ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

PEACE AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE AFRICAN UNION: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES OF ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Acronyms

ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific

ACPP- African Conflict Prevention Pool

AFRICOM- African Command

AMISOM- African Mission to Somalia

APF- African Peace Facility

APSA- African Peace and Security Architecture

ASF- African Standby Force

AU- African Union

AUC- African Union Commission

CADSP- Common African Defence and Security Policy

CAR- Central African Republic

CEWS- Conflict Early Warning System

CFSP- Common Foreign and Security Policy

DCI- Development Cooperation Instrument

DRC- Democratic Republic of Congo

EASF- East African Standby Force

EASTBRIG- East African Brigade

ECCAS- Economic Community of Central African States

ECCASBRIG- Central African Brigade

EC-JRC- European Commission Joint Research Centre

ECOBRIG- West African Brigade

ECOWAS- Economic Community of West African States

EDF- European Development Fund

ESDP- European Security and Defence Policy

ESS- European Security Strategy

EU- European Union

FOCAC- Forum on Chinese-African Cooperation

FOMAC- Multinational force for Central Africa

IAPF- Italian African Peace Fund

ICC- International Criminal Court

JAES- Joint African-Europe Strategy

JEGs- Joint Expert Groups

NASBRIG- North African Standby Brigade

NATO- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NEPAD- New Partnership for African Development

OAU- Organisation of African Unity

PLANELM- Planning and Management Element

PSC- Peace and Security Council

RECs- Regional Economic Communities

SADC- South African Development Community

SADCBRIG- Southern Standby Brigade

SSR- Security Sector Reform

UN- United nations

UNDP- United Nations Development Program

UNSC- United Nations Security Council

WMD- Weapons of Mass Destruction

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ABSTRACT

The 2007 EU- AU Summit has heralded the inauguration of multiple partnerships between Africa and Europe. Subsequently, issues of peace and security have become among the major dimensions of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted at the end of the summit. A number of goals are declared in this respect and believed to be implemented by means of peace and security partnership with its Action Plan that ran from 2008 to 2010. The plan identifies three priority actions to be executed in three years time. Using a qualitative research methodology, this thesis has evaluated the implementation process of this Action Plan and the progress achieved to date. Moreover, a critical analysis is made on the challenges that the partnership encountered so far. The evaluation has found that the two partners have registered a limited success in realising what they envisaged under their plan. This is particularly true for the goal set to fully operationalise the African Peace and Security Architecture by the year 2010. This has been at the heart of the first Action Plan. The thesis has come up with five major challenges that led to the limited progress. First is the low level of cooperation between the peace and security structures of the African sub-regions and that of the African Union. The AU takes sub-regional bodies as building blocks of its continental peace and security architecture but the level of interaction between the two is not to the desired extent. The second one is the insistence on the myths and rhetoric of African ownership of the peace and security project in the continent. Africa and its organisations, for different reasons, are not up to the task of assuming the ownership status and the thesis has attempted to show how this ill-timed claim for ownership poses a challenge for the partnership. The third challenge is lack of consistency and coherence between EU's policies on one hand and its members on the other. There are times when the official European policies come to clash and compete with national interests of individual states. The fourth is over emphasis on the military dimension of the partnership at the expense of other important endeavours notably the structural instability in African states. Here, there is a strong tendency of emphasising on traditional security over the desperately needed human security in Africa. The last challenge is the role that the policies and actions of third parties have on peace and security in Africa. There are major actors whose involvement in Africa has repercussions on the EU-AU relations in general and the peace and security partnership in particular. The challenge posed by two of these actors is discussed and analysed in the thesis. Under these challenges and elsewhere in the thesis, the asymmetrical inter-regionalism that prevails between the two actors and its implication on the effectiveness of the partnership in peace and security has been highlighted and analysed.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Africa and Europe have a long history of relations that have occurred at many levels and taken many forms. The master-servant relation during the colonial times, the interaction of the post-independence era which was based on unequal terms as well as the post-cold war love-and-hate dealings are among the major episodes of relation in the 19th and 20th centuries between the two continents.

Ties binding what are now the European Union and Africa date back to the early days of the European integration process (Tardy, 2006:8). However, Europe began to give an institutional dimension to its relation with Africa by arranging a series of binding agreements. The Four Lome Agreements from 1975-1998 and the Cotonou agreement of 2000 have been at the heart of this process. The goals of the Cotonou Agreement are to promote and expedite the economic, social and cultural progress of the developing states that are signatories to the agreement and contribute to peace and security as well as promote a stable and democratic political environment. Article11 of the agreement on peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution states that "the parties shall pursue an active, comprehensive and integrated policy of peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution within the frameworks of the partnership" (Cotonou Agreement 2000). It is obvious the EU's assistance to African states, along with other countries from the Caribbean and Pacific regions, in areas of economic and social development has not led to the desired result.

However, EU and Africa increased their effort to build stronger ties and cooperation beyond the ACP framework. In 2000 the first EU-Africa Summit took place in Cairo (AU & EU 2000). Over the years the cooperation has evolved and diversified notably in the field of peace and security. This is due to the acknowledgement that the "persistence of numerous conflicts, which continue to cause loss of human life as well as destruction of infrastructure and property, and threaten peace, stability and hinder the aspiration of the African peoples to peace, prosperity and development" (Ibid). The consequences of conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long term stability, prosperity and peace for its peoples (Annan, 2000:20). Moreover, the growing, in type and number, of threats for global, regional and national peace and security demand the close cooperation of different actors in the

international arena. There is also a growing consensus that certain issues cannot be addressed fully at only national or regional level.

It is also largely understood that there is a need to find common responses for challenges that have consequences at international level. It is in this context that the EU and the AU stressed the centrality of peace and security in their relation at the time when both parties undertook a great change in their aspirations and capacities as security actors. On the European side, within the context of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) developments, the EU has expressed a renewed interest for Africa, illustrated in the security field by the African Peace Facility (APF) and ESDP operations taking place in Africa (Tardy, 2006:3). In 2007 this has been manifested in the peace and security partnership that the EU has established with Africa.

On the African side, the aspiration to transform the AU into a security actor and initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) reflect the new wave of effort by African leaders to ensure peace and security in the continent (Tardy,2006; Tywuschik,2009:2). The two Unions have established partnerships in different areas of common interest. This study, however, focuses on the peace and security partnership between the African Union and the European Union.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Article 3 of the African Union's Constitutive Act specifically identifies the promotion of peace, security and stability as the prime objective of the AU (AU 2000). Violent conflicts and their unresolved consequences are the significant factors hampering a large number of African states from achieving their aspirations for socio-economic progress. Peace and stability remained elusive in many parts of Africa. This has said to be the compelling factor that pushes the AU and Africa's regional organizations to assume the responsibility of resolving conflicts in the continent.

Due to the complexity of the endeavour and the capacity related deficiency that the AU has been facing, it is imperative that it should work in collaboration with other international partners and stakeholders to realize peace and security in Africa. Common history, geographic proximity, and its political, economic and military resources, make the European Union the closest of these actors. With the growing impact of regionalism and emergence and consolidation of the respective regional organisations, the EU and AU, the interaction

between the two continents has been pushed into another level. In this regard the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy was a tremendous development.

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007 can be considered the capstone doctrines of European Union-Africa relations, consolidated in about fifty years of trade and development cooperation and substantially revised in the last decade. The Joint Strategy and its First Action Plan took stock of the evolution in the relation and identified eight priorities for cooperation, the first of which was peace and security. According to the Joint Strategy, the peace and security partnership aims at reinforcing dialogue concerning challenges to peace and security, fully operationalizing the African Peace and Security Architecture and ensuring reliable funding for peacekeeping operations by African countries (AU & EU 2007). Though the Strategy is declared to be based on common interest, it seems that Europe's internal security concerns have been externalized to Africa. This may have resulted from the understanding in the west in general and in Europe in particular that international insecurity is caused or at least facilitated by weak states of which many are found in Africa.

As the period committed to the 1st Action Plan (2008-2010) of the peace and security partnership has just ended, large parts of Africa continue to experience conflicts, insecurity and instability with its attendant humanitarian consequences and socio-economic impact. Therefore, this study evaluates the implementation process of the AU-EU peace and security partnership and analyzes the challenges faced in this process.

1.3 Research Questions

In the course of this study an attempt has been made to address the following research questions.

- How far have the AU and EU gone in executing the 1st Action Plan of the peace and security partnership?
- What is the level of compatibility between the security priorities of the AU on one hand and EU on the other?
- What are the challenges that the partnership encountered so far?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The general objective of the study is to examine the peace and security partnership between the EU and AU, and to analyze its implementation process.

The specific objectives are to:

- assess the overall content of the peace and security partnership;
- explore the extent to which the two Unions implement the First Action Plan of the peace and security partnership;
- explore the challenges that the partnership has faced to date.

1.5 Research Methodology

This research primarily concentrates on the role of the AU-EU peace and security partnership in dealing with African conflicts. It is basically a qualitative research in which the focus rests on exploring and assessing the performance of the partnership.

The data from the below-mentioned sources have been analyzed using qualitative methodology of social science research. This is mainly because of the fact that the problem and the questions raised for this study are largely addressable in a qualitative manner. The research problem, Kumar argues, should determine whether the study is classified as qualitative or quantitative (1996:12). In this regard, the data from the stated sources are dominantly be unquantifiable, it is appropriate, therefore, to make qualitative method a way of examining and analyzing the available data in this study. As Flick (2002:32) puts it, "… the object and data under study is the determining factor for choosing a method and not the other way round."

After the transcription of the recorded interviews, the information acquired has been used to consolidate the data generated from the documents. The analysis is made by contrasting this data against what has actually happened in implementing the agreement/Action Plan of the peace and security partnership as well as ongoing initiatives around this partnership. In doing so, the focus has been on exploring and assessing the performance of the partnership up to the end of the first Action Plan. The efforts of and challenges faced by the institutions in charge of executing the partnership is analyzed. In a bid to make this possible, data from various sources have been utilised.

1.6 Method and Source of Data

With regard to data-gathering method, this study made use of a qualitative method of data collection. As its typical feature, qualitative research gathers multiple forms of data (Creswell, 2007: 38). In line with this, both primary and secondary sources are used to generate data for this research. The primary data basically played a supplementary role. The

research, therefore, is predominantly based on secondary data which were collected from public documents and archives such as agreements, minutes and declarations of the two parties. Most of these are available on the official websites of the two Unions and in the respective offices in Addis Ababa. Therefore, document review has been the major data analysis method used in this research. An in-depth look at and review of such documents and other archive documents has been made to fish-out the necessary data in order to address the *what* and *how* of the problem in question.

Additional secondary data also depended on published and accessible materials on the EU-Africa relation in general and the peace and security partnership in particular. The notable materials in this regard are journal articles and books.

As a primary source of data, semi-structured interview has been conducted to enrich and supplement the data obtained from the relevant documents and archives. The reason for using an in-depth interview than other methods is that this method is believed to be convenient to get answer for questions not addressed by the documents and literature. Therefore, purposefully selected officials from the Peace and Security Department of the AU and the EU's exclusive delegation to the AU were participants in a one-on-one interview. Subsequently, four interviewees have been contacted. Flexibility of sampling techniques and number was considered to gain the optimal outcome.

1.7 Verification and Validity

The validity and reliability of data were ensured through various mechanisms such as:

1. Triangulation of data (document and interview),
2. Submission of the draft of interpreted data to interviewees
3. Peer reviews/evaluation, etc

1.8 Significance of the Study

Among the objectives of the AU is to achieve peace and security in Africa. The AU claims to be convinced that the attainment of this objective is crucial to the overall development of the continent. The peace and security partnership of the AU and EU has been initiated taking this nexus between peace and security on the one hand and development on the other in to consideration. This is clearly indicated on the "Rationale" of the peace and security partnership stated in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy of 2007 (AU and EU, 2007).

However, many parts of Africa remains in persistent conflicts and its people continue to suffer from absence of peace and security. Simultaneously the EU continues to consider Africa as the major source of threats for its security. Accordingly, the peace and security partnership is declared with the aim of addressing these common concerns of the two continents. The third Africa-European Union (EU) Summit held in late November 2010 and the first Action Plan of the peace and security partnership has ended in the same year. Therefore, looking into the nature and implementation process of this partnership in general and its first Action Plan in particular is a timely endeavour.

The study can serve as the source of information about the pitfalls that the execution process of the peace and security partnership has encountered up to now. This information may serve as an important input in expanding the existing knowledge on this partnership between the AU and EU. Moreover, there is a hope that the study also has its own contribution in throwing an insight about the footings of the two parties in the partnership and the implication this has on its effectiveness. There is also a belief that the research would spur other researchers in the area under study.

1.9 Scope and Limitation of the Study

The study focuses only on the peace and security partnership between the AU and EU. Thus the other seven priority areas of the Joint Strategy are not part of this study. The research would have been more comprehensive if other aspects of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy were taken into consideration than sticking on the single dimension of the Strategy.

The other limitation is in relation to the interview which has been carried out during the course of the study. Using interviews has its own downside, i.e. informants might not be willing to reveal some sensitive issues. This may affect the validity of some of the information. However, maximum care has been taken to ensure the validity of the information collected.

1.10 Organization of the Study

The entire research is organized into five chapters. The first deals with the background and methodological aspects of the study. The second chapter contained three parts. In the first part review of related literature is presented while conceptual and theoretical frameworks are the focus of the second and third parts of the same chapter respectively. Concepts of peace and security as well as relevant theoretical issues are discussed in this chapter.

In the third chapter an attempt has been made to discuss the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in general and the peace and security partnership in particular. Various components of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and EU's involvement in the development of the APSA are among the issues raised here. The distinct and common security challenges are also made part of the same chapter. The progress and challenges of the peace and security partnership are analysed in the fourth chapter. Finally, the study has provided summary and concluding remarks on the basis of the inquiry.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW, CONCEPTUAL AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORKS

2.1. Literature Review

2.1.1. Peace and Security in Europe and Africa

This part of the literature has the aim of tracing key issues and themes relevant to the problem under study. The review frames the problem of the study by establishing its context. It starts with briefly looking at the situation in Europe and Africa pertaining to peace and security state of affairs. In doing so particular attention is given to the situation in Africa due to the level of significance that the peace and security condition of the continent entail to the partnership under study.

2.1.1.1 Issues of Peace and Security in Europe

In an attempt to establish the context in which the EU is interacting with the AU in peace and security partnership, this part of the literature review has a twin purpose of briefly discussing the European perspective on threats and challenges to the European peace and security as well as looking into the impact that this perspective has on the partnership under study.

The security challenge for the EU today is, of course, not rooted in classical geopolitics. According to Aguirre (2009:1) the current challenges to peace and security are complex, unpredictable and related to fields that were commonly considered outside the state-oriented concept of security. The European Security Strategy (ESS) states that the post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked (ESS, 2003:2).

The strategy claims that Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable. To grasp the security agenda of the EU in its inter-regionalism with the AU, it is imperative that reviewing the ESS is a good start. The European Security Strategy drafted by Javier Solana[1] in 2003 was the EU's first overall strategic approach to dealing with contemporary threats and risks. The ESS provides analysis of the key contemporary threats to European peace and security which include terrorism, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime, and asserts that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the risk of

[1] High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary General of the Council of the European Union (1999-2009)

countries acquiring nuclear weapons are fundamental threats to European and global security (ESS 2003).

As stated in the ESS, Europe is both the base and target for terrorism and terrorist attack and this poses a strategic threat for the whole of Europe. The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism (ESS 2003). It arises out of complex causes. According to the ESS, these include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of European society (Ibid.). Concerted European action is declared to be indispensible and hence the European Security Strategy.

This threat assessment in relation to terrorism is directly related to peace and security partnership that the EU has established with Africa in which the continent is taken as source of the threat. According to Dorkken (2008: 195), international terrorism is on the increase in Africa. Poverty corruption and political decay make parts of Africa a very attractive destination for terrorist organizations and there are opportunities in this continent for recruitment of terrorists and attainment of bases for operation, as well as valuable sources for financing terrorist activity (ibid). In a related manner the EU strategy goes on to address the need to combat the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). According to the strategy, proliferation of WMD is the greatest threat to Europe's security and calls to ensure that those weapons do not fall in to the hands of terrorists. "The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction", warns the strategy. "In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for states and armies", the strategy states (2003:3).

Africa, at least in the current situation, may not be a place where WMD can be produced. However, it can serve as a source of both minerals that are useful for the production of such weapons and militants who use the weapons for terrorist purpose. The resale of diamonds and other highly valued natural resources purchased from African rebel movements is used to fund international terrorism networks. There is little doubt, therefore, that the African continent is the major concern in the so-called war on terror. It is, therefore, imperative that Europe work in partnership with Africa to address such potential and real sources of threat from Africa.

Regional conflicts are the other mentioned threats to peace and security in Europe and the world at large. The EU strategy argues that regional conflicts have direct or indirect impact for European interests (ESS, 2003:4). "Regional conflicts", claims the strategy, "can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD". According to the strategy the most practical way to tackle the often elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict. This assertion makes Africa an important focal point. Africa is one of the theatres of regional conflicts in the world. Since the strategy puts regional conflicts as threats for European interests and stress the need for dealing with the older problems of regional conflict, cooperating with Africa has been perceived as mandatory. The partnership that EU has launched with Africa in areas of peace and security can also be explained from this angle.

State failure is another peace and security threat for Europe that is mentioned in the ESS. The ESS (2003: 4) states that bad governance which includes corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode states from within and in some cases, according to the strategy, has brought about collapse of state institutions. It relates collapse of the state with threats, such as organised crime and terrorism. "State failure", asserts the strategy "is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability" (ESS 2003).

As persistent conflict undermines the state in Africa, the threat of state failure, as perceived by Europe, is another compelling reason to work in partnership with the AU. In relation to state failure Batt and Lynch (2004: 3) identify three functional dimensions of the problem: (1) *security* (internal and external); (2) *welfare* (economic, social, environmental); and (3) *legitimacy and rule of law* (political freedoms, human rights, courts and administration). In light of these dimensions many Africa states fit to EU's perception of threat from failed states. In fact, Europe's leaders in general have agreed what has been mentioned in the 2003 European Security Strategy. They have acknowledged that security for Europeans today lies not in manning the ramparts or preparing to resist invasion, but in tackling crises abroad before they become breeding-grounds for terrorism, international trafficking, and unmanageable immigration flows (Krastev, 2010:1).

The ESS contains the list of threats and ways of addressing these threats so that European peace and security will be ensured. However, questions are raised in relation to the shortcomings that the EU has in fully executing the strategy. Krastev (2010:1) for instan-

ce, argues that procrastination, weak coordination, and persistent absenteeism by some member states have hobbled the Union's ability to tackle real threats to its citizens' security, and to make a significant contribution to maintaining international peace.

The approach taken by the ESS doesn't go far enough from statist perspective of security. A narrow military, state-oriented concept of security will result in important problem areas being neglected such as the violation of human rights, the unfair distribution of resources, and also pollution and climate change. Of course, conflict prevention will be successful only if these unconventional threats too are perceived as security risks and taken seriously as such. The ESS is much more realist in its approach. However, in the researcher's view a security strategy for the Twenty-First century must make human security- the protection of human beings, not the state, against threats- as key yardstick for security policy.

In sum, there is no doubt that African security problems figure in EU security policy and taken as threats for European peace and security. The question, however, is how compatible are these threats with the security questions of Africa and its people. This is, of course, among the questions for which answers are attempted elsewhere in the thesis.

2.1.1.2 Peace and Security in Africa

It is unfortunate that Africa has become synonymous with instability, insecurity and conflict. For most of the post-colonial history of Africa, peace and security have remained elusive. Makinda and Okumu observed that security and peace have been, and remain, the scarcest commodities in Africa (2008: 75). Over the years, the African continent has been devastated by a vast number of conflicts, many of them of an intractable and prolonged nature. Millions of lives have been lost, and human rights abused. Entire populations have been forced to abandon their homes and take refuge in neighbouring countries. The economic cost of these conflicts has been crippling, reversing the development of countries and communities already exposed to extreme poverty. According to Francis (2007: 16), the wars wreaked devastating consequences in terms of considerable loss of human life and suffering, state collapse and societal fragmentation, disruption of economic and agricultural activities, the destruction of infrastructural facilities and the regionalisation of the domestic wars which have affected regional peace and security.

The story of Africa is one that recounts the distress and subsequent turmoil that tend to emanate from political instability, insecurity, ethnic conflict, poverty, famine, hunger and disease. According to Seth Obeng (2005:99), nowhere on this planet is the level of human deprivation more evident and so overwhelming than Africa. The African continent seems to have had more than its fair share of global conflicts, social problems and, often, unmitigated catastrophe. Since the 1980s, Africa has experienced more wars, conflicts, and crises than any other continent (Makinda & Okumu, 2008: 75). This has stranded the continent in multiple difficulties. These difficulties result not only from the magnitude of these challenges, but also from the lack of capacity of African states and organizations to respond quickly and effectively.

Here, it is important to briefly examine some explanations for conflicts in Africa and their implications for peace and security in the continent. Some African commentators and leaders have looked at conflicts from the prism of the continent's colonial past. Gambari (2009: 13), for instance, observes that the colonial system has created oppressive and divisive structures and institutions, yet made minimal investments in infrastructure, education and health. Its main interest was the pillage of the countries' natural resources to finance the Metropolis while imposing on the indigenous peoples, colonial values and political order with little or no regard for the latter's political institutions and traditions (Ibid.).

At independence, the new leadership inherited a country with a political system based on an order, which they had opposed; little or no resources; rampant illiteracy rates; poor social and economic infrastructures (Nugent, 2004: 164). Perhaps, worst of all, they had inherited an international system with established rules and norms in which the newly independent countries would depend on colonial powers for financial resources, equipment and technology (Gambari, 2009:14). The need to satisfy the demands of various constituencies at home while facing an international system not particularly favourable to African situation has created tensions and, eventually, conflicts in Africa (Mazuri, 1977: 132). The proponents of this view, generally, tend to see the solutions to African conflicts in terms of efforts to address the socio-economic imbalances that have been created by the colonial system.

A related explanation is that conflicts in Africa derive from differences in and politicisation of ethnicity and the vice-versa. Colonial boundaries cut through nations, bringing people who have very little in common and without a will to live together, on one hand and separating those who should perhaps be together on the other (Gamabari, 2009: 18). It is argued that

resisting colonial rule and fighting a common foreign enemy were the binding glue sustaining their apparent unity. According to Oliver & Atmore (1994: 173) the postcolonial state has been unable to sustain this unity or provide new incentives for the nations or tribes to live together. Most of the post-colonial states have been pursuing exclusionist policies with a basket of benefits for the ruling ethnic group or elite and this situation often caused revolts those that are left out and who see no room for change except through violence (Ibid.).

Some other analysts see conflict in Africa as being the result of poverty. Drokken (2008:12) argues that poverty creates a situation of mistrust of leaders and institutions that the countries' meagre resources are being misappropriated and applied on objectives other than those pertaining to the public good. This situation gives opportunities to those with different agendas from that of national unity or those that have personal, sectarian, economic and business interests (Ibid.). Poverty, inequality and scarcity of resources, all combine to affect political stability (Draman, 2003:8). With poor government structures and unequal access and distribution of economic resources, certain parts of the population tend to have better opportunities than others. This inevitably alters power relations, and in turn leads to the persistence of poverty among certain groups with very serious consequences for social stability.

