving to built a balance of power

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<sup>18</sup> A defensive view of foreign policy gives people a strong sense of purpose when facing a power that they perceive as a threat, but it is powerless to convince those who are still undecided. If the danger were known, there would be no need to invoke it. Until the danger is felt, calls for collective action will seem like self-righteous calls to fight in a foreign cause, which makes them all the more annoying ('A World Restored: Mettenich, Castlereagh and the Problem of Peace 1812-22', (1957).

through the classical and structural realism assumption of power. However, this theory is not the only determinant factor to show the dual relation. As a result the next theory is adopted.

## **II. Liberalism**

The theory of liberalism's essential doctrine includes individual and human nature (individualism in classical liberalism is more driven by passion than logic, and it is more determined to accomplish something useful with little authority than neoliberalism. Classical liberals believed that people's inherent nature disobeyed the law.), freedom (an individual is free to act in a non-interfering manner within the boundaries of freedom, provided that other people's rights are not infringed upon. Classical liberalism defines freedom as existing outside of the capricious will of another and does not oppose individual freedom. Rather, it advocates for the freedom of individuals against oppression.), natural law and natural rights (natural law is best understood in the context of a rationally designed mandate, guideline, or regulation in the contemporary sense. Property, freedom, and life are the three fundamental rights. They are not entitled to be.), spontaneous order (spontaneous order is the absence of government. It cannot be attributed to God or governed by rigid laws. Humans maintain spontaneous order through ongoing experimentation.), rule of law (the idea behind spontaneous order is the idea behind the rule of law. Individual rights are recognized by the government through legal means.), and limited state there is no precise boundary between nation and state in international affairs. If two men acknowledge one another as fellow members of the same nation, and if they share the same culture—defined as a set of beliefs, symbols, conventions, and modes of behaviour and communication—then they are of the same nation.) (Van de Haar, (2009).

A state is sovereign and required to have a liberal economy in the classical liberal framework. The goal of international law is to undermine hegemony in the field of international relations, as argued by classical liberal thinkers like Immanuel Kant, who reject coercion and influence. That being said, institutional liberalism, or neo-liberalism, declared that international coordination must be exercised and that hegemony should not impact this coordination, in opposition to neo-realism, which holds that a hegemonic state must exist in the international arena. Institutional liberalism

holds that economic domination and stability come before military might in establishing hegemony (Böhm, 2018).

However, there is an argument- on one hand for some neo-liberalism is hegemonic, on the other hand, neo-liberalism is not hegemonic. In compliance with this, Martin and Wissel (2017) argued that there are triplet points that show that neo-liberalism is not a pure hegemonic but a form of domination.

These arguments are, initially, since the ruling class does not materially give in to the interests of the subaltern classes, neoliberalism is not hegemonic; rather, it serves only the economically and corporately. For this reason, it is necessary to view neoliberalism as a method of governing that seeks to have the greatest amount of power without making any compromises. Afterward, all that neoliberalism is, the pragmatic philosophy of capitalist operators. It is unable to even pursue the objective of establishing hegemony in terms of universalizing its mode of life and obtaining a leading role for the bourgeois class, nor does it produce great organic intellectuals. In conclusion, a new dominant form that does not aim for hegemony arose during the post-Fordist period. When hegemony is seen as being replaced by governmental, this is known as ruling through contingency. A fear of the future that robs the idea of emancipation and enlightenment in favor of an uncertain, hazardous, and nature-like future is what defines this type of dominance.


Economic development to acquire hegemony- regional power is the strategy adopted with both countries. Investment attraction, advancement in economic sectors, stability, are sort of areas for the countries to have a hegemonic power through the lenses of liberal theory.

### **III. The English School**

The English School is one of the predominant theories of international relations. The British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, which first met in the late 1950s, is credited with launching the English School as a self-aware intellectual movement. The lectures on world society given by Martin Wight and Charles Manning may provide earlier origins (Buzan, 2001).

Linklater (2005) explained that the central thesis of the English School is that independent governments create societies, albeit anarchic ones as they are exempt from divine will. One of the aspects of international relations that the English School finds most fascinating is the fact that governments have succeeded in establishing a society of sovereign equals. . Despite their state of anarchy—that is, the lack of a higher political authority—they contend that there is an unexpectedly high degree of order and a surprisingly low amount of violence among nations. As a result, this theory acknowledges that it is significant to consider how likely it is that even in the most stable domestic cultures there would be violence, dread, insecurity, and mistrust if sovereign power failed. Though it is not the primary feature of global politics, anarchy would be the most likely outcome.

***Figure 2. Three predominant Concepts of English School Theory***



***Source: produced by the author based on the three predominant concepts revolving around the theory of English School***

As Figure 2. Shows, that the English School theory of international relations has interlinked trio grounds. The fundamental focus of the international system is power politics between nations, with each state's actions being dictated by the framework of international anarchy. Inversely, building and preserving common standards, laws, and institutions is the essence of international society. At last, the worldwide population, non-state actors, and individuals are the primary subjects of global

societal identities and arrangements in world society, which extends beyond the state system (Stivachris, 2017).

Stivachtis (2017), explained that the English School consists vital conceptions. The main discourse of English school is, on ‘pluralism and solidarity’.<sup>19</sup>

*A key debate within the English School revolves around pluralism and solidarism. Pluralism refers to international societies with a relatively low degree of shared norms, rules, and institutions. Solidarism refers to types of international society with a relatively high degree of shared norms, rules and institutions.*

The human kind interaction of Ethiopia and Kenya has distinctive features. There is the distinction and interchangeable societal agglomeration. Asebe (2016) illustrated the societal aggregation of Ethiopia and Kenya simultaneously:

*On the Ethiopian side, the Borana, Gabra and Garri live side by side though their territorial possessions have been fluid across time. The Gabra and Borana speak the Oromo language and are among the groups making up the broader Oromo nation. According to the post-1991 political and administrative reordering of Ethiopia along ethno-linguistic lines, the two groups form the Borana zone in the Oromia national regional state. The Garri, however, are part of the Somali clans who have progressively been expanding to Borana land since early 20th century and currently live in Somali national state as well as in the Borana zone. These three groups also live on the Kenya side of the border in countries such as Moyale, Marssabet, Isiolo and Sololo. (p,61)*

In addition, Henok Merhatsidk declared that the Ethiopia and Kenya diplomatic relations are based on the balance of power. This English School concept is applied between the two countries- balance of power through local, regional, and global arenas.<sup>20</sup> As a result, the English School's

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<sup>19</sup> The pluralism sort of world society align with the principle of Westphalia-absence of violating sovereignty. Thus states are ‘constitutionally insular’, on the other hand solidarism is about a broad exposure of norms values and mutual interests based on the internal law. The primary concern on the debate of pluralism and solidarism, both in actual and theoretically, is with to what extent the tense assertive states and their desire became less complex?

<sup>20</sup> Henok Merhatsidk, 2011, ‘Security Factors Affecting Ethio-Kenya Relations: (Post 1991) Challenge and Prospects, (P,12)

theory demonstrates the nature and dynamics of the two countries' bilateral relations- the study aimed to answer.

Two hegemonic guiding principles—Caution and moral obligation—form the foundation of the “English School” Theory. English School curricula will emphasize the moral duties that hegemonic powers carry out in order to govern international systems. To advance order is to advance the common good of peace and prosperity, according to the English School. To achieve these two goals, hegemonic powers place restrictions on the other players' independence. These restrictions must simultaneously be acknowledged as lawful by others and provide tangible benefits to them for them to be approved (Ruacan, 2008). There are also other international relations theories who has a nexus with hegemony- Gramsci <sup>21</sup> and Constructivism can be mentioned. <sup>22</sup>

When it comes to the theoretical framework, Don Nanjira labeled that (2010, p, 326-327):

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<sup>21</sup> When Bates (1975), explains about Gramsci and hegemony, he said that few people would disagree with the fundamental tenet of the hegemony theory, which holds that ideas as well as force govern humankind. In essence, Gramsci was correct when he identified the idea of hegemony as a turning point in Marxism from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. He uses the term hegemony to refer to his theoretical reaction to the crisis of Marxism and to the profound problems about society and consciousness raised by the Italian uprising against positivism. Hegemony in international relations refers to a state's traditional method of dominating throughout global history (Worth, 2009). Worth also mentioned the two influential hegemony theorists who derived their ideas from the Gramscian hegemony ideology must be mentioned: Robert W. Cox and Robert O. Keohane, who are realist and critical theorists, respectively. Robert Cox declared that the traditional definition of hegemony and state dominance concealed the actions of the hegemon state from a critical perspective. Hegemony, according to his definition, is contingent on state power.

Özçelik(2005), said that, Robert Keohane supports the widely recognized hegemony theory known as Hegemony Stability Theory (HST). Hegemony is hence the accumulation of economic power and the maintenance of a stable international order; HST is the alliance of fundamental ideas of international affairs, namely realism and structuralism; liberalism and institutionalism. The security version and the communal version are the two binary genres of hegemony stability theory. Hegemonic stability of security version is the state with the capacity for coercion in bilateral and multilateral relations, according to Özçelik (2005).

<sup>22</sup> Although constructivists acknowledge the significance of the material dimension in establishing hegemony, they tend to emphasize the ideational dimension of hegemony. Constructivists define hegemony as a form of hierarchical international order in which the dominant state in the international system exercises transnational authority over secondary states (Wang, 2003). Wang has also stated that, since it emphasizes the significance of the ideational source of power, the constructivist theory of hegemony has improved the comprehension of it. And yet there is a significant flaw in the constructivist literature that has been written about hegemony thus far.

To put it another way, it hasn't given much thought to how the general populace in secondary states feels about hegemony or how the general populace's exposure to hegemonic ideologies affects hegemony. In secondary states, it is thought that the governing class can control public opinion or stifle internal resistance.

*The study of African international relations in the context of international relations theory reveals that there is no theoretical framework for the study of African international relations. There is no debate on it. This is because the majority of the theories of international relations and systems do not fit African international relations since they are Western concepts that serve the interests of the developed world-the West in particular. Of the international relations theories applicable to African conditions, the following are noteworthy: statehood, democracy, diplomacy, subalternism, irredentism, majimboism, unipartyism, utipossidetis juris, subaltern state, state and international state system, national interest, development paradigms, anarchy, dependence, dependency, and independence. Strictly speaking, however, the only fundamental international relations theories applicable to the African situation are the nation-state building theory, natural law theory, and “power (balance/struggle)” theory.*


The theoretical synthesis would be, there is an anarchical world system as a result acquiring power is significant. Power in terms of military is one means as the realists offer, however, in order to build a strong and modern military economic development and economic hegemony is expected in the international arena. Both military and economic enhancement is processed through an international system by the international society. This argument- international system in international society by English School theory concept is built through in the anarchical world system is essential by integrating societal relation and societal aggregation.

