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ETHIOPIA IN AFRICAN POLITICS, 1956-1991

BY

BELETE BELACHEW YIHUN

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ETHIOPIA IN AFRICAN POLITICS, 1956-1991

BY

BELETE BELACHEW YIHUN

SUBMITTED TO

THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY

ADVISER

PROFESSOR BAHRU ZEWDE

APRIL 2012

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DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

ETHIOPIA IN AFRICAN POLITICS, 1956-1991

BY

BELETE BELACHEW

APPROVED BY BOARD OF EXAMINERS

BAHRU ZEWDE Advisor	Signature
CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM Examiner	Signature
Tesema Taá (Prof) Examiner	Signature

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Acronym

ANC	African National Congress
CIAS	Conference of Independent African States
COMESA	Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party (Sudan)
EACSO	East African Common Service Organization
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF	Eritrean Peoplesô Liberation Front
FAN	*Forces Armees Du Nord* (Hissène Habréôs Army, Chad)
FAP	*Forces Armees Populaires* (the military wing of FROLINAT, Chad)
FLCS	*Front de Liberation de la Cote des Somalis*
FROLINAT	*Front Pour la Liberation du Tchad*
IGADD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development
MLD	*Le Mouvement de Liberation de Djibouti*
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoFA (OA)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Old Archives)
NIF	National Islamic Front (Sudan)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress ï Azania
PAFMECSA	Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa

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	l Military Administrative Council
POLISARIO	Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro
PTA	Preferential Trade Area
SANU	Sudan African National Union
SNM	Somalia National Movement
SPF	Somali Patriotic Front
SPLM/A	Sudan Peoplesô Liberation Movement/Army
SSDF	Somalia Salvation Democratic Front
SSLM	South Sudan Liberation Movement
SWANUF	South West Africa National United Front
SWAPO	South West Africa Peoplesô Organization
SYL	Somali Youth League
TPLF	Tigray Peoplesô Liberation Front
USC	United Somalia Congress
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African Peoplesô Union

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to the Transliteration System

Institute of Ethiopian Studies

I have used the following IES transliteration system.

I. The seven sounds of the Ethiopic alphabet are represented as follows:

ቡ = Bä
ቡ = Bu
ቢ = Bi
ባ = Ba
ቤ = Bé
ብ = Be
ቦ = Bo

II. Palatalized sounds are represented as follows:

ሸ = š
ኘ = ḷ
ኛ = Ń
ዠ = zh
ጀ = J

III. Glottalized sounds are represented as follows:

ቀ = q
ጠ = Ş
ጨ = ch
ፀ = κ
ጰ = p

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Acknowledgment

A number of individuals and institutions have contributed to the successful completion of this research. Their valuable support and timely intervention on different occasions have facilitated the smooth proceeding of this dissertation.

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Officials and staff members of the various departments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs deserve special appreciation. Particularly the cooperation and hospitality of those in the archives and documentation sections had been commendable. Altogether, they made the time spent in the ministry worthwhile and fruitful. I would also like to convey a heartfelt gratitude to Jimma University for sponsoring my study and the Board and staff of the Forum for The Study of Foreign Policy for their encouragement and assistance in the process of my research. Especially, members of the Forum willingly shared their knowledge on various topics and some of them commented on drafts of the dissertation. In this regard, Ambassadors Mängesté Dästa, Seyoum Mohamud, Berhänu Dinqa, Mulugéta Etäffa, Berhänä Ghäbray, Ayälä Moltotal, Täfära Häylä-Selasé and *Ato*

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portant role. I am also thankful to Ambassador Yelma Tadasa for his willingness to share his insight on African diplomacy.

Words barely express my feelings towards members of my family. The study was marked by hardship and challenges, and they endured with me every bit of the course. It was their encouragement and assistance that kept me going and prevail over trying times. I am forever indebted to my brother, Dr. Manahloh Belachew, and my sister, Simegnish Belachew, for what they did these past four years. Above all, however, the love and support of my wife, Workezebo Tegegn, and our son, Menelik, remained a constant source of inspiration. You gave real meaning to life and kept me focused on the business at hand. I thank you all!

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Abstract

Ethiopia in African Politics, 1956-1991

Belete Belachew Yihun

Addis Ababa University, 2012

The nature of Ethiopiaôs involvement in the affairs of the continent has elicited various interpretations. There have been rather polarized positions on the issue. For one group, consisting largely of expatriate scholars, the country remained aloof from and indifferent to developments related to the Pan-African Movement in general and the African struggle for independence in particular. The other side, on the contrary, upholds the enduring commitment of the country to the cause well before fellow Africans themselves came to the realization of their predicament. The complex realities of African politics, and hence inter-state relations, provide ample justifications for the positions of each group. In this regard, the effort to unravel the level of the countryôs achievements and failures in concrete terms remains at a rudimentary stage. Ethiopiaôs approaches to regional as well as continental issues and the way successive regimes designed and implemented their African policies still awaits comprehensive investigation.

The thesis attempts to assess the nature of Ethiopiaôs involvement in African politics between 1956 and 1991. In the process, the root causes of these divergent attitudes are scrutinized. More importantly, efforts are made to present the evolution of Ethiopiaôs foreign policy directives on immediate security matters as well as general continental

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tensively employed in the process of reconstruction have shed a new light on our understanding of the issue.

The thesis argues that there is a much wider dimension to the nature of Ethiopiaôs involvement in African affairs other than securing immediate interests related to Eritrean secessionism and Somali irredentism. In the mean time, though, the struggle to maintain these interests at times forced successive Ethiopian governments to violate the principles of non-intervention in the affairs of others and the territorial integrity of a nation state, the two main principles the country has steadfastly championed. Similarly, Ethiopiaôs role in regional as well as continental activities reflects not only the countryôs objectives but also existing realities of inter-state relations between and among Africans. The thesis clearly demonstrates that the inter-African contact entertained diverse issues other than the ideals of a Pan-African solidarity and African consciousness.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the findings of this research establish that Ethiopiaôs relations with its immediate neighbors and regional entities was much more complicated; its involvement in regional and continental affairs was fraught with confusion and controversy; and the achievements in the African field that were so much publicized were not that much impressive. In spite of this, however, the fact remains that the nature and extent of Ethiopiaôs involvement in African affairs goes deeper than the customary dismissal of the matter as off-hand and occasional contacts with regional and continental actors.

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Foreword

The investigation of the extent of Ethiopiaôs involvement in African affairs and the actual motives behind its foreign policy directives are the central points of this research. In the process, archival materials of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) have been extensively employed. Altogether, a period of fourteen months was spent in the documentation sections of the Ministry, the arduous task being the selection of relevant materials from the bulk of invaluable documents on Ethiopiaôs foreign policy dealings. The archives reveal the attitudes of successive Ethiopian governments towards Africa, their positions on national, regional and continental issues, and the strategies designed to safeguard immediate and long term interests.

The thesis is divided into two parts. The first concentrates on regional developments, with Ethiopiaôs policy directives primarily focused on securing national interests. The chapters treat in detail the countryôs troubled relations with the Sudan; its endemic conflict with Somalia; its entanglements with Egypt over the Nile and its relation with Israel and the tricky contact with Gaddafiôs Libya; and the roles played in the creation and consolidation of regional bodies like PAFMECSA, IGADD and PTA/COMESA.

The second part focuses on general issues of Pan-African solidarity and Ethiopiaôs activities therein. The countryôs contributions towards the creation and strengthening of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the behind-the-scene frictions surrounding the charter of the organization and the struggle over housing the secretariat of the continental body are presented in some detail. In addition, the nature of Ethiopiaôs involvement in the OAU Liberation Committee and the support rendered to selected independence

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as well as its interventions in African politics by way of mediation and peaceful resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts are discussed.

The main objective of this research is to trace the nature of Ethiopiaôs involvement in African affairs during the imperial regime and the Darg era. Every effort is made to critically examine the course of events shaping the countryôs policy orientations towards pan-African issues. In addition, departing from the customary tendency to laud or denounce Ethiopiaôs role in regional and continental developments, an attempt is made to present the history in a balanced manner giving equal consideration both to the failures and achievements of the foreign policy of the two regimes.

Not much is known about the countryôs dealings with neighboring states, let alone its role in the intricate regional and continental fora. The tense relations with the Sudan and Somalia and the resultant conflicts are open knowledge. But the behind-the-scene frictions and how they shaped the nature of Ethiopiaôs contact with its major neighbors has largely remained in the dark. The same is true regarding the countryôs contact with North Africa, especially Egypt and Libya. The misrepresentation of the positions of the two regimes on the questions of the Nile and their approach towards Egypt needs serious reconsideration. In addition, our understanding of the level of Ethiopiaôs involvement in regional as well as continental affairs was restricted to brief, sometimes misleading, remarks. In this research it is hoped to address the topic in a comprehensive manner and direct scholarly attention towards a detailed investigation of similar issues. I hope it will contribute to our understanding of the diplomatic history of modern Ethiopia.

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Introduction

Venturing into the daunting and complex realities of Pan-African politics is not without its risks. The existing literature, either in its totality or focusing on specific events, personalities or states, underlines the upheavals witnessed over this extended period of time, thereby emphasizing the difficulty of dealing with all these developments. The various challenges the continent faced, the fast changing international realities, together with the divergent socio-economic and political transformations that took place, mean that there are a lot of elements to be critically examined.

The challenge appears even more formidable when one tries to assess the issue from the vantage point of the activities and contributions of a given state. In the first place, besides the danger of partiality, such an exercise has the potential of inadvertently feeding individual governmentôs propaganda campaign. Far more problematic in the process of reconstructing this kind of history, though, is the inclination to gloss over the actual behind-the-scene frictions and manipulations for the sake of the pan-African fraternity and assertions of commitment to one or other form of continental unity.

Researching on the positions and roles of Ethiopia in Africa is obviously bound to be affected by such problems. In dealing with the topic, one has always to consider the divergent interpretations of the countryôs role in the Pan-African Movement from the 1890s to the present. As demonstrated in the literature, the positions assumed tend towards either of two extremes, from those who tend to uphold a negative view on the

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n regimes to proponents of the countryôs unwavering commitment to the African cause.[1]

This has to some extent affected our understanding of the real picture with regard to the involvement of Ethiopia in the affairs of the continent. No one questions the substantial role it has played in African politics. But this fact has equally to be viewed along failures and frustrations registered in the bid for peaceful co-existence and unity. The venture to reconstruct Ethiopiaôs role in African socio-economic and political life, therefore, has to have the objective of balancing the recurrent polarities in the existing literature and the attitudes of scholars.

Ethiopiaôs active involvement in African politics goes beyond its geographical location and the color of skin of its people. These elements have for long been considered indicators of oneôs actual membership to the continental forum. The prevalent frictions and mutual suspicions between black sub-Saharan states and Arab/Islam North Africa primarily emanate from these physical attributes. Equally important in determining the nature of oneôs affiliation has been prior commitment to parallel non-African groupings,

[1] Colin Legum, ñThe Roots of Pan-Africanism,ò *Africa* (London, 1961): 455. Hosea Jaffe, ñThe African Dimension of the Battle of Adwa,ò *Adwa Victory Centenary Conference Papers*. Vol.1 (Addis Ababa, 26 February-2 March 1996): 4-22; Bahru Zewde, ñThe Italo-Ethiopian War of 1895-96 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05: A Comparative Essay,ò in *Society, State and History: Selected Essays* (Addis Ababa University press, 2008): 308-311; Kinfe Abraham, ñThe Meaning and Pan-African and International Significance of the Adowa Victory,ò *Adwa Victory Centenary Conference Papers* .Vol.1 (Addis Ababa, 26 Febuary-2 March 1996): 3-12. John Spencer, *Ethiopia at Bay: A Personal Account of the Haile Sellassie Years* (Michigan: Reference Publications Inc., 1987), 306. Bahru Zewde, *Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia: the Reformist Intellectuals of the Early Twentieth Century* (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), *91–92.* Ras Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism From Within.* Kenneth King (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 73ï74. Negussay Ayele, ñReflections on the International Impact of the 1935ï1941 Fascist Invasion of Ethiopia,ò *Proceedings of* the *Eleventh International Conference of Ethiopian Studies.* Vol.1 (1991): 822. *Ethiopian Herald*, 20 August 1959; and FO 371/138028, Furlonge to Lloyd: 15 January 1959. See FO 371/31609, Mr. Howe to Foreign Office: 18 June 1942.

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League, World Islamic Federation etc, which is the result of cultural and historical links with the outside world.

Ethiopiaôs independent existence has provided it with a unique position in the affairs of the continent.[2] Being a black nation with the advantages of strategic location and unique historical and cultural features, Ethiopia has a crucial interest to maintain and a role to play in Africa. It cannot, therefore, possibly remain aloof from developments, be it at regional or continental level. The necessity of involvement in African politics has been appreciated by successive Ethiopian governments, and it has been implemented with varying degrees of commitment, ranging from cautious and tentative contact to active leadership.[3] Irrespective of the sporadic accolades it received for its stand, what was actually achieved in terms of maintaining the countryôs interests and the level of commitment to promote the collective agenda requires further investigation. Whatever

[2] Richard Pankhurst, ñEthiopia and the African Personality,ò *Ethiopia Observer*. 3, 3 (April 1959): 161. Richard Pankhurst, óEthiopia and Africa: The Historic Aspect.ô *Ethiopia Observer*. 8, 2 (1964). Ethiopia Forty Years ..., 131 - 132; *Ethiopian Herald*, 5 May 1960. Pankhurst, ñEthiopia and the African Personality,ò *Ethiopia Observer*. Vol. 3, No. 3 (April 1959), p. 70. Hayla-Selassie I, *Speeches From the Throne, 1930 - 63* (Addis Ababa, 1967): 169 - 171; *Ethiopian Herald*, 21 June 1958, 8 November 1958, 5 May 1960; *Ethiopia: Forty Years of Reign, Forty Years of Progress, 1930 – 1970*. Published by Department of Press, Ministry of Information, (1970), 131 - 132. Also see *Important Utterances of His Imperial Majesty Emperor Hayla-Selassie I, 1963 - 1972* (Addis Ababa: Berehän ena Sälam Printing Press, 1972). Ali A. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations: the Diplomacy of Dependency and Change* (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1977), 2-3, 74-75, 82.

[3] Jack C. Miller, ñEthiopia and Intra African Politics, 1936 ï 74,ò *Horn of Africa*. 1, 2 (New Jersey, April/June 1978): 41 ï 42, 46. FO 371/138028, Mr. Furlonge to Lloyd: 19 January 1959. Colin Legum (ed.), ñEthiopia,ò *African Contemporary Record* (London, 1971): B104 - B105; Colin Legum, *Ethiopia: The Fall of Haile Selassie's Empire* (London, 1975), 19 - 23. Lemmu Baissa. ñThe Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The Case of Ethiopia, 1959 ï 1981ò (PhD Dissertation in Political Science. University of Syracuse, August 1988), 137; Robert L. Hess, *Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970), 214, 234; Robert L. Hess, ñEthiopia,ò *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States*. G.M. Carter (ed.) (Ithaca, 1966): 523, 527ï 528; Negussay Ayale, ñThe Foreign Policy of Ethiopia,ò *The Foreign Policy of African States*. Olajide Aluko (ed.) (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977): 50ï 53; Clapham, *Haile – Selassie's Government* (London: Longmans, Greens and Co. Ltd., 1969), 50; Spencer, *Ethiopia at Bay*, 155. *Ethiopia: Forty Years*, 132. How the emperor controlled Ethiopiaôs foreign policy was discussed in detail in Claphamôs book, *Haile – Selassie's Government*, 35, 39, 48, 55ï 56. Also see Miller, ñEthiopia and Intra Africané ò, 42. Edgar Oôballance, ñEthiopia on the Threshold of Change. Emperorôs Bid for Leadership in New Africa,ò *African World* (London, October 1964): 10-12.

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ıat Ethiopia received does not dramatically exceed the criticisms it drew.

The study of such a complex and controversial topic requires diligent investigation and readiness to account for developments in a detached and objective manner. It would be difficult and almost impossible to claim to cover every course in Ethiopiaôs position in Africa in the period under discussion. Specifically, the depth and length of these developments pose the danger of overstretching the research focus. The solution has therefore appeared to be selection of core issues to be addressed.

Every foreign relations exercise is believed to have two guiding principles ï securing oneôs own interests and being part of the wider international community. In other words, nation-states engage in foreign relations so as to protect and advance their strategic interests and to attain membership and credibility within a wider circle of fellow states. The intensity and commitment to either or both principles determine the nature and level of oneôs engagement.[4] Ethiopiaôs role in the African political arena could be viewed along these broad lines.

The available literature on the issue predominantly emphasizes the point that Ethiopiaôs active participation was primarily intended to secure its own specific interests while molding them as part of the continental agenda. In this regard, due attention is

[4] Vernon McKay, ñInternational Conflict Patterns,ò *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy*, Vernon McKay (ed.) (1966): 1-23; William Zartman, ñNational Interest and Ideology,ò *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy*, Vernon McKay (ed.) (1966): 25- 54; L. Gray Cowan, ñPolitical Determinants,ò *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy*, Vernon McKay (ed.) (1966): 119-143; C.T. John Norman Collins, ñForeign Conflict Behavior and Domestic Disorder in Africa,ò (PhD Dissertation in Political Science, Evanston, Illinois, August 1967), 16-37, 67-80. Christopher Clapham, ñEthiopia,ò *The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy.* Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko (eds.) (1984): 79-92.

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with Eritrean secessionism and Somali irredentism. A recurrent theme is the way successive Ethiopian regimes used the African forum to ward off potential dangers to the security and territorial integrity of the state. Cases repeatedly pointed out include efforts to adopt and maintain the principle of the sanctity of colonial boundaries, condemnation of secessionist movements and the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.[5]

To what extent these claims could be accepted beyond doubt still remains to be satisfactorily addressed. In the first place, the history of Ethiopiaôs involvement in Africa dates back well before the 1960s, when the above problems had their origin. Nor did Ethiopia manage to achieve its objectives through these methods.[6] Thus, other variables have to be considered as well.

In dealing with the question of security, however, attention is primarily focused on the Eritrean problem and on Somalia. The countryôs long standing boundary conflict with its southeastern neighbor and accusations of subversion by its western one have similarly

[5] Harold G. Marcus, *Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States, 1941 - 1974: The Politics of Empire* (Berkley: Los Angeles, 1983), 79 - 82. Christopher Clapham, ñEthiopia and Somalia,ò *Conflict in Africa*. Vol. 93 (London, 1972): 5ï 8, 18. Spencer, 293 - 294, 308 - 309. Spencer, ñ*A Review of Ethiopia's Foreign Relations with Particular Reference to the US,"* no publisher (1 August 1976): 31 ï 32. Haggai Erlich, *Ethiopia and the Middle East* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1994), 136. FO 371/146567, Wright to Lloyd: 18 January 1960. Negussay, ñForeign Policy of Ethiopiaé ò, 53 - 56. Christopher Clapham, ñEthiopia,ò *The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy*. Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko (ed.) (Trowbridge: Redwood Burn Ltd., 1984): 85 - 86. Haggai Erlich, *The Struggle over Eritrea, 1962 - 1978: War and Revolution in the Horn of Africa* (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1983), 36 - 39; Bereket Habte Selassie, *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa* (New York and London, 1980), 5. Also see Arnold Rivkin, *The African Presence in World Affairs: National Development and Its Role in Foreign Policy* (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1963), 4 - 5.

[6] Spencer, *Ethiopia at Bay*, 319 - 320; Tseggai Isaac, ñPolicy Efforts of a Weak State: Ethiopia Before and After the 1974 Revolutionò. PhD Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School University of Missouri - Colombia (August 1991), 12. Both authors believe that the creation of an independent regional organization (OAU) outside the domain of the UN, and the provision of non-interference in the affairs of other states lent no solution for the dispute Ethiopia had with Somalia and the Eritrean problem. The concern for the status quo and territorial concept was not apparently the sole idea of Ethiopia: see John Spencer, ñAfrica at the UN: some observations,ò *Africa and World Order*. Norman J. Padelford and Rupers Emerson (eds.) (New York: Frederic A. Praeger, 1963): 113-116.

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. Even if it is debatable whether Ethiopia secured its interests through the continental forum in all these confrontations, the facts demonstrate an important aspect of its relations with its immediate neighbors over the years. This study will hopefully show Ethiopiaôs intense relations with the Sudan and Somalia in the period under discussion.

An additional element in this investigation is the question of sub-regional groupings like the East African Federation, PAFMECSA, COMESA and IGADD. The nature of Ethiopiaôs participation vis-à-vis the actual achievement of these organizations has to be established. Ethiopiaôs role in these bodies from their inception to their consolidation, with all the ups and downs in between, will be assessed. In particular, events related to the evolution of IGADD and the practical involvement of the country to promote its interests as well as execute the regional agenda will be closely examined.

Strategic geopolitical factors also had an influence over Ethiopiaôs international relations. The Nile factor and the resultant tension with Egypt, the Arab-Israel conflict and the nature of Ethiopiaôs relations with the Middle East and Arab/Islam North Africa also have to be taken into consideration. In particular, the pressure exerted by the Arab League on Ethiopia on the questions of Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan and Djibouti merits investigation. Egyptôs vested interest in the region, particularly in Ethiopia by virtue of it being the major source of the Nile waters, and the largely negative role that it played in the affairs of the Horn and Ethiopiaôs reactions to it are investigated in some detail.

Equally important is the question of international power politics in the region and its implications for the foreign policy orientations of Ethiopia towards Africa. International

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es, together with involvement of the super powers in the Horn in particular and the continent in general, provide points of departure in the attempt to understand this aspect. The dramatic realignment on the West-East question witnessed in Ethiopia, together with the countryôs third option of seeking refuge in the Non-Aligned pact, provides additional insights into the nature of its involvement in African affairs.[7]

Ethiopiaôs name is mentioned, one way or the other, through the various phases of the Pan-African Movement. The country had an inspirational role in the early stages of the Movement. Intermittent contacts made between the 1890s and the 1940s elicited contradictory reactions, some considering Ethiopia a beacon of the Pan-African movement while others accused it of total lack of interest for the cause.[8] The fact that the Movement was initially confined to Blacks of African descent in the Western world might explain the absence of understanding and active participation on the side of Ethiopia. Actual developments after the emergence of what is referred to as ñContinental Pan-Africanismò after 1945 are of real interest here.

With regard to the factors pushing Ethiopia towards African politics since the 1950s, there are different interpretations. In addition to the security-related issues discussed

[7] Marcus, *Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States, 79-82;* Erlich, *Ethiopia and the Middle East*, 136; Negussay, ñThe Foreign Policy of Ethiopiaé ò, 53-56; Thorne, JR, ñExternal Political Pressures,ò *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy*, Vernon McKay (ed.) (1966): 145-175.Waldermar A. Nielsen, *The Great Powers and Africa* (1969), 197-98, 206-08, 265-66, 310, 389.

[8] P.O. Esedebe, cited in *General History of Africa*. Ali A. Mazrui (ed.).Vol.8 (1999),724. Colin Legum, ñThe Roots of Pan-Africanism,ò *Africa* (London, 1961), 455. Hosea Jaffe, ñThe African Dimension of the Battle of Adwa,ò *Adwa Victory Centenary Conference Papers*. Vol.1 (Addis Ababa, 26 February-2 March 1996): 4-22; Bahru, ñThe Italo-Ethiopian Waré ò, 308-311; knife Abraham, ñThe Meaning and Pan-Africané ò, 3-12. Spencer, *Ethiopia at Bay,* 306. Bahru, *Pioneers of Change, 91–92.* Ras Makonnen, *Pan-Africanism from Within.* Kenneth King (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 73ï74. Joseph E. Harris and Slimane Zeghidour, ñAfrica and its Diaspora since 1935,ò *General History of Africa.* Ali A. Mazrui (ed.) Vol. 8 (1999): 708ï709, 744; V.B. Thompson, *Africa and Unity: the Evolution of Pan-Africanism* (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), 32.

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n the notion of Ethiopiaôs leadersô unease with the revolutionary ideas of emergent African politicians. Therefore, by actively engaging in the affairs of the continent, it was intended to rein in these militant groups. These scholars claim that by using its developed bureaucratic clout, Ethiopia tempered passionate African sentiments into a much cooler tempo, thereby contributing to the frustration of the higher objectives espoused by the likes of Kwame Nkrumah. Others prefer to emphasize the pragmatic stance taken by Ethiopian rulers to the divergent views within the continent.[9]

On a positive note, Ethiopiaôs extended experience of statehood proved vital in the early stages of the Pan-African organizations. The country took responsibility to host and run most of these institutions; and, as a member of almost all of the sub-committees, ad hoc commissions and influence groups both in the continent and other international forums, including the United Nations, it managed to promote the African agenda.

The bid for leadership is also put forward as a factor behind Ethiopiaôs move into African politics. Nor is this argument a matter of mere speculation; rather, it is an official line repeatedly stated by successive Ethiopian regimes throughout the period. Obviously, in addition to Ethiopia, there were and still are other claimants for leadership, thereby creating cores (poles) throughout the continent. Even if this mitigated the intensity of criticism directed against Ethiopia, still the country remained on the hot seat of scrutiny. Open challenges targeting the removal of the OAU/AU headquarters outside the

[9] Miller, ñEthiopia and Intra Africané ò, 41 - 42. FO 371/138028, Mr. Furlonge to Lloyd: 19 January 1959. Legum (ed.), 'Ethiopia', pp. B104 - B105; Legum, *Ethiopia: The Fall of*, 19 - 23. Lemmu, 137; Hess, *Ethiopia: The Modernization* ..., 214, 234; Hess, ôEthiopiaô, 523, 527ï 528; Negussay, ñ*Foreign policy…"*, 50ï 53.

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ndirect criticisms regarding positions it has taken, etc., could be taken as indicators of such attitude.[10]

The policy formulation processes of successive Ethiopian regimes is also worthy of investigation in its own right. The way such processes were considered in relation to local, regional, continental and international realities, and were promoted in the African forum from the 1950s onwards have to be carefully examined. Irrespective of official lines declaring steadfast commitment to the Pan-African cause, obviously there were undeclared strategic schemes, decisions and operations. In view of the fact that each government would be pursuing its own immediate political objectives, no one state could claim unwavering commitment to the tenets of continental unity and welfare. Ethiopia cannot be an exception in this seemingly common trend of absence of continuity in foreign policy directives of member states in the continent.

The way neighboring states have to be handled also varied in accordance with the nature of relations adopted and the reactions elicited. The ósystem of Westphaliaô[11] dictating affairs in the region and the resultant love-hate relationship the country has had with the surrounding states are taken as indicators. The same is true regarding regional and continental organizations, for their priorities change with the unfolding realities. One has only to observe the evolutions of IGADD/IGAD, PTA/COMESA and OAU/AU, as

[10] Miller, ñEthiopia and Intra Africané ò, 42, 46; Clapham, *Haile – Selassie's Government*, p.50; Spencer, *Ethiopia at Bay*, p.155. *Ethiopia: Forty Years*, 132. Edgar OôBallance, ñEthiopia on the Threshold of Change. Emperorôs Bid for Leadership in New Africa,ò *African World* (London, October 1964): 10-12.

[11] This is a modern international system based on the principles of state sovereignty, non-intervention in the affairs of others and legal equality of states. The contrary political theory rejects this system for it does not accommodate ideas like internationalism, globalization, humanity and democracy. The latter also claim that the Westphalia system promotes rivalry between and among states than cooperation and exclusion than integration. See, for example, Andreas Osiander, ñSovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth,ò in *International Organizations* 55, 2 (Spring 2001): 251-287.

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the Middle East, Israel, and Western and Eastern powers to understand the constant policy shifts. Apart from active participation in conferences and determination to implementation of joint resolutions passed there, the overriding policy objectives of Ethiopia have to be assessed in accordance with specific situations and occurrences.

The level of commitment to the African cause and the achievements registered in this regard have also to be taken into account in the analysis of Ethiopiaôs role in the continent. Efforts exerted to bring divided Africa together and persuade them to create the OAU are recognized as a major contribution. The mission the country willingly assumed to help Africans overcome the ideological divide so prevalent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and to participate in successive conferences that resulted in the creation of continental bodies and institutions are actual cases in point. Even if not explicitly stated in the existing literature, successive Ethiopian leaders have exerted considerable time, energy and resource to save the OAU from imminent peril on different occasions.

The 1965 incident, when almost all of the member states boycotted the 3rd OAU summit in Accra, and Ethiopiaôs timely intervention is a case in point. The bitter struggle between 1982 and 1984 to convene the 19th summit was another dramatic occasion indicative of the countryôs commitment to the African cause. When leaders were simply unwilling to attend because of divisions arising from the Chad problem and the Morocco-Saharawi tension, an extended and successful shuttle-diplomacy was launched to ward off the danger. Some claim that had Ethiopia not intervened at that crucial moment, given

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resultant intervention of the super powers in Africa, the gains so far made towards continental unity would have been irreparably lost.[12]

Additional contributions were made by Ethiopia in mediating inter-state conflicts, giving support to the liberation movements of Southern African states and participation in different UN and OAU peace-keeping missions to Africa. Emperor Hayla-Selassieôs success in peacefully resolving the conflicts between Algeria and Morocco (1964) and the civil wars in Nigeria (1968); Col. Mengestuôs efforts to mediate between Chad and Libya as well as Morocco and the Saharawi Republic (1982-84) were a few examples in this regard.

Successive Ethiopian regimes also actively participated in the anti-colonialism struggles in Southern Africa. The initial clandestine and tentative ventures later assumed an open character, as evidenced by large scale military training and logistics assistance to freedom fighters and their organizations.[13] The 1960 peace-keeping missions to the Congo (K) can be taken as a reflection of Ethiopiaôs commitment to peace and stability in Africa. The country was at loggerheads with fellow African states during this mission,

[12] Informants: Ambassadors Berhänu Dinqa, Seyoum Mohamud and Mängisté Dästa.

[13] MoFA 2 Kenya 63/12, MoFA to British legation in Addis Ababa: 16 July 1942; MoFA 2 Kenya 63/12, Ambassador D. W. Lascelles (British Embassy, Addis Ababa) to Zäwdé Gäbrä Heywät (Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs): 26 January 1951; MoFA 2 Kenya 63/12, British Embassy (Addis Ababa) to Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld (Minster of Foreign Affairs): 18 June 1951; FO 371/31609, Mr. Howe to Foreign Office: 18 June 1942. MoFA 1 166, Kassa Wäldä-Maryam (Assistant Minister in the Ministry of Pen) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 26 August 1960. *Ibid*, Gäbrä-Wald (Minster *D' État* of the Ministry of Pen) to Yelma Därésa (Minister of Finance): 24 August 1960; MoFA 1 Kenya 63/12, Seyoum Häylu (MoFA, Director of the Department of Finance) to State Bank of Ethiopia: 1 September 1960; MoFA 1 Kenya 63/12, Zänäbä Haylé (Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Finance) to National Treasury: 30 August 1960. Out of the total 20, 210 Ethiopian Birr, $ 10, 000 was allocated to Kenyan African National Union, $ 4, 000 to Uganda National Congress, $ 2000 to Kenya Peoples Association, and $ 4000 to Africa National Congress of South Rhodesia. Nationalist leaders of the above mentioned parties, James Gichiru, Joseph Kiwanuca, Masende Mulero and Joshua Nkomo, respectively, had personally requested for assistance when they met the emperor in June 1960 after participating in the Second Conference of Independent African States, held in Addis Ababa.

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ll on its human and material resources. It tested imperial Ethiopiaôs perception of African problems, how they should be solved and the extent of its commitment to solving them.[14]

In the final analysis, Ethiopiaôs role in Africa has to be viewed holistically rather than outlining the nature of its involvement along distinct lines of immediate interest versus commitment to pan-African ideals. One clearly observes the fact that the two elements often overlap in every case of intervention in the affairs of the continent. This research will hopefully fill the existing gap in our understanding of what actually transpired in Ethiopiaôs relations with fellow Africans in the period between 1956 and 1991. Ethiopiaôs foreign policy objectives and the resultant diplomatic efforts remain the vantage point in the whole process of historical reconstruction.

[14] Catherine Hoskyns (ed.), *Case Studies in African Diplomacy, Number I: the Organization of African Unity and the Congo Crisis, 1964-64* (Dar es Salaam: Institute of Public Administration and Oxford University Press, 1969), 18-74.

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Part I

Securing Immediate Interest

The geo-political realities of North-East Africa have dictated Ethiopiaôs relations with its immediate neighbors as well as other regional actors. The contest over the Red Sea shoreline, religious conflict and the contention over resources (territory, grazing lands, rivers etc) have remained major areas of the long existing conflict. These factors in turn influenced the nature of the countryôs involvement in regional political and economic associations. The post-1950s in particular witnessed the convergence of complex developments demanding intricate policy directives. Shifting international alignments of states, apparent and/or perceived security threats emanating from others and, more importantly, the interests each government strove to safeguard shaped inter-state relations for long. Internal political situations in the country equally contributed to the dynamics of inter-state relations. Ethiopiaôs contact with various elements in the region and the strategic interests it sought to preserve in the process has to be viewed along these lines.

Ethiopiaôs long sovereign existence and the accompanying tradition of governance sharply contrasted with the euphoric anticipations of emerging states. On the other hand, the country has had to come to terms with the new political order that introduced fresh actors replacing European colonizers. Previous policy lines that primarily took into account neighboring European colonial powers started to face challenges. The categorical labeling of Ethiopia as an ally of the oppressors was the first challenge that necessitated a foreign policy rethink. The question of dealing with rulers of the new states in the region also has to be seriously considered in the process of policy formulation. In addition,

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es and figures in neighboring countries in order to create and sustain friendly governments became the principal agenda of successive Ethiopian regimes.

Simultaneously, more pressing problems started to emerge in the form of boundary disputes, resource utilization, support of subversive elements etc. Ethiopiaôs relations with the Sudan and Somalia illustrated this point. Somaliaôs ambition of acquiring portions of Ethiopian territory and the resultant skirmishes as well as Sudanôs work of destabilizing Ethiopia by sponsoring anti-government forces necessitated a defensive strategy from Ethiopia. As a result, the two countries remained a priority in the foreign policy agenda of Ethiopian governments. Further complicating Ethiopiaôs peace and security was the interventions of Egypt and Libya, most of the time siding with the Sudan and Somalia. The age-old ambition of the Arab/Islam world to dominate the entire Red Sea and North East Africa primarily influenced the attitudes of these powers towards Ethiopia. In the case of Egypt, it was combined with the agenda of securing its monopoly over the Nile waters. Equally interesting was the way Ethiopia reacted to these threats in the period under discussion.

In the struggle to secure the countryôs immediate interests, both the imperial regime and the Darg followed various approaches. Regional, continental and international fora always remained viable platforms to legitimize Ethiopiaôs claims. The good offices of the UN and OAU were frequently called upon to ward off the looming dangers. The African front particularly remained the preferred venue of the countryôs diplomatic offensives against its opponents. Regional groupings such as the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) and the Inter-Governmental Authority

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GADD) were similarly used for the purpose of promoting its strategic objectives.

More significantly, the characteristics of the two regimes determined the foreign policy dealings of the country with immediate neighbors as well as regional actors. The change in the countryôs international alignments from a predominantly pro-West orientation to joining the socialist camp, with various other realignments in between, had its influence on the course of events. Even more significant, however, was how this affected Ethiopiaôs relations with Africa in general and its struggle to secure its immediate interests in particular. Putting aside the East-West tension, Ethiopiaôs perpetual concern for sustainable security and the various strategies employed to realize this remains a point of interest.

The change-continuity paradigm in the African policy directives of the two governments needs to be fully described and investigated. Apparently, the special characteristics of the two regimes dictated differing approaches towards Sudan and Somalia, as well as determining the way relations with Egypt and Libya were handled and the nature of involvement in regional groupings. Yet, one clearly observes an element of continuity, revolving around the policy of sustaining Ethiopiaôs national interest. It is hoped to demonstrate that the achievements registered and the failures encountered in the period under discussion came to have a direct bearing on the current state of affairs in the region.

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Chapter I

Troubled Relations with the Sudan

The Sudan has always remained at the center of Ethiopiaôs foreign policy dealings. Its being a neighbor sharing the longest non-demarcated boundary (about 2000 kms) and a gateway to external interventions necessitated that priority be accorded to that country. Since Sudanôs march towards independence in the early 1950s, developments in that country remained the focus of serious attention by Ethiopian governments. However, the internal problems of the two states with the apparent spillover effect on the other contributed to the tension. In addition, the persistent perception that the other always harbors destabilizing elements intent on overthrowing the ruling party/regime of its counterpart further aggravated the situation.

Both the imperial regime and the Darg handled the Sudan case with varying degrees of serious application. Each was intent on guarantying the coming to power of friendly elements in Khartoum. When the contrary occurred, successive Ethiopian governments did not hesitate to exploit any opportunity that would bring about regime change in the Sudan. Similarly, problems related to the common boundary and dissident elements were treated differently. This chapter tries to document the foreign policy that Ethiopia followed towards the Sudan, the justifications behind the activities and the failures and achievements registered in the process.

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Developments to the late 1970s

The assistance Britain rendered to the Ethiopian Liberation campaign in 1940-41 set the background for subsequent bilateral relations between Ethiopia and what was then known as Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

[1] Following the escalation in the Sudan of political movements demanding immediate independence, Ethiopia started to closely observe the course of events. Developments associated with the creation in 1938 of the óGraduate Councilô and its issuance of the óPolitical Manifestoô in April 1942 demanding, among others, the right to self determination was well received by Ethiopian officials.[2]

Complications soon emerged when colonial officials rejected the manifesto. The secretary-general of the Graduate Council, Ismail El Azhari, requested Egyptôs protection and, with the latterôs assistance, established the ó*Ashika*ô party, which was later renamed the National Unionist Party (NUP). The leader of the Khatimiyya sect, Sayid Ali el-Mirghani, emerged as the religious patron of the NUP. Those who were opposed to this formed a separate political party, the UMMA, and set their political agenda under the guidance of the religious leader of the Mahdiyyah sect (the Ansar), Sayid Abdurrahman al- Mahdi. However, the growing power of the NUP alarmed Ethiopia and its fears

[1] MoFA Sudan 29-D2 2. Memo on Ethio-Sudan Relations: *Mäskäräm* 1964E.C (Sept. 1971); Basic Factors in Ethio-Sudan Relation: *Mäskäräm* 1964E.C. (Sept. 1971).

[2] MoFA Sudan 23-D2 31. Ethio-Sudan Relations from 1956 to 1971: no date.

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urge of Egypt, the scheduled plebiscite was bypassed and the country was accorded independence on 1 January 1956.[3]

Imperial Ethiopia had no alternative other than working with successive regimes in the Sudan. Relations were relatively fruitful during the governments of Sayid Abdulla Kahlil (July 1956 ï November 1958), and even more so under Maj. Gen. Abboud (1958-1964). A set of agreements aimed at strengthening mutual economic and political/defense ties were signed during these times. The major ones were the Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance (1 August 1957), the unratified Trade and Commerce Agreement and the Cultural Agreement (6 January 1960), and the Extradition Treaty of 29 March 1964.[4]

The objective of the ruling party, i.e. the UMMA, at this period, to work towards the unity and complete independence of the Sudan vis-à-vis the continuing Egyptian domination encouraged Ethiopia to create mutually rewarding ties with these governments. In addition, the UMMA partyôs principle of promoting the policy of closer cooperation with Ethiopia in the struggle to counterbalance the dominance of Egypt in the region formed the basis of their relations. The Imperial Ethiopian government had never been more content in its relations with the Sudan than during these earlier periods of contact.[5] The close contact among officials and their exchange of sensitive information manifested the level of understanding and cooperation between the governments of

[3] *Ibid.* See also Peter K. Bechtold, ñMore Turbulence in Sudan: A New Politics this Time?ò in *Sudan: State and Society in Crisis.* Edited by John O. Voll (Bloomington & Indiapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991): 6-8.

[4] MoFA Sudan 26-D2 11. Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance: 1 August 1957 and the Cultural Agreement of 6 February 1960; MoFA Sudan 23-D2 28. Chronology of Ethio-Sudan Relations: no date; MoFA Sudan 23-D2 31. Ethio-Sudan Relations from 1956 to 1971: no date; MoFA Sudan 28-D2 1. Study Report on Relations: no date. MoFA Sudan 1 B and Sudan 26-D2 11. Extradition Agreement of 29 March 1964.

[5] *Ibid.*

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hand and Ethiopia on the other. For instance, a couple of days before the November 1958 coup, Prime Minister Kahlil confided to the Ethiopiaôs ambassador regarding the imminent army coup. After the coup, the ambassador, Mäläs Mikaêél Andom, was bold enough to openly castigate Abboudôs foreign minister about the absence in the official statement of the new ruler of any mention of Sudanôs relation with Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular in contrast to the repeated mention of the countryôs Arabism.[6] The latter case was immediately remedied in the policy statement issued by the foreign minister on 19th November 1958:

> é I should like to reaffirm to all African independent states and above all to our sister neighbor Ethiopia, to which we are tied with bonds of friendship and family, which bonds we are keen to foster and develop, that our efforts will be mobilized to serve the interests of our African brothers. We hope to give full cooperation in the international field for this cause guided by the principles of the Accra Conference.[7]

All along, Ethiopia strove to assure the continuation of UMMA rule and the Ansar domination of Sudan politics. It has been giving financial assistance, along with Israel, Saudi Arabia, USA, Great Britain and France, to the religious leader, Sayid Abdurrahman al- Mahdi, in order to help the UMMA secure parliamentary seats. In one election, for instance, these countries had contributed around two million pound sterling. Following the death of the leader of the Mahdist sect in March 1959, Ethiopia was worried about the

[6] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 Şeraz 4. Ambassador Mäläs Mikaêél Andom (Khartoum) to the Emperor: *Hedar* 9, 16, 19 & 23, 1951E.C. (19, 26 & 29 Nov. and 3 Dec. 1958) Also see Scopas S. Poggo, ñGeneral Ibrahim Abboudôs Military Administration in the Sudan, 1958-1964: Implementation of the Programs of Islamization and Arabization in the Southern Sudan,ò in *Northeast African Studies*. 9, 1 (2002): 67-101.

[7] *Ibid,* Included in the letter from Ambassador Mäläs to the Emperor: *Hedar* 23, 1951E.C (3 Dec. 1958).

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between Sayid Sadeq al-Mahdi and Sayid Abdullahi al-Fayed al-Mahdi, the eldest son and nephew of the deceased, respectively. In order to sustain the unity of the party and the people, Ethiopia chose to fully support the son of the deceased and was ready to contribute the 100,000 pound sterling he requested to bolster his camp.[8]

Irrespective of these constructive contacts with Ethiopia, however, Sudanese political segments equally strove to sustain their special relations with Egypt. The November 1959 agreement between Egypt and the Sudan for the full utilization of the Nile waters was an act that had dashed the hopes of Ethiopia for stronger ties with the Sudan.[9] The secret federation talks between Gen. Abboud and President Nasser in the face of an imminent political crisis in the Sudan in late September 1961 was equally descriptive of the countryôs closer ties with Egypt.[10]

The probable intervention of Egypt as a decisive force in the Sudan following the deteriorating internal situation; Sudanôs serving as a base for subversive activities in Eritrea and its occasional collaboration with Somalia as well as the fear that the dispute in South Sudan might affect the overall situation in the Sudan and would be exploited by elements within and outside Africa necessitated the designing of a short and long term strategic plan in Ethiopia. The objective of the plan was ó---to bolster the independence of

[8] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 Şeraz 3. Yelma Därésa (Minister, MoFA) to Ambassador Mäläs: *Mägabit* 24, 1951E.C (2 April 1959); Ambassador Mäläs to Yelma Därésa: *Miyazya* 2, 1951E.C (10 April 1959).

[9] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 130. Agreement between Egypt and the Sudan for the full Utilization of the Nile Waters: 8 November 1959.

[10] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 130. Situation Report on the Sudan. Col. Yergu Endaylalu to Kätäma Yifru (State Minister, MoFA): *Ţeqemt* 2, 1954 E.C (13 Oct. 1961); MoFA Sudan 27-D2 Şeraz 1. Intelligence Report on the Situation in the Sudan. Col. Yergu to Kätäma: *Ţir* 8, 1954 E.C (17 Jan. 1962).

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the frustration of existing subversive operations, and the containment and eradication of Egyptian penetrationô.[11]

The plan of action proposed various steps to be taken in order to guarantee Ethiopiaôs interests in the Sudan. These included reinforcement of the UMMA and Ansar, the establishment of Ethiopian-Sudanese-Israeli cooperation through a tripartite committee and the establishment of direct contact with anti-Egyptian elements in the Sudanese army and police so as to induce them to serve as a stabilizing factor and to thwart hostile activity. The reinforcement of the UMMA was intended to ascertain objectives like ćthe UMMA should constitute a force in the Khartoum streets and elsewhere, and prevent a takeover by hostile elements,ô the UMMA should emerge ćsufficiently powerfulô from the April 1963 elections, and the UMMA should serve as a basis for a coalition government after the election. The tripartite committee would presumably check and uproot Egyptian penetration, and reinforce the anti-Egyptian elements in the Sudan and ultimately neutralize Sudan as a base for subversion in Eritrea.[12]

Troubled and murky episodes started to emerge under the pro-Egyptian and pro-Arab governments of Ismail El Azhari (January ï June 1956, 1965 - May 1969), Sir Katim Khalifa (1964-1965), and Gen. Nimeiri (May 1969- April 1985). In the first place, Ethiopia was not happy about the close associations these governments were trying to establish with Egypt. The tendency to create a predominantly Arab/Islamic Sudan also posed dangers for its immediate neighbor. Nonetheless, the two countries, with the exception of the brief rule of Sir Khalifa, attempted to assuage the growing mistrust by

[11] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 148. Plan of Action against Sudan and Somalia: 1955E.C. (c.1962).

[12] *Ibid.*

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e first was the Protocol Agreement of 30 April 1956 that leased to the Sudan the land and property reserved for the British Consulate General in Gambella for a period of twenty years.[13] However, the two countries were progressively losing their friendly and cordial relations and increasingly resorting to sustaining their own immediate and vital interests.

Three points appeared to dictate the nature of Ethio-Sudan relations in those troubled times. These were the issue of dissident elements (the Eritrean rebels in the Sudan and South Sudan fighters based inside Ethiopia[14]), the non-demarcated boundary and the staggering number of refugees on both sides.

All of these points of controversy continued to adversely affect bilateral relations following the coming to power of the above-mentioned governments in the Sudan. El Azhari and Katim Khalifa did not hide their pro-Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) feelings; and Nimeiri alternated between openly sympathizing with rebels and playing the middle man between them and the Ethiopian government. The Ethiopians equally began to exploit the situation in South Sudan to pressurize Khartoum into refraining from direct involvement in the internal problem of a sovereign state.[15]

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[13] MoFA Sudan 26-D2 11. Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance: 1 August 1957 and the Cultural Agreement of 6 February 1960; MoFA Sudan 23-D2 28. Chronology of Ethio-Sudan Relations: no date; MoFA Sudan 23-D2 31. Ethio-Sudan Relations from 1956 to 1971: no date; MoFA Sudan 28-D2 1. Study Report on Relations: no date. MoFA Sudan 1 B and Sudan 26-D2 11. Extradition Agreement of 29 March 1964. See also John Obert Voll and Sarah Potts Voll, *The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), 121-140.

[14] The issue of South Sudan will be treated separately. See pp. 60-94.

[15] MoFA Sudan 23-D2 31. Report on Ethio-Sudan Relation from 1956 to 1971: no date. See also Haggai Erlich, *Islam and Christianity in the Horn of Africa: Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan* (USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, 2010), 94-107; S. A. Akintoye, *Emergent African States: Topics in Twentieth Century African History* (London: Longman Group Limited, 1976), 221-223; David Pool, ñThe Eritrean Peopleôs

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stion of Subversion and Hostile Propaganda

By late 1964, the ELF managed to function in the Sudan without restraint. In the face of increasing subversive activities and distribution of malicious propaganda by the secessionist element, the Ethiopian embassy was forced to submit strongly worded complaints to the foreign ministry of the Sudan. In addition to the assistance the ELF acquired from Sudanese political parties and organizations, what was alarming to Ethiopia was the speech made by the Minister of Information and Labor on 3 December 1964 after receiving a petition at the end of a demonstration in Khartoum. The minister considered the petition delivered to him ―a weapon which will supportô the government of Sudan and that ―é the Peoplesô Revolution of October will not be completed unless all neighbors of the Sudan who look for freedom are liberated. The Peoplesô Revolution of the Sudan understands the case of the Eritreans. We will fight operations wherever it may beô.[16]

The deteriorating relation necessitated direct contacts between the leaders of the two states. The first contact occurred in December 1964, when Kätäma Yifru, the State Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Foreign Minister of the Sudan, Said Mohammed Mahjoub, met in the UN headquarters in New York. During the forty minutes discussion, the two ministers concurred on the problem afflicting them being ―rebel infiltrations from the South of the Sudan into Ethiopian territory and those infiltrating into the Sudan from

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Liberation Front,ò in *African Guerillas*. Edited by Christopher Clapham (Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998): 19-35.

[16] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 1. Ethiopian Embassy (Khartoum) to Sudan Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 5 December 1964.

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f restoring cordial relations, the ministers agreed to draw up an agenda to initiate talks in the near future at foreign ministers level which would then be worked out in detail by delegations representing each country.

Two provisional items were suggested and agreed upon by both ministers. First, review of past events and relations between the two countries would be made. This was expected to óventilate or sort out incidents that have marred the good Ethio-Sudan relationsô with the purpose of putting a halt to the recurrence of these incidents and discarding them for good. Second, drawing up a plan for the future, mainly a long term plan, that will serve as a guide by which both governments can apprise each other of their respective attitude in the conduct of relations affecting the mutual interests of Ethiopia and the Sudan.[18]

In the meantime, the call for reprisal measures against Sudan for its assistance to secessionist elements was intensifying within Ethiopia. The government of Katim Khalifa (1964-65) had officially announced its sympathy and support to the rebel groups, released all Eritrean prisoners and agreed to allow ELF cadres freedom of movement in the Sudan. It had also facilitated the delivery of material and financial shipments from the Arab/Islam states in the Middle East to the rebel groups in Eritrea.[19] A set of proposals outlined a list of measures to be taken. These ranged from approaching rebel groups in

[17] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 112. Summary Record on the Talk between Kätäma Yifru and Said Mohammed Mahjoub: 14 December 1964.

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] MoFA Ertra 68-D5 20. Memo on Sudanôs Support to the Eritrean Rebel groups. *Däj*. Keflé Ergäşu (Chief of Public Security) to the Emperor: *Ṭir* 9 & 11 (18 & 20 Jan.), *Miyazya* 4, 1957 (12 April 1965) E.C; MoFA Sudan 28-D2 130. Memo to Kätäma on Rebel Activities in the Sudan. Col. Yergu to Kätäma: *Miyazya* 16, 1957 E.C (24 April 1965).

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aring the UMMA party for acts of sabotage within the north and assigning a clandestine intelligence officer who would mastermind these actions to Ethiopiaôs embassy in Khartoum.[20]

A high level Sudanese good will mission led by the Prime Minister, Sayid Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub, visited Ethiopia from 26-28 July 1965. After two daysô deliberations, the Addis Ababa Memorandum of Agreement was signed on 28 July and a joint communiqué was issued the same day.[21] The two parties agreed to refrain from disseminating hostile propaganda of whatever origin; to desist from permitting, allowing or providing facilities for the transfer of arms and ammunitions or traffic of arms or ammunition of any type within their territorial jurisdiction destined for the use of outlaws, rebels or secessionists; refrain from allowing nationals of the other to involve directly or indirectly in activities that would encourage secessionist movements in the territory of the other party; take immediate and effective measures to eliminate all offices established by dissident elements; and refrain from allowing their territory to be used as a training center by dissident elements.[22]

They also agreed to put into effect the Extradition Agreement of 29 March 1964 immediately after ratification by both parties; to respect ôthe boundaries as defined in the existing treaties, agreements or protocolsô; undertake to prevent and bring to an end any incursion objected to by either party; and to establish a joint consultative ministerial committee ôwhich shall consult concerning the fulfillment of this agreement and which

[20] *Ibid*; MoFA Sudan 28-D2 1. Col. Yergu Endaylalu to Kätäma: *Mägabit* 27, 1957 E.C (5 April 1965).

[21] MoFA Sudan 26-D2 11. Addis Ababa Memorandum of Agreement: 29 July 1965; Joint Communiqué Following the Addis Ababa Agreement: 28 July 1965.

[22] *Ibid.*

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difficulties that exist or may exist in the relations between the Republic of Sudan and the Ethiopian Governmentô. More importantly, the two parties established a Joint Consultative Committee which would meet regularly to consider and resolve all problems and difficulties that might arise between the two governments.[23]

A set of activities were undertaken to capitalize on the above agreement and broker a mutually beneficiary accord on the question of subversion and the boundary problem. The first of successive meetings was held in Addis Ababa on 25 April 1966, when events connected to South Sudan rebels and their association with Ethiopia dominated the talks.[24] The second meeting (Khartoum, 24-26 June 1966), on the other hand, did focus on the common boundary and subversive activities. After formal exchange of pleasantries, the delegates resumed serious discussions under the two committees assigned to study border problems and to investigate the issue of subversion.

The imperial government similarly prepared an action plan on clandestine missions to be undertaken by Ethiopiaôs embassy in Khartoum. In an effort to countervail anti-Ethiopian activities emanating from Sudan, a special fund was to be set aside for a counter-propaganda mission, a second secretary was to be appointed to the embassy with the sole task of coordinating the propaganda mission, establishment of Ethio-Sudan solidarity club, bolstering the special contact with the UMMA party and the Ansar and, more importantly, travel-document restrictions to be imposed on Ethiopian citizens living abroad. The latter was presumably intended to frustrate young people planning to reside

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] MoFA Sudan 38-D2 Record of the Meeting Held between Sudanese and Ethiopian Delegation in Addis Ababa: 25 April 1966. See below for the details.

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report claimed, dissident elements easily recruited to their cause. The annual budget for all these activities, to the amount of about 70,000 *birr*, was authorized and the plan was set in motion immediately afterwards.[26]

The primary preoccupation of the imperial regime in its relations with Sudan, the issue of subversive elements, continued to gravely concern the officials despite joint agreements to the contrary. The gravity of the matter forced the foreign minister, Kätäma, to write directly to his Sudanese counterpart in early January 1967. The letter pointed out Ethiopiaôs increasing concern over ósudan Governmentôs failure to take appropriate measures against anti-Ethiopia elements which conduct hostile propaganda and subversive activitiesô harmful to its national unity and territorial integrity. Specifically, the óJäbhaô and óHärakaô organizations and their headquarters in Kassala, Eastern Sudan; the medical treatment the outlaws were receiving in government hospitals there; the financial and moral encouragement from Sudanese nationals in the city were cited. After listing the prominent leaders of these rebel groups, Ethiopia demanded for their expulsion from the Sudan and requested the Sudan government to ódo everything in its power to persuade the Sudan press to participate the fostering of good relations with Ethiopiaô.[27]

However, the relation between the two failed to assume the course Ethiopia ardently desired. The state of the conflict further intensified so much that in March 1967 a high level meeting was conducted at the prime ministerôs office to design counter measures to

[25] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 Şeraz 1. Memo on Action Plans for the Ethiopian Embassy in Khartoum: *Nähasé* 6, 1957 E.C (12 Aug. 1965).

[26] *Ibid*, Khartoum Embassy to MoFA: *Nähasé* 26, 1957 E.C (1 Sept. 1965).

[27] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 1. Kätäma Yifru to Ibrahim El-Mufti: 3 January 1967.

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he preamble of the action plan enumerated the strategies employed by successive Sudanese regimes to deceive Ethiopia and what their ulterior objectives were in doing so. The meeting categorically characterized Sudanôs involvement in previous negotiation talks with Ethiopia as noncommittal and lamented their perception of the absence of reprisals from Ethiopia as a sign of weakness.

The intensification of Sudanôs animosity towards Ethiopia in recent years was ascribed to the latterôs military actions to rout the Eritrean rebels and Sudanôs determination to sustain the secessionist elements; and Sudanôs delegation by the Arab League to advance the interests of the Arab world (securing their dominance along the Red Sea enclave and expansion plan towards Eastern and Central Africa) vis-à-vis the strong challenge it had faced because of the mere existence of Ethiopia. The report condemned the schemes of Sudanese regimes of pressurizing Ethiopia into accepting their agenda regarding the boundary and Eritrea as well as the deceptiveness of their politicians, particularly that of the UMMA leadership. The latter, according to the document, had consistently pledged to secure Ethiopian interests, received financial and material assistance in their struggle to assume power in the Sudan and, but once they had achieved it, frequently ignored their promises.[29]

Most annoying to the Ethiopian officials was the request by some members of the Sudanese parliament to Lord Bertrand Russell demanding criminal charges against

[28] MoFA Sudan 23-D2 yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän sememenätoḷe 2. Report on the Meeting in the Prime Ministerôs Office Concerning Ethiopiaôs Measures against Sudan: *Mägabit* 27, 1959 E.C (5 April 1967).

[29] *Ibid.* Members of the Policy Designing Committee included *Şähafé Te'ezaz* Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld, *Le'eul Ras* Asratä Kassa (Governor-General of Eritrea), Yelma Därésa (Minister of Finance), *Däj*. Keflé Ergäşu (Minister of Interior), Lt. Gen. Käbädä Gäbré (Minister of defense), Kätäma Yifru, Seyoum Harägot, Dr. Menasé Haylé (Imperial Cabinet), Dr. Täsfayé Gäberäzgi (State minister, MoFA) and *Fitawrari* Abäbä Bitäw.

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ocities committed in Eritrea. Moreover, a member of the five-man supreme council of the government of Sudan urged for the reinstatement of the federation status of Eritrea and requested OAUôs intervention. Simultaneously, the Sudan press launched an intensive propaganda campaign brandishing the country as an expansionist state, thereby attempting to tarnish its image among fellow Africans. They particularly used the 1891 circular of Emperor Menelik that defined the territorial extent of the Ethiopian empire as testimony for their accusation.[30]

The counter measure to be taken against Sudan was designed taking into consideration a range of factors. Some of these were the emerging perception within the African circle that Ethiopiaôs silence was tantamount to admission of the truthfulness of the charges; the growing military incursions by the Sudanese army not only into the disputed area in Sätit-Humära but also along the entire frontier and the frequent murders and property damages sustained by Ethiopian citizens; and the urgency of unequivocally demonstrating the countryôs potentials for launching reprisal measures so as to ward off similar interventions in the future.[31]

Altogether six possible areas of reprisal were identified by the high level committee.[32] The first was recalling the Ethiopian ambassador to Sudan. This, it was argued, would constitute the strongest gesture of demonstrating the displeasure felt within Ethiopia. Prior to the departure of the ambassador, it was decided to prepare a document detailing the reasons why this measure was taken. The document was to detail the anti-Ethiopian

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] *Ibid.*

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roundless accusations propagated against Ethiopia as well as Ethiopiaôs determination to defend its honor and territorial integrity. Secondly, by way of controlling the possible diplomatic damage in case of full scale confrontation, it was decided to update selected countries and governments on the state of affairs immediately. The action plan equally stressed the need for briefing the Ethiopian public on the situation.

Thirdly, in the event of any anti-Ethiopian statement from the Sudan, Ethiopia would issue a position paper outlining the worsening nature of their relations. This paper would outline its determination to militarily solve the Eritrean problem and underline the fact that any external involvement would be tantamount to violation of Ethiopiaôs sovereign rights and direct intervention in its internal affair. The fourth measure was the staging of a full scale propaganda campaign against Sudan in order to counter ongoing disinformation mission (of both the rebel groups and the Sudan press). Fifthly, on the assumption that the Sudan press was liable to be bought off easily, the action plan proposed the dissemination of pro-Ethiopian information using their print media. The sixth measure was the assignment of a special police force and army units along strategic places along the common boundary. The plan was presented to the emperor immediately; and following his authorization, it was put into practice.[33]

By mid 1968 the anti-Ethiopian propaganda regained momentum, this time directly associating the Eritrean case with that of Biafra and Cabinda, and calling for the

[33] *Ibid*, Seyoum Harägot (State Minister, Office of the Prime Minister) to Kätäma: *Mägabit* 27, 1959 E.C (5 April 1967).

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community.[34] The Eritrean rebels equally were granted a position of privilege among the highest echelons of the Sudanese government. The fact that they were allowed to hold public demonstrations, in the presence of higher officials and brandishing flags and placards which called for ómarmed struggle to liberate Eritrea,ô provoked strong protest from the Ethiopian side.[35]

These incidents continued to dictate the nature of Ethio-Sudan relations in the following years. The internal political turmoil in Sudan contributed to the absence of speedy resolution of the problems. The May 1969 revolution that brought Jafar El Nimeiri to power did little to resolve the age old mistrust between the two states. Particularly, the pro-communist inclinations of the new regime had created suspicion within the Ethiopian circles from the beginning. The opposition Nimeiriôs government faced from workers associations, army units and the Ansar as well as the harsh measures it took to quell the rebellion was closely monitored by Ethiopian officials. The Ansar revolt of March 1970, the destruction of their power base in the Aba Island, the death of their religious leader, Imam El-Hindi Abdurrahman, and the imprisonment of Sadiq El-Mahdi were among special incidents that attracted Ethiopiaôs attention.[36]

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[34] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 129. Memo on Anti-Ethiopian Propaganda in Sudan Press: *Säné* 4, 1960 E.C (11 June 1968).

[35] MoFA Sudan 23-D2 36. Memo to Sudan Embassy Regarding the Growing Activities of the Eritrean Rebels There: 7 June 1967.

[36] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 1. Intelligence Report from Within Sudan Embassy: *Säné* 5, 1961 E.C; Report to Khartoum Spy on Sudan Political situation: *Säné* 27, 1961 E.C (4 July 1969); MoFA Sudan 27-D2 Şeraz 2. Intelligence Report on Sudan Current Situation: *Hämlé* 9 & 10, 1961 E.C (16 & 17 July 1969); MoFA Sudan 27-D2 Şeraz 5. Report on Workers Mutiny: *Hämlé* 15, 1961 E.C (22 July 1969); MoFA Sudan 27-D2 Şeraz 2. Situation Report: *Hämlé* 17, 1961 E.C (24 July 1969); Analysis Report on Sudan Political division and Its Implication on Ethiopia: *Mägabit* 25, 1962 E.C (3 April 1970).

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the part of the Nimeiri regime to resolve the boundary problem in a peaceful manner; the open atrocities Sudanese troops were committing within the Ethiopian frontier in Humära district; the intensification of anti-Ethiopian propaganda by the Sudan press; and the freedom of movement, assembly and protection it gave to Eritrean rebels were perceived by Ethiopia as dangerous trends which had to be dealt with immediately.[37] One policy paper asserted that, because of an outright anti-Ethiopian stands of the Nimeiri regime, the hope for friendly relations with Sudan was now completely dashed and the country could no longer be considered a trusted neighbor.[38]

Another document labeled the post-1970 Sudan the top security threat to Ethiopia, far greater than even Somalia.[39] According to this document, the proposed Sudan-Libya-Egypt cooperation and eventual merger, together with Soviet military assistance to them, vis-à-vis the volatile geo-political situation in the Middle East after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War aggravated the level of Sudanôs enmity. The precautionary strategy designed to ward off the probable threat included strengthening South Sudan rebels, soliciting the assistance of Israel and the US and full assessment of the military capabilities of the two countries in the eventuality of full scale confrontation.[40]

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[37] MoFA Sudan 29-D2 4. Memo on Ethiopiaôs need for Counter Actions against Sudan: *Mäskäräm* 29, 1962 E.C (10 Oct. 1969). MoFA Sudan 34-D2 1. Memo on Deteriorating Relations and Measures to be Taken against Sudan: *Ṭir* 1962 E.C (Jan. 1970).

[38] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 Şeraz 5. Analysis Report on Sudan Political division and Its Implication on Ethiopia: *Mägabit* 25, 1962 E.C (3 April 1970).

[39] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 Şeraz 2. Study Report on Aspects of Sudanôs Danger to Ethiopia: *Miyazya* 20, 1962 E.C (28 April 1970).

[40] *Ibid.*

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unched by the imperial regime, in cooperation with its partners, demonstrates the extent of suspicion towards the state of events in Sudan and Ethiopiaôs readiness to topple the government of Nimeiri. Upon the request of the Ansar religious leader, Imam El-Hindi Abdurrahman, a secret mission was dispatched to Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia. The mission first came to Ethiopia in August 1969 and consulted with the emperor and other officials as well as diplomats of the US, West Germany and Israel on mechanisms to acquire weapons for the coup the Ansar were planning to stage against Nimeiri. After receiving travel documents from Ethiopia, it went to Riyadh. The Saudi ruler, King Fayzal, donated $947,172, which the mission deposited in the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Out of this amount, weapons were purchased from Israel for $410,340 and the shipment was transported in the highest secrecy to the Däbrä Zäyit Air Force Base, Ethiopia, in November 1969.[41]

Ethiopia assumed full responsibility to transport and deliver the armament to the representatives of the Ansar in two directions along the Ethio-Sudan boundary, via Mätäma and Asosa (Dul). The operation took more than four months and involved fifty-four Ethiopians. It was managed to sneak most of the shipment to Aba Island using a total of seventy-eight camels. Around ten tons, however, were later transported back and deposited in Addis Ababa (the Imperial Body Guard depot) and at Gondar police station. This was because of the inability of the Sudanese counterparts to execute the operation on time, the bombardment of the Aba Island in March 1970 and the resultant death of the Imam.

[41] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 148. Report on the Assistance to Ansar Religious Leader and His Followers: *Genbot* 1962 E.C (May 1970).

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iopiaôs bold measure, which had antagonized the Nimeiri regime, was worth the risk and all such opportunities should be exploited in the future. It claimed that immediately after the failure of the Ansar revolt, Sudanôs rulers came to the jolting realization of Ethiopiaôs potential to overturn their government and they subsequently rushed to Addis Ababa for friendly talks.[42] The intensification of the attack by South Sudan rebels equally forced Nimeiri to seek speedy rapprochement with Ethiopia.[43]

The 24 March 1971 Agreement Concerning Friendly Relations Between the Two Countries could be seen as an effort to reduce prevalent tensions and quell destabilization activities. The two parties agreed, among others: to take necessary measures that would put an end to all forms of subversive activities directed against the other, including activities taking place across their common border; to prohibit activities of all subversive organizations; to disarm all rebel elements and dismantle their camps; to expel all rebel and dissident leaders and take necessary measures to prevent the return of such leaders; to encourage the voluntary repatriation of refugees; to remove refugee camps to a distance of at least fifty miles from the common border; to establish two ad hoc commissions empowered to inspect suspected rebel camps and sites and make recommendations to both governments as to the dismantling of these camps and sites and the disarming of their occupants; and to reactivate the Standing Ministerial Committee.[44]

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[42] *Ibid.*

[43] MoFA Sudan 29-D2 2. Memo on Ethio-Sudan Relations: *Mäskäräm* 1964 E.C (Sept. 1971).

[44] MoFA Sudan 26-D2 11. Agreement Concerning Friendly Relations: 24 March 1971; Joint Communiqué: 24 March 1971.

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reement, the imperial government submitted a detailed memorandum on anti-Ethiopian activities in the Sudan and a list of rebel leaders to be expelled.[45] The two countries also established northern and southern ad-hoc committees that would investigate the presence of rebel camps in either country, determine whether refugee camps were situated fifty miles from the common border and that these camps did not harbor subversive elements.[46] Nimeiriôs regime similarly presented the list of South Sudan rebels to be expelled from Ethiopia. But soon the two governments resumed the customary accusations of the other for failing to abide by existing agreements.[47]

Nimeiriôs official visit to Ethiopia (2-7 November 1971) and particularly the secret agreement to appoint óa security liaison officer in their respective embassies known only to the security department of each Governmentô did little to permanently resolve common points of disagreement.[48] In spite of the seemingly cordial and friendly relations, as was manifested by the pomp following Emperor Hayla-Selassieôs state visit to Sudan (31 December 1971 ï 4 January 1972), the signing of the Trade Protocol (originally concluded in 1960) and agreement to the exchange of instruments of ratification of the

[45] MoFA Ertra 68-D5 2. Memorandum on Rebel Activities in the Sudan: 30 March 1971; Rebel Leaders to be Expelled from the Sudan: 30 March 1971.

[46] MoFA Sudan 31-D2 8. Establishing the Northern and Southern Ad Hoc Commission: March 1971.

[47] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 Şeraz 1. Sudanôs Request for Expulsion from Ethiopia of Specific South Sudan Rebels: *Genbot* 9, 1963E.C (17 May 1971); Sudanôs Unhappiness on Ethiopiaôs Failure to Expel the Rebels: 13 May 1971. MoFA Ertra 68-D5 2. Ethiopiaôs Displeasure on Sudanôs Failure to Expel Rebel Leaders: 12 May 1971; Memo to Sudan on Bilateral Relations: 12 May 1971. MoFA Sudan 29-D2 2. Memo on Ethio-Sudan Relations: *Mäskäräm* 1964 E.C (Sept. 1971). MoFA Sudan 31-D2 4. Ethiopiaôs memorandum Accusing Sudan of Harboring and Assisting Secessionists: 1 November 1971.

[48] MoFA etiyo-sudan yä ministroḷe sebsäba 1 Şeraz 1. Dr. Menasé Haylé (Minister, MoFA) to *Şähafé Te'ezaz* Aklilu (Prime Minister). Report on Agreements Signed after Nimeiriôs Visit to Ethiopia: *Hedar* 15, 1964E.C (25 Nov. 1971); Agreement Between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the Government of Ethiopia Relating to Matters of Security Between the Two Countries: 6 November 1971.

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future, the underlying tension continued to influence bilateral affairs.

1.1.2. Boundary Problem

In accordance with Article 9 of the Addis Ababa Agreement (28 July 1965), which affirmed the readiness of both parties to respect the boundaries as defined in the existing treaties, agreements or protocols, they agreed to set up a Joint Boundary Commission of Experts composed of surveyors and administrators. This commission was authorized to demarcate and to fix boundary marks covering the whole frontier between Ethiopia and Sudan. 15 October 1966 was accepted by both sides as a tentative date for the first meeting of the commission. More importantly, until this commission achieved its task, they óagreed to respect and recognize the status quo without prejudice to the treaty and protocol rights of either partyô.[50]

Nevertheless, they failed to reach an agreement on where to start the demarcation, Ethiopia insisting for either of the extremities while Sudan urged giving priority to the much disputed part, i.e. the Sätit-Humära area. The decision was left to the commission of experts. In the meantime, they agreed to establish a joint administrative committee to settle local border problems óon the spot and when it arisesô. A similar stalemate occurred on the question of alleged subversive activities. Each party claimed the other was more responsible for the problem and denied the existence of rebel groups in its territory. The

[49] MoFA etiyo-sudan yä ministroḷe sebsäba 1 Ṣeraz 1. Report on Agreements Signed After Hayla-Selassieôs Visit to Sudan: *Ṭir* 10, 1964E.C (19 Jan. 1972); Trade protocol: 3 January 1972; Joint Communiqué: 4 January 1972.

[50] MoFA Sudan 38-D2. Record of the Meeting Held Between Ethiopian and Sudanese Officials in Khartoum: 24-26 June 1966; Joint Communiqué Issued at the End of the Khartoum Meeting: 27 June 1966. MoFA Sudan 28-D2 1. Memorandum on Status Quo Situation of Ethio-Sudan Border: 27 June 1966.

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ly drafted to cover up the discrepancy. After admitting offhandedly to the problems being detrimental to their relations and national interests, they agreed to abide by international law and previous agreements concluded between them.[51]

The Joint Boundary Commission met in Addis Ababa from 18 November to 1 December 1966 with a view to preparing a working plan for the joint commission of experts. The Joint Commission of Experts was formally established at the end of the meeting. Its functions included, among others, checking and preventing any subversive activities designed to harm the interest of either country, controlling infiltration of outlaws, preventing smuggling, and considering and settling tribal disputes along the frontiers by amicable means, exchanging information regarding "outlaws and terroristsô.[52]

The two parties differed on the objective of the meeting. The Ethiopian side believed its purpose was "to demarcate and fix boundary marks covering the whole frontierô, while Sudan insisted it was "to re-demarcate and re-fix boundary marksô between the two countries. Taking the Khartoum Communiqué of 27 June 1966 as a basis of discussion, the two parties began their deliberations by examining the existing treaties, agreements and protocols relative to the boundary between Ethiopia and Sudan. The first step in the process was the exchange of all documents they had irrespective of whether they were

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] MoFA Sudan 1 A. Joint Ethio-Sudanese Declaration Forming Frontier Committees: 27 July 1966.

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...e right of both delegations to add later if and when additional treaties are discovered.ö [53]

However, the two parties failed to reach an understanding from the outset on the frontier between Sudan and northern Ethiopia ó or that was formerly known as the colony of Eritrea ô particularly the line from Abu Gamal southwards to the river Setit. Irrespective of the suggestion of the Sudan delegation to record the matter as a point of difference and proceed with the examination of other areas, Ethiopia requested for adjournment until further guidance on the matter from the parent body, the Ethio-Sudan Consultative Committee. The justification given was that since the boundaries north and south of the Setit River are intimately related to one another, meaningful discussion would be difficult if they are separated into ódistinct water-tight compartments.ô [54] The meeting was accordingly postponed.

In order to solve this stalemate, the Joint Boundary Commission and Joint Consultative Committee held consecutive meetings in Addis Ababa from 18 to 30 November 1966 and from 28 December 1966 to 3 January 1967, respectively. In the first case, they strove to narrow down their differences on the existing agreements, treaties and protocols related to the common boundary. However, Ethiopiaôs insistence on accepting as the basis of discussion the 1900 and 1901 [55] treaties and Sudanôs push for the 1902 agreement and the 1903 and 1909 Gwynn survey/demarcation continued to divide

[53] MoFA Sudan 38-D2. Record of the Meeting Held between Ethiopian and Sudanese Officials in Khartoum: 24-26 June 1966; Joint Communiqué Issued on 1 December 1966.

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] Declaration between Great Britain and Italy Respecting the Sudan-Eritrean Frontier, signed in Rome on 22 November 1901

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reached at this meeting was that the Joint Boundary Commission agreed to divide the boundary line into three sections, strictly for the purpose of examination. These were the Northern Part - from Ras Kasar to River Sätit (formerly the boundary line with Eritrea); the Middle Part ï from River Sätit to the intersection of latitude 6th degree north with 15th degree longitude east of Greenwich; and the Southern Part ï from the intersection referred to above to the end of the common frontier.[56]

The boundary problem continued to trouble relations between the two countries. While these meetings were being held, the Sudan army has crossed the boundary and occupied districts in Sätit-Humära, detained Ethiopian farmers and confiscated their property. This elicited the sending of protest message from the emperor to President El Azhari and Prime Minister Sadeq al-Mahdi in early December 1966.[57]

The Joint Consultative Committee (28 December 1966 to 3 January 1967), after extended talks, reaffirmed the desire of both parties to respect and recognize the status quo along the common frontier as agreed upon in Khartoum in June 1966 ówithout prejudice to the treaty and protocol rights of either partyô; agreed to allow farmers to farm ówas they used to along the frontier abiding by the laws and regulations of either stateô until the Joint Boundary Commission completes its task and the ófrontier is either demarcated, redemarcated or renovated as the case may beô; the Sudan side had agreed to release all

[56] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan wäsän guday 1 Şeraz 4. Minutes of the Ethio-Sudan Boundary commission Meeting: 18-30 November 1966. MoFA Sudan 41-D2. Summary Record of the First Meeting of Ethio-Sudan Boundary Commission: 29 December 1966.

[57] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 1. Yelma Tadäsä to MoFA. Memo on Dr. Täsfayé Gäbrägziôs Talks with El Azhari and Sadiq al-Mahdi: *Tahesas* 17, 1959E.C (27 Dec. 1966).

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y its authorities along with the restoration of their confiscated properties, agreed not to allow their respective territories to be used as a base for subversive activities; re-directed the Joint Boundary Commission to proceed with its discussion of the entire frontier ón accordance with the existing treaties, protocols, agreements and procès-verbal recognized by both sidesô and to submit its recommendation to the Consultative Committee; and, after reviewing the work of the Boundary Commission, agreed that óthe treaty governing the Ethio-Sudanese frontier from Khor Um Hagar to the intersection of 6th degree of North latitude with the 35th degree Longitude East of Greenwich is the Treaty of 15 May 1902 and its annexed mapô.[58]

Nonetheless, the variation in interpretation of existing treaties remained unsolved. The joint report issued at the end of the Consultative Committeeôs meeting stated that the Sudanese side perceived the whole boundary as being demarcated and didnôt admit of any dispute in this regard. Rather, according to them, in recent years the boundary marks in some parts of the line had been obliterated. The Sudanese side, therefore, was of the opinion that redemarcation was absolutely necessary in order to avoid unnecessary border conflicts. The Ethiopian side, on the contrary, reiterated its opinion that ófrom Khor Um Hager to the end of the common frontier has not been demarcated and that the 1903 and 1909 Gwynn demarcations being unilateral, Ethiopia will not give them any recognition or consideration whatsoeverô.[59]

[58] MoFA Sudan 38-D2. Record of the Meeting Held between Ethiopian and Sudanese Officials in Khartoum. Joint Communiqué of the Ethio-Sudan Consultative Committee: 3 January 1967.

[59] MoFA Sudan 1 A. Joint Report of the Second Boundary Commission Meeting: 3 January 1967.

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Sudan officials, Emperor Hayla-Selassie made a four day state visit to Sudan in late February 1967. The two leaders discussed matters concerning the common frontier and reaffirmed their adherence to the international treaties, annexes and protocols governing the boundary between the two states. In addition, a consensus was reached to conclude a treaty regarding the question of refugees which was expected to give the refugees the option of repatriation to the countries of origin or removal from the frontier. Finally, ótо give practical expression to the existing relationsô, the two leaders decided to set up a joint committee of experts to explore and study ways and means of cooperation in economic, social and cultural fieldsô.[60]

In the meantime, the imperial government authorized the assessment of all the treaties, protocols and agreements related to the Ethio-Sudan boundary prior to the commencement of formal talks on the matter. A five-man expert commission had examined the documents and come up with a detailed report on the connotations to Ethiopia of the various deals involving Egypt, Britain and Italy.[61] The popular pressure, articulated by the insistence of members of the parliament to secure the territorial advantages of Ethiopia, further complicated matters for officials in the line they had to assume in the negotiation with the Sudan. The heated debate in the parliament on the issue of the Sätit-Humära district was a case in point. A member of the Chamber of Senate, for instance, wrote directly to Kätäma Yifru reminding him of the public opinion and the debate in the parliament; and underlined the driving factor of the demand, i.e. ó[illegible]

[60] *Ibid*, Ethio-Sudan Joint Communiqué: 26 February 1967.

[61] MoFA Sudan 45-D2 56. Investigation Report on Ethio-Sudan Boundary: *Hamlé* 1957E.C (July 1965).

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prior treaty on the boundary, as long as it fails to secure Ethiopiaôs advantages, it should not be allowed to be binding after 57 years.)ô[62]

Ethio-Sudanese confrontation continued to flare up since early 1967. Ethiopia persistently accused Sudan of incursions along Sätit-Humära and demanded the release of detained farmers and confiscated equipments.[63] In spite of the urgent meetings of the Joint Frontier Administrators in Kassala and Asmara in April 1967, where Ethiopia managed to secure the release of detained farmers and some equipment, they failed to permanently resolve the problem.[64] Finally, in accordance with the designated measures to be taken in the event of any untoward act from the Sudan,[65] Ethiopia issued a thirty-five page memorandum with dozens of annexes on 19 April 1967.[66] The covering letter of Prime Minister Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld to his Sudanese counterpart, Sayid Sadiq El Mahdi, best summarized Ethiopiaôs intent:

> é .In the Memorandum, my Government have, at some length, reviewed certain developments of the last few years for your consideration. The sole purpose of my Government in submitting this Memorandum is to enable Your Excellency and myself to be in command of the situations affecting our relationship so that we will be able to discharge our responsibilities in the mutual fraternal interests of our peoples. I am confident that Your Excellency

[62] MoFA Sudan 23-D2 yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän sememenätoḷe 2. Asäfa Azäzäw (Member of the Chamber of Senate) to Kätäma: *Ṭir* 18, 1959E.C (27 Jan. 1967).

[63] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 2 Eth.1. MoFA to Sudan Embassy in Addis Ababa. Complaint on Sudan Troops Entry into Humära District: 4 April 1967.

[64] Ibid, Report on Meeting in Kassala: *Miyazya* 16, 1959E.C (24 April 1967); *Däj*. Keflé Ergäşu (Minister of Interior) to Kätäma. On Humära Land Dispute and the Asmara Meeting of the Joint Frontier Administrators: *Miyazya* 18, 1959 E.C (26 April 1967);

[65] See above, pp. 15-17

[66] MoFA Sudan 36-D2. Ethiopiaôs Memorandum to Sudan: 19 April 1967.

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andum the consideration it deserves with the aim of

ric relations of our two sister Statesé [67]

But Sudan continued to violate the status quo agreement on the common frontier, to cross particularly the boundary in the Sätit-Humära district and inflict heavy damages on the property and people of the area.[68] In the face of ongoing political turmoil in the Sudan, the only alternative to check these incursions appeared to be deployment of the police force and the army along the troubled areas. This was implemented starting mid May 1967, with full authorization to take every measure to defend the territorial integrity of the state and the safety of the people.[69] The situation became ripe for armed confrontations in Humära area; accusations and counter accusations started to be exchanged on the violation of their territorial rights.[70] The gravity of the confrontation necessitated an exchange of messages between the leaders themselves. In response to President El Azhariôs letter of concern on 4 June, the Ethiopian sovereign stressed the need to abide by the Status Quo Agreement of 26 June 1966, which prohibited either side to undertake any unilateral measure that would disturb the prevailing situation along the

[67] MoFA Sudan 34-D2. Prime Minister Aklilu to Sayid Sadiq El Mahdi: 19 April 1967.

[68] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 2 Eth.1. *Däj*. Keflé ErgäŞu to Kätäma: *Genbot* 8, 1959 E.C; Kätäma to Däj. Keflé: *Genbot* 10, 1959 E.C (18 May 1967).

[69] *Ibid*, Maj. Gen. Deräsé Dubalä (State Minister, Ministry of Interior, Public Security Department) to Maj. Gen. Yilma Ġibäġi (Commander of the Police Force): *Genbot* 9, 1959 E.C (17 May 1967); *Däj*. Keflé ErgäŞu to Lt. Col. Tamerat Yigäzu (Viceroy, Bägémeder and Semén Region): *Genbot* 10, 1959 E.C (18 May 1967).

[70] *Ibid*, *Däj.* Keflé ErgäŞu to Kätäma: *Genbot* 11, 1959 E.C; *Däj*. Keflé ErgäŞu to *Fit.* Abäbä Bitäw (Ambassador, Khartoum): *Genbot* 15, 1959 E.C (23 May 1967); Lt. Col. Tamerat Yigäzu (Viceroy, Bägémeder and Semén Region) to *Däj*. Keflé ErgäŞu: *Genbot* 16, 1959 E.C (24 May 1967); *Fit.* Abäbä Bitäw (Ambassador) to Kätäma: *Genbot* 19, 1959 E.C (27 May 1967); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Sudan to Ethiopian Embassy (Khartoum): 27 May 1967; *Fit.* Abäbä Bitäw to Kätäma: *Genbot* 19 & 22, 1959 E.C (27 & 30 May 1967); *Däj*. Keflé ErgäŞu to Kätäma: *Genbot* 22, 1959 E.C (30 May 1967); MoFA to Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Sudan: *Genbot* 28, 1959 E.C (5 June 1967); MoFA to Sudan Embassy: 14 June 1967; MoFA to Sudan MoFA. Letter of Protest: *Säné* 8, 1959 E.C (15 June 1967); Emperor Hayla-Selassie to President Al-Hazari on the Situation on the Border: 14 June 1967.

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er demarcation is completed. After underlining Ethiopiaôs stand to live up to its obligations, the emperor stressed that:

> é .In as much as We do not tolerate the territorial integrity of Our State to be infringed upon by other states, so also We do not allow or encourage the territorial integrity of other states be violated. We wish to assure Your Excellency that Ethiopia has not deviated from her traditional policy of friendship towards the Sudan and has not allowed het troops to trespass Sudanese territory. We also wish to inform Your Excellency that Ethiopia has not deployed military concentration, as stated in your message, on Sudanôs eastern border. There is, however, a small security force in the Governorate-General of Begemdir and Simein the sole purpose of which is to maintain law and order within Ethiopian jurisdictioné .[71]

One secret document the Ethiopian embassy managed to obtain dealing with a cabinet meeting of the Sudan government (2 July 1967), conducted under the chairmanship of the acting Prime Minister, Hassan Awadalla, equally demonstrated the confusion on the other camp. According to the document, the council of ministers had rejected the demand by the pro-Egyptian Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) to break diplomatic relations with Ethiopia because of what they termed as óEthiopian invasion of the Sudanôs Kassala and Blue Nile provincesô. The council refused to consider the suggestion and instead recommended that óinvestigations be carried out on the Sudan-Ethiopian border to determine the real extent of the Ethiopian threatô.[72]

[71] MoFA Sudan 23-D2 36. Emperor Hayla-Selassie to President Ismael El Azhari: 14 June 1967.

[72] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 129. Fit. Abäbä Bitäw to Kätäma: *Hamlé* 5, 1959 E.C (12 July 1967).

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soon spread to the Gambella region, where Sudanese troops were attempting to cross the boundary and to disrupt the trade on the Baro River.[73] The response of local residents came by way of attacking the Sudanese consulate in the area.[74] The deteriorating situation necessitated the urgent reconvening of officials of the two governments. This happened in Khartoum from 29 to 30 July 1967. Following intense discussions, the two parties agreed to instruct the Joint Boundary Commission to resume work immediately after the rainy season and demarcate the common boundary starting from the disputed areas; a consensus was reached on the point that the status quo was a temporary measure which should be maintained until the boundary is demarcated and that farmers, both Sudanese and Ethiopian, should continue to cultivate their old plots without prejudice to the treaty rights of either party; and they condemned subversive activities and vowed to stem forthwith any such activity detrimental to the security and integrity of either country.[75] However, the Boundary Commission, meeting in Addis Ababa from 18 to 30 November 1967, yet again failed to agree on which versions of the 1900, 1901 and 1902 agreements to accept as basis for future discussion.[76]

The boundary commission or the consultative committee failed to meet for the next four years. The intermission period on the other hand witnessed an escalation of tension

[73] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 2 Eth.1. Report on Sudan Military Incursions along the Wellega province: *Hamlé* 6, 1959 E.C (13 July 1967); Maj. Gen. Deräsé Dubalä (State Minister, Ministry of Interior, Public Security Department) to Kätäma: *Hamlé* 12, 1959E.C (19 July 1967); MoFA to Sudan Embassy. Protest on Sudanôs Incursions in Gambella: 20 July 1967; Maj. Gen. Deräsé to Kätäma: *Hamlé* 18, 1959 E.C (25 July 1967); MoFA to Sudan Embassy: 25 July 1967.

[74] *Ibid*, MoFA to Sudan Embassy: 22 July 1967.

[75] *Ibid,* Joint Communiqué of Khartoum Talks: 30 July 1967.

[76] MoFA Sudan 42-D2. Minutes of the Meeting of the Joint Boundary Commission: 18-30 November 1967. See also Harold G. Marcus, ñEthio-British Negotiations Concerning the Western Border with Sudan, 1896-1902,ò *Journal of African History*. IV, I (1963): 81-94.

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
metimes reaching a breaking point. The pressure was particularly intense upon Ethiopia to reach some kind of deal with the Sudan on the matter. However, when the Joint Consultative Committee finally assembled in Addis Ababa (July 1972) the two parties yet again failed to agree on most of the agenda items, relegating them for decision by higher authorities.[77] Surprisingly enough, though, in a bid to resolve the major impediment between the two, Ethiopia changed its previous position on the boundary question. Upon the emperorôs authorization, to the amazement of the Sudanese delegation, Ethiopia accepted the Gwynn line. The opening remarks of Dr. Menasé Haylé better explain the countryôs policy change.

> é our two governments have been discussing this subject matter [boundary demarcation] for some time. During our last meeting é there was a reference made by the Sudanese delegation concerning a report that was submitted to us ï a report of the legal experts concerning authorisation of Gwynn. I recall that controversy on this has been going on for several years. Our side was asking that the boundary should be solely based on treaties. The Sudan side has been insisting that the boundary should be based on Gwynnôs demarcation. It has been an unterminable [sic.] issue. It is over ten years that this controversy has been going on. Our legal people have examined the various documents on the basis of the last study submitted to us by the Sudan government and the whole matter was brought to the attention of His Imperial Majesty. The main obstacle in the past was the different approaches of the two sides on the question whether Gwynn had a specific authorisation. His Imperial Majesty has made a decision that such an issue should not be a barrier or an obstruction between us. Now the answer concerning the Sudanese documents Ethiopia has changed its position and is basically prepared to accept the Gwynn line as the line of frontier between the Sudan and Ethiopia. We do this out of desire to strengthen our friendship and in order to reach a quick settlement of the frontier question.[78]


[77] MoFA Sudan 31-D2 8. Agenda and proceedings of the Joint Consultative Committee Meeting: 18 July 1972. In addition to problems related to the boundary issue and subversive elements, Ethiopia had now to deal with a compensation row regarding the nationalization in 1967 of the Khartoum branch of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia.

[78] *Ibid.*

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Map Showing the Various Lines in Accordance with all Negotiations, Agreements and Surveys of the Ethio-Sudan Frontier.[79]

Following this revelation, they managed to broker a deal to re-demarcate the entire frontier and to identify and mark farms tilled by nationals of either country in the territory of the other. The Ethiopian side insisted on keeping the whole issue secret; it refused to issue joint communiqué fearing the negative effects it would have on public sentiment. Nimeiriôs government quickly ratified the agreement and requested its immediate implementation.[80]

After a set of behind-the-scene discussions, the Joint Boundary Commission finally met for practical talks in Addis Ababa from 30 June to 10 July 1973.[81] The boundary

[79] MoFA Sudan 23-D2 26. MoFA Department of Boundary and International Waters, August 1969. The document was particularly prepared by Gétaḷäw Täklä-Maryam.

[80] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän sememenätoḷe 1 38. Dr. Mansur Khalid (Minister of Foreign Affairs) to Dr. Menasé Haylé (Minister of Foreign Affairs): 13 September 1972.

[81] *Ibid*, Joint Report of the Boundary Commission Meeting in Addis Ababa: 10 July 1973.


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he boundary line into four major sections: the Northern Part (from Ras Kasar to River Setit), the Northern Middle Part (from River Setit to Mount Daglash), the Southern Middle Part (from Mount Daglash to the junction of Pibor and Akobo Rivers) and the Southern Part (from the junction of Pibor and Akobo Rivers to the tri-junction). There occurred a difference of views on the starting points of re-demarcation, Sudan opting for Ras Kasar to the tri-junction while Ethiopia preferred Setit.

The two sides also differed on fixing of priorities for re-demarcation and commencement of the actual field work. The Sudanese side was of the opinion that the redemarcation should start in the Northern Middle Part (through cadastral survey of tilled land and designating the area west of Ethiopian farms the status quo line), primarily because it would not be possible to properly identify the status quo line without re-demarcating the boundary in the Setit region from Setit River to Jebel (Mount) Daglash. The Ethiopian side, on the other hand, argued that priority should be given to ćthe identification and demarcation of the extreme farm limits to indicate the status quo in the Setit region in order to curb the forward movement of farmers of either country into the territory of the otherĉ It claimed that the identification and demarcation of the extreme farm limits in the Setit region was technically feasible without necessitating the redemarcation of that part of the common boundary. [82]

[82] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän sememenätoḷe 1 38. Joint Report of the Boundary Commission Meeting in Addis Ababa: 10 July 1973. The map was prepared by the Ethiopian Ministry of Interior, January 1975.

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Major Divisions of Ethio-Sudan Boundary Line for Demarcation[83]

Regarding the commencement of field work, Sudan insisted it could be carried out simultaneously with the identification of the status quo line in the Setit region while the Ethiopian side opposed to the deployment of two survey teams for simultaneous operations. Rather, it expressed its readiness to start redemarcation of the boundary south of Mount Daglash any time after the completion of the identification and marking of

[83] MoFA etiyo-sudan wäsän 3 Ṣeraz 1. Report of expert boundary committee for the joint ministerial meeting, *Ṭir* 13, 1967E.C (22 Jan. 1975).

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t region. The reason behind Ethiopiaôs position, as was described by another document, was to protect the unused land which its farmers did not yet till and frustrate the ambition of Sudan to tally the land Ethiopia had leased to foreigners.[84] The final decision was left to the Joint Ministerial Consultative Committee.

The two parties also agreed to solicit the financial assistance of the government of Finland for the demarcation. In this regard, the Joint Boundary Commission met in Khartoum (24-30 March 1974), prepared the project proposal to be submitted to the Republic of Finland (amounting to around five million US dollars), agreed upon joint contributions from each country ($9,750 million from Ethiopia and $4,875 million from Sudan) to the process and decided to commence field work in November 1974.[85]

On the Ethiopian side, the final preparation for the demarcation process was started well in advance in April 1974. On the instruction of the Prime Minister, Endalkaḫäw Mäkonnen, a high level technical committee, composed of experts from ministries of interior, foreign affairs, planning and development and finance, met in May 1974. They deliberated on the proposed demarcation of the common boundary and insisted on points like the speedy commencement of the field work, allocation of fund to the amount of 2,367,145 Ethiopian dollars (contrary to the original one million) for the 1974/75 fiscal year and emphasized the urgency of finalizing the demarcation process ówhile bilateral relations with Sudan were at its bestô. The report claimed that Ethiopia could benefit a lot from the process especially along Sätit-Humära region, and warned that, if this

[84] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 3 Eth.8. Joint Report of the Ethio-Sudan Boundary Commission, Khartoum, 30 March 1974.

[85] *Ibid.*

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ld be accomplished at a huge national cost to be paid later and The government of Finland agreed to provide the required assistance in September 1974.[87]

The escalation of border clashes in the vicinities of Kassala, Täsänäy (Eritrea), Quara (Gondar) and Abugamal; and the increasing transgressions by the Sudan military into these areas forced the Ethiopian side to urge for immediate demarcation. As a result, it took the initiative to reschedule the starting date of actual demarcation to mid September 1974 and requested Sudan to comply with this proposal.[88] The latter accepted the invitation to send its experts to Kassala area by mid-September.[89]

However, following the regime change in Ethiopia soon afterwards, frequent infringements across the boundary were witnessed and the deployment of Sudanese armed forces along Sätit-Humära further contributed to the deterioration of the situation.[90] Even though there was an attempt to carry out the demarcation according to

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[86] *Ibid*, Endalkḷhew Mäkonnen (Prime Minister) to *Däj*. Zäwdé Gäbré-Selasé (Minister of Interior), TäkaleÉe Gädamu (Minister of Planning and Development), Nägaġe Dästa (Minister of Finance) and Yodit Emeru (State Minister, MoFA). Organizing the Committee of Experts: *Genbot* 1, 1966 E.C (9 May 1974); Wehib Mulunäh (Secretary of the Technical Committee) to Endalkaḷäw Mäkonnen. Report on the Demarcation Process: *Genbot* 6, 1966 E.C (14 May 1974).

[87] Ibid, *Däj*. Dr. Zäwdé Gäbré-Selasé (Minister of Interior) to *Lej*. Endalkaḷäw Mäkonnen (Prime Minister). On Preparation for the Boundary Demarcation: *Miyazya* 24, 1966 E.C (2 May 1974); Ethiopiaôs Preparation for the Demarcation Process and the Financial Assistance from the Government of Finland. Gétahun Täsäma (Minister of Interior) to Dr. Menasé Haylé: *Yäkatit* 13, 1966 E.C (21 Feb. 1974); Joint Report of the Boundary Commission Meeting in Khartoum: 30 March 1974. MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän sememenätoḷe 1 38. Ambassador Veikko Hietanen to Meteku Jämbäré (Vice Minister, Ministry of Planning and Development). Finland Governmentôs Agreement to Finalize Demarcation process: 2 September 1974.

[88] *Ibid*, Yodit Emeru to Ambassador Dawit Abdu (Khartoum): *Nähäsé* 4, 1966E.C (10 Aug. 1974); MoFA to the Embassy of Sudan: 12 August 1974.

[89] *Ibid*, Sudan Embassy to MoFA: 26 August 1974.

[90] Ibid, Maj. Gen. Näga TägäÉe (Governor of Bägémeder and Semen provinces) to Col. Bälaḷäw Jämanäh (minister of Interior): *Mäskäräm* 25, 1967E.C (6 Oct. 1974); Tayé Räta (Assistant Minister of Frontier

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ed the issue indefinitely and a ruling was made to seek instead a political solution to the problem through dialogue with Sudanese authorities.[91] In line with this decision, the Joint Boundary Administrators and Experts Committees met in Kassala in November 1974.[92] However, scheduled meetings of the Joint Technical Committee (Addis Ababa, early December 1974) and the Joint Ministerial Consultative Committee (Khartoum, mid December 1974, Addis Ababa, February 1975 and Khartoum April 1975) failed to convene.[93] Rather, the general relation between the two countries continued to deteriorate in the following years.

1.2. Open Conflict and Africa's Mediation Efforts

Heightened tensions between the two states occurred during Nimeiriôs regime (May 1969- April 1985). They began with his nationalization of the Khartoum branch of the Ethiopian Commercial Bank along with all foreign establishments in the Sudan immediately after he came to power; following the Ansar revolt and the death of their

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Administration, Ministry of Interior) to MoFA. On Sudanôs Military Encroachment into Galabat (Mätäma): *Ṭeqémt* 4, 1967 E.C (15 Oct. 1974); Tayé Räta to Police Force Command Center. On Sudanôs Troop Mobilization into Mätäma: *Ṭeqémt* 8, 1967E.C (19 Oct. 1974); Maj. Gen. Näga TägäŔe to Col. Bälaḷäw Jämanäh: *Ṭeqémt* 9, 1967E.C (19 Oct. 1974).

[91] *Ibid*, Col. Bälaḷäw Jämanäh to Lt. Gen. Aman Mikaôél Andom (Chairman of the Darg): *Ṭeqémt* 15, 1967E.C (26 Oct. 1974).

[92] Ibid, Lt. Gen. Aman Mikaôél Andom to Ministries of Defense, Interior and Foreign Affairs. Assigning Delegates to Kässäla Meeting: *Ṭeqémt* 20, 1967E.C (31 Oct. 1974). MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä denbär sememenätoḷe 5 17. Report on Kässäla Frontier Administrators and Experts Meeting: *Hedar* 12, 1967E.C (22 Nov. 1974). MoFA etiyo-sudan wäsän 3 Şeraz 1. Report on Kässäla Meeting: *Hedar* 13, 1967E.C (23 Nov. 1974); MoFA to Ethiopiaôs Embassy in Khartoum. On Joint Ministerial and Technical Committee Meetings: *Hedar* 14, 1967E.C (24 Nov. 1974). MoFA etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 1 Şeraz 4. Joint Report of Ethio-Sudan Boundary Commission: 27 November 1974.

[93] MoFA etiyo-sudan wäsän 3 Şeraz 1. Col. Bälaḷäw Jämanäh (Minister of Interior) to Br. Gen. Täfäri Banté (Chairman of the Derg): *Ṭir* 13, 1967E.C (22 Jan. 1975); Minutes of the Ethiopian Expert Committee Meeting on the Boundary Demarcation with Sudan: no date. MoFA etiyo-sudan yä ministroḷe sebsäba 1 Şeraz 3. *Yäkatit* 5, 1967E.C (13 Feb. 1975). MoFA etiyo-sudan wäsän 3 Şeraz 1. Postponement of the Joint Ministerial Meeting: *Miyazya* 28, 1967E.C (6 May 1975).

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which Nimeiri insisted was orchestrated by Ethiopia; and the tension along the Sałt-Humära region following Sudanôs military encroachments. Nimeiriôs open support to Eritrean secessionists escalated thereafter, and Ethiopia responded in kind by supporting South Sudanese rebels. This ultimately led to the March 1971 Khartoum agreement between the two governments on dissident elements.[94]

The conflict between the two states flared up following the antagonistic stance Nimeiriôs government assumed immediately after the 1974 Revolution in Ethiopia. The proð west and pro- Egypt and Saudi Arabia foreign policy inclinations of Sudan contributed to the deterioration of the relations between the two countries. Nimeiriôs retreat from his role as mediator in the conflict between the Eritrean rebels and the Ethiopian government together with his integration plan with Egypt alarmed members of the Darg.[95] Soon afterwards, Nimeiri started to court, train and arm ócanti-revolutionaryô and separatist elements, notably the Eritrean ones, irrespective of the Dargôs Nine Point Peace Initiative on Eritrea (issued in May 1976) which requested Sudanôs assistance. In addition he launched an intensive propaganda campaign via the state media ï Radio Omdurman.[96]

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[94] MoFA Sudan 23-D2 31. Assessment Report on Ethio-Sudan Relations from 1956 to 1971: no date; Study Report on Relations: no date. MoFA Sudan 24-D2 23. Policy Paper on Nimeiriôs Sudan: no date. MoFA Sudan 28-D2 1. Study Report on Relations: no date. MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 1 Şeraz 1. Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä (Khartoum) to ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative of the Derg in MoFA). Study Report on Ethio-Sudan Relations: *Ţeqémt* 7, 1975E.C (18 Oct. 1982).

[95] MoFA Sudan 24-D2, Memo to Gen. Täfäri Banté on Nimeiriôs Press Conference Regarding the Eritrean Situation, 27 May 1975; MoFA etiyo-sudan wäsän 3 Şeraz 2, Report on Foreign Minister Keflé Wädajoôs Three Days Visit to Khartoum, *Mägabit* 18, 1968E.C (27 March 1976). See also Erlich, *Islam and Christianity*é , 107-115.

[96] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 1 Şeraz 1. Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä (Khartoum) to ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative of the Derg in MoFA). Study Report on Ethio-Sudan Relations: *Ţeqémt* 7, 1975E.C (18 Oct. 1982).