Understandably failure in development aspects in a country leads to crisis related to security. Gibert (2009: 629) has also observed that underpinning Africa's security crisis is, of course, the continent's severe developmental failure. Undeniably the common denominator of civil war and conflict in Africa is poverty, and much of that poverty is the result of bad policy and poor governance. Draman (2003: 22) asserted that as economic and social conditions have steadily worsened, so insecurity and instability have increased – thus affecting the general populace. In view of such explanation it is possible to assert that much of the story of underdevelopment, famine, and denial of basic human needs arises basically out of widespread failures in the political sector.

Politics, in many parts of Africa, easily degenerates a life-and-death struggle over private access to limited public resources. The zero-sum nature of the struggle compels would-be political leaders to obtain material benefits in order to wield influence over followers and competitors. Accordingly, Chabal & Daloz argue that:

> what all African states share is a generalised system of patrimonialism and an acute degree of apparent disorder, as evidenced by a high level of governmental and administrative inefficiency, a lack of institution-alisation, a general disregard for the rules of the formal political and economic sectors, and a universal resort to personalised and vertical solutions to societal problems." (cited in Cilliers 2003).

In a similar vein some commentators argue that the crises facing Africa are crises of governance. In other words, the economic crises are the result of political crises. According to Chuter (2006: 2), conflicts in Africa are just violent responses to the lack of freedom; transparency and inefficiency; politics of exclusion and corruption; and misuse of public resources for private interests. For those who subscribe to this view, addressing the issue of good governance is the decisive part of the solutions for conflict and instability in Africa.

In a similar manner, it is also argued that most of the security problems of Africa largely revolve around the failure of the postcolonial state. Insecurity and instability in much of Africa has become a single, complex and interrelated problem that is an intrinsic part of the debate about the nature and capability of the African state (Cilliers, 2003: 21). This outlook rejects the above view which takes economic underdevelopment as the main cause for conflict in Africa. According to Buzan and Weaver (2003: 220), Africa's economic and political failures are tightly linked with state failure, and economic improvement alone, even if it could be achieved, will not break the cycle. Here the argument is that strong states are a necessary one. While large parts of Asia benefited from strong, stable states, and Europe had both capable states and strong intergovernmental institutions, Africa has neither (Obeng, 2005:12). Most of Africa has failed to make this happen, and it is this failure that largely defines the nature, extent, and intensity of its insecurity.

The above discussion shows that it is difficult to fully comprehend conflicts in Africa on the basis of only one explanation. Indeed, the situation may be so complex that, in a given conflict, we may find that all the explanations discussed above are relevant to understanding it. As stated above several and interconnected reasons account for the lack of peace and security in Africa. These could be summarised as nerve-racking issues emanating from poor governance, inadequate resources for development, rising expectations of a deprived and restive people, weak state structure as well as unhelpful external influences (Obeng, 2005: 99). In other areas, intriguingly, internally induced factors have co-mingled with externally influenced factors to pose formidable obstacles to stability and security on the continent

(Ibid.). A long – term solution to African conflicts and the building of durable peace requires that the root causes of these conflicts be urgently addressed.

In relation to the nature of the conflict in Africa, Golaszinsk (2001: 1) states that the long-lasting and most debilitating of these conflicts have always occurred within sovereign states, have assumed various forms – states against their own population, dominant ethnic groups against minorities, religious groups against others – and have fostered warlords and various other actors benefiting from the turmoil. African states have failed thus far to find lasting solutions to these problems. Ill conceived and narrowly designed policies and actions have been the hallmarks of African states and leaders as far as addressing the issue of peace and security in Africa.

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, there are signs of change in this trend. In previous decades, peace and security have not ranked high on Africa's agenda as they have at the beginning of the millennium. Belachew (2007:71) states that while peace and security have been recognised, in the past, as one of the most challenges facing the continent, they have not had so clear a profile. However, due to the recognition of their persistent contribution to the continent's underdevelopment as well as their repercussion on the rest of the world, African peace and security are now a political priority for practical policy approaches both in and outside Africa.

Africa's peace and security challenges, on the other hand, have emerged as a global concern and rekindled international interest in the continent. The continent is growing in military, strategic and economic importance in global affairs. According to Francis (2010:9), the renewed international focus on and engagement with Africa have brought to the fore the imperative for peace and conflict resolution on the continent as a prerequisite for democratic consolidation, political stability, social progress, long-term economic growth and sustainable development. Of course, tackling the causes of conflict and instability is not beyond the reach of Africans. In his report on Africa in 1998, Annan had stated: "for too long, conflict in Africa has been seen as inevitable or intractable, or both. It is neither. Conflict in Africa, as everywhere, is caused by human action, and can be ended by human action" (Annan 1998).

By and large, Africa through its regional arrangement, the AU, has been rigorously taking steps towards addressing the issue of peace and security in the continent. Since the launch of the African Union (AU) in July 2002, African leaders have 'initiated' important steps towards

the creation of an African security regime for maintaining security and managing conflicts. Due to the complex nature of the task of realising peace and security in Africa as well as the common stake involved in it, the AU closely works with the EU in the direction of making peace happen in Africa.

2.1.2. Europe and Africa from Cairo to Lisbon

This part of the literature review is presented with the objective of setting the context and giving an immediate background to the subject under study. In doing so the peace and security aspects in the interregional relations between the two continents, from the Cairo Summit up until the second Summit at Lisbon, are summarised.

The first Summit between Africa and the European Union was held in Cairo in April 2000. It was the first time that Africa as a whole sat at the table with the EU and attempted to build on the regional groupings of the ACP and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to develop a strategic, pan-African partnership covering the whole continent (House of Lords, European Union Committee 2005). The Cairo Summit meant a fresh start in the relation between the two continents and launched a comprehensive framework of political dialogue between EU and Africa outside the Cotonou arrangement. The preamble to the Summit's action plan stresses that the two parties 'committed to work towards a new strategic dimension' which include issues such as peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution (AU & EU 2000). According to the *Financial Times*, the basic message from the summit was that the 'plight of Africa is Europe's problem' and that 'Europe's overall political message to the summit was that Europe cares about Africa' (cited in Oslen, 2002, 91-92).

According to Tardy (2006: 35), the summit reached a crucial decision towards a unique organisational infrastructure linking the two regional organisations on many levels when it recognised common values calling for security matters to be integrated with broader economic, cultural, development and political considerations. The Cairo Plan stressed that resolving conflicts (peace-building) would need to address multiple issues (AU & EU 2000). The list includes the causes of conflicts, arms control on light weapons, the removal of land-mines, the non-proliferation treaty, fighting terrorism, the gender dimension for the active participation of women in diplomacy and at peace-negotiating tables, as well as food and health security and development issues including education (AU & EU). At the Cairo Summit, therefore, the EU and the AU emphasised the nexus between security and development and pledged to work together towards improving Africa's stability.

In the interim, many geopolitical developments have impacted the relationship between the two continents. The African Union (AU) was established to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its first summit was held in Durban in July 2002, and the pan-African continental body was welcomed as a positive sign of the Renaissance promised for Africa in the Twenty-First century (Whiteman: 2007:13). In addition a new global balance of forces has emerged, and the post-Cold War "unipolar moment" of United States domination is being increasingly replaced by a multi-polar international system (Ibid.). Moreover the peace and security calculations of Europe and the West in general have been transformed after the 2001 attack against the United States which provided a new common ground for Europe and Africa to further cooperation on security affairs against terrorism (AU & EU 2001). Due to these and other developments Europe seemed increasingly concerned about the lack of more rigorous relation with its traditional sphere of influence.

Overhaus (2008: 4) Africa has gained further significance in international relations and European foreign policy discourses for at least three reasons. Firstly, since September 11, 2001 state failure became a prime international concern (Ibid.). Africa happens to be the place where fragile statehood and its related problems occur most frequently. In mentioning the second reason he states that rising market prices for oil and other commodities have raised geopolitical interest in and economic greediness towards Africa. Today, state-owned firms and multinationals from all over the world, not least China and India, compete for scarce resources on the continent. The third reason is that transnational challenges such as migration and environmental concerns have moved upwards on the EU's policy agendas (Ibid). Consequently Africa has become an important partner when it comes to dealing with global challenges.

Since the Cairo Summit in 2000, ministerial meetings between the EU and African governments have been held annually. New aspects of their relationship, ranging from governance to regional integration, from energy to climate change, and from migration to science and technology, have taken on an increasingly important role. In addition, regional terrorism, instability, crises and conflicts, represent key concerns for the EU and have led to increasing engagement (Elzabeth, 2009:12). Though the second Summit was due to be held in Lisbon in April 2003, it was indefinitely postponed, largely due to disagreements over the position of Zimbabwe (House of Lords, European Union Committee 2006). At the insistence of the British government the EU member states argued that President Mugabe would not be

allowed to enter the EU area and requested that African states should do more to condemn his domestic policies and actions. However, African heads of state and government were unwilling to agree to attend EU-Africa Summit in which not all African states are represented (Ibid). This can be taken as a manifestation for the actual and potential danger that a powerful EU member state tends to Europeanise its national interest.

In the seven-year period (2000-2007), peace and security has developed as important areas of relation between Africa and Europe, just as the question of migration has increasingly moved to the centre stage (Whiteman & Bertelsmann, 2008:13). This has been reinforced by increasing recognition, among African leaders, of the strong connection between the issue of stability on one side and the challenge of socio-economic development on the other (Tardy, 2006:32). For instance, the so called Africa's economic development blueprint i.e. the New Partnership for Africa's Development states: 'African leaders have learned from their own experiences that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development' (NEPAD, 2001:16).

Built on the debris of the OAU's experience in the field of peace and security, the AU has been characterised by a progressive securitisation of the pan-African project and has been reflected in the deployment of a number of AU peacekeeping missions and by the ongoing establishment of a new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).[2]These developments have also produced an increasing interaction with the EU, in the spirit of a comprehensive ''continent-to-continent'' dialogue. On the European side, addressing the instability of the African continent represents a major concern also because of its possible repercussions in terms of illegal immigration, drugs and arms trafficking, terrorism and organised crime (Pirozzi, 2010: 87).

While the post-Cold War era has witnessed dramatic changes, the Africa-Europe relationship seems caught in traditional patterns in which Africa reacts to policy directives emanating from Europe, rather than Africa setting the agenda as an equal partner, and actively participating in policy developments that will fundamentally affect the continent. It can be argued that the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa has been developed in such an environment where Europe convinced itself that Africa had little or nothing to contribute in the development of the strategy but only to implement the policy prescriptions emanated from Europe. In a move to change this trend the EU initiated the next summit in 2007.

[2]A detailed discussion about the APSA is presented in the next chapter.

Accordingly the second EU-Africa Summit took place in December 2007 in Lisbon and endorsed a 'Strategic Partnership' and related Action Plan to cover a broad range of activities. While the EU thus demonstrated its ambitions, the crucial question, as so often the case in European foreign policy, concerns resources, implementation and the Union's ability to act coherently (Overhaus, 2008: 5). More specifically, Europe and its former colonial powers have a credibility problem towards Africa and this problem, according to Overhaus, not only relates to broken promises in the past but also allegation of Europe pursuing particularistic interests (Ibid.). The EU and its member states agreed to collaborate with the AU partly because of their perceived historical obligation and partly because they believed African stability as being essential to European security (EU 2005). In the 2007 EU-Africa Joint Strategy Europe and Africa set ambitious partnerships in eight areas of common interests. The first of these eight partnerships deals with the peace and security field, which is taken to be the subject in this study.

2.2. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

This section is provided with a purpose of establishing the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of the study. Peace and security are the core concepts of the subject in this thesis. Therefore, a detailed discussion on these concepts is provided here. In a related manner an explanation of a relevant theory is presented under this part of the thesis.

2.2.1. The Concept of Peace

The most simplistic, traditional but popular understanding of peace is that it is the opposite of conflict or violence. In a similar vein, peace is considered as the absence of fear, conflict, anxiety, suffering, and is about a smooth coexistence (Francis, 2007:17). A major shortcoming of such understanding of the concept is that it lays exclusive emphasis on overt violence; it is silent on how to contend with psychological and structural violence, which Assefa (1993:3), defined as the 'social and personal violence arising from unjust, repressive, and oppressive national or international political and social structures'. According to Albert (2008:32), this kind of peace is technically referred to as negative peace.

This concept of negative peace was first introduced by John Galtung in the editorial to the first edition of the Journal of Peace Research. He defined negative peace as 'the absence of violence, absence of war' and positive peace as 'the integration of human society' (cited by Aguirre, 2009: 55). Negative peace is a kind of peace attained as a result of the absence of war or direct conflict or cessation of hostilities. The prevention and elimination of manifest

use of violence can be achieved through negotiation or mediation (Joang: 2000). Negative peace can also be achieved by force particularly when certain group's superiority prevails over the other contending groups by way of the use or threat of force (Ibeanu, 2007: 34).

Negative peace commonly equated with political realism, rests on the assumption that conflict is biological (the inherency argument), and a limited state-centric discourse that excludes non-state actors and ignores non-state-centric issues (Richmond, 2008: 99). In line with this Joang (2000) argues that it is through a dominant military force that international peace and stability are often brought. Likewise, Gambari (2001:4) states that the Cold War setting contributed to the concept of peace as the absence of war or military threats especially those coming from outside of national boundaries.

The notion of negative peace is, therefore, that military security is the basis for all attempts at achieving peace in its wider sense. This is an imposed peace because it emanates from stable social order in which the cause of conflicts might not be addressed. Hence, as stability and order can be maintained without questioning the causes of recurrent violence or trying to address it by an oppressive system, negative peace is compatible with structural violence.

Peace, however, is not the absence of war; it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, and justice (Ibeanu, 2007: 15). This understanding of the concept of peace has similarities with the conception of positive peace. Positive peace is the absence of unjust structures, unequal relationship, prevalence of justice and inner peace at individual level (Francis, 2007: 54). Positive peace entails a broad array of social conditions in which inequalities and injustice are removed (Jeorg, 2000: 12). The position of the advocates of 'positive peace' is that sustainable peace requires egalitarian distribution of resources and fighting against anything that compromises basic human existence and survival (Albert, 2008: 34).

Accordingly, positive peace requires not only eliminating direct violence but also reducing the structural violence that creates unequal conditions of life. While direct violence such as physical and verbal attacks is overt, structural violence is often built into the very composition of society (Jeorg, 2000: 13). Such violence has the effect of denying people important rights such as economic opportunity, social and political equality, a sense of fulfillment and self-worth and access to healthy natural environment (Barash, 2000: 129). Barash further states that structural violence can be characterized as a state of social

inequality in which privileged groups or classes deprive and exploited or subjugated populations of basic human rights such as nutrition, education, health care, political power, legal standing (Ibid.).

In line with these arguments, it is possible to assert that when people starve to death, or even go hungry; a structural violence is taking place. Similarly, when human beings suffer from diseases that are preventable, when they are denied a decent education, housing, an opportunity to work, raise family, to express themselves freely, to organize peacefully, or to participate in their own governance, structural violence is occurring, even when bullets or clubs are not used (Fontan & Chatterji, 2008: 43). Positive peace, therefore, includes many issues on top of avoiding direct conflict, issues that influence equality of life including personal growth, freedom, social quality, solidarity, autonomy and participation. Therefore, the concept of positive peace asserts that "true peace is more than the absence of war; it is the presence of justice" (Francis, 2007: 18).

The Concept of peace hence lacks global acceptance among scholars though most of them revolve around the dichotomy of negative and positive peace. The basic difference between these two concepts of peace is that while negative peace is absence of visible and direct violence, positive peace is emanicipatory in nature. Peace, both in its negative and positive forms, remains unachieved in most parts of Africa. It would also be wrong to classify countries experiencing pervasive structural violence as peaceful. In countries where there is pervasive poverty, oppression of the poor by the rich, police brutality, intimidation of ordinary people by those in power or monopolisation of resources and power by some sections of the society, it will be difficult to say that there is peace in such countries. Most African countries fit into this explanation. The structural violence that prevails in almost all corners of the continent are, of course, have been creating condition that breed direct violence resulting in the absence of negative peace. Peace is the prime value in contemporary Africa, the most valuable public good, but yet the most elusive.

2.2.2 The Concept of Security

Security again is remained to be a contested concept. According to Francis (2007:22) security is generally about the condition or feeling of safe from harm or danger, the defence, protection and preservation of core values and the absence of threat to acquire values. A related explanation is that security is most commonly associated with the alleviation of

threats to cherished values; especially those which, if left unchecked, threaten the survival of a particular referent object in the near future (Willams, 2008: 5).

Although security and survival are often related, they are not synonymous. Whereas, Williams (2008: 6) argues, survival is an existential condition, security involves the ability to pursue cherished political and social ambitions. Security is therefore best understood as what Ken Booth (2007) has called, 'survival-plus,' 'the "plus" being some freedom from life-determining threats, and therefore some life choices'.

In retrospect the meaning of security remained in flux since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the dominating conception of security focused on military power and strategic relationships between states (Booth, 2007: 95). Ayoob also observes that at the height of the bipolar politics, security was generally conceived in terms of external military threats (1984: 42). Concepts like power and deterrence influence the calculations of statesmen and foreign policy makers (Ibid.). It is this notion of security rooted firmly within the Realist tradition. This conception of security enabled states to confront self-defined threat to security and was shaped by the Cold War context.

The traditional conception of security has largely focussed on the threat and use of force (Francis, 2007: 23). This largely military conception of security asserts the state as the primary referent object of security. Similarly, Abutudu (2005:1) notes that the traditional conception of security is generally structured around the state, the defence and preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The key assumptions that figure out from this conception emplace first, states as unitary actors, the object to be secured is the nation state; second, threats to them stem from external military attacks; and third, other states are the primary if not the sole sources of these threats (Khosla: 1992).

Security in this conception, therefore, is "interpreted narrowly as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of global holocaust" (UNDP, 1994: 22). This traditional and orthodox conception of security, according to Ayoob (1984:42), is a product of a particular intellectual tradition, which faithfully reflected a particular process of historical and political development that could be traced back at least to the Peace of Westphalia. Similarly, Buzan (1988: 15) observes that the western concept of security has evolved not only to the particular

nature of western states, but also to the particular nature of international environment in which the western states find themselves.

Several variations and assumptions could be seen in the concept of security. Ayoob (1999: 5), for example, argues that the term security in Western conception is based on two major assumptions: one, that most threat to state's security are externally generated- that is they arise from outside its borders; and two, that these threats are primarily military in nature and require a military response if the security of the state is to be preserved. The concept of security in its traditional form which firmly established in the literature is largely of Western origin and cannot automatically be applied to African situation. This is mainly because of the fact that the sense of insecurity from which African states suffer emanates more from within their boundaries than from outside. This is not to suggest the total absence of external threats but rather that they are considerably fewer and more remote than the internal ones. Othman (2004) stresses that as opposed to the developed west, in many parts of the Third World security threats usually emanates from inside.

As far as Third World state security is concerned, state-based and externally directed conception of security of the traditional western model is insufficient in explaining the security contexts of these states (Ayoob, 1995: 11). The Third World's problems of insecurity and their relationship with the larger issues of international order have been quite different from what was envisaged under the dominant notion. In line with this, Miller (2001:19) states that military conflicts, in the Third World, result primarily from problems of domestic legitimacy, such as revolutionary challenges to the legitimacy of elites and political regimes, or from ethno-national challenges to the legitimacy of states and their boundaries on the part of the secessionists or pan-national unionists.

As far as African people are concerned the major security threat is posed by the states themselves, which violates human rights, discriminate on ethnic or gender bases, jail dissidents and even carry ethnic cleansing and mass killings. Miller (2001: 21) argues that the armaments especially in most of the Third World countries are not used to protect their citizens but only to secure the regime and the elite and are often used against the population. The military in this case is not only source of security but also source of insecurity for the people of Africa. Consolidating this view Francis (2007: 23) observes that there are both military and non-military sources of security threat in Africa. Security is about the survival of

African societies and peoples. Security in Africa is about peace, economic development, and justice because the absence of all these create the condition of conflict and insecurity.

Due to the distinct nature of insecurity in the third world, scholars have been developing a new orientation towards re-conceptualising security. Post independence Africa, for example, was characterised by interstate conflicts, which raised questions about the conventional notion of security (Karen, 2008). Questions were raised relating to whose security or who or what to be secured? How to make it secured? And what is the nature of the threat? (Cilliers, 2004: 23). The responses eventually led to the emergence of human security as an alternative concept in the field of security studies. As Kofi Annan noted at the millennium summit of 2000:

> Human security in its broader sense embraces for more than the absence of violent conflicts. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and healthcare, and ensures that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his/her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflicts. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy, natural environment are the inter-related building blocks of human and therefore national security (cited in Ginwala, 2004).

The UN Commission on Human Security states that two main strategies are essential for human security and these are based on the notion of protection and empowerment (UN, 2004: 6). Protection requires concerted effort to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically shield people from any form of threat and violence while empowerment enables people to develop their potential and become full participants on decision making process that affect their life (Ibid.). Matthew (2005) also argues that contemporary African thinking on security is manifestly influenced by the UNDP Human Development Report and the experience of national poverty program, which prescribe the security institutions have a role to play in poverty reduction.

Human security is people-centred and as such transcends the conventional state-centric conception of security. The key point of departure of the new in contrast to the old concept of security is the emphasis on the people rather than the state precisely because threats to human security are largely non-military and therefore require non-military responses (Tigerstrom, 2007: 35). The report UN Human Security Commission (2005) observes that human security is a concept that combines human protection and human development and interconnects

peace, security and sustainable development. It further asserts that the consideration of human security should not be focused only at the macro- or state level, but also at the community and individual level.

For Africa, therefore, human security means addressing the chronic and crippling problems of hunger, disease, poverty, unemployment and all forms of oppression and repression. By and large, there is a consensus across Africa that security should be people-centred; security means, first and foremost, people's safety. Africa has traditionally followed an expansive approach to the concept of human security. For example, the draft African Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact states:

> "human security means the security of the individual with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life; it also encompasses the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival, livelihood, and dignity of the individual, including the protection of fundamental freedoms, the respect for human rights, good governance, access to education, healthcare, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his/her own potential."[3]

In practice, however, the majority of African governments have continued to consider security issues in terms of protecting the state, its institutions and frontiers, regime stability and military defence. This is why in most of African states; the concept of human security in its current form has come to be considered as donor-driven. In the definition and conceptualisation of security, we see the inextricable link between peace and security, and the imperative for the securitisation of peace, i.e. peace perceived as a security issue. Peace and security are therefore two sides of the same coin: one cannot exist without the other- both are mutually reinforcing. The absence of peace means the absence of security. Likewise, the existence of peace invariably means the existence of security.

2.3. Inter-regionalism as Theoretical Framework

Today the number of interregional links between world regions or regional groupings is growing. The proliferation of regionalism has in-turn led to intensified relations between regional groupings in different regions in the world and in this it could be said that the European Union (EU) has been central to the development of this new inter-regional

[3] Draft text as adopted by the first meeting of the African ministers of defence and security on the establishment of the African Standby Force and the Common African Defence and Security Policy, 20–21 January 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 4(1). The text was eventually adopted during the AU summit meeting of July 2004.

occurrence (Hardacre & Smith, 2009: 167). The EU is enlarging its inter-regional relations as well as most other existing regional groupings. The increasing regionalisation in different corners of the globe is one reason for this development. Most of the EU–promoted inter-regional arrangements encompass not only trade and economic relations but also political dialogue, development cooperation, cultural relations and security cooperation.