These theoretical synthesis is experimented in the dual relation of Ethiopia and Kenya, through integration of society as an English School, economic development, and military power like liberalism and realism respectively, to acquire hegemony.

## 2.7 Conceptual Framework

Based on the historical overview and theory of international relations- mainly realism, liberalism and pluralism, the following conceptual framework is constructed. This conceptual framework aims to illustrate the relationship between hegemony and bilateral diplomacy, as well as the opportunities and challenges that result as Figure 2 indicates. Based on the longstanding bilateral relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya, the conceptual framework asks what kinds of opportunities and challenges might arise if the concept of hegemony were to enter the two countries; consequently, the concept of hegemony serves as the main argument to demonstrate its implications for both international relations in general and Ethiopia and Kenya's bilateral diplomatic relations in particular.

*Figure 3. Conceptual Framework*



## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **3. Ethiopian and Kenya: Cooperation and Hegemony**

#### **3.1 Horn of Africa and Hegemony: Ethiopia and Kenya**

The terms "Eastern Africa" and the "Horn of Africa" are arbitrary. The region commonly and mostly referred to in various literatures as the Horn of Africa has four countries: Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea; on the other hand, Eastern Africa comprises Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. This regional split gave rise to Ethiopia's and Kenya's different hegemonic strategies in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. Although this point will be clarified later, for the sake of geographical proximity and since Ethiopia and Kenya are both East African nations aligned with the Horn of Africa, this paper used the Horn of Africa as a regional subset of both countries.

##### **3.1.1 Ethiopia**

Ethiopia, one of the oldest nations in Africa, a highly developed civilization comprising economics, culture, religion, and administration, is still in the process of building a nation. This process takes a long time because many myths surround nation-building. This discourse presents a thesis and an antithesis between pro-Ethiopianist and ethnic nationalist groups, based on each historical Imperial ambition for nation-building. The foundation of modern Ethiopia was laid during the 19th century- it saw centralization on the one side, and growth to the southern region of the nation, which gave rise to the current national framework, on the other. The state structure can also be measured by looking at the revolutionary movements of 1974 and 1991, which also left a significant legacy.

Ethnic identity is a salient feature of Ethiopian politics. The 1960s brought it more widespread recognition. As Yonas (2020) asserted, the idea that Ethiopia had a single, peaceful, and stable political system in the region was called into question by ethnic consciousness, which also contributed to the regime's weakening as popular uprisings in Eritrea, Tigray, Bale, Ogaden, and Gedeo increasingly questioned the legitimacy of the state. This ethnicization of the political system

also created a window of opportunity for outside forces hoping to undermine Ethiopia's influence and sovereignty in the region. Ethiopian society's multiethnic makeup and the difficulties associated with nation-building made it possible for outside forces to get involved.

Following the coup, the Derg (Military Committee) embraced a radical ideology and began a profoundly transformative process in Ethiopian society. The Derg used Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism as the ideological foundation to dismantle the previous socioeconomic system. However deep-rooted ethnic inequality in Ethiopia was made worse by the Derg (Zhou, 2024). There were more rebel factions founded during this period that were focused on ethnicity. The overthrow of the Derg military regime in May 1991 and the ascent to power of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), spearheaded by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), signified not only the latter's military triumph but also the imposition of a particular interpretation of Ethiopian statehood (Bach, 2014). Bach also said that:

*As a “byproduct of the Ethiopian student movement (ESM)” .... the TPLF had forged its nationalist discourse in terms of the “national oppression thesis”, derived from the Stalinist theory of nationalities, as opposed to other competing interpretations of Ethiopia’s imperial period, i.e. the “nation-building thesis” (defended by the Ethiopian Democratic Union, EDU), the “colonial thesis” (notably defended by the Oromo Liberation Front), or the “multinational Marxist thesis” (defended by other branches of the ESM like the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party, EPRP) (p,105).*

One of the contentious aspects of the EPRDF's nation-building effort was its Stalinist attitude-nationalities and self-determination. According to Vaughan (2003), the concept of nationalities refers to the idea that if you organize a community from the inside out—that is, with its members, in its language, using its cultural traditions and wisdom—you can define or even mobilize it more successfully and get it involved in its political development. She also said that this definition of nationalities is acceptable to social constructivists. Furthermore, self-determination is described by Vaughan as, the idea of self-determination holds that the standards by which "nations, nationalities, and peoples" are to be defined are verifiable, objective, and external, and they should be established regardless of the opinions of their constituents. Marxist thought has led to the idea that a community may lawfully be granted self-determination by a vanguard party from the outside.

This process involves defining the ethnic criteria that the group uses to define itself and drawing boundaries around it (2003, p, 170).

In 2018, Ethiopia had a political reform inside the EPRDF party following several years of a protest and state of emergency. The fundamental reasons for the demise of the EPRDF were the unfinished business of nation-building and the lack of national historical consensus. This argument is supported by Aweke (2020), who made his point by listing several reasons, why EPRDF lost. He asserted that; the EPRDF's account of Ethiopian history interprets social injustices, economic hardship, and political marginalization as acts of transgression by the Amhara people. As a result, this core idea—that Amhara had gained comparative advantages—was the foundation of the post-1991 political climate. The other major reason for that lead for the transition within EPRDF was, that a dominating party state with unbreakable supremacy of fewer elites was ultimately formed by those who had suffered the most during the military fight to overthrow Derg. All post-Derg political and economic changes were, in theory, meant to be advantageous to the majority. Nonetheless, certain groups were purposefully excluded from exercising those rights. Another factor was unresolved regional boundary administration.

The EPRDF underwent an internal political reform in 2018 under the leadership of the elites known as OROMARA- Oromo and Amhara- nationalists' elite alliance in the administration of EPRDF along with the youths from the respective nationalities, and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed succeeded Hailemariam Desalegn. This change in leadership was brought about by the aforementioned primary factors. In 2019, the EPRDF was replaced by the Prosperity Party (PP).<sup>23</sup> As opposed to the EPRDF, Afar Regional State and Somali Regional State are given a full position at the national table within the PP. The former vast Regional State-Southern Nations, nationalities and People Region, in 2023, deadened as the Sidama Regional State, Central Ethiopia Region and South Ethiopia Region (Wedekind, 2024).

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<sup>23</sup> Wedekind (2024), said that "...Centre-periphery relations in the image of a Unitarian, pan-Ethiopia state and society, albeit within the cast of the existing federal constitution" (p, 20-21).

The primary justification for casting doubt on Ethiopia's nation-building efforts is that, due to her history as the only non-colonized nation in Africa, her status as the Hub of Africa, the forerunner of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the foundation of the African Union (AU), and a founding member of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Ethiopia is the first of the few nations considered to represent African hegemony. However, due to the nation's internal issues over time, the nation has experienced several political transitions. Different national interests are reflected in these political transitions, and foreign policy is the weapon used to achieve them. Furthermore, Ethiopia has been perceived as the nation that expresses interest in the Horn of Africa countries the most, as it attempted to address above. Geographical factors, ethnicity and clan relations, religion, and nations like Eritrea formerly a part of Ethiopia all contribute to the region's interconnection- these effects on the country are interpreted as Ethiopia's tactical plan to dominate the area. Some claimed that Ethiopia is and could become a hegemon for these and other reasons. Conversely, some view the nation as a defective hegemon. Before delving into these two points in isolation, it's critical to understand the relationship between hegemony and the concepts of polarization and regional power, as well as how these relate to Ethiopian hegemony.

Conversely, it is significant to see how all sorts of polarization have leverage over hegemony. Faridha (n.d) said that polarization is also hegemony. Polarity has existed throughout world history; it indicates the extent of the dominating power's presence. Affixes like Uni-, bi-, and multi- are applied with polarity. In the bargain, Faridha said that, when there are no regulations to govern the conduct of the states, the international system leans toward anarchy. As a result, it empowers the state to act freely to strengthen its position as a major power. Then, it seems that the poles both characterize and differentiate the state's status.

The prefixes that Faridha noted are generally not used overtly in Africa; yet, internal political polarization has happened in all of the continent's countries, including Ethiopia. A few factors that may contribute to internal polarization are political parties and leadership style. According to these factors, a political party that has gained traction will either be monolithic, bilingual, multiethnic, or religious. As previously said, polarization caused the nation-building process to drag on and

political fragmentation in Ethiopia. As a result, Merera (2007)<sup>24</sup> argued the cases of Ethiopian political parties' polarization by raising points such as, political parties exhibit a certain level of polarization, which is indicative of their issues. Which resulted, the "zero-sum game" was brought about by the previous generation's lack of experience in political parties, (p,15); within Ethiopian politics, political parties prioritize their legacies over the establishment of institutional frameworks; Ethiopia's multi-party system is not home growing, therefore people do not have fully internalized decision-making or polite political relationships with other parties; there is room for different liberation movements with and without division and democracy due to elite-led polarization that is based on ethnicity; and the official application of the "carrot and sticks" strategy by the ruling party to systematically undermine the opposition parties (p,16).

In addition, Dehèz (2008) strongly equated polarization with hegemony, noting that polarization has two aspects that are applicable at both the international and vernacular levels. These levels are:

*First, states that polarize their region or the global order are usually strong or more powerful than other states in their immediate neighborhood, which is why their actions have a more profound impact on the course of an entire region than the actions of less powerful countries, at least as long as smaller or less powerful states do not resort to drastic or radical action. And second, states that have the ability to polarize try to achieve and/or preserve their position by counterbalancing potential rivals and perpetuating their dominance in their region. These states can therefore be categorized as regional or global hegemons, states that for better or worse dominate the globe. (n.p)*

It is assumed that the order brought about by colonization and post-colonization is the regional power. For this reason, countries such as Eritrea and Somalia viewed Ethiopia as a colonizer on par with European powers, leading them to participate in the resistance movement. Ruth (1993), who asserted that although colonization required adjusting to new norms and values and, when

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<sup>24</sup> Merera Gudina, (2007) 'Party Politics, Political Polarization and the Future of Ethiopian Democracy', Center For African Development Policy Research, International Conference On African Development Archives 108, Western Michigan University,

feasible, utilizing a consensus founded on the formal rejection of convulsive hostility, supports this argument. In addition, she stated that, the most notable aspect of regional hegemony, which entails a countries' ability to retain its dominance through careful cultivation of international legitimacy and relative military and diplomatic superiority, is its capacity to exercise expansive power within such a consensus.