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iopia in the late 1970s and the resultant mass migration into the Sudan, the contention over the rich arable land in the Sätit-Humära area; the crumbling peace deal in South Sudan and the growing influx of refugees into Ethiopia since June 1975; and the Ansar refugees in northern Ethiopia who Nimeiri claimed were being trained and armed by Libya and Ethiopia, provided fertile grounds for the upcoming conflict.[97] Sudanôs massive military build-up along the border and the attempt to use dissident elements as instruments of destabilization was interpreted as an open attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.[98] Afterwards, accusations and counter accusations of attacks by the Sudanese army or Ethiopian farmers began to surface frequently in the diplomatic correspondences of the two governments.[99]

Contributing to the growing tension even more was the feeling of uneasiness in Ethiopia, particularly after the July 1976 mutual defense agreement signed between the

[97] MoFA Sudan 24-D2 23. Policy Deliberation on Nimeiriôs Sudan: no date. MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloṭe 1 Şeraz 1.Tayé Räta (Ministry of Interior) to Mr. Gunar Julinious (UN Commission for Refugees, Commissioner of African). On Huge South Sudan Refugees Entry in to Ethiopia: *Säné* 30, 1967E.C (7 July 1975). MoFA Sudan 29-D2 4. Minutes of Gen. Täfäri Bantéôs Discussion with Sudanese Envoy after Receiving a Message from Nimeiri: *Hedar* 30, 1969E.C (10 Dec. 1976).

[98] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 1 Şeraz 1. Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä (Khartoum) to ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative of the Derg in MoFA). Study Report on Ethio-Sudan Relations: *Ṭeqémt* 7, 1975E.C (18 Oct. 1982). MoFA Sudan 24-D2 23. Report on the Political, Economic and Military Capabilities of Sudan: Nähäsé 1967E.C (Aug. 1975). MoFA etiyo-sudan yä wäsän 3 Şeraz 2. Report on Sudanôs Military Build-Up along Common Boundary: *Mäskäräm* 13, 1968E.C (24 Sept. 1975).

[99] MoFA etiyo-sudan yä wäsän 3 Şeraz 2. Keflé Wädajo (Minister of Foreign Affairs) to Col. Lägäsä Wäldä-Hana (Minister of Interior). Report on Sudanôs Complaint of being attacked by Ethiopian Farmers: *Säné* 30, 1967E.C (7 July 1975); MoFA to Sudan Embassy. On Ethiopiaôs complaints regarding Sudanôs Military Incursions in to Sätit-Humära: 8 July 1975; Keflé Wärqu (Vice Minister of Defense) to MoFA. On Sudanôs Accusation of Ethiopian Jetsô Violation of its Airspace: *Ṭeqémt* 2, 1968E.C (13 Oct. 1975). MoFA Sudan 31-D2 2. Sudanôs Complaints of Being attacked by Ethiopian Farmers: *Mägabit* 27, 1968E.C (5 April 1976). MoFA Sudan 29-D2 5. Ambassador Yelma (Khartoum) to Keflé Wädajo (Minister of Foreign Affairs). Report on Sudan Military Built-up along Border: *Genbot* 5, 1968E.C (13 May 1976). MoFA etiyo-sudan wäsän 3 Şeraz 2. Accusations and Counter Accusations on Border Incursions: 15 September 1976.

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ategic understandings Nimeiri entered into with regional and global powers in 1977. The rulers of Ethiopia perceived these agreements and associations as being directed towards the geo-political and economic interests of the country, specifically targeting its right over the Nile and the Red Sea.[100]

The underlying tension assumed the character of an open confrontation between late December 1976 and early January 1977 when, through successive interviews and speeches, President Nimeiri first threatened to deport hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian refugees from his country so as to strain the facilities of the new regime and then pledged to support the Eritrean rebels ñin their fight for independence from Ethiopiaò.[101] For the first time in the history of the relation between the two countries, a Sudanese president openly denounced an Ethiopian government in power and vowed to work against the territorial integrity of the country.[102]

Ethiopia expressed its strong objection to these statements through the declaration of National Mobilization against Sudan in late January and April, and military operations (dubbed óGäseŞõ ï óreprimandô) on the Mätäma front to uproot the dissident elements

[100] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 1 Şeraz 1. Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä (Khartoum) to ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative of the Derg in MoFA). Study Report on Ethio-Sudan Relations: *Ţeqémt* 7, 1975E.C (18 Oct. 1982). These included the Cairo Protocol, the Kadiguli Declaration and the United Command Agreement with Syria between 1976 and 1977. Informant: Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä.

[101] MoFA Sudan 31-D2 5. Press Release by MoFA Opposing Nimeiriôs anti-Ethiopian Statement in Gadarif: 28 December 1976; Press Release by MoFA on Nimeiriôs Independence Day Speech in Kadiguli: 5 January 1977; Press Release by MoFA on Nimeiriôs Khartoum Speech Pledging to Assist óEritrean peopleô: 1 February 1977; Press Release Concerning Sudanôs Statement on the Red Sea Being an Arab Lake: 2 March 1977. Policy Paper on Ethio- Sudan Relations: 26 April 1977. MoFA Sudan 31-D2 4. Brief memorandum on Ethio-Sudan conflict: *Hedar* 22, 1970E.C (2 Dec. 1977). *Addis Zämän*: *Tahesas* 20 & 27, 1969E.C (30 Dec. 1976 & 6 Jan. 1977) and *Ţir* 24, 1969E.C (2 Feb. 1977). *Addis Zämän*: *Yäkatit* 1, (9 Feb.) *Miyazya* 7 (15 April), *Genbot* 5, 7 & 30, 1969E.C (13 & 15 May and 7 June 1977).

[102] *Ibid.*

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process, some Ethiopian troops crossed the international boundary and were stranded in the Sudan. Nimeiriôs government retaliated by revoking the right of any Ethiopian registered flights to use the territorial and air spaces of its country as of June 1977, calling for the transfer of the OAU headquarters to another location and later in the same year persuading the two rebel groups in Eritrea into creating a united front.[104] The upcoming 14th OAU Summit (July 1977) at Libreville, Gabon, suddenly assumed the character of a fighting ground for the two governments.

African Heads of State and Government convening in Libreville, aware of the looming danger in the region, assigned an Ad Hoc Mediation Committee composed of the foreign ministers of nine member states (Algeria, Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Zambia and Zaire). This committee was mandated to investigate the causes of the conflict and report to the Assembly immediately. Initially, it proved difficult to convene the committee because of the unwillingness of the Sudanese government. Discussions planned to be held in Libreville, Lagos and later during the 32nd UN General Assembly meeting in New York were frustrated because of this. Finally, following the deliberations in New York, agreement was reached to meet in Freetown, Sierra Leone, from 12-15 December 1977.[105]

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[103] *Addis Zämän*: *Ṭir* 3, 22 & 24, 1969E.C (12 & 31 Jan. and 2 Feb. 1977); *Säné* 5, 7 &15, 1969E.C (12, 14 & 22 June 1977).

[104] *Addis Zämän*: *Säné* 15 & 22, 1969E.C (22 & 29 June 1977). MoFA Sudan 31-D2 4. Brief memorandum on Ethio-Sudan Conflict: *Hedar* 22, 1970E.C (2 Dec. 1977).

[105] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 1 Şəraz 1..Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä (Khartoum) to ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative of the Derg to MoFA). Study Report on Ethio-Sudan Relations so far: *Ṭeqémt* 7, 1975E.C (18 Oct. 1982). See also C.O.C. Amate, *Inside the OAU*, pp, 445-51.

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legation, led by the Foreign Minister, Col. Dr. Fäläqä Gadla-Giyorgis, went to the Libreville Summit well before schedule. The Ethiopians were aware of the fact that invoking the principles of the Charters of the OAU was the only leverage they could use to their advantage in light of the relative strength Sudan was enjoying at the time.[106] This was because of the fact that Ethiopia had entered into an open war with Somalia; the ongoing internal political turmoil in the country; the apparent success of Eritrean rebels in the north; and the Ansar leadersô peaceful resolution of their conflict with Nimeiri, thereby denying Ethiopia a possible leverage.

According to the policy paper prepared for the occasion, Sudan would not be pleased with an African intervention and would therefore be easily pressurized into accepting immediate bilateral negotiations. However, the Ethiopians were not yet ready to engage in any bilateral talks in the near future. The strategy designed by the Ethiopian delegation, therefore, was to guarantee African presence in the process in order to diplomatically embarrass Sudan for its intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state and undermine a fellow member nationôs territorial integrity.[107] Col. Mengestuôs message to the chairman of the mediation committee, President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone, and the memorandum submitted at the occasion of the meeting emphasized these points and reaffirmed Ethiopiaôs commitment to the tenets of the OAU along with its readiness to defend itself in the face of the above dangers.[108]

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[106] *Addis Zämän*: *Tahesas* 2, 7&11, 1970E.C (12, 17 & 21 December 1977). MoFA Sudan 31-D2 4. Memo on Ethiopiaôs Expectation from Freetown Talks: *Hedar* 22, 1970E.C (2 Dec. 1977).

[107] MoFA Sudan 31-D2 4. Memo on Ethiopiaôs Expectation from Freetown Talks: *Hedar* 22, 1970E.C (2 Dec. 1977).

[108] Ibid, Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam to President Siaka Stevens: *Hedar* 28, 1970E.C (8 Dec. 1977); Ethiopiaôs Memorandum to the Freetown Talks: 12 December 1977.

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meeting was an eight point communiqué signed by the Ethiopian FM, Dr. Col. Falaqa Gädlä-Giyorgis, and State Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Dr. Francis Deng. Four points appeared important in this agreement: respect for the tenets of the OAU Charter, particularly those dealing with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation-states and non-intervention in the affairs of others; the immediate reconvening of the joint ministerial commission under the supervision of the mediation commission and the facilitation of the speedy resolution of mutual problems including refugee issues in accordance with the principles of the OAU; working jointly to minimize possible activities that adversely affect bilateral relations; creating grounds for mutual cooperation and coexistence; the need for the immediate cessation of all hostile acts and propaganda; and the re-establishment of air links.[109]

In spite of the Freetown deal, no substantial effort was made to normalize relations between the two countries. The only positive outcomes were, as was foreseen by the Ethiopian side, the commencement of air transport operations in early January 1978, and the return of Ethiopian soldiers stranded in the Sudan.[110] It proved difficult for the mediation committee to reconvene the joint ministerial commission, an important element in the negotiation process; which had not met since mid 1974. The attempt to conduct a meeting in Nairobi in April had failed because of the last minute request from

[109] MoFA Sudan 31-D2 Şeraz 2. Communiqué of the Freetown Talks: 15 December 1977. Addis Zämän: *Tahesas* 11, 1970E.C (21 Dec. 1977); Memo on Freetown Talks: *Hedar* 22, 1970E.C (2 Dec. 1977).

[110] Addis Zämän: *Tahesas* 22 (1 Jan. 1977) & *Ṭir* 3, 1970E.C (12 Jan. 1978).

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time. The commission finally managed to meet in Dar-es-Salam on 13 June 1978.

The mediation commission had totally failed to come up with a strong recommendation and possible suggestions to resolve the conflict at its Dar-es-Salam meeting. Rather, it resorted to the customary approach of requesting the leaders of the two countries to hold a face to face meeting and thus sort their problems by themselves. The Ethiopian delegation was angered by the stance taken by the commission in light of the continued insistence on the part of the Sudan to raise the issue of Eritrea as an agenda item and the anti-Ethiopian propaganda campaign that had been going on since the Freetown agreement. Ethiopia demanded a strong endorsement of the Freetown agreement (particularly respect for territorial integrity, non-intervention, and putting an end to negative propaganda) and pressurized the commission to include articles to this effect in its forthcoming statements.[112]

It appeared very clear that the Freetown and Dar-es-Salam mediation efforts had failed to achieve meaningful result in resolving the conflict between Ethiopia and the Sudan. Like most of the mediation committees set by the OAU, this one too soon found itself out of options and was increasingly becoming disillusioned and frustrated. The Dar-es-Salam plea for direct talks between leaders of the conflicting parties was a clear indicator of this feeling of failure and incapacity.[113] Thereafter, the commission had no

[111] *Addis Zämän*: *Genbot* 10, 1970 E.C. MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 1 Şeraz 1. .Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä (Khartoum) to ŝ ibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative of the Derg to MoFA). Study Report on Ethio-Sudan Relations so far: *Ţeqémt* 7, 1975 E.C (18 Oct. 1982).

[112] *Addis Zämän*: *Säné* 15, 16 & 20, 1970 E.C (22, 23& 27 June 1978).

[113] *Ibid.*

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ing singularly assumed by the chair of the commission, President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone.[114]

President Stevens managed to arrange a four-day meeting between Nimeiri and Mengistu in Freetown in mid-February 1979. But this proved a failure because the Sudan delegation refused to accept the joint communiqué prepared by the mediator in conjunction with the secretary of the OAU, Edem Kodjo. Nimeiriôs determination to include the Eritrean situation in the agenda was not acceptable to the Ethiopian delegation. This ended all possibility of concluding an agreement. If there was a positive note to the efforts of Sierra Leoneôs president, it was the face-to-face contact between Nimeiri and Mengistu, an appreciable step under the circumstances.[115]

Things remained at standstill for a couple of months after the apparent failure of the African mediation efforts. But developments in the two countries as well as the region brought about changes in relations between Ethiopia and the Sudan. This time the initiative for peace talks came from the side of Nimeiriôs government after January 1980. An array of factors induced Sudanôs desire for rapprochement with Ethiopia.[116] The latterôs military successes in turning back Somaliaôs aggression and reclaiming the territories that were temporarily occupied by Eritrean rebels in the north as well as the relative stabilization of the political situation in Ethiopia put pressure on the Sudan to

[114] *Addis Zämän*: *Säné* 25, 1970 E.C (2 July 1978).

[115] *Addis Zämän*: *Yäkatit* 9-30 (17 Feb.-9 March); *Mägabit* 11, 1971 E.C (20 March 1979). MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 1 Şeraz 1. Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä (Khartoum) to ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative of the Derg to MoFA). Study Report on Ethio-Sudan Relations so far: *Ţeqémt* 7, 1975 E.C (18 Oct. 1982). See also Amate, *Inside the OAU*, 445-51.

[116] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 1 Şeraz 1.Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä (Khartoum) to ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative of the Derg to MoFA). Study Report on Ethio-Sudan Relations so far: *Ţeqémt* 7, 1975 E.C (18 Oct. 1982).

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tact with a strong neighbor. In addition, the growing rift between Nimeiriôs government and Egypt after the Camp David Accord on the one hand and Sudanôs temporary alliance with Libya on the other encouraged alignments with Ethiopia. Sudan was also fearful that its policy on Eritrea might create a precedent for Ethiopia to stir up instability in South Sudan. Finally, the oil reserves in its southern territories discovered by Chevron could be exploited if only there is peace in the region, particularly with Ethiopia.[117]

For these and other reasons, Sudan took the initiative and insisted on reconvening all joint commissions set up earlier and proposed additional negotiations. Confidence-boosting measures were taken by Nimeiri and his government after January 1980. Sanctions were imposed on anti-Ethiopian elements in the Sudan; the negative propaganda campaign directed against Ethiopia was dramatically reduced; and Sudan demanded coordination between the security agencies of the two countries in order to control dissident elements on both sides of the boundary. More symbolic was the invitation to Ethiopia to send a government delegation to participate in the third National Congress of the Sudan Socialist Union Party (SSUP) conference held in Khartoum (25-30 January 1980), where the hitherto regular participants ï the Eritrean rebels ï were forbidden for the first time.[118]

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[117] *Ibid.*

[118] *Ibid.* MoFA Sudan 31-D2 6. Report on Sudanôs Increasing Intentions for Peace with Ethiopia: *Ṭeqémt* 26, 1972 E.C (6 Nov. 1979). MoFA Sudan 31-D2 7. Memo on the Growing Rift Between Sudan and Egypt: *Hedar* 23, 1972 E.C (3 Dec. 1979). MoFA Sudan 31-D2 5. Analysis Report on the Advantages for Ethiopia of Sudanôs peace Initiatives: *Hedar* 1972 E.C (Nov. 1979).

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between the two capitals. On 18 January 1980, the Addis Ababa Memorandum of Understanding was signed. More importantly, all the joint commissions were reactivated afterwards.[119] Therefore, after five years, the Joint Ministerial Commission was reconvened in Khartoum from 6-8 May. The Ethiopian government strove to consolidate these overtures with concrete and practical commitments from the side of the Sudan. Chairman Mengistu officially visited the Sudan for five days in May 1980. On the occasion of President Nimeiriôs visit to Ethiopia in November the same year, the Ethiopian rulers insisted on a formal signing of a Declaration of Basic Principles Guiding Friendly Relations that would particularly force the Sudan readjust its approaches towards irredentist elements in northern Ethiopia.[120]

But Ethiopiaôs expectations about Sudan closing offices of the Eritrean and Tigrayan rebels in the Sudan and completely severing its support to all dissident elements soon proved futile. Particularly after the August 1981 Ethio-Libya-South Yemen Pact, Nimeiriôs government strengthened its support to the rebels and reactivated its military pact with Egypt.[121] Absence of confidence in each other apparently contributed to the

[119] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 1 Şeraz 1. Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä (Khartoum) to ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative of the Derg to MoFA). Study Report on Ethio-Sudan Relations so far: *Ţeqémt* 7, 1975 E.C (18 Oct. 1979). *Addis Zämän*: *Yäkatit* 6, 1972 E.C (14 Feb. 1980); *Mägabit* 2, 3, 5, 11 & 13, 1972 E.C (11, 12, 14 , 20 & 22 March 1980).

[120] *Ibid.* MoFA etiyo-sudan yä ministroļe sebsäba 1 Şeraz 4. Report on Ethiopiaôs preparation for Khartoum Joint Ministerial Consultative Meeting: *Miyazya* 1, 1972 E.C (9 April 1980); Agreements of the Khartoum Joint Ministerial Consultative Meeting: 6-8 May 1980. MoFA Sudan 31-D2 3. Dr. Amarä Täklé (African and Middle East Directorate, MoFA) to Ambassador Yelma (Khartoum). On Improving Relations: *Pagumé* 1972 E.C (Sept. 1980). *Addis Zämän*: *Miyazya* 29 & 30, 1972 E.C (7 & 8 May 1980); *Genbot* 2, 3,5,17, 19 & 21, 1972 E.C (10, 11, 13, 25 & 29 May 1980); *Hedar* 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16 & 17, 1973 E.C (Nov. 1980).

[121] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 1 Şeraz 1.Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä (Khartoum) to ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative of the Derg to MoFA). Study Report on Ethio-Sudan Relations so far: *Ţeqémt* 7, 1975 E.C (18 Oct. 1982).

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two, and they had to wait yet another year to mend this situation.

After another exchange of high level missions, they signed another Memorandum of Understanding in Khartoum in May 1982. This agreement, issued as a communiqué, included closure of all offices of anti-Ethiopian and anti-Sudan elements, deporting to third country of rebel leaders, closure of the border to stop smuggling of weapons and setting a technical committee to supervise the implementation of the provisions of the agreement.[122] However, the two countries were unable to build lasting confidence that could sustain the mutual accord they strove to establish. The last rapprochement was destined to last only a couple of months, and then they entered another round of destabilization activities.[123] This time, Ethiopia resorted to the South Sudan card by openly sponsoring the SPLM/A after September 1983.

1.3. The Case of South Sudan

The general understanding in Ethiopia regarding South Sudan related it to the persecution of the non-Muslim Africans by the Moslem Arabs of the north. The latterôs control of the government and administration and efforts to de-Christianize the southern population in the name of national unity and homogeneity vis-à-vis the demand of the southerners for a plebiscite under international supervision to enable them to determine

[122] *Ibid.*

[123] *Ibid.*

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ceived to be the central point of conflict between the two parties.

Ethiopians understood very well the historical developments associated with the arrival of the British in Southern Sudan. They were equally aware of the formation of a joint Anglo-Egyptian condominium that treated the north and south as separate administrative units. They also understood that, following the end of the condominium and the withdrawal of British influence after WWII, the Egyptians had attempted to annex Sudan while the politically not yet organized southerners preferred a separate status as a British colony or merger with Uganda or Kenya. In particular, Ethiopians were cognizant of the way the British maintained their interests through a compromise solution of creating a united independent Sudan. Likewise, the disputation of this strategy by the South Sudanese was disregarded as concession to Egyptian ambitions, with a view to achieving a realization of British control of the Suez Canal. This situation was perceived to have provided the background to the conflict.[125]

1.3.1. Evolution of Ethiopia's Involvement in South Sudan

Ethiopiaôs association with the problem of the south can be traced back, one way or another, to the beginning. The conflict assumed a serious character with the beginning of

[124] MoFA Sudan 29-D2 5. Report on the Realities of South Sudan: 3 February 1963. See also Dustan M. Wai, *The African Arab Conflict in the Sudan* (New York, London: Africana Publishing Company, 1981), 55-79; Abel Alier, ñThe Southern Sudan Questionò in The Southern Sudan: the Problem of National Integration. (Dustan M. Wai, ed.) 1973: 11-27; Joseph U. Garang, ñOn Economic and Regional Autonomyò In *The Southern Sudan: the Problem of National Integration* (Dustan M. Wai, ed., 1973): 83-92; Edgar OôBallance, *Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000): 15-35; Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (The International African Institute, 2003), 11-12, 25-28; Scopas S. Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs and Israelis in the Southern Sudan, 1955-1972* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 22-37.

[125] *Ibid.*

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ler a British Governor-General with reserved power, in January 1954. Southern parliamentarians found themselves powerless to protect the interests of their people. In August 1955, an armed rebellion broke out over a widespread area in the south. This uprising was terminated following the intervention of the governor-general who was ómotivated by the consideration, tacitly agreed, that support for the northern Arab cause against the south would ensure that union with Egypt would not be considered by the northern political leadersô.[126]

The government of Ethiopia was in sympathy with the Sudan on the ground that it óboth in principle and in fact, opposed to any kind of fragmentation of a national territory on the basis of religion or tribalismô.[127] Accordingly, since the outbreak of the rebellion, a set of measures were taken. When the South Sudan army mutinied in Juba in August 1955 (the Torit mutiny), the imperial government availed the services of its aircraft to transport northern troops to the area in question to suppress the rebellion. When the rebellion became widespread, an order was issued to the governors of Ethiopian provinces adjacent to South Sudan óto prevent armed fugitives from coming in and to drive those who had already entered back to where they came fromô.[128] Consequently, the rebels either gave themselves up or fled with their arms to Uganda, Congo and Kenya. Those who came to settle in Ethiopia as refugees were allowed to reside under the strict

[126] *Ibid.* See also Poggo, *First Sudanese Civil Waré* , 40-47.

[127] MoFA Sudan 36-D2. Memorandum to Sudan: 19 April 1967.

[128] *Ibid.*

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their arms and ócease and desist from carrying out subversive activities against the Sudanô[129]

The apparent cordial relations between Ethiopia and the UMMA-led governments from mid-1956 to early 1964 necessitated their collaboration against southern Sudan rebels. Imperial Ethiopia pursued a policy of unconditional support to Sudanese regimes till late 1964. In January 1964, for example, soon after the beginning of the Anya-Nya guerilla movement, a Sudanese delegation came to Ethiopia and requested that when Sudanese troops undertake mopping up operations in the coming months, Ethiopia should close her frontiers with the Sudan along the Nasr-Pachula line. In addition to sealing the frontier, Ethiopia sent the governor of Gambella, Col. Lämma Gäbrä-Maryam, to Khartoum. In company with high-ranking Sudanese military officials, the colonel proceeded to the area of conflict and rendered his services in an advisory capacity in the mopping up operations undertaken by Sudanese troops. [130]

Demonstrating the extent of the countryôs cooperation was the silence it maintained when, under the pretext of undertaking hot pursuit operations, Sudan government troops, aided by heavy artillery and military aircraft, penetrated deep into Ethiopian territory and indiscriminately inflicted heavy damages upon the lives and property of Ethiopian nationals. Similarly, Ethiopia rejected the offer of assistance and service by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in June 1963 with respect to South Sudan refugees in its

[129] MoFA Sudan 29-D2 5. Report on the Realities of South Sudan: 3 February 1963. MoFA Sudan 36-D2. Memorandum to Sudan: 19 April 1967. For the nature of Sudanese regimes in this period and their policy towards the South see Scopas S. Poggo, ñGeneral Ibrahim Abboudôs Military Administration in the Sudan, 1958-1964: Implementation of the Programs of Islamization and Arabization in the Southern Sudanò In *Northeast African Studies.* 9, 1 (2002): 67-101.

[130] MoFA Sudan 36-D2. Memorandum to Sudan: 19 April 1967.

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order to avoid being instrumental to internationalization of the Southern Sudan problem and in order to safeguard Ethiopiaôs long existing friendly relations with the Sudanô.[131]

In spite of the above developments, Ethiopian authorities were increasingly becoming apprehensive of the South Sudan problem. They were closely monitoring the establishment in exile of the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU), and the extensive campaign of its chief officers, J.H. Oduho (President) and William Deng (Secretary-General), to bring the grievances of Southern Sudanese people to the attention of the world by way of submitting memoranda to the UN, to PAFMECSA and to African political associations.[132]

A range of factors necessitated Ethiopia to closely monitor the situation in Southern Sudan. These included the 1947 report of the Fabian Colonial Bureau that came out strongly in favor of Southern Sudan as a separate entity from the north; the subsequent debate in the UN and widespread press coverage of the matter particularly after the summer of 1962; the establishment in Britain of an unofficial organization called ñthe International Committee for the Study of Group Rightsò and the pressure it exerted for the consideration of the demands of Southern Sudan In addition, the apprehension that the issue would be discussed (in private and/or public) during the May 1963 OAU Summit contributed to the policy reorientation.[133]

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[131] *Ibid;* Felix Schnyder (High Commissioner for Refugees) to MoFA: 27 June 1963; Berhänu Bahta (Director general, MoFA) to Felix Schnyder: 8 July 1963.

[132] MoFA Sudan 29-D2 5. Report on the Realities of South Sudan: 3 February 1963. See also Poggo, *First Sudanese Civil War*é ,113-119.

[133] *Ibid.*

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iorating bilateral relations after the October 1964 coup in Sudan contributed to the revision of Ethiopiaôs position on the Sudan in general and the South in particular.[134] The 1963 proposed plan of action, for example, considered the case of South Sudan as a ópossible pressure on Sudanese government mainly as retaliation should it consider to support subversion in Eritreaô. This plan envisaged the maintaining of a series of contact with South Sudanese, ówho should be given assistance on a selective basisô and that óregular exchange of information and opinion be held on south Sudanese affairsô.[135] Ethiopiaôs association with South Sudan began in earnest afterwards. The first contact occurred in December 1963 following the request of the representative of the Kampala-based Sudan African National Union (SANU ï the new version of SACDNU), William Deng, to the emperor for financial assistance.[136]

The fact that the Extradition Treaty of 29 March 1964 remained on paper; and specifically Ethiopiaôs refusal to comply with Sudanôs request to deport Southern Sudanese refugees demonstrated the intentions of the imperial regime. The directive prepared for Ethiopiaôs good will mission to the Sudan that would discuss the deteriorating relations (November 1964) authorized the delegation to imply that, unless

[134] See above, pp.6-8.

[135] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 148. Proposed Plan of Action Against Sudan and Somalia: 1955 E.C (1962). See also John Obert Voll and Sarah Potts Voll, The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State (Westview Press, Inc, 1985) pp.138-141; Mohammad Beshir Hamid, ñAspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy: Splendid Isolation, Radicalization and Finlandisationò In *Sudan Since Independence* (Muddathir Abd al-Rahim et al, eds. Gower Publishing Company ltd, 1986): 165-176.

[136] *Ibid*, William Deng to Emperor Hayla-Selassie: 16 December 1963.

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ng Eritrean secessionist elements, thereby intervening in the internal affairs of the country, it would be obliged to respond in kind.[137]

Accordingly, memos submitted to the emperor and the state minister for foreign affairs, Kätäma Yifru, designed the aggressive policy that Ethiopia should assume in the process. This included sponsoring the liberation movement of South Sudan rebels through arms supply to the fighters and financial assistance to the leaders in their propaganda campaign within the continent and the wider world. The strategy stipulated the condition that Ethiopia could easily use the southern problem as a counter measure against Sudan if the latter could not desist from sponsoring the Eritrean rebels.[138]

The contact with South Sudan factions became more frequent after 1965. In February, the secretary general of the Nairobi-based Sudan African Freedom Fighters Union of Conservatives (SAFFUC), Alphonse Malek Pajok, discussed a priorly arranged plan concerning ―the future relationship or link between the independent Southern Sudan and the Imperial Ethiopian Government‖. He proposed that the link could be defined either by him, for he was mandated by the party, or by the president and chairman of SAFFUC, Mr. Dominic Muorwel. Mr. Pajok also requested urgent financial and military assistance as well as special treatment by Ethiopia's embassy in Nairobi.[139]

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[137] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 1. Memo on Ethio-Sudan Relations and Ethiopia's Counter Measures: *Hedar* 28, 1957 E.C (8 Dec. 1964); Talking Points Prepared by Sudan: November 1964.

[138] MoFA Sudan 29-D2 4. Memo to the Emperor on Ethio-Sudan Relations: *Hedar* 1957 E.C (Nov. 1964). MoFA Sudan 28- D2 1. Memo to Kätäma on Possible Counter Measures against Sudan: *Mägabit* 27, 1957 E.C (5 April 1965).

[139] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 112. Alphonse Malek Pajok (SAFFUC Secretary General) to Kätäma: 2 February 1965.

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U, Philip Pedak Lieth, similarly underlined the need to maintain friendship and cooperation between his faction and Ethiopia; and requested around 5,000 arms to be secretly delivered via Gambella and financial assistance to the amount of 120,000 *birr*.[140] Mr. Pedak was invited to come to Ethiopia, and he convinced the officials regarding SANUôs armed struggle and the assistance they desperately needed from Ethiopia. He was instructed to bring all the military and political leaders of his faction to Addis Ababa for implementation talks, which he did by June 1965. In addition, Ethiopia arranged for Mr. Pedak to meet higher officials of the OAU. In spite of the split within SANU and the subsequent creation of the Anya-Nya Liberation Front (Azania) around June 1965, Ethiopia decided to continue supporting the faction militarily and financially.[141]

More expressive of Ethiopiaôs stance on South Sudan was the response it gave to Sudan on the return of refugees in June 1965. Following the failure of the Round Table Conference (March 1965) sponsored by the central government and the subsequent escalation of the war in the south, Sudanese rulers issued a general amnesty declaration in June. Subsequently, they approached Ethiopia to repatriate all refugees currently present in its territories. The Ethiopian response was a categorical denial of the presence of southern refugees inside Ethiopia and the countryôs association with any of the factions.[142]

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[140] *Ibid*, Philip Pedak Lieth to Ketema: 5 April 1965.

[141] *Ibid*, Memo to Kätäma on relations with SANU: *Säné* 10, 1957 E.C (17 June 1965); Memo to Ketema on SANU: *Säné* 21, 1957 E.C (28 June 1965); Memo to Kätäma on Helping SANU: *Säné* 23, 1957 E.C (30 June 1965).

[142] *Ibid*, Memo Regarding Talks with Sudan official on South Sudan Refugees in Ethiopia: *Säné* 23, 1957 E.C (30 June 1965).

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ries managed to temporarily resolve the matter after the July 1965 talks in Addis Ababa. In the Memorandum of Agreement that was signed, they agreed that óneither party should engage itself or allow its own nationals or nationals of the other party or any foreign state or any other person or institution within its jurisdiction to engage in any type of activities that are harmful or designed to harm the national interests of the other partyô.[143] Using the lull, the two parties exchanged the list of refugees-cum-rebels to be expelled; this, however, was not implemented. The imperial government additionally issued a formal notice spelling out the terms and conditions under which all Sudanese refugees may reside in Ethiopia.[144]

The accord between the two governments coincided with the internal political divide within SANU and its apparent weakness in 1966. Ethiopian authorities were troubled by the dismissal of Philip Pedak from his vice-presidency in April and particularly the latterôs decision to go to Khartoum for peace talks without prior consultation.[145] The report prepared on the matter specially advised caution on the possibility of Pedak and his close allies being spies of the government of the Sudan. In the meantime, Ethiopia was strengthening its contact with the Azania Liberation Front. In a letter addressed to the emperor, the representative in Congo of the faction, Akuot Atem de Mayen, appealed for a secret aid in arms that could be channeled through its branch office in Addis Ababa.[146]

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[143] MoFA Sudan 38-D2. Record of Agreements, Meetings and Communiqués. Joint Communiqué: 28 July 1965; Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of Sudan and Ethiopia: 28 July 1965.

[144] MoFA Sudan 34-D2. Instructions Limiting the Actions of South Sudan Refugees in Ethiopia: 10 March 1966.

[145] MoFA Sudan 29-D2 5. Report on the Leaders of SANU: *Hämlé* 22, 1958 E.C (29 July 1966).

[146] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 180. Akuot Atem de Mayen to Hayla-Selassie: 17 November 1966.

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on the growing number of Eritrean refugees (about three hundred thousand) in its territory and its appeal to the UN High Commission for Refugees for assistance since March 1967 (which Ethiopia considered was an intentional act to internationalize the cause of the rebels) again changed the equation. Irrespective of Ethiopiaôs protests, both to the government of Sudan and the UN, the former had received funding to the amount of one million dollars for 1967 and 2,125,000 *birr* for 1969. Sudanôs intentional violation of the rule of reciprocity guiding the conduct between the two countries had for long angered the imperial government. As a result, a policy directive was issued whereby Ethiopia would publicize the issue of around twenty thousand South Sudanese refugees in its territory and seek assistance from the international community. The ministry of interior was instructed to prepare their list and gather them in refugee camps along the Ethio-Sudanese border.[147]

Following the executive decision regarding reprisal measures against Sudan,[148] Ethiopia intensified its assistance to South Sudan rebels. The nature of support was so visible that the embassy of Sudan could easily trace the activities of prominent rebel leaders, including Philip Pedak, Steven Lam and David Goak. These included the attack they launched on Pachula and Tedo districts from their bases in Gambella and the involvement of the embassy of Israel and British journalist in the process.[149] The response of the Ethiopian MoFA to Sudanôs accusations betrayed a sinister motive of

[147] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 1. Memo on actions to be taken against Sudan: *Tahesas* 17, 1959 E.C (27 Dec. 1966).

[148] See above, pp. 16-18; MoFA Sudan 23-D2 yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän sememenätoḷe 2. Report on the Meeting in the Prime Ministerôs Office Concerning Ethiopiaôs Measures against Sudan: *Mägabit* 27, 1959 E.C (5 April 1967).

[149] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 129. Intelligence Report from Within Sudan Embassy: *Säné* 8, 1960 E.C (15 June 1968).

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aimed of not knowing the whereabouts of Pedak and his friends, requested the copy of *The Daily Telegraph* in which the British journalists published a ómalicious anti-Sudan propagandaôand promised to investigate the attacks on Pachula and Tedo emanating from inside Ethiopian territory.[150]

The leadership role of the Protestant missionary, Father Philip Abas Gabush, and his relation with the governments of Ethiopia and Israel were equally known to the Sudanese side. Ethiopiaôs contact with rebel activities was further strengthened after the May 1969 coup that brought Nimeiri to power and the status of first-rate-enemy Sudan was accorded soon afterwards.[151] The clandestine mission of the rebels and Father Philip was facilitated by a range of measures taken by Ethiopia. These included the establishment in 1969/70 of Gambella refugee camps for about twenty thousand South Sudanese; the UN aid Ethiopia secured (not only for the period stated above, but the back payment to the amount of one million US dollars for earlier dates); and the creation of provisional secretariat for South Sudan refugees that would coordinate security issues and aid distribution.[152] The Sudanese side recruited a parliamentarian from Gambella, who was member of the sub-committee for defense, and, through him, managed to follow up the activities of the rebels and Ethiopiaôs role in the process.[153]

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[150] MoFA Sudan 23-D2 36. MoFAôs Response to Sudanôs Accusation of Ethiopiaôs Involvement in South Sudan: 25 June 1968.

[151] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 Şeraz 2. Memo on South Sudan rebels: *Ṭeqémt* 18, 1962 E.C (29 Oct. 1969); Report on Aspects of Sudanôs Enmity to Ethiopia: *Miyazya* 20, 1962 E.C (28 April 1970).

[152] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 Şeraz 1. Aid Plan for South Sudan Refugees in Gambella: *Ṭeqémt* 26, 1962 E.C (6 Nov. 1970).

[153] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 Şeraz 5. Report on South Sudan Rebels in Ethiopia: *Miyazya* 2, 1962 E.C (10 April 1970). See also Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War…*, 155-161.

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i venture, selected South Sudanese refugees were sent to Israel for special military training. After completion, they were deployed into South Sudan via the Gambella refugee camps. On one occasion, for example, the government of Sudan discovered the presence in the refugee camps of ten returnees, and Ethiopian officials had to relocate them before the joint investigation committee arrived in the designated area.[154] The fact that the Sudanese side knew about the presence of Israeli trainers in rebel training camps inside Ethiopia and rebel-held Sudan and that they found out about the military operation plans that designated May 1971 as the starting date of a general attack against the north equally made the Ethiopian authorities nervous.[155]

The November 1970 military incursions of Sudan into the Akobo district (Gambella) under the pretext of hot pursuit of the rebels further aggravated the situation. Outraged by the atrocity committed on the lives and properties of its nationals, in addition to a formal diplomatic protest, the imperial government sanctioned the deployment of a special army unit to secure the frontier region.[156] The Ansar revolt of 1969/70 and the intensification of southern rebelsô military missions against the north, coupled with Ethiopiaôs role in the process, could be considered as synchronized measures targeted against Nimeiriôs regime. The truce the two countries made following the March 1971 agreement and the

[154] MoFA Sudan 26-D2. Kätäma Yifru to *Bitwädäd* Zäwdé Gäbrä-Heywät: *Hämlé* 25, 1962 E.C (1 Aug. 1970). Also see Johnson, *Root Causes*é , 36-37.

[155] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 Şeraz 5. Memo to Kätäma on Sudanôs Discovery of the Extent of Ethiopiaôs Role: *Tahesas* 30, 1963 E.C (9 Jan. 1970).

[156] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan wäsän guday 3 285. Kätäma to Maj. Gen. Yelma Ġibäġi (Commander of the police Force): *Ṭir* 1, 1963 E.C (10 Jan. 1971).

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iri and Hayla-Selassie, in November 1971 and January 1972, respectively, temporarily cooled the tension.[157]

The Addis Ababa Accord of March 1972 between the government of Nimeiri and the Anya-Nya, also known as the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM), has to be viewed within the above general context. Ethiopiaôs role was limited to arranging the venue and applying pressure on the negotiating parties. In this regard, Emperor Hayla-Selassieôs personal diplomacy deserves special credit. The Ethiopian sovereign employed his aura and the respect he enjoyed among African circles (as was manifested during the mediation efforts of the Algeria-Morocco boundary conflict of 1964 and the Nigerian Civil War of 1969). The emperor persuaded particularly Nimeiriôs Sudan to accept the initiatives for peace talks of the World Council of Churches, the All African Council of Churches and the Sudan Council of Churches.[158]

However, apart from the presence of Dr. Menasé Haylé, the foreign minister, and Näbeyä-Leûul Keflé in the formal procedures and the emperor on the occasion of the signing of the agreement, together with the separate audience he gave the two sides, one can say that Ethiopiaôs role was minimal. Contrary to the belief that Nimeiri and Hayla-Selassie had arranged for the peace deal beforehand, the talking points prepared for the state visits did not in any way refer to the upcoming negotiation.[159] The premonition that

[157] MoFA Sudan 29-D2 2. Memo on Ethio-Sudan Relations: *Mäskäräm* 1964 E.C (Sept. 1971).

[158] Regassa Bayissa, PhD Dissertation, 2010, 100-108. Raphael Koba Badal, ñThe Addis Ababa Agreement: Ten Years After, an Assessmentò, In Mom K.N. Arou and B.Yongo-Bure (eds.*). Proceedings of the Conference on North – South Relations since the Addis Ababa Agreement*. Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum. *The Ethiopian Herald*, 29 February 1972. Informant: Ambassador Berhänu Dinqa.

[159] MoFA Sudan 29-D2 4. Memo to the Emperor on Ethio-Sudan Relations: *Mäskäräm* 1964 E.C (Sept. 1971). MoFA Sudan 29- D2 6. Talking points with Nimeiri on his Visit to Addis Ababa: *Mäskäräm* 1964 E.C (Sept. 1971). Regassa, 100; *Wai Afro-Arab Conflict*, 154; Abel Alier, *Southern Sudan: Too Many*

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ment between north and south Sudan might reflect negatively on Ethiopiaôs intricate relation with its northern province, Eritrea, effectively deterred both the emperor and his government from taking an active part in the negotiation process.[160] One document, for example, simply put Ethiopiaôs role as an effort of a good neighbor to sustain the national unity of the Sudan, comparable to its contributions to the independence of that country and the 1958 mediation role in the boundary conflict between Egypt and the Sudan.[161]

Within two years of the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord, signs started to emerge indicating the crumbling of the deal. According to Ethiopian authorities, the continuing backwardness of the south, indifference of the central government at a time of massive flooding; the disarmament of the Azania (Anya-Nya) army without integration into the national force as was promised by the 1972 Accord; the unilateral benefit reaped by SSLM leaders like Joseph Lagu in the process; and the rejection of the Addis Ababa agreement by some rebel factions in the South were among the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the accord.

The reaction in the south against the joint Egyptian-Sudanese plan to construct the Jonglei Canal in October 1974 was considered by the Ethiopian side as the immediate cause for the bloody student uprising in Juba (14-16 October 1974) and the army mutiny

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Agreements Dishonored (Ithaca Press, 2003), 91-95, 106-108, 113-114.; Francis Mading Deng, ñWar of Visions for the Nation,ò in *Sudan: State and Society in Crisis*. John O. Voll (ed.) (Bloomington & Indiapolis: Indian University press, 1991): 24-31; Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War..., 184-192.*

[160] Regassa, 100-108.

[161] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan wäsän guday 1 Şeraz 1. Report on Ethio-Sudan Relations: *Ţeqémt* 7, 1975 E.C (18 Oct. 1982).

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arch 1975).[162] The harsh reprisal measures of the central government against the south, and the subsequent mass exodus into Ethiopia revived the old tension between the two countries.[163] Ethiopiaגs plea for humanitarian assistance was considered by the government of Sudan as an act intended to internationalize the incident.

The February 1976 mutiny in the town of Wau (Bahr al Gazel), the assassination of northern officers and the subsequent desertion of one hundred fifty South Sudanese members of the army was, according to Ethiopian sources, the turning point in the relation between the north and the south.[164] Simultaneously, the growing association between Sudan and Egypt as was manifested by the Mutual Defense Agreement (July 1976), the deployment of huge Sudanese military force along its frontiers with Ethiopia and the increasing assistance Nimeiriגs government rendered to Eritrean rebels afterwards heavily strained bilateral relations between the two countries.[165]

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[162] MoFA Sudan 24-D2 23. Memo on Sudan Political Situation: 1967 E.C (1975). MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 Şeraz 1. Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä (Khartoum) to Keflé Wädajo (Minister of Foreign Affairs). On Crumbling Pease Deal: *Yäkatit* 13, 1968 E.C (21 Feb. 1976). See also Elias Nyamlell Wakoson, ñSudan Peopleגs Liberation Army/Sudan Peopleגs Liberation Movement: New Perspective for Peace, Unity and Democracyò In *Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the Horn of Africa* (New York, May 26-28, 1989): 8-18; Johnson, *Root Causes*é , 39-50.

[163] MoFA etiyo-sudan 3 Şeraz 1. Tayé Räta (Ministry of Interior, Director of Border Administration Division) to MoFA. On Sudanגs Incursions Along Gambella: *Miyazya* 21, 1967 E.C (29 April 1975). MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 Şeraz 1. Tayé Räta to UN High Commission for Refugees: *Säné* 30, 1967 E.C (7 July 1975); Asfaw Lägäsä (Assistant Minister, MoFA) to Ministry of Interior. On Sudan Government Statement on South Sudan Refugees: *Hämlé* 4, 1967 E.C (11 July 1975).

[164] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 Şeraz 1. Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä (Khartoum) to Keflé Wädajo (Minister of Foreign Affairs). On Crumbling Pease Deal: *Yäkatit* 13, 1968 E.C (21 Feb. 1976); Ambassador Yelma to Keflé: *Miyazya* 7, 1968 E.C (15 April 1976).

[165] MoFA Sudan 31-D2 5. Report on Ethio-Sudan Relations: 26 April 1977. MoFA Sudan 31-D2 4. Brief Memorandum on the Ethio-Sudan Conflict: *Hedar* 22, 1970 E.C (2 Dec. 1977). See also above, pp. 31-34. MoFA yä etiyo- sudan geneŔunät 3 Şeraz 1. Study Report on Ethiopia and Its Neighbors: *Ṭeqémt* 8, 1972 E.C (19 Oct. 1979).

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The Darg started to politically organize South Sudanese refugees in Gambella and Addis Ababa as early as April 1975. But no meaningful operation was planned and staged for the coming couple of years.[166] The Ethio-Sudan rapprochement from the late 1970s to the early 1980s seemingly contributed to the lack of joint ventures with southern rebels. However, following the decline of friendly relations between the two governments, Ethiopia continued to openly support the Sudan Peoplesô Liberation Movement and its armed wing (SPLM/A) from the mid-1980s on. In fact, it had a role in the creation of the Movement in June 1983 and significantly contributed towards its crystallization thereafter. Under the general supervision of the Ministry of Defense, Ethiopia rendered material, financial and moral assistance to what it dabbed ôProject 07ô. The project trained the military wing of the Movement, fully equipped it and supervised military operations conducted in mainland Sudan.[167]

Ethiopian officials equally monitored the propaganda campaign of SPLM/A. In a bid to pressurize Nimeiriôs regime to assume a similar position in relation to its contact with

[166] MoFA Sudan 31-D2 2. Ambassador Yelma to Col. ŝ elahun Sahelé (Head, Public Security Department): *Genbot* 29, 1971 E.C (6 June 1979); Col. ŝ elahun Sahelé to Lt. Col. Häbtä-Maryam Seyoum (Head, Border Administration Division, Ministry of Interior): *Säné* 18, 1971 E.C (25 June 1979).

[167] Ragassa, 120-25, 144-46. MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 Ṣeraz 2. Telegram on Khadafyôs Plan to Train SPLA Fighters: *Ṭeqémt* 12, 1977 E.C (23 Oct. 1984); Ambassador Ismaôél Hassan (Tripoli) to Goḡu: *Ṭir* 30, 1977 E.C (8 Feb. 1985). See also Claire Metelits, ñReformed Rebels? Democratization, Global Norms, and the SPLAò *Africa Today*. 51, 1 (Fall 2004): 65-82; Yehudit Ronen, ñEthiopiaôs Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War: Was it as Significant as Khartoum Claimed?ò In *Northeast African Studies*. 9, 1 (2002,): 103-126; Wani Igga (Lt. Gen), *Southern Sudan: Battles Fought and the Secrecy of Diplomacy.* 2nd Edition (Kampala: Roberts & Brothers General Printers, 2008), 19; James Bandi Shimanyula, *John Garang and the SPLA* (Nairobi: Africawide Network, December 2005), 15-20, 34; Eliyah Malok, *The Southern Sudan: Struggle for Liberty* (Nairobi, Kampala & Dar-es- Salaam: Kenway Publishers, 2009), 143; Roba Gibia, *John Garang and the Vision of New Sudan* (Toronto: The Key Publishing House Inc, 2008), 12-27; Douglas H. Johnson, ñThe Sudan peopleôs Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism,ò in *African Guerillas*. Edited by Christopher Clapham (Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998): 53-72; Johnson, *Root Causesé* , 60-65.

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PLM was designed to emphasize its commitment towards the national unity of Sudan. Through such assistance, the rebels managed to stage an all front attack on Nimeiriôs Sudan. By early1984, to the delight of Ethiopian officials, SPLA intensified its attacks and managed to disrupt crucial projects like the construction of the Jonglei Canal and the oil exploration in South Sudan. Simultaneously, Sudanôs denouncement of Ethiopiaôs involvement in the conflict increased.[169] The growing presence of the US in the Sudan and the commitment of the Regan administration to supply arms, coupled with Sudanôs permission to allow the former to use its air fields and ports, pushed ósocialistô Ethiopia to intensify its assistance to SPLA.[170]

More expressive of Ethiopiaôs stand on the matter were the alarm felt at the discovery of Sudanôs plot to assassinate Col. John Garang, the SPLM/A commander, and his followers while they were in Addis Ababa in March 1984. Even more alarming was Nimeiriôs reconciliation talks with a SPLM/A splinter group, Anya-Nya 2, in October of the same year and the establishment of a Peace Committee (with thirty members both from north and south) in March 1985.[171] The assurance that came from its embassy in Khartoum dismissing the latter measures as insignificant and as acts of desperation on the

[168] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 Şeraz 2. Ambassador Yelma (Khartoum) to Goġu Wäldé (Minister of Foreign Affairs). On SPLM/A Appeal to the People of Sudan and Its Political Program: *Yäkatit* 7, 1976 E.C (15 Feb. 1984) Also see Lam Akol (Dr.), *SPLM/SPLA: Inside an African Revolution*. 2nd Edition (Khartoum University Press, 2009), 16- 21.

[169] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 Şeraz 1. Wändwäsän Häbtä-Selasé (Charge de Affairs, Sudan) to African and Middle East Directorate (MoFA): *Yäkatit* 29, 1976 E.C (9 March 1984). See also Shannon Field, ôThe Civil War in Sudan: the Role of the Oil Industry,ô *Institute for Global Dialogue Occasional paper No 23* (February 2000): 7.

[170] *Ibid*; Report on Proposed US Military Support to Sudan: 6 March 1984; Report on US Offer to Solve the Conflict in Sudan: 7 March 1984.

[171] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 Şeraz 2. Ambassador Yelma to Goġu Wäldé: *Mägabit* 20, 1976 E.C (29 March 1984); Ambassador Yelm (Director, African and Middle East Directorate) to Ethiopiaôs Embassy in Khartoum: 31 October 1984.

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lief to the officials.[172] Ethiopia thereafter increased its involvement in the south. It commenced an open propaganda mission through Radio Ethiopia in support of the rebels and contributed its share in the release of West German, French and Swiss nationals hijacked by the SPLA.[173]

The downfall of the Nimeiri regime in April 1985, however, failed to alter the equation of Ethiopiaôs relations with SPLM/A. The new government in Khartoum, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, soon approached Ethiopian rulers for rapprochement talks and proposed the immediate reactivation of all joint ministerial commissions. The vice chairman of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) voiced his governmentôs disappointment at Ethiopiaôs failure to take its own steps to set right their troubled relations. The foreign affairs division of the central committee of the Ethiopian Workers Party (EWP) came out with a strong response to this accusation. Ethiopia insisted that the above measures were futile unless Sudan took the initiative to set the record straight and revise its anti-Ethiopian position (i.e., recognition of the cause of Eritrean secessionists). Sudan was requested to initiate policy lines to this effect as well as fully implement them in order to resolve the existing problem between the two countries.[174]

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[172] *Ibid*, Wändwäsän Häbtä-Selasé (Charge de Affairs , Khartoum) to African and Middle East Directorate: *Ṭeqémt* 22 & *Tahesas* 4, 1977 E.C (2 Nov. & 14 Dec. 1984); Analysis Report on the Sudan Peace Committee: *Mägabit* 12, 1977 E.C (21 March 1985).

[173] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 Ṣeraz 1. Report on West German Hostages Hijacked by SPLA: *Yäkatit* 30, 1976 E.C (9 March 1984). MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 Ṣeraz 2. West German Embassy to MoFA on its Citizens Hijacked by SPLA: 1 June 1984; Complaint from the Government of Sudan on Ethiopiaôs Pro-SPLM/A Propaganda: *Ṭeqémt* 21, 1977 E.C (1 Nov. 1984); Engeda Gäbrä-Mädhen (Charge de Affairs, Paris) to ŝibäbu Bäqälä (MoFA). On French Citizens Hijacked by SPLA: *Hedar* 5, 1977 E.C (15 Nov. 1984). Ambassador Yelma (African Directorate) to Ambassador Kassa Käbädä (Genève). On Freed Swiss Nationals: *Ṭir* 30, 1977 E.C (8 Feb. 1985).

[174] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan yä wäsän guday 1 Ṣeraz 1. Getachew (Charge de Affairs, Khartoum) to Yelma Tadäsä (MoFA): *Hämlé* 22, 1977 E.C (29 July 1985); Yelma to Gétaḷäw (Khartoum). On Ethiopiaôs Conditions for the Reactivation of Joint Ministerial Committees: *Nähäsé* 2, 1977 E.C (8 Aug. 1985). MoFA

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MC preferred to solve the South Sudan problem and the anti-SPLM/A rally in Khartoum, allegedly co-sponsored by the TMC and the National Islamic Front (NIF) in a bid to isolate the former and its supporters in the north as well as to bolster the morale of the disillusioned national army, were indicative of the upcoming relation between Ethiopia and the Sudan.[175] The establishment by the TMC (October 1985) of the Ministerial Committee on Southern Sudan that would organize a national reconciliation conference on Southern Sudan, as a result, was interpreted among Ethiopian circles as a futile gesture.[176] Likewise, the January 1986 proposal of Sadiq al-Mahdi, head of the UMMA party, to the government of Ethiopia to amend the troubled relations and enter into dialogue with SPLM/A was dismissed as political manipulation on the part of the former in light of the upcoming general elections in April.[177] In the mean time, Ethiopia intensified its logistic and propaganda assistance to SPLA, its planes parachuting deliveries and conducting air surveillance deep inside southern Sudan.[178]

Regarding the reconciliation talks, relatively better attention was given to the initiative of the National Alliance for Dialogue with SPLM/A with the aim of negotiating ceasefire in the civil war ahead of the April elections. The delegation of around twenty

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yä etiyo-sudan geneŕunät 3 ṣeraz 2. Embassy of Sudan to MoFA: 1 August 1985; Foreign Affairs Section of the EWP to MoFA. On Response to the Government of Sudan and Measures to be taken: *Nähäsé* 7, 1977 E.C (13 Aug. 1985); Ambassador Yelma to Wändwäsän (Khartoum): *Nähäsé* 13, 1977E.C (19 Aug. 1985).

[175] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 ṣeraz 2. Analysis Reports on Anti-SPLM/A Policy of the TMC and the Mass Rally in Khartoum: *Mäskäräm* 9 & 12, 1978 E.C (20 & 23 Sept. 1985).

[176] *Ibid*, Wändwäsän (Khartoum) to African Directorate: *Ṭeqémt* 14, 1978 E.C (25 Oct. 1985).

[177] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan geneŕunät 3 ṣeraz 2. Wändwäsän (Khartoum) to Goḍu. On His Talk with al-Mahdi: *Ṭir* 15, 1978 E.C (24 Jan. 1986).

[178] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 ṣeraz 3. On Ethiopiaôs Assistance to SPLA: *Mägabit* 13, 1978 E.C; (22 March 1986) On Sudanôs Accusation of Ethiopia Helping SPLM/A: *Mägabit* 17, 1978 E.C (26 March 1986).

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us northern parties was allowed to come to Ethiopia for the talks scheduled for mid March 1986.[179] Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä, Acting Foreign Minister, heralded the beginning of the Koka Talks (19-24 March), as they came to be known, after the lakeside resort of that name. After applauding the first formal meeting between the representatives of SPLM/A and the National Alliance for the Salvation of Sudan, Ambassador Yelma went on recounting the essence of the occasion:

> é .The gathering is historic in that it brings together the popular and patriotic forces of the Sudan who had the courage not only to resist the now defunct regime of Gaafar Nimeiri but also to go beyond and challenge that dictatorial and oppressive system to the very end. Some had no option but to take up arms in a militant struggle to resist the oppressive tentacles of the ñNayoò regime while others had to resort to tactics of protest in order to paralyze and dismantle the machineries of the Government presided over by Gaafar Nimeiri. One fact is clear to us here ï that without the courageous, combined and selfless struggle of the popular and democratic forces in the Sudan, its people would no doubt have continued to languish in deprivation and instability and our region would also have continued to suffer from the absence of peace and harmony thereiné .[180]

However, the Koka Meeting got off to a poor start when Col. Garang questioned the credentials of the informal alliance to negotiate such a deal, and accused the government of Gen. Abdul Rahman Swar al-Dahab of escalating the fighting in the south to coincide with the Koka talks.[181] The rebel leader presented conditions to be met for the Koka meeting and any future reconciliation talks to succeed. These included terms that the leadership in Khartoum, present and future, should recognize that the SPLM rebellion was not a southern problem but a national one; that it lift the current state of emergency

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[179] *Ibid*, On List of Delegates to the Addis Ababa Reconciliation Meeting: *Mägabit* 2 & 13, 1978 E.C (11 & 22 March 1986).

[180] *Ibid*, Ambassador Yelmaôs opening Statement: 19 March 1986. *Addis Zämän*: *Mägabit* 14, 17, 1978 E.C (March 1986). óNayoô or ñMayoô was a local Sudanese rendition of the May Revolution that brought Nimeiri to power in 1969. Informant: Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä.

[181] I*bid*, Col. John Garangôs Press Conference from Koka: *Mägabit* 15, 1978 E.C (24 March 1986).

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re; and that it repeal all defense agreements with foreign nations.

The remaining two conditions demanded the abrogation of the Islamic Sharia laws introduced under Nimeiri and that the TMC led by Gen. Dahab commit itself to the convening of a national constitutional conference prior to relinquishing power. When pressed by a Sudanese journalist whether Ethiopia was playing the óSPLM cardô to counter Sudanese support for separatists in Eritrea, the colonel wittily replied ó I didnôt know that Sudan was supporting the Eritreans, thank you for the informationô. On the probe regarding the genesis of the SPLM insurgency, Garang again elusively denied any involvement on the part of Ethiopia at any level in the evolution of the movement.[182] On the other hand, the inclusion in the SPLM delegation of Dr. Mansur Kahlid (prominent northern politician and member of the Nimeiri cabinet) angered members of the National Alliance, resulting in the walkout from the Koka talks of the Islamic Socialist Front and the Peoplesô Revolutionary Committee.[183]

In spite of the murky start, the negotiating parties, the SPLM and the National Alliance for Salvation (NAS), agreed to hold a constitutional conference in Khartoum the following June and formed a ófollow up committeeô that would oversee matters till the conference. The joint communiqué they issued called on the political forces and the TMC to take into consideration that the objective of the constitutional conference was to discuss the main problems of the Sudan and not the so-called southern problem. SPLM/A, in return, agreed that, even though it would not contest in the upcoming general

[182] *Ibid.*

[183] *Ibid*, Ambassador Yelma (Acting Foreign Minister) to Wändwäsän (Khartoum): 21 March 1986.

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government to be set and continue the reconciliation talks afterwards. Ethiopian authorities deemed the occasion historic and a huge success irrespective of the mixed reaction it faced among the leading political parties in Sudan. Particularly, the confused position displayed by the UMMA party, which was the major proponent of the Koka declaration but chose to assume a nonchalant position in its official statements afterwards, was considered typical of Sudanese unpredictability.[185]

The general election in the Sudan and the talks between Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and Col. Garang, in April and July 1986, respectively, were perceived by Ethiopian officials as constructive steps to resolve the civil war.[186] The government of al-Mahdi dispatched successive delegations to the region as well as other parts of the continent and the world in an effort to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. One document reveals that in all of these missions, Ethiopia was referred to as the prominent actor in the civil war and that Mahdiôs government would not accept its involvement in the negotiation process. This was interpreted as a strategy to isolate Ethiopia and wrench Col. Garang out of its influence.[187] In the meantime, Ethiopiaôs support to SPLA in its drive to control the territories of the south vis-à-vis the growing military missions of the central government was intensified. The resultant conflict between the two countries

[184] *Ibid*, SPLM-NAS Joint Communiqué: *Mägabit* 17, 1978 E.C (26 March 1986); Ambassador Yelma (Acting Foreign Minister) to Wändwäsän (Khartoum): 27 March 1986.

[185] *Ibid*, Gétaḷäw Yäsuf (Charge de Affairs, Khartoum) to Ambassador Yelma: *Mägabit* 28, 1978 E.C (6 April 1986); Ambassador Yelma to Gétaḷäw Yäsuf (Khartoum): 12 April 1986. Also see Akol, *SPLM/SPLA*é , 54-58; Bechtold, ñMore Turbulence in Sudané ò, 14-15.

[186] *Addis Zämän*: *Mägabit* 25, 1978 E.C (3 April 1986); *Hämlé* 25, 1978 E.C (1 Aug. 1986).

[187] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 Ṣeraz 4. Ambassador Lägäsä Wäldä-Maryam (Nairobi) to Ambassador Yelma (African Directorate): *Hedar* 30, 1979 E.C (10 Dec. 1986); Ambassador Yelma to Ethiopian Embassies. On Ethiopiaôs Response to Sudanôs Accusation of Helping SPLM/A and Not Wanting to participate in the Peace Process: 10 December 1986.

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eir relations so much that Sudan decided to recall its ambassador in November 1986.[188]

In the face of the growing discord between the two governments, the Ethiopian side apparently preferred pressurizing SPLM/A into continuing its dialogue with NAS on the proposed constitutional conference.[189] The attempt on the part of Sudan to drag President Mubarak of Egypt into the conflict, particularly the latterôs willingness to approach the Ethiopian leader ón a bid to put an end to the rebellion in Southern Sudanô, demonstrated the extent of the problem. According to the Sudanese foreign minister, Sharif Zein al-Handi, Mubarak was ódisgusted over the recent Ethiopian violations taking into consideration that the strategic threat of rebellion in Southern Sudan poses a threat to Egypt as wellô.[190]

In April 1987 Sudan took the initiative to mend its troubled relations with Ethiopia and proposed a set of measures to be taken by both sides. The proposal, among others, required that the two assert their respect for the unity and sovereignty of each other; and

[188] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan geneÝunät 3 Şeraz 2. On Sudanôs Ambassador Being Summoned: *Hedar* 16, 1979 E.C (26 Nov. 1986). MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloļe 1 Şeraz 4. Report on the New Military Assault by Sudanese Government: *Hedar* 3 & 25, 1979 E.C (13 Nov. & 5 Dec. 1986); Ambassador Yelma to Ethiopian Embassies. On Ethiopiaôs Response to Sudanôs Accusation of Helping SPLM/A and Not Wanting to participate in the Peace Process: 10 December 1986.

[189] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloļe 1 Şeraz 4. Ethiopiaôs Embassy in Khartoum to African Directorate: *Tahesas* 15, 1979 E.C (25 Dec. 1986). For the ongoing peace initiatives see: Bona Malwal, ñSudanôs Political and Economic Future: a Southern Perspectiveò In the Horn of Africa (Charles Gurdon, ed., UCL Press, 1994), pp. 90-104; and Charles Gurdon, ñ Sudanôs political Futureò In the Horn of Africa (Charles Gurdon, ed., UCL Press, 1994), pp. 105-114; Dustan M. Wai, ñCrisis in North-South Relationsò In the Sudan (Government Miscellanea 1), pp. 20-30.

[190] *Ibid*, On Mubarakôs Mediation Role: *Tahesas* 22, 1979 E.C (1 Jan. 1987).

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nterference in each otherôs internal affairs.[191] Irrespective of its assurance for good neighborly relations, Ethiopia continued to support the SPLAôs intensification of the offensive towards the towns of Akobo and Kurmuk, Upper Nile region.[192] In July 1987 Sudanese authorities again extended their readiness for peace talks with Ethiopia through their ambassador in Nairobi. In particular, they proposed face-to-face talks between Mengistu and Mahdi.[193]

In September, the SPLM/A leader expressed his readiness for a ceasefire and reconciliation talks if the Sudanese government showed willingness to implement the Koka Declaration of March 1986.[194] The Ethiopian government similarly agreed to facilitate a meeting between the two leaders during the upcoming OAU summit in Addis Ababa in October.[195] Mengistu and al-Mahdi met for the first time in Kampala, Uganda, on the sidelines of the East and Central African Countries Preferential Trade Area (PTA) summit conference. In the two days meeting, they agreed ćto step back from the brinkmanship that could easily lead to war between themô, decided to focus on peaceful means to resolve their differences and to contain the problems that confront them on their common borders. The two leaders also entrusted the Joint Ministerial Committee with the

[191] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan geneÉunät 3 Şeraz 2. Sudan MoFA to Embassy of Ethiopia: 11 April 1987; Andargaḷäw Abägaz (Charge de Affairs, Khartoum) to African Directorate: *Miyazya* 5, 1979 E.C (13 April 1987).

[192] *Ibid*, Telegram on Mengestuôs Message to Prime Minister al-Mahdi: *Miyazya* 27, 1979 E.C. MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 Şeraz 4. Reports on the Escalating SPLA Offensive and Ethiopiaôs Involvement: *Miyazya* 5 & 29 (13 April & 7 May 1987) and *Säné* 19, 1979 E.C (26 June 1987).

[193] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan geneÉunät 3 Şeraz 2. Report on Sudanôs Discreet Offer for Talks with Ethiopia: *Hämlé* 14, 1979 E.C (21 July 1987).

[194] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 Şeraz 4. Telegram on Garangôs Cease Fire and Reconciliation Offer: *Mäskäräm* 16, 1980 E.C (27 Sept. 1987).

[195] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan geneÉunät 3 Şeraz 2. Telegram on the Intended Meeting: *Mäskäräm* 11, 1980 E.C (22 Sept. 1987).

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se of the existing problems between Ethiopia and Sudan and recommending solutions.

In the meantime, the effort to reconcile SPLM/A and Anya-Nya II in a meeting held in Gambella in mid-November 1987 had failed, allegedly because of the formerôs preconditions, including the merger of the two movements under the leadership on John Garang.[197] The heavy battle fought between SPLA and the central army in early December 1987 and the alleged involvement of Ethiopia (and Cuba) on the side of the SPLA continued to mar the possibility of restoration of good relations between the two countries.[198]

In spite of the above setbacks, the leaders of the two countries again met in Djibouti on 22 March 1988 during the second summit of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD). Even if no substantial agreement was concluded, the fact that they did manage to affirm their commitment towards peaceful coexistence and to exchange views on possible items that could be included in the agenda of the next meeting (scheduled to be held in Addis Ababa in April) was considered promising.[199] However, Sudanôs unilateral peace effort to solve the civil war in the south, as was demonstrated by the Harare and Nairobi missions (February 1988), and even more

[196] *Ibid*, Reports on Kampala Talks Between Mengistu and al Mahdi: *Hedar* 24 & 26, 1980 E.C (4 & 6 Dec. 1987).

[197] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 1 Ṣeraz 4. Telegram on the Gambella Talks: *Hedar* 12, 1980 E.C (22 Nov. 1987).

[198] *Ibid*, Telegrams and Reports on the Battle of Kurmuk: *Tahesas* 1, 3, 7, 9 & 11, 1980 E.C (11, 13, 17, 19 & 21 Dec. 1987).

[199] MoFA IGADD 1 Ṣeraz 4. Joint Press Release on the Djibouti Talks: 22 March 1988; MoFA to Ethiopian Embassies: *Mägabit* 15, 1980 E.C (24 March 1988).

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ıcy of Gen. Obasanjo and Dr. Francis Deng (March 1988) were not accepted by Ethiopian officials.

The Harare inter-governmental forum on African problems, in its discussion on Sudan, failed to bring about any result other than urging the warring parties to find immediate peaceful solution to the conflict and facilitate the efforts of Gen. Obasanjo and Dr. Deng. Rather, the occasion was exploited by the warring parties to propagate their political agenda; as was demonstrated by the composition of their carefully assembled delegation. The SPLM/A was represented by Dr. Mansur Khalid, a northern Muslim and a high level official during the Nimeiri regime, while the central government chose the southern Christian, Mathew Obur. [200]

Ethiopia particularly rejected the mediation efforts of Gen. Obasanjo and Dr. Deng based on a number of considerations. First, the initiative was originally forwarded by the Woodrow Wilson Center (which Ethiopia considered was a CIA affiliate) with the aim of resolving the crisis in the Sudan independent of the secessionist struggle in Northern Ethiopia. Obasanjo confided to Ethiopian diplomats that the purpose of his mission was to personally reconcile Garang and Mahdi. So, the authorities perceived the effort to be detrimental to the national interests of Ethiopia. Second, the selection of Dr. Deng itself was not accepted. According to the document, during the Freetown Talks of December 1977, for example, Francis Deng (leader of the Sudanese delegation) ridiculed Ethiopiaôs position on Eritrea and argued that Ethiopia should not use the case of Southern Sudan to

[200] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 2 Ṣeraz 5. Analysis Reports on the Harare Conference and the Mediation Efforts of Obasanjo and Deng: *Mägabit* 16 & 28, 1980 E.C (25 March 1988).

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Ethiopian side in turn claimed that he was a CIA operative disguised under his current position as a research associate at the Wilson Center.[201]

As a counter-measure, Ethiopia hosted a meeting in Addis Ababa between the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and SPLM/A from18 to 20 August 1988. The DUP was represented by its deputy secretary-general, Sayid-Ahmed el-Hussein, and the SPLM/A by Dr. Lam Akol Ajawin, alternate member of the political-military high command. Discussions were held on the ónationalô problem (for SPLM/A insisted its cause should not be considered a South Sudan problem) and possible practical solutions to push forward the peace process. They agreed to arrange a meeting in the near future between Sayid Mohamed Osman el-Mirghani, the patron of the DUP, and Dr. John Garang.[202]

The meeting took place in a cordial atmosphere in Addis Ababa in November 1988. Ethiopian officials were delighted and, to the dismay of religious hard liners in Sudan, the occasion was deemed a success by both parties. They signed an agreement named the Sudanese Peace Initiative which include terms like the convocation of the proposed constitutional conference, freezing the application of Islamic hoods and all the related articles of the September 1983 laws, cancellation of military agreements signed between Sudanese governments and other countries, lifting of the state of emergency and imposition of a ceasefire between the warring sides in the south.[203] Irrespective of the

[201] *Ibid.*

[202] *Ibid*, Joint Statement: 20 August 1988. Akol, *SPLM/SPLAé* , 119-121.

[203] *Ibid*, Report on the Addis Ababa Meeting: *Hedar* 2, 1981 E.C (12 Nov. 1988); Telegrams from Ethio-Embassy (Khartoum) to MoFA: *Hedar* 4 & 5, 1981 E.C (14 & 15 Nov. 1988). See also Akol, *SPLM/SPLAé* , 128-124.

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om the National Islamic Front (NIF) and other hardliners, Ethiopia continued to pressurize Sudanese officials, including the UMMA leader, al-Mahdi, into adopting it.[204]

A high level delegation led by Feqrä-Selasé Wägdäräs, the prime minister, was dispatched to Khartoum in a bid to further capitalize on the positive developments. The Sudanese premier promised to convince the Eritrean rebels to open dialogue with the delegation without any precondition and requested audience for a high level Sudanese delegation with Mengistu and Garang regarding the designated constitutional conference to be conducted well before December 1988. The response given tacitly declined arranging any contact with the Ethiopian leader and Garang, apparently to pressurize the Sudanese side into fully committing themselves to the reconciliation process.[205]

The latter were fully disadvantaged following the withdrawal of the DUP from the coalition government in late December and the growing political isolation it faced afterwards. The prime minister confided to the Ethiopian ambassador on his partyôs readiness to accept the Addis Ababa Agreement (Sudanese Peace Initiative) of November 1988 as well as the commitment to convene all Eritrean factions for peace talks under the principle of Ethiopiaôs territorial unity. According to al-Mahdi, all of them accepted the proposal except Isaias Afwerki, the EPLF leader; the Sudanese premier promised to take strong measures against him and his faction unless he accepts the offer immediately. Al-

[204] *Ibid*, Ambassador Brig. Gen. Fäläqä Tabor(Khartoum) to Berhänu Bayäh: *Hedar* 12, 13 & 15, 1981 E.C (22, 23 & 25 Nov. 1988); *Tahesas* 12, 1981 E.C (22 Dec. 1988).

[205] *Ibid*, Alämayähu (MoFA) to Ambassador Fäläqä (Khartoum): *Hedar* 29, 1981 E.C (9 Dec. 1988); Ambassador Fäläqä to Berhänu Bayäh: *Hedar* 29, 1981 E.C; (9 Dec. 1988) Alämayähu (MoFA) to Ambassador Fäläqä (Khartoum): *Tahesas* 1, 1981 E.C (11 Dec. 1988); Ambassador Fäläqä to Berhänu Bayäh: *Tahesas* 17, 1981 E.C (27 Dec. 1988).

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ubarak al-Fadil al-Mahdi, reaffirmed these points in his meeting with Mengistu and the Ethiopian foreign minister in early January 1989.[206]



John Garang in Itang Refugee Camp (Gambella) in 1989 (Shimanyula 2005, 34)

The intensification by the SPLA of its military offensive and its apparent success in controlling strategic towns like Nasser around January 1989, however, detracted the two

[206] *Ibid*, Ambassador Fäläqä to Berhänu Bayäh. Report on Talk with Al-Mahdi: *Ṭir* 4, 1981 E.C (13 Jan. 1989). MoFA yä etiyo-sudan geneÑunät 3 Ṣeraz 2. Report on Points Raised during Fadil al Mahdiôs Talks with Mengistu and Berhänu Bayäh: *Ṭir* 7, 1981 E.C (16 Jan. 1989).

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e of reconciliation. Soon, the Sudanese side resumed accusation of Ethiopia regarding its involvement in the civil war and meddling in party politics, particularly in favor of the DUP.[207] The Ethiopian side, however, continued to host reconciliation talks among Sudanese parties. In early February, for example, it organized the Ambo consultative conference composed of the SPLM/A as well as academics and intellectuals drawn from the northern part of the country. This conference ended up calling for the convocation of a constitutional conference, observance of immediate ceasefire and justice and equality for all the people of the country.[208]

The humanitarian crisis witnessed in the south following the escalating military confrontation demanded the intervention of the UN. After a high level donor meeting in Khartoum in March, a UN-sponsored emergency relief operation was launched and the concept of ócorridors of tranquilityô was endorsed. The UN secretary-general approached the Ethiopian ruler to get his permission to use the southern parts of the country as an area of approach to the 250,000 South Sudanese in need of emergency food assistance.[209] Mengistu, while expressing the countryôs sympathy with the people of Southern Sudan and its willingness to participate in the operation, unequivocally advised the UN to use the facilities within Sudan and other neighboring states.

> é .I have the feeling that the request that we facilitate the movement of convoys of food and medicaments from within our

[207] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḽe 2 Ṣeraz 5. Ethiopiaôs Response to Sudanôs Accusation of Meddling in its party Politics: *Ṭir* 26, 1981 E.C (4 Feb. 1989); Ambassador Fäläqä (Khartoum) to Berhänu Bayäh. On Growing SPLA Military Success and Sudanôs political Tensionò *Ṭir* 27, 1981 E.C (5 Feb. 1989). See Also Peter Adwok Nyaba, *Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider's View* (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1997).

[208] *Ibid*, MoFA to All Ethiopian Embassies: 9 & 10 February 1989.

[209] *Ibid*, Javier Perez de Cuellar to Mengistu: 29 March 1989; Ambassador Täsfayé Tadäsä (Permanent Representative to the UN) to MoFA: *Mägabit* 25, 1981 E.C (3 April 1989).

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dan is based on an assessment which did not account certain basic facts pertaining to the

In a rather controversial move, however, and to the confusion of officials at the MoFA, President Mengistu promised the contrary to US Congressmen led by McClelland. Their agreement provided for the substitution of the wheat the USAID would bring to the refugees with Ethiopian corn, for the US then to buy corn from the government-owned Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) and Ethiopian long distance lorries to be employed for the purpose of transporting the shipment to the boundary of the Sudan.[211] The matter was amended following the intervention by foreign minister officials, with the consent of the president, who blatantly notified the US congressmen of their misunderstanding of the presidentôs intention.[212] In the meantime, the UN secretary-general accepted Mengestuôs message in good faith, and pushed for the use of the Gambella-Nassir dry weather road for the intended humanitarian mission, dubbed óOperation Life Line Sudanô.[213]

The embarrassment related to Ethiopiaôs confused positions coupled with the extensive anti-government smear campaign in the West necessitated a policy revision. The policy paper prepared immediately afterwards outlined the blunders committed so far and recommended some remedies to set the record right.[214] The major reason for

[210] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 2 Ṣeraz 6. Mengestuôs Telegram to de Cuellar: 07 April 1989; Mängestu Gämäḷu (Private Secretary of the president) to Fesähä Yemär (MoFA): *Mägabit* 29, 1981 E.C (7 April 1989).

[211] *Ibid*, US Embassy to MoFA: 11 April 1989; MoFA to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Derg: *Miyazya* 4, 1981 E.C (12 April 1989).

[212] Ibid, Memo on Operation Life Line Sudan: *Miyazya* 21, 1981 E.C (29 April 1989).

[213] *Ibid*, Javier Peres de Cuellar to Mengistu: 14 April 1989. Akol, *SPLM/SPLA*é , 129-138.

[214] *Ibid*, Memo on Operation Life Line Sudan: *Miyazya* 21, 1981 E.C (29 April 1989).

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the document, was the fear that the case would be used as a precedent for possible international intervention in the humanitarian crisis in the northern parts of the country. As an escaping mechanism, in spite of UN assurances, it had insisted on an official letter from the government of Sudan requesting Ethiopiaôs intervention. In the face of mounting international condemnation, particularly referring to the recent case of the wide scale famine in the country and the response of the outside world, the policy paper insisted on revision of the previous directive. [215]

In the meantime, Ethiopia hosted yet another peace talks between the Peace Ministerial Committee of the central government and the SPLM/A in Addis Ababa (10 - 11 June 1989). The major objective of this meeting was to establish ópeace corridors in order to guarantee relief flow to needy people in the southô.[216] In a parallel development, Prime Minister Feqrä-Selasé Wägdäräs visited Sudan in June 1989; afterwards, the two countries strove to improve their relations.[217] As was always the case in the region, the new regime of Omar Hassan al-Bashir (June 1989) pushed towards immediate resolution of the common problems in Ethio-Sudan relations. The two leaders met for the first time during the 25th OAU Summit in Addis Ababa and decided to negotiate immediately with all the rebel groups in their territories. The letters they exchanged showed their eagerness for such an undertaking in the near future.[218]

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[215] *Ibid.*

[216] *Ibid*, On the June 1989 Addis Ababa Meeting: *Säné* 12, 1981 E.C (19 June 1989).

[217] *Ibid*, On Feqrä-Sellaséôs Visit: *Säné* 18, 1981 E.C (25 June 1989).

[218] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan geneÝunät 3 Şeraz 2. Mengistu to Bashir: *Nähäsé* 6, 1981 E.C (12 Aug. 1989); Ambassador Fäläqä (Khartoum) to Berhänu Bayäh. On His Talk with Al-Bashir: *Nähäsé* 15, 1981 E.C (21 Aug. 1989). MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloţe 2 Şeraz 7. Telegram on Bashirôs Message to Mengistu: *Nähäsé* 16, 1981 E.C (22 Aug. 1989). See also Peter Woodward, ñSudan: a New Political Character?ò In

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urned to the old practice of destabilization missions as the means of realizing their objectives. Bashirôs unilateral ceasefire that lasted till September and the unsuccessful efforts of the steering peace committee he established failed to convince the Ethiopian side. Rather, the latter perceived them as deceptive strategy designed to camouflage the opening of comprehensive military missions against the SPLM/A and the strengthening of Khartoumôs contact with the Eritrean rebels.[219] The consequence of this understanding was the intensification of SPLA military attacks on the army of the central government. One intelligence report, for example, requested the destruction of the vital bridge leading to Juba town; instruction for the immediate execution of the mission was passed to concerned Ethiopian authorities.[220]

The customary accusations started to flare up from both sides. To the frustration of the Ethiopian authorities, though, Sudan resorted to its original claim that the problem in Eritrea was different from the one in their southern parts.[221] Ethiopia began to nonchalantly follow up the US-sponsored mediation talks between the SPLM/A and the central government held in Nairobi from 30 November to 5 December 1989. The fact that the two parties failed to reach a consensus on most of the talking points must have come

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Horn of Africa (Charles Gurdon, ed. UCL Press, 1994): 76-89; Bona Malwal, ñThe Agony of the Sudan,ò in *Journal of Democracy*. 1, 2 (Spring 1990): 75-80; Alexander de Waal, ñCreating Devastation and Calling it Islam: the War of the Nuba, Sudan,ò *SAIS Review*. 21, 2 (Summer-Fall 2001): 117-132; Ann Mosely Lesch, ñSudanôs Foreign Policy: In Search of Arms, Aid and Allies,ò in *Sudan: State and Society in Crisis*. John O. Voll (ed.) (Bloomington & Indiapolis: Indian University press, 1991): 63-65.

[219] MoFA yä sudan täqawami häyloḷe 2 Şeraz 7. Ambassador Fäläqä to Berhänu Bayäh. Reports On the Strategies of Bashirôs Government: *Ṭeqémt* 11, 14, 15 & 16, 1982 E.C (22, 25, 26 & 27 Oct. 1989).

[220] *Ibid*, Ambassador Fäläqä to Berhänu Bayäh: *Ṭeqémt* 15, 1982 E.C (26 Oct. 1989); Berhänu to Ministry of Defense: *Ṭeqémt* 16, 1982 E.C (27 Oct. 1989).

[221] *Ibid*, Telegrams from Khartoum Embassy to African Directorate: *Ṭeqémt* 24 & 30 (4 & 10 Nov. 1989)and *Hedar* 1, 2& 3, 1982 E.C (11, 12 & 13 Nov. 1989).

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.[222] Ethiopiaôs displeasure on Sudanôs open assistance to Eritrean rebels was conveyed to Al-Bashir on December 1989, and the latter at the same time condemned Ethiopiaôs involvement in the SPLA offensive that ended up capturing the strategic town of Kurmuk.[223]

In the following years, till the fall of the military regime in Ethiopia (May 1991), relations between the two countries remained at its lowest level. They continued to unreservedly support rebel groups. In retrospect, what has happened in the region, specifically, the independence of Eritrea and South Sudan, May 1991 and July 2011, respectively, was the result of this extended conflict and had the blessing of the two states.

Generally speaking, irrespective of intermittent attempts to establish cordial relations, the two countries managed to survive a period of mutual suspicion and animosity. The imperial regime and the Darg mostly felt that their counterparts in the Sudan were intent on destabilizing Ethiopia and were readily cooperating with forces having similar agenda. The brief moments of accord at the initial years of each government would soon give way to headlong confrontation and mistrust. The contention over the non-demarcated boundary and the vast arable land at Sätit Humära often added fuel to the conflict. Major concessions the imperial regime was willing to make on these points at the height of the problem in the early 1970s, such as accepting the Gwynn unilateral demarcation and thereby ceding parts of contested territories to the Sudan, failed to abate the age old

[222] *Ibid*, Telegrams on Nairobi Talks: *Hedar* 13, 20, 22 & 27, 1982 E.C (23 & 30 Nov. and 2 & 7 Dec. 1989).

[223] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan geneÑunät 3 Ṣeraz 2. Ambassador Fäläqä to Täsfayé Dinqa (Minister of Foreign Affairs). On His Talk With President Bashir: *Tahesas* 10, 1982 E.C (20 Dec. 1989).

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ntensification of the latterôs encroachments on Ethiopian sovereignty and national interests.

Nevertheless, Sudanôs support to Ethiopian secessionist elements and anti-government forces remained the central points of disagreement between the two countries. The understanding that Sudanese regimes willingly avail their services to traditional enemies of Ethiopia in North Africa and the Middle East further aggravated the situation. In a bid to appease Sudanese rulers and to discourage their negative activities, the imperial regime went as far as collaborating in the mopping up missions of South Sudanese rebels. The Derg equally sought the mediation role of the Nimeiri regime, which it believed was one of the major sponsors of Eritrean rebels. In the face of Sudanôs persistence in its support of the Eritrean rebels, the two successive regimes engaged in activities they deemed necessary to protect Ethiopiaôs vital interests. Apart from labeling the Sudan the number one enemy of the state, the imperial regime went as far as being involved in a plot to topple Nimeiri from power. The Dargôs response came by way of giving unconditional support to the SPLM/A. The end result was the chronic internal turmoil in the two countries and their ultimate disintegration, as was witnessed by the birth of the states of Eritrea and South Sudan.

Here, the important question is the investigation of the effectiveness of Ethiopiaôs policies towards the Sudan. The imperial regime initially preferred a policy that would guarantee the coming to power of friendly parties in post-independence Sudan. When this proved unsustainable, efforts were concentrated on pressurizing Sudanese governments to reconsider their anti-Ethiopian activities. Strategies employed to achieve the intended objective revolved around a set of agreements signed between the two countries and

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peedy implementation, the cautious and selective support rendered to South Sudan rebels and occasional direct interventions in party politics in the Sudan. In some instances, these strategies alarmed Sudanese regimes and forced them towards dialogue and reconciliation with Ethiopia. However, the plan failed to achieve the intended goal of stopping Sudan from sponsoring Eritrean secessionists and other anti-government forces.

The Darg similarly pursued this policy of appeasement at the beginning. But Sudanôs official declaration supporting the independence of Eritrea and its open support to other opposition groups necessitated a radical change of policy. The one party dominance prevailing in the Sudan after the early 1970s and the resultant weakness of opposition groups forced the Darg to abandon one of the techniques employed by the imperial regime and to exploit the only option available, the South Sudan card. As a result, Ethiopia started to train and equip the SPLM/A and fully committed itself towards destabilizing the Sudan in a bid to bring the latter to the negotiating table. The Darg adopted a policy that Sudanôs internal conflict had a direct bearing on the Eritrean situation. Therefore, any initiative to solve Sudanôs problem had to accommodate Ethiopiaôs need as well. Nevertheless, the whole exercise fell short of meeting the desired target and assumed the nature of an act of vengeance. Like its predecessor, the Dargôs approach did not achieve the intended objective. Rather, it further polarized the two states, with repercussions that still haunt the entire region.

Both the imperial regime and the Darg persistently invoked the principles of sovereignty and non intervention in the internal affairs of other countries throughout their conflict with the Sudan. African states and the continental body likewise unsuccessfully

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the two countries at the height of their problem in late 1970s. Heightened tensions between the two states occurred when Ethiopia was invaded by Somalia in the south east, there was a surge in Eritrean rebelsô attacks in the north and political turmoil within the country. In retrospect, it seems that the Darg invoked the African card out of desperation so as to buy time out of the complex situation it was facing. Nevertheless, the conflict and occasional reconciliation efforts remained exclusively an affair between Ethiopia and the Sudan, with little evidence of a decisive role from other African states.

On the other hand, regional powers like Egypt and some Middle Eastern states, the Arab League as well as the two super powers assumed an important role in the escalation of the conflict. All these powers were ranged against Ethiopia, and the countryôs foreign policy activities had to consider this wider picture. Fellow Africans and the continental body remained too impotent and indecisive to merit the confidence of Ethiopia in its conflict with the Sudan. More importantly, Sudanese rulers failed to react positively to successive Ethiopian initiatives to find amicable solutions to their mutual problems. Rather, they adamantly maintained the position that the Eritreaôs case was different from the situation in South Sudan. The growing disillusionment on the part of Ethiopia contributed to the adoption of the policy of dealing with the Sudan reciprocally. Thus, mistrust and retribution remained as the two guiding principles in bilateral affairs of these neighboring states.

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Chapter II

The Unending Conflict with Somalia

Somalia represented another major challenge in the foreign policies of Ethiopian governments. Relations between the two states were impaired from the beginning and the background causes that contributed to this state of affairs have continued to dictate their conduct to the present. The perpetual tension primarily revolved around Somaliaôs agenda of establishing Greater Somalia and Ethiopiaôs determination to ward off the danger of losing a fifth of its territory. The involvement of external elements in the conflict (primarily the Italians, the British, the United States, USSR and Egypt) further aggravated the matter, making the matter a facet of Cold War/West-East entanglements. Here an attempt is made to analyze the way Ethiopia perceived and handled the situation in the period between the 1950s and 1991.

The conflict was characterized by contention over a wide expanse of the common boundary, Ethiopiaôs categorical rejection of the union of the British protectorate (the former British Somaliland) and the Italian trusteeship (the former Italian Somaliland) and the efforts of successive regimes in the two countries to realize their respective agenda. The UN and OAU always were chosen destinations of the diplomatic offensives of successive governments of the two countries. The conventional wisdom was that Ethiopiaôs involvement in African politics was motivated primarily by the need to deflect Somaliaôs expansionist policy. This has to be clearly addressed.

Somaliaôs rulers employed various mechanisms to realize their policy of territorial aggrandizement. Ethiopia had to intervene in matters directly related to Djibouti and

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establishing Greater Somalia. Parallel efforts were exerted to cultivate friendly powers in Somalia. All these measures, however, failed to avert the 1977/78 war between the two states. In this chapter, Ethiopiaôs various plans to frustrate the expansionist tendencies of Somalia and to guarantee its territorial integrity will be treated in some detail. In the process, the role of the two regimes in bringing about the current state of affairs in Somalia will be shown.

2.1. Background

Imperial Ethiopia started to closely monitor developments in Italian- and British-administered Somalia soon after the end of WWII. Its consulate in Mogadisho and later a special unit set up at the MoFA for the purpose of monitoring the situation played the pivotal role in shaping the policy orientation of the government. The November 1949 decision to grant independence to Italian Somaliland after ten years as a UN trust territory under Italian administration actually heralded the beginning of Ethiopiaôs enduring involvement in events associated with Somalia. Nonetheless, the fact that it was Ethiopia and Liberia, the only independent African states in the UN, who had insisted on and secured the limit to the Italian trusteeship period[1] failed to soften the attitude of the leading political force in Somalia since 1943, the Somali Youth League (SYL).

Initially, the task of the Ethiopian consulate revolved around scrutinizing the party politics within the SYL and the transitional government of the trust territory it dominated. The August 1957 election that brought to power Mohammed Hussein and Aden Abdullah, as president and vice-president of SYL, respectively, was viewed by Ethiopian

[1] MoFA färänsay somalé 1 776-2. Yelma Därésa (Foreign Minister) to Abdullahi Issa (Prime Minister of Trusteeship Territory): 17 February 1959.

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mpending political situation in Somalia. Particularly, the commitment of the president-elect to introduce the Arabic script [contrary to the existing Latin script his opponents preferred] and his pro-Egyptian attitude was considered a danger.[2] Nonetheless, the sharp divisions of Somali society along the lines of the two clans ï Darod and Hawiye ï vis-à-vis the nationalistic policy of the SYL came as a relief to Ethiopia.[3]

The domination of the parliament and the transitional government by the pro-west Hawiye; the conflict between the leading members of the two clans, prime minister Abdullahi Issa (Hawiye) and the minister of interior, Mussa Beqore (Darod); the postponement of the early 1958 parliamentary election which the Darod were likely to win; and the estrangement between the trusteeship government and the Dagil-Marfile sub-clan (Darod, but pro-Hawiye) etc were viewed with some degree of relief.[4] In the process, Ethiopia clearly indicated its bias towards the positions of the Hawiye and the election of the moderate politician Aden Abdulla Osman to the presidency of the SYL


[2] MoFA Somalé 5 1B-3. Consul Asäfa Nägaġe (Mogadisho) to Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs) . On SYL election and its Implication: *Nähasé* 9, 1949 E.C (15 Aug. 1957).

[3] *Ibid*, Consul Asäfa to Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld: *Nähasé* 23, 1949 E.C (29 Aug. 1957). The six Somali clan families are: Darod (consisting of Dolbuhunta, Majerteen, Marehan, Ogaden and Warsengeli), Hawiye (Abgale and Habr Gidir), Isaaq (Habr Awal, Habr Jaalo, Habr Yunis, Arab and Eidegalla), Rahenwein, Dir and Digil. For Detail see Patrick Gilkes, *Conflict in Somalia and Ethiopia* (New York: New Discovery Books, 1994), 8-35.

[4] *Ibid*, Consul Asäfa to Aklilu. On Internal Political Conflict in Somaliaôs Government: *Ṭir* 15, 1950 E.C (24 Jan. 1958); Kätäma Yifru (Assistant Minister, MoFA) to Consul Asäfa. On the Upcoming Parliamentary Election: *Ṭir* 16, 1950 E.C (25 Jan. 1958); Consul Asäfa to Aklilu. On the Conflict between the Dagil-Marfile and the Somali Government: *Ṭir* 29, 1950 E.C (7 Feb. 1958); Consul Asäfa to Gaġaw Zäläqä (State Minister for Foreign Affairs). On SYL Internal Division: *Miyazya* 11, 1950 E.C (19 April 1958). For discussion of Somaliaôs unique parliamentary tradition between 1960 and 1969 see Alice B. Hashim, ñSomalia: State Failure, State Collapse, the Possibilities for State Reconstitution,ò in *Beyond State Failure and Collapse: Making the State Relevant in Africa*. Edited by George Klay Kieh Jr. (New York, Toronto & Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2007): 204.

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he parliamentary election of 1958 was postponed, to the delight of Ethiopian officials, Aden Abdulla managed to win the presidency of both the ruling party and the legislative assembly.[5]



Map Showing Areas Occupied by Somali Clans (Gilkes 1994, 30)

However, a sentiment started to spread in Mogadisho associating Ethiopia with the colonial powers and particularly the political agenda of the United States. Frequent publications by Somali press started to openly disseminate this attitude, and rumors began to circulate widely to the effect that Ethiopian troops were in readiness to invade Somalia as soon as the Italian administration left the territory. The Ethiopian consul-

[5] *Ibid*, Consul Asäfa to Gaġaw. On SYL Internal Conflict and Parliamentary Elections: *Miyazya* 23 (1 May) & *Säné* 3, 23, 1950 E.C (10, 30 June 1958).

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opean powers responsible for the rumor; he also warned his government of the negative implication of the propaganda campaign emanating from Addis Ababa claiming that Somaliaôs independence was unrealistic.[6]

Simultaneously, the authorities were worried about the British design of establishing Greater Somalia consisting of the Ogaden, French Somaliland, the British Protectorate (the former British Somaliland), the trusteeship territory (the former Italian Somaliland) and the North Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya. Even after the United Kingdom assured Ethiopia of its abandonment of the plan by late 1957, Ethiopia was still suspicious of the under-cover activities of British officials to include óGreater Somaliaô into the British Commonwealth. Letters advised caution on the part of Ethiopia to avoid possible debacle in this matter, particularly advising the government to indulge in extensive developmental activities in the Ogaden in an effort to deter any desire on the part of the Somali people living there from joining the Greater Somalia scheme.[7] Traces of anti-Ethiopian propaganda campaigns in the Ogaden by cadres of the SYL in the early 1950s in a bid to win the people to the other side, together with the growing defection of the local civil servants (especially the police) to the other side in search of better pay, further injected a sense of urgency on the part of the imperial government.[8]

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[6] *Ibid*; MoFA to Consul Asäfa: *Nähasé* 25, 1949 E.C (31 Aug. 1957); Consul Asäfa to Aklilu. On Foreign Intervention and Interest in Somalia: *Pagumé* 4, 1949 E.C (9 Sept. 1957); Consul Asäfa to MoFA. On Growing Anti-Ethiopia Sentiment in Mogadisho: *Mäskäräm* 9, 1950 E.C (20 Sept. 1957); MoFA to Consul Asäfa. On Growing Anti-Ethiopia Sentiment in Somalia: *Mäskäräm* 21, 1950 E.C (2 Oct. 1957).

[7] *Ibid*, Consul Asäfa to MoFA. On Somalia Independence and the Greater Somalia Plan: *Hedar* 15, 1950 E.C (25 Nov. 1957);

[8] *Ibid*, *Qäñazmače* Alämayähu ŝäyeqaḍäw (administrator of Kelafo *wäräda*, Ogaden) to Br. Gen. Käbädä Gäbré (Administrator of Ogaden and Commander of the 3rd Army Division): *Nähasé* 2, 1949 E.C (8 Aug. 1957); Harar province to MoFA: *Tahesas* 12, 1950 E.C (22 Dec. 1957); Kätäma Yifru (Assistant Minister,

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Ogaden in 1957 and his instruction to build schools and hospitals in the province was the first practical step towards appeasing the Somali people there.[9] Subsequently, at the invitation of the emperor, Aden Abdulla Osman, president of the trusteeship legislative assembly, Abdullahi Issa, prime minister of the trust territory, and other prominent politicians visited Ethiopia from 3-8 December 1957. Hayla-Selassie assured the representatives of Ethiopiaôsô continued support of the desire of the people of the trust territory for self-determination, up to the complete independence of the trust territory, and pledged to assist in the economic and cultural development of its people.[10]

The representatives of the trust territory on their part stressed áthe deep-seated desire of their people to live in perpetual peace and fraternal harmonyô with their neighbors in Ethiopia and átheir determination promptly to resolve any problems which might in any way impair the maintenance of the most friendly and cooperative relations between the peoples of two African countriesô. More important to Ethiopia was the confirmation that they would do átheir utmost to prevent the dissemination within their borders of propaganda hostile to the interests of the other or calculated to foment mistrust or create misunderstanding between their peoplesô.[11]

The issue of the international boundary between Ethiopia and Italian-administered Somalia similarly influenced the course of events in the 1950s and had a spillover effect

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MoFA) to Consul Asäfa: *Tahesas* 22, 1950 E.C (1 Jan. 1958); Consul Asäfa to Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld: *Ṭir* 5, 1950 E.C (14 Jan. 1958).

[9] MoFA Somalé 15-D1. On Visit of the Emperor to Ogaden: no date. MoFA Somalé 5 8-1B-3. Consul Asäfa to Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld: *Ṭir* 5, 1950 E.C (14 Jan. 1958).

[10] MoFA Somalé 12-D1 133. Joint Communiqué Issued After the end of the Visit: 8 December 1957.

[11] *Ibid.*

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lation with independent Somalia after 1960. Upon the failure of the bilateral discussions between Ethiopia and Italy between July and November 1957, the matter was debated at the UN General Assembly. The first debate was conducted during the 12th General Assembly meeting from 27 November to 16 December 1957. At this time, the Ethiopian side assumed the position that the problem should be resolved either through bilateral talks with Italy that would legalize the current provisional line as was defined by the 1908 agreement or, if this failed, through arbitration. The Italians, supported by the British and the US, on the other hand, insisted on the consideration of all colonial boundary agreements and particularly on the necessity for mediation.[12]

Even if the Ethiopian side managed to win the vote in favor of arbitration and managed to secure the selection as a third judge of a friendly state, Norway [the other two consisting of representatives of Ethiopia and Italy who would design a compromise solution to the problem] the final assessment betrayed disillusionment on the probable outcome of the process.[13] The fact that Ethiopia had presented a memorandum to the League of Nations on 15 December 1934, on the eve of the Italian invasion, stating its southern territorial limits to be 180 miles from the Indian Ocean was considered a major impediment in the negotiation process.[14] Nevertheless, and despite growing pressure

[12] MoFA Mogadisho 3 1950. Ambassador Haddis Alämayähu (Permanent Representative to the UN) to Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld. On The General Assembly Decisions: *Ṭir* 7, 1950 E.C (16 Jan. 1958); Yelma Därésa (Head of the Ethiopian Delegation in the UN Debate) to the Emperor. Memo on the Debate: *Ṭir* 9, 1950 E.C (18 Jan. 1958). See also Getachew Tedla (Translator), *Aklilu Remembers: Historical Recollections from a Prison Cell* (Addis Ababa University Press, 2011), 143-144, 146-150.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] *Ibid*; Ambassador Haddis to Aklilu. On the Reaction in the UN towards the Boundary Conflict: *Ṭir* 7, 1950 E.C (16 Jan. 1958); Memo to the Emperor on the Boundary problem: *Yäkatit* 24, 1950 E.C (3 March 1958).

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d the Arab League, the Ethiopian side insisted on its position. More alarming to Ethiopia was the statement by the UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, to the effect that the UN supports Somalia in its talks with Ethiopia for the rights over grazing land and water in the Ogaden.[15]

Talks held regarding the preparation of a compromise as a basis for arbitration first in Oslo (September 1960) and then New York (23 October-10 November 1960) failed to bring consensus between Ethiopia and Italy.[16] The matter was then deliberated upon by the 14th General Assembly and the óFourth Committeeô in the UN (December 1960). Italyôs last minute refusal to temporarily demarcate the boundary along the 1908 convention created a stalemate. Irrespective of the feeling of dismay on the part of Ethiopia, the fact that the matter was to be resolved between the two neighbors without the intervention in any way of a third party, particularly the UN, came as a relief.[17]

In the mean time, cross-boundary raids by the army and police forces of the two parties became rampant and contentions over strategic border sites grew considerably after early 1958. Initially, because of poor communication among government ministries and to the embarrassment of Ethiopian officials, they wrongfully accused the Italian administrators of the trust territory of crossing the provisional boundary line in Dollo

[15] MoFA yä etiyo-somalé wäsän 3 5-26 1. Ambassador Haddis to Gaġaw Zäläqä (State Minister for Foreign Affairs). On the Statement to the 14th General Assembly by The UN Secretary-General: *Mäskäräm* 26, 1952 E.C (1 Oct. 1959); Ambassador Germaḷäw Täklä-Häwaryat to Yelma Därésa. On North African Support to Somalia Claim: *Ṭeqemt* 2, 1952 E.C (13 Oct. 1959); Ambassador Gäbrä-Mäsqäl Keflä-Igzi (Cairo) to Yelma. On Arab League Support to Somalia: *Mäskäräm* 27, 1952 E.C (8 Oct. 1959).

[16] MoFA yä etiyo-somalé wäsän 3 5-26 . Ambassador Haddis to Yelma Därésa (Minister of Foreign Affairs). On the Boundary Talks: *Hedar* 14, 1952 E.C (24 Nov. 1959).

[17] *Ibid*, Ambassador Haddis to Yelma Därésa. On the Boundary Talks During the 14th General Assembly Meeting: *Tahesas* 4, 1952 E.C (14 Nov. 1959).

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d later on, it was Ethiopian troops who actually illegally crossed the line, occupied Dollo-Bado, Dollo Bay, Hillo Shid, Ferfer and Galkayo.[19] According to some documents, in view of the growing condemnation of Ethiopia in Mogadisho, it was felt that it would be politic if the Ethiopian troops left as a sign of good will.[20]

These incidents prompted the call for speedy identification on the ground of the international line, at least from the side of Ethiopia, and the reorganization of Ethiopian forces for possible future conflict on the matter.[21] Cross-boundary transgressions by the Somali police and propaganda missions by their officials began in earnest in early August 1958. Soon afterwards, the call for immediate deployment of Ethiopian police force along the provisional line intensified. The attempt by Somali forces to forcibly occupy the Dollo military camp (Bale region) in early August particularly necessitated the involvement of the central public security apparatus. Parallel to the decision to evacuate the territories mistakenly occupied well inside the provisional line, the authorities insisted

[18] MoFA Mogadisho 5 1. Consul Asäfa to Gagaw. On Submitting Statement of Protest to Italian Administrators: *Yäkatit* 1950 E.C (Feb. 1958); Kätäma Yifru to the Emperor. Memo on the Embarrassing Wrongful Accusation and its Causes: *Mägabit* 20, 1950 E.C (29 March 1958); Col. Keflé Ergäşu (Viceroy of Harar Province) to Major Wärqenäh Gäbäyähu (Director of Public Security). On the Wrong Report of Somali Infringement into Dollo: *Miyazya* 8, 1950 E.C (16 April 1958).