Regional entities have been created and used to address problems in a concerted manner. As stated by Doidge (2007:234), the concept of region is represented as a collective, often institutionalised, designed to address common problems among geographically proximate states. Gilson (2007: 1) also argues that regarded as a means of pooling resources, and even sovereignty, as well as a 'risk management strategy' to deal with globalisation and contemporary state and inter-state problems, the idea of regionalism in its contemporary or new form addresses common problems faced by the actors involved.

Although, there are some nuances in defining and explaining new regionalism, like many other political concepts, what all perspectives seem to have in common is an intrinsic characteristic of inter-regionalism. As Rüland (2002: 2) puts it "a novelty of this inter-regionalism was the regional organizations gradually became actors in their own right, developing their own external relations that included an increasing dense network of interactions with other regional organization…"

Interregionalism is premised upon a dichotomous relationship between two groups representing geographical/political/economic/cultural regions (Doidge, 2007: 231-232). Likewise, Söderbaum & Langenhove (2005:258) states that inter-regionalism is often defined as cooperation between two specified regions composed of states within an interregional framework or a formal relationship. The first, and most obvious, category of inter-regionalism involves dialogues between two regional organizations. The inter-regional level emerges and become a necessary intermediary between the global/multilateral and regional (including national) levels. Hänggi (2000: 3) explains this dimension as a consequence of new regionalism in addition to the group-to-group practice propelled by the EU in its relations with other regional organizations. He also elaborates that interregional relations among regional organizations in the Third World or peripheral regions has been increasing.

The causal factors of inter-regionalism, and of regionalism alike, are the ongoing processes of globalisation and regionalisation. According to Roloff (2006: 22), globalization and

regionalization present external challenge to states. States respond to this challenge by strengthening regionalism and building interregional institutions. The end of the Cold War helped pave the way for the emergence or resurgence of regional awareness and an increase in intra-regional cooperation on a global scale (Hanggi, 2000: 9). Inter-regionalism has, therefore, become an important feature in international relation and the study of inter-regionalism promised new insight into how international institution-building affects the emergence of a multilayered system of global governance.

The network of inter-regional relations becomes more complex than group-to-group dialogues between the EU and regional bodies of developing countries during and after the Cold War (Gilson, 2007:11). During the past decade, inter-regionalism appears to have become a lasting feature of the international system. Thus, it may be expected that a wide array of forms and types of inter-regionalism will continue to coexist, thereby further enriching (and complicating) the emerging multi-layered system of global governance (Hanggi, 2000: 13). Inter-regionalism is, therefore, beginning to have deeper ramifications for world order.

Although realists still view the nation state as the main actor in an anarchical international environment, its dominant role has come under siege. According to Ruland (2001: 3) analysts inspired by neoliberal and institutionalist thinking hold against realists that globalization has shaped an international system in which interdependence and cooperation have fostered the rise of new influential actors such as inter- and transnational organizations. Moreover, realist arguments highlighting power and balancing as essential characteristics of inter- and transregional relations are being challenged by institutionalist and constructivist approaches looking for spill overs, institutional learning and cognitive factors explaining regional identity-building (Ruland, 2002: 5).

It is, however, undisputed that no single theory can provide satisfactory answers to a comprehensive phenomenon such as the EU's interregional policy and its interaction with other regional organisations including the AU. Thus, it is important to underline the continued relevance of the dominant theories in the discipline of international relations, that is, variants of realism and liberalism and also constructivist perspectives to look into the interregional relations between the EU and AU. Accordingly, the three perspectives, mentioned above, are emphasised in accounting for the role of interregionalism in the EU's foreign policy and external relations, i.e., (i) the promotion of liberal internationalism; (ii)

building the EU's identity as a global actor, constructivist explanation; and (iii) the promotion of the EU's power and competitiveness, realist explanation (Soderbaum: 2005: 368).

Many of the official statements and proclamations released by the European Commission underline the liberal and idealist underpinnings of the EU. In a document outlining the EU's external relations the European Commission proudly states that:

> The EU is particularly active in promoting the human aspects of international relations, such as solidarity, human rights and democracy. …The Union works with other countries and international organisations to bring everyone the benefits of open markets, economic growth and stability in an increasingly interdependent world. … A major challenge now is to spread peace and security beyond the European Union's borders. To meet this challenge, the EU is developing a common foreign and security policy so that it can act as a force for stability, cooperation and understanding in the wider world. (European Commission 2004a, 1 & 3)

The objectives of EU's external relation, with a strong emphasis on the 'human' benefits of economic interdependence, democracy, human rights and the principles of sustainable and participatory development, are often referred to as a "liberal internationalist" approach to international relations (Smith 2003). There is also a belief that the EU should try to consolidate regional integration arrangements among developing countries because regional integration is seen as "an important step towards their integration in the world economy" (European Commission, 2004a: 10). Besides, it is believed in EU circles that regional integration and cooperation can enhance peace, prevent conflict and promote cross–border problem–solving and the better use and management of natural resources (Ibid.).

The EU tries to promote its own regional experience as the norm for region–building throughout the globe. Roloff (2006:19) argues that for many regions the EU is perceived as model and it provides a map or a 'how to' guide for regional integration and now inter-regionalism. The EU is eagerly persuading other regions, especially in Africa to follow its own example, which it sees as "a model for integration between countries in other regions of the world" (European Commission, 2004a: 3) and enhances its status of actorness. Promoting regional and interregional relations not only justifies and enhances the EU's own existence and efficiency as an 'actor'; the strategy also promotes the legitimacy and status of other regions (Soderbaum & Langenhove, 2005: 3).

Interregional cooperation may also be viewed from the perspective of constructivists. For constructivists cooperation is the result of previous historical experiences and interactions (Ruland, 2002:8). The way regional organizations cooperate may thus have repercussions on their own type of regionalism. Constructivists, according to Ruland, argue that interregional dialogues are spurring collective identities (Ibid.). Soderbaum (2005: 372), on the other hand states that a constructivist analysis suggests that a so–called 'civilian' foreign policy can be part of a strategy to manifest the EU's identity as a benevolent global actor.

Especially in heterogeneous and newly formed regional groupings inter-regionalism may stimulate regional identity-building and may sharpen differences between self and other and thus help galvanize regional solidarity on the basis of shared norms (Soderbaum, 2002: 10). Interregional agreements are a convenient channel for the regions involved to build their identity as a global actor. Inter-regionalism emphasizes its presence, and presence is all about identity-building and actorness (Ruland 2001). Region-to-region arrangements strengthen the EU's as well as its partner's identity as a global actor by justification and adding legitimacy.

On the other hand, empirical studies, according to Hardacre & Smith, within the realist perspective have also supported the argument that balancing and bandwagoning are the principal motivations for inter-regionalism (2009: 170). Rüland (2002:7), for example, notes that balancing is the 'least controversial' motivation for inter-regionalism. The realist approaches focus on the dynamics of rival regionalism and the balancing games among different regional actors (Hanggi, 2000: 8). Similarly, Gilson states that the participation of a group of nations in the world order does not translate into a different behaviour than that of previously isolated nation states, exemplified by the realist proposition that nation states and groups of nations still "value survival above all else" (2007: 13). In the case of the EU, according to Gilson, this implies the survival of an internal make-up that has been successful for its members. Hence inter-regionalism can be seen as a European centred approach aimed at defending the permanence of the gains achieved by means of regional integration (Ibid.). Roloff also argues that interregional arrangements are explicitly all for strengthening the EU's power (2006).

In sum inter-regionalism has become a strong component of EU's engagement with Africa. It is interesting to note that EU driven interregionalism tends to be multifaceted and comprehensive in nature. EU–AU inter-regionalism is comprehensive and multisectoral, spanning from trade and investments, politics, security and anti–terrorism, culture,

technology and science, drug trafficking, environmental protection and so on. The differences between the two unions in both economic and political fields make asymmetrical inter-regionalism an appropriate theoretical glass to look into the two Union's relation in general and the peace and security partnership in particular. The asymmetry is the main characteristic of the inter-regional relations between the EU and AU since the European Union, among others, is the largest market and source of assistance for Africa's peace and security activities.

CHAPTER THREE
THE JOINT AFRICA-EU STRATEGY: PEACE AND SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

In this section of the chapter, a brief introduction of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy is provided. More specifically, a detail presentation on the components and contents of the peace and security partnership, which is one of the eight partnership areas in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, are recounted.

3.1 The Joint Africa-EU Strategy

The first historic European Union (EU)-Africa Summit, which was held in Cairo in 2000, launched a more structured political dialogue between the EU and Africa, in particular through regular meetings between senior officials and ministers. A second summit was planned to take place in 2003 but was postponed indefinitely because of difficulties, as mentioned earlier, arising over the attendance of Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe. Due to this, the summit had to wait up-until 2007 and was held in Lisbon in that year. At the end of their second summit the EU and AU adopted the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES).

Under the joint leadership of the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU), the two continents have claimed to commit themselves to forge strong links based on a consensus built around values, interests and strategic objectives. This is said to be the driving force behind the adoption of the Joint Strategy. The JAES is embedded in eight separate AU-EU thematic partnerships including Peace and Security.[4]The document claims that a strategic partnership and the JAES serve as a political vision and roadmap for the future cooperation between the two continents in existing and new areas and arenas. And the purpose of the Joint Strategy, as stated in the document, is to take the Africa-EU relationship to a new strategic level with a strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation at all levels (AU & EU, 2007:2).

Four major objectives[5] have been stated in the Joint Strategy, of which the first is to reinforce and elevate the Africa-EU political partnership to address issues of common concern

[4] The other themes of partnership are: Democratic Governance und Human Rights; Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure; Millennium Development Goals; Energy; Climate Change; Migration, Mobility and Employment as well as Science, Information Society Space ://www.africa eupartnership.org/documents/EAS 2007_joint_strategy_en.pdf

[5] The other objectives are directly and indirectly related to peace and security. For the discussion of these objectives see the Joint Africa-Europe Strategy, available at http//:www.africa-eu-partnership.org

including peace and security, (AU & EU 2007). In order to meet the objectives, as stated in the strategy, Africa and Europe need to take concrete action and to make significant progress in some strategic and inter-related priority areas of which peace and security is the primary one. It is asserted that due to their history and experience, Africa and Europe understand the importance of peace and security as preconditions for political, economic and social development (AU & EU, 2007:5).

Generally, it is possible to underscore that the Joint Strategy has been an important move in the process of giving the AU an equitable footing in the inter-regional engagement where the EU was determined to give such a new strategic partnership the necessary means and instruments to fulfil the Joint Strategy and Action Plan. This, however, doesn't mean that having a joint a strategy alone would give the two partners equal status in their inter-regional dealings.

3.2. Peace and Security partnership

It is declared that Euro-Africa relations have been characterised by a shift in the development of a continent-to-continent dialogue based on a consensus on common values, common interests and common strategic objectives. The shift in the relations has been reflected in a series of landmark steps including the first EU-Africa Summit held in Cairo in 2000, the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted in 2007, and the recently held third Summit in Tripoli in November 2010. It could be said that such progressive inter-regional relations have consolidated the partnership between the two regions.

Since the start of the millennium when the first Africa-EU Heads of State summit took place in Cairo in April 2000, a more formal and specific Africa-EU political dialogue on peace and security has been going-on. The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the adoption of the Protocol Relating to The Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the Common African Defence and Security Strategy, the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the European Security Strategy, and the emergence of new global challenges are among the important factors which have brought the EU and the African continent to modernise their long-standing, complex relations in general and the peace and security partnership in particular.

The key objective of the peace and security partnership is for Africa and Europe to cooperate with a view to strengthening their capacity to react in a timely fashion and adequate manner to threats to peace and security, and to unite their efforts in the face of global challenges (Tardy, 2006:12). According to the peace and security partnership stated in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, this objective is to be met through short-term action plans, the first of which has ran from 2008 to 2010[6], with the following three priority actions:

1) to enhance dialogue concerning challenges to peace and security, with a view to formulating common positions and implementing common approaches with respect to peace and security in Africa, Europe and around the world;
2) to fully operationalise the African Peace and Security Architecture by ensuring that it functions effectively to meet challenges to peace and security in Africa; and
3) to ensure reliable and predictable funding for peacekeeping operations by African countries by providing the African Union and the regional security mechanisms with the financial means needed to carry out effective peacekeeping operations (AU & EU, 2007:30).

The document asserts that the objective for the first priority action is to "reach common positions and implement common approaches on challenges to peace and security in Africa, Europe and globally" (AU & EU, 2007: 30). More specifically, four outcomes have been expected under this objective: (a) deepened common understanding on the causes of conflicts and their resolution, (b) strengthened cooperation on conflict prevention, management and resolution, including long-term post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, (c) improved coordination of continent-wide and regional approaches and initiatives, and (d) increased EU and African cooperation and influence in international and global fora (Ibid.).

It is indicated in the document that for the second priority action, the objective is the effective functioning of the APSA to address peace and security challenges in Africa. Here also, four outcomes have been expected: (a) full operationalisation of the various components of the APSA, in particular the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, and the African Standby Force (b) enhanced capacities of the AU and the regional mechanisms (c) concrete progress in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts (d) strengthened African capabilities through the implementation of relevant proposals in the Action Plan of the related EU Concept adopted in May 2007 (AU & EU: 2007: 32).

[6]The second action plan (2011-13) has been adopted in the recent third EU-Africa Summit held in Tripoli from November 29-30, 2010.

It is also asserted that activities in this field are to a great extent orientated towards exercise, training courses, exchanges and logistics to make the African Standby Force and its regional brigades/national partners operational. Another key activity includes cooperation between EU and the AU to operationalise the Continental Early Warning System. To improve coordination and coherence between different policies, initiatives, financial instruments and actors are also an important activity and other activities including initiatives to strengthen other mechanisms and stakeholders relevant in the preventive and post-conflict phases (Powel, 2005: 12).

In a similar vein the objective for the third priority action is to financially enable the AU and regional mechanisms to plan and conduct Peace Support Operations. Under this endeavour two outcomes have been expected: (a) reduction of funding gaps and of the prejudicial uncertainty for African-led peace support operations, and (b) more effective deployment of these operations (EU & AU, 2007: 34). The activities for this priority action include the establishment of a new EU/AU funding mechanism, to work to ensure the contributions of other international community members, and to work together to achieve a UN mechanism for financial support for AU peace-keeping operations (Overhaus & Maull, 2008: 21). Through various mechanisms, the European Union has been continuing to be the largest provider of fund for the AU activities in areas of peace and security.

The political dimension of the EU-Africa inter-regional interaction, with peace and security issues at its heart, has been significantly strengthened and the African ownership of policies and actions has been embraced as guiding principle. The Joint Africa-EU Strategy reaffirms the EU support to the AU guided by the principle of "African ownership", its commitment to provide the necessary capacity building through the EU crisis management instruments and other programs through bilateral Member States' support (Dehaza, 2009: 3). One of the long-term goals of this partnership is to have African peace-making, peace-keeping, and peace-building mechanisms in place capable to take over any crisis management in the region (Ibid.). This has been expected to be realised with the full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture.[7] The details of this architecture are discussed in the later part of this chapter.

The partnership set to involve a large number of institutional and non-institutional actors in Africa and the EU at continental, regional, national and local levels, with a central role of the

[7] The progress made towards full operationalisation is discussed and analysed in the next chapter.

AU and the EU (Council of the European Union, 2008: 48). The two partners, however, place greater value on the role of their continental organisations in facilitating this partnership and task them to work closely together, including through more regular dialogue between corresponding AU and EU institutions, in the preparation and follow-up of decisions and meetings. In stating the major actors involving in the peace and security partnership, the Join Strategy names, among others, AU Commission and African States, European Commission, European Council and EU member States, EU and AU Heads of Mission in Addis Ababa, Brussels and New York, Research Centres and relevant Civil Society actors as well as UN, G8 and other relevant actors (AU & EU, 2007:31).

The finance needed for the implementation of the partnership has been planned to be sourced out from the AU Peace Fund, European Development Fund (EDF), African Peace Facility (APF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the Instrument for Stability (IfS), bilateral contribution from EU member states and African states as well as from other partners (Council of the European Union, 2008: 69). However, such separated and fragmented financial procedures imply higher transaction costs and a time-consuming decision-making process, considerably jeopardising the process of inter-regional interaction between the EU and AU. This picture is further complicated by EU member states' financial support on a bilateral basis.

Of course, the diversified nature and lack of coordination of issues related to the fund has been the agenda for discussion in different meetings between the two partners. For instance, recognising that the EU support is provided as part of the Africa-EU Partnership on peace and security and is to be coordinated closely with EU Member States and other international partners, the Consultative Meeting held in Akosombo, Ghana, in 2009 stressed the need for this support to be delivered under one comprehensive framework embodied in a roadmap, mirroring AU and RECs strategic objectives and adapted to different stages of progress.[8]

In sum, peace and security is considered a top priority in EU-Africa inter-regionalism. Both Africa and Europe acknowledge the close link that exists between security and development. They claim that their main focus remains addressing the root causes of conflict and instability as well as focusing on the need to address the whole cycle of conflict, from prevention to peacekeeping and to post conflict relief, rehabilitation and development.

[8] A Consultative Meeting between the AU, RECs, and the European Union was held in Akosombo, Ghana from 10-11 December 2009. The Conclusions of the Meeting is available on http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/focus/new- decade-peace-and-security-africa

The viability of this claim is analysed in the 4th chapter. The institutions of the AU and EU have been developing the capacity and institutional structures which would enable each of them to be effective and credible security actor though this may not be necessarily the case.

3.3 The African Union as a Security Actor

In July 2002, in Durban, South Africa, leaders and representatives from 53 African nations launched the African Union (AU), a continental organisation to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Replacing the OAU, the creation of the AU reflects a "new style" of pan-African level of governance. Clearly, Africa needed a revitalised organisation and level of governance to provide a framework to act collectively and decisively on peace and security, democracy, respect for human rights, the economic development of the continent and its proper integration into global polity. Departing from its predecessor, the new organisation called for major changes to the pan-African approaches to peace and security.

The various documents associated with the AU indicate that the organisation would have a different behaviour from its predecessor as far as peace and security of the continent are concerned. The Constitutive Act of the AU and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council in particular place renewed emphasis on building a continental security regime capable of preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts in Africa.

3.3.1. The Transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union and Peace and Security in Africa

At the time it was founded in 1963, the OAU took it upon itself the duty of supporting collective struggles for national liberation from colonialism as well as the responsibility to act as the guardian of Africa's hard-won yet fragile independence from colonial rule. The principles of equality, respect for national sovereignty, non-interference as well as territorial integrity constituted the cardinal principles that defined the modalities and parameters of multilateral cooperation within the OAU (Cown, 1980: 24). Notwithstanding the commitment in the preamble of its Charter to 'a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences', the basic principles listed were all state rights such as 'the sovereign equality of all member states' and 'non-interference in the internal affairs of states' (Umozurike, 1979).

African leaders created the AU to reflect a shift in the focus of the Pan-African project. Pan-Africanism as practised within the institutional framework of the OAU focused primarily on

legitimising and institutionalising statehood in Africa (Kwasi, 2007:28). In that regard the preamble to the Charter outlined a commitment by member states to collectively establish, maintain and sustain peace and security in Africa (OAU, 1963: 2). In parallel, however, the same Charter contained the provision to 'defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the member states' (Ibid.). As part of the efforts to protect and consolidate the African state, the Charter committed African governments to a treaty that contained some of the 'purest statements that defend and hold together the rings of elements of juridical sovereignty ever to be embodied in any international organization' (Clapham, 1996:111). The OAU thus become a guardian of the states and incumbent regimes which usually worked against their own peoples and became part of the problem in the continent's insecurity.

The creation of a more robust response on the part of the OAU to different forms and phases of conflict was initiated in 1993 when African heads of state made a declaration leading to the establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (Berman 2002). Although the establishment of the OAU conflict resolution mechanism should have moved the organisation to the centre of conflict management in Africa, the performance of the mechanism was not impressive. As Ambassador Sam Ibok, then director of the OAU's Political Affairs department, noted in 1999:

> Even though the OAU and its Charter came into existence as a continental framework for the promotion of the African collective will to ensure collective security and collective development, we have been unable in over thirty years to craft comprehensive security architecture to drive the peace and security agenda of the Continent. This is in spite of the establishment in Cairo in 1993 of a Continental Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. (cited by Kristina, 2005:12).

The excessive respect for states' sovereignty was later translated into the norm of non-intervention. The key organs of the OAU – the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government – could only intervene in a conflict situation if they were invited by the parties to a dispute (Murithi, 2007: 72). At the time, many intra-state disputes were viewed as internal matters and the exclusive preserve of the governments concerned. Regrettably, due to the doctrine of non-intervention, the OAU became a silent observer to the atrocities committed by some of its member states and, eventually, a culture of impunity and indifference became entrenched in the international relations of African countries during the era of the 'proxy' wars of the Cold War.

The OAU applied the policy of non-intervention was to the extreme and African states oppressed their own people with impunity and did little or nothing to prevent massive human rights abuses in neighbouring countries. Tim Murtithi (2007: 72) observes that the OAU was perceived as a club of African heads of state, most of whom were not legitimately elected representatives of their citizens but self-appointed dictators and oligarchs and this negative perception informed people's attitude towards the OAU. It was viewed as an organisation that had no genuine impact on the daily lives of Africans and in effect, the OAU was a toothless talking shop, a silent observer to the atrocities being committed by its member states (Ibid.). The 1994 tragedy in Rwanda was a wake-up call to Africa. It was this tragedy more than any other which caused African governments to re-assess their collective approach to conflict management in the continent.

Subsequently, the poor performance and limited results in peace and security achieved have led to the creation of a new organisation, the African Union (AU), and increasing attention paid to the security aspects of the pan-African project. On this issue, Kioko (2003) states that as a response to the ineffectiveness of the OAU's mechanism, African leaders decided to devise a new security regime to operate within the framework of the nascent AU. A core document that defines the principles and objectives of the AU's security policy is the Constitutive Act of July 2000. In its preamble, it states that member states are: "Conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment socio economic development of the continent, and the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the development and integration agenda.[9]

Learning from the lessons of the OAU, the AU has adopted a much more interventionist stance through its legal frameworks and institutions. The new Africa peace and security approach is embedded in Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act, which recognises the right of the Union to intervene in member state 'in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity' (AU, Constitutive Act, Art. 4(h) 2000). Once the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act came into force, this list also includes the notion of a "serious threat to legitimate order or to restore peace and security to the Member State of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council."[10]

[9] See The Constitutive Act of the African Union which was adopted in July 2000 in Lomé (Togo), available at http://www.africaunion.org/root/au/Aboutau/Constitutive_Act_en.htm

[10] Article 4, h) of the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted by the 1st Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) on 3 February 2003 and by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in Maputo Mozambique.

This spirit of non-indifference captured by Ambassador Said Djinnit in a speech he made on June 28, 2004:

> No more, never again. Africa cannot (...) watch the tragedies developing in the continent and say it is the UN's responsibility or somebody else's responsibility. We have moved from the concept of non-interference to non-indifference. We cannot as Africans remain indifferent to the tragedy of our people (Cited in Kristiana 2005).

The transition from the Organisation of African Unity to the African Union ushered in far-reaching changes to the pan-African peace and security agenda, particularly with respect to the parameters of sovereignty and intervention for human protection purposes. Powell (2005: i) observes that the principles underpinning the AU's emerging peace and security regime can be understood as drawing on elements of prevention-reaction-rebuilding continuum articulated in '*The Responsibility to Protect'*.

