



**ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUTE STUDIES
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCIES
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY**

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHY ON MORALITY AND CHRISTIANITY

BY

TEMESGEN BERHANU

**June, 2014
Addis Ababa**



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Abstract; Friedrich Nietzsche is a prominent thinker in his philosophy of Christianity and morality. Almost in all of his writings, he criticized morality and Christianity and advocated for the preference of any practice towards behaving master traits and noble characters. In this thesis, I would argue that Friedrich Nietzsche's thoughts on morality and Christianity are self-contradictory, inconsistent and utopia. How could humans live in peace by ignoring and criticizing the moral values? His philosophy of master morality, superman and the will to power are difficult to be realized in a well ordered society. A healthy society hopes not for mere survival but for evolving into and enjoying higher qualities of life. Therefore, I argue that Christian morality plays a greater role in maintaining peaceful coexistence in any society.

List of Abbreviations

AC Anti-Christ

BGE Beyond Good and Evil

GM On the Genealogy of Morals

WP Will to Power

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Chapter One: Nietzsche and Morality

1.1. Introduction

Friedrich Nietzsche is well known in his philosophy against Christianity and morality. He has a significant influence on the 20th century philosophy. Influenced by Darwinism, he thinks that evolution shows that life is a struggle for existence. Nietzsche's discussion of morality seems to be nothing more than a confused and polemic attack and a verbal war against the values and dogmas of Christianity. He tried to expose and criticize the traditional dogmas and values of Christianity by separating himself from the rest of humanity. But his attack on Christianity seems unjustified rather simply his personal aspiration of hating it. In this thesis I will explore his assessment of morality and Christianity on the basis of his works the *Genealogy of Morals*, *Anti-Christ*, *Beyond Good and Evil* and others¹. I will consider some of the problems that he posed. This thesis contains three chapters in which an attempt is made to show Nietzsche's philosophy towards morality and Christianity.

Nietzsche advocates that Christianity and Jewish religion are the means to the existence of slave morality by inspiring to revolt by which begins when resentment becomes a creative force. Slave morality is essentially negative and reactive which is originated from a denial of everything that is different from it. It looks outward and says "no" to the aggressive external forces that oppose and oppress it. On the other hand, master morality deals itself very little with what is outside of it. The low people or the "bad," are an afterthought and they are noticed only as a contrast that brings out more strongly the superiority of the noble ones.

While both slave and master morality can involve distortions of the truth, master morality does so far more lightly. Nietzsche notes that almost all the ancient Greek words denoting the

¹ The Will to power, Ecce Homo, The Gay Science, Untimely Meditations, Human All Too Human, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, And the Birth of Tragedy.

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lower orders of society are related to variants on the word for 'unhappy'. The nobles saw themselves as naturally happy and any mistake rested on the contempt and distance they held from the lower orders. By contrast, the man of resentment distorts what he sees so as to present the noble man in as bad a light as possible to gain reassurance. Nietzsche's claim about morality is inclined to possess master morality of which some qualities that Nietzsche appreciates like dominance, suppression, exploitation, etc. This way would lead him to his major plan to achieve 'the superman'.

Nietzsche's concept of the superman, the man of the future appears far-fetched and utopian but not his distinction between the two types of men; i.e. the average and the exceptional. The distinction introduced by Nietzsche between the average and the exceptional man should be taken as purely descriptive and not a normative one. This distinction together with the doctrine of "Eternal Recurrence" is the proof of Nietzsche's sensitive and acute perception of human reality. I will see it in detail in the second chapter of this thesis.

The above point will lead us to discuss about Nietzsche's concept of the will to power. Nietzsche's philosophy of the 'the will to power' has no pity for those who are weak or sick and wishes that the sick and weak ones get perished. If so, how the 'over man' could be a superman without the existence of the weak. This seems to be fully contradictory with his ideas and could be a weakness for his moral philosophy. In addition, Nietzsche's ethical principle of the will to power makes a claim to the egoistic nature of humanity. The doctrine asserts that all humans strive to forcefully impose their will upon others as a primary drive. Their nature compels them to do that. But it seems that he does not take into account what type of pressure will be arise in society's day to day life.

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For Nietzsche, human beings will stubbornly exercise their will on one another as an instance of their determination, spirit and strength of character. He alleged that no true altruistic deeds exist since humans are wholly egocentric and self-seeking by nature. We may give the impression that we are considerate, caring and selfless as we may perform good things for others. But our innate intentions are truly self-absorbed and do not entail goodness or benevolence. For him, these aspirations are to be esteemed as an example of human prominence and not mistaken for the malice and deterioration of mankind.

As a solution for the problems of morality, Nietzsche suggested trans-valuations of values. According to his persuasion, nature has no value in itself and it is value free. It is human beings who propose and give value to nature. Moral judgments have great connection with religious ones, as he argues, in believing realities which are not realities. Morality is simply an interpretation of certain phenomena and more importantly a misinterpretation of action by man. His attack on Christianity is also a severe attempt to weaken and avoid if possible, the ideals, principles and standards of historical tradition. On the other hand, Christianity defends what has been criticized by his work through providing a Biblical justification though ignored by Nietzsche as metaphysical.

In general this thesis will cover Nietzsche's philosophy of morality and Christianity in three chapters. The first chapter of this thesis will discuss the overall concepts of Nietzsche's morality by adding master-slave distinction. Related to this, my thesis will discuss his argument on resentment and how does he make it as a source of morality, particularly of Christian values. Then the second chapter would have something to deal about whether these distinctions have merits to life or its denial of life and whether life could be affirmed by his master morality of his own or rejected by the slave morality of traditional Christianity. The next step for my discussion

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is his concept of the 'Superman' and the 'Will to Power'. Then, I will discuss the ways that the master would apply to control and overcome the rest. The last part of this thesis will examine his philosophy of Christianity as much as possible. Then I would have some to say about his immoralism. Finally, a conclusion is essential to show my position in this thesis by providing own arguments.

1.2. Nietzsche's Conception of Morality

Nietzsche occasionally spoke of morality unfavorably and critically. His philosophy had got little realization since it is difficult to realize it in real life. Some of his best-known phrases might give the impression that he wished to drop the distinction between good and evil in order to transcend ethics altogether. Many serious thinkers, like Spinoza, have believed that everything that happens is equally necessary and equally expressive of the will of God, be it favorable or unfavorable to our special interests (Spinoza, 2002: 237). Therefore, we would call it as good or bad based on our met desires and its conformity to the will of God.

However, Nietzsche was entirely free from this divine impediment and disorder in morals. The courage to adhere to what his soul loved, he puts severe criticism on the conception of God. And what he liked was to think of power, he seriously commanded man and nature to pursue for their single object (Santayana, 1968: 125). What he criticized of was not all morality, for he had an enthusiastic master-morality of his own to impose. He was thinking of the Christian virtues and especially of a certain Protestant and Kantian moralism with which he had perhaps been surfeited. Kantian morality conceived that duty was something absolute and not a method of securing whatever goods attainable by action. The latter is the common and the sound opinion maintained by Aristotle. But Nietzsche, who was not humble enough to learn very much

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by studying, thought that he was propounding a revolutionary doctrine by putting beyond goods and evils and above right and wrong.

Nietzsche openly attaches morality to the attainment of power for gaining dominance over others. He tried to show the tight relation that good has with power in his work *Anti-Christ*:

What is good? - Everything that enhances people's feeling of power; will to power and power itself. What is bad? Everything that stemming from weakness. What is happiness? The feeling that power is *growing*, that some resistance has been overcome. Not connectedness, but more power; not peace, but war; not virtue but prowess (Nietzsche, 2007: 4).

For Nietzsche, every action, value and conduct could be the source of power if it is considered as good by any means. But the way he understands the use of power is difficult to realize and he does not consider whether it is easy to realize or not. It is difficult to grasp what Nietzsche means by the concept of power. I will argue over this concept in the coming sections.

In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, he gives emphasis on the shortcomings of the Judeo-Christian tradition and tracing back its origin. Disclosing the origin of slave morality in Christian tradition is the main objective of the book. He starts his discussion in this book by rejecting the moral concepts descended from Judeo-Christian tradition. Nietzsche has mentioned the death of God in his earlier book²; as 'God is dead'³: but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown' (Nietzsche, 2001: 109). His work *on the Genealogy of Morals* is seemed to rest on this statement. In the latter work, Nietzsche puts forth one question: what are the consequences for morality if God is dead? He suggested that, we could be free to act and no challenge to enjoy our will to life. Nietzsche criticizes Christian tradition for basing itself on two main weak points: the passivity and reactivity rather than

² Gay Science.

³ By this claim, Nietzsche wants to express the psychological denial of God or God's role in our life but not of the ontological existence of God's existence. This paper will discuss in detail at the last chapter.

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creativity and activity. He argues that Christianity has led the western man to live in a state of passivity and negativity rather than creativity and activity. According to him, Christianity erodes the capacity or excellence of the 'superman' by imposing unimportant and weak moral codes in the name of God (ibid: 113).

Nietzsche denies all aspects of traditional morality in order to introduce a new type of morality of his own to impose. He continuously provides his argument on morality, particularly Christian morality, that it doesn't affirm life but of the negation of it. It advocates and values a kind of person in whom it finds nothing to be valued: like a 'herd animal' that has very little or no idea of greatness and needs more security, absence of fear and suffering. Morality restricts the natural instincts of human beings (Craig, 1998: 166).

Nietzsche has tried to show the origin of morality through historical progress. He first establishes the origins of Christian values and believes that slavery has been an inseparable part of Christian tradition and values. He believes that Christian tradition has been contrarily enslaved during an important period of its development. Such a slave morality is analyzed by Nietzsche *On the Genealogy of Morals* in the following way:

The slaves' revolt in morals begins with this, that resentment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values: the resentment of those who are denied the real reaction, the deed and who compensate with an imaginary revenge, whereas all noble morality grows out of a successful affirmation of oneself, slave morality immediately says 'No' to what comes from outside, to what is different, to what is not oneself: and this 'No' is creative deed (Nietzsche, 1967: 24).

The above extract shows the attitude of Nietzsche towards the origins of moral approvals ('yes') and disapprovals ('no'). The factual motivation for such reactivity is hidden in the western man's state of slavery. He states that the word 'good' was first used by the nobility who applied it to themselves in order to set themselves apart from the so called the ordinary people.

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The word 'bad' was not first the antonym of 'good'; instead it was the opposite of how the nobility class of those societies performed as such (ibid).

Another term that needs to be explained in detail is '*ressentiment*'⁴. The word resentment appears frequently in the works of Nietzsche. Most of his critics believe that Nietzsche uses this term because there is no exact German word for it (Nietzsche, 1967: 5). One can have a better understanding of the resentment of the slave by contrasting it to the contempt felt by the master towards the slave. For Nietzsche, the bad acts of the masters are bad only in the eyes of the slave. The slave is resentful and this characteristic of resentment becomes the energetic source for the later revenge of the slave. The man of resentment (i.e. slaves) becomes ultimately cleverer than the noble man. Resentment is the emotion felt by the oppressed that could be an internal pain or external grievance. For Nietzsche, resentment is an imaginary revenge by those groups of the society who has been oppressed by the nobility. This feeling of having an enemy generates the most important creation of resentment which is evil.

This binary opposition of good and bad was thus reversed later on. The common people, who could not adopt the aristocratic style of life, have overturned this opposition in their frustration. Subsequently, the good-bad value system was reversed and the morality of the common was announced to have greater value whereas the morality of the nobility was declared to be 'evil'. In his book *on the Genealogy of Morals* Nietzsche writes:

The reverse is true of the noble way of evaluating: it acts and grows spontaneously, it seeks out its opposite only in order to say 'Yes' to itself still more gratefully, still more jubilantly; and in its negative concept, "base," "mean," "bad," is only an after-born, pale, contrasting image in relation to the positive basic concepts, which is nourished through

⁴ Nietzsche, 1967, *The Genealogy of Morals*, Edited and Trans. by Walter Kaufmann, p, 5-10. Walter Kaufmann's commentary, *GM* Editor's Introduction at section 3. '*Ressentiment*' is a French equivalent for the English word resentment. Most translators agreed that Nietzsche uses this word in order to show the deep pain and suppression of the slaves by their masters. I will come back later for detail discussion of this concept.

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and through his life and passion: “we who are noble, good, beautiful, happy ones!” (Nietzsche, 1967: 37).

This slave culture which is the culture of the common people celebrates this “after-born” reversal of values and ultimately glorifies its own existence. The Christian tradition celebrated negative values in the way adversely affected the world as he argues. However, for Nietzsche morality should celebrate the “noble, good, beautiful, happy” activity. As he argues, the slaves refuse this way of life. In other words, “slave morality immediately says ‘No’ to what comes from outside, to what is different, to what is not oneself and this ‘No’ is its creative deed”. As a result, this tradition is not creative; it is instead reactive to negative impulses (ibid).

Nietzsche’s radical and harsh refusal of the traditional moral system is mostly because of he assumes that it grows out of hatred, self-denial and a favorite reversal of the realities of the time. The attention of the slave first focused on the nobility who hardly thought of him. The wishes of the slave are fulfilled when the value system of the nobility is reversed. As a result, this reversal of values was originally a negative act produced by resentment. In Nietzsche’s view, this is exactly what has come to be true in the history of the dominant moral tradition of Europe:

Conversely, imagine “the enemy” as conceived by a man of resentment and here precisely is his deed, his creation: he has conceived “the evil enemy,” “the evil one” and indeed as the fundamental concept from which he then derives, as an afterimage and counter instance, a “good one” himself (Nietzsche, 1982: 452).

Nietzsche elaborates how the concepts of bad and evil are regarded by common people as opposed to the concept of “good”. He deals with this difference by mentioning that the concept of “good” has two distinct meanings. The nobility’s “good” is what the slaves call the “evil”. Nietzsche’s harsh critique of the slave morals is mostly based on this fact that it makes progress because of hatred and denial by the slaves. One could mention that these characteristics of Nietzsche’s criticisms of morality are not based on particular values he appreciates or refuses.

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On the other hand, in *Beyond Good and Evil*⁵, Nietzsche seems to be more careful in his explanations of the nobility and slave culture. Here he appears to be a much more profound philosopher whose definition of such concepts as “greatness”, ”good” and ”evil” are more sophisticated than his other reflections. He characterizes both the dominant slave morality and the modern world as arising from a complex mixture of drives and values:

Confronted with a world of “modern ideas” which would banish everybody into a corner and a specialty, a philosopher - if there could be any philosophers today would be forced to define the greatness of man, the concept of greatness ... of man’s comprehensiveness and multiplicity, his wholeness in manifoldness (Kaufmann, 1982: 445).

In general, all his attempts to exert power presuppose an interpretation that gives purpose and justification to a particular way of securing power as he puts:

all events in the organic world are subduing a becoming master, and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an adaptation through which any previous “meaning” and “purpose” are necessarily obscures or even obliterated’ (Nietzsche, 1967: 77).

He clearly tries to show his strong disposition of attaining power at any cost by which this would lead him to make his works unfinished since it makes all more or less imaginary. In the genealogy, Nietzsche shows that the morality which we usually count as self-evident is in fact the product of a long history⁶ in which decisive developments took place. At this point, he tries to show the struggle to attain dominance in the history of Jews based on his analysis of Christian and Jew religion not based on commentaries of the Holy Bible.

In his books, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *On the Genealogy of Morals* and *The Antichrist*, Nietzsche draws a sharp distinction between all conventional moralities. All moral systems that we live up with would be familiar with today if what he considers the original, animal or natural

⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Portable Nietzsche*, especially sections 200 and 212 of *BGE*, Edited and Translated by Walter Kaufmann, 1966.

⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *BGE*, 1966; 110 Translated and Edited by Walter Kaufmann.

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morality is the quality possessed by the 'superman'. The moralities of kindness, forgiveness, mercy, peace and fairness are termed as slave morality. He considers them as weakness and biological feebleness (fragility). In contrast, master morality is the morality of strength, animal spirits, power and the ability to control others.

Nietzsche believes that the original or biological morality is the master morality of strength and dominance. It is the earliest and most natural morality. This instinctual morality is that which values strength and dominance. Winning through power is the morality of the original, strong, and natural masters which is good for those with power and strength to force others to their will. It overcomes those who are weak and bends them to the will of those who have the strength and power to exploit others for their own benefit. In this sense, it is not good for the weak and the feeble ones.