[19] MoFA Mogadisho 5 2. Col. Keflé Ergäşu to Mäkonnen Häbtä-Wäld (Minister of Interior). On Ethiopian Troops Crossing the Boundary Line and Occupying Somali Territories: *Hamlé* 26, 1950 E.C (2 Aug. 1958); Consul Asäfa to MoFA: *Hamlé* 29, 1950 E.C (5 Aug. 1958); *Blatta* Sirak Heruy (State Minister for Foreign Affairs) to Col. Keflé Ergäşu (Viceroy, Harar): *Nähasé* 2, 1950 E.C (8 Aug. 1958).

[20] MoFA Mogadisho 5 1. Consul Asäfa to MoFA: *Hamlé* 18, 1950 E.C (25 July 1958); Memo on the Speech of Abdullahi Issa to the legislative Assembly on this Regard: July 21, 1958. MoFA Mogadisho 5 2. *Blatta* Sirak Heruy to Mäkonnen Häbtä-Wäld. On Evacuation of Ethiopian Troops and Holding on to Dollo: *Nähasé* 5, 1950 E.C (11 Aug. 1958).

[21] MoFA Mogadisho 3 1. Ministry of Defense to MoFA. On the Need for Identification of the Provisional Boundary Line: *Miyazya* 24, 1950 E.C (2 May 1958). MoFA Mogadisho 5 1. Major Wärqenäh Gäbäyähu to Col. Keflé: *Hamlé* 22, 1950 E.C (29 July 1958); *Blatta* Sirak Heruy to Mäkonnen Häbtä-Wäld (Minister of Interior): *Hamlé* 28, 1950 E.C (4 Aug. 1958).

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and that every action should be taken to retain it.[22] In addition, an instruction was issued to unilaterally demarcate the boundary between Ethiopia and the trust territory of Somalia, i.e. from Greenwich 48ô east longitude and 8ô north latitude to the junction of the Genale-Dawa Rivers.[23] In the mean time, Somaliaôs incursions continued to grow both in magnitude and proportion.

In a bid to positively influence the relation between the two, the imperial regime attempted to court some political parties and figures in the trust territory of Somalia. The December 1957 visit of Aden Abdulla Osman and Abdullahi Issa to Addis Ababa and the friendly attitude they maintained throughout the 1950s was the first step in this direction. In addition, closer contact was established with an opposition group, the Somali Youth Liberal Party, and its president, Mohamed Mahmud Borako. The latterôs letter addressed to the emperor in 1958, for example, recognized the state and government of Ethiopia and pledged to closely cooperate with it.[24]

In September 1958, the Liberal Party and the Dagil-Marfile Party leaders came to Addis Ababa and requested financial assistance for the upcoming parliamentary elections. The first pledged to work towards federation with Ethiopia after attainment of

[22] MoFA Mogadisho 5 2. *Šambäl* Aeôemro-Selasé Abäbä (Assistant Viceroy of Harar Province) to Mäkonnen Häbtä-Wäld (Minister of Interior). On Somalia Police Infringements and Actions to be Taken : *Hamlé* 30, 1950 E.C (6 Aug. 1958); QäŔazmaḍe Mamo Seyoum (Governor of Bale) to the Emperor. On Immediate Reinforcement to his Region: *Nähasé* 2, 1950 E.C (8 Aug. 1958); Mäkonnen Häbtä-Wäld to Major Wärqenäh: no date; *Blatta* Sirak Heruy to Mäkonnen Häbtä-Wäld . On Evacuation of Ethiopian Troops and Holding on to Dollo: *Nähasé* 5, 1950 E.C (11 Aug. 1958); Br. Gen. ḳegé Dibu (Commander of Police Force) to Mäkonnen Häbtä-Wäld. On Police Redeployment along the Boundary: *Nähasé* 9, 1950 E.C (15 Aug. 1958).

[23] MoFA Mogadisho 3 Ṣeraz 2. Major Wärqenäh to Abäbä Gäbrä-ḳadiq (Chief Boundary Demarcator): *Nähasé* 23, 1950 E.C (29 Aug. 1958). MoFA Mogadisho 5 2. Major Wärqenäh to *Däj*. Keflé ErgäŞu (Viceroy of Harar): *Hedar* 24, 1951 E.C (4 Dec. 1958); *Däj*. Keflé to Andargaḍäw Mäsay (Minister of Interior). On Growing Somali Incursions: *Miyazya* 19, 1951 E.C (27 April 1959).

[24] MoFA somalé 5 8-1B2. Somali Youth Liberal Party to the Emperor: *Hamlé* 1, 1950 E.C (8 July 1958).

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the second expressed the desire to achieve a semi-autonomous status within the Somali state and, in case of failure, to federate with Ethiopia. A high level consultation was held at the prime ministerôs office and a decision was passed to grant a total of 117,200 *birr* to the two parties for a period of six months.[25]

However, in light of the growing anti-Ethiopian sentiment in the trust territory, the government authorities were pessimistic about the capability of the minority Liberal Party to win the upcoming elections. The division within the SYL along the pro-Arab agenda of Mohamed Hussein that strove to establish Greater Somalia and Abdullahi Issaôs policy of peaceful coexistence with neighbors and other African states further worried the authorities. The determination of western powers and particularly the United Arab Republic (Egypt) to implement the Greater Somalia scheme further aggravated Ethiopiaôs fears. With a view to dealing with these complex realities, a policy line was designed that would safeguard the countryôs interests in the near future.[26]

Accordingly, the pro-Ethiopian political forces in the trust territory of Somalia were advised to adopt various lines in their campaigns for election and thereby positively dispose the Somali people towards Ethiopia in the process. The prime minister, Abdullahi Issa, and his faction were to state their determination to fully cooperate with Ethiopia in economic and political fields based on the principles of the Accra Declaration of 1958; the Dagil-Marfile party was to assume the position that the people in its constituency had close socio-economic ties with their counterparts in Ethiopia along the Juba River and,

[25] MoFA somalé 5 8-1B1. Minutes of the Meeting at Prime Ministerôs Office on Financial Assistance to the Two Parties: *Mäskäräm* 11, 1951 E.C (22 Sept. 1958).

[26] MoFA somalé 5 8-1B2. Memo to the Emperor on Ethiopiaôs Plan of Action on Somalia: *Ṭeqemt* 1951 E.C (Oct. 1958).

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or economic and international cooperation with Ethiopia; and the Liberal Party was instructed to abandon its position of federation with Ethiopia for the moment in order to forestall the growing pressure from Egypt and the west. In addition, it was decided to launch an intensive propaganda campaign detailing Ethiopiaôs readiness to recognize independent Somalia and to cooperate with it in the economic, cultural and political spheres.[27]

Nevertheless, the Anglo-American demarche of 9 and 12 January 1959 promising independence for the British protectorate in March followed by the immediate union between the two Somali territories shocked Ethiopian authorities. The British and US ambassadors notified the Ethiopian foreign minister, Yelma Därésa, about the joint proposal a few days earlier, and they were unequivocally told of the countryôs total objection to the plan.[28] The British ambassador, G.W. Furlonge, particularly tried to assure Ethiopia of his countryôs abandonment of the Greater Somalia plan and called for measures of direct contact and collaboration between Ethiopian officials and those in the protectorate.

On 7 February, the emperor notified the British charge dô affaires of Ethiopiaôs rejection of the joint proposal; the same day, the ministry of foreign affairs sent notes along the same lines to the two embassies. The rejections were motivated by a number of factors. First, the proposed union óconstitutes essentially a return to the same concept of a

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] MoFA somalé 5 8-1B. Yelma Därésa (Foreign Minister) to the Emperor. Memo on the Talk with the British and US Ambassadors on 1 & 4 January, Respectively: *Ṭir* 7, 1951 E.C (16 Jan. 1959); The Anglo-American Demarche: January 12, 1959. See also John H. Spencer, *Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa and US Policy*. Published by Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (Cambridge, Massachusetts, September 1977), 27-30.

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ng the past 15 years, had been consistently advocated by the British Government and which would involve the creation of an artificial entity at the expense of Ethiopiaô.[29] The proposals of De la Warr, Bevin and Dodds-Parker (in 1944, 1947 and 1956, respectively) were particularly referred to in the official note verbal. The Dodds-Parker plan specifically demanded union of British and ex-Italian Somaliland, involving at the same time cession of Ethiopian territory. The union of these Somalilands was expected to facilitate Western efforts towards checking the expansion of the influences of the UAR and USSR in the region. The official response argued that the latest joint Anglo-American demarche was advanced for the same purpose and reasons and, therefore, was ôbut another attempt directed against Ethiopian territory to advance the cause of British colonialismô.[30]

Second, the official statement argued, the union of these territories represents an essential first step in the creation of Greater Somalia at the expense of Ethiopia and French Somaliland. The mid-January meeting in Mogadisho between the British Somali National League and local trust territory political figures that ended calling for union of their two territories in order to bring about Greater Somalia including Ogaden was cited as a cause for Ethiopiaôs apprehension.[31] Ethiopian embassies and consulates were advised to reject the joint proposal on the following grounds. First, the allegation that such proposed union could only be achieved at the expense of Ethiopia even if it was deemed necessary in order to protect colonial interests from alleged UAR and USSR

[29] *Ibid*, MoFA to G.W. Furlonge: 7 February 1959; Circular to Ethiopian Embassies and Consulates: 7 February 1959; Yelma Därésa to Ambassador Don C. Bliss of the US: 7 February 1959.

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] *Ibid.*

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l by the two non-African powers, one of whom had no territorial rights or interests in the Horn, was presented as a ófait accompli without prior consultation concerning Ethiopiaô. Third, the combined attempt of the British and American governments to force adoption of the proposal was directed against the territorial integrity of a member of the UN. The final statement underlined the fact that óEthiopia will oppose by every means all attempts by either or both British or American Governments to persist in their present policy vis-a-vis Ethiopia or Greater Somaliland whether by the proposed union or declarationô.[32]

Ethiopiaôs rejection of the union plan between the British protectorate and the Italian trusteeship was similarly communicated to Somali political leaders in Hargessa and Mogadisho. The message to the president of the National United Front (NUF, British protectorate) warned the latter against his claim over the Ogaden; the one to Abdullahi Issa protested against the proposed merger and outlined the unfeasibility of the plan.[33] Abdullahi Issa in his response, after reiterating his governmentôs desire to maintain and develop friendly and neighborly relation with Ethiopia, expressed the disillusionment Ethiopiaôs protest had aroused in Mogadisho. He expressed the unanimous regret felt within his administration regarding Ethiopiaôs position and pleaded that the emperor should reexamine the decision ótaking into account the relation between Ethiopia and

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] MoFA färänsay somalé 1 776-2. Yelma to President of the NUF: *Yäkatit* 14, 1951 E.C (22 Feb. 1959); Yelma to Abdullahi Issa: 17 February 1959.

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ecisions which will ameliorate and renders it fruitfulâ[34]

The response from the president of NUF, however, was not so diplomatic:

> Your Imperial Majesty protested in extreme terms at news of self government for the Protectorate and union with Somalia by 1960 broadcasts over Radio Addis Ababa on ninth and tenth February. Imperial Ethiopian Government accepted without protest aggrandisement of Somali territory from colonial powers. Union of five Somali territories is our main aim and natural aspiration of every Somali. In view of Your Imperial Majesty opposition to this, we conclude with regret that no useful purpose can be served by discussions at this stage.[35]

To the alarm of Ethiopian officials, the Arab League endorsed the Anglo-American proposal and decided to present a resolution to this effect to the UN.[36] The Ethiopian side perceived all these as a coordinated move towards realizing the Greater Somalia scheme and, therefore, proposed immediate steps to be taken to frustrate it. These ranged from deployment of the armed forces along the boundary to exploiting the support of emergent African states. In the case of the latter, economic and political ties were to be strengthened with Sudan and Ghana; an accredited ambassador was to be sent to Liberia soon; Ethiopian Airlines should commence scheduled flights to West Africa irrespective of the overseen deficit; and particularly the emperor should make the intended visit to the Sudan and West Africa.[37]

But the situation continued to deteriorate. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, secretary general of the Somali National League (Hargesia), in his letter to the emperor, outlined in some detail atrocities committed on his people by Ethiopian forces so far and demanded for

[34] *Ibid*, Telegram. Abdullahi Issa to the Emperor: no date

[35] MoFA färänsay somalé 1 776-2. President of NUF to Hayla-Selassie: 19 February 1959.

[36] MoFA färänsay somalé 1 776. Ethiopian Embassy in Cairo to Yelma Därésa: *Mägabit* 16, 1951 E.C (25 March 1959).

[37] MoFA somalé 5 8-1B. Yelma Därésa (Foreign Minister) to the Emperor. Memo on the Talk with the British and US Ambassadors on and steps to be taken to frustrate it: *Ṭir* 7, 1951 E.C (16 Jan. 1959).

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Furthermore, he approached Ghanaian officials for their understanding and intervention to stop Ethiopia from haranguing the Somali people.[38]

To make things worse for Ethiopia, the Pan Somaliland Conference (Mogadisho, 30 August 1959) proclaimed that the borders of Greater-Somalia would extend as far as the highlands of Ethiopia. The parliament of the trust territory passed a resolution on 29 March 1960 to the effect that the goal of the government was the establishment of Greater Somalia, including the Ogaden. On 23 April, at the end of the meeting in Mogadisho between Abdullahi Issa and four elected ministers from Somaliland, they announced that the union of the two countries constituted the first step in the establishment of Greater Somalia. On 3 February, the parliament of Somalia passed a resolution providing for the establishment of an armed forces of 30,000. The aide memoire Ethiopia submitted to all concerned bodies detailed the above developments and emphasized the fact that it ódoes not consider this matter lightlyô, and demanded their views on the issue.[39]

A few days before the independence of Somalia, Ethiopia summoned the leaders of Somaliland, including Ibrahim Egal, to Addis Ababa for consultation. The authorities castigated the latter for their óunfounded complaintsô addressed to ówest coast African statesô and the secretary general of the UN on Ethiopiaôs misconduct to the Somali people. After expressing the long standing expectation that Somaliland would choose to

[38] MoFA somalé 19-D1 16. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal to Hayla-Selassie: 25 July 1959; Egal to Advisor to the Prime Minister on African Affairs (Ghana): 28 November 1959.

[39] MoFA somalé 5 8-1B2. Aide Memoire to Ambassadors of the US, France, Egypt, the UK & the USSR: 12 May 1960.

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pian empire, Ethiopiaôs position on the future of the protectorate was outlined in no uncertain terms:

> é .If you would be independent, it is essential that your independence be complete. We cannot agree to deal with a state which pays lip-service only to independence. A. For example, we cannot accept to have foreign consuls representing your interests. On the other hand, you have long opposed a consulate for Ethiopia at Hargeisha. Consequently, this is not the time to talk of any such arrangement. If foreigners administer your affairs, how can you claim to govern yourselves in independence? We would want to be sure that you are completely and rigorously independent. We are not making this remark in vain, it should be remembered that we have had a much longer familiarity with the problems and struggles connected with independence than anyone else in Africa. B. Likewise, we think that it is doubtful that your union with Somalia will help your economic viability with a population twice the size of yours. Somalia has a large budgeting difficulty already.[40]

Nonetheless, contrary to Ethiopiaôs desire, the union of the two Somali territories was realized as envisaged by the Anglo-American proposal. The Republic of Somalia came into existence on 1 July 1960.

2.2. From 1960 to 1974

The premonitions Ethiopia had related to the Greater Somalia agenda and to the fact that the latterôs irredentist claim acquired legal embodiment under the constitution of the Republic of Somalia. Accordingly, Article 6 of the constitution authorized the government to reinstate Somali territories through legal and peaceful means; the five-star emblem in the national flag was intended to represent the five territories designated to constitute the Greater Somalia.[41] The situation was farther aggravated by the domination of the SYL and the new government by the predominantly pro-Egyptian Somali clans of Darod (including the Ogaden and Majerteen).

[40] *Ibid*, Directive on the Talk with Ibrahim Egal: 18 May 1960.

[41] MoFA somalé 12-D1. Study Report on Ethio-Somalia Relations after 1960: no date.

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republic, Dr. Abdulrashid Ali Sharmake, emerged as a particularly strong critic of Ethiopia. In a speech at Hargeisa on 15 September 1960, for example, he asserted the position of the government in the strongest of terms, saying that it would not recognize the cession to Ethiopia of the Haud and Reserved Area, and that it considered the Somali boundary to be ótthe one which embraces all the land inhibited by the Somali people, and is the one which we aim and hope to achieveô. After castigating Ethiopiaôs colonial ambitions at some length, dubbing it anti-African, he claimed that his government was approaching the governments of Britain and France in a bid to reintegrate the NFD and Djibouti, respectively, into its domain.[42] Simultaneously, the Somali army crossed the boundary line and clashed with Ethiopian forces in Hodaye (23 November 1960), Eilig (3 December 1960), Disegaro (13 December 1960) and Danot (17-29 December 1960).[43]

The Somalia-UAR talks of 8 November 1961 and the statement made by Somaliaôs defense minister afterwards added fuel to the building tension. At a press conference in Cairo, the minister stated that, thanks to the assistance of UAR, his country had a strong national army; and, in case of the failure of the boundary talks with Ethiopia, Somalia would invoke the might of its army to occupy the contested area.[44] In addition, the government of Sharmake openly demonstrated its anti-Ethiopian stance by opening in Mogadisho and sponsoring an office of the Eritrea-Somalia Friendship Association. The

[42] MoFA somalé 5. Dr. Sharmakeôs Speech in Hargeisa: 15 September 1960.

[43] MoFA somalé 7-D1 Şeraz 3. Report on Major Developments in Ethio-Somalia Relations: no date.

[44] MoFA somalé 8-D1 2. Lt. Col. Yergu Endaylalu to Kätäma Yifru (State Minister for Foreign Affairs). Report on Somalia-UAR Pact: *Hedar* 6, 1954 E.C (16 Nov. 1961).

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al between the two governments further demonstrated the course their relation was following.[45]

Ethiopian authorities were not happy about the way the British entertained Somaliaôs territorial claims on the NFD. During the Kenya Constitutional Conference in London (April 1962) that formed a coalition government between the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), the future of the NFD was discussed. Here Somalia-sponsored representatives of the district pressed strongly for the holding of a plebiscite in the area, and a conclusion was reached to undertake an investigation by an independent commission in order to ascertain public opinion.[46] Ethiopiaôs reaction to this warned of Somaliaôs ulterior motive and cautioned the UK to be wary of its decisions:

> é .The Imperial Ethiopian Government, therefore, would like to recall that it has always put on record its opposition to any breakaway or secessionist tendency anywhere in Africa or the rest of the world for that matter. With this belief it has committed its armed forces to the UN in their effort to reintegrate the Katanga with the rest of the Congo. So it is with the above in mind that the Imperial Government would like to assure itself that the setting up of the proposed investigating commission is not misunderstood as to mean that Her Majestyôs Government is making any concession in principle and that the activities of the proposed commission does not result in any infavorable [sic.] consequence on Kenyaôs territorial integrity and general peace and stability in this part of Africa.[47]

Immediately afterwards, Somalia launched an extensive propaganda campaign against Ethiopia, openly entertained anti-Ethiopian elements and the prime minister made public statement during a mass rally in Mogadisho to the effect that his country was ready for armed confrontation and could easily defeat the Ethiopian army. Ethiopiaôs

[45] MoFA somalé 12-D1 132. Kätäma to Sharmake: 6 January 1962; Sharmake to Kätäma: 3 March 1962.

[46] *Ibid*, British Embassyôs Aide Memoire. On Her Majestyôs Governmentôs Notes on Northern Kenya and the Kenya Constitutional Conference: 9 April 1962.

[47] *Ibid*, MoFA Aide Memoire. The Ethiopian Governmentôs Reply: 12 April 1962.

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sending protest notes to the government of Sharmake and all diplomatic missions in Addis Ababa, notifying them of the situation and warning that the other party would assume full responsibility for whatever actions Ethiopia would take in the future: ôSomalia appears committed to an aggressive expansionist policy which, unless renounced and her claims to territories in neighboring states abandoned, could lead to the gravest consequencesô.[48] Ethiopiaôs permanent representative to the UN, Keflé Wädajo, was also instructed to convey this message to the secretary general, U Thant, making it clear that Ethiopia was ônot repeat not requesting interventionô from the international organization.[49]

Ethiopiaôs reaction to the impending danger came first in the form of the complete overhaul of the administrative structure of the contested territory, i.e. the Ogaden. In August 1961, the region was accorded a status of a governorate-general; the previous administration of one *awraja* (sub-province), ten *wäräda* (district) and twenty-nine sub-*wäräda* now constituted four *awrajas* (Qäbridähar, Dägähabur, Wälwäl & Wardér and Qälafo) and twenty-three *wäräda*. As justification, it was claimed that the measure was necessary to facilitate local administration and bring about the unification of clan-based Somali people residing in the region and boost the efforts of the central government in warding off irredentist claims from the other side of the boundary.[50]

Gestures also started to appear on the part of Ethiopia to approach opposition parties both in Mogadisho and Hargeisa. The Ethiopian embassy was instrumental in contacting

[48] *Ibid*, Memorandum to African Embassies in Addis Ababa: 14 April 1962; Memo on Ethio-Somalia Relations: *Miyazya* 10, *1954 E.C (18 April 1962).*

[49] *Ibid,* Instruction to *Ato* Keflé Wädajo: 19 April 1962.

[50] MoFA Ogaden 2 331. Report on the Restructuring of Ogaden: *Nähasé* 1953 E.C (Aug. 1961).

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striving to coexist peacefully with their northern neighbor. Among those who proposed joint venture with Ethiopia and requested financial assistance were the Somali Pan-African Organization and the Somalia Independent Constitutional Party. The petition the latter submitted to the president of the republic, Aden Abdulla Osman, on 12 December 1961, deeming the union of the two Somalis a mistake and not viable economically, caught the attention of Ethiopia. Ethiopiaôs ambassador, Ahadu Saburé, immediately approached the chairman of the party, Mohamed Ahmed Bafo, and decided to send him to Addis Ababa for further consultation.[51]

The December 1961 mutiny in Mogadisho by northern army officers that condemned the total domination of Somaliaôs economic and political life by the southerners and demanded separation opened a window of opportunity for Ethiopia. A similar uprising occurred in Hargeisa, which Egyptian and Somali officials claimed was incited by Ethiopia. In order to exploit the situation to Ethiopiaôs advantage, its Mogadisho embassy forwarded a proposal to open a consulate in Hargeisa. In a parallel development, a clan leader (of the Arep) from Somaliland (northern Somalia) approached the imperial government for assistance in their effort to unite with Ethiopia. The first meeting was held in Aden, Yemen, where the Ethiopian delegate proposed to limit its involvement to financial assistance.[52]

[51] MoFA somalé 12-D1 13. M.H. Gutale (Secretary-General of the Somali Pan-African Organization) to Hayla-Selassie: 21 January 1962; Ambassador Ahadu Saburé (Mogadisho) to Hayla-Selassie: *Ṭir* 18, 1954 E.C (27 Jan. 1962); Ambassador Ahadu to Hayla-Selassie: *Ṭir* 22, 1954 E.C (31 Jan. 1962).

[52] *Ibid*, Ambassador Ahadu to Hayla-Selassie. On Opening Consulate in Hargeisa: *Ṭir* 22, 1954 E.C (31 Jan. 1962); Lt. Col. Yergu Endaylalu (Ethiopiaôs Delegate to the Aden Meeting) to Kätäma Yifru. Report on the Aden Meeting: *Yäkatit* 26, 1954 E.C (5 March 1962). MoFA somale 12-D1 133. Col. Yergu

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...net reshuffles in Somalia, which the leader of the major opposition party, the Somalia National League (SNL), Ibrahim Egal, claimed was solely orchestrated by the SYL and Sharmarke, provided additional impetus for Ethiopiaôs policy towards the republic. In his public statement in Mogadisho on 7 November, Egal outlined the reasons for the growing frustration in Hargeisa and within his party. Some of these were the rejection of the constitutional proposals tabled by the territorial council of the protectorate at the time of the union and the economic crisis felt in the country with its negative effects particularly in the hitherto relatively prosperous north Somalia. To the delight of Ethiopia, Egal vowed to remain a viable opposition till the downfall of Abdulrashid Sharmakeôs government.[53] In the discussion with Ambassador Ahadu, Egal confided his intention to reform the current government, the plans he had for peaceful coexistence with Ethiopia and his desire to further consult with the emperor. In addition, Egal requested overall assistance from Ethiopia to implement his plans.[54]

The consultation Egal desired was granted in mid February 1963. A clandestine meeting was arranged between officers from the MoFA and representatives of the SNL at the border town of Hartshek, where the latter reaffirmed their determination to separate from Mogadisho. In order to realize this, they requested Ethiopia to set a political organization of refugees either in Addis Ababa or Harar; to recruit members, equip and run the political organization; to grant immediate recognition for the independent state

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Endaylalu (MoFA) to Ketema. Memo on the Political Turmoil In Somalia: *Hamlé* 11, 1954 E.C (18 July 1962).

[53] MoFA somalé 19-D1 16. Memo on SNL Meeting in Mogadisho: *Ṭeqemt* 30, 1955 E.C (10 Nov. 1962).

[54] MoFA somalé 22-D1 11 & MoFA somalé 18-D1 Ṣeraz 1. Ambassador Ahadu to Hayla-Selassie. Memo on His Talk with Egal: *Ṭir* 8, 1955 E.C (17 Jan. 1963).

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to cover its budget deficit; to allow their people to use the grazing land in Ethiopia and while they were there to agitate the Somaliôs on the feasibility of cessation from Mogadisho; the launching of an extensive propaganda campaign through Radio Ethiopia; and financial and arms assistance. The assessment report, although it deemed the matter crucial to the policy of separating Hargeisa from the Somali republic, advised caution and patience before fully committing to the cause.[55] Soon, plans started to emerge on the side of Ethiopia to train and equip sabotage units for the SNL and to orchestrate their propaganda missions.[56]

In the face of growing danger of Somaliaôs military incursions, a proposal was submitted to the emperor to urgently establish a modern intelligence unit with its headquarters in Harar governorate-general and a border security force that would monitor the activities of the government of Somalia.[57] According to the policy paper, in spite of the agreement to work in friendship and mutual cooperation following the talks between the leaders of the two states during the May 1963 OAU summit in Addis Ababa, Somalia intensified its propaganda campaign to press its interests. Therefore, Ethiopia felt that a counter-propaganda mission should be put in place with the objectives of sowing mistrust among the clans and political forces in Somalia. Capitalizing on the economic crisis and

[55] MoFA somalé 19-D1 171. Minutes of the Talks in Hartshek: *Yäkatit* 9, 1955 E.C (17 Feb. 1963). MoFA somale 12-D1 133. Memo to the Emperor on the Matter: *Yäkatit* 13, 1955 E.C (21 Feb. 1963). MoFA somale 22-D1 11. Memo to the Emperor on the Matter: *Yäkatit* 18, 1955 E.C (26 Feb. 1963).

[56] MoFA somalé 19-D1 171. Major Dämäqä Räta (Somalia Study Group, MoFA) to Kätäma: *Miyazya* 30, 1955 E.C (8 May 1963).

[57] MoFA somalé 5. Memo to the Emperor on the Actions to be taken: *Säné* 20, 1955 E.C (27 June 1963).

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ic, it was intended to create havoc and ultimately bring about the collapse of the state.

A rapid succession of frontier clashes further contributed to the escalating tension between the two countries. Following the August 1963 statement by Prime Minister Sharmake instructing his people to raise arms against Ethiopia, a series of incursions into Ethiopian territory occurred. Cases in point were the attack on a police station near Jijiga (11 October 1963), the assaults on Dabagoryalé (12 October 1963) and Hargälé (22 November 1963), the attack on an Ethiopian convoy between Awaré and Wardér and the police station in Elkäré (January 1964) and finally the invasion of Tog-Wajaleh (commonly known as Togochale) on 7 February 1964.[59]

Ethiopia communicated its final warning in August 1963[60]; and when the incidents continued, it began to entertain putting in place a set of measures against the republic. These included putting Ogaden under military administration, proclamation of an emergency law, comprehensive assistance to north Somalia separatist groups, and

[58] MoFA somalé 22-D1 8. Bäfäqadu Tadäsä (MoFA) to ḳähafé Teôezaz Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld (Prime Minister). On the Final Version of the Action Plan: *Hamlé* 12, 1955 E.C (19 July 1963). See also Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Unity* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967), 76-77.; Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political* Guide (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 47-48, 72; Adda B. Bozeman, *Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 42-44.

[59] MoFA somalé 7-D1 Şeraz 3. Major Developments in Ethio-Somale Conflict: no date. MoFA somalé 19-D1 14. PM Sharmake to the provisional Secretary-General of the OAU. On Dabagoryale Incident and Ethiopiaôs Invasion: 16 July 1963; President Aden Abdulla Osman to Hayla-Selassie. On the Incident in Ogaden and Exchange of Goodwill Missions: 5 August 1963; Hayla-Selassie to President Aden Abdulla Osman. Accepting the proposal: 16 August 1963.

[60] MoFA somalé 19-D1, Ayaléw Mandäfro to Ambassador Ahadu Saburé. On Katama Yifruôs discussion with Somaliaôs charge dô affairs and Ethiopiaôs final warning to Somalia: *Nähasé* 23, 1955 E.C (29 Aug. 1963).

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study unit.[61] A plan of action included the following objectives: preventive action against the political, military and subversive schemes for the takeover of Ogaden as part of the Greater Somalia plan; the systematic encouragement of northern isolationism and the creation of focal points of action in Hargeisa and Berbera; the application of pressure on the regime through contacts with opposition elements; and closer contact with Kenya on the Somali problem in view of formerôs interest in the NFD.[62]

The wide scale anti-Ethiopian uprising in Ogaden since April 1963, the mass desertion to Somalia of the local civil servants and, particularly, the incapability of the Ethiopian army to control the situation led to the proposal of closing off the entire frontier.[63] Between September 1963 and January 1964, for example, sixty-five clashes occurred, in which Ethiopia sustained heavy human and material losses.[64] Accordingly, immediately after the attack of Tog-Wajaleh by Somaliaôs army, the emperor declared a state of emergency in the region bordering the frontier of the Republic of Somalia effective 8 February 1964.[65] The border was sealed off in order to check the movement of armed bandits across the frontier; to obstruct Somaliaôs nomads from the grazing lands

[61] MoFA somalé 5 8-1B2. Col Yergu Endaylalu (Vice Minister, Special Branch of the Imperial Cabinet) to Kätäma: *Pagumé* 4, 1955 E.C (9 Sept. 1963). MoFA somalé 22-D1 1-69. Lt. Col. Tamerat Yigäzu (Viceroy, Harar Governorate-General) to *Däj*. Keflé Ergäşu (State Minister for Public Security): *Tahesas* 10, 1956 E.C (20 Dec. 1963).

[62] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 148. Plan of Action against Sudan and Somalia: 1955 E.C (c. 1962).

[63] MoFA somalé 22-D1 1-69. Memo to Hayla-Selassie on the Situation in Ogaden and Somalia: *Ṭir* 1956 E.C (Jan. 1964).

[64] MoFA somalé 19-D1 15. Ministry of Interior to Bätru Kidanä-Maryam (Somalia Study Group, MoFA): *Yäkatit* 2, 1956 E.C (10 Feb. 1964).

[65] *Ibid*, The Declaration of the State of Emergency: 8 February 1964. MoFA somalé 12-D1 133. *Nägarit Gazéṭa*. State of Emergency in the Region Bordering the Republic of Somalia Regulations: Number 284 of 1964.

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ic into unconditional surrender; and to effectively make communication between Hargeisa and Mogadisho more difficult, denying the central government an easy access to its northern territories through the triangular corridor in Ethiopia.

The entire region affected by the emergency was placed under the administration of the Ministry of National Defense, ówho was charged with the defining of the region to which the emergency applies and the taking of all measures to maintain security and law and orderô. This was communicated to the government of Somalia and the provisional secretariat of the OAU. In addition, on 9 February Ethiopia requested an emergency session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU to consider the aggression committed by Somalia.[66] Emperor Hayla-Selassieôs request communicated to independent African states outlined Ethiopiaôs position on the conflict:

> é .We have repeatedly asserted that African problems must now be settled by Africans. Unless this problem is solved within the African context we will have taken a step backward and a severe blow will have been dealt to the cause of African unity. We ask your support of Ethiopiaôs request.[67]

Similarly, at a press conference on 24 February, when asked whether his government would accept the involvement of the Security Council and the probable decision therein

[66] MoFA somalé 12-D1 112. Communiqué of the MoFA: 8 February 1964; MoFA to the Charge de Affairs of the Embassy of the Republic of Somalia: 8 February 1964; Communiqué of MoFA: 9 February 1964; Kätäma to Keflé Wädajo (Acting Secretary-General of the OAU): 9 Feb 1964; MoFA to the Charge de Affairs of the Embassy of the Republic of Somalia: 15 & 17 February 1964; MoFA to the Provisional Secretariat of the OAU: 17& 19 February 1964. MoFA somalé 15-D1. Ethiopiaôs Memorandum of Somaliaôs Aggression: 9 February 1964;

[67] MoFA somalé 19-D1 15. Hayla-Selassieôs Telegram to Leaders of Independent African States: 9 February 1964.

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frontier, the emperor insisted the issue had to be resolved only by the OAU.

Efforts were made by the continental organization to resolve the conflict peacefully. The second extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers (Dar es Salam, 12-15 February 1964), that was originally convened to investigate matters related to the Tanzanian army mutiny, called upon the governments of Ethiopia and Somalia to order an immediate cease-fire and to refrain from all hostile actions. This was implemented by the warring parties.[69] Then the second ordinary session of the Council of Ministers (Lagos, 24-28 February 1964) requested both parties ótо open direct negotiations, with respect to Article 3, paragraph 3 of the Charter, with a view to reaching a peaceful solution of the long standing border disputeô.[70]

Pursuant to the Dar-es-Salam and Lagos resolutions, representatives of the governments of Ethiopia and Somalia, led by their respective foreign ministers, Kätäma Yifru and Abdullahi Issa, met in Khartoum from 24 to 30 March 1964. After extended discussion, they agreed to maintain cease-fire alongside the border; to withdraw their military forces to a distance of between ten to fifteen kilometers from either side of the border, starting on 6 April and to be completed by 16 April 1964; to appoint a joint commission to ensure the complete withdrawal of the military forces; to stop all hostile

[68] MoFA somalé 8-D1 4. Hayla-Selassieôs Press Conference: 24 February 1964.

[69] MoFA somalé 15-D1. Dar-es-Salam CM Resolution: 12 February 1964. MoFA somalé 12-D1. Study Report on Ethio-Somalia Relation: no date.

[70] *Ibid*, Lagos CM Resolution: 28 February 1964.

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as from 2 April; and to resume boundary negotiations in the immediate future.

In the meantime, Ethiopia continued to complain to the OAU and individual African states regarding Somaliaôs military incursions and propaganda campaigns. While the Khartoum talks were in progress, Somali troops launched a surprise attack on the Ethiopian police post of Dabagoryale. The emperor notified all African leaders about this, accusing the other party of not wishing to resolve the border dispute in the spirit of the Dar-es-Salaam and Lagos resolutions.[72] Nkrumahôs response to Ethiopiaôs allegations demonstrates the differing views of African leaders to such problems. After expressing his dismay at the unfortunate incidents, he emphasized the point that óonly a strong and united Africa in which the frontiers which are the relics of a colonial past will become obsolete can save us all from these recurrent outbreaks between statesô.[73]

Irrespective of OAUôs efforts, accusations and counter-accusations of attacks or hostile propaganda continued.[74] Ethiopiaôs apprehensions were apparently caused by growing military assistance to Mogadisho from Egypt, Italy, USA, West Germany and the USSR. In particular, the USSRôs commitment to arm about 16,000 Somali troops and

[71] *Ibid*, Joint Communiqué of the Ethio-Somalia Negotiations in Khartoum: 30 March 1964. MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 1 13. Supplementary Agreement to the Khartoum Agreement of March 1964 to define Hostile Propaganda: 30 March 1964.

[72] MoFA somalé 15-D1 14. Telegram. Hayla-Selassie to African Heads of State and Government: *Mägabit* 18, 1956 E.C (27 March 1964).

[73] MoFA somalé 19-D1 14. Telegram. Nkrumah to Hayla-Selassie: *Mägabit* 1956 E.C (March 1964). See also A.C. McEwen, *International Boundaries of East Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 20-28.

[74] MoFA somalé 19-D1 21. Memo to Ketema on Somaliaôs Anti-Ethiopian propaganda Through Radio Mogadisho: *Miyazya* 21, 1956 E.C (29 April 1964); Ethiopiaôs Complaints to the OAU: April 1964. MoFA somalé 19-D1 14. Aide Memoire to the Soviet Ambassador Protesting Military Assistance to Somalia: 14 November 1964; Memo on Russian Military Build Up in Somalia: *Hedar* 1956 E.C (Nov. 1963).

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northern Somalia created concern among the Ethiopian authorities. The establishment of a new government in Somalia led by Prime Minister Abdirizak Hussein in September 1964 and its commitment to build the national army in cooperation with the Arab League and the Soviet bloc contributed to the growing apprehension of Ethiopia.[76]

The informal talks between Emperor Hayla-Selassie and President Aden Abdulla Osman during the second Non-Alignment Conference (Cairo, November 1964) and the ensuing agreement to arrange joint consultation meetings at the highest levels failed to produce meaningful result.[77] Neither did the supplementary agreement to the Khartoum Accord of March 1964 that the two governments signed in Accra in October 1965, further defining the extent of hostile propaganda.[78]

This does not mean that the Ethiopian side was not engaged in anti-Somalia activities throughout the conflict. Following the request by Ibrahim Egalôs Somalia National Congress (SNC) for overall assistance from the imperial government to be used during the national and municipal elections in late 1963, a high level policy deliberation was made to design the possible course of action. It was decided that, in the unlikely event of

[75] *Ibid*, Memo on the USSR Military Aid to Somalia: *Genbot* 28, 1956 E.C (5 June 1964). MoFA somalé 15-D1 2. Ethiopiaôs Consulate (Djibouti) to MoFA. On USSR Military Assistance to Somalia: *Säné* 25, 1956 E.C (2 July 1964).

[76] MoFA somalé 15-D1 2. Major Dämäqä Räta (Somalia Study Group, MoFA) to Kätäma. Memo on Abdirizak Government: *Nähäsé* 26, 1956 E.C (1 Sept. 1964); Memo on Somaliaôs Military Build Up: *Mäskäräm* 19, 1957 E.C (30 Sept. 1964); Memo on USSR Assistance to Somalia: *Mäskäräm* 21, 1957 E.C (2 Oct. 1964). MoFA somale 12-D1 133. On Abdirizak Governmentôs Military Build Up: ŝ eqémt 25, 1957 E.C (5 Nov. 1964).

[77] MoFA somalé 15-D1 2. Memo on the Cairo Informal Talks: *Hedar* 16, 1957 E.C (26 Nov. 1964); Hayla-Selassie to Aden Abdulla Osman: *Hedar* 1957 E.C (Nov. 1964).

[78] MoFA somalé 15-D1. The Accra Supplementary Agreement to Define Hostile Propaganda: 25 October 1965.

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on, sponsoring their efforts would considerably promote Ethiopiaôs agenda of frustrating the Greater Somalia scheme in general and creating internal political havoc within the republic. Egalôs requests included weapons for his followers and financial support for his election campaign.[79]

An instruction was issued to provide the weapons, as soon as the disturbances were instigated, via Tog-Wajaleh in the north and Kurajama (Ferfer) in the southern Somalia border. A decision was made to finance the election campaign, both through monetary grant and supplying vehicles equipped with loud speakers. The meeting also underlined that, irrespective of his militant and aggressive stance, the clan-based policy of the government of Abdulrashid Sharmake was indirectly facilitating Ethiopiaôs desire of dividing the Somali. The existing tension between the north and south Somalia was cited as an example. Therefore, apart from strengthening the political posture of Egal and his party, it was felt that there was no immediate need to replace the existing government.[80]

Similar requests for assistance were forwarded by Egal and his party for the March 1964 parliamentary elections in Somalia. This time, Ethiopia was for regime change in Mogadisho. Based on Egalôs demands, a decision was made to provide arms to supporters of SNC, to replace local administrators in the border towns whom the SNC suspected to be spies for Mogadisho, and to grant 200,000 *birr*.[81] However, the coming to

[79] MoFA somalé 19-D1 16. Memo on the High Level Policy Meeting at the Prime Ministerôs Office: *Ṭeqémt* 15, 1956 E.C (26 Oct. 1963).

[80] *Ibid.*

[81] *Ibid*, Draft Proposal on Assisting Egalôs Party: *Tahesas* 23, 1956 E.C (2 Jan. 1964). MoFA somalé 22-D1 144. Bätru Kidanä-Maryam (Somalia Study Group, MoFA) to *Däj.* Keflé ErgäŞu (Provisional Minister of Interior and State Minister for Public security): *Yäkatit* 17, 1956 E.C (25 Feb. 1964).

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Prime Minister Abdirizak Hussein frustrated Ethiopiaôs plans.

The new situation necessitated the formulation of a comprehensive action plan in order to realize Ethiopiaôs agenda.[82] The multi-faceted plan outlined the continuation of the emergency law till Somalia officially renounced its irredentist activities and its claims over the Ogaden and advised selective admission of northern Somali people into the pasturelands in Ethiopia in a bid to further isolate them from Mogadisho. By way of realizing the separation of the north, it was decided to establish and sustain an organization to be known as North Somalia Liberation Movement (NSLM), under the supervision of the viceroy of Harar governorate-general, with its headquarters in Jijiga.

This organization was intended to gradually spread its tentacles to major northern towns like Hargeisa, Berbera and Borao. The NSLM was structured to represent the eight sub-clans in north Somalia and had twenty-two central committee members and two branches - the propaganda and action units. To assist this organization, a panel of political experts was set under the auspices the Harar governorate-general. An annual budget of 331,910 *birr* was allocated for running both the organization and the expert committee.[83] The action plan also designed mechanisms to establish contact with

[82] MoFA Ogaden 2 242 & 331. Lt. General Märeêed Mängäga (Minister of Defense) to Mamo Tadäsä (Minister of justice), Kätäma Yifru (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Seyoum Harägot (State Minister in the Prime Ministerôs Office) and Dr. Menasé Haylé (State Minister of Information). Comprehensive Action Plan against Somalia: First Submitted on *Hedar* 24, 1958 E.C (4 Dec. 1965). and Endorsed as Action Plan on *Säné* 27, 1958 E.C (4 July 1966). The Action Plan was Originally Formulated by a Detailed Study Conducted between ŝ eqemt 28 and *Hedar* 23, 1958 E.C (9 Nov. & 3 Dec. 1965). See MoFA somale 20-D1 90-1. *Fitawrari* Dämesé Täfära (Vice Minister in the Prime Ministerôs office and chairman of the Policy Formulation Committee) to Kätäma Yifru: *Nähäsé* 4, 1958 E.C (10 Aug. 1966).

[83] *Ibid.*

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aders both in Hargeisa and Mogadisho. This task was delegated to the Ethiopian embassy and local administrative officials in Jijiga *awraja*.

Assessment of the possible scenarios in the event of north Somaliaôs independence was also made. These included the latterôs suspicion of Ethiopiaôs indefinite domination of its affairs; the financial burden that independence would entail on Ethiopia; and north Somaliaôs likely association with anti-Ethiopian elements in the region. But, a decision was made to ignore these possibilities for the time being; instead, it was agreed to supplement their budget deficits for at least five years, to the tune of four to five million *birr* annually.[84]

The plan similarly outlined actions to be taken in south Somalia, particularly against the central government. The clan-based politics and the resultant polarization of the society was perceived as a weapon to be exploited in the struggle to weaken the republic. The document discussed the existing Darod-Majerteen overall domination of the political and economic activities of the country. Based on this, it proposed closer contact with clan and political leaders of the marginalized sections, especially the Hawiye and Rahawayn; and the provision of all possible assistance in their struggle against their opponents. The plan emphasized the fact that the main purpose was not to topple the existing regime, for the opposition groups would surely pursue the Greater Somalia agenda, but to create a perpetual political/ethnic tension within the state. Ethiopianôs embassy was especially delegated with the special task of facilitating the clandestine activities.[85]

[84] *Ibid.*

[85] *Ibid.*

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political organization, known as the South Somalia Refugees Association, was to be established within Ethiopia with the objective of destabilizing southern Somalia. Its headquarters would be in Kelafo *awraja* and, like the NSLM, it would be under the supervision of the Harar governorate-general and the political expertsô committee. It was constituted by representatives of thirteen known anti-government ethnic groups along the common boundary, like the Habergedir, Hawadile, Rahawayn and Lelkesi. This body would orchestrate anti-Somalia propaganda activities. An annual budget amounting to 98,170 *birr* was allocated for the purpose.[86]

Simultaneously, a decision was made to establish two commando units, each for the northern and southern parts of Somalia. These units were intended to respond in kind to Mogadisho sponsored anti-Ethiopian transgressions. They were entrusted with the task of making secret incursions into Somalia with the aim of destroying hideouts of irredentist elements, attacking police and army installations, and sabotaging government infrastructures. The overall objective was to create havoc within the state, to frustrate its economic activities and divert the attention of the countryôs security apparatus to internal problems. The northern unit was to be based in Jijiga under the commander of tenth infantry brigade, while the southern was to be in Kebridehar under the commander of the ninth infantry brigade. A total annual budget amounting to 61,720 *birr* was allocated for the two units.[87] The plan also outlined activities to be undertaken in a diplomatic front, the propaganda campaign, refugee management and security issues along the boundary. All in all, an annual budget line totaling 1,156,132.85 *birr* was earmarked.

[86] *Ibid.*

[87] *Ibid.*

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an intensive campaign was launched against Somalia between mid 1965 and late 1967. The broadcasts were made in the Somali language. The broadcasts were considered so sensitive that nothing was mentioned about them on either the Amharic or English programs or the print media. Only a few officials were privy to the whole process and its contents. The document was later compiled in two volumes totaling 336 pages. Dr. Menasé Haylé, then state minister for information and tourism, was the sole architect and custodian of the propaganda mission.[88] The campaign apparently achieved some degree of success, for Somali officials were troubled by the confusion among their public. At some point, they approached the Ethiopian embassy in Mogadisho and proposed that the two states should immediately refrain from such activity.[89]

Likewise, the political division within the SYL along the leadership of the former and current prime ministers (Sharmarke and Abdirizak, respectively); the growing tendency of the north to split from the republic; the clandestine meeting of northern political and clan leaders within the Ethiopian frontier (at the village of Rebadcatum) in January 1966, when they affirmed their commitment towards independence and peaceful coexistence with Ethiopia, were considered indicators of the success of the above plan.[90] Somalia

[88] MoFA somalé 1-D1 76. Dr. Menasé Haylé to MoFA. On the Nature and Contents of the Anti-Somali Propaganda: 1958 E.C (1966); Vol. I. *Yederäs lä somalia hezb*: 1958 E.C (1966); Vol. II. *Yä somalia hezb sema:* 1959 E.C (1966). see also MoFA somalé 15-D1 3. Extracts from Radio Addis Ababa Somalia Service: 9, 13 & 22 October 1966.

[89] MoFA somalé 15-D1 2. Bätru Kidanä-Maryam (Charge de affairs, Mogadisho) to Kätäma Yifru: *Mäskäräm* 17, 1958 E.C (28 Sept. 1965).

[90] *Ibid*, Col. Yergu Endaylalu (Assistant Minister, Imperia Cabinet) to Kätäma Yifru. Situation Report on Somalia: *Yäkatit* 10, 1958 E.C (18 Feb. 1966).

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s boundary raids and mass imprisonment of Ethiopian nationals residing in the republic.[91]

The contention over French Somaliland (Djibouti) and particularly the March 1967 referendum in that territory provided another dimension in the Ethio-Somalia conflict. The issue came into the open when Prime Minister Abdirizak insisted that "both countries pledge themselves to fully support and respect an independent French Somalilandô in accordance with the resolutions of the UN, OAU, and the OAU Liberation Committee.[92] The response of his Ethiopian counterpart, *Şähafé Te'ezaz* Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld, expressed bewilderment at this sudden change in the approach by Somaliaôs government towards Djibouti. While reaffirming Ethiopiaôs long standing commitment towards the independence of the territory, he dwelled at some length on previous policies of Somalia which were contrary to the current one.[93]

Stating the foundation of Somaliaôs foreign policy, as was enshrined by the Greater Somalia motto in the constitution of the republic, Akliluôs message referred to recent memoranda submitted to the UN and the OAU. Accordingly, the 25 May 1965 memorandum that stated the republicôs intention of reintegrating all territories inhabited by the Somali people into one nation-state and the 13 February 1967 recognition by the Somali parliament of Somali liberation fronts operating within Ethiopia and Kenya were stated as cases in point. Aklilu insisted that a statement by the Somalia government

[91] *Ibid*; MoFA Note Verbal to Somalia Protesting the Mass Imprisonment of Ethiopian nationals: 21 April 1966.

[92] MoFA somalé 8-D1 6. Abdirizak to Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld (Prime Minister): 21 February 1967. See also Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles against White Minority Rule* (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 301-305.

[93] MoFA somale 1-D1 25. Aklilu to Abdirizak: 1 March 1967.

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ciple of independence for Djibouti would be ómeaningful only if it is accompanied by a larger declaration wherein the Somalia Republic renounces any and all claims to the territory of others, including the so-called Somali inhabited territories, and pledge herself to the taking of all measures required or calculated to place such a renunciation into effectô.[94]

A joint declaration would be issued, the Ethiopian premier asserted, if and only if the Somali government was prepared to undertake this course of action. The 13 March 1967 press statement in Damascus by Somaliaôs foreign minister expressing his hopes to get material and moral support from Arab countries to achieve the unity of the Greater Somalia homeland reinforced Ethiopiaôs suspicions. In particular, his remarks on the upcoming referendum in Djibouti (19 March) claiming that the nationalist forces in the territory were relentlessly working to bring about the óliberation of that part of Somaliaô as óa preliminary step towards joining the Greater Somali homelandô was alarming to Ethiopian officials.[95] Ethiopia used all these statements against Somaliaôs press and diplomatic offensives opposing the results of the referendum that granted autonomous status to the territory under French control.[96]

In the meantime, Somaliaôs retaliatory measures against Ethiopia and its interests increased in intensity and proportion. The inhuman treatment of Ethiopian nationals by Somaliaôs police, the frequent attacks on its embassy and the diplomatic staff in

[94] *Ibid.*

[95] MoFA Somalé 22-D1 1-69. Somaliaôs Foreign Ministerôs Statement: 13 February 1967.

[96] MoFA somalé 8-D1 6. Directives to Ethiopian Embassies and Consulates on How to Challenge Somaliaôs Opposition to the Referendum: *Mägabit* 19, 1959 E.C (28 March 1967). MoFA somalé 19-D1 . Ethiopiaôs permanent Representative to the UN to the Secretary-General. On Djibouti Referendum and Somaliaôs Opposition to it: 21 March 1967.

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ce of cross-boundary insurgencies were matters of considerable concern for Ethiopia. This warranted taking the measure of reducing diplomatic relations to the lowest level as a signal to the government of Somalia of more serious step to follow.[97] In addition, despite the insistent opposition from Mogadisho, Ethiopia and the US started cadastral survey and demarcation of the common boundary around August 1967.[98] Ethiopia claimed that it was its sovereign statehood right to do whatsoever was necessary within its internationally recognized frontiers.

The coming to power of Mohammed Ibrahim Egal (1967-69) introduced a brief period of relatively friendly relations between the two countries. The prime minister initiated face-to-face talks with regional leaders, particularly with Emperor Hayla-Selassie and Jomo Kenyatta in a bid to resolve bilateral issues peacefully. The first contact was made during the fifth OAU summit (Kinshasa, September 1967) when discussions were held on common problems and an understanding was reached to design mechanisms to resolve them through high level bilateral talks.[99]

As a result, the two governments embarked on three successive talks at the foreign and prime ministers level. These meetings were held in September 1967 (Addis Ababa), February 1968 (Mogadisho) and September 1968 (Addis Ababa). During the first

[97] MoFA somalé 8-D1 2. Policy Recommendation On Measures to be taken against Somalia: *Säné* 28, 1959 E.C (5 July 1967); Kätäma Yifru to the Emperor. On Measures Against Somalia: *Säné* 30, 1959 E.C (7 July 1967).

[98] MoFA Mogadisho 5 26 . Ambassador Asäfa Tämtem (Mogadisho) to Dr. Täsfayé Gäberäzgi (State Minister for Foreign Affairs): *Hämlé* 29, 1959 E.C (5 Aug. 1967); Kätäma to Ambassador Asäfa Tämtem: *Nähäsé* 6, 1959 E.C (12 Aug. 1967); Ambassador Asäfa to Kätäma: *Nähäsé* 11 & 20, 1959 E.C (17 & 26 Aug. 1967).

[99] MoFA somalé 21-D1 4. Egalôs Statement on Resolving Problems with Ethiopia and Kenya Peacefully: no date. MoFA somalé 12-D1. Reports on Ethio-Somalia Relations: no date. For Somalia-Kenyan temporary accord in late 1960s see Samuel Makinda, ñKenyaôs Role in the Somali-Ethiopian Conflict,ò in *Strategic and Defense Studies Centre Working Paper No. 55* (Canberra, August 1982): 1-19.

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n agreement was reached, among others, to promptly convene a Joint Military Commission whenever there was any complaint by either side of violation of the Khartoum Agreement of March 1964. The parties also reaffirmed their adherence to both the spirit and the letter of the Khartoum and Accra (October 1965) agreements relating to the cessation of hostile propaganda; agreed to undertake measures designed to eliminate all forces of tension between them, to remove all restrictions on the movement of members of the diplomatic missions, to accord fair treatment to the nationals of one country residing in the territory of the other, and to return planes they had captured (Somaliaôs Cessna and Ethiopiaôs Dakota) as well as to exchange other confiscated properties, both public and private.[100]

The Ethiopian side failed to convince the other party to engage in discussions on such points as the disbanding of the training camps and cessation of sabotage activities, the closing down of the offices of the Ogaden Liberation Front and the Eritrean-Somalia Friendship Association in Mogadisho and the release of Ethiopian citizens and officials imprisoned in Somalia.[101] The absence of major boundary conflicts during Egalôs premiership did not necessitate the reconvening of the joint military commission. Neither was there any hostile propaganda. Similarly, the two parties ceased harassments on members of the diplomatic missions and exchanged properties occupied by the other. A joint investigation commission met in Addis Ababa (24-27 November) to sort out the amount and type of properties to be exchanged. Accordingly, Ethiopia returned the

[100] MoFA somalé 13 81. Verbatim Record of the Ethio-Somalia Talks: *Mäskäräm* 1967 E.C (Sept. 1974).

[101] *Ibid*. MoFA somalé 7-D1 1. Ethiopiaôs Proposal to the Joint Talks: no date. MoFA somalé 19-D1. Points to be Raised during the Joint Talks in Addis Ababa: *Mäskäräm* 5, 1960 E.C (16 Sept. 1967).

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ehicles and other equipment on 28 November 1967; and Somalia returned the Dakota plane together with five vehicles and other material.[102]

The second meeting (Mogadisho, 5-8 February 1968) witnessed attempts on both sides to pressurize the other on accepting agendas relevant to their respective strategic interests. The friction occurred around Ethiopiaôs proposal to include in the agenda the disbandment of all anti-Ethiopian elements operating in Somalia and the restoration of the boundary marks dismantled by Somali nationals and government. The Ethiopian side insisted it would only consider Somaliaôs agenda regarding the lifting of the state of emergency along the frontier regions once the above conditions were met. The only alternative was to remove these items from the agenda.[103]

The two governments, therefore, concentrated on general issues like the reactivation of the Joint Military Commission, the creation of special joint commissions that would design mechanisms to improve their relations, the immediate exchange of properties still remaining under their control and the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement. Accordingly, the government of Somalia agreed to pay 20,000 *birr* as compensation for the attack on Ethiopiaôs embassy in Mogadisho in 1963. The special border administratorsô commission started to meet every three months to deliberate on mutual security matters, and, after extended talks, in September 1968 Ethiopia returned twenty-

[102] MoFA somalé 17-D1 62. Dr. Täsfayé Gäberäzgi (State Minister for Foreign Affairs) to Kätäma Yifru. Report on the Special Joint Commissions Meeting: *Hedar* 17, 1960E.C (27 Nov. 1967); Minutes of the Special Joint Commission Meeting in Addis Ababa: 25 & 28 November 1967. MoFA somalé 12-D1. Study Report on Ethio-Somalia relations: no date.

[103] MoFA somalé 8-D1 3. Memo on Upcoming Mogadisho Talks: *Ṭir* 1, 1960 E.C (10 Jan. 1968). MoFA somalé 8-D1 5. Memo on the Position Ethiopia had to Assume on Mogadisho Talks: *Ṭir* 1960 E.C (Jan. 1968). MoFA Ethio-Somalia sememenät 1 5. Position Paper on Upcoming Mogadisho Talks: *Ṭir* 1960 E.C (Jan. 1968). MoFA somalé 6 5. Joint Communiqué of the Mogadisho Talks: 8 February 1968. MoFA somalé 20-D1 12. Assessment Report on Mogadisho Talks: *Yäkatit* 1, 1960 E.C (9 Feb. 1968).

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paid 112,000 US dollars (800,000 Somali shilling) as compensation to damaged and lost Somali property. Somalia returned only five vehicles.[104]

Irrespective of these positive steps to amend bilateral relations, however, the Ethiopian authorities were suspicious of the peace initiatives of Ibrahim Egal and his government. The premierôs adherence to the Greater Somalia scheme, as was manifested by his various remarks, and similar statements by the Somali parliament and officials and the SYL, added to Ethiopiaôs apprehension. The policy papers prepared during these talks advised caution and being prepared for any future confrontation with the republic. Nonetheless, Egal appeared the best choice among the score of anti-Ethiopian Somali politicians. The justifications given to Ethiopiaôs financial assistance to Egal (to the amount of 300,000 *birr*) for the March 1969 national elections clearly indicated the extent of the favor he enjoyed with the imperial regime.[105]

The urgency on the part of Ethiopia to execute a meaningful deal with Somalia necessitated some sort of compromise. Following an imperial order, a high level policy meeting was held in late July 1967 to deliberate on the extent of Ethiopiaôs concessions.

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[104] MoFA somalé 6 5. Study Report on Ethio-Somalia Relations: *Miyazya* 1, 1960 E.C (9 April 1968). Verbatim Record of Tog Wajaleh Property Exchange Talks: *Miyazya* 23, 26 & 30, 1960 E.C (1, 4 & 8 May 1968). MoFA Ethio-Somalia sememenät 1 5. Verbal of Properties Ethiopia Returned to Somalia: *Yäkatit* 1960 E.C (Feb. 1968). MoFA somalé 12-D1. Study Report on Ethio-Somalia Relations: no date. MoFA somalé 5 5. Final Decision to Return 22 Vehicles and pay 319,011 *birr: Nähäsé* 6, 1960 E.C (12 Aug. 1968) (The final payment was 280,000 *birr*). MoFA somalé 6 5. On the Tog Wajaleh Exchange: *Mäskäräm* 18, 1961 E.C (29 Sept. 1968); Joint Press Release on Tog Wajaleh Exchange: 30 September 1968.

[105] MoFA somalé 8-D1 5. Memo on Somaliaôs Actual Commitment for Peace and its Implications on Ethiopia: *Ṭir* 1960 E.C (Jan. 1968). MoFA somalé 6 5. Study Report on Ethio-Somalia Relations: *Miyazya* 1, 1960 E.C (9 April 1968). MoFA somalé 7-D1 1. Annual Report of the African and Middle East Directorate: *Miyazya* 1, 1960 E.C (9 April 1968). MoFA somalé 13 81. Memo on Upcoming Somalia Election: *Miyazya* 10, 1960 E.C (18 April 1968). Abdullahi Issa was chosen a second alternative, in case of Egalôs failure to be elected, and 100,000 *birr* was allocated for his election campaign.

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easures was to pressurize Egal and his government to assume a similar stand during the upcoming third round of joint ministerial meeting in Addis Ababa. Ethiopiaôs concessions included selective opening of entry and exit points for traders and pastoralists (without lifting the emergency law) along the common border - specifically at Tog Wajaleh, Enguha, Duruskina and Ferfer - allowing Somalia to conduct civil flights between Mogadisho and Hargeisa through the triangular corridor in Ethiopia, but within specific height and corridor (thereby minimizing the distance by around 340km), and the execution of the delayed property exchange deal.[106]

In line with the above preparations, the third joint ministerial meeting was held in Addis Ababa between 1 and 5 September 1968, this time at the level of prime ministers. The two parties agreed to refrain from subversive activities against each other; Ethiopia further consented to open selected border crossings for pastoralists and traders, to allow an air corridor for Somalia civil aircrafts and to establish a joint ministerial consultative committee. The two sides also agreed to sign cultural, telecommunication and trade agreements.[107]

However, the agreement failed to live up to the expectations of Ethiopian authorities. Somaliaôs reluctance to close the offices of anti-Ethiopian elements was considered the first impediment. The infiltration of Somali troops into Ogaden via the newly opened border crossings and the atrocities they committed in the region was another problem.

[106] MoFA somalé 17-D1 2. Minutes of the High Level Meeting on Ethiopiaôs Compromise to Somalia: *Hämlé* 19, 1960 E.C (26 July 1968); Detailed Plan of Action on Ethiopiaôs Compromise: *Hämlé* 24, 1960 E.C (31 July 1968); Memo to the Emperor on the Proposed Ethiopiaôs Compromise: *Hämlé* 25, 1960 E.C (1 Aug. 1968). MoFA somalé 6.5. Ethiopiaôs Air Force and Civil Aviation Memorandum on the Air Corridor: *Nähäsé* 25, 1960 E.C (31 Aug. 1968).

[107] MoFA somalé 12-D1. Study Report on Ethio-Somalia Relations: no date

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d Somalia of reneging on its commitment to establish a joint consultative committee. The only practical measures adopted were the Aviation and Air Traffic Agreement (22 February 1969), the Telecommunications Agreement (24 February 1969) and the unratified Trade Agreement (31 March 1969).[108] Soon, Ethiopian officials started to entertain doubts about the feasibility of the September 1968 Addis Ababa agreement.[109]

Somalia started to exploit the partial suspension of the emergency law in the region to resume ground transportation through the triangular corridor. This created alarm within the governorate-general of Harar and the governor urged for immediate measures either countervailing the Addis Ababa agreement or defining its implementation.[110] Illegal immigration increased and Ethiopian officials continued to impound Somalia-registered vehicles that crossed the frontier. This elicited a minor conflict and exchange of protest notes between the two governments.[111]

More damaging to their relation, though, was Egalôs statement to the Somali parliament (June 1969) opposing taxation of the Somalis in Ogaden and demanding that

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[108] *Ibid.* MoFA somalé 6 5. On Trade Agreements: *Mägabit* 17 & 23 (26 March & 1 April 1969), and *Tahesas* 10, 11 & 18, 1961 E.C (20, 21 & 28 Dec. 1968). MoFA etiyo-somalé sememenät 1 5. Telecommunications Agreement: 24 February 1969; Agreement for Air Services Between and Beyond their Respective Territories: *Mägabit* 22, 1961 E.C (31 March 1969); Trade Agreement: 31 March 1969.

[109] MoFA somalé 6 5. Dr. Täsfayé Gäberäzgi to Seyoum Harägot (State Minister in the PM Office). On State of the AA Agreement: *Ṭeqémt* 8, 1961 E.C (19 Oct. 1968); On Meeting in MoFA Regarding the September Agreement: *Hedar* 2, 1961 E.C (12 Nov. 1968); Dr. Täsfayé to Ambassador Asäfa Tämtem (Mogadisho). On the Implementation of the AA Agreement: *Hedar* 3, 1961 E.C (13 Nov. 1968). MoFA somale 21-D1 1.Meeting in the MoFA on the Progress of the AA Agreement and Memo to the Emperor on the Situation: *Ṭeqémt* 29, 1961 E.C (9 Nov. 1968).

[110] MoFA Mogadisho 7 etiyo-somalé wäsän. *Däj*. Wärqenäh Wäldä-Amanuél (Governor-General of Harar) to ḳähafé Teôezaz Aklilu: *Tahesas* 8, 1961 E.C (18 Dec. 1968).

[111] MoFA Mogadisho 7 etiyo-somalé wäsän 2. Communications with Somalia Government on Illegal Immigrants: *Genbot* 5, 7 & 13, 1961 E.C (13, 15 & 21 May 1969).

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nsulted on local administration matters there.[112] The Ramaleh skirmish, near Borao, on June 24 which occurred following an attempt by Ethiopian authorities to enforce collection of *gibir* (tax) was considered by Somaliaôs president, Dr. Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, as a threat to their existing cordial relations.[113] The situation was temporarily resolved when representatives of the two governments met soon afterwards and reached an agreement to withdraw their forces from the conflict area, to keep the incident secret and to allow the Somali pastoralists to resume their customary practice. [114]

The assassination of President Sharmarke (15 October 1969), the subsequent coup that brought Maj. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre to power (21 October) and the imprisonment of Ibrahim Egal introduced yet another era in the Ethio-Somalia relations.[115] The chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, Siad Barre, went to great lengths to reassure Ethiopia of the new governmentôs positive intentions for peaceful coexistence. Barreôs first letter to Emperor Hayla-Selassie affirmed óthe Supreme Revolutionary Councilôs determination not only to respect all international

[112] MoFA etiyo-somalé sememenät 1 5. Report to Aklilu on Egalôs Statement: *Säné* 13, 1961 E.C (20 June 1969).

[113] Ibid, President Sharmarke to Emperor Hayla-Selassie: 26 June 1969; Hayla-Selassie to Sharmarke: 3 July 1969.

[114] MoFA Mogadisho 7 yä etiyopyana yä somalé wäsän 2. Br. Gen. Käbädä Gäbré (Minister of Defense) to Kätäma Yifru. on Ramaleh Incident: *Hämlé* 18, 1961 E.C (25 July 1969); Ambassador Asäfa (Mogadisho) to Kätäma: *Nähäsé* 6, 1961 E.C (12 Aug. 1969); Täklä-Häymanot Tädla (Director, MoFA) to *Bitwädäd* Zäwdé Gäbrä-Heywät (Minister of Interior): *Nähäsé* 13, 1961 E.C (19 Aug. 1969); Täklä-Häymanot Tädla to Kätäma. Final Report on the Ramaleh Incident: *Nähäsé* 17, 1961 E.C (23 Aug. 1969).

[115] MoFA somalé 20-D1 90. On the Death of Sharmarke: *Ṭeqémt* 7, 1962 E.C (18 Oct. 1969). MoFA somale 5 8-1B. Zäwdé Gäbrä-Heywät (Mogadisho) to the Emperor. Telegram on Somalia Coup: *Ṭeqémt* 11, 1962 E.C (22 Oct. 1969).

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faith in maintaining the closest of friendly ties with our neighboring states.

Ethiopian authorities were optimist of preserving the détente in the Horn of Africa following the foreign policy statement of the new government, with its promise to pursue Egalô's policy. The accompanying confirmation from Somaliaô's foreign ministry that the council ôhonors the Kinshasa Declaration of Understanding and the subsequent steps taken towards the normalization of conditions between our two countriesô further strengthened Ethiopiaô's attitude towards the new regime. The initial position was to give every encouragement to the new regime ôof moderate elementsô in Somalia.[117] The emperorô's letter to Barre expressed Ethiopiaô's delight at the foreign policies of the supreme council and reaffirmed its commitment to foster good neighborly relations between the two countries.[118]

Nonetheless, signs of tension started to emerge soon. The first sign appeared when the new government demanded the return of trade trucks still impounded by Ethiopia. The latter insisted that it had exchanged all impounded properties the previous September with compensation for damaged vehicles.[119] Then reports of cross-boundary infringements by Somali nationals increased in number. The initial verbal harassments on

[116] MoFA somalé 20-D1 90. Barre to Hayla-Selassie: 27 October 1969. MoFA somalé 20-D2 90. Press Release of the Embassy of the Somali Republic in Addis Ababa Regarding the Foreign Policy of the New Government: October 1969.

[117] MoFA somalé 20-D1 90. Somaliaô's MoFA to Ethiopian MoFA: 24 October 1969; Report on Somalia: *Ṭeqemt* 1962 E.C (Oct. 1969).

[118] *Ibid*, Hayla-Selassie to Barre: 7 November 1969.

[119] MoFA etiyo-somalé sememenät 1 5. Somalia Embassy to MoFA: 23 December, 1969; MoFA to Somalia Embassy: 16 January 1970.

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ministrators soon turned to orders of evacuation from their command posts and living quarters as well as conducting adjudication among the Somali people of the region.

The growing encroachments and the changing foreign policy directives of Barreôs regime, therefore, necessitated a new action plan. In a bid to check illegal immigrations into Ethiopia, which was seen as a disguised mechanism for Somaliaôs subversive activities and expansionist policies, directives were issued to tighten security along the border and permit entry only through the four recognized gateways [Tog-Wajaleh and Inagwo or Dabagoryalé along the northern frontier and Ferfer and Dudub along southern Somali]. The directive sanctioned forceful inhibition of any other attempt to enter the country and confiscation of unauthorized vehicles.[120] This was subsequently implemented to the letter.

However, armed conflicts continued to grow in number and intensity. The Wädäbäris clash of November 1970 between troops of the two countries, which Ethiopia considered as an intentional act of encroachment, and Somaliaôs insistence of being targeted by the other party, indicated the negative change of course in their relation.[121] Gen. Barreôs statement in Libya confirming his governmentôs full support for the struggling Eritrean

[120] MoFA Mogadisho 7 yä etiyopyana yä somalé wäsän 2. Täklä-Häymanot Tädla (MoFA) to Ethio Embassy (Mogadisho). On Conflict along the Border: *Ṭir* 1, 1962 E.C (10 Jan. 1970); Ministry of Interior to Ministry of Defense: *Yäkatit* 30, 1962 E.C (9 March 1970); MoFA to Ethio Embassy (Mogadisho): *Mägabit* 3, 1962 E.C (12 March 1970). MoFA Mogadisho 7 yä etiyopyana somalé wäsän . Policy Decision on Illegal Immigration of the Somali People into Ethiopia: *Miyazya* 12, 1962 E.C (20 April 1970); Mängisté Dästa (Assistant Minister, MoFA) to Ambassador Ayaléw Mandäfro (Mogadisho). On the Implementation of the Action Plan: *Hämlé* 4, 1962 E.C (11 July 1970); MoFA to Ambassador Ayaléw: *Hämlé* 13, 1962 E.C (20 July 1970).

[121] MoFA Mogadisho 7 yä etiyopyana somalé wäsän . Memo on the Wedeberis Incident: *Tahesas* 16, 1963 E.C (26 Dec. 1970); Ketema to Ambassador Ayaléw (Mogadisho): *Tahesas* 19, 1963 E.C (29 Dec. 1970).

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eriorating relations between Ethiopia and Somalia.[122] The reinvigorated anti-Ethiopian propaganda campaign of Somaliaôs press further aggravated the situation. To the frustration of Ethiopian officials, repeated Somali publications were issued condemning Ethiopiaôs ócolonial administrationô in Eritrea and Ogaden.[123] In addition, the mass immigrations of tens of thousands of armed Somali pastoralists in the districts of Elhabräd, Alasän, Ferfer and Burukur along the Wabi River added to the tension. Barreôs government was advised to disarm its pastoralist citizens or they would be denied entrance to Ethiopia.[124]

In the meantime, Emperor Hayla-Selassie and Gen. Siad Barre met for the first time during the eighth OAU summit in Addis Ababa (21-23 June 1971) and deliberated on mechanisms to resolve their troubled relations. The leaders held three exclusive discussions and their foreign ministers were assigned the task of designing a working agenda. At the latterôs meeting on 24 June, Somaliaôs foreign minister officially requested Ethiopia to cede Ogaden; Ketemaôs response underscored the impossibility of Somalia getting an inch of his countryôs territory. Rather, Ethiopia submitted a three-faceted alternative proposal. This proposal outlined Ethiopiaôs readiness to engage in boundary talks, its acceptance in principle of óterritorial adjustmentô based on the give-

[122] Ibid, Barreôs Statement in Libya: *Tahesas* 27, 1963 E.C (6 Jan. 1971).

[123] MoFA Mogadisho 7 yä etiyopyana somalé wäsän 359. Kätäma to Ambassador Ayalew: *Ṭir* 7, 1963 E.C (16 Jan. 1971); Ambassador Ayalew to Kätäma: *Ṭir* 8, 1963 E.C (17 Jan. 1971).

[124] MoFA Mogadisho 7 yä etiyopyana somalé wäsän . Correspondences on Illegal Immigration: *Ṭir* 21 & 27, 1963 E.C (30 Jan. & 5 Feb. 1971); Kätäma to Somaliaôs Ambassador: 29 January 1971.

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bility of confederation without compromising the existing boundary.

The two parties endorsed the proposal orally and agreed to keep the deal secret (the emperor and the Ethiopian premier insisted on this) and to design detailed execution procedures. Later, fearing Somaliaôs one-sided interpretation of the agreement, the Ethiopian side insisted on defining its position on the proposal and outlining the actual legal limitations of the intended settlement. In addition, a ruling was made to establish a panel of officials and scholars who would study the proposals and submit different options for implementation. Representatives from the prime ministerôs office, the ministries of foreign affairs, interior and defense as well as scholars from Addis Ababa University (departments of law, history, geography and political science) and Institute of Geography (Mapping Agency) were selected for the task.[126]

Somali incursions, however, continued to trouble Ethiopian officials. The infringement committed by Somali troops at Dollo in December 1971 was a case in point. Frustrated by Somaliaôs reluctance to withdraw its troops away from the frontier in accordance with the Khartoum Agreement, Ethiopian officials opted for the alternative of militarily occupying the contested area themselves.[127] The April 1973 invasion and

[125] MoFA OAU 1963 & MoFA somale 20-D1 12. Memo on the Talks between Hayla-Selassie and Siad Bare: *Säné* 1963 E.C (June 1971).

[126] Ibid, Fitawrari Dämesé Täfära (Prime Ministerôs Office), *Fitawrari* Mähäränä Menda (Ministry of Interior), Lt. Gen. Abäbä Gämäda, Maj. Gen. Haylé BaykädaŔe and Br. Gen. Meherätä-ab Tädla (Ministry of Defense), Keflé Wädajo, Mohamed Hamid Ibrahim, Gétaḷäw Kebrät and Bälaḷäw Asrat (MoFA), Täkläḳadiq Mäkurya, Abäbä Gäbrä-ḳadiq, Mäsfen Wäldä-Maryam, Dr. Negusé Ayälä and Abäbä Räta (AA University and Institute of Geography) were appointed members of the panel. Ketema Yifru, Dr. Täsfayé Gäberäzgi and Dr. Menasé Haylé were assigned as negotiators.

[127] MoFA Mogadisho 7 yä etiyopyana somalé wäsän 395. Gétahun Täsäma (Minister of Interior) to Lt. Gen. Käbädä Gäbré. On the Dollo Incursion: *Tahesas* 22, 1964 E.C (1 Jan. 1972). MoFA Mogadisho 7

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of the village of Bangul, twenty-five kilometers east of Dollo, similarly forced the emperor to write to General Barre demanding the immediate withdrawal of the troops. Irrespective of the customary denial of penetration into Ethiopia, Barre issued an order of withdrawal from Bangul.[128] In the mean time, the two governments reached an agreement to exchange additional impounded vehicles by June 1973. This time, Ethiopia faced the burden of repairing and compensating for thirty-four cars, which cost around 42,000 *birr*.[129]

The attempt by Somalia to raise the territorial dispute at the tenth anniversary summit of the OAU (Addis Ababa, 27-28 May 1973) created another row, this time at the continental forum. The agenda item Somalia proposed for consideration requested ó*the solution by the OAU of the territorial dispute*ô between the two countries. This necessitated the assessment of the legal implications of the proposed agenda and the probing of ó*any limits to the types of questions that can be a subject of discussion by the OAU*ô. The memorandum prepared for the purpose argued that the continental body being an association of Sovereign States joined together by a covenant, freely arrived at, for the fulfillment of a number of specific objectives, ó*it is obvious that the very nature of the Organization and the purpose for which it is created, place definite limits to the types*

1961-65. Lt. Gen. Käbädä Gäbré to Lt. Gen. Asäfa Ayené (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces): *Ṭir* 8, 1964 E.C (17 Jan. 1972).

[128] MoFA etiyo-somalé 8 5. Telegram. Hayla-Selassie to Barre: 6 April 1973; ŝ ibäbu Bäqälä (Mogadisho) to Dr. Menasé Haylé (Minister of Foreign Affairs): *Genbot* 23, 1965 E.C (31 May 1973).

[129] MoFA Mogadisho 7 1961-65. Gétahun Täsäma (Minister of Interior) to Dr. Menasé Haylé On Property Exchange: *Ṭir* 10 & 22, 1965 E.C (19 Jan 1973); *Däj*. Wärqenäh Wäldä-Amanuél (Viceroy, Harar Governorate-General) to Gétanäh Täsäma. On the Exchange: *Mägabit* 8, 1965 E.C (17 March 1973).

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ion can carry on and to the subject matter that can be properly discussed in any of its organsô.[130]

The memorandum cited the specific limits of the OAU which were set by the principles and by the terms of the agreement inherent in the charter. Some of these were: the principles contained in Art. III, Paragraph II, referring to ónon-intervention in the internal affairs of statesô and those in Paragraph III alluding to órespect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existenceô. In light of these criteria, Ethiopia argued, Somaliaôs request violated both the principle related to the nature as well as the objectives of the organization. In particular, the request violated the principle of territorial integrity and struck at the root of the association of sovereign and independent states. The memorandum insisted that óthe very discussion of territorial claim in any guise is therefore contrary to the Charter of the OAUô. The Ethiopian foreign minister, Dr. Menasé Haylé, emphatically presented this position to the Council of Ministers meeting and managed to convince others into withdrawing the agenda item.[131]

But, the summit deliberated on Somaliaôs accusation of Ethiopiaôs military buildup along the border and advised the two to commence boundary negotiations in the near future. It also established a Good Offices Commission, consisting of Nigeria, Liberia, Tanzania, Cameroon, Senegal, Sudan, Lesotho and Mauritania, that would follow up on

[130] MoFA somalé 13 81 & . MoFA □ □ □ 91-D6. Report on the Legal Implications of Somaliaôs request to the OAU: May 1973.

[131] *Ibid.* Dr. Menaséôs Speech to the CM: May 1973.

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next summit.[132] Soon afterwards, Ethiopia and Somalia intensified their allegations that the other was concentrating troops and causing tension along the border.[133] The intensity of the conflict alarmed fellow African heads of state and government so much that they started to put pressure on Emperor Hayla-Selassie and Gen. Barre to seek a peaceful and lasting solution in the ―spirit of mutual accommodation‖.[134] In particular, Barre‘s telegrams to members of the Good Offices Commission accusing Ethiopia of plans to forcefully occupy Somali territories along the boundary before the first meeting of the commission created alarm among African leaders.[135]

The Good Offices Commission held its first meeting in Algiers in September 1973 (after the Non-Alignment Conference there). The two countries were not allowed to participate in the deliberations. But, Ethiopia made its position clear from the beginning. It insisted that any suggestion dealing with territorial concession was out of question and such a consideration based on ethnic affiliation would jeopardize the very existence of all African states.[136] In addition, after finding out that Somalia had submitted a secret

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[132] MoFA etiyo-somale gechet 1 1. Dr. Menasé to ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Mogadisho): *Genbot* 23, 1965 E.C. (31 May 1973).

[133] *Ibid*, Hayla-Selassie to Gen. Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria: 13 June 1973; Dr Menasé to Nzo Ekangaki (OAU Secretary General): 13 June 1973.

[134] *Ibid,* Yohannes Kidanä-Maryam (Secretary of the Emperor) to Dr. Menasé. On Telegrams from Dr. Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, Seiko Toure of Guinea and Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone and: *Säné* 16, 1965 E.C (23 June 1973); Solomon Gäbrä-Maryam (Vice Minister, Imperial Cabinet) to Dr. Menasé. On the Telegram of Col. Houari Boumedienne of Algeria: *Säné* 19, 1965 E.C (26 June 1973).

[135] *Ibid*, Telegrams. Leopold Sedar Senghor to Hayla-Selassie: 13 July 1973; Hayla-Selassie to Senghor: 13 July 1973; Dr. William H. Tolbert, Jr. of Liberia to Hayla-Selassie: 18 July 1973.

[136] Ibid, Ambassador BälätŞi Gäbrä-ḳadiq (Lagos) to Dr. Menasé. On the Upcoming Algiers Meeting and Ethiopia‘s position: *Nähäsé* 25, 1965 E.C (31 Aug. 1973); Telegram. Yodit Emeru (State Minister for Foreign Affairs) to Dr. Menasé: *Nähäsé* 26, 1965 E.C (1 Sept. 1973).

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Ethiopia also presented a concise memorandum outlining its position and historic rights over Ogaden.[137]

The chairperson of the commission, Gen. Yakubu Gowon, communicated to the emperor the proposed solutions endorsed at Algiers. These included, inter alia, the withdrawal of both troops fifty to seventy kilo meters from the boundary and the deployment in the demilitarized zone of a military/civilian supervisory sub-committee composed of members of the commission. Ethiopia unequivocally rejected both proposals. Enraged by the commissionôs equal treatment of the perpetrator (Somalia) and the victim, the emperorôs response (he was in Algiers at that time) suggested offhand the unilateral deployment of the supervisors inside Somalia if that was what the latter needed to be safe. The emperor insisted that Ethiopia would consider the proposal only when Somalia officially renounced its territorial claims.[138]

The official response issued later on went to great length in affirming Ethiopiaôs desire for peaceful coexistence with Somalia.[139] However, concerning the points of controversy, it clearly outlined the countryôs position. First, regarding the border issue, it insisted on the demarcation to be undertaken pursuant to the Treaty of 1908. Accordingly, the response argued, in spite of the fact that the existing Provisional Administrative Line between Ethiopia and the southern section of Somalia was unfavorable to Ethiopia compared to the 1908 Treaty line, it had agreed to the provisional

[137] *Ibid*, Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld to Menasé. On Somaliaôs Memorandum to the Good Offices Commission and Ethiopiaôs Memorandum: *Nähäsé* 1965 E.C. MoFA somale 21-D1 3. Eth & Somaliaôs Memorandums: June 1973.

[138] *Ibid*, Hayla-Selassie to Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld: *Nähäsé* 1965 E.C (Aug. 1973).

[139] *Ibid*, Hayla-Selassie to Gen. Gowon: 26 October 1973.

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Provisional Administrative Line, pending the definitive demarcation of the frontier in accordance with the Treaty of 1908.

Ethiopia also insisted that Somaliaôs territorial claim countervails the charters of the UN and the OAU that affirms the territorial integrity of member states, the interest of African states in respecting existing boundaries as was pledged in Resolution ANG/Res. 16/I adopted in Cairo in 1964 and the resolution adopted in Lagos in 1964 concerning the border dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia that recommended a solution to the dispute should be sought in accordance with Art. III, paragraph III of the Charter of the OAU affirming the territorial integrity of member states.[140]

Second, the response claimed that the setting up of a supervisory sub-committee in the border areas ówould not help the Good Offices Committee in the discharge of its mandateô. Rather, Ethiopia proposed that ópending an effort by the committee to address itself to the core problem of the illegal claims by Somalia, the setting up of a tripartite committee composed of Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan with the terms of reference of the Agreement entered into by Ethiopia and Somalia in Khartoum on 30 March 1964ô. Ethiopia also requested that, under the auspices of the Good Offices Committee, both parties enter into a firm commitment ónot to resort to threat or use of force and pledge that neither country has territorial claims or design against the otherô.[141]

In the period between the Algiers Good Offices Committee meeting and the 1974 Revolution in Ethiopia that toppled the imperial regime, the conflict between Ethiopia

[140] *Ibid.*

[141] *Ibid.*

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ted. Reports of mass immigrations and cross border encroachments were frequent. However, the political turmoil in Ethiopia accompanied by cabinet reshuffles relegated foreign policy issues in general and the case of Somalia in particular to secondary status. The insistent plea from Ethiopiaôs embassy in Mogadisho for measures against the growing atrocities committed on the diplomatic staff and other nationals residing in the republic were simply ignored. At one point, for example, the ambassador, Ayalćw Mandäfro, proposed that, in the face of Somaliaôs open attacks on the countryôs interests, it would be better either to reduce the status of the embassy or close it altogether. He also raised the issue of reinstating the emergency law in a bid to totally frustrate Somali irredentism.[142] It was under this state of affairs that the regime change occurred in Ethiopia in September 1974.

2.3. 1974 – 1991

The military junta (Darg) was confronted with the danger of an escalation of Somali irredentism from the beginning. The general apprehension was that Siad Barreôs regime had been intensifying its attacks since early 1974 in a bid to exploit the political turmoil in the country. Between March and July 1974, for example, it executed forty-four cross border raids. The early warning issued by the authorities advised caution against inevitable encroachments in the near future.[143] Encouraged by the absence of retaliatory measures on Ethiopiaôs side, by December 1974 pro-Somalia elements had managed to extend their attacks as far inland as Durwale in Kebridehar. Expressive of Somaliaôs ingenuity was the permission they obtained from the leaders of the Darg for mass resettlement of their famine-stricken nationals into the pasturelands of Ethiopia and the infringements they committed in the process.[144]

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[142] MoFA etiyo-somalé 8 5. Ambassador Ayalćw to Dr. Menasé: *Tahesas* 25 1966 E.C (4 Jan. 1974); Ambassador Ayalćw to *Däj.* Zäwdé Gäbré-Selasé (Minister of Foreign Affairs): *Säné* 22, 1966 E.C (29 June 1974).

[143] MoFA etiyo-somalé 8 5. Tayé Räta (Assistant Minister, Ministry of Interior) to Lt. Gen. Aman Mikaôél Andom (Chairman of the Derg): *Mäskäräm* 7, 1967 E.C (18 Sept. 1974).

[144] *Ibid*, *Fitawrari* Käbädä Wädajo (Vice Governor of Harar) to the Darg: *Tahesas* 3, 1967 E.C (13 Dec. 1974); Br. Gen. Maôedä-Mikaôél Bälaḷäw (Head of Public Security, Ministry of Interior) to MoFA: *Tahesas* 17, 1967 E.C (27 Dec. 1974); *Fitawrari* Dämesé Täfära (Minister, Office of the Chairman of the

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A Map Prepared by the Republic of Somalia in 1972. Source: MoFA[145]

Similarly, Somalia intensified diplomatic campaigns to solicit international support in its struggle to regain the Ogaden. Documents it prepared and distributed to this effect prior to the upcoming OAU summit (Kampala, 29 July-1 August 1975) and the plan to stage a rally there predominantly using Somalis from Ogaden was alarming to Ethiopian authorities. As a precaution against possible embarrassments in Kampala, a high level committee was established that would outline counter measures and design an offensive strategy.[146] Likewise, an expert committee from Addis Ababa University (consisting of

Derg) to Col. Bälaḍäw Jämanäh (Minister of Interior) and Ayaléw Mandäfro (Minister of Defense): *Ṭir* 15, 1967 E.C (24 Jan. 1975).

[145] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan geneŔunät 3 Ṣeraz 1.

[146] *Ibid*, Ahadu Saburé (Administrator, Hararge Province) to Br. Gen. Täfäri Banté (Chairman of the Derg): *Ṭir* 13, 1967 E.C (22 Jan. 1975); Br. Gen. Täfäri Banté to Areĉaya Uqbägzy (State Minister for Foreign Affairs): *Ṭir* 24, 1967 E.C (2 Feb. 1975); *Fitawrari* Dämesé Täfära (Minister, Office of the

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Petrides and Dr. Negussay Ayele) was sanctioned to conduct a detailed study of the Ethio-Somalia boundary problem. It was agreed to publish their findings anonymously as a response to a recent Somali government publication entitled ôThe Portion of the Somali Territory under Ethiopian Colonizationô.[147]

Nothing substantial occurred during the Kampala summit. If there were incidents, it was related to the contention on the upcoming independence of Djibouti and the discussion between Br. Gen. Täfäri Banté (Chairman of the Darg) and Gen. Siad Barre. In the case of the first, the two countries exchanged accusations of territorial ambitions over French Somaliland; during the face to face contact, the leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the independence of the territory and their readiness to amend troubled relations.[148]

However, Somaliaôs infringements continued to trouble Ethiopia. The formerôs actions to upgrade its military capabilities, the creation of training camps for anti-Ethiopian elements (from Eritrea, Afar, Bale and Ogaden), the propaganda campaign supporting freedom for these sections of the country and the concentration of Somaliaôs armed forces along the border, particularly in Dägob (Qäbridähar *awraja*) were among

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Chairman of the Derg) to Keflé Wädajo (Minister of Foreign Affairs): *Mägabit* 2, 1967 E.C (11 March 1975); *Fitawrari* Mähäränä Menda (State Minister, Ministry of Interior) to Keflé Wädajo: *Mägabit* 4, 1967 E.C (13 March 1975).

[147] MoFA yä etiyo-sudan geneÉunät 3 Şeraz 1. Seven Rubenson, P. Petrides and Negusé Ayälä to Gétaḷäw Kebrät (Vice Minister, MoFA): 25 October 1974; Areôaya Uqbägzy (State Minister for Foreign Affairs) to Rubenson, Petrides and Negusé: 10 October 1974; Br. Gen. Täfäri to Nägaġe Dästa (Minister of Finance): *Miyazya* 7, 1967 E.C (15 April 1975). See for example, Sven Rubenson, ñThe Genesis of Ethio-Somali Conflict,ò in *Proceedings of the 5th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies* (Chicago, 1978): 641-661; Negussay Ayele, ñSomaliaôs Relations with her Neighbors,ò in *7th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies*. Vol. 2 (University of Lund, 1982).

[148] MoFA Kenya 56-D4 5. Keflé Wädajo to Cesil Dennis, Jr. (Foreign Minister of Liberia). On Kampala Summit and Somaliaôs Territorial Claim: 15 August 1975.

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orities.[149] It was then that the call for total preparedness for armed confrontation and the reestablishment of closer links with north Somalia rebel groups started to appear. The latter was seen as a possible mechanism to divert the attention of the republic from Ethiopia and engage it perpetually in internal conflict.

The January 1976 talks between Gen. Täfäri and Gen. Barre (Addis Ababa) equally failed to bring the much desired rapprochement between the two states. Ethiopia raised once again the possibility of confederation, asked for the reinstatement of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level, urged the renouncement of Somali smear campaigns labeling Ethiopia ôBlack Colonialistô and the return of its fighter jet that had crushed in Somalia during ótraining maneuverô. In his response, Gen. Barre concentrated on the feasibility of confederation and made general statements regarding the willingness of his government to mend relations with Ethiopia.[150]

Nonetheless, the two governments intensified their accusation against the otherôs preparedness for war. The Ethiopian side claimed that the consensus in Somalia was ôbelieving that any change of the magnitude that took place in Ethiopia would inevitably lead to a period of unsettling conditions é , as far as Somaliaôs territorial objective in

[149] MoFA somalé 18-D1 2. Häylu Käbädä (Charge de Affairs, Mogadisho) to Géta፤äw Kebrät (Permanent Representative of the Derg in MoFA). On Somaliaôs Intentions for Open War: *Mäskäräm* 5, 1968 E.C (16 Sept. 1975). MoFA Ethio-Somale 8 5. *Qäñazmače* Abdullahi Bade (Deputy Administrator of Hararge Province) to Ministry of Interior. Report on Somaliaôs Military Built up along the Border: *Mäskäräm* 5, 1968 E.C (16 Sept. 1975); Lt. Col. Lägäsä Wäldä-Maryam (Minister of Interior) to Ministry of Defense: *Mäskäräm* 6, 1968 E.C (17 Sept. 1975); *Fit.* Mähäränä Menda (Administrator of Hararge Province) to Lt. Col. Lägäsä Wäldä-Maryam: *Ṭeqémt* 16, 1968 E.C (27 Oct. 1975); Memo on Somaliaôs Military Built up along the Border: *Ṭeqémt* 18, 1968 E.C (29 Oct. 1975); Tayé Räta (Ministry of Interior) to the Office of the Derg. On Somalia Military Build Up: *Tahesas* 8, 1968 E.C (18 Dec. 1975). MoFA Somale 21-D1 4. Major Häylä-Maryam Léncho (Administrator of Bale Province) to Lt. Col. Lägäsä Wäldä-Maryam. On Insurgent Activities in Bale: *Tahesas* 13, 1968 E.C (23 Dec. 1975).

[150] MoFA Kenya 56-D4 5. Minutes of the Talk between Gen. Täfäri and Gen. Barre: *Ṭir* 4, 1968 E.C (13 Jan. 1976).

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ould not be a more propitious timeô.[151] Ethiopia was also worried about the growing insurgency activities in Mandéra, Bulhawäy and Mälka-Softu along the Shebelle/Dawa River, and the Cuba-North Korea sponsored rebel training camps in Bäläd wäyn.[152] By mid 1976, Somaliaôs military buildup along the border and armed insurgencies in Harar, Bale and Sidamo had reached a high level. Somalia also intensified the propaganda campaigns among the Somalis of Ethiopian nationality. This time Ethiopian authorities were certain that an open war was inevitable.[153]

The Soviet Union, as a nation friendly to both the conflicting parties, attempted to resolve the problem peacefully. Russia put forward a proposal for mediation during the visit of Ethiopiaôs high level delegation to Moscow in May 1977. While accepting the offer, Ethiopia insisted that Somalia had to acknowledge the existing boundaries as delimited during the colonial times and renounce its territorial claims over the Ogaden. Ethiopiaôs position was that, as long as Somalia remained in the Socialist camp and the terms of reference of the Soviet mediation did not refer to discussions on territorial dispute, it would participate in the dialogue.[154]

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[151] MoFA somalé 20-D1 90. Ethiopiaôs Memorandum Titled ôWar Clouds in the Horn of Africaô and ôSamples of Recent Somalia Propagandaô 12 January 1976. See also MoFA Ethio-Somalia 8 5. Somaliaôs Note Verbal Accusing Ethiopia of Armed Encroachment: *Ṭir* 8, 1968 E.C (17 Jan. 1976).

[152] MoFA somalé 21-D1 2. Alämayähu Kassa (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces) to Ministry of Defense: *Miyazya* 11, 1968 E.C (19 April 1976).

[153] MoFA etiyo-somalé 8 5. Tayé Räta (Ministry of Interior) to MoFA: *Nähäsé* 4, 1968 E.C (10 Aug. 1976); Ministry of Interior to MoFA and Ministry of Defense: *Nähäsé* 14, 1968 E.C (20 Aug. 1976); Alämayähu Kassa (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces) to MoFA. Summary Report on Somalia Insurgency: *Nähäsé* 26, 1968 E.C (1 Sept. 1976); Report on Somaliaôs Preparedness to Realize its Territorial Claims: *Pagumé* 2, 1968 E.C (7 Sept. 1976); Käbädä Gäbrä-Maryam (Permanent Representative of the Derg, Ministry of Interior) to MoFA: *Ṭeqémt* 13, 1969 E.C (24 Oct. 1976).

[154] MoFA somalé 21-D1 1. Häylu Yemänu (First Minister, Office of the Derg) to Col. Dr. Fäläqä Gädlä-Giyorgis (Minister of Foreign Affairs): *Genbot* 12, 1969 E.C (20 May 1977). For the Moscow talks and Russiaôs desperate pressure on Ethiopia to cede parts of its territory as a sign of good will see, Col.

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the two countries occurred in Aden, South Yemen in May 1977. Despite the efforts of Fidel Castro of Cuba and the party leader of the host country, Abdul Fattah Ismael, the meeting proved a failure from the beginning. Particularly Siad Barreôs refusal to engage in constructive dialogue to solve the problem and his insistence regarding Somaliaôs preparedness to acquire its territories through force contributed to the impasse. Following Ethiopiaôs rejection of Somaliaôs territorial claim, the meeting was aborted. Gen. Barreôs final remark to Mengistu to óhave a nice warô reminded all parties of the inevitability of armed conflict.[155]

Soon afterwards, Somalia attacked the Ethio-Djibouti railway line (May 1977) and intensified its military concentration along the border. Following this Ethiopia issued another detailed memorandum titled óWar Drums on the Horn of Africa: March of Somaliaôs Expansionismô.[156] Similarly, Ethiopia accused Somalia of subversive activities in southern and eastern Ethiopia during the Fourteenth OAU summit (Libreville, 2-5 July 1977), when Somalia described Ethiopia as a colonialist power.

Finally, on 23 July 1977, Somaliaôs armed forces, supported by tanks and aircrafts, crossed the boundary into Ethiopia and started a full scale war of aggression. Somali forces started carrying out military operations in Dägahabour, Qäbridähar, Wardér and Godé. Ethiopia immediately communicated the situation to the OAU and the UN,

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Mengistu Haile-Mariam, *teglačen: yä etiyopeya hezb abeyotawi yä tegel tarik* (Vol. I) (Los Angeles: Tsehai Publishers, 2011), 351-352.

[155] Mengistu, *teglačen,* 352-360. Informant: Ambassador Berhänu Dinqa. He was member of the Ethiopian delegation.

[156] *Ibid*, Memo on Somaliaôs Attack on the Rail Line: *Genbot* 29, 1969 E.C (6 June 1977). MoFA somalé 12-D1 13. Ethiopiaôs Memorandum: June 1977. See also Tom J. Farer, *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: the Widening Storm* (2nd ed.) (New York & Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979), 90-110, 120-121.

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ɔn of Somaliaôs expansionist policy which has at its goal the annexation of Ethiopian territoryô.[157] Its diplomatic representatives were instructed to disseminate the news and deliver up-to-date progress reports on the perception of the outside world towards the conflict. Kenya was specially pressurized to demonstrate its unequivocal condemnation of Somaliaôs aggression. In addition, Ethiopia requested the convening of the emergency extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU.[158] Ethiopia strongly refuted Somaliaôs claim that the war was between Ethiopia and the Western Somalia Liberation Front.

The presence of Russian military experts and Cuban troops in Ethiopia and the resultant US concern over the growing communist influence contributed to the Ethio-Somalia War (1977-78) assuming the character of a Cold War confrontation. Following persistent castigations from the western bloc for harboring foreign elements, the Ethiopian side was cornered into issuing conflicting statements on the matter. Initially it opted for the downright denial of the presence of the Russian, Cuban and South Yemeni forces arguing that the country is capable of defending itself without external assistance.[159]

[157] MoFA etiyo-somalé gechet 1 Ṣeraz 2. Col. Dr. Fäläqä to Diplomatic Missions and the OAU: 25, July 1977, and Ethiopian Embassies and Consulates: *Hämlé* 20, 1969 E.C (27 July 1977); Dr. Fäläqä to Ambassador Mohammed Hämid Ibrahim (Permanent Representative, New York): *Hämlé* 25, 1969 E.C (1 Aug. 1977). For the actual events of the Ethio-Somalia War of 1977/78 see Fantahun Ayele, ôThe Ethiopian Army: From Victory to Collapse, 1977-1991,ô PhD Dissertation in History (Addis Ababa University, May 2009), 114-142; Mengistu Haile-Mariam, *Teglačené* , 430-482.

[158] *Ibid*, MoFA to Nairobi Embassy: Hamlé 23, 1969 E.C; (30 July 1977) Dr. Fäläqä to Mr. Martin Bongo (Foreign Minister of Gabon): 1 August 1977

[159] MoFA etiyo-somalé gechet 1 vol.3, Directive to Ethiopian Embassies and Consulates: 27January 1978.

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arted to change soon afterwards. Ethiopian rulers held the United States accountable for reneging on prior understandings to supply much needed weapons; the country therefore had no choice but to seek them from other sources. They argued that the foreigners in the country were military advisers, and the inquiry about their number was simply irrelevant.[160] However, the final position Ethiopia assumed on the matter betrayed the level of pressure applied on the country both from the western camp and those providing the assistance. Without outright commitment towards ascertaining or denial of the presence of external forces, the responses to the question began to revolve around Ethiopiaôs sovereign right to acquire all sorts of foreign assistance from friendly states.[161]

Following Somaliaôs appeal to the UN for a General Assembly debate on the conflict, Ethiopian authorities started to contemplate the pros and cons of this approach. Fearing the lack of trusted allies that would counter the likely endorsement of a resolution ruling for the deployment of UN supervisors in the border area, it resorted to the option of

[160] MoFA etiyo-somalé gechet 1 vol.3, Directive to Ethiopian Embassies: 22February 1978. For prior Ethio-US arms deals, which the latter abandoned after the 1974 Revolution see Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, *Arms for the Horn: US Security policy in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1953-1991* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 55-130, 131-143, 149-274, 175-264. Also See Donna R. Jackson, *Jimmy Carter and the Horn of Africa: Cold War Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia (*Jefferson, North Carolina and London: McFarland & Company Inc, 2007), 36-67, 68-101; John W. Harbeson, ñMilitary Rule and the Quest for a Post-Imperial Ethiopia,ò in *The Military in African politics*. John Harbeson (ed.) (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987): 163-185; Timothy M. Shaw and M. Catharine, ñDependence or Interdependence: Africa in the Global Political Economy,ò in *Aspects of International Relations in Africa*. Mark W. DeLancey (ed.) (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1979): 71; J. Barron Boyd Jr., ñThe Origin of Boundary Conflict in Africa,ò in *Aspects of International Relations in Africa*. Mark W. DeLancey (ed.) (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1979): 165-171; Patrick J. McGowan and Thomas H. Johnson, ñThe Africa project and the Comparative Study of African Foreign Policy,ò in *Aspects of International Relations in Africa*. Mark W. DeLancey (ed.) (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1979): 204, 210-211.

[161] MoFA etiyo-somalé gechet 1 vol.3, Directive to Ethiopian Embassies: 9 March 1978.

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he continental organization if it comes to the worst and by military means if necessary.