The AU clearly lays out provision for intervention in the internal affairs of member state through military force, if necessary, to protect vulnerable populations from egregious human rights abuses. Implicit in these provisions is the understanding that sovereignty is conditional and defined in terms of a state's capacity and willingness to protect its citizens. These changes make the AU's Constitutive Act the first international treaty to recognise the right on the part of international organisation to intervene for human protection purposes (Powell, 2005:4). The practicality of such ambition was put to test in the last eight years of the AU's existence.[11]

In this regard and because of the different innovations and proactive conditions, the creation of the African Union must be seen as a step of crucial importance in the development of the new peace and security architecture. As already indicated, the AU's commitment to peace and security was reaffirmed in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act that set the promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent as a major objective of the Union (AU 2000). Therefore, it is possible to state that the AU constitutive Act and its spirit of intervention and non-indifference is the major element in the AU's quest for an identity of a security actor in the African and global security landscape.

Other than the Constitutive Act there is also a document which further strengthens the quest of African Union to be a security actor. This is a document entitled "A Solemn Declaration

[11] More discussion on this is provided in the subsequent chapter.

on a Common African Defence and Security Policy" (CADSP) which was adopted on February 28, 2004 in the Second Extraordinary Meeting of The African Heads of State and Government held in Sirte Libya (AU 2004). The need the CADSP is inherent in the objectives of the Constitutive Act, particularly in Article 3(a) to (h) as well as in Article 4(d) of the Act, which provides for the "establishment of a Common Defence Policy for the African Continent".[12]

In the preamble of the Common Policy it is declared that the leaders determined to ensure that Africa, through the African Union, plays a central role in bringing about peace, security and stability on the Continent. The AU, of course, would play this role through its Peace and Security Council. Article 3 of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union provides that the objectives for which the Peace and Security Council include "the development of a Common Defence Policy for the Union, in accordance with Article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act" (AU 2002). It also provides in Article 7, that one of the powers of the Peace and Security Council shall be to "implement the Common Defence Policy of the Union" (Ibid.).

The CADSP states that ensuring the common defence of Africa involves working on the basis of a definition of defence and security which encompasses both the traditional, military and state-centric notion of the use of the armed forces of the state to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the less-traditional, non-military aspects which relate to the protection of the people's political, cultural, social and economic values and ways of life (human security) (AU, 2004: 2 & 3). It further emphasis on the need for the protection of human security at all levels. At the national level, the aim would be to safeguard the security of individuals, families, communities in the economic, political and social dimensions. This applies at the various regional levels also; and at the continental level, the principle would be underscored that the "security of each African country is inseparably linked to that of other African countries and the African continent as a whole" (Ibid.).

Since it is essentially a strategy based on a set of principles, objectives and instruments that aims at promoting and consolidating peace and security on the continent as well as releasing energies and resources for development, the CADSP has become an additional element in giving the AU a posture of security actor. The Policy, together with the Constitutive Act of the African Union and its Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security

[12] See the Constitutive Act of the African Union

Council place renewed emphasis on building a continental security regime capable of preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in Africa. It is this huge task which necessitated the decision to establish the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Of course, such architecture is indispensible to be built-up if the AU is to play a decisive role as a security actor in Africa and the world at large.

3.3.2 The African Peace and Security Architecture

Recently 'African-driven' efforts to address peace and security issues have been increased. Since the launch of the African Union (AU) in July 2002, African leaders have initiated steps towards the creation of an African security regime for maintaining security and managing conflicts in Africa. The new institution seems proactive in terms of its preparedness to tackle the continent's peace and security challenges, and generally contributing to issues relating to the attainment of international peace and security.

This transformation of the OAU into the AU has opened a new chapter in African security management. At the heart of this transformation lies the introduction of the APSA. The two crucial institutional components that provided the legal foundation for APSA are (1) The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union which was adopted in 2002; and (2) the Common African Defence and Security Policy launched in 2004. The entire process of developing the African Peace and Security Architecture is the core in the quest, by African Union, to assume the status of a security actor.

It should be noted here that various imperatives have led to the development of the APSA. In this regard Pirozzi (2009: 11) argues that the emergence of an African architecture to address the major security challenges in the continent is guided by three main imperatives: (a) 'Africa must unite', the (b) 'Responsibility to Protect' and (c) 'try Africa first'. In the first imperative the dominant view is that a divided and marginalised Africa will not be able to respond to the challenges of globalisation and complex threats of wars, civil conflicts, terrorist activities, disease, economic crisis, poverty and underdevelopment (Francis 2006). Thus advancing a concerted move is taken as a way forward.

The second guiding tenet for Africa's own security Architecture is a direct reflection of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. This is particularly observable in Article 4 of the Act where the AU is accorded the mandate and responsibility to intervene in the member states'

internal affairs with the mission to protect its people from 'grave circumstances namely, war crimes, genocide and crime against humanity' (AU 2000). This is in line with the underpinning principles of 'The Responsibility to Protect'.[13]

The third guiding imperative is related to the declared commitment to forge home-grown solutions for those problems besetting Africa. The concept of providing 'African Solutions to African Problems' underlines the identity dimension of security issues in Africa (Francis 2006). Together with the need for 'African renaissance', the concept refers to the revival and renewal of the continent through the maximum use of resources, both human and natural, and the imperative for Africa to assume responsibility for its own future (Pirozzi, 2009: 10-11). The concept also derives from external factors such as the progressive disengagement or indifference of external actors from Africa during the 1990s due to both the loss of Africa's strategic interest that followed the demise of bipolar East-West confrontation and the failure of UN-led interventions in responding to African crisis.

The African Peace and Security Architecture is a holistic approach relating to the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa which links together the aspects of 'anticipation, prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and crises, as well as post-conflict reconstruction and peace building in Africa' (AU 2002). The term Architecture with reference to peace and security, according to Salim Ahmad Salim (2002), refers to structures, norms, capacities, and procedures relating to averting conflict and war, mediating for peace, and maintaining security. In its current situation, the APSA is not up to these tasks assigned to it.The APSA is referred to as a set of AU structures, in conjunction with African Sub Regi onal Organizations spearheaded by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) as the cornerstone of the building.

The PSC is at the heart of these arrangements. According to the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the African Peace and Security Council, the Council is a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts (AU 2002). The Council comprises fifteen members elected by the AU General Assembly, which is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or designates of AU member states' governments: Five

[13]The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a recent international security and human rights norm to address the international community's failure to prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It is based on a report by the independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was established by the Government of Canada in September 2000 and formally presented to the United Nations. The full report can be found at http://www.iciss-ciise.gc.ca/menu-en.asp

elected for terms of three years and ten elected for terms of two years.[14] It is a collective security and early warning group that facilitates timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa (AU, 2004: Art. 2). As the central organ of the APSA, the PSC legitimizes and coordinates all the activities of the other institutions of the architecture and also builds relations with bodies like the EU Political and Security Committee (AU: 2002).

The major organs of the PSC are, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Stand by Force and the African Peace Fund (AU 2002). The Panel of the Wise is an advisory mechanism aimed at stemming conflict before it breaks out. The Panel is composed of five highly respected African personalities selected by the chairperson of the African Union Commission after consultation with member states concerned (AU, 2002: Art. 11). They are selected from the various segments of society and are those who have made outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent (Ibid.). The logic behind its creation is to enable it to carry out "discreet" diplomatic initiatives at the very early stage of conflict prevention to avoid its escalation and try to resolve it peacefully. Its candidates are appointed by the Assembly of the African Union.

Similarly the Continental Early Warning System is a system established to collect and analyze country data on the basis of an appropriate 'early warning indicators module' to enable early response to a crisis (AU, 2002: Art. 12). This serves as intelligence wing of the APSA and works in collaboration with similar systems located at sub-regional levels. The Early Warning System shall develop an early warning module based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators, which shall be used to analyse developments within the continent and to recommend the best course of action (Ibid.). Since the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution are part of the overall security architecture in Africa, the continental system is expected to closely work with the Early Warning System established by each mechanism.

The African Standby Force (ASF) is the core of the African Peace and Security Architecture. The purpose of the ASF is to provide the African Union with capabilities to respond to

[14] According to the PSC Protocol, the Council's membership should be chosen on the principle of 'equitable regional representation and rotation' as well as an assessment of whether the state in question is in good standing (i.e. has it paid its dues, does it respect constitutional governance and the rule of law etc.) and whether it is willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities that membership would place upon it. However, the applicability of these prerequisites is very much questionable since it is difficult to find that much number of states who are up to the stated requirements. Moreover, the political will of AU member states in enforcing the requirements is also doubtable.

conflicts through the deployment of peacekeeping forces and to undertake interventions pursuant to article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act. It is a multi-disciplinary contingent with civilian and military components in the country of origin. It deploys on missions decided by the PSC and authorized by the Assembly of the African Union (AU 2002). The ASF is intended for rapid deployment for a multiplicity of peace support operations that may include, *inter alia*, preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peace building, post conflict disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration as well as humanitarian assistance.[15]

The ASF is planned to be composed of five regional standby brigades equally allocated among five sub-regions with their specific Regional Economic Communities (RECs).[16] According to Article 13(1) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, such Force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with military, police and civilian components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice (AU 2004). As stated in the Protocol the strength and types of such contingents, their degree of readiness and general location shall be determined in accordance with established African Union Peace Support Standard Operating Procedures and shall be subject to periodic reviews depending on prevailing crisis and conflict situations (Ibid.: Art. 13(2)).

The ASF structure – with its associated deployment timelines – is informed by six mission scenarios. According to Cilliers (2008: 3-4), the first scenario is where there is the deployment of AU/regional military advice to a political mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate provided by the PSC. The second is attributed to the AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate. In the third scenario envisaged the Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate.

The fourth scenario is informed by the possible deployment of AU/regional peacekeeping force under the spirit of Chapter VI of the UN Charter and preventive deployment missions. Deployment is required within 30 days of an AU mandate (Cilliers, 2008: 3-4). Scenario five is stated as AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions,

[15] Interview with Mr. Sayabu Pabi Garaba, Police Training Officer in African Stand Force, Feb. 2, 2011

[16] The responsible RECs are: The Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS); The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); The Southern African Development Community (SADC); The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

including those involving low-level spoilers. ASF completed deployment required within 90 days of an AU mandate, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days. The last scenario, according to Cilliers, is in line with AU intervention, for example in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly. Here it is envisaged that the AU would have the capability to deploy a robust military force within 14 days (Ibid.).[17]

In spite of its various shortcomings, the introduction of the APSA remains to be a significant enterprise in the ongoing African efforts with the leadership of the AU to overcome security challenges in Africa. Together with the other parts of the architecture, the ASF was originally planned to be fully operationalised by the end of 2010. This, however, has not been materialised and recently, at the Tripoli Summit, this timetable is postponed to 2015.[18] However, the APSA should not be taken as the sole response to concrete experiences of suffering from violent conflict and material destruction in Africa. Rather it has to be taken as one dimension of the solutions. Having discussed the architecture, it is now appropriate to examine those peace and security challenges against which the architecture would be tested.

3.3.3 Peace and Security Challenges in Africa

Africa has been grappling with difficult security challenges. While most of the current challenges for African peace and security have a long history, they intensified with the end of the Cold War. Oyebade and Alao (1998) observe that with the battle of ideologies ended, superpower support for authoritarian governments ceased and often caused them to break down. This led to the intensification of rivalries resulting in violent confrontations which include intergroup and ethnic tensions as well as conflicts over the control of natural resources. The end of superpower rivalry also implied the proliferation of huge stocks of small arms and light weapons making armed conflicts more feasible.

The various peace and security threats that Africa has been encountering have multiple sources. According to Aning (2007: 1), the critical human, regional, and international security challenges facing Africa can be summed up as a nexus between what he termed as ‘old’ and ‘new’ challenges. As he stated them, ‘old’ security challenges are characterized by perennial armed conflicts, for example, the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict or the Chad-Sudan tensions among

[17] For further discussion on these scenarios See African Union, *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (Part I)*, Exp/ASF-MSC/2(1), May 2003, p. 3.

[18] Interview with Col Daniel VETURI, Military Advisor for the EU Delegation to African Union, January 5, 2011. The reasons for the delay in implementation are taken as challenges and discussed in the subsequent chapter

others, underpinned by the easy availability of small arms and light weapons; political violence, and food insecurity. He argued that the 'new' challenges are nourished by the 'old', giving rise to public health problems, massive migration, and increasingly ungoverned and ungovernable spaces within which individuals with terrorist affiliations and other opportunistic groups exploit and threaten human, regional, and international security (Ibid.).

The peace and security challenges for Africa are diverse and pose great demands on a continental security regime. Hence, a look into the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) help to grasp what African states identify as common threats to the peace and security of Africa. The Policy is a common understanding, among African states, about their defence and security challenges and a set of measures they seek to take collectively to respond to those challenges. Fundamental to the CADSP are the three notions of defence, security and common threats. The definitions given in the Policy to defence and security in the AU context have already been discussed. Defence and security are given a wider conception and encompass both the traditional and less-traditional aspects of the terms, i.e. both notions of state-centric security and human security are taken into account in the policy. In this section emphasis is given to the discussion on the common peace and security threats for Africa as they are stated in the policy document of the African Union.

The notion of common threats is extrapolated from the broad definitions of defence and security and hinges firmly on the principle that the security of each African country is inextricably linked to the security of other African countries and the African continent as a whole. Generally, common security threats are threats to one or more member states of the Union and are grouped under two broad categories: threats that emanate from within the continent and those that are from outside (AU, 2004: 3). Listed among the common internal threats to Africa include interstate conflicts/tensions, intrastate conflicts; unstable post-conflict situations; grave humanitarian situations, as well as other circumstances (AU, 2004: 3). The document provides further elaborations on each of these threats before giving the general description of the common threats that are perceived to be emanated externally.

Under the threat of inter-state conflicts/tensions are situations which undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Member States of the AU; incidents involving the actual use of force or threat of use of force between and among Member States of the AU; lack of respect to the principle of non-interference by one Member State in the internal affairs of the other; aggression or threat of aggression from a country or coalition of

countries, in violation of AU principles and provisions of the UN Charter (AU, 2004: 4). This set of threats is in line with the traditional and state-centric conception of security and underscore the need to use military means to address the threats.

The second set of common security threats originating internally is presented in the policy document under intrastate conflicts. The specific threats stated include, the existence of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; lack of respect for the sanctity of human life, impunity, political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities; coup d'états and unconstitutional changes of government; and situations which prevent and undermine the promotion of democratic institutions and structures, including the absence of the rule of law, equitable social order, popular participation and good governance; improper conduct of electoral processes (AU, 2004: 4). Providing more elaboration the document states absence of the promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights, individual and collective freedoms, equality of opportunity for all, including women, children and ethnic minorities; poverty and inequitable distribution of natural resources; and corruption; political, religious and ethnic extremism, as common internal threats (Ibid.). These threats have more to do with the conception of security in a less traditional manner and subsequently underline the need for ensuring human security in the continent.

Another category of internally emanating threats of peace and security in Africa is detailed in the CADSP, under unstable post-conflict situations. These situations include failure to consolidate peace in the post-conflict period as a result of the absence of effective and complete post-conflict demobilization, disarmament, and re-integration and lack of sustained post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction processes (AU, 2004: 5). Other factors that engender insecurity in Africa under the terms of the Common Policy are plight of refugees and internally displaced persons and the insecurity caused by their presence; use of landmines and unexploded ordinance; illicit proliferation, circulations and trafficking in small arms and light weapons; pandemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria; environmental degradation; violent crimes including organized and cross border crimes; human and drug trafficking; and money laundering (AU, 2004: 6).

The other group of threats for Africa's peace and security emanate from external sources. According to the Common African Defence and Security Policy, common external threats, refer to external challenges to Africa's continental security, which may endanger or have the potential, either directly or indirectly, to constrain individual and collective efforts to achieve

continental security goals (AU 2002). There are a number of such threats identified in the Common Policy.

As stated in the policy, common external threats to continental security in Africa may include external aggression, including the invasion of an African country; international conflicts and crises with adverse effects on African regional security; mercenarism; terrorism and terrorist activities; the adverse effect of globalization and unfair international political and economic policies, practices and regimes; the accumulation, stockpiling, proliferation and manufacturing of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, unconventional long-range and ballistic missiles; cross-border crimes such as drug and human trafficking; unilateral policies aimed at isolating African countries; dumping of chemical and nuclear wastes in Africa (Ibid.). These and the previously explained internal threats are all to be dealt-with in a bid to achieve the enumerated objectives that the policy envisaged to meet.

The objectives of the CADSP are believed to be essential to effectively respond to both internal and external threats. According to Touray (2005:9), the objectives are to enhance defence cooperation between and among African states, eliminate suspicion and rivalry between them, enhance the collective defence and strategic capability as well as military preparedness of member states of the Union, facilitate the establishment of a threat deterrence capacity within the AU, integrate and harmonize regional initiatives on defence and security issues, and encourage the conclusion and ratification of nonaggression pacts between and among AU member states.

The common security threats and the related objectives identified in the Common African Defence and Security Policy are among the major factors that push the AU to assume the role of an assertive security actor and establish an inter-regional partnership with the EU in the areas of peace and security. Of course, the EU itself has its own security interests and motives in its inter-regionalism with the AU in the aforementioned area of partnership.

3.3.4 European Union's Security Interests and its Engagement in the African Peace and Security Environment

3.3.4.1 European Union's Security Interests in Africa

Until recently, there was a wide-spread consensus in the West that the conflicts and instability shaking the Third World would have insignificant security implication on Europe and the rest of the developed world. Ayoob (2005: 32) suggests that there has been a serious underrating of the potential impact of conflict and disorder in the global periphery on the international security agenda. Many argued that the issues of the conflict-ridden Third World are so marginal for the economically, politically and technologically powerful states and it is not imperative for them to be overly concerned with conflict and disorder (Belachew, 2009:37). This perception has led to the insufficient and lukewarm attention given to the interstate and intrastate conflicts that have been destabilising the African continent.

Africa has been referred to as the 'forgotten continent' in which most international actors do not have a vested interest. The European Community/European Union has not been exceptional since it has been one of these actors in the international arena**.** Whiteman (2007:29) argues that traditionally, the European Union as a bloc has been unable and/or unwilling to get involved in African conflict situations, though individual countries such as France intervened militarily over 30 times in post-colonial Africa.

In attesting the same view, Gibert (2004:623) states that until the late 1990s, Africa's insecurity and underdevelopment were perceived to be a threat primarily to its own peoples and Western interventions, officially at least, was led in the name of morality and disinterested humanitarianism . She states that the 9/11 events transformed such perceptions and Africa's insecurity and underdevelopment are increasingly understood, defined and addressed according to the alleged threats they pose to the rest of the world's stability and development (Ibid.). In this regard the increasing number of conflicts in Africa with disruptive impact on the EU in such areas as migration, organized crime and terrorist activities has called for a realistic security approach by the EU towards Africa.

For most of the second half of the twentieth century, European governments and people relied for their security on the nation-states and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). NATO will continue to play a key role in preventing war between European states and protecting them from external threats i.e. defending the security of Europe. However, a

growing number of close US allies in Europe have come to recognise that the security alliance with Washington can no longer be the sole significant provider of European security (Krastev, 2010: 1). This makes imperative that the EU should cooperate with other relevant international actors that matter for European security of which Africa is the major one. However, the EU has not been consistent in its dealings with Africa.

During the second half of the 1990s it was possible to identify two trends in the EU's policies towards Africa. One trend manifested itself in the shrinking aid to Africa and the other trend manifested itself in the increasing preoccupation with security issues in Africa, reflecting the 'European' (national) interests that had developed during the decade following the end of the Cold War (Olsen, 2004: 433). In this regard, the ever increasing number of security threats, both perceived and actual, has compelled the EU's emphasis on peace and security in its inter-regionalism with Africa.

It is clear that Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa and the 2005 EU Strategy for Africa is intended to help Africa achieve this (Council of the European Union 2005). For the EU, the renewed interest in Africa finds its motivation in the need to stabilise the continent, in the sense that stability in Africa matters to European peace and security. Promoting development and good governance has become in the interest of the international community as a whole since it will help prevent local conflicts and insecurity from spilling over (Gibert, 2004: 623). Likewise, the EU Strategy for Africa asserts that the EU will support both the African Union and individual African states to make progress in the directions of ensuring peace and security in the continent.

Therefore, having a decisive role in overcoming conflict and state fragility in Africa is not only one of the great moral imperatives but is vital for peace and security of Europe. Instability in Africa has a direct security impact on Europe – in terms of migration, the trafficking of drugs, weapons and people and in providing breeding grounds for terrorism. As a corollary, any increase in peace and prosperity in Africa would benefit Europe, both as a trading partner and as an increasingly equal guarantor of its own security. The African continent is rich in natural, energy and human resources, but is also a permanent arena of war, poverty, hunger and pandemics, of fragile and even failed states. These are risks and threats that affect not just the African continent; their reach is international – they are obviously a problem for European security (EU 2007).

Europe has, over the last decade, identified a series of threats to its own security – understood in the broadest sense, from the immediate, physical security of its citizens, to the political, economic and social security of its states and societies – that are thought to originate in Africa. The Cotonou agreement, which came into force in April 2003, spots the common security threats most of which possibly emanate from Africa. Articles 11a, 13 and 30 of the agreement elaborate that terrorism, migration, drugs and organised crime are common concerns that should be jointly addressed by the parties to the agreement (Cononou Agreement 2000). With the insight that the EU and Africa share the same challenges, the idea that Africa cannot be ignored gained ground.

In relation to migration, EU's military presence is to prevent or resolve conflicts so that people from the African crisis regions do not leave their areas and potentially head for Europe as a result of such conflicts. On this issue Belachew (2007: 172) argues that this strategy is a kind of trans-location of the EU borders from southern Europe to Northern, Eastern, Western and Southern Africa through military surveillance or long-term strategies of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post conflict reconstruction and economic development.

Europe's immigration policy has become a policy of threat and consequently threats and migration become interchangeable. Here the notion is that threats to European security would increase as a result of the spill-over effects of the political and economic crisis in Africa. As millions of Africans attempt to enter Europe to escape socio-economic problems and political harassment, helping Africa to resolve this situation is perceived within the EU as a strategy to stem the tide of migration (Mypisi, 2009: 7). Defined as a strategic priority impinging on overall stability, the management of migration is considered as a security matter needing coordination and cooperation processes at more levels and with more actors (Ceccorulli, 2009: 2). All in all, massive and unwanted inflows of migrants are deemed to threaten the stability of the Union. Therefore, the increasing securitisation of migration has become one important pushing factor of EU's inter-regionalism with Africa.

With the spirit of the ESS, EU Member States have accepted that they have a 'responsibility to protect' the innocent. The ESS refers to the need to develop a strategic culture that "fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention" (EU, 2003:11). This is said to be grounded not just on humanitarian grounds, but also because of the belief that instability, conflict and state failure have a detrimental impact on Europe's own security in this

interdependent world. However, recent developments reveal that EU is becoming increasingly reluctant in intervening via its troops in crises outside Europe. In this matter, the EU is falling well short of its declared ambition in playing a major role in global security and in the promotion of peace and stability.