Concerning regional power in Africa, countries including Ethiopia sort the region to influence in terms of political, economic, leadership, and also inter-societal relations that can strengthen the countries' interests. Kaleab (2021) provided novena clarifications for the regional power standard in his work. He used the term regional power to refer to regional hegemony. Still, he was careful to clarify that the term regional hegemon is typically used to refer to a single country in a specific region. In contrast, regional power is typically used to refer to a group of states with shared characteristics. Having said that, he also stated the standard of regional power. These are: (i), a state's boundaries and the surrounding areas need to recognize its identity, political economy, and allocation; (ii), the regional power needs to take decisive action to protect foreign power, establish regulations, and divide the power of the other areas; (iii), to effectively govern the region and achieve geopolitical dominance, the regional authority needs to possess a clear vision; (iv), the association must be present through the regional institutions; (v), maintaining the region's security, holding people accountable, and holding onto stability; (vi), the geopolitical, political-economic, principle and defensive aspects of the regional power ensure its power; (vii), economy and culture have a key role in fostering cooperation between and among the regional states; (viii), the regional power administrator is responsible for managing acceptability both inside the region and globally and; (ix), to preserve the regional power's collective hegemony in the area, the regional power also needs to establish itself internationally.

According to Hassan (2015), the global and regional race for Africa can be understood in terms of five distinct forms of hegemony. Military hegemony, the first mode, denotes the militarization of the kind of scurry. The promotion of neoliberal ideas with their political and economic facets is known as ideological hegemony, which is the second mode. Several new international relations ideas, including the duty to protect and intervene on behalf of others, have been formed by these

philosophies. Among the five types of hegemony in Africa are also soft hegemony, water hegemony, and regional hegemony.

The research covers a few variables to show the factors that determine Ethiopian hegemony in the area based on the variables mentioned above.

### **A. Foreign Policy**

Ethiopia's Foreign Affairs, National Security Policy and Strategy (FANSPS), which was created in 2002, allowed the country to continue playing a major role in the regional security of the Horn of Africa during the EPRDF. In addition to actively participating in continental and regional fora through international organizations, the nation is regarded as a reliable mediator in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. A strong military, active involvement in regional peace and security operations, the ability and compliance to combat terrorism, a legacy of Pan-Africanism, and effective use of multilateral platforms all serve to support the nation. Ethiopia's foreign policy document made clear which countries it considered adversaries and allies, as well as its approach to them. Ethiopia's foreign policy positions her as the regional hegemon in the Horn of Africa.

The synergy philosophy has been the driving force behind Ethiopia's recent foreign policy following reformation. The foreign policy of Ethiopia during the EPRDF and the current Prosperity Party periods, according to Sara Hassam Ali (2021), reflects the aspirations of the country's top elites. Consequently, in contrast to its former foreign policy, the country's current approach is implicit and centers on economic mutuality and consolidation as a way to accomplish internal objectives and stabilize the area. Ali added that the nation launched the Joint Plan for Action in 2020 intending to promote social and economic development while upholding regional security, stability, and peace. Thus, through their respective heads of state, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia offered to establish the Horn of Africa Cooperation, a new regional organization. In addition to enhancing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's reputation as a dedicated regional leader for peace and security who is eager to collaborate with the Eritrean government in particular, this kind of integration was seen as a response to Ethiopia's hegemonic movement in the Horn of Africa. The other central foreign policy issue is Ethiopia's landlocked status. According to Mersha Zenebe

(2023), the previous foreign policy recognized Ethiopia's landlocked status as a hindrance; as a result, port services should be provided concordantly and certainly based on reciprocal benefit.

A Memorandum of Understanding was recently signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland, granting Ethiopia access to the port on January 1, 2024. The region saw this Memorandum of Understanding as a turmoil in the region. According to Hassan, (2023) Ethiopia's most difficult task was to halt Somaliland and Somalia from uniting because it perceived this as a menace in two ways: One, Ethiopia owns Somali territory, which is the suppressed Somali region of Ethiopia; therefore, it feared that if Somalis united and acquired power, they would claim the region, as occurred in 1977 when the two countries went to war. The second difficulty was, that Ethiopia emerged as the most potent country in the Horn of Africa while Somalia was absent from the international political scene, posing a second obstacle. Ethiopia appeared to have lost its influence in the Horn of Africa, as Somalia appeared to be gaining ground on Ethiopia and would have to contend with it.

According to the Prosperity Party, Ethiopia has a right to access the sea, and this has caused the country's interests to shift toward port access based on diplomatic overtones and sound foreign policy reasoning. Referencing a policy paper titled "Ethiopian National Interests: Principles and Content," Farah (2023) noted that Ethiopia's Ministry of Peace highlights the need for Ethiopia to cooperate with other countries to get past any geostrategic barriers that might impede its development and attain unhindered access to the sea as a matter of national security.

Trade partnerships, military agreements, and international recognition are among the things Ethiopia is proposing in exchange for access to the ports of Zelia and Somaliland. Offering continuous access to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden is what Ethiopia is offering. The intention of Ethiopia to absorb land and territories held by nearby sovereign states, including more than just Somaliland, is a result of this promise, nevertheless. Before the MoU, Somaliland had turned down all such offers for several reasons, including empirical facts of the assumption that Ethiopia is an expansionist toward Somali territory, historical territorial losses to Ethiopia, and worries that

Ethiopia's presence in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden would lead to regional power tension between Ethiopia and other dominant players in the region (Ibid).

In Ethiopian politics, foreign policy is an instrument of last resort. The national interests of Ethiopia, as produced by the agenda of the ruling party leadership of the time, are reflected in Ethiopia's foreign policy. Throughout Ethiopian foreign policy, which included various mechanisms from the EPRDF to the Prosperity Party, key components include economic development, peace and security, fighting against terrorism, maintaining social integrity, gaining access to ports, and mediating disputes. Concerning the ruling government, this mechanism assesses the possibility that the nation could be perceived as a regional hegemon or not.

## **B. Military**

A country's military power is a fundamental factor determining its hegemony. This idea represents realism's emblem. Countries can defend themselves against internal and external foes by using their military might to further their interests. According to Troxell (2006), war is just a continuation of political discourse with the addition of other means. This is in line with Clausewitz's famous dictum, which states that the use of military force in battle should never be viewed as an independent force but rather as a tool of policy. He added that security policy—which has several essential elements—is the term for the political goal attained by military force. These elements are i, defeat (the primary goal of military force is to fight and win a national war; military power can be utilized in its purest form to physically defeat an opponent); ii, Coerce (a nation's main strategic goal is typically an endeavor to persuade an adversary to comply to one's objectives without resorting to war or actual combat operations due to the high cost and uncertainty connected with such operations. As a result, most states use force to try and accomplish their objectives. Effective coercion is not fighting a war; rather, it is deterring an adversary from acting in a certain way by threatening to use force and, in certain cases, using limited actual force to support that threat); iii, reassure (the goal of reassurance was to provide allies with additional security guarantees, which is closely linked to the idea of extended deterrence); and iv, dissuade (persuading someone not to do anything that could harm oneself is known as dissuasion).

Almost no Ethiopian leader has entered politics without a strong military force that could assert its supremacy over rival nations, according to Alem Kebede (2020). Strong military might, both in terms of quality and quantity, was desired by Ethiopia's pre-modern authorities. Regarding the military, the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie produced a noteworthy accomplishment. According to Alem, during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie, a noteworthy consequence of the halting of the hazy coexistence between military and civil establishments was that military personnel underwent a partial re-socialization, progressively shifting their allegiance from their home regions to the nation-state. Furthermore, ascription was becoming less and less of a factor in social mobility, with the military functioning as a crucial contemporary institution. With the arrival of the Derg, Ethiopia became a contemporary violent society, riddling the world with uninspiring propaganda, continuous bellicose language, political divisions, and pointless social, economic, and military policies.

One of the biggest and most well-equipped armies in Africa and the Horn of Africa was the Ethiopian National Defense Force, which operated under the EPRDF. According to the Worldwide Institute for Strategic Studies in 2012, there were 138,000 soldiers in the Ethiopian military. Armored cars, combat planes, helicopters, and tanks were all acquired by Ethiopian forces through imports from China, Russia, and Ukraine. Furthermore, Ethiopian light weapons, heavy mortars, and artillery are produced by the defense sector (Kidist, 2014).

One aspect of military power in international relations is defense diplomacy, which can be defined as the international functions and tasks carried out by the armed forces and the leadership of the ministries of national defense. As the world strives to move past the use of force, defense diplomacy—which is generally understood to be the peaceful use of a state's defense apparatus to advance a government's strategic goals through cooperation with other nations—has become one of the most important tools of military statecraft. Today's international relations often feature defense diplomacy, or the use of military force as a tool for foreign policy, which is most evident in peacekeeping operations. During the 1950s, Ethiopia increased its use of peacekeeping as a form of defense diplomacy, with the number of troops participating in such operations through the AU

and UN growing dramatically (Kaleab, 2023). Table 3.1 shows the participation of the Horn of African countries' peacekeeping position.