The OAU, after deliberating on the issue, decided to reconvene the Good Offices Commission in Libreville, Gabon (5-8 August 1977). The commission issued a recommendation whereby it requested the warring parties, in accordance with the Charter of the OAU, ‘to respect the borders existing at independence as well as adherence to the cardinal principle of holding inviolate the sovereign and territorial integrity of member states’; and to cease all acts of hostility. It also denounced the interference of ‘extra-African powers in the internal affairs of OAU member states’ (a reference to USSR and Cuba in Ethiopia and USA in Somalia).[163] Irrespective of Somalia’s strong objections, Ethiopia unilaterally communicated this recommendation to the UN and friendly states.[164]

On 7 September, the Darg ruled that ‘no useful purpose will be served by the continuation of diplomatic relations between the two countries’ and therefore decided to severe diplomatic relations with Somalia. Simultaneously, Somalia’s chargé d ’affaires as well as all staff of the embassy with the exception of locally recruited personnel were ordered to leave the country within forty-eight hours.[165] In addition, Ethiopia requested

[162] MoFA etiyo-somalé gechet 1 vol.2. Policy Paper: *Nähasé* 24, 1969 E.C (30 Aug. 1977); Col. Dr. Fäläqä to Ambassador Mängisté Dästa (Nairobi): *Ṭeqémt* 23, 1970 E.C (3 Nov. 1977); Dr. Fäläqä to Dr. Särʷu (Nairobi Embassy): *Ṭeqémt* 29, 1970 E.C (9 Nov. 1977).

[163] MoFA somalé 21-D1 1. Recommendation of the Good Offices Commission: 8 August 1977.

[164] MoFA etiyo-somalé gechet 1 vol.2. Ambassador Mohämäd Hämid Ibrahim (New York) to MoFA: *Nähäsé* 27, 1969 E.C (2 Sept. 1977).

[165] *Ibid*, Press Release by the MoFA: 7 September 1977; Col. Dr. Fäläqä Gädlä-Giyorgis to Embassy of Somalia: 7 September 1977.

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d the latter agreed to look after and protect Ethiopiaôs interests in Somalia. In a parallel development, Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam authorized the establishment of a special anti-Somalia propaganda committee with four sub-units under the supervision of the information and communication division of the Darg. In early December 1977, a detailed action plan was prepared for the propaganda committee.[167]

In the diplomatic front, Somalia initiated in January 1978 an informal campaign for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Ethiopian officials suspected that this was a ploy to internationalize the problem.[168] The authorities were also closely monitoring the logistic and political support to Somalia from Arab countries like Syria, Iraq, Egypt and western nations, particularly the UK and US.[169] In particular, the call from the UK and the US to raise the Ethio-Somalia issue in the Security Council at the request of Somalia was considered a deliberate attack on Ethiopiaôs national interest. Later Ethiopiaôs position on the matter was somewhat toned down: ôWe are not opposed to a Security Council meeting. However, we feel that there is nothing it can achieve that the OAU

[166] *Ibid*, MoFA to the Embassy of Nigeria: 8 September 1977; Embassy of Nigeria to MoFA: 26 September 1977.

[167] MoFA somalé 7-D1 Şeraz 3. Plan of Action for Anti-Somalia Propaganda Campaign: *Hedar* 26, 1970 E.C (6 Dec. 1977).

[168] *Ibid*, Berhänu Dinqa (African and Middle East Directorate, MoFA) to Dr. Fäläqä: *Ṭir* 9, 1970 E.C (18 Jan. 1978); Dr. Fäläqä to Major Berhänu Bayäh (Foreign Committee Head of the Derg): *Ṭir* 10, 1970 E.C (19 Jan. 1978).

[169] MoFA etiyo-somalé gechet 1 Şeraz 3. Security and Information Division of the Derg to MoFA: *Ṭir* 13, 1970 E.C (22 Jan. 1978); Ambassador Germa Haylé-Selasé (Sanaôa, Yemen) to MoFA: *Ṭir* 15, 1970 E.C (24 Jan. 1978).

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is at the present time, as always, actively engaged in the search for a peaceful solution to the conflictô [170]

The Chairman of the OAU Good Offices Committee, Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, proposed to convene a meeting of the committee both at ministerial and summit levels in Lagos sometime between 16th and 19 March 1978.[171] Ethiopia, fully agreeing to such a meeting in principle, tactfully declined to be represented at both levels within the proposed time frame. Apart from prior schedules for series of visits to Ethiopia by foreign dignitaries, it argued in its response that ón order to ensure the successful completion of the meeting adequate preparations must be made by all participantsô and that the Ethiopian delegation could not make the necessary preparation at such a short notice.

The major reason for Ethiopiaôs reluctance to accept the proposal, as was stated in the formal statement, was Ethiopiaôs position óregarding the necessity for prior exhaustive consultations, at appropriate levels, among the members of the Good Offices Committeeô. It claimed such consultation ówas agreed upon as being a necessary condition for the success of any future meeting of the committee, prior to fixing a date for the meetingô.[172] The meeting was later rescheduled to be held at ministerial levels in Lagos in April 1978, but failed to convene altogether.

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[170] *Ibid*, Telegram. Major Dawit Wäldä-Giyorgis (Permanent Representative of the Derg in MoFA) to Col. Dr. Fäläqä: *Ṭir* 11, 1970 E.C (20 Jan. 1978); Dr. Fäläqä to Major Berhanu Bayäh: *Ṭir* 12, 1970 E.C (21 Jan. 1978); Ambassador Mohamed Hämid (New York) to Major Dawit Wäldä-Giyorgis: *Yäkatit* 10, 1970 E.C (18 Feb. 1978); Major Dawit to Ambassador Mohamed: *Yäkatit* 16, 1970 E.C (24 Feb. 1978); Ambassador Mohamed to Major Dawit: *Yäkatit* 29, 1970 E.C (8 March 1978).

[171] *Ibid*, Aide Memoire of Nigerian Embassy to MoFA: 8 March 1978.

[172] *Ibid*, Major Dawit to Ambassador B.A. Clark of Nigeria: 13 March 1978.

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during the 15th OAU summit (Khartoum, 18-22 July 1978), when the former Nigerian leader and chair of the Good Offices Committee, Gen. Obasanjo, presented a recommendation to peacefully resolve the crisis. While Ethiopia supported the recommendation, Somalia rejected it altogether, criticizing Obasanjo for favoring Ethiopia. Thereafter, the Ethiopian side objected to the convening of the Good Offices Committee unless Somalia accepted OAUôs recommendation and Ethiopiaôs conditions.[173]

The Ethio-Somalia conflict also created problems for the countryôs relation with the OAU. Officials of the Darg continued to be worried about what they considered intentional acts by the OAU staff against Ethiopia and, in April 1979, they issued a protest statement against the organization and its apparent misconduct. Two incidents allegedly necessitated the move. The first was the omission in the report of the administrative secretary general to the 30th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers in Tripoli (February 1978) of the Libreville recommendation of the Good offices Committee and the insertion of a ófictitious pieceô in its place. Ethiopiaôs request that the paragraph concerned be immediately corrected and the individuals responsible for such an action be dealt with was ignored by the OAU secretariat.[174]

Second, in reply to Somaliaôs note to the OAU on 14 September 1978 which was circulated to member states by the secretary general, Ethiopia forwarded a letter on 26 September to the secretariat for transmission to all member states. Nevertheless,

[173] MoFA Lagos Report 2 Ṣeraz 5. Berhänu Dinqa (Head of African Directorate) to Ethio-Embassy in Lagos: *Tahesas* 23, 1972 E.C (2 Jan. 1979). For Ethiopiaôs conditions see below, p.126.

[174] MoFA etiyo-somalé gechet 1 Ṣeraz 3. Col. Dr. Fäläqä to Mr. Edom Kodjo (OAU Secretary General): 17 April 1979.

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nitted six months later; and, to the amazement of the Ethiopian authorities, although Somaliaôs note neither mentioned Ethiopia by name nor spoke about any burning of flags, the secretariatôs covering letter to the Ethiopian reply stated ótha t the Ethiopian message was a reply to Somali protest during last September concerning the burning of Somali flag on the occasion of the celebration of the Fourth Anniversary of the Ethiopian Revolutionô. Enraged by the misrepresentation, Ethiopia asked the new secretary general, Edom Kodjo, to look into this matter personally and ótake all the necessary measures in order to protect the integrity of the secretariatô, adding that the results of the investigation as well as steps Mr. Kodjo might take be communicated to Ethiopia before the forthcoming conference of the council of ministers and the summit in Monrovia, Liberia.[175]

Simultaneously, there were unilateral mediation efforts by Madagascar, Uganda and Italy. Ethiopiaôs initial readiness to accept peace proposals, as long as they were conducted under the auspices of the OAU and its member states, soon changed following its apparent military success over Somalia. When the Italians revealed their intentions in April 1978, for example, they were unequivocally informed of Ethiopiaôs ultimatum in case of any peace talks with Somalia. These included that, Somalia publicly, immediately and unconditionally renounce its policy of expansion against Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti; that Somalia officially declare its acceptance of all UN and OAU principles, resolutions and decisions; that Somalia solemnly pledge that it would, at all times, observe international agreements as well as the principles of non-use of force in inter-

[175] *Ibid.*

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commit itself to pay prompt and effective compensation for the war damages suffered by Ethiopia.[176]

Immediately after the war, a situation prevailed whereby Somalia continued a multi-faceted diplomatic offensive to ostracize Ethiopia. On the African front, it targeted pro-western states, emphasizing Ethiopiaôs oppressive measures, supported by Russia and Cuba, against liberation movements in the region. With respect to the UN, USA, Western Europe, China and Arab states, the propaganda mission focused on the need to make joint efforts to frustrate the expansion of communism and the genocide Ethiopia was perpetrating against the disadvantaged groups in the Horn.[177]

Simultaneously, Somalia started to approach leaders of socialist states (Ali Nassir Mohamed of South Yemen, Didier Ratsiraka of Madagascar, Chadli Benjedid of Algeria and the president of the Democratic Republic of Germany) to facilitate its rapprochement with Ethiopia and the USSR. To the delight of Ethiopian authorities, all of the above leaders advised Somalia to first accept Ethiopiaôs conditions to enter into any form of negotiation. The policy paper prepared for the situation advised extreme wariness on Somaliaôs approach and the need to make sure friendly states maintain the current course. The policy paper claimed that, despite Somaliaôs insistence that it was changing its foreign policy directives, irrefutable proof of its irredentist claims were visible in Art.16 of the new constitution, which stated:

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[176] *Ibid*, Ambassador Fetegu Tadäsä (Rome) to Dr. Fäläqä: *Miyazya* 3, 1970 E.C (11 April 1978); Wändwäsän Häylu (Head, European Directorate of MoFA) to Ethio-Embassy in Rome: *Miyazya* 11, 1970 E.C (19 April 1978). See also *Addis Zämän*: *Ṭeqémt* 3, 1971 E.C (14 Oct. 1978).

[177] MoFA somalé 7-D1 Ṣeraz 3. Policy Paper on Somaliaôs Recent Approach: *Pagumé* 1 & 2, 1971 E.C (6 & 7 Sept. 1978).

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ic Republic adopting peaceful and legal means shall of Somali territories under colonial occupation and nity of the Somali people through their free will.[178]

Attempts were made to raise the Ethio-Somalia dispute during the 35th Council of Ministers meeting of the OAU and the 17th Summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone (June 1980). The chairman of the Good Offices Committee, President Alhaji Shehu Shagari of Nigeria, attempted to convene the eight member states of the committee in the absence of the two conflicting parties. Ethiopia strongly objected to this, fearing that the recommendations the committee would submit to the summit could be biased and harmful to its interests. The recent visit to the disputed areas of the foreign minister of Nigeria and his anti-Ethiopian remarks afterwards was the main reason behind Ethiopiaôs objections.[179] As a result, the discussions were again postponed.

Finally, after consultations between the leaders of the two countries and the chairman of the committee, the Ethio-Somalia Good Offices Committee met at ministerial level in Lagos from 18-20 August 1980.[180] There a recommendation was adopted that recognized áthat the disputed region of Ogaden is an integral part of Ethiopiaâ. The resolution was based on the various OAU resolutions relating to inter-African disputes and particularly

[178] *Ibid.*

[179] MoFA etiyo-somalé gechet 1 Şeraz 4. ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative of the Derg in the MoFA) to Dr. Fäläqä (Freetown). Directives for the Freetown Talks: *Säné* 27, 1972 E.C (4 July 1980). See also *Addis Zämän*: *Säné* 14, 20, 24, 25, 27 & 29 (21& 27 June and 1, 2, 4 & 6 July 1980) and *Hämlé* 1, 2 & 3, 1972 E.C (8, 9 & 10 July 1980).

[180] *Ibid*, President Shagari to Mengistu: 24 July 1980; Edom Kodjo (OAU Secretary General) to MoFA: 24 July 1980; Mengistu to Shagari: 26, July 1980.

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/RES. 16 (1), which stated inter alia that states undertake to respect the borders existing at the time of their accession to independence.[181]

It also underlined the fact that óan indispensable condition for the settlement of the dispute could only be achieved through the recognition, affirmation, implementation and application by both sides to the disputeô of the major OAU principles. These principles included respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states; non-interference in the internal affairs of states; the strongest possible opposition to any encouragement of subversion against the government of another member state; and inviolability of the frontiers of member states as attained at the time of independence. In addition, the recommendation called for the normalization of their relations starting with the restoration of diplomatic relations.[182]

The fact that this happened immediately after the renewed Somalia aggression (between 27 May and 17 July 1980) came as a relief to Ethiopia and was considered a major diplomatic victory for Ethiopia.[183] In spite of Somaliaôs objection and in violation of OAU procedure, Ethiopia distributed the document to the UN and other states.[184] Later on, though, the 18th ordinary session of the assembly of heads of state and government of the OAU (Nairobi, 24-27 June 1981) adopted the report of the Good offices Committee

[181] *Ibid*, Telegram to all Ethiopian Embassies and Consulates: 22 August 1980; Lagos Good Offices Committee Recommendation: 23 August 1980.

[182] *Ibid.*

[183] *Ibid*, Dr. Fäläqä to Peter Onu (OAU Secretary General). On Continued Somalia Aggression: 9 August 1980; Dr. Fäläqä to UN Secretary General: 12 August 1980; MoFA Press Release: 20 August 1980; MoFA to all Ethiopian Embassies and Consulate: 26 August 1980.

[184] MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 1 Şeraz 2-2. Ambassador Mohamed Hämid (New York) to MoFA: *Pagumé* 3, 1972 (8 Sept. 1980) and *Mäskäräm* 7, 1973 E.C (18 Sept. 1980). MoFA somalé 7-D1 Şeraz 2. Amarä (African Directorate) to Ambassador Käsaté-Berehän Badäma (Lagos): *Mäskäräm* 9 & 14, 1973 E.C (20 Sept. 1980).

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and the recommendation contained therein. Somalia registered its reservations about the entire decision. To the amazement of Ethiopia, Djibouti expressed reservation on one of Ethiopiaôs conditions referring to Somaliaôs renouncement of its expansionist policy against Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti and requested that its name be deleted from the document.[185]

The mid-1980s witnessed the growing dedication on the part of Ethiopia towards strengthening anti-Siad Barre elements. The joint Ethio-South Yemen attempt to create a united front among the Somalia Salvation Front (SSF), Somalia Communist Party (Somalia Democratic Liberation Front -SDLF) and Somalia Workers Party represented the first step. Ethiopiaôs initial position in this regard was to postpone the creation of a united front until the emergence of a viable opposition group that recognized Ogaden as an integral part of the country.[186] The establishment of the Somalia National Movement (SNM) in London in March 1981, however, added special significance to the composition of opposition groups. Soon, a directive was issued to approach these elements, to exert every effort to bring them together and synchronize their struggle against the regime of

[185] MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 1 Ṣeraz 2-2. OAU Communication Regarding the 18th Summit in Nairobi: 14 August 1981; Häylu Wäldä-Amanuél (Head, African and Middle East Directorate) to Ethiopiaôs Embassies and Consulates: *Nähäsé* 21, 1973 E.C (27 Aug. 1981).

[186] MoFA yä somalé täqawami häyloḷe 1 1. Mesfen Negusé (Charge de Affairs, Aden) to Dr. Fäläqä. On SSF: *Mäskäräm* 13, 1973 E.C (24 Sept. 1980); Mesfen (Aden) to African and Middle East Directorate. On Somalia Opposition Elements in Aden: *Mäskäräm* 29, 1973 E.C (10 Oct. 1980); Mendayé Därésa (North Africa and Middle East Division Head) to Mesfen (Aden): *Ṭeqémt* 12, 1973 E.C (23 Oct. 1980); Argaw Kabtamu (Charge de Affairs, Djibouti) to ŝ ibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Secretary, MoFA): *Ṭeqémt* 27, 1973 E.C (7 Nov. 1980); Mesfen (Aden) to Dr. Fäläqä: *Ṭir* 21, 1973 E.C (30 Jan. 1981); Mesfen to Häylu Wäldä-Amanuél (African Directorate). On the Failure to Create a United Front among the three: *Säné* 4, 1973 E.C (11 June 1981).

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opposition groups based in London, New Delhi, Moscow, Bucharest, West Germany, Rome and Aden.[187]

The contact with SNM was, however, given special attention. Irrespective of the objectives of the movement as set in its constitution, which claimed ―to promote the unity of all Somalis and protect the integrity and sovereignty of the Somalia Republic‖ and ―to support the right of all peoples to self determination and political freedom and independence‖, Ethiopian authorities accepted the invitation from SNM for joint initiatives against Siad Barre.[188] By June 1983, the movement was firmly established in Ethiopia, with freedom of movement for its political and military leaders as well as closer cooperation with similar opposition parties like Somalia Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). Col. Abdullahi Yusuf (the commander of Somalia's army that defected after capturing Jijiga during the 1977-78 War) was appointed the military head of the SSDF.[189]

In the meantime, mediation efforts to peacefully resolve the Ethio-Somalia conflict resumed in earnest. After consultation with Somalia's foreign minister, the deputy premier of Kuwait advanced an invitation for peace talks through South Yemen in

[187] *Ibid*, Telegram. Ambassador Ayalew Wäldä-Giyorgis (London) to Dr. Fäläqä. On the Establishment of the SNM: *Mägabit* 30, 1973 E.C (7 April 1981); Täsfayé Wäldä-Selasé (Minister of State and Public Security) to MoFA: *Miyazya* 9, 1973 E.C (17 April 1981); Häylu Wäldä-Amanuél (African and Middle East Directorate) to Ethiopia's Embassies in Rome and London: *Miyazya* 28, 1973 E.C (6 May 1981).

[188] *Ibid*, Ambassador Ayalew Wäldä-Giyorgis (London) to Dr. Fäläqä. On SNM Constitution: *Hedar* 16, 1974 E.C (26 Nov. 1981). MoFA yä somalé täqawami häyloṭe 1 Ṣeraz 2. Ambassador Alämayähu Abäbä ĠänquṢ(Stockholm) to European Directorate. On Contact with SNM Leader: *Tahesas* 5, 1974 E.C (15 Dec. 1981); Ambassador Alämayähu (Stockholm) to Dr. Fäläqä. ON SNM Request for Cooperation with Ethiopia: *Tahesas* 9, 1974 E.C (19 Dec. 1981).

[189] MoFA yä somalé täqawami häyloṭe 1 Ṣeraz 3. Ambassador Tadäsä Täräfä (Genève) to Goġu Wäldé (Minister of Foreign Affairs): *Säné* 7, 1975 E.C (14 June 1983); Dr. Täġomä Täklu (Head, African and Middle East Directorate) to Ambassador Tadäsä (Genève): *Nähäsé* 2, 1975 E.C (8 Aug. 1983); Dr. Täġomä to Ministry of State and Public Security: *Hämlé* 16, 1975 E.C (23 July 1983); Dr. Täġomä to Ethio-Embassy (Genève): *Hämlé* 16, 1975 E.C (23 July 1983); Argaw (Charge de Affairs, Djibouti) to Mogäs Häbtä-Maryam (MoFA): *Nähäsé* 5, 1975 E.C (11 Aug. 1983). Mengistu, *teglačen…, 434.* Informant: Ambassadors Berhänu Dinqa and Yelma Tadäsä.

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mmunicated Somaliaôs readiness to momentarily overlook the case of Ogaden (leaving it for future consideration by the UN or OAU) and to engage in peace talks in the immediate future. President Ali Nasser Mohamed of South Yemen advised his Ethiopian counterpart not to categorically reject the initiative but rather to put forward a counter proposal. He insisted that Ethiopia could benefit from the situation by way of further defeating Siad Barre in the diplomatic front and amending its troubled relations with Kuwait in the process.[190]

Ethiopiaôs response demanded the fulfillment by Somalia of the conditions it had put forward earlier before any negotiations could resume. With reference to Somaliaôs plan to raise the Ogaden issue at UN or OAU, it also insisted that ósas Ethiopiaôs unity cannot be negotiable, it should be quite clear that Socialist Ethiopia would, under no circumstances, engage in any discussion either at the United Nations or elsewhere on integral part of her national territory with anyoneô.[191] The response claimed that if Somaliaôs leadership was serious about resolving the problems between the two countries, it should at least show some positive signs towards meeting Ethiopiaôs minimum conditions. Ethiopia assured its readiness to engage in the process óin the event that the Somalian [sic.] side makes a meaningful, constructive and realistic proposalô along the lines of the conditions set above.[192] The President of Madagascar, Didier Ratsiraka, driven by the spirit of socialist

[190] MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 1 2. Ambassador Husén Ismaôél (Aden) to Goḃu Wäldé: *Nähäsé* 20, 1975 E.C (26 Aug. 1983).

[191] *Ibid*, Goḃu Wäldé to Dr. Abdulaziz Eldalo (Foreign Minister of the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen): 14 September 1983; Goḃu to Ambassador Husén (Aden): Mäskäräm 4, 1976 E.C (15 Sept. 1983).

[192] *Ibid.*

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l to mediate between the two óprogressiveô states before any untoward incident topples Siad Barreôs government.[193]

The meeting between Mengistu and Barre during the first summit of Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) (Djibouti, January 1986) was a concrete step towards mending their troubled relations. There, they set up a joint ad-hoc ministerial committee to examine and identify the areas of basic difference and report to the two leaders on ways and means of resolving the differences between the two countries amicably, ranging from the border issue to minor problems.[194] Immediately after this agreement, Ethiopia set a committee responsible for outlining its approach towards the negotiation with Somalia.

The policy paper produced by the committee advised caution regarding the current Somali peace initiative, characterizing it as a temporary gesture with the ulterior motive of buying time to crush the growing political opposition (as was demonstrated by the relative success of the SNM and SSDF) and to boost its failing economy and thereby reinvigorate its military capabilities.[195] In the event that no Somali government would willingly surrender the inherent desire for territorial aggrandizement, the policy paper concluded, Somaliaôs initiative should be considered as a temporary appeasement of Ethiopia until possible political turmoil in the future that would divide its multi-national settings. In a bid to pressurize Somalia into compromise, it was suggested that Ethiopiaôs

[193] MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 87. President Didier Ratsiraka to Mengistu: *Ṭeqémt* 22, 1978 E.C (2 Nov. 1985).

[194] MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 13. Joint Press Statement on the Talks between the Heads of States of Ethiopia and Somalia: 18 January 1986.

[195] MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 87. Policy Paper on Ethiopiaôs position in the Negotiation with Somalia: 1978 E.C (1985/86).

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ould adopt ófrom basic to minor issuesô approach, i.e. treatment of the border question before any other matter. In that way, it was hoped that Somalia would be forced to recognize the existing international boundary.[196]

Ethiopiaôs draft agenda submitted to the joint ministerial meetings included, in order of appearance, such items as respect for the existing internationally-recognized boundary, non-interference and non-use of force, cessation of hostile propaganda, exchange of prisoners of war, withdrawal of forces from the common border, cessation of acts of destabilization and restoration of diplomatic relations. Somalia proposed to start negotiations around confidence-building measures and then move on to consider the border issue. It, therefore, proposed four agenda items including disengagement of troops and separation of forces to a mutually acceptable distance of 15 km from the Provisional Administrative Line, cessation of all hostile activities and propaganda, restoration of diplomatic relations and exchange of detainees.[197]

During the three sessions of the Ethio-Somalia Joint Ad Hoc Ministerial Committee (6-9 May 1986, Addis Ababa; 23-26, August 1986, Mogadisho; and 1-3 April 1987, Addis Ababa), to the frustration and annoyance of Ethiopian authorities, Somalia refused to entertain any discussion on the border issue. Ethiopiaôs claim that the terms of reference agreed upon during the 1986 Djibouti talks between Mengistu and Barre gave precedence to solving the border issue totally failed to convince its counterpart. The foreign minister, Berhänu Bayäh, issued a press statement outlining Ethiopiaôs regret at the failure to reach an agreement on the content of the agenda at the three meetings. He

[196] *Ibid.*

[197] *Ibid.*

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Somalia of Ethiopiaôs proposal to include in the agenda discussion on the frontier issue, ówhich is the stumbling block to the resolution of the problemô, and its insistence óto giving priority to secondary issues rather than the demarcation of the common borderô were cited as the major reasons for the failure. The foreign minister warned that, as was always the case, from then onwards, Somalia would be solely responsible for armed confrontations between the two countries.[198]

At the request of President Barre, the two leaders agreed to meet in Djibouti in March 1988. During the three day talks (20-22 March), the leaders intensely argued on the merits of their respective approaches towards conducting the negotiation. Even if Somalia accepted in principle the immediate treatment of the issue of frontier demarcation, Barreôs continuous reference to the common border as a óde factoô one, as opposed to Ethiopiaôs preference for the terminology of óexisting borderô or óprovisional boundary lineô, created yet another irreconcilable difference. As a result, the meeting failed to bring about meaningful conclusion to the age old animosity between the two countries.[199] Despite Mengestuôs dismissal of the need for any future meeting of the joint ad hoc committee, a decision was made to hold the 4th session in Mogadisho ón a date to be

[198] MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 13. Minutes of the 1st Session of the Ad Hoc Committee, Addis Ababa: 6-9 May 1986. MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 1 2. Joint Statement of the 1st Session: 9 May 1986; Goǧu Wäldé (Foreign Minister, Mogadisho) to ŝ ibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Secretary, MoFA). Report on Mogadisho Talks: *Nähäsé* 18, 1978 E.C (24 Aug. 1986); Joint Statement of the 2nd Session of the Ad Hoc Committee, Mogadisho: 28 August 1986. MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 87. Report on the 2nd Session: *Nähäsé* 1978 E.C (Aug. 1986). MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 12. Report on the 3rd Session of the Ad Hoc Committee, Addis Ababa: *Mägabit* 1979 E.C (March 1987); Minutes of the 3rd Session: April 1987. MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 87. Report on the Ethio-Somalia Negotiations from Djibouti (January 1986) to Addis Ababa (April 1987): *Mägabit* 1979 E.C (March 1987). MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 1 2. Joint Statement of the 3rd Session: 3 April 1987; Berhänu Bayähôs (Foreign Minister) Press Statement: 3 April 1987.

[199] MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 1 2. Verbatim Records of the Talks between Mengistu and Barre: *Mägabit* 11-13, 1980 E.C (20-22 March 1988).

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nmentsô. The agenda agreed upon by the leaders for the upcoming meeting included as a last item the ócconsideration of the boundary question between the two countriesô.[200]

The 4th session of the committee was held in Mogadisho in early April 1988. Based on the Djibouti agreement, Ethiopia presented a draft agenda and a draft agreement for the normalization of relations. The item dealing with boundary demarcation was deliberately omitted from the draft agenda, but a binding article referring to the convening of the ad hoc committee in the immediate future for the consideration of the issue was inserted in the draft agreement. The meeting was held both at plenary and expertsô level based on Ethiopiaôs agenda and draft agreement.[201]

Four points of the draft agreement elicited an extended argument. The first was the insertion of the detailed clause citing the charter and principles of the OAU. Somalia demanded the deletion from the agreement of the reference to the charter, objectives and principles of the OAU. Eventually, an agreement was reached to omit the description of the principles and objectives of the charter and to mention only the phrase ócGuided by Principles of the Charter of the OAUô. The other point of argument revolved around the provision in the agreement dealing with the exact line of troop withdrawal to 15 km from the common border. Ethiopiaôs objections to Somaliaôs terminology of óde facto borderô created a stalemate. Later, Ethiopia proposed two alternatives to resolve the situation; i.e. the troops either should withdraw ó 15 km from the common border without prejudice

[200] MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 1 2. Joint Statement Issued after the Djibouti Talks: 22 March 1988; Agenda for the 4th Session of the Joint Ad Hoc Committee Meeting in Mogadisho: 22 March 1988.

[201] *Ibid*, Minutes of the Mogadisho Meeting: *Mägabit* 25, 1980 E.C (3 April 1988).

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on the boundary questionô or ó in accordance with the Khartoum Communique of 1964ô. The Somalis finally accepted the second alternative with the inclusion of the phrase ówithout prejudice to the position of either party on the boundary questionô.[202]

The third point of contention was Somaliaôs attempt to omit reference in the agreement to any future ad hoc ministerial talks on the common frontier. Upon Ethiopiaôs strong objection, it at first proposed to mention the issue only in the joint statement to be issued; but, finally, it was forced to accept the insertion of their consensus in the final agreement. The last point of argument revolved around Somaliaôs choice of terminology regarding the POWs. Ethiopia rejected the term ódetained personsô on the ground that it was a ploy to confirm the 1977-8 War as an incident between Ethiopia and the Somalis in the Ogaden. In the end, they agreed upon the phrase óall prisoners of war and detained personsô.[203] In addition, the two parties agreed to exchange POWs within the next four months and to immediately commence diplomatic relations. The issue of refugees and compensation for war damages were not included in the discussion.

The Mogadisho talks and the Agreement on the Normalization of Relations signed as a result were considered a huge diplomatic success for Ethiopia. Somaliaôs agreement to the inclusion in the agreement of the reference to the OAU principles, particularly of the clause dealing with national integrity and sovereignty, was perceived as a departure from its previous policy. This was interpreted as acceptance of the 1964 Cairo Declaration that legalized colonial boundaries and the ruling of the 18th OAU summit that considered

[202] *Ibid*, Analysis Report on Mogadisho Talks and Agreement: *Mägabit* 25, 1980 E.C (3 April 1988).

[203] *Ibid.*

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Ethiopia. More importantly, Somaliaôs commitment to convene the ad hoc joint committee to deliberate on the frontier question in the near future was considered not only a political success for Ethiopia but a legal one as well.[204]



Signing of the April 1988 Mogadisho Agreement. Seen exchanging the signed documents are: Foreign Minister Berhänu Bayäh of Ethiopia (left) and Jalle Ahmed Farah, Third Deputy Prime Minister of Somalia.

Steps were immediately put in place to implement the agreement. A committee consisting of Maj. Gen. Mesfen Gäbrä-Qal (Political Commissar of the Armed Forces and Vice Minister of Defense, chairman), Maj. Gen. Abära Abäbä (Commander of the First Division) and Br. Gen. Tadäsä Täklä-Häymanot (Chief of Intelligence) was authorized to overlook the withdrawal of Ethio-Somali troops from the boundary.

[204] *Ibid*; Mogadisho Agreement on Normalization of Relations: *Mägabit* 25, 1980 E.C (3 April 1988); Joint Statement: 3 April 1988; FM Berhänu Bayähôs Press Conference on the Agreement: *Mägabit* 26, 1980 E.C; (4 April 1988) Report on the Entire Peace Talks with Somalia from 1986 to 1988: *Mägabit* 26, 1980 E.C (4 April 1988).

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the committee successfully completed its mission.[205] In addition, detailed preparations commenced on the exchange of POWs. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) initiated the preliminary talks in 1984/85; but the process started in earnest after the April 1988 agreement.


In July 1988, a joint committee on prisoner exchange met in Mogadisho and outlined a plan of action. As a result, a total of 3,566 Ethiopian (1401 from the ground and the air force, 321 police, and the remaining civilians) and 400 Somali nationals were repatriated by early November 1988; a directive for their rehabilitation was issued immediately.[206] Diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level resumed immediately after the April 1988 agreement and Ethiopian Airlines commenced weekly flights to Mogadisho a year later.

However, irrespective of the superficial acts of normalization of the relations, the two countries continued the policy of destabilization. The open support Ethiopia rendered to the SNM (predominantly of Isaaq clan) and SSDF (Majerteen) demonstrated its dedication to the collapse of Siad Barreôs regime; the latter likewise unconditionally supported anti-Ethiopia and anti-Derg elements. The cooperation agreement between the

[205] *Ibid*, Mengistu to Gen. Mesfen Gäbrä-Qal: *Miyazya* 4, 1980 E.C (12 April 1988). MoFA Ethio-Somalia astaraqi committee 13. Maj. Gen. Mäsfen to Mengistu. Report on the Withdrawal of Ethio-Somalia Troops: *Hämlé* 13, 1980 E.C (20 July 1988).

[206] MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 1 2. Memo on POW Exchange: *Miyazya* 8, 1980 E.C (16 April 1988); Maj. Gen. Mesfen to Mengistu. Report on the POWs Exchange: *Nähäsé* 1980 E.C (August 1988). MoFA etiyo-somale gechet ena yä esräÑa leweweŞ4 Şeraz 13. Joint Communiqué of the Somali-Ethiopian Joint Committee on Exchange of POWs and Detained Persons: 28 July 1988; National Strategy on the Rehabilitation of POWs and their Civilian Counterparts: *Pagumé* 3, 1980 E.C (9 Aug. 1988).

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Map showing troop withdrawal after the April 1988 Agreement[207]

[207] MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité Şeraz 13. Report to Mengistu on the activities of Joint Military Committee: *Hämlé* 13, 1980 E.C (20 July 1988).

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1988 (having a joint army of around 60,000); SNMôs objectives to either create a strong federal arrangement between the north and the south or bring about the secession of Somaliland; the successful military operations the two jointly executed in northern and southern Somalia respectively; and the resultant political turmoil in Mogadisho were among the major manifestations of Ethiopiaôs anti-Somalia policy. To this end, Ethiopia managed to woo Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid, the future leader of the United Somalia Congress (USC, predominantly of the Hawiye clan), from his ambassadorial post in New Delhi in late 1988.[208]

After November 1988, as a result of successive SNM offensives, the rebel group managed to control strategic towns in north Somalia like Hargeisa, Borao and Delbis, and undermined the ground transportation network in the entire region.[209] And later, coordinating with similar opposition elements in south Somalia (of the Hawiye, Habergedir and Seaôad), started to destroy government infrastructures. Ethiopiaôs logistic and moral support to SNM was crucial for the success of the attacks. Reconnaissance information on the direction and intentions of the Somali army were supplied to the rebels on a regular basis.[210] In a bid to exacerbate the political turmoil in south Somalia,

[208] MoFA yä somalé täqawami häyloḷe 1 Şeraz 3. Telegram.Akalu (MoFA) to BäläŞi Akalä-Wäld (Charge de Affairs, New Delhi). On Wooing Aidid: *Mäskäräm* 4, 1981E.C (15 Sept. 1988); BäläŞi (New Delhi) to MoFA. On hid Discussion with Aidid: *Mäskäräm* 18, 1981E.C (29 Sept. 2988). MoFA ye somale täqawami häyloḷe 2 Şeraz 4. BäläŞi (New Delhi) to Asia and Australasia Directorate (MoFA): *Ṭeqémt* 11 & *Hedar* 15, 1981 E.C (22 Oct. & 25 Nov. 1988). Informant: Ambassador Berhänu Dinqa.

[209] MoFA yä etiyo-somalé yägara comité 1 Şeraz 1. Ambassador Dr. Asmamaw Qälämu (Mogadisho) to Alämayähu Säyfu (Head, African Directorate): *Tahesas* 12, 1981 E.C (22 Dec. 1988).

[210] MoFA yä somalé täqawami häyloḷe 2 Şeraz 4. Ambassador Dr. Asmamaw (Mogadisho) to Berhänu Bayäh: *Ṭir* 25, 1981E.C (3 Jan. 1989); Alämayähu Säyfu to Ministries of Defense and Interior: *Ṭir* 27, 1981 E.C (5 Jan. 1989). MoFA yä somalé täqawami häyloḷe 2 5. BäläŞi (New Delhi) to Asia and Australasia Directorate: *Yäkatit* 30, 1981 E.C (9 March 1989).

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with opposition groups like the USC since February 1989.

Soon, the two governments started to exchange protest notes and accusations on the violation of the April 1988 agreement and on infringements directed against the interest of the other. On the occasion of the first anniversary of the agreement, for example, Somalia launched a large scale diplomatic offensive accusing Ethiopia of supporting the SNM, SSDF and, after May 1989, the Ogaden Soldiers Movement (later renamed Somali Patriotic Front - SPF, led by Brig. Gen. Omar Jese).[212] Simultaneously, the growing political turmoil in Somalia (tribal conflicts) frustrated the possible positive outcomes of the agreement. The military gains of the SNM in north Somalia after mid 1989, coupled with Ethiopiaגs active support to the rebel group, further aggravated the tension between the two states.[213]

Their reluctance, at one time or the other, to convene the joint implementation revision committee contributed to the mutual suspicion. Finally, the foreign ministers of the two countries, Berhänu Bayäh and Dr. Jama Barre, resolved the matter during the 44th UN General Assembly meeting in September 1989. Even if they both denied the accusation of violating the April 1988 agreement; they agreed to establish a joint

[211] MoFA yä somalé täqawami häyloḷe 2 Ṣeraz 4. Ambassador Dr. Asmamaw to MoFA: *Yäkatit* 18, 1981 (26 Feb. 1989) & *Tahesas* 14, 1982E.C (24 Dec. 1989).

[212] *Ibid*, Ambassador Asäfa Wäldé (Provisional Minister of Foreign Affairs) to Ethio-Embassy in Paris. Directives to Counter Somaliaגs Diplomatic Mission: *Mägabit* 16, 1981 E.C (25 March 1989); Ambassador Dr. Asmamaw to Alämayähu Säyfu (African Directorate): *Mägabit* 17, 1981 E.C (26 March 1989). MoFA etiyo-somalé sememenät 1 2. Ambassador Asmamaw to Alämayähu Säyfu. Analysis on the 1st Anniversary of the April 1988 Agreement: *Mägabit* 25, 1981 E.C (3 April 1989).

[213] MoFA yä somalé täqawami häyloḷe 2 5. Intelligence Report on Somalia: *Miyazya* 11, 1981 E.C (19 April 1989); Ambassador Asmamaw (Mogadisho) to Alämayähu Säyfu. On SNM Attack in North Somalia: *Genbot* 2 & 4 (10 & 12) and *Säné* 30, 1981 E.C (7 July 1989); Intelligence Report on Somalia Popular Uprising against Barre: *Hämlé* 26, 1981 E.C (2 Aug. 1989).

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the implementation of the normalization agreement and report to the Ethio-Somalia Joint Ministerial Committee in six months. The meeting was scheduled for December 1989 in Mogadisho. Ethiopia assigned a high level delegation that would make a detailed preparation for the meeting and represent the country.[214]

Somalia attempted to restrict the Mogadisho talks of the first joint monitoring committee (4-7 December 1989) to immediate issues like Ethiopiaôs assistance to the SNM and the resultant interference in its internal affairs. However, Ethiopiaôs position of assessing all the articles of the 1988 agreement with a view to mending their troubled relations forced Somalia into the consideration of detailed accusations tabled by the two parties. Even then, in spite of Somaliaôs demand for some sort of official agreement, again following Ethiopiaôs objection, a decision was made to convene yet another monitoring meeting in Addis Ababa. The brief joint communiqué issued on 7 December betrayed the absence of consensus between the two. The fact that they failed to agree on a date for the next meeting demonstrated the extent of their disagreement on matters and particularly Ethiopiaôs nonchalant attitude towards constructive deals in the near future.[215]

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[214] MoFA etiyo-somalé yägara comité 1 1. Joint Communiqué of the New York Ministerial Talks: 3 October 1989; Ambassador Asmamaw to Alämayähu Säyfu (African Directorate). On Somaliaôs Delegation to the Meeting: *Ṭeqémt* 2, 1982 E.C (13 Oct. 1989); Berhänu Bayäh (Minister of Foreign Affairs) to Lt. Gen. Addis Tädla (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces). Assigning Delegates: *Ṭeqémt* 16, 1982 E.C (27 Oct. 1989); to Lt. Gen. Addis Tädla to Maj. Gen. Berhänu Jämbäré (Commander of the 1st Division): *Ṭeqémt* 25, 1982 E.C (5 Nov. 1989); Täsfayé Dinqa (Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister) to Täsfayé Wäldä-Selasé (Minister of Interior): *Hedar* 4, 1982 E.C (14 Nov. 1989); Guide Line for the Ethiopian Delegation: *Hedar* 8, 1982 E.C (18 Nov. 1989); Täsfayé Dinqa to the Council of Ministers. On Assigning Ethiopiaôs Delegation: *Hedar* 13, 1982 E.C (23 Nov. 1989). MoFA etiyo-somalé astaraqi comité 1 2. Memo on the Upcoming Meeting: *Ṭeqémt* 10, 1982 E.C (21 Oct. 1989).

[215] MoFA etiyo-somalé yägara comité 1 2. Märǧa Qäkäla (Vice Minister of Interior and Head of the Delegation) to Täsfayé Wäldä-Selasé (Minister of Interior). Report on the Mogadisho Meeting: *Tahesas* 12, 1982 E.C (22 Dec. 1989); Joint Communiqué: 7 December 1989. MoFA etiyo-somalé yägara comité 1 1. Formal Complaints of Ethiopia and Somalia to the Joint Monitoring Committee: *Tahesas* 21, 1982 E.C (31

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was made by Ethiopia to convene the 2nd monitoring committee meeting in August 1990. In the meantime, the Fifth Joint Ministerial Committee Meeting was also held in Wändo Gänät, South Ethiopia, in late August 1990. Because of Ethiopiaôs careful preparations to make the event cordial, not to affront the Somalis in any way before the upcoming 2nd IGADD Ministerial Conference in Nairobi (August 1990) and in a bid to avoid provisions detrimental to Ethiopiaôs special relations with Somali opposition elements, the statement they issued was restricted to general matters like their commitment to the April 1988 Normalization Agreement and the need to reactivate the joint military and monitoring committees. The second Joint Monitoring Committee Meeting was held in Addis Ababa in October 1990. But again, the two disagreed on the agenda, with Ethiopia insisting on the revision of all the articles of the 1988 normalization agreement and Somalia demanding special consideration on the article dealing with subversive activities and interference in the affairs of others. The meeting ended up endorsing the minutes of the discussion and underlining the need for a third meeting.[216]

The escalating political turmoil in Somalia and the impending peril of Siad Barreôs regime, necessitated assessment of the possible scenarios Ethiopia should consider in

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Dec. 1989); Ambassador Asmamaw to African Directorate. Report on the Mogadisho Talks: *Tahesas* 25, 1982 E.C (4 Jan. 1990).

[216] MoFA etiyo-somalé yägara comité 1 2. Dr. Täqäda Alämu (Head, African Directorate) to Ministry of Defense. On Calling the 2nd Monitoring Committee Meeting: 29 May 1990; Memo on the Directives for the 2nd Monitoring Committee Meeting: *Hämlé* 22, 1982 E.C (29 July 1990). MoFA etiyo-somalé yägara comité 1 3. Fesähä Yemär (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs) to the Council of Ministers. Report on the 5th Joint Ministerial Meeting: 14 September 1990; Dr. Täqäda Alämu to Ministries of Interior and Defense: 20 September 1990; Verbatim Record and Analysis of the 2nd Joint Monitoring Committee Meeting: *Ṭeqémt* 16, 1983 E.C (27 Oct. 1990).

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engage Barreôs government in protracted talks without raising the issue of frontier demarcation and abstaining from direct contact with opposition groups in a bid to wait and see the course of events in Somaliaôs menacing civil war. The second was to pressurize the Somali government into maximum concession regarding the border and to resume the negotiations along the line of the normalization agreement of 1988. In the case of an agreement from Somalia, Ethiopia had to unconditionally withdraw its assistance to the major opposition factions and officially side with the republic. Kenyaôs recent protocol with Somalia on their common border and the formerôs acceptance of the existing boundary was cited as an encouraging sign in this regard.[217]

The third was to save the Siad Barre regime from the imminent peril it was facing and positively influence its policies towards Ethiopia. This idea was forwarded fearing the possibility of the accession to power of even more virulent anti-Ethiopian elements (like the Ogaden who had dominated the army during the 1977/8 War and the growing number of Muslim Fundamentalists) and suspicious of the future policies of opposition elements Ethiopia was working with at the time. This approach was endorsed by the USSR. Finally, since Barreôs demise was inevitable, Ethiopia should identify opposition groups that definitely understand and respect its interests in the future. This way, it can prevent the coming to power of radical anti-Ethiopian elements and the possibility of another war between the two states.[218]

[217] MoFA etiyo-somalé yägara sememenätoḷe. Policy Paper on Somalia: *Tahesas* 1982 E.C (Dec. 1989).

[218] *Ibid.*

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oval of government authorities, and Ethiopiaôs embassy in Mogadisho was instructed to work towards its realization. Siad Barreôs appeal in January 1990 for resolving the border issue in return to Ethiopiaôs closure of its frontiers and ceasing of its support to the rebels was rejected outright.[219] Accordingly, Abdurrahman Ahmed Aliôs SNM in north Somalia, Farah Aididôs USC in central Somalia (around Mogadisho), and Omar Jeseôs SPF around Kismayu and Baidowa in south Somalia were among the opposition forces chosen and supported by Ethiopia. These groups, to the delight of Ethiopian officials, controlled most of the territories they were operating in by August 1990. A good demonstration of Ethiopiaôs visible influence on these factions was their refusal to attend the Cairo Peace Conference of December 1990 that was prepared by Egypt, Italy and Kuwait.[220]

The civil war that erupted in Mogadisho in late December 1990 and the resultant malfunction of Siad Barreôs regime afterwards heralded the end of a troublesome period in Ethio-Somalia relations. The situation created five clan-based forces under SNM, SPF, SSDF, USC and the ex-Somali army. The last report from Ethiopiaôs Ambassador to Somalia, Dr. Asmamaw Qälämu, depicts three grim possibilities for the future of the republic: the intensification of the civil war because it would be difficult to create a united front among these units; the disintegration of Somalia into three distinct governments: Somaliland (Isaaq clan), Mogadisho and its environs (Hawiye) and South

[219] *Ibid*. MoFA yä somalé täqawami häyloḷe 2 5. Ambassador Asmamaw to MoFA. On his Talks with Siad Barre: *Ṭir* 21, 1982 E.C (30 Jan. 1990).

[220] MoFA yä somalé täqawami häyloḷe 2 6. Ambassador Dr. Asmamaw to African and Middle East Directorate: *Hämlé* 26 (2 Aug.) & *Nähäsé* 14, 1982 E.C (20 Aug. 1990). MoFA yä somalé täqawami häyloḷe 3 7. Ambassador Asmamaw to African Directorate. On the Cairo Peace Conference: *Hedar* 6, 1983 E.C (16 Nov. 1990). See also Daniel Compagnon, ñSomali Armed Movements: The Interplay of Political Entrepreneurship & Clan-Based Factions,ò in *African Guerillas*. Edited by Christopher Clapham (Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998): 73-90.

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creation of a new federal arrangement consisting of these regions. The report claimed that Ethiopia had successfully attained its policy of destabilizing and weakening Somalia. The remaining task would be to realize the coming to power of an entirely pro-Ethiopian government. In the final analysis, according to the report, óé [the important thing is that dangerous Somalia is no more].[221]

One can conclude that both the imperial regime and the Darg always considered Somalia a threat to the national interests of Ethiopia, and therefore acted in a manner designed to frustrate the impending danger. Simultaneously, the persistent objection of Hayla-Selassieôs government to the return of Italy as a trusteeship of south Somalia, the granting of independence to all Somali lands and particularly the scheme to unify the British protectorate and the trusteeship territory betray the underlying motive of integrating at least parts of these areas into the Ethiopian empire. The various attempts to meddle in party politics in Somalia, the courting of selected political figures and the special emphasis accorded to the policy directive aiming at the separation of the former British Somaliland from the republic demonstrate Ethiopiaôs attitudes towards Somalia.

More significantly, though, the Greater Somalia agenda and the avowed mission of Somali rulers to implement it to the letter dictated the nature of Ethiopiaôs policies not only towards the republic but the region as well. The Cooperation and Mutual Defense Assistance agreement with Kenya (July 1963) and the intervention in Djibouti even after the territoryôs independence in 1977 were testimonies of Ethiopiaôs readiness to frustrate

[221] MoFA etiyo-Somalia astaraqi comité . Ambassador Asmamawôs Final Report on Somaliaôs Civil War and Ethiopiaôs Policy Directives: *Ṭir* 4, 1983 E.C (13 Jan. 1991).

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gements in turn forced Ethiopia to perpetually guarantee the safety of the two neighboring states. Ethiopiaôs grudging acceptance of the unity of the two Somali territories and proposals it forwarded regarding the international boundary failed to assuage the animosity of the new republic. Rather, Somaliaôs continued claim to a fifth of Ethiopiaôs territory and the intensification of its diplomatic offensives within and outside the continent contributed to the escalation of the conflict. The frequent border clashes and the virulent anti-Ethiopian propaganda emanating from Mogadisho reflected the deteriorating relations.

Efforts of the imperial regime to contain the threat of Somali irredentism focused on trying to bring pro-Ethiopian groups and individuals to power in Mogadisho, fanning clan-based divisions to further polarize Somali communities and sealing off the entire boundary. The foreign policy directive heavily relied on the pressure the above steps would create on Somaliaôs governments. It was designed to cool off tensions when liberal Somali rulers were in power and attempts were made to compromise on contentious issues. Drastic measures like the sealing of the boundary and the abetting of opposition activities in Hargeisa equally exerted a pressure on the rulers of Somalia to reconsider their position towards Ethiopia. Even the inclination on the part of Ethiopia to make a major concession regarding the boundary in accordance with the principle of ôterritorial adjustmentô in early 1970s bore no fruit. All these steps ultimately failed to avert the major war between the two neighbors.

The intervention of Egypt, the Arab League, western powers and USSR in Somaliaôs affairs and the interest they always strove to maintain in the Horn of Africa in general contributed to the escalating tension. Assistance rendered to the new republic bolstered

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er the mid 1970s, Somalia under Siad Bare was ready to realize the age-old dream militarily. The Darg had to deal with the looming danger and the odds were very much against the ability of Ethiopia to defend itself. The 1977/78 Ethio-Somali war, even though concluded with Ethiopiaôs victory, reinvigorated the policy line of weakening and dividing Somalia unequivocally. Irrespective of the various agreements signed after the war, the Darg pursued this goal in earnest and had achieved it by 1991.

Throughout the conflict, Ethiopia skillfully utilized the OAU and its principles to securing strategic interests. Often, the country voiced its objections to involvement of external organizations in the conflict, but always remained accommodative of African mediation efforts. In particular, the principle of the sanctity of colonial boundaries was skillfully exploited by the two successive regimes. The continental body, after investigating the Ethio-Somalia dispute through mediation committees, endorsed Ethiopiaôs rights over the Ogaden. As a result, through a combination of diplomacy and war, Ethiopia safeguarded its territorial integrity and even forced Somalia to recognize the existing boundary line. However, both the imperial regime and the Darg were unable to capitalize on these developments. Their policy failed short of demarcating the boundary and permanently averting the security threat from Somalia. The disintegration of Somalia might have temporarily thwarted the Greater Somalia agenda, but, in addition to new challenges originating from that territory, the question remains a potential point of conflict between the two states.

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Chapter III

Entanglements with the Arab/Islam North Africa

Ethiopiaôs relations with not only the Arab/Islam Africa but also the Middle East had influenced its African policy orientations. The countryôs geographical location at the junction of two continents and cultures contributed to the unique encounters it had experienced over the years. The underlying tensions of the period under investigation revolve around the nature of Ethiopiaôs association with Israel, the question of the alleged marginalization of Ethiopian Muslims and the attempt by outside elements to explain the secessionist agenda of Eritrean rebels as being primarily motivated by this cause, and the overriding need to sustain the Arab/Islam dominance along the Red Sea enclave, which Ethiopia strove to counter.[1]

Parallel developments throughout the continent similarly influenced Black Africaôs relation with the Arab/Islam world. More specifically, the cultural/religious divide emerged as a prominent divisive factor in conducting the affairs of the Black community and the Arab sections of the continent. Mutual suspicion vitiated constructive contacts for long; the Blacks antagonized by the Arabsô feeling of superiority and their efforts to employ their petrodollar clout to dictate the political and diplomatic agenda. Cases in point are the hostility demonstrated towards the condescending African policies of Gamal Abdul Nasser and Anwar Sadat of Egypt in the 1960s and 1970s and the growing

[1] Erlich, *Ethiopia and the Middle East*, 151-164; Haggai Erlich, *Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia: Islam, Christianity and Politics Entwined,* (USA; Lynee Rienner, 2007), 98-111, 142-145. Tareq Youssief Ismael, *The UAR in Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 21-74, 111-130, 226-232.

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addafi of Libya since the 1980s.[2] Ethiopiaôs relations with the Arab world in general and its African component in particular had some important features that need to be examined. Accordingly, this chapter tries to assess the issue, taking the countryôs bilateral relations with Egypt and Libya as points of illustration.

3.1. Egypt

Developments associated with the Suez Crisis of 1956 characterized the post-WWII Ethio-Egyptian relations.[3] Ethiopiaôs involvement in the Committee of Seventeen that was mandated by the UN to seek solutions for the Suez crisis and the resultant complications set the background for later relations. The pro-west attitude that Ethiopia manifested in the process contributed to Egyptian animosity.[4] Relations became so troubled as to force Emperor Hayla-Selassie to delay his planned visit to Cairo till June 1959. In December 1956, for example, in a letter to the Egyptian president, he declined Nasserôs invitation on the pretext of the illness of the empress and postponed it indefinitely.[5]

A series of events negatively influenced relations between the two countries. Developments such as the failure of the 1957 Egyptian scheme to establish the Cairo-

[2] Victor T. Le Vine and Timothy W. Luke, *The Arab-African Connection: Political and Economic Realities*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), 2-8, 117-118; Colin Legume, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 39; Adda B. Bozeman, *Conflicts in Africa: Concepts and Realities* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), 43; Ali A. Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition* (Worcester and London: The Trinity Press, 1967), 44-66; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ñThe Foreign Policy of Egypt,ò in *The Foreign Policies of African States*. Edited by Olajide Aluke (London, Sydney, Auckland & Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977): 41-45.

[3] MoFA Folder-Kenya 67-D4, File-5. Correspondences on Suez Canal Conference: 21& 24 August 1956.

[4] Spencer, *Ethiopia at Bay*, 308-309; Haggai Erlich, *Ethiopia and the Middle East*, 136; FO 371/146567, Wright to Lloyd: 18 January 1960; Negussay, *ñForeign Policy…ò*, 53-56.

[5] MoFA Kenya 67-D4 4, Hayla-Selassie to Nasser: 28 December 1956.

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at would be a nucleus for the unity of the Nile riparian states," Ethiopiaôs communiqué and aide-memoire issued on 6 February 1956 and 6 February 1957, respectively, notifying all concerned bodies of its plan to conduct an aerial survey of the entire Blue Nile Basin and inviting bids for the purpose;[7] and Ethiopiaôs *de jure* recognition of the state of Israel in October 1961 contributed for the bad turn of events in the following years.

The 1956 communiqué affirmed Ethiopiaôs plans for the utilization of the vast irrigation and hydrological potentials of the Blue Nile and particularly the 1957 aide-memoire asserted the countryôs natural interests over the Nile. The aide-memoire stressed that:

> é .The Government must naturally draw the necessary consequences and conclusions and assert the full measures of its freedom of action as regards discussion being pursued concerning the water flowing from its territory and as to which, unlike the discussion pursued in the period between 1924 and 1951, it has not been consulted. Under these circumstances, Ethiopia, alone the source of nearly the entirety of the waters involved must, once again make it clear that the quantities of the water available to others must always depend on the ever increasing extent to which Ethiopia the original owner will be required to utilize the same for the need of her expanding population and economy.[8]

The intensification of anti-Ethiopian sentiment in the Arab world and their growing support to secessionist elements necessitated Hayla-Selassieôs visit to Egypt and some Middle East states in 1959. The talking points that were prepared for the purpose indicate

[6] Ismael, *The UAR in Africa*, 37

[7] MoFA ertra leyu-leyu guday 12 593. Aide-Memoire on Ethiopiaôs Plan to Survey the Blue Nile Basin: 6 February 1957. See also Girma Amare, ñThe Nile Issue: The Imperative Need for Negotiation on the Utilization of the Nile Waters,ò *Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD) Occasional Papers* Vol. II, No. VI (July 1999): 6.

[8] Cited in Girma Amare, ñThe Nile Issue,ò 5-6.

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and the urgency of remedying the situation.[9] Egyptôs foreign policy directives including the desire to dominate the Arab League; disseminate the ideology of the Arab Socialist Union in Middle East and the Horn of Africa; and employ a strategy of destabilization along the Red Sea were cited as particular points of concern. Egyptôs desire to dominate the Red Sea and particularly the Nile River, Ethiopiaôs recognition of the state of Israel, Egyptôs assistance to the secessionist elements, its strategy of stirring religious conflict via dissidents infiltrated into the country and its open support to the anti-Ethiopian Sudanese political groups and Somaliaôs territorial claim were stated as the basic problems affecting relations between the two.[10]

The Ethiopian policy directive that was formulated indicates possible lines to pursue during the 1959 talks with Egypt. These included, among others, caution regarding the ongoing trade relations because of Egyptôs foreign currency deficit; in the event of a cultural cooperation agreement, to ascertain Ethiopiaôs right to monitor print and electronic materials disseminated by the other party, to make sure Egyptian teachers would cooperate with Israeli ones already employed in the country, and to ensure that the former would not engage in any spying activities.[11]

[9] MoFA ertra 68-D5 1. Memorandum to the Emperor on His Visit to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon: No date. See also Erlich, *Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia,* 98-111.

[10] *Ibid.* Erlich, *Ethiopia and the Middle East*, 141-147, 151-164. Le Vine and Luke, *The Arab-African Connection,* 100-104. Jesse Ferris, ñSoviet Support for Egyptôs Intervention in Yemen,ò *Journal of Cold War Studies* Vol. 10, No. 4 (Fall 2008): 5-36; S.A. Akintoye, *Emergent African States: Topics in Twentieth Century African History* (London: Longman Group Ltd, 1976), 220223.

[11] *Ibid.*

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managed to persuade Nasser to cease anti-Ethiopian propaganda broadcast on Radio Cairo and to ban the activities of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in Egypt,[12] bilateral relations apparently did not take the much anticipated positive turn. Particularly, Ethiopiaôs closer association with Israel and Egyptôs retaliation by supporting the ELF contributed to the deteriorating conditions in the 1960s.[13] Developments in the two countries during the 1970s were marked by a change in their cold war alignments. President Sadatôs policy of ódestabilization and weakening of Ethiopia to advance Egyptôs national interestô and his open support of Eritrean secessionism and Somali irredentism exacerbated the feeling of animosity.[14]

Troubled by Egypt-led Arab interventions in internal affairs of Ethiopia by sponsoring the Eritrean rebel factions, the Darg ordered a detailed investigation of the matter and recommendation on possible actions to be taken.[15] A committee consisting of fifteen senior diplomats was set up for the task. It was instructed particularly to assess the scale of Sadatôs destabilization efforts through the arming of Somalia and the Sudan, and the spying activities of Egyptôs ambassador to Ethiopia, Mr. Sala Basuni. The committee members, after analyzing the information provided by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior and State and Public Security, proposed the creation of a special ñtask forceò that would follow up the matter on a continuous basis. In addition, the government was advised to engage on counter measures ranging from propaganda campaigns to intensive

[12] Lammu Baissa, ñThe Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The Case of Ethiopia, 1959 ï 1981ò (PhD Dissertation in Political Science, University of Syracuse, August 1988), 35-40; MoFA ertra 68-D5 1, Report on Egyptian Support to Eritrean Rebels: March 1, 1959E.C.
[13] Le Vine and Luke, *The Arab-African Connection*, 2-8, 117-118.

[14] MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneЁunät, Report on Relations: *Tahesas* 21, 1982E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

[15] MoFA yä etiyopeya ena yä goräbét agäroļe geneЁunät, Study Report on Egyptian Incursions in to Ethiopia: *Miyazya* 6, 1969E.C (14 April 1977).

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f of not only Egypt but also Somalia and the Sudan. The last resort would be to break diplomatic relations with Egypt.[16]

Following the coming to power of President Mubarak in 1981, however, policy reorientations manifested themselves on the side of Egypt and persistent initiatives were advanced to this end. Between 1981 and 1985, Egypt issued a total of fifty-nine invitations to the Ethiopian government and joint project proposals that could be implemented in the near future. Some of these included scholarship offers on fields like agriculture, mass media, water engineering, nursing, maritime transit, industrial development and higher education, invitations to take part in different exhibitions and workshops and for Ethiopian officials to visit Egypt.[17]

However, to the dismay of Egypt, all of the offers were turned down, presumably for lack of a political directive at a higher level. Egyptôs ambassador to Ethiopia expressed his countryôs growing perception of Ethiopiaôs unwillingness for better relations.[18] The only positive outcome of these efforts was the Trade Agreement signed on 14 January 1985 in Addis Ababa that provided for Ethiopian export of agricultural products and import of processed industrial goods.[19] However, no practical steps were taken to implement the agreement.

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[16] *Ibid.*

[17] MoFA etiyo-gebĸe geneŔunät, Report on Egyptian Initiatives from 1981 to 1985: *Ṭeqemt* 19, 1978E.C (30 Oct. 1985); *Addis Zämän*; *Yäkatit* 1 & 2, 1976 E.C (9 & 10 Feb. 1984); *Genbot* 3, 1976E.C (11 May 1984); *Ṭir* 2 & 7 1977 E.C (11 & 16 Jan. 1985).

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] *Addis Zämän*: *Ṭir* 7, 1977 E.C (16 Jan. 1985).

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vinced of Egyptôs commitment to meaningful dialogue following the statement in Addis Ababa in 1984 by its Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Ismet Abdul Majid. In a press conference at the end of the 20th OAU Summit, he outlined Egyptôs position that it would respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ethiopia and would not interfere in any way in the internal affairs of the country.[20] Egyptians then continued to press for positive reactions from Ethiopia through high level diplomatic missions, the ultimate gesture being made by the visit of President Mubarak on the occasion of the 22nd OAU Summit in Addis Ababa in July 1986.[21]

During the two hours discussion, Mubarak reiterated his countryôs initiative for peace and friendship and invited President Mengistu to visit Egypt; this, he insisted, would be the sole indicator of Ethiopiaôs good will. Simultaneously, Egyptian foreign ministry officials accompanying the president openly admitted that Sadatôs supply of weapons to Siad Barre during the 1977-78 war was a mistake and urged Somalia to accept Ogaden as an integral part of Ethiopia.[22] Irrespective of the growing pressure from Egypt, Ethiopia chose to assume the traditional position of wait and see and appeared nonchalant to the proceeding of events.

Ethiopiaôs response came later, when a high level delegation led by the foreign minister, Berhänu Bayäh, went to Egypt for a five day visit in January 1987.[23] The

[20] MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneÑunät, Report on Relations: *Tahesas* 21, 1982 E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

[21] *Addis Zämän*: *Hämlé* 20 & 24, 1978E.C (27 & 31 July 1986); *Hämlé* 23, 1978E.C (30 July 1986).

[22] MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneÑunät, Report on Relations: *Tahesas* 21, 1982E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

[23] MoFA Cairo Report 10 vol.37, Report on Berhänu Bayähôs Visit to Egypt: *Ṭir* 10, 1979E.C (19 Jan. 1987); MoFA Cairo Report 12 vol.46, Report on Relations: *Ṭeqémt* 17, 1981E.C (28 Oct. 1988); MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneÑunät, Report on Relations: *Tahesas* 21, 1982E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

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o assess the positions of Egypt on issues like the equitable use of the Nile and closure of rebel quarters in Cairo and disbanding of all their members. Ascertaining the practical measures that Egypt had taken regarding its earlier promises to honor the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ethiopia was particularly presented as a precondition if Mengistu is going to visit the country in the near future. In spite of the reluctance from some officials (including the foreign minister), Mubarak gave the order to close all functional units of secessionist elements in Egypt and disband their leaders, stating ñI do not wish to lose Ethiopia so as to gain Eritrea.ò[24]

After these confidence-building steps, Mengistu finally made the state visit to Egypt from 9 to 12 April 1987. The major achievement of this occasion perhaps was the establishment of the Joint Ministerial Economic Commission that would plan, coordinate and monitor bilateral relations.[25] Matters continued along this positive course for some time: Ethiopiaôs requests being readily accepted by the Egyptian leader and he promoting the formerôs cause throughout the Arab world.

The situation demanded that Ethiopia respond in kind. After intensive deliberations, some adjustments were made to previous procedures that were strictly reserved to immediate neighbors with a view to considering Egypt as one of them. That is to say, according to previous policy lines, only ministerial commissions for neighbors could entertain political agenda in addition to economic, cultural and science and technology issues. After careful consideration of Egyptôs geo-political clout in the region in general

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] MoFA Cairo Report 12 vol.46, Report on Relations: *Ṭeqémt* 17, 1981E.C (28 Oct. 1988); MoFA etiyogebĸe geneŕunät, Report on Relations: *Tahesas* 21, 1982E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

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the strategic objectives of Ethiopia in particular, it was accorded the same status.[26] Accordingly, the first Ministerial Economic Commission was convened in Addis Ababa on 10 March 1989 and endorsed various agreements; their implementation, though, proved non-satisfactory for years to come.

However, the late 1980s witnessed a dramatic decline in mutual relations. Egyptôs role in blocking the fund allocated to the ŝana Bäläs project was considered as the first negative move that triggered a set of others. The reinstatement of ELF and EPLF functionaries and the political decision to intervene in the Sudan to salvage the anti-Ethiopia military regime in power were additional measures that exacerbated tension between the two countries. Ethiopiaôs reprisal came by not including Mubarak, the current chairperson of the OAU, in the list of mediators in its negotiations with the secessionist elements and reestablishing diplomatic relations with Israel in December 1989.[27]

A brief analysis of the major factors contributing for the disagreement between Ethiopia and Egypt - issues related with the Nile, Ethiopiaôs relations with Israel and Egyptôs unique relationship with the Sudan ï helps one understand the scale of dissension in the period under discussion.

[26] MoFA Cairo Report 12 vol.46, Report on Relations: *Ţeqémt* 17, 1981E.C (28 Oct. 1988).

[27] MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneЌunät, Report on Relations: *Tahesas* 21, 1982E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

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One study paper compiled by the MoFA details developments associated with the Nile River and principles guiding Ethiopiaôs relations with the Sudan and Egypt on the matter.[28] It traces the origin of the problem to the controversial agreement between Emperor Menelik and the British in 1902. Specifically, Article III of the agreement states the consent on the part of Ethiopia not to engage on any activity that would reduce the amount of water entering the Nile. The paper similarly cites the 1904 agreement between the two parties that the British government would pay £10,000 per annum to Ethiopian rulers ósas long as the signatories maintain friendly relationsô.

This paper argues that the agreement ceased to legally bind Ethiopia after 1919 for a number of reasons. In the first place, when the League of Nation was established and Ethiopia became its member in 1923, the agreement was not registered by the international body; and more specifically the British official recognition of Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1938 directly contradicted the 1904 accord and therefore rendered the whole agreement null and void.[29]

Other sources in addition reject the legality of the agreement on other grounds. Some of the arguments forwarded included, according to the Amharic version of Article III, as long as the regular flow of the river is not óstoppedô, the agreement did not restrict Ethiopia from diverting the water; since the agreement was primarily signed in favor of

[28] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 vol.5, Study Paper on the Water Dispute between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt: No Date.

[29] *Ibid.* Also see Daniel Kendie, ñEgypt and the Hydro-Politics of the Blue Nile,ò *Northeast African Studies* Vol. 6, No. 1-2 (1999): 146-169. Ashok Swain, ñThe Nile River Basin Initiative: Too Many Cooks, Too Little Broth,ò *SAIS Review.* 22, 2 (Summer-Fall 2002): 293-308. Ashok Swain, ñEthiopia, the Sudan and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute,ò *The Journal of Modern African Studies.* 35, 4 (Dec. 1997): 675-694.

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ts from the agreement; the document was not ratified by Ethiopia, making the agreement non-binding legally; and since the Amharic version only obliges Ethiopia to seek the consent from Britain ―as the effective suzerain of the Sudan‖ it does not force the country to get the permission of independent Sudan and Egypt in any activities it planned to execute on the Blue Nile.[30]

In the immediate post-liberation period, attempts were made to broker a new deal with Egypt. But, according to the paper, Egyptôs persistence in posing as Sudanôs representative in the negotiations hindered the process. The Ethiopian side decided to stall talks on the matter till Sudanôs independence. However, Ethiopia was frustrated by independent Sudanôs decision to ally with Egypt on all matters related to discussions on the Nile. The November 1959 agreement between Egypt and the Sudan for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters further aggravated the situation.[31] The efforts of the two to isolate Ethiopia from the negotiation process cornered the country into assuming the position that any agreement reached by the other parties would not be acceptable and binding, and it would engage on actions targeting the utilization of the river for its development.[32]

Ethiopiaôs actual realization of the potentials of the river had been scarce till the late 1950s. All the studies until then were conducted by foreign elements, cases in point being

[30] Girma, ñThe Nile Issue,ò 3-4; John Waterbury, *The Nile Basin: National Determinants of Collective Action* (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2002), 62-63.

[31] MoFA Sudan 28-D2 130, Agreement between the Sudan and Egypt for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters: 8 November 1959. Also see Shlomi Dinar, ñScarcity and Cooperation along International Rivers,ò *Global Environmental Politics.* 9, 1 (February 2009): 109-135.

[32] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 vol.5, Study Paper on the Water Dispute between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt: No Date.

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Garstin (1904) to build a natural controlling reservoir for the Blue Nile in Lake Tana, the 1903 survey of the Lake Tana region by an expert employed by Egypt, Mr. C.A. Dupuis, the joint efforts by Egypt and the Sudan in 1915 and from 1920 to 1924, and Major R.E. Cheesmanôs first recorded journey down the full course of the Blue Nile between 1926 and 1929.[33] The motive behind Egyptôs initiatives was to probe into the possibility of building a dam around the lake so as to increase the amount of water supply and to regulate the flow of the river. The two beneficiary states approached Ethiopia to join the project and share expenses, but Ethiopia refused on the ground that it had conducted no prior investigations on the matter.[34]

In the mean time, the exchange of notes in November 1924 and June 1925 between the British governor-general of the Sudan and the Italian governor of Eritrea (regarding the unhampered flow of the Gash River to the Sudan and Italyôs endorsement of British interests to build a storage dam in Lake Tana) elicited some reactions from Ethiopia. The project proposal *Ras* Täfäri Mäkonnen (the regent to the throne) advanced to the New York based J.G. White Engineering to build a regulating dam at the outlet of the Blue Nile from Lake Tana and the concessions he granted to the same company in 1929 was considered a counter balancing act to the growing British interest on the matter.[35]

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[33] *Ibid.* See also *Fitawrari* Täklä-Häwaryat Täklä-Maryam , yäheywäté tarik (Addis Ababa University Press: Addis Ababa, 1998 E.C), 234-238. C.A. Dupuis, ñReport upon Lake Tana and the Rivers of the Eastern Sudan,ò in Sir William Garstin, *Report upon the Basin of the Upper Nile* (Cairo: National Printing Department, 1904):.3. Dale Whittington, ñImplications of Ethiopian Water Development for Egypt and Sudan,ò Paper Presented to *DSRC Seminar No.* 60 (University of Khartoum, March 1985): 2-3. Waterbury, *Nile Basin*, 59-62.

[34] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 vol.5, Study Paper on the Water Dispute between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt: No Date.

[35] Waterbury, *Nile Basin*, 64-65. Terje Tvedt, ñThe Management of Water and Irrigation: The Blue Nile,ò in *Beyond Conflict in the Horn: Prospects for Peace, Recovery and Development in Ethiopia, Somalia and*

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ted the first survey of the Blue Nile valley between 1933 and 1935.

But it was the feeling of uneasiness associated with the construction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt that effectively launched Ethiopiaôs actual commitment to the cause. Alarmed by the implications of Egyptôs undertaking, Ethiopian authorities approached the US Department of State for assistance in the spring of 1956. In the mean time, a Water Resources Development Authority was duly established under the Ministry of Public Works and Communications, and the proposal for a joint Ethio-US project to conduct a detailed survey of the basin was approved by the imperial government. Finally, in August 1957 the Bureau of Reclamation of the US Department of Interior agreed to make an extensive survey of the Blue Nile watershed on behalf of the Ethiopian government.[36]

The scope of the study was to investigate the entire Blue Nile basin in Ethiopia and to provide the first detailed account of the Blue Nile region ï including its hydrology, water quality, geology, physiology, mineral resources, sedimentation, land use, ground water and local economy. The seventeen volumes study report was submitted four years later in August 1964.[37]

Sudan. Eds. Martin Doornbos, Lionel Cliffe, Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed and John Markakis (The Red Sea Press, Inc, 1992): 87-88.

[36] Zewde Gebre-Sellasie, ñ óThe Blue Nile and its Basins: An Issue of International Concernô ò Paper Presented in a Meeting Organized by the *Forum for Social Studies* (Addis Ababa, 2006), 9-18, 22-27.

[37] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 vol.5, Study Paper on the Water Dispute between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt: No Date. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Department of Interior, Land and Water Resources of the Blue Nile Basin: Ethiopia, Main Report and Appendices I-V 1964, Washington, DC. See also Zewde Gebre-Sellasie, ñBlue Nile,ò 25-27; Whittington, *Implications of Ethiopian Water*, 3-5; Waterbury, *Nile Basin,* 68-69, 116-118.

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ntified thirty-three irrigation and hydroelectric projects, some marked for the 20th and the rest for the next centuries (see table 1, and figures 1&2). Accordingly, three major irrigation schemes are identified around Lake Tana, on Ethio-Sudanese border and on the Anger and Finchaa tributaries covering about 434,000 hectares with an annual water requirement of roughly 6 Billion cubic meters. Likewise, four major hydroelectric projects on the Blue Nile between Lake Tana and the Sudanese border are identified. These are the Karodobi, Mabil, Mendaia and the Border Project, altogether having an initial active storage capacity of about 51 billion cubic meters and an estimated annual electricity generation of about 25 billion kWh. Of these Karodobi is the largest project to be built upstream of the confluence of the Guder and the Abbay and the Border dam is the largest in storage volume, some 20 kilometers upstream from the Sudan.[38]

[38] *Ibid.*

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


Table 1: Proposed Irrigation and power projects in the Blue Nile Basin (Whittington, 1985)

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


Figure 1: Main Projects Proposed for the Blue Nile in Ethiopia (Whittington, 1985)

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


Figure 2: Profile of proposed Ethiopian Hydroelectric Dams on the Blue Nile (Whittington, 1985)

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Ethiopia would save around four billion meter cubes of water for its domestic consumption, which, the study proposed, could even be diverted to the Awash River valley if necessary. More important, though, was the bitterness displayed in recounting the manner in which previous negotiations were conducted with Ethiopia as simply the follower of otherså initiatives; and the sense of confidence displayed in the countryøs newfound position to dictate policy issues on the Nile.[39]

The positions Emperor Hayla-Selassie assumed during the 1959 talks with Nasser best explains Ethiopiaøs growing assertiveness on issues related to the Nile. Apprehensive of the desire on the side of Egypt to reach a deal on technical cooperation and exchange of information, the directive prepared for the talks advised insistence on Ethiopiaøs prerogative not to reveal project studies and programs on the river, the inclusion of all the riparian states in any future negotiations and to stall Egyptøs desire to engage at high level talks regarding the matter in order to buy some time to finalize ongoing discussions with concerned states of the region.[40]

The mid 1979 witnessed escalated confrontations on the Nile following President Anwar al-Sadatøs plan to divert the water to the Sinai desert ñso as to feed around 35,000 Bedouinsò.[41] This was in line with the new policy, which they dabbed øExtended Useø,

[39] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 vol.5, Study Paper on the Water Dispute between Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt: No Date.

[40] *Ibid.* Informant: Ambassador Mängesté Dästa. He claimed that a team consisting of Gétaḳäw Kebrät and himself was delegated to oversee the initiative of bringing the upper riparian states to the negotiating table on equitable use of the Nile.

[41] MoFA afriqa hagäroḷe 1, Ambassador Bätru Kidanä-Maryam (Cairo) to ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative, MoFA), Report on The Nile Being Diverted to Sinai Desert: *Genbot* 30, 1972E.C (7 June 1980). See also Shlomi Dinar, ñWater, Security, Conflict and Cooperation,ò *SAIS Review.* 22, 2 (Summer-Fall 2002): 229-253.

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ident Sadatôs speech at Haifa, Israel, in September 1979 best demonstrated the real motive behind the new scheme. ñé why not send you some of this sweet Nile water to the Negev desert as good neighborsé .ò[42]

The decision elicited a strong response from Ethiopia issued in the form of a memorandum addressed to the OAU in May 1980. The countryôs reaction to Egyptôs scheme in particular and its stand on the utilization of the river in general were presented in some detail in this document. The memorandum argued that, as the source of the Nile, Ethiopia had every right to employ the water for its own immediate developmental purposes, that it understood and respected the needs of the people of the Sudan and Egypt as long as they recognized Ethiopiaôs privileges, denounced Sadatôs plan to divert the river from its natural course, and, more importantly, accused Egypt of continuous violation of international law and refusal to incorporate the interests of the nine riparian states on matters pertaining to the Nile in general.[43]

Egyptôs response came in the form of an outright condemnation of Ethiopia and warning of military reprisal if any action were taken affecting the amount and flow of the Nile. Major Egyptian newspapers and magazines featured statements of political and military authorities that primarily focused on intimidating Ethiopia. President Sadat and the chief of staff, General Mohamed Abdul Halim Abu Gazzala, repeatedly claimed that any action on the side of Ethiopia would be tantamount to a declaration of war on their country. On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the reopening of the Suez Canal in

[42] *Ibid.* See also Dr. Gäbré ḳadiq Dägäfu, ñWhat Benefits Will Ethiopia gain from Membership of the Nile Basin Initiative?ò *Addis Tribune,* February 18, 2005.

[43] Referred to in the above report.

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ed Ethiopiaôs anger at this first step, enquiring what it would possibly feel when additional steps were to be implemented later on.[44]

Additional measures were taken, ranging from lobbying delegates of the riparian states into accepting the Egyptian position to asking the government of Jimmy Carter to immediately supply weapons both to Egypt and Somalia. With regard to the latter, Sadat insisted Ethiopia was preparing to invade Somalia and emphasized Egyptôs solidarity with Siad Barreôs government.[45] The Ethiopian authorities, though, were more troubled by the positions riparian states like Kenya would assume in the matter. On a positive note, however, the cordial relations that Mengistu had managed to establish with Nimeiri following his visit to the Sudan in May 1980 appeared to temporarily assuage Ethiopiaôs dismay in the ensuing conflict.[46]

The need to maintain the unhindered flow of the Nile by maintaining the status quo that guaranteed the legal, economic and political rights of Egypt remained a priority in the policy of successive regimes. Particularly after 1980, this policy envisaged strategies that would secure Egyptôs monopoly over the water vis-à-vis the growing awareness of the upper riparian states and their desire to advance their own immediate interests.[47] The underlining objective of the policy was to initiate cooperation among concerned parties, design joint projects and seek international funding for their implementation without

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] *Ibid,* Sadatôs interview with the Washington Post: 27May 1980.

[46] *Ibid,* The visit of Kenyaôs Water Minister to Cairo at that time and the interview Kenyan Ambassador to Egypt, Rafael Kio, gave endorsing Sadatôs new position irritated Ethiopia.

[47] MoFA Cairo Report 12 vol.46, Ambassador Zämäne KaseÉe (Cairo) to MoFA, Report on Relations: *Ṭeqémt* 17, 1981E.C (28 Oct. 1988); MoFA etiyo- gebɨe geneÉunät. Ambassador Zämäne (Cairo) to MoFA, Report on the Ethio-Egypt Relations: *Tahesas* 21, 1982E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

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tôs upper hand on the matter. This way, the demands from others on water property rights would be suppressed and Egypt would monitor proceedings of events and clinch additional recognition and confirmation of its privileges on the Nile from the mere participation of member states. Direct military confrontation remained the ultimate resort in the event of the failure of this scheme.[48]

Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, the foreign minister, was assigned to oversee the implementation of the above policy and he was the architect of what happened in the 1980s. In 1980, he formulated the concept of UNDUGU (Swahili term meaning brotherhood) and launched a diplomatic campaign among the Nile basin states. Successive UNDUGU conferences were held at foreign ministers level, first in Khartoum (1983), then Kinshasa (1984), Cairo (1985), Kinshasa (1987) and finally in Cairo (1988). Egypt, the Sudan, Uganda, Zaire, Rwanda and Central Africa were members of the union; Tanzania and Burundi participated as observers. Besides, in contrast to the Nile Commission, membership was open to any interested party. Out of the nine Nile basin states, only Ethiopia and Kenya did not participate in all the meetings. The forum remained a predominantly Egyptian initiative without any organizational structure and fully financed by Egypt till the 1988 Cairo conference.[49]

During the third conference in Cairo, 7-8 August 1985, Egypt issued what it called the ñWhite Paperò. This document, prepared in Arabic, French and English, was entitled ôEgypt and the Nileô and tried to define the countryôs overall rights on the river on the

[48] *Ibid.*

[49] *Ibid.* Erlich, *Ethiopia and the Middle East*, 147-149.

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law and previous agreements with different parties.[50] The Ethiopian side simply put aside this material for future reference in the study it was going to launch on the Nile.

Ethiopia was deliberately isolated from UNDUGU membership at the earlier stages. The plan was to present the remaining states of Eastern and Central Africa as the prominent sources of the Nile, to manipulate them into endorsing Egyptôs position and thereby securing its legal and political dominance indefinitely. When Egyptians realized their plan was not going to work, they started to put pressure on Ethiopia into joining the union. The invitation began as early as 1984 and progressively grew in intensity up to the late 1980s.[51] In addition to UNDUGU, other initiatives were taken by Egypt during the same period. These included the nominal Nile Technical Commission and particularly the Arab Africa Promoters for International Conference (AAPIC) that would coordinate hydro electric and irrigation projects on the Nile and locate financial sources for their implementation. However, Ethiopian authorities continuously stalled on the requests for membership and participation in various projects on the pretext that ongoing independent studies had to be finalized first.[52]

The prevalence of drought and famine in the region in general and Ethiopia in particular since the late 1970s reinforced the need to utilize major rivers for irrigation farming. The new-found attention on the Nile for domestic consumption began to dictate

[50] MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneЌunät, Ambassador Zämäne (Cairo) to MoFA: Report on Relations: *Nähäsé* 28, 1977 E.C (3 Sept. 1985).

[51] MoFA Cairo Report 12 vol.46, Ambassador Zämäne (Cairo) to MoFA, Report on Relations: *Ṭeqémt* 17, 1981E.C (28 Oct. 1988); MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneЌunät, Ambassador Zämäne (Cairo) to MoFA, Report on the Ethio-Egypt Relations: *Tahesas* 21, 1982E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

[52] *Ibid.*

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states in the mid-1980s. Apart from the ôDiversionô schemes of Egypt and Sudanôs Jonglei Canal project, Kenyaôs plan to pump the waters of Lake Victoria to nearby farms and Ethiopiaôs proposed ŝana Bäläs hydro electric and irrigation projects created fertile grounds for conflict.[53]

In view of the deteriorating environmental condition, the government of Ethiopia started to take a strong position on the Nile. Detailed preparations began to emerge on methods to counter the existing arguments of Egypt, especially the one dealing with legal rights on the river. The policy papers underlined how the Egyptians had been trying to avoid negotiations regarding the matter, and what lines they would adopt in case of Ethiopiaôs strong position in the future.[54] The possible scenario included their acceptance of all the principles ranging from the Harmone Doctrine that defines the source nation as the owner of an international river to the Nyerere Doctrine that rejects colonial agreements and claims that all riparian states have equal rights.[55] The twist Egypt persistently applied for long was that equal right did not always mean proportional share; rather it depends on the membersô need and option on the matter. Egyptôs argument, therefore, would concentrate on the premise that, in contrast to the remaining Nile basin

[53] *Ibid.* See also The Democratic Republic of the Sudan Executive Organ for the Development Project in Jonglei Area, *Jonglei Project (Phase One)* (Khartoum, Jan. 1975), 7-9; The Executive Organ, National Council for the Development of the Jonglei Canal Area (Publisher), *Jonglei Canal: A Development Project in the Sudan* (Khartoum, 1982), 5-7.

[54] MoFA Cairo Report 12 vol.46, Report on Nile Conflict: *Ţeqémt* 17, 1981E.C (28 Oct. 1988); MoFA etiyo-gebĸe geneŔunät, Analysis on the Nile Controversy: *Tahesas* 21, 1982E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

[55] For detailed analysis of the different legal views of the Harmone and Nyerere Doctrines see Nurit Kliot, *Water Resources and Conflict in the Middle East* (Rutledge, London and New York, 1994), 51 and Tvedt, ñManagement of Water and Irrigationé ò, 88.

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who have ample water and land resources, the existing appropriation rights should continue to apply.[56]

The approach designed by the Ethiopian side admitted that the 1902 agreement between the British and Emperor Menelik binding the latter not to engage in activities that would diminish the flow of the Nile was a reasonable deal, and could be signed again. To this effect, President Mengistu assured his Egyptian counterpart in January 1987 of Ethiopiaôs intentions not to affect the flow of the river, and that, guided by international law on the matter, they could use it equally for their respective goals.[57] Rather, Mengistu insisted, their joint developmental efforts would sustain and boost the amount of water, thereby satisfying the needs of both states.

But, since the remaining agreements on the River Baro/Sobat and other tributaries of the Nile were signed by colonial powers, the policy paper argued, they should not be binding in any way on Ethiopia. More importantly, since the concerned dependent territories have achieved independence, the matter has to be reconsidered under the international law guiding state succession.[58] The policy line adopted stressed that Egypt could no longer dictate discussions related to legal rights over the Nile or focus on its privileges as a prominent beneficiary. Rather it had to engage on constructive dialogue that would accommodate the needs of all the riparian states. Otherwise, the matter would

[56] MoFA Cairo Report 12 vol.46, Report on Nile Conflict: *Ṭeqémt* 17, 1981E.C (28 Oct. 1988); MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneÉunät, Analysis on the Nile Controversy: *Tahesas* 21, 1982E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

[57] MoFA Cairo Report 10 vol.37, Report of Foreign Minister Berhänu Bayehôs Visit to Egypt: *Ṭir* 10, 1979E.C (19 Jan. 1987).

[58] MoFA Cairo Report 12 vol.46, Report on Nile Conflict: *Ṭeqémt* 17, 1981E.C (28 Oct. 1988); MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneÉunät, Analysis on the Nile Controversy: *Tahesas* 21, 1982E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

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hat would dramatically alter relations, particularly those between Ethiopia and Egypt.

Similar controversies related with the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers and the resultant conflict between the source nation, Turkey, and the two riparian states, Syria and Iraq, were cited as practical examples that could be applied in the Ethiopian case. The measures Turkey started to take by implementing numerous hydro-electric and irrigation projects and how it began to use the two rivers as a political weapon to dictate the course of events in the region caught the attention of Ethiopian rulers. The policy paper also advised to prepare militarily to counter possible Egyptian attack if things get out of control.[60]

Amidst the deteriorating internal security situations, an Ethiopian delegation led by the new foreign minister, Täsfayé Dinqa, visited Egypt in January 1990 and, among other things, discussed issues related to the Nile. The talking points prepared for the occasion clearly indicate the position the country maintained on the issue and demonstrate the origin of the policy lines.[61] The document states Ethiopiaôs recognition of the importance of the Nile to Egypt, just as it expects the latter to realize the increasing significance of the river to Ethiopia.

It argues that, for centuries, the country has relied on rain-fed agriculture and, as a result, made no or very little use of its rivers for agricultural purposes. Recurrent drought

[59] *Ibid.*

[60] MoFA Cairo Report 12 vol.46, Report on Nile Conflict: *Ṭeqémt* 17, 1981E.C (28 Oct. 1988).

[61] MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneЌunät, Talking Points Prepared for the Visit of Foreign Minister Täsfayé Dinqa to Egypt: *Ṭir* 26, 1982E.C (4 Feb. 1990).

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necessitate increasing reliance on irrigation farming. Soil erosion, deforestation and desertification, compounded by population increase, compel Ethiopia to give priority to agriculture and food self-sufficiency. Hence, the position paper states, the need for an efficient and optimum use of its water resources.[62]

The Ethiopian side was keen to observe that, in its drive for food self-sufficiency and the expansion of irrigation agriculture, the country would always keep in mind the real needs and legitimate interests of the Egyptian people and would be led by the generally accepted norms of international law on trans-boundary rivers. Accordingly, given the good-will of both sides and a proper perception of each otherôs needs and interests as well as the technical potential for water conservation and storage, Ethiopia ósees no insurmountable conflict of interests between the two countriesô.

> é .To show its good-will and cooperative spirit, Ethiopia has now decided to join all the riparian states of the Nile in a lasting and judicious regional cooperation on the integrated development of the Nile River Basin. In the absence of adequate data on our water resources and water needs, we have hitherto been less than ready to plunge into basin-wide cooperationé .[63]

The position paper emphasized that Ethiopia believed all the riparian states were well aware of their interests and needs, that it was high time for all the concerned bodies to cooperate in sharing the water resources of the Nile on equitable and mutually beneficial basis. As a result, the document stressed, Ethiopia would in the future participate in the efforts of the riparian states towards the integrated development of the river basin.[64] As was foreseen, the Egyptian officials insisted on the participation of

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] *Ibid.*

[64] *Ibid.*

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arding the Nile, including UNDUGU; and an agreement was reached to coordinate their efforts in the future.[65]

3.1.2. Reaction to Ethiopia's Relation with Israel

Ethiopia's *de jure* recognition of the state of Israel in October 1961 was perceived by the Egyptians as a move intended to further embarrass them at a time of despair following the disintegration of their association with Syria a couple of months before. The Ethiopian ambassador was told in no uncertain terms of this view and Egypt's displeasure with the decision in general.[66] His efforts to explain the reasons behind the decision and the attempt to reaffirm Ethiopia's commitment to peaceful coexistence with the Arab/Islam world bore no fruit. The ambassador rather warned the Ethiopian government to be watchful of Egypt's reprisal in the near future.

Frictions following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the position imperial Ethiopia assumed on the situation further aggravated the existing tense relationship with Egypt. A case in point was Ethiopia's opposition to the motion tabled by the Non-Aligned caucus in the UN demanding the immediate withdrawal of Israel from the territories it occupied during the war. This reignited anti-Ethiopian sentiments in Egypt and provoked a huge propaganda campaign portraying the country as the crony of Israel. Alarmed by the developments, Ethiopia's ambassador to Egypt was ordered to investigate the feeling

[65] MoFA etiyo -gebʁe geneŔunät, Report on the Visit to Egypt: *Ṭir* 26, 1982E.C (4 Feb. 1990); MoFA etiyo -gebʁe geneŔunät, Täsfayé Dinqa (Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister) to the Council of Ministers, Report on the Visit to Egypt: *Ṭir* 30, 1982E.C (8 Feb. 1990).

[66] MoFA Cairo report 1 Ṣeraz 2, Ambassador Mäläs Mikaĉél Andom (Cairo) to Kätäma Yifru (State Minister, MoFA) on Ethiopia's Recognition of Israel and Egyptian Reaction: *Ṭeqémt* 16, 1954 E.C (27 Oct. 1961). Also see Arye Oded, ñAfrica in Israeli Foreign Policy ï Expectations and Disenchantment: Historical and Diplomatic Aspects,ò *Israel Studies.* 15, 3 (Fall 2010): 121-142. Also see Ferris, ñSoviet Support for Egypt'sé ò, 5-9.

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ent of the situation.[67] The attempt to appease Egyptian officials, emphasizing Ethiopiaôs neutrality and aspirations for equitable treatment of all the conflicting parties, bore no fruit. Much worse, the ambassador reported back that Egypt had already taken retributive measures, including the reopening of offices of Eritrean rebels.[68]

The Yom Kippur War of 1973 and subsequent developments in the region shaped Ethiopiaôs relation with Israel and Egypt for long. Ethiopia stopped contact with Israel following the resolution by the OAU that called member states to severe diplomatic relations with Israel, for the latter had occupied the territory of an African state, i.e. Egypt. When the decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel was made public on 13 November 1989, Egypt and the remaining Arab states were quick to express their objection and start an intensive propaganda campaign.[69]

An assessment report prepared to examine the background to the reaction of the above group demonstrates the way geo-political realities of the region influenced Ethiopia. In light of the 1979 Camp David Accord, whereby Egypt, contrary to all expectations, recognized the state of Israel in order to regain its occupied territory; the grudging awareness among the Arab world of Egyptôs motives and their efforts to reinstate it into their community; and measures by some Black African states to resume relations since as

[67] MoFA Cairo Report 2 vol.7, MoFA to Ambassador Mäläs (Cairo): *Hämlé* 14, 1959E.C (21 July 1967).

[68] MoFA Cairo Report 2 vol.7, Ambassador Mäläs (Cairo) to Mängesté Dästa (Assistant Minister, MoFA): *Hämlé* 21, 1959E.C (28 July 1967).

[69] MoFA etiyo -gebкe geneÉunät, Assessment Report on Egyptian Reaction to Ethiopiaôs Decision to Reestablish Diplomatic Relations with Israel: *Tahesas* 21, 1982E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

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e reaction to Ethiopiaôs decision was perceived to be an extension of other considerations.[70]

The strong reaction from the Arab world, according to the assessment, was as a result of the suspicion that forces threatening their strategic interest would secure the upper hand along the southern parts of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Some of the possible scenarios they feared included, for instance, Israel getting a military base along the western shore of the Red Sea, thereby creating security threats to the Arab/Islam world; the arming of Ethiopia and South Sudan rebels, thus altering the military balance in the Horn and creating immediate danger to the unity of the Sudan; creation of joint Ethio-Israelite water projects endangering both the Sudan and Egypt; and the strengthening of Israelôs army following the mass immigration of Ethiopian Jews (the Bétä Israel). More alarming to the Arab world, though, was the danger the situation might create to the pipelines of Saudi Arabia and Iraq in the Red Sea, oil shipments of the two Yemenôs and across the Suez Canal.[71]

The objection on the side of Egypt, the assessment assumed, was for two reasons. First, Egypt always considered its relation with Israel a special case; and was pressuring African states to maintain the post 1973 status quo so as to isolate Israel from the continent and use the former as weapon of influence. The second reason was the sensitivity it accorded to the timing of Ethiopiaôs decision. When the announcement was made, a high level Egyptian delegation was in Addis Ababa, and, according to them, it

[70] *Ibid.* Also see Shemesh Moshe, ñThe origins of Sadatôs Strategic Volte-face (Marking 30 Years Since Sadatôs Historic Visit to Israel, November 1977),ò *Israel Studies.* 13, 2 (Summer 2008): 28-53.

[71] *Ibid.*

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decision was a mutual one. The fact that Egypt had yet to recover from the isolation it suffered following the Camp David Agreement, however, put that country on equal footing with Ethiopia, and therefore, it could not issue official statements categorically denouncing the move.[72]

During the January 1990 talks in Cairo, Ethiopia stated its view on the matter unequivocally.[73] The talking points prepared for the occasion state the countryôs determination to widen the scope of its international ties by establishing diplomatic relations with all the states in the world, particularly with states with which it has geopolitical attachment. Pursuant to this, the position paper argues, Ethiopia in the last two years had reestablished diplomatic relations with Tunisia and Iraq and was trying to establish links with the Gulf States, particularly the United Arab Emirates. So the órésumption of relations with Israel is in line with this policy and is in consonance with the current trend in international relations of establishing contact and dialogue between adversariesô.[74]

The Ethiopian delegation tried to assure the Egyptian side that, irrespective of the ongoing attempt to depict this step as anti-Arab, the resumption of relations with Israel was not at the expense of any third party. Rather, it insisted, Ethiopia would never use its relations with Israel to harm the legitimate interests of the people in the region; Ethiopia also vowed to maintain its commitment to the cause of the Palestinian people and ó our brothers in South Africaô.

[72] *Ibid.*

[73] MoFA etiyo -gebÞe geneÝunät, Talking Points for the Visit to Egypt of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Täsfayé Dinqa: *Ţir* 26, 1982E.C (4 Feb. 1990).

[74] *Ibid.*

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> [Egypt and the other Arab states] of disinformation raeli experts are not building dams on the Nile, nted military bases and facilities to Israel in the Red Sea and she has no policy of mass emigration of any religious group to any country. Furthermore, she [Ethiopia] is not going to open an embassy in Jerusalemé .[75]

Contrary to the expectations of Egyptian officials, since their country is an influential member of the Arab world, Ethiopia requested them for help to fight back the campaign of disinformation, which, it claimed, was in the interest of neither the Arabs nor of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian delegation managed to persuade its Egyptian counterpart on the above points. However, with reservation on Israelôs possible attempt to manipulate things around, Egypt recognized Ethiopiaôs right to reestablish diplomatic relations with that country.[76]

3.1.3. Egypt's Special Relation with the Sudan

The mutual understanding between Egypt and the Sudan pertaining to the uniqueness of their relations had troubled Ethiopian regimes for long. Particularly, Egyptôs conviction that Sudan should remain an integral part of Egypt and óstrategic depthô for its national security; the determination to intervene in the Sudan in case of activities that would be contrary to its national interests; and the long-standing position that recognized the independence and sovereign status of the Sudan as long as its rulers remained loyal to their counterparts on the lower Nile were specific points that recurred in policy deliberations.[77] Consecutive policy statements by Egyptian regimes regarding the

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneЌunät, Report on the Visit to Egypt: *Ṭir* 30, 1982E.C (8 Feb. 1990).

[77] MoFA Sudan 27-D2 vol.4, Intelligence Report on the Sudan and Egypt: *Säné* 8, 1951E.C (15 June 1959); MoFA Sudan 28-D2 129, Report on Air Defense Agreement Between Egypt and the Sudan: *Miyazya* 3 & 7, 1960E.C (11 & 15 April 1968); MoFA Sudan 27-D2 vol.2, Report on Planned Unity Among Egypt, the Sudan and Libya: *Mägabit* 4, 1962E.C (13 March 1970); MoFA yä etiyopeya ena yä göräbét agäroḷe

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the two countries, attributing to their bond that goes beyond specific governments, parliaments or referendum (often describing it as the affair of one state with two nationalities), was taken by Ethiopian officials as clear testimony to Egyptôs stance on the matter.[78] Ethiopiaôs relation with the Sudan, therefore, was considered to be directly affected by the foreign policy directives of Egypt towards that country.

The way Egypt manipulated the political forces in post-independent Sudan was taken as indicator of the firm hand they were exercising in that country for long. The fast regime successions involving weak coalitions of parties like the Ansar, the Khatimiyya, scholars and trade unions that formed civilian parliamentary democracies on the one hand and governments created by educated military officers on the other were intended to serve their interests. The rebellion in South Sudan was perceived by Egyptians as the card they skillfully employed in balancing the power politics between the above two sections and ascertaining their perpetual dominance. Among these groups, the Egyptians preferred the military faction to assume power. The government of Jafar al-Nimeiri, 1969-1985, according to Ethiopian sources, best represented the above view.[79]

Various bilateral agreements signed between the two countries, including the 1959 and April 1968 agreements on the Nile and defense of their air spaces, respectively, were taken as indicative of the special ties. More alarming to Ethiopia were the 1976 Defense

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geneÉunät, Report on Egyptôs Interest on the Sudan: *Genbot* 8, 1971E.C (16 May 1979); MoFA Cairo Report 12 vol.46, Assessment Report on Relations: *Ṭeqémt* 17, 1981E.C (28 Oct. 1988); MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneÉunät, Report on Relations: *Tahesas* 21, 1982E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

[78] MoFA Cairo Report 12 vol.46, Assessment Report on Relations: *Ṭeqémt* 17, 1981E.C (28 Oct. 1988); MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneÉunät, Report on Relations: *Tahesas* 21, 1982E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

[79] *Ibid.* See also Ismael, *UAR in Africa,* 163-201.

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Sadat and particularly the 1982 Integration Charter that provided for complete unity of the two countries within ten years, to be executed in three phases, ultimately creating a political entity in the continent with the largest share on the Nile.[80] Had this plan been implemented, the policy paper observed, its overall impact on Ethiopia would have been overwhelming. The deposition of Nimeiriôs regime in April 1985 and the subsequent annulment of the agreement and its replacement by a less binding Charter of Brotherhood by the succeeding government of Sadiq al-Mahdi was a relief to Ethiopia.[81]

The rebellion in South Sudan and Egyptôs reaction to it was another concern for Ethiopia. During the times of Nimeiri, the Egyptians had fully supported the formerôs plan to crush the movement militarily. But al-Mahdiôs accommodating approach towards the problem in the South exacerbated the already troubled situation, at one point giving rise to the idea of military intervention by Mubarakôs government to restore Nimeiri to power.[82] Mahdiôs growing association with Libya also created similar tension. The idea of Egyptian military intervention was abandoned following the objections at both cases by the Egyptian president.

Irrespective of their troubled relations, though, Egypt continued to safeguard the interests of the Sudan during the latterôs confrontations with Ethiopia. The alternative strategy designed by Egypt in tackling the complex situation, however, appeared more dangerous to Ethiopia. While continuing to supply the Sudanese with arms, Mubarak now

[80] *Ibid.*

[81] MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneÉunät, Report on Relations: *Tahesas* 21, 1982E.C (31 Dec. 1989).

[82] *Ibid.*

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mediator in the conflict between Ethiopia and the Sudan. His attitude regarding the Sudan Peoplesô Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was that Ethiopia was its sole instigator and sponsor; that the conflict would entail serious consequences for the racial and religious relations of the region was taken by Ethiopia as an excuse to solicit material assistance from the entire Arab/Islam world for the Sudan and the Eritrean rebels.[83]

The increasing affinity among Libya, Syria and Egypt, together with the total endorsement by Egypt and the USA of the military government of General Omar Hassan Al Bashir after June 1989 and the possible effects these would have on Ethiopiaôs security and national integrity was a matter of serious concern to the Darg officials.[84] The January 1990 bombardment by Sudanese tanks and artillery of border posts along their common boundary and the revitalized insurgent activities in northern Ethiopia were taken as direct provocations deliberately instigated with the endorsement of Egypt and other Arab states. Ethiopiaôs position on these developments was communicated to Egypt during the January 1990 visit to Egypt of the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Täsfayé Dinqa.[85]

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[83] *Ibid.*

[84] *Ibid.*

[85] MoFA etiyo-gebкe geneЌunät, Talking points prepared During the Visit to Cairo: *Ṭir* 26, 1982E.C (4 Feb. 1990).