Nietzsche believes that, it is through gradual process that the weak figured out such a deceitful way to win some power over the masters. It was a small and sneaky trick that the weak used to gain power over those who have empowered them. Their trick, according to Nietzsche's contentions, was to develop an entirely new morality that could put limit on masters. This is the revaluation of those old values, which is helpful to persuade the society that the characteristics of weakness were good and that of strength were evil. The weak taught that gentleness, kindness, sympathy, and mercy are good qualities. On the other hand dominance, exploitation, and subjugation are bad. For him, these new values of the weak were the exact opposite of the original biological, natural or master values of power, strength and control. Nietzsche believes that the weak attempted to overcome the power of masters by this sneaky and underhanded method of re-valuing all values which makes them as lower ones. They could not overcome the strong by any other methods which required strength and control. The prominent agents of this

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decadent morality that values weakness over strength were Socrates, Judaism and Christianity that is why Nietzsche severely criticizes of them in many of his works.

Nietzsche offered partly a historical account of the harmful consequences of traditional ethics in *On the Genealogy of Morals*. For him, 'good' initially and properly designated only the right of those individuals who had social and political power to live by sheer force of will. But a 'priestly' social order is motivated by the resentment of the herd and it is a corrupt alternative that would appeal to the 'herd' of less capable persons. In 'slave morality' endorsed by religious establishments, Nietzsche argues that forceful actions which should be admired are labeled as evil, while the cowardly tendency is transformed into the supposed virtue of prudence.

The real autonomy to man as Nietzsche maintained could only mean freedom from all external constraints on one's behavior and actions. In this natural and admirable state of existence, each individual human being would live a life without artificial limits of moral obligation. No other authorization on conduct would be necessary than the natural punishment involved in the victory of a superior person over the defeated enemy.

But the wish of lesser people is to secure themselves against interference from nobles who are better gave rise to a false sense of moral duty. The natural fear of being overwhelmed by superior rival becomes internalized as the self-generated sense of guilt and individual conscience places severe limits on the normal exercise of human desire. For Nietzsche, the fundamental self-betrayal of the human race is to submit its freedom to the fictitious demands of an imaginary God. Afraid to live by the strength of our own wills, we invent religion as a way of generating and explaining our perpetual sense of being abused and defeated in life.

Nietzsche does not take into account the contributions of Christianity for the development of this world. His critique of theistic belief is essentially nihilistic.⁷ This undermines the meaning of our world that has been acknowledged through our contextual involvement in it for the sake of fictitious reality identified with the truth. His critique does not stop here. He is not simply interested in claiming that a belief in God undermines our meaningful involvement in world but also interested in exploring how life came to weaken itself through morality and religion. Does he consider the life of people without the values of Christianity? I will be back to this issue in the last chapter of the thesis. Now let me discuss what he discusses of master – slave distinction.

1.3. Slave and Master Morality

This section of my thesis will discuss Nietzsche's assessment of values and his concept of traditional morality. I will also try to show how Nietzsche deals with master and slave morality. His critique mainly depends on life-enhancement in which it could be reconstructed from many of his writings. He is also concerned with the general manner in which we value whether these values arise in a sovereign way or, rather, as a reaction to our envy/fear of others (May, 1999: 41). As Simon May tried to elaborate the term 'master' and 'slave' denote the sovereign and the reactive manner of valuing something respectively.⁸

The characteristics of a sovereign individual or master can be stated as follows. The master has no interest in universalizing his values and expects others like him to share his values because they are the same type of persons. His conception of 'good' is not shaped by a reaction of fear towards another in whom the master calls it as 'bad' (Nietzsche, 1967: 39 - 43). By being

⁷ Nihilism is Nietzsche's term for reality's meaning essentially nothing.

⁸ Simon May quoted and use this idea on his work as he deliberately use the term 'sovereign', rather than 'active'. First, 'sovereign' better describes the noble person's capacity to live 'in trust and openness with himself' (*GM*, I, 10) than does 'active' and is also closer in meaning to the masterly ideal of 'autonomy' that Nietzsche introduces in *GM*, II, 1–2, which is essentially the self-mastery to 'promise oneself'. Second, the term 'active' usually denotes the opposite of 'passive'; and yet, as mentioned in the next paragraph, passivity is also a crucial feature of the master, in his submission to the reality of his own historical determination. Third, the 'slave' is also active in the search for power, indeed crucially so; for with his very persistence he is able to overwhelm the masters.

courageous enough to recognize his own nature, the master has no need to expose onto external authority.

According to May (1999:1-2), the primary meaning of 'master' in its conceptual form is not the domination of others in which the 'slaves' attempt too. Instead, it is the relation of oneself namely that of self-legislation by culminating in the capacity to promise oneself. This sovereignty would be up to consciously submitting to one's own nature its behavior of historical determination. It does not need any type of authoritative guidance for the master which makes it as 'passive'. The master fully and courageously wills his own necessity and moreover, in the age of *decadence*, seeks uncompromisingly to abandon all life-denying ways of employing values, which makes the master active. Therefore, there is an ideal combination of activity and passivity which characterizes a healthy relation of an individual with the 'will to power'.⁹

On the other hand, the reactive individual needs physiologically speaking external stimuli in order to act freely at all. These stimuli are the triggers of all his most enduring valuations and practices that concern the strength in others or in him importantly of his fears. In a response, the slaves experience the reactive affects like hatred, envy jealousy and attempts to neutralize strength by taking it as evil and shameful (Nietzsche, 1967: 40). Thus, this reactive spirit never defines itself for itself and is always against something higher and stronger. Therefore, this act of resentment becomes the cause of oppression and suffering. This interpretation morally defines suffering by ascribing it to failure to respect unconditional maxims, a failure which is in turn held to originate inessential guilt. This resentment of one's perceived weakness that fuels these attitudes Nietzsche calls it as '*ressentiment*'.

According to Nietzsche, *ressentiment* has some principal features which distinguish it from mere resentment. First and foremost, its purpose of hatred is large in scope, i.e. it is

⁹ Simon May, *Nietzsche's Ethics and his War on 'Morality'*, Clarendon press, Oxford; 1999; 42.

universal that embraces all of the existences at the limit. Secondly, it falsifies that aim in order to blame the act of masters. Finally, this universal resentment is impossible to satisfy; its revenge must be imaginary at least in part (Deleuz, 1983: 111-24).¹⁰ This universal *ressentiment* cast blame on both specific objects such as on masters and on the whole world including the general features of it as time, space and contingency. Blame could be universal for two main reasons: first due to the direction of slaves anger towards suffering and from where this generates; secondly, to show their strong disagreement with the masters of the world and by this slaves could get better option to undermine anything that they could possibly live for (May, 1999: 43).¹¹

Also on his work of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche makes a contrast between what he calls “master” and “slave” morality.¹² Master morality is the morality of the masters, the nobles, the warriors, who see themselves and their actions as good. For him, strength, power, health, wealth, and happiness are all considered as “good” qualities of masters. These masters perceive what he calls ‘pathos of distance’ between themselves and those who are poor, unhealthy, weak, or impotent. For him, these are all undesirable qualities hence the masters call them as “bad”. Insofar as they consider themselves to be the sole ground of values, they find no need in projecting their values onto some external authority. In its pure conceptual form, the word ‘master’ concerns not the domination of others in which the slaves similarly attempt but rather a relationship to oneself through sovereign self-legislation (ibid: 44).

¹⁰ A substantially different and very interesting account of *ressentiment* is given by Gilles Deleuze in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, London: Athlone Press, 1983: 111–24—though Deleuze, here as elsewhere, and takes great liberties with Nietzsche’s texts. Perhaps the subtlest critique of Nietzsche’s conception of resentment and its nourishment of Christian morality is by Max Scheler in *Ressentiment*, trans. W. Holdheim, New York: The Free Press, 1961.

¹¹ I will discuss about resentment in detail at the second chapter of this thesis.

¹² *GM*, Essay I. For additional information on this concept read the work of Simon May, *Nietzsche’s Ethics and His War on ‘Morality’*, Oxford: Clarendon Press–Oxford University Press, 1999: 41. The ideas of master and slave morality are also expressed by Nietzsche in 1878 in section 45 of *Human, all-Too-Human*, and this is the passage in which his famous terms “master morality” and “slave morality” are introduced.

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There are two forms of master morality - passive and active. These are in no case mutually exclusive. Master morality is passive when the person submits to his own nature and historical determination. On the other hand, it is active when one wills one's own necessity and seeks to abandon all life-denying ways of employing values. Those opposed the masters developed slave morality by which Nietzsche recognized it with the plebs and the Priestly caste (May, 1999: 25). For him, these people are the poor, unhealthy, weak, and impotent and they have learned to hate the power of masters. The slaves experienced reactive effects, like hatred, envy, jealousy, and attempt to neutralize the strength of others. According to Nietzsche's contention, slaves believe that masters are the very source of their suffering and hence they stamp them as evil.

Nietzsche's account of master and slave morality is an attempt and challenge to explain human understanding of what is right and wrong. Master morality is based on strength that is used to influence others. What is strong is good and what is weak is bad. Those who are with master morality are strong and have created their own morality. They know that they are their own judge. Slave morality is the opposite of master morality. Slaves believe in the highest good for the most people rather than considering the good that benefits the strong. With the help of his concept of master-slave dichotomy, Nietzsche attempts to provide explanation for the conflicts existing in societies as created by master and slave distinction (ibid).

But it is not possible for an individual to be completely in slave or master group. One would have to be deliberately illogical to have a fully independent moral viewpoint. The morals of the slaves are generally the accepted moral stances. Someone in a master position would have to be in favor of murder, rape, robbery, and all sorts of things that are generally accepted as wrong by the herd, as Nietzsche argues, while it is possible that there are people who go against everything that slaves stand for. On the other hand, it is very unlikely that someone in the slave

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group follows every single moral concept of the society. It is not possible for a large group of people to fully have one moral profile.

In reality, there would be a combination of master and slave in every individual because it is not possible to follow completely either the slave's or master's profile. Nietzsche's concept of slave-master morality is a better generalization than an actual truth. There will always be those who break the master-slave social system and humans actions and habits cannot be split into only two categories. There will also be those who do not desire to make themselves as masters and slaves. There would be those who were happy with the social positions they had and who do not worry about the morality of slaves or masters. Does a person lives entirely outside of the slave-master morality or is it the self-surmounted man that Nietzsche has described?

Using this master-slave morality as general the self-surmounted man can exist within the system. Nietzsche describes him as a person who is beyond the morality of the slaves and masters. He is a person who is entirely unconcerned with being a master and far too intelligent to be a slave. Nietzsche is in favor of the self-surmounted man. He believes that there is a feeling of superiority in being beyond the moral concerns of others and living outside of the slave-master disagreement. But the self-surmounted man could not truly exist as there is no way to be above morality. In reality it could not be possible to live without the idea of what is right and wrong. Perhaps Nietzsche is simply advocating the disregard he had for morals. But this seems to have terrible implications. What good could possibly come from being a person without morality?

Nietzsche has tried to describe a person who was truly a free-thinker, capable of applying morality depending on the given situation and understanding the fluidity of morals. If this is the self-surmounting man he is describing than his reasoning better and it would be advantageous for society to strive (ibid: 31). Without the sanctions of strict moral thinking society could grow into

more flexible. This struggle would have high possibility to the advent of civil disorder since human desires are incalculable.

Now, let's come back to the discussion of his master-slave distinction. *The Genealogy of Morals* seems to be credible concerned to expose the origin of our moral prejudices. He states that: "in the beginnings were the knightly-aristocratic masters who determined for themselves that they were 'good' and the weak unfortunates lacked masterly qualities were in consequence 'bad'" (Nietzsche, 1967: 33). Not surprisingly, the numerous and miserable bad grew gradually resentful of their lot until in a surprising and under described stroke of genius, their resentment becomes creative and the fruit of this creative resentment was an unheard of new morality.

Slave morality at the heart of the claim that those who had previously been regarded as inferior and bad embody good qualities of humanity. The masters are not good but "evil" and the slaves' resentment is universal and they falsify the object of their sovereign individual for the purpose of making their master undeniably blameworthy (ibid: 42).¹³ They assign whoever they resent to a corrupting realm called the phenomenal, in contrast to those who are supposed to be truly 'real' transcending it altogether. Likewise, they posit a God who saves the weak and damns the strong. That means the slaves invent all sorts of philosophical concepts through essence and metaphysically free will. Those who possess strength will be made to feel constitutionally guilty and yet still capable of choosing to disclaim what they inescapably are. With the aid of such fictions,¹⁴ says Nietzsche, the slaves are able to despise and take revenge upon their enemies in

¹³ It is said that there are two reasons blame which the slave commits is universal. First, the slave's extreme anger is directed at suffering which existence generates. And second, to repudiate the world as a whole it is best strategy for undermining anything that masters could possibly live for.

¹⁴ The ascetic ideal structures the above fictions created by the men of resentment, which in its limiting form, demands that the whole of phenomenal existence be transcended for the sake of a metaphysical realm.

cooperation or in representation which then brings about “spiritualization of revenge” (ibid: 33-34).¹⁵

In addition, as *ressentiment* is impossible to satisfy, the revenge of the slave must be imaginary. Nietzsche declares that good judgment did not originate from those to whom “goodness” was shown rather it was the “good” or the powerful; themselves who could feel establish themselves and their actions as well. It was out of this pathos of distance they first seized the right to create values and to coin names for things. Above all else, noble morality is self-established and develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself (Nietzsche, 1967: 37-38).

The noble type of man is aware that he determines values. He does not need any type of approval from other members of the society. Nietzsche expresses this concept as:

It is obvious that everywhere the designations of moral value were at first applied to *men*; and were only derivatively and at a later period applied to *actions*; it is a gross mistake, therefore, when historians of morals start with questions like, “Why have sympathetic actions been praised?” It judges what is harmful to me is harmful in itself”; it knows itself to be that which first accords honor to things; it is value-creating. Everything it knows as part of itself it honors: such a morality is self-glorification (Nietzsche, 1966: 205).

Here, the idea looks to clarify morality has always rested upon the value of utility. Because it gives attention to what is harmful to the master should be harmful for others and in itself. For Nietzsche, master morality is essentially bound up with an energetic transcendence to the standpoint of utility for superior ones and disregards values of mere comfort and survival.¹⁶

¹⁵ *GM*, It is said that spiritualization of hatred and revenge is vital for the slave for two reasons. First, revenge against the master is best achieved by revaluing their values rather than by attempting a direct assault and second, revenge against existence or time itself cannot be enacted and must be imaginary (revenge over and above the revaluation is imaginary).

¹⁶ “What he writes had nobles to do with utility? The viewpoint of utility is as remote and inappropriate as it possibly could be in relation to such a burning eruption of the highest rank ordering rank-defining judgments: for here feeling has attained the antithesis of that low degree of warmth which any calculating prudence, any calculus of utility, presupposes—and not for once only, not for an exceptional hour but for good.” Ibid. Essay I, Section 2.

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The conclusive intention of nobles is to affirm about themselves in their ability to raise themselves above the common mob and concern for comfort and survival. Nietzsche speaks of an aristocratic value-equation according to which they are the only good, noble, powerful, beautiful, and happy (Nietzsche, 1967: 34). We see from this that at the bottom of the self-affirmation of Nietzsche's nobles is their delight in their own abundant energy and abilities. Nobles seek to give expression to their feeling of power by engaging themselves in certain activity. Initially, one that demands determined physical effort and involve taking large and dramatic risks like war, adventure and hunting have virtues of strength. These qualities of nobles have key role for the emergence of the future far-fetched 'superman' (ibid).

On the other hand, the slaves are the poor, impotent, deprived, sick, and ugly are blessed by God. The powerful and noble are on the contrary the evil, the cruel, the immoral, shameless, the greedy, the godless to all eternity; and you shall be in all eternity the unblessed, accursed, and damned!¹⁷ This valuation of Jewish revaluation provides for the most fundamental of all declarations of war which is incalculable and tremendous in their life history (ibid: 33-4).