**Table 3.1 Peacekeeping Troops of the Horn of Africa Countries.**

Country	Popltn	GDP	Def bdt	Military Capability							
				Active	Army	Navy	Air Force	Genda-merie	Para-military	Reserve	Peacekeeping Deployment
Djibouti	884,017	3.17bn	n.k	10,450	8,000	200	250	2,000	2,650		AMISOM 1,872; MINURSO 2 obs
Eritrea	5,970,646	2.11bn	n.k	201,750	200,000	1,400	350	-	-	120,000	-
Ethiopia	108,386,391	91.2bn	518m	139,000	135,000	1000	3000	-	-	70,000	AMISOM 4,323; UNMISS 2,122; UNAMID 1,684; UNISFA 4,368
Kenya	48,397,527	98.6bn	1.23bn	24,100	20,000	1,600	2,500	-	5,000	-	MINUSCA 7; MNUSCO 7; UNIFIL 1; MINUSMA 8; AMISOM 4,046; UNAMID 89
Somalia	11,259,029	4.96bn	n.k	19,800	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South Sudan	10,204,581	3.68bn	70.1m	185,000	185,000	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sudan	43,120,843	30.9bn	n.k	104,000	100,000	1,300	3,000	-	20,000	85,000	Yemen: Operation Restoring Hope 950
Uganda	42,169,690	30.7bn	547m	45,000	45,000	-	-	-	1,400	10,000	AMISOM 6,022; UNSOM 530; UNMISS 2

**Source, Kaleab Tadesse, (2021), 'Military Power as Foreign Policy Instrument: Post-1991 Ethiopian Peace Support Operations in the Horn of Africa', (P, 94)**

The Red Book<sup>25</sup> sees the ENDF as the last stronghold and bulwark of revolutionary democracy, according to Yonas Tariku (2022). In other words, the two main and connected goals of the institutional capability-building activities are: building a defense capacity to stave off opponents both inside and outside the revolutionary democratic system who seek to overthrow it violently; and establishing a defensive capability that, by cooperating with other models of conflict, avoids the risks of war. He also said that; in a nutshell, the document contrasts the process of constructing


<sup>25</sup> Yonas (2022), stated that the Red Book is translated into Amharic as 'Politicawi Ginbata' (p,48)

an army in a liberal democracy with a developing revolutionary democracy. The statement asserts that in an established liberal democratic society, liberal democracy has achieved hegemony.

The new administration's reforms, as per Jos et al. (2022), are intended to professionalize the security sector by bringing its goals and organization more in line with Ethiopia's interests as a nation and with international norms than with the coalition responsible for governing. They also elaborated that, the administrative framework that the EPRDF used has also been impacted by the change. The Federal Attorney General's Office, the Ministry of Federal Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense were previously under the prime minister. The National Defense Force, the Special Force (often referred to as Agazi), the espionage offices, the police, and the prison commission were among the security forces that these ministerial offices controlled.

Figures 4 illustrated, however, that Ethiopia, under the Prosperity Party's rule, must go through two security sector reorganizations in 2018. The second security sector structure held in 2021 shows the change of Federal Attorney General's Office into Ministry of Justice. This reform is utilized to enhance the capacity of the country's internal security and to address regional security respectively.

**Figure 4. Security Sector Structure Amendment in 2018**



*Source: Jos Meester, Guido Lanfranchi, Tefera Negash Gebregzianher (2022), 'A Clash of Nationalism and the Remarking of the Ethiopian State: The Political Economy of Ethiopia's Transition', (P, 45)*

### **C. Economy**

The potential of the economy is another aspect of regional hegemony. The nation's military capability and other development areas profited from economic expansion. Power, when interpreted in material terms, emphasizes economic factors including the availability of natural resources, capital, control over a sizable intrinsic market, and favorable positioning in producing

high-value commodities, according to Yonas K. (2020). He also said that having these vital resources gives a regional power the ability to lead economically and deliver public goods through encouraging free trade, providing a market for distressed goods, maintaining capital flows, acting as a lender of last resort, maintaining stable exchange rates, and organizing macroeconomic policies.

Regarding the economy and regional power, there are some traits. These are: compared to their region, regional powers have a considerably larger land area and population; the average per capita income of certain regional powers exceeds the average for the region; regional powers have demonstrated a greater average GDP growth rate and make a substantial contribution to both global and regional growth; an important share of international trade is vindicated by the regional power; Compared to other nations in the area, the economic structures of regional powers are more distinct; regional powers typically have greater values of human capital than other nations in the region; regional powers exhibit reduced spending; regional powers have an impact on regional association as well as the monetary policies of their surrounding nations (Kappel, 2011).

The concept of a developmental state guided Ethiopia's economic structure under the EPRDF. As Perez shows, in Japan and East Asia in the years following World War II, the government took the lead in fostering industrialization, which is linked to the developmental state. The development of a political-economic confederation was essential to the creation of these nations' developmental states. This confederation resulted in the creation of a specialized government administration apparatus with extensive powers that oversaw the development efforts, at least in the early going (Perez, 2008).

The developmental state idea was embraced by the EPRDF during Meles's leadership. From the time liberation movement, Meles has disagreed with liberalism's approach to economic growth. He contends that a lack of understanding of the economic background of developing nations is the

reason why neo-liberal ideas are ineffective. In Meles' view, democratic change should only be pursued once a certain level of economic growth has been principally attained. He claims that the pervasive poverty and the lack of democracy make neo-liberalism incompatible with the weak countries (Tsegab, 2021). Meles claims that three elements are necessary for defining a developmental state:

*First, it must be autonomous from the private sector but should guide it. For this he recommends that the state should be in control of what he calls the "commanding heights" of the economy such as banks and utilities; second it must be obsessed with development, that development should be its "overriding priority" and thirdly the hegemony of developmental discourse should be incorporated in the norms and value system of the society (Ibid, p 27).*

Getasew (2022, p. 17) came to the conclusion that "Performance-oriented governance" reflected the developmental state. The developmental state also strongly promoted industrialization; however, the industry was in its infancy due to the government's limited openness to foreign direct investment, despite its modest GDP contribution. Even though there was an unequal distribution of wealth during the EPRDF's developmental state, Getasew continued, the nation's economy was still growing.

The Home-growing Economic Reform is the basis of the Ethiopian economy under the Prosperity Party. The government privatization intentions and program were made concrete by the HGER agenda, which was to be administered by a recommending council composed of public professionals. Reducing the public sector shortage and the debt load was the agenda's primary goal, as it recognized the need to create jobs in all sectors and repositioned Ethiopia as an appealing destination for desperately needed foreign direct investment. Those who opposed the economic reform agenda said that it did not provide homegrown solutions and that Ethiopia's unique structural issues and social demands were not addressed by the suggested economic strategies. Rather, the reforming agenda primarily implemented international financial institutions recommendations that addressed debt reduction through cost-cutting measures, reduced governmental regulation and system, public asset sales to investors, and support for private market access (Wedekind, 2024).

Ethiopia's ability to exercise regional hegemony can also be demonstrated by several other factors, including water hegemony, soft hegemony (her position in international arenas and regional sub-regional organizations), geostrategic hegemony, and cultural hegemony. However, Ethiopia is not always viewed as the hegemon. Although others view Ethiopia as a hegemon that is "imperfect," they do not discount Ethiopia's considerable potential to become one.

Dehéz (2008) used two main factors—constraints and catalysts—to illustrate Ethiopian hegemony's promise but flaws. Once more, the variable constraint was divided into internal and external components. The former highlights ethnicity as a concern within the nation's sociopolitical framework. The reason for this is that liberation movements are a huge problem for Ethiopia since most ethnic groups view Ethiopia as a colonial state. The regional constraint is the latter kind of restriction. This limitation demonstrates how familiar the continent and the surrounding area are with conflict and warfare. The nature of these wars and conflicts is transitional- the majority are civil wars. Neo-liberalist and neo-Gramscian ideologies concur on one point: national hegemony, which is founded by a social class, serves as the foundation for international hegemony. It is impossible to discern the difference between international and domestic policy. Thus, according to le Gourirlec (2018), the theories depict the flawed hegemony of the Ethiopia. Additionally, Dehéz (2008) demonstrates that the second variable—the regional constraint—is viewed as the catalyst. Ethiopia is a powerful country with the potential to be the hegemon of the Horn of Africa, but due to its unresolved internal issues and lack of regional peace and stability, Ethiopia's hegemonic strength is not even recognized by regional and sub-regional organizations.

### **3.1.2 Kenya**

Kenya is one of the continent's principal states. Like most African nations, Kenya has a history of colonization, but it also has a pre-colonial past. As per Ndege's (2009) findings, Kenyan communities are classified according to their bionomic variety pre-colonization. While some communities, like the Agikuyu and Miji Kenda, have developed agricultural living standards, others, like the Maasai and Samburu, practice pastoralist types of production. In addition to the Ogiek, who lived off of hunting and gathering, the bulk, like the Luo and the Abagusii,

accommodate a combination of agricultural cultivation and animal rearing. He also mentioned that communities were highly fragmented. Also, West of Lake Victoria, in the inter-lacustrine area, were the principal locations of centralized kingdoms. In Kenyan groups living before colonization, ethnic boundaries were brittle. Limited and sporadic conflict, intermarriages, and trade were the hallmarks of interethnic contacts. Moreover, he claimed that colonialism just gave the innate dynamism of the communities a new form, significance, and direction.

England started settling in East Africa, encompassing British East Africa, while the other colonial powers focused on other parts of the Dark Continent. Guard seriously what would become Kenya in 1920 during the first ten years of the 1900s. Colonial cities like Nairobi started to appear all over Kenya, mostly around railways and amid lush pastoral areas. Several issues would cause turmoil in Kenya and give rise to discontent among the indigenous populations over their British rulers. The ideas of land possession and farming varied between the colonizers and local society, which could have the greatest influence. These differences would include religion, economic and social, and education (Alexander, 2005).

The Mau Mau is the most notable insurgent force in Kenyan history. Insurgent movements were held in Kenya to demand freedom. Comprising of two interrelated conflicts, the Mau Mau Rebellion was a difficult fight. Kenya's largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu people, were involved in a federation of tribe feuds between sects. Ferocity among the Kikuyu tribe broke out due to dissension about the best way to implement political and economic changes for Kenya's African population, dividing the tribe into radical and moderate groups. A group of leaders appointed by the British led the average ranks of the Kikuyu; in exchange for their loyalty, these masters received financial benefits that led to their emergence as an exclusive segment of Kikuyu society. Those unbenefited social classes stand for military-based struggle. The moderate faction was that portion of the Kikuyu that supported British colonial rule. As a result of the radical camp's terror campaign against loyalist Kikuyu who would not accept British control in 1952, the conflict between these groups became more violent. Kenyan colonial authorities dub those involved in the rebellion the Mau Mau. The Mau Mau revolted against British colonization and economic

inequities resulting from land confiscation. Some members of the adjacent Embu and Meru tribes also backed the insurrection and the Kikuyu (Pittman, 2016).