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Ethiopiaôs uneventful relation with the regime of King Idris I (1951-69) contrast with the friction witnessed during the rule of Muammar Gaddafi. The latterôs aspiration for leadership of the Arab/Islam world, as was demonstrated with his move for the coordination of political, military and economic policies with Egypt and the Sudan and creating the short lived federation with Egypt and Syria in 1971, was disturbing to Ethiopiaôs officials.[86] Gaddafiôs agenda of fanning strong anti-Israel sentiments in the region and particularly his support to dissident elements in Ethiopia apparently dictated the course of relations in the near future.

Tripoli soon became the safe haven for Eritrean rebels following the division within ELF leaders stationed in Egypt. Developments associated with the hijackers of Ethiopian Airlines plane in April 1971 best illustrates this point. The hijackers landed in Libya but soon departed to Cairo only to find the faction in deep turmoil following the division among Christians and Muslims, and the Christian highlanders feuding along the sides of Wäldä-ab Wäldä-Maryam and Tädla Bairu. Libya remained a preferred spot for the hijackers for they immediately returned there.[87]

More dramatic, though, was the decision in mid 1970 to send a delegation of journalists from the Libyan newsletter, *Al-Thawrah* (ñRevolutionò), to the Peoplesô Liberation Forces (PLF) in Danakil and the Red Sea Coast.[88] The detailed report

[86] MoFA afriqa hagäroḷ e, Assessment Report on Relation: *Tahesas* 19, 1972E.C (29 Dec. 1979).

[87] MoFA ertra leyu leyu guday 12 26, Report on Hijacked Ethiopian Plane: *Genbot* 2, 1963E.C (10 May 1971).

[88] MoFA ertra leyu leyu guday 12 vol.3, Report of the Visit by Libyan Delegation to PLF Bases in Danakil and the Red Sea Coast: 2 August 1970.

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of Muammar Gaddafi on 2 August 1970, and later disseminated to various groups supporting the rebels, outlined the policy lines envisaged by Libya towards Eritrea. The report, among other things, characterized the movement in Eritrea as primarily an Arab one and the territory as an integral part of the Arab world; the Christians were included in the struggle for tactical reasons; and there was a high level of moral and material assistance to the faction by the government of South Yemen. In addition, to the amazement of Ethiopian officials, it detailed the names of prominent leaders of the movement, its strategic locations, points of entry and exit of its functionaries, types of weapons supplied by South Yemen and how Libya could supplement this by providing small boats and anti-aircraft guns.[89]

Bilateral relations, which tipped very much to the negative side during the pre-1974 period, worsened afterwards. Initially, Gaddafiôs attempt to approach the new rulers immediately after the revolution failed because of the latterôs indifference. Meaningful contact, though, was made in October 1976 when the chairman of the military junta, Br. Gen. Täfäri Bänté, gave audience to the Libyan envoy that brought Gaddafiôs message stating his support to the revolution and recognition of Ethiopiaôs territorial integrity.[90] Similar assurances were advanced again after Col. Mengistu consolidated his power after eliminating his rivals in February 1977. This time, the two sides managed to sign a set of agreements that provided for the creation of economic and technical cooperation,

[89] *Ibid.*

[90] *Addis Zämän*: *Ṭeqémt* 3, 1969E.C (14 Oct. 1976).

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ural institutions, maritime and transportation companies and strengthening of cultural and trade relations.[91]

Nevertheless, parallel actions countervailing the above initiatives were taken by the Libyan side. In a rather emotional letter, the Ethiopian embassy in Tripoli detailed Gaddafiôs growing surveillance of its premises and the continuing assistance to the Eritrean secessionist factions.[92] The letter states Libyaôs demands for blind support from Africa and the Libyan peopleôs flimsy temperament and their tendency to be annoyed by developments negating their whims. The erratic behavior of Gaddafiôs regime was demonstrated, according to the letter, by his quick reaction to Sadatôs plan to divert the Nile in to the Sinai Desert and the propaganda campaign waged in the state media that validates the decision on the part of Ethiopia and the Sudan to take the case to the International Court of Justice. More fascinating, though, was the recommendation made for conducting affairs with the Libyans in the future. The letter warns of the tendency of the people in general to consider lying as a sign of astuteness, their unreliability for sustained friendship, total absence of humility and their irrational behavior.[93]

The Ethio-Libyan relation after 1977 were conditioned by the presumptions of the new political system in the latter, i.e. the *Jamahiriya* (state of the people).[94] The creation of the revolutionary committees that dictated policy issues in that country; the ideology

[91] *Addis Zämän*: *Säné* 14 & 21, 1969E.C (21 & 28 June 1977).

[92] MoFA afriqa hagäroḷe 1, Ethiopian Embassy (Tripoli) to Major Dawit Wäldä-Giyorgis (Permanent Representative, MoFA): *Tahesas* 19, 1972E.C (29 Dec. 1979).

[93] *Ibid.*

[94] MoFA afriqa hagäroḷe 1, Report from Ethiopian Embassy (Tripoli) on the Situation in Libya: *Genbot* 28, 1972E.C (5 June 1980).

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Book; the chaos that arose in handling African diplomatic representations in Libya and running of external affairs that resulted in direct confrontation with adjacent countries; the conflict with international organizations including the Arab League, the UN and the OAU; and the intense popular opposition the government faced immediately afterwards demonstrate the extent of difficulty in entering into friendly relation with that state. However, in the face of growing marginalization from the Arab/Islam world, Gaddafi began to take measures to bolster relations with countries in the continent like Ethiopia.[95] It was in this context that the brief but intense period of cordial relations between Ethiopia and Libya commenced.

This new phase in the relations between the two countries started following Colonel Mengestuôs surprise visit to Libya on 11 November 1980.[96] Indicative of the nature of upcoming developments was the fact that immediately before the trip to Tripoli, Mengistu was in Moscow for two weeks, and, following the talks with Gaddafi, he directly flew to Aden, South Yemen. The joint communiqué issued in Tripoli after the overnight discussion stated their agreement to strengthen bilateral relations and coordinate their efforts in regional and international affairs.[97]

In the meantime, MoFA was preparing an assessment report on the possible advantages and side effects of the upcoming trilateral coalition among Ethiopia, Libya and South Yemen.[98] The task involved appraisal of economic, political and military

[95] *Ibid.*

[96] *Addis Zämän*: *Ṭeqémt* 2 & 4, 1973E.C (13 & 15 Oct. 1980).

[97] *Addis Zämän*: *Ṭeqémt* 4, 1973E.C (15 Oct. 1980).

[98] MoFA kä Dr. Amarä Täklé biro yätägäÝu documäntoḷe 1, Assessment on the Intended Coalition with Libya and South Yemen: No Date.

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ies and project on the feasibility of the alignment in the long run. Accordingly, Libyaôs deteriorating international posture, both in the region and particularly the continent, was considered a political weakness and, therefore, a liability for the intended association.

Specific cases highlighted include the countryôs non-stop confrontation with immediate neighbors; closer alliance in the continent with the authoritarian regimes of Idi Amin, Bokasa and Bongo; lack of rapport with the major liberation movements like SWAPO and PLO; and, following its open conflict with Chad over the Aozou Strip, the allegations by West African states, the Sudan and Egypt of Gaddafiôs intervention in their internal affairs.[99] Nonetheless, Libyaôs new found oil riches and the resultant growth of its G.D.P. over the last decade was considered a plus that the two other partners could exploit in order to secure a much needed financial assistance. Likewise, the relative military strength of Gaddafiôs regime was expected to be of benefit to Ethiopia and South Yemen.[100]

The report put forward some possible outcomes of the intended coalition. It stressed that, since the goals and ideologies of *Jamahiriya* Arab Republic did not coincide with and sometimes even contradicted those of Ethiopia and South Yemen, the feasibility of brokering sustainable deal remains unlikely. Rather, Ethiopia should think in terms of short term financial and military assistance that could be exploited. The report, however, warned of Libyaôs demands at bilateral and trilateral levels, and advised caution against

[99] *Ibid.*

[100] *Ibid*

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would have on Ethiopiaôs credibility among the African caucus and the non-aligned group.[101]

When the trilateral coalition of Ethiopia, Libya and South Yemen was finally realized in August 1981, it assumed the form postulated by the MoFA. The leaders of these countries initially deliberated and agreed on the matter in secrecy in Jimma, Western Ethiopia in early August 1981. However, it was after four days discussion in Aden (16-19 August) that they finalized the agreement and issued an identical communiqué on 28 August in Addis Ababa, Tripoli and Aden.[102] The signatories agreed to cooperate in the political, technical and economic spheres; and created a political committee of foreign ministers directly accountable to a supreme council consisting of the three leaders, Col. Mengistu, Col. Gaddafi and Ali Nasser Mohamed that would oversee the implementation of the agreements.

[101] *Ibid.*

[102] For detailed description of the Eden conference and the communiqué issued later on see *Addis Zämän*: *Nähäsé* 14, 15, 23 & 26, 1973E.C (20, 21, 29 Aug. and 1 Sept. 1981). Informant: Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä.

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Mengistu, Ali Nasser and Gaddafi in Aden after the August 1981 Agreement[103]

The provisions of the Aden Agreement and joint statements emerging later on made perfectly clear the intention behind the trilateral association. The categorical condemnation of the west, particularly the US, and Israel, the denunciation of the Camp David Accord, open support to the Libyan invasion of Chad vis-à-vis the opposition it faced from most of African states and the west, and endorsement of the secessionist movement in Western Sahara (Saharawi Republic) against Morocco clearly demonstrate Gaddafiôs influence in the coalition. Ethiopia secured endorsement of the Asmara Manifesto that called for the resolution of the Eritrean problem peacefully; and Ali

[103] *Addis Zämän: Nähäsé* 14, 1973 E.C (20 Aug. 1981).

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tary assistance in the face of an eminent coup in April 1986.

This unique relationship between Ethiopia and Libya after 1980 was further strengthened by Gaddafiôs five day state visit immediately after the Aden meeting. From 20 to 24 August, a flurry of colorful activities were staged to impress the Libyan ruler, ranging from award of the highest order African Medal to Gaddafi to a mass rally in support of the two leaders.[105] In successive meetings on the occasion of Gaddafiôs visit and later on, a variety of deals were signed whereby the two states would cooperate in regional and continental matters. In addition to promises of technical and economic cooperation and Libyaôs assurance to respect Ethiopiaôs territorial integrity, efforts would be coordinated in training and arming selected liberation movements like PLO, SWAPO, ANC, POLISARIO and SPLA/M.[106] In addition to coordinating their efforts to strengthen South Sudan fighters, Gaddafi later admitted that the two leaders had collaborated in bringing down Gen. Nimeiriôs regime in April 1985.[107]

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[104] For decisions of successive meetings of joint council of ministers and defense ministers see *Addis Zämän*: *Hedar* 5, 9 & 10 (15, 19 & 20 Nov. 1981); *Tahesas* 3, 6 & 7 (13, 16 & 17 Dec. 1981); *Miyazya* 14 & 25 (22 April & 3 May 1982); *Genbot* 1, 3 & 21, 1974E.C (9, 11 & 29 May 1982). For Ethiopiaôs military assistance to Nasserôs government and opposition to US attack on Tripoli see *Addis Zämän*: *Ṭir* 9 (18 Jan.), *Mägabit* 18 (27 March) & *Miyazya* 8 & 12, 1978E.C (16 & 20 April 1986); Zänäbä Fäläqä, näbär II (Addis Ababa, Genbot 2001 E.C.), 86-98.

[105] For the scale of activities see *Addis Zämän*: *Nähäsé* 15-19, 1973E.C (21-25 Aug. 1981).

[106] MoFA etiyo-libya geneÑunät, Report on Relations: *Tahesas* 30, 1980E.C (9 Jan. 1988); *Addis Zämän*: *Nähäsé* 16 & 19, 1973E.C (22 & 25 Aug. 1981); *Tahesas* 3 & 7, 1974E.C (13 & 17 Dec. 1981).

[107] MoFA etiyo-libya geneÑunät, Minutes of Foreign Minister Seyoum Mäsfenôs Talks with Gaddafi in Tripoli in April 1999: *Mäskäräm* 6, 1992E.C (17 Sept. 1999).

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Saluting the crowd at Revolution Square, Addis Ababa, August 1981[108]

Ethiopia complied with the tenets of their bilateral accord, sometimes giving blind support to predominantly Libyan interests in Chad and the POLISARIO.[109] More dramatic manifestation of Ethiopia returning the favor were the risk it took in protecting and sometimes promoting Gaddafiôs agenda in the OAU and among member states of the continental body. Cases in point were how the country went out of its way to convince African states to hold the 19th summit in Tripoli, and, when this failed to materialize, the attempts made to make Gaddafi chairman of the OAU for the year 1983/84. Clear signs of estrangement between Ethiopia and Libya occurred when African leaders, suspicious of the motives and personality of Gaddafi, refused to grant him the position of chairperson. Following Mengistuôs appointment as chairperson, Gaddafi stormed out of

[108] *Addis Zämän*: *Nähäsé* 17, 1973 E.C (23 Aug. 1981).

[109] See below for the cases of Ethiopian support to Chad and POLISARIO, pp. 402-428

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1983). Thereafter, the pact between the two states started to assume a different course.

The rupture reached a new level in December 1987 following Gaddafiôs anti-Ethiopian comments on the occasion of the Libya-North Yemen joint ministerial meeting. In what was perceived to be an attempt to regain the attention of the Arab world, Gaddafi made provocative comments regarding the Nile and the Horn of Africa.[111] He denounced Black African efforts to check the flow of the Nile and their concerted actions to realize the secession of South Sudan, characterizing the moves as tantamount to challenging the national integrity of the Sudan and Egypt. Particularly the remark that the Horn is predominantly an Arab enclave, and the war in Eritrea and Ethiopiaôs attempt to divide Somalia and Sudan was motivated by the need to avert the impending encirclement appeared more alarming. At the same time, ELF and EPLF leaders were allowed to reenter Libya, they were given warm reception at government level and granted permission to use the state media for propaganda campaign.[112]

Libyaôs conduct was interpreted as a reaction to Ethiopiaôs efforts on rapprochement with the Middle East and North Africa after mid-1980s. The military government had dispatched successive missions to the region in an attempt to acquaint them of the Eritrean situation, its peace initiative, and to solicit their assistance in the process. Countries approached included, among others, North Yemen, Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, Egypt

[110] MoFA etiyo-libya geneÉunät, Report on Relations: *Tahesas* 30, 1980E.C (9 Jan. 1988).

[111] *Ibid.*

[112] *Ibid.*

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e face of its growing isolation from the of Arab League, and in order to speed up its reintegration into the community of Arab states, the Ethiopian side observed, Libya chose to exploit the sensitive case of the Nile and the politico-religious dynamics of the Horn thereby ascertaining its commitment on maintaining Arab interests in the region.

Libyaôs depiction of Ethiopia as anti-Arab and dangerous for their interests prompted a set of counter measures.[114] These included request for explanation from Libya, staging counter-propaganda campaign and minimizing the number of Libyan diplomats in Addis Ababa. The last resort was to summon Ethiopiaôs ambassador in Tripoli and ultimately to terminate diplomatic relations. By March 1991, two staff members of the Libyan embassy had been evicted from Ethiopia.[115] Afterwards, bilateral relations remained dormant for long. Attempts at amending relations with Libya occurred immediately after the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998-2000), Gaddafiôs role in fueling the conflict through supporting the Eritreans being the driving factor for Ethiopiaôs need for rapprochement. This happened following the visit to Tripoli of the foreign minister and premier of the new EPRDF government in April and May 1999, respectively, in an effort to convince Gaddafi to stop its assistance to Eritrea.[116]

Ethiopia and Egypt experienced a murky relation in the period under discussion. The condescending attitudes of Nasser and Sadat towards the country, their willingness to

[113] *Ibid. Addis Zämän*: *Hämlé* 8, 1979E.C (15 July 1987); *Mäskäräm* 19, 1980E.C (30 Sept. 1987); *Genbot* 24, 1980E.C (1 June 1988); *Genbot* 29, 1981E.C (6 June 1989).

[114] MoFA etiyo-libya geneÉunät, Report on Relations: *Tahesas* 30, 1980E.C (9 Jan. 1988).

[115] *Addis Zämän*: *Mägabit* 14, 1983E.C (23 March 1991).

[116] *Addis Zämän*: *Miyazya* 23 (1 May) & *Genbot* 6, 10 &11, 1991E.C (14, 18 & 19 May 1999).

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of dominating the Red Sea shoreline and the entire North Eastern part of Africa, Egyptôs age-old ambition to unilaterally control the Nile were among the major reasons. Ethiopian governments perceived the involvement of Egypt in the affairs of Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan, and particularly its support to Eritrean rebels, as being motivated by the desire to realize the above missions. One way or the other, Egypt participated in Ethiopiaôs conflicts with the Sudan and Somalia (primarily by supplying arms to the latter) and was directly involved in creating and sustaining secessionist elements. These incidents contributed to the perception in Ethiopia that Egypt is perpetually intent on destabilizing Ethiopia.

The bilateral affairs between the two countries started on a negative note following the 1956 Suez Crisis; Ethiopiaôs pro-West attitude at the time antagonized Egypt. The Imperial regime did not bother to change this situation; nor did the governments of Nasser and Sadat abandon their policies. The strategy employed by imperial Ethiopia mainly focused on ignoring Egypt and establishing intermittent contacts at a higher level, mainly concentrated on demanding the latter to abandon its support to opposition groups and to stop meddling in the affairs of neighboring states. The Darg maintained a similar line and almost succeeded in convincing Mubarak to comply with this ultimatum. Throughout the period, Ethiopia emphasized that any discussion on the Nile would be entertained only if Egypt went along with these requests.

Nonetheless, it has been the controversy over Nile that basically determined the relations of the two states. Contrary to what Egypt was claiming, Ethiopia insisted on its sovereign right to the waters of the Nile as a source of eighty percent of the water. To emphasize this point, the imperial regime repudiated the treaties Egypt invoked whenever

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ile arose and simultaneously solicited the assistance of a US-based company and later the US government in surveying the entire Blue Nile Basin. More importantly, it initiated a dialogue between upper riparian states in a bid to corner Egypt and Sudan. The Darg equally maintained the position that Ethiopia has a natural right to use the river to fulfill its immediate needs and it would not entertain any talks to the contrary.

Throughout, Ethiopia insisted on equitable use of the water but underlined its understanding of Egyptôs total reliance on the Nile. However, the latterôs refusal to negotiate on the issue frustrated the entire discussion. Simultaneously, Ethiopia failed to implement projects designed on the Nile, more so because of the pressure Egypt exerted on international funding agencies. Despite this setback, both the imperial regime and the Darg managed to insist that Ethiopia would not budge from its long-established position on the Nile and would somehow use the river for developmental purposes in the near future. The two governments also assumed a similar position in their responses to Egyptôs complaints regarding Ethiopiaôs relation with Israel. Oftentimes, they insisted on the fact that the matter was solely the preserve of Ethiopia. Israel was sought as a counterweight to the negative role of Egypt in refueling anti-Ethiopian sentiments in the Sudan. The Israelis were particularly active in the South Sudan rebellion.

Ethio-Libyan relations represent yet another dimension. The two countries had little historic ties to fall back on, and the scant incidents demonstrate the existence of anti-Ethiopian sentiments on the side of Libya. In particular, Gaddafi openly entertained anti-Ethiopian sentiments and gave shelter to major opposition elements. The odd intimacy between Mengistu and the Libyan leader (1981 - 1983) occurred in spite of this

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the two countries. The friendship totally failed to deliver the gains Ethiopia sought in the first place and ultimately contributed to the frustration of the negotiation with Nimeiriôs Sudan. The temperamental Gaddafi resorted to his earlier mission of sponsoring forces detrimental to the interest of Ethiopia. Unlike the policy directive towards Egypt, the Darg significantly departed from the customary trend of detachment from Arab/Islam countries and engaged in a futile exercise. In the final analysis, it can be concluded that the geo-political realities of the Horn of Africa and Ethiopiaôs strategic place therein for long dictated its relations with the Arab/Islam world in general and North African states in particular.

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Chapter IV

Involvement in Regional Issues

4.1. The Pan-African Freedom Movement of East, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) and the Federation of East Africa

PAFEMCSA, frequently labeled as ǵthe East African variant of the Pan-African movementô, came into existence in 1958 through the activities of nationalist leaders from Kenya, Tanganyika, Nyasaland and Zanzibar. Leading figures in the history of the movement were Tom Mboya of Kenya and Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika. What they intended to found was a sort of regional cooperation between nationalist movements in Eastern and Central Africa; so the movement had initially acquired the name PAFMECA. The last element, Southern Africa, was officially included later in the 1962 PAFMECA Conference in Addis Ababa.[1]

By October 1961 PAFMECA was on the verge of bankruptcy, having only ten pounds in its bank account, and continued to exist on the generosity of the Government of Tanganyika.[2] At this critical time Ethiopia advanced an offer to host the fourth meeting in Addis Ababa. The agreement was reached between the Ethiopian delegation to Tanganyika's independence celebration and officials of PAFMECA at a meeting held in

[1] Erasmus H Kloman Jr., ñAfrican Unification Movement,ò *Africa and World Order*. Eds. Norman J. Padelford and Rupert Emerson (New York: Frederic A. Praeger, 1963): 132ï 133; Teshome Shibru, ñIntra-African Relations: An Analysis of Conflict and Co-Operationò (BA Senior Essay in the Department of Political Science and International Relations. Addis Ababa University, June 1986), 19ï 20; John Hatch, *A History of Postwar Africa (*Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1965), 400ï 401.

[2] Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Pan-Africanism and East African Integration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 127.

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alaam in December 1961.[3] There it was decided that the invitations, the agenda and other similar arrangements should be done by the PAFMECA secretariat; and the logistical arrangements (accommodation, transportation etc.) should be taken care of by the Imperial Ethiopian Government.

The Secretary General of PAFMECA, Mbiyu Koinange, in a letter to Kätäma Yifru, asked the latter to convey his heartfelt gratitude to Emperor Hayla-Selassie for this generosity extended to his organization.[4] The conference took place from 2 to 10 February 1962; and a total of sixty delegates from eighteen territories attended it. In addition, the three independent states in the region, Ethiopia, Somalia and Tanganyika, officially associated themselves with the movement. This had tremendous impact on the nature of the organization. The movement had three members in the UN which would enable it to translate its policies into diplomatic action instead of being a mere pressure group.[5] Observers from All African Peoplesô Congress (AAPC), Algeria, Mali, Guinea, Morocco and Ghana were also invited. Among these delegates were personalities who were later to rise to positions of eminence in African politics like Oliver R. Tambo, Nelson Mandela and Kenneth Kaunda.[6]

To facilitate the activities of the conference, an inter-ministerial reception committee was organized under the chairmanship of Gétaḷäw Mäkaǧa (African Directorate head, MoFA). The committee was composed of representatives from the Ministries of Press

[3] MoFA OAU37 171/1 (205), Gétaḷäw Mäkaǧa (Head of African Directorate) to Mbiyu Koinange (Secretary General, PAFMECA): 22 December 1961. Also see Nye Jr. p. 126 and ff. 282.
[4] *Ibid*, Koinange to Kätäma: 17 December 1961.
[5] *Ethiopian Herald*: 2 February 1962.
[6] For the full list of delegates to the Fourth Session of PAFMECA in Addis Ababa, see MoFA OAU1962-63 1962. Ethiopia was represented by Kätäma Yifru (Foreign Minister and leader of the delegation), Gétaḷäw Mäkaǧa (Deputy Leader), Gétaḷäw Häylä-Maryam, Berhänu Bahta, Areĉaya Sirak, Ayälä Moltotal and Afäwärq Zäläqä. Yoftahé DiméŞos, Gétaḷäw Täklä-Maryam and Mäkbeb Gäbäyähu were alternate delegates.

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Palace Administration, and the Police Force. Besides, a total of 31,000 *birr* was allocated to cover all expenses of the conference. Gétaḷäw was made responsible for the effective utilization of the budget.[7]

The conference began its deliberations after an opening address by Emperor Hayla-Selassie. The items on the agenda included problems of the struggle against the vestiges of colonialism; the question of practical aid, both diplomatic and financial, to African nationalists from Southern and Northern Rhodesia, East and Central Africa, the Congo and Mozambique; the formation of the East African Federation and the affairs of PAFMECA. Nationalist leaders voiced their demands to members of the conference, and through the independent nations to a wider audience ï i.e. the international community.[8]

In order to accommodate new provisions, like the admission to membership of independent states, Ethiopia urged the revision of the constitution of the movement. As a result, on 6 February 1962 it became a full member of PAFMECSA. Gétaḷäw Mäkaġa, on behalf of the Ethiopian delegation, expressed his appreciation as follows: õWe would like to assure you that Ethiopia will do everything in her power to add strength and vigor to the ideas of this important organization.ö[9] According to the provision of the revised PAFMECSA Constitution, independent states would henceforth assume membership in the name of their respective governments.

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[7] MoFA OAU37 171/1 (205), Kasa Wäldä-Maryam (Vice Minister, Ministry of Pen) to Kätäma Yifru: 11 January 1962; Gétaḷäw Mäkaġa to *Blatta* Germaḷäw Täklä-Häwaryat (Minister of Press and Information), Gen. Deräsé Dubalä (Commissioner, Police Force); *Däjazmače* Keflé Ergäşu (Minister of State, Ministry of Interior), Lt. Gen. Abiy Abäbä (Minister of Interior and the Emperorôs Viceroy to Eritrea); *Tsähäfé Te'ezaz* Täfära-Wärq Kidanä-Wäld (Minister of Palace Administration): 15 January 1962; Zäwge Wäldä-Maryam (Director, MoFA) to Commercial Bank of Ethiopia: 30 January 1962; Zäwge to Gétaḷäw: 1 February 1962.

[8] For the speech, see *Ethiopian Herald*, 3 February 1962; *Ethiopian Herald*, 4 January 1962, 2 February 1962.

[9] MoFA Tanzanya1 90/1, Memorandum on the PAFMECSA Conference of February 1962, MoFA to the Emperor, no date; *Ethiopian Herald*, 7 February 1962. The revised constitution provided for official admission of Southern Africa in the sphere of influence of the movement.

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esolutions which would positively affect Ethiopia in the economic and political fields. One resolution called for a Federation of East Africa which would include Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The federation had the objective of promoting the liberation of Africa from colonialism and stabilizing the political, economic and social capacities of independent states of Eastern and Central Africa. The resolution provided that the federation would come into effect at the time of the attainment of independence by Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar. The other resolution called upon ―the East African Common Service Organization (EACSO) and the Governments of Ethiopia and Somalia to start discussions immediately on the extension of EACSO to embrace Ethiopia and Somalia.‖[10]

The possibility of Ethiopia joining the East and Central African Federation was subject to questions from the beginning. In a press conference Emperor Hayla-Selassie gave to foreign correspondents and the local press at the end of the PAFMECSA meeting, the first question raised was ―how could Ethiopia, being a monarchy fit sovereign-wise in the proposed federation?‖ Somehow ambiguously, the emperor declared that ―the problem was not difficult as Ethiopia is a Constitutional Monarchy‖. He further stated, ―any problem for a federation based upon the principles of democracy could be worked out with facility.‖[11] However, it was in other fields that Ethiopia‘s dedication to the PAFMECSA cause manifested itself. A case in point was the motion it tabled at the

[10] MoFA Tanzanya1 90/1, Memorandum on the PAFMECSA Conference of February 1962. Also see Nye, *Pan-Africanism,* 126ï 127; *Ethiopian Herald*, 10 February 1962. At the end of the Conference, Kenneth Kaunda of Northern Rhodesia was elected Chairman of the organization for 1962; and Gétaḫäw Mäkaḏa, Vice-Chairman by acclamation.

[11] *Ethiopian Herald*: 10 February 1962.

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March 1962 seeking admission of PAFMECSA, like the *Union Africaine et Malagache* (UAM), into full membership of the of the ECA.[12]

The six day visit of President Nyerere of Tanganyika brought into the open Ethiopiaôs conception of the EACSO and East African Federation. The two leaders discussed how Ethiopia would cooperate with EACSO. A memorandum prepared by the MoFA enumerated the benefits such an organization could provide to Ethiopia. It would provide markets for Ethiopian goods, and particularly stabilize the economy of Southern Ethiopia. Besides, the National Bank of Ethiopia would get a chance to open its international branches, like the one in Khartoum, in Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar. This would enable the bank to assume the status of an African Development Bank. Similarly, Ethiopian Air Lines would dominate East African services. The memorandum concluded its analysis of the situation by remarking how Ethiopia could ascertain a political, economic and social ascendancy in the region through the Common Service Organization.[13]

Hayla-Selassie and Nyerere also discussed the East African Federation. Ethiopia expressed its hope of joining the federation when the remaining states achieved independence, as was stipulated in the PAFMECSA resolution. Meanwhile, Hayla-Selassie proposed bilateral relations between the two countries on defense and foreign policies. Ethiopia agreed to the request made earlier by Tanganyikaôs delegates to PAFMECSA conference to give scholarships to Tanganyika students, to send a squad of

[12] *Ethiopian Herald*, 4 March 1962. Ethiopiaôs request was turned down on the ground that, like the UAM, PAFMECSA was not an inter-governmental organization.
[13] The visit was on the request of the Government of Tanganyika. MoFA Tanzanya1 90/1, Oscar S. Kambona (Minister of Interior of Tanganyika) to Marqos Agaj-Yäläw (Counselor General, Ethiopian Consulate General in Nairobi): 14 February 1962.

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eir armed forces and to allow Ethiopian personnel to be employed in government offices in Tanganyika.[14]

Nevertheless, Ethiopia later retracted its position on the East African Federation. In a press conference Kätäma Yifru gave immediately after Ethiopia convened the May Summit that created the OAU, he stated that his country might not probably be one of the founding members, but it would eventually join the federation. Katama also added that the three territories ï Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika ï had much in common such as currency and the EACSO, ówhich excluded Ethiopiaô; and to make up for this, Ethiopia would be kept informed on all the developments of the possible federation.[15]

Kätämaôs statement reflected the results of earlier negotiations between Ethiopia and EACSO, which had ended in disagreement. Around early June 1962 the Secretary-General of EACSO, A.L. Adu, was sent by the Government of Tanganyika to Ethiopia to start talks on the latterôs admission to the organization. At the end of his visit Adu invited Ethiopia to send a delegation to Nairobi that would study the activities of the EACSO.[16] The invitation coincided with the Steering Committee Meeting of the AAPC in Dar-Es-Salaam in July 1962. A committee was delegated to attend the AAPC meeting, and then study the structural setting of EACSO in Nairobi for a period of one month. The instructions given to the delegation demonstrate the importance attached to the task:

[14] *Ibid*. One peculiar element in early relations of Ethiopia and Tanganyika was the question of Ethiopians who have been living in Tanganyika since 1904/05. They went there with the German colonial army that conquered Tanganyika. The Ethiopians lived there in a position of colonial agents, despised by the natives. Students who were given scholarship in Ethiopia were grandchildren of these people. Also see MoFA Tanzanya1 282/1, Permanent Secretary of Second Vice-Presidentôs Office (Tanzania) to Getachew (Nairobi): 7 November 1964.
[15] *Ethiopian Herald*: 10 July 1963.
[16] MoFA OAU37 171/1 (205), Memorandum EACSO: 26 June 1962.

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e nature of Ethiopiaôs relations with East African nations. indulge in your assignments with every caution and sense of duty.ô[17]

The committee visited, among other things, the organization of the Secretariat of EACSO, Railways and Harbors Administration, Postal and Telegram Administration and East African Veterinary Research Organization. The report compiled by the delegation gives a hint of the positive impression created on the Ethiopian side by the activities of these institutions.[18] Equipped with these studies, a high level delegation, headed by Gétaḷäw Mäkaġa, went to Entebbe, Uganda, to participate in the meeting of the Central Legislative Assembly of the EACSO in November 1962. The meeting accepted Zanzibar's application for admission, and rejected those of Somalia and Ethiopia.[19]

Of course, this was not the end of Ethiopia's relations with EACSO. In April 1964 the two parties reached an agreement whereby Ethiopian Air Lines would transit three times a week between Addis Ababa and Nairobi, and through Nairobi to Dar-Es-Salaam and Entebbe. In addition, the airline acquired a right to extend its destinations to Southern Africa, except Madagascar, once a week. In return, East African Air Ways (EAAW) would fly to Addis Ababa three times a week; and via Addis Ababa to Europe once a week. But Ethiopia imposed the inclusion of a special provision that denied EAAW access to Athens and Frankfurt - the main destinations of the Ethiopian Air Lines.[20] Later, when EACSO realized Ethiopia had squeezed the most out of the agreement, and when

[17] MoFA Tanzanya1 282/1, Gétaḷäw Mäkaġa to Berhänu Bahta (Nairobi): 2 August 1962; Gétaḷäw to Marqos (Nairobi): 4 July 1962.

[18] *Ibid,* Berhänu (Leader of the delegation) to Kätäma: 24 July 1962.
[19] *Ibid*, Gétaḷäw to Adu: 7 November 1962; Nye Jr., pp.126-127
[20] MoFA Tanzanya1 282/1, Memorandum of Understanding, EACSO-Ethiopian Air Services Discussions, Gétaḷäw (Nairobi) to Kätäma: 10 April 1960. Ethiopia was represented at the agreement by Goytom Pétros, Chief Administrator of Civil Aviation, chief of delegate; Gétaḷäw Mäkaġa, Ambassador to Kenya; and Gétaḷäw Kebrät, Director General of Legal Affairs, MoFA.

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n a new route to West Africa via Entebbe, new rounds of negotiations began. In the new agreement, even if some earlier advantages were lost, still Ethiopian Airlines, represented by its Chief Administrator, Goytom PéŞros, secured a beneficial position.[21]

Ethiopia's involvement in the PAFMECSA, apart from securing its political and economic interests in the region, had also aimed at facilitating the anti-colonialist struggles of the peoples of Eastern, Central and Southern Ethiopia. The letter from Oliver R. Tambo, Deputy President of African National Congress (ANC), is a very good testimony to this side of Ethiopia's motivation. The letter recounted the assistance given to ANC, and was intended to express appreciations to the Government of Ethiopia. Most importantly, however, the letter manifested Mr. Tamboôs degree of familiarity and sense of belongingness. Mr. Tambo's impressions of Ethiopia and personalities like Gétaḷäw Mäkaġa, and more emphatically, Kätäma Yifru, were expressed in detail.[22]

4.2. Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD)

The apparent failure to form and sustain a functional regional association in East Africa, both in the form of PAFMECSA and the East African Federation, was somehow partially remedied with the establishment of IGADD in 1986. However, the intricate realities of the region, the fast changing nature of relation between and among member states of the regional body as well as the ever existent strategic importance of this part of Africa to the powers-that-be and their perpetual presence made it impossible to realize a meaningful and functional regional institution. Ultimately IGADD/IGAD proved to be yet another ineffective body, and the region has lived up to its name, the óHorn of

[21] *Ibid*, Gétaḷäw Mäkaġa (Nairobi) to Goytom Pétros: 9 March 1965; Goytom to MOFA: 5 June 1965.
[22] MoFA OAU33 466/47, O.R. Tambo to Kätäma Yifru: 16 February 1962.

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regional institution and Ethiopiaôs role in its affairs best illustrate this observation.

The recurrent natural disasters and intense drought situations in sub-Saharan Africa since the 1970s, and the general understanding in the UN that efforts should be coordinated at regional level to tackle the impending danger, formed the background for the establishment of IGADD in 1986. The creation of the Permanent Inter-Governmental Committee on Drought in the Sahel (CILSS) in late 1970s was expected to serve as a model for the East African nations.[23] Complex realities in the region, though, hampered its realization for quite some time; and when finally efforts were made to create a similar institution in East Africa ideological orientations of would-be-member states happen to influence the course of events.

In December 1980 Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda requested the UN for assistance in establishing a regional body that would synchronize their efforts in the struggle for prevention of natural disasters and drought in East Africa. Kenya and Ethiopia applied to be included in the group, but because of the strong opposition from Sudan and Somalia, Ethiopia was not considered for the original membership. The General Assembly of the UN passed Resolution 35/90 whereby the secretary general set a committee to coordinate emergency and long term aid to the region and assist the five

[23] MoFA yä mesraq afriqa agäroḷe yä gara comité (IGADD) Şeraz 1, Ġimälese AduŔa (Commissioner, Relief and Rehabilitation Commission) to MoFA: *Mägabit* 7, 1973E.C (16 March 1981); Dr. Däbäbä Worqu (Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN) to Dawit Wäldä-Giyorgis (Commissioner, Relief and Rehabilitation Commission), Memo on developments related with IGADD: *Ṭeqémt* 23, 1977E.C (3 Nov. 1984); MoFA IGADD 2, Memo on talks to set IGADD: *Tahesas* 2, 1978E.C (12 Dec. 1985).

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ia, Sudan and Uganda) to establish a permanent inter-governmental organ that oversees activities related with drought and natural disaster.[24]

A high level directive was issued to Ethiopiaôs permanent representative in the UN to remedy this and ensure the country is included among the founding members of the organization. An official appeal was made to the secretary general, head of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and prominent member states of the UN. Irrespective of the insistent opposition from Somalia, on 17 December 1981 the General Assembly passed yet another resolution no. 36/221 endorsing the inclusion of Ethiopia among the founding members of the inter-governmental organization to be set in the region.[25]

Nonetheless, predominantly because of the lack of good will and cooperation among member states, no effort was made to establish the designated institution until October 1984. At the occasion of the 39th General Assembly of the UN, following the insistent castigation from the secretary general regarding the indifference of member states to realize the plan, the foreign ministers of the six nations met in New York and agreed to set things in motion. Djibouti was mandated to host a ministerial meeting that would endorse a provisional founding document in January 1985 and to oversee the realization of the agenda in collaboration with the permanent representatives of member states at the UN.[26] Intrigues that ultimately resulted in what has come to be known as the IGADD/IGAD began to unfold thereafter.

[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] *Ibid.*

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and dictated activities associated with the regional body. Well before the first ministerial meeting divisive incidents happened following the application for membership of Tanzania and Egypt, and the contest to host the headquarters of the organization. Sudan and Somalia endorsed the inclusion of Egypt, while Ethiopia initially supported Tanzaniaôs membership, which in turn was not acceptable to Kenya. But so as to block Egypt, Ethiopia abandoned its support of Tanzaniaôs inclusion to gain the backing from Kenya and Uganda, and managed to block its membership during the February 1985 ministerial meeting.[27]

Sudan, supported by Somalia, had also expressed its intention to seat the headquarters of IGADD. This, together with Egyptôs application for membership, was perceived by Ethiopian authorities as a calculated move on the side of the Arab/Islam states to dominate the regional body. A high level directive was issued to encourage Djibouti to go ahead with its plan to host the IGADD headquarters, and Ethiopia solicited the assistance of Kenya and Uganda in this case. Ethiopia even went out of its way in advising Djibouti how to manipulate developments to its advantage. Following the encouragement from Ethiopia, Djibouti proposed to supply a fully equipped building for the financially insecure organization and duty free privileges for its staff.[28] This way Ethiopia managed to frustrate what was perceived as a potential danger to the countryôs interests.

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[27] MoFA yä mesraq afriqa agäroḷe yä gara comité (IGADD) Ṣeraz 1, Ambassador Berhänu Dinqa (Permanent Representative to the UN) to Goḫu Wäldé (Minister, MoFA), on Tanzaniaôs application for membership: *Tahesas* 18, 1977E.C (28 Dec. 1984); Ambassador Wäsän Bäḫah (Djibouti) to Goḫu Wäldé, Report on First Ministerial Meeting: *Ṭir* 30, 1977E.C (8 Feb. 1985); MoFA IGADD 2, Memo on talks to set IGADD: *Tahesas* 2, 1978E.C (12 Dec. 1985).

[28] MoFA yä mesraq afriqa agäroḷe yä gara comité (IGADD) Ṣeraz 1, Ambassador Wäsän Bäḫah (Djibouti) to Ambassador Yilma Tadäsä (Director, African and Middle East Directorate), Memo on the need to support Djiboutiôs request to host IGADD headquarter: *Ṭeqémt* 24, 1977E.C (4 Nov. 1984); Hashim Osman (Sudanôs Foreign Minister) to Goḫu Wäldé, on Sudanôs intention to host the headquarters: 15 December

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n, however, to proceedings of the successive ministerial and experts meetings conducted in Djibouti as a prelude to the formal establishment of IGADD on 16 January 1986. Ethiopia played a prominent role in dictating the course of events that resulted in the stand the regional organ assumed later on. The extent to which political and economic considerations drove the countryôs involvement in such an organization that was ostensibly intended to coordinate efforts in fighting drought and natural disasters appears amazing.

Djibouti communicated the draft charter for establishing a ñPermanent Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (PIGADD) in East Africaò and the invitation to the founding conference from 4-6 February 1985 well in advance.[29] Irrespective of Ethiopiaôs initial support to Djibouti on the issue of the headquarters and the hosting of the conference, on grounds not disclosed in the documents, the Ethiopian delegation to the first experts and ministerial meeting was confronted by Djiboutiôs foreign minister and the president before the meeting with the rumor that Ethiopia was not ready to accept the establishment of PIGADD and was trying to delay its creation through series of amendments to the draft charter and other documents. The head of the delegation, Berhänä Därésa, had to assure the officials of his countryôs favorable

1984; Ambassador Yilma Tadäsä (MoFA) to Ambassador Wäsän Bägah (Djibouti), Ambassador Mängesté Dästa (Nairobi), Ambassador Berhänu Dinqa (New York), Ambassador Wändwäsän Hayla-Selassie (Khartoum), Policy directive on Ethiopia favoring Djibouti to host IGADD headquarter: *Tahesas* 25, 1977E.C (4 Jan. 1985). MoFA IGADD 2, Memo on talks to set IGADD: *Tahesas* 2, 1978E.C (12 Dec. 1985).

[29] MoFA yä mesraq afriqa agäroḷe yä gara comité (IGADD) Ṣeraz 1, Moumin Bahdon Farah (Djiboutiôs Foreign Minister) to Goḍu Wäldé: 12 January 1985; Argaw Kaptamu (Councilor, Djibouti) to Ambassador Yilma Tadäsä (MoFA): *Ṭir* 5, 1977 E.C (14 Jan. 1984).

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nilar doubts continued to surface till the actual signing of the charter of IGADD in 1986.

Ethiopia had taken part in the first experts and ministerial meeting from 4-6 February. Despite Djiboutiôs insistence that the country be represented at least by the foreign minister, the delegation was led by the deputy head of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. The other countries were represented by high level cabinet members of their respective governments.[32] Ethiopia apparently strove to maintain a low profile and keep a calculated distance from the development of affairs. Even then the delegation insisted on careful assessment of every article of the charter presented by the host nation, tabled some amendments and proposed further discussions on the major rules guiding the internal regulations of the organization.

Three amendments were tabled by the Ethiopian side.[33] The first was the naming of the organization, i.e. PIGADD, which was accepted by all the delegates. On the grounds that no international institution could continue to infinity, and since the agenda of this particular body was to tackle occasional natural incidents that might not persist for long, the Ethiopian delegation insisted on dropping the term ópermanentô from the name of the organization. This was accepted by the others. The second amendment referred to objectives and purposes of the regional body. Somalia stressed that the organization should concentrate on supplying emergency reliefs to drought- and disaster- affected

[30] *Ibid,* Ambassador Wäsän to Goḃu Wäldé: *Ṭir* 30, 1977E.C (8 Feb. 1985).
[31] *Ibid,* Ambassador Wändwäsän Häylu (Prague) to MoFA: 6 March 1985; Ambassador Yilma (MoFA) to Ambassador Wändwäsän: *Mägabit* 5, 1977E.C (14 March 1985). MoFA IGADD 1 vol.2, Report on the 2nd Ministerial Meeting: *Genbot* 14, 1977E.C (22 May 1985).
[32] MoFA yä mesraq afriqa agäroḷe yä gara comité (IGADD) Ṣeraz 1, Ambassador Wäsän to Goḃu: *Ṭir* 22, 1977E.C (31 Jan. 1985); Ambassador Wäsän to Goḃu Wäldé: *Ṭir* 30, 1977E.C (8 Feb. 1985).
[33] MoFA IGADD 2, Memo on talks to set IGADD: *Tahesas* 2, 1978E.C (12 Dec. 1985).

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ɔian side perceived this as a ploy on the part of Somalia to control the resources of the organization in the name of huge number of refugees it harbored; it successfully argued that, beyond providing emergency assistance, it should also focus on coordinating long term plans to eradicate the problems.

Finally, Ethiopia opposed Somaliaôs proposal that the organization plan, coordinate and supervise relief and rehabilitation activities within member states on the ground that it is tantamount to intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation state. Rather, the delegation insisted, the authority would be much helpful if it focuses on assisting member states in formulating a plan of action to mitigate drought and disasters, and locating potential sub-regional projects so as to minimize the recurrence of similar problems. This as well was accepted by the member states.[34] This ministerial conference, after careful consideration of the articles, reached an agreement on setting IGADD, pending ratification by each government and technical details regarding internal regulations being sorted out in the near future.

The second ministerial conference was held in Djibouti from 9-10 May 1985. This meeting was preceded by deliberations of the experts committee (late March) on the meaning of drought and its implications, and the formulation of short, medium and long term goals of the authority; and that of legal personnel (early May) who drafted the internal regulations of IGADD.[35] The ministerial meeting was expected to consider the reports and recommendations of the experts and legal committees, and initial the draft charter and internal regulations guiding IGADD secretariat that would be presented for

[34] *Ibid.*
[35] MoFA IGADD 1 Şeraz 2, Report on Second Ministerial Meeting: *Genbot* 14, 1977E.C (22 May 1985). MoFA IGADD 2, Memo on talks to set IGADD: *Tahesas* 2, 1978E.C (12 Dec. 1985).

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state and government by January 1986. The Ethiopian delegation, from the expert committee to the ministerial conference (the latter led by the foreign minister, Goġu Wäldé) strove and succeeded in making sure the others accept the definition of drought it had presented:

> Drought is a periodic and recurrent phenomenon characterized by a lack of rainfall severe enough, of long enough duration and wide enough extent throughout the countries concerned to deleteriously affect plant growth, and water supplies for stock use, for domestic use (both rural and urban), industrial and mining purposes.[36]

This meeting witnessed a division of interest among member states and Ethiopiaôs lack of readiness to speed up the creation of the authority. Somalia, Sudan and Djibouti insisted on the ministers initialing the draft charter and the internal regulation document at this meeting. The Ethiopian delegation, after consultation with Kenya and Uganda, argued otherwise on the basis that the charter still needs further amendments, the contribution rates due from member states had to be detailed and it has no authority to initial the documents.[37] The controversial proposal that requested for equal financial contributions and the lack of consensus on the number of staff to be allocated to the authority created a division, and the Ethiopian side insisted that it be sorted out by another ministerial meeting.

The report the Ethiopian delegation submitted for policy decision reveals the motive behind all these delaying tactic. It states that it was difficult to stall the creation of the authority any longer for all the amendments Ethiopia tabled had been accepted. If additional reservations or objections were raised in the future, it would end up demonstrating the negative attitude of the country towards the organization. Therefore,

[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Ibid.*

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ecision approving the establishment of the authority and the countryôs full membership to it; the delegation for the next, i.e. third, ministerial meeting should also be accorded the clearance to initial the draft charter and internal regulations of IGADD; consideration should be made to designate an Ethiopian national to the post of secretary-general of the authority; and the running of the affairs of the authority should be delegated to the ministry of agriculture.[38]

All the above recommendations were given serious attention by the government and the delegation to the third ministerial conference from 14-16 November 1985 was organized accordingly. Based on the proposals made by the experts committee meeting from 8-13 November, the ministers discussed the structure, budget, amounts of contributions by member states and other administrative affairs of the authority.[39] The initial proposal for an extended structure of the authority was toned down to one small administrative unit consisting of a secretary-general and three division-heads each having two sub-units. Simultaneously, the number of staff, administrative costs and salaries to be paid for these officials was reduced substantially, and the qualifications for the respective positions detailed.

However, it proved difficult to reach a consensus on the contributions due from the member states. Initially, Kenya and Uganda demanded a rate based on the size of the population affected by drought, areal coverage, import-export expenditure and gross domestic product (GDP) indices of each country. According to this, Ethiopiaôs share was

[38] MoFA IGADD 1 Şeraz 2, Goġu Wäldé to the Central Committee of National Planning, Report on Second Ministerial Meeting: *Genbot* 14, 1977E.C (22 May 1985). MoFA IGADD 2, Memo on talks to set IGADD: *Tahesas* 2, 1978E.C (12 Dec. 1985).
[39] MoFA IGADD 1 Şeraz 3, Report on the Third Experts and Ministerial Meeting: *Hedar* 8, 1978E.C (18 Nov. 1985). MoFA IGADD 2, Memo on talks to set IGADD: *Tahesas* 2, 1978E.C (12 Dec. 1985).

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5.25%, followed by Sudan (27.72%), Kenya (13.60%), Somalia (12.43%), Uganda (8.44%) and Djibouti (2.54%). Ethiopia strongly objected to these criteria on the grounds that the extent of drought coverage and the number of people affected by it indicate not the financial capabilities of a given state but, on the contrary, the level of damage it had sustained. It insisted that other indicators, such as the per capita income and export standards of member states, be given priority, the population size and areal coverage being used as supplementary elements. After a protracted debate and behind the scene manipulation, an agreement was reached on the amount each state was going to pay as annual contribution to the IGADD secretariat. This was, in descending order, Sudan 25.00%, Kenya 24.88%, Ethiopia 22.70%, Uganda 12.59%, Somalia 9.92% and Djibouti 4.91%. [40]

More expressive of Ethiopiaôs preference regarding the nature of the authority to be established was its insistence on the fact that it should not establish independent contact with international organizations and donor agencies. Ethiopia managed to convince the others that IGADDôs communications with these bodies have to be conducted via national governmental agencies of member states.[41] The meeting was concluded by requesting member states to make an advance payment of at least a quarter of their allocated contributions by January 1986, recommending they forward their plans of action and their candidates for the various posts in the authority before the January summit, and finally initialing the draft charter and internal regulations for signing by heads of state and government. The Ethiopian delegation recommended to the government that it be represented at the highest level at the upcoming summit, pay the

[40] *Ibid.*
[41] *Ibid.*

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January, and ensure the appointment of an Ethiopian national to the post of secretary-general.[42]

The competition among member states to secure the position of secretary general for their own national had started well before the November 1985 ministerial meeting. In February, Sudan and Somalia had already notified member states regarding their candidates, requesting endorsement at the bilateral level. Ethiopia was wary of the possible double identity the authority might end up assuming if one of the above were to hold the position of the secretary-general, for both countries were members of the Arab League and World Islamic Conference Organization.[43] Ethiopia itself considered its own candidate seriously, after the third ministerial meeting. Immediately before the January summit, Berhänä Därésa, deputy head of Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, was shortlisted for nomination.[44] Due to a jurisdiction confusion between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Agriculture over IGADD, though, Dr. Mäkonnen Kebrät (from the Ministry of Agriculture), was appointed the first executive secretary of IGADD, and he remained in that position for the next five years.[45]

The Summit conference went ahead as planned, and the agreement establishing IGADD was officially signed by heads of state and government of the six member states

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[42] *Ibid.*

[43] MoFA yä mesraq afriqa agäroḷe yä gara comité (IGADD) Şeraz 1, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Sudan to MoFA: 26 February 1985; Wändwäsän Häbtä-Selasé (Charge-de-affairs, Khartoum) to Ambassador Yilma Tadäsä (MoFA): *Yäkatit* 28, 1977E.C (7 March 1985).

[44] MoFA IGADD 1 Şeraz 3, ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative, MoFA) to Djibouti Embassy, sending the Curriculum Vitae of Berhänä Därésa: *Ṭir* 7, 1978E.C (16 Jan. 1986).

[45] *Ibid,* Report on first IGADD Ministerial Meeting: April 8, 1986. MoFA IGADD 2 Şeraz 5, Dr. Mäkonnen Kebrät (Executive Secretary of IGADD) to Täsfayé Dinqa (Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister), Letter of Gratitude to Ethiopian Government up on leaving the post: 18 January 1991. Informant: *Ato* Berhänä Därésa.

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ving day, the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) of Ethiopia ratified the agreement.[46] The authority was generally envisaged to coordinate drought relief and rehabilitation efforts through short, medium and long term activities. The short term activity involved providing emergency relief services for drought and natural disaster affected parts of the region; the medium term plan was to facilitate the rehabilitation of the people affected by these calamities; and in the long run IGADD was to coordinate mutual projects so as to protect and enhance the ecological balance of the region.

IGADD officially started its operations on 22 January. It held the first ministerial meeting on 11 April 1986. The authority was faced with various problems from the beginning. It managed to sustain itself in the initial phase of its existence thanks to financial assistance acquired from the Italian government to the tune of $700,000 and annual contributions paid only by Ethiopia and Somalia. By the time of the first ministerial conference, only Ethiopia had ratified the establishing agreement. The meeting itself was delayed for two days owing to the failure of the delegates to appear on the designated time and because Uganda failed to send representatives at all.[47]

Far more daunting, though, was the way Kenya, Sudan and Somalia divided among themselves the positions of the three directors. Contrary to formal procedure, each presented for the specific post a candidate they seemed to have agreed upon beforehand, and cornered Ethiopia and Djibouti to comply with them on the basis of their earlier ópriviligesô, i.e. the post of executive secretary and hosting of the headquarters,

[46] MoFA IGADD 1 Şeraz 3, The Signed Agreement of IGADD: *Yäkatit* 12, 1978E.C (20 Feb. 1986); Ethiopiaôs Ratification of the Agreement: *Mägabit* 2, 1978E.C (11 March 1986).
[47] Report on first IGADD Ministerial Meeting: April 12, 1986.

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a took over the Administrative and Finance wing, Sudan the Plan, Research and Information directorate and Somalia the Operation and Program unit.[48]

The achievement of the regional authority in the following two years was restricted to the four ministerial conferences and the March 1987 meeting it had conducted with international donor agencies. The secretary-general admitted to the second IGADD Summit, which was held on 21-22 March 1988, that emphasis was given to preparation of project documents and regional maps to be submitted to donor agencies, and identification and establishment of contact with these bodies.[49] The interest of member states in the organization was already waning. Except for Djibouti and Ethiopia, the rest failed to pay financial contributions due for the year 1987 and 1988, Uganda in particular having paid no money at all.[50]

Yet, the summit ended up commending these minor achievements and encouraging the authority to keep up the good work. Besides reelecting the Djibouti president for chairmanship of IGADD for the next two years, the summit issued a statement to the effect that member states should coordinate their efforts to promote infrastructural development in the region.[51] The fact that President Mengistu bothered to go to Djibouti

[48] *Ibid.*
[49] MoFA IGADD 1 Şeraz 4, President Hassan Gouled Aptidon to President Mengistu: 17 January 1988; Report on the 2nd IGADD Summit: *Mägabit* 13, 1980E.C (22 March 1988); Report on IGADD Activities from January 1986 to March 1988: *Mägabit* 1980E.C (March 1988).
[50] *Ibid.*
[51] *Ibid.*

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d leg of discussions he had initiated with the Somali and Sudanese leaders holds much truth considering the futile nature of the IGADD summit.[52]

Ethiopiaôs interest, however, was more focused on the regional projects planned to be realized through joint ventures with neighboring countries under the auspices of IGADD. In the first two years of IGADDôs existence, the country had proposed ten sub-regional projects out of which six were approved for implementation.[53] These were:

a. Azäzoï Mätämaï Gädarif feeder Road. IGADD/Ethiopia/Sudan joint project estimated to cost $65.8 million,

b. Fälägänäwayï Qälämï Namarputhï Loditaungï Lodwar Road. The IGADD/Ethiopia/Kenya project estimated to cost $90.74 million,

c. Djiboutiï Addis Ababa Railway Track Rehabilitation. IGADD/Ethiopia/Djibouti project estimated to cost $150,000 million,

d. Pan-African Telecommunication Ethiopia-Sudan Microwave Link. IGADD/Ethiopia/Sudan project estimated to cost $1,800 million,

e. Djiboutiï Ethiopia Power Transmission Line. IGADD/Ethiopia/Djibouti project estimated to cost $230,000 million, and

f. Regional Animal Disease Control. (no estimate)

The four projects that failed to be approved for implementation were the ones that had direct connection with Somalia. These were the Ethio-Kenya irrigation project on Dawa River, which Somalia insisted should not go ahead for it had a special interest on the river; the Ethio-Somalia power transmission line; the Harar-Jijiga-Togochale road; and an Ethio-Somalia micro wave link. In addition, four sub-regional projects were selected to be based in Ethiopia. These were rangeland and pasture management support; monitoring of developments, coordination and training in small-scale irrigation; evaluation of agro-

[52] *Ibid,* the concluding remarks of the report on the 2nd IGADD Summit: *Mägabit* 13, 1980E.C (22 March 1988).
[53] MoFA IGADD 1 Şeraz 4, Report on IGADD Activities from January 1986 to March 1988: *Mägabit* 1980E.C (March 1988).

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economic impact, use in livestock feeding in combination with crop residue roughages, and selection of new food crops for East African arid lands.[54]

Unfortunately, irrespective of the bilateral talks Ethiopia had had with Sudan, Kenya and Djibouti regarding the implementation of these projects, nothing substantial transpired in the period under discussion. Most of the projects were previously agreed upon during times of good relations and were submitted to the European Economic Commission (EEC) for financial assistance. After the establishment of IGADD, the respective countries had to approach the Commission jointly, which they totally ignored to comply with. The murky relations between these states apparently contributed to the lack of good faith and cooperation.[55]

Well before the third summit, which was held on 16-17 January 1990, the authority was deep in trouble. Kenya, Uganda and Sudan had failed to pay their annual contributions for the past two years, and Somalia of the year 1989. The almost bankrupt organization had to borrow from a Djibouti bank to pay monthly salaries to its staff for the 1989 fiscal year. This in turn had eroded the confidence of the international community and aid agencies in the commitment of member states towards the regional body, and in turn contributed to the lack of confidence in its sustainability. On the part of Ethiopia, it had turned down the invitation to be represented at the upcoming summit by

[54] *Ibid.*
[55] MoFA etiyo-kénya yä ministroḷe sebsäba 3 Ṣeraz 10, Report on the 30th Joint Ministerial Consultative Meeting: *Ṭeqémt* 23, 1981E.C (3 Nov. 1988). MoFA IGADD 1 Ṣeraz 4, Asäged Wäldä-Amanuél (Minister, Ministry of Transport and Communications) to MoFA, on resuming talks on projects with Sudan: *Tahesas* 4, 1981E.C (14 Dec. 1988). MoFA Ethio-Djibouti meder babur 1 Ṣeraz 2, Reports on the talk to revitalize the railway: *Tahesas* 29, 1980 E.C (8 Jan. 1988); *Miyazya* 24, 1980E.C (2 May 1988); *Säné* 24, 1980E.C (1 July 1988). MoFA IGADD 2, Report of the 7th IGADD Ministerial Council: *Ṭir* 1982E.C (Jan. 1990).

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l situation following the May 1989 coup) and was even contemplating rejection of the mandatory chairmanship of IGADD for the next two years on the ground that it would create a total domination of the authority by Ethiopia.[56]

Ambassador Wäsän Bäġah (Djibouti) insisted on not losing faith in the regional authority yet. He argued that Ethiopia, as a crucial member of IGADD, has to exert one last effort to revitalize it. He recommended representation by the president himself and acceptance of the chairmanship; otherwise, it would be tantamount to admitting that internal problems are running out of control, the country is backing down from its obligations towards the authority and withdrawing from bilateral talks with Somalia and Sudan through the IGADD forum. The ambassador also proposed that Ethiopia should table a motion that would come out as the ñDjibouti Declarationò which would call for the revitalization of the authority and the reaffirmation of the commitment of member states towards its realization.[57]

The third IGADD summit, aware of the weakness of the authority, specifically the impotence of the secretariat and the three division directors, tried to shake up the administrative structure. It openly castigated the three division heads for their incompetence, and refused to reelect the secretary general for the next four years term. In the absence of candidates for the post, though, the leaders chose to extend Dr. Mäkonnenôs term for one year.[58] In addition to endorsing the project proposals and recommendations submitted by the Seventh Ministerial Meeting (12-14 January 1990),

[56] MoFA IGADD 2 Ṣeraz 5, Ambassador Wäsän (Djibouti) to Täsfayé Dinqa (Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister), Report on talk with President Aptidon on the fate of IGADD: *Tahesas* 19, 1982E.C (29 Dec. 1989).
[57] *Ibid.*
[58] MoFA IGADD 2, Report of the Third IGADD Summit: *Ṭir* 1982E.C (Jan. 1990).

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engistu as its chairman for the next two years and issued the "Second Djibouti Declaration" drafted by Ethiopia. The funny side of the story was that the Ethiopian leader was not there, and through his representative, Vice President Fesähä Dästa, he requested the Djibouti president to chair the conference on his behalf.[59]

As was stated by the declaration issued at the end of the summit, IGADD now entered its second phase, marking the end of the preparatory period and the start of the stage of project implementations formulated in the first five years. The declaration also called for increased commitment from member states and the donor agencies for the realization of the implementation phase. More indicative of the future course of IGADD was, however, the call in the declaration for member states to resolve problems related with peace, security and development in the region in a mutually beneficial manner.[60]

In its capacity as the current chairman and coordinating minister of the council of ministers (in addition to the secretary-general of the authority being an Ethiopian national), the government of Ethiopia soon launched an intensive diplomatic campaign to implement the agenda of peace and security in the region, as was envisaged by the declaration of the last IGADD summit. The deteriorating security situations in Somalia, south Sudan and particularly northern Ethiopia necessitated coordination of efforts at regional level; and an ulterior motive on the part of Ethiopia for political gains in the process apparently justified the move.[61]

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[59] *Ibid.*
[60] *Ibid.* It is then afterwards that IGADD started to assume the task of being a forum for regional peace and security. See below.
[61] MoFA IGADD 1 Ṣeraz 1, Report on the Extraordinary IGADD Summit: *Hämlé* 7, 1982E.C (14 July 1990).

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ound regarding the new IGADD policy reorientation with the meeting it organized at ambassadorial level at its Mogadisho embassy in May 1990. Member state representatives discussed the need for prioritizing peace, security and development issues in the region for the authority to be an efficient and sustainable organization. Their deliberations was concluded with the underlining of the urgent need for convening an extraordinary IGADD summit on the agenda of regional peace and development that would come up with some sort of resolution on security and political problems; and commending the efforts of Ethiopia for the initiative.[62] A high level Ethiopian delegation, led by the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and the current chair of IGADD Council of Ministers, Aklilu Afäwärq, visited member states and presented Ethiopiaגs plan to revitalize the regional authority.[63]

Capitalizing on these earlier steps, successive diplomatic missions were launched to realize the agenda the country perceived as a priority in revitalizing the regional authority. President Mengistu made an official visit to Djibouti and Kenya on June 7 and 10, respectively, and had hosted Ugandaגs president earlier in April.[64] He discussed in some detail with Presidents Museveni, Aptidon, and Arap Moi, inter alia, issues regarding the current deplorable state of IGADD; the deteriorating security situation in the region vis-à-vis the fast changing global and regional political alignments; complications following the involvement of member states in the internal affairs of one another by supporting opposition elements; and the need to find immediate regional solutions to the staggering internal problems troubling each member state.

[62] MoFA IGADD 2 Şeraz 5, Ambassador Dr. Asmamaw Qälämu (Mogadisho) to MoFA, Report on the IGADD Ambassadorial Meeting: *Genbot* 16, 1982E.C (24 May 1990).
[63] *Addis Zämän*: *Genbot* 10, 1982E.C (18 May 1990).
[64] MoFA IGADD 2, Verbatim Record of President Mengestuגs Talk with Aptidon and Moi; *Addis Zämän*: *Miyazya* 3, 1982E.C (11 April 1990).

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d on the urgency of convening an extraordinary IGADD summit that would deliberate on these matters and passing a resolution to tackle the impending danger of total destabilization in the Horn; and managed to convince member states, after some reluctance from Kenya, to hold the meeting in Addis Ababa immediately before the 26th OAU Summit. Presidents Mengistu, Aptidon and Moi reached a consensus not to involve the OAU in proceedings of the summit, but to employ its good offices to applaud and endorse resolutions passed by the regional authorities later on. [65]

Another high level mission, led by the Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Täsfayé Dinqa, had presented to the leaders of Sudan and Somalia Ethiopiaôs proposal to convene the extraordinary IGADD summit. In spite of the disappointment registered by these leaders regarding the Ethiopian presidentôs reluctance to talk to them directly, they claimed to understand the motive and readily accepted the invitation.[66] Once the agreement to convene the summit on issues specifically related to politics and security in the region was secured, the government of Ethiopia commenced preparations for the event.

However, the date of the meeting kept being rescheduled by member states, until the final decision was reached to convene it for half a day on the opening date of the 26th OAU Summit, i.e. on 9 July 1990. Invitations to the leaders of the IGADD member states were issued six days earlier and they were requested to arrive in Addis Ababa a day in advance. All except President Arap Moi readily accepted. Following an intense

[65] *Ibid.*
[66] MoFA IGADD 2, Verbatim Record on FM Täsfayéôs Discussions with Presidents Basher and Barre: *Hämlé* 10, 1982E.C (17 July 1990). MoFA IGADD 2 vol.5, Ambassador Dr. Asmamaw (Mogadisho) to MoFA: *Hämlé* 27, 1982E.C (3 Aug. 1990).

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opia, the latter did come to the summit and returned to Kenya without taking part in the OAU deliberations. The Somali president cancelled his trip at the last minute on the ground of the deteriorating situations in his country and instead sent the prime minister.[67]

The brief summit had no major task to accomplish other than endorsing the agenda, electing the conference chair, and reiterating the customary speeches about the necessity of the meeting. Proceedings of this conference went perfectly along the line designed by the Ethiopian side. President Moi was elected conference chairperson, and soon afterwards the summit recessed, leaving the foreign ministers to deliberate on the draft declaration presented by Ethiopia.[68] Notwithstanding the initial refusal from Somaliaôs premier to entertain the declaration on the grounds that he had no mandate to do so and his insistence to formulate a less binding resolution, the draft declaration was accepted by the foreign ministers as a working document. The leaders, who reconvened later on, like the foreign ministers, endorsed the draft declaration without a change; and this came out as the formal communication of the extraordinary summit.[69] The summit was concluded by instructing the foreign ministers to deliberate further on the mechanisms to implement the binding points of the declaration and report back to the second extraordinary summit scheduled to be held in Nairobi.

Even though the tenets of the six-point declaration were equally binding on all member states, the Ethiopian side was particularly delighted by what it entailed regarding

[67] MoFA IGADD 2 Şeraz 5, Dr. Täqäda Alämu (Director, African and Middle East Directorate) to Ambassador Fäläqä Tabor (Khartoum): 3 July 1990; MoFA IGADD 1 Şeraz 1, Report on the 26th OAU Summit and the 1st Extraordinary IGADD Summit: 14 July 1990.
[68] MoFA IGADD 1 Şeraz 1, Report on the 26th OAU Summit and the 1st Extraordinary IGADD Summit: 14 July 1990.
[69] *Ibid.*

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untry.[70] The clauses bound member states not to use or threaten to use power against the territorial integrity and political independence of states, and adherence to the peaceful settlement of disputes and non interference in the internal affairs of states (art. I.); to resolve disputes in accordance with the basic tenets of the UN and OAU (art. II.); reaffirm the position that any peaceful resolution of any conflict in the member states shall be within the framework of their national unity and territorial integrity (art. III.); mutually cooperate to bring about the peaceful resolution of internal conflicts prevailing within member states by supporting each otherôs peace and reconciliation efforts (art. IV.); and to cooperate bilaterally and collectively in all fields of socio-economic development with the aim of strengthening and consolidating peace, stability and the welfare of the peoples of the member states (art. V.). The third clause particularly was labeled a monumental achievement in relation to the immediate problems Ethiopia was facing at the time in its northern part, the role of its neighbors in the conflict and the ongoing peace process with EPLF and TPLF forces already set in motion in Atlanta and Nairobi.[71]

In line with the sixth clause that mandated the foreign ministers with the task of elaborating on the implementation of this declaration and reporting back to the next summit, they met on 9 July in Addis Ababa and urged member states to fully commit themselves to the principles of the declaration. Particular emphasis was made on the need for confidence-building measures among member states, strengthening of bilateral talks between Ethiopia and its two neighbors ï Somalia and the Sudan, actively pursuing the

[70] *Ibid.* MoFA IGADD 2 Şeraz 5, MoFA to all Ethiopian Missions, The Declaration of IGADD Extraordinary Conference on Peace, Stability and Development: 9July 1990.

[71] *Ibid.*

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s had began with opposition elements so as to solve their internal problems, and present to the next session of council of ministers (to be held in Nairobi in August 1990) a document detailing each countryôs understanding of and expectation from the new IGADD initiative for peace and development in the region.[72]

The Ethiopian side managed to convince the current chair of the OAU, President Museveni

of Uganda, to present the IGADD decisions to the 26th OAU Summit and elicit the approval of the continental organization. It also urged the communication of both the declaration of the summit and the deliberations of the foreign ministers to the UN and the OAU and persuaded the Kenyan and Djibouti foreign ministers to give a press conference immediately afterwards.[73]

The second meeting of IGADD Council of Ministers, 27-28 August 1990, contrary to the expectations of the Ethiopian side, proved to be unproductive. The only incident worth mentioning occurred following the position paper Sudan submitted and that categorically made Ethiopia responsible for the internal problems in that country. After behind the stage consultation and agreement with the chair of the meeting, the Kenyan foreign minister, the Ethiopian delegation responded in the strongest of terms to Sudanôs accusation, and ultimately managed to put pressure on the latter to withdraw its accusations. Sudan ended up pleading for the resumption of bilateral talks with Ethiopia,

[72] MoFA IGADD 1 Şeraz 1, Report on the 26th OAU Summit and the 1st Extraordinary IGADD Summit: 14 July 1990.
[73] *Ibid.* MoFA IGADD 2 Şeraz 5, MoFA to all Ethiopian Missions, The Declaration of IGADD Extraordinary Conference on Peace, Stability and Development: 9July 1990; Bäfäqadu Amäya (First Secretary, Nairobi Embassy) to MoFA, On the Communication of the IGADD Declaration to the UN Secretary General: *Nähäsé* 3, 1982E.C (9 Aug. 1990).

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epted in order not to appear reluctant to go along with the requests of fellow states.

It was only Ethiopia that submitted a detailed and well formulated document stating its understanding of the situation in the region. Sudanôs paper was shushed up for its inflammatory nature; and Ugandaôs attribution of internal problems to un-demarcated boundary and territorial disputes between and among member states was labeled inapplicable to the agenda at hand.[75] Ethiopiaôs document attempted to assess the global and regional factors that dictated relations between and among states in the region, and, in light of the changing realities of the times, proposed for a list of concerted actions to remedy past complexities that somehow affected every state in the region.

The major points indicated in the document were adherence to the principles of international law guiding inter-state relations; respect for the national unity and territorial integrity of every member state and cooperation to eliminate any and all threats to regional peace and stability; refraining from interference in the internal affairs of neighboring states; prohibition of the use of their territories for acts by organizations or groups to destabilize governments or bring about the disintegration of the states of the sub-region; giving unreserved support to efforts made by individual states of the region to seek political solutions to their problems on the basis of principles that uphold and strength national unity and regional stability; putting effective pressure on dissident elements to seek negotiated solutions to resolve the existing conflicts; and taking effective measures to resolve national problems taking into account the peculiarities of

[74] MoFA etiyo-somale yä gara comité 1 Şeraz 3, Report on Nairobi IGADD Foreign Ministers Meeting: *Nähäsé* 1982E.C (Aug. 1990).
[75] *Ibid.*

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e need to fulfill the aspiration of various parties for autonomous expression and popular participation.[76]

The meeting, however, failed to capitalize on the good will and positive attitude demonstrated by the heads of states and government at their Addis Ababa summit, and resorted to the customary conciliatory and muted position so characteristic of African gatherings. It ended up issuing a communiqué that insisted on the need to emphasize bilateral talks between conflicting member states, and hoping against hope for possible positive results by the next ministerial and summit meetings to be conducted in Nairobi in late October 1990.[77]

By late 1990, though, the regional authority had found itself in imminent peril. Except for Ethiopia and Djibouti, the remaining member states had failed to advance yearly contributions for the fiscal year. Some even had outstanding debts running for the past two years. The current chairman of IGADD, Mengistu, had to notify heads of state and government of this fact, and informed them that he would be obliged to summon an emergency summit at the end of January 1991 to decide on the fate of the organization.[78]

The executive secretary of IGADD, Dr. Mäkonnen Kebrät, upon the termination of his term of office and by way of recounting the achievements of the past five years, likewise insisted on the dangers facing the regional authority. More importantly, in a separate letter to the MoFA, he recounted what benefits Ethiopia had reaped from the

[76] MoFA IGADD 2 Şeraz 5, Dr. Täqäda Alämu (Director, African and Middle East Directorate) to Ethiopian Embassies in Mogadisho, Khartoum and Djibouti, Ethiopiaôs Position Paper to the 2nd Extraordinary Meeting of IGADD Council of Ministers: 03 September 1990.
[77] MoFA etiyo-somale yä gara comité 1 Şeraz 3, Report on Nairobi IGADD Foreign Ministers Meeting: *Nähäsé* 1982E.C (Aug. 1990). MoFA IGADD 2 Şeraz 5, Nairobi Communiqué: 28 August 1990.
[78] MoFA IGADD 2 Şeraz 5, Mengistu to Museveni, Basher, Aptidon, Barre and Moi: 22 December 1990; Status of Members Contributions to IGADD: *Nähäsé* 6, 1982E.C (12 Aug. 1990).

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y, thereby urging the country to put an extra effort to sustain these advantages. IGADD had used Ethiopian institutions in Djibouti, thereby providing financial benefits for the country. For example, according to him, the secretariat used the Ethiopian Commercial Bank of Djibouti as its bank, and in the last five years deposited over five million US dollars. The secretariat as well predominantly used Ethiopian Airlines, and over the same period had paid over $350,000.[79]

On 22 January 1991 the Ugandan, Dr. David S. Muluuli, was appointed executive secretary. Afterwards, the authority claimed it was entering a new phase, i.e. implementation of projects designed in the past five years. However, the organization was so devoid of finances it had to cut back its budget to meager level, put strict rules on staff employment, and pay salaries from the fund allocated by donor agencies for project design and implementation.[80] The already troubled authority faced additional problems with the rapid succession of events following the collapse of the regimes in Ethiopia and Somalia, and the rise of Eritrea in particular and the ideological reorientation of the entire region in general. IGADD remained practically defunct till the September 1993 summit in Addis Ababa; afterwards, the ongoing intent to overhaul the authority acquired additional momentum.[81] Nevertheless, the intricate process of transforming IGADD into Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has to wait till March 1996.

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[79] *Ibid,* Dr. Mäkonnen Kebrät to Täsfayé Dinqa (Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister): 18 January 1991; Report on IGADDôs Five Years Achievements: December 1990.
[80] MoFA IGADD 2 Şeraz 5, On New IGADD Executive Secretary: 18 January 1991; Report on 8th IGADD Ministerial Meeting: *Yäkatit* 25, 1983E.C (4 March 1991).
[81] MoFA IGADD 4 Şeraz 7, Declaration of the 4th Summit of Heads of State and Governments of IGADD: 7 September 1993.

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ea (PTA) to The Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

The creation of a viable economic community at continental and regional levels was among the primary agenda items of African conferences since the late 1950s. The issue was accorded special importance immediately after the establishment of OAU. The charter of the organization provided for the creation of a social and economic commission; and at a meeting in Niamey, Niger in mid 1963, the commission was officially instituted. This body was intended to coordinate, among other things, the formation of an African Common Market, the nature of Africaôs relation with other economic communities, the creation of African Payment Union, and designing mechanisms to facilitate developmental agendas at state, regional and continental levels. The first session of the council of ministers (Addis Ababa, November 1963), however, proposed to prioritize the creation of regional economic communities (RECs) with common geographic, demographic and infrastructural development as a foundation for the market at a wider scale.[82]

Successive meetings were conducted to realize the objective of creating a regional economic community, but tangible results began to appear only after the late 1970s. Various resolutions were passed at ministerial meetings of Eastern and Southern African states in Lusaka, Zambia (1965) and Addis Ababa (1966 and 1967) on viable measures to be taken to this end. The absence of any meaningful result at the continental level, though, necessitated additional sanction from heads of state and government at their tenth

[82] MoFA afriqa andenät 22 1212, Memo to the Emperor on talking points of the 4th OAU Summit: 1959E.C (1967).

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y 1973. It was finally decided at the Kinshasa summit (1976) to commence the effort immediately at regional level.[83] African leaders had also envisaged in 1980, by means of what they dubbed the Lagos Plan of Action, to finalize the establishment of regional economic units by 1984, the African Common Market by the 1990s, and the African Economic Community by the year 2000. This had lent additional impetus to the efforts at the creation of PTA in the eastern and southern sub-region.[84]

The real breakthrough in the process of establishing the regional economic communities came immediately after the Kinshasa summit of African economic ministers in February 1977. They regrouped the continent into five regional units, i.e. north, west, central, eastern and southern, and established the Multinational Programming and Operational Center (MULPOC) that would coordinate efforts at regional levels. The center for eastern and southern Africa was set at Lusaka with eighteen constituent states (Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Comoros, Lesotho, Mozambique, Mauritius, Malawi, Madagascar, Swaziland, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe).[85]

The third regional ministerial meeting held in Lusaka (4-5 Nov. 1977) deliberated on mechanisms to implement what came to be known as the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) and requested member states to come up with declarations of intent from their respective governments stating their agreement on its setting. Accordingly, the Ethiopian ministry of Trade and Tourism submitted a memo to the Council of Ministers, and on 23 January

[83] MoFA OUA81 AU77, Memo on PTA: *Hämlé* 8, 1974E.C (15 July 1982).
[84] Ibid.
[85] *Ibid.*

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made to participate in the negotiations leading to the creation of PTA. The basic framework agreement on the creation of a regional unit was reached at the first extraordinary meeting of trade, finance and planning ministers held in Lusaka (30-31 March 1978). There the consensus was reached to set PTA, the declaration of intent was signed by member states, agreement was reached to create an intergovernmental negotiating team that would carve out the intricacies related with the trade agreement, and make preparations for the actual endorsement of the treaty first by the council of ministers and finally by the heads of state and government.[86]

Ethiopia took an active part in all the eight rounds of negotiation conducted for the next four years that drafted twelve protocols and two treaties. Delegations representing the ministries of Foreign Trade, MoFA, Finance, Transport and Communications, Agriculture, Justice and Industry as well as experts from the national bank and customs and excise tax authority participated in these deliberations. Of those eight rounds, Ethiopia hosted the first, the third, the fifth and the seventh ministerial conferences and the two legal experts meetings.[87]

Most controversial were the talks on the founding protocol. Representatives of Ethiopia laid their imprint on some of the major agreements.[88] The first concerned the órule of origin of commoditiesô. The status of transnational products in the markets of the region was at the center of this argument. After an intense debate an agreement was reached, based on Ethiopiaôs proposal, to consider a trade item originating from a given member state eligible for customs tax deductions if and only if at least 51% of the share

[86] *Ibid.*
[87] *Ibid.*
[88] *Ibid.*

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by the government or the nationals of that state. An exception was made to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland because of their total dependence on South Africa, Djibouti and Comoros because of the scarcity of their natural resources, and Mauritius and the new independent state of Zimbabwe on special considerations.

The issue related to ―re-export of goodsô was the second matter that necessitated the direct intervention of Ethiopia in the negotiation process. The Ethiopian side was strongly for the inclusion in the protocol of the phrase that the country of origin of a given commodity should be requested for permission or at least consulted when the other state is going to sell it to a third party. The sole opposition to this claim, for obvious reasons, came from Djibouti. In addition to endorsing the proposal of Ethiopia, the intergovernmental negotiating team put in place a provision for talks between concerned parties, as situations dictate, to engage in dialogue to stop re-export of commodities.

The third issue involved the plan to accord special treatment to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (commonly referred to as the B.L.S. states) in view of their complete dependence on South Africa. Ethiopia cautioned against the influx of the latterôs products into the sub-region via the B.L.S. states and the import by South Africa of PTA commodities, thereby creating unbalanced trade relations, notwithstanding the prevalent sanctions against the apartheid regime. This was also accepted by the negotiating team and provisions were made for it in the protocol.[89]

[89] *Ibid.*

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sions of the agreement included: the protocol on the reduction and elimination of trade barriers on selected commodities to be traded with the PTA, the protocol related to customs cooperation, the protocol on the rules of origin for products, the protocol on the re-export of goods and the protocol on transit trade and transit facilities. The first protocol provided for customs tax reduction for six categories of commodities ranging from food products to luxury items. Ethiopia had supplied a list of twenty-seven items for export and nine for import, the former predominantly consisting of agricultural products and the latter of semi-processed goods. The justification given for the least amount of products to be purchased from the sub-region was that the tax-reduction agreement would substantially reduce the countryôs revenue by 4.6 million *birr*, and therefore the ploy was to balance the deficit by increasing the list of exports that would bring about a relatively fair sum of foreign currency.[90]

Agreement was reached on the twelve protocols and the draft treaty establishing PTA at the last extraordinary meeting of trade, finance and planning ministers of the sub-region held in Addis Ababa from 12-15 October 1981. The only articles that were not agreed upon yet and were postponed for further discussion were those related with the creation of Eastern and Southern Africa Development Bank and minor details regarding payment procedures in some protocols.[91]

The treaty creating PTA was officially signed on 21 December 1981 in Lusaka, Zambia. Out of the eighteen member states who participated in the negotiation process, only nine signed the treaty. These were Comoros Islands, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya,

[90] *Ibid.*
[91] *Ibid.*

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ganda and Mozambique. By June 1982, four additional states ï Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe ï had joined the group. Lusaka was unanimously voted to be the PTA headquarters and the regional economic group was expected to be fully functional by the beginning of the new year.[92]

The task of detailing administrative and financial matters for running the organization was left to the experts committee and the council of ministers, which had their first extraordinary meetings in Lusaka in June 1982. Sixteen states participated in these meetings; the remaining two out of the original eighteen, Madagascar and Seychelles, had never taken part in the earlier negotiations. The actual deal regarding budget allocations to the PTA secretariat and other bureaucratic arrangements, however, was made by the twelve signatories to the treaty. Even then, Djibouti and Comoros were exempted for the next three years from any financial obligation (based on the fragile state of their current economy), and the burden was solely put on the remaining ten.[93]

The ministerial council approved the scale of contributions for the 1983 fiscal year based on the GDP (30%), per-capita income (40%) and intra-PTA export (30%) ratios of signatory states. Accordingly, Kenyaôs share constituted the largest, i.e. 20%; followed by Zimbabwe (18.8%), Uganda (10.5%), Swaziland (10.1%), Zambia (8.7%), Ethiopia (8.4%), Malawi (8.3%), Mauritius (6.9%), Somalia (4.8%) and Lesotho (3.6%). A decision was as well passed for member states to advance half of the payment due for 1983 well before December 1982. Ethiopia paid the designated amount of 150,891.61

[92] *Addis Zämän*: *Tahesas* 10, 14, 16 and 18, 1974E.C (Dec. 1981). MoFA OAU81 OAU77, Report on the 1st PTA Expert Committee and Council of Ministers Meeting (Lusaka, 14-24, 1982): *Säné* 1974E.C (June 1981).
[93] MoFA OAU81 OAU77, Report on the 1st PTA Expert Committee and Council of Ministers Meeting (Lusaka, 14-24, 1982).

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udget allocation scale was revised later on, Kenyaôs share now being reduced to 14.7% and Ethiopiaôs share being 5%, i.e. $98,250 annually.[95] The first meetings of both the expert committee and the council of ministers also formulated the administrative structure of the Interim PTA Secretariat and its subsidiary organs.

Nonetheless, PTA remained a non functioning entity for long, member states being uneasy about the implementation of the protocols. Until December 1985, the agenda of customs tax reduction rates still dominated summit talks, and afterwards no practical steps were taken in promoting regional economic development.[96] The effort to reinvigorate the commitment of member states towards PTA at the summit conference in Addis Ababa in December 1986 failed short of bringing meaningful change other than the customary verbal commitment.[97] As far as the archival documents in the MoFA reveal, PTA had ceased to exist long ago, and Ethiopia seemed to care little more than participating in the conferences being conducted in the name of the regional economic association.

Practical projects that had direct bearings on Ethiopia appeared only after late 1991 when the secretary general of PTA, Dr. Bingua Mutarica, visited the country and discussed the possibility of connecting Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya via a railway line.[98] Even if talks regarding the establishment of the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) were started during the Fifth Summit in Addis Ababa in December

[94] Ibid.
[95] MoFA OUA81 AU77, Memo on PTA: *Hämlé* 8, 1974E.C (15 July 1982).
[96] *Addis Zämän*: On Lusaka Summit, *Tahesas* 8 & 9, 1975E.C (18 & 19 Dec. 1982); On Harare Summit, *Säné* 22 & 28, 1976E.C (29 June and 5 July 1984); On Harare Summit, *Tahesas* 11, 12 & 19, 1976 E..C (21, 22, & 29 Dec. 1984); On Addis Ababa Meeting, *Mäskäräm* 22 (3 Oct.) and *Ţeqémt* 3, 1977E.C (14 Oct. 1984); On Bujumbura Summit, *Genbot* 20 & 26, 1978E.C (28 May and 3 June 1986); On Lusaka Meeting, *Tahesas* 1978E.C (Dec. 1986).
[97] *Addis Zämän*: *Tahesas* 21, 24, 25, 26 & 30, 1979E.C (Jan. 1987).
[98] *Addis Zämän*: *Tahesas* 24, 1984E.C (3 Jan. 1991).

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rialize till the December 1994 Summit at Lilongwe, Malawi.

Ethiopia played a significant role in the creation and stabilization of regional institutions. The timely intervention that salvaged and revitalized PAFMECSA, the active involvement in the affairs of IGADD from the beginning and similar approaches towards PTA/COMESA are cases in point. These pro-active roles of both the imperial regime and the Darg demonstrated the strategic importance of the country in concerted regional efforts to establish political and economic associations. In spite of its weak economic stature in the period under discussion, Ethiopia proved instrumental in the struggle to establish these regional units.

Simultaneously, the country strove to advance its immediate needs through these fora. The failed bid for membership of the East African Federation and EACSO, the special privileges it secured for its airlines in the region, the skill employed in the process of creating IGADD and maintaining strategic interests in the process and the insistence for special rights during the negotiations to establish PTA/COMESA are testimonies to Ethiopiaôs attempts to promote its national agenda. Obviously, this applies to every nation and what Ethiopia did was not exceptional. However, in its totality, the whole exercise contributed to the failure of these regional bodies. Ethiopia, like its counterparts, opted for weak and ineffectual entities that could by no means challenge the integrity of its nationhood.

[99] *Addis Zämän*: *Hedar* 29 & 30, 1987E.C (9 & 10 Dec. 1994); *Tahesas* 5, 1987E.C (15 Dec. 1994).

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f membership to the East African Federation and a viable IGADD, which the Imperial regime and the Darg shunned, respectively, later haunted the two governments. They were forced to put forward the idea of some sort of federation with Somalia in a bid to solve the complex problem. The last ditch effort by the Darg to reinvigorate IGADD similarly demonstrated a wishful thinking on the part of Ethiopia. It can be argued that the two regimes envisioned such regional bodies as vehicles of advancing immediate goals, without imagining the ultimate results. What they helped create failed short of addressing much bigger challenges later on. Like other African organizations, these regional associations remained weak and bound to specific goals. Similar conclusions can be made to other economic forums Ethiopia was party to. The actual objectives of PTA/COMESA have yet to register with Ethiopian authorities and the business community.

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Part II

Involvement in Continental Affairs

In dealing with the nature of Ethiopiaôs involvement in continental affairs in the period under discussion, one has to consider a number of factors. Wider issues have to be taken into account in addition to the question of security and national interest. These included, among others, the creation of a viable Pan-African organization, the decolonization process and maintaining collective peace and security in the continent. Post-independence Africa witnessed differing positions on how these issues should be addressed and this divergence sometimes assumed an element of confrontation. Altogether, two ideological groupings, Casablanca and Monrovia, emerged, with additional associations along linguistic, cultural and geographical lines. Each section professed its own version of African unity, with distinct economic, social and political imperatives.

Ethiopiaôs role in the struggle to establish some sort of continental forum and its contributions to the African liberation movements and mediation efforts are often lauded by expatriates and Ethiopians alike. Yet, the history of that engagement is not fully documented and critically examined. Here an attempt is made to reconstruct developments associated with the creation and consolidation of the OAU and Ethiopiaôs place in the process. The struggle to convene the 1963 summit conference, the drafting of the charter and the contention over the headquarters will be investigated in some detail. In the process, the objective realities of inter-African relations would be assessed, Ethiopiaôs intricate plan to advance its strategic national interests would be discussed and

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f the two successive governments investigated. Likewise, the nature of Ethiopia's involvement in the African liberation committee, together with the moral and material support it rendered to selected liberation movements would be assessed. Finally, an attempt will be made to investigate the roles played by the imperial regime and the Darg to mediate African conflicts and maintain peace and security in different parts of the continent. The whole exercise is designed to demonstrate the positions of the two governments on African issues and to establish the basic similarities and variations, if any, of their approaches.

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Chapter V

From Pan-Africanism to OAU: Assessment of Achievements and Failures

5.1. The Organization of African Unity (OAU)[1]

5.1.1. The Evolution of Ethiopia's Involvement

Since the Accra Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) of 1958, the concept of 'African Unity' had preoccupied the thinking of African statesmen and leaders, and constituted one of the most predominant items of the agenda of successive Pan-African conferences. The need for achieving unity among the independent African states had been promoted by their desire to consolidate their fight against colonialism and to find, from an African perspective, solution to their domestic and international problems.[2] Below, a brief analysis of the development of Ethiopia's perception of African unity up to the Lagos Conference (January 1962) is offered.

Right from the emergence of African colonial states into a status of sovereign nationhood, different approaches towards continental unity were manifested.[3] Two extremes occurred in the Pan-African world, each with its own variants of interpretations. According to Colin Legum, these poles 'divided the unitarians from federalists; the revolutionaries from the reformists, in economic as well as social questions; and the

[1] This chapter is adopted from Belete Belachew, ñEthiopia in African Politics, 1958-1965ò (MA Thesis, Addis Ababa University), 2005.

[2] MoFA OAU1962ï 63 1963, Objectives of the Addis Ababa Summit Conference.

[3] For analysis of these approaches, see Clyde Sanger, ñToward Unity in Africa,ò *Foreign Affairs: An African Quarterly Review*. 42, 2 (1964): 269ï 272, 277ï 278; John Woronoff, ñThe OAU and Sub-Saharan Regional Bodies,ò *The OAU After Ten Years*. Yassin El-Ayouty (ed.) (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975): 62ï 65, 66ï 68; Imanuel Geiss, *The Pan-African Movement*. Translated by Ann Keep (New York: African Publishing co., 1974), 421ï 423; Vijay Sen Budhraj, ñPan-African Unification,ò *Africa Quarterly*. 5, 1 (1965): 8ï 11, 12ï 14.

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from those who favored a slower, functional approach'.[4] Successive Pan-African conferences on the issue of African unity demonstrated the competition among these elements in their zeal to promote divergent ideologies.

The division of opinion came into the open when Ghana and Guinea proposed the endorsement of some form of African union at the Second CIAS in Addis Ababa [June 1960]. The opposition rallied around Nigeria, which, according to some sources, woke up to challenge Nkrumahôs and Touréôs monopoly on African leadership.[5] In the face of divergent views, the Addis Ababa CIAS chose to delegate the issue to the President of the Conference, Yelma Därésa, so that he would contact Heads of State ótо initiate consultation through diplomatic channels with a view to promoting African unity, and to consider the item at their next meeting in 1962.ô[6]

As the time for the Lagos Conference (January 1962) approached, the MoFA set out to gather all possible information on the meeting. Ethiopiaôs ambassador to Nigeria, Käbädä Abäbä, was instructed to make enquiries about which heads of state and foreign ministers were going to attend the conference, and to find out in advance about the working papers and the agenda for the conference. Nigeria provided the list of attendees after some hesitation and delay. Accordingly, it was found out that eighteen independent states had accepted the invitation ï all of them members of the Monrovia group. The

[4] Legum, *Pan-Africanism* é , 46ï47; P. Olisanwuche Esedebe, *Pan-Africanism: the Idea and Movement, 1977-1991* (2nd Ed.) (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1994), 165-187, 192-224; Klass Van Walraven, *Dreams of Power: The Role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa, 1963-1993* (England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1999), 102-146; Basil Davidson, *Africa in Modern History* (Penguin Books, 1978), 288-289; Legum, *Pan-Africanism* é , 46ï47; Mazrui, *Towards a Pax Africana*, 44-48. Shaw and Newbury, ñDependence or Interdependenceò, 43-44.

[5] Rivkin, 174ï175; Basil Davidson, *Which Way Africa?* (3rd Ed.) (Great Britain: C. Nicholls and Company Ltd., 1971), 68ï69.

[6] Legum, *Pan-African* é , 46ï47; On the evolution of Ethiopiaôs African policy see Zäwdé Gäbrä-Heywät. *Yäheywät weṭä weräd (*Addis Ababa. Central Printing Press, 1995 E.C.), 193-199.

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gh indirect enquiries that Nkrumah had recommended to the Casablanca group to boycott the forthcoming conference.[7]

Through the Ethiopian Embassy in Cairo, the MoFA learned that Egypt was going to attend the conference ósо as not to give chance for imperialists who always wish to see Africa dividedô.[8] But it was to be represented by the Foreign Minister, Muhammad Fauzy, not the head of state. Besides, according to the report, North African states had decided to send delegates to the conference; they even started talks, at ambassadorial level, on the points they were going to raise.[9]

Ethiopiaôs ambassador to Nigeria advised his government on the position it had to take in the Lagos Conference.[10] Since the meeting was to debate on the issue of merging the Casablanca and Monrovia groups and creating a united front, the ambassador observed, Ethiopia had to assume the role of peace-maker and to keep a middlemanôs position throughout. This, he claimed, would give the government the prestige that the Nigerians endeavored to attain; and in case of failure of the Lagos Conference, Ethiopia could safely propose to bring about a negotiation between the two factions in Addis Ababa.[11]

The summit conference was preceded by the foreign ministers meeting (22ï 24 January 1962). Ethiopia had assigned an eight-man delegation, led by the State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kätäma Yifru, to attend the foreign ministers conference.

[7] MOFA Lagos1 13/1*Ư*, Report on the Lagos Conferenceôs Decision on Economic and Financial Matters, Käbädä Abäbä (Lagos) to Kätäma: 11 December 1961; Käbädä to Kätäma: 29 December 1961.
[8] *Ibid,* Ambassador Mäläs Mikaêél Andom (Cairo) to Kätäma: 29 December 1961. Of course it did not take part in the conference at all.
[9] *Ibid*. Somalia was to be represented by its Prime Minister Abdul Rashid Ali Sharmake and the Foreign Minister, Abdullahi Issa, Ambassador Ahadu Saburé (Mogadishu) to Kätäma: 21 January 1962.
[10] *Ibid*, Käbädä to Kätäma: 14 January 1962.
[11] *Ibid*. In this case, the ambassador claimed, the one to compete with Ethiopia for the chance would be Libya.

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thing to secure the emperorôs attendance so as to give leverage to Ethiopiaôs objective of establishing continental unity.[12] Kätämaôs efforts apparently succeeded. Ambassador Käbädä (Lagos) was instructed to notify the Nigerian authorities of Hayla-Selassieôs intent and keep the issue strictly secret until confirmed officially.[13] The imperial entourage included *Şähafé Te'ezaz* Aklilu (prime minister) and *Ras* Emeru Hayla-Selassie.

In an interview he gave immediately before setting out to Lagos, Kätäma clearly stated Ethiopiaôs view about the forthcoming conference. Speaking about the conference, he pointed out that ótthe purpose of this meeting is to find ways and means of fostering African unity and formulating a common basis for action.ô The existing differences between the Casablanca and Monrovia countries, he stated, were by no means basic. In principle both groups advocated the need for African unity, but the difference came in the approach and method of achieving the commonly desired end. In order to provide African unity the broader framework it deserved, Kätäma pointed out, óEthiopia has proposed the formation of an African regional organization whereby African solutions for purely African problems may be worked out.ô[14]

The minister claimed that the suggestion had been warmly received by all African delegates at the UN. This issue would certainly be brought up for general discussion both in the forthcoming Lagos Summit and the CIAS to be held in Tunisia, Kätäma ventured. But, he explained that the proposed regional organization ócan only yield fruit when it has its own clear-cut charter and a permanent secretariat to carry out the work entrusted to itô

[12] Makonnen Katama, Creation of the OAU, p.2..
[13] MoFA Lagos1 13/1 , Kätäma to Käbädä (Lagos): 13 January 1962; Käbädä to Kätäma: 15 January 1962. However, the information leaked before an official notification was issued, allegedly from Addis Ababa, see Käbädä to Kätäma: 18 January 1962.
[14] *Ethiopian Herald*, 16 January 1962.

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the complexity of effecting African unity; at the same time, he reminded Africans that it had to be achieved. [15]

The Lagos Conference suffered a setback from the beginning when members of the Casablanca group and Tunisia boycotted the meeting, under the pretext that the Algerian Provisional Government had not been invited. The major point these countries raised was that Algeria had been invited to the Monrovia Conference of May 1961, and there was therefore no reason why it should be deprived of the chance of attending the Lagos Conference. Most African nations favored Algeriaôs participation. The objection arose, however, in part from the reservations of the Brazzaville group, who did not want to embarrass their former colonial master, France.[16] Upon arrival at Lagos, Kätäma made the position of Ethiopia clear ï his delegation would recommend to the foreign ministers that the Provisional Government be invited.[17]

When the Heads of State Meeting (25ï 31 January) started, Hayla-Selassie was accorded the privilege of giving the opening speech to the conference after Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Governor General of Nigeria, had welcomed the delegates. The emperor declared Ethiopiaôs commitment to Africa and proposed the formation of an inter-African organization.[18] Following this, on 31 January 1962, the Summit of twenty African leaders adopted a resolution creating a new permanent Inter-African and Malagasy States Organization. The conference also unanimously adopted the establishment of a General Secretariat, and a permanent African and Malagasy representative assembly and council

[15] *Ibid.*
[16] For the Reuterôs detailed report on the debate in the Lagos Conference of Foreign Ministers, see *Ethiopian Herald*, 24 January 1962.
[17] *Ibid*. The Foreign Minister of Sudan, who arrived there at the same time, even went further. He stated that his delegation would insist on the participation of the Provisional Government; and when this did not seem to happen, the delegates walked out of the conference, see *Ethiopian Herald*, 25 January 1962, 26 January 1962. Libya and Somalia also had similar feelings.
[18] *Ethiopian Herald*, 27 January 1962.

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inter-African and Malagasy organization charter adopted in principle earlier.

During the final public session, the Ethiopian delegation suggested that the next heads of state conference be held in Addis Ababa. The assumption was that Tunis would convene the Third CIAS in April 1962 but that would be at Foreign Ministers level. There the question of the organization of African states would be discussed, and then passed on for decision to the Addis Ababa Summit. Kätämaôs press conference after the Lagos Conference confirmed this line of argument.[20] Eventually, however, Ethiopia set out to convince African nations to abandon the Tunis CIAS altogether and hold the foreign ministers meeting together with the Summit in Addis Ababa.

At the press conference, Kätäma stated Ethiopiaôs dismay at the absence of the Casablanca group from the Lagos Conference. ôIt is not by staying away from conferences that we can solve problems. Ethiopia does not subscribe to all the ideas of the Monrovia group; neither does she object to those of Casablanca but she was there to help find a common approach.ô[21] He further expressed the hope that delegates coming to the forthcoming Addis Ababa conference would abandon the feeling of belonging to the Monrovia, Casablanca and Lagos groups.[22]

The foreign ministers who met in Lagos from 1ï 3 June to discuss the draft charter of the inter-African organization decided that the Addis-Ababa Summit would take place in late 1962 or early 1963.[23]

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[19] MoFA OAU1962ï 63 1962, Lagos Conference of Heads of African and Malagasy State and Government 25th to 30th January 1962, Resolutions.
[20] *Ethiopian Herald*, 4 February 1962.
[21] *Ibid*.
[22] *Ibid*. This conviction of Ethiopia was later expressed in a detailed letter to Ethiopiaôs ambassador in Belgrade; see MoFA Lagos1 13/1 , Kätäma to Pétros Sahelu: 27 February 1962.
[23] *Ethiopian Herald*, 7 June 1962.

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Preparations for the May Summit: Responsibilities and Challenges

Ethiopia proposed to all independent African states to attend the conference from 18ï 20 April 1963 in Addis Ababa. The offer left room for alternate proposals from all Heads of State in case the above dates were inconvenient or unacceptable. Its embassies were instructed to follow up the matter and report immediately on every response from African heads of state.[24] Nigeriaôs Prime Minister, for instance, claimed that the dates coincided with the Budget Session of the Nigerian Federal Parliament in which he must take part, and suggested May. Hayla-Selassie agreed to Nigeriaôs proposal to postpone the conference pending the agreement of other states.[25]

Meanwhile, Liberiaôs secretary of state voiced his fear that Ethiopiaôs decision to hold the conference in April might inconvenience most of the Monrovia group, for they had agreed in Lagos to meet at the latest in early 1963.[26] Surprisingly enough, Nigeria emerged at the head of such an opposition. A joint communiqué issued by foreign ministers of Nigeria, Dahomey and Togo, after their meeting in Cotonou, Dahomey, stated that unless Ethiopia convened the conference before the end of 1962 the idea of African unity would be in danger.[27] Ethiopiaôs Embassy also discovered that Nigeria was pressurizing Cameroon, Chad and Niger to assume similar attitudes. Vexed by Nigeriaôs activities, the embassy staff approached Jaja Wachuku, the foreign minister, upon his return from Cotonou for an explanation. The minister was bluntly asked why his

[24] MoFA OAU28 32/1 , cited in Dr. Täsfayé to Kätäma ï see the bottom of the letter: 12 July 1962; also see, telegram, Ethiopian Embassy (Paris) to MoFA: 21 July 1962.
[25] *Ibid*, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa to Hayla-Selassie: 25 July 1962; Käbädä (Lagos) to Kätäma: 27 July 1962; Hayla-Selassie to Balewa: 17 August 1962.
[26] *Ibid*, Bäfäqadu Wäldä-Mikaôel (Monrovia) to Kätäma: 12 July 1962.
[27] *Ibid*, Asfaw Täfära (Third Secretary, Lagos) to MoFA: 27 August 1962.