In fact, the nobles choose to engage in challenging risks and take themselves in honoring such activities. They automatically begin a cycle of self-reinforcement by honoring themselves for being so good at these honorable pursuits. They set deliberately tough standards of excellence and then think well of themselves when they pass with supreme self-possession. Hence, the criteria of masters are self-generated and self-grounded and these criteria would be the values of

¹⁷ *BGE*, section 195, page 108: it clarifies that the Jews are the people "born for slavery," as Tacitus (Roman historian who wrote major works on the history of the Roman Empire (56-120)) and the whole ancient world say; "the chosen people among the peoples," as they themselves say and believe the Jews have brought off that miraculous feat of an inversion of values, thanks to which life on earth has acquired a novel and dangerous attraction for a couple of millennia. Their Prophets have fused "rich," "godless," "evil," "violent," and "sensual" into one and were the first to use the word "world" as opprobrium. This inversion of values (which includes using the word "poor" as synonymous with "holy" and "friend) constitutes the significance of the Jewish people: they mark the beginning of the slave rebellion in morals."

noble men. But measuring up to these criteria is often a matter of readily ascertainable fact because superiority in respect of strength, daring and competence can be eliminated objectively (Danto, 1965: 158).

We can nevertheless specify certain features of noble lives that account to their favorable self-evaluation, i.e. their ability to hit the target they have set for themselves. I could suggest that, the most important feature of the activities through which nobles characteristically manifest their appetite for life is not demanded by material circumstance or external authority. Noble morality is a morality of intrinsic value of lives lived for the sake of happiness inseparable from engaging in actions and activities deemed worthwhile in and of them together with the honor upon excelling at such actions and activities in the eyes of one's peers (ibid: 159).

On *the Genealogy of Morals* we are clearly informed that:

In the majority of cases, those who feel themselves to be men of a higher rank, designate themselves simply by their superiority in power (as "the powerful," "the masters," "the commanders") or by the most clearly visible signs of this superiority. For example, as "the rich," "the possessors."... But they also do it by a typical character trait: ... They call themselves, for instance, "the truthful" (Nietzsche, 1967: 28-9).

Nietzsche's point here is not connecting power, wealth, truthfulness and courage with primitive nobles. Rather, his account of master and slave morality would have been scarcely intelligible to anyone in the epoch of "pure" master morality. If these claims could have been made intelligible to the masters, they would have rejected just as the members of the present day teenage "in teenage" would reject the claim.¹⁸

¹⁸ Ibid. Essay II, section 23, Nietzsche inferentially admits their ancient Greek nobles were capable of acts that they themselves would deem disgraceful. He insists that such occurrences had to be rare, and that their possibility had to explain by appeal to a puzzling sort of divine intervention: "How is it possible? How could it actually have happened to heads such as we have, we men of aristocratic descent, of the best society, happy, well-constituted, noble, and virtuous?" Thus noble Greeks asked themselves for centuries in the face of every incomprehensible atrocity or wantonness with which their kind had polluted him. 'He must have been deluded by a god,' they conclude finally, shaking their heads..."

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The early nobles are intellectually too primitive to be able to defend or articulate their sense that their several virtues naturally belong together. It is just this incapacity that will render their world vulnerable to the corrosive influence of slave morality. This inability of nobles informally to account for them certainly indicates that the early masters are unreflective. But it does not entail that their favorable self-evaluation is merely a groundless prejudice. In fact, we have seen Nietzsche's claim that the origin of the opposition of "good" to "bad" is found in the "pathos of distance" (ibid: 26) presupposes the self-glorification of the masters¹⁹ has significant basis in facts rather than in fiction.

The bad are simply those who lack the distinctive values of desirable qualities that the nobles have. The distinction introduced by the slave revolt in morality between good and evil marks radically different sorts of contrast. Nietzsche takes pain to emphasize that when slave moralists deny that the masters are good. They are using a different sense of the word "good" from that embodied in master morality and that in order to think of the masters as evil and the slaves must first cover them in another color²⁰ (ibid: 39-43).

When the eye of resentment looks at the nobles, it does not see power, wealth, courage, truthfulness and the like that the nobles themselves could perceived. But it sees instead only cruelty, tyranny, lustfulness, insatiability and Godlessness (ibid. 33-40). The resentment of the weak has become creative and given birth to a new kind of morality what Nietzsche calls it 'slave morality'. Hence, the slaves become capable of when they look at themselves no longer to see pitiless, unredeemed misery and unhappiness. Instead, they could form a new kind of goodness constituted by the voluntary cultivation of patience, humility and justice.

¹⁹ See also Part 9, Section 257 of *BGE*: Trans. and Ed. by Walter Kaufmann, Random House, Inc. New York (1966).

²⁰ Cover them in another color, interpret them in another fashion and see them in another way, through the hopeless eye of resentment.

The most important accomplishment of slave morality for Nietzsche is not turning the tables on the masters and deeming the previous bad to be good and an earlier good to be evil. But what is the most important about slave morality²¹ is that it does this by inventing a new type of values, impartial values. Slave morality is the morality of impartial value in that it is the morality of value chosen by an impartial subject and more precisely a subject who is in himself neither a master nor slave but who can freely choose to behave and evaluate as either this or that.

The idealized relationship between nobles and subjects that Nietzsche imagines to have been the norm throughout pre-history and early history is most obviously exemplified in the pre-history of one particular culture, i.e. Classical Greece. But it is impossible for an individual to be outside of the norms that have been created by a given cultural society. Either directly or indirectly someone's actions within his/her life styles could not be free from such dominant values and codes of the mentioned cultural society.

Generally, Nietzsche's account of master and slave morality assesses how the values of traditional Christian and moral codes arise and how would challenge men in life. He tries to trace back to the origin from where does this antiquity begins to create a formal pattern as a part and parcel of each life. But the way that Nietzsche analyses strongly shows to what extent he has hatred on the practices of Christian life since influenced and directed at '*imaginary belief*'²² of the society of his time. On the one hand, he favors master characters with power but hard and absurd to realize it. On the other hand, he tries to ignore the presence of morality but construal of actions as moral phenomena by men. This seems a confused polemic attack on what his spirit hates of. I will discuss in detail in the coming sections of this thesis as much as possible.

²¹ Nietzsche, *BGE*, Part 5, Section 195, p. 108. Nietzsche indebted the Jews as the beginners of slave morality through revolt and that revolt has a history of two thousand years behind it and he predict as we will no longer see it.

²² I make the phrase italic because of the expression is of Nietzsche's own. But in fact, there is no imaginary and utopian description beyond his proposed philosophical concepts.

Chapter Two: Nietzsche's Morality of *Ressentiment*

Nietzsche puts a major emphasis on the account of modern morality that begins with the postulation of two different schemes of value, organized around contrasting personality of the noble and the slave type. Slavish personality is characterized by the negative effects of hatred and *ressentiment*, which become confined and generated within the mind of the powerless until reaching “monstrous and uncanny proportions” (Nietzsche, 1967: 33-4).²³ And His theory of *ressentiment* is not the same as a false consciousness that the oppressed accepts the ruling ideas of ruling class. Rather, *ressentiment* is the very act of egalitarian thinking, of putting others before oneself (“good”) and despising selfishness (“evil”) (May, 1999:31-34). But for Nietzsche, solidarity and egalitarianism for nobles are weak, slavish, unintelligent, and herd-like. Thus, engaging in solidarity movements in order to overthrow oppression, in his view, is intrinsically slavish and demonstrates *ressentiment*. They are against life itself rather than the belief in mass movements and religious institutions. Nietzsche is arguing that mass movements that seek to overthrow oppressive structures are in themselves slavish (ibid).

The slave revolt begins when these sentiments “become creative and give birth to values” (Nietzsche, 1967, 36), by initiating a historical process through which the universalistic and Christianized values of good and evil largely come to replace the aristocratic values of good and bad. Though this story is clear enough in its general outlines, it is not at all clear how exactly the psychological processes of the story describes are really supposed to work. The center is the causal relation that is posited between the *ressentiment* of the powerless and the new table of values to which that psychic force allegedly gives rise. There is a natural way of thinking about the causal link that makes sense of the basic idea of *ressentiment* should give rise to the erection of a new values.

²³ Nietzsche, *GM*, W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, trans., W. Kauffmann, Ed. New York: Vintage, 1967; 33.

But I would argue that the causal links postulated by this understanding are ultimately on shaky ground, yielding a narrative that is challenged with contradiction at the level of psychic mechanism and social process. We need a different, non-strategic way of understanding how *ressentiment* could come out at the end in Nietzsche's slave revolt. In order to do so, it will be necessary to think systematically about the nature of *ressentiment* and about the psychological situation of those who are subject to this emotion in a conceptual landscape defined by the aristocratic values of good and bad. The key to understand how new values might emerge under these conditions is to acknowledge the deep human need for a distinctive kind of self-conception.

The *ressentiment* of the powerless leads them to internalize a new evaluative scheme that makes sense of their basic emotional orientation to the world. This expressive relation between emotion and value is the root for considering Nietzsche's outstanding claim that the *ressentiment* of the weak is one of the main sources of modern moral consciousness. His works have great relevance as a philosophical document for moral psychology particularly his exploration of asceticism in modern consciousness. Some have celebrated Nietzsche's reflections on the will as examples of admirably naturalistic approach to understand the psychological preconditions of morality.²⁴ In the first essay of *Genealogy of Morals*, he investigates the origin of contemporary morality by examining the conditions and circumstances from which moral values emerged. His investigation leads him to conclude that our existing morality is not appropriate with man, but it was brought through slave revolt as morality through the feeling of *ressentiment*.

The next step in my discussion is Nietzsche's work on the emergence and growth of *ressentiment* as a reactive feeling to a sustained and repeated condition of powerlessness of the "priestly class" against the more powerful social class, the "noble". It is this feeling of weakness,

²⁴ For additional and detail explanation, see Bernard Williams, "*Nietzsche's Minimalist Moral Psychology*", as reprinted in his *Making Sense of Humanity* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 65-76.

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a frustrated feeling of being decisively overcome by someone more powerful, which resulted in the creation of a new, imaginary place where these frustrated emotions could be discharged. In this imaginary place the “slaves” were well off and become the superior class, while the morality of the “nobles” became inferior. According to Nietzsche, the establishment of this imaginary place and its moral valuations understandably appealed to the underprivileged, powerless “slaves”. With more and more adherents, the establishment gained momentous effect until it became the only excepted source of morality. Nietzsche maintains that the victory of slave morality was so complete to control everything directly/indirectly (Ibid: 28-9). In order to understand the intuitive means of *ressentiment*, one must first evaluate the three different social classes: the nobles, the priests, and the slaves. Nietzsche makes the analysis of the three classes which generate distinctively different moral values.

The first social class, the nobles, consists of people of “a strong physique, blooming, and even exuberant health, together with all the conditions that guarantee its preservation: combat, adventure, the chase, the dance, war games” (ibid: 33). These naturally well-endowed people are “the noble, mighty, highly placed, and high-minded who decreed themselves and their actions to be good”.²⁵ The nobles consider themselves good because they always exceed others in a dense series of social relationships. Whether it is through intellectual superiority or in terms of brute strength, the nobles always emerge on the top of the social hierarchy. The triumphs come to them naturally and they are capable of surviving any challenge. In a sense the nobles see their enemies and opposition as a welcome challenge that measures their own strength and nobility which helps them to affirm themselves more gratefully and delightedly (ibid: 37). The peaceful existence of constant conquests leads to the noble’s assertion of their own “incomparable self-worth and

²⁵ Nietzsche, *GM*, Edited and translated by W. Kaufmann, 1967: 26.

unrivalled social station” (ibid: 30). Therefore, this overjoyed feeling of superiority allows the nobles to designate themselves and everything they do as “good” and everyone else as “bad”.

The “bad” people make up Nietzsche’s second social class, the slaves. For him, slaves are those who are worse than others, inferior or suppressed in some way. They wish to better their situation but they cannot. Because those better off are powerful enough to prevent it. The slaves, being decisively overcome, have no choice but to obey the nobles. They are at the command of the nobles and thus “experience themselves, for the most part, as subject to the arbitrary alien will of another”.²⁶ Their powerlessness becomes a means to dislike the nobles who are separated by “pathos of distance”.²⁷ Hence, the noblemen cannot grasp the passive existence of slaves.

However, not everybody whom the nobles consider “bad” deals with subordinate position passively. These people constitute Nietzsche’s third social class, the priest. He identifies them as someone displaying “the unmistakably noble evaluations that are indicative of the pathos of distance” (ibid: 33). But in spite of the fact that the priests possess the noble traits, they despise the nobles. The reason for their hatred is that they are no longer able to keep up with truly superior class. The priests are simply “one step behind” the nobles. Since priests are not “willing to accept a subordinate position in the social hierarchy...conflict between the priestly and knightly aristocratic modes of evaluation is inevitable” (ibid). Nevertheless, the priests are aware that if the conflict between the two classes is to escalate into an open violent war, the nobles would overwhelmingly succeed. Thus, when priests faced war with nobles, the impotent priests responded, as was their habit, by turning inward” (ibid. 34-6).

Unlike the nobles, which habitually display their thoughts and ideas, the priests are never allowed to freely express their emotion or discharge their energies and aggressions. The nobles

²⁶ David Owen, *Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality*, 2007: 78.

²⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *GM, Essay I; Section 2*, 1967: 27.

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possess “the perfect functioning of the ruling, unconscious instincts or even certain temerity to follow sudden impulses,” (Owen, 2007: 78) which allows them to absorb any negative thoughts and feelings in their instantaneous actions. The noble man cannot for long take seriously their enemies, misfortunes, and misdeeds; for such characters have in them an excess of plastic curative power, and also a power of oblivion. The feeling of being almost entirely dominated becomes gradually more frustrating and forces the priests to start a new strategy against nobles. Nietzsche calls the priestly man untruthful and dishonest. His soul squints, his mind loves hide-outs, secret paths, and back doors. Everything that is hidden seems to him his own world, his security, his comfort; he is expert in silence, in long memory and in waiting (Nietzsche, 1967: 36-9). Thus, out of the awareness of their powerlessness, the priest has forged the perfect weapon to get awareness in the world.

The priests' dissatisfaction behaviors and actions grow into a feeling of *ressentiment*. Nietzsche defines *ressentiment* as a psychic mechanism, more specifically, as a reactive feeling to certain experiences (Bittner, 2010: 127). It is not only self-absorbed feeling of pity, or a mere awareness of one's misfortune. As Nietzsche tells us, “it takes two for resentment.”²⁸ The two parties involved are the frustrated, cunning priests and the carefree and reckless nobles. The feeling of *ressentiment* is aimed at the nobles, whom the priests blame for their oppressed, secondary position in a society. For Nietzsche, it is lack of power on the side of the priests which becomes the cause and content of *ressentiment*. Despite the fact that the priests exhibit their contempt or indifference for power, they are highly concerned with it. This is the crucial characteristic of the feeling of *ressentiment*: it is always projected outward at a particular target.

Nonetheless, the reactive forces of the priests never become strong enough to make them to physically overcome the nobles. The nobles always represent an obstacle in all of the priestly

²⁸ Rudiger Bittner, *Ressentiment*, 2010; 129.

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activities. Hence, the frustrated priests create a fundamentally and entirely new place into which they channel their energies and their imagination to get victory over the nobles. In their new desired world, the priests invent a story according to which they really are well off (ibid: 130). This issue²⁹ for Nietzsche implicitly ignores the orders of God given through Prophets to the people. For him, the priests and prophets will negate the qualities that esteem individual power such as strength or speed, and start to affirm new and opposite values. But they do not.

However, the opposite values such as weakness and slowness are not very admirable, as “contempt for weakness is not an unusual sentiment, even among the weak”.³⁰ Therefore, the priests must change these values into more inspiring virtues: slowness into prudence; impotence, which cannot react into kindness; the inoffensiveness of the weak, his cowardice, his inability to standing and waiting at doors, are being given honorific titles such as patience; to be unable to revenge oneself is what he calls to be unwilling to revenge oneself, even forgiveness (Nietzsche, 1967: 47-8). Only this transformation of the conditions that are responsible for the experience of impotence and ineffectiveness makes these values attractive and desirable. However, the most important aspect of their newly created dreamful world is the concept of “free will”. The priests claim that the nobles are free to choose their actions and are accountable for the suffering and violence they cause. It is within the will of the strong to be weak.³¹ Not only does this new claim turn the spontaneous, instinctual actions of the nobles into evil deeds, but it also allows the weak to interpret their defining weakness as a willed and exemplary act. The weak would go as far as to claim that they “prefer their suffering which they propose as an unquestionable index of their goodness. The slaves could react if they so desired... but they choose instead the righteous path of suffering and self-deprivation” (Conway, 2008: 48). Thus, the concept of free will allows the

²⁹ I want to show the acts of priests to the people.