Kenyan ethnicity is another important feature. Timothy (2012) demonstrates that colonial regimes tried to organize captured citizens—property of being stateless appeared disorganized and perplexing—into coherent and controllable managerial divisions. Tribes are conveniently thought to be less advanced than governments, which makes the British way of the new imperialism morally acceptable because it implies that primitive tribesmen were not capable of self-government. As the table illustrates, Kenya is made up of several regional states and ethnic groups.

**Table 3.2 The Arrangement of Kenya's Ethnic and Regional States.**

Regions	Ethic Composition	Comments
Nairobi	47% Kikuyu 16% Luhya 15% Luo 15% Kamba	Kenya's most ethnically diverse region
Coast	Smaller coastal communities	96% of Kenya's Coastal communities live in coast
Eastern	55% Kamba	87% of all Kamba live in Eastern 97% of all Meru/Embu live in Eastern
North-Eastern	96% Somali	95% of all Somali live in North-Eastern
Rift Valley	51% Kalenjin 15% Kikuyu 7% Maasai	95% of all Kalenjin live in Rift Valley 97% of all Maasai live in Rift Valley

Western	88% Luhya	80% of all Luhya live in Western
Nyanza	63% Luo	87% of all Luo live in Nyanza
	31% Kisii	95% of all Kisii live in Nyanza

*Source: Nathan Oyori Ogechi (2019), 'Ethnicity, Language, and Identity in Kenya', (p, 115-116).*

Regional hegemonic determinants are used to highlight Kenya's perspective, just as they are in the case of Ethiopia. Kenyan variables differ differently from those of other Kenyan cases- economy and regional role.

**A. Economy**

As an alternative, Kenya prioritizes its economic over its military in its hegemonic quest. Due to Kenya's free economy, Nairobi, the country's capital, has become a center for global investment (Lee Mwith, 2015). Kenya therefore began an economic power merger with the East African Community, which includes Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania. With relation to the political goal of establishing the East African Federation, Kenya is collaborating with the other EAC members to sign agreements in order to have a common bill in the area of economy. Kenya wants to dominate politics and business in the EAC (Rane, World View, 2013).

The foreign policy of Kenya highly supported economic development. Wanyama (2013) briefly explained that, following the conclusion of the Cold War in the early 1990s, Kenya's foreign policy became focused on Eastern Africa, with the overall goal of preserving peaceful coexistence with other countries while advancing regionalism. Within the framework of multilateral relations, Kenya seeks association as a means of advancing its economic development.<sup>26</sup> Wanyama also

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
<sup>26</sup> Majorly influencing Kenya's foreign policy is regional integration, which is promoted by a number of regional projects like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the East African Community. Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation and African Caribbean and Pacific-European Union Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Ibid).

asserted that Kenya significantly uses economic diplomacy. In Kenya, economic diplomacy is more of a response to shifts in the international environment than a concept that delineates differences in practice and policy. To develop regional economic commissions, particularly the EAC and COMESA, and make them competitive stepping stones to emerging and global markets, economic diplomacy is thus a means of advancing the impartial rules of international commerce

The other strategy of Kenya to enhance hegemony through its economy is infrastructural development with the neighboring countries. According to Joseph (2018) as a way for a state to preserve and uphold its hegemonic profile, Kenya aims to provide regional economic public goods through infrastructure projects, such as a connecting regional transport system. Kenya has a development program to be achieved in 2030 employing a huge scale of infrastructural evolution in the region. As a result, Kenya is building ports, railways, airports, and highways, which interconnect Kenya with the rest of the region's countries. For instance, Joseph showed the Lamu Port and Lamu-Southern Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor- connecting Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Kenya- as a magnificent infrastructural project with the implementation of advanced technology. As a result, Kenya is taken as a preeminent country in the region. As a result, infrastructural improvement assures economic development and regional peace and security.

Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (2024) reported that, in the East African region, Kenya is exhibiting remarkable economic growth. The country's economy was susceptible to the COVID-19 pandemic but recovered fairly quickly afterward. Poverty decreased from 45.3% in 2019 to 34.4% in 2022, although there was a crisis from 2020 to 2022. The figure 5 depicts the socioeconomic progress of Kenya from 2019 to 2022.

**Figure 5 Socioeconomic of Kenya**



Data source Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (2024)

### **B. Regional Role**

The discussion here centers on Kenya's contribution to regional integration. According to Ng'eno et al. (2003), the classic trade theory—which holds that free trade is preferable to all other trade systems—supports regional integration. They added that based on this fundamental tenet, it is expected that further integration of more nations will enhance the welfare of the participating nations, given that trade creation, limited trade diversion, or trade creation surpassing trade diversion results from the arrangement.

A major adjustment to regional integration has been made by the Kenyan parliament, based on Article 2 sub-article of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution. The country's regional connection and treaty ratification processes were highlighted in the article. Since Kenya gained its independence, the Kenyan Parliament has played a part in the regional integration of Eastern Africa (Inzofu, 2022). The House of Committee on Regionalism has been activated by the Kenyan Parliament. Under the provisions of Standing Order No. 212, the committee was specifically formed for regional integration. The committee is accountable for: (a), increasing the House's engagement in the

establishment and escalation of the regional integration process in the EAC and wider Africa; (b), looking through the transcripts of the pertinent discussions and resolutions from the EALA; (c), reviewing the EALA Acts and Bills that have been submitted in the EALA on EAC; (d), looking through the minutes of other regional integration groups' discussions and decisions; (e), looking through the minutes of other regional integration groups' discussions and decisions; (f), looking into and analyzing any further regional integration-related issues that called for Parliamentary action (Ibid).

Kenya has drafted a policy on the subject of regional integration as well. As a key tool for greater intraregional trade, investment, and growth, regional integration is anticipated to generate significant economic benefits for Kenya, which is why the policy states that the creation of a strategy on the subject is necessary. Nonetheless, the policy draft document stated that the nation has participated in regional integration for a considerable amount of time without having a clear policy to direct its actions. Due to this, there have been inconsistencies in the commitments made, redundant work that has wasted finance, and little progress made toward realizing the full potential of these regional integration projects. This policy strategy enhanced the regional integration role of Kenya and also harmonized regional integration (Regional Integration Policy of Kenya, 2015). The policy aimed to achieve the following policy areas- (these policy areas are directly quoted from the Regional Integration Policy of Kenya, 2015, p, 10)). These are: i). Pursue a coherent regional integration policy framework and a coordinated approach to regional and international engagements; ii). Maintaining peace and security and guaranteeing sustainability of livelihoods; iii). Convergence of national and regional macroeconomic policy framework; iv). Advance Kenya's national interests through innovative commercial diplomacy; v). Joint economic development corridors for enhanced competitiveness; vi). Regional management of trans-boundary natural resources; vii). Regional integration platform for engagement with the global economy- using RECs as a gateway to the globalization of policy interventions; viii). Consolidation of regional market and integration into the global economy; ix). Improvement of the quality of human capital and creation of opportunities for employment and poverty reduction and wealth creation; x). Information access; and xi). Resources for regional integration.

Kenya's desire to play a regional role is linked to its economic policies, as the country is entirely liberal. Economy and regional role are the primary variables that reveal the country's desire and focal areas for the sake of hegemony, leader's influence, and military capacity, and the role of the country in peace and security can also be noted. As previously stated, the country's regional hegemony concentrated solely on East Africa. Kenya has been pursuing regional hegemony, from its inception to its leadership in the EAC as it evidenced above.

### **3.2 Ethiopia and Kenya: Rivalry for Hegemony?**

The concept of hegemony is rarely mentioned in discussions about Ethiopia and Kenya's relations. The fundamental question that this study intended to answer was if there is hegemonic rivalry between Ethiopia and Kenya, and if so, what this means for their bilateral relations since 2018. Though based on the two countries' foreign policies and relatively peaceful relations, the term hegemony is difficult to raise. However, this study revealed two sides of the argument on the two countries' desire for regional hegemony and its implications for Ethiopia and Kenya's bilateral diplomatic relations.

The first conceivable postulate sequence is collaboration over hegemonic rivalry. Interviewee I<sup>27</sup> entire agreement with the case of cooperation between the two countries. The respondent emphasized Kenya and Ethiopia's shared values and ambitions, which include the pursuit of peace and development. Furthermore, the respondent mentioned practical evidence to show that the two countries, such as members in good standing in the continental organization, the African Union, and the regional organization IGAD, Kenya and Ethiopia have worked together to promote regional peace and security initiatives.

More precisely, Interviewee II<sup>28</sup>, indicated the two countries' regional and international cooperation. The key informant stated that they have regional cooperation and obligations to stabilize the Horn of Africa by addressing terrorism, piracy, climate change, drought, and the

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<sup>27</sup> Interviewee I (April,8, 2024)- is an official of Kenya Embassy in Ethiopia.

<sup>28</sup> Interviewee II (March,4, 2024)- is a senior diplomat who is still serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

region's future civil wars. The two countries are also still cooperating with their common enemy al-Shabab. Stabilizing Somalia is also a task that cannot be overlooked. In this regard, there is a need to assess what Post-2024 Somalia might look like after the withdrawal of ATMIS, and prepare in progress. In the case international arena, the respondent added that they work together to advocate for African perspectives on climate change, development aid, the eradication of severe poverty, and job opportunities, as well as a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Since 2018, economic and security interdependence has been a more prominent aspect in Ethiopia-Kenya ties. Ethiopia and Kenya are economically connected in a variety of ways. Kenya is Ethiopia's greatest trading partner, with Ethiopia coming in second. The two countries are also members of the COMESA and the EAC, with Ethiopia on its way, which encourage regional economic cooperation. Because of the melioration of the two countries bilateral relation, the economic relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya has grown dramatically in recent years. This is owing to the rise of the Ethiopian economy, which has made Ethiopia a more appealing market for Kenyan goods and services said interviewee III<sup>29</sup>.

These shreds of evidence support the conclusion that the Ethiopia-Kenya bilateral relationship is based on collaboration rather than hegemony. Interviewee I boldly said that there is no hegemonic rivalry between Ethiopia and Kenya because both countries share common ideals and objectives and have remained strong as a result of good neighborliness and a strong commitment to mutually beneficial cooperation.