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ted postponing the summit to May instead of what it was demanding now. Wachuku claimed that the reason was pressure from other smaller African states and Nigeriaôs fear of Ghana, Guinea, and north African states manipulating the conference before May 1963.[28]

In addition, the Cotonou Communiqué proposed the creation of an African group consisting only of the Monrovia member states in the UN or other international organizations. Ethiopiaôs ambassador to Ghana expressed his view that such an action would jeopardize Ethiopiaôs attempt to reconcile the two factions.[29] Nigeriaôs efforts had taken root among some African states. In response to Ethiopiaôs proposal for a May 1963[30] conference, the Central African Republic, through its embassy in Paris, for example, suggested that the meeting should be held in late 1962 or early 1963. Furthermore, it tabled a motion whereby the Casablanca group was to be excluded while the Monrovia nations were discussing the Lagos Charter at the Addis Ababa summit conference.[31]

The other challenge came from Ghana. Kwame Nkrumah approached Liberiaôs president with a proposal to hold a summit conference or a foreign ministers meeting of the Monrovia and Casablanca groups in Monrovia. Tubman forwarded the issue to Emperor Hayla-Selassie for further comment.[32] An intense diplomatic battle ensued between Ghana and Ethiopia. Ethiopiaôs ambassador to Ghana, Mäsfen Yäbägagäät, was instructed to make a courtesy visits to the foreign minister, and the director of African

[28] *Ibid*. The Foreign Minister also commented on the contents of Ethiopiaôs proposal to the Addis Ababa Conference, whereby the one to Nigeria requested for agreement on the date for the conference, while those to other simply issued invitations.
[29] MoFA Accra1 468/6U, Br. Gen. Mäsfen Yäbägagäät (Accra) to Kätäma: 27 August 1962.
[30] Ethiopia might had issued an alternate proposal that transferred the time of the Addis Ababa Summit to May 1963 for all the responses from African states either accepted or rejected it.
[31] MoFA OAU28 32/1 , Br. Gen. Mäkonnen Dänäqä (Paris) to Mamo Tadäsä (MoFA): 25 October 1962.
[32] *Ibid*, cited in Bäfäqadu (Monrovia) to Kätäma: 28 July 1962.

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he president, Dei-Anang. When asked how his country could do such a thing while Ethiopia was contemplating convening a summit conference, the foreign minister claimed that Ghana did not know Ethiopiaôs intentions at all. Besides, the minister argued, his country was thinking of a meeting at ministerial level that would set the agenda for a summit conference of heads of state and government. Finally, Ghana relented and assured that it would go to any conference, óeven to Addis Ababaô, which could forge African unity.[33]

Dissatisfied with such an answer, Ambassador Mäsfen next approached Dei-Anang for further explanations. The latter again emphasized the need for a foreign ministers conference before any summit conference. According to Dei-Anang, Nkrumah insisted on this, and, even if President Tubman would refuse to comply, Ghana would look for another alternative.[34] Then, as they were concluding their discussions, Dei-Anang asked whether or not Nasserôs Egypt and Aden Abdullah Osmanôs Somalia, ówith whom Ethiopia was in bad termsô, were going to attend the Addis Ababa Summit. The Ethiopian ambassador assured him of their participation, but left the Ghanaianôs office much intrigued. Later, Mäsfen discovered from Liberiaôs ambassador to Ghana that Nkrumah was preparing to send a delegation to Monrovia to convince Tubman to accede to his request.[35]

However, Ghanaôs envoys, consisting of Dei-Anang, A.K. Oku and A.K. Asante, had failed to convince Liberiaôs President. Tubman argued that such a move would only disrupt the objective of the conference, and thus refused to accept the proposal for a

[33] *Ibid*, *Blatta* Mäsfen Yäbägagät (Accra) to Kätäma: 16 August 1962. Mesfen alternated the titles between Brigadier General and *Blatta*.
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] *Ibid.*

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a or any other place other than Addis Ababa.[36] Liberiaôs opinion was officially expressed through its embassy in Addis Ababa: óé the Liberian Government does not feel any useful purpose could be served by a Foreign Ministers meeting in Monrovia separate from that of the Heads of State Meeting in Addis Ababa on which there is general agreement.ô[37]

Then, Nkrumah directly pleaded with the Ethiopian Emperor himself. The Ghanaian argued that he had reason to believe that those who accepted the idea of the summit conference at Addis Ababa would also understand the necessity for a preliminary discussion at foreign ministers level óto clear the ground and lay the foundation for a successful meeting among ourselvesô.[38] Nkrumah proposed that such a meeting could take place at Monrovia, Tunis or Casablanca. The interval between the two meetings, according to Nkrumah, would be used by the heads of state to study the problems identified by their foreign ministers. He claimed that an agreement had been reached on the matter between President Tubman and himself, and urged Hayla-Selassie to follow suit.

Nevertheless, Liberia denied reaching such an agreement with Nkrumah. óé President Tubman agrees with President Nkrumah that a conference should be held at Foreign Ministers level before the Summit Meeting, [but] President Tubman has never suggested that the conference should be held in Monrovia, Tunis or Casablanca.ô[39] Tubman still maintained his position that the foreign ministersô conference and the summit meeting should both be held in Addis Ababa. The presumption that the actions of

[36] *Ibid*, Bäfäqadu (Monrovia) to Kätäma: 2 September 1962.
[37] *Ibid*, The Embassy of the Republic of Liberia to Imperial Ethiopian MoFA: 16 August 1962.
[38] *Ibid*, Nkrumah to Hayla-Selassie: 28 September 1962.
[39] *Ibid*, The Embassy of the Republic of Liberia to Imperial Ethiopian MOFA: 18 October 1962.

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their respective strategic design to dictate proceedings of upcoming meetings rather than a desire to realize some kind of unity among divided African states bears much weight.

In a parallel development, Ethiopia was also promoting the idea of convening the two conferences together in Addis Ababa in May 1963. The major convincing was done again at the UN during the 17th Session of the General Assembly in October 1962.[40] The Ethiopian delegation, led by Kätäma Yifru, engaged African representatives in long discussions, and applied every pressure to persuade them to shift the Tunis CIAS, scheduled for the following month, to Addis Ababa, and succeeded. En route to New York to the 17th session, Kätäma had expressed Ethiopiaôs wish that the next summit conference should take a concrete decision on the problem created by the existence of the Casablanca and Monrovia groups.[41]

Agreements to Ethiopiaôs proposal to convene both meetings in May 1963 began to arrive immediately after the talks at the UN.[42] Confident of majority support, the government of Ethiopia decided to send out official invitations to independent African states in December 1962. Responses to these invitations were made immediately. The Libyan Chargé dô Affaires in Cairo, for example, explained that due to chronic illness, King Hassan might not attend the conference, but he would be represented by either the

[40] MoFA OAU1962ï 63 1963, Working Paper on the May Summit Conference; also sated in the press conference Kätäma gave in Addis Ababa upon his return from New York, *Ethiopian Herald*, 21 October 1962. The final decision was reached, however, at the Lagos Foreign Ministers meeting that met to review the draft charter of the Monrovia group in December 1962. Nineteen Foreign Ministers, after some convincing from Kätäma Yifru, agreed to replace the Tunis conference with the one in Addis Ababa. This was done in order to avoid both political and financial losses. MoFA OAU1962 ï 63.

[41] *Ethiopian Herald*, 15 September 1962.

[42] MoFA OAU28 32/1Ø , see for example, Br. Gen. Mäkonnen (Paris) to Mamo Tadäsä (MoFA): 16 October 1962, 26 October 1962; Br. Gen. Mäkonnen to Kätäma: 30 November 1962. These contained agreements of Coté dô Ivory, Togo and Dahomey, respectively; Leon Mba (President of Gabon) to Hayla-Selassie: 25 November 1962. Somalia had promised to think about the invitation and notify the Ethiopian state in due time, President Aden Abdullahi Osman to Hayla-Selassie: 25 September 1962.

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ister.[43] Milton Obote assured Hayla-Selassie of Ugandaôs attendance: ñIt will be a particular pleasure to me to be able to represent for the first time the Independent State of Uganda at such meeting.ò[44] The Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria expressed his appreciation for the efforts of Emperor Hayla-Selassie in the direction of African Independence and unity. ñThe dates proposed for the Foreign Ministersô preliminary meeting and for the Conference itself are convenient to us in Nigeria,ô the Premier asserted.[45]

In the meantime, the Casablanca nations held discussions among themselves about the forthcoming Addis Ababa Summit. In late January 1963, Morocco, Guinea and Mali agreed in principle to a summit conference the following May. By early February, all but Ghana had expressed their consent to attend the Addis Ababa meeting.[46] The Casablanca group had planned to meet on 8 May in Marrakech, Morocco, to formulate its position for the Heads of State Conference in Addis Ababa. To ensure the attendance of some members of the Casablanca group and other Arab states of North Africa, Kätäma Yifru made a two-week tour in early March covering Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Egypt. The plan was to make arrangements and to hold talks with leaders in preparation for the Summit.[47] In all of these missions, it was agreed, *inter alia*, that the Casablanca and Monrovia charters be replaced by a new one and that a permanent secretariat for the

[43] MoFA OAU28 23/1ï , Mäläs (Cairo) to MoFA: 29 December 1962. Of course both the Prime Minister and the Crown Prince attended the conference in May.
[44] *Ibid*, Milton Obote to Hayla-Selassie: 4 January 1963.
[45] *Ibid*, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa to Hayla-Selassie: 2 January 1963.
[46] *Ibid*, 9 February 1963.
[47] MoFA OAU1962ï 63 1963, Working Paper on the May Summit; *Ethiopian Herald*, 5ï 20 March 1963. Kätäma was accompanied by Ayalew Mandäfro.

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ation be created.[48] By the time Kätäma finished his tours, thirty-one African states had agreed to attend the proposed Summit.

The question of the thirty-second nation, Togo, however, brought complications. An official invitation had already been sent to President Sylvanus Olympio, and he had agreed to attend the conference.[49] But, by mid January 1963, this tiny nation experienced in effect the first *coup d' état* in post-independence Africa. Olympio was assassinated and a new government, led by Nicolas Grunitzky, assumed power. The event and its aftermath shook the African world. In a rather heated telegram, Sekou Touré of Guinea requested Emperor Hayla-Selassie to take action ófor the sake of our common interests, mutual solidarity and defenseô.[50] In particular, the president wanted to draw the attention of the Ethiopian Emperor to óthis new method of colonialist scheme of liquidating leaders of African peoples and of exposing the national independence to danger as well as of creating obstacles to the realization of African Unityô.[51]

Hayla-Selassieôs telegram reinforced Touréôs perception of the situation.[52] Then a diplomatic entanglement ensued between those African nations that did not recognize the new government and those that did. Guinea and Nigeria appeared at the head of the former, while Ghana practically stood alone in the second. The Togo case witnessed the breaching of group solidarity within the Casablanca and Monrovia member states. No

[48] *Ibid*.
[49] See ff. 42 above.
[50] *Ethiopian Herald*, 24 January 1963.
[51] *Ibid.*
[52] *Ibid*; also see 25 January 1963.

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he footsteps of Ghana, while Senegal and Dahomey in principle recognized the new Government of Togo.[53]

The Monrovia group called for an emergency session to discuss and pass a resolution on the issue. The Ethiopian Mission to the UN advised the government not to take part in the internal affairs of West African countries for it would possibly affect the forthcoming conference. But Ethiopia decided to involve itself with a view to condemning such a deplorable action against African unity.[54] Fifteen African states met on 26 January 1963 in Lagos and set three preconditions to be fulfilled if Grunitzkyôs government desired recognition. These were: full investigation of the death of the president, release of detained Togolese ministers and the disbanding of the military insurrectional committee established by the coup makers as a tribunal to judge former Togolese leaders.[55]

A committee composed of Dahomey, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast and Nigeria was sent to Lome but Togo refused to accept it. The report compiled on the situation discussed how Ghana adamantly refused to agree to such measures, and concluded that Nkrumahôs government could be a liability to be reckoned with in the forthcoming summit conference.[56] However, no clear cut decision was reached on the question of whether or not Togo should participate in the Addis Ababa Conference. To avoid this stalemate,

[53] MoFA Accra1 468/6u, Ambassador Ephrém Boru (Accra) to Kätäma: 19 February 1963. The Ghana-Togo boundary was reopened with a pompous ceremony, and both had agreed to exchange diplomatic missions immediately.
[54] MoFA OAU28 23/1 , cited in Mängesté to Dr. Täsfayé (New York): 28 January 1963. Dr. Täsfayé had sent a telegram on 25 January 1963.
[55] *Ethiopian Observer*, 27 January 1963.
[56] MoFA Accra1 468/6u, Ephrém (Accra) to Kätäma: 19 February 1963.

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recognize Nicolas Grunitzkyôs government, deferred the issue to the forthcoming Foreign Ministersô meeting.[57]

The last issue with regard to the invitation for the May conference was the case of dependent territories of Africa. Ethiopian embassies in Africa and Europe were approached by nationalist leaders for permission to attend the conference and some states voiced an agreement with their demands.[58] Observing the mounting pressure, the Ethiopian Mission to the UN advised the government to comply with the request. The explanation given was that the countries that these leaders represented, especially Kenya, Zanzibar, Gambia, North Rhodesia and Nyasaland, were going to achieve independence soon, and being shunned from the Addis Ababa meeting might prejudice them against Ethiopia.[59] Again, in order to accommodate the opinion of other African states, the issue was left to the foreign ministersô conference.

As the time for the conference approached, last-ditch efforts to influence the course of the summit were launched. President Kwame Nkrumah, without notifying accredited African diplomats in Accra, sent six delegations to different parts of the continent. The mission was allegedly to smooth out earlier misunderstandings with other African states on the Togo situation, and most importantly to promote Nkrumahôs perception of African unity and to pressurize leaders, especially Emperor Hayla-Selassie, into accepting his ideology.[60] Messages to North African rulers, as well as to Hayla-Selassie, were to be delivered by Nkrumahôs closest confidant, Kojo Botsio. The Ethiopian Ambassador was

[57] MoFA OAU1962ï 63 1963, Working Paper on the May Summit.
[58] MoFA 2 32/11, see for example, Sam Nujoma to Gétaḷäw Mäkaḍa: 12 April 1963; Maj. Gen. Yaôeqob Gäbrä- Leuel (Ambassador, Leopoldville) to Hayla-Selassie: 14 April 1963 ï he passed on the requests of both Augustino Nato and Holden Roberto of Angola to participate in the 1963 Summit. Nkrumah opposed to Ethiopiaôs hesitation to invite them.
[59] MoFA OAU38 32/1 (207), Dr. Täsfayé to Kätäma: 14 March 1963.
[60] MoFA Accra1 468/6u, Ephrém (Accra) to Kätäma: 6 March 1963.

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ly twenty-five minutes before Botsioôs departure. The Cultural Advisor to the President, Nana Coby, together with N. Kesya and the ôEthiopianô Ras Makonnen, were assigned to East African nations. Other similar delegations were sent to Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Guinea.[61]

Similar reports claimed that Nigeria applied pressure on smaller West African nations so as to give more leverage to its opposition to the invitation of Togo to the conference.[62] It was perceived that Nigeriaôs action was motivated by pure jealousy at the eventual success of the Addis Ababa Summit in contrast to the Lagos Conference of January 1962, which was frustrated by African division on the question of the Algerian Provisional Government. One report, for instance, cited a diplomatic maneuver the Nigerians applied. Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa had invited leaders of Ivory Coast and Dahomey to share his flight to Addis Ababa on Nigerian Air Ways. Sir Milton Margai readily accepted, but to the dismay of the Nigerian premier, Hubert Maga of Dahomey chose another route.[63]

Ethiopia also learned through reliable diplomatic sources about Egyptôs manipulations of the Arab nations of North Africa. Gamal Abdul Nasser proposed to Ben Bellah of Algeria to create a ôMaghreb blocô in case of the failure of the Addis Ababa Summit to reconcile the Casablanca and Monrovia powers.[64] These sources claimed that Algeriaôs president had agreed to this scheme and distributed a memorandum to other North African leaders. The MoFA was advised to look out for political maneuvers by the

[61] *Ibid*; Ras Makonnen, pp.271ï 272, called this mission ôbridge-buildingô.
[62] MoFA OAU38 32/1ï (208), Asfaw Täfära (Third Secretary and Acting Chargé dô Affaires, Lagos) to MoFA: 10 May 1963; MoFA OAU38 32/1ï (207), col. Mäbratu Fesähä (Acting Chargé dô Affaires, Lagos) to Kätäma: 19 April 1963.
[63] MoFA OAU38 32/1ï (208), Asfaw to MoFA: 10 May 1963.
[64] *Ibid*, Gétanäh Häylä-Maryam (Chargé dô Affaires, Khartoum) to Kätäma: 14 May 1963.

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amed Fauzi, and his Algerian counterpart while preparing the agenda at the preliminary conference of foreign ministers.[65]

The MoFA started preparations for the Summit earlier assuming it was going to take place in April 1963. Four major committees were organized to conduct studies on the positions Ethiopia had to take and to facilitate the activities of the conference. Committee I consisted of Dr. Menasé Haylé (chairman), D. Paradis, Gétaḷäw Kebrät, Mohamed Hamid and Dr. Gäbrä-ḳadiq Dägäfu. They were to prepare a draft proposal for the secretariat of a Permanent Organization of African and Malagasy States ï the task that had been especially assigned to Ethiopia by the Conference of Foreign Ministers at Lagos.[66] It was the duty of this committee to submit detailed proposals for the establishment of the secretariat together with detailed departmental charts. Their task also included the study of the structures of secretariats of similar existing international organizations like the Organization of American States, the Arab League, and the UN; consideration of problems in connection with the staff, budget and location of the secretariat; and other specialized agencies to be attached to the secretariat.

Committee II was composed of Yodit Emeru (chairperson), Gétaḷäw Mäkaġa (deputy chairperson), Gétaḷäw Kebrät, Ayalew Mandäfro, Mängesté Dästa, Berhänu Bahta and Dr. Gäbrä-ḳadiq Dägäfu. They were to study the charters of both the Casablanca and Monrovia groups and work out a formula for the amalgamation of the two charters. This included consideration of African political unity, economic, social and cultural cooperation, and regional organizations.

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[65] *Ibid.*

[66] MoFA OAU38 32/2(210), Memorandum on the Program of Work and Work Assignment for the Coming Addis Ababa Conference of Heads of African and Malagasy States; Kätäma to Chairpersons of the Four Committees ï Yodit Emeru, Gétaḷäw Mäkaġa, Dr. Menasé Haylé and Ayele Moltotal: 5 September 1962. *Ethiopian Herald*, 3 May 1963.

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ed to prepare up-to-date studies on current African and international issues that were to be discussed at the summit. In light of this extended task, in addition to the chairman, Ayälä Moltotal, and the deputy chairman, Ayalew Mandäfro, twenty-one other members were assigned to the committee. African issues were divided into three major areas: dependent territories, neo-colonialism and apartheid and racial discrimination. The question of dependent territories was again subdivided into two branches. The first branch included Kenya, Zanzibar, the Central African Federation, Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, Spanish Sahara and Guinea, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, South West Africa and South Africa, Gambia and Mauritius; the second consisted of only French Somaliland. In the case of the latter, since the territory was considered an integral part of Ethiopia, a detailed study of the political, economic and ethnic problems involved and preparation of a statement on Ethiopiaôs position was required. This was intended to guarantee the adoption of resolutions by the upcoming summit. Under neo-colonialism, issues like the Congo, the European Common Market, military bases and economic assistance with unfavorable conditions were to be treated.[67]

Committee IV included Gétaḫäw Mäkaǧa (chairman), Zäwgä Wäldä-Maryam (deputy chairman), Märeôed Mängäǧa, Mäsfen Abäbä, Ayalew Mandäfro and Yoftahé Dimésos. They were to prepare an efficient and smooth running provisional secretariat for the duration of the Addis Ababa conference. It was the task of this committee to start correspondence with international organizations if necessary with a view to acquiring the necessity staff, i.e. simultaneous interpreters, précis-writers, typing pool etc., and submit the budget estimates necessary for the Provisional Secretariat.

[67] *Ibid.*

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re instructed to mobilize the entire qualified staff of the ministry to ensure a thorough preparation for the conference. The active participation of most, if not all, of the officials of the ministry in the work of the committees was sought after for the double advantage it provided: lightening the burden of the work as a whole and at the same time keeping the entire ministryôs staff *au courant* with the progress of the general preparation for the conference.[68]

The fourth committee had established a provisional secretariat with a program of work and work assignment for the forthcoming conference.[69] The secretariat had sixteen sections, each with various sub-committees. Dr. Täsfayé Gäberäzgi was brought from New York and made conference secretary-general. Under his office, there were two sub-branches: that of the legal advisor ï Täġomä Gäbrä-Maryam; and conference and committee secretaries ï Yodit Emeru, Ayälä Moltotal and Ayalćw Mandäfro. The secretary-general was responsible for all organizational and administrative work. Täġomä was to deal with all legal affairs at the time of the summit and also to consult Dr. Täsfayé on such cases. The secretaries had the task of running each session of the Addis Ababa meeting ï both conference and committee meetings.[70]

The painstaking efforts exerted to prepare the famous inaugural keynote address of Emperor Hayla-Selassie demonstrate the amount of energy and time the ministry applied to the May summit. Thirty-seven themes were singled out for inclusion in the speech, and

[68] MoFA OAU38 32/2(210), Memorandum on the Program of Work and Work Assignment for the coming Addis Ababa Conference of Heads Of African and Malagasy States.
[69] MoFA OAU1962ï 63 1963, Program of Work and Work Assignment for the Provisional Secretariat.
[70] *Ibid.*

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em into that moving and epoch-making speech.[71] The last draft was edited by the Acting Foreign Minister, Kätäma, himself.

The Ethiopian delegation to the conference was notified of all the potential challenges and setbacks they might encounter in the forthcoming meeting. They were instructed to play an important role in harmonizing and reconciling African points of view toward a common goal ï i.e. unity.[72] In addition, Ethiopian ambassadors in Africa, Europe and Asia were summoned on special errand and were assigned to each African head of state and government as assistants.[73]

A special security unit was established under the overall command of Major Gen. Deräsé Dubalä and his assistant Col. Bäräkät Gäbrä-Mädhen. Brig. Gen. Tadäsä Gäbré was made responsible for clandestine surveillance. This included a close follow up on those who were suspected to harbor aversion towards African leaders, strategic sites in the town, including the airport, assigning mobile and permanent guards etc. President Tubman created the first security problem. He decided to fly to Djibouti, and thence by train to Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian forces had to put the entire rail line under surveillance throughout the length of the conference. [74]

Ethiopia completed its preparations for the conference well ahead of schedule and began to await the commencement of the largest African meeting of all time. In Kätämaôs words, óAfrica cannot afford to fail in the forthcoming Summit Conference to be held in Addis Ababa.ô[75]

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[71] *Ibid*, Drafts no. 4 & 6.
[72] *Ibid*, Two Working Papers For Use by the Ethiopian Delegation only.
[73] MoFA OAU38 32/1 (209).
[74] MoFA OAU1962ï 63 1963, Program on Security Measures.
[75] *Ethiopian Herald*, 3 May 1963.

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On 15 May, thirty-two African foreign ministers began a six-day meeting to lay the groundwork for the Heads of State Conference. On the first day, the ministers appointed officials who would coordinate the activities of the conference. Kätäma Yifru was nominated for the chairmanship by Guineaôs Foreign Minister, Beavogui Louis Lansana, and his nomination was seconded by Jaja Anucha Wachuku of Nigeria. Similarly, Dr. Täsfayé Gäberäzgi was nominated for the post of Secretary General by Tunisiaôs Foreign Minister, Mongi Slim. Both nominations were unanimously approved.[76]

The acting foreign minister of Ethiopia reminded his colleagues of what had brought them together, i.e. ćthe quest for African unity and the search for the solutions to the problems which trouble our continent todayô.[77] Kätäma remarked that they were facing great responsibilities and great challenges, but, at the same time, never before had the opportunity been so great to reach agreement on matters of common interest and to translate these agreements into reality. The minister warned that the time they had before them was short and it should not be wasted in idle or useless discussion of matters that would not make a real contribution to the achievement of the unity of Africa and the solution of mutual problems. He went on:

> It is essential that in the days ahead we are guided by this fundamental principle: seek the course to African unity. We can agree on positive steps; let us do so. Each step takes us just that much nearer our goal and make the next step that much the easier to take. Our views are identical on many matters. The areas in which African states can decide today to coordinate their activities include virtually every aspect of their national and international life. If we begin from these premises and work together in good will, Africa will prove that her ultimate union is possible and that we

[76] *Ibid*, 16 May 1963. The fourteen-man Ethiopian delegation to the conference of Foreign Ministers included, other than Kätäma and Dr. Täsfayé, Gäbrä-Mäsqäl Kefläzgi (Minister of State for Education), Mamo Tadäsä (Minister of State in the Office of the Prime Minister) and twelve other delegates and alternate delegates.

[77] MoFA OAU1963 1963A, Remark made by H.E. *Ato* Kätäma Yifru upon Being Elected Chairman of the Conference: 15 May 1963.

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of the increasingly important role which we are é .[78]

The conference devoted the second day to completion of the provisional agenda submitted by Ethiopia and it accepted it as a working basis.[79] The Ethiopian agenda called for the establishment of an Organization of African States, the formulation of a common charter and the setting up of a permanent secretariat to carry on and implement decisions of African conferences. It also suggested cooperation in the economic and social, educational and cultural areas as well as in the creation of a collective defense system.[80] On the third day of their deliberations, the Foreign Ministers split into two committees to continue discussions on the draft agenda submitted by Ethiopia.[81] Committee One, chaired by Senegal with Algeria as the rapporteur, studied the questions of the establishment of an Organization of African States, cooperation in specific areas of African endeavor, the effect of regional economic groupings in African economic development, disarmament and the establishment of a permanent conciliation commission.

Various amendments were made to the Ethiopian draft agenda.[82] Maliôs proposed amendment added to the possible fields of active cooperation in the technical, scientific and security fields. Regarding organized and continued support for nationalist movements, Sudanôs proposal suggested the creation of a liberation fund and the provision of facilities for military training for African freedom fighters. Effective boycott of South Africa, support for Mozambique and Angola, regional cooperation in the

[78] *Ibid*.
[79] Cervenka, *OAU and Its Charter*, 4.
[80] MoFA OAU38 21/2(210); Makonnen Ketema, Creation of the OAU.
[81] *Ibid*, 18 May 1963; Cervenka, *OAU and Its Charter*, 4.
[82] *Ethiopian Herald*, 18 May 1963.

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fields as well as the creation of a permanent secretariat were other issues suggested for discussion by the Sudanese proposal.

Ivory Coastôs amendment to the draft agenda was related to the problem of peace. While leaving the rest of the Ethiopian agenda unchanged, Ivory Coastôs proposal listed decolonization and the settlement of disputes as problems affecting peace. Ghana tabled the strongest of all proposals. It made the amendment through the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nkrumah has proposed that the following points be adopted as items of the agenda: creation of a political union of African states, headquarters of the organization of the union of African states and decolonization in Africa.[83]

On 17 May, the MoFA saw it opportune to release the proposed Ethiopian charter for the Organization of African States. The draft charter outlined, *inter alia*, the purposes, principles, membership, rights and duties of member states of the organization, and pointed out the need to respect the rights of others and called for the pacific settlement of disputes.

The two committees set up by the foreign ministers were further divided into four sub-committees, and they studied questions related to the proposed charter for the Organization of African States, decolonization, apartheid and racial discrimination and disarmament. In particular, the draft resolution prepared by the sub-committee of the second committee on the question of apartheid and racial discrimination called for the creation of a fund for financial assistance to the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, military training of guerrilla fighters there, and supported the recommendation of the

[83] *Ibid.*

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N on the political situation that had prevailed in that territory.

Furthermore, the draft resolution demanded the immediate release of Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners and detainees, recommended the granting of scholarships and other educational facilities to South African refugees, condemned all form of racial discrimination, and suggested concerted action against the Union Government of South Africa etc. This document was unanimously adopted by the Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government without any major change.[85]

Nevertheless, even though the Ethiopian draft charter had been adopted as a basis of discussion, the foreign ministersô conference failed to formulate a single charter scheme for the proposed inter-African organization. The chairman of committee one, the Senegalese Doudou Thiam, commented to the press that the existing charters, those of Lagos and Casablanca, were to be taken into account and suggestions and recommendations from member states had to be considered in preparing a final draft of the charter. Thiam explained, ćthe single charter scheme to be adopted will be studied further by a foreign ministersô meeting to be held at some later date for the purpose. The Heads of State could, however, decide otherwise.ô[86] If this line of action had been followed by the Summit conference later, Cervenka argued, ćthe establishment of the OAU would have been delayed for at least one yearô.[87]

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[84] *Ethiopian Herald*, 19 May 1963.
[85] Cervenka, *OAU and Its Charter*, 4ï 5.
[86] *Ethiopian Herald*, 21 May 1963, 22 May 1963; for detail, see below.
[87] Cervenka, *OAU and Its Charter,* 4; John Woronoff, *Organizing African Unity* (New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1970), 127ï 128.

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ces that the African Summit convened. African leaders and nations were at odds with each other, and they had professed different attitudes towards continental unity. To add to these complications, the Moroccan delegation issued a communiqué whereby it stated that because of the presence of Mauritania ï which the former claimed to be part of its territory ï King Hassan would not attend the conference.[88]

Emperor Hayla-Selassieôs keynote inaugural address to the Heads of State Meeting foresaw such complications. He urged them to adopt the proposal for a single charter, permanent secretariat and African bank and university. Furthermore, Africans were requested to sacrifice their differences for the sake of common interests:

> This conference cannot close without adopting a single African Charter. We cannot leave here without having created a single African organization possessed of the attributes we have discussed. If we fail in this, we will have shirked our responsibility to Africa and to the people we lead. If we succeed, then, and only then, will we have justified our presence hereé .[89]

A stratagem the emperor employed to smooth out personal rivalries among African leaders is worth mentioning here. So as not to give room for untoward clashes outside the conference hall, Hayla-Selassie arranged state receptions day and night throughout the period of the conference. As an Egyptian reporter observed, ótit was at these informal gatherings that understandings were reached and most of the work had been doneô.[90] For example, ideological gaps and rifts between Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and Modibo Keita of Mali, Sekou Touré and Kwame Nkrumah (over the situation in Togo), Ben Bellah of Algeria and Habib Bourgiba of Tunisia and the delegates of King Hassan

[88] *Ethiopian Herald*, 18 May 1963.
[89] For the whole speech, see *Ethiopian Herald*, 23 May 1963.
[90] MoFA OAU1963 1963(d-e), cited in Col. Yergu Endaylalu to Kätäma: 16 August 1963.

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ar Daddah of Mauritania were temporarily bridged. Each were seen exchanging ideas and in apparently jovial company of the other.[91]

This state of affairs exceeded the expectations of outsiders. For instance, Soviet journalists had reportedly commented that to imagine the Addis Ababa Summit would succeed was tantamount to saying the US would reach the moon before Russia; the French had claimed that their ex-colonies would see to it that the conference should fail; and the American magazines, *Time* and *Newsweek*, had launched successive articles that were intended to discredit the Ghanaian President.[92] Nevertheless, what had come to pass in the conference room in May 1963 was completely different.

5.2. The Charter of African Unity

5.2.1. The process of drafting the document

Historical analysis of developments in the early 1960s demonstrates variations in the Pan-African conception of unity. The period witnessed ideological differences over the meaning, rationale and importance of unity. For example, some, represented by Nkrumah, demanded a political union of the continent under an All-African Union Government modeled after the constitutional arrangements of the United States and USSR.[93] Others advocated the necessity for stabilizing economic cooperation among African states first for meaningful political unity to take effect.[94] Ethiopia, Nigeria and East African nations favored this latter approach. Such divergent positions and the resultant interpretations were manifested later in the struggle to establish the OAU. One scholar attributed the rift among Africans in the 1950s and early 1960s for the lack of

[91] *Ibid*. Informants: Ambassadors Mängisté Dästa, Yodit Emeru, and Ayälä Moltotal.
[92] *Ibid*; Cervenka, *OAU and Its Charter,* 6
[93] Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (2nd ed.) (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 172 ï 173; Cervenka, *OAU and Its Charter*, 2 ï 3.
[94] Cervenka, *OAU and Its Charter*, 2 ï 3.

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e and no clear intellectual hierarchyô in the Pan-African movement.

The ósentiment for unityô had initially assumed the form of regional cooperation than steadfast adherence to continental integration.[96] Inter-governmental associations in West, North and East Africa, like the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, PAFMECSA etc, were often lauded as manifestations of African unity. Even Nkrumah, after elaborating some attempts at unification in West Africa, claimed that they were positive indicators of the ultimate objective.[97] Eventually these regional associations gave way to cross continental blocs like the Monrovia and Casablanca groups.

Complications that arose following the independence of African states between 1960 and 1964 gradually forced Pan-Africanism to set aside the quest for continental political integration and assume a more órealistic school of unityô, i.e. a commitment to the cause of liberation and functional approach towards integration.[98] Scholars argue that this was facilitated by the development of norms in the African system, application of the rule of compromise and mainly through pressurizing all opposition factions ï i.e. the ódd man outô principle.[99] Some of the norms mentioned were: the predominance of national independence over continental unity, non-intervention in the internal affairs of others, the sanctity of boundaries and neutralism and non-alignment.

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[95] Wallerstein, *Africa: The Politics of Unity*, 235.
[96] *Ibid*, pp. 111 ï 112.
[97] Nkrumah, 141 ï 148; Wallerstein, 111 ï 112.
[98] Woronoff, 136; Kodjo and Chanaiwa, 748.
[99] W. Scott Thompson and I. William Zartman, ñThe Development of Norms in the African System,ò *The OAU After Ten Years*. Yassin El-Ayouty (ed.) (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975): 4 ï 7; Clyde Sanger, ñToward Unity in Africa,ò *Foreign Affairs: An African Quarterly Review*. 42, 2 (1964): 269, 273 ï 274; Wallerstein, *Africa…,* 66 ï 67.

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l to forge some sort of continental unity in May 1963, whereby for the first time the ideals of Pan-Africanism were translated into practice.[100] A brief survey of the process of promulgation of the Charter that became the basis of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) would exemplify the role Imperial Ethiopia played in the creation of this continental organization.

Independent Africa saw two charters before it came to accept the Charter of the OAU. These were the African Charter of Casablanca and the Charter of Inter African and Malagasy States Organization. The first was formulated by heads of state of the Casablanca group ï Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and the Algerian exile National Liberation Front (FLN) ï at their first meeting in Casablanca, Morocco (3 to 7 January 1961).[101] It envisaged steps that were aimed at the óconsolidation of liberty in Africa and building up its unity and securityô. Accordingly, the charter provided for the creation of an African consultative assembly, composed of the representatives of every state, having a permanent seat and holding periodical sessions. The second stated the need for creating four committees: the African Political Committee, (comprising heads of state, or their duly accredited representatives); the Economic Committee; the African Cultural Committee; and a Joint African High Command of the chiefs of staff that would ensure the common defense of Africa in case of aggression against any part of the continent.

The third motion provided for the creation of a liaison office for establishing effective cooperation among the different organizations mentioned above; and particularly for the holding within three months of a meeting of experts charged with defending the practical

[100] Ḷervenka, *OAU and Its Charter*, 47; Ukpabi, 44.
[101] Kloman Jr., 123. Libya then afterwards removed itself from this group to join the Monrovia bloc. Kloman gives a better analysis of the purpose of the conference.

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ioning of the organization in question.[102] The Monrovia group, on the other hand, adopted the document originally presented at the Lagos Conference of January 1962; this was later approved and renamed Charter of Inter African and Malagasy States Organization. This one as well provided for an assembly of heads of state and government, a council of ministers and a general secretariat. [103]

Ethiopia had taken part in all the Monrovia group ministerial meetings to review the draft charter for an organization of African states. The foreign ministers finally assembled in December 1962 to sign the charter that was first drafted at the summit meeting in Lagos the previous January.[104] Kätäma Yifru explained after signing the document that the charter was originally planned to be signed at the May Summit in Addis Ababa, but as some African countries did not participate in the Lagos deliberations, a decision was reached to sign the document at the foreign ministers level.[105] According to Kätäma, the Heads of State would be presented with two charters from which they were expected to compile one document. The Casablanca and Monrovia Charters were expected to serve as working papers which would give birth to the African charter, Kätäma explained.[106]

In the meantime, the MoFA had established a committee that would study both documents and work out a formula for the amalgamation of the two charters. On the first day of its deliberations, the second committee reorganized three task groups: Gétaḷäw Kebrät and Dr. Gäbrä-ḳadiq were assigned to assess the Casablanca and Monrovia

[102] *Ibid*.
[103] MoFA OAU1962 ï 63 1962, Lagos Conference of Heads of African and Malagasy States and Governments, Proposed Charter of Inter African and Malagasy States Organization; Kloman Jr., pp. 129 ï 130. MOFA OAU1962 ï 63 1962, Resolution on the Proposed Charter of Inter African and Malagasy States Organization.
[104] *Ibid*, 18 December 1962.
[105] *Ibid*, 29 December 1962.
[106] *Ibid*.

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ängesté and Berhänu were to consider the viability of African political unity, economic, social and cultural cooperation and regional organization; and Yodit and Ayalew were made responsible for gathering documents that were found in the UN and press departments, and to make them available for study.[107] All the background papers on the Monrovia group were found in the ministry, but none that dealt with the Casablanca group were located. So the committee demanded that the African department should collect them through Ethiopian embassies in Accra and Cairo.

Members of the committee understood from the beginning how difficult it was to reconcile the two charters. They were especially troubled by the position Ethiopia had to take in the situation for it was party to all Monrovia conferences and did not participate in any of the Casablanca meetings. However, the committee sought solace in the fact that the country had attended all non-aligned states conferences irrespective of group ideologies. The objective of the Addis Ababa Summit by itself posed a challenge. On the one hand, the conference aimed at ratifying the Monrovia (Lagos) charter and to bridge the gap between the two blocs and forge a common front. The committee had to take into consideration such irreconcilable ideas in tackling the assignment.[108]

The committee had assembled at different times to discuss the matter. Two legal advisors, Täġomä Häylä-Maryam and Täġomä Gäbrä-Maryam, were additionally assigned to the committee to help in the analysis of the two charters. But the absence of substantial information on the Casablanca group hampered the activities of the

[107] MoFA OAU2 32/5, Report on the First Meeting of Committee II: 12 September 1962.
[108] *Ibid*. For Yodit and Gétaḷäw Kebrät were going abroad for a meeting, Gétaḷäw Mäkaġa was assigned to run the activities of the conference.

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uary 1963 that it finally managed to compile some sort of a report.

On 23 January, Dr. Gäbrä-ḳadiq presented to the committee a study entitled óA Comparative Study of the Casablanca and Lagos Chartersô.[110] His research described the interest of the two groups in African unity, socio-cultural and economic betterment of the life of the peoples, and a desire to create effective form of cooperation among the nations as binding factors. Similarly, three basic points of divergence were also cited. These were, according to the study: adoption of the principle of non-alignment as a means of reinforcement of peace in the world, discouragement of stationing foreign troops and the establishment of military bases and the emancipation of African continent from political and economic interventions and pressures.[111] On these issues, the Casablanca group assumed a radical position whereby the continent should be free from all forms of foreign intervention and member states should stand firmly against neo-colonialism. The Monrovia group preferred a compromising approach regarding these issues.

After lengthy discussions, the second committee issued five observations.[112] First, it was difficult to reconcile the two charters for they were basically different in spirit and form. Second, Ethiopia should present to the Addis Ababa summit a proposal that would demand a promulgation of a new charter. This would effectively avoid the ideological differences among the two groups and would be a basis for African unity. The upcoming summit was also to create a committee that would study the issue in detail. Third, the heads of state had to authorize the formation of a special consultative committee that

[109] *Ibid*, Gétaḷäw Mäkaġa to Yodit: 26 November 1962, 10 December 1962, 23 January 1963.
[110] *Ibid*, Report on the Second Committee, Yodit to Kätäma: 31 January1963. His companion, Täġomä Gäbrä-Maryam failed to present his assignment.
[111] *Ibid.*
[112] *Ibid.*

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ging the gap between the two blocs. Besides, in order to realize African unity, the Casablanca nations had to nullify their charter, and Ethiopia had to persuade the Monrovia group to follow suit.[113]

Fourth, Ethiopia had to secure its national interest in political and economic fields in the process. The committee advised that if Ethiopia would advocate the principle of strengthening regional organizations, like African Common Service Organization, as the objective of continental unity, it would guarantee the countryôs economic gains. In the political fields, Ethiopia had to promote principles like non-intervention in internal affairs of others, territorial integrity and unanimity. The report stressed that every decision on the territorial sovereignty of an African state should be reached only unanimously.[114] Fifth, the whole issue had to be left to the heads of state to decide.

It was then that Gétaḷäw Mäkagga raised the idea of Ethiopia preparing a draft charter.[115] Ethiopiaôs role should not be limited to proposing the issue to the summit conference, he argued, but it had to take the initiative. The acting foreign minister immediately accepted the proposal and rushed the second committee to formulate a draft within a week.[116] The minister specially demanded the inclusion of the principles stated in the fourth item of the above recommendation. Members of the committee accepted the assignment with the understanding that in case the heads of state decided on the necessity of a new charter, Ethiopia should be ready in advance. On 18 March, the second committee designated Gétaḷäw Kebrät, a legal advisor in the MoFA, to prepare a draft

[113] The committee specially stressed on the role Ethiopia had to play in convincing the Monrovia group since it had signed the Lagos Charter.
[114] They justified this claim citing the working system of the UN in boundary conflicts whereby any debate was basically to be solved by the two parties themselves.
[115] *Ibid*, Gétaḷäw to Yodit: 7 March 1963.
[116] *Ibid*, Kätäma to Yodit: 27 March 1963.

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d presented on 3 April. After some discussions, the committee passed the document to higher authorities for further study.[117]

By order of the Ministry of Pen, a committee was created to study the draft charter of the Organization of African States prepared by the MoFA. It was requested, in the absence of a specific term of reference, to review, revise and on the whole redraft the charter.[118] The committee started its deliberations by hearing Gétaḷäwôs explanations on the fundamental principles that served as a point of departure to the MoFA while preparing the original document. Of these guiding principles, the principal was the desire on the part of Ethiopia to bring together all the independent African states to stand for a common goal in the interest of the peoples of Africa. The report elaborated that even though the thirty-two independent states were unhappily divided into two major camps, each having its own charter, their division had served only the interests of colonialism or neo-colonialism. Therefore, in the interest of Africa as a whole, these states should close their ranks to maintain their hard won independence and to improve the lot of the African people.[119] The draft charter of the MoFA was said to have been prepared with this objective in mind and strove to reflect the views of the two major camps.

The report stressed that since the Monrovia group embraces more members than the Casablanca one, any compromise charter was bound to reflect more the points of view of the former group. But this did not mean that the views of the Casablanca group were not given due consideration; on the contrary, to be a compromise charter, their views had to

[117] *Ibid*, Yodit to Kätäma: 8 April 1963.
[118] MoFA OAU1962 ï 63 1963, Report on the Draft Charter of the Organization of African States, Seyoum Harägot to MoFA: 7 May 1963. The committee included Seyoum Harägot (chairman), Gétaḷäw Kebrät, Bäräkät-Ab Häbtä-Selasé, Mohammed Abdul Rahman and Täġomä Gäbrä-Maryam (Attorney General). Täfära Awäqä from the Office of the Prime Minister attended the meetings as Secretary.
[119] *Ibid.*

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ermore, Ethiopia being signatory of the Charter of the Organization of Inter-African and Malagasy States, it would had been very difficult at that stage to abandon wholly its original stand. The report admitted the very fact that Ethiopiaôs being a signatory of the Lagos Charter complicated the task of bringing the two groups closer than it would had been otherwise.

The second guiding principle was that the draft should be not only a compromise document, ójust for the sake of compromiseô, but that it should reflect Ethiopiaôs point of view on how best African states could be brought together. Moreover, it should be exploited so as to óto safeguard the basic interests of Ethiopia in its inter-African relationsô.[120]

The committee found the draft of the MoFA similar to that of the Lagos Charter in terms of form and presentation, and chose to adopt the same style of presentation. The members were of the opinion that, whereas the Casablanca Charter was a declaration of unity of mind with the establishment of some sort of óvagueô organization, the Lagos Charter was a more complete document with a proper definition of the purpose and the establishment of definite organs to execute their policies. Besides, the members of the committee did agree that the term óMalagasyô had to be deleted. If the Malagasy Republic had the desire to be called an African state, the report argued, then the choice of joining or not the inter-African states organization should be left to the republic.[121]

With these two basic principles and additional remarks, the committee continued to examine and analyze the preamble and each and every article of the draft with a comparative study of the two existing charters.

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[120] *Ibid.*
[121] *Ibid.*

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ade to the preamble of the draft charter prepared by the MoFA. To the first - owe, the Heads of African states and Governments, Inspired by a common determination to promote understanding and collaboration among our states in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brotherhood and solidarity in a large unityô - was added a phrase ótranscending ethnic and national differencesô. The addition was designed to clarify in a more definite term that the aspirations of African states for large unity had to overcome narrow tribal, ethnic and other restrictive identities. The basis of inter-African quarrels had most of the time been, the report observed, a claim by one state of the territory of its neighbor on the basis of tribal or ethnic grouping. The Ethio-Somalia conflict over the Ogaden was cited as a major example.[122]

The phrase, óand to resist neo-colonialism in all its forms including political and economic intervention and pressuresô, was added to the third paragraph of the preamble for two main reasons. First, to convince the Casablanca group into accepting the new charter, for theirs had emphasized the need to liquidate not only colonialism but also neo-colonialism, and to rid the African continent of political and economic intervention. The committee, however, assumed that this óless vehement and more sober phraseologyô would be acceptable to the two groups. Second, one of the many tasks of the proposed organization was to protect the independent African states against the encroachment of colonialism under a different guise and to ascertain that the independence is real and with substance.

The addition at the end of paragraph six of the phrase óthrough the triumph of liberty and the achievement of unityô was similarly intended to reflect some of the ideas of the

[122] *Ibid.*

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re, ó to promote a better life in Africaô, liberty had to be given to those who were still dependent and there had to be unity among them to achieve it, the report argued.[123]

In the first article of the draft charter that described the purposes of the continental organization two changes were made. One was an addition of a second purpose ï ó to accelerate the total emancipation of the remaining dependent territories of Africaô. The report claimed that this purpose did emanate directly from the preamble: to eradicate colonialism from the African continent. Even though it could be argued that the first purpose ó to promote a better life é ô was all-embracing and included the purpose under discussion, the committee had felt strongly that colonialism in Africa was still one of the outstanding problems Africans had to eradicate, and, therefore, this purpose had to be stated in unequivocal terms. Besides, it was a purpose to which both major camps in Africa were dedicated.

In the clause that provided for the principles of the inter-African organization (Article II, Para. b of the draft renumbered as Para. 2) ï ó non-interference in the ñinternal and externalò affairs of statesô ï the words óinternal and externalô were deleted and replaced by ódomesticô. Members of the committee argued that to say African states should not interfere in the óexternal affairsô of other African states ó is tantamount to killing a child, which one wishes to be born, even before it is finishedô. Any state not wishing discussion by the Organization of any question affecting its interest adversely ï or even, for that matter, just for the sake of being obstructionist ï could successfully do so by labeling almost anything as falling within its external affairs. Furthermore, the argument went on,

[123] *Ibid.*

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d charter, a state had a duty to refrain from any subversive activity against neighboring or other states. Whenever the Organization is called upon to condemn a state that violates this duty, such state could, with impunity, claim that this would be an interference in its external affairs.[124]

Therefore, according to the report, the majority of the members of the committee suggested the term ódomesticô be inserted. They did admit that the meaning of this word is not definite and had created a great deal of óbickering squabblesô at the UN. Nevertheless, such a vague term appeared preferable if the Organization was going to be the success that those who had conceived it wished it to be.

However, Getachew Kebrät strongly resisted the change of words. He argued that the word óexternalô was purposely included to mean any dispute that might arise between Ethiopia and Somalia with respect to the Ogaden. If the Organization was going to consider such dispute, Ethiopia could claim that this falls within its óexternal affairsô. But other members of the committee rejected his reasoning claiming that the interest of Ethiopia in this respect was adequately protected.

For instance, Paragraph 3 of Article II did provide for the adoption of the principle for the respect ófor the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each stateô; under Article V the Organization was prohibited from discussion of any matter that may violate this principle; and under paragraph 2 of Article IX a vote of unanimity was required if a dispute would arise as to whether a matter falls or not within Article V. All of them were deemed adequate protections to the vital interests of Ethiopia.

[124] *Ibid.*

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Rights and Duties of Member states (Article V) prohibited the Organization from intervening in matters within the jurisdiction of any member state. However, members of the committee argued that the article as it stood was very narrow in scope ï it was intended to prohibit the Organization from intervening in only one of the three principles contained in Article II [i.e., the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of member state]. The members of the committee found no valid reason why such a distinction was drawn. They claimed that the principles of Article II were of the same importance and, therefore, any prohibition should apply equally to all. Thus a change was introduced whereby the article would have a wider scope and coverage.[125]

The issue of 'unanimity' was one of the areas of contention within the committee. The draft of the MoFA (Article IX) included a provision to the effect that all matters of importance should be decided by unanimity, and whether a matter was important or not should equally be decided by unanimity. According to Gétaḷäw Kebrät, his ministry, as a matter of policy, had decided to stipulate unanimity. He stated that the notion of unanimity was of utmost importance to Ethiopia with respect to the Ogaden.

Some members of the committee opposed the idea on the ground that its inclusion would make the proposed organization inefficient. Other members supported unanimity on grounds different from those of Gétaḷäw. They felt that it would make member states more serious in their understandings of decisions and resolutions they would be adopting. As a result, member states would not venture into useless resolutions, and perhaps more importantly, unanimity would tend to reduce the passage of resolutions just for propaganda effect.

[125] the phrase ó é may violate the principles stated in Article II here of é ô was inserted to this effect.

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the main fears of the MoFA, it was agreed that if the organization could be prohibited under Article V to discuss matters that may violate the principles contained in Article II, and if, further, unanimity was required for the decision of whether a matter falls or not within Article V, it could be said that all protective measures were taken and it would be useless to require unanimity for any other matters. Therefore, according to the report, to press for unanimity in the face of this ample protection 'could be nothing more than to have a blind belief in unanimity'. Gétaḷ äw, of course, maintained his position and could not be convinced by the above arguments.

So paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article IX were rephrased. Paragraph 2 came to read as follows: 'Whether a matter falls or does not fall within Article V hereof shall be determined by unanimity or otherwise by mutual agreement of all the Member States.' Paragraph 3 became: 'The High Contracting Parties agree that the Assembly shall, subject to the provision of Para. 2 of this Article IX, reach decisions on all matters, including resolutions to hold extraordinary sessions of the Assembly, by a four-fifths (4/5^{ths}) majority vote of those present and voting ....'[126]

Similarly, some change was applied to Article XI. The draft of the MoFA had required that the decision of the council of ministers be reached by unanimity. The committee felt that since the responsibilities of the council (under Article IX) was restricted only to areas of cooperation stated in Article I, it was unnecessary to make the work of that council cumbersome and rigid. It was, therefore, decided to replace the word ácunanimityô by the phrase áthree-fourths (3/4^{ths}) majority vote of all the membersâ[127]

[126] it also provided that questions of procedure required two-thirds (2/3^{rds}) majority; three-fifths (3/5^{ths}) of the total membership of the Organization formed a quorum at any meeting of the Assembly; and the Assembly was empowered to determine its own rules of procedure.
[127] *Ibid.*

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n the Transitional Provision (Article XXXI) was also completely changed. The draft of the MoFA included an article which was designed to empower a state to make a written declaration expressing its decision to withdraw from the Charter of Inter African and Malagasy States or from the Casablanca Charter, which ever was the case. This declaration was to be made either after ratification or before the entry into force of the proposed charter. Nevertheless, the members of the committee voiced the view that this did not go far enough to achieve what was required by those who had conceived the Addis Ababa summit conference and the proposed charter. According to the report, the proposed charter was attempting to bring together the two groups into one solid and unified body, and if it was to succeed in this attempt, it had to require signatory states to withdraw from their respective charters; and upon the entry into force of the proposed charter, the other two organizations had to be considered, *ipso facto*, as nonexistent and their property should devolve to the new organization.

The report claimed that this article was perhaps one of the most important in the sense that it endeavored to do away with the two charters and bring all the African states into one organization. Each state had to withdraw unequivocally from its respective charters in accordance with the procedure laid down by that charter; at the same time, this proposed charter had to put an obligation upon signatory states to do so and not give the choice of withdrawing or not.[128]

[128] Para. 1 and 2 of the revised Article XXXI reads: óAny African State, Participant of the Addis Ababa Conference upon its signature of the present Charter shall thereby be deemed to have agreed to withdraw from the Charter of Inter-African and Malagasy States and the Charter of Casablanca, whichever is the caseô, and óThe present Charter upon its entry into force pursuant to the provision of Article XXX hereof, shall supersede the Charter of Inter- African and Malagasy States and the Charter of Casablanca whose respective assets shall then be automatically vested in the Organization and established by the present Charterô, respectively.

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ere made on the Miscellaneous (Article XXXII) that deals with the admission of new members to the proposed organization. The draft prepared by the MoFA provided for the admission of new states, and these new states were defined as óindependent sovereign states in Africa under indigenous African ruleô. Presumably, this was so defined as to exclude any possibility of the Union of South Africa, or similar countries, applying for membership to the organization. However, the committee felt that the definition followed the Lagos Charter and might offend the Arab states of the Casablanca group. Therefore, the members agreed to use instead the phrase óindependent sovereign African statesô. The word óAfricanô, according to the report, connotes more a racial affiliation rather than geographical situation.

Secondly, the MoFA draft required four-fifths (4/5^{ths}) majority for the admission of a state, the decision to be reached at by the council of ministers within six months after receipt of communication from the secretary-general. The committee was of the opinion that the requirement of the four-fifths majority was too high and that the council of ministers should not be required to meet every time there is an application for membership. So the revised paragraph stated that admission had to be determined by óa majority vote of all the Member States. The decision of each Member State shall be transmitted to the Secretary-General, who shall, upon receipt of the required number of votes, communicate the decision to the States concernedô.[129]

These were some of the major amendments the committee made to the draft charter. Ethiopiaôs delegation to the forthcoming summit conference was instructed not to reveal the existence of such a document until authorized to do so. The reason given was that it

[129] *Ibid.*

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rom the Monrovia group, whose charter Ethiopia had signed. It was at the third day of the Foreign Ministersô meeting that Ethiopia finally tabled what it had prepared to be adopted as a basis of discussion for a new charter of African unity.

5.2.2. Adoption and Ratification

The First Committee, whose task had been to prepare a single charter for the summit conference, was further divided, on the proposal of Dahomey, into two sub-committees. The first sub-committee consisted of Algeria, Cameron, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Nigeria, Tanganyika and Tunisia. They were expected to issue a proposed charter for the Organization of African States and to choose from the documents presented by Ethiopia and the Lagos and Casablanca groups.[131] The sub-committee had met on 17 and 18 May.

A fierce competition occurred on the issue of which draft charter should be taken as a basis for discussion. One group, led by Nigeria, claimed that both the Lagos and Casablanca Charters should be adopted. Accordingly, the sub-committee had to make a comparative analysis of the two charters and find a way to merge them. Ethiopiaôs delegates, on the other hand, wanted to use Ethiopiaôs proposal as a basis of discussion.[132]

After some heated argument, the chairman of the sub-committee decided to use Ethiopiaôs draft emphasizing the point that the purpose of the conference was to start

[130] MoFA OAU1962 ï 63 1963, Working Paper on the May Summit, To be Used by the Ethiopian Delegation Only, no date.
[131] MoFA OAU86 ï D6 1966(B), Proceeding of the Summit Conference of Independent African States Verbatim Record, Preparatory Conference of Foreign Ministers Fifth Meeting, p. 2. Also see Michael Wolfers, *Politics in the OAU* (London: Methuen and co. Ltd., 1976), 4ï 5. Wolfers stands rare among scholars in his use of archival materials for reconstruction of the activities of the African Summit Conference in May 1963, specially the one related to the First Committee that was studying the charter for the proposed organization.
[132] *Ibid*; Wolfers, *Politics in the OAU,* 5 ï 6.

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a representatives of blocs or groups. We have come here inspired by good will to build African unity. This unity will not be built of Casablanca, nor on the basis of Monrovia, nor on the basis of Lagos é .ô, the chairman argued. The delegate of Guinea advanced a similar view: ót was wrong for the sub-committee to take the element of division in Africa to construct unityô.[133]

Even the debate on the Ethiopian draft charter was unnecessarily elaborate and extended. Ghanaôs delegate, Kojo Botsio, argued that it would be good to formulate a new document rather than endorsing the ópatch workô method employed by Ethiopia. Nigeria again voiced its complete refusal to accept Ethiopiaôs proposal. Under the circumstances, the sub-committee had to call for a vote, whereby the proposal of Nigeria and Ghana were ruled out in favor of Ethiopia (seven countries out of nine, the opposing two being Nigeria and Ghana).[134] Jaja Wachuku, Nigeriaôs Minister of External Affairs, had voiced an objection to the entire procedure. According to the minister, óhe had no mandate to prepare a new charter and his government had no knowledge that Ethiopia was withdrawing from [the Lagos Charter] and substituting another.ô[135] The Nigerian also accused Ethiopia of abandoning its commitment to the Lagos Charter. On these grounds, Wachuku strongly opposed the Ethiopian draft and urged the Ethiopian delegation to withdraw the document.[136]

Unable to reach a consensus, the sub-committee passed the issue to the main committee for decision. After further consideration, the First Committee assigned the representative of Algeria, the rapporteur of the committee, to take over the task of working

[133] Cited in Wolfers, *Politics in the OAU*, 7.
[134] *Ibid*, 7 ï 8.
[135] *Ibid*; also see the Verbatim Record of the fifth meeting of Foreign Ministers cited above.
[136] Wolfers, *Politics in the OAU,* 13.

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n to be submitted to the conference of heads of state. The assignment included assessment of the whole problem of the principle and structure of African Unity.[137] On 21 May, the Foreign Ministers convened to hear the report.

Algeriaôs report recommended the taking into consideration of the draft charter submitted by Ethiopia and suggested that the document be presented to all African governments for additional comments and amendments prior to a new conference of foreign ministers. The other documents ï the Charters of Casablanca and Lagos together with the draft of Nkrumah ï were among the texts to be likewise taken into consideration.[138] This draft recommendation of the First Committee was approved by representatives of Cameron, Tanganyika, Liberia, UAR, Nigeria and Senegal.

The Ethiopian delegation, after congratulating the rapporteur on his óclear and conciseô presentation, claimed that óthe report must, even if only briefly but nevertheless faithfully, reflect the discussions which have taken placeô.[139] For instance, he demanded the addition in Algeriaôs draft recommendation that read ó taking into account the debate as a whole the committee decided to assign to a sub-committee of nine members é the task of finding an agreed formulaôof the words ón the basis of the draft submitted by Ethiopiaôï for that was what the committee had decided in the first place. The Ethiopian delegation also rejected what the report had stated as a broad-based opposition to Ethiopiaôs draft in the First Committee on the basis that such refusals were only limited to certain

[137] MoFA OAU86 ï D6 1966 (B), Verbatim Record of the fifth meeting of Foreign Ministers, p. 2.
[138] *Ibid*, pp. 2 ï 3.

[139] *Ibid*, p. 8.

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d to replace the word órecommendsô by the phrase óto accept in principle as basis for discussionô.[140]

At the end of the day, however, the foreign ministers had failed to adopt a single draft charter that would be used as a basis of discussion for the heads of state conference. Their meeting was disbanded after reorganizing yet another committee consisting of the chairmen of the two committees, the foreign minister of Sierra Leone, the secretary-general and the chairman of the conference. They were charged to draw up the agenda for the summit and also to draft the recommendations to be submitted to the heads of state and government.[141] In addition, the foreign ministers proposed to hold the forthcoming foreign ministers conference in Dakar within six months to discuss the question of the charter for African unity.[142]

In a concluding remark, the chairman of the conference, Kätäma Yifru, thanked all the delegations for the óspirit of fair play and compromiseô they had displayed throughout the meeting and declared that the work of ópreparing an agenda and recommendationsô to the summit was completed. Kätäma declared that the misunderstandings manifested at their conference were merely differences in approach and would not in any way interfere with the main objective, i.e. African unity. He expressed his wish that African unity would prevail in the forthcoming summit meeting and would turn the event into an historic conference.[143]

What the foreign ministers were unable to accomplish was rectified by the heads of state. Upon the insistence of Emperor Hayla-Selassie for some sort of practical action, the

[140] *Ibid.*
[141] *Ibid*, p. 19.
[142] *Ibid*, p. 23; Wolfers, *Politics in the OAU,* 15ï 16.
[143] *Ibid*, Verbatim Record, p. 28.

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posing a single draft scheme to a Special Commission of Foreign Ministers. This commission was the one that the final session of the preparatory conference had set up to draw the agenda for the summit conference.[144] This special commission met on 23 and 24 May and unanimously agreed to submit Ethiopiaôs draft charter as a basis of discussion for the summit conference.

On the morning of 25 May, the president of the sixth meeting of the Heads of State Conference called for deliberation on the Charter of the Organization of Independent African and Malagasy States. But, before the chairman of the Committee of Foreign Ministers, Kätäma Yifru, started to present the text of the charter, President Nkrumah intervened and strongly recommended for adjournment of the session for an hour so as to óread this thing through carefully é and understand what is said with some comprehensionô.[145]

Modibo Keita of Mali then proposed that they discuss first the special resolutions presented by the foreign ministers and then ósatisfy the wish expressed by the President of Ghanaô. Upon Nkrumahôs strong objection, Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, intervened and proposed that ófirst the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Ministersô make a succinct report to orient the Summit about the work of the Committeeô, and then they could suspend the meeting for an hour.[146] This was accepted.

Kätäma submitted for the approval and adoption of the heads of state and government the texts prepared earlier by the preliminary conference of foreign ministers and later reviewed by the special commission. These included the Special Committee Charter,

[144] *Ibid*, Proceeding of the Summit Conference of Independent African States, Verbatim Record of the Sixth Meeting, p.1. Also see, Wolfers, 19ï 20; Ţervenka, *OAU and Its Charter*, 26ï 27.
[145] Verbatim Record of the sixth meeting, p. 1. President Nkrumah claimed that he had just received the charter that morning.
[146] *Ibid.*

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n transition measures that will be annexed to the Charter and three final documents containing resolutions on decolonization, apartheid, general disarmament, economic problems and the UN and Africa.

Kätäma also mentioned in his report the reservations made by the representatives of the UAR, Tunisia, Libya and ôa few other delegationsô with respect to the articles dealing with the languages of the proposed organization.[147] Concluding his report, the Ethiopian minister assured African leaders of the cooperation and agreement of the foreign ministers and claimed that the documents were the result of ôlong discussions and compromiseô:

> All our meetings were conducted in a spirit of brotherhood and there were complete agreement on all decisions. If there were differences, these were limited to questions of procedure, approach or tactic, but never on substance or the destiny of our peoples. It is therefore my bounden duty to express my appreciation for the wisdom of the Foreign Ministers and to ask this august body, in the name of all our peoples, to adopt these measures formally and to sign your name in history. As his Imperial Majesty remarked at the outset of the conference, if we fail surely history will never forgive us, for it shall not give us another occasion.[148]

After suspension for an hour the Assembly started to review each and every article of the draft charter. Secretary-General of the Conference, Dr. Täsfayé Gäberäzgi, was assigned the arduous task of reading the document and taking notes throughout the long debate on the charter.[149] All in all, eight amendments were made to the Ethiopian draft charter.[150]

The first was the naming of the Organization (Art. I). The Ethiopian draft had used the name the Organization of African and Malagasy States. The President of Cameron

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[147] *Ibid*, p. 2.
[148] *Ibid.*
[149] the debate had continued up to 10 pm in the afternoon. At the beginning there was a question of procedure that demanded the discussion of agenda no. 1 ï ôadoption of draft resolutionsô. But finally the Assembly agreed to give precedence to the second agenda ï ôadoption of the text of the charterô.
[150] *Ibid*, pp. 8 ï 19; MoFA OAU1963 1963 (d ï e), Information on the 1963 Summit, Col. Yergu to Kätäma: 16 August 1963.

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r name for the proposed organization on the ground that abbreviations are very fashionableô. Julius Nyerere then proposed an óOrganization of African Independent Statesô. But, when Tsaranina of Madagascar insisted the word óMalagasyô be retained, the President of Central African Republic proposed the name óOrganization of African Islands and Statesô. After some discussion, Hubert Maga of Dahomey intervened: óMy dear friends, we are assembled here to discuss African Unity. Why not say ñOrganization of African Unityò. I believe that Madagascar has come here because it knew that we will establish African Unity.ô[151] However, Tsaranina still refused to agree.

Aklilu Habte-Wold reminded the heads of state how long they had spent on this issue and expressed his fear that, at this rate, it would be difficult to conclude the work in two days. He then appealed to the President of Madagascar to understand the point of view of each of them. Aklilu reassured the latter of the fact that no one wished to diminish the merits of the Malagasy people, of Madagascar and of its history. The Ethiopian prime minister demanded ón what way would it affect the Malagasy people if we were to say that Madagascar is part of the African continent?ô After citing the cases of England and Japan, which were part of Europe and Asia, respectively, Aklilu stated that, similarly, all the surrounding islands are also part of Africa. óI, therefore, would like to have a special article stipulate that Africa includes Madagascar and all surrounding islands. I appeal to the President of the Malagasy Republic to accept this proposal.ô[152]

Filibert Tsaranina, to the relief of all, did accept the proposal. As a result, Article I, Para. 1, was revised as: óThe Contracting Parties do by the present Charter establish an

[151] Verbatim Record of the sixth meeting, p. 8.
[152] *Ibid.*

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Organization of African Unityô A second paragraph was then added that stated: ôThe Organization shall include Madagascar and all other islands of Africa.ô

Third, the clause that provided for the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to convene every first or second year (Art. IX) was replaced by the phrase óat least once a yearô Fourth, the clause that provided for a two-third majority vote of those present and voting to pass a decision was amended. The new clause demanded a two-third majority of members of the organization. Similarly, the clause that required a two-third vote on whether or not a question is one of procedure was decided to be determined by a simple majority of all member states. Fifth, the draft proposal for all resolutions by the Council of Ministers to be determined by two-third majority vote of those attending (Article XIV) was similarly replaced by a simple majority of members of the council.

Sixth, the draft article that dealt with the Secretary General was also amended. The draft had proposed for the heads of state to appoint a secretary general who was recommended by the council of ministers. This was completely changed and the whole authority was vested on the assembly. Seventh, concerning the Commission for Mediation, Reconciliation and Arbitration, it was decided that the protocol for its mandates should be the prerogative of the assembly. The draft proposal demanded individual member states of the would-be organization to sign the mandates. And the eighth amendment had to do with Article XIX, which dealt with the working languages of the organization. Upon Nasserôs recommendation, African languages were to be used as much as possible as working languages and English and French were taken as additional mediums.

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ósmooth proceedingô of the Addis Ababa Conference. The first was the inclination among some of the heads of state and government to postpone the signing of the Charter to later times. Some of the participants, following the footsteps of their foreign ministers, demanded recession on the final day of the summit conference so as to deliberate on the tenets of the new document. Perceiving the danger of total loss of control on the matter once the delegates are disbanded, the Ethiopian delegation proposed that the private consultations should be held inside the hall. In what was considered one of the great diplomatic maneuvers so far employed, Emperor Hayla-Selassie personally approached all of the African leaders and persuaded them to remain in the conference room. He also ordered a huge banquet from the palace to impress them. This way the discussion continued till the signing ceremony at midnight on Saturday 25 May 1963.[153]

The second incident was the open confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia following the speech of Aden Abdulla Osman on 24 May 1963.[154] The president demanded the right of self-determination for the Somali population in Kenya, French Somaliland and Ethiopia. In spite of the attempts of the president of the session, Houphouet Boagny of Ivory Coast, and President Modibo Keita of Mali to cool down the

[153] Informants: Ambassador Mängesté Dästa and Ayälä Moltotal. They strongly contested Bereket Habte Selassieôs story that claimed to Nkrumahôs impending walkout and the imploring Hayla-Selassie advanced to Sekou Toure of Guinea to bring the Ghanaian back to the table. Given the clash between Nkrumah and Toure at the time on the Togo situation, itôs difficult to believe that they would listen to each other at this scale. See Bereket Habte Selassie, *The Crown and the Pen: The Memoirs of a Lawyer Turned Rebel* (Trenton, NJ and Asmara: The Red Sea Press Inc, 2007), 184-186. The accounts of Tekalign Gedamu, *Republicans on the Throne: a Personal Account of Ethiopia's Modernization and Painful Quest for Democracy* (Los Angeles, CA: Tsehai Publishers and Distributors, 2011), 78-80 equally referred to the night long debate on the final charter. He mentioned no attempts by any African head of state to walk out of the proceeding. See also Getachew, *Aklilu Remembersé* , 211.

[154] Cervenka, *OAU and Its Charter*, 13 ï 14; S.O. Agbi, *The Organization of African Unity and African Diplomacy, 1963-1979* (Ibadan, Nigeria: Impact Publishers, 1986), 20-36.

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Minister Aklilu insisted on Ethiopiaôs right to respond to Somaliaôs ainterference on its affairsô:

> é if we are to redraw the map of Africa on the basis of religion, race and language, I fear that many states will cease to exist. It is in the interest of all Africans today to respect the frontiers drawn on the maps, even though they were drawn by the former colonizers é .[155]

Even if the situation was hushed for the time being, the Ethio-Somali conflict continued to be the darkest spot in the countryôs engagement with the OAU. Emperor Hayla-Selassie, a person highly credited for his role in peaceful settlement of disputes in Africa, had failed to reach an agreement with Somalia on the territorial dispute over Ogaden.[156] Negussay Ayele characterized Ethio-Somalian relations and the Somali challenge as óa symbol of frustration and futilityô for the emperor in his mission for personal diplomacy in the continent; and as a result, the two countries had never moved an inch towards resolving the boundary problem. Nevertheless, according to Negussay, the emperor simultaneously succeeded in not losing óan inch of Ethiopian territoryôto the cause of Greater Somalia.[157]

In spite of the above setbacks, in a very special ceremony held at the Jubilee Palace on 25 May, thirty Heads of State and Government of Independent African States signed the Charter that formally established the OAU.[158] The Ethiopian Parliament ratified the Charter of African Unity on 5 June 1963.[159] By the time of the first meeting of the Council of Ministers in Dakar, Senegal (August 1963), more than two-third of the signatories of the Charter had done so.

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[155] Cited in Cervenka, *OAU and Its Charter*, 13ï 14.

[156] Miller, ñEthiopia and Inter Africané ò, 43ï 46.
[157] Negussay, ñForeign Policyé ò, 64 ï 67.
[158] Togo and Morocco signed the charter later in July and September 1963, respectively.
[159] *Ethiopian Herald*, 6 June 1963.

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ecretariat of the OAU

5.3.1. The Provisional Secretariat

The Coordinating Body and the Secretariat of the Informal Permanent Machinery at the UN were the first continental institutions designed to organize the activities of independent Africa. These organs had been set up in compliance with Resolution XI of the Accra CIAS of April 1958.[160] In early 1960, before the second CIAS in Addis Ababa, the permanent representatives of the African Group in the UN ï Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and the UAR ï had convened and drafted provisions for the realization of the Coordinating Body and the Secretariat.[161]

Accordingly, the Coordinating Body was to consist of the permanent representatives of independent African states at the UN or their accredited representatives and the chairmanship would be held in turn in alphabetical order of the names of the independent African states. Each chairman was going to hold the office for only one calendar month. This institution was responsible for: coordinating all matters of common concern to the independent African states, examining and making recommendations to their respective governments in the form of concrete and practical steps which might be taken to implement the decisions of the first CIAS and similar future conferences, and making preparatory arrangements for future conferences of independent African states.

Similarly, a working paper was designed for the Secretariat. It was to be responsible to the Coordinating Body and composed of four of the independent African states. For example, at the first meeting of the African Group, Ghana, Liberia, Tunisia and the UAR

[160] MoFA OAU89 ï D6 76 ï D6, Proposed Informal Permanent Machinery Recommended by the Accra CIAS.
[161] *Ibid*, Future Status of the Informal Permanent Machinery, Report by the Informal Permanent Machinery: 14 June 1960.

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ıte not represented could send an observer to the meeting of the Secretariat if they so desired. Members of the Secretariat were to be elected for a term of two years and an executive secretary would be appointed by the Coordinating Body from the members of the Secretariat to serve for a period of one year, subject to reappointment.[162]

The Secretariat had the following major functions. First, it would examine the resolutions adopted at the Accra conference and such other matters disposed of at subsequent conferences of independent African states and make concrete suggestions to the Coordinating Body for their implementation. Second, it would make studies and submit reports to the Coordinating Body when requested to do so. And finally, it would circulate to members of the Coordinating Body a monthly report of the work of the Secretariat.[163]

Between them, the two institutions had a share of responsibilities during the sessions of the General Assembly of the UN. The Coordinating Body had to study the agenda of each session of the General Assembly with a view to suggesting joint action to be taken on various items of interest to the independent African states 'without prejudice to their relations with the Afro-Asian Group'. Similarly, the Secretariat had to meet during the session of the General Assembly as often as possible, and keep other members of the African delegation informed of the views of the Coordinating Body on all matters of common concern.[164]

Nevertheless, these institutions could not continue as effective agencies of African cooperation. The growing conflict between the two ideological blocs - Casablanca and

[162] *Ibid.*
[163] *Ibid.*
[164] *Ibid.*

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ly on their activities. Commenting on the cooperation among African countries at the UN, Kätäma Yifru once observed that no complete unity of action and purpose existed. He cited an incident in which the division between the two groups had been reflected. In the contest for the Security Council seat vacated by the UAR, the Casablanca group nominated Morocco as a substitute while the Monrovia states wanted Nigeria. In the face of such competition, Ethiopia withdrew itself from the candidacy.[165]

In the meantime, both groups sought to establish their own versions of a coordinating body of African affairs. The Lagos foreign ministers' conference (June 1962) that had convened to review a draft charter of the Monrovia group had seen the need to establish, in addition to the assembly of heads of state and government and a council of ministers, a general secretariat. According to Kätäma Yifru, 'of the three organs that of the establishment and organization of the Secretariat is probably the most difficult'.[166] This 'most difficult' task of establishing and organizing a permanent secretariat for all Africa had been, however, delegated to Ethiopia.[167]

The MoFA assigned a committee that would prepare a draft proposal setting the secretariat of the permanent Organization of African and Malagasy States. The duties of this committee included making a detailed proposal for the establishment of the secretariat together with detailed departmental charts, studying the structures of secretariats of similar existing international organizations, considering the problems in

[165] *Ethiopian Herald*, 21 October 1962.

[166] *Ethiopian Herald*, 7 June 1962.
[167] *Ibid*, 29 December 1962.

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and location of the secretariat, and recommending specialized agencies to be attached to it.

After certain preliminary steps, the MoFA had requested the assistance of the Chilean lawyer and ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), Manuel Trucco.[168] He was to share his experience in the OAS, but in the capacity of an individual advisor. Kätäma Yifru's letter to his Chilean counterpart clearly stated Trucco's contributions: '... [he] has already made considerable headway in planning for the organization of the Secretariat of the envisaged Organization, and has taken the initiative in preparing of draft documents in other areas which will come under discussion at the Conference ...'[169]

However, in most of the literature, Manuel Trucco's role is often stated as participation in the drafting of the Charter of the OAU.[170] Contemporary press reports in Africa and Europe had voiced similar views. One document, for instance, reveals the anger such a negative propaganda had caused among Ethiopian authorities. When directly accosted for such disinformation, the executive secretary of a Russian journal

[168] MoFA OAU2 32/4, Kätäma to Manuel Trucco (Washington): 14 December 1962. For the process it had taken to secure Truccoôs assistance, see Mängesté Dästa to Ethiopian Embassy in Washington: 17 December 1962, Ambassador Berhänu Dänäqä (Washington) to Kätäma: 28 December 1962, Berhänu to Kätäma: 4 January 1963, Mängesté to Ethiopian Embassy in Washington: 10 January 1963, Kätäma to Trucco: 21 January 1963. Up to the end of January the Chilean stayed in Washington allegedly studying the documents on the Casablanca and Monrovia groups found in the UN and State Department.

[169] *Ibid*, Kätäma to Senor Carlos Martinez Sotomayor (Foreign Minister of Chili): 16 April 1963. Kätäma requested for additional leave to Trucco for his óexperience in the Organization of American States has already proved and will continue to prove of very real usefulness to us, and the Imperial Ethiopian Government is hopeful that your Excellencyôs Government may be able to spare his services until his present work is fully completed.ô

[170] Lemmu, p. 165; Ļervenka, the OAU and Its Charter, p. 28. The only exception is Sangers, p. 272, who stated that Trucco had advised on the administrative structure of the Secretary General.

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for such a mistake and claimed some circles in Africa to be the source of the information.[171]

After careful scrutiny of Ethiopia's preparation, the preliminary conference of foreign ministers had passed a resolution upon which the assembly of heads of state had to decide.[172] The draft resolution had three paragraphs: the first provided for establishing a Provisional General Secretariat that would operate until the ratification of the Charter of the OAU; the second defined its possible tasks; and the last expressed the decision of the foreign ministers to establish the headquarters of the Provisional Secretariat in Addis Ababa. This document initiated another lengthy debate among African heads of state and government.

Milton Obote of Uganda opposed the above resolution and made a new proposal. According to him, a provisional mission or working group of officials and experts, two from each state, had to be appointed to examine the previous proposals contained in the charter and the resolutions of the foreign ministers, and make recommendations there of including the establishment of the permanent headquarters and other organs under the Charter. Second, these officials and experts had to meet in the last week of June and submit their recommendations to a conference of the council of ministers, who would in turn consider the recommendations and pass them for final approval of the assembly. Third, Addis Ababa had to be the venue of the 'provisional commission', and Dakar of the foreign ministers' meeting.[173]

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[171] MoFA OAU2 32/4, Alexander Soboleu (Executive Secretary, OTÁZKY MÍRU A SOCIALISMU) to Ayalew Mandäfro: 30 November 1963.
[172] MoFA OAU86 ï D6 1966(B), Verbatim Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Assembly, pp. 35 ï 36; also see *Ethiopian Herald*, 21 May 1963.
[173] *Ibid*, pp. 36 ï 37. Ghana supported the proposal of Uganda. Then the meeting was adjourned, at the request of Algeria, to meet at 6pm in the afternoon.

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ed Ethiopia's acceptance of the amendments proposed by Milton Obote, but with yet another amendment. In the preamble of Uganda's - 'having accepted in principle the proposed Charter of the OAU pending its ratification' - according to the Ethiopian prime minister, the words 'in principle' were 'superfluous' since the assembly was going to sign the Charter, and proposed that they be deleted. The second amendment was more of a technical nature. Aklilu proposed that what Obote referred to as the 'Conference of Foreign Ministers' should be replaced by 'the Council of Ministersû[174]

Aklilu also stated Ethiopia's agreement to Ghana's earlier proposal that demanded the collaboration of all countries with the Secretary-General in the preparation of all the documents of the May Summit. The Ethiopian premier explained that his country had already prepared many drafts for the Economic, Cultural, and Scientific and Technical Committees. According to him, the rules of procedure for the secretariat had likewise been prepared, but they were not circulated yet because Ethiopia was waiting for a convenient time. The premier thanked the heads of state for the honor bestowed on the government of Ethiopia and assured them that everything would be ready to facilitate the work of the committee.[175]

But, the President of the Central African Republic strongly objected to the proposal of Uganda. According to him, Ethiopia had been in charge of the organization of the conference 'up to its decisive phase' and all the documents of the summit were in Addis Ababa. So, he argued, there was no reason for not placing confidence in the Ethiopian Government and requesting it 'to act as Provisional Secretariat'. The President concluded

[174] *Ibid*, pp. 40 ï 41.
[175] *Ibid*, p. 41.

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first resolution 'which decided that Addis Ababa was to be the site of the Provisional Secretariat'.[176]

Then Ahidjo of Cameron, seconded by the President of Chad, proposed that officials and technicians drawn from Ghana, Niger, UAR, Nigeria and Congo (Brazzaville) should collaborate with the Provisional Secretariat that had to be entrusted to Ethiopia. They also proposed the naming of a secretary general by the assembly at that conference.[177]

Prime Minister Aklilu again expressed Ethiopia's gratitude for the honor and confidence accorded to it by the request that it provide the 'Provisional Head of the Secretariat' and that all preparations and documents provided by the Charter had to be compiled in Addis Ababa. He also formally supported the proposal of Cameron and Chad. But, Aklilu opposed the appointment of the secretary general on the ground that the Charter, even though it had been signed, had first to be ratified. Consequently, he appealed to everyone to accept what had been proposed. The premier asserted that Ethiopia had 'never interpreted in bad faith any of the proposals that have been made up to now', and expressed his belief that the compromise offered by Cameron and supported by Chad was perfectly acceptable to Ethiopia.[178]

Thus, the text of the resolution read: ôHaving signed the Charter of the OAU, pending its ratification:

1. Forthwith establishes the provision for a General Secretariat that will operate until the Charter of the OAU is applied.
2. The Provisional General Secretariat is entrusted to the Ethiopian Government.
3. The Conference hereby decides to establish the headquarters of the Provisional General Secretariat in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.ô[179]

[176] *Ibid*, p. 42.
[177] *Ibid*, pp. 44 ï 45.
[178] *Ibid*, p. 46.
[179] *Ibid*, p. 47.

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And a Special Resolution of the Addis Ababa Summit decided that:

> This Provisional General-Secretariat is entrusted to the Ethiopian Government and will essentially perform such common task as have been decided by the present conference; (the expert committee which will assist the Provisional Secretariat to be set up by the Ethiopian Government shall be composed of the following countries: Congo (B), Ghana, Nigeria, Niger, Uganda, and UAR.[180]

The Government of Ethiopia designated the Red Cross Building, near Gandhi Hospital, to be the Office of the Provisional Secretariat of the OAU. The formal contract was signed between Kätäma Yifru and the Chairman of the Ethiopian Red Cross Society, *Şähafé Te'ezaz* Täfära-Wärq on 1 July 1963.[181] According to the lease, the government had to pay a sum of 6,500 *birr* a month for a total of twelve office rooms, twelve living rooms, a hall and a cafeteria. The rent did not include electricity, telephone, drainage and sanitation expenses. This arrangement continued up to the 8th of November 1965 when the headquarters was transferred to the African Unity House.[182]

Office furniture and appliances were installed before the first meeting of the expert committee on 18 July.[183] These included telephone lines, conference tables, electric heaters, carpets etc. The furniture cost 18, 417.55 *birr*, and the government had to pay a sum of 24, 885.88 *birr* for telegram services within the first month. In the face of this huge financial drain, Kätäma had even to beg the emperor for some used curtains for the Office of the Provisional Secretariat.[184]

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[180] MoFA OAU1967 volume-2, Press Statement by the Provisional Secretary.
[181] MoFA OAU7 32/4, The contact between the Government of Ethiopia and the Ethiopian Red Cross Society to Lease the Red Cross Building.
[182] *Ibid*, Diallo Telli to Kätäma: 7 November 1965.

[183] *Ibid*, Zäwgä (MoFA) to Mozbold Ethiopia co. Ltd.: 13 July 1963, 15 July 1963; Zäwgä to Amanuél Abräham (Minister of Postal, Telegram and Telecommunication Service): 15 July 1963; Zäwgä to Monsure Edward Garvandian (Addis Ababa): 15 July 1963.
[184] *Ibid*, draft letter, Kätäma to Hayla-Selassie: 23 July 1963.

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ssion, the Provisional Secretariat conducted all of its correspondence through Ethiopian embassies in Africa and Europe. In one case, embittered by the pressure this new assignment had brought on his material and human resources, the ambassador in Paris complained to the MoFA and demanded that the secretariat run its own affairs.[185] But he was reminded of the fact that the secretariat was the responsibility of Ethiopia and the MoFA was assigned to facilitate its activities. The reliance of the Provisional Secretariat on the MoFA went as far as requesting delivery of newsletters and magazines published elsewhere in Africa.[186]

Ethiopia had assigned the cream of its diplomats to the office of the Provisional Secretariat of the OAU. Dr. Täsfayé Gäberäzgi had been temporarily transferred from his post in the UN to assume the post of the Provisional Secretary-General.[187] But, in October 1963, Keflé Wädajo, Deputy Representative of the Ethiopian Mission to the UN, was designated Officer-in-Charge of the Provisional Secretariat.[188] Initially, Keflé had been on secondment to the OAU on temporary basis, but he stayed there up to 1965. In addition, until April 1966, he was *de facto* Deputy Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the UN.[189]

Resolution 24 (I) of the First Ordinary Session of the OAU in Cairo (17-21 July 1964) requested Ethiopia to approve the secondment to the OAU of the staff members of the Provisional Secretariat under their current condition of service until the Secretary

[185] *Ibid*, Br. Gen. Mäkonnen Dänäqä to Kätäma: 8 September 1963.
[186] *Ibid*, Keflé Wädajo to MoFA.
[187] MoFA Personal File2 14, Telegram, Kätäma to Mrs. Katherine Gäberäzgi (New York): 25 June 1963.
[188] MoFA Personal File7 51, Kätäma to Keflé: 11 September 1963; MoFA to the Embassies of Nigeria, Ghana, Sudan, Liberia, Somalia, Niger, Togo and the UNECA: 2 October 1963.
[189] *Ibid*, Dr. Täsfayé (Permanent Representative to the UN) to Protocol Department of the UN: 6 April 1966; Dr. Täsfayé to Kätäma: 7 April 1966; MOFA OAU1968 volume-2, Memorandum, no date.

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l appoints a permanent staff.[190] Accordingly, the rules of procedure for the Secretariat, the plan of action and work assignment prepared by the MoFA demanded all Ethiopian appointees to pursue their obligations in close consultation with the ministry and unwavering dedication to attain the political objectives of Ethiopia.[191] Each development in the OAU was reported to the MoFA, and three officials in the ministry - Ayälä Moltotal (Vice Minister), Ayalέw Mandäfro (Director) and Mängesté Dästa (Director) - were always in close contact with the Officer-in-Charge of the Provisional Secretariat.[192]

The Provisional Secretariat, including the expert committee, started official work as early as the second week of July by preparing the grounds for the upcoming conference of ministers in Dakar in August 1963.[193] However, as it turned out, the Dakar conference witnessed a fierce conflict of interest among independent African states on the question of the permanent headquarters of the OAU. As one of the major contenders, Imperial Ethiopia launched the most astounding and successful diplomatic missions in African politics.

Emperor Hayla-Selassie was the only head of state to address the first conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Dakar (2 ï 14 August 1963). After reminding them of the work done at the Addis Ababa Conference that had laid the foundation stone for the unity of the continent, he urged the ministers to be guided by the same spirit of

[190] *Ibid*, Interim Financing of the Secretariat. According to John Markakis, ôThe OAU: A progress.ô*Journal of Modern African Studies* vol. 4, no. 2 (1966), 135ï 136, one of the earliest inefficiencies of the OAU had been the lack of adequate staff. African states had declined to assign their educated personnel to the OAU.
[191] MoFA OAU1967 volume-2, The Rules and Regulations of the Secretariat and the Program of Work and Work Assignment, Dr. Täsfayé to Ayalέw: 12 September 1963; MoFA Personal File7 51, Kätäma to Keflé: 11 September 1963.
[192] MoFA OAU1963 1963A, Keflé to Ayälä, Ayalέw and Mängesté: 17 October 1964. Informants: Ambassadors Ayälä Moltotal and Mängesté Dästa
[193] MoFA OAU1967 volume-2, Press Statement by the Provisional Secretariat: 18 July 1963; also see *Ethiopian Herald*, 19 and 27 July 1963.

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e Summit. ôLet us not only be satisfied with the results so far achieved but work harder for the greater task that still lies ahead of usõ, Hayla-Selassie advised.[194]

The foreign ministers commenced their deliberations by hearing the report of the Provisional Secretariat on the work so far done. Dr. Täsfayé, the Provisional Secretary-General, presented the three reports of the expert committee in Addis Ababa. These reports had dealt with the organization of the Provisional Secretariat (including its budget allocation), the implementation of the resolutions of the Summit Conference and the rules of procedure of the Council. In this connection, the government of Ethiopia, to whom the Provisional Secretariat had been entrusted, also made available draft rules and regulations of the Secretariat. This document was distributed as a working paper to the Council.[195] But the reports of the Provisional Secretary General and the activities of Ethiopia faced challenges from the onset of the conference.

Jaja Wachuku, minister of external affairs of Nigeria, was at the forefront of the opposition. He claimed that the government of Ethiopia had deliberately manipulated the constituency of the Provisional Secretariat. The ócommittee of expertsõ, together with the Provisional Secretary General, were to constitute the Secretariat; but the experts were relegated to a position of assistants to the Provisional Secretary General. Wachuku stressed that the committee was not doing what it was supposed to do, ówhich was to assist the Secretary General by collecting our records and giving interim records so that

[194] MoFA CM 4th Session, Dakar Fourth Plenary Session of the Council of Ministers Verbatim Record, 6 August 1963.
[195] *Ibid*. The report also included the implementation of the Summit resolutions concerning Portugal territories and apartheid by some member states of the Organization. Most of independent Africa, including Ethiopia, had taken some sort of action. For example, in July 1963, at the Economic and Social Council in Geneva, Ethiopia and Senegal, órepresenting the spirit of African Statesõ, had called for the expulsion of both South Africa and Portugal from the UN and its Specialized Agencies. The Council had confirmed the decision of the ECA to expel Portugal and South Africa from that institution.

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t was happeningô. In addition, the Nigerian minister categorically accused the Provisional Secretariat of inefficiency and sluggishness. He also opposed any suggestion that the staff of the Provisional Secretariat should be paid any salary. ôWe should not contribute any penny to any such salary é . Since the Provisional Secretariat comes from Ethiopia the Ethiopian Government are responsible é .ô[196]

Nevertheless, representatives of Tanganyika, Uganda and Congo (Leopoldville) denounced Wachukuôs comments and strongly called for the application of the spirit of the Addis Ababa Conference. In particular, the foreign ministers of Uganda and Congo (L), George Magezi and Kalanda, respectively, reminded their colleague from Nigeria that ôWe must realize that the Provisional Secretariat, to which we have not yet paid a penny, has a difficult task to performô; therefore, nobody could expect everything to be done by the host government ôin exactly the way we would likeô. They commended the work of the Provisional Secretariat so far accomplished, and urged all of them to express gratitude to Emperor Hayla-Selassie, the government of Ethiopia and the Provisional Secretary General for the ópraise worthy effortsô they had made to fulfill their duties and to sustain the Organization.[197]

Then Kätäma Yifru asked permission to respond to some of the allegations made by Nigeria against his country. After describing the extent of Ethiopiaôs assistance rendered

[196] Wachuku insisted other countries to follow suit in opposing the draft budget. He stressed that ôWhat are they to do to earn such salaryô. The Ethiopian delegation was more infuriated by Wachukuôs slanderous and sarcastic remarks denouncing Ethiopia utterly incapable of sustaining the secretariat and headquarters of the OAU. MoFA Yä OAU 1963 sänädoḷe 1963 1(F). Dr. Täsfayé Gäbrägziôs (Provisional Secretary General of the OAU) to Hayla-Selassie. Memo on the Dakar CM Meeting, Nähasé 25, 1955E.C (31 Aug. 1963).
[197] MoFA CM 4th Session, Dakar Fourth Plenary Session of the Council of Ministers Verbatim Record, 6 August 1963.

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ss of the preparations for that meeting, he deemed the accusation ï ódothing has been doneôï wrong and unfair:

> Our Government has no intention whatsoever of asking anybody to contribute a single penny é . We have done so far on our own. The budget which has been submitted to you was proposed by the expert group, for it was felt necessary to have this agreed at the beginning of our planned organization. I repeat that the Ethiopian Government has no intention of asking anybody else to contribute towards what has been done. The Delegate of Nigeria can rest assured that we have not kept a bank-like check on this.[198]

Similarly, the Provisional Secretary-General, Dr. Täsfayé, insisted on speaking ón order to provide additional clarificationô. He claimed that all the pertinent documents, which Wachuku presumably failed to locate, were dispatched well in advance. Regarding the salary of the Provisional Secretary General, Dr. Täsfayé reminded the conference of his earlier observation, when the item was proposed by the expert committee, to the effect that the Ethiopian government would not accept it. ó It was none of my business because it was a matter of national financeô, he explained to the foreign ministers. ó I have my post, I am instructed to give a service, and I am trying to give the best service I can.ô[199]

To aggravate the situation, the representative of Ghana, Kwesi Armah, made an incriminating statement on the views of Jaja Wachuku. The Ghanaian absolved the government of Ethiopia from the criticism over the budget, and commended the country for going to such length in óincurring great expenseô in organizing the Addis Ababa Summit. As regards the documents, Armah stressed that the fact that Nigeria did not receive them should not be laid at the door of the Provisional Secretariat. Any suggestion otherwise was not worthy, and he could not understand it. ó We cannot expect the

[198] *Ibid.*
[199] *Ibid.* But still the Nigerian minister maintained his position.

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ulder the responsibility for Africa *ad infinitum*ô, the Ghanaian went on, ôbut, if the Provisional Secretariat is to last for a little time, that is the responsibility of Africa, not the responsibility of Ethiopiaô.[200] He did conclude by expressing his view that the Provisional Secretariat should not be castigated as it had been.

5.3.2. The Headquarters Duel

The question of the seat of the permanent headquarters of the OAU became one of sustained diplomatic controversy among independent African states, right from Dakar up to the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly in Cairo in July 1964. When it was known that the agenda of the Dakar Conference would include the issue of the headquarters, Kätäma persistently pleaded with Hayla-Selassie to launch diplomatic missions in advance to secure the support of African leaders for Ethiopiaôs claim.[201] However, the emperor failed to perceive the need, and the Ethiopian delegation to Dakar was forced to enter the competition barehanded.

As a last resort, the eight-man Ethiopian delegation set out to lobby the representatives of thirty-two states, in a ratio of one delegate to four African states. A good example of this backstage maneuver was the deal between Kätäma and the representatives of Guinea: Kätäma pledged to support the candidacy of the Guinean Ambassador to the UN, Diallo Telli, to the post of Secretary General of the OAU in return for support for Addis Ababa continuing as a seat of the OAU.[202]

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[200] Wachuku denied the point that he had attacked the position of the Ethiopian Government, and accused Ghana of currying favors. ôThe distinguished Delegate of Ghana should understand, if he can understand the English language, that at no time did I mention the Ethiopian Government and that it is wrong to interpret my words as criticism of that Government.ô

[201] Makonnen Ketema, Biography of Ketema.

[202] *Ibid.*

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) August 1963, a total of twenty-eight African states cast their votes for the four contenders ï Senegal, Nigeria, Congo (L) and Ethiopia ï for hosting the permanent headquarters. Dakar secured twelve votes, Lagos none, Kinshasa one and Addis Ababa fifteen. The First Committee established by the foreign ministers to deal with this matter then submitted the result to the plenary session of the Council of Ministers for final decision.[203] In the meantime, Nigeria seriously contested the result on the basis that Togo and Morocco could not cast their votes since they did not ratify the Charter of the OAU at the moment. As a result, it argued, Addis Ababa failed to secure the simple majority vote needed for the purpose.

In the course of discussion on the selection of the permanent headquarters of the OAU, the Mali delegation proposed that the four contenders agree among themselves upon a single candidate. When they refused to agree, the Algerian delegation proposed that a secret ballot be taken. But, Ethiopia refused to agree to this procedure and suggested a roll call be taken instead. Such a method was envisaged so as to exert direct pressure on representatives of African nations.[204] The recommendation of Guinea resolved the problem of the procedure of voting. It suggested that identical ballot papers be distributed to all delegations, and each delegate come up and put them into a conspicuously placed box by óroll call from the Chairô The Sudan, Ivory Coast, Tanganyika and Libya were requested to act as tellers.[205]

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[203] MoFA OAU 1963 (g) Headquarters Vote, Secret Ballots of the First Committee on the Issue of the Headquarters. Each ballot was signed by the four tellers assigned to supervise the procedure.
[204] Makonnen Ketema, Biography of Ketema.
[205] MoFA OAU1963 (g), Report of the First Committee. There were also decided that only the name of the country chosen would be announced, without stating the number of votes obtained. This was óin order to obviate controversy and to select the permanent headquarters in an atmosphere of concord and fraternity and in the spirit of unity which marked the historic conference of Addis Ababaô

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states took part in the roll call to decide on the recommendation of the First Committee to choose Addis Ababa as the headquarters of the OAU. Nigeria and Senegal were registered as absentee; Congo (L), Dahomey, Ghana, Mauritania, Chad and Togo abstained; and Madagascar voted against. The rest ï a total of twenty-three states ï chose Addis Ababa to be the seat of the continental organization.[206] Of all these, however, it was the vote of the Somali Foreign Minister, Abdullahi Issa, that astonished Kätäma and the rest of the Ethiopian delegation.[207]

The Council of Ministers, therefore, chose Ethiopia to house the Permanent Secretariat and resolved to recommend Addis Ababa to the upcoming heads of state and government conference as the permanent seat of the headquarters of the OAU.[208] Meanwhile, the First Committee had also unanimously decided to recommend Ambassador Diallo Telli for appointment to the post of Secretary General. But, Nigeria refused to accept this on the ground that it had not taken part in the decision. Therefore, a roll call was taken by the plenary session whereby fifteen voted for, three voted against and twelve abstained. Surprisingly enough, Nigeria, together with Liberia, did not participate in the roll call. Finally, the president of the conference, Doudou Thiam of Senegal, decided to reject the proposition; and an agreement was reached to raise the

[206] *Ibid*, Record of a Roll Call of the Plenary Session on the Permanent Headquarters of the OAU. The initial record claimed that a total of twenty eight states had voted, one registered absent, and three states refused to vote. But upon insistence from Nigeria the vote was recounted again. Dr. Täsfayé informed the emperor later that of all the African states Ghana and Nigeria collaborated to frustrate Ethiopiaôs bid for hosting the headquarters. Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Algeria and Tanganyika deserved special place for they consistently supported the choice of Addis Ababa. Dr. Täsfayé also insisted that Ugandaôs uncharacteristic collaboration with Ghana and Nigeria, despite the fact that it later voted for Addis Ababa should be rebuked through proper diplomatic channels. MoFA Yä OAU 1963 sänädoḽe 1963 1(F). Dr. Täsfayé Gäbrägziôs (Provisional Secretary General of the OAU) to Hayla-Selassie. Memo on the Dakar CM Meeting, Nähasé 25, 1955E.C (31 Aug. 1963). Informants: Ambassadors Mängisté Dästa and Ayälä Moltotal

[207] Makonnen Ketema, Biography of Ketema.

[208] *Ibid*, Record of the Plenary Session on the Headquarters of the OAU.

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council of ministers, to be held in Lagos.[209] The Dakar resolution empowered the provisional secretariat to run the affairs of OAU until a secretary general was officially assigned to the post.

On 11 September 1963, Emperor Hayla-Selassie wrote to African heads of state soliciting their support for the Dakar recommendation of Addis Ababa to be seat of the OAU, and suggested Diallo Telli should be accepted as secretary general.[210] Kwame Nkrumah was the first to respond. He refused to accept the foreign ministersô recommendation on the ground that at the Addis Ababa Summit Conference they had agreed to leave the matter to the consideration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Therefore, the Ghanaian proposed to postpone a decision on the question of the headquarters until the next summit conference. Similarly, Nkrumah remembered that the decision in Dakar did not suggest the name of Diallo Telli for appointment, and accordingly labeled Hayla-Selassieôs attempt to raise the issue óa mistakeô.[211]

Nyerere accepted the candidature of Addis Ababa with utmost pleasure. In addition, he expressed his desire to put the secretariat on a permanent basis as soon as possible, and, therefore, agreed with the suggestion that Dialli Telli be accepted as secretary general of the OAU.[212] William Tubman of Liberia supported, ówithout reservationô, the naming of Addis Ababa as the seat of the secretariat. But, he proposed that the question of the appointment of a secretary general be held ón abeyance pending the next Summit meetingô.[213]

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[209] *Ibid*, Record of the Roll Call on the Choice of the Secretary General.
[210] MoFA OAU8 32/20, cited in all the responses to the emperorôs letters.
[211] *Ibid*, Nkrumah to Hayla-Selassie: 7 October 1963.
[212] *Ibid*, Julius K. Nyerere to Hayla-Selassie: 19 October 1963.
[213] *Ibid*, Tubman to Hayla-Selassie: 23 October 1963.

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a Republic likewise assured the Ethiopian emperor of his government's support of the candidature of Addis Ababa when it would be placed before the next session of the assembly. He observed that Somalia would do so "in recognition of the important role played by Your Majesty and the Ethiopian Government in the creation of the Organization".[214] The president also promised to seriously consider the question of Diallo Telli and reach a decision before the next meeting of heads of state. Milton Margai of Sierra Leone similarly expressed his government's "vote of confidence in Ethiopia with other African States in successfully recommending her candidature to be the Headquarters of the OAU". Besides, the premier notified the emperor of the willingness of Sierra Leone to support the candidature of Diallo Telli, as he had already expressed to the government of the Republic of Guinea.[215]

In the meantime, the Ethiopian mission to the UN discovered that Nigeria was lobbying African states to nullify the Dakar resolution and insert a new agenda about the question of the headquarters during the upcoming conference of the council of ministers in Lagos.[216] The major sponsors of the Dakar decision, and those who stood in favor of Ethiopia (like Tanganyika, Morocco, Algeria and UAR) were directly requested to support Nigeria's position. The mission also found about an alternative proposal of Francophone countries like Niger, Central Africa and Gabon that demanded the headquarters of the OAU be located at Bangui.[217] Dr. Täsfayé advised the government to

[214] *Ibid*, Aden Abdulla Osman to Hayla-Selassie: 28 October 1963. According to the President, the next meeting was going to be held in Tunisia next May.
[215] *Ibid*, Milton Margai to Hayla-Selassie: 30 November 1963

[216] *Ibid*, Dr. Täsfayé (New York) to Kätäma: 29 December 1963.
[217] *Ibid*. Ras Makonnen, on his capacity as the official of the Government of Ghana supported this idea, p. 272.