³⁰ Robert C. Solomon, *One Hundred Years of Ressentiment*, 107.

³¹ Nietzsche, *GM*, 1967: 45-6.

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slaves to transform the suffering they endure at the hands of their oppressors into their crowning virtues.

Nietzsche strongly disputes the claim of operative “free will” with his famous parable of the birds of prey and the tasty lambs, in which the birds of prey represent the nobles and the lambs portray the priests and the slaves. Understandably, the lambs do not like the birds of prey. They consider the birds of prey as “evil”. And since they view themselves and their actions as the opposites of the birds of prey from which they conclude that they must be “good”. Although Nietzsche argues that there is nothing basically wrong with such reasoning, he becomes alarmed when this reasoning is disseminated as the fundamental principle of a new morality. “To expect that strength will not manifest itself as strength, as the desire to overcome... is every bit absurd as to expect that weakness will manifest itself as strength” (ibid: 46). Nietzsche is positive that the birds of prey are not free to be predatory and he supports his claim by stating that a quantum of strength is equivalent to a quantum of urge, will, and activity. There is no neutral agent behind an action; the doing is everything (ibid).

Nevertheless, the new priestly morality gains more and more adherents. The priests make the new values of humility, altruism, and sensitivity even more attractive by promising happiness and ultimate enjoyment in the “next” world, the true and lasting world beyond. The suffering and self-deprivation of this world are told to be the signs of their “election by God...Perhaps also a preparation, a test, a kind of training... something for which eventually they will be compensated with tremendous interest” (Nietzsche, 1967: 48). This new fantasy world comforts the slaves. It allows them to live in hope of better future. Future they call “Judgment Day, the coming of their kingdom, the Kingdom of God” (ibid).

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Nietzsche, however, points out that this faith and hope in a better future is nothing more than a wish of revenge. Upon arrival in their “kingdom”, the slaves expect to be handsomely rewarded for their life of humility and deprivation. The anticipated reward is the “delight in the eternal suffering of their erstwhile oppressors” (Conway, 2008: 48). It is this vision of compensation that helps the slaves to endure their life in ‘preferred’ submissiveness, deprivation, and suffering. Daniel Conway (2008; 48) points out that, the wish of the slaves is to be rewarded in the “after-world” is not shared by the priests. The priests, who created the slaves’ vision of the rewarding afterlife, expect to be paid in the all too human currency of secular power.

Rudiger Bittner in her article entitled as *Ressentiment* raises a question whether it was possible that the priests and the slaves would sincerely believe in their new fantasy world. Bittner reasons that they must have known, at least initially, that their new fictional situation is merely a product of their imagination. “After all, they make it up themselves” (Bittner, 2010: 130). On the other hand, Christianity defends these philosophers by providing sufficient justification. If the claim of Nietzsche as Christian beliefs and values is as imaginary, what about his philosophy of master or the ‘overman’? It is really utopian.

Nietzsche’s investigation of the genealogy of morals discloses the historical existence and activity of the noble morality, to which the slave morality arise as a reaction. By combining the historical facts with psychological insight, he insists that contemporary authoritative values were descended from the resentment fueled slave morality, while the values that are now rejected once represented the dominant noble morality. His contempt for the feeling of *ressentiment* or the underlying weakness that causes and fuels resentment, works to the advantage of the noble morality as the source of superior moral values. Indeed, Nietzsche himself concludes his work by

saying that although the current victory of the slave morality is undeniable, he has high hopes for a future graced by the revival of noble values.

2.1. Master-Slave Distinction and Life

The values which Nietzsche most approves will maximally fulfill three criteria: 1st, they can be employed to maximize power; 2nd, this power will be maximally experienced; and, 3rd, this sublimated power will be maximally deployed in the creation of 'forms' that seduce to life. On the other hand, the values of which Nietzsche most disapproves will minimize one's power, will express power of the crudest kind and will inhibit the creation of forms (e.g. by making them seem bad or pointless) (May, 1999: 36).

Now the evaluation of traditional moral values using the three separate criteria, themselves of such great inner heterogeneity becomes a very complex business, which will issue neither in clear condemnation of those values, nor in clear approval. First, there is no reason why any given value particular ethic should not produce a high score by a criterion and a low score by another. So it could be subjected to different judgments depending on which criterion is uppermost in one's mind at any time or on how one could fulfill the three criteria. Thus, the 'ascetic ideal'³² generally scores highly in terms of power, highly in terms of sublimation, and poorly in terms of form-creation except in the hands of the 'priest' who uses it to dominate the 'herd' (ibid: 36-7).

The primary standard of Nietzsche's evaluation of values is life enhancement which is clearly illustrated on his attack of God. But the question of, how the 'master' and 'slave' would relate to life enhancement and life denial respectively would arise. The answer would be so complex because master morality and life enhancement are not identical concepts and the same

³² By Ascetic ideal I want to refer that the dedication of one's life to a pursuit of contemplative ideals and practices or the self- denial of for religious reasons. And this considers what Nietzsche is also used in many of his works.

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is true for the slave. Nietzsche's attitude to 'masters' is far from one of simple approbation and his attitude to 'slaves' one of total condemnation. Therefore, it will help us to clarify better the ethic that Nietzsche advanced in place of morality (ibid: 46).

Just like the 'master', the 'slave' type is capable of both power and sublimation. That is, they could be capable of satisfying the first two criteria of life enhancement and to a lesser extent of form-creation. As to power, the whole attempt of slave morality is that it is a successful formula for attaining power, a fact of which the 'priests' are all too aware (Nietzsche, 1967: 116-8). As to sublimation, slave morality is the spiritualization of revenge which is the channeling of revenge into high ideals that serve two purposes. That is, first, to subdue the masters by revaluing their values; second, to enable any revenge over and above that revaluation to be imaginary. In addition, the slave can weakly satisfy the third criterion of life-enhancement since *ressentiment*, for Nietzsche, gives birth to new values, though world-denying (ibid: 37).

On the contrary, the 'master'-type can publicize slavish values, as the ascetic priest does. In fact, the possibility of a sovereign manner of valuing that generates life-denying values may offer an indication to Nietzsche's complex outlook to Socrates, whom he seems both to criticize and to admire. In short, Nietzsche has respected Socrates' manner of valuing which was nobly sovereign in almost exactly Nietzsche's sense. While denying some of his specific values and especially the supreme value placed on absolute and timeless standards³³ he calls them as a road to western decadence. Thus, master and slave value distinction must satisfy life-enhancement by inviting the love of world and life (ibid: 46).

The creation of radically individual forms demands some extent of talent, power, and individuality that the 'reactive' or the slaves' emotions cannot supply. Though the slave may be

³³ For example, the idea that there is one timeless standard in relation to which all courageous acts are to be judged courageous.

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capable of form creation (such as 'giving birth' to moral values) that modestly seduces to life or that reflects a temperate attachment to the world. But, form-creation that passionately engages with the world requires different orders of courage and individuality which is, in this sense, life-enhancement becomes always masterly.

Though 'form-creation' that invites love of world and life is itself always 'masterly,' Nietzsche interestingly suggests that slavish characters are significant to motivate masters. The restless dissatisfaction of the slave can provide decisive drive to the highest realms of thought and self-mastery which is a way for life-enhancement. The slave is a painful problem to him and would search a way for relief. In such a way, the slave would be driven to the exploitation of thought, imagination, and self-discipline for which the self-assured master lacks comparable motivation. Therefore, for him all the three features of the reactive spirit namely *ressentiment*, bad conscience, and the ascetic ideal³⁴ which are the principal themes of *Genealogy of Morals*, which are unavoidably life-denying.

Nietzsche is inescapably indefinite towards both 'slave' and 'master' moralities: neither of them alone can maximize life-enhancement. Most fertile individuals and cultures are the composite of both: "in all the higher and more mixed cultures there also appear attempts at mediation between these two moralities ... and at times they occur directly alongside each other ... within a single soul" (Nietzsche, 1966: 204). Thus, on Nietzsche's account, if people with an obviously 'masterly' disposition adopt slave morality, they do so not only because they are forced or they unthinkingly internalize the moral norms of their society, but also they possess a partly slavish soul. The masters and nobles need slave characters to maximize life-enhancement and this will help to achieve the most powerful expressions of form creation (May, 1999: 48).

³⁴ The principal themes of the three essays of on the *Genealogy of Morals* respectively.

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Therefore, without slave instincts the masters' expression of power would remain crude and unreflective; while slave instincts uncontrolled by mastery would be marked by pure and formless *ressentiment*. Indeed, Nietzsche suggests "today there is perhaps no more decisive mark of a "higher nature", a more spiritual nature, than that of being ... a genuine battleground of these opposed values of 'good and bad' versus 'good and evil'" (Nietzsche, 1967: 52), that is, opposed value-systems of master and slave.

Finally, this discussion shows that whatever Nietzsche's 'historical' account may suggest slavishness and *ressentiment* should not be automatically correlated with weakness. The slave is someone in possession of the philosophical assumptions of resentment. In theory such a person could be gifted and powerful. This is confirmed that so many geniuses have succumbed to the slavish interpretation of life, among them Plato, Kant, Pascal, and the later Wagner. To be sovereign one must be one of nature's talents and if Nietzsche's concept of *ressentiment* had supposed otherwise it would have been rooted in an obvious psychological error.

Generally, Nietzsche's ideal of man cannot be assimilating to his picture of the original masters, with their 'disgusting' murderers, arsonists, and rapists (ibid: 39-42) even if he does admire their shameless fluency. His ideal life is attained only through unending fight against slavishness in order to impose a form upon oneself (ibid: 87-8) to discipline oneself. Nietzsche clearly rejects slavishness only where it scores negatively by all three criteria mentioned earlier - empowerment, sublimation, and form-creation that seduces to life. That is, only where its sole aim is to suppress, deny, and devalue life, one's own and others'. But to suggest that Nietzsche's critique of morality is limited to such entire criticism would be to underestimate the complexity and analytical power of his master/slave dualism.

2.2. The 'Übermensch'³⁵ – Superman

This section of the thesis discusses Nietzsche's idea of the 'superman'. This is part of his critique to Christianity and the crisis of modernity. His doctrine of superman is explained in most of his works implicitly and explicitly particularly in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and *The Gay Science*. Through the prophet Zarathustra Nietzsche tries to explain modernity as decadence and nihilism. Zarathustra, according to Nietzsche, has announced the death of the modern man and the advent of a new man, who has liberated himself from the tyranny of reason. For Nietzsche, this doctrine is a way for man to be out of deterioration. But it could lead to destruction of the weak so that the superman emerges.

Nietzsche opposed most of the commanding ideals of his own generation. Particularly, he considered that the notion of equality, equity and democracy are the anathema of the superman. Indeed, the idea of superman has been considered by some other writers too, as an aristocratic attempt to re-evaluate modern politics. According to Hoover (1994, 167), Nietzsche did not take into account the achievements and progresses scored as a result of enlightenment. On the contrary, he saw this progress possibly as the final stage in the dwarfing of man. This has begun with Socrates and Christ. Against the ideal of equity and progress Nietzsche advanced the counter ideal of the 'superman'. He assumed that a single man will dominate Europe and turn mankind into a sublime failure. For Nietzsche, the modern era has to overcome the revaluation of the Christian values as a necessary precondition for the emergence of the superman. He argues

³⁵ 'Übermensch'; this word is the German equivalent of the term 'superman' or 'overman' as translated by scholars. Most Nietzsche scholars prefer to provide the term *Übermensch* as 'superman' or 'overman'. Some prefer to submit the word in the original since there is no good English equivalent. Detwiller (1990), in his book *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism*, argues that the word 'superman' allows us to tie the translation to others words use 'super' like 'superhuman' or 'superhistorical'. However, others scholars such us Kaufmann (1974) prefer to connect the *Übermensch* with *Überwindung*³⁵ in its sense of 'overcoming'.

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that reappraisal of Christian values and traditions is mandatory for superman to arise. But it could be very difficult and impossible to avoid a deeply prevailed moral code all over the world.

As Nietzsche notes the first speech of prophet Zarathustra made to the people begins: 'I teach you the superman. Man is something that should be surpassed. What have you done to overcome him' (Nietzsche, 1966: 24). The superman is precisely the one who knows that God is dead and that religion could not be any more challenge to control us. He knows that a person of his kind needs no God for enjoying meaningful life because everyone has the potential to organize and lead life by oneself (Nietzsche, 1974: 585). But, in Christianity, man is naturally created in a way strongly attached to God in conscience and soul. If his devaluation fails to succeed, how this superman would ignore the presence of God and accept Godless life?

Nietzsche also used the term superman in the parable of Madman at *The Gay Science*, where he criticized the Jewish ideal of monotheism and warned that it could hinder man from civilization as most other species. Against the Hebrew ideal of a normal man, Nietzsche placed the Greek ideal of the free spirited and many spirited mentality. The Greeks rejected the idea of equality or conformity. Nietzsche desired for the return of such a culture where we could once again afford 'the luxury of individuals'. He takes this religion of monotheism as the most dangerous challenge to humanity which leads man to decadence (Hoover, 1994, 168). In his book the *Antichrist*, he argues that with the modern collapse of Christian monotheism the way has been opened up for the reconsideration of a superior man. He noted that without Christian theism as a support to the modern doctrine of equality is a great disrespect. By this concept, he needs to say, equality undermines the power, prestige, potential and esteem of those who are strong and superior. But how could everyone would be strong enough equally? Did Nietzsche

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consider the varied social strata of the community? He seems to be superficial and insincere in analyzing Christianity.

In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, we used to be equal before God, but God has died. God has become unbelievable belief in equality (Nietzsche, 1966: 323). In Christianity, the sense of equality arises from the belief that originally everyone was given pure and similar soul which is clear from sin. But as religious commentaries showed, everyone could be judged according to what he/she does in life. It is the time, according to Nietzsche, for us to reaffirm the order of ranks to intensify the 'pathos of distance' that creates the psychology of the superior man. Indeed the free spirits of modernity find themselves challenged by a momentous new task.

Nietzsche thought that the church ruined European man by turning all valuations on their head, by casting suspicion on joy in beauty, by breaking the strong, by bending everything mainly into suffering of conscience, and by inverting love of the earth into hatred of the earth. Again, Christianity tries to convince to give priority for the after death life which is believed to be everlasting. This, according to Nietzsche, forced man to undermine earthly life. In other words, the church spoiled the enrichment of man when men would have golden opportunity to strike into something beautiful. Of course, the church would have influenced individual persons indirectly but the major role to lead one's life through liberation is for the personhood.

Nietzsche's thought is a response to the Christian world and its hierarchies. For Nietzsche, the trend of modern age is characterized by nihilism as a result of value depreciation by Christianity. The superman is a key concept in Nietzsche's idea which represents a new thinking beyond the dichotomy between good and evil. This superman is surpassing all the standards of man and becomes the 'overman'. All the actions that the superman performs could not be judged by the standards of normative judgement. Zarathustra declared that what is great in

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man is that he is a bridge and not an end. Man is a rope tied between the beast and an overman. So for Nietzsche, mankind is not our goal but the superman (Nietzsche, 1966: 27). The emergence of the superman by any means at any cost is the goal to be pursued. Is it convincing to accept? No I do not think. It needs something new and radical action to achieve the overman which makes Nietzsche's theory implausible.

Nietzsche had strong conviction that man is endowed with immense potential for development. He believed that 'man is still in-exhausted for the greatest possibilities'. In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, he contended that man in his present state, is weighed down by his bad conscience. Therefore, he has become such incomplete and transitional creature whose potential is thwarted from unfolding. In other words, the present man is not an end but only a way, an episode, a bridge, a great promise (ibid).

In Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* it is contended that man is something that is to be overcome. Zarathustra asked: what have you done to overcome this man? Most people who first heard Zarathustra's question lived in a culture that praised equality, democracy, socialism, anarchism, and feminism. For Nietzsche none of these will produce the superman but 'the last man'. Indeed, he considers liberal democracy and socialism as symptoms of the weak will. The central goal is not equality but breeding perfect beings, 'free spirits'. The superman's superior autonomy excludes attachments with the 'herd' and its politics in which ideologies are obstacles to his perfectionism (ibid: 29). This concept is really imaginary because the values that Nietzsche undermines are the pillars of modern world social and political compass. What type of man could be overman? This is certainly the important point to argument and discussing over the issue.