Regarding the likelihood of hegemony rivalry between Ethiopia and Kenya, although the two nations' bilateral diplomatic ties are mutual, there is a prospect of hegemonic rivalry between Ethiopia and Kenya. According to Interviewee III, Ethiopia and Kenya have the potential for hegemonic rivalry. Both countries, Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa and Kenya in Eastern Africa are

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<sup>29</sup> Interviewee III (May, 8,2024)- is a researcher at African affairs research directorate in the Institute of Foreign Affairs.

the largest economies in their respective sub-regions and have a history of fighting for regional hegemony. The respondent also stated that Ethiopia and Kenya are striving for economic domination in the region. Here, it is important to note that, as neoliberalism addressed hegemony through economic dominance, the two countries are pursuing economic power to leverage each other and the region. As previously noted, neoliberalism is about dominance rather than pure hegemony. This point is proven by the two countries.

Both countries are competing for investment and trade possibilities, and both are attempting to establish themselves as the economic hubs of their respective sub-regions. Ethiopia and Kenya are also vying for political dominance in the region. Both countries are attempting to form alliances with other countries in the region and impact regional policy. In addition, Ethiopia and Kenya are likewise competing for regional military superiority. Ethiopia and Kenya are investing in their forces and attempting to build a regional security designer that benefits their interests.

According to Interviewee II, despite the two countries' cordial relations, it is best to investigate the ambition for hegemony. Interviewee II also asserted that Kenya's foreign relations policy has recently been perceived as a leading position in the region, with a strong desire to become an African and regional leader at the world level, particularly after President William Ruto took office. Therefore, the informant asserted that “there are tendencies to compete with Ethiopia as the country has faced internal challenges such as internal conflicts, which in turn affected its previous hegemonic role in the region”. Furthermore, the tripartite agreement signed among Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia in 2018 was not seen as positive by the Kenyan side. However, other engagements with Kenya normalized the relations. Furthermore, the role of Kenya in the Pretoria Peace Agreement, which ended the Conflict with the TPLF, should be well noted and indicates the hegemonic rivalry cannot be summarized in the zero-sum up game said the diplomat.

The structural realism argued that, no matter what the domain of the government, diversity of culture, and the international system is the motive for each great power. Power for structural realism is a means and also an end in the anarchical world. Kenneth Waltz- a defensive realist, argued that it is impetuous to track hegemony through the enlarging of power because the

international system would not allow it. Yet, John Mearsheimer (2013)-offensive realists claim that it is a must to acquire power as much as possible to pursue hegemony in this anarchical world system. The balance of power, according to the structural realist is made by “the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power” (Ibid, p, 78). Therefore, Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa, and Kenya in the side of Eastern Africa are aiming to have both offensive and defensive strategy to pursue hegemony.

In this respect- the presence of the hegemonic rivalry between Ethiopia and Kenya, has it is on significant encroachment on the bilateral diplomatic relations of the two countries. In response to this argument, Interviewee III emphasizes three possible instances. There is tension over regional issues (Ethiopia and Kenya have often clashed over regional issues, such as the conflict in South Sudan and the issue of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. These tensions have sometimes spilled over into their bilateral relations), mistrust and suspicion (this has made it difficult for the two countries to cooperate on issues of mutual interest), and competition for international support (Ethiopia and Kenya are both competing for international support in their rivalry for regional dominance. This competition has sometimes led to tensions between the two countries and their international partners).

The two countries' hegemony potential since 2018, asymmetrical power dynamics were presented between Ethiopia and Kenya because of the countries' differences in terms of geographical size, population, politics, peace and stability, and economic development. This difference between the two countries brought an advantage for Ethiopia said Interviewee III. Interviewee III illustrated that Ethiopia has better bargaining power in trade and investment negotiations. Ethiopia is also able to deploy more military might into the region than Kenya. Kenya has some advantages in its dealings with Ethiopia. Kenya is a more advanced country than Ethiopia, with a higher level of life and a more diverse economy. Kenya's political system is more stable than Ethiopia's. Overall, the connection between Ethiopia and Kenya is complicated and multifaceted. While the partnership has certain uneven power dynamics, both countries have strengths and disadvantages.

The pastoral conflict on the Ethiopia-Kenya border is longstanding. According to Abdissa (2007), the main motivations of their historical relations over the centuries have been Gam's aims to gain access to new pastoral resources in Borana-controlled territories and the Gabbra's attempts to strengthen their rights to the resources they jointly exploit with the Borana. He also defined the pastoralists' early interactions as the boundary between British East Africa and Ethiopia. Then, British East Africa and Ethiopia used diplomacy to divide pastoralists between the two kingdoms. Borana came under the Ethiopian administration. In contrast, the Gam and Gabbra were given to British East Africa. This historical fact hides a turmoil issue with the bilateral relations of the two countries. Thus, he concluded that The Kenyan pastoral border area is where the interests of Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia the Gulf, and also the Western world collide. Other than regional identity, religious factors are also involved- it is the region where Islam and Christianity compete for territory. These two clash with the local Borana Oromo religion and culture. As a result, it is difficult to talk about the area as if it were simple, with border conflicts limited to pastoral conflict.

This fact can be illustrated through the “new regionalism or second wave regionalism”- a regionalism between states and other regional stakeholders with a mutual influence over sharing interests (Yonas, 2012, p,3). The English School theory also supports this concept. Ethiopia and Kenya's shared society aspire to have a hegemonic interdependent as the theory argued.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **4. Elucidation of the Opportunities and Challenges of the Bilateral Diplomatic Relation between Ethiopia and Kenya Since 2018**

For the past six decades, Ethiopia and Kenya have had cordial bilateral diplomatic relations due to geographical closeness, historical, cultural, and sociological ties, and military collaboration against a common adversary. Even though the leaders on both sides have changed, the two countries' mutual relations remain reciprocal. This chapter addresses the stated subject of opportunities and problems within Ethiopia's dual relationship with Kenya since 2018 as it is proposed in this study.

According to interviewee III, Ethiopia and Kenya have a long and complicated history extending back to pre-colonial times. The two countries have a border of more than 800 kilometers and strong cultural and economic links. Furthermore, Interviewee II stated that Ethiopia and Kenya have a long history of cultural, economic, and political interactions, as evidenced by the signing of approximately 61 MoU/Agreements in the areas of economic, political, defense, and other forms of cooperation.

Ethiopia's most recent Prime Minister took office in 2018 and began his first international tour in Djibouti, followed by Sudan, and Kenya was his third. According to the ENA (2018) report, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed landed in Nairobi on May 6, 2018, on a two-day state visit. The report further mentioned that the Prime Minister visited Kenya at the request of President Uhuru Kenyatta. The two leaders discussed bilateral and shared issues.

Interviewee I stated that, although there was a high level of visits between the two nations, the COVID-19 epidemic and the strife in the north of Ethiopia could not allow for actual meetings or negotiations. On the other hand, Interviewee II claimed that the two countries have exchanged high-level visits in recent years. When Prime Minister Abiy gained power, Kenya was one of the first nearby nations to which he paid an official visit, and similar visits continue to this day. The

respondent said, as a result, such visits have a positive impact on the implementation of cooperation agreements in numerous areas, and they allow countries to collaborate in new directions.

Bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Kenya have improved significantly in recent years. This is due in part to Ethiopia's political and economic changes, which have been enacted since 2018. These reforms have resulted in a more open and democratic society in Ethiopia, as well as a better relationship with Kenya. Ethiopia's bilateral ties with Kenya have been significantly impacted by reforms undertaken since 2018. These measures have improved relations between Ethiopia and Kenya. The two countries have enhanced collaboration on several subjects, such as commerce, investment, and security (Interviewee III).

Furthermore, interviewee II argued Ethiopia and Kenya have strong bilateral relations, particularly in terms of security. For the past several years, the two nations have formed joint ministerial and border commission forums and have engaged in negotiations on mutual concerns. Furthermore, the two countries' collaboration in political and security matters is improving on a regular basis.

Interviewee II also indicated that the engagement has remained correlative to this day, with both countries wanting to take the relationship to the next level. Furthermore, this depth of relations is witnessed as the two countries convened the 36th Ethio-Kenya Joint Ministerial Commission meeting from 19-21 February 2024 in Addis Ababa and signed seven memorandums of understanding- cooperation on Correctional Services, Tourism, Culture, Wildlife Conservation, Blue Economy and Fisheries, Petroleum Sector Development, and Capacity Building in Public Service.

The two countries' dual relationship presents both opportunities and challenges. Based on the ideas and concepts established in Chapter Two and the cooperative and hegemonic rivalry nature of the

two countries outlined in Chapter Three, the following significant opportunities and challenges are raised and articulated.

#### **4.1 Opportunities Affiliated to the Bilateral Diplomatic Relation of Ethiopia and Kenya**

Bilateral diplomatic relations between countries were based on mutual benefit. As a result, Ethiopia and Kenya's bilateral diplomatic relations occasionally provided opportunities. Since 2018, what prospects have arisen due to bilateral diplomatic ties between countries is discussed here.

The growth and development demands of the two countries give varied opportunities, said Interviewee I. With this regard, this study identifies opportunities related to economic and political features separately.

##### **A. Economy**

Ethiopia and Kenya have several potential to cooperate on economic concerns. Interviewee III stated that the two countries may collaborate on infrastructure projects, as well as increase commerce and investment. With this assumption, Addisu (2019) stated that Ethiopia and Kenya's bilateral economic relations have been based on economic reforms implemented by Ethiopia's new administrator, the Prosperity Party, since 2018. The Prosperity Party is liberalizing major economic sectors such as telecommunications, banking, and others for development.

According to Interviewee II, there is potential for economic progress as cross-country infrastructure construction, energy generation and transmission, the establishment of a joint customs checkpoint in Moyale, and numerous other similar agreements have been signed and implemented to stimulate trade and investment. As a result, there is both current and future economic collaboration that has created opportunities for both Ethiopia and Kenya. The table below lists these economic opportunities.