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rent parts of the continent immediately to neutralize such developments.

In addition, Dr. Täsfayé mentioned one development the MoFA should be aware of: Liberia, Ghana and the Sudan were registered as candidates to the presidency of the nineteenth session of the General Assembly of the UN, and Jaja Wachuku of Nigeria was contemplating to support Sudan. According to Dr. Täsfayé, Ambassador Adil of Sudan had repeatedly approached him for support. But, he delayed from committing Ethiopia fearing that Nigeria would immediately shift her vote to Ghana. So as to breach this deadlock, the Ethiopian resident minister in the UN advised his government not to pledge support to anyone of the three contenders.[219]

Similarly, Ethiopiaôs ambassador in Khartoum found out that the government of Sudan was going to propose Osman Yassin, vice minister of foreign affairs, for the post of secretary general of the OAU in the upcoming ministerial conference in Lagos.[220] The ambassador claimed that Sudanese authorities thereby planned to make up for their earlier failures to secure the headquarters of African Development Bank. According to the ambassador, they were bound to request Ethiopiaôs sponsorship in exchange for their support in the contention for the headquarters of the OAU. The MoFA, through its embassy, notified the officials in Khartoum of Ethiopiaôs commitment to Guinea on the question of the secretary general; but at the same time promised them to help on the issue

[218] MoFA Yä OAU 1963 sänädoḷe 1963 1(F). Dr. Täsfayé Gäbrägziôs (Provisional Secretary General of the OAU) to Hayla-Selassie. Memo on the Dakar CM Meeting, *Nähasé* 25, 1955E.C (31 Aug. 1963). These included lion cubs to Nkrumah, which he specially requested during the May 1963 summit, so as to dissociate him from the unusual collaboration on the matter with Nigeria.

[219] *Ibid.*

[220] *Ibid*, Dawit Abdu (Lagos) to Kätäma: 30 August 1963.

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part, nominated Emil-Derlin Zinsou, its foreign minister, for the post of secretary general, and demanded Ethiopiaôs agreement.[222]

Tension mounted as the Lagos conference approached. The situation escalated into an open confrontation when Jaja Wachuku publicly opposed the Dakar recommendation that had nominated Addis Ababa as the seat of the headquarters of the OAU.[223] Emperor Hayla-Selassie and Kätäma Yifru raised the issue to Nuhu Bamali, minister dôétat of Nigeriaôs external affairs and allegedly a close confidant of the prime minister, when he came to Addis Ababa to participate in the first extraordinary session of the council of ministers on the Algeria-Morocco dispute in November 1963. The Nigerian promised to seek the opinion of his prime minister on Wachukuôs statement, and Bamali did subsequently send to the emperor directly through the Ethiopian chargé dô affairs in Lagos.

Accordingly, the report demanded that what the minister of external affairs expressed should not be taken as the official view of the government of Nigeria. The Nigerian prime minister also requested Wachuku for an explanation on his earlier statements. The latter initially denied the charge, Bamaliôs report claimed, but, when confronted with physical evidence, Wachuku attributed the fact to a slip of the tongue. In addition, Bamali expressed to Ethiopiaôs ambassador Nigeriaôs óutmost cooperationô in the choice of Addis Ababa.[224]

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[221] *Ibid*, Kätäma to Dawit: 6 September 1963.
[222] *Ibid*, Dawit Abdu to Kätäma: 30 June 1964. Ambassador Dawit had been transferred to Nigeria at the end of 1963 and stayed there up to 1967.
[223] *Ibid*. Pieces of Wachukuôs statements to Nigerian press were attached in a letter from Ambassador Dawit to Kätäma: 9 December 1963.
[224] *Ibid*, Dawit to Kätäma: 24 January 1964.

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mbassador Dawit, the above two contradictory positions continued to manifest in Lagos circles. Nigerian newsletters continued to advocate Wachukuôs line, while Nuhu Bamali consistently assured the MoFA of Tafawa Balewaôs support of Ethiopiaôs cause. Dawit reported that Jaja Wachuku was trying to smudge Ethiopiaôs reputation through gossips and at the same time was reaffirming his countryôs ambition to harbor the continental organization. For instance, the Nigerian claimed that the government of Ethiopia was unable to cover even the expense of the house it had leased for its embassy in Lagos and its telegram fares. Besides, according to Wachuku, the provisional secretariat could not function properly because of financial deficits. It failed to distribute even the Dakar resolutions, and was generally unable to coordinate the affairs of the continent. The Nigerian also was ridiculing the poor infrastructural situation of Addis Ababa and Ethiopiaôs economic status at large comparing it to what his country was to offer in return.[225]

Finally, the ministry of external affairs of Nigeria wrote to Kätäma explaining Nigeriaôs understanding of the issue of the provisional secretariat. The letter claimed that, upon the ratification of the Charter of the OAU by two-thirds of the member states, Addis Ababa would cease to be the seat of the Provisional Secretariat and that until a permanent headquarters was chosen, the office had to move alternately between countries where OAU meetings were being held.[226] Ambassador Dawit also reported that Jaja Wachuku, irrespective of earlier reprimands the minister had received from Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, was assigned for the chairmanship of the upcoming Lagos conference. In

[225] *Ibid*. In this case the Nigerian cited one example, i.e., according to him, the Government of Niger did request the Secretariat to delay the Summit meeting in Niamey in the Algeria-Morocco dispute for two days, which the Provisional Secretariat failed to notify concerned governments in advance.
[226] *Ibid*, cited in Dawitôs report. The letter was sent to Kätäma on 19 December 1963.

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ned to host the next summit meeting, Nigeria had contemplated doing it itself. Alarmed by the implications of such an eventuality, the Ethiopian chargé dôaffairs in Lagos requested for clarifications from the secretary of the Nigerian prime minister. To the relief of the entire embassy staff, the secretary expressed Nigeriaôs unwillingness to convene the summit on the ground that it would procure heavy financial losses, and suggested Ghana to be the venue.[227]

Then Dawit went directly to Wachuku for further explanation on the whole situation. The Nigerian foreign minister claimed that, since the provisional secretariat was practically non-existent, his country had taken the initiative to formulate the agenda for the upcoming conference. To the question as to whether or not the issue of the headquarters would be included in the agenda, Wachuku refused to give direct answer. Instead he stated that the foreign ministers would decide on the agenda Nigeria prepared at the time of the conference.[228]

The Ethiopian ambassador enumerated two possible points Nigeria would raise at the conference so as to challenge Ethiopiaôs move to host the headquarters of the OAU. First, the Dakar resolution was passed by a simple roll call and the secret ballot of the first committee had decided in favor of Ethiopia with the smallest of margins. Even this, Dawit ventured, the Nigerians would challenge on the basis that out of the fifteen votes two were by Togo and Morocco, who had not yet ratified the Charter. Secondly, the recommendation of the first committee was not passed by the required simple majority,

[227] *Ibid.*
[228] *Ibid.*

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go and Morocco were counted, it would not sum up to seventeen out of the thirty-two member states.[229]

The official-in-charge of the provisional secretariat, Keflé Wädajo, in a report to the MoFA mentioned four problems his office had faced and the government of Ethiopia should be aware of.[230] The first was the grudge some African nations, 'those who do assume themselves leaders of the continent', felt about Ethiopia's success both in hosting the May 1963 Summit that had founded the OAU and in bringing the headquarters to Addis Ababa. Second, he pointed to the undercurrent of lack of cooperation, especially of Nigeria, with the provisional secretariat. When requested to issue information on the forthcoming meeting of the council of ministers, according to the officer-in-charge, Nigeria refused to comply on the ground that the provisional secretariat had nothing to do with it.

Troubled by the situation, Keflé contacted the head of the OAU affairs in Nigeria's ministry of external affairs, Filip Assidyou, for clarification on the relation between the government of Nigeria and the Secretariat. Assidyou stated three setbacks that hampered understanding between the governments of Ethiopia and Nigeria regarding the provisional secretariat: in the first place, the government of Ethiopia did not notify Nigeria of the person assigned as the provisional secretary general; in the second place, the appointee did not conduct his responsibilities on a permanent basis, rather he did his work in addition to his position as a permanent representative of the Ethiopian Mission to the UN; and finally the 'expert committee' was not functioning as it should had been.

[229] *Ibid.*
[230] *Ibid*, Keflé to Kätäma: 29 January 1964.

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ed in Keflé that these were the personal opinions of Wachuku.

Third, the major reservations on the provisional secretariat that would possibly be raised in the Lagos conference, according to the report, were: the failure of the secretariat to compile the verbatim records of the previous summit in Addis Ababa and the role of the expert committee. Keflé observed that the expert committee claimed to have an executive power in the affairs of the secretariat on equal grounds with Ethiopia so as to run the activities of the office by a simple majority vote. The protagonists of this attitude, among members of the expert committee, were Nigeria, Ghana and Uganda. The representative of Egypt had also similar feelings, but could not join the others in order not to go against the orders of his government. Keflé warned the MoFA to be prepared for such potential sources of embarrassment.[232]

Fourth, Keflé notified the MoFA of what he had discovered from reliable sources about the agenda of the upcoming Lagos conference. Nigeria, of course, did plan to raise once again the question of the headquarters, and there were indications of possible agreement among Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal on the issue. Examples of the existence of such a common front were given. Senegal had failed to deliver the verbatim records of the Dakar Conference to the Provisional Secretariat, handing it over instead to Nigeria. Keflé harbored a fear that Nigeria's interpretation of the Dakar resolution (that it was

[231] Nigeria even withdrew its representative from two successive meetings of the expert committee in the Provisional Secretariat.
[232] Keflé later found out that, to his astonishment, Assidyou was transferred from his post for the confidence he had bestowed on the Provisional Secretariat.

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not the recommendation of the First Committee) would somehow get a way into the records.[233]

In addition, it was found out that the three nations had agreed to locate the headquarters of the OAU in Lagos and to give the post of secretary general either to Ghana or Senegal. Doudou Thiam, the foreign minister of Senegal, and Alex Koysan Saki of Ghana would be the contenders for the post. On the other hand, according to the report, Nigeria was going to recommend that, like the question of the secretary general, the issue of the headquarters be the prerogative of the assembly of heads of state. On one occasion, Keflé observed, Jaja Wachuku argued that since Ethiopia had the UNECA, it could not in addition claim to also host the headquarters of the OAU.[234]

In light of these developments, the officer-in-charge of the provisional secretariat of the OAU recommended that the following measures be taken: a) a high caliber committee to be organized, including the staff of the secretariat, that would formulate the position Ethiopia was going to take; b) Ethiopian ambassadors to African nations should be notified of the situation and immediately start the task of pressurizing the heads of state on Ethiopia's perception of the issue. Keflé suggested that where Ethiopia had no embassy special envoys be dispatched; c) the government of Ethiopia had to launch a propaganda campaign to counter those of Nigeria and others; and d) Keflé found out about Nigeria's decision to offer to host the next summit, and that Egypt was similarly contemplating the idea but was hesitating fearing no state would support the claim. According to Keflé, if Nigeria succeeded in getting acceptance for its offer, the chance

[233] *Ibid.*
[234] Keflé necessitated the need to acquire the original verbatim record as soon as possible. The MoFA complied and in early February 1964 Dr. Täsfayé delivered the original secret ballots, roll calls and reports of the first committee, with a photostat copy to Keflé. It was this documents that were used above. Dr. Täsfayé (New York) to Kätäma: 2 February 1964.

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ts interests through. So he recommended strongly that Ethiopia encourage Egypt as an alternative.[235]

The Second Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers was scheduled to convene from 24 to 28 February 1964. As one journalist observed, the spotlight on Africa that month would be on Lagos, where 'Nigeria will make another attempt to get Lagos named as the "capital" of Africa in place of Addis Ababa'. [236] Imperial Ethiopia dispatched a thirteen-man high level delegation to Lagos, including Kätäma, Mamo Tadäsä (Minister of State in the Prime Ministerôs Office), QäÑ*azmače* Abdurrahman Hajji Abdi (Minister of State in the Ministry of Interior), Haddis Alämayähu (Ambassador, London) and others.[237]

Nevertheless, nothing seemed to occur that had any bearing on the question of the headquarters. Most probably Ethiopia might have succeeded in having the issue withdrawn from the agenda. No document exists that gives hint of what had happened. Kätämaôs speech, for example, apart from positive remarks on the success of the OAU, singularly focused on the Somali provocation, which had been renewed since the Ethio-Kenyan defense agreement of 13 July 1963 which came into force immediately after Kenyaôs independence on 12 December 1963.[238]

The issues of the permanent headquarters of the OAU and the appointment of the secretary general were deferred to the heads of state conference that was going to be held

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[235] *Ibid.*

[236] *Ibid*. The article by Wilbur G. Landrey, entitled óOAU To Discuss on Explosive Problemsô *Japan Times*, 21 February 1964, is attached to the letter from Ethiopian Embassy (Tokyo) to Kätäma: 24 February 1964.

[237] MoFA OAU 1964 (A) 1964 (A), for the full list of the Ethiopian delegation, see Kätäma to Provisional Secretary General of OAU, no date. Why the delegation included two members from the ministry of interior in addition to officials from the MoFA and the diplomatic corps is not clear.

[238] *Ibid*, Speech Delivered By H.E. *Ato* Kätäma Yifru, Ethiopiaôs Minister of State For Foreign Affairs At OAU Meeting in Lagos: February 1964. For Somaliaôs memorandum to the OAU opposing the defense pact, see MoFA etiyo - kénya yä ministroḷe sebsäba 1, Ṣeraz 1: 11 December 1963.

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964. Without much argument, the assembly accepted the Dakar recommendation and designated Addis Ababa to be the seat of the General Secretariat. Congratulatory telegrams sent to Emperor Hayla-Selassie and Kätäma Yifru terminated the suspense Ethiopia had endured during the whole period of entanglement.[239]

The telegram addressed to Kätäma especially state that: 'We, the entire staff of the MoFA, would like to express our heartfelt happiness on the successful completion of the mission, for the attainment of which you [Kätäma] had sustained a sleepless and very taxing ordeal.' Ambassador Yodit, member of the Ethiopian delegation to the Cairo Summit, clearly remembers the occasion. Even if they had felt the highest of jubilation, the entire delegation strove to maintain an outward composure so as to create the impression that Ethiopia rightly deserved that special privilege.[240]

The Assembly also decided to appoint Diallo Telli as the Administrative Secretary General of the OAU.[241] In addition, four assistant secretaries general were assigned: Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun from Algeria, John Momboles from Kenya, Peno Gracien from Dahomey, and one person to be appointed from Nigeria. The first three were selected on geographical basis to represent Northern, Eastern and Western Africa, respectively. Nigeria's case appeared unique. One document claims that Nigeria was

[239] *Ibid*, telegrams, Zäwgä Wäldä-Maryam to Kätäma (Cairo): 21 July 1964; Yelma Därésa to Hayla-Selassie (Cairo): 21 July 1964. Informant: Ambassador Yodit.
[240] *Ibid.*

[241] MoFA OAU1964 ï 1966 B-C, General Record of the First Assembly of Heads of State and Government. Also see Wolfers, *Politics in the OAU*, 58ï 63, 66ï 67. At Cairo Summit Kenya proposed Diallo Telli for the post of Secretary General of the OAU, and this motion was supported by Ethiopia, Mali, Algeria, Uganda and Sierra Leone. Dahomey announced its politician, Emil Derlin-Zinsou a nominee for the post, and was supported by Senegal, Cameron, Madagascar and Gabon. Finally the President of the Session, Sekou Touré of Guinea, decided to take a secret ballot on the issue whereby twenty-three states voted for Diallo Telli, while only ten for Zinsou.

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having the highest population in Africa and, therefore, the highest financial contribution that it made to the Organization and 'so as to consol that nation for the loss of its ambitions to locate the headquarters in Lagos'.[242] The frigid reception Diallo Telli sustained on his way to Addis Ababa via Lagos demonstrated Nigeria's frustration at its defeat on both counts: the headquarters and nomination of the secretary general.[243]

Diallo Telli Boubacar officially resumed his duty of Administrative Secretary General of OAU on 22 August 1964.[244] He took his oath before Emperor Hayla-Selassie during the opening session of the Third Extraordinary Session of the Council of Ministers in Addis Ababa on 5 September 1964.[245]

5.4. Ethiopia and the OAU: Brief Survey of Developments between 1963 and 1991

5.4.1. Sustaining the OAU

Nothing could be more expressive of Ethiopia's contribution in the creation of the OAU than the telegrams sent to Emperor Hayla-Selassie immediately after the May 1963 Summit. Presidents Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt and Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, on their way to Cairo from Addis Ababa, sent a telegram congratulating the emperor and his government on the successful completion of the task designated to Ethiopia by the whole

[242] *Ibid*; also see MoFA OAU1968 volume-4, Mängesté to Kätäma: 2 September 1968. Nigeria designated Joe Iyalla, a Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, to be the Assistant Secretary General of the OAU, see MoFA OAU8 32/20, Dawit to Kätäma: 13 July 1964. The appointment of the Secretary General and the four assistants was subjected to reelection every four years.
[243] *Ibid*, Dawit to Kätäma: 21 August 1964.

[244] *Ibid.*
[245] MoFA 1964A, Verbatim Record of the Proceedings of the Third Extra-Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, Addis Ababa, 5 ï 10 September 1964.

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s historic conference was a big step and a new chapter in the liberation movement and the quest for unity of the peoples of Africa.[246]

Nnamdi Azikwe of Nigeria attributed the success of the occasion to Ethiopia's age-old sovereign existence and the political and diplomatic experiences it had amassed from this unique history.[247] Hamani Diori of Niger on his part lauded Ethiopia's success in convening independent Africa in a conference of such magnitude. He claimed that the achievements of the summit elevated the prestige of the emperor, amazed the international community and filled the hearts of Africans with unmatched sense of pride.[248] President Aden Abdulla Osman of Somalia, on his part, after expressing his gratitude on behalf of the Somali delegation for the lavish treatment in Addis Ababa, stated that the success of the conference heralded a period of peaceful coexistence and concerted action among African states. The president mentioned the talks he had with the emperor on their common interests and promised to measure up to that cordiality and friendship in the future.[249]

More impressive and catching, though, was Nkrumahôs address to the closing session of the conference. The way he portrayed Ethiopia referring to the biblical origin of the name and the phrases he used to express his feelings ended up rousing the feelings of those present at the occasion, both Ethiopians and their fellow Africans alike. After paying a tribute to the emperor for his role in the proceedings of the historic meeting the Ghanaian president characterized Ethiopia as ótheland of the wise,ô ôbeacon of freedom

[246] *Sändäq Alamačen*, *Genbot* 29 1963E.C (6 June 1971).
[247] *Voice of Ethiopia*, 29 May 1963 (6 June 1971).
[248] *Addis Zämän*, 22 *Säné* 1963 (29 June 1971).
[249] *Addis Zämän*, 31 *Genbot* 1963E .C (May 1971). Also see for telegrams of Tsaranina of Madagascar, *Voice of Ethiopia*, 29 Genbot 1963E.C (6 June 1971); Houphouet Bougney of Ivory Coast, *Addis Zämän*, 10 *Säné* 1963E.C (17 June 1971); Milton Margay of Sierra Leone, *Addis Zämän*, 14 *Säné* 1963E.C (21 June 1971); and Milton Obote of Uganda, *Addis Zämän*, 18 *Säné* 1963E.C (25 June 1971).

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d,ô órepository of Africaôs cultureô.[250] Such sentiments expressed by African statesmen must have considered the highest level of reward by Ethiopian authorities, for the commitment to the African cause increased considerably afterwards.

Accordingly, Ethiopia exerted utmost efforts to sustain the notion of African unity imperial Ethiopia had helped in creating in 1963. The successful mediation of the conflicts between Algeria and Morocco (1963), Ghana and Guinea (1966), Nigeria and Ivory Coast, Nigeria and the four states that supported the Biafra Republic (1967), the civil war of the Sudan (1972), Uganda and Tanzania (1973), were among the achievements of Emperor Hayla-Selassie and his government in this regard. The Liberation Committee of the OAU and the Commission for Mediation, Reconciliation and Arbitration were also highly influenced by the emperor.[251] The fact that Ethiopia invited and hosted the first six successive emergency sessions of the Liberation Committee, and the first there extraordinary sessions of the Council of Ministers (all between 1963 and 1965) similarly demonstrated its dedication to the cause of Africa.[252]

OAU had faced serious challenges that threatened its very existence ever since its creation. Even though the major groups in the continent were formally disbanded, ideological divisions continued to persist. Independent Africa still manifested division of interests that directly affected the working conditions of the OAU. The complications that occurred before the Accra Summit Conference of October 1965 as well as the perilous

[250] Tekalign, *Republicans at the Throne*, 79; Bereket Habte Selassie, *The Crown and the Pen*, 187. Informant: Ambassadors Mängesté Dästa and Ayälä Moltotal.

[251] For better analysis of these activities of the emperor and the Ethiopian Government, see Miller, pp. 41 ï 47. Also see Ļervenka, ñThe OAU and the Nigerian Civil War,ò *OAU After Ten Years*. Yassin El-Ayouty (ed.) (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975): 152 ï 153.

[252] Ļervenka, *OAU and Its Charter*, 51 ï 52. The extraordinary meetings of the Foreign Ministers and the six meetings of the Liberation Committee occurred within the sixteen short months of the OAUôs existence.

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found itself between 1981 and 1984 and Ethiopia's crucial role in resolving the problems could be cases in point.

On 19 May 1965, a high level Ethiopian delegation led by Kätäma Yifru went to West Africa. The main objective of this mission was to exert pressure on Francophone nations (who were going to hold a meeting that was expected to boycott the upcoming summit) and other nations, so as to save the continental organization from possible danger of disintegration.[253] The first destination of the Ethiopian mission was Lagos, where Kätäma conducted a lengthy discussion with Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa. The latter accused Kwame Nkrumah of subversive activities directed against Nigeria and other neighboring states. According to the prime minister, Ghana harbored criminals from other countries and trained them into bandits. So, he demanded an emergency meeting to be held before the Accra Summit to discuss the problem, which Kätäma accepted in principle.

The Ethiopian delegation heard similar allegations against Nkrumah in Ivory Coast and Liberia. Houphouet Boaigney claimed that these 'refugee liberators' trained by the Ghanaian 'madman' had made an attempt on his life. He demanded that the venue of the next summit should be transferred to the headquarters of the OAU, Addis Ababa, where ácthe security of the leaders is guaranteedâ.[254] William Tubman similarly condemned Ghanaôs interference in the internal affairs of others and emphasized the need for an emergency session before the upcoming summit in order to resolve the existing

[253] MoFA OAU1965 (D&E) D&E, Verbatim Record of the Activities of the Ethiopian Delegation. Also see Berhanykun Andemicael. *The OAU and the UN* (New York: Africana Publishing co., 1976), 15, 56 ï 57.
[254] Houphouet Bougney stated that he had tried to persuade Nkrumah to abandon his subversive activities in the affairs of Ivory Coast and other states. The President claimed to posses physical evidence to all of the allegations he made against Nkrumah.

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26 May, the Francophone nations issued a communiqué that boycotted the Accra Summit, but at the same time they promised to attend the summit at any other place.[256]

Then the mission went to Ghana, where Kätäma explained the position of other states to Nkrumah. The president attributed the allegations to imperialist intervention that was mainly intended to frustrate Ghanaôs march to socialism. Nkrumah stated that Africaôs problems would be solved only when his plan for establishing a Union Government materialized.[257]

Kätäma then proposed to all of the leaders whom he visited to organize a committee of mediation composed of the leaders of Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria and Ivory Coast that would strive to reach some sort of compromise.[258] All of them agreed to it. Even if no archival material discusses the activity of the committee later on, Kätäma somehow managed to convince all of the Francophone nations and other West African countries to attend the Accra Summit (21 ï 26 October 1965). Furthermore, these nations saw to it that a strong declaration on the problem of subversion should be issued at the conference that would limit in every possible way the activities of Ghana in the region.[259]

In addition, the Accra Summit Conference decided, upon the recommendation of President Nyerere and with amendments by Foreign Minister Doudou Thiam of Senegal, that all future conferences of the assembly should be held at the headquarters of the OAU

[255] The Liberian specially opposed to the plan of Nkrumah to create a Union Government of Africa.
[256] The communiqué was issued immediately after Kätäma's second discussion with Houphouet Bougney.
[257] *Ibid.*
[258] later the MoFA assigned a three-man committee that was to study the potential weakness of the OAU in relation to political, economic and legal aspects and to come up with recommendation. See MoFA OAU1967 volume-3, Dr. Täsfayé (State Minister) to Mängesté (Vice Minister, African Directorate): 15 December 1966.
[259] *Ibid*, AHG/Res. 27, Declaration on the Problem of Subversion. MoFA somalé 15-D1. Accra Declaration on the Problem of Subversion: 24 October 1965.

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with the agreement of the Heads of Stateô, to convene the assembly in its own country. Upon the insistent reminder of Kenya about the financial burden such a decision would entail on Ethiopia, it was decided that each state had to cover its expenses.[260]

The perilous situation the OAU faced between 1981 and 1984 represented the highest level of threat to the very existence of the continental organization. The problem started to manifest itself following the failure of forty-two countries, including Ethiopia, to advance annual contributions for the year 1980 and the reluctance of the majority of OAU member-states to comply with the new contribution rate assessments proposed by the OAU Advisory Committee meeting in Monrovia in August 1979. The situation placed the OAU in such a grave financial crisis that it had impaired daily routine work since the mid-1980s. Ethiopiaôs original annual contribution of 289,491.36 US dollars, for example, now rose to $528,618.49. This was considered an unfair burden, but it had to persuade others to oppose the realization of the new contribution.[261]

Nonetheless, issues related to Western Sahara and Chad heavily contributed to the division of African states. Particularly, the case of the Saharawi Republic, entertained since the 17th OAU summit in Freetown (July 1980), aggravated the polarization of member states. The situation had assumed a point of no return by February 1982 when Morocco and eight other states walked out of the 38th Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa (February 1982) following the invitation of representatives of the territory

[260] MoFA OAU1965 (D&E) D&E, Extracts From The Verbatim Record of the Plenary Meetings of the Second Ordinary Session of the assembly of Heads of States and Governments, Date and Venue of the Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
[261] MoFA kä Dr. Amarä biro yätägäÉu documäntoḷe 366. Memo on OAU Contribution: 1973E.C (1980); Policy Directives for Ethiopiaôs Delegation to the 36th OAU Advisory Committee Meeting: 1973E.C (1980); Report on the 36th OAU Advisory Committee Meeting: 1973E.C (1980).

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ointment as the host of the 19th summit was similarly not acceptable to the majority of sub-Saharan countries.[262]

The way the 39th Council of Ministers meeting and the 19th summit designated to be held in Tripoli in July and August 1982, respectively, were frustrated was indicative of the nature of this polarization. Because of these divisions, it proved difficult to convene the 19th summit for the next eighteen months. Ethiopiaôs initial efforts to realize the Tripoli meetings failed to bring about any result.[263] Five heads of state managed to be in Libya for the intended summit, and they ended up their deliberations setting a contact group that would facilitate the convening of the summit in the near future.

Ethiopiaôs role in realizing the convocation of the 19th summit started thereafter. Initially, in accordance with the new-found pact with Gaddafi, Col. Mengistu tried to convince African states to assemble again in Tripoli in November 1982. The second attempt for the 19th summit again failed allegedly because of the Libya-Chad conflict and the resultant division among African states.[264] The contact group that was mandated to bridge the gap between African states deliberated on the options of conducting the 19th summit first in its Addis Ababa meeting (October 1982) and then in Nairobi (February 1983). Finally, an agreement was reached during the 7th Non-Alignment Conference (New Delhi, March 1983) to convene the summit in Addis Ababa in June 1983.[265] In all

[262] *Addis Zämän*: *Säné* 24 & 25, 1972E.C (1 & 2 July 1980); Yäkatit 13, 17 & 19, 1974 E.C (21, 25 & 27 Feb. 1982).

[263] *Addis Zämän*: *Hämlé* 18, 28, 29 & 30 (25 July and 4, 5 & 6 Aug.), *Nähasé* 1, 2 & 4, 1974 E.C (7, 8 & 10 Aug. 1982).

[264] *Addis Zämän*: *Ṭeqémt* 7, 9, 20 & 25, 1975 E.C (Oct. 1982); *Hedar* 5, 8, 14, 15, 16 & 18, 1975 E.C (Nov. 1982).

[265] *Addis Zämän*: *Mäskäräm* 20, 21 & 22, 1975 E.C (Sept. 1982); *Yäkatit* 11, 12 & 13, 1975 E.C (Feb. 1983); *Mägabit* 2, 1975 E.C (March 1983).

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stu played an active role in convincing heads of state and government to set aside individual interests and work towards the collective good.

In a press conference that the Ethiopian foreign minister, Goġu Wäldé, gave regarding the upcoming summit, he urged fellow states not to boycott the event under any pretext. He claimed that such divisive factors as the membership to the OAU of the Saharawi Republic and the Chad issue would be decided by the assembly of heads of state and governments, and the question of the chairman of the summit (Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya was the chairperson of the 18th summit held in Nairobi in June 1981) would be equally resolved by the upcoming conference.[266] Following this, Ethiopia launched extensive preparations for the summit. The capital was redecorated for the occasion and issues related to the OAU and Africa were given extensive media coverage.[267]

A total of twenty-nine heads of state and governments, three prime ministers, one vice president and eighteen ministers attended the 19th summit; this number was unparalleled. To the disappointment of Col. Gaddafi, Mengistu Haile-Mariam was appointed chairperson of the 19th summit conference, a position he continued to hold till November 1984.[268] He had the daunting task of resolving points of African dissension, namely the problems of Saharawi Republic and Chad.[269]

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[266] *Addis Zämän*: *Genbot* 24, 1975 E.C (1 June 1983).

[267] See *Addis Zämän*: *Genbot* 17 (25 May) and *Säné* 7, 1975 E.C (14 June 1983).

[268] *Addis Zämän*: *Genbot* 28 & 30 (5 & 7 June); *Säné* 2, 3, 4, 5 & 7, 1975 E.C (June 1983).

[269] *Addis Zämän*: *Mäskäräm* 6, 10, 11, 12 & 13 (Sept. 1983); *Ṭeqémt* 2, 7, 8, 9 & 14 (Oct.); *Hedar* 10, 20, 22 & 26 (Nov.); *Tahesas* 3, 11 & 28 (Dec. 1983); *Ṭir* 1, 4, 6, 10 & 15 (Jan. 1984); *Yäkatit* 11 & 20 (Feb.); *Miyazya* 18 & 20 (April); *Genbot* 5, 22, 23 & 28 (May) ; *Säné* 1, 5, 6, 9 & 24(June), *Hämlé* 3 & 13, 1976 E.C (July 1984). See below for the Saharawi and Chad problems.

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ints of Retreat

Parallel to these successes, however, the positions Ethiopia assumed on some issues equally elicited strong condemnations. The first was Ethiopiaôs decision regarding the resolution of the sixth extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers in December 1965 concerning Rhodesia. The council of ministers demanded all independent African states to sever diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom in case of the latterôs failure to nullify the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the white minority regime by 15 December 1965.[270] The Council of Ministers of the imperial government accordingly decided to severe diplomatic relations with the UK. But upon the request of the British ambassador, the council delayed the official notification of the decision. In the meantime, the British government pleaded with the emperor, who was at the time visiting Madagascar; and the latter, to the embarrassment of his officials, vetoed the decision of his government. His measure, coming from such a prominent figure of African politics and the leader of the country claiming to be champion of the cause of the continent, came as a major blow to Ethiopiaôs prestige.[271]

Ethiopiaôs final position, therefore, purposefully side-stepped the issue of breaking diplomatic relations with Great Britain. Ethiopia simply condemned the minority regime in Rhodesia, announced the severance of economic relations with that regime, denied recognition to all travel documents issued or renewed by the ólegal regimeô, denied all servicing and other facilities by land, air and sea to all means of transportation from and

[270] MoFA OAU86 ï D6 1966(A), Resolution ECM/Res. 13 (VI) Concerning Rhodesia.
[271] Täfära Häylä-Selasé, *Ityopia ena talaqwa bretanya: yä diplomatic tarik kä 1798- 1966* (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 1999 E.C.), 307-309. Informant: Ambassadors Täfära Häylä-Selasé and Mängesté Dästa

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rms of communication between Ethiopia and Rhodesia[272] After Ethiopia communicated its position, an African students union, called the Council of African Organization, among it thirty-two constituent bodies was the Ethiopian Students Union, in a rather rude letter to the emperor, demanded that either óyou honor the OAU resolution or leave the OAUô.[273]

Col. Mengestuôs personal decision similarly created embarrassment among diplomatic circles in Ethiopia and Africa. The incident occurred when, heeding the advice of his leftist cronies, he cancelled the trip to New York to address the 38th General Assembly meeting in his capacity as the current chairman of the OAU (September 1983). Arrangements had been made for the Ethiopian leaderôs travel to the US, but at the very last minute he changed his mind and went first to South Yemen and then North Korea. It was cited as a major diplomatic blunder injurious to the prestige of not only Ethiopia but also the entire African continent.[274]

Generally speaking, however, Ethiopiaôs contribution to the African struggle to create a united front surpasses the intermittent failures registered over the period under discussion. Post-independence Africa did espouse the notion of continental unity but lacked the drive to overcome existing differences as to how to realize the agenda. The rift that later evolved into the Casablanca-Monrovia camps had began to manifest itself since the second CIAS in Addis Ababa (June 1960). So did Ethiopiaôs assumption of the role to bring the two sides together. In spite of its association with the Monrovia group, the country professed a policy of neutrality and commitment to bring the conflicting sides

[272] *Ibid.*
[273] *Ibid*, the President of the Organization to Hayla-Selassie: 3 January 1966.
[274] Informants: Ambassadors Seyoum Mohamud , Berhänu Dinqa, Mängesté Dästa and Yelma Tadäsä.

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ample time and energy was spent to realize the goal of achieving some sort of continental unity.

Bringing divergent African states to a summit conference was no easy task. Neither was convincing them to set aside their respective ideologies and to establish the OAU. Given the nature of African politics in that period, the obstacles Ethiopia faced looked almost insurmountable. Based on the overall spirit of the ócontinentalô Pan-African Movement, particularly the decolonization process and the quest for some sort of political integration, Ethiopia prepared a draft charter for African unity which was later endorsed as the Charter of the OAU. The organizational structure of the would-be-organization that Ethiopia proposed (an inter-state association of heads of state and government with a diluted authority of the council of ministers and a secretariat) was also accepted.

Seeking a compromise solution to the differing approaches of the Casablanca and Monrovia groups was what necessitated Ethiopiaôs initiative. The existing traditions of international organizations like the UN and the Organization of American States equally influenced the way Ethiopian authorities perceived the OAU. In retrospect, one can argue that there was no other viable alternative and Africa was not ready to entertain radical versions of associations. What Ethiopia sought and achieved represented a pragmatic approach taking into consideration the realities on the ground. Like its grand predecessor, the UN, the OAU was set to fulfill selected objectives, which it did accomplish with varying degree of success. The liberation of the African continent, its primary agenda, for example, was among the achievements, even if there were other contributory factors to that end. If anyone is to be blamed for the weakness of the OAU and its failures to realize

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ion, something for which it is criticized today, it is not only Ethiopia but the entire continent that willingly accepted the status quo.

In the meantime, though, Ethiopia exploited the chance to promote its immediate strategic interests. Efforts exerted to promote the principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention in the internal affairs of others were primary intended as protective measures against Somali irredentism and Eritrean secessionism. Even if the level of security they provided for Ethiopia remains questionable, the country nonetheless managed to introduce them as collective African tenets. Simultaneously, Ethiopia campaigned vigorously to host the headquarters of the continental organization. Apart from the prestige it would bring to the country, it was felt that it would enable Ethiopia to closely monitor the activities of the OAU. After an intense diplomatic battle, which brought the country into headlong confrontation with Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, it managed to secure the honor to permanently house the OAU. These achievements, however, entailed huge commitments from the country. The financial burden Ethiopia bore on various occasions and the efforts to sustain the notion of unity whenever the Africans faltered from course and put the very existence of the OAU in danger were cases in point.

This is not to say that Ethiopia, just like other member states, did not contribute to the bad state of affairs in African inter-state relations. It frequently deviated from collective decisions and on occasions ignored African calls for concerted action against common adversaries. The assembly, the council of ministers and the secretariat of the OAU remained ineffectual entities of the OAU. The unity of action and commitment to promote the interests of the continent and its people eluded African statesmen for long.

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ican unity, it was expected of Ethiopia to exert efforts to revitalize the OAU. It failed to do so even after the repeated incidents that had endangered the very existence of the continental body. More importantly, based on the policy of reciprocity it so dearly espoused, Ethiopia chose to ignore the plight of the African people and the misconduct of their leaders. African unity and collaboration predominantly revolved around external adversaries like colonialism, white minority regimes, neo-colonialism etc. The leaders of the continent systematically ignored what was happening within the continent as long as their counterparts remained silent. Ethiopia clearly failed in this regard, contributing its share to the whole process.

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Chapter VI

Ethiopia and the Liberation Movements

The suit that Ethiopia and Liberia submitted jointly on 4 November 1960 to the International Court of Justice against South Africa (for the violation of its obligations in South West Africa), and the subsequent legal intricacies till October 1966, were often presented as the prelude to Ethiopiaôs anti-colonial sentiments and dedication to the cause of freedom in the continent.[1] The UN and later the OAU served as forums where the country promoted its stance and provided assistance to various independence struggles, predominantly the ones in Southern Africa.

The countryôs policy orientation towards liberation movements, particularly in the case of territories that harbor multiple freedom fighters, had been always to support those recognized by the continental body and work towards their coordination and hence the creation of a united front.[2] Cases in point were Ethiopiaôs relation with ANC/PAC of South Africa, ZANU/ZAPU of Zimbabwe, FNLA/MPLA of Angola and SWANUF/SWAPO of Namibia. This chapter considers Ethiopiaôs activities in OAUôs Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa and practical assistance rendered to liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia (South West Africa) and Zimbabwe.

[1] Miller, ñEthiopia and Inter African Politicsé ò: 41; Lemmu, ñForeign Policy Decision-Making,ò 144; Zdenek Cervenka, *The Organization of African Unity and its Charter*, 124-132; Robert L. Hess, ñEthiopia,ò 523 and Hess, *Ethiopia: The Modernization of Autocracy*, 238.
[2] See below for the policy lines of the imperial regime and the military junta for the specific territories under discussion.

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As a member of the Liberation Committee Ethiopia took part in all the deliberations and actions to help peoples of southern Africa achieve independence. The committeeôs mandate of mobilizing financial, strategic, moral and material support to the freedom fighters represented one of the major objectives of the continental organization. Therefore, a lot was expected particularly from member states of this body. The nature of Ethiopiaôs involvement in this committee, as in other aspects, has to be measured in comparison with the level of commitment of others and what the country strove to maintain in the process as well.

The ideological tensions within the committee affected its smooth functioning, resulting in its initial incapability to live up to the original expectation. Every nation tried to influence proceedings so as to advance its immediate interest, and Ethiopia was no exception. In the period between 1963 and 1968 no significant role was played by this committee other than extending rudimentary support to liberation movements and engaging in a set of meetings that focused on creating additional sub-units.[3] Most of the time was spent either on reconciling factions of freedom fighters or trying to promote a given group as the sole representative of a given territory. The primary mission of Ethiopiaôs delegations that took part in the first successive meetings, accordingly, was to follow up deliberations on the future of French Somaliland (Djibouti).[4]

[3] C.O.C. Amate, *Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice* (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Publishers, 1986), 211-240; Wolfers, *Politics in the Organization of African Unity*, 165-184.

[4] All the reports by Ethiopiaôs representatives to the Liberation Committee singularly focused on how the question of the territory was entertained, and their recommendations for what to be done regarding future meetings. See below for these reports. See also Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements:*

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d taken the initiative by creating the *Front de Liberation de la Cote des Somalis* (Liberation Front of French Coast, FLCS) in mid-1963, and established contact with the Liberation Committee immediately afterwards. Through its designated secretary general, Abdullahi Ardiye, FLCS solicited the committee for arms, financial and material assistance in February 1964 and secured a donation pledge amounting to 7,500 pound sterling, out of which it had already acquired a thousand pounds.[5]

At the Fourth Meeting of the Liberation Committee in Dar-es-Salam, 25May - 3June 1964, Ardiye demanded for the balance of the pledged fund. The Ethiopian delegation had realized the implication of Somaliaôs activities only then and had to fight hard to check the progress of events. It insisted that the Mogadisho-based FLCS did not represent the people of French Somaliland, and had no meaningful members and followers in the territory. In spite of Ethiopiaôs opposition, the committee decided to give an additional two-thousand pounds to Ardiyeôs faction. As a concession to Ethiopia, however, members of the Policy Formulation Sub-Committee (Nigeria, Senegal and Congo (L)), together with the executive secretary of the Liberation Committee, were assigned to investigate the issue of the territory by visiting Ethiopia, Somalia and if possible French Somaliland. More alarming to the Ethiopian side, though, was the fact that this pro-Mogadisho faction managed to convince members of the committee that it was the sole

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Contemporary Struggles against White Minority Rule (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 301-305.

[5] MoFA Djibouti 57-D3 1B, Abdullahi Ardiye to the Secretary of the Coordinating Committee of African Liberation: 14 Feb. 1964.

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French Somaliland and that the territory was an integral part of Somalia proper.

The disgruntled Ethiopian delegation proposed a set of actions to be taken by the government to counter Somaliaôs intentions. The recommendations ranged from assessing the capabilities of FLCS, both in Mogadisho and French Somaliland, to formulating a policy directive on the future of the territory and establishing a pro-Ethiopian faction. Immediately afterwards, a whole set of activities were launched to prepare for the oncoming visit by representatives of the Liberation Committee. Frequent communications were exchanged between the MoFA and Ethiopian missions in Djibouti and Mogadisho; refugees both in Addis Ababa and the provinces (mostly Dire Dawa, Harar and Afar) were approached; and finally, risking the danger of alienating France, the *Le Mouvement de Liberation de Djibouti* (Liberation Movement of Djibouti, MLD) was established in September 1964.[7]

The period between late 1964 and 1967 witnessed fast changes in the situation of French Somaliland. The sub-committee assigned to investigate the existing condition had planned to go to the region in September 1964. The drama unfolded when the Nigerian representative saw it fit to visit only Mogadisho and compile a separate report while the

[6] MoFA Djibouti 57-D3 1B and OAU 1963, Ambassador Mängesté Dästa (Head of Ethiopiaôs delegation) to Kätäma Yifru (Minister of State, MoFA), Report on The Forth Meeting of the Liberation Committee: 16 *Säné* 1956 EC (23 June 1964).

[7] MoFA Djibouti 57-D3 5, Major Dämäqä Räta (Policy Study Group Head, MoFA) to Ambassador Ahadu Saburé (Mogadisho) and Consul General Asäfa Gäbrä-Maryam (Djibouti), Requesting immediate information on FLCS: 2 July 1964; Consul Asäfa to MoFA, Report on activities of FLCS in Djibouti: 9 July 1964; MoFA Djibouti 57-D3 1B, Minutes of high level policy discussion on Djibouti: *Nähasé* 7, 1956 EC (13 Aug. 1964); Major Dämäqä Räta to Kätäma Yifru, on the Dire Dawa based MLD: *Nähasé* 7, 1956 EC (13 Aug. 1964); MoFA Djibouti 54-D3 16, Minutes of a high level policy discussion on Djibouti: *Nähasé* 25, 1956 EC (31 Aug. 1964).

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go (L) were in Addis Ababa.[8] The Liberation Committee, meeting in Dar-es Salam from 16-23 October 1964, yet again urged the sub-committee to investigate the situation and come up with a comprehensive report, possibly by the end of November.[9]

Intense preparations were made on the Ethiopian side for the upcoming sub-committee visit; and when they finally managed to arrive in January 1965, everything was in place. Arrangements were made for the delegates to investigate MLD bases in Dire Dawa and Asayita (Afar), interviews were organized with leaders of the movement and members of the community and a detailed memorandum outlining the positions of both Ethiopia and MLD on French Somaliland was submitted.[10] Members of the sub-committee were accorded a warm reception and were courted by top officials including the Prime Minister and the Emperor. At the end of the visit, the delegates were amply impressed by Ethiopiaôs position. The split within FLCS (that later created the National Liberation Front of French Coast, NLFFC) and the absence of its representatives at the eighth Liberation Committee meeting in Dar-es-Salam, January 1966, in contrast with

[8] MoFA Djibouti 57-D3 57-D3, Ambassador Ahadu (Mogadisho) to Kätäma Yifru, Report on the activities of the Nigerian delegate in Mogadisho: *Mäskäräm* 12, 1957EC (23 Sept. 1964); MoFA Djibouti 51-D3 Vol. 4, Report on the Nigerian delegateôs activities in Mogadisho: no date; MoFA Djibouti 57-D3 57-D3, Ambassador Gétaḷäw Mäkaǧa (Nairobi, and head of the Ethiopian Delegation to Liberation Committee Meeting) to Kätäma Yifru, Memo on the Dar-es-Salam Meeting: *Ṭeqémt* 20, 1957EC (31 Oct. 1964).

[9] MoFA Djibouti 57-D3 57-D3, Ambassador Gétaḷäw Mäkaǧa (Nairobi, and head of the Ethiopian delegation to Liberation Committee Meeting) to Kätäma Yifru, Memo on the Dar-es-Salam Meeting: 31 Oct. 1964.

[10] MoFA Djibouti 57-D3 2, Major Dämäqä Räta to Kätäma Yifru, Memo on preparations for Liberation Committee Visit: *Hedar* 14, 1957EC (24 Nov. 1964); Major Dämäqä to Kätäma, Memo on final preparations, 12 Dec. 1964. MoFA Djibouti 57-D3 57-D3, Kätäma Yifru to PM Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld, Memo on preparations for the Liberation Committee Visit: Nov. 17, 1957; MoFA Djibouti 56-D3 2, Verbatim record on the activities of the Liberation Sub-Committee in Ethiopia: Dec. 20-27, 1965.

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MLD, contributed to the growing confidence of the Ethiopian side.

The political disturbance in French Somaliland following President De Gaulleôs visit in August 1966; the subsequent decision to hold a referendum on March 1967; the much-contested choice of the people to remain under French administration and change the name of the territory to ôFrench Territory of Afar and Isaô, together with what was presumed to be the negative role of Ethiopia in the process, influenced the deliberations of the Liberation Committee. The turn of events had reflected badly on Ethiopia and resulted in producing a feeling of antipathy among member states of the committee.

At the Eleventh Meeting of the Liberation Committee in Kampala, 31 July to 3 August 1967, representatives of Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Egypt, Algeria and Somalia deemed the referendum undemocratic and therefore unacceptable. The change in the naming of the territory particularly met unanimous rejection. More embarrassing to the Ethiopian delegation, however, was the blunder made by the head of MLD, Ahmed Burhan, while explaining the position of his faction to the committee. He had been drilled to assert the policy lines formulated by the government, i.e. his movement had fought for and respects the will of the people of Djibouti as was reflected in the referendum and will work for the eventual independence of the territory. But at the actual inquisition at

[11] MoFA Djibouti leyu-leyu fayloḷe 1 Ṣəraz 1, Major Dämäqä to Bätru Kidanä-Maryam (Provisional Charge de Affairs, Mogadisho) and Ambassador Gétaḷäw (Nairobi), Report on the Eighth Liberation Committee Meeting: *Yäkatit* 9, 1958EC (17 Feb. 1965).

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nning the results of the referendum labeling it as the mischief of the French.

The Tanzanian delegate, seconded by the Egyptian, immediately forwarded the motion to cancel the MLD from the list of liberation movements supported by the committee. Considering the absence of representatives of the FLCS, other delegates proposed the termination of financial assistance to both movements. After an extended argument, a consensus was reached to send yet another investigative body to the two countries, with a ruling to be made on which one to disband on the basis of the report. Angered by this decision, representatives of Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda abstained; and the foreign minister of the host nation, Uganda, cast off protocol while delivering a ceremonial closing speech by labeling the referendum as ôimperialistô.[13]

Alarmed by the negative attitude prevailing among fellow African nations, the Ethiopian delegation proposed for immediate actions to be taken by the government to set things right. This included the immediate launching of special diplomatic missions to disseminate Ethiopiaôs position; exerting special pressure on the rulers of Tanzania, Zambia and Uganda (for their representatives were considered a bad influence within the liberation committee); setting a consulate in Dar-es-Salam before the special sub-committee arrives in Ethiopia, for it was through its diplomats there that Somalia influenced the perceptions of the committee; and, more importantly, restructuring the MLD, including the immediate replacement of Ahmed Burhan with a more capable

[12] MoFA OAU 1963, Ambassador Mängesté (head of the delegation) to Kätäma Yifru, Memo on the 11th Liberation Committee Meeting: *Nähasé* 2, 1959EC (8 Aug. 1967).

[13] *Ibid*

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ations were implemented, with the exception of replacing MLD leader, for it proved difficult to reconcile the Afar-Isa ethnic conflict within Ethiopia and come up with a compromise leader for the movement.[14]

What happened during the Twelfth Liberation Committee Meeting in Conakry, Guinea, in January 1968, justified the fear of the Ethiopian delegation. In spite of the previous decision to send an investigative body to Ethiopia and Somalia, the executive secretary of the committee, Mr. George Magumbe, compiled a pro-Somalia report without any field observation. More frustrating to the Ethiopian side was the fact that, backed by what was referred to as the nine ôreactionary and progressive nationô out of the eleven committee members, the report called for the elimination of MLD in favor of FLCS, for the latter struggled for the total eradication of French colonialism and immediate independence of the territory.[15] Upon insistent opposition from the Ethiopian delegation, the report was withdrawn and the secretary general was requested to make another report for the upcoming meeting in Algeria, this time after visiting the region.

Somaliaôs latest maneuver to instigate violence in Djibouti using the FLCS was designed to coincide with the expectations of African nations from liberation movements. At the Kinshasa Summit (September 1967), heads of state and government had established a seventeen-member special commission of military experts to boost the slack liberation committee and help freedom fighters engage more in armed struggle. Somaliaôs

[14] *Ibid*; MoFA Djibouti 55-D3 Şeraz 3, Minutes of high level policy formulation meeting for the Kinshasa Summit: *Nähasé* 18, 1959EC (24 Aug. 1967); Summary record of the 6th and 7th meeting of the policy planning committee, 18August 1967; MOFA OAU1967 Şeraz 1, Mängesté to Kätäma: 8 August 1967; MOFA 1967OAU Şeraz 2, Fetegu Tadäsä to MOFA: 27 November 1967.

[15] MoFA OAU 1963, Report on the 12th Liberation Committee Meeting: January 1968.

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pment, and the ruling that a frontline state can request technical assistance from the military expertsô commission alarmed the Ethiopian side for it had implications both for its policy towards the territory and its relations with France.[16]

Ethiopiaôs intense diplomatic activities, however, managed to cool off the heat and lift off the pressure on it. The special investigative commission indeed visited the region and was in Ethiopia from 1 to 5 June 1968. This time Ethiopia was amply prepared for the visit. The MLD structure was overhauled and it appeared as a strong functional body, the Djibouti refugees were drilled to perfection, their camps were well organized and the people supportive of Ethiopiaôs policy towards their territory. The three members of the commission were duly impressed and expressed their satisfaction at understanding the realities behind the countryôs position.[17] Though no documentary evidence has been found as to what had happened at subsequent meetings of the liberation committee, the Djibouti issue seems to have ceased to trouble Ethiopia thereafter. If there were any subsequent discussions, they were apparently conducted at meetings of the council of ministers and summits of heads of state and government.

Apart from the Djibouti situation, Ethiopiaôs involvement in the liberation committee appeared to be in line with the actual nature of the committee itself. Every nation state attempted to influence procedures according to its immediate interest, and beyond that no substantial gesture was made to alter the slow progress of events associated with

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] MoFA Djibouti 51-D3 Şeraz 3, Memo on Ethiopiaôs preparation for the special commission visit: 20 May 1968; MoFA Djibouti leyu-leyu fayloḷe 1 Şeraz 1, Report on special commissions visit: 11 June 1968; MOFA OAU1968 Şeraz 3, Report on the Activities of the OAU Committee of Liberation Investigation Committee in Ethiopia, Täklä-Häymanot Tädla (MOFA, African Department, Director of Research Section) to Dr. Täsfayé: 11 June 1968. At the end of their mission Dr. Täsfayé met the three man delegation, and gave them a memorandum stating the Ethiopian stand on Djibouti question.

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restricted itself to issuing recommendations to the council of ministers and redistributing the meager resources at its disposal to freedom fighters throughout the continent.

The inefficiency of the committee actually emanated from the ideological divisions within member states of the OAU and the effort to incorporate divergent views. The Cold War alignments of African states and the resultant favoritism towards a given movement; the danger frontline states faced from Portugal and South Africa for supporting freedom fighters, and the formersô desire to keep the balance between harboring these elements and facing possible retaliation from their powerful colonial neighbors; and unwillingness of members to pay the mandatory contributions to the organization and the committee in particular often influenced the policy directives and actual activities of the liberation committee.[18] Ethiopia was not an exception. Like most fellow African states, it frequently failed to fulfill monetary obligations due the liberation committee and, more distinctly, assumed an aloofness regarding ideological divergences (often interpreted as indifference) that was so characteristic of the country. This was particularly true up to 1969.

African Heads of State and Government, aware of various problems associated with the liberation committee and freedom movements in southern Africa, had tried to update and coordinate their strategies at various times. Ethiopia had taken part in all of the deliberations and decisions and designed its policy accordingly. Some of these were the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto that resolved to tackle the question of decolonization primarily

[18] Amate, 211-240

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Mogadisho Declaration whereby armed struggle was endorsed as the only solution for liberating southern Africa; the Accra Strategy of 1973 that called on prioritizing and intensifying the armed struggle in Portuguese colonies; and the 1975 Dar-es-Salam Strategy that demanded concentrating efforts on Zimbabwe to help it achieve immediate independence.[19]

Ethiopiaôs conciliatory role in the ideological rift among frontline states and the rest of Africa during the new strategic overhaul concerning liberation movements is worth mentioning here. In the meeting held in Addis Ababa from 28-31 March 1980, ANC and SWAPO, in conjunction with Uganda advanced a proposal to label their problem a ñcolonial questionò. Frontline states, led by Tanzania, adamantly refused this proposal, referring to the Lusaka Manifesto, which accepts the South African government as a sovereign state and claims the liberation movement was primarily launched to eradicate the apartheid system. Tanzania threatened to boycott the strategic meeting if the effort to change the status quo succeeds. The Ethiopian delegation proposed a compromise to the effect that the policy should concentrate on eradicating the apartheid system and ultimately establishing a democratic government. This was unanimously approved and endorsed as the policy to be pursued by all African states.[20] Ethiopiaôs involvement in the liberation movements discussed below has to be viewed within this context.

[19] MoFA OAU86 OAU124, Memo on the activities of Liberation Committee: *17* April 1980. See also Organization of African Unity, Manifesto on Southern Africa: Lusaka Manifesto AHG/44 (16 April 1969).

[20] *Ibid*, Berehäne Därésa (Head of International Organizations and Non-Alignment Directorate, MoFA, head of the Ethiopian delegation) to ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative, MoFA), Report on the Forth Meeting of the Committee of Nineteen on Southern Africa: *Miyazya* 9, 1972EC (17 April 1980).

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Movements

6.2.1. South Africa: PAC/ANC

Imperial Ethiopia, as a member of the international community, had strongly objected to the introduction of the policy of Apartheid in South Africa in 1948 and had condemned the Sharpeville Massacre of March 1960. The countryôs practical assistance to the oppressed people of that part of Africa began soon afterwards when the regime donated 28,000 *birr* for children orphaned due to the carnage and granted full scholarship to thirty students.[21] However, this does not mean the Ethiopian state followed a consistent policy towards the South African government. Apart from officially denouncing the policy of racial segregation, no significant measure was taken to sever ties with that country.

The occasion of the establishment of the South African Republic on May 31, 1961, and the resultant confusion on what lines to follow towards the new regime best demonstrates the above observation. Ethiopiaôs diplomatic missions stationed in Africa and Europe requested for immediate directives on the position they were expected to assume on the new republic.[22] These included whether or not to participate on the ceremony in May 1961, how to conduct relations with South Africaôs consular and diplomatic representatives and whether they were to grant visas to individuals holding South African passports. Ethiopiaôs diplomats were pressurized by fellow Africans to

[21] MoFA (OA) däbub afriqa leyu-leyu guday 1 6B-29, Mängesté Dästa (Director, African and Middle East Directorate) to Ambassador Mäsfen Yäbägaǧät (Accra): *Hamlé* 1, 1953EC (8 July 1961).

[22] MoFA (OA) däbub afriqa leyu-leyu guday 1 6B-29, Berhänä Dänäqä (Charge de affairs, London) to MoFA: 10 May 1961; Berhänä Dänäqä to *Lej* Mikaôél Emeru (Minister, MoFA): 31 May 1961. MoFA (OA) selä däbub Africa (ANC) 629/1 , Mehrät Ergäşu (charge de affairs, Athens) to Kätäma Yifru (Minister of State, MoFA): *Yäkatit* 29, 1954EC (7 March 1962).

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vernment and this added to the insistence for immediate response.

Correspondences originating from MoFA suggest the absence of clear-cut policy directives to be followed (other than opposing the apartheid system in general and maintaining the position on South West Africa in particular), instead encouraging diplomatic missions playing it safe in all their actions. This included adopting the policy lines of other African states, and simultaneously maintaining diplomatic and consular exchanges with South Africa until final directives were to be issued in the near future.[23]

All the diplomatic missions, particularly Ethiopiaôs permanent representative to the UN, were instructed to investigate the attitudes of African States towards the new republic and report back with their own recommendations.[24] The reports show division among fellow Africans on what policy to adopt towards South Africa. The United Arab Republic was the first to severe diplomatic relations and refused to recognize the new government; members of the Casablanca group were expected to follow suit. Other states remained neutral and rather chose to focus on the proposal to force South Africa out of the International Labor Organization together with raising the issue of apartheid in upcoming Security Council meetings. The accompanying recommendations insisted on following the latter line, and that apparently was what was adopted by the Ethiopian

[23] MoFA(OA) däbub afriqa leyu-leyu guday 1 6B-29, Memo on South Africa Situation: *Genbot* 14, 1953EC (22 May 1961); Gétaḷäw Mäkaġa (Director, African and Middle East Directorate) to Berhänä Dänäqä (London): *Genbot* 15, 1953EC (23 May 1961).

[24] MoFA(OA) däbub afriqa leyu-leyu guday 1 6B-29, Lej Mikaôél Emeru to Dr. Täsfayé Gäberäzgi (Ethiopiaôs Permanent Representative, UN): *Genbot* 17, 1953EC (25 May 1961); Berhänä Dänäqä (London) to *Lej* Mikaôél Emeru. MoFA(OA) selä däbub afriqa (ANC) 629/1 , Mängesté Dästa (MoFA, Director) to Ethio-Embassies (Paris and Lagos): 10 & 13 June 1961; Asfaw Täfära (3rd Secretary, Lagos) to MoFA: *Säné* 8, 1953EC (15 June 1961); Dr. Täsfayé (New York) to *Lej* Mikaôél: *Säné* 15, 1953EC (22 June 1961).

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a major proponent of peaceful resolution of the problem (as was endorsed by most African states and the UN) and economic sanction as a mechanism to pressurize South Africa into slackening its policy of segregation and freeing political prisoners.[25]

Ethiopiaôs association with the liberation movements of South Africa began in earnest following the crack down on and banning of the two factions, African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), in April 1960. South Africaôs action precipitated the emergence of active resistance, ANC targeting government institutions through its military wing *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (Spear of the Nation) while PAC attacked white civilians whom it considered the primary source of their countryôs problem. This new orientation, together with the tightening sanctions imposed on them by the apartheid regime, necessitated the establishment of closer contact with independent Africa. Soon afterwards, therefore, leaders of the two factions began to go around the continent in search of material and moral support.[26]

In June 1961, the exiled leaders of PAC approached the Ethiopian embassy in Accra and presented a memorandum seeking assistance. The Executive Secretary of PAC, Philip Ata Kgosana, together with the former secretary, Lawrence T. Mgweba, explained

[25] MoFA(OA) selä däbub afriqa (ANC) 629/1 , Dr. Täsfayé (New York) to *Lej* Mikaéél: *Säné* 15, 1953EC (22 June 1961). MoFA(OA) selä däbub Africa (ANC) 629 1 , Ambassador Häddis Alämayähu (London) to Kätäma (Provisional Minister): *Mägabit* 9, 1956EC (18 March 1964); Kätäma to Häddis: *Mägabit* 25, 1956EC (3 April 1964); Dr. Täsfayé to Kätäma, UN Resolution on South Africa: *Miyazya* 20, 1956EC (28 April 1964).

[26] *Ibid*. Also see Dale T. McKinley, *The ANC and the Liberation Struggle: A Critical Political Biography* (Pluto Press: London, Chicago, Illinois, 1997), 1-23, 25-40; ANC Department of Information and Publicity, *The Pan Africanist Congress of Azania: A Viable Alternative? Or a Flat Spare Tyre? A Reflection on the Origins, Track-Record, Present Performance and Policies of the PAC,* (No Date), 2-6; Ben Turok, *The ANC and the Turn to Armed Struggle* (Jacana Media, Johannesburg, 2010), 17-72, 77-88, 106.

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to liberate and rehabilitate imprisoned members and organize a well-trained army. They requested immediate assistance and, if possible, audience with the emperor.[27] After the customary investigation of the faction, the two leaders were invited to come to Ethiopia in early August 1961. In addition to granting them a small amount of money, the emperor gave instructions for eleven PAC members to be trained in guerilla warfare.[28]

Emperor Hayla-Selassie brought along the eleven political refugees when returning from the Lagos Conference in January 1962. The preparations for the military training of the eleven chosen PAC recruits was well underway when another claimant to the leadership of PAC, Peter H. Molotsi, approached Ethiopian officials, presented a report claiming that Kgosana and Mgweba were no longer leaders of PAC and warned the authorities against any support to them. After a heated discussion whether or not to disperse the eleven recruits, it was finally decided to go ahead with the plan. The justification given was whichever group they belonged to, since both were equally accepted by the OAU, they would ultimately serve their country and the cause at hand, i.e. the elimination of the system of apartheid from South Africa.[29]

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[27] For PAC Memorandum to Ethiopia see MoFA(OA) däbub afriqa leyu-leyu guday 1 6B-29, Ambassador Mäsfen Yäbägagäit (Accra) to *Lej* Mikaêél Emeru (Minister): *Säné* 4, 1953EC (11 June 1961).

[28] MoFA(OA) däbub afriqa leyu-leyu guday 1 6B-29, Mängisté Dästa (Director) to Accra Embassy: *Säné* 9, 1953EC (16 June 1961); Ambassador Mäsfen (Accra) to MoFA: 24 June 1961; Mängisté Dästa to Ambassador Mäsfen: *Hamlé*, 1953EC (July 1961); Mängisté Dästa to Accra Embassy: *Hamlé* 21, 1953EC (28 July 1961); Mängisté Dästa to Lt. Col. Yergu Endaylalu (Emperors Private Cabinet): *Yäkatit* 14, 1954EC (22 Feb. 1962).

[29] *Ibid*, Lt. Col. Yergu Endaylalu (Emperorôs Private Cabinet) to MoFA: *Yäkatit* 6, 1954EC (14 Feb. 1962); Mängesté Dästa (Director) to Lt. Col. Yergu: *Yäkatit* 14, 1954EC (22 Feb. 1962); Memo to the Minister on the status of Ten South African Refugees in Ethiopia: *Hämlé* 13. 1953EC (20 July 1961).

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financial support now and then to the various groupings working against the South African regime,[30] Ethiopia continued to give scholarships to members of PAC and ANC until August 1966. For instance, twenty ANC-affiliated students had received different levels of military training by 1964. They included Nelson Mandela and others, who formed the first nucleus of the armed wing of ANC.[31] But the selection process, the friction among the factions themselves, what to do with the recruits after training and the confusion regarding how the UN and OAU would cover their expenses (for the two bodies had set aside a special fund for such cases), created administrative problems for Ethiopia. By August 1968, a decision had been reached to halt receiving any refugees from South Africa.[32] This necessitated a detailed study on how to arrange scholarships, both to freedom fighters and those coming from independent African nations, the financial burden it entailed on Ethiopia and how the international institutions could help to cover them. The document was produced in December 1970 and endorsed as a guideline then afterwards.[33]

The struggle in South Africa had failed to bring about any meaningful result. The imprisonment of the leaders of ANC and PAC; the internal divisions within the two

[30] MoFA(OA) selä däbub afriqa (ANC) 629 1 , Ambassador Häddis (London) to MoFA: *Miyazya* 13, 1956EC (21 April 1964) and MoFA to Ethiopiaôs Embassy (London) on financial assistance to London based affiliation group: *Säné* 19, 1956 EC. MoFA(OA) däbub afriqa leyu-leyu guday 1 6B-29, Dr Täsfayé (State Minister, MoFA) to Yohänes Kidanä-Maryam (Deputy Minister, Ministry of Pen) on financial assistance to ANC: *Ṭeqemt* 7, 1960EC (18 Oct. 1967); Dr. Täsfayé to Bulḷa Dämäqsa (State Minister, Ministry of Finance), on financial assistance to ANC and ZAPU: October 14, 60; Dr. Tesfaye to National Bank of Ethiopia: December 17, 1960.

[31] MoFA OAU82 OAU71, Memo on talk with ANC and PAC leaders: *Ṭer* 27, 1968EC (5 Feb. 1976); Memo to Gen. Täfäri Bänté on ANC and PAC requests: *Miyazya* 5, 1968EC (13 April 1976).

[32] MoFA selä däbub afriqa (ANC) 20, Memo on Teaching South African Refugees: *Nähasé* 23, 1958EC (29 Aug. 1966).

[33] MoFA yä afriqa agäroḷe 108-D8 1, Policy directives on granting scholarships for Africans: 11 Dec. 1970.

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fusion among African nations as to which one to take seriously, and the impediment created to these freedom fighters by the total encirclement of their country by Portuguese colonies were often adduced as the contributing factors. The independence of Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970s eliminated one major problem and introduced a new phase in the struggle for the emancipation of not only South Africa but the entire region as well. African states concurrently adopted the 1975 Dar-es-Salam Strategy that called for the intensification of armed struggle in Zimbabwe so as to totally remove the encirclement of the apartheid regime by colonial powers. However, the ideological divisions within the two factions continued to be an obstacle, the Peopleôs Republic of China and USSR sponsoring PAC and ANC, respectively; and there were different groups who claimed to represent the true spirit of each movement.[34]

The contact between Ethiopia and the two factions assumed a different course following these developments in the region. Representatives of the two movements, J. Makatini for ANC and L.T. Mgueba for PAC, approached officials at MoFA for assistance in late January 1976. The former requested a training camp for its infantry division and permission to open a branch office in Addis Ababa. PAC in turn asked for an immediate short-term assistance of $50,000 and the military training of its cadres in both guerrilla and conventional warfare, Ethiopia covering the whole expense.[35] Cognizant of developments in the liberation struggles of Southern Africa, and in line with

[34] MoFA OAU82 OAU71, Memo on talk with ANC and PAC leaders: *Ṭer* 27, 1968EC (5 Feb. 1976); Memo to Gen. Täfäri Bänté on ANC and PAC requests: April 5, 1968 EC. See also Daniel R. Kempton, *Soviet Strategy Toward Southern Africa: The National Liberation Movement Connection* (Praeger, New York, London, 1989), 151-212.

[35] *Ibid*, Käsaté-Berehän Badäma (MoFA) to Kiflé Wädajo, Memo on talk with ANC and PAC leaders: *Ṭer* 27, 1968EC (5 Feb. 1976).

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ations, the military government in Ethiopia allocated a budget of $100,000 for the four major liberation movements in the region (ANC, PAC, SWAPO and ZANU/ZAPU) , and preparations were made to set up a training camp for the freedom fighters.[36]

ANC and PAC representatives also met the chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), Br. Gen. Täfäri Bänté, during the Fifth Non-Alignment Conference in Colombo, Jakarta (August 1976) and an agreement was reached for Ethiopia to render short term and long term support to both movements. This time ANC requested, in addition to the military training, air time on Radio Ethiopia for propaganda purposes; and PAC concentrated on training its members in warfare.[37] ANCôs secretary general, Alfred Nzo, stressed the need for the air time when he visited Ethiopia in May 1977, claiming the fact that their previous propaganda base in Lusaka (Zambia) had been closed down by the government because ANC supported *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola-Partido de Trabalho* (MPLA) which was not in good terms with the government of Kenneth Kaunda. High level deliberations were made on the

[36] *Ibid*, Memo to Gen. Täfäri Bänté on ANC and PAC requests: *Miyazya* 5, 1968EC (13 April 1976). Similar request for a special fund was made again two years later MoFA(OA) yä däbub afriqa wäqtawi hunéta 2 125, Major Dawit Wäldä-Giyorgis (Permanent Representative, MoFA) to Provisional Military Administrative Council: *Genbot* 28, 1970EC (5 June 1978).

[37] MoFA(OA) däbub afriqa leyu-leyu guday 1 6B-29, J. Mfanafuthi Makatini (ANC representative) to MoFA, cited in Memo to Kiflé Wädajo on ANC Request for Assistance from Ethiopia: *Nähasé* 24, 1968EC (30 Aug. 1976); David M. Sibeko (Director for Foreign Affairs and Member of the Central Committee of PAC) to Ambassador Mengeste Dasta (Nairobi): December 7, 1976; Ambassador Mängisté to Kiflé Wädajo: *Tahesas* 29, 1968EC (8 Jan. 1976).

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casting rights to the two movements, for PAC had also requested for similar services earlier, and it was decided to grant the right only to ANC.[38]

Still the actual implementation of military training for PAC and ANC cadres met difficulties following bureaucratic complications in Ethiopia and problems within the movements. The execution of Gen. Täfäri in February 1977, the irreconcilable differences between PAC and ANC, and the ever-continuing power struggle within PAC were among the contributing factors. Immediately after the 1976 request, the Ministry of Education had planned to accept one hundred ANC and SWAPO affiliated students for the next academic year, and presented a budget proposal to the tune of 144,000 *birr* per annum.[39]

The MoFA opposed the idea on the basis that the sponsoring agent, CODESRIA, (that would cover travel, medical, clothing and book expenses) was not yet an OAU-recognized institution and that the list did not include PAC members, rather had Namibian students who were not in the original agreement. In spite of the fact that the idea to train these students was accepted in principle, the ministry argued such activities should be conducted through the appropriate channel designated by the continental organization. Otherwise it would have negative consequences on the already divided South African freedom fighters, and ultimately affect the image of the host. So the plan

[38] MoFA(OA) OAU82 OAU71, Memo on talk with Alfred Nzo: *Genbot* 8, 1969EC (16 May 1977); Dr. Fäläqä Gädlä-Giyorgis (Minister, MoFA) to Häylu Yemänu (Minister, Council of Ministers): *Genbot* 29, 1969EC (6 June 1977); Häylu Yemänu to Ministry of Press and Information: *Säné* 22, 1969EC (29 June 1977).

[39] MoFA(OA) africa andenät 20 91, Hussain Ismaôél (Permanent Representative, Ministry of Education) to Council of Ministers: *Yäkatit* 8, 1969EC (16 Feb. 1977).

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a directive was issued authorizing the MoFA as a body responsible to decide on such matters in the future.[40]

In spite of the above setback, ANC appears to have fared relatively better with the new government than its counterpart. In addition to the radio broadcasting privilege, it was granted tax-free import privileges, permission to establish a permanent representative office as well as travel documents for the head of the office, Mr. Zola Skweyiya.[41] The joint broadcasting permit to ANC and SWAPO was issued in May 1981 with a slot from 10 to 11 pm local time (3:00 to 4:00 pm South African time), with an equal share of thirty minutes. It was estimated to cost Ethiopia a total of 165,917 *birr* per annum. ANCôs request for an extension of air time a year later met strong opposition from press officials on the grounds that, apart from technical and financial constraints it would entail, they were not using the allotted time effectively and the broadcasts failed to address the ongoing struggle in South Africa.[42]

PAC was less fortunate. Its insistent request for military training failed to materialize despite the decision taken during the chairmanship of Gen. Täfäri to accept and train 150 cadres.[43] The assassination of one of their leaders, David Sibeko, in 1979 instigated yet

[40] *Ibid*, Major Dawit Wäldä-Giyorgis (Permanent Representative, MoFA) to Council of Ministers: *Miyazya* 10, 1969EC (18 April 1977); Wäldä-Maryam Wäldä-Mikaĉel (Chairperson of Economic and Social Affairs, Council of Ministers) to Ministry of Education: *Genbot* 2, 1969EC (10 May 1977).

[41] MoFA(OA) OAU66 OAU103, Africa and Middle East Directorate to the Political Commissar (MoFA): 3 May 1979; Protocol Division to Africa and Middle East Directorate: *Ṭer* 4, 1974EC (13 Jan. 1982); Häylu Wäldä-Amanuél (Director, Africa and Middle East Directorate) to Ministry of State and Public Security: 14 July 1982.

[42] MoFA(OA) yä däbub afriqa wäqtawi hunéta 2 125, Major Germa Yilma(Minister, Ministry of Press and Information) to MoFA: *Genbot* 12, 1973EC (20 May 1981). MoFA(OA) OAU66 OAU103, Gädamu Abräha (Councilor, Ministry of Press and Information) to MoFA: *Säné* 2, 1974EC (9 June 1982).

[43] MoFA(OA) däbub afriqa leyu-leyu guday 1 6B-29, Major Dawit Wäldä-Giyorgis to Häylu Yemänu (Council of Ministers): *Säné* 6, 1969EC (13 June 1977).

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le. One of the leaders, Mr. Lebalou, approached the Ethiopian embassy in Lagos and requested support for the transfer of their headquarters from Dar-es-Salam to Addis Ababa. This was immediately turned down on the grounds that such an action would negate the mandate of the OAU that recognized the Dar-es-Salam based movement, and Ethiopia would not in any way interfere in the factionôs domestic affairs.[44] Even more illustrative of Ethiopiaôs apparent rejection of PAC was the refusal to allow the movement to open its branch office in Addis Ababa. The foreign minister, Dr. Fäläqä Gädlä-Giyorgis, clearly stated in a memo to the African Directorate Ethiopiaôs ongoing favoritism towards ANC and ordered the directorate to justify why PAC had to be assisted.[45]

The Ethio-ANC relation entered yet another phase after July 1981. In a memorandum presented to PMAC by Thabo Mbeki (Director of Political Department of the National Executive Council of the ANC) and P. Dlamini (Member of the Revolutionary Council of the ANC), the movement requested for a monthly allowance of a thousand *birr* for the maintenance of its office in Addis Ababa; duty free privileges for the import of all equipment, publications and furniture they would be receiving from ANC headquarters in Lusaka and other offices abroad; accommodation for three radio journalists who would be broadcasting on Radio Voice of Revolutionary Ethiopia; issuance of Ethiopian passports to all its functionaries; the immediate military training of 200-300 ANC cadres as well as specialized training for thirty cadres as intelligence and security officers,

[44] *Ibid*, Ambassador Käsaté-Berehän Badäma (Lagos) to Berhänu Dinqa (Director, Africa and Middle East Directorate): 27 Sept. 1979; Berhänu Dinqa to Ambassador Käsaté-Berehän: *Ṭeqémt* 11, 1972EC (22 Oct. 1979).

[45] MoFA(OA) OAU82 OAU71, African Directorate to Dr. Fäläqä: *Genbot* 5, 1973EC (13 May 1981).

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men; western type weapons and ammunition; and scholarships for its members in higher learning institutions in Ethiopia.[46]

After some deliberations and administrative procedures, a budget of 24,000 *birr* for office maintenance and 61, 803 *birr* for one hour radio broadcasting was allocated both to ANC and SWAPO. Military training for their cadres was also allowed based on prior consultations with their military experts. In addition, they were granted duty free import privileges and passports for their leaders.[47] Apart from the initial financial shortages due to bureaucratic delays on the side of Ethiopia, ANC activities went pretty well thereafter. Don Reuben Ngubeni organized ñRadio Freedomôsò broadcasts from Addis Ababa to the satisfaction of both parties.

Based on this success, after direct request by the president of ANC, Oliver Tambo, to the chairman of the PMAC, Mengistu Haile-Mariam, the duration of radio transmission was extended from 60 to 90 minutes in January 1984.[48] Taking advantage of these privileges, the ANC imported commodities ranging from electronic material to cars and textiles. Worth mentioning here is the whole package of transmission equipments and

[46] MoFA(OA) yä däbub afriqa wäqtawi hunéta 2 125, Memorandum of Request by the ANC to PMAC and Council of Ministers of Socialist Ethiopia: *Hamlé* 22, 1981.

[47] *Ibid*, Fesäha Dästa (Deputy Chairperson, Council of Ministers) to Ministry of Finance: *Mäskäräm* 8, 1974EC (19 Sept. 1981); Fesäha Dästa to MoFA: 19 Sept. 1981; ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative, MoFA) to the Council of Ministers: *Ṭer* 7, 1974EC (16 Jan. 1982); African and Middle East Directorate to ŝibäbu Bäqälä: *Nähasé* 13, 1974EC (19 Aug. 1982); ŝibäbu Bäqälä to the Council of Ministers: *Nähasé* 27, 1974EC (2 Sept. 1982); Fesäha Dästa to Ministry of Finance: *Mäskäräm* 6, 1975EC (17 Sept. 1982).

[48] MoFA(OA) yä däbub afriqa wäqtawi hunéta 2 9, Zola S.T. Skweyiya (Chief ANC Representative to Ethiopia) to ŝibäbu Ġïfäraw (Director, African and Middle East Directorate): January 3, 1984; ŝibäbu Ġïfäraw to Ministry of Press and Information: *Ṭer* 14, 1974EC (23 Jan. 1982).

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n institutions based in the Netherlands like ñBroadcast for Radio Freedomò and ñAnti-Apartheid Movementò.[49]

Ethiopiaôs direct association with the ANC in the period under discussion, as far as the documents reveal, ends in August 1988. Following the 1988 trilateral agreement between Angola, South Africa and Cuba to evacuate ANC fighters from Angola, Oliver Tambo met with President Mengistu at Lusaka and explained the impending perilous position of his movement. The front line states had already ordered the freedom fighters out of their territories, and Tambo reiterated his fear that the joint Angola-Cuba proposal to relocate ANC fighters to relatively distant Ethiopia, Cuba and USSR would endanger the credibility of the whole movement.[50]

Ethiopiaôs officials were intrigued by this development and arranged for an immediate inquiry into the situation by approaching the provisional secretary of the OAU, Ambassador Yilma Tadäsä, the chargé dô affaire of the USSR Embassy in Addis Ababa, as well as the Zambian and Cuban Ambassadors. Even though authorities were aware of the danger awaiting ANC following its forceful evacuation from Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Mozambique and now Angola, and the political leverage accepting

[49] MoFA(OA) yä däbub afriqa wäqtawi hunéta 2 21, ŝ ibäbu Ġifäraw to Ministry of Finance: *Mäskäräm* 24, 1976EC (5 Oct. 1983); ŝ ibäbu Ġifäraw to Customs Authority: 8 May 1984; Dr. Täġomä Täklu (Director, African Directorate) to Customs Authority: *Mäskäräm* 30, 1977EC (11 Oct. 1984); Zola S.T. Skweyiya to ŝ ibäbu Ġifäraw: October 6, 1984; Dr. Täġomä to Customs and Excise Tax Administration: 11 Nov. 1984; Bäqälä Tamerat (State Minister, ministry of Finance) to Customs and Excise Tax Administration: 18 June 1985; Ethio-Embassy in Brussels to MoFA: 14 June 1985. For Norwayôs involvement in the anti-apartheid movement supporting both ANC and PAC see Eva Helene Østbye, ñThe South African Liberation Struggle: Official Norwegian Support,ò in *Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa,* Ed. Tore Linné Eriksen (Nordiska Afrikanstitutet, 2000): 131-176; Tore Linné Eriksen, ñThe Origin of a Special Relationship: Norway and Southern Africa, 1960-1975,ò in *Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa,* Ed. Tore Linné Eriksen (Nordiska Afrikanstitutet, 2000): 9-87.

[50] MoFA(OA) yä däbub afriqa wäqtawi hunéta 2 vol.1, Memo on the Plan to Evacuate ANC Fighters from Angola to Ethiopia: *Mäskäräm* 12, 1981EC (23 Sept. 1988).

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ia, they feared the financial burden that it would entail on the country. In the end, to the relief of Ethiopian authorities, the plan was altogether dropped and the ANC fighters were relocated to Uganda.[51]

6.2.2. South West Africa/Namibia: SWANUF/SWAPO

Ethiopiaגs involvement in the affairs of South West Africa/Namibia dated as far back as 1946 with its strong objection to the violation of the mandate of the League of Nations on that territory by South Africa. Following lengthy deliberations in the UN and various rulings by the International Court which bore no meaningful result, Ethiopia, together with Liberia, brought a charge against the South African government in 1960.[52] The essence of the submission was that South Africa, by introducing apartheid into South West Africa, had violated the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the terms of the mandate for the territory, and had significantly failed to carry out its obligations to promote to the utmost the moral and material wellbeing and the social progress of the indigenous population of the territory.

The International Courtגs ruling in July 1966, to the effect that the two African states had no interest in South West Africa and no legal grounds to be the plaintiff, had angered the Ethiopian government. The foreign minister, Ketema Yifru, made a strong statement to the 21st session of the General Assembly of the UN castigating the utter incompetence that the global forum and its affiliates had exhibited for the past twenty years on this

[51] *Ibid*. See also M. Hidayatullah, *The South-West Africa Case* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1967), 20-21, 37-50, 64-82, 93-111.

[52] MoFA selä namibia näkanät guday 31, Memo on Namibia: *Miyazya* 6, 1970EC (14 April 1978).

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d that Ethiopiaôs requests need to be entertained by the Assembly. These included the demand that the mandate which conferred upon South Africa the power of administration of the territory be revoked and that the Assembly assume, through a special machinery to be established for the purpose, the administration thereof. Ketema ended his passionate address on a personal note:

> é My country, by virtue of its membership in the League of Nations, has been honored to carry, on behalf of all African states, and with its sister state of Liberia, the burden of the legal battle in the Court. Now that we have come to a dead end on this road, I would like to state we have no regrets. For one thing, we are satisfied that we have not spared any effort to seek all possible solutions to the problem. This knowledge itself is a reward from which we derive a larger measure of solace and satisfaction. We are also satisfied in that we have discharged to the end the collective trust put upon us by our brother African Statesé .[54]

The General Assembly, apparently embarrassed by the July ruling, revoked South Africaôs mandate over that territory in October 1966; and in its meeting in early 1967 sanctioned the establishment of the ñNamibian Councilò that would oversee the territoryôs march towards independence the coming year.[55] This led to a series of events culminating in the actual independence of the territory in December 1989.

Irrespective of the above development at the UN, Ethiopiaôs relation with freedom fighters in South West Africa was insignificant till mid-1967. Traces of contact with Sam Nujoma can be found as far back as September 1961, when, leading an entourage of six, he was granted audience by the emperor and given 4,060 *birr* as compensation for

[53] MoFA Djibouti 52-D3 26, Kätämaôs Speech to the 21st General Assembly: September 23, 1966.

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] MoFA selä namibia näкanät guday 31, Memo on Namibia: *Miyazya* 6, 1970EC (14 April 1978). For better understanding of the debate in the UN and Ethiopiaôs involvement therein see M. Hidayatullah, *The South-West Africa Case* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1967): 1-11, 20-39, 50-111. See also Eva Helen Østbye, ñThe Namibian Liberation Struggle: Direct Norwegian Support to SWAPO,ò in *Norway and National Liberation in Southern Africa,* Ed. Tore Linné Eriksen. (Nordiska Afrikanstitutet, 2000): 89-90.

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and from Ethiopia.[56] However, when the practical phase of Ethiopia's assistance began, it was marred from the beginning by complications emanating from problems among the different freedom fighters associated with that territory.

In July 1967, one of the movements, the National Unity Democratic Organization (NUDO), approached the Ethiopian Embassy in Nairobi and requested military training for fifteen of its cadres who were at refugee camps in Botswana at that moment. The request was granted a year later after the authorities acquired a written assurance from the chief representative of this organization in East Africa, Jacson Kambode, that the trainees would return to their country immediately after completion of the designated courses.[57] The controversy involving the different movements and the Ethiopian government started when these students were approaching the end of their training.

The movement that had initially applied for the scholarship, NUDO, had been dissolved in the meantime and had assumed a new status, adopting the name South West Africa National United Front (SWANUF). The new body presented a new request to Ethiopia for the granting of refugee status to the above cadres and an extension of their training to a higher level that would match the standards of the enemy, i.e. the South African Army. The Ethiopian authorities refused both requests on the grounds that it was

[56] MoFA(OA) selä däbub africa(ANC) 629/1 , Zäwgä Wäldä-Maryam (MoFA) to Finance Department (MoFA): *Mäskäräm* 19, 1954EC (30 Sept. 1961).

[57] MoFA(OA) yä däbub afriqa wäqtawi hunéta 2 2, Ambassador Gétaḷäw Mäkaṅa (Nairobi) to Dr. Täsfayé Gäberäzgi (State Minister, MoFA): *Hamlé* 18, 1959EC (25 July 1967); Dr. Täsfayé to Ambassador Gétaḷäw: *Nähasé* 8, 1959EC (14 Aug. 1967); Embassy of the Republic of Zambia to MoFA: August 24, 1967; Dr. Täsfayé to Lt. Gen. Käbädä Gäbré (Minister, Ministry of Defense): *Tahesas* 11, 1961EC (21 Dec. 1968).

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inal agreement and the academic capabilities of these students did not warrant any higher training.[58]

Further complications arose when the SWANUF representative, Mr. Kambode, disclosed the fact that his movement could not afford to transport them back and was contemplating to ask the OAU Liberation Committee to take care of them until further notice. The other movement that was fully recognized by the OAU as the sole representative of the territory, the South West Africa Peoplesô Organization (SWAPO), perceptive of their potential, proposed to take over the trainees, thereby creating an extended jurisdiction problem that involved the Liberation Committee. To make things worse, during an OAU Seminar on Namibia held in Addis Ababa from 27 April to May 2, 1970, the trainees refused to return to their homeland.[59]

The Dargôs favoritism towards SWAPO contributed to strengthening the latterôs activities in post-revolutionary Ethiopia. The kind of assistance that had been offered to ANC was likewise accorded to this movement over the years until the territoryôs independence. This included permanent representation in Addis Ababa, free broadcasting time in Radio Ethiopia, tax- free import privileges and training for SWAPOôs cadres ranging from guerilla warfare to a batch of military and civil pilots and technicians.[60]

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[58] *Ibid*, Mängesté Dästa (Assistant Minister, MoFA) to Yohännes Kidanä-Maryam (State Minister, Ministry of Pen): *Säné* 2, 1961EC (9 June 1969); Lt. Gen. Käbädä Gäbré to Yohännes Kidanä-Maryam (Personal Secretary to the Emperor): *Hamlé* 25, 1961EC (1 Aug. 1969).

[59] *Ibid*, Berhänu Bahta (Charge de affair, Nairobi) to Dr. Täsfayé (MoFA): *Hamlé* 15, 1961EC (22 July 1969); Jacson Kambode to Ethio-Embassy (Nairobi): July 21, 1969; Mängesté Dästa (MoFA) to Berhänu Bahta (Nairobi): *Mäskäräm* 30, 1962EC (11 Oct. 1970); Jacson Kambode to Dr. Fetegu Tadäsä (Director, African Directorate, MoFA): October 26, 1969; Jacson Kambode to MoFA: June 2, 1970.

[60] MoFA(OA) yä däbub afriqa wäqtawi hunéta 2 125, Major Dawit Wäldä-Giyorgis (Political Commissar, MoFA) to PMAC, Justifying Permanent Budget to ANC and SWAPO: *Genbot* 28, 1970EC (5 June 1978); Fesäha Dästa (Deputy, Council of Ministers) to Ministry of Finance: *Mäskäräm* 6, 1975EC (17 Sept. 1982).

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sistance rendered to the movement, the UN turned out to be the battle ground for the independence of South West Africa. Ethiopia, as chairman of the UN Liberation Committee and member of the Committee of Seventeen on Namibia organized by the Non-Aligned Movement, took an active part in all the deliberations. Ethiopiaôs permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Täsfayé Tadäsä, took a lot of credit in leading his countryôs diplomatic activities immediately before the 1989 general election and the resultant independence under SWAPO leadership.[61]

Sam Nujomaôs thirty year exile and struggle finally bore fruit, and he got ready to return home well before the election in late August 1989. As a token of his gratitude, he made one last request to the Ethiopian government: that an Ethiopian Boeing 767 airplane be made available, with Namibian pilots and crew being trained in Addis Ababa and wearing the uniform of the airline to transport him back to his home from Luanda, Angola, on August 26, 1989. His wish was granted, with Ethiopia providing the ceremonial service free of charge.[62]

Ethiopia had sent an observer mission to the December elections and took an active part as member of the Non-Aligned Commission of Eighteen that was assigned to officially supervise election proceedings from October to December 1989. Its

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MoFA(OA) däbub africa leyu leyu guday 1 1-16/7, ŝibäbu Bäqälä (Permanent Representative, MoFA) to Berhänu Bayäh (Minister, MoFA), Memo on Military Training to SWAPO Cadres: *Ţeqémt* 14, 1973EC (25 Oct. 1980). MoFA(OA) Bäqälä Tamerat (Vice Minister, Ministry of Finance) to Customs and Excise Tax Administration: 18 June 1985. Regarding the establishment and strong communist orientations of SWAPO as well as its friendship with socialist states see Andries Botha, *SWAPO – Dialogue or Conflict.* (Southern African Freedom Foundation, Feb. 1977), 5-6.

[61] MoFA selä namibia näkanät guday 31, Report on Namibiaôs Independence Process, Ambassador Täsfayé Tadäsä to MoFA: *Ţer* 26, 1981EC (4 Feb. 1989).

[62] *Ibid*, Ethiopian Embassy (Harare) to MoFA: *Nähasé* 2, 1981 EC; Jesaja Nyamu (SWAPO Chief Representative to Ethiopia) to MoFA, On Nujomaôs Request to Ethiopia: August 14, 1989.

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lämayähu Säyfu, was assigned as head of the sub-committee that supervised the actual election procedures in southern Namibia.[63]

6.2.3. Zimbabwe: ZANU/ZAPU

Initial contact with the liberation movements of Southern Rhodesia can be traced as far back as 1960. Immediately after the skirmishes in mid-1960 between followers of the National Democratic Party (NDM) and the white minority regime in Salisbury and Bulawayo, the capital and second largest town, the director of external and international affairs of that party, Joshua Nkomo, came to Addis Ababa to solicit Ethiopiaôs diplomatic assistance in his appeal to the UN. Along with promises for political support, his travel expenses to London and hotel accommodation were covered.[64]

The relationship evolved gradually even after the NDM had been dissolved and had assumed a new name, the Zimbabwe African Peoplesô Union (ZAPU), of which Nkomo officially notified Ethiopia a couple of months later. On various occasions, Nkomo himself and his delegates approached the imperial government for financial assistance and continued to accept small amounts of money.[65] However, the customary competition for attention and privileges emerged soon afterwards, when to the dismay of ZAPU leaders, Robert Mugabe began to be equally entertained by Ethiopian officials after July 1962. The establishment of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in 1963, the equal status accorded to both movements by the OAU Liberation Committee, and

[63] *Ibid*, Ambassador Alämayähu to MoFA, Report on Namibiaôs Constitutional Conference: 24 Dec. 1989.

[64] MoFA(OA) däbub africa leyu-leyu guday 1 49, Ambassador Dawit (Accra) to MoFA: 15 Aug. 1960.

[65] *Ibid*, Täsfayé Mäkaġa (First Secretary, London) to African Directorate: *Yäkatit* 2, 1954EC (10 Feb. 1962); Dr. Täsfayé (NY) to Kätäma Yifru (State Minister): *Säné* 25, 1954EC (2 July 1962); *Tsähäfé Te'ezaz* Täfära-Wärq (Minister of Palace Affairs) to Ministry of Pen: *Genbot* 2, 1955EC (10 May 1963).

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ce to the two contributed for this development which continued to manifest into the late 1980s.[66]

Ethiopia had taken active part in OAU deliberations regarding this territory. In accordance with OAU Resolution No. 2 on Southern Rhodesia, upon the request of the chairman of the Committee of Five on Rhodesia, it had allocated one military expert who took part, inter alia, on studying and planning the possibility of military intervention on that territory by an OAU force and to study and plan the safeguarding of the countries neighboring Southern Rhodesia. An officer, Ephrém Boru, was loaned to this committee. His services to the committee was so much appreciated that the administrative secretary general of the OAU, Mr. Diallo Telli, wrote him a letter of commendation.[67]

The nature of the two movements dictated their relations with Ethiopia. The relative strength of Nkomoôs party up to the early 1970s enabled it to secure the bulk of the financial assistance rendered to the two movements.[68] Their concentration on diplomatic offensive against the white supremacist regime and the apparent absence of an armed struggle restricted the level of Ethiopiaôs support. ZANUôs launching of an armed struggle in 1972, together with the rise to the leadership position of the Marxist-leaning Robert G. Mugabe in 1976, vis-à-vis the internal power struggle that crippled its counterpart during the same period, contributed for the invigoration of the slackening

[66] MoFA(OA) selä däbub africa(ANC) 629/1 , Gétaḷäw Mäkaġa (Assistant Minister, MoFA) to Ras Hotel: *Säné* 22, 1954EC (29 June 1962). See below for later developments.

[67] MoFA(OA) däbub africa leyu-leyu guday 1 49, Oscar Kambona (Chairman of the Committee of Five) to MoFA: December 6, 1965; Diallo Telli to Kätäma Yifru: February 3, 1966.

[68] MoFA(OA) däbub africa leyu-leyu guday 1 6B-29, Dr. Täsfayé (MoFA) to Bulḷa Dämäqsa (State Minister, Ministry of Finance): *Ṭeqémt* 14, 1960EC (25 Oct. 1967); Dr. Täsfayé to National Bank of Ethiopia: *Tahesas* 17, 1960EC (27 Dec. 1967); Mängesté Dästa (Assistant Minister, MoFA) to G.B. Nyandoro (ZAPU National Secretary, Lusaka, Zambia): January 2, 1968.

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particularly in line with the ideological orientation of the military junta that had come to power in Ethiopia a few years earlier.[69] Nonetheless, assistance was given to both parties, in the hope that they might put into effect the OAU-arbitrated temporary coalition, i.e. the Patriotic Front.

In May 1978, Robert Mugabe made an official visit to Ethiopia in his capacity as the joint-chairman of the Front. Following talks with authorities in the MoFA and later Col. Mengistu himself, an agreement was reached to open a ZANU-PF office in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia supplying office and residences to its officials), to equip and launch the ôRevolutionary Voice of Zimbabweô under Radio Ethiopia, to train one thousand PF fighters in guerilla warfare (each movement equally represented) and a few pilots and technicians in Ethiopian airlines, as well as the supply of three thousand weapons to be distributed between the two movements.[70] The two movements saw to it that they were fully represented in Ethiopia, both for the PF office and for the radio broadcasting program to be launched. ZANU-PF took the initiative by immediately appointing Mr. Dragon Patiripakashata and two other radio technicians in July 1978 and ZAPU-PF followed suit later on by designating Mr. Raphael Baleni Ndebele together with two other radio operatives.[71]

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[69] For better treatment of the evolutions of and ideological orientations of ZAPU and ZANU parties see Kempton, pp. 95-97; Joshua M. Nkomo, *Nkomo: The Story of My Life* (Sapes Books: Harare, 2001), 39-42, 101; Liberation Support Movement (ed.), *Zimbabwe: the Final Advance* (Oakland, California, 1978), 17-23, 24-31.

[70] MoFA däbub africa leyu-leyu guday 1 2-16-4, Robert .G. Mugabe to MoFA, Assigning ZANU Representative to Ethiopia: July 4, 1978; African Directorate to the Minister, Memo on the Assistance to the Patriotic Front: August 18, 1978; Joshua M. Nkomo (ZAPU-PF President) to MoFA: September 23, 1978.

[71] *Ibid.*

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ailed to meet its part of the agreement, particularly in relation with the supply of offices and residences and the provision of radio equipment. It was implemented after extended bureaucratic hurdles, the delay causing unnecessary expenses. For example, the accommodation of four ZANU/ZAPU-PF functionaries who stayed in Hilton and Harambe hotels from late May 1978 to January 1979 cost 32,307 *birr*.[72] The actual problem between the government and particularly ZAPU-PF came later on when, on the pretext of the latterôs administrative ineffectiveness, the one thousand guerilla trainees enrolled at TaŞiq camp were recruited entirely from ZANU-PF cadres, the designated weapon was totally allocated to Mugabeôs movement and the cadets at Ethiopian airlines were composed again of the latter group. Joshua Nkomo presented an embittered appeal against such intentional misrepresentation of his faction.[73]

However, in accordance with Col. Mengestuôs promise made to the 14th OAU Summit in Libreville (Gabon) in June 1977 to train Zimbabwean militias, a total of three thousand cadres, some of them from ZAPU-PF, received military training at TaŞiq camp up until April 1980.[74] The Ethiopian government also equipped these fighters with the necessary equipment prior to their deployment and afterwards. For instance, by December 1979, it had contracted the service of a Rumanian vessel, named Dumbrãveni,

[72] *Ibid*, Dr. Fäläqä (Minister, MoFA) to Major Berhänu Bayäh (Chair of Foreign Relations Committee, PMAC): *Nähasé* 19, 1970EC (25 Aug. 1978); Dr. Fäläqä to Major Berhänu: 29 Aug. 1978. Major Dawit Wäldä-Giyorgis (Political Commissar, MoFA) to Major Berhänu: *Mäskäräm* 16, 1971EC (27 Sept. 1979); Major Fesäha Dästa (Assistant Secretary, PMAC) to Housing Agency: 3 Oct. 1971. MoFA(OA) däbub africa leyu-leyu guday 1 2-16/7, Dr. Fäläqä to Lt. Col. Berhänu Bayäh: 8 Feb. 1979; Dr. Fäläqä to PMAC: *Säné* 4, 1971EC (11 June 1979).

[73] MoFA(OA) däbub africa leyu-leyu guday 1 2-16/7, Joshua Nkomo to the Foreign Minister: December 28, 1978; Dr. Fäläqä to Lt. Col. Berhänu Bayäh: *Ṭer* 24, 1971EC (2 Feb. 1979).

[74] *Ibid*, Major Dawit (Permanent Representative, MoFA) to Col. Hashim Abita (Executive Secretary of OAU Liberation Committee, Dar-es-Salam): February 13, 1979; Berhänu Dinqa (African Directorate, MoFA) to Ambassador Ayaléw Mandäfro (London): 1 Oct. 1979. *Addis Zämän*, *Miyazya* 9, 1972EC (17 April 1980).

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military material granted to ZANU from the port of Assab to the port of Beira, Mozambique.[75] In addition to the fixed budget allocated since 1978 for ZANU/ZAPU representativesô offices and house rent (24,000 and 11,400 *birr* per year, respectively) and small amount of money granted now and then, by February 1980 the government had granted 200,000 US dollar (423,315 *birr*) via the OAU to the Patriotic Front.[76]

The presence of the two movements in Ethiopia had created various problems for the authorities. In spite of the common understanding to run ZANU/ZAPU affairs under the auspices of the Patriotic Front, each movement chose to act separately, having distinct representatives and functionaries in Addis Ababa. Ethiopian officials had to deport some of the members of each movement so as to minimize the financial burden and administrative havoc they were creating to the government and the Front. The irresponsible and undisciplined behavior they displayed towards the local people and in executing the functions entrusted to them, much to the embarrassment of the leaders of the two movements, forced the Ethiopian officials to issue series of warnings and formulate a code of conduct for them to abide by.[77] Even more frustrating were the frequent clashes between members of the two factions (including trainees at military facilities and Ethiopian airlines), which altered the smooth functioning of the liberation movement in general and Ethiopiaôs assistance in particular.

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[75] *Ibid*, State and Public Security Minister to MoFA: 28 Dec. 1980; Embassy of Rumania to MoFA: December 31, 1979; Dr. Fäläqä to Ambassador Ayalew (London): *Tahesas* 30, 1972EC (9 Jan. 1980).

[76] MoFA däbub africa leyu-leyu guday 1 2-16-4, Major Dawit (MoFA) to Häylu Yemänu (Council of Ministers): 6 Jan. 1979; Amanuél Amdä-Mikaôel (Assistant Minister, Council of Ministers) to MoFA: 9 Jan. 1979. MoFA(OA) ZANU-ZAPU 1 1314, Dr. Fäläqä to Council of Ministers: 23 Feb. 1980.

[77] MoFA, Dr. Fäläqä to Major Berhänu Bayäh (Foreign Affairs Head, PMAC): *Ṭer* 21, 1971EC (30 Jan. 1979).

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n, Ethiopia invited Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo to Addis Ababa in mid-May 1979. The mediation effort was done at the highest possible level, with Col. Mengistu consulting with leaders of the frontline states of Southern Africa beforehand and later communicating the proceedings in the fullest detail. After intensive talks, Mengistu persuaded Mugabe and Nkomo to sign an agreement whereby they established a provisional coordinating council, a defense council and a joint operational command.[78] The front line states, led by Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, tried to capitalize on this, particularly following the UK-sponsored sham election that brought Abel Muzorewa to the premiership in February 1979 and the resultant problem in the territory. Ethiopia and Nigeria were the only states outside the frontline invited to the May 1979 meeting in Lusaka.[79]

Ethiopiaôs efforts to reconcile the two, however, bore no fruit; with the intensification of the conflict in Zimbabwe following the deteriorating political atmosphere, the clashes between ZANU and ZAPU representatives and members worsened. After July 1979, the confrontation in Addis Ababa escalated into an open attack on each other, refusal to attend similar classes and preparation of different propaganda for the ôRevolutionary Voice of Zimbabweô broadcast from Addis Ababa. This necessitated an intervention by Ethiopian and ZANU/ZAPU authorities, in view of charges by the police of public disturbance and threats of imminent repatriation, so as to seek a political solution to a

[78] MoFA däbub africa leyu-leyu guday 1 2-16-4, Dr. Fäläqä to Mugabe and Nkomo: May 7, 1979; Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile-Mariam to Agostino Neto (Angola),Samora Machel (Mozambique), Sir Seretse-Kama (Botswana), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), and Kenneth Kaunda (Zambia): May 10 and 14, 1979; Ambassador Bätru Kidanä-Maryam (Cairo) to Berhänu Dinqa (African Directorate): *Säné* 12, 1971EC (19 June 1979).