The highest man would have the greatest multiplicity of drives and relatively the greatest strength that can be enduring. He must be one who is capable of frightening religious people,

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because religion always seeks the demolition of the drives (Nietzsche, 1974: 585). According to Nietzsche, superman is not a blond beast, an Aryan racist monster who murders at will and justifies it by some romantic primitivism, although he has no obligation to show pity to his inferiors (Hoover, 1997: 169). Nietzsche does not consider the result of destruction in order to be overman. On what basis does this annihilation of the weaker will be framed by the will be superman? This seems to be dependent only on the passions alone. Nietzsche's concept of race was not the romantic biological racism of many of his contemporaries. He felt that a higher man could theoretically come from the most widely different places and cultures. Nietzsche argues that only 'scholarly oxen' would interpret the superman in terms of Darwinian evolution. To him, the superman is not aimed to self-preservation as in the Darwinian code but to self-domination (ibid).

The superman is not necessarily a perfect physical specimen who is strong, healthy, and athletic. A sublime man could have the highest value even if he is terribly delicate and breakable. Because an abundance of very difficult and rare things has been bred and preserved together through many generations (Nietzsche, 1974: 998). When Nietzsche speaks of a 'higher type' who becomes the 'higher aristocracy of the future', he means the superman. The superman must be the future masters of the earth or the 'legislators of the future', and the 'free spirits of the future', the coming 'master race' and the coming 'ruling caste'.

Our future could be different because we may live to see the superman produced. The superman deliberately cultivates a process known to every great aristocracy. He painfully acquires all the virtues and efficiency of body and soul. According to Nietzsche, there are men who are the heirs and masters of this slowly acquired manifold treasure of virtue and efficiency. In the end there appears a man, monsters of energy, who demands a monster of a task (ibid: 995).

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At this point Nietzsche does not give a clue where this overman would appear. Is it meaningful for us to wait the coming of this superman? If so, since it is ideal, it would be better for man to be guided by the values of Christianity because his suggestion would not be better than such hopeful Christian ideals.

One must start, according to Nietzsche, with the body, the splendid animal, a creature with powerful drives, vigorous passions, robust health, unusual strength, and overflowing vitality. But these are the conditions for the superman. The sufficient cause must be something in addition to these because it involves a will that controls the passions and presses them into service, a will that rides the string drives (Hoover, 1994: 171).

All beings seek to discharge their power and to dominate. The will to power always encounters and seeks to overcome resistance. The overman is engaged in self-domination and the domination of others. In the future, according to Nietzsche's account, men will be beaten into unique specimen whose values will be determined by power. 'What determines your rank is the quantum of power you have'. Power, for Nietzsche, means holistic human power or strength of both body and soul, both physical and spiritual. That is why he says 'order of rank is order of power'. (Nietzsche, 1974: 858). Thus, superior men of the future will be the finest possible incarnations of the will to power. In this sense, Nietzsche seems to say that the suggested overman could be strong enough physically and spiritually. In spiritual sense, whether he intended or not, Nietzsche's belief is the same as that of Christians belief. Christians believe that when Jesus Christ comes back to this earth for last judgement, those who would be on the right of God would be supermen. They become beyond what is good and evil by their virtue of their being and free from any act of evil. They would recover to their original creation of the very beginning and free from any act of evil since they start to act freely based on their likeliness of

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God³⁶ which is naturally free from doing evil. In them the primitive urge of the everlasting cosmos thrusts forward a new, higher form of culture (Hoover, 1994: 176). They will be synthetic, justifying men who will invent a “higher form of being” while dominating the mechanical, atomized masses for our modern age. Their advent will open a new chapter in improving life, for they will be beyond good and evil which is similar with faith of Christianity.

For Nietzsche, if God is dead and religion becomes invalid, human life gets the meaning it deserves. His superman is very ambitious one to redeem mankind's existence. That is why Zarathustra exclaimed: “be-hold I teach you the overman. The overman is the meaning of earth. Let you will say: the overman shall be the meaning of the earth” (Nietzsche, 1966: 24). One might presume that the superman would dominate the earth for a long time and Nietzsche warns that this is not necessarily true. This would be to fall into error of Darwinism that considers durability as a benchmark of value. For Nietzsche, ‘duration as such has no value’. Quality is more important than duration. ‘One might prefer a shorter but more valuable existence for the species’ (Hoover, 1994: 172).

According to some writers, when Nietzsche politicizes his own philosophy in the relationship between superman and will to power, he describes human agency in the dialect of exploitation, domination, struggle, mastery, etc. In Addition, Nietzsche according to Warren (1988, 208) was often able to provide uniquely incisive criticisms of modern political ideologies. However, he could not account for every political effect he observed. His political idea of a hierarchical society with a small leadership of aristocrat–philosophers is seen to be inconsistent with his politics.

³⁶ Holy Bible, Genesis chapter one Number 26-7, God said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness God created man in his own image. In God's image he created him; male and female he created them” it implies that originally Adam was created by the image and likeness of God.

2.3. The Will to Power

Nietzsche understands human life in terms of a mass of forces each striving according to its own will to power. Forces are characterized by their differentiation from one another. There is no force without its relation to other forces. The will to power is the principle according to which force operates. In other words, the will to power is the theory that all inner drives strive to exert themselves externally and upon others by which this 'will' gains strength through action and experiences pleasure.

Nietzsche's philosophy of will understands the strength of the will as the ability to actively and creatively exert its power over other forces. He further argues,

My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (—its will to power) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the parts of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. ... The process goes on— (Nietzsche, 1968: 340).

The world is made up of finite forces with no overarching, consistent infinite force (ibid: 547). Inter-dynamic force is the constitutive element of all human motivation. For Nietzsche, "the only force that exists is of the same kind as that of the will: a commanding over other subjects, which thereupon change" (ibid: 271). Nietzsche gives high priority for will as a determinant agent for every action. But does this make sense for human stability? If a person is guided by only his will, it is not difficult to guess about what would happen in human life.

Nietzsche designates the 'will to power' as an enthusiastic desire to manifest power and it is a creative drive.³⁷ It is also a creative drive because it acts upon other forces, "the stronger will

³⁷ Nietzsche, *WP*, Section 619, p. 333 The victorious concept "force," by means of which our physicists have created God and the world, still needs to be completed: an inner will must be ascribed to it, which I designate as "will to power," i.e., as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or as the employment and exercise of power, as a creative drive, etc.

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directs the weaker.”³⁸ He explains that every drive is a kind of desire or aspiration to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all other drives to accept as a norm whereas the interpretation and valuation constructed by the Christians through the ascetic ideal provided the passive nihilist with a weak sense of power through self-denial. Nietzsche's will to power reinterprets life according to a much stronger, life-affirming exertion of force. The satisfaction of the will to power is expressed as the outward exertion of power and is experienced a sense of effectiveness in the world (ibid: 211).

The strength expressed through the will to power, is an expression of our motive and well-being. The will to power is “essentially creating and giving. Power is in the will as ‘the bestowing virtue’, through power the will itself bestows sense and value” (Deleuz, 1983: 85). Against the slogans of the ascetic ideal, poverty, chastity and humility, Nietzsche's will is ample and overflowing. Understanding of will to power in terms of differentiations of force and the exertion of affirmative power is central to Nietzsche's critique of the self-denying ascetic will. What was found to be problematic about the ascetic ideal and its passive nihilist attitude is that even having announced that God is dead, they do not create new values. Rather, they make it to decline or stagnate in their own meaningless despair. Therefore, the will to power is essentially central to Nietzsche's re-evaluation of values in so far as it interprets meaning and value differently and creatively.

³⁸ Ibid. Section 658, p. 347 the organic functions translated back to the basic will, the will to power-and understood as offshoots. The will to power specializes as will to nourishment, to property, to tools, to servants (those who obey) and masters; the body as an example. The stronger will directs the weaker. There is absolutely no other kind of causality than that of will upon will. Not explained mechanistically. Thinking, feeling, willing in all living beings. What is a pleasure but; an excitation of the feeling of power by an obstacle (even more strongly by rhythmic obstacles and resistances)-so it swells up. Thus all pleasure includes pain.-If the pleasure is to be very great, the pains must be very protracted and the tension of the bow tremendous.

When we see the backgrounds of the will to power, Nietzsche connects it with the *Homer Contests* of ancient Greece. In *Homer Contest* of 1872³⁹, Nietzsche writes of the approbation poured on envy by ancient Greeks. Envy was appreciated not because it led to nihilistic struggle but it spurred men on to activity in the form of contest. In this sense, Nietzsche understood contest and competition as source of the Hellenic state and vital for the perpetuation of the state. This is the way to overcome Nietzsche's theme of the will to power. In *the Greek state* of 1872, Nietzsche writes about the benefit of war and the origin of the state as forged by nature is bloody and violent.⁴⁰ The strong conquers the weaker and the weaker ones attached them to the stronger thereby internalizing as an acceptance and love of the state.

In metaphysical sense of the word, will to power is to be thought as a plurality, Nietzsche writes,

That I have to be struggle and becoming and goal and conflict of goals: he who divines my will surely divines too what crooked paths it has to go to. Life as Will to Power is 'conflict of goals' and instantiates itself in 'crooked paths' (Nietzsche, 1966: 139).

In this sense, Nietzsche argues that life needs height and conflict between the steps and overcomings it creates. Also he guaranteed this idea again and again: "And because it needs height, it needs steps and conflict between steps and those who climb them! Life wants to climb and in climbing, overcome itself" (ibid: 389). This section of his book clearly shows that his will to power has indirect implication to suppression and exploitation by which someone would intend to be dominant by any means and cost. With the textual emphasis being on the plurality and multiplicity of overcomings, appeals either monism/dualism. How do plurality and multiplicity get reconciled through mastery and domination? Domination implies the

³⁹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Homer's Contest*. www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/tgs.htm

⁴⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *the Greek State*. www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/hc.htm.

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homogeneity of masters whereas plurality is antithetical to homogeneity. There appears to be a tension between the two.

The other issue which should be discussed is about the concept that will to power is life and life overcomes itself. The prime thesis that will to power is life and life overcomes itself is questionable. An immediate response to this point is that Nietzsche is not a systematic writer. The themes in his writings are fragmented throughout his works. For example, the doctrine of will to power is not introduced in a substantive, self-contained way; references to it are scattered throughout his works. So he never links will to power with life etc. Although he is nonsystematic writer, he does not do so explicitly.

Nietzsche says “where I found a living thing, there I found will to power” (Nietzsche, 1966: 138). Therefore, according to him, in all living things will to power is present. As living things *qua* living things are instances of life, it is sound to conclude that will to power can be found in life. That is why Zarathustra tells us only where life is, there is also will: not will to life, but will to power’. Again, for Nietzsche, it is safe to conclude that life is will to power and will to power is life.

It is all about the expansion, conflict, having power, mastery and domination over the weaker people. According to Nietzsche, this is inevitable and natural. A person is perpetually subject to the overcomings of others. We see the effect of this tension created in a person. There is a serious and inescapable strain within the life of individuals because of the need to dominate others and becoming master of all of them since he/she needs to challenge the trials of others domination.

The ontology of will to power, however, does not necessarily entail a brutish and aggressive philosophy which is ‘might is right’. In his writings, Nietzsche develops and qualifies

“might is right” as an activity that is not simple and crude. He also mentions how laws are made by the stronger to protect themselves and others and drives become sublimated (ibid: 143). In spite of these qualifications, the will to power remains an aggressive ontology that seeks to dominate and control by overcoming others instantiations of will to power. It dominates in order to grow and expand, which would finally result in aristocratic anarchy.

For against the modern interpretation of laws obtaining in nature, another interpretation of the text of nature would observe:

...the tyrannically inconsiderate and relentless enforcement of claims of power...an interpreter who would picture the unexceptional and unconditional aspects of all ‘will to power’ so vividly that almost every word, even the word ‘tyranny’ itself would eventually seem unsuitable or a weakening and attenuating metaphor – being too human –but he might, nevertheless end by asserting the same thing about this world as you do, namely that it has a ‘necessary’ and ‘calculable’ course, not because laws obtain in it, but because they are absolutely lacking and every power draws its ultimate consequences at every moment (Nietzsche, 1966: 30).⁴¹

The important insight in this passage is the exposition of the nature of will to power. It is described as the claims of will to power are opposed to democratic, uncompromising and absolute enforcement of tyrannical power. Power qua power is necessarily compelled to be its ultimate state, its absolute superlatively at every moment. Generally, Nietzsche’s concept of the will to power overcomes to master and dominate hastily. This would result in a tension between mastering to control the entire low class and the struggle to be free from suppression. Some of the dominating class members will also need a growth for prestige to happiness as personal

⁴¹ Also in Kaufmann’s edition of *WP* at 619 it says “The victorious concept ‘force’ by means of which our physicists have created God and the world still needs to be completed: an inner will must be ascribed to it, which I designate as ‘will to power’, i.e., as an insatiable desire to manifest power; or as the employment and exercise of power, as a creative drive etc...one is obliged to understand all motion, all ‘appearances’, all ‘laws’ only as symptoms of an inner event...”

desire. That is why Nietzsche says to be master in it feels mastery and it aims at growth and increasing the feeling of growth.

2.4. The Transvaluation of Values

According to Nietzsche's persuasion nature has no value in itself (it is value free). It is human beings that proposes and give value to nature. For him, moral judgments have strong connection with religion. They make people believe in realities which are not realities. Morality is simply an interpretation of certain phenomena and more importantly a delusion (Melchert, 1995: 500). The present/existing values and moral judgments are misinterpretations that were created by considering God as "true world" for granted. But if God is dead, as Nietzsche argues, we might not believe in any world other than the one revealed to our senses. Nietzsche proposes the death of God as an alternative belief to avoid a belief in non-sensual world. Transvaluation of values should be the solution. But his hope for the adoption and transvaluation of all the existed norms is also fictional. The death of God for him was both a cultural phenomenon as the declining and expiration of the Christian moral interpretation of life and the world which is the rejection of any hypothesis like God.

Nietzsche wants to teach people to say "yes" to all that create strength; and "no" to those that evoke weakness and exhaustion. He wants to ridicule the accepted ideals of the Judeo-Christian standards and Greek rationalism by labeling them as the opposite of true values. To make his work needed to moral revolution, he wants to replace humility by pride, sympathy and pity by contempt and a loathness, love of one's neighbor by no more tolerance. He said that this kind of transvaluation of values is not for the "common herd" but for the few "free spirits" of the time who are intellectually fit to receive it. Free spirit is someone who is flexible and has creative mind to see everything from different angles (Denise, 2008: 212).

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Nietzsche strongly urged the aristocracy of free spirits to prepare man for the highest possible stage in human development. Only the superman represents the unrestricted spirit and enjoys his strengths and his own worth. "Man is something to be surpassed" (Nietzsche, 1966: 24). Humanity is not a goal but a means or a transition between animal and superman. That is, a step towards overman who is the meaning of the earth. But superman cannot be realized through evolution rather by the exercise of the will (Kenny, 2006: 331).

According to Nietzsche, human struggle for dominance over environment is hampered by the teachings of false moralities. The true moralities must build from the immediate sense of power that all people can feel within themselves (Denise, 2008: 213). Here, Nietzsche is saying that the teaching of false moralities (Judaism and Christianity) is an obstacle to control our environment. For him, true moralities are those that affirm our power and strength by exercising our will freely. Johnston writes that (2006: 147) Nietzsche argues that man must turn environmental values upside down in order to live creatively. The values of the society were invented by the weak to allow them to overcome the strong. But sometimes the strong will be overwhelmed by the cooperation of the weak ones. In the philosophy of traditional rationalism, by considering human as rational animal, philosophers wrongly give major place for reason in human nature. In reality, the essence of an individual is not reason, but the will to power. Nietzsche argues that reason has a role of facilitating the functioning of the urge for power by organizing it efficiently the conditions of action (Denise, 2008: 213). And yet, the dominant role should be played by 'will'. What type of 'will' does act freely from the participation of reason? Whether the extent varies or not, our 'will' should be capable of doing actions consciously and intentionality through the role of reason.