**Table 4.1 Economic Opportunities Linked to the Bilateral Diplomatic Relation of Ethiopia and Kenya Since 2018**

Economic Sector	Descriptions	Sources
Telecommunication	<p>In 2021, Safari com was awarded a license to operate in Ethiopia. Safari com is the consequence of the Ethiopian Prime Minister's ambition to encourage and attract foreign investment, as well as important initiatives to improve relations between Kenya and Ethiopia, Kenya's former President Kenyatta stated at the launch of Safari com.</p> <p>Furthermore, the two countries are collaborating on a digital economy. Following the COVID-19 epidemic, both demand and supply for e-commerce increased. They hosted a policy panel discussion to strengthen the digital economy by focusing on regional issues and supporting local enterprises.<sup>30</sup></p>	[1-3]
Bank	<p>Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), a 125-year-old bank that operates in Kenya and East Africa, is one of the banks that has expressed interest in Ethiopia's financial industry. On October 27, 2022, the CEO of KCB met with former EIC Deputy Commissioner Temesgen Tilahun in Addis Ababa.<sup>31</sup></p>	[4]
Port	<p>Ethiopia, a landlocked country, relies on Djibouti for port access; however, since 2022, Ethiopia has been</p>	[5-6]

<sup>30</sup> [1]Walta Tv, 2021, 'Ethiopia Inks Agreement With Kenyan Telecom', <https://waltainfo.com/ethiopia-inks-agreement-with-kenyan-telecom/>,

[2] Fana Broadcasting, 2021, 'Telecom License Award Marks Historic Moment in Kenya-Ethiopia Mutual Prosperity Drive: President Kenyatta' <https://www.fanabc.com/english/telecom-license-award-marks-historic-moment-in-kenya-ethiopia-mutual-prosperity-drive-president-kenyatta/>

[3] Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), 2023, 'Digital Economy: Ethiopia & Kenya', Washington, DC

<sup>31</sup> [4] Tesfa-Alem Tekle, 2022, 'Kenya's KCB Bank Now Eyes Ethiopia Financial Market', The East African, <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/business/kenya-kcb-eyes-ethiopian-banking-market-4000494>,

	using Lamu and Mombasa ports instead. The former Minister of Transport and Logistics emphasized that having access to those ports is important for Ethiopia since it is inexpensive both in terms of cost and distance. The port boosts Kenya's economy, notably in the aftermath of the epidemic COVID-19. The project began in 2012. <sup>32</sup>	
Hydropower	Ethiopia has signed an agreement to supply 600 megawatts of hydropower to Kenya in 2022. The goal is to sell hydropower at the lowest possible cost. The project took place in 2016 and cost 1.3 billion US dollars. The intention is to export 2000 megawatts to Tanzania and South Africa as well. Hydropower exports will contribute to Ethiopia's economic development. <sup>33</sup>	[7]

In addition, the two countries maintain bilateral cooperation in the industries of technology and tourism. According to the Fana Broadcasting report (2020), Former Ethiopian Ambassador to Kenya, Ambassador Meles Alema, and Kenyan Minister of Tourist and Wildlife, Nejib Balala, have expressed mutual interest and discussed the tourist sector in 2020.

<sup>32</sup> [5] Metasebia Teshome, 2022, 'Ethiopia Alternates to Kenya's Port to Alleviate Djibouti Dependency', <https://www.capitalethiopia.com/2022/01/31/ethiopia-alternates-to-kenyas-port-to-alleviate-djibouti-dependency/>,

[6] Further Africa, 2021, 'Ethiopia Holds the Key to Kenya's Lamu Port Success', <https://furtherafrica.com/2021/05/31/ethiopia-holds-the-key-to-kenyas-lamu-port-success/>,

<sup>33</sup>[7] Xinhua, 2022, 'Ethiopia Starts Energy Export to Kenya', <https://english.news.cn/africa/20221118/f40fa3814f374d4b982dbfbc3c2950df/c.html>,

## **B. Political Issue Matters**

Security, regional cooperation, and societal integration are examples of politically significant issues. Ethiopia and Kenya can also collaborate on security matters. Interviewee III believes that the two countries can collaborate to combat terrorism and organized crime, as well as on border security issues. As a result, according to Addis-Standard (2022), former Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service Director General Temsegen Tiruneh and Kenyan National Intelligence Service Director General Filp Kamuru signed an agreement in 2022 to “Jointly prevent organized crimes and terrorism”. The traits outlined in the agreement include the ability to resist terrorism, unauthorized weapons and money, systemic crimes, and human trafficking. There is a new agreement between the two countries to fight terrorism. According to Fana Broadcasting (2022), Ethiopian Federal Police Commissioner General Demelash Gebremichael would meet with Hilary Nzioki Mutyambai, the third Inspector General of the Kenya National Police Service Commission, in 2022. During their discussion, they agreed to work together to combat Al-Shabab and OLF-Shene for the sake of regional peace and security.

Furthermore, Ethiopia and Kenya are both significant players in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. The two countries can cooperate to enhance regional peace and stability. In addition, Ethiopia and Kenya have people-to-people relations. Both countries have the same culture and history, and there is a lot of cross-border trade and travel. These interpersonal relationships can serve to foster trust and understanding between the two countries.

### **4.2 Challenges Associated With the Bilateral Diplomatic Relation of Ethiopia and Kenya**

The Somalia issue, as described in earlier chapters, was one of the primary bilateral diplomatic ties initiated by Ethiopia and Kenya. However, the subject of Somalia has also challenged the dual relations of the two countries. Belete (2022) alleged that Ethiopia and Kenya intervened in Somalia's internal political affairs. Kenya frequently made strategic decisions regarding Somalia's internal matters. Jubaland, as Belete describes it, is a strategic location where Al-Shababa conducts terrorist assaults against both countries, but mostly Kenya. Not only that, but Jubaland is a tactical location for welfare--it is a key trade nexus, includes a vast port near to Kismayo, has an airport,

agricultural development, and has other developments. Kenya has recently consolidated her control over Jubaland, undermining Ethiopia's dominance in that key region.

Belete also stated that because of Jubaland, Ethiopia, and Kenya have come closer to a dispute. He also stated that the clans found in Jubaland are mostly found in Ethiopia's Somali-Ogaden and have ties to the ONLF), which will have an impact on Ethiopia's internal political issues. The Somali Regional Government of Ethiopia's progress, when Somalia was and is still unstable, caused Somalia to retain animosity. Ethiopia's failure to incorporate Somalia's presidential election as part of her national interest forces Ethiopia to act now and in the future. Kenya intervened in the preceding Somali presidential election, whilst Ethiopia was largely ignored. As a result, President Sheikh Mohamud was appointed.

The other challenging issue related to Somalia and the bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Kenya is the Tripartite Agreement, which was signed by Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia. Abdur Rahaman (2020) demonstrated that the tripartite agreement signed by Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia was initially and subsidiary in Asmara and Bahir Dar in 2018 and upgraded in 2020 in Asmara with three plans of action. The agreement included core points. These are: maintaining peace, stability, and security, improving economic and social growth, and supporting initiatives to promote successful regional collaboration.

The agreement between and among the three countries is a new regional bloc called Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC). Abdur showed that:

*Regional powerhouse Kenya plays a prominent, to some extent even dominating, role in IGAD. The HoAC initiative certainly is an attempt by Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia to curtail Kenyan influence in their domestic affairs and broader regional politics. They increasingly seek to protect national prestige and state sovereignty in security affairs, and establishing an additional regional bloc certainly helps in this regard. Moreover, Kenya's Lamu Port Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) project with Ethiopia and South Sudan would lose insignificance once the proposed HoAC takes on economic issues. As Kenya worries about losing*

*influence in the region, it does not come as a surprise that the HoAC proposal was Criticized and branded “anti-IGAD” (n.p).*

The two countries use their political, military, and economic strength to influence one another as well as the rest of the region. Interviewee III showed that Ethiopia's huge size and military capabilities give it great political influence in the region. Ethiopia has utilized its political strength to further its interests in the region and to shape regional affairs. The respondent also stated that Kenya's more stable political system, as well as its close ties to the West, provide it with some political clout in its relationship with Ethiopia. Kenya is part of the Commonwealth of Nations and the EAC. Kenya has utilized its political strength to further its interests in Ethiopia and affect its political growth.

Another form of leverage used by the two countries is military strength. Ethiopia has the largest army in the region. Ethiopia's military is well-equipped and experienced, with a history of involvement in regional conflicts. Ethiopia has utilized military strength to preserve its interests and influence regional affairs, said Interviewee III. Kenya, on the other hand, has a smaller military than Ethiopia, but it is well-equipped and trained. The Kenyan military has a history of engaging in regional peacekeeping operations. Kenya has utilized its military force to advance its own goals while also contributing to regional security. Interviewee III also asserted both countries wield economic power. Ethiopia's enormous population and economy offer it tremendous bargaining power in the area. Ethiopia is a significant market for Kenyan goods and services, as well as a key source of investment in Kenya. Ethiopia has used its economic might to negotiate advantageous trade arrangements with Kenya and to entice Kenyan investment. Kenya, on the other hand, has a more developed economy and a higher standard of living, giving it considerable bargaining power in its relationship with Ethiopia. Kenya has used its economic clout to advance its economic interests in Ethiopia and influence Ethiopian economic policies.

Another difficulty in the economy is the two countries' unequal economic interaction. According to the Trading Economics study (2023), there has been a significant discrepancy between

Ethiopia's export rate to Kenya and Kenya's to Ethiopia since 2018. According to the Trade Economics assessment, Ethiopia had no exports to Kenya in 2018. However, from 2019 to 2021, export commodities include: copper, salt, Sulphur, lime and cement , edible fruits, oils, distillation products, vegetables, cotton, textile, coffee, wood and so on.

From 2018 to 2021, Kenya exported things such as aluminum, live animals, plastic, cereal, flour, starch, milk preparations and products, and other items to Ethiopia consistently. Kenya has a wide range of commodities and a high export rate. This imbalanced export cavity will have a significant impact on the two countries' economic hegemonic goals and bilateral relationships.

Bilateral diplomatic connections are exposed to hazards as well as opportunities; hence, Ethiopia and Kenya's bilateral diplomatic contacts, which lasted over sixty years, presented both possibilities and problems. Furthermore, even after Ethiopia's political and economic reforms in 2018, the countries' bilateral relations have been fraught with opportunities and challenges.

Even though it is difficult to predict the prospective the bilateral diplomatic relationship between the two countries, according to Interviewee III, possible future scenarios can be presented as the following:

**Scenario 1: Continued Cooperation:** in this scenario, Ethiopia and Kenya continue to cooperate on several issues, including trade, investment, security, and regional affairs. The two countries build on their existing foundation of cooperation to address common challenges and achieve mutual benefits. This scenario is most likely if the two countries can manage their differences and build trust and confidence.

**Scenario 2: Increased Competition:** in this scenario, competition between Ethiopia and Kenya intensifies. The two countries compete for resources, markets, and influence in the region. This

scenario is more likely if the two countries are unable to manage their differences and if mistrust and suspicion grow.