The ESS signifies both a comprehensive EU response to the rapidly changing security environment in the era of globalisations and an attempt to project the global security actor role for the EU. However, the geopolitical challenges have evolved considerably since the adoption of the strategy in 2003 and go nowadays beyond the five key security threats outlined in the document. Later on the EU's document on the 'Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy', released in December 2008, reaffirmed the threat assessment of the ESS by stating that the strategy has established principles and set clear objectives for advancing EU's security interests based on Europe's core values and is comprehensive in its approach and remains fully relevant (EU, 2008: 3). In addition to reasserting the already identified ones the 2008's Report came up with further list of threats to Europe's peace and security. These are cyber security, energy security and climate change (Ibid.).

From the 2008 Report it is possible to establish that energy security is an important factor that brought more EU engagement in Africa's peace and security landscape. Europe needs security of supply and Africa is an alternative to the volatile Middle East and Europe's disadvantageous dependency on Russia (Biscop, 2005:65). The EU's intensified work with Africa can also be seen as a result of a feeling that it could be about to 'miss the boat'. Major players such as China, India and the US are competing for influence and access to natural resources and trading benefits in Africa. A related motivation for EU's active involvement is the concern that possible effect of China's approach for development assistance in Africa might in the long run be a more unstable continent or less democratic one (Tull, 2008: 2).

As was noted above, since the end of the cold war, Africa as a continent was completely abandoned to itself. The entire 1980s and 90's were seen as lost decades for Africa and the lure of Chinese "soft loans" was therefore seen as a bailout for many African countries (Fowale 2009). Since then the ever-increasing intimacy between China and Africa continues to be worrisome for the west in general and Europe in particular. Certainly the most remarkable consequence of China-Africa embrace is that it has contributed to reignite a tremendous amount of European interest in Africa. Obviously, the EU is afraid of losing

influence in Africa and seems to be growing nervous about entering into a new type of competition with China and other powers.

The need to have a greater role, as a security actor, in the international arena and the EU's quest for visibility is another factor for EU's zeal to engage in Africa. Once it has embarked on developing its own security architecture- a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as well as a common Security Strategy- the next natural move would be putting these policies in practice. Gibert (2009: 623) observes that the newly established ESDP found in Africa an ideal experimentation field. In a similar manner Bach (2008: 355) argues that for EU, support to peacekeeping in Africa has been viewed as an opportunity to test the new ambitions assigned to ESDP after the crisis in the Balkans had offered a striking confirmation of European weakness in the field of conflict prevention in the post-Cold War era. Beyond Europe, Africa is, therefore, a place where the EU can demonstrate that it really exists as a security actor.

From Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, to the first EU naval mission, EUNAVFOR Somalia, the EU has found in Africa a field where it can both test and expand its ESDP concepts – from military peacekeeping to naval monitoring and deterrence – and find an easy consensus in favour of intervention among its member states (Bagayoko & Gibert 2009). This is to say that once with the EU expanding its range of foreign policy capabilities, the willingness to use them followed. Thus the aim of ensuring its institutional efficiency and becoming a major international actor can be taken as another important factor that compels the EU to involve in the African peace and security landscape.

3.3.4.2 European Union's Engagement in the African Peace and Security Environment

As discussed in the preceding section, the European Union has clear security and security-related interests in Africa that it has been striving to meet through the peace and security partnership with the African Union. In accordance with this partnership, the EU has continued to engage in the African peace and security environment. This engagement has various forms though is increasingly shifting from physical involvement of the EU troops to financial and technical commitments.

The EU claims that it has been working with the AU aiming at promoting peace and security in the continent so as the condition for development would be realised. As underlined in the

ESS, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security; and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace (EU 2003). But not only is African security a precondition for the continent's development, it is also essential for Europe's security. It is understood that Europe will share the fruits of Africa's progress or will suffer the negative consequences of its decline.

Much of the EU's involvement in Africa is in terms of financial support channelled through the European Development Fund (EDF).[19] This is due to the recognition of the central role that peace and security play in achieving development goals and commits the European Union to supporting the development of APSA (Council of the European Union, 2005: 1). The African Peace Facility (APF), driven out of the EDF, is the major financial instrument as far as EU's financial engagement in African peace and security activities is concerned.

Both EU and Africa underscore the close nexus between security and development. This relationship becomes more evident in Africa where poverty and underdevelopment are seen as key contributing factors to the eruption of civil wars and destructive armed conflicts. The preamble of the AU Constitutive Act states that member states of the organization "are conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of the development and integration agenda" (OAU 2001). Here the notion is that development in Africa is linked with stability and security: wars, terrorism, fundamentalism and illegal trafficking are all obstacles to progress in that direction and are barrier to investment and improvements leading to greater social and political stability.

In a related manner, Cilliers (2004: 27) stresses that underlying Africa's security crisis is its serious developmental failure; the common denominator of civil war and conflict in Africa is poverty, and much of that poverty is the result of bad policy and poor governance. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) also underlines the relation between peace and security with socioeconomic development and governance. This is because a lack of governance is seen as nurturing the potential for conflicts, and socioeconomic development is considered instrumental in both conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction (NEPAD

[19]European Development Fund (EDF) is the main instrument for providing European Community aid for development cooperation in the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) states.

2006). What the AU and NEPAD have been working on the ground remains to be questionable.

The EU also recognises that economic development and security are mutually dependent and there is a strong nexus between the two. The ESS, for instance, emphasizes that Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict (Council of the European Union, 2003: 3). The nexus between development and security "should influence EU strategies and policies in order to contribute to the coherence of EU external action."[20] This nexus between security and development is also duly taken into account in the framework of the implementation of the EU-Africa Partnership.

A similar emphasis has been given to security-development nexus in the 2007 EU Council conclusions on security and development. It is stated that inter-linkage between security and development should be seen as an integral part of the ongoing EU efforts, including those to enhance Civil-Military Coordination in order to address complex crises in a coherent manner.[21]The EU Commission also argued on the basis of the Cotonou agreement that "there can be no development without peace and security", therefore "the decision to extend the use of development funds to peace and security issues" to fund the African Peace Facility (APF) was "a deliberate one" (European Commission 2004).

While the architecture is in place, the price of peace is high: support operations are extremely costly and resources in Africa are scarce. Accordingly, at the Maputo Summit in 2003, the AU Heads of State proposed that a facility should be set up from funds earmarked to their countries through the EU development co-operation agreements with Africa (European Commission 2004). In response to this request the African Peace Facility[22] was, therefore, created by the EU in 2004.[23] The request was initially acknowledged and adopted in the final communiqué of the EU−Africa Dialogue in Rome in November 2003 (EU & AU 2003). The

[20]EU Development Policy: Security and Development, http://www.consilium.europa.aspx?id=1659&lang=EN

[21]EU Council Conclusions on Security and Development, 19 November 2007, Brussels - Council of the European Union, 2831st External Relations Council meeting, conclusions on Security and Development, http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_7523_en.htm

[22]The APF is based on three principles: the first is ownership i.e. led, operated and staffed by Africans; the second is encouraging African solidarity; the third and most important is to create the necessary conditions for development, http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/docs/flyer_peace_en.pdf

[23]Interview with Col Daniel VETURI, Military Advisor for the EU Delegation to African Union, January 5, 2011.

APF is claimed to be created in support of peace and security in Africa in order to create better conditions for development.

Development policy has, therefore, incorporated security issues in its strategies and operations, and security policy has done the same with development issues. Here lies the EU's rationale behind allocating the finance for the APF from the EDF. It is argued that it is the link between underdevelopment and insecurity that informed the EU's decision to reallocate the fund already available for developmental endeavours to peace and security issues under the African Peace Facility. However, such redirection of fund may undermine the EU-AU resource capacity to tackle the root causes of conflict and insecurity in Africa.

Moreover, the fact is that the main resources associated with the Peace and Security Partnership of the Joint Africa−EU Strategy (JAES) are taken from the EDF, since the JAES is neither a legal framework, nor does it have a dedicated system of financial resource allocation and management. This is a structural weakness and a constant threat to the long-term sustainability and predictability of EU support to JAES in general and AU peace support activities in particular. Nevertheless, financial commitment remains to be one dimension of EU's involvement in African peace and security arena.

The other facet of EU's engagement in Africa is direct involvement in Africa through military and civilian crisis management missions. As a way of sharpening the efficiency of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the EU has dispatched missions directly involving European troops and, of course, several of the EU's operations under the ESDP have taken place in Africa. Furthermore, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) saw the first deployment of the EU military operation outside Europe, in 2003, which was codenamed as Operation Artemis.It is this mission in Africa that became the first autonomous EU military operation which was launched, when EU troops were deployed without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities in the town of Bunia, in the Eastern part of the DRC between 12 June 12 and September 1, 2003.[24]

It is hard to tell whether Operation Artemis occurred because of "France (...) judged it politically advantageous" to intervene under EU banner in a region where its presence had been highly contested, or whether "EU high officials in the Council saw it as a good opportunity to heal the bitter political differences among member states on intervention in

[24] Interview with Col. Daniel VENTURI, Military Advisor for the EU Delegation to the AU, Jan. 5 2011

Iraq and give a boost to ESDP (Bach, 2008: 361). Grignon (2003: 1) also states that France, the lead nation, was the only country to have men engaged in direct military operations on the ground and it also provided the headquarters for operational planning while other participant countries provided logistics, health facilities, units of engineers, etc. It seems that without French leadership, the EU operation would not have happened. There is, therefore, a question over the level of EU ownership of the Artemis operation. Given the level of its enthusiasm and the composition of the forces on the ground it could be argued that Artemis was more a French operation with an EU cover, than EU operation led by the French.

Operation Artemis, however, provided a testing ground for the EU' new security doctrine and its aspiration to a much longer view on crisis management and conflict prevention. For the civilian population of Bunia, the operation was a success, as it restored security, allowed humanitarian assistance to be provided, and brought an end to the immediate crisis (UN, 2004: 15). It is not successful, however, in terms of bringing security to large areas in Bunia.

The other EU engagement mission was sent to Chad and Central African Republic and named as EUFOR Tchad/RCA. This mission was deployed in 2008 and had the objectives of protecting civilians in danger, facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and protecting United Nations personnel and activities.[25]Capacity related and other constraints had hampered the full success of the mission. For instance, the number of troops and the logistics available were not compatible with the vast areas to be covered by the mission.[26] Another interesting aspect of this mission is that it once again illustrated the pivotal role that national interests played in the decision of member states to take part in military missions under the EU banner. Austria's decision to involve in the EUFOR is a case in point.

Austria's desire to join the mission came as a particular surprise as the small, neutral country, with limited military resources, has in the past frequently abstained from engaging in 'adventures in Africa' (Franke 2010). Austria's participation in EUFOR, according to Franke, served a clear Austrian national interest: gaining influences in Europe and enhancing troop experience vis-à-vis other countries. The other self-interest of Austria was its bid for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council for which it desperately needed African votes

[25] EUFOR Tchad/CRA, http://www.assembly-weweu.org/en/documents,sessions_ordinaries

[26]One example of logistic related constraint was the lack of helicopters which brought the EU close to Russia for help in which EU received four helicopters and 160 personnel. This cooperation between the EU and Russia was the first in the history of the ESDP, Assessing EUFOR Chad/CRA, ://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_231_esr42-euforchad.pdf

(Ibid). Indeed African leaders welcomed Vienna's EUFOR engagement and as a result, threw their weight behind Austrian bid. Similarly, Austria was aware that acquiescing to France's demand for troops would ensure Paris' support and lobbying of African leaders for Vienna's non-permanent seat (Ibid). This is one manifestation that the EU has a lot to do in rallying member states behind a clear and officially stated interests under European solidarity.

The EU has also undertaken its first naval ESDP mission 'EU NAVFOR ATALANTA' to respond to piracy off the coast of Somalia. Missions under the auspices of the EU have also participated in programmes of security sector reforms in countries like Guinea-Bissau and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In all these commitments, the EU has been attempting to assert its ability to engage in military and civilian crisis management missions in Africa, yet these missions to date have only ever been mounted in clear reference to a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution.[27] This pre-condition is likely to be maintained in the near future, since the neutrality status of some EU member states, including Ireland, Sweden and Austria, require the existence of UNSC decision before their involvement in any armed mission (Ibid).

Provision of training for African forces is another aspect of engagement for the EU in the African peace and security environment. In this regard the AMANI Africa cycle[28] has been the most visible one. The AMANI Africa training cycle used as vehicle to assist the African Union in making the African Standby Force operational through training and evaluating the continental decision making process.[29] The AMANI Africa cycle was officially launched on 21 November 2008 at the AU - EU Ministerial Troika in Addis Ababa (AU & EU, 2008). Over the two-year cycle the programme planned to conduct a range of activities to train AU Staff, in accordance with the AU /ASF doctrine and procedures to improve decision-making for crisis management at continental level.

In practical terms the training would involve capabilities of the African Union by putting in place procedures and permanent mission structures covering everything from the political decision making to the commitment of forces and ensuring predictable funding (Ibid.). The

[27] Interview with Col. Daniel VENTURI, Military Advisor for the EU Delegation to the EU, Jan. 5, 2011

[28] The program draws in large part upon France's experience in the Reinforcement of the African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) program and the experience adopted to be European initiative in as EUROCAMP. The name AMANI is taken from the Swahili language which means peace. http://www.amaniafricacycle.org/spip.php?article66

[29] Amani Africa/EURORECAMP (2008) *Report of the Initiating Conference*. Available from: <http://www.amaniafricacycle.org/spip.php?article15> Accessed on 10 June 2010.

AMANI Africa cycle culminated in the Command Post Exercise held in AU Headquarters in October 2010.[30] The training was conducted to test the brigades' readiness and showed that good progress had been made in several areas, but revealed that the ASF was not yet fully operational. In particular, implementation of the more ambitious scenarios was still beyond its reach.

However, European Union's engagement in Africa is not without drawbacks particularly in relation to its military missions. By and large, it is possible to discern that it is not a prerequisite that EU interests and national interests completely converge in order to launch a mission, as long as national interests can be satisfied alongside the official European interest. Likewise, unless EU operations in Africa are planned and organised in relation to African crisis needs and not primarily guided by European internal politics, they are unlikely to make a difference at all to control African crisis and may in the end, have only marginal effects.

Most importantly, however, the trend in relation to EU military mission to Africa shows that Europe is gradually distancing itself from directly involving its troops in Africa either under the UN hat or the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Bach (2004: 362) observes that European military interventions whether they occur under the aegis of the EU or proceed from individual commitments/interests, do not really depart from what was, already in the late 1990s provocatively described as 'constructive disengagement', an approach centred on the build-up of African intervention capacity, as an alternative to European direct military engagement. All-in-all the European Union has been busy in moving from a policy of burden-sharing to burden-shifting as far as direct military engaging in Africa is concerned.

[30] Interview with Payibu Pabi Garba, Police Training Officer in the African Stand Force, Feb. 2011

CHAPTER FOUR
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AND CHALLENGES

The first focus of this chapter lies on the progress made in implementing the first Action Plan (2008-2010) of the peace and security partnership between the African Union and European Union. In doing so particular attention is given to the three Priority Actions stated in the partnership: (a) Enhance Dialogue on Challenges of Peace and Security; (b) Full Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); and (c) Predictable Funding for African-led Peace Support Operations. Due to the spirit of the partnership which underscores the peace and security condition in Africa as well as the growing trend of Africanisation of peace operations in the continent, more attention is given to the progress made on the African side. The other major focus of the chapter is on the major challenges that the partnership has encountered so far.

4.1. Progress made in the Implementation Process

4.1.1 Enhance AU-EU Dialogue on Challenges to Peace and Security

As one of the three shared and agreed goals, the European Union and African Union vowed to enhance their dialogue on challenges to peace and security. This goal considers an upgraded political dialogue as the linchpin of the new partnership. In this regard, it is clearly stated that the continental level is the key focus and added value of the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES), with the two Unions at the core of the dialogue process and institutional architecture.

The two sides reaffirmed the strategic nature of the partnership and acknowledged that the EU-AU dialogue is a political process aimed at reaching common understanding on issues of mutual interests in the areas of peace and security. Both underscored the need for consistent and meaningful dialogue at various levels. Consequently, Africa and Europe have agreed to hold a series of joint meetings to facilitate the implementation and monitoring of the JAES in general and the peace and security partnership in particular while simultaneously upgrading their dialogue in various international fora. The AU-EU dialogue primarily takes place through the Joint Expert Groups (JEGs); the Ministerial Troika meetings and the Summits.[31]

[31] Interview with Dr Admore Kambudzi , Secretary, the AU Peace and Security Department, Feb. 25, 2011

The JAES calls for the establishment of informal Joint Expert Groups (JEGs) on all priority actions identified in the Action Plan. These informal Groups are set to bring together African, European and international key-actors (including civil society organisations) with the necessary competence and commitment to work on the priority action concerned (AU & EU; 2007: 28). It was in the 11th EU-Africa Ministerial Troika in Addis Ababa that the role of the JEGs was finally defined and the first guidelines for the Joint Expert Groups were published (AU & EU 2008). The Groups are set to discuss the implementation and financing of the respective priority actions.

Similar to the JEGs in the other themes of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, the Joint Expert Group for peace and security has been mandated to coordinate the members' roles, set a timeline and road map for implementation by defining priority actions, foster debate and report regularly to the other actors (Tywuschik & Sharriff 2009). In a way, the JEGs form the core part of the institutional architecture in the AU-EU interactions and have been identified as motors of the implementation process including the peace and security partnership (AU & EU 2009).

In general, both partners recognise that the JEGs have opened up a new political dialogue in which both parties have had to prepare their partnerships and jointly agree on priorities and modalities. However, lack of the required level of expertise particularly on the African side remains a challenge for the effectiveness of the various groups. In addition, the extent to which the recommendations and the works of the JEGs are influencing the decision making process of the EU and the AU is unclear and the impacts seem not encouraging.

Specific peace and security issues have also been major areas of discussion at the EU-Africa Ministerial Troikas and often dominate the agendas of the meetings. The Africa-EU Ministerial Troikas is a format for political dialogue which arose after the first EU-Africa Heads of State Summit in Cairo in 2000 and which is now conducted every six months either in Europe or Africa. While they do not paint the full picture of EU-Africa political dialogue it is useful to generally reflect on the statements and outcomes of some of these meetings, particularly after the coming of the JAES, in relation to peace and security because this could help reveal if the discussions made have been in line with the spirit of the partnership.

Five Ministerial Troika Meetings have been held under the framework of the JAES until April 2010. The first Ministerial Troika[32], under the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, held in Brussels in September 2008, was intended to inform the competent bodies about the progress made thus far and to enable ministers to assume their overall political responsibility for the partnership (AU & EU, 2008). Though not directly, the issue of peace and security was raised in this meeting under the agenda "update on current issues" in which the peace and security situations in both Africa and Europe have been discussed.

According to the Communiqué released, on the African side the situations in Sudan/Chad, Somalia, Zimbabwe and Mauritania were discussed while Kosovo and Georgia were given particular attention from the European side (Ibid.). The representatives of both sides presented briefings on these situations and agreed to work closely to ensure continued progress in the peace process in Sudan. It is also stated that the participants of the two side shared concerns about the delay encountered in the full deployment of the authorised strength of African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (AU & EU, 2008).

The discussion in the second Ministerial Troika Meeting, held in November 2008, accorded more attention to the issues related to the peace and security. It is in this meeting that the training cycle for African Standby Force, Amani Africa/Euro Recamp[33] has been launched and the new African Peace Facility for the period 2008-2010 was agreed (AU & EU: 2008). Furthermore, according to the communiqué of the meeting, the Joint Expert Group agreed to organise a seminar on the support given by the EU to African training centres. In the meeting, all parties were asked to allocate the necessary funds to the implementation process. However, no concrete proposals were made as to where the funding should come from.

Peace and security continued to be the major agenda in the last three Troikas held between April 2009 and April 2010. The Ministers in attendance, as they did in their previous meetings, raised and discussed specific situations in countries like Sudan and Somalia. They also made exchange of views on election-related conflicts and violence; and stressed the need for the early entry into force of the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (AU & EU 2009). In their last meeting, held in Luxemburg, the two sides agreed to further enhance the quality, scope and effectiveness of political dialogue on peace and security

[32]Nine official Ministerial Troik Meetings held before the first Ministerial Troika held in 2008. These meetings have been held since the 2000 Cairo Summit.
[33]Further discussion on Amani Africa is presented in the following part of this chapter.

including the meetings between the AU Peace and Security Council and the EU political and Security Committee. A close look at the post-meeting documents, however, depicts that the meetings were dominated by discussions over ongoing conflicts and crises. Sadly, the root cause leading to these conflicts were not taken as agendas and discussed in this important component of the Joint AU-EU institutional arrangement.

Under the peace and security partnership, one of the most innovative of the dialogues is the provision for joint meeting between the AU Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC) and its European equivalent, the Political and Security Committee (EU-PSC). This is a meeting agreed to be held on a yearly basis. So far three such meetings have taken place and the first was held in Brussels in September, 2008 (AU & EU: 2008). As indicated in the communiqué, the two sides have discussed on issues including the consolidation of the African Peace and Security Architecture. They also held discussion on the on-going major crisis such as in Zimbabwe and Mauritania in Africa and Georgia and Kosovo in Europe in which both African Union and European Union were trying to resolve. It is in this first joint meeting that the participants decided to hold joint meetings on annual basis.

According to the Press Statement of the 2nd Joint Consultative Meeting between the AU-PSC and the EU-PSC, the sides recalled the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership in the area of peace and security, and the need to strengthen political dialogue; the meeting discussed related issues including unconstitutional change of government; prevention, management and resolution of disputes and tensions arising from elections in Africa; and conflict situations in Somalia and Sudan (AU & EU 2009). It is also noted that the importance to draw concrete lessons from crisis management experiences in Europe and welcomed the AU and the EU intention to organize joint assessment missions in post-conflict areas in Europe.

The next Joint EU-PAC and AU-PSC Meeting held in October 2010 in Brussels discussed on conflict prevention and crisis situations in Africa. Once again the conditions in both Sudan and Somalia were discussed in which both sides reconfirmed their common resolve to fight impunity and encouraged all efforts to bring peace, reconciliation and justice in the countries (AU & EU 2010). The issue of Maritime Safety and Security was another agenda addressed in the meeting. In that regard the participants agreed to explore ways to step up coherence in efforts of maritime safety and security on sea and to stabilize Somalia on shore.

From the above, it could be said that by and large the goal set to have an enhanced dialogue between the EU and AU looks have moved forward. The setting of regular time for meetings between and among the various bodies of the two Unions and the encouraging level of attendance by both sides are all commendable developments. This, however, doesn't mean that the process of the AU-EU political dialogue is entirely a success story. The domination of the dialogues by on-going conflicts at the expense of their main causes and solutions is one weakness of the dialogue process. There is also lack of clarity on how the decisions and recommendations of the Ministerial Troikas are linked to the political decision process of both the EU and AU. In fact, decisions are made in these meetings but their effect is constrained by low level of implementation. The factors for this are discussed and analysed in the next section of the chapter.

The rhetoric of dialogue has also been put into question, for instance, by the EU's tendency to project its normative power and promote its own values and agenda in its relationship with the African continent.[34] Normative power is defined as the 'ability to shape conceptions of "normal" in international relations' (Manners, 2002: 239). The EU's normative power is understood as a practice by which the EU seeks to spread its core norms, such as human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance internationally.