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The will to power leads to the transvaluation of traditional values which means the present moral judgment is to be rejected and new values are to be proposed. What has been forbidden for centuries, by the system of the weak is now to be replaced by that of the strong. Nietzsche's hero is a man who goes a head of his fellows by his own power and refuse to regret for his superiority. The superman is to remain faithful to earth and nothing more for him (Johnston, 2006: 147).

According to Nietzsche, by grasping the values dedicated to the will to power will the coming philosophers stand apart from the masses. They will be aristocrats and 'true freedom' will be their doctrine. The philosopher of the future will affirm his individuality and does not agree with harmful things. For Nietzsche, the principle of the 'common good' must not be accepted because something in common always has small value.

In the end things must be as they are have always been – the great things remain for the great, the abysses for the profound, the delicacies and the thrills for the refined and to sum up shortly, everything rare for the rare (Denise, 2008: 222).

I think, for Nietzsche the philosophers of the future praise values that value power, strength and pride. I argue that in theory it might be possible but seems absurd. How does such free spirits could live in isolation?

For the progress of humanity, transvaluation of traditional values that give important place for the will to power is needed. Writers describe it in the following way;

Transvalue values implies that all spontaneous, motivates, all new, future, and stronger motives, are still extant; but that they are now appear under false names and false valuations, and have not yet become conscious of themselves. We ought to have the courage to become conscious, and to affirm all that which has been *attained*- to get rid of the humdrum character of old valuations, which makes us unworthy of the best and the strongest things that we have achieved (ibid).

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The transvaluation of values can successfully be achieved if and only if there is a tension of new needs, and new set of needy people arise who feel all old values as dangerous and painful. In the arguments of Nietzsche, there must be some criteria that should be fulfilled. The first one is, new need should arise from all sections of the community (including the stronger and the weaker). Secondly, agreement of all groups of the society should feel bad about old values. Otherwise, Nietzsche's scheme of trans-valuation of values will not succeed. Before the new philosophy of strength can become effective, there is a task that must be performed: "the truth must be shown to those who are fit to receive it" (ibid). It is not an ordinary person that can assess the present values and reevaluate them, but who is capable of exercising his will to power.

Generally, Nietzsche's concept of transvaluation is implicitly the denial and hatred of Christian values. He wants to attenuate the role of the church in life with religious functionaries (the priests) that indoctrinate new impression in people. But his plan would not be succeed due to the deep rooted nature of religious values in man. But I would argue that those Christian values are not the result of slave revolt rather it has been given to Adam as an order by God as stated in the Holy Bible.⁴² Therefore, his valuation of Christian standards, principles and norms as evolutionary has failed. Because on the one hand Christianity is not a phenomenon come after Christ incarnation but of from the time of Adam was created.

Nietzsche's assertion of transforming morality by his ideal value could not succeed. Even if he wanted to declare as God is dead, he cannot create a morality of his own. This is his trial to cover his philosophical deficiency. As much as his philosophy is a utopian, he has no courage to undermine what he calls ideal concepts of Christianity like God, Angels, Soul, etc.

⁴² The Holy Bible, Genesis; Chapter 2 Number 17, "but of the tree of the knowledge of **good and evil**, you shall not eat of it; for in the day that you eat of it you will surely die."

Chapter Three: Nietzsche's View of Christianity

This chapter of my thesis examines the place of religion in Nietzsche's writings. Though Nietzsche opposed all monotheistic religions, it would be misconception to think that Nietzsche proposes atheism as a solution. He contends that religion is an essential part of any culture. I would like to attempt to set forth what Nietzsche says about Christianity in his work, *the Anti-Christ*. Although he talked in many of his works about Christianity, the theme of this section would give emphasis on *Anti-Christ*. The objective is to provide an adequate understanding of his critique of Christianity. I have given special emphasis to this work because I believe that this work of Nietzsche constitutes an intense theoretical attack ever made against Christianity.

In his article,⁴³ Steven Michels showed that Nietzsche conceives of modernity not as a progress but an unhealthy and dangerous break from tradition that he seeks to set right. Consequently, he turns to the greatness of antiquity. He follows the ancients in affirming the superiority of philosophy to politics. His new philosophy is characterized by its motive to use and indeed govern religion, science, and politics for the sake of high culture (Michels, 2004: 4). The death of God is a terrible event, but it makes possible the discovery of the will as a fact of nature and the creation of new Gods. Rather than merely opposing modernity, Nietzsche preferred to look at past culture to create something new and greater.

Accordingly, it is better for me to see Nietzsche's view as something other than anti-religious. Ideas which are in favor of religion are usually surpassed by contrary statements. His claim that "there are no moral phenomena at all, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena" implies an absolute freedom for moral interpretation.⁴⁴ And also he refutes both God and the devil (Nietzsche, 1966: 48).

⁴³ Steven Michels, *Nietzsche and the religion of the future*, Sacred Heart University, 2004; 2.

⁴⁴ Nietzsche, *BGE*, 1966, Section 108: p. 85.

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Although Nietzsche is regarded as an atheist who revels in the death of god, nowhere does he advocate an exclusively atheist agenda. For instance, he does not show atheism as the remedy for his denial of the ascetic life. J.A. Bernstein contends:

Nietzsche never attempted a logical refutation of the possibility of God's existence. He does not appear to have thought it attainable. What he substituted was a genetic reduction of faith, which was clearly intended to have the effect of a refutation by suspicion Nietzsche's implication is that the belief in God is traceable to human needs (Bernstein, 1987: 165-66).

Nietzsche is only unwillingly special in proclaiming the death of god (Nietzsche, 1967, 160). He calls it as the great scene in a hundred acts reserved for the next two centuries in Europe which would be the most terrible, questionable, and perhaps most hopeful of all spectacles (ibid). He wants a new faith as much as he wants a new philosophy, a view that is only now being taken seriously.

Nietzsche used the presumption of the death of God to the effect that men must learn to re-examine their human situation since it is no longer justifiable to believe in the existence of God. One of his concerns was how to live successfully as an atheist. He is worried about the human situation and wants to correct by rejecting all abstract, objective, systematic philosophy as an illusion. This is because he thinks that life is more than logic (Passmore, 1957: 470). The death of the Christian God leaves the European man without a universal goal. The aim is to stimulate the noble and free spirits by breaking the shackles of herd morality so that men get the opportunity to determine their own values. In so doing, Nietzsche allows running free and brutal attack on Christianity. He writes:

From the start, the Christian faith is a sacrifice, a sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-confidence of the spirit, at the same time it is enslavement, self-mockery and self-mutilation. Nietzsche believes that the day will come when the most solemn concepts

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which have caused the most frights and suffering, that is, the concepts of God and sin, will seem no more important to us than a child's toy (Nietzsche, 1966: 68-69).

Nietzsche believes that whoever reveals the true nature of Christian morality unmasks the worthlessness its values. For him, the notion of God was invented as a counter notion to life. The notion of a beyond was invented to depreciate the only world that exists and the idea of immortal soul was invented to despise the body. The notion of sin was invented to mislead our instincts and finally the notion of a good man has come to mean everything that was weak, ill and misshapen. He believes that this Christian morality ruins the law of selection in the name of morality (Castell, 1976: 250). In Christianity the act of worshiping and praising God will be manifested in this physical world when the soul alone could be incapable to be seen on our eyes. Nietzsche strongly believes that the survival of the fittest would live on earth.

Nietzsche equates herd morality with priestly morality or morality of timidity. He asserts that morality in Europe is the herd animal. It resists all alternative possibilities with all its power by claiming that 'I am morality itself, and nothing besides is morality' (Nietzsche, 1966: 116). Through the backing of religion, this morality manifests itself in social and political spheres. He also rejects Christianity because of its proclamation of equality for man before God as well as for the self-humiliation of man. For him, Christianity kills the passion to the will to power and equality of men distorts human capability which distinguishes one man from the other. For him, Christianity must be rejected since it caused slave morality. Christianity is about the conformity to what is considered to be the will of God. This does not allow individuals to show their individuality. Nietzsche is not interested in metaphysical truths of Christianity or any kind of religion. He believes that "no religion is really true, he judges all religions entirely by their social effects" (Russel, 2004: 691). But I argue that Nietzsche evaluates religion on their social effects

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but it is better to consider the positive advantages of religion to contribute for civilization, stability and security of modern world.

Nietzsche opposes the submission to what is assumed to be the will of God. Christianity for him is nihilistic because it rejects any basic difference of value existing between men. Christianity gives equal value to two or more different persons. For Nietzsche, "Christianity is degenerative, full of decaying and excremental elements; its driving force is the revolt, the bungled and botched" (ibid). He argues that the concept of equality in Christianity is not true. For Christianity, soul was equally given to everyone. But the kind of work they perform during their lifetime puts them at different levels.⁴⁵ Christianity considers, as Nietzsche says, values such as strength, revenge, instincts of war, conquest and other values associated with strength should be rejected and overcome. On the other hand, values like humility, being mediocre; weak and other similar ones are values that have great place in Christianity.

Nietzsche argues that Christianity aims at making easy to control the heart of man. For him this is wrong. A wild beast has many qualities that it may lose when tamed. Something is good if and only if it is self-respecting, and this is what we have to fight for against Christianity. Destroying the strong, breaking their spirits, changing their proud into anxiety and fear, suppress passions and noble instincts are the aims of Christianity. Self-respecting values are discouraged instead self-contempt and emptiness are promoted. As a result, a person seeks redemption from God to become a full human being. In other words, the concrete human believes that he gets his/her full humanity not by his/her own life affirming activity, but by upholding and respecting the laws that are assumed to be the will of God (ibid: 692).

⁴⁵ Holy Bible: Revelation Chapter 22 Number 12, "Look, I am coming soon! My reward is with me, and I will give to everyone according to what they have done".

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Nietzsche discards Christian love because he considers that is the result of fear. One loves his neighbor because he is afraid that his neighbor will inflict harm on him. Had it been the case that one is sure that he is stronger and courageous, one may openly exhibit the contempt for his neighbor (ibid: 693). I think for Nietzsche, if one is sure that there would be nothing in breaking or violating God's command, one may not respect that law. Therefore, in Christianity, one respects rules and regulations by fearing the consequences of breaking the rules.

Nietzsche wants to replace Christian saint by what he calls the 'superman' he says that the desire of the 'superman' is not the result of fear. Instead of denying one's own existence by considering the 'other world', superman wants to affirm life in this concrete and earthly world through the exercise of the will to power.

Nietzsche considered Christianity as a negation of life because it makes people to believe in the afterlife value at the expense of this world. Christianity emerges from resentment and hatred for life to those who are enjoying it. It devaluates the powerful and strong by advocating weakness. The fearing of guilt and sin makes us to repress our natural instincts. God is both the source and destination for Christian morality. For Nietzsche this is not true. Indeed he announced that "God is dead". This is most of the time misinterpreted by many. When Nietzsche says "God is dead" he is not talking about metaphysical existence rather about the irrelevance of Christian morality. He convinced himself that it is no more useful and cannot sustain. Therefore, something new is to be introduced. The death of God suggests at least two things: one is that there is no spirit that commands us and the other is that our enslavement to ideals of the spirit comes to its end. Hence, we will feel free to do whatever we want to do and value life as it is in this earthly world (Melchert, 1995: 498-9).

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Nietzsche also considered Christian morality as slave morality. Both are the outcomes of resentment and hatred for the strong and powerful. For him, Christianity is an instrument to advocate mediocrity and weakness. But he denies this because there is no goodness in weakness and mediocrity. The pleasure of the common is no part of the good. Everything that is good in itself is found only in few superiors and what is happening to the rest does not matter. The superior few are the powerful, the conquering race or the noble. He regards this kind of morality as master morality. For him, master morality is the affirmation of the strength by the strong. It is a kind of morality that says 'yes' to this worldly and active life, has great consideration for natural instincts and passions (ibid: 694).

Among the major and well known Nietzschean scholars, W. Kaufmann summarizes the notion and main thesis of *The Anti-Christ* as follows:

The Anti-Christ is part one of the *Revaluation*, and one of its main themes is the reversal of the traditional appraisal of the relationship between Christianity and Judaism an appraisal that had reached an extreme form in the self-styled "Christian" anti-Semitism of those days (Nietzsche, 1982: 566).

The *Anti-Christ* is a work of exceedingly clear text to blame and degrade Christianity. In this book Nietzsche's criticism goes beyond the familiar attacks on religion because it is the value system of the Christian society which has been carefully examined in this book. The book begins with a warning that "this book belongs to the very few" (ibid: 568). The preface shows that the content of the book has been presented in distinctive way and its argument might be rejected by different groups of readers. Nietzsche states that only those who have already been able to understand the representation of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* can welcome this book. He begins by presenting his famous negation of the 'decadent' individual and 'decline' as the

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consequences of Christianity that tends to set itself up in opposition to the instincts of man. That is why he calls Christianity as an expression of decadence and negation of the will to life:

I call an animal, a species, or an individual corrupt when it loses its instincts, when it chooses, when it prefers, what is disadvantageous for it...Life itself is to my mind the instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of forces, for power: where the will to power is lacking there is decline (Nietzsche, 1982: 572).

This accusation of Christianity as a religion limits and undervalues the instincts of man that could enable man to control nature. Nietzsche criticizes not only the belief and practices of Christianity but also refuses its ethical-moral value system. Similar positions can be seen in *Beyond Good and Evil* and the *Genealogy of Morals*. This is particularly true of the present system of morality which is an inversion of the noble moral values. Nietzsche thinks that Christianity focuses on the concept of pity and hence calls it the religion of pity. He says that pity is practical nihilism which is the infection of suffering. Inspiring pity and its depressive effects restrict those instincts that preserve life:

Christianity is called the religion of pity. Pity stands opposed to the tonic emotions which heighten our vitality: it has a depressing effect. We are deprived of strength when we feel pity. That loss of strength which suffering as such inflicts on life is still further increased and multiplied by pity. Pity makes suffering contagious (ibid: 572).

According to Nietzsche, pity is nothing less than the multiplication of suffering. It makes us suffer along with those for whom we feel pity. To feel pity for somebody means to suffer along with him. By making pity a high virtue, Christianity has made people nihilistic, depressed and weak. In his *Genealogy of Morals*, he traces the origin of this value system to the ancient Jews who lived under Ancient Roman Empire. Finally, pity is nihilism which has historically been put into practice and makes life seem more miserable and 'decadent' (ibid).

Another criticism of Christianity made by Nietzsche in his *The Anti-Christ* exposes that it has no connection with reality. He says “in Christianity neither morality nor religion has even a single point of contact with reality” (ibid: 581). For him, Religion is concerned with imaginary causes (such as God, soul, and spirit) and imaginary effects (sin, grace, and so on), and the relationships between imaginary beings (i.e. God, angels, etc.). Nietzsche argues that such concept of Christian God is one of most contradictory of any God that has ever been taught of:

The Christian conception of God — God as god of the sick, God as a spider, God as spirit, is one of the most corrupt conceptions of the divine ever attained on earth. It may even represent the low water mark in the descending development of divine types. God degenerates into the contradiction of life, instead of being its transfiguration and eternal Yes! God is the declaration of war against life, nature, the will to live! ... God the deification of nothingness, the will to nothingness pronounced holy! (ibid: 585-6)

Nietzsche attempts to show how the God of Israel in the Old Testament. It was a God of a very proud Jewish people. However, for him this representation of God is much healthier than the Christian's conception of God. This God was the expression of the Jews' self-proclaimed virtues. The idea of the God was at that time exactly the idea of nature which is both helpful and hurtful. When the Jews' land was occupied by the Ancient Roman Empire, their God underwent a change. Instead of being powerful and noble, the God of the Jews became a God who embodied the sentiments of the oppressed and resentful. They transformed the God into the God of the poor and the weak. This God was all good, whereas the God of their enemies became evil. In Nietzsche's view, this is a very poor type of God because it is always subject to change as the worshippers want (ibid).