**Scenario 3: Conflict:** in this scenario, conflict breaks out between Ethiopia and Kenya. This scenario is the least likely, but it cannot be ruled out if tensions between the two countries escalate.

## Conclusion

In general, Ethiopia and Kenya's rivalry for economic hegemony contributes to stable diplomatic relations by default. This study has shown the roots and types of diplomacy and attempted to show the dual relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya through their foreign policy and key areas of bilateral relations. Moreover, the study also revealed what hegemony is, its implication in international relations, and major arguments for hegemony and also showed the cooperation and hegemonic rivalry between the two countries. The funding of the study also illustrated the bilateral diplomacy of Ethiopia and Kenya's continuities and challenges since 2018. The study utilized primary data from a member of the Kenya Embassy consular staff in Ethiopia, a senior diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, and a researcher at the African Affairs research directorate in the Institute of Foreign Affairs. The primary data is accompanied by the secondary data drawn from publications and media platforms.

Countries in Africa, and particularly in the Horn of Africa, share geographical location, natural resources, history, culture, norms, values, religion, language, and social interconnectedness. This makes it worthwhile to investigate the bilateral diplomatic relations of each Horn of Africa country. Thus, this study looked at two Horn of Africa countries, Ethiopia and Kenya, and assessed their bilateral diplomatic relations since 2018. The study revealed that Ethiopia and Kenya have a 'regional affinities' kind of bilateral relationship, which is conducted between closer neighboring countries with a mutual interest in dealing with challenges that come from any country or group. The empirical evidence of this regional bilateral relationship between the two countries is pointed out after 1963 when Kenya gained independence. Ethiopia's and Kenya's diplomatic relations are based on non-interference and cooperation, which helps to sustain.

The study also identified that the land demarcation set by the foreign powers is a huge problem, not only in the Horn of African Countries but also the whole of Africa. This problem proceeded from Somalia and brought together Ethiopia and Kenya to enhance their relationship. Somalia's land claim from both countries and then the terrorist group Al-Shababa played an important role in the bilateral relationship.

Ethiopia and Kenya's bilateral relationship plays a significant role not only in terms of politics but also in terms of economics and social relations. Ethiopia uses Kenya's port, there is an export-import relationship, hydropower, telecommunications, and other economic factors, and there are clans in both countries.

However, the purpose of this study was to look at the impact of hegemony on Ethiopian-Kenyan relations. Pursuing of hegemony is natural as well as it can be used as a national interest. Both countries seek regional predominance. This provides both opportunities and challenges. Ethiopia's foreign policy and national interests are focused on economic development as well as military might enhancement. Kenya's policy strategy, on the contrary, is to promote economic development. Thus, in order to further their national interests, Ethiopia and Kenya extorted for the benefit of all.

## **Recommendation**

This chapter is concluded with a recommendation to suggest how Ethiopia can maximize the benefit of from the bilateral relationship through the principle of hegemony and reduce associated challenges and leverage. According to the principle of hegemony, military and economic capability are major elements. In the case of Ethiopia and Kenya, not only military and economic development, but also strategic vertical and horizontal diplomatic relations between and among the two countries, as well as societal interactions on the one hand, and on the other hand, with the rest of their neighbors, particularly Somalia, are significant.

Hegemony is a means to an end. Understanding Ethiopia's cooperative and hegemonic rivalry relation with Kenya is clear here. As a result, using the English School concept- societal integration characteristic; structural realism- offensive and defensive thinking; and idealism- economic development, Ethiopia must seek to build a balance of power and acquire hegemony in the region. To hound regional hegemony, Ethiopia must take pragmatic political, social, and economic actions toward its neighboring neighbors, particularly Somalia. Ethiopia must use its clans to impede

Somalia's politics. Somalia's politics have an impact on bilateral relations with Ethiopia and Kenya, as well as the region's stability. Furthermore, Ethiopia must try to improve its economic development along with military strength and inter-societal connections.

Ethiopia and Kenya have a well-balanced relationship, however, there are certain indirect obstacles they confront due to internal political dynamics in both countries since 2018. For example, Ethiopia's tripartite alliance with Eritrea and Somalia had caused indirect conflict between Ethiopia and Kenya. However, Kenya's strategy in Somalia's internal politics, combined with Ethiopia's domestic instability (the war in the northern part of Ethiopia and the tensions in Eritrea), and the Somalia election, which accompanied the recent Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (propinquity of Kenya), has posed a significant challenge to the dual relationship. Economic development and also internal stability are necessary to maintain hegemony and stabilize bilateral relations between the two countries.

The war in Ethiopia, as well as the ongoing volatility and relative tranquility in Kenya, have caused Kenya's economy to grow faster than Ethiopia'. Kenya is also significantly more integrated into Ethiopia's economy than Ethiopia. In addition, Kenya is pursuing international and regional recognition--in terms of leadership quality--President Ruto, internal stability, Kenya's role in combating climate change, and working for regional peace and stability have led the country to be regarded as a dominant force in the Horn of Africa region. According to the BBC (2024), during the visit, the President of the United States, Joe Biden, referred to Kenya as "a major non-NATO ally," making Kenya the first Sub-Saharan African country to receive this appointment. The visit came after the United States held such a welcoming ceremony for the African Emperor Haile Selassie after 120 years.

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## Annex

### Annex One: Checklists

#### **Checklist one:** The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and Kenya Embassy in Ethiopia

These interview questions are prepared for the Master's thesis under the title of “The Bilateral Diplomatic Relation between Ethiopia and Kenya Since 2018: Continuities and Challenges”, thus I assure you that I only use the pieces of information from the interview for the thesis purpose only.

1. How do you describe the bilateral relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya since 2018?
2. What are the most important aspects of the relationships between the two countries recently?
3. Have any recent developments impacted the relationships such as a high level of visit, trade agreement, or political agreement and/or disagreements since 2018?
4. In what areas do you see the most potential for growth in the relationship between these two countries beginning in 2018?
5. What are the potential opportunities and challenges through the countries' bilateral diplomatic relations and how do the two countries maintain cordial diplomatic relations since 2018?
6. Are there any specific initiatives or policies that you believe would be beneficial for improving relations between these two countries?
7. How do Ethiopia and Kenya cooperate on issues of global like international security, and climate change?
8. Do you think there is a hegemonic rivalry between Ethiopia and Kenya? If yes explain how and how the hegemony rivalry affects the diplomatic relations of the two countries

#### **Checklist Two:** Institute of Foreign Affairs

These interview questions are prepared for the Master's thesis under the title of “The Bilateral Diplomatic Relation between Ethiopia and Kenya Since 2018: Continuities and Challenges”, thus I assure you that I only use the pieces of information from the interview for the thesis purpose.

1. What Historical factors influence the bilateral relation of Ethiopia and Kenya from the recent reform of Ethiopia?

2. After 2018, to what extent does economic and security interdependence influence the dual relations of the two countries?
3. Do you think there is a hegemonic rivalry between Ethiopia and Kenya? If so how does the concept of hegemony play out in the bilateral relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya from the period 2018? And also how does the rivalry affect the bilateral diplomatic relation of the two countries?
4. Are there any asymmetrical power dynamics present in the relationship between the two countries since 2018?
5. In what ways do these countries leverage their economic, political, or military power to influence each other and also on the region?
6. What are the key challenges and opportunities facing the bilateral relationship between the two countries, from the given period above?
7. What are the possible future scenarios for the bilateral relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya?

## Annex Two: Key Interview Respondents

Code of Respondents	Institution	Position	Date
Interviewee I	Kenya Embassy	An Official (First Counsellor) of the Kenya Embassy in Ethiopia	April,8,2024
Interviewee II	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Senior Diplomat Who is Still Serving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	March,4,2024
Interviewee III	Institute of Foreign Affairs	Researcher at African Affair Research Directorate	May,8,2024

## Annex Three: Kenya and Ethiopia Ministerial MOU



**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT**  
OFFICE OF THE PRIME CABINET SECRETARY  
AND MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AND DIASPORA AFFAIRS

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### Press Release

For immediate release

### **KENYA AND ETHIOPIA CONCLUDE JOINT FRAMEWORK TO PROMOTE BILATERAL COOPERATION IN STRATEGIC AREAS**

**Addis Ababa, February 21, 2024**

Kenya and Ethiopia today conclude a strategic framework to promote bilateral cooperation in key areas of economic and social development.

The 36th Ethiopia-Kenya Joint Ministerial Commission (JMC) anchors bilateral relations between Kenya and Ethiopia on economic, social, security and foreign relations cooperation, said **Prime Cabinet Secretary and Cabinet Secretary for Foreign and Diaspora Affairs Musalia Mudavadi**, who co-chaired the JMC with **Ethiopia's Foreign Minister Ambassador Taye Atske Selassie**.

*"I am excited by this great opportunity to explore ways to strengthen the friendly relations between our two countries,"* Mudavadi said.

He underlined the need for Kenya and Ethiopia to resolve trade barriers, including tariff and non-tariff barriers, that stifle expansion of trade between the two partners.

The two countries pledged to enhance their cooperation and signed memorandum of understanding in seven specific areas—tourism, wildlife, culture, blue economy, petroleum, correctional services and capacity building in public service.

Selassie reiterated Ethiopia's commitment to work for peace and prosperity, including through enhanced security along the common border.

The two sides further agreed to promote parliamentary diplomacy through exchange visits by the speakers of Kenya's National Assembly and Ethiopia's House of Peoples Representatives.

The 36th JMC further provided an opportunity for Kenya and Ethiopia to enhance their cooperation in regional and global issues of mutual interest.

The JMC, established in 1963, aims to deepen historical ties between the two countries and promote prosperity of the people of the two countries.

The agreed minutes of the two sides set the stage for the implementation of decisions with far reaching impact on bilateral ties. The two sides further agreed on time bound monitoring, including a midterm review hosted by Kenya on February 2025, to assess progress and prepare for the next JMC in 2026.

Mudavadi and Selassie appreciated the JMC negotiation teams spearheaded by Ambassador Fisseh Shawul, Ethiopia's Director General for Africa Affairs, and Kenya's Ambassador Moi Lemoshira, Director General Bilateral and Political Affairs.

The Kenyan delegation included Amb. George Orina, Kenya's envoy in Addis and Mr. Chimwaga Mingo, Secretary, State Department for Roads.

**Annex Four: Map of Ethiopia and Kenya**