The mechanism of 'othering' is central in the construction of the EU's identity as a normative power in its external relations. On this issue, Scheipers and Sicurelli (2008: 610) observed that the practice of 'othering' has received much attention as an activity by which EU officials construct the EU's identity as a normative power while at the same time exerting power in its external relations. 'Othering' refers to the demarcation of the self against a threatening, inferior or simply different 'other' (Ibid.). EU's threat perception towards Africa, the 'other', can be understood from this perspective. Expanding European values into Africa, through EU's normative power, therefore, is taken as one way of addressing these threats. However, African leaders have repeatedly complained that the West, including the EU, usually puts conditionalties around these values and tend to exercise its normative power. The leaders see that as interference in their domestic affairs.

Even with regard to the values like human rights, democracy and good governance, there is clearly a disconnection between rhetoric and action. There are examples where the EU, is complaisant with serious human right violations and measures which undermine

[34] Interview with Dr Admore Kambudzi , Secretary, the AU Peace and Security Department, Feb. 25, 2011

democratisation in some African countries which eventually lead to instability. Lack of concrete and quick response both from the EU and AU to the recent, January and February 2011, popular revolts in Tunisia and Egypt; and the un-proportional reaction of the two governments against unarmed civilians is a case in point. After all, it is the peace and security of that part of Africa which have been at stake with possible consequences on the rest of Africa and parts of Europe as well.

It seems, therefore, that the EU is uninterested to be serious about human rights and democracy in 'strategic' countries despite the peace and security repercussion this might have for the people of those countries. In the case of Tunisia and Egypt, EU was not prepared to put its rhetoric about human rights, the rule of law and freedom of expression into practice even though these are the declared values that are meant to underpin its foreign and security policy. In these particular cases, the EU and its members have maintained the 'polite fiction' that they are in favour of democracy and openness but in reality they have been happy to allow regimes to avoid reforms. Of course, the very nature of the partnership that the EU has established is a partnership with an organisation made by states which are under illegitimate and unelected governments.

The AU and its members on their part have found it uncomfortable to seriously discuss the issues and failed to show their solidarity to the people of Tunisia and Egypt. In fact, most of the leaders of the AU member states have worse political and economic records and this deprived them of the courage and moral strength to speak about the real causes for and reliable solution to the 'revolutions' in the mentioned states. In the recently held 16th Summit, the AU has accorded marginal discussion status to the developments in Tunisia and Egypt. The Chair Person of the AU- Jean Ping- stated that the developments in Tunisia and Egypt could not be among the agendas because the agendas have already been set prior to the eruption of popular revolts in those states.[35] This can be taken as one manifestation of the hesitation that the AU has been showing in addressing direct violence let alone towards making real progress in responding to structural causes of instability and insecurity in the continent.

A more appalling silence of the African Union has been witnessed during the popular revolt and the extremely disproportionate response of the Libyan government in February 2011. The reaction of the government using heavy weaponry and aerial bombardment against protesters

[35]See more on: http://allafrica.com/africa/news/au/summit

deserved strong response and action from the AU beyond mere condemnation. It is unclear how the AU officials understand what they call crime against humanity and grave human right violations. Otherwise the atrocities in Libya should have been taken as grave human right violation in which the AU, in line with its Constitutive Act, should have been at the fore-front in taking concrete action to show its solidarity to the people of Libya. Once again the AU lost the chance to show its credibility to the people of Africa that it is a real security actor in the continent and is actually different from a cosy club of dictators.

All in all, claiming to be working for peace and security in different political dialogues would not help the EU and AU to move forward their partnership in peace and security while deliberately ignoring the structural instability prevailing in most parts of Africa. Conflict prevention is all about addressing such instability in an effective and timely manner. The EU and AU, as actors of peace and security, should realize the fact that local stability in Africa relies heavily on two factors: firstly, popular consent to being governed – if states and ruling regimes lack sufficient popular legitimacy, such conditions may lead to popular uprising and in extreme cases, result in armed rebellion and insurgency like what has happened in Libya; secondly, the ability of states to project their institutional and security capacity within their territories to provide basic services and to establish a secure environment. So far the AU and EU have unimpressive record in helping these happen in Africa.

Therefore, the issues at hand in the political dialogue need practical actions and tangible results more than rhetoric and decorated declarations at the end of meetings. In other words, the quality of political dialogue needs to be improved. Talking about post election violence, for example, doesn't help without being serious about the election itself. Both Unions in general and the EU in particular must put pressure on African governments to make visible political and economic reforms; and the ongoing dialogues on challenges to peace and security have to take this into consideration. Both need to be courageous enough to say no for many sit-tight dictators who are perpetuating structural instability against their own people in Africa. It is only then that the peace and security partnership and the resultant dialogue would bear fruits on the ground.

4.1.2 Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

The full operationalization of APSA which includes the strengthening of the involvement of RECs/RMs in the process, constitutes a crucial part of the Africa-EU partnership on peace and security. According to the first Action Plan of the partnership, the full operationalisation

has been envisaged to be effective at the end of 2010. The success and effective implementation of the APSA is believed to be a determining factor for the peace, stability and prosperity of the continent. Under the Peace and Security Council, the Architecture is planned to be composed of these major components: the Continental Early Warning System, The Panel of the Wise and the African Standby Force as well as the Peace Fund. The full picture of the Architecture, therefore, can only be clearly seen when all this parts are made put operational.

Evaluation of the operationalisation of the APSA reveals a mixed image where progress is witnessed in some of its elements while lagging behind in others. The overall result, however, is not impressive. In terms of the realization of Art 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU and the prevention of serious atrocities, the most important institutional tool is the envisaged African Standby Force (ASF). According to Article 13 of the Peace and Security Council Protocol, an African Standby Force shall be established in order to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4(h) and (i) of the Constitutive Act (AU 2002).

The ASF with its Military Staff Committee was conceived to conduct, observe, and monitor peacekeeping missions and responding to emergency situations anywhere on the continent requiring rapid military responses. On May 2003 African Chiefs of Defence and Security adopted the AU Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (AU 2003). The framework also called for five brigades comprised of military, civilian, and police components in each of the continent's five geographic regions.[36] The progress made so far in each region shows variations with a better advancement in West Africa under ECOWAS while the Northern and Central brigades are lagging behind.

According to initial planning, the ASF would be established in two phases.[37] Phase I was supposed to be completed by June 2005, but this deadline was postponed to June 2006. During this period, the AU was to establish a Planning and Management Element (PLANELM), while the five regions would develop regional standby forces up to brigade

[36]The Brigades are: the Southern African Development Community Brigade (SADCBRIG), the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), the North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG), the Economic Community of West African States Brigade (ECOBRIG), and the Economic Community of Central African States Brigade (ECCASBRIG).

[37]Interview with Mr. Sayibu Pabi Garibap, Police Training Officer, African Standby Force. Feb. 2, 2011

size. Phase II was supposed to end in June 2010: by then, it was envisaged that the AU should have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, including two large missions and one smaller mission at the same time, while the five regions would continue to develop their capacity (Ibid).

In regard to the requirement of sub-regional standby brigades with 5,000 troops and some degree of command and control, the ECOWAS brigade (ECOBRIG) appears to have proceeded the farthest. ECOWAS Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Col. Mahmane Toure stated, in August 2010, that with the complete evaluation of its Task Force, the Economic Community of West African States' Standby Force is now ready for full operation.[38] The ECOBRIG has managed to designate the requisite number of 5,000 troops as standing by and has developed command and control mechanisms and a planning element with donor assistance.[39] The previous experiences and the leading role that Nigeria has been willing to play made all the progress in this part of Africa.

The ECOBRIG, however, is not free from shortfalls. The civilian and police divisions are still lagging behind.[40] In terms of finance the achievements made so far heavily depend on external sources and this poses a challenge for the issue of ownership and future endeavours of the brigade. In regard to airlift, there are not many assets in ECOWAS, and sealift and ground transportation are underdeveloped.[41] The dominant role of Nigeria in the region would also lead to political tension among member states. This is particularly the case with the francophone countries which are the majority in the region.

The other sub-regional standby force which registered a relatively good progress is the East African Brigade (EASTBRIG) which is transformed into East African Standby Force (EASF) in January 2010.[42] In their Second Extraordinary meeting in Addis Ababa, the sub-regional leaders acknowledged that East African Standby Force now has the capacity to undertake operations up to Observer Mission and be co-deployed with a UN Mission (Ibid). In relation to finance, East Africa is ahead of the other regions in that it has allocated $2.56 million of its own funds for EASTBRIG headquarters, planning and a logistics base (Cilliers 2005). This,

[38] More on: http://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2010/08/29/west-african-standby-force-ready-for-deployment/
[39] Interview with Col. Daniel VENTURI, Military Advisor of the EU delegation to the AU, Jan. 12, 2011.
[40] Interview with Mr. Sayibu Pabi Garibap, Police Training Officer, African Standby Force. Feb. 2, 2011
[41] Interview with Dr Admore Kambudzi, Secretary, the AU Peace and Security Department, Feb. 25, 2011.
[42] During the summit chaired by Djibouti President Ismael Omar Guelleh in Addis Ababa, the regional Heads of State and Government adopted the revised policy framework and Memorandum of Understanding aimed at changing the East African Standby Brigade (EASTBRIG) to East African Standby Force (EASF). http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/news/jan2011/2011290102.htm

however, doesn't mean that the sub-region is self-sufficient in this regard. The activities of the EASF are heavily dependent on the financial donations of external actors.

Here too there are some drawbacks on the whole process. The area is known for the complex security situation. In that regard, one area of concern remains the political dynamics and political tensions between member countries which would lead to some not being willing to contribute or accept troops from countries with which they are in dispute or on the basis of religious difference. The other major challenge is the competition between the two 'anchor states', Ethiopia and Kenya. There is generally a lot of work to be done in avoiding the suspicion among member states and develop wider trust among them.

The SADC Standby Force (SADCBRIG) is the other building block of the African Standby Force. Due to the experience that the organization has and the existence of leading nation, Republic of South Africa, there has been an encouraging progress towards realizing the standby force. The Brigade's operational centre is in Gaborone, Botswana, the headquarters of the SADC. The SADC force successfully held a military exercise to establish its readiness. This was executed in three phases over the course of 2009: a planning phase in February; a command-post exercise in Mozambique in April; and a field-training exercise held in South Africa in September, where troops from 12 countries participated.[43] The Brigade chose to undertake the exercise on its own, without external support, and achieved its objectives (Ibid.). However, donors still play a crucial role in sustaining relevant SADC security related endeavours.

It even declared that the SADCBRIG is ready for deployment. According to the Director of the SADC organ on politics, defence and security- Lieutenant Colonel Tanki Mothae- the standby force is ready to be deployed for peacekeeping, humanitarian and natural disaster-relief efforts throughout Africa.[44] He also stated that the SADC Brigade is largely made up of officers from the uniformed forces of SADC member states. However, like the other brigades, there are also a number of problems faced by the standby force in Southern Africa.

The dependency of the force on the will and contribution of South Africa is one while the political tension between member states is the other. The division of the states over the situation in Zimbabwe has been an illustrative factor in this regard. The other problem in the

[43]Interview with Dr Admore Kambudzi , Secretary, of the AU Peace and Security Department, Feb. 25, 2011
[44]See more on http://www.southerntimesafrica.com/article.php?title=SADC_standby_force_ready_for_deployment_% A0&id=4591,

SADC sub-region is related to logistics.[45] The sub-region has immense logistical challenges for setting up the force and deploying peace missions, and the difficulties of making the force operational are exacerbated by shortage of capacity in most member states, including airlift, engineer support, essential supplies and training.

North African Regional Standby Brigade (NASBRIG) and the brigade for Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) brigade (ECCASBRIG) or Multinational force for Central Africa (FOMAC) - remained far behind meeting the objectives set to realise a standby force (Ibid). One of the common challenges for NASBRIG and FOMAC is that there was no prior collaboration among the states in the region at this level.[46]

In the case of FOMAC there is no formal memorandum of understanding between ECCAS and its member states. The only binding legal framework is a 2008 pledge by states to provide a force totalling 4,800 police, troops and civilians, and six transport aircraft.[47] ECCAS has established a planning element, but opted not to set up a permanent brigade headquarters. It has not yet developed a rapid-deployment capability. There is a chronic problem of internally generated resources in ECCAS for sub-regional brigade development. Moreover, the Central African sub-region is confronted with several states that are in crisis (Chad, Central African Republic, and Democratic Republic of the Congo), which are a major distraction. However, the force's capacity to take part in peace missions was tested in Exercise Kwanza in May 2010 in Angola.[48]

North African Standby Brigade is behind schedule in setting up its standby force. A brigade headquarters is to be established in Cairo, as well as logistic depots in Algiers and Cairo. Constitutional and legal regulations in some member states, such as Tunisia, have delayed ratification of a memorandum of understanding agreed in 2008.[49] The unresolved dispute over the status of the Western Sahara, which is one indication for lack of multilateral cooperation is an additional complicating factor (Ibid.).

By and large the five regional brigades have made progress to differing degrees. The overall current situation, however, indicates that the plan set in 2007, by the AU and EU, to fully

[45]Interview with Mr. Sayabu Pabi Garaba, Police Training Officer i African Stand Force, Feb. 2, 2011
[46] Interview with Mr. Sayabu Pabi Garaba, Police Training Officer i African Stand Force, Feb. 2, 2011
[47] Interview with Dr Admore Kambudzi , Secretary, the AU Peace and Security Department, Feb. 25, 2011
[48] Interview with Mr. Sayabu Pabi Garaba, Police Training Officer i African Stand Force, Feb. 2, 2011
[49] Interview with Dr. Dawit Toga, Political Analyst in the Conflict Management Division of the African Union. Feb. 22, 2011

operationalise the African Standby Force by June 2010, as one of the goals of their Peace and Security Partnership, is not fulfilled and, of course, postponed to 2015.[50] The AU only realise the initial operation capabilities.[51] Command and control structures are still to be developed and PLANELMs at both continental and regional level are understaffed and lack adequate expertise. Of course, the dates set were too ambitious and aspirations had to be lowered.

While there are still causes for optimism for the future development of these standby forces, their operations have been hampered by a number of shortcomings including intra-regional and inter-state tensions; mandates and coordination; institutional capacity building; political will; equipment, logistics, and training; funding; and to some extent, poor legal framework.[52] The question of impartiality is the other major obstacle to the effectiveness of ASF. This is about the question of neutrality of states who contribute troops under regional mechanisms to operate in disputed areas of neighbouring states. States in conflict are usually suspicious of the neutrality of their neighbours and hesitate to welcome troops from these neighbours.

Another body of the APSA is the early warning system. According to Article 7 (1.a.) of the Protocol Establishing the African Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Council must anticipate disputes and conflicts as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity (AU: 2002). In line with this the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is set as a crucial element of the African Peace and Security Architecture to accomplish this task. At the heart of the AU's strategy for promoting peace, security and stability on the Continent is the creation of a structure that will specifically facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts.

As stated in Article 12 (2.a.) of the PSC Protocol, CEWS planned to consist of ; (i) an observation and monitoring centre, to be known as the 'Situation Room', which is located at the Conflict Management Division of the African Union and is responsible for data collection and analysis; and (ii) the observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which be linked directly through appropriate means of communication to the Situation Room and which would collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room (AU 2002).

[50] Interview with Col. Daniel VENTURI, Military Advisor for the EU Delegation to African Union, Jan. 12, 2011
[51] Interview with Mr. Sayabu Pabi Garaba, Police Training Officer i African Stand Force, Feb. 2, 2011
[52] Interview with Mr. Sayabu Pabi Garaba, Police Training Officer i African Stand Force, Feb. 2, 2011

The European Union supports the continental early warning system and regional early warning systems. This means putting in place hardware, computers and communication means and transferring software to analyse open source intelligence.[53] It also means operators and analysts must be trained to process information received into crisis indications. This has been underway for some time now to the benefit of the African Union Situation Room, which has been fitted out by the EU with African analysts trained in implementing software and in how to work on intelligence through the exchange of information between Addis Ababa and existing structures in Europe (Ibid.).

In implementing the plan, the AU Situation Room has been established in the Conflict Management Division within the Commission. The first step in this development was technical and based on a software (Africa Media Monitor) developed by the European Commission Joint Research Centre (EC-JRC) in Ispra, Italy.[54] This system was installed and tested at the AU premises in March 2010, but it will not be ready for daily use by the Situation Room until the infrastructure at the AU has been improved (Ibid.). Here, the biggest shortcomings concern the lack of reliable network infrastructure (both internet and intranet). Moreover the Room is not staffed by the required level of personnel both in terms of quantity and quality.

Hence, we can say that, in spite of the support provided, the implementation of the CEWS in the RECs/RMs has been progressing very unevenly. While Eastern, Southern, and Western Africa have already have gone far, the Northern and Central regions are not on track. However, the real challenge is to ensure the effective link between the Situation Room and observation and monitoring units of the RECs/RMs. This encompasses the development of effective communication, coordination and harmonisation between Situation Room in Addis Ababa and RECs/RMs. Beyond the development and implementation of a system of regular exchange of data, the sharing and co-development of strategic conflict and cooperation assessments or exploration of policy options must be ensured.

The work of the CEWS is directly correlated with identifying conflict factors or proximate causal factors that are latent or on the surface waiting to get open and in most cases transform into physical or violent conflicts. These factors are mostly imbedded in structural,

[53] Interview with Col. Daniel VENTURI, Military Advisor for the EU Delegation to AU, Jan. 12, 2011
[54] Interview with Dr. Dawit Toga, Political Analyst in the Conflict Management Division of the African Union. Feb. 22, 2011

institutional or systemic domains manifesting themselves in: horizontal inequalities (poverty gap between regions in the same country); vertical inequalities (poverty gap between individuals of the same country); constitutional manipulation as in some countries where constitutions are engineered to exclude, annex or annihilate a segment of society leading to marginalised.[55] The work of the CEWS in anticipating these and similar factors is extremely dependent on the political will of the states under consideration. This is mainly because of the fact that most of these factors are politically sensitive.

The political sensitivity of the information required and the resulting lack of political will from member states hampered the effectiveness of the CEWS. In most cases the CEWS unearths things that states rather want to keep it hidden. There is also the issue of capacity. Across Africa response capacities to early warning signals are at best weak, non-existent or subjected to political tinkering. Moreover, despite years of so-called 'lessons learned and best practices,' successful conflict early warning is still measured in number of reports, not in the number of lives saved, let alone operational responses.[56]In this regard, there is a pressing need for the real commitment in moving from early warning to early action.

The other element of the African Peace and Security Architecture is the Panel of the Wise. Modalities setting up The Panel of the Wise were adopted by the Peace and Security Council at its 100th meeting held on 12th December 2007.[57] The Panel was then inaugurated on 18th December 2007.[58] Five members are drawn from the five sub regions based on their integrity and independence. They are also required to assume no active political office at the time of their appointments which last for a period of three years renewable once.[59] Here regional representation is taken into consideration.[60]

According to the AU Peace and Security Protocol, the Panel of the Wise has been designed to support the PSC's work in the area of conflict prevention and act as a 'politically independent' advisory mechanism with the aim of forging "a culture of mediation" (AU:

[55] http://www.gngwane.com/2010/04/the-panel-of-the-wise-and-early-warning-systems-in-africa.html
[56]Interview with Col. Daniel VENTURI, Military Advisor for the EU Delegation to the African Union. Jan. 12, 2011
[57]Interview with Dr. Dawit Toga, Political Analyst in the Conflict Management Division of the African Union. Feb. 22, 2011
[58]See more on: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/africa
[59]Interview with Dr. Dawit Toga, Political Analyst in the Conflict Management Division of the African Union. Feb. 22, 2011
[60]Pioneer members since 2007 include Salim Ahmed Salim from East Africa, Ahmed Ben Bella from North Africa, Miguel Trovoada representing Central Africa, Mrs Brigalia Bam representing South Africa and Mrs Elizabeth Pognon representing West Africa (Ibid). Their mandate has ended in 2010.

2002). It is meant to operate through personal mediation, discreet diplomacy and good offices with a view of de-escalating conflicts and facilitating the conclusion of viable peace agreements. On the basis of its programme of work, the Panel decided to undertake, each year, a thematic reflection on an issue relevant to conflict prevention: for 2010-2011, the Panel has decided to focus on the problem of women and children in armed conflicts.[61] The Panel also agreed to carry out information-gathering missions to evaluate the situation on the field and examine the modalities of its involvement.

The Panel of the Wise is a welcome innovation and its work programme is something to be commended. Wisdom is indeed required to achieve the peaceful hopes and aspirations of millions of Africans who remain affected and afflicted by the plague of violent conflict. Since its inauguration in 2007, however, the Panel has held nine ordinary meetings but has not engaged in mediation.[62] Consequently, the Panel has not succeeded in translating its intentions into effective mediation actions principally because of constraints owing to lack of support from qualified experts that can assist its members in designing, managing and evaluating peace processes, facilitating dialogue and liaising with parties in conflict and other groups as well as in the areas of bilateral and multilateral mediations. It seems also that there is insufficient coordination between the Panel and other facets of the APSA and this has to be addressed in order to maximise the importance of the input from the Panel.

In response to the financial need of the APSA a mechanism already initiated by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has been reasserted as the source of fund. The Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) reinvigorated the Peace Fund to finance the AU's activities in areas of peace and security. The Protocol states that in order to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security, a Special Fund, to be known as the Peace Fund, would be established (AU, 2002: 26-27). Member states are expected to contribute regularly, and other contributions are also sought for the Peace Fund.

The PSC Protocol further noted that the Peace Fund has been planned to be made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of the Union, including arrears from member states, voluntary contributions from member states and from other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund

[61]Interview with Mr. Sayabu Pabi Garaba, Police Training Officer i African Stand Force, Feb. 2, 2011
[62] Interview with Dr Admore Kambudzi, Secretary, of the AU Peace and Security Department, Feb. 25, 2011

raising activities.[63] Initially, only 6% of the AU regular budget has been allocated for the Peace Fund. Member states have, however, recently decided to increase their contribution for the Peace Fund to 12% over a period of 3 years starting from 2011(Ibid.).

The Fund is declared to be the AU's autonomous source of funding for peace and security operations in Africa. So far, however, the AU Peace Fund has failed to be a reliable and predictable source of finance for the intended purposes. Most of the member states failed to make the Peace Fund stand on its feet and put the claim of ownership under question mark.

4.1.3 Predictable Funding for African-led Peace Support Operations

Sufficient and predictable funding remains the largest constraint on peace support operations led by the African Union. Currently it is the EU which is the largest source of finance for the AU in its peace related activities. Of course, this issue remains one priority area of the ongoing peace and security partnership between the two Unions. The third priority area of the partnership under the JAES has been stated as ensuring Predictable Funding for Africa-led Peace Support Operations (AU & EU 2007). The establishment of a predictable and sustainable funding mechanism has been planned to be realised through building on the experience of the African Peace Facility (APF); EU and AU member states' bilateral contributions as well as contributions from other members of the international community including the United Nations and G8 members (Ibid.).

Initially there have been differences about the financial aspect of the JAES in general and the peace and security partnership in particular. African states and the AU Commission (AUC) emphasise the need for a new JAES-dedicated finance envelope with a specifically pan-African focus.[64] They regard this as the key to finally developing the Joint Strategy into an operational framework capable of bringing existing development cooperation programmes within its scope. In contrast, European Union insisted on the viability of reallocating existing resources to create a separate JAES envelope (Ibid.). Diplomats on both sides admit that there have been difficulties in the face of growing African expectations that the new framework would provide additional EU funding[65]. So far the EU stand of reallocating the existing financial schemes has become operational. Consequently the African Peace Facility (APF) has been strengthened to finance the AU's activities in peace and security areas.