For Nietzsche, this Christian God as the God of everyman becomes ultimately a life-denying God. It represents a denial of life which is the opposite to the powerful and yes-saying and life-affirming God of the ancient Jews. For him the Christians' God becomes nihilistic one

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that disclaims the existing situation and hopes for a better condition of man by ignoring this world. The Christian God is involved in the rejection of the world by taking everything in it as “sinful” and “decadent”. That is why, for him, in Christianity the instincts are more and more devalued and restricted. Hitherto, God does not order to ignore this world since it is created by him as a place for man to live. But, completely rejects acts of evil doings against rules of God⁴⁶ and human beings themselves who are created by the image and likeness of God.

Nietzsche later on paints a picture of Jesus in history as being a true evangel. In his view, the true Jesus is different from the Jesus depicted by the church. The true Jesus did not subscribe to the concepts of guilt, punishment and reward. He was not involved merely in faith, but only in actions. These actions are like those ways Nietzsche would call a Buddhist way of life. For example, the evangel does not become angry, does not pass judgment, and he does not feel hatred or resentment for his enemies. Moreover, he rejects the idea of the sin and repentance:

This “bringer of glad things” died as he had lived, as he had taught—not to “redeem men” but to show how one must live. This practice is his legacy to mankind: his behavior before the judges, before the catchpoles, before the accusers and all kinds of slander and scorn — his behavior on the cross (ibid: 608-9).

Nietzsche argues that this picture of Jesus is completely alien to the one which the church has taught to us. Surprisingly he expresses some degree of admiration for the character of Jesus. At least the way he faced his death and expressed no hostility towards those who arrested and crucified him. He was above this hostile manner of life and died graciously in order to convince others to the perfection of his mode of life. Nietzsche appreciated this manner of Jesus.

But he criticizes the apostles and followers of Jesus who were filled with the desire of revenge. The disciples of Jesus were not as such willing to forgive. In Nietzsche’s opinion, the worst of them was Paul who was the real founder of the Christian Church. The followers of

⁴⁶ These orders of God are given for the sake of man’s security and peaceful life as stated on Holy Scriptures.

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Christ thought that Jesus was the Messiah whom the Jewish scripture was prophesized long before. That is why they elevated him to a high status: the Son of God. Confused the question that how God might kill his son, they soon believed that God sent down his Son as a sacrifice for man's sins (ibid: 609).

On the other hand, Nietzsche also believes that the Gospels are not so spiritual in so far as they have been considered. He sees the Gospel as a proof that the corruption of Christ's ideals had already happened even in the early Christian societies. He uses the Gospel is a good example to show the morality of resentment. Hence Nietzsche advises the reader "to put on gloves when reading the New Testament because there is so much uncleanness" (Nietzsche, 1967: 165) in it:

I have looked in vain through the New Testament to descry even a single sympathetic feature: there is nothing in it that is free, gracious, honest. Humaneness did not even make its first beginnings here — the instincts of cleanliness are lacking. There are only bad instincts in the New Testament and not even the courage to have these bad instincts (Nietzsche, 1982: 625).

According to the above mentioned points, one can come to the conclusion that Nietzsche believed that Christianity came to existence only after the death of Jesus Christ, and it evolved completely opposite to what Christ had thought and done. Christianity, for Nietzsche, is really a religion made of Christ's Apostles and the Church. It is the center for Christian propaganda which was built after the death of Christ. In the following centuries the whole European countries were under the direct control of the church. A hierarchy of clergymen and the different kinds of priests were formed to carry out various functions and responsibilities. The social behavior, ethics, the norms and the metaphysics were all under the impact of the church.

In Nietzsche's view, Christianity is an instrument to devalue man and this world by considering it as the result of the Original Sin (the fall of Adam and Eve). Therefore, for him our life on earth is a kind of punishment and our goal in Christianity is to get out of this world in

order to get into heaven. We should get rid of our passions which cause us to sin and of our bodies. Based on such a view, for Christianity bodies are bad and souls are good. In Nietzsche's view, considering man as originally sinful, having pity in life and manners, neglecting this world and dreaming of a better world, restricting man's freedom, neglecting his instincts, emphasizing revenge, producing resentment and finally creating slave morality are the major weak points of Christianity. In general, one can suggest that Nietzsche criticizes Christianity mainly for his partial and improper understanding on what grounds Christian practices are performed.

3.1. Nietzsche and the death of God

Nietzsche believes that 'God is dead'. He announced this to make us to understand it not its literal sense but as a cultural event for the death of Christianity and its replacement by scientific apparatus. He first used the term 'God is dead' in the parable of *Madman*, section 125 of the *Gay Science*:

Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market place, and cried incessantly, "I seek God! I seek God!"... "Whither is God?" he cried. "I shall tell you. We have killed him - you and I. All of us are his murderers." ... "God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him" (Nietzsche, 1974: 181).

In saying this Nietzsche meant that society no longer had a need for God. As a cultural fact God becomes cognitively unnecessary and the absence or presence of faith makes no difference to humanity. Nietzsche recognized the cruel implications of this position; because he thought that without God we were literally on our own. The death of the Christian God includes the death of Christian ethics that have supported western culture since Constantine converted to Christianity in the 4th Century. It is as if the ground has been swept from under our feet.

Nietzsche says that society becomes decadent and at best people were unaware of this fact. Even if they could be aware about it they refused to face up to the reality of the situation

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and instead they prefer to live in self-deception and ignorance. Significantly, he thought that the assertion of Christianity on the pursuit of truth could help us to be free from the need of Christianity itself. Atheism is 'the awe-inspiring catastrophe of a two thousand year discipline in truth that finally forbids itself the lie involved in belief in God' (Nietzsche, 1967: 160). He suggested that the pursuit of truth led man to the development of scientific method that made the discovery of truth possible. For Nietzsche, a naturalistic explanation of our place in the universe is sufficient for human life and hence God becomes unnecessary because we have discovered our own answers to the big questions of life.

By having this discovery, Nietzsche has to explain why society has failed to wake up to the fact that God is dead. The answer for him is to be found in the instrumental role of religion. Religion might have an instrumental role to question the possible use that could be put in order to do further the aspirations of a particular individual or group within a given society. But he does not mention what specific contributions religion has. In doing so the function of religious practice is questioned, not the truth or falsehood of the religion by itself. Nietzsche does hold that the beliefs and doctrines of Christianity are deceptive but he is more concerned with the function of religion. He asserts that although the beliefs of Christianity may be false its usefulness is not necessarily diminished.

Nietzsche directed his attack upon the priests who had a unique position in society. Paradoxically they were both strong and weak at the same time. They were weak in relation to the masters as a consequence of their own social background and they were strong through the status they enjoyed as God's appointed agents. So they are powerful as the masters. In their hands, Nietzsche thought that, religion had become a tool of social control.

Westphal (1998: 238) pointed out that Marx shows how ugly religion can be amongst the rich and powerful but Nietzsche completes the picture by showing how ugly religion can be among victims. Masters may be sinners but that does not make their slaves into saints. Nietzsche said that Priests exercise pastoral power which is the opposite of royal power. By this he meant that the priests' will to power was in part frustrated because they were subject to their masters and at the same time priests have higher status and ability than the other members of the herd because of the special responsibility they have for curing souls. Westphal supports this concept as: "Knowledge of the soul generates power without the need of physical force. Pastoral power does not come out of the barrel of a gun but uses moral approval as a tactic for behavioral control" (Westphal, 1998: 241).

This position gave the priests considerable power to whom the society would be submissive to whatever they order since they are believed to have a special claim to the 'truth' and promote the ascetic ideal to the herd. Ironically Nietzsche said that it was not Jesus of Nazareth but Paul who was responsible for developing the slave morality. He believes that the mission of Jesus has been misinterpreted and his teaching is used for ends differently to the intention of Jesus.

It is not a faith that distinguishes the Christian: The Christian acts, he is distinguished by acting differently...The life of the redeemer was nothing less than this practice- nor was his death anything else.. He knows that it is only in the practice of life that one feels divine ... only the evangelical practice leads to God. Indeed it is God! ...The bringer of glad tidings died as he had lived, as he had taught- not to redeem men but to show how one must live. This is his legacy to mankind (Nietzsche, 1982: 606-9).⁴⁷

For Nietzsche Jesus embodied the values of the master morality. Jesus Christ criticizes the instrumental use of religion and affirmed life, being prepared to die for the values he espoused.

⁴⁷ Read AC section 33 and 35 at all.

But at the same time all individuals could not be owners of his master morality and on what ground does master morality would be considered as master value without the existence of herd like norms. Thus, Nietzsche distinguished between the religion of Jesus that represented the master morality and religion about Jesus that represented the morality of the slaves.

I shall now relate the real history of Christianity. - The word 'Christianity' is already a misunderstanding - in reality there has only been one Christian and he died on the cross.

The 'Evangel' died on the Cross.....from that moment all is lies (Nietzsche, 1982: 612).

Nietzsche believes that Paul had taken the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth and used it for his own ends. In doing so, anything real in Jesus' teaching was corrupted. But Nietzsche does not specify what expression of Jesus has been corrupted by Paul. Once the Christian Church was established the stage was set for the slave morality to fully develop whereby the priests exercised the will to power through the ascetic ideal. For Nietzsche, the ascetic ideal⁴⁸ declares humanity's highest calling should be the way of self-denial which is based on a dualistic world view.⁴⁹ In that sense, Christianity, for Nietzsche is a life-negating institution and hence he calls for its elimination in order to save the world from degeneration. Christianity represents a denial of man's natural instincts which are directed towards strength (Kellenberger, 1997: 61). Human beings were declared guilty before God; their sin had necessitated the crucifixion of Jesus. However, the guilt was redeemable since the death which human sin had caused was also the road to salvation.

As the priests were the keepers of the keys, Nietzsche believes that they had utilized the ascetic ideal to exercise their own will to power. They denied the values of the masters and kept

⁴⁸ On the whole assessment of his emphasis on Christianity, Nietzsche hates the superficialities of ascetic ideal which is clearly not a comprehensive assessment of Christianity.

⁴⁹ Life on earth and the other life in Heaven. In this life style suffering is considered as deserved but also as preparing one for a better existence in a future life. He said that the origins of the dualistic worldview were to be found in the writing of Plato. Nietzsche calls Christianity as 'Platonism for the masses.' For him, Christianity negates life by declaring ignorance to the present existence as inferior to the 'true' world and the ascetic ideal was maintained through guilt.

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that of slaves in their place. As a result, Nietzsche argues that priests had turned Christianity into a religion which was life denying not life affirming. His whole philosophical enterprise aimed to denounce God as our most enduring lie and provide an alternative morality which affirms life.

Nietzsche holds that, the basic assumption of Christianity's "ascetic ideal", is used as a means to weaken ones natural capacity and prevent man from becoming stronger, better and more powerful. These are precisely the capacities which Nietzsche most values. He argues:

The ascetic life treats life as a wrong road... For an ascetic life is a self-contradiction: here rules a *ressentiment* without equal, that of an insatiable instinct and power-will that wants to become master not over something in life but over life itself, over its most profound, powerful, and basic conditions; here an attempt is made to employ force to block up the wells of force; here physiological well-being itself is view askance, and especially the outward expression of this well-being, beauty and joy; while pleasure is felt and sought in ill-constitutedness, decay, pain, mischance, ugliness, voluntary deprivation, self-mortification, self-flagellation, self-sacrifice (Nietzsche, 1967: 118).

Here, he takes ascetic life could be for all but in Christianity it is for those who are gifted for such life by God naturally.⁵⁰ He had tried to describe the disillusionment of Christendom in his *Beyond Good and Evil*:

Has it ever been really noted to what extent a genuinely religious life (both in microscopic favorite occupation of self-examination and that tender composure which calls itself "prayer" and is a continual readiness for the "coming of God") requires a leisure class, or a half-leisure- I mean with a good conscience (Nietzsche, 1966: 69).⁵¹

Nietzsche is referring to what he finds to be the "nausea" that has become religion and he describes this issue as follows,

⁵⁰ Holy Bible, Gospel of Matthew Chapter 19, number 12: it states that; "for some are eunuchs because they were born that way; others have been made eunuchs; and others have renounced marriage because of the kingdom of heaven. The one who can accept this should accept it".

⁵¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *BGE*, Trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York: Random House, 1966, Part 3, section 58, p.69.

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They are not enemies of religious customs when participation in such customs is required in certain cases, by the state, for example, they do what is required, as one does many things - with a patient and modest seriousness and without much curiosity (ibid: 69 - 70).

Nietzsche feels that Christianity has become a mere custom or tradition for the people of his time. For him, it has lost its religious significance. What reason is there behind that? Simon May presents Nietzsche's argument against Christianity in his work *Nietzsche's Ethics and his War on Morality* as, "Christianity engenders weakness, degradation, and despair- and its claim to foster love, light and life is simply false" (May, 1999: 39). Nietzsche argues that Christianity denotes a denial of natural instincts, which are directed towards strength. As pointed out in his work, *Antichrist*:

Whatever a theologian feels to be true must be false: this is almost a criterion of truth. His most basic instinct of self-preservation forbids him to respect reality at any point or even to let it get a word in. Wherever the theologians' instinct extends value judgments have been stood on their heads and the concepts of 'true' and 'false' are of necessity reversed: whatever is most harmful to life is called 'true; whatever elevates it, enhances, affirms, justifies it and makes it triumphant, is called 'false' (Nietzsche, 1982: 576).⁵²

As he sees it, it should be good to do things, which one is naturally compelled to do. Why would one be refrained from natural inclinations, or continually going against one's instincts? Why should one go against nature? Nietzsche tries to describe the state of Christendom as ruled by the ascetic ideal and calls for its rejection together with its values. He disregards this repression of the true self and of one's true nature. Indeed, he wants to eradicate the false impression of good and bad by introducing a new revaluation. He picks out exactly what he thinks as wrong ones. For example, most religions both western and non-western see loss of self

⁵² See also J. Kellenberger, *Kierkegaard and Nietzsche: Faith and Eternal Acceptance*, Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997: 61.

as key to both virtue and personal happiness. Nietzsche does not seem to understand the possible merits of benevolence and generosity of spirit that extends at all.

Does Nietzsche realize the contribution of Christianity to stability and peace of the world and even to human civilization? He argued that all the ideas of Christian religion are imaginary and utopia. But, is it possible for man to realize the ideal of the 'superman' and will to power? It is certainly doubtful. It could not be possible for man to ignore the importance of Christianity due to its invaluable contribution to life. In some way he wants to avoid the influence of Christianity in order to realize his ideal of the superman, master morality and transvaluation of traditional Christian values.

3.2. The Immorality of Nietzsche

According to Philipia Foot, Nietzsche had every right to be considered as an immoralist as fundamental moral ideas such as those of justice and common good were completely absent from his evaluative perspective.⁵³ But in some new readings there is a claim that Nietzsche's devaluation of morality is the expression of needs that are themselves the part and parcel of ethics. Nietzsche claimed that his own special conception of ethics would be accepted and it would have to get rid of those particular interpretations embodied by Christian and modern morality. Those who take this line share the view that Nietzsche's doctrine of value should be included in the category of virtue ethics (Foot, 2002: 81–95).⁵⁴

Nietzsche's criticisms were directed against the progressive moral disintegration of Germany took place in the late 19th century. He termed morality as 'the doctrine of the relations of supremacy under which the phenomenon of life comes to be' (Nietzsche, 1966: 25-7). He wished to be called an immoralist because his project was not to promote traditional morality but

⁵³ See R. C. Solomon (ed.), *Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays*, New York, Anchor Books, 1973: 156-68.

⁵⁴ Robert C. Solomon, *Nietzsche's Virtues: A Personal Enquiry*, in Richard Schacht (ed.), *Nietzsche's Post-moralism. Essays on Nietzsche's Prelude to Philosophy's Future*, 2001: 123- 148.

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to undermine it. He displaces such open moral claims attached with enlightenment in reason it was authoritative for him. He tried to prescribe the radical changes required to rescue humanity from such condition of decadence. Comparisons had to be fixed to ascertain cohesions and differences in the standards of moral valuations of peoples' across periods and destinations (Nietzsche, 1974: 81-2).

In *Schopenhauer as Educator*, the exemplars are able to encourage a process of self-transformation are described as authentically moral figures. On the subject of the lack masters, Nietzsche writes as: “[...] then one finally asks oneself: where are we, scholars and unscholarly high placed and low, to find the moral exemplars and models among our contemporaries, the visible epitome of morality for our time” (Nietzsche, 2007: 132).