[79] *Ibid*, Kenneth Kaunda to Mengistu: May 19, 1979.

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on.[80] Things became worse following the desertion of twenty ZAPU cadres to the other camp, which Nkomo claimed to have happened with the full knowledge of the Ethiopian authorities. He demanded for immediate deportation of the deserters to the ZAPU base in Zambia, a demand that the authorities refused to comply with.[81]

Such incidents notwithstanding, Ethiopia could be said to have taken an active role in the developments leading to the attainment of independence by Zimbabwe in April 1980. Along with fellow African states, it denounced the proceedings that tried to guarantee the power of white minorities in the territory in April 1979. The country sent observers to the February 1980 election and was among the first that accepted the results that guaranteed Mugabeôs victory and officially recognized the new African state a week later.[82]

Ethiopiaôs involvement in the African liberation movements remains one of the major achievements it scored in the continental political arena. Irrespective of the frequent ideology-driven frictions in the OAU Liberation Committee (which Ethiopia initially used to sustain its interests in French Somaliland), both the imperial regime and the Darg exerted a lot of effort towards the realization of one of the major agendas of the Pan-African Movement. Contrary to the preference customarily displayed by fellow Africans

[80] *Ibid*, Memo on the Talk Between Major Dawit Wäldä-Giyorgis (MoFA) and ZANU/ZAPU Representatives: *Hamlé* 25 & 31 July and 1 Aug. 1979; Memo on Berhänu Dinqaôs Talk with ZANU Chief of Operation: *Nähasé* 1, 1971EC (7 Aug. 1979); Memo from African Directorate to the Permanent Representative (MoFA) on the ZANU/ZAPU Conflict: *Nähasé* 2, 1971EC (8 Aug. 1979). MoFA yä däbub afriqa wäqtawi hunéta 2 125, Major Girma Yilma (Minister, Ministry of Press and Information) to MoFA: *Mäskäräm* 25, 1972EC (6 Oct. 1979).

[81] MoFA(OA) yä däbub afriqa wäqtawi hunéta 1 2-16/7, Ambassador Ayaléw (London) to MoFA: *Tahesas* 27, 1972EC (6 Jan. 1980).

[82] *Addis Zämän*, *Miyazya* 11, 1971EC (19 April 1979); *Yäkatit* 26, 1972EC (4 March 1980); *Mägabit* 4, 1972EC (13 March 1980).

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iven dependent territory, Ethiopia maintained a consistent policy of sponsoring all of them provided that they were recognized by the OAU. The argument that they were ultimately struggling for the emancipation of their people and country despite their divergent ideological orientations had often been cited in the course of policy deliberations. It would not be fair, however, to ignore the marginal favors displayed towards ANC, SWAPO and ZANU vis-à-vis their counterparts-in-arms, PAC-Azania, SWANUF and ZAPU, respectively. The Darg was less discreet in its partiality than its predecessor.

The situation was not a clear cut case of sponsoring liberation movements and providing material and moral assistance to them. The entire African approach to the problem had been so complicated that it involved intense debates and frictions on the best ways to handle each case. The controversy between the so called front line states and the rest of Africa on how to handle South Africa and the Rhodesia affair best demonstrate the seriousness of the matter. Ethiopia took part in all the deliberations and resolutions on these issues and contributed its share to the course of events. The hesitant policies of the imperial regime towards the white minority regime in South Africa, apart from the total castigation of its apartheid system, and the confusion that occurred regarding the 1965 unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia were in part the result of the general ambivalence at the continental level. The Darg on the other hand was equally inclined to the pro-USSR liberation movements.

In spite of these shortcomings, Ethiopia fully exerted itself towards the realization of African emancipation from colonialism. In the process, it irrevocably associated itself with the anti-colonialist struggles of the peoples of South Africa, Namibia and

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f prominent liberation fighters like Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe started with their training in and associations with Ethiopia on different occasions. The material, logistical and moral support rendered to liberation movements in Southern Africa endeared Ethiopia to the people and politicians of these territories alike. It thus managed to write one success story in this field, despite the various criticisms leveled at Africa with regard to the entire process of decolonization.

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Chapter VII

Mediation Efforts: Changing Policy Orientations of Ethiopian Governments

Successive Ethiopian governments had attempted to solve inter-state and intra-state problems in post-independence Africa. The way various conflicts were perceived and handled demonstrates the changing nature of their involvement and understanding. In this chapter, an attempt is made to document how Ethiopiaôs concerns over African problems changed course between the regimes of Emperor Hayla-Selassie and Col. Mengistu. In spite of the overriding objective to consider the national interest in formulating their approaches towards the problems, one witnesses a shift from the policy of neutrality and the emperorôs personal mediation efforts to the focus on the principle of socialist internationalism of the Darg.

Accordingly, Ethiopiaôs involvement in incidents like the Congo peace keeping mission (1960s) and its mediation efforts in the Nigerian Civil War (1967-70), the Chad-Libya conflict (1977-1984) and the Saharawi Republic issue (1980s) are taken as representative cases to demonstrate the above observation. The last two cases have to be viewed in the context of the divisive effect they had on the existence of the OAU.

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The Congo Crisis of 1960, and the sense of solidarity and responsibility Ethiopia manifested in the complicated situation, exemplified its commitment to the Pan-African ideals. Even before sending troops to the Congo under the banner of the United Nations, the Ethiopian State offered its good offices to Lumumba to alleviate the lack of experienced personnel in that country ï allegedly the major setback of the new government. Above all it advocated the necessity of finding an African solution to the problem.[1] When the UN Mission to the Congo was frustrated, and other African states began to take sides in the Congo situation, Ethiopia still maintained its principle of support for the unity of that nation and non-interference in its internal affairs. Ethiopiaôs position was later applauded by African states at the 1961 Pan-African Conference.[2]

Throughout the conflict in the Congo, Ethiopia strove to maintain its policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of that country and strictly adhering to the mandate formulated of the UN peace keeping mission. Complications arising from the Cold War further necessitated caution on the part of Ethiopia. This was manifested in the positions it assumed on various occasions when ideas were advanced to restructure the UN mandate in the Congo.

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[1] Telegram exchanges between Ethiopia and other African leaders testify to this point. *Ethiopian Herald*, 15 July 1960, Hayla-Selassie to Nkrumah: 13 July 1960; *Ethiopian Herald*, 10 August 1960, Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld to Nkrumah: 8 August 1960; *Ethiopian Herald*, 17 August 1960, Hayla-Selassie to Moise Tshombe: 11 August 1960. Ethiopia even proposed an African Summit concerning the subject of African political problems. The invitation was sent to all Heads of State and Governments of independent Africa. In *Ethiopian Herald*, 3 September 1960, Modibo Keita of Mali, in a telegram sent to Emperor Hayla-Selassie on 2 September 1960, agreed to participate on the Summit meeting. See also Agbi, *Organization of African Unity*, 39-56. See also Bärihun Käbädä, *Yä Aşé Häylä-Selasé tarik* (Addis Ababa: Artistic Printing Press, 1993 E.C.), 339-342.

[2] MoFA OAU1969 Şeraz 1. Report on All African Peoples Conference Steering Committee Meeting, Guinea, Conakry, from 19ï 30 September 1961. A look at *Ethiopian Herald* editions of the year 1960, for example, reveals a lot.

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xample, the Acting Secretary-General U Thant consulted Dr. Täsfayé Gäbäräzgi, Ethiopiaôs permanent representative to the UN, on the political situation in the Congo. He pointed out the difficulty of taking military actions against the Katanga secessionists led by Tshombe because of lack of enough UN peace keepers in that country and the opposition to such measures, particularly from the US. In the face of Tshombeôs imminent build-up in the south using the huge mercenary army he had managed to gather, U Thant confided to Dr. Täsfayé that the most viable option was to push forward the joint reconciliation efforts initiated by himself and the Congolese premier, Cyrille Adoula.[3]

Their three stage-plan consisted of the incorporation of the Katanga ógendarmerieô into the national army, bringing the revenue from Katanga under the control of the central government and its redistribution to be based on constitutional provisions, and the inclusion of six ó*Balukat*ô (ócentral governmentôsô) ministers in Tshombeôs cabinet, with the latter in exchange being represented by two ministers in the central government. Dr. Täsfayé expressed his doubts about Tshombeôs readiness to accept this proposal. Rather he claimed the contrary would happen, for the Katangese leader was waiting for an opportune time to attack Adoulaôs government with the help of external powers. In the meantime, Dr. Täsfayé requested for any directives on the situation. But none was forthcoming. In subsequent developments, whereby the UN executed military actions to

[3] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Dr. Täsfayé Gäbäräzgi (UN, New York) to Kätäma Yifru: *Yäkatit* 29 1954E.C (8 March 1962).

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ga, the Ethiopian government refrained from direct intervention in the internal affairs of that country.[4]

More expressive of the attitude of Ethiopia was the explicit response given to a similar demand for explanation from its ambassador in Washington, Berhänu Dinqé.[5] After a discussion with the assistant secretary of African affairs in the US State Department, when the latter stated the problems Tshombe was creating for the peace initiative and requested Ethiopiaôs position on the situation, the ambassador requested for immediate policy directives from Addis on the course to be followed. The brief response stressed that there was no change in the policy lines the government had assumed from the beginning, i.e. unconditional support for the unity of Congo and abiding by the UN mandate.[6]

The incident that created a big problem occurred in March 1963 when Adoula proposed a plan for training the Congolese national army by predominantly NATO member states. The acting secretary-general raised the issue during an advisory committee meeting, which agreed on Canada, Italy, Norway, Israel, Belgium and the United States training and equipping various sections of the army.[7] Accordingly, Canada took the responsibility of the technical schools (communications), Italy for the air force,

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Ambassador Berhänu Dinqé (Washington) to Kätäma: *Genbot* 3, 1954E.C (11 May 1962).

[6] *Ibid,* Mängesté Dästa (Director, African Directorate) to Ambassador Berhänu Dinqé: *Genbot* 14, 1954E.C (22 May 1962).

[7] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Dr. Täsfayé (New York) to Kätäma: *Mägabit* 12, 1955E.C (21 March 1963); also attached letter from Cyrille Adoula to U Thant on ôThe Question of the Modernization and Training of the Congolese Armed Forcesõ 20 March 1963.

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for the paratroopers, Belgium for technicians for the Congolese National Army (ANC) general staff and for the various units. Belgium would also assist in matters related to military bases, the gendarmerie and various military schools, while õUnited States action would be limited to providing the equipment necessary to make this technical assistance a successö.[8] In addition to representatives of each of the above six nations, the proposal also called for the inclusion of Ethiopia, Nigeria and Tunisia in the ócoordinating groupô that would be responsible for coordinating the task. The expense of the entire project was to be funded by all parties participating in the project through bilateral technical assistance to the government of Adoula, but the UN had first to endorse the program. The acting secretary-general personally approved Adoulaõs request for assistance from the UN:

> é .I consider these requests to be fully in accord with the provisions of the resolutions concerning the Congo adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly, and in particular, with paragraph 2 of the Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960. The United Nations, therefore, will accept the responsibility resulting from your requests and will do everything possible to implement them with expedition.[9]

Dr. Täsfayé expressed his reservations on the implications of the project to the UN mission to Congo in general and to Ethiopia in particular. In the first place, he argued, the idea negated UN resolutions that forbade bilateral assistance to Congo thereby creating a problem related to its mandate in that country. Second, the idea that the project was to be funded and run primarily by NATO member states was not acceptable. The inclusion of the three African states in the ócoordinating groupô, Dr. Täsfayé emphasized, was merely

[8] *Ibid*, detailed on the attached letter from J.P. Dericoyard (Minister for Economic Affairs and Middle Classes of the Republic of Congo, signed for PM Adoula) to Officer in Charge of UN Mission to Congo: 26 February 1963.

[9] *Ibid*, attached letter from U Thant to Adoula: 27 December 1962.

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d to silence possible opposition that might arise from the other sections. Finally, and more importantly, the project would facilitate the return of Belgium to the Congo under UN auspices, which would represent a huge departure from earlier positions assumed on the matter. Dr. Täsfayé requested for an immediate policy directive on the matter, and enquired whether the government would agree to contribute to the funding.[10]

Adoulaôs foreign minister, Mr. Bomboko, similarly convened African diplomats stationed in Leopoldville and pleaded with them to support the proposed plan to train the national army. In a report sent to Addis Ababa, Ethiopiaôs ambassador expressed his qualms on the return of the Belgians to that country. Agreeing to the urgency of training and equipping the national army, in the face of the approaching date for the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers and the simultaneous strengthening of Katangese secessionists, he insisted on searching for alternative solutions that would bypass the current stalemate.[11] The ambassador claimed that in spite of Africaôs rejection of the above plan, the Congolese government would ultimately find ways to secure external trainers. He also urged for Ethiopiaôs acceptance of the proposed African consultative committee.

The response to Dr. Täsfayé was framed in the strongest possible terms.[12] Recounting the sacrifices Ethiopia and fellow African states had made to sustain the unity and sovereignty of Congo, it lamented UNôs backing out of the original objective that necessitated the mission to that country. The response reaffirmed Ethiopiaôs position that

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Ethiopian Embassy (Kinshasa) to MoFA: *Mägabit* 26, 1955E.C (4 April 1963).

[12] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Kätäma to Dr. Täsfayé: *Mägabit* 23, 1955E.C (1 April 1963).

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iple of neutrality from Cold War politics that had created the problem in the first place, especially when situations were improving in that country. The response opposed the attempt by Western powers to train the Congolese national army alone and demanded that African states should be allowed to participate in the process. Second, the UN should refrain from granting this mandate to Western powers, as that would totally contradict earlier resolutions on Congo. And finally, Ethiopia would not be part of the said group unless the above conditions were met and the Afro-Asian caucus in the UN had fully endorsed the decision.[13]

As was expected, the Afro-Asian group had rejected the idea of a NATO-dominated program. They demanded that the training of the Congolese army had to be done under UN mandate and supervision. If the acting secretary-general insisted otherwise, and continued to claim the plan was legal, then he personally had to assume the responsibility for any political consequences the project would entail in that country and on the international organization. More importantly, they urged that the project should be implemented outside the framework of the United Nations. Ethiopia endorsed the decisions of the Afro-Asian group. The attempt of the Congolese foreign minister, Mr. Bomboko, to convince Ethiopiaôs deputy representative to the UN, Keflé Wädajo, otherwise bore no fruit.[14]

Ethiopiaôs position on the presence of foreign mercenaries in the Congo and the practical steps it had taken to solve the problem was another indicator of the countryôs

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Dr. Täsfayé to Kätäma: Mägabit 25, 1955E.C (3 April 1963); Keflé Wädajo (Deputy Permanent Representative) to Kätäma: *Miyazya* 18, 1955E.C (26 April 1963).

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ersonal request from President Mobutu Sese Seko, the two countries signed in July 1967 a military assistance agreement whereby Ethiopia would provide air force planes and pilots in the fight against the mercenaries based in eastern Congo and Rwanda. The Ethiopian side insisted to withdraw from its commitment in case of internal conflicts that might arise in the meantime, and the pilots were instructed to remain neutral if such incidents occurred.[15]

In December 1967, the Rwandan president, Gregoire Kayibanda, issued a note on the mercenaries in his country. The secretary-general of the OAU passed the document to African heads of state and government and requested for their official view on the matter.[16] Ethiopiaôs policy statement affirmed that the mercenaries were weapons of colonial powers and should be wiped out of Africa and that the country would always do whatever is necessary to realize this objective.[17] The order to forcefully land a Super DC 6 airplane bearing a Red Cross emblem and carrying white mercenaries from Rwanda to Europe if it crossed Ethiopiaôs airspace could be taken as a practical commitment to realize the above policy line.[18]

Ethiopiaôs endorsement of OAU Resolution AHG/RES/IV on the deportation of the mercenaries from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the establishment of a committee consisting of six African leaders, including Emperor Hayla-

[15] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-7. Ambassador Col. Lägäsä Wäldä-Hana (Kinshasa) to Kätäma: *Nähasé* 12, 1959E.C (18 Aug. 1967); Ketema to Ambassador Col. Lägäsä: *Nähasé* 22, 1959E.C (28 Aug. 1967).

[16] *Ibid*, Yohannes Kidanä-Maryam (Secretary of the Imperial Cabinet) to Kätäma: *Tahesas* 17, 1960E.C (27 Dec. 1967).

[17] *Ibid*, Kätäma to Dr. Fetegu Tadäsä (African Directorate): *Tahesas* 18, 1960E.C (28 Dec. 1967).

[18] *Ibid*, Dr. Täsfayé (State Minister, MoFA) to Ministry of Communication: *Tahesas* 19, 1960E.C (29 Dec. 1967); Civil Aviation Authority to the Air Force: *Tahesas* 23, 1960E.C (2 Jan. 1968).

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to the speedy repatriation of the foreign agents via the International Red Cross Society equally demonstrated the steadfast position adopted on the Congo crisis.[19] Ethiopia maintained its policy of non intervention in the affairs of Congo and believed in the unity of that country, notwithstanding the attempt on the part of the latter to transfer the headquarters of OAU to Kinshasa in early 1967.[20]

Ethiopiaôs mission to the Congo was beset with controversies and tensions from the beginning. The incident associated with the redeployment of the Ethiopian contingent under the command of foreigners represented the first source of displeasure. After January 1962, a fully equipped brigade, hitherto stationed in Stanleyville (now Kisangani) and commanded by Ethiopian officers, was reassembled into four battalions and deployed in the provinces of Stanleyville, Kindu and Katanga. The first two battalions continued to be led by Ethiopians, but the remaining two were allocated to the Katanga area command, to Elizabethville (now Lubumbashi) and Monono. This was considered an insult to the country. The emperor himself gave an order to regroup the entire contingent under Ethiopian commanders.[21] This was followed by the launching of an intensive campaign to reassemble the brigade and ensure that it would be under the command of Ethiopian officers. The complaint of the Katanga secessionists regarding some misconduct of Ethiopian troops, which the Indian area commander confirmed, further complicated the matter.

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[19] *Ibid*, Hayla-Selassie to President Said Ismail al-Hazari of the Sudan: 11 October 1967.

[20] MoFA Kinshasa 1 22-6. Ambassador Col. Lägäsä (Kinshasa) to Dr. Täsfayé (State Minister): *Yäkatit* 29, 1959E.C (8 March 1967); Dr. Täsfayé to Ambassador Col. Lägäsä: *Mägabit* 9, 1959E.C (18 March 1967); Ambassador Col. Lägäsä to Dr. Täsfayé: *Genbot* 4, 1959E.C (12 May 1967); Kätäma to Ambassador Col. Lägäsä: *Genbot* 16, 1959E.C (24 May 1967).

[21] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Kasa Wäldä-Maryam (Vice Minister, Ministry of Pen) to Kätäma Yifru (State Minister, MoFA): *Yäkatit* 1, 1954E.C (9 Feb. 1962).

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cated to Ethiopiaôs permanent representative to the UN, Dr. Tasfaye Gäberäzgi. He was requested to communicate to the secretary general that the Ethiopian contingent being used as ancillary unit was no longer acceptable and to emphasize that the entire brigade be commanded by Ethiopian officers.[22] The secretary general pleaded with Dr. Täsfayé to consider the existing situation on the ground, adding that the existing deployment structure was necessitated by the absence of enough UN troops in the Congo. UN officials equally argued that if Ethiopian battalions were to be redeployed from Katanga, it would simply ascertain the accusations of the Katanga press and would, therefore, tarnish the countryôs positive image.[23] A compromise deal seemed to emerge, whereby Ethiopian troops continued to function in Katanga but under leadership of their own officers.

[22] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Kätäma to Dr. Täsfayé Gäberäzgi: *Yäkatit* 5, 1954E.C (13 Feb. 1962).

[23] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Dr. Tesfaye to Kätäma: *Yäkatit* 16, 1954E.C (24 Feb. 1962); Kätäma to Kasa Wäldä-Maryam (Ministry of Pen): *Yäkatit* 24, 1954E.C (3 March 1962).

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Diagram Showing Administrative Divisions of the Congo in 1960s (Hoskyns 1969, xvii)

A similar problem occurred following the charge that Ethiopian soldiers had employed inappropriate measures while interrogating rebel forces in Elizabethville, Katanga. This necessitated an investigation at higher level by the commanders of the mission. Major Gen. Marqos Gäbrä-Leuel, Deputy Commander of the UN Mission to the Congo and Head of the Ethiopian contingent, was asked to look into the matter. The report he compiled to the commander of the mission, Lt. Gen. Macqueen, dismissed the accusation as abominable and defamatory and urged that efforts should be made to stop those who instigated it.

> é .On every occasion the most blatant lies have been used to discredit our troops and this one could not have been more calculated. I can only believe that this might well be a well-organized psychological propaganda against our troops who have

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their duty. It is regrettable to see that there is no such defamation.[24]

Together with his recommendation, Gen. Macqueen passed the report to the secretary general of the UN. After additional inquiry, the Acting Secretary, U Thant, issued a written statement corroborating the findings and applauding the positive role Ethiopia was playing in the Congo peace-keeping mission.[25] In spite of these findings, however, the accusations continued to circulate. In the absence of mechanisms to quell the matter, the alternative was to ignore the issue and let time dissipate it. [26]

The ensuing tension between the Ethiopian government and the UN following the disappearance of an Ethiopian F-86 jet fighter was another contentious incident during the Congo mission. The matter assumed a serious dimension when UN officials failed to mount intensive search and rescue missions even after obtaining information that the aircraft was spotted in Elizabethville, Katanga. In a rather strong letter, Kätäma Yifru, State Minister of the MoFA, castigated the UN for the double standard it assumed when similar incidents occurred to nationalities or properties of Western states. Ethiopiaôs permanent representative was instructed to challenge UN officials on the matter and to convince them to step up their efforts.[27] UN commendation of the secessionist Moise Tshombe for his cooperation in what Ethiopia thought were half-hearted search missions further exacerbated the countryôs frustration.

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[24] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Major Gen. Marqos Gäbrä-Leuel to Lt. Gen. Macqueen: 8 February 1962; Major Gen. Marqos to Lt. General Märeêd Mängäġa (Minister, Ministry of Defense): *Yäkatit* 6, 1954E.C (14 Feb. 1962); Lt. Gen. Märeêd to Kätäma: *Mägabit* 4, 1954E.C (13 March 1962).

[25] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. U Thant to Dr. Täsfayé (New York): 7 March 1962; Dr. Täsfayé to Kätäma: *Yäkatit* 28, 1954E.C (7 March 1962).

[26] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Lt. Gen. Märeêd to MoFA: *Mägabit* 10, 1954E.C (19 March 1962).

[27] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Kätäma to Dr. Täsfayé: *Hedar* 4, 1955E.C (14 Nov. 1962).

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J. Bunche, nevertheless refused to accept Ethiopiaôs complaints. He issued an official report enumerating consecutive rescue efforts and the reason why the attempts were ultimately scaled down.[28] The problem was finally resolved when the UN assumed responsibility for the replacement of the jet fighter.[29]

Even more interesting in the history of Ethiopiaôs peacekeeping mission to the Congo was the tension between the UN on the one hand and the soldiers and successive Ethiopian regimes on the other over the amount of compensation they should get.

Talks with UN officials over the issue had begun as far back as early 1962. The international organization had agreed to reimburse costs related to compensation and depreciation expenses based on local laws of respective states that had taken part in the peacekeeping mission.[30] In April 1962, the deputy permanent representative, Keflé Wädajo, notified the Ethiopian government of a UN officialôs intended visit to Cairo, Khartoum and New Delhi to assess the situation and his plan to come to Addis Ababa for a similar purpose. Keflé advised against encouraging the UN officialôs visit on the grounds that the absence of a practical law in Ethiopia guiding the redistribution of compensations to soldiers would complicate matters for the future.[31]

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[28] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Ralph J. Bunche to Gen. Käbädä Gäbré: 18 & 26 October 1962; Ralph J Bunche to Dr. Täsfayé: 22 October 1962; Dr. Täsfayé to Kätäma: *Hedar* 17, 1955E.C (27 Nov. 1962).

[29] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Ralph J Bunche to Dr. Täsfayé: 22 November 1962; Dr. Täsfayé to Kätäma: *Hedar* 14, 1955E.C (24 Nov. 1962); Mängesté Dästa (African Directorate, MoFA) to Ministry of Defense: *Tahesas* 1, 1955E.C (11 Dec. 1962). Nothing was said about the pilot or other personnel aboard the missing fighter jet.

[30] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Keflé Wädajo to MoFA: *Ṭir* 22, 1954E.C (31 Jan. 1963).

[31] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Keflé to MoFA: *Miyazya* 4, 1954E.C (12 April 1962).

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nitially claimed that the total cost it had incurred through its participation in the Congo mission from July 1960 to 30 June 1964 was 33,369,918.64 *birr*. Out of this, the UN controllerôs office had demanded in July 1962 an explanation for the amount of 100,282.95 *birr.* In response, the Ethiopian government claimed that the expense was for medical, telephone and maintenance services rendered by various government institutions to the mission.[32] Archival sources show that a settlement was reached for an amount of 32,631,476.94 *birr*, out of which the Ethiopian government received an advance payment of 19,128,424.83 *birr* immediately.[33]

But soon afterwards, the Ethiopian side started to ask for additional money, arguing that unforeseen expenses had been discovered. To the frustration of the countryôs representatives to the UN, the effort to come up with the final figure lasted as late as September 1965.[34] Dr. Täsfayé had directly pleaded with various officials in the ministries of defense and finance for speedy conclusion of the proceedings, for the UN was closing all issues related to the Congo mission and to be thorough in compiling the final assessment. More importantly, in the absence of clearly defined directives on how to

[32] MoFA Congo 3 224-5 . MoFA to Ministry of Finance: Nähasé 2 1954E.C (8 Aug. 1962) & *Mägabit* 12, 1955E.C (21 March 1963); Mulatu Däbäbä (Assistant Minister, Ministry of Finance) to MoFA: *Mägabit* 25, 1955E.C (3 April 1963); Keflé Wädajo (New York) to Bruce Turner (UN Controller): 17 April 1963.

[33] MoFA Congo 3 224-5 . Referred to in the letters from Dr. Täsfayé (New York) to Mulatu Däbäbä (Ministry of Finance): *Säné* 15, 1957E.C (22 June 1965); Bruce Turner (UN Controller) to Dr. Täsfayé: 21 May 1965.

[34] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Lt. Gen. Märeêd Mängäġa (Minister, Ministry of Defense) to Kätäma (Provisional Minister, MoFA): *Genbot* 8, 1956E.C (16 May 1964); Mängisté Dästa (Director, African Directorate) to Yelma Därésa (Minister, Ministry of Finance): *Säné* 12, 1956E.C (19 June 1964). MoFA Congo 3 224-5 . Lt. Gen. Märeêd to Dr. Täsfayé: *Mäskäräm* 15, 1958E.C (26 Sept. 1965).

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money for the soldiers, he insisted from the beginning that the advance payment be kept in a closed bank account until the rules were formulated.[35]

The letter Kätäma Yifru wrote to the ministry of finance best summarizes what transpired in the process of getting the refund to the cost incurred during the Congo peace keeping mission.[36] Altogether, Ethiopia asked for 13,052,590.78 US dollars (1 US dollar was around 2.5 *birr*), out of which it had received an advance payment to the amount of $11,366, 450 before May 1966. According to Kätäma, it was the remaining $1,686,140.78 that had created a protracted debate with the UN. Surprisingly, all the payments earmarked for soldiers (pension, disability and death), weapons depreciation, transportation etc were to be extracted from the due amount. The UN claimed Ethiopiaôs compensation and pension requests were the highest, the weapons on which it asked for depreciation money had been taken back to the country and therefore had to be returned to the organization and there were repetition of services and materials in the list it forwarded.

After some discussion, the secretary-general offered to pay $1,225,000. The Emperor, who was visiting Jamaica at the time, instructed the Ethiopian delegation to bid for more. Finally, the two parties settled for 1,495,000 US dollars. Deducting some money for the expenses of the UN permanent representativeôs office, a check to the amount $1,437,390

[35] MoFA Kinshasa 1 33-1. Dr. Täsfayé to Kätäma (Provisional Minister): *Säné* 3, 1956E.C (10 June 1964). MoFA Congo 3 224-5 . Dr. Täsfayé to Lt. Gen. Märeêd Mängäga (Minister, Ministry of Defense): *Genbot* 6, 1957E.C (14 May 1965); Dr. Täsfayé to Mulatu Däbäbä (Ministry of Finance): *Säné* 10 & 15, 1957E.C (17 & 22 June 1965).

[36] MoFA Congo 3 224-5 . Kätäma (Minister, MoFA) to Yelma Därésa (Minister, Ministry of Finance): *Nähasé* 19, 1958E.C (25 Aug. 1966).

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f finance.[37] No account could be found of what happened to the advance payment made to Ethiopia before May 1966. The controversy that occurred later on following the soldiersô demand for the compensation payment unfolded against this background.

In particular, low-ranking officers and soldiers who had taken part in the peacekeeping mission under the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th *Ṭäqel* Brigades began to appeal to higher authorities for UN funded compensation money going as far back as early 1967. In March 1967, an order was issued to the ministry of finance to immediately make the payment as per the criteria set by the international organization.[38] But, to the frustration of the soldiers, nothing practical transpired for the next two years. The soldiers argued that for the duration they were stationed in Congo, a daily payment to the amount of 4.62 *birr* for the low-ranking officers and 4.15 *birr* for others was paid to them. Their real demand, hence, was, in line with the actual rate of daily allowances (35 *birr* for low-rank officers and 32.5 *birr* for others per day), an investigation should be made on what happened to the rest and that the payment should be made immediately.

In successive letters they wrote to all concerned ministries, including the prime ministerôs office, claiming that high-ranking officers beyond the rank of major had apportioned their share and were therefore siding with government officials in denying them what was rightfully theirs.[39] Following the two strong petitions, submitted in April

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] MoFA Congo 3 224-5 . Seyoum Harägot (State Minister, Prime Ministerôs Office) to Yelma Därésa (Minister, Ministry of Finance): *Mägabit* 22, 1959E.C (31 March 1967).

[39] MoFA Congo 3 224-5 . Petition addressed to the offices of the Prime Minister, Ministries of Defense, Finance, Foreign Affairs and Internal Security and the Ground Forces: *Miyazya* 1, 1961E.C (9 April 1969);

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Aklilu Häbtä-Wäld was forced to arrange an audience with the emperor for representatives of the soldiers in June 1969. However, in spite of the emperorôs decision in favor of the petitioners and the order to solve the issue immediately, the prime minister dismissed them claiming ignorance on the existence of the fund.[40]

Infuriated by the turn of events, the petitioners threatened to march to the imperial palace. The Minister of Interior, *Bitwädäd* Zäwdé Gäbrä-Heywät, intervened and arranged another audience with the emperor in August 1969. This time, another order was issued to investigate the issue deeply and pay every penny the government owed them. A Commission of Inquiry consisting of *Bitwädäd* Zäwdé, *Däjazmače* Käbädä Täsäma (Member of the Imperial Cabinet), *Fitawrari* Abäbä Gäbré (Minister of Land Tenure and Administration) and *Ato* Bälaḷäw Asrat (Vice Minister of Justice) was instructed to oversee the implementation of the decision.[41] The commission commenced its work soon afterwards. The MoFA, for example, was instructed to make available all relevant documents related to the matter and attend all meetings regularly.[42] But nothing substantial came out of the efforts of this commission.

In early 1971, the ministry of defense processed the petitions for compensation of 758 officers and non-commissioned soldiers and accepted the demands of the forty-four

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Other petitions to similar offices: *Genbot* 30, 1961E.C (7 June 1969); *Hamlé* 16, 1961E.C (23 July 1969); *Pagumé* 4, 1961E.C (9 Sept 1969).

[40] *Ibid*, *Pagumé* 4, 1961E.C (9 Sept. 1969).

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] MoFA Congo 3 224-5 . *Bitwädäd* Zäwdé Gäbrä-Heywät (Minister of Interior) to Kätäma: *Nähasé* 30, 1961E.C (5 Sept. 1969).

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99,170 *birr*. The MoFA was instructed to make the necessary query whether the UN would supply the money.[43] The response from the MoFA, written by Dr. Täsfayé Gäberäzgi himself, now state minister, expressed anger at this demand. He reminded the prime ministerôs office and the ministry of defense of his persistent requests for a thorough investigation of every detail. What he had received from the UN as compensation for Ethiopia was the final settlement, and therefore there was no room for any request whatsoever.[44]

The problem remained unsolved until May 1974. Following the outbreak of the Ethiopian revolution, the new Prime Minister, Endalkaḍäw Mäkonnen, had to set up another inquiry commission consisting of five government officials and three representatives of the petitioners. *Ato* Solomon TäkaleÑe (Vice Minister, Historical Heritages Administration) was assigned to be chairman of the commission.[45] The fast-changing political atmosphere in the country lent new vigor to the appeal of the soldiers, who started to castigate the previous administration and later the regime in general.[46] Contending political forces, including the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces at the headquarters of the Fourth Army Division (Addis Ababa), the government of *Lej* Endalkaḍäw Makonnen and later Provisional Military Administrative Council (the Darg) attempted to exploit the situation for immediate political consumption, and therefore

[43] MoFA Congo 3 224-5 . Abetäw Gäbrä-Iyäsus (Vice Minister, Prime Ministerôs Office) to Kätäma: *Ṭir* 5, 1963E.C (14 Jan. 1971).

[44] *Ibid*, Dr. Täsfayé (State Minister, MoFA) to Abetäw Gäbrä-Iyäsus and Lt. Gen. Käbädä Gäbré (Minister of Defense): *Ṭir* 14, 1963E.C (23 Jan. 1971).

[45] *Ibid*, Endalkaḍäw Mäkonnen to *Ato* Solomon TäkaleÑe: *Genbot* 22, 1966E.C (30 May 1974).

[46] *Ibid*, Petition submitted to Lt. Gen. Abiy Abäbä (Minister of Defense): *Genbot* 15, 1966E.C (23 May 1974); Major Aṣnafu Abatä (Second Deputy Chairman of PMAC) to Commission of Inquiry: *Ṭir* 1, 1967E.C (10 Jan. 1975).

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up with a favorable solution. The commission promised to give the matter utmost priority, but nothing substantial was done to meet the demands of the peacekeeping soldiers.[47]

7.2. The Nigerian Civil War (July 1967 – January 1970)

The imperial government was closely observing events unfolding in Nigeria following the assassination of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa by junior army officers on 15 January 1966. A number of assessment reports and memos compiled by the special research unit of the imperial cabinet and the MoFA detailed the progression of events and suggested the position Ethiopia should assume throughout the conflict.[48] According to the reports, the mutiny had an essentially ethnic character and challenged the existing federal arrangement that guaranteed the supremacy of the Hausa (Northern) and Yoruba (Western) tribes. The Ibo (Eastern Nigeria), who were predominantly Christian and relatively well educated, felt marginalized and exploited.

The fast-changing realities in Nigeria were disturbing to Ethiopian officials. The appointment of the Ibo Gen. Ironsi as head of the provisional military government until January 1969 and the abrogation of the civilian federal arrangement, the retaliatory measures taken by northerners that resulted in the massacre of around two thousand Ibo people working in Kano (Hausa) and the resultant mass emigration of the Ibo to Eastern

[47] Ibid, Major Aṣnafu Abatä (Second Deputy Chairman of PMAC) to Commission of Inquiry: *Ṭir* 1, 1967E.C (10 Jan. 1975); The Commission of Inquiry to PMAC: *Ṭir* 5, 1967E.C (14 Jan. 1975). For varying interpretation of the situation, see Tekalign Gedamu, *Republicans at the Throne*, 199-206; Mengistu, *Teglačen*, 168-169, 237. They associate Colonel Aṣnafu Abatäôs earlier activities in the military movements with this question. See also Bärihun, *Yä Aṣé Häylä-Selasé tarik,* 343-357.

[48] MoFA yä afriqa agäroḷe 106-D8 33-1. Special Research Unit of the Imperial Cabinet to Kätäma: *Miyazya* 6, 1959E.C (14 April 1967); Näbeyä-Leôul Keflé (Assistant Minister, Imperial Cabinet) to Kätäma: *Hamlé* 5, 1959E.C (12 July 1967); Memo to the Emperor: 25 September 1967.

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966 that ended in the assassination of Gen. Aronsi in the district of Ibadan and the subsequent appointment of the army chief of staff, Lt. Col. (later Gen.) Yakubu Gowon (Angas Clan, Hausa) as military leader of the provisional federal government, the intense opposition this faced form the Ibo, particularly their military commander, Lt. Col. Odemegwu Ojukwu, and the civil war that broke out soon afterwards were of special concern.[49]

Africaôs mediation role started with the efforts of the Ghanaian new military ruler, Gen. Joseph Ankrah, and the meeting he organized in Aburi (Ghana) between Gen. Yakubu and Col. Ojukwu on 4 January 1967. The two parties agreed, within the general framework of Nigerian unity, to reorganize the army, redeploy the northern army out of Ibo state, halt military recruitment, revise previous declarations, enact new and better laws guiding relations between the two and arrange for the release of all political prisoners. But it failed to materialize later as a result of differences that occurred in the interpretation of the above provisions.[50]

Conditions began to deteriorate when Col. Ojukwu boycotted the security meeting the federal government held in Benin (seat of mid-west state of Nigeria) in February 1967. The statement from Ibo state to the effect that they prefer a con-federal arrangement vis-à-vis the insistence from the central government to maintain the status quo at any cost further aggravated the conflict. Matters assumed an irreversible course when Col. Ojukwu declared the independence of the predominantly Ibo eastern state of Nigeria as

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] *Ibid.*

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0 May 1967.[51] The central government immediately implemented measures aimed at frustrating the impending danger to Nigeriaôs national unity and territorial integrity. These included economic sanctions, closure of all sea and land ports leading to Eastern Nigeria, blocking access to eastern ports of any foreign vessels and finally, in June 1967, a full scale military invasion.[52]

Initially Ethiopia maintained a position of neutrality throughout the above developments, taking no part in the intermittent African mediation efforts and, more importantly, restricting statements it had to make to general expression of concern and in line with the provisions of international laws and the principles of the OAU.[53] But, gradually, a new policy line began to crystallize, tilting towards the central government.

African heads of state and government were presumably concerned by the problem in Nigeria for two reasons. The first was the feeling of solidarity with the federal government under the general provisions of the continental forum. The second, and more driving, factor was the overriding fear that similar situations might arise in each and every country unless legally binding preventive steps were put in place for the Nigerian crisis. Various peace initiatives were put forward by African leaders. These ranged from the request by the prime minister of Lesotho for an extraordinary OAU summit on Nigeria to the official denouncement by the governments of Guinea and Togo of Col.

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[51] *Ibid;* see also C.O.C. *Amate, Inside the OAU (1986)*, pp. 440-441; Colin Legume, ñInternational Intervention in Nigeria, 1966-70,ò in *Horizons of African Diplomacy.* Y.A. Tandon and D. Chandarana (eds.) (Nairobi, Dar es Salaam and Kampala: Literature Bureau, 1974), 45-85.

[52] MoFA yä afriqa agäroḷe 106-D8 33-1. Näbeyä-Leôul Keflé (Assistant Minister, Imperial Cabinet) to Kätäma: *Hamlé* 5, 1959E.C (12 July 1967); Memo to the Emperor: 25 September 1967.

[53] MoFA yä afriqa agäroḷe 106-D8 33-1. Special Research Unit of the Imperial Cabinet to Kätäma: *Miyazya* 6, 1959E.C (16 April 1967).

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recognize the statehood of the republic that he had proclaimed. The Zambian-led mediation effort of eastern African states (consisting of Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya) was another attempt to solve the problem. The leaders of these states met in Nairobi in early July 1967 and proposed the resolution of the conflict without compromising the unity of Nigeria.[54]

The position that the central government of Nigeria maintained on African mediation efforts further complicated the situation. It deemed all reconciliation activities to be direct intervention in its internal affairs and tantamount to recognizing the independent existence of Biafra. The official line affirmed that African mediation efforts were welcome as long as they recognized the federal arrangement and the unity of Nigeria.[55]

Despite the insistent plea for understanding and assistance from the military governor of Biafra, Col. Ojukwu,[56] the imperial regime chose to tread cautiously, albeit leaning towards the federal government of Nigeria. When notification of its position on the issue became inevitable, though, careful assessment of alternative options was made. Accordingly, the policy paper stipulated that, as the oldest nation in Africa and founder of the OAU, Ethiopia had to maintain its diplomatic/political stature in the continent and

[54] MoFA yä afriqa agäroḷe 106-D8 33-1. Näbeyä-Leûul Keflé (Assistant Minister, Imperial Cabinet) to Kätäma: *Hamlé* 5, 1959E.C (12 July 1967); Memo to the Emperor: 25 September 1967. See also Agbi, 59-69.

[55] *Ibid.*

[56] MoFA yä afriqa agäroḷe 108-D8 yä Lusaka yä mesraq ena yä mäkakäleŔa afriqa agäroḷe sebsäba. Lt. Col. Odemegwu Ojukwu to Hayla-Selassie: 30 May 1967.

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n of the Nigerian crisis on its unresolved problems in Eritrea and Ogaden.

The report argued that the provision in the Charter of the OAU that forbade interference in the affairs of others and Nigeriaôs denunciation of any effort to mediation as meddling in what was strictly its internal politics made it difficult for Ethiopia to get involved in the ongoing mediation efforts. Even the Mediation and Arbitration Commission could not venture in the process for its mandate was limited to inter-state conflicts. The driving factor in imperial Ethiopiaôs policy formulation, though, was the fear that the Biafra case might have a spillover effect in the continent, particularly influencing future activities in Eritrea and Ogaden. Supporting the cause of the federal government and insisting on the territorial integrity of Nigeria were considered to be the only options for creating favorable conditions in case similar incidents would occur in Ethiopia.[58]

When the Kinshasa Summit (September 1967, Resolution AHG/Res. 51(IV)) established a Consultative Committee consisting of six heads of state (Emperor Hayla-Selassie ï chairman, President Mobotu of Zaire, President Ahidjo of Cameroon, President Ankrah of Ghana, President Tubman of Liberia and President Diori of Niger), it had the above considerations in mind. In the first place, the committee had to conduct its affairs in consultation with the federal government of Nigeria ón order to find an amicable solution to its problems within the context of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as one

[57] MoFA yä afriqa agäroḷe 106-D8 33-1. Näbeyä-Leôul Keflé (Assistant Minister, Imperial Cabinet) to Kätäma: *Hamlé* 5, 1959E.C (12 July 1967).

[58] *Ibid.*

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defined along similar lines. Emperor Hayla-Selassie, as chairman of the special delegation, confirmed during the first mission of the commission to Lagos in November 1967 his countryôs commitment to the principles of the OAU Charter.

> é .The national unity and territorial integrity of Member States is not negotiable. It must be fully respected and preserved. It is Our firm belief that the national unity of individual African States is an essential ingredient for the realization of the larger and greater objective of African Unity. It is precisely because of this that We oppose any attempt at national fragmentation on religious and/or ethnic grounds. That is why Ethiopia unreservedly supports Nigerian national unity and territorial integrity. [60]

C.O.C. Amate and Zdenek Cervenka give a good account of developments associated with the consultative committeeôs efforts to mediate the Nigerian crisis until the matter was finally resolved militarily in January 1970. The personal efforts the Ethiopian ruler exerted in bringing together the warring parties and reconciling Nigeria with the four states that had recognized the Republic of Biafra, namely Ivory Coast, Zambia, Gabon and Tanzania, are discussed in some detail.[61] Worthy of noting here are the successive consultative commission meetings he chaired in Lagos (Nov. 1967), Niamey (July 1968) and Monrovia (April 1969); the repeated failures to convene the opposing groups in November and December 1968 and January and December 1969 vis-à-vis additional OAU resolution issued in Addis Ababa (Sept. 1969); and, after the central governmentôs military victory over Biafra in January 1970, Hayla-Selassieôs success in brokering the

[59] MoFA yä afriqa agäroḷe 108-D8 Nigeria. Emperor Hayla-Selassieôs Speech at the occasion of the Missionôs visit of Nigeria: no date. See also Amate, 441-442.

[60] *Ibid.*

[61] Amate, 442-445; Zdenek Cervenka, *The OAU and Its Charter* (1969), 192-224. See also Gino J. Naldi, *The Organization of African Unity: An Analysis of Its Role* (London and New York: Mansell Publishing Lid, 1989), 37-38.

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ne proclamation of a general amnesty and national reconciliation.

7.3. The Libya-Chad Conflict

The conflict between Libya and Chad (1977-1984) and the mediation efforts of African states witnessed some unique features necessitating serious policy deliberations and direct involvement from Ethiopia. Ethiopia had to balance the following factors in formulating its policy on the matter: its cordial relation with Libya vis-à-vis the emerging accord with Nimeiriôs Sudan in 1980s; the implications of the Libya-Chad contention over the Aozou Strip for Ethiopiaôs boundary conflict with Somalia and the war in Eritrea; the nature of partisan politics among various factions in Chad and their association with external powers; the possible effect of the involvement of Egypt and the Sudan in the Chad-Libya conflict on Ethiopiaôs interests; the need to maintain the balance between the views of individual African states and the OAU over the conflict.

In light of the above, Ethiopia started to closely observe developments that led to the Libya-Chad conflict since the early 1970s. The first incident drawing its attention occurred in 1973 when Libyan troops invaded and occupied the Aozou Strip. This heralded the beginning of the Libya-Chad estrangement that continued for the next fifteen years. The issue assumed a new course when Chad presented the case to the 1977 OAU Summit in Libreville, Gabon, which established a provisional committee of inquiry consisting of the heads of state of Algeria, Nigeria, Cameroon, Mozambique, Gabon and Senegal. A policy paper prepared on the conflict by the MoFA assessed the situation

[62] *Ibid.*

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gements on the Libya-Chad boundary, African efforts to seek political solution to the problem and the position Ethiopia had to assume in light of the ongoing contention with Somalia over Ogaden.[63]

Libyaôs ownership claim over the strip based on the un-ratified agreement of 1935 between its colonial master, Italy, and France (on behalf of Chad) was described by the policy paper as unfounded and groundless. Rather, the paper argued, Libyaôs position and conduct violated international conventions guiding boundary-related problems, as was defined by Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States to Treaties and the OAUôs 1964 Cairo Resolution (AHG/Res. 16 (1)) that ruled in favor of maintaining colonial boundaries. The case of the Ethio-Somalia boundary disagreement was cited in the policy paper in this spirit. It was concluded that Somaliaôs denunciation of the existing frontier would not make its claims legal; likewise, Libyaôs forceful occupation of the strip was a clear violation of international law. [64]

Irrespective of the above justification, though, Ethiopiaôs friendly relations with Gaddafiôs regime made it difficult to assume an outright position on the matter. Hence, Ethiopia chose to remain neutral throughout African mediation efforts up to 1983. When African states decided to take the problem to the Security Council in March 1983, Ethiopia openly supported the position of Libya that called for mediation solely by the OAU. It was the only African state to sponsor this resolution together with Syria, Iran, Poland, Nicaragua and USSR. In the absence of alternatives, the UN finally decided on 6

[63] MoFA Chad 1 1. Assessment Report on Libya-Chad Boundary Conflict: no date. See also Terry M. Mays, *Africa's First Peacekeeping Operation: The OAU in Chad, 1981-1982* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), 17-30.

[64] *Ibid.*

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acefully resolved through the mediation of the continental body.

The real dilemma for Ethiopia occurred when it had to decide what position to assume next on the conflict between Libya and Chad over the Aozou Strip. Supporting Libya, according to the policy paper, would reflect badly on Ethiopia and erode the broad African support it had cultivated for long to counter Somaliaôs territorial claim. On the other hand, to recognize Chadôs rightful stand would be tantamount to antagonizing Libya, thereby giving the latter a reason to resume its assistance to Eritrean secessionists and even to side with Somalia. The possible way out envisaged was to maintain the neutrality so far assumed in the matter, to denounce categorically all forms of western attack on Libya and push for the peaceful resolution of the conflict through the sole mediation of the OAU.[66]

This policy was implemented to the letter in subsequent developments associated with the conflict. When US forces began to conduct military exercises close to the shores of Libya in July 1983 and during the March 1986 bombardment of Gaddafiôs quarters and some strategic towns, Ethiopia categorically denounced these actions and in the latter case even called for an extraordinary session of OAU Council of Ministers.[67] We shall discuss in more detail below the mechanisms employed to secure Ethiopiaôs strategic interests in the Chad-Libya conflict, the way it handled the warring parties in Chad and its mediation efforts.


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[65] *Ibid.*

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] *Addis Zämän*: *Hamlé* 29 (5 Aug.), *Nähasé* 5 & 7, 1975E.C (11 & 13 Aug. 1983); *Miyazya* 8 & 12, 1978E.C (16 & 20 April 1986).

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Map Showing the Libya Chad Boundary Conflict over Aozou Strip

The second incident in the Chad-Libya conflict that necessitated serious deliberation on the side of Ethiopia was the preliminary agreement in Tripoli (January 1981) between Gaddafi and the Chadian President Goukouni Oueddei to create a united Jamahiriya state. The situation was given much emphasis following the strong objection to the plan primarily from West African states and even members of the socialist camp that were known to support Libya. West Africans rejected the proposed merger on the ground that the Chadian president was leader of the Provisional Government of National Unity established following the OAU-sponsored Lagos Accord of August 1979. Therefore, he

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le on the countryôs fate prior to the scheduled general election of January 1982.

The memorandum compiled by MoFA analyzed the background leading to the proposed merger and forwarded suggestions on the position Ethiopia had to assume. The fragile coalition government created by the 1979 Lagos Accord that divided power among the eleven warring factions in Chad; the rebellion that broke out in March 1980 led by the defense minister, Hissène Habré, and continued for the next nine months; the support France, its former colonies in the region as well as Egypt and the Sudan gave to Habré and his initial success in occupying most of the territory, including parts of the capital, Ndjamena; the failure of the OAU, pursuant to the provisions of Lagos Accord, to provide a peace-keeping force for Chad; and Libyaôs military intervention on the side of President Oueddei that drove the rebels out of most of Chad, were stated as factors influencing the decision for merger between the two states in early 1981.[69]

The official position Ethiopia had to assume on the situation was formulated after careful assessment of the meaning and implications of the above developments. First, the memorandum questioned the justifications behind the decision of African states to oppose the proposed merger on the ground of the provisional status of Oueddeiôs government. According to the policy paper, the OAU had passed a number of resolutions to stop the Chadian civil war and created various committees. Each of these resolutions had requested member states to assist Chad, collectively or individually, and, more

[68] MoFA Chad 1 1. Memo on the Proposed Libya-Chad Merger: no date; The Lagos Accord of August 1979; The Lagos Communiqué of OAU Good Office Committee: 24 December 1980.

[69] MoFA Chad 1 1. Memo on the Proposed Libya-Chad Merger: no date.

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organization had officially recognized the transitional government as the sovereign and legal entity. In the face of the failure of the OAU and its member states to practically implement two major resolutions, i.e. to advance the financial contribution to the amount of $50,000 per member state and the sending of a fully functioning African peace-keeping force consisting of Congo, Benin and Guinea-Conakry, the appeal of the Chadian government for assistance from Tripoli and the latterôs intervention in driving off the rebel forces should not be considered a violation of any prior agreement.[70]

On the other hand, Gaddafiôs determination to disseminate the philosophy of the óGreen Bookô as a third world theory; his decision to train, equip and organize an óIslamic Legionô so as to realize the ambition of creating an óIslamic Confederationô; the subsequent concentration in Tripoli of all secessionist elements and known opposition parties functioning in Africa, Middle East and Europe; and the resultant tension in West Africa following Gaddafiôs attempts to destabilize their governments together with the severing of diplomatic relations between Libya and most of the West African countries were indicated as points of concern for Ethiopia.[71]

More perplexing to Ethiopian officials, though, was the confession of President Oueddei and his senior ministers to the Ethiopian ambassador in Lagos, Käsaté-Berehän Badäma, that the proposed merger was a fraud and a forceful imposition by Libya. The Chadian leader explained the matter on the occasion of his state visit to Lagos which ended embarrassingly when Nigerian officials refused to receive his delegation.

[70] *Ibid.* Also see Mays, *Africa's First Peacekeeping Operation*, 35-53.

[71] *Ibid.*

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efeat of Habréôs forces, the president and his colleagues were urgently summoned to Tripoli and presented with a prepared statement by the minister of defense declaring the merger. In the face of the possible peril that awaited them if they refused, Oueddei and his ministers confided to the Ethiopian ambassador, they had no alternative but to sign the document. Since Nigeria refused to hear them out and the remaining West African states were intent on categorically denouncing them, the Chadian president appealed for Ethiopiaôs intervention and requested for an immediate audience with Col. Mengistu. If Ethiopia was willing to intervene in favor of Chad, Oueddei expressed his readiness to officially denounce the merger. [72]

As a result, the policy paper had to consider this information regarding the nature of the proposed unity. The final assessment on how Ethiopia should handle the Chad-Libya merger was made taking three issues into account: the nature of the agreement itself, Libyaôs interference in the internal affairs of West African states and the implications of the proposed merger for Ethiopiaôs relations with the Sudan, Libya and Egypt.[73]

The memorandum argued that OAU had fully recognized Goukouni Oueddeiôs government, and the Chadian regime had already signed earlier a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with Libya (June 1980), to which no African state had objected. More importantly, it was argued in the paper, there was no legal ground, international or continental, to deny them the sovereign right to merge if they desire. However, the paper underlined, the admission by Oueddei and his ministers of the fact that the agreement was

[72] MoFA Lagos Report 2 Vol.6. Ambassador Käsaté-Berehän Badäma (Lagos) to Dr. Amarä Täklé (Director, African and Middle East Directorate): *Ṭir* 12, 1973E.C (21 Jan. 1981).

[73] MoFA Chad 1 1. Memo on the Proposed Libya-Chad Merger: no date.

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offset this argument. If Ethiopia had to assume a position other than the one stated above, though, the Chadian leader had to make an official statement detailing the actual facts behind the agreement of January 1981.[74]

Gaddafiôs óGreen Bookô philosophy and the desire to establish an óIslamic Confederationô through Jihad wars in Western Africa using the óIslamic Legionô were interpreted in the policy paper as a dangerous move fraught with negative consequences for Ethiopia. The free hand Eritrean secessionists were enjoying in Libya by associating themselves with Gaddafiôs ideology; the official geography text books in Libya that categorized Eritrea as an Arab land were depicted as extremely harmful to Ethiopiaôs territorial integrity.

Interestingly, the policy paper associated Gaddafiôs strategy with Nkrumahôs óContinental Union Governmentô initiative of the 1960s, and detailed how, when the objective failed to materialize through diplomatic channels, he attempted to realize it through destabilization missions using óLiberation Forcesô he personally created in some West African countries . The 1965 OAU Summit in Accra had condemned such acts and strongly denounced their future recurrence in any part of the continent. The policy paper insisted that Gaddafiôs fanatic political agenda was similar to Nkrumahôs plan and, therefore, had to be condemned and frustrated unequivocally.[75]

The intricate politics involving Ethiopia, Libya, the Sudan and Egypt had similarly influenced the policy deliberation. The existing cordial relations between Ethiopia and

[74] *Ibid.*

[75] *Ibid.*

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mpathy for the Eritrean cause, had to be weighed against the feeling of animosity the Sudan and Egypt had for Gaddafi in general and his involvement in the affairs of Chad in particular. The policy paper argued that Libya had been trying to impose on Ethiopia its policy orientations towards Egypt and the Sudan. The most dramatic incident happened when the Libyan foreign minister, Ali Triki, come to Addis Ababa with a prepared defense agreement and urged Ethiopian officials to sign the document immediately.[76]

The beginning of a period of relative understanding and friendship between the governments of Nimeiri and Mengistu in the early 1980s, however, necessitated reassessment of Ethiopiaôs policy. Accordingly, the memorandum emphatically underscored the fact that Ethiopia could not afford to exchange the Sudan for Libya and thereby push Nimeiri to fall under the influence of Egypt. Nevertheless, Libya should not be estranged in the meantime. The only way out envisaged was to remain aloof and tread carefully as matters develop in the future. The general understanding on the part of Ethiopia was that, since most African states had condemned Libyaôs military presence in Chad and requested for its immediate withdrawal and return to Chad of the Aozou Strip, Ethiopia could not afford to neglect the African consensus. [77]

Ethiopiaôs direct involvement in Chadian affairs started in earnest in February 1980. The leader of the Chadian delegation to the 34th OAU Council of Ministers meeting (Addis Ababa, January 1980), Mr. Mohamet Nur, briefed Col. Mengistu on the current

[76] *Ibid.*

[77] *Ibid.* MoFA kä Dr. Amarä Täklé biro yätägäÑu documäntoḷe 366. Memo on Chad: *Yäkatit* 1973E.C (Feb. 1981).

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quested for immediate assistance. The Ethiopian leader responded by sanctioning the dispatch to Ndjamena of a fact-finding mission that would assess the problems the provisional national unity government was facing and devises mechanisms to work together with the ruling faction of President Oueddei, the *Front pour la Liberation du Tchad* (FROLINAT). The detailed objectives of the mission included investigation of the status of various factions in that country, evaluation of their military capabilities, assessment of the scale of French military presence, understanding of the positions of neighboring states on Chadian civil war and identifying factions that would be amenable to Ethiopiaôs interest and whom it should support in the future.[78]

The general assessment portrayed a gloomy picture of the situation in Chad. Difficulties associated with implementing the provisions of the Lagos Accord were indicated as major impediments hampering the political stability of that country. For things to assume a positive turn and for the central government to function properly in accordance with the Lagos Accord, the report recommended, an African peace-keeping force should be deployed; the French troops had to vacate the country; Libya had to withdraw its territorial claims over the Aozou Strip and cease sponsoring forces of destabilization; Chadôs French speaking neighbors had to refrain from meddling in that country; and an urgent humanitarian assistance had to be rendered to the famine-stricken nation.[79]

[78] MoFA Chad 1 1. Report of the Mission to Chad: *Yäkatit* 26, 1972E.C (5 March 1980); MoFA Chad 1. General Report on Chad: *Yäkatit* 28, 1972E.C (7 March 1980).

[79] *Ibid.*

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ur political/military factions were identified as significant actors influencing the course of events in Chad. These were President Oueddeiôs army, *Forces Armees Populaires* or FAP (the military wing of FROLINAT) that controlled the Arab-dominated North and most of the western parts; forces commanded by the vice president, Lt. Col. Kamuge, *Forces Armee Du Tchad* or FAT, dominating the southern parts; Habréôs troops, *Forces Armees Du Nord* or FAN, which controlled the north-eastern regions along the Chad-Sudan boundary; and an army under the command of the minister of interior, Mohammed Aba Said, *Front D'Action Commune Provisoine* or FACP, which controlled the remaining parts.[80]

After consultations with each of these groups and other smaller ones, the Ethiopian delegation arrived at the conclusion that none of them were worthy of special consideration. If choosing one was a necessity, though, President Goukouni Oueddeiôs faction that demonstrated ósocialist and progressiveô tendencies would be the best alternative. Otherwise, lacking any major differences in their political agenda, the report observed, the warring factions, except Hissène Habré, seem ready to come together provided there was patience and skill on the side of the mediating party.[81]

In the mean time, African heads of state and government meeting for the 18th OAU Summit (Nairobi, June 1981) passed various resolutions on the Chad problem. These included the establishment of an African peace-keeping force; the creation of a committee of observers consisting of Kenya, Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Djibouti, Gabon and Zambia; and request for the withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad as soon as the

[80] *Ibid.*

[81] *Ibid.*

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the country, i.e. no later than December 1981. Three countries - Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire - agreed to contribute soldiers to the mission. To the dismay of President Oueddei, disregarding his demand that the peace-keeping mission should participate in routing the rebels, African states pressured him into peace talks with Habré. To make things worse, the Libyan troops suddenly left the country in early November 1981. The vacuum created in the process enabled Habréôs forces to control some strategic towns in the north and seriously eroded the power base of Oueddei.[82]

Alarmed by the rapid deterioration of his control of the situation, the Chadian leader sent an emissary to Ethiopia requesting for assistance. The leader of the delegation, the minister of justice, Dilawa Kabire, together with the OAU secretary-general, Edem Kodjo, briefed Feqrä-Selasé Wägdäräs, secretary of the Darg, on the current situation in the country. They transmitted President Oueddeiôs official request demanding Ethiopiaôs participation, at least by way of a symbolic presence, in the African peace-keeping mission to Chad. The response given to this request betrayed bewilderment and surprise on the part of Ethiopia; promises were made to reach a final decision after consultation with Col. Mengistu himself. On the occasion, Ethiopia expressed its reservations with regard to the Nairobi resolutions on Chad that created a neutral peace-keeping force. Rather, expressive of the countryôs sympathy with Goukouni Oueddei, it was stated that

[82] MoFA Chad 1. Assessment Report on African Peace Keeping Missions to Chad: *Miyazya* 19, 1974E.C (27 April 1982); Memo on the Problems Encountered by the African Peace Keeping Mission to Chad: *Miyazya* 1974E.C (April 1982); MoFA afriqa leyu leyu gudayoḷe 7, yä chad mälekteÑoḷe. Feqrä-Selasé Wägdäräs to Mengistu. Memo on talks with President Oueddeiôs Delegation: *Yäkatit* 8, 1974E.C (16 Feb. 1982). Also see Mays, *Africa's First Peacekeeping Operation*, 57-140; Naldi, *The Organization of African Unity*, 73-86. Zinaida Tokareva, *Organization of African Unity: 25 Years of Struggle.* Translated from Russian by Clance Nsiah Jaybex (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989), 64-74.

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e been engaged in battling the ódictatorô Habré and provisions should have been made to reinforce the army of the central government. [83]

The recommendation forwarded to Col. Mengistu regarding the request for Ethiopiaôs participation in the peace-keeping mission and military assistances to the Chad government indicates the Ethiopian governmentôs confusion on how to maintain the balance between the African consensus and its relations with Libya. In light of the discord between Gaddafi and Oueddei that transpired with the sudden withdrawal of the formerôs troops from Chad; the possible reprisals from Libya in the form of strengthening its support to Eritrean rebels if Ethiopia complied with Oueddeiôs demands; and the apparent support the majority of African states gave to Hissène Habré, the memorandum recommended that Ethiopia should refrain from participating in the peace-keeping mission and desist from associating itself openly with President Oueddei. More surprising, though, was the proposal to send a message to Tripoli to consult on the course of action to be followed in the future.[84]

Matters assumed a dramatic turn when Habréôs forces controlled Ndjamena and forced Oueddei into exile in June 1982. The time table set for the African peace-keeping forces to Chad, which would end by 30th of June; and the revival of the conflict between the major factions following Habréôs ascension to power further complicated the Chadian situation. Ethiopia faced a new challenge on the issue of what position to adopt.

[83] MoFA afriqa leyu leyu gudayoḷe 7, yä chad mälekteÑoḷe. Feqrä-Selasé Wägdäräs to Mengistu. Memo on His Discussion with Edem Kodjo and the Chadian Delegation: *Hedar* 22, 1974E.C (2 Dec. 1981); Memo to the Foreign Minister on Feqrä-Sellaséôs talk with OAU Sec. Gen. and the Chadian Delegation: *Hedar* 1974E.C (Nov. 1981).

[84] MoFA afriqa leyu leyu gudayoḷe 7, yä chad mälekteÑoḷe. Feqrä-Selasé Wägdäräs to Mengistu. Memo on His Discussion with Edem Kodjo and the Chadian Delegation: *Hedar* 22, 1974E.C (2 Dec. 1981).

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began to call for an OAU-sponsored mediation effort involving all the concerned factions including the government Goukouni Oueddei had established in the northern part of the country. Ethiopia insisted that this has to be accomplished before the withdrawal of the African peace-keepers. The continental body, in accordance with its earlier decisions (which Ethiopia had hesitated to accept initially), had to take the initiative in brokering a deal in Chad.[85]

Ethiopia faced a real dilemma in sorting out its policy towards Chad following the establishment in northern Chad of a separate Libya-sponsored government by Goukouni Oueddei. The country had to choose between the internationally recognized (including by the OAU) government of Hissène Habré and its strategic alliance with Gaddafi. In addition, Col. Mengistu was the chairperson of the OAU for the years 1983-84, and this necessitated careful consideration in every policy line Ethiopia had to assume on the Chad problem. A policy paper formulated for this occasion labored through the pros and cons of every possible scenario in entertaining the above elements.[86]

The justifications for the position Ethiopia had to assume on Chad were set in the context of an age-old tradition in its foreign policy directives that recognized states rather than governments, its responsibilities to Africa as the seat of the OAU as well as the current chair of the continental organization, beside safeguarding its strategic interests in the process. Ethiopiaôs recognition of Goukouni Oueddeiôs government would entail nothing substantial other than identifying the country with the expansionist policies and destabilization missions of Col. Gaddafi. In addition such a decision would only confirm

[85] MoFA Chad 1. Memo on Chad Conflict: *Miyazya* 1974E.C (April 1982).

[86] MoFA Chad 1 1. Memo on Chad Problem and Ethiopiaôs Policy: *Ṭir* 17, 1976E.C (26 Jan. 1984).

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anda campaigns, thereby contributing to the negative image the country had among some partisans in the conflict. The only outcome of this mayhem would be the creation of two competing powers jeopardizing the territorial integrity of Chad.[87]

The most serious consequence was its implications for OAUôs principles guiding issues related to the territorial integrity of member states and colonial boundaries. The weakening of the OAU as a result of the Chad problem might result in the demise of the organization and the nullification of the central tenets of its Charter. Practically speaking, the policy paper argued, Ethiopiaôs recognition of the rebellious government would encourage others to respond in kind by espousing the causes of Eritrean secessionism and Somali irredentism. On another dimension, the situation, if handled wisely, would enable Ethiopia to benefit from the ensuing conflict between Libya on the one side and the Sudan and Egypt on the other. As long as Ethiopia managed to keep these parties apart, its national security would be guaranteed and Libya would refrain from openly supporting the rebel groups in the north.[88]

In its conclusion, the paper advised against any identification with Oueddeiôs government and conducting of all future actions in line with a policy of neutrality that reflects the countryôs traditional and current positions in the OAU. The policy paper indicated that Ethiopia could indirectly help Libya and, if necessary, Oueddei himself using its current status as chair of the OAU. Short of recognizing his government, it could sponsor motions that would urge the two Chadian factions to the negotiating table under

[87] *Ibid.*

[88] *Ibid.*

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ddition, the paper hinted at the possibility that the two countries, Libya and Ethiopia, could coordinate their efforts in bolstering the military capabilities of Goukouni Oueddei so as to help him realize his reinstatement in power.[89]

Surprisingly enough, Mengistu, as chairman of the OAU, attempted to execute this plan by pressuring President Habré into conducting round table talks with Oueddei and other opposition groups in Addis Ababa in January 1984. Mengistu proposed that Ethiopia would accord every privilege due a statesman to the Chadian leader, but once he entered the negotiating room he would be treated as equal to the others. The initiative met a stalemate following Habréôs insistence that opposition factions should first recognize his presidency and allegedly over the contention on the placement in the negotiating table of the Chadian flag.[90] Irrespective of Ethiopiaôs proposal to simultaneously place the Chadian flag in front of the two opposing groups, President Habré demanded that only his delegation deserves the right as the current ruler of the country. As a result, Ethiopiaôs brief mediation effort in the Chadian conflict ended there, the reason for the failure being the confusion in balancing its immediate interests with what is expected of it as a member of the African caucus.

[89] *Ibid.*

[90] *Addis Zämän*: *Ṭir* 3-9, 1976E.C (12-18 Jan. 1984).

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The Western Sahara case became an international issue since the early 1960s. The rival territorial claims of Morocco and Mauritania, coupled with the bid for independence of the people of Western Sahara supported by Algeria contributed to the internationalization of the problem. Debates in the UN went back to 1963; resolutions were passed in 1965 and 1966 demanding the speedy independence of the territory and the holding of a referendum, respectively.[91] Afterwards, things began to deteriorate.

In cooperation with the colonial ruler of Western Sahara, Spain, Morocco and Mauritania insisted on dividing the area among them. To this effect, the two African states signed an agreement in 1974. Following the 1975 ruling by the UN fact-finding mission that voted for total independence of the territory, Morocco declared what it called the óGreen Marchô. This incident heralded the beginning of an armed struggle that continued for the following decades. On 11 November 1975, Spain, Morocco and Mauritania signed the Madrid Accord by which, irrespective of the decisions of the UN and the OAU, the colonial power handed over the territory to the two other signatories. Soon afterwards, in February 1976, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO) declared the independence of Western Sahara and established a government in exile.[92] After the 1979 peace deal between POLISARIO and

[91] MoFA yä afriqa agäroḷe 106-D8 33. Assessment Report on Western Sahara: *Säné* 10, 1970E.C (17 June 1978). Informant: Ambassador Yelma Tadäsä

[92] *Ibid.* For the involvement in the conflict of neighboring states and Spain see ñArms for Morocco? US Policy Towards the Conflict in Western Sahara,ò *Report of a Study Mission to Morocco, the Western Sahara, Mauritania, Algeria, Liberia, Spain and France, August 5-18, 1979. To the Committee of Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives* (US Government Printing Office, Washington: 1979): 17-25; David Lynn Price, ñThe Washington Papers VII, 63: The Western Sahara,ò in *The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University*, Washington, DC (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1979): 21-68; Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *The Western Saharans: Background to Conflict* (London: Croom Helm Ltd, 1980), 104-184, 247-268; Arnold Hottinger, ñWestern Sahara and

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greed to return the portion of land it controlled), Morocco extended its claims to all of the territory and continued to fight with the government-in-exile till the 1990s.[93]

The OAU, too, was taking its own parallel measures on the situation in Western Sahara. Discussions and resolutions on the territory date back to 1969. The request of the 13th ordinary session of Council of Ministers (Addis Ababa, September 1969) that demanded Spain to grant Western Sahara its independence represented the first action. Similar resolutions urged the colonial power to facilitate the conducting of a UN-monitored referendum. However, the case began to challenge the continental body following POLISARIOôs request to be admitted to full membership of the OAU immediately after its establishment. African division on the matter appeared after the 13th OAU Summit (Port Louis, Mauritius, June 1976) when a resolution calling for an urgent meeting consisting of all political parties in Western Sahara failed to materialize because of lack of willingness from most of the member states.[94] From this point onwards, the issue continued to polarize African opinion and trouble the very existence of the OAU.

Beyond: New Perspectives on the Desert War After Chad,ò in *Instituti De Cuestiones Internacionales* No.9 (Feb1981): 3-9; John Gretton, ñWestern Sahara: the Fight for Self-Determination,ò in *Anti-Slavery Society and the Committee for Indigenous Peoples*. Research Report No.1 (1976): 20-25, 29-33; John Damis, *Conflict in Northwest Africa: the Western Sahara Dispute* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute Press, Stanford University, 1983), 14-44, 46-102, 104-131; Leo Kamil, *Fueling the Fire: US Policy and the Western Sahara Conflict* (Trenton, New Jersey: The Red Sea Press, 1987), 1-87, 97-98.

[93] MoFA afriqa leyu leyu guday 7 Mauritania. Dakar Embassy to Berhänu Dinqa (Director, African and Middle East Directorate): *Säné* 9, 1970E.C (16 June 1978).

[94] MoFA yä afriqa agäroḷe 106-D8 33. Assessment Report on Western Sahara: *Säné* 10, 1970E.C (17 June 1978).

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Sketch Map of the Contention over Western Sahara[95]

Throughout these developments, Ethiopia refused to take any position on Western Sahara. The reason behind this was that the situation resembled the cases of Eritrea and Ogaden and the taking of sides might instigate the intervention of others in these internal problems.[96] The argument, however, was dramatically reversed after the late 1970s. One document claims that it was inappropriate and ill-principled to refrain from involving in the situation on the grounds that it might reflect badly on Ethiopiaôs rightful claims.[97] There are no historical and legal parallels between the Eritrean and Ogaden situation on

[95] ñ*Arms for Morocco? US Policy towards the Conflict in the Western Sahara*,ò v.

[96] Informant: Ambassadors Mängisté Dästa, Seyoum Mohamud and Yelma Tadäsä.

[97] MoFA yä afriqa agäroḷe 106-D8 33. Memo on Western Sahara and Ethiopiaôs Position: Nähasé 20, 1970E.C (26 Aug. 1978).

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claims of Morocco on Western Sahara, the document emphasized, and therefore Ethiopia should not fear of any negative consequences in this regard.

The speculation that others might recognize an Eritrean state in exile if and when Ethiopia gave recognition to POLISARIO was equally dismissed. The notion that secessionists would resolve their internal divisions and establish a unity government was considered presumptuous. In the unlikely event of such an eventuality, Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Sudan, Kuwait and Morocco would not provide additional support other than the one they were already providing at the moment. Rather, the memo hinted, the situation in Western Sahara resembled the case of Djibouti vis-à-vis Somaliaôs territorial claims on the territory. It drew a parallel between Ethiopiaôs recognition of the independent status of French Somaliland and Algeriaôs similar stand on Western Sahara. Therefore, Ethiopia could benefit by acknowledging POLISARIO and demanding that Algeria respond in kind on the case of Djibouti.[98]

The assessment also projected possible losses Ethiopia could sustain in the event of recognizing the POLISARIO government in exile. The primary damage would be in its diplomatic relations with Morocco. The memo underlined that it would come as a relief to Ethiopia if Morocco decided to sever its ties under this pretext. A number of reasons were stated as justifications for the above observation. First, bilateral relations between the two countries were almost nonexistent in the post-1974 period, and the closure of Ethiopiaôs embassy in Rabat was long overdue. Second, Morocco gave open material and

[98] *Ibid.*

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ecessionists and Somali irredentists. During the 1977/78 Ethio-Somali War, for example, in addition to siding with Siad Barre, the Moroccan foreign minister gave audience to the delegation of Western Somalia Liberation Front (WESLF) and issued a joint statement.[99]

So, the report argued, it was time for Ethiopia to respond in kind. It claimed that the decision had already been made to close the embassy in Rabat. Therefore, Ethiopiaôs recognition of POLISARIO and its government in exile would entail no additional cost. Rather, Moroccoôs possible retaliation by way of calling its diplomatic staff would facilitate the withdrawal of its spies from the country. The report insisted that the time was ripe for Ethiopia to recognize the Saharawi Republic. This step would ensure the countryôs closer association with socialist African states and would eliminate possible embarrassment in the event of the republicôs attainment of independence in the near future.[100]

Ethiopia thus officially recognized the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic on the third anniversary of its establishment in February 1979. A delegation led by Lt. Germa Ayälä, member of the Darg and political commissar of the southern command, headed to the territory to mark this special occasion. On 24 February, the MoFA issued a statement announcing the decision of the government. It argued that the measure was taken based on Ethiopiaôs adherence to socialist internationalism and in accordance with the decisions of the UN. A couple of days later, Morocco severed its diplomatic relations with

[99] *Ibid.*

[100] *Ibid.*

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a was immersed into the frictions and tug-of-wars that troubled Africa and the OAU for the coming decades.

The wisdom behind Ethiopiaôs decision was brought into question no later than a year. The experience of the Ethiopian delegation during the 35th ordinary session of the Council of Ministers (Freetown, Sierra Leone, June 1980) called for reassessment of the policy directives towards Western Sahara. Immediately before that, Ethiopia had been facing serious challenges from some African states which started to associate the Eritrean cause with that of POLISARIO. Cases in point were the general tendency to categorize the Eritrean situation with the secessionist activities of Biafra, Katanga and Cabinda; Sudanôs effort to introduce the agenda as an international issue during the 15th OAU Summit (Khartoum, July 1978); and similar attempts by Somalia during the 17th Summit (Freetown, June 1980). More expressive of Ethiopiaôs confusion, though, was an earlier incident in the UN General Assembly where, apprehensive of Moroccoôs attempt to raise the Eritrean case, it kept silent throughout the heated debate on Western Sahara.[102]

African division over Western Sahara came into the open during the 35th Council of Ministers meeting. Senegalôs proposal for a round table discussion of all concerned parties in the conflict was considered by others as a strategy to advance the interests of Morocco and, therefore, was downplayed. In the meantime, the OAU secretary general tabled a motion sponsored by twenty-six member states that demanded the Saharawi

[101] For the series of events see *Addis Zämän*: *Yäkatit* 18 (26 Feb.) & *Mägabit* 2, 1971E.C (11 March 1979).

[102] MoFA kä afriqa wana ḳehefät bét 5 meôerab sahara 1. Memo on Western Sahara and Ethiopiaôs Policy Directive: *Hamlé* 22, 1972E.C (29 July 1980). See also David Lynn Price, *Conflict in the Maghreb: the Western Sahara* (England: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1981), 3-17; Naldi, *The Organization of African Unity,* 45-71; Tokareva, *Organization of African Unity*, 56-64; Walraven, *Dreams of Power*, 258-262.

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nt seat in the organization. The sponsoring states claimed that, according to Art.28, Par.2 of the OAU Charter, only a simple majority was needed for an admission of a new member. Therefore, the republic should be accorded the honor.[103]

On the other hand, Morocco objected, raising a legal question based on Art.28, Par.1 of the Charter that demanded member states to be independent and sovereign. Further complicating the situation, Morocco and its major supporters (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Congo (Kinshasa), Gabon, Guinea and some French-speaking African countries) threatened to walk out of the OAU. In the absence of a better alternative, the meeting heeded Moroccoôs proposal, again referring to Art.27 of the Charter, which called for a deadlock in the Council of Ministers to be resolved by 2/3 majority of the summit conference. The 17th Summit (Freetown, June 1980) simply endorsed Senegalôs proposal that called for discussions between and among parties involved.[104]

In addition to the premonition on the toll this division might have on the OAU, the report compiled by the Ethiopian delegation advised for utmost caution in future actions to be taken on the matter. Particularly, emphasis was given to the possible retaliatory measures Morocco could take against Ethiopia. It speculated, apart from Somalia, other African states which had not yet officially recognized the Eritrean problem as Ethiopiaôs internal affair (like Mozambique, Guinea and some French-speaking nations) might join the camp of Morocco. The report emphatically criticized the absence of up-to-date study

[103] *Ibid.*

[104] MoFA kä afriqa wana ḳehefät bét 5 meôerab sahara 1. Memo on the Freetown 35th CM Meeting and the 17th Summit: no date. MoFA kä afriqa wana ḳehefät bét 5 meôerab sahara 1. Memo on Western Sahara and Ethiopiaôs Policy Directive: *Hamlé* 22, 1972E.C (29 July 1980).

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matter vis-à-vis the urgency witnessed during the rush to recognize the Algeria-based POLISARIO government. Two measures were forwarded by way of ensuring Ethiopiaôs interests on the matter. These were stepping up the effort to resolve the Eritrean problem militarily, thereby denying any leeway for external manipulation and establishing a high level committee that would engage in designing actions to be taken on issues related to Western Sahara.[105]

The conviction on the part of Ethiopia that the Eritrean situation was different from Western Sahara continued to backfire in the coming months. In March 1980, while celebrating its fourth anniversary, the Saharawi Republic, through its Washington office, issued a document entitled ôWestern Sahara: the Struggle of the Saharawi People for Self-Determinationô. To the utter dismay of Ethiopian officials, the material included an inflammatory statement regarding POLISARIOôs position on Eritrea:

> é .Another arbitrary act, no less serious, concerns Eritrea. Eritrea had been an Italian colony, as were Somalia, Libya and Ethiopia (the last country to be conquered). Then Ethiopia regained its independence, as was right and proper. Libya and Somalia became independent states. Why was Eritrea not treated in the same way? Eritrea is the only Italian colony which was not granted independence: instead, it was forced into a federation with Ethiopia. As with the Palestinian, the Eritrean people were in no way consulted, neither at the time, nor when the Negus [Emperor Hayla-Selassie] decided to transform the federation into a straightforward annexation. There was no historical justification for this, as Eritrea has never belonged to Ethiopia.[106]

Infuriated by the above statement, the MoFA instructed POLISARIOôs East African representative, Mr. Mouloud Slimani, to notify his government of Ethiopiaôs concern and displeasure with the incident. Ethiopia demanded that the booklet should be recalled and

[105] MoFA kä afriqa wana ḳehefät bét 5 meĉerab sahara 1. Memo on Western Sahara and Ethiopiaôs Policy Directive: *Hamlé* 22, 1972E.C (29 July 1980).

[106] *Ibid*, Memo on Ethio-Saharawi Republic Relation: September 23, 1973E.C (4 Oct. 1980).

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to revise its position unless the statement is erased from the document.

Hakim Ibrahim, foreign minister of the Saharawi Republic, claimed the booklet was not the responsibility of his government and that its representative in Washington had disseminated the material without prior consultation. His assurances failed to convince Ethiopian officials, who suspected foul play when their request for a public statement denouncing the above assertion failed to materialize.[107] In the mean time, the president of the republic had requested permission to open an embassy in Addis Ababa. The assessment report proposed that, in the face of the above development and the fact that the Sahrawi republic had embassies only in Algeria, Mozambique, Madagascar and Angola, permission should be denied and its presence restricted to the level of a órepresentationô until the republicôs position on Eritrea was clarified.[108]

Africaôs division on the question of Western Sahara continued to trouble the OAU. In an effort to find an amicable solution to the stalemate, the ad hoc committee established during the 17th Summit in Freetown finally agreed in its fifth session in September 1980 to conduct a UN- and OAU-monitored referendum to decide on the fate of the territory and advised warring parties to declare a ceasefire before December 1980. The UN endorsed the above resolution, and the OAU as well did so in its 18th Summit (Nairobi, June 1981) following the agreement of the King of Morocco to hold a ócontrolled referendumô. Immediately afterwards the Implementation Committee established by the Nairobi Summit

[107] *Ibid.*

[108] *Ibid;* Memo on Western Sahara: no date.

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es of the referendum.[109] But Africa still failed to bring about a sustainable solution to the conflict.

The question of membership to the OAU of the Saharawi Republic created havoc during the 38th meeting of the Council of Ministers (Addis Ababa, February 1982). Upon finding that the representatives of the territory had assumed formal seats at the opening session, Morocco and other eight African states walked out of the conference. Further complicating the matter, on 25 February 1982, the OAU secretariat took an administrative decision to fully admit the Saharawi Republic as the 51st member of the continental body.[110]

The issue continued to divide Africa in the coming years, and Ethiopia played its role in the process. Events associated with the third African Information Ministers Conference in Dakar, Senegal (March 1982), best illustrate the level of polarization. The disagreement had occurred well before the opening of the conference, when Senegal refused to accept the Saharawi delegation and returned them back from the airport. Other African states, led by Algeria and Angola, opposed this measure and refused to participate in the conference.[111]

The chair of the conference, Ethiopia, even if it sympathized with the latter group, had initially pushed for the commencement of the event as scheduled. But when Senegalôs

[109] Ibid, Memo on Western Sahara: no date; OAU Resolution on Western Sahara: June 27, 1981; Decision of the OAU Implementation Committee on Western Sahara: August 26, 1981; Decision of the Implementation Committee on Modalities and Organizational Framework for the Referendum in Western Sahara: 9 February 1982.

[110] *Addis Zämän*: *Yäkatit* 17 & 19, 1974E.C (25 & 27 Feb. 1984).

[111] MoFA yä OAU/AU leyu leyu guday 6 4-2-13. Germa Yelma (Minister of Information) to the Council of Ministers. Report on the Dakar Information Ministers Conference: *Mägabit* 17, 1974 E.C (26 March 1984); Wäsän Bägah (Charge de Affair, Dakar) to Dr. Fäläqä Gädlä-Giyorgis (Minister, MoFA): *Mägabit* 16, 1974E.C (25 March 1984).

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nal protocol, attempted to assume the role of the chair, Ethiopia openly criticized the step taken against the Saharawi Republic and walked out of the conference, making the total number of dissenters fourteen. Ultimately, the meeting had to be abandoned, irrespective of the efforts of the Morocco group to finalize it, for the majority of African states refused to take part in its deliberations.[112]

OAUôs attempts to find a viable solution to the problem of Western Sahara had met a deadlock and this stalemate continued well beyond the times of the Darg. The government of Ethiopia, however, gradually realized the seriousness of the matter and the haste in which it had taken sides. The new foreign policy directive issued in May 1990 clearly admitted the mistake committed in relation to the Saharawi Republic. The new directive characterized Ethiopiaôs position on Western Sahara as damaging to the national interest and lamented the loss of the geo-political advantages that could have been secured otherwise.[113]

Ethiopiaôs efforts at mediating inter- and intra-state conflicts in post-independence Africa represent another dimension of the countryôs involvement in the affairs of the continent. Generally speaking, the whole exercise demonstrated Ethiopiaôs sense of belongingness and commitment to collective peace and security in Africa. The countryôs prominence in African politics, its adherence to the principle of the peaceful resolution of conflicts and its carefully nurtured principle of non-affiliation in ideology-driven associations in the continent contributed to its successes in most of the mediation roles.

[112] *Ibid.*

[113] MoFA Annual Plan and Reports. Ethiopiaôs New Foreign Policy Directive: *Genbot* 1982E.C (May 1990).

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the Darg abided by some basic principles while engaging in mediation efforts in Africa. The policy lines they adopted primarily took into consideration the possible implications each case might have on Ethiopia. The cases of Eritrea and Ogaden were taken into account before any decision was reached on the role Ethiopia was going to play in a given inter- or intra-state conflict in Africa. They also steadfastly advocated a resolution of African problems without any intervention from external forces. In particular, the meddling of ex-colonial powers elicited the strongest of reactions.

Irrespective of this, however, the two governments slightly differed on their approaches to African conflicts. The imperial regime persistently maintained the principle of preserving the unity of the affected nation in the process of peaceful resolution of conflicts. Disputes had, therefore, to be resolved within the framework of maintaining national unity and without meddling in the internal affairs of the concerned nation-state. This way it was presumed to advance Ethiopiaôs own interests regarding its internal problems in Eritrea and Ogaden. Fellow Africans were expected to respond in kind when and if these issues necessitated their intervention.

The Darg, likewise, adhered to these principles. But at times it overstretched its assessment of ongoing African conflicts through the lens of ideological affinity than the consequence it would have on Ethiopiaôs internal problems. The imperial regime, assisted by the aura of statesmanship enjoyed by the emperor, maintained a near perfect record in its efforts to resolve African problems. The Darg, on the contrary, at times put its socialist internationalism first. This often placed the regime in a tight situation and the Darg

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decisions in a number of cases. However, in a way, the measures it had boldly taken proved instrumental in saving the OAU from peril later on.

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Conclusion

Contrary to conventional wisdom, Ethiopiaôs contact with Africa dates back to the early 1940s and 1950s. Liaison offices it has opened in neighboring dependent territories of Sudan, Egypt, Somalia and Kenya in 1941, 1943, 1956 and 1958, respectively, set the background for later relations. The formal contact with French Somaliland (Djibouti) can even be traced back to 1897. In addition to maintaining closer cooperation with respective colonial powers in these areas, there was an urgent desire on the part of Ethiopia to protect and advance its own national interests. The country started to establish contacts with clan and/or political leaders of Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya. Initial interactions with liberation movements of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa were likewise initiated after the mid-fifties through Ethiopian consulates and legations.

Simultaneously, the UN served as a forum for following up developments in other parts of the continent. This way, Ethiopia managed to stay abreast of developments and contribute its share to such intricate cases as South West Africa as well as the entire decolonization process. It can be argued that there were ample historical precedents justifying the countryôs subsequent identification with African problems and its active involvement in the affairs of the continent. The negative experience that Ethiopia had at the League of Nations and later the UN [related to the Italian invasion of 1935-41 and the question of reinstating Eritrea, respectively] particularly contributed to the necessity of closely associating with emergent Africa. Ethiopian authorities vividly remembered the sense of isolation, estrangement and sometimes ridicule, they had endured particularly at

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gue of Nations to protect Ethiopia from Italian aggression and occupation and the prolonged struggle over Eritrea at the UN were the two major sources of disillusionment. As a result, the realization that collaborating with fellow Africans and Third World countries (the Non-Alignment Bloc) was deemed to be in the best interest of the country. It was these experiences that shaped the policy directives and pragmatic approaches of successive Ethiopian governments towards Africa.

Africa stood at the forefront of Ethiopiaôs foreign policy activities after the 1950s. Both the imperial regime and the Darg accorded special attention to developments in the region and the continent at large. As a result, Africa remained the epicenter of Ethiopiaôs diplomatic efforts to maintain immediate interests and to promote collective security. These parallel objectives often proved complementary, enabling Ethiopian governments to approach regional as well as continental affairs with genuineness and enthusiasm. Yet, the dichotomy between safeguarding national interests and advancing collective values time and time again posed acute challenges, setting the country on a collision course with fellow Africans. The practical involvement of Ethiopia in African politics between 1956 and 1991 has to be understood within this context.

The contradiction between maintaining immediate interest and preserving Pan-African ideals particularly manifested itself in the countryôs relations with the Sudan and Somalia. Ethiopiaôs conflict with these states started well before the beginning of concerted African efforts to create some sort of continental organization and to find collective solution to inter-state problems. Accordingly, Ethiopia embarked on strategies deemed necessary to frustrate the potential threat to its national interest emanating from neighboring countries. Therefore, it can be presumed that Ethiopiaôs consideration that

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tional prerogative and did not warrant the involvement of external forces, including African ones, was not unfounded. In line with this argument, it can also be deduced that the African forum was skillfully employed later on to promote Ethiopiaôs interest in the conflicts.

Nonetheless, African states failed to apply significant pressure on the regimes in the Sudan and Somalia other than passing resolutions condemning subversion and irredentism and endorsing Ethiopiaôs sovereign rights over the Ogaden. Moreover, apart from invoking the principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of others and the sanctity of colonial boundaries and applauding decisions beneficiary to Ethiopiaôs interests, successive Ethiopian regimes preferred to deal with Sudan and Somalia on their own. Cases of Ethiopiaôs acceptance of African good offices for mediation occurred in times of desperation, and can be understood as delaying tactics to weather trying times. In this regard, the issue of securing its own immediate interest has to be viewed in the light of Ethiopiaôs determination to ward off the dangers emanating from neighboring countries. This phenomenon represents one aspect of the countryôs African policies in the period under discussion.

Entanglements with the Arab/Islam North Africa equally demonstrated Ethiopiaôs determination to safeguard national interests. The foreign policy directives of both the imperial regime and the Darg considered Egypt in particular as a force to reckon with and always intent on destabilizing Ethiopia. The problem was associated with the wider strategy of the Arab/Islam world to dominate the Red Sea littoral and the Horn of Africa. Egyptôs enduring ambitions over the Nile, its patrimonial stance over Sudan and its readiness to support anti-Ethiopian elements were considered detrimental to the national

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were made to dissociate Sudan from Egypt on various occasions. More importantly, successive measures were taken to thwart Egyptôs claim over the Nile. However, the latterôs obstinacy and continued sponsorship of Eritrean secessionism and Somali irredentism frustrated Ethiopiaôs desire for productive relations. This ultimately resulted in a perpetual feeling of animosity among Ethiopians towards Egypt. The case of Libya represented a slight, yet un-sustained, departure from the general trend. The brief period of intimacy proved a futile exercise to befriend an unpredictable ruler who ultimately resorted to the traditional practice of weakening and undermining Ethiopia.

African political and economic associations, regional as well as continental, like PAFMECSA, IGADD and PTA and the OAU were similarly utilized by Ethiopia to advance its strategic interests. Ethiopia played a significant role in the creation and sustenance of these organizations. Far more importantly, it skillfully instilled in them principles instrumental to thwart imminent and perceived threats. Events associated with the establishment of PAFMECSA, IGADD and particularly the OAU illustrate the insistence on the part of Ethiopia for ample protection and security. One has simply to observe the drafting processes of the charters of IGADD and the OAU to appreciate the situation. All these were no mean achievements under the circumstances of African political and economic realities between the 1950s and 1990s. Every nation could have done the same if it were provided the opportunity and had the determination. However, it was Ethiopia alone that managed to accomplish it. On top of that, the country succeeded in being the seat of the headquarters of the continental body, clenching thereby the privilege of being an undisputed center of African diplomacy.

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e objective of securing national interests, there was an undeniable commitment to the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the creation of some sort of continental unity. It was no mean achievement to bring together the two differing ideological groups in post-independence Africa to the May 1963 Summit that created the OAU. Given the circumstances, one can safely ponder the probable course of events had Ethiopia not acted on that scale and level at that crucial time. Not only did Ethiopia convince Africans to attend the 1963 conference, but it also provided them with a compromise document which was adopted as the charter of the OAU. It utilized its bureaucratic skills to positively influence proceedings of the meeting and to pressurize Africans to commit themselves to the agreement. Similar efforts were made in the process of maintaining the OAU as a functional and viable Pan-African organ. The roles Ethiopia played in the liberation movements of Southern Africa and the peaceful resolution of intra- and inter-state conflicts equally demonstrate its dedication to the African cause.

All these achievements, however, were not without sacrifice, limitation and consequence. The extended conflict with Sudan obstructed good neighborly relations that would have otherwise facilitated their overall development. Their failure to demarcate the common boundary and thereby settle the dispute over vast arable land remained a constant impediment. On a larger scale, though, Ethiopia embarked on a mission of reciprocating Sudanôs assistance to Eritrean secessionists by progressively sponsoring the South Sudan rebellions. In the end, the two biggest states in Africa ended up losing significant parts of their territory.

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milarly entailed huge consequences for Ethiopia. Apart from the uninterrupted dispute that taxed both countries heavily, the situation proved a continuous source of diplomatic imbroglio for Ethiopia. The failure to irrevocably deal with the boundary problem and Somaliaôs territorial claim ultimately induced the mission of destabilizing and dividing the Somali republic. The sacrifices endured by Ethiopia in its relation with Sudan and Somalia, therefore, simply served to avert immediate threats temporarily. The vital ingredients for future conflict are still in place.

Neither did the country manage to deter Egyptôs interventions in ways harmful to the well being of Ethiopia. More frustratingly, it proved difficult to utilize the Nile for immediate developmental purposes, which Ethiopia desperately needed as time progressed. Egyptôs negative role, coupled with the undesirable interventions of Gaddafiôs Libya, and most of the North African states for that matter, contributed to the perpetual state of civil war and deprivations Ethiopia has been suffering from in the period under discussion. Ethiopiaôs foreign policy directives on different occasions in part generated this animosity from the Arab/Islam North Africa. Particularly, the shifting Cold War alignments that Ethiopia experienced during the imperial regime and the Darg, coupled with the ideological brinkmanship it had to exercise, contributed to this state of affairs. The pro-West and pro-Israelite position it had assumed during the 1956 Suez Crisis, the fateful intimacy with Gaddafi during the Darg period that necessitated needless compromises on the Chad problem and the rush to recognize and support the Saharawi republic were among the policy measures that Ethiopia could have avoided easily and consequently forestalled the antagonism of the Arab/Islam states.

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on of regional and continental organizations also entailed considerable sacrifices on the part of Ethiopia. Besides the financial burden most of them imposed on the country, the very nature of these institutions required continuous follow ups and interventions. On various occasions, Ethiopia single handedly saved organizations like PAFMECSA, IGADD and the OAU from imminent peril. The process required intricate acts of balancing polarized ideological groupings, most of the time accomplished after intense behind-the-scene negotiations.

On the other hand, Ethiopiaôs traditional approach of restraint and detachment in its external relations determined the degree of its involvement in regional and continental affairs. Primarily, there was, and still is, the obdurate commitment to shield the ósacrosanctô Ethiopian nationhood from any external interference. To a certain extent, in spite of the above contributions towards regional and continental affairs, this has contributed to the resistance towards the creation of viable supranational organizations at regional or continental levels and the realization of African political unification. Thus, Ethiopia was at the forefront of frustrating the initiatives to set up strong and long-lasting versions of PAFMECSA, the East African Federation and, to some extent, IGADD and mainly the OAU. This was particularly the case with regard to the notion of African political unity, whereby painstaking efforts were made to thwart the idea of creating some kind of continental unity government. Even if the country was not alone in this endeavor, as the drafter of the charter of the OAU and an active participant in subsequent activities, Ethiopia saw to it that the dream of political union remained just a óutopianô fantasy.

In all fairness, the argument that African economic integration must precede any sort of political union, which Ethiopia steadfastly espoused, is in accord with the reality of

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riod under discussion. Africans pledged to the realization of the scheme and put in place various mechanisms. The approach of creating regional economic groupings that would progressively lead to continent-wide integration was among the various designs. The downside of this strategy, however, was that, like most of its counterparts, Ethiopia refrained from fully committing itself to regional and/or continental economic associations. This reflected negatively on a country that professed to be a leading proponent of African unity and cooperation.

The other variable dictating the nature of Ethiopiaôs involvement in regional and continental issues has been the desire by successive governments to infuse their respective agendas into the national prerogative. Often the imperial regime and the Darg designed foreign policy directives aimed at securing and consolidating their power. Particularly the latterôs flamboyant display of its socialist orientations departed from the calculating and cautious pro-West disposition of its predecessor. The hesitation of the imperial regime to commit itself to the ideals of creating continental unity and the reserve displayed during the call for outward condemnation of white minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa to a certain extent emanated from fear of not offending its main sponsors. The military regime, however, primarily chose to design its African policies along ideological lines. Apart from influencing the countryôs foreign policy direction, this issue drew varying degree of criticism from fellow Africans at various times. This ranged from an oblique castigation of radical nations in the immediate post-independence Africa to explicit antipathy shown to the Darg by neighbors and others alike.

Generally speaking, Ethiopiaôs overall involvement in African affairs can be assessed in light of what it managed to accomplish in the process. This is the history of a backward

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s trying to safeguard its strategic interests and to simultaneously establish a position of reverence amidst the euphoria of post-independence Africa. Ethiopia has been part of both the success and failure stories of the continental Pan-African Movement. It has been harshly criticized and even condemned for some of its positions while fervently applauded for others. The country has equally benefited from the services of African states and their organizations in times of difficulties.

Nonetheless, it can be argued that there is nothing that is dramatically exceptional with the Ethiopian story in the context of inter-African politics. It has simply functioned along the general framework of international diplomacy and contributed its utmost to the realization of commonly shared ambitions. Relations with immediate neighbors and regional powers have yet to crystallize and efforts so far made to promote the collective agenda still remain at a rudimentary stage. In light of the fact that much work has still to be done in this regard, no state can claim to have tried hard enough. The OAU has now been phased out and replaced by the AU. We could not celebrate the perfectness of the previous machinery; neither can we vouch for the reliability of the new one. Africa still remains unable to present a united front even to solve African problems, let alone to stand up to international pressures and manipulations. The aim of finding genuinely African solutions to inter-and intra-state problems is yet to be achieved. More importantly, African forums have yet to be meeting grounds of the people, not just of the ruling elite.

To this end, irrespective of earlier efforts, a lot more is expected from Ethiopia. Its history has inspired generations of Africans. It helped some to achieve independence and was directly involved in peace-keeping missions to stabilize troubled states. The country

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l and continental organizations from possible dissolution. The dedication of its statesmen earned the respect and confidence of their fellow Africans. As a result, it has had the honor of hosting by common consent the headquarters of continental organizations and most conferences up to now.

However, Ethiopia has still to earn its position among fellow Africans in this period of globalization, economic development and democratization. Africa expects even greater inspirational leadership from the country compared to previous efforts. It has to maintain its historic role of bringing the continent together by realizing the age-old quest of creating a united and viable African political and economic entity. Ethiopia has first to evaluate its stance and then set out to coordinate African efforts in working towards the overall benefit of the people of the continent who for ages have been suffering from political and economic injustice. The African habit of inaction and prevarication has to be overcome. It is then that we can proudly talk about the contributions of our respective countries to the realization of the Pan-African dream, which still remains elusive.

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No.	Name	Title	Place and Date of Interview	Remarks
1	Keflé Wädajo	*Ato*	Addis Ababa Hilton, 29-12-2003	- Provisional Secretary General of OAU (1963-1965) - Advisor to the OAU Secretary-General (1965-66) - Permanent Representative of Ethiopia in the UN (1966-70) - Ambassador to the USA (1972-74) - Minister of Foreign Affairs (1975-76)
2	Yodit Emeru	Ambassador	Addis Ababa (Her Residence), 25-02-2005	- Head, American Directorate, MoFA (1958-61) - Head, International Organizations Directorate, MoFA (1961-66) - State Minister for Foreign Affairs (1971-75)
3	Mängesté Dästa	Ambassador	Addis Ababa: Ghion Hotel and the office of the Forum for the Study of Foreign Policy (18-05-2010, 19-03-2012)	- Head, African and Middle East Directorate (1961-65) - Assistant Minister, MoFA (1965-69) - Ambassador to the Sudan (1969-71) - Ambassador to East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), 1974-85
4	Berhänu Dinqa	Ambassador	Addis Ababa: at the office of the Forum for the Study of Foreign Policy (13 & 15-08-2011)	- Head , African and Middle East Directorate (1976-80) - Ambassador to Djibouti (1980-84) - Ambassador to the UN (1984-1988)
5	Ayälä Moltotal	Ambassador	Addis Ababa: at the office of the Forum for the Study of Foreign Policy (01-03-2012)	- Assistant Minister of European Department, MoFA, (1963-70) - Vice Minister in Charge of European Directorate and Press Affairs, MoFA (1970-75) - Secretary of the Charter Committee at the May 1963 OAU Summit - Conference Secretary of the First Foreign

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
				Ministers Meeting, Dakar, Senegal, August 1963
	Mohamud		ddis Ababa: at the office of the Forum for the Study of Foreign Policy (25-05-2011, 22-02-2012)	- International Organizations Directorate, MoFA (1966-78) - Ambassador to Ivory Coast (1978-89) - Head, International Organizations Directorate (1989-1992)
7	Täfära Häylä-Selasé	Ambassador	Addis Ababa: at the office of the Forum for the Study of Foreign Policy (24-10-2011)	- Ambassador to the UK
8	Yelma Tadäsä	Ambassador	Addis Ababa, 29-02-2012	- Ambassador to the Sudan (1975-84) - Head of the African and Middle East Directorate (1984-87) - Assistant Secretary of the OAU (Political Division), 1987-1991
9	Berhänä Därésa	*Ato*	Addis Ababa: at the office of the Forum for the Study of Foreign Policy (17-04-2012)	- Head of the Ethiopian Delegation to IGADD Ministerial Meetings in 1986.

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DECLARATION

I, the undersigned, declare that this dissertation is my work and that all the sources for the dissertation have been duly acknowledged.

Name: Belete Belachew Yihun

Signature: 

Place: Addis Ababa University

Date of Submission: April 2012