[63] Interview with Dr Admore Kambudzi , Secretary, the AU Peace and Security Department, Feb. 25, 2011
[64] Interview with Col. Daniel VENTURI, Military Advisor for the EU Delegation to the AU, Jan. 5, 2011
[65] Interview with Dr. Dawit Toga, Political Analyst in the Conflict Management Division of the African Union. Feb. 22, 2011

The APF which is funded through the European Development Fund (EDF) under Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement and is subject to significant limitations in terms of the destination of funds, military and arms expenditures are excluded and geographic scope, Northern African countries and South Africa are not eligible (EU & ACP :2003 Art. 11). Both limitations have their own drawbacks on the AU's activities particularly on peace support operations. The barring on military and arms expenditures has been handicapping the AU's efforts during operations on the ground. On the other hand the exclusion of Northern Africa and South Africa makes EU's claim of treating Africa as one, questionable and encourage the states in North Africa to be reluctant to take active role in the AU's peace and security related activities.

In line with priorities of the peace and security partnership, the APF funds have been specifically allocated to four major areas.[66] The first is *capacity building* focussing on the operationalisation of the APSA and Africa-EU dialogue. EU support aims at strengthening the capacity and effective functioning of the various components of the APSA and at reinforcing the political dialogue by improving cooperation on the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. In other words the objective of the capacity building programmes is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the African Union and the African regional organizations on the planning and conducting of peace support operations in Africa**.** The amount dedicated for this endeavour has been €100 million (Ibid.).

The second area is *peace support operations* which primarily aim at enabling the AU and African sub-regional organisations to plan and conduct peace support operations. The funding of peace support operations represents the core activity of the African Peace Facility and the largest amount from the facility i.e. €600 million has been earmarked for this purpose. The third one is *early response mechanism* to finance preparatory stage of peace support operations or initial stages of mediation. The general purpose of early response mechanism is to endow the African Union and Regional Economic Communities with a source of immediate funding for the first stages of actions aimed at the prevention, management or resolution of crises.[67] A total of €15 million has been allocated under for this activity. The fourth area to which €40 million APF fund has been committed is set as *a contingency* for unforeseen needs in case any of the above mentioned budge lines is depleted. Additional

[66]More on http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/regional-cooperation/peace/index_en.htm

[67]Interview with Col. Daniel VENTURI, Military Advisor for the EU Delegation to the African Union, Jan. 5, 2011

funds have been assigned to cover costs for activities, such as audit, monitoring, visibility, evaluation and technical assistance (Ibid.).

So far this EU assistance to the AU peace and security operations, allocating nearly one billion Euros[68], is a major source of predictable and sustainable fund. The APF supports the costs of deploying UN-authorised AU peace support operations. The main peace support operations it has funded so far have been in Somalia, the Central African Republic, Sudan and the Comoros Islands.[69] The former two are still ongoing while the last ones are completed as AU's operations. Important capacity building programmes have also been funded (Ibid).

The African Peace Facility has helped to fund the above four African peace operations and has also backed capacity building activities at the regional and sub-regional level in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management. The Facility from the EU has enabled the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) or Regional Mechanisms (RMs) to strengthen their role in taking responsibility for the stability of the continent and emerge as internationally recognised major player in the peace and security area. However, absence of an independent funding scheme for the JAES in general and peace and security in particular is still a serious challenge for the implementation process. This has remained a major factor that undermined the legitimacy and relevance of the partnership.

In addition to the EU's African Peace Facility programme, the AU has also been securing support on a bilateral basis from individual states and organisations. Individual states like the United States, Germany, France, Britain, China, Canada and organisations including the United Nations (UN) as well as group of states, notably G8, have been assisting the AU in its peace and security ventures.[70]In relation to the UN, it is still expected to reply to the 2007 request by the AU for a permanent financial support to peace support activities from the UN regular budget (Ibid.).

Al-in-all the African Union still lacks predictable, sustainable and flexible resources, both financial and logistical, to undertake effective peacekeeping operations and related activities.

[68]Mark Lyall Grant, United Kingdom's Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN. He stated this in the UN Security Council Debate on Peace and Security in Africa held on 22 October, 2010 http://ukun.fco.gov.uk/en/news/?view=Speech&id=23078537

[69]Interview with Col. Daniel VENTURI, Military Advisor for the EU Delegation to the AU, Jan. 5, 2011

[70]Interview with Mr. Sayabu Pabi Garaba, Police Training Officer i African Stand Force, Feb. 2, 2011

The APF, for instance, is neither a long term nor a flexible resource. As a result the peace support operations have been conducted in a context of uncertainty and inefficiency. There is also a problem of coordination and coherence, on the part of donors, in the flow of funds to the AU which is aggravated by the lack of capacity on the AU side to effectively absorb and utilise the available funds. Therefore, AU and EU need to work towards a more predictable and sustainable solution to the funding challenges facing AU's peace efforts in Africa as well as a more efficient financial management within the AU.

4.2 Challenges to the Peace and Security Partnership

Although, there has been some progress made in the implementation of the various facets of the AU-EU Peace and Security partnership, yet, the overall picture depicts that the two partners are behind the full implementation of the objectives and priorities they set in the first Action Plan. A number of challenges have contributed to the prevailing deficiency in the level of implementation process. In the subsequent section, the major challenges that the partnership has encountered so far are discussed.

4.2.1 Low Level of Cooperation between the AU and Regional Mechanisms

The Regional Mechanisms (RMs) or Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are declared to be the building blocks in African Union's political and economic integration scheme in general and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in particular. It is, therefore, imperative that close and harmonious relation among the RECs as well as between the RECs and the AU are prerequisites for the successful establishment and operation of APSA. To that end, in July 2008, the AU and regional organizations signed a Memorandum of Understanding to reinforce ties between the two regional and continental entities.[71] In the present condition, however, this doesn't seem supported by enthusiastic and practical endeavours of the required depth and flexibility.

The construction of a continental security architecture built on regional capacities could be undermined by the fact that the AU and RECs have not been able to formalise a clear division of labour and responsibilities for conflict prevention, management and resolution on the continent. This is due to reluctance on the part of member states of the RECs to confer greater decision-making authority to the AU in some cases, in part because sub-regional

[71] Interview with Dr. Dawit Toga, Political Analyst in the Conflict Management Division of the African Union. Feb. 22, 2011

organisations provide an alternative forum to exercise influence and leverage greater institutional support for specific political agendas than might be possible in organisations with a larger and more diverse membership.

The perception by some RECs that they have better security arrangements than the AU is another challenge that hinders close cooperation. This is to say that some RECs consider themselves as more institutionally experienced and effective than the AU. But reality contradicts this as the majority of RECs are afflicted by the same institutional constraints as the AU. Such sentiments among some RECs diverge on the primacy of the AU and make AU's effort of coordination unnecessarily strained at times of crisis. The initial dispute between the AU and the SADC over the way to handle the crisis in Madagascar is one instance in this regard. At the beginning of the crisis the AU felt somewhat sidelined by the SADC though the issue was settled soon.[72]

The insertion of an additional level of regional political control between the AU and its member states necessarily complicated matters and it has taken some time to come to the realisation that the primary role of the regions is force preparation on behalf of the continental structure, and that of the AU is force employment – and this is still not a commonly accepted view. In relation to this, the way how the AU would use the capacities of the RECs or the regional brigades under its jurisdiction is not clearly established. This needs to be addressed in a very reliable and convincing manner.

Another deficit in the relation among the RECs themselves; and between the RECs and the AU lies in the absence of efficient and interactive exchange of information. The circulation of data between the AU and the sub-regional organizations is still at lowest level due to lack of political motivation and funding constraints. This is more visible in the fact that the link between the Early Warning Systems of the various RECs/RMs as well as between the Situation Room at the AU and the RECs/RMs is still lacking and this forces the AU Peace and Security Council to operate on the basis of external and inadequately analysed information.[73]

Moreover the RECs compete with the AU as partners with the EU and this undermine the AU as overarching continental institution. This has also resulted in a strain between the two over

[72] Interview with Col. Daniel VENTURI, Military Advisor for the EU Delegation to the AU. Jan. 12, 2011
[73] Interview with Dr. Dawit Toga, Political Analyst in the Conflict Management Division of the African Union. Feb. 22, 2011

securing fund from the EU. The AU is expected to receive and distribute the fund for the RECs but there is some kind of tension over the rate or amount to be allotted to each REC.[74] Some regional organisation request more amount than the other claiming that they have more peace and security activities than the others.

There is also a wrong expectation by most of the RECs that the AU will be covering all the costs of their peace related operations.[75] On the other hand, most members of the African Union continued to be unable and unwilling to live up to their financial obligation for the continental organisation. Failure to comply with the financial requirements not only stem from states' low level of economy but also the will to do so. This unwillingness is in the list of factors that have been jeopardising efforts to make AU institutions work effectively and maintaining them heavily dependent on external funding. As a result, most of the structures and activities of the AU in the field of peace and security are covered by external sources. Thus the issue of fund is one area of constraint in the relation between the AU and its building-blocks.

On the whole, it could be discerned that the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding calls for certain level of autonomy for regional organisations while at the same time recognises the fact that the organisations are parts of the various continental structures, under the AU, including peace and security. However, absence of a clear balance between being autonomous on the one hand and the complementarities between the regional organisations and the AU remains to be another challenge in the process of operationalisng the continental peace and security architecture.

4.2.2 African Ownership and African Solutions for African Problem

It is claimed that the Joint Africa-EU Strategy in general and the partnership in peace and security in particular are built around what has become a catchphrase- 'African ownership'. Its core concept of Africanisation is declared to be guiding Africa's international relations. The notion is that the primary responsibility for ensuring peace and security in Africa belongs to Africans themselves and they must shoulder that responsibility and partners like the EU must let Africans develop their capacity to deal with these problems and run their own business in the field. The issue of ownership has a lot to do with African leaders' echo for

[74]Interview with Dr Admore Kambudzi , Secretary, of the AU Peace and Security Department, Feb. 25, 2011
[75]Interview with Mr. Sayabu Pabi Garaba, Police Training Officer in African Stand Force, Feb. 2, 2011

African solutions to African problems. However, such claim remains to be one challenge in implementing the peace and security partnership between AU and the EU.

The issue of ownership has to be seen in light of the reality on the ground about the capability of the African Union to practically own the peace and security endeavours in the continent. This is directly related to the institutional, financial, and military capacities as well as political commitment of the AU and its member states. Institutionally the AU lacks the ability to live-up-to its ambitious responsibilities. At the continental level the AU's lack of institutional capacity remains a serious impediment for executing crucial tasks of peace and security on the ground. The AU Commission is plagued by severely understaffed departments and high staff turnover rate, widespread lack of training and an inefficient top-down management.[76] All these make the AU organisationally immature to fully assume the ownership of the peace and security project in the continent. It is mistaken to simply assume that African ownership is a reality despite the fact that the majority of the burden in African peace operations is carried by non-Africans.

One should, however, not place too much emphasis on the organisational setup, as what matters more is the political will to do what is needed. If the will is there, states will find a way around organisational obstacles, but if it is lacking, even the best organisational setup with the most binding commitments will be of little help. Quite naturally, African leaders have been among the most fervent advocates of an African ownership of Africa's security affairs. However, most of Africa's 53 states have been reluctant in substantiating their political and financial commitment vis-à-vis the AU and the continent's security affairs.

While the reluctance of many states to contribute more than words to the process of Africanisation has to be seen in the context of their often disastrous economic situation, the lack of broad support beyond the occasional common declaration undermines the very idea of African ownership. As a result, the AU continues to be fully dependent on donors such as the EU to fund its institutional mechanisms and the running costs of its operations. This heavy financial dependency of the AU on the EU makes the claim of ownership so much groundless and such EU support runs the risk of eroding African ownership. African leaders and their aid embezzle billions of dollars annually and accumulate in western banks but when they are requested to fulfil their African responsibility they tend to complain about the financial

[76] Interview with Col. Daniel VENTURI, Military Advisor for the EU Delegation to the AU, Jan. 5, 2011

inability of their respective states. The paradox here is that it is these same leaders who are claiming to own the activities of the AU.

The other and related challenge is that AU's reliance on foreign funding means that donors could influence which missions the AU can undertake based on their national interests. Donors including the EU can determine the duration of a mission and can influence a mission's mandate by placing terms and conditions on continued funding or by withdrawing funding if they no longer agree with the scope of the mission. The AU claims to have the ownership on the decision making stage. However, it is once again the EU and other external actors and not Africa that practically decides on when, where and how the African ownership is applied because without significant financial and military means of their own, African organisations have no choice but to bow to the strategic, operational and tactical demands of their sponsors. The principle of AU ownership is, therefore, constrained by the asymmetrical nature of the relationship between the EU and AU based on the EU's continuing role as a net donor to AU activities.

In many cases African leaders insist on the issue of African ownership and African solutions for African problems in time when they are pressurised by the external actors. In other words the two concepts are used as an excuse for and justification of African inaction or are manipulated as self-serving shield to protect African dictators. Whenever there is international condemnation and sign of intervention the AU and leaders in Africa highlight the need for African solution for African problem. The principle of African ownership has been misused by autocratic regimes in countries such as Zimbabwe and Sudan who claim that the rest of the world has no business in criticizing their human rights violations, stolen elections and culture of corruption.

Specific cases that reveals the continent's immature insistence on an African solution for the crisis in Zimbabwe and the ongoing dispute over the indictment of the Sudanese President and Kenyan officials by the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicates the problem in the principle of African solutions for African problems. The AU has also recently decided to follow a policy of non-engagement with the ICC.[77] Such stands of the AU undermine its

[77]The AU raises the issue of double standard, in relation to the ICC, as one major reason for its stand towards the court. The AU seems to insist that if other criminals are not indicted by the ICC neither the Africans. The flaw in this argument is that the AU is not focusing on the substance of the crimes and weather those indicted have committed them or not. Therefore, instead of being stubborn on the double standards and trying to defend the offenders, the AU must change the course of its argument to insist that the African criminals should

credibility in face of the international community and clearly show the fact that the nature of most regimes in member states is not compatible with what the Union envisaged to accomplish.

The lack of unity among AU member states on certain crisis in Africa has also weakened the viability of the notion of African ownership and African solutions for African problems. The dispute and rift among African nations on how to resolve the recent post election political stalemate in Côte d'Ivoire have been one indication for lack of common position on such vital condition for peace and security of that part of Africa. The dispute between South Africa and ECOWAS over the crisis was said to be destroying the solidarity in the continent that has brought members this far.[78] The solidarity that started among African states has been claimed to be eroded because certain countries were taking sides on the decision already taken by ECOWAS (Ibid). In addition to South Africa; Angola and Uganda have pursued a completely different policy, from the majority of African states, to the political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. Absence of unity in such crucial times makes the principle of African solutions for African problems more rhetorical than reality.

The other major shortcoming of the idea of African ownership and African solutions for African problems is that it has been encouraging and being taken as an excuse for international indifference. The projects that the AU assigned for itself definitely need international support. The EU plays the ownership card to distance itself from conflicts where its member states do not have vested interest. The objectives of the AU are extremely ambitious given the current capacity of the organisation. The AU wants, for instance, to ensure solidarity and cooperation among African peoples promoting peace, security, stability, and democratic principles and institutions; and promoting popular participation, good governance, and human rights.[79]

But Africa cannot do all these alone. It is wrongly believed, by the AU and its members, that once financial support is available the AU could and should deal with all the continent's peace and security problems. Africa's problems are too multifaceted to be solved by Africans alone. Africa and AU do not have the political commitment and the required material power

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be held accountable while the court must also indict other similar criminals elsewhere in the world. The AU should also get the courage to admit the fact that it is primarily in Africa that, for example, civilian and unarmed demonstrators are shot on head and chest by their own governments.

[78] ECOWAS Commission President, Ambassador James Victor Gbeho;http://allafrica.com/stories/201102090037.html

[79] Interview with Dr Admore Kambudzi , Secretary, of the AU Peace and Security Department, Feb. 22, 2011

to prevent or address atrocities like genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This is, for example, proved in the AU‘s inaction to what happened recently in North Africa in general and Libya in particular where the Libyan government waged war against its own people.

The other point is that all of Africa’s problems are not only African but also global problems, some aspects of the solutions for African problems, therefore, need to come from external actors including the EU. The North African upheaval, for example, led to the exacerbation of the influx of migration to Europe which makes the problem not only African but also European. Moreover the crisis in Libya put pressure on the global economy by leading to oil price hike. This makes the problem global not only African. Thus the concepts of African ownership and African solutions for African problems should not be an excuse for international disengagement and indifference. The EU and similar actors have a responsibility to be part of the solutions for African peace and security problems. This is primarily due to the fact that the problems in Africa have both causes from and consequences on outside Africa in general and the Europe in particular.

Generally, it is possible to summarise the problems in the rhetoric of African ownership in three interrelated factors. First, the *nature of the African peace and security problems* i.e. African peace and security problems are part of the international peace and security problems and, therefore, need some form of international ownership and involvement. Second, *nature of the African Union* i.e. the Union which claims to be the source of the solutions is itself made up of units or states whose regimes are the major source of the problems. The similarity of the regimes in bad human right records, perpetuating socio-economic inequalities, regime longevity, etc undermines their claim for ownership position. Third, *capacities of the African Union* i.e. the institutional and human resource deficiency of the AU make the organisation, at least for the time being, inefficient to assume the entire ownership status in African peace and security. Here, it should, be noted that any external support to African peace and security need to be provided in a coordinated manner. Moreover with all its shortfalls and deficiencies the AU has to be taken as the hub of this coordination.

4.2.3 Lack of Coherence and Consistency in the European Union’s Policy in Africa

The Joint Arica-EU Strategy is underpinned by a central theme based on ‘partnership of equals’ in which the EU would engage the African continent as a single entity. Treating

Africa as one has, therefore, been believed to become the frame of reference for EU-AU inter-regionalism at all levels – continental, sub-regional and national – for both partners. The reality, however, is different from the declared intention. This difference has become one challenge for the peace and security partnership.

This challenge for the peace and security partnership emanates, on one hand, from the incoherent and fragmented European Union's policy towards Africa. The EU does not treat Africa as a one, *i.e.*, there is a persistent lack of coordination and coherence between the diverse political instruments and financial mechanisms by which the EU has been dealing with Africa. On the other hand incoherence at the EU level is reinforced by the existence of member states' bilateral policies that often differ or sometimes conflict with the official European policy.

The fragmentation of EU policy towards Africa is observable in the different policies through which the EU deals with the different parts of Africa. Generally, the EU has divided Africa into three and deals with the continent accordingly. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and European Neighbouring Policy embrace North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa has been handled through the ACP framework or the Cotonou Agreement and South Africa remains a single focus under the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement.[80] The EU also engages with African states on individual basis. All these arrangements have been in place when the Union claims to be treating Africa as one.

The above policies and arrangements are predominantly economic and development oriented. However, they have direct and indirect consequences on the peace and security partnership. For example, other than responding to immediate conflict situations, the partnership in peace and security also envisaged, though on paper, to address the root causes of conflict which definitely include poverty and under development as well as regional integration. It should also be remembered that both the EU and AU recognise the direct link between socio-economic development and security. The failure of those agreements that the EU signed with different parts of Africa would, therefore, definitely increase the level of human insecurity in Africa.

[80]The EU has also been insisting that Africa should be divided into five sub-regions for the purpose of negotiations over the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The EPAs are among the factors eroding the trust that Africa has on the EU and remains to be one of the contentious areas in the EU-Africa relations.

The creation of an environment conducive to peace and security requires attention to be paid to a range of issues such as trade, environment, private sector development, education, and regional integration, for their potential to increase or decrease the risks of conflict and instability in a country or region. Most of these are the declared concerns of EU's engagement with different parts of Africa. There are also similar aspirations in the JAES. However, there is no visible development towards the coordination of these initiatives under the JEAS and those under the ACP framework and the European Neighbourhood Policy. The only exception could be the allocation the APF from the EDF. It is important, therefore, that the commitments and related actions across all areas of the JAES and other EU initiatives/agreements are assessed from the perspective of their contribution to peace building, conflict prevention, management and resolution potential.

In this regard, failure to compromise over one aspect like the treatment of Africa as one, as insisted by the AU, would be a disincentive for Africans to cooperate wholeheartedly on issues including peace and security. Moreover, EU's division of Africa into such parts undermine the pan-African project of integration and unity which in turn raise the suspicion of African states towards the intension of Europeans. To this end the multiple and fragmented EU approaches of the European Union need to be revisited.

The incoherence and inconsistency also emanates from lack of coordination and sometimes contrast between EU policy and interests on one hand; and the policies and interests of EU member states on the other. Unilateral initiatives by individual EU member states in areas of peace and security would have been more effective if coordinated with that of activities at the European level. However, those states due to their vested interests continued to maintain such initiatives.

A number of European states have bilateral initiatives towards Africa and African states in areas of peace and security. Some of these bilateral activities include: the UK's Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) and this is an interdepartmental mechanism established in April 2001 in order to support conflict prevention and peace-building in Africa.[81] The French Directorate for Military and Defence Cooperation is in charge of the management of French structural cooperation in Africa.[82] French support is mainly directed towards French-speaking

[81]The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool: A Joint UK Government Approach to Preventing and Reducing Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. For details see on: www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/acppinfodoc

[82]Interview with Dr Admore Kambudzi , Secretary, the AU Peace and Security Department, Feb. 25, 2011

African states and is implemented through constant military and defence cooperation including the provision of technical and tactical training for African personnel.

An Italian African Peace Facility (IAPF) was established on the agreement between the AU Commission and the Italian Government at the margin of the Africa-EU Summit in 2007.[83] The IAPF, with the amount of 40 million Euros, has been originally designed to support the AU's efforts in the promotion of peace and security, including the areas of conflict prevention, conflict management with particular emphasis on negotiation and mediation support; post-conflict peace building (Ibid). However, its major focus areas remain to be on regions of particular concern to Italy in Africa, with especial attention to the Horn of Africa.

The seat of EU, Belgium, has been active in Central Africa and in particular in the former Belgian colony of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); and series of military cooperation activities have been implemented by the Belgian Defence Ministry.[84] The other EU member state, Portugal, has established a programme for the support of peace missions in Africa which aims to strengthen Portugal's cooperation with African Portuguese speaking countries to enable them develop their crisis management capacities. All these and other similar initiatives manifest the fragmented nature of European policies towards Africa.

In these unilateral initiatives, there is a clear tendency of strengthening states' particularistic interest in their former colonial territories indicating the residue of historical colonial ties between Africans and Europeans. Yet, EU member states' policies in Africa are diverse. As stated earlier they respond to different colonial legacies, economic interests and political priorities. Some EU member states have specific interests and policies on certain countries and regions of Africa, thus making coordination and complementarity within the EU framework uneasy endeavour. One recent example has been that while the EU claims to be African partner on democratisation and good governance, France was too cosy with the authoritarian and corrupt regime in Tunisia even when the regime was shooting pro-democracy protesters by whom it was eventually overthrown.[85]In fact, this is not exceptional to France and it is not uncommon to see such hypocrisy in the policies of EU member states towards Africa.

[83]www.africaunion.org/.../Press%20Release%20on%20agreement%20between%20AU%20&%20Italy.

[84]Interview with Dr Admore Kambudzi , Secretary, the AU Peace and Security Department, Feb. 25, 2011

[85]The issue led to the resignation of the French Foreign minister, Michele Alliot-Marie, from her position. In a move to heal her damaged status, France has dispatched two planes of aid to opposition territory in Libya during the popular revolt there. By sending aid to protesters in Libya, Paris appeared to be taking steps to ensure it is seen as supporting democratic change in the region.