The vocation of *Schopenhauer as Educator* seems to be in conflict with the devaluation of morality which is the center of Nietzsche's writings of the 1880s and with the inclination to define him as the “first immoralist” (Nietzsche, 2005: 145). To examine this point we need to briefly consider the argumentative strategy behind Nietzsche's immoralism. An important indication of his immoralism can be found in the *Ecce Homo*, entitled “why I am a destiny”. He claims that at last he knows his true self; a few years after the writing of his most famous works, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, *Beyond Good and Evil* and *Genealogy of morals*. His mission consists in bringing about the transvaluation of all values. After praising his discovery, he explains his strategy that directed the announcement of this message of truth in his earlier works. He wants to use an openly challenging language and describes himself as an immoralist. He called himself as “*I am the first immoralist*” (Nietzsche, 2004: 91).

Do you want a formula for a destiny like this, one that becomes a human being? You will find it in his Zarathustra. Whoever wants to be a creator in good and evil, certainly he must first

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shatter all values. Thus, does the highest evil belong to the highest good: but this latter is the creative (Nietzsche, 2001: 89). Thus, he tried to state that the highest evil is the part of the highest good. This is the creative good. Further on, the subject of his immoralism:

Have I been understood? – What sets me apart, what singles one out over and above the rest of humanity is the fact that I discovered Christian morality. That is why I needed a word whose significance lay in challenging everyone (Nietzsche, 2001: 93).

Nietzsche does not intend to get rid of morality instead he wants that each of us once again gives a meaning to the evaluative terms that the culture dominated by Christian element has emptied of meaning. A theme already present in *Schopenhauer as Educator* is that moral education is a practice that does no more transmit empty formulae of terms like good or virtues have become words that no longer make thought possible (Nietzsche, 2007:11).

Then, Nietzsche's immoralism has meaning only in the light of the distinction between a positive and desirable concept of morality and a negative one. I argue that an examination of the different characteristics of morality that Nietzsche wants to oppose supports the hypothesis that the positive concept of morality he wants to sustain develops from the perfectionist theses expressed in the third part of *Untimely Meditation*. The critique of morality is a fundamental passage in the broader critique of culture and it becomes another dedication of culture in which it hinders the moral development of human beings. To this end, we can divide Nietzsche's argument against the reigning moral culture in to two parts. First, he discusses the psychological motives that explain its genesis, particularly the resentment and hatred that one particular class of

people nurtures for another.⁵⁵ Secondly, he observes its normative components by identifying a certain way of understanding values like pity, altruism and search to happiness.⁵⁶

The two parts of the argument throw light on the reasons that had convinced Nietzsche on the main elements characterizing the moral culture in which he found himself as hostile to education and individual elevation. In the first essay of the *Genealogy of Morals*, he claims that morality associated with Christianity does not derive from divine inspiration, but it is the creation of a particular social class of people. He calls it in various ways as the “the mob”, “the slaves”, “the herd” etc.⁵⁷ in a particular historical moment that can be placed roughly in the early centuries of the Roman Empire. Slaves create morality as a reaction to unfavourable economic and social circumstances when they are unable to overturn their oppressors with their physical strength alone. They also invent a system of values that prevents the development and survival of their master.

We now have a fairly large collection of criticisms which Nietzsche put against different ideas of which some are standards of value while others are psychological or metaphysical theories. One thing they all have in common is that the notion he attacks is either a part of something or it is among the crucial assumptions of “morality.” We can understand at least a large part of what “morality” means for him, insofar as it is something he rejects, by drawing together in one place the targets of his various attacks (Lester, 1991: 17).

Morality is a normative discipline that evaluates human actions as right or wrong, good or bad. Based on its evaluation of the acts, it also evaluates the agents. Actions are evaluated

⁵⁵ Interpreters who claim that morality in its negative sense should be identified starting from its peculiar genesis include W. Kaufmann, *How Nietzsche Revolutionized Ethics*, in *From Shakespeare to Existentialism*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959: 213- 14; by the same author see also *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 4th edition, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1974: 374.

⁵⁶ P. Foot, *Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values*, 1973; 6.

⁵⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *GM*, edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann, 1967: 35.

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morally by judging that something “ought” or “ought not” to be done. Nietzsche does not deny that other sorts of evaluative judgments might also be included in the moral problems of value. But he clearly thinks that no system of ideas which fails to make judgments of this form could be a moral one. Further, to say that something morally ought to be done does not mean merely that it would be nice, desirable, a good idea, and so forth (ibid: 18).

Morality uses at least one pair of opposite values, as positive and negative. Additionally, to think that an action has moral worth is to make a judgement which in some way is supposed to be valid to everyone. This is the sort of thing one does if one judges that a certain action ought to be done by a certain person or ought to be done by anyone in the same circumstances. From this we can infer, though Nietzsche does not say so, moral “ought” can always be either stated as or derived from general rules which apply to everyone. Finally, to think that an action has moral worth is also to think that it is done because of its moral worth, which could mean that one does it because one understands that there is a legitimate moral rule that requires it. In this sense it is an action which is done disinterestedly (ibid).

In a familiar sense of the word, Nietzsche rejects “morality.” It is consequently not at all misleading to call himself an immoralist. It is also at least credible to say that he was the first immoralist. Probably no one before him had consciously formulated and rejected all or even most of the characteristics of morality as Nietzsche did. These characteristics cannot be found in some of the oldest philosophical systems probably because their authors are too close to the pre-moral period of human development to think that way.

But Elizabeth Anscombe (1976: 35)⁵⁸ has claimed that these words do not have the same meaning when they are used by contemporary moral philosophers. Still, he could argue that consciously making war on morality is quite a different position. Finally, we can see now that

⁵⁸ Elizabeth Anscombe, *Intention*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976: 35.

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there is no inconsistency in admiring some moralities while attacking morality as what Nietzsche does. As such, morality is a very distinctive sort of code and it is one way to distinguish between good and bad in human conduct and ways of life.

Is Nietzsche's procedural conception of virtue compatible with his immoralism? The answer to this question is complicated, but I think it is fairly close to being "yes". As far as I observe it, it is perfectly compatible with his rejection of opposite values. Where responsibility and "ought" are concerned, facts are more ambiguous (Lester, 1991: 126-8). It does not seem to be compatible with rejecting everything under the name of "responsibility", nor does it allow him to abandon all the types of "oughts" that he wants to throw out.

If we take Nietzsche's ethical ideas seriously, the most important problem we face is to determine where we should agree with and where we should not. It would be silly of someone to attempt a summary view of what is living and what is dead in the philosophy of Nietzsche. The issues he raises are too complex and difficult to be settled in such short topic (ibid: 129). What I would like to do is to begin by posing a problem that appears when we try to put together some Nietzschean themes into coherent position. I argue that it is tricky to anyone who accepts Nietzsche's philosophy of morality and Christianity at all.

3.3. The Problem of Nietzsche's Immoralism

Nietzsche claims to be an immoralist. Definitely, he claims to be the first immoralist and adds: "that makes me the annihilator par excellence" (Nietzsche, 2004: 91). Indeed, this means that in some way or other he is a critic of morality, but beyond this small area of certainty and the exact nature of his immoralism becomes quite problematic. The word suggests an extreme sort of doctrine. He predicts that immoralist ideas will become influential precisely because the "spell that fights on our behalf...is the magic of the extreme, the seduction that everything

extreme exercises: we immoralists, we are the most extreme” (Nietzsche, 1968: 396). There are important passages in which he explicitly describes his way of thinking as an alternative to the moral way of thinking as such.

Yet there are other times when he gives out a quite different impression of what his immoralism amounts to. In the only passage in which he defines “immoralism”, he says that fundamentally it involves two negations. One of them is his opposition to “a type of man that has so far been considered supreme: the good, the benevolent, and the beneficent.” This apparently means that he is opposed to the idea that being a good person is the same thing as trying to have beneficial effects on other people (Nietzsche, 2004: 92). Later he disregards the idea as “all should become ‘good human beings,’ herd animals, blue-eyed, benevolent, and ‘beautiful souls’”. The other negation is his opposition to “a type of morality that has become prevalent as morality itself, the morality of decadence” (ibid) or what he calls Christian morality. But, if this is all his immoralism amounts to, it makes his due that immoralists are the most extreme and mysterious, and it also makes his belief that he was the first immoralist very difficult to account for.

The mystery is merely intensified by the fact that he says a number of things which at least seem to support the idea that the scope of his attack on morality is restricted and does not extend to the limits of morality as such. In the section, “morality as anti-nature” in *Ecce Homo*, he attacks morality “insofar as it condemns for its own sake and not out of regard for the concerns... of life” (Nietzsche, 2004: 95). It also clearly shows that he is not attacking morality as such, but only morality that condemns in a certain way. In the same chapter, he makes critical remarks about “almost every morality which has so far been taught” (ibid: 92), and about morality “as it has so far been understood” (ibid: 95).

The whole improvement of morality including Christian values was a misunderstanding which suggests that there is morality which is not part of “improvement morality”⁵⁹ and is not being said to be confusion. Finally his comments on what he calls ‘noble morality’ are uniformly favorable (read *GM*, essay I section 10; and *Anti-Christ* section 24). There is probably no way to make all of Nietzsche’s remarks on the scope of his immoralism entirely consistent. There is a fairly considerable and apparent inconsistency in his works. Nietzsche does recognize a distinction between what he variously calls “anti-natural” or “denaturalized” morality. This is a morality that shows no “regard for the concerns...of life”. On the other hand, naturalistic morality shows this sort of regard (see also *Will to power* section 298 and 299).

3.4. Critical Reflection and Analysis

Until now, we have discussed the major philosophical works of Friederich Nietzsche. Now it is time to reflect on how his philosophy of morality and Christianity would be justified. It is unfair to consider that his philosophy is totally invalid and at the same time to think that it is free from inconsistency. He is well known for his idea of master and slave distinction in which Nietzsche puts the enhancement of life as a standard to his morality. He attempts to glorify the status of the nobles that should determine the standards of value system to be pursued. But to me what Nietzsche proposes cannot create a moral standard between the slaves and nobles. Because whenever the commands and desires of the masters become harsh the slave may oppose the supremacy. This shameless and greediness of nobles/masters would be short because it cannot harmoniously hold together the interests of nobles and slaves.

Nietzsche also tries to create a link between power and goodness. But, how someone would apply his abundant potential without any restriction? Naturally human beings are shaped with the passion to incline to humility unless life will be problematic. If so, what type of man

⁵⁹ See Nietzsche, *WP*, 1968; essay II, section 11 to 13.

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would have strong desire to suppress and destroy the will of others? Let imagine this could be possible. If then, is it possible to survive for someone to sustain (a plan of man that would dominate others) and to be successful? This is something that will be a challenge to life which paved a way to an open disorder and anarchy.

Nietzsche criticizes all qualities and traits of the traditional or Christian morality in order to pave a way for its elimination and at the same time lay a foundation for the creation of master morality. His justification for the criticism is that the Christian morality denies life and its values and practices. Can his master morality promote the life that Christian morality denies? No it cannot. On the contrary, his proposal of master morality would lead society to a civil war. He tried to show that Christian values have sprung from slave revolt in which he argues that both are connected each other. I argue that Nietzsche tried to determine from what he knows about the moral codes and values of Christianity. As stated by the scriptures and commentaries of Holy Bible, a moral code has been given to Adam and Eve when they lived in Eden.⁶⁰ This standard was all-inclusive and complete which puts limit on the freedom of man and shows to what extent man should enjoy freedom. All the coming traditions, norms and standards of Christianity are indirectly streamed from this first order of God. This being the truth, Nietzsche's conclusion that Christian morality and values emerged as a result of slave revolt would turn to be false.

Nietzsche considers the priests and nobles as the contending parties in which the priests are dissatisfied by the supremacy of nobles. As a result, the priests make values of their own and that of slaves. They praised and taught values such as humility, altruism, and submissiveness to God. But, for Nietzsche, these values are the symptom of suffering and self-deprivation. From Christian perspectives on the day of last judgment, individuals would be recompensed for the

⁶⁰ The *Holy Bible, Genesis*; Chapter 2: Number 17:- "but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of **good and evil**, for when you eat of it you will certainly die".

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suffering they face in their effort to respect to the rules and orders of God. But the value that they would get for this is based on the degree of their commitment to respect and obey the rule of God. Nietzsche argues this is mere wish to revenge the nobles. Christianity does not oppose nobility except those who disregard the orders given by God. Therefore, the argument that Nietzsche in connection to the subject in the above point is invalid. For me, this shows that his wish to change values of Christianity due to his own hatred.

Nietzsche's chief criterion to his valuation of values is life enhancement. But his proposal of life enhancement could not succeed in a way he intended to do so because it is too imaginary to be realized. He argues that power belongs to the master but the slaves enjoying power by getting satisfied with or accepting the values imposed on them. But this Nietzsche's ideal life would be unattainable since it is not taking into account the risks that could be encountered.

The 'superman' is also one of Nietzsche's vibrant projects especially to flourish his transvaluation of values. It is too clear a way for a man who could be superman that he announced the death of God. He also negates the equality of men that Christianity taught in the eyes of God. He rather imagines equality from physical perspective. According to Christian commentaries, man would stand in front of God not in a way he recognizes but by the culminative natural behavior of soul. This also shows Nietzsche's narrow and superficial apprehension of Christianity.

The other important philosophical concept of Nietzsche is the doctrine of the 'will to power' in which his objective will be achieved through perpetual struggle. He tries to explain, in political sense, the benefit of bloody and violent war as a means to reach his project of the will to power. As discussed above, this proposition of Nietzsche is highly exposed to severe chaos and disorder. This would led to his claim about 'might is right' which is not simple phrase to apply as

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it is a means to destruction which could be aggravated by the unlimited human desire. His method of overcoming to master and dominate is also aimed to dominance by any cost which could not be supported logically and rationally.

On the other hand, the transvaluation of traditional Christian values opens his plan by claiming as nature has no value but moral interpretations of phenomena. These interpretations, for Nietzsche, has credited to religion of believing in misconception particularly Christianity. His plan is to ridicule the accepted and deeply rooted ideals of Judeo-Christian principles unless his revaluation of values could not be successful. At this point he is also alert to replace these Christian values by standards of his own like humility by pride, sympathy by contempt, etc. If so, our environment would be upside down, and there will be no more tolerance.

Conclusion

To conclude, a brief account of this thesis attempts to scratch something from Nietzsche's philosophical works. Indeed, his work contributed to the development of philosophical inquiry particularly with reference to moral and Christian conceptions. This thesis attempted to figure out the merits and demerit of his works.

The first chapter of this thesis discussed about morality that Nietzsche philosophizes. Nietzsche did not develop consistent and coherent theory of the subject. While his philosophy claims truth, Nietzsche did not provide a centrally organized and all-inclusive exposition of his argument. The evidence provided in his thesis does not offer a profound philosophical reflection. Again and again in his writings; he deals with master and slave morality on the one hand and the influence of Christianity to life on the other. This has added no new knowledge. There are inconsistencies in his writings that would make him chaotic writer in the eyes of his readers. If his view of morality and Christianity is valid, how human species could survive in a situation

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where all intend to make themselves “supermen”? How could it be possible for man to exercise his ‘will’ to the maximum potential?

Chapter two of this thesis deals with Nietzsche’s unrealistic belief about the superman and the will to power. It is self-contradictory that the ‘Superman’ is not subjected to the morality of the common people. As noted in the last chapter of this thesis, Nietzsche is concerned above all not with refuting Christianity, but with assessing its value for life. The exposure of nihilism, in Christian horizon, would constitute a refutation of the basic view of Nietzsche. Christianity has its source in morality of *ressentiment* and therefore, from the physio-psychological perspective, it is the product of sickness/weakness. In Nietzsche’s view, a horizon which stems from weakness can ultimately only become contrary to life. The denial of life he claims to discover at the center of Christianity makes him to judge it as “a conspiracy against health, beauty, well-constitutedness, bravery, intellect, benevolence of soul, against life itself” (Nietzsche, 1982: 655-6).

The last chapter discussed about Nietzsche’s attack on Christianity. But his attack on Christianity does not seem to be reasonable rather it shows his hatred. Indeed, he wants to revalue the already established values. He tries to show how human being may be redeemed with the return of master or the sovereign individual, to fulfill the individual life. In this way, the slave may free himself from the cancer of resentment, for the will loses its ill-will against the time.

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