A related challenge here is states' growing preference, both in Africa and Europe, for bilateral interactions and lack of their expected level involvement in the Joint African-EU Strategy in general and the peace and security partnership in particular.[86] Here the reluctance to lose autonomy over spheres of influence is an important factor. In these spheres member states have low interest in using multilateral channels. Such preference will definitely reduce the effectiveness of the partnership and undermine the multilateralism that the EU has been preaching in its inter-regionalism including in Africa.

Here it should be underlined that while respecting the current African integration process and acknowledging the specificities of each region, the EU has the obligation to ensure coherence among the various themes of partnership under the JAES on one hand and the JAES and other partnerships such as the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the newly established Mediterranean Union on the other. This also applies to bilateral relations between EU and African states and the other instruments by which the European commission engages on the continent.

Lack of coordination risks the negative effect on the coherence of EU Africa policy and this makes it difficult to actively involve those member states that do not have such strong economic and post-colonial interests in the African continent. These include EU member states in Central and Northern Europe. Therefore, there is a greater need for a coordinated European approach in order to direct the efforts in a collective and coherent manner into AU peace and security endeavours. To date, however, despite diplomatic pledges, there has not been a lot of evidence of any systematic attempt to achieve coherence in practice.

4.2.4 Over-Emphasis on the Military Aspect of the Partnership

The EU and AU have been showing a tendency towards according excessive attention to peacekeeping, for example, at the expense of conflict prevention related activities. Such tendency has left the underlined causes of African conflict and instability unaddressed. In the process, large amount of resources have been diverted from dealing with those causes of conflict and ways of preventing them. This undermines the importance of addressing the incidence of war and conflict resulting from poverty and deep inequalities within society, bad governance and lack of respect for human rights. These have been sidelined and are not taken as key early indicators for intrastate conflict in Africa.

[86] Interview with Col. Daniel VENTURI, military advisor in the EU Delegation for African Union, Jan. 2011

There is no doubt that Africa need a standby force to deal with a number of security problems in the continent. But the African Standby Force (ASF), once operational will be a conventional military force, and its concept implies a judgement that security problems in Africa could, in general, be addressed by the deployment of a multinational light brigade for a period of six months. However, it is wrong to assume that Africa's security problems are primarily addressable by such force. The kind of peace that is lasting needs to be carefully examined. It should be noted that the people of Africa lack sustainable positive peace not sustainable negative peace.

There must be a vigilant and balanced view in order to avoid over-investing in areas like peacekeeping but without investing in the cultivation of economic conditions necessary for the deepening and durability of peace. The European Union has tended to be more attracted to the peace and security sector of the AU activities and invest more around these areas. Of course, in some issues EU's assistance helps strengthen a repressive regime rather than enhance structure stability and democratization. This is particularly evident in EU's support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Africa. The support, under the SSR, certainly strengthens the coercive power of authoritarian regimes and equips them with the technologies of violence; and these regimes usually use that power to undermine the quest by the people for democracy and good governance. This in turn weakens the efforts to make real progress in areas of peace and security.

The two partners seem to relegate the reality that behind each conflict and crisis in Africa, there are fundamental reasons and it is these reasons that should be exposed and properly addressed as part of finding lasting solutions for Africa's peace and security challenges. In this regard both the AU and EU are not giving adequate attention to the deep-seated causes for absence of positive peace and the resulting insecurity in Africa. The two Unions, therefore, should act in a way that practically recognise the fact that insecurity has been stemming from various factors, including bad governance, ethnic rivalry, struggle over natural resources, human rights abuses, failure to respect the rule of law, nepotism, poverty, and lack of access to affordable health, shelter, and education.

The other related point is that the AU and EU tend to undermine the close and direct correlation that exists between the partnership in peace and security on one hand; and the other areas of their partnership. This is particularly true to the partnership in democratic governance and human rights as well as those in areas of socio-economic development. It

should be noted that the value of EU's investments in peace and security depends on Africa make long strides in such agendas as well. Failure to advance the partnership in these and related areas would definitely have a negative repercussion on the implementation of the peace and security partnership. In this regard, lack of coordination between the eight partnerships and sluggish progress in their concretization is an obstacle to effective implementation of the partnership in peace and security in particular and the JAES in general. Therefore, all aspects and dimensions of the JAES must be fully addressed if far reaching result is desired from the peace and security partnership.[87]

By and large, the EU-Africa peace and security partnership is of limited relevance to the African people. In peace and security, there is little engagement with the fundamental causes which leads to a structural gap. This would require, among others, challenging the predatory elites who have been perpetuating the structural instability in many parts of the continent. The AU has to move from rhetoric to real commitment in making tangible move in realising its declared goals. In a similar vein the EU need to be serious about such elites and their aides. The EU should also address the daunting policy of its member states that have been directed towards deliberately supporting these elites and regimes given they serve their national and even regime interests.

Therefore, there have to be a shift in focus from strictly military concerns to cover structural violence, ensure positive peace and human security for the people of Africa. The EU must develop a comprehensive policy approach that enhances the capacity of African states and the APSA to deal with underline causes of conflict rather than reacting to the symptoms and consequences. This, of course, remains to be among the challenges that the peace and security partnership should cope with.

4.2.5 The Role of Third Parties

The overall outcomes of the partnership between Europe and Africa could and should not be determined by only what the two partners are or aren't doing. Third parties or major actors in Africa have their own direct and indirect role in having constructive or destructive impact on the desired outcomes of the peace and security partnership. The two major actors that are discussed here as third parties, to the Africa-EU peace and security partnership, are the

[87] All the eight areas of partnership in the JAES have their own priority actions to be taken in the process of implementation. In spite of stating these priority actions the Strategy doesn't clearly establish ways of coordination among them in the implementation phase.

People's Republic of China and the United States of America. These states are selected because of their huge level of involvement in the continent. In this section, therefore, a brief discussion is made on the challenges that the involvement of these global powers in Africa pose to the AU-EU peace and security partnership.

The beginning of the Twenty-First century has brought to Africa new partners other than the West. In the list of these partners China assumes the top position. China has been intensifying its engagement in Africa in an unprecedented manner. Perhaps the most visible manifestation of China's activities in Africa is economic. China is one of the three leading trading partners to Africa with a dramatic increase in recent years on Chinese export to the continent, and the growing and diversifying Chinese direct investment though criticised Chinese development aid is becoming very popular in Africa.[88] These and similar developments manifest the ever growing intimacy between Africa and China.

The AU-EU partnership could face some challenges from this growing Chinese involvement in Africa. This could be seen from different perspectives. The first is related to the importance of addressing the structural cause of conflict in Africa. Chinese policy of 'non-interference' in African affairs and the subsequent unconditional development aid may lead to further deterioration of vital values like accountability, human right and democracy. This increases the potential for conflict and human insecurity in the continent. The stark difference between Chinese perception of democracy and human rights on one hand and that of EU is an important factor here.

In other words EU's intent to exercise normative power over the AU and its members would face a serious challenge due to the way China is making business in Africa. China officially trade arms with oil and rich minerals with repressive African regimes. China doesn't raise anything related to human rights and democracy the values that the EU wants to inculcate in Africa through its normative power. China has a different perspective to these values. For instance, the Chinese press centre distributed at the November 2006 Forum of China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) the book China and Africa 1956-2006, which presents democracy 'as a scourge because it 'exacerbates' tensions inside African countries'; 'Fortunately,' the work observes, 'the wave of democratisation has started weakening'.[89]Chinese presence in Africa

[88]Interview with Dr Admore Kambudzi, Secretary, the AU Peace and Security Department of the AU Feb. 25, 2011

[89]See more on: China in Africa: an AFRICOM response. http://www.thefreelibrary.com/China+in+Africa%3A+an+AFRICOM+response.-a0203279662

with such stand and the comfort that many African regimes found in it may undermine the necessity of tackling structural instability for sustainable peace and security in the continent. By the same token, Africa's 'look east' policy could possibly lead to tensions in the EU-AU peace and security partnership.

The second challenge emanates from the nature of Chinese interaction with Africa, which has repercussion on AU-EU partnership efforts. China prefers more bilateral relations than the multilateral one. This is different from the EU-AU relations claimed to be centred on multilateralism. The AU, for instance, wants all actors in Africa to promote multilateral institutions in the continent and to enable them to tackle critical issues including peace and security.[90]China strictly pursues bilateralism in Africa and FOCAC is simply a Forum to announce the aggregate results and doesn't establish an impulse for multilateral cooperation or better African coordination. The option for bilateralism would discourage African states to engage wholeheartedly in multilateral forums including the AU itself and this may undermine the AU's ongoing effort to institutionalise the peace and security endeavours at continental level which is also stated as a major goal of the EU-AU peace and security partnership.

Thirdly, China's expansive involvement and its growing concentration on resource extraction in the continent have been worrying the EU. The resources traditionally exploited by Europe are now bit by bit slipping to China. This is an upsetting development for the EU. The important point is that EU doesn't want to lose Africa. The feeling of replacement by China may force the EU to compromise some of its commitment to the declared common values over which it has established its partnership with Africa. The fierce competition over influence and resource in Africa might force EU to be moderate in pressing for political reform and rule of law in Africa. EU's soft response, for example, to the 'ballot-coup' and the resultant turmoil in some African states could be seen from this angle. Generally, the challenge here is if EU tends to be implicitly socialised by the Chinese rules of engagement in Africa. Of course, as discussed earlier, EU itself has a problem of credibility and known for hypocrisy as far as its commitment for its guiding values and principles is concerned. Here Chinese presence may play an exacerbating role.

The other potential and actual challenge for the AU-EU peace and security partnership emanates from the United States' involvement in the African peace and security landscape.

[90]Interview with Daniel VENTURI, Military Advisor for the EU Delegation to the African Union, Jan. 12 , 2011

As far as peace and security is concerned the US is a crucial actor in the African continent. Its engagement, however, has a challenge to the peace and security partnership that the EU and AU have been implementing.

The first challenge emerges from the US's view towards Africa. The United States takes a narrow view of Africa, as a recipient of charity, a place to pump oil and extract other resources, and an arena for fighting terrorists.[91]This has been the unofficial and driving view that shapes the US policy towards the continent. Such view doesn't take the interests of African people into account. Ensuring human security which the AU claims to realise in Africa has been sidelined by the US activities. The growing militaristic and narrow approach of the US foreign policy towards Africa undermines initiatives which could help to address the cause of conflict in the continent. As far as US African policy is concerned, the US fails to realise that its security depends on the human security of Africans.

The other and related challenge originates from the establishment of US African Command (AFRICOM). In the first place, US's bilateral military relations with the various African states under the AFRICOM puts a challenge to the multilateralism that the EU and AU declared to be working for under their partnership. AFRICOM has consolidated military-to-military relations with 50 African nations, including non-African Union member Morocco and the world's newest state, South Sudan.[92] In these bilateral initiatives, like seen in the Democratic Republic of Congo[93], most of African soldiers trained by AFRICOM are the very soldiers that are involved in military oppression of the people. The related problem is that there are also other actors including China who are involving in the same troops training business. Here AFRICOM is a major additional factor which further accentuates the tendency of relying on military solutions for African security problems. This focus on traditional security is not compatible with what the AU claims to achieve.

Moreover AFRICOM has a potential plan to deploy military forces to Africa.[94] For instance, the initial commandship in the military intervention against the Libyan government was assumed by AFRICOM.[95] On the other hand the AU and EU have been working to

[91]Interview with Dr Admore Kambudzi , Secretary, the AU Peace and Security Department, Feb. 25, 2011
[92]Details on: http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=24218, Only Eritrea, Sudan, Libya, Zimbabwe and Ivory Coast are states that do not have working relations with AFRICOM.
[93]See more on: http://africahumansecurity.weebly.com/1/post/2011/02/a-word-on-africom-from-the-regional-peace- coordinator-for-southern-africa.html
[94]Interview with Dr Admore Kambudzi, Secretary, the AU Peace and Security Department, Feb. 25, 2011
[95]More on: http://allafrica.com/stories/201104020071.html?page=2

operationalise the African Standby Force (ASF) with the same deployable capacity. There is a possible clash of priorities here and tension that would emerge from this clash. In other words, it is not clear whether AFRICOM would be playing a complementing or competing role in relation to African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in general and the ASF in particular. The challenge, therefore, remains to be how the two partners- EU and AU- tend to work with this new establishment and harmonise the APSA with the real motive of AFRICOM.

All-in-all one of the greatest challenges that the EU-AU peace and security partnership faces is the task to put in place collaborative efforts with the above mentioned and other crucial actors in the African continent. The unilateral or self-centred move by China and the US in African peace and security environment may have a daunting effect to the endeavours that the EU and AU have been pursuing towards African peace and security. In this regard, all attempts should be made to harmonise the policies and actions of the two great powers with that of the EU-AU ventures under their partnership. These attempts must put human security at the centre of the desired outcomes. The AU must also try its best to mitigate the destructive consequences of the possible China-US proxy-based showdown in Africa.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

There is a wide consensus, both in and outside Africa, on the close connection between peace and security on one hand and socio-economic development on the other. Creating a stable and peaceful continent, therefore, remains to be the foremost prerequisite in the move towards extricating Africa out of its chronic socio-economic quagmire. This task could and

should not be left to Africans alone. This is mainly because of the fact that the envisaged outcome i.e. peaceful, stable, and prosperous Africa is also said to be in the interest of the rest of the world in general and the European Union in particular. It is this common understanding that has been the pushing factor for the partnership launched in 2007 between the AU and EU in areas of peace and security and has been the theme of this thesis.

As a common interest, the AU-EU inter-regionalism particularly focussed on the importance of ensuring peace and security in the African continent. Conflicts have produced insecurity, contributed to under-development, aggravated poverty and worsened the human condition in many parts of Africa. These conflicts have also direct and indirect repercussions for the peace and security of the EU mainly in areas like uncontrolled migration, terrorism and drug trafficking. Despite convergence of interests that seems to be existing on these issues there are differences in some areas of priority. In other words there is tension between priorities of the two partners. The EU, for instance, primarily insists on traditional peace and security and has been directing and redirecting more resources to these areas. It, for example, redirected the fund already allocated for developmental activities to peace and security endeavours.

The AU on the other hand claims to be prioritising economic development or at least to take this hand in hand with the peace and security initiatives. To this end the AU has been insisting other alternative and separate sources of finance for the Joint African-EU Strategy in general and peace and security partnership in particular. This, however, doesn't mean that the AU is serious-enough about addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity in the continent because its constituting units- member states- have so far failed to properly utilise the resources at their disposal to that end. Rather they usually abuse these resources to perpetuate economic injustice and intensify structural instability. It is mainly this fact, among others, which make positive peace and human security the most precious politico-economic commodities in the African continent.

The analysis in the thesis reveals that the inter-regional relations between the EU and AU, as far as peace and security is concerned, basically revolves around the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which has various components with the African Standby Force (ASF) as its core feature. However, as the discussion shows, the context of the two Unions led to slow progress in implementing the commitments made in the partnership. It is found that many crucial goals and objectives stated in the First Action Plan (2008-2010) have not been achieved and are further postponed for the future.

A number of challenges make the attainment of the goals very minimal. In the thesis challenges like low level or lack of harmonious relations among the RECs/RMs on one hand and between the RECs and the AU on the other confusion and immature claims that revolve around the issues of African ownership and African solutions for African problems the excessive emphasis on the militaristic approaches, at the expense of the root cause of instability, to address African peace and security problems the incoherent and fragmented policies and initiatives from the EU and its member states and the role of third parties as competitive actors in the African peace and security landscape are discussed and analysed in light of both their role in hampering more realization of the partnership so far and in the future implementation process. Elsewhere in the thesis and within these challenges issues like finance, capacity, and difference between rhetoric and reality or what has been said and done, as well as competition between states' national interest and those declared as official multilateral goals have been raised and critically discussed.

In a bid to go far in implementing the partnership, it is of the utmost importance for both Africans and the Europeans to be extremely realistic about what can be achieved in the short and mid-term plans by a relatively young organisation like the AU. Building effective security capacity in Africa will take time and external actors like the EU should not make the mistake of considering it as a quick exit strategy from engagement in Africa. They must instead explore long term capacity building options in order to make the African peace and security architecture more independent and more sustainable.

On the other hand, responsibility is required from both sides, in terms of input and dialogue. In this respect the rhetoric on partnership of equals need to be revisited. The Joint Strategy should take into account the fact that the partners should be equal in terms of rights and responsibilities but not in terms of their level of integration and the availability of their financial and human resources even in some of their priorities. The partnership must be implemented in a realistic way. Partnership and ownership must be defined in the context of this reality.

As partners the two Unions should show that they are really serious about exhibiting a coordinated stance which they lack when some urgent peace and security issues are surfaced on the ground. For example, until the time of writing this thesis[96] they failed to have even a

[96]At the time of writing this thesis three months have already passed since the popular revolt flooded North Africa in general and more than two months for the Libyan crisis.

single and urgent joint discussion on the turmoil that have destabilised Northern part of Africa and Libya in particular. The EU, insisted by the so-called lead nations- France and Britain- has unilaterally discussed on 'no-fly' zone and 'possible military intervention' though was opposed by other member states notably Germany.[97] The interesting thing here is that the EU was discussing these aspects while the AU announced its rejection for any form of military intervention in Libya.[98]

The EU's unilateral move and the disagreement within it show two important issues. First, the EU doesn't seem convinced about the credibility of the AU as significant partner to talk with over the issue that the AU itself has a direct stake.[99]In this particular case the EU found it necessary to overlook the AU and pressed on the Arab League. Second, it shows that the EU still suffers from division[100] and is far from putting collective interest ahead of national interests. This puts question on the EU itself as a credible and united security actor capable of striking a balance between states' national interests and EU's interests. Generally, such uncoordinated and conflicting moves by the EU and AU in such demanding times undermine their partnership in peace and security by further eroding the trust on each other.

Moreover the continued wrong and seemingly deliberate understanding, on the part of the international community in general and the EU in particular as well as many African leaders, of the causes of conflict need to be given more attention. A state-centric approach, based on a sole project of building state and regional organisation capacity to respond to regional or internal conflicts, fails to understand or accept that much of the violence in a number of African countries has been based on legitimate grievances and popular anger aimed at elite dominance of power and resources, and the marginalization of large strata of the population. This has been witnessed in the failure of the heavily armed and militarily capable North

[97]Germany and most of the 27 EU member states rejected the proposals, see the The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/11/libya-no-fly-zone-plan-rejected

[98]The AU officially rejects military intervention in Libya http://allafrica.com/view/group/main/main/id/00012794.html

[99]The EU relied more on the Arab League than the AU in relation to the instability in Libya. This may worry the AU as a continental Union that has a partnership with the EU in areas of peace and security. The AU didn't attend the international conference on Libya held in Paris on March 19, 2011. The EU and the Arab League were in attendance. The AU itself was divided on the issue before rejecting the call for its attendance.

[100]There was also a division within the EU over the French decision to recognise some rebels as legitimate representative of the Libyan state. Many members strongly criticised this unilateral move. Italy, for instance, argued that Recognition should be a European, not a national, decision. Read more: http://www.news.com.au/breaking- news/west-divided-ahead-of-libya-crisis-talks/story-e6frfku0-1226019751333#ixzz1GMBfyCNX

African states particularly Egypt and Libya to maintain peace and security in their respective territories. The possession of immense military capabilities by these states didn't entail the desperately needed structural stability and failed to address the legitimate political and economic grievances of the people. This is also true for almost all parts of Africa and AU and EU are required to respond in accordance with this harsh reality in the continent.

The need for emphasis on the structural cause of conflict and insecurity in Africa doesn't lead to the relegation of the importance of standby forces. There is no doubt on the necessity of the force. The APSA with its ASF is an indispensible component of the efforts to bring peace and stability in the continent. The argument here is that this should not be taken as an overriding solution but must be taken only as part of the solutions. There has to be a harmonious interaction between the ASF and other initiatives. The other related issue is that the willingness to intervene must be matched by the capacity to do so. Signing and ratifying agreements including the Constitutive Act of the AU is only the means not the end by itself. The visible difference in capacity and willingness among African sub-regional organisations and states has to be considered when, for instance, scenarios for intervention are set. So far the AU and EU failed to take this into account.

The major lesson that can be drawn from the overall evaluation on the implementation of the AU-EU peace and security partnership is that the intent to put ambitions on documents doesn't necessarily guarantee the political and financial commitment of the parties concerned. Thus, the task ahead is huge and unlikely to be effectively and efficiently executed without determined and real commitment; and the political will from African states and particularly without sustained support from the international community. There is also a pressing need for reorientation from the sole focus on traditional security to comprehensive approach that accommodates issues of human security. In addition, the EU and AU need to figure out some kind of coordination with other members of the international community to bring a more comprehensive and pragmatic approach to make the APSA operational. Till then, to be optimistic, the status of the APSA could only be seen as a glass half full.

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Annex I

Interview Questions

- **Questions**

1. What factors have pushed the two parties to launch a partnership in peace and security?

2. How do you explain the degree of compatibility between the security priorities of the AU and EU?

3. How do the EU institutions and member states harmonize their interests in Africa? How coherent are their policies?

4. Can we say that the EU currently has a single Foreign and Security Policy as far as Africa is concerned? Or does the EU treat Africa as one? For example, how do you EU's separate dealings with North Africa in the EU's Neighbourhood policy?

5. Members in most of the RECs have problem of legitimacy and often accused of promoting conflicting political agendas and yet they are the building blocks for the APSA. Are they strong enough to act in line with expectations of the partnership?

6. What do you say about the footings of the two parties in the partnership? Or can we say that the two Unions are real partners, given the visible disparity, like in their institutional and structural capacity?

7. How do you see EU's commitment in light of one of the '*Common external threats*' for Africa that the AU stated in 2004 as '*the adverse effect of globalization and unfair international political and economic practices and regimes'?*

8. How can we evaluate the role of the third parties, like China and the USA in the implementation process?

9. What are the major accomplishments and failures of the partnership *vis-a-vis* the "expected outcomes" stated in the 1st Action Plan which has just ended?

10. Are there any undesired consequences of the peace and security partnership on the EU's direct support in other development areas?

11. For instance, the EU's APF has been using finance which has already earmarked for development purposes. What effect this would have on the efforts that aim at address structural causes of conflict?

12. The APSA with all its components has been planned to be fully operationalised by the year 2010. Do you think that has happened?

13. What are the major challenges for the full execution of the partnership? How are the AU and the EU copping with the challenges?

14. How do you see the future trend of the partnership?

A

List of Key Informants

The following interviewees have been contacted and interviewed:

	Interviewee	Organisation	Position	Date of Interview
1	Colonel Daniel VENTURI	European Union	Military Advisor to the Delegation of the European Union to the African Union	January, 5 and 12, 2011
2	Dr. Dawit Toga	African Union	Political Analyst in Conflict management Division	February 25, 2011
	Dr. Admore Kambudzi	African Union	Secretary to the Peace and Security Department	February 22, 2011
4	Mr. Sayibu Pabi Garibap	African Union	Police Training Officer, African Standby Force	February 2, 2011

DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that the thesis is my original work, has not been presented for a degree in any university and that all sources of materials used for the thesis have been duly acknowledged.

_____	_____	_____
Name	Signature	Date

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as university advisor.

_____	_____	_____
Advisor	Signature	Date